Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology 9781803921235, 1803921234

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Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology

ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIAS IN SOCIOLOGY Elgar Encyclopedias in Sociology serve as the definitive reference works within the field. The Encyclopedias present a comprehensive guide to a wide variety of subject areas within Sociology, and form an essential resource for academics, practitioners, and students alike. Each Encyclopedia is edited by one or more leading scholars, internationally recognised as preeminent names within the field. They each include an overarching collection of entries authored by key scholars, which collectively provide a concise and accessible coverage of the essential areas. Equally useful as reference tools or high-level introductions to specific topics, issues, methods and debates, these Encyclopedias make an invaluable contribution to Sociology. For a full list of Edward Elgar published titles, including the titles in this series, visit our website at http://www​.e​-elgar​.com.

Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology Edited by

Maria Grasso Professor of Political Science and Political Sociology, School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University of London, UK

Marco Giugni Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations and Director, Institute of Citizenship Studies (InCite), University of Geneva, Switzerland

ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIAS IN SOCIOLOGY

Cheltenham, UK · Northampton, MA, USA

© Maria Grasso and Marco Giugni 2023   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.     Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK   Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA       A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library     Library of Congress Control Number: 2023946846     This book is available electronically in the Sociology, Social Policy and Education subject collection http://dx​.doi​.org​/10​.4337​/9781803921235    

ISBN 978 1 80392 122 8 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80392 123 5 (eBook)

EEP BoX

This book is dedicated to David Beetham.

Contents List of contributors Introduction to the Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology Maria Grasso and Marco Giugni 1 Age and generation Achim Goerres

xii

15 Class Magnus Wennerhag and Anders Hylmö

xx

59

16 Class consciousness and class struggle 63 Berch Berberoglu

1

2 Alienation Amy Wendling and Rebecca Murray

5

17 Class voting Geoffrey Evans

67

3 Anarchism Dana M. Williams

9

18 Cleavages David Attewell and Marco R. Steenbergen

71

19 Clientelism Francesco Stolfi

75

20 Coalition formation Anna Bassi

78

4 Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 14 Natasha Lindstaedt 5 Biopolitics Knut Ove Eliassen and Sverre Raffnsøe

18

6 Bourdieu, Pierre Craig Calhoun

22

21 Collective action Nella Van Dyke

82

7 Bureaucracy Marina Nistotskaya and Palina Kolvani

26

22 Comparative-historical sociology Barry Eidlin

86 91

8 Capitalism Bruno Amable

30

23 Comparative political economy Jonas Pontusson and Lucio Baccaro

9 Citizenship Christine Hobden and Laurence Piper

34

24 Comparative political sociology Kai Arzheimer

95 99

10 Civic engagement Kristin Strømsnes

38

25 Conflict theory Jörg Rössel

11 Civic voluntarism Henry E. Brady

42

12 Civil disobedience Sandra Laugier

47

13 Civil society Simone Baglioni

53

14 Civil wars Francisco Villamil

56

26 Constructivism Michael Buckley

103

27 Contentious politics Kaylin Bourdon and David S. Meyer

107

28 Corporatism and neo-corporatism 111 Michael Dobbins and Rafael Pablo Labanino 29 Decommodification Kenneth Nelson

vii

115

viii  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology 30 Democracy Natalie J. Doyle

118

47 Field theory Gregor Kungl

185

31 Democratization Jan Teorell

123

48 Foucault, Michel 188 Vanessa Lemm and Venessa Ercole

32 De Tocqueville, Alexis Marinus Ossewaarde

127

49 Framing/frame analysis Louisa Parks

192

33 Discrimination Kassra A.R. Oskooii

131

50 Frankfurt School Dustin Garlitz

195

34 Durkheim, Emile Nicolas Sembel

134

199

35 Economic voting Martin Okolikj

138

51 Functionalism Jonathan H. Turner and Alexandra Maryanski

204

36 Emotions Helena Flam

142

52 Gender Silke Roth

208

37 Empowerment Aaron Schutz

147

53 Globalization Amentahru Wahlrab

151

54 Governance Ramona Coman and Leonardo Puleo

212

38 Environmentalism Amanda Machin and Alexander Ruser

154

55 Governmentality Mathias Hein Jessen

216

39 Ethnicity Shamit Saggar 40 Ethnocentrism Wouter van der Brug and Linet R. Durmuşoğlu

158

56 Gramsci, Antonio Fabio de Nardis

219 222

41 Europeanization Anna Kyriazi

162

57 Group consciousness Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

226

42 Euroscepticism Sofia Vasilopoulou

166

58 Identity Francesca Polletta, Dylan Gray, and Nathan Redman

43 Exploitation Arthur Sakamoto and Michael Ohsfeldt

169

59 Ideology Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

229

44 Extreme right Jens Rydgren and Ryan Switzer

174

60 Inequality (political) Paul Marx

234

45 Factionalism Matthijs Bogaards and Hager Ali

177

61 Institutionalism Edwin Amenta

237

46 Feminism Christine M. Slaughter, Kennia L. Coronado, and Nadia E. Brown

181

62 Interest groups Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

241

63 Intersectionality Karine Duplan

244

contents  ix 64 Left/right Anthony F. Heath

249

65 Legitimacy David Beetham

253

66 Liberalism Julie Smith

257

67 Libertarianism and authoritarianism 262 Paula Surridge 68 Lifestyle politics Francesca Forno

267

69 Marx, Karl Bob Jessop

271

70 Marxism and neo-Marxism Rohan Advani and Michael A. McCarthy

275

71 Mass media Rens Vliegenthart

279

72 Memory (collective) Lorenzo Zamponi

282

73 Michels, Robert Giorgio Volpe

285

74 The micro–macro link Karl-Dieter Opp

289

75 Migration Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

292

76 Modernity John Rundell

82 NGOs Grace L. Chikoto-Schultz and Bryson Davis

322

83 Nonviolence Selina Gallo-Cruz

326

84 Norms Vicente Valentim

330

85 Parties and party systems Emilie van Haute

334

86 Partisanship Paolo Bellucci

338

87 Patriarchy Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider

343

88 Pluralism Rainer Eisfeld

347

89 Polarisation Juan Rodríguez-Teruel and Fernando Casal Bértoa

351

355 90 Policy analysis Frédéric Varone and Karin Ingold 91 Policy networks Manlio Cinalli

359

92 Political attitudes Kathrin Ackermann

363

93 Political behaviour Sadiya Akram

367

296 301

94 Political communication Chiara Valli and Alessandro Nai

371

77 Modernization Stefan Kruse 78 Multiculturalism Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy

306

95 Political consumerism Shelley Boulianne

375

79 Nationalism Liah Greenfeld

310

96 Political corruption Marcia Grimes and Oleksandra Keudel

379

80 Neoliberalism Johanna Bockman and Margaret Zeddies

313

97 Political culture Mabel Berezin, Nathan T.B. Ly, and Chiara Visentin

384

81 New politics and postmaterialism Toni Rodon and Raül Tormos

317

98 Political efficacy Jennifer Oser

388

x  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology 99 Political elites 391 Lars Vogel and Christian Schneickert

117 Populism Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser

461

100 Political engagement Judith Bessant and Rob Watts

395

465

101 Political generations Laura Stoker

399

118 Postcolonialism Daniela Musina and Francesco Strazzari

470

102 Political institutions Elisabeth S. Clemens

404

119 Postmodernism Simon Susen

475

103 Political knowledge Wyatt I. Dawson and Lindsay H. Hoffman

408

120 Post-structuralism Oscar L. Larsson 121 Poverty Leo Azzollini and Brian Nolan

479

104 Political learning Diana Owen

412

482

105 Political opportunities Katerina Vrablikova

416

122 Power Sebahattin Ziyanak, Jesse Lindley, and Leticia Haro

486

106 Political organizations Tom Einhorn and Catherine Corrigall-Brown

420

123 Precariat Arne L. Kalleberg and Kevin Hewison

489

107 Political participation Yvette Peters

423

124 Protest Hank Johnston

493

108 Political preferences Rose McDermott

427

125 Public choice Bruno S. Frey, Sandro Bieri, and Louis Moser

109 Political regimes Erik Martinez Kuhonta

431

126 Public opinion Viktor Orri Valgarðsson and Daniel Devine

496

127 Public policy Jean-Francois Savard

500

128 Race and racism Ali Meghji and Seetha Tan

503

129 Rational choice theory Paul Whiteley

507

130 Religion and politics Alberta Giorgi

510

131 Repression Christian Davenport

514

132 Resources Kay Lehman Schlozman

518

133 Revolutions Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Jalal Fetrati

521

435 110 Political representation Nathalie Giger and Zoe Lefkofridi 111 Political socialization Tawnya Adkins Covert

439

112 Political sophistication Marta Fraile

443

113 Political transitions Olga Onuch

447

114 Political trust Marc Hooghe

451

115 Political violence Måns Robert Lundstedt and Lorenzo Bosi

454

116 Politics/the political Oliver Marchart

458

contents  xi 134 Riots Matteo Tiratelli

525

151 Tilly, Charles Lesley Wood

591

135 Security Jonathon Whooley and Laura Sjoberg

528

152 Trade unions Jelle Visser

595

531

153 Transnationalism Michele Ford

599

136 Social capital Francesca Vassallo

534

154 Underclass Robert MacDonald

603

137 Social change Jennifer Earl, Sam Scovill, and Rina James

155 Unemployment Emmanuel Pierru

607

138 Social democracy Frank Bandau

538

156 Universalism/traditionalism Alain Policar

610

139 Socialism Pierre Musso

542

157 Urban politics Claire Colomb

613

140 Social media Francesco Bailo

546

158 Values Jan Cieciuch and Eldad Davidov

618

141 Social movement organizations Edward T. Walker and John D. McCarthy

550

159 Verba, Sidney David E. Campbell

623

142 Social movements Donatella della Porta

555

160 Voluntary associations Sarah Cameron

627

143 Social networks Elena Pavan

560

161 Volunteering Nathalie Hofstetter and Markus Freitag

631

144 Socio-economic status Sebastian Jungkunz and Nadja Wehl

564

162 Voting Pascal Sciarini and Andreas C. Goldberg

635

145 Solidarity Christian Lahusen

568

163 War Christian Olsson

639

146 State/state formation John L. Brooke and Julia C. Strauss

572

164 Weber, Max Kari Palonen and Niilo Kauppi

643

147 Strikes Roberto Franzosi

576

165 Welfare state Romana Careja

646

148 Structuralism Johannes Angermuller

580

166 World-systems Christopher Chase-Dunn

650

149 Structure and agency Matthew Norton

583

167 Xenophobia Claudia Alegre, Jessica Cobian, and Efrén Pérez

656

150 Terrorism Jeff Goodwin

586

Index

660

Contributors Kathrin Ackermann, Department of Social Sciences, University of Siegen, Germany

Frank Bandau, Institute of Political Science, University of Bamberg, Germany

Tawnya Adkins Covert, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Western Illinois University, United States

Anna Bassi, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States

Rohan Advani, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, United States

David Beetham, Emeritus Professor of Politics, University of Leeds, UK Paolo Bellucci, Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena, Italy

Sadiya Akram, Department of History, Politics and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK

Berch Berberoglu, Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, United States

Claudia Alegre, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, United States

Mabel Berezin, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

Hager Ali, German Institute for Global and Area Studies, University of Hamburg, Germany

Judith Bessant, AM, Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia

Bruno Amable, Département d’économie, histoire et société (DEHES), Université de Genève, Switzerland

Sandro Bieri, CREMA Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland

Edwin Amenta, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, United States

Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark

Johannes Angermuller, School of Languages and Applied Linguistics, The Open University, UK

Johanna Bockman, Global Affairs Program, George Mason University, United States

Kai Arzheimer, Department of Political Science, University of Mainz, Germany David Attewell, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Switzerland

Matthijs Bogaards, Department of Political Science, Central European University, Austria

Leo Azzollini, Department of Social Policy and Intervention and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK

Lorenzo Bosi, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy

Lucio Baccaro, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Germany Simone Baglioni, Department of Economics and Management, University of Parma, Italy

Shelley Boulianne, European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL), Université Catholique de Lille, France

Francesco Bailo, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Sydney, Australia

Kaylin Bourdon, Department of Sociology, University of California Irvine, United States xii

contributors  xiii Henry E. Brady, Goldman School of Public Policy & Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, United States John L. Brooke, Department of History, Ohio State University, United States Nadia E. Brown, Women’s and Gender Studies Program and affiliate in the African American Studies, Georgetown University, United States Michael Buckley, Department of Philosophy, Lehman College, City University of New York, United States Craig Calhoun, Schools of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, United States Sarah Cameron, School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, Australia David E. Campbell, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, United States Romana Careja, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark Fernando Casal Bértoa, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK Christopher Chase-Dunn, Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California-Riverside, United States Grace L. Chikoto-Schultz, Maxine Goodman Levin School of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, United States Jan Cieciuch, Institute of Psychology, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Poland and URPP “Social Networks”, University of Zurich, Switzerland

Jessica Cobian, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, United States Claire Colomb, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, UK Ramona Coman, Institut d'études européennes/CEVIPOL, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium Kennia L. Coronado, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, United States Catherine Corrigall-Brown, Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, Canada Christian Davenport, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, United States Eldad Davidov, Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany; and URPP “Social Networks”, University of Zurich, Switzerland Bryson Davis, Maxine Goodman Levin School of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, United States Wyatt I. Dawson, Department of Communication, University of Delaware, United States Donatella della Porta, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy Fabio de Nardis, Department of Economics Management and Territory, University of Foggia, Italy Daniel Devine, Department of Politics and International Relations and St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, UK Michael Dobbins, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Germany

Manlio Cinalli, SPS-University of Milan, Italy and CEVIPOF-Sciences Po (CNRS – UMR 7048), France

Natalie J. Doyle, School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics, Monash University, Australia

Elisabeth S. Clemens, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, United States

Karine Duplan, Department of Geography and Environment, University of Geneva, Switzerland

xiv  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Linet R. Durmuşoğlu, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Dustin Garlitz, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Central Florida, United States

Jennifer Earl, School of Sociology, University of Arizona, United States

Nathalie Giger, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland

Barry Eidlin, Department of Sociology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada Tom Einhorn, Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, Canada Rainer Eisfeld, Fachbereich 1, Universität Osnabrück, Germany Knut Ove Eliassen, Department of Language and Literature, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway Venessa Ercole, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University, Australia

Carol Gilligan, Department of Applied Psychology, School of Law, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, New York University, United States Alberta Giorgi, Dipartimento di Lettere, Filosofia, Comunicazione, Universita’ degli Studi di Bergamo, Italy Achim Goerres, Institute for Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Geoffrey Evans, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK

Andreas C. Goldberg, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway

Jalal Fetrati, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, United States

Jeff Goodwin, Department of Sociology, New York University, United States

Helena Flam, Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, Germany

Dylan Gray, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, United States

Michele Ford, Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, University of Sydney, Australia Francesca Forno, Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy Marta Fraile, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, Spain Roberto Franzosi, Department of Sociology & Linguistics Program, Emory University, United States Markus Freitag, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Switzerland Bruno S. Frey, CREMA Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland and Permanent Visiting Professor, University of Basel, Switzerland Selina Gallo-Cruz, Sociology Department, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, New York, United States

Liah Greenfeld, Departments of Sociology, Political Science, and Anthropology, Boston University, United States Marcia Grimes, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden Leticia Haro, Social Work, University of Texas at Arlington, USA Anthony F. Heath, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK Kevin Hewison, Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States Christine Hobden, Wits School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa Lindsay H. Hoffman, Department of Communication, University of Delaware, United States

contributors  xv Nathalie Hofstetter, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Switzerland Marc Hooghe, Department of Political Science, University of Leuven, Belgium Mathew Humphrey, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK Anders Hylmö, School of Business, Innovation and Sustainability, Halmstad University, Sweden Karin Ingold, Institute of Political Science and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Bern; Environmental Social Science Department, Eawag, Switzerland Rina James, School of Sociology, University of Arizona, United States Mathias Hein Jessen, Department of Business Humanities and Law, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark Bob Jessop, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Lancaster University, UK Hank Johnston, Department of Sociology, San Diego State University, San Diego, California, United States

Gregor Kungl, Department of Organisational Sociology and Innovation Studies, University of Stuttgart, Germany Anna Kyriazi, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy Rafael Pablo Labanino, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Germany Christian Lahusen, Department of Social Sciences, University of Siegen, Germany Oscar L. Larsson, Department of Political Science and Law, Swedish Defence University, Sweden Sandra Laugier, Faculty of Philosophy, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris, France Zoe Lefkofridi, Department of Political Science, University of Salzburg, Austria Vanessa Lemm, University of Greenwich, London, UK and University of Melbourne, Australia Jesse Lindley, Sociology, University of Texas Permian Basin, United States

Sebastian Jungkunz, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Bonn, Germany

Natasha Lindstaedt, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Arne L. Kalleberg, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States

Måns Robert Lundstedt, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy

Niilo Kauppi, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland

Nathan T.B. Ly, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, United States

Oleksandra Keudel, Department of Public Policy and Governance, Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine Palina Kolvani, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway Stefan Kruse, Center for the Study of Democracy, Institute of Political Science, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Robert MacDonald, School of Education and Professional Development, University of Huddersfield, UK Amanda Machin, Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Agder Oliver Marchart, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Austria Paul Marx, Institute of Political Science and Sociology, University of Bonn, Germany

xvi  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Alexandra Maryanski, Graduate Division, University of California, Riverside, United States

Brian Nolan, Department of Social Policy and Intervention and Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK

John D. McCarthy, Department of Sociology and Criminology, Pennsylvania State University, United States

Matthew Norton, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, United States

Michael A. McCarthy, Department of Social and Cultural Sciences, Marquette University, United States Rose McDermott, Department of Political Science, Brown University, United States Ali Meghji, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, UK David S. Meyer, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine Tariq Modood, Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol, UK Louis Moser, CREMA Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland Rebecca Murray, Department of Cultural and Social Studies, College of Arts and Sciences, Creighton University, Omaha, United States Daniela Musina, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Firenze, Italy Pierre Musso, University of Rennes 2 and Institute for Advanced Studies in Nantes, France

Michael Ohsfeldt, Division of Sociology, Tarleton State University, United States Martin Okolikj, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway Christian Olsson, Department of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium Olga Onuch, Politics Department, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK Karl-Dieter Opp, Department of Sociology at the University of Leipzig, Germany, and Department of Sociology at the University of Washington, Seattle, USA Jennifer Oser, Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University, Israel Kassra A.R. Oskooii, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, United States Marinus Ossewaarde, Department of Public Administration, University of Twente, the Netherlands Marius S. Ostrowski, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy

Alessandro Nai, Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Diana Owen, Graduate Program in Communication, Culture, and Technology, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., United States

Kenneth Nelson, Department of Social Policy and Intervention and St Cross College, University of Oxford, UK

Kari Palonen, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Department of Sociology & Criminology, University of New Mexico, United States

Louisa Parks, School of International Studies & Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy

Marina Nistotskaya, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Elena Pavan, Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy

contributors  xvii Efrén Pérez, Departments of Political Science and Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, United States

University of Chile (UC) and School of Political Science, Diego Portales University (UDP), Chile

Yvette Peters, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway

John Rundell, School of Humanities and Social Science, La Trobe University, Australia

Emmanuel Pierru, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Picardie, France Laurence Piper, University West, School of Business, Economics & IT, Trollhättan, Sweden and the Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa Alain Policar, Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Cevipof), IEP de Paris, France Francesca Polletta, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, United States Jonas Pontusson, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland Leonardo Puleo, School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe), University College Dublin, Ireland Sverre Raffnsøe, Department of Business Humanities and Law, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

Alexander Ruser, Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Agder, Norway Jens Rydgren, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, Sweden Shamit Saggar, National Centre for Student Equity in Higher Education, Curtin Business School, Curtin University Arthur Sakamoto, Department of Sociology, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong Jean-François Savard, École nationale d’administration publique, Québec, Canada Kay Lehman Schlozman, Department of Political Science, Boston College, United States Christian Schneickert, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Sociology, Ottovon-Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany Aaron Schutz, Department of Educational Policy and Community Studies, University of Wisconsin, United States

Nathan Redman, Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, United States

Pascal Sciarini, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland

Toni Rodon, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Spain

Sam Scovill, School of Sociology, University of Arizona, United States

Juan Rodríguez‑Teruel, Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science, University of Valencia, Spain Jörg Rössel, Department of Sociology, University of Zurich, Switzerland Silke Roth, Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Southampton, UK Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Institute of Political Science, Pontifical Catholic

Thomas Sealy, Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol Nicolas Sembel, Institut national supérieur du professorat et de l’éducation, AixMarseille Université, France Laura Sjoberg, Department of Politics, International Relations, and Philosophy, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK Christine M. Slaughter, Department of Political Science, Boston University, United States

xviii  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Julie Smith, Robinson College and Department of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University, UK

Viktor Orri Valgarðsson, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton, UK

Naomi Snider, School of Law, New York University, United States

Chiara Valli, Institute for Communication and Media Studies, University of Bern, Switzerland

Marco R. Steenbergen, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Switzerland Laura Stoker, Department of Political Science, University of California–Berkeley, United States Francesco Stolfi, Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Australia Julia C. Strauss, Department of Political and International Studies, SOAS, University of London, UK Francesco Strazzari, Istituto di Diritto, Politica e Sviluppo, Sant’Anna, Scuola Universitaria Superiore, Pisa, Italy Kristin Strømsnes, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway Paula Surridge, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, UK Simon Susen, School of Policy and Global Affairs, City, University of London, UK Ryan Switzer, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, Sweden Seetha Tan, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, UK Jan Teorell, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Sweden Matteo Tiratelli, Social Research Institute, University College London, UK Raül Tormos, Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió – Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain Jonathan H. Turner, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States Vicente Valentim, Nuffield College and Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK

Wouter van der Brug, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands Nella Van Dyke, Department of Sociology, University of California, Merced, United States Emilie van Haute, Department of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Faculty of Social Sciences, Sociology, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands Frédéric Varone, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland Sofia Vasilopoulou, Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, UK Francesca Vassallo, Department of Political Science, University of Southern Maine, United States Francisco Villamil, Department of Social Sciences, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain Chiara Visentin, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, United States Jelle Visser, Department of Sociology and Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands Rens Vliegenthart, Strategic Communication Group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands Lars Vogel, Department of Political Science, Leipzig University, Germany Giorgio Volpe, Department of Humanities, University of Naples “Federico II”, Italy

contributors  xix Katerina Vrablikova, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of Bath, UK Amentahru Wahlrab, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at Tyler, United States Edward T. Walker, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, United States Rob Watts, Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia Nadja Wehl, Cluster of Excellence “The Politics of Inequality”, University of Konstanz, Germany Amy Wendling, Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences, Creighton University, Omaha, NE, United States Magnus Wennerhag, School of Social Sciences, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden

Paul Whiteley, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK Jonathon Whooley, Department of International Relations, State University of San Francisco, United States Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, CNRS, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Paris, France Dana M. Williams, Department of Sociology, California State University Chico, United States Lesley Wood, Department of Sociology, York University, Toronto, Canada Lorenzo Zamponi, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence, Italy Margaret Zeddies, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, George Mason University, United States Sebahattin Ziyanak, Department of Social Sciences, University of Texas Permian Basin, United States

Introduction to the Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology

We are delighted to have put together this Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Sociology which we believe will form an excellent resource for students, researchers, academics and others for years to come. We were excited to put together this volume, and we are grateful to Daniel Mather at Edward Elgar Publishing for the invitation and kind support throughout as well as to all the authors who responded positively to the idea and allowed the volume to take shape with their entries. It was not an easy task for them to summarise sometimes broad topics in such short pieces of writing, which is not normally what academics are used to doing, and so we are even more grateful that they took up this challenge. We thoroughly enjoyed reading the various drafts of the entries and felt that we learned a lot throughout the process, particularly in terms of the frontier areas across the discipline for future research work. Deciding which entries should be included and which should not was not an easy task. To do this, we were guided by our desire to be as comprehensive as possible, but at the same time, we had to be selective in order to remain within the length allowed for such a volume. We aimed to include the key historical thinkers and major concepts. We included entries for what we felt were major approaches and theories as well as for major ideational and ideological dynamics. We also included entries on the founders of the field and other thinkers as well as the major schools of thought. We are truly delighted to have been able to edit this collection of excellent entries from experts on their topics from around the globe at different career stages and representing as far as possible the diversity of authors in the area. We are also grateful that the authors made suggestions for additions to the initial list of topics to be included. We appealed to all the authors and asked if they felt there were any missing areas in our coverage of topics and, as a result, added entries where relevant to come to the current final total of 167. Of course, there is always room for improvement, but we are confident that, in the end, we have achieved a comprehensive and balanced coverage of key topics. This is a reference work addressed to teachers, researchers, students and all those who have an interest in political sociology, what it is and what it covers. It works both as an entry point to the field, for example for undergraduate or graduate students, and as a

There is no single definition of what political sociology is, nor a unique shared view of what it should cover. As Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash and Alan Scott stress in the introduction of the revised version of The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology (2012), “political sociology remains a highly diverse intellectual endeavour.” It is “a field both distinct and overlapping with sociology and political science” and “seeks to redress the limitations and blind spots of the two disciplines whose borders it crosses.” In his Oxford Bibliography on the subject matter, Jeff Manza provided a definition of political sociology that is probably the closest to our understanding of this field and that informed the way in which we chose the entries to be included in this volume. Manza defined political sociology as “the study of power and the relationship between societies, states, and political conflict.” As such, it has both macro and micro components. On the one hand, the macro-focus looks at questions relating to nation-states, political institutions and their development, as well as the sources of social and political change such as social movements and other modes of contentious politics. As Manza notes, here the “big” questions pertain to why and how political institutions are the way they are and how they change. The micro-focus, on the other hand, tends to look at identities and how membership of different groups influences political behaviour. Political science, of course, shares many of these concerns, but political sociology is more focused on the underlying social forces shaping politics and political systems as opposed to their workings and inner mechanics. While the behaviourist revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was linked to the focus of the field on micro-questions such as those related to the influence of factors such as class, religion, ethnicity and so on for political behaviour, since the 1970s there has been an increasing focus on more macroaspects such as revolutions, the role of states and institutions for shaping outcomes and so forth. This volume aims to do justice to both strands of thought and research. xx

introduction to the elgar encyclopedia of political sociology  xxi tool for more experienced academics to provide the key references and ideas and concepts on topics which are not directly linked to the specific focus of their everyday work. More generally, the various entries included in the volume should represent a helpful resource to all those interested in the field of political sociology. As such, we hope that it can also allow many to approach this topic for the first time. In the current historical juncture, questions of political sociology take major importance. Issues relating to power and to political conflict

as well as the relationship between societies and states are critical for understanding our contemporary political and social contexts, the sources of crises and social tensions and possible ways out of this impasse. We believe that this volume is particularly timely in the present moment, and we hope that you will find reading the entries engaging and enlightening as it was for us and also inspiring for future work to come. Maria Grasso and Marco Giugni, 28 March 2023

1. Age and generation

generational effects refer to the shaping of a cohort by politics, most importantly at a young age (see Stoker entry). For example, party preferences can reflect a political generation, such as the disproportionally socialdemocratic Brandt Generation in West Germany. Its cohort members first cast their vote in the 1969–1980 Bundestag elections as they experienced student revolts, new foreign policy towards the East and the first SocialDemocratic government since the Weimar Republic (Goerres 2008). The micro-level effects of generational socialisation have macro-level implications. Generational change or cohort replacement is considered a major mechanism of historical change. Cohorts, when still at a young age, are most impressionable and sensitive to period effects (Rekker 2022). In this way, social change can be understood to occur when cohorts with a different set of behaviours, interests and preferences replace older cohorts that are dying out in the population, leading to aggregate change. The relative size of a cohort and its dire economic situation, for example, high levels of unemployment, can create tensions in a society even though the mechanisms remain unclear. For example, Urdal (2006) put forward the youth-bulge thesis that large cohorts at a young age with little access to economic resources can create conflicts within and between states. More generally, the cohort composition of societies is viewed as a major backdrop for politicalsociological analysis in global comparisons (Goerres & Vanhuysse 2021). The meaning of chronological age is not self-evident but must be understood with attention to context. The meaning of one additional year of lifetime is contingent on life expectancy in a society. If we take Sweden as an example, being a 50-year-old woman in the 1750s with a life expectancy at birth of about 36 meant something different to being a 50-year-old woman in 2020 with a life expectancy at birth of about 83 years (data from Generations and Gender Programme 2022). The major line of social construction of age is through status-attribution that more often than not intersects with gender. In premodern times, older men were revered within the family and often given special recognition (Foner 1984). Middle and old age and the male gender are at the centre of patriarchal power relations within the family. In a study of 91 European regions with census data from

Age and generation are important markers of social and political experience and shape the experience of public policy. We need to distinguish between a generation or synonymously a cohort, that is, a group of individuals who were born around the same time and who age through the life course together, and age groups, that is, individuals of the same age compared to other people of the same age at a different point in time. Many European and North American countries share large cohorts born after World War II before the availability of the pill (birth years 1946–1964), called the Baby Boomers. Members of this large group shared a particular collective experience of growing up in a period of sustained economic growth, without the harsh experiences of hunger and war that many from their parents’ generation shared. Baby Boomers’ formative episode was roughly the period between the mid-1950s and the early 1980s when they were in their most impressionable years. Age groups that are often compared are young people before they finish school, middle-aged people that are economically active or older people after retirement. Specific demarcation lines of chronological age, such as 18 years of age for reaching legal majority or 65 for pension age, exist in some countries and define an individual’s relationship with the state and its public policies. Next to age group experiences, ageing is a longitudinal process at the individual level that often captures life experience or political experience (Goerres 2007). Among cohort or generational effects, it is helpful to distinguish between socioeconomic cohort and political generational effects (Goerres 2009). Socio-economic cohort effects refer to a cohort’s shared social and economic experiences, such as growing up during an economic boom or recession. Shared social and economic circumstances can influence how cohort peers can take similar trajectories into the fabric of society. For instance, returning GIs in the United States were able to attend colleges and vocational programmes, giving them unexpected opportunities after World War II. This cohort of men experienced unexpected social upward mobility (Mettler 2005). In contrast, political 1

2  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology about 1750 to 1918, only 15 per cent of households were headed by a younger person and only 10 per cent were headed by women (with a correlation of only .15 between the two types) (Gruber & Szołtysek 2016). Increasing labour division and industrialisation weakened the powerful position of the oldest man in the household because younger male and female members of a family could seek economic independence outside of that household. Ironically, therefore, the social status that is given to an older person has never been lower than in advanced industrial nations (Foner 1984) despite the high share of older people in them. Across the world today, there still remains a lot of variance as to the social status of older people. Looking at support for the statement “Older people are not respected much these days” from the World Values Survey 2010–2014, we can see that the minimum lies at 17 per cent in Uzbekistan and the maximum at 85 per cent in Romania. The respect received by older people varies massively across the globe. Old age and its status perception (intersecting with gender) do not only play out differently across time but also space in this present day and age. The state entrenches the meaning of chronological age by using it to demarcate legal duties and rights or eligibility for certain welfare state programmes. In 2023, many countries used the threshold of 18 years to separate minors from adults as to legal responsibility, to distinguish between those not eligible and those eligible to vote. Moreover, chronological age is employed as a marker for passive voting rights with the underlying assumption of higher age being a sign of more maturity and wisdom. For instance, candidates must be 40 years of age to be elected German president. Age is also used for selecting candidates in democratic forums when an election is not possible yet, such as the first session of a new parliament. Before 2021, the chronologically eldest member of the Bundestag presided over the first session of parliament and the election of the Bundestag president. Age and political power are another line of political-sociological interest. Some researchers have looked at the congruence between the age distribution of the electorate and that of their representatives in national parliament. Like with many group characteristics of political elites, the difference from the voting population is clear-cut: middle-aged to senior Achim Goerres

men of the ethnic majority and higher income groups are overrepresented. Institutional rules of proportional representation and of passive franchise at an early age mitigate the age skewness (Stockemer & Sundström 2018). In welfare states, the public pension age is another demarcation line by which employees are forced to retire in many countries (even though rules for pension age are increasingly flexible). Using age for public policy is a function of the institutionalisation of the life course by the mature and extensive welfare state of advanced industrial democracies (Kohli 1985). Up to a certain age, citizens of mature welfare states have to attend school, then there is a relatively small age corridor of professional education, followed by economic activity in a long corridor of about 40 years, and a long period of retirement of about 20 years. In such societal contexts, parenting is squeezed into a remarkably small social age corridor that has been termed the “rush-hour of life” (Tremmel 2010) in which the demands on individuals from care and work massively shape their lives. Conceptually, cohort/generation and age group are easily distinguishable from one another. Empirically, separating them into their constitutive parts is hard. Two pieces of information about any of the three, age, cohort and period, lead to perfect collinearity. This means knowing two pieces of information about an individual, such as age and year, can perfectly predict cohort and vice versa. There is a methodological strand of literature about how to deal with this age-period-cohort problem (A-P-C) (Fosse & Winship 2019; Grasso 2014; Grasso et al. 2019). Empirical researchers need to have strong theoretical reasoning and sophisticated data sources such as cumulated cross-sectional or panel data in order to be able to make an argument for distinguishing between age and cohort effects and to manage the problem of A-P-C identification. It is important to be aware of these important technical issues since the high demand on data for cohort identification and the high attractiveness of postulating the peculiarity of another Generation X/Y/Z could potentially lead to too many thinly grounded generational analyses in public discourse and in the social sciences, particularly since data for more recent generations will, by nature, be sparser – and after all, these generations have not been observed a lot along the life cycle. As such, this entry is meant to discern some

age and generation  3 key issues that should be borne in mind when assessing findings for generational patterns and linked questions (Grasso 2016). To sum up, age and cohort effects always manifest themselves at the same time and lead to a high demand on individual-level data. The social status of old age, especially older men, still varies a lot globally today, but has declined. Age is used at various pointsof-contact with the state to demarcate minors from majors, to determine eligibilities for various programmes, to institutionalise a certain mainstream life course and to shape the institutional rules of democratic politics. The composition of political elites is clearly biased towards middle-aged and older people on top of the bias towards men and people with higher incomes. Future research is likely to be fruitful in two areas: first, scholars have an increasing abundance of survey data available for highquality research. In particular, the accumulation of comparable cross-sectional surveys, like long-running series and panel surveys, allows more and more nuanced analysis of political-sociological age and cohort effects at the individual level. Second, the analyses will span across more of the Global South, complementing the relatively thorough knowledge from the advanced industrial democracies of the OECD world. Collective data collection efforts on such surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, or on public policies of the welfare state, such as Pension Legislation around the World (Grünewald 2021), and globally comparative case study projects (Goerres & Vanhuysse 2021) allow much more comprehensive analyses of how states and age-generational structures affect one another. Achim Goerres

References Foner, Nancy. 1984. Ages in Conflict: A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Inequality Between Old and Young. New York: Columbia University Press. Fosse, Ethan, and Christopher Winship. 2019. “Analyzing age-period-cohort data: A review and critique.” Annual Review of Sociology 45 (1):467–92. Generations and Gender Programme. 2022. The Generations and Gender Contextual Database 2022 [cited 02-09 2022]. Available from https://px​.web​.ined​.fr​/GGP​ /pxweb​/en​/GGP​-CDB Archive/.

Goerres, Achim. 2007. “Why are older people more likely to vote? The impact of ageing on electoral turnout in Europe.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9 (1):90–121. Goerres, Achim. 2008. “The grey vote: Determinants of older voters’ party choice in Britain and West Germany.” Electoral Studies 27 (2):285–304. Goerres, Achim. 2009. The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of Our Democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Goerres, Achim, and Pieter Vanhuysse, eds. 2021. Global Political Demography: The Politics of Population Change. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan (Open Access). https:// link​.springer​.com​/ book​/10​.1007​/978​-3​-030​ -73065-9. Grasso, Maria T. 2014. “Age, period and cohort analysis in a comparative context: Political generations and political participation repertoires in Western Europe.” Electoral Studies 33:63–76. Grasso, Maria T. 2016. Generations, Political Participation and Social Change in Western Europe. London: Routledge. Grasso, Maria Teresa, Stephen Farrall, Emily Gray, Colin Hay, and Will Jennings. 2019. “Thatcher’s children, Blair’s babies, political socialization and trickle-down value change: An age, period and cohort analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 49 (1):17–36. Gruber, Siegfried, and Mikołaj Szołtysek. 2016. “The patriarchy index: A comparative study of power relations across historical Europe.” The History of the Family 21 (2):133–74. Grünewald, Aline. 2021. “The historical origins of old-age pension schemes: Mapping global patterns.” Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 37 (2):93–111. Kohli, Martin. 1985. “Die Institutionalisierung des Lebenslaufes. Historische Befunde und theoretische Argumente.” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial­ psychologie 37 (1):1–29. Mettler, Suzanne. 2005. Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Rekker, Roderik. 2022. “Young trendsetters: How young voters fuel electoral volatility.” Electoral Studies 75:102425. Achim Goerres

4  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Stockemer, Daniel, and Aksel Sundström. 2018. “Age representation in parliaments: Can institutions pave the way for the young?” European Political Science Review 10 (3):467–90. Tremmel, Jörg, ed. 2010. A Young Generation under Pressure? The Financial Situation

Achim Goerres

and the “Rush Hour” of the Cohorts 1970– 1985 in a Generational Comparison. Heidelberg: Springer. Urdal, Henrik. 2006. “A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence.” International Studies Quarterly 50 (3):607–29.

2. Alienation

in operationalizing the concept empirically. However, there are a number of examples that suggest an empirical approach to political alienation may be warranted. These are more clearly identified using the four dimensions of political alienation outlined by Finifter (1970), which include political powerlessness, political meaninglessness, political normlessness, and political isolation. As noted below, each of these fits well with the moments of alienation Marx develops, with powerlessness tracking the product, meaninglessness tracking the process, normlessness tracking the genus, and isolation tracking our fractured relationships. Alienation from the product, or object, of work, can be very simple, as when I cannot afford to buy the thing I work on. Think of working at a television maquilladora but being unable to afford the televisions you produce, or even not having them for sale in a market you can access, for example, laboring at a private school whose tuition you cannot afford for your own children. However, alienation from the product or object also has a symbolic dimension. Because of the capitalist division of labor, products are even less the work of one person than they were in previous modes of production. This means nearly all users of products (i.e., all humans) are cut off from the experience of holistic object production. No matter how many flat-screen televisions you can afford, you will not see your own labor reflected back in them. We enter, instead, a pre-formed world whose array of objects reflects partial human capacities, the whims of the market, and ever-increasingly automated production lines. This type of alienation also applies to a separation from the social and political structures that humans have created. On the one hand, in the United States and likely other inheritors of the contract tradition, a magical rhetoric upholds the Constitution and our political structure, especially separation and balance of power. On the other hand – and perhaps most importantly – the idea of representation is built on the presupposition of engagement in the political process. This product of this labor is not static but dynamic, and it is eroded in the phenomenon of powerlessness, where I do not see my interests represented in the “product” of political work. This is even more prominent within our current system of representative, versus direct, democracy, where research has suggested

Alienation is a central concept in the early Marx, elaborated in his 1844 manuscripts, where it translates two German words: Entausserung and Entfremdung (in Tucker, 1972, 56–67). Entasserung’s complex history dates from Luther’s translation of the Bible into German. Here he renders kenosis, the term for God’s incarnation into human form, as Entausserung (Pippin, 2018). German idealism then takes up the term to capture a schema of self-externalization that both maintains and transforms a subject. Famously, Feuerbach uses the schema as a critique of religion itself: humans project themselves in an ideal state and call it God (1957). Hegel applies the Entausserung schema to labor (1975), and Marx adopts this characterization of labor and elaborates on it. Entfremdung is sometimes translated as “estrangement” in order to capture its root in Fremd – alien, stranger, or enemy – and thus has a much less neutral coding than its predecessor term Entaussserung. In the 1844 manuscripts, Marx uses Entfremdung to name the peculiar kind of Entausserung that dominates the labor process in capital. The alienation concept originates here. Once developed by Marx in the 1844 manuscripts, the alienated labor concept reaches far beyond a critique of the labor process (2007). Marx divides the alienation that unfolds in capitalism into four analytically distinct, but related, moments. First, we humans are alienated from the products of our work. Second, we humans are alienated from the work process itself. Third, we humans are alienated from our genus, the class of things that have similar characteristics. This third point is notoriously difficult and will require some explaining. Fourth, we humans are alienated from our fellow humans. The third and fourth moments form the basis for a broad psychological account of alienation that is tied materially to life within the capitalist social form. These concepts can be expanded specifically into dimensions of political alienation. As with economic alienation, political alienation can rupture trust in our social sphere and ultimately harm or destroy it. While sociologists have long used the language of alienation theoretically, there has been some difficulty 5

6  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology an unequal influence on power between the populace and elected officials, and the lines between political participation and political outcomes are opaque (Ingham, 2022). What’s more, engaging in complex political mechanisms such as the electoral college in the United States further removes individual voters from any power to influence representatives. This disconnect is exacerbated by more current examples of presidential elections won despite the loss of the popular vote. Alienation from the process of labor means that the vast amount of productive activity we undertake does not actualize our capacities as an experience: it is boring and repetitive, at best, and disables, stunts, and kills those undertaking it, at worst. This again is related to the division of labor and subdivision of labor that characterize the capitalist social form, and perhaps especially to the division between intellectual and manual labor, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978) points out. As Marx puts it in the original text, the labor process ruins the body and mind instead of developing them freely. His observation that humans only feel truly themselves when not at work is borne out by data: workers will forgo rest breaks, even essential ones for meals and the bathroom, in order to get away from work faster (Linder & Nygaard, 1998, 160). We see a corresponding political alienation in the experiences of political engagement, which we might classify as political meaninglessness. Political engagement has become toxic. Rather than stimulating our minds and allowing individuals to engage with similar groups toward action, political engagement results in disappointment at best and violence at worst. Both blatant and subtle forms of voter suppression – voter ID requirements and truncated poll hours – have increased the difficulty in completing this basic form of political engagement. After the Supreme Court ruled in Shelby v. Holder (2013) that voter protection for disenfranchised groups was no longer necessary (Hardy, 2020), this became worse. Likewise, local, grassroots alternative political movements, such as Occupy, or local unionizing efforts, which have the potential to be good experiences of political engagement, often have not resulted in real or lasting power. Instead, working-class and other non-politically powerful persons are set on a path of parroting pre-formulated political discourses that may not lend themselves to any real material gain Amy Wendling and Rebecca Murray

– and which, in fact, may even work against the material and other interests of the working classes. The result is that individuals have disengaged from meaningful political processes, even maintaining meaningless political-type rhetoric (Eliasoph, 1997). Alienation from the human genus, from a class of things with similar characteristics, primarily means that under capitalism we operate with a concept of the human that limits us. This has several dimensions. First, we humans who are a part of nature view ourselves as cut off from it, giving rise to the environmental crisis we know so well. Second, we view ourselves exclusively as Homo economicus, producing only from need, while Marx instead stresses that we are free only when physical need does not drive our productions, including our productions of the concept of the human. In this, Marx shows his inheritance of the Aristotelian concept of human nature. Homo economicus claims to be an account of human nature and so appears as political normlessness. To be nature is to be a norm that claims no normativity and so which hides itself as political. And once Homo economicus is functioning as an account of human nature, game theory is inevitable. Political alienation occurs because humans are identified, exclusively, with the truncated set of interests it describes. This produces a form of the false consciousness problem, where working-class persons cannot imagine interests outside of those attributed to rational calculators, do not know what is in their best interests even within the realm of rational calculation, cannot self-identify as working class, and/or assume the best interests of wealthy corporations as their own. For example, those not paying any taxes due to poverty might admire the rich, but not working professionals such as teachers, and so support lower taxes. In addition, the democratic process in both theory and execution prides itself on its inefficiencies and so its irrationality. Democracy is premised on the proposition that we might be different from one another and have to negotiate these differences: not on the premise that we are the same as one another, just competitors for goods in a scarce world. For this reason, the adoption of Homo economicus as a concept of the self will always be a political alienation from democracy. We can see practical intuitions of this in reports of distrust and dissatisfaction with governments, and the

alienation  7 political process, and in the targeted attention of anger to the restriction of individual freedoms, especially when this disables a focus on collective needs. Perhaps the most acute representation of this alienation empirically is the increase in adherence to conspiracy theories. Particularly within the past two decades, a number of studies have suggested that a substantive number of citizens in Western democracies subscribe to political conspiracy theories (Butter & Knight, 2020). Whether these theories themselves are promulgated by the elite or a figment of the imagination of the uneducated matters little; it is more crucial that their proliferation has served to increase alienation of the human concept, as their structure is to regard all human political motives as criminal. As described by Pantazi et al.: [Conspiracy theories] all ascribe nefarious motives to other groups, including powerful groups like governments (e.g., U.S. government being complicit in the 9/11 terrorist strikes) and corporate giants (e.g., pharmaceutical companies), but also ideological or ethnic outgroups (e.g., Democrats or Republicans; Jewish or Muslim people). (2022, 530)

As indicated above, when one perceives that even with full participation in a seamless democratic system “someone” is rigging the system, then one cannot help but feel there is no norm to follow. The fourth dimension of alienation follows from this: humans are alienated from other humans. We regard ourselves as individuals, and we regard one another as hostile competitors for scarce resources, with a limited notion of rationality that pits us against one another in a zero-sum game. Once this view of the human is established and broadly held, as it is in capitalist societies, it necessarily damages our relationships. Pivotal examples of this are the erosion of civic and political trust; the erosion of norms, including legal norms; and even the conspiracy theorist’s sense that civic or political bodies are all a front. In political isolation, political identity is convoluted, causing separation from those with whom we have the most in common, in favor of a false identity with a larger group. Historically, political identity has tended to align with those with whom we share geographic space and economic standing, mostly our family, friends, and neighbors. Now,

political identity has become more aligned with specific national groups, so that one’s “belonging” revolves around ideals promulgated by a platform, such as personal freedoms or religious liberty rather than around tangible, often localized, needs, such as clean water and passable roads. In addition, the rhetoric or tone of ad hominem attacks is normative for political engagement, and the extent to which one uses this to identify a political outgroup has been well-documented (Hanson, O’Dwyer, Lyons, 2021). In addition, dialogue may be mediated by technological platforms and the algorithms into which they organize the political imaginary. Local issues and interests are then, of course, necessarily ignored. Issues that attract algorithmic attention cultivate intra-class conflict, while more urgent issues go unexplored, unexamined, or unnamed. The implications of alienation’s four dimensions for working-class subjects are easy to see. But, importantly, alienation applies not only to working-class subjects but to bourgeois subjects too. As with Hegel’s account of the Master, even if all of one’s material wants are luxuriously met, one can still be meaningfully cut off from the holistic production of objects, even as one uses them, and from important dimensions of human activity. And of course, the third and fourth dimensions are ideological and so spare no one. The bourgeois subject is thus also differently partial and stunted, also alienated. Marx addresses this feature of the concept at the end of the manuscripts. And indeed, we can identify the precise political alienations of ruling classes. One may not show up to vote in an election because the side one perceives oneself as being on, rightly or wrongly, is sure to win. One may never have queried political identifications absorbed from one’s family. One may identify as apolitical and so feel pride in one’s ignorance about civic truths and the federal structure, or conversely, eschew political participation in favor of fatalism, eliminating any responsibility for political outcomes. One may be unable to identify oneself as a political being with a stake in shaping how we live out human capacities. One may seek a fulfilling life only in highly salaried work. One may be unkind to those one loves, competing even with those in one’s kinship structures. Finally, excess resources may enable one to live alone or in giant spaces, which, even if one lives Amy Wendling and Rebecca Murray

8  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology extravagantly, can exacerbate one’s isolation, and so affluent people also experience widespread anxiety and depression. This further exacerbates political alienation, as it becomes more difficult to engage in something beyond my own insular existence and problems. Amy Wendling and Rebecca Murray

and Voter ID Laws. Mercer Law Review, 71, 857. Hegel, G.W.F. (1975). Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Trans. by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ingham, S. (2022). Representative Democracy and Social Equality. American Political Science Review, 116(2), 689–701. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S000305542100109X. Linder, M., & Nygaard, I. (1998). Void where References Prohibited: Rest Breaks and the Right to Butter, M., & Knight, P. (2020). Routledge Urinate on Company Time. Ithaca, NY: Handbook of Conspiracy Theories. Cornell University Press. Available at London: Routledge. SSRN: https://ssrn​.com​/abstract​=2224285. Eliasoph, N. (1997). “Close to Home”: The Marx, K. (2007). Economic and Philosophic Work of Avoiding Politics. Theory and Manuscripts of 1844. Trans. by M. Milligan. Society, 26(5), 605–647. http://www​ .jstor​ Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. .org​/stable​/658024. Pantazi, M., Papaioannou, K., & van Prooijen, Feuerbach, L. (1957). The Essence of J.-W. (2022). Power to the People: The Christianity. Trans. by George Eliot. New Hidden Link Between Support for Direct York: Harper (Orig. pub. 1841). Democracy and Belief in Conspiracy Finifter, A.W. (1970). Dimensions of Political Theories. Political Psychology, 43, 529– Alienation. The American Political Science 548. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/pops​.12779. Review, 64(2), 389–410. https://doi​.org​/10​ Pippin, R. (2018). Idealism and Anti-Idealism .2307​/1953840. in Modern European Philosophy.” Plenary Hanson, K., O’Dwyer, E., & Lyons, E. Session, Society for Phenomenology and (2021). The National Divide: A Social Existential Philosophy, October 18. Representations Approach to US Political Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978). Intellectual Identity. European Journal of Social and Manual Labour: A Critique of Psychology, 51, 833–846. https://doi​.org​/10​ Epistemology. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: .1002​/ejsp​.2791. Humanities Press. Hardy, L. (2020). Voter Suppression Post- Tucker, R. (1972). The Marx-Engels Reader. Shelby: Impacts and Issues of Voter Purge New York: W.W. Norton.

Amy Wendling and Rebecca Murray

3. Anarchism

from the so-called classical era to the contemporary era following the 1960s. The classical and contemporary eras are divided by a period of decreased anarchist influence, a lull greatly influenced by Marxism’s hegemony and the Soviet Union. Anarchism experienced a period of rebirth and reconfiguration that culminated in the 1960s’ New Left and subsequent developments following the Cold War (Cornell 2016). It’s difficult to separate self-conscious anarchism from what is proto-anarchist. The former includes thinkers and activists like Proudhon and Bakunin, while the label has been extended to the latter, like William Godwin and Max Stirner. Delineating between explicit anarchists and those implicitly anarchistic is also complicated. The key distinction hinges upon the former using the anarchist tradition’s values, organizing methods, and chosen actions, while formally adopting an anarchist identity, while the latter utilizes these approaches—consciously or not—but doesn’t adopt a formal anarchist identity (Williams 2017). There are many pivotal events in anarchist history, but two are of particular note. First, the contentious 1872 schism within the International Workingmen’s Association (an organization greatly influenced by followers of Proudhon and later Bakunin, also called the First International), saw the expulsion of anarchists by Karl Marx and his supporters during the Hague Congress. The conflict stemmed from disagreement about the political strategy of seizing state power during the revolution—Marx’s followers thought the state’s machinery could be used to direct the revolution, whereas Bakunin believed the state would corrupt radicals and create a “red bureaucracy”, a “vile and terrible lie”. Anarchists—who predominated in many of the European sections of the International— left to form their own “black international” at a congress in St. Imier, Switzerland. This event signifies anarchists’ clear ideological break from other socialists and their pursuit of a decentralist, federated, insurrectionary, and syndicalist trajectory (Graham 2015). The second event of note was the Spanish Revolution, which erupted after decades of anarchist agitation and insurrection, following Franco’s fascist coup in 1936 against the Second Republic. Anarchists seized armories—which they distributed to the populace in major cities—for the purpose of beating

Anarchism is an economic, political, and social philosophy, praxis, and movement. It is a way of understanding, an informed way of acting, and an organized and collective project to radically change the world. The word “anarchism” consists of the prefix “a-” meaning without and the suffix of “archism” meaning rule. Anarchists tend to oppose the exertion of power-over by rulers, rather than the collaborative construction of rules, per se (see Ward 1996). Anarchists generally oppose hierarchy and domination and support horizontalism and egalitarianism. The nineteenth-century Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin advocated for libertarian socialism, since “liberty without socialism is privilege, injustice; and . . . socialism without liberty is slavery and brutality”. This definition combines the Enlightenment traditions of liberalism and radicalism; anarchism can be contrasted against other major twentieth-century ideologies, such as state communism, free-market libertarianism, and fascism, occupying the nexus of anti-state power and economic social equality. Anarchism’s origins are traceable to premodern analogues as varied as indigenous North Americans, African communalism, ancient China and Greece, and medieval European communes (Marshall 2010). However, anarchism is the product of the Enlightenment: classical liberalism’s prioritization of individual freedoms and radicalism’s concerns with social justice. Consequently, anarchism’s primary mid-nineteenth-century European enemies were the centralizing nation-state, entrenched religious authority, and industrial capitalism. Most historians consider Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, author of What Is Property? (“Theft!” was his answer), the first self-identified anarchist. Anarchists have pursued three general political strategies, including insurrectionism (e.g., propaganda by the deed and political assassination, armed conflict with the state, and black bloc militancy), mass-organizing (e.g., syndicalism and radical unionism, community organizing, and popular propaganda), and prefiguration (e.g., communes, alternative schools, and lifestyles). These are present across anarchism’s major historical periods, 9

10  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology back Franco’s forces in Barcelona (Guillamón 2014). They then used the opportunity to carry out a widespread social revolution, by collectivizing large estates for the peasantry, taking over factories, attacking hierarchical and patriarchal social norms, and raising militias for self-defense. A large, active anarcho-syndicalist union (estimated at approximately one million members prior to the Revolution) led the way, but was ultimately undermined by Stalin’s internationalist forces, a Western-led blockade of Spain, anarchist indecision that led a few anarchists to controversially join the besieged Republican government, and battles with Franco. The Spanish Revolution notably demonstrates the possibilities of highly organized anarchists, with long-lasting cultural traditions, changing society’s dominant institutions (Mintz 2013). While often considered a Western European phenomenon, some of the countries with the most active anarchist movements fall outside the West or even the Global North (see Finn 2021). Immigrant networks (e.g., Italians and Spaniards) diffused explicit anarchist politics, which merged anarchist ideas with indigenous philosophies to create locally relevant forms of anarchism. Most important are the lesser-known revolutions in Baja (led by the Magón brothers) and Emiliano Zapata’s indigenous anarchism during the Mexican Revolution, anarchism during the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions (from 1917 through 1921), and Korean anarcho-communists in Manchuria who formed the Shin-min commune (Potiker et al. 2022). Many ideological subvariants exist—collectivists, individualists, mutualists, syndicalists, and communists during the classical era, and thereafter joined by anarcha-feminists, ecologists, pacifists, and others. All subscribe to anti-authoritarian, anti-statist, and anti-capitalist principles. Consequently, the so-called anarcho-capitalism is usually considered an oxymoronic label, as it defends the value of private property and employer-rule over workers. In the United States, this latter group has also appropriated the common anarchist synonym “libertarian”. Anarchists have struggled against unfavorable popular perceptions—it’s commonly associated with violence, chaos, and naivete. While these have to some degree existed within certain anarchist traditions, they are overwhelmingly negligible compared to other characteristics. For example, while most Dana M. Williams

anarchists reject ideological pacifism, most of their strategies are, by default, nonviolent, and anarchist philosophy seeks a social future in which violence is not necessary. In fact, anarchists have noted that mainstream republicanism, classical liberalism, Christian democracy, and democratic socialism have created far greater violence when wielding state power (Williams 2017). Considering anarchism as simply “antistate” is an incomplete assessment. Rather, anarchism opposes a slew of hierarchical systems, including capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy, white supremacy, militarism, and so forth. These hierarchies lead to relationships of domination and ultimately patterns of inequality (e.g., capitalism results in patterns of class inequality) (Shantz & Williams 2013). These hierarchies are the first of three types of power identified by anarchists: a form of domination referred to as “power-over”. This form of power involves force, manipulation, and authority and is distinctly anti-freedom. The next two forms of power are anarchistic. The second form, which builds individual capacity, is “power-to”. Empowered individuals can assert their interrelated autonomy— this is a pro-individual freedom. And the third form is non-coercive influence called “powerwith”; it involves cooperation and solidarity and is an expression of pro-collectivist justice (Gordon 2009). States wield power-over and coerce via their various institutions, including police, courts, prisons, militaries, regulatory bureaucracies, and often state-run education and media. Anarchists have described state power as centripetal force, because states attempt to survey and understand beyond their sphere of influence, thus making previously uncontrolled people and territory “legible”. Yet, people have always sought escape from the state—and its wars, famines, repression, and disease—via passive or confrontational strategies of resistance (Scott 2010). Anarchists have a dialectical critique of democracy: when democracy is a tool for statecraft, problems result. However, if democracy is a tool for confederated people to enjoy autonomy outside the state, it’s considered a natural expression of power-to and power-with. Thus, anarchists assume that democracies don’t require states, just as states don’t require democracy (although more stable states often feign democracy). Election abstentionism is central to the anarchist

anarchism  11 tradition, because elections embody distasteful values like celebrity, representation, and centralization. Still, anarchists regularly engage with political issues, even during election time, using them as a means to organize around anti-authoritarian positions. Direct democracy is considered preferable to indirect representative democracy, and anarchists have always used such techniques in their organizations and communities. This direct democracy typically manifests as super-majority voting or consensus decisionmaking processes, instead of elected leaders. Anarchists playfully engage with democracy’s “rules”, believing no universally perfect solution exists. Smaller organizational hubs (e.g., affinity groups or collectives) constitute grassroots anarchist practice, while larger bodies (e.g., assemblies, federations, or networks) coordinate between hubs (Day 2005, Williams 2018b). Leadership within anarchist communities is complicated. In some organizations, facilitators are appointed to help realize the group’s will created via consensus building; in others, group representatives are recallable whenever they fail to successfully reflect group decisions. But, in the majority of anarchist organizations, leadership is informal or eschewed altogether. Some consider themselves “leaderless” or “leaderful”, where no one or everyone, respectively, is a leader (Dixon 2014). In other situations, leadership is not the problem, but “followership”. When sociologist Robert Michels described an “iron law of oligarchy” impacting organizations, he considered anarchism to be a “prophylactic” against such centralizing power (Michels 1959). Thus, smaller organizations are prioritized, and federation instead of centralization unites across geographic space and social scale. Things often considered to be granted by the state—such as human rights—may be framed in non-state terms. Anarchists generally believe states to be the greatest perpetrators of human rights abuses; states often fail to protect rights and don’t achieve the stability they promise in an allegedly Hobbesian world (Bray 2019). Instead, anarchists advocate for rights, and their enforcement, through the generalization of education, popular pressure, norms, and customs, as opposed to statutory law. While “civil society” exists outside the state and capital, most conceptualizations of

a civil sphere still advocate for peaceful coexistence with those hierarchical institutions, generally tolerate long-entrenched inequalities, and overlook systemic violence while condemning anti-systemic violence (see Bamyeh 2009). In place of the state, anarchists advocate for self-organized free spaces (e.g., Makhnovshchina during the Ukrainian Revolution), establishing autonomy instead of nationalism and voluntarily associating with other organizational formations. Instead of using large social engineering policies like state social welfare to satisfy needs (or forestall revolutionary agitation), anarchists advocate mutual aid premised on humanity’s natural impulses to help each other (Firth 2022). Anarchist movements require a particular analytical lens to assess. Despite claims that anarchists cannot form movements, it is clear that they possess all relevant qualities: they organize extra-institutionally, possess a collective identity and engage in collective action, exist in conflictual relations with various institutions, and constitute informal networks of individuals and organizations. This qualifies anarchism as a movement. But anarchists also participate in other movements, too, where they occupy those movements’ most radical wings, combining anarchist politics and self-identification to form sub-movements like eco-anarchism, Black anarchism, and radical antifascism. Standard organizational forms include networks, collectives, affinity groups, and federations. Many organizations are deliberately small and temporary, whereas others are longer-lasting and confederated from the ground up. Distribution analyses note them in nearly every country, often in major cities, and with a wide diversity of foci. These organizations can possess different scales— local, regional, national, or even international. What qualifies as “anarchist” is often subjective in these counts, and data quality is often questionable, as anarchists seek to avoid surveillance and repression (Williams 2017). Standard sociological social movement theories weren’t created with radical antiauthoritarianism in mind. Still, theories can explain parts of anarchist movement structure and behavior, while modification to popular theories offers the greatest promise to more fully explain anarchism (Williams 2017, Williams 2018a). Dana M. Williams

12  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology The interdisciplinary field of anarchist studies brings together anarchistic academics, public intellectuals, and scholarly-oriented activists with interests in sociology, political science, history, and anthropology. According to the North American Anarchist Studies Network’s statement of purpose, its focus is “research, scholarship, education, and theorization” either about anarchism or informed by anarchism. Anarchist studies possess an ambivalence toward standard academic hierarchies and their tacit support for capitalism and statecraft. As such, the academy is a site of cooptation and mythologizing about radical intellectuals, whose strictures ultimately neuter and render ineffective anarchist academics. Yet, the academy is also a self-managed space for inquiry and occasionally radical critique (especially for younger generations) and a place to support unpopular scholarship on marginalized radicals and social alternatives. The academy’s origins in medieval Europe means universities function on a craft basis: offering tenure and worker control, albeit alongside formidable social hierarchies and customs of prestige and deference, which keep dissidents in line. Thus, anarchist studies have an erstwhile home in the academy, but also draw upon anarchist movements, as it cannot rely upon the academy alone for strength and protection. Anarchism lacks an overt presence within sociology—unlike Marxism and feminism— due to academia and scholarly disciplines’ structures, anarchism’s values, and the deliberate exclusion of anarchist voices (Williams 2022). Instead, an anarchist sociology remains a distinct possibility in the future, wherein a “big tent” treats anarchist sociology as a subject matter, subfield, caucus, ideology, and theoretical perspective. Anarchist sociology’s purpose could be to challenge the sociology discipline with anarchist thought and praxis, as well as to introduce sociological insights and rigor to anarchist movements (Levy 2019, Shantz & Williams 2013). Practically, this may use study groups, anarchist departments, caucuses of anarchist sociologists within professional organizations, and independent individuals who adopt the label. There are many connections between nineteenth-century anarchists and sociologists, although the early history is a tentative one. Most prominently, sociologists such as Marx, Weber, Sorokin, Veblen, DuBois, and Dana M. Williams

Durkheim either engaged with anarchists or knew about anarchism (Williams 2014). Today, many diverse techniques are used in pursuit of anarchist sociology, including mainstream sociological methods, alongside critics of those same methods, while some favor more radical approaches like militant ethnography (Amster et al. 2009, Williams & Shantz 2016). Directions for future research on anarchism and political sociology include an anarchist analysis of the political trust concept; a consideration of how anarchism and anarchist movements pertain to well-established civil society theories; a multi-level anarchist critique of modern state bureaucracies; an assessment of the micro-politics of anarchist movements; studies on anarchist coalitionbuilding within non-anarchist movements; and an anarchist studies expansion into new areas, such as sociological network and queer theorizing, and an interpretation of classic anarchists such as Emma Goldman, Errico Malatesta, and Rudolf Rocker as sociologists—alongside a deeper historical consideration of other anarchists heretofore suggested as sociological thinkers (i.e., Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and Peter Kropotkin). Dana M. Williams

References Amster, Randall, Abraham DeLeon, Luis A. Fernandez, Anthony J. Nocella, and Deric Shannon. 2009. Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy. London: Routledge. Bamyeh, Mohammed. 2009. Anarchy as Order: The History and Future of Civic Humanity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Bray, Mark. 2019. “Beyond and Against the State: Anarchist Contributions to Human Rights History and Theory”. Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 10 (3): 323–338. Cornell, Andrew. 2016. Unruly Equality: U.S. Anarchism in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Day, Richard J.F. 2005. Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. London: Pluto Press.

anarchism  13 Dixon, Chris. 2014. Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s Transformative Movements. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Finn, Mike. 2021. Debating Anarchism: A History of Action, Ideas and Movements. New York: Bloomsbury. Firth, Rhiannon. 2022. Disaster Anarchy: Mutual Aid and Radical Action. London: Pluto Press. Gordon, Uri. 2009. “Power and Anarchy: In/equality + In/visilibity in Autonomous Politics”. In New Perspectives on Anarchism, edited by N. Jun & S. Wahl, pp. 39–66. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Graham, Robert. 2015. We do not Fear Anarchy—We Invoke it: The First International and the Origins of the Anarchist Movement. Oakland, CA: AK Press. Guillamón, Agustin. 2014. Ready for Revolution: The CNT Defense Committees in Barcelona, 1933–1938. Oakland, CA: AK Press. Levy, Carl. 2019. “Introduction: Anarchism Encounters the Humanities and the Social Sciences”. In The Anarchist Imagination: Anarchism Encounters the Humanities and the Social Sciences, edited by C. Levy & S. Newman, pp. 1–29. London: Routledge. Marshall, Peter. 2010. Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. Oakland, CA: PM Press. Michels, Robert. 1959. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Dover. Mintz, Frank. 2013. Anarchism and Workers’ Self-Management in Revolutionary Spain. Oakland, CA: AK Press. Potiker, Spencer Louis, Dana M. Williams, and Jake Alimahomed-Wilson. 2022. “Anarchist and Anarchistic Anti-Systemic

Movements in World-Systems Perspective: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Non-State Spaces”. Journal of WorldSystems Research, 28 (2):188–218. Scott, James C. 2010. The Art of not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shantz, Jeff and Dana M. Williams. 2013. Anarchy & Society: Reflections on Anarchist Sociology. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. Ward, Colin. 1996. Anarchy in Action. London: Freedom Press. Williams, Dana M. 2014. “A Society in Revolt or Under Analysis? Investigating the Dialogue Between Nineteenth Century Anarchists and Sociologists”. Critical Sociology, 40 (3): 469–492. Williams, Dana M. 2017. Black Flags and Social Movements: A Sociological Analysis of Movement Anarchism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Williams, Dana M. 2018a. “Contemporary Anarchist and Anarchistic Movements”. Sociology Compass, 12 (6): 1–17. Williams, Dana M. 2018b. “Tactics: Conceptions of Social Change, Revolution, and Anarchist Organisation”. In PalgraveMacmillan Handbook on Anarchism, edited by C. Levy & M. Adams, pp. 107– 123. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. Williams, Dana M. 2022. “Taming All Challengers: Academically and Philosophically Situating AnarchistSociology in North America”. Anarchist Studies, 30 (1): 30–57. Williams, Dana and Jeff Shantz. 2016. “An Anarchist in the Academy, a Sociologist in the Movement: The Life, Activism, and Ideas of Howard J. Ehrlich”. Journal for the Study of Radicalism, 10 (2): 101–122.

Dana M. Williams

4. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes

leaders from power through institutionalized peaceful methods. Totalitarian regimes seek to maximize their power over the population and dominate every sphere of life (Arendt, 1958; Wintrobe, 2000). Totalitarian regimes are highly repressive, and the state rules through a system of terror, making use of an extensive surveillance system. Citizens are constantly being spied on by the secret police, and many citizens may serve as informants. In North Korea, the surveillance and invasion of the public’s privacy is unrelenting. As North Koreans are constantly being watched, even the most trivial gesture of disloyalty is met with harsh punishment. As such, North Korean prisons resemble small cities, with one of their prison camps holding 50,000 inmates (Haggard & Nolan, 2009). Almost all North Korean prisoners face starvation and hard labour. Eritrea also represents a modern example of totalitarian leadership. Citizens face forced labour and indefinite military conscription and are prohibited from expressing their opinions (Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2014). The totalitarian state also has total control over information and communication and uses propaganda to brainwash the public to undyingly support the regime. The regime creates an elaborate ideology to justify its repressive style of rule and indoctrinates its citizens from a very young age about the accomplishments of the regime. Indoctrination may also take place in authoritarian regimes as well, but this is not as all encompassing. Ideology may be important to an authoritarian regime when it first takes power, but over time the regime loses this focus and concentrates entirely on staying in power through more transactional methods, such as developing patron–client relationships. In totalitarian systems, there is no room for the opposition or opposing voices. All critics are silenced, and opposition to the regime is not tolerated. In contrast, authoritarian regimes may allow for some opposition to exist and may even allow the opposition to run in elections, which have varying degrees of credibility. Elections in authoritarian regimes have mostly a predetermined outcome, as the playing field is not level even when the regime does not engage in outright fraud. Authoritarian regimes may also allow a small space for civil society, though this is heavily controlled. In totalitarian regimes, citizens are expected to become actively involved and fully mobilized in support of the regime.

An authoritarian regime is a form of government where a single leader (or group of individuals) holds absolute power. Though the term dictatorship is largely synonymous with authoritarian regime and autocracy, there is no consensus on whether a dictatorship refers specifically to one-man rule and should therefore be distinct from other authoritarian labels. For this entry, we use the terms dictatorship, autocracy and authoritarian regime interchangeably. Though there are many different types of autocracy, there is a general consensus that its defining characteristic is that there is no turnover in power of the executive (Geddes, 1999). This is the single most distinguishing feature between dictatorship and democracy (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Elections may take place, but there is little doubt about who the winner will be. Additionally, authoritarian regimes prohibit civil liberties and fail to implement the rule of law. There are usually few mechanisms to hold those that abuse power accountable, and elites are free to use the state for their own private gain without repercussions. Constitutions may exist on paper only or are written in ways to constrain the press, civil society and the wider public. Early work on dictatorships began in the late 1930s and 1940s as scholars sought to explain the emergence of a new political phenomenon – the rise of a previously unseen type of dictatorship in the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, Germany under Adolph Hitler and Italy under Benito Mussolini. This led to seminal studies that examined how dictatorships differed by degree of authoritarianism and control, making the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Brzezinski, 1956; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956; Linz & Linz, 2000). Totalitarian regimes are systems of government where the state monopolizes authority over the entire nation and controls both public and private activities. Totalitarian regimes are led by a powerful leader, a single mass party and possess an extensive security apparatus to maintain control over their citizens. The mass party, the leader and the security institutions are never accountable to the public, and there is no way to remove the 14

authoritarian and totalitarian regimes  15 According to Linz, this is another important difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The former would prefer that citizens are demobilized and apathetic, willing to look the other way and allow the regime to get on with things. Totalitarian systems demand that citizens are deeply loyal to the regime, the party and the leader and any departure from this is met with harsh punishment. The main issue in the study of totalitarian regimes is that, since the Cold War ended, there are very few that exist today to study. With the exception of the examples given of North Korea and Eritrea, all dictatorships today are arguably authoritarian. Furthermore, the landscape of dictatorships is far more varied and nuanced than just two categories. There was increasing interest in how to better understand how authoritarian regimes differ from one another, based on not just the degree of power but who held power. Thus, contemporary approaches to disaggregating authoritarian regimes have looked at the structures of dictatorships and the strategies of these regimes for remaining in power. Work by Barbara Geddes (1999; 2005) disaggregated autocracies based on who made decisions, who controlled access to patronage and what segments of society the regime relied on for support. Based on these criteria, Geddes argues that autocracies can be designated as a personalist, single-party or military regime. Further studies added the category of monarchies and theocracies, the latter of which only exists in Iran at the moment. Personalist regimes have power concentrated in the hands of one person. The dictator is free to rule by decree unencumbered by the power of other political elites, the police and the military. As a result, policies tend to be highly variable and unpredictable. For example, Hastings Banda of Malawi decreed one day that women were forbidden from wearing trousers. The lack of checks on the leader’s power also means that the dictator is free to abuse power without repercussions. The military, in particular, is deliberately weakened, in order to prevent it from challenging the power of the dictator. All of the institutions of the state become subsumed under the dictator’s power. Instead of hiring competent technocrats to fill positions of the state, the personalist dictator relies on family members and loyalists, hollowing out the state. The outcomes for states run by

personalist dictators are predictably poor. They underperform in almost every way—in terms of economic development, corruption and in conflict. Examples of personalist rulers include Vladimir Putin, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, Idi Amin, Ferdinand Marcos, François Duvalier and Alexander Lukashenko. Military regimes are regimes run by a military junta. The military has had a history in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s) of staging a coup in order to restore order and, supposedly, to later return power to civilians. In many instances, the military decided to stay put and rule the country on the pretext that civilian rule was incompetent and poorly suited to govern. Most military regimes do not rule for very long, however. There are inherent weaknesses in military rule that undermine a long stay in power. Often the military would prefer to go back to the barracks and retain their legitimacy rather than see their institution become divided by political differences. Splits often happen when the military takes over, making military rule a threat to the institution’s unity. When the military governs, there are more veto players than in personalist dictatorships, but the military usually has little experience with governance and prioritizes security spending over investing in healthcare, education and welfare. The military was once believed to be the best institution in the developing world to govern and generate economic growth, but now studies have demonstrated that any growth that takes place in military regimes is in spite of military rule and not because of it (Geddes et al., 2014). Very few military regimes exist today. Examples of military rule in the past include Turkey (1980–1983), Nigeria (1966–1979 and 1983– 1993) and Argentina (1976–1983). Military rule has been a near constant in Thailand, with brief interludes with democracy, and in Algeria. Single-party regimes are regimes in which policy‑making control and political offices are in the hands of a single party (Geddes, 1999). Other parties may be allowed to operate, compete in elections and hold political posts, but they have very little influence. The party controls all of the state institutions and dominates local government, civil society and the media. There are greater checks on the power of the leader, however. The party Natasha Lindstaedt

16  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology may have one leader in charge at one time, but there are many different political elites in the system that may possess veto power over decisions. Outcomes in single-party rule are often the result of discussions and deliberations involving members of the party elite. This leads to greater levels of predictability in terms of policy output, as decisions are not made due to the whims of a single person. Single-party regimes also do not only recruit just family members. While being loyal to the party is important, technocrats may be recruited as well. Furthermore, the party does not deliberately weaken the military in order to prevent it from staging a coup. Instead, the military is often professionalized and indoctrinated with the party’s propaganda. Examples of single-party regimes include China, Laos, Vietnam, Tanzania and Mexico before 2000. These regimes tend to last the longest and experience the fewest coups (Geddes, 2005). They are also more likely to generate economic growth (Keefer, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011; Wright, 2008). Monarchies operate very similarly to single party regimes, but instead of being headed by a ruling party, there is a ruling family in charge. The family is often nowhere near as large as a single party, but there are considerably more people involved in making decisions than meets the eye. This means that there are more veto players in making decisions than in a personalist dictatorship and monarchies tend to have fairly stable policy output because greater levels of consensus are needed in making decisions. Unlike single-party regimes that use some sort of political ideology to justify their hold on power, monarchies rely on traditional forms of legitimacy to garner the support of the public. Monarchies are often very repressive with little space for free expression or for civil society. The public is essentially the monarch’s subjects, not citizens, and the relationships are highly patron-clientelistic. There are no public goods. Instead, gifts are bestowed upon a monarch’s subjects. Within monarchies, there is a wide range of variation in terms of the degree to which power is personalized, the level of freedoms that citizens enjoy and how developed other political institutions are (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). For example, Kuwait has had a parliament since 1962, while there is no equivalent in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia was once ruled by consensus but has become increasingly personalized under Natasha Lindstaedt

Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Other examples of monarchies include Morocco, Oman, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. In comparison to the totalitarian period, dictatorships in the post-Cold War period have tried to adopt democratic institutions but only to prolong their rule. Dictatorships today possess all of the institutional features of democracy, such as elections, and have legislatures, judiciaries, constitutions and political parties, but there is little representation and accountability. The institutions serve the interest of the dictator by providing legitimacy for the regime and helping to manage elite conflict. Future research looks to better understand why citizens support autocracies and the legacy of dictatorships for citizens’ attitudes towards democracy today. Natasha Lindstaedt

References Arendt, H. 1958. Totalitarian imperialism: Reflections on the Hungarian revolution. The Journal of Politics, 20(1), pp. 5–43. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1956. Totalitarianism and rationality. American Political Science Review, 50(3), pp. 751–763. Ezrow, N.M. and Frantz, E. 2011. Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding authoritarian regimes and their leaders. Bloomsbury Publishing. Friedrich, C. and Brzezinski, Z. 1956. Totalitarian dictatorship and autocracy. Harvard University Press. Gandhi, J. 2008. Dictatorial institutions and their impact on economic growth. European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 49(1), pp. 3–30. Geddes, B. 1999. What do we know about democratization after twenty years?. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), pp. 115–144. Geddes, B. 2005. Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes?. In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (pp. 456–471), September. Geddes, B., Frantz, E. and Wright, J.G. 2014. Military rule. Annual Review of Political Science, 17, pp. 147–162. Gehlbach, S. and Keefer, P. 2011. Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies. Journal of Comparative Economics, 39(2), pp. 123–139.

authoritarian and totalitarian regimes  17 Haggard, S. and Noland, M. 2009. Repression and punishment in North Korea: Survey of prison camp experiences. East West Centre, pp. 1–43. Keefer, P. 2007. Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), pp. 804–821. Linz, J.J. and Linz, J.J. 2000. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Schmitter, P.C. and Karl, T.L. 1991. What democracy is... and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), pp.75–88.

Tronvoll, K. and Mekonnen, D.R. 2014. African Garrison state: Human rights and political development in Eritrea (Vol. 21). Boydell & Brewer Ltd. Wintrobe, R. 2000. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge University Press. Wright, J. 2008. Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), pp. 322–343.

Natasha Lindstaedt

5. Biopolitics

A complex notion, “biopolitics” is developed in a dual relation to two older terms, both belonging to the toolkit of the genealogy of power, sovereignty and discipline. Reflecting Foucault’s aversion to system-driven analyses, the concept’s relation to the two older terms is not symmetrical. His epistemological objects are always teased out of messy empirical fields of conflicting forces and inert materialities. Following Foucault, the finality of sovereignty as a historically specific diagram of power resides in wealth and territory; it operates on a macro-level through taxation, law enforcement, and violence, and its dominant form of individualizing is the royal subject (taxpayer, subject of law). On the other hand, discipline is a technology of the body, functioning on a micro-level, its instruments are drill and training, and it individualizes through collective forms. The prime objectives of the biopolitical practices of the nineteenth century are neither taxation nor the production of disciplined bodies, but rather the well-being of the population, and its means of operation are analysis, security measures, and control. Thereby the focus of Foucault’s analytics of power shifts from the microphysics of discipline and castigation to the question of the health of the body politic and the practical issues and security of dayto-day governing. If, on a macro-level, biopolitics replaces the paradigm of sovereignty, it also appropriates it, transforming the figure of the royal sovereign into the abstract notion of the sovereign nation. With the introduction of biopolitics as the horizon of governing the population, a new analytical meso-level (or plane) is introduced in the Foucauldian toolkit, “le dispositif” (Foucault 1976: 99). The dispositif names the strategic intervention in a given singular situation through the means of practical strategic measures to obtain specific goals, whether of a long-term or a short-term nature. The term is symptomatic of Foucault’s move from analyses that accented the pre-reflexive conditions of speaking or acting—be it the regularities of discourse or the second nature of socialization—to the study of the problematization of the same conditions, be they in the form of reflections upon the arts of governing or the hermeneutics of the self. A shift in the scope of Foucauldian analyses takes place emphasizing two aspects less accentuated earlier, the meso-levels of historical processes, and the strategic and reflexive dimensions of

The term “Bio-politique” circumscribes, identifies, and conceptually articulates what Foucault in La volonté de savoir (1976) deemed a pivotal historical shift in the political rationalities of late eighteenth-century Europe. “Undoubtedly for the first time in history, the biological is reflected in the political” (Foucault 1976: 187). With the rise of such disciplines as la science de la police, Statistik, and political economy, “human life” emerges as practical and theoretical reality in the intersections between natural history, medicine, philosophy, and political theory. As early industrialism recognized labor as an input factor, the political economy of Adam Smith (1723–1790) emphasized the economic value of life. The profound significance of the human population for the upkeep of the state was voiced with particular emphasis by Thomas Robert Malthus (1766– 1834) and David Ricardo (1772–1823), altering the perception of the relationship between state and society. The appearance of biopolitics redefined the range and aims of practical politics. Demographics and economics came to designate two new and inseparable realities upon which biopolitical governance would rest. No longer meted out and celebrated by the royal subjects’ chastised bodies, sovereign justice, pace Foucault, yielded to the double logic of the microphysics of the pliable body and the macrophysics of the population (Foucault 1975: 162). The sword, once the privilege of the prince, symbolizing sovereign power and capital punishment, was replaced by the care for the living, as life became the source of value and national might. The concept “Bio-politique” is introduced towards the end of the spring 1976 lectures, Il faut defendre la société, in a brief analysis of the origins of modern racism (Foucault 1997: 216). Two years later in Sécurité, territoire, population, the term signals a shift away from the knowledge-power-matrix (matrice de savoir-pouvoir) that had provided the analytical framework for Foucault’s work in the first half of the decade. In lieu of the double perspective of discourse analysis and the microphysics of power, a new conceptual triad is gradually introduced that would structure his work in the last years of the 1970s, governmentality, control, and subjectivity/subjectivization (Foucault 2012: 13). 18

biopolitics  19 power, symptomatically reformulated as conduire des conduites (Foucault 2004a: 196197, Foucault 2004b: 258.). If the sovereign power of the Renaissance prince offered physical protection from external dangers—invasion, robbers, and pirates— it also functioned by extortion, suppression, and torture. Repression and violence are its fundamental modes of regulating pathologies of the body politic. Contrarywise, biopolitics works less by restricting; its chief operational mode is production. Rather than confirming itself in the taking of life, biopolitics cultivates life. If discipline works directly on the individual bodies, biopolitics targets the population as an organic “multiplicity of individuals” (Foucault 2004a: 23). Historically, biopolitical governance is for Foucault the expression of a political rationality that responds to a series of complex historical processes in the eighteenth century spanning agricultural reforms, early industrialism, and an expanding bureaucracy (Foucault 1976: 188). From the point of view of sovereign reason, epidemics, famine, and war, were just as many manifestations of destiny or inscrutable acts of God, and thus beyond the field of politics; on the contrary, within a biopolitical framework, these are the events that governance should anticipate, target, and handle. Its strategies are risk management and prophylactic care for the population and its environment. Unlike many of the critical thinkers that later drew inspiration from Foucault’s analysis of biopolitical reason and developed his concept further—such as Giorgio Agamben (2003), Maurizio Lazzarato (2000), Michael Hardt and Toni Negri (2004)—Foucault does not systematically distinguish between “la biopolitique” and “le bio-pouvoir” (jf. Foucault 2004a: 23) nor is he systematic in his use of hyphens (thus both forms, biopolitique and bio-politique, are used). Much of the current reception of Foucault seems oblivious to the fact that his lectures were not intended to be published. Rather than the archive of a finished argument they are the laboratory for the articulation, testing, and development of terms and ideas. In his published oeuvre, only the final chapter of La volonté de savoir develops the term thoroughly. Indeed, the term’s content and function change as Foucault’s work moves on as a consequence of how it is applied rather than by virtue of any reflections of a meta-theoretical nature. The claims

made by Revel and Lemke that Foucault’s use of the term is inconsistent and often unclear is nevertheless not without justification (Revel 2002: 14, Lemke 2007: 47). Jean Trenel suggests in his analysis of the notion’s fuzziness that it should be understood in light of the two rather different purposes it served. On the one hand, “Biopolitics” provided Foucault with a conceptual platform to reformulate and rethink “the problematics” that came out of the analytics of power, on the other hand it was part of a political reorientation towards issues of gender, health, race, and, eventually, neo-liberalism (Terrel 2010). The concept does not originate in Foucault; its history goes back to the 1920s and the Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén. The term played a role—with different inflections (such as the German Vitalpolitik)—in vitalist, conservative, and anti-democratic theories of state in the inter-war period where political processes were analyzed as expressions of biology (Lehmke 2007: 19). Where his predecessors were prone to a vitalist position that established life and its various expressions as a historical a priori, and the ultimate condition of political interest and action, Foucault’s ambition is instead to map the trajectory of vitalist politics and its complex relationship to the emergence of modern biology, demographics, political economy, and governance—both in practices and in theory. His appropriation of the term is thus a rearticulation of an older—and politically contaminated—concept in a critical analysis that by focusing on the emergence of the notion of biological normativity subverts both the term and the claims it was used to underpin. Biopolitics is thus both an analytical category, the name of a historical field of knowledge, and a political marker. The concept’s changing semantic and functional status cannot be understood without taking into account Foucault’s methodological nominalism (Foucault 2004b: 5). For Foucault concepts are always already overdetermined by the conceptual economy of which they are a part; they are differentially determined by their relation to other concepts (Foucault 1969: 17). While there is a tendency in Foucault’s lectures in the first half of the 1970s, in particular in Théories et institutions penales and La société punitive, to ontologize the notion of social power, manifest for instance in comparisons such as that between “the wage form” and “the prison

Knut Ove Eliassen and Sverre Raffnsøe

20  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology form” (Foucault 2013: 72), or in Surveiller et punir, to draw on a notion of power, not without debt to Deleuze’s vitalism, the latter half of the 1970s sees a Foucault that repeatedly stresses his methodological nominalism. Thus, the introductory discussion of “biopouvoir” in Sécurite, territoire, population highlights that the concept does not entail a theory of the “nature of power”. Instead, he emphasizes, the term is of a pragmatic nature; it names a set of relations, shifting “procedures”, the purpose of which is “to secure power” (Foucault 2004b: 4). It is the name given to relations that have been identified in a given empirical corpus aided by simple analytical questions such as “where?”, “who?”, “when?”, “in which ways?”, “to what effect?”, and so on. The epithet “bio-” does not change this non-essentialist, pragmatic definition of power; instead, it conceptually circumscribes and limits the scope of the archive. The aim of Foucault’s analyses is to identify the complex effects to the occidental societies – from the eighteenth century onward – following the introduction of a new factor in the practice and theory of governance, namely the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species (Foucault 2004b: 3). If the ultimate reason for sovereign power is violence, then the rationality of biopolitics is of a cybernetic nature; it governs indirectly, by feedback-mechanisms; its objective is less the individual body than the conditions under which populations exist. Rather than punishment and discipline the protocols of biopolitics are characterized by measuring, assessing, quantifying and qualifying, ranking, and, in the final account, individualizing, regulating, and controlling. What distinguishes such modern institutions as the public school and health systems, modern prisons, and armies, is that they produce vast amounts of information data that are turned into statistics that are fed into mechanisms for social feedback. New forms and objects of knowledge are generated to provide information that prompts certain acts. Schools produce exam papers, pedagogy, and misfits, hospitals clinical observations, public health measures, and patients, and the army protocols for management, means for communication and command, and large amounts of health data—all of which feeds into the biopolitical concept par excellence: normality. Out of the statistics generated by schools, hospitals, and armies come the notions of

norm and normality. Norms are statistical realities before they become standards and benchmarks for health and morals. Schools, hospitals, and military camps not only generate data, they also foster values which again produce deviations: the idea of the statistical average gives the framework for concepts such as norm and normality. The idea of a norm entails “principles of qualification and of correction.” The function of the norm is not to exclude or to discard. Quite on the contrary, it is always linked to a positively given technique of intervention, of change, that is to a kind of normative project (Foucault 1999: 46). “Norm” and “normality” introduce a form of power that doesn’t work through force, but through technologies: “not by law, but by normalisation; not by punishment, but through control, and that is exerted on levels and in forms that transcend the state and its apparatuses” (Foucault 1976: 118). “Biopolitics” may have its legal or pedagogical expressions, still its general form is noso-politics, public health care. Foucault’s concept remained explorative, straddling the two impulses implied by the nuance “bio-politique” and “bio-pouvoir”. If it initially was introduced in Il faut défendre la société as an important impulse in the emergence of state racism, and then, in La volonté de savoir, as something of a correlate to earlier macro-concepts such as “disciplining power”, the analyses in Naissance de la biopolitique rather emphasize its affinity with the particular forms of governing reasons that Foucault refers to, respectively, as liberalism and neoliberalism. And while he stresses the fundamental difference between the two forms of political rationality, his analyses nevertheless draw attention to how they consider life a crucial political factor. However, “biopolitics” does not perform the same analytical work in these distinctly different contexts. In Foucault’s analysis of racism, notably, his point is not that biopolitics by necessity leads to state racism, in so far as political concern for the well-being of the population is also the precondition and a tenet for the welfare state. Different political forms of governance and their accompanying ideologies may find their same historical conditions of existence in the same discursive field with different practical and political outcomes; nevertheless, they elucidate each other mutually. However, Foucault’s approach to the analysis of liberalism and neo-liberalism operates quite differently; it marks a shift

Knut Ove Eliassen and Sverre Raffnsøe

biopolitics  21 from a focus on the relations of power to the forms of governance that organize them. In the analysis of the neo-liberalism of the twentieth century (Erhard, Hayek, Becker, etc.), the concept of “biopolitics” is transformed, being no longer a political field limited to the relation between state and society. By using as his guiding thread the question of how liberty is produced, Foucault extends his perspective to a level beyond Polizeiwissenschaft, discipline, and eugenics; biopolitics becomes the name of a space where liberty is produced, and where life becomes a resource (foyer) for initiatives and resistance, the place for l’inservitude volontaire (Foucault 2004a: 205). Thus, what the term makes visible is the political will to establish a different way to live, other forms of life, what Foucault also names a “biopoetics” (Foucault 2014: 37). “Biopolitics” was initially a label given to conceptualize the historical meeting of two new disciplines, demographics and political economy, on the horizon of practical politics or governance. But what happens when life no longer provides the key to humankind’s historical existence? When biology is confronted with cybernetic and genetics, normative notions such as the natural and the organic fade. It is not a matter of science fiction, Foucault observes (Foucault 2004b: 233ff), whether or not it remains meaningful in the age of stem cells and computers to analyze the political economy of the human organism in biological terms. Whereas the human being “for millennia” “remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence”, this creature has according to Foucault become a different kind of being. With the appearance of biopolitics, the human being became “an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault 1976: 188). Making use of the term “biopolitics” in new and productive ways, Foucault opened a field of investigation that was able to convey and articulate an increasingly close mutual relatedness between and an interpenetration of politics and life. It became clear that politics had become of decisive importance for human existence and its biological realities within the social fabric as an ongoing modulation of human biological existence. With the appearance of biopolitics, the advancement of human biological life became a primary criterion for good governance aiming to strengthen the state and an

inevitable point of reference for politics now perceived as power exerted in and through life. Knut Ove Eliassen and Sverre Raffnsøe

References Agamben, Giorgio. 2003. Ce qui reste de Auschwitz. Paris, Vrin. Foucault, Michel. 1969. L’Archéologie de savoir. Paris, Gallimard. Foucault, Michel. 1975. Surveiller et punir. Paris. Gallimard. Foucault, Michel. 1976. L’Histoire de la sexualité. La volonté de savoir. Paris, Gallimard. Foucault, Michel. 1997. 1975–1976. “Il faut défendre la société”. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 1999. 1974–1975. Les Anormaux. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2003. 1973–1974. Le Pouvoir psychiatrique. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2004a. 1977–1978. Sécurité, territoire, population. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2004b. 1978–1979. Naissance de la biopolitique. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2011. 1970–1971. Leçons sur la volonté de savoir. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2013. 1972–1973. La Société punitive. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2014. 1980– 1981. Subjectivité et vérité. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, Michel. 2015. 1970–1971. Théories et institutions pénales. Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. Hardt, Michael & Negri, Antonio. 2004. Multitude. Paris, La Découverte. Lazzarato, Maurizio. 2000. “Du biopouvoir à la biopolitique”, Paris, Multitudes n° 1. Lehmke, Thomas. 2007. Biopolitik zur Einführung. Hamburg, Junius. Paltrineri, Luca. 2012. L’Expérience du concept. Michel Foucault entre épistémologie et histoire. Paris, Sorbonne. Revel, Judith. 2002. Le Vocabulaire de Foucault. Paris, Ellipses. Revel, Judith. 2004 “La naissance littéraire du biopolitique”, in Michel Foucault, la littérature et les arts. Paris, Kimé. Revel, Judith. 2011. Une pensée du discontinu. Paris, Seuil. Terrel, Jean. 2010. Politiques de Foucault. Paris, Presses universitaires françaises.

Knut Ove Eliassen and Sverre Raffnsøe

6. Bourdieu, Pierre

An abrupt break with familiarity was forced on Bourdieu by his deployment to colonial Algeria. His years there coincided with the struggle for independence and increasingly violent repression. He stayed on, trained himself in the practice of ethnography, and launched collaborative research projects with students and others that durably shaped his orientation to sociology and politics. Understanding Algeria demanded reckoning first with its internal diversity and the tendentious character of claims to unity. Multiple regions had long-standing Berberspeaking societies. There were Arabicspeaking cities. Colonization brought large numbers of French nationals to Algeria. There were complicated relations among these groups and competing principles of integration: Islam, secular nationalism, and the colonial state. The unity of an Algerian people was not obvious—though either to deny it or presume it was a political act. Bourdieu’s first book was published tendentiously with an Algerian flag on its cover though no Algerian state was yet recognized (Bourdieu 1958). It was an effort to see the whole, including its diversity, and yet also a recognition that Algerians did not live in an integrated, singular, state-society. Focusing on the Berber-speaking Kabyle, Bourdieu studied the production of social order through ‘practices’ that mediated between symbolic and material structures and the actions of individuals and groups. Pursuit of power or land was not a differentiated matter of politics or economics but mediated through kinship and marriage and the effort to achieve and maintain a reputation as “a man of honor” (Bourdieu 1972, 1980). In this context, Bourdieu developed concepts that would guide his continued work and inform that of numerous others. Notably, Bourdieu gave new life to the old notion of habitus, which Aristotle had approached as ‘second nature’ and which was central to both Aquinas and later phenomenology. More than simply custom, habitus is embodied knowledge that combines internalized cultural memory and norms with biographical experience of dealing with other people, with structural constraint, and with unequal capacities and resources. “We perceive what happens to us by way of structures that have been put into our minds by what has happened to us” (Bourdieu 2012: 80). Habitus enables individuals to improvise effective

Pierre Bourdieu was born on August 1, 1930, in Denguin, a small village in Southwestern France, where his father was a postal worker. He died in Paris on January 23, 2002, the most famous intellectual in France. He was educated at the Lycée Louis-Barthou in Pau before moving to the Lycée Louis-leGrand in Paris and from there to the École Normale Supérieure. After a year as a secondary school teacher in Moulins, he was conscripted in 1955 and sent to Algeria for military service. He stayed on as a lecturer at the Université d’Alger until 1960. He then returned to Paris, taught at the University of Lille, and was appointed from 1964 to the VIe Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (which became the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) where he also headed the Centre de Sociologie Européenne and launched the interdisciplinary journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. In 1981, he was elected to the chair of sociology at the Collège de France. When he died on January 23, 2002, Le Monde delayed publication by several hours so the front page could carry the news. Informed by Aristotle, building on Weber and Durkheim, in dialog with Marx and Marxism, and indebted to structuralism and phenomenology, Bourdieu pioneered conceptual tools and analytical strategies now widely employed in political sociology. But Bourdieu identified himself emphatically as an empirical researcher and presented his shift from philosophy to sociology as a necessary correction to a field both elitist and insufficiently aware of the society in which it was embedded. Bourdieu challenged common approaches that fail to break with the seemingly ‘natural’ vocabulary and understandings of everyday life. Phenomena like voting behavior, public opinion, political parties, and the state depend on histories and social conditions of possibility. Objectivity can only be obtained by analyzing these conditions. Otherwise, social science unconsciously affirms existing power structures, inhibits attention to the history that produced them, and obscures how they are reproduced or (more rarely) changed in social action (Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron 1968). 22

bourdieu, pierre  23 actions reflecting their position in relation to others, but within a pattern of repeated practices and the reproduction of internalized structures. The concept is important for grasping how social order is maintained without differentiated politics or law but also vital to grasping the tacit order underpinning more explicit strategies when the political field becomes distinct. Bourdieu’s approach to reproduction mediated between the subjectively understood social actions Max Weber famously saw as basic and the external, enduring, and coercive appearance of social structure that Durkheim emphasized. He analyzed symbolic and cultural capital and showed their vulnerability to symbolic violence. He explored how different kinds of resources were accumulated and deployed as different forms of capital in familial and other strategies that managed practical choices in the face of necessity and norms, distinct from capitalism as a process that, like the state, centralized accumulation. He considered how at times of dispute and crisis, Kabyle poets, prophets, elders and analogues among French political figures and public intellectuals could intervene to articulate the demands of normative order, a sort of proto-politics. Without constituting a state, they gave voice to the interest of society in general (212: 46–7). Colonialism and capitalism disrupted this pattern of reproduction. They uprooted people both materially from their homes and land and culturally from their traditions, ways of life, and symbolic order (Bourdieu & Sayad 1964). Labor migration and a new monetary economy subject to far-flung markets were destabilizing (Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, & Seibel 1963). They brought new class alignments (some cross-cutting ethnicity), new significance for religion, and new interests in state power. Revolution, repression, and war each brought further disruptions. The world of distributed, embedded practices did not vanish, but ‘traditional’ structures were stripped of their seeming naturalness and their capacity to organize a vision of society in general. Still valued, family, land, and normative order were recast as particular attachments in tension with the new, wider-reaching organizational principles. Colonialism made this happen with particular speed and brutality, but violent disruption has also been basic to the longer history of European societies. Algeria’s revolutionary struggle, moreover,

exposed internal divisions in a new way: Berber speakers had less access to revolutionary consciousness in the Arab-led struggle (1961). In making modern states the same thing happened. Like states themselves, revolutions and movements demanding new and greater unity had blind spots toward inequalities hidden by ideals of universality. What made modern, Western ‘nationstates’ distinctive was not just an effort to rule multiple societies but to transform and integrate a singular society. Of course, empires sometimes imposed religions, built roads, and changed markets. Bourdieu’s concepts could be used to analyze the range of variation. But his focus was on the broad contrast that differentiated the modern state: “Kabylia, for example, was under Turkish domination for centuries without the local structures, based on the clan or the village, being even slightly affected by the exercise of a central power” (2012: 187). French rule was different. It was disruptively centralizing, and it insisted on incorporating individuals through territorial units rather than clan structures (2012: 224). At the time of Bourdieu’s fieldwork, villagers had to contend with two competing organizational logics. The imposition of new logics, new systems of social classifications, and new constructions of social reality was also central to the development of nation‑states in Europe. Max Weber famously summed up the rise of this kind of state as a long struggle to achieve a monopoly of legitimate violence; Bourdieu modified Weber’s formula to say physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977, 2012). One founding act of symbolic violence during the French Revolution was to declare religion a private matter, illegitimate in the public space. Likewise, the revolutionary state combined the physical violence of killing a monarch with the symbolic violence of killing the principle of hereditary monarchy (Bourdieu 2012: 238–63). Simultaneously, it thus distinguished the public good and reasons of state from mere private interest. The French republican state declared itself definitive of the universal, the general, and the public—by contrast to the merely particular and private. The state was produced by relatively empowered actors, struggling for wider power and more effective administration. Endless repetition has made the idea that the French Revolution was an uprising of the Craig Calhoun

24  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology already-formed people seem intuitive. But, says Bourdieu, “this democratic view is false . . . If the people are unified it is in relation to a state, not as the prior condition for the state” (2012: 32). The state enforced borders, built roads and schools, and unified markets. It centralized power and resources but at the same time integrated citizens into a new kind of cohesive whole. Indeed, the very status of ‘citizen’ cannot exist outside the state’s constitution and consecration: it is not the same as either a ‘natural’ person or a ‘subject’. The work of the state produced the nation: “the whole body of citizens with a frontier”, “a unified population speaking the same language” (2012: 32–3). Both the frontier—the very shape of the state—and the language could be taken for granted, naturalized, understood as obvious and somehow always already there. Bourdieu describes these underlying, minimally conscious orientations as doxa. Rather than requiring explicit consent, they govern what is tacitly accepted as self-evident, the basis for automatic consensus. But, says Bourdieu, this is the kind of false naturalization that political sociology needs to analyze. The state could not achieve all the conformity or cohesion it needed by means of doxa. It also relied on law, policy, and public rhetoric to produce orthodoxy—the official view and rules of the game for proper social order. The principles of publicness and disinterestedness were basic. These paved the way for democracy with its notion of equal rights and also for bureaucracy with its insistence on rationality, rules, and the sharp separation of an office from the personal interests of an incumbent. Of course, neither was perfectly realized. There is never full, equal inclusion. The most honest official still has particular interests and a particular perspective on the general good. Likewise, the very project of orthodoxy implies heterodoxy—challenges and refusals to conform to the state’s official norms. But these core principles set terms for future political struggles. In these struggles, the state is not an autonomous, integral organizational structure or set of apparatuses. The juridical field is distinct from the bureaucratic field. There is contention among different administrative bodies, local and national; agencies like police, post office, and tax collectors; executive and legislature; elected officials within government and in opposition. The state is also active in relation to the economy. It establishes money and monetary policy, operates contract and Craig Calhoun

property law, builds roads to expand trade, invests in new technologies, and educates workers for jobs in the private sector. Of all fields, business is closest to the market but not directly reducible to it. It seeks autonomy by balancing state power with market demands and opportunities. Education, science, health, media, and art are also organized with relative autonomy and must balance relations to the state and market. If science is to deliver new knowledge, for example, it must organize the practices and hierarchy of the field to encourage the pursuit of truth and resist immediate reduction to either market incentives or state power (Bourdieu 2001). Artists must defend art for itself or at least for beauty, not art, to serve the state or market (Bourdieu 1983, 1992). Each field thus cultivates a stance of disinterestedness toward powerful outside forces in order to pursue fieldspecific interests. At the same time, a common underlying structure creates unity of a kind in a national hierarchy of distinction. After WWII, the world’s capitalist democracies saw both an economic boom and a massive expansion of state investment in public welfare. Known in France as “les trente glorieuses,” this period brought new services and opportunities but was also an effort to secure the loyalty of citizens. This offered a “spectacle of universality” as the provision of ostensibly equal services dramatized the inclusion of all citizens (2012: 28). But, as Bourdieu had observed in Algeria, “unification benefits the dominant” (2000). Citizens were very unequally prepared to benefit from ostensibly universal opportunities. Bourdieu set out to make visible—and thus available to political contestation—the inequalities that were nonetheless built into the welfare state and all the different fields providing the public good (Bourdieu & Passeron 1970, Bourdieu 1993). Mass access to education became Bourdieu’s prime example of inequalities hidden in a seemingly universal pursuit. Assessment stressed formal, meritocratic selection but in fact provided room for subjective judgment—say of writing styles—that reproduced a whole pattern of cultural distinction with older, even aristocratic roots (Bourdieu & Passeron 1964). Families developed strategies (conscious or unconscious) to advantage their children in the assessment structures that governed promotion and access to the best schools. Seeking to convert monetary wealth into educational credentials

bourdieu, pierre  25 and future success for their children, they developed a kind of cultural capital: manners, attitudes, and familiarity with high-status art or literature. This was partially embodied in a habitus, the sum of skills, knowledge, and abilities required to occupy a particular position in any field. What might seem abstract intellectual questions of judgment and taste were analyzed by Bourdieu as embodied, practical relations to culture mediated by material inequality. However much differentiated fields perpetuate inequalities, they also serve to buffer the impacts of capitalism. Inequality could have been greater (and in much of the world was greater than in France). The benefits of capitalist growth were channeled not only into private wealth but also investments in public goods from education to art, health care to media, science to housing and infrastructure. Differentiation into fields meant that there were protagonists for struggles to protect specific gains as well as social movements within the field of power more generally. In the last decade of his life, Bourdieu focused increasingly on how this social arrangement has come under threat from neoliberalism. The modern state foregrounded promises it did not fulfill. Bourdieu analyzed the ways they fell short, but he also recognized achievements to be defended. Nearly all the concerns that animated Bourdieu’s work remain important for political sociology. New research informed by Bourdieu is prominent on questions of gender and power, crises of democratic politics, new forms of social movements, the importance and limits of decolonization, the relation of cultural to material struggles, and the relationship of macrosocial structures to interpersonal relations. Craig Calhoun

References Bourdieu, Pierre, “Révolution dans la Revolution,” Esprit 1 (January 1961): 27–40. Bourdieu, Pierre, The Algerians (Boston: Beacon, 1962, orig. 1958). Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; orig. 1972).

Bourdieu, Pierre, Distinction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984; orig. 1979). Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1980). Bourdieu, Pierre, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990; orig. 1980). Bourdieu, Pierre, “On Symbolic Power,” pp. 163–70, in Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity, 1991: orig. 1977). Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; orig. 1983). Bourdieu, Pierre, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; orig. 1992). Bourdieu, Pierre, ed., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1999; orig. 1993). Bourdieu, Pierre, “Unite and Rule,” pp. 82– 96, in Firing Back (New York: New Press, 2002; orig. 2000). Bourdieu, Pierre, Science of Science and Reflexivity (Cambridge: Polity, 2004; orig. 2001). Bourdieu, Pierre, On the State (Cambridge: Polity, 2014; orig. 2012). Bourdieu, et al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000; orig. 1993). Bourdieu and J.-C. Passeron, The Inheritors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1873; orig. 1964). Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, and Seibel, Travail et travailleurs en Algérie (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1963). Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, The Craft of Sociology (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991; orig. 1968). Bourdieu and Passeron, The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relation to Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; orig. 1964). Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture (London: Sage, 1990; orig. 1970). Bourdieu and Sayad, Le Déracinement: La Crise de l’agriculture algérienne (Paris: Minuit, 1964).

Craig Calhoun

7. Bureaucracy

properties of the ideal type. Public bureaucracies with Weberian features were established in many countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (for example, through Great Britain’s Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854 or the USA’s Pendleton Act of 1883) and the early twenty-first century (such as in post-Communist Europe) (Meyer-Sahling, 2004; Nistotskaya, 2009), but in many countries public bureaucracy is less conformant to the Weberian ideal (Nistotskaya et al., 2021; Schuster et al., 2023). The onset of a New Public Management philosophy and practice of public administration in the 1980s has affected both the Weberian and non-Weberian organizational forms of bureaucracy (for example, the supremacy of legal principle was challenged by the efficiency principle), resulting in an even larger diversity of organizational forms (Gualmini, 2008). Weberian bureaucracy has been long recognized as a relevant attribute of good government, but a systematic enquiry into its welfare-enhancing properties began only after World War II. In the 1980s a series of influential studies in the context of South Asia (Amsden, 1989) found that autonomous competent state bureaucracies were one of the key push factors behind the rapid economic development of the Asian Tigers. More recent comparative research has found that Weberianism is associated with such positive societal outcomes as economic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999), higher entrepreneurship rates (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016), reduced poverty (Henderson et al., 2007) and corruption (Charron et al., 2017; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017; Oliveros & Shuster, 2018), better public policies (Boräng et al., 2018; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016) and improved health outcomes (Cingolani et al., 2015). Most empirical studies operationalize Weberianism through meritocratic recruitment and career protection, and the use of the terms Weberian and meritocratic bureaucracies as synonyms is common (Fukuyama, 2013). While there is a strong body of empirical evidence on the association between Weberian bureaucracy and human development outcomes, what are the causal mechanisms linking the two? Starting with Weber himself, many scholars have argued the case for the better bureaucratic output inherent in meritocratic recruitment and long-term careers (Evans & Rauch, 1999). Merit-based selection inputs better knowledge and skills

Bureaucratic organizations are an omnipresent feature of modern private and public life, but historically they emerged in the public realm, and the term is most commonly applied to a body of non-elected government officials who carry out decisions adopted by the political leadership of a country. The dominant conception of public bureaucracy is that of Max Weber, who saw the main distinction between modern bureaucracies and their premodern counterparts in the former’s “legalrational” character. Modern bureaucracies are hierarchical, specialized, meritocratic, salaried and rule-bound organizations (Gerth & Mills, 1970, pp. 196–244). Prior to modernization, public bureaucracies were patrimonial (operated on the basis of kinship or personal ties to the ruler) and prebendal (selffinanced through the imposition of fees on the people within the bureaucracy’s jurisdiction). In contrast to this, modern bureaucracies are characterized by the strict separation of offices and officeholders, which implies no private ownership of offices, including no right to extract rent from public office by the officeholder. They employ personnel selected through a recruitment process that prioritizes knowledge, skills and experience relevant to the duties of office. Under meritocratic recruitment, the power to appoint is in the hands of standing (civil service) commissions or specially formed vacancy contest juries, and the process usually involves public vacancy calls and a check of the candidate’s suitability for the post via examination or interview. In a Weberian bureaucracy, meritocratically recruited bureaucrats regularly receive salaries from state budgets and cannot use their office to cover the costs of holding it or for any other private gain. They also enjoy careers protected from arbitrary dismissal (security of tenure) and promotions and pay progressions that are determined primarily, but not exclusively, by length of service within the bureaucracy. Legal norms, rather than personal or political loyalty, economic efficiency or effectiveness, determine the standards of bureaucratic conduct in modern bureaucracy. Weber’s conception of modern public bureaucracy is an ideal-type analytical construct in which no empirical case has all the 26

bureaucracy  27 into the machinery of government, and longer tenure activates a “learning by doing” mechanism, which, in turn, increases the probability of a political system producing better public policies and implementing them efficiently (Boräng et al., 2018; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). Oppositely, politicized recruitment leads to the selection of less competent individuals (Colonnelli et al., 2020). In other words, emanating from meritocratic recruitment and tenure protection, the higher epistemic quality of Weberian bureaucracy makes it a better implementational tool for the political decisions set forth by political leaders. The higher competence of public bureaucracy contributes to higher state capacity (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2021). A different perspective comes from the new institutional economics. Being largely concerned with the propensities of those who control the power of the state to abuse this power, the search for institutional solutions that would credibly commit the rulers not to perform such abuses led some scholars to see Weberian bureaucracy as one such credible commitment device (Miller, 2000). By limiting politicians’ powers over making and breaking bureaucratic careers through meritocratic recruitment and protection from arbitrary dismissals (tenure protection) or transfer (Brierley, 2020), bureaucrats become non-responsive to the narrow short-term (reelection) or openly rent-seeking interests of individual politicians (yet sufficiently disciplined to be responsive to publicly agreed policies). In other words, as politicians cannot influence the hiring and firing of bureaucrats, this makes bureaucrats less attuned to and much less willing to act upon the orders of politicians, such as participation in re-election campaigns (Oliveros & Schuster, 2018) or the production of biased policy knowledge that benefits incumbents (Boräng et al., 2018). In addition to providing bureaucrats with a protective shield against undue demands by politicians, the separation of political and bureaucratic careers may also equip bureaucrats to serve as a check on politicians (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). By being autonomous – or “above politics” – Weberian bureaucracy is seen as one of the institutional solutions to the problem of the time-inconsistent and simply morally hazardous incentives of politicians. The extant empirical literature does not sufficiently clearly distinguish between

the different causal mechanisms that link Weberian bureaucracy and desirable social outcomes. For example, in one of the most influential studies in the field, Evans and Rauch (1999) attribute the positive impact of meritocratic recruitment on economic growth to the combined effects of increased competence, greater internal cohesion and commitment to the norm of integrity. Several recent studies acknowledge the presence of various causal pathways linking meritocratic bureaucracy with desirable social outcomes. For example, Cornell et al. (2020) connect Weberian bureaucracy to economic growth through three specific mechanisms: (1) rulefollowing and impartial decision-making, (2) the increased competence and longer time horizons of bureaucrats and (3) curbing arbitrary interferences by political leaders. They operationalize Weberian bureaucracy using several proxy indicators, not only meritocracy, and their findings are predominantly statistically not significant. Similarly, Boräng et al. (2018) suggest four mechanisms through which politicized bureaucracy (the opposite of meritocratic recruitment) leads to the production of biased official statistics. They point to the plausibility of lower competence, and their other three mechanisms are congruent with the credible commitment literature. For example, they suggest that in politicized public administration bureaucrats are naturally interested in keeping their political patrons – and thus themselves – in office, or that bureaucrats fear that their political patrons will damage their careers and therefore yield to their illicit pressure “to cook” the statistical books. To date, there has been only a single effort to empirically account for alternative causal mechanisms of meritocratic bureaucracies. Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2016) attempt to do so by employing outcome variables that best reflect the state capacity and credible commitment effects – regulatory quality and entrepreneurship rates, respectively – and find meritocratic recruitment to be the single source of both effects. While recognizing the importance of Weberian bureaucracy for achieving a variety of desirable social outcomes, the literature is less precise when it comes to elucidating and testing the causal mechanisms through which bureaucratic structures achieve them. First and foremost, the literature has failed to explicitly recognize the intellectual origins of the main effects of Weberian bureaucracy. Marina Nistotskaya and Palina Kolvani

28  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Two distinct and widely used families of theoretical arguments about efficient social order – the state capacity and credible commitment frameworks – treat higher competence and the autonomy of bureaucrats as the root causes of such. These frameworks, however, differ considerably from each other in how they view state power: while state capacity is about the accumulation of state power, credible commitment is about constraining the use of the power of the state for particularistic aims. From a state capacity point of view, the merit of Weberian bureaucracy is in a stronger state, but credible commitment views Weberian bureaucracy as a constraint on the abuse of state power. In other words, the same structural feature of the organizational design of public bureaucracy – meritocratic recruitment – seems to generate a positive effect on socially desirable outcomes, but this effect has two causal pathways, which are embedded in two very differing theoretical logics. From a policy perspective, this is good news, as the institutionalization of meritocracy could be a major step forward in creating the institutional foundations of a society in which the human condition is improved for most members. If this is the case, a civil service type of public administration reform should be a top priority of developmental programmes. The effort of the international community to reform public administration in the countries of the Global South that peaked in the 1990s (World Bank, 1997), but which has faded since, should not only be reinstated but given new strength. Just as international observation of elections has become one of the forms of democracy support, international observation of meritocratic entry to bureaucracy could be a similarly important measure. Having said this, the insight about the separate, logically differing, causal effects of Weberianism on human development needs stronger scientific support. Research has to go beyond a “package” treatment of Weberian bureaucracy’s effects and empirically ascertain its state capacity and credible commitment impacts. One way to achieve this is by creating novel indicators that carefully measure organizational features pertaining to the ability of politicians to make (hire, promote) and break (fire, demote, relocate) bureaucratic careers. Research comparing the preferences of individual bureaucrats in Weberian and non-Weberian types of organizations constitutes another important avenue of research. Qualitative Marina Nistotskaya and Palina Kolvani

research unpacking the causal effects of Weberian bureaucracy is also needed. Marina Nistotskaya and Palina Kolvani

References Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization. Oxford University Press. Boräng, F., Cornell, A., Grimes, M., & Schuster, C. (2018). Cooking the books: Bureaucratic politicization and policy knowledge. Governance, 31(1), 7–26. Brierley, S. (2020). Unprincipled principals: Co‐opted bureaucrats and corruption in Ghana. American Journal of Political Science, 64(2), 209–222. Charron, N., Dahlström, C., Fazekas, M., & Lapuente, V. (2017). Careers, connections, and corruption risks: Investigating the impact of bureaucratic meritocracy on public procurement processes. The Journal of Politics, 79(1), 89–104. Cingolani, L., Thomsson, K. & de Crombrugghe, D. (2015). Minding Weber more than ever? The impacts of state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy on development goals. World Development, 72, 191–207. Colonnelli, E., Prem, M., & Teso, E. (2020). Patronage and selection in public sector organizations. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3071–3099. Cornell, A., Knutsen, C.H., & Teorell, J. (2020). Bureaucracy and growth. Comparative Political Studies, 53(14), 2246–2282. Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2017). Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government. Cambridge University Press. D‘Arcy, M., & Nistotskaya, M. (2021). State capacity, quality of government, sequencing, and development outcomes. In: A. Bågenholm, M. Bauhr, M. Grimes, & B. Rothstein (eds.), Oxford handbook of the quality of government (pp. 756–780). Oxford University Press. Evans, P., & Rauch, J. (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of “Weberian” state structures on economic growth. American Sociological Review, 64, 748–765. Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? Governance, 26(3), 347–368.

bureaucracy  29 Gerth, H.H., & Mills, C.W. (eds and trans.). (1970). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Oxford University Press. Gualmini, E. (2008). Restructuring Weberian bureaucracy: Comparing managerial reforms in Europe and the United States. Public Administration, 86(1), 75–94. Henderson, J., Hulme, D., Jalilian, H., & Phillips, R. (2007). Bureaucratic effects: Weberian state agencies and poverty reduction. Sociology, 41(3), 515–532. Meyer-Sahling, J.H. (2004). Civil service reform in post-communist Europe: The bumpy road to depoliticisation. West European Politics, 27(1), 71–103. Miller, G. (2000). Above politics: Credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 289–328. Nistotskaya, M., & Cingolani, L. (2016). Bureaucratic structure, regulatory quality, and entrepreneurship in a comparative perspective: Cross-sectional and panel data evidence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(3), 519–534. Nistotskaya, M. (2009). Organizational Design of Welfare-Enhancing Public

Bureaucracy: A Comparative Analysis of Russia’s Regions. Budapest: Central European University. Nistotskaya, M., Dahlberg, S., Dahlström, C., Sundström, A., Axelsson, S., Mert Dalli, C., & Alvarado Pachon, N. (2021). The quality of government expert survey 2020 (Wave III): Report. The Quality of Government Institute Working Paper Series 2. https://gupea​.ub​.gu​.se​/ bitstream ​/ handle​ /2077​ / 69915​ /gupea ​ _ 2077​ _ 69915 ​ _1​ .pdf​ ?sequence​=1. Oliveros, V., & Schuster, C. (2018). Merit, tenure, and bureaucratic behavior: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in the Dominican Republic. Comparative Political Studies, 51(6), 759–792. Schuster, C., Mikkelsen, K.S., Rogger, D., Fukuyama, F., Hasnain, Z., Mistree, D., Meyer‐Sahling, J., Bersch, K., & Kay, K. (2023). The global survey of public servants: Evidence from 1,300,000 public servants in 1,300 government institutions in 23 countries.  Public Administration Review, 83(4), 982–993. World Bank. (1997). World development report 1997: The state in a changing world. New York: Oxford University Press.

Marina Nistotskaya and Palina Kolvani

8. Capitalism

to crises which combine the over-accumulation of capital, which cannot be developed as profitably as desired, under-consumption due to the imbalance in the distribution between wages and profits, and monetary and financial collapse. The question of the origins of capitalism raises the question of the links between economics and politics. A ‘traditional’ explanation of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is the ‘commercialisation model’, which states that capitalism has its roots in commercial activity, the development of which would have enriched certain merchants, allowing them to accumulate sufficient wealth to invest in more efficient production techniques that would have made possible the development of industrial capitalism. This explanation is part of a perspective that sees the emergence of capitalism as a liberation of the economy from political constraints. In this view, capitalism is represented as a quasinatural development of human activity. This separation of economics and politics is found in some Marxist-inspired contributions. The transition from feudalism to capitalism would mark the end of the extortion of surplus by extra-economic means at the disposal of the landlords, law, custom or violence and the beginning of a mode of production where this surplus is appropriated by the capitalists through the participation in the labour market of individuals deprived of the means to ensure their own subsistence. This separation of economics and politics is also found in the competing thesis of the commercialisation model. In a controversial article published in 1976, Robert Brenner argued that capitalism did not originate in the development of commercial activity in urban societies but in rural England between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. What distinguished England from both the merchant cities and other European countries was the centralisation of power which left the nobility with relatively little political power. It was therefore primarily on the political level that the feudal order had almost completely disappeared in England. With no extra-economic means to maintain its rank, the English aristocracy had an interest in obtaining the highest possible economic return from the land it owned. Taking advantage of the existence of an integrated national market, in contrast to the fragmented markets characteristic of the feudal era, landowners rented out their land

The word ‘capitalism’ is commonly used to refer to the economic system which dominates in most economies of the world. Its use refers to a number of distinctive features of a mode of production. A first idea frequently associated with capitalism is that of the market, so much so that the term ‘market economy’ is sometimes used as a synonym for capitalism, thus reducing the guiding principle of this mode of production to mere market exchange. But if markets are indeed a central element of the capitalist system, they are not exclusive to it, and capitalism is not reducible to exchange. The centrality of market exchange can be seen in Braudel’s (1985) definition of capitalism, taken to be the third and final level of the socio-economic organisation of pre-industrial societies. Capitalism is then reduced to the development of merchant capital necessary for long-distance exchange, which evades the limits set by local regulations and the constraints of competition in local markets, allowing the realisation of considerable profits for a relatively small number of merchants. A second idea attached to capitalism is that of the valorisation of capital which is put into production, of the mobilisation of resources with a view to making a maximum profit which will make it possible to increase the capital which will in turn be put into production. The search for maximum profit, the increase of capital and the extension of the domain of the commodity, which includes labour power (Marx 1847, 1965) as well as money and nature (Polanyi 1944), are thus characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. But capital is not reduced to a financial resource; it is, as Marx showed, a particular social relation which is based on the separation between the owners of the means of production and a mass of individuals who only possess their labour power. Capitalism is then driven by a struggle between social classes articulated around this separation. Finally, the accumulation of capital and the increase in production does not ipso facto guarantee an outlet for everything produced. There is no process which ensures that the capitalists’ investment and production plans will be compatible with their expectations of the rate of profit. The anarchy of production then leads 30

capitalism  31 to the highest bidders, which encouraged farmers to use the most productive production methods possible. This profit-maximising logic also led to increasing differentiation within the farming community as a result of intensified competition and the growing concentration of resources in the hands of the most productive farmers. This ‘liberated’ a workforce that was now deprived of the means to ensure its own subsistence and was thus available to serve as a workforce for industry. Industry developed thanks to the existence of a domestic market for cheap products, especially textiles, which also encouraged the development of more productive techniques, the invention of new machines and ultimately industrial development. Questioning the origin of capitalism leads to the possibility of its transformation. If capitalism is characterised by particular social relations that emerged at a certain period, these social relations can change in configuration over time while still characterising the same mode of production: the way in which wages are determined (indexed or not to inflation or productivity, negotiated individually or collectively, etc.), the monetary regime (gold standard, Bretton Woods agreements, floating exchange rates, etc.), the role of the state (‘night watchman’, welfare state, developmental state, etc.), the type of competition (oligopolistic, monopolistic, etc.). The French school of régulation (Aglietta 2015; Boyer 1990) has placed this question at the centre of its research programme with a unified analysis of crises and periods of stability. Reversing the usual perspective of economists, it posed the crisis as a starting point and asked how capitalism could experience episodes of stability for sufficiently long periods instead of being permanently stuck in the anarchy of production. This research has led to a periodisation of capitalism, which is not an immutable mode of production, but is characterised by a succession of modes of régulation ranging from the competitive régulation typical of nineteenth-century capitalism to contemporary financial capitalism, via the monopolistic régulation of the postWorld War II Fordist period. Regulationist analysis is based on a specification of the forms that social relations take and, in particular, the way in which they are embodied in institutions seen as the result of compromises between socio-political forces

(Amable & Palombarini 2009). These compromises are established independently of each other and do not generally aim to ensure the regularity and stability of the economic system as a whole, which means that the overall coherence is not intentional, can only be observed ex-post and is the result of the complementarity between certain institutions. For example, in the Fordist period, a series of institutional changes resulting from social conflicts and compromises between capital and labour led to an increase in real wages and a decrease in labour precariousness, which played a positive role in stabilising the growth trajectory of the developed economies. Each epoch of capitalism is characterised by a particular institutional structure that defines both the conditions for the coherence of the trajectory followed and the modalities of the crises that will affect this trajectory. The differentiation within the capitalist mode of production is not only observed in the temporal dimension. For the same period, national institutional specificities in areas such as wage relations, social protection, the financial system, competition in the markets for goods and services, the public sector and so on are easily observable. How can we explain that similar developing countries can adopt substantially different institutions while remaining within the capitalist mode of production? Michel Albert’s (1993) book, Capitalism versus Capitalism, published shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the apparent victory of capitalism, presented, among other things, two main types of capitalism: the neo-American model (the United States) and the Rhenish model (Germany). The two models were differentiated by social values, individual success versus collective performance for instance, but above all by specific institutions and organisations: financial markets versus banks, individualised labour market versus collective bargaining and so on. The New American model is supposed to be more adaptable to economic changes than the Rhenish model, whose efficiency is based on the patient accumulation of individual or organisational skills. The New American model, on the other hand, is characterised by greater economic inequality. The diversity of capitalism is not, however, reduced to the opposition of two models. The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Amable 2003) distinguished at least five types among Bruno Amable

32  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the OECD economies: neo-liberal capitalism, the social democratic model, the continental European model, the Mediterranean model and the Asian model. They are distinguished by their specific institutional forms in five main areas: goods and services markets and competition, the labour market, the financial system, social protection and education systems. The complementarities between institutions constitute the basis of the coherence of each type of capitalism. They also explain the persistence of this diversity and the difficulties of institutional changes which are initially limited to one area but whose consequences may affect others. Since institutions are the result of socio-political compromises, they do not abolish social conflicts, they can only channel and regulate them. Institutional change implies the reopening of conflicts that the institutionalised compromise had momentarily appeased. Consequently, in order to understand the variations of capitalism both in space and in time, it is necessary to analyse the interactions between economic dynamics and the evolution of socio-political power relations. The question of overcoming capitalism has resurfaced in recent years, after the 2008 crisis when even its defenders called for its ‘moralisation’ or the need to ‘renew’ it (Corneo 2017), as well as in connection with global warming and serious doubts about the capacity of a system whose logic is based on permanent accumulation and growth to cope with the environmental problems largely caused by these phenomena: ‘the “anthropocene” would in fact be a ‘capitalocene’ (Malm & Hornborg 2014; Moore 2017). Streeck’s book How Will Capitalism End? left no doubt about the compromised future of this mode of production: capitalism is disintegrating. But the problem was that there was no replacement for capitalism yet and that we would have to live with a zombie system for some time to come, heralding a prolonged period of crisis with dire economic and social consequences. However, the near-disappearance of socialist economies at the end of the twentieth century left capitalism ‘alone’, as the title of Branko Milanovic’s 2019 book, Capitalism Alone, suggests. The book proposed different solutions for capitalism to solve, at least in part, its problem of the endless growth of inequalities, based on the redistribution of capital to attenuate or even eliminate the separation between the owner of the means of Bruno Amable

production and the proletarians. But the logic of accumulation in conjunction with competition should eventually lead to a differentiation of profit rates and therefore of individual situations which would put society back on an unequal dynamic. The proposed solutions however come up against private property and the reality of social relations in the capitalist mode of production. Contemporary social (inequalities within and across countries…) and environmental (global warming…) problems question the superiority of capitalism as a sustainable economic and social system. But the cultural hegemony of capitalism (Gramsci 1926– 1934) has not diminished sufficiently for a possible exit and transition to a new way of life to be considered feasible by a sufficiently large part of the populations most concerned. Future research on capitalism should then focus on analysing this ideological and political aspect of what is more than a mode of production in the strict sense. Bruno Amable

References Aglietta, M. (2015). A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. The US Experience. Verso. Albert, M. (1993). Capitalism against Capitalism. Wiley. Amable, B. (2003). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford University Press. Amable, B. & Palombarini, S. (2009). A neorealist approach to institutional change and the diversity of capitalism. Socio Economic Review, 7(1), pp. 123–143. Boyer, R. (1990). The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction. Columbia University Press. Braudel, F. (1985). La dynamique du capitalisme. Flammarion. Brenner, R. (1976). Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe. Past & Present, 70(February), pp. 30–75. Corneo, G. (2017). Is Capitalism Obsolete? A Journey through Alternative Economic Systems. Harvard University Press. Gramsci, A. (1926–1934). Lettres de prison: deuxième partie (lettres nos 150 à 309), accessed at http://classiques​.uqac​.ca​/ classiques ​ /gramsci ​ _ antonio ​ / lettres ​ _ de​ _prison​/lettres​_de​_prison​_t2​.pdf. Malm, A. & Hornborg, A. (2014). The geology of mankind? A critique of the

capitalism  33 Anthropocene narrative. The Anthropocene Review, I(1), pp. 62–69. Marx, K. (1847, 1965). Travail salarié et capital. In: K. Marx Œuvres Economie I. Galimard. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, pp. 197–229. Milanovic, B. (2019). Capitalism Alone. The Future of the System That Rules the World. Harvard University Press.

Moore, J.W. (2017) The Capitalocene, Part I: On the nature and origins of our ecological crisis. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 44(3), pp. 594–630. Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. Beacon Press. Streeck, W. (2016). How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. Verso.

Bruno Amable

9. Citizenship

welfare rights to guard against hunger and poverty. Marshall not only saw these three sets of rights as interrelated but also mutually reinforcing so that civil and political rights would tend to lead to social rights as the lower classes became more accepted as full members of English society. While Marshall’s theory is not transferable across the diversity of state formation experiences, it has deeply influenced liberal framings of citizenship as about rights. A criticism of the Marshallian view from the global south is the assumption that the formal extension of rights will lead to social inclusion. A key reason for this is that the history of access to rights in the post-colony was quite different from England, arriving not slowly and sequentially over time through popular pressure but all at once at the moment of national independence (Tapscott & Thompson 2010). Consequently, many of the civil and social rights assigned at independence were not necessarily rooted in anti-colonial struggle and lacked an organisational and cultural basis in the wider society. Philosophically too, the concept of citizenship has multiple traditions. Liberal conceptions centre the concept of citizenship on the equal provision of social, political and civil rights. Citizens, on this account, have protected access to political voice but do not hold responsibilities to act upon this, other than respecting the rights of others (Miller 2000). A republican conception includes these core citizenship rights but contains the further promise of freedom through participation. Republican models, broadly construed, view citizens’ participation in the state as securing their civic freedom or, on contemporary accounts, ensuring freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997). It is this active participation in shaping one’s society that allows the citizen to be both free and governed. African theories of democracy, rooted in consensus, emphasise substantive representation which implies a form of participatory citizenship (Wiredu 1997). In contemporary versions this is argued to value not complete consensus but a process that facilitates citizens taking each other’s interests seriously (Matolino 2009). The good of democratic citizenship, with substantive rights, has highlighted the costs of exclusion for those who are not full citizens of substantive democracies. There are four problems long associated with this question.

Today, citizenship is understood as membership of a particular political community or the state, especially legal membership (Giugni & Grasso 2021). Thus, in contemporary international law, every person is entitled to citizenship of a state through protections against statelessness. The substance of citizenship is in turn determined by each state and the nature of its regime. Where in authoritarian regimes citizenship may amount to little more than legal membership, in democratic states, citizenship comes with the promise of universal civil, social and political rights too. Indeed, rights have been central in the domestic and international politics of democratic states globally over the last 200 years. In sum, despite a common legal meaning, the substantive experience of citizenship varies significantly around the globe. Being a democratic citizen today is associated with multiple social goods, often framed as rights. The substance of these goods is shaped by politics over legal standing, cultural belonging, social and economic rights and political participation (Stokke 2017). Beginning with legal standing, citizenship is acquired by a variety of modes across different states. Citizenship by birth is typically determined either ‘jus sanguinis’, through one’s parents’ citizenship status, or ‘jus soli’, by virtue of being born within that state, or a combination of both. It is possible to change one’s country of citizenship and in some cases to acquire multiple citizenships, but these processes generally present high barriers to access. In addition to legal belonging, the other rights of democratic citizenship are often closely associated. Thus, in his famous essay on citizenship in England, TH Marshall (1950) argued that the advent of capitalism extended citizenship from those of higher status to the general population. This proceeded through the expansion of rights, beginning with civil rights in the eighteenth century, then political rights in the nineteenth century and finally social rights in the twentieth century. Civil rights included new individual rights to property, contract, freedom of religion and access to justice; political rights included the vote and participation in government; and social rights included various 34

citizenship  35 First is the tension between national and international meanings of democratic citizenship, which prompts extensive multi-disciplinary debates on borders and distributive justice. It informs, on the one hand, arguments in favour of world citizenship, either rooted in a global ethic (Nussbaum 2010) or a world government (Archibugi 2008), and on the other hand, theories arguing for the reinventing of urban citizenship (Baubock 2003). There are also conceptions of citizenship that forge a middle ground as state-based but globally oriented (Hobden 2021). In light of fundamentally changed social, economic and political conditions, scholarly attention has considered new ways of understanding citizenship, such as transnational and supranational citizenship. The second long-standing challenge is the exclusion of the foreign resident from citizenship. The logic of state-based citizenship in a world of independent states means that where people move to a new country because they are forced to by war or persecution or choose to move for economic or social reasons, new legal categories of belonging must be constructed. Over time, through reciprocal and international agreements, states have assigned statuses like asylum-seeker and refugee to forced migrants and migrant and permanent worker to voluntary migrants. These categories offer the migrant more rights than non-citizens, typically civil rights, but never full political rights such as the right to vote in national elections or fully secure residence rights. The legal path to full citizenship varies greatly but is typically steep, including requirements ranging from the length of residence and financial security to requirements around language, religion and loyalty to a monarch. Third, there are people who are born and live in a state who are not formally recognised as citizens. A famous example is the ancient Greek democracies that restricted citizenship to land-owning men, excluding nearly 90 per cent of the population including women, the poor and slaves from citizenship (Manville 2014). Other, more recent examples would be authoritarian states that refuse to recognise the belonging of key groups, for instance, the white supremacist apartheid government of South Africa that denied black South Africans any political rights and most social and civil liberties (Dugard 1980). A related theme is

how citizenship status can be weaponised for political ends. Examples of this include questioning Barak Obama’s status as an American born, or threats to withdraw citizenship from naturalised citizens or citizens with dual citizenship such as with the case of Shamima Begum in the UK. The final challenge of democratic citizenship concerns the exclusion of some legal members of a state from full belonging by virtue of an aspect of their identity or the intersection of their identities (Crenshaw 1991). Evidence of ‘second class citizenship’ can be found in discriminatory practices against racial and ethnic minorities that endure contrary to legislation, and women who, despite constituting half the population, consistently, on average, occupy lower status occupations, are under-represented in positions of power and authority, are paid significantly less than men in the same positions and are subject to ongoing attempts to control reproductive practices (Munday 2009). Key examples include the historical reluctance to give women the vote, police violence against black people, preventing women, minorities or gay men from participating in the military and ignoring indigenous, female and queer voices in public debates. The BlackLivesMatter movement and the origins of ‘#MeToo’ within black feminist resistance to gender-based violence represent examples of ongoing resistance to structural and systematic injustices persisting within democratic citizenship (Lebron 2017; Burke 2021). In recent years, the promise of democratic citizenship has come under pressure from a set of new challenges. First here is the relative decline of the democratic state in the developed world due to the rise to dominance of neoliberal policy and politics since the 1990s and the continuing growth, with some significant resistance, of supranational political formations (Van Creveld 1999). A central feature of the neoliberal ideology is that the state’s role in economic development is a constraint on trade and growth and that the state itself, and its role in society, should be reduced to enable economic prosperity. Typical features of neoliberal politics involve reducing taxes and reducing welfare benefits as part of shrinking the cost and role of the state. This has clear implications for citizenship, especially the social rights associated with affordable health, free education, subsidised public Christine Hobden and Laurence Piper

36  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology transport, unemployment insurance and the like, particularly as access to traditionally public goods is increasingly through private means (Mitchell 2016). The second challenge of supranational or post-national political formations such as the European Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN and the like involves a pooling of national sovereignty. Some allege this dilutes the accountability of national politicians to their citizens and thus weakens the meaning of national citizenship in ways that, as illustrated by Brexit, can lead to popular dissatisfaction and resistance to so-called ‘global elites’. These supranational institutions connect to neoliberalism to the extent that they are also informed by the desire to grow capitalism by reducing the costs of business across national borders. At the same time, the rising power of multinational corporations and especially investment capital is becoming more important in defining the agenda of global economic priorities, with direct and indirect impacts on political governance (Babic et al. 2020). The third challenge to democratic citizenship is the enduring weakness of the state in the global south, reinforced by the challenges already identified. This means that the promise of democratic citizenship is in the developing world fragmented by contending forms of governance that often involve undemocratic non-state actors from traditional leaders to drug gangs to local strongmen running protection rackets. Corruption, clientelism and coercive politics turn citizens into subjects or at least erode the reach and significance of democratic rights and entitlements (Anciano & Piper 2019). Christine Hobden and Laurence Piper

References Anciano, F., & Piper, L. (2019). Democracy disconnected: Participation and governance in a city of the South. New York: Routledge. Archibugi, D. (2008). The global commonwealth of citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Babic, M., Garcia-Bernardo, J.S., & Heemskerk, E.M. (2020). The rise of transnational state capital: State-led foreign investment in the 21st century. Review of Christine Hobden and Laurence Piper

International Political Economy, 27(3), 433–475. Baubock, R. (2003). Reinventing urban citizenship.  Citizenship Studies,  7(2), 139–160. Burke, T. (2021). Unbound: My story of liberation and the birth of the me too movement. London: Headline Publishing Group. Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241–1299. Dugard, J. (1980). South Africa's independent homelands: An exercise in denationalization. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 10, 11–36. Giugni, Marco, & Grasso, Maria (eds). (2021). Handbook of citizenship and migration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Hobden, C. (2021). Citizenship in a globalised world. London: Routledge Press. Lebron, C.J. (2017). The making of black lives matter: A brief history of an idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manville, P.B. (2014). The origins of citizenship in ancient Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Marshall, T.H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matolino, B. (2009). A response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu’s consensual democracy. South African Journal of Philosophy, 28(1), 34–42. Miller, D. (2000). Citizenship and national identity. Cambridge: Polity. Mitchell, K. (2016). Neoliberalism and citizenship. In: Springer, S., Birch, K., and MacLeavy, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Neoliberalism (pp. 146–157). New York: Routledge. Munday, J. (2009). Gendered citizenship. Sociology Compass, 3(2), 249–266. Nussbaum, M. (2010). Patriotism and cosmopolitanism. In Garret Brown and David Held (Eds.), The Cosmopolitan Reader (pp. 155– 162). Cambridge: Polity. Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stokke, K. (2017). Politics of citizenship: Towards an analytical framework. Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift-Norwegian Journal of Geography, 71(4), 193–207.

citizenship  37 Tapscott, C., & Thompson, L. (2010). Citizenship and social movements: Perspectives from the global south. London: Zed. Van Creveld, M.L. (1999). The rise and decline of the state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wiredu, K. (1997). Democracy and consensus in traditional African politics: A plea for a non-party polity. In C. Eze (Ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (pp. 303–312). Cambridge: Blackwell.

Christine Hobden and Laurence Piper

10. Civic engagement

Usually, when civic engagement is defined, it is done by placing it in contrast to political engagement. This distinction between political engagement and civic engagement goes as far back as Tocqueville, who in his study of the American democracy clearly distinguished between civil associations and political associations (Tocqueville 1835). Political associations were related to the political sphere and the selection of political leaders, while citizens through civil associations could collaborate to find solutions to community problems, outside the state and the political sphere, that is, by civic engagement. This divide between political and civic engagement is also evident in the classical study Voice and Equality by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995). Here, in what has become the standard definition used in the literature, political engagement—or participation—is defined as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995: 38). A common understanding of civic engagement, on the other hand, is the one found in Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, et al. (2006: 7), where it is defined as “organized voluntary activity focused on problem solving and helping others”, or as Barrett and Zani (2015: 4) formulate it, civic engagement can be defined as “engagement of an individual with the interest, goals, concerns and common good of a community”. In their understanding, community is not only associated with the neighborhood, town, or local community but could as well mean the country, a group of countries, or even the global community. Even though the division between political and civic engagement has deep roots in the literature, it does not imply that civic engagement is necessarily something apolitical. Engagement within civil society is important not only because of the work that is done and the societal challenges that are solved that way but also due to the more indirect role it plays in voicing political interest and because citizens through civic engagement can be socialized into political engagement. As Tocqueville (1835) highlighted, organizations within civil society can function as “large free schools”, through which citizens learn how democracy works. Even though

“Civic engagement is ready for the dustbin”, wrote Ben Barber (2009: 335) in Perspectives on Politics in 2009. The reason was that the concept, which used to describe citizens’ involvement in the local community, over time had developed into a “catch-all” concept, including “almost anything that citizens might happen to do together or alone” (Barber 2009: 335). This entry will start by presenting how civic engagement traditionally has been defined and understood in the literature before it moves on to describe how the concept has developed over time, including the massive concept stretching we have witnessed (cf. Sartori 1970) and some of the solutions that have been suggested in order to restore the concept. Adler and Goggin (2005: 236) define civic engagement as “the way in which citizens participate in the life of a community in order to improve conditions for others or to help shape the community’s future”. At the same time, they state that “there is currently no single, widely agreed-upon meaning for the term” (Adler & Goggin 2005: 237). Civic engagement is a concept that is used within the fields of political science, political sociology, social movement studies, voluntary sector research, education research, psychology, and more. The various fields emphasize different elements and put various meanings into the concept, which may explain why the definition and understanding of what civic engagement is, vary a lot. This also implies that the concept is difficult to use, as researchers do not agree on what it is and consequently tend to talk past each other when discussing it. These types of issues are of course especially challenging when doing comparative research. In most definitions, however, civic engagement implies hands-on work in cooperation with others within voluntary, non-governmental organizations and includes various forms of volunteer work done for the benefit of the community. The engagement can be either episodic or regular, and it can be done individually or collectively. It should also be noted that engagement is a broader concept than participation, as it does not necessarily imply action. That means that individuals can be cognitively and affectively engaged without being behaviorally engaged (Barrett & Zani 2015: 4). 38

civic engagement  39 Tocqueville’s primary focus was on political associations, in contrast to how some neo-Tocquevillians later interpreted his work (cf. Villa 2008), engagement in non-political associations can also have political consequences. Nina Eliasoph (2013: 59–63), for example, underlines this and argues that the line between political and civic engagement is thin, as “caring about people” often also involves “caring about politics”. The distinction between civic and political engagement found in the classical studies within the field has also over time become much less clear. In much the same way as the understanding of political engagement has expanded over time (van Deth 2014; Ceccarini 2021), we have witnessed an expansion in how civic engagement is understood, and the boundaries between the two concepts have become more diluted and indistinct. One reason why we have seen this development is that more and more have been included in the theoretical concepts in accordance with new forms of political and civic engagement being added to the participation repertoire. Civic engagement has expanded from primarily being about voluntary activity within the local community to also include, for example, giving practical help to family and friends and donating money to good causes (Henriksen, Strømsnes & Svedberg 2019). In addition, when it comes to civic engagement, part of the explanation may also be a growing political importance of civil society over time, where politicians to an increasing extent point to associations within civil society when they face challenges that need to be solved (e.g., Enjolras & Strømsnes 2018; Zukin et al. 2006). The result is that today, civic engagement seems to include everything from participation in voluntary associations and advocacy work to participating in rallies, contacting politicians, and voting, and everything from charity and community work to family dinners and card games with close friends. A concept stretched that far is of little use as an analytical concept, which is also why Barber (2009) points it to the dustbin. In addition to a development where the dividing line between political and civic engagement has become more blurred, the distinction between the public and the private sphere has also become much less clear. With the publication of Robert D. Putnam’s (1993, 2000) pathbreaking and highly influential works on social capital—first on Italy

and then in the USA—we witnessed a concept expansion where also social activities such as family dinners, picnics, and card games were included as forms of civic engagement. Putnam studied, first, the differences in public sector performance between the north and south of Italy and, second, the democratic development over time in the USA. In both cases, he found that one of the most important factors explaining institutional and democratic performance was the level of civic engagement. In his study of the differences between the north and the south of Italy, Putnam (1993: 15) finds that public sector performance to a large extent can be explained by the character of civic life, what he calls “the civic community”. Communities characterized by civic engagement, that is, active participation in public affairs (ibid.: 87–88), perform much better than communities with lower levels of civic engagement. Likewise, when studying the decline in civic engagement in the USA, Putnam (2000) looks at engagement in community life but also emphasizes informal connections like neighborhood barbeques and playing card games with close friends, that is, activities within the private rather than the public sphere. These informal connections contribute, according to Putnam (2000), to the development of networks, reciprocity norms, and trust between people, that is, what he defines as social capital. Putnam’s work was later criticized, among other things, for being too micro-oriented, for being too occupied with, and optimistic when it comes to the socialization effect of the organizations, and for putting too much weight on apolitical organizations at the expense of more politically oriented organizations (e.g., Tarrow 1996; Skocpol & Fiorina 1999). Another critique that has been raised is that Putnam seems to treat civic engagement as something that per definition is good. In Putnam’s work, civic engagement is about participating in civic life and contributing to the civic community and to the public good. Civic engagement is expected to build up social capital, trust, and civic skills and to improve the health of democracy. In addition, it has been argued that civic engagement enhances people’s subjective well-being, life satisfaction, and happiness (Putnam 2000). As Fiorina (1999) and van Deth and Zmerli (2010) point out, however, not all organizations within civil society are working for good Kristin Strømsnes

40  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology causes, the mafia, Ku Klux Klan, and Hells Angels being frequently mentioned examples of the opposite. Likewise, Sheri Berman (1997) demonstrates how a flourishing civil society was a prerequisite for the Nazis coming to power in Germany. Partly as a follow-up on Putnam’s (1993, 2000) studies of social capital, there have been discussions of what to include when talking about civic engagement, and there have also been several attempts to distinguish and categorize civic engagement with regard to various related concepts. In most cases, this implies the replacement of the concept by several other concepts. Ben Barber (2009), for example, suggests replacing the civic engagement concept with three other concepts: political, social, and moral engagement. Here, political engagement is attentive activity directly involving the polity or activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting government action, that is, a definition that to a large degree corresponds with the definition by Verba et al. (1995) mentioned earlier. Social engagement refers to attentive action in associations in civic life which has no political object, that is, non-political associations. Lastly, moral engagement, which Barber (2009: 342) admits, is the most difficult to define, is described as “attention to, and activity in support of, a particular moral code, moral reasoning, or moral principle”. At the same time as he finds it useful to separate the various forms of engagement, however, Barber (2009: 344) also realizes that they often overlap. He therefore introduces a fourth concept, civil engagement, which he defines as “the social-moral engagement of publicspirited, cooperative problem-solving”. There is, in other words, still a need for a concept that describes the community-oriented activity going on within civil society, but Barber argues that the “civil” prefix is more accurate than “civic”. Zukin et al. (2006) have another suggestion, resulting in a typology of citizen engagement with four dimensions: political engagement, civic engagement, cognitive engagement (e.g., political interest, following politics in the news, discussing politics), and public voice (i.e., the way citizens express their political views through, e.g., signing petitions, writing letters to the editor, contributing to political blogs). A third attempt to classify various forms of engagement is by Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå (2012, Kristin Strømsnes

2022). They suggest a typology where they distinguish between civil participation (latent political activity) either in the form of social involvement (attention) or civic engagement (action), and political participation (manifest political activity) either in the form of formal political participation or extra-parliamentarian political participation (non-violent or violent forms). To sum up, there seems to be broad agreement that civic engagement has developed into a concept that no longer has any analytical meaning. The definitions vary, and the concept is getting washed out as more and more is added to it. There is still no widely agreed-upon meaning of the concept. So, was Barber right, or is it possible to save civic engagement from the dustbin? Is it still of relevance within political sociology? Several researchers have tried to develop typologies for various forms of engagement, and even though many are critical of the civic engagement concept, most seem to keep it in one form or another. Even Barber includes a new “civil engagement” concept in his four-concept typology. To make it useful, however, the concept needs to be clearly distinguished from political engagement which is directly aimed at and targets the political system and politicians. Instead of a concept that tries to include everything, we should take a step back and reserve civil engagement for activities that take place outside of the sphere of political decision-making and outside of the private sphere of family and close friends. Kristin Strømsnes

References Adler, R. P. & J. Goggin (2005) “What do we mean by ‘civic engagement’?” Journal of Transformative Education 3(3): 236–253. Barber, B. (2009) “Political theory, political science, and the end of civic engagement”. Perspectives on Politics 7(2): 335–350. Barrett, M. & B. Zani (2015) Political and Civic Engagement. Multidisciplinary Perspectives. London: Routledge. Berman, S. (1997) “Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar republic”. World Politics 49(3): 401–429. Ceccarini, L. (2021) “Political participation”. In: P. Harris, A. Bitonto, C. S. Fleisher & A. S. Binderkrantz (Eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Cham: Palgrave

civic engagement  41 Macmillan, https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/978​-3​ -030​-13895​-0​_141​-1. Ekman, J. & E. Amnå (2012) “Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology”. Human Affairs 22(3): 283–300. Ekman, J. & E. Amnå (2022) “Civic engagement”. In: M. Giugni & M. Grasso (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Participation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 381–397. Eliasoph, N. (2013) The Politics of Volunteering. Cambridge: Polity Press. Enjolras, B. & K. Strømsnes (Eds.) (2018) Scandinavian Civil Society and Social Transformations: The Case of Norway. Cham: Springer. Fiorina, M. P. (1999) “Extreme voices: A dark side of civic engagement”. In: T. Skocpol & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.) Civic Engagement in American Democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 395–425. Henriksen, L. S.; K. Strømsnes & L. Svedberg (2019) (Eds.) Civic Engagement in Scandinavia: Volunteering, Informal Help and Giving in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Cham: Springer. Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2000) Bowling Alone: Civic Disengagement in America. New York: Simon & Schuster. Sartori, G. (1970) “Concept misinformation in comparative politics”. American Political Science Review 64(4): 1033–1053.

