Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis: Insights from Great Figures in History 3031388895, 9783031388897

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Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis Insights from Great Figures in History Izhar Oplatka

Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis

Izhar Oplatka

Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis Insights from Great Figures in History

Izhar Oplatka School of Education Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel

ISBN 978-3-031-38889-7    ISBN 978-3-031-38890-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

1 I ntroduction  1 A Brief Description of the Book   4 References   6 2 T  he Current Scholarship About Crisis Management in Organizations  9 The Essentials of Crisis Management  12 The Dynamic Aspects of Crisis Management  14 Factors Affecting Crisis Management  19 Leadership and Crisis  21 Crisis Management in Schools  24 References  28 Part I Political Crises in Times of War  33 3 A  braham Lincoln 35 The Biggest Crisis in the History of the US  36 Lessons to Learn from Lincoln’s Crisis Leadership  37 References  49

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4 W  inston Churchill 53 The Triumphs of Nazi Germany and the Biggest Crisis in Churchill’s Life  54 Lessons Learned from Churchill’s Crisis Leadership  55 References  68 5 C  harles de Gaulle 69 The Crises in France: Occupation, Algeria, and Europe  69 Lessons Learned from de Gaulle’s Crisis Leadership  72 References  81 6 J ohn Kennedy 83 The Cuban Missile Crisis  84 Lessons Learned from Kennedy’s Crisis Leadership  86 References  97 Part II Military Crises in Times of war  99 7 T  he Duke of Wellington101 The Crisis: The Peninsular War and the Battle of Waterloo 101 Lessons to Learn from Wellington’s Crisis Leadership 103 References 112 8 A  lexander the Great113 The Invasions and Conquers 113 Lessons Learned from Alexander’s Crisis Leadership 115 References 124 9 E  lizabeth I127 The Defeat of the Spanish Armada 128 Lessons Learned from Elizabeth’s Crisis Management 130 References 138 10 Napoleon Bonaparte141 The Crisis: The Battle of Austerlitz 142 Lessons Learned from Napoleon’s Crisis Management 144 References 151

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Part III Insights from Social and Economic Crises 153 11 Theodore Roosevelt155 A Great Strike in the Anthracite Coal Fields of Pennsylvania 156 Lessons Learned from Roosevelt’s Crisis Leadership 157 References 164 12 F  ranklin D. Roosevelt165 The Great Depression and the New Deal 166 Lessons Learned from F.D.R.’s Crisis Management 167 References 173 13 Margaret Thatcher175 The Economic Crises in the 1970s and the 1980s 176 Lessons Learned from Thatcher’s Crisis Leadership 177 References 181 14 T  oward a Practical Model of Crisis Management in Our Schools183 Phase One: Understanding the Crisis and Its Elements 184 Phase Two: Moving to Action from Multiple Views 187 References 192 Index193

About the Author

Izhar Oplatka is Professor of Educational Administration and Leadership at The School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Oplatka’s research focuses on the lives and career of school teachers and educational leaders, emotion in organizations, and the foundations of educational administration as a field of study. His most recent books (and edited books) include Advanced Theories in Educational Leadership (with K.  Arar, 2022, Springer); Handbook of Gender and Educational Leadership and Management (with Showunmi, Moorosi & Shakeshaft, 2022); Reforming Education in Developing Countries (2019); Emotion Management in Teaching and Educational Leadership: A Cultural Perspective (with Arar); Project Management in Schools (2018, with Yemini and Sagi, Palgrave Macmillan); Higher Education Consumer Choice (2015, with Jane Hemsley-Brown, Palgrave); The Legacy of Educational Administration: A Historical Analysis of an Academic Field (2010, Peter Lang); and Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Schools (2015, with Anit Somech, Routledge).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Since early 2020, with the appearance of COVID-19, countries all over the world have enacted specific rules and regulations aimed at preventing the spread of the virus. Thus, in order to keep the number of infections and deaths as low as possible schools were closed down for long periods of time, sometimes several times. Schools, local education authorities (LAs), and Education Districts encouraged online teaching, being responsible for the access to technological resources for teachers and students (Schaffer & Perez, 2020). The need to respond rapidly and effectively to the crisis in education forced educational leaders and teachers to find solutions to new problems caused by school closures and online teaching. In other words, they had to develop adequate skills and competencies to cope with an organizational crisis. The umbrella term of crisis helps capture extraordinary phenomena such as pandemic viruses, volcanic oil spills, hurricanes, tsunamis, policy failures and institutional fiascoes, and so forth. Crises are extraordinary episodes that disturb and threaten established patterns of working and dominant assumptions about the way aspects of society operate. They can threaten lives, property, markets, infrastructure provision, public services, policy agendas, political careers, and even governing paradigms (McConnell, 2011). Crisis events can occur internally within an organization due to leadership failures, acquisitions, technological changes, and so forth or to be stimulated by external conditions.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3_1

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Irrespective of their type, crises are characterized by surprise, extraordinary disruption of routine, escalation of events, shortage of information, loss of control, absence of quick solution, and sometimes the spread of panic (Areiqat & Zamil, 2011; Massey & Larsen, 2006). Pearson and Clair (1998) explained that a crisis marks a turning point in the performance of an organization based on internal and external factors, and therefore there is a need for urgent changes in the management model and the decision-making practices. They defined crisis as: A low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly. (Pearson and Clair, ibid., p. 60)

Although crises “may hold value for the organization, both in a positive and a negative sense” (Bechler, 1995, p. 2), organizations are keenly aware of the potentially devastating impact of a crisis and place enormous pressure and responsibility on crisis managers (McConnell, 2011). Therefore, issues related to crisis management have become increasingly relevant and important for the survival and progressive development of organizations in recent years. Smith and Ally (2003) defined crisis management as “role appropriate, understood, accepted, and rehearsed behaviors made consistent and coordinated at all levels of the organization through leadership and teamwork in order to facilitate crisis management-specific communication, decision-making, and control” (p.  2). Therefore, crisis management encompasses a number of actions targeted at predicting the risk of crisis, the analysis of its symptoms, and taking measures to reduce its possible adverse implications and to utilize all possible opportunities with regard to the organization’s further development (Kuzmanova, 2016). The person responsible for managing the crisis and leading the organization out of the crisis is the leader of the organization. When the crisis gets out of hand, these organizations realize belatedly that the current leader does not necessarily possess the leadership style required to manage the crisis effectively (Bowers et al., 2017). Kapucu and Ustun (2018) indicated that the effectiveness of crisis leadership level is positively influenced by task-oriented leadership behaviors. It is important for organizational leaders to understand why crisis situations occur, when a crisis situation will happen, how it will occur, what can be done to handle it, and the extent to which it can be prevented or

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its impact minimized (Taneja et al., 2014). To help leaders effectively confront the crisis, the literature is replete with practical tools such as the establishment of an ad-hoc team whose members will engage in seeking a well-orchestrated crisis resolution, resource mobilization, and a sufficient amount of manpower with the requisite skills to cope with the crisis. The response to the crisis will determine the trajectory of recovery and future organizational performance (Bowers et  al., 2017). Therefore, researchers have emphasized the importance of professional training and guidance for crisis management in preparing leaders for impending crises and ensuring that when a crisis strikes they will be able to react effectively and minimize its dire consequences (Muffet-Willettm & Kruse, 2008). Lockwood (2005) found that denial of an impending threat to the organization and a reluctance to make crisis preparedness a priority are among the reasons why managers and organizations fail in handling the crisis. Given the disruption that crisis situations cause to an organization, including schools, the desire for capable leadership is well justified. In times of crisis, leadership becomes an integral part of a successful organizational crisis outcome. Strong effective leadership is imperative to organizational survival, as Muffet-Willettm and Kruse (2008) claimed. Hence, the study of crisis leadership is important today due to the unpredictability, intensity, duration, and cost of crises (Prewitt et al., 2011). Leaders in many occupational sectors, including education, struggle with the challenges of crisis, particularly following the current pandemic crisis. In times of uncertainty, though, schools should have crisis leaders with adequate skills to decide what goals need to be achieved and understand how every action they take affects school effectiveness and teacher well-­ being. Unfortunately, however, most of our knowledge about crisis management hitherto is based on non-educational organizations that differ largely from educational institutions such as colleges and schools. It also focuses on global, political, and economic crises. The book aims to fill the gap in our knowledge about crisis management in schools, its particular characteristics, and strategies from a historical point of view. It combines the knowledge about educational leadership with biographical narratives of great leaders in history who have faced a tremendous crisis successfully and from whom we can learn a lot about effective coping strategies in times of crisis. The leaders in the book represent different nations and organizations, facing political, military, economic, or social crises. Biographies and narratives have been common

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mechanisms to understand the reality of crises and learn profoundly from them. The biography of each leader is depicted, followed by a brief account of the crisis with which s/he had to cope. Then, the leader’s responses to and strategies for managing the crisis are discussed and analyzed, particularly in relation to the unique contexts of schools and the special characteristics of educational leadership. Each chapter ends with reflective questions for educational leaders who have to cope with any form of crisis in their organization and for students in leadership development programs in education. The book has both theoretical and practical contributions to offer. It is intended to promote our knowledge and understanding of organizational crisis within the school’s contexts and highlight the unique use of crisis management within schools. In this manner, the book contributes to a better understanding of the process of managing crises within schools and provides a holistic view of crisis management within the educational arena. As such, the book aims to suggest a model that can be used to manage the next crisis in educational organizations. From a more practical view, this book may have implications for school principals’ and teachers’ work and training in times of crisis. The book is likely to provide a deeper knowledge necessary for preparing for a possible crisis and for managing it in successful ways when it breaks out. In summary, I hope that the book will lead to a significant advancement in our understanding of crisis management in educational organizations from a biographical point of view and will add novel insights into the field of educational administration and leadership in the twenty-first century. However, given the limited scope of books and articles in English about exceptional leaders in other cultures and societies, most of the leaders in this book have lived and worked in Western societies or constitute great leaders in Western heritage and legacy.

A Brief Description of the Book The book is composed of 13 chapters edited in three sections, except the first one. The first chapter sets the stage for the following chapters by presenting the literature about organizational crisis and crisis management. Special attention is given to the dynamic aspects of crisis management and to the factors affecting the effectiveness of crisis management. Leadership is one of the most significant factors of crisis management and therefore the research on leadership and organizational crisis is discussed at length.

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The chapter ends with some works that focused on crisis management in schools and sharpens the particular characteristics of organizational crises in educational institutions. The first section—Insights from global/political crises—focuses on national leaders who had to cope with severe internal conflicts (Lincoln), horrible wars (Churchill and de Gaulle), and an intensive global crisis (Kennedy). Abraham Lincoln faced the biggest crisis in the history of the US but knew how to transform his opponents into supporters and expressed high personal resilience. Winston Churchill, driven by a strong moral judgment and decisiveness, inspired the British people with his speeches of hope and justice until the happy victory over Nazi Germany. Concurrently, Charles de Gaulle refused to accept his government’s surrender to Nazi Germany and broadcasted to his people from London, unifying them and promising to liberate France from its occupation. Twenty years later, President John Kennedy faced one of the most dangerous international crises in human history, the Cuban missile crisis, and proved his ability to stay calm and think thoroughly before responding while at the same time he had the courage to go to the limit. The second section—the military crisis in times of war—brings us the stories of three military leaders and one queen who faced a military crisis (among many during their life) and managed it admirably. The Duke of Wellington who fought against the intimidating Napoleonian army in the Peninsular War and in the Battle of Waterloo expressed mental agility, flexible thinking, and open-mindedness in times of crisis. Alexander the Great who reached the western border of India in his invasions and conquers has been attentive to his soldiers’ distress and desires and responded rapidly and innovatively to changing situations. Queen Elizabeth I rode on her white horse all the way from her palace to the English Channel in order to encourage her troops before the frightening Spanish navy arrives, pushing them to be patriotic and fight the invaders while emphasizing her own “marriage to their country.” Finally, the greatest military strategist in history, Napoleon Bonaparte, faced stronger armies in the Battle of Austerlitz but won due to his ability to maneuver the enemy and respond urgently to changing circumstances. The third section—Insights from social and economic crises—revolves around economic crises and shows how leaders can ameliorate the economic situation considerably but at the same time might bring about also unexpected, dire consequences. President Theodore Roosevelt had to face a great strike in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania but although it

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was not under his sovereignty, he encouraged the parties to participate in peaceful negotiation and displayed high social awareness that was required to end the crisis. President Franklin D.  Roosevelt promised to end the Great Depression and proposed the New Deal, a series of programs aimed to face the enormous economic crisis. He suggested revolutionary ideas and expressed much optimism even in the hardest times. Similarly, Premier Margaret Thatcher has faced many economic crises during her premiership and responded by introducing large-scale neo-liberal reforms in the UK. Unfortunately, many of her ideology-based solutions were very harmful and she had to cope many times with the gap between her initial intentions and the final results. My purpose in the last chapter is to propose a dynamic model that can be practically used to manage the next crisis in educational organizations that is based on the experiences of the great figures in this book. The model is practical-oriented and divided into two phases of crisis management: (1) understanding the crisis just after it commenced followed by institutional awareness of the crisis and (2) moving to action after recognizing potential threats and hazards stemming from the crisis. The model is intended to help educational leaders prevent systematically potential crises of all kinds in their workplace and provide them with adequate insights and tools to manage crisis events that had already broken out.

References Areiqat, A.  Y. M., & Zamil, A.  M. (2011). The role of empowerment in crisis management in business organizations. Asian Journal of Business Management, 3(3), 188–195. Bechler, C. (1995). Looking beyond the immediate crisis response: Analyzing the organizational culture to understand the crisis. Journal of the Association for Communication Administration, 1, 1–17. Bowers, M. R., Hall, R., & Srinivasan, M. M. (2017). Organizational culture and leadership style: The missing combination for selecting the right leader for effective crisis management. Business Horizons, 60, 551–553. Kapucu, N., & Ustun, Y. (2018). Collaborative crisis management and leadership in the public sector. International Journal of Public Administration, 41(7), 548–561. Kuzmanova, M. (2016). Contemporary problems related to crisis management in organizations. Trakia Journal of Sciences, 3, 256–261. Lockwood, N.  R. (2005). Crisis management in today’s business environment: HR’s strategic role. HR Magazine, 50(12/Special Section), 1–10.

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Massey, J. E., & Larsen, J. P. (2006). Crisis management in real time. Journal of Promotion Management, 12(3–4), 63–97. McConnell, A. (2011). Success? Failure? Something in-between? A framework for evaluating crisis management. Policy and Society, 30(2), 63–76. Muffet-Willettm, S. L., & Kruse, S. D. (2008). Crisis leadership: Past research and future directions. Journal of Business Community and Emergency Planning, 3(3), 248–258. Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. The Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 59–76. Prewitt, J. E., Weil, R., & McClure, A. Q. (2011). Crisis leadership: An organizational opportunity. Australian Journal of Business and Management Research, 1(6), 60–74. Schaffer, L., & Perez, I. (2020). Blinded by the unknown: A school’s leader’s actions to support teachers and students during COVID-19 school closures. Journal of School Administration Research and Development, 5, 49–54. Taneja, S., Golden-Pryor, M., Sewell, D., & Recuero, A.  M. (2014). Strategic crisis management: A basic for renewal and crisis prevention. Journal of Management Policy and Practice, 15(1), 78–85.

CHAPTER 2

The Current Scholarship About Crisis Management in Organizations

Chapter Overview • The characteristics of organizational crisis • The essentials of crisis management • The dynamic aspects of crisis management • Factors affecting crisis management • Leadership and crisis • Crisis management in schools The impact of crises on organizations and individuals has been stronger than ever (Wang, 2008). Thus, contemporary organizations operate in an age of extreme uncertainties and crises, such as natural calamities, global pandemics, wars, migration, infrastructure breakdowns, product and service failures, violent attacks, social unrest, and many other unpredictable conditions that made our world more vulnerable than ever. In this sense, crises include a surprise, a threat to high-priority purposes, and a limited amount of time available for preparing in advance or for responding to them after they erupt (Choi & Kim, 1999; Eismann et al., 2021). Pearson and Clair (1998) offered one of the first comprehensive definitions of an organizational crisis: An organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3_2

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cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly. (p. 60)

Coombs (2015, p. 2) described crisis slightly differently, as a “perception of an unpredictable event” that threatens stakeholder expectations and influences organization’s performance. A more dynamic definition of a crisis was suggested by Taneja et al. (2014): A crisis is a series of unforeseen events that launch a group, team or an organization into a downward spiral that is quick and will have long term effects if the situation is not rapidly handled effectively and efficiently. (p. 80)

Finally, MacNeil and Topping (2007) defined a crisis as an event that “causes severe emotional and social distress, which may occur at any time and without warning” (p. 64). Whereas there is no one, unified definition of an organizational crisis, it is commonly accepted that a crisis event is unexpected and ambiguous in nature, causes, and effects, and may cause incalculable damage to the organization and its reputation (Wang, 2008; Sinha, 2011). Although crises may engender positive or negative changes in the organization, they pose a major threat to the survival of an organization, because they provide little time to respond strategically or make decisions, based on profound and thorough processes of thinking and judgments. There is general agreement among researchers that a crisis involves some kind of unusual disruption of routine (Massey & Larsen, 2006), poses a threat to the organization’s core values (Bechler, 1995), and marks a turning point in the performance of an organization, based on internal and external factors. Thus, a crisis tends to alter the current organizational culture that, in turn, plays a visible role in molding the organization’s response to crisis situations, both positively and negatively (Bhaduri, 2019). In other words, various types of crises influence the operation of a wide variety of organizations, from small firms to large international companies, including organizational environments. However, despite common characteristics, crises vary in magnitude, duration, intensity, scope, depth, size, and so forth. Crises can be very intense and long or gradual and persistent. They can be widespread, impacting a host of parts in the organization and even in its environment or they can be self-contained. According to Sinha (2011), crises differ with respect to frequency and probability of reoccurrence.

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Mitroff (2008) claimed that there are seven types of major crisis families in his business model of crisis management. (1) Economic that includes events or situations such as strikes, market crashes, and shortage of labor opportunities. (2) Informational that refers to a loss of important information or organizational records, public or confidential. (3) Physical, which includes compromised major equipment, loss of suppliers, or a major disruption at a key operating plant. (4) Human resources, such as a loss of a top manager or member of the team, vandalism, or workplace violence. (5) Reputational such as rumors and gossip which can hurt the reputation of the organization. The sixth type includes psychopathic acts, that is, unthinkable acts such as terrorist attacks, kidnapping, or even tampering with products. (7) Natural disasters including tornadoes, global pandemics, earthquakes, fire, and flash floods. In addition, crises can occur from internal and external factors. Examples of the former are moral failures in the organization, poor products, or inadequate responses to environmental changes. Bowers et  al. (2017) indicated that external crisis events are “environmental disasters due to acts of nature, pandemic threats, targeted public acts, [and] stock market crashes” (p. 552). Managers are keenly aware of the potentially devastating impact of a crisis on their organization and therefore, they try to fit their crisis response to the new situation. The intensive development of a crisis forces fast changes to organizational policies, procedures, structures, and even culture. Weiner (2006) explained: The first casualty of a crisis is perspective. Characteristically, the pattern is one of escalation, with the initial response being surprise… As events escalate, management senses a loss of control over the issue. Intense scrutiny by the media, regulators, stakeholders and competitors breeds a siege mentality, tempting a company to batten down the hatches. (p. 3)

The response of the organization can range from chaos and arbitrary actions to controlled, purposeful, and well-devised crisis resolutions, depending on the extent to which the leadership team has previous experience in crisis management, the degree of structural flexibility in the organization, the dominant value system, and the like. The pace and efficiency of the organizational response to the crisis will determine the course of recovery and future organizational performance. Thus, to minimize the negative impact of crises and restore operations, organizations have to respond rapidly to emergent and ongoing crisis events as well as to convert

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crisis experiences into actionable learnings (Eismann et  al., 2021). No doubt, following the emergence of any organizational or environmental crisis, there is a need for urgent changes in the management model and decision-making practices. According to Bowers et al. (2017), an organization should focus efforts on resolving the crisis, at least in part, by communicating that a clear action plan is being developed to deliver a successful crisis response. Unfortunately, nevertheless, many organizations fail to identify preliminary signals of internal and external crises and recognize the crisis only after it had erupted and probably caused much damage. Boin et al. (2013) indicated that negative outcomes of large-scale crises (e.g., Hurricanes, financial crises) had been followed by failures of initiative or false perceptions of the impending threats. Deverell (2010), who collected data about crisis management in Swedish firms, connected these failures to human bias: The aggregated results of the analysis indicate that organizations, especially when they are not experienced crisis responders, tend to act rigidly in response to threats, warnings and signals in the crisis lead-up phase…. The second blackout came as an unwelcome surprise and again learning was difficult for the organizational actors because of the belief that the initial problem had been solved. (p. 694)

Consequently, one of the primary aims in the public sector, according to Heller (2012), should be organizing comprehensive professional preparations in crisis management intended to assist public organizations in providing security for the citizens. The concept of “crisis management” is analyzed in the next section.

The Essentials of Crisis Management In recent years, the topic of crisis management has become increasingly relevant and significant for the survival and progressive development of organizations. Broadly speaking, crisis management is a systematic attempt to obviate organizational crises or to manage those crisis events that have already broke out (Pearson & Clair, 1998). In fact, this is a process through which organizations cope with unexpected or disruptive crisis events that threaten their performance, prestige, and reputation (Catino, 2008). Three definitions cover the major aspects of crisis management exhaustively:

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Role appropriate, understood, accepted, and rehearsed behaviors made consistent and coordinated at all levels of the organization through leadership and teamwork in order to facilitate crisis management-specific communication, decision-making, and control. (Smits & Ally, 2003a, 2003b, p. 2) We define crisis management as the sum of activities aimed at minimizing the impact of a crisis. Impact is measured in terms of damage to people, critical infrastructure, and public institutions. Effective crisis management saves lives, protects infrastructure, and restores trust in public institutions. (Boin et al., 2013 p. 81) Organizational crisis management is a systematic attempt by organizational members with external stake-holders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do occur. (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 61)

From these and other definitions we learn that crisis management encompasses organizing, directing, and implementing actions targeted at predicting the risk of a certain crisis and minimizing the impact of its threat (Boin et al., 2013; Kuzmanova, 2016). In times of a crisis, managers are suggested to analyze its symptoms and take measures to minimize its plausible negative implications by forging cooperation between previously unrelated employees and stakeholders, particularly because routines do not work as before. Furthermore, crisis management enables to create a culture of reliability and trust in organizations as a way of learning from individual and organizational mistakes. Meyer et  al. (2021) suggested reviewing the public policy that regulates the aviation sector following the corona crisis, assuming it will make the complex civil aviation system more reliable when unpredictable crisis events will occur again in the future. When the effectiveness of crisis management is concerned, some crisis management initiatives and interventions may be considered more successful than others. Basically, organizational crisis management effectiveness is viewed by managers, employees, and stakeholders when they assume that the crisis management helped minimize damage to people and property, restored order and stability, and brought about more positive impacts of the crisis than negative ones (Boin et  al., 2013; McConnell, 2011). Pearson and Clair (1998) provided a view of effective crisis management initiatives: Effective crisis management involves minimizing potential risk before a triggering event. In response to a triggering event, effective crisis management

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involves improvising and interacting by key stakeholders so that individual and collective sense making, shared meaning, and roles are reconstructed. Following a triggering event, effective crisis management entails individual and organizational readjustment of basic assumptions, as well as behavioral and emotional responses aimed at recovery and readjustment. (p. 66)

Many books about crisis management in organizations provide examples of successes and failures in this type of management. Typically, they summarize the crisis, explain the process used to cope with it, analyze correct and mistaken decision-making procedures, and illuminate strengths and weaknesses of crisis management plans. According to Kuzmanova (2016), there are many examples of managers who underestimated risks related to the symptoms of an impending crisis, were slow in responding to the crisis, or misunderstood the damage inflicted by the crisis on the organization. One should bear in mind, however, that successful crisis management is both a matter of “fact” and a matter of “perception” (McConnell, 2011). If success was purely a matter of perception, we would be denying the reality that some objectives had been achieved—no matter the circumstances of how long they took.

The Dynamic Aspects of Crisis Management Crisis management is not static but virtually a sequential dynamic process. A review by Lettieri et al. (2009) reveals that the literature on crisis management agrees on four time-oriented stages of crisis management: two pre-crisis phases, mitigation and preparedness; and two post-crisis phases, response and recovery. The objective of the mitigation stage is to preclude a crisis and mitigate the vulnerability of environmental and social systems. In the preparedness phase that also pertains to the pre-crisis stage, the purpose is to enable crisis managers to respond effectively should a crisis actually happen. In the post-crisis response phase, the responders react with the aim of preventing further loss and damage. The fourth crisis phase is recovery, in which the restoration and rehabilitation of the crisis environment occur. Several models proposed in the literature to describe the ideal phases of crisis management merit highlighting. The first model, suggested by Pearson and Mitroff (1993), outlines five stages through which managers undergo in response to the appearance of a new crisis. The first

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stage—signal detection—includes small warnings that begin to appear in the organization and/or in its environment. When these signs are ignored, managers and employees continue their routine, unknowing that a crisis is about to come up/happen/occur/? The second stage—preparation/prevention—involves “systematic planning to prepare the organization to manage a crisis event, explicating critical personnel, resources, and actions to be allocated during a crisis situation” (Hutchins & Wang, 2008, p. 316). At this stage, managers do the best they can to prevent the crisis while maintaining a regular routine of tasks. In the third stage—damage containment—effective managers would detail plans for preventing any negative impact of the crisis on uncontaminated parts of the organization or on its environment. This is likely to minimize the overall damage incurred to the organization. The fourth stage—recovery—involves developing both long-­term and short-term plans while taking actions to restore employee performance and organizational operations. Pearson and Mitroff (1993, p. 53) suggest several questions to be addressed at this stage: “what are the minimal procedures and operations that we need to recover and conduct normal business? [And] what are the key activities and tasks that we must perform to serve our most important customers?” The last stage—learning—is a time of reflection on the crisis experiences, the organization’s responses, the impact of the crisis on different parts of the organizations, and the ways to improve the organization’s crisis management practices. Another famous model is Fink’s (1986) life cycle model that consists of four linear stages. The first one—prodromal crisis stage—is the warning phase of the crisis. In some situations, it is hard to detect the warnings while in others the warning signs are apparent but no action is taken by the organization, resulting in the eruption of an acute crisis. In Darling’s (1994, p. 6) view, it “is much easier and more reliable to take care of the problem before it becomes acute and erupts, resulting in possible complications.” When the second phase—acute crisis stage—arrives, there is no return and the organization will face damages before recovering from the crisis. At this stage, crisis managers face the speed at which damages intensify and, therefore, have to ensure that both managers and employees are aware of the crisis and its immediate and long-term consequences and respond to the crisis professionally. In the third stage—chronic crisis stage—crisis managers use the time for self-audit and planning better responses to the crisis. They have to “identify its vulnerabilities and learn from the failures and successes of its

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responses” (Paraskevas, 2006, p. 893), because crises are an integral part of the organizational life. In the final stage—resolution—the managers are preoccupied in learning the lessons from their crisis management practices and seek to discern and highlight new issues and events arising from the crisis. This, in turn, will provide them with adequate knowledge to recognize early signs of oncoming crises and prevent a ripple effect. An integration of these and related models enables us to reflect on the dynamical nature of crisis management and suggests four sequential phases of organizational responses to potential and tangible crises. Phase one: Preparation in advance. As crises are an integral part of organizational life, managers should be on the alert and pay attention to tremors or signals of misplaced values and behaviors (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). Being prepared for an incoming crisis is critical in our era, though, as Taneja et al. (2014) explained: The potential for crises to develop and escalate is greater than ever because of the global inter-connectedness of organizations. As a result, crisis preparation is becoming an increasingly important issue as organizational leaders seek to prevent, or effectively cope with, impending crises. At no point should an organization be left unprotected from a crisis that could have been avoided. (p. 82)

To this end, every organization should have procedures and action plans devised for crisis prevention and crisis management, regardless of the kind of crisis. For example, educational leaders should set regulations and plans for preventing high levels of school violence or for managing the results of future global pandemics. Unfortunately, organizations rarely prepare for managing future crises and allocating adequate resources to cope with them, since crisis management is not a part of their operational activities in routine (Bowers et al., 2017). Many managers and employees simply assume that their organization is unlikely to be affected by any crisis or simply cannot anticipate a crisis clearly. Lockwood (2005) indicated five reasons for a lack of effective preparation phase in many organizations, including denial of an impending threat to the organization, a reluctance to make crisis preparedness a priority, a lack of awareness of the risks inherent to the firm, ignorance of warning signs accompanied by a failure to identify the disaster experiences of similar organizations, and reliance on weak, untested plans that will not effectively protect organizations in a real crisis.

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Phase two: Understanding the crisis. The transition point from the preparation phase to the “understanding” phase commences when an eruption is followed by institutional awareness of the crisis (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). Some organizations, though, have developed an ability to recognize deviations from complex but known situations (Roe & Schulman, 2008), just like some higher education institutions that could predict a future decrease in student enrollment due to changes in the labor market or in the preferences of young people from Y generation. Under these new circumstances, tension, pressure, and disequilibrium become unendurable and the survival of the organization is sometimes questioned. Very reasonably, an immediate response by organization managers is required to face with the recognized threat to the organization and to its environment. An extensive, dynamic period begins and managers must rise to the challenge and employ operational capabilities and resources to adapt to and confront the onerous situation. Practically speaking, in order to better identify the nature of the crisis and its possible implications for the organization, managers need to evaluate vital elements such as: “(a) the problem must pose an imminent threat to the organization; (b) the situation must involve an element of surprise or shock; (c) unexpected and uncertain nature of a complex problem will place pressure on business to make timely and effective critical decisions” (Coccia, 2020, p. 12). Thus, at this stage, organizations should use continual monitoring of their internal and external environments as a means to analyze the vulnerability of the organization to the crisis and, thereby, minimize its ominous consequences (Kuzmanova, 2016). In addition, in order to make informed decisions as regards to the crisis, crisis managers should arrive at a collective understanding of the nature, characteristics, consequences, and potential scope and effects of the evolving threat (Boin et al., 2013). This includes gathering information about the potential risk sources, learning about ongoing events and their impact, and collaborating with stakeholders and with other organizations, if possible, to coordinate responses. When conducted effectively, crisis managers can plan for the occurrence of crises, build resilience, and allocate adequate resources needed to minimize the negative influences of the crisis. Thus, responding to crises poses both strategic and operational challenges for organizations and requires systematic efforts to learn from past events, as Eismann et al. (2021) highlighted. In contrast, if organizations do not decide timely, and sources of risk are left unaddressed, they can

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result in severe damages to the organization or cause it to fail with concomitant socioeconomic problems. Phase three: Moving to action. Following a thorough diagnosis of the crisis, crisis managers should move to action in the third phase. Hence, after recognizing potential threats of the crisis that could harm the organization, each one should be analyzed in terms of likelihood and severity, and priority should be given to the potentially most significant ones (Massey & Larsen, 2006). After all, different organizations are at risk for different kinds of crises and some crises are potentially more significant than others. In fact, crisis managers and employees are engaged now in re-­organizing work processes and re-allocating resources per se. Competencies and skills are required at this stage to increase the ability to innovate and be creative, make employees feel secured, increase supportive systems and solidarity, and so on. For example, the tourism industry has experienced a severe crisis during the Corona time. But, rescue packages and non-refundable subsidies given by many governments worldwide encouraged many tourist providers to find innovative and creative mechanisms to handle the chaos (Assaf & Scuderi, 2020). Thus, when the virus has faded, organizations in the tourist industry restored local markets and revived many destinations (Aldao et al., 2021). Phase four: Reflection. When the pressing danger is controlled and the sense of emergency is over, it is time to face the challenge of reflecting on the crisis and on the organization’s responses to it. Crisis managers gain an opportunity to improve their practice prior to the appearance of the next crisis and engage in transformational learning. Aldao et al. (2021) believe that the crisis in tourism caused by COVID-19 has triggered many tourist companies to encourage consumers to commit to values such as fairness and to new sustainable patterns of consumption. Unfortunately, however, most crisis managers and organizations refrain from facing the hard challenge of reflecting on their work activities, particularly after overcoming the immediate crisis (Prewitt et  al., 2011). Reflecting on their responses and activities after the crisis is inherently complicated and least understood for many leaders who effectively navigate crisis. Perhaps this book will help educational leaders reflect on previous organizational crises in their educational institution/environment.

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Factors Affecting Crisis Management The literature about crisis management has pointed to varied factors affecting the quality of this kind of management in organizations. Very reasonably, an integral part of managing a crisis would be to have adequate resources necessary to face the negative impacts of the crisis on the organization and a sufficient amount of manpower with the requisite skills (Taneja et  al., 2014). Thus, to enable crisis managers to cope with the crisis, training the employees to act in times of crisis is indispensable (Kuzmanova, 2016). Managers and employees have to be aware of regulations, procedures, and action plans to deploy when a crisis erupts and threatens the organization. Much attention should be given in these trainings to coordination and collaboration within the organization and with its stakeholders, particularly in organizations characterized by high level of structural complexity and vertical and horizontal differentiation (Smits & Ally, 2003a, 2003b). Several factors of crisis management merit highlighting. First, as crises are characterized by surprise, escalation of events, uncertainty, loss of control, inability to provide quick solutions, and high pressure, empowerment seems to be a critical factor in successful crisis management (Areiqat & Zamil, 2011). Empowered managers and employees are more capable of identifying crisis events in the early stages of their appearance and are more likely to think innovatively in difficult situations. In doing so, they help managers in fulfilling their plans to cope with the crisis and overcoming barriers caused due to deficient preparation for a crisis and slow responses to its initial signs. Likewise, as technological barriers such as a refusal to use technology are typically found in the “moving to action” phase, resulting in negative implications for the ability to manage the crisis successfully (Fischer et al., 2016), empowered employees are likely to have the capacity to adopt new technologies relatively shortly. For example, when the corona crisis began, many university professors moved to teach in Zoom or in similar software, simply because they had used them before, particularly in international research programs. However, crisis managers should remember that empowered employees need their leaders to express empathy and compassion toward them, particularly in times of crisis characterized by high levels of uncertainty and anxiety (Oplatka, 2017). According to Massey and Larsen (2006),

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when crisis management includes also a display of positive emotions toward employees, it inculcates a sense of caring among stakeholders too. Effective crisis management depends also on planning and plans developed in advance to cope with crises (Massey & Larsen, 2006). A crisis management plan should include, according to Smith and Ally (2003a, 2003b), (a) a clear leadership, team, and individual assignments in the form of roles and responsibilities, (b) forms of training and rehearsal sessions, and (c) mechanisms of coordination and control across levels and units of the organization. But a plan alone is not enough; it still needs to be implemented by all parties in the organization whose commitment to behave in accordance with the plan should be unquestionable. For example, educational leaders can write a high-quality crisis management plan that indicates exactly how the school should react when there is a decrease in teacher moral or in student achievement. But, as long as the teachers refuse to follow this plan and prefer to keep teaching as if there is no crisis behind the corner, the effect of the plan on the school’s ability to manage the crisis may be very low. Crisis management plans are about to include, among other things, the establishment of the crisis management team and the development of the crisis communication plan. To begin with the former component, a strong positive correlation was found between the establishment of an ad-hoc crisis management team and positive attitudes toward work among the employees. Danish organizations whose crisis has been managed by such a team seem to experience a loss of motivation and engagement to a lesser extent than organizations without this kind of teams. Their employees are perceived to be less frustrated, feel less insecure, and are less afraid in crisis events (Johansen et al., 2012). A further description of this kind of teams and it functions during times of a crisis we receive from Coccia (2020): A crisis management team is a task force within organizations to proactively prepare for managing crises and taking critical decisions. These teams are in charge of anticipating potential problems and making critical decisions to resolve strenuous situations and complex problems for organizations. Successful crisis management teams understand the different types of crisis and are thoroughly prepared for all situations. In a crisis, leaders are expected to reduce uncertainty and provide an authoritative account of problems, solutions and difficulties. When leaders have formulated a strategy for complex problems, they must get others to accept the proposed solution. (p. 6)

The crisis team, though, plays a key role in helping managers and employees reduce cognitive load by instilling complexity thinking in day-to-day

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decision-making as individuals solve nonlinear problems (Liou, 2015). Thus, crisis management team, trained to deal with crises, should be set up, as Kuzmanova (2016) stated. This book aims, among other things, to provide these teams with the knowledge required to manage the crisis successfully. The last factor affecting crisis management refers to communication. One of the outstanding barriers to effective organizational response to crisis stems from the need for managers and employees to communicate and coordinate actions under extreme pressure, confused circumstances, and high uncertainty (Fischer et al., 2016). Thus, successful crisis management depends largely on good communication between all crisis respondents, because it positively affects coordination and collaboration between organization members (Van Gorp et al., 2015) and between the organization and its environmental constituencies (Kuzmanova, 2016). Sometimes, nevertheless, reliable and effective communication during a crisis response is hard to attain, because it must be established within and between organizations and with the public (Fischer et al., 2016). In this respect, it is interesting to analyze the role of social media in crisis management nowadays. According to Eismann et al. (2021, p. 2), “social media provide opportunities not only for organizations to learn about a crisis as it occurs (i.e., intra-crisis learning), but also to integrate information, knowledge, and collaborative processes that reside beyond their established structures.” In this way, they enable organizations to access resources provided by non-organizational users and facilitate collaborative structures that integrate organizational and non-organizational users equally. Likewise, organizations can use social media to share information that conveys a particular interpretation of a crisis and use their authority to influence non-organizational users’ perceptions of and responses to a crisis. Social media, though, may be used to improve interand intra-organizational communication in times of crisis.

