Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law: Second Edition 9781849466073, 9781782257783, 9781509902033

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ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Since the first edition of this book (published in 2009), there have been several important developments including the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on individual communications and significant developments in the case law on economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. The second edition addresses these developments and explores ESC rights from foundational issues to substantive rights and systems of protection. It has been fully updated to include new material and up-to-date coverage of the case law of human rights bodies and national courts on ESC rights. In addition to the rights to health, education and work covered in the first edition, the second edition analyses new developments in several areas such as the rights to adequate food, water and sanitation, adequate housing, social security and cultural rights. It also considers several contemporary issues including the extraterritorial human rights obligations of states in the area of ESC rights; nonstate actors; the relationship of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to other areas of international law; the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR; regional protection of ESC rights; more examples of the domestic protection of ESC rights; the protection of ESC rights of vulnerable groups; and contemporary challenges to ESC rights including poverty, corruption, armed conflicts and terrorism. It concludes by exploring the possible establishment of a World Court of Human Rights.

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law Second Edition

Manisuli Ssenyonjo

OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2016

Hart Publishing An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc Hart Publishing Ltd Kemp House Chawley Park Cumnor Hill Oxford OX2 9PH UK

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

www.hartpub.co.uk www.bloomsbury.com Published in North America (US and Canada) by Hart Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213-3786 USA www.isbs.com HART PUBLISHING, the Hart/Stag logo, BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 1st edition published 2009 This edition first published 2016 © Manisuli Ssenyonjo Manisuli Ssenyonjo has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. While every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this work, no responsibility for loss or damage occasioned to any person acting or refraining from action as a result of any statement in it can be accepted by the authors, editors or publishers. All UK Government legislation and other public sector information used in the work is Crown Copyright ©. All House of Lords and House of Commons information used in the work is Parliamentary Copyright ©. This information is reused under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/opengovernment-licence/version/3) excepted where otherwise stated. All Eur-lex material used in the work is © European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/, 1998–2015. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data Available ISBN: PB: 978-1-84946-607-3 ePub: 978-1-50990-083-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ssenyonjo, Manisuli, author. Title: Economic, social and cultural rights in international law / Manisuli Ssenyonjo. Description: Second edition.  |  Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing Ltd, 2016.  |  Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015049487 (print)  |  LCCN 2015049634 (ebook)  |  ISBN 9781849466073 (pbk. : alk. paper)  |  ISBN 9781509900831 (Epub) Subjects: LCSH: Human rights. | Social rights. | Economic policy. | Cultural policy. | International law.  |  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966 December 16) Classification: LCC K3240 .S68 2016 (print)  |  LCC K3240 (ebook)  |  DDC 341.4/8—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015049487 Typeset by Compuscript Ltd, Shannon

Foreword Happily, the legal protection of economic, social and cultural rights has come more to the fore in recent years than previously. Although United Nations texts have consistently over time stressed the indivisibility and equal importance of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, in practice there has been a great divide, with the latter not being given the same legal priority as the former. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights initially did not have an independent treaty-monitoring body, let alone one that could receive individual complaints. This omission was partially remedied by the creation of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which became competent to receive and review national reports. The most recent and hugely encouraging development has been the adoption of the 2008 Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which entered into force in 2013. Currently there are 21 states parties to the Protocol. The Committee published its first views on an individual complaint brought under the Optional Protocol in 2015 in IDG v Spain,1 finding a violation of the right to adequate housing due to lack of an effective remedy to protect this right. At the regional level, there was largely the same pattern of difference. The European Convention on Human Rights 1950, despite its all-embracing name, is concerned almost exclusively with civil and political rights. It took another decade before the European Social Charter was adopted and a further generation before a right of collective (but still not individual) complaint was introduced under it. As to the interAmerican human rights system, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 likewise emphasises civil and political rights; only later was the San Salvador Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—with its partial system of individual complaint—adopted. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 was a great improvement in that it included from the outset a comprehensive guarantee of the full range of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, and made these subject to a right of individual complaint. At the national level, the courts of some countries have shown the way, with the jurisprudence of the Indian and South African courts being particularly well known, demonstrating that economic, social and cultural rights can be enforced through the courts. Celebrated judgments by the South African Constitutional Court, such as that in the Grootboom case, have been particularly influential, showing that such rights are justiciable and providing a public law model for deciding cases concerning them. What emerges is that it is not the nature of the rights that is crucial, but the nature of the obligations that are imposed by national law concerning them. Two other points have become clear. First, that the argument about justiciability, which has now largely been resolved, concerns social and, to some extent, cultural rights only. Economic rights, both individual and collective, have long been enforced in national courts without

1

Communication no 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015).

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difficulty. Second, national courts have in fact been applying social rights, such as the rights to health and education without knowing it, deciding cases that are about these rights under different rubrics, such as health or education law. All of these considerations make the present book very timely and valuable. In its first edition it offered a comprehensive analysis of the basic elements of the legal regime of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of certain key economic and social rights and themes more generally. Of considerable importance was the focus upon the economic, social and cultural rights of women. The book also critically reviewed the jurisprudence of selected national courts. In its new second edition, these features remain. The second edition has been significantly expanded to cover substantive rights not covered in the first edition in 2009 (in particular, the right to an adequate standard of living—adequate food, water and sanitation and adequate housing—and the right to social security, as well as cultural rights protected in Art 15 ICESCR) and to cover the significant evolution on various aspects of ESC rights since the first edition, including a new chapter on economic, social and cultural rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. With the arrival of the right of individual communication following the entry into force of the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, together with the increased interest in and awareness of economic, social and cultural rights that will result as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights gives it views in cases brought under the Protocol, as well as other developments that have raised the profile of social rights, this new edition of a book that has already proved its worth will be greatly welcome in both the academic and practitioner worlds. David Harris Professor Emeritus and Co-Director of the Human Rights Law Centre School of Law University of Nottingham December 2015

Preface The publication of this edition marks 50 years since the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted in 1966 the two human rights covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1 (ICCPR) protecting civil and political rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 (ICESCR), the most comprehensive treaty protecting economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights). Both treaties have been ratified by a vast majority of states. Despite the fact that since the adoption of the two covenants and their entry into force in 1976, most actors including states, international organisations and scholars have historically given priority to civil and political rights protected by the ICCPR at the expense of ESC rights protected by the ICESCR, there has been increased attention in recent decades to ESC rights in the United Nations, regional human rights systems and in several national legal systems. This edition reflects on debates, developments and challenges in the protection of ESC rights in international law in the last 50 years (since the adoption of the ICESCR) and looks into the future. The book has been significantly expanded to cover substantive rights (adequate food, water and sanitation, adequate housing, social security and cultural rights) which were not addressed in the first edition, and to cover the significant evolution of various aspects of ESC rights since our first edition in 2009. One of the most recent developments with respect to the international protection of ESC rights has been the entry into force on 5 May 2013 of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (GA resolution A/RES/63/117) following its unanimous adoption by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 2008 and by the Human Rights Council, by its resolution 8/2 of 18 June 2008. The Optional Protocol provides the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or ‘the Committee’), the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the ICESCR by its states parties, competence to receive and consider communications submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a state party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the ESC rights set forth in the Covenant. This provides an opportunity to generate coherent, robust, systematic, and persuasive jurisprudential insights into the field of ESC rights. The emerging jurisprudence will serve as an important interpretation aid in similar cases before regional and national courts as well as influence debates on implementation of ESC rights at the national level. The Optional Protocol reaffirms ‘the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Significantly, in recent years the contents of specific ESC rights have been clarified by the CESCR, 1  GA res 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. 2  GA res 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976.

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regional human rights bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the courts in many national legal systems. It is notable that the CESCR decided its first communication, in response to an individual complaint, under the Optional Protocol in 2015 in IDG v Spain,3 finding a violation of the right to adequate housing due to lack of effective access to the courts to protect this right. Confirming the justiciability of ESC rights, the Committee noted that the state has an obligation to provide for effective remedies in foreclosure procedures related to defaulting on mortgage payments, to ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to guarantee personal notification in foreclosure procedures, and to guarantee that legislative measures are adopted to prevent repetition of similar violations in the future. This shows the Committee’s commitment to treating the ICESCR as a living instrument, capable of addressing contemporary threats and challenges through jurisprudential advances within broadly framed rights and drawing international attention to the situation of vulnerable individuals and groups. Regardless of these positive developments, and the fact that ESC rights are fundamental to the dignity of every person, many actors working with human rights law still focus solely or mainly on issues relating to civil and political rights and tend to pay lip service in practice to the interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights. Claims of violations of ESC rights are still treated less seriously. The challenges to implementation and realisation of ESC rights remain significant, given the persistent deprivation of basic ESC rights for the majority of the world’s population. This means that in practice ESC rights are still marginalised. This edition of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law subjects ESC rights protected in the ICESCR and other human rights treaties to a deeper analysis in terms of their conceptual and practical applications in the light of the practice of the CESCR while taking into account other relevant sources of ESC rights at national, regional and international levels. This book analyses key issues relevant to ESC rights, with particular emphasis on various themes including state obligations; non-state actor obligations; women’s ESC rights; domestic protection of ESC rights; and state reservations to ESC rights. Furthermore, the book makes a thorough examination of ESC rights, in particular the rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work, adequate food, water and sanitation, adequate housing, social security, health, education and cultural rights. By so doing, it demonstrates that ESC rights are human rights just as much as the traditional civil and political rights and do not deserve to be marginalised. It is noted that notwithstanding the entry into force of an Optional Protocol to the Covenant in 2013, the views/recommendations of the Committee under the Protocol, despite carrying considerable persuasive authority, are not legally binding in a strict sense. States could, thus, easily ignore them. In this context, the book questions whether there is a need to establish a World Court of Human Rights which could also consider claims involving alleged violations of ESC rights in legally binding judgments against willing states and non-state actors. The book is supported by a collection of selected essential materials on ESC rights (published online only) necessary to understand and analyse

3 

Communication No 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015).

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the subject.4 For reasons of limited space, appendix materials published in the first edition have been omitted from this text. This timely study will be of value to all those interested in human rights and international law, whether as students, practitioners who wish to litigate and enforce ESC rights, scholars or those charged with advocating or adjudicating on disputes with ESC rights elements. I would like to express my special thanks to all colleagues who have given me enormous support and encouragement to prepare this edition. I would also like to express my special thanks to my family for their love over the years and endless patience in this undertaking. The team at Hart Publishing deserve my thanks for their help and patience in preparing this edition through completion. Special tribute to the Commissioning Editor Bill Asquith and Catherine Minehan for copyediting this edition with skill. The book is intended to be up to date to 1 November 2015. Manisuli Ssenyonjo Professor of International Law and Human Rights Brunel University London November 2015

4 See http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/economic-social-and-culturalrights-in-internationallaw-9781849466073/.

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Contents Foreword��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������v Preface���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������vii List of Abbreviations�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xxi Table of Cases��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xxv Table of National Legislation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������xlv Table of International and Regional Instruments�����������������������������������������������������lxiii Part I: Reflections on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1. The International Legal Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������������3 I. Introduction�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3 II. Human Rights Obligations Under International Law��������������������������������7 A. Background����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 B. What are Human Rights?�����������������������������������������������������������������13 C. Human Rights Obligations and Responsibilities�������������������������������24 D. Globalisation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights�����������������25 E. Obligations of Conduct and Result in International Law�����������������30 III. Tripartite Typology of Obligations�����������������������������������������������������������31 A. Obligation to Respect�����������������������������������������������������������������������32 B. Obligation to Protect������������������������������������������������������������������������33 C. Obligation to Fulfil���������������������������������������������������������������������������35 D. Obligation to Recognise?������������������������������������������������������������������36 IV. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights�����������������������������������������������������������������������36 A. Adoption and Ratification����������������������������������������������������������������36 B. Overview of the Covenant����������������������������������������������������������������39 C. Treaty-monitoring Body: The Committee and the Examination of State Reports����������������������������������������������39 D. A Complaints Procedure Under the Covenant and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant��������������������������������������43 E. Substantive Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������51 F. Non-derogability and Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights During and After Armed Conflicts�������������������52 G. Extraterritorial Application and Scope of the Covenant������������������62 H. Denunciation of or Withdrawal from the Covenant�������������������������74 V. Conclusion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������76 2. State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights��������������������������������������������������������������78

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I. Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������78 II. Article 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������79 A. Obligation to ‘Take Steps … by All Appropriate Means’������������������81 i. Adoption of Legislative Measures��������������������������������������������84 ii. Non-Legislative Measures���������������������������������������������������������87 B. Progressive Realisation and Prohibition of Retrogression�����������������90 i. The Standard of Progressive Realisation�����������������������������������90 ii. Presumption Against Deliberate Retrogressive Measures�������������������������������������������������������������93 C. Obligation to Utilise ‘Maximum Available Resources’����������������������95 i. Obligation to Eliminate Corruption������������������������������������������99 ii. Budget Allocations to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������������������������������������������������102 D. Minimum Core Obligations������������������������������������������������������������105 E. Obligations Regarding International Assistance and Cooperation�����������������������������������������������������������109 i. Obligation to Respect�������������������������������������������������������������113 ii. Obligation to Protect��������������������������������������������������������������114 iii. Obligation to Fulfil�����������������������������������������������������������������116 F. The Application of International Cooperation and Assistance�����������������������������������������������������������118 i. Developed States: Any Obligation to Assist?���������������������������118 ii. Developing States: Obligation to Seek and Use Effectively International Assistance?�������������������������124 iii. Non-state Actors: Any Obligation to Assist?��������������������������126 III. Articles 2(2) and 3: Obligation to ‘Guarantee’ Non-discrimination and Promote Equality��������������������������������������������128 A. Prohibition of Discrimination��������������������������������������������������������130 B. Equality Between Men and Women������������������������������������������������136 C. Eradication of De Jure and De Facto Discrimination���������������������139 D. Temporary Special Measures����������������������������������������������������������142 E. Discrimination by Non-State Actors����������������������������������������������146 IV. Article 2(3): Non-nationals in Developing Countries�����������������������������147 V. Articles 4 and 5: Limitations on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Safeguards Against Abuse��������������������150 VI. Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 3. Beyond the State: Non-State Actors and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������157 I. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������157 II. Definition of Non-State Actor���������������������������������������������������������������161 III. State Obligation to Protect Against Human Rights Violations by Non-State Actors��������������������������������������������������162 A. State Obligation to Protect�������������������������������������������������������������162 B. Protection Against Discrimination�������������������������������������������������169 C. Global Actors/Institutions��������������������������������������������������������������172 D. Remedies Against Violations by Non-state Actors�������������������������174

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IV. Direct Human Rights Responsibilities of Non-State Actors with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������������������177 A. Responsibilities of Non-state Actors in International Human Rights Instruments����������������������������������������������������������177 B. Responsibility of Non-state Actors Under International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law��������������������185 V. Human Rights Obligations of International Organisations�����������������187 A. The IMF, the World Bank and Human Rights�����������������������������187 B. The WTO and Human Rights������������������������������������������������������195 i. TRIPS and the Right to Health��������������������������������������������199 ii. Agreement on Agriculture and the Right to Food����������������201 iii. Aligning WTO Policies with States’ Human Rights Obligations���������������������������������������������������202 iv. Human Rights as ‘Public Morals’ Under the WTO��������������204 VI. Corporations, Other Business Entities and Human Rights������������������206 A. Corporations and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������206 B. Corporate Criminal Responsibility����������������������������������������������214 VII. Non-State Armed Opposition Groups�������������������������������������������������216 VIII. Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������220 4. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights����������������������������������������������������������225 I. Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������225 II. The Legal Protection of Economic Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter�����������������������������������������226 III. The Interpretation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights���������������229 A. Right to Property�������������������������������������������������������������������������231 B. Rights to Health and Education��������������������������������������������������235 C. Right to Work������������������������������������������������������������������������������242 D. The Right to Cultural Life�����������������������������������������������������������243 E. Non-discrimination in the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights�����������������������������������������������������������244 F. Rights Implied in the African Charter: Rights to Housing, Food, Social Security, Water and Sanitation�����������������246 IV. Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������248 5. The Domestic Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected in International Law������������������������������������������������������������251 I. Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������251 II. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the National Plane�������������������������������253 III. Examples of the Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the National Plane��������������������������������������������������������������������������258 A. United Kingdom��������������������������������������������������������������������������259 i. The Covenant in the United Kingdom���������������������������������259

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ii. Why has the United Kingdom not Incorporated Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected in the Covenant?���������������������������������������������������������������������265 B. South Africa�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������268 i. The Covenant in South Africa������������������������������������������������268 ii. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected Under the South African Constitution�����������������������������������272 C. Uganda�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������279 i. The Covenant in Uganda��������������������������������������������������������279 ii. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected Under Uganda’s Constitution���������������������������������285 D. Italy������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294 i. The Covenant in Italy�������������������������������������������������������������294 ii. Discrimination in the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Italy������������������������������������������297 E. Ecuador, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia�����������������299 F. India�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������301 i. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in India�����������������������301 ii. Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in India����������������������������������������304 G. Canada�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������307 IV. Towards an Effective Domestic Application of the Covenant: The Role of Independent National Human Rights Institutions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������309 V. Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������321 6. State Reservations to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������323 I. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������323 II. Permissible Reservations and the Consequence of an Invalid Reservation����������������������������������������������������������������������������328 A. Permissible Reservations: The ‘Object and Purpose’ Test����������������������������������������������������������������������������������328 B. Consequence of an Invalid Reservation������������������������������������������332 i. Who should Determine the Validity of a Reservation?��������������������������������������������������������������������332 ii. The General Consequences of an Invalid Reservation�����������������������������������������������������������������337 III. Questionable Reservations����������������������������������������������������������������������340 A. Kuwait’s Reservations���������������������������������������������������������������������340 B. Pakistan’s Reservations�������������������������������������������������������������������348 C. Turkey’s Reservations���������������������������������������������������������������������354 IV. Reservation by Other States: Examples from Africa and Europe���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������358 A. Reservations by African States�������������������������������������������������������359 B. Reservations by European States����������������������������������������������������360 V. Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������364

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7. Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights���������������������������������������������367 I. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������367 II. Background and Context�����������������������������������������������������������������������369 III. Human Rights of Women to Equality and Non-discrimination: African Experiences�����������������������������������������������372 A. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Rights of Women in Africa�������������������������������������374 B. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa�������������������������376 C. The State of Women’s Rights in Africa in Practice�������������������������381 IV. Prejudicial Cultural Practices and Customs as an Obstacle to the Realisation of Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa������������������������������������������������������383 A. African Culture in General�������������������������������������������������������������383 B. Right to Inheritance�����������������������������������������������������������������������388 i. The Magaya Case�������������������������������������������������������������������389 ii. The Bhe Case��������������������������������������������������������������������������391 iii. The Mmusi Case���������������������������������������������������������������������393 C. Right to Marry and Found a Family: Same-sex Marriages and Polygamous Marriages����������������������������395 i. Right to Marry and Found a Family���������������������������������������395 ii. Polygamous Marriages������������������������������������������������������������397 D. Right to Equality and Divorce��������������������������������������������������������406 V. Conclusion: The Duty to Uproot Cultural Obstacles to Enhance Women’s Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������408 Part II: Substantive Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 8. Right to Work and Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work: Articles 6, 7 and 8����������������������������������������������������������415 I. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 II. Non-discrimination and Equal Protection in Employment���������������������418 A. Non-nationals: Migrant Workers����������������������������������������������������422 B. Equal Remuneration of Men and Women��������������������������������������434 C. Health (HIV) Status and the Right to Work�����������������������������������439 III. Freedom from Slavery and Forced or Compulsory Labour��������������������442 A. General Overview���������������������������������������������������������������������������442 B. Slavery, Servitude and Human Trafficking��������������������������������������444 C. Forced or Compulsory Labour�������������������������������������������������������446 D. Protection against Exploitative Child Labour���������������������������������449 i. Siliadin v France: The Facts�����������������������������������������������������455 ii. Siliadin v France: The Decision�����������������������������������������������457 State Obligation to Protect��������������������������������������������������457 Slavery���������������������������������������������������������������������������������458 Forced Labour��������������������������������������������������������������������458 Servitude�����������������������������������������������������������������������������459

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IV. Right not to be Unfairly Deprived of Employment��������������������������������460 V. Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������463 9. Rights to an Adequate Standard of Living and Social Security: Articles 11 and 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������465 I. Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������465 II. Obligations of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living���������������������������������������������������������������������������������468 A. Non-state Actors����������������������������������������������������������������������������468 B. State Obligations����������������������������������������������������������������������������468 III. Normative Content of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living�����������������������������������������������������������������473 A. The Right to Adequate Food����������������������������������������������������������473 i. International Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Food���������������������������������������������������������473 ii. National Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Food�����������������������������������������������������������������������476 iii. Essential Elements of the Right to Adequate Food�����������������������������������������������������������������������480 B. The Right to Water and Sanitation�������������������������������������������������481 i. International Legal Protection of the Right to Water������������������������������������������������������������������������481 ii. National Legal Protection of the Right to Water������������������������������������������������������������������������483 iii. Essential Elements of the Right to Water�������������������������������485 iv. The Right to Sanitation����������������������������������������������������������486 v. International Legal Protection of the Right to Sanitation�����������������������������������������������������������������487 vi. National Legal Protection of the Right to Sanitation�����������������������������������������������������������������488 vii. Essential Elements of the Right to Sanitation���������������������������������������������������������������������������489 C. The Right to Adequate Housing�����������������������������������������������������489 i. International Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Housing����������������������������������������������������489 ii. National Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Housing������������������������������������������������������������������493 iii. Essential Elements of the Right to Adequate Housing������������������������������������������������������������������496 IV. The Right to Social Security�������������������������������������������������������������������498 A. International Legal Protection of the Right to Social Security��������������������������������������������������������������������������������498 B. Defining Social Security and State Obligations�������������������������������500 V. Remedies and Accountability�����������������������������������������������������������������504 VI. Conclusion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������506

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10. The Right to Health: Article 12���������������������������������������������������������������������507 I. Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������507 II. International Protection of the Right to Health���������������������������������510 III. Scope and Content of the Right to Health�����������������������������������������518 A. The Right to Healthcare�������������������������������������������������������������519 B. Underlying Determinants of Health������������������������������������������522 IV. State Obligations Regarding the Right to Health�������������������������������525 A. Availability���������������������������������������������������������������������������������525 B. Accessibility�������������������������������������������������������������������������������526 i. Equality and Non-discrimination���������������������������������������526 ii. Physical Accessibility����������������������������������������������������������527 iii. Economic Accessibility�������������������������������������������������������527 iv. Informational Accessibility�������������������������������������������������528 C. Acceptability and Quality�����������������������������������������������������������529 D. Implementation of the Right to Health Through Policies and Other Operational Interventions��������������530 V. Levels of Obligations�������������������������������������������������������������������������532 A. Obligation to Respect the Right to Health���������������������������������532 B. Obligation to Protect the Right to Health����������������������������������535 C. Obligation to Fulfil the Right to Health�������������������������������������537 VI. Minimum Core Obligations of the Right to Health���������������������������538 VII. Justiciability of the Right to Health���������������������������������������������������540 A. General Overview�����������������������������������������������������������������������540 B. Progressive Realisation and Resource Availability����������������������545 C. Immediate Obligations���������������������������������������������������������������546 D. Available, Accessible, Acceptable and of Good Quality�������������547 E. Reproductive Rights and Freedom from Non-consensual Sterilisation������������������������������������������������������549 VIII. Conclusion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������555 11. The Right to Education: Articles 13 and 14���������������������������������������������������558 I. Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������559 II. International Protection of the Right to Education���������������������������562 A. Protection Under the UN Charter���������������������������������������������562 B. Protection Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights�����������������������������������������������������������������������563 C. Protection Under the Convention against Discrimination in Education������������������������������������������������������564 D. Protection Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination�������������566 E. Protection Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women�����������������������567 F. Protection Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights������������������������������������������������������������569 G. Protection Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights���������������������������������������570 H. Protection Under the European Convention on Human Rights����������������������������������������������������������������������������572

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I.

III.

IV.

V. VI. VII.

Protection Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child��������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 J. Protection Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������578 K. Protection Under the Protocol of San Salvador�������������������������579 L. Protection Under the (Revised) European Social Charter and the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights�����������������������������������580 Scope and Content of the Right to Education�����������������������������������581 A. Scope and Content���������������������������������������������������������������������581 B. Levels of Education�������������������������������������������������������������������582 i. Primary Education�������������������������������������������������������������582 ii. Fundamental Education�����������������������������������������������������585 iii. Secondary Education���������������������������������������������������������586 iv. Higher Education���������������������������������������������������������������589 Human Rights Obligations in the Context of Education�������������������594 A. Making Education Available, Accessible, Acceptable and Adaptable����������������������������������������������������������594 B. Levels of State Obligations: Respect, Protect and Fulfil�������������599 C. Justiciability of the Right to Education��������������������������������������603 i. Making Education Available, Accessible and of Good Quality����������������������������������������������������������603 ii. Prisoners’ Access to Education�������������������������������������������604 iii. Non-discrimination������������������������������������������������������������605 iv. Making Education Acceptable�������������������������������������������613 Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy�������������������������������617 The Right to Inclusive Education of Persons with Disabilities���������������������������������������������������������������������������������619 Conclusion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������621

12. Cultural Rights: Article 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������623 I. Introduction���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������623 II. The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life���������������������������������������������626 A. What is Cultural Life?����������������������������������������������������������������626 B. The Scope of the Right to take Part in Cultural Life������������������630 C. State Obligations in Relation to the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life����������������������������������������������������������631 i. Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil��������������������������631 ii. Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, Adaptability and Appropriateness��������������������������������������635 iii. Minimum Core Obligation�������������������������������������������������635 III. The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications���������������������������������������������������������������������������636 IV. The Right to Benefit from Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production����������������������������������������������������������640 V. Limitations to Cultural Rights�����������������������������������������������������������643 VI. Conclusion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������646

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Part III: Conclusion 13. The Right of Victims of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Violations to an Effective Remedy: Towards a World Court of Human Rights����������������������������������������������������651 I. Introduction�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������651 II. Reasons for the Establishment of a World Court of Human Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������653 III. Reasons Against the Establishment of a World Court of Human Rights���������������������������������������������������������������������������������656 IV. Responding to Reasons Against the Establishment of a World Court of Human Rights����������������������������������������������������������657 V. Establishing the World Court of Human Rights�����������������������������������660 Selected Bibliography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������665 Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������683 Appendices Each of the appendices below is available in full online at the following address: http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/economic-social-and-culturalrights-in-international-law-9781849466073/ Appendix A: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) Appendix B: Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008) Appendix C: States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2015) Appendix C.1: States Parties to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2015) Appendix D: A List of the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1989–2015) Appendix D.1: A List of Statements adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1991–2013). Appendix D.2: List of Concluding Observations or Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on State Reports (1980–2015) Appendix E: Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht (2–6 June 1986) Appendix F: Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht (22–26 January 1997) Appendix F.1: Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (29 February 2012) Appendix G: Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (7–10 December 2002) Appendix H: Declarations and Reservations to the ICESCR and Objections (as of 12 March 2015)

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Appendix I: Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (18 November 2008) Appendix J: List of Least Developed Countries (2015) Appendix K: Provisional Rules of Procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (12–30 November 2012)

List of Abbreviations ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 [or ‘the African Charter’] African Commission African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AmCHR American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 AoA Agreement on Agriculture, 1994 Arab Charter Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2004 ASIL American Society of International Law ATCA Alien Tort Claims Act [US], 1789 ATS Alien Tort Statute [US], 1789 CAT Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [or ‘the Committee’] CIL customary international law CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 2006 CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 CRC-AC Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000 CRC Committee Committee for the Rights of the Child DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [qv ] DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECHR [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [or ‘the European Convention on Human Rights’], 1950 ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the UN ECOWAS Court Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice ECtHR European Court of Human Rights ESC economic, social and cultural ESCR economic, social and cultural rights EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization [of the United Nations]

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List of Abbreviations

FGM female genital mutilation GA General Assembly GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994 GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 and 1994 GC I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 GC III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949 GC IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 GDP gross domestic product GNI gross national income GNP gross national product HIPCs Heavily Indebted Poor Countries HRA 1998 Human Rights Act, 1998 HRC Human Rights Committee IACmHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICC International Criminal Court ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 ICJ International Court of Justice ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ICTY Statute Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 1993 IDA International Development Association IFC International Finance Corporation IHL international humanitarian law ILC International Law Commission ILO International Labour Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund LDCs least developed countries

List of Abbreviations

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MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Migrant Workers Convention International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990 NGO non-governmental organisation NHRIs national human rights institutions NIAC non-international armed conflict NSA non-state actor OAS Organization of American States ODA official development assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice Protocol I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977 Protocol II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977 Protocol of San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988 PRSPs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers res resolution Rome Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 SAPs Structural Adjustment Policies SERAC Social and Economic Rights Action Center STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon TBT Agreement Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 1994 TNC transnational corporation TRIPS Agreement Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 TVE technical and vocational education UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 UHRC Uganda Human Rights Commission UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO Convention Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960 UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNSC United Nations Security Council

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List of Abbreviations

UPR Universal Periodic Review US United States [of America] VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 WCHR World Court of Human Rights WHA World Health Assembly WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization WTO Agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994

Table of Cases African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v Republic of Sudan, Communication no 368/09������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������225 Amnesty International v Zambia, Communication no 212/98, (12th Annual Activity Report, 1988–1999), (2000) AHRLR 325������������������������������� 150, 246 Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon, Communication no 39/90 (1997)������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 243, 420 Bah Ould Rabah v Mauritania, Communication no 197/97������������������������������������������ 370, 597 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (Endorois case), Communication no 276/2003 (2009)���������������������������������� 227, 234–35, 243, 245, 492, 629 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad, Communication No 74/92 (1995), para 21; (2000) AHRLR 66 (9th Annual Activity Report)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55, 227 Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Communication nos 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������55, 227, 232 Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, Communication no 236/00, (2003) AHRLR 153��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 350, 597 Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front v the Republic of South Africa, Communication 335/07, 53rd Ordinary Session 9–23 April 2013���������������������������������������130 Femi Falana v African Union, App no 001/2011������������������������������������������������������������������222 Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v Zaire, Communications nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1996)��������������������������������� 235, 521, 523, 578 Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger, 27 October 2008, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (ECOWAS Court)����������������������������������������������������������������� 370, 449 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (Merits), Communication no 292/2004, (2008) AHRLR 43������������������������������������������������������� 429–30 Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communication no 373/2009 (formerly 242/2001)����������������������232 International PEN and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria, Communications nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (joined)�������������������������236–37, 522 John K Modise v Botswana, Communication no 97/93 (2000)����������������������������������������������231 Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, Communication no 313/05 (2010)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 244–45, 428–29 Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon, Communication no 266/2003 (2009)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 240, 250 Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, Communication no 211/98, (2001) AHRLR 84���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 227, 376