Skocpol, T. & M. P. Fiorina (1999) “Making sense of the civic engagement debate”. In: T. Skocpol & M. P. Fiorina (Eds.) Civic Engagement in American Democracy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 1–23. Tarrow, S. (1996) “Making social science work across space and time: A critical reflection on Robert Putnam’s making democracy work”. American Political Science Review 90(2): 389–397. Toqueville, A. (1835) Democracy in America. New York: New American Library. Van Deth, J. W. (2014) “A conceptual map of political participation”. Acta Politica 49(3): 349–367. Van Deth, J. W. & S. Zmerli (2010) “Introduction: Civicness, equality, and democracy – A ‘dark side’ of social capital”. American Behavioral Scientist 53(5): 631–639. Verba, S.; K. L. Schlozman & H. E. Brady (1995) Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Villa, D. (2008) Public Freedom. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zukin, C.; S. Keeter; M. Andolina; K. Jenkins & M. X. Delli Carpini (2006) A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kristin Strømsnes

11. Civic voluntarism

The Civic Voluntarism Model – The CVM accounts for the attention that the term “civic voluntarism” has received. The bestknown models of political participation before the CVM focused on proximate psychological or cognitive factors such as interest in politics, feelings of efficacy, knowledge of politics, and rational individual choice or they considered more distant factors such as socio-economic status (SES) (i.e., education, occupation, and income) and other demographic factors. The CVM filled the gap between psychological factors and SES and demographic factors by analyzing the way that people are embedded in the institutions of society, their families, schools, religious institutions, jobs, and voluntary organizations and how these experiences shape their portfolio of civic activity (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995, Chapters 9–15 and Schlozman, Brady, & Verba 2018, Chapter 3). Factors – To identify the relevant factors, the CVM found it useful to turn around the standard question about why people participate and to ask “Why don’t people take part in politics?” Three answers immediately suggest themselves: because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked.

Just as the concept of “civic culture” entered the political science vocabulary with the 1963 publication of The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, the related concept of “civic voluntarism” entered the lexicon of political science with the publication of Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady in 1995. In all the years prior to 1995, the term “civic voluntarism” appears in the JSTOR digital archive only a handful of times. Starting in 1995 there are 19 references, and in the following years, the term appears an average of over 50 times every year, almost always with a reference to the Verba–Schlozman–Brady book. Why civic voluntarism? – The authors of Voice and Equality used the term “civic voluntarism” instead of “political participation” to emphasize that political activities are not necessarily partisan and to signal an especially important feature of participation in liberal democracies: its voluntary character. Civic activities include involvement with good government groups and neighborhood associations, contacting government bureaucrats to solve a problem, attending a protest, and participating in non-partisan elections as well as voting for political party candidates, making political contributions, and participating in political campaigns. Except for paid political operatives or elected officials, involvement in these activities is not obligatory—no one is forced to participate—and there is no pay or only token financial compensation. The choice of the term “civic” stems from a concern with “civil society”—a sector distinct from government and the marketplace that provides a home for independent thought and action. Although the roots of civil society go back to ancient Greece, some of the most important modern descriptions are by G.W.F. Hegel, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Almond and Verba. The Civic Culture made the case that democracy requires citizens who tolerate differences in opinions and defend free speech, engage in political participation, and respect the rule of law. Voice and Equality christened its model of civic involvement the “Civic Voluntarism Model” (CVM), and the CVM systematizes the factors and institutions that encourage political participation.

“They can’t” suggests a paucity of necessary resources—time to take part, money to contribute to campaigns and other political causes, and civic skills to use time and money effectively. “They don’t want to” focuses attention on the absence of psychological engagement with politics—little interest in politics or little concern about public issues, a rational belief that individual activity can make little or no difference, little or no knowledge about the political process, no strong political commitments, or just having other priorities. “Nobody asked” implies isolation from the networks of recruitment through which citizens are mobilized to politics.

Access to resources, the capacity to take part, and psychological engagement with politics (the motivation to take part) seem necessary for activity. Psychological engagement matters, and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, Chapter 4) found that many people develop ample reasons to participate that overcome any concerns about the small probability of affecting the outcome by voting or participating. Issue commitments—for example, having a direct stake in some government policy or caring passionately about a controversial 42

civic voluntarism  43 issue—can stimulate activity with regard to an issue but only if people have the resources to do so. Resources turn out to be the most important factor because those lacking the necessary skills, time, or money cannot participate. Recruitment by being asked to take part acts as a catalyst for participation among those with the wherewithal and desire to become active. Resources – Of the three factors that foster participation, the model places special emphasis on such resources as money, time, and civic skills. For most people, resource acquisition takes place outside the realm of political activity, which means that resources are less likely than either psychological engagement with politics or requests for political activity to be the result, rather than the cause, of activity. Focusing on resources also provides a powerful and theoretically satisfying explanation of disparities and inequalities across individuals and groups in the extent to which they take part in political life (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman 1995, Chapters 16–17). Money and time are the resources expended most directly in political activity. Money plays a dual role in the analysis of political participation: it is simultaneously an important source of conflict in politics—associated with interests in public policy and with needs for government assistance—and an important resource for political action. Time is apportioned according to “life circumstances.” Having a job or young children at home reduces free time, but being retired provides time not committed to other activities. Civic skills that facilitate participating in civic life are acquired throughout the life cycle, beginning at home and, especially, in school. Education enhances participation directly by developing skills that are relevant to politics—the ability to speak and write and the knowledge of how to cope in an organizational setting. Education also imparts information about government and politics and encourages attitudes such as a sense of civic responsibility or political efficacy that predispose an individual to political involvement. In addition, education affects activity indirectly: those who have high levels of education are much more likely to command lucrative jobs and to have opportunities to exercise leadership and to develop politically relevant skills at work, in church, and in voluntary associations. With the end

of schooling, the non-political institutions of adult life—the workplace, voluntary associations, and churches—foster the organizational and communications capacities that facilitate the effective use of time and money in politics. The economic and educational stratification of families and workplaces and to a lesser extent voluntary associations leads to unequal political participation that is only slightly ameliorated by the relative equality of religious involvements. Psychological engagement – In the CVM, measures of political engagement such as political interest, political efficacy, political information, and strength of party identification affect political participation. Policy commitments also stimulate participation such as being the recipient of and dependent upon social security (Campbell 2003) or caring deeply about a particular political issue such as abortion. Recruitment – The likelihood of being asked to get involved politically is not randomly distributed. Those who are socially connected to family, neighbors, coworkers, or fellow organizations or church members are positioned to receive more requests for political activity. Furthermore, whether they are individuals soliciting friends or fellow club members or firms developing lists for the purpose of mass solicitations, those who seek to mobilize others to take part politically try to focus their efforts on likely prospects. The result is that requests are aimed disproportionately at those who command other factors that foster participation and at those who have taken part in the past—thus reinforcing unequal political participation. Institutions – The analysis of the participatory process takes the CVM model deep into the basic structures of American society—families, schools, jobs, non-political organizations, and religious institutions— where resources are acquired, motivations are nurtured, and recruitment networks are established. The foundations for future political involvements are laid early in life—in the family and in school. Later on, experiences at work, in voluntary associations, and in religious institutions provide additional opportunities for acquiring politically relevant resources and enhancing psychological engagement with politics. These non-political institutions also function as a location for Henry E. Brady

44  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology recruitment to politics: not only do coworkers and fellow organization or congregation members ask one another to become politically active but requests for activity originate from within the institutions themselves. The family – The family has two kinds of impacts: through political learning in which children are exposed to politics and through the socio-economic status of one’s family of origin which shapes opportunities for educational attainment and experiences in school, which, in turn, affect the likelihood of acquiring many other attributes that foster political participation (Brady, Schlozman, & Verba 2015). Adulthood and jobs, religious institutions, and voluntary organizations – Youthful experiences continue to ramify outward in adulthood, channeling individuals differentially into non-political institutions where affiliated adults accumulate bundles of participatory factors. These stockpiles are affected by the level of participatory factors available in the institutions into which they have been sorted and the distribution of participatory factors across different kinds of people within the institution. In order to exercise civic skills or to be the target of requests in a non-political institution, one must be in the workforce, join an organization, or be a member of a religious congregation. Typically, half to two-thirds of a population belongs to each one of these three institutions. For those who are affiliated, all three of these non-political settings provide opportunities to practice skills relevant to politics. Chances to develop civic skills are especially plentiful in the workplace, especially for those in high-level jobs—that is, jobs requiring high levels of education or on-the job training. Across the various institutions that foster civic skills opportunities to exercise skills are distributed unevenly along lines of class, race, or gender with different patterns in different institutions. The institutions of adult life also facilitate political participation by serving as the locus of requests for political activity. In all three adult non-political settings, not only are requests for political activity less frequent than opportunities to exercise civic skills but the pattern of requests is different. Requests for activity are most frequent in religious institutions followed by workplaces and, then, non-political organizations, and overall these requests reinforce political inequality. Henry E. Brady

The CVM – Three factors operate in the Civic Voluntarism Model: resources—in particular, time, money, and skills—that make it possible to take part; psychological orientations to politics—including political interest, information, and efficacy as well as identification with a political party and political commitments—that predispose a citizen to want to take part; and recruitment, the requests for activity that serve as a catalyst for participation. People accumulate different portfolios of participatory factors as they move through the life course in various institutions, and this affects their portfolio of civic involvement. The process begins in the family and continues as people move through school into adult institutional involvements on the job, in non-political organizations, and in religious institutions. Participation depends upon the distribution of resources, psychological engagements, and recruitment efforts fostered by the institutions of society. The stratification of these institutions leads to unequal political participation in terms of income, race, ethnicity, gender, and other socio-economic and demographic characteristics. For a review of research using the CVM and an agenda for future research, see Casey Klofstad (editor), 2016, New Advances in the Study of Civic Voluntarism: Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment. Topics ripe for more research include ethnic and racial identity and political participation (Abrajano, Marisa A. and R. Michael Alvarez. 2010, Garcia-Bedolla & Michelson 2012, Philpot & Hanes 2014, Wong et al. 2011), the impact of incarceration on participation and citizenship (Burch 2013, Lerman & Weaver 2014), the effect of religious involvement on participation (Wielhouwer 2009), the determinants of young people’s engagement with politics (Holbein & Hillygus 2020), the impact of digital environments on participation (Mossberger, Tolbert, & McNeal 2007), how electoral rules affect voting (Burden and Vidal 2016), the role of civic education and communities in promoting participation (Campbell 2008), how class, race, and other individual characteristics are related to voting over time (Leighley & Nagler 2014), whether education is a proxy for other factors that influence participation (Persson 2015), policy feedback from participation (Campbell 2003, Bussi et al. 2022), and continued

civic voluntarism  45 inequality in America political participation (Schlozman, Brady, & Verba 2018). This research is well underway, and as of July 31, 2023, JSTOR lists 1,34 1articles or books that have referenced both “Voice and Equality” and “Civic Voluntarism.” Google Scholar reports over 15,400 citations to Voice and Equality and more than 4,100 to the 1995 article, “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation”. Henry E. Brady

References Abrajano, Marisa A. and R. Michael Alvarez. 2010. New Faces, New Voices: The Hispanic Electorate in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brady, Henry E., Kay Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2015. “Political Mobility and Political Reproduction from Generation to Generation.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 657(1), 149–173. Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation.” American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271–294. Burch, Traci. 2013. Trading Democracy for Justice: Criminal Convictions and the Decline of Neighborhood Political Participation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burden, Barry C. and Logan Vidal. 2016. “How Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment are Shaped by Election Rules.” In: Casey Klofstad (Ed.), New Advances in the Study of Civic Voluntarism: Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 77–94. Bussi, Margherita, Claire Dupuy, and Virginie Van Ineglgom. 2022. “Does Social Policy Change Impact on Politics? A Review of Policy Feedbacks on Citizens’ Political Participation and Attitudes Towards Politics.” Journal of European Social Policy, 32(5), 5. Campbell, Andrea. 2003. How Policies make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and

the American Welfare State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Campbell, David. 2008. Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape our Civic Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garcia-Bedolla, Lisa and Melissa P. Michelson. 2012. Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate Through GetOut-the-Vote Campaigns. New Haven: Yale University Press. Holbein, John B. and Sunshine Hillygus. 2020. Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes into Civic Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Klofstad, Casey. (ed.). 2016. New Advances in the Study of Civic Voluntarism: Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Leighley, Jan E. and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. Who Votes now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lerman, Amy and Vesla Weaver. 2014. Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mossberger, Karen, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Ramona S. McNeal. 2007. Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Persson, Mkael. 2015. “Education and Political Participation.” British Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 689–703. Philpot, Tasha S. and Hanes Walton. 2014. “African American Political Participation.” In: David L. Leal, Taeku Lee, and Mark Sawyer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Racial and Ethnic Politics in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. -org​ Accessed August 5, 2023. https://doi​ .libproxy​.berkeley​.edu​/10​.1093​/oxfordhb​ /9780199566631​.013​.001. Schlozman, Kay, Henry Brady, and Sidney Verba. 2018. Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People’s Voice in the New Gilded Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wielhouwer, Peter W. 2009. “Religion and American Political Participation.” In: Corwin E. Smith, Lyman A. Kellstedt and Henry E. Brady

46  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology James L. Guth (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Accessed August 5, 2023. https://doi​-org​.libproxy​.berkeley​ .edu​/10​.1093​/oxfordhb​/9780195326529​.003​ .0014.

Henry E. Brady

Wong, Janelle, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn. 2011. Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

12. Civil disobedience

the disobedient – in positions of contributors and even primary actors in political thought. Can we count on ourselves, and if so, how? On the day he moved to Walden Pond – it was July 4, the anniversary of US independence – the American thinker Henry David Thoreau decided that he would build his house with his own hands and live alone in the woods: “I earned my living by the labor of my hands only” (Thoreau, 2004, 1). After two years, Thoreau returned to civilization, but the spirit of Walden lived on in the many acts of “civil disobedience” that marked the fight for civil rights in the US in the 1960s, as well as recent grassroots movements in many parts of the world. Disobedience is based on the moral principle of self-reliance, which encourages individuals to base themselves on their own conviction that the law is unjust and unsuitable. Civil disobedience is a voluntary and conspicuous refusal to obey a law or regulation. It is a very specific form of action and entails non-violent, collective and public refusal to fulfil a legal or regulatory obligation on the grounds that it violates some “higher principle.” The goal of the action is to draw punishment, so that the legitimacy of the obligation in question may be assessed in court. The refusal to obey an unjust law, far from signalling a rejection of politics, is an appeal to expand the rights and freedoms that a democracy affords its citizens. The sociologist Albert Ogien and I in our first book1 attempted to justify civil disobedience and the “occupy” movements as expressions of democracy. In 2010, civil disobedience was considered an outdated, inadequate and even toxic form of political action. In a democratic regime, freedom of the vote, of expression, of assembly, of strike, of consciousness and of association are supposed to be guaranteed; mechanisms for “social dialogue” are built into the legislative process; the defence of fundamental rights is a legal reality. In these circumstances, it is not obvious why an expression of discontent should take the form of disobedience, and one might even worry that disobedience calls into question a principle of democracy – that is, the minority agrees to accept the legitimacy of what the majority decides and waits for an eventual change in power rather than contesting the decision directly. Disobedience becomes necessary when all the possibilities for expressing disagreement through traditional political means have been exhausted.

The first decades of the twenty-first century saw a return of civil disobedience actions: far from being a marginal or folk phenomenon, they are now at the heart of the classic repertoire of social and political struggles. Carola Rackete, captain of the Seawatch3, disembarked 40 rescued migrants in the port of Lampedusa, was arrested and then released by a judge. In the US, universities and cities declared themselves in 2017 “sanctuaries” for illegal aliens, explicitly entering into disobedience against the Trump presidency. The Extinction Rebellion movement explicitly refers to disobedience happenings – in 2019 during an action to remove portraits of President Macron from town halls or more recently with the attacks on works of art. Other more disturbing mobilizations, such as the violent invasion of the Capitol in Washington by far-right activists rejecting the outcome of the US presidential election, even refer to the tradition. Disobedience, a paradigm of democratic action, thus seems threatened by the trivialization or extension to all forms of direct action; it is, therefore, important to return to the very concept of civil disobedience and to examine its present forms and to demonstrate its centrality in actual and living political reflections and the various ways this return to/of civil disobedience calls for a deep transformation in political science itself. The development of disobedience indeed accompanies the new centrality of the concept of democracy. These refusals to obey the law or provisions seen as unacceptable call for an extension of the rights and freedoms that a democracy must ensure for its citizens, with the idea that democracy is not limited to a political regime or an ideal but that it must be achieved in practice. More and more explicitly, these actions also give the opportunity to debate problems that are ignored or to make visible citizens or people who are considered to be negligible. They demand that decisions take into account those they concern, in the democratic tradition defined by John Dewey (1934). They signal the presence of ordinary citizens as a central figure on the political scene. Better still, and this is the essential transformation that they have brought about, they place these citizens – and 47

48  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology The contemporary turn to civil disobedience revived a tradition that was born in the US but had come to seem historically outdated or inappropriate in a democracy. It was within a democratic, not tyrannical, context that Thoreau and his master Ralph Waldo Emerson spoke out against the betrayal of the ideals of their democracy. This feeling of betrayal is what sparks civil disobedience: one no longer recognizes oneself in the government or its discourse, and one no longer wants to speak in its name (or for it to claim to speak in one’s name). Dissensus is a specific feature of democracy and of the conformism Emerson deplored when he called for “selfreliance.” Thinking about disobedience in democracy means enforcing the very definition of a democracy: a government of the people and by the people. A democratic government is a government that is ours, mine – it expresses me. Thus, the question of democracy is the question of voice. I must have a voice in my history and recognize myself in what is said or shown or done by my society – thus I give it my voice and accept that it speaks in my name. Thoreau writes that when he moved to Walden, it was “by accident, Independence Day, or the fourth of July, 1845” (Thoreau, 4). This moment has been interpreted as a “transcendental declaration of independence.” Thoreau sought to repeat an act of founding, of occupying, to constitute rupture and separation as political action. What would give one the right to separate oneself from an unsatisfactory society? The thread of dissent is important in the American tradition, and was visible, for example, in the minority opposition to the Iraq War under George W. Bush, which led to the creation of a memorable slogan: “Not in our name.” In Civil Disobedience, Thoreau asks: How does it become a man to behave toward this American government today? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave’s government also. (Thoreau 1849)

We see from this the enduring need for disobedience against conformism to combat democratic despair. For Thoreau, disobedience acts as a kind of “counter-friction” to an unjust political order: “Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine” (id.). Sandra Laugier

Reinventing individualism – Disobedience in democracy, hence, is not a refusal or a limit of democracy. On the contrary, it is part of the very definition of democracy as a form of life. Disobedience requires claiming a radical, critical form of individualism. Thus, individualism becomes a democratic principle: the principle of each person’s political and expressive competence. True individualism is not egoism, it is attention to each person’s specific expressiveness; it is the observation of the ordinary situations in which others are living. The position taken by Thoreau and Emerson is simple: one has not only the right but also the duty to disobey when a government acts against its own principles. Thoreau refuses to recognize the government as his and refuses to give it his voice or contribute to it financially; he refuses to allow it to speak in his name when it promotes slavery or wages war on Mexico. This disobedience rattles the idea, found in various forms in contemporary political life, that there are rules of debate and public life. John Rawls, for example, writes that “Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society” (Rawls 1999). On this view, there is an original agreement, made in advance, on the scope and nature of claims that will be allowed and the rules that will arbitrate them. Conceptualizing disobedience means not only thinking that there are no predetermined rules for how society operates but also that there are no rules limiting the acceptability of claims or their form. To disobey is precisely to challenge the idea – which periodically re-emerges in contexts of serious or violent conflict – that one must accept certain rules in order to claim anything at all. It may be objected that liberal thinkers have produced justifications for civil disobedience; Rawls in A Theory of Justice defines it as a “public, non-violent, conscientiously decided, but political act, contrary to the law, and done to bring about a change in the law or in government policy.” Still this is not a justification of civil disobedience, but a limitation; disobedience is not a right, but a public, political act, which is situated within the existing political framework. Rawls sets out conditions for civil disobedience which, if not respected, make disobedience illegitimate (quite surprising when we know Rawls’ positions, as he has always strongly stood for civil

civil disobedience  49 rights). For Rawls disobedience is theoretically possible, morally justifiable, but politically undesirable. Rawls’ idea is that “men must decide in advance according to what rules they will arbitrate their mutual claims and what must be the founding charter of society” (Rawls 1971, 37–38). Thus, there is an original agreement, in advance, on the scope and nature of authorized claims, and on the rules that will arbitrate them. To think of disobedience is to think not only that there are no pre-determined rules of social functioning (many are ready to admit this) but above all that there are no rules that limit the acceptability of claims and their form. What disobedience challenges is the idea – common to many contemporary political doctrines – that certain demands are impossible, or misplaced, because they are formulated outside the accepted rules and deny the initial agreement on which they are based; that there are limits to any expression of demands that must not be crossed, beyond which the entire social game is called into question. It is as if one had to learn how to make a claim in the right way; to accept certain rules (the social game) in order to be able to make a claim of any kind. But no. As philosopher Stanley Cavell reminded us: there is no rule that tells us how to stake a claim. This is the conceptual difficulty that disobedience deals with: only those who have been asked for their consent (and who could therefore rightly withdraw it) can defend their claim. But how is this claim possible if they have not been asked? These conditions for disobedience are in fact restrictions on its legitimacy. If we apply them to the civil rights movement and to the struggle for Indian independence, we come to the conclusion (surprising when we know Rawls’ personal positions, as he has always personally fought for civil rights) that the actions of Martin Luther King and Gandhi were illegitimate, since they did not correspond to his criteria. Rawls, while approving of the moral principle, attaches such a series of conditions to civil disobedience that he manages to empty it of its real scope: for him, disobedience remains a danger, which can lead to anarchy. The same goes for Habermas, who is more concrete and generous in his defence, developed in the 1980s in protest against the reactionary positions of German jurists and the “snotty media” that sought to criminalize

the actions of committed citizens. Habermas comes to praise limited resistance, so much so that it ends up being justified only in a small number of cases (Habermas 2015). Rawls and Habermas have the merit of justifying the principle of civil disobedience, but they block its use. Disobedience is theoretically possible, morally, but politically undesirable. This is demonstrated by their characteristic insistence on disobedience as a last resort, in a political context where the obstacles to any extension of freedoms are multiplying, and where one is never “at the end”; and on its publicity, while it now makes the disobedient vulnerable to repression. If we compare the thinking of Rawls and Habermas with that of Gandhi and King, we can see that their arguments have been challenged by the disobedient themselves; they are even more so today. This touches on the essential point of the subversion brought about by disobedience, namely the contribution of the disobedient to the “thought of disobedience.” This touches on the essential point of the subversion brought about by civil disobedience, namely the contribution of the disobedient to the constitution of the very concept. The thought of Thoreau, Gandhi and King is not well known to political scientists; they are only mentioned as activists in the political science literature and in critical theory more generally. Most scholars who have worked on civil disobedience never mention the writings of Thoreau (25  000 pages) or King (15  000 pages). Hence, the rupture in the radical movements is not only political, it is epistemological: it reveals the thought and competence of the actors themselves and renews the practice and the understanding of democracy. Today, civil disobedience may be considered an outdated form of political action, in an age marked by struggles for democracy in crumbling dictatorships and the formal appropriation of strategies of disobedience by far-right groups. Re-reading Thoreau allows us to understand the meaning of civil disobedience today. The immanent meaning of the practices of contestation and resistance that we have seen emerge in the twenty-first century is a demand for “democracy” less as a form of government, or even as an institutional idea or ideal, and more as a form of life. Democracy is created on the ground, at the intersection of dissident voices whose Sandra Laugier

50  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology irreducible plurality is not suppressed. This means not choosing a leader, spokesperson or delegation; it also means rejecting the principle of majority rule and concretely expanding the meaning of freedom and the equality of each voice. “Real democracy” has happened when people occupy public spaces in protest and a democratic group must operate on the model of what it demands and proclaims. These new forms of political organization foreground the idea that everyone has political competence – especially when an issue from ordinary, everyday life concerns them in particular. Appropriating the public space amounts to claiming a space for those who have no voice and no space. In this view, far from endangering or overtaking democracy, disobedience is a constituent and protective element of it and hence should be rediscovered as a main concept of political science. Firstly, acts of civil disobedience are nonviolent; secondly, these demands are justified by the internal requirement of an increase in citizens’ rights and freedoms. Disobedience is today part of the repertoire of actions of struggles, of the definition of a democracy where everyone has a voice. As a result, a new difficulty emerges with the extension of the concept of disobedience and its trivialization. So it is important to come back to this and to remember that if every act of disobedience is an illegality, not every infraction of the law is disobedience. One difficulty is that history is not lacking in examples of protest movements that have used disobedience as a means of destabilizing democracy, as was the case in Chile to bring down the government of Salvador Allende, and more recently in the US with the rejection of the results of the presidential election by a significant proportion of Republican voters. These movements have a factional character which obviously distinguishes them from civil disobedience: their aim is not the extension of the social and political rights of citizens but their restriction; they are not the work of a minority of individuals but an action deliberately organized with powerful leaders who intend to capitalize on its success. Nevertheless, one can question the need to distinguish between just and unjust disobedience, and the need for normative criteria to determine good and bad causes, and to limit their definition – as we have seen with Rawls. Thoreau and Gandhi refer to a consciousness, Sandra Laugier

which is not only subjective – the feeling of indignity which is not reduced to indignation, powerful enough to be universal. Remarkably, King proposes in his Letter from Birmingham Jail empirical criteria for the injustice of a law. A law is unjust when a majority subjects a minority to the yoke of a law that it does not respect and when it is made without the participation of a minority, deprived of the right to vote. These apparently simple elements are of singular power and allow us to evaluate the legitimacy of disobedience today, when, for example, elected officials refuse to marry homosexual couples or when we think of antimigrant laws. Today, however, the frequent claim of disobedience blurs the concept. If we examine the current acts of civil disobedience, we can see that, as in Wittgenstein’s family resemblances, the current actions retain elements of civil disobedience stricto sensu and reject others (“Family resemblances”, Wittgenstein §66–67). Disobedience is no longer a last resort. The majority of actions carried out under the name of civil disobedience, like those of Extinction Rebellion, are not. But it is also because they don’t know what to disobey: there is no law that obliges us to pollute or to destroy biodiversity and that we should openly disobey in order to demand its abandonment. Some of the current political struggles aim, in a theatrical, so-called festive way, to denounce big businesses, the government’s inaction concerning the climate, animal abuse and so on. The aim of this type of action, which is reminiscent of the media coverage of rebellion actions of the last century (from pacifism to Act up), is to cause a public disturbance in order to draw attention to the cause it defends. Disobedience must use justice but need not lead to being condemned, going to prison or suffering violence. The activists called “Chair Reapers” decided to steal seats in bank branches accused of tax evasion, which gave rise to the BNP’s lawsuit against John Palais for theft in assembly and at the end of which the bank was dismissed and ridiculed. In the “Décrochons Macron” campaign, the requisitioning of the president’s portraits in town halls to signify the state’s imperialism in environmental matters, there were also lawsuits. But in most cases, an acquittal was demanded, obtained and welcomed. The new forms of disobedience maintain pressure on governments and companies.

civil disobedience  51 They meet the criteria of the democratic form of life: to keep the public debate alive by leaving open a question of general interest that seems to have been resolved by law while the unworthy character of some of its provisions is obvious; to bring to the fore public problems that are ignored and denied; to demand that political decisions take into account those they concern. Disobedience does not always have to be public, in its own name. The Anonymous collective carries to the end the democratic logic of defending freedom and the circulation of information, while acknowledging that the public space governed by states does not allow for free expression. To disobey is to escape from surveillance (to be off the grid) as shown by the case of whistleblowers like Edward Snowden. Hence the hidden and anonymous nature of the actions of some organizations, breaks with the public tradition of disobedience. Anonymous points out that the struggle is unequal in the public space and that real democratization must take a new path. Anonymous justifies these new forms – leaking “classified” information and attacking official websites – by the violence of the state which leads to more radical and less respectable methods. Disobedience is traditionally non-violent, but this is now a contested issue. The great activist Starhawk expressed nicely these new accents of disobedience: Part of the way nonviolence functions is by heightening the contrast between protesters and police, between the movement and the larger society . . . Again, in the Civil Rights movement the contrast was clear. The public saw brutal, racist cops beating neatly dressed, nonresistant, black youth and their white supporters. But many of today’s younger activists are not going to look like the Good Guys, no matter what they do. (Starhawk 2008)

Has non-violence, essential to Gandhi’s and King’s thinking and strategy, become a weakness? Thoreau himself, who first conceived the link between civil disobedience and nonviolence, supported the arming of slaves, advocated and practiced by a white abolitionist, Captain John Brown. Against a violent state, disobedience must sometimes take more radical, less civil guise. Let’s not forget that King and his friends were seen by “respectable” politicians as cowards and thugs.

Disobedience matters for political science because it implies a constant expansion of democracy, which always mechanically elicits a violent reaction from conservative circles, which has recently found an echo in the intellectual class in France. The violence of those who oppose the extension of rights seems to place non-violence in a shaky position. The repressive policies against any action of solidarity with migrants, against any demonstration of protest against government policies or any display of benevolence toward stigmatized and discriminated populations offer us a calendar of actions to come. The criminalization of normal behaviour is the ferment of civil disobedience (Arendt 1972), especially when it is accompanied by the normalization of criminal behaviour, such as leaving people to die at sea or imprisoning children. The struggle is unequal in the public space, and civil disobedience must sometimes take more radical, less civil, less public methods. Political science today needs to establish the irreducible or basic features of civil disobedience. Disobedience is not only disobeying the law: it is performing an illegal action in the general interest, to increase or defend the rights of others. Its definition contains an internal ethical requirement. Hubertine Auclert, a French feminist activist, in 1879, refused to pay her taxes in order to publicly demand the right to vote for women. Activists who help migrants at the borders are not disobeying on their own behalf, but on behalf of a group of vulnerable individuals. The second criterion for defining an act as civil disobedience is its non-violent character, which is essential for the best causes. In defence of migrants, if someone picks up a gun and attacks border guards, that is not civil disobedience. It’s hard to call Thoreau “violent” when he refused to pay a tax that financed his country’s war against Mexico, or Rosa Parks when she defended her seat on the bus. It is then a question of taking non-violence as a revolutionary tactic, suggested by Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Disobedience aims to relentlessly demonstrate the violence of a situation, and its power lies in non-violence; for example, that of the actions of the Chipko Indian women, supported by philosopher and activist Vandana Shiva (Shiva 2002), who opposed the commercial exploitation of their forests, through a tactic of sticking to Sandra Laugier

52  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the trees. Ecofeminism won over to disobedience and non-violence allows us to grasp on a global scale the predatory strategies of agro-food “bio-piracy” and extractivism. The challenge is epistemological: to disobey is to produce this knowledge. The important fact for political science is that non-violence can oppose a force equivalent to the violence of capitalism. A third and last criterion. The migrant “crisis” and the clarity of the acts of disobedience that are being committed in order to come to their aid highlights a political fact: the rights of foreigners (immigrants, refugees, displaced persons, illegal immigrants) are the new frontier of democracy. This brings us back to the primary question of disobedience: are we in a democracy with such inequality? Let us return to King’s principle: those to whom the law applies must participate in its elaboration. Today everywhere, migrants are subjected to laws over which they have no say. The claim of those who defend them is to enlarge the community of citizens. And this, of course, has never been done through legal means. The battle seems not to be going well for these disobedient people in the present world. But disobedience has always been a minority – it was the case with blacks in the US. It was non-violent acts of disobedience that forced their entry into a political arena where they were not invited. And where they are now present. If we don’t forget this history, civil disobedience offers promising directions for future and more realistic research in political science. Sandra Laugier

Note 1.

Ogien, Laugier, Pourquoi désobéir en Démocratie? 2014.

Sandra Laugier

References Arendt, Hannah. Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, on Violence, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, Mariner Books Classics, 1972. Dewey, John. The Public and Its Problems, Holt Publishers, 1927. Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Trans­ formation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society 1992 Polity; 2015. Laugier, S., and Ogien, A. Pourquoi désobéir en démocratie? [Why Disobey in Democracy?], Paris: La découverte, 2010. Laugier, S., and Ogien, A. Le Principe Democratie [The Democracy Principle], Paris: La découverte, 2014. Milton, John. The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, London: The John Milton Reading Room, 1645. www​.dartmouth​.edu/​~milton​/ reading​_room ​/ddd​/introduction ​/text​.shtml. Rawls, John A. A Theory of Justice, rev. ed, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Shiva, Vandana. Vedic Ecology: Practical Wisdom for Surviving the 21st Century, Mandala Publishing; Illustrated edition, 2002. Starhawk. Webs of Power: Notes from the Global Uprising, New Catalyst Books, 2008. Thoreau, Henry David, Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Thoreau, Henry David. Civil Disobedience, 1849, http://xroads​.virginia​.edu/​~hyper2​/ thoreau​/civil​.html. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.

13. Civil society

and public actors working to realize welfare state services. As mentioned earlier, in the history of the concept in Western political thought the ideal of civil society has been used as a powerful intellectual and political tool for human emancipation, a tool that is strengthened by the causal link that normative conceptions have then established between civil society and liberal democracy. Democracy cannot exist without free citizens endowed with precise rights but also duties towards the rest of their fellow community members, and the everyday expression of such rights and duties passes through the channels of civil society. As Rosenblum (1998: 26) maintains: “[t]oday the dominant perspective [in theory of civil society] is moral: civil society is seen as a school of virtue where men and women develop the dispositions essential to liberal democracy”. On this specific aspect, the influence of the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville is preeminent. In his study of American democracy, Tocqueville argued that people, to remain or to become ‘civilized’, need to develop the art of association which is the way to promote equality and civilized relationships (Tocqueville [1840] 1961: 160). Unless people learn to join others through associations, equality cannot be reached, and civilization cannot be established. Such a connection between civil society and democracy still holds when we consider how civil society can fuel new democracy models: such is the case with Habermas’ deliberative democracy. According to the German thinker, “Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere” (Habermas 1996: 367). Like early liberal thinkers used the idea of civil society as a basis for the development of a liberal theory of democracy, thinkers such as Habermas use civil society as a pre-requisite for the development of a new model of democracy: the deliberative model. In deliberative democracy, civil society plays a crucial role because it is within civil society that the discursive interaction at the very basis of collective, shared, discursive decision-making takes place. This is a very different form of democracy compared to the classical-liberal one. As efficaciously summarized by Chambers (2002: 99), in deliberative

The idea of civil society is used across continents and cultures to name different forms of non-coercive social interactions, carried out through associations or groupings to pursue different goals such as personal fulfilment through leisure, sport, religious or cultural activities but also wider social, economic and political objectives. Yet, it is the latter aspect that prevails when considering civil society in a political sociology framework. In Western political thought the conceptual value of civil society stems from its connection with social and political change or stability, and in particular with reference to democracy, given that such voluntarily joined associations or groups that form civil society are considered to produce the values and norms that make democracy work (Putnam 1993), values and norms including solidarity and cooperation, social and institutional trust or, by contrast, critical thinking and public scrutiny. However, the saliency of civil society in political sociology pre-dates the current interweaving between the state and society or democracy. In fact, civil society’s political value developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the revolutions in England, North America and Europe questioned the traditional ways to legitimize political authority. Instead of emanating from divinity or monarchic inheritance, legitimacy started to be understood as emanating from the ‘sovereign people’, that is, individuals who had found in economic freedom and civil liberties enshrined through civil society the instruments and ideas for self-determination (Seligman 2002). Civil society’s importance as a political actor then increased with the advent of the welfare state in post-WWII Europe and even more so with the advent of the ‘lean’ state in the US and in the UK of the 1970s and 1980s, when it was conceptualised as more intertwined with governance and public policy for both policy inspiration and implementation. In more recent times, the intricacy of the relationship between civil society and public or state actors in policy making and implementation has led scholars to speak about the co-production of policies (Pestoff 2012) and, when the welfare state was at stake, of the ‘welfare mix’ (Evers 1995) to allude to the constellation of both civil society 53

54  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology democracy “[v]oice, rather than votes, is the vehicle of empowerment”. And such ‘voicing’ occurs primarily through civil society. Still, civil society exists also in nondemocratic settings, and therefore political sociology questions the causal link between civil society and liberal democracy, pointing to the example of non-democratic Asian countries where such associations still subsist (Khilnani 2001). In fact also the late twentieth-century political history of CentralEastern Europe, Africa and Latin America shows that forms of civil society did exist even during authoritarian rule; they existed informally, as ‘clandestine’ gatherings, but paved the way for regime change and provided opportunities for people to experience what Vaclav Havel (1989) called “life in truth” and as the “independent life of the society” in opposition to the “life in lie” to which regimes relegated citizens’ public exchange or relationships with authorities. Nonetheless, political sociological understandings of civil society have also promoted a critical appraisal of a purely normative conceptualisation of it. Walzer (2002), for example, considers civil society as a heterogeneous arena where different, sometimes conflicting, identities (based on gender, race, religion, and nationality) may better be worked out. Hence, civil society becomes the sphere where the politics of identity and recognition can be better expressed, with the potential for social conflict that implies. As Walzer puts it: “Because it is a realm of difference and fragmentation, civil society, even in the absence of ‘greedy institutions’, is always a realm of conflict—of competing ‘causes’, interest groups, companies, parties, even churches and philanthropies” (Walzer 2002: 38). Other scholars have highlighted the polarizing nature of civil society engagements, arguing that the political associational spectrum is dominated by ‘extreme’ voices: because political and civic engagements are motivated by “expressive” values, extremists will likely tend to become more involved in political and civic engagement than those who have milder feelings concerning the status quo (Fiorina 1999). But also the partisans of deliberative democracy mentioned earlier admit that the participation of all civil society actors in the discursive arena means that everyone can find a voice, including those groups that critical theorists define as “bad civil society”, i.e. groups that promote a restricted, Simone Baglioni

particularistic and exclusive view of civility (Chambers 2002). The critical political sociological imagination of civil society admits the existence of associations with anti-democratic purposes, like the Ku Klux Klan, the mafia and similar groups. The solution proposed to avoid the risks related to the diffusion and empowerment of the ‘bad civil society’ consists in the strengthening of democratic, open deliberation procedures encouraging citizens’ engagement across group boundaries and consequently fostering alternative cultural venues (Chambers 2002: 105). Finally, political sociology has argued that civil society is a phenomenon that is not only limited to Western cultural and political traditions. Charitable and voluntary organisations existed in thirteenth-century China’s urban centres and pre-modern India (Goody 2001). Similarly, in the thirteenth century, the Middle East developed a wide network of commerce through associations like those that we include in Western definitions of ‘civil society’ (ibidem). Moreover, civil society does not exist only as an empirical phenomenon in non-Western social and political thinking. As Hasan Hanafi (2002: 174) argues with reference to Muslim countries: In short, Islamic theory and practice sustain a number of legitimate human groupings existing between the state and the individual. These groupings are endowed with their own sphere of autonomy free from government intrusion, which made Islamic societies historically far less monolithic and undifferentiated than some Western stereotypes of a theocratic society allow.

Among other non-Western cultural traditions, Confucianism is not per se impermeable to the concept of civil society, yet in some Confucian countries, just a restrictive interpretation of Confucianism was promoted leading to the dramatic limitation of civil society (Metzger 2001). At the same time, there are places like Taiwan, where the Confucian tradition has allowed and even fostered the development of a vibrant associational life and a rich debate about it (Madsen 2002). In sum, the conceptual value of civil society for political sociology stems from civil society being the arena that can offer tools and moral justification for people to get together to pursue personal and social advancement, an arena that is contingent on given contexts and times. Moreover, civil society represents a contentious or consensual

civil society  55 negotiation between people and established political authorities, contributing, maintaining or changing the social, cultural and political order regardless of whether such a political order is a democracy or not. Hence, future research should investigate how the relationship between civil society and contemporary statehood evolves at a time when political regimes, especially democracies, are challenged by uneven benefits of economic growth, social, economic and environmental disruption provoked by climate change, and the fast pace of technological progress. Furthermore, we should also welcome investigations into the relationships between democratic and non-democratic regimes and local and international civil society at a time of de-globalisation and increasing tensions and conflicts among different political regimes. Simone Baglioni

References Chambers, S. 2002, A critical theory of civil society. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 90–110 Evers, A. 1995, Part of the welfare mix: The third sector as an intermediate area. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 6(2), 159–182 Fiorina, M. P. 1999, Extreme voices: A dark side of civic engagement. In: Skocpol, T. and M. P. Fiorina (eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp: 395–425 Goody, J. 2001, Civil society in an extraEuropean perspective. In: Khilnani, S. and S. Kaviraj (eds.), Civil Society: History and Possibilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp: 149–164 Habermas, J. [1992] 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press

Hanafi, H. 2002, Alternative conceptions of civil society: A reflective Islamic approach. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 171–189 Havel, V. 1989, Essais politiques, Paris: Calman-Lévy Khilnani, S. 2001, The development of civil society. In: Khilnani, S. and S. Kaviraj (eds.), Civil Society: History and Possibilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp: 11–32 Madsen, R. 2002, Confucian conceptions of civil society. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 190–204 Metzger, T. A. 2001, The Western concept of civil society in the context of Chinese history. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 204–231 Pestoff, V. 2012, Co-production and third sector social services in Europe: Some concepts and evidence. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 23(4), 1102–1118 Putnam, R. 1993, Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press Rosenblum, N. L. 1998, Membership and Morals. The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America, Princeton: Princeton University Press Seligman, Adam B. 2002, Civil society as Idea and Ideal. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 14–33 Tocqueville, Alexis de [1840] 1961, De la démocratie en Amérique (Vol. 2), Paris: Gallimard Walzer, M. 2002, Equality and civil society. In: Chambers, S. and W. Kymlicka (eds.), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp: 34–49

Simone Baglioni

14. Civil wars

are conventional civil wars, when both the state and rebels field large standing armies and the fighting takes place along stable frontlines; irregular conflicts, when a conventional state army fights against a lightly armed rebel group (traditionally called guerrillas or insurgencies); and symmetric non-conventional wars, when both the state and the rebels lack strong military capabilities. This latter form, the least common of all three, usually takes place in a context of state collapse. Since the end of World War II, civil wars have displaced interstate wars as the primary form of armed conflict in the world. They reached a peak in incidence (the number of ongoing civil wars) in the early 1990s, which motivated the emergence of a new research agenda around the early 2000s. This literature forms the core of our current knowledge. Research on civil wars has been very sensitive to the historical evolution of conflicts during the last century. The first works on civil wars can be traced back to studies of Third World insurgencies starting in the 1970s, even though they did not use this term. These works, motivated by the rise in internal conflict that took place in the context of decolonization and the Cold War, usually highlighted the role of grievances in giving rise to what were referred to as “peasant rebellions” or “revolutions”. After 1989, the outbreak of some infamous ethnic conflicts, most notably in the Balkans, and the rise of the so-called “New Wars” brought about a new interest in civil wars. Studies during these years focused on the collapse of centralized authority as the facilitating factor for the outbreak of wars mainly motivated by ethnic hatred, fear, and tribalism. A new body of research emerged around 2000 and for the first time analyzed civil war onset quantitatively. Focusing on the initial outbreak of civil wars, rather than on their incidence over time, the goal was to identify the structural factors that predicted civil wars across the globe. Methodologically, these works spearheaded an empirical strategy based on the use of regression analyses on time-series cross-sectional datasets. Downplaying earlier explanations based on grievances, these new works focused on the political economy of conflicts and defended the thesis that civil wars erupted because it was financially viable for the rebels to do so (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). This new perspective argued that, since motivations were

Civil wars are sustained violent conflicts between a government and one or more nonstate armed groups that claim full or partial territorial legitimacy. This last point is key. A civil war only qualifies as such when rebel groups aim to rule at least some part of the territory of the state, which distinguishes them from other forms of political violence, such as ethnic riots, state repression, or terrorist attacks. These phenomena, however, can and usually do take place within the context of civil wars. The literature on civil wars usually distinguishes between different types of civil wars. These are not necessarily exclusive types but rather refer to subsets of civil wars that merit special attention, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. On the one hand, a usual way to classify civil wars is based on the main apparent reason that motivates the conflict in the first place. Regarding the conflict over sovereignty, we can speak of governmental civil wars, when the conflict affects the whole territory of the state, and territorial civil wars, when the rebels only attempt to control some part of the state. Relatedly, it is common to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, depending on the main cleavage of the conflict. Even though we can distinguish between different types of civil wars according to the main cleavage, ethnic civil wars usually stand out because of their particularities: they are more common, tend to last longer, and are linked to higher levels of violence. On the other hand, civil wars are also classified according to the characteristics of the fighting itself. First, war intensity, normally measured as the number of battle deaths across a definite time period, is used both to establish a minimum threshold to define civil wars empirically and to distinguish between major and minor civil wars (or between civil wars and civil conflicts). A popular threshold for collecting data on major civil wars is 1000 battle deaths per year, a number that comes from previous research on interstate conflict. Second, civil wars are also classified depending on the “technology of rebellion” (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010) or the military technologies employed by the state and the rebels. According to this classification, there 56

civil wars  57 ubiquitous and hence could not serve as an explanation, we should look to opportunitybased factors instead. It gave rise to the notorious greed-vs-grievance debate, defining the field thereafter. A later reformulation by Fearon and Laitin (2003) became the most established explanation of civil war onset: wars break out where potential insurgents have a viable opportunity to rebel against the government, which mainly depends on state capacity. Mountainous terrain, low income, or hard-to-reach populations became some of the most common predictors of civil war onset. A new set of works in the late 2000s brought up again the role of grievances in explaining civil war onset. The main criticism of the opportunity perspective was that they were not properly operationalizing the concept of grievances. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) adopted a new approach, shifting the unit of analysis to ethnic groups and measuring the extent of group-based political inequalities across the globe, finding that they do increase the risk of civil war onset. Recent research acknowledges the role of both motivation-based and opportunity-based factors. Civil wars are a multicausal phenomenon where no single domestic cause can be pinned down for outbreaks. And even though structural models are important, particularly for the design of conflict-preventing and peace-making strategies, many studies stress their limited predictive ability while others stress the importance of the international dimension. The literature on civil wars has also covered different “macro” phenomena other than civil war onset. In particular, research has focused on understanding how long civil wars last, how they end, or their patterns of escalation over time. The same greed-vs-grievance debate has been present in this research agenda. For instance, civil war duration has been linked to the rebels’ economic incentives (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004), but also to group-based horizontal inequalities (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). One question of particular interest for its policy relevance is that of explaining why and when post-conflict peace fails. In other words, the determinants of conflict recurrence. Ever since a previous history of conflict was identified as arguably the most important factor explaining civil war outbreaks—the so-called “conflict trap” (Collier

et al., 2003)—conflict scholars have tried to identify factors that affect this risk of recurrence. For instance, previous empirical findings show that the duration of post-conflict peace increases after civil wars that end with a negotiated settlement (Hartzell, 2009) or when there is the presence of international, third-party actors, such as peacekeeping missions (Fortna, 2004). Beyond the study of macrophenomena, such as the onset or termination of entire civil wars, the last two decades also witnessed the emergence of a new research agenda that focuses on micro-level dynamics during civil wars. A major strand of this literature focuses on patterns of violence against civilians within conflicts. Although previous studies already acknowledged the strategic component of violence against civilians, Kalyvas (2006) pioneered a new approach showing that victimization varies greatly within conflicts and that this variation is not random, arguing that both selective and indiscriminate violence are functions of armed groups’ local territorial control. Despite the importance of this early theoretical development, our understanding has evolved ever since. For instance, now we know that civilian victimization also depends on pre-existing political affinities (Balcells, 2017) or on ethnic identities (Fjelde & Hultman, 2014). Related to this, some of the topics that might be of more interest to sociological analyses of civil wars are those that look at the social processes brought about by civil wars. For instance, some works focus on the role of social networks in explaining insurgent cohesion and success (Staniland, 2014) or on civilian wartime responses to violence (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013; Schubiger, 2021). Another important development in the civil war literature during the last few years concentrates on the legacies of civil wars. These legacies can refer to a whole different range of social transformations in the short and long term that are the consequences of wartime processes. In an early review of the literature, Wood (2008) discussed how civil wars have enduring consequences for, among other things, political mobilization and identities, the nature of local political authority, and social structures, including gender relations. The literature on civil wars has grown vastly during the last two decades, and our theoretical and methodological knowledge on the topic has developed accordingly. Civil Francisco Villamil

58  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology wars are the most common form of violent conflict nowadays, caused by both conditions that facilitate the organization of insurgency and group grievances. And far from being an isolated interruption of politics, they leave important social and political legacies that change the trajectories of conflict-torn societies. Francisco Villamil

References Balcells, Laia. (2017) Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cederman, Lars-Erik; Andreas Wimmer & Brian Min. (2010) Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. World Politics 62(1): 87–119. Collier, Paul; V. L. Elliot; Håvard Hegre; Anke Hoeffler; Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas Sambanis. (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press. Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler. (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–595. Collier, Paul; Anke Hoeffler & Måns Söderbom. (2004) On the duration of civil war. Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 253–273. Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin. (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90. Fjelde, Hanne & Lisa Hultman. (2014) Weakening the enemy: A disaggregated study of violence against civilians in

Francisco Villamil

Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(7): 1230–1257. Fortna, Virginia Page. (2004) Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. International Studies Quarterly 48(2): 269–292. Hartzell, Caroline A. (2009) Settling civil wars armed opponents’ fates and the duration of the peace. Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(4): 347–365. Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis N. & Laia Balcells. (2010) International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the cold war shaped internal conflict. American Political Science Review 104(3): 415–429. Lyall, Jason; Graeme Blair & Kosuke Imai. (2013) Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in Afghanistan. American Political Science Review 107(4): 679–705. Schubiger, Livia I. (2021) State violence and wartime civilian agency: Evidence from Peru. The Journal of Politics 83(4): 1383–1398. Staniland, Paul. (2014) Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wood, Elisabeth Jean. (2008) The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks. Annual Review of Political Science 11(1): 539–561. Wucherpfennig, J.; Nils Metternich; Lars-Erik Cederman & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. (2012) Ethnicity, the state and the duration of civil war. World Politics 64(1): 79–115.

15. Class

Weber rejected Marx’s binary conception and understood class as a more complex “market situation” through which labour market competition created stratified life chances for different groups of wage workers in a hierarchical process in which education and various exclusion mechanisms played a decisive role. While Marx focused mainly on the conflict between wage labourers and capital owners, Weber was more oriented towards how different working conditions and opportunities created divisions between different classes of wage labourers, for example, between working-class, white-collar and specialised occupations. For Weber, such conflicts were not derived from the exploitation of surplus value but instead from the ways in which different groups sought to protect or contest various occupational opportunities and privileges. The question of how social class affects political action, political beliefs and the distribution of political power in society are central themes in Marx’s writings. For example, Marx introduced a distinction between class as an objective common situation (“class in itself”) and class as a political identity and agency linked to the recognition of collective class interests (“class for itself”) (Marx 1846–1847/1975). Many of Marx’s works thematise how political conflicts, mobilisations and revolutions are linked to the actions and interests of specific classes. While some of his best-known works describe the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as the main class protagonists (e.g., Marx and Engels 1848; Marx 1867/1990), other texts contain more detailed analyses of the political role played by various intermediate classes in specific historical situations (e.g., Marx 1852/1984). The link between social class and politics is not as pervasive a theme in Weber’s writings. Instead of considering class as something that completely permeated the political order, Weber saw different forms of social stratification as analytically distinct and not necessarily empirically linked. For example, he distinguished “class” from both “social rank” or “status” (prestige, lifestyle and honour) and “party” (power and politics) (Weber 1922/2019). The collective political agency of a class is only discussed by Weber parenthetically when he talks about “class actions” (ibid.). Much of the twentieth-century political sociology and other empirical studies of the relationship between class and politics has been theoretically influenced by both Marx

Class refers to the socio-economic stratification of individuals into more or less distinct social classes. Class is a key concept in political sociology for analysing how the political actions and beliefs of groups and individuals are shaped by labour and property relations. In the early nineteenth century, class became a central concept for theorising the emerging capitalist society and its new social divisions, as it gradually replaced earlier notions of social rank given by birth (e.g., German Stand) in both colloquial language and early social science (Conze et al. 1990; Williams 1976). Important intellectual influences came from both Enlightenment philosophers and classical political economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who linked the three factors of production (labour, land and capital) with the distribution of wealth between the three classes of workers, landowners and capitalists. The class concept became pivotal to political sociology’s predecessors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as they analysed the rapid social transformation of European societies, characterised by widespread economic and political inequalities, increasing labour conflicts and collective demands for social and political rights. The classical sociologists who have had the greatest impact on the conceptualisation of class are Karl Marx and Max Weber. Both, in different ways, understood class as being based on the individual’s employment situation (Wright 2015). Later conceptualisations of social class have often drawn on and refined their perspectives. Marx regarded the conflict between labour (the proletariat or working class) and capital (the owners of the means of production, the capitalists) as the fundamental conflict in emerging capitalist industrial society. The source of this conflict was capitalists’ exploitation of the surplus value that workers created. Marx saw conflicting class interests as the driving force behind historical changes in both economic and political systems. Conflicts over the organisation and outcome of production between workers and capitalists were seen as inherent in the capitalist mode of production and as determining how wealth and political power were distributed in society. 59

60  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology and Weber. This was also the case with some of the early empirical studies of political organisation and electoral behaviour conducted in the decades following World War II (e.g., Heberle 1951; Lipset 1950, 1960), which was also the time when political sociology became a more distinctive academic subfield. In the late 1960s and 1970s, scholarly interest grew in the role of class for political processes, such as how class relations shaped the state, movement mobilisations and revolutions. Some of these studies also broadened the geographical scope beyond Western societies. During the 1980s, however, class became a less salient theme and other forms of social stratification received more attention in research. Empirical research about the role of class for political action and beliefs has, however, not always been grounded in more elaborate conceptualisations of class. For example, it has been common to use related, but analytically differing, measures such as income, educational level, self-perceived prestige/status or socio-economic status as proxies for class. While education and income tend to correlate with class positions, they are still conceptually distinct from class; for example, a certain level of education is often required to achieve a certain class position, while certain class positions make certain levels of income more likely. Alongside such more general indicators of socio-economic status, operationalisations of class have been developed that draw on and further develop both Weber’s and Marx’s perspectives and conceptual distinctions, which have become important in empirical research on the relationship between class and political actions and beliefs. Especially since the 1960s, statistically oriented class research based mainly on Weber’s conceptualisation of class (e.g., Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1963) has been important. In these studies, the analytical starting point has been that different occupations form a hierarchy, based on employees’ ability to control their own work process and the role of skills and monitoring in the work. One of the more influential occupation-based classification schemas is the Eriksson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema, which since the 1970s has been further developed into other classification schemas, such as the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESeC). Magnus Wennerhag and Anders Hylmö

The EGP and similar class schemas make a basic distinction between employers, selfemployed and employees. The vast majority (around 90%) of the population in developed countries are employees. Employees are further subdivided into two types of employment contracts: the service contract and the employment contract. They derive from two fundamental aspects of the employment relationship: the difficulty of monitoring the work performed and the specificity of skills and expertise. The employment contract is characterised by low skill specificity: workers can easily be replaced, and their work is easily monitored. In contrast, the service contract is characterised by specific skills and work processes that are hard to monitor and provides various forms of compensation, such as relative security and career opportunities (Goldthorpe 2000). Other scholars’ class schemas draw inspiration from both Weber and Marx; for instance, Wright’s (1997) model is partly based on Marxian conceptions of ownership and exploitation. There also exists quantitative empirical research on class that not only focuses on occupational class but also examines how individuals are stratified according to other economic factors and status hierarchies. An example of this is Bourdieu’s (1979/2010) analysis of the role that different forms of economic and cultural capital play in distinguishing different class segments. Another way of operationalising class found in both quantitative and qualitative studies is to focus on individuals’ self-perceived class belonging, that is, their class identity. This is closer to Marx’s distinction between “class in itself” and “class for itself” than Weber’s class concept. This aspect of class can sometimes be a stronger predictor of political actions and beliefs than an individual’s occupation, and someone’s class identity may differ from their occupational class. For example, Skeggs (1997) discusses how people with working-class occupations “disidentify” with the working class and instead identify as middle class. Since the 1970s, sociologists have noted that class structures in developed societies have changed, with the working class (particularly industrial workers) declining while the middle class has grown and become increasingly differentiated. The latter has sometimes been described as the emergence of a highly educated “new class”, with the

class  61 upper middle class divided into technical intelligentsia and social-humanist intellectuals (Gouldner 1979). Studies of the class composition of “new social movements” show that they mainly mobilise specific segments of the “new middle class” – in particular “social and cultural specialists” (semi-professionals and professionals in healthcare, education, social work, the arts and the media). In contrast, other segments of this new middle class, such as technical specialists and administrative personnel, as well as those with workingclass occupations, are generally underrepresented in movement protests (Kriesi 1989; Wennerhag and Hylmö 2022). The increasing differentiation of the middle class and the growing importance of sectoral differences between classes have also led to the construction of new class schemas that complement hierarchical class models such as the EGP with additional horizontal dimensions related to other divisions between occupations. An example of this is political sociologist Daniel Oesch’s (2008) two-dimensional class schema, which combines the Weberian idea of a vertically stratified labour market with a new, horizontal dimension that highlights how different sectors of the labour market are dominated by different “work logics”. Oesch distinguishes between four work logics: the organisational, technical and interpersonal, and the independent work logic of self-employed workers and employers. According to Oesch, the growth of the middle class means that divisions within this class segment are increasingly important for understanding how class affects party preferences. The traditional left-right division of modern politics has often revolved around issues such as workers’ rights, social welfare and economic redistribution. Opinions on these issues have often correlated with the hierarchical division between manual workers and more skilled and specialised employees due to these classes’ different economic interests. Voting behaviour in many liberal democracies has, however, been increasingly structured by conflicts over socio-cultural values (sometimes referred to as green-alternative-libertarian versus traditional-authoritarian-nationalist values). Politics thus no longer only concerns economic class interests but also socio-cultural conflicts. Oesch’s analysis shows that the latter also depend on occupational class, but mainly on class division

based on the different work logics that dominate in different sectors of the labour market. According to Oesch, this is because different sectors are dominated by different forms of social interaction as well as different types of education socialising employees into specific “work roles”. His analysis shows, for example, that support for Green parties is much higher among specific sectoral segments of the educated middle class (socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals), while it is lowest among specific sectors of working-class occupations (office clerks). Today, research on the impact of class on political actions and beliefs is characterised by an increasing sophistication in how the class concept is defined and operationalised. At the same time, we still see the continuing influence of Marx’s and Weber’s concepts and perspectives, albeit adapted to the contemporary era. There is growing interest in the concept of class among scholars today, for example in studies of the class base of right-wing populist parties and more generally the significance of class in protests and distrust of mainstream politics. Here, recent research on class, based on more sophisticated analyses – such as two-dimensional operationalisations of class or analytical distinctions between class and status – points to fruitful avenues for further research. For example, recent studies on rightwing populism suggest that status discontents, rather than class, appears to be the main driving force behind so-called “working-class authoritarianism” (Bukodi and Goldthorpe 2021). The rapidly expanding research on the economics of inequality and the super-rich (Piketty 2014), as well as on how inequality is driven by growing segments of the population that benefit from the steady inflation in asset and housing ownership (Adkins et al. 2021), also points to new possibilities for future politico-sociological research. Such research could shed light on whether an aspect of class that has been relatively unstudied in previous political sociology – the ownership of assets – affects the political behaviour and beliefs of different classes in contemporary society. Magnus Wennerhag and Anders Hylmö

References Adkins, Lisa, Melinda Cooper & Martijn Konings. 2021. Class in the 21st Century: Asset Inflation and the New Logic of Magnus Wennerhag and Anders Hylmö

62  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Inequality. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 53(3): 548–572. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979/2010. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge. Bukodi, Erzsébet & John H. Goldthorpe. 2021. Meritocracy and Populism – Is There a Connection? UKICE working paper 01/2021. Conze, Werner, Otto Gerhard Oexle & Rudolf Walther. 1990. Stand, Klasse, pp. 155– 284. In: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Band 6: St–Vert. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Goldthorpe, J. 2000. On Sociology: Numbers, Narratives, and the Integration of Research and Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldthorpe, John H. & David Lockwood. 1963. Affluence and the British Class Structure. The Sociological Review 11(2): 133–163. Gouldner, Alvin. 1979. The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. New York: Seabury. Heberle, Rudolf. 1951. Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1989. New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands. American Journal of Sociology 94(5): 1078–1116. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1950. Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan: A Study in Political Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: Doubleday.

Magnus Wennerhag and Anders Hylmö

Marx, Karl. 1846–1847/1975. The Poverty of Philosophy: Answer to the “Philosophy of Poverty” by M. Proudhon. Moscow: Progress Publishers Marx, Karl. 1852/1984. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress. Marx, Karl. 1867/1990. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Marx, Karl & Friedrich Engels. 1848. Manifesto of the Communist Party, pp. 237–260. In: Terrell Carver & James Farr (Eds.), 2015. The Cambridge Companion to the Communist Manifesto. New York: Cambridge University Press. Oesch, D. 2008. The Changing Shape of Class Voting: An Individual-Level Analysis of Party Support in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. European Societies 10(3): 329–355. Piketty, T. 2014. Capital in the TwentyFirst Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Skeggs, B. 1997. Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable. London: Sage. Weber, Max. 1922/2019. Economy and Society. A New Translation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wennerhag, M. & A. Hylmö. 2022. Social Class and Environmental Movements, pp. 355–373. In: M. Grasso & M. Giugni (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Movements. London: Routledge. Williams, Raymond. 1976. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana. Wright, Erik Olin. 1997. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wright, Erik Olin. 2015. Understanding Class. London: Verso.

16. Class consciousness and class struggle

Historically, social classes, class conflict, and class struggles have evolved from one type of society to another, depending on the extent and intensity of the exploitation and oppression of one class by another. Under slavery, for example, the brutal exploitation of slaves by the slave-owning master class in Ancient Greece and Rome persisted for a long time until the class contradictions of these societies in time resulted in their transformation into semi-slave modes of production in emergent feudal serfdoms. Such class struggles between slaves and masters ignited slave uprisings and rebellions in different periods and locations. The abolition of slavery ushered in new forms of servitude under conditions that were at once liberating and yet continued to be oppressive. Thus, under feudalism, while formal slavery ceased to exist in much of Europe and other adjacent territories that were undergoing the transition to serfdom, the subsequent exploitation and oppression of rural labor led to the prolonged subordination of serfs to the lords in feudal society (Cameron 1977). In time, the persistent exploitation and oppression of serfs and peasants under feudalism led to the peasant wars across Europe and eventually to the decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe and elsewhere during the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries (Hilton 1976). The development of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shifted the exploitation and oppression of serfs and peasants to that of wage labor by capital under conditions of capitalist production (Marx [1867] 1967). This new development in class relations led to the emergence of class consciousness and class struggles waged by the working class against the capitalists through varied forms of class struggle when capitalism replaced feudalism as the dominant mode of production (Szymanski 1983; Berberoglu 1994). Figure 1 illustrates the process by which social classes gain class consciousness and engage in class struggle to bring about social change. This process involves both objective and subjective factors that lead to an awareness of one’s social economic position in society and the development of an ideology that supports and advances one’s class interests in a collective way together with others in the same class. It entails an understanding of prevailing social conditions in which class

Class consciousness is defined as awareness of one’s class position in society leading to the collective political will of a class to advance its interests. Social classes and class struggles have developed in various societies that have undergone class divisions and class conflicts ever since the emergence of classes several thousand years ago (Szymanski 1983). This has been the case in despotic, slave-owning, feudal, and capitalist societies across the globe over this period. This entry provides the basis for an understanding of the development of class consciousness and class struggles through an analysis of class relations between various classes in different types of class-divided societies. We shall explore the dynamics and contradictions of this process by mapping out the ways in which exploitative class relations lead to class polarization and the development of class consciousness and class struggles, which may lead to the transformation of society through the emergence and mobilization of social movements for collective political action to bring about social change. Within this framework, we will discuss the three levels or stages in the development of class consciousness that occur as those in various classes become aware of their economic position, interact socially with others located in the same class, and play an active political role to effect change (Berberoglu 2009). This comes about when members of a particular class come to the realization of their own identity defined by their particular socialeconomic (material) conditions based on their social relations of production (what Marx calls “class-in-itself”), develop social bonds with members of the same class to acknowledge their identity as a social class, and act collectively to express their political will to advance their class interests (what Marx calls “class-for-itself”) to engage in class struggle for state power to bring about social change. Thus, the progression from the economic to the social to the political level or stages of development of class consciousness is what differentiates the presence or absence of class consciousness and class struggle among various social classes in society. 63

64  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Ruling-class ideological hegemony ↓ Social → Class → Class → Class →→→ Class-based → Class-based { a. reformist → Class → Political {a. reform divisions relations conflict organizations social movements { b. revolutionary struggle structure action {b. revolution ↓

Working-class consciousness and ideology { - - - - - - - - objective conditions - - - - - - -} {-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - subjective conditions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - }

Source:   Constructed by the author.

Figure 1  The emergence of class consciousness and class struggle in capitalist society arising from the exploitation and oppression of the working class

consciousness is developed, focused first and foremost on one’s relationship to the ownership and control of the means of production within a broader social relation with those in other classes with which one engages in class relations that lead to class conflict and class struggles (see Figure 1). Howard J. Sherman and James Wood (1989) provide a list that outlines the conditions that are required before class consciousness develops and class struggles ensue. These include (1) social structural conditions that must lead to certain stresses and strains between various classes in society; (2) objective economic, political, or social deprivation, resulting from the above structural conditions, must occur; (3) these objective deprivations must lead to conscious feelings of deprivation, which will crystallize into an ideology that would show the way out of these conditions; (4) this ideology must lead to the organization and mobilization of the discontented class to become a powerful political force that can bring about social change; (5) the structural conditions must also include weakened social control by the dominant class, such that the depth of the societal crisis weakens the ability and the will of those in power to effectively control society; (6) given these five conditions, many kinds of precipitating events can lead to situations that can trigger mass protests and demonstrations that translate into political action and serve as a catalyst to bring about change (Sherman and Wood 1989; see also Goldstone 2002 and Goodwin and Jasper 2015). The above conditions for the development of class consciousness and class struggles, argue Sherman and Wood, flow from the prevailing social structure, as society is built on a Berch Berberoglu

certain economic base on which arises social and political institutions, such as the state, as well as ideologies, and these institutions and ideologies of the dominant class play a central role in supporting and justifying present societal arrangements, while counter-ideologies from below confront and challenge the ideological hegemony of the ruling class by engaging in varied forms of class struggle (Gramsci 1971). In his book, The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class, Albert Szymanski (1983) provides additional insights into this process and argues that the material conditions necessary for the emergence of class consciousness and class struggles must include the following: (1) felt oppression, as the economic oppression and political repression of large segments of society are increasingly felt to be unnecessary and intolerable; (2) decline of the dominant class’s ideological hegemony, as the masses become increasingly bitter and disillusioned with their present existence; (3) the failure of non-revolutionary solutions to a social crisis, as the various alternative solutions being offered to the masses lose credibility among the oppressed; (4) decline of the dominant class’s ability to solve social, economic, and political crises and counter the growth of social movements; (5) the efficient organization and adoption of scientific strategy and tactics by movements to bring about social change. These five important conditions set the stage for the emergence and development of class consciousness and class struggles and facilitate the process that leads to revolution and social transformation (Szymanski 1978). The history of workers’ struggles against the capitalists is replete with victories and

class consciousness and class struggle  65 defeats, from the rebellions and revolutions of workers in the early to mid-1800s in Europe through the Paris Commune of 1871 to the great working-class struggles of the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Communist Party in the United States in the early 1900s (Foner 1965; Boyer and Morais 1980). Subsequently, through the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions led by workers, peasants, and other oppressed peoples across the world, workers took the lead in the struggle against capitalism, imperialism, and all forms of exploitation and oppression throughout the course of the twentieth century to the present in their protracted struggles against the capitalist class and the capitalist state on a global scale (Lenin [1917] 1975; Berberoglu 2007). Today, in the early twenty-first century, in the age of globalization, the struggles of class-conscious workers continue on every continent where there are workers who are exploited and oppressed across the world, especially workers of color in both the advanced capitalist and less developed capitalist countries where they work in the sweatshops of transnational corporations day in and day out week after week and year after year while being paid only a small fraction of the value they create for their capitalist bosses. It is here in the core of the super-exploited and oppressed laboring masses across the world that we see the leading role of the working class in the global struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and the capitalist state that will lead to revolutionary activity by the class-conscious contingents of the working class in their worldwide quest for liberation from capitalist tyranny from which they have suffered for so long (Polet 2007: Berberoglu 2009; Petras 2020). While the workers will surely be the leading force in society to bring about an end to the exploitation and oppression of labor and all other oppressed peoples who have been ruled by the dominant capitalist class, global capitalism and imperialism won’t be defeated until large numbers of workers gain class consciousness and engage in protracted class struggles to take state power (Lenin [1917] 1975). Thus, the call by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto: “Workers of the world unite!” because they have nothing to lose but their chains (Marx and Engels [1848]

1974)! Indeed, this process opens up the possibility that one day workers will in fact gain full class consciousness, come together, and take power to rule the world—and thus become free! Berch Berberoglu

References Berberoglu, Berch. 1994. Class Structure and Social Transformation. Westport, CT: Praeger. Berberoglu, Berch. 2007. The State and Revolution in the Twentieth Century: Major Social Transformations of our Time. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Berberoglu, Berch. 2009. Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Boyer, Richard and Herbert Morais. 1980. Labor’s Untold Story. 3rd ed. New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America. Cameron, Kenneth Neill. 1977. Humanity and Society: A World History. New York: Monthly Review Press. Foner, Philip S. 1965. History of the Labor Movement in the United States: Industrial Workers of the World, Vol. 4. New York: International Publishers. Goldstone, Jack. 2002. Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies. 3rd ed. New York: Cengage. Goodwin, Jack and James Jasper. 2015. The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts. 3rd ed. Malden, NJ: Wiley Blackwell. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers. Hilton, Rodney. 1976. The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism. London: New Left Books. Lenin, V. I. [1917] 1975. The State and Revolution. In V. I. Lenin (Ed.), Selected Works in Three Volumes, Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Marx, Karl. [1867] 1967. Capital, Vol. 1. New York: International Publishers. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1974. The Communist Manifesto. New York: International Publishers. Petras, James F. 2020. US Imperialism: The Changing Dynamics of Global Power. New York: Routledge. Berch Berberoglu

66  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Polet, Francois (Ed.). 2007. The State of Resistance: Popular Struggles in the Global South. London: Zed Books. Sherman, Howard J. and James L. Wood. 1989. Sociology: Traditional and Radical Perspectives. New York: Harper Collins.

Berch Berberoglu

Szymanski, Albert J. 1978. The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop. Szymanski, Albert J. 1983. Class Structure: A Critical Analysis. Westport, CT: Praeger.

17. Class voting

expansion and rising female participation, the growing size of the middle class has led to attempts to differentiate it more extensively than in the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema. Thus Oesch’s (2006) schema overlaps with the Erikson and Goldthorpe schema but further distinguishes occupations on the basis of their ‘work logics’, which primarily concern the degree to which jobs are people-oriented or managerial and technical. Managers and technocrats tend to be involved in running organizations and making profits, whereas socio-cultural professionals are focused on the needs of clients, patients and students. In conjunction with the development of more differentiated measurement of class position, there was also a recognition of the need to expand party choice from two parties in multi-party systems and adopt analytical techniques (e.g. multinomial logistic models, and ‘Kappa’ and ‘Lambda’ indexes that summarize these more complex patterns of association) more appropriate for such complexity (Evans 1999). Using such approaches, much of the research involving the Erikson– Goldthorpe class schema, in particular, examined the class dealignment thesis. This involved a substantial body of research and debate on whether the extent of class voting has weakened as Western democracies have moved from industrial to post-industrial societies (Clark & Lipset 2001; Evans 1999). The dispute focused not only on whether class– party dealignment was occurring but also on whether the drivers of this change were the policies and programmes offered by political parties or the dissolution of classes as meaningful social groups (Evans & Tilley 2012). The class dealignment literature has been accompanied in recent decades by research into class–party realignment. Two areas of realignment have received the most attention: voting for ‘radical right-wing’ parties advocating nationalism and restrictions on immigration by the working class (Rydgren 2013) and the increasing bloc of socio-cultural professionals in the middle class who typically vote for social-democratic parties supportive of redistribution and social liberalism (Oesch & Rennwald 2018). A further striking development is the substantial proportion of the working class who have recently stopped voting altogether. This process has been documented in Britain (Evans & Tilley 2017), where there was near equality in class participation rates before the

Class voting refers to the tendency for people in a particular social class to vote for a given political party or candidate when compared with voters in other classes. This simple idea has generated a great deal of debate over how best to measure class position, how class voting is evolving over time and how to explain patterns and levels of class voting. Recent decades have accordingly seen the development of more complex measures of class position, research into differing trajectories and types of class-based political divisions and a growing focus on explanations of class differences in voting. Class position has been operationalized via occupation, income, education and various combinations of these characteristics, as well as by self-defined class identity. Most studies however use occupation as the key marker of someone’s class position. Early research into class voting focused on the ‘Alford index’, which was simply the difference between the percentage of manual and nonmanual workers, respectively, voting for left-wing political parties. The Alford index found evidence of a relationship between manual occupations and support for left-wing parties that was assumed to derive from class differences in economic self-interest. Later work replicated this using the ‘Thomsen index’ using the odds for manual workers of voting left‐wing rather than right‐ wing divided by the odds for nonmanual workers of doing the same. However, the somewhat crude manual/nonmanual and left/right distinction has since been replaced by more complex classifications of both classes and parties. The most influential of the more differentiated class schema is that developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). The main classes identified in this schema are higher and lower professional and managerial classes, the ‘routine nonmanual’ class, the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ (small employers and self-employed) and the working class, composed of supervisors and skilled, semi- and unskilled manual workers. These classes differ significantly in terms of wages, job security, flexible working hours, pension provision, sickness benefits, job autonomy, future career prospects and lifetime expected income. In recent years, with the emergence of a burgeoning service sector, welfare state 67

68  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology 1990s but which has since seen a dramatic increase in non-voting by the working class and the less highly educated. Similar patterns have been found elsewhere in Western Europe (Rennwald 2020). Explanations for these changes in patterns of class voting initially focused on social classes themselves, assuming (though not demonstrating) that they had become more similar in terms of living conditions, ideologies and identities. However, later studies failed to find such blurring of differences (Evans & Tilley 2017). The working class is still relatively disadvantaged compared with the middle class; working-class people identify more strongly as working class and are more in favour of redistribution. Although there is little evidence of inequalities between classes, the size of the different classes has changed substantially. Evans and Tilley (2017) document a decline in the British working class from 60 per cent in the 1950s to little more than 20 per cent by 2015. Rennwald (2020) finds that the working class provided over 30 per cent of the electorate in six West European countries in the 1970s, but only 16 per cent by the 2010s. Accordingly, recent research has focused on changes in political parties’ programmes in response to both the changing shape of the class structure and the emergence of new political issues on which voters can be mobilized. Evans and De Graaf (2013) advocated such a ‘supply-side’ perspective, focusing on the powerful role of the degree of polarization or convergence in party positions on redistribution in levels of left-right class voting across 15 countries. Others have expanded this to include party positions on issues such as immigration, gay rights and European integration (Ares 2022). The general argument is that class differences in voting are accentuated when parties emphasize and polarize on important issues and weaken when parties do not take distinct and salient positions on them. Processes of class realignment are facilitated when parties either change their positions to represent interests and preferences that have some basis in different social classes to their traditional voting constituencies, such as that occurred in Britain following Brexit (Fieldhouse et al. 2020). Or, as has happened in some other European societies, new parties emerge to represent such constituencies in response to rising immigration concerns (Rydgren 2013). This is particularly Geoffrey Evans

likely to have happened when the main parties have converged on the economic dimension of party competition (Spies 2013). It is important to remember however that these supply-side effects are only found because classes continue to have long-standing differences in attitudes and preferences (Evans & Tilley 2017). The idea that the working class vote for left parties to obtain some degree of economic redistribution has been a central tenet of research into the electoral politics of class since its inception (Lipset 1960) and continues to be observed currently (Langsaether et al. 2022). Underlying differences in such redistributive preferences are class differences in resources and future prospects (Evans 1993), though intergenerational mobility between classes can serve to reduce such differences in preferences through the persistence of class origin-based orientations (Ares & van Dittmars 2022). There has also been increasing evidence that class voting is influenced by differences in attitudes on issues such as immigration and the European Union (Langsæther 2019), with the working class and small employers and the self-employed increasingly supporting nativist radical-right parties for these reasons (Rydgren 2013). Recent years have also seen a resurgence of research into less obviously instrumental mechanisms that can link classes and parties, specifically identity- and affinitybased appeals. Thus class identities shaped by socialization or current circumstances (Evans et al. 2022) can be mobilized by parties through symbolic appeals or by descriptively representing voters in different classes through the composition of their political candidates (Robison et al. 2020; Vivyan et al. 2020). A failure to make such appeals, or to have political representatives from the working class, has been shown to be associated with increased working-class disaffection and non-voting (Evans & Tilley 2017; Heath 2018). In summary, both the study of class and class voting itself have become more complex and increasingly focused on the realignment of class–party relationships in response to social and political change. The choices offered to voters by parties influence the extent of class-based divisions in voting, the types of class–party alignments and the likelihood that some people in particular positions vote at all. But the reason such party behaviour is consequential is because even in

class voting  69 post-industrial societies, class position continues to provide a source of differences in interests, identity, attitudes and preferences. Future work will doubtless reflect the renewed interest in the motives and political behaviour of the working class both because of their recent support for radical-right parties and their declining participation in electoral politics. Whether working-class non-participation can be stemmed or reversed is of particular interest given that abstention is likely to lead to increasing disregard by vote-seeking political parties, which in turn is likely to lead to greater abstention. The changing class structure has also led to social-democratic parties relying on coalitions of support from workers, socio-cultural professionals and ethnic minority voters. But this alliance is fragile and may well depend on the prevailing salience of classic traditional left-right issues on which these otherwise disparate groups can converge. The most likely alternative, the rise of a cultural dimension of political competition, could not only splinter such coalitions but could arguably reconfigure electoral politics from a class-based to an education-based cleavage, where the most proximate factor for partisan choice is not material interest, but cultural and psychological divisions. What does seem likely is that the responses, actions and strategies of parties, both established and challenger, will be most decisive in any further re-shaping of the nature of class voting. Geoffrey Evans

References Ares, Macarena (2022). “Issue politicization and social class: How the electoral supply activates class divides in political preferences.” European Journal of Political Research, 61(2): 503–523. Ares, Macarena and Mathilde, M. van Dittmars (2022). “Intergenerational social mobility, political socialization and support for the left under post-industrial realignment.” British Journal of Political Science, 53(2), https://doi​.org​/10​.1017​/ S0007123422000230. Clark, Terry Nichols, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. (2001). The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Erikson, Robert, and John H. Goldthorpe (1992). The Constant Flux: A Study of

Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, Geoffrey (1993). “Class, prospects and the life-cycle: Explaining the association between class position and political preferences.” Acta Sociologica, 36(3): 263–276. Evans, Geoffrey, ed. (1999). The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, Geoffrey, and Nan Dirk De Graaf (2013). Political Choice Matters. Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, Geoffrey, Rune Stubager, and Peter Langsaether (2022). “The conditional politics of class identity: Class origins, identity and political attitudes in comparative perspective.” West European Politics, 45(6): 1178–1205. Evans, Geoffrey, and James Tilley (2012). “The depoliticization of inequality and redistribution: Explaining the decline of class voting.” The Journal of Politics, 74(4): 963–976. Evans, Geoffrey, and James Tilley (2017). The New Politics of Class: The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fieldhouse, Edward, Jane Green, Geoffrey Evans, Jonathan Mellon, Christopher Prosser, Hermann Schmitt and Cees van der Eijk (2020). Electoral Shocks: The Volatile Voter in a Turbulent World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heath, Oliver (2018). “Policy alienation, social alienation and working class abstention in Britain, 1964–2010.” British Journal of Political Science, 48(4): 1053–1073. Langsæther, Peter Egge (2019). “Class voting and the differential role of political values: Evidence from 12 West-European countries.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 29(1): 125–142. Langsæther, Peter E., Geoffrey Evans, and Tom O’Grady (2022). “Explaining the relationship between class position and political preferences: A long-term panel analysis of intra-generational class mobility.” British Journal of Political Science, 52(2): 958–967. Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960). Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. London: Heinemann. Geoffrey Evans

70  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Oesch, Daniel (2006). Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Oesch, Daniel, and Line Rennwald (2018). “Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right.” European Journal of Political Research, 57(4): 783–807. Rennwald, Line (2020). Social Democratic Parties and the Working Class: New Voting Patterns. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Robison, Joshua, Rune Stubager, Mads Thau, and James Tilley (2020). “Does class-based

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campaigning work? How working class appeals attract and polarize voters.” Comparative Political Studies, 54(3): 1–30. Rydgren, Jens, ed. (2013). Class Politics and the Radical Right. London: Routledge. Spies, Dennis. (2013). “Explaining workingclass support for extreme right parties: A party competition approach.” Acta Politica, 48(3): 296–325. Vivyan, Nick, Markus Wagner, Konstantin Glinitzer, and Jakob-Moritz Eberl (2020). “Do humble beginnings help? How politician class roots shape voter evaluations.” Electoral Studies, 63: 102093.

18. Cleavages

little prospect of mobility between groups. For social conflicts to be politicized, group membership needs to become a part of the psychological fabric of the voter. Next, group attachments need to map onto political parties and transform themselves into partisan attachments. The multiplicity of different social identities and potential lines of conflict opens up a key theoretical debate about the agency of parties in the process of cleavage formation. Should we understand cleavage formation and change as primarily a “bottom-up” or “topdown” phenomenon? The traditional Lipset– Rokkanian perspective focuses on the former – structural conflicts divide social groups and strengthen their attachments to parties, which defend their interests and ideological commitments. Here, political socialization within the family and community plays a key role as the means through which socially rooted values and partisan orientations are transmitted between generations. However, the top-down literature suggests that while social structure offers the raw material for a potential cleavage, a cleavage’s strength depends on the ideological positioning of parties, which can either signal or mute the relevance of different social divides for vote choice (Evans & de Graaf 2013). Researchers have offered empirical evidence of cleavages at the individual level in several ways. First, the stability of individuals’ vote choice along group lines captured over time in panel data, or between parents and children, can be used to demonstrate the social embeddedness and stickiness of voting behaviour. Second, decomposition methods can disentangle the pure effects of voters’ socio-structural characteristics, their values or attitudes net of these characteristics and “cleavage voting” – the effects of structural characteristics on voting behaviour via the values they impart (Knutsen & Scarbrough 1998). Finally, structural divides can be associated with “cleavage identities”, detectable by questions about individuals’ perceptions of in-groups and out-groups (Bornschier et al. 2021). In turn, these identities strongly predict vote choice. At the aggregate level, several approaches have been proposed for measuring the degree to which a party system is cleavage-based. Cleavage strength has traditionally been measured by assessing the effect of membership of a social category on voting behaviour

Where spatial theory conceives of political parties as strategic actors which shift positions to meet the preferences of voters, cleavage theory understands parties as rooted in party systems which express durable conflicts between social groups. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that the national and industrial revolutions in Europe created new structural divides represented by the centre-periphery, state-church, land-industry and worker-owner cleavages. Each cleavage birthed new party families, many of which still play a prominent role in contemporary politics: regionalist, Christian-democratic, liberal, agrarian, communist and social-democratic parties. Two particularly influential theoretical insights followed: first, the capacity of cleavages to structure party systems generations after the conflicts which birthed them (the “freezing hypothesis”), and second, the importance of the historical sequencing of cleavages for explaining cross-national variation in party systems. Later conceptual elaborations sought to specify the components of a cleavage: (1) a structurally rooted conflict between social groups, (2) group identities which facilitate collective action and (3) organizations which strengthen the loyalties of groups to parties and mobilize groups in support of their party-political representatives (Bartolini & Mair 1990). An important question has always been how different cleavages interact. Cleavages can be mutually reinforcing or create crosspressures. Reinforcing cleavages intensifies conflict, potentially to the point of threatening democratic stability. The effects of cross-pressures are less clear. Some theories posit identity hierarchies and argue that the most important identity prevails. In this vein, Suryanarayan (2019) finds that status divides in the Indian context create a coalition between poor and rich high-caste Hindus, crowding out class conflict. Others argue that exposure to cross-pressures moderates ideology and tempers social conflicts (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Cleavages are strengthened and reproduced by processes of social closure (Bartolini & Mair 1990: 2016). Conflict is more likely to be sustained between groups with different cultural practices, unequal life chances and 71

72  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, & Manza 2006). The kappa and lambda indices incorporate nonbinary social characteristics and account for group size and party vote share, as well as, in some cases, participation rates across groups (Goldberg 2020). Some scholars reverse the logic, asking what share of the party vote stems from a particular group (Marks et al. 2023). Here, the focus is on parties and their social composition, rather than voters, although the two logics are, of course, related determined as they are by the same data. Its origins in the comparative historical analysis of Western Europe have left cleavage theory vulnerable to critiques of external validity. Many democracies elsewhere possess more unstable links between social groups and political parties or feature nonprogrammatic forms of party competition which cleavage theory is ill‑suited to explain. Scholars have nonetheless fruitfully studied cleavages in contexts such as South America (Faguet 2019) and South Asia (Suryanarayan 2019). Such advances rest on careful attention to country-specific critical junctures, as well as their relative sequencing vis-à-vis extensions of suffrage. Even in Western Europe, there has been much argument about the continued relevance of cleavages for party systems. Dealignment theory has offered a strong challenge to cleavage theory. Dealignment theorists argue that structural forces (e.g., social mobility and mass media) weaken the effects of social background on voting behaviour (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000). This is evidenced by the decline of older social-democratic and Christian-democratic parties, their inability to maintain the support of key social support groups and the ensuing rise of electoral volatility at the level of both individuals and party systems (Dassonneville 2022). However, many argue that social background continues to exert a strong influence over vote choice but, in large part, along different lines from older cleavages. Most scholarship on a potential new cleavage focuses on conflicts over (supra)national authority and social diversity, incarnated by competition between rising new left and radical-right parties. The roots of the new cleavages go back to the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s, which introduced the libertarian-authoritarian divide into party politics, especially in Europe, and gave rise to Green parties (Kriesi et al. 2012).

More recently, globalization and immigration have birthed challengers from the right in the form of radical-right parties. In this context, marked occupational and educational divides can be observed (e.g., Marks et al. 2023). There is disagreement about the precise structural bases of such a cleavage. Some researchers conceive of a divide between winners and losers of globalization, characterized by differences in educational attainment and exposure to international competition (Kriesi et al. 2012; Hooghe & Marks 2018). Others see educational divides as rooted in conflicts over libertarian/universalist values and particularistic/authoritarian values (Stubager 2009; Bornschier et al. 2021). Although much has been made of new cleavages, it should be noted that older cleavages have persisted or transformed themselves. Despite being one of the oldest historical divides studied by Lipset and Rokkan, the religious cleavage continues to structure vote choice. There is no doubt that secularization has hurt mainstream Christian-democratic parties. However, the religious cleavage remains powerful in much of Europe, and strongly homogeneous confessional parties have proven robust even in increasingly secularized societies. The occupational cleavage, meanwhile, has transformed. The service sector transition has introduced new horizontal divides within the broader working and middle classes. Sociocultural professionals have emerged as a key middle-class support group of new left parties, while production workers are now overrepresented in the ranks of radical-right parties (Oesch & Rennwald 2018). As the knowledge economy causes occupational and educational groups to cluster geographically, this cleavage is manifested spatially in a sharpening rural/urban divide (e.g. Maxwell 2020). This divide was highlighted, for instance, in the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections, where rural areas voted overwhelmingly for Donald Trump, and virtually all urban centres supported the Democratic candidate. The key empirical question for diagnoses of a new cleavage is whether the current volatility sometimes attributed to dealignment is transitory or enduring. Cleavage theory would predict that educational and class groups’ support of new left and radical-right parties should persist, even beyond the initial conflicts which generated them. However, this remains to be seen.

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cleavages  73 A key difference between the cleavages of the twenty-first century and those of Lipset and Rokkan is the atrophy of collective organizations crucial to the strength and durability of historical cleavages. How then do parties durably command and mobilize the loyalties of social groups? Even when formal membership organizations are in decline, social networks may provide sites of political socialization and mobilization capable of reproducing cleavages (Lindh et al. 2021). On the supply side, recent veins of research have demonstrated that group appeals (Thau 2021) and descriptive representation of social groups by party MPs (O’Grady 2019) offer further channels through which today’s parties succeed or fail in mobilizing social cleavages. David Attewell and Marco R. Steenbergen

References Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885–1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bornschier, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and Céline Colombo. 2021. “How ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Relates to Voting Behavior: Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice.” Comparative Political Studies 54(12): 2087–2122. Brooks, Clem, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Jeff Manza. 2006. “Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies.”  Social Science Research 35(1): 88–128. Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds). 2000. Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dassonneville, Ruth. 2022. Voters Under Pressure: Group-Based Cross-Pressure and Electoral Volatility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans, Geoffrey and Nan Dirk de Graaf. 2013. “Explaining Cleavage Strength: The Role of Party Positions.” In G. Evans and N. de Graaf (eds.), Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National

Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26. Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2019. “Revolution From Below: Cleavage Displacement and the Collapse of Elite Politics in Bolivia.” Politics and Society 47(2): 205–250. Goldberg, Andreas C. 2020. “The Evolution of Cleavage Voting in Four Western Countries: Structural, Behavioral, or Political Dealignment?.” European Journal of Political Research 59(1): 68–90. Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2018. “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage.” Journal of European Public Policy 25(1): 109–135. Knutsen,  Oddbjørn and Elinor Scarbrough. 1998. “Cleavage Politics.” In Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (eds.), The Impact of Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 492–524. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter, and Bruno Wüest. 2012. Political Conflict in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press. Lindh, Arvid, Anton B. Andersson, and Beate Volker. 2021. “The Missing Link: Network Influences on Class Divides in Political Attitudes.” European Sociological Review 37(5): 695–715. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments.” In S.M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, pp. 91–138. Marks, Gary, David Attewell, Liesbet Hooghe, Jan Rovny, and Marco Steenbergen. 2023. “The Social Basis of Political Parties: A New Measure.” British Journal of Political Science 53(1): 249–260. Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2020. “Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism: Evidence from Switzerland.” Comparative Political Studies 53(13): 2061–2090. Oesch, Daniel and Line Rennwald. 2018. “Electoral Competition in Europe’s New Tripolar Political Space: Class Voting for the Left, Centre-Right, and Radical Right.” European Journal of Political Research 57(4): 783–807. O’Grady, Tom. 2019. “Careerists Versus Coal-Miners: Welfare Reforms and the Substantive Representative Representation of Social Groups in the British Labour

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74  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Party.” Comparative Political Studies 52(4): 544–578. Stubager, Rune. 2009. “Education-Based Group Identity and Consciousness in the Libertarian-Authoritarian Value Conflict.” European Journal of Political Research 48(2): 204–233. Suryanarayan, Pavithra. 2019. “When Do the Poor Vote for the Right Wing and Why:

Status Hierarchy and Vote Choice in the Indian States.” Comparative Political Studies 52(2): 209–245. Thau, Mads. 2021. “The Social Divisions of Politics: How Parties’ GroupBased Appeals Influence Social Group Differences in Vote Choice.” Journal of Politics 83(2): 675–688.

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19. Clientelism

Clientelism is founded on unequal power relations (Scott 1972). However, recipients do have agency, and recent work has indeed engaged with the so-called demand side of clientelism, namely with how voters can request goods and services they value in various forms of clientelist exchange in ways that allow them to hold politicians accountable for the provision of these benefits (Nichter 2018). Clientelism is empirically associated with the lack of political information, poverty and high economic inequality (Stokes 2005), unstable or young democracies in which parties have yet to develop a programmatic track record with voters (Keefer & Vlaicu 2008), and inefficient bureaucracies (Geddes 1994). A common expectation, then, is that clientelism will become less prevalent with economic and political development (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). However, this expectation should be nuanced. It might well be that what matters is not how affluent a country is, but how much trust citizens have in the efficiency and impartiality of the state (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci 2017). Further, Kitschelt and Daniel (2012) have argued that the relationship between clientelism and economic and political development is curvilinear rather than linear, namely that clientelism actually increases when countries move from low levels of economic and political development and that it only decreases once a certain development threshold has been crossed. Central to Kitschelt’s and Kselman’s thesis is the observation that clientelism, first, requires a certain level of organizational infrastructure to deliver benefits and to contact voters and, second, that it implies a dual commitment: voters promise to deliver votes in exchange for benefits, and those who control benefits promise to actually provide them once they have received the votes. In turn, this dual commitment requires a degree of trust between actors, which accrues from a track record of successful electoral transactions. The literature has given sustained attention to the commitment problem of clientelism and particularly to the fact that currently, even in young democracies, politicians cannot in general monitor what happens in the voting booth and thus hold voters to their commitments; yet they do provide particularistic benefits to voters with the aim of getting their vote (Robinson & Verdier 2013). Several answers have been given to this puzzle. In a series of seminal contributions,

Political clientelism is the discretionary, contingent, and individualized distribution of benefits with the purpose of influencing voters’ behavior. These typically take the form of vote buying and patronage, that is, personnel hiring for electoral purposes, generally although not necessarily in the public sector, but can also be regulatory decisions, such as the issuing of licenses or the enforcement (or not) of regulation (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Several elements of this definition are worth highlighting. First, clientelism is characterized by its discretionary nature. In other words, decisions on the distribution or withholding of benefits are not based on the faithful application of rules. Rather, they are made in ways that violate the spirit or letter of existing rules or are outside of the scope of the regulatory framework. Hence, it is the nature of decision-making rather than of the benefits that matters in defining clientelism. Second, benefits are contingent on an exchange whereby the beneficiary is expected to vote according to the wishes of the actor that controls the benefits. Third, and connectedly, clientelism refers to decisions that affect individuals. This differentiates it from other nonprogrammatic policymaking, such as “pork barrel” spending targeting territorial constituencies. Finally, clientelism is an electoral strategy, and it occurs not only in democracies but also in authoritarian countries whose governments find it expedient to run elections (Frye et al. 2019). This differentiates it from outright corruption. While clientelism is empirically correlated to corruption, its immediate aim is electoral success rather than the actors’ enrichment. As an electoral strategy, it can be both short term, such as vote buying, and aim at establishing long-term relations with beneficiaries, such as patronage. Furthermore, the definition does not limit clientelistic decision-making to politicians seeking (re)election or to their vote brokers on the ground. While the literature, and indeed this entry, focuses on politicians and brokers, other actors can also be engaged in clientelistic practices. In particular, employers can direct their workers to vote in a certain way or else (Frye et al. 2019). 75

76  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Susan Stokes has emphasized the role of brokers (e.g. Stokes 2005). Brokers are agents on the ground for politicians; they distribute the resources they receive to potential voters, extracting a rent for themselves. They can improve monitoring and thus reduce vote leakage through their personal networks and their knowledge of the local context. In Stokes’ model, the agency problem between brokers and politicians is solved or at least ameliorated through the operation of an established party organization (the “political machine”). The party machine facilitates the monitoring of the brokers who, moreover, are vested in the party’s electoral success as it ensures their continued access to resources. In reality, however, clientelism is also present where parties are weakly institutionalized, which reduces the generalizability of Stokes’ model. Scholars have suggested other solutions to the puzzle of commitment in clientelistic relationships. Some in fact prefer to limit the concept of clientelism to ongoing relationships between patrons and clients, such as those brought about through public employment, which reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the beneficiaries (Robinson & Verdier 2013), while others have pointed to the role of engrained social norms of reciprocity to explain voters’ compliance in the absence of monitoring (Finan & Schechter 2012). Yet others have argued that the exchange is not about the vote, difficult or impossible to monitor even for brokers, but about more observable behavior: electoral mobilization (turnout buying) or, its opposite, absenteeism (Gans-Morse et al. 2014). As a matter of fact, it might be argued that conditionality should be dropped altogether from the defining characteristics of clientelism. For instance, the candidates’ provision of particularized benefits might aim to build credibility with voters regarding their perspective ability to distribute resources, rather than coming with electoral strings attached (Hicken et al. 2022). In fact, there is no consensus regarding whether clientelistic practices significantly sway voters. Many scholars do find that they do (e.g. Cantú 2019). However, others report that clientelistic distribution has little or no impact on electoral results (Guardado & Wantchékon 2018). Clientelism then might just be akin to a ticket to enter the electoral arena: if all or most candidates engage in it, Francesco Stolfi

not paying for the ticket would put the candidate at a disadvantage in the competition for votes. Another question that has attracted significant attention regards the criteria used in targeting voters. The poor are especially targeted (Stokes 2005), as are, it has been argued, individuals with a higher sense of reciprocity (Finan & Schechter 2012) or with larger social networks (Cruz 2019). In contexts where parties are institutionalized, and where therefore parties and candidates have a sense of how voters divide up between core party supporters and swing voters, the question is often framed in terms of the choice of whether to target core (Cox & McCubbins 1986) or swing (Dixit & Londregan 1996) voters. Inasmuch as clientelism creates “perverse accountability,” whereby it is voters that are accountable to politicians rather than the reverse (Stokes 2005), it distorts democratic governance, as politicians then have an electoral incentive to maintain the conditions, such as poverty and economic dependence, or the inefficient and ad-hoc provision of government services and public goods, that they can use to control at least some of the voters. How does this distortion of democratic accountability impact policies and policy outcomes in practice? The answer will vary depending on time and place, but scholars have indeed found a causal connection between clientelism and excessive public sector hiring, lower governance quality, the under-provision of public services such as education and health services, and more limited income redistribution (Berenschot & Mulder 2019, Khemani 2015). Thus clientelism, by reinforcing the economic dependence of the poor and the centrality of actors that can distribute government resources and facilitate access to public services, can create the conditions for its own perpetuation. Francesco Stolfi

References Berenschot, W., and P. Mulder (2019) ‘Explaining Regional Variation in Local Governance: Clientelism and State-Dependency in Indonesia’, World Development, 122: 233–44. Bustikova, L., and C. Corduneanu-Huci (2017) ‘Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity. The Historical Trajectories of Clientelism’, World Politics, 69(2): 277–326.

clientelism  77 Cantú, F. (2019) ‘Groceries for Votes: The Electoral Returns of Vote Buying’, Journal of Politics, 81(3): 790–804. Cox, G., and M. McCubbins (1986) ‘Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game’, Journal of Politics, 48(2): 370–89. Cruz, C. (2019) ‘Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying’, Comparative Political Studies, 52(3): 382–411. Dixit, A., and J. Londregan (1996) ‘The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics’, Journal of Politics, 58(4): 1132–55. Finan, F., and L. Schechter (2012) ‘VoteBuying and Reciprocity’, Econometrica, 80(2): 863–81. Frye, T., O. J. Reuter, and D. Szakonyi (2019) ‘Vote Brokers, Clientelistic Appeals, and Voter Turnout. Evidence from Russia and Venezuela’, World Politics, 71(4): 710–46. Gans-Morse, J., S. Mazzuca, and S. Nichter (2014) ‘Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections’, American Journal of Political Science, 58(2): 415–43. Geddes, B. (1994) Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America, Berkeley: University of California Press. Guardado, J., and L. Wantchékon (2018) ‘Do Electoral Handouts Affect Voting Behavior?’, Electoral Studies, 53: 139–49. Hicken, A., E. Aspinall, M. Weiss, and B. Muhtadi (2022) ‘Buying Brokers. Electoral Handouts Beyond Clientelism in a WeakParty State’, World Politics, 74(1): 77–120.

Keefer, P., and R. Vlaicu (2008) ‘Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism’, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24(2): 371–406. Khemani, S. (2015) ‘Buying Votes Versus Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to under-Invest in Pro-poor Policies’, Journal of Development Economics, 117: 84–93. Kitschelt, H., and K. Daniel (2012) ‘Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies’, Comparative Political Studies, 20(10): 1–32. Kitschelt, H., and S. Wilkinson, eds. (2007) Patrons, Clients and Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nichter, S. (2018) Votes for Survival: Relational Clientelism in Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press. Robinson, J., and T. Verdier (2013) ‘The Political Economy of Clientelism’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(2): 260–91. Scott, J. (1972) ‘Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia’, America Political Science Review, 66(1): 91–113. Stokes, S. (2005) ‘Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina’, American Political Science Review, 99(3): 315–25.

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20. Coalition formation

the formation of coalitions as a function of parties’ size and ideology. The foundational theories, which assume that the primary goal of parties is to gain office, analyze government formation as a zero-sum game in which cabinet portfolios (the set of executive posts) are the payoffs. The most notable theories originate from the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and Riker (1962), who considered coalition formation the most important issue in multi-player games. Their main prediction is that only coalitions with minimal winning size emerge, that is, those that strictly include the minimum number of coalition members to obtain the majority vote. The size of the coalition can be thought of as a commitment device. In a zero-sum game, a minimal size coalition would assure that every coalition member receives the largest possible share of the payoffs. The Core (Gillies, 1959) and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) are the two most impactful ideas from this tradition. The Core addresses a question of coalition stability, identifying the set of optimal payoff allocations for each feasible coalition, that is, from which no sub-coalition of members has an incentive to deviate. The Shapley value attempts to answer the question of how to divide payoffs fairly by considering how much a player marginally contributes to the coalition. A question that is more successfully answered by a sociology conjecture developed in parallel to the cooperative theories: Gamson’s law. Gamson (1961) argues that each coalition party demands a share of cabinet portfolios proportional to the number of votes (i.e., seats in the parliament) that it contributes to the coalition. Gamson’s law owes its importance in the government formation literature to its intuitive nature and robust empirical evidence. While contributing valuable theoretical insights, foundational theories have little predictive power, as a multitude of minimal winning coalitions can form at any given time. To address this issue, scholars of this tradition embrace ideological grounds, relaxing the original assumption of parties being exclusively motivated by office considerations. Namely, Axelrod (1970) argues that parties are not only interested in maximizing their office benefits but also in minimizing the transaction costs of the bargaining process over the coalition policy. Hence, only minimal winning coalitions of ideologically adjacent parties (minimal-connected-winning

Coalitions pervade the social scene widely, from military and political alliances to business cartels, from political parties to labor unions. Although many theoretical models treat coalitions as given—assuming they exist and behave as unitary actors—the process by which coalitions form is a key subject of analysis in social sciences. Coalition formation is an essential process in many real-world contexts, varying from the study of the origins of nations to the formation of classes. However, it is the process by which government coalitions form, which selects which party rules a country and which stays in the opposition, that has been the central concern of political scientists. Political scientists analyze the process of government formation primarily in the context of parliamentary democracies, in which the executive branch—consisting of a prime minister and a cabinet—is not elected directly by the citizens but answers to the parliament (Laver & Schofield, 1990; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Müller & Strøm, 2000). The fractionalization of the party system that most parliamentary democracies have witnessed over the past 80 years makes it almost impossible for a single party to gain the majority of the seats in parliament. On average, only 10 per cent of all general elections in Western European countries return a single party with a simple majority in parliament (Bassi, 2017). Hence, parties rely on teaming up to pass the investiture vote in parliament, enact laws, and survive potential votes of no confidence. The pioneering theories of coalition formation analyze primarily the set of possible coalitions that could form as a function of parties’ sizes and ideologies. Coalition theory scholars have then shifted away from this static analysis to focus on the dynamics with which coalitions form and the role of institutions. Both approaches contribute fundamental research paradigms to understanding the features and mechanisms by which government coalitions come to life. The coalition formation literature can be divided into two major traditions: the “size and ideology” and the “new institutionalism.” Theories belonging to the “size and ideology” domain rely on cooperative game theory and spatial modeling tools to analyze 78

coalition formation  79 coalitions) are predicted to form. The ideology assumption leads to the conclusion that the median party can operate essentially as a policy dictator when policy concerns are salient enough. The ability of the ideology shift to explain and match empirically observed governments has proved, however, to be not significantly better than that of the theories it attempts to improve upon, with the predicted government coalitions rarely matching the empirical evidence (Laver & Schofield, 1990). Furthermore, theories of the “size and ideology” doctrine offer no grasp on the selection mechanism that yields a particular coalition. Theories constituting the “new institutionalism” tradition emerged in the 1980s and emphasized the role of institutions, the set of rules and norms governing the process of government formation, as key variables of the coalition formation process. This new approach offers several novel insights compared to the foundational theories, provides a deeper understanding of the selection mechanism that yields a particular coalition, and generates specific predictions as a function of the country’s rules and norms of the coalition bargaining process. Consistent with the “size and ideology” tradition, institutionalist theories assume parties to be office seekers, predict minimal winning coalitions, and predict a prominent role for parties at the median position of the policy space. Furthermore, the coalition’s composition is a function of the rules and norms that govern the negotiation process. Notably, the formateur’s power to propose the cabinet and the power to control the timing of the government formation process are the two most studied procedural powers in the government literature. Most of the theories in this tradition analyze the coalition formation as a bargaining game over the cabinet portfolio payoffs. The first and most influential model of legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) extends the two-person alternating-offers bargaining model (Rubinstein, 1982) to n legislators and a simple majority rule for a proposal to pass. A long and distinguished theoretical literature has sprouted from Baron and Ferejohn’s framework. Yet, institutionalist theories of government formation seem to be characterized by a striking paradox. In fact, virtually all coalition theories share two robust predictions: the equilibrium coalition’s minimal winning size and the fact that the

party that has the power to propose an allocation of the cabinet portfolios (the formateur) obtains a disproportionally larger share of payoffs compared to the coalition partners.1 This is in stark contrast with empirical regularities, which show a much greater diversity of coalition size2 (only about a third of the government coalitions have a minimal winning size) and a perfect proportionality between the government parties’ share of cabinet portfolios and the share of legislative seats that the parties contribute to the coalition (Bassi, 2013). In light of the significant disjunction between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, the coalition formation literature relaxed several simplifying assumptions and moved in different new directions to include procedural features of the government formation process. To explain the rationale of non-minimal winning coalitions, institutionalists’ theories of government formation focus on the fact that policy-motivated parties can affect policy through the executive offices’ control. For example, Diermeier and Merlo (2000) analyze the allocation of cabinet portfolios as one aspect of the government formation process, where parties simultaneously bargain over the distribution of office posts and the government coalition’s policy. In this framework, the formateur party, to obtain majority support in the legislature, can either make “policy concessions” by enacting compromising policies that appeal to parties outside the government or propose direct “side payments” to opposition parties. The non-cooperative approach of these models produces equilibrium governments that can be minority, minimal-winning or surplus coalitions. Bassi (2017) extends these findings by focusing on the stability of non-minimal winning coalitions. Minority governments represent a strong equilibrium of the game when some external parties prefer to support the minority cabinet and its government policy rather than coalesce with other opposition parties. Similarly, surplus governments form when coalition members prefer the policy of the oversized coalition to the policy of a smaller coalition and when the utility loss in terms of office benefits due to the larger coalition size is less than the policy benefit. A handful of studies focus on the insights of the selection process of the formateur that generates its disproportional cabinet portfolio Anna Bassi

80  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology advantage. For example, Yildirim (2007) and Bassi (2013) relax the assumption that the formateur is exogenously recognized and analyze the coalition formation process with players competing to achieve the formateur’s role. In equilibrium, parties compete until they are indifferent between being formateur or partners, dissipating the formateur’s advantage and resulting in a proportional distribution of the payoffs. Other studies focus on the parties’ longterm utility of being in government, assuming that the formateur’s goal is to form durable coalitions that can survive against votes of no confidence. The formateur overcompensates its partners to guarantee they do not seek alternative partnerships, producing a more proportional distribution of the payoffs (Golder & Thomas, 2014). Alternatively, some studies focus on the long-term electoral goal and the relationship between parties’ bargaining behavior and the expectations of their voter base, to which they remain accountable. For example, Martin and Vanberg (2020) assume that voters punish their party if it fails to meet their expectations in terms of government portfolios they can secure. If voters expect parties to get a share of cabinet portfolios in proportion to their seats in parliament, a focal point discussed by many scholars (Bäck et al., 2009; Falcó-Gimeno & Indridason, 2013), parties maximize their utility by conforming to their expectations. Ultimately, some models depart from the legislative bargaining process’s structure, assuming a freeform negotiation process in which formateurs initiate the government formation phase by selecting a “proto-coalition” and then negotiate over the distribution of cabinet portfolios (Cox, 2021). In equilibrium, the allocation of payoffs is consistent with the Nash bargaining solution, and the distribution of cabinet portfolios is a weighted average of the seats the coalition parties contribute to the coalition. Despite fundamental advances and contributions, government formation continues to be one of the most studied processes in political science. In light of the rapid evolution of the party systems in most parliamentary democracies, coalition formation theorists face new questions: how does intra-party politics competition affect the behavior of party leaders during the government formation process? Does the existence of extreme “anti-system” parties alter Anna Bassi

the mechanism by which parties negotiate? Does the emerging GAL/TAN political ideology dimension change the bargaining game over government policy? As countries’ party systems, voters’ priorities, and international equilibria change, coalition theory scholars need to update and integrate coalition formation models to understand the novel driving forces affecting the formation and the activity of the executive branch. Anna Bassi

Notes 1.

2.

For example, with three parties seeking to coalesce to form a government, the formateur would receive at least two-thirds of the total payoffs, no matter the relative size of the coalition parties. A study of 15 post-World War II European democracies from 1945 to 2015 finds that only about 39 percent of the governments formed were minimal winning coalitions (Bassi, 2017). Of the remaining government alliances, 37 percent were minority government coalitions that controlled less than half of the legislative seats, and 24 percent were surplus government coalitions that included more than the required number of parties to reach the majority vote.

References Axelrod, Robert M. (1970). Conflict of Interest; A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics. Markham, Chicago. Bäck, Hanna, Meier, Henk Erik, Persson, Thomas. (2009). Party Size and Portfolio Payoffs: The Proportional Allocation of Ministerial Posts in Coalition Governments. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 15(1): 10–34. Baron, David P., Ferejohn, John A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review. 83(4): 1181–1206. Bassi, Anna. (2013). A Model of Endogenous Government Formation. American Journal of Political Science. 57(4): 777–793. Bassi, Anna. (2017). Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments. The Journal of Politics. 79(1): 250–268. Cox, Gary W. (2021). Nonunitary Parties, Government Formation, and Gamson’s Law. American Political Science Review. 115(3): 917–930. Diermeier, Daniel, Antonio, Merlo. (2000). Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies. Journal of Economic Theory. 94(1): 46–79.

coalition formation  81 Falcó-Gimeno, Albert, Indridason, Indridi H. (2013). Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson’s Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe. West European Politics. 36(1): 221–247. Gamson, William A. (1961). A Theory of Coalition Formation. American Sociological Review. 26(3): 373–382. Gillies, D. B. (1959). Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum, Games. In: A.W. Tucker and D.R. Luce, editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 47–85. Golder, Sona N., Thomas, Jacquelyn A. (2014). Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence. British Journal of Political Science. 44(1): 29–39. Laver, Michael, Schofield, Norman. (1990). Multiparty Governments: The Politics of Coalitions in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laver, Michael, Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1996). Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Martin, Lanny, Vanberg, Georg. (2020). What you see is not always what you get:

Bargaining before an Audience under Multiparty Government. American Political Science Review. 114(4): 1138–1154. Müller, Wolfgang C., Strøm, Kaare. (2000). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven. Rubinstein, Ariel. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica. 50(1): 97–110. Shapley, Lloyd S. (1953). A Value for n-Person Games. In: H. Kuhn and A. Tucker, editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games. Vol. II, Annals of Mathematics Studies. 28: 307–317. von Neumann, John, Morgestern, Oskar. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Yildirim, Huseyi. (2007). Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition. Journal of Economic Theory. 136(1): 167–196.

Anna Bassi

21. Collective action

contexts and the personal and interpersonal factors that make participation more likely. A number of factors help explain who gets involved, including social ties and networks, individual beliefs and identities, emotional reactions to experience, and the social construction and communication of issues. Social ties play a critical role in the decision to participate in collective action. At their most fundamental level, social ties are important because they are conduits of information. Obviously people cannot attend an event if they don’t learn that it’s occurring (Klandermans & Oegema 1987). Social ties are also important because they can provide social motivation to go to an event and support for doing so. People with ties to other activists are much more likely to attend a protest event. They may be motivated by an identity they share with other activists (McAdam & Paulsen 1993). Participation can provide social support and generate positive emotions that inspire continuing action (Taylor 1995). At the same time, ties to others and the busy lives we lead pull people away from participation. Those organizing collective action events communicate via social networks and social media in their attempt to mobilize participants. Collective movements describe problems and propose solutions, often strategically appealing to individual emotions and identities to draw them in (Viterna 2013). For example, Viterna (2013) shows how left‑wing guerrillas in Nicaragua tailored their rhetoric with emotional appeals to their intended audience, for example, by telling isolated women, “come join us, we’ll protect you from violence.” The different emotions an appeal generates can shape the type of action individuals are inspired to pursue (Beyerlein & Sikkink 2008; Van Dyke et al. 2021). Information that inspires sorrow can make people want to educate or volunteer, while that which angers or shocks may motivate people to protest. Around some issues, emotions play a larger role than social ties. Jasper and Poulsen (1995) demonstrate that a significant proportion of animal rights activists were driven to collective action, not by their social ties but after encountering shocking information on the mistreatment of animals that made them feel compelled to take action. Individuals may be driven to protest when they perceive either threats or opportunities in their social environment. They may

Collective action can be defined as people working together to achieve a common goal and can take many forms. Business enterprises involve people working together, sometimes in vast numbers, requiring extensive coordination. People also work together in voluntary associations focused on a wide range of issues. Today, we see collectivities coming together in countries around the world to mobilize against COVID-19 lockdowns and vaccination requirements, police brutality, and election results. Collective action can produce what are known as public goods, such as clean air policies, or individual goods, such as a paycheck or a feeling of solidarity or moral satisfaction. Early social and political theorists recognized the importance of collective action in fostering the solidarity and shared beliefs and culture necessary for both social cohesion and social change. These scholars, however, assumed that individuals would participate. However, while collaboration is a cornerstone of capitalist enterprises, it is less common for actions that do not provide a clear individual benefit. Olson (1968) was the first theorist to suggest it is not rational for individuals to contribute their time to activities that will produce public goods, because they will have access to these whether they contributed to their production or not. He described this as a free rider problem and argued it explains why many individuals do not participate in collective action. He suggested that individuals must be provided with incentives (e.g., membership benefits) to motivate them to work collectively. However, scholars have demonstrated that the incentive idea is inconsistent with the theory since the resources for incentives would have to come from some collectivity, which would also face a free rider problem (for a discussion see Oliver 1993). Olson’s (1968) work had a big impact on studies of collective action. Rather than assuming that people would just naturally act together if they shared a common goal, scholars came to realize that individual participation in collective action needs to be explained. Even in the face of serious grievances or threats, some people will engage in collective action while others do not. Thus, attention has turned more to understanding the social 82

collective action  83 interpret social conditions as presenting a threat to their existing rights and privileges or may already be experiencing a negative economic or physical event. For example, the United States saw some of the largest protests in its history following the election of Donald Trump to the presidency because he presented political threats to a broad swath of the population (Fisher 2021). Economic threats can also inspire collective action, as in 2010 when students in England and Italy contested tuition increases and proposed funding cuts to higher ed. Threatened or already occurring environmental threats or disasters and government responses to them have generated collective action for decades. When people live in nations where they know that political structures offer them an opportunity for participation and influence, they are more likely to engage in collective action to take advantage (Kriesi et al. 1995). Indeed, allies within positions of authority, be they in government or corporations, can help movements achieve their policy goals (Amenta 2008). As new leaders are elected or put in place, political opportunities can change. When people come to have allies in positions of power, they may mobilize for collective action to encourage supportive policies. Indeed, after President Trump told members of the Proud Boys hate group to “stand back, and stand by” during a presidential debate, their membership numbers tripled (Teh 2022), and they became more involved in collective action. When people decide to act collectively, their actions can take a range of forms, from demonstrations and road blockades to artistic performances and social media campaigns. They may take action in an attempt to influence with the power of numbers—by demonstrating that many people care deeply about an issue. Disruptive action can force powerholders to make concessions in order to restore daily activities. Sometimes collective action can involve relatively ordinary activities, such as when US civil rights activists defied the KKK in the 1960s to register to vote, or LGBTQ+ activists apply for marriage licenses in political contexts that do not recognize same-sex marriage. Taylor and colleagues (Taylor et al. 2009) suggest we can identify whether an action is part of a broader movement when it contests existing social relationships, or policies, when it is done intentionally to challenge, and when

participants have a collective identity which they share with others pursuing the same goals. Activists in particular geographic areas tend to have a relatively limited set of tactics they draw upon as part of their collective action repertoire. These collective action repertoires vary from one place to another due to different cultures, political systems, and histories of protest (Tilly 2008). Bossnapping, or the forcible sequestration of company managers, has a long history in France, but not in other countries (Hayes 2012). The use of bossnapping reflects a longstanding culture of protest but also France’s political structure, which offers fewer opportunities for citizen influence via less disruptive means. Collective action repertoires do evolve over time as new tactics are invented or adopted from elsewhere, with social networks often playing an important role in this diffusion of tactics. Protests that bring together activists from across a wide range of movements often exhibit a broader range of tactics. For example, the anti-globalization protests in the early 2000s that brought together tens of thousands of activists in many countries employed a diverse and colorful range of actions ranging from street blockades to parades with giant puppets, faeries, clowns, and music (della Porta 2006). Activists from different movements brought tactics from their repertoires, such as building occupations from student activists, and vigils and fasts by religious groups. This led to a much greater range of action than we would typically see from a campaign with a narrower issue focus. Collective action repertoires are also influenced by the involvement of movement organizations and professionals. Some social theorists believed that the involvement of organizations leads groups to engage in less disruptive forms of collective action. Michels ([1911] 1968) argued that over time goals of organizational maintenance take priority and prevent groups from engaging in mass-scale disruptive protests that can lead to success. Staggenborg (1994) found that as movements develop over time, the involvement of professional paid activists can lead to the formalization of organizations, which does lead to the use of more institutional, less disruptive tactics. However, this can be a benefit to the movement because organizations are effective at managing the labor of protest—planning Nella Van Dyke

84  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology action, coordinating mobilization (sometimes through coalitions), communicating with powerholders and the media, and ensuring safety. They often have resources, leaders, and membership numbers which help generate large protests and help movements achieve their goals. Informal organization, including diffuse, non-centralized social networks, can also play a critical role in mobilizing people for collective action, for example, via social media. Political opportunities, or the extent to which a political system is open to citizen input, also impact collective action repertoires. Protest activity is most likely when a system is neither completely open, nor completely closed, to its populace. When a system is completely closed, collective action may be too risky, and protesters face extreme repression, even death. When it is completely open, there is no need for protest, as citizens can exert political influence without engaging in collective action. A country that offers multiple points of access to citizens, such as Switzerland, tends to see a great deal of moderate, non-disruptive protest, while a country that offers far fewer opportunities, such as France, tends to see outbursts of more disruptive collective action (Kriesi et al. 1995). Group tactical strategies are shaped by their interactions with authorities, and as a government institutes more repression against a movement, activists often turn to more violent forms of collective action (Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou 2012; della Porta 2008). As social theorist Emile Durkheim ([1912] Durkheim, Cosman, & Cladis 2008) long ago observed, when groups come together for collective activity, it generates powerful emotions that help build solidarity and shared understandings that enable groups to sustain themselves and achieve shared goals. Citizens often turn to collective action in an effort to impact social policy when they feel they have no other means of doing so. Collective action has profoundly shaped the social world and will undoubtedly continue to do so. Nella Van Dyke

References Alimi, Eitan, Lorenzo Bosi, and Chares Demetriou. 2012. “Relational Dynamics and Processes of Radicalization: A Comparative Framework.” Mobilization 17(1):7–26. doi: 10.17813/maiq.17.1.u7rw348t8200174h. Nella Van Dyke

Amenta, Edwin. 2008. When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security. 2. print., 1. paperback print. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Beyerlein, Kraig, and David Sikkink. 2008. “Sorrow and Solidarity: Why Americans Volunteered for 9/11 Relief Efforts.” Social Problems 55(2):190–215. doi: 10.1525/ sp.2008.55.2.190. della Porta, Donatella, ed. 2006. Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. della Porta, Donatella. 2008. “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence.” Qualitative Sociology 31(3):221–230. doi: 10.1007/s11133-008-9109-x. Durkheim, Émile, Carol Cosman, and Mark Sydney Cladis. 2008. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fisher, Dana. 2021. American Resistance: From the Women’s March to the Blue Wave. New York Columbia University Press. Hayes, Graeme. 2012. “Bossnapping: Situating Repertoires of Industrial Action in National and Global Contexts.” Modern & Contemporary France 20(2):185–201. doi: 10.1080/09639489.2012.665577. Jasper, James M., and Jane D. Poulsen. 1995. “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests.” Social Problems 42(4):493–512. doi: 10.2307/3097043. Klandermans, Bert, and Dirk Oegema. 1987. “Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements.” American Sociological Review 52(4):519. doi: 10.2307/2095297. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. McAdam, Doug, and Ronnelle Paulsen. 1993. “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” American Journal of Sociology 99(3):640. doi: 10.1086/230319. Michels, Robert. 1968. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. 2. Free Pr. paperback ed. New York: Free Press. [u.a.].

collective action  85 Oliver, Pamela. 1993. “Formal Models of Collective Action.” Annual Review of Sociology 19(1): 271–300. Olson, Mancur Jr. 1968. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. New York: Schocken Books. Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1994. The Pro-choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict. New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, Verta. 1995. “Watching for Vibes: Bringing Emotions into the Study of Feminist Organizations.” Pp. 223–233 in Myra Marx Ferree and Patricia Yancey Martin, eds, Feminist Organizations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Taylor, Verta, Katrina Kimport, Nella Van Dyke, and Ellen Ann Andersen. 2009. “Culture and Mobilization: Tactical Repertoires, Same-Sex Weddings, and the Impact on Gay Activism.” American Sociological Review 74(6):865–890.

Teh, Cheryl. 2022. “A Proud Boy Told the January 6 Panel That Membership in the Organization ‘tripled’ after Trump Told Them to ‘Stand Back and Stand By.’” Business Insider. Retrieved July 6, 2022 (https://www​.businessinsider​.com ​/proud​ -boy​ - membership​ - tripled​ - trump​ - stand​ -back​-and​-stand​-by​-2022-6). Tilly, Charles. 2008. Contentious Performances. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Dyke, Nella, Kathryn P. Daniels, Ashley N. Metzger, and Carolina Molina. 2021. “Rhetorical Form, Emotions, and Mobilization Potential in the Movement Against Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 26(2):197–216. doi: 10.17813/1086-671X-26-2-197. Viterna, Jocelyn. 2013. Women in War: The Micro-processes of Mobilization in El Salvador. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nella Van Dyke

22. Comparativehistorical sociology

sociology as a subfield, focused primarily on its formation and development. After delving into what does and does not constitute comparative-historical sociology, it then offers a historical account of the emergence and development of comparative-historical sociology as a subfield focused primarily on the United States. It then finishes with an assessment of where the subfield currently stands. What is comparative-historical sociology? – The question of what constitutes comparativehistorical sociology is trickier than it may seem at first glance. As a method, it is closely identified with the textual analysis of archival documents. This is true and has increasingly become a central feature of comparative-historical sociology (Mayrl & Wilson 2020). But many foundational works within the subfield are based on synthetic analyses of secondary materials (Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1990). Other works that have won awards from associations of comparative-historical social scientists use large-N quantitative analysis (Wimmer 2018), network analysis (Erikson 2016), spatial analysis (Braun 2019), and more. Empirically, the subfield has primarily focused on questions at the core of political sociology such as the formation of modern nation‑states (Ertman 1997), or welfare states (Orloff 1993), the causes and consequences of revolutions (Goldstone 1991), or the emergence of capitalism (Lachmann 2000). But it has also broached broader questions related to social cohesion and differentiation (Haveman 2017), manners (Elias 1939), political and cultural identities (Ikegami 2005), and more. Likewise, the subfield has tended to focus on European and North American cases, but it also has a tradition of engaging with nonWestern cases (Bendix 1977; Eisenstadt 1963; Moore 1966), which has only expanded in recent years (Charrad 2001; Paschel 2016). If there is a unifying idea tying together comparative-historical sociology as a subfield, it is that of taking time seriously (Tilly 1984). Rather than using time simply as another variable or a source of more data points for a pooled dataset, comparative-historical sociology begins from the notion that questions of the timing and sequence of events are crucial for understanding social processes. That is, when events occur and the order in which they occur fundamentally shape the set of possible outcomes. For example, a revolutionary movement may succeed or fail depending on whether it occurs at time when critical political and/or economic factors are

Comparative-historical sociology sits awkwardly at the intersection of method and subfield, of theoretical approach and empirical analysis. It is simultaneously central and marginal to the discipline of sociology writ large. Fundamentally, it is a diverse and wideranging body of scholarship concerned with processes of large-scale change over time. It tends to involve tackling big macro-structural questions, as well as rare but consequential events like revolutions, state and empire formation, the development of social norms and institutions, and more. Many of these questions are political at their core, making comparative-historical approaches a favored tool for a wide array of political sociologists. It is a genre of sociology with a long historical pedigree. Many if not most of the canonical works by those identified as the “founders” of sociology such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Du Bois could today be categorized as examples of comparative-historical sociology. However, it has only been codified and recognized as a distinct subfield within sociology relatively recently, roughly over the past 60 years. Since then, especially over the past 25 years, comparative-historical sociology has undergone several waves of reinterrogation and reinvention, which have unsettled and expanded the subfield empirically, theoretically, and methodologically. At the same time, it has led to debates about the very meaning of comparative-historical sociology and what “counts” as comparativehistorical sociology. Today, despite its centrality among sociology’s founders, comparative-historical sociology occupies a peculiar niche position within the discipline as a whole. On the one hand, it remains highly valorized, with many influential and award-winning works using some kind of comparative-historical approach. On the other hand, it is not very prevalent within the discipline, with most self-identified comparative-historical sociologists concentrated at large research-intensive universities and few sociology departments counting more than a single comparative-historical sociologist, if any (Prasad 2006). This article explores and contextualizes the tensions surrounding comparative-historical 86

comparative-historical sociology  87 present or absent, such as intra-elite conflict or economic crisis (Skocpol 1979). Likewise, whether political democratization precedes or succeeds economic industrialization has consequences for a variety of outcomes such as welfare state regimes, party systems, class formation, social mobilization, and more (Aminzade 1993; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Shefter 1977; Tilly 2006). More broadly, comparative-historical sociology offers a complement and corrective to other forms of sociology in that it offers sociologists a way to study types of social phenomena where causal processes and/or outcomes may occur over longer time horizons (Pierson 2003). This complements other approaches by allowing sociologists to expand the types of questions they can ask, analyzing processes that occurred or began at a time when other forms of data may be hard to obtain or that happened at a scale that is difficult to observe with other methodological tools. It also corrects other approaches by acknowledging that incorporating time fundamentally changes our analysis of social processes. And conversely, not incorporating time can distort research findings and artificially restrict our scope of analysis. For example, an analysis of the US Civil Rights Movement that focuses on the mass mobilization and judicial and legislative victories of the 1950s and 1960s without incorporating the role of longer-term migration patterns or shifts in the structure of the cotton economy of the US South will come up short (McAdam 1982). The same can be said of approaches that fail to insert the US Civil Rights Movement within a global context of the unfolding of the Cold War and decolonization struggles (Marable 2007). In this, comparative-historical sociology offers an invaluable conceptual toolkit for better understanding a wide array of social processes. To the extent that there is a technique to comparative-historical analysis, it involves close attention to the researcher’s logic of inquiry—although there are a variety of approaches to this within the subfield (Skocpol & Somers 1980). Given that it lends itself to the study of big questions with negative degrees of freedom—too many variables, not enough observations—comparativehistorical analysis relies on the researcher’s judicious selection and motivation of cases to compare, along with the meticulous use of evidence to assess competing explanations

and advance causal claims, in order to work. This is not unique to comparative-historical sociology, but given the high degree of uncertainty and the lack of standardized techniques in comparative-historical analysis, it is particularly important to this approach. It has also ensured that questions of the logic of inquiry have remained a live source of debate within the subfield. Development of Comparative-Historical Sociology as a Subfield – Comparativehistorical sociology is as old as sociology itself. Those retroactively identified as sociology’s founders, including Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Du Bois, all made extensive use of comparative-historical analysis. We need only think of Marx’s account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, or Weber’s account of the origins of modern bureaucracy, or Durkheim’s account of the origins of the family, or Du Bois’s analysis of the forces shaping post-US Civil War Reconstruction. But the subfield as such did not take shape until much later. Reacting against the survey-based empiricism and Parsonian grand theory that characterized much of US sociology in the mid-twentieth century, some scholars made a turn to history starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Rather than seek out general covering laws that govern social processes in all times and places or generate findings and theories based on the statistical manipulation of survey data, they sought to understand social change. Almost by definition, this required thinking historically and comparatively. Without abandoning the search for broader patterns or social structures, they sought to situate their analysis within historical trajectories, in which prior events enable or constrain subsequent ones. They also thought comparatively, trying to explain why similar processes led to different outcomes in different parts of the world, at different times (Eisenstadt 1963; Moore 1966). The pushback against dominant modes of social science was not simply an intellectual battle. It was inextricably tied to the social upheavals of the period. Students involved in fights against US imperialism and European colonialism around the globe, along with movements for civil rights and against Jim Crow in the US, sought to understand the social changes in which they were often direct participants. As some entered graduate programs in the 1960s and 1970s, these questions Barry Eidlin

88  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology animated their own research agendas. This in turn lent a distinctly left political cast to this emerging body of scholarship. Some engaged directly with Marxism, particularly via the work of British scholars like E.P. Thompson and Perry Anderson or the world systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, while others adopted a “left-Weberian” approach most closely identified with the work of scholars like Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, and Theda Skocpol (Sewell 1996). This mode of analysis gathered steam throughout the 1960s and 1970s as a discernible subfield took shape. An early indicator was the founding in 1958 of Comparative Studies in Society and History, an explicitly interdisciplinary journal bringing together social science-oriented historians with historically oriented social scientists from several fields. This continued in 1974 with the founding of the Social Science History Association, which launched its own journal, Social Science History, in 1976. Other journals, like Politics & Society, founded in 1970, were not explicitly historical in orientation but nonetheless became important venues for publishing historical social science. Within the US context, the subfield came of age organizationally with the founding of the American Sociological Association’s Sections on the Political Economy of the World-System in 1977 and Comparative Historical Sociology in 1982. The organization of the subfield developed alongside efforts to articulate it as a distinct if heterogeneous approach to social science research. Most notable among these was a 1979 conference that culminated in the 1984 publication of Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, edited by Theda Skocpol (1984). The book featured leading figures in the new generation of historical scholarship engaging with the work of their mentors, the pioneers of the subfield. It also included an extensive annotated bibliography to provide a map of the field. This period also saw the publication of several foundational works from the new generation, particularly the Bringing the State Back In edited volume (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol 1985). As the millennium drew to a close, and the movements that animated the 1970s cohort of comparative-historical sociologists faded from view, a new generation of scholars redefined the discipline. Against classical Marxist and Weberian modes of explanation focused on interests, organizations, and institutions, Barry Eidlin

they called for greater attention to the systems of culture, meaning, and identity that shaped interests and gave organizations and institutions their power. They also pushed to expand comparative-historical sociology’s scope of analysis to address questions of race, gender, and other axes of social difference. This generational shift within comparative-historical sociology was formalized with the publication in 2005 of another critical edited volume entitled Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Adams, Clemens, & Orloff 2005). In the introduction, editors Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Orloff offered their conception of how the subfield had developed since its contemporary emergence in the mid-twentieth century. They proposed their now-canonical periodization of “three waves” of comparative-historical sociology, with the pioneers of the 1950s and 1960s being the first wave, the institutionalists of the 1970s and 1980s the second, and the culturalists of the 1990s and 2000s the third. The wide-ranging chapter contributions, again from leading figures of the third wave, showcased a characteristic focus on culture, action, and multiplicity (i.e., “Pathways to Modernity,” “Transitions to Capitalism”). Nearly 20 years on from Remaking Modernity, comparative-historical sociology is once again in a process of reinvention. While some have spoken of a “fourth wave,” it has yet to materialize. Nonetheless, certain themes are discernible. One is a return of more politically engaged scholarship, with a new generation of sociologists shaped by the social mobilizations in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis re-engaging with Marxism, particularly neo-Gramscian variants (DeLeon, Desai, & Tuğal 2015). Another is a more systematic engagement with questions of empire and imperialism, particularly their central role in shaping political developments in the metropole—even sociology itself (Steinmetz 2014). And a third, related to the second, is an effort to create a more globally oriented comparative-historical sociology, with greater attention to questions of racial capitalism and the Black radical tradition (Go & Lawson 2017). Methodologically, the subfield has become even more ecumenical, with the digitization of archives and advances in computational sociology creating analytical opportunities unthinkable even a decade ago. At the same

comparative-historical sociology  89 time, the subfield has emphasized the importance of archival research, with a distinct trend in recent years toward favoring work based on primary sources (Mayrl & Wilson 2020). Expanding methodological pluralism has raised the question of what “counts” as comparative-historical sociology. While agreement on this question is unlikely, there are likely enough scholars who are invested enough in debates surrounding such questions to keep comparative-historical scholarship vibrant and dynamic for the foreseeable future. For political sociology, comparativehistorical approaches will continue to offer vital insights. Contemporary political questions related to racial, national, and ethnic cleavages, populism, changing welfare state regimes, class power and inequality, and development/underdevelopment can all benefit from a comparative-historical analytical lens. This can reframe current debates by placing them in a historical context and breaking them out of the nation-state framework that often prevails. For a discipline that is criticized for a myopic focus on single cases in the present day, often limited to the US and Western Europe, this can be a useful corrective. Barry Eidlin

References Adams, Julia, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff. 2005. “Introduction: Social Change, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology.” Pp. 1–72. In: Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Politics, History, and Culture), edited by J. Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and A. S. Orloff. Durham: Duke University Press. Aminzade, Ronald. 1993. Ballots and Barricades: Class Formation and Republican Politics in France, 1830–1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bendix, Reinhard. 1977. Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. Berkeley: University of California Press. Braun, Robert. 2019. Protectors of Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Charrad, Mounira. 2001. States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

DeLeon, Cedric, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tuğal, eds. 2015. Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Eisenstadt, S. N. 1963. The Political Systems of Empires. New York: Routledge. Elias, Norbert. 1939. The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. Erikson, Emily. 2016. Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ertman, Thomas. 1997. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flora, Peter, and Arnold J. Heidenheimer. 1981. The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. Transaction Books. Go, Julian, and George Lawson, eds. 2017. Global Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley: University of California Press. Haveman, Heather A. 2017. Magazines and the Making of America: Modernization, Community, and Print Culture, 1741–1860. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ikegami, Eiko. 2005. Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lachmann, Richard. 2000. Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and European Transitions in Early Modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marable, Manning. 2007. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction and Beyond in Black America, 1945–2006. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Mayrl, Damon, and Nicholas HooverWilson. 2020. “What Do Historical Sociologists Do All Day? Analytic Architectures in Historical Sociology.” American Journal of Sociology 125(5):1345–1394. McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Barry Eidlin

90  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. New York: Beacon Press. Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. The Politics of Pensions : A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880–1940. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Paschel, Tianna S. 2016. Becoming Black Political Subjects: Movements and Ethnoracial Rights in Colombia and Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pierson, Paul. 2003. “Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences.” Pp. 177–207. In: Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Prasad, Monica. 2006. “The Prada Bag Problem.” Comparative & Historical Sociology: Newsletter of the ASA Comparative and Historical Sociology Section 18(1):9–14. Sewell, Jr., William H. 1996. “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology.” Pp. 245–280. In: The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences, edited by T. J. McDonald. University of Michigan Press.

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Shefter, Martin. 1977. “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy.” Politics & Society 7(4):403–451. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda, ed. 1984. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, Theda, and Margaret Somers. 1980. “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22(2):174–197. Steinmetz, George. 2014. “The Sociology of Empires, Colonies, and Postcolonialism.” Annual Review of Sociology 40(1):77–103. Tilly, Charles. 1984. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. Thousand Oaks: Russell Sage Foundation. Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Oxford: Blackwell. Tilly, Charles. 2006. Regimes and Repertoires. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wimmer, Andreas. 2018. Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

23. Comparative political economy

of the 1970s or, in other words, to the end of the postwar era of sustained economic growth across OECD countries. Inspired by Shonfield’s Modern Capitalism (1967), political scientists working on “advanced democracies” sought to explain divergent national responses to the disruptions of the 1970s— currency fluctuations, oil price shocks, and the decline of traditional industries—in terms of institutionalized relations among state actors, business associations, and organized labor (Katzenstein 1978, Zysman 1983). In parallel, the role of the state in promoting economic development, and the distinction between export-led and import-substituting industrialization strategies, emerged as a topic of theorizing and comparative analysis by political scientists and sociologists working on developing countries (e.g., Evans 1979, 1995). While industrial policy and state capacity have remained core concerns of comparative political economists working on developing countries, the literature dealing with OECD countries became less state-centered in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Under the banner of “neo-corporatism,” cross-national variation in macroeconomic performance, wage bargaining, and government partisanship emerged as a prominent theme of OECDfocused CPE scholars in the 1980s. Bringing globalization into the picture, Garrett (1998) synthesized the extensive literature on this topic by arguing that partisan differences with regard to macroeconomic management and social spending are most pronounced when unions are encompassing and economic openness renders wage restraint imperative. Under these conditions, according to Garrett, unions are both willing and able to engage in “political exchange” with left parties, providing the basis for export-led growth combined with social protection (cf. Katzenstein 1985). Less closely linked to political science, yet another stream of CPE literature in the 1980s interpreted the economic dislocations of the 1970s as a crisis of Fordist mass production and explored the emergence of alternative ways of organizing industrial production. Emphasizing the key role of industrial districts as the site of coordination among firms, Piore and Sabel (1984) challenged the relevance of national models posited by more mainstream CPE scholars. By contrast, Streeck (1991) linked the study of technological and organizational change at the shop floor to the theme of national diversity, arguing that core

The term “comparative political economy” (henceforth CPE) is here used as the label of a sub-field of political science and political sociology. Within political science, CPE is a sub-field of the sub-field of political science known as “comparative politics,” with “international political economy” (IPE) being the equivalent of CPE within the sub-field known as “international relations.” Many political scientists and political sociologists who selfidentify as “CPE scholars” assign analytical primacy to formal institutions, but CPE, like IPE, is a field of inquiry defined by substantive questions rather than a theoretical perspective. The substantive questions that define CPE and IPE as fields of inquiry pertain to the interplay between politics and economics. CPE and IPE are part of the tradition of political economy at the intersection of political science, economics, and sociology. CPE scholarship, in particular, has been inspired by the insights of heterodox economists who challenge the lack of attention to distributive conflict and power relations in mainstream economics. There are also important parallels and synergies between CPE and economic sociology. What distinguishes CPE from other strands of the political economy tradition is its focus on cross-national variation. Heterodox economists are first and foremost interested in common capitalist dynamics. IPE scholars are interested in the economic and political interactions between national units, and economic sociologists are interested in how specific markets and corporate entities are organized and how this affects the behavior of individual “market actors.” By contrast, the idea of “national models,” or “varieties of capitalism,” is the cornerstone of the research agenda of CPE scholars.1 In thinking about cross-national variation, CPE scholars typically emphasize how formal institutions and power relations shape the distribution of resources between labor and capital, between different categories of “labor,” and between different economic sectors. In this sense, the core analytical concerns of CPE scholarship fall within the domain of political sociology. The emergence of CPE as a distinct field of inquiry can be dated to the second half 91

92  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology features of the “German model”—vocational training, employment protection, co-determination, and coordinated wage bargaining— prevented German firms from competing by cutting labor costs and, at the same time, enabled them to pursue diversified-qualityproduction (DQP) strategies. Edited by Soskice and Hall, the 2001 volume entitled Varieties of Capitalism established the analytical approach pioneered by Soskice as the dominant paradigm of CPE scholarship on advanced capitalist countries (Soskice 1999, Hall & Soskice 2001). The “VofC approach” recast insights from earlier CPE research programs into an analytical framework organized around the distinction between “liberal market economies” (LMEs), exemplified by Britain and the US, and “coordinated market economies” (CMEs), exemplified by Germany and Japan. Emphasizing similarities between Germany and Japan, the typology of advanced capitalist political economies proposed by Soskice and embraced by many other scholars downplays the role of tripartite concertation as well as the role of the state as an autonomous actor. According to the VofC school, the first question comparative political economists ought to ask themselves is whether or not firms have the capacity to engage in strategic coordination with respect to wage bargaining, vocational training, technological innovation, and lobbying of political authorities. Coordinating capacity derives from concentrated ownership, banks as stakeholders in corporations, and associational networks that link firms to each other. Institutional complementarities and comparative institutional advantages are foundational concepts of the VofC framework. “Institutional complementarities” refer to the idea that business coordination in any one sphere (e.g., corporate governance) increases the returns to coordination in other spheres (e.g., labor relations). From the VofC perspective, the distinction between LMEs and CMEs does not have much, if any, bearing on overall efficiency and long-term growth rates. What distinguishes these two types of capitalism has to do with the economic activities that generate growth. While the institutional framework of LMEs favors the expansion of low-wage services as well as high-tech sectors engaged in radical (product) innovation, the institutional framework of CMEs favors incremental (process) innovation in Jonas Pontusson and Lucio Baccaro

manufacturing and, more specifically, diversified quality production. Building on these ideas, VofC scholars have argued forcefully against the proposition that globalization generates convergence across varieties of capitalism. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the VofC framework implies that international competition leads to a crystallization of LME/CME differences, as firms specialized in economic activities that are advantaged by existing institutions thrive and governments seek to promote growth by engaging in reforms that render institutional frameworks more coherent and thus enhance institutional complementarities. As with any analytical paradigm that aspires to reconfigure an existing field of inquiry, the VofC approach has generated a good deal of debate. Some critics question the conceptual foundations and empirical adequacy of the binary typology proposed by the VofC school, arguing that the LME/ CME distinction fails to encompass the full range of advanced capitalist economies and that VofC scholars lump together political economies operating according to very different logics.2 Accepting the LME/CME distinction as the foundation for a meaningful typology of advanced capitalist political economies, a second set of critics have taken VofC scholars to task for failing to explain why some countries are LMEs while others are CMEs. A third debate pertains to institutional changes in advanced capitalist political economies since the 1980s. In this debate, the critics emphasize common trends across LMEs and CMEs, frequently construed as “liberalization" (Baccaro & Howell 2017), while VofC scholars insist on the persistence of fundamental differences between LMEs and CMEs (Hall & Gingerich 2009). Thelen (2014) stakes out a distinctive position in this debate by identifying two different liberalization trajectories in CMEs (“embedded flexibilization” and “dualization”) while insisting that both of these trajectories are very different from the neo-liberal trajectory of LMEs (characterized by “deregulation”). Early critics of the VofC approach did not advance a coherent alternative approach, and the debate about the merits of the VofC approach became rather stale over time. In addition, the experience of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 and the ensuing recession brought to the fore a series of issues that seemed to call into question the supply-side

comparative political economy  93 emphasis of VofC advocates and critics alike. Many CPE scholars responded to these developments by focusing on determinants of the policy and party preferences of voters with different socio-economic characteristics (occupation, income, and the like), effectively abandoning the macro-comparative problématique of the CPE tradition and, more specifically, the idea that CPE is about understanding capitalism(s) (see Beramendi et al. 2015). In recent work, the authors of this encyclopedia entry have sought to revitalize the CPE tradition and to propose an alternative to the VofC approach that we refer to as the “Growth Models (GM) perspective” (Baccaro & Pontusson 2016, Baccaro, Blyth & Pontusson 2022). Bringing macroeconomics back into CPE, the GM perspective shifts the focus of attention from the supply side (skill formation, corporate governance, and the like) to the demand side of the economy and conceives of capitalist diversity in terms of the relative importance of different components of aggregate demand as drivers of economic growth.3 In the first instance, we distinguish between export-led growth models and consumption-led growth models, but we emphasize that this distinction is a matter of degree and that exports and domestic consumption can be complementary growth drivers under certain conditions. We also distinguish among export-led growth models based on leading export sectors—including financial services and tourism as well as agriculture, natural resources, and manufacturing goods—and, in the case of manufactured goods, their position in global supply chains. In a similar vein, we distinguish among consumption-led growth models based on how household consumption is financed (wages, borrowing, and income transfers).4 This, then, makes for a more complex and fluid typology of capitalist political economies than that of the VofC school. Indeed, a key objective of the GM perspective is to avoid reifying a particular typology and instead focus on the challenge of understanding the dynamic evolution of growth models and transitions from one growth model to another. Related to its focus on medium-term dynamics, the GM perspective conceives the politics of growth models in terms of the politics of macroeconomic management and, crucially, emphasizes that macroeconomic management involves distributive

conflicts. By stimulating or depressing different components of aggregate demand, macroeconomic policy shapes the distribution of earnings and profits across sectors of the economy as well as the “functional” distribution of income between labor (wages) and capital (profits). The successful reproduction of growth models depends on the cohesion of “dominant growth coalitions,” consisting of leading firms, interest groups, and government officials, but also on the mobilization of electoral majorities whose policy objectives are compatible with the growth model. The congruence of dominant growth coalitions and electoral majorities must not be taken for granted. Tensions between these two domains of politics, operating according to distinctive logics, give rise to moments when the growth model itself becomes politically contested. As illustrated by the contributions to Baccaro, Blyth, and Pontusson (2022), the new literature on growth models seeks to encompass countries in the periphery and semi-periphery as well as the core of the capitalist world economy. The GM perspective also aspires to integrate the analytical concerns of CPE and IPE scholarship. From an IPE perspective, growth models are interdependent and complementary. While the long-term success of export-led economies depends on the success of consumption-led economies, and vice-versa, international and supranational efforts to manage macroeconomic imbalances between countries with different growth models have become an increasingly important factor in the domestic politics of macroeconomic management. Identifying transitions from one growth model to another and theorizing such transitions is a challenge that scholars working in this domain have only begun to tackle. Another promising direction for future theorizing and empirical research concerns the relationship between growth-model dynamics and different trajectories of income and wealth inequality in developing as well as advanced capitalist economies. Jonas Pontusson and Lucio Baccaro

Notes 1. This also holds for the analytical approach of the French regulation school, as exemplified by Amable (2003). 2. VofC scholars address this problem by designating some countries as “mixed market economies,” but

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94  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology

3. 4.

this has always been in a residual category (and something of a puzzle given the emphasis on institutional complementarities in the VoC tradition). “Bringing macroeconomics back in” also features as a theme in Soskice (2007). Similar ideas are developed by Hassel and Palier, who emphasize the relationship between growth regimes and the welfare state (2021).