Leadership and Crisis The numerous crises in our era coupled with their varying nature and complexity have increased the importance of leadership in managing them and in protecting the organization from disruption. Thus, the leadership of the manager is a critical factor in effective crisis management in organizations whose employees and stakeholders rely on the leader to lead them out of the crisis or at least minimize its negative implications (Bowers et al., 2017). Put another way, in times of crisis, leadership becomes an

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integral part of a successful organizational crisis outcome and strong effective leadership is imperative to organizational survival (Muffet-Willettm & Kruse, 2008). People over-attribute a responsibility for organizational outcomes for leaders, especially in times of crisis. However, when leaders fail in this mission, it is likely that they do not possess the competence and skills to manage the crisis effectively, despite their successful attempts at handling day-to-day tasks and activities. Besides, the non-routine nature of decision-making within crisis events can stress even the most skillful leader (Muffet-Willettm & Kruse, 2008) and threaten employee performance and well-being. Crisis management and leadership are closely related (Schoenberg, 2005), because in times of crisis organizations should have crisis leaders with adequate skills and competencies to decide what purposes should be set and achieved in order to minimize the negative impact of the crisis (Wang, 2008). Crisis leaders should be experts in coordinating teamwork and motivating employees to further invest time and effort to cope with the crisis (Bhaduri, 2019). In Madu’s (2012) view, a leader who “understands his organizational culture and takes it seriously is capable of predicting the outcome of his decisions in preventing any anticipated consequences” (p. 2). High flexible organizational culture, coupled with a mix of transactional and directive leadership styles, supports organizations in detecting signals of an impending crisis and preventing it. Thus, the ability of a leader to adapt to a changing and complex environment is a key foundation of crisis leadership (Muffet-Willettm & Kruse, 2008). In fact, whether leaders maintain effective communication, build trust, increase productivity, or protect brand value, leaders play a huge role during crisis times (Lockwood, 2005). Lockwood further emphasized the importance for crisis leaders to have emotional intelligence competencies, such as “empathy, self-awareness, persuasion, teamwork skills and the ability to manage relationships” (p. 3) during crisis management. Furthermore, they should be skillful in managing multiple constituencies and developing human capital (Wooten & James, 2008), because leaders should inspire and motivate the team to face time and resource constraints while performing well in uncertain situations. Dwiedienawati et al. (2021) extended this issue: In the high uncertainty, team are confused; therefore they need their leaders to be there to give assurance and motivation. At the same time, the uncertainty with lack of information or knowledge of the situation and time con-

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straints, required leaders to be agile. During COVID-19, where leaders can lead by tight grips to the situation, required leaders to delegate more. Rather than commanding and controlling, leaders need to give other people the power to make decisions. (p. 205)

Emotional intelligence competencies are related also to the leader’s capacity to anticipate the nature response of the staff and discuss with them a strategy to make a difficult process more effective (Houlihan, 2007; Madera & Smith, 2009). In other words, crisis managers should be able to understand the feelings of staff members and discuss possible responses to the crisis with them. In this way, the staff’s sense of belonging to the organization will increase and probably also their commitment to help management to cope successfully with the threat caused by the crisis. This means that employees should be treated as responsible adults and given much professional autonomy and discretion to manage the influences of the crisis on their roles and tasks. A support to this conclusion we receive from the study of Zehir and Narcıkara (2016) indicating that authentic leaders foster employees’ self-efficacy by providing them confidence and trust, and in turn, create hope and optimism and strengthen resilience that is critical in times of crisis. Interestingly, Kapucu and Ustun (2018) found that the effectiveness of crisis leadership levels is positively influenced by task-oriented leadership behaviors. Thus, the more the leaders in crisis situations implement their task-oriented behaviors as a leader’s competency, the higher their effectiveness levels will be. But, at the same time people-oriented leadership behaviors increase the effectiveness of collaborative crisis leadership. Lacerda (2019) claimed that leaders who have the ability to predict and create a future view of the organization (visionary leadership) are effective during financial crisis. In both cases, crisis managers should participate in training organized out of the organization and prepare organization managers to manage crises. According to Muffet-Willettm and Kruse (2008), “the practice of looking externally for education and training is assumed to provide leaders access to best practices, ensuring that when crisis strikes they will be prepared and the business or agency will emerge relatively unscathed” (p. 249). Few leadership styles have been studied for crises and the current book attempts to fill the gap in this respect by presenting and analyzing the stories of great figures who successfully coped with a crisis (or crises) and took advantage of it (or them) to move their country or organization forward.

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Crisis Management in Schools While schools may experience many of the crises outlined thus far, some crises seem to be more particular to this kind of organization, among them are student death, mass violence event, injuries from students falling, vandalism that disrupts the normal school operation, swearing parents, and massive use of substances (Sokol et al., 2021; Tanrıöğen & Savçı, 2011). Liou’s (2015) definition of school crisis illustrates the broad resemblance between crises experienced by schools and those reported in other types of organizations. School crisis is defined as a traumatic event associated with a school  – whether occurring inside or outside it – and is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, urgency and ambiguity in cause. (Liou, 2015, p. 250)

School leaders and teachers may experience responses and feelings following the eruption of a crisis in the school or in its environment that are shared also by employees in other organizations. However, the effect of the crisis may be different, to a certain extent, from that in non-education organizations, deriving from the nature of the schooling process, the structure of the school as an organization, and the institutional environments in which school operate. Thus, while the crisis can be a trigger for improvements in existing regulations and protocols and induce greater cohesion and cooperation among school members (Pepper et al., 2010) that have been socialized to work in a loosely coupled system (Weick, 1976), the school crisis may have some peculiar negative effects. For example, a crisis threatens students’ optimal mental health, school-­ community relations, and learning outcomes (Finelli & Zeanah, 2019; Liou, 2015). A long time is required to minimize the negative impact of these threats and increase student achievement. In fact, the school crisis affects not only the school community but also the overall community and society and, therefore, could be defined as anything that adversely influences the school-community members concerning their physical health, social, and psycho-emotional well-being (Tokel, 2018) and has implications to wider parts in the society. A severe shortage of teachers in recent years has implications for the labor market and for many occupational sectors, for instance. Schools, like any other organization, ought to manage the crisis by preparing for school disruptions and crisis events, developing a safety plan

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for the school, and implementing this plan in practice (Coombs, 2015; Sokol et al., 2021). Schools tend to combine the crisis team development, crisis plan creation, and community collaboration activities with training on the mental health implications of crises (Sokol et al., 2021). Similarly, Blackwelder (1995) found that a certain district in the US utilized a crisis team to provide the majority of services and coordination including faculty meetings to inform, debriefing sessions, and counseling in response to a school shooting that resulted in a death of administrator. The team was supported and guided by community-based organizations and the local police department (in the form of counseling, victim assistance, and other follow-up services). But, the majority of staff (72%) perceived that the crisis intervention provided to staff was ineffective at addressing the needs of staff. In contrast, another district used a crisis response team led by the school psychologist and consisting of school personnel to provide counseling, debriefing, and mental health referrals. The evaluation indicated that the majority of staff (65%) perceived that the crisis intervention was effective at addressing the emotional and psychological needs of staff. Among the factors affecting crisis management in schools are competent school leadership (e.g., inspiration, guidance, motivation, conflict resolution), effective coordination, training of the teaching staff, positive school climate, sufficient resources, and the like (Karasavidou & Alexopoulos, 2019). Unfortunately, our knowledge about facilitators and inhibitors of effective crisis management in schools is extremely limited, and not only that. Sokol et al. (2021) reviewed the research on crisis management in schools and concluded that “the field has made little progress in the area of school-based crisis intervention evaluation…the majority of studies in our review either described the general crisis team function, crisis team roles, and/or day-to-day activities” (p. 255). I hope that this book will fill the gap in our knowledge about crisis management in schools. But, before moving to the first figure in Chap. 3, some explanations for the need to manage crises in schools distinctively are warranted. Schools have been characterized many years ago as loosely coupled systems, a term coined by Weick (1976) to denote that structure is disconnected from technical work activity, and activity is disconnected from its effects. Purposes and programs are poorly and uncertainly linked to outcomes; rules and activities are disconnected and internal organizational sectors are unrelated. Thus, it is uneasy for educational leaders to manage the crisis as usually recommended in the literature about crisis management outlined above, since coordination, collaboration, and

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information-­sharing are more complex and uncertain in loosely coupled systems. In the case of loose coupling whose school management itself has a limited control over and knowledge about instructional processes (Meyer & Rowan, 1978), it is hard also to diagnose preliminary signals of an impending crisis. Another characteristic of educational organization is conformity to institutional rules (Wiseman & Chase-Mayoral, 2014). It refers to the organization’s tendency to incorporate rationalized myths and societally agreed rules in its structure, thereby promoting survival, social legitimacy, and apparent success without increasing efficiency or technical performance. It is likely, then, that educational leaders might prefer to keep adhering to commonly accepted myths to gain social legitimacy, although they might intensify a potential crisis. For example, the school may continue using a particular procedure to evaluate student achievement despite its potentially negative implications for student’s well-being just because this is the “right” way to measure student progress in the view of many parents and other environmental constituencies. In addition, organizations that depend on conformity to institutionalized rules for their survival are assumed to engage in a process of “decoupling” that buffers work in the technical core from the visible, conformed structure. While decoupling highly appropriate for schools that are considered to be “loosely coupled systems” (Meyer & Rowan, 1978), it may constitute a barrier to crisis prevention since decoupling buffers the reality inside the school from outside and prevents appraising the situation in the classroom per se. For that reason, many warnings and initial signals of an impending crisis may be ignored. In sum, there is some inconsistency between the characteristics of educational organizations and dominant assumptions of crisis management underlying the literature outlined above. The last chapter addresses this issue by presenting an initial conceptualization of crisis management in educational organizations, in general, and in schools, in particular. Chapter Summary • Whereas there is no one, unified definition of an organizational crisis, it is commonly accepted that a crisis event is unexpected and ambiguous in nature, causes, and effects, and may cause incalculable damage to the organization and to its reputation. Yet, crises vary in magnitude, duration, intensity, scope, depth, size, and so forth.

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• Crisis management is a systematic attempt to prevent organizational crises or to manage those crisis events that have already broken. This is a managerial process through which organizations cope with unexpected or disruptive crisis events that threaten their performance, prestige, and reputation. • Crisis management is not static but virtually a sequential dynamic process that is composed of four time-oriented stages of crisis management: two pre-crisis phases, mitigation and preparedness; and two post-crisis phases, response and recovery. • The factors affecting the quality of crisis management are the availability of resources, trainings aimed to prepare employees for crises, empowerment, effective planning, crisis management teams, and effective systems of communication. • The leadership of the manager is a critical factor in effective crisis management in organizations whose employees and stakeholders rely on the leader to lead them out of the crisis or at least minimize its negative implications. • The effect of the crisis in education may be different, to a certain extent, from that in non-education organizations, deriving from the nature of the schooling process, the structure of the school as an organization, and the institutional environments in which schools operate. • Particular organizational characteristics of educational institutions challenge common beliefs and practices in the literature about crisis management in organizations and require some special attention, as discussed in this chapter. Questions for Consideration 1. In your own words, how do you define crisis management? 2. What are the factors affecting crisis management that are most relevant to schools? 3. How could educational leaders diagnose a potential crisis before it breaks out? 4. Why is educational leadership critical in crisis management? Can you think of any real-life example? 5. What might be the barriers to effective crisis management program in schools?

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Practical Activities 1. Choose a crisis event you were involved in at your school (workplace). First, write down the actions taken by educational leaders in response to this event. Second, based on your own belief, how would you evaluate their response and to what extent would you expect leaders to respond in this way? 2. When the corona crisis emerged, schools moved to virtual teaching in most countries. Write down the major problems leaders and teachers faced during this period and suggest practices from the literature about crisis management that may help them in the next global crisis.

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Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. The Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 59–76. Pearson, C. M., & Mitroff, I. I. (1993). From crisis prone to crisis prepared: A framework for crisis management. Academy of Management Perspectives, 7(1), 48–59. Pepper, M. J., London, T. D., Dishman, M. L., & Lewis, J. L. (2010). Leading schools during crisis: What school administrators must know. Rowman and Littlefield Education. Prewitt, J. E., Weil, R., & McClure, A. Q. (2011). Crisis leadership: An organizational opportunity. Australian Journal of Business and Management Research, 1(6), 60–74. Roe, E., & Schulman, P. (2008). High reliability management: Operating on the edge. Stanford University Press. Schoenberg, A. (2005). Do crisis plans matters? A new perspective on leading during a crisis. Public Relations Quarterly, 50(1), 2–6. Sinha, T. (2011). Crisis management in organizations: An exploratory study of factors that affect strategy formation and selection. A dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Smits, S. J., & Ally, N. E. (2003a). Thinking the unthinkable: Leadership’s role in creating behavioral readiness for crisis management. CR, 13(1), 1–23. Sokol, R. L., Heinze, J., Doan, J., Normand, M., Grodzinski, A., Pomerantz, N., Scott, B. A., Gaswirth, M., & Zimmerman, M. (2021). Crisis interventions in schools: A systematic review. Journal of School Violence, 20(2), 241–260. Smits, S. J., & Ally, N. E. (2003b). Thinking the unthinkable: Leadership’s role in creating behavioral readiness for crisis management. Competitiveness Review: An International Business Journal, 13(1), 1–23. Taneja, S., Golden-Pryor, M., & Sewell & Recuero, A.M. (2014). Strategic crisis management: A basic for renewal and crisis prevention. Journal of Management Policy and Practice, 15(1), 78–85. Tanrıöğen, A., & Savçı, S. (2011). Perceptions of high school teachers related to crisis management in their schools. Egitim Arastirmalari-Eurasian Journal of Educational Research, 42, 243–258. Tokel, A. (2018). Assessment of crisis management skills of secondary school administrators. Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 52(1), 901–912. Wang, J. (2008). Developing organizational learning capacity in crisis management. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 20(10), 1–21. Weick, K.  E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 1–19.

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Weiner, D. (2006). Crisis communications: Managing corporate reputation in the court of public opinion. Ivey Business Journal, 70(4), 1–10. Wiseman, A.  W., & Chase-Mayoral, A. (2014). Shifting the discourse on neo-­ institutional theory in comparative and international education. In Annual review of comparative and international education 2013 international perspectives on education and society (Vol. 20, pp.  99–126). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Wooten, L. P., & James, E. H. (2008). Linking crisis management and leadership competencies: The role of human resource development. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10(3), 352–379. Van Gorp, A., Pogrebnyakov, N., & Maldonado E. A. (2015). Just keep tweeting: Emergency responder’s social media use before and during emergencies. In ECIS 2015 proceedings (pp. 1–15). Zehir, C., & Narcıkara, E. (2016). Effects of resilience on productivity under authentic leadership. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences, 235, 250–258.

PART I

Political Crises in Times of War

CHAPTER 3

Abraham Lincoln

Chapter Overview • The biggest crisis in the history of the US • Being focused on very specific goals • High personal resilience • Building a climate of open dialogues in the school • Leaving the office and spending the time with the followers • Compassion and empathy of teacher’s distress • Transforming opponents into supporters • Using first-person plural language (“we”) The presidency has always been a time of pressure, stress, and hard work. But the presidency of Abraham Lincoln faced some of the biggest crises the US has ever seen; the civil war and the threat to the unity of the US as a nation. According to Olden (1978), the consequences of the civil war have been considered revolutionary, because it modified the social order of the South and forcefully established the permanence of the Union and the supremacy of the Federal government. Thus, Lincoln’s contribution to carry the North to victory is remarkable, as Philips (1992) indicated: There are countless other leaders, on both local and national levels, in all aspects of society, who could be labeled ‘great.’ Yet there is one person who rises above all of them. One who is consistently ranked as the greatest © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3_3

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president, one who is viewed as the greatest leader this nation has ever known or will ever know, and one who, although dead for more than 125 years, still inspires and moves people from all walks of life, from all around the globe. That person is Abraham Lincoln. (p. 2)

Interestingly, without the civil war and its results, we would not probably remember Lincoln, and if we did, he would be considered one of the obscure nineteenth-century presidents (Woods, 2013). What made him an exemplary of successful crisis leadership?

The Biggest Crisis in the History of the US Lincoln was born in Kentucky in 1809 in a poor family and was assassinated in Washington, DC, on April 15, 1865, at the age of 56. After serving in the US House of Representatives for one term, he was elected President in 1860 and campaigned to end slavery which, in turn, precipitated a national crisis (Kohan, 2017). Convinced that the president-elect would try to abolish slavery, many Southern leaders believed that the only way to protect the social order in their nations was to leave the US and establish their own country. In early February 1861, they declared the establishment of the new nation and several weeks later Jefferson Davis was sworn in as president of the Confederacy. President Buchanan had given up hope of holding the country together and was simply waiting for his term to expire. When Lincoln became president on March 4, 1861, he was faced with the realization that the Confederacy had taken control of all federal agencies and had seized almost every fort and arsenal in its territory. Washington, DC, was left almost completely defenseless, protected only by a portion of the nation’s army, which was unprepared for war. It was a scattered, dilapidated, poorly equipped, and disorganized array of some 16,000 soldiers, many of them Southern sympathizers (Philips, 1992). This was the situation in many other areas in the North. Moreover, Lincoln had to face poor military leadership, a divided country, hatred, and with the challenge of holding the Northern nations together. At the same time, he was faced with the urgent need to organize a new, more effective government and prepare the army for an impending civil war. In his view which was raised in his inaugural address, the Southern states would never be allowed to

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separate, although at that time he had no means to keep them in the Union. The funding required to deal with the rebellion was approved by the congress and a war, in which brothers fought their brothers, tore apart the US for four horrible years. According to Philips (1992), few people at that time could have known that Lincoln possessed the leadership qualities and abilities necessary to save the Union. Among these qualities were honesty and integrity, high impersonal abilities, empathy for the common man, and devotion to the rights of individuals. For example, during the war he taught himself military history and strategy, borrowing books from the Library of Congress. In this way he learned that the victory of the Union depends largely on its ability to exploit its human and economic resources in a series of interrelated attacks on the Confederacy (Koehn, 2017). In addition, even in times of severe crisis he remained calm and resourceful, prompt, strong, hopeful, and clear-sighted (Curtis, 1902). Although ignored sometimes by his generals who often acted without top-level coordination, his visionary leadership and brave personality along high emotionality have characterized him in times of crisis. On January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation and expressed his strong belief in the right of every human being to be free. Donald (1995) described the president’s bodily and sensual reaction: Those who watched the president could not help but notice that his hand was shaking so badly that he had to put the pen down. He would pick it up, put it down, and then pick the pen up a third time before he could sign the measure. Even then his signature seemed a bit shaky. Lincoln told his Secretary of State that his arm was stiff and numb from several hours of shaking hands prior to the signing ceremony. (p. 407)

Lincoln’s character and leadership seem to be fascinating. He combined both visionary and emotional leadership styles that were of much value in managing the war and contributed a lot to the victory of the North.

Lessons to Learn from Lincoln’s Crisis Leadership In the next pages, I highlight the lessons every educational leader can learn from Lincoln’s crisis management and responses to changing circumstances and conditions during the civil war.

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Being Focused on Very Specific Goals From early age, Lincoln tended to focus on the things that matters and on practical ends; he prepared himself to be a lawyer and later on strove to become a politician. Koehn (2017) highlighted this instrumental inclination: Lincoln’s ability to relate to juries provides a useful lesson about discernment. Leaders trying to accomplish a worthy mission have to cultivate the ability to identify the one, two, or three essential issues facing them at a given moment. It is never five or ten. It is always one or two—maybe three— issues that really matter. Having identified these, leaders must let the remaining concerns go, either by giving themselves permission to turn their attention away from all that is not central to their purpose or by handing peripheral issues to others, including an adversary. (p. 192)

Once Lincoln won the election, his major and single aim was to save the Union, announcing consistently that his purposes are repudiating secession, waging war for the Union, emancipating the slaves, and reconstructing the nation (Woods, 2013). Through simple words and decisive actions, he moved followers to higher levels of motivation and morality, emphasizing the belief that the war is against insurgents and rebels within one country—the US and leading profound transformations in American society (Goethals & Allison, 2015). His vision guided him and empowered the ordinary citizens and soldiers in the front. We should bear in mind that Lincoln’s vision of a just American society, particularly during the time of the civil war, was a source of inspiration for many people in his time (McCombs, 2013). His insistence to go on with his vision teaches us a lot about the importance of vision-building in times of crisis. After all, when schools face a crisis, teachers and students have to believe that the crisis will be over one day and that a better future is there behind the corner as long as they follow the leader’s vision unwaveringly. Through words and actions the educational leader may inspire the staff to buy into the vision and take appropriate actions. For example, if the school experiences a dramatic decline in student enrolment, the educational leader should offer a vision of the school as a community center in which parents and teachers engage, among other things, in developing programs in value-based education. In fact, what we learn from Lincoln is the great importance of projecting a vision of a better future during a crisis, when everyone feels

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overwhelmed by the intensity of crisis events and by plausible feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. During the civil war, though, Lincoln had issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction as a means to deal with the problems of this War. In his view, when the civil war (i.e., the crisis) is over, the American citizens should live together, regardless of their position in the battlefields. To this end, he granted amnesty and returned the right to vote to those who lived in areas newly occupied by the North and welcomed back into the fold those who pledged fidelity to the US. Likewise, he was especially concerned with the difficulties of the liberated slaves, as Lodice (2022) indicated: [Lincoln] wanted the states to care for them and grant them the rights of all citizens with these words: And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that any provision which may be adopted by such state government in relation to the freed people of such state, which shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may yet be consistent as a temporary arrangement with their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class, will not be objected to by the National Executive. (Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, December 8, 1862, cited in Lodice, 2022, p. 14)

Although crises make it necessary for leaders to solve immediate problems and center on current events, Lincoln found the time to give voice to his great ideas and views for the future, understanding their inspirational value, particularly in times of turbulence and distress. For instance, in his speech dedicated to a new national cemetery in Gettysburg, Lincoln chose to highlight larger issues that he had been wrestling with, using phrases such as a great civil war, a testing struggle, and thousands of victims. In doing so, he implanted new hopes in the hearts of his followers. Koehn (2017) provided some insights into modern leadership based on Lincoln’s speech in Gettysburg. Accordingly, it is very important to frame the stakes of a particular moment and connect current change efforts to the history and future of the organization. In schools, though, educational leaders should connect crisis events to a better future and identify the mechanisms that are necessary to make a change and overcome the crisis. They have to lead teachers, students, and stakeholders toward a higher level of goals by presenting their hopes for a better future and emphasizing their strong beliefs in eliminating current crisis events. Inspirational speeches in times of crisis are not limited merely to national leaders.

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Note, however, that the goals should be connected also to moral ideals that propel people to act for the sake of a just and better society. In the case of Lincoln, he was determined unflaggingly to destruct slavery in the US and was concerned with the sins of the slaveholders. According to Olsen (1978), “his general conception embraced the history and the welfare of all mankind, and his immediate concern was the fate of economic freedom and political democracy in the United States” (p.  215). Thus, when the crisis stems from immoral and unjust policies and situations, the response of the educational leader should include an unflagging determination to alter this situation and reconstructing the reality in the school, even at the price of massive conflicts and controversies. High Personal Resilience Let’s imagine ourselves observing Lincoln in his office or in his cabinet, while he is receiving bad news from the front, making fateful decisions, or writing every line in his Emancipation Proclamation carefully. He had to work under very difficult circumstances and should respond to a host of uncertain events caused by the war. Yet, historians have told us again and again that Lincoln never gave up but stayed in for the long haul and took actions that respond to crisis events. Goodwin (2005, p. xvi) describes him as “[m]ore accustomed to relying upon himself to shape events. He took the greatest control of the process leading up to the nomination, displaying a fierce ambition, an exceptional political acumen, and a wide range of emotional strengths, forged in the crucible of personal hardship that took his unsuspecting rivals by surprise.” Thus, one of Lincoln’s greatest qualities was resilience, that is, the ability to rebound from the hardships of life, that is considered to be superior over intellectual brilliance among successful leaders (Koehn, 2017), particularly in the face of crisis (Allison, 2011). Allison further described resilience as a personal quality that predisposes individuals to bounce back in the face of loss. Resilient leaders, however, do more than bounce back—they bounce forward. With speed and elegance, resilient leaders take action that responds to new and ever-changing realities, even as they maintain the essential operations of the organizations they lead. (p. 80)

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In the face of internal or external crisis, resilient educational leaders are those who demonstrate their determination not to give up but rather to find innovative solutions to crisis events and to uncertain situations. They should inspire teachers and stakeholders by encouraging them to keep searching for better solutions even when the situation seems to be complex and hopeless. For example, McLeod and Dulsky (2021) found that resilient school leaders, struggling personally with the impacts of the pandemic, still leaned into the immense challenges before them and were brave enough to try new instructional methods and create new organizational structures (e.g., parents-teachers conference, a coordination team), although they could not be sure what would work in practice. Their optimism in their school’s capacity to cope with the pandemic successfully guided their decisions and actions. Consistent with the term “transformative resilient leadership” (Everly & Athey, 2022), high resilience enables crisis leaders not only to navigate the challenges that the crisis poses to their school, but also to use it as an opportunity for professional and organizational growth. Tugade and Fredrickson (2004) revealed that high-resilient individuals use positive emotions to rebound from frustrating situations (such as crises) and find positive meaning in stressful encounters. High-resilient participants in their study further reported feeling more eagerness, excitement, happiness, and interns in times of distress and frustration. This was exactly how Lincoln responded to one of the worst crises in the history of the US and saved the nation as a unified entity. In times of crisis, then, it is wiser to inculcate the belief that we, educational leaders, teachers, and stakeholders, can overcome any threat to the school or to the schooling process and leap forward to personal and organizational growth. The contribution of positive emotionality to effective crisis management in schools is one lesson we all can learn from Lincoln’s leadership during the civil war. Building a Climate of Open Dialogues in the School One of Lincoln’s famous quotes was “my policy is to have no policy” indicating his flexible nature which enabled him to examine varied solutions to a problem without sticking to dogma (Duval, 2014). Concurrently, he believed in negotiation and open dialogues with military generals, cabinet members, and others, such as politicians and professionals in the public sector. This, however, did not mean that he was not a man of principles (e.g., no extension of slavery to new territories!). Put another way, his

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flexibility and comfortable character encouraged forms of shared leadership, even in uncertain times that require immediate responses. However, Lincoln’s kindness and good character were not enough. According to Philips (1992), Lincoln’s tendency to seek for others’ opinions, ideas, suggestions, and innovative strategies (i.e., better ways of making things work) made it necessary to provide an adequate climate to allow sharing and negotiation among his subordinates. He actively encouraged innovative thinking and the participation of generals and cabinet members in critical decision-making processes during the crisis. Furthermore, although he never deferred his judgment to others in choosing generals, he was willing to replace his own judgment of what was a good strategy with the opinion of any general whom he considered to be expert and competent (Woods, 2013). Thus, whenever the school faces a crisis, the teachers’ professional voices should be heard loudly, because as Lincoln taught us, effective crisis educational leaders have to yield the power to any middle manager or teacher who holds high professional capabilities necessary to solve the crisis and cope with crisis events successfully. In addition, Lincoln intentionally selected a cabinet of individuals who disagreed with him and with each other, and who were his and each other’s political rivals (Caulfield et al., 2021). In doing so, he ensured there would be a wide variety of perspectives at the table in any meeting, and thereby enhanced the quality of decision-making because conflicts may result many times in innovative ideas. Needless to say, his decision contrasts human inclination to interact mainly with similar people and avoid interactions with “others” who are “different.” Hence, educational leadership that invites contradictory perspectives and encourages counter-­ arguments is likely to find innovative ways to face the crisis. Spending the Time with the Followers Out of the Office As opposed to leaders who tended to remain in their protected offices far away from the battlefields throughout human history, Lincoln spent most of his time among the troops and virtually lived at the War Departments’ telegraph office. In this way, he could gain access to key information for speedy, timely decisions. In his visits to the front, he inspected new weaponry, talked with officers and soldiers, and neither isolated himself by creating a palace guard nor developed a sense of his own importance (Thompson, 2008). Lincoln went to the field to observe or even to take charge of several battle situations himself, coming under fire at least once

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(one of the few American presidents to do so while in office) (Philips, 1992, p. 7). He met with his generals and cabinet members in their homes, offices, and in the field, principally to provide direction and leadership, but not only. His aim was to obtain accurate knowledge of the workings and abilities of the armed forces that is necessary to make informed, accurate decisions without having to rely solely on the words and interpretations of others. His informal encounters were not limited to politicians and soldiers only, as arising from the next citation: Lincoln contrived to show himself. He simply wanted to be seen. He gambled that reaction to the view would be positive, given people’s tendency to view leaders through a lens of heroism… Thousands touched him, heard him, saw him at close range, and scarcely one in all those thousands ever forgot the sight of that tall figure, made still taller by the stovepipe hat, and the homely drape of the shawl across the shoulders. Never forgotten, because it was unforgettable, the impression remained, incredible and enduring, imperishable in its singularity—and finally, dear. (Goethals & Allison, 2015, p. 118)

In times of crisis, then, teachers, students, and parents need the educational leader’s presence, because it increases their self-confidence and positive attitudes toward the end of the crisis. This impact is well manifested in a letter written by a young soldier following Lincoln’s visit to the front: “None of us to our dying today can forget that countenance … Concentrated in that one great, strong yet tender face, the agony of the life and death struggle of the hour was revealed as we had never seen it before. With a new understanding, we knew why we were soldiers.” Thus Lincoln’s appearance, at a distance and close up, had an inspiring, empowering effect. (Goethals & Allison, 2015, p. 119)

But not only teachers and stakeholders benefit from a direct contact with the leader in times of crisis. Educational leaders who prefer to interact with school members and stakeholders collect critical information personally, instead of relying on advisers, supervisors, officials in the local education authority, and so forth. After all, any information that is transmitted to the leader by a chain of sources might change during the long hierarchical process.

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Finally, Lincoln also made it a point to visit hospitals where wounded soldiers were recuperating (Philips, 1992). When the civil war ended, he came to Richmond immediately and sat on the chair of Jefferson Davis as a symbol to those who fought and died (Iodice, 2021). Any crisis in school, though, has its own “wounded” teachers and students (although, metaphorically) who expect their leader to visit them, support them, and help them return to normal life. Compassion and Empathy of Teacher’s Distress Lincoln also provides a rich historical example of virtue, compassion, and empathy (Caulfield et al., 2021) that make the crisis less painful for followers and in the case of schools, for teachers and students (Oplatka, 2017). Lincoln is a figure who showed a great deal of empathy throughout his entire political life, because he “possessed an innate ability to intuit the motivations of his interlocutors” (Shogan, 2009, p. 863), and was able to understand both sides of the civil war. For instance, although he resisted the idea of slavery, he also expressed empathy toward slave owners and tried to place himself in their position. He understood his followers by empathizing with them (Brown, 2015). In July 1864, he and Mary Todd Lincoln visited Fort Stevens, in Maryland, not far from the nation’s capital. Soldiers were wounded in a hospital on the compound. Lincoln took their hands in his, encouraged them, and asked about their feelings, their families, and their personal lives (Thomas, 2008). Successful suicide attempts of teenagers, for example, lead many schools into crises that disrupt the routine and impede student learning. In these cases, the leader’s empathy toward teachers, students, and parents is of much significance for returning to normal life in the school and for minimizing the dire consequences of the crisis. Visiting traumatic students or teachers in their homes supports and strengthens them considerably, as the wounded soldiers whom Lincoln visited probably felt. Furthermore, Lincoln was against the wanton execution of deserting soldiers, because it was immoral and damaged the nation. He explained: When neither incompetency, nor intentional wrong, nor real injury to the service is imputed - in such cases it is both cruel and impolitic, to crush the man and make him and his friends permanent enemies to the administration, if not to the government itself…we should avoid planting and cultivating too many thorns in the bosom of society. (Philips, 1992, p. 30)

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In other words, when the staff faces a crisis, offending and blaming some middle managers and teachers for not managing the crisis effectively is improper and unfruitful. Particularly, in uncertain times leaders and teachers should know that even when they make an innocent mistake while trying to solve the crisis, the school principal is unlikely to humiliate them, but on the opposite. Any feedback should be constructive, due to the uncertain nature of crisis management. Interestingly, Lincoln was able to empathize with his supporters as well as opponents, that is, the southern slaveholders whom he thought were in a difficult position of completely changing their way of life due to abolition of slavery (Dubal, 2014). More important, he understood that his enemies were a product of their circumstances and were trapped and motivated by their environments. The leaders’ ability to understand both their supporters and opponents is very important in times of crisis that threaten the status quo and undermine current organizational structures. Understanding the environments in which teachers and students live and work is likely to help the crisis leader to harness their support in his or her attempts to minimize the negative impacts of the crisis and to improve the schooling process. Transforming Opponents into Supporters Lincoln’s empathy turned his enemies into supporters. Fully aware of his limited political experience, and preparing himself for the impending crisis, Lincoln felt a need of support from popular leaders of experience, ability, and influence, regardless of their political and personal proximity to him (Curtis, 1902). His cabinet did not include, consequently, almost any intimate friends with whom he had confidential relations. Shogan (2009) described Lincoln’s inclination to turn his enemies into his advocates: After Lincoln won the presidency in 1860, he knew that he had defeated others who had more experience than him. He might have embraced hubris and created formidable political enemies. Instead, he stroked bruised egos and gained several political allies; Lincoln transformed his enemies into his supporters throughout his career. (p. 864)

Even when an allied tribe of the Apaches, the Sioux, rose against the white population in Minnesota, he refused to join those who called for a revenge,

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and did not agree to execute 103 Native Americans who were arrested after killing white people. According to Cox (2005), whenever Lincoln faced human dilemmas, he followed the road toward mercy and forgiveness. It was not perfect, but fair. The same traits motivated him to be generous toward the political leadership of the South after the victory and to forgive them for their rebellion as long as they would become loyal to the union again (Lodice, 2022). He favored allowing the Confederate soldiers to return to their homes if they took an oath of loyalty to the Union (Dubal, 2014) and refused confiscating the lands of the Confederate. In uncertain times when crisis events break up abruptly, educational leaders need the most competent and skillful middle managers and teachers to help them manage the crisis effectively. To this end, the leaders should choose both advocates and opponents and forgive those with whom they had many conflicts in the past. Blaming the opponents or acting in revenge and excluding them from decision-making would not lead to a blood bath as Lincoln was concerned (Dubal, 2014), but will probably result in a waste of human resources and in intensive conflicts that will impede the efforts to solve the crisis. Before Lincoln acted on an impulse of anger, he used to write a letter to the irritating person or to himself. He read it and then discarded it when his feelings had subsided (Iodice, 2021). This act should be taught by educational leaders in times of crisis characterized by confusion, anger, disappointment, and many other negative emotions. The leaders should keep control of their emotions and remain calm in the storm, because teachers, students, and stakeholders look at the leader’s responses to the crisis and are affected emotionally by them. Using First-Person Plural Language (“We”) As indicated thus far, leaders need the support and efforts of their followers or subordinates, because crisis management requires much personal investment from those who are responsible to minimize the impact of crisis events and bring the organization back to routine. Lincoln’s situation was no exception; he needed the popular support of the American people in order to implement his policies effectively and required public and Congressional backing to sustain government authority and to wage war against Southern belligerents. To this end, he employed skillful rhetoric in his public speeches, confirming that the citizens, not the President, directed the nation’s course and that the responsibility for the civil war

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would lie with Southerners who preferred conflict to the preservation of federal authority. Hugo (1997) explained: [Lincoln] constantly reiterated to the American public that the Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, thus ensuring that his policies would be perceived as popularly directed, even if they were not. Through the manipulation of language, Lincoln was able to direct public opinion, rather than be directed by it. In the instance of the Fort Sumter crisis, the people were largely unaware of Lincoln's intentions and plans beyond his vague proposal, in his inaugural…and such would be the case through most of his Presidency. (pp. 59–60)

The drive for consensus was remarkably expressed in his use of the first-­ person plural (Field, 2011). In his speeches and writings, Lincoln’s first-­ person plural sets the tone and connects the people to his ideas and aspirations. His presidential address at Gettysburg in November of 1863 illustrates the power of “we” in establishing common ground between the leader and the people who are listening to his speech: [We] are engaged in a great civil war…. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field. (cited in Field, 2011, p. 51)

Lincoln’s famous public addresses and private writings, particularly their repeated and creative use of the first-person plural, bound together disparate Americans at a moment of disunion and disarray when the meaning of union and nation and freedom was in doubt (Field, 2011, p. 54). Thus, when educational leaders in our era have to harness the teachers, for example, and motivate them to do the best they could to find adequate instructional ways to facilitate the results of any crisis (e.g., pandemics), they should consider employing the first-person plural, because as Lincoln knew, it bounds the employees together and gives them a sense of “we are all in the same boat.” This sense, in turn, encourages them to act together in order to defend their workplace and improve practice in spite of the crisis. Likewise, Lincoln was a great communicator who possessed a host of anecdotes and stories which he was able to use effectively to communicate with the individuals. Many times, when he wanted to transmit an idea he told a story and simple anecdotes that effectively communicated the essence of the idea or explained his points while avoiding technical and pompous language (Dubal, 2014). Like the people who have listened to

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Lincoln during the war, teachers and stakeholders who cope with uncertain events and attempt to reconstruct their work need simple explanations and examples to better understand the complex situation caused by the crisis and the manner in which they should respond to it. Stories about great educational leaders in times of crisis (in the past) and how they managed the school’s crisis successfully could help them in understanding what is expected from them in this hard and ambiguous time. Chapter Summary • The civil war is considered to be one of the biggest crises in the history of the US. But, the victory of the North and the revolutionary results of the war have been attributed by and large to Lincoln’s unique leadership capabilities and personality. • Lincoln taught us about the great importance of projecting a vision to a better future during the crisis, when everyone feels overwhelmed by the intensity of crisis events, helplessness, and hopelessness. Educational leaders should give voice to their ideas and views for the future, due to its inspirational value in times of turbulence and distress. • Resilience, that is, the ability to rebound from the hardships of life, that is considered to be superior over intellectual brilliance among successful leaders, is highly significant in crisis management, particularly when it is coupled with optimism. • Flexibility enabled Lincoln to examine varied solutions to a problem without sticking to dogma and encouraged forms of shared leadership. He was willing to replace his own judgment of the reality with the opinion of anyone in the army/cabinet he estimated, and pushed his surroundings to suggest counter-arguments in decision-making. • Lincoln has tended to visit his generals in the front and to talk with ordinary soldiers in order to gain critical information from first-hand before making a decision. Educational leaders should follow this leadership behavior and meet followers frequently. • Leader’s empathy toward followers is critical to gain their support in any effort to manage the crisis. • In managing the crisis, leaders need the most competent and skillful employees to help them respond to the crisis properly, including their opponents. Blaming the opponents or acting in revenge and excluding them from decision-making will probably result in a waste of human resources and in intensive conflicts that impede the efforts to solve the crisis.

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• Using the first-person plural bounds together teachers, students, and stakeholders at a moment of uncertainty, anxiety, and disarray and creates a sense of mutuality and collectiveness. Questions for Consideration 1. Compare the crisis faced by Lincoln with those faced by educational leaders. Could you find any similarities and distinctions? 2. What are the factors increasing leaders’ resilience and how our educational systems could benefit from resilient educational leaders? 3. With whom should educational leaders meet frequently during a time of crisis? Why? 4. In what ways could educational leaders express their compassion and empathy toward teachers, students, and parents who struggle with crisis events? 5. What are the facilitators and obstacles of using first-person plural in the school? Practical Activities 1. You were asked to teach the essentials of crisis management in one of the principal preparation programs. What are the major points in Lincoln’s leadership that you will emphasize in this class? 2. Choose one element in Lincoln’s crisis management and suggest practical ways to perform it in your school/educational institution. What would you suggest to the educational leader(s) and to others who are involved in crisis events in light of these elements? Please exemplify. 3. Share your insights from Lincoln’s crisis leadership with a colleague and ask him/her to suggest practical ways to implement these insights in your school/campus.

References Allison, E. (2011). The resilient leader. Educational Leadership, 69(4), 79–82. Brown, C. (2015). The servant leadership of Abraham Lincoln. Servant Leadership Theory and Practice, 2(1), 95–101. Caulfield, J. L., Lee, F. K., & Richards, B. A. (2021). Leadership as an art: An enduring concept framed within contemporary leadership. Management Faculty Research and Publications, 350. https://epublications.marquette.edu/ mgmt_fac/350

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Cox, H. H. (2005). Lincoln and the Sioux uprising of 1862. Cumberland House. Curtis, W. E. (1902). Abraham Lincoln. J. B. Lippincott Company. Donald, D. H. (1995). Lincoln. Simon & Schuster. Dubal, A. (2014). Abraham Lincoln: His leadership qualities and their relevance to today's business leadership. A thesis submitted to system design and management program in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of science in engineering and Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved on 20 August 22 from https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/100362. Everly, G.  S., & Athey, A. (2022). Crisis leadership (resilience) predicts overall leadership effectiveness. Crisis, Stress and Human Resilience, 4(1), 26–31. Field, P. S. (2011). Abraham Lincoln and the first-person plural: A study in language and leadership. American Nineteenth Century History, 12(1), 49–75. Goethals, G. R., & Allison, S. T. (2015). Kings and charisma, Lincoln and leadership: An evolutionary perspective. In G. R. Goethals, S. T. Allison, & R. Kramer (Eds.), Conceptions of leadership: Enduring ideas and emerging insights (pp. 111–124). Palgrave Macmillan. Goodwin, D. K. (2005). Team of rivals: The political genius of Abraham Lincoln. Simon & Schuster. Koehn, N. (2017). Forged in crisis: The power of courageous leadership in turbulent times. Scribner. Iodice, E. F. (2021). Common denominators of great leadership. The Journal of Values-Based Leadership, 14(1) Article 10. Available at: https://scholar.valpo. edu/jvbl/vol14/iss1/10 Lodice, E. M. (2022). The leadership of Abraham Lincoln: Why it matters today. Journal of Value-Based Leadership, 15(2), 1–22. McCombs, G.  M. (2013). Abraham Lincoln, management guru! Lessons for library leadership on resilience, true grit, and bouncing forward. Libraries and the Academy, 13(3), 227–231. McLeod, S., & Dulsky, S. (2021). Resilience, reorientation and reinvention: School leadership during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Frontier in Education, 6. Available at. https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc. 2021.637075/full Olsen, O.  H. (1978). Abraham Lincoln as revolutionary. Civil War History, 24(3), 213–224. Oplatka, I. (2017). Empathy regulation among Israeli school principals: Expression and suppression of major emotions in educational leadership. Journal of School Leadership, 27(1), 94–118. Philips, D.  T. (1992). Lincoln on leadership: Executive strategies for tough times. Warner Books. Shogan, C. J. (2009). The contemporary presidency: The political utility of empathy in presidential leadership. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39(4), 859–877.