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Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, Communication nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97–196/97 and 210/98 (2000)���������������������������������175, 227, 232, 236–37, 436, 522 Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, Communications nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 (1998)�����������������������������������������������������232, 237, 522 Modise v Botswana, Communication no 97/93������������������������������������������������������������� 231, 428 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, Communication no 241/2001, 16th Annual Activity Report, (2003) AHRLR 96����������������������������������������������164, 238, 250, 538, 556 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v Republic of Zambia, Communication no 71/92�����������������������������������������429 SERAP, Request for Advisory Opinion No 001/2012�����������������������������������������������������������101 SERAP [Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project] v Federal Republic of Nigeria, General List No ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/ JUD/18/12 (14 December 2012) (ECOWAS Court)�����������������������������������������������������������207 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication No 155/96, (2003) 10(1) IHRR 282, (2001) AHRLR 60������������������������ 21, 31, 106, 148, 162, 179, 230–231, 238, 246, 249, 402, 475, 491, 523, 543 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), General List No ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09 (ECOWAS Court)�����������������������������������������������663 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, Suit no ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (27 October 2009) (ECOWAS Court)����������������������������������������������231 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Communication no 338/07�������������������������������������������231 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v Libya, Communication no 378/09������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������231 Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, Communications nos 279/03–296/05, 28th Annual Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 153�����������������������������������492 Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, Communications nos 279/03 and 296/05 (2009)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������227, 230, 239–40, 247, 249–50, 492 Tanganyika Law Society & Others v The United Republic of Tanzania, App nos 009 and 011/2011, (Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 14 June 2013)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������150 Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola, Communication no 159/96(1997)�����������������������������������������������������������������������236, 245, 429 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002�����������������������������������������������������������������������������162, 167, 230, 245, 376 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Republic of Zimbabwe, Communication no 284/2003 (2009)���������������� 232, 420 Zimbabwe NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, annex III, 21st Annual Activity Report, 54, (2006) AHRLR 128��������������������������������������175

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Arbitration Tribunals Rainbow Warrior, The (New Zealand v France), (1990) 82 ILR 449�������������������������������������114 Argentina Mariela Viceconte v Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Case no 31.777/96�������������������526 Second Federal Criminal and Correctional Court, Case no 14.467, Olmos, Alejandro S/Denuncia�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������127 Australia Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������458 R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������445 Bangladesh Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) HCD 438������������������������������529, 537, 548 Botswana MolefiSilabo Ramantele v Edith Modipane Mmusi and Others, CACGB-104-12, [2013] BWCA 1 (Court of Appeal of Botswana, 3 September 2013)������������������������� 393, 410 Canada Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143��������������������������������������������308 Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 791, 2005 SCC 35�������������������������������308 Eldridge v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 624������������������������������������������������������308, 529, 547 Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429�����������������������������������������������������309 Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson [1989] 1 SCR 1038������������������������������������������������307 Victoria (City) v Adams [2008] BCSC 1363��������������������������������������������������������������������������309 Victoria (City) v Adams [2009] BCCA 563����������������������������������������������������������������������������309 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������308 CEDAW Committee Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, Communication no 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 553–55 Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, Communication no 4/2004, UN Doc CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 530, 533, 548–51 LC v Peru, Communication no 22/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 552–53 Maria de Lourdes da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, Communication no 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/ C/49/D/17/2008 (27 September 2011)��������������������������������������������������172 Salgado v United Kingdom, Communication no 11/2006, UN Doc CEDAW/ C/37/D/11/2006 (2007)������������������������������������������������������������������������337 CERD Committee FA v Norway, Communication no 18/2000, UN Doc CERD/C/58/D/18/2000 (21 March 2001)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������146 GAC Enkelaar v France, Communication no 2/1989, UN Doc CERD/C/39/D/2/1989 (1991), (1994) 2 IHRR 353������������������������������������������������������ 431–32

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Murat Er v Denmark, Communication no 40/2007, UN Doc CERD/C/71/D/40/2007������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 566, 611 Stephen Hagan v Australia, Communication no 26/2002, UN Doc CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003)����������������������������������������������������������������������������337 Committee Against Torture Hijrizi v Yugoslavia, Communication no 161/2000, UN Doc CAT/C/29/D/161/2000����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������247 Committee on ESCR IDG v Spain, Communication no 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49, 105, 258, 504, 660 Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Community Court) SERAP v Nigeria 2008 and 2012������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������101 Czech Republic Case no PL.US 25/94, 13 June 1995, (1995) 2 Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law 151��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������584 Ecuador Case No 0907-2008-RA (constitutional action of amparo in respect of the right to education)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������300 Case No 1207-10-EP, Decision 148-12-SEP-CC (extraordinary action for injunction in respect of the right to housing)���������������������������������������������������������������300 Case No 1586-2008-RA (constitutional action of amparo in respect of the right to work)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������300 European Commission and Court of Human Rights A v UK (1998) 2 FLR 959����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������296 A v United Kingdom, App no 25599/94�������������������������������������������������������������������������������597 Abdul Aziz, Cabales and Bakandali v the UK, App Nos 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985, (1985) 7 EHRR 471������������������������������424 Airey v Ireland, App no 6289/73, (ECtHR, 9 October 1979), Series A, No 32 (1979–80) 2 EHRR 305�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33, 88, 91 Akkoçv Turkey, App nos 22947/93 and 22948/93, (2000) 34 EHRR 1173�����������������������������168 Ali v United Kingdom, App no 40385/06�����������������������������������������������������������������������������601 Alinak v Turkey, App no 40287/98����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������643 Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, App no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, App nos 55721/07, ECtHR, 7 July 2011������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������64, 73 Amegnigan v The Netherlands, App no 25629/04�����������������������������������������������������������������534 Anna Pancenko v Latvia, App no 40772/98 (ECtHR, 28 October 1999)�������������������������������262 Anonymos Touristiki Etairia Xenodocheia v Greece, App no 35332/05 (ECtHR, 21 February 2008)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������233 Antonov v Russia, App no 38020/03�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������447

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Arcila Henao v The Netherlands, App no 13669/03��������������������������������������������������������������534 Austria v Italy, App no 788/60�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 184, 330 Aydin v Turkey, App no 23178/94 (ECtHR, 25 September 1997), (1998) 25 EHRR 251���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Ayubov v Russia, App no 7654/02����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������490 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others, App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001)��������������������������������������������������������������������� 64, 66, 72–73, 112 BB v France, App no 30930/96����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������534 Belilos v Switzerland, ECHR (1988) Series A, no 132, (1988) 10 EHRR 466���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 334, 338, 340–341 Bensaid v the United Kingdom, App No 44599/98, ECHR2001-I����������������������������������������534 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi (Bosphorus Airways) v Ireland, App no 45036/98, (2006) 42 EHRR 1������������������������������122 Botta v Italy [1998] 26 EHRR 241����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 Branko Tomašić and Others v Croatia, App no 46598/06, (ECtHR, 15 January 2009)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Budayeva and Others v Russia, Apps nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, (ECtHR, 20 March 2008)������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Burden v United Kingdom, App no 13378/05, 29 April 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 857���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������130 Burghartz v Switzerland, App no 16213/1990, [1994] ECHR 2���������������������������������������������374 Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, App no 32967/96 (ECtHR, 17 January 2002)���������������������� 165, 536 Campbell and Cosans v UK, judgment of 25 February 1982, Series A, No 48, (1982) 4 EHRR 293����������������������������������������������������������������165, 297, 572, 574, 581, 597 Carabulea v Romania, App no 45661/99, (ECtHR, 13 July 2010)������������������������������������������ 33 Castan and Others v Moldova and Russia, App nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 October 2012)������������������������������������������������������� 74, 629 Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia, Apps nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������600 Chagos Islanders v United Kingdom, App no 35622/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 2012)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 73 Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 399��������������������������������������������������������������490 CN and V v France, App no 67724/09�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445, 447 CN v The United Kingdom, App no 4239/08�����������������������������������������������������������������������430 Costello Roberts v UK (1993) 19 EHRR 112������������������������������������������������������������������������297 Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, (2002) 35 EHRR 731���������������������������������������� 64, 68, 135 Cyprus v Turkey, App nos 6780/75 et al��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 64 D v United Kingdom, App 30240/96, (ECtHR, 2 May 1997), (1997) 24 EHRR 423��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 534–35 DH and Others v Czech Republic, App no 57325/00, 13 November 2007, (2008) 47 EHRR 59���������������������������������������������������� 135, 564, 600, 606 Dikme v Turkey, App no 20869/92 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000)���������������������������������������������������� 12 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, (1992) 14 EHRR 745�������������������������������������������� 68 Dudgeon v UK, judgment of 23 September 1981, Series A, No 45; (1982) 4 EHRR 149��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132, 153 Dzieciak v Poland, App no 77766/01(ECtHR, 9 December 2008)������������������������������������������ 15 E and Others v United Kingdom, App no 33218/96, (ECtHR, 26 November 2002), [2002] ECHR 763������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 EB v France, App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008)���������������������������������������������������111

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El Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App no 39630/09 (ECtHR, 13 December 2012)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Evans v The United Kingdom, App no 6339/05��������������������������������������������������������������������549 Folgerø and Others v Norway, App no 15472/02 (ECtHR, 29 June 2007), (2008) 46 EHRR 1147�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������574 Gagiu v Romania, App no 63258/00�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������537 Gaskin v United Kingdom, App no 10454/83, (1989) 12 EHRR 36��������������������������������������529 Gaygusuz v Austria, App no 17371/90, [1996] ECHR 36�����������������������������������������170, 421–23 Giacomelli v Italy, App no 59909/00����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 490–491 Golder v United Kingdom, Series A, No 18, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 524�������������������������������79, 91 Gratzinger and Gratizingerova v Czech Republic, App no 39794/98 (ECtHR, 10 July 2002)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 Guerra v Italy, App no 14967/89, (ECtHR, 19 February 1998), (1998) 26 EHRR 357��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33, 529 Gündüz v Turkey, App no 35071/97, (2005) 41 EHRR 59�����������������������������������������������������644 Handyside v UK, App no 5493/72, Series A, no 24, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737������������������������643 Hassan v United Kingdom, App no 29750/09 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014)������������������������� 64 Hatton and Others v UK, App no 36022/97, (2003) 37 EHRR 611, para 98 (ECtHR)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Hirsi Jamaa and Other v Italy, App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 74, 299 Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, App no 11146/11(ECtHR, 29 January 2013)�������������������������135 Hristoz and Others v Bulgaria, App nos 47039/11 and 358/12, 13 November 2012������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 81 Huylu v Turkey, App no 52955/99 (ECtHR, 16 November 2006)������������������������������������������� 15 IB v Greece, App no 552/10 (ECtHR, 3 October 2013)������������������������������������������������� 166, 440 Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), (2005) 40 EHRR 1030�������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Ireland v UK, App no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978), Series A, No 25, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 25����������������������������������������������������������������������� 11, 177 Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, (2005) 41 EHRR 567�����������������������������������64, 68 Iversen v Norway, App no 1468/62���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������447 James and Others v United Kingdom, App no 8793/79, 21 February 1986, (1986) 8 EHRR 123�����������������������������������������������������������������������������232 Jasinskis v Latvia, App no 45744/08(ECtHR, 21 December 2010)������������������������������������15, 33 Jasvir Singh v France, App no 25463/08��������������������������������������������������������������������������������614 Karara v Finland, App no 40900/98�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������534 Karner v Austria (2003) 38 EHRR 24�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Kiyutin v Russia, App no 2700/10 (ECtHR, 10 March 2011)�����������������������������������166, 439–40 Kjeldesen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark, App nos 5095/71, 5920/72, and 5926/72���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������574 Kjeldesen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark, Series A No 23; (1979–80) 1 EHRR 711�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������520 Konstantin Markin v Russia, App no 30078/06 (Grand Chamber ECtHR, 22 March 2012)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������138 Koua Poirrez v France, App no 40892/98 [2003] ECHR 459�������������������������������������������������170 Kudla v Poland, App no 30210/96����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������605 L and V v Austria (2003) 36 EHRR 55���������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Lautsi and Others v Italy, App no 30814/06��������������������������������������������������������������������������574 Lawless v Ireland, App no 332/57, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 15�����������������������������������������������������227

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Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium v Belgium (Belgian Linguistic), App nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, and 2126/64, Series A, no 6; (1979–80) 1 EHRR 252����������������������������������� 581, 615 LCB v United Kingdom, App no 23413/94 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998), (1998) 27 EHRR 212�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15, 33 Leander v Sweden, App no 9248/81��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������529 Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, (ECtHR, 28 December 1996), (1997) 23 EHRR 513�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������54, 64, 68, 80, 111, 330, 334 López Ostra v Spain, App no 16798/90 (1995) 20 EHRR 277�����������������������������������������������523 Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 548����������������������������������������������������������132 Marckx v Belgium, Series A No 31, 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80, 244 Marguš v Croatia, App no 4455/10 (Grand Chamber of ECtHR, 27 May 2014)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 61 Markcx v Belgium [1979] 2 EHRR 330���������������������������������������������������������������������������������264 Maslova and Nalbandov v Russia, App no 839/02 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008)���������������������� 12 Matthews v United Kingdom, App no 24833/94, (1999) 28 EHRR 361��������������������������������122 Medvedyev and Others v France, App no 3394/03 (ECtHR, 23 March 2010)������������������������ 68 Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey, App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 9 April 2013)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 15, 537 Menesheva v Russia, App no 59261/00 (ECtHR, 9 March 2006), (2007) 44 EHRR 1162�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Mikheyev v Russia, App no 77617/01 (ECtHR, 26 January 2006)������������������������������������������ 12 Modinos v Cyprus (1993) 16 EHRR 485������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Mojsiejew v Poland, App no 11818/02����������������������������������������������������������������������������������537 Müller and Others v Switzerland, App no 10737/84��������������������������������������������������������������631 N v The United Kingdom, App no 26565/05�����������������������������������������������������������457, 534–35 Nada v Switzerland, App no 10593/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 September 2013, (2013) 56 EHRR 593�������������������������������������������������������������������������153 Naumenko v Ukraine, App no 42023/98 (ECtHR, 10 February 2004)����������������������������������� 15 Ndangoya v Sweden (dec), App No 17868/03�����������������������������������������������������������������������534 Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, App no 54825/00 (ECtHR, 5 April 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 645���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Norris v Ireland (1988) 13 EHRR 186����������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Norwood v United Kingdom, App no 23131/03�������������������������������������������������������������������154 Öcalan v Turkey, App no 46221/99 (ECtHR, 4 December 2000)�������������������������������������������� 64 O’Keeffe v Ireland, App no 35810/09 (Grand Chamber ECtHR, 28 January 2014)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Öneryildiz v Turkey, App no 48939/99, (ECtHR, 30 November 2004), (2005) 41 EHRR 325���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Opuz v Turkey, App no 33401/02, (ECtHR, 9 June 2009), (2010) 50 EHRR 695���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 33 Oršuš and Others v Croatia, App no 15766/03 (ECtHR, 16 March 2010)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������135, 564, 607 Patel v UK, App no 8844/80, (1982) 4 EHRR 256����������������������������������������������������������������590 Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria, App no 5335/05�����������������������������������������������������������������������������608 Pretty v United Kingdom, App no 2346/02, (2002) 35 EHRR 1�������������������������������������������478 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte B and Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, QBCOF 96/0462/D, QBCOF 96/0461 and 0462/D (21 June 1996)���������������������������������������������������������������������264

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Ramaer and Van Willigen v The Netherlands, App no 34880/12 (ECtHR, 23 October 2012)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 Ranjit Singh v France, App no 27561/08�������������������������������������������������������������������������������614 Rantesev v Cyprus and Russia, App no 25965/04��������������������������������������������������������� 446, 463 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, Apps nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, judgment of 13 February 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������350 Saad v United Kingdom, App no 13229/03, judgment of 29 January 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 427���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 Saadi v Italy, App no 37201/06, 28 February 2008, (2009) 49 EHRR 730�����������������������������299 Sabah Jaloud v The Netherlands, App no 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 2014)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 68 Şahin v Turkey, App no 44774/98, (2005) 41 EHRR 8���������������������������������������������������� 614–17 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal (1999) 31 EHRR 1055�������������������������������������������������132 Sampanis and Others v Greece, App no 32526/05��������������������������������������������������������� 564, 606 SAS v France, App no 43835/11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������568 SCC v Sweden (dec), App no 46553/99���������������������������������������������������������������������������������534 Schmidt v Germany (1994) 18 EHRR 513����������������������������������������������������������������������������448 Schuitemaker v Netherlands, App no 15906/08���������������������������������������������������������������������448 Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland, App no 14518/89, judgment of 24 June 1993, (1993) 16 EHRR 405�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������374 Selmouni v France, App no 25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1999), (2000) 29 EHRR 403���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12 Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01 (judgment of 26 July 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 166–67, 370, 430, 444–45, 455–59, 463 Silver v United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A, No 61, (1983) 5 EHRR 347�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153 SL v Austria (2003) 37 EHRR 39������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Slawomir Musial v Poland, App no 28300/06 (ECtHR, 20 January 2009)������������������������������ 12 Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493�����������������������������������������������������������������������132 Soering v UK, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, no 161, (1989) 11 EHRR 439���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 Sulak v Turkey, App no 24515/94������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������598 Taïs v France, App no 39922/03 (ECtHR, 1 June 2006)��������������������������������������������������������� 15 Tarantino and Others v Italy, Apps nos 25851/09, 29204/09 and 64090/09���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 590, 601 Tekeli v Turkey, App no 29865/96�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������370 Thlimmenos v Greece, App no 34369/97, 6 April 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 411������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 130, 170 Turgut and Others v Turkey, App no 1411/03 (ECtHR, 8 July 2008)������������������������������������233 Twenty-one Detained Persons v Federal Republic of Germany, App nos 3134/67, 3172/67 and 3188-3206/67���������������������������������������������������������������������448 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) Series A No 26, 15–16����������������������������������� 80, 297, 402, 597 Valsamis v Greece, App no 21787/93������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 573–74 Van Der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 EHRR 163������������������������������������������������������������������447 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, 9 July 1980, Series B, no 44, p 30, (1982) 4 EHRR 443��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445, 459 Varnava and Others v Turkey, Apps nos 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90���������������������������������������537 Vasiliauskas v Lithuania, App no 35343/05��������������������������������������������������������������������������186

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Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App no 1813/07�����������������������������������������������������������������644 Velyo Velev v Bulgaria, App no16032/07����������������������������������������������������������������������� 559, 604 Virabyan v Armenia, App no 40094/05 (ECtHR, 2 October 2012)����������������������������������������� 12 W, X, Y, and Z v United Kingdom (1968) 11 Yearbook 562�������������������������������������������������448 Waite and Kennedy v Germany, App no 26083/94 (1999) 30 EHRR 261���������������������� 122, 187 Weber v Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, ECHR (1990) Series A, no 177, (1990) 12 EHRR 508��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������338 X and Y v The Netherlands, (ECtHR, 26 March 1985), Series A, No 91 (1986) 8 EHRR 235������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 33, 164 X v UK, App no 8874/80 (1982) 4 EHRR 252����������������������������������������������������������������������590 Y v UK, App No 14229/88���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������296 Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria, App no 25446/06������������������������������������������������������������491 Z and others v United Kingdom, App no 29392/95, (ECtHR, 10 May 2001), (2002) 34 EHRR 97������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 33 Zontul v Greece, App no 12294/07(ECtHR, 17 January 2012)����������������������������������������������� 12 European Committee of Social Rights European Roma Rights Centre v Portugal, Complaint no 61/2010���������������������������������������472 General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece, Complaint no 66/2011������������������������������������������������� 95 International Association Autism Europe v France, Complaint no 13/2002������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 603–4, 611 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France, Complaint no 14/2003�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������547 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece, Complaint no 30/2005�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������536 European Court of Justice International Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide (Case 11/70) [1970] ECR 1125�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 Owusu v Jackson (Case C-128/01) [2005] ECR I-553������������������������������������������������������������212 Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health, Case C-127/92, [1994] 1 All ER 495��������������������������������������������������������436 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 3 November 2011�������������������������������������������������������������������� 60 Fiji Rarasea v The State, Criminal Appeal no HAA0027.2000����������������������������������������������������479 Gambia Denton v The Director-General, National Intelligence Agency and Others, HC241/06/MF/087/F1, 24 July 2006, (2006) AHRLR 241������������������������������������������������420 Ghana Federation of Youth Association of Ghana (FEDYAG) v Public Universities of Ghana and Others, Writ no J1/5/2009���������������������������������������������������������������������������592

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Human Rights Committee (HRC) Albert Womah Mukong v Cameroon, Communication no 458/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������473 Angela Poma Poma v Peru, Communication no 1457/2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������632 AP Johannes Vos v The Netherlands, Communication no 786/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������138 Apirana Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication no 547/93, UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 Arieh Hollis Waldman v Canada, Communication no 694/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/ 694/1996������������������������������������������������������������������������������������570 Bernadette Faure v Australia, Communication no 1036/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1036/2001 (2005)�������������������������������������������������������������������������448 Bikramjit Singh v France, Communication no 1852/2008, UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008����������������������������������������������������������������������������������614 Cabal and Pasini v Australia, Communication no 1020/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Carl Henrik Blom v Sweden, Communication no 191/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/32/D/191/1985�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������570 Chief Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication no 167/84, UN Doc CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984������������������������������������������629 Christopher Brown (represented by Allen & Overy, a law firm in London) v Jamaica, Communication no 775/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997������������������������473 CLD v France, Communication no 439/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/439/1990�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Craig Minogue v Australia, Communication no 954/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/954/2000�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Edward Young v Australia, Communication no 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (18 September 2003)���������������������������������������132–33, 290 Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v France, Communication no 549/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1�������������������������������������������������������������������� 329, 396 G and L Lindgren and L Holm et al v Sweden, Communications nos 298/1988 and 299/1988, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/46/40) at 253 (1991)������������������������570 GB v France, Communication no 348/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/ 348/1989������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Hartikainen v Finland, Communication no 40/1978, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 573–74 Harward v Norway, Communication no 451/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/451/1991�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Ibrahima Gueye et al v France, Communication no 196/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/196/���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 Iskandarov v Tajkistan, Communication no 1499/2006, CCPR/C/101/D/1499/2006������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������482 Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v Peru, Communication no 1153/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005)�������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Länsman et al v Finland, Communication no 511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/ C/52/D/511/1992������������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 Leirvåg et al v Norway, Communication no 1155/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������574 LG Danning v The Netherlands, Communication no 180/1984, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������133

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Loubna El Ghar v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Communication no 1107/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/1107/2002�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Lubuto v Zambia, Communication no 390/1990�������������������������������������������������������������������284 Massera et al v Uruguay, Communication no R.1/5 (1979)���������������������������������������������������473 MK v France, Communication no 222/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/222/1987�������������������329 Rawle Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication no 845, UN Doc CCPR/C/67D/845/1999����������������������������������������������������������������� 334, 336–37, 339 RLM v France, Communication no 363/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/44/D/363/1989����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Rodríguez v Uruguay, Communication No 322/1988, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 61 Sergio Euben López Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No R.12/52, A/36/40, annex XIX, UN Doc A/36/40�������������������������������������������������������������������������54, 68 SG v France, Communication no 347/1988, UN Doc CCPR/ C/43/D/347/1988���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Smith and Stewart v Jamaica, Communication no 668/1995, CCPR/C/65/D/668/1995����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������482 Toonen v Australia, Communication no 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132–33 William Eduardo Delgado Páez v Colombia, Communication no 195/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������574 X v Colombia, UN Doc CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005���������������������������������������������������������������132 Young v Austria, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000��������������������������������������������������������������132 India Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161�����������������������������������������������306 Chameli Singh v State of UP & Another (1996) AIR SC 1051�������������������������������������� 304, 495 Consumer Education and Research Centre v Union of India (1995) AIR 922��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������146, 304, 306 FK Hussain v Union of India, OP 2741 of 1988 (26 February 1990), AIR 1990 Ker 321�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������304 Francis Coralie v The Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608���������������������������������������304 Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 623�����������������������������������������������������������������������������306 Kishen Pattnayak & Another v State of Orissa, AIR 1989 SC 677���������������������������������������466 MC Mehta v Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 463��������������������������������������������������������������������306 Minerva Mills Ltd and Others v Union of India and Others (1981) (1) SLR 206�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka and Others (1992) 3 SCC 666���������������������������������� 290, 303 MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitant v M/s ZY and another, AIR 1997 (Bombay) 406���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������440 Olga Tellis & Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation & Others (1986) AIR 180 SC, (1985) 2 Supp SCR 51����������������������������������������������������������������������������������304 Parmanand Katara v Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 248����������������������������������������������� 146, 306 Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426, (1996) 4 SCC 37, (1996) SCJ 25���������������������������������������������������������546 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v Union of India, (SC 2001), Writ Petition (Civil) no 196/2001������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 306, 466 Ratlam Municipality Council v Vardi Chand, AIR 1980 SC 1622����������������������������������������537

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Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame and Others (1990) 1 SCC 520���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������304 State of Kerala v NM Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310�����������������������������������������������������������������303 Subhash Kumar v Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598������������������������������������������������������������������� 306, 485 Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India, Supreme Court of India, Order 15-02-1989 in Civil Appeals Nos 3187–89���������������������������������������������������������������206 Unnikrishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645��������������������������������������������304 Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v State of Bihar (1988) Supp SCC 734����������������������������������������305 Vishala Kochi Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of Kerala, 2006(1) KLT 919���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������485 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Court of Human Rights Abella v Argentina, Report no 55/97, Case no 11.137, 18 November 1997����������������������������217 Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname, Series C no 15�������������������������������������������������������������������������600 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1989), Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989, Series A No 10������������������������������������������� 80 Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile, Merits, Series C no 239, Judgment of 24 February 2012��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Barrios Altos v Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C No 75���������������������������������� 60–61 Case of The Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v El Salvador, (Merits, reparations and costs), Judgment of 25 October 2012������������������������������������������� 59 Coard et al v United States, Case 10.951, Report no 109/99 (29 September 1999)������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 69 Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosica v Dominican Republic, Report 28/01, Case 12.189����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 610–611 Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al) v Peru, Judgment of 24 November 2006����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������462 Effect of Reservations on the Entry in Force of the American Convention, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of 24 September 1982���������������������������������������������184, 330, 334 Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Report No 55/97, Case 11.137, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 17 September 2003, IACtHR, Series A, No 18, 2003����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129, 172, 331, 341, 345, 427 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, IACtHR, Judgment of 27 June 2012, Series C no 245��������������������������������������������������������������� 629, 632 María Mejía v Guatemala, Case 10.553, Report no 32/96�����������������������������������������������������436 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, IACtHR, Judgment of 31 August 2001���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provision of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 (19 January 1984)����������������������������������� 144, 244 Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, IACtHR (Ser A) no 3 (1983)������������������������������������������������������������������������������330, 334, 337 Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, (Ser A) No 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80 Saramaka People v Suriname, IACtHR, Judgment of 28 November 2007, Series C no 172���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 629, 632 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-ACtHR (Ser C) No 4 (1988)���������������������������������������������������������33, 164, 168, 402, 663

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Victor Saldaño v Argentina, Petition, Report No 38/99 (11 March 1999), OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev, 289 (1998)�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 68 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2006) Series C no 142���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 465, 629 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, [2011] ICJ Reports 70������������������������������� 66–67, 654 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) Merits, Judgment of 19 December 2005, 45 ILM 271 (2006)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54, 66–67 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 3����������������������������� 11, 330, 332–34, 633 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, (Belgium v Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 3�������������������������������������������������������������������331, 374, 449 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90��������������������������������� 11 Corfu Channel Case [1949] ICJ Rep 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 34 Genocide Convention (Bosnia v Serbia) [1996] ICJ Rep 595�������������������������������������������������� 10 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt [1980] ICJ Rep 73����������������������������������������������������������������������������������187 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council resolution 260 (1970), Advisory Opinion 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8, 66–67, 341, 374 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11, 29, 54, 57, 66, 112, 330, 355 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226��������������������������������������������� 11, 58, 64, 483, 533 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������156, 190, 217 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, [2012] ICJ Rep 422���������������������������������� 11 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������207 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] ICJ Rep 15�����������������������330, 332, 338 South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa), ICJ Rep 319����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������190 Switzerland v United States (Interhandel case) (1959) ICJ Rep 6������������������������������������������339 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahariya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6���������������������������������� 79 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v United States of America), [1999] ICJ Rep 9�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������654

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International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07������������������������������������������� 186, 217–18, 474 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09�������������������������������������������� 53 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59, 186, 217–18 Prosecutor v William Sameoi Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case no ICC-01/09-01/11��������������������������������������������������������������������474 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4������������������������������������������������� 217, 474 Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR–96-13-T����������������������������������������������������������������������������������474 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Kunarac IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445, 458 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka ‘Dule,’ Case no IT-94-1-A������������������������������������������������������ 53 Prosecutor v Kupreskic et al, Judgment, IT-95-16-T�������������������������������������������������������������490 Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić, Case no IT-02-60/1-S, 2 December 2003�����������������������������54, 60 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33-A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������633 Ireland G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������466 Israel Israel v Committee for the Expansion of the Health Basket, HCJ 2974/06 (11 June 2006)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 Louzon v Government of Israel, HCJ 307/05 (28 July 2008)���������������������������������������������������� 5 Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v Government of Israel and others, High Court of Justice, Case no 769/02, 14 December 2006������������������������������������� 54 Italy Cambria, Cass, sez VI, 18 Marzo 1996, [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th Penal Section, 18 March 1996], Foro It II 1996, 407����������������������������������������������������296 Kenya Republic v Minister for Home Affairs and 2 Others, ex parte Sitamze [2008] eKLR High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 18 April 2008������������������������������������������������������ 31 Republic v The Head Teacher, Kenya High School & Anor, ex parte SMY (Suing Through Her Mother and Next Friend A B) [2012] eKLR�������������������������������������617 Lesotho Khathang Tema Baitsokoli and Another v Maseru City Council and Others CA (Civ) 4/05 CONST/C/1/2004 (20 April 2004), (2004) AHRLR 195������������������������������������478 Senate Gabasheane Masupha v The Senior Resident Magistrate for the Subordinate Court of Berea and Others, Case no C of A (Civ) 29/2013, Judgment of 17 April 2014, Court of Appeal of Lesotho, [2014] LSCA 22�����������������������384 Mauritius Tengur v The Minister of Education and the State of Mauritius, Record No 77387, Supreme Court of Mauritius, 2002 SCJ 48������������������������������������ 612–13

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Military Tribunal Nuremberg United States of America v Carl Krauch et al, Judgment of 30 July 1948�����������������������������206 United States v Krupp, Judgment of 31 July 1948, 1439–40�������������������������������������������������206 Namibia LM and Others v the Government of the Republic of Namibia, Case nos 1603/2008, 3518/2008, 3007/2008, [2012] NAHC 211������������������������������������������551 Netherlands Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague], 30 January 2013, Case no C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580������������������������������������������������������������������������������163 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania (1935) PCIJ Series A/B, No 64��������������129 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (1925) PCIJ Series B No 10����������������������������252 Free Zones (1932) PCIJ, Series A/B, no 46����������������������������������������������������������������������������252 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion (1935) PCIJ, Series A/B no 64�������������������628 Polish Nationals in Danzig (1931) PCIJ, Series A/B, no 44���������������������������������������������������252 Portugal Decision no 39/84 (Constitutional Court of Portugal, 11 April 1984)�����������������������������������546 South Africa Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Others (CCT 12/09) [2009] ZACC 31; 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another (CC) [2011] ZACC33; 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 269, 504 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 4 SA 744, (1996) 10 BCLR 1253 (CC)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������276 Government of South Africa v Grootboom, 2001(1) SA 46 (CC)�������������������������105, 258, 269, 271, 275–76, 278 Hoffmann v South African Airways, Case (CCT 17/00), 2000 (11) BCLR 1235�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������421, 439, 520 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others (CCT 74/03) [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC)��������������������������������������������������������269 Joseph v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC)������������������������������������������ 269, 274–75, 345 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC)���������������������������������������������������269 MC Denneboom Service Station CC and Another v Phayane [2014] ZACC 29��������������������258 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC)�������������������������������������� 269, 271, 275–77, 527–28, 545–46