References Amable, Bruno. 2003. The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baccaro, Lucio and Chris Howell. 2017. Trajectories of Neoliberal Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baccaro, Lucio and Jonas Pontusson. 2016. “Rethinking Comparative Political Eco­ nomy.” Politics & Society 44(2): 175–207. Baccaro, Lucio, Mark Blyth and Jonas Pontusson (eds.). 2022. Diminishing Returns. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beramendi, Pablo, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). 2015. The Politics of Advanced Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans, Peter. 1979. Dependent Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, Peter and David Soskice (eds.). 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hassel, Anke and Bruno Palier (eds.). 2021. Growth and Welfare in Advanced Capitalist Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Katzenstein, Peter (ed.). 1978. Between Power and Plenty. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Hall, Peter and Daniel Gingerich. 2009. “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Change in the Political Economy.” British Journal of Political Science 39: 449–482. Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Piore, Michael and Charles Sabel. 1984. The Second Industrial Divide. New York: Basic Books. Shonfield, Andrew. 1967. Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Soskice, David. 1999. “Divergent Production Regimes.” In: Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101–134. Soskice, David. 2007. “Macroeconomics and Varieties of Capitalism.” In: Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes and Mark Thatcher, eds., Beyond Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89–121. Streeck, Wolfgang. 1991. “On the Institutional Preconditions of Diversified Quality Production.” In: Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Beyond Keynesianism. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 21–61. Thelen, Kathleen. 2014. Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zysman, John. 1983. Governments, Markets, and Growth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

24. Comparative political sociology

even eschewed the nation‑state altogether and have turned to studying the institutions and dynamics of a world society instead. More conventional research overlaps with comparative analyses of welfare, labour market and property rights regimes in neighbouring disciplines. Two classics hold a particularly prominent status in macro-level political sociology and are also of particular interest because they connect macro phenomena to the lower levels of analysis. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) famously claimed that large-scale historical events and developments in West European history – the reformation, the national revolutions and industrialisation – have created durable societal cleavages, which impose equally durable constraints on European party systems. The approach’s roots in Parsonian systems theory are long forgotten, and the notion of “frozen” party systems became obsolete within a decade of publication through the rise of new party families (see below). But the idea that macro-level events can indirectly affect micro-level voting behaviour through the actions of collective actors at the meso level – which was not even central to Lipset and Rokkan’s original analysis – has become almost an axiom in comparative political sociology. Similarly influential is the concept of a political culture that was developed by Almond and Verba (1965), who were drawing on similar ideas by Easton. For Almond and Verba, political culture is the distribution of individual attitudes towards various aspects of the political system and one’s role in politics. Their point is subtle: while attitudes exist at the micro level, their aggregate is a property of the macro level. And while political systems may shape attitudes through slow processes of socialisation and generational replacement, in the short and medium term, a political system’s stability relies (inter alia) on a compatible political culture. The meso level offers perhaps the broadest range of topics in comparative political sociology. Parties are one particularly prominent subject, and party systems – the patterns of interactions between parties that are formed by the forces of competition and cooperation – can only be fully appreciated in comparison. A related concept that is exclusively applied in a comparative fashion is that of party families. Party families are groups of parties that exist in different countries but show a degree of family resemblance in terms

Political sociology – “the study of power and domination in social relationships” (Burnham 2009) – is a field at the intersection of sociology and political science, and comparative perspectives are essential for both of its mother disciplines. Political sociology deals with the political consequences of social processes and the impact that politics has on social relations. Durkheim ([1895] 1982, 157) famously argued that comparative sociology should not be considered a special branch of sociology because all sociology is comparative. In a similar vein, many of the foundational thinkers in what would become political science were comparativists long before comparative politics emerged as an institutionalised sub-discipline (Schmitter 2009). This puts the comparative perspective at the heart of political sociology. This comparative perspective is usually of an international nature, although subnational comparisons can be fruitful, especially within larger and heterogeneous states. The well-known distinction between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis undergirds all research in comparative political sociology. It is also useful for structuring the field. At the very highest level of aggregation, political sociology tackles two interrelated problems: which (large) groups in society shape and control the institutions of society and the state, and how do these institutions in turn allocate power and resources to social groups? This leads to a host of other big questions: how did government come to be? How (if at all) is the modern state different from a protection racket? Why do revolutions occur, and whom do they really benefit? Such analyses are often inspired by neo-Marxist, feminist and other critical theories. But there is also considerable overlap with more mainstream “new institutionalist” approaches that have taken hold in neighbouring disciplines such as economics, political science, sociology and even history. Crucially, all of these perspectives are comparative by necessity: to understand how social arrangements emerge and play out, one must view them across time and space. At the most “macro” margin of this domain, some political scientists and sociologists have 95

96  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology of their history, social base and ideology. Often, these similarities lead them to set up transnational umbrella organisations. The political influence, societal role, tactics and internal workings of interest groups are other core topics in comparative political sociology. This includes businesses and trade unions but also organisations such as churches, charities and a whole host of other collective actors that are grouped under the label of “civil society”. The ability of interest groups to influence policy varies greatly across and within sectors but also across countries. An even more fundamental difference between countries lies in the degree to which the role of certain interest groups is institutionalised. This concerns most prominently the role of trade unions in the labour market and the role of religious organisations and charities in the provision of welfare, but also the self-regulation of professions such as medicine, law and accounting through bodies in which membership is (quasi-) mandatory. Again, there is some overlap between comparative political sociology and neighbouring disciplines and fields, for example, political philosophy, economics or the sociology of work and employment. An adjacent field is the comparative study of social movements. While many interest groups act as social movement organisations or have evolved from them, social movements as a whole are characterised by their openness, heterogeneity and informality. The resources, importance, size and sometimes even existence of social movement sectors vary considerably across nations, and some of the most interesting work in social movement research tries to link these variations to institutional and other structural differences between countries. Like in the case of interest groups, there is (or should be) substantial overlap with work done in related fields, for example, the attempts in comparative politics to adequately describe the many varieties of democratic and authoritarian rule. Finally, a separate but related strand of research has latched onto the fact that many social movements have long-standing traditions of cooperation across national borders (e.g. the labour movement) or, like the movement to slow down climate change, can even be conceived as transnational by their nature. Social movements and interest groups are often studied through the lens of network analysis, and social networks and associations Kai Arzheimer

also play an important role in the concept of social capital. While many sociologists have contributed to social capital theory, Putnam has popularised the idea that social capital is generated and utilised at the (local or regional) meso level. In his landmark study (Putnam 1993), he argues that differences in social capital, which are constituted by high levels of interpersonal trust and widespread acceptance of a norm of reciprocity that are generated within a dense and favourably structured associational network, can explain differences in the implementation and success of policies. While Putnam studied subnational regions within a single state, the concept of social capital is also being applied in comparisons between states. Finally, the study of elites as well as analyses of media, the media system and, more recently, digital social networks are wellestablished topics in political sociology. These (and other meso-level) issues have been fruitfully studied from a comparative perspective. In terms of sheer quantity, analyses of individual political orientations and behaviours that are based on standardised surveys probably make up the bulk of micro-political sociology’s output. While the roots of this body of work lie in the study of the American society of the 1940s and 1950s and while there is an ongoing interest in cross-sectional and longitudinal national surveys, the subfield took an early comparative turn with Almond and Verba (1965). The reason for this is obvious: although the data are collected on the micro level, the supposed impact of institutions and other higher-level factors on individuals can only become fully visible through their variation across countries. While much of this research was (and is) concerned with attitudes on the one hand and voting as the most prevalent form of political participation on the other, one landmark study broke this mould. Against the backdrop of the “New Politics” of the 1970s, Barnes and Kaase (1979) were the first to study other forms of political behaviour, including participation in the “New Social Movements”, in a comparative fashion. Since then, interest in mass political participation, broadly defined, has never faded. After the fall of communism, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) proposed a “Civic Voluntarism Model” that links participation to resources on the micro and meso level. This is now widely accepted as a fundamental starting point for both

comparative political sociology  97 comparative research and national case studies on political participation. As far as the comparative study of attitudes is concerned, it is next to impossible to overestimate the influence that Ronald Inglehart had on the field from the early 1970s (see e.g. Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1989, 1997). Over more than five decades, he contributed enormously to the renewed interest in values and other aspects of culture and was involved in countless scientific controversies and collaborations (see e.g. Abramson and Inglehart 1995, Inglehart and Norris 2004, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Norris and Inglehart 2018). What sets survey-based comparative political sociological work in the micro domain apart from research that is focused on the meso or macro level is an unusually high degree of institutionalisation, which is necessitated by its subject matter. Because data collection is expensive, secondary analysis of existing data is the norm. From the 1960s, national data archives were established to preserve data sets, make them accessible and provide the training necessary for their analysis. Existing ties between these archives, universities and other research institutions led to the creation of more formal networks that finally helped to bring about several long-term projects. Important examples include the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (from the mid1990s) and the European Social Survey (from the early 2000s) which exist as large public research infrastructures, accessible to scholars from all over the globe. Some other projects have been running for even longer: the European Values Study/World Values Survey started in 1981, and the International Social Survey Programme began in the mid-1980s. Finally, the Eurobarometer (not an academic study but partly shaped by input from the scientific community) ran its first surveys during the early 1970s and has inspired similar studies (the Afrobarometer, Asian barometer and Latinobarometro) in other parts of the globe. For many fields in political sociology, the internationally comparative perspective has become the norm. This trend is perhaps most obvious in micro-quantitative applications. Here, the proliferation of data collected across a large and growing number of countries, in combination with powerful computers, user-friendly software and improved training, has led to a surge in the application of statistical multi-level analysis. Even a simple search for publications based on European

Social Survey data that have “multi-level” in the title yields hundreds of hits. While this trend is very positive in principle, the current focus on macro–micro links should not distract researchers from bringing back in mesolevel (subnational) factors and from analytical work. Kai Arzheimer

References Abramson, Paul R., and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. Value Change in Global Perspective. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1965. The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Barnes, Samuel H., and Max Kaase, eds. 1979. Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage. Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES. A Resource Model of Political Participation.” American Political Science Review 89(2): 271–294. Burnham, Peter. 2009. “Political Sociology.” In: The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, edited by Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 1 Aug. 2022, from https:// www​.oxfordreference​.com​/view​/10​.1093​ /acref ​ / 9780199207800 ​ . 001​ . 0001 ​ /acref​ -9780199207800 ​-e​-1040. Durkheim, Émile. [1895] 1982. The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Postindustrial Societies.” American Political Science Review 65(4): 991–1017. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. “Political Dissatisfaction and Mass Support for Social Change in Advanced Industrial Society.” Comparative Political Studies 10(3): 455–472. Inglehart, Ronald. 1989. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kai Arzheimer

98  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2004. Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, Ronald, und Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction.” In: Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan.

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New York, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1–64. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2018. Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schmitter, Philippe C. 2009. “The Nature and Future of Comparative Politics.” European Political Science Review 1(1): 33–61. DOI: 10.1017/s1755773909000010.

25. Conflict theory

in society may be institutionally excluded from decision making because of selectivity in media coverage and political institutions. Therefore, latent conflict is typically characterized by unequal distributions of wealth and income and other scarce resources and relations of exploitation and domination between the concerned parties. Manifest or overt conflict results from two or more parties actually pursuing their conflicting interests or intentions. This rather wide concept also includes processes of peaceful bargaining, competition and exchange. It can be further differentiated according to the power resources used in conflict behaviour. When all parties concerned use rewarding resources to influence the other actors’ course of action, the type of conflict can be labelled as exchange or competition. If only some of the actors involved use punishing resources and the other parties bring in rewarding resources, one can speak of plunder or exploitation. In a final step, we can define manifest conflict in a narrow sense, as a situation where all concerned actors resort to punishing moves, like in a brawl, strike or war. The conflict perspective has a very long tradition in sociology, going back at least to Marx’s analysis of capitalism (see Collins, 1994). Marx especially emphasized the role of class conflict in political and social change. His enduring legacy in the social sciences is an attempt to uncover the underlying socioeconomic causes of different types of conflict. It is especially Weber’s merit to have laid the foundation for a broader, multi-dimensional conflict theory, acknowledging the diversity of conflicts within politics, economy, households and religious groups and the manifold underlying structural causes of these conflicts. These two authors have shaped conflict theoretical thinking in an enduring way and are still the most important theoretical references for this type of analysis. In the early twentieth century, a separate strand of conflict theoretic thinking emerged that focused very much on the continuous conflict among different social groups, especially elites, and their organizational power. This was put forward by authors like Gumplowicz, Michels (iron law of oligarchy), Mosca and Pareto. They focused on the different strategies that small elites use to dominate large majorities of the population, be it organizational power, the ability to use force and persuasion or the ability to resort

The term conflict theory crystallized in the 1950s as sociologists like Coser, Dahrendorf, Lockwood and Rex criticized the then-dominant structural functionalism in sociology for overly emphasizing the consensual, conflictfree nature of societies (Joas & Knöbl, 2011). Whereas structural functionalism viewed societies as integrated by shared values and norms and analysed social conflicts primarily as pathological phenomena, conflict theory had the aim of developing a theoretical perspective which could empirically explain phenomena of domination, social conflict and social change: a conflict model of society was placed alongside or opposite the consensus or equilibrium model (Dahrendorf, 1985). However, this conflict theory of society has hardly been able to establish itself as an independent theoretical paradigm within the social sciences (Dahrendorf, 1985; Turner, 1993: 181–253). Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction with a consensus model of society expressed in the conflict theory of the 1950s has led to a diffusion of its theoretical concepts in the social sciences. The field of social conflict is now widely researched: this ranges from the studies of social movements and social protests, the game-theoretical analysis of social conflict, the study of the causes of war and the study of intra-family conflict and family violence, to historical sociology (McAdam, 1982; Schelling, 1963; Collins, 1990; Heitmeyer & Hogan, 2005). Furthermore, nearly all grand theories in the social sciences, like Giddens’ theory of structuration, Bourdieu’s theory of class and practices, rational choice theory, for example, in Thomas Schelling’s work and Luhmann’s systems theory, have incorporated many of the important insights of conflict theory (Bonacker, 2008 for an overview). Social conflict can be defined as an interaction or structural relation between two or more individual or collective actors having partially or entirely incompatible interests or intentions (for the following Korpi, 1985; Rössel, 2005). However, overt struggle does not emerge in all such situations. Therefore, latent and manifest conflicts can be differentiated. Conflicts may remain latent when one of the involved actors does not follow his interests and other actors do not have to use power resources to pursue theirs. Furthermore, certain interests 99

100  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology to material resources, like income and wealth. Gumplowicz, Mosca and Pareto referred also to the distribution of innate talents in the struggle for power; Gumplowicz in particular assumed that social conflicts take place mainly between different human races. It was especially Mannheim’s contribution to highlight the role of ideas and ideologies within this power struggle between social groups. He especially emphasized the importance of class structures and generational structures in shaping the main ideas of societies. A very important descendant of the elite-focused type of thinking is the analysis of power elites that was put forward by Mills (1956) in his book on the structure of power in the United States in the 1950s. It has inspired more recent research not only on the power elites of individual countries but on the global power elite. This book was part of the explosion of conflict theoretical thinking in the 1950s driven by authors like Coser, Dahrendorf, Rex and Bernard. Coser’s major book (1964) was an attempt to integrate the study of social conflicts into the thendominant structural functionalism. Bernard was a forerunner of Schelling’s (1963) more well-known work, applying game theory to the analysis of conflict. Dahrendorf’s works (1959) constitute the even more radical suggestion to develop conflict theory as an independent theoretical paradigm in the 1950s. The most important thinker today who still adheres to the idea of a conflict theoretical paradigm is Collins, who summarizes very succinctly the basic assumptions of conflict theory (Collins, 1990): 1. Two central features of social organization are social and cultural differentiation and stratification. 2. Individual and collective interests are shaped by social and cultural differentiation and stratification and therefore have often contradictory relationships, possibly leading to manifest conflicts. 3. The development of manifest conflicts out of contradicting interests and the results of conflicts depend on the conditions of mobilization and organization in society and the distribution of power resources. 4. Social change is often driven by conflict, but since manifest conflict is dependent on several preconditions, history is full of long periods of stable domination Jörg Rössel

only punctuated by manifest conflict. However, contemporary societies are characterized by several possible lines of conflict and a rather broad distribution of power resources; therefore social and political conflict is a rather endemic phenomenon nowadays. Conflict theory has usually focused very strongly on processes of meso- and macrosocial change, giving central attention to power and conflict relations among social actors. These macro-sociological analyses require as a complement a theory that can explain why solidaristic relationships emerge in particular social networks or groups that hold together conflicting collective actors in societies. Here, the theory of interaction rituals, put forward by Collins, aims to establish a microtheoretical foundation and explain both the emergence of conflict and the emergence of solidarity and cohesion (Collins, 2004: 40–41, 1990: 72). Interaction rituals depend on the physical presence of at least two people with certain cultural similarities, a common focus on one thing, be it a ceremony or an object, and most important, the mood with which the actors enter a situation as well as the development of the affective mood during the interaction itself. The stronger these conditions, the stronger the results of an interaction ritual. As an example, one can mention ordinary conversational situations in which two or more people are physically present, focus on a common topic, use the same linguistic symbol system and – if the conversation goes well – get into a common mood. Successful interaction rituals provide all participants with emotional energy as well as turn certain forms of cultural capital into membership symbols. Depending on their position within interaction rituals, persons can accumulate different levels of emotional energy and cultural capital; thus interaction rituals do not only explain the emergence of solidaristic groups and networks but also stratification based on the distribution of emotional energy and cultural capital, which are in Collins’ view crucial for the allocation of more physical resources. Organizations and the economy are major arenas of social conflict with important consequences for social stratification, domination hierarchies and social change. Edwards’s study (1979) is a classical analysis of the historical transformations of workplaces and industrial

conflict theory  101 conflict from a neo-Marxist perspective. Fligstein (1990) focuses on the development of corporate control from a neo-institutionalist point of view and traces the rise of finance personnel in the corporate hierarchy. The most important economic conflicts discussed in the social sciences are those between capital and labour. This includes economic conflicts such as workplace actions, strikes and lockouts but also spills over into class-based political conflicts (Franzosi, 1995). Economic conflicts between capital and labour do not only influence the distribution of economic resources and the development of working conditions. Furthermore, they have effects on political developments (political crises, development of welfare states), the structure and organization of firms, the development of technology and machinery and sometimes on the whole social structure of accumulation. In particular, the great historical strike waves contributed to wholesale changes in the social, economic and political structure of society (Franzosi, 1995; Shorter & Tilly, 1974). Western societies show a decline in strike frequency in the last decades, but with the increasing globalization of industrialization to the Global South, industrial conflict has also shifted geographically (Silver, 2003). Social stratification is one of the most important topics of conflict theory since it is the starting point for many explanations of social conflict. The classic statement of a conflict theoretical explanation of forms of stratification in history is Lenski (1966); he shows that the allocation of surplus value in societies is based on their power structure. With the educational expansion in the United States and other Western countries, the analysis of stratification shifted more and more to the analysis of educational stratification, exemplified by Bourdieu and Passeron (2000) and Collins (1979). However, Bradley et al. (2003) show that a conflict theoretical approach is also able to explain income inequality, which is strongly shaped by the class-specific distribution of political power resources. The field of social movement and protest research is most clearly linked to the upsurge of conflict theoretical thinking since the 1950s and 1960s. It is not at all possible to mention even the most important references or theoretical approaches here since this is a flourishing and highly differentiated field of research. The resource-mobilization perspective, especially, took up conflict theoretical ideas focusing on

the importance of the mobilization of power resources for social movements, whereas the political-opportunity structure approach also took the structures of power into account (McAdam, 1982). Further research has shown the importance of cultural framing and radicalism for successful mobilizing and protest. Revolution is the most fascinating but also a rather infrequent form of social conflict and social protest (Collins, 1990). Apart from a Marxist focus on class relations as conditions for revolutions, Skocpol (1979) emphasizes the political-opportunity structures shaped by major state crises. The formation of modern states and their democratization are exemplary topics of comparative historical sociology. Most studies rely on theoretical concepts with a strong similarity to the conflict theoretical paradigm. Marxist approaches explain the formation of absolutism and modern states based on the transformation of class structures. In contrast, more recent publications emphasize the causal importance of state structures for historical developments (Collins, 1990). Downing (1992) develops this statecentred perspective further by considering the importance of military power and war. A full-fledged multi-dimensional conflict theoretical approach considering class structures and state structures is applied to explain the development of democracy in Moore (1966) on the one hand and especially by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) on the other. This is also important for an analysis of contemporary and future social conflicts that do not focus alone on their socio-economic foundations but take the different dimensions of possible clashes of interests into account, be they cultural, political, organizational or related to the various axes of social stratification. Jörg Rössel

References Bonacker, T., ed. (2008). Sozialwissenscha­ ftliche Konflikttheorien: Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissens chaften. Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. C. (2000). Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. Los Angeles: Sage. Bradley, D., Huber, E., Moller, S., Nielsen, F., & Stephens, J. D. (2003). Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Jörg Rössel

102  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Democracies. World Politics 55(2): 193–228. Collins, R. (1979). Credential Society. An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification. New York: Academic Press. Collins, R. (1990). Conflict Theory and the Advance of Macro-historical Sociology. In: Ritzer, G. (ed.), Frontiers of Social Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. Collins, R. (1994). The Conflict Tradition. In: Collins, R. (ed.), Four Sociological Traditions. (47–120). New York: Oxford University Press. Collins, R. (2004). Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Coser, L. (1964). The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press. Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Dahrendorf, R. (1985). Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt. Zur Entwicklung und Wirkung eines Theoriestücks. Ein Persönlicher Bericht. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 14(3): 236–240. Downing, B. M. (1992). The Military Revolution and Political Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century. New York: Basic Books. Fligstein, N. (1990). The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Franzosi, R. (1995). The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Heitmeyer, W., & Hagan, J., eds. (2005). International Handbook of Violence Research. 2 vols. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

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Joas, H., & Knöbl, W. (2011). Conflict Sociology and Conflict Theory. In: Joas, H., & Knöbl, W. (eds.), Social Theory: Twenty Introductory Lectures (174–198). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korpi, W. (1985). Power Resources Approach vs. Action and Conflict: On Causal and Intentional Explanations in the Study of Power. Sociological Theory 3(2): 3–45. Lenski, G. E. (1966). Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill. McAdam, D. (1982). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, B. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press. Rössel, J. (2005). Conflict in the Economy. In: Beckert, J., & Zafirofsky, M. (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology (92–94). London: Routledge. Rueschemeyer, D., Huber Stephens, J., & Stephens, J. (1992). Capitalist Development & Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Schelling, T. (1963). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Silver, B. (2003). Forces of Labor. Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shorter, E., & Tilly, C. (1974). Strikes in France, 1830–1968. New York: Cambridge University Press. Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. Turner, J. (1993). Classical Sociological Theory. A Positivist’s Perspective. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

26. Constructivism The metaphor of construction is used in different ways across various disciplines. In the social sciences, it usually refers to a set of epistemic and ontological commitments rather than a principal theory. Epistemically, constructivists regard knowledge as partly built from norms, identity, and other ideational factors in shared systems of meaning. Ontologically, these social elements help constitute a world in which action takes place and judgments are made. Constructivists’ assumptions inform a complex mix of mutually reinforcing commitments that contrast most clearly with representational epistemologies and realist ontologies. Representational realism implies that the world outside us is knowable. The more precise our ideas about an objectively given external world, the more accurate our knowledge. It is typically combined with assumptions about people as rational decision‑makers and self-interested agents. By contrast, constructivists situate knowledge within systems of socially knowledgeable and discursively competent actors. Rather than passively receiving objects through sensory inputs and then presenting those inputs back to the mind’s eye as clear and distinct ideas, human cognition processes information through mind-dependent rules, purposes, concepts, social norms, interests, and other affective attitudes. This epistemic framing carries over into claims about social reality and the use of political power. Rather than base reality on material conditions and human motivation on instrumental reasoning, constructivists focus on how social processes of collective meaning help shape identities, which in turn define situations as calling for certain types of political action (Wendt 1992). In political sociology, constructivist assumptions construe power politics as socially dependent upon a complex mix of norms, beliefs, history, linguistic competency, and shared understandings. Socially knowledgeable actors sustain and refine their political agency through interactions of collective interpretation over time rather than through individual reflections at a particular moment. Focusing on the social dimensions of political agency and knowledge formation represents a development from constructivism’s origins in

philosophical thought. Although constructivism stretches as far back as Plato’s Republic and the idea—expressed by Glaucon in the Republic—that justice is an artifact of human ingenuity, Immanuel Kant provides its first sustained treatment. For Kant, representational realism cannot secure theoretical knowledge because it cannot perform the further step of verifying the fit between ideas and objects. Kant’s solution was to flip the intuitive relationship between minds and objects. On Kant’s view, the use of theoretical cognition does not conform to objects found in the world. Instead, objects in the world conform to cognition because the human mind constructs knowledge from a combination of sensory inputs and a priori rules of cognition (Kant 1965, B xvii). In the case of practical reason, Kantian constructivism views reason as capable of providing the determining grounds of the will and thus regards it as efficacious in that reason produces objects (i.e., actions) corresponding to ideas. Kant’s constructivism treats cognitive faculties as a priori conditions of sensory experience and practical action. Durkheim thought this strategy was not subject to empirical science because it treated cognition as a necessary condition of experience and thus “lifted the mental out of the world and above the ordinary methods of science” (Durkheim 1974, 33). As a result, he resisted Kant’s transcendental explorations on the grounds that they lacked a sociology. Instead, Durkheim pursued a scientific examination of social phenomena by subjecting “social facts” to empirical study. Constructivist insights nonetheless occupy his work through the claim that new “social facts” result from combining social interactions with ideational factors, such as norms or religious beliefs. In contrast to Kant, Durkheim argued that new social facts determine the will by serving as collective ideations existing outside an individual’s mind. Knowledge of social facts was not reduceable to private reasons or material conditions. Instead, communal or collective ideation helps explain social behavior and power relations. The central importance of ideation in constructivist-oriented political sociology contrasts with the central importance attributed to physicality in material-oriented political sociology. Marxist political sociology illustrates a non-constructivist approach that reduces the immaterial elements of social

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104  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology life—laws, norms, customs, beliefs, and class interests—to material conditions. Immaterial phenomena are explained in terms of material shifts in the mode of production. Predictive models of class conflict are built on assumptions about a society’s material stage of development. Material conditions exist independently of what people think and are thus subject to objective scientific study. Indeed, what people think, as reflected in the law and custom, tends to lag the productive transitions within society. The disconnect between ideation and material reality produces class conflict. Marxist analysis thus adopts a representational epistemology and a realist ontology, although the residual effects of ideology and false consciousness suggest a qualified commitment to materialism. Weber’s distinction between natural and social science tracks Marx’s distinction between the economic substructure and the ideologic superstructure. For Weber, natural science subsumes individual events under universal law, while social science demonstrates the meaning and social significance of actions. Social science aims to “understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestation and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise” (Weber 1949, 81). Ideational phenomena are central to Weber’s conception of objective social science, but his use of ideation does not entail the “social construction of reality”. Rather, it suggests the “construction of social reality”. The difference between the two phrases is notable and shapes both criticisms of constructivism and debates between constructivists. The construction of social reality takes as its subject matter rule-based institutions situated within collective systems of shared meaning. Within this framework, either ideational and material elements comprise the building blocks of reality or inquiries into whether material aspects of the world are independent of what humans think are bracketed. For example, the construction of  social  reality might refer to a dialogical relation between social structures and actors whereby structures constrain actors, but actors transform structures through ideas and the new forms of action those ideas engender (Giddens 1979). Or it might focus on institutional facts as a special case of social reality, along with the natural human ability to engage cooperatively Michael Buckley

with linguistic symbolism when determining the function of institutional facts (Searle 1995). By contrast, the social construction of reality suggests something more far-reaching. It might mean that our knowledge of reality is culturally relative and that the sociology of knowledge concerns whatever passes for knowledge in particular societies, regardless of the claim’s validity (Berger & Luckmann 1967, 15). Or it might mean that sociology can help mitigate but never eliminate the influence of ideology on most disciplines of human analysis (Mannheim 2015). Or, at a further extreme, it might deny social science’s ability to mitigate ideational factors by casting researchers as active agents of knowledge construction and construing “scientific fact” as the consequence of scientific work (Latour & Woolgar 1986). Promising applications of constructivism focus on how institutional arrangements shape and maintain power relations. Institutions are human artifacts emerging from intentionally directed modes of social coordination. As a result, they are suitable for empirical study informed by constructivist frameworks. To borrow language from Durkheim and Weber, institutions are social facts to which we lend significance. One instructive example involves the UN’s Global Compact (GC) and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). These documents help shape business conduct through instances of soft power. Though not legally binding, the GC and UNGP heighten ideational considerations related to norm-based frameworks of international law. These, in turn, nudge C-level executives to view their environmental, social, and governance policies as part of a risk management framework informed by global due diligence responsibilities (Ruggie 2017). Absent ideational factors, one cannot explain why familiar business situations call for new types of norm-based behavior. Perhaps the most influential application of constructivism is in gender and race studies. The idea that gender and race are social constructs is widely accepted, and the two examples provide valuable cases for developing constructivist-oriented theories of power. Early work in feminist theory drew on ideational elements to explain women’s subordination to men. Mid-twentieth century feminists challenged the existence of mind-independent essences to which the concept of “gender” is attached by arguing that gender is assigned

constructivism  105 to people by social convention. Nonetheless, they maintained that gender is actual because society uses social conventions to distribute social benefits and burdens in ways unfavorable to women (Beauvoir 2011). Recent work in feminist and queer theory pursues this thought further by disrupting binary depictions of sex, gender, and sexuality. According to this line of thought, linguistic and behavioral performatives based on social norms create the perception of two natural sexes (Butler 2006). These gender-informed performatives reinforce oppressive conditions for sexual minorities who fail to fit the dominant binary view. Similarly, race studies expose the role of socially constructed racial norms in existing power structures. According to an influential position, white supremacy is the unnamed political system that funnels wealth and power to whites by excluding racial minorities from the benefits of social cooperation and taxing minorities with a disproportionate share of burdens (Mills 1999). Constructivist-oriented social theories along the lines of gender and race studies can help transform power relations and liberate those suffering from the burdens of discriminatory and malformed social conventions. However, as a form of social criticism they are vulnerable to their own critique; for if claims about malformed social arrangements are sustained through socially constructed identities and interests, then those claims, and the normative comparisons they invite, stand on equal footing with the opposing claims they seek to displace. Each is built from ideas no truer than those found in the opposing view. The best one can do is to defend one’s preferred social arrangement on rhetorical tropes or people’s intuitive judgments of how they ought to live. Appeals to fundamental principles of social justice are unavailable since fundamental principles either assume non-constructivist epistemologies and ontologies or result in part from ideations that lack grounding beyond social convention. And yet many people think that standards of justice, such as human rights, evaluate social conventions, an office they could not perform if they were constructed from social conventions. This creates a significant challenge for those adopting constructivist assumptions. The problem is longstanding in political philosophy, where political constructivism is described as a theory to the effect that whatever principles result from a certain kind of

hypothetical situation count as valid standards of justice. Critics argue that this view of justice is circular, for if our moral judgments inform the structure of the hypothetical situation, then the resulting principles cannot serve as independent moral standards against which those same judgments are assessed and found wanting. Constructivist-oriented political sociology faces a similar critique. The challenge is to establish constructivist commitments without forfeiting the critical distance required of social scientific explanation. This challenge is perhaps easier met if constructivists assume certain pre-given materials from which to start their analyses. But ultimately, answering critics and converting sceptics is best achieved through a series of successful research programs. Only then can social scientists adopt constructivist assumptions as confidently as many now adopt representational epistemologies and realist ontologies. Michael Buckley

References Beauvoir, Simone De. 2011. The Second Sex. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. 1st edition. New York: Vintage. Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor. Butler, Judith. 2006. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 1st edition. New York: Routledge. Durkheim, Émile. 1974. Sociology and Philosophy. Translated by D. F. Pocock. New York: Simon and Schuster. Giddens, Anthony. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1965. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St Martin’s Press. https://www​.alibris​.com​/search​/ books​/isbn​ /9780312450106. Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. 1986. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. 2nd edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mannheim, Karl. 2015. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth Michael Buckley

106  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology and Edward Shils. Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Fine Books. Mills, Charles W. 1999. The Racial Contract. 1st edition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ruggie, John Gerard. 2017. “The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP17-030. https://www​.hks​.harvard​ .edu​ / publications​ / social​ - construction​ -un​ -guiding​ - principles​ - business​ - human​ -rights.

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Searle, John R. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Simon and Schuster. Weber, Max. 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Edited by Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46(2): 391–425. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1017​/S0020818300027764.

27. Contentious politics

treats them as the product of situated interactions among multiple purposeful actors cooperating and competing. With Tarrow, Tilly proposed that contention can be reduced to Charles Tilly (see entry on Tilly, Charles) recurring mechanisms, defined as “delimited first introduced the contentious politics events that change relations among specified (CP) framework in From Mobilization to sets of elements in identical or closely similar Revolution (1978) as an attempt to bridge ways over a variety of situations” (Tarrow & scholarship that traditionally treated social Tilly 2009, 12). They argued that mechanisms movements as a distinct form, analytically such as radicalization, diffusion, and institudifferent from more conventional politics tionalization could be applied to a range of and other forms of collective dissent, such contentions beyond individual movements. Critics have argued that the contentious as revolutions, civil wars, and terrorism. The main contention in contentious politics is that politics program attempts to explain a wide movements are connected to other political range of actions and events within a unified phenomena and their development and out- framework, ignoring the nuance of different come are defined by interactions with other forms of collective action (e.g., Lichbach 1997, political actors. In his long and prolific career, Selbin 1997). Tarrow (2015) acknowledged Tilly developed and demonstrated the power additional criticisms of the contentious politics of this approach and particularly the impor- program, including charges that CP (1) focuses tance of adopting a relational framework for too much on mechanisms to the neglect of oriunderstanding collective action (e.g. Tilly gins and outcomes, (2) too casually deduces 1986, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2008a, b). mechanisms, and (3) leaves unclear the role of With McAdam and Tarrow, Tilly provided a structure and agency. Nonetheless, the framesynthesis and a brief for a contentious politics work has inspired and informed a wide range approach characterized by three key assump- of work that applies the framework to disparate phenomena, including interactions with tions (1996, 2001): political parties and elections (e.g., Tarrow 1. Collective dissent, in its various forms, 2021), repression (e.g., Ong 2022), and race can be best understood with a focus and ethnic politics (Furuyama & Meyer 2011). Since its introduction, CP has influenced or on underlying causes and recurrent aligned with a range of research that emphamechanisms; 2. Interaction between the state, actors, and sizes the relational dynamics and mechanisms groups produces repertoires of conten- that drive collective dissent and has provided tion, or patterned and routine forms of a foundation and inspiration for a great deal claim-making and interaction, and shapes of contemporary work on a range of subjects. the structure of opportunity for collective A growing body of work explores how players’ perceptions of their arenas and each other action and dissent (e.g., Meyer 2015); 3. Collective dissent occurs within fields shape contentious politics. Passy and Monsch of episodic contention between various (2020) develop and detail this perspective, actors and groups who are competing arguing that an actor’s perception of their and constantly innovating; it is inherently social and political environment shapes their level of participation and commitment to the iterative and relational. cause. This section will focus on interesting and relevant work on three topics: authoritarTilly’s framework was an explicit effort to ian contexts, clandestine tactics, and contenremedy weaknesses he saw in earlier schol- tion over the long durée. arship: (1) the separation of studies of social While Passy and Monsch (2020) focus movements from other forms of collective on how members of democratic societies dissent; (2) the methodological focus on case understand their opportunity to protest, their studies of individual social movements that framework can also be applied to authoritardid not necessarily produce generalizable ian settings. Examining variations across insights; and (3) the lack of attention to the cities in Jewish resistance to the Holocaust, internal processes that drive collective dissent Einwohner (2022) argues that threat can be (Tarrow 2014). Contentious politics consid- a mechanism of mobilization under extreme ers a broader range of events, such as revo- repression, but only with the presence of suflutions, civil wars, and acts of terrorism, and ficient resources and organization. She finds 107

108  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology that resistance is not always instrumental and that in Warsaw, one of the three cities she studied, armed resistance emerged because of the collective perception of threat and the recognition that the prospects of Jewish survival, resisting or not, were minimal. In this case, she finds dying with honor and influence was a motivator. Similarly, Moss (2022) investigates the continuing power of threat after members successfully exit an authoritarian context. Using interviews with diaspora activists originally from Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Moss (2022) explores the conditions that lead exiled members to attempt to intervene in their homecountry’s politics. Moss (2022) argues that diaspora mobilization is often stifled by transnational repression, or the use of violence and threats to silence exiled members, and conflict transmission, when diaspora mobilization is constrained by partisan conflicts rooted in the home-country. Such expatriate mobilization occurs when these forces are disrupted by critical events that shift relationships and loyalties, such as the Arab Spring rebellions of the 2010s. The capacious contentious politics framework allows consideration of this diversity of motivating elements. By examining the interaction between Islamic and secularist feminist groups in Tunisia, Youssef (2023) explores the conditions that lead activists with different, even opposing, ideological beliefs to work together by forming a coalition. She finds that unlikely alliances can be negotiated when disparate actors identify similar threats and can construct some sort of common identity. In Tunisia after the start of the Arab Spring, a shared perception of threat against women, a common goal to advocate for women’s rights, and the feminist identity led to the formation of a coalition. Similarly, Zhang (2021) argues that a shift in relationships between state and elite actors can lead to antagonistic cooperation between elite groups, who were formerly opposed but joined forces to take on a new common enemy, the state. Zhang (2021) finds that a dynamic, relational model of insurgency accounts for the insurrection of elites in midnineteenth‑century China. As relationships shifted, so did loyalties. A related line of research explores the relational nature of tactical decisions. Braun (2018) explores clandestine action, or the use Kaylin Bourdon and David S. Meyer

of quiet, subtle tactics to avoid attention and recognition, using a study of Catholic and Protestant rescue groups in the Netherlands during the Holocaust. Clandestine action, purposeful and political, operates differently than a more common social movement approach. Although social movements usually want attention, clandestine efforts present a repertoire of contention that allows certain groups to advance their cause while avoiding political repression. Braun (2018) argues that a group’s minority position can serve as a mechanism to facilitate successful clandestine action, in this case, an underground network to protect and hide Jewish refugees. Finally, the CP framework allows researchers to identify shifts in the prominence of particular actors and strategies over a long movement campaign. Malae (2022) traces the long history of a feminist campaign against rape that included radical student activists, legal reformers, and institutional political figures. The student activists who first proposed affirmative consent in the early 1990s were ridiculed, but by 2014, discourse surrounding affirmative consent shifted and several states and the federal government promoted it as an approach to combatting sexual assault. Reform occurred slowly through a “policy relay,” in which advocates in different positions defined and carried the cause at distinct times through interaction with activists, policymakers, and courts. In sum, CP has influenced innovative and exciting research that emphasizes the interaction of multiple actors and groups in episodes of contention. There is room for significant contributions and innovations in the future. On the horizon, scholars should investigate the role of social media in contentious politics (e.g., Reilly 2021). Studies may explore the capacity of social media as a mobilizing network and the dynamics of virtual relationships. Social media has introduced new repertoires of contention, including hashtag activism, which has been criticized as “slacktivism,” and increased attention to celebrity activists. Studies should explore the range of virtual tactics employed and their efficacy. Second, scholars should pay attention to the relational elements of credibility. Extensive literature looks at how actors frame issues (see Benford & Snow 2000), but far

contentious politics  109 less attention has been afforded to how claimmakers construct their own credibility as someone worthy of being listened to. Studies should investigate the ways in which credibility is a relational process based on the situated position of the claim-maker and the receiver of the claim. The contentious politics framework is capacious, and there is a great deal of work to be done. Kaylin Bourdon and David S. Meyer

Ong, Lynette H. 2022. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China. New York: Cambridge University Press. Passy, Florence and Gian-Andrea Monsch. 2020. Contentious Minds: How Talk and Ties Sustain Activism. New York: Oxford University Press. Reilly, Paul. 2021. Digital Contention in a Divided Society: Social Media, Parades and Protests in Northern Ireland. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. References Selbin, Eric. 1997. “Mobilization Forum: Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. Response to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: Contentious Cartography.” Mobilization: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual An International Journal 2(1): 99–106. Review of Sociology 26(1): 611–639. Tarrow, Sidney. 2014. “Contentious Politics.” Braun, Robert. 2018. “Minorities and the in The Oxford Handbook of Social Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma: Movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and The Secret Protection of Jews during the Mario Diani. New York: Oxford University Holocaust.” American Journal of Sociology Press, pp. 86–107. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ 124(2): 263–308. oxfordhb​/9780199678402​.013​.8. Einwohner, Rachel L. 2022. Hope and Honor: Tarrow, Sidney. 2021. Movements and Parties Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust. Critical Connections in American Political New York: Oxford University Press. Development. New York: Cambridge Furuyama, Katie and David S. Meyer. 2011. University Press. “Sources of Certification and Civil Rights Tarrow, Sidney and Charles Tilly. 2009. Advocacy Organizations: The JACL, “Contentious Politics and Social the NAACP, and Crises of Legitimacy.” Movements.” Ch. in The Oxford Handbook Mobilization: An International Quarterly of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix 16(1): 101–116. and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford Lichbach, Mark I. 1997. “Contentious Maps University Press, pp. 435–460. https://doi​ of Contentious Politics.” Mobilization: An .org​/10​.1093​/oxfordhb​/9780199566020​.003​ International Journal 2(1): 87–98. .0019. Malae, Katelyn Rose. 2022. “Policy Relay: Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to How Affirmative Consent Went from Revolution. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Controversy to Convention.” Sociological Tilly, Charles. 1986. The Contentious French. Perspectives 65(6): 1117–1143, https://doi​ Cambridge MA: Harvard University .org​/10​.1177​%2F07311214221100836. Press. McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Tilly, Charles. 1995. Popular Contention in Charles Tilly. 1996. “To Map Contentious Great Britain, 1758–1834. Cambridge, Politics.” Mobilization: An International MA: Harvard University Press. Journal 1(1):17–34. Tilly, Charles. 2000. “Mechanisms in Political McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Processes.” Annual Review of Political Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Science 4(1): 21–41. Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge Tilly, Charles. 2004. “Social Boundary University Press. Mechanisms.” Philosophy of the Social Meyer, David S. 2015. The Politics of Protest: Sciences 34(2): 211–236. Social Movements in America, 2nd edition. Tilly, Charles. 2008a. Contentious New York: Oxford University Press. Performances. New York and Cambridge: Moss, Dana. 2022. The Arab Spring Abroad: Cambridge University Press. Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Tilly, Charles. 2008b. Explaining Social Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Processes. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Press. Kaylin Bourdon and David S. Meyer

110  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Youseff, Maro. 2023. “Unlikely Feminist Coalitions: Islamist and Secularist Women’s Organizing in Tunisia.” Social

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Politics 30 (1): 1–21. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​ /sp​/jxab020. Zhang, Yang. 2021. “Why Elites Rebel: Elite Insurrections during the Taiping Civil War in China.” American Journal of Sociology 127(1): 60–101.

28. Corporatism and neo-corporatism

traditionally rivalling groups. Katzenstein (1984) nearly simultaneously coined the term “democratic corporatism”, which aims to reduce socio-economic inequality through social partnership, a centralized, concentrated interest group system, and commitment Since the 1970s, (neo-)corporatism has gradu- to informal conflict coordination. Within ally established itself as a standard paradigm these frameworks, large interest associations in political science and triggered lively debates were granted state resources and formally regarding its impact on business–labor rela- entrusted with setting wage and income politions, economic performance, and socio- cies (Traxler 2004). economic equality (see e.g., Guiliani 2016). Unlike pluralism, which conceptualGenerally speaking, corporatism grasps izes interest intermediation as a disorderly policy-making based on formalized negotia- “battlefield” of rivalling groups, corporatist tions between major rivalling social partners, political systems enable the institutionalized usually outside of formal executive and leg- integration of privileged organizations repreislative institutions, but still often involving senting large segments of the socio-economic the state as a mediator. Accordingly, (neo-) arena into policy formulation and implemencorporatist arrangements exhibit a significant tation. Streeck and Schmitter (1985) heavily degree of shared responsibility vested in peak theorized such constellations under the banorganizations traditionally representing labor ner of “private interest governments”. After and capital. However, scholars have struggled oscillating between state interventionism and to conceptualize and operationalize corporat- market-oriented liberalism, post-war Western ism. Moreover, country-specific corporatist governments became increasingly interested arrangements have mutated in different direc- in de-bureaucratizing and downsizing the tions and no longer remain restricted to socio- regulatory apparatus and embraced the idea economic policy-making. of responsible government by associations. The concept of corporatism was originally Large organized interests were granted pubderived from the idea that society should be lic status and key implementational tasks. Yet organized not only by the state and politi- even Schmitter (1989) critically recognized cal parties but also incorporate larger asso- that corporatist arrangements may marginciations to promote social harmony. Yet in alize poorly organized or specialized social parts of Southern Europe and in particular groups and new issues (e.g., digitalization), fascist Italy (Gagliardi 2016), authoritarian thus reinforcing representation monopolies governments exploited the notion of corporat- for certain organizations. ism to enhance industrial production through What all corporatist systems share is the state-industry pacts. Such arrangements had collective aim to counteract representational little to do with multilateral social represen- inequalities by balancing out countervailing tation and consensus but rather were charac- interests. The classical “social corporatist” terized by state dirigisme over key industrial model consists of “tripartite” constellations of sectors. In post-war Western Europe, both organized labor, business associations, and the Christian and social democrats pushed for state. One example is the Dutch polder model, policies based on institutionalized “tripar- in which employers’ organizations (in particutite” negotiations between the state and lar the VNO-NCW) and labor unions (mainly employers’ and employees’ associations to the Federation Dutch Labour Movement) foster consensus on socio-economic policies. and government reconcile labor-related conWhile Christian democrats linked corporat- flicts within the Sociaal-Economische Raad ist policy-making with their historical guid- (Social-Economic Council) (see Woldendorp ing principle of social accommodation (van & Keman 2007 for a critical, chronologically Kersbergen 2003), social democrats gener- nuanced view). Although criticized by the left ally sought to increase the voice of labor for subordinating the struggle of the working unions and hence also supported corporatist class to cross-class compromise and collaboarrangements (Hicks 1988). The term “neo- ration, variants of social corporatism have corporatism” (Schmitter 1985) emerged in been prevalent in much of western Europe. distinction to authoritarian industrial pacts German industrial relations, for example, to grasp such institutionalized systems of are traditionally characterized as capitalism “balanced” interest representation between with strong macro-economic coordination, 111

112  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology but also sectoral self-regulation, influential firm-specific works councils (Betriebsräte), and branch-specific industrial adjustment policies. The Rhineland capitalist model has managed to fend off a neo-liberal onslaught on corporatist structures and remained a “non-liberal” variety of capitalism, still characterized by tripartite pacts (e.g., Bündnis für Arbeit/Alliance for Work) despite welfare cutbacks and national commitments to balanced budgets. Key to understanding variations in corporatism are the concepts of centralization and concentration. Concentration refers to the extent to which one comprehensive umbrella organization represents labor or capital, respectively. This is the case for the United States and Great Britain. However, they are low on the centralization dimension, that is, the extent to which national-level wage bargaining occurs. Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are, by contrast, low on the concentration dimension (i.e., the union landscape is highly segmented), but wage bargaining is centralized (Elvander 2002). Against this background, other concepts have emerged to grasp the evolution and diversity of corporatism. “Lean corporatism” (Traxler 2004) accounts for the fact that intra-associational coordination of wages and other socio-economic issues may take place at the meso-level (i.e., within sectors) or even micro-level (between individual firms). Hence, lean arrangements are still more coordinated than pluralistic or purely statecentered wage regulation but often lack the hierarchy, concentration, and centralization common to classical neo-corporatist polities. In fact, bipartite constellations with either the absence of the state or bilateral negotiations between the state and business or social welfare groups are a distinctive characteristic of the Swedish labor market regime: bipartite centralized self-regulation on the industry/ sector level is combined with the unilateral self-regulation of unions and employers’ associations (Kjellberg 2017). Other authors have elaborated on public‑sector corporatism. Unlike private sector unions, public unions do not produce marketable commodities, rather public goods, but still collectively bargain with the state. Yet public sector unions have the advantage that they can deprive citizens of essential services such as education. Moreover, they generally demonstrate

detailed sector-specific knowledge and do not jeopardize their jobs by posing high demands to the state (Terry 2000). Linking corporatism with consensual democracy, Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) elaborated a scale of corporatism drawing on the works of numerous other authors. In line with what Streeck and Kenworthy (2005) later referred to as corporatism’s “structural dimension”, groups are first organized in national monopolistic peak organizations. The second dimension grasps “social concertation” or the “functional dimension” of corporatism, i.e., “efforts by the governments to include the social partners in policymaking and implementation, involving consulting, coordinating or even negotiating on matters of economic and social policies that go beyond normal bilateral wage bargaining” (Ebbinghaus & Weishaupt 2022: 8). While Lijphart and Crepaz’s (1991) scale heavily drew on expert assessments from other works, Siaroff (1999) introduced 22 empirically measurable indicators of integrated market economies. These span from strong unionization (with relatively few unions), institutionalized business and labor input into policy-making, and their mutual recognition as social partners, to the prevalence of consensus-oriented policy-making. However, Jahn (2016) correctly points out that Siaroff (1999) somewhat mixes the features and outcomes of corporatism (i.e., small open economies, high social expenditures). He aimed to remedy this shortcoming by designing rankings focusing on corporatism’s structural component, that is, centrally negotiating peak organizations and the rights and structure of works councils, and its functional component, that is, government intervention into wage bargaining and, conversely, union involvement in government decision-making. He also accounts for the scope of corporatist outcomes, that is, the wider applicability of branch agreements. Drawing on a dataset by Visser (2011) covering wage-setting policies, trade union features, state intervention, and social pacts, Jahn constructs a time-variant index of corporatism for 42 (western and non-western) countries from 1960 to 2010. Austria, Sweden, and Belgium have the highest mean scores for the 50-year period, followed by the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, and Finland, with the USA, Canada, and the UK coming in last. Particularly striking is

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corporatism and neo-corporatism  113 the variation among post-communist/socialist countries, with Slovenia ranking 8th and Slovakia 18th, closely followed by Romania and Bulgaria, whereas Poland and Estonia rank lowest. The highly useful data grasp the evolution of corporatism over time within and between countries and widely reflect a cyclical trend. Corporatist structures may also develop in other policy areas. Hukkinen (1998) introduced the term “environmental corporatism” to grasp the systemic integration of conflicting socio-political interests into environmental policy-making in Finland and Sweden (see also Gronow et al. 2019). Recently, Horváthová et al. (2021) developed country-specific “energy corporatism” scores based on a survey of post-communist energy organizations. Using a similar survey method, Dobbins et al. (2021) explore how “stakeholder” corporatism has emerged in higher education systems to facilitate the formal participation of students’ unions, academic/professional unions, and university managers’ associations. Also looking at the post-communist context, they show that higher education policy is a particularly corporatist policy area and—importantly—that stakeholder arrangements in higher education are not necessarily contingent on general socio-economic policy arrangements.1 Despite declining unionism, there are numerous reasons for scholars to remain focused on corporatism. Amid austerity, pandemic politics, and energy crises, social harmony and consensus are clearly at stake and only compounded by partisan polarization. Corporatism and the involvement of organized interests may promote compromise-building and alleviate the detrimental political consequences of unpopular but objectively necessary reforms (Afonso 2013). Hence, preserving corporatism may preserve the social fabric in times of crisis. The post-communist experience and particularly recent democratic backsliding in various EU member states also highlight the importance of the social embeddedness of the economy for democratic development. The top-down installed post-communist tripartite systems could not socially and democratically embed the new capitalist economies. This contributed to the emergence of illiberal populist governments (Scheiring 2020). The 2010s saw the curtailment or even formal

abolishment of neo-corporatist institutions in several post-communist countries (e.g., Korkut et al. 2017). Many industrial democracies are also characterized by falling union density rates and increasingly hollowed-out corporatist structures. Yet despite this visible parallel decline in both corporatism and democratic quality, scholars have been slow to deliver explanations for the decline (or increase) of corporatism and instead focused on mapping different indicators of corporatism over time (Jahn 2016). Hence, a crucial research question is whether the weakening of corporatism contributes to the exhaustion of the different varieties of (welfare) capitalist regimes and in turn how this affects democratic quality. Michael Dobbins and Rafael Pablo Labanino

Note 1.

Czech higher education was shown to be highly corporatist, and Slovenian higher education was weakly corporatist (see Jahn 2016 for contrasting findings for socio-economic policy-making).

References Afonso, A. (2013) Social Concertation in Times of Austerity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Dobbins, M., Horváthová, B. & Labanino, R.P. (2021) Exploring interest intermediation in Central and Eastern Europe: Is higher education different? Interest Groups and Advocacy 10(4): 399–429. Ebbinghaus, B. & Weishaupt, T. (2022) The Role of Social Partners in Managing Europe’s Great Recession: Crisis Corporatism or Corporatism in Crisis? Abingdon: Routledge. Elvander, N. (2002) The Labour Market Regimes in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Scandinavian Political Studies, 25, 117–137. Gagliardi, A. (2016) The corporatism of fascist Italy between words and reality. Estudos Ibero-Americanos 42(2): 409–429. Gronow, A., Tuomas, Y.A., Carson, M. & Edling, C. (2019) Divergent neighbors: Corporatism and climate policy networks in Finland and Sweden. Environmental Politics 28(6): 1061–1083. Guiliani, M. (2016) Patterns of democracy reconsidered: The ambiguous relationship

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114  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology between corporatism and consensualism. European Journal of Political Research 55(1): 22–42. Hicks, A. (1988) Social Democratic corporatism and economic growth. The Journal of Politics 50(3): 677–704. Horváthová, B., Dobbins, M. & Labanino, R.P. (2021) Towards energy policy corporatism in Central and Eastern Europe? Interest Groups and Advocacy 10(4): 347–375. Hukkinen, J. (1998) Institutions, environmental management and longterm ecological sustenance. Ambio 27(2): 112–117. Jahn, D. (2016) Changing of the guard: Trends in corporatist arrangements in 42 highly industrialized societies from 1960 to 2010. Socio-Economic Review 14(1): 47–71. Katzenstein, P.J. (1984) Corporatism and Change Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kjellberg, A. (2017) Self-regulation versus State regulation in Swedish industrial relations, in Mia Rönnmar & Jenny Julén Votinius (eds.), Festskrift till Ann Numhauser-Henning. Lund: Juristförlaget, 357–383. Korkut, U., de Ruyter, A., Maganaris, M. & Bailey, D. (2017) What next for unions in Central and Eastern Europe? Invisibility, departure and the transformation of industrial relations. European Journal of Industrial Relations 23(1): 65–80. Lijphart, A. & Crepaz, M. (1991) Corporatism and consensus democracy in eighteen countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages. British Journal of Political Science 21(2): 235–256. Scheiring, G. (2020) The Retreat of Liberal Democracy: Authoritarian Capitalism and

the Accumulative State in Hungary. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Schmitter, P. (1989) Corporatism is dead! Long live corporatism! Government and Opposition 24(1): 54–73. Schmitter, P.C. (1985) Neo-corporatism and the State. EUI Working Paper 106. Schmitter, P.C. & Streeck, W. (1985) Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Streeck, W. & Kenworthy, L. (2005) Theories and practices of neocorporatism, in T. Janoski, R. R. Alford, A. M. Hicks & M. A. Schwartz (eds.), The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies and Globalization (pp. 441–461). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Siaroff, A. (1999) Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement.  European Journal of Political Research 36(2): 175–205. Terry, M. (2000) Redefining Public Sector Unionism: UNISON and the Future of Trade Unions. London: Routledge. Traxler, F. (2004) The metamorphoses of corporatism: From classical to lean patterns. European Journal of Political Research 43(4): 571–598. van Kersbergen, K. (2003) Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State. Abingdon: Routledge. Visser, J. (2011) ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 Countries between 1960 and 2007. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. Woldendorp, J. & Keman, H. (2007) The polder model reviewed: Dutch corporatism 1965–2000. Economic and Industrial Democracy 28(3): 317–347.

Michael Dobbins and Rafael Pablo Labanino

29. Decommodification The term decommodification is typically used to characterize a process in which people can secure an adequate livelihood outside the market. It is a central concept in welfare state research and was brought into mainstream political sociology by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his analyses of different worlds of welfare capitalism. Although decommodification (or rather its antonym commodification) was central for Marx in his analysis of labor power under capitalism, the first uses of the concept are often credited to Polanyi (1980). According to Polanyi, free market capitalism is based on the false premise that labor can be bought and sold, just like any other commodity. However, unlike other commodities, labor cannot be separated from its owner or detached from the rest of human activity. People need to eat, socialize, and reproduce for society to exist. While a mining company may store iron ore or put production on temporary hold until the price is agreeable, labor is unable to withhold itself for too long before the very means necessary to support life are threatened. Without some kind of decommodification of labor, free market capitalism is therefore bound to self-destruct. The escape route out of this dilemma of self-destruction is support systems to preserve and enhance labor when it is not traded on the market. With reference to the Speenhamland system of outdoor relief that was implemented in much of pre-industrial England at the end of the eighteenth century, Polanyi considered those support systems to be a pre-condition for the commodification of labor and thus something that paradoxically developed alongside or even prior to free market capitalism. Instead of setting minimum wages for workers, in the Speenhamland system, the parishes provided a wage supplement to increase pay rates to agreed levels. The Speenhamland was in place until 1834, when it was replaced by the Poor Law Amendment. The fictitious commodity of labor and its contradictory relationship to capital inspired a series of neo-Marxist accounts of the welfare state in the 1970s and early 1980s (Offe, 1984). However, decommodification gained more widespread recognition in research in the early 1990s after Esping-Andersen (1990) used it to categorize countries into different

welfare state regimes. Nonetheless, there is no univocal definition of decommodification in research, and over the years it has been defined in different ways, with subtle but nonetheless important shifts in meaning. A widely cited definition is the one offered by Esping-Andersen (1990: 21–22), in which “De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without a reliance on the market”. Compared to Polanyi, Esping-Andersen considered decommodification policies to be of more recent date and something that emerged with the welfare state in the late development of capitalist societies. According to Esping-Andersen, decommodification empowers people against the forces of the market on the basis of citizenship rather than performance. There is thus a close resemblance with Marshall’s (1950) theory of citizenship. According to Marshall, the emergence of the welfare state in the twentieth century completed the transition to full citizenship by introducing a new set of inviolable social rights. These social rights complement the civil and political rights of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, eventually leading to a new form of social citizenship in which people of all social classes were guaranteed at least a modicum of material resources and social support. Although decommodification provides an option to exit the labor market without potential loss of income, the definition offered by Esping-Andersen should not be understood as a complete abolishment of labor as a commodity. As the concept is typically applied in research, decommodification is a matter of degree. It is not about all or nothing. Through social policy, welfare states make people less dependent on wage income during critical periods in life, characterized for example by unemployment, long-time illness, or old age. Decommodification is thus considered foremost a priority of wage-earners and something that ultimately re-shapes the power struggles in society by giving more political voice to the labor movement. In class mobilization theory, decommodification is considered an important power resource in its own right by making wage-earners in capitalist societies less fragmentized and compelled to compete among themselves. Decommodification is thus considered to increase capacities for cross-class political coalition making and solidarity, for example between low-income and middle-income wage-earners (Korpi, 1983).

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116  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Decommodification can be measured in different ways. Esping-Andersen (1990) used an index based on certain aspects of countries’ old age pension systems, sickness insurance, and unemployment benefits. The most crucial aspect was the degree of income replacement in social insurance (i.e. the extent to which benefits replace normal earnings), but also qualifying criteria and the coverage of benefits in relevant population categories were used. The analysis was thus purely based on how social policy was codified in national legislation. Based on this index of decommodification, patterns of social stratification, and the public–private mix of welfare, Esping-Andersen argued that three distinctively different forms of welfare capitalism had emerged: the liberal, conservative, and social-democratic welfare states. Notably, Esping-Andersen labelled each type of welfare capitalism according to the main political ideology that supposedly led to its creation. The liberal welfare state tends to provide low degrees of decommodification as the public programs only step in when the market fails. There is no ambition from the state to crowd out private welfare, and benefits, therefore, tend to be flat-rate or meanstested in character, providing manly for minimal needs. The conservative welfare state provides high degrees of decommodification, but mainly for labor market insiders. Focus is on status preservation rather than vertical redistribution between the rich and the poor. For those with an extended work history, benefits are set up in tripartite agreements between the state, employers, and employees, and benefits are designed to uphold accustomed living standards by earnings-related compensation. Those outside the labor market (or people with insufficient work history) are typically left with only a modicum of social protection. The social-democratic welfare state provides high degrees of decommodification for all groups in society by combining generous earnings-related state benefits for middleincome groups and a public universal basic floor for all citizens. As a consequence, the role of private welfare is marginalized. Despite an immediate impact on comparative welfare state research and its status today as a modern classic, Esping-Andersen’s application of decommodification has been criticized from both a conceptual point of view and empirically (Emmenegger et al., 2015). Kenneth Nelson

While Room questioned the narrow focus on income maintenance, advocating for a greater focus on human self-creation through work and enabling policies (i.e. education, active labor market programs, and so forth), feminist-inspired scholars (Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1994; O’Connor, 1996) vouched for a greater emphasis on domestic unpaid work and care arrangements. According to feminist scholarship on the welfare state, decommodification, as conceptualized by Esping-Andersen (and those before him), was mainly concerned with the emancipation of a full-time male worker from market forces. In extension, feminist scholars also recognized that welfare states can be an important source of commodification by moving many care responsibilities from the family to the market. Subsequently, this debate of welfare state commodification crafted its own path in the comparative analysis of welfare states around the related concept of de-familialization. Empirically, the decommodification index used by Esping-Andersen has been accused of being both arbitrary and non-transparent. Analyses based on similar types of institutional data have had difficulties in replicating Esping-Andersen’s findings (Scruggs & Allan, 2006). Since the publication of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, a parallel debate has also emerged on the conceptualization and measurement of welfare states more generally (Clasen & Siegel, 2007). Specific concerns are raised about using solely institutional data in social policy analysis, which in the worst-case scenario describes a paper reality by showing how policies are expressed in legislation, which may or may not correspond to how they function in real life. There is a widespread agreement today that careful social policy analysis requires different types of data, where legislative frameworks are analyzed alongside expenditures and beneficiary ratios. The latter in particular provides important information about the inclusiveness of the welfare state and the extent to which people actually have access to the various benefits and services that are associated with the welfare state (van Oorschot, 2013). Although people are formally covered by social insurance during periods of work incapacity, as analyzed by Esping-Andersen (1990), they may nonetheless have difficulties in receiving benefits due to harsh eligibility criteria, work requirements, discretionary

decommodification  117 decisions in the administrative process, or other circumstances related to each individual claim. Only a combination of different types of data may reveal these structures and show in more detail how distinct forms of welfare capitalism create their own unique systems of social stratification. The categorization of countries into different groups is another prominent theme in the comparative welfare state literature that owes much to Esping-Andersen’s influential analysis of decommodification. Numerous alternative classifications of welfare states have been proposed over the years, leading to its own branch of research that has been characterized as the welfare modelling business (Abrahamson, 1999). Many of these studies cover developments in countries or regions of the world that were not part of EspingAndersen’s original analysis, such as Southern Europe (Ferrera, 1996), Central and Eastern Europe (Fenger, 2007), as well as countries in the global south (Wood & Gough, 2006). Alternatively, the focus has been on programs overlooked by Esping-Andersen (1990), such as means-tested social assistance (Gough et al., 1997). Decommodification continues to be a widely debated and sometimes contested concept in political sociology, social policy research, and related disciplines. It is also a concept that continues to inspire new research, not least in areas of sustainable consumption, the digital economy, and basic income guarantees. Kenneth Nelson

References Abrahamson, P. (1999). The welfare modelling business. Social Policy and Administration, 33(4): 394–415. Clasen, J., Siegel, N. A. (2007). Investigating Welfare State Change. The ‘Dependent Variable Problem’ in Comparative Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Emmenegger, P., Kvist, J., Marx, P., Petersen, K. (2015). Three worlds of welfare capitalism: The making of a classic. Journal of European Social Policy, 25(1): 3–13.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. New Jersey: Prinston University Press. Fenger, M. (2007). Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating postcommunist countries in a welfare regime typology. Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences, 3(2): 1–30. Ferrera, M. (1996). The ‘Southern Model’ of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1): 17–37. Gough, I., Bradshaw, J., Ditch, J., Eardley, T., Whiteford, P. (1997). Social assistance in OECD countries. Journal of European Social Policy, 7(1): 17–43. Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Connor, J. S. (1996). From women in the welfare state to gendering welfare state regimes. Current Sociology, 44(2): 1–124. Offe, C. (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: Hutchinson. Orloff, A. S. (1993). Gender and the social rights in citizenship: The comparative analysis of gender relations and welfare states. American Sociological Review, 58(3): 303–328. Polanyi, K. (1980). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Sainsbury, D. (1994). Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage. Scruggs, L., Allan, J. (2006). Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: A replication and revision. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1): 55–72. van Oorschot, W. (2013). Comparative welfare state analysis with survey-based benefit: Recipiency data: The ‘Dependent Variable Problem’ revisited. European Journal of Social Security, 15(3): 224–248. Wood, G., Gough, I. (2006). A comparative welfare regime approach to global social policy. World Development, 34(10): 1696–1712.

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30. Democracy Democracy, a political system first pioneered in the fifth century bce in ancient Greek city-states, establishes the principle that the government (kratos) of a political community must be in the hands of the people comprising it (demos) and be open to politics, that is, public debate among its citizens. Although democracy was long overshadowed in European history by empire and monarchy, the creation of politics survived in republican form in the city-states of Renaissance Italy but was largely restricted to the oligarchic rule of a privileged class. The democratic ideal of collective self-government was, however, revived in North-Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, along with a new understanding of government as predicated on an implicit contract binding states and populations, loyalty to the state being demanded in exchange for military protection. Contract theories made the authority of governments ultimately dependent on the consent of the ordinary people, giving birth to the notion of popular sovereignty which inspired ‘revolutions,’ radical transformations of preexisting social structures extending into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Democracy is now the dominant style of government across the world but in the modern form of ‘liberal democracy,’ the outcome of a synthesis of its classical Greek understanding with eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury European liberal thought associating collective self-government with a principle of elective parliamentary representation, inherited from earlier attempts of European aristocracies to counterbalance the power of monarchs (Held 2006). Under historically unprecedented international scrutiny, even the last remaining critics of liberal democracy, notably in the Muslim world, are now compelled to invoke some of its fundamental values to uphold the legitimacy of their rule: the notions of popular sovereignty and even of individual rights (Vitkauskaite-Meurice 2010). Liberal democracy, however, was long contested by reactionary re-assertions of the monarchies’ claims of moral superiority, as well as by alternative visions of democracy inspired by critiques of the elitist nature of parliamentary representation and of the selfserving nature of its party systems.

Democracy’s victory was consolidated in the decades following the end of World War Two after the defeat of its most influential enemies, Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, totalitarian ideologies having enjoyed great prestige in the 1930s because of their claims to offer a viable alternative to democratic government discredited by its failure to counter the social ravages of the Great Depression of 1929. In the second half of the twentieth century, under the United States’ geo-political leadership, the world was then democratised in successive waves, the remaining autocratic regimes of Southern Europe (then Latin America) being swept aside in the 1970s, with a liberal-democratic camp being created, later joined by two Pacific-Asian allies (Korea and the Philippines) (Huntington 1991). The collapse in the early 1990s of the last form of government rivalling liberal democracy, Soviet communism, because of the regime’s incapacity to cater for the people’s economic needs and its bloated bureaucracy, then encouraged Western triumphalism symbolised by Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992). Western triumphalism then gave birth to US-led neo-liberal financial globalisation, an extension of the superpower’s nationalism and economic imperialism (Hudson 2003, 2005). Globalisation came into tension with democratic values despite its champion’s purported commitment to democracy, and Western liberal democracies entered a crisis, engendered not only by the external economic pressures of globalisation but also by inner social-cultural changes associated with a ‘revolution of identity’ affecting the definition of individuality and transforming social mores (Gauchet 2020). Simultaneously, globalised communication spread the ideal of democracy in autocratic parts of the world, notably inspiring popular protests in the Middle East, the revolutions of the Arab Spring even securing in Tunisia a multi-party democratic electoral system despite persistent neo-authoritarian forces preventing it from becoming a fully liberal democracy. Throughout its history, democratic thought has indeed always fostered aspirations for collective and individual freedom, political participation, citizenship and even self-realisation, aspirations possessing an enduring universal appeal (Khosrokhavar 2012). Alongside lofty aspirations to individual and collective self-determination, democracy

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democracy  119 has, however, also been promoted in a more modest procedural perspective, simply as the means to protect individuals from excessive government power and arbitrary rule, to allow preferences to be expressed and conflicts to be managed peacefully. In the context of the Cold War, empirical political theorists (mostly American) painted a rather rosy picture of the capacity of the electoral system based on mass parties to deliver policy outcomes which satisfied Western electorates. Democratisation was closely observed by American modernisation theorists in their attempt to defend a middle path between free market economic development and communist collectivisation (Gilman 2003). Liberal-democratic governments were thought to be able to manage equitably a political market in which a plurality of specific interest groups – each with their own political demands – competed peacefully (Held 2006, 158–184). This description of harmonious pluralism – presumably offered by liberal representative politics – was influential until the 1960s but later came under scrutiny from new critical currents of democratic theory within the paradigm of empirical democratic theory (neo-pluralism) (Held 2006, pp. 165–168) or that of critical theory informed by neoMarxism (Held 2006, pp. 169–170). Liberal democracy, however, retained its ideological hegemony, not least because of its capacity to deliver not only peace (in and among countries) but also high standards of living. The success of liberal democracy was predicated on the invention of a new form of state with a much broader range of responsibilities with respect to the needs and desires of societies, now national communities (Gauchet 2022a). The victory of liberal-democratic culture over the totalitarian ideologies of the 1930s was not secured only by the military victory over Nazism (Gauchet 2010, 2022a). Nor was it simply the outcome of electoral representation securing social cohesion by balancing the competing interests of various pressure groups. Rather, it was the result of a host of reforms pursued across the Western world in competition with the ideology of communism. Protection from external threats was no longer seen as the state’s only mission. The pursuit of economic growth (managing its distribution through the cycles of capitalism) now became a crucial source of government legitimacy. In Western Europe, the invention of the liberal-democratic nation-state was

accompanied by the creation of a novel mode of international relations, putting an end to the region’s old nationalistic rivalries through the construction of a new, ‘European’ layer of governance regulated by the legal provisions of international treaties and overseen by a transnational bureaucracy. In parallel with the creation of a common, liberal economic space, the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community also secured a commitment to the new responsibility of government for the economic well-being of their national societies and the individuals composing them. Three categories of reforms pursued across Europe from the late 1950s and 1960s can be said to have secured strong popular support for liberal democracy and undermined the belief in revolutionary change fostered in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century by both Marxist and anarchistic political ideologies (Gauchet 2017): 1. Political reforms aiming to reinforce and personalise executive power to counter the weaknesses of the parliamentary system of government favoured by European countries since their broadening of universal suffrage in the early twentieth century, 2. Administrative reforms developing the state’s regulatory and forecasting capacity to guide the economic change constantly generated by capitalist free markets, 3. Social reforms and the development of the state’s role to protect individuals from the hazards of life in capitalist market societies (sickness, unemployment, old age, poverty). Behind the so-called ‘welfare’ measures – pursued to a much higher degree in Western European countries than in the United States – there also lay a much deeper ambition for which the empirical democratic theory of the 1950s and 1960s could not account: to give democratically representative governments the capacity to guide through historical change the lives of the nations they represented, according to an overall vision of justice (Gauchet 2022a). This ambition had first been formulated in eighteenth-century Republican political theory in its ‘developmental’ version (Held 2006). After having gradually lost its appeal Natalie J. Doyle

120  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology under the influence of nineteenth-century liberalism – with its emphasis on the autonomous capacity of civil society to deliver a superior common good through the liberation of individual enterprise – this ambition was revived after World War Two with a new respect for democratic pluralism and the need to protect individuals from human rights abuses. The liberal, parliamentary political systems in existence before World War Two – democratised through the broadening of suffrage – thus evolved into fully fledged liberal democracies, their hybrid political regime gaining considerable support despite it having been radically contested a few decades earlier (Gauchet 2022a). In the 1970s the consolidation of liberal democracy and the growth of individualism saw the decline of participatory conceptions of democracy directly involving citizens in policy formulation, despite their having flourished in the 1960s with the rise of ‘new social movements’ seeking to broaden the scope of civic recognition to new categories of the population (women, homosexuals, later broadened to LGBTQ+, immigrants) (Held 2006). The top-down, paternalistic conception of government dominant in the previous decades was also questioned, bringing to the fore the question of political legitimacy and its reformulation in terms of new values of impartiality and reflexivity favouring procedural guarantees (Rosanvallon 2011). During the 1970s and even more so the 1980s, in association with increasing individualism, a new understanding of democracy thus took shape, displacing the classic definition of democracy as self-government and self-determination, originally pursued from the mid-nineteenth century onwards through the push for universal male suffrage hitherto limited by wealth. The renewed concern for the question of justice and ethical legitimacy was manifest in the influence of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice and of new philosophical understandings of democracy inspired by the work of Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, John Stuart Mill, Dewey and, most notably, Habermas, who brought into the mix a European sensibility more critical of the democratic theory promoted by the American social sciences (Chambers 2018). Habermas inspired the notion of deliberative democracy, ‘one of the main games in contemporary political theory for two decades’ (Bächtiger and Dryzek 2018), which Natalie J. Doyle

displaced American empirical theory, inspiring many innovations in the actual practice of democracy. Rejecting the idea that political decisions in a liberal democracy should only be the result of an aggregate of citizens’ preferences, advocates of deliberative democracy argued that they should be informed by a rational and fair debate which would not only allow competing views to be expressed and weighed up but also deliver a superior public good. This emphasis on the importance of the law in establishing the framework for rational deliberation accompanied the growth of constitutionalism in liberal-democratic political systems, this legalism and its individualistic rationalisation of all human relationships being a factor in the contemporary crisis of democratic politics, because of the law’s erasure of the dimension of collective power central to the first visions of democracy (Doyle and Gauchet 2022). A narrower understanding of democracy has indeed come to prevail in Western countries, underpinned by their societies’ depoliticisation, by the ‘closing of the civic mind’ (Braeckman 2004) and their loss of a common purpose (Doyle 2017). The balance between the different components of liberal democracy (collective self-determination, rights-based law, economic power) has been lost. This has profoundly destabilised national politics based on the party systems established in the decades after World War Two and translated into a new form of populist discourse, identified by governing elites as a major threat to liberal democracy. Populism, however, can be understood as a symptom of a more profound crisis of democratic politics associated with the entry of Western countries into a radicalised form of modernity and their endorsement of the new ideology of neoliberalism (Gauchet 2022b). This ideology – with its individualistic parameters and pursuit of an ‘automatic’, fully rationalised form of society – can be understood as undermining democratic culture from within (Brown 2017, Doyle 2022). Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, Western democratic politics have been plagued by a dysfunctionality of party systems and the questioning of government legitimacy, first evident in the Brexit referendum and in Donald Trump’s election in the United States, a populist anti-establishment figure. In this context, faced with the challenge of a pandemic (Doyle 2021, 2022b), most Western governments enacted public

democracy  121 health measures incompatible with liberal freedoms, the lack of resistance from their populations consolidating the perception that the very idea of liberal democracy is struggling for survival. Triggered by two factors – the destabilisation of Western societies from within by identity politics amplified by social media and the destabilisation of the international order by assertive state actors contesting Western liberal hegemony in the name of their civilisational specificity (Acharya 2020) – this crisis of European democratic culture spells the death of the early twentyfirst-century cosmopolitan vision of democracy that sought to manage globalisation deliberatively (Held 1995; Archibuggi & Held 1995). Deeply divided by great economic inequalities (Piketty 2014) and the appearance of plutocratic networks pursuing their own interests and indifferent to the ravages of globalisation caused by de-industrialisation (Gauchet 2022a), Western countries now face the challenge of reasserting both their collective democratic agency and their individual freedoms, whilst emancipating themselves from their residual imperialistic understanding of power and attachment to Western hegemony. They must draw full conclusions from their own liberal-democratic values and accept the validity of other cultural ways of life and their equal right to enjoyment of the common planet’s natural resources. Natalie J. Doyle

References Acharya, Amitav (2020), “The Myth of the ‘Civilization State’: Rising Powers and the Cultural Challenge to World Order”, Ethics & International Affairs, 34(2). Archibugi, Daniele and Held, David, eds. (1995), Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bächtiger, André, Drysek, John, Mansbridge, Jane and Warren, Mark, eds. (2018), The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Braeckman, Antoon (2004), “The Closing of the Civic Mind: Marcel Gauchet on the ‘Society of Individuals”, Thesis Eleven, 94(1), 29–48.

Brown, Wendy (2017), Undoing the Demos. Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chambers, Simone (2018), ‘The Philosophic Origins of Deliberative Ideas’. In: The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Andre Bächtiger, John S. Drysek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark Warren, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–15. Doyle, Natalie J. (2017), Marcel Gauchet and Loss of Common Purpose. Imaginary Islam and the Crisis of European Democracy, Lanham: Lexington Books. Doyle, Natalie J. (2021), ‘Marcel Gauchet and the Crisis of European Democracy’. In: The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, 2nd edition, G. Delanty and B. Turner, eds., London & New York: Rouledge, pp. 174–185. Doyle, Natalie J. (2022), ‘The New World of Liberal Democracy’. In: Marcel Gauchet and the Crisis of Democratic Politics, N. J. Doyle and S. McMorrow, eds., London & New York: Routledge, pp. 223–258. Doyle, Natalie J. and Gauchet, M. (2022a), ‘Neo-liberal ideology and the New World: An Interview with Marcel Gauchet’, The International Journal of Social Imaginaries, 1(2), 303–332. Fukuyama, Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, London: H. Hamilton. Gauchet, Marcel (2010), À l'épreuve des totalitarismes, 1914–1974, Paris: Gallimard. Gauchet, Marcel (2017), Le nouveau monde, Paris: Gallimard. Gauchet, Marcel (2020), ‘À la découverte de la société des individus’, Le Débat, 3(210), 155–168. Gauchet, Marcel (2022a), ‘Democracy from one Crisis to Another’. In: Marcel Gauchet and the Crisis of Democratic Politics, N. J. Doyle and S. McMorrow, eds., London & New York: Routledge, 2022, pp. 15–36. Gauchet, Marcel (2022b), ‘Populism as Symptom’. In: Marcel Gauchet and the Crisis of Democratic Politics, N. J. Doyle and S. McMorrow eds., London & New York: Routledge, pp. 37–59. Gilman, Nils (2003), Mandarins of the Future: Modernisation Theory in ColdWar America, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. Natalie J. Doyle

122  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Held, David (1995), Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, David (2006), Models of Democracy, 3rd edition, Cambridge & Malden: Polity. Hudson, Michael (2003), Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance, 2nd ed. London and Sterling: Pluto Press. Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Husdon, Michael (2005), Global Fracture, the New International Economic Order, new edition, London & Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.

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Khosrokhavar, Farhad (2012), The New Arab revolutions that shook the world, 2nd Edition, London & New York: Routledge. Picketty, Thomas (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Belknap Press. Rosanvallon, Pierre (2011), Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Vitkauskaite-Meurice, Dalia (2010), ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights: The Naissance of New Regional Human Rights System or a Challenge to the Universality of Human Rights?’, Jurisprudencija, 1(119), 165–180.

31. Democratization In early May 1789, the French king summoned the estates to a meeting for the first time in 175 years. At the time, only a handful of countries in the world held periodic elections to a national parliament – among them England, Sweden and, for the first time the previous year, the United States of America. Today, the opposite holds: only a handful of countries in the world do not hold periodic elections to a national parliament – China and Saudi Arabia perhaps being the most prominent among them. The world has thus undergone a profound change in the last 250 years. Periodic elections have gone from the exception to the rule. This is not to say that all elections are democratic, nor to argue that democracy is only about elections. The concept of democracy is discussed in a separate entry to this encyclopedia, but in the empirical and minimal sense referred to here, it implies five things (following Dahl 1971, 1998): (1) free and fair elections with (2) universal suffrage to the (3) most important offices of state, combined with a high degree of freedom of (4) expression and (5) association upheld also in between elections. Democratization, meanwhile, implies an improvement in any of these five pillars underpinning democracy. De-democratization – or as it has been more commonly called lately: autocratization – implies the opposite. Both democratization and de-democratization can be gradual processes, where for example the suffrage is first extended to some (but not all) of the population, or where some (but not all) political organizations are banned. But democratization can also be an eruptive process, where most of democracy’s five safeguards are introduced at once in a very short time period. Similarly, de-democratization can be a wholesale dismantling of all democratic pillars at once, such as in a military coup (Coppedge et al. 2020). In a much-cited book, Huntington (1991) famously proclaimed that democratization in the world has followed a wave-like pattern with three peaks. The first wave was long and slow but peaked around the end of the First World War when parliamentary control over government formation and suffrage extensions were brought to large parts of the

Western hemisphere. In the inter-war period, however, there was a first reverse wave with the introduction of fascist and Nazi regimes in Italy, Germany and elsewhere. After the Second World War, democracy experienced its second wave, when it first returned to large parts of Western Europe but now also spread to parts of Latin America as well as former Western colonies in Asia and parts of Africa. But in the 1960s, there was again a setback with the introduction of military or singleparty rule in many of these countries. The third wave of democracy started in the 1970s, first sweeping through Southern Europe, then to Latin America, at its peak overturning former Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after 1989 and then also spreading to large parts of SubSaharan Africa and parts of Asia in the 1990s and 2000s. In the last decade or so, there has however again been a decline in the average level of democracy in the world, although at a much higher level and so far not as steep as during the first and second reverse waves. Through these waves, the five underpinnings of democracy have not always changed in the same direction at the same time. In the nineteenth century, as a rule, it was the liberties (freedom of expression and association) that were first developed, while the fairness of elections, the extent to which the elections affected government formation, as well as the suffrage, lagged behind. Today, the situation is in many ways the reverse: universal suffrage has become the norm, and most leaders are – in one way or another – elected by the people. At the same time, the quality of elections is still very much at stake, and among the first things autocrats do when they want to dismantle democracy is to attack basic liberties, such as the freedom of the press. This also means that the five pillars of democracy do not move together to the same extent as they have done historically (Knutsen & Skaaning 2022). Four different approaches have dominated the literature trying to explain democratization within political science, sociology and economics (Teorell 2010). According to the first approach, democratization is primarily a response to structural shifts, one of the most prominent being socio-economic modernization in the surrounding society (Lipset 1959). The so-called modernization theory sustained the idea that countries tend to undergo a large number of more or less parallel and

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124  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology simultaneous processes, most notably industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of education, rising national income and a continued spread of communication technologies – all of which may be viewed as different aspects of modernization. Democratization, then, was thought of as but the tip of an iceberg composed of these larger processes at work in society. Modernization theory has however undergone criticism in the last two decades, the most serious challenge being that socio-economic modernization does not appear to be a stable factor underlying democratization. Instead, the bulk of studies tend to show that modernization prevents de-democratization, so that countries that have democratized for other reasons are more likely to sustain their achievements, the more socioeconomically developed they are (Przeworski et al. 2000; Coppedge et al. 2022). However, the structural approach does not only concern itself with socio-economic modernization but also with, for example, short-term economic performance, economic inequality, natural resource dependence, societal cleavages or political institutions as factors underlying democratization. According to the second approach, democratization is instead the by-product of patterns of strategic interaction among political elites. This theoretical tradition stems from the common observation that democratization is not a mechanical process but a series of reforms decided upon by people of flesh and blood. These reforms can be enacted single-handedly by incumbent elites that rise to power under authoritarian rule, but they can also ensue from negotiations with the democratic opposition. In the latter case, the elites bargaining with the opposition are usually the more reform-minded among the authoritarian elites. A very common precondition for a democratization process to be initiated is therefore a division within the authoritarian regime itself. Personal skills, luck or strategic mistakes are, according to this approach, part and parcel of what democratization is about. The process is characterized by the indeterminacy of the short-term dynamics, and the same goes for events leading up to de-democratization (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Again, de-democratization is typically a process initiated by elite actors, be they within the military, within parts of the security forces or even within the incumbent administration itself. One of the elite-level Jan Teorell

dynamics often resulting in such a coup against the democratic system is polarization, which may become particularly toxic when leaders encourage violence and de-legitimize their opponents or threaten to restrict their rights. Strategic interaction among elites thus characterizes processes of de-democratization much as democratization (Linz 1978; Bermeo 2003). While the second view thus holds that democracy is usually granted or undermined from above, the third theoretical approach to explaining democratization, by contrast, holds that it is instead imposed from below by the people itself through popular mobilization (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). According to this view, incumbent authoritarian elites would not care to enact reforms or bargain with the democratic opposition if they did not fear the masses or an imminent threat of revolution. Paradoxically, however, this fear is most effectively sustained if the masses do not take to arms but protest peacefully (Teorell 2010). There are several reasons for this. First, nonviolent protest, while risky in the face of a repressive regime, requires no special technology or equipment, nor does it depend critically on the physical fitness of its implementers. It is therefore something that people from all walks of life can engage in, be they young or old, farmers or urban middle-class, students or workers. Second, harsh repression against peaceful demonstrators may have a mobilizing effect by spreading a sense of victimization, or even martyrdom, of innocent people. It may further or spawn elite divisions by questioning the legitimacy of the regime, and it risks leading to mutinies or defections within the military and security forces, when ordered to shoot at innocent people. Third, and finally, peaceful popular mobilization, if sustained over time, can seriously hurt the economy and thereby disrupt the material and other support bases of the authoritarian regime. But popular mobilization can also undermine a democratic regime, particularly if it turns violent (Bermeo 2003). Riots and violent protests have on several occasions in history preceded coups against a democratic system, in part because the elites (including the military) misread the signal from radical elements in the population and interpreted them as representative of the population at large. The fourth and final approach holds that one cannot explain democratization by taking into

democratization  125 consideration domestic affairs alone. Instead, democratization has international roots. It does not only come from above or below; democratization is enacted from the outside (Pevehouse 2005; Li & Reuveny 2009). Under this large umbrella, there are numerous theoretical claims. According to one tradition, democratization is affected by market integration (such as increasing international trade) or financial integration (such as increasing capital flows across borders). Whether such processes are good or bad for democratization is however contested. A school that developed in the 1960s called “dependency theory” held that increased economic globalization suppressed democratization in the global periphery through exploitation by the Western core, but others have argued that increased market and financial integration instead encourage democratization or lowers the risk for dedemocratization, by allowing for lower taxes and thus making democracy less costly (and more attractive) for authoritarian economic elites. Another strand of literature instead looks at political pull and push factors in the international system, ranging from international efforts to impose democracy through military invasion, threats of or actual imposition of economic sanctions, through the pressure of international organizations or through democracy aid. There is also strong evidence to support that democracy –  and autocracy – sometimes spread through emulation (Weyland 2014). Both incumbent authoritarian elites and the democratic opposition learn from experiences of democratization elsewhere. Democratization, or de-democratization, may thus spread across borders. Although these four explanatory approaches have developed independently over time, most scholars of democratization today view them as complementary rather than competing (Berins Collier 1999; Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Teorell 2010). To begin with, no structuralist accounts today deny that the way for example economic conditions affect processes of regime change is by changing the perceptions and preferences of the general population and the political beliefs. The same goes for international factors: barring military conquest with the purpose of installing democracy, reactions to market and financial integration, economic sanctions and democracy aid, as well as democratizing or de-democratizing events to be emulated elsewhere, all occur through

their effects on the perceptions and preferences of domestic actors. In other words, the first and the fourth explanatory approaches can be well integrated with the second and third. It is equally clear that the second and third explanatory approaches are not mutually exclusive. Rather the opposite: democratization from above is typically a response to mobilization from below, and the choice of the masses of whether and how to mobilize occurs as a response to reforms promised – or not promised – by the incumbent elites. Jan Teorell

References Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berins Collier, R. (1999). Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bermeo, N. (2003). Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Boix, C. (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coppedge, M., Edgell, A., Knutsen, C. H. & Lindberg, S., eds. (2022). Why Democracies Develop and Decline. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Glynn, A., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Skaaning, S.-E. & Teorell, J. (2020). Varieties of Democracy: Measuring Two Centuries of Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. Knutsen, C. H. & Skaaning, S.-E. (2022). “The Ups And Downs of Democracy, 1789–2018”. In: Coppedge, M., Edgell, A., Knutsen, C. H. & Lindberg, S., eds. Why Democracies Develop and Decline. Jan Teorell

126  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–54. Li, Q. & Reuveny, R. (2009). Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System: Complex Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linz, J. (1978). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration. An Introduction. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipset, S. M. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy”. American Political Science Review 53(1): 69–105. O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pevehouse, J. (2005). Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and

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Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A. & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rueschemeyer, D., Huber Stephens, E. & Stephens, J. D. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Teorell, J. (2010). Determinants of Democratization: Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weyland, K. (2014). Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

32. De Tocqueville, Alexis Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) was a French political sociologist, political philosopher, historian and politician. He was born into an old aristocratic Norman family; his ancestors are said to have fought in the company of William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings (Zunz, 2022). His maternal great-grandfather was Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de Malesherbes (1721–1794), member of the French Academy, the protector of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, minister, and one of the lawyers of Louis XVI at his so-called trial (that would lead to his decapitation in 1793). A year later, the same fate befell Malesherbes and several members of his household, including his daughter, son-in-law and grandchildren. Tocqueville’s father, Hervé, and mother, Louise, also imprisoned in PortRoyal with Malesherbes, survived the Reign of Terror due to the downfall of Robespierre, but they never overcame the trauma of imprisonment and of seeing their loved ones being guillotined. Hervé de Tocqueville became a politician and a political writer, who wrote, amongst other things, a philosophical history of the reign of Louis XV. While the ancestral castle of Tocqueville can be found in a small village near Valognes in Normandy, Alexis grew up, with his two brothers, in a castle in Verneuil-sur-Seine, close to Paris, where his father worked as a mayor in the First French Empire (1804–1815). Alexis received a typical Catholic aristocratic home education, tutored by l’abbé Lesueur, who was also the preceptor of Alexis’ father and brothers. When Hervé was appointed prefect in Metz in the Lorraine region during the Bourbon Restoration (1815– 1830), Alexis came to study at the College Royal in Metz, where he obtained his baccalaureate. He moved back to Paris, where he eventually obtained his law degree. In 1827, he was appointed apprentice magistrate at the Versailles court of law. In February 1831, less than a year after the July Revolution (1830) that ended his father’s political career, Alexis de Tocqueville and his fellow magistrate and friend Gustave de Beaumont (1802–1866) received a commission from the new king Louis-Philippe (1773–1850) to travel to a variety of northern and southern states of the United States, to study new prison reforms. Both Tocqueville

and Beaumont, however, had political aspirations. Each, therefore, wrote a book on the New World for a French audience, which would give them the required credibility to enter political affairs. Beaumont wrote a book on slavery in America, while the book that made Tocqueville famous was the first volume of Democracy in America, published in 1835. Tocqueville became a member of the French Academy in 1837. From 1839 onwards Tocqueville was elected and re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the July Monarchy. After the February Revolution in 1848, he shortly became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Second French Republic, with Beaumont as ambassador in Vienna, being part of a cabinet that lasted only a few months. When Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808–1873) seized power in a coup d’état on 2 December 1851, Tocqueville and other politicians, including Beaumont, were imprisoned for a few days. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and the founding of the Second French Empire (1852–1870) ended Tocqueville’s political career. He died of tuberculosis in 1859, after years of ill health (Zunz, 2022). Tocqueville is especially renowned for his books and much less for his political career. He wrote four major masterpieces: Democracy in America, Volume I (1835), Democracy in America, Volume II (1840), Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848 (1850) and The Old Regime and the French Revolution (1856). In Democracy in America, Volume I, Tocqueville described the so-called ‘democratic revolution’ as the unfolding of a new world marked by equality of living conditions in the United States. He traced the origin of North American democracy back to the New England townships, where the descendants of the Puritan colonists – migrants fleeing the West European Reformation wars – governed their own affairs democratically, without many class distinctions or privileges and with somewhat less male domination than was common in West European societies. Tocqueville analysed the praiseworthy federal constitution of the United States, which, he pointed out, was designed to facilitate democratic township government. At the same time, he warned of the dangers of ‘populism’ – a term he implies but does not use (the word ‘populism’ had not yet entered the French language during Tocqueville’s lifetime). He warned particularly of a populism that assumes the

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128  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology form of a ‘tyranny of the majority’, which destroys the rights and the dignity of all sorts of minorities. In Democracy in America, Volume II, Tocqueville offered a more critical perspective on American democracy in the Jacksonian era (1829–1860). He stressed that American democracy was marked by a certain shallowness, anti-intellectualism and highly limited concern for the classical virtues and care of the soul (Ossewaarde, 2004; Yarbrough, 2018). The Reformation drive that denied the superiority of a particular mode of life and affirmed ordinary life also abolished the standards of excellence, style and taste that were upheld by the aristocratic class. Such egalitarianism, according to Tocqueville, resulted in a certain mediocrity of the American mind, politics and morality (marked by utilitarianism) (Lebow, 2018; Englert, 2022). A less evident danger that he pointed out was that of despotism, which in democratic states takes the form of soft, administrative, paternalistic or benevolent despotism. Such oppression is not necessarily unpleasant for people or terrible for society yet it is always degrading and barbarizing. The theme of the threat of modern despotism was once again picked up in Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848. In this book, Tocqueville recounted the inherent weaknesses of the July Monarchy (1830–1848) in France, in which he himself acted as a liberal centre-left deputy (Tocquevile, 1987). Tocqueville argues that the government of the July Monarchy, led by bourgeois politicians like Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877) and François Guizot (1787–1874), was hopelessly mediocre, lacking in political virtue and statesmanship. Given its political and moral shortcomings, the July Monarchy appeared unable to contain or moderate the desires of the working class, which channelled its resentment into populism and the idolization of Bonaparte. Tocqueville argued that the revolution of 1848 was a socialist-populist revolution marked by mass resentment and as such the product of the bad government of the July Monarchy (Ossewaarde, 2004). In his final book, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Tocqueville explained how the origins of the French Revolution and the shaping of equal living conditions in France went back to centuries of monarchical statebuilding and levelling tactics of the French kings (Tocqueville, 1998). Louis XI (1423– 1483) was identified as the first French king to Marinus Ossewaarde

attack the privileges of the local aristocracy. Louis XI deprived the nobles of their political authority and jurisdictional prerogatives to the point that they eventually would become too weak for any civic (aristocratic) resistance to the king’s political will. Without aristocratic resistance, Louis XIV (1638–1715) could abolish free municipal elections altogether in 1692 and sell off the offices previously held by the nobility to the increasingly wealthy upper middle classes that longed to be lords (Ossewaarde, 2004). In all of his four major works, Tocqueville revealed a distinctively sociological understanding of democracy (Schleifer, 2018). He presented democracy as the outcome of a historical process of societal transformations in which feudal living conditions – the premodern condition of West European societies – gradually come to vanish. Democracy, for Tocqueville, was not primarily a democratic system (marked by party systems, electoral systems, universal suffrage, interest groups, etc.), but, instead, referred to a distinctively modern cultural complex in the West. Democracy, for him, was constituted by the affirmation of equality of dignity, materialized in equality before the law and the corresponding abolition of aristocratic privileges. Tocqueville, however, lived, worked and wrote in a nineteenth-century France in which the feudal world had vanished, but a new world of democracy was not yet realized. In fact, in Tocqueville’s lifetime, the democratic prospect of a common people that was politically and morally capable of self-government seemed quite bleak in the July Monarchy and the Second French Empire. Such political and administrative capacity is not acquired overnight. In pre-democratic societies, the common people were not expected to be selfgoverning citizens. They devoted themselves primarily to economic activities, from labouring and trading to climbing the social ladder. Their un-civic ways of life did not prepare them for the burdensome responsibility of self-government, which has traditionally been the duty and privilege of the aristocracy. An ideal aristocratic upbringing aimed at cultivating great spirits and noble characters capable of high standards of political, religious and moral action, of governing honourably and with dignity. In the revolutionary aftermath of the French Revolution, the common people seized power but were intellectually and morally not ready to carry its burden

de tocqueville, alexis  129 as democratic citizenry. Having been too accustomed to the monarchical despotismservitude nexus, they preferred the comfort, recognition and material well-being of serfdom to the insecurity and hardship of political freedom. The New England township, on the other hand, Tocqueville emphasizes, testifies to the democratic faith that the common people are capable of governing its own affairs, without calls for authoritarian leaders (Rau & Tracz-Tryniecki, 2014). The New England township, for Tocqueville, is a modern variant of ancient Athenian democracy, without the cultural rootedness of ancient citizens, the warrior ethos and the underclass of non-citizens (including slaves and women) and without Athens’ political, intellectual and aesthetic achievements. The New England township is characterized by a nexus of decentralized executive power and self-governing citizenship. Administrative centralization, for Tocqueville, contradicts democratic selfgovernment. Centralized executive power robs self-ruling citizens of their political capacity and desire for governing their own affairs, reducing them to ‘a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd’ (Tocqueville, 2000, p. 663). Tocqueville points out that the American federal government is politically but not administratively centralized. It is precisely this lack of administrative centralization that makes township politics democratic – even if the wider American political context, beyond the boundaries of the township, is lawless and inhumane towards non-citizens like black people and Native Americans. The French version of democracy, on the other hand, is self-contradictory since it is the product of administrative centralization. Tocqueville explains that the French ‘democratic revolution’ – the shaping of equal living conditions and the levelling of differences – was initiated by centuries of invasive monarchical despotism. The latter resulted in the orchestrated destruction of the old habits of aristocratic self-government and the corresponding concentration of power in a centralized monarchical state that had the entire French nation at its disposal. Tocqueville emphasizes that the French Revolution and its revolutionary aftermath in nineteenth-century France did not constitute a break but a continuation of the French imperialist pattern of monarchical despotism (Kuz, 2015).

Tocqueville points to a complex intermingling between politics and intellectual and moral culture, which is to say that a certain quality of mind and heart is intertwined with a certain quality of political life. The French monarchs’ dwarfing of the aristocrats and their increased dependence on middle-class finances destroyed the aristocratic habits of the mind and heart that Tocqueville conceived as essential for feudal self-government. When the possibilities for self-rule were largely annihilated by successive monarchs, the dejected aristocrats retreated from the real world of politics and administration to a ‘republic of letters’ (Mélonio & Furet, 1998). In this fictive world and idleness, the aristocratic habits of the mind and heart were quickly eroded. Political and moral thought became more abstract and general, divorced from the concrete and specific realities of political life. Though the American model of democracy seemed to have been able to elude an undemocratic centralization of administrative power in the Jacksonian era, it did, however, pay the price of cultural regress. Tocqueville, though committed to the democratic project, does not hide his grief over the intellectual and moral loss that seems to come with the rule of the common man. While Tocqueville, being a Christian and a liberal, is always hopeful about the possibility of curbing the trend, he does stress that modern mediocrity is not without awkward political and moral consequences (Lerner, 2020). It can fuel extremes to which democracies are extremely vulnerable: on the one hand, the voluntary servitude of common people who are not up to the task of self-government, and on the other hand, the degeneration of the democratic polity into populism (Henderson, 2022; Ikuta, 2022). This spectre of populism has been haunting modern societies since the French Revolution. Marinus Ossewaarde

References Englert, G. (2022). Tocqueville’s politics of grandeur. Political Theory 50(3): 477–503. Henderson, C.D. (2022). Beyond the “formidable circle”: Race and the limits of democratic inclusion in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Journal of Political Philosophy 30(1): 94–115. Marinus Ossewaarde

130  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Ikuta, J.C. (2022). Rethinking Tocqueville: White democracy or American democracy? Journal of Classical Sociology 22(4): 396–401. Kuz, M. (2015). Tocqueville’s dual theory of revolution. The European Legacy 20(1): 41–55. Lebow, R.D. (2018). The Politics and Business of Self-Interest from Tocqueville to Trump. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Lerner, M. (2020). Tocqueville and American Civilization. London: Routledge. Mélonio, F. & Furet, F. (1998). ‘Introduction’. Pp. 10–79. In: A. de Tocqueville (ed.), The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Volume I: The Complete Text. London: Chicago University Press. Ossewaarde, M.R.R. (2004). Tocqueville’s Moral and Political Thought: New Liberalism. London: Routledge. Rau, Z. & Tracz-Tryniecki, M. (eds.) (2014). Tocquevillian Ideas: Contemporary

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European Perspectives. Lanham: University Press of America. Schleifer, J.T. (2018). Tocqueville. Cambridge: Polity Press. Tocqueville, A. de (1987). Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848. New Brunswick: Transaction Press. Tocqueville, A. de (1998). The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Volume I: The Complete Text. London: Chicago University Press. Tocqueville, A. de (2000). Democracy in America. London: Chicago University Press. Yarbrough, J.M. (2018). Tocqueville on the needs of the soul. Perspectives on Political Science 47(3): 123–141. Zunz, O. (2022). The Man Who Understood Democracy: The Life of Alexis de Tocqueville. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

33. Discrimination Scholars interested in issues of conflict and power contestation across and within social identity groups and between different groups and the state must consider an important concept in political society and psychology: discrimination. Discrimination can be defined as distinctions drawn in favor or against a member or members of a socially defined group by intentional or unintentional judgment or action (Krieger, 1999). It differs conceptually from prejudice in that the latter is an attitude or belief that is negative and based on conscious or subconscious generalizations about a person because of their membership in a particular group (Allport, 1954). Discrimination, then, is the manifestation of prejudice. Therefore, to “discriminate against” means to treat individuals or groups as second-class citizens, subordinate or undeserving of equality and fairness, which maintains or reinforces privileges for members of dominant groups. This means that the two essential components of attributing an action as discriminatory include the judgment that the treatment was unjust, unfair, or underserved and the judgment that the treatment was based on one’s social identity or group membership (Major, Quinton, and McCoy, 2002). Discrimination is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon that can also be carried out systematically or informally in a multitude of ways ranging from overt, blatant, or direct to covert, subtle, or indirect methods (Jones, 1997). Individuals can perceive group or/and individual-level discrimination once or multiple times (chronic) throughout their childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. Perception of group discrimination is the belief that one’s group has been subjected to devaluation. A person does not necessarily have to be exposed to individual-level experiences of stigmatization to perceive that her group is discriminated against. For instance, a person can become cognizant of police discrimination toward her group by viewing news coverage of an event without having personally been singled out by the police based on her group membership. In terms of measurement, one distinguishing factor between individual and group discrimination is to inquire whether respondents have personally been treated negatively in a certain context based

on their group membership (e.g., ethnicity) or whether they believe their group has been treated unfairly (Schildkraut, 2005; Lajevardi et al., 2020). Variation in the severity and the source of discrimination also exists. Experiences can range from being treated with less courtesy or respect in public or private places to being verbally or physically threatened or assaulted. In the context of racial discrimination, verbal antagonism encompasses racial slurs or disparaging racial comments, which contrasts with nonverbal or more covert hostility that is disseminated in posture or tone of voice. The daily verbal or nonverbal slights or indignities toward racial or ethnic minorities are often referred to as microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007). Studies have shown that both verbal and nonverbal actions function as reliable indicators of discriminatory effect because they create a hostile environment for the targeted or excluded individuals (Blank, Dabady, and Citro, 2004). However, some acts of discrimination may go unnoticed altogether because discrimination is often ambiguous and difficult to detect. For instance, one may be denied a mortgage, an apartment, a business permit, or admission to a club or be given a lower salary without realizing that the basis for such actions is related to factors associated with one’s group membership such as race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. In terms of source, discrimination can be perpetrated by a diverse array of actors, with different levels of severity. Individuals such as one’s neighbors, colleagues, community members, or classmates can be culprits of mistreatment and devaluation as much as non-state institutions (e.g., religious or private organizations) and the state and its institutions (e.g., lawmaking and law enforcement bodies). Oskooii (2016, 2020) has proposed two conceptually distinct sources of discrimination to which individuals may attribute negative outcomes: political and societal discrimination. Political discrimination refers to actions taken by state or private institutions/organizations and their affiliated actors intended to delegitimize or marginalize a group of people. These actions can take the form of policies, laws, rules, or political frames that attempt to interpret, represent, or explain group dynamics and reorganize or redistribute various resources along socio‑cultural markers, characteristics, or lines. As such,

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132  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology political discrimination is often formal, systematic, organized, and far-reaching in nature. Examples include the systematical denial of citizenship, civil rights and liberties, and socioeconomic and legal resources to minority groups in the United States (Smith, 1993). While individuals can attribute discrimination to government actors, political elites, or public figures, they can also recognize acts of stigmatization perpetuated by rank-and-file members of the society. Societal discrimination, therefore, is regarded as various actions taken by individuals not affiliated with the state or its institutions in more routine encounters such as on the street, in shops, at social gatherings, or in other public and private spaces where individuals interact with one another. Responses to and consequences of discrimination can also take different forms. Perceptions of discrimination may trigger actions such as resistance or confrontation, minimization, or the internalization of negative experiences. Resistance is considered a protective response to discrimination and ranges from directly challenging or confronting discriminatory outcomes to enhancing one’s group status by creating environments that nurture self-affirmation. Political science research has found that heightened awareness of political discrimination may motivate individuals from various racial and ethnic backgrounds to take part in civic and political life for expressive (having one’s voice be heard) or substantive (changing laws) purposes (Barreto and Woods, 2005; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001). In contrast to acts of resistance, victims of discrimination may internalize experiences of devaluation and display low levels of self-esteem, particularly if they lack sufficient group pride (Harris‐Britt et al., 2007). The link between perceptions of discrimination and adverse mental health outcomes such as feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, sadness, and depression is well established (Williams and Mohammed, 2009). Under such circumstances, individuals may come to believe that confrontation will not yield desired or beneficial outcomes; confrontation could even be viewed as worsening one’s situation and creating further marginalization. However, by refraining from directly addressing the problem of discrimination some individuals may cope with their negative experiences by engaging in behaviors that Kassra A.R. Oskooii

could be even more detrimental to their overall well-being, such as dealing with the pain of rejection by resorting to substance abuse (Gibbons et al., 2004). Finally, another response to discrimination is known as denial, avoidance, or minimization. Stigmatization may provoke such psychological distress that individuals may deny the extent to which they have experienced discrimination, particularly if the social costs of acknowledging discrimination are high (Carvallo and Pelham, 2006). This act of denying or underestimating discrimination has been observed even in settings in which subjects were objectively discriminated against because of their group affiliation (Crosby, 1984). Kassra A.R. Oskooii

References Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Addison-Wesley. Barreto, M. A., & Woods, N. D. (2005). Latino voting behavior in an anti-Latino political context: The case of Los Angeles County. In G. Segura & S. Bowler (Eds.), Diversity in democracy: Minority representation in the United States (pp. 148–169). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Blank, R. M., Dabady, M., & Citro, C. F. (2004). Measuring Racial Discrimination. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. http://elibrary​.pcu​.edu​.ph​:9000​/digi​/ NA02​/2004​/10887​.pdf. Carvallo, M., & Pelham, B. W. (2006). When fiends become friends: The need to belong and perceptions of personal and group discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(1), 94. Crosby, F. (1984). The denial of personal discrimination. American Behavioral Scientist, 27(3), 371–386. Gibbons, F. X., Gerrard, M., Cleveland, M. J., Wills, T. A., & Brody, G. (2004). Perceived discrimination and substance use in African American parents and their children: A panel study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(4), 517. Harris‐Britt, A., Valrie, C. R., Kurtz‐Costes, B., & Rowley, S. J. (2007). Perceived racial discrimination and self‐esteem in African American youth: Racial socialization as a protective factor. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 17(4), 669–682.

discrimination  133 Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and Racism. McGraw-Hill Humanities, Social Sciences & World Languages. Krieger, N. (1999). Embodying inequality: A review of concepts, measures, and methods for studying health consequences of discrimination. International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation, 29(2), 295–352. Lajevardi, N., Oskooii, K. A., Walker, H. L., & Westfall, A. L. (2020). The paradox between integration and perceived discrimination among American Muslims. Political Psychology, 41(3), 587–606. Major, B., Quinton, W. J., & McCoy, S. K. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of attributions to discrimination: Theoretical and empirical advances. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 251–330). Academic Press. Oskooii, K. A. (2016). How discrimination impacts sociopolitical behavior: A multidimensional perspective. Political Psychology, 37(5), 613–640. Oskooii, K. A. (2020). Perceived discrimination and political behavior.

British Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 867–892. Pantoja, A. D., Ramirez, R., & Segura, G. M. (2001). Citizens by choice, voters by necessity: Patterns in political mobilization by naturalized Latinos. Political Research Quarterly, 54(4), 729–750. Schildkraut, D. J. (2005). The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: The role of identity and perceptions of discrimination. Political Behavior, 27(3), 285–312. Smith, R. M. (1993). Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The multiple traditions in America. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 549–566. Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A., Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. American Psychologist, 62(4), 271. Williams, D. R., & Mohammed, S. A. (2009). Discrimination and racial disparities in health: Evidence and needed research. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 32(1), 20–47.

Kassra A.R. Oskooii

34. Durkheim, Emile To understand Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), his political sociology and his general sociology (Sembel, 2017), we will examine his biography and 6 key aspects related to his scholarly and professional trajectory towards psychology and medicine and away from philosophy (Kantianism and positivism) and scientizing mysticism. His biography and work are inseparably linked, but how (Lacroix, 1974)? We will examine 6 consequences of Durkheim’s life for his work. The institutionalization of his work (in university textbooks and popular works, but also in colloquia and commentaries), and the accumulation it produced, fed a doxa that obscured his thinking, built around hidden, forgotten or misinterpreted texts and ideas. It seems necessary to us to approach Durkheim from a counterintuitive angle, with this 12 crucial and more or less well-known social facts, considered as clues (Ginzburg, 1990). They draw another image of the author and his work, in line with the renewal of his approach to politics and his political action based on political sociology (Lacroix, 1981), considered as general sociology. Durkheim both succeeded and failed in his school, university and professional trajectory. The title of professor at the Sorbonne was the most prestigious obtained by Durkheim in 1902. But he had failed to obtain it in 1893. And the list of his other university failures is long, known, but rarely used as an important criterion. He took four years and three registrations at Louis-le-Grand high school to enter the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS), he was seventh and penultimate in the aggregation competition, and he received two failures at the Collège de France; in the summer of 1871, he obtained a scholar prize only for it to be immediately withdrawn to finance the military cause of the war against Germany. His criticisms of moralism, erethism, emulation and formalism, put end to end, pushed to their consequences, and placed him on the level of Bourdieu, reputed to be the most radical possible. As Bourdieu has shown with his analysis of the “ultrarational madness of the concentration camps” (Bourdieu, 1987), this criticism has of course a political dimension and feeds political action in school and in society.

Durkheim could have become a psychologist (Sembel, 2022b). He experienced the best possible beginnings: a very early familiarization with medicine afterwards developed in Bordeaux, an extremely powerful analogy with physiology (cf. next point & Sembel, 2022b), a very strong familiarization with psychology, and a scientific and intellectual insertion into the most dynamic networks of his time. There is no distance between him, “his” sociology and scientific psychology, which is closer to early psychoanalysis than to today’s experimental psychology. And it is because Durkheim could have become a psychologist against classical, metaphysical philosophy that he became a sociologist. Durkheim could have become a doctor (Sembel, 2022b). Most likely, Durkheim, like Mauss, never wanted to become a doctor. But the medical culture assimilated him on this occasion, and he forged a lasting relationship with the most innovative medical science of his time, that of Claude Bernard, Charcot, Brown-Séquard, Broussais, Dumontpallier, Azam, Pitres and Gley and directly related to physiological science, from Milne-Edwards. It is thanks to medicine that Durkheim turned to psychology, in a double intellectual break with philosophy, in the name of science. If scientific psychology is an indispensable complement to sociology, the physiological analogy of medical inspiration runs through all of Durkheim’s work. Experimental medicine (Bernard, 1865) underlies the elementary political fact, the passage from the horde to the clan (Durkheim, 1893, 1899). Durkheim “sociologized” Kantianism to the point that it could not be classified as Kantian, any more than Kant could be classified as pre-Durkheimian or a precursor to sociology. No Kantian has ever recognized him as one of their own. Durkheim retains only a few pre-scientific intuitions from Kant. It is the relationship, considered as marginal and mystical, of Kant with Swedenborg (particularly spotted by Paul Janet) which could paradoxically bring Kantianism closer to certain scientific attempts of Durkheim. And Durkheim’s entire relationship to philosophy can be questioned. His defence of the scientific imagination in one of his aggregation dissertations probably cost him dearly. He cited fewer and fewer philosophers in his work (Paoletti, 2012). He is resolutely on the side of the radical critics of the philosophy of his time, both with Ribot’s review, with Wundt, in

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durkheim, emile  135 his report to Renouvier, and in his regular contests with the French Society of Philosophy. Durkheim is against philosophy because it is systematically cut off from social practices, which inspires abstract political analysis also systematically cut off from practices, like that of E. Boutmy and the review Annales de science politique in France. Durkheim is neither Comtian nor positivist. In any work, there are representative quotations (and quotations which are less so, or not at all). Not all written sentences are created equal. They are caught in an emergent structure of a work in constitution and must be systematically recontextualized. For example, the sentences of Durkheim against Comte (and Spencer) in the Règles de la méthode sociologique are definitive. Durkheim gave birth to modern sociology as we know it and which remained abstract in Comte (or Spencer). With him, experimentation takes place in a methodological pluralism itself subject to the sociological imagination, and his scientism takes place in an evolutionism itself subject to the social dynamics of living things. As we have shown (Sembel, 2019,  271–272, footnote 29), Durkheim has the same approach, empirical but not positivist, to politics and to social practices as that of W. Robertson Smith (1885, 1889), which he discovered early in his career (in 1886). Durkheim (like Mauss) has a scientific relationship to mysticism. Two notes on them written by their biographer M. Fournier in a Dictionary of Psychology and Psychopathology of Religions are justified by two sentences taken from their otherwise classic notes. Durkheim developed a “Durkheimian program for the critical study of the social unconscious as the objectification of irrationalism” (Fournier, 2013, 681). And concerning Mauss: “Mental confusion, inhibition, delirium, hallucination, so many phenomena which . . . greatly interest [Mauss], but which, unlike psychologists, he does not consider as pathological manifestations” (Ibid., 1018). Religion is for Durkheim as much an important dimension of his habitus as a central object of study for his sociological approach, a decisive explanatory element of the social, a driving force for his scientific imagination. Durkheim published a lot but read even more, hence the idea of his “hidden work”. All scientific or intellectual work is above all a hidden work (including in part for the one who performs it) of unquoted readings; this hidden work revisits the hierarchy of texts

(Sembel, 2022a). Durkheim worked on everything simultaneously, all his themes, his research, his courses, his publications. The first ten texts published and known before the theses are an entry as formidable as little used to apprehend his work. They translate the working habits of their author. But these texts are only an outpost of a considerable work of “cursive” readings started in two Terminale classes. Durkheim read everything, all the time, books, theses, reviews, French and foreign. Durkheim’s most important theoretical text is hidden, the least known and never quoted. This text is entitled “Ce que devrait être la sociologie générale [What general sociology should be]”; it was published in an Italian journal in 1899 following a communication by Durkheim in a symposium, but wasn’t republished until the centenary of L’Année sociologique in 1998, presented by M. Borlandi. Durkheim resituates his fundamental hypothesis (Durkheim, 1893) there, that of the “horde des consanguins [horde of consanguineous]” of which he recalls the page, which he links to the first results found (on the sociology of religious life, Durkheim, 1899), and announces the publication of Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912), without giving the title or dating the future publication. It defines general sociology as the search for the elementary social fact. This strategic definition, forgotten and never cited either by Durkheim or later, therefore remained unknown for nearly a century. It allows us to revisit all of his work. The texts of Durkheim that are usually considered secondary are the central ones. Any published work is placed in a hierarchy over time. Durkheim’s work is no exception to the rule, which relegates texts deemed secondary or negligible to the background. Yet they are decisive in understanding the work and the work that produced it. Reading the first ten texts of Durkheim, which are apparently heterogeneous, together proves the coherence of his work, his thought and his work to come. The speech to the “lycéens” (high school students) of Sens in 1883 anchors its pedagogy in a sociology of education itself linked to a general sociology; the reviews around religion announce a sociology of religious life also linked to a general sociology; Schaeffle’s 1885 review poses the physiological analogy that structures the work; Hommay’s obituary of 1887 summarizes in Nicolas Sembel

136  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology a quoted letter the general sociology to come which is the product of an intellectual and scientific era; the suppressed introduction of the 1893 thesis breaks with non-scientific, that is to say non-historicized philosophy (as the 1912 preface to Hamelin’s work on Descartes will reaffirm); the extraordinary diversity of the hundreds of reviews published in L’Année sociologique structures by its “material order of knowledge” (Waquet, 2015) a general sociology integrating all possible objects; all the texts co-signed with Mauss are as much forgotten as the one on “De quelques formes primitives de classification” (1903) is quoted, while they prove the inseparable link between their two authors. The most important methodological remark (reported by Mauss) about Durkheim is almost unknown and never cited. A general methodology is granted to general sociology, but it is only formulated unequivocally in 1927 by Mauss in the footnote of a short text only found and published by M. Fournier in 1997: “For Durkheim, there was never a ‘sociological method’ and other methods that it could oppose. This word simply signifies the general method of the experimental sciences as applied in sociology” (Mauss, 1927). To conclude, we have tried to show that Durkheim’s political sociology is anchored in his life and in social practices, which respectively build all his political commitment and the life of earlier political institutions, analysable in the same terms, for example with the hypothesis of the “horde of consanguineous” as an elementary political fact (see above). His political sociology is, like his educational sociology and his religious sociology, a sociology of knowledge, characterized by a dynamic “relational thinking”, opening towards a general sociology. Nicolas Sembel

References Bernard, C. (1865). Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale, Paris, Baillière. Bourdieu, P. (1987). “L’assassinat de Maurice Halbwachs”, La liberté de l’esprit, 16, 161–168. Durkheim, E. (1883/1975). “Discours aux lycéens de Sens sur le rôle des grands hommes dans l’histoire”, Textes, 1, Paris, Minuit, 409–417. Nicolas Sembel

Durkheim, E. (1885/1975). “Organisation et vie du corps social selon Schaeffle”, Textes, 1, Paris, Minuit, 355–377. Durkheim, E. (1887/1975). “Nécrologie de Victor Hommay”, Textes, 1, Paris, Minuit, 418–424. Durkheim, E. (1893/1985). De la division du travail social, Paris, PUF. Durkheim, E. (1899/1998). “Ce que devrait être la sociologie générale” (introduction by Massimo Borlandi), L’Année sociologique, 48, 67–75. Durkheim, E. (1912/1985). Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, PUF. Durkheim, E., and Mauss, M. (1903/1969). “De quelques formes primitives de classification”, in Marcel Mauss, Œuvres, 2, Paris, Minuit, 13–89. Fournier, M. (2013). Notices “Durkheim” and “Mauss”, in F. Rausky and S. Gumpper (eds.), Dictionnaire de psychologie et de psychopathologie des religions, Paris, Bayard (reviewed by N. Sembel, p. 117– 126, Durkheimian studies, 2014, 20). Ginzburg, C. (1990). Myths, emblems, clues, London, Hutchinson Radius. Lacroix, B. (1974). Compte-rendu de S. Lukes, Emile Durkheim. His life and work. A historical and critical study, London, Penguin, 1973, Revue française de sociologie, 15, 422–427. Lacroix, B. (1981). Durkheim et le politique, Paris, PUF. Mauss, M. (1927/1997). “Comme si…” (introduction by Marcel Fournier), Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 116–117, 105–106. Mauss, M. (1931/2012). “Leçon d’ouverture”, in J.-F. Bert (ed.), L’atelier de Mauss, Paris, CNRS editions, 249–264 . Paoletti, G. (2012). Durkheim et la philosophie, Paris, Classiques Garnier. Sembel, N. (2017). “Extension de l’intelligence et sortie de soi: la figure durkheimienne et maussienne de l’engagement”, in J.-P. Higelé et L. Jacquot (eds.), Engagements et sciences sociales, 149–166, Nancy, PUN. Sembel, N. (2019). “Religion, éducation connaissance. La méthode de Durkheim vers la sociologie générale”, in M. Béra, N. Sembel (eds.), Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, cent ans après. Emile Durkheim et la religion, 235–292, Paris, Classiques Garnier. Sembel, N. (2022a). “‘Hidden’ Durkheim & ‘Hidden’ Mauss. An empirical rereading

durkheim, emile  137 of the hidden analogical work made necessary by the creation of a new science”, in Johannes Schick, Mario Schmidt and Martin Zillinger (eds.), The social origins of thought: Durkheim, Mauss and the category project, 44–56, New York/ Oxford, Berghahn. Sembel, N. (2022b). “Durkheim et Mauss au travail: sociogenèse et généralisation de leur analogie physiologique (1873–2017)”,

Sociologos, 16, https://doi​.org​/10​.4000​/ socio​-logos​.5478 Smith, W. R. (1885). Kinship and marriage in earlier Arabia, London, Black. Smith W. R. (1889). Lectures on the religion of the Semites, London, Black. Waquet F. (2015). L’ordre materiel du savoir. Comment les savants travaillent (XVIXXIe siècles), Paris, CNRS.

Nicolas Sembel

35. Economic voting Economic voting is one of the most studied subjects in the field of political sociology, with Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) reporting over 500 published papers on the topic. Economic voting theory suggests that when the economy is doing well, citizens are more likely to vote for incumbent governing parties, and when the economy is in decline, so is the support for incumbent governments (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). This theory, also known as the reward-punishment hypothesis, is crucial for functioning democracy, as it represents the easiest link between a rational electorate and accountable politicians. Anderson (2007), for example, argues that the economy requires very little knowledge for citizens to be able to detect the performance of the incumbent governments, allowing citizens an easy way to keep governing parties accountable for their performance during elections. This link between the economy and elections makes economic voting a central tool of democratic accountability. When the economy grows, it is expected that the incumbent governing party/coalition will be rewarded in elections with increased voter support. Conversely, when the economy is in decline, it is expected that the incumbent governing party/coalition will be punished by voters, resulting in fewer votes in the election. Tufte (1978) uses elections and economy interchangeably: When you think economics, think elections; When you think elections, think economic (Tufte 1978: 65). However, the reward-punishment hypothesis is not only found in academic studies, but it also has direct implications for realworld politics. Most prominent is the 1992 US presidential election campaign, where Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist James Carville coined the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!” – bringing economic voting to the general audience. The simplicity and effectiveness of economic voting theory in explaining electoral competitions, and with that broader political dynamics, places this theory in a very central place of study of political sociology. The academic origin of economic voting theory can be traced back to the late 1950s/ early 1960s when the first books using quantitative research in political science emerged (Downs 1957; Campbell et al. 1960; Key

1966). This period, labeled the first wave of economic voting (Nannestad and Paldam 1994), introduced the responsibility hypothesis, that is, voters see governments as responsible for the economy. It was also found that the responsibility hypothesis was asymmetric (Mueller 1970), that is, voters tend to punish incumbents for bad performance more than they reward them for good (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). Both aggregate-level data (Karmer 1971; Tufte 1978) and individuallevel surveys (Key 1966) contributed to putting economic voting at the forefront of electoral research. V.O. Key (1966) was among the first to use survey questionnaires that directly tapped into the vote choice and perceptions about the overall economic performance, as well as the personal financial situations of the respondents. Later research by Fiorina (1981) and Kiewiet (1983) labeled this as sociotropic and egotropic voting (also known as pocketbook voting). Sociotropic voting is the voter’s judgment of national collective economic conditions at the ballot box (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), while egotropic, or pocketbook voting, concerns the personal financial evaluation of the respondent when deciding for whom to vote (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The literature on economic voting consistently finds that sociotropic evaluations of the economy have a stronger impact on vote choice than is the case with egotropic evaluations (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). Another important feature, at the individual level, emerged during the late first and second waves of the economic voting literature and concerns timing. Fiorina (1981) coined the term retrospective voting, when voters evaluate the past performance of incumbent governments. In contrast to retrospective voting, those who vote based on future expectations about economic conditions are labeled prospective voters (or forward-looking voters). Notably, prospective voting is about future expectations and lacks the notion of accountability, as governments cannot be held accountable for future expected performances. This makes retrospective voting crucial for the reward-punishment hypothesis, as it allows retrospective judgments to be correctors of policy outcomes. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier’s (2013) overview of the economic voting literature finds retrospective voting to be a stronger predictor of vote choice as compared to prospective voting.

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economic voting  139 The third wave of the economic voting literature saw the focus on widening the scope of countries studied in economic voting by introducing comparative analysis. This comparative approach was first introduced by Lewis-Beck (1988), who found that economic voting was not limited to the US but that evidence of retrospective and prospective sociotropic economic voting existed across France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the UK. This comparative approach to economic voting became predominant in the literature in the decades that followed (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Two major criticisms of economic voting have emerged over the past few decades. The first concerned the inconsistent effect sizes of economic voting across samples, primarily among aggregate-level studies, resulting in the instability dilemma (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). The instability dilemma was a product of many studies reporting varying or no effects of economic voting when using different samples of countries across time. This instability in findings questioned the very core of the reward-punishment hypothesis, as democratic accountability was seen as an exception rather than the rule (Anderson 2007: 276). These inconsistencies across samples provoked research on the so-called conditional model of economic voting, where inconsistencies of economic voting were found to be due to institutional restrictions (Powell and Whitten 1993). The second criticism concerned individual-level studies of economic voting, where perceptions of economic performance were argued to be distorted by partisanship affiliation, leading to the absence of an independent effect of economic perceptions on vote choice (Van der Brug, Van der Eijk and Franklin 2007). These studies indicated that those who supported opposition parties were more likely to see economic improvements with skepticism, and those who were in support of governing parties were more likely to be forgiving of economic downturns. Therefore, the endogenous relation between economic perceptions and partisanship could lead to a reverse causal arrow, where economic perceptions become a consequence of the support for incumbent parties rather than the effect (Evans and Pickup 2010). That is, voters see the economy through a partisanship lens (Bartels 2002). However, the endogenous relation of economic perceptions and partisanship has also been met with criticism, as

an increasing number of studies have shown independent effects of economic perceptions on vote choice, even when partisans are considered within the models (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias 2008; De Vries, Hobolt and Tilley 2018; Okolikj and Hooghe 2022). The most dominant conditional model in the economic voting literature, addressing the instability dilemma, was first introduced by Powell and Whitten (1993) as the clarity of responsibility hypothesis. The clarity of responsibility hypothesis suggested that economic voting was conditioned by institutional characteristics. For example, in countries where voters can easily attribute responsibility for economic performance, it is expected that there will be a high level of economic voting, while in countries where the distribution of responsibility for economic policies is blurred among different parties or institutions (such as in systems with bicameral opposition, a governing coalition, or minority governments), there will be restrictions to the economic voting model, resulting in limited or no economic voting (Powell and Whitten 1993). Since voters have difficulties in assigning responsibility for economic performance in countries with a low level of clarity of responsibility, this is reflected in the variations in the effects of economic voting across these samples. The conditional model, however, limits the notion of democratic accountability as it suggests democratic accountability functions only in systems that promote high levels of institutional clarity, which are a minority of democratic countries. This conditional model has also been met with criticism, as replication studies of the Powell and Whitten (1993) model find that institutional restrictions are not necessary for economic voting to exist (Royed, Leyden and Borrelli 2000; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2017). Over the last decade, the economic voting literature has turned to the concept of multidimensionality. Multidimensional economic voting suggests that there are three dimensions of the economic vote, that is, valence, positional economics, and patrimony, forming the compleat economic voter (LewisBeck and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault 2013). The economy is a primary example of a valence issue, as all voters want a good economy, and no voter wants economic decline (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011:288). However, valence is limited when Martin Okolikj

140  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology it comes to other economic factors that are important to voters, such as economic positions or their economic possessions. Positional economic voting, a second dimension of the compleat economic voter, assumes that citizens vote based on selected positions on economic policies, that is, an issue-motivated vote (Quinlan and Okolikj 2020). This dimension allows voters to channel economic performance through policy implementation. For example, some voters would prefer the distribution of wealth to fight societal inequality at the expense of higher taxation while others would be inclined to liberal market regulation, without state intervention. These economic policy differences are captured by positional economic voting, which allows citizens to have a say in how economic benefits are distributed in society. The third dimension concerns personal asset ownership, that is, patrimony. Patrimonial voting expects that citizens will vote to protect the ownership of their assets, where what one owns decides the vote (Quinlan and Okolikj 2022). Those who own more assets, especially high-risk assets such as businesses, stocks, and bonds, are expected to vote for political parties likely to preserve wealth by lowering taxes, usually center-right parties. And those voters owning less risk-averse assets (i.e., house ownership or savings) where taxation on wealth is not a high concern, are expected to be more likely to vote for center-left parties. Both positional economics and patrimony tap into the ideological economic division between left and right parties, allowing for ideological divisions to be added to the compleat economic voter. The conditionality and multidimensionality of economic voting have merely scratched the surface of what future research on economic voting theory might uncover. Little is currently known about the democratic accountability channels in complex societies, where coalition governments or shared multilevel governance is a common practice. Moreover, limited research currently exists on how different dimensions of the compleat economic voter interact with each other. Yet, the central importance of this topic for democracy as an accountable system makes economic voting an ongoing topic of central importance for research in political sociology. Martin Okolikj Martin Okolikj

References Anderson, Christopher J. “The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 271–296. Bartels, Larry M. “Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions” Political Behavior 24, no. 2 (2002): 117–150. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. The American Voter Unabridged Edition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1960. Dassonneville, Ruth, and Michael S. LewisBeck. “Rules, institutions and the economic vote: Clarifying clarity of responsibility.” West European Politics 40, no. 3 (2017): 534–559. De Vries, Catherine E., Sara B. Hobolt, and James Tilley. “Facing up to the facts: What causes economic perceptions?.” Electoral Studies 51 (2018): 115–122. Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row, New York, 1957. Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson. The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. Evans, Geoffrey, and Mark Pickup. “Reversing the causal arrow: The political conditioning of economic perceptions in the 2000–2004 US presidential election cycle.” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010): 1236–1251. Fiorina, Morris P. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981. Key Jr, Valdimer Orlando. The Responsible Electorate. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966. Kiewiet, D. Roderick. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues. University of Chicago Press, 1983. Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. “Sociotropic politics: The American case.” British Journal of Political Science 11, no. 2 (1981): 129–161. Kramer, Gerald H. “Short-term fluctuations in US voting behavior, 1896–1964.” American Political Science Review 65, no. 1 (1971): 131–143.

economic voting  141 Lewis-Beck, Michael S. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1988. Lewis-Beck, Michael Steven, and Richard Nadeau. “Economic voting theory: Testing new dimensions.” Electoral Studies 30, no. 2 (2011): 288–294. Lewis‐Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau, and Angelo Elias. “Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and panel data.” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (2008): 84–95. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau, and Martial Foucault. “The compleat economic voter: New theory and British evidence.” British Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (2013): 241–261. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. “Economic determinants of electoral outcomes.” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 183–219. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. “The VP-function revisited: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years.” Public Choice 157, no. 3 (2013): 367–385. Mueller, John E. “Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson1” American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970): 18–34. Nannestad, Peter, and Martin Paldam. “The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years.” Public Choice 79, no. 3–4 (1994): 213–245.

Okolikj, Martin, and Marc Hooghe. “Is there a partisan bias in the perception of the state of the economy? A comparative investigation of European countries, 2002– 2016.” International Political Science Review 43, no. 2 (2022): 240–258. Powell Jr, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. “A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context.” American Journal of Political Science (1993): 391–414. Quinlan, Stephen, and Martin Okolikj. “Exploring the neglected dimension of the economic vote: A global analysis of the positional economics thesis.” European Political Science Review 12, no. 2 (2020): 219–237. Quinlan, Stephen, and Martin Okolikj. “Patrimonial economic voting: A crossnational analysis of asset ownership and the vote.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 32, no. 1 (2022): 193–213. Royed, Terry J., Kevin M. Leyden, and Stephen A. Borrelli. “Is ‘clarity of responsibility’ important for economic voting? Revisiting Powell and Whitten’s hypothesis.” British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 4 (2000): 669–698. Tufte, Edward R. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1978. Van der Brug, Wouter, Cees Van der Eijk, and Mark Franklin. The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.

Martin Okolikj

36. Emotions In political sociology the focal unit of analysis is the modern territorially consolidated democratic state based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). It monopolizes the means of violence, law-making, and taxation. It is ruled together by its administrators and politicians who are appointed or elected as specified by the legal framework whose basic principles are found in its constitution. These politicians are most often brought to power by political parties which prepare electoral campaigns and designate specific individuals as their candidates. These compete, usually in local, regional, and national elections, for citizenvotes. In the past 50 years, the realization that these states are contested by various social movements and, more recently, that they have come under attack by terrorist organizations has also informed the political studies of the state. As concepts, feelings and emotions are variously labeled and still widely debated. A constructivist approach (Hochschild 1979) sees culture with its vocal ideological groups, such as, for example, managers, traditionalists, or women’s movements, as the sources of norms about feelings, called the “feeling rules”. These rules specify what is to be felt in which specific situations and also with what intensity and duration. They are taught in the process of socialization which declines them by social class, gender, color, and so on. A positivist approach (Kemper 1981) defines “real emotions” as a somatic-cognitive outcome of social hierarchies—a result of status and power relations played out in social interactions by the members of different classes and social status groups. Kemper distinguishes these from the anticipated emotions and those emotions which follow interactions. Kemper concedes that cultural rules, forged by the elites, specify which “real emotions” can be displayed and which have to remain hidden. The constructivist and the positivist approaches exemplify two pioneering attempts to grasp and legitimate a sociological study of emotions in a scholarly context which still in the 1970s made room only for normative and rational approaches. Today terms such as feelings, emotions, emotionality, affect, or affectivity are often used interchangeably, buttressed by few definitions,

although an idea that affect should be reserved for sub- or unconscious bodily processes, and emotion (and often also feeling) for conscious processes, influenced by social and cultural rules, is slowly gaining ground. Next Thomas Hobbes and Norbert Elias will exemplify a broader literature concerned with state-constituting emotions. The European predecessors of the modern consolidated states were political units which were often territorially disconnected, unstable, and engaged in nearly constant internal and external conflicts, redefining their territories, populations, official religions, and international standing. Attentive to the role of emotions, Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) is an argument for and Elias’ Civilizing Process (2000, originally: 1933) is a historical study of their development toward the absolutist states. They agreed that such states tame aggression and desire while stipulating and regulating emotions. To Hobbes, all human beings are desirous and proud. Most painful they find the experience of wanting and thus feeling inferior compared to others. Superiority felt toward others, or “glorying”, generates great pleasure, as does its excess, or “vaingloring” (Minogue 1994 [1973]: xxiii). As individuals human beings vary in how envious they are and how intensely they desire more (superiority-bestowing, hence scarce) resources and more power as prerequisites of “glorying”. In the state of nature—Hobbes’ thought experiment—they engage in continuous comparisons out of a fundamental sense of insecurity and fear that they, unless they acquire even more riches and power, might risk being subjected to violence, conquered and subjugated to somebody else’s power or, worse, to hurt and violent death. Hobbes argues that they therefore should enter into a contract with each other to allow a third party—the state—to establish lawful peace. This state condones peaceful competitive envy-underwritten emulation in the pursuit of riches and power but condemns and punishes envy leading to destruction and violence (Flam 2007: 112–113). It stands for freedom from the pressure to constantly monitor others for signs of impending threat to one’s riches, power and life. It frees one from the pressure to engage in violent conflict as well as from the fear of death, offering instead peaceful means of conflict resolution. Norbert Elias’ (2000) historical account of the emergence of the modern state also

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emotions  143 takes a point of departure in the nature of man and in many warring political units. But it posits both inter- and intra-powerholder relationships as an explanation for why only some of the literally thousands of European princedoms could be turned into a few fullblown states. His Freudian point of departure is human nature with its drives and instincts: men are aggressive and lustful. But in the course of civilization processes political units emerge which modify the initial socio-economic and psychic developmental conditions. Only those rulers who had managed to play the rising bourgeoisie against the aristocracy, extract money from the first and warriors from the second, and, thus equipped, defeat and take over the resources of their enemies had a good chance of building states. The absolutist rulers of such states had managed to assert their right to monopolize taxes, soldiers, and the means of violence and thus put themselves in a position to also revolutionize human emotions. As monopolists and fashion-setters they could dictate state rules and good courtly manners as a new means of carrying out competition for the favor of the absolutist ruler and thus for more riches and power. The rulers built on but also lowered earlier shame and embarrassment thresholds. From then on, neither drives nor emotions—ranging from aggression through fear to pride—could be expressed freely. They became censored and shaped by the state rules and courtly etiquette. The peace secured by the absolutist state thus rested on its monopolies but also its rule- and etiquettedefining role. Over centuries, the civilizing thrust—the spread of aggression-taming and emotion-regulating etiquette—acquired increased importance because of the growing interdependencies of the social classes in the ever-more consolidated national societies of such pacifying states. As Elias stresses, these, however, remained vulnerable to occasional regression processes, resulting in, for example, the emergence of the National-Socialist, German totalitarian regime. A founding father of political sociology, Max Weber also posed the question of how the ruled are ruled within their states. Max Weber’s opus was for a long time treated as focused on the progressive rationalization and bureaucratization of the world. In fact, Weber remained attuned to the role of emotions. If Hobbes argued for and Elias traced the development of an absolutist state,

Weber asked how the rather modest central power of the state manages to administer considerable territories and their numerous inhabitants. His typology of relations of domination—traditional, charismatic, and bureaucratic—addresses the question of how political power is shaped and wielded within and by the state. While the emotional pillar of traditional authority (found in a monarchy, for example) is the emotion of awe, as well as a deep-rooted belief in upholding tradition and the God-sent authorization of rulers to hold power, charismatic authority (found in a mass-acclaimed authoritarian state, for example) rests on the love, awe, enthusiasm, and devotion of both the immediate followers and the masses for their leader or ruler— both dependent on his demonstrated capacity to achieve extraordinary normative changes and miraculous feats. The bureaucratic authority (as in a modern firm or state) much more than these two derives its power from the loyalty it demands and commands from its incumbents and the fear of forfeited life chances, if one would defy it. A meritocratic state bureaucracy fills most positions with experts who put at its disposal their certified knowledge. In exchange they receive social and professional recognition, also expressed in realized career chances. So equipped, relatively small administrative apparatuses rather effectively handle sizeable territories and populations. Attuned to emotions, a feminist critique of the male-dominated theorizing about the state points out that it has long been gendered. Men are portrayed as rational and capable of deliberation and decision-making. They are therefore considered suitable for taking the reins of power and running public affairs. Women, in contrast, are portrayed as emotional, incapable of making decisions, and therefore banned from the public arena to take on household duties. The state while silencing women pressures them into the role of mothers symbolizing, generating and sacrificing male soldiers for the love of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). Even state-critical Marxists ignore the male bias of the state whose jurisprudence has assumed an anti-women stand on such highly emotionalized issues as gender equality, rape, abortion, and pornography (MacKinnon 1989). As empirical research shows, law and the courts perpetuate widespread, heavily emotion-laden biases against women and minorities. Helena Flam

144  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Newest in the current research on democratic states is the focus on the “emotional states”—the role of emotions in the past and present theorizing about these states and the ways they respond to and shape, whether through political discourses or policies, the dominant emotional regime and norms prevailing in the polity (Pykett, Jupp and Smith 2016). Runciman’s (2006) book on Bush’s and Blair’s hypocritical, fear-creating discourses after 9/11, which mobilized, among other things, for war against Iraq, also fits into this research category. A democratic modern state, as defined by Weber, monopolizes the means of administration and violence and has a political system which proclaims the people to be the sovereign who, periodically, following a set of written-down rules, elects its representatives from a list of candidates usually proposed by political parties. The purported function of these representatives is to make and implement decisions for the people within this state. It is interesting to note the historical and analytical transformation of the revolutionary or rioting, irrational “masses” into the “sovereign” composed of “mass voters” for whose votes political parties compete in democracies. At the time of the French Revolution and British riots, the working classes, often defined as a lower race, were held in contempt and feared as a volatile, hostile, and violent mass. The image of the irrational masses was also invoked to explain the rise to power of such totalitarian rulers as Hitler. Subsequent studies proved that in fact many organized groups or groups coordinated by outside organizers came together to constitute what to the outsiders appeared as an irrational crowd. In democracies no longer the threatening, violent, murderous “mass” but the mass of individual “rational voters” became the main topic. Jack Barbalet (2006) underscored that the introduction of the secret ballot put an end to the solidarity of the British working classes and replaced it with the loneliness typical of each voter. The “emotional turn” explicitly countered the view that leaders and voters are rational. A pioneering argument was that emotions, rather than disturb, actually support political deliberations and thus underpin democracy. Specifically, anxiety, stimulated by threat and novelty, pulls attention toward electoral campaigns and encourages political learning, while enthusiasm further sharpens interest, involvement, and candidate preferences Helena Flam

(Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Valentino et al. (2011) initially elaborated on this thesis but later singled out anger as the more decisive voter-mobilizing emotion. Such studies lean on (neuro-)psychological approaches and hence speak of emotionality or affect, pinpointing also fear as an important factor in politics (Redlawsk 2006). Another pioneering author originally focused on the role of ressentiment among political elites but later considered such emotions as gratitude or sorrow and the role they play in politics broadly understood (Demertzis 2020). For a long time, an assumption prevailed that only evil charismatic leaders relied on emotionalized rhetoric (demagoguery), violence, and force to gain political power. A Western politician was defined by his rationality, his rational arguments, and his suggestive power. David Ost (2004) in contrast proposed that it is not just the mass of voters that is occasionally swayed by emotions but also regular politicians. More importantly, they instrumentalize emotions in pursuit of electoral victories and particular policy goals. This position dovetails with the research on the emotional state and the emotional regimes it tries to institute. Given the relatively recent rise of many populist and neo-Nazi political leaders employing intensely emotional rhetoric to gain support, numerous scholars have attempted to explain their appeal to the masses of voters, pinpointing emotions that come into play. Both discourse and attitudinal analyses reveal the pairing of (ultra-)nationalism, sexism, and emotions, in particular anger about immigration as well as about the progress of women and minority rights, as factors mobilizing populist leaders, their parties, and their voters (Wodak 2020; Graff and Korolczuk 2021; Valentino et al. 2018). Political sociology also pays attention to authoritarian and totalitarian states. To explain the origin of German totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt (1991) distinguished between the amoral, anarchic, murderous, frustrated, aggressive, hateful, and leader-craving (French and German) mob and the situated emotions of the German masses longing for security and welfare, yet facing post-WWI humiliation and frustration, anger, and hate as well as bitterness and despair at being neglected by the political class. The masses longed for a millennial task and leader. The alliance of the mob with the masses brought,

emotions  145 in Arendt’s view, totalitarian rulers and their repressive system to power (Arendt 1991). The orchestrated, top-down transfer of family, regional, and religious emotions to fascist nationalism played an important role in Italy (Berezin 2002). The post-WWII classics such as Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965) and Feher and Heller (1987) diagnosed fear of long‑term imprisonment and death as the emotion keeping the masses obedient in totalitarian systems. In their final decades, it was instead the fear for one’s life chances and other situational emotions which buttressed the authoritarian Central European regimes (Flam 1998). The role of fear as well as of held-back and exploding anger in the upholding and then overthrowing of repressive totalitarian regimes (the USSR, Poland, China) has also received due attention (Scott 1990; Flam 2004; Yang 2000). Forthcoming research explores system-bound rule regimes and emotions associated with authoritarian, totalitarian and democratic states (Verbalyte and Ulinskaitė 2024). Government political discourses and government policies have both been an object of contention by social movements. Since the mid-1970s a US school of thought, focused on social movements and leaning on industrial and organizational sociology, posited movement entrepreneurs as rational decisionmakers. Further approaches to social movements followed. From 1990 on theorists of social movements were confronted by their younger critics who pinpointed their indifference to emotions (Flam 1990; Goodwin, Jasper, Polletta 2001; Flam and King 2005; Jasper 2006). Emotions and social movements are now a thriving research area with many handbooks. A glimpse of how political sociology deals with emotions would be incomplete without taking a brief look at how it approaches the issue of the state in relation to refugees and terrorists. A recently edited volume traces the mobilization of citizens showing solidarity with mobilized refugees in various states along and beyond the Western Balkan Route, investigating their cooperation attempts (della Porta 2018). Developing a very sophisticated research framework, another study highlights the relationship between states, terrorists, and the public, drawing attention to how their emotion-provoking actions and emotionalizing discourses mutually condition each other (Barbalet 2006; see also Smith 2015).