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Thomas, B.  P. (2008). Abraham Lincoln: A biography. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(2), 320–333. Tugade, M.  M., & Fredrickson, B.  L. (2004). Resilient individuals use positive emotions to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(2), 320–333. Woods, B. F. (2013). Abraham Lincoln: Letters to his generals, 1861–1865. Algora Publishing.

CHAPTER 4

Winston Churchill

Chapter Overview • The triumphs of Nazi Germany and the biggest crisis in Churchill’s life • Risk-taking, decisiveness, and innovative behaviors • Moral judgment and moral vision • Leading realistically with much optimism • I am in the “front” (of the crisis)! • Inspiring speeches Born on November 30, 1874, and died on January 24, 1965, Winston Churchill is best remembered for leading the UK to victory during the tough years of World War II and for uniting the English people against the threat of Nazi invasion in the darkest hours of their nation. Churchill held many positions throughout his life, including war correspondent, soldier, writer, historian, painter, and politician, but is best known for his leadership as the British Prime Minister during the five years of World War II. Churchill’s activities in saving his nation and the world from Nazi domination have become legendary. But it was not always so; there were many people in the UK and around the world who believed before he came to power that what Churchill lacked above all was the capacity for sound leadership (Al & Green, 2013). Many others supported peach with Nazi Germany against Churchill’s belief that such capitulation would mean the

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end of the UK as a liberal and democratic country. In fact, Churchill has been out of politics for several years but after the war broke out in September 1939, he entered the War Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty (Gilbert, 1981), and became the Prime Minister several months later in May 1940 at the age of 65 as catastrophe loomed. Jenkins (2001) highlighted the connection between Churchill’s selection to premiership and the dire consequences of the war in May 1940: In a normal political situation, he likely would not have become Prime Minister at all. He was not the leader of his own party, which was in power, nor the leader of the opposition power. Further, assuming a change in leadership, Churchill was “by no means the clear public choice for Prime Minister,” either. (p. 576)

The Triumphs of Nazi Germany and the Biggest Crisis in Churchill’s Life At the time of his election to premiership, most of Europe was under Nazi control. Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and other countries fell, leaving Britain alone to face the Nazi threat of a very likely invasion by German troops from across the English Channel (Wakely & Carson, 2010). With the continent overrun shortly after, the Battle of Britain began in the late summer of 1940. German bombers have attacked on British cities on a daily basis, and British air defenses did the best they could to protect civilians, military camps, and the local industry from harm. Britain was surrounded, and Nazi Germany strove to break down the defenses and morale of the British in order to launch a proper invasion (Sink, 2017). On May 24 when the War Cabinet meets under Churchill’s headship, Britain faced an impending calamity caused by the fall of France and Belgium that made it urgent to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force that had retreated to a few Channel enclaves in the area of Dunkirk. Understanding that only a united Britain could triumph over the Nazis, Churchill first aimed to rally his dispirited and divided nation, while managing the crisis in Dunkirk successfully and encouraging the British people with enthusiastic speeches about a better future and promising the victory of the moral nations over the evildoers in the world. Although he did not adequately grasp the challenges of fighting the Japanese army in Singapore and in other British colonies in South East

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Asia or the effectiveness of the Japanese army in the first years of War World II (Fraher, 2022), probably because he was distracted by challenges closer to Britain, Churchill was voted the greatest figure in British history in a poll in 2002 due to public recognition of his role in guiding the UK through the most threatening crisis in the nation’s history (Rossi, 2006). Churchill was a visionary leader who raised concerns over German rearmament many years before others could identify the danger, but his voice had not been heard. Nevertheless, in his rise to the premiership, he took advantage of changing circumstances coupled with his long career in different public systems. Winston Churchill was a highly successful crisis-responsive leader during World War II whose strong and talented leadership was called upon during the darkest hours of the UK, that is, in times of unprecedented war and conflict. His crisis leadership provides guidelines for how to effectively manage varied crisis events in our educational systems.

Lessons Learned from Churchill’s Crisis Leadership When reading the biographies of Churchill, a picture of a very talented person arises and any attempt to point to a particular capacity or pattern of crisis management is difficult and almost impossible. Like other leaders in this book, he was willing to take risks because it was, in his view, indispensable for achieving greatness and succeeding in the war, although it made him unpopular with other politicians of his time who feared of taking-­ending stance on an issue (Sink, 207). Churchill simply understood that winning the war (i.e., solving the crisis) is inherently connected to risk-taking in times of uncertainty, despite the personal price a (educational) leader might pay in case of failure. Likewise, risk-taking is precondition of innovative behavior. Churchill was known for his own innovative ideas; for example, he sponsored the development of the tank and converted the navy’s fuel from coal to oil and created a new naval staff. In being involved in new initiatives he was prepared to take risks and embrace failure (Longstaffe, 2005). Thus, Churchill seems to teach educational leaders the importance of initiating changes and being receptive to innovations, particularly in uncertain times, when old solutions may be no longer valid and effective. In this sense, the educational leader should look for solutions by listening to others, questioning their suggestions/ideas for crisis management, and following through in his/her actions. Note, Churchill was receptive to accepting and

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initiating changes while not compromising his principles or purposes. Thus, even in times of severe crises, school leaders should not give up moral and educational values only because the situation “is very bad,” but have to seek innovative solutions that may modify the current situation and take the school out of the crisis. Churchill also taught us about the importance of making decisions and the pitfalls of indecisiveness (Gibson & Weber, 2015), particularly due to human tendency to resist changes and remain stagnant even in face of severe crises and impending disasters. During World War II, he once said, “I never worry about action, but only about inaction” (Hayward, 1997), emphasizing his tendency to make a decision even in times of uncertainty. Hayward’s analysis of Churchill’s modes of decision-making can tell us a lot about the desired crisis leadership. The modes are: keep the central aspect of the problem in sight, know how to balance both sides of a decision, and be able to modify the course of decision-making when new information and facts present themselves. An example of Churchill’s proactive decision-making we get from his decision (together with the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt), to attack first in North Africa. Jenkins (2001) described the meaning of this decision: Churchill had advocated for opening a second front in the Atlantic theater. The major point of contention was where that front should be and when attacking should commence. Churchill agreed largely with initial landings in North Africa with Operation Torch and strongly pushed for further attacks in the Mediterranean through Sicily and then the Italian peninsula. (p. 704)

In fact, Churchill (and Roosevelt) understood the importance of quick, symbolic victories after years of defensive maneuvers in the war against Nazi Germany and, consequently, decided to attack on North Africa, although it was strategically worth less than Europe (Sink, 2017). This case emphasizes both the role of educational leaders in taking innovative decisions when the crisis hits (after a thorough evaluation of the situation) and the need of teachers, students, and stakeholders to realize that the future is not entirely gloom, because there are some positive turns and successful solutions in the midst of the crisis. However, Churchill could not make thoughtful decisions unless he was much concerned with the details of any operation including matters of manpower, equipment, or even timing (Pitt, 2004). He did not appoint a

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defense minister and thereby had the adequate authority over strategic maneuvers during the War (Gibson & Weber, 2015) and the “right” to visit barracks and airfields, watch training exercises, and talk with soldiers. Hence, whether another pandemic erupts in the world or whether a hurricane hits a whole city, educational leaders should talk with teachers, participate in virtual classrooms, consult with school board members, and the like, before making any decision as regards the ways in which the schooling process will proceed under the new circumstances. One lesson from Churchill’s experience refers to the need to be “everywhere” and talk with whomever possible before making a critical decision in times of crisis. Educational leaders must make decisions in order to manage any crisis successfully. However, innovative and “out of the box” decisions necessitate critical information from the field, that is, from the classes, the parents, the secretary, the students, and so on. Yet, Churchill’s leadership teaches us another important aspect of decision-­making: sincere interactions with experts. Churchill tended to choose the person who was best suited for the role at hand. Gibson and Weber (2015) described this tendency: Winston Churchill was well aware of the importance of relationships in leading others. Over Churchill’s career, he developed a pattern for selecting individuals with strong personalities who were not afraid to speak up. In fact, many times he was criticized for exercising poor judgment in placing controversial individuals in key roles. He shied away from individuals who were not willing to voice their opinion. Harold Alexander, a formal field marshal, said, He “hated yes-men – he had no use for them.” (p. 81)

Churchill understood that people who would challenge him are likely to help him find the best solutions to crisis events and attain the goals he and they had set during the war. In his view, a leader should organize a good group of experts at the top and let them work out the details in accordance with principles and guidelines that have been clearly prescribed (Hayward, 1997). To wit, when a crisis breaks out, every educational leader should have the most talented middle managers and teachers on his/her side, due to their critical contribution to crisis management in the school. Together, the staff is more likely to face the crisis successfully and bring the schooling process back to normal and routine. Many years later, during the Corona Crisis, one university college in Canada responded successfully to the crisis by moving to forms of shared leadership, as Smith (2022) showed:

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The transition from top-down to shared leadership was largely completed on June 1, 2020, the 82nd day of the pandemic, when the 'return to site steering committee' was established and a team approach was taken, giving technical experts greater autonomy to contribute to pandemic management, and provided flexibility to address new situations as they arose. (p. 90)

Four legacies left by Churchill merit highlighting in our discussion about crisis management in educational systems worldwide, because they emphasize how Churchill led Britain to go through the “darkest hours” in the war until the final victory over Nazi Germany. Moral Judgment and Moral Vision One of Churchill’s outstanding characteristics was an ability to clearly understand the moral stakes of a decision and correctly prioritize these stakes when making any decision or determining a course of action (Al & Green, 2013). The famous Churchill biographer Martin Gilbert once stated that Churchill “felt that governments had a duty to their citizens, not only to protect them against foreign interference, but also to help them against unfair social irregularity and hardship…. A nation [deserves] to be treated with respect by its leaders” (Gilbert, 1967, p. 170). Moreover, Churchill had the ability to appraise the moral character of key actors in a situation in order to accurately evaluate their advice or predict their likely actions (Al & Green, 2013). In this respect, Churchill was exemplary of moral leadership. Moral judgments guided him through difficult decisions under very dangerous and critical circumstances. For instance, in his visit to Germany in the early 1930s as part of his research for a book on his ancestors in this country, Churchill met Putzi Hanfstaengl in passing who was a charming, Harvard-educated millionaire, acting as Hitler’s press secretary. The next quote illustrates, explicitly and implicitly, the moral judgment of Churchill: Hanfstaengl asked Churchill whether he might like to meet with the Führer. At that time Churchill was a freelance journalist forced to earn his living through his writings, so the chance for an interview with Germany’s rising political star was understandably attractive. But, instead of jumping at the offer, Churchill asked: Why is your chief so violent about the Jews? I can quite understand being angry with Jews who have done wrong or who are against the country, and I understand resisting them if they try to m ­ onopolize

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power in any walk of life; but what is the sense of being against a man simply because of his birth? (cited in Al & Green, 2013, p. 94)

Needless to say, Churchill had no intention to interact with such an immoral person like Hitler. He remained obliged to the English sense of justice in the face of the growing power of totalitarianism that raised him above all other English politicians in his time (Holmes, 2005). A decade later when the British cities have been bombarded night after night by German aircraft, Churchill described Hitler as the devil, using adjectives such as wicked, crazy, and outrageous (tyrant). His sense of rightness would serve him and the nation well during the terrible crisis of 1940 when England faced a potential invasion. The lesson for every educational leader from this story is simple; even in the worst time, when any solution to the crisis seems to be far away and a sense of helplessness dominates the room, the ends never justify immoral means. For example, an exclusion of a child with special needs from virtual learning just because he or she cannot concentrate in e-classrooms is immoral, despite the urgent need to keep teaching regularly and preparing the students to the final exams in times of pandemics or natural disasters. Educational leaders should follow moral human values in any time, including in times of crisis and, in the view of Churchill, no moral compromise could be considered at all. When other politicians considered negotiating with Nazi Germany during the dangerous summer of 1940, Churchill convinced the British people that they had something worth fighting for and that they were still capable of greatness (Hardy, 2010; Holmes, 2005). He believed that Britain was worth fighting for, not only because of a simple desire for self-preservation, but because Britain stood for something larger than itself. He expressed both of these sentiments in the first line of his first speech as the prime minister: I speak to you for the first time as Prime Minister in a solemn hour for the life of our country, of our Empire, of our Allies, and, above all, of the cause of Freedom…after this battle in France abates its force, there will come the battle for our Island—for all that Britain is, and all that Britain means. (cited in Lyons, 2006, p. 5)

In times of crisis, educational leaders may think they could deviate from moral values in the name of the need to overcome a severe crisis by all means. Churchill seems to have warned them when he said that the fate of

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Poland would be the fate of Britain if the Nazi threat was not energetically opposed. To wit, any inaction in the face of tyranny, that is, an immoral regime regardless of the reasons, could only result in subjugation. This should be the message of every educational leader to his/her staff and to stakeholders, because any deviation from moral values in education will bring about negative implications to schools, teachers, and students. To those middle managers and teachers that might undermine the leader’s insistence to remain moral in spite of the changing circumstances, Churchill would suggest to respond to some ponderings, as he did in his image of Britain under a tyrannous yoke: How could we bear, nursed as we have been in a free atmosphere, to be gagged and muzzled; to have spies…at every corner; to have even private conversation caught up and used against us by the Secret Police and all their agents and creatures; to be arrested and interned without trial; or to be tried by a political party or Party courts for crimes hitherto unknown to civil law? (quoted in Lyons, 2006, p. 6)

In the case of schools, moral leaders may ask: Would we really want to abandon our educational values and expel a number of students just because we are facing a dramatic increase in school violence? Do we really agree to ignore moral and democratic values in our attempts to cope with crisis events in our school? Are the groups of parents and students we blame for the crisis got fair trials? Particularly in times of crisis moral judgments and considerations must be present in the back of the minds of educational leaders across the school’s departments and hierarchy, because as Churchill taught us, no leader could compromise with immoral activities and acts, even if they are not on the horrible levels that characterized Nazi Germany. Leading Realistically with Much Optimism A crisis brings with it negative feelings because the future seems desperate and people are concerned about their life and work. Pessimism dominates and people seek for some good news or at least some hope for a better future. They look at the leader to profusely acknowledge the contributions that have been made to date and optimistically capture the reality that will ultimately emerge from the crisis back to a state of normality (Stoller, 2020). Churchill’s crisis leadership responded to this need. In his famous

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“we shall fight on the beaches” speech to the British people in the dark days of 1940, Churchill literarily acknowledged the formidable current challenge while encouraging the British people that they will win at the end. His message to any educational leader in times of crisis would be: be realistic and tell teachers and stakeholders how difficult the crisis is but at the same time inspire optimism and give them some hope for a successful crisis management, because their leaders control the crisis events and navigate the school wisely. At the very start of his premiership, Churchill delivered some of his most well-known and effective war-time rhetoric, clearly offering the nation and the world his “blood, toil, tears and sweat” (quoted in Jenkins, 2001, 591). Nevertheless, “long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival” (quoted in Jenkins, 2001, 591). These words (and others) would serve as a rallying cry during the later Battle of Britain (Sink, 2017). With his words, Churchill “promises” the British people that there is some hope and he, the leader of their country, is there to lead them to victory, regardless of the potential costs. Similarly, educational leaders can model the way to teachers who may look at leaders’ affect to guide their responses. More importantly, however, is a display of authenticity and honesty; educational leaders would be advised by Churchill never to present an illusionary reality as if everything is just fine, but rather to explain the crisis and its threats to the schooling process while at the same time talking with teachers, students, and stakeholders about a “happy end.” The fall of Singapore “stupefied the Prime Minister,” Churchill’s private physician Lord Moran (1966, p. 27) recalled. It “stunned him. He felt it was a disgrace. It left a scar on his mind.” Moran explained: It never entered his head, he complained that the rear of the fortress was quite unprotected against an attack from the land. ‘Why didn’t they tell me about this? … Did no one realize the position?’

The case of Singapore reflects a time of failure, even though many people were aware of the vulnerability of Singapore and had doubts about Churchill’s Singapore Strategy from the start (Hack & Blackburn 2003). But, even then, Churchill remained optimistic, believing in the moral way of the UK, promising not to give up. This is a message every educational leader should deliver after failures caused by crisis events or by incorrect decisions made from time to time during the crisis.

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The educational leader should inspire hope along the crisis, regardless of failures or “victories.” Two years after the battle for England began, Churchill delivered a broadcast recounting the course of the war and hopes for the future. He ended with a characteristic statement of hope and resolution: Therefore tonight I give you a message of good cheer. You deserve it, and facts endorse it. But be it good cheer or be it bad cheer will make no difference to us; we shall drive on to the end, and do our duty, win or die. God helping us, we can do no other. (quoted in Lyons, 2006, p. 7)

What Churchill taught us is how important it is to instill in teachers and stakeholders a belief that the crisis would be over and the school would be a better place afterward. When Churchill urged Britain to rise to the challenge and make this “their finest hour,” he seems to have encouraged educational leaders to deliver a notion of “challenge” rather than “threat” and inculcated a feeling of positive responses to crisis events. “We will manage the crisis effectively and get out of it” should be told to teachers and stakeholders regularly by educational leaders during any crisis. I Am in the “Front” (of the Crisis)! Like other great leaders in this book, Churchill’s wish to be present off the beaches during the pre-landing bombardment (eventually thwarted by a personal appeal from the King) reflects Churchill’s tendency to be where the war (i.e., crisis) is. In fact, Churchill visited many sites in London and in other cities the next day after terrible air raids during the Blitz in the winter of 1940–1941, inspecting the damage and rallying the people as well as working in his underground headquarters (Wakely & Carson, 2010). Four days after the landings of the Allayed to France, he visited General Montgomery in his headquarters chateau on June 10. He visited France on several occasions during the following months, but perhaps the most exciting was in March 1945 when the Allied armies had closed up to the Rhine, and the First US Army had captured the Remagen Bridge almost undamaged. Churchill arrived at Montgomery’s headquarters soon afterward, and during a tour of the front with General Eisenhower gazed across 400 yards of flat water into Germany itself (Pitt, 2004). From his, although limited, visits to the front Churchill could learn a lot about the situation in the field, just like the school leader can observe

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teachers’ and students’ responses to a crisis (e.g., the threats caused by the Pandemic) through visits to (virtual?) classrooms. When visiting bombard areas in London and in other cities, Churchill has inspired the people to take whatever the Germans threw at them and come through with the “bulldog spirit.” How many educational leaders entered the Zoom in the middle of a virtual teaching-learning process and encouraged the teacher and her students to do the best they could to get high achievements and enjoy the learning process, despite the threats caused by COVID-19? Churchill would no doubt recommend doing that! Snow (1969) added another aspect to the story of Churchill and his visits: So, He seemed to do [the visits] with boundless and frenetic energy, working for more than 18 hours a day, either from his office or from home, maddening his staff and his family with his impatience and demands. A civil servant described his attitude thus ‘the Prime Minister has determined that we shall die in the last ditch, and there is no one inclined to say him nay’. (p. 124)

In his visits, Churchill showed the people that he was one of them, suffering and feeling concerns, but at the same time strong and determined to win the war. Undeniably, attempted to be as visible as possible to his followers; he realized that visibility increased morale and subsequent confidence (Hardy, 2010). Educational leaders should follow Churchill’s way, particularly when everything seems to be lost and the staff might have fallen into desperation. Just like Churchill who had no fear to go out of his Cabinet war rooms and watch London as the German bombers were attacking it, educational leaders should interact with teachers, students, and parents even if it could expose them to complaints, insults, or inconvenience. They must not remain in the bunker (i.e., office); their staff needs them, especially when uncertainty and ambiguity prevail. Inspiring Speeches Churchill was not for the British people only when their homes had been bombarded and destroyed. He was for them throughout the whole war via impassioned radio broadcasts, a genuinely popular wartime leader from start to finish (Bell, 2017). Sometimes Churchill’s speeches were given live to the nation and sometimes to the Commons, with only the staff able to hear its debut. To illustrate the strength and inspiration of his speeches, here are the most famous of them:

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I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined this government: ‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat’. (House of Commons—May 13, 1940) We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old. (House of Commons—June 4, 1940)

To those readers who are anxious they will never reach the level of Churchill’s exceptional rhetoric, we shall recall that he had a stutter and a lisp. He was known to put a huge amount of energy, preparation, and reflection into the language and the delivery of his speeches. According to Gibson and Weber (2015, p. 81), Churchill utilized four communication principles: using the best possible words (e.g., using short and simple words and refraining from jargon or polysyllabic words, as he believed these words reduced clarity), rhythm (e.g., using appropriate cadence throughout Churchill’s speeches), accumulation of argument (i.e., using facts to build focus on a single point), and the use of analogies during communication connects the unknown to the known. Thus, every educational leader can follow these communication principles to a certain extent, depending on the type of crisis and the cultural and social contexts in which he or she works. Notably, Churchill connected the survival of the Christian civilization and of the democratic liberal county to the efforts of the British people and its army to stand up for “their finest hour” in the face of Nazi Germany, their enemy (Jenkins, 2001, 621). How could educational leaders motivate and inspire a confused and dejected teaching workforce against a background of uncertainty, violence, low achievement, and so forth? Churchill unquestionably communicated a vision of better future and inspired a nation, perhaps the world, with his passion and determination (Longstaffe, 2005). Longstaffe further details how Churchill succeeded in motivating the British people through his speeches: Churchill’s approach would be firstly to explain the current realities, then inspire the team by offering them a vision for how things could be, then tell them how to achieve this and finally mobilize them into action. Churchill’s

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words show how he did this; he presented the current realities, “Against this loss of over 30,000 men” … then he offered a vision for a better future “… if all do their duty … if the best arrangements are made …” and showed how the vision could become a reality “… we shall go on to the end we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds we shall fight on the fields and in the streets we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.” (p. 81)

Churchill simply used short words in short sentences to deliver his inspirational ideas. Similarly, and consistent with Show (1969), prior to his or her speech to teachers and parents, the educational leader has to spend a considerable amount of time and reflection on selecting the right words and constructing simple-to-understand sentences. Then, the leader has to include facts regarding how the school should move on as well as to propose some changes in current routines and performances. At this point, Churchill would recommend avoiding terminology or jargon that could confuse teachers or parents during the speech and instead using an analogy that would fill any gaps of understanding for those who may not be familiar with the organizational change or the innovative practice. Just as Churchill was determined not to admit defeat, but to deliver messages of defiance and hope to strengthen the people to endure the hardships and fight to with (Snow, 1969), educational leaders have to maintain the confidence and subsequent trust of their followers. Trustful and open, visible and competent, Churchill undoubtedly retained the trust of the British people as he charged them forward to fight for the preservation of Britain during World War II (Hardy, 2010). Educational leaders who will follow Churchill’s leadership in this respect are likely to be trusted by their staff who may consequently participate in any project or activity aimed to resolve the crisis and minimize its potentially negative outcomes. A special attention should be given to language. Churchill has always been revered for his outstanding control and employment of the English language, allowing him to persuade others to comply and follow his lead, rather than unethically forcing compliance through coercion (Hardy, 2010). His persuasion technique relied heavily on his vivid language; an educational leader could use the language to convince the teachers they will face the crisis and get out of it much stronger. Gilbert (1967) explains how Churchill used the language to convince other people:

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Certainly, by persuading through his words, Churchill was able to evoke a strong sense of patriotism and excitement within the British people…[he] had through his power over words, but still more through his power over the hearts of men, that rare ability to call out from those who heard him the sense that they were a necessary part of something greater than themselves; the ability to make each one feel just that much greater than he had been; the ability which runs like a golden thread through our national history to inspire a slumbering nation so that it can call up those inner reserves of effort and of character which have never failed [the British people] when our very survival has been at stake. (p. 165)

Not every leader can persuade teachers and stakeholders to follow his ideas through inspiring speeches like Churchill did, but educational leaders have to do the best they could to raise the morale of teachers and stakeholders, particularly when their followers expect them to manage the crisis effectively and bring the school back to safety. This was evident during the Corona Crisis, as one educational leader in Manitoba, Canada, indicated (Tamtik & Darazsi, 2022). Accordingly, she was aware of the importance of disseminating and distributing timely and key information to the school community for reassurance and safety purposes. In her words, “clear communication became an integral component of my daily leadership practices and monopolized a great deal of my time and attention as we adjusted to the many changes” (ibid., p. 30). Chapter Summary • Churchill became the Prime Minister of the UK when Nazi Germany had already conquered France and other European countries and prepared to attack the UK. • Innovative behaviors and risk-taking characterizing Churchill’s leadership, coupled with his strong decisiveness and concern for details, resulted in effective responses to crisis events and abrupt failures. • In times of crisis Churchill taught us of the critical decision to appoint the most talented people to the management team, regardless of their (political) proximity to the leader. • Moral judgment and vision are critical in times of crisis, especially when some immoral solutions and responses to the crisis might be prioritized by some organizational members so as to minimize the negative impact of the crisis. • To be a good model to the staff, the educational leader has to be realistic and optimistic. In his speeches, Churchill did not ignore the

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threats and the ordeal many British people might have experienced, but concurrently, he gave them hope; the UK will finally win the war. • Churchill visited bombarded areas in London as well as soldiers in the front in order to be visible and increase the people’s confidence and belief in the final victory, or in the case of schools, in successful crisis management and a better future at the end. • Churchill’s inspiring speeches have entered the English pathos of World War II, because he used high rhetoric capacities to encourage every man and woman in their worst days. Although educational leaders are not expected to have such capacities, their address to staff and stakeholders during a crisis may be of much value to successful crisis management. Questions for Consideration 1. Compare the crisis faced by Churchill and those faced by educational leaders. Could you find any similarities and distinctions? 2. What are the factors increasing leaders’ moral judgment and how is this term related to leadership for social justice, a topic of much interest in our educational systems? 3. To what extent are educational leaders expected to visit classrooms and team meetings in times of crisis? Why? 4. In what ways could educational leaders express their optimism and realism in front of teachers, students, and parents who struggle with crisis events? 5. What are the facilitators and obstacles of using “speeches” in the school? Practical Activities 1. You are the educational leader of a school in crisis. Write down your inspiring speech to teachers and stakeholders. While writing the speech, pay attention to words, sentences, idioms, and analogies that may help you to transmit to others some sense of hope, enthusiasm, commitment, optimism, and so forth. 2. Choose one characteristic of Churchill’s leadership during World War II and write down some suggestions for educational leaders who are facing a severe school crisis.

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References Al, G., & Green, R. M. (2013). 10 Virtues of outstanding leaders: Leadership and character. John Wiley & Sons. Bell, C. M. (2017). Churchill and the Dardanelles. Oxford University Press. Fraher, A.  L. (2022). Disobeying orders’ as responsible leadership: Revisiting Churchill, percival and the fall of Singapore. Journal of Business Ethics, 175, 247–263. Gibson, M., & Weber, R. J. (2015). Applying leadership qualities of great people to your department: Sir Winston Churchill. Hospital Pharmacy, 50, 78–83. Gilbert, M. (1967). Churchill. Prentice-Hall. Gilbert, M. (1981). Winston Churchill: The wilderness years. Heinemann. Hack, K., & Blackburn, K. (2003). Did Singapore have to fall? Churchill and the impregnable fortress. Routledge. Hardy, B. (2010). Servant leadership and Sir Winston Churchill. Honors college capstone experience/thesis projects. Paper 280. http://digitalcommons.wku. edu/stu_hon_theses/280. Hayward, S.  F. (1997). Churchill on leadership: Executive success in the face of adversity. Forum. Holmes, R. (2005). In the footsteps of Churchill: A study in character. Basic Books. Jenkins, R. (2001). Churchill: A biography. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Longstaffe, C. (2005). Winston Churchill, a leader from history or an inspiration for the future? Industrial and Commercial Training, 37(2), 80–83. Lyons, J. D. (2006). Winston Churchill and the rhetorical challenges of democratic statesmanship. Perspectives on Political Science, 35(1), 4–13. Moran, C. M. W. (1966). Winston Churchill: The struggle for survival (1940–1965). Constable. Rossi J.P. (2006). Churchill redux: Review essay. Society, 78–81. Pitt, B. (2004). Churchill and the generals. Pen & Sword Books. Smith, D. (2022). More pivots than a centipede on ice skates: Reflections on shared leadership in a post-secondary institution during COVID-19. Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 200, 76–95. Snow, C. P. (1969). Variety of men. Penguin. Stoller, J. K. (2020). Reflections on leadership in the time of COVID-19. BMJ Leader, 1–3. Tamtik, M., & Darazsi, S. (2022). Navigating turbulent waters: Leading one Manitoba school in a time of crisis. Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 200, 22–36. Wakely, E., & Carson, J. (2010). Historical recovery heroes – Winston Churchill. Mental Health and Social Inclusion, 14(4), 36–39.

CHAPTER 5

Charles de Gaulle

Chapter Overview • The crises in France: Occupation, Algeria, and Europe • The critical role of emotions in leader-followers relations • The leader as a unifier • A brave innovator • Instigating a crisis and highlighting its dire consequences

The Crises in France: Occupation, Algeria, and Europe Born in 1890 (died in 1970), Charles de Gaulle was given a military education and developed a keen interest in history, literature, and philosophy just like his father (Knapp, 2021). After graduating France’s foremost military academy, Saint-Cyr, in Brittany, he served as a second lieutenant and fought with distinction in World War I, was injured a few times, and showed bravery, a trait that has characterized him all his life. He made a number of attempts to escape, but failed (de Gaule, 1954, p. 67). In the 1920s, he wrote several books and articles on politics and military strategy. For many years, de Gaulle was a good officer, but not yet a well-known figure in the French army. It was World War II that made him a famous figure in France and internationally, mainly thanks to his theoretical

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knowledge and various writings, which had a great impact on France. Following the defeat of France in World War II, the first crisis with which de Gaulle faced as a national leader, he fled to London to lead the Free France movement, consisting of forces that had escaped German occupation and fighters from French colonies. After four years in exile, years in which de Gaulle had become the “voice of free France,” de Gaulle with the French 2nd Armored Division and the US Army liberated Paris, where he was welcomed as a hero. In the election of 1944, de Gaulle became the provisional president of liberated France but resigned in 1946, claiming, not for the last time, that he lacked sufficient governing power. Twelve years later, when France experienced social resentment and a savage war in Algeria, he returned to the presidency. The situation in France deteriorated rapidly between 1956 and 1958. In 1957, over 350,000 French soldiers were involved in the Algerian War of Independence that increased the instability of the French political system and created internal divisions within the various political parties. In parallel, France experienced economic difficulties, stemming from irresponsible distribution of resources, the growing deployment of French troops in Algeria, and an economic policy based on an increasing level of public expenditure (Warlouzet, 2011). Unfortunately, the French government could not overcome small political calculations and ideological proclivities that prevented the implementation of necessary solutions to this crisis. This state of affairs resulted in the deepening of both the budget and trade deficits. Hofmann (1990) described the situation in France when de Gaulle returned to the presidency: The year 1958 sounded the death knell of the Fourth Republic. Beyond ministerial instability, the impossibility for the Government to resolve the crisis in Algeria plunges him into a major crisis. Since 1954, when attacks were perpetrated by the National Liberation Front, the tension has continued to mount in Algeria. Crisis turned into a real civil war between local populations who want independence total and European populations who have settled in Algeria and who want that she remains French. (p. 82)

For several years after the Algerian war had begun (in 1954), the French government searched for a solution to the continuing crisis, but in vain. Although most of the French army was in Algeria in an attempt to

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suppress the rebellion, the authority of the French governments in Algiers was weak. Therefore, most of the attempts to impose reforms or to defeat the independence movement have failed. In addition, French officials were unable to make any commitments regarding the free trade agreements in Europe in 1957 for the simple reason that at that particular time there was no French government (Warlouzet, 2011). In a context of growing rumors of a coup d’état in Paris, led by the armed forces, the French National Assembly accepted the nomination of Charles de Gaulle as Prime Minister (Président du Conseil) on June 1, 1958. In face of these and related crises de Gaulle’s return to presidency brought some hope for better solutions, as Bajon (2011) maintained: On the one hand, he was to solve the Algerian problem, and, it was assumed, keep Algeria French. On the other, he was to restore the integrity of the state and the effectiveness of the government. It took him four years for the former, and his solution, Algerian independence, was the opposite of what had been expected, the opposite of what he had been brought back to do. (p. 261)

During his presidency, de Gaulle solved the Algerian question by granting independence to Algeria in 1962 (though after switching his promises to keep Algeria under the French regime), established France as a nuclear power, brought political stability, and initiated economic reforms. He established the Fifth Republic and strengthened the governing power of the French government. De Gaulle is undoubtedly the most significant figure in the French political history of the twentieth century. Many years after his death, scholars seem to glorify the crisis leadership of de Gaulle. Thus, according to Rubinsky (2015), de Gaulle made two invaluable contributions to France: “first, after the national disaster of 1940 [when France was defeated by Nazi Germany] he was able to bring France back to the great powers’ table and make it responsible for Germany’s fate…second, when he came back to power in 1958, at the height of the war in Algeria, which threatened to turn into а civil war in France itself, de Gaulle could find an acceptable solution of the decolonization issue, with France retaining its great power status” (p. 2). Although de Gaulle was a humorless, arrogant, and difficult man, he was disliked or feared by virtually all who worked alongside him over the years—and yet he drew millions to him and created a durable political legacy that continues to exert force in French life today.

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His passion and love for his country were often obscured by his austere, caustic personality (Jackson, 2018, 221). Recently, Knapp (2021) asked whether de Gaulle made a difference and replied that although the Allies would certainly have liberated France without his assistance, yet de Gaulle was a voice of hope, courage, honor, rectitude, and liberation to sustain France through the occupation. Accordingly, he saved France from bloodshed and armed civil war after the liberation and again in the Algerian war. For the purpose of this book, though, it is curious to learn de Gaulle’s unique strategies and tactics in face of crisis events throughout his political career.

Lessons Learned from de Gaulle’s Crisis Leadership De Gaulle was a person of contradictions; nonetheless, when we analyze his activities and responses to crisis events, he seems to be both decisive and emotional. His well-known phrases in his radio broadcasts to the French people a month after the fall of France—“France has lost a battle, but she has not lost the war” and “must hope disappear? Is defeat final?”— illustrate his decisive response to the crisis: never give up! In his speech on the BBC from London he called not to abandon the struggle against the occupiers, because the flame of the resistance must not be extinguished (Ducastel, 2015). Many years later, in his TV broadcasts during the Algerian crisis, he wore a military outfit to symbolize his dual position as a military general and the Head of State (Chalaby, 1998). The military uniform transmitted strength and decisiveness, aspects of leadership that followers need in times of crisis. Admittedly, school leaders are not supposed to wear military uniform in order to encourage their staff subsequent to a crisis event (e.g., accidental death of a student, clashes among students in the school), but their neat clothes may transmit some notions (e.g., “everything is under control” or “I’m the leader and I know how to go on from here”) that the teachers may expect to feel in hard times. Because de Gaulle was called into power during major crises, his national speeches were primarily policy speeches designed to suggest solutions to problems and to propel the French people to embrace them. According to Dawes-Mccorkle (1978), his speeches commenced with a sense of national pride and glory, followed by belief in the personal legitimacy of de Gaulle’s leadership, and end with an appreciation for his prominent and critical role in the history of France. They included also a feeling of confidence, both in him and in the security of the state under his

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presidency as long as his policies are accepted. Underlying in his speeches, like in those of Churchill, for example, are emotional relationships built between the leader and the followers that create the right emotional environment, according to de Gaulle himself, for his leadership and sustain his power (Chalaby, 1998). Chalaby further explained: De Gaulle understood that domination has little to do with force or constraint but rather with the intellect and emotions. In his view, for power relations to be efficient, it needs to be grounded on a personal basis. Leaders need to establish a personal relationship between themselves and their followers because the masses do not obey impersonal power. As a result, leaders have to address people’s minds, catch their imaginations, imprint their ‘living mark’ in their psyches. “One does not move crowds without elementary feelings, violent images, and brutal invocations” de Gaulle indicated. (p. 55)

Like other great figures in this book, de Gaulle emphasizes the critical role of emotion regulation in crisis leadership. Constantia et al. (2021) found that students had felt much fear and anxiety during the transition of schools in the COVID-19 pandemic and, therefore, school leaders should be trained in crisis management. Anxious students and teachers, for example, generally benefited from extra emphasis on supportive calming statements by their educational leaders (and teachers in the case of students) in times of crisis (Oplatka & Crawford, 2022). De Gaulle would add that their training should include strategies of emotion regulation required to scrutinize and address the emotional needs of teachers and students in uncertain times or in face of crisis events in the school. Four aspects of De Gaulle’s leadership merit highlighting in our discussion about educational leadership in times of crisis. The Leader as a Unifier Some of the social crises involve social disintegration and resentment. Thus, de Gaulle came to power in periods of crisis which disrupted class and interest-group politics and put a premium on the reuniting of the “nation” and the stabilization and reinforcing of state power and the state apparatus (Creny, 1988). While politicians positioned themselves in one of the interest groups, de Gaulle retained power partly by maintaining his distance from specific interest groups and by positioning himself above

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political disputes. In his rhetoric and public appearances, he presented himself as a unifying leader whose aim is to unite the people of France and recreate the one and strong nation. Some of our schools suffer high level of social disintegration and inter-group conflicts in the staff’s room for many reasons. De Gaulle could teach educational leaders in these schools how to unify the staff and foster a positive school climate. De Gaulle has always tried to be simultaneously a unifier and an innovator. During the war years, he persistently took on the task of unifying the diverse and often antagonistic parts of the French Resistance, at home and abroad. But, according to Hofmann (1990), his goal was not unification for its own sake: rather, he aimed to lead liberated France in directions that would make an ordeal like that of 1940 impossible in the future. Hence, his insistence on profound economic and social changes, and his preference for a strong and unfettered executive in a new constitution. It is inhabited by the idea of safeguarding the national interests that de Gaulle tried to rally to his cause of the French soldiers and officers, to whom he asked to join him in London (Ducastel, 2015). Similarly, educational leaders are advised to rally the teachers and school community prior to launching any new project aimed at preventing child maltreatment (i.e., a crisis event) following such a case in which a teacher victimized a student and betrayed the trust of the entire school community, a case reported by Roth (2018). De Gaulle would recommend unifying the staff as a means to promote this project and obviate any conflicts and suspicions. Thus, unifying the staff in face of current and future crisis events is critical but insufficient. The aim of the unification is also to harness the staff toward changing malfunctions and improving the schooling process. In his Memoirs of Hope, de Gaulle explained that his speeches along the years were designed to foster a spirit of unity, and especially, an emotionally toned unanimity in favor of the policy he was urging at the moment: I always speak to them less of themselves than of France … I force myself … to gather their hearts and their spirits around that which they have in common, to make them all feel that they belong to the same ensemble, to make them subscribe to the national effort. On each occasion, I point out where we collectively are in the face of the problem of the moment, to show how we can and must resolve it, to raise our will and our confidence, and then succeed. (De Gaulle, 1970, p. 302)

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Any educational leader who aspires to unity among teachers, students, and parents could learn a lot from the way in which de Gaulle described his efforts to motivate the people to act in favor of France (the school) and to inculcate a sense of a unified entity. Notably, de Gaulle aimed to unify all of the actors—the army, the party politicians, and interest groups—because, according to his political philosophy, unity is constantly to be striven for prerequisite to greatness and happiness (Gaffney, 2010). His success is derived from his ability to create an image of a leader whose motives are reconciliation and negotiation among conflicting groups, but without becoming one or the other. For Gaffney (2010, p.  39), de Gaulle represented an extraordinary political phenomenon; a person who refuses in times of crisis to condemn or endorse either side (almost an imperative in crises) and who posits himself as the transcendent site of legitimacy. Similarly, educational leaders who suppress their anger and frustration and follow de Gaulle’s unifying attitude toward the staff may gain more legitimacy in the school and in its community and, consequently, manage the crisis and recruit school members and environmental constituencies to respond to the crisis events more effectively. A Brave Innovator Although his leadership was not equally innovative in all domains, as Hofmann (1990) indicated, de Gaulle had initiated and implemented many structural reforms aimed at restoring France as a major power in the world. To this end, he had to take moderate or high risks. Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, once said that de Gaulle had the merit of posing openly the hard questions which would have been more damaging if left unresolved (Knapp, 2021). Braveness and risk-taking characterized other great figures outlined in this book and seem to be major components in any type of crisis leadership. Coming back to power in 1958, de Gaulle pushed forward the establishment of the Fifth Republic and its new constitution and suggested new foreign policies. He pulled France out of the colonial trap in Algeria, revised the Constitution in 1962 to enable the president to be elected by universal suffrage, and left the military organization, NATO for a while. Regardless of the outcomes of his reforms, he assumed they would resolve crisis events in France and demonstrated much braveness and courage in face of high risks underlying any large-scale reform. Warlouzet (2011)

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outlined the kind of reforms introduced by de Gaulle and explained their innovative and bold characteristics: De Gaulle established a coherent twofold strategy as early as the summer of 1958…De Gaulle tackled the financial and trade crises in addition to instigating institutional reforms and resolving the colonial problem. He set up a special committee entrusted with the preparation of an ambitious reform plan, the Rueff Plan, which was based on a three-point program: the devaluation of the franc, budget austerity and the opening up of the French market. These bold reforms were meant to break with the protectionist past and to allow France to fulfil its international commitments. (p. 429)

Only a brave, innovative leader like de Gaulle could refuse to subjugate himself to dominant convictions and best “realist” instincts of many and instead realized that the Algerian war was destroying the fabric of France and, consequently, reinitiated a new policy toward the end of the war (Merom, 1999). Likewise, and consistent with Knapp (2021), the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic that created a semi-presidential regime would never have been adopted without de Gaulle and, therefore, is considered to be one of his most tangible legacies. De Gaulle simply released France from years of searches for an optimal variant of democratic government and brought political and social stability back (Rubinsky, 2015). Although De Gaulle made many political mistakes in his career; many times his actions were old-fashioned and unrealistic (Troitino, 2008), he showed a strong pragmatic sense, being able to adapt to new situations and transform his ideas with much courage. If he had to advise educational leaders who are facing higher levels of school violence or coping with an impending hurricane, no doubt he would tell them to initiate bold changes required to respond effectively to the crisis and use their courage and braveness to manage the crisis effectively. Implicitly, he would call to initiate large reforms to prevent the next crisis, even if they might undermine social order in the school or threaten the principal’s leadership for a while. Analyzing the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on schools, Sahlberg (2020, p. 1) concluded that “there is only a little chance schools will change as a consequence of this pandemic without bold and brave shifts in mindset in how that change happens.” De Gaulle would hold this conclusion with both hands.