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National Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14) [2014] ZACC 30 (30 October 2014)����������������������������������������������������������� 70–71 Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others (CCT 31/09) [2009] ZACC33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC)����������������������������������������������������269 Nonkululeko Letta Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, Case CCT 49/03, 2004 (2) SA 544 (CC) 2004 (1) BCLR 27����������������������������������������� 391–92 Ntombizodwa Yvonne Maphango and Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (PTY) Ltd, (CCT 57/11), 2012 (3) SA 531, 2012 (5) BCLR 449 (CC)��������������������������������504 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 3 Others, Case (CCT 24/07), [2008] ZACC 1��������������������������������������������������������������� 258, 269, 278–79 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, (CCT 53/03) [2004] ZACC 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council, Case No 01/12312 2002 (6) BCLR 625���������������������������������������������������������������������� 270, 469 Residents of the Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) [2009] ZACC 16; 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC)���������������������������������269 S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995(3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������270 Shibi v Sithole and Others, (Case CCT 69/03)�����������������������������������������������������������������������391 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath & Others [2000] ZACC 22���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case (CCT 50/03)������������������������������� 391–92 Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC)��������������������������������269, 271, 275–78, 546 Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2014] ZACC 17�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������258 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), SCSL-2004-14-AR72E (31 May 2004)���������������������218 Special Tribunal for Lebanon Akhbar Beirut SAL Ibrahim Mohamed Al Amin, Case No STL-14-06/I/CJ/, 31 January 2014�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������215 Thailand AIDS Access Foundation v Bristol-Myers Squibb, Black Case No Tor Por IP 34/2544 (1 October 2002)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Uganda Allen Atukunda v Hon Col Kahinda Otafiire, Complaint no UHRC 228/2003 (decision of 6 February 2004)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������318 Attorney General v Susan Kigula & 417 others, Constitutional Appeal no 03 of 2006, [2009] UGSC 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������284 Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development, Mugerwa David & others v Nakaseke District Local Government, High Court Civil Suit No 111 of 2012 (30 April 2015)�������������������������������������������������������������������������289

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Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development and Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition no 16 of 2011, [2012] UGCC 4���������������������������������������289 Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development and Others v Attorney General, Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No 1 of 2013, (30 October 2015)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������289 Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 64 of 2011 [2015] UGCC 12 (13 October 2015)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 284, 538 Dimanche Sharon et al v Makerere University, Constitutional Appeal no 2 of 2004 [2006] UGSC 10 (Supreme Court of Uganda, 1 August 2006), arising out of Constitutional Cause no 1 of 2003 (Constitutional Court of Uganda, 24 September 2003)������������������������������������������������������������������������������289 Emmanuel Mpondi v The Chairman, Board of Governors Nganwa High School, Complaint no 210 of 1998, reported in [1999–2002] UHRR 68�����������������������������������������320 Eva Nanwanye v Itaaga Bosco, Complaint no 187 of 2004���������������������������������������������������320 Flt Cpt George M Mukula v Uganda, High Court of Uganda at Kololo, Anti-Corruption Division, HCT-00-AC-CN-0001 of 2013������������������������������������������������293 Jacqueline Kasha Nabagesera & others v Attorney General and Another (Kasha-2), Miscellaneous Cause 33/ 2012, [2014] UGHC 49�������������������������������291 Kaifumba Estolia v Bareberaho Ezekiel, Complaint no UHRC/MBA/32/2002�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������320 Kasha Jacqueline & 3 others v Rolling Stone ltd and Another (Kasha-1), High Court Miscellaneous Cause no 163/2010������������������������������������������������������������������291 Mifumi (U) Ltd & Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No 2 of 2014���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������390 Mirembe Margaret v Dr Mukubwa Tumwine, Complaint no UHRC 373 of 2000�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������320 Oloka-Onyango and 9 Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 8 of 2014, [2014] UGCC 14�������������������������������������������������������������������� 132, 290 PK Ssemwogerere v The Attorney General of Uganda, Constitutional Petition No 5 of 2002��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������283 Rose Namande Kaduyu v George Mugisha, Compliant no 197 of 2003�������������������������������320 Sam Muwonge v Capt Sulaiti Mwesigye and Others, Complaint no 202/1998����������������������284 Susan Kaasa v Major Godfrey, Complaint no UHRC/J/LOG-12/2002���������������������������������320 Tinyefuza v Attorney General, Constitution Petition No 1 of 1996������������������������������ 284, 290 Tugume Mariam Rajab v Attorney General, Complaint no UHRC 776/1998�����������������������318 Uganda v Hon Jim K Muhwezi and Three Others, High Court of Uganda at Kampala, Anti-Corruption Division, Case no ACD-CSC-97 of 2010�������������������������������292 Uganda v Muliika Geoffrey, HCT-03-CR-SC-0182-2014�����������������������������������������������������602 Unity Dow v Attorney General (1992) LRC (Const) 623������������������������������������������������������284 United Kingdom Adam, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������493 Aishah Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] IRLR 434 (Employment Appeal Tribunal)������������������������������������������������������������������ 438–39 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������261 Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22������������������������������������������������������������������������221 Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, Case No B3/2011/1272����������������������������������������212

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Fatima Ahmed Benkharbouche & Minah Janah v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Libya and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 33����������������������������������������������423 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1983] 2 AC 751�������������������������������������������������������������261 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry, Tin Council Cases [1990] 2 AC 418�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������261 Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������260–261, 283 A NHS Trust v DE (Appearing by his Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) and Others [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam)���������������������������������������������������530 R (Bernard) v Enfield London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 2282 (Admin)��������������������264 R (on the application of Al Skeini and Others) v the Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 72 R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] EWCA Civ 49, [1995] 1 WLR 898 (CA)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������266 R v Lyons [2002] UKHL 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������261 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������284 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 (HL)�����������������������������479 Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116�������������������������������������260 United States Barney v Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir 1998)�������������������������������������������������������479 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (17 May 1954)������������������������������������605 Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al v the State of New York et al, 719 NYS 2d 475 (2001)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������603 Doe v Unocal Corp, 110 F Supp 2d 1294, 1310������������������������������������������������������������ 206, 213 Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884–87 (2d Cir 1980)����������������������������������������������������163 Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971)������������������������������������������������������������������������419 John Doe I, et al, v UNOCAL Corp, et al, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir 2002)�����������������163, 213, 449 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 SCt 1659 (2013)���������������������������������������������������163 Peguy Delva v The Continental Group, Inc, no SC 12-2315 (Supreme Court of Florida, 17 April 2014)�����������������������������������������������������������������������371 Ramos v Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570–71 (10th Cir 1980)���������������������������������������������������������479 Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004)������������������������������������������������������������������������163 South African Apartheid Litigation [Khulumani, et al v Barclays], RE 346 F Supp 2d 538 (SDNY, 2004)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������213 Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari and Others v Caci Premier Technology Inc; Caci International Inc, US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, No 13-1937, 30 June 2014�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163 Thompson v Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir 2002)����������������������������������������������������479 Wiwa v Anderson No 01 Civ 1909 (2001)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������213 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum, No 96 Civ 8386 (1996)�������������������������������������������������������213 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Shell, 226 F.3d 88 (2000)����������������������������������������������������������������������214 Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Development Company, No 4 Civ 2665 (2004)������������������������� 213–14 Venezuela Case no 15.789, Decision no 916 (15 July 1999)��������������������������������������������������������������������306 López, Glenda y otros c. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (IVSS) s/acción de amparo. Expediente 00-1343. Sentencia No 487����������������������������������640

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WTO Appellate Body EC—Seal Products, WTO Appellate Body Report, WT/DS400/AB/R; WT/ DS401/AB/R�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������205 US-Shrimp, WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R�����������������������������������������������197 WTO Dispute Panels China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R������������������������������204 European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R; WT/DS401/R (25 November 2013) (EC—Seal Products)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 204–5 United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US—Gambling), WT/DS285/R�������������������������������������������������������204 Zimbabwe Farai Dzvova v Minister of Education, Sports and Culture & Others, Civil Application 291/06, [2007] ZWSC 26; (2007) AHRLR 189���������������������������������������617 Peter Makani and Others v Epworth Local Board, The Minister of Local Government and Others, HH 550-14 and HC 8596/14��������������������������������������������470 Venia Magaya v Nakayi Shonhiwa Magaya Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Judgment no SC.210/98/Civil Appeal no 635/92, 1999 (1) ZLR 100���������������������������� 389–90

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Table of National Legislation Albania Constitution, Art 122������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Constitution 1998, Art 57�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Algeria Constitution 2008 Art 38��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 132������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Andorra Constitution, Art 3(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Angola Decree no 5/95 of 7 April 1995, s 3(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������149 Argentina Constitution 1994�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 75(22)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Armenia Constitution Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 34��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Constitution 2005, Art 40�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Australia Capital Territory Human Rights Act 2004����������������������������������������������������������������������������253 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011����������������������������������������������������������������253 Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006����������������������������������������253 Austria Constitution 1867, Art 17�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Azerbaijan Constitution Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 51��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 151������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Bangladesh Constitution 1972�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478

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Art 18������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 478, 549 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������548 Belarus Constitution 1994 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 116������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Belgium Constitution, Art 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Benin Constitution 1990�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 147������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Bolivia Constitution 2009 Art 13(iv)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 476, 484 Art 158������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 410(ii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, Art III(b)(3)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Botswana Constitution, s 3(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������393 Immigration Act 1966����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 428–29 s 7(f)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������428 s 11(6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 428–29 s 36������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������429 s 36(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������428 Immigration Act 2011�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������428 Brazil Constitution 1988�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 7(iv)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 206������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 208(7)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 227������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Penal Code, Art 119��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������553 Bulgaria Constitution, Art 5(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Burkina Faso Constitution, Art 151������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255

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Burundi Constitution, Art 33��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Cambodia Constitution Art 31��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 31(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 63��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Education Law����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������596 Cameroon Constitution, Art 45��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 307–9 s 7���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 307–9 s 15������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 307–8, 547 Constitution Act 1982�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������307 Human Rights Act of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador 2010���������������������������307 Prince Edward Island Domestic Relations Act 2008�������������������������������������������������������������307 Cape Verde Constitution 1990�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 11(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Central African Republic Constitution, Art 69��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Chad Constitution, Art 222������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Chile Constitution, Art 5(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 China, Education Law 1995 Art 8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������601 Art 25�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������601 Colombia Constitution 1991�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 93��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Congo Constitution Art 34(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 58��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478

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Costa Rica Constitution Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 50��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 82��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Cote d’Ivoire Constitution, Art 87��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Croatia Constitution, Art 134������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Cuba Civil Code, Art 20�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Constitution Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 12(B)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Cyprus Constitution Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 169(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Czech Republic Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art 33(2)�������������������������������������������584 Constitution Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Constitution 2005 Art 48��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Art 176������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 215������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Djibouti Constitution, Art 37��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Dominican Republic Constitution 2010, Art 63�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Ecuador Constitution 2008��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������204, 254, 300 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������299 Art 11(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������299 Arts 11–74�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������300 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476

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Art 28��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������601 Art 29��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������494 Art 31��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������494 Art 59��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 66(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������489 Art 355������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 417���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 256, 299 Art 421������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������204 Art 424������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 426������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 428������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Egypt Constitution 2014 Art 78��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������495 Art 79��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 El Salvador Constitution 1983 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Arts 60–61�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 101������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 144(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Equatorial Guinea Constitution, Art 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Eritrea Constitution Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Estonia Constitution, Art 123������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Ethiopia Constitution 1995 Art 43��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 43(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 90��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Fiji Constitution, Art 25(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������479 Finland Constitution 1999�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477

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Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Constitution 1991, Art 118������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 256, 300 France Act No 71.1130, Art 11(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������432 Act No 2004/228 of 15 March 2004�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 613–14 Act of 15 March 2004����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 567–68 Constitution, Art 55��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Criminal Code, Arts and 225-14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������456 Gambia Constitution 1997, Art 25�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Lunatics Detention Act 1917���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164, 538 Georgia Constitution Art 6(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Germany Constitution Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 5(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 28��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Control Council Law No 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity 1945����������������������������������������������������������186 Ghana Constitution 1992����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 254–55 Art 21(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������592 Art 25(1)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������592 Art 36��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Greece Constitution 2001 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 28(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Guatemala Constitution Art 46��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 51��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 119������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477

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Guinea Constitution Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 79��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Guyana Constitution Art 15a������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 40��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Haiti Constitution Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 276(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Honduras Constitution Art 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 123������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Hungary Constitution 1949 as amended 1989��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 India Constitution (86th Amendment) Act 2002�������������������������������������������������������������������� 302, 304 Constitution 1949 as amended����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Arts 14–35�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������302 Art 21������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 303–5, 485, 547 Art 21A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������302 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������302 Arts 36–51�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������302 Art 37��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������303 Art 38��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������305 Art 39(e)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 302, 304 Art 39(f)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������305 Art 39A�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������305 Art 41������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 302, 304 Art 42��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������305 Art 43������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 302, 304 Art 47������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 303, 478 Art 48A������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 303–4 Art 226������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������302 Divorce Act as amended 2004�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������303 Hindu Succession Act, as amended 2004������������������������������������������������������������������������������303 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000������������������������������������������������304 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005����������������������������������������������������������������303 Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994���������������������������������������������������������������������������303 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006�������������������������������������������������������������������������������303

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Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005������������������������������������������������������303 Right to Information Act 2005���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������303 Iran Constitution Art 3(12)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 43��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Ireland Constitution 1937 as amended����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003���������������������������������������������������������������253 Italy Act No 7/2006 on provisions concerning the prevention and prohibition of the practice of female genital mutilation�����������������������������������������������������������������������294 Act No 11/2009���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Act No 38/2006 concerning the fight against the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography also via Internet����������������������������������������������������������294 Act No 54/2006 on provisions on the separation of parents and shared custody of children������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294 Act No 62/2011 on the protection of the relationship between mothers in prison and their minor children�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294 Act No 94/2009���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������298 Act No 112/2011 on the establishment of the National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294 Act No 133/2008�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������298 Act No 296/2006�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294 Constitution��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������299 Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������298 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Arts 29–31�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Arts 33–34�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Arts 35–36�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Arts 38–40�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Art 39��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Art 41��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Art 42��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Art 117������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Legislative Decree No 5/2010������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Legislative Decree No 198/2006��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Unified Text incorporating Chamber Act 2426 and Chamber Act 2956 B of 28 June 2011�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������295 Japan Constitution 1946, Art 23�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Kazakhstan Constitution, Art 4(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255

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Kenya Constitution 2010�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 33��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 43�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������293, 476, 495 Art 43(1)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������489 Art 43(1)(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Art 48�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Kuwait Constitution 1962 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������342 Art 29�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 341–42 Kyrgyzstan Constitution, Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Latvia Constitution 1922 as amended 1998��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Liberia Constitution 1986, Art 15�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Lithuania Constitution, Art 138(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Madagascar Constitution, Art 132(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Malawi Constitution 1994�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 13(10)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 30(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 33��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Maldives Constitution 2008, Art 23(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Mali Constitution, Art 116������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Mauritania Constitution, Art 80��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255

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Mauritius Constitution s 6(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������612 s 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������612 s 16(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������612 s 16(2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������613 Mexico Constitution Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Moldova Constitution, Art 47(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Montenegro Constitution, Art 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Namibia Constitution 1990�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 21(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Nepal Interim Constitution, Art 18(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Netherlands Civil Code, Art 6:162������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163 Constitution Art 20(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 94��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Criminal Code, Art 51����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������253 Human Rights Act 1993�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������253 Nicaragua Constitution 1987 Art 10(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 63��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Art 105������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 Art 125������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Niger Constitution, Art 132������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255

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Nigeria African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 2004, s 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������250 Constitution 1999�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 16(2d)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Criminal Code, s 360�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Labour Act 1990, s 55�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Penal Code of Northern Nigeria, s 55�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 2014���������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Norway Human Rights Act 1999, s 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 255, 300 Oman Constitution, Art 72��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Pakistan Constitution 1973�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340, 348–50, 352 Art 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������349 Art 25(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������349 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������349 Art 38��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 38a������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 227������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������350 Factories Act 1934, s 45��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������350 Mines Act 1923, s 23-C���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������350 Panama Constitution Art 52��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 105������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 110(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Papua New Guinea Constitution, Art 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Paraguay Constitution 1992 Art 54��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 74��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 137(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Peru Constitution Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 55��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256

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Philippines Constitution 1987, s 5�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Poland Constitution, Art 91(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Portugal Constitution, Art 65��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������494 Republic of Moldova Constitution, Art 4(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Romania Constitution Art 20(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Art 47(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Russian Federation Constitution, Art 15(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Rwanda Constitution 2003 Art 40��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������359 Art 190������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Senegal Constitution, Art 98��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Serbia and Montenegro Constitution 2003, Art 16�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������300 Sierra Leone Constitution 1991�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 8(3a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Slovakia Constitution, Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Slovenia Constitution, Art 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 South Africa Black Administration Act 1927, s 23�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������391 Constitution 1996 s 2(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������545 s 7(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������274

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s 8(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������146 s 9��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������392 s 9(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������392 s 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������392 s 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������277 s 23������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 24������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 25������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 26��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272, 275, 277–78, 494 s 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272, 275, 277–78, 484 s 27(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 s 27(1) and (2)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 277, 545 s 27(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������277 s 28������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 28(1)(c)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 s 29������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 272–73 s 30������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273 ss 30–31�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 31������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������273 s 35������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������272 s 231(4)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������269 s 233����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������270 Intestate Succession Act 1987, s 1(4)(b)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������391 Social Assistance Act 1992����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������274 Water Services Act 1997 s 1(ii)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������489 s 3(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������488 South Sudan Transitional Constitution 2011 Art 34��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������495 Art 38(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Spain Constitution 1978�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������254 Art 20(1)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 96(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Sri Lanka Constitution Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 27(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Sudan Constitution 2005, Art 13(6)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Penal Code 1991, Art 152(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������598 Suriname Constitution 1987, Art 24�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477

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Switzerland Constitution 1999 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Tajikistan Constitution, Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Thailand Constitution 2007 Art 50��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 79��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Timor-Leste Constitution, Art 9���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Togo Constitution Art 140������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 145������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������101 Tunisia Constitution, Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Constitution 2014, Art 33�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Turkey Civil Code�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������370 Art 187������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 369–70 Constitution��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������354 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340, 354, 356–57 Art 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340, 354, 356–57 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 42����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 340, 354, 356–57 Art 61��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������477 Art 90��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������256 Uganda Access to Information Act 2005��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 Act 11/2005, s 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������291 Anti Homosexuality Act 2014�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������132 Bill of Rights�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285–90, 292 Children’s Act 2000������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281, 286, 387 s 6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������318 Constitution (Amendment) Act 2005������������������������������������������������������������������������������������280 Constitution 1995�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������254, 280, 285, 289, 291 Preamble, Cultural Objective xxiv�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������386 Art 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Art 2(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290

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Art 8A����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 290–292 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Art 20(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 Art 21������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 285, 291 Art 25(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������286 Art 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 149, 286 Art 26(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������286 Art 29��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 Art 30������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 286, 320 Art 32������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 285, 287 Art 32(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 287, 386 Art 32(2a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������291 Art 33�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 285–86 Art 33(6)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������386 Art 34�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285–86, 319 Art 35�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 285–86 Art 36�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 285–86 Art 37�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 286–87 Art 39��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������286 Art 40�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 286–87 Art 45������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 288, 290 Art 50��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285 Art 51��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������314 Art 51(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������282 Art 51(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 316, 318 Arts 51–59�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������314 Art 52�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 314–16 Art 52(1)(h)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 280, 282 Art 53��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������315 Art 53(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������319 Art 53(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������319 Art 53(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285 Art 53(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������319 Art 54�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 315–16 Art 55��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 Art 55(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 Art 56��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 Art 57��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 Art 58��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 Art 79��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������283 Art 123(1) and (2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������283 Art 223������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������321 Art 225������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������321 Art 226������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������321 Art 286���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 280, 282 Art 287������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Domestic Violence Act 2010�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 Employment Act 2006����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 Equal Opportunities Commission Act 2007��������������������������������������������������������������������������281 Art 14(2)(g)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285 Art 14(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������285

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Inspectorate of Government Act 2002����������������������������������������������������������������������������������321 International Criminal Court Act 2010������������������������������������������������������������������������� 281, 283 Land Act Amendment 2004��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy�������������������������� 280, 285, 287–89, 291–92 I����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������288 I(i)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������289 VI��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 XIII�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 XIV��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 288, 290 XIV.ii��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 XX������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 XXI�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 XXII���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������287 XXVIII�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������282 XXXVIII(i) (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������290 Penal Code Act 1950�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 s 145����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������291 s 146����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������291 Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act 2012�������������������������������������������������������������������281 Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act 2010����������������������������������������������������������������������281 Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act 2010�������������������������������������������������������������281 Ratification of Treaties Act 1998�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������283 Uganda Human Rights Commission Act 1997���������������������������������������������������������������������316 s 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 s 13������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������316 ss 18–26�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������319 Whistleblower Protection Act 2010���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281 Ukraine Constitution, Art 48��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476 Labour Code�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������438 Law on Equal Rights and Opportunities for Men and Women���������������������������������������������438 United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, s 172(1)(d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Equality Act 2006�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������267 Human Rights Act 1998����������������������������������������������������������������������� 71–72, 253, 262–64, 267 Modern Slavery Act 2015������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������454 State Immunity Act 1961������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������423 United States Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 1789������������������������������������������������������������������������163, 213–14 Civil Rights Act 1964������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 419–20 Constitution Eighth Amendment�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������479 Fourteenth Amendment����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������606 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States������������������ 10, 24, 158, 329

Table of National Legislation

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Uruguay Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado��������������������������������������������������������� 61 Venezuela Constitution Art 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������255 Art 299������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������478 Vietnam Constitution, Art 14(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������151 Zambia Constitution 1996 Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������388 Art 23(4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 388–89 Constitution 2014�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������403 Art 51��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������389 Art 52(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������293 Art 58(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������293 Zimbabwe Constitution 2013��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 390, 617 s 23������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������390 s 74���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 470, 495 s 77(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������484 s 77(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������476

lxii 

Table of International and Regional Instruments African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (ACHPR)������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4, 9, 16, 21, 55, 101, 150, 154, 168, 175, 179, 225–50, 269, 280, 283, 288, 290, 360, 373–77, 394–96, 398–99, 401–3, 408–10, 420–421, 428–30, 475, 491–93, 513–14, 521–22, 538, 578–79, 654, 658 Preamble para 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������250 para 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 168, 175, 225, 250 Art 2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129–30, 148, 164, 179, 244–45, 250, 374, 578 Art 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 164, 374 Art 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������179, 247, 385 Art 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13, 164, 426, 443, 522, 597–98 Art 7(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������175 Art 7(1)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 Art 7(1)(a) and (c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Art 12(4)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 428–29 Art 12(4) and (5)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246 Art 12(5)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Art 13(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Art 14������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51, 152, 179, 226, 230–234, 246–47, 420, 492–93 Arts 14–25���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 15������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 148, 226, 242–43, 246, 416, 420, 429–30, 435–36 Arts 15–17�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������360 Art 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 148, 164, 179, 226, 236–39, 246–48, 492–93, 507, 513, 522 Art 16(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 235, 238 Art 16(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������235 Art 16(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������239 Art 17������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 148, 236 Art 17(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������226, 235, 240–241, 246, 578–79 Art 17(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������226, 243–44, 384, 625 Art 17(2) and (3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 Art 17(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������226 Art 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������246

lxiv 

Table of International and Regional Instruments

Art 18(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������179, 226, 246–47, 492 Art 18(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226, 375 Art 18(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 374–75 Art 18(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������164 Arts 19–24������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16, 226 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������360 Art 21�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 179–80 Art 21(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������180 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������247 Art 24����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 179, 238–39, 524 Art 27(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������227 Arts 27–29�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������181 Art 29(7)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������375 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������229 Art 60������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 244, 375 Art 61������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 226, 244 Art 62������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 378, 579 Protocol on the Establishment of An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9, 658 Art 3(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9, 658 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003����������������������������� 9, 280, 290, 373, 376–77, 381, 397–99, 401–2, 404–5, 407, 409 Preamble, para 12����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������383 Art 1(f)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������141 Art 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 8������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 12�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 228, 377 Art 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������602 Art 13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228, 377, 437 Art 13(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������436 Art 13(d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������443 Art 13(g)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������444 Art 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228, 280, 377 Art 15����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 228, 377, 475, 483 Art 15(a)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������483 Art 16�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 228, 377 Art 17�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 228, 378 Art 17(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Art 18����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 19����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 20����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 21�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 378, 388

Table of International and Regional Instruments

 lxv

Art 22����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Arts 22–24���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 24����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������378 Art 26�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 378, 380 Art 26(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 Art 27����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������380 Art 34(6)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990��������������������������� 9, 280, 360, 377 Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 11(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������579 Art 11(3)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 11(3)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������587 Art 11(3)(b) and (c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 11(3)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������590 Art 11(3)(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������584 Art 11(3)9e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������603 Art 11(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������597 Art 11(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 165, 597 Art 11(6)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������598 Art 11(7)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������597 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 12(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 14(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������513 Art 14(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������516 Art 14(2)(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 475, 483 Art 14(2)(e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������519 Art 15������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 228, 452 Art 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 2009 Art 3(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 7(5)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������219 African Youth Charter Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Art 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228 Agreement between the UN and the IBRD 1947������������������������������������������������������������������190 Agreement between the UN and the IMF 1947, Art 1(2)������������������������������������������������������190 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 26, 195–98, 203–4, 640 Preamble��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 196–97 Art XVI(5)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������324

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Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal 1945������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������186 Agreement on Agriculture (WTO)�������������������������������������������������������������������������198, 202, 205 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1994, Art 2(2)��������������������������������������������� 196, 205 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 113, 172, 198–203, 208, 640 Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Art 27(3)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Art 28��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������199 Art 28(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������199 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Art 31��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Art 31(f)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Art 31(h)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������200 Art 33��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������199 Art 66(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 American Convention on Human Rights 1969 (AmCHR)�������������������������������� 9, 326, 330, 334, 513, 600, 610 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129 Art 1(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 68 Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������444 Art 6(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������448 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 13�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152, 181, 385 Art 13(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������528 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 17��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������181 Art 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������610 Art 21������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 385, 629 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 22(8)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Art 22(9)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Art 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������9, 90 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 54 Art 29(a)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 Art 32��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������181 Art 32(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 74��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������330 Art 75��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������330 Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1988����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4, 9, 384, 514, 564, 579–80, 588, 625 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������578 Art 6������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416

Table of International and Regional Instruments

 lxvii

Art 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 Art 7(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 7(f)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 Art 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������507 Art 10(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������513 Art 10(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������516 Art 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������524 Art 12����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������475 Art 13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 571, 578 Art 13(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 564, 582 Art 13(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������579 Art 13(3)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 13(3)(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 587–88 Art 13(3)(b) and (c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 13(3)(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������590 Art 13(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 580, 597 Art 13(5)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 580, 597 Art 13(d)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������585 Art 14�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 384, 625 Art 14(1)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������636 Art 14(1)(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man������������������������������������������������ 80, 625 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625 Art 13(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 Arts 29–38�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������181 Art XII������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������610 Art XVI����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004��������������������������������������������� 4, 10, 51, 129, 416, 435, 476 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129 Art 26(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Arts 30–32�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 31��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51 Arts 33–42���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 34(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 36��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 38������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 475, 490 Art 42(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������636 Art 42(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 Art 45��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������658 Art 48��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������658 ASEAN Declaration on Cultural Heritage 2000�������������������������������������������������������������������632 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law������������������������������������� 654, 660 Beijing Declaration������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 408, 508 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886���������������������������640 Art 6 bis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������641

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CEDAW, see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Charter for the Cultural Renaissance of Africa 2006������������������������������������������������������������632 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union�������������������������������������9, 38, 321, 580 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������636 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������580 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������131 Art 34��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 35��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������519 Art 47��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������423 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2007, Art 14(1)�������������������������������659 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 1945��������������������������������������474 Charter of the Organization of American States, Art 31(k)��������������������������������������������������491 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1995 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 20(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129 Constitutive Act of the African Union���������������������������������������������������������������������������������219 Art 3(h)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Art 4(1)(l)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������377 Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960����������������������������564, 581–82, 586, 588, 612–13, 628, 632 Art 1(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������564 Art 1(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 581, 583 Art 1(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������588 Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������564 Art 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 564, 587 Art 4(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 582, 586, 589–90 Art 4(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������585 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������565 Art 9�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 323, 379 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT)��������������������������������9, 12, 49, 62, 259, 268, 280–281, 284, 294, 300–301, 307 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 Art 2(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 68 Art 2(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 54 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Optional Protocol�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������301 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������632 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������632 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms 1971������������������������������������������������������640 Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001����������������������������632 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003��������������������������������632 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992���������������������������������������������������������������������� 627, 640

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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)����������������������������������������� 4, 9, 12, 49, 54, 60, 92, 137, 139, 143, 170, 172, 245, 256, 259, 268, 280, 294, 301, 307, 324, 326, 328–29, 343, 345, 347, 349, 353, 366, 371–72, 375, 380, 384, 388–90, 401–4, 406–9, 437, 470, 488, 499, 549–50, 552, 554, 567–69, 625, 644 Preamble para 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������139 para 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������138 Art 1���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129–30, 139, 141, 342, 349, 376 Art 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 132, 135, 170, 373, 380, 554 Art 2(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������567 Art 2(e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������169 Art 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 143, 569 Art 4(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 137, 142–43, 145 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������645 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������446 Art 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 567, 582 Art 10(h)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 549–50 Arts 10–14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������437 Art 11(1)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 11(1)(e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 12���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 473, 507, 549–50, 553–54 Art 12(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 515, 554 Art 12(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������473, 515, 554 Art 13(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������170 Art 13(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 384, 625 Art 14������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 473, 488 Art 14(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 482, 489 Art 14(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 14(2)(h)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������470 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������380 Art 16(1)(e)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 549–51 Art 28(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 329, 380 Optional Protocol, Art 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48–49 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10, 329–30, 334, 633, 654 Art 2���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20, 633 Art 6(c)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 21 Art 7(1)(h)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20 Art IX�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������334 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 632–33 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992, Protocol on Water and Health������������������������������������� 486–87