From the perspective of emotions, political sociology teaches that fear, envy, pride, and the quest for happiness belong to the stateconstituting emotions and that a modern state fosters generalized affect-control, banning aggression and violence while favoring statesustaining rule-bound emotions. The political and administrative rule of the modern democratic state is buttressed by fear and loyalty, supplemented by other emotions. In totalitarian states controls and sanctions, and, therefore, fear play a much greater role. In general broad societal developments, including the transformations of the state itself, shape (inter) personal emotions. Not just a democratic “emotional state” but also an authoritarian or totalitarian state does its utmost via its discourses and policies to shape top-down the emotional regimes in which it wishes its inhabitants to become immersed. Similarly, in democracies, politicians employ a variety of emotions to gain voters, while voters are moved by anxiety, worry, anger, and other emotions to vote. Apart from voting, state inhabitants engage in politics in other ways. Bottom-up, “hidden” personal emotions when articulated and mobilized in protest become political (see feminist and social movement research). Movements do their best to put them on the national agenda and move states to include them in the emotional regimes they promote. Their range is endless and calls for a situational issue analysis, but shame, fear, contempt, hatred, hope, anger, and solidarity are most often discussed. Helena Flam

References Arendt, Hannah. 1991 [1955 German, 1951 English]. Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft. München: Piper Barbalet, Jack. 2006. “Emotions in Politics”. In: Emotion, Politics and Society. Edited by Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 31–55 Berezin, Mabel. 2002. “Secure States”. In: Emotions and Sociology. Edited by Jack M. Barbalet. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 33–52 Della Porta, Donatella. (Ed.). 2018. Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’. London: Palgrave MacMillan Demertzis, Nicolas. 2020. The Political Sociology of Emotions. London: Routledge Elias, Norbert. 2000. The Civilizing Process. 2nd edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Helena Flam

146  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Feher, Ferenc and Agnes Heller. 1987. Eastern Left, Western Left: Totalitarianism, Freedom and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press Flam, Helena. 1990. “Emotional ‘Man’” International Sociology 5(1): 39–56 Flam, Helena. 1998. Mosaic of Fear. East European Monographs. NYC: Columbia University Press Flam, Helena. 2004. “Anger in Repressive Regimes” European Journal of Social Theory 7(2): 171–188 Flam, Helena. 2007. “Misgunst als Lebenshaltung: Neid”. In: Die Sieben Todsünden. Edited by Alfred Bellebaum and Detlef Herbers. Münster: Aschendorf Verlag, pp. 105–134 Flam, Helena and Debra King. (Eds.) 2005. Emotions and Social Movements. London: Routledge Friedrich, Carl Joachim and Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski. 1965. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Please note: each book cover says Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski) Goodwin, Jeff, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta. (Eds.). 2001. Passionate Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press Graff, Agnieszka and Elzbieta Korolczuk. 2021. Anti-gender Politics in the Populist Moment. London: Routledge Hobbes, Thomas. 1994 [1973]. Leviathan. Everyman. London: J. M. Dent and Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle. Hochschild, Arlie. 1979. “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structures” American Journal of Sociology 85(3): 551–575 Jasper, James. 2006. “Emotions and the Microfoundations of Politics”. In: Emotion, Politics and Society. Edited by Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14–30 Kemper, Theodore D. 1981. “Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to the Sociology of Emotions” American Journal of Sociology 87(2): 336–362 MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Marcus, George E. and Michael B. MacKuen. 1993. “Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning Helena Flam

and Involvement during Presidential Campaigns” American Political Science Review 87(3): 672–685 Minogue, Kenneth. 1994 [1973]. “Introduction” to Thomas Hobbes Leviathan. Everyman. London: J.M. Dent and Vermont: Charles. E. Tuttle, pp. xiii–xxxiv Ost, David. 2004. “Politics as the Mobilization of Anger” European Journal of Social Theory 7(2): 229–244 Pykett, J., E. Jupp and F.M. Smith (Eds.) 2016. Emotional States. London: Routledge Redlawsk, David P. (Ed.) 2006. Feeling Politics. London: Palgrave MacMillan Runciman, David. 2006. The Politics of Good Intentions. Princeton: Princeton University Press Scott, James. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press Smith, Debra. 2015. “Symbiotic Othering: Terrorism, Emotion and Morality”. In: Punishing the Other: The Social Production of Immorality Revisited. Edited by Anna Eriksson. London: Routledge, pp. 247–269 Valentino Nicholas, A., Carly Wayne and Marzia Oceno. 2018. “Mobilizing Sexism: The Interaction of Emotion and Gender Attitudes in the 2016 US Presidential Election” Public Opinion Quarterly 82(21): 799–821 https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ poq​/nfy003 Valentino Nicholas, A., Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz and Vincent L. Hutchings. 2011. “Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation” The Journal of Politics 73(1): 156–170 Verbalyte, Monika and Jogilė Ulinskaitė. 2024. “Emotions and Political Regimes”. In: Research Handbook on the Sociology of Emotion. Edited by Helena Flam. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing (with the press) Wodak, Ruth. 2020. The Politics of Fear: The Shameless Normalization of Far-Right Discourse. 2nd edition. London: Sage Yang, Guobin. 2000. “Achieving Emotions in Collective Action: Emotional Processes and Movement Mobilization in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement” The Sociological Quarterly 41(4): 593–614 Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender & Nation. London: Sage

37. Empowerment

conceptions of empowerment build. To work together in groups, for example, individuals must learn practices for doing so. There is a neoliberal character (Harvey, Empowerment joins the Latin root “-em” 2007) to many visions of individual empowwhich means “put in or into, bring to a certain erment, however. Implicit is the conviction state” and “power,” “the ability or capacity to that people must succeed or fail in relative do something.” In a very general sense, then, isolation, dependent upon their own skills and empowerment involves giving people new resources to compete on the capitalist battlecapacities to do something they could not ground, escape dangerous relationships, or maintain their own health, even though social have done before. While “empower” has existed since the forces beyond any person’s control have a sixteenth century, “empowerment” became huge impact on individual outcomes. Ultimately, there are deep limits to the important in the early 1970s in response to the social movements of the time and writings on power generated by individual transformation critical pedagogy like Paulo Freire’s (1970). and action. As Horton and Freire (1990) noted, Early uses generally included references to most individualist empowerment efforts seek social action and conflict (Calvès, 2009). As to fit people into the existing structure of the the use of the term grew in the 1980s, how- status quo. Broader social change is not on ever, more radical understandings fell away. the menu of options. Further, in our highly Writers increasingly discussed how indi- unequal society, individual “empowerment” viduals and not groups were enabled. When is frequently a lie. For example, we tell lowgroups were addressed, the focus was increas- income minoritized students of color to learn ingly on cooperation and collaboration, not in school so that they can succeed when we know that very few will be able to alter their conflict and solidarity (Schutz, 2019). The different meanings of the sub-term social and class positions. Individual success may allow a tiny pro“power” are crucial for understanding the work the term is doing in different texts. portion of individuals to achieve wealth or Writings on power represent an entire litera- positions of power in institutions, providing ture itself, with Lukes (2004) and Gaventa some capacity to make larger changes. But, (2019) two of the most important scholars, as Gee (2007) noted, successful people are building on the work of writers like Marx, almost always those who learn to buy into Weber, and Foucault. In the interests of brev- the logics of the institutions and cultures they ity, this entry is grounded in a relatively sim- advance within. As a result, those who reach ple continuum of different kinds of power in the top tend not to be the ones who support empowerment, focused on (1) individuals, (2) significant change. And the status quo is quite collaborative groups, and (3) collective action robust. What a single person can do to foster groups seeking power through conflict. More change is generally quite limited. When group empowerment is referenced, nuanced analyses are available in Christens today, this is generally framed on the model (2019) and Schutz (2019). Individual empowerment has increasingly of collaboration where participants work become dominant. Most human service fields, supportively together to accomplish common for example, focus on empowering individu- goals. The preeminent theorist of progressive als framed as clients (social work/psychol- democracy in the first half of the twentieth ogy), students (education), residents (public century, Dewey (1916) provided perhaps the health), job seekers (workforce development), most sophisticated vision of collaboration. and the like. Individual future workers, for While there are many different forms of colexample, are empowered to enter the IT field laboration, they generally stress the value of by learning how to code. A drug treatment the myriad perspectives in a group, leaning program empowers participants by helping toward forms of consensual as opposed to them reduce their dependence. A domestic hierarchical decision-making or even voting. For example, groups of parents in a school violence program empowers clients to exit can collaborate on an “action research” proharmful relationships. Efforts to provide resources and capaci- ject to understand better why their children ties to individuals can allow many people to are not doing well in school. Neighborhood alter their life paths. Furthermore, individual residents can come together around plots development is the ground on which other of land to create and then coordinate a new 147

148  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology urban garden. Different participants may play different roles, but the overall commitment is to dialogue and joint action that leverage the different gifts of each person as well as making decisions that take people’s different perspectives into account. In the ideal, everyone’s voice matters. Fundamentally, the collaborative vision implies that if people engage supportively with each other, then they will generally be able to reach some reasonable agreement that balances everyone’s interests and perspectives: “If we would just all work together, we could solve any problem.” The challenge, of course, is the “if” in that statement. In reality, everyone is not always ready to collaborate. Even if the parents learn why their students are not succeeding, simply presenting this knowledge to decision-makers is unlikely to lead to change. If the City decides it wants to take the garden plot, there is not much these residents can do. These limitations are especially evident with respect to issues that directly affect the core self-interests of particular groups. Oakes and Lipton (1992) found, for example, that privileged parents vehemently and almost always successfully prevent efforts to “de-track” classrooms in ways that might help low-income students of color because of worries that the achievement of their own children may suffer (despite robust evidence to the contrary). As Alinsky (1989) pointed out, the privileged or powerful are rarely willing to “collaborate” on efforts to support less privileged people if the privileged believe it will cost them something significant. Collaborative efforts can accomplish significant things, then, but have often foundered on the rock of self-interest. In fact, on issues that groups care the most about, authentic collaboration among all interested parties can be very difficult to achieve. Collaboration has no tools for pressuring stakeholders to come to the table and listen to—to say nothing of actually working together with—those without traditional forms of power or resources. Even proponents of democratic deliberation are increasingly conscious of the limits of collaboration, alone (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012). Finally, while collective action efforts are, in the ideal, grounded in individual and collaborative empowerment, these only provide preparation for solidarity and conflict. Participants work to come to an agreement on Aaron Schutz

the issues they will fight for and the strategies and tactics they will employ. But when groups emerge into the public realm, in the ideal they seek to speak with a single voice. This conception of empowerment acknowledges that when individual members lack wealth or control over institutions they have substantive power only when they act as collectives. In fact, a classic tactic of those who oppose collective action is to try to fracture this solidarity. In contrast with collaboration, collective action generally employs conflict and pressure to challenge and change the status quo. One key approach is community organizing in the tradition of Alinsky (1989) (although this is not the only vision of organizing, which takes on different forms in different cultures and communities). Alinsky-based community organizing targets the self-interests of powerful people in an effort to get them to the negotiating table. “When people are organized,” Alinsky (1969) argued, “they move into the central decision-making tables downtown and say, ‘We are people, and damn it, you’re going to listen to us!’” A group of 50 angry residents, for example, might show up unannounced in a recalcitrant city traffic manager’s office to demand the installation of stoplights at a dangerous intersection. Negotiations might lead to a stop sign or a traffic hump instead but hopefully still address the residents’ concerns. This example, however, indicates why scholars and professionals have increasingly shied away from empowerment through collective action. It is much safer to recommend that people join together in cooperative mutual support or that individuals be provided with the tools or resources they need to advance than to teach and engage people in methods for directly confronting aspects of society that they experience as oppressive. In fact, there is a long history of human service and other projects being defunded when they began to bite the hands that fed them. The field of social work provides an exception that proves the rule, briefly creating programs in community organizing training in the early empowerment era but soon dissolving most of these in favor of less controversial approaches like counseling and service. One school of social work at the University of Syracuse, for example, actually used federal funds in the late 1960s to develop community organizing groups and train community organizers (Schutz and Miller, 2015). Angry complaints from local

empowerment  149 Syracuse government officials to Congress led the university to shut the program down, played an important part in the quick passage of laws to prevent the use of funding for this purpose in the future, and taught other schools of social work an important lesson. While much more could be (and has been) said about the nuances of empowerment, the tripartite definition in this entry is meant to encourage scholars, professionals, activists, and others to expand their understandings of empowerment. None of the three options, by themselves, fully captures what empowerment is or could encompass. A first step toward conceptualizing empowerment in more comprehensive ways is to acknowledge the potential limits of the definitions that most using this term today begin with. It is important, for example, to understand the limits of individualist understandings of empowerment and the ways this narrowed definition can play into neoliberal visions of action and change without denying the potentially productive impacts of individual-focused efforts. While collaboration brings groups into the picture, it does so in a manner that has limited capacity to foster broader change or to alter problematic aspects of the status quo. Collective action conceptions of empowerment provide no simple silver bullet of social change but appear to present some of the few possibly effective ways to challenge dominant truths and systems. While academic subfields do study social movements and community organizing in sociology and elsewhere, explorations of these approaches often do not fit comfortably within the strictures and tenets of professional human service fields or the language of research grant applications. As one of my students recently pointed out, for example, a proposal for an effort to organize heroin users to fight in solidarity to change laws that criminalize the possession of test strips for detecting deadly levels of fentanyl would almost certainly be rejected out of hand by agencies focused on drug treatment and foundations interested in “helping” addicts. In part because of current dominant understandings of empowerment, such an effort would likely never even occur to agency staff, even as they see their work as “empowering” those with substance abuse challenges. Yet a project like this would have the potential to save many lives while treating heroin users as potentially active agents in forming our society instead of victims.

People may reasonably determine that collective action is not part of their vision of empowerment, but this should be a conscious decision and not the result of unacknowledged exclusions and gaps in our discourse. Illuminating such previously unseen alternatives is itself a kind of “empowerment.” Erasing collective action from the definition of empowerment prevents even consideration of a key set of options for action and education for those who are marginalized in our society. The definitions we accept as natural and normal, the boundaries we create around what “counts” as empowerment, invisibly exclude alternatives (Lukes’s [2004] third “face” of power), affecting what happens in the real world. Visions of solidarity and conflict provided a foundation for early uses of the term in the 1970s and should be recovered, bringing back the tension-filled implications that made empowerment a challenging concept instead of a vague reference to positive forms of human improvement. Aaron Schutz

References Alinsky, S. D. (1969). Interview with George T. Harris. Educational Research Group. Alinsky, S. D. (1989). Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. Vintage. Calvès, A. E. (2009). Empowerment: The history of a key concept in contemporary development discourse. Revue TiersMonde, 200(4), 735–749. Christens, B. D. (2019). Community Power and Empowerment. Oxford University Press. Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. Macmillan. Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Continuum. Gaventa, J. (2019). Applying power analysis: Using the ‘Powercube’ to explore forms, levels and spaces. In R. McGee & J. Pettit (Eds.), Power, Empowerment and Social Change (pp. 117–138). Routledge. Gee, J. P. (2007). Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses. Routledge. Harvey, D. (2007). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. Horton, M., & Freire, P. (1990). We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Aaron Schutz

150  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Education and Social Change. Temple University Press. Lukes, S. (2004). Power: A Radical View. Bloomsbury Publishing. Oakes, J., & Lipton, M. (1992). Detracking schools: Early lessons from the field.  Phi Delta Kappan, 73(6), 448–454. Parkinson, J., & Mansbridge, J. (Eds.) (2012). Deliberative Systems: Deliberative

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Democracy at the Large Scale. Cambridge University Press. Schutz, A. (2019). Empowerment: A Primer. Routledge. Schutz, A., & Miller, M. (Eds.) (2015). People Power: The Community Organizing Tradition of Saul Alinsky. Vanderbilt University Press.

38. Environmentalism When political sociologists talk about ‘environmentalism’ they are normally referring to organisations, institutions, campaigns and concepts that seek to protect non-human nature, particularly from processes and technologies of industrialization. ‘Environmentalism’ therefore encompasses both a body of political and ethical thought that constructs and interrogates philosophies, ideologies and discourses about ‘the environment’ as well as political activism and the social movements that campaign for environmental causes and rights (see Grasso and Giugni 2022). Environmentalist thought is commonly traced back to the philosophical Romanticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which lamented the emergence of what was seen as rationalized, artificial and conflictual modern society. In different ways, writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson all emphasized the importance of life lived in harmony with nature. Notions of human interconnection with a great and mysterious nature found further expression in Rachel Carson’s famous book Silent Spring, published in 1962, and, a decade later, in Ishimure Michiko’s Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease (1972). Both of these books warned of the ecological destruction of which humans are capable and are regarded as masterpieces in their own right as well as key environmentalist texts. Since then, a rich body of scholarly work has emerged to further conceptualise and problematise the relation between the natural world and human society and to generate distinct political ideologies such as green liberalism (Wissenburg 1998), eco-socialism (Pepper 1993), eco-Marxism (Foster 2000), eco-anarchism (Bookchin 1971) and eco-feminism (Plumwood 1993). The ideas and categories of environmentalist thought have been applied, expanded and challenged by environmentalist activists around the world. Environmental movements and organisations campaign for the protection of the natural environment in relation to environmental degradation, pollution, road building, nuclear energy, biodiversity loss, deforestation, food production and consumption, climate change, ‘rewilding’ and other

emerging concerns. Environmental movements are heterogeneous, with an array of different tactics and demands, some campaigning for conservation and ‘green growth’, others focusing on unchecked capitalism as the root cause of environmental problems and advocating ‘post-growth’ economies (Giugni and Grasso 2015). Climate change has indubitably become the key concern for many activists; the climate movement has attracted campaigners from across the social spectrum and around the world, including children who are holding older generations to account for their failure to implement effective policy to reduce emissions of greenhouse gas. In September 2019 millions of people from 150 countries gathered for a ‘global climate strike’, and ‘climate strike’ became the ‘word of the year’ for 2019. While environmentalism has been labelled as a ‘post-materialist’ concern of upper social strata in the affluent societies of the global north, the activities of the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ in the global south show that it can be those impoverished populations – whose livelihoods, health and culture are dependent on their environment – who have most to lose from its destruction and who are some of the most vociferous campaigners (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). For example, the Chipko movement of the 1970s is one of the most famous environmentalist campaigns, in which women living in rural areas in the Indian Himalayan region protested against the government policy that denied them access to the forest resources they relied upon. Environmentalism in the global south and of indigenous peoples underlines the interconnection of environmental damage with colonialist exploitation. The displacement of indigenous peoples through colonization has exacerbated the vulnerability of these people to environmental hazards (Whyte 2018). At the same time, there is concern that many, often well-intended, projects that attempt to protect indigenous interests and to integrate local knowledge can depoliticize environmental policymaking and can further entrench patterns of exclusion and harm (Shah 2010). As this indicates, environmentalism, as both a body of thought and political activity, has influenced several prominent discussions in political sociology, including those related to justice, democracy and knowledge. The first discussion, centring on justice, concerns

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152  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the unfair distribution of environmental hazards and benefits that are further exacerbated by unequal access to environmental policymaking (Schlosberg 2007). Although environmental concerns are indeed ‘the most conspicuously global’ of sociological and political issues (Yearley 1996: viii), they are not distributed evenly at the local level. Certain communities are more likely to experience the environmental risks that are generated by the practices and technologies from which others profit. Research has shown the tendency for political and social marginalisation to correlate with exposure to environmental hazards and bad health (Mohai et al., 2009; Machin and Ruser 2021). There is also a historical aspect to this discussion of environmental justice, pertaining to the rights of future generations and the misdeeds of past and present generations. How can it be fair that the wealth of those living today, built through processes that wreak irreparable damage on the planet, is not equally bequeathed to the yet-to-be-born, who will nevertheless inherit an abundance of social, ecological and political problems? This connects to a second discussion within political sociology, which concerns democracy and the possibilities of empowered and inclusive political participation in socioecological transformation (Eckersley 2004; Fischer 2017). Democratic institutions seem, in general, to prioritise the short-term interests of consumers who neither understand nor appreciate the environmental implications of policy decisions. This was the worry of the eco-authoritarians of the 1970s, who believed that at a time of ecological crisis, policymaking was too important to be placed in the hands of the masses. Defenders of democracy have resisted this conclusion and have therefore promoted various suggestions for how democracy might be reimagined to be more responsive to complex or ‘wicked’ environmental problems. These suggestions include the expansion of representative rights to non-human nature and future generations, enhancing deliberation between various types of experts and citizens from different backgrounds, and, more radically, encouraging the clash of alternative approaches to both reinvigorate politics and facilitate the contestation of the unsustainable status quo (Machin 2022). A third political and sociological discussion in which environmentalism intervenes concerns the role of knowledge in policymaking Amanda Machin and Alexander Ruser

and the value of different types of knowledges. Science is important for environmentalists since it was scientists who discovered and uncovered environmental dangers – such as acid rain, the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change. However, the depiction of scientific expertise as the primary (if not sole) source of environmental knowledge and main driver of political mobilization and decision making has been thoroughly – and at times bitterly – contested. The neutrality and objectivity of scientific expertise have been widely challenged, which has led to a polarised debate over its authority; while some denounce scientific claims, others point out that scientists provide crucial information and guidance. At the same time, it is clear that scientific knowledge cannot provide generic ‘greenprints’ for environmental problems but must connect to the specific local contexts in which it is being applied (Ruser 2018). Indigenous, aboriginal or ‘lay’ environmental knowledge is thus acknowledged as an important source of environmental sense-making. What has been called ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ (or ‘TEK’) not only introduces alternative narratives, imaginaries, explanations and conceptions of the place of humans “in” nature but highlights the way in which knowledge is held and reproduced through the lived practices of everyday life (McGregor 2004). Yet others have warned that native traditions and philosophies tend to be invoked only when they correspond to Western environmentalist projects, which can result in damaging and limited cultural stereotypes (Nadasdy 2005). This discussion over the value of different types of expertise for environmental policies and practices, along with the other two discussions on justice and democracy, has provoked an emphasis on ‘co-production’ in which scientists together with different social groups are empowered to deliver more effective, inclusive and legitimate knowledge and policy decisions about environmental issues and technologies. The recent diagnosis of the ‘Anthropocene’, the new geological epoch brought about by the impact of human activity on the very geology of the planet, has intensified the debate over the possibilities of intradisciplinary and transdisciplinary research and the connections between experts and policymaking. The Anthropocene concept is disputed, however, because while some point to the way that it collects together the array of related environmental issues as the terrible

environmentalism  153 outcome of industrialized capitalist society and human hubris, it can also be seen as a celebratory discourse in which the power of the human to dominate nature is both reified and extended. Questions arise here concerning whether humans possess ownership or stewardship over non-human nature, or if humans are rather coextensive with their natural and material environment. Sociology has tended to focus on human society and to disregard the environmental contexts that both support societies and are threatened and exploited by them. By highlighting nature as an object of concern, environmentalism has disrupted sociology and demanded the extension of its traditional focus on ‘human’ affairs. Environmentalism troubles political sociology. But environmentalism itself remains troubled by its own internal tension, while emphasizing the continuity between social and ecological realities its own disciplinary contribution apparently depends upon a distinction between society and the natural environment. We suggest that this tension continues to raise important and fertile questions for political sociologists about the implications, challenges and possibilities of both society and sociology at a time of environmental concern. Amanda Machin and Alexander Ruser

References Bookchin, M. (1971) Post-Scarcity Anarchism. London: Wildwood House. Carson, R. (1962) Silent Spring. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Eckersley, R. (2004) The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge, London: MIT Press. Fischer, F. (2017) Climate Crisis and the Democratic Prospect: Participatory Governance in Sustainable Communities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foster, J.B. (2000) Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. New York: Monthly Review Press. Giugni, M. & M. Grasso (2015) “Environmental Movements: Heterogeneity, Transformation, and Institutionalization”. Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 40(1): 337–361. Grasso, M.T. & M. Giugni (eds) (2022) Routledge Handbook of Environmental Movements. London: Routledge.

Guha, R. & J. Martinez-Alier (1997) Varieties of Environmentalism. London: Earthscan. Michiko, I. (2003) [1972] Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Disease. Translated by Livia Monnet. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Center for Japanese Studies. Machin, A. (2022) “Climates of Democracy: Skeptical, Rational, and Radical Imaginaries”. WIREs Climate Change. e.774. DOI: 10.1002/wcc.774. Machin, A. & A. Ruser (2021) “Corporealising a Healthy Democracy? Inequality, Bodies and Participation”. Representation: Journal of Representative Democracy. 57(2): 209–224. McGregor, D. (2004) “Coming Full Circle: Indigenous Knowledge, Environment, and Our Future”. American Indian Quarterly. 28(3/4) Special Issue: The Recovery of Indigenous Knowledge: 385–410. Mohai, Paul, David Pellow & J. Timmons Roberts (2009) Environmental Justice. Annual Review Environmental Resources. 34: 405–430. Nadasdy, P. (2005) “Transcending the Debate over Ecologically Noble Indian: Indigenous Peoples and Environmentalism”. Ethnohistory. 52(2): 291–331. Pepper, D. (1993) Eco-Socialism: From Deep Ecology to Social Justice. London & New York: Routledge. Plumwood, V. (1993) Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. London: Routledge. Ruser, A. (2018) Climate Politics and the Impact of Think Tanks. Scientific Expertise in Germany and the US. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Schlosberg, D. (2007) Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements and Nature. New York: Oxford University Press. Shah, S. (2010) In the Shadows of the State: Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism, and Insurgency in Jharkhand, India. Durham & London: Duke University Press. Whyte, K. (2018) “Settler Colonialism, Ecology, and Environmental Injustice”. Environment and Society. 9(1): 125–144. Wissenburg, M. (1998) Green Liberalism: The Free and the Green Society. London: University College London Press. Yearley, Steven (1996) Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization. London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Amanda Machin and Alexander Ruser

39. Ethnicity Ethnicity describes people’s sense of common identity drawing from shared history, culture, way-of-life, sense of belonging and mutual obligation. It is a form of invisible glue that binds individuals together, creating an idea of solidarity based on kith and kinship. The notion that people’s ethnicity shapes their political outlook and behaviour is important for examining the sources of political difference. For empirical political sociology, ethnic group membership and identity are important building blocks that can affect group solidarity and coherence, though the actual challenge is to examine the mechanisms by which this takes place. Ethnicity effectively amounts to an amalgam of contributory factors affecting political identity, selectively symbolising, projecting and uniting aspects of shared experience and common feeling. However, few theorists have delved long or deep enough into what it is about (or embodied within) the concept of ethnicity that counts in influencing political outlook and action. For this, an ethnically related theory of politics is needed that probes this process which goes far beyond casually dragging ethnicity into larger claims. Moreover, ethnicity is not only about ethnic minorities since everyone has an ethnicity. The psephological literature in the US is dominated by contemporary studies of the ethnicity of black, Asian and Hispanic ethnic minorities in voting behaviour, thus overlooking earlier studies of the role of white European ethnicity in shaping voting. Indeed, shedding light on the political mobilisation of white nativist and racist sentiment, underpinned by a form of group grievance in the election of Donald Trump surely ranks alongside explanations of African American or Hispanic American voting choice. What matters about ethnicity? An ethnically related theory of politics is concerned with the transmission process by which thought, sentiment and emotion crystallise into forms of common outlook, behaviour and action. There are at least four different processes through which this can take place. First, historic ethnic loyalties can be used to construct a claim that specific groups occupy distinctive and irreconcilable political agendas. The political orientation of the group is

then exclusively derived from that source, and it follows that the units of political life then reflect basic appeals to ethnic identity. This may include a common experience of exclusion and discrimination through which the world is perceived politically, a common feature of severely divided societies such as Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s or Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. A key test relates to the strength and endurance of hostility (and of a distinct agenda based on earlier divisions) when violent conflict ends. In Northern Ireland, polling suggests that tribal loyalties have waned as workplaces (though not neighbourhoods and school classrooms) have become integrated across old sectarian divides. Ethnic conflict commonly arises when unequal structural power relations are mobilised into the political realm. Addressing those relations necessarily involves some degree of rebalancing, and that process will carry the weight of irreconcilable agendas that are frozen in the past. Second, an ethnic group may hold similar political priorities to other groups but with reordered priorities and points of emphasis. For example, this may take the form of more concern about public spending commitments in health and education than other groups based on greater reliance on such public services. This reflects a different socio-economic structural position and has scarcely anything to do with ethnically related fundamental differences. Such differential priorities can also reflect residential and demographic patterns. For example, lavish promises by political parties to raise state pensions for senior citizens will resonate minimally among those groups with youthful age structures. As these patterns converge (or fail to), we might expect convergence in policy and issue priorities (or not). That said, very little can be discerned about the saliency of particular issues beyond the circumstances in which particular ethnic groups find themselves. This is a long way from political life being infused with appeals to ethnic group loyalty. Third, ethnic groups appear to exhibit parallels and similarities in what matters to them politically, but, crucially, this masks the fact that key issues are seen through a lens linked to their ethnicity and shared experience. Thus, schooling as a political issue can be interpreted to have a variety of meanings ranging from class sizes and educational testing and attainment to preferences and disputes about

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ethnicity  155 curriculum content, most notably, in areas such as national and world history. The latter of these has become associated in recent times with heated disputes over historical authenticity and the adequacy of coverage of acts of racial injustice. The crux here is that ethnic group identity acts as a potential twist through which all political matters may (but not necessarily will) be subject to an appeal that cuts across other lines of political organisation and mobilisation. Ethnicity is simultaneously both a transmission source of political difference (working with this broad potential) and a non-transmission source (when it is conceptualised narrowly). Finally, the role of ethnicity may be overplayed especially when it does not amount to a driver of political difference across ethnic groups. That is to say, the sources of difference are found in other factors that serve to create bigger cleavages across society such as social class or urban–rural divides, and are not surprisingly seen as the building block of political life. Over many decades Australian society witnessed large-scale inwards migration and settlement, first from mostly European societies and more recently from its East, South and South-Eastern Asian neighbours. This variety of ethnic backgrounds has made a minimal impression on national politics in part because of the very strong existing divisions around social class and urban–rural life. In that sense, the priorities of specific groups have certainly reflected objective variations in their circumstances in jobs, location, housing and education, but more importantly they and their outlooks have been seen as a microcosm of Australian society at large. Ethnicity, politically speaking, has been writ very small indeed. Perhaps the only exception has been the occasionally heated politics of addressing historic racial injustices experienced by Indigenous groups, but even this difficult racial scar has given rise to only very limited concerted joint action across many hundreds of Indigenous groups. The Australian case raises the issue of how ethnic identities are diluted by national cultural assimilation policies. The premium has been on ensuring that all minority groups become like the majority, in essence, ‘one of us’. This involves valuable benefits flowing from ‘fitting in’ and suppressing a separate sub-group identity at odds with a dominant Anglo-Celtic tradition. Latent ethnic identity has become a matter for the private realm.

At the same time, the ability to harvest votes based on ethnic ties has not been lost on Australian parties that are growing accustomed to the rise of a multi-ethnic electorate. Many ethnically related political disputes are in practice coloured by claims and affiliations in sporadic ways which makes it difficult to assess the stand-alone influence of these forces. What matters is the extent to which ethnic identity gives rise to a coherent way of understanding and interacting with the world politically (Anderson, 1991). This need not be comprehensive in its reach or impact but rather as something that serves to coalesce interests into something that has the potential to over-ride other pulls on loyalty. Once this process takes hold, membership of the group becomes the central unit of analysis, and the focus shifts to the use of ethnicity ideologically to account for political differences. Nevertheless, this potential to override other sources is not necessarily the same as doing so, and it is the interaction between such ethnic and other divides that requires closer attention. Take the following six examples. UK party voting. From the 1970s onwards studies have had to shift to account for the unusual and enduring grip of the Labour Party in attracting the backing of immigrantdescended ethnic minorities (echoing the race-trumps-everything-else account of the US Democratic Party’s record among African American voters). At least three rival explanations sit beneath the surface: that ethnic bloc voting has become a new and vital feature of the electoral landscape; that the labour market position of these voters benefited the Labour Party merely due to the party’s pre-existing status as the voice of poorer, manual workers; that the Conservative Party’s imperial white roots served to blunt its traditional appeal to aspirant, middle-class ethnic minorities (Saggar, 2000; Heath et al., 2013). The Indian Sikh rebellion. The crisis of 1984 following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (at the hands of her own Sikh bodyguards) represented the single biggest challenge to Indian constitutional secularism. The descent to that point is frequently described in ethno-religious terms, emphasising the influence of Sikh ethnoreligious hardliners in seeking secession from the Indian state. But there are other explanations that rely less on ethnicity, notably the role of economic factors in shaping agrarian Shamit Saggar

156  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology interests in Punjab and other northern Indian states from the 1950s which in turn sharpened ethno-religious polarisation (Singh and Shani, 2021). Ethno-religious policy sensitisation. Various religious minorities in Western societies have sought degrees of autonomy for aspects of their religious traditions and observance, though these can sometimes collide with on-going national policy priorities in, for example, animal welfare. This has allowed Jews and Muslims some separate arrangements, albeit against vocal opposition. Elsewhere, dietary provisions have altered in schools, hospitals and prisons following similar pressure, while Hindus have campaigned in addition for greater sensitivity with regard to funeral cremations. Public policy may contain examples of sensitivity for particular groups, but this overlooks the larger question surrounding the friction between these groups’ collective ethno-religious interests and largely secular Western societies (Douglas, 2000; Saggar, 2010; Shah, 2005). Historic genocide claims arising from the 1990s Balkan Wars. Almost two decades after the worst atrocities, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia received evidence against Radovan Karadžić and others. A contentious feature of his trial was the suggestion that strong residual backing for the Bosnian Serb existed among ordinary members of the group, especially in the violent context of the time. The notion of a common ethnic group defence appears contentious but is similarly found in the blind eye phenomenon seen in attitudes towards Republican and National paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Simons, 2014: International Tribunal, 2016). Labour market disadvantage. A number of studies have pointed to labour market penalties experienced by visible ethnic minorities in many Western economies, and it is likely that these outcome gaps persist over time even as gains are made in education, skills and experience. At first glance, the political ramifications of this would seem to point to a point of common interest around which quite different ethnic groups could coalesce. In pushing back against such exclusion, it is important to remember that this has not been a uniform experience. This is because, for some groups with poor human capital, the gains made through education and skills are Shamit Saggar

less than those enjoyed by native workers. But for other groups with much richer human capital, the problem is that they have done well in earnings and progression but, in a bittersweet way, still experience worse outcomes than others with their profile would usually obtain. These are two very different mechanisms through which ethnic group experience might be transmitted into politics (Heath and Cheung, 2007). Australian multiculturalism. As previously mentioned, Australia’s strong assimilationist national story has largely succeeded in relegating the ethnic identity and loyalty of non-Anglo-Celts to a peripheral role in politics. However, this past suppression of a certain political ethnicity is likely in the future to give way to political ethnicity from growing migration (and demographic growth) from Indo-Pacific sources, coupled with a gradual steer towards greater national trade, security and cultural engagement with its region. This national priority reflects the importance of the region as a growth centre for future global markets but, despite that, the pivot has often been hesitant. The common European heritage of many Australians stands in the way for now (Jayasuriya, 2012; Soutphommasane, 2013; Pietsch, 2018). The common thread in this entry is to remind readers about the variable, indirect and sometimes disguised nature of ethnicity in shaping political outlooks and actions. Even where an ethnic affinity is placed front and centre, it often melds to rework other sources of political difference. The iconic 1985 film My Beautiful Laundrette features a powerful exchange between the main character, Omar, and his uncle, Nasser. The latter’s threat to evict a fellow Pakistani is criticised for perceived ethnic disloyalty. Angered by this slur, Nasser exclaims: “I’m a professional businessman, not a professional Pakistani,” dismissing ethnic kinship as wrong-headed. The conclusion this points to is that ethnic bonds themselves are an important variable to be studied and understood and should not be treated as a constant in explaining outcomes. Shamit Saggar

References Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. (Verso)

ethnicity  157 Douglas, G. (2000). ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts: Report of a Research Study funded by the AHRC’ – available at: https://www​ .academia​.edu​/20602889​/Social​_Cohesion​ _and​_Civil​_ Law​_ Marriage​_ Divorce​_ and​ _Religious​_Courts Heath, A. and Cheung, S. (eds.) (2007). Unequal Chances: Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets (British Academy/Oxford University Press) Heath, Anthony, F., Fisher, Stephen D., Rosenblatt, Gemma, Sanders, David and Sobolewska Maria (2013). The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Oxford University Press) International Tribunal (2016). International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (2016), PROSECUTOR v. RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ (Public redacted version of judgement issued on 24 march 2016 – Available at: https://www​.legal​-tools​ .org​/doc​/173e23​/pdf Jayasuriya, L. (2012). Transforming a ‘White Australia’: Issues of Racism and Immigration (SSS Publications)

Pietsch, J. (2018). Race, Ethnicity, and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia’s Political Complexion (University of Toronto Press) Saggar, S. (2000). Race and Representation: Electoral Politics and Ethnic Pluralism in Britain (Manchester University Press) Saggar, S. (2010). Pariah Politics: Understanding Western Radical Islamism and What Should be Done (Oxford University Press) Shah, P. (2005). Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with Cultural Diversity in Law (Glass House) Simons, M. (2014). ‘Bosnian Serb Ex-Leader Closes His Defense at War Crimes Trial’, The New York Times, 7 October Singh, G. and G. Shani (2021). Sikh Nationalism: From a Dominant Minority to an Ethno-Religious Diaspora  (Cambridge University Press) Soutphommasane, T. (2013). Don’t Go Back to Where You Came From: Australia’s Multicultural Genius (NewSouth Books)

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40. Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism is a term that was coined by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociologists, in particular, Gumplowicz (1879) and Sumner (1906) (for an overview of the history of the term, see Bizumic 2014). Sumner (1906: 5) defines the term as ‘the technical name for the view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.’ Nowadays, social scientists see ethnocentrism as the basic attitude that one’s own ethnic group and its culture and norms are superior to those of other ethnic groups (e.g., Hooghe 2008). While the term ‘ethnocentrism’ suggests that the ingroup and outgroup(s) can be distinguished by ethnicity or race, this changed in established democracies after World War 2, as race theories were seen as unacceptable by most citizens due to the atrocities of the Nazis. Contemporary ethnocentrism focuses more on culture and religion than on ethnicity. It emphasizes the culture and religion of the ingroup and how the basic values and cultural norms cannot be reconciled with the norms and values of outgroups (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2006). This implies an exaggeration of the internal homogeneity of the ingroup, while religious and cultural differences that exist among members of that group are disregarded. Strong identification with the culture of the ingroup and a tendency to contrast this with the outgroup can easily lead to stereotyping, which can be defined as a cognitive process that involves generalizations about the attributes of a group of people (e.g., Allport 1954). An ethnocentric worldview entails that the culture of the ingroup is to be preferred over the culture of outgroups, which implies that immigrants with other cultural habits and norms pose a threat to ‘our way of life’ (e.g., Hooghe 2008). Ethnocentrism is thus very similar to xenophobia, which means ‘fear of others’, or even ‘hatred of others’. Both attitudes are essentially exclusionary, claiming that the presence of culturally different people is threatening to society. The implication is that migration is undesirable and if people do migrate anyways, they should fully assimilate. As ethnocentrism and xenophobia place most emphasis on cultural and religious differences, the attitudes

are different from classical forms of racism, which tended to focus mainly on biological differences between different racial groups (see Barker 1981, who does not refer to ‘ethnocentrism’, but coins the term ‘new racism’). Ethnocentrism is also present in certain forms of nationalism, but only in those that define membership of the nation in ethnic terms. Ethnocentrism can be seen as antithetical to multiculturalism and related concepts such as ethnic or cultural pluralism. In these inclusionary perspectives, modern societies consist of ethnically and culturally diverse groups, and they should mutually respect their diverse cultural and religious traditions, without expecting other groups to adapt to the dominant culture. Ethnocentrism is a term that is used by scholars in various disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology, history and philosophy. While these disciplines differ in their analytical approaches, the theoretical perspectives seem rather similar. A first perspective on ethnocentrism is ethnic competition theory (Quillian 1995), which argues that the indigenous population of a country develops negative attitudes towards ‘newcomers’ because they feel that they have to compete with these newcomers for scarce resources. This perspective is sometimes equated with ‘realistic conflict theory’ (e.g., LeVine and Campbell 1972), when the competition between ethnic groups involves material goods, such as (social) housing and jobs (in particular in the manual sectors). Realistic conflict theory then predicts that ethnocentrism will be high among the least educated, low-income groups, often living in deprived neighbourhoods of larger cities. These disadvantaged groups are expected to feel economically threatened by people from other ethnic groups and to develop antagonistic feelings against ethnic outgroups as a response to this perceived threat. According to realistic conflict theory, then, ethnocentrism mainly results from economic grievances. The predictions made by ethnic competition theory and realistic conflict theory are generally supported when they are tested at the individual and regional levels. It has been established repeatedly that lower-educated groups such as for example blue-collar workers are more likely to express negative feelings towards ethnic outgroups than other social groups (Ivarsflaten 2005). Also at the

158

ethnocentrism  159 regional level, it has been shown that native inhabitants of regions with higher percentages of immigrants from countries outside of the European Union are more likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes (Markaki and Longhi 2013). At the country level, there is less support for realistic conflict theory, however (Sides and Citrin 2007). Countries with many racial tensions are not necessarily always the countries which are economically slagging or that attract many immigrants. While these empirical results may be in line with the idea that ethnocentrism is a consequence of economic interests, this is not the full story. If ethnocentrism was only a response to the economic competition that people experience or perceive from foreign workers, it would for example not matter to a Dutch citizen whether an immigrant is German or Syrian. Yet, European citizens respond more negatively to immigrants from non-Western countries than to those coming from Western countries (Schneider 2008). So, ethnic competition does not just focus on material goods but might also focus on the feeling that one’s cultural norms and values are being challenged by outsiders (Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006; Ivarsflaten 2005). The idea that cultural differences between the ingroup and outgroup matter for the feeling of ‘ethnic threat’ and, thus, the degree of ethnic competition is predicted by social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity is an individual’s sense of self based on perceived memberships in social groups. In everyday life, these group memberships are often related to categories such as gender, sexual orientation, class or, most relevant for our purpose, culture, religion and ethnicity. Social identity theory proposes that individuals’ attitudes and behaviours in group contexts are influenced by their own and others’ social identities and group memberships. Individuals are thought to categorize themselves and others into social groups by accentuating (stereotypical) similarities within these groups and differences between these groups. Moreover, social identity theory posits that relations between different groups in society and their members are dictated by perceived group status differences. Based on the social categories individuals sort themselves and others into, they compare themselves and the group(s) they identify with (so-called ingroups) to other groups they do not identify

with (so-called outgroups). During this comparison, individuals engage in self-serving cognitive patterns such as ingroup favouritism, predisposing them to more positively evaluate the groups they belong to compared to ‘the others’, thereby increasing their own self-esteem. This tendency has been consistently observed in various settings (even based on the most arbitrary group definitions assigned in experiments, such as groups divided by random coin tosses) and is thought to drive a range of negative attitudes and behaviours towards perceived outgroups, including ethnocentrism. A strong identification with one’s ethnic ingroup, paired with favouritism towards this ingroup, is thought to lead to the derogation of ethnic outgroups and feelings of ethnic superiority. How does this explain why European citizens react more negatively to immigrants coming from non-Western countries than Western countries? Based on social identity theory, the answer to this question would be that on average, a European citizen is more likely to consider immigrants from Western countries as part of their ingroup based on (stereotypical) racial, religious and cultural similarities, leading to more favourable attitudes towards Western immigrants and more negative attitudes towards non-Western immigrants. Realistic conflict theory and social identity theory make opposite predictions regarding the impact of interactions between the ingroup and outgroup. Realistic conflict theory would predict that the arrival of many immigrants in a neighbourhood would be seen as threatening by the native population, thus leading to an increase in ethnocentrism. However, social identity theory explains the psychological mechanism that produces ethnocentric feelings as stemming from a strong identification with the ingroup of the actor and stereotyping of members of the outgroup. Regular contact with members of the outgroup, who may be your colleagues or neighbours, whose children are your children’s classmates, should render it less likely that one develops such strong negative feelings towards the members of the outgroup. On the basis of these considerations, the ‘contact hypothesis’ predicts that under appropriate conditions regular contact with members of the outgroup reduces ethnocentrism (Allport 1954). Empirical tests of the predictions following from realistic conflict theory and the contact

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160  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology hypothesis are somewhat inconclusive, probably because both are partially correct and run in opposite directions. Survey research shows that ethnocentrism is often quite prominent in rural areas where few migrants live (e.g., Harteveld et al. 2022). This is predicted by the contact hypothesis, which holds that, in the absence of normal day-to-day contact with people from other cultural groups, it is easy to develop stereotypical images of the ‘other’. Yet, a large influx of many new immigrants does lead to more ethnocentrism, but probably only initially (e.g., Olzak 1994). One of the main problems that researchers in this area face is that (to some degree) citizens decide themselves where they want to live. Some older neighbourhoods of cities with many immigrants may attract young students who welcome the ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as the cheaper housing, while the more prejudiced inhabitants may choose to move to less ethnically diverse suburbs. Such changes in the composition of neighbourhoods make it difficult to establish the consequences of ethnic diversity for ethnocentrism in the long run. Ethnocentric feelings, and particularly the politicization of ethnocentrism as a political issue, are associated with the rise of various parties and organizations, ranging from violent groups like the ‘Ku Klux Klan’ (KKK) to radical right parties such as the French ‘National Rally’ (Rassemblement National, RN) and the ‘Freedom Party of Austria’ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). It is uncertain whether ethnocentrism or more traditional forms of racism are behind the rise of clearly extremist violent movements such as the KKK or eruptions of ethnic violence that we have witnessed in countries like Rwanda in 1994 or Biafra in the late 1960s. These types of conflicts are often not just associated with ethnicity but also with religion. Yet, at the root of all of these conflicts is a deep sense of ingroup identification and hatred (even dehumanization) of members of the outgroup. More recently, the politicization of ethnocentrism is seen as (one of) the main driver(s) of the success of radical right parties in established democracies. According to several scholars, large-scale socio-economic changes in post-industrial societies gave rise to a new socio-cultural political ‘cleavage’, which divides the ‘losers and winners of globalization’ (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2008). The ‘losers’ are those who feel threatened both

economically and culturally by the consequences of open borders and who therefore oppose European integration and migration. The ‘winners’ are people who benefit from the opportunities of open borders and who do not feel threatened by immigrants (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2018). The politicization of socio-cultural issues and the subsequent rise of anti-immigration parties, also called nativist parties, or radical right (populist) parties, has produced the largest changes in Western European party systems since the end of the Second World War. It has been demonstrated that ethnocentrism is the strongest driver of support for such parties (e.g., Van der Brug et al. 2000). Wouter van der Brug and Linet R. Durmuşoğlu

References Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books. Barker, M. (1981). The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. London: Junction Books. Bizumic, B. (2014). ‘Who coined the concept of ethnocentrism? A brief report’. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2(1), 3–10. Gumplowicz, L. (1879). ‘Das Recht der Nationalität und Sprachen in OesterreichUngarn [The right of nationality and languages in Austria-Hungary]’. Innsbruck, Austria: Wagner’sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung. Harteveld, E., van der Brug, W., de Lange, S. L., & van der Meer, T. (2022). ‘Multiple roots of the populist radical right: Voting for populist radical right parties in cities and the Countryside’. European Journal of Political Research, 61(2), 440–461. Hooghe, M. (2008). ‘“Ethnocentrism”, entry’. In: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, W. A. Darity (ed.). Philadelphia: MacMillan, pp. 11–12. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018). ‘Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage’. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Ivarsflaten, E. (2005). ‘Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to Western Europeans’. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 15(1), 21–45.

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ethnocentrism  161 Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior. New York: Wiley. Markaki, Y., & Longhi, S. (2013). ‘What determines attitudes to immigration in European countries? An analysis at the regional level’. Migration Studies, 1(3), 311–337. Olzak, S. (1994). The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Quillian, L. (1995). ‘Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe’. American Sociological Review, 60(4), 586–611. Schneider, S. L. (2008). ‘Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived ethnic threat’. European Sociological Review, 24(1), 53–67.

Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., & Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). ‘The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988– 2000’. American Sociological Review, 71(3), 426–449. Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). ‘European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests and information’. British Journal of Political Science, 37(3), 477–504. Sumner, W. G. (1906). Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals. Boston, MA: Ginn and Company. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979, reprinted in 2004). ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’. In: Organizational Identity: A Reader, Hatch, M.J. and Schultz, M. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56–65. Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2000). ‘Anti‐immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote’? European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), 77–102.

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41. Europeanization

studies focusing on the domestic implementation of EU policies span virtually all policy fields, from the environment and transport to migration and social policy (e.g., Graziano Europeanization is a key concept in EU stud- and Vink eds. 2006). Europeanization can ies. Starting in the 1990s scholarly interest be detected in the process of policymaking, turned toward the ways in which the EU was changes in administrative structures, and shaping domestic policies and politics in its policy paradigms, too (Mastenbroek 2018). member states. Since then, the field of study Another major theme of Europeanization has diversified and expanded. By the early research documents its effects on parties and 2000s contributions sought to take stock of party systems and the behavior of governthe various definitions of the term, noting that ments in a wide variety of contexts (Ladrech the label was applied to a wide variety of phe- 2002; Mair 2008). Finally, Europeanization nomena and processes of change (Olsen 2002, can be identified not only in formal institutions and policies but also in changing disp. 921; see also: Radaelli 2000). One of the most common uses of courses, values, and identities (Olsen 2002). The possible outcomes are many, ranging “Europeanization” has been to describe the domestic impact of the EU and the adaptation from deep to shallow forms of Europeanization triggered by it. The basic theoretical model to none at all. Europeanization can take the of Europeanization departs from the con- form of “downloading”, that is, the domestic cept of misfit, that is, the difference between transposition of EU models with no modian EU blueprint and the domestic situation, fication whatsoever but also interpretation giving rise to adaptational pressures (see, and translation whereby the original input is e.g., Featherstone 2003). While misfit is a modified and adapted to the domestic conscope condition for Europeanization, domes- text. Effects flowing in the opposite direction, tic responses to it are not uniform. In fact, that is, from the national to the supranational a key task of Europeanization research has level, are also possible. In terms of the overbeen to map and explain variations in domes- all pattern of change, scholars are generally tic responses to such EU-induced pressures. skeptical of whether Europeanization leads Domestically, EU influence is filtered through to the cumulation of EU-wide convergence. existing institutions, available resources, and It is more common to speak of differential administrative capacities and is shaped by the Europeanization or, at a maximum, clusters prevailing interest constellations. At the same of convergence, even though divergence is time, the EU’s input cannot be assumed to be also possible (Radaelli 2018). Institutional uniform, either. EU institutions and policies inertia (non-change) as well as policy reversal are unevenly developed across domains, and at a later stage have also been observed. The Europeanization literature draws EU pressure varies from soft forms (such as the provision of templates and good practices) insights and concepts from political science to legally binding forms (flowing from the and international relations. It has been proprescriptions of EU regulations and direc- foundly influenced especially by the new tives). Taken together, this set of factors is institutionalisms in political science. In terms used to explain puzzles of variation observed of the rationalities driving actors’ behavior, scholars tend to strike a distinction between across countries and in diverse domains. The fit–misfit model has been subject the logic of consequences, whereby actors to much debate, criticism, and revision. select behavioral options that maximize Various studies have identified, inter alia, their utility, and the logic of appropriateness, instances of ill-fitting policies being adopted whereby actors select behavioral options or potentially well-fitting policies being based on their social role and the norms they neglected. Alternatively, it was proposed that hold (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2012, pp. 6–7). Europeanization can also result from domes- The former envisages Europeanization as tic actors strategically “playing the Europe the result of the manipulation of incentives, card” in which case change in the status quo for example through financial aid or market does not originate primarily from EU pres- access while the latter sees it as the result of sures but from other factors (for references social learning, because actors come to consider certain ways of doing things as legitimate see, e.g., Mastenbroek 2018). Research on Europeanization extends to and/or identify with the EU. Each rationala broad range of phenomena. To begin with, ity is linked to one of the two fundamental 162

europeanization  163 mechanisms of Europeanization, conditionality and socialization, respectively. Not universally espoused but nonetheless noteworthy is a third type of rationality, the logic of arguing, whereby actors deliberate and try to convince each other with a view to triggering change; the corresponding mechanism for this rationality is persuasion (Börzel and Risse 2012). The EU’s eastern enlargement gave further impetus to Europeanization research. This literature was expanded to include the potential impact of the EU on candidate states prior to and after accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). The point of departure of many of these analyses was the evidently vast power asymmetry between the EU institutions and Central and Eastern European governments, as the “return to Europe” became the number one foreign policy priority in most post-Communist states. The EU’s influence on applicant countries had the added dimension of accession conditionality, that is, tying the prospect of membership to the prior fulfillment of certain conditions. Nonetheless, studies also showed the limits of this formally enormous potential. These limits stemmed from several factors, including the vagueness of the accession criteria, inconsistent EU input, and the complexity of the actor constellation involved (Grabbe 2001). Another related theme of Europeanization research had to do with the degree to which change is durable and persists after accession. To be sure, even the early literature on Europeanization left open the possibility of deconsolidation and backsliding. However, this subject arose specifically in relation to Eastern and Central European member states because the main driver of change there had been conditional incentives as opposed to the supposedly more profound internalization of norms and socialization (Börzel and Risse 2012). Moreover, the formal adoption of the EU’s so-called acquis communautaire, that is, the body of EU law, along with numerous policies and institutions, was not accompanied by proper application and enforcement in each case. While the EU does not lose all its leverage after accession, nonetheless, already in the early years of eastern, enlargement studies showed mixed results, detecting some degree of weakening of pre-accession institutions and (partial) reversals (Sedelmeier 2008). The prospects of de-Europeanization came into sharp relief especially in the

second half of the 2010s, when the nationalconservative governments of some of the former frontrunners of democratization, most prominently Hungary and Poland, escalated a roll-back of liberal democratic checks and balances, bringing about a rule of law crisis in the EU (Ágh 2015). In terms of its geographic reach, Europeanization can affect not only states located within the borders of the EU, that is, member states but also, as mentioned, candidate states, the EU’s quasi-members (Norway, Switzerland), neighboring countries, and, ultimately, countries around the world. From the early 2010s onwards Europeanization research found new impetus by looking at the potential diffusion of European forms of political organization and governance “beyond Europe”—our second key definition of the term. To capture these dynamics, scholars of Europeanization utilized theories of international relations, embedding Europeanization research in the literature on international diffusion (Börzel and Risse 2012). In terms of its content, this type of Europeanization is nowhere near as extensive as within the union. It is limited mainly to exporting more general content, such as the EU’s constitutional norms, governance standards, and its economic model (Schimmelfennig 2012). The major mechanisms through which Europeanization takes place are also different, that is, weaker, and indirect with the EU being thought to influence domestic change in third countries mainly through emulation (Ibid.). The third major branch of Europeanization research concerns the institutionalization at the European level of a distinct system of governance (see Olsen 2002). This directs attention to, on the one hand, processes of mutual adaptation and coevolution across various domains and domestic contexts and, on the other hand, the creation of authoritative rules, shared institutions, and commonly binding policies in the EU as a whole. Europeanization in this sense includes formal-legal developments, such as building a politically stronger, more coherent EU, but also social transformations, such as the construction of a European cultural model (Delanty 2005). Studies have elaborated on this topic, by examining Europeanization “from below” or “from the bottom up”. They focus on how the EU becomes more and more relevant, infiltrating a variety of domains, including, but not Anna Kyriazi

164  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology confined to national political debates (Kriesi and Grande 2015), social movement mobilization (Della Porta and Caiani 2007), and electoral participation (Kyriazi and Visconti 2021). Political sociologists have also documented the ways in which the EU is engendering changes in the everyday life of Europeans, mainly by promoting the proliferation of cross-border interactions, patterns of cultural consumption, and the exchange of ideas. Through such “horizontal Europeanization”, it is argued European nation-states are undergoing a gradual but fundamental transformation (Mau and Mewes 2012). The concept of “horizontal Europeanization” is used also in a different sense to denote the mounting transnational cooperation of European cities and towns (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). Europeanization, therefore, can be detected at all levels of the EU’s multilevel governance architecture. A key research area which has developed its own niche within Europeanization studies concerns political parties (Ladrech 2002; Mair 2008). An early research theme was the Europeanization of parties and party systems, including the creation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions. The EU’s impact on domestic party politics and political competition has attracted considerable attention in recent scholarship, especially as EU integration has become increasingly salient and politicized since the 2000s. The EU is thought to shape domestic political parties and patterns of party competition in several ways. One prominent example is the EU feeding into the emergence of new (overwhelmingly Eurosceptic) parties or factions within existing parties along the EU dimension. The EU can also have more indirect but nonetheless profound effects. It can contribute to the hollowing out of policy competition between parties, as decision-making is delegated to the EU level and the available policy space shrinks. Another important EU-linked transformation is the appreciation of non-partisan channels of political participation, given that the EU generally encourages the involvement of civil society organizations, lobbies, and advocacy groups in policymaking. A common methodological limitation of Europeanization research is the difficulty of isolating the EU’s independent effect on a given outcome and disentangling it from other (global, domestic, local) sources of change. Moreover, change is not necessarily Anna Kyriazi

unidirectional, but the interactions and feedbacks between different levels of governance and institutions are challenging to capture. Anna Kyriazi

References Ágh, A. (2015). De-Europeanization and de-democratization trends in ECE: From the Potemkin democracy to the elected autocracy in Hungary. Journal of Comparative Politics, 8(2), 4–26. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2012). From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction. West European Politics, 35(1), 1–19. Delanty, G. (2005). The idea of a cosmopolitan Europe: On the cultural significance of Europeanization. International Review of Sociology—Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 15(3), 405–421. Della Porta, D., & Caiani, M. (2007). Europeanization from below? Social movements and Europe. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 12(1), 1–20. Featherstone, K. (2003). Introduction: In the name of Europe. In: The Politics of Europeanization (pp. 3–26), edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Grabbe, H. (2001). How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6), 1013–1031. Graziano, P., & Vink, M. (Eds.) (2006). Europeanization: New Research Agendas. Springer. Kern, K., & Bulkeley, H. (2009). Cities, Europeanization and multi‐level governance: Governing climate change through transnational municipal networks. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 309–332. Kriesi, H., & Grande, E. (2015). The Europeanization of the national political debate. In: Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress (pp. 67–86), edited by Olaf Cramme and Sara Hobolt. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kyriazi, A., & Visconti, F. (2021). The Europeanisation of political involvement: Examining the role of individual transnationalism. Electoral Studies, 73, 102383. Ladrech, R. (2002). Europeanization and political parties: Towards a framework for analysis. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403.

europeanization  165 Mair, P. (2008). Political parties and party systems. In: Europeanization (pp. 154– 166) edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Mastenbroek, E. (2018). Europeanization of policies and administration. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe (pp. 823–840), edited by Edoardo Ongaro and Sandra Van Thiel. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Mau, S., & Mewes, J. (2012). Horizontal Europeanisation in contextual perspective: What drives cross-border activities within the European Union? European Societies, 14(1), 7–34. Olsen, J. P. (2002). The many faces of Europeanization. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5), 921–952. Radaelli, C. M. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and

substantive change. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 4(8), 1–25. Radaelli, C. M. (2018). EU policies and the Europeanization of domestic policymaking. In: Handbook of European Policies (pp. 55–71), edited by Hubert Heinelt and Sybille Münch. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Europeanization beyond Europe. Living Reviews in European Governance, 10(1), 1–34. Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 661–679. Sedelmeier, U. (2008). After conditionality: Post-accession compliance with EU law in East Central Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), 806–825.

Anna Kyriazi

42. Euroscepticism Euroscepticism may be defined as opposition to one or several facets of the European Union (EU). As the EU developed from a primarily economic organisation to a political union, European integration began to be contested by both elites and the general public. Although Euroscepticism is by no means a new phenomenon (Vasilopoulou 2013), the early years of European integration may be characterised as a period of ‘permissive consensus’ whereby the public gave tacit support to elite decision-making. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, however, marked the beginning of a new period of ‘constraining dissensus’ with citizens increasingly having different views and attitudes towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Over the years, Euroscepticism became an ‘embedded’ feature of European integration that is, a social force serving to shape both the EU political system and the domestic politics of its member states (Usherwood and Startin 2013). Opposition to the EU has moved from the margins towards the political mainstream with parties with a Eurosceptic agenda gaining public support in many European countries, including some that have been historically Europhile. This change was also reflected in the academic literature, with studies in the 1990s focusing primarily on the concept of support for European integration, and subsequent research from the 2000s onwards seeking to understand opposition to the EU. Euroscepticism can vary in terms of degree and across different dimensions. In its hardest form, it denotes the outright rejection of one’s country’s EU membership, undermining the very existence of the EU project. Softer forms of opposition may include qualified criticisms of the direction of specific EU policies, such as EU enlargement, the single currency, the single market and the EU’s internal borders (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001). To capture Euroscepticism among the public, early literature mostly focused on questions of EU membership and the desired speed of integration. Yet, over time, scholars suggested that a multi-dimensional approach was required to examine attitudes towards different aspects of the EU. Drawing from Easton’s (1975) diffuse versus specific support

for a political system, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) suggested five dimensions of EU attitudes, including performance, identity, affection, utilitarianism and strengthening. De Vries (2018) coined the term EU differential. This framework conceives of Euroscepticism relationally. Citizens compare the perceived benefits of the ‘status quo’ of EU membership with ‘an alternative state’, that is, the country exiting the EU. If the benefits of membership outweigh the costs of EU exit, then citizens are EU supporters. If, on the other hand, being outside the EU is perceived as having more benefits than being an EU member, then citizens are Eurosceptics. Public Euroscepticism has attracted substantial scholarly attention. There are three main approaches to explaining public opposition to the EU, including the utilitarian, identity and cue-taking approaches. Starting with utility, the rational model suggests that public attitudes towards the EU are a function of cost-benefit calculations (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). To the extent that the EU is associated with prosperity, for example, through EU fiscal transfers or benefits from trade, citizens tend to become supportive of integration as the country’s standard of living increases. Yet, there are individuallevel differences because economic liberalisation promoted by the EU tends to benefit people differently. Citizens with low levels of human capital – low education, low occupational skill – tend to lose from such processes and perceive them as a threat to their status. In fact, low education is a core driver of Euroscepticism (e.g. Hakhverdian et al. 2013). An alternative approach suggests that rather than being driven by economic self-interest, attitudes towards the EU reflect identity, norms and values (Carey 2002). Individuals suspicious or hostile towards out-groups tend to oppose the EU which advocates diversity and free movement between member states. European integration can raise questions of belonging, especially for those who tend to feel cultural insecurities and seek to defend their national culture against competing forms of identity. Transnationalism promoted by the EU is negatively associated with exclusive forms of national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2018). The third approach proposes a link between attitude formation in the national context and the European supranational level (Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Talving and

166

euroscepticism  167 Vasilopoulou 2021). The EU is too complex or too remote for citizens to understand. Limited information entails that citizens cannot necessarily weigh up the economic costs and benefits of the EU. To address these information shortfalls, citizens tend to use cues or proxies from the national arena as cognitive shortcuts that allow them to form their EU preferences. These proxies range from individuals’ evaluations of domestic institutions and satisfaction with democracy to national-level conditions such as the domestic macroeconomic context and cues provided by the national media and political parties. Yet, there is still a debate in the literature as to whether evaluations of the national context correlate positively (Anderson 1998; Talving and Vasilopoulou 2021) or negatively (Rohrschneider 2002) with EU support. Some scholars argue that EU attitudes reflect their general orientation towards democratic governance. Euroscepticism thus reflects a ‘general feeling of malaise’. Yet others view the national context as providing a contrasting lens for citizens to compare the costs and benefits of EU membership vis-à-vis a hypothetical alternative state (De Vries 2018). In countries that perform well, for example, in terms of corruption levels and GDP, citizens tend to be more Eurosceptic (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). With regards to political parties, there is a distinction between mainstream parties that have held positions of power which generally tend to support the EU and those non-mainstream radical parties without a significant government track record which oppose the EU. On the one hand, mainstream parties have been involved in the making of the EU and face reputational costs if they change their positions. On the other hand, radical parties without significant government experience have limited constraints and hold a comparative advantage by disrupting the status quo and adopting Eurosceptic positions. Their Eurosceptic argumentation displays both differences and similarities. Left-leaning Eurosceptics tend to view the EU as a neoliberal and imperialist project posing a threat to the economic and territorial integrity of the nation-state. Right-wing Eurosceptics usually frame their opposition in cultural identity terms. Commonalities in argumentation include institutional criticisms and arguments related to national sovereignty or the sovereignty of the people (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015).

Indeed, far-right and far-left citizens tend to oppose Europe more than centrist individuals. Yet, they are driven by different concerns. Whereas left-wing citizens are primarily motivated by socio-economic considerations, right-wing citizens prioritise questions of identity (Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2015). Europe’s consecutive crises since the end of the 2000s served to intensify Euroscepticism. The Eurozone and migration crises further revealed the interdependence of the two levels of governance to European citizens. Yet they also exposed problems related to the limits of national competence and the domestic legitimacy of EU intervention. The crises also amplified geographical divisions, for example, between EU member states inside and outside the Eurozone and between member states positioned at the EU’s external borders versus those that are not. For example, the link between trust in domestic institutions and trust in the EU is much stronger at the height of the Eurozone crisis and in countries hardest hit by the crisis (Talving and Vasilopoulou 2021). Brexit, that is, the UK’s decision to leave the EU, has to some extent worked in the opposite direction. Although it was feared that Brexit would result in Eurosceptic contagion across the EU, research has shown that at least in the short run it has mostly operated as a deterrent (Hobolt et al. 2022). Brexit did not serve as an incentive for farright Eurosceptics to harden their criticisms (van Kessel et al. 2020). Their positions have become much more ambiguous, yet they steer away from arguments in favour of their country’s exit from the EU. Furthermore, unlike during the Eurozone and migration crises, European solidarity has been much higher during the COVID-19 pandemic (Katsanidou et al. 2022). The EU’s response to the war in Ukraine has also generally been met with support. Yet, challenges to the international security order are still unfolding, and their precise impact on the future of European integration remains to be seen. Sofia Vasilopoulou

References Anderson, C.J. (1998) ‘When in doubt, use proxies: Attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European integration’. Comparative Political Studies 31(5): 569–601. Sofia Vasilopoulou

168  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Boomgaarden, H.G., Schuck, A.R.T., Elenbaas, M. and de Vreese, C.H. (2011) ‘Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support’. European Union Politics 12(2): 241–266. Carey, S. (2002) ‘Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European integration?’ European Union Politics 3(4): 387–413. De Vries, C.E. (2018) Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Easton, D. (1975) A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science 5(4): 435–457. Eichenberg, R.C. and Dalton, R.J. (1993) ‘Europeans and the European community: The dynamics of public support for European integration’. International Organization 47(4): 507–534. Hakhverdian, A., van Elsas, E., van der Brug, W. and Kuhn, T. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism and education: A longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, 1973–2010’. European Union Politics 14(4): 522–541. Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2012) ‘The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism’. European Journal of Political Research 51(4): 504–539. Hobolt, S.B., Popa, S.A., Van der Brug, W. and Schmitt, H. (2022) ‘The Brexit deterrent? How member state exit shapes public support for the European Union’. European Union Politics 23(1): 100–119. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’. British Journal of Political Science 39(1): 1–23. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2018) ‘Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset,

Sofia Vasilopoulou

Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage’. Journal of European Public Policy 25(1): 109–135. Katsanidou, A., Reinl, A.K. and Eder, C. (2022) ‘Together we stand? Transnational solidarity in the EU in times of crises’. European Union Politics 23(1): 66–78. Rohrschneider, R. (2002) ‘The democracy deficit and mass support for an EU-wide government’. American Journal of Political Science 46(2): 463–475. Sanchez-Cuenca, L. (2000) ‘The political basis of support for European integration’. European Union Politics 1(2): 147–171. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001) ‘Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe’, Opposing Europe, Sussex European Institute Working Paper 46, Brighton. Talving, L. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2021) ‘Linking two levels of governance: Citizens’ trust in domestic and European institutions over time’. Electoral Studies 70: 102289. Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1): 1–16. Van Elsas, E. and van der Brug, W. (2015) ‘The changing relationship between left– right ideology and euroscepticism, 1973– 2010’. European Union Politics 16(2): 194–215. Van Kessel, S., Chelotti, N., Drake, H., Roch, J. and Rodi, P. (2020) ‘Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22(1): 65–84. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) ‘Continuity and change in the study of euroscepticism: plus ça change?’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1): 153–168.

43. Exploitation

In other words, the analyst is usually vague about where to demarcate the distinction between acceptable versus exploitative behavior. For example, in regard to the Exploitation has typically been used in two aforementioned topics, exactly what level of general ways in sociological studies from clas- expense and technology is required in ecosical theorists up until the present time. The nomic development that involves utilizing first is the broader and often rather subjective environmental resources? Is the domesticaunderstanding of exploitation as the treatment tion of animals for human use as pets, food, of a person or thing that is somehow unfair or clothing always exploitation? Exactly what or inappropriate because some other person sort of practices are considered appropriate (or group of people) is acting excessively in in intimate relationships between women and their own self-interest in their treatment of men? Are children of any age in any kind of the exploited person or thing (e.g., Tharinger society never allowed to engage in any type of et al. 1990; Fuentes 2017). The second general physical chores? Was Foucault correct in his meaning of exploitation is more specific in ref- stated belief that 12-year-old children should erencing economic exchange that is unequal be able to give their consent to freely have sex or lopsided in the sense of one party obtaining with anyone they choose? Exactly where to demarcate the distincmuch more value than is normally expected from the other party involved in the exchange. tion between exploitation versus appropriThe common denominator between these two ate behavior may be quite complex in most types of understandings of exploitation is that instances and perhaps beyond the scope of one party is gaining at the expense of another the analyst’s research concerns. Nonetheless, party so that the latter is being “taken advan- a more informed usage of exploitation as a conceptual rather than a merely evaluative tage of” by the former. Examples of the first, more expansive term should at least be generally indicative usage include the exploitation of women by of an appropriate counterfactual case. To their male companions; the exploitation of the extent that the analyst fails to clarify the children by forcing them to engage in harsh non-exploitative alternative in a logical and labor or sexual relations; the exploitation reasonable way, then the use of exploitation of animals such as those that are illegally constitutes more of a moralistic statement poached in order to sell their body parts; the than an illuminating analytical assessment exploitation of executed prisoners and other (Roemer 1985:33). People’s value judgments captives when their organs are harvested for and moralistic sentiments are notoriously the financial gain of their captors; and the affected by their own personal political exploitation of the environment by developers instincts or the standards of the society or who do not take proper precautions to limit social groupings with which the person idenpollution or the degradation of ecosystems. tifies. Flippant moralistic usages of exploitaSociological research has considered all of tion have led at least one leading sociologist to these topics in addition to other exploitative argue that “exploitation is a word that I would myself gladly see disappear from the sociophenomena. However, as is common in its more expan- logical lexicon” (Goldthorpe 2000:1574). In regard to the second general meaning of sive usage, describing such practices as exploitation often entails an arguably sub- exploitation (which Roemer [1985:33] refers jective component due to some conceptual to as “exploitation in its technical sense”), ambiguity. By labeling the situation as exploi- the usage specifically identifies economic tation, the analyst denotes their moral disap- exchange that is unusually or unnecessarproval of the circumstances surrounding the ily unequal due to one party obtaining much given phenomena because that term implies more value than is to be expected from (i.e., that some inappropriate action is involved at the expense of) the other party involved whereby the perpetrating party is deemed to in the exchange. The origin of this usage in be gaining an undue or inappropriate level of sociology is commonly attributed to Karl advantage or reward. The ambiguity arises Marx who famously envisioned capitalist when the analyst is unclear (often entirely so) society as being inherently exploitative. That about what counterfactual would specifically conclusion derives from Marx’s labor theory be required in order for the situation not to be of value which assumes that value is proportional to “socially necessary” labor time deemed exploitation. 169

170  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology (Cohen 1979:339). Marx maintained that any remuneration paid to any factor of production other than labor constitutes exploitation by definition. Capitalism is therefore necessarily exploitative because it rewards other factors of production such as land, machinery, new technology, energy inputs, and of course any associated financial investment (i.e., “capital”). Exploitation thus refers to the quantity of “surplus value” that was created by labor but is diverted (i.e., “appropriated”) to pay for those other factors of production (Cohen 1979:341; Zafirovski 2003:463). Marxist theory has had an enormous influence on discussions of exploitation and of course on sociology more generally especially during the twentieth century. In recent decades, however, the analytical usefulness of the orthodox version of Marx’s labor theory of value has been increasingly questioned (Roemer 1985:65; Sakamoto and Liu 2006:211; Sørensen 2000:1524) while the broader limitations of Marxist theory have become more widely recognized (e.g., Lenski 2001; Barone et al. 2022). The classical Marxist view of exploitation has thus been losing its popularity in part because of the growing recognition that, as stated by Sørensen (2000:1524), “it is based on a labor theory of value abandoned long ago, even by Marxist economists.” Sociologists in recent decades have been considering more flexible definitions of economic exploitation. Perhaps the most pliable of definitions is provided by Wright (1997, 2000) who seeks to retain the esprit of Marxist theory by emphasizing the “appropriation of labor effort” as a necessary condition for the existence of exploitation (Wright 2000:1563). The other major preconditions of his definition are that the appropriation needs to derive from “the exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive resources” and that one party is gaining material advantage “that causally depends upon the reductions of the material welfare of the exploited” (Wright 2000:1563). Wright’s definition seems motivated to develop a more general understanding of Marx’s “surplus value” as the underlying source of exploitation albeit a definition that, as explicitly stated by Wright (2000:1563), “does not depend upon the thesis of the labor theory of value.” As argued by Sakamoto and Liu (2006), however, Wright’s (2000) definition errs in the opposite direction by being too vague analytically. Wright certainly formulates a more

flexible definition by rescinding the labor theory of value, but he suggests no alternative conception of value to fill the conceptual void. Wright’s (2000) discussion is definitely highly critical of capitalism as being inherently exploitative because Wright intentionally seeks to maintain the Marxist tradition. The problem arises, however, that Wright is entirely unclear about what the non-exploitative counterfactual situation would entail thereby rendering the application of his definition arbitrary. The vagueness is heightened by Wright’s (2000:1566–1570) strong critique of Sørensen’s (2000) view of exploitation that relies on market values derived from competitive processes which, following Marxist custom, Wright categorically rejects. Lacking any reliance on the labor theory of value, market values, or any hints about how to know when a worker is being underpaid, Wright’s (2000) discussion is inherently ambiguous. As concluded by Sakamoto and Liu (2006:209), “Wright’s analysis of exploitation, therefore, remains primarily normative and empirically unsubstantiated.” For example, Wright refers to rentier capitalists collecting interest payments as an obvious example of exploitation but then acknowledges in a footnote that some interest payments are legitimate “costs of production” (Wright 2000:1566). Whether, how much, and under what circumstances interest payments constitute exploitation thus remains indeterminate in Wright’s discussion (Sakamoto and Liu 2006:216). Suppose that the “rentier capitalist” is an elderly retiree whose wealth was mostly obtained through the purchase of a house that appreciated over decades as well as from a working lifetime of saved earnings that accrued tax-free interest payments (which is, in fact, an extremely common case in aging societies). How much exploitation is this “rentier capitalist” engaging in? A clearer analysis of the exploitative nature of interest payments could probably be imagined, but Wright does not provide any analytical basis for understanding what exactly constitutes the “appropriation of labor effort” in the context of a market economy. Assessing when the material advantage of one party “causally depends upon the reductions of the material welfare of the exploited” also remains conceptually arbitrary until some alternative is considered or at least suggested (Sakamoto and Liu 2006:212). Another related approach which seeks to broadly adhere to the Marxist tradition is Tilly

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exploitation  171 (1998). Generally consistent with Wright, Tilly (1998:86–87) defines exploitation as occurring when “some well-connected group of actors controls a valuable labor-demanding resource from which they can extract returns only by harnessing the effort of others whom they exclude from the full value added by that effort.” Tilly’s (1998) view is similar to Wright’s in that they both focus on the gain of one party over another because the labor of the latter group is not being fully compensated. The exploiting party can “extract returns” due to some organized power to “control valuable resources,” but this power need not necessarily be based on monopolistic market forces (Tilly 1998:90–91). Like Wright’s work, Tilly (1998) has been quite popular. Tilly (1998) strongly influences, for example, Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt’s (2019) discussion of exploitation within firms. Unfortunately, however, Tilly’s (1998) approach suffers from the same essential limitation as Wright (2000). By not being conceptually clear about how to define the value of labor, the application of Tilly’s (1998) definition seems arbitrary as is illustrated by Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt’s (2019:109–114) interpretations which are debatable. Relatedly, no one has ever proposed any specific measure of exploitation as defined by Tilly (1998) or Wright (2000). Rather than being measurable in terms of a specific numerical quantity, exploitation using Tilly (1998) or Wright (2000) reduces to simply being a qualitative, judgmental assessment of a particular situation. An analytically more complete analysis was developed by Sørensen (2000) which was alluded to above. Sørensen (2000) describes his approach as the “rent-based concept of class as exploitation” which is more compatible with conventional neoclassical economics. That is, in contrast to Marx, Wright (2000), and Tilly (1998), Sørensen’s (2000:1536) definition explicitly adopts market values in lieu of the defunct labor theory of value. Sørensen (2000:1536) uses the neoclassical economics model based on marginal productivity theory in which values are derived after accounting for all of the factors of production under the condition of a high level of competitive market pressures (i.e., which is formally referred to as perfect competition). Exploitation is then defined as economic advantages (i.e., income gains) above and beyond the values

that would have been obtained under perfect competition. Sørensen (2000:1540–1548) details the different sources of deviations from perfect competition in markets. These include various types of monopoly power: differential property rights; informational advantages; agglomeration effects derived from applying a particular combination of different factors of production, some of which may possess asset specificity; and endowed natural resources which may also include scarce human abilities. Some of this discussion builds upon his earlier work interfacing between economics and the sociological study of class (Sørensen 1996). Sørensen’s approach appears not to be as popular as one might expect given its conceptual clarity perhaps because many sociologists working in this area of research (e.g., Tilly, Wright, Avent-Holt [2015]) still seem reluctant to fully adopt analytical tools from neoclassical economics. However, the discussion of Sørensen (1996, 2000) makes clear that important sociological factors still play critical roles in the configuration of market structure and related topics concerning monopoly power. Sakamoto and Liu (2006) extended some key conceptual issues developed by Sørensen as well as by Wright (2000) in his critique of Sørensen (2000). (Sørensen died in 2001 and never responded to Wright’s comments.) Building upon those studies, Sakamoto and Liu (2006) defined three types of exploitation depending upon the context in which the counterfactual market values are assessed: (1) Pigouvian exploitation; (2) rent-extraction exploitation; and (3) initial-conditions exploitation. Pigouvian exploitation (which was initially identified by Pigou [1932]) is a sort of direct discrimination that occurs when a group of workers (or possibly some other factor of production) is paid less than their observed value of marginal productivity, given the existing conditions in the economy. Rent-extraction exploitation (which is most emphasized by Sørensen [2000]) uses as its comparison the group’s value of marginal productivity as estimated if the economy were closer to perfectly competitive conditions by removing monopolistic elements and other barriers to entry. Initial-conditions exploitation (which is emphasized by Wright [2000]) is more difficult to empirically estimate but uses as its comparison the group’s value of marginal productivity as estimated

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172  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology if the economy were closer to perfectly competitive conditions and also if the initial distribution of household income were more equal (i.e., removing the inequality in material circumstances that children adapt to during their socialization and human capital development). Sakamoto and Kim (2010, 2014) provide precise numerical estimates of Pigouvian exploitation among groups of workers in the US manufacturing sector using data from the 1970s through the end of the twentieth century. The results showed female, Hispanic, and blue-collar workers were consistently underpaid relative to the value of the marginal productivities (i.e., exploited) while older workers, managers, and professionals were overpaid relative to the value of the marginal productivities (i.e., exploiters). In terms of changes over that time period, the exploitation of lower-paid workers increased while the overpayment of higher-paid workers increased. Relative to the value of their marginal productivity, African American workers were initially underpaid during the 1970s but became overpaid by the 1990s. Although not as yet well developed, an alternative approach is to define exploitation with an explicitly normative counterfactual. As argued by Avent-Holt (2015), the rationale for a normative approach is that the marginal productivity theory lacks any moral basis. He suggests that some baseline counterfactuals may be defined in terms of “norms of fairness regarding the distribution of economic resources” (Avent-Holt 2015:219). Relatedly, Roemer (1985:65) states that “precisely when the asset distribution is unjust becomes the central question to which Marxian political philosophy should direct its attention.” A normative model of exploitation may eventually become a fruitful alternative to the rentbased approach of Sørensen (2000) and its extensions by Sakamoto and Liu (2006) and Sakamoto and Kim (2010, 2014). In conclusion, our internet searches indicate that exploitation is a term that continues to be consistently found in sociology journals. It has typically been used in two slightly different but related ways. The first is exploitation in a very general sense, and the second is exploitation in regard to a specific view of inequality in economic exchanges. The latter has been traditionally based on the Marxian view using his labor theory of value, but that approach has become less

popular in recent decades. To date, the rentbased approach based on Sørensen (2000) is the most well-developed alternative that has been empirically operationalized. However, debate continues about whether and under what circumstances marginal productivity theory is an adequate basis to use as the nonexploitative counterfactual. Sociologists will undoubtedly continue to further research this issue while at the time using exploitation in its more general sense. Arthur Sakamoto and Michael Ohsfeldt

References Avent-Holt, Dustin. 2015. “Reconceptualizing Exploitation: New Directions for an Old Concept in Social Stratification.” Social Currents 2(3):213–221. Barone, Carlo, Florian R. Hertel, and Oscar Smallenbroek. 2022. “The Rise of Income and the Demise of Class and Social Status? A Systematic Review of Measures of Socio-economic Position in Stratification Research.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 78:100678. Cohen, Gerald A. 1979. “The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:338–360. Fuentes, Alejandro. 2017. “Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Traditional Lands and Exploitation of Natural Resources: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Safeguards.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 24(3):229–253. Goldthorpe, John H. 2000. “Rent, Class Conflict, and Class Structure: A Commentary on Sørensen.” American Journal of Sociology 105(6):1572–1582. Lenski, Gerhard. 2001. “New Light on Old Issues: The Relevance of Really Existing Socialist Societies for Stratification Theory.” Pp.77–84 in Social Stratification: Class, Race and Gender in Sociological Perspective, 2nd edition, edited by David B. Grusky. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pigou, Arthur C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan. Roemer, John E. 1985. “Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14:30–65. Sakamoto, Arthur, and Jeng Liu. 2006. “A Critique of Wright’s Analysis of Exploitation.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 24(2):209–221.

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exploitation  173 Sakamoto, Arthur, and ChangHwan Kim. 2010. “Is Rising Earnings Inequality Associated with Increased Exploitation? Evidence for U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1971–1996.” Sociological Perspectives 53(1):19–43. Sakamoto, Arthur, and ChangHwan Kim. 2014. “Bringing Productivity Back in: Rising Inequality and Economic Rents in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 1971 to 2001.” The Sociological Quarterly 55(2):282–314. Sørensen, Aage B. 1996. “The Structural Basis of Social Inequality.” American Journal of Sociology 101(5):1333–1365. Sørensen, Aage B. 2000. “Toward a Sounder Basis for Class Analysis.” American Journal of Sociology 105(6):1523–1558. Tharinger, Deborah, Connie B. Horton, and Susan Millea. 1990. “Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children and Adults with

Mental Retardation and other Handicaps.” Child Abuse and Neglect 14(3):301–312. Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable Inequality. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, and Dustin Avent-Holt. 2019. Relational Inequalities: An Organizational Approach. New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, Erik O. 1997. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wright, Erik O. 2000. “Class, Exploitation, and Economic Rents: Reflections on Sørensen's Sounder Basis.” American Journal of Sociology 105(6):1559–1571. Zafirovski, Milan. 2003. “Measuring and Making Sense of Labor Exploitation in Contemporary Society: A Comparative Analysis.” Review of Radical Political Economics 35(4):462–484.

Arthur Sakamoto and Michael Ohsfeldt

44. Extreme right

parties’ tendency to engage in contentious politics outside of parliaments, activities which include collaborating with alternative media outlets, organizing demonstrations, Public interest in the extreme and radical right and at times engaging in political violence. Though many have leant on comparisons to has increased dramatically in the twenty-first century. From Viktor Orbán to Narendra the pre-war rise of Nazism to explain the farModi, from PEGIDA to the Proud Boys, from right milieu of the twenty-first century, most Christchurch to Utøya—anti-system politi- scholars agree that fascism is not the current cians and racist violence in peaceful societies essence of the radical right. Even (and espehave challenged firmly held ideas about the cially) political parties with links to openly fascist movements typically work to distance resiliency of liberal democracy. Who are those “fighting back” against, in themselves from the stigma of biological ractheir view, corrupt political elites that have ism in order to be electorally viable (Ignazi betrayed their nation and ethnic majority pop- 1992). This distancing has led to the creation of ulation? How do they frame their messages in a salient radical-right master frame (Benford online chat rooms, in movement propaganda, and Snow 2000) internationally: a pairing of or on the floor of a parliament? What oppor- ethnonationalist xenophobia (or nativism) and tunity structures make their success or failure anti-establishment populism (Rydgren 2005). more likely? In this entry, we outline political Nativism brings an exclusionary orthodoxy sociology’s major contributions to the study to nationalist ideologies’ contention that the of the extreme right beginning with a sketch borders of the nation and state should align. of the field’s major concepts. Then we out- Rooted in myths of a harmonious and homogline demand- and supply-side approaches to enous past, nativists advocate policies which understanding far-right mobilization. The lat- prioritize ethnic natives, internally and exterter set of approaches is used to introduce the nally securitizing the nation against the wideranging threats posed by immigrants—the far far right as a social movement. Most scholarship on the far right has right’s raison d’être. Nativists’ arguments against immigration defined “the right” in opposition to “the left” on an axis of anti-egalitarianism versus egali- are distinguished from the fascists’ argutarianism, respectively (Bobbio and Cameron ments against immigration, in part, by the 1996). While the right understands inequali- ethnopluralist paradigm. Instead of claiming ties to be natural, the left sees inequality as a hierarchy of racial distinction, the radical amenable and unacceptable, directing the right purports to understand ethnical differences as non-hierarchal. Monolithic national state to intervene. Nearly 30 years of debate has produced cultures and heritages across borders can a tentative definitional consensus on the key only be and should be protected by preventing terms far, radical, and extreme right (Mudde their mixing, a miscegenation which eventu2007). Radical politics are distinguished from ally leads to individual cultures’ extinction extreme politics by radical politics’ compli- at the hands of a decadent globalist culture. ance with a minimal form of democracy. The The exclusion of others via deportation is the extreme right rejects and attempts to replace fundamental ethnopluralist policy. This parademocracy, while the radical right tries to digm is notably, at times, linked to anxieties reform it from within in their own illiberal over the demographic replacement of an ethideological image. This radical/extreme nic majority with an invading minority popubifurcation tempts us to exclusively link radi- lation, most often Muslims. Why do people support nativist, anti-estabcal politics to the party sector and extreme politics to the non-parliamentary movement lishment political parties and movements? sector. But political sociologists have pointed The bulk of early political scientific-inspired out an ongoing hybridization and the mutual research on the far right was devoted to underinclusivity of movement and party politics— standing the grievances which pushed peoleading some to prefer the use of the far-right ple toward the populist radical right. Emile concept instead (Pirro 2022). Analytically less Durkheim’s anomie concept, borrowed from precise but more encompassing, “far right” is the sociological tradition, aided the developan umbrella term which captures both radi- ment of the early social breakdown thesis. cal and extreme variants of nativist collective This thesis understood support for radicalaction. The term helps recognize far-right right ideas to be a product of temporary social 174

extreme right  175 crisis. This implied a manageable equilibrium of rational voters content with centrist policies unless subjected to social dissolution, a contention which has been empirically discredited (Mudde 2010). Support for far-right organizations is not irrational but linked to ideological and pragmatic choices. Ideology has long proven to be just as crucial to voters’ decision to support the populist radical right (PRR) as other parties (van der Brug et al. 2000). Scholars have turned to more sound demandside explanations, all emphasizing voters’ grievances with social change to explain their support for the PRR. These include anxieties over modernization, poor economic conditions, competition with minorities, and discontent with mainstream parties (see Rydgren 2007 and Golder 2016 for a review). At the structural level, sociologists have pointed to how the transition to a neoliberal, postindustrial economy has brought with it parallel demands for authoritarian forms of decision making (Kitschelt and McGann 1997). In summation, there is no single grievance that can uniformly explain support for the PRR across countries. Recent scholarship has explored how cultural and economic backlash is deeply interconnected (Norris and Inglehart 2019) and rooted not just in national contexts, but in local conditions as well (Harteveld et al. 2022). The pathological normalcy thesis is one influential critique of demand-side approaches (Mudde 2010). This thesis treats radical-right politics not as a pathology or product of crisis but as an intrinsic feature of the demos. By empirically demonstrating that demand for nativism, populism, and authoritarianism is a given in liberal democracy (and not a temporary aberration) the critique of the social breakdown thesis—which suggests an equilibrium or state of “non-grievance”—is extended to the entire premise which demand-side questions are built on. This critique encouraged a generation of scholars to “bring parties back in” and approach the radical right from the supply side. Supply-side approaches to the far right focus on the structural conditions, organizational make-up, and strategies which the far right uses to appeal to supporters. Methods and concepts of sociological social movement literature are used to explain how these actors capitalize on favorable political opportunity structures and frame their messaging. Organizationally, in line with their emphasis on strong man-style authoritarianism, far-right movements and parties typically

have hierarchal internal structures. Decisionmaking power is often fixed within a small cadre. While this can allow organizations to emerge quickly and electorally break through in relation to certain events—the 2015 socalled refugee crisis, for instance—the development of a strong internal structure has proved necessary for maintaining success. Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) was able to rapidly organize mass, weekly demonstrations in East Germany in reaction to the crisis but failed, despite their attempts, to consolidate into an electoral force. Strong party organizations behoove all parties, including the far right. This anecdote suggests an interaction between organizational capacity and political opportunity structures, the focus of much supply-side literature. Opportunity structures can be both political and discursive. At the state level, electoral rules or restrictions on offensive speech, for instance, can inhibit the participation of the far right in the public sphere. Far-right rejections of political correctness mean actors are often penalized for making racist, unsavory statements—such as Geert Wilder’s conviction for insulting Moroccans by inciting a crowd to chant that they wanted “fewer” of the minority in the Netherlands. Similarly, a democratic deficiency in a centralized party structure can trigger exclusion from democratic consideration in, for example, more militant democracies like Germany. Far-right parties have to navigate these formal rules and de facto cordons sanitaires adopted by, for example, media outlets—who serve as gatekeepers between all political movements and the public. In Luxembourg, journalists nearly uniformly negatively cover the Flemish Interest party, refusing to reproduce their ideology uncritically (de Jonge 2019). The far right has tested and these cordons sanitaires have been eroded by unignorable electoral successes and updates to these organizations’ external framing of their messages. Frames, in part, explain how far-right movements navigate closed political opportunity structures in their pursuit of shifting public opinion and/or electoral success. Derivatives of the ethnonationalist xenophobic and anti-establishment populist master frame take different forms depending on their national contexts. Jobbik, a successful Hungarian party-movement hybrid, mobilized widespread anti-Roma sentiments to Jens Rydgren and Ryan Switzer

176  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology mobilize Hungarian voters through cultural—not biological—stigmatization (Pirro 2018). The Sweden Democrats nostalgically harken to an imagined, past Golden Age to draw links between multiculturalism and national decline, drawing on the country’s long history of welfarism (Elgenius and Rydgren 2019). More general frames scholars have located through comparative analysis include anti-capitalism, anti-modernity, law and order, and racism (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012). These cognitive “ways of seeing” are deliberated by movement elites and, from the top down, used by activists to ideologically interpret social issues they witness. Policymakers and students of the far right should foremost recognize the heterogeneity of these actors across levels of organization (parties, movements, and subcultures), goals, and contexts. Treatment of the far right as a social movement then captures the reality of their mobi­ lization across different planes of contention (Castelli Gattinara and Pirro 2018). Beyond elections, the far right has indeed con­tributed to a cultural and social milieu as well as the political. Future research should recog­nize this and make use of a variety of meth­odological tools across sociology’s subfields. And while it may be tempting to, in reaction to their perceived novelty, treat the far right as an aberration of democracy “soon to pass”, these movements’ specific brand of national­ism has a strong resonance in liberal democ­racies and is likely here to stay. Jens Rydgren and Ryan Switzer

References Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 611–639. Bobbio, N., & Cameron, A. (1996). Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Caiani, M., della Porta, D., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Mobilising on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Castelli Gattinara, P., & Pirro, A. L. P. (2018). The far right as social movement. European Societies, 21(4), 447–462. Jens Rydgren and Ryan Switzer

De Jonge, L. (2019). The populist radical right and the media in the Benelux: Friend or foe? The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 24(2), 189–209. Elgenius, G., & Rydgren, J. (2019). Frames of nostalgia and belonging: The resurgence of ethno-nationalism in Sweden. European Societies, 21(4), 583–602. Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 19(1), 477–497. Harteveld, E., Van Der Brug, W., De Lange, S., & Van Der Meer, T. (2022). Multiple roots of the populist radical right: Support for the Dutch PVV in cities and the countryside. European Journal of Political Research, 61(2), 440–461. Ignazi, P. (1992). The silent counter‐revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right‐wing parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(1), 3–34. Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1997). The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2010). The populist radical right: A pathological normalcy. West European Politics, 33(6), 1167–1186. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (1st ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pirro, A. L. P. (2018). Lo and behold: Jobbik and the crafting of a new Hungarian far right. In: M. Caiani & O. Císař (Eds.), Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe. London: Routledge. Pirro, A. L. P. (2023). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 101–112. Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme rightwing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. European Journal of Political Research, 44(3), 413–437. Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. Annual Review of Sociology, 33(1), 241–262. van der Brug, Wouter, Fennema, Meindert, & Tillie, Jean (2000). “Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?” European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), 77–102.

45. Factionalism

engage in collective action to achieve their members’ particular objectives” (p. 468). Boucek’s (2009) distinction between cooperative, competitive, and degenerative facOrganizations are rarely homogeneous actors. tionalism has proven helpful in case studies To understand the internal life of organi- of factions in political parties. On their own, zations, we need to understand factions. though, the three types of factionalism aid Fortunately, there is a rich literature on the description more than explanation. In the literature on factionalism in topic. The figures in Ceron (2019: 6) show that “intra-party politics is a well-established democracies, the cases of Italy’s Christian area of party politics” and that interest in fac- Democrats and Japan’s Liberal Democratic tions and factionalism has increased substan- Party dominate. Both parties ruled their countially in the last decade. It is thus surely an tries for many decades after the Second World exaggeration to claim that “factionalism has War, leading Boucek (2012) to examine why been poorly developed in the study of political dominant parties seem especially prone to parties and it is still an orphan of conceptual experiencing factionalism. Her analysis highapproaches and hypotheses” (Verge & Gómez lights intra-party competition, but also notes 2012: 668). It is true, though, that the most how the type of democracy makes a differinfluential contribution is half a century old. ence. Boucek (2012) claims that majoritarian Also, the literature on factions remains frag- institutions put a premium on party unity and, mented by type of organization, with some by consequence, constraints on factionalism. types of organizations (especially political The link between type of democracy, majoriparties) receiving more attention than others. tarian versus consensus (Bogaards 2017), and The most complete treatment of factions factionalism is promising (Invernizzi 2023). remains Sartori (1976). He distinguishes Hicken and Tan (2020: 193) offer an imporbetween “pre-party” and “within” party fac- tant nuance, pointing out that “factionalism tions. The first type is the faction that Madison across dominant and opposition parties difwas concerned with in the Federalist Papers fers in terms of the origin, type, and effect” due to differential access to resources. (cited in Sartori 1976: 12–13): We use Close and Gherghina’s (112019: a number of citizens, whether amounting to 657) analysis of bibliographic data on intraa majority or minority of the whole, who are party cohesion to structure the discussion of united and activated by some common impulse the contemporary literature on factionalism in of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights what follows. They discover three themes in of other citizens, or to the permanent and the literature on factionalism: (1) the strength aggregated interests of the community. of factions/the degree of institutionalization; (2) their nature, for example, whether facAs is clear from this quote, Madison thought tions are ideological versus clientelistic; (3) of factions as a problem, a view shared by the scope of factions, meaning how dominant many political philosophers before the advent factions are in a party’s organization. of mass politics. An important innovation is that the The second, contemporary, type of fac- strength of factions can now be measured. tion is as a sub-unit within a political party. This has spurred quantitative research on Also in this sense, the term has negative con- factions as an independent and dependent notations, as it suggests internal divisions and variable. For example, the “Visible Intraparty power battles. Sartori (1976) prefers the more Factionalization” score calculates for every neutral term “fraction”, but this never caught party the number of candidates in a leaderon. More influential were Sartori’s typology ship race weighted by the share of votes each of factions (pp. 75–82) and his hypotheses attracted (Emanuele et al. 2023). Ceron (2019) (pp. 93–104) on the emergence and resilience uses party congress motions to identify both of factions. the factions and their preferences. Moving beyond static typologies, Boucek Many typologies and hypotheses about (2009, 2012) looks at dynamics. She views factions focus on their nature. For example, factionalism as a “process”, defined as “the programmatic parties are said to be internally partitioning of a political party (or other cohesive because of ideology. However, interorganization and group) into sub-units which nal rigidity can just as well galvanize competare more or less institutionalized and who ing factions and internal splits (Chambers & 177

178  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Ufen 2020: 8), especially when disagreements over policy decisions emerge in highly centralized ruling parties. Factions matter. Through formal channels or informally, factions can substantially shape a party’s organizational structures, influence policy outcomes, veto decisions, or even align with political parties in the opposition (DiSalvo 2009). In American politics, factions within the Democratic and Republican parties loosen the typical constraints of two-party systems and help legislators define their political positions more precisely to voters (Clarke 2020: 455). Using formal modeling, Dewan and Squintani (2016: 876) even arrive at a “defense of factions”, arguing they “enhance the quality of party programs” and moderate the extremists. It should be noted their study does not draw on original empirical research and was written before Trump took over the Republican party. Though there is some consensus in the literature that governments with factionalized parties may be less stable over time (Druckmann 1996), the impact of factionalism on the stability of a political system varies. In new or fragile democracies factionalism can be symptomatic of ongoing institutionalization (Olson 1998). In older regimes, factionalism can indicate the opposite. Finally, the scope of factions can be measured empirically. Verge and Gómez (2012) use the degree of vertical integration of factions to characterize the internal organization of political parties across levels of governance. Factions are not limited to democratic politics. The one-party states and military regimes that characterized the Cold War period were rife with factions. Egypt’s Arab Socialist Union under Gamal Abdel Nasser, for instance, authorized distinct factions during its tenure, which turned into political parties when his successor introduced a multi-party system (Hinnebusch 2017: 8). In an era of de-democratization and autocratization, the study of factionalism in authoritarian settings is gaining new traction (Musil and Bilgin 2016). When autocrats need to safeguard their power, they can deliberately engineer factions and facilitate factionalism within the party system and other institutions to structurally undermine political opposition. This has happened, for example, in Thailand (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2020) and Sudan. After decades of ruling through a highly centralized Matthijs Bogaards and Hager Ali

one-party state, Omar al-Bashir introduced a multi-party system in Sudan; though it appeared like a concession to ethnoreligious minorities, the intra- and interparty rivalries that emerged through electoral competition ultimately fractured the political opposition and helped cement al-Bashir’s regime (Ali et al. 2022). In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic stacking of institutions, including militaries, is a common strategy to counter opposition from religious or ethnic factions (Hendrix & Salehyan 2017). Factions are not limited to political parties. If factions are simply “groups within larger groups” (Boucek 2009: 468) then factions can be studied across different types of organizations. Kretschmer (2013) provides an overview of the literature on factions and factionalism in social movements. Bueno De Mesquita (2008) develops an explanation for the emergence and behavior of factions inside terrorist organizations. The study of factional rivalry inside elites has a long tradition (Nathan & Tsai 1995). In closed systems like China, the analysis of factions is becoming increasingly sophisticated (Chen & Hong 2021). Though militaries should ideally be internally coherent, factions can emerge within armies for various reasons including rank, socio-economic backgrounds of soldiers, ethnoreligious membership, or through political discord. In Turkey in 2016, a dissatisfied army faction attempted a coup against the increasingly authoritarian rule of the prime minister, later president, Erdogan (Waldman & Caliskan 2020). In Venezuela, democratizers sought to exploit divisions within the army to weaken the military’s grip on power and establish civilian control (Trinkunas 2000). The classic view of factions and factionalism is normative and negative. Contemporary political science offers a more nuanced view. Empirical research has shown that the origins, types, functions, and consequences of factionalism vary. Much effort has been put into analyzing particular cases and conditions. New measures and a renewed interest in factionalism in authoritarian regimes promise to revitalize the study of factionalism. One particularly encouraging development is the emergence of theories of intra-party politics, such as the game theoretic approach in Ceron (2019). Though her analysis is limited to political parties, it has the potential to grow into a general theory of

factionalism  179 intra-organizational politics centered on factions. In democratization studies, Bogaards (2018) has asked why we should have different explanations for different regions. In the study of factionalism, we could ask why we are not moving towards an understanding of factionalism that transcends particular types of organization. Matthijs Bogaards and Hager Ali

References Ali, H., Ben Hammou, S., & Powell, J. (2022). Between coups and election: Constitutional engineering and military entrenchment in Sudan. Africa Spectrum 57(3): 327–339. Bogaards, M. (2017). Comparative political regimes: Consensus and majoritarian democracy. In: W. Thompson (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, available at: http://politics​.oxfordre​.com​/ view​/10​.1093​/acrefore​/9780190228637​.001​ .0001​/acrefore​-9780190228637​-e​-65. Bogaards, M. (2018). Microscope or telescope? The study of democratization across world regions. Political Studies Review 16(2): 125–135. Boucek, F. (2009). Rethinking factionalism: Typologies, intra-party dynamics and three faces of factionalism. Party Politics 15(4): 455–485. Boucek, F. (2012). Factional Politics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Buena de Mesquita, E. (2008). Terrorist factions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3(4): 399–418. Ceron, A. (2019). Leaders, Factions and the Game of Intra-Party Politics. London: Routledge. Chambers, P., & Ufen, A. (2020). Causes, effects, and forms of factionalism in Southeast Asia. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39(1): 3–16. Chambers, P., & Waitoolkiat, N. (2020). Faction politics in an interrupted democracy: The case of Thailand. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39(1): 144–166. Chen, T., & Hong, J. (2021). Rivals within: Political factions, loyalty, and elite competition under authoritarianism. Political Science Research and Methods 9(3): 599–614.

Clarke, A. (2020). Party sub‐brands and American party factions. American Journal of Political Science 64(3): 452–470. Close, C., & Gherghina, S. (2019). Rethinking intra-party cohesions: Towards a conceptual and analytical framework. Party Politics 25(5): 652–663. Dewan, T., & Squintani, F. (2016). In defense of factions. American Journal of Political Science 60(4): 860–881. DiSalvo, D. (2009). Party factions in Congress. Congress and the Presidency. 36(1): 27–57. Druckmann, J. (1996). Party factionalism and cabinet durability. Party Politics 2(3): 397–407. Emanuele, V., Marino, B., & Diodati, M. (2023). When institutions matter: Electoral systems and intraparty factionalization in Western Europe. Comparative European Politics 25(3): 356–378. Hendrix, C., & Salehyan, I. (2017). A house divided: Threat perception, military factionalism, and repression in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(8): 1653–1681. Hicken, A., & Tan, N. (2020). Factionalism in Southeast Asia: Types, causes, and effects. Journal of Current Asian Affairs 39(1): 187–204. Hinnebusch, R. (2017). Political parties in MENA: Their functions and development. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44(2): 159–175. Invernizzi, G. M. (2023). Antagonistic cooperation: Factional competition in the shadow of elections. American Journal of Political Science 67(2): 426–439. Kretschmer, K. (2013). Factions/factionalism. In D. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, and D. McAdam (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 443–446. Musil, P., & Bilgin, H. (2016). Types of outcomes in factional rivalries: Lessons from non-democratic parties in Turkey. International Political Science Review 37(2): 166–183. Nathan, A., & Tsai, K. (1995). Factionalism: A new institutionalist restatement. The China Journal 34: 157–192. Olson, D. (1998.). Party formation and party system consolidation in the new democracies of Central Europe. Political Studies 46(3): 432–464. Matthijs Bogaards and Hager Ali

180  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Trinkunas, H. A. (2000). Crafting civilian control in emerging democracies: Argentina and Venezuela. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42(3): 77–109.

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Verge, T., & Gómez, R. (2012). Factionalism in multi-level contexts: When party organization becomes a device. Party Politics 18(5): 667–685. Waldman, S., & Caliskan, E. (2020). Factional and unprofessional: Turkey’s military and the July 2016 attempted coup. Democracy and Security 16(2): 123–150.

46. Feminism Women are at a disadvantage globally. With few exceptions, women have been, and continue to be, excluded from positions of high power, prestige, and wealth. Feminism demands the equality of all human beings despite their gender identity. To do this, the overarching goal of feminism is to level inequities between women and men. The feminist movement, feminist research, feminist thought, and feminist methodology lead us closer to achieving equality among men and women. Defined by bell hooks, feminism is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression (1984). Feminist sociology takes the standpoint of women’s experiences to examine how patriarchal and maledominated institutions, rules, customs, and norms disadvantage women in social, political, and economic contexts. Sociologist and Black feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins (1990) writes that for women, shared experiences of oppression and struggle against that oppression give them a particular standpoint. Refusing to essentialize, rejecting objectivity, and accepting that a universal truth does not exist are some tenets of post-structuralist feminist theory (Weedon 1997). Embracing that all women have unique standpoints that inform their perspectives, it is imperative to recognize that no research approach—qualitative, quantitative, ethnographic, theoretical, or empirical—best illustrates a feminist method (DeVault 1996). There are several feminist methods, schools of feminist thought, and approaches to feminist research. Several schools of thought exist for conducting feminist research (B. A. Ackerly and True 2020). The most popular approaches among earlier waves of feminism, however, were the liberal, Marxist, post-modernist, and post-colonialist schools of thought. Scholars within these traditions focused on understanding the roles of freedom and equality, the means of production, the deconstruction of gender binaries, and the role of colonialism in women’s lives. Feminist theory has explored how the “woman” category is created and exists only in its subservient relationship to the “male” (Butler 2006). On the other hand, queer feminist theory imparts that the social construction of identities, including

sexuality, can change over time and is thus impossible to place into finite categories. Queer feminist theory suggests that removing categories altogether is liberating and necessary to understand human behavior. Advances in feminist thought now include a variety of approaches, such as anti-colonial feminism, Black feminism, disability feminism, ecofeminism, psychoanalytic feminism, queer feminism, and radical feminism (B. A. Ackerly and True 2020). Collectively, these schools of thought are useful in the diverse ways researchers can conceptualize the approach best suited for their project (B. Ackerly and True 2010). There is not one feminist method or thought that captures the range of feminist positions. As a research paradigm, feminism and feminist methodologies are potent tools. How women interact within the political world, women-led social movements, women’s political behavior, and their representation within political institutions structure how, and if, women are politically empowered (Sapiro 1984). Feminist scholarship emerged from a need to disrupt the status quo and masculinist ideologies in the social sciences. Feminist scholars, like other scholars, use the methods that are best suited for the research they are conducting and that can move the needle on the feminist agenda. Naming pivotal feminist movements is needed to contextualize the outgrowth of feminist-oriented scholarship and scholarly debates (B. Ackerly and True 2010). To understand how feminist research developed, it is imperative to understand the four waves of the feminist movement. White, upper-middle-class women led the first wave of the feminist movement initially (Butler 2006). In 1851, the Women’s Suffrage Movement, beginning at Seneca Falls, united women around the lack of voting rights. However, women’s rights advocates existed before the language of feminism. Abolitionist Sojourner Truth combined women’s rights and slavery’s abolition in her 1851 speech, “Ain’t I a Woman?”. American women did not get the right to vote until 1920. The beginning of the second wave of the feminist movement coincided with the publishing of Friedan’s The Feminist Mystique and the African Americans’ Civil Rights Movement. Friedan (1963 [2013]) tapped into American women’s frustration with gender inequity in the household. Through the National Organization of Women (NOW),

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182  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the organization she led, Friedan leveraged the protest climate of the Civil Rights Movement to advance women’s causes and interests through rallies and demonstrations. Despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—which banned gender-based discrimination—feminists continued to fight to increase women’s equality and legislate feminist causes. While white women’s voices and concerns primarily dominated the United States’ feminist movement, feminists and the feminist movement thrived beyond the United States. Moraga and Anzaldua (2015 [1983]) anthology, This Bridge Called My Back, organized the writing of queers, Latinas, and women at the borderlands as subjects of feminist research, on topics of race, gender, sexuality, and nativity, by writers from the “Third World.” This anthology introduced a global perspective on women’s issues and provided an avenue for non-Western feminists to connect. Race, sexuality, and gender expression are relevant for lesbian and queer women who reject Western feminists’ dominance in feminist spaces (Lorde and Clarke 2007). Again, there is no singular experience for women, and it is imperative to refrain from essentializing women’s experiences for forced commonality (Brown 1992). For Black women, women of color, and indigenous women, a universal feminist standpoint also intersects with their racial, ethnic, and national identities. The third wave of feminism also broadened the topics addressed by feminists to include topics that impacted women worldwide. To further cement that feminism is a global project, the United Nations adopted the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), an international rights treaty. In 1979, CEDAW, although now ratified in many countries, aimed to expand women’s access to reproductive rights, sexuality, inheritance, and property rights, access to credit, and allow women in the workforce. Similarly, the Third World Women’s Alliance (TWWA) emphasized feminism’s global reach. TWWA centered on the voices of women of color worldwide, particularly those confronting challenges in their lives as brought upon by gender, race, class, and imperialism. Feminists against imperialism, in India, at the time were advocating for their freedom from British rule and gender equality simultaneously (Mohanty 1984). Today, feminism remains Western-led,

despite women and girls’ worldwide efforts to achieve gender parity. For American women, the end of the third wave also coincided with electoral and representational change sparked by women’s awareness and consciousness of sexual harassment in the workplace. The “year of the woman” in 1991–1992 is defined by an unprecedented number of American women elected to office (Dolan 1998). Professor Anita Hill testified about sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Hill’s testimony pushed against women believing harassment is an individual misfortune rather than a common experience shared by multiple women (Brown 1992). A chief concern among feminists is combatting sexual abuse globally. Most notably “Denim Day” raises awareness of how institutions fail to hold rapists accountable. In 1996, the Italian Supreme Court overturned a rape conviction because of the survivor’s jeans. Denim Day demonstrates feminist international solidarity. Combatting sexual abuse continues to mobilize anger for women, which started the #MeToo movement of 2006 and beyond. The “personal as political” for women. Globally, women are vastly under-represented in politics compared to men, which remains a challenge to the representation of women and feminist issues (“Women’s Representation,” 2022). Women elected officials are primarily white, followed by Black women, Latinas, Asian American/ Pacific Islanders, Middle Eastern, and Native Americans. This is troubling since female legislators are more likely to propose, sponsor, and vote for bills related to women’s issues—such as education and healthcare—regardless of party and advocate for legislation that favors disadvantaged and minoritized populations (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Despite women making great strides in elected positions globally, the positions women hold are often less powerful than their male counterparts (Paxton and Hughes 2015). Women’s ascent to executive leadership positions is context-dependent and based on institutional structures, party selection processes, quotas, and influential institutions like religion (Jalalzai 2013; Paxton and Hughes 2015). Sexism among the public prevents women from winning elected office. Lastly, the fourth wave of feminism continues one objective of the third combatting women’s harassment. Contemporary

Christine M. Slaughter, Kennia L. Coronado, and Nadia E. Brown

feminism  183 feminism has radical commitment (hooks 2000). Hip-hop feminism, nearly a 30-yearold field, is a broader space among Black and women-of-color feminisms and hip-hop feminist studies that takes an intersectional approach to contemporary issues. Developed during the rise of critical masculinity studies and hip-hop studies, this genre of feminism engages with women in hip-hop culture that spans the genres of music, literature, film, and cultural spaces (Durham, Cooper, and Morris 2013). Hip-hop feminism is a bold articulation of the messiness of women’s lives that are often portrayed politically in binary terms. As Joan Morgan notes, hip-hop feminists call for a form of “feminism brave enough to fuck with the grays” (Morgan 2000, 59). This term distinctly calls for dismantling essentialist claims or feminist turf wars about who or what gets called a feminist. This is key. Hiphop feminists do not conform to traditional or second- and third-wave versions of feminism that seek to theorize in abstract forms that are often used solely to deconstruct and critique rather than to build a new vision of politics (Isoke 2013). What we learn from contemporary feminism is that women’s under-representation in the public sector has dire consequences. Without feminist methods, women’s perspectives are invisible. A feminist methodology is a shared commitment to center the diversity of women, use science as a mechanism that can reduce harm and consequences toward women, and advance change in women’s lives (DeVault 1996). Despite the contributions of feminist scholarship, the critiques around feminist methodology are that it may not be “objective” despite scholars employing a range of methods and demonstrating the utility of feminist methodologies in advancing scientific knowledge (Eichler 1997). Women’s experiences were mainly absent in social science research before feminist academics. Because of feminists’ persistent activism, women’s private experiences represent their “personal” concerns but are also public through their theory-building efforts within feminist approaches. Across disciplines, feminist researchers must remain accountable to the goals of feminism and use research to empower women. Including women’s voices in the research is imperative to achieving these goals (B. Ackerly and True 2010). Overall, feminism is a powerful tool in research. Feminism serves as a political goal

but also a research methodology. Feminism frames social movements but also electoral priorities. Feminists and feminist movement(s) have advocated for women’s rights in four distinct periods, each progressing in different ways toward equality. Centering women’s voices is a simple tool to reach equality. For political sociology, political science, and sociology, there’s an imperative to interrogate feminist thought and women’s local and global political activism to the mainstream. By studying feminism, the power that men wield over women is exposed. Scholars interested in incorporating feminism into their research agenda should (1) center women’s voices, with particular attention to women of marginalized racial, ethnic, and national identities, (2) ensure that gender is an analytic category rather than a placeholder as a comparison to men, (3) contextualize how patriarchy and heteronormativity influence social, economic, and political outcomes, despite its invisibility. There are vast opportunities to expand feminist research, including developing novel methodologies, new theories, and paradigms, increasing the influence of marginalized women, and clarifying feminism as the struggle women face diversifies in contemporary society. Christine M. Slaughter, Kennia L. Coronado, and Nadia E. Brown

References Ackerly, Brooke, and Jacqui True. 2010. “Back to the Future: Feminist Theory, Activism, and Doing Feminist Research in an Age of Globalization.” Women’s Studies International Forum 33(5): 464–72. https:// doi​.org​/10​/ bvgb7r. Ackerly, Brooke A., and Jacqui True. 2020. Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science. 2nd edition. London: Macmillan International. Brown, Elsa Barkley. 1992. “‘What Has Happened Here’: The Politics of Difference in Women’s History and Feminist Politics.” Feminist Studies 18(2): 295–312. https://doi​ .org​/10​/cnczqn. Butler, Judith. 2006. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge Classics. New York: Routledge. DeVault, Marjorie L. 1996. “Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of Feminist Methodology.” Annual Review of

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184  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Sociology 22(1): 29–50. https://doi​.org​/10​/ Glass Ceiling Worldwide. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. c53z6p. Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. “Voting for Women Jones, Martha S. 2020. Vanguard: How Black in the ‘Year of the Woman.’” American Women Broke Barriers, Won the Vote, and Journal of Political Science 42(1): 272–93. Insisted on Equality for All. New York: https://doi​.org​/10​/ bgdwfp. Basic Books. Durham, Aisha, Brittney C. Cooper, and Lorde, Audre, and Cheryl Clarke. 2007. Sister Susana M. Morris. 2013. “The Stage HipOutsider: Essays and Speeches. Reprint Hop Feminism Built: A New Directions edition. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press. Essay.” Signs: Journal of Women in Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1984. “Under Culture and Society 38(3): 721–37. https:// Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and doi​.org​/10​/gnm4rj. Colonial Discourses.” Boundary 2 12/13(3): Eichler, Margrit. 1997. “Feminist 333–58. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/302821. Methodology.” Current Sociology Moraga, Cherríe. 2015. This Bridge Called 45(2): 9–36. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ My Back, Fourth Edition: Writings by /001139297045002003. Radical Women of Color. Edited by Gloria Friedan, Betty, and Anna Quindlen. 2013. Anzaldúa. Illustrated edition. Albany, NY: The Feminine Mystique. 50th Anniversary State University of New York Press. Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Morgan, Joan. 2000. When Chickenheads Company. Come Home to Roost: A Hip-Hop Feminist Hill Collins, Patricia. 1990. Black Feminist Breaks It Down. First Printing Edition. Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and New York: Simon & Schuster. the Politics of Empowerment. Perspectives Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. on Gender, v. 2. Boston, MA: Unwin 2015. “The Increasing Effectiveness of Hyman. National Gender Quotas, 1990–2010.” hooks, bell. 1984. Feminist Theory from Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3): 331– Margin to Center. Boston, MA: South End 62. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/lsq​.12079. Press. Paxton, Pamela, Sheri Kunovich, and Melanie hooks, bell. 2000. Feminism is for Everybody. M. Hughes. 2007. “Gender in Politics.” London: Pluto press. https://www​ Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 263–84. .plutobooks​ . com​ / blog​ / feminism​ - is​ - for​ https://doi​.org​/10​/c335k6. -everybody​-bell​-hooks/. Sapiro, Virginia. 1984. The Political Isoke, Zenzele. 2013. Urban Black Women Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and the Politics of Resistance. New York: and Politics. Urbana, IL: University of Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi​.org​/10​ Illinois Press. .1057​/9781137045386. Weedon, Chris. 1997. Feminist Practice & Jalalzai, Farida. 2013. Shattered, Cracked, or Poststructuralist Theory. 2nd edition. Firmly Intact?: Women and the Executive Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Pub.

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47. Field theory In sociology, the term ‘field theory’ encompasses various relational approaches that examine social action in the context of social orders, referred to as ‘fields’. In a sociological context, a field describes a delineated area of social life in which actors relate to each other on the basis of certain shared understandings. Actors can be individuals or collective actors such as organisations. Fields typically form around specific issues or practices. Field theory can therefore be used to study phenomena as diverse as social or political debates, market dynamics and status struggles within particular areas of activity. Common to various field theories is the notion that specific social forces operate within a field that influence the actors’ scope of action. These forces relate, among other things, to the distribution of resources, the rules and institutions of the field and the characteristics of the actors in the field. The struggles that take place in a particular field are often described using the metaphor of a game, in the sense of a more or less rule-based contest (Martin 2003). Field theory originated in physics and was applied to the social sciences by Gestalt theory, in particular by the social psychologist Kurt Lewin. Early sociologists who made significant contributions to the emergence of today’s popular field theories include Karl Mannheim, Max Weber and Friedrich Fürstenberg (Martin 2003). Today, social scientists working with field theory typically refer to one of the following three concepts: Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of social fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), the concept of organisational (or institutional) fields stemming from neo-institutionalist organisational theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1994) or Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of strategic action fields (2012). In Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology, the term ‘field’ describes “a specialized social space arising when a domain of action and authority becomes sufficiently demarcated, autonomized, and monopolized” (Wacquant and Akçaoğlu 2017: 62). Examples of fields studied by Bourdieu include the artistic field, the economic field and the academic field (for an overview, see Swartz 1997). Bourdieu’s concept of a field is directly related to his concepts of habitus and capital. The relational

positions of the actors in a field depend on their endowment with different forms of capital (social, cultural, economic, symbolic). In each field, specific forms of capital apply: scientific reputation, for example, only applies in the academic field and is less relevant in the field of art. The scope of this capital determines the boundaries of the field. The habitus of the actors within a field describes the dispositions for action they have internalised during socialisation. Their habitus is, in turn, strongly influenced by their endowment with capital and their position in the social space. Other key concepts within Bourdieu’s understanding of fields include doxa, illusio, field autonomy, homology and the field of power. The term doxa describes, with reference to a social field, the implicit knowledge held by actors in the field and their taken-for-granted beliefs. Illusio (from the Latin ‘ludus’: the game) refers to the actors’ conviction or belief in the worth of the game within the field. In Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology, fields have different degrees of autonomy from other fields depending on the specificity of the forms of capital valued in the field and the peculiarities of the field’s logic (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Despite their relative autonomy, fields also have structural and functional homologies, defined as “a resemblance within a difference” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 106). For example, in most fields, there are dominants and those who are dominated, and certain mechanisms of reproduction. However, these features take a specific, irreducible form in each field. Another key concept is the field of power. Bourdieu does not use this term uniformly, but it describes a “sort of ‘metafield’ that operates as an organizing principle of differentiation and struggle throughout all fields” (Swartz 1997: 136). Within the neo-institutionalist theory of organisations, a field is referred to as “a community of organisations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott 1994: 207). The focus of neo-institutionalist field theory is less on individual actors and more on organisations, such as companies or NGOs. In this tradition, fields are typically termed ‘organisational fields’ or ‘institutional fields’. This concept of a field emphasises the significance of institutions (and their cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative aspects) in explaining

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186  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology organisational action and institutional change in specific social domains. While the early work of neo-institutionalists focused on the isomorphic forces at work within fields that cause organisations to become increasingly similar (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), their later work addressed the issue of institutional complexity and institutional change (Wooten and Hoffman 2017). Core concepts in this context include institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al. 2009), institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) and institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The notion of institutional entrepreneurship was introduced by DiMaggio (1988) and describes “actors who leverage resources to create new or transform existing institutions” (Battilana et  al. 2009: 68). Institutional entrepreneurs strive to influence the institutional context of a field through strategies such as technical innovation, market leadership and lobbying for regulatory change. The concept of institutional work is broader and focuses on the practices of (de-)institutionalisation. Institutional work represents “the broad category of purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 216). The concept of institutional logics, in turn, emphasises institutional complexity and conflictuality within fields (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Fields are therefore often governed by different institutional logics, and actors are subjected to different, sometimes conflicting, rationalities. The most recent strand of field theory, the theory of strategic action fields, was developed by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012). It combines elements of Bourdieu’s thinking and neo-institutionalist field theory with concepts from social movement studies and symbolic interactionism (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Strategic action fields are defined as “mesolevel social orders” which are considered “the basic structural building block[s] of modern political/organizational life in the economy, civil society, and the state” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 3). Compared to the other two field concepts, Fligstein and McAdam’s field concept is more open in the sense that both the scope of a strategic action field and the issues around which it is constructed can vary greatly. A small working group within a company can be regarded as a strategic action field, as can international negotiations in the context of global climate policy. Each strategic action Gregor Kungl

field is itself embedded in an ecology of horizontally or vertically superordinate or subordinate neighbouring fields. Vertically, fields form a nested hierarchy, something like a Russian doll. For example, a market can be considered a field, each company active in that market is a field in its own right, and each department within those companies can also be considered a field. Fligstein and McAdam distinguish between two types of actors in a field: incumbents and challengers. Incumbents are the powerful actors who have access to most of the field’s resources and are privileged by the rules of the field, while challengers seek to challenge the status quo from an underprivileged position. Fligstein and McAdam’s version of field theory focuses on explaining dynamics and power struggles. Changes within fields typically originate from developments in neighbouring fields, which trigger so-called ‘episodes of contention’, defined as “a period of emergent, sustained contentious interaction between . . . actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one another” (McAdam 2007: 253). In such episodes, the ability of actors to shape the changes in a field depends, besides rules and resources, on their social skill, defined as “the ability to induce cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and collective identities” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 46). Field theory has been used, among other things, to analyse policy-related issues. The political field plays a central role in some of Bourdieu’s best-known studies (e.g. 2005). Later in life, Bourdieu (2014) devoted himself to an in-depth study of the phenomenon of the state and its significance for the (re) production of symbolic power. Bourdieu’s approach has been applied by others for the purposes of political research, for example for the analysis of European politics (Kauppi 2018). Since neo-institutionalist field theory is concerned with institutionalisation, a lot of focus is placed on political actors and political negotiation processes (Walker 2021). The importance of the interrelation between different political fields for the formulation of free trade agreements has been studied in this tradition, for example (Evans and Kay 2008). The theory of strategic action fields is intended as a general social theory and is thus deemed applicable to the analysis of political processes. Researchers use the theory to analyse sustainability-related transformation

field theory  187 conflicts at different levels, for example (Kungl and Hess 2021). Gregor Kungl

References Battilana, Julie; Leca, Bernard; Boxenbaum, Eva (2009), ‘How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship’, Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 65–107. Bourdieu, Pierre (2005), The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (2014), On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1989–1992. Bourdieu, Pierre; Wacquant, Loïc J.D. (1992), An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. DiMaggio, Paul J. (1988), ‘Interest and agency in institutional theory’. In: Zucker, Lynne G. (Ed.), Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, pp. 3–21. DiMaggio, Paul J.; Powell, Walter W. (1983), ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160. Evans, Rhonda; Kay, Tamara (2008), ‘How environmentalists “Greened” trade policy: Strategic action and the architecture of field overlap’, American Sociological Review, 73(6), 970–991. Fligstein, Neil; McAdam, Doug (2012), A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kauppi, Niilo (2018), Toward a Reflexive Political Sociology of the European Union: Fields, Intellectuals and Politicians. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kungl, Gregor; Hess, David J. (2021), ‘Sustainability transitions and strategic action fields: A literature review and discussion’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 38, 22–33.

Lawrence, Thomas B.; Suddaby, Roy (2006), ‘Institutions and institutional work’. In: Clegg, Steward R.; Hardy, Cynthia; Lawrence, Thomas B.; Nord, Walter R. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organization Studies. Second Edition. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 215–254. Martin, John Levi (2003), ‘What is field theory?’, American Journal of Sociology, 109(1), 1–49. McAdam, Doug (2007), ‘Legacies of AntiAmericanism: A sociological perspective’. In: Katzenstein, Peter J.; Keohane, Robert O. (Eds.), Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 251–269. Scott, W. Richard (1994), ‘Conceptualizing organizational fields: Linking organizations and societal systems’. In: Derlien, Hans-Ulrich; Gerhard, Uta; Scharpf, Fritz W. (Eds.), Systemrationalität und Partialinteresse. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 203–221. Swartz, David (1997), Culture and Power. The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Thornton, Patricia H.; Ocasio, William (2008), ‘Institutional logics’. In: Greenwood, Royston; Oliver, Christine; Sahlin, Kerstin; Suddaby, Roy (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 99–129. Wacquant, Loïc J.D.; Akçaoğlu, Aksu (2017), ‘Practice and symbolic power in Bourdieu: The view from Berkeley’, Journal of Classical Sociology, 17(19), 55–59. Walker, Edward T. (2021), ‘Organizational theory in political sociology’, Sociology Compass, 15(3), 1–13. Wooten, Melissa; Hoffman, Andrew J. (2017), ‘Organizational fields: Past, present and future’. In: Greenwood, Royston; Oliver, Christine; Lawrence, Thomas B.; Meyer, Renate E. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 55–74.

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48. Foucault, Michel Michel Foucault (1926—d. 1984) was a French philosopher, historian of thought and one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Involved in structuralism and post-structuralism movements, his thought challenged many claims of previous philosophy and history. He was born October 15 in Poitiers, France, to Paul Foucault (father) and Anne Malapert (mother). Foucault’s father was a prominent surgeon and his mother the daughter of a surgeon. Naturally, Foucault was encouraged to follow suit. Instead, at just the age of 20, he began his studies in philosophy and psychology at the University of Paris, Sorbonne, with Jean Hyppolite and Louis Althusser. In 1961 Foucault received his PhD with a thesis on the history of madness under the tutelage of Georges Canguilhem at the École Normale Supérieure. Foucault then worked as a university professor and philosopher and held a variety of teaching positions in institutions in Sweden, France, Germany, Poland, Tunisia and the United States. During this time, Foucault became known as a public intellectual and political activist championing human rights, penal reform and campaigning against racism. In 1970, Foucault was appointed Chair of the History of Systems of Thought at the prestigious Collège de France, Paris, where he lectured publicly to great success until his death in 1984. Foucault’s works, each in their own ways, focus on the development of Western attitudes towards sexuality, madness, illness and knowledge. For example, in works such as Madness and Civilization (1961) and Discipline and Punish (1975) Foucault examines social attitudes relating to institutions such as asylums, hospitals and prisons to demonstrate the uses and development of a discursive conception of power. In his three-volume The History of Sexuality (1976–1984) Foucault examines the way in which Western attitudes towards sexuality evolved since the ancient Greeks (Foucault, 1985). Some other notable works by Foucault include The Order of Things (1966) and Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). Foucault’s theories of discourse analysis and the relationship between power and knowledge have been highly influential in a number of fields including sociology.

Foucault’s thought was influenced by a number of thinkers, including Martin Heidegger and Georges Canguilhem, particularly for the way he examines the appearance of new domains of knowledge. Arguably, no influence was more important and enduring for Foucault than that of Friedrich Nietzsche. Many consider Foucault to be a Nietzschean, including Foucault himself who said in a final interview: “I am simply a Nietzschean” (“The Return of Morality”, 1988: 327). Foucault has two key methods of inquiry known as genealogy and archaeology which are essential to understanding his work. Archaeology is the analytical method Foucault used in his earlier works on the prison and madness (implicitly) and which he makes clear in Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). Archaeology is a different way of doing history which displaces the human being as a transcendental subject of knowledge. Instead, Foucault’s archaeological method aims to analyse and uncover the underlying fundamental rules that govern the discourse of a particular time. These rules are not grammatical or logical rules of language, but rather material rules which describe and limit the conditions of the possibility of true knowledge within a particular time frame. Archaeology reveals the discontinuities in discourse, the historical breaks in understanding which show how each era is marked by different “epistemes” (or “configurations of knowledge”). This method characterises Foucault’s early work; for example in his doctoral thesis, he explored the changes in the concept of madness over time, arguing that madness is not a natural, unchanging state but rather one that is constructed by various (cultural, economic and intellectual) structures. Foucault’s archaeological method demonstrated that certain underlying rules determined the experience of madness at specific times. For example, in medieval society, certain forms of madness were considered to offer access to truths that lay beyond reason, and the insane were considered to be harmless and part of society, whereas with the early modern birth of the first asylums, madness came to be considered the opposite of reason and the insane were considered to pose a danger to society and to be in need of management and control. While Foucault’s archaeological method departs from traditional historiography which put the subject in the centre offering a nontranscendental, non-linear method which

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foucault, michel  189 instead focuses on depth, archaeology is limited in that it can only look at a specific time. Archaeology cannot account for the transition between time periods. From the publication of Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault adopts a new methodology of genealogy influenced by Nietzsche’s use of the term in his On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). For both philosophers, genealogy serves as a historical critique of the present that reveals the origins of norms. Following Nietzsche, Foucault contests notions of history that presuppose an “absolute” origin to the meaning of concepts and values, thus hiding from view the contingent conditions that determine their emergence and evolution. Foucault uses genealogy to examine power structures tracing the subject across different time periods to demonstrate how power produces different kinds of subjectivities specific to those regimes of power. Foucault is not always clear on what the difference is between genealogy and archaeology. While the methods are indeed similar the central difference is that while archaeology can only examine one specific time period and focus on one site revealing the discontinuities, genealogy can analyse the discontinues and continuities, offering a history of the present. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault uses genealogy to offer a history of the modern penal system, examining the transformations of societies’ values and attitudes towards punishment influenced by the industrial age and Enlightenment ideas to critique the modern forms of domination that permeate modern society even outside the prison (Foucault, 1977). Power is the central concern of Foucault’s thought and is highly relevant for political sociology insofar as it puts in question the classical conceptions of the state as the sole wielder of power. Foucault displaces the concept of sovereign power and argues that power is not simply the restriction or the absence of freedom, but rather power is capillary, ever present and productive rather than merely repressive. Foucault challenged the idea that power should be thought of as concentrated in the hands of one individual or one institution that is dominant, but rather our world is comprised of a fluid system of power relations which permeate all social relations. Power, for example, comes from knowledge but in turn, power also produces and reproduces knowledge. Foucault saw the relationship between

power and knowledge to be so intimate that “power-knowledge” became a central term in Foucault’s work. There are three main paradigms of power in Foucault’s early thought, sometimes referred to as Foucault’s power triangle, which includes sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower. Sovereign power is a medieval and early modern form of power which Foucault uses to describe the absolute power of the sovereign who is free from outside interference and cannot be legally challenged. Sovereign power determines what is legal and illegal and punishes disobedience of its laws. Sovereign power, therefore, is a power over life and comes with the right to decide who lives and who dies. Sovereign power is a visible form of power, often involving spectacle and displayed through external punishment of the body of the criminal. While modern societies still contain remnants of sovereign power, Foucault argues that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a shift occurs from sovereign power to disciplinary power in order to exercise control over aspects of social life that escape legal regulation. Disciplinary power is intended to control and train the bodies and behaviours of subjects to extract from them the greatest amount of useful force. Unlike sovereign power that controls bodies only indirectly and merely through the threat of punishment, disciplinary power operates on bodies through norms that enhance, correct and restore bodily forces in order to produce a new form of subjectivity. For example, the way schoolchildren are taught to be good pupils and the normalcy of constant surveillance are both techniques of disciplinary power. In the first volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault locates another shift in the deployment of power which appears in the late eighteenth century and extends practices of dominance and control from individual bodies to the life of entire populations. Foucault calls the technology used to control and manage whole populations “biopower”. The collecting and monitoring of statistics on life expectancy, birth rates, longevity and mortality rates are all examples of biopower. For Foucault, these are government techniques which aim at either bolstering life (for example, techniques aimed at stimulating birth rates) or letting populations die (for example, withholding lifesaving medicine). Vanessa Lemm and Venessa Ercole

190  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology As Foucault continued to develop his ideas on power, he recognised that state and government were not synonymous terms and more than just being a sovereign state is required to govern. The art of governing, therefore, is not only top-down and exercised over people. It also requires the willing participation of the governed. In his 1977–1978 Collège de France lectures Security, Territory, Population, Foucault uses the term “governmentality” to describe a political rationality and technology that employs individual freedoms from the state in order to exercise power over populations and in which the people themselves are willing participants in their own government (Foucault, 2007). Challenging the state-centred understanding of power, governmentality derives from the word rationality and government and can be described as “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1982: 220–1). Foucault demonstrates that while we see a shift away from people being governed or controlled by law, this does not necessarily mean control is lessened but rather marks the perfection of control whereby we are governed by a whole set of other techniques, procedures and processes that have an influence over the way we behave and conduct ourselves. Individuals are seen as responsible agents capable of adjusting their own behaviours in accordance with desirable norms. Foucault’s analysis of governmentality provides the first genealogy of liberalism and neoliberalism. With the emergence of liberalism, Foucault identifies a shift in the logic underlying the art of government from Homo politicus to Homo oeconomicus whereby economical rationality is applied as a standard of government to other social spheres, citizens are treated as utility-maximisers (or: entrepreneurs of their own lives) and considerations of the health and well-being of populations become paramount over questions of equality and social justice. Throughout his genealogy of liberalism and neoliberalism, Foucault argues that, for the first time in human history, the biological existence of the human being becomes a distinct political concern of Western societies. Biopolitics is the term Foucault gives to this political and social control over the biological lives of people which, unlike sovereign power, is manifest in its capacity to “make live” rather than to put to death. Foucault connects the biopolitical rationality to capitalism and later uses this to explain racism (racial Vanessa Lemm and Venessa Ercole

biopolitics) and genocide distinguishing between an affirmative and a thanatopolitical variant of biopolitics. Foucault was always interested in practices of freedom and the ways in which we may transgress the limits and norms imposed by power. “Where there is power, there is resistance” (1978: 95–96), Foucault argued. Yet, resistance is not external to the power relation, for Foucault, but part of it. In order to resist governmentality, therefore, it must harness power while taking on a different form to domination. In attempting to answer the question of how this practice of freedom can be achieved, Foucault returns to the Ancient Greeks and the classical idea of care of the self (Foucault, 1986). In late lecture series comprised of The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981–1982), The Government of Self and Others (1982–1983) and The Courage of Truth (1983–1984), Foucault executes a genealogy of the care of the self, exploring the ways in which the Ancient Greeks cultivated their moral lives through techniques of the self (Foucault, 2005; Foucault, 2010; Foucault, 2011). Foucault finds in Ancient Greek care of self an understanding of the individual as not ready-made but as something to be formed. He found that the Ancient Greeks utilised a number of techniques of the self to continuously fashion themselves. Practically these included both self-knowledge but also care of the body (diet, exercise, writing, learning, self-reflection/contemplation). Practices varied between different schools of philosophy (Platonic, Stoic, Epicurean and Cynic to name a few) who taught their own set of techniques aimed at transforming and cultivating oneself. Importantly for Foucault, Greek philosophical practices of care of self did not seek to fashion a disciplined and obedient subject, which for him originated with the Christian idea of pastoral care, but rather transforming the self so as to become capable of being governed less by others. Importantly for political sociology, Foucault’s thought not only challenges traditional understandings of subjectivity but also emphasises the relationship between ethics and politics (Dean & Villadsen, 2016; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). While scholars continue to debate how to reconcile the politicised Foucault of the 1970s with his “ethical turn” in the final lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault’s final contributions – governmentality, biopolitics

foucault, michel  191 and care of self – will continue to aid future researchers in reflecting on contemporary ethical and political challenges (Faustino & Ferraro, 2020; Lemm & Vatter, 2014). Vanessa Lemm and Venessa Ercole

References Dean, M., & Villadsen, K. (2016). State Phobia and Civil Society: The Political Legacy of Michel Foucault. Stanford , CA : Stanford University Press. Dreyfus, H., & Rabinow, P. (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Faustino, M., & Ferraro, G. (Eds.) (2020). The Late Foucault: Ethical and Political Questions. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Foucault, M. (1966). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Random House. Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1961). Madness and Civilisation. Trans. Richard Howard. London: Travistock Publications, 1979. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Middlesex: Penguin. Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1982). “Afterword: The Subject and Power”. In: Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow and Michel Foucault (eds.),

Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. With an Afterword by and an Interview with Michel Foucault. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 211–211. Foucault, M. (1985). History of Sexuality: Vol. 2, The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1986). History of Sexuality: Vol. 3, The Care of the Self. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon. Foucault, M. (1988). “The Return of Morality”. In: L. D. Kritzman (ed.). Trans. A. Sheridan, Michel Foucault Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984. New York: Routledge, 242–54. Foucault, M. (2005). The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–1982. Trans. G. Burchell. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78. Trans. G. Burchell. New York: Palgrave. Foucault, M. (2010). The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–1983. Trans. G. Burchell. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Foucault, M. (2011). The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1983– 1984. Trans. G. Burchell. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Lemm, V., & Vatter, M. (Eds.) (2014). The Government of Life: Foucault, Biopolitics, and Neoliberalism. New York: Fordham University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1887). Nietzsche: On the Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings (3rd edition), ed. K. Ansell-Pearson. Trans. C. Diethe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Vanessa Lemm and Venessa Ercole

49. Framing/frame analysis

world shape our collective actions in different ways. The meaning work carried out by individuals and collective actors to frame an issue, event or object is known as framing. In line with the idea of meaning contests, it is important to think of framing as an ongoing The concepts of frames and framing pro- process. If frames are snapshots of moments cesses, introduced most prominently in the of interpretation during that ongoing process, field via the work of Erving Goffman (1974), framing captures the struggle over definition are used by political sociologists to study how of meaning. meanings are constructed and attached to A host of concepts that describe mechapeople, events and issues by different actors nisms linked to what frames do and how in society. The fundamental assumption that framing is achieved have been developed. underpins these concepts is constructivist: They can be understood and categorised in meanings are built in social interactions rather different ways, for example by whether the than naturally occurring, they ‘do not automat- concept refers to framing processes within a ically attach themselves to the objects, events, collective actor, or how a frame is presented or experiences we encounter, but often arise, to the world at large (Johnston and Noakes instead, through interactively based interpre- 2005). In line with the account given here, it tive processes’ (Snow 2004: 384). Departing is perhaps simpler to think of these concepts from that premise, the concept of the frame as being about the purposes and characterleads scholars to examine how both individu- istics of frames on one hand, and about the als and collective actors (such as political features of framing processes and meaning parties, politicians, social movements, civil contests on the other. Concepts about frames society organisations or media outlets) inter- point out their various purposes and are used pret issues and events. This act of framing by scholars to reconstruct the component new information takes place by linking the parts of frames. Many of these concepts have issue to other, already existing, frames. These been developed by scholars of social movealready existing frames can be more or less ments, which are understood as collective rooted in our everyday understandings of the actors that are particularly concerned with world: if they are part of what we think of as meaning-making (Snow 2004). The most ‘common sense’ they are referred to as frames common and arguably most important of of understanding, or they may also be thought these concepts are what Snow, Vliegenthart of – depending on their characteristics – as and Ketelaars (2019: 403) term ‘core framing discourses or norms. As this suggests, many tasks’ for social movements, though equally frames, whether they are newly constructed applicable to the framing processes of other by different actors or already existing to dif- actors. These tasks are diagnostic, prognosferent extents in a society, compete to assign tic and motivational and concern how frames an object, event or issue its meaning through identify problems, solutions and reasons to social interactions. act. These authors also point to other useful These interactions can be interpersonal, concepts such as master frames, which probetween individuals and media outlets, or vide broader umbrella ideas that can bring with social movements, political parties and together disparate collective actors, with a host of other collective actors. By studying common examples including human rights these interactions between collective actors frames and more recently climate or enviseeking to apply their frames, as well as how ronmental justice frames (ibid: 403). Scholars individuals receive and adopt these frames, have used these categories to understand how political sociologists uncover the power that is different social movements and civil society wielded in meaning contestation. The power organisations seek to set agendas and probto define meaning is linked to questions at lematise new issues, how they propose new the heart of politics and governance: it is ways of tackling problems in society, how linked to defining what we should consider as they build coalitions and how they motivate problematic in society, what should be done their members to act. Studies have focused on about problems and how we should act to single movements, whether national or transbring those solutions about. In that sense, the national, have taken comparative approaches concept of the frame helps us to understand and have looked at the impacts of frames how the different meanings we attach to the on those held by other actors ranging from 192

framing/frame analysis  193 governments and international organisations, to protesters themselves and public opinion more generally (for an overview see, e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Vliegenthart and van Zoonen 2011; Snow, Vliegenthart and Ketelaars 2019). Many other concepts are concerned with different aspects of framing as a process. Essentially, these concepts zoom in on the various techniques used in framing to ensure that a frame fits into a given societal context, or indeed that it is capable of fitting into, or diffusing across, multiple societal contexts. They include frame alignment processes which refer to the techniques used to connect with already existing frames, often held by other collective actors that the frame proponent wishes to ally with. They include strategies such as bridging, amplification, extension and alignment (Snow, Vliegenthart and Ketelaars 2019: 396; Ketelaars, Walgrave and Wouters, 2014). The concepts of discursive fields and discursive opportunity structures are used instead to describe the contexts that need to be considered when engaging in framing and refer to broader cultural backdrops (Snow 2004) and more circumscribed political discursive landscapes (e.g. Koopmans and Olzak 2004) respectively. Scholars that pay attention to frames are thus concerned with uncovering the mechanisms used to assign meanings, while scholars who (also) pay attention to framing are concerned with how meanings seek to travel and change over time and space. Frame analysis is the umbrella term for methods used by political sociologists and others to study frames and framing processes. Frame analysis is essentially a type of content analysis, but cannot be summed up as a single, unitary method (see, e.g. Boréus and Bergström 2017). Instead, different approaches to frame analysis have been developed by scholars in light of their research interests and questions and can range from in-depth, manual and qualitative approaches (e.g. Gerhards and Rucht 1992) to more recent examples of broader, computer-assisted and quantitative approaches (e.g. Wahlström, Wennerhag, and Rootes 2013). An overview of some examples of scholarship on framing is useful to illustrate this conceptual overview. As mentioned, framing and frame analysis came into prominence in political sociology through the work of Erving Goffman. In his book Frame Analysis (1974), Goffman introduces the idea of frames and

framing as a way of uncovering processes of ‘making sense of events’ (10). The aim is to use the concept of the frame to pay attention to how existing, dominant frames of understanding interact with newly introduced frames. This contains some seeds of tension. How can we understand when and why more structural or deep-rooted dominant discourses and norms, such as those that underpin powerful institutions, shape understandings, and when newer, less dominant frames brought into play by less powerful actors such as social movements manage to gain a foothold (Gamson 1985)? Framing approaches have developed the concepts outlined above in part to unravel this tension. In Goffman’s work, unpacking framing processes sheds light on the ‘vulnerability’ of meaning-making and highlights it as ‘a locus of potential struggle, not a leaden reality to which we all inevitably must yield’ (ibid: 615). Since the mid-1970s, the framing approach has been followed by many political sociologists, as well as political scientists, scholars of media and communication, law and more besides. Gamson (1982) uses the approach to study whether the frames of social movements are echoed in media reports and in individuals’ everyday conversations; with Modigliani to investigate the relationship between media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Gitlin (1980) discusses the US student movement of the 1980s and how media coverage framed the movement over time to re-frame its ideas in line with dominant societal norms. This earlier work on frames and framing illustrated empirically, among other things, core ideas from Goffman’s work: that ‘frames are multiple and can be contradictory’ and ‘are part of a struggle for meaning between different actors that have unequal material and symbolic resources’ (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen 2011: 105). Over time, scholars have used framing approaches and analysis to understand the ways that frames diffuse among individuals and collective actors across national borders, following the progressive growth of international organisations after the end of the Cold War, as well as the protest movements that unfolded around the turn of the millennium (see, e.g. Smith 2002; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006; della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 2009). In more recent years scholars have progressively adopted more quantitative and/or broad approaches to frame Louisa Parks

194  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology analysis methods. Research has focused on unpacking framing processes within groups, reflecting on how far frames are or need to be shared by individuals to allow for collective action, as well as how frames have changed and diffused over time. A number of examples come from research on climate change and environmental activism of different types. Here, scholars have uncovered how far protesters share the frames of prominent social movement organisations (Wahlström, Wennerhag, and Rootes 2013), examined broad changes in framing within the climate change movement over time (della Porta and Parks 2014) and consider how the frames of marginalised groups have shaped global environmental governance (e.g. Allan and Hadden 2017). Research on framing has made a rich contribution to our understanding of how new meanings emerge across societies and over time and how they are produced by a range of collective political actors of different types. Louisa Parks

References Allan, J. I. and Hadden, J. (2017) Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global climate politics. Environmental Politics 26(4). doi: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1319017. Benford, R. D. and Snow, D. A. (2000) Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26(1): 611–639. Boréus, K. and Bergström, T. (2017) Analyzing Text and Discourse. Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences. London: Sage. della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L. and Reiter, H. (2006) Globalization from Below. Transnational Activists and Protest Networks. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. and Rucht, D. (eds) (2009) Social Movements in a Globalizing World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. della Porta, D. and Parks, L. (2014) Framing processes in the climate movement: From climate change to climate justice. In: Dietz, M. and Garrelts, H. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Climate Change Movements. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 19–30. Gamson, W. A. (1982) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gamson, W. A. (1985) Goffman’s legacy to political sociology. Theory and Society 14(5): 605–622. Louisa Parks

Gamson, W. A. and Modigliani, A. (1989) Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach. American Journal of Sociology 95(1): 1–37. Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. (1992) Mesomobilization: Organization and framing in two protest campaigns in West Germany. American Journal of Sociology 98(3): 555–596. Gitlin, T. (1980) The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis. New York: Harper & Row. Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (2005) Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ketelaars, P., Walgrave, S. and Wouters, R. (2014) Degrees of frame alignment: Comparing organisers’ and participants’ frames in 29 demonstrations in three countries. International Sociology 29(6): 504–524. Koopmans, R. and Olzak, S. (2004) Discursive opportunities and the evolution of right‐wing violence in Germany. American Journal of Sociology 110(1): 198–230. doi: 10.1086/386271. Smith, J. (2002) Bridging global divides? Strategic framing and solidarity in transnational social movement organizations. International Sociology 17(4): 505–528. Snow, D. A. (2004) Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields. In: Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., and Kriesi, H. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 380–412. Snow, D. A., Vliegenthart, R. & Ketelaars, P. (2019). The Framing Perspective on Social Movements: Its Conceptual Roots and Architecture. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon, (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 392–410. Vliegenthart, R. and van Zoonen, L. (2011) Power to the frame: Bringing sociology back to frame analysis. European Journal of Communication 26(2): 101–115. Wahlström, M., Wennerhag, M. and Rootes, C. (2013) Framing ‘The Climate Issue’: Patterns of participation and prognostic frames among climate summit protesters. Global Environmental Politics 13(4): 101– 122. doi: 10.1162/GLEP_a_00200.