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Heroism Is Limited Even in Times of Crisis It is commonly held that heroes have saved their countries in hard times by empathically fighting against the sources of the crisis and leading their people all the way to victory. While heroism has been given much place in national tales and folklores, the story of de Gaulle highlights the limited power of these heroic leaders, even in times of severe crises when romantic attributes to leader prevail. According to Clague (1975), de Gaulle was far more limited than Weber’s ideal-typical charismatic leader as the President of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Thus, the dynamics of French political attitudes created the opportunity in 1940 for the heroic leader to emerge, but they also rendered him powerless once the crisis of war and occupation had been resolved. Many years later, when the crisis over Algeria grew and France drifted toward civil war, those dissatisfied with the direction of government policy, especially within the army, began to see de Gaulle as a possible savior. He came back as the hero of World War II, but his heroism did not mean endless power, as Merom (1999) explained: When de Gaulle became premier, the majority of the French were already unwilling to pay more blood or money to sustain the Algerian war effort … ready to compromise over Algeria, and in disagreement with the policy of ‘no negotiation’ with the FLN…they were already amenable to more radical suggestions than, say, De Gaulle's October 1958 ‘peace of the brave’ initiative … [but] de Gaulle’s quick consolidation of support in 1958, and the extraordinarily high level of public confidence in his ability to resolve the Algerian problem, should not be understood as the French people giving the Gaulle a blank check to choose whatever Algerian policy he wanted…they supported him because he was taking the road they wanted him to follow. (p. 276)

Why is it important to highlight the limited power of heroic leaders, particularly in times of crisis? De Gaulle’s story emphasizes the need for (even) heroic leaders in getting followers’ support in their decisions and activities, despite the followers’ fear and anxiety caused many times by the uncertain aspects of the crisis. Not even an educational leader whose reputation as an extraordinary leader is well known in the community can imagine that his/her heroism and status are beyond the teachers’ or parents’ needs and desires. De Gaulle would warn the school leaders not to rely on heroism as a panacea for everything, as heroism alone is insufficient

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to solve the crisis. After all, even he had to satisfy France’s elites and could withdraw from Algeria only after these elites had lost confidence in the existing regime to solve the Algerian crisis. Jackson (2018) illustrated the gap between heroism and reality by stressing the long time that took de Gaulle, despite his heroic image, to solve the Algerian crisis: Many historians have argued that de Gaulle had a clear vision with regard to that crisis, a game plan that led slowly but surely towards independence. Jackson, however, contends that: “perhaps no one could have done any better, but it is hard to see that anyone could have done much worse. The Fourth Republic had struggled with Algeria for four years; de Gaulle, with all his prestige and all the powers at his disposal, struggled on for another four.” (p. 545)

The lesson is very clear; even if the followers (i.e., teachers) attach a heroic image to their leaders, the leaders cannot rely on that image solely and act as if other actors have no influence on the crisis and its management. Shared leadership is particularly important in times of crisis when every teacher (or parent) plays a key role in solving the crisis. For example, South African school principals constantly tried to improve the conditions in their schools to minimize negative impact of COVID-19 by drawing toward participative styles of leadership including caring and shared leadership (Msila, 2022). Shared governance allowed middle managers and teachers to create common purposes in face of the pandemic, raise their voices in meetings, and support each other. In this way, each school member and stakeholder contributed in one way or another to the management of the crisis. Instigating a Crisis and Highlighting Its Dire Consequences Sometimes, in order to solve a continuous inconvenience or malfunction, the leader has to initiate a crisis intended to reconstruct the reality and make an end to current ineffective situations. De Gaulle seems to have used this technique more than once in his political career. Thus, he intentionally instigated crises in Syria and Lebanon after hearing from his intelligence sources that England and the US had altered their plans for a cross-Channel invasion of France that year and were intending secretly to take over French North Africa with the collaboration of a new American sponsored French leader, General Henri Giraud, and local pro-Vichy

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commanders; he was to be excluded from this operation (Zamir, 2007). By instigating a crisis in both countries he convinced Churchill that he could not be ignored. In 1965, likewise, following serious disagreement between the European Commission, France, and its European Economic Community (EEC) partners over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), de Gaulle initiated the “empty chair crisis” and started a boycott of the EEC at the beginning of July 1965 (Bajon, 2011). Bajon further explained the instigation: De Gaulle wanted to test his partners and provoke initiatives for mediation favorable to France. Alain Peyrefitte openly admitted that the French aim was “to dramatize the situation while our partners were trying to de-­ dramatize the situation”. This was a highly promising tactics since Belgium and Luxembourg were extremely worried by the European situation and would try to reach a settlement with de Gaulle at almost any price. (p. 261)

When an actual situation of crisis did not exist, de Gaulle strove to create a feeling that a crisis would ensue where his policy was not accepted. In any case, a minor crisis would occur because he threatened withdrawal from office (Dawes-Mccorkle, 1978). Nonetheless, although de Gaulle won the battle in 1965 he lost the war, because it kept France within the European Common without major formal reforms (Knapp, 2021). Any educational leader should bear in mind, though, that we know how we enter a crisis but we can never know how it will proceed and what its results will be. De Gaulle, for example, could not know that the crisis he had provoked in the Levant was jeopardizing an operation which Churchill deemed to be one of the most crucial of the entire World War II (Zamir, 2007). De Gaulle’s instigation strategy is common among politicians in our era too, but is less recommended in educational leadership. Yet, in times of crisis some teachers and stakeholders may not be convinced of the potentially dire consequences of the crisis or even might deny the occurrence of crisis events in the school. In this case, the school leaders ought to raise teachers’ awareness of the destructive situation and propel them to be involved in any activities intended to manage the crisis and minimize its negative outcomes. Initiating a crisis is unnecessary in this case, but shedding much light on its actual factors and consequences is vital to motivate teachers and stakeholders to participate in a crisis team or to perform what is required to manage the crisis successfully.

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Chapter Summary • De Gaulle led France along three crises—the occupation of France in World War II, the war in Algeria, and the “empty chair crisis” during the 1960s in Europe. • De Gaulle was aware of the critical role of emotion in leader-­followers relations and used it to encourage the French people in hard times. • Unifying diverse and antagonistic groups in the school and in its environment is an indispensable part in any crisis management, as de Gaulle did at different times in his political career. • Innovative behavior and risk-taking have characterized the lives and career of de Gaulle and should be adopted by educational leaders who face crisis events and need “revolutionary solutions” in order to respond to them effectively and successfully. • Although instigating a crisis, as de Gaulle sometimes did during his career, is less suitable for educational organizations, it provides insight into the leader’s need to increase teachers’ and stakeholders’ awareness of current and impending crisis events in the organization. Questions for Consideration 1. As de Gaulle was fully aware of the strong impact of emotions on his followers, particularly in times of crisis, could you suggest educational leaders how to regulate their emotions in hard times and help teachers regulate their own emotions in face of crisis events. 2. What are the strategies educational leaders can use in order to unify the staff in face of an impending crisis? Could you give real-life examples of crisis events in schools and indicate how “unification” could help improve their management? 3. Assume that an educational leader had to face with a death of a midlife teacher in the school due to heart attack or with a homicide of a student in the 12th grade. What could s/he learn from de Gaulle’s inclination to take risks and suggest revolutionary solutions to national and military crises? 4. Is there any situation in the school that could have pushed educational leaders to instigate a sense of crisis in the school? Could you explain your answer? 5. What is the legacy of de Gaulle to educational leadership in our turbulent time?

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Practical Activities 1. You were asked to teach the leadership of de Gaulle in one of the principal preparation programs. How would you convince the principal candidates to follow de Gaulle’s legacy when combating a crisis (of all types)? Please provide at least three rationales. 2. Talk with your colleagues about the ways in which de Gaulle solved national crises in France. Ask them to compare his “way” to their experiences with and responses to crises during their career? List their responses and analyze the gap between de Gaulle’s legacy and teachers’ responses to crisis events.

References Bajon, P. (2011). De Gaulle finds his “Master”: Gerhard Schröder’s “fairly audacious politics” in the European crisis of 1965-66. Journal of European Integration History, 17(2), 253–269. Chalaby, J.  K. (1998). A charismatic leader’s use of the media: De Gaulle and television. Press/Politics, 3(4), 44–61. Clague, M. (1975). Conceptions of leadership: Charles de Gaulle and Max Weber. Political Theory, 3(4), 423–440. Creny, P. (1988). The process of personal leadership: The case of de Gaulle. International Political Science Review, 9(2), 131–142. Constantia, C., Christos, P., Glykeria, A., Anastasia, A. R., & Aikaterini, V. (2021). The impact of COVID-19 on the educational process: The role of the school principal. Journal of Education. Online First. Dawes-Mccorkle, D.  O. (1978). Flattery for reform: A case for de Gaulle. Communication Quarterly, 26(1), 27–36. de Gaule, C. (1954). Mémoires de guerre. L’appel 1940–1942. L’unité 1942–1944. Le salut 1944–1946. Paris, Plon. Ducastel, J. (2015). Charles de Gaulle: L'homme de la résistance: Aux multiples facettes. Lemaitre Publishing. Gaffney, J. (2010). Political leadership in France: From Charles De Gaulle to Nicolas Sarkozy. Palgrave Macmillan. Hofmann, S. (1990). De Gaulle as an innovative leader. French Politics and Society, 8(4), 78–92. Jackson, J. (2018). De Gaulle: The self-made man. Harvard University Press. Knapp, H. (2021). Charles de Gaulle. Routledge. Merom, G. (1999). 'The grand design': Charles de Gaulle and the end of the Algerian war. Armed Forces and Society, 25(2), 267–288.

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Msila, V. (2022). Managing poor schools through relevant values and cultures: Lessons from COVID-19. Proceedings of INTED2022 conference, Valencia 7–8th March. Retrieved on 8 November 22 from https://doi.org/10.21125/ inted.2022. Oplatka, I., & Crawford, M. (2022). Principal, let’s talk about emotions: Some lessons COVID-19 taught us about emergency situations and leadership. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 25(1), 162–172. Roth, B. C. (2018). Betrayal of a school community. London: Routledge. Rubinsky, Y. (2015). De Gaulle’s lessons for 21st century Europe. Retrieved from https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/de-­gaulle-­s-­lessons-­for-­21st-­century­europe/. Sahlberg, P. (2020). Will the pandemic change schools? Journal of Professional Capital and Community, 5(3/4), 359–365. Troitino, D. R. (2008). De Gaulle and the European communities. Socio-economic and institutional environment: Harmonization in the EU countries of Baltic Sea rim: A collection of research articles dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the Institute for European Studies. Warlouzet, L. (2011). De Gaulle as a father of Europe: The unpredictability of the FTA’s failure and the EEC’s success (1956–58). Contemporary European History, 20(4), 419–434. Zamir, M. (2007). De Gaulle and the question of Syria and Lebanon during the second world war: Part I. Middle Eastern Studies, 43(5), 675–708.

CHAPTER 6

John Kennedy

Chapter Overview • The Cuban missile crisis • The courage to go to the limit • Calmness: stay relax! • The importance of time to think before responding • An analysis of the crisis from the enemy’s view • Secretly trading a solution John Kennedy was only 46 years old at the time of his murder. Born in 1917, he went to a series of private schools in the 1920s and 1930s in which he earned average grades in most of the subjects, except an excellent grade in math (David & Peterson, 2010). David and Peterson further described the life of young Kennedy: While at Harvard, John remained an average student but did develop a special interest in contemporary politics, especially the rising crisis in Europe in the late 1930s. Since his father was the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain from 1937 to 1940, John was able to pursue his interest while watching the deteriorating conditions in Europe. He traveled throughout much of Europe, and because of his father’s connections, he gained audiences with many European leaders. Interestingly, despite his father’s well-known anti-­ Semitism and pro-Germany views, John came to see Germany as a great

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threat and considered the decision by Great Britain and France to appease Hitler at the September 1938 Munich Conference a colossal mistake. (p. 5)

After an impressive military service in World War II and a brave, successful attempt to rescue his team in the Far East, Kennedy won a seat in the Senate in 1953 where he focused mostly on local Massachusetts issues (e.g., labor issues, fishing industry) and national security topics. In 1961, he was elected as the 35th president of the US. Learning from the failure of the American army in its attempt to invade Cuba in 1961 and replace the Communist regime with a pro-American one, in what is named—Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy, as I will show in the next pages, was successful in facing a difficult test amid complicating personal and political circumstances (Holiday, 2019). In Pantalone’s (2020) view, his presidential position made him a critical player in the crisis and the deciding factor of any resulting fallout. His high cognitive abilities and emotional intelligence directly molded his response to information about the missiles in Cuba. Note, nevertheless, that after reviewing the literature about Kennedy’s foreign policy, Kaufman (1993) claimed that Kennedy was a person with two contrasting sides. Accordingly, there was a worldly, perceptive, strong, and judicious leader that inspired the American people with confidence and charisma and recognized the fast changes taking place in his time. In contrast, there was a darker president, a shallow, cynical, passionless, and arrogant politician who sometimes lost control over his own foreign policy and might have weakened the nation.

The Cuban Missile Crisis In October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was fifty-fifty, because the Soviet Union deployed not only nuclear-armed ballistic missiles but also hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba. It was obvious to Kennedy and his cabinet that any US air strike or invasion of Cuba would trigger a nuclear response against American ships and troops, and perhaps even Miami (Graham, 2012). The resulting war might have led to the deaths of 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians, or even worse than that; the end of life on Earth (Holiday, 2019). Needless to say, Kennedy had to respond very carefully and wisely to prevent such a consequence.

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Chronologically speaking, on October 14, a US spy plane caught the Soviet Union attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba, 90 miles off the US coast (Graham, 2012). A day later, Kennedy received information about the offensive nuclear missiles placed in San Cristobal, Cuba, but could not believe it was true. After the shock, he assembled on October 16 a group of high-level personnel—the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (“ExComm”), the group established by the president at the start of the crisis to furnish him with advice and discuss the crisis. The group met on the same day and perceived the deployment of the nuclear missiles as an aggressive intervention by the Soviet Union into the strategic balance of power (May & Zelikow, 1997). After a week of secret deliberations with his most trusted advisers, Kennedy tells the world about the missiles situated in Cuba on October 22 in a televised speech and impose a naval blockade (i.e., quarantine) on further shipments of weapons and ammunition to Cuba. A day later, the Organization of American States (OAS) supported the US decision to quarantine Cuba. On October 24, the first Soviet vessels approached the blockage boundary, but turned back before reaching the boundary. This military withdrawal was followed two days later by a long, informal “first letter” from Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, in which he offered to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in return for a US pledge not to invade the island or undermine its communist regime. On October 27, Khrushchev sent a more serious, formal “second letter,” also demanding that the US withdraw its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy tells his closest colleagues (and later to the Soviet ambassador) that he is going to agree to Khrushchev’s formal request, but wants to keep the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey a secret. Thus, Kennedy answered positively in public to Khrushchev, promising that the US would abstain from invading Cuba and wants to explain the options for relieving tensions regarding Turkey. At the last minute, the crisis was resolved without war, as Khrushchev accepted Kennedy’s offers. Although some historians have thought that Kennedy was driven in the crisis also by political motives related to the incoming elections to the Senate and Congress, Paterson and Brophy (1986) unequivocally claimed that the president did not engage in the missile crisis in order to silence his noisy Republican critics or to attract votes in November. However, as is now well known, Kennedy had a secret taping system installed in the White House in both the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room, which he could turn off and on unbeknownst to others (Bredhoff, 2012). When

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listening to the tapes in the time of the crisis, we reveal a range of thoughts and opinions as regards the correct response to the Soviet’s aggressive act, from those advocating a surprise attack on Cuba to a peaceful diplomatic solution (Chace, 2015; Grattan, 2004). The leadership of Kennedy in this crisis and the work of ExComm teach us a lot about crisis management in education and shed light on new aspects of crisis leadership.

Lessons Learned from Kennedy’s Crisis Leadership How well did President Kennedy perform during the missile crisis? According to the participants in ExComm, it was Kennedy’s finest hour; he was neither hasty nor hesitant; he was neither reckless nor afraid (Sorensen). He demonstrated toughness, restraint, and determination (Schlesinger). He always exercised wisdom, analysis, and a keen sense of strategy; he was not only a leader but also a hero (Medland, 1990, p. 443). He was a realist who was able to delegate authority (Schlesinger, 1986) and acknowledged his limit of power and control. Therefore, he delegated much authority to his ad hoc advisory committee formed to address the crisis (ExComm) and relied on his brother, Robert Kennedy, the US Attorney General at that time (Chace, 2015). Robert Kennedy claimed that in ExComm President Kennedy had unwaveringly led those officials who supported the idea of blockading Cuba against those more reckless advisers who favored some form of military action against the island (Kennedy, 1969). This highlights, and not for the first time in this book, the importance of shared leadership in times of crisis whose uncertain characteristics make it impossible for one person to make decisions. In order to share his authority with ExComm, Kennedy had to be a flexible person whose ability to read a changed situation and detach himself from common attitudes toward military crisis or Cuba was high. Although he was ready to use any military means required to overthrow the anti-American, communist government in Cuba, he was fully aware of the new situation caused by the deployment of nuclear missiles as part of the conflict. Peltonen (2019) explained this complexity: Kennedy attempted to detach himself from the attitude towards Cuba that was prevalent in the American atmosphere. On several occasions, he states on the recordings how Cuba has become an obsession for the US, and how other countries, including their own allies, might see the situation from another, more balanced perspective…The Europeans did not understand

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the emotional Yankee attitude towards losing their “own” island state in the aftermath of Castro’s revolution. Kennedy tried to analyze the prevalent beliefs in an unprejudiced way, and to highlight alternative interpretations of the situation. (Peltonen, 2019, p. 94)

Many times teachers hold conservative views of the schooling process and avoid changing their practice, in spite of social or technological changes in their environment. In contrast, Kennedy’s successful crisis management taught us about the importance of ignoring conventional “remedies” or common responses to the crisis. Kennedy has always sought for flexibility and crafted a strategy “that did not put the Soviets in a position where they felt the need to lash out,” not only during the Cuba missile crisis but also during political negotiations with them (Batchelder, 2020, p. 83). In this sense, Kennedy’s tendency to search for alternative ideas (e.g., the blockade) is consistent with the conclusion of Kane et al. (2021) in that companies that emerge stronger because of disruption are those that use it as an opportunity for innovation. This conclusion should be further highlighted by educational leaders due to the varied and complex nature of the schooling process and the wide variety of students whose needs should be met many times in different manners. Furthermore, Pantalone (2020) asserted that Kennedy’s cognitive style throughout this missile crisis was impeccable and evidence of his mental prowess. When information is massive and the leader has to read quickly a host of documents sent to him from different sources, his or her skillful mastery over many documents in small amount of time is critical. Kennedy was such a person; his mental capabilities had allowed him to be a quick reader, as Greenstein (2009) indicated. He used to read various intelligence briefings and communications with foreign nations and make decisions about the next stage carefully but relatively fast. While educational leaders are unlikely to engage in a nuclear crisis, they had to struggle with many documents sent to them from different stakeholders during the corona crisis such as the health authorities, the superintendents, and the municipality. One of the hazards in this case is making (fatal?) mistakes. But Kennedy was also a person who admits his mistakes and, consequently, attempts to correct them in order to improve the management of the crisis, as Batchelder (2020) showed: Kennedy’s willingness to correct his mistakes during the Berlin crisis offers a masterful case study in leadership. Admitting error is never easy. In his

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speech on July 25, Kennedy said that no man “who does not bear the burdens of this office” could understand how heavy and constant would be those burdens. Kennedy struggled to carry them. (p. 84)

No doubt, during the pandemic, many educational leaders made mistakes, and some of the responses to health constraints could have been implemented and done better. Some Canadian principals, though, seem to have learned from Kennedy’s attitude toward mistakes: they used their mistakes and the consecutive critics from teachers and stakeholders for learning, unlearning, and relearning (Briscoe & Nyereyemhuka, 2022). Put another way, the chances of making mistakes in times of crisis are high, but the educational leader should learn from the mistakes and be sufficiently flexible to alter previous practices and improve them adequately. The Courage to Go to the Limit While serving in the army during World War II, his PT-boat was hit severely by a Japanese warship, and Kennedy, slightly injured, organized the survivors and encouraged them to swim for 3 h until they arrived at land in the Pacific. His bravery and commitment to his crew coupled with his decision to serve in the navy despite his poor health condition (he has suffered back injury all his life) are remarkable. He risked his life on several occasions in the Solomon Islands to save his crew from further suffering and the real possibility of Japanese captivity. His courage accompanied him also during the long days in the Cuban missile crisis, as Medland (1990) noted: The composite perspective of the participants then is one of a President acting courageously, selecting an appropriate response, and managing the crisis to a successful resolution. The participants view positively the results which followed in the aftermath of the crisis. (p. 435)

Let’s think about a crisis event in the school, be it an extreme violence during the break or a severe disagreement with local politicians over the introduction of a new curriculum into the classrooms. What would Kennedy recommend? How would he respond to this crisis? In confronting the Soviet leader, Kennedy ordered actions that he knew would increase the risk not only of conventional war but also of nuclear war

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whose consequences might have been deadly (Graham, 2012). Thus, Kennedy would suggest responding to these crisis events in new, even risky ways, in the short run in order to decrease them over the longer term. Back to our examples from the school’s context, having a restraining order from the court against some extremely violent students may engender resentment from community leaders and local politicians; yet, despite the risk underlying this response, it may decrease school violence in the long run and, in turn, improve the school’s climate and student achievement. Graham (2012) formulated Kennedy’s possible recommendation in the following citation: One lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is that if you are not prepared to risk war, even nuclear war, an adroit adversary can get you to back down in successive confrontations. If you do have redlines that would lead to war if crossed, then you have to communicate them credibly to your adversary and back them up or risk having your threats dismissed. (p. 15)

Sometimes, the leader has no other choice but to go to the limit and act forcibly in the crisis, as Kennedy did, according to Bundy (1988). An effective response to any crisis event requires sometimes negotiations with teachers, students, or stakeholders during which the leader is likely to go to the limit and make it clear that he or she is ready to take any risk necessary to solve the crisis. This is one conclusion we reach after analyzing the leadership of Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. Calmness: Stay Relax! As the world stared down the barrel of nuclear war, Kennedy was a model of calmness (Holiday, 2019). Kennedy’s speechwriter Arthur Schlesinger Jr. indicated that Kennedy was well satisfied by the performance of the Executive Committee that proved a brilliant instrument of consideration and coordination. He was most impressed with Kennedy’s personal performance, as Pious (2001) described: [Kennedy] coolly and exactly measured the level of force necessary to deal with the level of threat. Defining a clear and limited objective, he moved with mathematical precision to accomplish it, and “by his own composure, clarity and control, he held the country behind him” (p. 82)

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When listening to the tapes in the White House, Kennedy makes decisions calmly, openly, and collaboratively despite the enormous stress of the situation (Holiday, 2019). There are no fighting, no raised voices, no finger-­ pointing, but laughing and relaxing. According to the participants, Kennedy’s leadership in the crisis led to a reduction in the tensions during the meetings and to the installation of the teletype “hot line” between the White House and the Kremlin as well as to the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty several months later (Medland, 1990). Under the calm leadership of Kennedy, the participants could consider a number of options and choose the least aggressive course of action—a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba—over the use of military force whose consequences could be lethal (Grattan, 2004). Along the same line, for example, an educational leader who faces an abrupt death of one teacher after he suffered a heart attack in the classroom must avoid any hysteric response and express calmness and control in the situation. Kennedy’s leadership taught us how critical calmness is to effective decision-making in times of crisis. During the Cuban missile crisis, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down using a Russian anti-aircraft missile. The plane crashed and its pilot died. In response, Kennedy had to use all the methods of persuasion he knew to prevent ExComm from deciding to immediately initiate a counterstrike against the missile batteries. The calm climate he built in the Committee enabled him to convince everyone not to respond at all. Later, it became clear that the anti-aircraft missile was fired upon without permission from the Soviet military command (Peltonen, 2019). One can imagine what would happen if an American counterstrike killed many Russians on the ground and led to a military deterioration between both superpowers. Grattan (2004) highlights the influence of Kennedy’s leadership in this crisis: The American determination was made clear to the Soviet Chairman, Khrushchev, who was left in no doubt that the situation would escalate, even to include nuclear options. The strategy that began to emerge can be seen as comprising three levels analogous to corporate, business and functional levels. The leadership provided by President Kennedy guided the discussions between the “hawk” and “dove” extremes, and used a Socratic, questioning approach to a large degree. The President acted as a facilitator, rather than a dictator of strategy. (p. 67)

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Gilstrap et al. (2016) examined how 43 nonprofit leaders across the US make sense of organizational crises in their contexts and explored their perceptions toward effective leadership during times of crisis. The leaders stressed the importance of “maintaining a calm demeanor” and “having a calming influence.” I assume that educational leaders would hold similar perceptions, as calmness is critical, particularly in managing crises in schools whose influence on the growth and well-being of young people is high. The Importance of Time to Think Before Responding When the information about the deployment of the missiles reached Kennedy and his staff, the immediate advice he received from his advisors was to destroy them with the full might of the country’s military arsenal and afterward invade Cuba (Holiday, 2019). Otherwise, they added, he would risk the safety and the reputation of the US. Surprisingly, Kennedy wanted everyone to slow down and think calmly about the problem in front of them. One of the first questions Kennedy asked on being told of the missile discovery was, how long until this leaks? McGeorge Bundy, his national security adviser, thought it would be a week at most (Graham, 2012). Several decades later, a school principal receives a very alarming message from her friend in the municipality; one of the schools in the city that competes for the same students (as part of school choice policy) has adopted an aggressive marketing program and intends to emphasize its advantages over the others. The principal was advised to advertise her positive school outcomes and tie up a loose end. She could do it, but marketing requires time for studying the needs of market targets and for planning promotion activities and tools (Oplatka & Hemsley-Brown, 2021). Kennedy no doubt would recommend her to wait before acting, because the time he had to understand the situation, examine the evidence, explore varied options, and consider each one of them profoundly and secretly not only prevented harsh responses (e.g., air strike), but also helped change his mind more than once along the way (Graham, 2012). McKeown (2000) explained why Kennedy’s decision after several days to impose the blockade was the best option: The domestic political situation induced the selection of the blockade mainly by inhibiting the choice of initial responses that were either more or less

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forceful. Leaving the international situation aside, less forceful options would have generated sharp public criticism from hawkish Republicans and others. Public opinion, which supported “doing something” even before the discovery of the missiles, would not have been as supportive of the White House as it was after the announcement of the blockade. (p. 72)

A response that takes into account both international and domestic constraints requires several days of thinking and reflecting on various options. Similarly, before responding to a competitor’s aggressive marketing, the educational leader has to avoid creating a situation where it would appear that she was merely being swept along by calls from teachers and parents to be strong and determined. Therefore, the leader has to form a thinking group consisting of teachers, middle managers, parents, and if possible a marketer. This group needs time before suggesting an adequate response. Escalation of the situation is unfruitful, to say the least. An example of the importance of time to think before responding to any crisis we receive during the corona crisis. Kane et al. (2021) found that organizations’ response to COVID was inextricably linked to the longer-­ term digital disruption that had been ongoing for years. The shift to remote work enabled many Silicon Valley tech companies to begin hiring a more diverse workforce, because they were not limited to people who wanted to (and could afford to) live in the San Francisco Bay Area. An Analysis of the Crisis from the Enemy’s View Some crises involve a clear enemy (or a troublemaker) that evokes the crisis and usually threatens the target person or the organization (e.g., a competing school, a hostile parent association). Understanding the “enemy” and knowing how to manipulate him or her in the desired direction is one of the lessons we learn from Kennedy’s leadership during the missile crisis (Pious, 2001). The Soviets have not understood Kennedy at all, thinking him weak and irresolute, but Kennedy used his understanding of the Soviet’s motives and fears to help him respond properly to their brutality and provocation. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Kennedy’s advisor and biographer, indicated that “with his capacity to understand the problems of others, the President could see how threatening the world might have looked to the Kremlin” (Holiday, 2019, p. 3). Kennedy’s understanding of the “other side” gave

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him insight into how the Soviets would react to his responses, as arising from the next quote from the ExComm meetings: The experts wanted Kennedy to hang tough and make few if any concessions. Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, intervened at various points in ExComm meetings to take a hard line. He thought any deal with the Soviets would be a defeat: “I think they’ll change their minds when we take a continued, forceful action, stopping their ship or—or taking out a SAM-site. That kills some Russians. …” He told Kennedy that the Soviets would not insist on a Jupiter trade. “[W]e’re going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey,” Kennedy began at one point, and turning to Lewellyn, continued “Tommy, he’s not going to take them out of Cuba if we …” But Thompson interjected, “I don’t agree Mr. President. I think there’s still a chance that we can get this line going.” “He’ll back down?” Kennedy responded. Lewellyn proposed the Trollope ploy, so that Kennedy would ignore a message in which Khrushchev had proposed a trade and instead accept an earlier message in which no trade was demanded. (Welch & Blight, 1987, p. 83)

Because of his deep understanding of the Soviets, Kennedy enabled the members to express their ideas and attitudes but then asked them evocative questions intended to encourage them to reflect on their attitudes or to undermine their determined views of the Soviets’ intentions and actions. His responses to those members who called for more assertive actions against the Soviets illustrate the importance of “knowing the enemy” before responding to the crisis. Similarly, an educational leader who is facing a hostile parent association should, first, unearth their attitudes toward the school and education and analyze the latent emotions driving them in the crisis. For example, the leader may discover that their hostility derives from an irrational fear of losing control over their child’s education due to a new instructional reform aimed at changing the schooling process in grades one and two. Kennedy transmitted his solutions to the crisis via speeches just like other leaders outlined in this book. His speech was replete with many statements that fell on the ears of the Soviets and met their views of the situation. For instance, he called upon Chairman Khrushchev to end the crisis to stable relations between the US and the USSR and, thereby, to join in a historic effort to end the perilous arms race. In his mind, he knew that the Soviets felt threatened by the superiority of the US in the nuclear race between the countries. He was very careful not to corner the Soviets

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politically (Peltonen, 2019), while at the same time declaring his intention to eliminate the missiles from Cuba by all means. Analyzing Kennedy’s foreign policy with respect to the Limited Test Ban Treaty—the goal of signing a nuclear test ban between the countries—Wenger and Gerber (1999) concluded that: While Kennedy was clearly not the cold warrior that Fitzsimons, Walton, and Fairlie accused him of being, his foreign policy decisions were subject to political considerations related to domestic and foreign pressures to a far greater degree than Schlesinger, Sorensen, and Hilsman lead the reader to believe with their emphasis on Kennedy’s personal skills as a foreign policy leader and crisis manager. (p. 461)

In the organizational arena of the educational leaders, the leaders’ high personal skills in external relations may help them negotiate with the competitors or with the adversaries and find a solution to the crisis between them. Kennedy taught us of the salient role of collecting information about the “other side” and of trying to learn its motive, emotions, and perspectives. Secretly Trading a Solution When the crisis becomes too dangerous, as happened during the Cuban missile crisis, leaders from both sides should find a solution that will curtail the danger of severe confrontation, be it between two schools or between the school principal and the staff. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev misplayed their hands during the missile crisis, but eventually they made a deal, because they wanted to keep the danger of nuclear conflict contained (Pious, 2001). However, due to political constraints in both sides, their negotiations were handled secretly and only a part of the deal was discovered to the public. Basically, both leaders agreed to trade the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for the removal of American missiles in Turkey (Chace, 2015). Nevertheless, Kennedy insisted that the trade be kept secret and therefore, only a few people beside him were aware of the offer. The Soviets agreed to the US insistence that the dismantling in Turkey would not occur immediately; instead, it would take place four to five months after the crisis was resolved (Pious, 2001). May and Zelikow (1997) noted that in the ExComm transcripts there is no mention of any deal negotiated by the president as of the

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27th, though Kennedy had on numerous occasions talked about the probability that a deal would be the only way to end the crisis. One may wonder why it was critical to keep the deal secret. Schlesinger (1986) seems to provide a part of the answer: We simply expected that the U.S. president, as leader of the free world, as the head of the most powerful nation on earth, could prevail in superpower confrontations. The political dangers of seeming willing to compromise with the enemy had to be managed through the fiction that no compromise had occurred. Kennedy was vulnerable politically, and he was prepared to preserve an illusion rather than pay political costs at home. (p. 415)

Back to the school’s context, a crisis caused by a conflict between educational leaders and parent associations, for instance, may arouse various negative emotions and result in teachers’ strict demand not to compromise under any term. In this case, the educational leader who reaches a settlement with “the opponents” might be accused for giving up the interests of the school or for undermining the major values in the community. To avoid these and other accusations, Kennedy would recommend not publishing those parts in the compromise that might stimulate resentment and discomfort in the teacher’s lounge. I leave the ethical considerations to each reader, though. Chapter Summary • Kennedy’s high cognitive abilities and emotional intelligence directly molded his response to information about the missiles in Cuba. • Kennedy had to make critical decisions in face of catastrophic results due to the potential use of a nuclear weapon in the crisis. Despite a lack of information about the real situation in Cuba, the crisis was solved successfully without causing a military conflict. • Realizing his limited power and control over the crisis, Kennedy formed an advisory committee that helped him balance between different voices. He was driven by flexible thinking and personal resistance to follow conventional, sometimes conservative views of crisis management. • Sometimes, the leader should go to the limit in order to solve the crisis and prevent similar crises in the future. Risk-taking is critical in this case, even in fact of a nuclear threat.

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• Calmness, one of Kennedy’s features, enables thorough discussions and insightful decision-making during the crisis. • Some crises involve a clear enemy (or an opponent) that arouses a crisis and usually threatens the target person or the organization. Understanding the “enemy” (opponent) and knowing the ways to manipulate him or her in the desired direction in order to solve the conflict. • Sometimes it is better to conceal these parts in the compromise that may stimulate resentment and discomfort in the staff or in the community. Questions for Consideration 1. After reading this chapter, to what extent do you agree with Kaufman (1993) who claimed that Kennedy was a cynical, passionless, and arrogant politician? What are the behavioral expressions in his leadership during the Cuban crisis that supports your attitude? 2. Think about a crisis in educational organizations that resembles the Cuban missile crisis. Which strategies used by Kennedy could be applicable to the crisis you selected? 3. What is the connection, in your view, between flexible personality and shared leadership? Could you provide some real-life examples from your workplace? 4. Is it moral to go to the limit in education, as Kennedy did? What are the advantages and disadvantages of being engaged in manipulative negotiations in the school? 5. What does decision-making look like under calmness and relaxation? Any particular characteristic in educational organizations? 6. Why is it critical to analyze the opponent’s views, attitudes, and emotions in crisis management? 7. Could you think of a crisis in the school whose parts of its solution should be kept silent? Why? What are the ethical implications of this managerial act? Practical Activities 1. Ask several friends/colleagues to join in forming a crisis team. First, choose two elements in Kennedy’s crisis leadership and examine the

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extent to which they fit major values in your society/educational ­system. Second, think about a crisis event that occurred in your organization and suggest several mechanisms used by Kennedy to solve it. 2. List several elements of calmness that are relevant to the school’s context and combine them in effective decision-making process in your workplace.