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Convention on the Protection of the Archeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations 1976��������������������������������������������������������632 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, see International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)��������������������������4, 9, 12, 43, 54, 91, 97, 102, 125, 132, 179, 183, 207, 218, 256, 259, 268–69, 280, 294–96, 301, 307, 324–26, 335, 347, 353, 384, 409, 450, 452, 466, 483, 488, 513–14, 525, 548, 575–78, 581, 588, 590, 609–10, 625, 644, 658 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 Art 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 90, 95, 110 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 7(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 11(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 577 Art 17(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 21(e)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 22(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 23(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Arts 23–34���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 24������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 473, 507 Art 24(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������513 Art 24(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 482, 516 Art 24(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������473 Art 24(2)(e)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 488, 520 Art 24(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������520 Art 24(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 24(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������519 Art 26��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 27������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 473, 489 Art 27(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������467 Art 27(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������468 Art 27(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������473 Art 27(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������110 Art 28�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 576–77 Art 28(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������609 Art 28(1)(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������576, 578, 582 Art 28(1)(b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 586–87 Art 28(1)(b) and (c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������582 Art 28(1)(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 590, 592

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Art 28(1)(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������588 Art 28(1)(e)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������584 Art 28(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 165, 597 Art 28(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 110, 578 Arts 28–29�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������576 Art 29�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������356, 582, 598 Art 29(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 564, 575, 582–83 Art 30��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������336 Art 31������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 384, 625 Art 32�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416, 452, 577 Art 32(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 450, 576 Art 32(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������450 Art 34������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 110, 452 Art 35������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 110, 452 Art 36��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 Art 37��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������577 Art 51(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 323, 329 Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure������������������������������������������������� 556, 659 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 259, 301 Art 4(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 218, 281 Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography����������������������������������������������������������������������������������269, 281, 301 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951��������������������������������������������������������������490 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������490 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������564 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������565 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������565 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development 1995������������������������������������������119, 508, 561 Copyright Treaty 1996����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������294, 446, 453 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse������������������������������������������������������������������294 CRC, see Convention on the Rights of the Child Cultural Charter for Africa 1976����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 244, 632 Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959����������������������������������������������������������������� 451, 575 Principle 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Declaration on Social Progress and Development 1969, Art 6����������������������������������������������416 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1963����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������566 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1993, Art 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������139 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 1975������������������������������������������������������������565 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples��������������������������������������������������207, 435, 629 Arts 21–24�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 8311����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons�����������������������������������������������������565 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Art 2(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������628

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Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind 1975�������������������������������������������� 117, 638 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 2001��������������������������������������������������� 200, 203 ECHR, see European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages�������������������������������������������������������628 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR)�����������������������������������������������9, 33, 51, 62, 66, 72–73, 91, 153, 167–68, 170, 223, 231, 244, 262–65, 267, 294, 296, 300–301, 323–24, 334, 338, 340, 374, 379, 395–97, 402, 422, 441, 444, 447–48, 457–58, 490, 493, 514, 535, 548, 572–75, 580, 582, 606–9, 617 Art 1�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������68, 72–73, 615 Art 2���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15, 81, 165 Art 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������165 Arts 2–12���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72 Art 3�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������262, 296–97, 299, 426, 493, 534–35, 597, 605 Art 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������167, 444, 455–59, 463 Art 4(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 448, 458 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Art 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91, 423 Art 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������262, 264, 370, 441, 491, 535, 549, 615 Art 8(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������490 Arts 8–11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 Art 9�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 573, 615 Art 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 529, 615 Art 10(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������181 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72, 129, 370, 422–23, 441, 578, 607–8, 610 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 55 Art 15(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������444 Arts 16–18�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72 Art 17�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������54, 154, 573 Art 57������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 323, 379 Art 59(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������223 Protocol 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 Art 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������51, 231, 385, 422, 640 Arts 1–3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72 Art 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 572, 578, 581, 597, 604–5, 607–8, 610, 615–16 Art 9������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������572 Protocol 4, Art 4���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Protocol 6, Arts 1 and 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 72 Protocol 14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 223, 663

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European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997���������������������������������� 551, 636 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������636 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������636 European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities�����������������������153 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������628 European Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society 2005���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 628, 632 European Social Charter 1961, revised 1965������������������������������������������4, 9, 259, 262, 294, 426, 499, 514, 521, 524, 548, 580, 604 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 514, 524 Art 3(2)–(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������529 Art 4(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 6(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������361 Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������580 Arts 9–10���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������588 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������580 Art 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 507, 514 Art 11(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������521 Art 11(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������521 Art 11(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������521 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499, 547–48 Art 14��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 15��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������604 Art 15(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������611 Art 15(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625 Art 17������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 548, 581 Art 17(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������580, 604, 611 Art 17(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������580 Art 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 Art 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625 Art 31��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������490 Art E������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 604, 611 European Union Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I) Art 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 60��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 European Union Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II) Art 4(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 4(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 Art 26��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������212 European Union Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products��������������������������������204 Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights���������������������������������������������������������������627, 630–631

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GATS, see General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT)����������������������������������� 196–97, 203, 205 Art XX(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 204–5 Art XX(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������196 Art XXI����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������203 General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 (GATS)������������������������������������������������� 198, 204 Art XIV(a)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������204 Geneva Conventions 1949����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11, 185–86 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58, 185, 217, 483 Fourth Convention������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 85����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 89����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 127��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Protocol I 1977 Arts 54 and 56���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Art 54����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Protocol II 1977�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 185, 217 Art 5(1)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������186 Art 6(5)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 60 Art 14����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 54���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58, 483 Third Convention��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 20���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������58, 185, 483 Art 26����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 29����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������185 Art 46���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������58, 185, 483 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924��������������������������������������������������������451 IBRD Articles of Agreement������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������193 Art I (iii)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������190 Art III, s 5(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������189 Art IV, s 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������189 ICCPR, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD, see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESCR, see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights IDA Articles of Agreement���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������193 Art V s 1(g)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������189 s 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������189 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24, 30, 177 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Art 33(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������177 ILO Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105)����������������������426, 434, 448 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������448

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ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 1948 (No 87)���������������������������������������������������������������416, 434, 461 ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989 (No 169)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations 1957 (No 107)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������629 ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No 97)�����������������������������������������426 ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No 143)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������426 ILO Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 1973 (No 138)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������434, 444, 451 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 2(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 2(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 3(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 7(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 7(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 ILO Convention concerning Occupational Health Services 1985 (No 161), Art 5(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������488 ILO Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 1982 (No 158)��������������������������������������������������������������������������460 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������461 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������461 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������462 Art 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������462 Art 9(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������462 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������463 Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������461 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������462 ILO Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No 98)�����������������������������������������������������461 ILO Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 1999 (No 182)��������������������������������������������������������������������������434, 444, 451 Art 3���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 451–52 Art 3(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 Art 3(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 ILO Convention concerning the promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health 2009 (No 187)����������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Convention concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 1949 (No 98)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 ILO Convention Concerning Vocational Guidance and Vocational Training in the Development of Human Resources 1975 (No 142), Art 3���������������������������������������588 ILO Convention on Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment 1988 (No 168)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������503 ILO Convention on Home Work 2012 (No 177)�������������������������������������������������������������������301 ILO Convention on Maternity Protection (No 103)��������������������������������������������������������������498 ILO Convention on Maternity Protection 2012 (No 183)�����������������������������������������������������301 ILO Convention on the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention 2012 (No 187)�������������������������������������������������������������������301

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ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998��������������������������������417 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������420 ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 417, 421–22, 434 Art 1(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������421 Art 1(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 434, 438 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������422 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 ILO Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (No 189)������������������������������������������������164, 417, 423 ILO Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No 122)���������������������������������������������������������4, 443 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 (No 100)��������������������������������������������������� 417, 434 Art 1(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 1962 (No 118)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 498 ILO Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No 29)���������������������������������������������� 166, 301, 426, 443, 446, 448, 458 Art 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������446 Protocol, Art 4������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������449 ILO Forty-Hour Week Convention 1935 (No 47)�����������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) 1970 (No 132)�����������������������������������������������417 ILO Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No 30)������������������������������417 ILO Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No 1)������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention 1979 (No 153)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (No 169)����������������������������������������������� 4 ILO Labour Statistics Convention 1985 (No 160)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 ILO Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (No 183)�������������������������������������������������� 417, 498 ILO Minimum Age Recommendation (No 146)�������������������������������������������������������������������451 ILO Minimum Wage Fixing (Agriculture) Convention 1951 (No 99)������������������������������������417 ILO Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970 (No 131)�������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention 1928 (No 26)���������������������������������������417 ILO Night Work Convention 1990 (No 171)�������������������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No 155)����������������������������������� 417–18 2002 Protocol��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Part-Time Work Convention 1994 (No 175)������������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention 1993 (No 174)����������������������4, 498 ILO Protection of Wages Convention 1949 (No 95)��������������������������������������������������������������417 ILO Recommendation concerning Migrant Workers (No 151)���������������������������������������������426 ILO Recommendation concerning Migration for Employment (No 86)��������������������������������426 ILO Recommendation concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 1982 (No 166)���������������������������������������������������������� 461–62 ILO Recommendation on HIV and AIDS in the world of work (No 200)���������������������� 441–42 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������442 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No 102)�������������������� 4, 498, 501 Art 71��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������503 Art 72��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������503 ILO Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention 1962 (No 117)�����������������������4, 498 ILO Unemployment Convention 1919 (no 2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 ILO Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1957 (No 106)���������������������������������417 ILO Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 1921 (No 14)���������������������������������������������������������417

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ILO Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 1981 (No 156)���������������������������������417 IMF Articles of Agreement Art I (ii)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������190 Art IV, s 3(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������189 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2005����������������������������������������������������������������������������259, 300–301 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961, as revised�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations 1961�������������������������������������640 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)������������������������������������������������ 4, 9, 12, 48, 54, 66–67, 74, 245, 259, 268, 280–281, 294, 301, 307, 329, 431, 566, 654 Art 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 130, 141 Art 1(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 129, 432 Art 1(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������432 Art 2���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 67, 431 Art 2(1)(d)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 169, 171 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181, 337, 633, 644 Art 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������67, 432, 507, 566, 582 Art 5(d)(v)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385 Art 5(e)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 432 Art 5(e)(i)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416, 431, 435 Art 5(e)(iii)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������489 Art 5(e)(iv)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 499, 515 Art 5(e)(v)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������171, 566, 612 Art 5(e)(vi)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 384, 625 Art 11��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Arts 11–13�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Art 20(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������329 Art 21��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 74 International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities���������������������������� 4, 95, 245, 259, 294, 300–301, 307, 416, 442, 482, 565, 619, 625 Art 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 131, 565 Art 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 130, 442 Art 4(2)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������90, 95 Art 16(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 24����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 619 Art 25����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4, 527 Art 26(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 27(1)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 28����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 28(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 28(2)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������482 Art 30����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Art 30(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625

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Arts 42–44�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������223 Optional Protocol����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������223, 280, 301 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families��������������������������� 4, 54, 150, 259, 280–281, 294, 423, 426, 433, 625 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������424 Art 1(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������421 Art 2(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������425 Art 7�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������421, 426, 433 Art 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 416, 433 Art 18��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������280 Art 22��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������433 Art 25������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 416, 433 Art 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 416, 433 Art 27������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 433, 499 Art 28��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������433 Art 31�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������384, 433, 631 Art 35��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������425 Art 40������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 416, 433 Art 43������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 433, 499 Art 43(1)(g)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������625 Art 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 Art 45(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������499 Art 47��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 Art 52��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 54��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 54(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 434, 499 Art 54(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������434 Art 74��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)�����������������������������������������������4, 9, 11–12, 14, 19, 21–22, 37, 39, 43, 45, 47, 51, 62, 74–77, 80, 91, 96, 110, 132, 135–36, 159, 177–78, 259, 262, 265, 268, 280–281, 283–84, 290, 294–95, 300–301, 307, 324, 326, 329, 334–36, 343, 348, 380, 391, 395–96, 406–7, 432, 443, 451, 481, 507, 542, 569–70, 572, 614, 629, 644, 660 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 Art 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11, 14, 17 Art 2�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24, 80, 82, 343 Art 2(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63, 68, 91, 129, 159, 343, 569 Art 2(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 83 Art 2(3)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������322 Art 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������139, 343, 569 Art 4(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 54 Art 4(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������443 Art 5(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154, 178, 181 Art 6���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������473, 481–82 Arts 6–27���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 Art 7������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 473, 481–82, 597

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Art 8���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 443–44 Art 8(3)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Art 8(3)(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������448 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������481 Art 10(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������91, 473, 482 Art 12�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83, 152 Art 12(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 385–86 Art 14(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 91, 542 Art 18�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152, 508, 568 Art 18(4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������560, 571, 573–74, 597 Art 19�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152, 508, 633 Art 19(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������617 Art 19(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385, 528, 618 Art 20��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������633 Art 20(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������644 Art 21������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 152, 508 Art 22������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 152, 508 Art 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������343 Art 24(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������451 Art 25(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 343, 542 Art 26���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������129, 131–33, 290, 482, 569–70 Art 27�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 298, 336, 384, 625, 628–29 Art 41��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������380 Arts 41–43�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Protocol I������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 268, 280 Art 5������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������280 Protocol II�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������268 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR)�������������������������������������� 3–7, 9–10, 12–13, 15, 18–19, 22–23, 27, 31, 33–82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102–4, 106, 108, 110–114, 116–20, 122, 124, 126, 128–36, 138–42, 144, 146–50, 152, 154–56, 165, 170–171, 173, 178–79, 186–87, 189, 194, 202, 205, 228, 238, 247, 252–59, 261–63, 265–71, 273, 275, 277, 279–85, 287, 289–91, 293–95, 297, 299–301, 303, 305, 307, 309–11, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321–28, 330–332, 334, 336–38, 340, 342–44, 346, 348–50, 352–62, 364–66, 373, 384, 395–96, 416, 420, 422–23, 425, 435, 451, 466–68, 481, 487, 498, 504, 507, 509, 513–15, 517–18, 524, 532, 538, 541–42, 544, 570–572, 575, 577, 581–83, 585, 587–88, 590, 592, 599, 609, 612–13, 618, 623–47, 654, 658–61, 663 Preamble��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13, 660 para 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80 Art 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������11, 17, 39, 150, 259, 335 Art 1(3)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������363

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Table of International and Regional Instruments

Art 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15, 24, 31, 49, 78, 80, 82, 90, 252, 332, 348, 516, 583, 590, 595 Art 2(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������39, 46, 49, 55, 58, 65, 69, 78–128, 154, 159, 163, 179, 310, 322, 331, 349, 368, 483, 571, 576 Art 2(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 79, 128–48, 154–55, 170–171, 257, 275, 291, 331, 340–343, 345–48, 360–361, 421, 423, 432, 435, 496, 502, 613 Art 2(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147–50, 155, 259, 346, 360–361, 363 Arts 2–5���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 78, 154 Art 3�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 52, 59, 78, 84, 128–47, 155, 171, 331–32, 340–343, 346–47, 349, 421, 546, 583 Art 4�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39, 49, 55, 59, 150–155, 346, 643 Arts 4–5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 89 Art 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39, 78, 150–155, 643 Art 5(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 154, 178, 181, 643 Art 5(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 Art 5(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������384 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49, 57, 148, 259, 262, 335, 361, 363, 415–16, 418, 421, 423, 432–33 Art 6(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������166, 442, 463 Arts 6–15�������������������������������������������������������������������39, 51, 59, 79, 85, 90, 130, 135, 228, 341 Arts 6–7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������416 Arts 6–8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 326, 335 Arts 6–9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 52 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 49, 57, 139, 148, 325, 335, 415–16, 424, 431, 464 Art 7(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 423, 641 Art 7(a)(i)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 259, 363, 373, 435 Art 7(a)(ii)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41 Art 7(d)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 335, 361 Art 8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152, 267–68, 335–36, 340, 415–16 Art 8(1)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������423 Art 8(1)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������363 Art 8(1)(d)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 336, 346–47, 362 Art 8(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������335 Art 8(a) and (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������148 Art 8(b)(1)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������259 Art 9����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 34, 49, 259, 340, 344–47, 361, 363, 423, 465, 498, 500 Art 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 57, 452, 498, 502 Art 10(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������259 Art 10(1) and (2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������363 Art 10(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 259, 325, 337, 519 Art 10(3)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 49, 107, 450–451 Arts 10–12�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 52 Art 11������������������������������������������������������������������������ 49, 57, 65, 110, 113, 262, 265, 361, 423, 465–67, 473, 481, 487–89, 496, 502, 641 Art 11(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 49, 300

Table of International and Regional Instruments

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Art 11(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201 Art 11(2)(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������637 Art 12��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 49, 57, 238, 265, 300, 423, 487–88, 502, 507–57 Art 12(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49, 113, 513 Art 12(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������516 Art 12(2)(b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������524 Art 12(2)(c)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������520 Art 12(2)(d)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49, 519, 637 Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49, 57, 139, 235, 262, 296, 335, 361–62, 558, 560–561, 570, 572, 575–76, 585, 587, 591, 596, 600 Art 13(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 356, 385, 423, 564, 570, 575, 582–83, 595, 599 Art 13(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������359, 571, 582, 588, 595 Art 13(2)(a)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������325, 361–63, 578, 582 Art 13(2)(b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������335, 586–88 Art 13(2)(b) and (c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 83, 582 Art 13(2)(c)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������335, 589–91 Art 13(2)(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������585 Art 13(2)(e)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 148, 600 Art 13(2a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������259 Art 13(3)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 366, 571–72, 574, 595, 597 Art 13(3) and (4)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������340, 354, 356–58, 582 Art 13(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 366, 574, 595, 597 Arts 13–15�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 52 Art 14������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 57, 69, 112, 117, 259, 296, 359, 363, 558–59, 561, 570, 575, 578, 585, 596 Art 15���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 49, 57, 110, 243, 596, 623–47 Art 15(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������623–24, 630 Art 15(1)(a)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 151, 645 Art 15(1)(a) and (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������423 Art 15(1)(b)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28, 636 Art 15(1)(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14, 203, 640–642 Art 15(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������637 Art 15(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������638 Art 15(4)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������117 Art 16������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 39–40, 42, 147, 259, 334 Arts 16 and 17�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 Art 16(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������464 Arts 16–25�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 Art 17������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 39–40, 42, 147, 259, 334 Art 22�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������65, 110, 193 Art 23����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 65, 110, 126, 193 Art 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������150 Art 26(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 190, 361 Art 26(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������361 Arts 26–31�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39 Art 27�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 39, 329 Art 41��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������328

lxxxii 

Table of International and Regional Instruments

Optional Protocol 2008���������������������������������������������������������������� 46–48, 50, 70, 76, 103, 118, 518, 556, 659–60 preamble, para 3��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 Arts 1 and 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������103 Art 2������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70 Art 3������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������662 Art 5��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 Art 9(2)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 50 Art 10����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Art 11����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Art 12����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 48 Art 13����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 70 Art 20(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������336 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR�������������������������������������������������� 81 16��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82 21���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82, 92, 95 23��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 25��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 98 28�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������98, 102, 107 37��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������140 37–39���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������143 38��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������140 43�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 147–48 44��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������147 46–47���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 48–51���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 52��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 55��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153 56��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������152 57��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 58��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������154 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 81, 230 para 6��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 para 7���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82–83, 89 para 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 92 para 9��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������105 para 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������105 para 11������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������135 para 12������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������135 para 14(e)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 94 para 14(e)–(f)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������591 para 18������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������175 para 20������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 36 para 23������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 89 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States Principle 8�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63 Principle 9�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32 Principle 13������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 65 Principle 20�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������123

Table of International and Regional Instruments

 lxxxiii

Principles 20–22����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32 Principle 25������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 34 Migrant Workers Convention, see International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2004���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 137, 367, 404, 407 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2011���������������������������������������������180, 209–10 Oviedo Convention, see Convention of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and Biomedicine Paris Principles, see Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2010���������������������������������������������������150, 230, 233, 240, 376 para 55������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������234 para 55(c)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������233 para 58������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������242 para 59������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������242 paras 68–71�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������240 para 71������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 1993�������������� 311–12, 316, 318 Protocol of San Salvador, see American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR), Additional Protocol in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1988 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 Art 4(g)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������241 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 1���������������������������������� 485, 524 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court������������������������������������� 20, 59, 186, 218–19, 323, 474 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������633 Art 6(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 86 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������474 Art 7(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������474 Art 7(1)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 86 Art 7(1)(h)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 86 Art 7(2)(b)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 86 Art 7(2)(g)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 86 Art 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Art 8(2)(a)(iii)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 85 Art 8(2)(a)(iv)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 62, 85, 490 Art 8(2)(b)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������186 Art 8(2)(b)(ii)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 85 Art 8(2)(b)(xxv)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������62, 85 Art 8(2)(e)(iv)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������218 Art 8bis�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������219 Art 61(7)(a) and (b)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������474 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention 1926���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 444, 458

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Art 1(1)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 444–45 Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa 2004�������������������������������������������������������411 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 2014������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 401, 654 Art 28(1)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 99, 401 Art 28M(A)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������219 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 Art 38��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58 Art 38(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Art 59��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda 1994���������������������������������������������������������186 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������633 Art 6(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 62 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (1993)�������������������186 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������633 Art 7(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 62 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2007 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������215 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������215 Art 3����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������215 Stockholm Declaration 1972, Principle 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������524 Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery 1956������������������������������������������������ 443, 450 Art 1�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445, 450 Art 1(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������452 Art 7����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������445 Art 9�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 323, 379 Treaty establishing the ECOWAS Court, Supplementary Protocol, Art 9(4)�������������������������241 Treaty establishing the European Community, as amended by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Art 13��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������131 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������131 Treaty of Versailles 1919������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 434–35 Treaty on European Union Art 6(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������223 Protocol No 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������223 TRIPS Agreement, see Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights UDHR, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN Charter 1945������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8, 63, 115, 126, 136, 139, 159, 219, 510–511, 562–63, 599 Preamble��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8, 129, 159 Art 1������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3, 109, 131, 511, 575 Art 1(3)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8, 129, 159, 171, 562 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 Art 2(6)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8 Art 55�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3, 8, 12, 116, 131, 159, 190, 563 Arts 55 and 56�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������109 Art 55(b)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 511, 562 Art 56���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3, 8, 12, 116, 159, 190, 562–63

Table of International and Regional Instruments

 lxxxv

Art 57��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������563 Art 103������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 8, 190–191 Ch VII�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 65 UN Convention against Corruption 2003��������������������������������������������������������������100–101, 292 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children�������������������������������������������������������������������������294, 446, 453 Art 3(a)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������445 UN Declaration on the Right to Development 1986������������������������������������������������16, 111, 565 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������191 Art 1(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������197 Art 2����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 96 Art 6����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21 Art 8(1)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������565 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 Art 10��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������207 Art 17(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 26��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������207 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1957������������������������������� 91, 527 UNECE Protocol, see Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992, Protocol on Water and Health UNESCO Constitution 1945������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������563 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, see Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960 UNESCO Convention on Technical and Vocational Education 989�������������������������������������588 UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001������������������������������������������������������ 383, 627, 630–631, 633 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������383 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������644 UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudices 1978�������������������������������������������������565 UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies 1982����������������������������������������������623 UNESCO Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1974�������������������������������������������������������������565 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel 1997���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������618 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers 1966�����������������������������������565 UNESCO Recommendation on Development of Adult Education 1976������������������������������565 UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers������������������������������������636 UNESCO Universal Copyright Convention 1952�����������������������������������������������������������������640 Protocol 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 Protocol 2��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������640 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR)����������������������������� 3–4, 7, 9, 11–12, 14, 19, 36, 51, 75–76, 80, 109, 125, 153, 171, 177–78, 180–182, 219, 256, 284, 322, 373, 402, 432, 435, 466, 512–14, 563–64, 575, 588, 624, 626, 644, 652–53, 660 Preamble��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13, 19, 660 Art 1��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13, 19, 128, 372 Art 2�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 129, 171

lxxxvi 

Table of International and Regional Instruments

Arts 2–11���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Art 4����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������449 Art 5����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������597 Art 8����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������252 Art 17����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 51, 149, 385, 641 Art 19������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 385, 528 Art 22����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 109, 142, 498 Art 22–26����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4 Arts 22–28�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Art 23�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 416 Art 23(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������435 Art 24��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Art 25�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 467, 473, 489, 507, 513 Art 25(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������466, 498, 512 Art 25(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 512, 519 Art 26�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 563 Art 26(1)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������563, 582, 588 Art 26(2)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������385, 563, 575, 582–83 Art 26(3)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������564 Art 27������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 623–24, 626 Art 27(1)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������384 Art 27(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 640–641 Art 28������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19, 109–10, 653 Art 29��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������178 Art 29(2)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 181, 643 Art 30������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 154, 181 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005�����������������������������������������������639 Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications 2009������������������������������������������������������������������������ 28, 636–39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT)������������������������������� 184, 252, 324, 548 Art 2(1)(d)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������324, 342, 349 Art 19������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 338, 379 Art 19(c)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 329, 347 Art 20(5)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������325 Art 26�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������79, 184, 252 Art 27��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 252, 322, 344, 357 Art 29��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 63 Art 31����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������79, 81 Art 31(2)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 80 Art 32����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������79, 81 Art 53����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11, 331, 342, 379 Art 54��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 74 Art 56��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 74 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993���������������������������������� 5, 18, 107, 111, 309, 311, 327, 365–66, 408, 577 para 5�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������5, 18, 21, 327, 366, 388, 644, 660 para 8��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153 para 9��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 para 10������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������107 para 12������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 para 18������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������136

Table of International and Regional Instruments

 lxxxvii

para 26������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������327 para 33������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 para 34������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������111 para 36������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������310 para 39������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������327 para 46������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������327 para 71������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 89 para 75������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 para 80������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 WHO Constitution 1946������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 511–12 Preamble���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������511 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������511 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003�����������������������������������������������������512 World Declaration on Education for All 1990��������������������������������������������������������������� 562, 585 Art 1����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������575 Art 13(2)(d)�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������585 WTO Agreement, see Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization

lxxxviii 

Part I

Reflections on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

2 

1 The International Legal Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights I. INTRODUCTION [1.01]  International human rights law is an important part of international law. Its object is to protect (civil, political, economic, social and cultural) rights of all human beings. Economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights or ESCR) in international law include a variety of rights, such as: (a) the rights to work and to just and favourable conditions of work; to rest and ­leisure; to form and join trade unions, and to strike; (b) the rights to social security; to protection of the family, mothers and children; (c) the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; (d) the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; (e) the right to education; and (f) the rights to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.1 States have repeatedly committed themselves to the realisation of human rights, including the progressive realisation of ESC rights, of everyone. This commitment is found in the Charter of the United Nations,2 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)3 and several international treaties, such as the ICESCR 1  See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976 (Annex A) and section IV. in this chapter. 2  Adopted 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 October 1945, Arts 1, 55 and 56. 3  GA res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). On the UDHR see BG Ramcharan (ed), Human Rights: Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration: Commemorative Volume on the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The Hague and Boston, Mass, M ­ artinus Nijhoff, 1979); A Eide et al (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Commentary (Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1992); United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York, United Nations, 1998); MG Johnson and J Symonides, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A ­History of its Creation and Implementation, 1948–1998 (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1998); B van der Heijden and B Tahzib-Lie (eds), Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A ­Fiftieth Anniversary Anthology (The Hague and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998); J Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Y Danieli, E Stamatopoulou and CJ Dias (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond (Amityville, NY, Baywood, 1999); G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999); W Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine (New York, Palgrave, 2001); MA Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal ­Declaration of Human Rights

4 

International Legal Protection of ESCR

(or ‘the ­Covenant’),4 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),5 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),6 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),7 the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (Convention on the Rights of P ­ ersons with Disabilities),8 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant ­Workers and Members of Their Families (Migrant Workers Convention),9 several ­International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions,10 and many regional human rights instruments in Africa,11 America,12 Asia13 and Europe.14 [1.02]  The effective respect, protection and fulfilment of these rights is an important but under-explored component of international human rights. This is despite the fact that the UDHR recognised two sets of human rights, ie civil and political rights, as well as ESC rights, without separating these categories.15 In transforming the provisions of the UDHR into legally binding obligations, the United Nations (UN) adopted two separate covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and ­Political Rights (ICCPR),16 and the ICESCR. The two covenants constitute the core of the ­inter­national human rights, and, as shown below, the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights protected in the two covenants has been affirmed.17 Despite some academic debate on whether human rights are ‘relative’, ‘universal’ or ‘relatively universal’,18 it is recognised that the two sets of human (New York, Random House, 2001); and W Sweet (ed), Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 2003). 4 

993 UNTS 3, above n 1. UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4 January 1969, Art 5(e). UN Doc A/34/46, 1249 UNTS 13; 19 ILM 33 (1980), entered into force 3 September 1981, Arts 10–14. 7  UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990, Arts 4, 17, 23–34. 8  UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), entered into force 3 May 2008, Arts 23, 24, 25, 28, 30. 9  UN Doc A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 July 2003. 10  See, eg, the following ILO conventions: the Unemployment Convention, 1919 (No 2) 38 UNTS 41; the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No 102) 210 UNTS 131; the Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No 117) 494 UNTS 249; the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No 118) 494 UNTS 271; the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No 122) 569 UNTS 65; the Labour Statistics Convention, 1985 (No 160) 1505 UNTS 39; the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No 169) 1650 UNTS 383; and the Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention, 1993 (No 174) 1967 UNTS 231. 11  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR or ‘the African Charter’) 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), Arts 14–25. 12  Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of San Salvador’), OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988). 13  Arab Charter on Human Rights, 23 May 2004, 12 IHRR 893 (2005), entered into force 15 March 2008, Arts 33–42. 14 See also the European Social Charter 1961, UKTS 38 (1965), and the European Social Charter (revised), ETS No 163. 15  The UDHR protects ESC rights in Arts 22–26. On the inclusion of these rights in the UDHR, see Morsink, above n 3, 157–238. 16  999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. 17  See below n 19. 18 See, eg, J Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’ (1984) 6 Human Rights ­Quarterly 400; D Otto, ‘Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law’ (1997) 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 1; J Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29(2) Human Rights Quarterly 281; M Goodhart, ‘Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly’ (2008) 30(1) Human Rights Quarterly 183; and J Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (A Reply to Michael Goodhart) (2008) 30(1) Human Rights Quarterly 194. 5  6 

Introduction

 5

rights in the two covenants are ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’, and must be treated in a ‘fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis’.19 However, despite the rhetoric of indivisibility,20 in practice, greater emphasis is typically still accorded to civil and political rights than to ESC rights. As a result, many ESC rights have not been given adequate attention, and domestic courts in many domestic jurisdictions have not shown a willingness to review cases concerning ESC rights.21 [1.03]  To cite one example—the right to adequate food—the Committee on ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or ‘the Committee’), an expert body monitoring the implementation of the Covenant by states parties, was alarmed in May 2008 at the rapid worldwide rise in food prices and the soaring energy prices that precipitated a global food crisis, and which are adversely affecting the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger, as well as other human rights, of more than 100 million ­people.22 The Committee concluded that that there was ‘a failure to meet the obligations to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need’.23 It also noted that the ‘food crisis also reflects failure of national and international policies to ensure physical and economic access to food for all’.24 Ideologically, ESC rights are perceived as being about social policy, benefits and welfare, rather than being accepted as legal entitlements for immediate realisation. As a result, inadequate application tends to be viewed as social injustice, not as violation of rights. As Daniel J Whelan and Jack Donnelly wrote: In fact, the understanding of economic and social rights as directive rather than justiciable was shared by all states [at the time of drafting the ICESCR]. No state, Western or nonWestern, seriously proposed—in the sense of being willing to adopt as a matter of enforceable national law—treating economic, social, and cultural rights as matters of immediate rather than progressive realisation.25

[1.04]  The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the international ­protection of ESC rights at the global level, under the auspices of the UN system, as recognised under the ICESCR. This is intended to set the stage and a general context for the

19 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14–25 June 1993, UN Doc A/CONF157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993), 32 ILM 1661 (1993) (hereinafter Vienna ­Declaration), para 5. See also the 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/60/L1 (15 September 2005) para 13; General Assembly Resolution 60/251 establishing the Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006), preamble, para 3; and Human Rights Council Resolution 8/2, Optional Protocol to the ­ICESCR, preamble, para 3 and Art 5. For the view that UN statements about indivisibility are ‘broad overstatements of more modest truths’, see JW Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations Between Human Rights’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 984. 20  DJ Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 21  For example the Supreme Court of Israel has refrained from intervening in major right-to-health cases brought before it. See, eg, Israel v Committee for the Expansion of the Health Basket, HCJ 2974/06 (11 June 2006); Louzon v Government of Israel, HCJ 307/05 (28 July 2008). 22  See CESCR, The World Food Crisis, UN Doc E/C12/2008/1 (40th Session; 19 May 2008), para 1. 23  Ibid, para 9. 24  Ibid. 25  DJ Whelan and J Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight’ (2007) 29(4) Human Rights Quarterly 908–49.