50. Frankfurt School

Enlightenment as the Culture Industry (Adorno 2002; Adorno 2004). Adorno offered a political sociology and critical social theory that complemented his aesthetics of music The Frankfurt School is a school of, and and musical ontology. The Frankfurt School movement in, critical social theory, associ- embraced the philosophy of history of G.W.F. ated with the Institute for Social Research Hegel, the critical Immanuel Kant’s theoat the University of Frankfurt in Germany. retical and practical philosophy from the First-generation critical social theorists asso- Critique(s) of Pure and Practical Reason ciated with the school include Theodor W. and Aesthetic and Teleological Judgment, Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Karl Marx’s dialectics and fetishism of comHerbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm. Second- modities from Das Kapital, Dilthey’s historigeneration critical theorists associated with cism, Nietzsche’s existentialism and cultural the school include sociologist, social theo- criticism, aspects of Lebensphilosophie in rist, and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, while German intellectual culture, and Simmel’s third-generation thinkers include Habermas’ philosophy and sociology of culture. There doctoral student Hans-Herbert Kögler, were elements of Max Weber’s work on Professor of Philosophy at the University of rationalization and disenchantment found North Florida. Adorno was a philosopher of in early Frankfurt School theorizing as well music, a sociologist of music, and music theo- as his brother Alfred Weber’s theorizing of rist in addition to a social scientist, critical culture (grounding and presenting him as a social theorist, and continental philosopher. theoretician of culture in their critical theHis work along with other first-, second-, ory). Aspects of Weber’s sociology of music and third-generational figures reflected the remerged in Adorno’s music sociology at the school’s interdisciplinary scholarly outlook Frankfurt School in Germany. Max Horkheimer’s essays other than The and intellectual orientation. The Institute for Social Research at the Culture Industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment University of Frankfurt was, in fact, an include “Traditional and Critical Theory,” interdisciplinary endeavor, with leading Eclipse of Reason, and Critique of member Theodor W. Adorno participating Instrumental Reason. Horkheimer developed in the Positivist Dispute in Sociology with an epistemology and philosophy of history in Anglo-Viennese philosopher and social sci- addition to his critical social theory pursued entist Karl Popper at the London School of at the Frankfurt School. Both Horkheimer Economics and Political Science, and polit- and Adorno were concerned with dialectics ical-sociological critiques of a dialectical and theory construction—conceptual framemanner in Germany (Frankfurt and Berlin) works applied to a number practical social in the context of critical social theory and a concerns—and Adorno developed an ethical social criticism informed by the continental theory comprised of these matters in works social thought of Hegel and Marx. Adorno of his such as Ethics after Auschwitz. Herbert trained in Vienna with musical thinker Alban Marcuse offered a critical pedagogy—a critiBerg, studying his string quartets, and clas- cal theory of education or social theory of sical composer Schoenberg. He was a cham- critical education—and also pursued studies pion of Stravinsky’s chromaticism, Berg’s in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory serialism, and Schoenberg’s 12-tone tech- (Freud—Eros and Civilization) and Hegel nique. Adorno emerged as one of the lead- (Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise ing musicologists, sociologists, philosophers, of Critical Social Theory). Marcuse’s critical music theorists, and social psychologists of theory was a precursor to contemporary culthe twentieth century, with his multi-discipli- tural studies in the United States and abroad. nary/cross-disciplinary approach characteriz- Marcuse and Horkheimer engaged major ing social research and intellectual inquiry at themes in political sociology such as hegemthe Frankfurt School. The institute embraced ony, ideology critique, materialism, commodMarxian, neo-Marxian, and post-Marxian ification, power, and class relations including economics, and social, cultural, and philo- inequality. Walter Benjamin offered a literary theory sophical critiques of late capitalism, consumand literary criticism that accompanied his erism, and commodification. Such a theme emerged in Adorno aesthetic theory and theory of aura from and Horkheimer’s work Dialectic of The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 195

196  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Reproduction, reprinted in his anthology Illuminations, a cornerstone of Frankfurt School critical theory—canonical first-generation Frankfurt School critical theory. His Arcades Project was embraced by literary scholars, and he also published on Hegelian philosophy of history. Marcuse studied with Martin Heidegger and published works on Heideggerian Marxism before breaking with and moving beyond Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, hermeneutics of facticity, and German existentialism. Erich Fromm offered a social psychology, folk psychology, and theory of psychoanalysis/psychoanalytic thought in his writings on Sigmund Freud at the Frankfurt School, including his book The Art of Loving and a critique of late capitalist consumerism/consumerist cognition and commodification in To Have or to Be? Fromm taught as a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York City, and Marcuse taught in Massachusetts at Brandeis University in the Boston Metropolitan Area before moving to the University of California system (UC San Diego). Marcuse’s doctoral students included political activist, African American studies, contemporary cultural studies, and critical feminist studies/women’s studies scholar Angela Y. Davis. Other critical social theorists of the Frankfurt School include Leo Lowenthal, Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Albrecht Wellmer, Friedrich Pollock, the aforementioned Hans-Herbert Kögler, Siegfried Kracauer, Claus Offe, Oskar Negt, and Karl-Otto Apel. At times, Max Scheler and György Lukács’ critical and social theory construction informed the Frankfurt School. At the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research in New York City (the former University-in-Exile), contemporary critical theorists Nancy Fraser, Andrew Arato, Jay Bernstein, Richard J. Bernstein, and Agnes Heller have engaged with Frankfurt School figures, as have Thomas McCarthy at Northwestern, Douglas Kellner at UCLA, and Martin Jay at UC Berkeley. Other commentators include Richard Wolin in New York City (City University of New York Graduate Center), Jay’s student Peter Gordon at Harvard, and Espen Hammer at the New School for Social Research in addition to Richard Shusterman in the Graduate Faculty (GF) (University-in-Exile) Liberal Studies Department at that research institution (the Dustin Garlitz

latter engaged in dialogues with Habermas). At times, social historian Eric Hobsbawm at the New School for Social Research in New York City and in London and Cambridge in the UK engaged with Frankfurt School theorists, as did Anthony Giddens, Craig Calhoun, Nigel Dodd, Don Slater, and Mike Savage at the Department of Sociology of the London School of Economics and Political Science. At Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, and formerly at the New School for Social Research in Manhattan, Seyla Benhabib has engaged a number of Frankfurt School critical social theorists. Both Adorno and his mentor Benjamin studied the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, as did Marcuse, but the former had epistemological concerns while the latter had ontological concerns with the Husserlian and Heideggerian philosophy. Adorno published the critical polemic The Jargon of Authenticity, which was his philosophical, social, and cultural critique of the ideology of German existentialism. Adorno’s critique of his musical teacher Schoenberg was published as Philosophy of New Music (Philosophy of Modern Music) in 1949. His philosophical magnus opus, a treatise of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics, was published as Negative Dialectics at the end of his life. Aesthetic Theory was Adorno’s posthumously published philosophical treatise that engaged music and literature in addition to art (philosophy and sociology of art, literature, and music). Frankfurt School members Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann applied the institute’s critical theory to emerging disciplines associated with sociology including criminology—forming a theoretical criminology to add to the institute’s commitments to theory construction across disciplines. One of Kirchheimer’s major publications/studies in this area was Punishment and Social Structure, and it employed Marx’s labor theory of value and notion/theory of surplus labor to criminology, forming a Marxian, neo-Marxian, and post-Marxian criminology. Kracauer’s work on urban culture and urban theory informed the work of other Frankfurt School members. Both Benjamin and Kracauer offered distinct cultural theories of urban life in their sociology and philosophy. Contemporary commentators in cultural theory such as Simmel scholar David Frisby have been inspired by this work, and

frankfurt school  197 studies have been published synthesizing the work of all three, Kracauer, Benjamin, and Simmel, on the philosophy, theory, and sociology of urban culture. Kracauer’s work in this area is Mass Ornament and Benjamin’s work is the Arcades Project. Adorno scholar and commentator Susan Buck Morss has published on this area, namely The Dialectics of Seeing: Benjamin and the Arcades Project, while Frisby’s work was Fragments of the Metropolis/Modernity. Simmel’s work in this area is The Metropolis and Mental Life and also The Philosophy of Money. In addition to waging battles with Karl Popper and his philosophy of science, Adorno critiqued the works of Carnap in analytic philosophy, Heidegger in continental philosophy, Schoenberg in musicology, Berg in composition and conducting, and a number of French figures in theoretical sociology and political sociology. Adorno was critical of Sartre’s existentialism in France and its influence on French sociology/French social science. Adorno and Horkheimer were preoccupied with presenting, approaching, advancing, and contributing to the discipline of sociology as a science. The Frankfurt School interpreted sociology, namely political sociology, in Weberian terms and theorized about the discipline with the critical apparatus of Lukácian polemics. The philosophy of Nietzsche and Dilthey also influenced the theoretical and political sociology of the Frankfurt School, especially Benjamin and Adorno. Adorno’s leading theme was the Culture Industry while Benjamin’s leading contribution to critical and cultural theory was aura. Kantian critical and theoretical philosophy was a major influence on the Frankfurt School’s political sociology as well. The Frankfurt School influenced British cultural theory/British cultural studies with individual cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall influenced by Adorno’s Culture Industry (Enlightenment as Mass Deception). Themes engaged in this cultural theory include Marx’s fetishism of commodities (commodification), estranged and congealed labor, ideology critique, and consumerism/anti-consumerism. The number-one Frankfurt School theorist expositing these themes was Adorno, with Horkheimer a close second, Marcuse third, and Benjamin fourth. At the level of theory construction, Adorno offered a critical ontology in his philosophy and sociology of music and culture. He also proposed

an aesthetics of music in the context of critical sociological theory/thought. The psychanalytic thought in the work the Frankfurt School theorists is implicit, as is the critique of capitalist culture (the economic dimension of cultural critique and cultural criticism for the Frankfurt School). In addition to the neoMarxism of Hungarian iconoclast and dissident György Lukács (as explicated in The Theory of the Novel and Marxism and Class Consciousness), the early critical theory of Karl Korsch was influential on the Frankfurt School. The dialectical materialism and historical materialism of Marxist thought were found in all aspects of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory construction. Marcuse’s critical theory from the Frankfurt School (inspired by Freud, Hegel, and others) formed the basis for a philosophy and sociology of education, namely the foundations for a critical pedagogy and critical education. The Frankfurt School’s ideology critique was more leftcenter than their Marxian forerunners and was non-totalitarian and non-absolutist as well as non-Stalinistic. Nonetheless, it promoted revolutionary praxis, critical rationality, and utopian theories of democratic society and democratic socialism. These sociological and philosophical agendas and telos of the institute were reformed and reconstructed when the school was relocated to Columbia University in New York City in the years of the Second World War, and then recontextualized by the second- and third-generation figures of the institute when the school moved back to Germany (with the addition of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and structural transformation of the public sphere). The Frankfurt School’s theories and their implications for future generations of critical theory and political sociology rest on a Hegelian-Marxian approach to ideology and ideology critique, as well as intercultural dialogue, critical hermeneutics, class structure and class formation, social stratification, and social criticism and commentary of a neo-Marxian nature. Dustin Garlitz

References Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. London: Routledge, 1968 Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997 Dustin Garlitz

198  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Adorno, Theodor W. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002 Adorno, Theodor W. The Culture Industry. London: Routledge, 2003 Adorno, Theodor W. Minima Moralia. New York and London: Verso, 2004 Adorno, Theodor W. Eclipse of Reason. London: Continuum, 2006a Adorno, Theodor W. Philosophy of New Music. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006b Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. New York: Schocken, 1992 Benjamin, Walter. Reflections. New York: Schocken, 1994 Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998 Fromm, Erich. The Art of Loving. New York: Harpers, 2001 Fromm, Erich. To Have or to be? New York: Harpers, 2003 Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989

Dustin Garlitz

Habermas, Jürgen. Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992 Habermas, Jürgen. Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994 Kögler, Hans-Herbert. The Power of Dialogue. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002 Kirchheimer, Otto. Punishment and Social Structure. London: Routledge, 1979 Kracauer, Siegfried. The Mass Ornament. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999 Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991 Marcuse, Herbert. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. New York: Humanity Books, 1992 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. London: Routledge, 1994 Simmel, Georg. The Metropolis and Mental Life. London: Routledge, 1974 Simmel, Georg. The Philosophy of Money. London: Routledge, 2001

51. Functionalism

Durkheim sought to codify the functional approach into a distinctive mode of analysis in his The Division of Labor in Society ([1893]1947) and, later, The Elementary Functionalism in sociology was originally Forms of the Religious Life ([1912] 1995). derived from the “organismic analogy” of However, functional theorizing would have Greek philosophy by Auguste Comte at a likely died with Durkheim as his ideas in the time when the evolutionary study of organic early twentieth century were viewed as marlife forms and human societies was just ginal and “suspiciously radical,” especially beginning in biology and sociology. In his in American sociology (Thompson 1985:13). Positive Philosophy (1830–42 [1896]) Comte How then did functional analysis survive? Functional thinking was kept alive in compared the structure and operation of human societies with those of living organ- anthropology as social anthropologists in both isms, speculating on how social structures Europe and the United States embraced what could be viewed as equivalents of struc- would be increasingly termed “functional tures in biological organisms. After read- analysis” because it gave them a conceptual ing Comte’s organismic analogy of social hook for “explaining” why pre-literate cultures dynamics, Herbert Spencer advanced a more with no history revealed particular patterns sophisticated theoretical approach by pro- of culture and social structure (i.e., a cultural posing that societies and organisms have item exists because it has positive functions for “parallel properties,” although they were not sustaining a pre-literate society). So, anthrothe same. In contrast to Comte’s more philo- pology preserved functional theory through sophical view, Spencer had a physics-oriented the mid-twentieth century and to a great extent view of what he termed his synthetic philos- through the work of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and ophy in which he asserted that all facets of Bronislaw Malinowski. In the comeback of functionalism into the social universe—in its physical, organic, social, and even moral dimensions—can be sociology, the work of Herbert Spencer, understood and explained by what he termed who had been a giant in early American First Principles (1862 [1880]) before writing sociology, continued to be stigmatized and The Principles of Biology (1864–67) and The abandoned. In contrast, Émile Durkheim’s Principles of Sociology (1874–96) in serial- sociology was valorized because it had no ized volumes, culminating in The Principles associations with biology (whereas Spencer of Ethics (1892–98). Although Spencer’s prin- had written a two-volume treatise on biolciples were “physics sounding,” they were ogy). And, since Social Darwinism was, in definitely about the evolution of super-organic reality, “Social Spencerianism,” he was never forms from simple, undifferentiated forms to to be forgiven for such an idea, even though ever larger and more differentiated forms. it was not prominent in his sociology. Yet, His foundational principle was that growth Spencer’s sociology was a mix of physicsin the size of organisms and super-organisms like laws describing the evolution of societies (societies organizing organisms) generates from simple to complex forms, blended with “pressures” for differentiation of structures to the “requisites” that had to be met to sustain support the larger social mass. After coining viable forms of societal organization. These the phrase “survival of the fittest” nine years requisites driving societal evolution revolved before Darwin published On the Origin of around production (securing resources), Species (1859), Spencer was on the verge of reproduction (of societal members and the making a “selectionist” argument for socio- structures organizing their lives), distribucultural evolution, but, in the end, he looked tion (of resources, information, and societal for the “functions” of the essential elements members), and regulation (by power and culthat make super-organisms and organic life tural symbols). These became, in essence, his view of functional requisites of societies and viable. In the last decade of Spencer’s life, Émile would be the cornerstone of all functional Durkheim also developed a functionalist analysis in the social sciences in the twentiargument. Having read functional arguments eth century. The revival of functional analysis in sociin Comte’s Positive Philosophy, Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, and the implicit ology began quietly, almost behind closed functional analysis of his mentor Fustel de doors in academia in the 1940s, when the Coulanges’ The Ancient City ([1864] 1889), notion of “system”-level analysis was gaining 199

200  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology currency in the 1930s to 1950s as the “cybernetics movement” and the emergence of “general systems theory” pursued the same strategy as Spencer in trying to isolate the common properties and dynamics evident in physical, biological, and social systems. By avoiding the stigma of earlier functional analysis, it created an environment in which functionalism could re-emerge in the 1950s, especially in American sociology. It also later helped launch James G. Miller’s (1978) “living systems theorizing,” which was very much functionalist in isolating out structures of life forms and their similar functions across different life forms. Another condition encouraging functionalism was American sociology’s need for more theory in a discipline that had devoted much time to developing methodologies for qualitative and quantitative analysis. American sociology had absorbed the great insights of European sociology but had not continued to build upon these early beginnings because of the problems attached to functionalism. Yet, in the 1950s, Talcott Parsons, colleagues, and former students set out to colonize academia and brought functionalism back into sociology, which dominated theoretical sociology for a decade and remained relevant even as scholars developed alternative theoretical approaches. Table 1 outlines the functional schemes of some of the “giants” of twentieth-century sociology, including Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown who, while generally identified as anthropologists, called themselves “sociologists.” The right side of the table label the “functional

requisites” of Spencer, Durkheim, RadcliffeBrown, Parsons, and Niklas Luhman. While many others engaged in functional analysis between 1950 and 1990, these were the dominant theorists (Turner and Maryanski 1979). What is evident when the terms in the middle column are defined is that some forms of functionalism emphasize one master functional need, such as “integration” (Durkheim 1893; Radcliffe-Brown 1952) or “reduction of complexity” (Luhmann 1982), while other approaches emphasize multiple functional requisites (Spencer 1874–96; Malinowski 1944; Parsons et  al. 1953). Moreover, these approaches often reveal more complexity when the levels at which these requisites operate are enumerated. For example, Malinowski postulated different requisites for cultural, structural, and biological levels.1 In contrast, Parsons proposed four requisites but saw these four fundamentals operating across all levels of the universe at different “system levels” (i.e., cultural, societal, personality, and organism), which looks very much like Spencer’s system, even though Parsons rarely cited Spencer. Similarly, Luhman sees the master need state for “reducing complexity” as operating on the three primary levels of the social universe: societal systems, organization systems, and interaction systems. Despite different terminologies, these conceptions focus on the same dynamics in human social systems. All emphasize in some way the importance of meeting needs for control and regulation through the consolidation and centralization of power and authority, although political sociology itself did not

Table 1  Functional requisites proposed 1830 to 2023* August Comte 1830–1842

Integration through (1) structural interdependencies and (2) common culture

Herbert Spencer 1874–1903

Meeting selection pressures through (1) production, (2) reproduction, (3) distribution, and (4) regulation

Émile Durkheim 1893–1918

Meeting selection pressures for (1) structural interdependencies and (2) common culture

A.R. Radcliffe-Brown 1935–1958

Meeting selection pressures for (1) structural interdependencies

Bronislaw Malinowski 1936–1944

Selection pressures for (1) economic adaptation, (2) political-legal integration, (3) cultural integration, and (4) education/socialization

Talcott Parsons 1951–1978

Meeting selection pressures for (1) adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) integration, (4) control of emotions and social relations

Niklas Luhmann 1965–1995

Selection pressures for reducing the complexity of (1) temporal, (2) material, and (3) symbolic dimensions of societal organization

Note:   * Dates refer to period of influence of each functional theorist.

Jonathan H. Turner and Alexandra Maryanski

functionalism  201 buy into functional conceptualizations to a high degree. All emphasize production (the gathering of resources, their conversion into usable goods, and their distribution). Some, like Spencer, emphasized distribution as a distinctive functional requisite for development mechanisms for distributing goods and economic resources (markets) as well as information and movement of members of populations (infrastructures). All emphasize reproduction (often as “education” or, in Parsons’ case, as reproduction and tension management under the label “latency”). The basic idea behind the “discovery” (more like a rediscovery of what Spencer had argued) of a limited number of functional requisites was to view these as the fundamental need states that super-organic systems must meet if they are to sustain themselves in their environments. A functional need was specified in a social or cultural system and then the structural and/or cultural substructures meeting this need would be described. For some, such an exercise “explained” both the dynamics of the more inclusive social systems and the reasons for the operation of its subsystems by simply finding the “need” or “requisite” that these subsystems meet in sustaining the viability of the larger social system. What functionalism accomplished, especially among American sociologists, was theorizing on a grander scale, much like the early nineteenth-century masters of sociology in Europe. And so, it is not surprising that, for a two-decade period, functional theorizing dominated world-level theorizing, although many in Europe rejected such an approach. And in the US, alternative schools such as symbolic interactionism and conflict theory rejected functionalism. Functionalism then began to fade when Marx could be more fully explored in American academia (after the repression of anything “communistic” in the 1950s). Yet, efforts to build more general theories (of almost everything) continue to the present day. So, if nothing else, functionalism encouraged general or what is often called, in a derogatory way, “Grand Theorizing.” The critique of functionalism was threefold. First, much functional analysis is an illegitimate teleology, in which a need state (the functional requisite) “causes” the structural and cultural formations for meeting this need state to miraculously appear. Without specifying how and through what specific processes this need state created cultural and

social structures, it appeared that the end state caused the emergence of the structures that led to the end state. Second, functionalism tends to be tautological: how do we know that a subsystem meets the survival needs of a larger social system? We know this because the system is surviving! Yet, it was probably the third substantive critique that accelerated the downfall of functionalism at a time in the 1960s when conflict sociology was emerging. The argument was simply that functionalism is ahistorical and represents a kind of “utopia” where structures exist to sustain the status quo and, thereby, work against social changes needed to “make a society better.” Indeed, functionalism was seen as a conservative ideology posing as a scientific theory supporting elite sectors of societies (Turner and Maryanski 1988). Early on in the revival of functionalism in the 1950s, defenders of functionalism sought to portray it as simply what any good sociologist would do. For example, Kingsley Davis’ 1959 presidential address to the American Sociological Association proclaimed that there is little that can be considered “distinctive” about functional analysis. Over two decades later, Jeffrey Alexander (1985:9) argued that that functionalism “indicates nothing so precise as a set of concepts, a method, a model, or an ideology” at the very time that a chorus of criticism to the contrary was being issued from many quarters. Indeed, almost all functional analyses had a list of functional requisites like those listed in Table 1 [for more examples, see Davis (1949), Aberle et al. (1950), Levy (1952), Goldschmidt (1966), and even Merton (1949)]. Undaunted, Alexander (1985) introduced the notion of neo-functionalisms, downplaying the notion of functional requisites and need states and insisting that functionalism was no more than a concern with (a) social structure, (b) a recognition of dialectic relations among integration, social control, and deviance, (c) a reformulation of Keynesian equilibrium models, (d) an emphasis upon the relations among personality, culture, and social structure, and (e) an emphasis on differentiation as the principle direction of social change. What he did not mention, of course, is that all of these were conceptualized in terms of the functional need states of social systems at all levels of social structure and culture. Nor did he review the consequences of this line of emphasis as we have in summarizing key criticisms. Indeed, Alexander

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202  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology continued to see functionalism now recast as neo-functionalisms as simply an approach that conceptualizes what is obvious to any sociologist: analytical levels of socio-cultural phenomena (person, social structure, and culture), systems and subsystems, normative processes, differentiation dynamics (including conflicts), and differentiation of substructures within differentiated institutional systems. In the end, neo-functionalism was everything that Alexander said it was, except what he was describing was sociology in general, not functionalism in particular—which was, of course, the intention of his advocacy. Yet, in reality, the central concern of all functional analysis begins with the notion that any type or level of socio-cultural formation can be best understood by determining the functional need or requisites that it meets. This is what makes functionalism distinctive. If, for example, functionalists had argued that one way to understand socio-cultural formations is their history in terms of meeting adaptive problems facing a given population in a given environment, Alexander’s argument would have been more plausible. Still, as we shortly conclude, this is exactly what needs to be done with functional analysis, which does not make it neo-functionalism but a more of an evolutionary approach for understanding why socio-cultural formations evolve within varying environments generating “selection pressures” on populations—which was perhaps evident in Parsons’ (1966) movement into the evolutionary analysis of societies. Thus, the criticisms of functionalism were all somewhat overdrawn, even as they pushed sociologists to abandon functional analysis. The defenses of functionalism were not really plausible because they ignored the very feature that made functionalism unique. Yet, functionalism is still intriguing because of its capacity to think about societies as systemic wholes and search for the laws of their operative dynamics. Although contemporary functionalism did not produce many laws comparable to those generated by Spencer and Durkheim, recent functionalism did have the virtue of looking at societies as systems and looking at particular subsystems, such as political systems within a society, in a way that sustained a concern with how parts of larger systems work. And as functional theorists in the 1960s sought to understand societal evolution (e.g., Parsons 1966), just as the

classical sociologists had in the nineteenth century, critics of evolutionary analysis have often brought back the old “ghosts” of eugenics and Social Darwinism, even though such critiques have little substantive merit. Still, as noted above, shifting functionalism to a more evolutionary focus would have been one way to have saved this form of analysis. And so, we should ask: should functionalism have been saved? Even if it could, is it worth the effort? One strategy that J. Turner (Turner and Machalek 2018: 260–90) has pursued is to review the “functional requisites” delineated in Table 1 and to re-conceptualize these as nodes of “selection pressures” on populations. Selection is a powerful force in both organic and super-organic evolution, and just like organic bodies, social structures and their cultures emerge and disappear by virtue of selection pressures. And if we shift focus in this way and see the labels in the middle column of Table 1 as a list of fundamental selection pressures on super-organic systems, evolutionary analysis of this sort can bring back the larger vision that the classical theorists had for sociology and that functionalism seemed to promise but not fully deliver. For example, if we see as generic and fundamental Spencer’s requisites as delineated in Table 1, we can reasonably argue that these are nodes of selection pressures that increase with environmental changes or the growth (or contraction) of a society. The notion of “function” was, in essence, a short-hand way to address the dynamics of selection, but this was not clear in most functional analyses after Spencer. Just as medical biology denotes one of the “functions” of the heart in humans is to circulate air to cells and to remove potentially harmful products of respiration, this argument can be expressed in more evolutionary terms: as organisms grow in size, selection pressures for distributing vital resources to internal organs increase, as do selection pressures for removing harmful byproducts, with one solution to such pressures involving the evolution of hearts and circulatory systems for blood to cells and from cells through filters such as kidneys and livers as waste products as well as through respiration from lungs. If sociologists shift the focus in this way for socio-cultural systems, viewing existing structures as an outcome of selection pressures and then examining how such pressures produced these structures historically,

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functionalism  203 most of the “problems” with functionalism disappear, as does the notion of function itself, to be replaced by a more nuanced ecological and evolutionary analysis of societal evolution. This brings back what was implied by nineteenth-century evolutionary approaches with a unique form of evolutionary sociology that recognizes that the nature of the units under selection in socio-cultural systems, the nature of selection in the socio-cultural universe, and the nature of evolution itself are all different than in the biological evolution of organisms. In this way, the ghost of functionalism lives on, but without the problems that led to its downfall. Jonathan H. Turner and Alexandra Maryanski

Note 1.

The organismic system level is not included in Table 1.

References Aberle, D. F., A. K. Cohen, E. Moore, A. K. Davis, M. J. Levy, and F. Y. Sutton. 1950. “The Functional Requisites of a Society.” Ethnics 60: 100–111. Alexander, Jeffrey C., ed. 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Comte, Auguste. 1830–1842 [1896]. The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. 3 volumes. Trans. and cond. By H. Martineau. London: George Bell & sons, Originally published in 1857. Darwin, Charles. 1859. On the Origin of Species. London: John Murray. Davis, Kingsley. 1949. Human Society. New York: Macmillan. Davis, Kingsley. 1959. “The Myth of Functional Analysis.” American Sociological Review 25: 757–772. DeCoulanges, N. D. Fustel. [1864] 1889. Boston the Ancient City. Boston, MA: Lee and Shepard. Durkheim, Emile. 1893 [1947]. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. 1893.

Durkheim, Emile. [1912]1995. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Trans. Karen Fields. New York: Free Press. Goldschmidt, Walter. 1966. Comparative Functionalism. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Levy, Marion J. 1952. The Structure of Society. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Luhmann, Niklas. 1982. Theory and the Differentiation of Society. Trans. S. Holmes and C. Larmore. New York: Columbia University Press. Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1944. A Scientific Theory of Culture. London: Oxford University Press. Merton, Robert K. 1949. “Manifest and Latent Functions.” Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. Miller, James G. 1978. Living Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill. Parsons, Talcott 1966. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Parsons, Talcott, Robert F. Bales, and Edward Shils. 1953. Working Papers in the Theory of Action. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. 1952. “Structure and Function in Primitive Society.” Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Spencer, Herbert 1862 [1880]. First Principles. New York: A. L. Burt. Spencer, Herbert. 1874–96 [1899]. The Principles of Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Thompson, Kenneth. 1985. “Introduction.” Pp. 13–20. In: Readings from Emile Durkheim. edited by K. Thompson. London: Routledge. Turner, Jonathan H. and Alexandra Maryanski. 1979. Functionalism. Palo Alto CA: Benjamin–Cummings. Turner, Jonathan H. and Alexandra Maryanski. 1988. “Is ‘Neofunctionalism Really Functional?” Sociological Theory 6(1): 110–121. Turner, Jonathan H. and Richard S. Machalek. 2018. The New Evolutionary Sociology. London: Routledge.

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52. Gender

(2009:31) defines gender regimes as “a set of inter-related gendered social relations and gendered institutions”. Based on a set of indicators which include women in the workforce, How gender is defined and how gender is gendered inequality in employment, equality related to sex is historically variable (Hines legislation, childcare use, childcare public 2020). While sex differences are based on expenditure, gendered education, women in socially agreed upon biological criteria (usu- parliament, women in trade unions, and genally tied to reproductive functions), gender dif- dered civil liberties (which include legality of ferences refer to social constructions of male abortion), Walby (2009) identifies three types and female, masculine and feminine (West of gender regimes: a domestic gender regime, and Zimmerman 1987). Gender is a basic ele- a neoliberal public gender regime, and a ment of politics, and Scott (1986) defines it as social democratic gender regime. A higher “constitutive element of social relations based proportion of women can be found in leaderon perceived differences between the sexes, ship positions in the economy, education, and and . . . a primary way of signifying relations politics in public gender regimes compared to domestic gender regimes. Social democratic of power” (p. 1066). The binary construction of both sex and gender regimes spent a higher percentage of gender is hotly contested. Whereas cis men GDP on public day care than neoliberal puband women identify with the sex category lic gender regimes (Walby 2009). Gender assigned at birth, trans men and women do not regimes vary with respect to the depth of and reject binary sex and gender categories democracy which can be measured by consid(Hines 2020). Gender differences are rein- ering the extent of gender- and class-focused forced and institutionalised in gendered divi- public expenditure, equal treatment laws, sions of labour which are shaped by social, political and civil rights and the presence of economic, and political transformations (Roth women in parliament (Walby 2009). Social and Walker 2019). The transition from monar- democratic public gender regimes are characchies and aristocracies to liberal democracies terised by deeper democracy and more gender resulted in a new “sexual contract” (Pateman equality in political participation (Roth and 1988) in which patriarchal relations were Saunders 2020). Gender regimes not only shape politireplaced by relations among (white, middle-class) men as brothers while excluding cal participation but are also shaped by the women and colonial subjects (Ferree 2020). political participation of those fighting for or Initially, such liberal democracies were char- against gender equality. Women who were acterised by a breadwinner-housewife model excluded from political rights such as voting which, due to the mobilisations of women’s or standing for office, participated in civil and LGBTQ movements, has been increas- society to fight for political rights (Clemens ingly replaced by a “partnership model of 1993). Women’s movements successfully families that is not necessarily heterosexual mobilised for women’s political representaor binary” (Ferree 2020:903). Gender does tion and achieved important gains including not only intersect with sexuality, but impor- female suffrage, the election of female partantly also with other systems of domination liamentarians, and a growing proportion of such as race, ethnicity, class, and nationality. women in national legislatures. Paxton et al. A gender analysis thus requires an intersec- (2006) examine increasing global pressure tional analysis (Crenshaw 1991). For example, for the inclusion of women in parliaments it is important to keep in mind that the pub- and governments in comparative perspective. lic-private split, which is associated with the Based on an analysis of 150 countries over transition to modern, industrialised societies, 110 years (1893–2003) they identify changes describes the public sphere of paid employ- in discourse in three time periods. Between ment and politics and the domestic or private 1893 and 1945 women fought for the right sphere of social reproduction in family and to vote which was taken for granted after household, and reflects white middle-class 1945. Newly independent states incorporated norms and makes the paid work of non-white, women at a basic level between 1945 and immigrant, and working-class women and 1990. After the 1970s, more pressure to incorporate women in politics through gender men invisible. At the macro-level, societies can be com- quotas or benchmarks was noted. Variations pared with respect to gender regimes. Walby in women’s involvement in parliaments and 204

gender  205 governments can be explained by countrylevel political (proportional representation, affirmative action), social structural (access to education, labour market, professions) and cultural (gender roles, socialism, religion, conservativism, and colonial) characteristics that interact with global pressure (international non-governmental organisations, transnational organisations) (Paxton et al. 2016). Despite the progress that has been made since the nineteenth century, the representation of women in politics is still limited, and women are still under-represented in parliaments. Celis and Childs (2020:42) argue that it is important to distinguish between descriptive representation (how many women representatives participate in our parliaments and assemblies?); (ii) substantive representation (are women’s interests “acted” upon in our political institutions?); (iii) and . . . symbolic representation (how are women and gender symbolized in and through politics, and how do women feel about their representation?).

They note that these different forms of representation are “overlapping and connected dimensions” (ibid.). In addition, Celis and Childs (2020: 43) introduce the concept of “affected representatives of women” who are defined as “political representatives [who] stand, and act, for differently affected groups of women when our political institutions address issues and interests that affect women”. This understanding of political representation is informed by an intersectional perspective that acknowledges that women are differently positioned with respect to class, race and other markers of inequalities which affect their concerns. Women’s political participation is not restricted to mainstream political institutions but continues to comprise involvement in social movements and trade unions, as well as consumer activism such as boycotts and buycotts and a wide range of “everyday activism” (Bassel and Emejulu 2017, Jupp 2022). Everyday activism encompasses community activism to protest against the closure of public services such as family centres as well as self-help and mutual aid. Roseneil and colleagues (2012) introduced the notion of “intimate citizenship” which refers to legal and policy frameworks that regulate close sexual and non-sexual relationships between adults, as well as relationships between adults and children. Women’s movements have long

focused on self-determination or intimate citizenship. The involvement of women in different forms of political action (institutional politics, social movements, everyday politics) is accompanied by gains for gender equality and policies that address women’s varied interests including affirmative action, anti-discrimination legislation, legal access to abortion, efforts to prevent violence against women and sexual harassment, as well as access to public day care. The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE https://eige​.europa​.eu/) monitors the progress that has been made in the Gender Equality Index which is annually updated. Various crises in the first decades of the twenty-first century including the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent economic and fiscal crises which resulted in rising unemployment and public sector cuts as well as the COVID pandemic which started in 2020 have gendered effects (Kantola and Lombardo 2017; Grasso et al. 2021). Public sector cuts hit women, especially workingclass and minority women, harder than men due to their employment in the public sector and their use of public services (Bassel and Emejulu 2017, Jupp 2022). In many countries, austerity measures resulted in protest events, and gender differences in participation have been noted (Roth and Saunders 2020). In addition to leftist mobilisations against neoliberalism, the growth of right-wing populist movements represents a response to globalisation and threats to white male privilege. Such movements of “mobilised masculinities” (Ferree 2020) criticise gender equality and seek to defend the “natural order” of traditional heteronormative families and binary sex-categories. Although they need to be analytically distinguished, there is an overlap between right-wing and anti-gender mobilisations (Ferree 2020; Graff and Korolczuk 2022). The focus of anti-gender campaigns varies and includes attacks on abortion rights as well as LGBTQ rights in defence of the family. The Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the World Congress of Families, and a range of right-wing political parties underpin these anti-gender mobilisations (Graff and Korolczuk 2022). However, the attacks on trans rights go beyond right-wing populist actors and include contentious debates among feminists (Hines 2020; Mackay 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic which led to the shift to home-working and the closure Silke Roth

206  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology of childcare centres had a stronger impact on the gendered division of labour between men and women than the financial crisis of 2008. However, the impact varied depending on policy decisions (Mooi-Reci and Risman 2021) and thus gender regimes. At the same time the COVID-19 pandemic provided opportunities for women political leaders such as Jacinda Ardern or Angela Merkel to “display forms of feminine protectionism” (Johnson and Williams 2020). Scholarship on gender and politics is rich and multifaceted and employs intersectional and comparative perspectives on gender regimes, gendered interests, and gendered mobilisations. Nevertheless, so far, the perspectives of scholars based in the Global South have been under-represented and marginalised (Medie and Kang 2018). This has significant consequences for the understanding of global variations of gendered political participation, gendered social movements and gendered political participation which require a “global lens” (Medie and Kang 2018). Such an approach “enables scholars to identify the normatively positive and negative linkages between global power dynamics and local politics” (Medie and Kang 2018: 49) and how they shape gender relations. Silke Roth

References Bassel, L. and A. Emejulu (2017). Minority Women and Austerity. Survival and Resistance in France and Britain. Bristol, Policy Press. Celis, K. and S. Childs (2020). Feminist Democratic Representation. New York, Oxford University Press. Clemens, E. S. (1993). “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890–1920.” American Journal of Sociology 98(4): 755–798. Crenshaw, K. (1991). “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241–1299. Ferree, M. M. (2020). “The Crisis of Masculinity for Gendered Democracies: Before, During, and After Trump.” Sociological Forum 35(S1): 898–917. Graff, A. and E. Korolczuk (2022). AntiGender Politics in the Populist Moment. London, Routledge. Silke Roth

Grasso, M., M. Klicperová-Baker, S. Koos, Y. Kosyakova, A. Petrillo and I. Vlase (2021). “The Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis on European Societies. What Have We Learnt and Where Do We Go from Here? – Introduction to the COVID Volume.” European Societies 23: S2-S32 https://doi​ .org​/10​.1080​/14616696​.2020​.1869283. Hines, S. (2020). “Sex Wars and (Trans) Gender Panics: Identity and Body Politics in Contemporary UK Feminism.” The Sociological Review 68(4): 699–717. Johnson, C. and B. Williams (2020). “Gender and Political Leadership in a Time of COVID.” Politics and Gender 16(4): 943–950. Jupp, E. (2022). Care, Crisis and Activism. The Politics of Everyday Life. Bristol, Bristol University Press. Kantola, J. and E. Lombardo (2017). Gender and the Politics of the Economic Crisis in Europe. In J. Kantola and E. Lombardo (Eds.), Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe. Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–25. Mackay, F. (2021). Female Masculinities and the Gender Wars. The Politics of Sex. London, Bloomsbury. Medie, P. A. and A. J. Kang (2018). “Power, Knowledge and the Politics of Gender in the Global South.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 1(1–2): 37–53. Mooi-Reci, I. and B. J. Risman (2021). “The Gendered Impacts of COVID-19: Lessons and Reflections.” Gender and Society 35(2): 161–167. Pateman, C. (1988). The Sexual Contract. Cambridge, Polity. Paxton, P., M. M. Hughes and J. L. Green (2006). “The International Women’s Movement and Women’s Political Representation, 1893–2003.” American Sociological Review 71(6): 898–920. Roseneil, S., I. Crowhurst, T. Hellesund, A. C. Santos and M. Stoilova (2012). Remaking Intimate Citizenship in Multicultural Europe: Experiences Outside the Conventional Family. In: B. Halsaa, S. Roseneil and S. Sümer (Eds.), Remaking Citizenship in Multicultural Europe. Citizenship, Gender and Diversity. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 41–69. https://doi​.org​/10​.1057​/9781137272157_3. Roth, S. and C. Saunders (2020). “Do Gender Regimes Matter? Gender Differences in

gender  207 Involvement in Anti-austerity Protests - A Comparison of Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.” Social Movement Studies 19(3): 303–324. Roth, S. and C. Walker (2019). Gender Relations. In W. Merkel, R. Kollmorgen, and Hans-Jürgen Wagener (Eds.), Handbook of Political, Social and Economic Transformation. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 509–514.

Scott, J. W. (1986). “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.” American Historical Review 91(5): 1053–1075. Walby, S. (2009). Globalization and Inequalities. Complexities and Contested Modernities. Los Angeles, Sage. West, C. and D. H. Zimmerman (1987). “Doing Gender.” Gender and Society 1(2): 125–151.

Silke Roth

53. Globalization

the processes of globalization operate in and between different dimensions had been usefully added (Urry 2003). The ideas of disembodied and embodied globalization have been Globalization is often defined as “the multidi- used to further refine globalization theory mensional and uneven intensification of social (Steger and James 2019). Understanding glorelations and consciousness across world- balization as having to do with the comprestime and world-space.” Put differently, it is sion of time and space also makes it easier to about “intensifying planetary interconnectiv- see it as a set of processes that may (not “will”) ity” (Steger 2020, 17). It is also a “stand-in” lead to the creation of “globality”—an associfor wider changes associated with popula- ated spatial term indicating that national and tion growth and increased density and con- other related territorial boundaries are chalnectivity (Pieterse 2021, 3). “What is there is lenged and transgressed by people, trade, also here and what is here is also there” cap- culture, diseases, and environmental flows. tures the essence of globalization in practice However, while globality indicates a kind of (Steger and Wahlrab 2017, 1). However, criti- “one world” spatially and socially, it makes no cal scholars argue that assertions of global claim to content since it could be governed by connectivity and the compression of space individualist, pluralist, or communal norms. The “global imaginary,” another related and time mean that almost everything has a global dimension, potentially making the term, refers to our consciousness of the world term globalization an empty signifier (Axford as a whole. With this increase in global con2013, 1; Rosenberg 2005). On the other hand, sciousness comes a weakening and altering popular debates often center on reductive nor- of our understanding of the necessarily more mative and ideological questions of whether it limited spatial concept of national imaginary. The global imaginary is implicated in is “good” or “bad.” Its definition frequently depends on who globalization because the processes that have is using the term and at what time. To better led to the compression of time and space have chart this, numerous researchers present glo- made it possible for people to literally see the balization scholarship as occurring in waves world as a globe in photographs taken from with the first wave beginning in the 1980s outer space, the ability to communicate with and ending in the mid-1990s and comprised and see people around the world in real-time, mostly of scholarship centering on the eco- and experience the effects of production and nomic dimension (e.g. lowering tariffs and consumption as the climate heats up and the integrating markets). The term was broadly Earth burns. Global pandemics like SARS used by business leaders and politicians so and COVID-19 dramatize our interconnected frequently in this early period that globaliza- existence by drawing attention to “embodied” tion was associated with neoliberalism and a and “disembodied” globalization. Although range of pro-market policy positions (Axford the global COVID-19 pandemic disrupted 2013, 11–17). Dubbed “hyper-globalizers,” global supply chains, caused a reduction in they promoted global capitalism as lifting global tourism, and gave ethno-nationalist the world out of poverty and into a better anti-global populists around the world a politlife, even world peace (Steger 2002). Critical ical excuse to tighten borders (all examples of scholarship developed in response and sug- embodied globalization), the world also saw gested that globalization should be under- a continued rise in “disembodied” globalizastood multidimensionally in order to better tion as internet usage increased for pleasure understand the analytically but mutually con- and trade (James and Steger 2022). It must stitutive dynamics of not just economics but be noted too that even those critics who rage also culture, politics, history, and the environ- against globalization find themselves in the awkward position of increasing everyone’s ment (Steger 2020; Axford 2013, 8). Culture (Robertson), time-space com- consciousness of it. Globalization is so frequently associated pression (Harvey), politics, history (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton), and the with other topics that publishers often title metaphor of networks (Castells) were all books and articles Globalization and . . . Yet added in the 1990s as more critical scholarly even entire continents get glaringly left out, amendments to globalization theory. By the as noted by the absence of publications about first decade of the twenty-first century, the globalization and Africa to say nothing of metaphor of fluids and flows to describe how knowledge production itself, as shown by the 208

globalization  209 predominance of Western sources in university curricula on the topic of globalization. Such findings reveal that proponents of “market globalism,” the ideology that promotes global capitalism, only want to show “good” results or a narrow interpretation of globalization and label the negatives as exceptions. In other words, globalization is everything except what those in positions of power do not want it to be (Kamola 2013, 42). Understood by global historians as imperialism, critical scholars of globalization call for the adoption of subaltern voices (Darian-Smith and McCarty 2017). Accordingly, scholars of postcolonial politics invite an even broader and longer view of globalization and include in their descriptions its malignant aspects (Rutazibwa and Shilliam 2018). The wider popular and scholarly use of the term globalization occurred naturally at around the same time that scholars began forming new organizations, programs, journals, book series, and college and university departments of globalization studies and global studies (Wahlrab 2020; Steger and Wahlrab 2017; Darian-Smith and McCarty 2017; Pieterse 2021). Whether globalization studies or global studies, the new academic field embodied in these terms adopted “globalization” both as its object of study and the lens through which it viewed the world. The new field was created because the complexity it sought to understand could not be appropriately described and interpreted by one discipline. In due course, global studies scholars worked in teams, reading outside of their disciplines, and experimented with methodologies described as multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and, especially, transdisciplinary. Transdisciplinarity offers global studies the potential for generating both deep insights and new topics relevant for globalization theory and practice (Curran 2021). It is often through this transdisciplinarity that productive criticisms arise, such as that it has not kept up with human-caused climate chaos and the indelible mark we humans are leaving for future generations, not to mention marking the geological record itself. Indeed, global governance is failing at the most critical level of preventing the creation of a “hothouse Earth”: prominent Earth systems scientists conclude that “the Earth System may be approaching a planetary threshold that could lock in a continuing rapid pathway toward much hotter conditions—Hothouse

Earth. This pathway . . . could not be reversed, steered, or substantially slowed” (Steffen et al. 2018, p. 8257). The term “Anthropocene” does not appear in indexes of major handbooks on globalization published as recently as 2014 even though it was introduced in the late 1990s by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). While past critical engagement has helped to refine key terms associated with globalization, scholars in the fields of globalization studies and global studies point to the need to expand the core vocabulary of globalization theory to include “Eurocentrism,” “epistemicide,” the “Anthropocene,” and “ecocide” (Steger 2021, 2). Whether pro-market or otherwise, even (especially) good definitions are ignored outside of the academy as politicians and pundits employ the term in normative ways. Anti-globalist populists, for example, continue to employ the term in the service of ethno-nationalism, progressives use the term to imagine a cosmopolitan world, and religious globalists imagine some form of global Caliphate. Inevitably, it seems, the term must be explained in each context as it cannot be used in isolation unless everyone already knows or imagines they know what is implied (e.g. when Donald Trump or Viktor Orbán uses the term in front of a large audience). Grouped under the category of “disjunctive globalization,” disruptions like September 11, 2001, the 2008 global recession, and the COVID-19 pandemic further create space for debate about de-globalization, or the idea that globalization is in retreat, as states reassert themselves and the national imaginary resists the global as the dominant framework for understanding. However, challenges to globalization imply a particular ideological conception as when protestors disrupt global economic conferences under the banner of global justice (“justice globalism”), global jihadists attack globalization as imperialism (“religious globalism”), or when nationalist populists promote their country first (antiglobalist populism, Trumpism, and the like). All of this points to the way that the processes of globalization have created space for sociological research to attend to the differences between national society and global society and the fact that what concerns one may not concern the other (Axford 2013, 41). As the COVID-19 pandemic raged at the beginning of 2020, scholars incorporated its Amentahru Wahlrab

210  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology effects into their theoretical and empirical discussions of climate change and the reemergence of nationalist-populist forces all while insisting that Globalization Matters in a period they called the “Great Unsettling— shorthand for the profound dynamics of volatility and destabilization” (Steger and James 2019, 18). The journal Globalizations saw the need for a special issue on the topic and asked contributors to address the question of “engaging the global in unsettled times” (Steger and James 2019; Axford 2021). Without mincing words, the concluding essay asserted that “Our planet, our humanity, our lifeworlds, are in crisis, and we should be talking about how we understand these global disruptions and what can be done to make our world a better place” (James and Steger 2021, 795). Globalization is used by so many people in so many ways that it seems unlikely to disappear from use any time soon. The twenty-first-century debates and global crises give continued justification for its usefulness. Indeed, it may even be the unsettled nature of the term and the things it is used to describe that make it unlikely to fade as many early critics claimed. Demographic shifts, climate change, new technology, economic uncertainty, political conflict, and ideological struggles will continue to require scholarly interpretation which requires studying globalization as both an object and a lens through which to understand phenomena. Amentahru Wahlrab

James, Paul, and Manfred B. Steger. 2021. “Globalization in Question: Why Does Engaged Theory Matter?” Globalizations 18(5): 794–809. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /14747731​.2020​.1842045. James, Paul, and Manfred B. Steger. 2022. “On Living in an Already-Unsettled World: COVID as an Expression of Larger Transformations.” Globalizations 19(3): 426–438. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14747731​ .2021​.1961460. Kamola, Isaac A. 2013. “Why Global? Diagnosing the Globalization Literature Within a Political Economy of Higher Education.” International Political Sociology 7(1): 41–58. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1111​/ips​.12008. Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 2021. Connectivity and Global Studies. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Rosenberg, Justin. 2005. “Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem.” International Politics 42(1): 2–74. https://ezproxy​.uttyler​ .edu ​ / login​ ? url ​ = http:/​ /search ​ . ebscohost​ .com​/ login​.aspx​?direct​=true​&db​=hia​&AN​ =25510984​&site​=eds​-live​&scope​=site. Rutazibwa, Olivia U., and Robbie Shilliam. 2018. Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics. London and New York: Routledge. Steffen, Will, Johan Rockström, Katherine Richardson, Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke, Diana Liverman, Colin P. Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Sarah E. Cornell, Michel Crucifix, Jonathan F. Donges, Ingo Fetzer, Steven J. Lade, Marten Scheffer, Ricarda Winkelmann, and Hans Joachim References Schellnhuber. 2018. “Trajectories of the Axford, Barrie. 2013. Theories of Earth System in the Anthropocene.” Globalization. Malden, MA: Polity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Axford, Barrie. 2021. “Editorial.” Sciences of the United States of America Globalizations 18(5): 683–684. https://doi​ 115(33): 8252. https://doi​.org​/10​.1073​/pnas​ .org​/10​.1080​/14747731​.2020​.1841542. .1810141115. Crutzen, Paul, and Eugene Stoermer. 2000. Steger, Manfred B. 2002. Globalism: The “The ‘Athropocene’.” IGBP Newsletter 41: New Market Ideology. Lanham, MD: 17–18. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Curran, Sara R. 2021. “Green- or Rose- Steger, Manfred B. 2020. Globalization: A Coloured Lenses for Globalization Matters? Very Short Introduction. 5th ed. New York: Transdisciplinary Epistemic Practices and Oxford University Press. Paradigmatic Transformations in Ecologies Steger, Manfred B. 2021. “Two Limitations of and Equalities.” Globalizations 18(5): 738– Globalization Theory.” Global Perspectives 749. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/14747731​.2020​ 2(1): 1–14. https://doi​.org​/10​.1525​/gp​.2021​ .1841544. .30035. Darian-Smith, Eve, and Philip C. McCarty. Steger, Manfred B., and Paul James. 2017. The Global Turn: Theories, Research 2019. Globalization Matters: Theories, Designs, and Methods for Global Studies. Histories, Issues. Cambridge and New Oakland, CA: University of California Press. York: Cambridge University Press. Amentahru Wahlrab

globalization  211 Steger, Manfred B., and Amentahru Wahlrab. 2017. What Is Global Studies?: Theory & Practice. London and New York: Routledge. Urry, John. 2003. Global Complexity. Malden, MA: Polity.

Wahlrab, Amentahru. 2020. “Global Studies.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, edited by Nukhet Sandal, 1–29. London: Oxford University Press.

Amentahru Wahlrab

54. Governance

black) and the EMU (in dark grey) as well as with democracy (in white) and party politics (in light grey). Drawing on these clusters of research, this entry reviews three main underOver the past decades, the concept of govern- standings of governance in reference to strucance has become central in several disciplines tures, processes and actors. Structures: the emergence of this concept and fields of research from political science, international relations and European studies cannot be dissociated from the transformato international political economy, sociol- tion of the state (Le Galès 1998) in Western ogy and anthropology, not to mention public Europe in the 1970s and the growing role of administration and economics as well as the non-state/private actors in decision-making growing literature on the new public manage- (Rhodes 1996). While some scholars have ment and the management of organizations. argued that the concept of governance allows Governance is an interdisciplinary concept us to “bring the state back in”, others, more par excellence, yet to a large extent, it is poly- critical, maintained that governance rather semic, fluid and used in many ways to cover captures the idea of the state moving “out” different realities. The concept has been as a result of the dispersal of authority within used not only to explain and describe forms the state (Peters and Pierre 2000). With a of power transformation but also to provide focus on national arenas, this transformation prescriptions in normative terms, to attain an of the role of the state finds its origins in the ideal that many international organizations belief that markets, civil society and individurefer to as good governance. The aim of this als are able to spontaneously cooperate and entry is threefold: (1) to review some of the to support governments’ capacity to solve key definitions attributed to this concept; (2) policy problems (Bartolini 2011; Rhodes to explain its academic popularity, illustrating 1996). With a focus on international arenas, the ways in which the concept has been used it has been argued that states (more specifiin different areas of research, and ultimately cally national governments) are no longer the ultimate decision-makers, as they delegate (3) to discuss its limitations and grey zones. The concept of governance has found a limited authority to supranational institutions fertile intellectual ground to develop since the to attain specific aims (Marks, Hooghe and 1970s in the context of the complex process Blank 1996: 345). States remain important of state transformation in Western Europe. as well as national executives. But power is The academic interest in this term increased shared with other actors, making the boundaamid globalization and European integration, ries between arenas – regional, national or being often used to capture the idea of a shift supranational – more fluid. Processes: Peters and Pierre defined govfrom government – understood as the “state’s competence to rule through hierarchy” (Offe ernance as “the process of defining collective 2009: 551) – to less hierarchical power rela- goals, making political priorities, and bringtions. Since then, through this notion, scholars ing together resources from a large number have conceptualized different yet important of different actors necessary to attain those phenomena of change both at the domestic objectives” (2000). Governance is a concept and international levels (Piattoni 2009): at the compatible with decision-making at the micro, level of polity (with a focus on the reconfigu- meso or macro level. It is used to understand ration of power structures beyond and within the governance of organizations and their the state and the reconfiguration of its sover- culture. It can shed light on decision-making eignty), policy (in reference to processes of processes in specific policy areas, from sociodecision-making both at the domestic, supra- economic governance to international migranational and international level) and politics tion and internet governance. At the macro (with a focus on new relationships between level, Hooghe and Marks (2003) coined the state and society and in terms of actors’ par- concept of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) ticipation in decision/rule making more gen- to capture not only the complexity of the erally). As the conceptual map in Figure 1 European Union (EU) but also its fragmented illustrates, drawing on data retrieved from the and pluralistic day-to-day decision-making. Scopus dataset, this notion is mainly associ- From this perspective, in conceptualizing the ated with decision-making in polities like functioning of the EU, MLG has been defined the European Union (in black) in general and as “a system of continuous negotiation among in specific areas such as the market (light nested governments at several territorial 212

governance  213

Figure 1  Map of co-occurrence based on a sample of articles retrieved in the Scopus database containing the term “governance” in the title, abstract or keywords, published in the 20 top political science journals from 1990 to May 2022 (N = 1680)

tiers” as a result of “a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that had pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level” (Marks 1993, 392). Outward looking, governance has been also used to explain and understand the EU’s external action through its enlargement and neighbourhood policy. While internal governance implies the “creation of rules” and their implementation in EU member states, external governance refers to the “transfer of given EU rules and their adoption by non-member states” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 662). Actors: the concept of governance refers also to the growing number of actors participating in decision-making. While the role of central governmental institutions as well as social and political actors such as parties

and trade unions, has been gradually eroding, new actors have emerged, ranging from agencies to private and public actors, participating in varying degrees in processes of decision-making. The relationship between these actors has shaped new modes of governance (Héritier and Rhodes 2011) and has given rise to a wide range of networks – from epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Sabatier 1998) to regulatory networks (Rhodes 1996; Hasselbach and Tsingou 2020) – and to diverse modes of interest representation and participation, complementing the traditional articulation of demands via electoral participation (Bartolini 2011). From a normative perspective, the concept of governance is seen as a “natural and successful alternative to traditional hierarchical forms of governance” (Bartolini 2011: 1). Overall, governance has been mainly grasped Ramona Coman and Leonardo Puleo

214  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology as a solution to a problem of increased interdependence, stemming from the need to solve problems beyond the state. This implies not only a transformation of power and authority but also a reconfiguration of sovereignty, in order to reduce transaction costs and limit asymmetrical uncertainty. As a corollary, it has been argued that new modes of governance do not weaken the power of the state, on the contrary. The cost of losing political control is compensated by the political benefits of sharing or pooling sovereignty. Not only is governance seen as a solution to increased interdependence and the need for cooperation and integration beyond the state, but it has also been portrayed as a promise of efficiency and legitimacy (Scharpf 1997) and quality of democracy. The quality of governance depends on its input, output and throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). As Schmidt (2013: 8) put it, “output legitimacy requires policies to work effectively while resonating with citizens’ values and identity”, input legitimacy depends on “citizens expressing demands institutionally and deliberatively”, and throughput legitimacy refers to “governance processes that work with efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness”. Yet, one of the growing concerns from a normative point of view is that power is shared or pooled between a variety of actors, all of them participating in the production of rules, but most of them lacking accountability. Governance encapsulates the idea of power sharing and dispersion rather than the accumulation of authority (Stephenson 2013), as national governments are losing ground to networks of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, professional societies and advocacy groups. The interactions between these actors are often non-hierarchical and fluid, breaking the link between territory and authority. With a more sceptical eye, some scholars have argued that the plurality of actors involved might dilute the attribution of responsibilities in the case of unsatisfactory outcomes (Curtin, Main and Papadopoulos 2010; Papadopoulos 2010). To conclude, governance has received many definitions to shed light on the simultaneous process of transformation at national and supranational/international levels. The concept encapsulates the idea of the coproduction of norms and public goods in a decision-making system in which the Ramona Coman and Leonardo Puleo

co-producers are different kinds of state and non-state actors (Bartolini 2011) involved in a non-hierarchical process. The quality of governance depends on its input, output and throughput legitimacy (Schmidt 2013). Ramona Coman and Leonardo Puleo

References Bartolini, S. (2011). New Modes of European Governance. An Introduction. In: A. Héritier and M. Rhodes (eds.), New Modes of Governance in Europe. Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1–18 Curtin, D., Mair, P. and Papadopoluos, Y., eds. (2010). Positioning Accountability in European Governance: An Introduction. West European Politics, 33(5), 929–945. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2010.485862 Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35 Hasselbalch, J. and Tsingou, E. (2020). Regulatory Networks and Policy Communities. In: R. Coman, A. Crespy and V. A. Schmidt (eds.), Governance and Politics in the Post-crisis European Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 74–93. DOI: 10.1017/9781108612609 Héritier, A. and Rhodes, M. (2011). New Modes of Governance in Europe. Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy, Palgrave Macmillan, London Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2003). Unravelling the Central State, but how?: Types of Multilevel Governance. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 233–243. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055403000649 Le Galès, P. (1998). Regulations and Governance in European Cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(3), 482–506. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2427.00153 Marks, Gary (1993). Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. In: A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community, Lynne Rienner, New York, 391–410 Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. (1996). European Integration from the 1980s: StateCentric v. Multi-level Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), 341–378. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1996.tb00577.x

governance  215 Offe, C. (2009). Governance: An “Empty Signifier”? Constellations, 16(4), 550–562. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00570.x Papadopoulos, Yannis (2010). Accountability and Multi-level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy? West European Politics, 33(5), 1030–1049. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2010.486126 Peters, B. J. and Pierre, J. (2000). Governance, Politics and the State. Macmillan, St. Martin’s Press, New York Piattoni, S. (2009). Multi‐level Governance: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis. Journal of European Integration, 31(2), 163– 180. DOI: 10.1080/07036330802642755 Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The New Governance: Governance without Government. Political Studies, 44(4), 652–667. DOI: 10.1111/ j.1467-9248.1996.tb01747.x Sabatier, Paul (1988) “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”, Policy Sciences, 21(2/3): 129–168

Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multilevel Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(4), 520–538. DOI: 10.1080/135017697344046 Schmidt, V. A. (2013). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’. Political Studies, 61(1), 2–22. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00962.x_962 2 Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 661–679. DOI: 10.1080/1350176042000248089 Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty Years of Multi-level Governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’ Journal of European Public Policy, 20(6), 817–837. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2013.781818

Ramona Coman and Leonardo Puleo

55. Governmentality

When Foucault first introduced the term governmentality, which he himself acknowledged was an “ugly word” (2007, p. 115), he characterized it as meaning three things:

The notion of governmentality was originally 1. the ensemble formed by institutions, procoined by Michel Foucault in the lecture cedures, analyses and reflections, calculaseries Security, Territory, Population in order tions, and tactics that allow the exercise to understand the specific art of government of this very specific, albeit very complex, that emerged in relation to the government power that has the population as its tarof the state in the sixteenth and seventeenth get, political economy as its major form of centuries. He continued to explore governknowledge, and apparatuses [dispositifs] mentality the following year in the lecture of security as its essential technical series The Birth of Biopolitics, investigating instrument. 2. the tendency, the line of force, that for a the governmental rationalities and technololong time, and throughout the West, has gies of liberalism and neoliberalism. Very constantly led towards the preeminence broadly, governmentality refers to the way in over all other types of power – soverwhich government takes place in the intereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type section between governmental practices and of power that we can call “government” practices of self-government and is a kind of 3. the process, or rather, the result of the propower that both creates and works on free cess by which the state of justice of the subjects. From a governmentality perspective, Middle Ages became the administrative one is interested in the intersection between state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalgovernmental rationality (the way an object ized”. (Foucault, 2007, p. 109) of government is thought, calculated, and rationalized) and the proposed or actual govFirst, governmentality is a form of power ernmental practices and technologies. Governmentality comes from the French that takes into account the naturalness and gouvernemental meaning ‘concerning gov- ‘economic’ nature of human beings instead ernment’ and relates to a broad understanding of disciplining them into acting in a cerof government as understood in early mod- tain way or punishing their transgressions. ern Europe encompassing the government Governmentality characterizes a kind of of state, self, and others (Lemke, 2019, p. x; power that attempts to stimulate certain ways Saar, 2010, p. 39). While Foucault developed of acting rather than forcing individuals, and governmentality to investigate government does this by acting on the desires, beliefs, historically, it is today predominantly used and urges of the subjects. Instead of attemptto analyze current and contemporary forms ing to eliminate delinquency, government is of government – particularly those of liberal- concerned with calculating an ‘acceptable’ ism and neoliberalism. Governmentality has level of transgression. ‘Security’ in this sense been developed and used in a multitude of means securing circulation and movement academic endeavors across a multiplicity of of the (primarily economic) processes of the disciplines within the social sciences and the population and the attempt to calculate the humanities. Foucault never fully developed optimal level of governmental intervention. Second, it characterizes a process by the notion of governmentality, calling it a “little experiment of method” (2007, p. 358) – a which government becomes a form of power little experiment that resulted in one of the preeminent over, and not a replacement of most popular concepts of the social sciences. other forms of power. Governmentality does Despite – or probably because of – its unfin- not replace sovereignty or discipline, but ished nature, it has become fruitful ground these are governmentalized, brought into the for inventions and further developments. In calculation of government (Foucault, 2007, the following, I start by looking more closely pp. 107–8). Governmental rationality constiat what Foucault himself meant by govern- tutes a calculation of the most optimal way mentality before moving on to how we can of governing, to which degree dispositifs of understand it through the notion of ‘conduct sovereignty (for instance legal punishment, of conduct’. I end with an overview of how it fines, etc.) are effective or to which degree has been used and current trends in the schol- dispositifs of discipline (for instance surveilarship, before concluding with strengths and lance) are the most (cost) effective in relation to the effect. Governmentality thus acts as a weaknesses. 216

governmentality  217 prism through which other forms of power work and can be analyzed. Third, the notion of governmentality refers to the (investigation of the) process by which the state was ‘governmentalized’, that is, how it came to increasingly govern in this way and how government as a form of power gained preeminence over other types of power. The notion of governmentality and the focus on government is in line with Foucault’s interest in power, not as a negative, prohibitive force, but as a productive force that exists everywhere in the social grid. Governmentality continues his earlier endeavors to “cut off the king’s head” in political thought and analyses (Foucault 1998, pp. 88–89). Power and government in this sense necessitate a form of reciprocity, an acceptance and accounting for the ones being governed as free subjects (1982, p. 790). To study power and government in this sense is to be alert to the intersection of power, government, knowledge, and subjectivity. Studying governmentality means starting from the governmental practices and rationalities, and not with specific organizations, institutions, or individuals. Foucault was adamant in studying not the ‘where’ or ‘what’ of power and government, but the ‘how’. From a governmentality perspective, one cannot start with the assumption that power resides in the state, the CEO, or the president. This is not to say that these organizations, institutions, or individuals are not powerful, but methodologically, any inquiry into governmentality cannot start with this assumption. Foucault stressed that he wanted to avoid a theory of the state “as one can and must forgo an indigestible meal” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 76–77; Lemke 2007). However, this does not in any way mean cancelling “the presence and the effect of state mechanisms” (2010, p. 77; Jessen & von Eggers, 2020, p. 57). From a governmentality perspective, one must avoid starting with what Foucault calls ‘universals’, such as state, nation, people, and sovereignty, and start instead with concrete governmental practices and rationalities, and then in turn see how they create certain universals, and which power effects these generate (Mitchell, 1991; Jessen & von Eggers, 2020). Governmentality can be understood through the notion of ‘the conduct of conduct’. Conduct means ‘to lead’ and concerns both conducting others as well as conducting

oneself. This underlines the centrality for a governmentality perspective to the intersection of governmental practices and practices of the self. To govern in this sense is to “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). To govern means to account for the freedom, actions, and dispositions of subjects and make certain ways of acting more preferable to others. According to Dean (2010, p. 18), “government is a calculated and rational activity” which entails “any attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends”. In an analysis of the governing of the unemployed in an active society, Dean (1995) analyses the problematization of government, what is governed, how is governed, which subject is produced, and the aim of government. In relation to the unemployed, the problematization is not simply unemployment, but the notion of passive welfare services as a right. What is governed is not simply ‘the unemployed’, but the risk of dependency and demoralization. The techniques constitute self-help, therapy, voluntary work, contracts, and partnerships with private enterprises, and the subject produced is the active, job-seeking, entrepreneurial subject, just as the aim or utopia is a vision of an active, entrepreneurial, and competitive society. This stresses that governmentality concerns a certain rationality, meaning how the practice of governing is rationalized, understood, and calculated, how it makes sense to those governing, and how the object of government is constituted in this rationalization. How to govern is contingent upon the constitution of the object of government. The conception of a problem constitutes how solutions are thought of and devised. Governmentality is therefore interested in how problems, objects, and subjects are constructed as governable through forms of knowledge, practices, techniques, and technologies. Foucault’s lectures were not published until 2004 and were only translated into English in 2007 and 2008. In the 1990s, the first, mainly Anglo-Saxon, reception of governmentality was primarily used to investigate the multiplicity of power relations in ‘advanced liberalism’ where the state governed increasingly not through law and command, but in a de-centralized network of institutions and organizations. It was used to analyze a form of political power primarily ‘beyond the state’ (Rose & Mathias Hein Jessen

218  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Miller, 1992) through networks, partnerships, economic processes, and delegations of control in what subsequently came to be known as ‘governmentality-studies’ (Barry, Osborne & Rose, 1996; Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991). In recent years, a number of scholars have attempted to underline the centrality of the state for Foucault himself, but also for contemporary governmental practices (Dean, 2013; Lemke, 2007; Saar, 2010; Jessen & von Eggers, 2020). Underlining the tentative nature of governmentality and its adaptability to developing contexts, the increased ‘return’ to state, sovereignty, nationalism, people, and populism has facilitated a renewed governmentality perspective on the state, just as there has been a surge in studies on neoliberal governmentality. In the same vein, the narrow focus on the West and its forms of rationality and institutions has prompted governmentality studies of post-colonialism, feminism, gender studies, global governmentality, affective governmentality, and a host of other developments. In conclusion, governmentality offers a form of analysis that is attentive to the intersection of governmental practices and practices of self-government. It is especially attentive to the way government is thought, planned, calculated, and rationalized, and how it makes sense to those governing. It alerts attention to how certain problems are available for thinking, and how others are not, and how governmental problems are constituted with great consequences for the solutions proposed. Mathias Hein Jessen

References Barry, A., Osborne, T. & Rose, N. (eds.) (1996). Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government. University of Chicago Press. Burchell, G., Gordon, C. & Miller, P. (eds.) (1991). The Foucault Effect: Studies in

Mathias Hein Jessen

Governmentality. University of Chicago Press. Dean, M. (1995). Governing the Unemployed Self in an Active Society. Economy and Society, 24(4), 559–583. Dean, M. (2010). Governmentality – Power and Rule in Modern Society (2nd ed.). Sage. Dean, M. (2013). The Signature of Power – Sovereignty, Governmentality and Biopolitics. Sage. Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795. Foucault, M. (1998 [1976]). The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1). Penguin Books. Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78. Palgrave Macmillan. Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978– 79. Palgrave Macmillan. Jessen, M.H. & von Eggers, N. (2020). Governmentality and Statification. Towards a Foucauldian Theory of the State. Theory, Culture & Society, 37(1), 53–72. Lemke, T. (2007). An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State theory Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, 8(2), 43–64. Lemke, T. (2019). A Critique of Political Reason. Foucault’s Analysis of Modern Governmentality. Verso. Mitchell, T. (1991). The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. American Political Science Review, 85(1), 77–96. Rose, N. & Miller, P. (1992). Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government. The British Journal of Sociology, 43(2), 173–205. Saar, M. (2010). Relocating the Modern State. Governmentality and the History of Political Ideas. In: U. Bröckling, S. Krasmann & T. Lemke (Eds.), Governmentality – Current Issues and Future Challenges. Routledge, 34–55.

56. Gramsci, Antonio

themes of his writings concern the rejection of mechanistic and economicist interpretations of Marx’s doctrine and adherence to a historicist and humanist form of Marxism. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian journalist, For Gramsci, socialism is a worldview that linguist and thinker who greatly influenced aims at an intellectual and moral reform of developments in modern political sociology. society. This goal is unattainable without the He was born in Ales in Sardinia in 1891 and collective will created in political praxis. In died in Rome in 1937, after 11 years of impris- this sense, he partly subverts the Marxian onment in fascist prisons where he had been interpretation of the relationship between segregated due to his membership of the structure and superstructure, assigning cenCommunist Party of Italy, of which he was the trality to the ideological and cultural dimenfounder and leader until his death. Gramsci is sion. The process of social reform is the result considered one of the greatest Marxist think- of the historical transformation of the ecoers of the twentieth century mainly due to nomic class into the dialectical relationship the Prison Notebooks, a monumental work between the masses and intellectuals. While in the form of 33 notebooks, written between Lenin had emphasised the primary role of the 1929 and 1935 during his years of imprison- revolutionary vanguards organised in a party, ment. His Notebooks were first published in according to Gramsci, both the vanguards Italy between 1948 and 1951. This work has and the party are subordinate to the collective been made available to an international audi- will of civil society. The autonomous mass organisation born ence since 1971 under the title Selections from Prison Notebooks published by International within the party does not represent only Publishers. In 2007, Columbia University a part of the masses but forms an organic Press published the first complete version of whole with them. Both the intellectuals the Notebooks; this is the only complete criti- and the party, interacting with the popular cal edition of Antonio Gramsci’s fundamental masses, must work on the development of a writings in English, translated and edited by political consciousness and collective will, corresponding to the elaboration of an ideJoseph A. Buttigieg. The concepts introduced by Gramsci have ology of transformation rooted in historistrongly influenced modern political sociol- cal processes. If the goal is the seizure of ogy, social anthropology and linguistic stud- power, the subaltern classes, to be successful, ies (Buroway 2003; Chesta and Buroway must work to create the conditions of trans2019). He uses important sources referring formation, aiming to become an ideologito authors such as Michels, Pareto, Croce, cally hegemonic class well before becoming Machiavelli and Sorel and carefully reflects the dominant social group. The concept of on European and Italian history, on the con- hegemony thus becomes central. The socialicept of the party as a collective intellectual, sation of the material means of production is on the concept of revolution, on the role of only one aspect of the revolutionary process, civil society, on Fordism, on popular culture which must be combined with the socialisaand folklore. In order to understand Gramsci’s tion of the cultural and intellectual means of thought, it must be contextualised within the production. Gramsci’s thought goes beyond historical framework of theoretical Marxism the mere culturalist reinterpretation of clas(Paggi 1979). He is critical of the determin- sical Marxism, making him a theorist of ism expressed by the main components of the transitional political forms defined by the Second International, such as Kautsky, and dialectical relationship between social forces some Bolshevik theorists, such as Plekhanov (Buci-Glucksmann 1979). Political realism is defined as the renunciaand Bukharin. To the automatism of historical evolution he contrasts the collective will tion of the pursuit of immediate political sucof the masses. For Gramsci, social change is cess and the construction and maintenance a function of the creative role of the masses of conditions for future action. The presence and the political capacity to articulate a revo- of the state spirit is a condition for the stability of the collective will, which is necessary lutionary consciousness. Gramsci states that every revolution was to overcome the fragmented, subversive and preceded by intense intellectual critical work, reactive initiative of the subjugated masses. the dissemination of culture and the spreading For Gramsci, the state spirit is first and foreof ideas among the masses. The fundamental most substantiated in the spirit of the party, 219

220  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology because the political party is an in-embryo state structure. The lack of state spirit coincides with apoliticality. The central concept of Gramscian thought on the forms of political action is the idea of economic-corporative action. It refers to a certain level of internal homogeneity of self-consciousness and organisation of a collective body. Gramsci identifies three levels of political action corresponding to three stages of development: (1) the economic-corporative level is the most basic, where solidarity and forms of collective action are internal to a single category, but not to a class; (2) the economic-political level, in which action is based on class solidarity expressed by simple trade union demands, while the question of the state is seen only in the sense of legal equality between the dominant and the dominated within existing arrangements; (3) the state-hegemonic level, in which grows the awareness that the interests of one group must also become the interests of other social groups. This level refers to the political stage, in which ideologies that have already sprouted are transformed into political parties. It is through the party that the creation of unity based on economic, political and intellectual goals can be fostered. According to Gramsci, social transformation can only be guaranteed through the emergence of a new historical bloc defined by the organic unity between structure and superstructure, in the sense that the complex set of superstructures is an ideological reflection of the social relations of production. A necessary reciprocity exists between the two, which is precisely the true dialectical process. The historical bloc is not a kind of amalgamation of different classes, but rather a hegemonic situation in which social cohesion is guaranteed by a new worldview (superstructural dimension) and a dominant social class (structural dimension). In this context, the dominant power of a particular social group is not guaranteed by violence but by a more subtle process of consensus-building by other social groups. In this context, the role of intellectuals becomes crucial, as they represent the functionaries of the superstructure. According to Gramsci, the core of the problem does not lie so much in the non-realisation of the objective historical conditions, as in the absence of a subjective realisation of the objective conditions for social transformation. It is precisely this insistence on the subjective elements in Fabio de Nardis

Marx’s theory that differentiates Gramsci from Lenin. According to the Gramscian perspective, social transformation is a function of the creative role of the masses and of the political ability to articulate a revolutionary consciousness. From this point of view, the role of intellectuals is central (de Nardis and Caruso 2011). Born as one of the categories of the specialised productive world, they become the administrators of social hegemony. Each social group, born on the original ground of an essential function in the world of economic production, gives shape to one or more organic intellectual classes whose task is to give homogeneity and awareness to the group of reference of its historical function. Gramsci distinguishes between two major superstructural levels: that of civil society, that is, the set of organisms commonly referred to as private individuals, and that of political society or the state, corresponding to the hegemonic function that the dominant social group exercises over the whole of society, both directly, through the functions of command control exercised through legal and police institutions, and indirectly, through the strengthening and development of organic cultural institutions. The party plays the same role in civil society that the state plays in political society. It creates a link between the organic intellectuals of a particular group and the traditional intellectuals. Thus, all members of a party primarily perform an intellectual function, as their activity is divided into managerial, organisational and educational dimensions. In a political party, the elements of a social group overcome the economic moment of their historical development and become agents of general activities. The Gramscian party is an entity distinct from the masses, or a social group that is not yet politically active. It will be organically linked to them at a later stage, which is that of political consciousness and hegemony. In the first phase, the party is a vanguard that anticipates the future society, a kind of history in the making. The achievement of hegemony, which requires the conscious unity of civil society, is the historical condition in which the party tends to lose its usefulness. At this point, it abandons its partisan nature and identifies with the interests of society as a whole. The political party thus has the task of anticipating the future experience of a progressive society. It is an

gramsci, antonio  221 experimenter of new worldviews and represents a historical necessity only for those groups that aspire to become hegemonic. In Europe, and particularly in Italy, there is a tradition of substantial passivity on the part of the masses. This produces mystifying and extra-historical values. In contrast, an organised, active and conscious popular mass is able to create new socio-historical worlds, legitimising them, in political praxis, through new worldviews. The political praxis of the masses is, in this sense, a source of historical certainty. Every mechanical law of necessity, as well as every form of alienation and mystification, disappears in the active awareness of organised civil society (Salamini 1981, p. 71). The activities of the ruling classes are guaranteed by the non-activity of the subordinate social groups. The masses live for Gramsci in a primitive stage of indifference and apathy, superstition and fatalism. Their awareness of their interests is so limited that it never exceeds the dimension of the local context in which they live. Excluded from high culture, they are relegated to a folkloristic dimension. In Italy, the masses have not been able to achieve a hegemonic position, because hegemony presupposes emancipation and cultural autonomy. These considerations lead Gramsci to reflect on common sense and folklore (Grooten & Steenbergen 1972). He insists on the historical, ideological and political aspects of common sense, understood as a spontaneous philosophy separate from the philosophy of professional philosophers. All people are bearers of a spontaneous philosophy contained first and foremost in language, seen not only as a set of empty grammatical figures, but also as a cognitive system, that is, a set of notions and concepts that convey a conception of the world. Once this assumption is accepted, a qualitative leap is required to move from a stage of pure observation to one of critical awareness. Whereas philosophy reflects above all the traits of individual elaboration of thoughts, common sense expresses the diffuse and scattered features of the generic thinking of a certain era and a certain popular environment.

Common sense is the worldview of the subaltern masses during the negative phase of their development, that is, the phase of political and cultural subordination to a dominant group. Due to its lack of critical awareness, common sense is unable to think dialectically and historically. However, in the context of folklore and common sense, Gramsci identifies a positive core, a creative element that, if developed, can lead to the development of an autonomous popular self-consciousness. Fabio de Nardis

References Buci-Glucksmann, C. (1979), Gramsci and the State, Lawrence & Wishart, London. Buroway, M. (2003), “For Sociological Marxism, The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi.” Politics & Society, 31(2): 193–261. Chesta, R. E., Burawoy, M. (2019), “The Modern Prince and the Sociological Imagination. Michael Burawoy in Conversation with Riccardo Emilio Chesta.” Sociologica, 13(1): 83–96. de Nardis, F., Caruso, L. (2011), “Political Crisis and Social Transformation in Antonio Gramsci. Elements for a Sociology of Political Praxis.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(6): 13–23. Gramsci, A. (1971), Selections from Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, New York. Gramsci, A. (2007), Prison Notebooks [3 Vol.], Columbia University Press, New York. Grooten, J., Steenbergen, G. (1972), “Common Sense,” in New Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophical Library, New York. Paggi, L. (1979), “Gramsci General Theory of Marxism,” in C. Mouffe (Ed.), Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 113–167. Salamini, L. (1981), Sociology of Political Praxis, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Fabio de Nardis

57. Group consciousness

Among the dominant groups, the ideology justifies advantage, gives legitimacy to their social status, and provokes action aimed at securing permanence for their position.

Over four decades ago, Gurin and colleagues (1980) published their research on stratum identification and consciousness. They argued that consciousness involves the correct identification of the categories or groups and one’s location in the social structure, and the recognition that one’s group interests are opposed to those of the other groups. They studied class consciousness of people with working- and middle-class occupations, race consciousness of blacks and whites, sex consciousness of women, and age consciousness of people 60 years or older. In doing so, they distinguished between identification and consciousness, two concepts, they argued, that usually are confused in the literature. Identification and consciousness both denote cognitions: the former about a person’s relation to others within a group, the latter about the group’s position within a society. Identification refers to the awareness of having ideas, feelings, and interests similar to others who share the same group characteristics. Group consciousness, on the other hand, is a multidimensional concept with identification forming only one, albeit a very important, component, augmented by polar affect, polar power, and individual vs system blame (Miller et al., 1981, pp. 496–497). Polar affect, defined as “a preference for members of one’s own group (ingroup) and a dislike for those outside the group (outgroup)” (ibid), is akin to what we nowadays describe as affective polarization (e.g. Iyengar et al., 2019). Polar power is defined as “expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the group’s current status, power, or material resources in relation to that of the outgroup” (ibid). Individual vs system blame is about pointing to who or what is to blame. In the words of Miller and colleagues, “the belief that the responsibility for a group’s low status in society is attributable either to individual failings or to inequities in the social system” (ibid). The four components of consciousness form a political ideology that for subordinate groups represents a shift from a situation in which group members simply accept their status to one in which they express a sense of grievance as victims of injustice, perceive a lack of legitimacy in the social hierarchy, and eventually set about collectively to correct the injustices.

Tajfel (1974, cited by Gurin et al., 1980) stresses that the transformation of simply categorizing into a more developed state of consciousness is enhanced by conflict and structural factors. Thus, consciousness refers to a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of an awareness of similarity. This politicization is also prominent in Duncan’s (1999, p. 612) definition of group consciousness: “identification with a group in which an individual recognizes the group’s position in a power hierarchy, rejects rationalizations of relative positioning, and embraces a collective solution to group problems”. Importantly though, action on behalf of such groups is politicized; that is, group members act self-consciously as representatives of that group in a context of contested, asymmetric intergroup relations (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Politicization involves a subjective transformation of the quality of the group such that group members act in conscious awareness that “we are” committed (identified), angry, and agentic (Thomas et al., 2022). Consequently, consciousness is defined as politicized identification―that is an identification with a category coupled with a collective political ideology around issues concerning that category (Duncan, 1999). What distinguishes politicized collective identity from collective identity? First, raised consciousness. Consciousness-raising takes place within social networks. It is within these networks that individual processes such as grievance formation, strengthening of efficacy, identification, and group-based emotions all synthesize into a motivational constellation preparing people for action. The second aspect that distinguishes a politicized identity from a collective identity is the relation with other groups. A politicized identity provides antagonistic lenses through which the social world is interpreted. This intergroup polarization defines other groups in the social and political arena as allies or opponents. The third distinction concerns the unique behavioral correlates of politicized collective identity. Politicized group members are more likely to engage in collective action on behalf of the affected group to force politicians or other citizens to intervene or to take sides. In the

222

group consciousness  223 pages to come, I will discuss these three foci, starting with the role of networks in raising consciousness, followed by intergroup relations, and finally the behavioral correlates. Taylor and Whittier (1992) describe how strong bonds existing in social networks shape political actors. Within these networks, individuals come to see themselves as part of a group when some shared characteristic becomes salient and is defined as important. As a result, “boundaries are drawn between a challenging and a dominant group” (p. 175). Taylor (2013) conceives of such activist networks as discursive communities held together not only by common action and bonds of solidarity, but by identities, symbols, shared identity discourse, and practices of everyday life that attribute participants’ experiences to particular forms of social injustice. Social networks thus function as communication channels; discursive processes take place to form consensus that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992). Moreover, people are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans et al., 2008). These networks can have a form of formal relationships as in party membership or being a member of the labor union (cf. Klandermans et al., 2008), informal relationships, such as friends, family, colleagues, and virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, social media, and so on (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Networks thus play a pivotal role in consciousness-raising, but why? It is through group interaction that people develop and define who ‘we’ are, what ‘we’ feel (emotion norms), believe (efficacy norms), and intend to do (action norms). The effect of interaction in networks on the propensity to participate in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result (McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms: immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest provided that they were embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks. Networks provide space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities and provide a way for

active opposition to these authorities to grow (Paxton, 2002). Being integrated into a network increases the chances that one will be targeted with a mobilizing message and that people are kept to their promises to participate (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Thus in these networks, people talk politics; the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed, in- and outgroups are constructed, and people are mobilized for protest. Consciousness involves the correct identification of the categories or groups and one’s location in the social structure, as well as recognition that one’s group interests are opposed to those of the other groups. The moment you think in terms of identity, by definition you also think in terms of difference. That in itself is not critical. That’s diversity. But when groups polarize, a strict distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ evolves. Ingroup and outgroup mutually reinforce each other, identifying themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their collective actions. Both groups assert that what ‘we’ stand for is threatened by ‘them’, tribute is paid to the ingroup’s symbols and values, and the outgroup is derogated. Several models highlight the role of antagonistic interactions with outgroups or authorities as key drivers of increasing group consciousness and politicization of identities. The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) explains the conditions under which crowd events (demonstrations, soccer crowds) become unruly or violent (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 1999). According to ESIM, the positioning of the protesters as oppositional by police (authority or outgroup) precipitates groups toward violence for two key reasons. The first is that a group of protesters come to see themselves as oppositional, changing the subjective meaning and understanding of who ‘we’ are (thus a change in the group consciousness). Under these circumstances, the norms, values, and belief of the group transform such that these are now defined by the legitimacy of violent action (rather than nonviolent action as previously). The second consequence is that being treated as a homogenous group of illegitimate protesters transforms the group boundaries. The crowd may have begun divided, with many different subgroups, but indiscriminate treatment by the police changes these dynamics, creating a subjective sense of unity in the crowd (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Overall then, people who Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

224  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology had turned up to participate in what they saw as a democratic, peaceful protest may be transformed by what they perceive as the illegitimate and indiscriminate treatment of police. They not only develop a radicalized sense of ‘what it means’ to be a member of the protester group (radicalized group consciousness), but they also come to have common cause with other (violent) protesters who they had previously seen as separate (Thomas et al., 2022). Consciousness also includes an action orientation, the view that collective action is the best means to realize the group’s interests. This action orientation figures, central in Tajfel’s (1971) related concept of social change orientation (solving group problems through group actions), in that it indicates the process of investing the self in the group and can be understood as a form of collective identity that underlies group members’ explicit motivations to engage in such a power struggle. Thomas and colleagues (2022, p. 42) therefore give group consciousness a prominent position in their MOBILISE integrative framework for collective action participation. In their own words: “group consciousness—social identification as a supporter of change, beliefs about the effectiveness of acting, and emotions about injustice—appears to be the most immediate (proximal) motivational driver of action to bring about change”. Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that protest participation generates a ‘positive social-psychological transformation’. The emergence of an inclusive self-categorization as ‘oppositional’ leads to feelings of unity and expectations of support. This empowers people to oppose authorities. Such action creates collective self-objectification, that is to say, it defines the participant’s identity opposite the dominant outgroup (Drury & Reicher, 2009). As such, taking it onto the streets strengthens empowerment and politicization. However, Thomas, McGarty, Reese et al. (2016) provide evidence that, having engaged in action to promote an end to global poverty, participants reported a subsequent decrease in group consciousness one year later. They maintain that, especially for very entrenched, long-standing forms of inequality, action that is not seen to effect meaningful change can lead some to disengage. Others, on the other hand, might feel the need to strengthen their effort as a Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

reaction to lack of results and change their tactical choices to more disruptive forms of action. Jacquelien van Stekelenburg

References Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (1999). The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2(4), 381–402. http:// gpi​.sagepub​.com​/cgi​/content​/abstract​/2​/4​ /381. Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2009). Collective psychological empowerment as a model of social change: Researching crowds and power. Journal of Social Issues, 65(4), 707–725. Duncan, L. E. (1999). Motivation for collective action: Group consciousness as mediator of personality, life experiences, and women’s rights activism. Political Psychology, 20(3), 611–635. http://www​ .blackwell​- synergy​.com​/doi​/abs​/10​.1111​ /0162​-895X​.00159. Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking Politics. Cambridge University Press. Gurin, P., Miller, A. H., & Gurin, G. (1980). Stratum identification and consciousness. Social Psychology Quarterly, 43(1), 30–47. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 129–146. Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps toward participation in social movements. American Sociological Review, 52(4), 519–531. Klandermans, B., Van der Toorn, J., & Van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances into action. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 992–1012. McClurg, S. D. (2003). Social networks and political participation: The role of social interaction in explaining political participation. Political Research Quarterly, 56, 448–464. Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group consciousness and political participation. American Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 494–511.

group consciousness  225 Paxton, P. (2002). Social capital and democracy: An interdependent relationship. American Sociological Review, 67(2), 254–277. Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Towards a social psychological analysis of politicized collective identity: Conceptualization, antecedents, and consequences. American Psychologist, 56(4), 319–331. http://www​ .sciencedirect​ .com ​/science​/article​/ B6WY2​- 46FVF2N​-2​ /2​/462​8464​923c​8033​c021​e502​b74bbf653. Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy, R., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149–178. Taylor, V. (2013). Social movement participation in the global society: Identity, networks and emotions. In J. Van Stekelenburg, C. M. Roggeband, & B. Klandermans (Eds.), The Future of Social Movement Research: Dynamics, Mechanisms and Processes (pp. 37–58). University of Minnesota Press.

Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. E. (1992). Collective identity in social movement. Thomas, E. F., Duncan, L., McGarty, C., Louis, W. R., & Smith, L. G. (2022). MOBILISE: A higher‐order integration of collective action research to address global challenges. Political Psychology. 43, 107–164. Thomas, E. F., McGarty, C., Reese, G., Berndsen, M., & Bliuc, A. M. (2016). Where there is a (collective) will, there are (effective) ways: Integrating individualand group-level factors in explaining humanitarian collective action. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 42(12), 1678–1692. Van Stekelenburg, J., & Boekkooi, M. (2013). Mobilizing for change in a changing society. In J. Van Stekelenburg, C. M. Roggeband, & B. Klandermans (Eds.), The Future of Social Movement Research: Dynamics, Mechanisms, and Processes (pp. 217–234). University of Minnesota Press.

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58. Identity

references to the nation—in popular culture, news, and political talk—in shaping its meaning (Skey & Antonsich 2017). Existing policies, too, communicate ideas about the Where identity refers to an individual’s sense bonds joining co-residents, which then lead to of a coherent self, social or collective identity national differences in preferences for more refers to the part of the self that derives from or less generous welfare policies (Banting & membership in a group, along with the posi- Kymlicka 2017). Some have vested hopes for more inclusive tive emotions attached to that membership. Research pursued under diverse theoretical social policies in the development of supraprograms has shown that social identity influ- national, cosmopolitan identities (Calhoun ences public opinion, voting behavior, social 2007). However, if a sense of the boundamovements, and ethnic conflict in a way that ries of belongingness depends on everyday is distinct from self-interest. However, the reminders, one might ask whether transfact that the research findings sometimes con- national institutions and imaginaries have flict—showing, for example, that strong group enough of a presence in people’s everyday identifiers pay more attention to politics but lives to foster the development of strong cosare biased in their evaluation of political fig- mopolitan identities. A second tension centers on the relation ures (Schildkraut 2014)—points to tensions that are at the heart of group identification. We between perception and affect in collective discuss three of these tensions as they figure identity. Tajfel’s experimental studies in the in scholarship on national identities, partisan 1970s showed that people form social identities on the basis of even minimal similarities political identities, and movement identities. One tension is that collective identity is (preferring the painter Klee to Kandinsky, for based both on what makes people similar example) and then favor in-group members within the group and different from those and discriminate against out-group memoutside it. To what extent, then, can a sense of bers. This is the case even in the absence of collective identity allow for difference within competition over resources (Tajfel & Turner the group? With respect to national identity, 1979). To what extent, though, does the posiwhen are citizens likely to embrace an inclu- tive affect not only follow from but also cause sive understanding of national membership in the perception of similarity? And under what which immigrants and those in need of aid conditions does that lead to outright hostility to the out-group? This question has become are viewed as deserving of public support? Beginning with Kohn (1944), scholars pressing in the context of widespread conhave distinguished between ethnic and civic temporary partisan polarization (Carothers & conceptions of national identity. Ethnic O’Donohue 2019). Scholars have argued that nationalism claims a pre-political shared much polarization today is affective in charpast of kinship or quasi-kinship while civic acter, with partisans disliking and distrusting nationalism locates solidarity in a shared those from the other party even in the absence commitment to liberal norms and institutions. of strong ideological differences (Iyengar Unsurprisingly, people who identify on the et al. 2019). Affective polarization has been basis of an ethnic understanding of citizenship shown to be as strong as polarization based tend to have negative views of immigrants on race or religion and to operate in countries and racial minorities and oppose generous with historical traditions of interest- and idewelfare policies. But research also suggests ology-based politics (Reiljan 2020). The Michigan model of voting behavior that most people’s understandings of national identity actually incorporate civic and ethno- relied on psychological mechanisms of idencultural beliefs (Brubaker 2004), along with tification  to explain excessive party loyalty clusters of beliefs that are not reducible to (Johnston 2006). But scholars today attribeither one (Schildkraut 2014). For example, ute the growth of affective polarization to a British nationals talked about national iden- social process of “partisan identity sorting.” tity in terms of common origin and shared Polarization among political elites and parcommitment, but also as lying simply in the tisan media has encouraged citizens to align fact of living in the same place at the same their social and moral identities with their time (Condor 2006). In tune with a view of political affiliations (Huddy & Bankert 2018). national identities as fluid and syncretic, Elite polarization increases citizens’ affecscholars point to the importance of everyday tive polarization both directly by politicizing 226

identity  227 issues and identities and indirectly by decreasing trust in the government as an institution (Mason 2018). Once party identity has been made morally salient, though, it cannot easily be abandoned, and this may account for the fact that people’s distrust of politics has deepened rather than moderated their polarized views (Iyengar et. al. 2019). Important questions center on how to diminish partisan polarization. Research suggests that cross-cutting identities and superordinate identities potentially moderate antagonisms based on group identity. The perception of threat, however, promotes convergence in religious, national, and other identities (Mason 2018)—a perception that today is promoted, if not entirely crafted, by media and partisan leaders. A third tension inherent to collective identification is that it is at once subjective—it is a positive sense of shared membership in a group—and it is dependent on recognition by outsiders. For groups that are low in status and power, social movement mobilization is a way to gain political concessions that will improve their position. But mobilization also depends on the sense of positive group identity that leads people to participate rather than free ride on the efforts of others (Van Steklenburg & Klandermans 2013). What, then, are the potential sources of that identification? Early research assumed that people’s stake in collective action was given by their structural powerlessness. The identity work that took place in institutions like the church and black colleges in the case of the 1960s civil rights movement was aimed at turning social identities into movement ones. But other movements have not been able to take for granted the existence of a collective actor. Accordingly, scholars have studied the boundary-drawing and ritual activities that movement groups use to build a sense of we-ness (Taylor & Whittier 1992; Hunt et al. 1994). Even among anti-identitarian movements, whose members openly refuse a unified movement identity (e.g., Autonomist movements across Europe and global Occupy movements), rituals of refusal—for example, refusing to engage with highly visible spokespersons or to construct professional-organizational hierarchies—emerge as bases for movement identities (Flesher Fominaya 2018). Some research has questioned whether strong collective identities are necessary

for online mobilization since the decreased cost of participation makes free-riding less attractive. At the same time, researchers have argued that online movement identities are more than an extension of those forged faceto-face. On the contrary, they may reflect a contemporary logic of “connective” rather than collective action (Bennett & Segerberg 2012). In the latter, organizations persuade people to join the movement based on a common identity and ideology. In a logic of connective action, people recruit each other to the movement by sharing their diverse experiences, often online. In movements like #Black Lives Matter and those protesting sexual harassment around the world, participants effectively constituted themselves as a new public—and a new collective actor—by recognizing each other online (Thakur 2020). The question, remains, though, to what extent such movements depend also on their recognition by mainstream media and officials to have enduring effects. Another important question has to do with the conditions in which movement identities are translated into enduring policy categories. In sum, people’s identification with the group leads them to behave in group- rather than self-oriented ways. But just what that entails is complicated. In this entry, we have sought to integrate social psychological studies of identity into a sociological approach that sees group identification as taking place within institutional as well as interactional contexts. Accordingly, we have treated tensions at the heart of identity as practical challenges that political actors face in circumstances that are not of their own making. Thus, although research has demonstrated that citizens’ understanding of national identity shapes their views of how generous the government should be vis-à-vis the needy, we have emphasized that those understandings are fluid, syncretic, and shaped by everyday cultural and institutional reminders of just “who” the nation is. Scholarship on partisan polarization has demonstrated that affective identification often accompanies a perception of group members’ ideological similarity. But we have emphasized the institutional context in which affective identification may supersede ideology, leading partisans to dislike people whose views are not all that different from their own. Social movement scholars have demonstrated that a sense of collective identity can override people’s

Francesca Polletta, Dylan Gray, and Nathan Redman

228  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology propensity to free ride on the efforts of others. But the digitally mediated character of contemporary movements has transformed the kinds of identities that motivate participation as well as how they do so. Advances in our understanding of how identity shapes processes of political solidarity, conflict, and change, we believe, will continue to depend on integrating psychological and sociological perspectives. Francesca Polletta, Dylan Gray, and Nathan Redman

References Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (Eds.) (2017). The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies. Oxford University Press. Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. Information, Communication & Society, 15(5), 739–768. Brubaker, R. (2004). Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University Press. Calhoun, C. (2007). Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream. Routledge. Carothers, T., & O’Donohue, A. (Eds.) (2019). Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization. Brookings Institution Press. Condor, D. (2006). Temporality and collectivity: Diversity, history and the rhetorical construction of national entitativity. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45(4), 657–682. Flesher Fominaya, C. (2018). Collective identity in social movements: Assessing the limits of a theoretical framework. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (2nd ed., pp. 429–445). Wiley-Blackwell. Huddy, L., Bankert, A., & Davies, C. (2018). Expressive versus instrumental partisanship in multiparty European systems. Political Psychology, 39, 173–199. Hunt, S. A., Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (1994). Identity fields: Framing processes

and the social construction of movement identities. In E. Laraña, H. Johnston, & J. R. Gusfield (Eds.), New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity (pp. 185–208). Temple University Press. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 129–146. Johnston, R. (2006). Party identification: Unmoved mover or sum of preferences? Annual Review of Political Science, 9(1), 329–351. Kohn, H. (1944). The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background. Macmillan. Mason, L. (2018, April). Losing common ground: Social sorting and polarization. The Forum, 16(1), 47–66). Reiljan, A. (2020). ‘Fear and loathing across party lines’(also) in Europe: Affective polarisation in European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 59(2), 376–396. Schildkraut, D. J. (2014). Boundaries of American identity: Evolving understandings of ‘us’. Annual Review of Political Science, 17(1), 441–460. Skey, M., & Antonsich, M. (Eds.) (2017). Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism. Springer. Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole. Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. E. (1992). Collective identity in social movement communities. In A. D. Morris & C. M. Mueller (Eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (pp. 104–129). Yale University Press. Thakur, A. K. (2020). New media and the Dalit counter-public sphere. Television & New Media, 21(4), 360–375. Van Stekelenburg, J. & Klandermans, B. (2013). The social psychology of protest. Current Sociology Review, 61(5–6), 886–905.

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59. Ideology

in society in any given period. Under capitalism and previous forms of social organisation, the rule of the dominant class is legitimated through ideologies that ‘mask’ the exploitaSince it was first coined, ideology has been a tive and rapacious bases of this dominance. deeply contested concept, with diverse, multi- From here we get the association of ideology faceted, even mutually incompatible interpre- with ‘false consciousness’, an understanding tations. Its importance for political sociology of the world that is illusory and which serves lies in the fact that ‘ideology’ has been cen- to shore up the status quo. This Marxist tradition of thinking about trally concerned with questions of language and power and how ideas that either legiti- ideology has spawned a rich and complex mate or challenge the existing social order theoretical literature. Key figures in this tradition include György Lukács and his work form and flow through society. The term ‘ideology’ was first intro- on ‘history and class consciousness’ explorduced in 1796 by Antoine Destutt de Tracy, ing a key theme of the effects of reification intended to denote a ‘science of ideas’ – a on human consciousness; Antonio Gramsci’s way to materially explain the beliefs and theory of hegemony and counter-hegemony, ideas that people cleave to. The importance and the sedimentation of ideological tropes of this science was premised upon the into the ‘common sense’ of a society, ideology notion that all claims to knowledge, includ- being at its most effective when it is essening scientific knowledge, are no more than tially invisible; and Louis Althusser’s work on expressions of ideas. Ideology, then, would ‘ideological state apparatuses’, and their role be a lynchpin of scientific explanation in legitimising the capitalist economic order. (Kennedy, 1979), which Destutt de Tracy In Althusser’s structuralist Marxist account, hoped would underpin a ‘theory of moral it is worth noting that ideology has mutated and political sciences’, and ultimately allow from the transient phenomenon envisaged by ideologists to ‘regulate’ society. The scien- Marx and Engels, into a permanent feature of tific pretensions of ‘ideology’ were soon the human condition – ideology allows indichallenged, and the implicit liberal politi- viduals to ‘make sense’ of complex social cal agenda associated with Destutt de Tracy worlds, and this would remain necessary even and his fellow idéologues was attacked under a communist society. Alongside the Marxist tradition of thinkand all but destroyed by Napoleon, who regarded it as a serious challenge to the pre- ing about ideology, there has been a parallel body of work operating outside of that tradivailing imperial order. Ideology thus rapidly gained a pervasive tion while at times interacting with it. Notable negative connotation as unnatural, dissimu- here is Karl Mannheim and his work Ideology lative or subversive, a view given its deepest and Utopia (1936), in which he develops a and most influential treatment in the works of sociology of knowledge. Mannheim mainKarl Marx and Friedrich Engels, especially in tains a historical perspective on ideology, The German Ideology, written across 1845–6 retaining from Marx the notion that perspec(although not published until 1932). At least tives on the world are tied to social and ecotwo highly influential views on the nature of nomic positions. He identifies two modes of ideology emerge from this text. One is the ideological thinking, the particular and the contrast between ‘idealist’ and ‘material- total; the former associated with individuals ist’ conceptions of history. Viewing history and their interest-inflected views of the world, as an ‘abstract act’ on the part of ‘self-con- the latter representing the collective worldsciousness’, or a ‘world-spirit’, or offering view (Weltanschauung) of an entire class or any other kind of metaphysical explanation, historical epoch. Mannheim relativises and fails to appreciate that it is the material forces pluralises ideology such that there is no hope of economic production, and the relations of of a ‘true’ class consciousness – Marxism on production that accompany them, that drive this view is just another class-based ideology, history forwards. Ideology, then, is nothing not a form of social science unmasking the more than idle speculation, not real scientific truth. The only hope of seeing which beliefs analysis of historical processes. The second, are in accordance with their age (‘relational’ even more influential meaning given to ide- rather than ‘true’) lies with free-floating intelology here, is that it represents, in ideational lectuals who can extricate themselves from form, the material interests of the ruling class their class attachments. 229

230  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology An important and long-standing distinction between different theories of ideology is whether it is seen as a permanent part of the human condition (as for Mannheim) or as a historically specific phenomenon. For Marx and Engels, ideology serves as the particular mask for capitalist exploitative economic relationships. After the transition to communism, there would be no more economic exploitation, and therefore ideology would no longer exist. The expectation of the ‘end of ideology’ has occurred in other theories of ideology as well, and became particularly popular with some theorists after the end of World War II. The origins of the ‘end of ideology thesis’ (see Brick, 2013) lie in two related claims: (1) that fascism was essentially disposed of as a viable political ideology after 1945, and (2) that the economic and political systems of the two Cold War opponents, the capitalist ‘West’ and the communist ‘East’, were becoming more alike, tending towards increasing technocracy and managerialism, and merging into an overarching form of ‘industrial society’ (Aron, 1967). At the same time, the ‘great ideologies’ with their roots in the nineteenth century were becoming ‘exhausted’ (Bell, 1962). Even where certain ideologies were still officially venerated (such as Marxism in the ‘communist bloc’), the vast majority of the population no longer took them to be true. Needless to say, the ‘end of ideology thesis’ itself became the subject of intense ideological debate, with vital implications for the scope and pace of social change, the importance of democracy and party politics, the role of religion, the media and mass opinion and other similar questions. But in the face of overwhelming pessimism about ideology from several traditions, the last few decades have witnessed a considerable resurgence of interest in the concept within sociological research. For these new generations of ideology researchers, the rich history of ideology theory and analysis has provided contemporary ‘ideology studies’ with a diverse spectrum of approaches to draw on. These are characterised by often profoundly different assumptions about what ideology is and how it should be evaluated. Building on the distinct conceptions that have emerged over time through the work of Destutt de Tracy, Marx and Engels and their successors, Mannheim and the ‘end of ideology’ theorists, we can think of these in terms

of six binary contrasts, or ‘either/or’ questions (Ostrowski, 2022): ●

●

●

●

●

●

True or false: Does ideology try to match reality ‘as it actually is’ or disguise it behind an ‘alternative reality’? Necessary or unnecessary: Does ideology offer us tools to comprehend and evaluate ourselves and our surroundings, or can we only achieve this by going beyond ideology’s limitations? Temporary or permanent: Does ideology belong to a certain moment in the course of our shared history, or can it be found in a broadly recognisable form in every human society? Singular or plural: Is ideology a monolithic social force with consistent, blatant effects, or a subtle, diffuse and fragmentary phenomenon dispersed across the myriad encounters we have with one another? Individual or collective: Is ideology entrenched in our separate minds and bodies, or does it manifest in our interpersonal interactions? Explicit or implicit: Does ideology appear mainly in the guise of self-declaredly ideological ideas and arguments, or does it more commonly take subliminal, clandestine or otherwise unconscious and ostensibly ‘non-ideological’ forms?

Different ideology studies approaches offer different answers to these questions, drawing variously on the historical legacy of the last 200 years of developments in ideology theory. The mantle of the Marxist tradition has been inherited by ideology critique (Geuss, 1981), which maintains that ideology is an irredeemable illusion to be ‘unmasked’ and overcome. Ideology in all its superficially diverse forms legitimates social arrangements of domination and exploitation specific to capitalist society. As such, it is an essential accompaniment to intense bourgeois–proletarian class struggle even if it manifests in what are ostensibly our ‘own’ preferences and choices, which are often ‘naturalised’ to hide their ideological origins. This tradition is opposed quite firmly by the subfield of comparative politics (Lipset and Rokkan, 1969; Sartori, 1976), which regards ideology as a set of shorthand labels for substantive policy positions and wider

Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

False

True

True

True and false

False

True

Ideology critique

Comparative politics

Social psychology

Poststructuralism

Critical discourse analysis

Conceptual morphology Necessary

Necessary (unnecessary)

Necessary

Necessary

Necessary

Unnecessary

Necessary or unnecessary?

Permanent (temporary)

Permanent

Permanent

Permanent (temporary)

Permanent

Temporary

Temporary or permanent?

Source:   Marius S. Ostrowski, Ideology (Cambridge: Polity, 2022), pp. 4–9, 145–60.

True or false?

Ideology studies approach

Table 1  The treatment of ideology in different ideology studies approaches

Plural

Plural (singular)

Plural (singular)

Singular (plural)

Plural

Singular

Singular or plural?

Individual or collective?

Collective

Individual and collective

Collective

Individual

Collective

Collective (individual)

Explicit or implicit?

Explicit

Explicit and implicit

Implicit

Explicit

Explicit

Implicit

ideology  231

Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

232  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology social attitudes, tied to concrete changes in the character and conduct of social (especially political) institutions. There are typically several of these labels that describe the range and distribution of available positions, which are consciously claimed by voters and political elites and often reported in opinion polls and statements of principle. Another major social-scientific contribution comes from social psychology (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000; Mondak, 2010), which links ideology to pre- or unconscious part-biological, part-socially conditioned ‘schemata’, personality traits, emotional states and styles of reasoning. These affect how we process and evaluate our social experiences, often measured as points along one continuous ‘radical–reactionary’ ideological spectrum. Where we fall on this spectrum depends on our personal characteristics and ideological stances, usually elicited in response to surveys and targeted ‘tests’. Further approaches stem from analyses of culture and discourse within sociological theory. Poststructuralism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Žižek, 1989) argues that ideology gives us the means to constitute reality for ourselves to grasp and operate within, an inevitable simplification that can never quite capture the complexity and weirdness of ‘what is there’. We can at most incrementally bridge this epistemic divide, although this is the crux of almost all contests between rival ideologies. For an ideology to work, its ideas must be socially shared and expressed, and ideally unquestioned, either as everyday banalities or unspeakable taboos. Similar to ideology critique, critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2009; Wodak, 2013) also holds that ideology ‘masks’ the reality of social conflict and power-relations but concedes that it is an ineliminable product of this conflict as well as a major site where it is conducted. Rival ideologies wage this conflict at the level of control over language whenever a society’s rifts become sufficiently severe. Ideological conflict can pervade any social setting and interaction, from struggles of ownership over labels, terms and arguments to the most incidental, off-hand communication. Finally, a significant approach that has risen in tandem with the renaissance in ideology analysis is conceptual morphology (Freeden, 1996), which understands ideology as a

strategy to provide plans for public policy and justify, contest or change political arrangements and processes. These are captured in the form of distinctive patterned conceptual configurations, and rival ideological families engage in constant ‘turf wars’ over concepts and their meanings. As such, ideology is first and foremost the preserve of political parties, movements or institutions and found above all in ordinary statements by politicians, journalists, activists and voters. There are a number of other possible approaches whose objects of analysis are closely entwined with ideology, such as rhetorical analysis, the history of ideas, hermeneutics and affect theory. Nevertheless, these six are the main approaches that have asserted themselves within ideology studies so far. We can map out their answers to the questions above as shown in Table 1. With their alignments and divergences, these approaches help make ideology studies one of the most vibrant and fertile areas of sociological research. It makes space to uncover the power of ideas, bringing to light the complex networks of outlooks and values, beliefs and behaviours, institutions and groups that shape our day-to-day experiences. In turn, many of the everyday objects and events we are confronted with gain new dimensions of significance when we read them through the unique lens that ideology adds to our analysis. Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

References Aron, Raymond, The Industrial Society, Three Essays on Ideology and Development (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967) Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: Free Press, 1962) Brick, Howard, ‘The End of Ideology Thesis.’ In Freeden, Michael, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 90–114 Freeden, Michael, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) Geuss, Raymond, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

ideology  233 Kennedy, Emmet, ‘“Ideology” from Destutt De Tracy to Marx.’ Journal of the History of Ideas 40.3 (1979): 353–368 Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985) Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1969) Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1936) Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000) Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988)

Mondak, Jeffery J., Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) Ostrowski, Marius, Ideology (Cambridge: Polity, 2022) Sartori, Giovanni, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) van Dijk, Teun A., Society and Discourse: How Social Contexts Control Text and Talk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Wodak, Ruth (ed.), Critical Discourse Analysis, 4 vols (London: Sage, 2013) Žižek, Slavoj, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989)

Mathew Humphrey and Marius S. Ostrowski

60. Inequality (political) Political inequality describes a situation in which a category of citizens has a systematically lower influence on government decisions than others. It is usually criticized on normative grounds because it influences the allocation of material resource and life chances (Page and Gilens 2017). An obvious case is the disenfranchisement of parts of the population in autocratic countries. Democracies, in principle, provide formal equality of political opportunity. In the democratic context, political inequality refers to two interrelated phenomena: disproportionate abstention and a bias in interest representation in favor of some categories of citizens. Participation and representation gaps exist for multiple inequality dimensions. This includes gender, ethnicity, and age. The strongest research tradition in political sociology is concerned with socio-economic aspects. It, hence, deals with the socio-economic gradient in political participation and the disproportionate influence of relatively rich or educated citizens on government decisions (Schlozman et al. 2012). The reasons for this focus arguably lie in the conjectures that political inequality has contributed to the growth of economic inequality and that the recent rise of populist parties is at least partly related to political inequality by social class. The socio-economic gradient in political participation can be seen as a stylized fact. Across countries, political engagement tends to increase with socio-economic status (high income or education) (Dalton 2017). However, there is no agreement on how to explain this gradient. Explanations can be located on several levels that might interact in producing the disproportionate abstention of relatively poor citizens. On the macro societal level, an important reason could be individualization (Armingeon and Schädel 2015). As citizens are less likely to join organizations and groups that help them structure their political preferences (churches, unions, clubs), individual cognitive resources and motivations become more important determinants of political engagement. These are skewed in favor of the highly educated. The effect might be strengthened by the clustering of citizens in increasingly homogenous milieus with different degrees of

politicization. In light of current knowledge, the effect of individualization can be seen as plausible. It is in line with research findings on the mobilization potential of civil society organizations and peer groups (Schlozman et al. 2012). It is also consistent with declining rates of party membership and identification as well as with growing volatility in election results. Other explanations focus on the role of political elites and their failure to represent lower classes (see below). If political parties predominantly cater to the interest of capital and the rich, members of the lower classes might conclude that political participation is not worth the effort (low external political efficacy). This conjecture is in line with declining political trust in many countries and in the lower classes in particular. However, researchers could be more attentive to how lower-class citizens actually define their interests and how they perceive concrete representation gaps. There are plentiful examples of lower-class citizens stubbornly refusing to vote on what researchers consider their best economic interests (Bartels 2008; Jost 2020), which cautions against jumping to conclusions regarding their subjective representation. Current research, therefore, emphasizes that political inequality matters already at the stage of political preference formation (Hacker and Pierson 2020; Kelly 2020). A final set of explanations, which are growing in relevance, see the link between socioeconomic status and political engagement as a spurious correlation (Jungkunz and Marx 2022). Socio-economic status, as measured in cross-sectional datasets, might really reflect preceding explanations located in youth and childhood or even pre-birth factors. What people achieve in life is influenced by their genes and their upbringing (e.g. in the form of social and cultural capital or cognitive and non-cognitive skills). To the extent that these factors have an autonomous effect on political inclinations, the link between socio-economic status and participation would be inflated by family background in cross-sectional data. This reasoning does not imply that socioeconomic factors are irrelevant to political engagement, but it strongly suggests that their influence should mainly unfold between childhood and early adolescence (Akee et al. 2020). There is mounting evidence for this view. Longitudinal studies indeed show that adults become quite resilient in their political

234

inequality (political)  235 habits to economic shocks (Emmenegger et al. 2017; Prior 2019). However, there is not enough research to date on inequality in political childhood socialization (as well as its long-term consequences over the life course). Finally, there are psychological explanations that point to situational effects of economic stress on political participation that are mediated by cognitive impairment and negative emotions. While the mechanisms differ, such arguments essentially claim that economic worries distract citizens from politics. Some initial evidence supports this view (Schaub 2021), but the just-mentioned life-course research clearly shows that political habits tend to be maintained also in situations of sudden economic hardship. Once citizens are habitually involved in politics, not even unemployment tends to have a meaningful impact on political participation (Emmenegger et al. 2017). The psychological mechanisms, which are well supported by research outside of political science, therefore are most likely to matter as an impairment during political socialization, when political habits have not yet crystallized. While this conjecture is in line with observed age patterns in the responsiveness to economic shocks, it still awaits systematic inquiry. In sum, the socio-economic gradient in political participation is a consistent characteristic of political inequality in most developed democracies. Unearthing its causes seems to require engagement with a complex interplay of societal and political developments as well as processes in families that shape the life course. This raises the question of how much responsibility for unequal participation should be attributed to political parties and the way in which they represent interests – or fail to do so. The second important aspect of political inequality is unequal representation. It occurs if policy-making is more responsive to the interests of relatively rich citizens (Page and Gilens 2017). This would mean that the preferences of poorer people are systematically less well reflected in legislative changes. It is often suggested that the two sides of political inequality – unequal participation and unequal representation – are linked to each other in a vicious cycle. The more the poor abstain, the stronger the incentives for parties to prioritize the interests of highstatus groups that do participate. And the stronger the policy bias in favor of the rich,

the lower the incentives for poorer voters to participate. Political inequality could thus escalate into a spiral of misrepresentation and abstention. To make things worse, this spiral could produce more income inequality which has been argued to have an autonomous negative effect on social and political participation (Solt 2008). There is mounting evidence that legislative output in a diverse set of countries corresponds more to the preferences of higher than of lower classes. The precise nature of this bias is up for debate. Interpretations of empirical patterns – as well as normative assessments – seem to partly depend on methodological choices (Elkjær and Klitgaard 2022). It is also sometimes argued that the rich and poor citizens broadly agree on a large number of policy issues which means that the poor are represented, as it were, coincidentally. Overall, there is little research to date on the feedback mechanisms that are implied in the notion of a vicious cycle. Finally, it is striking that political science is making modest progress on the question of why unequal representation occurs. In fact, there are a number of plausible reasons that likely interact. One important reason is arguably the instrumental power of business that has superior resources to lobby for policies in its interest. This includes the agenda-setting as well as the decision stage (HertelFernandez 2019; Witko et al. 2021). Another factor likely is insufficient descriptive representation of lower classes. This means, compared to the population, a relatively low probability of members of parliament have a background in lower-status occupations. Descriptive misrepresentation could produce a number of biases that lead to policies in the interest of the rich and highly educated (Alexiadou 2022). Descriptive misrepresentation also is the area in which other inequality dimensions have received a large amount of attention, particularly regarding the gender and ethnic background of parliamentarians. Overall, evidence linking descriptive to substantive representation is mixed (Bailer et al. 2022). Hence, having representatives of disadvantaged groups in parliament does not in all cases seem to lead to more policy responsiveness. Finally, and as mentioned already, unequal turnout could have effects on policies and responsiveness, because parties have more incentives to cater to the interests of groups Paul Marx

236  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology that participate in elections (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). However, the evidence for this link is limited so far. Paul Marx

References Akee, R., Copeland, W., Holbein, J. B., & Simeonova, E. (2020). Human capital and voting behavior across generations: Evidence from an income intervention. American Political Science Review, 114(2), 609–616. Alexiadou, D. (2022). Cabinet Ministers and inequality. European Journal of Political Research, 61(2), 326–350. Armingeon, K., & Schädel, L. (2015). Social inequality in political participation: The dark sides of individualisation. West European Politics, 38(1), 1–27. Bailer, S., Breunig, C., Giger, N., & Wüst, A. M. (2022). The diminishing value of representing the disadvantaged: Between group representation and individual career paths. British Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 535–552. Bartels, L. M. (2008). Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the Gilded Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dalton, R. J. (2017). The Participation Gap: Social Status and Political Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elkjær, M. A., & Klitgaard, M. B. (2022). Economic inequality and political responsiveness: A systematic review. Perspectives on Politics, https://doi. org/10.1017/S1537592721002188. Emmenegger, P., Marx, P., & Schraff, D. (2017). Off to a bad start: Unemployment and political interest during early adulthood. Journal of Politics, 79(1), 315–328. Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2020). Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality. New York: Liveright Publishing.

Paul Marx

Hertel-Fernandez, A. (2019). State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States–And the Nation. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Jost, J. T. (2020). A Theory of System Justification. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jungkunz, S., & Marx, P. (2022). Income changes do not influence political involvement in panel data from six countries. European Journal of Political Research, 61(3), 829–841. Kelly, N. J. (2020). America’s Inequality Trap. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Page, B. I., & Gilens, M. (2017). Democracy in America? What Has Gone Wrong and What Can We Do About It? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pontusson, J., & Rueda, D. (2010). The politics of inequality: Voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states. Comparative Political Studies, 43(6), 675–705. Prior, M. (2019). Hooked. How Politics Captures People’s Interest. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schaub, M. (2021). Acute financial hardship and voter turnout: Theory and evidence from the sequence of bank working days. American Political Science Review, 115(4), 1–17. Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (2012). The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Solt, F. (2008). Economic inequality and democratic political engagement. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 48–60. Witko, C., Morgan, J., Kelly, N. J., & Enns, P. K. (2021). Hijacking the Agenda: Economic Power and Political Influence. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

61. Institutionalism

under which organized interests mobilize and seek collective goods from the state. Another form of institutional theorizing posits that institutions are constitutive, establishing the It has been said that everyone in political soci- available and viable models and heuristics for ology is now an institutionalist, but there are political action and evoking imagery of culimportant differences among institutionalists. tural frameworks or toolkits. That is the case There may be as many as six types of institu- for political sociological “state constructiontionalists: economic, sociological, world soci- ist” theories of mobilization and identity forety, historical, political, and discursive (see mation. Similarly, sociological institutionalist reviews in Hall and Taylor 1996; Clemens theories of the influence of “epistemic comand Cook 1999; Schmidt 2008; Amenta and munities” on policy paradigms or of interRamsey 2010; Amenta 2012; Fioretos, Falleti, national non-governmental organizations in and Sheingate 2016). Here we focus on socio- a “world society” argue that normative and logical and historical institutionalists for the cognitive institutions embedded in networks following reasons. Economic institutional- of expertise constitute the moral and episteists have an understanding of institutions that mological bases of policy formulation (see diverge from that of other institutionalists. In review in Amenta and Ramsey 2010). Sociological institutionalism, sometimes addition, world society is closely connected to sociological institutionalism, political insti- known as neo-institutionalism, provides a tutionalist thinking is allied with historical critique of interest-driven theories. Scholars institutionalism, and discursive institutional- working in this mode argue that interestism has connections to both sociological and based theories predict a variety of policies, actions, and functional forms among states, historical institutionalism. Institutions are broadly considered to but often these features display isomorphism. be “the rules of the game” or “the humanly Moreover, the ambiguity of the linkages devised constraints that shape human inter- between observed reality, political instruaction” (North 1990: 3). More specifically ments, and policy goals may render impracin political sociology, institutions are usu- ticable a well-informed pursuit of interests. ally defined as emergent, “higher-order” In addition, interest-driven theories may prefactors above the individual level, constrain- maturely dismiss the constitutive role of culing or constituting the interests and political ture in politics. In sociological institutionalist participation of actors “without requiring explanations, the main reasons for policy and repeated collective mobilization or authorita- political structural isomorphism are cultural tive intervention to achieve these regularities” institutions common to political actors: cog(Jepperson 1991: 145). Historical institution- nitive or normative constructs that define the alists view institutions as formal or informal conceivable and appropriate forms of political procedures, routines, norms, and conventions organization, policy goals, and policy instruin the organizational structure of the polity or ments for attaining those goals (see review in the political economy, often focusing on the Hall and Taylor 1996: 947–948). There are two main strands of sociologiimpact of political institutions. Sociological institutionalists add cognitive scripts, moral cal institutionalism. In one view, associated templates, and symbol systems (Hall and with Meyer (1999) and “world society” theTaylor 1996: 938, 947), as do discursive insti- ory, norms, rituals, models, and conventions tutionalists (Schmidt 2008), that typically establish what is appropriate. State actors reside at supra-state or supra-organizational are motivated by status and legitimacy concerns. They adopt and maintain the characlevels. Institutional theories posit two distinct teristics and forms of a parent, global polity forms of institutions’ influence over political (or of those of peers they perceive as being action. Institutions can be constraining, super- more legitimate, or both). Institutions are imposing conditions of possibility for political not organizations, but normative constructs mobilization, access, and influence and limit- defining the appropriate forms of politics and ing some forms of action, while facilitating policies. Research in this area tends to focus others. Theories of “political mediation” and on stability, imitation and isomorphism and “political opportunity” in the study of social to rely on large-N studies of policy adoption, movements posit institutional constraints, in while not addressing any major divergences that political institutions limit the conditions in polities or policies. As Strang and Chang 237

238  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology (1993: 237) observe: “This perhaps makes ‘institutionalism’ a misnomer; the institutions of concern are the codified cultural constructions, not the organizations that mirror them.” (See review in Amenta and Ramsey 2010.) A second related point of view comes from the sociology of organizations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Here, cognitive schemas, scripts, and paradigms drive state action by establishing what is conceivable. This “new” institutionalism contrasts with the “old” sociology of organizations in which organizations were viewed as being designed to achieve a specific goal in an instrumental manner, going back to Max Weber (Stinchcombe 1997). Political actors may be motivated by substantive policy concerns and not just status ones, in this view, but the linkage between available means and desired ends is ambiguous. For that reason, political actors select available means based on an imperfect, bounded, or “garbage can” rationality (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Consequently, they address policy either by working from a shared available stock of professional expertise or simply emulating other polities or organizations in civil society perceived as more successful. The latter emulation may derive from competitive motivations or be part of a heuristic learning process (see review in Amenta and Ramsey 2010). This second strain of sociological institutionalism is most closely aligned with “discursive” institutionalism, which focuses on the political impact of ideas. Ideas are divided into three levels—policies, programs, and philosophies—and can be cognitive or normative; discourse is the process of conveying ideas, which differs between that among policy actors and between political actors and the public (Schmidt 2008). Sociological institutionalist explanations of transnational stability do not, however, address how state-level institutions and path dependencies might work against incentives to conform to global standards, or how a predominance of reasonably powerful, instrumentally motivated states might minimize the influence of norm-diffusing INGOs, or how domestic political factors might independently influence states to adopt similar policies. The influence of policy norms and paradigms relative to political calculations and constituency preferences remains an open question. Sociological institutionalist explanations must establish not only that dominant norms and schemas exist but also that Edwin Amenta

they are internally coherent enough to inspire straightforward policy prescriptions. Most of all, these explanations do not help greatly in explaining major political divergences, such as the rise of authoritarianism in some countries and not others. In contrast, historical institutionalism is more an approach to research than a theory (see Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Thelen 1999). Scholars working in this vein have a metatheoretical commitment to arguments concerning path dependency, including policy feedback, and historical time order in explanation, and historical research (Pierson 2000; Amenta 2009). Historical institutionalist questions are motivated by empirical puzzles of real-world importance, often with both comparative and theoretical aspects to them. These questions usually have comparative motivations and implications. For instance, questions about the failure of national health insurance or the late start of other public social programs in the United States are at least implicitly comparing these failures to successes elsewhere in similarly situated countries. Puzzles are also often constructed from the failure of well-known theoretical explanations. For instance, US social policy lagged despite being among the richest of countries. Historical institutionalist scholarship is more concerned with explaining important outcomes than developing theories and typically results in small-N studies of key political outcomes (see reviews in Amenta 2012; Fioretos et al. 2016). Political institutionalism (see entry on political institutions) is the main theoretical strand in historical institutional research and focuses on the impact of the structure of polities and differences in policies on political outcomes and processes (Immergut 1998). Although historical institutionalists usually put forward theoretical arguments with political institutional components, they tend to seek complete explanations rather than the greatest variation with the most parsimonious model. As a result, the explanations provided are usually configurational and implicate a conjunction of institutions, processes, and events. The configurational explanations typically involve the interactions of more than one institution and different aspects of these institutions, as well as possibly slow-moving processes and contingent factors. In these explanations, other elements from other theoretical

institutionalism  239 perspectives are often added (see review in Amenta and Ramsey 2010). Because institutions tend toward stasis, explaining major political change typically requires causal claims that go beyond institutions. Historical institutionalists will often invoke the influences of crises, the collective action of social movements, the rise of new governments, and the like in their multicausal explanations for change. This usually involves some theorizing at the meso level of political organization, often involving the interaction of politically active groups with state bureaucrats and other actors, or some combination of theorizing at the macro and meso levels (see Clemens and Cook 1999; Amenta and Ramsey 2010). Historical institutionalists’ multi-causal explanations promote theoretical eclecticism. That leaves roles open for the influence of ideas, which can address more fine-grained, change-oriented questions, such as why particular reforms took the forms that they did. This is one way in which the two institutionalisms can merge, along with ideas from discursive institutional thinking. The content of new policies may depend upon the national policy domains of state bureaucracies, interest groups, think tanks, academic research institutions, and social movements that monitor an issue area. This potential integration of norms and schemas presumes relatively autonomous, calculative authorities with agency to adjudicate policy decisions – but operating within the bounds of available and feasible analyses and proposals generated by policy domain actors, which are partly the product of national political structures. Elected officials and policy advocates must frame policy innovations in ways that draw public support or avoid resistance; this contrasts with the standard approach of sociological institutionalist theories, which discount domestic political constraints. Historical institutionalist theorizing often fails to theorize beyond the cases and time periods of interest. It would be better for historical institutionalists to theorize, for instance, about “rich democratic societies during the period of the formation of welfare states” than specific countries to afford their arguments greater portability. Historical institutionalists also would do well to intervene in debates between political and sociological institutionalists. Political institutionalists predominantly address political developments and policies

that are consequential in terms of resources and fundamental power arrangements; these issues inevitably attract the attention of the most powerful state and domestic political actors. Sociological institutionalist studies, in contrast, usually address policies for which delegation to an increasingly globally interconnected civil society is unlikely to result in major reallocations of state resources or group interests. Similarly, the need for legitimacy – a key motivator in sociological institutionalist accounts – is typically greater in more newly minted states at power deficits with societies at a low level of resources and thus may account for the usefulness of sociological institutionalist analyses across a wide variety of states. Positing and evaluating various empirical boundaries to these camps may be useful for a historical institutionalist scholarship to explore to ascertain how far the claims of each tradition may go (see Amenta and Ramsey 2010). More generally, great intellectual progress can result from a dialogue between the small-N historical studies typical of historical institutionalism and the large-N quantitative studies typical of sociological institutionalism. Historical research can appraise the mechanisms in these claims and address variance in larger statistical patterns. If there is contention among theories about these patterns, historical analyses can adjudicate among them. Historical institutionalist research that applies more rigorous statistical tests to more precisely formulated explanatory claims, analyzing more ambitious sets of data, would shore up explanations whose particularistic scope has consigned them to a frequently marginal status in sociological and political theorizing and research. Edwin Amenta

References Amenta, Edwin. 2009. “Making the Most of An Historical Case Study: Configuration, Sequence, Casing, and the US Old-Age Pension Movement.” Chapter 20 in The Handbook of Case-Oriented Methods, edited by C. C. Ragin and D. Byrne. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Amenta, Edwin. 2012. “Historical Institutionalism.” Chapter 6 in The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash, and Alan Scott. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edwin Amenta

240  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Amenta, Edwin and Kelley M. Ramsey. 2010. “Institutional Theory.” Chapter 2 in The Handbook of Politics: State and Civil Society in Global Perspective, edited by Kevin T. Leicht and J. Craig Jenkins. New York: Springer. Clemens, Elisabeth S. and James M. Cook. 1999. “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 25(1): 441–466. Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17: 1–25. Fioretos, Orfeo, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate. 2016. “Historical Institutionalism in Political Science.” Chapter 1 in The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, edited by Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate. New York: Oxford University Press. Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44(5): 936–957. Immergut, Ellen M. 1998. “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism.” Politics & Society 26(1): 5–34. Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. “Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism.” Pp. 143–163 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Meyer, John W. 1999. “The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State: A World Society Perspective.” Pp. 123–144 in State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, edited by George Steinmetz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 94(2): 251–267. Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. 2002. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science.” Pp. 693– 721 in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, edited by I. Katznelson and H. V. Milner. New York: W. W. Norton. Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.). 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse.” Annual Review of Political Science 11(1): 303–326. Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds.). 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1997. “On the Virtues of the Old Institutionalism.” Annual Review of Sociology 23(1): 1–18. Strang, David and Patricia Mei Yin Chang. 1993. “The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960–1980.” International Organization 47(2): 235–262. Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2(1): 369–404.

62. Interest groups

between different types of interest groups in terms of influencing decision-making. Although most people would agree that a trade union, a business association, and a In all democratic societies – and in many soci- women’s rights group are interest groups, eties that are less than perfect democracies there is not a universally used definition of –interest groups seek to affect political deci- what an interest group is. Moreover – as dissions. These groups usually represent a wide cussed by Chalmers et al. (2020: 3–4) – alterrange of different interests and viewpoints native labels are used to refer to the types including for example those of the business of associations usually encompassed in the community, wage earners, environmentalists, definition(s) of interest groups. Some scholor supporters of human rights. Interest groups ars refer to subtypes of interest groups (e.g. constitute an essential element of democracies citizen groups) or use close synonyms such but may also threaten the ability of democra- as interest organizations. Other scholars use cies to balance the voices of citizens in a fair related, but not entirely overlapping, concepts manner. As such, understanding how interest such as ‘advocacy group’ or ‘social movegroups operate and the extent to which they ment’. To some degree, this reflects differare politically influential are essential endeav- ences depending on the research question in focus. There is, however, also an element of ors for researchers. In a democracy, it is crucial that options diverging traditions in different parts of the exist for citizens to form and articulate their literature and different parts of the world. viewpoints politically (Dahl 1998). Interest For example, political scientists often use groups play a crucial role as vehicles for the interest group label and focus their work this. They provide citizens with the option on how societal interests may affect politics, to meet and discuss with like-minded oth- whereas sociologists are more prone to refer ers and to have their interests and viewpoints to social movements and are often more interrepresented in the political system. Interest ested in the broad mobilization of societal groups can thus be seen as transmission belts interests. Despite the use of different labels connecting citizens and politics (Albareda and the focus on somewhat different research 2018). In addition, the presence of interest questions, there is considerable overlap in the groups and their inclusion in the political types of associations included in empirical process can lead to more qualified political studies. In the research tradition focused on interdecisions. Interest groups can thus provide important information for example about est groups, two main approaches to defining the consequences of political decisions for interest groups can be identified: a behaviodifferent societal groups. In short, it is hard ral approach and an organizational approach to imagine a democracy without interest (Chalmers, Puglisi and Broek 2020). The behavioral approach takes its point of depargroups. The flip side of the coin is that the exist- ture in the activities of groups – in particular ence of interest groups also constitutes a dem- lobbying activity. From this perspective, any ocratic challenge. Ideally, the voice of every entity that seeks political influence through citizen should carry equal weight when politi- lobbying can be considered an interest group. cal decisions are made (Dahl 1998). However, This may for example include business firms all groups and viewpoints are not equally and institutions in addition to groups with well represented by interest groups. There are members such as trade unions or citizen many obstacles for organizing interest groups groups. The behavioral approach has been including the well-known collective action particularly prominent in US scholarship. In contrast, the organizational perspecdilemma; these obstacles are more severe for some societal interests than others (Olson tive stresses the characteristics of the entity 1965). Empirically, business interests have in question. Here, interest groups are defined repeatedly been found to be particularly dom- as associations of members. Membership is inant and in control of more resources than usually conceived broadly to include citizens, for example trade unions and citizen groups business firms, or even other associations. (Binderkrantz, Fisker and Pedersen 2016; Most often groups with supporters rather than Schattschneider 1975 [1960]). In effect, one official membership are also encompassed by of the most important research questions in the definition. Some scholars add to the defithe interest group field relates to the balance nition that a membership association is only 241

242  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology an interest group if it seeks political influence (Binderkrantz, Christiansen and Pedersen 2020). As a consequence of the organizational focus, business firms or individual institutions are generally not seen as interest groups even if they are politically active. This definition is thus closely linked to the normative role of groups in channeling citizen viewpoints into politics. Among the most crucial questions from a normative perspective is to what degree different societal interests are politically represented. Answering this question requires a way to classify and map the types of interests being represented. Several specific classification schemes have been suggested, often with a main distinction either between economic and non-economic interests or between specific and more diffuse interests. This reflects that one of the most crucial research questions in this respect relates to the extent of business group dominance and whether groups representing more diffuse interests are able to balance those of the business community. It is also linked to theoretical arguments about the types of resources different group types have available (Binderkrantz, Christiansen and Pedersen 2020; Dür and Mateo 2016). The first scholarly contributions in the interest group field were focused on the US system where scholars such as Dahl (1961) and Truman (1951) pointed to the existence of a wide range of groups seeking political influence. In this pluralist tradition, groups were mainly seen as external actors competing for access and influence, and scholars were relatively optimistic about the ability of different interests and viewpoints to be heard in politics. In the European context, a contrasting image of the role of interest groups appeared. Here, a wave of interest group scholarship focused on the existence of corporatist structures where groups were closely integrated with the state (Schmitter 1974). Over the last couple of decades, more common ground has been found among interest group scholars from different parts of the world (including but not limited to the US and European contexts). In what can be seen as a strategic turn in the literature, many have turned their attention to the strategies of influence employed by interest groups, their access to politics, and eventually their influence over political outcomes. From this perspective, many of the institutional features emphasized by previous scholars can be seen as contextual Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

factors that may affect for example the balance between different strategies in the action repertoire of interest groups or the ability of different types of interest groups to affect political outcomes (Lowery and Gray 2004). The lobbying strategies of interest groups have attracted considerable attention. A distinction is usually made between strategies that bring groups into direct contact with decision makers in politics and the bureaucracy and strategies that are more indirect where groups use for example media tactics. While the latter was traditionally seen as a fallback option for groups lacking insider access, there is now consensus that media strategies are part of the action repertoire also for the most important groups (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005). In recent work, the use of social media and coalitions have also been incorporated (Junk and Rasmussen 2019; van der Graaf, Otjes and Rasmussen 2016). The next step – after engaging in lobbying strategies – toward influence is gaining political access. While access is not in itself influence, it is often a prerequisite for influence. Moreover, while influence is notoriously difficult to study, it is far more manageable to conduct systematic studies of access to politics including to arenas such as parliament, the bureaucracy, and the news media. Among the main findings is that access is heavily skewed toward resourceful groups. Moreover, differences in patterns of access have been identified across different political arenas (Binderkrantz, Christiansen and Pedersen 2020). When it comes to influence, this is often defined as influence over outcomes. From a theoretical point of view, this includes both affecting decisions that are on the agenda and agenda-setting itself, but empirically it is often restricted to those issues or policy proposals that are officially discussed (Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall 2015). A prerequisite for groups to represent citizens, business firms, and other entities is that they do in fact channel the viewpoints of their members into politics. One aspect of this is their political role as discussed above. Another aspect is the internal functioning of groups – to what extent are interest groups operating as ‘little democracies’ where group members have a say in shaping the issues and policy positions that groups work on (Albareda 2018)? This issue has received less attention than the external actions of groups,

interest groups  243 but there is reason to question the representative role of interest groups. As such, many interest groups are highly professionalized organizations, and their staff members interact regularly with public officials and so forth. This amplifies the political influence of groups but may also draw them away from membership representation (Klüver and Saurugger 2013). Moreover, many groups have complex organizational structures, and some even have non-democratic traits. This limits members’ opportunity to have a say in group politics (Barakso and Schaffner 2008; Binderkrantz 2009). While there is no doubt that interest groups play a crucial role in politics, there is, therefore, reason to be somewhat skeptical about the degree to which they fulfill their role as transmission belts between citizens and policy makers. Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

References Albareda, Adrià. 2018. “Connecting Society and Policymakers? Conceptualizing and Measuring the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations to Act as Transmission Belts.” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 29(6):1216–1232. Barakso, Maryann, and Brian F. Schaffner. 2008. “Exit, Voice, and Interest Group Governance.” American Politics Research 36(2):186–209. Beyers, Jan. 2004. “Voice and Access. Political Practices of European Interest Associations.” European Union Politics 5(2):211–240. Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær. 2005. “Interest Group Strategies: Navigating Between Privileged Access and Strategies of Pressure.” Political Studies 53(4):694–715. Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær. 2009. “Membership Recruitment and Internal Democracy in Interest Groups: Do Group-Member Relations Vary Between Group Types?” West European Politics 32(3):657–678. Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Peter Munk Christiansen, and Helene Helboe Pedersen. 2020. “Mapping Interest Group Access to Politics: A Presentation of the INTERARENA Research Project.” Interest Groups & Advocacy 9(3):290–301. Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær, Helene Marie Fisker, and Helene Helboe Pedersen.