References Batchelder, E.  F. (2020). The chief executive: Kennedy, crisis, and decision-­ making. A Thesis submitted to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Bredhoff, S. (2012). To the brink: JFK and the Cuban missile crisis. National Archives. Briscoe, P., & Nyereyemhuka, N. (2022). Turning leadership upside-down and outside-in during the COVID-19 pandemic. Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 200, 104–114. Bundy, M. (1988). Danger and survival: Choices about the bomb in the first fifty years. Random House. Chace, S. (2015). The Cuban missile crisis: Leadership as disturbance, informed by history. Journal of Leadership Studies, 9(2), 63–68. David, D. L., & Peterson, B. B. (2010). John F. Kennedy: the new frontier president. Nova Science Publishers. Gilstrap, C. A., Gilstrap, C. M., Holderby, K. N., & Valera, K. M. (2016). Sense-­ giving, leadership, and nonprofit crises: How nonprofit leaders make and give sense to organizational crisis. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27, 2787–2806. Graham, A. (2012). The Cuban Missile crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy today. Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 11–16. Grattan, R. F. (2004). The Cuban missile crisis: Strategy formulation in action. Management Decision, 42(1), 55–68. Greenstein, F. (2009). The presidential difference: Leadership style from FDR to Barack Obama. Princeton University Press. Holiday, R. (2019). Leadership lessons from the Cuban missile crisis. Retrieved on 16 November 22 from https://www.managementtoday.co.uk/leadership-­ lessons-­cuban-­missile-­crisis/leadership-­lessons/article/1662045. Kane, G. C., Nanda, R., Philips, A. N., & Copulski, J. R. (2021). The transformation myth: Leading your organization through uncertain times. MIT Press. Kaufman, B.  I. (1993). John F.  Kennedy as world leader: A perspective on the literature. Diplomatic History, 17(3), 447–470. Kennedy, R. F. (1969). Thirteen days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile crisis. Norton.

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May, E. R., & Zelikow, P. D. (1997). The Kennedy tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile crisis (p. 464, 482). Belknap Press. McKeown, T.  J. (2000). The Cuban Missile Crisis and Politics as Usual. The Journal of Politics, 62(1), 70–87. Medland, W. J. (1990). The Cuban Missile crisis: Evolving historical perspectives. The History Teacher, 23(4), 433–447. Oplatka, I., & Hemsley-Brown, J. (2021). A systematic and updated review of the literature on higher education marketing 2005–2019. In Z.  Sinuany-Stern (Ed.), Handbook of operations research and management science in higher education (pp. 35–80). Springer. Pantalone, A. (2020). Cognitive and emotional intelligence of President John F.  Kennedy During the Cuban Missile crisis. The Histories, 16(1), Article 8. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/the_histories/vol16/iss1/8 Paterson, T.  G., & Brophy, W.  J. (1986). October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962. The Journal of American History, 73(1), 87–119. Peltonen, T. (2019). Towards wise management. Palgrave Macmillan. Pious, R. M. (2001). The Cuban missile crisis and the limits of crisis management. Political Science Quarterly, 116(1), 81–105. Schelsinger, A., Jr. (1986). Cycles of American history (p. 415). Houghton Mifflin. Welch, D. A., & Blight, G. (1987). The eleventh hour of the Cuban missile crisis: An introduction to the ExComm transcripts. International Security, 12, 88. Wenger, A., & Gerber, M. (1999). John F. Kennedy and the Limited Test Ban Treaty: A case study of presidential leadership. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29(2), 460–487.

PART II

Military Crises in Times of war

CHAPTER 7

The Duke of Wellington

Chapter Overview • The crisis: The Peninsular War and the Battle of Waterloo • A need for flexible managerial thinking • The critical aspect of resource mobilization • Intelligence and understanding of the “lay of the land” • A courage to act • Accessibility and visibility in the school

The Crisis: The Peninsular War and the Battle of Waterloo In 1806, France’s inability to defeat the British on the sea coupled with the Royal Navy’s dominance of the English Channel led Napoleon to embargo all traffic between Europe and Great Britain (Hall, 2004). When in 1807 Napoleon made peace with Russia and Prussia he isolated England from mainland Europe and severely hampered their ability to wage a decisive land war against the French army. Likewise, the lack of a powerful continental ally in Europe enhanced the importance of retaining an Anglo-­ Portuguese alliance, an act that Napoleon immediately responded to by mounting extensive diplomatic pressure upon Portugal to abandon England and join his continental system. Nevertheless, Portugal refused

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and the French army invaded and occupied the country in November of that year. Thus, England remained completely isolated and it was just a matter of time before the continental system would destroy the English economy and force its government to the bargaining table (Chandler, 1966). The English government could not let it happen, though. Their opportunity came in 1808 when Napoleon conspired against the ruling Spanish Bourbons and placed his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the throne of Spain in an attempt to bring the kingdom of Spain under his direct control. The Spanish people reacted by rising in revolt against him and by May 2 a general insurrection had to be put down in Madrid itself. A month later, the revolt extended to the entire Spanish nation and the revolutionaries requested British assistance (Hendrick, 1998). Thus, Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula brought Spain, Portugal, and Britain into a close, if sometimes uneasy alliance. When an expeditionary force led by General Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the 1st Duke of Wellington, arrived in Portugal in August 1808, the British army had already been at war with France for five years. The arrival of the British forces signaled the beginning of the Peninsular War, the “Spanish ulcer” that was to begin a telling military drain on Napoleon. After his landing in the Portuguese coastal areas, Wellington had to face a host of problems. They included inadequate numbers of soldiers of good quality, reluctant or incompetent senior officers, an absence of ongoing assistance to supply the army, inadequate supplies and funding, and a lack of disciplined and organized Portuguese army to carry out his campaign plan (Chandler, 1994; Kirby, 2011). For example, in 1810, Wellington’s logistical strategy was the transformation of Lisbon and the adjacent areas into a well-defended sanctuary where he could protect his soldiers and equipment. In many respects, “it was a bold, yet very skillfully conceived plan that relied on the limitations of the French supply system to maintain large armies in the Peninsula in one place,” as Horward (1999, p.  39) indicated. Likewise, Wellington capitalized on the advantages that the Royal Navy and sea-based logistics provided and won the war of attrition through the superior exploitation of available logistical resources as opposed to military strategy (Wiegley, 1991). This was an asset the French simply did not have. In 1814, Wellington eliminated the French army completely from Spain and invaded the southern areas of France itself. However, a year later Napoleon reorganized his army and met Wellington in the Battle of Waterloo. According to Black (2009, p.  59), “the battle of Waterloo

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proved to be the ultimate test of Wellington’s abilities as a battlefield commander. Wellington’s hodgepodge Allied army was insufficiently trained, particularly compared to his previous Peninsular army or to Napoleon’s veteran troops.” His own army was not in the best condition; its multinational structure generated myriad difficulties of loyalty and brought about a regional inconsistency in the level of training. Nevertheless, Wellington artfully reacted to problematic situations that came up throughout the battle and worked within the limitations of his own resources. The victory in the Napoleonic Wars placed the UK in a position to become the nineteenth century’s dominant power. Wellington became a national hero with a supremely significant impact on the history of the British Empire. In later years, he entered national politics and was elected the prime minister of the UK in 1828–1830 and in 1834 and served as a minister in several offices. But it was his military leadership that teaches us so much about educational leadership in times of crisis. In the next pages, I focus on several aspects of Wellington’s leadership during the Peninsular War from which we can learn some lessons relevant to educational leaders who face a particular social, organizational, or educational crisis.

Lessons to Learn from Wellington’s Crisis Leadership After we become familiar with the context in which Wellington lived and fought, let us now turn to discuss his unique qualities, skills, and capacities whose important value to educational leadership in times of crisis is irrefutable. Five lessons to educational leadership, arising from Wellington’s story, are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. A Need for Flexible Managerial Thinking After the war was over and Napoleon was defeated, Wellington was asked why he had enjoyed such success against the French Marshals in Spain. He replied: They planned their campaigns just as you might make a splendid piece of harness. It looks very well; and answers very well; until it gets broken; and then you are done for. Now I made my campaigns of ropes. If anything went wrong, I tied a knot; and went on. (Longford, 1969, p. 442)

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During times of crisis, daily procedures and routines may be disrupted abruptly by external events. This, in turn, may undermine the social order and the organizational structure that have been institutionalized for many years in the school. In Wellington’s own words, everything looks very well in the school until it gets broken, resulting in confusion and uncertainty among school leaders, teachers, pupils, and environmental constituencies. Many of them need to ask themselves what to do now, after the crisis has erupted and everything goes wrong, just like in the COVID crisis in which schools had to close their gates and move to online teaching within 24 h (De Voto et al., 2023). More specifically, can educational leaders go on running their schools as before? Can they stick to the same organizational procedures? Are they capable of retaining traditional, deeply institutionalized managerial norms and behaviors? Two centuries ago, Wellington faced the same dilemma. Influenced by his military experience in India, he assumed that classic strategy used successfully by his soldiers against Indian natives would work as well against the French on the Iberian Peninsula. Shortly afterward, he found this was not always possible. Hendrick (1988) explained: When [Wellington] was able to gain a numerical superiority, either by actual numbers, or in the advantages of the defense, [he] did quite well against Napoleon’s Marshals. But, when confronted by massed corps, he encountered an enemy that, while possible to defeat, was impossible to destroy. Wellington had met his own “dreadful symmetry” on the high plains of Spain. Obviously, a new style of military art would be required to gain victory. (p. 42)

A crisis may stimulate re-understanding of the reality among educational leaders, resulting in reframing of their leadership styles and strategies to accommodate the new conditions and circumstances. To this end, however, the leader needs flexibility and open-minded leadership traits. Wellington had both of them; in the campaigns of 1809–1811 and 1813–1814, he mounted a new style of military campaign that can, at best, be called an early form of operational art (Hendrick, 1998). Thus, while the French Marshals persisted in the practice of classic strategy, Wellington abandoned his well-known, old classical strategy and adapted a new operational vision that gave his army the ability to react more rapidly than the enemy. His extraordinary mental agility made him a great crisis leader because it allowed him fast reaction to changing events on the

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battlefield. No doubt, mental agility is required, by and large, in times of crisis. But how can educational leaders respond quickly to changing circumstances in times of crisis? Wellington’s leadership in the Battle of Waterloo provides part of the answer. In order to respond to enemy movements in a timely and efficient manner, Wellington had to maintain his active involvement with all aspects of the battle and be on the spot to move troops personally. Black (2009) elaborated on it: [Wellington] did as much as he could himself, always being on the spot to move troops personally, oversee the deployment of reserves, and ensure that his troops carried out his orders to the last detail. He fought a carefully planned battle, where he prepared for the inevitable surprises that occur in such battles. As a result, he was prepared for anything that Napoleon could throw at him. He even planned his battlefield deployments, so that the weaker, foreign troops would not ever be isolated from the stronger British and German veterans. Wellington worked within the confines of his own resources, never underestimating the abilities of the French Emperor. (Black, 2009, pp. 92–93)

The lessons every educational leader should gain from Wellington’s leadership in the battle are twofold: first, in uncertain and turbulent times it is wiser to remain flexible and alter structures and procedures to accommodate new needs and realities. Otherwise, the school will not be equipped for abrupt changes that occur in times of crisis (e.g., flooding, mass allergic reactions, and suicide attempts). Second, the crisis makes it necessary for educational leaders to be present almost everywhere (e.g., classrooms, team meetings, zoom classes) in order to be able to react immediately to difficulties, ambiguities, and uncertainties that are prevalent in these times. This will increase teachers’ confidence and trust in the leader and, in turn, enhance teacher collaboration and exchange of information that are necessary to cope with the uncertain nature of the crisis. I elaborate on the second lesson later on. The Critical Aspect of Resource Mobilization Much of the success of the British army in the Peninsular War was derived from the effectiveness of Wellington’s supply system. The ability of Wellington to keep his army supplied presented him with an enormous

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advantage over the French. “While superior logistics alone cannot win a war, their absence can lead to defeat, as the French learned to their detriment” (Kirby, 2011, pp. 4–5). No doubt, resource mobilization and utilization in times of crisis are critical to successful crisis management in schools because solving the crisis requires innovative responses and procedures as well as new human resources and expertise. For example, during the COVID crisis, education districts and local education authorities had to acquire new technologies necessary for online instruction and hire computer staff to support these technologies (De Voto et  al., 2023). Although resource mobilization and supply of instructional and technological tools are easier in our era than it was in Wellington’s days, still it is interesting to understand the complexity of these procedures in times of crisis through the logistic challenges faced by Wellington and his army: The logistic challenges faced by Wellington during the Peninsula War were daunting. The role logistics played in deciding the outcome of the war in the Peninsula as well as detailing the needs of the troops is important in understanding how the war was conducted. The procurement, transport, distribution, and payment of supplies for the use of the Anglo-Portuguese Army during the Peninsula War played a direct role in determining the final outcome. (Kirby, 2011, p. 4)

Put another way, funding and logistics may determine the outcomes of crisis management in schools. Wellington, for instance, used four main rivers in Portugal as transportation networks to move supplies and troops (Reid, 1993), and this gave him an advantage over the French forces. In this sense, Wellington’s army was based on the sea and rivers, his depots were built so that they could be replenished by ships and boats, and were within easy reach of the troops (James, 1992). Similarly, school principals must collaborate with a wide variety of stakeholders to achieve resources and supplies that are usually scarce in times of crisis. This will assist them in ensuring that teachers will be adequately supplied despite potential interruptions in resource mobilization stemming from the implications of the crisis. As part of his preparation for the battles with the French army, Wellington created by the end of 1812 a network of 37 magazines across Portugal that would serve as a supply base and a point from which mule trains could regularly deliver food and fodder, to various points on the battlefield. In our times, educational leaders must prepare in advance for a

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potential crisis in the future and keep reserve resources for hard times. When the crisis begins, they can deploy the resources skillfully and manage the crisis more effectively in its imminent phases. At Waterloo, Wellington understood the importance of keeping a fresh reserve force for the final attack, and when the reserves proved necessary, he deployed them skillfully on the battlefield (Morris, 1968). This is a very important lesson for educational leaders who may one day face an organizational, national, or global crisis. Intelligence and Understanding of the “Lay of the Land” One of the leadership features that eventually enabled Wellington’s army to defeat an army of such superior numbers was knowing its environment and understanding its enemy and its major weaknesses (Kirby, 2011). Interestingly, in all the places he fought, Wellington systematically read books about the topographical, geographical, and historical aspects of the country and the manner of government. When he deployed to India, he stocked his library with books on India and before he arrived in Portugal, he read the defense of Portugal conducted by William, the Count of Lippe Schaumberg, in 1762. This provided him with basic knowledge required to plan an effective military campaign. Thus, an educational leader must read about the essentials of the crisis (e.g., the nature of pandemics during the COVID crisis or mechanism of welfare systems in times of a severe economic crisis) and better understand its conceivable impact on the school. But, reading alone is insufficient. Intelligence, for Wellington, became the basis of strategic and operational planning, not just the evidence to support his preconceived plan (Davies, 2007). He and his divisional staff organized their own operational intelligence collection network that included civilian correspondents, military intelligence officers, and military spies and were able, for the most part, to obtain operational-level intelligence. In this way, Wellington could gain a better understanding of the topography and the land and, in turn, he identified the difficulties of the French army. Early in 1812, Marshal Marmont reported to Napoleon that Lord Wellington was quite aware that he had no supplies, and was familiar with the immensely difficult character of the country (Chandler, 1994). Consistent with Wellington’s astute understanding of the environment (James, 1992), educational leaders should visualize the influences of a

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forthcoming crisis on the school functioning and environment and, concomitantly, plan their responses. Although they are not supposed to use intelligence of the military kind, information gained from the education district or the local education authority and conversations with parents, teachers, and students are of much value to managing the crisis effectively. For example, an earthquake intrudes upon the schooling process and may disconnect students from the school, either physically or mentally, even many days after this natural disaster is over. Under these circumstances, educational leaders have to receive information about the likelihood of more earthquakes, continually communicate with community leaders, and learn about the health and well-being of students and their families. The information will enable the leaders to decide how to support students psychologically and to what extent teachers need to change former instructional plans. This brings us to talk about trust building prior to the appearance of the crisis in the school. When analyzing the persona of Wellington, Davies (2007) indicated that he relied on trusted subordinates to analyze incoming intelligence and to provide advice about the most effective course of action. He added: This allowed Wellington to concentrate solely on integrating operational and strategic intelligence into his decision-making, certain that the intelligence he was reading was as accurate and timely as possible. This reliance on the advice of his subordinates demonstrates that far from being an isolated commander, making decisions alone, Wellington relied heavily on his staff, an aspect of his art of command which shows clear evolution since his ‘command apprenticeship’. (p. 23)

One must bear in mind, though, that teamwork in times of crisis is of much value to effective crisis management. However, effective teamwork and shared decision-making require trust relations in the staff room and in school, and cannot be “generated” abruptly just because a threatening crisis erupts. A Courage to Act The French army counted 140,000 soldiers in Spain and the high quality of its soldiers and their new systems of warfare that helped Napoleon conquer large parts of Europe had been well known to Wellington. But, with characteristic confidence he declared:

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My die is cast, they may overwhelm me, but I don’t think they will out manoeuvre me. First, because I am not afraid of them, as everybody else seems to be; and secondly, because if what I hear of their system of manoeuvre is true, I think it a false one as against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle was begun I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand. (Griffith, 1983, p. 26)

As opposed to many European leaders and military generals who had been overwhelmed by the enormous power of Napoleon’s army, Wellington reacted calmly and with much confidence. He retreated to the safety of the Portuguese mountains and abandoned his strategy to wage war in Spain (Hendrick, 1998) just to locate his troops in better positions. He was simply unafraid of the myths told about the French army and the wise military leadership of its officers (Glover, 1983). Similarly, educational leaders who face an extreme crisis must avoid displaying fear, panic, or anxiety and remain calm and rational. In severe weather, for example, that has not been accurately foreseen and, therefore, teachers and students cannot leave the school building and get back home, it is better to think about how to keep them safe, evacuate some classrooms, and care for their nutritional needs rather than being panicky and indecisive. It was the Battle of Waterloo that demonstrated the unique courage of Wellington. According to Black (2009), his personal involvement in troop movements inspired the soldiers with confidence even though he was risking his life. Black further elaborated on Wellington’s courage: Wellington had an unsurpassable ability to inspire his troops. His cool, confident demeanor eased the fears of the allied soldiers; they could see that he did not panic, even with such huge responsibilities, so they could feel reassured that they could also remain calm and perform their tasks to the utmost. (p. 88)

There is no need to risk one’s life in most of the crises in schools nowadays. Yet, the courage of the educational leader to face the crisis directly with no hesitation is oftentimes critical for successful crisis management. The educational leaders must not be afraid of adopting new procedures and mechanisms necessary to manage the crisis even if they are likely to increase resistance among school members and stakeholders.

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Accessibility and Visibility in the School Whereas Napoleon was known for his obsession with time management and strict planning, Wellington triumphed at Waterloo with his ability to move constantly among the troops, repositioning whole armies on the fly (Hibbert, 1967). Sleeping very few hours during the battle, he tended to ensure he could always be at the scene of the action where he would be most required. Jackson (1903) remarked: His active role in the battle was facilitated by his mobility on horseback and his group of staff officers, numbering at least forty; this group of personal staff, the Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals, the commanding officers of the artillery and engineers and all of their aides-de-camp ensured that his orders would reach even the farthest corners of the battlefield without delay. This prevented most errors in communication and kept all units on the battlefield informed as to their role in the combat. (p. 46)

In the first phases of the crisis, the reality becomes vague, and old procedures and decisions seem to be more irrelevant than ever. This may result in elevated levels of anxiety and confusion among educational leaders, teachers, pupils, and stakeholders who are likely to need much more direction and guidance than on normal days. Thus, consistent with Wellington, educational leaders must continually communicate with teachers, students, and parents in order to provide them with as much information as possible about their response to the crisis and receive information from them. This is very important, given the plausible collapse of common mechanisms of communication in times of uncertainty and ambiguity. Likewise, Wellington’s presence among his soldiers embodied confidence at the Battle of Waterloo; most soldiers had the opportunity to observe him at some point during the battle (Hibbert, 1967). In times of crisis, though, new and experienced teachers need to feel confident again and the presence of the educational leader in the schoolyard and in their classrooms may not only emphasize his/her dedication to the school, but also inspire them to join the leader in coping with the crisis. This leadership behavior succeeded at the Battle of Waterloo and will probably work out in future crises in our world. Chapter Summary • Despite a lack of sufficient resources and the superiority of the French army on many battlefields, Wellington’s personality and leadership led the Allies to victory in 1814 and 1815.

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• Mental agility, flexible thinking, and open-mindedness are very important in times of crisis and enable the educational leader to find innovative strategies and solutions to uncertain, changing circumstances. • Resource mobilization is extremely important in times of severe crisis because confronting the crisis requires innovative responses and procedures as well as new human resources and expertise. • Before managing the crisis, the educational leader should read about its nature, factors, and implications and talk with anyone who can shed some light on the crisis. • High self-confidence, calmness, and courage are critical leadership traits in times of crisis in schools. • Educational leaders should be visibly present in the schoolyard and in classrooms and be accessible to teachers, students, and stakeholders as a way to decrease negative emotions and increase organizational commitment. Questions for Consideration 1. Choose a potential crisis in education/schools and write down the kind of information educational leaders need to manage the crisis effectively. 2. What are the sources of “intelligence” educational leaders have/ need in times of global/social/organizational crisis? 3. What are the traits educational leaders need in order to face the implications of school shootings or acts of terror for the school and its staff/students? 4. What can educational leaders adopt from Wellington’s experience and what can’t they? Why? 5. To what extent can educational leaders and teachers learn from the stories of military commanders? Why? Practical Activities You have been appointed the new organization counselor of an old school that experienced several shooting incidents in recent years and many senior teachers have requested, therefore, to transfer to other schools. The school principal is asking you to study the situation and propose a systematic plan to manage the crisis effectively. Based on the leadership of Wellington, write down key suggestions to solve the crisis. Pay attention to the role of educational leaders in managing this crisis.

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References Black, S. E. (2009). The emperor and the Duke: A comparative leadership analysis of the Battle of Waterloo. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of bachelor of arts in global studies from the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. Chandler, D. G. (1966). The campaigns of Napoleon. MacMillan Publishing. Chandler, D. G. (1994). On the Napoleonic wars. Greenhill. Davies, H. (2007). The influence of intelligence on Wellington’s art of command. Intelligence and National Security, 22(5), 619–643. De Voto, C., Superfine, B. M., & DeWit, M. (2023). Navigating policy and local context in times of crisis: District and school leader responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational Administration Quarterly. Glover, M. (1983). Wellington as an attacking general  – the peninsular war. Antony Bird Publications Limited. Griffith, P. (1983). Wellington - commander. Antony Bird Publications Limited. Hall, C. D. (2004). Wellington’s navy. Chatham Publishing. Hendrick, K. (1998). A campaign of ropes: An analysis of the Duke of Wellington’s practice of military art during the Peninsular War, 1808 to 1814. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Hibbert, C. (1967). Waterloo: Napoleon’s last campaign. The New American Library. Horward, D. (1999). Logistics and strategy in the peninsula: A case study, 1810-11. Consortium on Revolutionary Europe (Tallahassee), (pp. 355–363). Jackson, B. (1903). In R. C. Seaton (Ed.), Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer: Chiefly relating to the Waterloo campaign and to St Helena matters during the captivity of Napoleon. John Murray. James, L. (1992). The iron Duke. Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited. Kirby, T.  T. (2011). The Duke of Wellington and the supply system during the Peninsula War. A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Longford, E. (1969). Wellington: The years of the sword. Harper & Row. Morris, T. (1968). Military memoirs: The Napoleonic wars. Archon Books. Reid, W. (1993). Tracing the biscuit: The British Commissariat in the Peninsula War. Paper delivered to the International Association of Museums of Arms and Military History, Museo Arqueologico, Madrid, 8 September. Wiegley, R. F. (1991). The age of Banles (pp. 438–439). Indiana University Press.

CHAPTER 8

Alexander the Great

Chapter Overview • The invasions and conquers • Crisis prevention through collaboration with the (alien) community • Attentiveness to the followers’ distress and desires • Rapid, innovative, and improvised responses

The Invasions and Conquers Alexander the Great is often considered the most successful world leader in history and a great conqueror and warrior in the ancient world who received almost divine status in his own lifetime. He was only 20 years old when he became king in 336 BC, succeeding his father Philip, who was assassinated the same year. For a relatively brief period of seven years, Alexander conquered much of the known world in the fourth century BC and marched from Greece to India. His invasions, sieges, skirmishes, and conquests included, for instance, the invasion of Asia Minor and the Battle of Granicus in 334 BC, the siege of Tyre and the invasion of Syria and Egypt in 332 BC, the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, and the invasion of India in 327–326 BC. Alexander was 22 years old when he began his invasions with the intention of confronting the Persian Empire on its own turf and spreading

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Hellenism in the Eastern world (Hammond, 1981). Therefore, he is considered one of the fathers of Hellenism, which is a term that refers to the adoption and spread of Hellenic culture and ideology. There is little doubt that his expedition created the circumstances for the nature of the eastern Mediterranean world for the next two centuries (Anson, 2013, p. 182). Kets de Vries (2003) described his great leadership: Alexander the Great of Macedonia more than any other person changed the history of civilization. His life story illustrates the psychological forces that generally come into play in the making of a leader and reveals leadership lessons that can be learned from his actions. (p. 370)

Since Alexander was born, he has acquired a considerable amount of knowledge in theory from his teacher, Aristotle, and in practice from his father and his generals who taught him the art of war, diplomacy, and administration (Thermos, 1975). According to Green (1996, p.  487), Alexander’s true genius was as a field-commander: “his gift for speed, improvisation, variety of strategy; his cool headedness in a crisis; his mastery of terrain; his psychological ability to penetrate the enemy’s intentions-­ all these qualities place him at the very head of the Great Captains of history.” Notably, nevertheless, Alexander had to cope with many crises and threats during his wars in the East, as Briant (2010) explained: Neither Alexander’s steadfast advance nor his ultimate success should mislead one into thinking that his campaign proceeded smoothly, with no setbacks. On the contrary, he had to cope with prolonged resistance from Darius and the Achaemenid forces (334–330). The danger was increased by the very real possibility that a revolt in European Greece might coincide with the Persian counterattacks (333–331). During the three years following Darius’s death (330–327), the Macedonian army faced the threat of defeat in Bactria and Sogdiana. At the same time, opposition developed among the Macedonian nobility. (p. 42)

Since 330, Alexander has been making ever greater demands of his soldiers as he led them into increasingly hostile environments under climatic conditions that were as unpleasant as they were severe in their extremes. For example, during his crossing of the Hindu Kush in 329 BC, “snow blinded the soldiers and they were gnawed by hunger; the wounded and stragglers were abandoned on the side of the road” (Briant, 2010, p. 66).

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Lessons Learned from Alexander’s Crisis Leadership How did Alexander win so many battles? How did he encourage his soldiers to keep fighting even in the worst situations? Historians told us that he mastered the ability to manage the imagination of people; he spoke directly to the imagination of his troops, motivated and inspired them, and used symbolic action to put forward his vision. Engellau and Kets de Vries (2004) described his inspirational leadership: Alexander had the “gift of grace” usually ascribed to prophets; his charisma was legendary. He had a special ability to transform ordinary laborers into extraordinary soldiers, to get the best out of his people, whatever their role. By dramatizing the risk  – by telling his troops that they were up against impossible odds at the Battle of Issus, for example – and by reassuring them that they were none the less up to the challenge, he made them feel special. And his troops would accept the dare every time…Alexander knew how to “stretch” his men, creating in them a determined commitment that fueled extraordinary effort. (p. 55)

This kind of mastery could support Canadian task force members who unanimously indicated that uncertainty around the pandemic made it very difficult for them to prepare and plan for the 2020–2021 school year and beyond, being aware that many students and parents would not feel comfortable with a return to in-person schooling in the Fall of 2020 (Rizk et al., 2022). Alexander would suggest their educational leaders to encourage these members to imagine how the school year would look like if they found new, creative ways to teach under the dire circumstances in the times of COVID-19. He would motivate them to find ways to increase safety in the few cases it is necessary to combine in-person and virtual teaching, and so forth. Like the Duke of Wellington, Alexander set the example of excellence in the battlefield and, in turn, heightened identification and group solidarity. He lived the lives of his soldiers, spoke their language, suffered the same wounds as his troops, and shared their food and their distress (Engellau & Kets de Vries, 2004). He rode a huge black horse and wore an ostentatious helmet and plume so his troops could see him leading from the front, which established one part of his identity (Kurke, 2004). Needless to say, teachers, students, and parents need to see their educational leaders walking around in the yard and in the corridors during crisis events, because their presence contributes to their solidarity with the

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school and with each other as well as increases their own sense of safety and stability. Wars are times of high levels of uncertainties and ambiguities. According to Worthington (2004), Alexander was almost always accurate in understanding the intentions of the enemy and know how to oversee the opponents’ battle strategy, even their internal mind. This is an instinct one cannot learn, but every educational leader should try to know more about the intentions of and concrete steps that other education players might undertake in any inter-school competition introduced many times by school choice policies. Kennedy also taught us a lot about this virtue. Note, however, that Alexander can be seen as a multifaceted personality with a highly complex internal theater. He tended toward radical mood swings and could be very brutal against imaginary conspiracies (Kets de Vries, 2003) and did not hesitate to inflict ruthless punishments on his opponents (Briant, 2010). Yet, his legacy of crisis leadership must be learned by educational leaders who aim to prepare themselves for the next crisis in their organization. Three insights merit highlighting in this respect. Crisis Prevention Through Collaboration with the (Alien) Community Many crisis events may occur due to the ethnic composition of the students, particularly when the teachers in the school belong to ethnic groups that differ from those of their students. Under these circumstances, schools might face intercultural and inter-social conflicts between the school’s staff and the parents, for example, and, consequently, educational leaders are required to bridge the cultural gaps between these two groups. Parent resentment of teachers’ values and instructional activities or teachers’ negative emotional responses toward dominant cultural scripts in the community are examples of the potential consequences of these ethnic relations. Alexander seems to have understood the dire consequences of this type of crisis events on any human organization, be it his own empire or the school. For this reason, he strove for unifying the Greeks, the Persians, and other tribal or racial groups (Thermos, 1975). He seems to have believed that the line between what the Greeks saw as barbarians and non-­ barbarians had to be based on individual ones rather than on ethnic or tribal boundaries. This, in turn, will likely bring security and the ultimate

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survival of his empire. In Brian’s 2010 view, it illustrates his remarkable political intelligence and his desire to ensure the durability of his work. Unfortunately, his belief has not always dominated the school’s culture of schools serving unprivileged communities, resulting many times in high levels of student dropout and school-community conflict. Educational leaders who work with ethnic and minority communities may learn a lot about the critical role of school-community cooperation from the next description of the Macedonian foreign policy: Since his stay in Egypt Alexander seems to have begun to understand that the best policy of establishing an enduring and successful government in a foreign territory was to be based primarily upon a close and honest cooperation between the victor and the conquered.2 The principle of cooperation had been developed by and large by his father, and it was incorporated into the Macedonian foreign policy. The treatment of Athens and other Greek city states, which, with the exception of Thebes, submitted to Macedonia’s power, was generous, and they were urged to join a cooperative organization. Philip discovered that brute force alone could not serve best the imperial interests of his state and he was glad to share his culture, religion and economic interests with other states as long as the basic interests of Macedonia were promoted. (Thermos, 1975, p. 219)

While an arrogant, Eurocentric attitude toward minority communities is likely intensifying varied crisis events, a school in which teachers and parents from diverse ethnic communities enjoy harmony as partners in the school board will benefit both sides, as Alexander taught us (although as Anson (2013) claimed it was based also on Alexander’s self-interest). However, Alexander went one step further toward building a new order. Due to a shortage of soldiers from Macedonia, he began to introduce regiments of Bactrians, Parthians, Arachotians, and Zarangians into his army and many of them fought bravely with him in the Indian invasion of 327–326 BC. While educational leaders are not virtually supposed to recruit soldiers, Alexander’s attitudes toward the conquered communities may encourage recruiting teachers from the ethnic communities that their school serves. These teachers, though, may prevent many crisis events caused by cultural misunderstandings or inter-group conflicts and constitute a bridge between the teachers from the majority groups and their students from minorities. Alexander left us with a legacy of crisis prevention in this respect.

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However, any collaboration among different ethnic groups can bring about new crises, as Alexander learned quickly. The generous attitudes of Alexander and the noble treatment he has given to the conquered races brought about much resentment among the Macedonian troops (Thermos, 1975). For many years, the only people around the king were the Macedonians who alone shared the king’s wine (Briant, 2010). But, when Alexander invited the ruling elite of the Achaemenes to take up the reins of government coupled with his order to form Persian units in order to replace Macedonian older soldiers, a crisis between him and his Macedonian troops broke out. They felt that they had been used by him, and now when he found them useless, he was casting them aside. They were also angry with his identification with the oriental culture and specifically with his assumption of oriental dress and his favorable behavior toward his new subjects and their gods. Whereas Alexander’s first response to his Macedonian troops’ resentment was to stick to his own way, after several days he relaxed and listened to their grievances and finally reconciled with them. Teachers from the majority group may react in the same way when feeling threatened by the leader’s tendency to favor the parent’s cultural view frequently or by his or her decision to recruit mostly teachers from minorities in order to attract more students to the school. To avoid this type of crisis, Alexander would suggest establishing collaboration among teachers from different ethnic groups and strengthening cultural sensitivity and intercultural ideologies in the school. They should highlight the importance of voicing the culture of the indigenous people. In her paper, Purcell (2023) brought the voice of an indigenous teacher who wanted to create a school system where her nephews could be openly proud to be Metis rather than being scared to self-identify as their children for fear of discrimination. Alexander would have been able to understand her distress and give her a sense of belonging in his empire. The leaders should also express empathy toward the senior teachers who might be concerned about the need to balance their own cultural and instructional values and these of the community. They should emphasize the common rather than the differences, and encourage the teachers from both sides to interact with each other and learn about their common educational values and patterns of lifestyle. This will no doubt facilitate teacher collaboration and obviate inter-group crises in the school. Alexander tried to rule in a fair manner and replaced provincial officials who were ruling unjustly. He made the army multicultural by including

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soldiers from all conquered territories (Kets de Vries, 2003). Educational leaders who follow this manner of governance may increase solidarity and intercultural collaborations in the schools and with the community. Teachers who behave unfairly toward students from minorities might intensify many crisis events, as Alexander would claim. Attentiveness to the Followers’ Distress and Desires As schools are characterized by “loosely coupled systems” (Hoy & Miskel, 2008), teachers tend to spend most of their working hours in isolated classrooms and their relationships with educational leaders and colleagues may, therefore, be limited to a large extent. This structural characteristic may be very critical in times of crisis when teachers are likely to feel distress and uncertainty and the leader is expected to support them professionally and emotionally. Alexander’s response to his soldiers’ distress may shed some light on the leader’s adequate response in times of crisis. In the summer of 326 BC, Alexander the Great’s triumphal seven-year campaign in Asia was unexpectedly halted in the upper reaches of the Indus River—not by enemy action, but by the Macedonian troops’ refusal to march further eastward (Retief & Cilliers, 2005, p.  33). The Indian campaign began in the Indus Valley with the battle of Hydaspes/Djelum against Porus. Alexander won this battle, but with significant losses (Hammond, 1981:207–210), because his army had to contend for the first time with a large number of battle-elephants. Moreover, the summer monsoon season of 326 BC was particularly hot, and the Aratta people defended their territory ferociously. Alexander sustained heavy losses in taking Sangala (Wood, 1997). These were the circumstances under which the Macedonians became dispirited and staged their revolt. In fact, they were willing to assist Alexander in conquering the Persian Empire, their traditional enemy, but refused to fight in the unknown territories and dangers in India. A new crisis broke out. In some sense, the story of Alexander and his endless desire to go on and conquer more lands resembles a case of an educational leader who initiates or adopts new projects frequently without enabling teachers and students to complete previous projects first. Teachers might feel very exhausted and overwhelmed by a host of new projects, just like the Macedonian soldiers felt when realizing that their leader was eager to go on and fight in the jungles of India.

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When Alexander heard that there was dissatisfaction among his troops, he summoned the senior officers and tried to convince them to support his plan—or to be dissuaded from it (Retief & Cilliers, 2005). He spoke with them about their achievements thus far and promised them that there was only a small area left between the Ganges and the Eastern Ocean. He further praised his Macedonian core troops and assured them that they would all be rich when the war is over. Their reaction to his speech is described by Retief and Cilliers (2005): There was a lengthy silence after his speech as Alexander waited for his army’s reaction. The response came from one of his senior Macedonian leaders, Coenus, who…praised Alexander for his wise leadership over the years and for the fact that he had never ruled as a tyrant, but went on to say that the troops felt it was time to call a halt to the campaign. Of the large initial contingent of Macedonians, only a small number remained, and they were mentally drained, as well as physically exhausted. He advised Alexander not to attempt to command unwilling troops, but rather to return home for a while in order to assemble a fresh army, to attain further triumphs. (p. 35)

How many times did teachers respond similarly to their leader’s desire to implement another educational project in the school? Probably many times in schools run by a very frisky and innovative school principal. Probably, some of the educational leaders would react spontaneously like Alexander did; he went to his tent, staying there for three days, threatening to send them back to Macedonia and to discharge all who, through age or disability, were no longer fit for military service, while replacing them with young men from the conquered lands (e.g., Epigoni, Persia). But his words stirred anger rather than rejoicing (Lyons, 2015). Then, he tried to convince them to follow him by reminding them of the benefits conferred upon them by his father Philip, who transformed them from wandering shepherds beset by enemies into the masters of Greece and the Balkans, and by emphasizing his wounds and own prices. However, the Macedonians refused to change their mind. Finally, Alexander informed them that a special sacrificial offering had shown unfavorable signs for the crossing of the Hyphasis/Beas River and that he had thus decided to go no further. Alexander had realized that, without his Macedonians, he would be lost. His decision was applauded by the army (Hammond, 1981, p. 214).