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examination of several issues covered in chapters two to thirteen. As noted above, while lip-­service is paid to the interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights, in actual practice ESC rights are accorded second-rank status as compared to civil and political rights.26 This can, inter alia, be discerned from the con­ siderable opposition that existed for a long period of time to the proposal to establish an individual complaints mechanism under the ICESCR.27 It has long been stated (albeit unjustifiably) that ESC rights, unlike civil and political rights, are too vague to be justiciable, and that their justiciability intrudes fundamentally into an area where the democratic process ought to prevail.28 Consequently, the implementation of the ICESCR faces particular difficulties in view of the ‘perceived vagueness of many of the principles contained therein, the relative lack of legal texts and judicial decisions, and the ambivalence of many States in dealing with economic, social and cultural rights’.29 For example, despite the official United States (US) support in mid-1947 for ESC rights and correlative state obligations (evident from the documents submitted by the US to the UN for the work of the Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights set up by the UN Commission on Human Rights),30 the US Government continues to oppose ESC rights within the UN and has claimed: At best, economic, social and cultural rights are goals that can only be achieved progressively, not guarantees. Therefore, while access to food, health services and quality education are at the top of any list of development goals, to speak of them as rights turns the citizens of developing countries into objects of development rather than subjects in control of their own destiny.31

The statement above clearly indicates that the US is still opposed to giving ESC rights the same status as civil and political rights. Although the US is no longer in the Cold War, the US view of the Covenant as a ‘socialist manifesto thinly veiled in the ­language

26  M Robinson, ‘From Rhetoric to Reality: Making Human Rights Work’ (2003) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 1–8 at 3; D Newman, ‘Institutional Monitoring of Social and Economic Rights: A South African Case Study and a New Research Agenda’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 189–216. 27  See, eg, W Vandenhole, ‘Completing the UN Complaint Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure Complementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2003) 21(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 423–62; M Dennis and D Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should there be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and Health?’ (2004) 98 (3) American Journal of International Law 462. 28 See I Koch, ‘The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 3; A Neier, ‘Social and Economic Rights: A Critique’ (2006) 13(2) Human Rights Brief 1, available at http//:www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/132.pdf. 29  M Shaw, International Law, 7th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 223. 30  See United States Suggestions for Redrafts of Certain Articles in the Draft Outline, UN Doc E/CN.4/ AC.1/8 (11 June 1947); and ‘United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Human Rights’ in Report of the Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights to the Commission on Human Rights, Annex C, UN Doc. E/CN.4/21 (1 July 1947) 41-47; SA Way, ‘The “Myth” and Mystery of US History on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The 1947 “United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Rights”’ (2014) 36(4) Human Rights Quarterly 869. 31  Comments submitted by the United States of America, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Right to Development, UN ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 57th Session, UN Doc E/CN4/2001/26 (2001), para 8 (emphasis added).

Human Rights Obligations

 7

of rights’ has not completely changed.32 Although it is accepted that ‘rights begin with breakfast’, there is still a debate as to whether ESC rights are real human rights,33 and assertions such as ‘the communist system promised to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights but failed to deliver them’.34 This chapter attempts to clarify the general legal nature of obligations applicable to ESC rights with respect to the general provisions of the ICESCR. [1.05]  The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in order to provide a c­ oherent analysis, a general overview of human rights obligations under international law (­section II.) and the tripartite typology of obligations (section III.) is provided, from which to mount a review of the ICESCR, including its adoption and ratification, monitoring of the Covenant by the CESCR, non-derogability of ESC rights, extraterritorial application of the ICESCR and a discussion of denunciation or withdrawal from the ICESCR (section IV.). Lastly, several concluding observations will be made (section V.).

II.  HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW A. Background [1.06]  Generally, the history of human rights is a long one, but its contemporary legal expression can be traced only since World War II, with the founding of the UN in 1945 and the proclamation by the UN General Assembly of the UDHR in 1948.35 While there was considerable academic acceptance of international human rights law from

32  B Stark, ‘Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New Strategy”’ (1992) 44 Hastings Law Journal 79, 81. See also EH Wood, ‘Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Right to Education in American Jurisprudence: Barriers and Approaches to Implementation’ (2008) 19 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 303; and FI Michelman, ‘Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away’ (2008) 6(3–4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 663. 33 See, eg, K Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an Inter­ ­ national Human Rights Organisation’ (2004) 26(1) Human Rights Quarterly 63; LS Rubinstein, ‘How International Human Rights Organisations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth’ (2004) 26(4) Human Rights Quarterly 845; K Roth, ‘Response to Leonard S Rubinstein’ (2004) 26(4) Human Rights Quarterly 873; LS Rubinstein, ‘Response by Leonard S Rubin­stein’ (2004) 26(4) Human Rights Quarterly 879; M Robinson, ‘Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way Forward’ (2004) 26(4) Human Rights Quarterly 866; K Tomaševski, ‘Unasked Questions about Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998–2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson’ (2005) 27(2) Human Rights Quarterly 709. 34 Remarks by US Delegate Richard Wall, UN ESCOR, UN Commission on Human Rights, 59th ­Session, Agenda Item 10 (2003). 35 On the history of, and standard setting in, human rights, see MR Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to The Globalization Era (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 2004); T ­Buergenthal, ‘The Evolving International Human Rights System’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 783; M Mutua, ‘Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis’ (2007) 29(3) Human Rights Quarterly 547; LA Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York, WW Norton, 2007); S Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass, The Belknap Press of H ­ arvard University Press, 2012).

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

an early date, and some national constitutions specifically provided for the protection of the human rights of their citizens, development of the protection and implementation of human rights in international law has generally been subsequent to the promulgation of the UN Charter.36 That Charter, widely considered as the centre of an international ‘constitutional order’,37 imposes obligations on Member States to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.38 [1.07]  The UN Charter became the first international treaty to call for general respect for human rights. The Charter reaffirmed ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women’.39 Under it, the protection and respect of human rights became a central ­purpose of the UN,40 with obligations imposed upon member states through ‘joint and separate action’ to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging ‘­universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental ­freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.41 By virtue of these Charter provisions, seen in the context of Article 103,42 the UN member states were obliged to observe, promote and encourage universal respect for human rights, including ESC rights. However, apart from the Charter’s non-discrimination clause, the ­precise ­content of human rights under the Charter was lacking. [1.08]  Although the full scope of human rights remained to be defined, states could no longer validly claim that human rights were essentially domestic in character. The obligation imposed by Article 56 on the UN member states provided the UN with the requisite legal basis to define and codify these rights. As a result, since 1945,

36 

Adopted 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 October 1945. White, ‘The United Nations System: Conference, Contract or Constitutional Order?’ (2000) 4 ­Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 281, 291. See also B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1997) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 594 (claiming that Art 2(6) and Art 103 of the Charter ‘give a strong hint of its c­ onstitutional character’). But see B Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 2nd edn (The Hague/­London/ Boston, Mass, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 10. Benedetto Conforti has noted ‘The ­constitutional aspect of the UN should not be exaggerated. The Charter is and remains a treaty.’ 38  See UN Charter, preamble, together with Arts 1(3), 55 and 56. For a Commentary, see B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edn, vols I and II (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 33–47, 917–44; Z Stavrinides, ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3(2) Inter­national Journal of Human Rights 38. 39  UN Charter, preamble. 40  UN Charter, Art 1(3): The purposes of the UN are to ‘achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. 41  UN Charter, Arts 55 and 56. In its opinion on the ‘legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council resolution 260 (1970)’, Advisory Opinion 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 58, para 29, the ICJ stated: ‘To establish instead, and to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, which constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.’ 42  Art 103 of the UN Charter provides: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ For a discussion, see R Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 583. 37 N

Human Rights Obligations

 9

a considerable number of rules of international law, both customary and treaty, have been developed at the international43 and regional levels—in Europe,44 America45 and Africa46—with the aims of protecting, promoting and defining the content of human rights, including ESC rights.47 Although Arab and Asian states have not yet created a regional human rights system supported by an effective implementation (judicial) mechanism for determining complaints brought by individuals and groups, due to several factors including vast differences in culture, political ideology and economic

43 The UN principal international human rights instruments include the UDHR; the ­ ICCPR; the I­ CESCR; the ICERD; the CEDAW; the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984); and the CRC. See United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, UN Doc ST/HR/1/Rev6, UN Sales No E.02. XIV.4 (New York, United Nations, 2002). 44  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 1950, UKTS (1953), 213 UNTS 221. For a discussion, see generally DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); B Rainey, E Wicks and C Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); C Grabenwarter (ed), The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013); MW Janis et al, European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). See also the European Social C ­ harter 1961, UKTS 38 (1965), and the European Social Charter (revised), ETS No 163. For a discussion see D Harris and J Darcy, European Social Charter, 2nd edn (Ardsley, NY, Transnational Publishers, 2001); DJ ­Harris, ‘Collective Complaints under the European Social Charter: Encouraging Progress?’ in KH Kaikobad and M Bohlander (eds), International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Leiden and ­Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 3. Another key human rights treaty at the European Union level is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1, entered into force 7 December 2000. 45  The American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR) 1969, 9 ILM 673 (1970), Art 26; the Protocol of San Salvador, above n 12. See J Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); OR Ruiz-Chiriboga, ‘The American Convention and The Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties—Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System’ (2013) 31(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 59; L Burgorgue-Larsen et al, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011); D Harris and S Livingstone (eds), The Inter-American System of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998); T Buergenthal and D Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials, 4th edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 1995). 46 The ACHPR, above n 11; Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev2 (1997); Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, Maputo, 11 July 2003, available at http://www.au.int/en/ treaties; ­African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45. For a discussion of human rights in Africa, see F Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford ­University Press, 2012); M Ssenyonjo (ed), The African Regional Human Rights System (The Hague, ­Martinus Nijhoff, 2012); R Murray and D Long, The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015); M Evans and R Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986–2006 (Cambridge, ­Cambridge University Press, 2008); F Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); V Nmehielle, The African Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). 47 For an overview of the action taken to protect international human rights, see I Bantekas and L Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); O De ­Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014); D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013); M Baderin and M Ssenyonjo (eds), International Human Rights Law (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010); M Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); M Haas, International Human Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction (London, Routledge, 2008).

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

development,48 there are emerging trends that present an opportunity to advance the regional protection and promotion of human rights in the Middle East.49 [1.09]  For example, it is important to note that although certain human rights (eg ­ freedom from genocide, slavery or slave trade, torture and systematic racial ­discrimination) may now be regarded as having entered the category of customary international law (CIL) in the light of state practice,50 the codification of international human rights law through treaties, and the ratification of such treaties by most states, has made reliance on CIL of human rights increasingly less significant.51 However, since CIL generally binds all states,52 it remains of some importance as a source of human rights obligations for non-state parties to human rights treaties, and for states with reservations to treaties contrary to CIL (as such reservations are ­impermissible).53 Customary international law may also bind non-state actors that cannot be parties to existing human rights treaties.54 Human rights established under treaty law (including the ICESCR) may constitute obligations erga omnes for the states parties, in the sense that each state party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case. For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stressed that ‘the rights and obligations enshrined in the [Genocide] Convention are rights and o ­ bligations erga omnes’55

48  See D Shelton, ‘The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems’ in BH Weston and SP Marks (eds), The Future of International Human Rights (New York, Transnational Publishers, 1999) 351, 364. 49  This is evident in the adoption of the Arab Charter on Human Rights adopted by the League of Arab States, 15 September 1994 (which was never ratified and failed to enter into force), reprinted in (1997) 18 Human Rights Law Journal 151. This Charter was revised, and a final draft was adopted in May 2004 and entered into force on 15 March 2008. See the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2004, available at http:// www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html, reproduced in I Brownlie and GS Goodwin-Gill, Basic Documents on Human Rights, 5th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 1070; M Rishmawi, ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An Update’ (2010) 10(1) Human Rights Law Review 169. 50  See, eg, Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, vol II (St Paul, MN, American Law Institute Publishers, 1987) 161, 165, para 702: ‘A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.’ See also T Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989) 95–98; articles on the growing importance of customary international human rights law (1995–6) 1–2 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/gjicl/vol25/iss1/. 51  JP Trachtman, The Obsolescence of Customary International Law, 21 October 2014, available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2512757, observing that CIL has several important limitations: ‘(i) it cannot be made in a coordinated manner in advance of events, (ii) it cannot be made with sufficient detail, (iii) it cannot be made with sufficiently heterogeneous reciprocity between states, (iv) it cannot be made with s­ pecifically-designed organizational support, (v) it is generally not subject to national parliamentary ­control, (vi) it purports to bind states that did not consent but failed to object to its formation, and (vii) it provides excessive space for auto-interpretation by states, or for sometimes insufficiently disciplined interpretation by judges.’ 52  This is subject to the so-called ‘persistent objector’ rule, though this is less relevant to human rights. See J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 28. 53  See ch 6. 54  See ch 4. 55  Genocide Convention (Bosnia v Serbia) [1996] ICJ Rep 595, 616.

Human Rights Obligations

 11

and the right of peoples to self-determination56 ‘has an erga omnes ­character’.57 Thus, the individual and groups of individuals enjoy such rights although they may be enforceable by states for them. Some norms, whether derived from custom or treaty, are regarded as rules of jus cogens or ‘intransgressible principles of customary ­international law’,58 eg the prohibition of torture59 and genocide,60 and ‘rules of the law of armed conflict which prohibit the murder of civilians in occupied territory, the deportation of civilian inhabitants to slave labour and the deportation of prisoners of war to slave labour’.61 With respect to torture, the ICJ in 2012 stated: In the Court’s opinion, the prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens). That prohibition is grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States. It appears in numerous international instruments of universal application (in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; General Assembly resolution 3452/30 of 9 December 1975 on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), and it has been introduced into the domestic law of almost all States; finally, acts of torture are regularly denounced within national and international fora.62

A rule of jus cogens is a peremptory norm ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.63 Since torture is a rule of CIL with a status of jus cogens, a state would violate jus cogens if, for example, public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity intentionally denied a detainee access to available food, water or healthcare, leading to severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for such purposes as obtaining from him [or her] or a third person information or a confession, punishing him [or her] for an act he [or she] or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him [or her] or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.64

[1.10]  Various forms of ‘deliberate inhuman treatment [of prisoners] causing very serious and cruel suffering’65 violate ESC rights and may amount to torture. 56 

ICESCR and ICCPR, Art 1. Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, 102. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, at paras 118 and 122. 58  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 79. 59 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, [2012] ICJ Rep 422, para 99. 60  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 3, para 64. 61  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, Judgment of 3 February 2012, para 93. 62  Belgium v Senegal, above n 59, para 99. 63  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art 53. 64  CAT, above n 43, Art 1. 65  Ireland v UK, App no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978), Series A, No 25, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 25, para 167. 57  Case

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

­ xamples from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) E include force-feeding of a prisoner on hunger strike, where it could not be established that such feeding was a medical necessity supported by genuine medical opinions;66 an extreme regime of solitary confinement;67 beating by police officers;68 the use of electric shocks;69 extraordinary rendition;70 incommunicado detention;71 and fear of execution while waiting on death row.72 In addition, extreme poor prison conditions, such as overcrowding, poor hygienic and sanitary conditions in the detention facilities, combined with aggravating circumstances, such as a failure to respond to a prisoner’s mental health problems, could (in addition to being ‘inhuman and degrading as well as violating the right to health) constitute torture.73 Similarly, a single act (or repeated acts) of ‘rape of a detainee by an official of the state’ can give rise to suffering amounting to torture.74 [1.11]  Foremost amongst the UN documents that together constitute the principal international human rights instruments because of their comprehensive coverage of human rights are the 1948 UDHR, which defines the UN Charter’s human rights provisions contained in Articles 55–56,75 and the two 1966 international covenants, the ICESCR and the ICCPR. In addition, other international human rights treaties have been adopted dealing with genocide, torture, racial discrimination, discrimination against women, the rights of children, persons with disabilities and migrant ­workers.76 Every state in the world (despite a wide variety of historical, political, religious, social and cultural traditions) has ratified at least one of these human rights treaties,77 which indicates the increasing trend towards universal acceptance of human rights in the international legal system, viewed in terms of ratification. Some of these treaties may be viewed as creating an entire body of customary international lawmaking, making it increasingly difficult for non-states parties to claim that the human rights ­guarantees proclaimed in these treaties, particularly those from which derogation is not ­permitted,

66 

Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, App no 54825/00 (ECtHR, 5 April 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 645. Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), (2005) 40 EHRR 1030. 68  Virabyan v Armenia, App no 40094/05 (ECtHR, 2 October 2012); Menesheva v Russia, App no 59261/00 (ECtHR, 9 March 2006), (2007) 44 EHRR 1162; Selmouni v France, App no 25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1999), (2000) 29 EHRR 403. 69  Mikheyev v Russia, App no 77617/01 (ECtHR, 26 January 2006). 70  El Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App no 39630/09 (ECtHR, 13 December 2012). 71  Dikme v Turkey, App no 20869/92 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000). 72  Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), (2005) 40 EHRR 1030. 73  Sławomir Musiał v Poland, App no 28300/06 (ECtHR, 20 January 2009) para 95. 74  Aydin v Turkey, App no 23178/94 (ECtHR, 25 September 1997), (1998) 25 EHRR 251, para 83; ­Maslova and Nalbandov v Russia, App no 839/02 (ECtHR, 24 January 2008); Zontul v Greece, App no 12294/07 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012). 75  H Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1995–6) 1–2 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 289, 352–53. 76  See para 1.01 above. 77  For example, as of 6 December 2014, the total numbers of states parties were as follows: ICESCR, 162; ICCPR, 168; ICERD, 177; CEDAW, 188; CAT, 156; CRC, 195 (ratified by all states, with the exception of South Sudan and the US). For the current state of ratification, see Office of UN Treaty Collection, Human Rights, at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 67 

Human Rights Obligations

 13

do not impose legal obligations on them.78 Respect for human rights may be regarded as forming an integral part of the ‘general principles of law’ due to the wide recognition of human rights and due to the fact that they are replicated in a vast m ­ ajority of national constitutions throughout the world, across various regions and legal systems.79 [1.12]  It is, therefore, not surprising that this period has been described as the ‘age of rights’, and human rights as the ‘only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance’.80 It has also been argued that the characterisation of a specific goal as a human right elevates it above the rank and file of competing societal goals, gives it a degree of immunity from challenge, and generally endows it with an aura of timelessness, absoluteness and universal validity.81

B.  What are Human Rights? [1.13]  There are different theories and concepts of human rights based, amongst other things, on natural law, legal positivism, Marxism, justice and human dignity, as well as on equality of respect and concern.82 This leads to a lack of agreement in practice on what human rights are and how they can be realised. Broadly, human rights may be considered from four different perspectives: (i) human rights as ‘given’; (ii) human rights as ‘agreed upon’; (iii) human rights as ‘fought for’; and (iv) human rights as ‘talked about’.83 Most human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, adopt the theory that human rights derive from the ‘inherent dignity of the human person’,84 and explicitly assume that human rights protected in those instruments pre-exist their legal formulation. In this context human rights have been described as ‘a twentieth-century name for what has been traditionally known as natural rights or the rights of man [humankind]’.85 While human rights are difficult to define, in general terms they are regarded as fundamental and inalienable claims or entitlements that are 78 

Buergenthal, above n 35, at 790. See, eg, Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 1125, para 4, where the European Court of Justice (now the Court of Justice of the European Union) held, ‘In fact, respect for fundamental [human] rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the member states, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community.’ See also see B Simma and P Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1988–1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82. 80  L Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York, Columbia University Press, 1990) ix. 81  P Alston, ‘Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook 3. 82  See J Shestack, ‘The Jurisprudence of Human Rights’ in T Meron (ed), Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984) ch 3. 83  These have been described as ‘four schools of thought’ about human rights. See M Dembour, ‘What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’ (2010) 32(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1, 2, stating that ‘“natural scholars” conceive of human rights as given; “deliberative scholars” as agreed upon; “protest scholars” as fought for; and “discourse scholars” as talked about’. 84  ICESCR and ICCPR, preambles. See also UDHR, preamble and Art 1; ACHPR, Art 5. 85  M Cranston, What are Human Rights? (London, The Bodley Head, 1973) 1. It should be noted that the term ‘human rights’ was also used in some 18th- to 19th-century documents and writings, eg in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens; HD Thoreau, ‘Civil Disobedience’ (1849), reproduced in HS Canby (ed), The Works of Thoreau (Boston, Mass, Houghton Miffin Co, 1937) 789, 798; T Paine, Rights of Man (New York, Penguin Books Ltd, 1984) 110, 176. 79 

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essential for life as a human being.86 Human rights are ‘the rights that one has simply as a human being’,87 without any supplementary condition being required.88 Human rights must be enjoyed equally by all human beings ‘against the whole world’.89 In the words of the CESCR: Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities. Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human person … [H]uman rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person.90

[1.14]  In international law, human rights have been commonly (although, as seen below, albeit unjustifiably and inaccurately) divided into three ‘generations’.91 ­Professor Rebecca Wallace put it this way: Traditionally, human rights have been sub-divided into three classifications: ‘first, second, and third generation’ rights. According to this classification ‘first generation’ rights are those which may be characterised as civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights, as ‘second generation’ and group rights as ‘third generation’ or ‘solidarity’ human rights.92

The so-called ‘first generation’ civil and political rights derive primarily from the ­seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reformist theories, associated mainly with the English, French and American revolutions.93 These rights are now protected under the ICCPR94 and traditionally were conceptualised as ‘negative’ rights, in that they were seen as demanding ‘freedom from’ state intervention and were therefore viewed as justiciable and capable of immediate implementation by all states.95 Consequently, 

86  R Wallace, International Law, 5th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 225; M Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, Polity, 2002) 6; D O’Byrne, Human Rights: An ­Introduction (Harlow, Longman, 2003) 26–71. 87  J Donnelly, ‘Human Rights, Democracy, and Development’ (1999) 21 (3) Human Rights Quarterly 608, 612. See also J Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights (London, Croom Helm, 1985) 1. 88  Cranston, above n 85, 36. 89  R Wasserstrom, ‘Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination’ in J Rachels (ed), Moral Problems: A Collection of Philosophical Essays, 3rd edn (New York and London, Harper & Row, 1979) 7. 90  See CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1 (C), of the Covenant), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006), paras 1 and 2. 91  French lawyer Karel Vasak first proposed this notion of three human rights ‘generations’ in 1977. See K Vasak, ‘A Thirty Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to give Force of Law to the UDHR’ [November 1977], UNESCO Courier 29; KT Jackson, Charting Global Responsibilities: Legal Philosophy and Human Rights (Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1994) 16. 92 Wallace, above n 86, 226. See also D Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7th edn (­London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 535–635. 93  S Marks, ‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’ (1980–81) 33 Rutgers Law Review 435, 437. 94  The rights protected under the ICCPR (Arts 1, 6–27) include: self-determination; life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery/forced labour; the right to liberty and security of person; freedom of movement; fair hearing; privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; peaceful assembly; freedom of association; and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs. 95  On the ICCPR, see generally, M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 2005); S Joseph and M Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013); R Hanski and M Scheinin, Leading Cases of the Human Rights Committee (Turku, Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 2003).

Human Rights Obligations

 15

‘[i]n practice, civil and political rights have almost always been given precedence at both international and domestic levels’.96 However, civil and political rights also entail positive obligations on states. The protection of the right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR, for example, ‘enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.97 Taking ‘appropriate steps’ may require, in some cases, the provision of adequate healthcare, food, water and housing required to safeguard the lives of vulnerable individuals, eg prisoners, within a state’s jurisdiction. Thus, in Jasinskis v Latvia,98 the ECtHR held that the national authorities have an obligation to protect the health of persons who have been deprived of their liberty.99 In the context of Article 2, the obligation to protect the life of individuals in custody also implies an obligation for the authorities to provide them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their life.100 A failure to provide adequate medical care may constitute treatment in breach of the Convention.101

In Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey,102 the Court reiterated that the positive obligations imposed on the State by Article 2 of the Convention imply that a regulatory structure be set up, requiring that hospitals, be they private or public, take appropriate steps to ensure that patients’ lives are protected. They also imply the obligation to put in place an efficient and independent judicial system by which the cause of death of an individual under the responsibility of health professionals can be established, whether they are operating in the public sector or employed in private structures, and, as the case may be, to ensure their accountability for their actions.103

[1.15]  The so-called ‘second generation’ ESC rights have been associated p ­ rimarily with the socialist tradition prevalent in early nineteenth-century France.104 Since then, ESC rights have been promoted through various revolutionary struggles and ­welfare movements, now recognised under the ICESCR. Such rights were conceived as ­positive ‘rights to’, and thus were seen as demanding state intervention (eg to p ­ rovide healthcare and underlying determinants of health, education and social security). As a result such rights were regarded as susceptible only of ‘progressive realisation’, ­subject to a state’s ‘available resources’,105 which allegedly makes them ‘principles and ­programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations that are justiciable’.106

96  See D Kinley, ‘The Legal Dimension of Human Rights’ in D Kinley (ed), Human Rights in Australian Law: Principles, Practice, and Potential (Sydney, Federation Press, 1998) 9. 97  LCB v United Kingdom, App no 23413/94 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998), (1998) 27 EHRR 212, para 36 (emphasis added). 98  Jasinskis v Latvia, App no 45744/08 (ECtHR, 21 December 2010) para 60. 99  Naumenko v Ukraine, App no 42023/98 (ECtHR, 10 February 2004) para 112; and Dzieciak v Poland, App no 77766/01 (ECtHR, 9 December 2008) para 91. 100  Taïs v France, App no 39922/03 (ECtHR, 1 June 2006) para 98; and Huylu v Turkey, App no 52955/99 (ECtHR, 16 November 2006) para 58. 101  Huylu, above n 100, para 58. 102  Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey, App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 9 April 2013). 103  Ibid, para 81. 104  A Eide, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concept and Standards (Aldershot, Ashgate and Paris, UNESCO, 2000) 109, 113–18. 105  See ICESCR, Art 2, examined in ch 2 of this book. 106  For example, as shown in ch 5, this is the view of the UK in relation to most rights under the ICESCR.