2016. “The Rise of Citizen Groups? From Mobilization to Representation.” Scandinavian Political Studies 39: 291–311. Chalmers, Adam, Alfio Puglisi, and Onna van der Broek. 2020. “Interest Groups.” In Harris, P., Bitonti, A., Fleisher, C.S., Binderkrantz, A.S. (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Dahl, Robert A. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, Robert A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dür, Andreas, Patrick Bernhagen, and David Marshall. 2015. “Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?” Comparative Political Studies 48(8):951–983. Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. 2016. Insiders and Outsiders. Interest Groups in Multilevel Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Junk, Wiebke Marie, and Anne Rasmussen. 2019. “Framing by the Flock: Collective Issue Definition and Advocacy Success.” Comparative Political Studies 52(4):483–513. Klüver, Heike, and Sabine Saurugger. 2013. “Opening the Black Box: The Professionalization of Interest Groups in the European Union.” Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(2):185–205. Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 2004. “A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests.” Political Research Quarterly 57(1):163–175. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schattschneider, E. E. 1975 [1960]. The Semisovereign People. A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. US: Thomson Learning. Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Review of Politics 36(1):85–131. Truman, David B. 1951. The Governmental Process. Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. van der Graaf, Amber, Simon Otjes, and Anne Rasmussen. 2016. “Weapon of the Weak? The Social Media Landscape of Interest Groups.” European Journal of Communication 31(2):120–135. Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

63. Intersectionality

intersectional thinking, its racial underpinnings being overlooked. The academic rise of intersectional thinking is equally linked to that of postmodern theory (Brah and Phoenix Intersectionality is a feminist theory that 2004). This is particularly effective in relabears a project of social justice. Referring to tion to queer theory, which seeks to think the ways in which race, class, gender, age, about the politics of difference while destasexuality, disability, among other categories bilising identity politics towards a more fluid of difference, interact with one another, inter- conception of (gender and sexual) identities. sectionality opens up an understanding of the As such, a theorisation of intersectionality complexity of politics of identities and allows that acknowledges the changing nature of for an accounting of experiences located at categories at their point of crossing and the particular sites within the matrix of power. internal diversity within the categories, as As a critical theory, it enables the norma- it has been developed later (Hancock 2007; tive interests of minorities to be carried for- Yuval-Davis 2006), is strongly related to femward when not represented in law, politics or inist queer theorisation of subjectivation prosocial movements. Intersectionality has ben- cesses. Specific attention has then to be paid efitted from a meteoric rise within academic to the categories that are accounted for, the spheres since it has been first conceptualised. ways their crossing is conceptualised and the Such a successful pathway is not straightfor- related effects of such premises. While intersectionality has been recogward though and deserves further scrutiny, as its paths within academic and activist nised by many scholars as “the most imporspheres only partially share objectives and tant theoretical contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with related fields, has acquaintances. Intersectionality is strongly rooted in a made so far” (McCall 2005, 1771), discussions broad range of initially US-based academic continue about whether to define it as a critiand activist Black feminist theorists who have cal theory (Bilge 2013), a paradigm (Collins paved the way prior to a proper conceptuali- 2019), a set of normative theories (Hancock sation to shed light on the interlocking work- 2007) or around its use as a “theory, concept ings of structures of oppression (Anzaldua or heuristic device” (Davis 2011, 4). Debates 1987; Combahee River Collective 1979; Davis extend to its operationalisation as there is no 1983; hooks 1984). Crenshaw (1989, 1991) is specific method to engage with it, although deemed to have coined the term through her intersectionality has also been defined both analysis of court cases involving women of as theory and praxis (Nash 2008; but see, colour’s experiences of violence. Crenshaw e.g., Raghuram 2019; Rodó-de-Zárate 2014; differentiates between structural intersection- Grünenfelder and Schurr 2015). This relates ality, which refers to the intersection of every- to the various ways of reflecting on social catday forms of domination and the consequent egories and addressing the analysis of power lived experiences of oppression; and political relations. Using intersectionality allows for the intersectionality, which refers to the intersection of political agendas needed to contest reflection of the everyday effects of power these very specific forms of oppression. In relations. However, what categories of interso doing, her seminal work focuses on the sectional analysis encompass may vary, agency of social groups who are dominated alternatively referring to the category itself, in multiple ways, allowing for the recognition the identity it relates to, the process of disand visibilisation of the specificity of experi- crimination that marginalises the associated ences of Black women as constituted at the social group or the system of oppression. To point of intersection of the interlocking struc- illustrate through the example of race, this means that intersectional analysis alternatures of racist and sexist oppression. This first theorisation has allowed the term tively accounts for the operations of the catto spread into “a burgeoning field of intersec- egory of race, Black identity, racialisation tional studies” (Cho et  al. 2013: 785). This and/or racism. For instance, in her seminal has led feminist political and social sciences work, Crenshaw reflects on the lived and to use it as a heuristic tool enabling account- embodied experience of multiple oppressions ability for minorities’ lived experiences of and on how this contributes to the making of oppression (Davis 1983). In so doing, gen- Black woman identity through the combined der has often remained the central locus for processes of racism and sexism, an identity 244

intersectionality  245 that has to be articulated at the crossroad of two political agendas. This questions thus the nature of categories themselves. This also helps in noting that Crenshaw’s work eludes the working of the structures of oppression themselves. The definition of categories has also been questioned since referring to categories implies a form of internal unity along with a bounded external border. Theorists have then argued for the importance of reflecting on the social construction of categories to avoid the reification of related subjects or groups. This is particularly important when it comes to identity, which can be considered either as a stable given or a more fluid social construct. Moreover, discussion has arisen about whether to reflect on the categories that existed before their intersection or on the new one that emerges at the point of intersection. As for an example, and back to Crenshaw: race and gender are the categories to reflect on when considering political intersectionality, while Black woman is the prism to account for when considering structural intersectionality. As such, Crenshaw counts among theorists who argue for the importance of specifying the categories that intersect for better visibility in aiming for a stronger political action. This argument can be nuanced depending on context, as invisibility can sometimes be a useful strategy to counter the workings of power relations, for example dropping out gender classification with the aim of developing gender equality. Finally, thinking through categories has been contested for it neglects the operation of power that allows for their own making. Walby, Armstrong and Strid (2012) propose therefore to talk about “sets of unequal social relations” or “social system”, to better address issues of inequalities. This also enables for the consideration of inequalities within each intersecting set of social relations and the downplaying of the reification of categories as homogeneous while questioning the workings of power relations themselves. Another point of attention that emerges from the discussion of categories concerns the articulation of power relations and its effect on lived experiences. Initial arithmetic approaches to the recognition of multiple oppressions lead to a superposition approach, for example, being a Black women equates to being twice as oppressed as a Black man or a white woman. Scholars have now moved from this additive model by identifying the

way in which specific oppressions located at the articulation between different systems of power are not cumulative but rather specific forms of oppression that are declined according to context. Coming back to the example of a Black woman, studies show that Black men are more exposed to police brutality in public spaces for example than Black women since the latter are considered in need of protection due to their gender. Moreover, such an arithmetic tends also to deny agency to those subjects whose lives are shaped by the weight of multiple oppressions. Other early approaches attempted to analyse the working of power from an analogical perspective, for example, showing the common workings of race and gender power relations. This body of work has been useful, notably in attempting to unpack the action of power. It does not allow us however to think together of the common action of racism and sexism, proposing a fragmented view of power that prevents united political action. There is now a growing consensus for embracing intersectional thinking attentive to the mutual constitution of oppressions through the interconnectedness of systems of power in the “matrix of domination” (Collins 1990). Drawing on bell hooks, the French feminist Marxist sociologist Kergoat (2009) contests Crenshaw’s approach that prioritises fixed identities and runs the risk of stigmatising a specific social group, while invisibilising more diverse segments within the groups. To face those possible drifts, she proposes rather to read systems of oppression as consubstantial, emphasising the constant, renewed and contextrelated co-production of power relations. This vision strongly contrasts with an idea of an overarching unique oppression, thus acknowledging the agency of the oppressed that can express itself through the various entry points opened through this conceptualisation when it comes to political action. Indeed, this very point of discussion enables an analytical distinction between macro and micro levels, structural and experiential levels, social categories and social relations (Anthias 2012). As such, it refers to the normative and political versus sociological and analytical spheres and allows consideration of how to bridge this gap by focusing on the processes at stake. The question then remains whether or not each system of oppression weighs the same. Karine Duplan

246  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology While Black feminist theories have emphasised race and gender, feminist Marxist approaches have rather focused on class and gender. In any case, in most approaches, if not all, emerge what are more or less recognised as foundational categories of oppression, that is, race, class and gender. Each of these declines itself in interrelated subcategories, for instance, sex, gender identity and expression and sexual orientation when it comes to gender; cultural acceptance of race, beyond skin colour, ethnic, nationality or even language and migratory background, when it comes to race; education, socioeconomic position, incomes, when it comes to class. Coming back to foundational categories from which to think about oppression, opinions differ about whether to consider them equal or not to each other. Drawing on an intersectional approach that acknowledges the relationality of systems of oppression prevents hence the positing of an “Oppression Olympics” (Hancock 2016) that would hierarchise the different components of social inequalities. However, while the prioritisation of one set of unequal relations to another leads to competition in policy claims and agendas, it is worth noting that it can also be used strategically as a way to enhance alliances and coalitions. Finally, the question that remains is how to open up intersectional analysis to wider categories of power and oppression (Yuval Davis 2011). Current debates highlight the importance of integrating disability for instance. When it comes to age, one can also ask how to integrate it as a power relation, for instance in regards to elder people but also to the youngest ones, both extremes of the age spectrum who are less likely to be listened to. To wrap up on categories and their uses in intersectional thinking, what to keep in mind is to reflect on our own uses in research and to position our work within these debates. With such popularity, one can question whether or not the use of intersectionality in research has lost a part of its subversive power or even become a normative framework of analysis when working on the complexities of social inequalities (Bilge 2013), if not a “buzz word” (Davis 2011). Puar (2020 underlines how the ongoing banalisation of intersectionality and its shifts in various spheres Karine Duplan

contribute to supporting the hegemonic position of white liberal feminism, which includes a dismissal of race as being central in intersectional thinking. Intersectionality becomes recognised however as guaranteeing a certain degree of critical content (Dhamoon 2011). By addressing diversity issues, it does work as an internal critique for social movements, allowing for instance for fighting against racism within feminist movements or sexism within anti-racist movements. Referring to the unicity of a category, it nevertheless promotes a collective aim for women that might run the risk of universalism (Davis 2011). Intersectionality remains however a heuristic tool to account for the claims of the oppressed, as a potential resource for activism and resistance (Konstantoni et al. 2017) and a strategy for successful coalitions to foster the representation and participation of multiply marginalised groups (Evans and Lépinard 2019). Beyond its original frame that has worked towards the mapping of the experiences of oppressed groups, intersectionality has recently emerged as a useful transversal framework to further scrutinise the ways power is reproduced in the everyday (Duplan and Cranston 2023; Jaunait, Chauvin and Morel 2012; Nash 2008). Therefore, more research should be done on the lived experiences of the most advantaged and on the structures that enable for the reproduction of privileges and consequent inequalities. While reflecting on its initial grounds, intersectional thinking should now be taken forward in the ongoing search for social justice. To conclude, it would be worth additionally acknowledging how intersectionality can circulate across time and space and, as a “travelling concept”, how this entails paying particular attention to situating the localities and historical and institutional contexts in which we account for its dynamics, a key area for future research in the political sociological tradition. Karine Duplan

References Anthias, F. (2012). Transnational mobilities, migration research and intersectionality: Towards a translocational frame. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 2(2), 102–110.

intersectionality  247 Anzaldúa, G. (1987). Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books. Bilge, S. (2013). Intersectionality undone: Saving intersectionality from feminist intersectionality studies. Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race, 10(2), 405–424. Brah, A., & Phoenix, A. (2004). Ain’t I a woman? Revisiting intersectionality. Journal of International Women’s Studies, 5(3), 75–86. Chauvin, S., & Jaunait, A. (2015). L’intersectionnalité contre l’intersection. Raisons Politiques, 2(2), 55–74. Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W., & McCall, L. (2013). Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 38(4), 785–810. Collins, P. H. (1990). Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. Boston & London: Unwin Hyman. Collins, P. H. (2019). Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory. Durham: Duke University Press. Collins, P. H., & Bilge, S. (2016). Intersectionality. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Combahee River Collective. (1979). A black feminist statement. In: Zillah Eisenstein, Z. (ed.), Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism. New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 210–218, 215. Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A Black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989(1), 139–167. Crenshaw, K. W. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139, 139–168. Crenshaw, K. W. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241–1299. Davis, A. (1983). Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House. Davis, K. (2011). Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what

makes a feminist theory successful. In: Lutz, H., Vivar, M. T. H., & Supik, L. (eds.), Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-faceted Concept in Gender Studies. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 43–54. Dhamoon, R. K. (2011). Considerations on mainstreaming intersectionality. Political Research Quarterly, 64(1), 230–243. Duplan, K., & Cranston, S. (2023). Towards geographies of privileged migration: An intersectional perspective. Progress in Human Geography, 47(2), 333–347. Evans, E., & Lépinard, E. (2019). Intersectionality in Feminist and Queer Movements: Confronting Privileges. London: Routledge, p. 302. Grünenfelder, J., & Schurr, C. (2015). Intersectionality–A challenge for development research and practice? Development in Practice, 25(6), 771–784. Hancock, A. M. (2007). When multiplication doesn't equal quick addition: Examining intersectionality as a research paradigm. Perspectives on Politics, 5(1), 63–79. Hancock, A.-M. (2016). Intersectionality: An Intellectual History. New York: Oxford University Press. hooks, b. (1984). Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press. Jaunait, A., Chauvin, S., & Morel, C. (2012). Representing the intersection in France and America. Revue francaise de science politique, 62(1), 5–20. Kergoat, D. (2009). Dynamique et consubstantialité des rapports sociaux. In: Dorlin, E. (ed.), Sexe, race, classe. Pour une épistémologie de la domination, Paris: PUF, pp. 111–125. Konstantoni, K., Kustatscher, M., & Emejulu, A. (2017). Travelling with intersectionality across time, place and space. Children's Geographies, 15(1), 1–5. McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 30(3), 1771–1800. Nash, J. C. (2008). Re-thinking intersectionality. Feminist Review, 89(1), 1–15. Puar, J. K. (2020). “I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess”: Becoming-intersectional in assemblage theory. In: McCann C., Kim S., Ergun E. (eds.), Feminist Theory Reader. London: Routledge, pp. 405–415. Raghuram, P. (2019). Race and feminist care ethics: Intersectionality as method. Gender, Place and Culture, 26(5), 613–637. Karine Duplan

248  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Rodó-de-Zárate, M. (2014). Developing geographies of intersectionality with relief maps: Reflections from youth research in Manresa, Catalonia. Gender, Place and Culture, 21(8), 925–944. Walby, S., Armstrong, J., & Strid, S. (2012). Intersectionality: Multiple inequalities in social theory. Sociology, 46(2), 224–240.

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Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and feminist politics. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(3), 193–209. Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). The Politics of Belonging, London: Sage, 1–264.

64. Left/right

have substantial similarities with the left-right spectrum (Klingemann 1979). ‘Liberal’ does however suggest a rather more centrist position than does ‘left’, and does not have the same socialist connotations. To be sure, the division between left and right is not the only important political division in contemporary politics. While in many mature, wealthy democracies the left/right dimension has been seen as the major cleavage underlying political conflict, there are other cross-cutting cleavages, such as the perpendicular axis from libertarian to authoritarian values (related to progressive/traditionalist issues such as LGBTQ+ and women’s rights, immigration and concern for the environment) which have risen in political importance and been linked to the emergence of various social movements (Giugni and Grasso 2019). The libertarian-authoritarian dimension is often seen to be orthogonal to the left-right dimension and would therefore point to a multidimensional rather than a uni-dimensional political space. Nevertheless, despite many claims of its imminent demise, the distinction between left and right has been remarkably resilient and recent research shows that it continues to shape divisions within the great majority of mature democracies. The distinction between left and right dates from the time of the French Revolution. When the National Assembly gathered in 1789 to write France’s new constitution, a central issue was whether or not the king should have the right to an absolute veto. Those who thought the king should be denied the power of veto were seated on the left of the president of the assembly, while those who supported the king’s right to veto were seated on the president’s right (Gauchet 1994). This divide soon became more general, with supporters of the king occupying the righthand side of the assembly and supporters of the revolution occupying the left. To be leftwing, then, was to be revolutionary, while to be right-wing was to seek to preserve tradition (James 2017). Early observers also noted the presence of a sizeable centrist group.

The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have been used by politicians, by the public and by political scientists as a short-hand to describe the policy programmes of political parties and the political values and preferences of the electorate. As Bobbio has powerfully argued ‘“Left” and “right” are two antithetical terms which for more than two centuries have been used habitually to signify the contrast between the ideologies and movements which divide the world of political thought and action’ (Bobbio 1994, p. 1). While the meaning of the terms has shifted over time and will doubtless continue to shift in future, the most common contemporary interpretation equates ‘left’ with more egalitarian and interventionist programmes oriented toward helping the working class and disadvantaged groups, while ‘right’ is equated with laissez-faire and free-market programmes oriented toward business groups. Examples of left-wing policies include state ownership of major public services, state intervention and regulation of the economy, greater provision of universal welfare benefits (and higher taxes to pay for them) and redistribution of wealth and income to more disadvantaged groups. In contrast, right-wing economic policies include deregulation of the economy, privatization of governmentowned assets, low taxes (and reduced government spending on welfare) and acceptance of inequality. Historically, the left were the challengers seeking to reform the established order in a more egalitarian direction. The precise meaning of the left-right spectrum is, however, subject to variations around the world in terms of its implications and associations. The political context will also tend to shape the content of the terms. The content became particularly ambiguous in the new Eastern European democracies after the fall of communism. While communism was conventionally regarded as left-wing, the political parties that were successors to the previous official communist parties became defenders of the status quo ante. Conversely, the same content has sometimes been conveyed with different terminology in other countries. In the USA for example the terms liberal and conservative have often been used in place of left and right, but the liberal-conservative spectrum turns out to 249

Duquesnoy, for example, noticed more than just the polarization of the hall on August 23, 1789. He also observed the significant position of those who ‘occupy the middle’: ‘they are in favor of everything that is being done’ he says, ‘but they would like to see it done more slowly and with less disruption’ (Gauchet 1994, p. 246).

250  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology The left/right distinction was given added prominence by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the emergence of communist and socialist parties across Europe. The distinctions between left and right thus became institutionalized in the party conflict of the inter-war years. The more one was sympathetic to an international workers’ revolution, the more left-wing one was seen to be. Conversely, the more one was sympathetic to the maintenance of capitalism, the more one was seen to be right-wing. The original spatial meaning of the terms left and right continues to be important in explanatory models based on the left-right spectrum. In a classic early study, Antony Downs (1957) built on Hotelling’s (1929) spatial model of shop location to develop a formal model showing that, just as shops will tend to locate at the mid-point of a street, so political parties will tend to converge at the mid-point of the left-right dimension. If citizens vote for the party that is closest to them in political space, then parties will gain by moving to the centre: they will retain the votes of those who are, so to speak, on their outside but will gain votes from those on the inside by moving closer to the opposing party (assuming a single-peaked distribution of voters in political space). Other scholars have used this kind of spatial reasoning to show that coalitions are more likely to form between parties that lie closer to each other on the left-right spectrum (Laver and Budge 1992), that voters are more likely to switch back and forth between adjacent parties than between more distant parties (Heath et al. 1991) and to vote tactically for a party that has more chance of winning than their preferred party has but is located close to their preferred party’s position. To be sure, while these accounts have all been developed in the context of the left-right spectrum, the logic of these spatial models could equally apply in the context of other dimensions such as the libertarian/authoritarian dimension. Empirical research on the left-right spectrum has taken two main lines. One line of research focusses on party positions and uses expert surveys or expert coding of party manifestos to investigate whether patterns of party competition within a polity can accurately be characterized in left-right terms and whether other dimensions are present or indeed rival the importance of the left-right spectrum (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Budge Anthony F. Heath

et al. 2001; for a comparison of the two methods see McDonald et al. 2007). The other line of work focusses on the electorate and investigates whether the mass public recognizes the terms, how they interpret and use them and why they take up different stances on the dimension. There has been a series of studies asking experts from different countries to rate the party positions in the country along different axes of competition. For example, Huber and Inglehart (1995) asked their expert respondents about the language used in each country to define the major poles of political conflict. They found that the terms left and right were the ones by far the most commonly used, South Korea being the only country where a majority of the experts used other labels (most respondents preferring ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’). They also found that there was a tendency for the terms left and right to be considered more appropriate in countries that had had competitive party systems for a relatively long period of time. In non-democratic societies and recently established democracies politics was dominated by the clash between authoritarian versus democratic politics. Other dimensions of political conflict and competition included a pro- versus anti-European Union cleavage in Norway, economic growth versus protection of the environment cleavage in Sweden and secularism versus religious (presumably Hindu) fundamentalism in India. (Rovny and Polk (2019) provide a recent study of these non-economic dimensions of political competition, and how they relate to the left– right dimension, in contemporary European democracies.) Huber and Inglehart also found that economic issues and class conflict were by far the most frequent response to an open-ended question about the substantive meaning of left and right. However, it appeared that the polarity had shifted over time. For much of the twentieth century ‘left’ in most countries had been associated with the nationalization of industry and the expansion of government, while ‘right’ was associated with preserving the status quo. At the time of their research (1993), however, the central issue was no longer nationalization but instead privatization and deregulation. In effect, then, the centre of the distribution of parties on the left–right party spectrum had shifted rightwards during the 1980s.

left/right  251 Various approaches have been used for measuring left–right positions of the voters. One widely used method simply asks respondents to place themselves on a scale (typically with ten points) running from ‘Left’ to ‘Right’. These self-placement scales leave it up to the respondent to decide what the terms mean. An alternative approach asks respondents a set of questions about their attitudes toward different political issues such as the redistribution of income and wealth, government intervention in the labour market and private ownership of basic utilities, thus enabling one to understand the substantive meaning of the abstract concepts left and right (Heath, Evans and Martin 1994). Research suggests that the majority of citizens do recognize the terms left and right and associate ‘left’ more with equality, nationalization, socialism, workers and the poor, while ‘right’ is associated with individualism, capitalism, the market economy, the rich and entrepreneurs (Fuchs and Klingemann 2014). As with the studies of party positions, studies of voters’ positions show that their distribution on the left-right spectrum has changed markedly over time, in the case of Britain for example shifting to the right in the 1960s and 1970s and then moving back to the left in the 1980s and 1990s (Bartle et al. 2010, see also Stimson 1999 on the USA). One persuasive account suggests that there is a thermostatic relationship between party and voter positions. Thus when the incumbent government spends ‘too little’ (relative to the median voter’s preferred position), popular demand for increased spending grows; and conversely when the incumbent government spends ‘too much’ (relative to the voters’ preferred position), the demand for additional expenditure declines (Wlezien 1995). By pursuing their own policy goals instead of aligning themselves with public opinion, governments thus ‘sow the seeds of their own demise’. Future research can be expected to focus on the rise of authoritarian populism in many contemporary democracies. Despite the use of terms such as ‘radical’ or ‘new’ right to characterize these parties, the libertarianauthoritarian dimension and cognate cleavages such as nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, many of the supporters of these parties appear to be on the left in terms of economic policy (Crewe and Sanders 2020). But even if the electoral role of left-right

positions might be in (partial) decline, new research suggests that it might have wider significance for non-electoral forms of political participation (Grasso and Giugni 2018). Anthony F. Heath

References Bartle, John, Sebastian DellepianeAvellandeda and James Stimson (2010) The moving centre: Preferences for government activity in Britain, 1950–2005, British Journal of Political Science 41(2): 259–285. Bobbio, Norberto (1994) Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica. Rome: Donselli editore. Translated by Allan Cameron as Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Cambridge: Polity Press (1996). Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum (eds.) (2001) Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crewe, Ivor and David Sanders (2020) Authoritarian Populism and Liberal Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Downs, Antony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Fuchs, D. and H.-D. Klingemann (2014) The left-right schema. Pp. 203–234 in M. K. Jennings and J. W. van Deth (eds.), Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies. Berlin, Boston, MA: De Gruyter. Gauchet, Marcel (1994) Right and left. Pp. 241–298 in Pierre Nora (ed.), Realms of Memory: Conflicts and Division, Vol. I. New York: Columbia University Press. Giugni, M. and M. T. Grasso (2019) Street Citizens: Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics Series). Grasso, M. T. and M. Giugni (2018) Political values and extra-institutional political participation: The impact of economic redistributive and social libertarian preferences on protest behavior, International Political Science Review 40(4): 470–485. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0192512118780425. Anthony F. Heath

252  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Heath, A. F., R. Jowell, J. Curtice, G. Evans, J. Field and S. Witherspoon (1991) Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964–1987. Oxford: Pergamon Press (chapter 2). Heath, A. F., G. A. Evans and J. Martin (1994) The measurement of core beliefs and values: The development of balanced socialist/laissez faire and libertarian/ authoritarian scales, British Journal of Political Science 24(1): 115–132. Hotelling, Harold (1929) Stability in competition, The Economic Journal 39(153): 41–57. Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart (1995) Expert interpretations of party space and party location in 42 societies, Party Politics 1(1): 73–111. James, Alex (2017) Why do we conceptualize politics as left versus right? https:// respublicapolitics​.com​/articles​/why​-do​-we​ -conceptualise​-politics​-as​-left​-vs​-right. Klingemann, H.-D. (1979) Measuring ideological conceptualizations. Pp. 215–254

Anthony F. Heath

in S. Barnes and M. Kaase (eds.), Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, CА: Sage. Laver, Michael J. and Ian Budge (eds.) (1992) Party, Policy, and Government Coalitions. London: Oxford University Press. McDonald, Michael D., Silvia M. Mendes and Myunghee Kim (2007) Cross-temporal and cross-national comparisons of party left-right positions, Electoral Studies 26(1): 62–75. Rovny, Jan and Jonathan Polk (2019) New wine in old bottles: Explaining the dimensional structure of European party systems, Party Politics 25(1): 12–24 https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/1354068818816970. Stimson, James (1999) Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview. Wlezien, Christopher (1995) The public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending, American Journal of Political Science 39(4): 981–1000.

65. Legitimacy Since the dawn of human history those occupying positions of power, and especially political power, have sought to ground their authority in a principle of legitimacy, which shows why their access to and exercise of power is rightful and why those subject to it have a corresponding duty to obey. It has been the task of normative theorizers in every era to justify, or in times of uncertainty, to challenge, the bases of these legitimacy claims. This they have done by means of discursive argument, showing both the one true source of rightful authority and the ends which it is designed to serve, including the powers necessary to these ends. Before the twentieth century, such prescriptive theorizing formed the only mode in which the subject of legitimacy was framed. It was only early in the twentieth century that legitimacy became a subject for empirical analysis in the nascent discipline of sociology, especially in the work of Max Weber. For Weber legitimate rule was what a given people believed to be legitimate at a particular time and place, and this could only be established by empirical investigation, which would show that what people believed varied enormously across different historical epochs and types of rule. But he also insisted that it was possible to draw up a typology of these beliefs, which he termed ‘traditional, rational-legal and charismatic’ according to their respective source of authority, though different combinations of these pure types were possible. According to Weber a belief in their legitimacy, shared by those subordinate to them, was a crucial element in maintaining structures of power and in doing so economically. ‘Custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given structure of power,’ he wrote. ‘In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy’ ( Weber 1978, p. 213). Weber’s analysis constituted a major breakthrough in the empirical study of legitimacy, divorced from the personal convictions of the investigator. However, aspects of it became subject to criticism in their turn. His threefold typology has proved more useful for exploring the different historical systems of administration than the different bases of

political systems in the twentieth century and subsequently. And the study of what people believe to be legitimate encourages a purely subjective characterization of the concept. If we ask the question ‘belief in precisely what constitutes legitimacy?’ the answer turns out to have a similar structure to that of normative theorizing – belief in the claims of the powerful to possess a rightful source of authority on the one hand, and to fulfil the accepted purposes and standards of government on the other. These could be termed the authorization and performance dimensions respectively, or more crudely input and output components. These components turn out to be universal in all political legitimacy, though from a sociological point of view, the precise content of what is believed under each of these two elements will differ according to time and place, unlike the perspective of normative or prescriptive theorizers. To take an extreme example, no normative theorizer would accept that Hitler’s dictatorship was legitimate from the standpoint of his or her belief in a rightful source of authority, whereas the sociologist or historian is concerned to explore how in practice it was possible for Hitler to achieve the level of belief in his legitimacy among the German population that he did – a level of acceptance that could not be explained simply by a fear of the police state. To these belief components, should be added acts of recognition by relevant and significant others which serve to consolidate a regime’s legitimacy. So, in a traditional system, these acts will involve the swearing of an oath of allegiance on the part of clan leaders, religious authorities, and so on. Besides binding them to the authority, these acts also send an important signal to the rest of the population. In an electoral democracy, by contrast, public acknowledgment of the result by losing candidates and parties comprises a key contribution to the legitimacy of the winner over and above the rightful source of authority in electoral rules and the will of the people. These different components of legitimacy are clarified in the table of twentieth‑ and twenty-first‑century political regimes. To what has been said so far should be added the legitimacy of an accepted source of law, necessary because of the compulsory nature of its prescriptions and its key role in any structure of political authority over and above the personnel comprising it.​

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David Beetham

custom/precedent

sovereign decisionism

codification of collective will

constitutional rule of law

sacred texts and canons

decree

Traditional

Fascist

Communist

Liberal-democratic

Theocratic

Military dictatorship

Source:   Author original.

Form of law

Regime type

none

divine will interpreted by hierarchy

the people through competitive election

party monopoly of truth and representation

leadership principle

heredity/the past

Source of authority

Table 1   Legitimating elements of different twentieth-century regime types

restore order and national unity

purifying society’s moral order

individual rights protection and advancement

building communist future

national purity/expansion

well-being within traditional order

Ends of government

none

various of the above

electoral endorsement

mass mobilisation

mass mobilisation

assembly of social elite

Mode of public affirmation

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legitimacy  255 The legitimacy of a political regime is rarely total but a matter of more or less, according to the strength of the beliefs of those subordinate to it and its reach across them. In terms of the different components outlined above, persistent failure in expected performance can undermine the legitimacy of an individual leader or officeholder and facilitate their replacement by a different one. But if the source of authority and rules of appointment start to be seriously contested, performance failure can serve as the trigger to bring a regime down and accelerate the transition to a different type. For Weber, the most important believers and bearers of a regime’s legitimacy were the administrative officials tasked with administering and enforcing its laws and policies both nationally and locally. In pre-modern times it could matter less what the typical subject of authority believed, provided its legitimacy was secure among the governing class and other key agencies, such as religious and military leaders. Since the French Revolution, however, the idea has become widely accepted that the source of a regime’s legitimacy lies in the will of the people, however interpreted, so the beliefs of these people have become relevant to a regime’s legitimacy, even in countries with non-democratic regimes, given that their governments could reach the whole population via mass media. This observation raises a key question, ‘how are we to tell what people actually believe, especially in authoritarian regimes?’ Sceptics of legitimacy argue that all we can investigate are the legitimacy claims of the powerful and their ideologists and that the acceptance of these claims by the subordinate is simply beyond reach. More hardened sceptics dismiss it as a redundant concept, and that what keeps people acquiescent in such regimes is the power and resources of government, enough to convince them that resistance is futile. Organized rebellion, if it happens, takes place because the subordinates have found that they have the collective power to resist. Recent research has shown that carefully designed opinion surveys can overcome this problem, even in authoritarian regimes. A particularly important contribution to this research has been made by Bruce Gilley in his book The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (2009). He uses a combination of survey and other data to assess

the degree of perceived legitimacy of states across 72 countries. Among his findings are that some authoritarian regimes enjoy more legitimacy than some formally democratic ones and that it is possible for states to improve their position by changes in their policies or mode of governing. Central to Gilley’s (2009, p. 11) work is the conviction that the moral authority of a regime matters as much as its sheer power and can have beneficial consequences for its effectiveness in governing. ‘Legitimacy’, he writes, ‘is the endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level, and is an important public good which has significant consequences for the effectiveness and stability of a system of authority’ (2009, p. 11). Studies of the criminal justice system confirm the conclusion that the moral authority of officeholders is relevant to their effectiveness. A pathbreaking work by Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990), showed through interviews with a panel of randomly selected citizens of Chicago that people were in the main law-abiding for normative rather than instrumental reasons, because they believed the authorities had the right to interpret and enforce the law. But this belief proved to be dependent on the perception that the authorities treated people fairly and with respect, which Tyler termed ‘procedural justice’. Where this was absent the level of compliance and co-operation with the authorities – police or prison officers – was correspondingly reduced. Many subsequent studies have confirmed these findings. If we turn from the state and its personnel and administrative systems, then we find that legitimacy is important for other power structures, those of class, gender, and ethnicity in particular. These all count as ‘political’ because they concern issues of equality in public life. In all three we can see selfreinforcing cycles of justification, where the power structure precedes but also reinforces its own legitimation. Thus, for example, if women are denied the means to develop and exercise the capacity for involvement in public life, it is easy to argue from this disability that it is a naturally determined and inalienable feature of their sex. And the conception that people of color are inferior to whites followed rather than preceded the fact of their slavery in order to justify it – a conception that has long survived the abolition of slavery itself, reinforced by all kinds of pseudo-scientific David Beetham

256  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology investigations. Deep-seated legitimations can thus continue informally, even where legal obstacles to equality in public life have been overcome. As to the legitimation of class divisions, Weber wrote what is still one of the best accounts: The fates of human beings are not equal. People differ in their states of health or wealth or social status, or what not. Simple observation shows that in every such situation he who is more favoured feels the never ceasing need to look on his own position as in some way ‘legitimate’, upon his advantage as ‘deserved’ and the other’s disadvantage as being brought about by the latter’s ‘fault’. That the purely accidental causes of the difference may be ever so obvious makes no difference. (Weber 1978, p. 953)

These notions of desert can then be developed into the most elaborate justifications by a class of ideologists, who are themselves among the beneficiaries of the existing power arrangements. These are the very normative theorizers with whom we started this account. If we now make a jump upwards to the sphere of international institutions, we find that there is a radical difference between them as to how far legitimacy matters to their power or effective operation. At one end of the spectrum come international financial and investment institutions and their operators, who are so powerful that legitimacy becomes redundant to their effectiveness. We know this because the elaborate pyramid of justifications that had been constructed to legitimate their activities and enormous wealth fell down piece by piece in the financial crisis of 2008–9. The free market was exposed as far from self-regulating, and ruthless competition between banks and individual traders to maximize profit for themselves and their investors was shown to produce system-wide collapse. Many of the market activities which were claimed to be serving an essential public interest were revealed as not merely useless but economically and socially damaging. And the claim of financiers to possess esoteric knowledge and unique skills justifying their rewards was punctured by the revelation that most of them did not understand the complex instruments in which they were trading. In almost any other power structure such a revelation of the emperor’s new clothes would have led to the collapse of the institutions David Beetham

themselves. Not so with the international financial institutions. They rapidly returned to business as usual as if nothing had happened. Not only that, they succeeded in disseminating an alternative discourse whereby the governments that had bailed out the banks with eye-watering sums of taxpayers’ money were guilty of profligacy and should impose austerity on their citizens to bring the public finances under control. This they could only do because their international sphere of operation escaped any governmental control and because of their ability to damage countries through their exchange rates if they did not fall into line. Near the same end of the spectrum come the large global social media companies, albeit enjoying a certain patina of legitimacy through the endorsement of their users. At the other end of the spectrum, however, are international bodies whose power and influence depend wholly on maintaining public legitimacy for their activities. Among many examples are international campaigning NGOs, whose influence depends on the quality of their research, skill in campaigning, the number of their members, and the recognition by governments. Toward the same end could be placed many of the UN’s special agencies. In conclusion, those seeking to research and analyze legitimacy from a sociological point of view should start by recognizing that the moral or normative element in power relations is important for their persistence, economy of operation, and effectiveness. Rather than being a wooly concept, it can be analyzed into its component elements: rightful authorization, fulfilment of the accepted ends and standards of government, and recognition by significant others. These components are universal, but their content differs according to time and place. The task of the sociologist is to explore these differences and the variable relationships between them. David Beetham

References Gilley, Bruce, 2009, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York, Columbia University Press) Tyler, Tom, 1990, Why People Obey the Law (Yale, Yale University Press) Weber, Max, 1978, Economy and Society, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press)

66. Liberalism

representative democracy from the nineteenth century onwards, these parties, like many others, were shaped by national social cleavages arising from critical junctures in When Francis Fukuyama (1989) declared the national histories (see Lipset and Rokkan ‘end of history’ in the wake of the collapse 1990 [1967]). Liberal parties owe much to of communism in Europe, he was essentially the writings of Enlightenment thinkers such arguing that another philosophy, namely lib- as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire in eralism, had prevailed. Often conflated with France and Adam Smith and David Hume another value prized in the modern nation- in Scotland, with their focus on reason and state, at least in Europe – democracy – liber- progress (see Miller 1991a) not to mention alism seemed to have triumphed (Jahn 2013, the individual. At its core is a commitment to p. 15). Just as John Dunn (1993, p. 1) heralded liberty or freedom, the two terms generally that ‘we are all democrats now’, so Fukuyama being used interchangeably. The concept of liberty dates back much (1989, p. 3) assumed that we were all liberals now as he hailed ‘an unabashed victory of eco- further, of course. Quite how far its antenomic and political liberalism’ in 1989. Yet, cedents can or should be traced is debatable. what does liberalism mean? Must it inevitably Some hark back to the ancient Greeks and be linked to democracy as the widespread use Athenian city-state democracy. Benjamin of the term ‘liberal democracy’ implies? And Constant’s distinction between the liberty of with them ‘the rule of law’ as advocates of the ancients and moderns reflects the chang‘liberal internationalism’ and the rules-based ing nature of liberty across time and space. international order would assume? Indeed, Does it, or should it, refer to the public or private sphere? For the Greeks it was the former, has liberalism prevailed? Liberalism can be construed as a politi- whereas Constant, often seen as a forerunner cal ideology based on the concept of liberty, of modern liberalism (Fontana 1988, p. 41), albeit the concept of liberty itself is subject argued that in the modern world people were to debate. It can mean freedom from exter- more interested in being free to act according nal constraints, ‘negative liberty’ in Berlin’s to their own wishes in their private lives, preterms (Berlin 1969), or freedom to, otherwise ferring to leave politicians to take decisions known as ‘positive freedom’. Such freedom in in the public sphere. For Constant, liberalism the economic sphere is associated with lais- constituted ‘a shared aspiration to the democsez-faire economics, low tax and free trade, ratization of French political life, and the where regulation is minimal. Beyond the eco- somewhat indeterminate belief in the merits nomic, liberty may relate to people’s ability of private property and economic competito live their lives without unnecessary con- tion’ (Fontana 1988, p. 42). One need only straints on their activities as long as they do remove the word ‘French’ and in many ways not impinge on the liberty of others. Thus, in the rather loose definition still seems quite On Liberty first published in 1859, John Stuart adequate as a way to define some of the basic Mill, who was at the forefront of liberalism aspects of liberalism in the twenty-first cenin the nineteenth century, talked of ‘Civil, or tury. Yet, over the years, the concept of liberSocial Liberty’ as ‘the nature and limits of the alism has expanded. Much modern thinking on liberalism power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual’ (Mill 1972, p. 69). dates back to the writings of John Locke Liberalism is also predicated on the value of and, arguably, Thomas Hobbes (see Gray pluralism, assuming a degree of consensus 1995, p. 5). While Hobbes’s claims to any in both domestic and international politics – liberal interpretation are contested, Locke’s ‘perpetual peace’ in Kant’s immortal phrase position is unchallenged. A leading figure in being a plausible objective in a way that real- the Scottish Enlightenment, Locke believed that ‘by nature human beings are equal and ist scholars would eschew (Kant 1991). Liberalism can be understood from the therefore nothing can put anyone under perspective of political philosophy and the authority of anybody else except by his political practice as a normative ideal and own consent’ (Waldron 1991, p. 293). The as the core value for numerous political par- role of the individual is thus central to early ties that have emerged in modern democra- conceptions of liberalism. So, too, was tolcies. Created alongside the expansion of the eration, serving both as part of Locke’s thinkfranchise and the associated burgeoning of ing (Waldron 1991) and more generally in 257

258  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology liberal philosophy. Zvesper notes that liberals favoured religious toleration as a way to stop competing religions from becoming a ‘recipe for civil war’ (Zvesper 1987, p. 286). Whereas early liberal parties in continental Europe, especially predominantly Catholic countries, were typically anti-clerical, having their origins in church-state divisions (see Lipset and Rokkan 1990), the British liberals were often Non-Conformist, in other words, they were not part of the established Church of England (and historically also the established Churches of Wales and Ireland) but they were not anti-clerical: there was a religious dimension absent among continental liberal parties. Modern secularism has, however, weakened this phenomenon within British liberalism. The seminal writings of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and On Representative Government, still serve as points of reference for many liberals. However, Mill’s views on gender, taxation and the appropriateness of extending the franchise to people in certain parts of the world might raise some eyebrows among contemporary readers. Sounding remarkably like the unpopular poll tax that proved to be the downfall of rightwing Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Mill’s views on taxation would put him rather firmly on the right of the contemporary political spectrum. Here we see one of the difficulties of identifying liberalism. Thatcher herself followed the philosophy of Friedrich von Hayek, articulated in The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 2001 [1944]). Hayek was an economic liberal whose views put him at odds with many liberals at the time he was writing and later. This highlights the longstanding phenomenon that liberalism is often divided between its social and its economic or ‘classical’ strands. Most so-called liberal parties are socially liberal, rejecting constraints on people’s life choices and reflecting the values of toleration of the early liberals. Not all are economically liberal, as some liberals endorse intervention in the markets precisely to facilitate Berlin’s concept of positive freedom, believing that it is not only formal/legal constraints that make people ‘unfree’ but also their socio-economic circumstances. Yet other liberals would tend more towards Hayek’s views; the German Liberals as well as the Danish Venstre Party and the Dutch VVD are considered economically ‘dry’ and would sit on the right of the traditional left-right political spectrum. Julie Smith

(Indeed, the Liberal grouping in the European Parliament sits to the right of the Christian Democrats, reflecting the economic views of large sections of the party family.) Over the years, however, some liberal politicians accepted the need to support the most vulnerable in society and thus accepted the need for a degree of state intervention that would have been anathema to Locke. For example, it was the Liberal Chancellor David Lloyd George who in 1909 introduced a state pension in the UK, not a Labour politician. Liberal parties espousing more interventionist policies are situated on the centre-left of contemporary politics – this was particularly true of British Liberal Democrats under the leadership of Charles Kennedy (1999–2006), which tended to view the social liberal Radikale Venstre in Denmark and D’66 in the Netherlands as more natural allies than their economic liberal counterparts in terms of economics. By contrast, all liberal parties would sit towards the libertarian end of the libertarian-authoritarian axis, favouring limited government as well as inclusivity and tolerance. Hence, liberal parties tend to be strong supporters of LGBTQI communities and to advocate immigration, the latter also fitting with an openness to trade. Liberalism is often bracketed with other political philosophies, such as Christian democracy, communism, or social democracy. In many ways, it can be juxtaposed against both conservatism and socialism as well as all forms of totalitarianism, over which it seemed to have triumphed in the West by the late 1940s and globally by the late 1980s. Yet, it is somewhat amorphous, changing over time and space and lacking a single canonical text. Indeed, the essence of liberalism remains unclear as Duncan Bell (2014) argues. It was against such apparent ideological weakness that critics such as Carl Schmitt vehemently railed in the 1930s (Strong 2007). Schmitt believed that the pluralism espoused by liberals would essentially lead to the ‘end of politics’, since the vital element of confrontation, or ‘friend/enemy’ distinction, would be lost. For Schmitt liberals sought ‘to substitute procedure for struggle’ (Strong 2007, p. xv) and were fundamentally unable to press their own arguments home (see Strong 2007, p. xvi and Schmitt 1988) – a damning critique, yet one still raised by many modern critics of liberal parties, which are often seen to lack the powerful vision and values that characterize

liberalism  259 some political movements. Thus, Foucault believed that liberalism, ‘rather than a more or less coherent doctrine, rather than a policy pursuing a number of more or less defined aims, may be best seen as a form of critical reflection on the practice of government’ (quoted by Fontana 1988, p. 42, footnote c). However, there are certain key tenets that bind those who would consider themselves to be liberals. Zvesper (1987, p. 286) argues that the foundations of liberal thought are based on the absence of positive moral guidance in nature, the priority of liberty over authority, the secularization of politics, and the promotion of constitutions of government and principles of law that establish the limits of government and the rights of citizens against government.

Undoubtedly, liberals prize freedom, yet they should not be confused with libertarians or the right-wing populists such as the Hungarian Fidesz party of Viktor Orbán, which briefly aligned itself with the international liberal family. Certainly, ‘limited government’ is important to liberals, but libertarians go further in pursuit of individual freedoms, seeing a very limited role for the state, quite at odds with the role of the modern nation-state and certainly of modern welfare states, and ultimately leading to a situation bordering on anarchy. Moreover, the words ‘liberal’ or ‘freedom’ in a political party’s official title do not necessarily entitle a party to be deemed liberal, as in the case of the deeply conservative Austrian Freedom Party (FPŐ), which left the Liberal International in 1991 over its illiberal views (Smith 1997, pp. 60–1). Liberalism has not spread evenly across the world, or even within Europe. Post-war France, especially the Fifth Republic (established in 1958), has not had a continuous liberal party, although in the 1970s the centrist Giscardians came close. Former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing took his party into the transnational European Liberal, Democrat and Reform (ELDR) Party and led its group in the European Parliament (Smith 2014). Yet, the fact that he then sought unsuccessfully to take the Liberal MEPs into the Christian Democratic European People’s Party demonstrated the flimsiness of his, or his party’s, liberal credentials. Centrist French party politics do not necessarily match those of other (West) European states. This is reflective of

a wider phenomenon that liberalism (unlike social democracy) has not been seen throughout the whole of the European Union. This is especially true in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, which have few stable liberal parties, sometimes experiencing the emergence and decline of multiple liberal parties that have not become embedded in their national political systems, as seen in Lithuania in the 1990s. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron led his En Marche movement into government in France and in 2019 En Marche joined forces with liberals in the European Parliament, as Giscard had done before. The price for such a move was to rename the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) ‘Renew Europe’, highlighting the ongoing reluctance of French centrists to use the term liberal. Concerns about the term ‘liberal’ are not restricted to France. In North America, there is a notable difference between Canada, with its long tradition of liberal governments, and the United States, where the term liberalism is frequently equated with something akin to communism and is, hence, typically avoided even by those (Democratic) politicians whose attitudes to social issues would be considered ‘liberal’ in European circles. Yet, even in states that do not overtly espouse liberalism as a political philosophy, there has long been support for aspects of liberalism in international politics, seen in the doctrine of liberal interventionism, initially advocated by Canada, yet also at the core of US (and British) interventions in the post-Cold War era. Liberal parties from across the world came together in 1947 to establish the Liberal International (LI), the analogue of the Socialist International and the Christian Democrat International (Smith 1997). (By the 1940s the essence of liberalism remained quite ill‑defined – as a group of liberals met in Oxford in 1947 to establish the Liberal International, a rival liberal group met in Switzerland under the auspices of avowed economic liberal Friedrich von Hayek.) Initially, the core of LI comprised parties from Europe, with some individuals also attending from Israel and even, on an individual basis, the US. After the creation of ELD/ALDE prior to the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, LI briefly struggled to find a role. Subsequently, it has expanded dramatically into Asia, Africa and Latin America. Not Julie Smith

260  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology all of its member parties have thrived or survived – as noted, some such as the FPŐ have proved not to be liberal. Nonetheless, the success of LI highlights the widespread, if partial, transmission of liberalism globally, even at a time when it can seem under threat in Europe, where former liberal Hungarian PM and Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán advocates ‘illiberalism democracy’, a populist travesty of the concept that seeks to break the link between liberalism and democracy, neither of which can easily be exported by means of international intervention. In sum, liberalism is a philosophy at the core of an established party family that originated in Europe but has spread to many parts of the world, including North America and Latin America as well as parts of Africa and South-East Asia. Many more parties and countries have voluntarily adopted liberal norms, even while being reluctant to accept the name liberal. The term may still be contested, yet its values have arguably been more pervasive. Liberalism seems set to persist even if individual liberal parties fail. Nonetheless, in the 2020s, as in previous centuries, the fate of liberalism is unpredictable, its form still depending, as Zvesper has argued, on ‘the circumstances or the enemies it has confronted’ (Zvesper 1987, p. 285). Social liberalism (coupled with a deep secularism) has become a dominant force within many political parties around the world, whether formally called liberal or not. Yet the rise of populism and authoritarianism once again leaves liberalism vulnerable to global political forces. History has not ended. Liberalism, liberal democracy and the rule of law have not triumphed comprehensively even in Europe. There is thus much work for political sociologists to do in order to understand the conditions under which liberalism emerges, thrives and survives in the long term. Julie Smith

References Bell, Duncan (2014), ‘What is Liberalism?’, Political Theory, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp. 682–715. Berlin, Isaiah (1969), Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: OUP). Constant, Benjamin (1988), Political Writings, ed. by Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: CUP). Julie Smith

Dunn, John (1993), Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: CUP). Fontana, Biancamaria (1988), ‘Introduction’ in Benjamin Constant, pp. 1–42. Fukuyama, Francis (1989), ‘The End of History’, National Interest, Summer 1989, No. 16, pp. 3–18. Gray, John (1995), Liberalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, Second edition). Hayek, F.A. (2001), The Road to Serfdom (Abingdon: Routledge Classics; originally published in 1944). Jahn, Beate (2013), ‘Liberalism – In Theory and History’, in R. Friedman, K. Oskanian and R.P. Pardo et al. (eds.) After Liberalism? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 15–32. Kant, Immanuel (1991), Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: CUP, 2nd edition). Lipset, Seymour Martin & Rokkan, Stein (1990), ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments’, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System, (Oxford: OUP), pp. 91–138, abridged version of Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal 1967 piece ‘Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: An introduction’, in S.M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: The Free Press, pp. 1–64. Mill, J.S. (1972), Utilitarianism, On Liberty & Considerations on Representative Government, ed. by H.B. Acton (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd). Miller, David (ed.) (1991), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, p/b edition). Miller, David (1991a), ‘The Enlightenment’, in David Miller (ed.) The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 135–136. Schmitt, Carl (1988), The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, translated by Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT; original published in 1923). Schmitt, Carl (2007), The Concept of the Political, translated and with an Introduction by George Schwab (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press). Smith, Julie (1997), A Sense of Liberty The History of the Liberal International (London: Liberal International).

liberalism  261 Smith, Julie (2014), ‘Between Ideology and Pragmatism: Liberal Party Politics at the European Level’, Acta Politica, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 105–121. Strong, Tracy B. (2007), ‘Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt’ in Carl Schmitt (2007), pp. ix–xxxi.

Waldron, J.J. (1991), ‘John Locke’, in David Miller (ed.) The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 292–295. Zvesper, John (1987), ‘Liberalism’, in David Miller (ed.) The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 285–289.

Julie Smith

67. Libertarianism and authoritarianism

are not our beliefs about what is but rather our desires about what ought to be; not a diagnosis of society’s ills but rather a picture of what a healthy society would look like. Values are ‘enduring’; more permanent than attitudes, more akin to broad musical tastes than to a The contrast between authoritarianism, a like or dislike of a particular piece of music. preference for obedience and conformity over They are ‘latent’, they cannot be directly freedom and difference, and libertarianism, measured by simply asking people what valwhich favours the reverse, delineates two ends ues they hold. of a value dimension that has been widely Values can be classified into domains or used to understand contemporary politics. institutional spheres where they have influHowever, libertarianism and authori- ence. At the simplest level then, political valtarianism are terms which give rise to some ues are merely the sub-set of human values confusion as they are used within political that relate specifically to the political sphere. discourse in different ways. The key to under- Attitudes/issue positions are more reactive standing the evolution of the use of the terms to specific situations, contexts and political among political sociologists studying values, arguments, while values are not subject to ideologies and political behaviour are the key these short-term influences (Schwartz, 1999). distinctions between the economic and the How many of these values or belief syssocio-cultural (non-economic) aspects of lib- tems people hold may vary depending on the ertarianism and the personality and attitudi- domain. In the political sphere, an emergent nal aspects of authoritarianism. consensus is that at least two dimensions are Within political psychology authoritarian- needed to capture the political values of the ism, and in particular the idea of the ‘authori- electorates of Western democracies and that tarian personality’, is widely contested one of those dimensions is the ‘non-economic’ (Stenner, 2005). However, within political dimension (Dalton, 2019). However, there sociology and the study of political behaviour are different conceptions of how this nonit has come to be used not as a personality economic dimension should be characterised type but rather as a set of beliefs or values and, critically, how it should be measured. which relate to the non-economic aspects of While the distinction between the ecopolitical positions. nomic and non-economic dimensions can be Stenner defines authoritarianism as ‘an traced back to Lipset, it was the emergence enduring predisposition, in all matters politi- of a ‘new’ politics, particularly in Western cal and social, to favour obedience and con- Europe, that led to greater emphasis on the formity (oneness and sameness) over freedom dimensionality of political values and ideoloand difference’ (2009, p. 142). In this defini- gies. Often contrasted with the ‘old’ politics tion, the key contrast is with libertarianism of class this ‘new’ politics, or ‘second dimenwhich favours freedom and difference and sion’ of political positions, has variously is itself distinct from economic liberalism, a been framed as ‘post materialist’ (Inglehart, preference for the free market and minimal 1977), ‘transnational’ (Hooghe, Marks and state intervention. Wilson, 2002), ‘cultural’ and as a contrast In his classic article exploring the links between authoritarianism and libertarianism between class and authoritarianism Lipset (Kitschelt, 1994; Flanagan and Lee, 2003). (1959) made this distinction between eco- Initially identified with the feminist and envinomic and non-economic liberalism, a distinc- ronmentalist movements of the 1960s and tion which remains critical to understanding 1970s (Kitschelt, 1988), more recent develhow authoritarianism can be contrasted with opments have identified movements of the libertarianism and form a cultural dimension radical right as an opposing pole in this new of political values distinct from, and theoreti- politics, both for activists (Giugni and Grasso, cally uncorrelated with, the traditional eco- 2019) and at the ballot box (Bornschier, 2010). nomic left-right. Formal measurement instruments of the Taking libertarianism and authoritarian- kind developed within political psychology ism as the defining oppositions of a value or (such as the ‘big 5’ personality traits) are belief system means we need to define what much less commonplace in political sociolvalues are. Values represent ‘core concep- ogy. While there is widespread agreement tions of the desirable’ (Rokeach, 1973); they that values are ‘latent’ traits of individuals 262

libertarianism and authoritarianism  263 and that in the political sphere they are best summarised by at least two dimensions, there is much less agreement on exactly how to measure these dimensions. The most common method is to measure a group of attitudes on the assumption that these are manifestations of the underlying latent value dimension. The measurement of the authoritarian-libertarian opposition most commonly draws on the work of Evans, Heath and Lalljee (1996). The measures designed by Evans et al. capture both the ‘old’ politics dimension concerned with economic justice, the distribution of resources and economic power, which is commonly called the ‘left-right’ dimension (see Chapter 64) and a dimension concerned with personal freedom, which has most commonly been labelled the ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ dimension. In the British context a selection of these measures has been included in both the British Social Attitudes surveys and the British Election Surveys (as well as other large-scale survey instruments) since the late 1980s, which has allowed the study of change over time to cover almost three decades in the UK (Grasso et al., 2019). Crossnational research using the European Social Survey, the European Values Study and the World Values Study has had a more restricted number of these items over a shorter time frame. For example, items used for the authoritarian-libertarian scale can be a selection from these (most commonly the first five). In each case, respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement on a fivepoint Likert-style scale which is then aggregated to generate an authoritarian-liberal position. ●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Young people don’t have enough respect for traditional values Censorship is necessary to uphold moral values For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence Schools should teach children to obey authority People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government Even political parties which wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned

There is a clear focus on personal freedom in these items, also reflecting the key elements of Stenner’s definition, obedience and conformity. This contrasts with other conceptions of the second dimension, which have tended to be more expansive including aspects of lifestyles, environmental politics and nationalism in their measurement. The economic or traditional ‘left-right’ dimension of political ideology has long been most closely associated with the politics of social class. In contrast, differences in positions on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension are greatest between different age groups and, more starkly still, between those with different education qualifications (Dalton, 2019). Young people tend to be on average more liberal than older groups, while higher educational qualifications – particularly a degree-level qualification – are especially associated with more liberal positions. In contrast there are few differences in authoritarian-liberal position according to social class or income, independent of the relationship with education. Tilley (2005) and Grasso et al. (2019) show that there is less evidence that people move from libertarian positions to more authoritarian positions as they age but rather that changes over time are as a result of generational replacement. In most Western democracies, generational replacement since the 1950s has seen more highly educated generations replacing those where experience of higher education was far more restricted. Exactly why this relationship with education exists is contested. There are three main sets of explanations. First, some argue these are selection effects; those who choose to study to a higher level are already more liberal than those who do not (Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015). Second, there are allocation effects; these are the effects of later life outcomes as a result of studying to a higher level in terms of higher earnings and different types of work outcomes. Finally, there are direct effects, where there is something specific about the experience of studying at a higher level, and particularly in higher education settings, that leads people to become more liberal and less authoritarian (Surridge, 2016). The relationship is seen in most Western democracies and accounts in part for the relationship with age as most of these societies have seen a significant expansion in participation in higher education since the 1960s. Paula Surridge

264  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology The ‘old’ politics of left–right, economics and social class was dominant in the early studies of political behaviour, both in Western Europe and the US. However, the rise of political parties with different agendas has challenged this and led to debate about the extent to which the ‘new’ politics as represented by the authoritarian-libertarian dimension has come to be more important to Western electorates (Kitschelt, 1994; Stubager, 2013). In Western Europe this has been seen in the rise of Green parties (drawing votes from those with liberal positions) and more recently ‘radical-right’ parties (drawing votes from those in authoritarian positions). Votes for both are more strongly correlated with positions on this scale than with social class or traditional left-right politics (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020). A further complicating factor has been the relationship between Euroscepticism and political values, with the rise of pro- and anti-European stances by political parties closely linked to the parties’ existing positioning on this broader second dimension (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). While the 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom saw the choice between leaving the EU and remaining within it strongly correlated with authoritarian-libertarian positions (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The economic left–right divide remains important for voter choices across Western Europe and in the US (Green-Pedersen, 2019), particularly when distinguishing between votes for the mainstream right and social-democratic left. But authoritarian-libertarian positions also play a role. For some party groups economic left-right positions are not a useful way to discriminate between their respective voters. For example, in the UK voters for the UK Independence Party (a party of the radical right) and the Green Party were on average positioned in the same place on economic issues – slightly to the left of centre. But these two groups of voters were positioned at opposite ends of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension. Thus, while it would be inaccurate to suggest that noneconomic concerns have replaced economic concerns in voter choices, non-economic concerns nonetheless play a role in voting decisions (Stubager, 2013). This recognition of the importance of the authoritarian-liberal dimension for understanding the preferences of the Paula Surridge

electorate also gives rise to the idea of ‘cross-pressured’ voters, those whose values are to the ‘left’ economically but to the ‘authoritarian’ end of this scale or those who are to the ‘right’ on economic issues but who favour liberal positions on non-economic issues. That there are ‘two lefts’ among the electorate is clear (Evans and Tilley, 2017; Houtman et al., 2008). These voters pose challenges for both the mainstream right parties and the socialdemocratic parties in Western Europe and which are acutely felt in the US and the UK where elec­toral competition has been largely between two blocs broadly defined by the economic left-right divide. Kitschelt and Rehm (2022) argue that in the transition from industrial to knowledge societies which groups of voters are ‘cross-pressured’ has changed leading to a ‘polarity reversal’ and pressure on political parties to adapt. Similarly, Dassonneville (2022) identifies these cross-pressures as a key source of volatility in Western electorates, while Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann (2014) identify the gap in policy representation for voters in ‘left-authoritarian’ positions. This lack of policy representation leads to further research questions about political participation among different groups of voters defined by their value positions (Heath et al., 2022) and an emerging research agenda around the implications for both political and civic participation. Grasso and Giugni (2019) have explored the way in which these values connect with forms of non-electoral political behaviour and political activism showing that, while it is those on the ‘left’ who are most likely to engage in protest behaviours of all forms, it is those with the most liberal views who are most likely to engage in non-electoral political behaviour. While some have suggested that the ‘new’ politics represents a realignment of political structures and political behaviour (Dalton, 2019), the continued importance of the economic left-right and the cross-pressures that arise from a multi-dimensional political space suggest that political behaviour is likely to remain volatile. As such understanding the social origins and political consequences of authoritarian-liberal values will remain a key topic for political sociologists. The values held and positions occupied on the range of

libertarianism and authoritarianism  265 issues represented by the authoritarian-liber­ tarian dimension will remain important for understand­ing voter preferences. Paula Surridge

References Bornschier, S. (2010) Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Dalton, R. J. (2019) Political Realignment: Economics, Culture and Electoral Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dassonneville, R. (2022) Voters Under Pressure: Group-Based Cross-Pressure and Electoral Volatility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Vries, C. E., & Hobolt, S. B. (2020) Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Evans, G., Heath, A., & Lalljee, M. (1996) Measuring left-right and libertarianauthoritarian values in the British electorate. British Journal of Sociology, 47(1), 93–112. Evans, G., & Tilley, J. (2017) The New Politics of Class: The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Flanagan, S. C., & Lee, A.-R. (2003) The new politics, culture wars, and the authoritarianlibertarian value change in advanced industrial democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 36(3), 235–270. Giugni, M., & Grasso, M. T. (2019) Street Citizens: Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics Series). Grasso, M., Farrall, S., Gray, E., Hay, C., & Jennings, W. (2019) Thatcher’s children, Blair’s babies, political socialization and trickle-down value change: An age, period and cohort analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 17–36. Grasso, M., Giugni, M. T., & Giugni, M. (2019) ‘Political values and extrainstitutional political participation: The impact of economic redistributive and social libertarian preferences on protest behaviour’. International Political Science Review, 40(4), 470–485.

Green-Pedersen, C. (2019) The Reshaping of West European Party Politics: Agenda-setting and Party Competition in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heath, A. F., Richards, L., & Jungblut, J. (2022) ‘Political values and political participation’, in Marco Giugni, and Maria Grasso (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Participation, pp 630–651: Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002) Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), 965–989. Houtman, D., Achterberg, P., & Derks, A. (2008) Farewell to the Leftist Working Class. New York: Routledge. Inglehart, R. (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, H. (1988) Left-libertarian parties: Explaining innovation in competitive party systems. World Politics, 40(2), 194–234. Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kitschelt, H. P., & Rehm, P. (2022) Polarity reversal: The socioeconomic reconfiguration of partisan support in knowledge societies. Politics & Society, 0(0). https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /00323292221100220. Lancee, B., & Sarrasin, O. (2015). Educated preferences or selection effects? A longitudinal analysis of the impact of educational attainment on attitudes towards immigrants. European Sociological Review, 31(4), 490–501. Lefkofridi, Z., Wagner, M., & Willmann, J. E. (2014) Left-authoritarians and policy representation in Western Europe: Electoral choice across ideological dimensions. West European Politics, 37(1), 65–90. Lipset, S. M. (1959) Democracy and working-class authoritarianism. American Sociological Review, 24(4), 482–501. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019) Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rokeach, M. (1973) The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press. Paula Surridge

266  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. Applied Psychology, 48(1), 23–47. Stenner, K. (2005) The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stenner, K. (2009) Three kinds of “conservatism”. Psychological Inquiry, 20(2–3), 142–159. Stubager, R. (2013). The changing basis of party competition: Education,

Paula Surridge

authoritarian–libertarian values and voting. Government and Opposition, 48(3), 372–397. Surridge, P. (2016) Education and liberalism: Pursuing the link. Oxford Review of Education, 42(2), 146–164. Tilley, J.R. (2005). Research note: Libertarian-authoritarian value change in Britain, 1974–2001. Political Studies, 53(2), 442–453.

68. Lifestyle politics The term lifestyle politics refers to a specific set of citizen political actions that reflects the tendency of individuals to recognize the political significance of choices concerning one’s personal life on issues such as, for example, climate change, biodiversity loss, and the exploitation of workers and natural resources in global value chains (de Moor, 2016). As “politics by other means” (Bennet, 1988) it blurs the traditional division between public and private and indicates a move away from institutional and formal modes of engagement, which is based on the belief that everyday actions can be a more effective way to achieve political ends than traditional forms of political engagement. As is the case with boycotts (i.e., refusing to buy a product for ethical, political, or environmental considerations) and ‘buycotts’ (i.e., ‘positive’ buying of goods based on ethical, political, or environmental considerations), many lifestyle political actions identify the market as their privileged arena for politics. By politicizing everyday practices, these actions attempt to exert direct pression on how public and private organizations operate; therefore they also represent a specific type of “direct social action” (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015). Although some of the actions most commonly considered as part of the repertoire of lifestyle politics are not new, as is the case, for example, of boycotts which have a long history, various studies indicate that the politicization of everyday decisions is increasing (Boström et. al., 2019). Lifestyle politics can in fact span several and diverse aspects of daily life such as, among others, fashion, food, transportation, household waste disposal, the use of energy sources, health, and housing. What distinguishes lifestyle politics from other types of lifestyle choices, as de Moor (2016, p. 182) puts it, is: “that the latter are motivated by self-regarding motives, like one’s personal health, whereas the former is ‘other-regarding’ by considering the organization of society at large”. In other words, lifestyle politics’ actions stress the importance of individual responsibility for the common good. Scholarly interest in lifestyle politics began to grow in the second half of the 1990s in the wake of the debate over the consequences of

declining membership in intermediate groups and organizations in Western societies, which was seen by some scholars as a sign of democratic decay (Putnam, 1993). The decline of participation in labor unions, political parties, and civil society organizations, by reducing the opportunity for interpersonal contact between people and direct engagement in the life of their communities, was highlighted as a possible risk for the maintenance of individuals’ sense of civic duty. As argued by Robert Putnam (1993), disengagement affects trust in others ultimately depleting the “social capital” on which individuals base effective and satisfying political participation. Although trends indicating declining trust, identification, and participation in traditional political organizations were evidently demonstrating that some important changes were taking place in democracy and citizens’ participation, some scholars objected that these did not signal an overall decline in citizens’ civic engagement. Indeed, other indicators suggested a more complex reality: the decline in citizen engagement through traditional political channels, it was claimed, was more a move away from the old forms of participation which nevertheless was counterbalanced by the emergence of new forms of political interest and engagement (Bennet, 1998). From this perspective, the rise of individualized, self-actualizing, and expressive everyday forms of political engagement had to be explained by looking at the complex systems of changes that occurred in the configuration of the interests at stake, social organization, and opportunities for action. It was, for example, argued that by “disembedding” the economy from its social, cultural, and political contexts, the process of increasing economic globalization has led to significant changes in the relationship between work, production, and consumption (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2009). The greater ease in the movement of goods and services as well as increased economic competition, while limiting the political and redistributive capacity of nationstates, had also made traditional forms of participation – such as joining a political party, taking part in a labor strike, or working for a campaign or organization – potentially a less effective means of achieving social change. Disillusion with institutional politics produced what Beck (1997) called ‘sub politics’, a form of politics which takes place outside and beyond the representative institutions of

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268  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the political system of nation-states. From this perspective, lifestyle politics emerges from below as a reaction to the absence of relevant issues from the formal political system, and it is favored by contextual processes of de-traditionalization and individualization. As Giddens (1991) argued, globalization, de-traditionalization, and individualization are all processes characterizing late-modern societies which, while reflecting important structural changes, have also had important effects on individual identity formation. In this regard, it was stressed how the self has increasingly become frail, brittle, fractured, and fragmented, a shift that brought about important consequences for the way that people know and understand themselves as social and political actors, which ultimately meant a move from emancipatory politics to life politics. Moreover, disembedded from traditional forms, several issues started to take on a fundamentally ethical aspect which also signaled a change from the question of the distribution of resources for collective realization to the question of the opportunities for self-creation and self-actualization. Within the different variants of lifestyle politics, the politicization of citizens’ role as a consumer has received particular scholarly attention. Given the centrality taken on by liberal market exchanges in late capitalist societies, it is not surprising that consumption has become an important tool for political action through which to bring about social change. Additionally, as it is often argued, in these societies, consumption has come to define a growing portion of people’s lives and has become increasingly central in the formation of individual identities (Bauman, 1998). As defined by Michele Micheletti (2003), political consumerism is a form of citizen engagement that combines self-interest and a concern for the general good. As a practice, it refers to the purchase of goods and services based not only on price and product quality, but also on the behavior of producers and production methods (i.e., environmental sustainability, workers’ rights, human rights, etc.). In other words, it is a form of citizen participation that stresses the importance of individual responsibility for the common good by recognizing a fundamental part of the production process in the very act of shopping. Past research has indicated that women, young people, and more educated individuals are particularly likely to make consumption Francesca Forno

decisions based on political and ethical considerations. Political consumerism has also been linked to factors which are usually predictors of citizens’ political engagement such as religiosity and partisanship (Forno & Ceccarini, 2006). It has been also shown how political consumerism links with a higher interest in politics, with ‘post-materialist’ values and with a sense of moral obligation (Bennet, 1988; Inglehart, 1997; Stolle & Micheletti, 2015). It must also be highlighted that lifestyle politics is often coordinated through digital media technologies (Bennett, 2012). It is with the proliferation of the Internet that such more personalized forms of political engagement have increased and spread. Moreover, the lifestyle literature recognizes that lifestyle politics can be located on a continuum spanning from very private individual projects to more collective ones, thus reflecting different degrees of coordination. Put differently, whereas lifestyle politics is rooted in private daily habits, it is not limited to individual uncoordinated actions (de Moor, 2016). Today, such practices are in fact among the principal modalities of action of a wide array of social movement organizations. An increasing range of grassroots organizations calls on citizens to act in their everyday practices, whether to build transnational awareness and intensify pressure on corporations or to facilitate the building of alternatives to capitalist production (Wahlen & Laamanen, 2015). Activism embedded in daily life has been central to the spread of both individualized actions – for example, ‘vote with your dollar’ tactics or lifestyle changes such as veganism – as well as more communitarian efforts, such as communal and ecological ways of producing or living (Forno & Graziano, 2014; Schlosberg & Coles, 2015; Monticelli & della Porta, 2019). The focus on the self-determination and self-actualizing of lifestyle politics has been the subject of much criticism. In particular, everyday life forms of participation have been criticized for diverting civic action from real economic and social problems (the socalled ‘crowding out’ thesis) and for promoting political and ideological formulas that channel social discontent away from targets such as national and international institutions (Forno & Wahlen, 2022). Several scholars have also stressed the limits of lifestyle practices in terms of their transformative potential

lifestyle politics  269 and efficacy, emphasizing how these experiences are often an expression of the middle and upper classes (Goodman et al., 2012). Similarly, it has been argued that lifestyle politics risks remaining an experimental niche phenomenon, with limited or no impact on how society functions (Blühdorn, 2023). In response to these criticisms, empirical research has shown that alternative ways of living and consuming do not displace other forms of engagement (Adams & Raisborough, 2010). Furthermore, those engaged in alternative consumption and lifestyles tend to also be more active in other forms of political participation. As the example of new food movements shows, building new, localist food economy networks does not necessitate abandoning lobbying and protesting (Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Schlosberg & Coles, 2015). However, although empirical research does not support the ‘crowding out’ thesis, the debate over whether these practices can change society or merely give rise to niche communities and reinforce traditional class structures remains open. While future research will need to focus more on the political outcome of these forms of participation, despite its limitations, lifestyle-related activism remains the most innovative and engaging form of political action in the twenty-first century (Lorenzini & Forno, 2022). Francesca Forno

References Adams, M., & Raisborough, J. (2010). Making a difference: Ethical consumption and the everyday. British Journal of Sociology, 61(2), 256–274. Bauman, Z. (1998). Work, Consumerism and the New Poor. Buckingham: Open University Press. Beck, U. (1997). Subpolitics: Ecology and the disintegration of institutional power. Organization and Environment, 10(1), 52–65. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2009). Individualization. London: Sage. Bennett, W. L. (1998). The unCivic culture: Communication, identity, and the rise of lifestyle politics. Political Science and Politics, 31(4), 740–761. Bennett, W. L. (2012). The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media and changing patterns of participation. The ANNALS of the American Academy

of Political and Social Science, 644(1), 20–39. Blühdorn, I. (2023). Recreational experientialism at ‘the abyss’: Rethinking the sustainability crisis and experimental politics. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, 19(1), 46–60. Bosi, L., & Zamponi, L. (2015). Direct social actions and economic crises: The relationship between forms of action and socio-economic context in Italy. Partecipazione and Conflitto, 8(2), 367–391. Boström, M., Micheletti, M., & Oosterveer, P. (2019). The Oxford Handbook of Political Consumerism. New York: Oxford University Press. de Moor, J. (2016). Lifestyle politics and the concept of political participation. Acta Politica, 52(2), 179–197. Forno, F., & Ceccarini, L. (2006). From the street to the shops: The rise of new forms of political action in Italy. Southern European Society and Politics, 11(2), 197–222. Forno, F., & Graziano, P. R. (2014). Sustainable community movement organisations. Journal of Consumer Culture, 14(2), 139–157. Forno, F., & Wahlen, S. (2022). Environmental activism and everyday life, in The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Movements, edited by M. Grasso & M. Giugni, 434–450. London: Routledge. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and SelfIdentity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Giugni, M., & Grasso, M. T. (2015). Environmental movements: Heterogeneity, transformation, and institutionalization. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 40(1), 337–361. Goodman, D., DuPuis, E. M., & Goodman, M. K. (2012). Alternative Food Networks: Knowledge, Practice, and Politics. London: Routledge. Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lorenzini, J., & Forno, F. (2022). Political consumerism and lifestyle activism, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Participation, edited by M. Giugni & M. Grasso, 417–433. New York: Oxford University Press. Francesca Forno

270  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Micheletti, M. (2003). Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and Collective Action. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Monticelli, L., & della Porta, D. (2019). The successes of political consumerism as a social movement, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Consumerism, edited by M. Boström, M. Micheletti & P. Oosterveer, 773–792. New York: Oxford University Press. Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Schlosberg, D., & Coles, R. (2015). The new environmentalism of everyday life: Sustainability, material flows, and movements. Contemporary Political Theory, 15(2), 160–181. Stolle, D., & Micheletti, M. (2015). Political Consumerism: Global Responsibility in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wahlen, S., & Laamenen, M. (2015). Consumption, lifestyle and social movements. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 39(5), 397–403.

69. Marx, Karl

significant freedom for manoeuvre when enabled by an unstable balance of class forces. The incumbent government (or its successor) could exercise its exceptional authority Karl Marx was a German political econo- to impose social order or to pursue its own mist, who was born in 1818 in Trier, in the interests. Among other examples, this view Rhineland, and died in 1883 in London. He appeared in Marx’s analyses of France in the studied law and philosophy in Bonn and 1850s and 1860s under Louis Bonaparte (see Berlin, was influenced by Hegel and the below). A third account usefully locates both young Hegelians and critiqued antisocial policies in his early journalism. Following approaches. This was developed in Marx’s political oppression in Germany, he moved Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law (1975b) to France in late 1843, then to Brussels in and Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s early 1845 and then settled in England (early Philosophy of Right (1975c). Marx regarded the state as an alienated form of political 1848 to 1883). Marx wrote before scientific disciplines organisation that is based on the separation of emerged and when philosophy was a general rulers and ruled. He presented this account in scientific mode of inquiry. Nonetheless, he ever more materialist rather than philosophitouched on many issues relevant to political cal terms. This separation assumed a novel sociology: the relation between structure and form in the modern state. Class is absent as agency, the state as a social relation, forms its explicit organising principle because the and stakes of political struggle, the relation bourgeoisie does not – and does not need to – between economic base and political and hold a legal monopoly of power. It must comideological superstructure and the role of pete for power on formally equal terms with discourse in shaping political identities and subordinate classes. Substantively, of course, political action (on the last, see Jessop and matters are quite different. In short, form Sum 2018). He studied the changing architec- analysis is the key to reading Marx’s work on ture and class nature of specific states. He also the state and state power from the 1840s to undertook more specific conjunctural analyses 1880s (cf. Jessop 2020). In 1843, Marx studied the history of states of different political periods and/or significant events as well as more strategically oriented in several countries; the English and French accounts of concrete situations that were revolutions; and related texts on political and intended to influence political debates in the constitutional theory (Marx 1981). These labour movement (e.g., Marx 1976, 1979). His intensive analyses informed his critique of studies extended to inter-state relations, colo- Hegel’s doctrine of the state and his further nialism, the international balance of forces work on state power. Against Hegel, Marx and the formation of the world market, the argued that the emerging bourgeois society relation between varieties of capitalism, the saw the institutional separation of (a) the emergence of world crises and the generalisa- ‘public sphere’, with the state at its centre, tion of capital’s contradictions to a world scale. in which politics is oriented to the collective Marx analysed the state from three per- interest; and (b) ‘civil society’, in which prispectives. First, he viewed it as an instrument vate property and individual self-interest are of class rule. For example, The Manifesto of dominant. To Hegel’s claim that the modern the Communist Party posits that ‘[t]he execu- state would represent the common, organic tive of the modern state is but a committee interests of all members of society, Marx for managing the common affairs of the replied that it could represent only an ‘illuwhole bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels, 1976: sory’ community of interest beneath which 486). Apart from its rhetorical value at a time would lie the continuing antagonisms, crass when revolution seemed feasible, this claim materialism and egoistic conflicts of a society also made sense given the then-limited fran- based on private property and waged labour. chise in Europe and North America. From the For Marx, true emancipation and a true com1840s onwards, he advanced similar argu- munity of interests required the abolition of ments, describing the dominant class frac- private property (1975b). In November 1844, Marx sketched ‘A tions and classes that directly or indirectly Draft Plan for a Work on the Modern State’ controlled the state apparatus. Second, elsewhere, Marx saw the state (1986a: 534). While never realised, it identias an autonomous authority that can win fied ten themes pursued throughout Marx’s 271

272  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology writings on the state. These included interest in the French Revolution and the lessons of the subsequent path of French democracy (and its crises) for political development. Thus, while England was his model for the first stages of capitalist industrial development (with the USA attracting his interest in the 1870s–80s), France had the same role in his analysis of the capitalist state. In 1871, the Paris Commune taught him that one could not use existing forms of state, which were organs of domination, to pursue emancipation. Thus, in the ‘Second Draft of the Civil War in France’, he wrote that the Commune showed that ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the readymade state machinery and wield it for its own purposes. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation’ (1986a: 548). Thus enlightened, he declared that he had, at last, discovered the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat – of the exceptional, transitional form of state towards a classless society and form of self-rule that would defend the interests of the entire community. The Commune abolished the separation between state and society, and citizens were represented through direct membership of the executive power. However, its bloody repression after just two months ended this experiment before any firm political conclusions could be drawn. Writing in Capital I, Marx observed that capital is not a thing but ‘a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things’ (1996: 753). There are two aspects of this relation. In the labour market, there is ‘a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham’ (1996: 186). In the labour process, however, we find economic exploitation and the despotism of capital. Capital accumulation depended on struggles to secure this relation as well as struggles that occur within its limits. Marx also treated the state as a social relation – a relation between class forces mediated through the material form of juridico-political institutions and powers. In the ‘Draft Plan for a Work on the Modern State’, Marx wrote that ‘all elements exist in duplicate form, as civic elements and [those of] the state’ (1975a: 666). Thus, while the constitutional state guarantees citizens’ innate rights, whatever their class position, based Bob Jessop

on ending feudal and guild privileges, it also defends capital’s interests in general even as it claims to maintain order in the national interest. Thus, class conflicts may be transposed from the economic into the political sphere but, reflecting the institutional separation of the two spheres, they normally take different forms in each case. Marx stressed that class struggle could undermine and overturn these seemingly enduring features of contemporary society. Marx is often cited but rarely read thoroughly. The Manifesto of the Communist Party, which belongs to a particular genre of political text (manifesto), was written speedily for rhetorical effect in a specific conjuncture (Marx and Engels, 1976). Market relations were still being liberated from broader political and ideological relations, a rising bourgeoisie was fighting to overthrow the ancien régime to consolidate its own power in a still emerging ‘civil society’, and there was widespread famine and popular unrest. The Manifesto asserts that classes are the motor force of history, and it aims to polarise a complex set of social forces around the communist project and to encourage intermediate classes to side with the proletariat, which it alleged they would join sooner or later. This was a rhetorically powerful, scientifically weak analysis that defines classes at best by their relation to property ownership and the resulting distribution of goods and services. Marx refused to update the Manifesto because it was a product of its time, but he and Engels wrote introductions when it was re-issued or translated. Second, the 1859 Preface to Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1987) is a well-cited account of base-superstructure relations, which remarks how technological change prepares the ground for an eventual revolution and does not mention classes or class struggle. It was written to avoid the Prussian censor’s confiscation of the main text (Prinz 1969). It is the major source of claims that Marx believed in technological determinism. Third, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte is Marx’s best exercise in political sociology. It studied the ‘specificity of political struggles’ in the modern state. No class is directly and unambiguously represented as such on the political scene, and Marx sought to decipher the ‘class bases’ and/or ‘class relevance’ of different political forces, for

marx, karl  273 example, political factions, political parties, the army, paramilitary forces, political mobs, intellectuals, journalists and so on. In this context, he distinguishes between classes as defined by their role in the social relations of production (in themselves) and their capacity to articulate their interests (for themselves). These linkages were highly mediated. Louis Bonaparte staged a coup d’état in 1851 and replaced the Second Republic with an empire that appeared to operate above the main contending classes. Nonetheless, it had a secure class basis in the conservative smallholding peasantry. This class, because of its members’ rural isolation, familial relations of production and dependence on usurious capital and local political figures, form a class ‘much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes’ and therefore had to be represented by others (1979: 187). This isolated rural mass responded to the emperor’s rhetorical appeal to their values and Napoleon Bonaparte’s memory, even as his economic policies betrayed their long-term interests. As his regime lost its legitimacy, Louis Bonaparte attempted to reinforce his power by strengthening the military. Marx even suggested elsewhere that Louis Bonaparte, recognising ‘the general aversion to his rule’ (1986b: 466), sought to establish a praetorian state, in which the army led by himself began to represent itself against the entire society. Within a short period, however, state power was once more tied to capitalist interests through the growth of state debt and the Bonapartist state performed a key role in promoting economic expansion, expropriating the peasantry and engaging in overseas economic adventures. In conclusion, Karl Marx’s contributions to political sociology can be assessed in broad terms as concerned with the form of the capitalist type of state, its impact on the stakes and interests of political struggle, the analysis of the balance of forces and specific conjunctures and the role of intellectuals, language and discourse in shaping projects, alliances and strategies. This is quite different from the technological and class determinist views attributed to him based on his more abstract writings, especially those in the texts on Capital. In short, his more concrete analyses explore how social reality is created in practice through social action in specific conditions based on how different social actors construe their world and try to

change it within circumstances that they cannot choose. Bob Jessop

References Jessop, Bob (2020) ‘State’, in Marcello Musto, ed., The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations, pp. 266–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jessop, Bob and Sum, Ngai-Ling (2018) ‘Language and Critique: Some Prefigurations of Critical Discourse Studies in Marx’s Work’, Critical Discourse Studies, 15(4), 325–37. Marx, Karl (1975a) ‘A Draft Plan for a Work on the Modern State’, in Jack Cohen, Maurice Cornforth, Maurice Dobb, Eric J. Hobsbawm, James Klugmann, Margaret Mynatt; James S. Allen, Philip S. Foner, Dirk J. Struik, William W. Weinstone. N. P. Karmanova, V. N. Pavlov, M. K. Shcheglova, T. Y. Solovyova, Y. V. Yeremin, P. N. Fedoseyev, L. I. Golman, A. I. Malysh, A. G. Yegorov, V. Y. Zevin (eds.), Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 4, p. 666. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1975b) Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 3–129. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1975c) Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 175–87. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1976) ‘The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850’, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 10, pp. 45–144. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1979) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 11, pp. 99–197. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1981) Kreuznacher Hefte 1–5, in Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe2, vol. IV/(2), pp. 9–278. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Marx, Karl (1986a) ‘Second Draft of the Civil War in France’, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 22, pp. 515–40. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1986b) ‘The Rule of the Pretorians’, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 15, p. 466. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1987) ‘Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, in Bob Jessop

274  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 29, pp. 261–5. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl (1996) Capital, vol. I, in MarxEngels Collected Works, vol. 35. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1976) Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Jack Cohen, Maurice Cornforth, Maurice Dobb, Eric J. Hobsbawm, James Klugmann, Margaret Mynatt; James S. Allen, Philip S. Foner, Dirk J. Struik, William W.

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Weinstone. N. P. Karmanova, V. N. Pavlov, M. K. Shcheglova, T. Y. Solovyova, Y. V. Yeremin, P. N. Fedoseyev, L. I. Golman, A. I. Malysh, A. G. Yegorov, V. Y. Zevin (eds.), Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 6, pp. 477–519. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Prinz, Arthur M. (1969) ‘Background and Ulterior Motive of Marx’s “Preface” of 1859’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 30(3), 437–50.

70. Marxism and neo-Marxism

legacies of state formation to determine the nature of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990) typologized these historical developments into three distinct welfare state regimes: the social-democratic model of Scandinavia, the conservative Christian-democratic model Classical Marxism conceptualized the capi- of mainland Europe, and the liberal-demotalist state as a set of institutions through cratic model of the Anglo-American world. which dominant classes exerted politiMore recent work in neo-Marxian sociolcal power and preserved capitalism. In the ogy has applied Marxist concepts to a wide Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels range of problems of the state including famously described the state as “a commit- policy-triggered financialization (McCarthy tee for managing the common affairs of the 2017), the origins of fascism (Riley 2019), whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1978 revolutions and welfare in the global south [1848]). However, in Marx’s (1978 [1859]) (Harris 2017; Tuğal 2009), and American later writings, he noted that political institu- exceptionalism and party politics (Eidlin tions were “conditioned” by the capitalist 2018; De Leon et al. 2015). system but were not wholly reducible to it. Marx repeatedly invoked class without Moreover, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of systematically defining it. Broadly referring Louis Bonaparte, Marx (1852) analyzed the to an individual’s relationship to the means of state as a site of political conflict amongst the production, Marx’s model of classes posited a ruling class. fundamental division between the bourgeoiThese nuances in the political sociology of sie and the proletariat. Unfortunately, this the state were lost on subsequent generations polarized vision of society proved unhelpful of Marxists who reduced the state to a mere for political sociologists contending with the instrument wielded by dominant classes. This dramatic growth of the middle class in the instrumentalist view was later challenged twentieth century. by a structuralist view put forward by neoAs such, neo-Marxist sociologists – Marxists in the 1970s (Jessop 1982; O’Connor first in the field of stratification in the early 1973; Poulantzas 1973). They agreed that the 1970s – began to theorize the structure of capitalist state protects capitalism, but only class positions under contemporary capitalthrough its autonomy from dominant classes. ism. How, after all, should Marxists explain Crucially, this autonomy is relative because of the so-called middle classes when Marx had the capitalist state’s structural compulsion to suggested that class was dividing more and promote capital accumulation. Yet, the struc- more into two warring camps? Some asserted turalist view fell short of explaining the pre- that white-collar professionals were part of cise mechanisms that consistently reproduced the working class, though this was a dissatcapitalism. Block (1987) took up this prob- isfying answer. Through empirical analysis, lem, arguing that state managers tended to act Wright (1985) argued that salaried profesin the interests of capitalists because the state sionals and managers stood in contradictory depended on an adequate rate of investment to class locations. Wright attempted to theorize ensure sufficient tax revenues and public sup- the nebulous concept of the middle class by port for government economic management. identifying three unevenly distributed assets The structuralist view not only informed as the basis of class exploitation – property, neo-Marxist theories of elite power, but organizational power, and credentials. Yet, also social policy and welfare. O’Connor by drawing on variables outside the Marxist (1973) argued that the capitalist state man- tradition, his class map bore a family resemaged the contradictions between accumula- blance to competing neo-Weberian schema. tion and legitimation through the creation of The dramatic increases in income and a welfare state. Partially building from this wealth inequality in advanced industrial Marxist foundation, Korpi (1983) and Esping- states beginning in the 1980s sparked a Andersen (1990) incorporated class political renewed interest in class analysis. The burden factors into their accounts of welfare states. of proof fell on Marxist sociologists to demAccording to their “power resources” model, onstrate that mechanisms of exploitation and as capitalism produced unequal class rela- domination accounted for rising inequality. tionships, different class conflicts and coali- This class analysis helped explain inequality tions developed in tandem with the historical through the political mobilization of business 275

276  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology associations, wealthy individuals, and financial groups, and conversely, the decline of organized labor. Non-Marxist analyses now began to take class seriously. This illustrates that Marxist approaches to inequality remain highly relevant to the field of political sociology (Manza and McCarthy 2011). Marx wrote extensively on work and labor, both in his early writings on alienation and in his later writings on exploitation at the point of production. Yet, the classical scholarship on industrial sociology discarded many of Marx’s insights in favor of a more optimistic and oversocialized view of work. Workers were not primarily motivated by economic self-interest but were shaped by the technical and human organization of the labor process. Sustained labor conflict in the mid-twentieth century exposed some of the shortcomings of this scholarship. During this period, neo-Marxists made important interventions by returning to a focus on control, exploitation, and alienation. Braverman (1974) argued that capitalism progressively deskilled workers through the managerial deployment of new modes of control and monitoring. Workers were increasingly limited to the execution, rather than the planning and conception, of work. While Braverman’s research resonated with radical sociologists, it tended to center on managerial ambitions rather than the perspectives of workers themselves. Burawoy (1979), spurred by his deep engagement with Marxism, revitalized the field of industrial sociology through his distinct ethnographic approach. He sought to explain why some labor systems were more successful in gaining the consent of workers than others. This included the “gamification” of work, which increased workers’ economic output and decreased conflict with management, but increased antagonisms between workers. Not limiting himself to advanced industrial economies, Burawoy studied how labor processes interacted with wider political environments in post-colonial, state-socialist, and post-soviet settings to produce distinct factory regimes. Subsequently, a new generation of sociologists deeply influenced by Burawoy extended their analyses to highlight the critical role played by gender, race, and citizenship in shaping the labor process. Recent neo-Marxist theories of conflict, consent, coercion, automation, and exploitation have fundamentally shaped the sociology

of work and the labor process (Benanav 2020; Vidal 2022). Nonetheless, important developments in capitalism remain unresolved. Do neo-Marxist theories have less purchase in understanding labor processes in professional occupations where employers’ control is relatively weak or indirect? Conversely, can neoMarxist theories productively inform research on semi-proletarianized and informal labor in the developing world? These questions will remain pertinent as capitalism transforms the nature of work. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1978 [1848]) wrote that “the need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe.” Other Marxists such as V.I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Rudolf Hilferding developed their own theories of global capitalism by examining the role of imperialism, underconsumption, and finance capital. In the postwar period, the dominant modernization paradigm marginalized interest in the internationalization of capital and the role of imperialism, especially in American sociology. However, the upsurge in anticolonial and national liberation struggles in the 1960s disrupted this paradigm, inviting a whole host of neo-Marxists to theorize global political developments. The dependency school argued that capitalism is not necessarily an engine of development, but rather one that consistently produces “underdevelopment” in the periphery. While this theory grew from the Latin American experience, it envisioned a rather static conception of capitalist (under) development that was geographically determined and fixed. Wallerstein’s (1979) contributions to world-systems theory (WST) accounted for more dynamism and mobility. He theorized a world capitalist-economy based on the transnational division of labor, consisting of a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. While wage suppression and market exchange were still the key mechanisms transferring value from the periphery to the core, the semi-periphery played an intermediate role in stabilizing this volatile arrangement, especially when wages were too high in industrial core zones. By the late 1970s, however, some Marxists critiqued the dependency and WST schools for conflating the growth of markets with capitalism, at the expense of analyzing class relations and class struggle (Brenner 1977).

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marxism and neo-marxism  277 Silver (2003) reconciled some of these differences, focusing on how long-term transformations in production patterns and workers’ powers shaped global capitalist development. Similarly, Arrighi (1994) demonstrated that recurring configurations of business and state organizations lead to systemic cycles of accumulation at the global scale. They theorized that as hegemonic powers move toward phases of financial expansion, the ensuing global chaos is followed by transformations in business and state organizations which underlie the rise of new hegemonic forces (Arrighi and Silver 1999). The common thread linking these neoMarxist accounts is that global capitalism is an inherently unstable and crisis-ridden system. The focus on the crisis tendencies of global capitalism has been central to both classical Marxism and neo-Marxist sociology, distinguishing this scholarly tradition from its non-Marxist counterparts.  In new lines of research, neo-Marxists in political sociology have considered the role of China in international development (Hung 2022; Lee 2017) and dispossession and development in the Global South (Levien 2018; Levenson 2022). Rohan Advani and Michael A. McCarthy

References Benanav, Aaron. 2020. Automation and the Future of Work. London: Verso Books. Block, Fred. 1987. Revising State Theory. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. Brenner, Robert 1977. “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism.” New Left Review. 24:24–92. Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. De Leon, Cedric, Desai, Manali, Tuğal, Cihan (eds). 2015. Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Eidlin, Barry. 2018. Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Giovanni, Arrighi. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century. London: Verso. Giovanni, Arrighi, Silver, Beverly J. 1999. Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Harris, Kevan. 2017. A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hung, Ho-fung. 2022. City on the Edge: Hong Kong under Chinese Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jessop, Bob. 1982. The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. Oxford: Blackwell. Korpi, Walter. 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Lee, Ching Kwan. 2017. The Specter of Global China Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Levenson, Zachary. 2022. Delivery as Dispossession Land Occupation and Eviction in the Postapartheid City. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levien, Michael. 2018. Dispossession without Development: Land Grabs in Neoliberal India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Manza, Jeff, McCarthy, Michael A. 2011. “The Neo-Marxist Legacy in American Sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology. 37(1):155–183. Marx, Karl. 1852. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. London: International Publishers. Marx, Karl, Engels, Friedrich. 1978 [1848]. “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” See Tucker, Marx & Engels Reader 1978, pp. 469–500. McCarthy, Michael A. 2017. Dismantling Solidarity. Capitalist Politics and American Pensions since the New Deal. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. O’Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. London: Palgrave. Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973. Political Power and Social Classes. London: Verso. Riley, Dylan. 2019. The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe. London: Verso Books. Silver, Beverly. 2003. Forces of Labor. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tuğal, Cihan. 2009. Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to

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278  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Capitalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Vidal, Matt. 2022. Management Divided: Contradictions of Labor Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wright, Erik Olin. 1985. Classes. London: Verso.

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71. Mass media Mass media are channels of communication that aim to reach a mass audience. Often, they are equated with traditional media, and the most prevalent types are (online) newspapers, television and radio. Mass media play a key role in current societies and are studied in different ways and at different levels. At the micro level, questions relate to the usage and effects of media on for example political socialization and political behaviour. At the meso level, the interaction between news media coverage and other institutions, such as parliament, is a key topic of consideration. And finally, at the macro level, scholars consider how media shape and are shaped by existing structures in society and reinforce power distributions and divides. In short, mass media are of crucial importance in the interaction between governance and society at different levels and thus for the study of political sociology. Until relatively recently most attention has been devoted to traditional media, with newspapers and television as the most prominent forms. With the rise of the internet, we witness a shift in attention to social media in particular. The importance of this type of medium, both in election campaigns as well as in citizens’ everyday life, provides a clear rationale for this research focus, but traditional media remain an important factor to consider. In a mediatized society, citizens rely on the media as their most important source of political information (Strömbäck, 2008). It has been demonstrated to affect for example political attitudes, knowledge, electoral preference and turnout. For example, if individuals are exposed to high levels of conflict framing in news coverage, they are more likely to go out and vote (Schuck et  al., 2016). Studies are conducted in either an experimental setting or by combining a media content analysis with media exposure reported by respondents. Exemplary theories that are considered in this context are agenda setting, priming and framing (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Agenda setting refers to a transfer of salience from the media agenda to the public agenda. In other words, if individuals are exposed to a lot of news on a certain political topic, they will consider this topic to be more important. If then this increased issue importance also

affects for example choices in the ballot box, priming takes place. Framing focuses on the way political issues are presented – by selecting some aspects of a problem, while ignoring others, news media contribute to the understanding of issues at the individual level. Until relatively recently, citizens relied on a wide, yet manageable range of traditional media. The recent rise of the internet and social media has fundamentally altered the way citizens consume news. A high-choice media environment has come into place, where an abundancy of information on any political topic is present, but that also provides ample opportunities to avoid news (Van Aelst et  al., 2017). Personalization has been considered a key feature of this new context. People either self-select into certain types of information, or algorithmic selection takes place. As a consequence, people have become more fragmented in their news diets and vastly differ in the political information they encounter. Arguably, this has contributed to a polarization of the electorate, in particular in majoritarian democracies such as the United States. In other countries, these developments have been less pronounced and have been limited to the ‘fringes’ of the political spectrum (Loecherbach et al., 2020). While mass media are only one type of the sources people rely on when getting their political news, they are, also in an online context with high levels of (algorithmic) selection, still the main supplier of political information. They have adapted their strategies to this new environment by increasing their online presence and become increasingly active on social media. Also, their role seems to have fundamentally altered – while originally they were focused on getting the news out first, they now more frequently provide (in-depth) analysis (De Vries et al., 2022) or actively counter mis- and disinformation (Walter et al., 2020). Mass media have an impact beyond individual-level effects and can also be considered an institution that influences other institutional and non-institutional actors as well. While examples are multiple, the impact of media on both parliament and social movement organizations offers telling examples. When it comes to parliament, research finds media’s political agenda-setting power to be considerable. If the media report more about a certain political issue, it is also likely to be more elaborately discussed in parliament. While this effect appears to be robust across different

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280  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology contexts, its strength depends on a range of factors, including the issue under consideration, the electoral system and governmentopposition dynamics (Vliegenthart et  al., 2016). Another important distinction that can be made is between impact on the symbolic and substantial political agenda. While the impact of the media on the symbolic parliamentary agenda is considerable – for example, on the questions parliamentarians pose and the content of parliamentary debates – the substantial consequences in terms of policy and legislation are more limited. Another relevant research realm is that of the interaction between media and social movement organizations. As a key venue for political participation, these organizations play a pivotal role in current societies. Their interaction with media has attracted substantial scientific attention, and their success, both in terms of gaining citizen support and fostering political change, is considered to be dependent upon favourable media coverage (Koopmans, 2004). First, the media can have an impact on the direct sympathizers. Favourable media attention can have a mobilizing impact on citizens, who might decide to support the movement financially or become active in any kind of protest. Second, political elites also closely monitor movements. As Koopmans (2004) forcefully argues, rather than direct interactions, it is the way the media cover protest and other movement activities that determines authorities’ responses. The media legitimize, or validate, the mere presence of a movement and its claims for politicians and policy makers. The third purpose for which movements need media coverage is scope enlargement and involving the larger public. If a movement succeeds in getting its claims and demands in the media, it draws attention to the conflict from actors, including the more general public. A favourable public opinion can serve as a key legitimizing source for movements’ claims and put additional pressure on political elites to adhere to the movements’ claims. The relationship between movements and media is in practice a difficult one. Already more than four decades ago, Todd Gitlin analysed in his seminal book The Whole World Is Watching (2003) the interaction between mass media and the US New Left. Gitlin demonstrates the crucial importance of the way media framed the movement and how it contributed to obtaining broader support. Rens Vliegenthart

However, the importance of news values, such as drama, conflict and personalization, made it increasingly difficult to maintain positive attention. Instead, coverage shifted to internal struggles and anomalies within the movement and ultimately yielded the erosion of the movement. Gitlin’s study clearly demonstrates the difficult and paradoxical relationship between movements and the media: on the one hand, movements need the media more to obtain support and legitimacy and want their claims to diffuse, while mass media pay attention to movements often because of their disruptive nature, rather than the substantial claims they make. Also in more general terms, the media are a determining factor in societies. Considerable debate exists on how to classify different countries based on the prominence of different types of media and legislation. A widely used classification of Western media systems is offered by Hallin and Mancini (2004), who distinguish between liberal, democratic-corporatist and polarized pluralist models based on the structure of the media market, the levels and nature of political parallelism, the professionalization of journalism and the role of the state. Since then, several amendments and extensions have been proposed to include a wider range of cases, but also to emphasize the dynamic and changing nature of those systems (e.g. Brüggemann et al., 2014, Humprecht et al., 2022). What is crucial is that specific features of the media system can make a substantial difference to the functioning of politics and the political socialization of citizens, often in interplay with the electoral system. On the one hand, it is for example argued that a strongly divided partisan media system, such as is present in the United States, contributes to the polarization of the electorate and can further indirectly increase the presence of misperceptions among parts of the electorate (Garrett et al., 2019). On the other hand, the presence of a strong public broadcasting system, where news usually devotes more attention to public and international affairs, contributes to the general levels of political knowledge of citizens and thus to a more informed citizenry. Mass media are still a key source of information for many citizens and an indispensable source for politicians. They play an important role in the acquisition of political knowledge, and specific content features can influence political participation at the individual level,

mass media  281 while also impacting the behaviour and success of political parties and social movements and shaping the functioning of politics more broadly. The media thus remain a key player in the distribution of power across societies and thus warrant the continuous attention of political sociologists. We do witness a fundamentally altered information environment and strongly diversifying media consumption patterns of individuals, that might have profound, yet very context-specific effects that deserve further exploration. Establishing on the one hand media consumption patterns and on the other hand knowledge and (extremity in) attitudes remains one of the most pressing research topics of the coming years, as it has direct consequences for (the quality of) our democracies. Rens Vliegenthart

References Brüggemann, M., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Humprecht, E., & Castro, L. (2014). Hallin and Mancini revisited: Four empirical types of Western media systems.  Journal of Communication, 64(6), 1037–1065. De Vries, E., Vliegenthart, R., & Walgrave, S. (2022). Telling a different story: A longitudinal investigation of news diversity in four countries. Journalism Studies, 1–19. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/1461670X​. 2022​ .2111323. Garrett, R. K., Long, J. A., & Jeong, M. S. (2019). From partisan media to misperception: Affective polarization as mediator. Journal of Communication, 69(5), 490–512. Gitlin, T. (2003).  The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. University of California Press. Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge University Press. Humprecht, E., Castro Herrero, L., Blassnig, S., Brüggemann, M., & Engesser, S. (2022). Media systems in the digital age: An empirical

comparison of 30 countries.  Journal of Communication, 72(2), 145–164. Koopmans, R. (2004). Movements and media: Selection processes and evolutionary dynamics in the public sphere. Theory and Society, 33(3), 367–391. Loecherbach, F., Moeller, J., Trilling, D., & van Atteveldt, W. (2020). The unified framework of media diversity: A systematic literature review. Digital Journalism, 8(5), 605–642. Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9–20. Schuck, A. R., Vliegenthart, R., & De Vreese, C. H. (2016). Who’s afraid of conflict? The mobilizing effect of conflict framing in campaign news.  British Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 177–194. Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(3), 228–246. Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., De Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stępińska, A., Papathanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheafe, T., & Stanyer, J. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: A challenge for democracy?  Annals of the International Communication Association, 41(1), 3–27. Vliegenthart, R., Walgrave, S., Baumgartner, F. R., Bevan, S., Breunig, C., Brouard, S., Chaqués Bonafont, L., Grossman, E., Jennings, W., Mortensen, P.B., Palau, A.M., Sciarini, P., & Tresch, A. (2016). Do the media set the parliamentary agenda? A comparative study in seven countries.  European Journal of Political Research, 55(2), 283–301. Walter, N., Cohen, J., Holbert, R. L., & Morag, Y. (2020). Fact-checking: A meta-analysis of what works and for whom.  Political Communication, 37(3), 350–375.

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72. Memory (collective) Memory has been an object of study in many different disciplines, and it is still investigated through different and rarely overlapping conceptual lenses by researchers coming from sociology, cultural studies, history, literature and psychology, with different disciplinary borders and analytical traditions thriving in different national contexts. Memory studies are still “a nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise” (Olick and Robbins 1998: 106), even if in the last two decades there has been a visible process of convergence along some shared elements, and in particular on the notion of memory as something socially constructed and inherently plural and contentious. Looking at memory from the point of view of political sociology means taking into account its inherently plural and contentious nature and investigating its role in social processes of political organisation, participation and mobilisation. If memory, in the Halbwachsian tradition, is collective insofar as it is produced in “social frameworks”, in the context of social groups structured by social relationships, then a society composed of multiple groups and multiple belongings produces a plural, and often contested and contentious, memory of the past. Contention thus becomes a structural element of the field of memory, in different ways: on the one hand, processes of political organisation, participation and mobilisation can be the object of commemoration and remembrance, thus continuing to produce outcomes in the social reality long after the time in which they took place; on the other hand, memory can be the object of political contention, as in the case of the struggles for memory that have been taking place for decades in several countries characterised by a recent transition to democracy and have been characterising many Western countries in the last few years regarding their colonial and racial past. Furthermore, mnemonic processes can play a role in political processes at large, shaping the way actors face their present world, imposing taboos and prescriptions, defining symbols, identities and traditions. There is no point in seeking where . . . [memories] are preserved in my brain or in some nook

of my mind to which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them. (Halbwachs 1992: 38)

Sociology is interested in memory insofar as memory is collective, and collective memory’s space within social research has been steadily growing since the so-called “memory boom”, from the late 1970s on, in a context characterised by a wide series of phenomena: the decline of postwar modernist narratives of progressive improvement, the decline of utopian visions, the increasing role of collective pasts as an inspiration for repressed identities and unfulfilled claims, the growth of identity politics, the emergence of a culture of trauma and regret, the commodification of nostalgia, the popularisation of history and a certain politics of victimhood. In social research, memory has been studied both through an individualistic lens, based in psychology, that considers collective memory as an “aggregation of socially framed individual memories” and focuses on “neurological and cognitive factors”, and through a collectivistic lens, rooted in the Durkheimian sociological tradition, emphasising “the social and cultural patternings of public and personal memory” (Olick 1999: 333). The latter, sociological reading of collective memory is informed by the seminal work of Maurice Halbwachs, according to whom collective memory is such because it is reproduced in “social frameworks”, in the context of social groups structured by social relationships. For Halbwachs, memory is first of all “a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated but are structured by social arrangements” (Olick and Robbins 1998: 109). In Halbwachs’ (1992: 38) own words: “It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognise, and localise their memories”. Social research has been investigating how the social frameworks of memory shape our imagination of the past, pointing out that “much of what we ‘remember’ is actually filtered (and therefore inevitably distorted) through a process of interpretation that usually takes place within particular social surroundings”, the “mnemonic communities” in which “mnemonic socialisation” takes place (Zerubavel 1996: 285); in this vein, memory is interpreted as a

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memory (collective)  283 pattern, a “cultural program that orients our intentions, sets our moods, and enables us to act” (Schwartz 1996: 910). Investigating memory as a social process implies addressing its inherently plural and contentious nature, going beyond commonsense denunciation of “distortion” and recognising an agency in mnemonic processes, that are always selective and only sometimes instrumental. Selection is driven by various processes, both willful and unconscious. Most often, students of a particular cultural memory seek to show the self-interested ways in which the memory has been shaped. Instrumentalisation is one of the dynamics of memory construction, but it does not operate independently of other processes like narrativisation, conventionalisation, and distanciation. (Schudson 1995: 360)

Such agency is severely limited, as testified by the ubiquitous presence in the social world of symbols representing failed mnemonic projects, that did not succeed in shaping the publicly discussed representation of the past (Kansteiner 2002). Similarly, research has pointed out the limited malleability of the past, as a necessary element to account for persistence, challenging and strengthening constructivist interpretations of memory at the same time: intrinsic properties of the meaning of some past objects and events do sometimes influence their power and persistence in subsequent collective memory. But these properties are aspects not of their inherent, necessary, constitutive charisma but rather of their potential semiotic multivalence, which generates links between symbol and referent less likely to be blocked or suspended. (Spillman 1998: 452)

Mnemonic processes are not placed in the void, but in the context of a mediated world. If they consist of social and cultural patterns, investigating their mediation is needed to grasp both their empirical substance and their theoretical meaning. Scholars have investigated the mediation of memories in different forms, including canons and archives (Assmann 2008), commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices (Connerton 1989), the mass media (Zelizer 2008) and digital communication (Hoskins 2017). Different forms of the multifaceted process of mediation, that is inherently cultural:

Memory can only become collective in this specific sense when different acts of communication and representation using whatever tools are available have come into play so as to create a common pool of stories and figures of memory to which reference can be made . . . In the process, however, cultural artefacts, forms, and practices do not just provide a conduit for expressing already existing memories; as many studies have shown, they also play an active role in shaping what is remembered and how. (Rigney 2015: 65)

In the last few years, the scholarly interest in the intersection between collective action and memory has grown considerably. This growth is linked to developments within both social movement studies and memory studies. On the one hand, memory studies scholars have become increasingly interested in mnemonic agency, resilience and resistance. On the other hand, social movement scholars’ attention to memories has grown against the background of the cultural turn and debates about movements’ temporality and continuity. If two decades ago Polletta and Jasper referred to memory as the “cultural building blocks that are used to construct collective identities” of which “we still know little” (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 299), recent years have seen a growing number of publications on the movement–-memory nexus both within social movement studies and memory studies. This nexus has been explored mainly in three ways (Daphi and Zamponi 2019: 402–403): memories of movements, focusing on “how past movements are remembered in society” (Armstrong and Crage 2006; Eyerman 2016); movements about memory, analysing “movements that center on shaping memory of a particular event, exploring how they mobilize around the reinterpretation of the past and how they participate in the construction of public memory about past contentions and other historical events” (Bisht 2018; Jelin 2003); and memories in movements, studying “how memories of various pasts affect how movements mobilize, shaping for example recruiting processes, identity building or strategic decisions” (Harris 2006; Jansen 2007; Zamponi 2018). In this vein, memory is interpreted as both an outcome of collective action and as a tool in fostering it. All in all, memory remains a fascinating and increasingly central element within the study of political sociology, due to the Lorenzo Zamponi

284  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology capacity of publicly discussed representations of the past to affect contemporary processes in the social, political and cultural realms. The recent wave of contestation of symbols and monuments connected to the history of colonialism and institutional racism in several Western countries provides a particularly clear-cut example of the presence of the past in contemporary society and politics and of the need to use the right conceptual and analytical lenses to address it. Lorenzo Zamponi

References Armstrong, Elizabeth A., and Suzanna M. Crage. 2006. ‘Movements and Memory: The Making of the Stonewall Myth’. American Sociological Review 71(5): 724–751. Assmann, Aleida. 2008. ‘Canon and Archive’. In Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, edited by Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, and Sara B. Young, 1st edition, 97–107. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Bisht, Pawas. 2018. ‘Social Movements and the Scaling of Memory and Justice in Bhopal’. Contemporary South Asia 26(1): 18–33. Connerton, Paul. 1989. How Societies Remember. Themes in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511628061. Daphi, Priska, and Lorenzo Zamponi. 2019. ‘Exploring the Movement-Memory Nexus: Insights and Ways Forward’. Mobilization: An International Quarterly 24(4): 399–417. doi:10.17813/1086-671X-24-4-399. Eyerman, Ron. 2016. ‘Social Movements and Memory’. In Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies, edited by Anna Lisa Tota and Trever Hagen, 79–83. New York: Routledge. Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Harris, Fredrick C. 2006. ‘It Takes a Tragedy to Arouse Them: Collective Memory and Collective Action during the Civil Rights Movement’. Social Movement Studies 5(1): 19–43. Hoskins, Andrew, ed. 2017. Digital Memory Studies: Media Pasts in Transition. London: Routledge. Lorenzo Zamponi

Jansen, Robert S. 2007. ‘Resurrection and Appropriation: Reputational Trajectories, Memory Work, and the Political Use of Historical Figures 1’. American Journal of Sociology 112(4): 953–1007. Jelin, Elizabeth. 2003. State Repression and the Struggles for Memory. London: Latin American Bureau. Kansteiner, Wolf. 2002. ‘Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies’. History and Theory 41(2): 179–197. Olick, Jeffrey K. 1999. ‘Collective Memory: The Two Cultures’. Sociological Theory 17(3): 333–348. Olick, Jeffrey K., and Joyce Robbins. 1998. ‘Social Memory Studies: From “Collective Memory” to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 105–140. Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. ‘Collective Identity and Social Movements’. Annual Review of Sociology 27(1): 283–305. doi:10.1146/annurev. soc.27.1.283. Rigney, Ann. 2015. ‘Cultural Memory Studies. Mediation, Narrative, and the Aesthetic’. In Cultural Memory Studies, edited by Anna Lisa Tota and Trever Hagen, 65–76. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203762844.ch6. Schudson, Michael. 1995. ‘Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory’. In Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past, edited by D. Scachter, 346–364. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schwartz, Barry. 1996. ‘Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II’. American Sociological Review 61: 908–927. Spillman, Lyn. 1998. ‘When Do Collective Memories Last?: Founding Moments in the United States and Australia’. Social Science History 22(4): 445–477. Zamponi, Lorenzo. 2018. Social Movements, Memory and Media. Narrative in Action in the Italian and Spanish Student Movements. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Zelizer, Barbie. 2008. ‘Why Memory’s Work on Journalism Does Not Reflect Journalism’s Work on Memory’. Memory Studies 1(1): 79–87. Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1996. ‘Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past’. Qualitative Sociology 19(3): 283–299.

73. Michels, Robert

culminating in the offer of a co-directorship in 1913 (Tuccari, 1993). His political convictions also prevented him from pursuing an academic career in Germany, and he had to move to Italy. Robert Michels was born in Cologne on His encounter with the Italian elitist school 9 January 1876 into a wealthy family of tex- around 1907 marked the other pivotal moment tile entrepreneurs and grew up in a cosmo- in the formation of Michels’ political sociology. politan cultural environment. He attended Michels ranks among the classical exponents the Collège Français in Berlin and the Carl of elite theory, but his relationship with elitFriedrich Gymnasium in Eisenach and did ism was problematic. His positions were often a year of military service in Hannover and original and not always comparable to those of Weimar. He conducted his university studies Pareto and Mosca. The progressive political in various places: Paris, Munich and Leipzig. disengagement corresponded with increasing In 1900, he received his doctorate from the scientific activity: two aspects that should not University of Halle, with a dissertation on be seen in opposition but in continuity. In this Louis XIV. In the same year, he married sense, the famous “iron law of oligarchy” repGisela Lindner, daughter of the historian resents the epilogue of his socialist militancy. Theodor, with whom he had five children. Although mainly famous as a political socioloBetween 1901 and 1907, Michels settled in gist, Michels always taught economics: from Marburg, where he continued his scientific 1908 in Turin, from 1914 in Basel, and from work. During the same years, after an initial 1928 in Perugia. His ties with Italy were deep stay in 1900–01, he frequently visited Turin, and marked the different phases of his life. where he established relations with important While in Switzerland, Michels became presifigures of the Italian academy (Luigi Einaudi, dent of the Italian Institute of Culture (Dante Alighieri Society) and promoted numerous Achille Loria, Gaetano Mosca and others). In addition to cultivating his scientific patriotic initiatives during the First World interests, Michels approached socialism dur- War. In 1921, he completed the Italian natuing this period: in November 1902, he joined ralisation process, which had begun in 1913. the Chamber of Labour and the section of Michels adhered to the Fascist regime: he inithe Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in Turin; in tially studied it; in 1924, he met Mussolini and January 1903, the section of the German began to support the Fascist cause; in 1928, he Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Marburg. joined the National Fascist Party (PNF), conBetween 1902 and 1907, he participated in tinuing his work of cultural promotion of the the congresses of the SPD, the PSI and the regime. Michels died in Rome on 2 May 1936 Socialist International, but never held official (Genett, 2008). Gisela Lindner compiled a list of Michels’ posts. His militancy was predominantly intellectual, as evidenced by numerous articles in writings, which includes 701 articles and the socialist press. Michels’ position within 30 books published in numerous languages the socialist movement varied according to the (Lindner, 1937). Although subsequent context in which he operated (Germany, Italy research has shown it to be incomplete, this and France), although it is possible to identify bibliography is sufficient to show the consida progressive radicalisation process. The first erable size of Michels’s oeuvre and its varieyears within the ranks of the SPD were essen- gated nature. Without taking into account his tial for his political formation, but one should writings on political commentary, indeed, his not attribute too much importance to the scholarly works span numerous disciplinary social-democratic imprinting. Michels soon fields. Of these, the studies in political sociolbecame impatient with the revolutionary wait- ogy are the most interesting and original, to and-see attitude and gradually moved closer to which Michels mainly owes his notoriety. On French and Italian syndicalism (Volpe, 2018). the one hand, the first sociological essays conThereafter, Michels finally moved away tain the initial formulations that are already from active politics in 1909. During his years of profoundly significant for the future developpolitical engagement, he did not abandon scien- ment of Michelsian analysis of political partific research. Towards the end of 1905, he came ties, and on the other, show the progressive into contact with Max Weber, a collaborative detachment from Marxism. Proletariat und relationship that would continue for a decade, Bourgeoise in der sozialistischen Bewegung punctuated by Michels’ articles in the “Archiv Italiens (1905–06) is the first attempt at a für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik” and sociological analysis of a political movement, 285

286  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology namely the Italian socialist party. In the introduction to the Italian edition, Michels speaks of a new scientific discipline: the “science of the analytical history of political parties, a branch of applied sociography”. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie (1906), inspired and supervised by Max Weber, studies the social composition of the German party. Michels thinks that the SPD is still an expression of the German proletariat but emphasises the inevitable emergence of hierarchies and bourgeois dynamics within political organisations. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im internationalem Verbande (1907) is the third essay published in the “Archiv”. Michels argues the political impotence of German socialism can only partly be blamed on the national political context, as the real problem lies within the party, namely the process of its transformation into an organisation aimed solely at its own preservation. Oligarchia organica costituzionale (1907) marks the official encounter with elite theory. Despite using elitist categories, Michels disagrees with Mosca and Pareto on some critical points: the rejection of the indispensable and permanent character of the ruling class, but above all, the idea that democracy is popular self-government. In La democrazia e la legge ferrea dell’oligarchia (1910), Michels regarded the democratic system as irredeemably oligarchic, thus anticipating the theoretical core of his most famous theory. Political Parties (1911; English translation 1999) is Michels’ most important and representative work, in which many previously elaborated concepts converge, finding a specific place within his sociological reflection (Lipset, 1962; Linz, 2006). The entire work is built on the axiom that the internal dynamics within a socialist party constitute the most scientifically adequate field of observation to analyse the possibilities and limits of democracy. In particular, the SPD is the best field of observation for such a study since it is the reference model for other socialist parties. Thus the presence of hierarchical tendencies within the SPD proves that every political organisation inevitably has oligarchic traits. Michels states that “the question we have to discuss is not whether ideal democracy is realisable, but rather to what point and in what degree democracy is desirable, possible, and realisable at a given moment”. Nevertheless, his analysis comes to definitive conclusions independent of a specific historical context or moment. The oligarchic tendencies Giorgio Volpe

within the most influential socialist party represent the end of the dreams of the proletariat’s emancipation. Therefore, democracy as the self-government of the masses – that is, for Michels, true democracy – is nothing more than a mirage. In this sense, Political Parties was the endpoint of a process of progressive political disillusionment. Michels would later return to the theme of the ruling class, reworking it in light of his adherence to the fascist regime. First Lecture in Political Sociology (1927; English translation 1949) marks the last phase of Michels’s elitism. Strongly influenced by the Italian political context, and the advent of fascism, in particular, it is of fundamental importance for understanding not only the author’s political evolution but also the possible consequences of Michels’s democratic extremism. Michels is inextricably linked to “the iron law of oligarchy”, according to which every party or union is dominated by an elite. For him, democracy requires organisation, organisation leads to oligarchy, and democracy inevitably tends to develop into oligarchy. The progressive specialisation of functions, centralisation of governing bodies and internal bureaucratisation create a solid power structure with a ruling minority and a governed majority. Thus, the very nature of the party changes: it ceases to be a means to an end, becoming an end in and of itself. Moreover, the oligarchic tendency of organisations is reinforced by psychological factors: the need for leadership felt by the masses and the lust for power of politicians. This process also affects workers’ parties and trade unions, as even leaders of proletarian extraction over time become part of the elite. The observation of the inevitable emergence of a ruling elite in all organisations, even voluntary ones, is a milestone in the history of political sociology. Besides influencing the way political organisations are studied, “the iron law of oligarchy” has also had significant consequences for democratic theory. According to Michels, the oligarchic character of parties proves that democracies – those based on representation and the voting rights of the masses – are not real democracies but oligarchies or, at best, aristocracies. They are characterised by an indispensable and, to a certain extent, irreplaceable minority of leaders who rule over an indifferent, spiritually passive majority incapable of self-rule and all too ready to venerate its leaders. Michels admits the possibility of

michels, robert  287 political organisations with a greater democratic sensibility, but this does erase “the iron law of oligarchy”. The very idea of democracy is rejected: popular sovereignty is an abstract ideal because, in any political regime, whatever its form, there is always a minority that holds power. In First Lecture in Political Sociology (1925), Michels developed a “new theory of elite”, which constitutes the theoretical justification for his adherence to fascism. Compared to Political Parties, the starting point is reversed: the question is no longer whether a truly democratic political movement can exist, but whether the undemocratic elite can do without the consent of the masses. According to Michels, whereas representative democracy is founded on the myth of the general will, autocracies are legitimised by public opinion: real democracy consists in the circulation of elites and is, therefore, the prerequisite for the emergence of duces. In this way, Michels pushed the ‘iron law of oligarchies’ to its extreme consequences, becoming “the most elitist among the elitists” (Tuccari, 2012). From the very beginning, Political Parties aroused a certain interest also outside Germany and Italy, being translated into several languages. Given the development and global influence of the American social sciences in the twentieth century, the fortune of Michels’s work in the United States is particularly interesting. In the 1920s, he came into contact with Charles Merriam’s Chicago School of Political Science, particularly with Harold Lasswell. On the one hand, the American academy was interested in Michels’s methodological approach to the study of parties; on the other hand, it inevitably equated elite theory with fascism. In the 1940s, James Burnham contributed and influenced the spread of elite thinking across the Atlantic. Despite the severe limitations of his interpretation, he had the merit of making Michels known to a broader audience. After the Second World War, the German sociologist’s fame increased further. He became an indispensable reference for many scholars: the link between the need for organisation and the risks to democracy seemed highly relevant to scholars, mainly as it referred to political parties and bureaucracy. In this sense, the following thinkers should undoubtedly be mentioned without claiming to be exhaustive: Seymour M. Lipset, Philip Selznick and Max Nomad. The applicative character

of Political Parties certainly contributed to making the “iron law of oligarchies” synonymous with elitism in the United States and beyond (Volpe, 2021). Even today, Michels still arouses a fair amount of interest, especially when referring to populism and plebiscitarianism. In particular, his analysis seems to return to relevance for the study of digital parties, namely political organisations based on disintermediation between the grassroots and the leaders (Gerbaudo, 2019). Giorgio Volpe

References Genett T. (2008). Der Fremde im Kriege: Zur politischen Theorie und Biografie von Robert Michels 1876–1936. Akademie Verlag. Gerbaudo P. (2019). The Digital Party: Political Organisation and Online Democracy. Pluto. Lindner G. (1937). “Opere di Roberto Michels.”Annali della Facoltà di giurisprudenza della R. Università di Perugia, 49. Linz J. J. (2006). Robert Michels, Political Sociology, and the Future of Democracy. Transaction Publishers. Lipset S. M. (1962). “Introduction,” in Michels R., Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Crowell-Collier, 15–39. Michels R. (1905–06). “Proletariat und Bourgeoisie in der sozialistischen Bewegung Italiens. Studien zu einer Klassen und Berufsanalyse des Sozialismus in Italien.” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 21–22. Michels R. (1906). “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie.” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 23. Michels R. (1907a). “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im internationalen Verbande. Eine kritische Untersuchung.” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 25. Michels R. (1907b). “L’oligarchia organica costituzionale.” La Riforma Sociale, 18. Michels R. (1910). La democrazia e la legge ferrea dell’oligarchia. Rassegna contemporanea, 5. Michels R. (1911). Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungenüber die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens. Klinkhardt. Giorgio Volpe

288  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology English translation is based on the Italian edition of 1912: Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Hearst’s International Library Co. (1915); republished by Free Press (1949), Dover Publications (1959), Crowell-Collier (1962), and Transaction Publishers (1999). Michels R. (1927). Corso di sociologia politica. Istituto editoriale scientifico. English translation: First Lectures in Political Sociology. University of Minnesota Press.

Giorgio Volpe

Tuccari F. (1993). I dilemmi della democrazia moderna: Max Weber e Robert Michels. Laterza. Tuccari F. (2012). “Le radici, le ragioni e l’inattualità della ‘Sociologia del partito politico’ di Robert Michels.” Annali della Fondazione Einaudi 46, 55–84. Volpe G. (2018), Il carteggio fra Roberto Michels e sindacalisti rivoluzionari. FedOA. Volpe G. (2021). Italian Elitism and the Reshaping of Democracy in The United States. Routledge.

74. The micro–macro link

tested. In Olson’s theory (1965) the link is analytical (i.e. logically true): personal influence is 1 divided by group size (see line 3b). For a group of size 1000, influence is 1/1000. A goal of sociology and other social sciences This can be computed by a simple algebraic is to explain collective (i.e. macro) phenom- operation. Micro-to-macro links can also be ena such as revolutions or economic growth. analytical (line 4a). The crime rate (a macro “Collectives” range from nuclear families variable) is an (analytical) aggregation of to entire societies. Of particular interest are individual crimes. An empirical link would macro propositions such as the larger a group, be given if individuals saving energy leads the less likely the realization of common to cleaner air (arrow 4b). In the examples the goals (i.e., the provision of public goods). empirical bridge assumptions are singular “Group size” and “provision of public goods” causal hypotheses (referring to certain times and places), but they may also be theories (i.e. are macro properties. Most scholars want to know why macro conditional statements that do not refer to spepropositions hold. A plausible explanation is cific times and places). The micro foundation (arrows 2a and 2b) is that group size influences individual motivations to produce the public good. There is thus often a version of rational choice theory (RCT a macro-to-micro link (group size to certain – see Kirchgässner 2008; Opp 2020). The verindividual motivations). Assume that mem- sion that is widely accepted assumes bounded bership in a large group has the effect that per- rationality. This includes beliefs (which ceived influence to produce the public good may be wrong) and all kinds of preferences is low. This, in turn, leads to abstaining from (including the goal not to deviate from norms participation in providing the public good. or altruistic motivations) as determinants of This is a micro proposition. If many individu- behavior. Another assumption is that actors als refrain from contributing to public goods do what they think is best for them in their production, this aggregates to low production situation (subjective utility maximization). of public goods on the macro level. This is a The figure suggests that not all individual variables need to be influenced by the macro micro-to-macro link. To summarize, group size is related to the factor. The “other causes” might be so strong provision of public goods because a large that there is no longer an impact of the macro group diminishes personal perceived influ- factors. The micro foundation does not need ence; this reduces individual contributions to to be RCT. It might be a middle-range theory public goods and, thus, raises overall public (such as anomie theory). Our example is simplified to outline the goods production. There is thus an indirect causal effect of the independent macro on basic structure of micro-macro explanations. the dependent macro variable – via the micro Researchers apply more complicated models. There are several independent macro varilevel. The macro proposition is a correlation. The explanation consists of three compo- ables and several bridge assumptions. There nents: the macro proposition, the micro prop- may be macro-micro processes in which, for osition, and the micro-macro links. The latter example, repression raises incentives to proare macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro rela- test, which then influences repression again, tions and are called bridge assumptions and so on. Micro-macro modeling is the realizabecause they connect the macro and micro levels. Such explanations are called micro- tion of the program of methodological indimacro (or macro-micro) models. They can vidualism (MI – see, e.g., Brodbeck 1958; be visualized with a causal diagram known Hodgson 2007). The idea is that macro propas the Coleman boat (Coleman 1990: 1–26). ositions can be explained by drawing on the It was first proposed by McClelland (1961: micro level. This is also called the structure47). Figure 1 illustrates this diagram with our agency problem (see the entry “structure and example. We will now analyze the compo- agency”). “Structure” refers to the macro level, “agency” to the individual properties. nents of the model in more detail. Macro propositions are empirical correla- Micro-macro modeling, as described before, tions (see arc 1 in the figure). There is an indi- is practiced by numerous social scientists. However, there are different versions of MI. rect causal effect via the micro level. The bridge assumptions can be empirical, For example, some philosophers assert that as in our example (see arrow 3a) and can be MI means that macro propositions are only 289

290  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology 1 Macro level

Correlation

Group size 3a Macro-tomicro relations

3b Bridge assumptions

Influence

2a Micro theory

Micro level

Other causes

Public goods production 4a

4b Micro-tomacro relations

Individual action

2b

Figure 1  Example of a micro-macro explanation

explained by facts about individuals (Bhaskar 1978: 5). Bridge assumptions apparently do not exist in this version. MI is controversial. One issue is the micro foundation. Most of the objections are directed against a narrow neo-classical model. The bounded rationality version is widely used in behavioral economics, rational choice sociology, and political science. Other objections against MI do not apply to the version described before. To illustrate, it is argued that MI is not possible because there are emergent properties (e.g. Bedau and Humphreys 2008). These are properties of collectives that their parts, that is, individuals, do not possess. For example, individuals commit crimes, but only a collective has a crime rate. Nobody would deny the existence of emergent properties. However, advocates of MI argue that emergent properties do not thwart micro-macro modeling. For example, the crime rate is an aggregation of individual crimes. Nonetheless, we can explain individual crimes that aggregate to the crime rate. Take an earthquake that is not related to individual properties. If this is taken as a macro property, we can model its impact on individual behavior. A deathblow to MI is the charge that it is a form of reductionism. As for MI, there are different meanings of this objection. One meaning is that the reducing micro proposition replaces or eliminates the macro proposition (e.g., Ylikoski 2012: 24). However, it is not the goal of MI to eliminate macro propositions. The goal is only to explain them. In the version of MI described in this entry Karl-Dieter Opp

“reduction” means a micro-macro explanation (see already Homans 1967: 80–87). Advocates of MI claim that macro propositions should be explained individualistically. The major argument is that micro-macro modeling increases our knowledge about social processes and shows under which conditions macro propositions are valid. The reason is that macro propositions only hold if the bridge assumptions are valid (assuming that the micro foundation is correct). Another advantage of micro-macro modeling is that the micro theories are exposed to new empirical tests. MI and micro-macro modeling are widely practiced in the social sciences. A classic example is Max Weber’s macro proposition about the impact of Protestantism on capitalism (Weber 2005, first 1930). The spread of Protestantism leads to certain individual beliefs (e.g., about salvation) that lead to actions (e.g., to invest in occupational success). The individual actions then aggregate to the “spirit” of capitalism. Another example for micro-macro modeling are analyses of the impact of institutions on individual incentives. A classic example is Adam Smith’s analysis of the impact of market institutions on economic activities. Acemoglu and Robinson and Robinson (2012) analyze the impact of numerous institutional provisions on the development of societal wealth. The conclusion is that micro-macro explanations are a fruitful explanatory strategy that is widely practiced in the social sciences. Karl-Dieter Opp

the micro–macro link  291

References Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Random House/Crown Publishers. Bedau, M. A., & Humphreys, P. (Eds.). (2008). Emergence. Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press. Bhaskar, R. (1978). On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of Naturalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 8(1), 1–28. Brodbeck, M. (1958). Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction. Philosophy of Science, 25(1), 1–22. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hodgson, G. M. (2007). Meanings of Methodological Individualism. Journal of Economic Methodology, 14(2), 211–226. Homans, G. C. (1967). The Nature of Social Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Kirchgässner, G. (2008). Homo Oeconomicus. The Economic Model of Behaviour and Its Applications in Economics and Other Social Sciences. New York: Springer. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McClelland, D. C. (1961). The Achieving Society. New York: The Free Press. Opp, K.-D. (2020). Rational Choice Theory and Methodological Individualism. In P. Kivisto (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Social Theory (pp. 1–23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weber, M. (2005, first 1930). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. London and New York: Routledege. Ylikoski, P. (2012). Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms. In H. Kincaid (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Sciences (pp. 21–45). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karl-Dieter Opp

75. Migration

national passports that don’t require visas. For Japanese or Singapore passports, there is free access to 192 countries without visas, for South Korea 190, for EU countries, between During the last 30 years, migrations have 186 and 189 according to the country, for become a major factor in international rela- the US 186, and for Australia and Canada tions, and they have been viewed as a chal- 185. The last in terms of how many counlenge to nation states (Wihtol de Wenden, tries can be accessed is Afghanistan: only 2021). They have led the way in globalization. 26 countries allow access without a visa, All parts of the world have been involved with mostly neighboring and relatively poor ones. migration in one way or another. However, This context defines the possibilities of world migrants represent 3.5 percent of the world mobility and explains the role of traffickers. population (5 percent in the beginning of the The right to exit, which became universal twentieth century), so 287 million out of a and protected by some international conworld population of over 8 billion inhabitants ventions (UN Declaration of Human Rights of the planet. Their weight is usually over- of 1948, Geneva Convention on refugees of estimated, as are some categories, like envi- 1951, UN Convention of 1990 on the rights of ronmentally displaced populations (mostly all migrant workers) is now confronted with internal migrants) or south-north flows from the difficulty of entering, which arises from Africa, while refugees from the Middle national decisions. Most migrants at the global level are workEast have represented, with other migration movements (of families, workers, students), ers, and most legal migrants belong to three most migrants in recent years, as well as categories: workers, family reunification, and refugees. There are several categories Ukrainians since 2022. Who is an international migrant? The of migrants, forced and voluntary, for work, United Nations (Department of Population studies, family reunification, men and women and UNDESA national reports) define a (48% of all migrants), young, adult and old, migrant as somebody who was born in one but we are faced with mixed flows, due to country and moved to another country for at migrants with several purposes (refugee, famleast one year. So, provisional movers (e.g. ily reunification, studies, or work) with diffitourists, short-term workers) are not counted culties fitting into the legal categories foreseen as migrants, but all categories of populations because migration for work has been severely crossing borders for one year at least (workers, controlled in immigration countries. The catstudents, families, refugees, unaccompanied egories opposing countries of arrival and counminors) are international migrants. Along tries of departure are also blurred, with some with them, internal migrants are estimated emigration countries becoming places for the at over 740 million in the world, mostly in departure, transit, and arrival of newcomers. Refugees and asylum seekers number China, but also including south–south flows in the same country like climate-displaced 110 million people, including asylum seekers and refugees of the Geneva Convention peoples and internal refugees. Those migrations are structural, region- of 1951 (26.5 million statutory refugees), alized, and involved in new forms of world Palestinians with United Nations Welcome and Release Agency (UNWRA) status (6 governance. This trend began in the 1990s, when the million), and various forms of humanitarian fall of the iron curtain introduced the devel- and temporary statuses for forced migrations opment of the right to exit from one’s country, similar to Ukrainians today with provisional along with the delivery of national passports protection (UNHCR, 2022). Women are also part of this diversificain many southern countries. Along with this generalization of the access to a passport, a tion, as well as children (with an increasright of emigration emerged, confronted at ing number of unaccompanied ones), highly the same time with the increasing require- skilled migrants, families (especially in old ment for visas from immigration countries immigration countries like Europe and the meaning that the right to leave has been US), migrants moving for health reasons, contrasted with the difficulty of entering. and a lot of people without any precise staAccording to the International Association tus: undocumented migrants (11 million in of Air Transportation (IATA) in 2021, the the US approximately, 5 million in Europe right to mobility is closely linked with roughly), environmentally displaced people 292

migration  293 (60 million), and stateless people without any citizenship such as in Myanmar and Bangladesh (13 million people). We also observe a rise in students, in (seasonal) short-term migration, and in rich people from poor countries who have the possibility of obtaining a residence permit due to their investments, funds, trade, or housing properties and “golden” passports in some EU countries (Malta, Cyprus, Portugal). Some new kinds of migration are emerging but in small numbers: migrants for health reasons, due to sexual mistreatment (harassment, sexual orientation), due to environmental threat, and so forth. Migrations to the south (140 million) have matched the number of migrants to the north (140 million) if we add the north–north and south–north migrants on one side and south– south and north–south migrants on the other side. The number of south–south migrants toward emerging countries but also to Gulf states, along with the environmentally displaced and refugees, and the number of north–south migrants (skilled migrants from the north to the south since the economic crisis of 2008, pensioned seniors looking for sun, second- and third-generation entrepreneurs in the countries of their parents, the exploitation of raw materials by northern countries in the south, etc.) are growing. All these trends have occurred in the last 30 years: the world is moving and urbanization is increasing. Demography will be a crucial issue moving into the future, with older populations in the north and younger ones in the south. The entrance in the fourth age of the very old requires new jobs in care, whereas jobs in agriculture or services are undertaken by migrants, and some skilled jobs are not filled in the north. However, during these last 30 years, immigration policies in the north became security trended, with the objective of closing borders to newcomers. The consequence of this disequilibrium is a very important role for borders. From north to south, exit and entrance are both easy but the rights in welcome countries may be restricted (access to citizenship or to property, for example). From north to north the rights are more or less the same (and without visas in many cases) for entrance and stay and close to nationals’ rights. From south to north it is now easy to leave but difficult to enter and to stay with many deaths of people aiming to cross borders (Mediterranean, US/Mexican

border), but a legal migrant may have substantial equality of rights with some years of residence and may have access to citizenship. From south to south, no rights are recognized in most cases, but entrance and stay are tolerated de facto for asylum seekers and illegal workers and some countries link stay with work (Gulf states). Another consequence is the weight of big immigration states in the policy making of migration regimes with countries such as the US, Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia, and so forth defining the main migration rules. So, the management of migration at world level leads to several unwanted results: undocumented migrants, unaccompanied minors, asylum seekers without recognition of refugee status, and camps, prisons, repatriations, and deaths. Most migrations are due to an addition of gaps: demographic, social, economic, cultural, and political gaps (democracy/authoritarian regimes, unemployment, health, environmental contexts). These gaps do not find a solution in the regions of departure and the candidates for migration think that they can find a solution with the option of “exit”. Demography, in spite of the growing number of countries facing demographic transition, is different in north and south, with older countries with a demographic dependence on migration in the north and young populations without employment in the south or threatened by political, social, and environmental instability. The median age in the north is over 40 years while in the south it is 25 years in the Maghreb and 19 in Sub-Saharan Africa. The economy also shows an important gap, if we take into account the differences in the Human Development Index (HDI – i.e. education, life expectancy, and living standards) between north and south. The social gap relating to health protection, social insurance, and pensions is very large today, and migration may represent life insurance in countries where safety nets do not exist. Political and environmental crises are mostly located in the south with refugee movements and climate-displaced populations internally. The images of other horizons spread by new technologies and other migrants are also a strong exit factor for the two-thirds of the population of the planet who cannot move freely. Transnational networks are bringing linkages crossing borders: families, new technologies (TV, cell phones, internet), and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

294  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology remittances (which represent 550 billion dollars sent by migrants to their families in 2021). Second or third generations from families settled abroad have double citizenship and can move across borders. The general aspiration is easier access to mobility, a phenomenon which existed before, during the period of labor immigration, which was closed in the mid-1970s in Europe and in 1965 between Mexico and the United States (“bracero program”). Mobility became possible from east to west in Europe after the fall of the iron curtain in 1989: the settlement into mobility as a way of life became a reality for eastern Europeans but it was closed to southern migrants. The main factor of migration is the feeling of no hope and insecurity. Most migrants are young, urbanized, educated, and informed, and they think that there is no future in their countries. They sometimes say that they are already dead before their possible death in the Mediterranean Sea or at the Mexican border. More than half of the young from the south want to get out. Those who leave are never the poorest ones, but those who are able to build a project, who have networks and the possibility of raising money to pay illegal traffickers if they cannot get a visa. In spite of globalization, there is a regionalization of flows and settlement. We can observe a Euro-Mediterranean space, and a US/Mexican one, among the most important migration places in the world: most migrants in Europe come from Europe and from the south rim of the Mediterranean while Mexicans and Central Americans make up half of migrants in the US. South America is in itself a migration region, with newcomers mainly coming from South America (Columbia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and now Venezuela) to Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. After Europe and the United States as first destinations, the Gulf is third, with south–south migrants from Arab countries extending to Pakistan, the Philippines, and some Sub-Saharan countries. Russia, the fourth migration destination, has migration from the former USSR: South Caucasus and Central Asia, due to the strength of former links to the Soviet Union (language, knowledge of Russian administration, and shortterm visas for work). Turkey is also a strong migration region, due to the recent refugee crisis (Iraq, Iran, Syria) while remaining the most important emigration country to Europe Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

(4.4 million Turks in Europe, mainly in Germany). Japan, South Africa, and Australia also see regional migration from surrounding areas. In all of these immigration countries or regions, the number of immigrants from the same region as the immigration country is higher than the number of immigrants from other regions, showing that a movement toward more regionalization of flows is on the way, in spite of the globalization and diversification of flows, because regional migration is easier, less dangerous, and cheaper. Some regional spaces at the global level are thus accompanying this movement of regionalized migrations with free spaces of mobility, such as Europe for Europeans (with the opening of internal borders and the closure of external borders with freedom of circulation, work, and settlement for Europeans), the Nordic space (including some members not belonging to the EU alike Norway and Island but they are part of the Nordic space with free circulation of work with Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the ECOWAS in Western Africa in spite of conflicts in the region, the Trans Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA) between Australia and New Zealand, the ASEAN to help South Asian emigration countries to work easily in other Asian countries, the UNASUR between South American countries, and the SADC between South Africa and its neighbors. There are other regional spaces of free circulation but they work with difficulty due to conflictual zones in some African countries. Faced with these openings of borders, we observe a lot of frontiers, walls, and deaths – over 50000 in the Mediterranean Sea since the end of the 1990s. The 2015 refugee crisis led the UN General Assembly to underwrite the Global Compact on Migration and Refugees, adopted in Marrakech in 2018. In spite of the hospitality developed toward Ukrainians in 2022 and some forms of multilevel actions of solidarity toward newcomers, the COVID-19 crisis showed that the shortages in the labor force and the impact of closed borders did not change security-oriented migration policies. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

References Global Compact on Migrations, UN Marrakech World Conference, 2018 IATA, Henley and Partners, Annual Report, 2022

migration  295 UNDESA Annual Report on International Migration, 2021 and 2022 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees. Annual Report, 2022 Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, Les nouvelles migrations. Paris, Ellipses, 2013 Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, Géopolitique des migrations. Paris, Eyrolles, 2019 Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, Atlas des Migrations. Paris, Autrement, 6th edition, 2021a

Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine (2021b) “Citizenship and migration in a globalized world” in Giugni, Marco and Grasso, Maria (eds), Handbook of Citizenship and Migration. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing

Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

76. Modernity From the vantage point of the great thinkers of classical social theory, modernity came to be identified with a central or singular process, for example, of capitalism (Marx), purposive rationalisation (Max Weber), a combination of societal differentiation and value integration (Parsons). Post-classical social theory pluralised this image and emphasised a more multi-dimensional view of modernity that has highlighted processes of societal and cultural differentiation. Social theorists such as Giddens, Habermas and Luhmann emphasise societal differentiation, while those such as Lyotard emphasise a cultural differentiation in areas such as education, technological mediation and aesthetics that culminates in a postmodern, pluralised condition (Giddens, 1990; Habermas, 1987; Luhmann, 1982; Lyortard, 1984). Yet, there is an odd consensus that unites these diverse social theorists concerning the historical dimensions of modernity and postmodernity. Modernity is viewed, historically, as a period that begins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe and spreads globally throughout the world. It is ruptured in the later part of the twentieth century by increasing crises – of political legitimacy, of cultural values and ways of life – and collapses under its own weight, the result of which is the current postmodern moment. Generally, these two periods also constitute the so-called globalisation of the world. The contours of the narrative about modernity are also repeated in the narratives about modernisation, with some amplification regarding power and money. Modernisation theory emerged out of a conjunction of historical forces and ideas after the end of World War Two. The historical forces included colonialism, the defeat of the Ottoman and AustroHungarian Empires after World War One and the collapse of the British and European Empires after World War Two which was completed by the 1960s. The result of these forces was the emergence of new nation states in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Other factors also included the emergence of the USA and the Soviet Union as world powers. In this context, modernisation theory served an affirming ideological function to distinguish a world supposedly divided between capitalism

and communism. Behind this ideological positioning, there was a shared assumption that societies moved on a historical trajectory based on dynamic processes of markets, technologies and state-centred controls and ambitions, and those that did not were viewed as backward or underdeveloped. Modernisation was viewed as a positively transforming process that was irreversible. Recent arguments concerning ongoing globalisation in the wake of the anti-totalitarian revolutions in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (1989–1991) and even the rise of modern-day China have continued the legacy of modernisation theories with a continuing emphasis on capitalism and neo-liberalism at the levels of the economy, culture and politics. Yet, pre-existing geo-political forms of power or the creation of new geo-political realities cannot be reductively viewed as the result of the role of globalised economic ideals derived from institutions such as the IMF, which emphasised a single global world, or at best a bi-polar one. There are no single, straightforward paths that lead to modernisation, development or underdevelopment. There are, rather, incongruities, paradoxes and tensions between ‘modernisation’ and its so-called implementation by social actors, if one views this process as more than a system which plays itself out at a global level. A critique of modernisation/globalisation perspectives, together with their underlying theories of modernity/postmodernity, can begin from observations that have emphasised combinations and intersections of the long histories of regions and cultures that include but also predate colonialism and its collapse, the specificity of modernising impulses and conflicts at junctures of these forces, the result of which are multiple modernities including regional ones. This perspective is typified by the work of, among others, Eisenstadt, Arnason and Kahn (Eisenstadt, 2002; Arnason, 2020; Kahn, 2006). In their work, each deploys an image of tension between conflict and integration within modernity itself, between all its different dimensions and between these dimensions and the civilisational backdrops against which these modernities develop. In this way, credence is given to the specific characteristics of regional and civilisational identities and geographies, and the way in which tensions and conflicts are constitutive of these.