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Alexander understood that no leader can lead when his followers refuse to be led by him anymore, let alone when the followers have to face many crises along the way. This is the first lesson every educational leader should bear in mind; when teachers are overwhelmed by instructions and proposals initiated by the school management, the appearance of a human crisis is just a matter of time. To prevent such a crisis or to solve it, the leader should be attentive to the concerns, fears, and distress of the teachers, students, and parents. Alexander was such a person and his leadership teaches us a lot about the importance of attentiveness in times of crisis. His high emotional intelligence is reflected in the next story: When his father bought a beautiful horse named Bucephalus, it proved to be so wild that nobody was able to ride it. Philip was about to get rid of it when Alexander made a wager that he would be able to tame the beast. When approaching the horse, the younger man noticed that it appeared to be afraid of its own shadow. Facing it toward the sun to keep the shadow behind it, Alexander managed to get on Bucephalus and was able to ride him. Having won the wager, Alexander got to keep the horse and later rode him all the way to India. (Kets de Vries, 2003, p. 371)

His high emotional intelligence was intertwined markedly within his leadership. He made his men feel valued, knew the names of 10,000 soldiers, slept with his troops on the march, and was a great “container” of others’ emotions, putting his soldiers at ease (Kets de Vries, 2003; Kurke, 2004). Furthermore, Alexander was good at emotionally touching and moving his people, demonstrating empathy through his actions, and thereby, conveying the impression that he had all the time in the world for any soldier who wanted to address him (Engellau & Kets de Vries, 2004). According to different historians, he was a genuinely caring general, a generous person to his men, and a genius in human relations (Kurke, 2004; Worthington, 2004). He rewarded them with high pay, bonuses, remission of taxes in certain cases, cancelation of soldiers’ debts, and various signs of royal favor. Likewise, when every battle was over, he spent his time treating his soldiers’ wounds because he was trained as a physician. He did this even when he had wounds of his own. Simply saying, he was with them and for them in the hardest times in the battlefield. What would Alexander recommend, though? Probably that it is paid off to be affective to teachers, students, and stakeholders all the year but particularly in face of crisis events, because a caring, generous leadership is

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likely to galvanize the teachers, inspire them to work further, and make any effort necessary to perform their work effectively even in face of many crisis events. According to Engellau and Kets de Vries (2004, p. 56), “the unflagging determination of their king was often the only thing that kept them going when they faced seemingly impossible odds.” Rapid, Innovative, and Improvised Responses Every educational leader who experienced a crisis event of the kind of school violence or failing student enrolment due to great inter-school competition knows that the response to these crises should be critically immediate. Similarly, Alexander knew the true value of the statement that one is either quick or he is dead (Kets de Vries, 2003). However, Alexander teaches us another thing; he was a master of competitive analysis and knew how to take maximum advantage of any situation in the battlefield, adapting quickly to the tactics of his opponents (Kets de Vries, 2003). Green (1996) provided more insights into Alexander’s responses to crises: Alexander’s true genius was as a field-commander: perhaps, taken all in all, the most incomparable general the world has ever seen. His gift for speed, improvisation, variety of strategy; his cool headedness in a crisis; his mastery of terrain; his psychological ability to penetrate the enemy’s intentions-all these qualities place him at the very head of the Great Captains of history. (p. 487)

Educational leadership, Alexander would say, must always be prepared for the unexpected, be it an abrupt death of a teacher or a suicide committed by a student, unfortunately. Likewise, because he was a master at coordinating all parts of his military machine, he would recommend educational leaders to coordinate between teachers and stakeholders before any response to crisis events. For example, following massive floods and the closure of schools in the area, a crisis team should work together with parents and other stakeholders in order to find immediate solutions to students in distress or to explain to parents how to work with their child at home until the emergency situation is over. Like other great leaders discussed in this book, Alexander knew how to bring about innovation and creativity among his troops, corps of engineers, and employees in the administration he established in the conquered areas (Engellau & Kets de Vries, 2004). For these and other

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reasons, his war machine was the most advanced of its time. Creative and innovative responses to crisis events usually make the management of the crisis more effective. In contrast, remaining closed-minded leads many times to an inability to solve the crisis or to minimize its negative effects considerably. Alexander understood this simple insight and as a result tended to be preoccupied with creating new military strategies whenever his army fought against tough enemies or faced massive resistance. Similarly, educational leaders had to be very creative during the COVID-19 crisis in order to enable instructional routines to continue as before, even from a distance. For example, many principals in Anderson et al. (2022) study indicated that they used creative and innovative solutions to meet the needs of students with special education needs studying in socially distanced, virtual contexts (e.g., working closely with the student’s family to develop an individualized program with alternative video conferencing software where he could have his owl meetings). The response facilitated the lives of students with special educational needs, and the impact of COVID-19 was limited in their case. Alexander would probably applaud the educational leaders in these schools. Chapter Summary • Alexander the Great conquered much of the known world in his time, and his legendary crisis leadership includes the management of imagination, an example of excellence in the battlefield, and a unique ability to “read” the opponents. • Considering multicultural relationships in many schools, Alexander’s belief in establishing a close and honest cooperation between the victor and the conquered seems to be critical in preventing crisis events related to ethnic relations. Educational leaders who follow this manner of governance may increase solidarity and intercultural collaborations within the schools and with their communities. • Attentiveness to soldiers’ (teachers’) needs and desires is critical in times of human crises in the organization, as Alexander personally experienced when planning to go on the war in India, despite his soldiers’ refusal to join him. His high emotional intelligence leaves a legacy of caring leadership and empathy. • Alexander’s agile leadership allowed him quick responses to changes in the battlefield or in his empire. At the same time, he acknowledged the importance of creative and innovative solutions to crisis

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events and attached great significance to coordination among his troops. Innovative and creative behaviors coupled with coordination and collaboration are critical, by and large, in any crisis faced by schools. Questions for Consideration 1. What kind of crises did Alexander face? Which of these crises are similar to those faced by schools from time to time? 2. Why is it so important for leaders to be present and seen by teachers in times of crisis? Please explain Alexander’s motives for riding on his horse in the middle of the battle. 3. What are the insights we gain from Alexander’s leadership about crisis prevention in human organizations? 4. How did Alexander prevent a crisis with his Macedonian troops and what are the implications of his patterns of crisis management in this case for educational leaders who face a similar crisis in the staff’s room? 5. Why is it important to maintain coordination among teachers, students, parents, and stakeholders in times of crisis? Could you give an example in your answer from a real-life crisis event in schools? Practical Activities Following an attempt to murder a student in one of the high schools in a rural area, you have been invited to write a plan to face with the consecutive crisis in the school and in the community. Based on Alexander’s own experience in crisis management, could you suggest proactive mechanisms to prevent another case like that as well as to consider suitable strategies to manage the current crisis effectively and bring it to an end?

References Anderson, D. J., MacCormack, J., & Sider, S. (2022). Exploring school principals’ experiences during the first four months of the pandemic as a way to reimagine inclusive education. Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 200, 37–48. Anson, E.  M. (2013). Alexander the Great: Themes and issues. Bloomsbury Publishing. Briant, P. (2010). Alexander the Great and his empire: A short introduction. Princeton University Press.

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Engellau, E., & Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (2004). Are leaders born or are they made? The case of Alexander the great. Routledge. Green, R. (1996). Alexander the Great. Grolier Publishing. Hammond, N. G. L. (1981). Alexander the Great. Chatto & Windus. Hoy, W., & Miskel, C. (2008). Educatioanl administration: Theory, research, practice (eight edition). McGraw-Hill. Kets de Vries, M. (2003). ‘Doing an Alexander’: Lessons on leadership by a master conqueror. European Management Journal, 21(3), 370–375. Kurke, L. B. (2004). Wisdom of Alexander the Great: Enduring leadership lessons from the man who created an empire. AMACOM. Lyons, J. D. (2015). Alexander the Great and Hernan Cortes: Ambiguous legacies of leadership. Lexington Books. Purcell, M. (2023). Learning to lead from indigenous leaders: Courage, resiliency, and advocacy. Paper presented in IAFOR international conference on education. Honolulu, 4–8 January. Thermos, E. (1975). Alexander the Great and the concept of homonoia. The Greek Review of Social Research, 24, 217–227. Retief, F. P. & Cilliers, L. (2005). The army of Alexander the Great and combat stress syndrome (326 BC): The Greek world. Acta Theologica Supplementum, 7 Retrieved on 10 December 2022 from https://doi.org/10.10520/EJC111504. Rizk, J., Gorbet, R., Aurini, J., Stokes, A., & McLevey, J. (2022). Canadian K-12 schooling during the COVID-19 pandemic: Lessons and reflections. Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy, 201, 90–100. Worthington, I. (2004). Alexander the Great: Man and god. Taylor & Francis Group. Wood, M. (1997). In the footsteps of Alexander the Great. BBC Books.

CHAPTER 9

Elizabeth I

Chapter Overview • The defeat of the Spanish Armada • Seeking for allies • Boldness: unafraid of the Spanish Armada • Keeping up appearances • Understanding the limit of power Elizabeth I was born in 1533, the only child of Henry VIII and his second wife. As a child, she was fluent in French, Italian, and Spanish, and possessed a scholar’s grasp of Greek and Latin. At age 25, she assumed the throne of England following the death of her half-brother, Edward VI, and ruled for 44 years until her death in 1603 at age 69 (Dunford et al., 2019). Elizabeth I never got married, despite having been in love and leaving no child to inherit the throne, thereby ending the Tudor dynasty. In one of her speeches, she claimed she had already joined herself in marriage to a husband, namely the kingdom of England. When she became queen, she did so as a highly educated and astute young woman, who combined her father’s hot temper and his strength of conviction. According to Huso (2011), she knew she was assuming the leadership position of a man in view of many people in her time, but she was determined to hold her own in a kingdom characterized by religious conflicts, political conspiracies, financial difficulties, and threats from © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3_9

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Spain. In fact, the English people greeted Elizabeth’s accession with enthusiasm and relief, but they had little reason to expect much from the inexperienced young woman of 25 (Neale, 1957). They were more concerned, though, with whom the queen would marry due to a strong desire for dynastic stability, which could only be assured through a settled succession. Likewise, in those years it was commonly accepted that a queen needed male guidance in order to rule effectively. However, Elizabeth chose to rule as a virgin queen, proving herself in the process one of England’s best rulers, in spite of her gender. Taylor-­ Smither (1984) analyzed the gender factor in Elizabeth’s governance: Elizabeth’s unique handling of the sexual ambiguity inherent in her role as female head of state and governor of the Church of England was not only a reflection of contemporary attitudes on gender roles but also a necessary result of her own psychological development. The queen’s accomplishments, her popularity, and the length of her rule inevitably provoked an alteration in traditional perceptions of women. (p. 47)

Elizabeth’s “paradoxical” success as a ruler has been a dominant theme in the historiography of her times. For years she has been hailed as the English Deborah, the savior of the English people, and now it seemed that this is what she had really become (Shanette, 1998–2023). The defeat of the Spanish Armada, one of the most famous crisis events in English history, is arguably Queen Elizabeth’s finest hour.

The Defeat of the Spanish Armada Although refraining from war for 30 years, Elizabeth I was forced into it by the Catholic Church’s efforts to restore its hold on England after the Reformation. Other factors that triggered the war between Spain and England were the attacks of English pirates at sea against Spanish ships sailing from the New World to Spain with valuable merchandise (Paranque, 2019), as well as the execution of Mary due to her role in an assassination plot against Elizabeth I. Spain’s King Philip II, who had once hoped to marry Elizabeth I for the sake of increasing his power and spreading Catholicism, was already enraged by Elizabeth’s support in Dutch Protestants who were revolting against Spain. He was also furious because of the queen’s endorsement of English adventurers, who plundered Spanish treasure ships returning with gold and silver from the New World (Huso, 2011).

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As a matter of fact, Phillip II was a constant threat to invade England during the recent years of Elizabeth’s reign. Elizabeth was not, however, concerned about this threat, because she had heard rumors about a Spanish invasion for almost 30 years, and easily dismissed them. In 1585, nevertheless, the Duke of Parma discovered Spanish troops in the Netherlands in preparation for the 1588 Armada. Now it became clear to Elizabeth that this time, the Spanish king was really going to send an armada against England. In response, she sent several different armed expeditions to mainland Europe in defense of England’s interests and ordered Sir Francis Drake and a small naval force to attack Spanish shipping between Spain and their colonies in the Caribbean. She also employed all her efforts in raising funds to ensure that when the Spanish Armada came, England would be prepared. In 1588, the crisis between Spain and England reached the tipping point when Phillip II sent his naval armada north to invade England. The fleet, consisting of over 100 ships, had to sail up from Spain along the English Channel and meet with the forces that make their way from the Netherlands. King Phillip II planned for his forces to overwhelm the English and depose Elizabeth I as the queen in accordance with the Pope’s blessing (Booth, 2013). Hearing about the incoming invasion, Elizabeth I personally went to meet with her troops at the Tilbury camp at the mouth of the Thames where the invasion was expected to begin. It was against this backdrop of a military camp where Elizabeth made her famous speech to her troops (discussed later on in this chapter). Meanwhile, the English forces were waiting for the first sighting of the great Armada. When they saw the great ships in the horizon, messages about the invaders were sent throughout the country. As soon as the ships began to make their way up the channel, the fighting began (Shanette, 1998–2023). Elizabeth not only encouraged her soldiers but also turned to the nation’s pirates to lead the counterattack, using powerful rhetoric to convince every English man to support the war against the Spanish forces. When the Spanish approached the English coast, they not only had to cope with dreadful weather, strong winds, and heavy rains, but also had to compete with the superior English ships and war tactics. The result was a humiliating defeat to what was considered to be the strongest army in Europe in those years; the Spanish troops fled in terror when fireships were aimed at them while the English gained the upper hand with its navy, leading to the triumph at Gravelines. The remnants of the Armada

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launched by King Philip II, which it was believed was set to invade the southern English coast, eventually retreated. Once the remnants of the Armada had limped back to Spain, the image of Elizabeth I as a powerful, perhaps even invincible, warrior queen became entwined in the English national spirit (Paranque, 2019). The victory over the ferocious Spanish army was attributed to her leadership and the memory of this battle has been rooted deeply in the history of England. Yet, Booth (2013) warns of any glorification of Elizabeth I and its troops: Despite all the preparation on both sides, the Spanish invasion never materialized. Although this was welcome news, it was far from an outright victory for Elizabeth’s forces. Her navy did manage to drive the Spanish northwards, but only sank one ship during the battle. It was actually the treacherous seas around the coasts of Scotland and Ireland that did the most damage to the armada sinking a third of Phillip’s ships and causing the death of nearly 20,000 of his men. While there was immense political capital to be gained by the publication of this oration of the Queen, it does not exist in any officially-sanctioned printed form. The publication of this kind of speech could have been used to promote Elizabeth’s political image in the eyes of her subjects and the world. However, this speech was only for a highly specific situation, and at the time no one could have known the historical significant of the events about to transpire. (p. 144)

Lessons Learned from Elizabeth’s Crisis Management Regardless of the historical controversy over the role of Elizabeth I in the victory, for the purpose of this book, her strategies and tactics during the crisis may provide some insights into crisis management in our educational organizations. Seeking for Allies When Elizabeth realized that the Spanish attack is across the horizon and the crisis between the countries is inevitable, she wrote two letters to James VI, the King of Scotland, giving him strict advice on how to face the possibility of a Spanish invasion of England. She began by thanking him for his professed desire to defend Scotland from the Spanish and from other “strangers” and added that many had tried to undermine his credibility with her as someone who might be “double dealing” but that she assured him that she would ever trust his work till she be too sure of the

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opposite. She also warned him not to deal with two different monarchs because, “he that hath two strings to his bow may shoot stronger, but never straight, and he that hath no sure foundation cannot but ruin. God keep you ever, therefore, in your well-begun path” (cited in Booth, 2013, 141–142). Very reasonably, when the crisis breaks out, people tend to seek for support and this is exactly what Elizabeth I did by writing to King James VI. With support from other countries, as we could see in the Russian– Ukrainian war in 2022, the defending country can hold on and even fight back. Similarly, when governments suspended all learning institutions as one of the measures taken by Ministries of Health worldwide to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the learning process became under the responsibility of parents whose new role was to ensure that their children participate in virtual learning. In some sense, the parents became the “allies” of the schools, and when this was not the situation, as Mabeya (2020) found in Kenya, most learners had not benefited much from the online classes. In fact, Elizabeth I would recommend every educational leader not to stay alone in front of the crisis, but rather to seek for others (e.g., educational leaders in other schools, environmental constituencies) in order to collaborate with them and, if required, to get their support and assistance. Marie et al. (2002, p. 39) reported the results of a collaborative project on school violence and safety that was conducted for a partnership that serves 13 school districts in Niagara and Orleans (NY) counties. Their recommendation was clear: “school safety requires a long-term community commitment [and therefore] the first step is for each administrator to create a strategic action plan for a collaborative school safety initiative in his or her district…principals can reach out to parents and community agencies by inviting them to participate in the planning and action phases, establishing an open-door policy, and communicating regularly and fully.” In other words, they suggest preparing for a crisis event by getting the support of stakeholders in advance and involving them in managing the crisis in various ways. Boldness: Unafraid of the Spanish Armada Although boldness characterizes also other leaders in this book, it is fascinating to remember that the courage and boldness Elizabeth I projected to her people and troops was in sharp contrast with the image of a woman in her time. In the next citation Loades (2003) connects Elizabeth’s courage and her gender:

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Elizabeth was not easily frightened, but her early experiences had made her apprehensive of danger. The traumatic experiences of 1547 and 1554 were never entirely erased from her mind. Then she had feared dishonor more than death, and that remained with her, although the nature of the dishonor changed. Her physical courage was perfect. When James I feared assassination, he took refuge in padded mattresses and other undignified expedients. Elizabeth was similarly threatened for years, but would allow no additional precautions, and never curtailed her exposure to her people. Greatly as they feared for her safety, her people found her courage an inspiration. The dishonor which she feared as queen was not sexual assault in the common sense, but a theft of her authority which was also related to gender. If a king was weak, his male subordinates would exploit him, but a woman might be exploited simply because she was a woman. (pp. 311–312)

When told about the impending invasion, Elizabeth laughed, indicating that the Spanish are not so ill-advised, and then added her favorite oath— “I and my people will send them packing!” (Holt, 2006, p. 48). Needless to say how inspired her ministers, councilors, and generals were when their queen reflected such a courage. Similarly, female educational leaders have to strive harder to convince teachers, students, and stakeholders that they are strong enough to face any crisis event. In a study about successful female superintendents, the educational leaders had to draw upon their resilience when facing tough public opposition (Reed & Patterson, 2007). They had the courage to acknowledge their own mistakes and, consequently, adopted a view of “I don’t have to prove I have all the right answers.” This is also the conclusion we make after reading the life story of Elizabeth I; she managed to rule for 30 years without wars but when a war was forced on her, she projected no fear in front of her people and soldiers and encouraged them to fight for England, their lovely homeland. Thus, no matter what kind of crisis the educational leader copes with, effective crisis management depends largely on the way in which the leader reflects the situation to teachers, students, and stakeholders. For example, aspiring school principals in one university-based school leadership preparation program in the US were inspired by the leadership and courage the school principals portrayed in the midst of COVID-19 (Gonzales et al., 2022). One candidate explained that the pandemic gave way for heroic school leadership, indicating that “out of these challenging times came forth one of the most heroic aspects of leadership, as school principals assumed the responsibilities, the professional demeanor and calm their

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staff needed to successfully navigate the unthinkable” (p. 98). The candidate principals admired the principals for not flinching when something had to be changed due to the crisis and for their courage to do what is best for the students and the community. The subjects of Elizabeth I seem to have felt the same feelings toward her courage and brevity during the crisis with Spain several centuries ago. Keeping Up Appearances As indicated before, the leader’s presence in the life of the followers during times of crisis is critical. In the case of Elizabeth I, it was more than just “to be around.” She has kept up appearances and understood the importance of projecting leadership, particularly in times of crisis. Jordan-Meier (2011) linked (feminine?) appearance and crisis management: Her management of her court, her dressing, and her presence were all part of protecting her majesty—and that of England. “Her clothing for State occasions was not costly drapery,” says Pascoe, “but strategic investment.” Leaders, particularly in a crisis, need to manage their appearances as strategically as the late, great Queen Elizabeth I did so well. If you look unimpressive in a TV interview, on YouTube, or the company website, the crisis will be certain to escalate—and at alarming speed, thanks to social media. (pp. 17–18)

While educational leaders are unlikely to appear in a TV show, still Elizabeth I would encourage them, maybe particularly the women among them, to pay attention to their pace of talking, hair, clothing, and so forth. Moreover, although England was much weaker than Spain, a very powerful and wealthy country in that century, Shanette (1998–2023) highlighted her calm response, albeit the very few allies of England. Accordingly, whenever Elizabeth felt nervous about challenging the greatest power in the known world, she never showed it and appeared to believe entirely in the devotion and loyalty of her people. This, in turn, caused her people to believe in her leadership. The Duke of Wellington and Winston Churchill visited in the battlefield unwaveringly. But Elizabeth I was a woman and her unusual appearance in the battlefield had a strong motivating impact on her troops. Thus, instead of staying safely in London and despite the fears of her advisors, Elizabeth I went to Tilbury to cheer on her troops when the first messages

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about the arrival of the Spanish armada reached her palace. Elizabeth could not simply sit trembling inside a guarded Palace while her troops fight; rather, she domed full armor, rode to Tilbury to live or die among the soldiers, and joined her troops on the shores of England to fight the Spanish Armada (Akkerman, 2013). However, the queen knew that her soldiers might question her abilities in warfare. To this end, she gave a speech to them, while they are preparing themselves to face the anticipated Spanish invasion: My loving people, we have been persuaded, by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes, for fear of treachery. But I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear. I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and good-will of my subjects: and therefore I am come amongst you, as you see, at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved in the midst and heat of the battle to live or die amongst you all,—to lay down, for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honor and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak, feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a King of England too; and think foul scorn that Parma, or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm: to which, rather than any dishonor should grow by me, I myself will take up arms,—I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. (cited in Holt, 2006, p. 32)

Although there is some controversy among historians about the accurate phrases used by Elizabeth I in this speech (Paranque, 2019), it is fascinating to compare her response to the crisis with that of a female educational leader who faces increasing levels of school violence (i.e., a crisis). Let’s imagine a female leader standing behind the podium and encouraging both teachers and parents not to give up and find the ways to manage the crisis effectively. Unfortunately, due to gender-based prejudices that dominate in their community some parents might question the female leader’s ability to cope with the school violence because of her gender that in their eyes represents weakness. How would Elizabeth I suggest responding? From her speech in front of her male soldiers, her recommendation to the female educational leader would include determination, persistence, and resiliency; “don’t conceal your femininity, but at the same time highlight your leadership competence and experience!” or “I know I’m a woman,

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but I have been fighting all my life to improve education and we will overcome this crisis too!” Despite the upheavals in woman’s status since Elizabeth’s time, female educational leaders may face, unfortunately, gender-­ based prejudices in some traditional communities (Arar et  al., 2023; Showunmi et  al., 2022). The ways in which Elizabeth I bridged between her gender and leadership could guide them in responding to crises. In response to Elizabeth’s speech, the soldiers responded unanimously: “is it possible that any Englishman can abandon such a glorious cause, or refuse to lay down his life in defense of this heroic Princess?” (Holt, 2006, p. 33). In other words, she motivated them to believe in the victory and increased their commitment to fight for England, despite the inferiority of their army and the isolation of England in the international arena. The lesson is transparent: even when the situation seems lost and the chances to solve a crisis event are against all odds, the educational leader must do the best s/he can to raise teacher morale and encourage stakeholders to manage the crisis and finds effective solutions to it. Thus, the educational leaders should “manage their own fears and anxieties and those of the wider school community, which can, if not carefully managed, become overwhelming” (Oplatka & Crawford, 2022, p. 168). This is exactly what Elizabeth I projected to her people. However, she did another thing; she promised to fight for England with her troops if it is required. Thus, the appearance of the leader is insufficient; teachers and stakeholders expect educational leaders to be involved directly in crisis management and not to leave it for them. The leader’s commitment to solving the crisis by all means together with the staff seems to be a strong motivating factor in crisis management. Understanding the Limit of Power Many times in history, leaders seem to have thought that their power is unlimited, resulting in many human disasters. In contrast, Elizabeth I acknowledged the limit of power, and it was sharply defined, first of all, by her strong identification with her father and her inadequate assimilation of “feminine” qualities (Taylor-Smither, 1984). For example, Elizabeth’s image of a Protestant heroine who managed to rule effectively amid a host of Catholic enemies was imposed upon her, as it was generated by the actions and proclamations of the queen herself. In fact, she was a reluctant heroine of the Reformation, because she had never desired to go to war

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against her neighbors in order to defend her coreligionists (Doran & Freeman, 2003). From a pragmatic view, she was unwilling to alienate one side in favor of the other. Therefore, she decided to establish a state church that both moderate Catholics and moderate Protestants would be willing to attend (Huso, 2011). She was simply fully aware of the limit of her power and refrained from exerting power unnecessarily. How is Elizabeth’s understanding of power limit related to crisis management in our schools? Many times crisis events engender fear and anxiety among people and, in turn, a demand for a stronger leader who will exert the excessive power required for solving the crisis. Similarly, parents may request educational leaders to exert much power in order to decrease student violence by expelling some disruptive students or worst: not to let students from minorities attend the school, because they “make a lot of problems,” an admittedly a racist attitude that dominates some communities, unfortunately. How would Elizabeth recommend educational leaders to respond in this case? First, to remember that their power is limited and constrained by educational ideologies, social values, and formal regulations. Therefore, any reckless, one-dimensional response may cause resentment among teachers, students, and stakeholders, alienate some communities, and result in unethical decisions. Second, to search for ways to gap between parents from different social groups and communities and lead the school peacefully, despite the existence of inter-group tensions. The educational leader should seek for harmony rather than conflict, acceptance rather than controversy, inclusion rather than exclusion, and so forth. During the first stage of COVID-19, educational leaders in the UK perceived a change in their perceptions of power and authority; although all of them maintained the hierarchy inherent in their roles, some leaders reported a flatter structure of distributed leadership that was essential to manage the crisis (Beauchamp et al., 2021). No doubt, Elizabeth I would advocate their way. Moreover, Elizabeth has often tended not to make her control obvious and frequently reserved a position from which it was possible to disclaim mistakes (Loades, 2003). For instance, Elizabeth could, and occasionally did, forbid the English pirates to set out, which suggests that those who did go went with her explicit or implicit approval. Foreign complaints, however, were regularly met with surprise or assumed concern, and referred to the admiralty court, as not being political issues. Sometimes, then, it is better not to emphasize the leader’s control over some aspects

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of the crisis in order to let him or her have the space they need to minimize the negative impact of these aspects on the school and on the schooling process. Chapter Summary • For years Elizabeth I has been hailed as the English Deborah, the savior of the English people, and now it seems that this is what she had really become. The defeat of the Spanish Armada is one example of here high capabilities in crisis management. • In 1588, the crisis between Spain and England reached the tipping point when Phillip II sent his naval armada north to invade England. In response, Elizabeth I personally went to meet with her forces at the Tilbury camp at the mouth of the Thames where the invasion was expected to begin. This is the place where she gave her famous speech. • Seeking for allies in the case of Elizabeth and for supporters in the community in the case of educational leaders is critical in managing a crisis effectively. • When the leader projects courage and brevity to the followers who feel insecure and concerned due to crisis events, they are more likely to face the crisis effectively and find solutions to the difficulties and uncertainty caused by it. • Elizabeth taught us that the appearance of the leaders in front of the followers is insufficient, because followers expect them to be involved directly in crisis management and not to leave it for them. The leader’s commitment to solving the crisis by all means (together with the staff) seems to be a strong motivating factor in crisis management. • The educational leader should seek for harmony rather than conflict, acceptance rather than controversy, inclusion rather than exclusion as well as to understand the limit of power before responding to any crisis event. Questions for Consideration 1. From the worldview of people in the sixteenth century, why is Elizabeth’s response to the crisis considered to be beyond any expectation from a female leader? What could female educational leaders in our era learn from her female leadership in times of crisis?

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2. Why do principals need to collaborate with others during a crisis? Who are the most appropriate “others” in educational crisis? Do men and women seek for “allies” during crisis in different ways? 3. What kind of “courage” is expected from educational leaders in times of crisis? 4. What might be the distinctions between male and female leaders with respect to “appearance” during times of crisis? 5. What was particular in Elizabeth’s appearance in the battlefield? 6. Why is it important to understand the limit of power, especially in times of crisis? Practical Activities 1. Choose a crisis event that happened in the past (and is related to educational organizations) and write down a motivating speech to teachers, students, and parents. In writing it, please be inspired by Elizabeth’s own speech in Tilbury as well as by the ways she projected her leadership during the crisis. 2. Describe to your peers a very difficult crisis in education. Then discuss together the plausible implications of “every response is right,” that is, of an unlimited power among educational leaders, for students, teachers, and stakeholders.

References Akkerman, N. (2013). Semper Eadem: Elizabeth Stuart and the legacy of Queen Elizabeth I. In S. Smart & M. R. Wade (Eds.), The palatine wedding of 1613: Protestant alliance and court festival (pp. 145–168). Harrassowitz Verlag. Arar, K., Sawalhi, R., & Hourani, R.  B. (2023). Educational leadership for an equitable resilient and sustainable. Routledge. Beauchamp, G., Hulme, M., Clarke, L., Hamilton, L., & Harvey, J. A. (2021). ‘People miss people’: A study of school leadership and management in the four nations of the United Kingdom in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational Management, Administration & Leadership, 49(3), 375–392. Booth, T. (2013). A body politic to govern: The political humanism of Elizabeth I. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Doran, S., & Freeman, T. S. (2003). The myth of Elizabeth. Palgrave Macmillan. Dunford, C., et al. (2019). Leaders who changed history. DK Publishing.

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Gonzales, M. M., Roberts, M. B., & Tegano, S. (2022). School leadership during COVID-19: Implications for school leadership preparation programs. Journal of School Administration Research and Development, 7(2), 93–102. Holt, E.  S. (2006). Clare Avery: A story of the Spanish Armada. Independent Publishing Platform. Huso, D. (2011). The virgin queen: Elizabeth I ruled England for 45 years, becoming one of the most powerful women in Western history. Success, 76–78. Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A254405590/AONE?u= tel_aviv&sid=bookmark-­AONE&xid=82c27d33. Accessed 24 January 2023 Jordan-Meier, J. (2011). The four highly effective stages of crisis management: How to manage the media in the digital age. CRC Press. Loades, D. (2003). Elizabeth I. Bloomsbury Publishing. Mabeya, M. T. (2020). Distance learning during COVID-19 crisis: Primary and secondary school parents experiences in Kenya. East African Journal of Education Studies, 2(1), 173–186. Marie, A., Leinhardt, C., & Willert, H. J. (2002). Involving stakeholders in resolving school violence. NASSP Bulletin, 86(631), 32–43. Neale, J. E. (1957). Queen Elizabeth. Harcourt, Brace. Oplatka, I., & Crawford, M. (2022). Principal, let’s talk about emotions: Some lessons COVID-19 taught us about emergency situations and leadership. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 25(1), 162–172. Paranque, E. (2019). Elizabeth I of England through Valois eyes, power, representation, and diplomacy in the reign of the queen, 1558–1588. Palgrave Macmillan. Reed, D., & Patterson, J. (2007). Voices of resilience from successful female superintendents. Journal of Women in Educational Leadership. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/jwel/44 Shanette, H. (1998–2023). Elizabeth R: The life and times of Queen Elizabeth I. Retrieved on 27 January 2023 from https://www.elizabethi.org. Showunmi, V., Moorosi, P., Shakeshaft, C., & Oplatka, I. (Eds.). (2022). Handbook of gender and educational leadership and management. Bloomsbury. Taylor-Smither, L.  J. (1984). Elizabeth I: A psychological profile. The Sixteenth Century Journal, 15(1), 47–72.

CHAPTER 10

Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter Overview • The crisis: The Battle of Austerlitz • Strategic planning • Speed of response and a sense of urgency • Maneuver: The art of deception • The talented employees ought to be promoted Napoleon Bonaparte was born on the island of Corsica, on August 15, 1769, and died in exile on the island of St. Helena on May 5, 1821. He considered himself, first and foremost, a military leader in the tradition of the Caesars and remained a remarkable general to the end. His army found itself fighting against an enemy seven times more numerous, but his enemies continued to fear him and accumulated defeats at his hands (Van der Heyden, 2021). Iodice (2022) depicted the leadership skills of Napoleon: He was well trained in military affairs and developed brilliant skills as a strategist and leader of men into battle. His combat successes made him famous. Napoleon…took control of the government, following the Revolution, and crowned himself Emperor. As an administrator, he reformed the French form of government and extended these to the empire. He was praised for his genius as a tactician and his leadership as a brilliant governor of an empire as far flung as that of ancient Rome. (p. 3)

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History has accorded Napoleon the status of a great transformer, innovator, highly charismatic, and a leader who not only led his countrymen but also identified himself with them, and they with him. His greatness was multifaceted. He was a lawgiver, social reformer, and administrator and is acknowledged as “one of the greatest military genius of all time” (Parijat, 2014, p. 71). However, despite his high leadership abilities, particularly in face of various crises, he had many failures, the worse of which was the invasion of Russia. Napoleon did not prepare his army for a long campaign that could extend from summer to winter. He did not study the possible maladies that could infect his troops. Hence, the French soldiers froze and starved in the Russian winter, and the French army was completely destroyed after several months of extremely low temperatures, storms, and heavy snow. In contrast to his leadership in previous years, the Russian campaign lacked strategic planning and intelligences and suffered overarching ambition and micromanagement (Lodice, 2022). Several years before, though, Napoleon had acted in an entirely different way. To understand his contribution to our analysis of crises in educational organizations, the current chapter analyzes the successful military leadership of Napoleon in the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805.

The Crisis: The Battle of Austerlitz The Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, also known as the Battle of the Three Emperors, was one of the most important and decisive activities of the Napoleonic Wars, the greatest military victory achieved by Napoleon. Against all odds, the French army defeated larger Russian and Austrian armies led by Emperor Alexander I and Holy Roman Emperor Francis II. The battle occurred near the town of Austerlitz in the Austrian Empire and brought the War of the Third Coalition to a rapid end, with the Treaty of Pressburg signed by the Austrians later in the month (Goetz, 2005). Briefly, for several years, Napoleon built an army along the northern French town of Boulogne and intended to invade England when it would be prepared for that. A lack of a naval force sufficient enough to challenge the British at sea and the approaching of the Russian and Austrian forces to France led Napoleon to change his plans. Therefore, Napoleon divided his grand army into four corps and ordered them to march eastward toward the Danube River from three different directions to confront this new threat. His overall strategic goal was to destroy the Russo-Austrian coalition in piecemeal fashion, crushing one part after another rather than all at once.

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From Boulogne Napoleon arrived with his army at Ulm by mid-­ October, where the Austrian forces under the command of General Karl Mack von Leiberich were encamped. As the Austrian commander had no guard, Napoleon besieged his camp until Mack had no other choice but to surrender his entire army of 30,000 men on October 19, 1805. The capitulation of the Austrian army forced the Russian troops that were advancing toward Ulm in order to reinforce Mack to alter their direction and retreat toward Vienna, with Napoleon soon in pursuit. He entered Vienna a month later, while the Russian troops retreated further north and east toward Austerlitz and dug in there, waiting for the Russian czar, Alexander I, and the Austrian emperor, Franz II. When Napoleon arrived at Austerlitz, his troops were already exhausted after three months of continuous marching. Furthermore, the combined Austro-Russian armies outnumbered the French troops by nearly two to one. However, after carefully studying the landscape surrounding Austerlitz, Napoleon devised a battle plan that relied on surprise and tactical maneuver that offset the numerical advantage enjoyed by his adversaries. According to Esdaile (2007, p. 225), in order for the plan to succeed, Napoleon had to achieve several objectives. First, he needed to give his exhausted troops time to rest and regain new energies. Second, he needed to convey the impression to his enemies that he was vulnerable and therefore unwilling to engage in battle. To this end, Napoleon requested a meeting with the Russian czar, Alexander I, ostensibly for the purpose of proposing a peace treaty. Alexander sent his envoy to meet with Napoleon, who, in turn, reported to the czar that Napoleon was weakened and ripe for the taking. Lulled into a false sense of security by Napoleon’s ploy, Alexander’s high confidence led him to reject Napoleon’s proposals— which the French emperor had hoped and expected he would do—and innocently fell into the trap he set for him. In the morning, Napoleon ordered the wing of his army on his right flank to withdraw from a sloping hill known as the Pratzen Heights. Surprisingly, his order was in sharp contrast with the need to obtain and hold high ground that allows the occupants of the terrain a view of the surrounding landscape and for this reason, unless it is part of retreat. But Napoleon had a ploy; by withdrawing his forces from the hill, it reinforced the idea that he was weak and vulnerable. The Czar Alexander was anxious to achieve military glory and fell into Napoleon’s trap. As Napoleon expected, the Russian troops occupied the Pratzen Heights, opposite his right flank, which Napoleon purposely left exposed, choosing instead, to

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concentrate his forces on his left flank and center. In order to attack Napoleon’s seemingly weakened right flank, the Russian and Austrian troops left their center precariously weakened—thereby fighting the battle according to Napoleon’s intentions. Napoleon threw his troops into the enemy’s center, effectively splitting the Russian and Austrian forces in two. After destroying their center, Napoleon easily hit the Russian’s left flank. By late afternoon, the battle had turned into an enormous fuss, with Russian and Austrian soldiers fleeing the French and leaving behind 40,000 of their friends who had been killed, captured, or too wounded to flee, along with over 100 Russian and Austrian canons (Blond, 1979). For the Russians and the Austrians, Austerlitz was a disaster while for Napoleon, Austerlitz was his finest hour as a military leader and forever cemented his legacy as one of the best battlefield commanders of all time.