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However, the growing jurisprudence on ESC rights makes this position untenable. Although it reflected essentially the contrasting interests of the Cold War division between the West and the East,107 it continues to impact negatively on the realisation of ESC rights.108 This means that any right not considered a ‘first generation’ civil or political right is not given the same value by the ­inter­national community, and, as a result, violations of ‘less-valued’ ‘second or third generation’ human rights are more tolerated.109 [1.16]  The so-called ‘third generation’ group or solidarity rights110 follow from latetwentieth-century thinking, and essentially reflect the emergence and concerns of mainly developing states.111 This is evident in the emphasis on the collective rights, such as the rights to development,112 self-determination,113 peace and freedom of groups from genocide, a clean environment and humanitarian assistance.114 Most of such rights are protected under the African Charter.115 Such rights generally cannot be exercised by individuals alone but are asserted by collections of individuals as a group. Although some scholars have expressed the view that ‘“people’s” rights should be regarded as a sub-category of human rights’,116 some states and writers have indicated a certain degree of scepticism.117 Sieghart, for example, argued that, according to classical theory, only the rights of human individuals can be human rights;

107 

See Stark, above n 32. P Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in L Henkin and J Hargrove (eds), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century (Washington, DC, American Society of International Law, 1994) ch 6a, 151–54. 109  See P Goldberg, ‘Women, Health and Human Rights’ (1997) 9 Pace International Law Review 271, 278. 110  See generally P Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); D Ingram, Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 2000); D Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ (1991) 13 Human Rights Quarterly 368. 111 M Wa Mutua, ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law ­Journal 589. 112  See Declaration on the Right to Development, GA res 41/128, annex, 41 UN GAOR Supp (No 53) at 186, UN Doc A/41/53 (1986). The Declaration was adopted by 146 votes to 1, with 8 abstainers. The USA cast the only vote against adoption. Abstainers were Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden and the UK. For a discussion of this right, see A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999); A Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 837; A Sengupta et al (eds), Reflections on the Right to Development (New Delhi, Sage, 2005); Reports of the UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Dr Arjun Sengupta, First Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/WG.18/2 (24 January 2005); Second Report, E/CN.4/2000/ WG.18/CPR.1 (11 September 2000), A/55/306 (2000); Third Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/WG.18/2 (2 ­January 2001); Fourth Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2 (5 March 2002); Fifth Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6 (18 September 2002); Sixth Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2 (12 December 2002). See also BA Andreassen and S Marks (eds), Development as a Human Rights: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2006). 113  See J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium’ (1999) 15 American University International Law Review 151. 114  Alston, above n 110. 115  See, eg, ACHPR, Arts 19–24, providing for peoples’ rights such as the right to self-determination; right to development; national and international peace and security; and the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to development. 116  See, eg, J Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) 39. 117  See, eg, AH Robertson and JG Merrills, Human Rights in the World, 4th edn (Manchester, ­Manchester University Press, 1996) 294–95, noting that ‘the rights which can properly be called “human rights” are rights of individual human beings stemming from their nature as human beings, and not rights of groups, associations, or other collectivities’. 108  See

Human Rights Obligations

 17

any rights belonging to entities of some other kind may be highly desirable, accepted, valid and even enforceable, but, whatever else they may be, they cannot be human rights.118 Thus, it is commonly suggested, or assumed, that (apart from the right to self-determination­)119 the ‘third generation’ of human rights is not part of the existing law but is ‘emerging’.120 Emerging trends towards recognition of collective rights reflect the West/North’s evolving acceptance of norms from the developing world.121 [1.17]  Reference has been made to a ‘fourth generation’ of human rights, which is said to relate to the impact of scientific and technological developments, for example communication and information rights such as access to the Internet and rights relating to developments in biotechnology.122 However, such rights can be read into existing human rights treaties.123 [1.18]  It is imperative to note that the notion of ‘generations’ is problematic, since it may focus on divergencies rather than convergencies or interdependence.124 It could suggest a hierarchy within human rights, which implies that some rights can only be respected, protected and fulfilled after other rights.125 In particular, it may suggest that the so-called ‘second generation’ ESC rights can be met only after what are regarded as the ‘first generation’ civil and political rights have been achieved. Similarly, one might believe that the so-called ‘third generation’ rights can be met only after achieving the ‘second generation’ rights. The generation approach may also suggest that the more established civil and political rights are in some way less relevant today, because it might seem that the new generations of human rights make the older generations obsolete.126 Indeed, it must be asked whether any theory of human rights law which … condemns arbitrary imprisonment but not death by starvation, and which finds no place for the rights to access to primary health care [and to other ESC rights such as education, social security, work, food, water and housing] is not flawed both in terms of human rights and of United Nations doctrine.127

[1.19]  As shown in the next chapter, all human rights, both civil and political rights and ESC rights, entail negative and positive obligations. Hence, the attempt to rank civil and political rights as superior to ESC rights based upon the purported ­negative character of the former and the positive character of the latter ‘can only breed

118 

P Sieghart, The Lawful Rights of Mankind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986) 161. ICCPR and ICESCR, Common Art 1. 120  I Brownlie, Principles of Public International, 7th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 567. 121  See, eg, M Wa Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201, 204 (asserting that historically, ‘[t]he human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric’). 122  See, eg, Otto, above n 18. 123  See, eg, S Tully, ‘A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects’ (2014) 14(2) Human Rights Law Review 175. 124  A Eide, Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23. 125  See C Flinterman, ‘Three Generations of Human Rights’ in J Berting et al (eds), Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities (Westport, CT, Meckler, 1990) 75. 126 C Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 25. 127 P Alston and B Simma, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General ­Principles’ (1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 95. 119 

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­confusion’.128 Thus, the ‘generation’ approach to human rights is a generalisation, since all rights (whether civil and political rights or ESC rights) have both negative and positive dimensions, and in particular ESC rights are not immune to justiciability (see chapters four, and eight to eleven). Indeed all human rights are (to some extent) justiciable. What has to be noted is that the real driving force behind the distinction was based not on legal or empirical rationality but rather on Cold War politics.129 The US and the West advocated mainly civil and political rights, while the then Soviet bloc advocated ESC rights.130 Thus, in the UN, ESC rights have been an ‘orphan of the cold war’, monitored for several years by a fairly weak state reporting system until the Optional Protocol entered into force on 5 May 2013.131 Accordingly, this text does not adhere to the categorisation of rights in terms of ‘generations’, especially since the history of the evolution of human rights does not make it possible to place the emergence of different human rights into ‘clear-cut stages’.132 Indeed civil and political rights and ESC rights were historically often developed together, rather than as one set neatly following the other.133 As Cees Flinterman states, ‘the various so-called generations of human rights, especially the first generation of civil and political rights and the second of social (economic and cultural) rights have themselves grown and expanded in a more or less parallel way’.134 [1.20]  Thus, one part of the transition from human rights rhetoric to human rights reality is to take the indivisibility of rights seriously.135 Support for this proposition can also be drawn from numerous international proclamations, particularly the ­Proclamation of Tehran (1968)136 and the Vienna Declaration (1993).137 It is less ­satisfactory to have a guarantee of a right to vote if one is too sick to lift the ballot paper, too poor to afford the costs of healthcare and the underlying determinants of health (chapter ten), or too illiterate to make an informed choice. Conversely, it is not meaningful to have a right to health or education if your freedom to speak out on the lack (or inadequacy) of these rights is muzzled. It makes no difference whether

128 H Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton ­University Press, 1980) 53. 129  Otto, above n 18, 5–6. 130 See I Merali and V Oosterveld (eds), Giving Meaning to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (­Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) ch 2. See also A Kirkup and T Evans, ‘The Myth of Western Opposition to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? A Reply to Whelan and Donnelly’ (2009) 31(1) Human Rights Quarterly 221. 131 K Tomaševski, Education Denied: Counting the Costs (London, Zed, 2003) 90–91; Optional ­Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly Res A/RES/63/117 (10 December 2008). 132  For a similar approach, A Eide and A Rosas, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’ in A Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 4. 133  See P Alston, ‘A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?’ (1982) 29 Netherlands International Law Review 307. 134  Flinterman, above n 125, 76. 135  See Robinson, above n 26, 4. 136 Proclamation of Tehran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, UN Doc A/CONF 32/41 at 3 (1968), para 13: ‘Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realisation of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible.’ 137  See Vienna Declaration, above n 19, para 5.

Human Rights Obligations

 19

one dies due to a lack of access to healthcare facilities or to a lack of underlying ­determinants of health (a violation of ESC rights), or from torture (a violation of a civil and political right). Clearly, then, what is the right to life without the right to health, food, water or adequate housing? Without an education, how is there a right to meaningful free speech? What is the value in the right to work if individuals are not permitted to assemble and associate in groups to discuss the conditions of work? Therefore, the emphasis in this text is to view the rights recognised under the ICESCR in a holistic way as being ‘universal, indivisible and inter-dependent and interrelated’ with other human rights.138 [1.21]  More substantive support for this position can be taken from the UDHR, which together with the UN Charter is considered to spell out the general human rights ­obligations of all UN member states.139 The UDHR recognised in one consolidated text that human beings are ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’, and are entitled to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms as ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.140 While there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions, it would be difficult to deny that ESC rights are an essential component of human dignity. Although in the UDHR, ‘[m]ore space and importance are allotted to civil and political rights than to economic, social and cultural rights, and no mention at all is made of the rights of peoples’,141 this was made without any sense of separateness or priority. [1.22]  However, since then, the arena of human rights discourse and practice, at both a theoretical and a practical level, has been predominantly centred on civil and political rights as guaranteed under the ICCPR. By contrast, ESC rights as guaranteed under the ICESCR have been marginalised.142 Despite some growing recognition of ESC rights, only rarely do ESC rights form the subject of concerted political will, consistent media campaigns, enforcement, effective monitoring and accountability or critical reportage. Economic, social and cultural rights are still widely perceived as appertaining to development, rather than as being central to the international human rights regime. Even where these rights have been recognised, they have not in most states generated the national legal frameworks for their effective implementation. ­Historically, ‘the great majority of non-governmental organisations pay little more

138 

Ibid. See Alfredssson and Eide, above n 3, 453–632; Buergenthal, above n 35, 787. 140  UDHR, Art 1 and preamble, para 1. Arts 2–11 of the UDHR focus on civil and political rights, while Arts 22–28 deal with ESC rights. For a discussion of dignity, see C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655. 141  A Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) states (at 358): ‘On the whole, the view of human rights expressed in [the UDHR] is western.’ As noted in n 140 above, only 7 of the 30 Arts of the UDHR refer to ESC rights: Arts 22 (social security); 23 (work, just and favourable conditions of work, and right to form and join trade unions); 24 (rest and leisure); 25 (adequate standard of living including food, clothing, housing and medical care); 26 (education); 27 (participation in cultural life); 28 (social and international order). 142  See J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in the Age of Globalisation: International Mechan­isms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18(4) American ­University International Law Review 851. 139 

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than lip service to ESCR’,143 and are based in, or funded by those living in, developed states, and tend to be concerned primarily with civil and political rights. This reflects the marginal­isation of vulnerable individuals and groups, who are meant to be the primary beneficiaries of this category of rights. This is due to the fact that the people suffering the most from violations of ESC rights—eg violation of the right to water— are poor people in general and poor women in particular, who often lack the political voice needed to assert their claims to ESC rights.144 Not only is there a ­lacklustre approach to the effective realisation of ESC rights, but there are also lingering questions about their con­ception as human rights.145 [1.23]  In many respects, violations of ESC rights are treated far less seriously by states and non-state actors (NSAs) than if those violations had occurred in relation to civil and political rights, when they would provoke ‘expressions of horror and outrage’.146 It is rare, for example, to hear of the discussions of ‘massive and direct denials of economic, social and cultural rights’147 (such as systematic and large-scale violations of rights to health, education, housing, water and food) in relation to the subject of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,148 genocide149 or crimes against humanity.150 Yet, under CIL, crimes against humanity are particularly odious offences, which are part of a widespread or systematic practice, in that they constitute a serious attack on human dignity.151 The elements of the crime against h ­ umanity of persecution include cases where the ‘perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights’, including ESC rights, if targeted against such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity (based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds), or if targeted against the group or collectivity as such.152 Similarly, genocide may be ­committed by ‘deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring 143 P Alston, ‘Denial and Neglect’ in R Roech (ed), Human Rights: The New Consensus (London, Regency Press, 1994) 112. 144  See UNDP, Human Development Report 2006—Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis (New York, United Nations, 2006) foreword, v; available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/ hdr2006/. 145  See D Beetham, ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?’ (1995) 43 Political Studies 41. 146  See Statement of the CESCR to the Vienna World Conference, UN Doc E/1993/22, Annex III, para 5. 147  CESCR, Report on the Seventh Session, Annex III. 148  J McBride, ‘The Violation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’ in G Van Bueren (ed), Childhood Abused: Protecting Children against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 107. 149 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted verbatim in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)), 78 UNTS 277, entered into force 12 January 1951, Art 2: ‘[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’ 150  S Skogly, ‘Crimes Against Humanity-Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights’ (2001) 5(1) International Journal of Human Rights 58; R Howard-Hassmann, ‘Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, 2000–2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and the Failure to Protect’ (2010) 32(4) Human Rights ­Quarterly 898. 151  A Cassese et al, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 90–92. 152 ICC, Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), Art 7(1)(h).

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 21

about physical destruction’ upon one or more persons with the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.153 The term ‘­conditions of life’ may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival and the progressive realisation of ESC rights, ‘such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes’.154 As noted above, the denial of civil and political rights is considered as a ‘violation’, while the denial of ESC rights is generally viewed as a form of ‘injustice’.155 Yet the reality is that, in some contexts, violations of ESC rights may give rise to serious human rights violations.156 [1.24]  Despite this, a general consensus has emerged, at the UN level and within the African regional human rights system,157 that civil and political rights on the one hand and ESC rights on the other, as noted above, are ‘universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated’.158 This means that they form a single, unified body of rights and must be treated ‘globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis’.159 Thus, human rights must not be subjected to a hierarchical subclassification,160 as this prejudices the effective realisation of ESC rights. [1.25]  It has to be noted, however, that this formal consensus, although restated by the UN General Assembly in its 2005 resolution creating the Human Rights Council,161 masks a deep and enduring disagreement over the proper status of ESC rights generally with ‘many countries still falling very short of their [ESC] rights obligations, and some even regressing’.162 The reality is that these rights continue to be marginalised in practice by many states, state agents, intergovernmental bodies including the UN

153 

Ibid, Art 6(c). Ibid. 155  See UNHCR Standing Committee, 12th meeting (UN DOC EC/48/SC/CRP.29). 156  See, eg, M Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) ch 5. 157  See, eg, The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication No 155/96, (2003) 10(1) IHRR 282, (2001) AHRLR 60 (15th Annual Activity Report); African Commission, Draft Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 50th Ordinary Session, 2011, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/economic-social-cultural/. 158  See Vienna Declaration, above n 19, para 5. The first World Conference on Human Rights in Teheran (1968) also proclaimed that ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible’ (Proclamation of Tehran, UN Sales No E.68.XIV.2 (1968), Art 13), as well as the Declaration on the Right to Development, Art 6 (1986). 159  Vienna Declaration, above n 19, para 5. 160 But see T Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the ­Perspect­ive of Non-derogable Rights’ (2001) 12(5) European Journal of International Law 917, 920 and 925, for the view that non-derogable rights (eg Art 4 of the ICCPR), because of their normative specificity and status, are often regarded as ‘core human rights, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes’, and therefore ‘To this extent, the interdependency and indivisibility of human rights should be denied and a hierarchy of human rights appears.’ It should be noted, however, that the existence of non-derogable rights does not, per se, contradict the principle of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. See D Prémont (ed), Non-derogable Rights and States of Emergency (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1996). 161  UN Doc A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006), preamble, para 3. 162  S Fukuda-Parr et al, Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 103. See also Alston and Goodman, above n 47, 277. 154 

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

Human Rights Council and NSAs.163 Their marginalisation can be discerned from the low level of international attention paid to them, exemplified by the approach of governments, judges, NSAs and academics, who state that ‘economic and social human rights are costly to secure’.164 As noted above, at the international level, the roots of marginalisation of ESC rights can be traced to the ideological stand-off of the Cold War era, coupled with the process of decolonisation and the ensuing North– South divide in international politics.165 Despite the end of the Cold War, the current unrivalled and influential global superpower, the United States, continues to oppose enhanced recognition and enforceability of ESC rights.166 The ‘United States generally views civil and political rights as the only “real”, or enforceable, human rights.’167 This impacts on ESC rights in other states, because ‘the United States, clearly the global hegemony, traditionally champions [the so-called] first-generation rather than secondgeneration rights’.168 As noted above, many other states take a similar approach and regard most ESC rights as non-binding ‘principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations that are justiciable’.169 This undermines the realisation of rights falling within the category of ESC rights. The more extreme view is that ESC rights do not constitute rights at all but ‘societal goals’ or ‘luxuries’ of the developed states, and that treating them as human rights ‘undermines the enjoyment of individual freedom, distorts the functioning of free markets by justifying large-scale state intervention in the economy, and provides an excuse to downgrade the importance of civil and ­political rights’.170 [1.26]  It is vital to note that the continuing reluctance to accord ESC rights the same level of recognition and enforceability affects disproportionately the more vulnerable members of societies. While vulnerability will vary according to context, vulnerable groups may include the following: ethnic, religious and racial minorities; indigenous persons; internally displaced persons; refugees; children and young

163  S Agbakwa, ‘Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights’ (2000) 5 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 177, 178; L Richardson, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (and Beyond) in the UN Human Rights Council’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 409, 439 observing that in terms of procedural equality, ‘almost across the board, the [UN Human Rights] Council still spends more time addressing questions of CPR [civil and political rights] than it does questions of ESCR’. 164  See, eg, P Harvey, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 363, 471. 165  Oloka-Onyango, above n 142, 853. 166  Stark, above n 32, 79–80 observes that ‘the United States is the only major industrialized democracy that has not yet ratified the [ICESCR]’, despite its having ratified the ICCPR on 8 June 1992. M Robinson, ‘Shaping Globalisation: The Role of Human Rights’ in American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting (2–5 April 2003) 1, 11, notes that during her five years at the UN she found the ‘United States reluctant to embrace the full corpus of international human rights law’. 167  N Saito, ‘Beyond Civil Rights: Considering “Third Generation” International Human Rights Law in the United States’ (1997) 28 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 387, 392. The ICCPR and the ICESCR were opened for signature in 1966 and signed by President Carter in 1977. The ICCPR was not, however, ratified by the US Senate until 1992, and the ICESCR has not been ratified yet. 168  R Honey, ‘Symposium Interrogating Globalization: The Impact on Human Rights—An Introduction to the Symposium: Interrogating The Globalization Project’ (2002) 12 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 8. 169 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002), para 11 and UN Doc E/C/12/1/Add.19 (4 December 1997), para 10. 170  Alston and Goodman, above n 47, 277.

Human Rights Obligations

 23

­ ersons; non-nationals; persons living in rural areas; elderly persons; persons with p disabilities; migrants; trafficked persons and groups that are more often the victims of poverty and discrimination, such as women, especially in post-conflict s­ ituations.171 For example, unsafe abortions kill at least some 68,000–70,000 women each year and leave close to five million women with temporary or permanent disability.172 The women most affected are those living mainly in developing states with restrictive ­abortion laws, who often resort to unsafe, clandestine abortions, jeopardising their lives and health.173 According to some estimates, ‘[i]n the last two decades, roughly 1 million women and girls have died and more than 100 million have suffered injuries—many of them lifelong—due to complications from unsafe abortion’.174 Without education, women cannot claim their human rights, and overcome discrimination and gender barriers causing violations of ESC rights. By 2003, girls in 54 states still faced discrimination as regards access to education, with girls in sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, India and China especially affected.175 Despite recent advances in girls’ education, ‘over 100 ­million young women living in low and lower middle income countries are unable to read a single sentence’.176 By 2011, 31 million girls were still out of school and 493 ­million women were illiterate, accounting for almost two-thirds of the world’s 774 million illiterate adults.177 [1.27]  Thus, the widespread international ratification of the ICESCR (Appendix C) has not been accompanied by targeted and effective steps to entrench those rights within the domestic legal system of several states as human rights. Similarly, no effective administrative measures have been implemented (in several states) to give effect to ESC rights in practice, or to provide effective means of redress to individuals or groups who are victims of violations of ESC rights. At an international level, the lack of a world court for human rights, to give binding decisions about violations of human rights, including ESC rights, continues to undermine effective accountability

171  See H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and S Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 613, 639; C Chinkin and H Charlesworth, ‘Building Women into Peace: The International Legal Framework’ (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 937. 172  See World Health Organization (WHO), Unsafe Abortion: Global and Regional Estimates of Incidence of Unsafe Abortion and Associated Mortality in 2003, 5th edn (Geneva, WHO, 2007) 3, available at http:// who.int/reproductive-health/publications/unsafeabortion_2003/ua_estimates03.pdf; P Hunt, ‘The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/49 (16 February 2004), paras 11 and 30. 173 WHO, above n 172; C Zampas and JM Gher, ‘Abortion as a Human Right—International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 249, 250; C Cosentino, ‘Safe and Legal Abortion: An Emerging Human Rights? The Long-Standing Dispute with State Sovereignty in ECHR Jurisprudence’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 569; WHO, Unsafe Abortion: Global and Regional Estimates of Incidence of Unsafe Abortion and Associated Mortality in 2008, 6th edn (Geneva, WHO, 2011). 174 The Airlie Declaration on Safe Legal Abortion, Issued by participants in the World Leaders ­Consultation on Uniting for Safe Legal Abortion, convened at Airlie Center, Warrenton, VA, 24–25 March 2014, available at http://www.ipas.org/en/News/2014/March/~/media/Files/SafeAbortionPost2015/Airlie-­ Declaration-on-Safe-Legal-Abortion.ashx. 175 See UNESCO, Education for All (EFA) Global Education Monitoring Report 2003/4: Gender and Education for All—The Leap to Equality, ch 3, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ ­ images/0013/001325/132513e.pdf. 176  UNESCO, EFA Global Education Monitoring Report 2013/14, Teaching and Learning: Achieving Quality for All, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002266/226662e.pdf, 1. 177  Ibid.

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for human rights violations.178 Without independent and effective accountability, a state can use scarcity of resources as an excuse to do virtually nothing, or to neglect vulnerable groups. C.  Human Rights Obligations and Responsibilities [1.28]  There are two features that characterise legally guaranteed human rights: ­entitlement (for the right holder) to the ‘substance of the right’ and obligation (for the obligation holder).179 Traditionally, rights relations are conceptualised as vertical, in the sense that they involve the obligation of a governing actor (the state or agents of the state) towards individuals (groups of individuals) within a state’s jurisdiction.180 This is based on the principle of state responsibility to guarantee human rights on the basis that the state/individual relationship involves unequal power dynamics between the parties. A state’s potential to abuse its position of authority to the detriment of an individual’s interests is the basis for human rights law to insulate the latter against state interference and abuse of power. In this context, human rights are viewed primarily as being exercisable against the ‘state’, and the state has the primary responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.181 [1.29]  Thus, the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)182 provide: Article 4 Conduct of organs of a State 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under ­inter­national law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State. Article 5 Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall

178  M

251.

Nowak, ‘The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review

179  A D’amato, ‘The Concept of Human Rights in International Law’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1110; J Donnelly, International Human Rights, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1998) 18. 180  See, eg, W Nelson, ‘Human Rights and Human Obligation’ in J Pennock and J Chapman (eds), Human Rights (New York, New York University Press, 1981) 275. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), pt VII, introductory note, at 144–45 (1987) does not fully commit to any position, but states that ‘how a state treats individual human beings … is a matter of international concern and a proper subject for regulation by international law’. 181  For example, under common Art 2 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it is only each ‘State party’ to the Covenant that undertakes obligations. 182  Articles Finally Adopted by the International Law Commission on Second Reading (2001), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol II (Part Two); annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49 (Vol I)/Corr 4. For a discussion, see J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Human Rights Obligations

 25

be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.

Therefore, all organs and branches of the state (executive, legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level—national, regional or local—are in a position to engage the responsibility of the state party with respect to human rights violations, irrespective of whether these are ESC rights or civil and political rights.183 [1.30]  By contrast, under traditional approaches to international human rights law, relationships in the private sphere have been regarded as being based on a degree of parity between free and autonomous parties, and NSAs are thus regarded as being beyond the direct reach of international human rights law.184 They cannot be parties to the relevant human rights treaties (meant for states) and so they are bound only to the extent that obligations accepted by states can be applied to them by governments. The result is that entities, including NGOs such as the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), private security contractors and transnational corporations, along with many others, are generally considered not to be bound directly by human rights law.185 How effective is this state-based approach in the era of globalisation? D.  Globalisation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1.31]  Globalisation has set in motion a process of far-reaching change that is affect­ ing international human rights law. Although it is capable of multiple and diverse definitions, globalisation is a phenomenon that has brought fundamental changes within every society. New technology, supported by more open policies, has created a world more interconnected than ever before. This spans not only growing interdependence in economic relations—trade, investment, finance and the organisation of production globally—but also social and political interaction among organisations and individuals across the world.186 Globalisation is primarily an economic process, although it is

183  See also HRC, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para 4. 184  See, eg, S Wood and B Scharffs, ‘Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 531, 544–45 (Section IV), asserting that ‘On their face, international human rights instruments do not appear to apply to corporations.’ 185  See generally P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). 186  See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2004), x, available at www.ilo.org/public/english/ wcsdg/docs/report.pdf. See also J Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontent (New York, WW Norton, 2002), 9 describing globalisation as ‘the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders’.

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

also a political, social and cultural process.187 As the CESCR said in its Statement on Globalisation: [Globalisation] is usually defined primarily by reference to the developments in technology, communications, information processing and so on that have made the world smaller and more interdependent in very many ways. But it has also come to be closely associated with a variety of specific trends and policies including an increasing reliance upon the free market, a significant growth in the influence of international financial markets and institutions in determining the viability of national policy priorities, a diminution in the role of the state and the size of its budget, the privatization of various functions previously considered to be the exclusive domain of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities with a view to facilitating investment and rewarding individual initiative, and a corresponding increase in the role and even responsibilities attributed to private actors, both in the corporate sector, in particular to the transnational corporations, and in civil society.188

[1.32]  Significantly, globalisation can be understood as a double movement— globalisation­driven ‘from above’ and globalisation ‘from below’.189 The first and most dominant form of globalisation (neoliberal globalisation) is currently driven from above, by dominant states, international economic actors and institutions, mainly the Bretton Woods agencies190 and the WTO,191 as well as by the economic and political élites that they serve.192 The second form of globalisation is driven from below, by broad participation at the local level, i­ nter­action among globally conscious NGOs and other organisations committed to international human rights.193 As Oloka-Onyango

187 See, eg, J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Who’s Watching “Big Brother”? Globalization and the Protection of ­ ultural Rights in Present Day Africa’ (2005) 27(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1245. On economic globalisaC tion, see Van Den Bossche, below n 191, 1–74. 188 CESCR, Statement: Globalisation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (May 1998), UN Doc E/1999/22-E/C.12/1998/26, Chap VI, s A, para 515. See also R McCorquodale and R Fairbrother, ‘­Globalisation and Human Rights’ (1999) 21(3) Human Rights Quarterly 735, 763–66; R Howse, ‘The End of Globalisation Debate: A Review Essay’ (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1528. 189  See R Falk, ‘The Making of Global Citizenship’ in J Brecher et al (eds), Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order (Boston, MA, South End Press, 1993) 39. 190  The Bretton Woods agencies comprise (i) the IMF and (ii) the World Bank family, made up of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the ­Inter­national Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Agency (IDA), and affiliated organisations such as the M ­ ultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment ­Disputes (ICSID). For a discussion see AH Qureshi, International Economic Law, 2nd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 121–263 and 507–35. 191  See Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154; 33 ILM 1144 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ legal_e/04-wto.pdf. For a discussion of the WTO, see M Matsushita et al, The World Trade Organisation: Law, Practice and Policy, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006); P Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); M Trebilcock, R Howse and A Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade, 4th edn (London, Routledge, 2012); A Narlikar et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012); and S Lester, B Mercurio and A Davies, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 192  Falk, above n 189. See also P Streeten, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on Development Cooperation’ (1999) 42(3) Development 11. For a discussion of neoliberal globalisation, see P O’Connell, ‘On R ­ econciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 483; RE Howard-Hassmann, ‘Reply to Paul O’Connell’s Article on Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 127; and P O’Connell, ‘Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees: A Reply to Rhoda Howard-Hassmann’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 135. 193  Falk, above n 189.

Human Rights Obligations

 27

and Deepika Udagama noted, the ‘globalisation-from-below activists have the potential to add a democratic dimension to the debates about globalisation from above’.194 [1.33]  The impact of globalisation on human rights has been a subject of great ­discussion.195 As noted above, globalisation is multidimensional, consisting of numerous complex and interrelated processes that can have a dynamism of their own, resulting in varied and sometimes unpredictable effects.196 While previous eras have experienced globalisation, the present-day version has a number of distinctive ­features, including—though not limited to—trade liberalisation, changing patterns of financial flows, a growth in the size and power of corporations, advances in information and communications technology, and changing flows of people.197 These phenomena or developments are not divinely ordained, and accordingly globalisation is not ‘a natural event, an inevitable global progression of consolidated economic growth and development’.198 The CESCR noted that while none of these developments in itself is necessarily incompatible with the principles of the ICESCR or with the obligations of governments under the Covenant, taken together, and if not complemented by ­appropriate additional policies, globalisation risks downgrading the central place accorded to human rights by the UN Charter in general and the principal international human rights instruments in particular.199 This is especially the case in relation to ESC rights, as globalisation affects individuals and groups everywhere (with special difficulties to developing countries and countries with economies in transition) and in many aspects of their daily lives—jobs, food, health, education, leisure time, etc. As noted in the UN Millennium Declaration: We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalisation becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For while globalisation offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognise that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalisation be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.200

[1.34]  As the CESCR explained, for example, respect for the right to work and the right to just and favourable conditions of work is threatened where there is an excessive emphasis upon competitiveness to the detriment of respect for the labour rights

194 

See Preliminary Report UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, below n 195, at para 9. See, eg, J Oloka-Onyango and D Udagama, ‘Globalisation and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights’, Preliminary Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (15 June 2000); Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/11 (2 July 2001); and Final Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14 (25 June 2003). 196  See JF Addicott et al, Globalization, International Law, and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). 197  Ibid. 198 See Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/11, above n 195, para 12, citing BK Murphy, ‘­International NGOs and the Challenge of Modernity’ (2000) 10 Development in Practice 332. See also B Jordan, ‘Yes to Globalisation, But Protect the Poor’ International Herald Tribune, 21 December 2000. 199  CESCR, above n 188 at para 3. 200  General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000, para 5. 195 

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

contained in the Covenant. The right to form and join trade unions may be threatened by restrictions upon freedom of association, restrictions claimed to be ‘necessary’ in a global economy, or by the effective exclusion of possibilities for collective bargaining, or by the closing off of the right to strike for various occupational and other groups. The right of everyone to social security might not be ensured by arrangements that rely entirely upon private contributions and private schemes. Respect for the ­family and for the rights of mothers and children in an era of expanded global labour markets might require new and innovative policies rather than a mere laissez-faire approach. If not supplemented by necessary safeguards, the introduction of user fees, or cost-recovery policies, when applied to basic health and educational services for the poor, can easily result in significantly reduced access to services that are essential for the enjoyment of the rights recognised in the Covenant. An insistence upon higher and higher levels of payment for access to artistic, cultural and heritage-related activities risks undermining the right to participate in cultural life for a significant proportion of any community.201 [1.35]  Although the right of everyone to enjoy ‘scientific progress and its applications’ is protected by Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR, scientific progress in the context of globalisation has had both positive and negative effects on human rights: 3. The acceleration of the production of knowledge in the context of globalization has increased the effects on human rights in both positive and negative ways, with consequences for inequalities among and within States and across generations. We have identified many examples of these conflicting trends, including the following: i.

In the area of food production, although scientific advances have significantly increased crop yields, they may also reduce crop genetic diversity, widen the gap between poor farmers and large-scale producers, and thus affect the right to food. ii. Scientific advances in medicine have helped to cure more diseases and enhance the quality of life. However, these advances are driven primarily by market considerations that often do not correspond to the health needs of the world’s population as a whole, thus affecting the right to health. iii. Advances in information and communication technologies have expanded opportunities for education, freedom of expression and trade. But they have also widened the ‘digital gap,’ and facilitated infringements of privacy, incitement to hatred and censorship, and thus affect the full spectrum of human rights as well as cultural diversity. 4. Significant disparities are increasing among States concerning the availability of resources, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to engage in research and development. The acceleration of scientific progress is widening the divide between the most and least scientifically and technologically advanced societies. The resulting lack of access reduces the ability to enjoy human rights, including the ability to hold governments accountable, particularly for the direction of scientific progress and its impact on human rights.202

[1.36]  As will be shown in chapter three, a wide range of NSAs have more powers than states, and consequently have the potential to respect or violate human rights.

201 

Ibid. Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, 2009, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001855/185558e.pdf. 202  See

Human Rights Obligations

 29

This situation threatens to make a mockery of much of the international system of accountability for human rights violations. As privatisation, outsourcing and downsizing place ever more public or governmental functions into the hands of NSAs, the human rights regime must adapt if it is to maintain its relevance. Non-state actors such as trans­national corporations (TNCs) and armed opposition groups have committed, and continue to commit, massive human rights violations.203 The process of globalisation, in particular trade and foreign direct investment in food processing, retailing and food advertising, and the promotion of unhealthy foods (which increase diet-related non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, cancers, chronic respiratory diseases and diabetes) driven by transnational corporations, including food and beverage companies and supermarket chains, have altered diets from traditional and minimally processed foods to ultraprocessed ones.204 Supermarkets based in North America and Europe have invested heavily in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, where they have largely replaced fresh food markets and influenced the sale and consumption of unhealthy foods (eg by providing more price discounts for unhealthy foods) in comparison to promoting the availability and affordability of healthy foods within the food system.205 Such developments, among others, provide a basis for the ‘horizontal’ extension of the application of human rights to NSAs to ensure some degree of accountability. It is in this context that there is increasing recognition that in the era of globalisation, ‘it is essential to ensure human rights obligations fall where power is exercised, whether it is in the local village or at the international meeting rooms of the WTO, the World Bank or the IMF’.206 [1.37]  In this respect, it is argued in chapter three that while states are primarily obliged to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’ all human rights, including ESC rights, in the era of globalisation, emerging global trends have increased the influence of NSAs such as TNCs, international financial institutions and other business enterprises on the economies of most states, resulting in economic activities beyond the actual capacities of any one national system. As a result, the key NSAs involved in this process have the capacity to foster economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, as well as the capacity to harm the human rights and lives of individuals through their core and subsidiary business practices and operations, including employment practices, environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and consumers, interactions with governments and other activities. In the words of Roslyn Higgins, ‘[g]lobalisation represents the reality that we live in a time when the walls of sovereignty are no protection against the movements of capital, labour, information and ideas—nor can they provide effective protection against harm and damage’.207 This necessitates an

203  See Commission on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003), para 20. For a discussion of these norms, see D Kinley and R Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447. 204 A Grover, Unhealthy Foods, Non-Communicable Diseases and the Right to Health, UN Doc A/HRC/26/31 (1 April 2014), para 5. 205  Ibid, paras 6–11. 206  Robinson above n 26, 5–6. 207 R Higgins, ‘International Law in a Changing International System’ (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law ­Journal 78, 82.