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modernity  297 These tensions have entailed that the appropriation of occidental institutional patterns and ways of thinking and acting has neither been immediate nor straightforward. Rather, a continuous selection, re-interpretation and re-formulation of traditions and modernities have occurred that has given rise to new political and institutional arrangements and cultural programmes that have their own antinomies and tensions. As Eisenstadt has pointed out, these multiple points of intersection at economic, political and civilisational junctions have entailed the constant reconstruction of conceptions of collective identity, including positive and negative conceptions of others (Eisenstadt, 2002, 39). However, an emphasis on traditions, regional modernities and specific and long histories is not enough to tease out the theoretical horizon of the term multiple modernities. In the context of the formulation of multiple modernities, images and theories of modernity developed that emphasised the differentiation, competition and tension of specifically modern imaginations in ways that indicate that modernity cannot add up to either a totality or trajectories of development or underdevelopment. We can term these modern imaginations, following the works of Castoriadis and Taylor, social imaginaries (Castoriadis, 1987; Taylor, 2004). A social imaginary is not simply ‘ideological’, a representation of a material base or an economic condition. It is a cultural form and self-interpretation by the participants of their living reality that can never be fully explained or articulated. Yet, it is real in a very full, meaningful and socially organising sense. One modern social imaginary cannot be viewed as co-extensive with modernity. There are modern imaginaries that are capitalistic, political, state-centred, technological and aesthetic. My selection is neither extensive nor necessarily complete. One can always include other imaginaries such as the expansion of education, literacy and healthcare and health outcomes although these may be included under the formulation of (social) citizenship (Rundell, 2017; T.H. Marshall, 1950). These tensions have entailed that the appropriation of modern patterns of thinking, acting and institutionalisation has neither been immediate nor straightforward, irrespective of their occidental origins or otherwise. Rather, a continuous selection, re-interpretation and re-formulation of traditions and modern

imaginaries has occurred that has given rise to new economic, political, technological, institutional and aesthetic arrangements and cultural programmes that have their own intersections, antinomies and tensions. Modernity can, thus, be characterised as a dynamic form of specific and differentiating imaginaries, each with its own long history and historical self-understanding, spatial field and temporal horizon. It is this selfunderstanding that entails that the historical context cannot be separated from the way in which each imaginary is both constituted and viewed. In other words, these imaginaries combine both action and systemic dimensions, with the horizons of understanding constituting both the points of orientation, and intersection, for, and between, them. As indicated above, these social imaginaries include the general and global capitalisation of social life which revolves around a dual process of the subsumption of labour under capital and the extension of the formation of market-driven economies, mediated by the de-personalising money form and the restless, ceaseless expansion of the horizon of needs. There is also the imaginary of industrialisation which includes the explosion of, and control over, very heterogeneous processes of machine-driven technological innovation, including the technologisation of signs and the development of the functional division of labour, of which paid work and function are its expression. The autonomisation of art becomes the imaginary for the destruction of the traditional aesthetics of the sacred through the development of its own aesthetic codes, practices and innovations (of which Romanticism is only one) through which ideals or otherwise of transcendence, the beautiful, the sublime and even ugliness can be conveyed. It also becomes a basis for a critique of other imaginaries of modernity. The imaginary of nation-state formation also constitutes another aspect of modernity and within the European context, at least, consists historically in the developments of, firstly, the territorial consolidation of absolutist rulership with its imperial reach beyond Europe’s shores, and secondly, the nation state – a relative latecomer that has not been superseded. The logic of the nation state revolves around the control of control: not simply the developments of instruments of nation-state control – territorial boundaries, identity, professional armies, policing, John Rundell

298  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology professionalised administrative apparatuses, taxation – but the control of these instruments. The imaginary of modern democratisation and public spheres was constituted in the medieval cities outside the context of European state formation and inside the nation states themselves as an argument against the state’s capacity to absorb society. In the context of medieval cities, a republican image emerged in which politics was articulated as a model for the circulation and limitation of power and some forms of political representation, for example, direct versus corporatist democracies. In the context of European state formation, debates and conflicts emerged concerning the meaning and sovereignty of civil society, in which, minimally, it has been viewed as a separate field from the state freed from its regulatory intervention (the liberal argument), and maximally as the ground from which parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics and public spheres could be formed. The meaning and sovereignty of autonomous persons, together with the conceptual languages of universalisable democratic and human rights, became consolidated through ideas of political citizenship. The idea of political citizenship often stands in competition with national-juridical, social or welfarist and cosmopolitan versions of citizenship. This makes citizenship a point of condensation and tension between the imaginaries of the nation state and democracy in modernity (Rundell, 2017, 178). Modernity can, thus, be viewed as constituted by pluri-dimensional imaginaries in which there are irreducible tensions and conflicts between and within them. Thus, one particular social imaginary cannot be viewed as co-extensive with modernity. In other words, whilst this tension may appear as if one imaginary is being privileged against others, or that there is a tendency towards systemic re-unification and totalisation, nonetheless, there is an irreducibility of the tension in one sphere to other spheres and the irresolvability of tensions between spheres. The result is a paradox – a ‘system’ that is not a system. It is in this context that one can locate totalitarianism; it is an experiment not only in de-differentiation and an enforced expulsion of politics, but also an unfettered expansion of the control of the modern state’s instruments of control throughout all areas of social life. This interpretation of modernity, which emphasises the articulation of differentiated John Rundell

imaginaries and geo-political regions, spatial fields, temporal horizons and the competition and conflict between them, is also accompanied by an image of history that is a three-way conversation or series of competing interpretations between ideas of the past, present and future. Imaginaries and concepts of modernity (often tied to concepts of civilisation and culture) enable the transformation of ideas about history, which are also linked to questions of social identity. Imaginaries of modernity enabled the more generalisable questions of ‘who are we?’, ‘where are we coming from?’, and ‘where are we going to?’ to be raised in new and non-orthodox ways (Heller, 1993, Blumenberg, 1985). These questions, and hence the relation between past, present and future, are first asked in the famous dispute between the ancients and the moderns which was interpreted from a civilisational perspective. This debate first develops in the sixth century in which the concept of the modern referred not to a break in the cultural tradition of antiquity, but explicitly, to its uninterrupted continuity. However, beginning in the Renaissance, to be modern means the opposite – not imitation, nor recreation, but replacement through a rejection of what went before and the creation of new ways of thinking and doing (Schabert, 1985). This new modern sense of historical consciousness involved notions of progress typified at its height by Hegel’s philosophy of history in which the present built on the past by integrating it and moving irrevocably towards a positive future (Hegel, 1979). This positive image of progress finds its way into philosophical and political positions from Marxism and social evolutionism to functionalism. Its negative version, in which modernity represents a downward spiral of increasing degradation, alienation and dehumanisation, is articulated in the wake of two World Wars by such writers as Adorno and Benjamin (Adorno, 1973; Benjamin, 1979). However, a different consciousness of the modern has emerged alongside positive and negative philosophies of history that have taken what appear to be two divergent paths. One version looks similar to the older version of modern historical consciousness – but its emphasis is on long historical periods rather than a trajectory of progress. The modern historical consciousness of the long durée ‘history’ is not so much informed by but

modernity  299 constituted as historical junctures and figurations that occur in terms of hundreds of years and even millennia. In this sense, this historical consciousness of the long durée has affinities with the sweep of temporality that civilisational histories have with their own sense of the durability of Axial Age civilisations (Braudel, 1972/73; Elias, 2000). For Elias and Braudel, for example, the present is not so much an open question, or a causative effect, but a (re)-sedimentation of processes from which we are not immune, that still affect us, but which we are certainly not passive in the midst of. Another version posits that modernity disaggregates an assumed continuous relation between past, present and future. The present asks the question and directs the light on the so-called object of enquiry, which it, itself, constructs, thus driving the initial valueladen motivation to enquiry. In parallel, the texts of the longer history speak but in a mediated way. One does not enter or merge with history directly; one neither fuses with the past, nor extracts from it the correct meaning using the latest ‘archaeological’ technique. In this sense, too, the present ‘listens’ to ‘texts’ (documents, archives, books, data, monuments, grave sites and research excavations) in ways that speak differently to it depending on the question being asked and the position of the interlocutor. In other words, questioning, listening, speaking assume gaps between past and present that can never be filled nor crossed. Modernity and its pasts will shift and change. Interpretations are neither stable nor exhausted. Moreover, the activity of history is also a public heterodox activity. It is an argument between interlocutors located in the present and the past. This entails that there is never a community or agreement of interpretation, but a series of ongoing disputes from the standpoint of any particular present (Foucault, 1984). This emphasis on the clash of histories or historical consciousness is a recognition of a distinction between modernity’s long and short durées. The past and the present clash rather than repeat as comedies or ongoing tragedies (Marx, 1973; Adorno, 1973). A modernity of the long durée has an eye on its pasts including other traditions and civilisations and might be termed classical modernity which begins in the Renaissance; a modernity of the short durée, most notably identified as postmodernity which begins

after the disaster of World War One, is a modernity in which the question is always in front of itself. Modernity is a living combination of imaginaries and histories. It is filled by the perspectives and questions of each imaginary, each region, each interlocutor and interpreter who creates their own modernity. It all looks quite different depending on the position from which one is looking. It is also filled with tensions and paradoxes, including the constitutive conditions and relations between classical and postmodern modernities with their long and short durées, and the dawning realisation that these imaginaries and temporalities cannot be resolved or brought into alignment without great loss. John Rundell

References Adorno, Th. (1973). Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Arnason, J.P. (2020). The Labyrinth of Modernity: Horizons, Pathways and Mutations, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Benjamin, W. (1979). Illuminations, trans. H. Arendt. Glasgow: William Collins. Blumenberg, H. (1985). The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. R.M. Wallace. Boston: MIT Press. Braudel, F. (1972; 1973). The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vols. 1&2, trans. S. Reynolds. London: Collins. Castoriadis, C. (1987). The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. K. Blamey. Cambridge: Polity Press. Eisenstadt, S. (2002). ‘The Vision of Modern and Contemporary Society’. In Identity, Culture and Globalization, Eds. E. Ben-Rafael and Y. Sternberg. Leiden: Brill, pp. 25–48. Elias, N. (2000). The Civilising Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, trans. E. Jephcott, with some notes and corrections by the author, and ed. E. Dunning, J. Goudsblom and S. Mennell. Oxford: Blackwell. Foucault, M. (1984). ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. In The Foucault Reader, Ed. P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 76–100. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press. John Rundell

300  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Habermas, J. (1987). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hegel, G.W.F. (1979). The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heller, A. (1993). A Philosophy of History in Fragments, Oxford: Blackwell. Kahn, J.S. (2006). Other Malays Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern World, Singapore/Copenhagen, Singapore University Press and NIAS Press. Luhmann, N. (1982). The Differentiation of Modernity, New York: Columbia University Press. Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition, trans. G. Bennington and B.

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Massumi with a Forward by Frederic Jameson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Marshall, T.H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rundell, J. (2017). Imaginaries of Modernity. Politics, Cultures, Tensions, Abingdon: Routledge. Schabert, T. (1985). ‘Modernity and History I: What Is Modernity?’ In The Promise of History, Ed. A. Moulakis. New York: de Gruyter. pp. 9–21. https://doi. org/10.1515/9783110872439-002. Taylor, Ch. (2004). Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham: Duke University Press.

77. Modernization Modernization is an encompassing process of social transformation from tradition to modernity, which affects human thought and behavior in all domains of life, including the economic, sociocultural, and political spheres. In the economic sphere, modernization is represented by the transition from agricultural to industrial and post-industrial societies and includes changes in economic activities that are linked to increased occupational diversification, specialization, and division of labor. Modernization in the sociocultural sphere is defined by the increased accumulation of knowledge and its diffusion via mass education and mass communication (Huntington 1971, 286–287). It is further associated with higher rates of geographic mobility and urbanization. In the political sphere, the process of modernization is characterized by increased independence from traditional and religious authorities (secularization) that are replaced with a single secular national political authority. Together with economic modernization, the emergence of a bureaucratic state and the functional specialization of organizational subdivisions advance the spread of standardized procedures based on written documents via increased demand for rational accounting, measurement, and efficient organization. Political modernization further increases citizens’ participation in politics and the extent to which they are affected by politics (Huntington 1968, 34–35). Taken together, modern societies differ from traditional societies by the extent of control over the natural and social environment due to differential levels of scientific and technological knowledge and by the extent of the complexity and division of labor. Theories about economic, sociocultural, and political modernization emerged during the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century (Antoine de Condorcet, Edmund Burke, and Thomas R. Malthus) and are closely connected to the works of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber. After the Second World War, modernization theorists like Walt W. Rostow and Seymour M. Lipset dominated the discourse on social change and development until dependency and world-systems theories gained popularity in the late 1960s. Yet, modernization theories

revived in the 1990s after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent wave of democratization. The main hypothesis underlying modernization theory is that economic development, cultural change, and political change are linked in coherent patterns. The most recent conception of modernization theory is the evolutionary modernization theory (Inglehart 2018), which builds upon previous revised versions of modernization theory (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Evolutionary modernization theory argues that existential conditions determine human values, and as economic and physical conditions improve, individuals place more emphasis on personal and political freedoms making societies more tolerant, open, and egalitarian. When economic modernization significantly improves living conditions, young cohorts that grow up under conditions of higher economic and physical security place less emphasis on survival needs and more emphasis on freedom of choice, equality of opportunities, and citizen participation. The emancipatory dynamic of this shift in value priorities – the Silent Revolution (Inglehart 1977) – stimulates human empowerment, elite-challenging action, and democratic orientations. Conversely, by the same mechanism, the experience of economic and physical insecurity is conducive to cultural change toward xenophobia, in-group favoritism, and the persistence of traditional norms (Inglehart 2018, 8). Thus, cultural change occurs when younger and older generations have experienced differential levels of economic security and younger birth cohorts gradually replace older ones in the adult population. The intergenerational cultural differences are complemented by the diffusion of value change through the expansion of university education, processes of urbanization, and the media. Cultural modernization theories build upon the assumption that the effects of modernization on cultural change vary between industrial and post-industrial modernization. The transition from agricultural to industrial societies is mainly characterized by secularization and rationalization. Hence, the experience of increased technological control over the environment due to science and the eroding authority of traditional and religious institutions shape societies’ cultural orientation toward secular-rational values. At the same

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302  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology time, working conditions in industrialized societies create incentives that favor group conformity and obedience over individual autonomy and independence, giving rise to conformist values that put little emphasis on individual freedoms. Yet, despite citizens being more involved in politics (universal suffrage), industrial societies’ conformist orientation prevents a liberal democracy that goes beyond electoral participation and prevents individual and minority rights from emerging (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). By contrast, the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies shifts the center of economic activity to the service sector and increases the importance of knowledge, information, and autonomous decision-making. The experience of lower conformity pressures and higher independence of individuals changes the culture of post-industrialized societies toward value orientations that place emphasis on freedom of choice, equality of opportunities, and citizen voice. These values are at the center of the idea of democracy and make a transition from postindustrialized societies to liberal democracy more likely. In contrast to classic modernization theory, more recent conceptions avoid simplistic assumptions of economic or cultural determinism, linearity, and universal convergence toward secular-rational, egalitarian, or individualistic orientations (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This implies that the relationship between economic, cultural, and political developments is reciprocal and mutually supportive and that modern societies’ distinct traditional and religious cultural heritage coexists despite predictable adjustments to changes in living and working conditions. It also implies that modernization is a reversible process. Over several decades, comparative researchers have tested revised modernization theories and mapped cultural differences in value orientations between and within societies using survey data. One of the scholars that has contributed the most to this field of research is Ronald F. Inglehart. His work is directly linked to several large-scale survey data collection efforts including the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Values Study (EVS), and the Eurobarometer Survey. Inglehart’s Standard Four-Item MaterialismPostmaterialism battery is still an integral part of the WVS and the EVS that have Stefan Kruse

been conducted in more than 100 societies worldwide. Repeated analyses of this data have found that economic, cultural, and political change are linked in coherent patterns via intergenerational value shifts that are reinforced by higher levels of education, urbanization, migration, globalization, and female labor force participation. In particular, decades of increased economic and physical security in advanced industrial societies led to a rise of socially liberal and postmaterialist values that place emphasis on individual freedom (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000). As a result, traditional beliefs about sex, marriage, and the family have eroded and given rise to growing tolerance of outgroups of (previously) marginalized identities based on gender and sexuality (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Modernization further contributed to the secularization of authorities, the erosion of traditional religious practices, values, and beliefs, and the rise of new individualized forms of spirituality (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Inglehart 2021). The cultural changes of individuals’ value priorities have also induced changes in political institutions. The rise of postmaterialist values brought declining respect for traditional authorities, rising concern for environmental protection, and a growing emphasis on elite-challenging modes of political participation. These changes gave rise to environmentalist movements and Green parties in many advanced industrialized countries and paved the way for democracy to take root and consolidate (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013). Cross-cultural psychologists have repeatedly verified the linkages between social transformations and differences in attitudes, beliefs, and values. In his seminal comparative study of six developing countries (Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and East Pakistan), Alex Inkeles identified a common set of attitudinal and behavioral characteristics related to the process of modernization. The identified psychological elements of “individual modernity” include increased (1) openness to new experiences, both with people and with new ways of doing things; (2) independence from traditional and religious authorities; (3) belief in the efficacy of science and medicine; (4) ambition for oneself and one’s children to achieve high occupational

modernization  303 and educational goals; (5) rational attitude toward careful planning (future orientation); (6) active participation in local politics; and (7) interest in political matters of national or international scope (Inkeles 1969). In a review study, Kuo Shu Yang (1988) found further support for the psychological effects of modernization and distinguishes 20 characteristics that are correlated with social modernization.1 Based on this evidence Yang concludes that psychological orientations that are specifically functional for modern life converge across modernizing societies, while other traditional psychological characteristics remain unchanged and coexist with modern ones. Accordingly, adjustments to changing living and working conditions in modern societies lead to differential functional adaptations that shape cultural change. Research on the psychological effects of modernization regained momentum with the emerging study of collectivism and individualism. Evidence from this area confirms the finding of conditional psychological convergence, suggesting that modernization replaces certain traditional, collectivistic psychological qualities with modern, individualistic characteristics while others continue to coexist (Hofsteede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010; Greenfield 2016; Grossmann and Varnum 2015). Modernization theory experienced a resurgence in the 1950s and a revival in the 1990s. The relevance and evolution of modernization theory are best exemplified by the changes in development strategies that international agencies adopted to promote modernization and alleviate poverty by means of development assistance. In the phase of decolonization of African states, development thinking was dominated by economic modernization based on simple growth models, such as the Harrod–Domar model. According to this model, foreign aid was mainly spent on industrial and infrastructure projects such as roads and dams, assuming that capital and technology transfer creates growth and helps developing countries “catch up.” At the same time, modernization theorists, like Seymour M. Lipset (1959), claimed that economic modernization fosters democratization, providing another reason for giving foreign aid to developing countries. In the late 1960s, a consensus emerged that economic modernization does not necessarily translate into reduced poverty and made

donor organizations question the expected trickle-down effects of economic growth that modernization theory proposed. At the same time, dependency and world-system theorists argued that differences in modernization outcomes mainly result from a country’s positioning in the global economic system, unequal terms of trade, and colonialism. As a result, donors’ primary focus shifted towards the sociocultural aspects of modernization prioritizing poverty reduction and pro-poor policies that addressed education, health, food security, and housing issues. At the same time, emerging social movements placed issues of human rights, gender equality, and the ecological consequences of modernization at the center of the development discourse.2 The discourse on the limits to growth subsequently influenced the development and modernization discourse and marked the beginning of the sustainable development discourse. The preservation of ecosystem functioning became widely understood as an essential prerequisite for economic development, leading to a revised concept of modernization that incorporates ecological, economic, and social aspects of development. Political leaders of the Global South viewed the shift in development thinking toward basic needs and environmental concerns as an impediment to the structural transformation of the economy and thus industrial modernization. Furthermore, many developing countries pursuing import-substitutionbased industrialization strategies experienced a massive rise in debt burden due to rising interest rates in the early 1980s, prompting development strategists to advocate for policy reforms to “stabilize” the economy.3 At the same time, the concept of sustainable development, that is, the pursuit of sustainability, entered the development discourse complementing the traditional view of modernization with ecological, social, and distributional aspects of development.4 Growing concerns for environmental protection moved the concept center stage in the development discourse after the neoclassical paradigm dominated international development cooperation until the 1990s. It also stimulated the debate on (late) modernization as a necessary condition for ecological sustainability as proposed by ecological modernization theorists (York and Rosa 2003). Following the end of the Cold War, modernization theory was revived due to the Stefan Kruse

304  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology popular revolutions in Eastern Europe and the renewed interest in “people power.” After focusing on increased private-sector competition during the neoliberal turn, donors engaged in deepening political modernization and democratization processes by targeting the bureaucratic state and civil society. Public sector reforms were implemented that sought to change the values, attitudes, knowledge, and work ethics of public officials, aiming to increase government responsiveness (Eggen and Roland 2013). Additionally, donors increased support for NGOs to strengthen civil society’s role as a countervailing power against authoritarian governments and a control mechanism to improve government accountability. The contributions of modernization theory and cultural approaches have been widely cited and disputed, often on methodological grounds. Despite valid criticism, there is broad evidence supporting modernization theory’s key propositions that link economic and social transformations with changes in cultural values and democratic institutions (Welzel 2013; Ruck et al. 2020; Ruck, Bentley, and Lawson 2020). Improvements in data availability and methodological advancements will allow future studies to model the dynamics and the channels through which economic, cultural, and political changes operate and shed more light on the conditions under which modernization forms a distinctive syndrome that makes transitions to democracy more likely. In this regard, the sustainable development paradigm provides a fertile testing ground for evaluating modernization theory and the effectiveness of development interventions (Kruse 2024). Stefan Kruse

Notes 1.

The list of 20 modern psychological (mostly specific-functional) characteristics identified by Yang (1988) includes qualities that are strongly related to individualism and qualities that are unrelated to individualistic orientations. Modern psychological characteristics that are related to individualism include (1) a sense of personal efficacy, (2) low integration with relatives, (3) egalitarian attitudes, (4) openness to innovation and change, (5) belief in gender equality, (6) achievement motivation, (7) individualistic orientation, (8) independence or self-reliance, (9) active participation, (10) empathetic capacity, (11) propensity to take risks, and (12) non-local orientation. Conceptually rather unrelated to individualism are (13) tolerance of and respect for others, (14) cognitive and behavioral flexibility, (15) future

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orientation, (16) field independence, (17) need for information, (18) secularized beliefs, (19) preference for urban life, (20) educational and occupational aspirations. 2. The Club of Rome published an influential report on “The Limits to Growth,” simulating the future consequences of industrialization, demographic growth, food shortages, resource depletion, and environmental pollution. 3. The so-called Washington Consensus included the reduction of government spending and consumption, decreased imports, reduced subsidies for state-run businesses, increased private-sector competition, decentralization, and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The Washington Consensus relied on the assumption that unleashing markets and limiting the bureaucratic state are more efficient ways to modernity. 4. The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as: “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations 1987, 24). The idea of sustainable development thus combines the principles of intraand intergenerational distributive justice with the preservation of the natural environment.

References Eggen, Øyvind, and Kjell Roland. 2013. Western Aid at a Crossroads: The End of Paternalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot. Grossmann, Igor, and Michael E. W. Varnum. 2015. “Social Structure, Infectious Diseases, Disasters, Secularism, and Cultural Change in America.” Psychological Science 26 (3): 311–324. Greenfield, Patricia M. 2016. “Social Change, Cultural Evolution, and Human Development.” Current Opinion in Psychology 8: 84–92. Hofstede, Geert, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov. 2010. Cultures and Organizations. Cultures and Organizations. New York: Mc Graw Hill. Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1971. “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics.” Comparative Politics 3(3): 283–322. Inglehart, Ronald F. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald F. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald F. 2021. Religions’s Sudden Decline. What’s Causing It, and What Comes Next? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

modernization  305 Inglehart, Ronald F. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald F., and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, Ronald F., and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review 65(1): 19–51. Inglehart, Ronald F. 2018. Cultural Evolution. People’s Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inkeles, Alex. 1969. “Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries.” American Journal of Sociology 75(2): 208–225. Kruse, Stefan. 2024. How Ordinary Citizens Make Aid Work. Civic Engagement and Health Aid Effectiveness. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53(1): 69–105. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald F. Inglehart. 2011. Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics

Worldwide. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald F. Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Nations. 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. United Nations General Assembly Document A/42/427. Ruck, Damian J., R. Alexander Bentley, and Daniel J. Lawson. 2020. “Cultural Prerequisites of Socioeconomic Development.” Royal Society Open Science 7 (190725): 1–11. Ruck, Damian J., Luke J. Matthews, Thanos Kyritsis, Quentin D. Atkinson, and Alexander Bentley. 2020. “The Cultural Foundations of Modern Democracies.” Nature Human Behaviour 4: 265–269. Welzel, Christian. 2013. Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Yang, Kuo Shu. 1988. “Will Societal Modernization Eventually Eliminate CrossCultural Psychological Differences?” In Michael Harris Bond (Ed.), The CrossCultural Challenge to Social Psychology (pp. 67–85). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. York, Richard, and Eugene A. Rosa. 2003. “Key Challenges to Ecological Modernization Theory: Institutional Efficacy, Case Study Evidence, Units of Analysis, and the Pace of Eco-Efficiency.” Organization and Environment 16(3): 273–288.

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78. Multiculturalism

where all individuals are formally equal. For assimilationism, interculturalism and cosmopolitanism the political recognition of group difference is seen to undermine integration The term multiculturalism gets used in a vari- and equality. In contrast to these individual integrationety of senses. It is used to refer to the empirical or demographic reality of ethnic and cultural ist positions, multiculturalism emphasises diversity, a state approach to managing such the need for political recognition of ethnodiversity and fostering integration, a policy cultural groups and of group rights, and not orientation, the way in which people of differ- just formal legal equality between individuent ethnicities and cultures mix in their every- als and individual rights. How this works can day lives and a political theory. As a political vary between different national contexts, but idea and how this translates into policy, there the emphasis is on the idea that some groups are two main senses in which multicultural- require positive forms of respect and recogniism is theorised and used and which this entry tion and that this may vary between groups discusses: an approach to managing ethno- and across policy spheres. It is this that marks cultural and ethno-religious diversity and fos- multiculturalism as a distinct approach to tering equality and integration, and as a mode managing cultural diversity and to integraof thinking about secularism – although we tion, where the emphasis is more on a two-way should note that the ideas relevant here spring integration through which both minorities from the reality of multicultural populations and the majority are affected. In political theory, multiculturalism has and how best to foster inclusion and equality been developed predominantly in relation to in multicultural polities. Multiculturalism contrasts with alterna- North American and Western European contive approaches to ethno-cultural diversity texts, most notably through the work of theoand integration. Assimilation refers to a one- rists such as Charles Taylor (1994) and Will way process in which newcomers become Kymlicka (1995), with the Canadian context more like the majority population and do in mind, and Bhikhu Parekh (2006 [2000]) little to disturb the existing socio-cultural and Tariq Modood (2013 [2007]) with the norms and practices. The desired outcome British context in mind. The type of positive forms of recogniis that difference is gradually erased, with national identity conceived in homogenous tion multiculturalism is concerned with, and terms. Cosmopolitanism emphasises mul- its emphasis on groups and group recognitiple and fluid identities, primarily of indi- tion, emerge from two bases. The first is viduals. Cosmopolitanism also emphasises that minorities can suffer discrimination and the global over the national and deprivileges racism, which has a cultural and religious majority national cultures as well as minor- dimension (Sealy 2021), such as anti-Muslim ity group identities. It emphasises that people Islamophobia, and that there exist ethnic and should think of themselves as global citizens religious disparities in different policy areas and come together across categorical lines (Meer and Modood 2009). Identifying and of group difference. Interculturalism also addressing these requires some consideration emphasises multiple and fluid individual of ethno-cultural or ethno-religious groups. identities and rights. In its European vari- Policies might include laws on discrimination ant, it emphasises the local and global over or hate speech, or the inclusion of representathe national and often focuses on cities tion criteria for employers. The second is that group identities might (Cantle 2012; Zapata-Barrero 2019); while its Canadian variant developed in Quebec insists be positively valued and seen as highly sigon the national (Bouchard 2010). A core nificant by the groups themselves and can empirical premise of interculturalism is that therefore become the site from which claims different ethno-cultural groups do not mix for inclusion are made, and so these should across difference, and this needs to be encour- be respected on these grounds also. An examaged and fostered to ensure common values. ple here is some Indigenous groups and the These positions emphasise individualist forms Quebec region in Canada, which have speof integration, where institutional adjustments cially protected rights for greater degrees in relation to migrants or minorities are only of autonomy and self-governance. A differrelevant to claimants as individuals, and laws ent example is faith school provisions and and policies are conceived in general terms accommodations made for dress and dietary 306

multiculturalism  307 requirements for Muslims or Jews in Britain. Other examples might include language provision in public services or funding cultural activities of ethnic groups. There are two further strands that it is important to highlight here and which are related to the two bases just outlined. The first is multiculturalism and secularism. Religion has come to occupy a central role in debates around multiculturalism. In contrast to individual-integrationist positions that see religion as a problem of difference, or as a more private matter, multiculturalism highlights the importance of ethno-religious identities to some minorities and that public recognition and accommodation of religion can be important modes of inclusion (Modood 2019). Rather than denuding the public sphere of religion in the name of the formal equality of individuals, multiculturalism argues that existing arrangements and state-religion connections with dominant religions, such as those found in much of Western Europe between the state and Christian churches, should be extended to minorities. Faith school provision, noted above, is a relevant example here, and others would include recognising religious festivals and holidays and consulting religious organisations on public policy matters, especially those that most affect them. Although this is relevant to different religious minorities, it has been provoked by and developed the most in relation to Muslim minority populations. The second aspect to highlight here is that multiculturalists are interested in the making of a multicultural national identity that is inclusive of minority identities, a form of ‘multicultural nationalism’. This involves thinking of the national story in a way that includes minorities as important characters, not obscuring difference but weaving it into a common identity in which all can see themselves and that gives everyone a sense of belonging to one another (Modood 2013: 134–43). This posits hybrid or hyphenated identities as the desirable norm, so Italian Americans, British Asian, and so on. The idea of state multiculturalism emerged largely in response to patterns of immigration in the latter half of the twentieth century but also reflects particular contexts and histories. For a few examples: Canada, which was also concerned with national minorities such as the Quebecois and Indigenous groups, came to officially conceive itself as a multicultural

country through a declaration in 1971 and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988; multiculturalism was adopted as an official state policy in Australia in the 1970s to address the challenges and issues faced by migrants; in Britain, the concern has primarily been post-immigration populations who migrated from former colonies, especially from South Asia and the Caribbean, and who experienced continuing systemic racism; and in Singapore, since independence, the state has adopted an official policy which categorises people according to ethnicity and supports these different groups. In all cases, albeit differently, states have sought to integrate diverse populations through laws and policies aimed at fostering inclusion and addressing discrimination. Yet, as a form of policy and public discourse and as a theoretical idea, multiculturalism has come to be seen by many as having failed, or even as having caused certain social problems (see, for example, Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Multiculturalism has seen a retreat in policy statements in countries such as Britain and Australia in the last decade, where individualist forms of integration and majority culture have been re-emphasised. Moreover, a number of controversies around multiculturalism have been in relation to issues around secularism. Multiculturalism has been blamed for encouraging social segregation between different communities, allowing illiberal practices when it comes to matters such as free speech or sexist practices (honour killings, forced marriages, veiling, for instance) and even home-grown extremism and terrorism. These kinds of criticisms became prominent in public and political discourse particularly focussed on Muslims following high-profile events, such as the Rushdie Affair in Britain in 1989 or the ‘cartoon affairs’ in France and Denmark in the 2000s, and terrorist attacks such as 9/11 in the United States in 2001 and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. Religious dress, signs and symbols have become prominent sites of debate, and, in some countries, bans have been instituted in some public places, such as state schools (see, for example, Sealy and Modood 2022). ‘Majority rights’ has become a new site for critique and debate with multiculturalism, which has been accused of not taking sufficient regard for majorities and majority culture (Orgad and Koopmans, 2022). Similar Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy

308  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology criticisms have also been made in pro-diversity academic circles. These criticisms have come from those who adopt more individual integrationist positions, including cosmopolitan and interculturalist thinkers. For some, these criticisms of multiculturalism, both academic and political, do and should mark the end of multiculturalism. There are a few problems with this view, however. One is that the problems these criticisms refer to occur in countries that have never adopted multiculturalism, such as France. A further problem with the focus on individuals against groups is that processes of discrimination and disparities rooted in structural discrimination across a number of policy areas show that certain groups are disadvantaged. A framework that does not consider groups as an important unit of analysis will, therefore, struggle to address the issues. Also, as mentioned above, multiculturalists would emphasise that group identities that are valued and claimed by minorities themselves, and which can be a way of challenging forms of discrimination, should be respected. These criticisms also demonstrate a lot of confusion over what multiculturalism is. In these criticisms, multiculturalism is defined by its critics, but these characterisations do not accurately reflect what multiculturalists themselves say multiculturalism is. For instance, arguments that multiculturalism necessarily entrenches separation between different ethno-cultural groups ignore the central principle of dialogue (or ‘multi’-logue) and national identity in the thought of multiculturalists. While multiculturalists have come to recognise their focus on minorities and not also the majority (Modood 2014), they have also shown how a positive view of the majority is consistent with multiculturalism within the idea of an inclusive ‘multicultural nationalism’ (Modood 2020). A final problem with these criticisms is that while multiculturalism has become a problematic term when it comes to political and policy discourse, policies consistent with multiculturalism have not in fact receded in the last couple of decades and in some cases have increased. In governance and policy ideas from interculturalism have become increasingly influential, featuring explicitly at the level of the Council of Europe, EU and in some countries, such as Spain. In Britain, an emphasis on contact and mixing and on common values has become prominent in Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy

policy, although the term interculturalism is not used. Yet, these policies influenced by interculturalist thinking have been added but have not completely replaced multicultural policies (Mathieu 2017). Indeed, measures that foster contact and mixing are on their own not in contradiction with multiculturalism. Many governments continue to work with group data, consultations, engagement, representation and accommodations. These form important parts of how (in)equality and inclusion are measured and addressed. Analysis of policies in 21 countries between 1980 and 2020 shows that only three countries had a lower score on multicultural policies in 2020 than they did in 2000 (Multiculturalism Policy Index n.d.). More syncretic thinking between different pro-diversity positions of which multiculturalism is a central part is an emerging area of theory too (Fossum et al. 2023). These trends suggest that multiculturalism, despite the controversies and noise that have come to surround it, will remain a significant political idea and orientation for thinking about equality and diversity. Tariq Modood and Thomas Sealy

References Bouchard, G. (2010) “What is interculturalism?” McGill Law Journal, 56(2), 435–468. Cantle, T. (2012) Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Fossum, J. E., Kastoryano, R., Modood, T., and Zapata-Barrero, R. (2023). Governing diversity in the multilevel European public space. Ethnicities, 14687968231158381. Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mathieu, F. (2017) “The failure of state multiculturalism in the UK? An analysis of the UK’s multicultural policy for 2000– 2015.” Ethnicities, 18(1), 43–69. Meer, N. and Modood, T. (2009) “Refutations of racism in the ‘Muslim question’.” Patterns of Prejudice, 43(3–4), 335–354. Modood, T. (2013[2007]) Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press. Modood, T. (2014) “Multiculturalism, interculturalisms and the majority.” Journal of Moral Education, 43(3), 302–315.

multiculturalism  309 Modood, T. (2019) Essays on Secularism and Multiculturalism, London: Rowman and Littlefield. Modood, T. (2020) “Multiculturalism as a new form of nationalism?” Nations and Nationalism, 26(2), 308–313. Multiculturalism Policy Index: https://www​. queensu​.ca​/mcp/. Orgad, L. and Koopmans, R. (2022) Majorities, Minorities and the Future of Nationhood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parekh, B. (2006[2000]) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sealy, T. (2021) “Islamophobia: With or without Islam?” Religions, 12(6), 369.

Sealy, T. and Modood, T. (2022) “Western Europe and Australia: Negotiating freedoms of religion.” Religion, State and Society, 50(4), 378-395. Taylor, C. (1994) “The politics of recognition”. In Multiculturalism and “the Politics of Recognition”: An Essay, edited by Amy Gutmann, 25–73, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. (2010) The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices, London: Routledge. Zapata-Barrero, R. (2019) Intercultural Citizenship in the Post-Multicultural Era, London: Sage.

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79. Nationalism Nationalism is an umbrella term, referring to specific forms of consciousness (national consciousness), identity (national identity), and socio-political order (nation). In the first place, it is a form of consciousness, a way of seeing and, therefore, constructing, reality: both the social order on the collective level (nation) and its microcosm on the individual level (national identity) are reflections of the national consciousness. Historically, nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon, only about half a millennium old. From the moment of the emergence of nationalism in the sixteenth century, social processes fundamentally and noticeably change, as a result of which a new, distinct period begins in history – modern history. Nationalism forms the cultural framework of modernity: everything characteristically modern, from modern society, politics, and economy to modern personal relations and existential experiences, is a product of nationalism. Nationalism, therefore, without any exaggeration, is the most important social and political phenomenon of our time (Greenfeld 1992, 2016, 2019). The essence of nationalism lies in its vision of the social reality: the social world is seen as consisting of sovereign communities of fundamentally equal members. It is such communities that are called “nations.” This makes nationalism a secular and egalitarian consciousness and places it in contrast to the essentially religious consciousness dominant when it emerged in Europe where it emerged, in which sovereignty belonged to God, who in His wisdom divided societies into separate and unequal orders of human beings, as different between them as we imagine species of animals to be different. All the characteristic features of modernity derive from the image of the social world as in-essence secular and consisting of sovereign communities of fundamentally equal members in nationalism. Secularism, popular sovereignty, and egalitarianism imply that the individual becomes one’s own maker and is free to decide on one’s own identity and way of life. Thus, the core modern values of freedom and equality are implications of nationalism. Popular sovereignty in conjunction with equality, specifically, constitutes democracy

– liberal democracy, when combined with individual freedom, authoritarian democracy, when individual freedom is limited. This means not only that modern democracy is the creation of nationalism, but that every nation is, by definition, a democracy. But democracy comes in two different forms, and each nation, naturally, insists that its form is the “true” democracy. Which form democracy takes in a nation depends on the type of nationalism which produces it. Three types of nationalism have developed within the monotheistic civilization in which nationalism originally emerged. These types are individualisticcivic type of nationalism, collectivistic-civic type of nationalism, and collectivistic-ethnic type of nationalism. The type of nationalism depends on the circumstances in which national consciousness develops in any particular case, specifically whether these circumstances favor the definition of the nation as a composite entity – an association of individuals – or as a unitary entity – a collective individual – and whether the belief is that the membership in the nation is voluntary, on the one hand, or biologically inherent, on the other (Greenfeld 1992). The combination of the composite definition of the nation with the voluntary idea of national membership produces individualistic-civic type of nationalism. The original nationalism, which emerged in England in the sixteenth century, was of this type. It logically stresses individual freedom and, therefore, produces institutions (ways of thinking and acting) which safeguard it, favors liberal democracy. The combination of the unitary definition of the nation as a collective individual (with its own interests and will, independent of the interests and wills of the human individuals in it) with the voluntary idea of national membership produces an ambivalent, logically inconsistent collectivistic-civic type. This type first emerged in France in the eighteenth century. The turbulent political history of France, which within the recent two centuries has at times presented paradigmatic examples of both authoritarian democracy and liberal democracy, reflects the ambivalence of its nationalism. Finally, the combination of the unitary definition of the nation as a collective individual with the idea that one’s nationality (national membership) is biologically inherent, transmitted by blood, produces collectivistic-ethnic nationalism. It emerged

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nationalism  311 first in Russia in the eighteenth century and became the most widespread type of nationalism (Ibid.). The majority of nations in the monotheistic civilization (if not the world) were constructed on the basis of collectivistic-ethnic national consciousness. In contrast to the other two types, consistently limiting individual freedom, collectivistic-ethnic nationalism invariably generates authoritarian democracy. This type of nationalism is the consciousness behind modern authoritarian (and by extension, totalitarian) regimes, whether left, such as the Soviet Union, or right, such as National Socialist Germany. It is worth noting that, when this consciousness is formalized as explicit ideology, it is referred to in collectivistic-ethnic nations of both left and right as “socialism.” All modern political ideologies are formalized articulations of nationalism. Socialism is the ideology of collectivistic nationalism, in general, and so is communism. Many societies can be characterized as socialist, none as communist; communism is an ideology of an ideal society. Classical liberalism was the ideology of individualisticcivic nations, while in two paradigmatic cases of Italy and Spain, collectivistic-civic nationalism was formalized as fascism (Greenfeld 2016, 2019). Contrary to the common notion that nationalism is the modern iteration of the natural (socially atavistic) phenomenon of ethnicity – the sense of belonging to a certain group, membership in which is hereditary, the concept of ethnicity (referring to such a phenomenon) is, instead, a product of collectivistic-ethnic nationalism. Ethnicity, therefore, is an essentially modern phenomenon, and nationalism is older than ethnicity. As an explicit concept, “ethnicity” is a recent scholarly invention. Before it appeared, the term “race” was employed to express it. This means that racism – the belief that one’s identity is natural, innate, and transmitted by blood – is also a product of collectivistic-ethnic nationalism and, indeed, is characteristic of collectivistic-ethnic nations. In contrast, this belief, and social attitudes reflecting it, are quite foreign to civic nationalisms, which, in principle, regard membership in a nation, and therefore one’s identity, as a matter of individual choice. Among other things, this means that while racism was of the essence of National Socialism (i.e., Nazism), and while the Soviet Union was openly racist despite

the international character of its communist ideology, racism was uncharacteristic of the Fascist regimes in either Italy or Spain (Ibid.). Nationalism itself is a product of a historical accident, not of immanent laws of history: its emergence was unexpected and unpredictable. The specific accident which brought it into being was the Wars of the Roses in fifteenth-century England, as a result of which the upper stratum of English society – the feudal aristocracy – was for all intents and purposes wiped out. In the consciousness of the period, this stratum differed categorically from the rest of society and, thanks to its special nature, occupied positions and fulfilled very important responsibilities which no one from other (lower) strata could occupy and fulfill. Unlike the aristocracy, the lower strata were common. They were referred to as “people,” the word having the meaning of “plebs” or “rabble.” However, suddenly members of the plebs were occupying the positions of the aristocracy and fulfilling their responsibilities since the physical destruction of the aristocrats did not eliminate the social need for such fulfillment. The vacancy at the top of the social hierarchy brought on mass upward mobility, which could not be understood in terms of the prevailing consciousness and required rationalization. It was rationalized with the help of the concept “nation,” in the late Middle Ages a term for factions representing various potentates at the Church Councils, where the collective fate of the respublica Christiana was discussed – and decided. These ecclesiastical “nations” were tiny groups of an enormous political and cultural authority, the wielders of sovereignty in fact. At a certain moment in the early sixteenth century, the terms “people” and “nation” were equated in English, which elevated the common people to the dignity of the elite, making commoners essentially equal to the dignitaries (and every commoner a potential dignitary) and, collectively, the holder of sovereignty (Greenfeld 1992). The core institutions of modern society and politics, the class stratification system and the state, derive directly from this symbolic revolution (the definition of the people as a nation) and are present in every nation, irrespective of the type of nationalism. The modern system of stratification is logically implied in the principle of fundamental equality of membership in a nation. Liah Greenfeld

312  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology An egalitarian society does not mean an unstratified society, or a society in which there are no inequalities: all societies are stratified, among other things because, as a matter of fact, all men (and women) are not created equal. But national consciousness makes us believe that they are, and our belief in natural equality creates a stratification system that is dramatically different from other stratification systems, a fluid and open system, in contrast to others that are rigid and closed, a system characterized by social mobility. In distinction to closed systems of social stratification, the bearer of status in the modern one – called class system – is the individual, not the family, and the foundations of status – wealth and education in its case – are achievement-based and therefore transferable, in distinction to birth or blood-relations, on which status is based in other systems, which are ascriptive and thus cannot be transferred between unrelated families. The system of social stratification regulates social relations across all spheres of life; its nature is, therefore, reflected in all the other social institutions, which makes equality the central modern value and explains our obsessive preoccupation with the smallest transgressions against it. The state is logically implied in the principle of popular sovereignty. Today we tend to use the words “state” and “government” as synonyms. But the word “state” came to refer to government only after the emergence of nationalism and, as a new addition to the political vocabulary, designated a new form of government. In distinction to kingship, for instance, which is a personal government, state government is impersonal. It is always a government by officials, representing an impersonal, thus abstract, authority and so, essentially, a representative government. The values of equality and popular sovereignty, in stark contrast from those underlying rigid social stratification and personal government, necessarily involve the population in the political process. In every modern society, whether liberal or authoritarian, people of all social strata participate in elections (however these may be organized) and referenda and may ascend to the political leadership. These forms of participation are connected and feed into the state. In addition, nationalism is responsible for two Liah Greenfeld

other characteristic modern forms of political activism: civil society and revolution. Liberal democracies encourage widespread political activity independent from the state and often organized vis-à-vis it, which may be confrontational as well as cooperative. Authoritarian democracies offer significantly fewer civil outlets for the political energies of their populations, which, as democracies, they necessarily encourage. The possibility to spend these energies through civil society results in generally lower levels of collective violence in liberal democracies. In authoritarian democracies, pent up by comparison, they periodically erupt in violent group conflicts and, rarely but spectacularly, in revolutions. Revolutions differ dramatically from spontaneous popular rebellions as well as from more or less limited elite revolts, which are common throughout history. They are not direct expressions of material deprivations and do not pursue the specific interests of their participants and leaders or advocate specific changes. Instead, they are organized conscious attempts at the transformation of the entire social and political order, beginning with the destruction of the existing one. With revolutions, ideology assumes the center stage in politics writ large, with the core values always being equality, liberty, and popular sovereignty. In this sense (which is the sense in which the word is understood today) revolutions are only possible within the cultural framework of nationalism (Greenfeld 2016, 2019). In the last half a century, nationalism, which emerged and for the first 400 years of its existence developed within monotheistic civilization, rooted itself in the two other civilizations of the world, the Chinese and the Indian ones. Chinese and Indian nationalism cannot be characterized without further study, but it is clear that equality is less important in them. Liah Greenfeld

References Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1992. Liah Greenfeld, Advanced Introduction to Nationalism, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: A Short History, Brookings Institution Press, 2019.

80. Neoliberalism Neoliberalism looks different in different locations and is never fully realized, but, in its essence, it is the creation of market societies, societies managed by markets. However, neoliberalism is also much more than markets, money, and commodities. While laissez-faire ideologues celebrated free markets and condemned states, neoliberalism is an approach to government, which uses markets to govern. To do so, neoliberalism requires the active protection of existing markets and the expansion of new markets into realms formerly organized by non-market logics. For example, this expansion may occur through the privatization of education, social security, medical insurance and care, and public housing, which become realms of corporate control and profit-making. Public-private partnerships and budgetary austerity can further integrate market logics throughout the state and across governance structures. Moreover, international governmental and non-governmental organizations may expand market logics on a global scale. This entry speaks to the concerns of political sociologists by discussing the neoliberal transformations of states, governance structures, citizenship, sovereignty, political parties, social movements, and, most importantly, democracy. Scholars developed three primary narratives about the origins of neoliberalism. First, French theorist Michel Foucault ([1978-1979) 2008) understood neoliberalism as emerging from 1950s German ordoliberalism and economists at the University of Chicago. This narrative focuses on the individual managed within an expanding entrepreneurial market society. Second, Marxists have understood neoliberalism as a class project developed by capitalists during the 1970s economic crisis to reestablish their power (Harvey 2005). This narrative has its origins in Latin America and focuses on the expansion of US hegemony. Third, scholars more recently have argued that an exclusive focus on white men in the US and the capitalist core incorrectly assumes their efficacy in forming policy and spreading hegemony. In fact, elites around the world continually create neoliberalism within domestic and international political battles (Connell and Dados 2014). Scholars have productively brought these narratives together

and have moved the field forward through a series of debates. Neoliberalism fundamentally changes the nature of the state and the way it governs. As scholars have shown, the state does not disappear or necessarily shrink. Political sociologists have documented the 1970s move away from the welfare state or the nascent developmentalist states beyond Europe toward a state founded on market-based solutions. Building on the work of Foucault, scholars argue that this market-fundamentalist state turns away from politics, citizenship, and sovereignty and toward governing the population through markets and encouraging an entrepreneurial rationality that colonizes the political sphere and the individual (Brown 2015). In neoliberalism, the state distributes benefits according to a market logic of efficiency, competitiveness, and profitability. According to Loïc Wacquant (2009), the neoliberal state both nurtures wealthy populations and violently manages the poor by actively encouraging segregation, dismantling social programs relevant to them, and criminalizing them. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, microfinance institutions, and corporations join the state in networks of neoliberal governance. The repercussions of neoliberalism have resulted in what Choudry and Kapoor (2013) call the “NGOization” of societies. In the absence of public support from the state, NGOs have become a pipeline of social services assistance. The ascendancy of NGOs correlates with neoliberalism’s move away from government aid and toward the market as driver of development. Elyachar (2005) cautions, however, that NGOs, the state, and international organizations work together in “one field of power”. Within these public-private networks, citizens and other residents are forced to manage themselves and to become entrepreneurs in their own lives, making choices within a highly volatile world and taking individual responsibility for their failures. They must negotiate and compete with each other, which leaves certain groups excluded from state provision. On an international level, state sovereignty changes. International governmental and non-governmental organizations can further expand market logics on a global scale. As Linda Weiss (1997) has shown, powerful imperial states can strengthen their sovereignty, while coercing other states to give up

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314  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology their sovereignty, which they may have never really had. In the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank implemented structural adjustment policies, which required that indebted countries reduce state budgets (austerity), privatize state industries, and deregulate and liberalize their economies in order to lure foreign capital investment. These policies were advocated as ways for governments to pay back debts. Structural adjustment policies reduced state sovereignty and expanded neoliberal governance. These policies had such negative social, political, and economic consequences and led to mass protests that they were redesigned numerous times. With the transformation of the state, there is a deep concern among political sociologists that neoliberalism undermines substantive democracy and real political participation. Political sociologists have demonstrated the professionalization of political parties and the rise of expertise at the expense of grassroots participation. The neoliberal state may enhance social actors’ political capacity and activism, which may transform social relations in potentially liberatory ways (Shucksmith et al. 2021). However, neoliberal ideologues are most alarmed by active democratic participation. They seek to diminish this participation and democratic space, replacing it with constitutions, automated systems, and market mechanisms that colonize democracy. Democratic values such as liberty and equality are reduced to market “freedom” and competition (Brown 2015). Political parties themselves have played key roles in the rise of neoliberalism. Early studies of neoliberalism focused on the influence of transnational networks of right-wing groups in converting right-wing politicians to neoliberalism worldwide. These studies explored the Mont Pelerin Society, influential economists like Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, the University of Chicago economics department, think tanks, publishing houses, and the US Republican Party led by Ronald Reagan and the British Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher as political advocates of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005; Mirowski 2013). However, many scholars have since questioned whether these groups merely offered ideological legitimacy to a wide range of ad hoc market-based, conservative strategies to cope domestically

with global financial crises (Connell and Dados 2014; Hay 2018). Stephanie Mudge (2016) has shown that there may be “neoliberalism without neoliberals.” She and many others have noted that center-left parties, like the US Democratic Party, have also actively participated in neoliberalizing projects. In a variety of countries, the labor movement and labor parties have also participated in these projects, to the detriment of the interests of the rank and file. Verónica Gago (2017) has discussed “neoliberalism from below.” Neoliberalism wends its way into the informal economy as in the case of marginalized Bolivian immigrants adopting neoliberal logic into their market practices, demonstrating that neoliberalism does not just come from anti-state, promarket actors from above. Béla Greskovits (1998) demonstrated that during socialism, Eastern European countries had their own “homegrown” neoliberal economists, whose ideas converged with those of advisors in the World Bank. In contrast, Johanna Bockman (2011) has argued that these economists were likely experimenting with new forms of “homegrown” socialism, which only appear neoliberal. After 1989, former communist parties and political parties more generally in the region took on more typical neoliberal projects. Conservative parties have turned, or returned, to racist, patriarchal nationalisms. While some commentators have suggested that these parties have rejected neoliberalism, scholars have generally agreed that this is a new kind of neoliberalism (Callison and Manfredi 2020). Thus, we now see global neoliberal nationalisms in battle with global neoliberalism, as manifested in the polarization of the US Republican and Democratic Parties each with their own global networks. These party politics, often between elites at the expense of the rest of the population, make neoliberalism look different in each country. Scholars have documented the many social movements formed in opposition to neoliberalism. In his 1944 book The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi argued that attempts to create market societies always provoke countermovements to protect society from marketization. The global justice movement, one of the most well-known examples, mobilized massive protests against the neoliberal policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World

Johanna Bockman and Margaret Zeddies

neoliberalism  315 Trade Organization (WTO). These social movements have also played a role in stopping certain aspects of neoliberalism, such as the privatization of water and extreme budget austerity. As a result, neoliberalism looks different everywhere due to the work of social movements. Neoliberal forces use NGOization and discourses of rights, civil society, and development to politically control social movements and narrow democracy. As Kamat (2004) shows, the extension of the NGO sphere encircles possibilities for social change within limiting structures that undermine democracy. NGOs often maintain hierarchies of class and power through the very structures of neoliberal resource distribution. Scholars have continually suggested that neoliberalism might have already ended. There was the 2008 global financial crisis and then a proliferation of social movements and political parties – on the right and on the left – criticizing neoliberalism. The question is whether these movements are creating alternatives to or new forms of neoliberalism. For example, global neoliberal nationalism is the far-right appropriation of neoliberalism (Callison and Manfredi 2020). However, J. K. Gibson-Graham (2006) has criticized “capitalocentrism,” a tendency to see neoliberal capitalism as already everywhere. Recognizing socialist alternatives to neoliberalism is necessary in a world in which social movements and political leaders seek new socialist models, like participatory budgeting, the solidarity economy, and other “real utopias.” Johanna Bockman and Margaret Zeddies

References Bockman, Johanna. 2011. Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Brown, Wendy. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books. Callison, William, and Zachary Manfredi. 2020. Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture. New York: Fordham University Press. Choudry, Aziz, and Dip Kapoor. 2013. NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects. London: Zed Books.

Connell, Raewyn, and Nour Dados. 2014. “Where in the World Does Neoliberalism Come From? The Market Agenda in Southern Perspective.” Theory and Society 43(2):117–138. Elyachar, Julia. 2005. Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Foucault, Michel. [1978–1979]. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979. New York: Palgrave. Gago, Verónica. 2017. Neoliberalism from Below: Popular Pragmatics and Baroque Economies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Gibson-Graham, J. K. 2006. A Postcapitalist Politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Greskovits, Béla. 1998. The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: Eastern European and Latin American Transformations Compared. Budapest: Central European University Press. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hay, Colin. 2018. “Brexit and the (Multiple) Paradoxes of Neoliberalism.” Pp. 15–21 in Destabilizing Orders: Understanding the Consequences of Neoliberalism. Proceedings from the MaxPo FifthAnniversary Conference, edited by Jenny Andersson and Olivier Godechot. Paris: Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies. http://www​ . maxpo​ . eu ​ / pub ​ / maxpo ​ _ dp ​ / maxpodp18​-1​.pdf. Kamat, Sangeeta. 2004. “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a Neoliberal Era.” Review of International Political Economy 11(1):155–176. Mirowski, Philip. 2013. Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso. Mudge, Stephanie L. 2016. “Neoliberalism, Accomplished and Ongoing.” Pp. 93–104 in Handbook of Neoliberalism, edited by Simon Springer, Kean Birch, and Julie Macleavy. London: Routledge. Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.

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316  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Shucksmith, Mark, Simin Davoudi, Liz Todd, and Mel Steer. 2021. “Conclusion: Hope in an Age of Austerity and a Time of Anxiety.” Pp. 257–274 in Hope under Neoliberal Austerity: Responses from Civil Society and Civic Universities, edited by Mel Steer, Simin Davoudi, Mark Shucksmith, and Liz Todd. Bristol: Policy Press.

Wacquant, Loïc. 2009. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Weiss, Linda. 1997. “Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State.” New Left Review 225:3–27.

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81. New politics and postmaterialism

post-industrial type of society. This change was progressively modifying the political cultures following the gradual demographic pace of cohort replacement. At the initial stages, this change created visible tensions between young cohorts holding new values and older The concept of ‘new politics’ emerged dur- individuals still clinging to more traditional ing the 1970s when political scientist Ronald schemas. It was a conflict between a social Inglehart (1971) proposed an explanation minority of value pioneers against a hegembased on a silent value change to the new onic majority with an important influence in political realities experienced in Western shaping the social norms. However, as time Europe that manifested in events such as the passed, cohort replacement transformed the 1968 student protest movements. Inglehart social landscape in aggregate terms, and what (1977) suggested that a new conflict was was once a minority became an increasing emerging with the power to structure politi- majority. This ‘silent revolution’ ended up cal competition, especially among the young gradually but radically renovating the politipopulation. This new dimension, compared to cal makeup of Western societies. For some, it the old cleavages, shaped preferences based is probably behind current political developon materialist (originally ‘acquisitive’) and ments such as the cultural backlash, the rise postmaterialist values (‘post-bourgeois’, as of populism, or increased polarization (e.g., also coined by Inglehart). Many thought that Norris & Inglehart 2019). Demographically, its emergence would eventually displace the the youths of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s traditional cleavage politics and even the represent today’s ruling class in many counprominence of the left-right in the political tries. As a result of mere cohort replacement, realm. New politics stood in sharp contrast to most of the population in the West is now old politics. The post-war period of the 1950s more inclined toward postmaterialist values; and 1960s in Western Europe was character- values that were then on the fringe are today ized by political stability, described as ‘the mainstream (see Norris & Inglehart 2019, p. freezing of party systems’ by Lipset and 37), such as gender equality or more flexible Rokkan (1967), which largely reflected the moral norms in the personal-sexual domain cleavage structures of the previous decades. (Inglehart et al. 2017). Electorates were opting for the same major According to Inglehart’s theory (1977, parties in a rather stable way from election 1987), the roots of new politics are to be to election (Rose & Urwin 1970). Voters’ and found in deep structural changes that conparties’ positions on the classical conflicts of nect political culture with major processes the past—that is, between the center/periph- of modernization. Inglehart’s theory rests on ery, the urban/rural, the church/state, and the two main hypotheses. The scarcity hypothowner/worker—shaped political conflict. esis follows Maslow’s idea of a hierarchy of With the arrival of new parties, protest needs, which argues that people tend to put groups, and new social movements, the idea of higher priority on needs that are in short supnew politics gained momentum. In the 1980s, ply. Thus, individuals care about higher-order it became a usual trait of West European needs when they have already fulfilled their political systems (e.g., Müller-Rommel 1989). most basic ones. The gradual socioeconomic Political scientists detected volatility, dea- modernization and the expansion of the wellignment, unconventional political behavior, fare state since World War II in the Western a breakdown in traditional party loyalties world led to a decreasing worry about mateand voting patterns, and the emergence of rialist needs, such as economic and physical new parties and the erosion of old ones—the security, and a growing concern for postmaunfreezing of party systems (see Scarbrough terialist needs (the higher order ones), like 1995). The old order of cleavage politics was freedom, self-expression, or quality of life. thought to have been displaced by new con- However, the social change in value prioriflicts centered around values. ties is not meant to happen quickly, but rather According to Inglehart (e.g., 1990, following the slow process underlined by the with Welzel 2005), all these changes were generational hypothesis. People are supposed connected to a specific source: a deep to acquire their value priorities during their transformation in advanced capitalist democ- impressionable years, in between late adolesracies transitioning from an industrial to a cence and early adulthood, and remain largely 317

318  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology attached to them from then on. Crucially, aggregate value change takes place through demographic cohort replacement. Yet, value change happens increasingly by means of period effects (irrespective of age and cohort), going in the same direction as cohort trends (Tormos 2019).1 During the post-war years, Western countries provided physical security to their citizenry, bringing about a value change led by younger postmaterialist cohorts who had not experienced the tougher formative experiences of their elders. Studies have accumulated abundant empirical evidence on the increasing adoption of postmaterialist values among younger cohorts in economically developed countries. According to Inglehart, the confrontation of materialist and postmaterialist values had the capacity to become central to political conflict, to endure as a divide, and to be able to influence party competition. This new value dimension was supposed to have the potential to be as relevant as traditional cleavages. Inglehart and others have employed the term ‘new value cleavage’ to refer to this structure of political conflict (e.g., Inglehart 1987). But can it properly be considered a cleavage? There is still a vivid debate on whether we can classify the materialist-postmaterialist value opposition as a new cleavage. It is usually considered that three conditions must be met (see Bartolini & Mair 1990). It must have a structural, normative, and organizational/ behavioral component. In other words, the division must entail identifiable social groups, that share common interests and values, and are institutionalized in some form of organization. To some extent, the materialist-postmaterialist opposition fits this conception of a cleavage: the new middle classes and whitecollar workers tend to be more postmaterialist than the working class and old middle classes; the normative component is self-evident; and postmaterialists are more inclined to take part in unconventional or non-electoral forms of participation, support new social movements (environmental, gender equality, LGTBIQ+), and vote for green parties, new left or centrist parties that emphasize environmental topics, or left-wing parties in general (Scarbrough 1995). Although this value dimension has played an important role in vote choice since the 1970s (Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995), it is still unclear that its power is equivalent to the economic leftright divide, or that postmaterialists carry a Toni Rodon and Raül Tormos

sense of common identity (Schoultz 2017). To complicate things further, other possible value cleavages have been identified, such as a libertarian–authoritarian dimension (Flanagan 1987) or an integration–demarcation dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008). The new social groups that hold postmaterialist values like younger cohorts, new middle classes, and the highly educated are also those less clearly aligned along traditional class and religious divides (Dalton 2002). The emergence of new poles of conflicts, such as the rural–urban divide, globalization, or automation can further put pressure on traditional values and lay the ground for the strengthening of new politics (Lachait 2017). Aside from Inglehart’s opposition between materialist and postmaterialist values, there are alternative approaches to ‘new politics’, such as that of Flanagan’s libertarian-authoritarian value cleavage (1987). Yet, there is a vivid debate as to whether Flanagan’s dimensions are orthogonal to the traditional leftright economic dimension. Flanagan supports the idea that two distinct value cleavages should be identified. The first one centers on the importance of economic concerns over non-economic ones and represents an opposition between ‘old politics’ and ‘new politics’. The second value dimension is an opposition within new politics between authoritarian and libertarian stances. Flanagan identifies three groups of citizens: the ‘libertarians’, the ‘authoritarians’, and the ‘materialists’. The libertarians correspond to what Inglehart calls the postmaterialists and give more importance to non-economic goals and take culturally liberal positions. The authoritarians also emphasize non-economic issues but favor authority, law, and order, as well as traditional moral and religious values. Both libertarians and authoritarians belong to the new politics domain, unlike materialists. Other authors have analyzed the capacity of ‘new politics’ to structure political conflict. The most common is that electoral competition is structured by two dimensions (see Kitschelt 1994). One corresponds to the classical left–right economic axis and is akin to the traditional class cleavage. The second dimension is structured by non-economic issues, and there is less agreement regarding their exact nature. Overall, however, it is thought to correspond to Flanagan’s libertarianauthoritarian value divide. Figure 1 illustrates the rising salience of the cultural dimension

new politics and postmaterialism  319

Note:   Proportion of reference to each type of issue in party manifestos weighted by party vote share in the most recent election for each country. Source:   European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, using the Comparative Party Manifesto Dataset. See: https://www​.consilium​.europa​.eu​/media​/53807​/art​-paper​-on​-populism​-8​-dec​-2021​.pdf.

Figure 1  Changes over time in the relative prominence of economic and cultural issues in the party manifestos of 21 Western democracies 1950–2010

as compared to the economic dimension in party manifestos across Western Europe from 1950 to 2010. Besides, the old/new politics opposition, rather than a conflict between different policy positions, can be viewed as a divide about the relative importance attached to each of the two dimensions, economic and non-economic (Lachait 2017). The non-economic dimension of electoral competition has received different names. It has been framed as the libertarianauthoritarian dimension (Kitschelt 1994), the ‘GAL/TAN’ dimension—for green, alternative, libertarian vs. traditional, authoritarian, nationalism—(Hooghe et  al. 2002), or a ‘libertarian–universalistic’ vs. ‘traditionalist–communitarian’ opposition (Bornschier 2010). The issues usually considered to polarize parties and citizens in this dimension relate to cultural liberalism, traditional values, personal freedoms and rights, the national community, and ethnic, religious, and other minorities (Lachait 2017). The exact

definition of the conflict may vary across authors (Kitschelt 1994; Stubager 2013). Hooghe et  al. (2002) emphasize the relationship between the ‘new politics’ dimension and national sovereignty (or lack of). Immigrants, foreign cultural influences, cosmopolitan elites, and international agencies could be perceived as threats and then trigger a negative response from traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist parties and citizens. The rejection of furthering European integration or favoring exit from the EU could be interpreted along those lines and therefore be strongly connected to the ‘new politics’ dimension (Kriesi et  al. 2008). These processes engendered new conflicts between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization and of the opening-up of borders. Overall, Hooghe and Marks (2017) argue that these new issues of conflict are even giving rise to a transnational cleavage, based on the defense of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate Toni Rodon and Raül Tormos

320  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule. ‘New politics’ is not new anymore. It refers to a situation which was novel around 40 years ago, but it is currently embedded in our reality. But what is the current phase of the modernization process described by Inglehart as the ‘silent revolution’? Gen Xers, millennials, and Gen Zers have become the demographic majority in modern-day Western democracies—and part of the political and social jargon too. It might not always show in elections, due to differential patterns of political participation (Norris and Inglehart 2019), but time has inexorably changed the political landscape. This generational replacement came together with the expansion of higher education, urbanization, growing gender equality, greater ethnic diversity, and more interconnectedness. These processes have steadily reduced the size of the social segments leaning toward social conservatism. The new hegemonic consensus is much more socially liberal. This creates the underlying social conditions for a backlash. Social segments outside the progressive consensus become organized into political parties and movements. According to Norris and Inglehart (2019), the silent revolution set the stage for a cultural backlash that has led to phenomena such as authoritarian populism. Age, education, urbanization, and cultural values explain political support for authoritarian-populist parties in Europe and the US. Albeit with exceptions, people who are older, non-college educated, or live in rural areas with the most authoritarian values drive populist-authoritarian parties across Europe. In the current battleground of new politics, older issues like ecologism, feminism, LGTBIQ+, peace, proabortion, or civil liberties and rights movements coexist with more recent ones such as #metoo, black lives matter, refugees welcome, disabled people’s rights, the occupy movement, tax the rich, or the decolonization movement. As more affluent Western countries adopt socially liberal norms of the new politics type, individuals with a more traditional mindset feel threatened and may turn to in-group favoritism and discrimination against perceived outsiders. Right-wing populism exploits this and attracts the support of social groups that feel left behind and willing to vote for breaking the new cultural consensus. One of the big questions for future scholars is whether recent Toni Rodon and Raül Tormos

structural changes we are witnessing will lay the ground for new conflicts that will shape electoral competition and whether, as a result, the unfolding present will drive the new politics to the world of yesterday. Toni Rodon and Raül Tormos

Note 1.

Tormos (2019) reviews multiple empirical evidence on how the same socioeconomic environment that creates cohort effects in the direction of modernization when individuals are in their impressionable years (e.g., improving material well-being) continues to influence them along the same lines beyond that life-stage. This happens because the nature of cohort and period effects are similar. Both can be caused by the same environmental influences so that if individuals are in their impressionable years these influences translate into cohort effects, but beyond that life-stage they are considered period effects.

References Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885–1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Dalton, Russell J. 2002. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 3rd edition. New York: Chatham House. Flanagan, Scott C. 1987. “Value Change in Industrial Society.” American Political Science Review 81(4): 1303–1319. Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. 2002. “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies 35(8): 965–989. Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2017. “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage.” Journal of European Public Policy https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13501763​ .2017​.1310279 Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies.” American Political Science Review 65(4): 991–1017. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political

new politics and postmaterialism  321 Style among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1987. “Value Change in Industrial Society.” American Political Science Review 81(4): 1289–1303. Inglehart, R. F., E. Ponarin, and R.C. Inglehart. 2017. “Cultural Change, Slow and Fast: The Distinctive Trajectory of Norms Governing Gender Equality and Sexual Orientation.” Social Forces 95(4): 1313–1340. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knutsen, Oddbjørn, and Elinor Scarbrough. 1995. “Cleavage Politics.” In The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 492–523. Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lachait, Romain. 2017. “Cleavage Politics.” In The Sage Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, edited by Kai Arzheimer, J. Evans, and M. S. Lewis-Beck. Sage. Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan Eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: The Free Press.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand Ed. 1989. New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists. Boulder, Colorado: Westview. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash. Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rose, Richard, and Derek W. Urwin. 1970. Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945. Political Studies 18(3): 287–319. Scarbrough, Elinor. 1995. “MaterialistPostmaterialist Value Orientations.” In The Impact of Values, edited by Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–159. Schoultz, Asa von. 2017. “Party Systems and Voter Alignments. In The Sage Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, edited by Kai Arzheimer, J. Evans, and M. S. LewisBeck. Sage. Stubager, Rune. 2013. “The Changing Basis of Party Competition: Education, Authoritarian–Libertarian Values and Voting.” Government and Opposition 48(3): 372–397. Tormos, Raül. 2019. The Rhythm of Modernization. How Values Change Over Time. Boston & Leiden: Brill.

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82. NGOs The term non-governmental organization (NGO) was first referenced in 1945 by the newly minted United Nations (UN) in Article 71 of the UN Charter to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Irwin, 2015; Davies, 2014). The term is often used in a generic sense to describe voluntary entities that are separate from the government, typically founded by private citizens for the benefit of society, and are not profit-seeking, thus distinguishing them from for-profit corporations. The term refers to voluntary entities that provide a variety of social services, ranging from community development, advocacy, democracy building, disaster response, relief, and recovery to international development (Stoddard, 2012). While the term NGO appears straightforward, qualifications are sometimes added to draw important distinctions about their nature and orientation. From an international orientation, NGOs have been referred to as international NGOs (INGOs), transnational NGOs (TNGOs), or northern NGOs (NNGOs versus southern NGOs) to distinguish them from domestic NGOs operating in their domicile of origin – also known as nonprofits in other places (e.g., the United States of America). The NGOs this entry focuses on are a subset of NGOs typically headquartered in a developed nation (usually in the northern hemisphere), while the bulk, if not all, of their operations are conducted in a developing nation. Contrary to conventional belief, NGOs have existed since well before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Davies, 2014). The earliest NGOs would not have been classified as such but served the same purpose. These include religious orders (e.g., Order of St. John founded in 1099, the Islamic order, Naqshbandiyyah, founded in 1350), missionary groups (e.g., Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge founded in 1698), and early merchant and scientific guilds (e.g., Academia Secretorum Naturae founded in 1560). China was also home to some of the first known humanitarian NGOs as associations formed to address universal challenges of the thirteenth century, such as rescuing and resuscitating shipwrecked victims along rivers (Davies, 2014). The Roman Catholic

Church of the thirteenth century is likely the first iteration of an international NGO (INGO) with its international congresses and missionary expeditions (Charnovitz, 1997). The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries birthed several anti-slavery and peace organizations in the West (e.g., Great Britain and the United States), including the earliest record of an organization self-identifying as international – the International Association of Scotland – marking an influential stage in the development of INGOs. The Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery was founded in 1775, followed by similar abolitionist and peace NGOs (e.g., the Society for Effecting the Abolition of Slave Trade, American Convention of Abolition Societies, The Societé des Amis des Noirs, the League for the Just in France) (Davies, 2014; Charnovitz, 1996; Newman, 2002). The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society of 1839, now called Anti-Slavery International, still exists today as the oldest international humanitarian organization. Later, merchant and scientific guilds emerged, also pre-dating the NGO classification (Davies, 2014). Inspired by Anti-Slavery International and its annual international convention, the 1840s saw the continued proliferation of human rights NGOs with similar causes, including women’s suffrage (Davies, 2014). Between the 1760s and 1860s, the “ancient forms of organizations (e.g., religious orders and secret societies) were superseded by a diverse array of INGOs in a broad range of fields of activities,” thus laying “the foundations for the more enduring and better-known INGOs of the late 19th century” (Davies, 2014, p. 4). Numerous factors have influenced the growth of NGOs, including various social (demographic changes), economic, political (internal and external), scientific or technological, and environmental (e.g., natural disasters, epidemics) factors (Davies, 2014). For example, by attending to war casualties from the battle of Solferino in the 1859 Italian War of Unification, Henry Dunant’s Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ushered in a new era of NGOs, thus laying the foundation for the contemporary concept of humanitarian action (Grossrieder, 2003). Other examples include the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee’s (JDC) founding (1914) to assist starving Jews in Ottoman-era Palestine (JDC website); in 1933, the International Relief Association

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ngos  323 (now International Rescue Committee (IRC)) formed to assist those fleeing the Nazis at the behest of Albert Einstein; and many more NGOs that formed during and after World War II (e.g., Oxfam in 1942; Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in 1943; Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) in 1945; Church World Services (CWS) in 1946). The global focus shifting away from rebuilding war-torn Europe to building newly decolonized and independent states in the developing world in the 1950s, and the end of the Cold War, also catalyzed further NGO expansion. Per Escobar (2011), the 1950s were characterized by a “professionalization and institutionalization of development” in response to the prevailing development discourse, which constructed and problematized poverty as an issue of the global South (pp. 44–45). NGOs, among other institutions, emerged as one key vehicle with the supposed knowledge and expertise needed to solve the poverty problem in the so-called “third world.” This, coupled with the failure of government-to-government foreign aid transfers of the mid-twentieth century, served to propel and heighten NGOs’ visibility as the preferred implementing partners of donor countries on account of their perceived effectiveness, flexibility, freedom from the inefficiencies of bureaucracy, and their knowledge of the local context (Stoddard, 2012; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Estimates of the number of international NGOs range between 40 000 and 80 000, all serving a diversity of functions and roles in “every sector of human activity” across many issues (e.g., education, healthcare, environment, advocacy, empowerment and human rights, good governance, disaster response, relief, and development, technical assistance and training, sports, micro-finance, responding to the humanitarian crises caused by global food shortages, climate change and the occurrence of natural disasters, failed states, and complex humanitarian emergencies) (Davies, 2014; Grossrieder, 2003). Broadly speaking, the work of voluntary organizations can be classified across five roles: social or human service (e.g., humanitarian assistance, emergency response, provision of healthcare services, education), innovation (e.g., identifying new, evolutionary, expansionary, or total innovations), advocacy (e.g., human rights, animal rights, and the environment and climate change),

expressive and leadership development, and community building and democratization (Salamon et  al., 2000). While some NGOs play adversarial roles that challenge or call governments and corporations to account for their public or market failure, respectively, other NGO roles either complement or substitute governments’ work (Salamon, 1987). Nonetheless, albeit limited, profiles of various international NGOs and their activities can be found in the Union of International Association’s Yearbook of International Organizations (YBIO). In terms of funding, NGOs receive support to provide direct services for social progress from various philanthropic and individual sources, including being instrumental channels for disbursing resources for government agencies (Woods, 2000). Historically, NGOs have played a minor role in channeling aid to countries and territories compared to official agencies like governments providing direct aid (Yontcheva & Nancy, 2006). However, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at more than US$23 billion, NGOs now provide approximately half of the estimated private development assistance (e.g., finance from private sources given voluntarily) and nearly one-fifth of total bilateral assistance (e.g., direct finance from donor to recipient) of OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) global aid program (OECD, 2022; Hénon, 2014). For example, 20 percent of US ODA funds was channeled through NGOs in 2018 (Ingram, 2019). NGOs encounter a wide range of unique opportunities and challenges: funding and autonomy. The ability to solicit and receive funding from multiple and diverse funding sources is both a blessing and curse for all nonprofits, including the INGOs that are the focus of this entry. Diverse funding sources give NGOs options but require administrative expertise for soliciting them and for providing multiple accounts to multiple stakeholders for how funds have been utilized. Philanthropic insufficiency – “an inability to generate sufficient resources on a scale that is both adequate . . . and reliable enough to cope with the human service problems’’ nonprofits seek to respond to and solve (Salamon, 1987, p. 39) – is another challenge that can lead to the “voluntary failure” of NGOs. Regarding autonomy, rather than simply responding to the needs of those NGOs

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324  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology purport to help, those who control the purse strings often have significant influence over the definition of the problems NGOs must focus on (Banks et  al., 2015; Smith, 2009), a problem others have labeled philanthropic paternalism (Salamon, 1987). NGO government relations: NGOs operate within at least two legal frameworks – one within their domicile of origin and that of the countries they operate within. The legal environment can create an enabling or stifling environment for NGOs. Repressive NGO laws have increased under the guise of NGO regulation or in the name of accountability and transparency, particularly in African nations (see ICNL website). Nonetheless, with respect to developing nations, some of these laws are due in part to the fear that the funded relationship with INGOs, including domestic NGOs, and foreign governments, makes them mere appendages of foreign governments (Chikoto-Schultz & Uzochukwu, 2016; Banks et  al., 2015; Dupuy et  al., 2015). Indeed, some of these fears are not without warrant since aid has often been politicized and thus usurped for other non-humanitarian or development purposes (Lancaster, 2007). Legitimacy and accountability: NGOs’ legitimacy has also come into question in light of the accusation of their being too tethered to funders; this ties into the issue of public trust and the question of whom NGOs represent. Others question the source of NGO legitimacy and credibility regarding their supposed reputation for being flexible and nimble, free from the inefficiency of bureaucracy; their reputation as repositories of expertise and wealth of policy know-how around wicked problems; their fiscal accountability and transparency; or, if they actually make a difference. For Lang (2013), the source of NGO legitimacy lies in public engagement – the degree to which NGOs communicate with those they purport to serve and how those relationships are developed and sustained. NGOs continue to struggle with how to manage their multiple accountabilities: upward to donors and governments which has been the most dominant focus; downward to their beneficiaries, which has historically been of least priority; laterally to their internal staff and boards; and the external NGO community (Ebrahim, 2003). With so many NGOs involved in almost every sector of human activity, even to the point of supplanting local governments’ roles in some sectors in complex situations (e.g., the departure of Médecins Sans Frontières from

Somalia in 2013 after 22 years of providing healthcare, albeit to safeguard its aid workers), a question of empowerment remains, particularly for development NGOs. How empowered or disempowered does a nation become when NGOs substitute government provision? Does this engender processes that promote “sustainable development,” or do such actions generate and entrench a resource and capacity dependency that would be most difficult to resolve? If NGO government-substitution occurs at the expense of local capacity building, combined with the challenges outlined above, then what remains will be an environment entrenched by a dominant NGO/ aid industry existing in parallel to weakened local governments and local NGO capacities. In that scenario, developing nations and peoples lose (most of whom are disadvantaged by colonized backgrounds). They lose a sense of autonomy over their lives and affairs, their cultural take or perspective on the problems that plague them, their ability to shape and cultivate their own culturally sensitive and appropriate problem-solving capabilities, and a sense of who they are in the world, especially as their own views and approaches are often replaced by a process of acculturation. Global-social movements continue to underscore the persistent realities of racism, classism, and the increasing divide between the rich and poor prevalent within the fabric of our social systems. Perhaps, there is a need for NGOs to revisit their humanitarian roots, as well as the extent to which the “development discourse” (Escobar, 2011) has influenced and colored their role and work in international settings. For example, to what extent is their work grounded in, and shaped by, ethnocentric notions of racial and class superiority that were inherent in the development discourse of the 1950s? Such soul‑searching should compel and empower NGOs to question the motivations of key institutional funders and donors, challenge their funding priorities, and examine the impact of their work in perpetuating these divides. Grace L. Chikoto-Schultz and Bryson Davis

References Banks, N., D. Hulme, & M. Edwards (2015). NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still Too Close for Comfort? World Development, 66, 707–718.

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ngos  325 Charnovitz, S. (1997). Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance. Michigan Journal of International Law, 18(2), 183–286. Chikoto-Schultz, G. L., & K. N. Uzochukwu (2016). Governing Civil Society in Nigeria and Zimbabwe: A Question of Policy Process and Non-state Actors’ Involvement. Nonprofit Policy Forum, 7(2), 137–170. Davies, T. (2014). NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Dupuy, K. E., J. Ron, & A. Prakash (2015). Who Survived? Ethiopia's Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs. Review of International Political Economy, 22(2), 419–456. Ebrahim, A. (2003). Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World Development, 31(5), 813–829. Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Grossrieder, P. (2003). Humanitarian Action in the Twenty-First Century: The Danger of a Setback. In K. M. Cahill (ed.), Basics of International Humanitarian Missions. Fordham University Press, New York, 3–17. Hénon, S. (2014). Measuring Private Development Assistance. Development Initiatives. Retrieved from: https://devinit​.org​ /wp​- content​/uploads​/2014​/08​/ Measuring​ -private​-development​-assistance​.pdf. Hulme, D., & M. Edwards (1997). Conclusion: Too Close to the Powerful, Too far from the Powerless? In D. Hulme & M. Edwards (eds.), NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort. St. Martin’s Press, New York. Ingram, G. (2019). What Every American Should Know about US Foreign Aid. Ripon Forum, 53(4), 16–17. Irwin, R. (2015). Non-Governmental Organizations. History Faculty Scholarship, 19, 1–4. https://scholarsarchive​ .library​.albany​.edu​/ history​_fac​_scholar​/19.

Lancaster, C. (2007). Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. Lang, S. (2013). NGOs, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere. Cambridge University Press, New York. Newman, R. S. (2002). The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. OECD (2022). Grants by Private Agencies and NGOs (Indicator). https://doi​.org​/10​ .1787​ /a42ccf0e​ -en. Accessed: June 30, 2022. Salamon, L. M., L. C. Hems, & K. Chinnock (2000). The Nonprofit Sector: For What and for Whom? Working Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, no. 37. The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, Baltimore, Maryland. Salamon, L. M. (1987). Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State. Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 16(1–2), 29–49. Smith, B. H. (2009). Non-governmental Organizations in International Develo­ pment: Trends and Future Research Priorities. Voluntas, 4(3), 326–344. Stoddard, A. (2012). International Assistance. In Lester M. Salamon (ed.), The State of Nonprofit America, 2nd ed. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 329–361. Woods, A. (2000). Facts about European NGOs Active in International Development. Development Centre Studies. OECD, Paris, France, https://doi​.org​/10​.1787​ /9789264187849​-en. Yontcheva, B., & G. Nancy (2006). Does NGO Aid Go to the Poor? Empirical Evidence from Europe (No. 2006/039). International Monetary Fund.

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83. Nonviolence Nonviolence is a form of organized resistance and conflict resolution utilized in the mobilization of movements for social and political change. As a global, broad-based school of thought and repertoire of collective action, nonviolence is espoused and practiced by diverse communities with different philosophical and ideological beliefs and political and social motivations. In the social sciences, scholars have sought to better understand what makes nonviolence effective in different kinds of contentious contexts and to build knowledge of how nonviolence works to effect change. While scholars note many examples of nonviolent acts of resistance throughout history, Mohandas Mahatma Gandhi has long been recognized as a global founding father of nonviolence. Gandhi contributed significantly to developing the concept and collective action repertoire of nonviolence, which encompasses diverse resistance strategies and tactics that share a common commitment to avoiding violence, even and especially in response to violence. Gandhi drew on ideas and practices from numerous contemporaries including Adin Ballou, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, the British suffragists, French salt tax resisters, early Indian cotton boycotters, and a Muslim “nonviolent army” in what would later become Pakistan. Gandhi’s own uniquely Hindu formulation of nonviolent resistance, which he called “satyagraha” or “truth force,” gained global acclaim during the Indian independence movement, of which Gandhi was a celebrated leader. His ideas and techniques soon spread to other independence movements throughout the colonial world and were taken up by global pacifist organizations for a range of causes. By the late 1930s, several peace leaders and organizations were formulating visions for how a “peace army” might be used to intervene in conflicts through humanitarian cross-border nonviolent campaigns. Over the course of the twentieth century, nonviolence became a protest strategy, inspiring resistance movements against colonization in African nations, German occupation during World War II (Sharp & Paulsen, 2005), and apartheid in South Africa, as well as in favor of democracy in Latin America and racial equality in

the United States. Antiauthoritarian, environmentalist, antinuclear, civil war, human rights, and feminist antiwar activists have also organized movements that put a variety of nonviolent principles and practices into action. As a globally recognized repertoire of collective action, nonviolence holds widely celebrated international authority. Hundreds of international nongovernmental organizations and coalitions of NGOs work to support nonviolent training, provide resources and solidarity to nonviolent movements, and mobilize on behalf of these movements to enhance their political leverage against more powerful states (Gallo-Cruz, 2019). The United Nations has long praised nonviolence as the best means for conflict resolution and the democratic redress of grievances. The UN declared the years 2001 to 2010 to be an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World and, in 2007, designated October 2 as an International Day of Nonviolence. The Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to numerous prominent leaders of movements who have promoted nonviolence, and dozens of other international awards have been developed to honor the work of those who practice nonviolence. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, scholars began to analyze the factors that may influence the effectiveness of nonviolent action. Psychologists, historians, sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers have all chronicled and closely examined different nonviolent movements, often comparatively, to better understand their origins, dynamics, and outcomes. The work of political scientist Gene Sharp has helped to publicize and popularize the study of nonviolent resistance techniques utilized by diverse movements around the world. Sharp’s well-known manual 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action describes the repertoire as comprising three principal approaches: protest and persuasion, such as rallies, marches, and street actions; intervention, such as roadblocks and sit-ins; and noncooperation, including strikes and boycotts (Sharp, 2003). To these foundational three categories, others have added the concept of nonviolent transformation, the construction of alternative policies and practices that can shift attention, resources, and participation away from the forces and institutions a movement opposes (Zunes, Asher, & Kurtz, 1999).

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nonviolence  327 Scholars have also critically examined the mechanisms through which nonviolent action can spur policy transformation. This can be done through conversion when a nonviolent campaigner is able to change the beliefs, and thus the policy position, of a target through nonviolent action; persuasion, in which the target does not necessarily change their interpretation of a situation, but, due to strategic self-interest, is moved to refrain from violent repression of a movement in favor of accommodating its demands; or coercion, in which the campaigner leverages the political force resulting from a target’s dependence on movement members, and their relationship with a sympathetic third party, to achieve policy change (Lakey, 1968). Some have argued that a savvy strategy of “aggressive measures to constrain or punish opponents and to win concessions” is necessary for nonviolent movements to be successful (Ackerman & Duvall, 2000: 2). This is thought to occur through at least 12 strategic principles. These encompass the field of conflict, the dynamics of power among opponents, timing, and the potential for widespread support, among other considerations. An element of surprise has also long been acknowledged as central to gaining strategic power. Richard Gregg described Gandhi’s achievements as due, in part, to the unexpected “moral jiu-jitsu” he was able to wield by calling on his oppressors to live up to their own professed values. Gene Sharp formulated a more clinical version of the concept, “political jiu-jitsu,” redefined as the political gains accorded to movements when targets compromise their own legitimacy through repression and violence. Among comparable movements, two necessary strategic advantages are resilience, “the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities,” and leverage, “the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power” (Schock, 2004: 142–143). The nature of group cohesion is also of notable importance. Wirmark (1974) identified four components that signal a strong and united nonviolent movement: established group leadership, a carefully prepared strategy, clear disciplinary rules, and extensive action

training. Contextual analyses have revealed additional social forces that can make or break a national movement’s success, including religious institutional support and military defection (Nepstad, 2011; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012). Target response is also identified as significant to movement success. McAdam and Tarrow (2000) note that opponents, especially state actors, can respond to movements using a variety of control mechanisms, including normative or symbolic appeals to the legitimacy of the political process and political or institutional authority; material or political incentives or sanctions; and physical control using security and military forces. Some studies have highlighted the importance of global and transnational forces. Chabot (2011) examines the transnational diffusion of nonviolent strategies between the Indian independence movement and the US civil rights movement and elucidates both the obstacles to and favorable conditions for repertoire diffusion. This analysis suggests that early attempts by African American activists to implement Gandhian nonviolence fell short because many campaigners either assumed that the context of the American segregated South differed too much from that of India’s independence movement for those strategies to be effective or that Gandhian strategies could be imported wholesale without a process of dislocation and relocation. Chabot (2011) argues that the process of adapting nonviolent strategies to a new context typically consists of at least five steps: a knowledgegathering stage, a persuasion toward adoption stage, an innovation stage, a practical implementation effort, and a confirmation stage. Gallo-Cruz (2019) has closely examined the role of third-party organizations in this process, demonstrating how they diffuse nonviolence into local conflict fields. Outsiders can play influential roles by imparting knowledge of nonviolent strategies and offering local organizers the chance to reconceptualize the relationships between citizens, the state, and other institutions while claiming new entitlements and rights. Others have argued for a more cautious approach to large-scale “contagion” effects, suggesting that periods of diffusion are often limited to the regional level, as in the democracy revolutions of the 1990s following the fall of the Eastern Bloc or the more recent “Arab Spring” (Gleditsch & Rivera, 2017). Scholars have also carefully examined Selina Gallo-Cruz

328  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology tactical adoption at the organizational level, explaining that it involves innovation and diversification for a number of reasons, including resource constraints, visibility, and other strategic insights. Early on, the field of nonviolent studies grew through extensive case and casecomparative historical research methods. Comparative case studies have underscored the importance of factors both internal and external to movements. Diplomatic pressures can be organized by solidarity movements in other states, for example (Sharp & Paulsen, 2005), and scholars elaborate on many ways alignments and misalignments between elite and movement perceptions and strategies can profoundly redirect the course of resistance. Schock (2004) points to how states’ responses to resistance can be constrained when movements are embedded in multiple levels of a society, state, and the international system. Ritter’s (2014) comparative historical study of revolutions reveals that even the “façade” of commitment to the norms of international regimes can provide mobilizing opportunities for movements, though these revolutionary forces can follow very different paths depending on local histories and political economies. A growing number of projects draw on large quantitative datasets that allow scholars to measure general contextual features of nonviolent campaigns at a macro level. Studies by Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) have been pivotal to this research, providing the first large-scale global and historical statistical assessments of the efficacy of nonviolent campaigns weighed comparatively against violent ones. They have found the nonviolent campaigns in their dataset to be more successful because they gained greater legitimacy in the international arena. Governments may also find it more difficult to justify violent repression of nonviolent movements. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Database that Chenoweth and Orion devised to undertake this research has been expanded in several revised and updated versions covering nearly 400 campaigns from over a century-long period. This has allowed researchers to scrutinize size, diversity, thirdparty relationships, target responses, tactical commitments, and outcomes. Research drawing on this data has examined the effects of nonviolent campaigns Selina Gallo-Cruz

before and following the Cold War era, security force defections, foreign support for campaigns, international sanctions, prior mobilizations, and contemporaneous armed challenges, as well as radical flank effects, the long-term political impacts of nonviolent campaigns with international support, how group characteristics impact tactical choices, the effect of gender equality on nonviolent mobilization, the influence of oil and gas revenues on the onset of nonviolent dissent, and the effect of globalization on nonviolent mobilization. This work has also been challenged on many counts. Some criticize NAVCO studies as promoting endogeneity bias in case selection, overlooking the effects of elite power in internally shifting regimes on both sides of a conflict, failing to account for the historicity of waves of success, and excluding unarmed violence and reactive violence while skewing data toward elite interests. Others have suggested that these studies falsely uphold a violence/nonviolence dichotomy despite the fact that many major movements have regularly engaged in unarmed violence and that they overlook the interactions between violent riots and nonviolent movements. Still others take on a more paradigmatic critical approach to nonviolent studies, viewing NAVCO studies as generally failing to account for ethnic diversity, dismissing the inordinate power posed by external support, failing to recognize value-biases in the research paradigm, offering unstated support for expanding a neoliberal political economy through both funding and biased frameworks, and promoting a Western-gaze through rational choice theories (cf. Anisin, 2020; Gallo-Cruz, 2019; Lehouqc, 2016). New directions in nonviolent studies push the field to ask questions about the nature of repression and its effects on nonviolent mobilization (Kurtz & Smithey 2018). These include engaging with long-held feminist criticisms of value-bias in the field’s dominant frameworks, considering what the field can learn from a robust literature on decolonial approaches to indigenous empowerment, and examining how marginalized and disenfranchised minorities navigate protest fields with both violent and nonviolent approaches (Chabot & Vinthagen, 2015; Gallo-Cruz, 2021; McGuinness, 1993). Selina Gallo-Cruz

nonviolence  329

References

Lakey, G. (1968). The Sociological Mechanisms of Non-Violent Action. Peace Ackerman, P., & DuVall, J. (2000). A Force Research Institute. More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict. New York: St. Martin’s Publishing Lehoucq, F. (2016). “Review: Does Nonviolence Work?” Comparative Politics Group. 48(2): 269–87. Anisin, A. (2020). “Debunking the Myths Behind Nonviolent Civil Resistance.” McAdam, D., & Tarrow, S. (2000). “Nonviolence as Contention Interaction.” Critical Sociology 46(7–8): 1121–39. PS: Political Science and Politics 33(2): https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0896920520913982. 149–54. Chabot, S. (2011). Transnational Roots of the Civil Rights Movement: African American McGuinness, K. (1993). “Review: Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power: A Feminist Explorations of the Gandhian Repertoire. Critique of Consent.” Journal of Peace Lexington Books. Research 30(1): 101–15. Chabot, S., & Vinthagen, S. (2015). “Decolonizing Civil Resistance.” Nepstad, S. (2011). Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century. Mobilization: An International Quarterly Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20(4): 517–32. https://doi​.org​/10​.17813​ Ritter, D. (2014). The Iron Cage of Liberalism: /1086​-671X​-20​- 4​-517. International Politics and Unarmed Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. E. (2012). Revolutions in the Middle East and North Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Africa. Oxford University Press. Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Columbia Schock, K. (2004). Unarmed Insurrections: University Press. People Power Movements in Gallo-Cruz, S. (2019). “Nonviolence beyond Nondemocracies. University of Minnesota the State: International NGOs and Local Press. Nonviolent Mobilization.” International Sharp, G. (2003). From Dictatorship to Sociology 34(6): 655–74. https://doi​.org​/10​ Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for .1177​/0268580919865100. Liberation. Albert Einstein Institution. Gallo-Cruz, S. (2021). “Circles of Threat and Spheres of Power: Reflections on Women’s Sharp, G., & Paulson, J. (2005). Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice Nonviolent Activism,” in Women and and 21st Century Potential. Extending Nonviolence in the 20th and 21st Centuries, Horizons Books. edited by Anna Hamling. Cambridge Wirmark, B. (1974). “Nonviolent Methods Scholars Publishing. pp. 130–150. and the American Civil Rights Movement Gleditsch, K. S., & Rivera, M. (2017). “The 1955–1965.” Journal of Peace Research Diffusion of Nonviolent Campaigns.” 11(2): 115–32. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(5): /002234337401100206. 1120–45. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/002200 Zunes, S., Asher, S. B., & Kurtz, L. (1999). 2715603101. Nonviolent Social Movements: A Kurtz, L. R., & Smithey, L. A. (2018). The Geographical Perspective. Wiley. Paradox of Repression and Nonviolent Movements. Syracuse University Press.

Selina Gallo-Cruz

84. Norms Social norms are ubiquitous. As social beings, humans strive to be accepted by others around them and to behave as they think they are expected to. Politics is no exception. Given the strong normative component of many political discussions, perceptions of what view is “right” abound. If individuals perceive that their views and behaviors are deemed unacceptable by others, they may fear judgment, gossip, or a breakdown of social ties. This gives them an incentive to adapt their behavior to what is considered desirable. Bicchieri (2017) defines social norms as behavioral rules characterized by three main elements.1 First, a reference group whose views one cares about. Second, expectations as to what people in that group do (empirical expectations) and think should be done (normative expectations). Finally, the expectation that, if one deviates from the established norm, individuals in their reference group may sanction them.2 According to this definition, norms are conditional preferences: one’s behavior depends on what they expect others do or think should be done. This sets norms apart from other drivers of behavior such as values. Even though the formation of values can be influenced by internalized norms, they represent one’s view of what is right, in a way that is fairly independent from others’ expectations (Goldstein, 2022). It is important to note that norms can either represent good or bad equilibria, depending on the nature of the belief that one holds conditional on expectations of others’ views. For example, while some norms may be able to prevent hate speech (Alvarez-Benjumea and Winter, 2018), others can sustain systems where some members of society are subject to deeply problematic practices like footbinding or female genital cutting. The discussion below applies to both types of norms. Social sanctions are a particularly crucial element of norms. It is the expectation that one might be sanctioned for deviating from a norm that makes norm compliance rational. Sanctions can either be direct (verbal or physical) or indirect (like gossiping or refusing to help or interact with someone in the future). Previous research has shown that third parties are indeed willing to impose such sanctions

(e.g., Molho et al., 2020) and that those sanctions constrain counternormative behavior (Alvarez-Benjumea and Winter, 2018). While sanctions foster norm abidance, they can also provide incentives for individuals to conceal their views. If an individual perceives that their views are counternormative, they have an incentive to avoid the reputational costs of revealing that preference. As such, they may choose not to publicly reveal what they think in private, so as to avoid social sanctions by others. This phenomenon is often called preference falsification (Kuran, 1995). Preference falsification makes it possible for norms to persist even if a sizeable number of individuals disagree with them. All it takes for a norm to remain in place is that individuals in a group believe that sufficiently many others agree with the norm. Preference falsification can bring about situations of pluralistic ignorance (Miller and McFarland, 1991), where individuals believe that others do agree with the norm because they abide by it—unaware that, privately, others may also disagree with the norm in place. This is what Ogunye (2021) has termed a fragile social norm. Normative pressures change the way individuals behave, but many of them engage in preference falsification and still hold the counternormative preference in private. Norms affect a wide range of human interactions of interest to political sociologists. When it comes to voting, the quintessential political act, norms have been shown to influence turnout—a very socially desirable political act. Experiments that manipulate perceptions of social pressure to vote have found that such treatments significantly increase someone’s probability of casting a vote during election day (e.g., Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008). To the extent that expectations of what is normatively desirable can affect one’s specific political preferences (beyond simply casting a vote or not), norms can also affect the behavioral demonstration of those preferences. Previous research has shown that norms affect support for stigmatized parties and their policies (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten, 2018; Valentim, 2021; Valentim, 2022; Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin, 2020), the expression of anti-democratic views (Dinas, Martínez, and Valentim, 2022), or participation in protests (Hale, 2022).

330

norms  331 But norms also affect a wider range of human interactions that are of interest to political sociologists. In all realms where individuals perceive that a given behavior can be deemed more or less acceptable by others, normative influences are likely to affect them. Prominent examples include gender relations (e.g., Felmlee, 1999), intergroup contact (e.g., Mähönen, Jasinskaja-Lahti, and Liebkind, 2011), and tolerance of corruption (e.g., Agerberg, 2022). Beyond their effect on citizens, norms can also constrain the behavior of elites. They can affect the extent to which elites engage in practices of democratic backsliding (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019), their parliamentary behavior (Franceschet, 2010), and the extent to which they engage in corruption practices (Fisman and Miguel, 2007). Once in place, changing existing norms can represent a coordination problem. Deviating from established norms can come at the cost of sanctions, which individuals will try to avoid. As such, even if one disagrees with the norm in place, they are likely to only act against that norm if they are confident that a sufficiently large number of others are also opposed to it. Otherwise, they are likely to falsify their preferences and abide by the norm—even if they privately disagree with it. For norms to change, one needs to update their perceptions as to what is deemed acceptable in one’s reference group. Institutional signals represent one mechanism through which individuals can update such perceptions. The groups and parties that are members of political institutions (Chauchard, 2014; Valentim, 2021) and their decisions (Tankard and Paluck, 2017) can signal that norms are shifting in the direction of the views expressed in those decisions or espoused by those actors. It is important to note that institutions can signal norm change in different directions. The representation of previously marginalized groups can make norms more inclusive of those groups (Chauchard, 2014), but the representation of exclusive actors like radicalright parties can also make individuals likely to perceive that their views have become legitimized (Valentim, 2021). A second channel of norm change are information shocks that update one’s perceptions of the views of others in one’s reference group. If an individual is given information

suggesting that other members of the reference group deem a given behavior more acceptable than they had previously thought, they can become more likely to engage in that behavior. In the realm of politics, this role is usually played by elections (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin, 2020) or referenda (Jung and Tavits, 2021). However, other forms of public behavior that also signal one’s views— like political symbols—can have an analogous effect (Dinas, Mart́ınez, and Valentim, 2022). Finally, elite rhetoric can also lead to norm change. Political elites can work as role models for voters. As such, the extent to which they abide by or breach established norms can make voters more likely to follow suit (Clayton et al., 2021). Understanding political behavior is a central goal of political sociologists. More often than not, the field tends to rely on explanations derived from an individual’s intrinsic motivations—such as their attitudes, preferences, or position amid societal cleavages. While social norms remain a rather secondary explanation for behavior, appreciating their role can provide for a more holistic understanding of behavioral change. For example, a focus on social norms might help explain instances of behavior changes in the absence of a change in preferences. Even if their preferences remain constant, individuals may act differently in two contexts depending on how much they perceive those preferences to be acceptable in each of them. They will be more likely to translate their preferences into behavior in a setting where those preferences are deemed acceptable than in one where they are not. This might be the key to explaining interventions that change individuals’ behavior without changing their attitudes or preferences (e.g., Mousa, 2020). Vicente Valentim

Notes 1.

2.

Since the focus here is on social norms, this entry focuses on norms in relation to political behavior. This leaves out a discussion of norms in the field of international relations, where the concept is also widely discussed. Other authors (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren, 1990) see empirical and normative expectations as amounting to different types (rather than constituent elements) of norms: the former are descriptive social norms, while the latter are injunctive social norms.

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332  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology

References Agerberg, Mattias (2022). “Messaging about corruption: The power of social norms”. Governance 35(3) pp. 929–950. Alvarez-Benjumea, Amalia and Fabian Winter (2018). “Normative change and culture of hate: An experiment in online environments”. European Sociological Review 34(3) pp. 223–237. Bicchieri, Cristina (2017). Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bursztyn, Leonardo, Georgy Egorov, and Stefano Fiorin (2020). “From extreme to mainstream: The erosion of social norms”. American Economic Review 110(11) pp. 3522–3548. Chauchard, Simon (2014). “Can descriptive representation change beliefs about a stigmatized group? Evidence from rural India”. American Political Science Review 108(2) pp. 403–422. Cialdini, Robert B., Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren (1990). “A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58(6) pp. 1015–1026. Clayton, Katherine, Nicholas T. Davis, Brendan Nyhan, Ethan Porter, Timothy J. Ryan, and Thomas J. Wood (2021). “Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118(23) , e2024125118. Dinas, Elias, Sergi Martínez, and Vicente Valentim (2022). “Social norm change, political symbols, and expression of stigmatized preferences”. The Journal of Politics, Forthcoming. Felmlee, Diane H. (1999). “Social norms in same-and cross-gender friendships”. Social Psychology Quarterly 62(1). JSTOR, pp. 53–67. Fisman, Raymond and Edward Miguel (2007). “Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets”. Journal of Political Economy 115(6). The University of Chicago Press, pp. 1020–1048. Franceschet, Susan (2010). “The gendered dimensions of rituals, rules and norms in the Chilean Congress”. The Journal of Legislative Studies 16(3). Taylor & Francis, pp. 394–407. Vicente Valentim

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer (2008). “Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment”. American Political Science Review 102(1) pp. 33–48. Goldstein, Daniel (2022). “The social foundations of democratic norms”. Working Paper 4. Hale, Henry E. (2022). “Authoritarian rallying as reputational cascade? Evidence from Putin’s popularity surge after Crimea”. American Political Science Review 116(2). Cambridge University Press, pp. 580–594. Harteveld, Eelco and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2018). “Why women avoid the radical right: Internalized norms and party reputations”. British Journal of Political Science 48(2). Cambridge University Press, p. 369. Jung, Jae-Hee and Margit Tavits (2021). “Do referendum results change norm perceptions and personal opinions?” Electoral Studies 71 p. 102307. Kuran, Timur (1995). Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt (2019). How Democracies Die. Reprint edition. New York: Broadway Books. Mähönen, Tuuli Anna, Inga JasinskajaLahti, and Karmela Liebkind (2011). “The impact of perceived social norms, gender, and intergroup anxiety on the relationship between intergroup Contact and ethnic attitudes of adolescents”. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 41(8). eprint: https:// onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com​/doi​/pdf​/10​.1111​/j​ .1559​-1816​.2011​.00793​.x, pp. 1877–1899. Miller, Dale T. and Cathy McFarland (1991). “When social comparison goes awry: The case of pluralistic ignorance”. In: Molho, Catherine, Joshua M. Tybur, Paul A. M. Van Lange, and Daniel Balliet (eds.), (2020) “Direct and indirect punishment of norm violations in daily life”. In: Nature Communications 11.1. Number: 1. Nature Publishing Group, p. 3432. Molho, Catherine, Joshua M. Tybur, Paul A. M. Van Lange, and Daniel Balliet. “Direct and Indirect Punishment of Norm Violations in Daily Life.” Nature Communications 11, no. 1 (July 9, 2020): 3432. Mousa, Salma (2020). “Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims

norms  333 through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq”. Science 369.6505. American Association for the Advancement of Science, pp. 866–870. Ogunye, Temi (2021). Are norms necessarily normative? Working Paper. Tankard, Margaret E. and Elizabeth Levy Paluck (2017). “The effect of a supreme court decision regarding gay marriage on social norms and personal attitudes”. Psychological Science 28(9) pp. 1334–1344.

Valentim, Vicente (2021). “Parliamentary representation and the normalization of radical right support”. Comparative Political Studies 54(14). SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 2475–2511. Valentim, Vicente (2022). Social Norms and Preference Falsification in a Democracy. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 4023263. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. 5.

Vicente Valentim

85. Parties and party systems

articulated around distinct criteria: origins, ideology, objectives, life cycle, organization, or functions. A first approach stresses the genetic roots of parties. If representative democracy today is seen as inseparable from political parties, At first glance, it may seem easy to define the structuring of political life around parwhat a political party is. However, the concept ties has not always been obvious. Why have covers diverse realities. We find parties of all democracies generated political parties? The ages, adopting a more or less flexible organi- literature emphasizes the role of institutions, zational form and a more or less clear ideol- social forces, and political actors. The parogy. It is therefore not always easy to identify liamentarization of democracies went hand what differentiates parties from other organi- in hand with a structuring of parliamentary zations such as social movements or interest life around political parties (Scarrow, 2006). groups. The task is all the more difficult when For instance, if the American Congress was political parties themselves refuse the label initially composed of representatives with no of “party” (e.g., Five Star Movement in Italy) political affiliation, debates led to the emeror when movements claim to be parties (e.g., gence of groups according to positions on Tea Party in the USA). Defining what a politi- the central issues of the time, systematically cal party is and is not matters from a politi- opposing two points of view. The parties of cal sociology perspective, as actors use labels parliamentary origin are then machines at the to convey how they want to be perceived and service of elected representatives and their construct their image toward the public. re-election. However, other parties derive Duverger defined parties as having “their their emergence from being rooted in a social primary goal the conquest of power or a share movement around a salient issue, such as in its exercise” and drawing “their support the extension of suffrage or the defense of from a broad base”, in contrast to interest the rights of workers in democracies with groups, for instance (1972, pp. 1–2). Some property-based suffrage facing strong indusauthors emphasize electoral goals or the exer- trialization. Furthermore, some also argue cise of power: Sartori defines a party as “any that political actors will embark on the parpolitical group identified by an official label tisan adventure if and only if it allows them that presents at election, and is capable of to maximize their chance of achieving their placing through elections (free or non-free), objective (winning elections) (Aldrich, 1995). candidates for public office” (1976, p. 63), A second approach investigates why some while for Neumann, political parties have emerged in specific national contexts. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) the term “political party” can be defined as the consider parties as mediators of structural articulate organization of society’s active polit- divisions in society, called cleavages. This ical agents, those who are concerned with the approach considers the emergence of parcontrol of governmental power and who com- ties in Western Europe from two revolutions pete for popular support with another group or (national and industrial), giving rise to four groups holding different views. (1956, p. 396) cleavages (church-state and center–periphery for the national revolution; workers-employers Adopting a more organizational perspective, and rural–urban for the industrial revolution). LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) identify four An active cleavage in a country gives birth essential criteria for distinguishing parties to a party on each side of the cleavage, each from other organizations: (1) durability (con- party mediating the interests of the populatinuity in the organization and depersonaliza- tion on this side of the societal division. This tion), (2) complete organization (visible and classification therefore identifies eight famipermanent organization at the local level in lies of parties. The structure of the cleavages connection with the national level), (3) power at work in a country determines the political (willingness to conquer and maintain power), parties present in the national party system. (4) popular support (concern to gain supportIllustrating a disciplinary turn in political ers, adaptation of the party in order to obtain science, the rational choice approach promaximum popular support). Just as there are poses a classification based on the objectives a multitude of definitions of political parties, pursued by the parties (Müller and Strom, there are numerous classifications of parties, 1999): vote-, office-, or policy-seeking. This 334

parties and party systems  335 approach argues that, according to the institutional contexts and parties’ organizational form, parties will pursue specific objectives, and that the objectives pursued by a party play on its chances of survival and institutionalization. Following the emergence of new parties in Western Europe (Bolleyer, 2013), new classifications were put forward, which distinguish parties according to their life cycle and thresholds in their development (Pedersen, 1982): declaration (creation of the party and intention to participate in elections), authorization (meeting the legal prerequisites for participating in elections), representation (obtaining seats in parliament), and relevance (becoming an actor that other parties in the system must consider). The organizational approach constitutes perhaps the most classic perspective of party typologies, embodied by pioneers such as Michels (1915), Ostrogorski (1964), and Duverger (1972). To the classic opposition between mass and cadre parties (Duverger, 1972) were added the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966) and variants of the market metaphor such as the franchise party (Carty, 2004), the business firm or the entrepreneurial party (Krouwel, 2006), and the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995). These different models focus on the way in which parties ensure the link between citizens and the state. They distinguish parties based on characteristics in terms of resources, size, and composition of the party base, the type of leadership, the level of professionalization, bureaucratization and efficiency, the level of centralization, and the balance of power between the three “faces” of party organizations: the party in central office, the party in public office, and the party on the ground. Finally, several authors have made classifications of the functions exercised by parties (Lawson and Merkl, 1988; Key, 1964). In relation to the electorate, parties simplify and structure electoral choices, serve as channels of communication, educate citizens, participate in their socialization and their integration within the political system, generate symbols of identification and loyalty, and organize electoral campaigns. Parties are also channels of political participation. As organizations, parties recruit, train, and select leaders and candidates and develop political programs. In their relations with the government, parties organize the government and create majorities, ensure accountability

for government actions, control government administration, maintain government stability, structure parliamentary divisions, and organize representation. In this view, parties are considered essential to the functioning of political representation and democracy. Note that some authors add the subversive or tribune role of certain parties. Parties tend to be relatively stable organizations, especially when they are highly institutionalized (Panebianco, 1988). Consequently, partisan change rarely occurs. A first view understands party change as a gradual process of slow adaptation and as the unintended consequence of natural evolutions in the life cycle of parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). Parties gradually transition from one organizational model to another by a dialectical process of adaptation to the context. For example, the extension of suffrage at the end of the nineteenth century would be concomitant with the development of the mass party model. A second view sees party change as an abrupt and discontinuous event, resulting from intentional and conscious choices by actors. Harmel and Janda (1994, p. 275) conceive party change as “any variation, alteration or modification in the way parties are organized, the human and material resources on which they can rely, what they stand for, and what they do”. They identify two necessary conditions for party change: a good reason (external factor) and a coalition supporting change (internal factor). Among the external factors, the authors list in particular institutional reforms, major societal events, the appearance of new competitors, and public opinion. They argue that certain external shocks will affect certain parties more, depending on their primary objective: electoral defeats and mobilizations of public opinion will particularly affect vote-seeking parties, while external societal events will affect policy-seeking parties. From this perspective, external stimuli do not automatically generate organizational transformations. These stimuli must be perceived by the actors for a reform to take place (Gauja, 2017). Finally, many other classifications of parties are based on the place they occupy in the national party system. Some oppose mainstream parties to small parties or minor parties, niche parties, or third parties (for instance, in the American context). Some labels explicitly refer to the strategic position occupied by a party: we then speak of a pivotal party or Emilie van Haute

336  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology a dominant party. This leads to a distinct literature on party systems that focuses not only on parties as autonomous units, but also on their interaction or competition. Parties are constitutive of a political “market”, opposing actors in search of a good that remains central to all of them, popular support. The first typologies of party systems, developed until the 1970s, mainly focused on the number of parties as a determining feature, with an internal debate as to how to count parties in a system. It opposed bipartyism (two parties structure the system) to multipartyism (more than two parties are structuring). This dichotomy was subsequently refined by considering the relative size of parties. On the one hand, the concept of a “two and a half” party system was introduced to describe systems in which a third party, smaller than the other two, manages to disrupt the political game. This model existed in countries with a pivotal liberal party in the system (traditionally in Germany with the FDP). This type of configuration is now rarer in Europe. On the other hand, the concept of a “dominant party” multiparty system was introduced, to describe a system where a party reaches at least 40 percent of votes, as illustrated then, for example, by Sweden. Typologies then added the number of criteria considered. For instance, polarization and volatility were introduced to describe party systems. The first criteria adds an estimate of the ideological dispersion of parties in the system; the second refers to the variation in support for different parties from one election to the next and reflects the structuring capacity of parties. More recently, typologies have proposed a theoretical refoundation to consider more directly the structure of interactions between parties. Mair (1996) takes into account three criteria: the existence of alternation in government; innovation or continuity in coalitions; the existence of parties systematically excluded from coalitions, whether it is a refusal on their part or a “cordon sanitaire” strategy on the part of the other players in the system. These criteria make it possible to distinguish between two large types of systems, those where the competition is “closed” (the UK or Japan until the 1990s) and those with an open structure (the Netherlands and Denmark). Why is one type of party system present in one country and not another? A first approach points to the role of institutions. Duverger (1972) proposes three laws linking, for the Emilie van Haute

two most important ones, first-past-the-post voting methods and two-party systems on the one hand, and proportional voting methods and multi-party systems on the other. These laws have given rise to an extensive literature which concludes that there is a strong link between the “magnitude” of constituencies (i.e., the number of elected officials per constituency) and the number of parties. This is explained by mechanical effects of voting methods and how they transform votes into seats. But it stems above all from a psychological effect, that is, from anticipation by the actors of the mechanical effects of the voting methods. If voters can adopt a strategic vote, leaders will adapt to this constraint by regulating the number of candidates and, therefore, of parties. A second approach has insisted on the role of socio-economic divisions in the formation of partisan systems (see Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory presented above). These two explanations are less antithetical than they might appear. Voting methods have been seen as institutions constraining the political expression of social divisions, but also as instruments of their institutionalization. The literature also converged to explain the stability of party systems. Lipset and Rokkan observed that the party systems of the 1960s were very similar to those of the 1920s in Europe. This stability was explained both by the stability of social divisions, the parties contributing to renewing these identities and these collective organizations over time, and by the stability of the institutional arrangements, voting methods in particular. This idea of ​​the stability of party systems has been undermined since the 1970s. Many new parties have emerged, and the structuring capacity of parties has declined. At the same time, party system have faced a dynamic of misalignment. These changes point to a growing fluidity of party systems. Because parties are central actors in representative democracies, understanding how and why parties emerge and evolve, how they organize, what roles they play, and how they are structured in a party system are central themes in political sociology. Political parties face numerous challenges. Among other things, the processes of personalization, digitalization, and deterritorialization are important dimensions for future research. Emilie van Haute

parties and party systems  337

References Aldrich, J. (1995). Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bolleyer, N. (2013). New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carty, R. K. (2004). Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical Organizational Imperative. Party Politics, 10(1): 5–24. Duverger, M. (1972). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen, 2nd edition. Gauja, A. (2017). Party Reform. The Causes, Challenges, and Consequences of Organizational Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harmel, R., Janda, K. (1994). An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(3): 259–287. Katz, R. S., Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1): 5–28. Key, V. O. (1964). Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell. Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The Transformation of the West European Party System. In LaPalombara, J., Weiner, M. (Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 177–200. Krouwel, A. (2006). Party Models. In Crotty, Katz (Ed.), Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage, pp. 249–269. LaPalombara, J., Weiner, M. (Eds.) (1966). Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lawson, K., Merkl, P. H. (1988). When Parties Fail. Emerging Alternative Organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lipset, S. M., Rokkan, S. (Eds.) (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: CrossNational Perspectives. New York: Free Press. Mair, P. (1996). Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Michels, R. (1915). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Hearst’s International Library Company. Müller, W. C., Strom, K. (Eds.) (1999). Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neumann, S. (Ed.) (1956). Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Ostrogorski, M. (1964). Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. Volume 2: The United States. Chicago: Quadrange Books. Panebianco, A. (1988). Political Parties: Organization and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pedersen, M. N. (1982). Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor Parties. Scandinavian Political Studies, 5(1): 1–16. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scarrow, S. (2006). The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted Emergence of Party-Based Politics. In Katz, R. S. and Crotty, W. (Eds.), Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage, pp. 16–24.

Emilie van Haute

86. Partisanship

unable to explain the entire vote among the European and US electorates and were biased towards electoral stability, therefore at odds with explaining electoral change. Researchers Partisanship – the relationship which links in what was later to be recognized as the citizens to parties and that leads most voters Michigan School shifted their analytical to repeatedly cast a ballot for the same par- focus to the psychological processes behind ties – is a continued matter of critical debate the calculus of individual behaviour. The in comparative research (Bartle and Bellucci, focal point of their proposal was the mediat2009; Oscarsson and Holberg, 2020) but also ing role of long-term political predispositions, one of the fundamental analytical constructs located between voters’ mainly ascriptive routinely employed in empirical research on social characteristics and the final political voting in democracies. The main disagree- choice, which they defined party identificament in this large literature concerns the tion. Relying on the ‘reference group’ social psychology theory, party identification was nature and sources of partisan attachments. Let’s start by recapping the development conceived as ‘an affective attachment to an of research on partisanship. Early accounts important group object in the environment’ of voting behaviour relied on sociological (Campbell et al., 1960, 121). Such people’s explanations of party support, linking soci- enduring emotional attachment to the (US) etal divisions to parties originated to repre- parties originated from early socialization in sent them. Both the US-Columbia School the family, only loosely linked to social strati(Lazarsfeld et al., 1949) and the European fication but rather rooted in the party itself. tradition (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) found in The party becomes then an important compothe alignment between social stratification – nent of an individual’s self concept, forging a along class, religion and territorial lines – and political identity which would shape how the political parties, the source of people’s elec- political world is perceived by largely unsotoral choice. The representation of common phisticated citizens. The theoretical significance of party idengroup interests shaped parties’ ideology, and membership in social groups forged relatively tification centred on the crucial distinction stable allegiances to political parties. In the between party attachments and actual voting US two-party system such allegiances were preferences, thought to be independent from initially conceived as ‘political predisposi- each other. Occasionally, short-term factors tions’ based on social group belonging: ‘A – leaders’ personality, policy issues, scandals person thinks, politically, as (s)he is, socially’ and so on – could push voters to deviate from (Lazarsfeld et al., 1949, p. 25). Social charac- their long-term party identification without teristics determined political predispositions, however losing it. Lacking short-term extermeasured in the 1950s on the basis of just a nal shocks, partisans rely on their party idenfew social features which best predicted vot- tification in choosing at the ballot box. The ing choice (religion, socio-economic status, observed general stability in voting choice at the aggregate level was then attributed to urban/rural residency). In the ideologically more polarized multi- the influence of party identification at the party European context, such political pre- individual level. This would also function as dispositions had stronger roots and were a perceptual screen – a heuristic – to orient referred to as cleavage voting (Rokkan, 1970). voters in evaluating policy issues, leaders and Cleavages were the fundamental lines of con- events. The notion of party identification has flict existing in Europe at the time of mass enfranchisement which had been reinforced known great fortune among scholars who rapand politicized by parties’ organizational idly incorporated this construct into the toolkit structures. Voters’ encapsulation (Bartolini, of (survey-based) electoral studies, adapting 2000) within such cleavages – the people’s the original US formulation – which includes sharing of social positions, values and inter- a directional element (which party to identify actions with party structures and secondary with) and a strength element (how strong the organizations such as unions or churches – identification is) – to other national contexts. created political subcultures and identities However, the format of the European multiparty systems did not allow an easy replicawhich sustained stable party support. Such sociological models of partisan- tion of a construct more attuned to two-party ship were not without limitations: they were systems (Budge et al., 1976). It was argued 338

partisanship  339 that voters could be attached to more than one party; the independence of party identification from current vote choice, which would easily coincide, was questioned; and it was shown that vote choice appeared more stable than party identification (Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009). Also in the Anglo-American polities party identification appeared more volatile than the assumed ‘unmoved mover’ (Johnston, 2006), showing patterns of change not compatible with the notion of a stable ‘identity’. Fiorina’s (1981) seminal analysis conceptualized party identification as ‘a running tally’ of people’s experiences with the parties, thus open to adjustment and changes. This revisionist approach ushered in a second psychological concept employable in the study of party attachments, that of attitudes, an association in people’s minds between an object and their evaluation of it. Partisanship would then ‘correspond with the set of attitudes – positive, or negative, to a certain degree – towards each of the individual parties’ (Rosema and Myer, 2020, 125). Attitudes towards parties have been then analysed as evaluations (Rosema, 2004), predispositions (Pappi, 1996), and heuristics (Huckfeldt et al., 2005). Sources of party attitudes are to be found in party performance (Fiorina, 1981), issue preferences (Adams, 2001), ideology (Homola et al., 2022), and evaluations of leaders (Garzia, 2014). Over time a (somewhat conflictual) consensus has been reached in the literature that two notions of partisanship have evolved (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009; Rosema and Myer, 2020): one based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981) and one based on attitudes theory (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), that is, as a generalized and enduring response to an object, the party. According to the social identity perspective, partisanship is founded on a sense of ‘we-feeling’, the perception of a shared interdependence or common fate among voters. The US Columbia School and the European Rokkan–Lipset tradition both conceptualized the ‘we-feeling’ as based on primary group belonging, such as class, religion and territory. In particular, European cleavage parties were associated with forms of partisanship based on people’s pre-political allegiances which provided the sources of party support. Also the Michigan School – which introduced the social-psychological approach

– conceptualized partisanship as a weak form of social identity, although allegiances were based, rather than on primary groups, on secondary groups such as the parties themselves or partisan groups or fellow party voters. The alternative attitudinal perspective to partisanship is based on the notion of a positive or negative disposition towards parties. Partisanship as an attitude has been primarily associated with research on instrumental political behaviour based on people’s reasoning and evaluation of party supply and performance. Attitudinal partisanship is, in brief, a political predisposition to support a party, open however to updating processes based on experience, a sort of Bayesian prior representing voters’ summary experiences and information on parties’ performance (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009, 13). The current notion of partisanship can therefore be thought of as an umbrella concept, which can be decomposed according to the nature of the party attachment – identitarian or attitudinal – and the source of such attachment – political or social (Bellucci and Bartle, 2009). This fourfold typology can then accommodate the multiple proposals advanced in the literature. It allows us to distinguish, for example, party identification – based on a we-feeling attachment to a party – from party evaluation, where a positive and emotional attachment to a party does not also entail the sharing of a common fate with other partisans. Partisanship moreover varies according to nations, parties and time periods (Grofman et al., 2009). Actually, students of partisanship confront themselves with the rising trend of electoral volatility observed in the last decades in both established and recent democracies (Mair, 2013), which has been matched by a parallel reduction of partisan voters (parties without partisans, in the apt title of the book edited by Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) although the verdict is still open on the actual fading of partisan voters (Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2020). The erosion of cleavage parties, brought about by socio-economic modernization which undermined the very social bases of class, religion and territory as sources of political identities, is singled out as the main culprit of the progressive decoupling of parties and voters. Further, rising electoral volatility has been matched by the emergence of new parties disrupting traditional party system environments and providing voters Paolo Bellucci

340  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology with novel – although often unstable – political actors (Emanuele and Chiaramonte, 2018). The political supply side has shown, then, an overall weakening of the parties and a blurring of their images, thus affecting one end in the continuum of party-voters relationship. This likely impacts the willingness/capacity of voters to develop stable party allegiances. On the demand side, however, this does not mean that voters are necessarily impervious to developing partisan identity or attitudes to changing/new parties. It is enticing to connect social identity partisanship with traditional (cleavage-based or just stable) parties while associating attitudinal partisanship with catch-all parties (or just with new parties), so as to adjust people’s evolving partisan allegiances to the changing reality of parties. Such association is however not warranted, since social identity partisanship need not be associated with social cleavages, as the US case illustrates, while, as social psychology research has shown concerning the emergence of in-group favouritism under minimal conditions (that is, in experimental settings people develop social identities with groups designated by other than a common label; Huddy, 2001), even new parties can elicit significant levels of partisan identification. On the one hand, conceptualizing partisanship as a social identity could then provide an answer to the declining strength of traditional religious or occupational groups as the basis of party support, which would leave otherwise unexplained the contemporary origin of partisan allegiances. Huddy and Mason (2010) argue that ‘social identity theory provides a more plausible and purely psychological alternative [to the traditional sociological base of party support] in which partisan identity rests on perceived similarity to typical partisans’. Greene (1999) has pioneered such an approach in the US context, relying on a standard multi-item scale used to assess social identity, employing ten items – featuring Mael and Tetrick’s Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale – to gauge partisanship. Similar studies have also been conducted in European multi-party systems (Bankert et al., 2017). Findings show that social identification with a political party is an important additional element of partisanship, traditionally seen only as social-psychological attachment, supplementing the dimensions of affection and cognition, and show that multi-item scales Paolo Bellucci

differentiate feelings towards candidates and parties, party support and levels of party involvement. On the other hand, conceptualizing partisanship as an attitude – measured with feeling thermometers or probability-to-vote (PTV) scales – offers insights into relatively new developments, such as multiple partisanship, positive and negative partisanship and affective polarization (Rosema and Myer, 2020), all phenomena that can be better interpreted and studied with a non-identity-based notion of partisanship. Scholars ask whether partisanship is a good thing or a bad thing and inquire into the behavioural consequences of widespread partisanship among the electorate (Oscarsson and Holberg, 2020). Partisanship has been positively associated with political mobilization and system stability but also with ideological polarization and restricted accountability, at the macro level. Among voters, positive consequences of partisanship include attitude formation and political literacy but, on the negative side, also motivated reasoning and misperception. Hopefully, a firm grasp on what partisanship is can help assess the macro- and micro-level effects of diffused or restricted partisanship and of its nature across contemporary democracies. Promising lines of inquiry lie, among others, at the juncture of research on government accountability and political cognition. The extent to which partisanship interacts with the responsiveness-accountability chain of political representation and how citizens rely on affection and reasoning cues to establish links to parties are crucial issues for democratic politics. Paolo Bellucci

References Adams, J., 2001. A theory of spatial competition with biased voters, British Journal of Political Science, 3:121–158 Bankert, A., Huddy, L. and Rosema, M., 2017. Measuring partisanship as a social identity in multi-party systems, Political Behavior, 39:103–132 Bartle, J. and Bellucci, P., 2009. Introduction: Partisanship, social identity and individual attitudes, in J. Bartle and P. Bellucci (Eds.). Political Parties and Partisanship. Social Identity and Individual Attitudes, London & New York, Routledge, pp. 1–25

partisanship  341 Bellucci, P. and Bartle, J., 2009. Conclusion: Partisanship and heterogeneity, in J. Bartle and P. Bellucci (Eds.). Political Parties and Partisanship. Social Identity and Individual Attitudes, London & New York, Routledge, pp. 200–204 Bartolini, S., 2000. The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Budge, I., Crewe, I. and Farlie, D., (Eds.), 1976. Party Identification and Beyond: Representation of Voting and Party Competition, London, Wiley Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. and Stokes, D. E., 1960. The American Voter, New York, Wiley Emanuele, V. and Chiaramonte, A., 2018. A growing impact of new parties: Myth or reality? Party system innovation in Western Europe after 1945, Party Politics, 24(5):475–487 Fiorina, M., 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press Garzia, D., 2014. Personalization of Politics and Electoral Change, Palgrave MacMillan Greene, S., 1999. Understanding party identification: A social identity approach, Political Psychology, 20(2):393–403 Grofman, B., Wayman, B. and Barreto, M., 2009. Rethinking partisanship: Some thoughts on a unified theory, in J. Bartle and P. Bellucci (Eds.). Political Parties and Partisanship. Social Identity and Individual Attitudes, London & New York, Routledge, pp. 40–74. Holmberg, S. and Oscarsson, H., 2020. Party identification: Down but not out, in H. Oscarsson and S. Holberg (Eds.). Research Handbook on Political Partisanship, Cheltenham & Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 14–30 Homola, J., Rogowski, J., Sinclair, B., Torres, M., Tucker, P. D. and Webster, S. W., 2022. Through the ideology of the beholder: How ideology shapes perceptions of partisan groups, Political Science Research and Methods, doi: 10.1017/psrm:2022.4 Huckfeldt, R., Mondak, J. J., Craw, M. and Morehouse Mendez, J., 2005. Making sense of candidates: Partisanship, ideology, and issues as guides to judgment, Brain Research. Cognitive Brain Research, 23(1):11–23 Huddy, L., 2001. From social to political identity: A critical examination of social

identity theory, Political Psychology, 22(1):127–156 Huddy, L. and Mason, L., 2010. Measuring partisanship as a social identity. Predicting political activism, Paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, San Francisco, CA, July 7–10 Johnston, R., 2006. Party identification: Unmoved mover or sum of preferences, Annual Review of Political Science, 9:329–351 Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson and Gaudet, H., 1949. The People’s Choice. How the Voters Make up Their Mind in a Presidential Campaign, New York, Duell Sloan & Pearce Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (Eds.), 1967. Party Systems and Voters Alignment, New York, Free Press Mair, P., 2013. Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy, London and New York, Verso Oscarsson, H. and Holberg, S., 2020a. Introduction to the research handbook on political partisanship, in H. Oscarsson and S. Holberg (Eds.). Research Handbook on Political Partisanship. Cheltenham & Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 1–13 Oscarsson, H. and Holberg, S. (Eds.), 2020b. Research Handbook on Political Partisanship. Cheltenham & Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing Pappi, F., 1996. Political behaviour: Reasoning voters and multi-party systems, in R. Goodin and H. Klingemann (Eds.). A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 255–275 Petty, R. R. and Cacioppo, J. T., 1981. Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches. Dubuque, IA, Wm. C. Brown Rokkan, S., 1970. Citizens, Elections, Parties, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget Rosema, M., 2004. The Sincere Vote. A Psychological Study of Voting, Leiden, Febodruk Rosema, M. and Myer, J., 2020. Measuring party attachment with survey questionnaires, in H. Oscarsson and S. Holberg (Eds.). Research Handbook on Political Partisanship. Cheltenham & Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 123–140 Paolo Bellucci

342  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Tajfel, H., 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Thomassen, J. J., 1976. ‘Party identification as a cross-national concept: Its meaning in the Netherlands’, in I. Budge, I. Crewe and D. Farlie (Eds.). Party Identification and Beyond: Representation of Voting and

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Party Competition, London, Wiley, pp. 63–79 Thomassen, J. and Rosema, M., 2009. Party identification revisited, in J. Bartle and P. Bellucci (Eds.). Political Parties and Partisanship. Social Identity and Individual Attitudes, London & New York, Routledge, pp. 42–59

87. Patriarchy Patriarchy refers to an order of social and political domination privileging some men over other men and all men over women (Lerner, 1987; Gilligan & Snider, 2018). It is a multi-layered structure of power relations that operates at the level of state and law, as well as the home and the workplace. It is maintained by cultural norms and ideologies, reinforced within education and religion (Higgins, 2018). As a structure of power relations, not all men benefit equally from it and not all women are equally disadvantaged by it. Patriarchy literally means “the rule of the father” and derives from the Greek patriarkhēs, “chief or head of a family”. The term has been subject to changing and varied definitions over time. Traditionally an anthropological term describing families that are ruled by fathers, feminists have advanced the meaning of the term by focusing on the element of domination by men over women (Walby, 1989) and by emphasizing that patriarchy was not confined to the family structure but in fact permeated every facet of society and culture (Millett, 1969; Lerner, 1989). Patriarchy has existed in varied forms over time and space (Warby, 1989; Lerner, 1989). According to anthropological, archaeological and evolutionary psychological data, prehistoric societies were relatively egalitarian and sex roles within them were complementary (Lerner, 1989; Wood & Eagly, 2002; Hrdy, 2009). Patriarchal societies arose in the Neolithic era when we became agrarian (Hrdy, 2009). According to one school of thought, patriarchal societies emerged with the advent of agriculture and private property (Engels). Others have argued that it was the exchange of women as reproducers through which private property was eventually created (Levi-Strauss, 1969; Lerner, 1989). Based on anthropological evidence, Lerner (1989) argues that women’s enslavement preceded and made possible other forms of enslavement and oppression. According to Lerner (1989: 8) “‘the establishment’ of patriarchy was not one event, but a process developing over a period of nearly 2500 years, from app. 3100 to 600 B.C.” Moreover, this process occurred in different parts of the world at different times and so there is no single initiating event or cause.

The establishment of patriarchal power relationships is said to have coincided with the rise of archaic states, with women’s status and roles becoming more circumscribed as state apparatuses became more complex (Lerner, 1989). Studies of Mesopotamian cultures from the fourth to the second millennium bc show the active participation of some women in economic, religious and political life alongside their dependence upon men. At this juncture a new set of relations emerged in which “some men acquired power over other men and all women” (Lerner, 1989: 75). Patriarchal relations between the sexes, whereby women depended on men for their protection, were firmly in place before formal laws, the institutionalization of the state and the articulation of patriarchal ideology. Mesopotamian and Biblical laws institutionalized the patriarchal family as a facet of state power. Control of women’s sexuality became a state matter through harsh laws pertaining to adultery and abortion. Religion became central to the establishment of patriarchal authority. Women were excluded from direct links to the divine in Mesopotamian religion and Judaism. The imperial authority of both the Roman and Chinese emperors rested on their position as religious leaders who alone had access to ultimate religious truth (Richards, 2013: 24). The assumption of women’s inferiority and subordination was foundational to Ancient Greek thought. Patriarchal ideology even erased the role of women in procreation, which was regarded as essentially a male act. However, some scholars have pointed out that contained within some ancient texts are counter‑narratives of resistance and explorations of the tensions between democracy and patriarchy (Gilligan, 2002; Gilligan & Richards, 2008; Hartman & Buckholtz, 2014)). Nonetheless, both of the traditions generally regarded as the sources of Western culture—the Bible and Greek (particularly Aristotelian) thought—affirmed women’s secondary position and established patriarchal ideology. Ancient Greece was used as the ideological foundation for the elaboration of patriarchy in multiple dimensions of society in the modern era. For example the French jurist and political theorist, Jean Bodin, used patriarchy to object to women’s rule, arguing that just as the husband/father has authority and power over all others, so in the state a male

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344  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology monarch should always rule. The English political writer Robert Filmer extended this in Patriarcha, asserting that monarchs derived all legal authority from the divinely sanctioned fatherly power of Adam. Concerns about the patriarchal state and household led to legal and institutional reforms enhancing the power of men over the women and children in their own families (Hanley, 1989). The French Revolution as a catalyst for debate regarding women’s emancipation lead some thinkers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to question the basis of patriarchy. In his On the Equality of the Two Sexes (1673), François Poulain de la Barre argued that men and women have equal capacity for reason and that differences between the two are a matter of inherited prejudices. His ideas were adopted by several of the leading figures in the Enlightenment, but for most of the revolutionaries, sex remained an unbridgeable chasm, and despite women’s participation during revolutionary times, the successive assemblies following the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen refused to give women political equality (Briatte, 2020). The nineteenth century saw the affirmation and creation of patriarchal structures and norms as well as the beginning of social movements to overthrow them. New feminist initiatives emerged from the 1850s in England and Scandinavia, in connection with debates surrounding legal reforms in the fields of matrimony, education and women’s employment. During the ensuing decade, feminist movements formed in Western and Central Europe (Briatte, 2020). The first attempt to organize a national movement for women’s rights in the United States occurred in Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848. The international movement for women’s rights gradually succeeded in lessening husbands’ control over their wives’ property and persons and, in the twentieth century, secured voting rights for women in Europe and the United States. This slow dismantling of the patriarchal order saw a backlash as twentieth-century fascist regimes sought to regain control over women. In Nazi Germany, harsh restrictions were placed on the use of contraception and abortion came to be seen as a form of treason and was strictly forbidden for all “Aryan” women with special courts authorized to issue the death penalty for illegal terminations of pregnancy. In Mussolini’s Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider

Italy abortion was banned, and the sale of contraceptives and publication of birth control propaganda was criminalized (Albanese, 2003). In the aftermath of World War II political rights were granted to women in a number of countries in Western Europe and the Balkans. A number of Western European countries inscribed gender equality in their new constitutions. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized both gender equality and equality between spouses. Despite these legal advances and changing social norms, a number of analysts point out the continued power of patriarchy to structure people’s lives. Applying Walby’s (1989) six criteria of patriarchal oppression, Higgins (2018) has pointed out that women still do most of the domestic labour and a legal right to equal pay has not resulted in the eradication of the gender pay gap. Women are underrepresented in nearly all political and state bodies. In Britain, 11 rapes are carried out or attempted every hour of every day. Women’s sexuality is still more likely to be treated negatively and subjected to state control. And the “patriarchal gaze” is still strong in education, religion, culture and the media (Higgins, 2018). Recent developments in Western democracies, such as the 2022 US Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v Wade thus removing women’s constitutional right to abortion, point to a patriarchal backlash against gender equity. The concept of patriarchy has been central to feminist theorizing as a term for naming gendered power relations. Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938) used “patriarchy” to describe the dynamics within wealthy families, like hers, in which economic power was held by the father and the girls were denied formal education and work opportunities. Woolf did not here write of “patriarchy” as a social structure that went beyond the boundaries of the bourgeois household (Higgins, 2018), but rather saw the patriarchal household as analogous in the private sphere to the fascist state. Second-wave feminists expanded the definition of patriarchy to describe a systemic bias against women in both private and public life. It was clear to feminists in the 1960s and 1970s that oppression continued and that existing theories of power were not equipped to explain this oppression (Higgins, 2018). Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1969) positioned “patriarchy” as society’s “most

patriarchy  345 fundamental concept of power” and “the most pervasive ideology of our culture”. As feminists attempted to theorize it into a coherent system of domination, the term “patriarchy” was reformulated and refined. Traditional feminist conceptualizations of patriarchy have been criticized on a number of grounds including tautology, ahistoricism and universalizing and oversimplifying the realities of oppression (Acker, 1989; Welhelen & Pilcher, 2004; Patil, 2013). By the 1990s and 2000s many feminists rejected the usefulness of “patriarchy”. In recent years, the term has re-emerged in public debate, with feminists increasingly using it to highlight the forces that keep oppression in place. Contemporary definitions emphasize patriarchy’s intersection with other systems of oppression including white supremacy and capitalism, while some theorists prefer the term kyriarchy, developed by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (1992), as a theory of power that describes multiple, interacting structures of power and domination. Feminist scholars have pointed to the intricate connection between gender – a set of cultural roles – and patriarchy (Acker, 1989; Butler, 1990). Gilligan (2011: 18) has argued “the gender binary and hierarchy are the DNA of patriarchy—the building blocks of a patriarchal order”. Gilligan and Snider (2018: 6) define patriarchy as a culture based on a gender binary and hierarchy, a framework or lens that: 1. Leads us to see human capacities as either “masculine” or “feminine” and to privilege the masculine. 2. Elevates some men over other men and all men over women. 3. Forces a split between the self and relationships so that in effect men have selves, whereas women ideally are selfless, and women have relationships, which surreptitiously serve men’s needs.

Developmental research has shown that what had been taken for normative gender development is actually a process of initiation into patriarchy (Gilligan, 1990, 2011). Moreover, this process of initiation has negative consequences for all children across the gender spectrum, including boys (Chu, 2014; Way, 2011; Brown & Gilligan, 1992). This research suggests that the initiation into patriarchy, and our complicity with it, hinges on the enforcement of patriarchal codes of masculine honour and feminine goodness. These gender codes shame the capacity to repair the ruptures in

connection inflicted by patriarchy (and all other hierarchies). Seen in this light the gender binary and hierarchy are crucial to the persistence of patriarchy and the lynchpin of all forms of oppression (Gilligan & Snider, 2018). To set up and maintain a hierarchy of privilege, it is necessary to stunt what are recognized as basic human relational capacities (Gilligan & Snider, 2018; see also Hrdy, 2009; deWaal, 2009). Developmental research shows that this loss of relationship is marked by a change in voice (Weinberg & Tronick, 1994). Thus, the initiation into patriarchy is manifest as a shift in voice. A human voice goes under and is replaced by a cover voice (Gilligan, 2021). Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider

References Acker, Joan. “The problem with patriarchy.”  Sociology  23(2) (1989): 235–240. Albanese, Patrizia. “Abortion & reproductive rights under nationalist regimes in twentieth century Europe.”  Women’s Health and Urban Life 3(1) (2004): 8–33. Briatte, Anne-Laure. “Feminisms and feminist movements in Europe.” Digital Encyclopaedia of European History (2020). https://ehne​.fr​/en​/encyclopedia​ /themes​ /gender​ - and​ - europe​ / feminisms​ -and​-feminist​-movements​/feminisms​-and​ -feminist​-movements​-in​-europe. Accessed 8 June 2022. Brown, Lyn Mikel., and Carol Gilligan. Meeting at the Crossroads: The Psychology of Women and the Development of Girls. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1992. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990. Chu, Judy. When Boys Become Boys: Development, Relationships, and Masculinity. New York: New York University Press, 2014. De Waal, Franz. The Age of Empathy. New York: Harmony, 2009. Gilligan, Carol.  “Joining the resistance: Psychology, politics, girls and women.” Michigan Quarterly Review 29(4) (1990): 501–536. Gilligan, Carol. The Birth of Pleasure. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider

346  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Gilligan, Carol.  Joining the Resistance. Cambridge: Polity, 2011. Gilligan, Carol, and David A.J. Richards. The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and Democracy's Future. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Gilligan, Carol, and Naomi Snider. Why Does Patriarchy Persist? Cambridge: Polity, 2018. Gilligan, Carol. “Women’s voices and women’s silences.” Paper presented at the Evolution of Psychotherapy Conference, December, 2021. And in Gilligan, Carol. In a Human Voice. Cambridge: Polity, in press. Hanley, Sarah. “Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France.” French Historical Studies 16 (Spring 1989): 4–27. Hartman, Tova, and Charlie Buckholtz. Are You Not a Man of God?: Devotion, Betrayal, and Social Criticism in Jewish Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Higgins, Charlotte. “The age of patriarchy: How an unfashionable idea became a rallying cry for feminism today.” The Guardian, 22 June 2018. https://www​ .theguardian​.com​/news​/ 2018​/jun​/ 22​/ the​ -age​- of​-patriarchy​-how​-an​-unfashionable​ -idea​-became​-a​-rallying​-cry​-for​-feminism​ -today. Accessed 8 June 2022. Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer.  Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Carol Gilligan and Naomi Snider

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon, 1969. Millett, Kate. Sexual Politics.  New York: Doubleday, 1969. Patil, Vrushali. “From patriarchy to intersectionality: A transnational feminist assessment of how far we’ve really come.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 38(4) (2013): 847–867. Richards, David AJ. Resisting Injustice and the Feminist Ethics of Care in the Age of Obama: “Suddenly, . . . All the Truth Was Coming Out”.  New York and London: Routledge, 2013. Schussler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. But She Said: Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation. Boston: Beacon, 1992. Walby, Sylvia. “Theorising patriarchy.” Sociology 23(2) (1989): 213–234. Way, Niobe. Deep Secrets: Boys’ Friendships and the Crisis of Connection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Weinberg, M Katherine, and Edward Z Tronick. “Beyond the face: An empirical study of infant affective configurations of facial, vocal, gestural, and regulatory behaviors.”  Child Development  65(5) (1994): 1503–1515. Whelehan, Imelda, and Jane Pilcher. Fifty Key Concepts in Gender Studies. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2004, pp. 93–95. Wood, Wendy, and Alice H Eagly. “A crosscultural analysis of the behavior of women and men: Implications for the origins of sex differences.” Psychological Bulletin 128(5) (2002): 699. Woolf, Virginia. Three Guineas. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1938.