Lessons Learned from Napoleon’s Crisis Management What kind of crisis faced by Napoleon in the Battle of Austerlitz? At the beginning he was at an inferior point, because his enemies outnumbered the French army; nonetheless, Napoleon won the battle. While the victory cannot be attributed completely to the leadership of Napoleon, without his stoic courage, profoundly calculated tenacity, rapid thinking, and inspirational leadership, the results of the battle would probably be different (Ellis, 1991; Fuller, 1955). Notably, Napoleon shared many personality traits with other figures in this book, such as risk-taking, fearless determination, presence, adaptability, speed of thought, flexibility, and the like (Manas, 2006). For example, his military principles were ultra-modern in their conception: a semi-autonomous army corps of about 20,000 men; “coordinated troop movements able to quickly converge on strategic points identified by the Commander-in-Chief; speed of movement giving the element of surprise, and committed troops ready to die for the cause” (Van der Heyden, 2021, p. 7). Likewise, consistent with other leaders who coped with crises effectively, Napoleon had two personality traits—self-confidence and decisiveness—in more abundance than most generals in history (Swain, 2019). Napoleon’s self-confidence seemed to have infused his field marshals and generals with a sense of confidence and belief in their capabilities. Add to this Napoleon’s decisiveness, and we can understand how he was able to overcome the reservations of his field marshals concerning his plan to yield the coveted high ground of the Pratzen Heights. Due to the emperor’s

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self-confidence and decisiveness, the soldiers believed so enthusiastically that they will win and achieve the victory, despite the numerical superiority of the coalition forces, four months of incessant marching, and a need to endure the hardships of extreme weather. Four aspects of Napoleon’s crisis leadership may explain his victory against all odds in Austerlitz. Strategic Planning Napoleon had a great ability to plan, organize, and control a series of events as well as a great foresight and ability to calculate (Parijat, 2014). He was able also to be a fantastic administrator. In fact, he possessed “a great ability to see the complete picture of war, to analyze all its components, understand what was essential and what was not, and combine these factors into an integrated war plan and operational campaign plans” (Epstein, 1994, p. 17). These abilities are extremely important in uncertain situations in which it is highly likely to lose control and have the crisis get worse. Many educational leaders are aware of this danger in critical events such as the abrupt death of a teacher, a stabbing in the school’s yard, or a homicide of a student. To better understand the key role of strategic and tactical planning in crisis management, let’s read what Napoleon himself said about it: Napoleon was a meticulous planner and gave careful thought to his military campaigns, envisioning the process from beginning to end. A remark Napoleon made to one of his subordinates attests to how central strategic planning was to the success of his military endeavors: ‘If I always seem to be ready for everything, to face up to anything, it is because I never undertake anything at all without having first meditated for a long time and foreseen what might happen. It is not a genie, but meditation, that suddenly reveals to me, in secret, what I must say and do under circumstances not anticipated by others.’ (cited in Castelot, 1967: 231)

Preparing for the next crisis is a very salient task in educational leadership, as Napoleon indicated more than two centuries ago. But, preparation should include some elements of analyzing the reality, understanding its ingredients and complexities, imagination, and integration of different sorts of information into a whole picture. Napoleon would tell educational leaders to prepare themselves for the next violent incident in the

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school by studying the students’ complex reality, understanding current factors of student indiscipline, and envisioning the process resulting in high levels of school violence in advance. But planning is ineffective without flexibility. When Napoleon abandoned his plan to invade England and instead marched with his Grand Army toward North Italy and Austria, he highlighted the importance of being able to apply problem-solving skills so as to adjust grand strategic plans when circumstances require it (Swain, 2019). Similarly, educational leaders should be able to adjust their long-term plans in order to deal with short-term crisis events. Thus, every plan to face an incoming crisis should be sufficiently adjustable when the foreseen circumstances change. Swain (2019) further explained the salience of flexibility among leaders in nonprofit organizations, like schools: Whereas operations planning suggest a broader, wider scope that have long-­ term strategic goals in mind, problem solving suggests a leadership process that addresses short-term problems that arise unexpectedly and occur in the course of an organization’s pursuit of its strategic goals. Problem solving is aimed at navigating and mitigating the effects of these unexpected disruptions—the fog of war—that are more likely to plague public and non-profit organizations. Napoleon’s ability to adjust his plans for invading England and to redirect his attention to dealing with the immediate threat posed by the combined forces of Russian and Austrian soldiers illustrate how leaders in public and nonprofit organizations must develop strategic plans, which while broad and far reaching, are yet flexible enough to adjust to unforeseen and unplanned for contingencies. (p. 241)

Many years later, higher education institutions had to amend their curricula during COVID-19 due to changing circumstances, including the revision of course syllabi, the transformation of courses to flexible learning modes, the revision of course contents, changes in academic calendar, and so on (Pawilen, 2021). The pandemic resulted in a strong need to adopt flexible modes of teaching and learning in higher education, just as happened to Napoleon, who had to make changes in his original plans due to changing circumstances in international relations. Speed of Response and a Sense of Urgency Napoleon surveyed the terrain and his intelligence officers indicated where the troops of the enemy were, which direction they were moving, and

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where they would meet them in battle. Napoleon wanted to attack with the element of surprise and thereby take advantage of all conditions and meet his adversaries where and when they least expected it. To this end, he had to focus on speed, inculcating a sense of urgency among his officers and troops. If something needed to be done, it needed to be done immediately (Manas, 2006). In this way, he could overcome the advantage of his foes and reach victory before they would have had time to take control of the situation. So many crisis events in schools, though, should be handled immediately and urgently to prevent the worsening of the situation. Meriade and Sales (2020) analyzed Napoleon’s leadership in terms of emergency management. This type of management involves taking exceptional and rapid action to prevent an unfavorable scenario from unfolding (e.g., decreasing of the school’s reputation, not meeting a response deadline) or to remedy a critical situation (disrupting the schooling process). In this sense, many educational leaders in the post-Corona era would agree with Canetti et  al. (2013) who constructed an emergency in an organization as a situation with a real risk within a short timeframe. As part of their emergency management in face of the spreading pandemic, educational leaders had to respond very fast to quarantines (e.g., building virtual communities of teachers) or to cope quickly with parents’ fear of sending their children to the school. Any delay in their response would have increased confusion, uncertainty, anxiety, and other negative emotions among teachers, students, and parents. Back to Napoleon, according to Manas (2006), speed was a key advantage of the French army, a skill that Napoleon engrained in their training and preparation. This means, that teachers should be trained to respond the fastest they can to any crisis event in the school. But, Napoleon further understood that any rapid response makes it necessary to avoid many obstacles on the way. Therefore, for example, he refrained from opening a second front in Austerlitz and focused entirely on winning one battle at a time. Emergency management requires, though, clear purpose and self-­ determination. Meriade and Sales (2020) further explained: These axioms allow Napoleon Bonaparte to be in anticipation, a real catalyst that triggers his action in terms of communication and organization. The results in terms of cohesion and concentration of forces are thus particularly effective in dealing with and managing emergencies. (p. 174)

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In the school’s context, fast and effective communication systems within the school and with the external constituencies appear to be key assets for anticipating emergency situations in an efficient manner. Thus, while anticipation of floods and pandemics are not under the responsibility of educational leaders and teachers, other potential crisis events such as suicide attempts or assaults among students should be handled in advance and responded as fast as possible. Napoleon would recommend educational leaders to collect much information about disruptive students and students in distress in order to anticipate any crisis event, and in turn, respond to it urgently. Maneuver: The Art of Deception After destroying an Austrian army during the Ulm Campaign, French troops seized Vienna in November 1805. However, the Austrians avoided further battles because they were waiting for reinforcements from their Russian allies. At the beginning, Napoleon sent his army north in pursuit of the Allies, but then ordered his forces to retreat due to his decision to feign a grave weakness of his forces. He was desperate to lure the Allies into battle and did the best he could to give them an elusive impression that the French army was in a pitiful state, even abandoning the dominant Pratzen Heights near Austerlitz. But, in fact, Napoleon deployed the French troops below the Pratzen Heights and deliberately weakened his right flank, tempting the Allies to launch a major assault there in the hopes of rolling up the whole French line. The Austrian army fell into the trap and, in turn, weakened its center on the Pratzen Heights, which was viciously attacked now by the French forces. Napoleon simply set a psychological trap in order to lure the Allies out and in this way overcame the advantage of the Allies in number of troops (McLynn, 1997). Preston and Wise (1979) elaborated on this maneuver: Napoleon was considered by many to excel at the art of deception, he would maneuver to confuse and then strike where least expected. One of his most innovative tactics was to attack along a broad front to fix the enemy, then send a Corps in a flanking movement to attack the enemy rear and destroy his lines of communications. He would then determine the weak spot on the Battle of Austerlitz front and attack with massed artillery or cavalry. He often held reserves back until the enemy was worn out and at Austerlitz he deliberately used this strategy. (p. 190)

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Some readers, especially the educators among them, may wonder why I bring up this kind of tactic in a book for educational leaders who are obliged to foster moral and ethical values. Well, it is not my intention here to suggest that educational leaders should follow Napoleon’s tactics simply as they are, but rather to consider some tactics during times of crisis that educational leaders could learn from his own military experience. In fact, what Napoleon did in Austerlitz some narcissistic policymakers or agents of interest groups can do in our educational systems nowadays and, consequently, educational leaders should be aware of that when facing a crisis that might be deceptive and elusive. In his book, Mitnick (2003) warns us of the art of deception in our time that refers to the skills and techniques that are called social engineering and make people believe in fabricated realities. Let’s assume, for instance, that local politicians are attempting to create a negative image of the local educational system by claiming it is in severe crisis and must, therefore, be reformed fundamentally. Many parents might fall into the trap, believing that local schools are ineffective, unaware that the politicians create a false reality for their own interests. Under these circumstances, educational leaders should remember what happened to the Allies in Austerlitz after they changed their defendable positions and, therefore, have to refuse to take part in the maneuver. They must not agree to manage a virtual crisis and should illuminate the effective aspects of the schooling process despite public resentment. Napoleon would warn them of manipulation and temptation, though. The Talented Employees Ought to Be Promoted Napoleon was mindful of such leadership qualities in others. He had no exclusive club, seat of romance, or haven of the well-connected here: careers were thrown open to talent (Keithly, 1996). Fortunately for Napoleon, he inherited an officer corps that was both militarily professional, transformed by the revolution and established on the revolutionary principles of merit, talent, and elections amongst peers for promotion. He promoted those who performed well regardless of their social background (Ellis, 1991). The lesson here is transparent; educational leaders interested in managing crisis events effectively and rapidly should promote to managerial roles only talented teachers and supportive staff, because when a crisis breaks out, these employees will be able to help them in this mission. In other words, when the most talented employees are gathering together as a team

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to prepare for a crisis or to respond to it, they are inevitably linking their fortunes to their leaders’ own continual success and, in turn, bring a good end to the crisis. In contrast, when promotion is based on nepotism, friendships, and micro-politics, it is unsurprising that the response of the school to crisis events is likely to be poor, slow, and ineffective, to say the least. Napoleon would not allow himself to appoint marshals for these reasons, understanding they will make him fail in the battlefields. Chapter Summary • Despite the inferiority of the French army in number of soldiers, Napoleon expressed high manipulative capacities and seduced his enemies to fall into his trap. This led the Grand Army to overwhelming victory in the battlefield. • Like other great leaders in this book, Napoleon was characterized by risk-taking, fearless determination, presence, adaptability, speed of thought, flexibility, self-confidence, decisiveness, and courage. These personality traits helped him face the crisis in Austerlitz and win the battle. • Napoleon taught us that strategic and tactical modes of planning are critical in times of crisis, but without the leader’s capability to adjust them to changing circumstances, their value in crisis management is questionable. • Speed of response to an anticipated or current crisis, coupled with effective communication systems, is critical in effective crisis management. • Sometimes local politicians and policymakers might create a sense of crisis in education for their own interest, and educational leaders should avoid falling into the trap. • Only the most talented teachers and support staff should be selected to face the crisis in the school. Otherwise, it is unlikely to manage the crisis effectively and rapidly. Questions for Consideration 1. What kind of crises in education resemble the crisis faced by Napoleon and his army in Austerlitz? 2. What are the personality traits shared by Napoleon and by other figures in this book that are essential to effective crisis management? Why?

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3. What are the facilitators and inhibitors of flexibility in educational leadership during times of crisis? 4. Why should crisis events in schools be handled immediately and urgently? Can you think of any example? 5. How did educational leaders respond to COVID-19? How fast their responses were? 6. Could you suggest educational leaders to cope with deceptions and temptations in their external environment? Practical Activities Choose a crisis event that might break out in education. Apply the tactics used by Napoleon in Austerlitz and write down a plan to face the factors of the crisis and its negative outcomes. Then, explain the constraints of each response in educational institutions.

References Blond, G. (1979). La Grande Armée. Arms and Armour Press. Canetti, C., Catinaud, C., & Koch, T. (2013). Manager l’urgence: Créer et gérer la rupture, diriger la transition. Dunod. Castelot, A. (1967). Bonaparte. Librairie Academique Perrin. Ellis, G. (1991). The Napoleonic empire. Macmillan Press. Epstein, R. M. (1994). Napoleon's last victory and the emergence of modern war. UP of Kansas City. Esdaile, C. (2007). Napoleon’s wars: An international history. Penguin. Fuller, J.  F. C. (1955). Military history of Western world (Vol. II, p.  413). Da Capo Press. Goetz, R. (2005). 1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon and the destruction of the third coalition. Greenhill Books. Iodice, E. F. (2022). Lessons from history: The astonishing rise to leadership and power of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Journal of Values-Based Leadership, 15(1) Article 13. Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/jvbl/vol15/iss1/13 Keithly, D.  M. (1996). Leadership in doctrine. Journal of Leadership Studies, 3(4), 129–138. Manas, J. (2006). Napoleon on project management: Timeless lessons in planning, execution, and leadership. Harper/Collins. McLynn, F. (1997). Napoleon: A biography. Arcade Publishing Inc.

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Meriade, L., & Sales, J. M. (2020). Le management de l’urgence dans les organisations? Les réponses apportées par Napoléon Bonaparte. Revue Internationale de Psychosociologie et de Gestion de Comportements Organisationnels, 26, 165–196. Mitnick, K. D. (2003). The art of deception. Wily Publishing. Parijat, P. (2014). Great transformational leaders - Gandhi, Napoleon and Lincoln: What business managers can learn from them? International Research Journal of Business and Management, 7(10), 68–76. Pawilen, G. T. (2021). Preparing Philippine higher education institutions for flexible learning during the period of COVID-19 pandemic: Curricular and instructional adjustments, challenges, and issues. International Journal of Curriculum and Instruction, 13(3), 2150–2166. Preston, R. A., & Wise, S. F. (1979). Men in arms: A history of warfare and its interrelationships with western society. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Swain, R.  D. (2019). Leadership lessons through the lens of historical military leaders: A pedagogical approach to teaching leadership theories and concepts in a Masters of Public Administration course. Teaching Public Administration, 37(2), 234–252. Van der Heyden, L. (2021). History lessons: The case of Napoleon Bonaparte reflections on the bicentenary of his death. Working paper, INSEAD, 2021/18/ TOM.  Retrieved on February 12, 2023, from https://www.insead.edu/ faculty-­research/research.

PART III

Insights from Social and Economic Crises

CHAPTER 11

Theodore Roosevelt

Chapter Overview • A great strike in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania • Taking responsibility over the crisis • High emotional intelligence and social awareness • Peaceful negotiation—arbitration Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th president of the US, was born in New York City in 1858 and died in 1919. With the assassination of President McKinley, Roosevelt, not quite 43, became the youngest president in the nation’s history till then. From his first moments in office in December 1901, Roosevelt expressed the progressive conviction that the government should mediate between conflicting forces in order to stabilize the American society and prevent social and economic crises. In Gould’s (2012) view, Roosevelt brought new excitement and power to the presidency, as he dynamically led Congress and the American public toward progressive reforms and a strong foreign policy. Staudacher (2016) described Roosevelt’s influence even many decades after his death: President Theodore Roosevelt is both a famous and contested political figure in twentieth-century American politics. Even after one-hundred-twelve years, interpretations and reinterpretations of his policies, speeches, and actions continue both within and outside of the academic sphere. Politicians © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3_11

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on both sides of the political aisle claim him as their own, pulling certain aspects of his presidency and associate their ideals with his set of beliefs. Views range from him being a visionary of modern American government to being a stalwart defender of traditional values. (p. 43)

For the purpose of this book, it is interesting to analyze Roosevelt’s assertions in favor of a greater role of governments in arbitrating among conflicting economic forces, particularly between capital and labor, guaranteeing justice to each and dispensing favors to none. His crisis leadership is reflected through his involvement in the attempt to bring an end to the great strike in the anthracite coal field of Pennsylvania in 1902.

A Great Strike in the Anthracite Coal Fields of Pennsylvania The economic depression of 1893 forced down the wages of many miners across the US, resulting in spontaneous uprisings that forced many mine owners to sign a contract with the United Mine Workers. For miners the work was hard, intermittent, and hazardous. In Pennsylvania, a young man named John Mitchell, who became the president of the United Mine Workers in 1898, hoped to achieve the same kind of success in the anthracite or hard coalfields of Pennsylvania, a natural monopoly heavily concentrated in a few hundred square miles in five counties in Pennsylvania (Grossman, 1975). To keep wages low, local mine operators recruited many immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. Consequently, the miners were of 14 different nationalities, spoke different languages, and had different customs. Yet, despite the low percentage of mine workers in the labor union, Mitchell hoped that the anthracite industry would negotiate with the union in order to reduce competition (Berfield, 2020). But, he was wrong. Mitchell was frustrated by the refusal of the employers to deal with the union, and therefore, had no other choice but to declare a strike on May 12, 1902. A long, bitter fight between the mine owners and the union was ahead, and clashes between miners, scabs, and armed guards hired by the employers became widespread. No side in the conflict showed any sign of surrender or concession, and by fall eastern cities started to face a coal famine. A fear of a severe shortage of coal during the incoming winter has

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spread rapidly all over the nation. The public demanded a strike settlement (Wiebe, 1961) and the president feared “untold misery…with the certainty of riots which might develop into social war” (Grossman, 1975, p. 23). Although Roosevelt had no legal right to intervene in the crisis, he sent telegrams to both sides summoning them to a White House conference to discuss plausible solutions. In fact, he asked the opponents in the name of the public to compromise and when the mine operators arrogantly refused, Roosevelt used threats and diplomacy to arouse J. P. Morgan, one of the most powerful bankers of his era. Morgan forced the operators to accept a presidential arbitration commission. In return, the miners went back to work while the commission considered the labor relations in this sector. In March 1903, this commission made an award favorable to the mine workers (Wiebe, 1961), and Roosevelt’s efforts to end the strike were successful. Both sides finally agreed to the findings of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, and peace was restored in the coalfields. Perry (1991) highlighted the leadership of Roosevelt in this crisis: The anthracite coal .strike of 1902 shows Roosevelt at his best. In that crisis, he seized the initiative by bringing labor and capital to the negotiating table. He proved to be a successful mediator in what contemporaries saw as the most significant strike in American history. (p. 3)

In the next pages, I analyze Roosevelt’s crisis management and explore the ways in which educational leadership may learn from his leadership.

Lessons Learned from Roosevelt’s Crisis Leadership On June 8, Roosevelt asked his Commissioner of Labor, Carroll Wright, to examine the causes of the strike and its implications. Wright investigated and proposed reforms that acknowledged each side’s position, recommending a 9-h day on an experimental basis and limited collective bargaining. In doing so, Roosevelt shared similar responses to crises like other figures in this book who collected as much information as possible before reacting to the crisis. However, due to the need to face a social-­ economic crisis, Roosevelt’s crisis leadership exposes some particular aspects of crisis management.

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Taking Responsibility Over the Crisis Sometimes, educational leaders can be told not to interfere in a certain crisis event (e.g., riots and demonstrations in the community), because it is beyond their legal responsibility and, consequently, they must not take any initiative that might be seen as taking one’s side over the other in the dispute. What would Roosevelt advise to do under these circumstances? In his letters and public addresses before the crisis began, Roosevelt showed considerable interest in labor but little appreciation of labor unions and had a host of opinions on the proper relationship between labor and capital (Perry, 1991; Wiebe, 1961). But, as time passed and the dispute between the mine owners and the workers was not resolved, the prices of the anthracite coal soared and by October hard coal was practically off the market. As a result, many people assumed that eastern cities which used this sort of coal for domestic heating would face a coal famine, leading to a panic which public officials and retailers exacerbated and to a fuel crisis. Next came more rumors, fright, and scare buying. According to Perry (1991), there is no evidence in Roosevelt’s personal papers to indicate any alarm at the onset of the strike. However, when it became clear that the strike was not going to end in the short run due to the resiliency of the labor union and the insistence of the operators not to recognize the union as the legal representative of the employees or to reach a settlement, Roosevelt became concerned about the crisis and its dire consequences in the coming winter. Thus, Roosevelt’s interest in the strike developed along with the public panic. By late August, however, he could no longer ignore the damage a coal shortage might inflict upon the Republicans in the fall elections and on his own election chances in 1904 (Wiebe, 1961). Nevertheless, his attorney general told him that the strike was not his concern, and whenever Roosevelt raised the issue, the attorney continued to advise the president that he had no legal right to intervene. Grossman (1975) highlighted the dilemmas faced by Roosevelt when the crisis worsened: President Roosevelt was in a quandary. “There is literally nothing…the national government has any power to do,” he complained to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. “I am at wit's end how to proceed.” Lodge too was worried. He did not understand the folly of the operators which would cause great suffering and probably defeat the Republican Party. As winter neared and coal prices soared, Roosevelt feared “the untold misery…, with the certainty of riots which might develop into social war.”

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Although the President agreed with his advisers that he had no legal right, he was determined to bring both sides together and see whether he could bring about an agreement (p. 23).

Educational leaders may find themselves in the same dilemmas when faced by external crises whose impact on the school might be ominous, such as political controversies or conflicting suggestions to reform education. An educational leader may ask: Am I supposed to take a stand in the conflict? Am I allowed legally to display any stance in the crisis? These ponderings are related to issues of jurisdiction and duty. Obviously, the answer depends on many factors such as the degree of threats toward the schooling process, the positional power/public image of the educational leader in the community, and the type of the crisis/conflict. In the case of Roosevelt, political, social, and economic factors seem to have stood behind his decision to interfere in the crisis, although he had no legal right to act in this way. Hence, he would answer the indicated-above ponderings with one word—yes! It is the leader’s responsibility to manage a severe crisis even if he or she has never been given any formal authority to do it. Otherwise, the crisis might become devastating, dangerous, and destructive. Roosevelt practiced what he preaches and sent telegrams to both sides summoning them to Washington to discuss the strike (Grossman, 1975). In the meeting, Roosevelt disclaimed any right to intervene but emphasized that the impending dire consequences of the strike impelled him to use his influence in order to find a solution. Therefore, he would further condemn educational leaders and teachers who choose not to intervene in a conflict that took place entirely outside of school, despite its impact on students, as reported by Cornell and Sheras (1998). Thus, despite a series of confrontations between two groups of girls in the same community, the principal regarded the conflict as a community matter and not a school matter. This decision worsened the situation and influenced inevitably the school’s life (e.g., greater levels of absenteeism, increased school violence). An open-minded perspective was critically necessary. High Emotional Intelligence and Social Awareness Leaders in every field, Roosevelt wrote, “need more than anything else to know human nature, to know the needs of the human soul; and they will find this nature and these needs set forth as nowhere else by the great imaginative writers, whether of prose or of poetry” (cited in Goodwin,

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2018, p. 25). His letter came up many years before the term “emotional intelligence” was coined. According to Goleman (1995), emotional intelligence is composed of four dimensions; the most relevant of them to our discussion here are social awareness and social skills. Thus, in his activities to solve the crisis, Roosevelt displayed an ability to sympathize with others, learn their personal views, and manage his relationships with both the mine owners and the employees effectively. Therefore, he gained positive outcomes, as we already know. Signs of his sympathy toward others we receive in his First Annual Message to Congress in 1901, in which he stressed the importance of the welfare of each citizen that makes the nation, because it must rest upon individual thrift and energy (Staudacher, 2016). Particularly striking, nevertheless, was his high emotional intelligence during the crisis, as arising from the next quote: Roosevelt, who had been injured a month earlier when his carriage was hit by a trolley car, sat in his wheelchair pleading with representatives of management and labor. “With all the earnestness there is in me…” the President urged, “I ask that there be an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines in some such way as will…meet the crying needs of the people.” He appealed to the patriotism of the contestants to make “individual sacrifices for the general good.” (cited in Grossman, 1975, p. 21)

When talking about the needs of the people, Roosevelt expressed a deep sympathy toward their fears and concerns due to a possible shortage of coal in the cold winter. Driven by his social awareness and skills, he turned the policy of the US government until then from strikebreaker to peacemaker in labor disputes (Gould, 2012). In fact, and consistent with Staudacher (2016), Roosevelt defined his role as president in this crisis as the “public interest’s” agent and defined the public in this case as coal consumers. Moreover, he “heartily disliked the operators, and he liked Mitchell.” He gave no indication of knowing or caring why the United Miner Worker was striking. Only once did he mention the miners themselves, and said that “many of them were very poor and ignorant and of foreign birth,” fit material for riot (Wiebe, 1961, p. 245). What do educational leaders learn from Roosevelt’s social awareness and skills? Every leader, particularly in times of crisis, should be able to see the reality from another person’s eyes and enter his or her sphere of emotions. This enables the leader to generate positive relationships with those

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involved in the crisis management and harness their support in solving the crisis effectively and peacefully, as Roosevelt did. Wittmer and Hopkins (2022) focused on leaders who had been thrust into leading remotely through virtual platforms during the corona crisis and found that emotional intelligence benefits leaders navigating the challenges of leading remotely in time of crisis. They further concluded what Roosevelt seems to have acknowledged many years ago: Individuals with a higher level of emotional intelligence experienced lower levels of concern for leading in these extraordinary times. This highlights the central importance of leaders focusing on the human factors throughout crisis situations. While operational issues are certainly important to address, the human elements are even more essential since the operational issues are influenced by people and their emotional reactions. (ibid., p. 184)

Educational leaders with a higher level of emotional intelligence are more likely to create good atmosphere among conflicting groups of teachers, unsatisfied parents, or frustrated stakeholders and solve the crisis events peacefully. One lesson we receive from Roosevelt’s crisis management, then, is the impact of the leader’s high emotional intelligence on individuals’ capability to reach their full potential in times of crisis. Peaceful Negotiation—Arbitration Several months after the strike began, a sense of deadlock dominated in the air, especially due to the mine operators’ refusal to recognize the United Mine Workers union. In contrast, the talented and modest president of the union, Mitchell, sought arbitration and peace (Wiebe, 1961). Roosevelt who could act like former presidents and send the troops to break the strike in labor disputes shared the same attitude and genuinely struggled to find a solution that would promote long-term stability in labor relations. In his words, Most of my correspondents wish me to try something violent and impossible. A minor but a very influential part desire that I send troops at once without a shadow of warrant into the coal districts, or that I bring suit against the labor organization; the others demand that I bring suit against the operators, or that I under the law of eminent domain, or for the purpose of protecting the public health, seize their property, or appoint a receiver, or do something else that is wholly impossible. My great concern is, of course,

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to break the famine; but I must not be drawn into any violent step which would bring reaction and disaster afterward. (cited in Perry, 1991, p. 13)

The arbitration process is voluntary, as Roosevelt indicated in the meeting with the mine owners and the representatives of the workers. According to Carlston (1952, p. 631), it involves “(i) an identifiable dispute or controversy between parties (ii) which by agreement of such parties (iii) is referred or referable to one or more persons for final decision.” Roosevelt chose peaceful negotiations rather than any violent response to the strike. What could educational leaders learn from his decision? First, in many crises that derive from disputes and inter-group conflict in the school, the leader should attempt to mediate the settlement of the conflict. Second, the leader should lead an arbitration panel when both conflicting sides are obliged to accept the results of the arbitrator(s). Third, the leader has to create a climate of compromise and negotiation in the school and in its community. In this way, educational leader may solve varied conflicts and disagreements between teachers and between the school and its community. This, in turn, may result in the restoration of order and harmony in the school. Arbitration and conciliation are better mechanisms, then, for coping with crises related to disputes and controversies between different groups of school members and stakeholders. It is much better than any attempt to impose a solution that prioritizes the interests of one group over the other, as Roosevelt showed. Both Roosevelt and Mitchell believed that arbitration is a better way to settle disputes that seem to be unresolved by direct negotiation between the opposing parties, as Berfield (2020) indicated. Note, however, that arbitration is only one strategy to resolve conflicts and therefore, it is advised to use it in parallel to dialogue or smoothing (Dwan, 2018). Chapter Summary • Many months of strike in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania resulting in greater public resentment propelled President T. Roosevelt to conciliate between the mine operators and the trade union. His crisis leadership merit highlighting because it led to a lasting successful solution to problems inherent in local labor relations. • Roosevelt asked his commissioner of labor to provide him with much information about the causes of the strike and its potential implications, prior to intervening in the dispute.

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• When the crisis might be destructive, it is the moral responsibility of the educational leader to intervene and seek for solutions, even if it is not under his or her legal jurisdiction. • A leader’s high social awareness and social skills, two dimensions of emotional intelligence, are critical in crisis management, because they enable the leader better see the world through the eyes of the followers and encourage them to find the best solutions for the crisis. • In cases of severe disputes it is better to initiate an arbitration process between the conflicting parties rather than imposing a solution on one side. Roosevelt avoided sending troops to break the strike and instead encouraged both sides to participate in an arbitration process. Questions for Consideration 1. What should be the role of educational leaders in times of strike in the educational sector? 2. Why is it so important to collect information about the sources of the crisis and its implications in varied types of crisis events? What kind of information educational leaders should collect before managing the crisis? 3. What might be the inhibitors of the principal’s intervention in external crisis? What might be the results of a lack of intervention in crises whose impact on the school is likely to be destructive? 4. In what ways high emotional intelligence supports effective crisis management in schools? 5. How is an arbitration process look like in the school? Who should take part in this process? Why? Practical Activities Select several students/teachers to participate in an arbitration process. Some should be the conflicting parties and the others are the arbitrators. Choose a crisis/dispute and manage the crisis through this process. Write down the facilitators and the inhibitors arising in an arbitration process that takes place in schools.

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References Berfield, S. (2020). The hour of fate: Theodore Roosevelt, J.P. Morgan, and the battle to transform American capitalism. Bloomsbury. Carlston, K. S. (1952). Theory of the arbitration process. Law and Contemporary Problems, 17(4), 631–651. Cornell, D. G., & Sheras, P. I. (1998). Common errors in school crisis response: Learning from our mistakes. Psychology in the Schools, 35(3), 297–307. Dwan, V. J. (2018). Conflict management strategies and secondary school teachers’ job effectiveness in Obubra local government area of Cross River state, Nigeria. Unpublished B.Ed. Project Submitted to Department of Educational Administration and Planning, University of Calabar, Calabar. Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence. Bantam Books. Goodwin, D.  K. (2018). Leadership in turbulent times. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Gould, L. L. (2012). Theodore Roosevelt. Oxford University Press. Grossman, J. (1975). The coal strike of 1902 turning point in U.S. policy. Monthly Labor Review, 98(10), 21–28. Perry, P. R. (1991). Theodore Roosevelt and the labor movement. A thesis presented to the faculty of California State University, Hayward. Staudacher, N. A. (2016). Theodore Roosevelt's construction of the ‘public interest’: Rhetoric, ideology, and presidential intervention, 1901–1906. A thesis submitted To Kent State University in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of the Arts. Wiebe, R. H. (1961). The anthracite strike of 1902: A record of confusion. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 48(2), 229–251. Wittmer, J. L. S., & Hopkins, M. M. (2022). Leading remotely in a time of crisis: Relationships with emotional intelligence. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 29(2), 176–189.

CHAPTER 12

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Chapter Overview • The Great Depression and the New Deal • Revolutionary ideas • Reliance on a wide variety of individuals • Optimism: a message of hope Franklin Delano Roosevelt (F.D.R.) was born in Hyde Park, New York, in 1882 and was elected president in 1932 during the height of the Great Depression. He served as president from March 1933 to April 1945, the longest tenure in American history, and died at the age of 63 on April 12, 1945. F.D.R. was the only US president to serve four consecutive terms during which he coped with several political, military, and economic crises, including the Great Depression and World War II. In this chapter, I focus on his response to the Great Depression, a massive economic crisis that influenced almost every American in that time. Roosevelt is remembered as the president who created the New Deal programs that helped bring the US out of the Great Depression and back to prosperity. The New Deal was a set of varied economic reforms designed to help the US recover, and despite the historical controversies over its success, we can learn a lot about crisis management from the leadership of F.D.R. in those years.

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The Great Depression and the New Deal The crash of Wall Street on October 29, 1929, signals the beginning of one of the largest economic crises in US history, named the Great Depression. The Depression was spreading economic misery everywhere and almost every American experienced an economic disaster that lasted an entire decade. One of every three workers lost his job, banks were failing, real Growth National Product fell by roughly one-third between 1929 and 1933, and malnutrition or even starvation was becoming a real problem in the US (Walsh, 2020). Many people lost their homes, jobs, and hope for the future. According to Fishback et al. (2005a), such a dramatic economic shock was likely to contribute to substantial shifts in demographic outcomes, because the stark reductions in income and concomitant inadequate access to nutrition, housing, and medical care put infants and people of all ages at greater risk of death and disease. Likewise, economic distress potentially fueled psychological depression that contributed to more suicides and social and economic stresses that led to more homicides. Under these circumstances, F.D.R. was elected the 32nd president of the US. At that time, the situation in the US (and in many other countries) was very bad. Due to the limited response of President Hoover to the severe crisis, Americans were eager for a new leader who would restore hope after three years of economic depression. They voted for F.D.R. who promised to solve the crisis in a more creative manner. Thus, as soon as he entered the White House, he began an unprecedented series of federal actions to reduce the negative effect of the economic calamity on every American. Briefly, the New Deal distributed large sums of money to state and local governments to enable them to provide employment and relief and build a wide array of public works. In one of the programs of the New Deal, the government paid farmers to change their production patterns in an attempt to raise commodity prices. Fishback et al. (2005b) elaborated on the various programs in the New Deal reform: The federal government poured resources (sometimes in partnership with state and local governments) into the provision of emergency work relief and direct relief during the First New Deal (1933–1935). After 1935 through the beginning of World War II, the federal government continued providing emergency work relief. Under the Social Security Act enacted in 1935, the Roosevelt administration established a federal/state/local partnership to provide public assistance to dependent children, the blind, and

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the aged that replaced the much smaller state and local programs that had existed prior to the New Deal. Federal involvement in relief efforts led to dramatic increases in spending, as per capita relief expenditures increased by about 160 percent between 1932 and 1933. By 1940 per capita relief expenditures were almost three times the 1932 level even though the unemployment rates were substantially below the 1932 level. (p. 59)

During the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration also established a federal/state/local partnership to provide public assistance to dependent children, disabled people, and the elderly that replaced the much smaller state and local programs. Note, nevertheless, that the notion that when Roosevelt became president he had a plan in his head called the New Deal is a myth (Roger, 2015). In fact, the New Deal was many times inconsistent and even contradictory, having little ideological coherence or a clear set of principles on which Roosevelt drew on (DiNunzio, 2011). Yet, although F.D.R. didn’t end the Great Depression by merely introducing the New Deal, he created an invaluable welfare system to support those in need (Walsh, 2020), resulting in a substantial and novel change in the federal government intervention in local economies (Fishback et al., 2005a). After all, the intensity of the Depression and his own humane character moved F.D.R. first to practical emergency experiments, and then his progressive political faith turned him to thoughts of long-term, systemic reforms (DiNunzio, 2011, p. 42). For the purpose of this book, his actual responses to the crisis are worth further explanation.

Lessons Learned from F.D.R.’s Crisis Management Like many other leaders in this book, F.D.R. is characterized as bold, flexible, and risk-taker whose personal courage and high resilience enabled him to push the New Deal forward, despite many obstacles he was facing during the implementation phase (Goodwin, 2018). However, F.D.R. seems to emphasize three distinctive elements that are vital in order to manage any crisis effectively and intensely. Revolutionary Ideas Because the Great Depression was such a massive economic crisis, ordinary traditional economic solutions simply did not work. Roosevelt’s predecessor, President Hoover, could not deviate from common and dominant social and economic perspectives in his time, and the Depression

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has further worsened. In contrast, Roosevelt was an experimentalist who did not hesitate to put forward unorthodox views (Rosen, 2005). For example, even before Congress reassembled, Roosevelt stretched his authority by proclaiming a four-day bank holiday based on the Trading with the Enemy Act that authorized the president to “prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange and the export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency” (Roger, 2015, p. 44). Needless to say, Hoover did not dare to do it, even though some of his advisers urged him to do so in order to face the dire consequences of the Great Depression. Rosen (2005) further illuminated Roosevelt’s tendency to put forward revolutionary ideas and procedures in times of crisis: More open than his predecessor to experimentation, flexible in ideological and programmatic outlook, Roosevelt proved willing to unbalance the budget by provision for relief and public works. If budget unbalance evolved initially from social priorities and declining tax revenues, monetary policy represented a conscious endeavor to separate the dollar from both gold and management of sterling to the disadvantage of American price levels. (p. 22)

Revolutionary responses are required sometimes in face of severe educational crises such as weapon incidents in the school’s yard, mass allergic reactions among students, or several suicide attempts among teenagers. In light of Roosevelt’s legacy, educational leaders have to think “out of the box” and become open-minded; they should not constrain themselves to current regulations or spheres of responsibility in their role, but rather should suggest solutions of second-order change that are more likely to face the crisis effectively. Roosevelt would encourage them to follow his way as expressed in one of his statements regarding the vast changes he made in social welfare provision: “I assert that modern society, acting through its Government, owes the definite obligation to prevent the starvation or the dire want of any of its fellow men and women who try to maintain themselves but cannot” (cited in Biles, 1998, p. 139). Likewise, Roosevelt would insist on being committed to the unprivileged students by breaking new ground in providing relief for those who suffer mostly in our society. According to DiNunzio (2011), there was a moral and political coherence in Roosevelt’s desire, often expressed, to provide basic security and liberation for Americans and to strengthen the role of government in solving national problems. Educational leaders will no doubt agree with his revolutionary line of thought in his time.

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Revolutionary, “out-of-the-box” ideas are implemented many times by trial and error. Thus, during the New Deal, scores of social and economic experiments flourished. While not all of them were successful, they shared the common purpose of building a country from whose basic benefits no one was excluded (Kennedy, 2009). Roosevelt encouraged his subordinates to suggest many new projects to help farmers, refugees, workers, and many other Americans survive the Great Depression, claiming it is better to try and fail sometimes than do nothing in face of the crisis. This is a lesson that should be taught by educational leaders; when a crisis erupts, it is better to respond in varied ways, although some may fail, because the successful responses will help minimize the dire consequences of the crisis in the short run and develop better solutions in the long run. Never be afraid to act in response to the crisis, F.D.R. would have probably told the educational leaders in our time. Reliance on a Wide Variety of Individuals Although other figures in this book employed a kind of shared leadership in their attempt to manage a crisis, the massive scope of the New Deal and the high levels of uncertainty (i.e., no one had the right solutions to the Great Depression) forced Roosevelt to consult with many people from varied social and occupational groups and communities. Walsh (2020) explained this aspect of Roosevelt’s crisis leadership: FDR was not sure what could work [to solve the crisis], so he tried many programs that he thought had potential – the pragmatic, flexible approach that was needed. He got his ideas from many places, notably what historians have called his ‘brain trust,’ consisting of long-time advisers, scholars he admired, and labor and business leaders, and everyday people whom he encountered and whose stories he was eager to hear. (p. 18)

As a matter of fact, any view of F.D.R. as single-handedly crafting the New Deal distorts much of what occurred in the 1930s, as Biles (1998) claimed. There were many politicians, civil servants, and experts who contributed to manage the Great Depression effectively, such as Senator Robert F.  Wagner of New  York, who was, in fact, the driving force behind the New Deal’s great achievements in social welfare reform. The conclusion is transparent, then; when educational leaders face a serious, new crisis toward which current strategies of crisis management simply do not work,

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it is imperative to consult with a wide variety of people and analyze the sources and implications of the crisis from different points of view. The crisis caused by the massive spread of COVID-19 is only one example of serious crisis that made it necessary to respond to its implications in education from social, economic, organizational, and emotional perspectives (Oplatka & Crawford, 2022). Educational leaders needed the best middle managers with them during the COVID-19 crisis. Notably, Roosevelt’s shared leadership stemmed not only from pragmatic reasons, but also from his moral obligation to ordinary and disadvantaged people. In his famous campaign speech, he sought favor with a broad coalition of working people both employed and unemployed, indicating that after three years of the Great Depression, it is a time to devise plans that rest upon the forgotten, the unorganized but indispensable units of economic power (Cowie & Salvatore, 2008). These plans should be built from the bottom up and not from the top down that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid. In the educational sector, any plan to manage a severe crisis should be built on various voices of teachers, students, and stakeholders in order to unify all of them together in face of the crisis. This is what F.D.R. tried to do in his vision to unify farmers, miners, and millions of unemployed. Roosevelt, paralyzed from the waist down by polio, was forced to rely on family, friends, and aides in his daily life. But, this is what made him understand more than many other leaders in his time that the leader is stronger when he or she works through others. An educational leader facing massive students’ physical assaults or guns in the school, which are common in the US (Nickerson & Zhe, 2004), should establish a crisis response team, consisting of school psychologist, parents, senior teachers, policemen, and so on. The team has to raise the voices of students and stakeholders as part of its attempt to devise both prevention plans and interventions to cope with these types of crises. Optimism: A Message of Hope According to Walsh (2020), F.D.R. maintained a leadership trait that is essential to any president’s success in a crisis—optimism. Optimism has been linked to better emotional well-being, life satisfaction, more effective coping strategies, happiness, and even to better outcomes in several areas of physical health (Alarcon et al., 2013). Optimist individuals expect good outcomes, even when things are hard, resulting in a relatively positive mix

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of feelings (Carver et al., 2010). Teachers need their leaders to be optimistic and Roosevelt’s leadership tells us why. Optimism is reflected in Roosevelt’s attitude toward the management of the Great Depression. He radiated confidence that he would set things right and that the country will be strong again, and most Americans believed him (Perkins, 1946). He projected a positive feeling toward the people, indicating that “the country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all try something” (cited in DiNunzio, 2011). If he was not optimistic, he would not probably dare to declare a statement that is embedded with many risks and uncertainties. So, why did F.D.R. project optimism? Carver et al. (2010) seem to provide an answer: The advantages of optimism also seem to translate into the domains of interpersonal relationships: optimists are better liked than pessimists, they benefit from their natural tendency to see things in the best light, and they appear to engage more productive effort in the sorts of problem solving that keep relationships alive. (p. 887)

In times of a crisis, teachers, students, and many stakeholders prefer to be exposed to optimistic views of the future rather than to pessimistic ones. Thus, no matter how serious the crisis is, Roosevelt would recommend educational leaders to project optimism and radiate confidence in that the crisis will be over and is under control. They should foster an optimistic atmosphere and encourage teachers, for example, to believe they can overcome the crisis and come back to normality. Particularly striking is the fact that although optimism is a personality trait, the cognitive–behavioral view posits that every individual can train him/herself to think in the ways optimists think and act in the ways optimists act (Carver et al., 2010). To wit, educational leaders must make a deliberate choice to practice a calm state of mind and reframe a threat as an opportunity for innovation and changes in the school. They may further inspire some hope among teachers, students, and stakeholders. Hope is defined as “a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (1) agency (goal-directed energy) and (2) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287). Hope was positively associated with happiness and negatively associated with depression and stress (Alarcon et al., 2013). For this reason, educational leaders must not lose hope and feel desperate, but in contrast; they must remind

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everyone that the crisis is temporary and one day everything will be ok. They have to convince teachers and other professionals that their efforts to minimize the negative consequences of the crisis are not in vain. After all, optimism and hope drive people to act. Chapter Summary • In face of one of the biggest economic crises in the history of the US, Roosevelt initiated an unprecedented series of federal actions to reduce the negative effect of the economic calamity on every American. • Roosevelt was an experimentalist who did not hesitate to put forward unorthodox, revolutionary solutions to the severe crisis, assuming that old, traditional responses to economic crisis are unlikely to work out under new circumstances. • Managing a serious crisis cannot be on the shoulder of one person solely. To face the Great Depression, F.D.R. consulted with a wide variety of politicians, civil servants, and experts and attempted to unify workers, farmers, and middle-class people in face of the crisis. Educational leaders may consider this approach when facing a very complex and uncertain crisis. • As part of their crisis management, educational leaders should learn from F.D.R. how to project optimism and give hope to teachers, students, and stakeholders, emphasizing that the crisis is not fatal but temporary and they will solve the crisis together. Questions for Consideration 1. Why did Roosevelt have to initiate such a massive program (the New Deal) in order to cope with the Great Depression? What could be considered a parallel crisis in education? 2. Why should educational leaders be open-minded in times of crisis and suggest revolutionary solutions? Could you think of any crisis in education that makes it necessary to find “out-of-the-box” responses? 3. Who are the “advisors” that educational leaders have to rely on their view when facing a particularly serious crisis in education? How could their expertise help manage the crisis effectively? 4. How can we teach prospective educational leaders to foster optimism and hope in times of crisis?