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International Legal Protection of ESCR

increasing recognition of the human rights responsibilities of NSAs. Making space in the international legal regime to take account of the role of NSAs (in the progressive realisation of all human rights, including ESC rights) is one of the most critical challenges facing international law today. E.  Obligations of Conduct and Result in International Law [1.38]  The primary sources of international law laying down human rights obligations for states and from which obligations for NSAs may be derived are international treaty law, international customary law and the general principles of law.208 Generally, in the discussion of international human rights obligations, a distinction is usually made between ‘obligations of conduct’ and ‘obligations of result’.209 Regarding the obligation of conduct, the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Inter­nation­ally Wrongful Acts (2001)210 provide for obligations both of conduct and result: Article 2 Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. Article 12 Existence of a breach of an international obligation There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.

[1.39]  It follows that ‘there is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring to adopt a particular course of conduct when the conduct of that State is not in conformity with that required of it by that obligation’.211 On the other hand, with respect to the obligation of result, the ILC noted: there is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to achieve, by means of its own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve the result required of it by that obligation.212

208  Art 38(1) of the Statute of ICJ (widely considered as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international law) provides: ‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as ­evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59 (stating that the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case), judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’ For a discussion, see Shaw, above n 29, ch 3. 209 CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), para 1. 210  Articles Finally Adopted by the International Law Commission on Second Reading (2001), above n 182. 211  Yearbook of International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.a/1996 (Draft Art 20 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility). 212  Ibid, Art 21.

Tripartite Typology of Obligations

 31

[1.40]  Thus, international human rights obligations may be fulfilled through a state’s behaviour (conduct) and/or the end result of this behaviour (result). As shown in ­chapter two, Article 2 of the ICESCR imposes both obligations of conduct (eg to take steps and to guarantee against non-discrimination) and obligations of result (eg to achieve progressively the full realisation of the rights guaranteed under the ­Covenant). Some of these obligations (eg the prohibition of discrimination) require fewer resources and are immediate, while others (eg the introduction of free higher education on the basis of capacity) require more resources and are progressive, requiring states parties to the ICESCR to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the states concerned.

III.  TRIPARTITE TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS [1.41]  Henry Shue (a political philosopher) noted in 1980 that human rights impose three sets of duties on states: (i) the duty to avoid depriving (respect); (ii) the duty to protect individuals and groups from deprivation by others (protect); (iii) the duty to aid or to provide the deprived for the security (or subsistence) of those unable to provide for their own (fulfil).213 It has since been widely established that the goal of full realisation of ESC rights, like other human rights, imposes these three types or levels of multilayered state obligations: the obligations to respect, protect and ­fulfil.214 This approach has been applied by the CESCR in its General Comments,215 by the ­African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its decisions,216 by some national courts217 and by academic experts.218 The state obligation to ‘respect, protect and ­fulfil’ ESC rights within a state’s territory and extraterritorially arises in any of the following situations: (a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether or not such control is exercised in accordance with international law;

213  H Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1980) 52; H Shue, ‘The Interdependence of Duties’ in P Alston and K Tomasevski (eds), The Right to Food (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 83. 214  This analysis follows Asbjorn Eide’s taxonomy, whereby state obligations for all human rights can be seen as involving obligations to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ the rights in question. See A Eide, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987), para 66; A Eide, The Right to Adequate Food and to be Free from Hunger: Update Study on the Right to Food, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999 (28 June 1999), para 52. 215  See, eg, CESCR, E/C.12/GC/21 (2009), paras 48–54; General Comment 19 (2008), para 43; General Comment 18 (2005), para 22; General Comment 17 (2005), para 28; General Comment 16 (2005), paras 18–21; General Comment 15 (2002), paras 20–29; General Comment 14 (2000), para 33; General Comment 13 (1999), para 46; General Comment 12 (1999), para 15. 216  See, eg, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60, (2003) 10 IHRR 282; 15th Annual Activity Report. 217  See, eg, Republic v Minister for Home Affairs and 2 Others, ex parte Sitamze [2008] eKLR High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 18 April 2008, para 8. 218  See, eg, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22–26 January 1997, (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691, Appendix F of this book, para 6.

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(b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; (c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.219

These obligations are set out below briefly. A.  Obligation to Respect [1.42]  The obligation to respect entails obligations not to interfere with the enjoyment of ESC rights. It requires states, at a primary level, to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of all human rights and freedom of the individual to use material resources—alone or in association with others—to satisfy basic needs or enjoy the right in question.220 States should respect rights-holders, their freedoms, autonomy, resources and liberty of action.221 Respecting ESC rights obliges states parties, inter alia, not to adopt laws or other measures, and to repeal laws and rescind policies, administrative measures and programmes that do not conform to ESC rights protected by human rights treaties. For example, to respect the right to social security, a state should refrain from engaging in any practice or activity that denies or limits equal access to adequate social security, arbitrarily or unreasonably interferes with self-help or customary or traditional arrangements for social security, and arbitrarily or unreasonably interferes with institutions that have been established by individuals or corporate bodies to provide social security.222 [1.43]  The obligation to respect has an extraterritorial dimension.223 States must refrain from engaging in any conduct that nullifies or impairs the enjoyment of ESC rights of individuals and groups not only in their territories, but also outside their territories. Similarly, states must refrain from any conduct that impairs the ability of another state to comply with ESC rights obligations, for example voluntarily aiding, assisting, directing, controlling or coercing another state to breach its ESC rights obligations, or adopting measures such as embargoes or other economic sanctions that result in violations of ESC rights, eg prevention of the supply of water, as well as of

219  Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29 February 2012, (Appendix G in this book), Principle 9. 220  Eide, above n 104, 127. 221 K Drzewicki, ‘Internationalisation of Human Rights and Their Juridization’ in R Hanski and M Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Åbo, Åbo Akademi University, 1999) 31. 222  CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (4 February 2008) para 44. 223  Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29 February 2012, Appendix G of this book, Principles 20–22.

Tripartite Typology of Obligations

 33

goods and services essential for securing the right to water,224 food, adequate medicines and medical equipment.225 In General Comment 12 the Committee stated: States parties should refrain at all times from food embargoes or similar measures which endanger conditions for food production and access to food in other countries. Food should never be used as an instrument of political and economic pressure.226

In short, states parties to the ICESCR have to respect the enjoyment of ESC rights in other countries.227 [1.44]  Furthermore, the policies of NSAs, as noted above and discussed further in chapter three, increasingly affect the well-being of individuals and groups, and so have tremendous human rights implications. To this end NSAs are obliged, as a minimum, to respect human rights in their policies and actions. B.  Obligation to Protect [1.45]  The obligation to protect requires states to take measures that prevent NSAs (third or private parties), including individuals, groups, corporations and other entities, as well as agents acting under their authority, from interfering in any way with ESC rights (see chapter three). Both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)228 and the ECtHR229 have also interpreted the relevant regional human rights treaties as imposing positive obligations upon states to ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The same principle applies to ESC rights, especially for vulnerable individuals and groups. [1.46]  The obligation to protect, therefore, generally entails the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay of laws, regulations and other measures, so that individuals and groups will be able freely to realise their rights and freedoms. This demands that the state protect against harmful activities carried out by NSAs and prevent violations by such actors by creating and ­imple­ment­ing the

224 CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003) para 32. 225 CESCR, General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997); CESCR, General ­Comment 12: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para 41. 226  CESCR, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999) para 37. 227  See, eg, ibid, para 39. 228  Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Inter-AmCtHR (Ser C) No 4 (1988). 229 See, eg, Airey v Ireland, App no 6289/73, (ECtHR, 9 October 1979), Series A, No 32 (1979–80) 2 EHRR 305; X and Y v The Netherlands, (ECtHR, 26 March 1985), Series A, No 91 (1986) 8 EHRR 235; Z and others v United Kingdom, App no 29392/95, (ECtHR, 10 May 2001), (2002) 34 EHRR 97; E and Others v United Kingdom, App no 33218/96, (ECtHR, 26 November 2002), [2002] ECHR 763; LCB v United Kingdom, App no 23413/94, (ECtHR, 9 June 1998), (1998) 27 EHRR 212; Guerra v Italy, App no 14967/89, (ECtHR, 19 February 1998), (1998) 26 EHRR 357; Öneryildiz v Turkey, App no 48939/99, (ECtHR, 30 November 2004), (2005) 41 EHRR 325; Budayeva and Others v Russia, Apps nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, (ECtHR, 20 March 2008); Branko Tomašić and Others v C ­ roatia, App no 46598/06, (ECtHR, 15 January 2009); Opuz v Turkey, App no 33401/02, (ECtHR, 9 June 2009), (2010) 50 EHRR 695; Jasinskis v Latvia, App no 45744/08, (ECtHR, 21 December 2010); Carabulea v Romania, App no 45661/99, (ECtHR, 13 July 2010).

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necessary policy, legislative, regulatory, judicial, inspection and enforcement frameworks. As shown in chapter three, when violations by NSAs occur, the state must not acquiesce in such violations. It is obliged to take appropriate measures, or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish or investigate the harm caused by NSAs, and, where appropriate, provide an effective remedy. Such remedy might be in the form of ­monetary compensation or restitution of property; rehabilitation (legal, ­psychological, medical and social measures); satisfaction (truth commissions, criminal prosecution of perpetrators); and guarantees of non-repetition (amendment of laws, abolition of certain institutions). [1.47]  For example, in its General Comment on the right to social security as protected by Article 9 of the ICESCR, the CESCR stated that where social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, are operated or controlled by third parties, states parties to the ICESCR retain the responsibility of administering the national social security system and ‘ensuring that private actors do not compromise equal, ­adequate, affordable, and accessible social security’.230 To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must be established that includes framework legislation, independent monitoring, genuine public participation and the imposition of penalties for non-compliance.231 One example of the violation of the right to social security is the failure to regulate the activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating this right to social security.232 This also extends to the failure to regulate the activities of NSAs so as to prevent them from violating other ESC rights. [1.48]  The state obligation to protect human rights by regulating the conduct of NSAs (including private individuals and organisations, transnational corporations and other business enterprises) which they are in a position to regulate is not territorially limited but extends to situations where such conduct may lead to violations of human rights in the territory of another state. International law imposes a prohibition on the state to allow the use of its territory to cause environmental damage in the territory of another state.233 States are obliged to prevent third parties from violating ESC rights in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the UN Charter and applicable international law.234 As noted in Principle 25 of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: States must adopt and enforce measures to protect economic, social and cultural rights through legal and other means, including diplomatic means, in each of the following circumstances: (a) the harm or threat of harm originates or occurs on its territory; (b) where the non-State actor has the nationality of the State concerned; (c) as regards business enterprises, where the corporation, or its parent or controlling company, has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business activities, in the State concerned;

230 

CESCR, General Comment 19, para 46. Ibid. 232  Ibid, para 65. 233 See The Corfu Channel Case [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 18. 234  See eg CESCR, General Comment 12, para 39. 231 

Tripartite Typology of Obligations

 35

(d) where there is a reasonable link between the State concerned and the conduct it seeks to regulate, including where relevant aspects of a non-State actor’s activities are carried out in that State’s territory; (e) where any conduct impairing economic, social and cultural rights constitutes a violation of a peremptory norm of international law. Where such a violation also constitutes a crime under international law, States must exercise universal jurisdiction over those bearing responsibility or lawfully transfer them to an appropriate jurisdiction.

C.  Obligation to Fulfil [1.49]  The obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures, including relevant national policies, to ensure the goal of full realisation of ESC rights to those who cannot secure rights through their personal efforts.235 The obligation to fulfil can be subdivided into the obligations to facilitate, promote and provide.236 [1.50]  The obligation to ‘facilitate’ requires states, inter alia, to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy ESC rights.237 The obligation includes, amongst other things, according sufficient recognition of the rights recognised in human rights treaties protecting ESC rights, such as the ICESCR, within the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation; adopting a national strategy and plan of action to realise ESC rights; and ­ensuring that systems relevant to ESC rights (eg the social security system, education system or health system) will be adequate and accessible to everyone.238 [1.51]  The obligation to ‘promote’ requires states to undertake actions that ­create, maintain and restore the realisation of all ESC rights. The steps to be taken to ­promote a particular right will depend on the right in question, but they generally involve appropriate education and public awareness concerning access to ESC rights. For example, to promote the equal rights of men and women in the enjoyment of ESC rights, the steps to be taken include: —— T  o conduct human rights education and training programmes for judges and public officials; —— To conduct awareness-raising and training programmes on equality for workers involved in the realization of economic, social and cultural rights at the grass-roots level; —— To integrate, in formal and non-formal education, the principle of the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, and to promote equal participation of men and women, boys and girls, in schools and other education programmes; —— To promote equal representation of men and women in public office and decision making bodies.239

235  Eide, above n 104, 172. Examples include the disadvantaged/marginalised; the elderly; during crisis, armed conflict or disaster. 236  Ibid, 128–55. 237  Ibid. 238  See eg CESCR, General Comment 19, para 48. 239  CESCR, General Comment 16, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005) para 21.

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[1.52]  States are also obliged to ‘provide’ ESC rights when individuals or groups are unable, on grounds reasonably considered to be beyond their control, to realise these rights themselves, with the means at their disposal. This is especially the case as regards those who are particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged, such as the poor240 or lower-income groups, disadvantaged and marginalised women, indigenous and tribal peoples, occu­pied populations, asylum seekers, refugees and internally displaced persons, minorities, the elderly, children, landless peasants, persons with disabilities and the homeless.241 D.  Obligation to Recognise? [1.53]  In addition to the above typology of obligations, Roger Normand adds the obligation to recognise as another dimension to this typology, which, according to him, ‘not only imposes an obligation on States to ratify human rights treaties, but also on non-State actors to accept human rights responsibilities’.242 Do states have an obligation to ratify human rights treaties? To consent to be bound is the most significant, positive act that a state can take in relation to any treaty.243 Therefore, the ‘obligation to recognise’, if understood as requiring states to ratify human rights treaties, takes human rights obligations too far when it claims an obligation on states to ratify human rights treaties regardless of whether or not a state consents. Ratification of treaties is, and should remain, a purely voluntary measure, as each state should decide freely whether or not to ratify a particular treaty. Accordingly, this book simply adopts and applies the view that the full realisation of ESC rights requires states to take steps on all the three levels—to respect, protect and fulfil. But it also contends that in order not to violate states’ human rights obligations, NSAs should, at the very mini­mum, respect completely the human rights obligations of states in which they operate.

IV.  THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS A.  Adoption and Ratification [1.54]  The most comprehensive UN treaty on the protection of ESC rights is the 1966 ICESCR.244 As noted in paragraph 1.02 above, after the adoption of the UDHR, the next step was to translate the rights recognised in the Declaration into binding treaty

240 S Skogly, ‘Is There a Right Not To Be Poor?’ (2002) 2(1) Human Rights Law Review 59, 79–80, observes that ‘by virtue of living in poverty, [poor] people face systematic and widespread violations of large number of human rights … such as the right to equality, to participation, and to food, health, housing and education’. 241  Maastricht Guidelines, above n 218, para 20. 242  R Normand, ‘Separate and Unequal: Trade and Human Rights Regimes’, Background Paper for Human Development Report 2000 (January 2000) 5, available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ normand2000.pdf. 243  A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 87. 244  For the codification of the ICESCR, see M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) ch 1, 6–29.

The ICESCR

 37

obligations. The process lasted from 1949 to 1966, when the UN General Assembly adopted the ICESCR at the same time as the ICCPR (on 16 December 1966), followed later by numerous specific conventions. The original decision of the UN General Assembly was that ESC rights should be included in the single international covenant, which was then projected.245 As noted in paragraph 1.04 above, even the US had initially (in mid-1947) supported the drafting by the UN Commission on Human Rights of an International Bill of Human Rights, which protected civil and political rights alongside ESC rights.246 The US support for ESC rights was made in the context of the US position at the time to produce a non-legally binding declaration that would nonetheless be a forceful statement of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. The text of the US Suggestions (taken from the July 1947 proposal) included several ESC rights, and spelt out correlative state obligations for each right:247 United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/21 (1 July 1947), 41–47 Article 29 [Right to Progress] Everyone has the right to a fair and equal opportunity to advance his own physical, economic, spiritual and cultural well-being and to share in the benefits of civilization. It is the duty of the State, in accordance with the maximum use of its resources and with due regard for the liberties of individuals, to promote this purpose by legislation or by other appropriate means. Among the social rights thus to be achieved progressively by joint effort of the individual and the State are those defined in the following Articles. Article 30 [Right to Health] Everyone, without distinction as to economic or social condition, has a right to the highest attainable standard of health. The responsibility of the State for the health and safety of its people can be fulfilled only by provision of adequate health and social measures. Article 31 [Right to Education] Everyone has the right to education. Each State has the duty to require that each child within territories under its jurisdiction receive a fundamental education. The State shall maintain adequate and free facilities for such education which, however, shall not be exclusive of private educational facilities or institutions. It shall also assure development of facilities for further, including higher education, which are adequate and effectively available to all the people within such territories.

245 See General Assembly Resolution (GAR) 421 (V) of 4 December 1950; Robertson and Merrills, above n 117, 275. 246  See United States Suggestions for Redrafts of Certain Articles in the Draft Outline, UN Doc E/CN.4/ AC.1/8 (11 June 1947); and ‘United States Suggestions for Articles to be Incorporated in an International Bill of Human Rights’ in Report of the Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights to the Commission on Human Rights, Annex C, UN Doc E/CN.4/21 (1 July 1947) 41–47. 247  Report of the Drafting Committee, above n 246, 41–47.

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Article 32 [Right to a decent standard of living] Everyone has a right to a decent standard of living, to a fair and equal opportunity to earn a livelihood; to wages and hours and conditions of work calculated to insure a just share of the benefits of progress to all; and to protection against loss of income on account of disability, unemployment or old age. It is the duty of the State to undertake measures that will promote full employment and good working conditions; provide protection for wage-earners and dependents against lack of income for reasons beyond their control; and assure adequate food, housing, and community services necessary to the well-being of the people. Article 35 [Right to Participate in the Cultural Scientific and Artistic Life] Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the benefits of science.248

[1.55]  The wording used in the US Suggestions above is close in form and content to the wording used in the ICESCR with respect to the concepts of ‘maximum available resources’ and ‘progressive realisation’ (or ‘achieving progressively’), as well as references to ‘full employment’, ‘the right to the highest attainable standard of health’, ‘the right to education’, ‘a decent standard of living’, ‘adequate food, housing’, ‘full employment and good working conditions’, ‘cultural life’ and the right to share in the ‘benefits of science’. However, by November 1947, there was a significant shift in the US position to eliminate references to the correlative obligations of states. The US submitted a new draft text with only 10 articles, out of which only Article 9 referred to ESC rights, as follows: Everyone has the right to a decent living; to work and advance his well-being; to health, education and social security. There shall be equal opportunity for all to participate in the economic and cultural life of the community.249

Between 1949 and 1951 the Commission on Human Rights worked on a single draft covenant dealing with both categories of rights.250 The Assembly changed its position in 1952,251 at the height of the Cold War,252 under pressure from the Westerndominated­Commission, and decided that there should be two separate covenants dealing with the two categories of rights, but that they should contain ‘as many similar provisions as possible’ and be approved and opened for signature simultaneously, in order to emphasise the unity of purpose.253 This change in approach and the delay in

248 

Emphasis added to highlight closer similarity to the wording used eventually in the ICESCR. Proposal for a Declaration of Human Rights Submitted by the Representative of the United States on the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/36 (26 November 1947). 250 See Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, UN Doc A/2929 (1955) 7. 251  GAR 543 (VI) of 5 February 1952; M Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehr, NP Engel, 2005) xxiii. 252  The USA, which had initially been supportive of ESC rights, following President Roosevelt’s avowal of ‘freedom from want’ in 1941, reversed its position, fearing that expansion of state obligations associated with these rights would lead to the growth of Communism and Soviet influence. See J Kenner, ‘Economic and Social Rights in the EU Legal Order: The Mirage of Indivisibility’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 1, 2. 253  UN Doc A/2929, above n 250, 7. 249  See

The ICESCR

 39

adopting the international human rights covenants were due to a number of reasons, including ‘the Cold War, developing US opposition to the principle of international human rights treaties, and the scope and complexity of the proposed obligations’.254 The ICESCR came into force on 3 January 1976 once it had 35 ratifications.255 [1.56]  As of 9 March 2015, there were 164 states parties to the ICESCR (Annex C), compared to 168 states parties to the ICCPR. Fewer than 35 states still remained outside the ICESCR. Only 42 of the 164 states parties to the Covenant had made reservations and declarations with respect to some provisions of the Covenant, while eight states objected to some of these reservations and declarations primarily on the ground that such reservations were incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant (Annex H). Since the ideological controversy has ended with the end of the Cold War, there should be no reason to continue ‘this rather sterile dichotomy between the two sets of rights’.256 In any case, as of June 2014, apart from only six states, all other states parties to the ICCPR, including Canada, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom, were also parties to the ICESCR. A notable non-state party to the ICESCR remains the United States of America, though it signed the Covenant on 5 October 1977. B.  Overview of the Covenant [1.57]  The ICESCR is divided into five parts. Part I (Article 1) recognises the right of all peoples to self-determination. Part II (Articles 2–5) contains general provisions that apply to all substantive rights under the Covenant: this includes ­Article 2(1), which defines the general nature of states parties obligations; Article 2(2), dealing with non-discrimination; Article 3 on equal rights for men and women; and ­Articles 4 and 5 focusing on general limitations. These are discussed in chapter two. Part III (­Articles 6–15) deals with the specific substantive rights, outlined in section IV.E. below, and some examples are discussed in chapters eight, nine, ten, eleven and twelve. Part IV (Articles 16–25) focuses on international implementation and the system of supervision, and is examined in the next section below. Part V (Articles 26–31) centres on the ordinary provisions of a human rights treaty relating to the ratification, entry into force and process of amendment of the Covenant (Appendix A). C.  Treaty-monitoring Body: The Committee and the Examination of State Reports [1.58]  The CESCR has developed several working methods in its examination of state reports.257 Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR require states to submit reports, at intervals defined by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), on the ‘measures which they have adopted’ and ‘the progress made’ in achieving the observance of the

254  See Alston and Goodman, above n 47, 281. See also BG Plummer, Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988 (Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 2003) 31. 255  ICESCR, Art 27. 256  Eide, above n 104, 111. 257  See OHCHR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Working Methods, Overview of the Present Working Methods of the Committee, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/ Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx.

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rights in the Covenant. Reports should be made in accordance with the reporting guidelines.258 The compliance of states with their obligations under the Covenant is monitored by the CESCR.259 This Committee was established in 1985 by a decision of ECOSOC260 to merely ‘assist’ in the ‘consideration’ of state reports.261 Thus the Committee is not a body established by treaty but a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. It has the primary responsibility for ‘monitoring’ the implementation of ESC rights protected under the Covenant.262 The Committee is composed of 18 ‘experts with recognised competence in the field of human rights, serving in their personal capacity’, elected with due consideration given to ‘equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of different forms of social and legal systems’.263 [1.59]  The reporting procedure under the ICESCR is based on a direct dialogue (characterised as a ‘constructive dialogue’)264 between the expert delegation of a state party and the Committee. This process is followed by the Committee’s adoption of its ‘­Concluding Observations’ (since its 7th Session, 1992) in relation to a specific state report. The observations contain an introduction to the dialogue; highlight the positive aspects; highlight factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the ­Covenant and principal subjects of concern; and any suggestions and recommendations that aim at a better implementation of the Covenant.265 Although the observations are not legally binding, they provide guidance to the normative content of the Covenant and indicate the Committee’s evaluation of the extent to which p ­ rogress has been made towards the realisation of the obligations contained in the Covenant in a particular state. The success of the reporting procedure largely depends on efforts made by states parties to submit timely, accurate and comprehensive reports; to respond adequately and in a timely fashion to the lists of issues raised by the ­Committee; and to send specialists for a meaningful dialogue with the Committee. Dialogue is an integral part of the consideration of the report and provides a unique opportunity for the Committee and the state party to ‘hold constructive, in-depth discussions which,

258  Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2 (24 March 2009). 259  See M Odello and F Seatzu, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Law, Process and Practice (London, Routledge, 2013); K Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (Antwerp, Intersentia/Hart Publishing, 1999). 260  ECOSOC Decision 1985/17. 261  ECOSOC Res 1985/17, 28 May 1985 (in UN Doc E/1985/85, 15), para f. 262  Report of the CESCR, UN Doc E/1999/22, para 24. 263  ECOSOC Decision 1985/17, para b. It is noteworthy that, in the past, the Committee members have been predominantly lawyers with limited economic expertise. See M Dowell-Jones, ‘The Committee on ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assessing the Economic Deficit’ (2001) 1(1) Human Rights Law Review 11. For the current membership of the Committee, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx. 264 P Alston, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Manual on Human Rights Reporting under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, 2nd edn, UN Doc GV.E.97.0.16 (Geneva, United Nations, 1997) 160. 265  Report of the CESCR, UN Doc E/1994/23, paras 32–34. Alston noted the need for the ‘improvement in the quality of the concluding observations, especially in terms of clarity, degree of detail, level of accuracy and specificity’. See UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/74 (27 March 1997), para 109.

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together with the report submitted by the State party and other information received, allow the Committee to assess the progress made and to indicate to the State party the areas where further efforts are needed’.266 Thus a state’s failure to send a delegation to attend the meeting with the Committee has a severe impact on the Committee’s task of evaluating as objectively as possible the implementation of the ICESCR in a given state.267 [1.60]  The Committee’s Concluding Observations do not have a section that deals expressly, in-depth and consistently with the ‘violations of the Covenant’. Only rarely has the Committee expressly referred to a violation of the Covenant. For example, the Committee has emphasised that it considers the non-performance by a state of its reporting obligations not only a violation of the Covenant, but also a grave impediment to an adequate application of the Covenant.268 In 1999, the Committee found that Mexico was ‘in violation of article 7(a)(ii) [right to just and favourable conditions of work] of the Covenant’.269 Similarly, in 1998 the Committee found Israel in breach of the Covenant, noting: The Committee takes the view that large-scale and systematic confiscation of Palestinian land and property by the State and the transfer of that property to these agencies constitute an institutionalized form of discrimination because these agencies by definition would deny the use of these properties to non-Jews. Thus, these practices constitute a breach of Israel’s obligations under the Covenant.270

The finding of a violation is a form of condemnation by a treaty body that a state is not complying with its international human rights obligations: it goes beyond inability to failure to perform. This can contribute to pressures towards increased attention to ESC rights by reinforcing and legitimising domestic demands to protect ESC rights, and even by helping to call into question, both internally and externally, the commitment of the state to its voluntarily accepted human rights obligations.271 Thus, it is useful to apply this approach consistently. [1.61]  Since the 21st Session (1999), Concluding Observations encourage follow-up action by requesting states to include detailed information in their periodic reports on the steps taken to implement the Committee’s recommendations.272 This acts as a form of permanent supervision, but its success depends largely upon a particular state’s willingness to cooperate with the Committee. One problem faced by the ­Committee arises from non-submission of reports by some states parties to the ICESCR. To address this problem, at its 47th Session, the CESCR decided that after numerous requests and a lack of response from the state concerned, the Committee

266 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015), para 3. Ibid. 268  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/6 (3 June 1993), para 4. 269  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.41 (8/12/1999), para 20. 270  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.27 (4 December 1998), para 11. 271  See P Alston, ‘Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspective’ in P Alston and J Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, Cambridge ­University Press, 2000) 501, 523. 272  E/2000/22, para 38(a); E/2001/22, paras 43–46. 267 

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will review a state’s ­implementation of its obligations under the ICESCR even in the absence of a state report required under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. In such a case of non-cooperation with the Committee, the Committee proceeds on the basis of information available to it from other sources. It did so for the first time in November 2012 in relation to the Republic of Congo273 and Equatorial Guinea.274 [1.62]  It has been a practice of the Committee to adopt ‘General Comments’ and ‘­Statements’, outlining its views on the substantive and procedural aspects of the ­Covenant (see Appendix D). Statements have been used to highlight some general aspects relevant to the Covenant, eg globalisation, poverty, intellectual property, ­Millennium Development Goals, an evaluation of the obligation to take steps to maximise available resources, the world food crisis, the right to sanitation, state obligations regarding the corporate sector, the importance and relevance of the right to development, and sustainable development. Although not formally legally binding, the Comments draw upon the Committee’s experience in examining reports on states, and thereby act as a tool for ‘normative development’ or standards setting. By 2009, the Committee had adopted 21 General Comments, 14 of which relate to substantive rights,275 while seven deal with other aspects of the Covenant.276 The Committee did not adopt any General Comment in 2010–15. No state had raised any formal objections to the General Comments or Statements, suggesting wide acceptance of the Committee’s interpretation by states. Despite the fact that such General ­Comments have ‘contributed significantly to the operation­ alisation of human rights obligations and … spelled out, in greater detail, the content of the different rights’277 in the ­Covenant, they do not permit the same level of normative specificity that would be possible under a petition system. A report-based system alone is insufficient to result

273  See CESCR, Observations made in the absence of an initial report from the Congo and adopted by the Committee at its Forty-Ninth Session (12–30 November 2012), UN Doc E/C.12/COG/CO/1 (2 January 2013). 274  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Equatorial Guinea, UN Doc E/C.12/GNQ/CO/1(13 December 2012), para 4: ‘A State party’s failure to submit a report is not only a violation of the Covenant but also a serious obstacle to the Committee’s work’. 275  Rights to adequate housing (General Comment 4, 1991); persons with disabilities (General Comment 5, 1994); older persons (General Comment 6, 1995); forced evictions (General Comment 7, 1997); plans of action for primary education (General Comment 11, 1999); adequate food (General Comment 12, 1999); education (General Comment 13, 1999); highest attainable standard of health (General Comment 14, 2000); the right to water (General Comment 15, 2002); the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (General Comment 17, 2005); the right to work (General Comment 18, 2006); the right to social security (General Comment 19, 2008); non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (General Comment 20, 2009); and the right of everyone to take part in cultural life (General Comment 21, 1999). See Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, vol II (27 May 2008). 276  Reporting by states parties (General Comment 1, 1989); international technical assistance measures (General Comment 2, 1990); nature of states parties’ obligations (General Comment 3, 1990); relationship between economic sanctions and respect for ESCR (General Comment 8, 1997); domestic application of the Covenant (General Comment 9, 1998); the role of national human right institutions in the protection of ESCR (General Comment 10, 1998); and the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (General Comment 16, 2005). All available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/ hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx. 277  A Eide, ‘The Use of Indicators in the Practice of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, in Eide, Krause and Rosas (eds), above n 132, 545, 550–51.