88. Pluralism

“endorses”, first and foremost, “cultural multiplicity” – a “cross-fertilized” culture avoiding “tribalized segmentation” (Sartori 1997: 60, 61, 62). Broadly speaking, social and cultural Pluralism may be defined as both a descriptive and a prescriptive (normative) theory of changes, more often than not politically individual participation by social association induced, will be prone to affect professional positions, social standings, and cultural patin the political process. Descriptively, the concept establishes, first, terns. The fabric of societal cleavages is the existence of a plurality of societal inter- altered, adherence to traditional political and ests and corresponding social groups which, institutional loyalties questioned. The intelas latent centers of power, may organize into lectual climate may then be ready either for a associations; and, second, the transformation new – or the (modified) revival of an earlier – of this diversity into public policies by means political concept. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth of pressures exerted on each other and on governments. Normatively, the concept endorses centuries, the rigid class structure started to the formation of interest groups as subjects of dissolve, with gross inequalities of economic democratic politics and the sequence of group and political influence persisting. On the one conflict, bargaining, and compromise in the hand, the wage-paid working class was segshaping of public policies, on the condition that menting into numerous separate groups, each basic rights and principles of justice remain with “its own specialized faculty and distinctive needs”. On the other hand, replacing “the respected and protected. (Eisfeld 2006: 15) The notion of “pluralism” originated during single figure of the capitalist entrepreneur”, the early twentieth century as a philosophical the advent of large joint-stock corporations, view contrasting monist assumptions, particu- trusts, and cartels resulted in a “hierarchy larly Hegel’s, about a unified “block universe”. of specialist professionals . . . organized in The pragmatist philosopher William James their own professional organizations” (Webbs (1842–1910) used it to characterize what he 1902: 843). Control of production by these considered a “distributive” reality – intercon- salaried white-collar employees was dissocinected, but irreducible to unity (James 1909). ating from the ownership function. The pluThe British Labour Party intellectual Harold ralist response consisted in a theory of groups J. Laski (1893–1950) borrowed the term to and associations, of positive (interventionist) construe a polity where societal groups and government and of industrial democracy, their associations, possessing inherent rights which Harold J. Laski put forward between not conceded by the state, elicited individ- 1915 and 1925. In the United States, immigrant subculual loyalties and pursued social ends (Laski 1915). Likewise inspired by James’ philoso- tures were flourishing in the east, after nearly phy, Horace M. Kallen (1882–1970) intro- 15 million immigrants – mostly from southduced the term “cultural pluralism” into the ern and eastern Europe – had been admitAmerican debate to argue against “melting ted to the country between 1901 and 1920. Writing, not unlike Laski, between 1915 and pot” conformity (Kallen 1924). From Harvard’s Pluralism Project (est. 1924, bent on arguing against assimilationist 1991) and Ottawa’s Global Center for pressures, Horace Kallen offered his vision of Pluralism (est. 2006) to Potsdam’s Center for a “commonwealth of cultures”, a “federated Citizenship, Social Pluralism and Religious republic” of different nationalities (Kallen Diversity (est. 2016), research centers on plu- 1924: 11, 116). After the Great Depression had hit the ralism have sprung up during the past decades. Their proclaimed missions range from United States, Roosevelt’s New Deal estab“exploring the changing cultural and religious lished organized labor and organized agricullandscape of the United States” (Harvard) to ture as “junior” bargaining partners alongside “doing research on the significance of citi- business. With more and more social interests zenship in the face of social pluralism and turning to organization, overlapping group growing ethnic and religious heterogeneity” memberships, resulting in cross-cutting (Potsdam). Such focus derives its saliency individual solidarities, were supposed to from the increasing diversity of Western soci- proliferate in American society. A generaeties. It supports Giovanni Sartori’s conten- tion of political scientists – David Truman tion that pluralism’s belief in such diversity (1913–2003), Robert Dahl (1915–2014), 347

348  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Charles Lindblom (1917–2018) – judged the “acceptance of groups as lying at the heart of the process of government” conceptually “unavoidable” (Truman 1951: 46). The Cold War encouraged the introduction of an additional normative element: Competing “multiple centers of power” supposedly resolved conflicts “to the mutual benefit of all parties” (Dahl 1967: 24). Even so, pluralists conceded that political activity, including control of group leaders and access to government, were largely determined by income, education, and status. Capitalist democracies offered “unusual” opportunities for “pyramiding” these already unequally distributed political resources into structures of social power (Truman 1951: 265; Dahl and Lindblom 1953: 315, 329; Dahl 1963: 227). As the Cold War thawed, and further “New Dealish” reform periods failed to materialize, Dahl and Lindblom turned more skeptical and radical in their assessments of the “dilemmas of pluralist democracy” (Dahl 1982). Looking for remedies, they singled out the large business corporation as the major target for participatory reforms. Proposing the “enfranchisement” of blue- and whitecollar employees, Dahl returned to pluralism the “Laski” component of industrial democracy (Dahl 1989: 327 ss., 331, 332). Meanwhile, the 1965 Immigration Act significantly altered the discriminatory national quota system in place since 1921. As a consequence, the demographic composition of the US population has changed dramatically. The economic – and socio-political – future of the United States is now plainly “tied to non-whites”, particularly Hispanics (Maharidge 21999: 48). In Europe, immigration from former African and Asian colonies to the United Kingdom and France and labor migration from Southern European countries provided the first indications of what would follow. Wars and civil wars in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) did the rest (Eisfeld 2019: 28, 29). Along with increasing ethnic and cultural diversification, Kallen’s decentralized “plural state” informed by a recognition of groups’ rights was rediscovered by Will Kymlicka, Tariq Modood, and others. Setting out more systematically the conceptual frameworks just indicated, three primary pluralist approaches may be discerned. A first variety of radical pluralism (Laski/ Hirst school) can be understood as aiming at a more egalitarian society by combining Rainer Eisfeld

participatory democracy with an employeecontrolled economy, so as to diminish the grossly unequal distribution of political resources. Nationalizations would, in effect, leave workers’ positions unchanged. Rather the citizen . . . must be given the power to share in the making of those decisions which affect him as a producer if he is . . . to maximize his freedom . . . The present system of private property does not in the least involve the present technique of industrial direction. (Laski 1925: 112, 113)

The Great Depression and the circumstances of the formation of the British National Government in 1931 induced Laski to move more clearly in a Marxian direction without, however, as has erroneously been suggested (Deane 1955: 153), “rejecting” pluralism. Rather, by combining pluralism and Marxism, he proposed in 1937 to transcend the capitalist system: “The purpose of pluralism merges into a larger purpose . . . The object of the pluralist must be the classless society”. Only in such a society, he contended, “authority can be pluralistic both in form and expression” (Laski 1925 [expanded reprint 1948]: XII). Laski’s original project was resurrected in the United Kingdom by Paul Hirst (1946–2003) who developed a program of “associative democracy”. Representative political institutions would be supplemented by a democratically governed business sector and a public service system of “voluntary and democratically self-governing associations”. These “communities of choice” were expected to best serve both “human welfare and liberty” (Hirst 1994: 19). A liberal pluralist strand (Dahl/McFarland school) committed to ongoing Western political systems instead emphasized group competition, formal equality of opportunity, and compromise through bargaining. These were considered the means of realizing “polyarchy”, an essentially democratic polity. The emphasis was now anti-totalitarian, rather than anti-monist. In its entirety, the concept resembled a modified marketplace model – “interest-group liberalism”, in Theodore Lowi’s term (1967). A generation later, building on the early Dahl and Lindblom, Andrew McFarland sought to construct a comprehensive political process theory, widening liberal pluralism’s scope by including social movements and an element of “statism” (McFarland 2004, esp. ch. 4).

pluralism  349 A second variety of radical pluralism (later Dahl/Lindblom school) can in contrast be framed as focusing again on “democratizing” large business corporations. Since the days of the Webbs, these corporations had not only completed the divorce between property (joint-stock) and control (management). They had been developing – with regard to sales, assets, numbers of employees – from private enterprises into “political bodies” with an “internal government” (Dahl and Lindblom 1976: XVIII, XXIX). The impact of their pricing, investment, and financing policies, in other words their power, was comparable to that of many states – but neither subject to effective internal control by stockholders, nor to effective external control by governments or markets. Radical pluralism sought to diminish that power’s discretionary exercise. Finally, a cultural pluralist strand (Kallen/ Kymlicka school) has been arguing in favor of a “commonwealth of cultures”, where each ethno-cultural group would be given equal treatment, so that individuals might realize their possibilities according to their groups’ cultural traditions. According to Horace Kallen, self-government was impossible without “self-realization”, from which society’s creativity would benefit (Kallen 1924: 11, 116). Kallen’s vision was taken up by scholars such as Will Kymlicka and Tariq Modood, arguing that “denial of self-government rights . . . encourages resentment, even secession” (Kymlicka 1995: 192). Unlike the liberal state, the “plural state” may “offer an emotional identity with the whole, . . . which should prevent the fragmentation of society into narrow, selfish communalism” (Modood 1999: 88). Every concept so far discussed raises thorny issues. At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s brutal assault on Ukraine, and the worsening climate crisis are pushing these to the background. But they will not just vanish. Do radical pluralist visions of increased competence and control, for instance, stand a chance of being accepted, internalized, practiced by consumption-oriented citizens (Dahl 1970: 135)? How can cultural pluralism’s focus on group rights be balanced against individual rights, without endangering individual autonomy to exit groups perceived as confining (van Dyke 1976/77: 368)? Even more crucially, how can aggressive anxieties, which may fuel “evergreater racial tension” (Abrajano and Hajnal

2015: 21, 216) in the United States, be reduced while the emergence of whites as the “coming minority” is beginning to penetrate the collective consciousness? Practiced pluralism is central to democracy. But, as attested not least by the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol, living democratically seems presently bound to become ever more difficult. Rainer Eisfeld

References Abrajano, M. and Hajnal, Z. L. (2015): White Backlash. Immigration, Race and American Politics. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press Dahl, R. A. (1963): Who Governs? New Haven/London: Yale University Press Dahl, R. A. (1967): Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent. Chicago: Rand McNally Dahl, R. A. (1970): After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. New Haven: Yale University Press Dahl, R. A. (1982): Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press Dahl, R. A. (1989): Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press Dahl, R. A. and Lindblom, Chas. E. (1953): Politics, Economics and Welfare. Chicago: Chicago University Press Dahl, R. A. and Lindblom, Chas E. (1976): “Preface”, in Re-Issue of Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., XXI–XLIV Deane, H. A. (1955): The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. New York: Columbia University Press Eisfeld, R. (ed., 2006): Pluralism: Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy. Opladen: Barbara Budrich, 11–20 Eisfeld, R. (2019): Empowering Citizens, Engaging the Public: Political Science for the 21st Century. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan Hirst, P. (1994): Associative Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press James, W. (1909): A Pluralistic Universe. New York: Longmans, Green Kallen, H. M. (1924): Democracy and Culture in the United States. New York: Boni & Livewright Kymlicka, W. (1995): Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press Rainer Eisfeld

350  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Laski, H. J. (1915): “The Sovereignty of the State”, in Harold J. Laski (ed.) (1917): Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1–25 Laski, H. J. (1925, exp. reprint 1948): A Grammar of Politics. London: George Allen & Unwin Lowi, Th. J. (1967): “The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism”, APSR LXI, 5–24 Maharidge, D. (1999): The Coming White Minority. New York: Vintage Books McFarland, A. S. (2004): Neopluralism. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press

Rainer Eisfeld

Modood, T. (1999): “Multiculturalism, Secularism and the State”, in R. Bellamy and M. Hollis (eds.): Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality. Portland: Frank Cass, 79–97 Sartori, G. (1997): “Understanding Pluralism”, Journal of Democracy 8, 58–69 Truman, D. B. (1951): The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Webbs, S. and B. (1902); 1897): Industrial Democracy. 2 volumes in 1. London. New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green van Dyke, Vernon (1976/77): “The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory”, World Politics XXIX, 343–369

89. Polarisation Polarisation refers to an increase in political differences among citizens and a reduction of non-partisan voters as well as to a decline in electoral support for moderate (mainstream) forces. Those differences are not only socially constructed, but also determine individual attitudes and collective action. When conceptualising the notion a distinction should be made between polarisation as a property – referring to polarised individuals – and polarisation as a process of change towards increasing ideological distances and/or negatives attitudes. Moreover, it is also important to distinguish between first-order polarisation, understood as that taking place across the population without grouping, and secondorder polarisation – that is, between party groups of voters (Campbell 2016). Finally, polarisation studies also vary depending on whether scholars decide to undertake their analysis at the elite or at the socio-electoral level. Paraphrasing Giovanni Sartori (1976), studying polarisation is like going on a “fishing expedition”. There are as many conceptualisations, and operationalisations (see below), as studies on polarisation. From a political sociologist perspective, two traditions should be emphasised. On the one hand, the sociological and psychological traditions have been mainly interested in social polarisation, a term used to describe a society composed of identifiable socially different groups which are usually connected to dissimilarities in political/social attitudes/opinions between those groups and their individual components in a given population. Research work in this tradition has devised different notions to capture such polarisation (Bramson et  al. 2017). Some scholars within this school of thought conceive polarisation as dependant on the breadth of individual opinions within the population, looking at their spread, distribution, coverage and the type of areas they occupy in society. Conversely, others tend to put their focus on groups or communities, making polarisation depend on their degree of fragmentation, distinctiveness, divergence, consensus and parity. Hence, social polarisation can be also framed from economic, spatial and relational perspectives, indicating “how inequality takes a linked social and

geographical form, and how ‘left behind’ locations are distinctive from more prosperous and dynamic, urban centres” (Koch et al. 2021, p. 7). The political scientist tradition and media studies have, on the other hand, employed the concept of political polarisation. This notion includes two different types. Traditionally, ideological polarisation has usually been related to ideological or policy distances between voters as well as between parties across the ideological spectrum of any given polity in a way which decisively shapes how political forces compete within the party system (Dalton 2008). From this point of view, ideological polarisation usually denotes, either implicitly or explicitly, three different components: (1) an ideological distance among parties, voters or both; (2) an element of extremism related to the presence of antisystem forces; and (3) parties’ internal homogeneity (Schmitt 2016, p. 3). Much more recently, scholars have introduced the notion of affective polarisation, capturing the negative feelings expressed by individuals towards other political parties by measuring the level of dislike for opponents (Iyengar et al. 2019). In this second sense, the emphasis on social identity borrows from the sociological tradition the relevance of groups dynamics to explain the affections for outgroups, challenging the role of ideology. From a different perspective, the idea of populist polarisation has also been suggested, indicating a political scenario characterised by intense and aggressive competition between party blocs, composed, among others, by relatively stable and strong parties, where some of them reject the principle of division of powers, and with the political debate focusing on the question of who the “people” are (Enyedi 2016: 8). Aiming to capture the extent and growth of polarisation in a society or a party system, scholars have employed different approaches and tools. Thus, there is a vast amount of variation in how they measure dispersion, weighting – the approach employed for the ideological position – or the number of dimensions employed (Schmitt 2016). These several strategies are theoretically and empirically relevant because they may entail different outcomes in terms of measurement, but also different conceptions of what polarisation means. Still, very few studies have attempted to systematically assess and

351

352  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology compare the various indicators used to measure polarisation. The sociological tradition observes individual and groups differences by measuring spatial distances in different attitudes or social features through a set of indexes: for example, health, income, geographic or ethnic polarisation. These indexes may also express unidimensional or multidimensional polarisation, depending on the number of scales being aggregated. In the politological tradition, where polarisation is similarly defined in terms of ideological or party preferences, the specific operationalisation of the measures varies substantively from American to European studies. On the one hand, ideological polarisation has been traditionally measured in the former as the percentage of individuals reporting to be either liberal or conservative (i.e. Democrat or Republican voters), in contrast with moderate or non-aligned voters (or those who do not know their ideology). Hence, in this tradition, increases in polarisation capture an escalation in the partisan alignment of voters to the detriment of moderate or non-partisan positions in the centre. On the other hand, multiparty settings have led scholars in the European literature to design more complex indicators. The most common approach, based on Sartori’s seminal work (1976), analyses ideological polarisation as based on party distances along the left–right dimension, although ideological differences may also be captured on other dimensions or in relation to specific issues. In effect, most of these indicators seem to be capturing voters’ perceived polarisation, since distances are measured according to how individuals place themselves and political parties across the ideological or policy axis. For instance, a distinction has been made between vertical (measured as the weighted distance between voters and parties) and horizontal polarisation (reporting voters’ perceived mean distance among political parties) (Rodríguez Teruel 2020). However, some scholars have reasonably raised important reservations about using self-reported ideology as a measure. For this reason, some studies prefer to employ party manifestos’ and/or expert surveys’ data to estimate political parties’ ideological or policy position(s). Alternative measures, as summarised in Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2021: 193–194), may rely on the proportion of anti-system parties in the electorate/parliament.

In clear contrast, the abovementioned differences tend to vanish when trying to capture affective polarisation, which is usually measured using indicators based on feelings or affection. This certainly allows for more comprehensive comparative studies across different regional areas. With the aim of neutralising the impact of party system peculiarities, recent works have produced a new index of affective polarisation estimating the average divergence of partisan affective evaluations between in-groups and out-groups, weighted by the electoral size (vote share) of these parties (Reiljan 2020). There is an important debate about how polarised democratic societies are currently and to what extent polarisation is actually increasing. For many social scientists, the rise of political polarisation seems an unquestionable trend in contemporary democracies. While parallels of such an increase in political divisions can be found in the inter-war period (1919–1939), it is in contrast with the general ideological consensus that prevailed, at least in the Western world, after WWII. Other scholars observe, however, signs of stable or declining cultural polarisation in a number of issues, such as racial integration, ethical attitudes, gender or age dimensions (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). In this regard, the recent salience given to polarisation, especially after the Great Recession, has not only important commonalities with historical precedents, but also new idiosyncrasies. Looking at the possible explanatory factors, scholars have relied on institutional and cultural theories, referring to some familiar correlates discussed by the literature: party system fragmentation, the presence of cabinet coalitions, the timing of elections, the arrival of radical right-wing political parties, societal and media changes, just to name a few (Bischof and Wagner 2019). The sociological and psychological traditions have used computational models to test mechanisms that may lead to increasing polarisation. In this respect, four main families of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed, namely, (1) cultural diffusion and differentiation; (2) bounded confidence and relative agreement; (3) achievements in structural balance; and, borrowed from social psychology, (4) “group polarisation”. In turn, politologists have also found some relevant mechanisms when trying to explain polarisation, namely, (1) that partisan-motivated

Juan Rodríguez-Teruel and Fernando Casal Bértoa

polarisation  353 reasoning produces individuals that are primed to pay particular attention to being consistent with their partisan identity; and, similarly, (2) that party cues assume that parties send signals to their loyal voters, which will necessarily end up in partisan bias. Scholars analysing ideological polarisation have given special interest to the causal direction of the elite–mass relationship, splitting the literature over two main sources of polarisation. The first approach suggests that parties increase their ideological distances when voters move to the extremes, depending on the strength of voters’ attachment to parties, their propensity to abstain, or the institutional incentives produced by the electoral system. A second approach assumes that elites are prone to polarisation and that they may, therefore, adopt centrifugal strategies to compete with their adversaries (Rodríguez Teruel 2020). These will, in turn, produce changes in voters’ partisanship and ideological perceptions, fuelling polarisation in the electorate. Consequently, it is argued that elite polarisation is not a response to mass polarisation, but rather conditioned by institutional changes and party strategies. Other explanations of elite polarisation that exonerate the mass public include the changing basis of party activism from clientelist to ideological, the rise of ideological interest groups, the changing composition of electoral districts, and the decline of US Southern Democrats in the post–civil rights era. In this respect, Campbell (2016) has mentioned a “staggered realignment” as an important mechanism that has increased distances between voters and parties. One particular factor for polarisation is social media and new information and communication technologies (ICT), although the extent and strength of the impact are still inconclusive and unclear. On the one hand, the use of algorithms, exposure to disagreement in social media (in contrast to face-toface settings), online political expression, the amount of social media consumption and Twitter’s particular use have all been found to be positively related to rising polarisation. Other studies seem to be more cautious on the other hand. Moreover, the fact that polarisation has little connection to greater internet usage, clickbait headlines or the use of digital tools within parties seems to suggest exactly the opposite. The number of studies claiming polarisation has an impact on different aspects of the

political system (e.g., party system instability, fragmentation, electoral turnout), with particular attention to its – indirect – effect on the quality of democracy, has exponentially increased over time. Focusing on polarisation’s direct impact on democracy, and inspired by Sartori’s seminal work, a more traditional school of thought equates the presence of electorally successful anti-systemic (e.g., fascist, communist) parties in the political system, and the consequent electoral and partisan polarisation, with “conflict, protest and gridlock” (Singer 2016: 176). The Weimar Republic in Germany and the Spanish Second Republic constitute the best examples of how high ideological distances between political parties at the extremes of the political spectrum could lead to inimical attitudes, irresponsible oppositions, centrifugal competition, political outbidding and polarisation, fostering high levels of systemic instability and, eventually, causing democratic collapse. As recent experiences in Poland, Hungary, Serbia and Turkey demonstrate, polarisation can also lead to “democratic backsliding” and illiberalism (Enyedi 2016). Recent studies also show how polarisation may become a relevant driver for change in partisan competition, producing party switching or even raising demands for secession in regionalist settings (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2021). A political sociologist perspective may contribute decisively to elucidating whether attitude polarisation is crystallised into social and relational patterns, that is, how political and social polarisation are related (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). Hence, elite polarisation seems to be at the roots of a parallel increase in wealth disparity among the population, producing a negative impact on voters’ health. This also may affect the marketplace as polarisation could encourage consumers to buy products with brands that they perceive as reflecting their values and beliefs, while preventing neighbours and/or colleagues of opposing parties from developing personal friendships. Even in the financial world, research has found that employees accept lower wages in order to be able to work for politically like-minded entities. In order to deal with/tackle all of these negative effects, particularly in terms of the quality of democracy, political sociologist studies should identify strategies at the political level to curb polarisation and its social consequences. For instance, parties must

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354  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology build strong, institutionalised organisations that allow them to create professional structures capable of resolving internal conflicts, making good decisions and maintaining close links with their voters and supporters. Besides, parties must be responsible (avoiding the populist trap) and responsive to their voters (pursuing policies that are consistent with their electoral promises), with emphasis on transparency and a long-term policy perspective to avoid populist effects (Casal Bértoa and Rama 2021). Interpersonal trust may also help to reduce polarisation. Hence, the idea is that polarisation might decrease for participants with both mild and strong views when they are directly exposed to people with differing political views (Balietti et al. 2021). Juan Rodríguez-Teruel and Fernando Casal Bértoa

References Baldassarri, D. & Bearman, P. (2007). Dynamics of Political Polarization. American Sociological Review, 72(5), 784–811. Balietti, S., Getoor, L., Goldstein, D. G. & Watts, D. J. (2021). Reducing Opinion Polarization: Effects of Exposure to Similar People with Differing Political Views. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 118(52), 1–11. Bischof, D. & Wagner, M. (2019). Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter Parliament? American Journal of Political Science, 63(4), 888–904. Bramson, A., Grim, P., Singer, D. J., Berger, W. J., Sack, G., Fisher, S., Flocken, C. & Holman, B. (2017). Understanding Polarization: Meanings, Measures, and Model Evaluation. Philosophy of Science, 84(1), 115–159. Campbell, J. E. (2016). Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Casal Bértoa, F. & Enyedi, Z. (2021). Party System Closure: Party Alliances, Government Alternatives, and Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Casal Bértoa, F. & José Rama, J. (2021). Polarization: What do we know and what can we do about it? Frontiers in Political Science, 3, 687695. Dalton, R. J. (2008). The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems Party System Polarization, its Measurement, and its Consequences. Comparative Political Studies, 41(7), 899–920. Enyedi, Z. (2016). Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The Role of Party Politics in De-Democratization. Problems of Post-Communism, 63(4), 210–220. Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N. & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 129–146. Koch, I., Fransham, M., Cant, S., Ebrey, J., Glucksberg, L. & Savage, M. (2021). Social Polarisation at the Local Level: A Four-Town Comparative Study on the Challenges of Politicising Inequality in Britain. Sociology, 55(1), 3–29. Reiljan, A. (2020). ‘Fear and Loathing across Party Lines’ (also) in Europe: Affective Polarisation in European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 59(2), 376–396. Rodríguez-Teruel, J. (2020). Polarisation and Electoral Realignment: The Case of the Right-Wing Parties in Spain. South European Society and Politics, 25(3–4), 381–410. Rodríguez-Teruel, J. & Barrio, A. (2021). The Asymmetrical Effect of Polarization on Support for Independence: The Case of Catalonia. Politics and Governance, 9(4), 412–425. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmitt, J. (2016). How to Measure Ideological Polarization in Party Systems. Paper prepared for the ECPR Graduate Student Conference, University of Tartu. Singer, M. (2016). Elite Polarization and the Electoral Impact of Left-Right Placements: Evidence from Latin America, 1995–2009. Latin American Research Review, 51(2), 174–194.

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90. Policy analysis

analysis focuses on actors’ interests, social identities, political roles and organizational resources. However, policy analysis is located much more on the meso level when conceiving actors as organizations and collective Public policy is defined as (rather than individual) entities and paying a series of intentionally coherent decisions much attention to structures and institutions or activities taken or carried out by different tying these actors together, influencing their public – and sometimes – private actors, whose interactions and shaping the outcomes of the resources, institutional links and interests vary, policy process. with a view to resolving in a targeted manner a Agenda-setting stage: studies of agendaproblem that is politically defined as collective setting investigate how a policy problem is in nature. (Knoepfel et al. 2007: 24) socially constructed and politically framed and, furthermore, how it attracts the scarce Some policy scholars are interested in attention of policy-makers and is considered describing and understanding the process as a priority on the political agenda (Hill and and content of particular policies (e.g. social Varone 2021: 149–176). policy, climate policy, economic policy or The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory foreign policy). They investigate one or more (Baumgartner and Jones 2009), that owes empirical cases in order to trace how policy much to Kingdon’s pioneering work on problems emerge, how a policy solution is agenda-setting (Kingdon 1995), assumes formulated and later implemented and, even- that the number of policy problems compettually, what the results are (i.e. analysis of ing for serious consideration by politicians is policy, also known as policy studies). potentially infinite, whereas policy-makers Other scholars aim at improving the qual- and institutions have a very limited carrying ity of public policies by assisting policy-mak- capacity. Consequently, some problems are ers to reach robust decisions (i.e. analysis for given attention, while others are simply left policy). They inform elected officials, civil out of the political agenda. servants and advocacy groups about ‘what While tracing agendas across several decworks and what not’ and try to ensure that pol- ades in the United States, Baumgartner and icy choices are ‘evidence-based’. Evaluation Jones (2009) discovered that political attenstudies and (regulatory) impact assessments, tion across issues follow a pattern: long periwhich are concerned with analysing the ods of low saliency contrast with a few, short impacts policies have on society, the economy but dramatic peaks in attention. Furthermore, and/or the environment (Markard et al. 2012), the periods of high political saliency are conmark the borderline between analysis of pol- gruent with the occurrence of major policy icy and analysis for policy (Hill and Varone changes. An overall view of the policy pro2021: 5). cess shows that policies follow a punctuated The volume edited by Weible and Sabatier equilibrium pattern across time, where long (2018) offers an anthology of the most estab- periods of stability are interrupted by policy lished theories in the field of policy process. punctuations. This pattern is observed in It is accompanied by a supplemental guide European political systems as well (Greenabout how to develop a methodological design Pedersen and Walgrave 2014). for applying these theories in empirical studAgenda and policy continuity is associies (Weible and Workman 2022). The present ated with a stable configuration of actors in entry can only select and briefly introduce a the concerned policy domain. Dominant few mainstream theories to explore crucial actors exert a policy monopoly: they define questions arising at each stage of the policy the framing of the issue at stake and control process (based on Hill and Varone 2021). the access to the institutional venue in which Note that these stages are inter-linked and the policy is primarily discussed. In order to can develop in parallel and that the presented depart from the status quo, pro-change actors theories can most often be applied to one or (e.g. parties, interest groups, public agencies, another stage in the policy process. What we experts, media) seek to attract the attention propose is some sort of ideal-typical triangu- of politicians who do not belong to the closed lation of theories, key questions and stages community of policy insiders. They follow of the policy process. In line with the micro a “conflict expansion” strategy by proposing orientation of political sociology, policy an alternative framing of the policy issue and 355

356  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology engaging in “venue shopping” (e.g. parliamentary lobbying, launching a popular initiative, litigation, grassroots mobilization). A change in the agenda occurs only when the challenging frame receives increasing levels of attention in the alternative venue. Policy formulation stage: the most studied stage of the policy process consists in designing and adopting a legislative and regulatory framework that politically legitimates the choice of policy objectives, policy instruments – which determine the degree of state ‘interventionism’ (e.g. information, incentives and prescriptions; Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998) – and administrative procedures to be followed to resolve the problem under consideration on the political agenda. This is the point in time when a policy becomes directly tangible for all actors involved. Actors can anticipate whether or not they are targeted by the instruments mix and whether or not they should change their behaviour. The calibration of policy instruments is therefore one of the elements which best characterizes the design of a public policy (Howlett 2019). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) suggests that the choice of policy instruments results from a conflict between different coalitions of actors. Members of one advocacy coalition, or advocates for a cause (e.g., those who favour and those who oppose the use of nuclear energy), share the same belief and value systems and, based on that, coordinate their actions. The work done inside a coalition results in a preference for one mix of instruments over another (e.g., the public licensing and financing of nuclear power plants versus prohibiting such plants and imposing an obligation on the private plants’ owners to bear the dismantling costs). The public policy eventually adopted during the policy formulation stage reflects the belief systems of the dominant (in Gramscian terms ‘hegemonic’) advocacy coalition. Public administrations and independent agencies can either be members of different advocacy coalitions (i.e. competing to assert their belief systems and own instruments’ mix) or they may act as intermediaries between the coalitions in competition. In this latter case, a public administration body aims above all to reduce the level of conflict between the coalitions and mediate between them so as to identify possible compromise solutions. They are Frédéric Varone and Karin Ingold

referred to as policy brokers or entrepreneurs (Ingold and Varone 2012). Implementation stage: the third stage of the policy process corresponds to the application of the policy design, hence to the production of administrative outputs in specific and concrete situations (e.g., granting a building permit, a subsidy for solar panels or training in ecological farming practices). The implementation phase puts public administrations in direct contact with representatives of civil society, including, first and foremost, the groups targeted by the policy instruments. Most of the time, this interaction is complex, because a variety of potential snares exist, including the non-execution or very selective application of certain legislative or regulatory provisions. Such implementation deficits might be due to missing coordination between public administrations (affiliated to different ministries and/or levels of government), their insufficient endowment with resources (e.g. personnel, money, time), the opposition by the target groups and/or the reluctant attitudes of civil servants at the frontline. The street-level bureaucracy approach (Lipsky 1980; Hupe et al. 2015; Hill and Varone 2021: 246–272) insists on the latter explanation for implementation gaps. It focuses on the civil servants who are interacting directly and on a regular basis with citizens and who exercise discretionary power when delivering public services (e.g. welfare workers, police officers, nurses, educators). Such discretion is welcomed to tailor implementation decisions to local contexts and individual circumstances. However, it may also lead to significant divergences between the legislator’s intention (as formulated in the policy design) and the way policy is implemented. For example, when implementing policy instruments (e.g. granting a disability benefit), welfare workers may use their leeway to prioritize some citizens’ demands over others and justify their discriminatory behaviour by arguing that some citizens deserve more help than others. Such deservingness cues often resonate with the moral dispositions and professional norms of street-level bureaucrats. The implementation stage resembles thus a strategic game with – sometimes – quite unpredictable outputs. To make sense out of unexpected outputs, policy scholars study the daily interactions between street-level bureaucrats and citizens, the routines the former establish and the “devices they invent

policy analysis  357 to cope with uncertainties and work pressures” (Lipsky 1980: xii). As matter of fact, the implementation decisions taken by streetlevel bureaucrats become the public policy. Evaluation stage: at this final stage of the policy process, policy scholars aim at measuring the effects generated by the policy (Hill and Varone 2021: 301–310). To this end, evaluators have to reconstruct, both conceptually and empirically, the causal chain from problem definition and policy inception through the implementation activities of public administrations (outputs) to the behavioural changes of the target groups (outcomes) and, eventually, the intended effects on society (impacts). Furthermore, the ambition of any policy evaluation is to make a value judgement on these effects. For instance, the evaluation criterion of effectiveness analyses the achievement of the policy objectives, that is, the ability of the policy to solve the policy problem. Evaluators assess the match between actual effects and intended effects (i.e. doing the right things?). The efficiency criterion compares the policy effects to the resources invested by public administrations and street-level bureaucrats during policy implementation (i.e. doing the things right?). Conducting an evaluation contributes to answering political questions about the relevance of a policy and, eventually, giving a secondary legitimacy to state intervention (Knoepfel et al. 2007). Policy evaluation is a useful tool to deliver empirical evidence on ‘what works and what not’. Evidence-based policy-making (Cairney 2016) advertises the systematic search and use of scientific evidence about which policy instrument works (best) in a certain context. This policy analysis approach is strongly inspired by the development of randomized controlled trials in clinical medicine. In evaluation studies, the use of (field) experiments has gradually expanded from medicine to welfare policies in the United States (1960s) and, later on, to aid policies in developing countries or education and employment policies in Europe (1990s). However, the development of trials in the academic field of public policy has really taken off in the 2010s, notably when public agencies such as the Behavioural Insight Team in the United Kingdom have evaluated with experimental designs the effects of “nudges”, as a new type of policy instrument (John 2017). However, experimental evaluation designs and evidence-based policy-making are not easy

to implement in reality (Oliver and Cairney 2019). In addition, policy scholars who adopt a social constructivist (post-positivist) approach claim that policy-making is not just about selecting which instrument works best. Policy evaluation, as a political activity, should also contribute to asking whether the policy contributes value to society and raising wider ideological questions about which citizens and social groups deserve policy benefits (Fischer 2006). If policy-making is about “who gets what when and how” (as coined by Laswell 1936, a pioneer of policy analysis), then a policy evaluation cannot only focus on the ‘how’ question but should also address the social desirability and political acceptability of ‘what’ is delivered ‘to whom’. Policy evaluation has thus in common with political sociology to study power relationships and how they impact political outcomes (Hill and Varone 2021: 306). Frédéric Varone and Karin Ingold

References Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones (2009). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (second edition). Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist and Evert Vedung (1998). Carrots, Sticks & Sermons. Policy Instruments & Their Evaluation. New York: Routledge. Cairney, Paul (2016). The Politics of EvidenceBased Policy Making. London: Palgrave. Fischer, Frank (2006). Evaluating Public Policy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Stefaan Walgrave (eds). (2014). Agenda Setting, Policies, and Political Systems. A Comparative Approach. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Hill, Michael and Frédéric Varone (2021). The Public Policy Process. London: Routledge (eighth edition). Howlett, M. (2019). Designing Public Policy. Principles and Instruments. London: Routledge (second edition). Hupe, Pieter, Michael Hill and Aurélien Buffat (eds). (2015). Understanding StreetLevel Bureaucracy. Bristol: Policy Press. Ingold, Karin and Frédéric Varone (2012). Treating policy brokers seriously: Evidence from the climate policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22(2): 319–342. Frédéric Varone and Karin Ingold

358  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology John, Peter (2017). Field Experiments in Political Science and Public Policy. Practical Lessons in Design and Delivery. New York: Routledge. Kingdon, John W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Polices. New York: HarperCollins. Knoepfel, Peter, Corinne Larrue, Frédéric Varone and Michael Hill (2007). Public Policy Analysis. Bristol: Policy Press. Laswell, Harold D. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What, When and How. Cleaveland, OH: Meridian Books. Lipsky, Michael (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy. New York: Russel Sage. Markard, Jochen, Rob Raven and Bernhard Truffer 2012. Sustainability transitions: An

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emerging field of research and its prospects. Research Policy 41(6): 955–967. Oliver, Kathryn and Paul Cairney (2019). The dos and don’ts of influencing policy: A systematic review of advice to academics. Palgrave Communications 5(1): 1–11. Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993). Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Weible, Christopher M. and Paul A. Sabatier (2018). Theories of the Policy Process. New York: Routledge (fourth edition). Weible, Christopher and Samuel Workman (2022). Methods of the Policy Process. New York: Routledge.

91. Policy networks The debate on policy networks is among the classics of social science: suffice it to say that scholars have been inquiring into the relational properties of policymaking for four decades. Thus, early inquiries into “issue networks” (Heclo 1978) and “implementation structures” (Hjem and Porter 1983) were matched by a true explosion of the so-called network approach already at the beginning of the 1990s, focusing for example on “policy communities” (Jordan 1990), “iron triangles” (Jordan and Schubert 1992), “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992), “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and more broadly network structures of political governance (Kenis and Schneider 1991). These developments have allowed for the overcoming of standard approaches to policymaking. By contrast with a ‘stage’-centric heuristic that considers policymaking as a succession of steps – each one with its own properties – the analysis of policy networks has allowed for extensive analyses of how policy actors really govern vis-à-vis the governed, thereby strengthening scholarship with a stronger explanatory stand. In particular, seminal scholarship on communities, coalitions and more broadly “systems of action” (Crozier and Friedberg 1980) have opened space for a long-standing scholarly tradition dealing with two distinct strands – at the macro-level of structural policy output on the one hand, and, on the other, at the (inter-)actor level of agency-based initiatives. Ultimately, policy networks have allowed for structures and processes to be treated together: networks could be viewed as relatively stable social structures governed by some commonly understood rules and guidelines (Keast et al. 2004), while at the same time they have been taken as dynamic processes made of everchanging relationships among actors (Hay and Richards 2000). Against the idea that networks lack sufficient theoretical and empirical substance and exist only as metaphors (Baldamus 2010), scholars currently look at networks as inescapable facts, which stand out as an effective instrument of both conceptual and empirical analysis, rather than as a simple heuristic device (Christopoulos 2008). In particular, policy networks are taken as dynamic

channels combining structure and agency through relations. These channels comprehend the fundamental relationship between state and private actors, broad processes of organisation of politics and society, as well as the genesis and development of political agency. The strength of this relational approach consists in the possibility of treating at once actors (distinguishing between public and private, social and political, top-down and bottom-up, etc.), linkages (distinguishing between direct and indirect, collaboration and opposition, membership level and organisational level, etc.) and their own boundaries (for example in terms of actors’ identity, functional roles, overall fields, etc.). As a further point of strength, policy networks can be taken both as an independent variable that may explain properties of single nodes (policymakers, policy recipients, specific policies, etc.) or alternatively as a dependent variable: in this latter case, other explanatory factors account for the way networks have been shaped the way they are. For example, policy networks can be related to exogeneous macro-level factors such as the sudden opening of broader institutional opportunities or cross-national variations in terms of the inclusive/exclusive spectrum of politics. In this latter case, the main effort consists in assessing the extent to which facilitating/constraining political contexts translate into similar relational patterns. Relational analysis may also reveal some evidence of cross-national synergies in terms of policy networks across countries that are otherwise different for their policy approaches. By focussing on processes of (mis)matching between networks and contextual factors, scholars have increasingly engaged with the core business of social science, dealing with cross-scale dynamics between the macro- and the micro-level (Tilly 2010). Large network fields across the macro- and the micro-level can thus be identified in terms of sets of nodes which are entrusted to actors who, through their reciprocal interactions, contribute to shaping the overall context of constraints and opportunities that in the longer term is established upon them. Most crucially, this development has brought seminal top-down approaches focusing on networks and coalitions in the policy sphere (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier 1988), together with the most recent scholarly interest in bottom-up processes that link policy networks to the

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360  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology public sphere (Stier et al. 2018). Accordingly, policy networks become crucial for appraising the relational patterns that substantiate the complex relationship between policy elites and the “publics” of recipients; simply put, the study of policy networks can allow for deeper knowledge of the relationship between governors and the governed (Cinalli 2017). Hence, policy networks are by now nurturing a research agenda that is “context sensitive” (for example focussing on how different environments contain different sources of exclusion) and “actor sensitive” (for example focussing on why and how individual actors form specific patters of interaction) as well as “output sensitive” (for example focussing on the performance of broader outcomes of policy networks). By bringing together structures and dynamic processes grounded on actors’ agency and their relations, policy networks can bridge the wide gap between the most immutable aspects of institutional architecture and the most volitional preferences of actors on the ground, standing out for their crucial role in the constitution of politics and society (Giddens 1984; White 2008). In fact, policy networks can capture the most hidden properties across the policy and the public spheres; for example, they may reveal an essential part of the power structure within a policy field, as power is not an individual attribute of some actors but rather inherent in actual or potential interactions between them (Knoke 1990). Current research on policy networks is producing important advances in terms of operationalisation and measurement. The analysis of ‘scope’ and ‘heterogeneity’ has allowed for evaluating field boundaries, for example assessing the extent to which these boundaries become tighter when policymaking focuses on a specific issue. Research has for example considered the relevant role of specialised stakeholders, which avoid the creation of looser multi-organisational fields that have high coordination costs, as well as the presence of diverse actors in terms of cultural perspectives, political goals or different levels of intervention. Similar notions and their measurement have allowed for further inquiry into variations of politics between models of inclusion and exclusion respectively, for example evaluating how stronger inclusion is promoted by tighter borders and low organisational heterogeneity (Bassoli and Cinalli 2016). Manlio Cinalli

‘Reciprocity’ provides another valuable notion to be measured so as to retrace mutual acknowledgement and shared cooperation, which are essential to replace the traditional forms of top-down policymaking with more inclusive bottom-up processes. At the same time, the analysis of ‘coreness’ and ‘centralisation’ is valuable to appraise whether organisations are in full control of their own field—with actors interacting with each other in dense, dispersed, and highly decentralised patterns—or if, alternatively, the main control passes through one or a few highly centralised brokers. Thus, a central group of actors that are densely tied with each other can easily communicate with the periphery, whose members have more ties to core members than to each other. By contrast, the opposite situation of segmentation may translate into stronger top-down control and less inclusive dynamics across the public and the policy sphere: loose interactions in the policy field can only give more room to governors who want to decide for themselves what needs to be done (Majone 1996). Of course, the pathway is still long for providing some conclusive answers to many crucial questions dealing with complex interactive dynamics between policy networks and the whole public sphere. Nevertheless, the study of networks across the policy and public spheres can tell us much more about the unaffected dominance, or alternatively the ongoing weakening, of traditional forms of top-down politics within our contemporary democracies. Thus, keeping with the seminal notion of power (Atkinson and Coleman 1989), this could be thought in terms of dominance that is concentrated in the hands of few actors or is alternatively and more inclusively shared across networks. Traditional forms of top-down politics, with very little sharing of power, may well reward the strongest interest groups and organisations in the public sphere, showing the well-grounded reasons of the old debate on the ‘tyranny of structurelessness’, or in a less normative claim, the fact that resourceful actors will have a freer hand in the absence of formal structures (Freeman 1973). Simply put, scholars of policy networks are well-endowed with sound conceptual and methodological tools for dealing with the most pressing challenges for politics and society. Against risks of recognising only patterns of reductionist politics, being focussed in the main

policy networks  361 on questions of winning or losing resources for oneself, future research on policy networks may identify fields of burgeoning interactions across the policy and public spheres. Citizens, groups and actors of different kinds are likely to get what they want in terms of policies if they link more closely to rulers; at the same time, social life impacts policymaking insofar as rulers are attuned to the ebb and flow of society and adjust their policies accordingly. Of course, there is always room for potential contentiousness, yet policy networks allow for attention to be focussed beyond opposing interests and particular group identities, possibly to identify virtuous processes that nurture a more efficient public/policy nexus and a more inclusive social life. Manlio Cinalli

References Atkinson, M. M., and W. D. Coleman (1989). Strong states and weak states: Sectoral policy networks in advanced capitalist economies. British Journal of Political Science 19(1): 47–67. Baldamus, W. 2010. 1982. “Networks” in Mark Erickson and Charles Turner (eds.), The Sociology of Wilhelm Baldamus: Paradox and Inference. Farnham: Ashgate (pp. 107–121). Bassoli, M. and M. Cinalli (2016). “Political participation of local publics in the unemployment field: A comparison of Lyon and Turin”. Social Movement Studies, 15(2): 197–215. Baumgartner, F. R. and B. D. Jones 1993. Agenda and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Christopoulos, D. (2008). “The governance of networks: Heuristic or formal analysis? A reply to Rachel Parker”. Political Studies, 56(2): 475–481. Cinalli, M. 2017. Citizenship and the Political Integration of Muslims: The Relational Field of French Islam. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg 1980. Actors and Systems. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Freeman, J. 1973. “The tyranny of structurelessness”. Berkeley Journal of Sociology 17: 151–164. Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.

Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Haas, P. M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization 46(1): 1–35. Hay, C. and D. Richards 2000. “The tangled webs of Westminster and Whitehall: The discourse, strategy and practice of networking within the British core executive”. Public Administration 78(1): 1–28. Heclo, H. 1978. “Issue networks and the executive establishment” in A. King (ed.), The New American Political System. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute (pp. 87–124). Hjem, B. and D. Porter 1983. “Implementation structures: A new unit of administrative analysis” in B. Holzner (ed.), Realizing Social Science Knowledge. Vienna: Physica-Verlag (pp. 265–277). Jordan, G. 1990. Sub-governments, policy communities and networks: Refilling old bottles? Journal of Theoretical Politics 2(3): 319–338. Jordan, G. and K. Schubert 1992. “A preliminary ordering of policy network labels”. European Journal of Political Research 21(1–2): 7–27. Keast, K., M. Mandell, K. Brown and G. Woolcock 2004. “Network structures: Working differently and changing expectations. Public Administration Review 64(3): 363–371. Kenis, P. and V. Schneider 1991. “Policy network and policy analysis: Scrutinizing a new Analytica ltoolbox” in B. Marin and R. Mayntz (eds.), Policy Networks, Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag (pp. 25–59). Knoke, D. 1990. Political Networks. The Structural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Majone, G. 1996. Regulating Europe. London; New York: Routledge. Sabatier, P. A. 1988. “An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein”. Policy Sciences 21: 129–168. Sabatier, P. and H. C. Jenkins-Smith. (eds.) 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalirion Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Stier, Sebastian, Wolf J. Schünemann, and Stefan Steiger 2018. “Of activists and Manlio Cinalli

362  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology gatekeepers: Temporal and structural properties of policy networks on Twitter”. New Media & Society 20(5): 1910–1930. Tilly, Charles 2010. “Mechanisms of the middle range” in Craig J. Calhoun (ed.), Robert K. Merton: Sociology of Science

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and Sociology as Science. New York: Columbia University Press (pp. 54–62). White, H. C. 2008. Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

92. Political attitudes The concept of political attitudes is at the heart of political sociology research. Ever since political scientists have analyzed citizens or political elites, they have used this term to describe their stances toward political issues, actors, institutions, or regimes. This entry gives an overview of the concept, the foundations of public opinion research as well as the causes and consequences of political attitudes. One of the oldest, yet most widely used, definitions of political attitudes stems from Allport (1935, 810) saying that an attitude is “a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related”. Building on Allport’s work and other approaches to the concept, Rokeach (1972, 112) developed a condensed and clear description of an attitude: “An attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner”. Thus, an attitude has at least five features. First, it is “relatively enduring”, meaning that it is not a temporary or situational disposition but an ongoing one. Second, it is an “organization of beliefs” that are related to each other. For instance, an attitude toward migration encompasses a number of beliefs around migration, like its humanitarian component, its economic consequences, or its effects of social cohesion. Beliefs might be descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive, according to Rokeach (1972, 113). Each of them has a cognitive, an affective, and a behavioral component, meaning that a belief builds on a person’s knowledge about an object and is able to arouse an affect and lead to action. Third, an attitude is organized “around an object or situation”, meaning that it refers to an object, like an actor, an institution, a regime type or a certain policy, or a situation, like an election. Fourth, it is a “predisposition to respond”. That means that an attitude predisposes us to respond in a certain way, either by expressing an opinion or showing a certain behavior. Fifth, this response is supposed to be a preferential one which might be positive or negative depending on

the stance toward the object or situation. Referring back to the example of immigration attitudes, if a person holds pro-immigration attitudes, she will respond positively to liberal immigration policies. To further clarify the conceptual meaning of an attitude, Rokeach (1972, 123) distinguishes it from related concepts. While he discusses a multitude of concepts, we will focus on the most important ones for research in political sociology. Attitudes need to be distinguished from ideologies or belief systems which encompass a multitude of attitudes. Values are supposed to be more lower lying than attitudes and can be thought of as a basis for them. Finally, an opinion is understood as “a verbal expression of some belief, attitude, or value” (Rokeach 1972, 125). The aggregation of political attitudes is referred to as public opinion. Public opinion research has a long tradition as a subfield within political sociology, which is closely related to the rise of population surveys as a method of data collection and quantitative methods of data analysis from the 1950s onwards. Central questions of public opinion research concern the process of attitude formation and the structure of political attitudes among ordinary citizens. Two of the most influential theories addressing these issues have been developed by Converse (1964) and Zaller (1992). In his seminal writing “The Nature of Belief Systems”, Converse (1964) argues that most people do not hold structured political attitudes in the sense of ideological belief systems. Rather, their attitudes are loosely connected and incoherent. His conclusions, which are based on the analysis of open-ended interview questions, have sparked lively debates in public opinion research. About 30 years later, Zaller (1992) counters the argument that attitudes are quasirandom and inconsistent for large parts of the public. According to Zaller’s “ReceiveAccept-Sample” (RAS) model, awareness of political information (“receive”), prior beliefs (“accept”), and current priorities (“sample”) explain an individual’s attitudes. Thus, attitudes can be understood when considering individual dispositions and situational factors. Against this backdrop, Zaller’s model of information processing and attitude formation has been labelled as “memory-based”: individuals are not expected to have a set of fixed attitudes but form them when they are asked about an object, like an institution,

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364  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology a political actor, or a policy. To do so, they retrieve information from their long-term memory. This view is challenged by the socalled “online model” of information processing that assumes that individuals update existing attitudes when they receive new information (Lodge et al. 1995). The model belongs to a larger set of dual-process models of information processing that distinguish between conscious and unconscious information processing (Druckman and Lupia 2000). To fully understand the process of attitude formation, scholars argue that both perspectives – memory-based and online models of information processing – need to be considered and integrated (Kim and Garrett 2012; Lau and Redlawsk 2006). The theoretical debate on how people form their attitudes also relates to the methodological debate on how to measure them. Explicit measures are most widely used in public opinion research. Yet, these measurement instruments may affect attitudes as a situational factor. Therefore, a combination of explicit and implicit measures might be the silver bullet. Implicit measures of political attitudes are also less prone to social desirability, which makes them particularly attractive for studying attitudes toward controversial issues (Ksiazkiewicz and Hedrick 2013). Causes and consequences of political attitudes are manifold. Regarding the causes, biological, psychological, socialization, context, and media effects are most prominently discussed in the literature. Research on biology and political attitudes suggests that certain neuronal structures in the brain are associated with particular political preferences and that genetic differences might explain up to 50 percent of the variation in political attitudes depending on the attitudinal domain (Hatemi and McDermott 2016). Concerning psychological causes of political attitudes, most of the work deals with personality traits and emotions. A number of studies have shown a correlation between personality dispositions, like openness to experience or conscientiousness, and policy orientations in particular (Gerber et al. 2010). Meanwhile, theories of motivated reasoning discuss the importance of emotions in attitude formation (Taber and Lodge 2006). Moreover, socialization is assumed to be particularly relevant for the formation of political attitudes. Recent work applying sophisticated strategies of causal identification lends support to Kathrin Ackermann

this assumption (Healy and Malhotra 2013). Another frequently studied topic are contextual effects on political attitudes. They can take very different forms and are particularly useful to understand differences in public opinion across countries. For instance, institutional performance is a contextual factor that is highly relevant for political trust (Van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017). Finally, the role of media is an important topic in public opinion research. The changing landscape of media and media consumption makes this strand of research highly relevant in the digital age. Most prominently, the literature is concerned with priming and framing effects (Price and Tewksbury 1997). Priming refers to the idea that media reports might activate certain cognitive structures depending on the topics they cover. Framing describes the fact that information might be presented in different ways by deliberately stressing certain aspects of a topic. Frames are expected to affect political orientations, but it is unclear whether different frames can really cause long-lasting changes in political attitudes. Concerning the consequences of political attitudes, two issues are particularly prominent in the literature. On the individual level, research mostly cares about the behavioral consequences of political attitudes. Yet, the direction of effects is not always clear-cut. The relationship between political attitudes and behavior might be reciprocal or even reversed, as recent work on satisfaction with democracy and turnout shows (Kostelka and Blais 2018). On the aggregate level, the link between public opinion and public policy is widely studied in the literature. This strand of research is highly important because congruence between the two might be considered a key goal of democracy from a normative perspective (Wlezien and Soroka 2016). The analysis of political attitudes is a core topic in political sociology. Attitudes can take different forms depending on the object of interest, for instance attitudes toward certain policies or attitudes toward an institution. Most prominently, attitudes toward major policy fields, like attitudes toward socio-economic policies, toward immigration policies, or toward climate policies, are studied (for recent contributions, see Arndt et al. 2023; Bullock 2021 or Maxwell 2019). Moreover, attitudes toward political institutions and attitudes toward regime types are popular objects of study (for recent contributions, see Kölln

political attitudes  365 and Aarts 2021 or Esaiasson et al. 2021). The structure and formation of political attitudes have been the subject of intense scholarly debate ever since political scientists began devoting themselves to the analysis of attitudes. Most recently, research on the formation of political attitudes is mainly concerned with different ways of information processing and is highly influenced by psychological work. Similar tendencies can be found in the study of the root causes of political attitudes, where biological and psychological approaches have also gained momentum. Yet, contextual, socialization, and media effects still play an important role in understanding the foundations of attitudes. Concerning the consequences of political attitudes, most studies examine behavioral consequences, like voting behavior or participation, as well as the interplay of public opinion and public policy. Although public opinion research has a long tradition, new approaches from neighboring disciplines, like psychology, as well as methodological innovations, like survey experiments, promise an ever-better understanding of citizens’ political orientations. In particular, multinational survey experiments will help to understand whether the mechanisms that link political attitudes and their antecedents are generalizable across different contexts (see for instance Silva and Wratil 2023). Moreover, efforts at data harmonization open up new perspectives for comparative research on political attitudes (see for instance Claassen 2020). Kathrin Ackermann

References Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology. Worcester, Mass (pp. 798– 844). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. Arndt, C., Halikiopoulou, D., & Vrakopoulos, C. (2023). The centre-periphery divide and attitudes towards climate change measures among Western Europeans. Environmental Politics, 32(3), 381–406. Bullock, J. G. (2021). Education and attitudes toward redistribution in the United States. British Journal of Political Science, 51(3), 1230–1250. Claassen, C. (2020). Does public support help democracy survive? American Journal of Political Science, 64(1), 118–134.

Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent (pp. 206– 261). New York: The Free Press. Druckman, J. N., & Lupia, A. (2000). Preference formation. Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), 1–24. Esaiasson, P., Sohlberg, J., Ghersetti, M., & Johansson, B. (2021). How the coronavirus crisis affects citizen trust in institutions and in unknown others: Evidence from ‘the Swedish experiment’. European Journal of Political Research, 60(3), 748–760. Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts. American Political Science Review, 104(1), 111–133. Hatemi, P. K., & McDermott, R. (2016). Give me attitudes. Annual Review of Political Science, 19(1), 331–350. Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Childhood socialization and political attitudes: Evidence from a natural experiment. The Journal of Politics, 75(4), 1023–1037. Kim, Y. M., & Garrett, K. (2012). On-line and memory-based: Revisiting the relationship between candidate evaluation processing models. Political Behavior, 34(2), 345–368. Kölln, A. K., & Aarts, K. (2021). What explains the dynamics of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy? An integrated framework for panel data. Electoral Studies, 69, 102271. Kostelka, F., & Blais, A. (2018). The chicken and egg question: Satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout. PS: Political Science & Politics, 51(2), 370–376. Ksiazkiewicz, A., & Hedrick, J. (2013). An introduction to implicit attitudes in political science research. PS: Political Science and Politics, 46(3), 525–531. Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2006). How Voters Decide: Information Processing during Election Campaigns. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lodge, M., Steenbergen, M., & Brau, S. (1995). The responsive voter: Campaign information and the dynamics of candidate evaluation. American Political Science Review, 89(2), 309–326. Maxwell, R. (2019). Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in large European cities: Contextual or compositional effects? American Political Science Review, 113(2), 456–474. Kathrin Ackermann

366  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Price, V., & Tewksbury, D. (1997). News values and public opinion. A theoretical account of media priming and framing. In G. Barnett & F. J. Boster (Eds.), Progress in the Communication Sciences (pp. 173– 212). Greenwich: Ablex. Rokeach, M. (1972). Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values: A Theory of Organization and Change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Silva, B. C., & Wratil, C. (2023). Do parties’ representation failures affect populist attitudes? Evidence from a multinational survey experiment. Political Science Research and Methods, 11(2), 347–362. Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political

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beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769. Van der Meer, T., & Hakhverdian, A. (2017). Political trust as the evaluation of process and performance: A cross-national study of 42 European countries. Political Studies, 65(1), 81–102. Wlezien, C., & Soroka, S. (2016). Public opinion and public policy. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, doi: 10.1093/ acrefore/9780190228637.013.74. Zaller, J. R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

93. Political behaviour Political behaviour is a form of human behaviour that invokes politics. Political behaviour can be individual or collective and applies to the activities of citizens and elites. One strand of the evolution of this debate has focused on exploring the political views, ideology and levels of political behaviour of individuals and, as such, the emphasis is on identifying political behaviour as a sub-set of behaviour more generally. A further strand of this debate encourages us to think about the context in which individuals act and how this affects political behaviour. This literature focuses on the situations within which people act politically and is particularly interested in how political behaviour is affected by institutions such as political parties, interest groups and administrative agencies. An institutional-level focus aligns with political science’s broader aim of determining the effects of political behaviour for the functioning of political institutions. Several different approaches to the study of political behaviour can be discerned in the literature, each offering a particular focus, as is outlined below. An individualistic approach, informed by political psychology and psychoanalysis, characterises the early literature on political behaviour and considers personal qualities in politics. Psychoanalysis offered a framework for selecting and organising empirical findings relating personality types to political orientation, while the political preferences and choices of leaders and followers were interpreted by referring to unconscious drives and mechanisms. Early research pioneered by this perspective includes Lasswell’s (1930) work on the motives behind political engagement, while research under the lead of Adorno focused on the authoritarian personality. The study by Adorno and colleagues (1950) was influenced by Freudian ideas concerning the role of drives and defence mechanisms in personality. While the effects of political psychology on understanding political personality were strong in the second third of the twentieth century, the effects of this paradigm have diminished over recent decades and the focus has turned to other perspectives in the post-war period. A further long-standing theme in debates about political behaviour, and which seeks to

situate the individual within a social context, explores the effect of political socialisation on political behaviour. In 1965, Greenstein posed the question of: “(1) Who (2) learns what (3) from whom (4) under what circumstances and (5) with what effects?” (Greenstein, 1965: p. 15) as central to the study of political socialisation, and it continues to guide researchers working in the sub-field today. It was Hyman (1959) who coined the term political socialisation and argued that political behaviour is learned behaviour and that learning begins in childhood and, in many respects, is completed by adolescence. The height of the political socialisation literature occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and saw a focus on children in the early literature (Easton and Dennis, 1969; Hess and Torney, 1967), but this later expanded to include other groups, such as adolescents and young people (Campbell, 1980). Returning to Greenstein’s question, as regards what is learned, the focus is on norms, values and attitudes (Hyman, 1959). With regards ‘from whom’, research has tended to identify specific agents of socialisation, such as the family or the school (Jennings and Nieini, 1968). The question about under what circumstances the process occurs invokes the importance of context (Marsh, 1971), while the discussion about with ‘what effects’ focuses upon debates about outcomes, system stability and the evolution of the system (Marsh, 1971). Marsh’s (1971) critique of the early studies of political socialisation challenged the assumption that adult opinions reflect the product of political socialisation, arguing that the enduring nature of political attitudes remains uncertain. Despite a sharp decline in research on political socialisation in the 1980s, the tide seems to be turning and there has been a re-emergence of interest in this debate (Kudrnáč, 2015). It is voting and the study of individual voters that has captured most interest in debates on political behaviour with the study of voting behaviour constituting an enduring paradigm in the discipline and creating a highly specialised sub-field within political science. Voting behaviour is a form of electoral behaviour and is the main expression of political participation in liberal democratic societies. Understanding voters’ behaviour can help political scientists to explain how and why decisions were made by public decision-makers or by the electorate. Voting patterns in data can be studied to identify the determinants of why people vote

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368  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology as they do and how they arrive at the decisions they make. A range of factors can influence voting behaviour, with political scientists focusing on socio-economic determinants of support for political parties, and documenting and explaining the correlations between class, occupation, ethnicity, sex, age and vote. Political scientists have also studied the influence of political factors such as particular issues, electoral campaigns and the popularity of party leaders on voting behaviour. The study of voting behaviour reflects a behaviouralist approach to political behaviour and draws on the use of large-scale voting data and sample surveys. While voting data provides inferential data, sample surveys enable a direct study of individual voters and the isolation of variables that affect voting decisions. The behaviouralist paradigm is the dominant approach to the study of political behaviour in the United States, but we can also see its influence on the early studies of British elections undertaken by Butler and Rose (1960) or the studies on electoral behaviour conducted in Norway by Rokkan and Valen (1960) and Sartori (1976) in Italy. A range of different approaches can be found for explaining voting behaviour (Dalton and Klingemann, 2009). Rationalchoice approaches explain voting behaviour as the outcome of cost-benefit calculations by individuals, assessing preferences for specific electoral outcomes in terms of the issues addressed and policies espoused. Structural approaches consider the relationship between individuals and social structure, exploring the effects of variables such as class or age. Ecological approaches are concerned with voting patterns in reference to geographical area (ward or constituency). These different approaches utilise distinct research methods while making particular assumptions about what motivates political behaviour. Debates about what counts as political behaviour are informed by broader arguments about the changing nature of political participation. While political behaviour takes the individual as its focus, or the individual in relation to the social, political participation refers to the range of activities that individuals engage in to influence politics, thus offering a broader lens through which to explore political behaviour. Adopting a narrow definition of political participation, for Verba and Nie (1972), political participation includes voting, so Sadiya Akram

contacting elected representatives and participating in campaigns, but does not include protesting or expressing support or attitudes. Verba and Nie are thus concerned only with political participation that is aimed “at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel” (Verba and Nie, 1972: p. 2). In later work, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) highlight the effects of resources such as money, time and civic skills on levels of political participation, thereby refining our understanding of the effects of socio-economic status on political participation. While voting or narrow definitions of political participation offer one perspective on political behaviour, the post-war period has witnessed a vibrant discussion about the changing nature of political participation, a change that requires re-thinking how people engage politically and the reasons for their engagement. Although there is much consensus that political participation and, in turn, political behaviour are changing, at least in Western democracies, there is less agreement as to the nature of this change and its implications for the health of democracy. For some, the decline in conventional modes of political behaviour, such as voting, joining political parties and interest groups as is evident since the post-World War Two period, is evidence of a crisis in political participation and best understood as a malaise, which requires swift remedy (Putnam, 2000). Others, however, note an increase in new and alternative forms of political mobilisation such as protesting (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), consumer boycotts and direct action (Bryant and Goodman, 2004) and that this occurs both online and offline (Norris, 2002), and suggest that the ways in which citizens are engaging with democracy and the types of political behaviour being expressed are changing thereby necessitating a broader definition of political participation and behaviour. A range of reasons for why political behaviour has changed in the post-war years have been offered. These include a long-term decline in public trust in government and here we might note the MPs expenses scandal in the United Kingdom in 2009 (Allen and Birch, 2015). Others have pointed to the rise of a culture of anti-politics linked to antielite sentiment (Clarke et al., 2018), as well as profound shifts in how citizens relate to their

political behaviour  369 government and to politics more broadly. For Dalton and Welzel (2014), the cumulative effect of these factors is to indicate a shift from allegiant to assertive citizens. Building on this sentiment, Norris (2002) adds that while there is support for democracy, citizens are ‘dissatisfied democrats’ and are divided as to the practice of democracy. The long-term decline in formal modes of political behaviour such as voting is important but should not be our primary focus in this debate as has been argued by some (Norris, 2002; Akram, 2019). Rather, we need to take new and alternative forms of political behaviour seriously because the way in which people engage with democracy is evolving as is evident in the diversification of modes of political participation. Accordingly, there is a need to move beyond binary positions in this debate to recognise that citizens do not see formal and informal modes of political participation as opposite ends of a spectrum where they must choose between the two. Instead, we are seeing a proliferation of activities on the borders between formal and informal modes of political participation, which necessitates moving from a polarised position where we think of this debate in terms of crisis or opportunity, to recognising the multifaceted nature of the issue. This changing landscape requires shifts in how we understand what counts and does not count as political behaviour. Such a question brings into focus a series of sub-questions such as: where does politics occur? What is the relationship between social and the political issues? Finally, how do we measure the efficacy and impact of political behaviour? Addressing these questions is paramount if we want to understand the nature of contemporary political behaviour. While the earlier literature on political behaviour emphasised personal qualities in politics, drawing on psychology and psychoanalysis, later decades emphasised the effects of the wider socio-political context on political behaviour. A balance between the two seems important especially for thinking about the changing nature of contemporary political behaviour, yet the pull of an empirically dominant political science necessarily loses some of the richness of the accounts of why people engage in politics, their reasons and motivation, but also how they understand the outcomes of such behaviour. Taking agency seriously and having a more complex account

of what agency is (Akram, 2019) without losing the insights brought in by a contextualised account matters immensely for political science if it is to provide richer accounts of political behaviour. Sadiya Akram

References Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., and Sanford, R. (1950). The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper. Akram, S. (2019). Re-thinking Contemporary Political Beahviour. The Difference That Agency Makes. London: Routledge. Allen, N. and Birch, S. (2015). Process Preferences and British Public Opinion: Citizens’ Judgements about Government in an Era of Anti-Politics. Political Studies, 63(2), 390–411. Barnes, S.H., Kaase, M., Allerbeck, K.R., Farah, B.G., Heunks, F., Inglehart, R., Jennings, M.K., Klingemann, H.D., Marsh, A., and Rosenmayr, L. (1979). Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Brady, H.E., Verba, S., and Schlozman, K.L. (1995). Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation. The American Political Science Review, 89(2), 271–294. Bryant, R.L. and Goodman, M.K. (2004). Consuming Narratives: The Political Ecology of ‘Alternative’ Consumption. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(3), 344–366. Butler, D.E. and Rose, R. (1960). The British General Election of 1959. London: Macmillan and Company. Campbell, B.A. (1980). A Theoretical Approach to Peer Influence in Adolescent Socialization. American Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 324–344. Clarke, N., Jennings, W., Moss, J., & Stoker, G. (2018). The Good Politician: Folk Theories, Political Interaction, and the Rise of Anti-Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dalton, R. and Klingemann, H-D. (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. J. and Welzel, C. (Eds.). (2014). The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sadiya Akram

370  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Easton, D. and Dennis, J. (1969). Children in the Political System. Origins of Political Legitimacy. New York: McGraw Hill. Greenstein, F. (1965). Children and Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale. Hess, R.D. and Torney, J. (1967). The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago, IL: Aldine. Hyman, H. (1959). Political Socialisation. Glencoe: The Free Press. Jennings, M.K. and Nieini, R.G. (1968). The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. American Political Science Review, 62(1), 169–184. Kudrnáč, A. (2015). Theoretical Perspectives and Methodological Approaches to Political Socialisation. Sociologica, 47(6), 605–624. Lasswell, H.D. (1930). Psychopathology and Politics. New York: Viking. Marsh, D. (1971). Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned.

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British Journal of Political Science, 1(4), 453–465. Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Rokkan, S. and Valen, H. (1960). Parties, Elections and Political Behaviour in the Northern Countries. Pages 103–136 in Otto Stammer (ed.), Politische Forschung. Cologne (Germany): Westdeutscher Verlag. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Verba, S. and Nie, N. (1972). Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row.

94. Political communication

message tonality, often referred to as “attack politics” or “negative campaigning,” that has captured most of the scholarly attention in recent years. A large-scale investigation on the use of negative campaigning in elections worldwide showed that political attacks are Broadly speaking, political communica- more likely used by challengers (vs. incumtion encompasses all forms of information bents) and ideologically extreme candidates exchange, creation, or consumption, associ- and are less likely in countries with a higher ated with the political world. A rather crude share of female members of parliament (Valli threefold typology could be used to make & Nai, 2022). sense of the main trends within this field. Negativity has been shown to be more First, political communication refers to “ver- memorable and noteworthy, mainly because tical” information exchanges between the the human brain is hardwired to pay particupolitical sphere and the public. This includes lar attention to the negative side of things all forms of political campaigning and adver- (“negativity bias”; Soroka et al., 2019). tising during elections and routine phases, Whether negativity is electorally successful as well as the investigation of how the pub- remains unclear, however (Lau et al., 2007). lic acquires, understands, processes, and The public at large tends to dislike negative ultimately is affected by such information. campaigning. As such political attacks might Second, political communication includes be more memorable but also face a bigger risk “horizontal” forms of communication, for of backlash against the sponsor or even proinstance, between citizens, social groups, moting other candidates (Walter & van der parties, and elites themselves. Third, politi- Eijk, 2019). It is also questionable whether cal communication encompasses all forms of negativity is detrimental from a normative, “mediated” information exchanges, covering, systemic standpoint. Is campaign negativfor instance, how traditional and new (social) ity a threat to democracy? Here, as well, media filter, shape, reframe, and diffuse polit- the answer is a mixed bag. If negativity can ical messages. stimulate attention and mobilization, it might This entry focuses on the “vertical” infor- also increase cynicism and partisan dislike mation exchanges between the political elite (“affective polarization”). and the public for two reasons: first, this is A message’s sentiment, on the other hand, likely what comes to mind when thinking reflects the specific affective and emotional of political communication – the persua- responses it intends to arouse in the recipisive nature of election campaigns, political ents. Or, more simply, whether the message propaganda, political speeches, and so forth. is framed around emotional cues and includes Second, it allows us to frame political com- appeals to positive emotions, such as hope, munication as a hierarchical set of compo- enthusiasm, or pride (e.g., “Yes, we can!”), or nents, which include (a) the message, that is, negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, anger, what is communicated; (b) the mechanisms, or rage (e.g., “Lock her up!”). that is, how such messages are received and The use of such appeals stems from the processed; and (c) the receivers, that is, who is desire to arouse an emotional response in the more likely to be affected by those messages, public in order to shape subsequent behaviors and why. and attitudes (Brader, 2005). According to the Beginning with the message, we first ask affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., how elites communicate with the public. 2000), positive emotions are particularly useThis question, extremely vast in itself, could ful to “drum up” the passion of the ideological be answered by looking at three elements of base of the speaker but are less effective in their messages: the tone, the sentiment, and making new acolytes. Negative emotions such the style. as anger and rage also are particularly likely The tone of political messages relates to to mobilize the base, especially if a clear culwhether the message advocates for the posi- prit, real or imagined, can be identified. Other tions, programs, or character of the sponsor negative emotions, most notably anxiety and of the message (“positive” messages) rather fear, can encourage individuals to uncouple than criticizing the positions, programs, or from their ideological predispositions and character of the political opponents (“nega- open their minds to new, potentially opposing tive” messages). It is this second type of information. 371

372  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Finally, the style refers to all additional elements above and beyond the messages’ content, tone, or sentiment. A particularly salient example in this sense is the use of a populist style, characterized by simpler language and the showcasing of more direct, uncouth, rude, and even vulgar manners (Moffitt, 2016). The populist political style, both on the left and on the right of the political spectrum, seems, thus, characterized by transgressive and provocative acts, a style that “emphasises agitation, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations, and the intended breech of political and socio-cultural taboos” (Heinisch, 2003, p. 94). To be sure, it is not only stylistic elements that are central to populist communication. From the standpoint of their content, populist messages tend to be framed by appeals to people-centrism and anti-elitism, in general espousing a normative worldview that pits the pure and innocent people against the corrupt and debased elites. Political messages, like the ones described above, are often designed to convince the electorate of something, be it a policy issue, an ideology, a political candidate, or a social cause. Through which mechanisms people accept or reject these persuasive messages is, therefore, a central question of political communication. The dual-process models of persuasion aim to identify the conditions under which people’s attitudes change. One of the most influential dual-process models is the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which posits that there are two information-processing modes through which individuals can evaluate a persuasive message. The first mode is deliberative and requires cognitive effort: citizens who use this route to process a political message scrutinize the message’s arguments and assess their true merits. The second processing mode functions on a more superficial level and relies on simple decision rules. In this case, citizens use heuristic cues such as party identification or candidate likeability to evaluate the validity of the political message. According to the ELM, it is the amount of thought, or elaboration, that determines which of the two processing routes is taken. Individuals process the political message through the more complex processing route only when they are both motivated and able to engage in critical thinking. While it is typically the issue’s relevancy or the recipient’s knowledge that influence Chiara Valli and Alessandro Nai

someone’s elaboration likelihood, effortful message processing can also be induced or reduced through extraneous factors, such as the use of fear appeals or political humor (e.g., Young, 2008), respectively. Turning to the outcome of these processing modes, studies suggest that an attitude change resulting from centrally routed messages is more persistent and consequential for future behavior than a change resulting from the peripheral persuasion route. Compared to the dual-processes models of persuasion that emphasize the cognitive component of information processing, the theory of motivated reasoning focuses on the motives that determine how individuals acquire, construct, and evaluate political messages. According to the theory, people’s reasoning processes are guided by motives that fall either into accuracy or directional goals. When individuals pursue accuracy goals, they scrutinize political information in an unbiased fashion to reach an accurate conclusion free from error. When engaging in directional motivated reasoning, individuals strive for a preferred conclusion that protects their preexisting political beliefs (Kunda, 1990). Such directional reasoning can be achieved through various mechanisms that include judging attitudinally congruent evidence as more compelling; seeking out information in support of one’s political predispositions; and countering inconsistent information while accepting confirmatory evidence uncritically (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Studies suggest that these biased (“partisan”) information processes encourage opinion polarization and are most prominent among politically sophisticated citizens and those with the strongest priors. The latter phenomenon can be explained by the instance that unsophisticated and uncommitted citizens lack the necessary cognitive resources and motivation to successfully defend their political attitudes against change. From the discussion above, we know that citizens are not equal before political communication and that these information processes also depend on individual-level factors. One central dispositional factor that determines people’s processing of political messages is their need for cognition (NC), which describes their intrinsic motivation to engage in cognitively demanding activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). When confronted with (novel) information, individuals high

political communication  373 in NC engage in more thinking and reason through evaluations. On the other hand, individuals low in NC try to avoid effortful thinking and rely on heuristic cues to evaluate the message. Although NC does not necessarily guarantee an unbiased evaluation of political information, there is evidence that individuals high in NC are less susceptible to the mechanisms of motivated reasoning and process party information in a more evenhanded manner (Arcenaux & Vander Wielen, 2013). Another influential cognition that shapes the way individuals process political messages is the need for cognitive closure. This cognitive-motivational factor describes people’s rigidity of thought, which often leads them to “seize and freeze” on given information, rely on heuristic cues for attitude formation, and resist attitudinal change. Because of their intolerance for ambiguity and need for stable and firm knowledge, they are attracted to political conservatism (Chirumbolo et al., 2004) and are particularly receptive to the simple and certainty-promoting appeals often found in populist rhetoric (Kruglanski et al., 2021). Next to these cognitions, we also have good indications that personality more broadly influences the way individuals receive and process persuasive political information. Dogmatism, for example, describes rigid, close-minded individuals who showcase a confirmatory bias in their information processing: trying to protect their established belief systems, they actively generate attitude-consistent (vs. inconsistent) thoughts and tend to polarize their opinions in the light of contradicting information (Leone, 1989). People’s receptiveness and evaluation of persuasive political appeals can also be explored through the framework of the Big Five Personality Traits. A study conducted by Gerber et al. (2013) indicates, for example, that the assertive and self-assured nature of individuals high on extraversion makes them less receptive to social pressure in persuasive political appeals. Open individuals, on the other hand, are generally more persuadable: because they “crave experiences that will be cognitively engaging . . . [and] seek information of virtually all sorts” (Mondak, 2010, p. 50), they are willing to engage with a broad range of views. Agreeable individuals and those who are generally more conflict-avoidant, on the other hand, are deterred by uncivil messages, while those high in psychopathy

react favorably to negative campaigns (Nai & Maier, 2021). Chiara Valli and Alessandro Nai

References Arceneaux, K., & Vander Wielen, R. J. (2013). The effects of need for cognition and need for affect on partisan evaluations. Political Psychology, 34(1), 23–42. Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2), 388–405. Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116–131. Chirumbolo, A., Areni, A., & Sensales, G. (2004). Need for cognitive closure and politics: Voting, political attitudes and attributional style. International Journal of Psychology, 39(4), 245–253. Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., Dowling, C. M., & Panagopoulos, C. (2013). Big five personality traits and responses to persuasive appeals: Results from voter turnout experiments. Political Behavior, 35(4), 687–728. Heinisch, R. (2003). Success in opposition– failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. West European Politics, 26(3), 91–130. Kruglanski, A. W., Molinario, A., & Sensales, G. (2021). Why populism attracts? On the allure of certainty and dignity. In: J. P. Forgas et al. (eds.), The Psychology of Populism. (pp. 158–174). London: Routledge. Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480–498. Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007). The effects of negative political campaigns: A meta-analytic reassessment. The Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1176–1209. Leone, C. (1989). Self-generated attitude change: Some effects of thought and dogmatism on attitude polarization. Personality and Individual Differences, 10(12), 1243–1252. Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and Chiara Valli and Alessandro Nai

374  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moffitt, B. (2016).  The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Stanford University Press. Mondak, J. J. (2010). Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nai, A., & Maier, J. (2021). Is negative campaigning a matter of taste? Political attacks, incivility, and the moderating role of individual differences. American Politics Research, 49(3), 269–281. Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123–205. Soroka, S., Fournier, P., Nir, L., & Hibbing, J. (2019). Psychophysiology in the study of political communication: An expository study of individual-level

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variation in negativity biases. Political Communication, 36(2), 288–302. Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769. Valli, C., & Nai, A. (2022). Attack politics from Albania to Zimbabwe. A largescale comparative study on the drivers of negative campaigning. International Political Science Review, 43(5), 680–696. Walter, A. S., & van der Eijk, C. (2019). Unintended consequences of negative campaigning: Backlash and secondpreference boost effects in a multi-party context. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(3), 612–629. Young, D. G. (2008) . The privileged role of the late-night joke: Exploring humor's role in disrupting argument scrutiny. Media Psychology, 11(1), 119–142.

95. Political consumerism

company, country or brand for its political values (Neilson, 2010). A further approach is to use questions about boycotts and buycotts to create a four-category operationalization: Political consumerism is the idea that people only boycott, only buycott, both boycott and make purchasing choices based on politi- buycott (also known as dualcott) and neither cal reasons. Citizens use the marketplace to boycott nor buycott (Neilson, 2010). These survey questions focus on “prodexpress their political concerns (Stolle et al., 2005). Political reasons are often broadly ucts,” which is a narrow view because it framed to include ethical issues (Summers, could be an entire country that is targeted 2016). In some cases, environmental (ISSP, for boycotts, for example, because of the 2020) or ecological (Gundelach, 2020) issues country’s foreign policy or treatment of their are mentioned. Further, the boundaries of citizens. For example, people could boycott “environmental” are unclear when it comes all products coming from a country “whose to animal welfare, which is a popular reason religious, political, diplomatic or military for political boycotts tying into both ethical attitude I reject” (Gundelach, 2020, p. 316). and environmental issues (Boulianne et  al., The focal point is on the country, rather 2022; Gundelach, 2020). Gundelach (2020) than a specific product. In contrast, citizens questions whether existing surveys truly may support locally or nationally sourced capture political motives for political con- products and services as part of a buycott sumerism. She recommends asking a generic (Gundelach, 2020). In addition, the focus question referring to “political, social, ethi- on products is exclusionary and not consistcal or environmental reasons” (Gundelach, ent with the “goods and services” framing 2020, pp. 325–6), then asking a follow-up offered by Stolle et al. (2005). This broader question that distinguishes political motives, framing would capture tourism (service) such as “environmental protection and/or boycotting, which is becoming an increasanimal welfare; human rights, labour law ingly popular and politically motivated reaand fair pay, regional/national product ori- son to support or avoid a country or region gin.” Researchers should then adjust the esti- (Boström et al., 2019). Political consumerism is often grouped mates to reduce over-reporting of this activity with other protest-type activities, such as (Gundelach, 2020). Political consumerism is often framed in participating in marches and demonstrations, terms of boycotts, which means choosing striking and signing petitions (van Deth, not to purchase certain products and ser- 2022). Political consumerism and participatvices, or buycotts, which means choosing to ing in these other activities are significantly purchase certain products and services. The correlated (Stolle et  al., 2005; van Deth, word “buycott” has yet to be recognized in 2022). These activities are often labelled as the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, making it non-institutionalized forms of participation a niche concept for studies of consumption. (Gundelach, 2020; van Deth, 2022), meanMost of the scholarship focuses on measures ing that the state may not be the direct target. of boycotts (Copeland & Boulianne, 2022), Some scholars restrict political participation which have been the focal point for large- to those activities that identify the state as scale surveys. Table 1 summarizes the survey the target. However, Stolle et  al. (2005) and questions used in the most contemporary iter- more contemporary scholars (Boström et al., ation of ongoing, large-scale, cross-national 2019) make compelling arguments about how political consumerism is indirectly connected surveys. Another approach to measuring political to government action related to the environconsumerism is to combine these measures ment, regulating the occupational health and into a single question assessing whether a safety of workers and encouraging and moniperson participates in either of these activi- toring product labelling to help inform conties, as was done in the 2014 International sumers about ethical products. Furthermore, Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Given the in a globalized era, political consumerism is popularity of these activities, this approach an important method for citizens to signal is problematic. In addition, the findings and to governments—theirs or another—what related theories differ. In particular, boycott- products and services may require governing is considered to be a punishment, whereas ment intervention and regulation (Copeland buycotting is considered to be rewarding a & Boulianne, 2022). 375

376  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Table 1  Survey questions about political consumerism in international studies Name of survey

Question wording and responses

World Values Survey, 2017–2022

“Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of

Source: https://www​.worldvaluessurvey​.org/

political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one,

Scope: 59 countries

whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining in boycotts. Have done, might do, would never do”

European Social Survey, Round 10, 2020/2021

“And still thinking about different ways of trying to improve things in [country]

Source: https://www​.eur​opea​nsoc​ialsurvey​.org/

or help prevent things from going wrong, during the last 12 months, have you

Scope: 32 countries

done any of the following? Have you boycotted certain products? Yes, No, Refusal, Don’t know”

International Social Survey Programme,

“Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can

Citizenship II, 2014

take. Please indicate, for each one,

Source: https://issp​.org/ Scope: 36 countries

• whether you have done any of these things in the past year, • whether you have done it in the more distant past, • whether you have not done it but might do it • or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it. Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons”

International Social Survey Programme,

“And how often do you avoid buying certain products for environmental

Environment IV, 2020

reasons? [“Avoid buying” refers to taking a decision deliberately not to buy

Source: https://issp​.org/

certain products for the sake of the environment] Always, Often, Sometimes,

Scope: 14 countries

Never”

Political consumerism is often grouped with other “forms of protest” (van Deth, 2022), such as petitions (Acik, 2013) or marching and other protest activities (Valenzuela, Correa, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018). This framing is problematic given the many differences in these activities. Participation in marches and demonstrations is, in contrast, a higher effort activity and, in non-democratic states, can be considered a high-risk activity. Political consumerism, in contrast, requires little effort; the choice is basically checking the online ordering form for one product, for example, Fair Trade chocolate, over another product. Furthermore, many scholars argue that buycotting, one form of political consumption, is resource-dependent (Stolle et  al., 2005; Summers, 2016). Purchasing Fair Trade products, for example, may require greater purchasing power than purchasing generic products. In contrast, participation in a march or demonstration requires time, but not money. Finally, marches and demonstrations are “collective” in that participation requires a group format. In contrast, politically motivated shopping is Shelley Boulianne

an individualized form of political participation (Gundelach, 2020). Within the scholarship are three types of predictors of citizens’ participation in boycotting and buycotting activities: microlevel, meso-level and macro-level. In terms of micro-level predictors, a meta-analysis of research from dozens of studies suggests political distrust, liberal ideology, media use, education, political interest and organizational membership predict participation in political consumerism (Copeland & Boulianne, 2022). However, these predictors are largely based on studies of boycotting, which means these same factors might not influence buycotting or participation in both boycotts and buycotts. In terms of meso-level predictors, several factors have been considered. The first is household characteristics such as wealth. The second is the presence or activities of organizations, particularly labour unions, who may encourage the consumption of more ethical (Fair Trade) products and services and discourage the consumption of less ethical products and services. A third factor is community characteristics, such as residing in an urban or

political consumerism  377 rural area, which can increase or limit opportunities to choose different stores and/or products. However, with consumption moving online this urban–rural distinction may be less salient as a predictor of participation. In terms of macro-level predictors, Summers (2016) and others have studied the economic and political opportunity structures that relate to political consumerism. This scholarship has considered a range of variables that might influence the availability of products and services in specific countries and enable or restrict purchasing decisions. The most popular measure is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which is intended to measure the economic development of a country (Summers, 2016) and, thus, the availability of opportunities to make different purchasing decisions. In terms of political opportunities, this scholarship has measured the quality of democracy or level of democratization (Boulianne et al., 2022), which indirectly relates to the state’s role in labelling schemes and/or regulating occupational and environmental standards related to production (Summers, 2016). While digital media use has been utilized to predict political consumerism (Copeland & Boulianne, 2022; Boulianne et al., 2022), this field of research has been slow to study the potential of digital media to facilitate political consumerism, such as social media discussions of boycott and buycott campaigns, studying organizations, influencers who are calling on citizens to participate in campaigns and purchasing products online that align with one’s political views. Returning to Stolle et  al.’s (2005) classic piece, the supermarket is now virtual and thus raises questions about how digital media and relatedly digital literacy and skills might influence engagement in online buycotting (Boulianne et al., 2022). While scholarly attention has focused on boycotts, the study of buycotts is important. Summarizing contributions to their volume, Boström et al. (2019) describe the importance of labelling of foods in enabling decisions to buycott for environmental, animal welfare and social justice reasons. Eco-labelling or labelling more generally can inform buycotting on a daily basis (Boström et al., 2019); other scholars have also advocated for a study of habitual or routine political consumerism, rather than a one-off activity (Gundelach, 2020). Finally, the existing scholarship has framed political consumerism with political

values associated with those on the left. In particular, framing political consumerism in relation to the environment may bias participation towards left-wing or liberal causes. However, how right-wing causes are related to political consumerism has been given less attention. For example, calls to boycott (or buycott) often reference conservative political values, such as views about religion or traditional family values, which the left would describe as homophobic, racist and/ or sexist. Further research might examine how the left and right interact in their calls for political consumerism, such as how leftwing calls to boycott a product, service, brand or country might initiate calls for buycotts of these same entities from those on the right. Shelley Boulianne

References Acik, A. (2013). Reducing the participation gap in civic engagement: Political consumerism in Europe. European Sociological Review, 29(6), 1309–1322. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ esr​/jct016. Boström, M., Micheletti, M., & Oosterveer, P. (2019). Political consumerism: Research challenges and future directions. In: M. Boström, M. Micheletti, & P. Oosterveer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Consumerism (pp. 879–897). Oxford University Press. Boulianne, S., Copeland, L., & KocMichalska, K. (2022). Digital media and political consumerism in the United States, Britain, and France. New Media & Society, Advance online publication, 1–21. Copeland, L., & Boulianne, S. (2022). Political consumerism: A meta-analysis. International Political Science Review, 43(1), 3–18. Gundelach, B. (2020). Political consumerism as a form of political participation: Challenges and potentials of empirical measurement. Social Indicators Research, 151(1), 309–327. ISSP Research Group (2022). International Social Survey Programme: Environment IV – ISSP 2020. GESIS, Cologne. ZA7650 Data file Version 1.0.0, https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .4232​/1​.13921. ISSP Research Group (2016). International Social Survey Programme: Citizenship II – ISSP 2014. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. Shelley Boulianne

378  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology ZA6670 Data file Version 2.0.0, https://doi​ the interactions between individual-level predictors and country-level affluence. .org​/10​.4232​/1​.12590. Neilson, L. A. (2010). Boycott or buycott? Social Problems, 63(3), 303–328. Understanding political consumerism. Valenzuela, S., Correa, T., & de Zuniga, H. Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 9(3), G. (2018). Ties, likes, and tweets: Using 214–227. strong and weak ties to explain differences Stolle, D., Hooghe, M., & Micheletti, M. in protest participation across Facebook (2005). Politics in the supermarket: and Twitter use. Political Communication, Political consumerism as a form of political 35(1), 117–134. participation. International Political van Deth, J. W. (2022). Similar but different: Science Review, 26(3), 245–269. Constructing equivalent protest measures Summers, N. (2016). Ethical consumerism in in comparative research. American global perspective: A multilevel analysis of Behavioral Scientist, 66(4), 489–509.

Shelley Boulianne

96. Political corruption Like many concepts in the social sciences, corruption has been subject to considerable definitional debate. Political corruption denotes abuses by politicians who use the power of their office to steer who gets access to power (Philp 1997; c.f. Ceva and Ferretti 2021). This includes receiving illicit campaign funds, receiving payments to enact the laws and regulations sought by narrow interests, or seeking to affect election outcomes through one of the many strategies to manipulate voters, capture election tribunals, or obstruct challengers. Administrative corruption relates instead to the exercise of political power (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), as when civil servants receive or demand bribes, rents, or favors for the selective application of state regulations or access to resources and contracts. In reality, however, the two intersect and correlate strongly, and much research employs the broader definition of corruption as the abuse of public power for private gain (for an overview, see: Cerqueti and Coppier 2017). Depending on the nature of the underlying social order, corruption can be a norm or an exception, and in systems where it is the norm, the role of the state in society may be affected. Political systems with an underlying norm of impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) or ethical universalism (MungiuPippidi 2015: 27–33) – that is, that neither social status and ties nor private economic considerations influence access to or the exercise of public power – can be described as having open-access social orders (OAOs). In such systems, a wide range of actors have a say in how wealth and power are distributed in society (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). In OAOs, political corruption may still exist and undermine political institutions when private interests bribe or channel funds “to and through political figures who put their access and connections out for rent,” the so-called “influence markets” corruption syndrome (Johnston 2014: 16). Additionally, elites may collude to share corrupt benefits into “elite cartels” (Johnston 2014: 16). Nevertheless, the distinct feature of OAOs is that corruption violates both legal and social norms, that is, corruption is an exception. Citizens expect the state to treat everyone equally and to serve

the public interest. OAOs are relative newcomers in historical terms, and even today public-private separation in public affairs, as well as states that show autonomy from private interest, remain the exception rather than the rule (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Many contemporary states instead resemble limited-access social orders (LAOs), where power and wealth are concentrated in a relatively narrow set of actors who extract rents from their privileged position and limit access to economic and political resources for all other members of society (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). The exclusion may vary, producing more open and more closed LAOs, and the extent of economic and political limits may be balanced or asymmetric (Ademmer, Langbein, and Börzel 2019). Whether closed or somewhat open, in an LAO, the underlying logic of social organization is particularism: individuals expect to be treated differently based on social status and proximity to the dominant group (MungiuPippidi 2015: 14–16). The fundamental political structures of such societies are not formal institutions such as political parties or parliaments but networks of personal acquaintance, through which individuals pursue their political and economic interest by means of exchange of personalized rewards and punishments. Politics may still be competitive but access to such competition is limited by access to relevant informal networks (Hale 2015). The principle of social organization based on familial or other types of private ties and the confluence of state and personal power is a breeding ground for systemic political corruption. Johnston’s typology of corruption (2014: 17) suggests that more closed LAOs can enable centrally steered corruption (the “official mogul” syndrome), while more open LAOs, with some economic and political competition, can feature several informal groups engaging in contentious corruption (“oligarchs and clans” syndrome). Importantly, patterns of social organization around the personalized exchange of favors in LAOs make corruption a norm for accessing and exercising political power (see Huss 2016 for an informative case study of Ukraine before 2013–14 Euromaidan). This broader view of corruption partially explains the difficulty in developing impartial government institutions in which neither status nor connections are requisite for access. Where government officials attained power

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380  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology through ties and quid pro quo exchanges, developing impartial institutions may entail significant costs as they may feel compelled to honor reciprocal obligations. Anti-corruption in such contexts requires establishing institutions that allow for a wider range of actors to have a say in how political power is accessed and exercised, what Johnston calls “deep democratization”. Historically, such a profound shift toward ethical universalism occurred gradually as marginalized groups accumulated enough resources to force the dominant coalition to develop inclusive and impartial institutions (Johnston 2014: 43–48). Corruption, both political and administrative, affects society in significant ways (Bågenholm et  al. 2021). Considerable evidence from experimental and field studies indicates that corruption erodes generalized trust, the extent to which people feel that others can be trusted in general (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2021; Rothstein 2011). The inverse is also true, however: surveys of diasporas who immigrate from high- to low-corruption countries over time show that they attain higher levels of generalized trust compared to similar individuals in their countries of origin (Sønderskov and Dinesen 2021). Why might institutions have such farreaching effects on people’s trust for one another? Collaboration (and thus trust itself) entails risk, which is proportionate to the stakes involved and the recourses available if one’s prospective collaborator defects. In for example business ventures, risks are greatly reduced if the venture rests on contracts, and all partners trust that those contracts can be adjudicated in an impartial way. Similarly, citizens’ confidence that others obey laws and do not for example receive undue welfare benefits rests on the belief that the government enforces laws and implements programs in an even-handed manner. Impartial government institutions thus act as a third-party guarantor both in collaborative efforts among individuals and also of citizens’ interactions with the state itself. By undermining trust among individuals, corruption also deters other efforts involving collaboration or coordination (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). While corruption may, on the one hand, create a demand among citizens for better government, it simultaneously weakens citizens’ ability to mobilize efforts to articulate those demands or take coordinated action. Actions such as citizen monitoring, corruption Marcia Grimes and Oleksandra Keudel

reporting, as well as abstaining from engaging in clientelism in favor of voting for parties credibly promising more impartiality, integrity and improved provision of public goods and services all appear more impactful and reasonable if one believes others are prepared to do the same. For this reason, some have argued that mobilization of office holders themselves is crucial to enhance and sustain the integrity of public institutions (Ceva and Ferretti 2021). The character and quality of government institutions can have additional far-reaching consequences for citizens’ interrelations and engagement and for civil society. Civil society has a tendency to mimic the form of government in a setting (Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000) and may even support antidemocratic and discriminatory ends where regimes are anti-democratic and discriminatory (Berman 1997), as with grassroots mobilizations to oppose the desegregation of schools in the United States. In addition, corruption also affects incentives for how civil society engages politically. When those in political office offer targeted help or rewards either through social networks (patronage) or more ad-hoc exchanges (clientelism) in exchange for political support, the logic of political engagement shifts, affecting social relations as well. Studies on Latin America and the Philippines find that parties and politicians use social networks and associations to distribute targeted goods and mobilize voters. Individuals who are embedded and who occupy central roles in social networks or associations are more likely to report having been approached with offers of targeted rewards, suggesting that candidates use social networks to attain a “social multiplier effect” (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Cruz 2019). Despite these far-reaching implications of political corruption on social relations and civil society, citizen initiatives can nonetheless contribute to reducing corruption (e.g. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; Beyerle 2014). Quantitative analyses comparing countries or regions find that the strength of civil society is negatively associated with corruption, but not in all contexts. In OAO polities in which systems of oversight and accountability work well, the strength of civil society exhibits no relationship with the prevalence of corruption (Larsson and Grimes 2022). Rather discouragingly, a strong civil society (in terms of how many people report being a member of

political corruption  381 an association) also has no bearing on levels of corruption in settings where conditions are the least favorable, as where political competition at the elite level is low, media freedoms are lacking, and where government fails to publish information on its own operations, i.e. closed LAOs (Themudo 2013; Grimes 2013). But where corruption is prevalent but not systemic, and the political sphere is competitive as in more open LAOs, a strong civil society is associated with lower levels of corruption. In-depth case studies show, however, that large-scale mobilization against corruption is also possible even if conditions are unfavorable; corruption scandals may indeed trigger large-scale mobilization (Beyerle 2014), but when such initiatives arise and succeed is not well understood. Citizens’ willingness and ability to engage to hold government accountable are thus, as is the case with social movements more generally, to some extent, a function of the political environment. In what ways does the political environment shape citizen mobilization against corruption? We differentiate between political opportunities and political structures (Giugni 2009): volatile versus static aspects of the political environment that affect collective mobilization. In settings with systemic corruption, a highly mediatized scandal which shows how political corruption affects other aspects of development or even personal security can create a “window of opportunity” for large-scale protests against corruption, even if the structural conditions are unfavorable. As example, publicized evidence of electoral fraud triggered a wave of color revolutions in Eastern Europe (Tucker 2007); a fire due to systematic corruption and regulatory failure triggered large-scale anti-corruption protests in Romania (Olteanu and Beyerle 2017). In terms of political structures, divided elites, such as in the “oligarchs and clans” syndrome of corruption (Johnston 2014), can be somewhat conducive to anti-corruption activism, especially when opposition elites instrumentalize corruption in their struggles for domination. Civil society can capitalize on this competition by exposing corruption or bringing evidence of corruption to law enforcement in the hope that competing elites may initiate investigations and indictments. When elites are consolidated and form “official moguls” (Johnston 2014), civil society activists can still find influential members within the political elite to exchange information or promote

reform (Huss et al. 2020), though opportunities are more restricted. The specifics of the context – intra-elite dynamics, whether particularistic exchange is the norm or an exception, and the extent to which access to power is open or limited, affect political opportunities and structures for societal mobilization, shaping strategies and gains of civil society seeking to curb corruption. More systematic research is needed, however, to unpack the relationship between the political environment and the strategies, gains, and mobilization intensity of anticorruption movements. Change requires that both elites and citizens make commitments and invest effort, but both face negative incentives to do so. Unpacking the complex dynamics of stasis and change with respect to political corruption is paramount to understanding political and institutional development more generally. Marcia Grimes and Oleksandra Keudel

References Bågenholm, Andreas, Monika Bauhr, Marcia Grimes, and Bo Rothstein. 2021. The Oxford Handbook of the Quality of Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/oxfordhb​ /9780198858218​.001​.0001. Berman, Sheri. 1997. “Civil Society and Political Institutionalization.” American Behavioral Scientist 40(5): 562–74. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1177​/0002764297040005003. Beyerle, Shaazka. 2014. Curtailing Corru­ ption: People Power for Accountability and Justice. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https:// www​ . nonviolent​ - conf lict ​ . org ​ / wp ​ - cont ent ​ / uploads ​ / 2014 ​ / 06 ​ /Curtailing​ - Corrup tion​-full​-book​.pdf. Cerqueti, Roy, and Raffaella Coppier. 2017. “Political Corruption.” In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, edited by Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello, 1–8. New York: Springer. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1007​/978​-1​- 4614​-7883​-6​_366​-1. Ceva, Emanuela, and Maria Paola Ferretti. 2021. Political Corruption: The Internal Enemy of Public Institutions. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Cruz, Cesi. 2019. “Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying.” Comparative Political Studies 52(3): 382–411. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1177​/0010414018784062. Marcia Grimes and Oleksandra Keudel

382  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Giugni, Marco. 2009. “Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly.” Swiss Political Science Review 15(2): 361–67. https://doi​ .org​ /10​ .1002​/j​.1662​-6370​.2009​.tb00136​.x. Grimes, Marcia. 2013. “The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government.” Studies in Comparative International Development 48(4): 380– 402. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s12116​-012​ -9126​-3. Hale, Henry E. 2015. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Holland, Alisha C., and Brian Palmer-Rubin. 2015. “Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies 48(9): 1186–223. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /0010414015574883. Huss, Oksana. 2016. “The Perpetual Cycle of Political Corruption in Ukraine and Post-revolutionary Attempts to Break Through It.” In Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine. The Challenge of Change, 161, edited by Olga Bertelsen, 317–52. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. Huss, Oksana, Max Bader, Andriy Meleshevych, and Oksana Nesterenko. 2020. “Explaining Variation in the Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Activism in Ukraine’s Regions: The Role of Local Context, Political Will, Institutional Factors, and Structural Factors.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of PostSoviet Democratization 28(2): 201–28. https://doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ajae​/aau104. Johnston, Michael. 2014. Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Larsson, Fredrik, and Marcia Grimes. 2022. “Societal Accountability and Grand Corruption: How Institutions Shape Citizens’ Efforts to Shape Institutions.” Political Studies, January, 00323217211067134. https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​ /00323217211067134. Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2015. The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1017​/CBO9781316286937.

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North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olteanu, Tina, and Shaazka Beyerle. 2017. “The Romanian People versus Corruption: The Paradoxical Nexus of Protest and Adaptation.” Partecipazione e Conflitto 10(3): 797–825. https://doi​.org​/10​.1285​/ i20356609v10i3p797. Peruzzotti, Enrique, and Catalina Smulovitz. 2006. “Social Accountability. An Introduction.” In Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies, edited by Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, 3–33. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/j​.ctt9qh5t1. Philp, Mark. 1997. “Defining Political Corruption.” Political Studies XLV(3): 436–62. Rothstein, Bo. 2013. “Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots from the Head Down.” Social Research 80(4): 1009–32. Rothstein, Bo. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rothstein, Bo, and Dietlind Stolle. 2008. “The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust.” Comparative Politics 40(4): 441–59. Rothstein, Bo, and Jan Teorell. 2008. “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 21(2): 165–90. Skocpol, Theda, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson. 2000. “A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States.” American Political Science Review 94(3): 527–46. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2585829. Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar, and Peter Thisted Dinesen. 2021. “Quality of Government and Social Trust.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Quality of Government, edited by Andreas Bågenholm, Monika Bauhr, Marcia Grimes, and Bo Rothstein, 538–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1093​/oxfordhb​/9780198858218​ .013​.26.

political corruption  383 Themudo, Nuno S. 2013. “Reassessing Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral the Impact of Civil Society: Nonprofit Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Sector, Press Freedom, and Corruption.” Post-communist Colored Revolutions.” Governance 26(1): 63–89. https://doi​ .org​ Perspectives on Politics 5(3): 535–51. https:// /10​.1111​/j​.1468​-0491​.2012​.01602​.x. doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S1537592707071538.

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97. Political culture Contemporary social science views culture as a constitutive component of politics (Berezin, Sandusky and Davidson 2020). This was not always the case. This entry traces the evolution of the concept of political culture from its origins in postwar functionalism to the present moment. In the postwar period, social scientists often thought of political culture as limited to a set of overarching values orienting political behavior. Talcott Parsons (1942), for instance, analyzing propaganda, identified cultural tradition as a crucial element alongside institutional structure and concrete situations of action, providing value orientations, meaning, and justifications for social action. Culture was understood as needing to be integrated into the social system if the latter is to achieve stability or equilibrium and if deviance is to be kept in check. In turn, democratic traditions play an essential role toward this end, counter-acted or supplemented by more deliberate manipulation through propaganda. In a landmark, wide-ranging study focusing expressly on political culture in the framework of modernization, Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the nation-specific patterns of political and social values, or attitudes, orientations, and beliefs in the population that were most and least conducive to the functioning of a stable democracy. They identified three basic types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant, arguing that a successful civic culture is a balanced mixture of those and is best approximated in the United States and Britain, while Germany, Mexico, and Italy fell short of this ideal in distinctive ways. Robert Bellah (1967) identified civil religion as a key element of American political culture, looking at the systematic religious references in official communication like the mentions of God in presidential addresses or the use of biblical tropes in the interpretation of key moments of national history. Civil religion, a concept drawn from Rousseau, is clearly distinct from churches, being national in scope. It serves to bolster the legitimacy of sovereignty, law, and political processes, endowing it with a transcendent source of value. In the following decade, Inglehart (1997) argued that the political changes at the time,

such as the rise of environmental and peace movements (or “new” social movements more generally) along with the decline in traditional social class cleavages, could be traced to a shift from “materialist” to “postmaterialist” values in Western “publics.” Such a value shift involved moving from a strong emphasis on physical security and material well-being toward one focused on quality of life, individual autonomy, and other “lifestyle” concerns. In the 1980s, the “cultural turn” began. Social scientists identified culture as crucial to an increasing variety of political phenomena. Cultural anthropology stressed the importance of culture as meaning and interpretation with great impact on social and political sciences, especially through the work of Clifford Geertz. In his analysis of Balinese politics, Geertz (1981) described the “theater state” to capture the prominence of ritual dramatization over effective domination. The theater state, just like art forms, is geared toward the ordered display and expression of deeply held collective beliefs, like those around status hierarchy and divine kingship, staged through elaborate ceremonies, bringing the symbolic aspect of politics into sharp focus. In this period nationalism and nations too were theorized and analyzed as culturally constructed, notably by Anderson (1983), who defined nations as imagined communities: it is only possible to imagine, never to personally know, all of one’s co-nationals, but nevertheless a deep sense of horizontal fraternity develops in the frame of this community imagined as bounded and sovereign – to the point of making many willing to die for it. Anderson (1983) showed how such nationalism is the child of deep modern-era cultural transformations in the wake of secularization. A significant debate between Sewell (1985) and Skocpol (1985) over the role of ideology in revolutions laid out important theoretical insights on culture and political change. As a solution to the contrast between explanations of revolutions emphasizing social structural determinants at the expense of participants’ conscious ideological aims, such as Skocpol’s, and those doing the opposite, Sewell (1985) proposed a structural notion of ideology as anonymous, collective, and constitutive of the social order. The internal dynamics of ideological development during revolutions could then be fruitfully analyzed. Skocpol (1985) replied criticizing the conception of ideology as a cultural system or coherent

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political culture  385 totality with a life of its own. She proposed to distinguish between cultural idioms and ideologies, deliberately deployed. What matters, Skocpol argued, is the interplay among the many discourses intentionally mobilized in concrete interaction, the idioms they draw upon, and the unintended outcomes to which they contribute. Lynn Hunt’s (1986) work placed the political culture of the French Revolution at the forefront of the “cultural turn.” Hunt (1986) examined key revolutionary rhetorical tropes, symbols, and imagery, showing how they formed a distinctive and innovative culture of democratic republicanism. Even if its ambivalence toward party politics made it self-undermining, it was, by introducing the aspiration to achieve a radically new community through politics, the most fateful, lasting, and wide-reaching legacy of the Revolution. Political culture as an analytic concept expanded in the 1990s. This entry highlights three areas: (1) modes of participation and the public sphere; (2) citizenship; and (3) the nation‑state. Jürgen Habermas (1989) defined the public sphere as a space between the private lives of individuals (e.g., family and market spaces) and that of political authority (e.g., state and courts), where people could meet and debate about public issues. Features of the public sphere include its accessibility and a focus on the quality of argumentation over personal status. The key settings include public squares, coffee houses, and media like letters, books, and art. This arena served as a countervailing force to that of political authority and was tied to the rise in importance of public opinion. Many at the time looked to the United States for its strong traditions of civic engagement and participation. Putnam (1995), however, noted the decline of such traditions: lower levels of church membership, unions, volunteer groups, public meetings, and election turnout. This was accompanied by an increase in mass-membership and tertiary organizations, which required less substantial engagement. His most famous example was that more people than ever were bowling, but they were bowling alone due to the sharp decline in organized leagues. Putnam urged researchers to explore how social capital was changing and the potential explanations for such changes. Relatedly, Calhoun (1997) discussed the public sphere in relation to the 1989 Tiananmen

Square student protests. He argued that the protests were influenced by the nascent public sphere which allowed for a space outside government control. Participation was not limited to intellectuals, but television, magazines, and think tanks allowed ideological connections between the protesters and citizens more broadly (with important caveats). The interaction between the students and this sphere influenced how the movement was discussed, how it acted and organized, and how the government responded to it (the use of the public sphere, both nationally and internationally, made it especially threatening). Those examining citizenship often focused on the intersection between institutional development and cultural development. The line between citizens and foreigners, insiders and outsiders, is demarcated not only by legal distinctions, but by emotional and political understandings of the nation, all of which have cultural roots. Brubaker (1992) showed how citizenship laws are deeply influenced by such cultural understandings, contrasting France (jus soli, based on a statist and assimilationist understanding) and Germany (jus sanguinis, based on an ethnocultural understanding). Although citizenship can be thought of as an inclusive and equal status, states often have a variety of culturally distinct subgroups. Such heterogeneity has led scholars such as Kymlicka (1995) to explore “multicultural citizenship,” involving key questions on the relationship between individual rights and “group-differentiated” rights, such as polyethnic rights (legal and financial support for certain culturally specific practices) and the right of self-government. The relationship between political culture and citizenship can also be looked at from the “bottom up.” Margaret Somers (1993) noted that although England in the eighteenth century had uniform national laws, popular citizenship practices differed by region across the country. She argued that such differences were shaped in part by patterns of local political culture and community associational life as they interacted with legal and institutional structures. Interest in the state continued in the 1990s. Philip Gorski (1993) argued that variation in a state’s strength and organization in early modern Europe was shaped by the presence or absence of a “disciplinary revolution,” rooted in ascetic religious movements such as

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386  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Calvinism. Such revolutions influenced state formation by solidifying a ruling group committed and capable of imposing order, and the creation of disciplinary institutions that can effectively control populations. Disciplinary revolution and economic development combined in various ways to result in three main forms of state structure: despotic empires, centralized monarchies (military-bureaucratic or court-based), and constitutional republics. George Steinmetz’s edited volume State/ Culture (1999) explored the influence of the “cultural turn” on studies of the state. He noted that studies and approaches could be put on a continuum. On one end is a “radical culturalism” which does not distinguish between cultural and non-cultural objects. For example, the state is not merely influenced by culture, but is “cultural” in and of itself. On the other end are approaches that view culture as setting and influencing the context, rules, and assumptions within which rational and strategic human action take place. Political culture as an analytic frame developed in all sorts of new directions in the new millennium. Familiar themes, such as political culture and civil society, expanded. Interest grew in more recent societal changes (e.g., the expansion of globalized trade and global culture). Methodological advances, computational methods in particular, opened the door for new avenues of exploration. The following scholars represent these trends. Ulrich Beck (2002) discussed the “cosmopolitan society,” characterized by the “imagination of a globally shared collective future.” With globalization and greater interconnectedness came changes in the relationship between territory, culture, and politics: geographic proximity became less important to sociability (one can be isolated from their neighbors but connected to those from distant lands); identities may be shaped by a variety of global experiences; and business decisions are influenced by global competition and opportunities. Civil society emerged as a focus in multiple works. Jeffrey Alexander (2006) analyzed the internal cultural structure of the democratic civil sphere, based on a set of homologous binary oppositions between civil and anti-civil qualities that shape discourse. Embedded in concrete institutions and ways of life, the civil sphere is made possible by solidarity. It is inherently paradoxical and

fragmented, due to essentializing and exclusionary tendencies and to interaction with non-civil social spheres, but it also provides the framework for overcoming these limits and broadening the reach of solidarity through civil repair and civil incorporation of out-groups. Paul Lichterman and Nina Eliasoph (2014) reconceptualized civic political culture as civic action, not necessarily virtuous and an attribute of a dedicated institutional sector, but taking place every time, and everywhere, participants coordinate to improve common life in society as they imagine it. To analyze it, they introduced the notion of scene styles, distinctive patterns of group boundaries, bonds, and speech norms, tied to a setting. Different styles have varied implications for participants and for outcomes and can co-exist in the same organization by virtue of scene-switching practices. Bart Bonikowski and Paul DiMaggio (2016) focused on the study of nationalism in the United States where they identified four “classes”: ardent, restrictive, creedal, and the disengaged. The authors distinguished these classes based on variations in attitudes on four dimensions of nationalism: national pride (heritage and institutions), hubris (comparisons with other countries), identification (attachment to the nation), and membership (what is a “true” American). They also found that the classes vary with respect to attitudes toward immigration, foreign policy, and sovereignty. Recently, Christopher Bail (2021), a pioneer of the use of computational and mixed methods in the study of political culture, tackled current concerns such as the acute political polarization, tribalism, and culture wars plaguing the American public in particular on social media. He argued that these platforms distort the perceptions of public opinion by inducing a disproportionate share of communication from cult-like extremists at the expense of moderates, and proposed changes in their use and design for an improved civic life. Mabel Berezin, Nathan T.B. Ly, and Chiara Visentin

References Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. The Civil Sphere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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political culture  387 Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bail, Christopher A. 2021. Breaking the Social Media Prism: How to Make Our Platforms Less Polarizing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Beck, Ulrich. 2002. “The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies.” Theory, Culture & Society 19(1–2):17–44. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1177​/026327640201900101. Bellah, Robert N. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” Dædalus 134(4):40–55. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1162​/001152605774431464. Berezin, Mabel, Emily Sandusky and Thomas Davidson. 2020. “Culture in Politics and Politics in Culture: Institutions, Practices, and Boundaries.” Pp. 102–131 in The New Handbook of Political Sociology, eds. Thomas Janoski, Cedric de Leon, Joya Misra, and Isaac William Martin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bonikowski, Bart, and Paul DiMaggio 2016. “Varieties of American Popular Nationalism.” American Sociological Review 81(5):949–980. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1177​/0003122416663683. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Calhoun, Craig J. 1997. Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Geertz, Clifford. 1981. Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gorski, Philip S. 1993. “The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia.” American Journal of Sociology 99(2):265– 316. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/230266. Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:

An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hunt, Lynn Avery. 1986. Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Lichterman, Paul, and Nina Eliasoph 2014. “Civic Action.” American Journal of Sociology 120(3):798–863. https://doi​ .org​ /10​.1086​/679189. Parsons, Talcott. 2014 (1942). “Propaganda and Social Control,” in Essays in Sociological Theory. Free Press. Putnam, Robert D. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6(1):65–78. Sewell, William H. 1985. “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case.” The Journal of Modern History 57(1):57–85. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​ /242777. Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell.” The Journal of Modern History 57(1):86–96. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/242778. Somers, Margaret R. 1993. “Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy.” American Sociological Review 58(5):587–620. https:// doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2096277. Steinmetz, George. (ed.) 1999. State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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98. Political efficacy Political efficacy is a key attitudinal measure that captures individuals’ perceptions of their connection with the state. Measures of political efficacy are among the most frequently used survey questions of political attitudes and are considered to be centrally important empirical indicators of the positive functioning and health of democratic systems (Craig et al. 1990). The often-quoted early description of political efficacy articulated by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954: 187) defined political efficacy as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process.” Importantly, the less-cited continuation of this sentence adds the following: “i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change.” Taken as a whole, this classic definition fully captured that the concept of political efficacy relates to both attitudes and behavior, and subsequent survey-based research further clarified approaches for how this complex concept can be empirically measured and analyzed. The most fundamental conceptual distinction to the Campbell et  al. (1954) definition was added a few years later by Lane (1959: 149) who discussed two main aspects of political efficacy, described as “the image of the self” and “the image of democratic government.” Subsequent empirical research has sharpened this theoretical and empirical distinction to define two distinct dimensions: internal efficacy, which relates to individuals’ conceptions of themselves as political actors; and external efficacy, which concerns people’s assessments of the broader political context (Craig et al. 1990; Niemi et al. 1991). Consistent findings in the literature of a relatively low correlation between internal and external efficacy measures are consistent with the consensus in the literature that they are theoretically distinct attitudinal constructs (Craig & Maggiotto 1982; Wolak 2018). Optimal measurement of political efficacy has been a topic of intense theoretical debate and empirical research. The evolution of the conceptualization and measurement of these two dimensions of political efficacy since

they were first measured in survey-based research in 1952 by the American National Election Studies (ANES) resulted from the refinement of these measures over time (Craig et al. 1990; Niemi et al. 1991). These studies refined the indicators used to measure political efficacy as a distinct construct from other important political attitudes, such as political trust and government evaluations. Although most of the early survey-based research was based primarily on data from the United States, and particularly from the American National Election Studies surveys, subsequent research established the cross-national validity of the conceptual and empirical dimensions of external and internal efficacy (Acock et al. 1985; Hayes & Bean 1993). These questions are usually phrased as a five-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” For internal efficacy, the index based on the four questions used to measure this construct in Niemi et al.’s (1990) analysis of the ANES 1987 pilot survey was subsequently validated by Morrell’s (2003) experimental research. These four internal efficacy statements note the following: (1) “I consider myself wellqualified to participate in politics”; (2) “I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people”; (3) “I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country”; and (4) “I think I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.” Morell’s (2003) combination of observational and experimental findings provided clear confirmation of this four-item index as a strong measure of internal efficacy. For external efficacy, however, optimal measurement is still a topic of debate. The two measures used by Morrell (2003) relate to people’s perceptions of whether others care about their opinions, and whether they have a say in politics. Although these two external efficacy items did not yield as robust findings for index measurement as the internal efficacy items, these types of questions are still used in contemporary research to measure external efficacy. For example, Stauffer’s (2021) research on gender and external political efficacy used data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study which included the following two survey items: (1) “Government officials care what people like me think”; and (2) “People like me have a say in what the government does.” Yet, Chamberlain’s (2012) longitudinal study challenges the validity of

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political efficacy  389 prevalent external efficacy measures based on the finding that aggregate external efficacy is not responsive to changes in the political environment that would be expected to make a difference for people’s perceptions of their capacity to influence political processes. Scholars’ efforts to more clearly conceptualize and measure external efficacy are ongoing, including work by Esaiasson, Köln, and Tupper (2015) to distinguish between the concept of external efficacy and the idea of the “perceived responsiveness” of the political system. A main early motivation for research on the topic as a central attitudinal construct in political science and sociology was the linkage between this attitude and diffuse support for the political system (Easton 1965). Indeed, Easton’s (1965) focus on political efficacy was informed by his argument that individuals who perceived that they were capable of influencing government outcomes would be more likely to support the democratic system as a whole. Subsequent research confirmed a strong empirical connection between political efficacy and multiple important attitudes and behaviors for democratic functioning. Regarding political attitudes, research showed that political efficacy is consistently positively associated with political trust, political interest, and government evaluations (Niemi et al. 1991). Regarding political participation, decades of research have found a strong association between political efficacy and a range of political behavior, including electoral turnout (Abramson & Aldrich 1982) and participation beyond the electoral arena (Verba et al. 1995), as well as online political participation (Oser et al. 2022). Political efficacy is strongly related to political participation because feeling efficacious encourages participation and also because participation can boost feelings of efficacy, thus increasing the likelihood that participation will continue in the future (Finkel 1985). As such, political efficacy is an important political attitude for enabling strong connections between citizens and their elected leaders and for ensuring both the functioning and the legitimacy of democratic political systems (Iyengar 1980; Wolak 2018). Integrating this scholarship on the importance of political efficacy for attitudes and behaviors that are central to democratic functioning, Morrell (2003: 589) stated: “Simply

put, efficacy is citizens’ perceptions of powerfulness (or powerlessness) in the political realm.” At a time of concern for democratic stability and legitimacy, it is clear that the investigation of factors that may affect individuals’ sense of their own political efficacy is an important area of future research. Particularly for democratic systems, we will continue to expect that the public perceives that it has some degree of effect on political processes. As noted by Chamberlain (2012: 117), there should be normative concerns for the health of democratic systems if the public generally feels that its voice is unheard. A perennial normative concern in scholarship on political efficacy is the potential that systematic inequalities in political efficacy across distinctive socio-economic groups could contribute to a vicious cycle that exacerbates the underrepresentation of traditionally lower status groups (Verba et al. 1995). In a cross-national study designed to investigate the socio-demographic correlates of political efficacy (Hayes & Bean 1993), analysis of comparable data gathered in 1985 in four advanced democracies showed a clear positive association of measures of socio-economic status (i.e., education, income) with both internal and external efficacy. This finding of higher political efficacy for those with higher socio-economic status is a consistent finding in empirical research (e.g., Karp & Banducci 2008; Wolak 2018). The persistence of this type of socio-economic-based gap in political efficacy is clearly suboptimal in relation to the democratic ideal of governance that values both voice and equality (Verba et al. 1995). A central topic of ongoing scholarship on political efficacy is the degree to which it is inherently an individual trait, or alternatively, a political attitude that can be enhanced or diminished by specific contextual features. Early survey-based research focused on data from the United States concluded that political efficacy is a personal character trait that is formed in childhood (Easton & Dennis 1967; Iyengar 1980). More recent research focused on external efficacy in the United States supports this conclusion by showing no over-time connection between aggregate measures of external efficacy and national-level contextual factors that are expected to affect individuals’ perceptions of their own political efficacy (Chamberlain 2012). However, some comparative research has found that certain contextual-level factors may affect individuals’ Jennifer Oser

390  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology sense of political efficacy, including Karp and Banducci’s (2008) cross-national investigation of electoral system characteristics and Wolak’s (2018) analysis of politicians’ actions and government design in the US states. The importance of better understanding factors that affect individuals’ political efficacy along with the development of sophisticated analytical techniques (such as big data analysis and machine learning approaches) promise that scholarship on political efficacy will continue to yield new insights in the coming years.

Acknowledgment Funded by the European Union (ERC, PRD, project number 101077659). Jennifer Oser

References Abramson, P. R., & Aldrich, J. H. (1982). The decline of electoral participation in America. American Political Science Review, 76(3), 502–521. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1017​/S0003055400188379 Acock, A., Clarke, H. D., & Stewart, M. C. (1985). A new model for old measures: A covariance structure analysis of political efficacy. The Journal of Politics, 47(4), 1062–1084. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/2130807 Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. E. (1954). The Voter Decides. Row, Peterson Chamberlain, A. (2012). A time-series analysis of external efficacy. Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(1), 117–130. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1093​/poq​/nfr064 Craig, S. C., & Maggiotto, M. A. (1982). Measuring political efficacy. Political Methodology, 8(3), 85–109 Craig, S. C., Niemi, R. G., & Silver, G. E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. Political Behavior, 12(3), 289–314. https://doi​.org​/10​ .1007​/ BF00992337 Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Wiley Easton, D., & Dennis, J. (1967). The child’s acquisition of regime norms: Political efficacy. The American Political Science Review, 61(1), 25–38. https://doi​.org​/10​ .2307​/1953873 Esaiasson, P., Kölln, A.-K., & Turper, S. (2015). External efficacy and perceived responsiveness—Similar but distinct Jennifer Oser

concepts. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 27(3), 432–445. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ijpor​/edv003 Finkel, S. E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: A panel analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 891–913. https://doi​.org​/10​ .2307​/2111186 Hayes, B. C., & Bean, C. S. (1993, 2019/03/10). Political efficacy: A comparative study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia. European Journal of Political Research, 23(3), 261–280. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1475​-6765​.1993​.tb00359.x Iyengar, S. (1980). Subjective political efficacy as a measure of diffuse support. Public Opinion Quarterly, 44(2), 249–256. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/268589 Karp, J. A., & Banducci, S. A. (2008). Political efficacy and participation in twenty-seven democracies: How electoral systems shape political behaviour. British Journal of Political Science, 38(2), 311–334. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1017​/S0007123408000161 Lane, R. E. (1959). Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. The Free Press Morrell, M. E. (2003). Survey and experimental evidence for a reliable and valid measure of internal political efficacy. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 67(4), 589– 602. https://doi​.org​/10​.1086​/378965 Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. American Political Science Review, 85(4), 1407–1413. https://doi​.org​/10​.2307​/1963953 Oser, J., Grinson, A., Boulianne, S., & Halperin, E. (2022). How political efficacy relates to online and offline political participation: A multilevel meta-analysis. Political Communication, 39(5), 607–633. https://doi​ .org​/10​.1080​/10584609​.2022​.2086329 Stauffer, K. E. (2021). Public perceptions of women’s inclusion and feelings of political efficacy. American Political Science Review, 115(4), 1226–1241. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1017​/S0003055421000678 Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Harvard University Press Wolak, J. (2018). Feelings of political efficacy in the fifty states. Political Behavior, 40(3), 763–784. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/s11109​ -017​-9421-9

99. Political elites

the assumption of hidden power resources (Hoffmann-Lange 2018). A cornerstone in this strand of research can be found in Suzann Keller’s (1963) work. She Elites constitute minorities who are able to suggests, based on Parsons’ AGIL scheme, exert a substantial influence on their fellow four types of “strategic elites”, among which citizens and society as a whole—whatever political elites are responsible for decisions the source of this power. Classic elite theo- about the goals and the allocation of the ries (such as those of Mosca, Michels, and respective means and resources. These elites Pareto) identified elites as a homogenous are differentiated by their functions, which group whose members combine the access prevents a structural hegemony of one elite to resources, competences, and moral merits type—although temporal dominance may required to rule society—in contrast to the appear. Access to elite positions is increas“masses”. From this perspective, elites are ingly organized by meritocratic achievement ruling classes rather than differentiated into, or, at least, this becomes the only legitimate for instance, political, economic, or scientific way of advancement. This ultimately leads elites. The classic elite theories fell into dis- to the socio-demographic openness of the repute after WWII due to the theoretical, and elites and the end of the link between elites partially personal, affirmation of fascist ide- and upper-class status. In these functional ology arising from the idea of the superiority approaches, elite differentiation—and hence of the elites (Hartmann 2007). From that time the evolving necessity to cooperate—creates on, elite research can roughly be character- a functional equilibrium between elite comized as a theoretical competition between petition and cooperation, which is required pluralist and conflict-theoretical positions. for stable and prosperous societies. More recent theories have kept the pluPluralist approaches emphasize elite differentiation and are thus primarily concerned ralist approach but challenged the idea of a with the conditions of elite integration and functional equilibrium. Instead, they empirisocietal stability. The critical approaches cally investigate the extent and conditions of emphasize elite integration and are thus elite cooperation and integration (cf. Putnam rather concerned with the concentration of 1976). For instance, Field and Higley (1980) power, the inequality of access to the elites, and Higley and Burton (2006) stress the and the resulting lack of integration between autonomy of elites and explain their internal elites and the population. Recent develop- structure primarily by their contingent deciments in elite research point toward the inte- sions but partially also through the sociogration of these two strands. Political elites economic conditions of societies. Based on are at the center of these debates because this assumption, they distinguish three diftheir ability and ambition to simultaneously ferent elite types (Ibid.): fragmented elites foster both elite integration and the inclusion compete with each other and put the stabilof the population are perceived as their piv- ity of societies at risk. Ideologically unified otal but contradictory tasks. In particular, the elites provide stability, but their ideological legitimation of political elites in democracies uniformity makes societies less efficient and is judged by the quality of their relationship innovative, which subsequently undermines their stability. In contrast, stable democrato the population. Pluralist elite theories abandoned the clas- cies are characterized by consensually unisic idea of a homogenous ruling class and fied elites who support the institutional and identified distinct elites in different sectors informal rules of conflict solution and colof modern societies (e.g., politics, economy, lective decision‑making but who otherwise administration, military). The elites in these compete to assert the organized interests of sectors follow different modi operandi that the sector that they represent. The influence are structured by distinct formal and infor- of the population is considered as either neglimal rules. They can be identified by their gible or even threatening to democratic stabilformal leadership positions in most power- ity because elites support democratic values ful organizations, apart from any judgment more strongly than average citizens (for an about their competences or merits. This posi- overview, see Peffley & Rohrschneider 2007). Others consider the elite-population relational approach assumes the sources of elite power in modern societies as linked to formal tionship as a defining element of political positions within organizations and refuses elites: (elected) political elites are challenged 391

392  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology by the task to contribute to elite integration at the horizontal level (i.e., to achieve consensus between elites from different sectors about the allocation of societal resources, and the institutions and rules of conflict regulation). This consensus is, however, not grounded in functional necessities but needs to be settled initially in critical junctures in which the institutions and norms of conflict solution are established. Subsequently, elites from all sectors need to maintain them in their bargaining processes as cooperating antagonists (Best 2010). At the vertical level, elites pursue the interests and follow the modi operandi that are prevalent in their sector. While elites need autonomy from these sectoral demands and constraints to achieve horizontal elite compromises, this autonomy tends to impair the vertical elite-sector integration (Vogel et  al. 2018). Political elites are particularly characterized by this dilemma: when fostering horizontal elite compromise, they deviate from their constituencies; and when fostering the representation of their constituencies, they impede elite compromise. Although elites from other sectors are also confronted with this dilemma, political elites in democracies are the only elites who are threatened by elections as the main mechanism to sanction insufficient representation of their constituents. The starting point for critical elite theory is C. Wright Mills (1956, 1958). Mills described the history of American society as a process of integration and concentration of power in and between the social spheres of politics, economics, and the military. These “big three” historically concentrated so much power that all other sectors became practically irrelevant regarding major societal decisions. Moreover, Mills presumes that the spheres are not functionally separate but overlap in terms of personnel, namely through networks of the US upper class. Based on this cornerstone, some basic assumptions and foci can be described that can be found in almost all works of critical elite theory on political elites. First, this strand of research tends to be skeptical about the actual power of political elites in capitalist societies, especially in relation to economic elites. While political science concedes relative agency to political elites, (political) sociology is more skeptical here and also empirically focuses more often on economic elites (Hartmann 2007). Lars Vogel and Christian Schneickert

Even if the political arena is considered to be an autonomous field, its relevance in the context of the respective nation-state in a globalized world economy is questioned (Schneickert 2018). Second, critical elite theory focuses on the interconnections of fields, especially between politics and the economy, whether through direct lobbying, through indirect influence, or through the inter-field mobility of actors. The focus here has usually been on Paretonian plutocracy, in which political decisions protect the wealth of economic elites. Less attention is paid to etatism, in which economic decisions are orchestrated by political and state-administrative elites to increase political power even at the expense of economic growth (Best & Higley 2014). Recent research identifies elites as flexibly operating beyond their sectoral or formal hierarchical positions (Wedel 2017). Third, critical elite theory sets up a pronounced critique of the vertical integration of political (and other) elites, especially regarding social class, but in recent decades also in terms of gender, migrant background, religious and regional affiliations, and so on. This focus is especially polarizing for political elites in democracies because they are normatively expected to represent the entire society. This should result in recruitment processes that are open and in responsiveness that consider equally all social classes and groups. These presumptions are usually disputed by critical elite theory (theoretically and/or empirically). Bourdieu’s (1996) field-theoretic elite research, while originating in critical elite research, is considered to integrate several approaches (Savage & Silva 2008). However, the specific feature of the political field is its precarious relation to the public and the voters (e.g., discursive recourses to the “true will of the people”). Conversely, the voters’ skepticism toward “those up there” or the “caste of politicians” can be interpreted as a field effect, that is, the existence of a field-specific agreement on the basic rules of the game in the field (Bourdieu 1981, 2000). Nevertheless, the field is also characterized by multiple conflicts, which can only be fully understood from within the field. In the political field, general (e.g., cultural or economic capital) and specific resources (e.g., forms of political capital) are relevant. Bourdieu defines political capital as a special form of symbolic

political elites  393 capital, which is essentially “credibility” and is therefore vulnerable to scandals and other forms of symbolic discredit. Political capital exists in personal (charismatic, habitual) and institutionalized form (positions) (Ibid.). Field-theoretical elite research combines the analyses of conflicts within and between fields, as well as analyses of individual fields and their elites with overarching analyses of power and inequality. The division between pluralist and conflict-theoretical elite theory has become less severe in recent years. This is due to integrative theoretical approaches, such as fieldtheoretical elite research, and (in particular) to the empirical orientation of current elite research. Thus, the central questions of the vertical openness of elites and the horizontal differentiation and concentration of power, as well as links between political and economic (or other) elites are increasingly being empirically investigated. For that purpose, it is advantageous that the data base improved, especially with regard to detailed career trajectories (e.g., Cotta & Best 2007) and also elites’ attitudes (e.g., Conti, Göncz, & RealDato 2018). This is in particular true for political elites, for which the normative demand for transparency and representativeness is mirrored in the convenient availability of data. The crucial theoretical issues that have long divided elite theory are, however, still reflected in the empirical focus (e.g., the selection of specific groups, the limitation of samples). Perhaps it is the increasing polarization in Western democracies that has contributed to the convergence of the different strands, whether because the conflict-theoretical side today values the stability of political systems once more or because the pluralist side can no longer deny the problems of representation (i.e., vertical integration of political elites and the population). Lars Vogel and Christian Schneickert

References Best, H. (2010): Associated Rivals: Antagonism and Cooperation in the German Political Elite. In: Democratic Elitism: New Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. J. Higley and H. Best (eds.). Leiden, Boston: Brill: 97–116. Best, H. and J. Higley, Eds. (2014): Introduction. In: Political Elites in the

Transatlantic Crisis. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 1–22. Bourdieu, P. (1981): La Représentation Politique. Eléments Pour Une Théorie Du Champ Politique. Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 36/37: 3–24. Bourdieu, P. (1996): The State Nobility. Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Oxford: Polity Press. Bourdieu, P. (2000): Propos Sur Le Champ Politique. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon. Conti, N., B. Göncz and J. Real-Dato, Eds. (2018): National Political Elites, European Integration and the Eurozone Crisis. Routledge Series on Social and Political Elites. London: Routledge. Cotta, M. and H. Best (2007): Democratic Representation in Europe. Diversity, Change and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, G. L. and J. Higley (1980): Elitism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hartmann, M. (2007): The Sociology of Elites. London: Routledge. Higley, J. and M. Burton (2006): Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracies. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2018): Methods of Elite Identification. In: The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites. H. Best and J. Higley (eds.). London: Palgrave Macmillan: 79–92. Keller, S. (1963): Beyond the Ruling Class. Strategic Elites in Modern Society. New York: Random House. Mills, C. W. (1956): The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. (1958): The Structure of Power in American Society. The British Journal of Sociology 9(1): 29–41. Peffley, M. and R. Rohrschneider (2007): Elite Beliefs and the Theory of Democratic Elitism. In: Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior. R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann (eds.). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 65–79. Putnam, R. D. (1976): The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Savage, M. and K. Williams, Eds. (2008): Remembering Elites. The sociological review monographs. Malden: Blackwell. Schneickert, Christian (2018): Globalizing Political and Economic Elites in National Fields of Power. Historical Social Research 43(3): 329–358. Lars Vogel and Christian Schneickert

394  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Vogel, L., R. Gebauer and A. Salheiser (2018): Contested Status: Contemporary Challenges to Political Elites and Elite Responses. In: The Contested Status of Political Elites. At the Crossroads. L. Vogel, R. Gebauer and A. Salheiser (eds.). London: Routledge: 1–22.

Lars Vogel and Christian Schneickert

Wedel, J. R. (2017): From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 21st Century. Theory, Culture & Society 34(5–6): 153–178.

100. Political engagement The study of political engagement and its synonym political participation has become one of the most important subfields of political science and is a fundamental category in that discipline, especially when democracy, citizenship, political activism and human rights are the focus of inquiry. This reflects the conventional wisdom that political engagement is central to any democracy because it ensures the people have a say in how society operates. For many, political engagement is a synonym for political participation. One classic formulation proposes that political engagement or participation ‘refers to those activities by private citizens that . . . aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel’ (Verba and Nie 1972: 2). Others however distinguish between political engagement and political participation seeing political engagement as the interest people have in political ideas and activities while reserving political participation for political behaviours or actions, like voting, contacting politicians or marching in demonstrations. Further consideration suggests that the seemingly simple idea of political engagement is freighted with controversy. What exactly is political engagement? Who does it? Is the conventional wisdom true, that democracies are committed in practice to political engagement? To what extent, for example, has modern political theory valued political engagement? Saying what political engagement is, is not a straightforward exercise because like most political science concepts it is conceptually indeterminate. This imprecision is unsurprising because defining a concept like political engagement, democracy, the state or citizenship foregrounds the problem of polysemy or that most words when talking about political engagement have multiple meanings. This feature of all human languages has always been a stumbling block especially for political scientists like Giovanni Sartori who derided the ‘ambiguity’ or ‘vagueness’ of natural languages (Sartori 1984: 26–8). Many political scientists like to produce clear, coherent and presumably monosemic concepts (i.e. with one meaning) as the prelude to counting,

measuring and explaining-predicting ‘things’ in the world. Leaving a critique of that task for another time, we note that any sign, symbol, or phrase used in disciplines like political science can have multiple meanings. As Schalk (1979) rightly observed, ‘engagement’ is a French word that has no obvious English equivalent. Nonetheless, Schalk allows that synonyms including participation, commitment and involvement spring to mind. As a compound category, much also depends on how the political is understood when talking about political engagement. We can see the political as coterminous with the practices of government like voting or lawmaking. Alternately the political can be understood more expansively as any involvement by members of a community engaged in deliberating about the good society while aiming to resolve disagreements among members of that community that arise from that deliberation (e.g., Sluga 2014). Mindful of these complexities, we consider how political engagement typically refers minimally to four meanings-in-use. 1.

Political engagement is a synonym for political participation. Type ‘political engagement’ into Google to discover that two out of three times we are referring to items dealing with ‘political participation’. Political engagement as a synonym for political participation refers to all voluntary activities by citizens in their bids to influence political outcomes. In empirical political science and cognate disciplines, political engagement and political participation are seen as synonymous ‘dependent variables’. Early American empirical research on political engagement in the 1940s and 1950s focused, for example, on voting and electoral turnout. However, since the 1960s, the repertoire of activities covered by empirical studies has grown (Theocharis and van Deth 2018). 2. Some people distinguish between political engagement and political participation by referring to political engagement as a cognitive or psychological state involving interest in or feelings about political or civic matters that does not lead to action. This is said to be distinct from political participation which refers to distinctively political action, or behaviour both narrowly or broadly defined.

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396  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Political engagement denotes having an interest in, paying attention to or having knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes or feelings about political matters (Dahlgren 2016: 119–124). Understood in this way political engagement begins to look like the interest in political ideas and public issues that Habermas (1989) talked about in his account of the ‘public sphere’. 3. Political engagement has been used in a restricted sense to refer to the ‘political or social action of intellectuals who make a conscious decision to enter the [political] arena’ (Schalk 1979: 3). It refers to intellectuals who enjoy a significant or unusual degree of esteem or public attention and who engage in public activities like writing open letters or issuing public manifestos or marching in demonstrations (Schalk 1979). The notion of the ‘engaged intellectual’ is epitomised by figures like Emile Zola, Simone de Beauvoir, Bertrand Russell and Noam Chomsky. 4. Finally, political engagement can be understood as encompassing both political interest in things political and behaviours. This acknowledges that our ways of thinking and our attitudes and interests are precursors to action because they guide or inform both behaviour and action. This takes into account the impact of social media platforms which expand both the forms of information and opinion and new forms of mediabased politics (e.g., Rowe 2015). For political theorists such as Arendt engagement entails the use of mental facilities of thinking and judging which she treats as important in the conduct of both political deliberation and action (1978). On the face of it, many modern political scientists seem to assume that widespread political engagement is a fact, or normatively ‘that all citizens [should] possess the opportunity to participate and also that they take up this opportunity’ (e.g., Parvin 2018: 31). Having said that, there is no evidence that political engagement is as widespread or actually occurring to the extent that it is supposed to be. While political participation and political engagement are considered necessary conditions for democracy to function effectively, research reveals increasing evidence of disengagement and a growing disconnect between Judith Bessant and Rob Watts

citizens and their governments. A large body of research now exists that says representative democracy defined, for example, in terms of voter turnout, party membership, trust in politicians and interest in politics is in crisis. There is an abundance of evidence suggesting that, using conventional measures like voting or party membership, political engagement is waning. If we treat voting as a proxy for political engagement, then we see conspicuous evidence of a global decline in voting over the last half century. Despite a general growth in the global voter population and the number of countries that hold elections, voter turnout as a proportion of the global voting age population has decreased significantly since the early 1990s. While global voter turnout was stable between the 1940s and the 1980s, running at between 76 per cent and 78 per cent, it dropped sharply in the 1990s to 70 per cent. Since 2010 almost half of the countries in the world have seen voter turnouts of 60–79 per cent (Kostelka and Blais 2021: 630), while turnouts above 80 per cent are found only in 20 per cent of countries. Other proxies like party membership likewise point to declining political engagement. Party membership in Europe, for example, has declined since 1960, when nearly 15 per cent of the electorate in Europe’s democracies were members of a political party. By 1980, that share had shrunk to ten per cent and then to five per cent by 2008 (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017). Scarrow (2000), for example, found that the proportion of Australia’s electorate belonging to political parties declined from around four per cent to 1.5 per cent between the 1970s and 1990s. However, if we accept as many political scientists do that political engagement extends far beyond such conventional measures, then we can expand the kinds of engagement to include everything from ‘activities such as voting, demonstrating, donating money, contacting a public official and boycotting. It also includes guerrilla gardening, volunteering, attending flash mobs, buying fair-trade products and even suicide protests’ (van Deth 2016: 1158–1159). However, evidence suggests people are not engaging more in non-conventional forms of political activity (Wilke and Castillo 2018). Others worry about the ‘conceptual stretching’ involved in expanding the forms of political engagement. This leads some to argue that if ‘engagement

political engagement  397 is used by scholars to mean completely different things, it is basically a useless concept – it confuses more than it illuminates’ (Ekman and Amnå 2012: 284). This rise of social media raises questions about whether online activism is political engagement (Morozov 2009). That debate is closely associated with controversy about the alleged political dispositions of young people seen variously as apathetic, politically disengaged, engaged (Henn et  al. 2005: 47-67) or as harbingers of a new kind of politics (Theocharius and van Deth 2018). Plenty of research shows that while many young people have little interest in party politics or conventional politics, other research confirms that young people are engaging in new social movements and non-conventional forms of political activity (Grasso and Bessant 2018; Pickard 2019). What of claims that political theorists value political engagement? According to Carol Pateman (1970) modern political theorists in the 1970s were actually not that interested in promoting widespread political engagement or participation. To make this point she offered a critique of Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Pateman highlighted the disparity between the ideological commitment to popular sovereignty while ensuring the people were actually denied the capacity to exercise political influence. For Schumpeter, democracy was simply a method that enabled elite competition. Pateman pointed out how Schumpeter was not alone in rejecting the idea of political engagement by ordinary people. Gerry Mackie (2002) concurred, suggesting that the theory and actual practice of representative democracy requires that ‘the people’ stay out of the way and let the elites and governments get on with the job of governing. This raises major questions about popular claims that political engagement has been or is a central, empirically defining, characteristic of modern democracies. It also raises political and intellectual issues about the future of political engagement. Judith Bessant and Rob Watts

References Arendt, H. (1978). Life of the Mind. vols 1 and 2. New York: Brace Jovanovich. Chiaramonte, A., & Emanuele, V. (2017). ‘Party system volatility, regeneration

and de-institutionalization in Western Europe (1945–2015)’. Party Politics 23(4): 376–388. Dahlgren, P. (2016). ‘Civic engagement’. In: Maxoleni, G., Barnhurst, K., Ikeda, K., Maia, R. & Wessler, H. (Eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1002​/9781118541555. Ekman, J., & Amnå, E., (2012). ‘Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology’. Human Affairs 22(3): 283–300. Grasso, M., & Bessant, J. (eds). (2018). Governing Youth Politics in the Age of Surveillance. London: Routledge. Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Burger, T. & Lawrence, F. (trans). Cambridge: MIT Press. Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Forrest, S. (2005). ‘Uninterested youth? Young people's attitudes towards party politics in Britain’. Political Studies 53(3): 556–578. Kostelka, F., & Blais, A. (2021). ‘The generational and institutional sources of the global decline in voter turnout’. World Politics 73(4): 629–667. Mackie, G. (2002). Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morozov, E. (2009). ‘The brave new world of slacktivism’. Foreign Policy, May 19. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy​ .com​/2009​/05​/19​/the​-brave​-new​-world​- of​ -slacktivism/. Parvin, P. (2018). ‘Democracy without participation: A new politics for a disengaged era’. Res Publica 24(1): 31–52. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pickard, S. (2019). Politics, Protest and Young People: Political Participation and Dissent in 21st Century Britain. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Rowe, P. (2015). ‘MamaBakers as everyday makers: The political as personal’. Policy Studies 36(6): 623–639. Sartori, G. (ed). (1984). Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage. Scarrow, S. (2000). ‘Parties without members? Party organization in a changing electoral environment’. In: Dalton, R., & Wattenberg, M. (Eds.), Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Judith Bessant and Rob Watts

398  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology Industrial Democracies, 79–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schalk, D. (1979). The Spectrum of Political Engagement: Mounier, Benda, Nizan, Brasillach, Sartre. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Routledge. Sluga, H. (2014). Politics and the Search for the Common Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Theocharis, Y., & van Deth, J. (2018). ‘The continuous expansion of citizen participation: A new taxonomy’. European Political Science Review 10(1): 139–163.

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van Deth, J. (2016). ‘What is political participation?’ In Thompson, E. (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1093​/acrefore​/9780190228637​ .013​.68. Verba, S., & Nie, N. (1972). Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row. Wilke, R., & Castillo, A. (2018). ‘Many around the world are disengaged from politics’. Pew Research. https://www​.pewresearch​ .org​ /global ​ / 2018​ / 10​ / 17​ / inter national​ -political​-engagement.

101. Political generations A political generation is a group of people thought to share political orientations— beliefs, attitudes, identities, priorities, habits, memories, and/or behaviors—due to the influence of historical events and circumstances experienced during their adolescent and early adult years. The classic citation is to Karl Mannheim’s 1926 essay “The Problem of Generations,” although the idea has a longer pedigree (Bristow 2016; Delli Carpini 1989). Related concepts include lineage generations, which refers to groups along the line of descent within families (e.g., grandparents, parents), and age cohorts, which refers to individuals grouped on the basis of when they were born. Arguments concerning political generations integrate micro-, meso-, and macro-level elements. Essential to the theorizing about political generations is the idea that that a person’s basic political predispositions tend to develop and stabilize during the “impressionable years” of late adolescence and early adulthood rather than being malleable throughout the life span. Also essential is the idea that historical events and circumstances experienced during the impressionable years can have a durable impact on a person’s political orientations. Political socialization research firmly supports these propositions (Sears and Brown 2013; Stoker and Bass 2011). People tend to emerge from early adulthood with stable political identities and attitudes, having built habits of political engagement or disengagement that persist as they age. Sociopolitical events are more likely to be remembered and judged important, to be cited as influential to one’s political development, and to provoke attitude formation and change when experienced in young adulthood. Although events and experiences taking place later in life always have the potential to induce change, initial predispositions shape later learning and often strengthen with age due to motivated reasoning and behavioral reinforcement. Thus, people who came of age in one historical milieu will tend to be politically distinguishable from people who came of age in another, all else equal, with each bearing an imprint of the historical context they experienced when young.

These ideas make it fruitful to group people into generations based on the sociopolitical conditions they encountered as adolescents and young adults. Generational location becomes important to understanding political differences among individuals, across groups differentiated by age, and between family members from different lineage generations. It also becomes important to understanding macropolitical developments, since the generational composition of any population changes over time. New (young) people continually enter the polity as others (old) exit through death, with fertility and mortality rates influencing the size of different age groups. When entering and exiting citizens fall into different political generations, this engine of population replacement brings about macropolitical change. Since generational replacement is a slow-moving and continual process, it can influence longterm trends but will not bring about abrupt or short-term change. The classification of people into generations is sometimes based only on when they were born and where they resided when young—for example, calling US residents born between 1900 and 1925 the “DepressionEra Generation.”1 If so, a political generation is equivalent to an age-cohort, albeit one that is bounded geographically and expected to be distinct, politically. Frequently, however, the generational classification is only applied to a subgroup within a given age-cohort, which Mannheim referred to as a “generation unit”—for example, only women or civil rights activists. The use of generation units reflects the fact that young people may differ in the extent to which they are shaped by the historical moment or react to that moment in divergent ways. Some argue that to be worthy of the “generation” label, the group members must also be aware of their distinctiveness and identify themselves in generational terms. This consciousness was a feature of Mannheim’s theorizing about generations and in some accounts is what distinguishes a “cohort” from a “generation” (see Alwin and McCammon 2003; Aboim and Vasconcelos 2014). As Braungart and Braungart (1986, 217) put it, “A cohort becomes transformed into a political generation when many of its members become aware that they are bound together by a shared age-group consciousness and mobilize as an active force for political change.” This

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400  elgar encyclopedia of political sociology idea has tended to be absent from the work of political scientists but is common in the work of sociologists studying youth culture and social movements. Research into political generations can be roughly grouped into four clusters. The first relies on very explicit ideas about when, why, and which distinct generations form. Examples include Schnittker, Freese, and Powell (2003), who demonstrate that American men and women who came of age during second wave of feminism (1963–1973) are more likely to identify as feminists than those who were younger or older during that time; and Firebaugh and Chen (1995), who argue that women in the US who came of age before passage of the 19th amendment (1920) were throughout their lives less likely to vote than were those who came of age later, with generational replacement producing a steady erosion of the gender gap in voter turnout between 1920 and 1980. The second cluster focuses on members of a single political generation or generation unit. Some research uses qualitative interviewing to detail the political views of generation members and tie them to historical events and circumstances, such as Whalen and Flacks’ (1984) study of student activists from the 1960s or DeSante and Smith’s (2019, Chs. 4–5) research into the racial beliefs of white Millennials. Others use quantitative data to study the political distinctiveness and/or durability of the group, for example Jennings (1987) on 1960s activists and Milkman (2017) or Rouse and Ross (2018) on Millennials. Also common is research looking at a wide array of non-political as well as political outcomes, such as Seemiller and Grace (2019) on “Generation Z.” In this cluster, attention is firmly fixed on one generation (unit), though analysts will often bring in data on others in an effort to establish the focal generation’s distinctiveness. A third cluster of research focuses on intergenerational comparisons, usually working with data from an entire population categorized into age cohorts. Although the labels and boundaries marking generations vary, the ones most commonly utilized by scholars and journalists are the six identified by the Pew Research Center: Greatest, Silent, Baby Boomers, Gen X, Millennials, and Gen Z. Typically, analysts use cross-sectional and/ or longitudinal survey data to describe the political attitudes and behavior of the groups Laura Stoker

(e.g., Duffy 2021, Fisher 2020), though some use qualitative interviews (e.g., Kruse, Norris, and Flinchum 2018, Schuster 2013). Much of this research is primarily inductive, aimed at describing generational differences whose root causes are unclear, though some rests on theoretical claims about the shifting conditions that could be producing them, such as modernization (Inglehart and Welzel 2010) or economic booms and busts (Strauss and Howe 1991). Research comparing generations collected into Pew’s or similar categories is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. One set was recently articulated in an open letter to Pew signed by over 150 social scientists,2 namely that the boundaries and labels demarcating generations are arbitrary, applied without regard to whether people think of themselves as belonging to a generation, and inspire stereotyping and false journalist narratives that can fuel intergroup conflict (see also Bristow 2021). When exploratory generational research requires dividing the population into groups, they recommend using cohorts of equal length (e.g., born in any given fiveyear interval) and eschewing generational labels. A second set of criticisms concerns the potential confounding of effects due to generation or cohort with those of age, time period, and demographics. When analysts compare generations at any one point in time, generation and age are perfectly correlated; people who differ in when they were born will differ in how old they are. This is confounding because aging can itself affect political orientations via the accumulation of political experience or life stage transitions. Comparing two or more generations when they were of the same age (e.g., Gen X in 1984 vs. Millennials in 2004) removes the age confound but introduces a period confound. Here, the possibility is that the generations differ because events are causing individuals throughout the population to change over time. Finally, political differences across generations or generation units can also be due to differences in their demographic composition rather than the historical circumstances each group experienced as young adults. Recognition of these kinds of inferential problems leads to the fourth cluster of research on generations, which uses individual-level data from repeated cross-sections and age-period-cohort (APC) modeling. An

political generations  401 APC model is designed to show whether and how outcomes vary with age and other demographics, whether groups defined by when they were born (cohorts or generations) are politically distinctive, and the extent to which outcomes are otherwise changing over time (i.e., are period effects) taking all of these under consideration simultaneously. The results can also be used to show how generational replacement, period effects, and a population’s shifting demographics account for macropolitical change. Researchers have used APC models to study all sorts of topics—including partisanship and ideology (Stoker 2024; Twenge et  al. 2016), vote choice (Tilley and Evans 2014; Van der Brug and Rekker 2021), political attitudes (Grasso et  al. 2016; Johnson and Schwadel 2019; Neundorf 2010), and political participation (Blais and Rubenson 2013; Grasso 2016)— and sometimes focus on generation units (e.g., Dinas and Stoker 2014; Lindskog and Oskarson 2023). APC models have their adherents but have also been met with skepticism. One reason is that they try to disentangle causes that are thoroughly entangled and are only able to do so by making statistical assumptions that may not be warranted. Good overviews of these issues can be found in Bell (2020), Fosse and Winship (2019), and Yang and Land (2013). A second is that even when they yield believable results about generational differences, they are silent as to why those differences exist. As Markus (1985, 720) put it, “the APC model is primarily an accounting equation rather than an explanatory one.” Considering the growth of social science experimentation, one might expect there to be a fifth cluster of research using experimental methods to distinguish among political generations. Aside from a few recent studies (e.g., Haenschen and Tedesco 2020; Schildkraut and Marotta 2018), however, there is very little work of this kind. This should be a promising direction for generational research moving ahead. Ideas about political generations have drawn the attention of those inside and outside of academia because of their relevance to understanding political outcomes at multiple levels and because they link the past to the present and future. The literature is diverse, sometimes contentious, and often fraught with inferential limitations not always recognized or acknowledged. We can expect

continued attention to the topic and hope for progress in the years ahead. Laura Stoker

Notes 1.

2.

If we say that the impressionable years run from age 15 until age 30 and the Depression ranged from 1930 to 1940, then people born before 1900 were too old when it started (>30) and people born after 1925 were too young when it ended (