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Practical Activities Think about the time of COVID-19 and suggest revolutionary mechanisms educational leaders could develop to cope with it. Elucidate some reference to the facilitators and inhibitors of revolutionary ideas in education.

References Alarcon, G.  M., Bowling, N.  A., & Khazon, S. (2013). Great expectations: A meta-analytic examination of optimism and hope. Personality and Individual Differences, 54(7), 821–827. Biles, R. (1998). Robert F. Wagner, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and social welfare legislation in the New Deal. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 28(1), 139–152. Carver, C.  S., Scheier, M.  F., & Segerstrom, S.  C. (2010). Optimism. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 879–889. Cowie, J., & Salvatore, N. (2008). The long exception: Rethinking the place of the New Deal in American history. International Labor and Working-Class History, 74, 3–32. DiNunzio, M.  R. (2011). Franklin D. Roosevelt and the third American revolution. Praeger. Fishback, P. V., Haines, M. R., & Kantor, S. (2005a). Births, deaths, and New Deal relief during the great depression. National Bureau of Economic Research. Fishback, P. V., Horrace, W. C., & Kantor, S. (2005b). Did New Deal grant programs stimulate local economies? A study of federal grants and retail sales during the great depression. The Journal of Economic History, 65(1), 36–71. Goodwin, D.  K. (2018). Leadership in turbulent times. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. Kennedy, D.  M. (2009). What the New Deal did. Political Science Quarterly, 124(2), 251–268. Nickerson, A. B., & Zhe, E. J. (2004). Crisis prevention and intervention: A survey of school psychologists. Psychology in the Schools, 41, 777–788. Oplatka, I., & Crawford, M. (2022). Principal, let’s talk about emotions: Some lessons COVID-19 taught us about emergency situations and leadership. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 25(1), 162–172. Perkins, F. (1946). The Roosevelt I knew. Viking. Roger, D. (2015). Franklin D.  Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 1882–1939. University of Illinois Press.

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Rosen, E. A. (2005). Roosevelt, the great depression, and the economics of recovery. University of Virginia Press. Snyder, C. R., Irving, L., & Anderson, J. (1991). Hope and health: Measuring the will and the ways. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.), Handbook of social and clinical psychology (pp. 285–305). Pergamon. Walsh, K. T. (2020). Presidential leadership in crisis. Routledge.

CHAPTER 13

Margaret Thatcher

Chapter Outline • The economic crises of the 1970s and the 1980s in the UK • A very expansive solution to economic crises • The gap between expected solutions and final solutions Margaret Thatcher was born in Grantham, Lincolnshire, UK, in 1925 and died in 2013 at the age of 88. She became the UK’s first female and longest-­serving prime minister, and her economic policies changed her country’s political landscape forever. She had a domineering personality, won three successive election victories, and exploited more fully than most of the powers available to the premier in Britain’s unique form of unwritten “elected dictatorship” in a highly mediatized age (Jessop, 2015). A year after she resigned from premiership, Brazier (1991) praised her unique achievements: Mrs. Thatcher’s political achievements are many and will probably stand for many years…she was the first woman to be elected leader of a British political party and subsequently Prime Minister. She has left a political philosophy and policies which will be forever associated with her name as Thatcherism, a memorial the like of which no other Prime Minister can claim. Her political record, and all that constitutes Thatcherism, will remain in the history books. (p. 484)

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Although Thatcher’s politics and policies could be seen as part of wider neoconservative and neo-liberal trends in the 1970s and 1980s and as just one (if exemplary) case of a neo-liberal regime shift, the ways in which she coped with the severe economic crises of the 1980s in the UK provide some insights into the implications of large-scale reforms initiated by political leaders for human institutions, including educational ones.

The Economic Crises in the 1970s and the 1980s The 1970s, dominated by the energy price rises of 1973 and 1979, was a turbulent period for the world economy as a whole. In Britain, furthermore, a number of domestic policy decisions added to this turbulence, such as a policy of laissez-faire that withdrew subsidies to failing industries, removed price and wage controls, reformed the tax system, and modified the system of agricultural support in preparation for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). This led, among other things, to increased unemployment in early 1972 (Backhouse, 2002). In 1976, a crisis in the Sterling broke out and the government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), resulting in the imposition of massive cuts in public spending and a large rise in unemployment. In 1979, a series of strikes, particularly in the public sector, occurred from the end of 1978, which came to be known as the “winter of Discontent.” When Thatcher became prime minister in May 1979, the UK entered a period of sustained economic stagnation and industrial decline. Its traditional industries of coal, iron and steel, railways, and shipbuilding had become increasingly uncompetitive in global markets. Further, its public welfare services were judged by the 1960s to have become highly inefficient and in need of urgent reform (Stepney, 2014). In his speech at the Conservative party’s spring forum, in Nottingham on March 18, 2007, Thatcher’s successor, David Cameron, spoke about her record as prime minister who coped with massive economic crises: In the 1970s, Britain faced economic breakdown. Businesses that couldn’t deliver the goods. Rampant inflation. Irresponsible trades unions. An over-­ taxed and over-regulated economy that was the sick man of Europe. Margaret Thatcher focused on these challenges, applied Conservative ideas and values, and engineered Britain’s great economic revival. The result was something we can all be proud of. A free enterprise economy—the envy of Europe and the world. (cited in Evans, 2010, p. 329)

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During the decade of her governance, Thatcher’s government introduced the large-scale privatization of nationalized industries, deregulation of management structures, union law reform, evaluation of performance based on outputs rather than inputs, use of contracts, the sale of council houses, and the so-called poll tax that was tax levied as a fixed sum on every adult at a rate set by the local authority (Kajimbwa, 2013). Her policies, called also “Thatcherism,” have been consolidated after winning the election of 1983 and included a neo-liberal accumulation strategy, a centralizing “strong state” project, and a “two nations” authoritarian populism. Together these entailed a more radical economic program to roll back the post-war settlement that had been based on a Keynesian commitment to full employment and a social democratic welfare state (Jessop, 2015). What was the role of Margaret Thatcher herself in these reforms, that is, in these responses to lasting economic crises in the UK? How did she manage the crises? What kind of solutions she adopted?

Lessons Learned from Thatcher’s Crisis Leadership When reading the biographies of Margaret Thatcher, many features of great leaders in this book characterized her also, including a courage to act, decisiveness, determination (to fulfill her economic ideology), and strong loyalty to her country. She has been influenced greatly by the economic events of the 1970s and was determined to improve the economy of the UK markedly (Backhouse, 2002). Her intentions were good, but the side effects of her solutions to the economic crisis are a warning sign to every educational leader who manages a crisis. A Very Expansive Solution to (Economic) Crises Determined to cope holistically with the lasting economic crises in the UK, it was not very long before Thatcher began to make her mark domestically with a strong monetarist policy to manage the economy, including stricter immigration controls, the privatization of public utilities along with welfare reform complemented by a tough labor market activation policy (Stepney, 2014). In this respect, Thatcher hold distinctive economic ideologies whose aim was to change the economic structure of the country fundamentally, as King (1985) indicated:

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It is essential to recognise that Margaret Thatcher is a very unusual prime minister, in two crucial but little-noticed respects. The first is that she is, and always has been, in a minority inside her own party and her own government. The reason is simple. Thatcher holds strong views, especially on economic policy. But she was elected leader of the Conservative party in February 1975 not because she held those views, but largely despite the fact that she held them. A majority of Conservative MPs in the winter of 1974–1975 were determined to unseat the then party leader, Edward Heath, and Thatcher was the only one of Heath's former cabinet colleagues with the courage and determination to stand against him. (p. 2)

These characteristics enabled her to introduce large-scale economic reforms in many public sectors (including education) firmly and persistently. However, there is a fly in the ointment; her attempts to bail out the British economy from lasting crises have been very immense throughout a relatively short period of time. This, in turn, led to many social and occupational crises that many experts had warned about before, but Thatcher seems to have resisted listening to them. For example, by increasing interest rates and taxation Thatcher succeeded in reducing inflation, but the country fell into recession and high levels of unemployment. Likewise, by introducing a series of privatizations and selling off former state-owned industries—measures that gradually improved the economy— she crushed the trade unions and eradicated mining communities across the UK (Stepney, 2014). When the influence of the unions has been reduced, many workers have been left with no alternative form of self-­ esteem or protection, and the result was a high sense of alienation among many workers who were feeling enslaved by the intensification of all labor forces, as predicted by Braverman (1974). According to Albertson and Stepney (2020), the combination of recession, deindustrialization, and unemployment made the bottom two-thirds of the population increasingly left out of even the weak gains the economy saw, while their income growth falling behind the none-too-spectacular GDP growth, and the bottom tenth seeing its income decline in absolute terms. What can educational leaders learn from the story of Thatcher, thus far? First, large-scale reforms are not always the right solution to crisis events, particularly when they are driven by “blind” commitment to a certain educational ideology. In fact, this kind of reform might stimulate unintended negative consequences or effects in some parts of the school. For example, Thatcher believed in the introduction of market forces into the

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educational sector in a form of school choice policies and accountability, but their application in our schools has been largely questioned (Oplatka, 2004). Second, from a moral point of view, not every solution to crisis events is legitimate. Many times educational leaders and teachers should avoid adopting a certain solution to, for example, student indiscipline, when they are not sure how it will affect their students’ well-being or self-­ concept. Similarly, during the outbreak of COVID-19, despite the popularity of virtual teaching as a means to cope with the perennial quarantines, it caused widening inequalities among students from different socio-­ economic backgrounds which, in turn, had a negative impact on learning and consolidation of knowledge (Monteiro et al., 2023; Muchacho et al., 2021). While COVID-19 did not enable to continue teaching in schools per se, educational leaders could provide personal assistance to students at-risk or to students from unprivileged communities and, thereby, minimize the negative effects of virtual teaching. Any insistence on following one, ideology-driven solution to the crisis blindly and uncritically may result in a failure to meet basic educational needs in the school or in the worsening of the crisis itself. This is what happened to the radical Thatcherism under Thatcher’s leadership: From the Annual Party Conference in October 1986 onwards, Mrs. Thatcher committed the government to a more radical, neo-liberal project aimed at restructuring the whole society through measures to reorganize a wide range of institutions in civil society: education, the health service, the professions, the mass media, the culture industries and religion. Following a third election victory in 1987, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, introduced a radical tax-cutting budget that excessively favored the rich. This marked the highpoint of radical Thatcherism under Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership. By autumn, the Lawson boom turned to bust, affecting homeowners, shareholders and jobs. Although further neo-liberal measures were pursued to tackle the economic crisis, momentum was dissipating as problems accumulated at home and abroad. (Jessop, 2015, p. 20)

Economically speaking, in 1990 Britain’s manufacturing output was still only slightly larger in 1990 than it was when Thatcher took office 11 years before (Galbraith, 2008). No educational leader would like to find out that his or her efforts to tackle the crisis were in vain at best or devastating at worst. To avoid such a miserable consequence, educational leaders

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should refrain from any radical solution to crises, regardless of the educational ideology that supports it. The Gap Between Expected Solutions and the Final Solutions The main lesson to be drawn from the Thatcher years is that neo-­liberalism (or Thatcherism) had major, unanticipated implications for the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Backhouse (2002) explained how Thatcher had to deviate from her original solutions to economic crises and highlighted the gap between initial intentions and the final results: The government of Margaret Thatcher forms a revealing case study of how economic ideas become entwined with the political and economic history of any country where attempts are made to apply them…Thatcher and her government became inextricably associated with “monetarism.” They were influenced by a range of economists, including Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, but the policies that went under the label of monetarism ended up being very different from what one would expect from reading the academic literature on monetarism. Though it shared important features, Monetarism came to mean something very different from, for example, Friedman’s quantity theory. More significantly, the meaning of monetarism and the way it was applied changed significantly during the government’s period…many of these changes were in response to specific economic problems that the government was forced to confront. (p. 313)

Thatcher seems to have learned the gap between the ideology underlying her neo-liberal solutions to economic crises and the final form of the solutions due to the need to adapt these solutions to the changing circumstances. Similarly, educational leaders may face this gap whenever they try to cope with suicide attempts or assaults and fighting between two gangs in the school’s yard. Sooner or later they may realize that their ideology-­ based solutions simply do not work in their current form and therefore, they have to refine them or revise some aspects of them. Any solution is subject to change, though. When the leaders insist on following the solution in its original form and resist any criticism, they might find themselves in big trouble as happened to Thatcher herself at the end of her political career due to her policy of “poll tax” (Brazier, 1991; Stepney, 2014). This policy made her even more unpopular and ultimately caused her fall from power. Thus, inflexibility and determination to follow a certain ideology even against all odds might be critical and disastrous in times of crisis.

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Chapter Summary • A series of economic crises preceded the entry of Margaret Thatcher into premiership and influenced considerably on her time in office. • Some responses or solutions to the crisis might have unintended negative effects on the school and on the schooling process, particularly when they are part of radical ideologies to change the reality holistically and fundamentally, as happened to England under the leadership of Thatcher. • Inflexibility and determination to follow a certain ideology might be critical and disastrous in times of crisis. In contrast, any solution to a crisis is subject to changes and revisions due to changing circumstances. Questions for Consideration 1. What kind of solutions do educational leaders ought to avoid? Why? 2. Can we have only one way to cope with educational crises? Please explain. 3. Why is it very important to foster a climate of flexibility in the organization, particularly in education? Practical Activities Choose one plausible crisis in education and analyze each potential solution in terms of advantages, shortcomings, opportunities, and threats. What is your lesson?

References Albertson, K., & Stepney, P. (2020). 1979 and all that: A 40-year reassessment of Margaret Thatcher’s legacy on her terms. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 44, 334–335. Backhouse, R. E. (2002). The macroeconomics of Margret Thatcher. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 24(3), 313–334. Galbraith, J. K. (2008). The predator state: How conservatives abandoned the free market and why liberals should too. Free Press. Braverman, H. (1974). Labor and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twentieth century. Monthly Review Press.

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Brazier, R. (1991). The downfall of Margaret thatcher. Modern Law Review, 54(4), 471–491. Evans, S. (2010). ‘Mother’s boy’: David Cameron and Margaret Thatcher. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12, 325–343. Kajimbwa, M. (2013). New public management: A tribute to Margaret Thatcher. Public Policy and Administration Research, 3(5), 64–69. King, A. (1985). Margaret Thatcher: The style of a prime minister. In A.  King (Ed.), The British prime minister (pp. 96–107). Macmillan Publisher. Jessop, B. (2015). Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism: Dead but not buried. British Politics, 10(1), 16–30. Monteiro, A., Leite, C., Coppi, M., Fialho, I., & Cid, M. (2023). Education in emergency: Lessons learned about school management practices and digital technologies. Research in Educational Administration & Leadership, 8(1), 223–254. https://doi.org/10.30828/real.1134984 Muchacho, L., Vilhena, C., & Valadas, S. (2021). COVID-19 e desigualdades escolares [COVID-19 and school inequalities]. Educação, Sociedade & Culturas, 59, 183–202. Oplatka, I. (2004). The characteristics of the school organisation and the constraints on market ideology in education: An institutional view. Journal of Education Policy, 19(2), 143–161. Stepney, P. (2014). The legacy of Margaret Thatcher—A critical assessment. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 2, 134–143. https://doi.org/10.4236/ jss.2014.21013

CHAPTER 14

Toward a Practical Model of Crisis Management in Our Schools

Biographical research entails researchers to express their interest in the lived experiences of leaders and to explore the temporal nature of their experiences and changes over time in the self and representations of the self. According to Bryman (2004), biographical research involves sensitivity to the connections in people’s accounts of past, present and future events and states of affairs; people's sense of their place within those events and states of affairs; the stories they generate about them; and the significance of context for the unfolding of events and people's sense of their role within them. It is the ways that people organize and forge connections between events and the sense they make of those connections that provides the raw material of narrative analysis. (p. 412)

While biographical research is only one method to understand organizational crises and crisis management, it enabled us to trace common strategies used by great leaders throughout the history to cope with political, social, economic, and human crises and to realize the salient role of these leaders and their unique virtues during times of crisis. More specifically, they displayed personality traits that helped them minimize threats, uncertainties, disruption of routine, loss of control, panic, anxiety, surprise, and the like, characterizing many types of crises and possessed the leadership

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styles required to manage the crisis effectively. Many of them seem to have understood the sources of the crisis they faced, some even could predict when and how it would happen, and all of them thought they could handle it and minimize its negative impact. As a crisis is a series of unforeseen events that have long-term effects if it is not rapidly handled effectively and efficiently, as Taneja et al. (2014) indicated, my purpose in this chapter is to propose a dynamic model that can be practically used to manage the next crisis in educational organizations that is based on the experiences of the great figures whose biography was analyzed in this book. The model is practical-oriented and divided into two phases of crisis management: (1) understanding the crisis just after it commenced followed by institutional awareness of the crisis and (2) moving to action after recognizing potential threats and hazards stemming from the crisis. The model is intended to help educational leaders prevent systematically potential crises of all kinds in their workplace and provide them with adequate insights and tools to manage crisis events that had already broken out. However, in no way do I claim that the model presents an exhaustive solution to educational crises in schools. Rather, it presents the insights gained from the biographies of the great figures outlined in this book.

Phase One: Understanding the Crisis and Its Elements While some great leaders like Churchill, Thatcher, and F.D.R. entered their roles in the midst of the crisis, determined to solve it, others had to cope with crises during their terms as happened to Kennedy, Elizabeth I, and Theodore Roosevelt. They all took responsibility over the management of the crisis and built a formal team to support them and consulted informally with many advisers. Therefore, when the crisis commences, 1. The educational leader must take a stand and devote much time and effort to manage the crisis. Teachers, students, and stakeholders expect him or her to declare publicly: “I am responsible to face the crisis and suggest plausible solutions to its consequences.” 2. The educational leader, as an employee in the public sector, should be advised by supervisors and local education authorities about his or her legal jurisdiction and duty with regard to the crisis and to its

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management. A special attention should be given to the legal aspects of potential responses to the crisis. 3. The educational leader has to build a crisis team to help him/her manage the crisis and give areas of responsibility to each team member. Likewise, the leader should encourage an atmosphere of critical thinking and open dialogues to intensify the outcomes of the team. Consistent with Breakspear and Jones (2020), leaders have to put much emphasis on building a productive environment in the team in which every teacher feels safe to express his/her attitudes, take risks, challenge ideas, and be reflective in team discussions about the crisis and its sources. One should bear in mind that teachers usually work in isolated spaces, mostly with kids or adolescents, and are less familiar with intensive teamwork. After taking responsibility over the crisis and recognizing its potential impact on the school, it is time to analyze the sources of the crisis as military leaders used to do and, when the crisis involves also adversaries, the analysis should include the enemy’s conditions and views, just like Napoleon and Kennedy. At this stage, 1. The educational leader has to map the sources of the crisis and predict its negative implications as a basis of a plan to minimize the crisis. As the school is a loosely coupled system, teachers should be invited to help map these sources because the leader cannot be present in (or observe) every part of the school. 2. The plan should include some reference to resource mobilization and utilization required to solve the crisis effectively and rapidly. 3. The educational leader should seek for support and assistance from colleagues, experts, stakeholders, and the like, just like Elizabeth I asked the support of the King of Scotland in face of the incoming Spanish invasion. 4. When the crisis involves adversaries (e.g., competitive schools, a hostile parent association), the educational leader should understand their interests, tactics, intentions, and weaknesses not in order to immorally overwhelm them, but to oversee their potential manipulative responses, concrete steps, or competitive advantages that might intensify the crisis. This is what we learn from Kennedy, the Duke of Wellington, Alexander the Great, and other great figures.

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Above all, however, educational leaders at this stage should be very focused on clearly devised goals and responses to the crisis. The goal may be the transition to virtual teaching and learning following the spread of pandemic, the restoration of order after a violent assault in the school’s yard, or the projection of a new vision to the school after a dramatic decrease in student achievement. Lincoln was determined to save the Union, and Napoleon was eager to chase the Austrian and Russian troops away from the border of France. These goals directed their activities. Nevertheless, as educators we must bear in mind that not every solution to the crisis is morally legitimate. Several points merit highlighting at this phase: • Educational leaders should adhere to moral values even in the worst time, when any solution to the crisis seems to be far away and a sense of helplessness dominates the school, the ends never justify immoral means. For example, Churchill refused to negotiate with Hitler and clearly understood the moral stakes of a decision, and Lincoln was against the wanton execution of deserting soldiers, because it was immoral and damaged the nation. Although Mahatma Gandhi is not included in this book, his strategy of non-violent resistance underlying strong moral values (Mettra, 2015) can be adopted by educational leaders who face severe conflicts in the school environment. • Educational leaders should develop high social awareness and skills necessary to manage educational and organizational crises, because many of them are entwined with moral dilemmas deriving from the cultural and social diversity in our schools. • Educational leaders should respond immediately to any sign of an incoming crisis, particularly when the crisis has already broken out, just like Alexander the Great who knew how to adapt quickly to the tactics of his opponents and Napoleon who inculcated a sense of urgency among his troops. When information about the crisis, its sources, and implications have been sufficiently gathered, initial steps to minimize the crisis have been taken, and each team member knows his/her responsibility in the management of the crisis, it is time to move to the next phase.

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Phase Two: Moving to Action from Multiple Views What would the great figures in this book recommend doing after the crisis had broken out and the educational leaders and their crisis team is ready for action? Briefly saying, be emotional, be decisive and flexible, be innovative and risk-taker, unify the people in face of the crisis, and adopt shared leadership. The leader’s emotional intelligence plays a critical role during crisis times, including their ability to be empathic, calm, optimistic, and the like, because leaders should inspire the followers while facing the crisis and projecting courage, love, optimism, and other positive emotions. This is particularly important in schools, as teachers tend to work in isolated spaces (i.e., classrooms) behind closed doors, and their commitment is, first and foremost, to their instruction while crisis management necessitates the participation of many teachers in varied efforts to solve the crisis effectively and efficiently also on the organizational level. Therefore, 1. Following Lincoln, Kennedy, and Elizabeth I, educational leaders should remain calm and hopeful and never show their nervousness about the challenges brought about by the crisis. This will cause the teachers, students, and stakeholders to believe in their effective leadership, allowing them to make decisions calmly and openly, as happened in the White House during the Cuban missile crisis. Note, children of all ages need a comfortable atmosphere and calmness in order to grow up normally. 2. Decisions made during uncertain and turbulent times increase the risk of failure; yet, the great leaders projected brevity and courage, be it Lincoln who signed the Emancipation Proclamation during the civil war, de Gaulle who took high risks when introducing large-­ scale reforms, or the Duke of Wellington who reacted to Napoleon’s enormous army with much confidence. Courage may be defined as “the disposition to voluntarily act in a dangerous circumstance, where the relevant risks are reasonably appraised in an effort to obtain some perceived good for one’s self or others, recognizing that the desired perceived good may not be realized” (Shelp, 1984, p.  384). In organizational settings, courage may be defined as “a work domain-relevant act done for a worthy cause despite significant risks perceivable in the moment to the actor” (Detert & Bruno, 2017, p.  594). Hence, by projecting courage, educational leaders

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may convince teachers and stakeholders they are determined to solve the crisis unwaveringly and thereby further motivate them to join them in managing the crisis collaboratively. Note, many of the crises in schools are related to violence and assault and the leader’s courage is critical in eliminating these negative human phenomena. 3. Many times a crisis might generate a sense of helplessness and pessimism among teachers, students, and some stakeholders. Lincoln, Churchill, F.D.R., and other great figures tended to implant new hope in the hearts of their followers during the dark days, project optimism about the “happy end” of the crisis, and radiate confidence that they would set things right. Similarly, educational leaders should project positive feelings toward teachers, students, and parents, provide positive confidence and trust, and create hope and optimism for a better future. Only then, one can expect teachers to participate proactively in any attempt to manage the crisis cooperatively. 4. Educational leaders should express empathy toward teachers because empathic leadership is likely to galvanize the teachers, inspire them to work further, and make any effort necessary to perform their work effectively even in face of many crisis events. Facing a crisis of all types is not an easy task, let alone when crisis management is conducted in an organization whose different parts are loosely integrated to each other (i.e., loosely coupled system) and inter-­ communication among followers (i.e., teachers) is not necessarily connected to performance and work outcomes. In this condition, it is uneasy to harness the teachers during times of crisis and motivate them to make collective efforts required to solve it effectively. For this reason, 1. The educational leader should be seen as a decisive person who makes decisions rather than gives up any attempt to solve the crisis. The leader’s decisiveness and self-confidence is likely to infuse his/ her staff with a sense of confidence and belief in their capacity to solve the crisis. Napoleon taught us that decisive leadership tends to overcome reservations of followers concerning the leader’s plan to face the crisis. After all, teachers could simply close the classroom’s door, keep teaching as always, and ignore the crisis as if it does not exist in their professional world.

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2. But, decisiveness without flexibility may lead to rigidity in response to threats, ignoring warnings and risks, and to a sense of alienation among the staff whose contribution to crisis management is critical. Following Lincoln who said “My policy is to have no policy” and F.D.R.’s attitude of “trial and error,” the educational leader should adapt to a changing and complex environment and examine varied solutions to a crisis without sticking to dogma like the French Marshals in their war opposite the Duke of Wellington. This is particularly important in educational institutions whose technology (i.e., teaching-learning processes) is uncertain; the relations between input–process–output are weak, because there is no sole, accepted mechanism to manage the crisis in education. 3. Because there is no one (best) solution to crises in education, the educational leader should strive for receiving innovative ideas to solve the crisis from teachers, students, and stakeholders. Decisiveness to solve the crisis coupled with managerial flexibility is a precondition to any innovative behavior in the crisis team and in the staff’s room during times of crisis. For example, following the COVID-19 crisis, Arab principals reported becoming open to trying new modalities and skills and becoming more flexible in developing new leadership models such as digital instructional leadership (Arar et al., 2022). In loosely coupled systems like schools, it is uneasy to receive teachers’ opinions, ideas, and suggestions to solve the crisis, because the teacher is used to working individually in times of routine and those who participate in teams are more likely to be middle managers and educational leaders. Yet, any teacher (and stakeholder) may assist in facing the crisis markedly, because crisis management necessitates a broad perspective of the crisis from multiple points of view. For this reason, 1. The educational leader should learn from great leaders such as Lincoln, Kennedy, Theodore Roosevelt, Churchill, and many others and adopt a mode of shared leadership during the crisis. Accordingly, leaders have to provide an adequate climate to allow sharing of ideas to solve the crisis and negotiation among teachers, students, and parents as regards the best ways to manage the crisis in the school. 2. More specifically, the educational leader should give middle managers, teachers, students, parents, and other stakeholders individual and collective assignments in the form of roles and responsibilities

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intended to bring an end to the crisis. This is very important in professions such as teaching that is characterized mostly by individual performance. 3. Educational leaders should encourage teachers to actively be engaged in innovative thinking and critical decision-making during the crisis. Leaders must not be afraid of any criticism regarding their crisis management strategies and allow open dialogues among the crisis team. People who challenge the leader contribute a lot to finding the best solutions to crisis events, as Churchill taught us. 4. Educational leaders should recruit external experts in areas related to the crisis and sincerely interact with them. The most skillful and experienced educational leader whose image of a hero in the community is unquestionable cannot manage a crisis alone, as de Gaulle’s biography showed. 5. Shared leadership in times of crisis is beyond collaborative decision-­ making, consultation, and delegation of authority to team members. Great military leaders went to the front and met with their troops, sometimes even laughing with them, like in the case of the Duke of Wellington and Alexander the Great. They literally moved among their troops, visited the battlefield, and wanted to get to know the reality from first glance. Hence, educational leaders should visit classrooms, participate in team meetings, talk with parents, and stay in the school as much as possible in order to understand the crisis in detail. The presence of the educational leader in the “heart of the crisis” projects confidence in the heart of the teachers and increases their motivation to cope with it in their work. Due to the individualist, isolated nature of the teacher’s role and the complex work done in our schools, the empowerment of teachers, students, and stakeholders seems to be a critical factor in successful crisis management, because as Areiqat and Zamil (2011) claimed, empowered employees are more likely to think innovatively in difficult situations. Great leaders used several strategies to empower their followers in hard times, 1. Inspirational speeches have been used by great leaders to connect the people to the leader’s ideas, give them hope, inspire them, and so forth. Thus, educational leaders should consider giving similar speeches in front of teachers, students, and parents aimed at com-

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municating their vision of a better future after the crisis is over and at motivating the teachers to do the best they can to face the crisis, despite their daily instructional obligations. 2. In these speeches, the leader has to include his/her plan to face the crisis well and to propose some changes in current routines and performances. De Gaulle, for example, used his national speeches to suggest solutions to problems and to push the French people to embrace them. 3. Educational leaders should transmit a spirit of unity through their speeches that is very important in times of crises. They have to unify the staff in face of the crisis and inspirational speeches are one way to inspire the teachers and foster a sense of collective effort. This is particularly critical in loosely coupled systems like schools whose members work relatively individually and their interactions with others are not tightly connected to their performance. The role of educational leaders is specifically significant in times of crisis in which high levels of uncertainty and threat dominate the school. They are responsible for managing the crisis effectively and thoroughly and their leadership influences organizational and psychological responses to the crisis. Netolicky (2021) seems to follow this line of thought when stating that In times of uncertainty, educational leadership needs to be the driving force behind our education system’s future. In more unpredictable times, we need leadership processes to shape our collective vision, to make decisions and implement them for our education systems to thrive and respond to our evolving needs. COVID has tested our education systems, but it is also pre-­ paring them for the future, which will continue to be fast, unstable, and ever changing. Educational leadership will need to be ready to make and shape decisions around education taking into account much more the context around schools. This may even become one of its primordial tasks. (p. xviii)

In many respects, educational leadership can bring a “good” end to the crisis or, unfortunately, worsen the crisis and bring about dire consequences to the school. The stories of great leaders may help them sharpen their expertise in crisis management and prevent potential failures and distress in our educational systems.

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References Arar, K., Sawalhib, R., Chaabanc, Y., & Alhoutiti, A. Z. (2022). School leaders’ perspectives towards leading during crisis through an ecological lens: A comparison of five Arab countries. Journal of Educational Administration and History, 54(2), 123–142. Areiqat, A.  Y. M., & Zamil, A.  M. (2011). The role of empowerment in crisis management in business organizations. Asian Journal of Business Management, 3(3), 188–195. Breakspear, S., & Jones, B. R. (2020). Teaching sprints: How overloaded educators can keep getting better. Corwin Press. Bryman, A. (2004). Social research methods. Oxford University Press. Detert, J. R., & Bruno, E. A. (2017). Workplace courage: Review, synthesis, and future agenda for a complex construct. Academy of Management Annals, 11(2), 593–639. Mettra, M. (2015). Gandhi: Le symbole de la Non-Violence et de l'indépendance Indienne. Lemaitre Publishing. Netolicky, D. N. (2021). Future alternatives for educational leadership: Diversity, inclusion, equity and democracy. Routledge. Shelp, E. E. (1984). Courage: A neglected virtue in the patient physician relationship. Social Science and Medicine, 18, 351–360. Taneja, S., Golden-Pryor, M., & Sewell & Recuero, A.M. (2014). Strategic crisis management: A basic for renewal and crisis prevention. Journal of Management Policy and Practice, 15(1), 78–85.

Index

A Arbitration, 157, 161–163 Assault, 132, 148, 170, 180, 186, 188 Attentiveness, 119–123 B Boldness, 131–133 C Calmness, 89–91, 96, 111, 187 Civil war, 35–39, 41, 44, 46–48, 70–72, 77, 187 Collaboration, 19, 21, 25, 78, 105, 116–119, 123, 124 Communication, 2, 13, 20–22, 27, 64, 66, 87, 110, 147, 148, 150 Community, 24, 25, 38, 66, 74, 75, 77, 89, 95, 96, 108, 116–119,

123, 131, 133–137, 147, 158, 159, 162, 169, 178, 179, 190 Conflict, 5, 25, 40, 42, 46–48, 55, 74, 86, 94–96, 116, 117, 127, 136, 137, 156, 159, 162, 186 Conformity, 26 Control, 2, 11, 13, 19, 20, 26, 36, 40, 46, 54, 61, 65, 72, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93, 95, 102, 136, 141, 145, 147, 171, 176, 177, 183 Coordination, 19–21, 25, 37, 41, 89, 124 Courage, 5, 72, 75, 76, 88–89, 108–109, 111, 131–133, 137, 144, 150, 167, 177, 178, 187, 188 COVID-19, 1, 18, 23, 63, 73, 76, 78, 92, 104, 106, 107, 115, 123, 131, 132, 136, 146, 170, 179, 189, 191

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 I. Oplatka, Educational Leadership in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38890-3

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INDEX

D Damage, 10, 12–15, 18, 26, 62, 130, 158 Dialogues, 41–42, 162, 185, 190 Disaster, 11, 16, 56, 59, 71, 108, 135, 144, 162, 166 Disruption, 2, 3, 10, 11, 21, 24, 87, 92, 146, 183 Distress, 5, 10, 39, 41, 44–45, 48, 115, 118–122, 148, 166, 191 E Economic crisis, 6, 107, 165, 167, 172, 177, 179 Emotional intelligence, 22, 23, 84, 95, 121, 123, 159–161, 163, 187 Empathy, 19, 22, 37, 44–45, 48, 118, 121, 123, 188 Empowerment, 19, 27, 190 Enemy, 5, 44, 45, 64, 92–96, 104, 105, 107, 114, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123, 135, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150, 185 Environment, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24, 27, 45, 73, 87, 107, 108, 114, 185, 186, 189 F Failure, 1, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 55, 61, 62, 66, 84, 142, 179, 187, 191 Flexibility, 11, 42, 48, 58, 87, 104, 144, 146, 150, 189 H Helplessness, 39, 48, 59, 186, 188 Heroism, 43, 77–78

Hope, 4, 5, 23, 25, 36, 39, 60–62, 65, 67, 71, 72, 148, 166, 170–172, 188, 190 Hopelessness, 39, 48 I Innovative behavior, 55, 66, 189 L Loosely coupled system, 24–26, 119, 185, 188, 189, 191 M Maneuver, 5, 56, 57, 143, 148–149 Military crisis, 5, 86 Moral judgment, 5, 58–60, 66 O Opponents, 5, 45–46, 48, 95, 96, 116, 122, 123, 157, 186 Optimism, 6, 23, 41, 48, 60–62, 170–172, 187, 188 P Pandemic, 1, 3, 9, 11, 16, 41, 47, 57–59, 63, 73, 76, 78, 88, 107, 115, 132, 146–148, 186 Planning, 15, 20, 27, 91, 107, 110, 123, 131, 142, 145–146, 150, 171 Political crises, 5 Power, 23, 42, 47, 53, 54, 59, 64, 66, 70–73, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 95,

 INDEX 

103, 109, 117, 128, 133, 135–137, 155, 158, 159, 170, 175, 180 Preparation, 12, 15–17, 19, 64, 76, 106, 129, 130, 132, 145, 147, 176 R Resilience, 5, 17, 23, 40–41, 48, 132, 167 Resource, 1, 11, 15–19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 37, 46, 48, 70, 102, 103, 105–107, 110, 111, 166 mobilization, 3, 105–107, 111, 185 Responsibility, 2, 20, 22, 46, 109, 131, 132, 148, 158–159, 163, 168, 184–186, 189 Risk-taking, 55, 66, 75, 95, 144 Routine, 2, 10, 13, 15, 16, 44, 46, 57, 65, 104, 123, 183, 189, 191 S Shortage of teachers, 24 Social awareness, 6, 159–161, 163, 186 Speeches, 5, 39, 46, 47, 54, 59, 61, 63–67, 72–74, 85, 88, 93, 120, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 137, 155, 170, 176, 190, 191 Stability, 13, 71, 76, 116, 128, 161 Stages, 4, 14–16, 27, 87, 136

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Strike, 3, 5, 11, 23, 84, 91, 148, 156–159, 161–163, 176 Suicide attempts, 44, 105, 148, 168, 180 T Team, 3, 10, 11, 20–22, 25, 27, 41, 58, 64, 66, 79, 84, 105, 122, 149, 170, 184–187, 189, 190 Time, 1, 9, 35, 42–44, 59, 72, 77–78, 83, 91–92, 102, 115, 127, 142, 158, 165, 178, 183 Trust, 13, 22, 23, 65, 74, 105, 108, 130, 188 U Unity, 35, 74, 75, 191 Urgency, 24, 146–148, 186 V Violence, 11, 16, 24, 60, 64, 76, 88, 89, 122, 131, 134, 136, 146, 159, 188 Visibility, 63, 110 Vision, 38, 48, 58–60, 64–66, 78, 104, 115, 170, 186, 191 W Well-being, 3, 22, 24, 26, 91, 108, 170, 179 World-War Two/World War II, 53, 55, 56, 65, 67, 69, 70, 77, 79, 84, 88, 165, 166