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in any real changes, especially where the state is not subject to internal scrutiny by its population, before or after a report is presented, because of deliberate state restrictions on information and lack of NGO interest or activity.278 D. A Complaints Procedure Under the Covenant and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant [1.63]  By 2008, only two of the seven major UN human rights treaties—the CRC and the ICESCR—lacked a complaints procedure that would allow individuals and groups to submit complaints involving alleged violations of rights recognised in these treaties. With respect to the ICESCR, the effect of this lacuna meant that the CESCR could not carry out an extensive and more in-depth inquiry into the real problems confronting specific individuals and groups that would in turn lead to the development of international jurisprudence or case law on ESC rights that would prompt states to ensure the availability of more effective remedies at the national level.279 Where national remedies for violations of ESC rights are either not available or ineffective, the absence of a complaints proced­ure under the ICESCR ‘greatly limits the chances of victims of abuses of the Covenant obtaining international redress’.280 In this respect, the system of monitoring the ICESCR based exclusively on a state reporting system and making non-binding Concluding Observations, has been a fairly weak system in terms of accountability. [1.64]  Accordingly, it was recognised that there was a need to strengthen the super­ vision of the ICESCR by providing for a complaints procedure to complement the existing supervisory mechanism, in the form of an Optional Protocol to the ­ICESCR.281 This need for an Optional Protocol (in some respects similar to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR), providing for a complaint/communication procedure for individuals and groups seeking redress in instances where they consider their human rights guaranteed under the Covenant to have been violated, had been a subject of discussion before the Committee since its 5th Session in 1990 until its 15th Session in 1996.282 The length

278  M Dixon and R McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 200. 279 The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.5 (26 March, 1993), paras 32–38. 280  See CESCR, Fact Sheet No 16 (Rev 1). 281  See, eg, CESCR, ‘Towards an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’, UN Doc E/1993/22; Arambulo, above n 259, 173–346; P Alston, ‘Establishing a Right to Petition under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ IV(2) Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 1995), 107; International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net), Resource Page on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, available at http://www.escr-net.org/resources/ resources_show.htm?doc_id=431553. 282  Report of the 5th Session of the CESCR, UN Docs E/1991/23, para 25 and E/CN.4/1997/105, para 2. At the Committee’s request, Committee member Philip Alston reported four times on the Optional Protocol in UN Docs E/C.12/1991/WP.2 (25 October 1991); E/C.12/1992/WP.9 (27 November 1992); E/C.12/1994/12 (9 November 1994); E/C.12/1996/CRP.2/Add.1. For a background to the Optional Protocol, see the International Commission of Jurists, The Evolution of An Optional Protocol Complaints Mechanism Under The ICESCR (Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, no date), available at http://www.icj.org/ IMG/ pdf/1.pdf; C Mahon, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Coven­ant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2008) 8(4) Human Rights Law Review 617.

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of this debate at Committee level reflected the fact that not all Committee ­members were in agreement about the need for an Optional Protocol, or about the content of the proposed protocol. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna, encouraged the UN Commission on Human Rights, replaced by the Human Rights Council in March 2006,283 to continue, in cooperation with the CESCR, the examination of Optional Protocols to the ICESCR.284 The CESCR worked on an Optional Protocol to enable complaint procedures under the Covenant. In December 1992, the Com­mittee adopted an ‘analytical paper’ that examined the various modalities of such a protocol, including, amongst other things, the possibility of collective and individual complaints.285 Through this paper the Committee strongly supported the development of an Optional Protocol. The Commission on Human Rights, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 1994/20, took note of the steps taken by the Committee … for the drafting of an optional protocol … granting the right of individuals or groups to submit communications concerning non-compliance with the Covenant, and invite[d] the Committee to report thereon to the Commission.

A draft Optional Protocol was finally adopted in 1996 at the Committee’s 15th Session.286 [1.65]  The draft Optional Protocol to the CESCR was submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights during its 53rd Session in 1997, but for the next decade its future remained largely uncertain.287 For four consecutive years (1997–2000), the Commission called for comments from states, the UN, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, but did not take any decision.288 While NGOs were strongly in favour of an Optional Protocol,289 only a limited number of states submitted comments.290 283  On 15 March 2006, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/60/251 to establish the Human Rights Council. The Commission on Human Rights concluded its 62nd and final Session on 27 March 2006 before the Optional Protocol was adopted. 284 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, Part II, para 75. 285  See Contribution of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the World Conference on Human Rights, 26 March 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.5, Annex I at para 18 and Annex II. 286  Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/105. The draft provided for: (i) the justification for the Optional Protocol in the preamble; (ii) the complaints to the competent supervisory body from individuals, and from groups who are alleged victims or who act on behalf of alleged victims of violations of all rights in the Covenant contained in Arts 1–15; (iii) interim and follow-up measures; as well as (iv) a friendly settlement procedure. For comments on the Draft, see UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/84, and for the analysis, see Arambulo, above n 259, 199–342; The Report on the UN Workshop on the Justiciability of ESC Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/62/Add.2. 287  See Reports of UNHCHR, Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, UN Docs E/CN.4/2001/62/ Add.2 (2001), E/CN.4/2000/49 (2000) and E/CN.4/1997/105. See also E De Wet, ‘Recent Development Concerning the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 514. 288  UN Docs E/CN.4/RES/1997/17, E/CN.4/RES/1998/33, E/CN.4/RES/1999/25 and E/CN.4/ RES/2000/9. 289  UN Docs E/CN.4/1998/84 and E/CN.4/2001/62. 290  Most of those who submitted comments (11 out of 14) were in favour. See, eg, Croatia, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/112; Cyprus, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/84; Czech Republic, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/49; ­Ecuador, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/84; Finland, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/112; Georgia and Germany, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/49; Lebanon and Lithuania, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/49; Mauritius, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/62; Mexico, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/112/Add.1; Norway and Portugal, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/62; Syrian ­Republic, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/84.

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This testifies to the considerable lack of enthusiasm and political will on the part of most states to be held accountable for the progressive realisation of ESC rights by an independent international body. Some states expressed doubts on the desirability of an Optional Protocol.291 Some commentators were strongly critical of the proposal to provide for a complaints procedure under the ICESCR. For example, two US State Department legal advisers, writing in their personal capacities, stated that the ‘proposal for a new individual-complaints mechanism remains an ill-considered effort to mimic the structures of the ICCPR—and largely for mimicry’s sake’, and that the rights and obligations contained in the ICESCR were ‘never intended to be susceptible to judicial or quasi-judicial determination’.292 [1.66]  However, in 2001, the Commission took an important step and appointed an independent expert, Professor Hatem Kotrane, to examine the question of the draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.293 Professor Kotrane made two reports294 and concluded that ‘there is no longer any doubt about the essentially justiciable nature of all the rights guaranteed by the Covenant’.295 As some examples discussed in chapters four to twelve demonstrate, that conclusion is tenable. [1.67]  Professor Kotrane also noted that the procedure envisaged under the Optional Protocol would be both beneficial and practical because it would, inter alia, ensure that effect was given to every individual’s right to appeal, and contribute to the development of international law by producing a coherent body of principles covering all the rights set forth in the Covenant; these principles could gradually acquire an authority that would be recognised by all, both at the international level and in the various countries where they could be used in the drafting of national legislation. It would also be beneficial in that it would provide more vigorous support for the principle of the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.296

Thus, he recommended that the Commission establish an open-ended working group, mandated to elaborate an Optional Protocol in the light of the draft as prepared by the CESCR, comments by states, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, and his own report.297 [1.68]  The Commission took the further significant step in 2003 of establishing an ‘Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ to ‘consider options’ regarding the

291 

Notably Canada, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/84/Add.1 and Sweden, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/112/Add.1. Dennis and DP Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 462 at 514. 293  Commission on Human Rights Res 2001/30, 20 April 2001, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/30, para 8(c). 294  Report by Mr Hatem Kotrane, Independent Expert on the Question of a Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/57 (12 February 2002); UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/53 and Corr.1 and Corr.2 (13 January 2003). 295  Kotrane, above n 294; UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/53, para 2. 296  Kotrane, above n 294, para 3. 297  Kotrane, Corrigendum UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/53/Corr.2 (7 April 2003), para 76. 292  MJ

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e­ laboration of an Optional Protocol.298 Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution of 29 June 2006, the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, ­submitted a first draft Optional Protocol to the 4th Session of the Open-ended ­Working Group. Based on the discussions held and proposals for amendments made during that s­ ession, the Chairperson prepared a revised draft,299 which was considered at the first part of the Working Group’s 5th Session. Based on discussions held at the first part of the 5th Session, the Chairperson prepared a new revised version300 as a basis for negotiations at the second part of the session. [1.69]  On 18 June 2008, the UN Human Rights Council adopted without a vote an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and recommended that the General Assembly adopt and open the Optional Protocol for signature, ratification and accession, at a signing ceremony in Geneva in March 2009.301 The United Kingdom (UK) expressly reserved its position until such time as the final decision was ready to be taken by the General Assembly. On 10 December 2008, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Optional Protocol.302 [1.70]  It is important to note that in the debate on the Optional Protocol there were several contentious issues, including the following: (a) The scope of the complaints mechanism—whether the mechanism would allow states to pick and choose the right on which the Committee had the competence to adjudicate, or whether a comprehensive approach would be adopted, giving the Committee competence to consider all rights under the ICESCR. (b) Locus standi (standing)—who would have standing to bring complaints under the Protocol? Individuals only, or even groups, including NGO-generated com­ plaints or other collective complaints? (c) Admissibility—what admissibility criteria were to be applied? Should applicants exhaust regional remedies? Should applications disclose that victims had suffered a ‘clear disadvantage’? (d) Criteria for review—what criteria should the Committee apply when examining complaints: reasonableness, appropriateness, margin of appreciation? (e) International cooperation and assistance—how to include appropriate reference to the crucial role of ‘international assistance and cooperation’ in the realisation of ESC rights as enshrined in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR? Would this require the establishment of a trust fund? (f) Reservations—whether to allow or prohibit reservations in an express provision?303

298 CHR Resolution 2003/18, paras 12–13. The open-ended working group met in February–March 2004 but ‘did not reach consensus on whether to start drafting an Optional Protocol’. See UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/44 (15 March 2004), para 76. See Analytical Paper by C de Albuquerque, ‘Elements for an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/WG.23/2 (2005). 299  Contained in UN Doc A/HRC/8/WG.4/2 (24 December 2007). 300  Contained in UN Doc A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 (25 March 2008). 301  See Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 8/2, 28th meeting, 18 June 2008, A/HRC/8/L.2/ Rev.1/Corr.1 Annex. 302  Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, GA Res A/RES/63/117 (10 December 2008), Art 18. For the text, see Appendix B. 303  For an overview, see Mahon, above n 282.

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[1.71]  It is undeniable that the Optional Protocol contains a number of progressive provisions. For example, states parties to the Covenant that become parties to the Optional Protocol recognise the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications of three types, namely: (a) communications by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals; (b) inter-state communications; and (c) inquiry procedures. While the first of these applies to all states parties to the Optional Protocol, the last two are optional, binding only on states that declare that they have recognised the competence of the Committee in respect of inter-state communications and inquiry procedures. These methods are outlined below. [1.72]  The first type involves communications submitted by or on behalf of ‘individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a state party’, claiming to be victims of violations of any of the ESC rights set forth in the Covenant (Article 2). This has several advantages. First, this provision is not limited to individuals but extends to groups of individuals, such as minority groups, trade unions or NGOs. Thus, it offers a wider locus standi before the Committee. Secondly, communications are not limited to individuals or groups within a state’s territory. As stated in Article 2, communications could be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a state party. This means that communications could be brought by anyone within the power, effective control or authority of a state. Thirdly, communications under the Optional Protocol could be brought alleging a violation of any provision of the Covenant and not just violation of some provisions. This confirms that all rights under the Covenant are justiciable. Therefore, like other existing communication procedures, the approach adopted in the Optional Protocol is comprehensive and not selective or limited. [1.73]  The second type involves inter-state communications. Under this type the ­Committee can receive and consider communications to the effect that a state party claims that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant (­Article 10). This can only take place where a state party has made a declaration recognising in regard to itself the competence of the Committee to receive inter-state communications. This leaves open the possibility that a state may not recognise this procedure. The inter-state communications mechanism reflects the fact that every state party has a legal interest in the performance by every other state party of its obligations.304 However, even if some states were to make Article 10 declarations, the inter-state communications mechanism is unlikely to be widely used because of the perceived diplomatic and political implications of such an action; states might fear retaliatory attacks on their own human rights records.305 Similar procedures for

304  See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted on 29 March 2004 (2187th meeting), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.13 (2004), para 2. 305  S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 21.

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i­nter-state complaints under other human rights treaties have not been used so far.306 For example, despite the fact that Article 11 of the ICERD provides for a mandatory inter-state communication procedure which had entered into force in 1970, not one of the 177 states parties to ICERD has so far invoked that procedure against any of the other states parties, even where systematic racial discrimination and ethnic cleansing has led to genocide. Since the contractual dimension of the Covenant involves any state party to the Covenant being obligated to every other state party to comply with its human rights obligations under the Covenant, it is desirable that states should ratify the Optional Protocol and make the declar­ation contemplated in Article 10. But even if the inter-state procedure is not (widely) used, its mere existence provides a useful tool for international diplomacy, and leaves the door open for possible future developments in international human rights litigation. It is better to have it rather than to omit it. [1.74]  The third type is an inquiry procedure. This can be invoked by the C ­ ommittee on its own initiative under Article 11 of the Optional Protocol if the Committee ‘receives reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a State Party of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant’. There is no definition of what violations would be considered ‘grave or systematic’, leaving this to the Committee to determine. The origin of such information is not specified; it is likely that in most cases this would be derived from reports by NGOs or the media. A similar procedure is provided for in Article 20 of the CAT and Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW,307 provided the relevant committees have received indications of grave or systematic practice of torture or forms of discrimination against women. [1.75]  The inquiry procedure involves, as a first step, an invitation to the state party concerned to submit observations with regard to the relevant information. In addition, the Committee may designate one or more of its members to conduct a confidential inquiry, which may include a visit to a state’s territory with the consent of the state party. The Committee then transmits the findings of the inquiry to the state party concerned, together with any comments and recommendations. A state may then submit its observations to the Committee within six months of receiving the findings, and the Committee may, after consultations with the state party concerned, decide to include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report. A follow-up to the inquiry procedure is provided for under Article 12 of the Optional Protocol, which allows the Committee to invite the state party concerned to inform it of the measures taken in response to such an inquiry. Thus, the success of the inquiry procedure would depend largely on the positive support and cooperation of states. It is likely that if this procedure is used, it would provide an opportunity to address grave or systematic violations of ESC rights. However, a state may at any time withdraw its declaration under Article 11 of the Optional Protocol by notification to the Secretary-General.

306 See CAT, Art 21; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant ­Workers and Members of Their Families, above n 9, Art 74; ICERD, Arts 11–13; and ICCPR, Arts 41–43. 307  GA res 54/4, annex, 54 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) at 5, UN Doc A/54/49 (vol I) (2000), entered into force 22 December 2000.

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[1.76]  In practice the inquiry procedure has rarely been used. This has been the case with respect to both CEDAW and CAT. By 2008, the CEDAW Committee had completed only one inquiry under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol, which was concluded in July 2004, regarding the abduction, rape and murder of women in the Ciudad Juárez area of Chihuahua, Mexico.308 The Committee Against Torture had initiated inquiries on the systematic practice of torture in only seven states parties, and had published the results of six procedures (against Turkey, Egypt, Peru, Sri Lanka, Mexico and Brazil). [1.77]  Although some states and some writers are generally sceptical as to the viability of the complaints mechanism in relation to ESC rights, which are regarded, incorrectly, as ‘non-justiciable’,309 the ratification by some states of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and its entry into force in May 2013, allowing complaints from both individuals and groups, have the potential to enhance the effective protection of ESC rights at an international level as reflected in the first communications brought against Spain310 and Ecuador.311 The complaints procedure under the Optional Protocol could contribute to the implementation by states parties of the obligations under the ICESCR in several ways, including the following: First, concrete and tangible cases would be discussed by the Committee in a framework of inquiry that is otherwise absent under the abstract discussions that arise under the State reporting procedure. … Second, the views of a treaty monitoring body on a complaint can be more specific than General Comments on how provisions should be understood [and applied in a specific context]. In this way, the views of the Committee on ESCR can contribute to clarifying the content of the obligations from the provisions of the Covenant. Third, the mere possibility that complaints might be brought before an international forum could encourage governments to ensure that more effective local remedies are made available.312

The fact that the Protocol provides for the Committee to request a state concerned to take interim measures in ‘exceptional circumstances’ if a victim or victims of alleged

308  See Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under Art 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and reply from the Government of Mexico, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (27 January 2005). 309  See ch 5, paragraphs 5.19–5.21; ESCR-Net, Caselaw Database: A Database of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Related Jurisprudence, Cases and Other Decisions, available at http://www.escr-net.org/ caselaw/; MF Tinta, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 431. 310  The first four communications before the CESCR brought against Spain were: Communication No 1/2003 (alleged violations of Arts 2 and 9 ICESCR, discrimination in access to non-contributory pension while in prison); IDG v Spain, Communication No 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014, 13 October 2015 (Committee found Spain violated Arts 2(1) and 11(1) ICESCR, the right to housing of an individual identified as Ms I.D.G, whose house was subjected to a special mortgage enforcement procedure due to her failure to submit several mortgage repayments to a bank); Communication No 4/2014 (alleged violations of Arts 12(1) and (2(d)) ICESCR, non-consensual medical treatment; lack of appropriate and timely medical care); and Communication 5/2015 (alleged violations of Art 11 ICESCR, forced eviction of a tenant as a result of proceedings instituted by landlady). 311  Two communications were pending before the CESCR brought against Ecuador. See Communication No 3/2014 (alleged violations of Arts 2, 4, 10(3), 13 and 15 ICESCR, discrimination of a minor foreigner in participating in football tournaments); and Communication No 7/2015 (alleged violation of Arts 2, 6, 7 and 12 ICESCR, access to complementary compensation established by collective bargaining agreement). 312  ESCR-Net, above n 309. See also P Alston, ‘Establishing a Right to Petition under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 4(2) Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 107.

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violations faces possible ‘irreparable damage’ (Article 5), provides an opportunity to protect ESC rights before determination of a communication. [1.78]  This would in turn positively influence national legislation and administrative policy to give effect to these rights. It would stimulate the formulation of precise claims, attract political concerns of states, and contribute to further clarity of the scope and content of the rights under the Covenant. Such an Optional Protocol should be ratified without delay by all states parties to the ICESCR.313 If appropriate cases are brought and examined before the CESCR, it would strengthen the Covenant and lead to ‘detailed jurisprudential scrutiny at the international level’.314 In the words of one organisation in favour of the Optional Protocol: An OP to the ICESCR allowing individuals and groups of individuals to submit claims against violations of economic, social and cultural rights and providing for an inquiry procedure would advance the principle that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent. Additionally it would help overcome the common misconception that economic, social and cultural rights are not ‘justiciable’—that their controversies cannot be decided by a court.315

[1.79]  As a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed in March 2008, the establishment of a communication procedure under the ICESCR will truly be a ‘milestone’ in the history of universal human rights, sending a strong and unequivocal message about the equal value and importance of all human rights and putting to rest the notion that legal and quasi-judicial remedies are not relevant for the protection of ESC rights.316 Indeed, to the extent that there is still a need for further clarification of the meaning of broadly phrased ESC rights and obligations in the ICESCR, the ratification of the Optional Protocol by more states becomes more necessary.317 For this reason, there is a need for more states to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol so that it reinforces in practice the indivisibility, interdependence and equal value of all rights.318 The views of the Committee developed under the Optional Protocol will be a relevant interpretive source for many courts. [1.80]  However, despite the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, such a P ­ rotocol has its own limitations. Two of these are significant. First, although the Optional ­Protocol requires states to give ‘due consideration to the views of the Committee’ (­Article 9(2)), the Committee’s views, like those of the Human Rights ­Committee (HRC), are likely to be considered by most states as non-binding, and thus such states might simply ignore the Committee’s views by not implementing them.

313 

The majority of states parties to the ICESCR had not yet ratified the Optional Protocol by 2015. See UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.5, para 24; Communications cited above n 310. Benefits of an OP-ICESCR (21 November 2006), available at https://www.escr-net.org/ docs/i/426659, para 1. 316  See Statement by Ms Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fifth Session, Salle XII, Palais des Nations, 31 March 2008 (on file). 317  W Vandenhole, ‘Completing the UN Complaint Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure Complementing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2003) 21(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 459. 318  See Kotrane, above n 294, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/57, para 56(a). 314 

315  ESCR-Net,

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­ on-implementation­of, and compliance with, the views of UN treaty-monitoring N mechanisms is widely ­documented.319 Yet there is no political body in the UN that feels responsible for supervising the implementation by states parties of treaty b ­ odies’ decisions, leaving this to the relevant treaty bodies. Secondly, existing UN treatymonitoring bodies have not handled many cases compared to regional human rights courts which hand down binding judgments. For example, while the full-time ECtHR considers some 1,000 individual complaints each year (in relation to 46 states parties to the ECHR), all existing UN bodies competent to deal with individual communications (the HRC, the Racial Discrimination Committee, the Committee against Torture and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) had by 2007 handed down little more than 500 non-binding decisions (‘final views’) over almost 30 years in relation to more than 100 states parties.320 By 2013, when the ECtHR celebrated the 60th anniversary of the ECHR since its entry into force on 3 September 1953, over 500,000 applications had been dealt with by the machinery set up under the ECHR and the Court had delivered approximately 16,500 judgments.321 Therefore, as chapter thirteen notes, the ultimate goal should be to establish a World Court of Human Rights, so that rights-holders are able to hold duty-bearers (states or NSAs) accountable for not living up to their legally binding human rights obligations before a fully independent international human rights court with the power to render binding judgments and to grant adequate reparation to the victims of human rights violations.322 E.  Substantive Rights [1.81]  The substantive rights guaranteed in Part III of the ICESCR (Articles 6–15) are outlined in paragraph 1.01 above. The following substantive rights, namely work, health, education and an adequate standard of living (adequate food, water and sanitation, housing and social security), as well as cultural rights, are examined in chapters eight to twelve. It is clear that the Covenant contains more rights with more detailed definitions than those contained in the UDHR, except that the right to property, despite recognition in Article 17 of the UDHR and in regional human rights instruments,323 was not included in the Covenant primarily because there was no agreement on such principal issues as: (i) its inclusion or non-inclusion in the Covenants (ICESCR and ICCPR), (ii) the formulation of the right governing public takings and the compensation therefor, (iii) limitations on the right, and (iv) restrictions on state action.324 319  See, eg, R van Alebeek and A Nollkaemper, ‘The Legal Status of Decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law’ in H Keller and G Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 356. 320  Nowak, above n 178, 253. 321  ECtHR, Court Celebrates 60th Anniversary of Entry into Force of European Convention on Human Rights (2 September 2013). 322  Nowak, above n 178, 254. 323  See, eg, Protocol 1 ECHR, Art 1; African Charter, Art 14; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art 31. 324  10 UN GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 28, part 2) para 196, UN Doc A/2929 (1955). For a discussion of this omission, see WA Schabas, ‘The Omission of the Right to Property in the International Coven­ants’ (1991) 4 Hague Yearbook of International Law 135. See also T van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2002).

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[1.82]  It is important to note that, under the ICESCR, there is no clear distinction between what rights are ‘economic’ and what rights are ‘social’ or ‘cultural’, as most rights evidence economic, social and cultural aspects.325 The original drafting rationale suggested that the rights contained in Articles 6–9 of the ICESCR, the rights of concern to the ILO (to work, just and favourable conditions of work, trade unions, strike and social security) were ‘economic rights’.326 The rights in Articles 10–12, rights relevant to UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WHO (the protection of the family; adequate standard of living, ie adequate food and nutrition, clothing, housing; health) were treated as ‘social’, while other rights that fell within the sphere of UNESCO in Articles 13–15 (education, and the right to take part in cultural life) were considered as ‘cultural rights’.327 It has been claimed that under international law, five human rights as listed below are generally understood as ‘cultural rights’: 1. The right to education; 2. The right to participate in cultural life; 3. The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 4. The right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which the person is the author, and 5. The freedom for scientific research and creative activity.328

In general, however, the above distinction between ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ rights does not hold, both in theory and practice, and it is unproductive to seek to ­distinguish rights that are so closely intertwined.329 Although, as shown in chapter two, section IV, a definition of ‘economic rights’ is necessary in the context of Article 3 of the ICESCR, most of the rights in the Covenant fall into more than one category. For example, the CESCR has acknowledged that the right to education has been variously classified as an economic right, a social right and a cultural right. It is all of these. It is also, in many ways, a civil right and a political right, since it is central to the full and effective realisation of those rights as well.330

F. Non-derogability and Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights During and After Armed Conflicts [1.83]  Does the ICESCR apply fully in time of armed conflict (which may be international, including military occupation, or non-international, as defined in international humanitarian law (IHL)), war or other public emergency? An armed

325  HJ Steiner, ‘Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 25, 27, referring to rights in Arts 11–14 as ‘social rights’. 326  See eg T Daintith, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights’ (2004) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 56–90 at 58. 327  HJ Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and ­Morals, 3rd edn, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 276. 328  See E Stamatopoulou, ‘The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life’, UN Doc E/C.12/40/9 (9 May 2008) 3. 329  See P Alston, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in L Henkin and J Hargrove (eds), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century (Washington, DC, American Society of International Law, 1994) ch 6, 138. 330 CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of action for primary education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (10 May 1999) para 2.

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conflict is international where there is ‘resort to armed force between States’.331 It is a non-international­armed conflict (NIAC) where there is ‘protracted armed ­violence between ­governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’.332 The words ‘other public emergency’ could refer to any crisis situation due to natural causes, such as earthquake, tsunami, flood or hurricane, or post-conflict situations, eg institutional collapse post-conflict, which impair or violate human rights.333 They could also refer to other situations of concern, such as internal disturbances, protracted and low-intensity civil strife, political strife, ethnic and communal violence, and the suppression of mass uprisings that result in serious violations of human rights. [1.84]  Armed conflicts generally have a negative impact on the enjoyment of ESC rights by, inter alia, destroying means of survival, including food, shelter, crops and livestock, contaminating wells and water pumps,334 causing damage to schools and hospitals, and destroying housing and the diverse cultural heritage. As a result of armed conflicts, for instance, schools will shut, hospitals will close or their services may be severely reduced, individuals will be unable to work, thus undermining their source of income, there may be limited access to food and water, and the homes of civilians perceived to be allied to opponents may be destroyed. The rights to education, and to access to healthcare, food, water, housing and work will therefore be put in jeopardy.335 For example, in 2013 during the armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, more than 2,400 of the 20,000 schools were damaged by military operations, and thousands more were converted into shelters for displaced persons, undermining access to education.336 In addition, intentional and repeated attacks against medical facilities, personnel and vehicles, as well as the use of medical civilian facilities, including hospitals, for armed purposes, undermined access to health.337 The use of siege warfare, as part of the military strategy, led to violations of basic ESC rights to adequate water, food, housing and medical care.338 The CESCR recognises that armed conflicts or wars will have a negative impact on the protection of ESC rights. Thus in 2008 the Committee observed with respect to Angola that ‘[27] years of civil

331  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka ‘Dule’, Case no IT-94-1-A, International Tribunal for the Former ­ ugoslavia (ICTY), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October Y 1995, para 70. 332  Ibid. See also International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’, Opinion Paper (Geneva, 2008), available at http://www.icrc. org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 333  V Muñoz, ‘The Right to Education in Emergency Situations’, UN Doc A/HRC/8/10 (20 May 2008) para 5. 334  Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009) para 91; Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09, 12 July 2010, 7. 335  See UN, The International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic: Final Report (S/2014/928, 22 December 2014) 99–124. 336 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/22/59 (5 February 2013) para 116. 337  Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/ RES/22/24 (12 April 2013) para 6. 338  Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/25/65, (12 February 2014) paras 132–43.

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war, which followed a 13-year independence war had a serious negative impact on the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in the State party’.339 [1.85]  Generally, human rights law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict governed by IHL, save through the effect of provisions for derogation. This position has been confirmed by several bodies, including the ICJ,340 UN human rights treaty bodies (such as the CESCR341 and the HRC),342 the UN General Assembly343 and the Security Council,344 by judgments of international criminal tribunals,345 and by regional courts such as the ECtHR346 and domestic courts.347 It is clear that both human rights law and IHL aim at protecting all human beings and are grounded in the principles of respect for the life, well-being and human dignity of the person.348 The concurrent application of both human rights law and IHL in armed conflict enhances the rights of affected populations. [1.86]  It is crucial to note that, unlike some other human rights treaties (eg ICCPR, Article 4(1); ECHR, Article 17; AmCHR, Article 27), there are no clauses in the UN treaties protecting ESC rights (eg ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, ICERD, and the Migrant Workers Convention)349 that allow for, or prohibit, derogations in a state of emergency. Some international human rights treaties explicitly prohibit derogation from some provisions. For example, Article 2(2) of the CAT provides that ‘no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture’. The absence of specific derogation clauses from a treaty is not per se determinative of whether derogations are permitted or prohibited. In the case of the ICESCR, this may be taken to mean either (i) that derogations from ESC rights are not permissible (since they are not provided for, meaning that states have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights, whether or not an emergency situation prevails),350 or (ii) that they may be permissible for non-core obligations (since they are not explicitly

339 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Angola, UN Doc E/C.12/AGO/CO/3 (1 December 2008) para 7. 340  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 43 ILM 1009 (2004), para 112; Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Merits, [2005] ICJ Rep 168 (Judgment of 19 December 2005), 45 ILM 271 (2006), paras 216–17. 341  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.69, (31 August 2001), para 12. 342  Sergio Euben López Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No R.12/52, A/36/40, annex XIX, UN Doc A/36/40 at 176 (1981). 343  GA res 57/233, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc A/RES/57/233, (28 January 2003). 344  Resolution 2016 (2011), Situation in Libya, S/RES/2016 (2011), 27 October 2011; Resolution 1181, Situation in Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/RES/1181 (1998). 345  See, eg, ICTY, Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić, Case no IT-02-60/1-S, 2 December 2003, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf, para 89. 346  Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, (ECtHR, 28 December 1996), (1997) 23 EHRR 513, para 44. 347  See, eg, Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v Government of Israel and others, High Court of Justice, Case no 769/02, 14 December 2006, para 18. 348  Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2011) 7. See also, G Giacca, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). 349  Above n 9. 350  See the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights decisions cited in the next paragraph.

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prohibited), if the measures taken in respect to a public emergency or crisis are ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ and consistent with a state’s obligations under (treaty or customary) international law.351 [1.87]  The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Commission’) has taken the first view in a number of cases. For example, in Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad, the African Commission held: The African Charter, unlike other human rights instruments, does not allow for states parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations. Thus, even a civil war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse by the State violating or permitting violations of rights in the African Charter.352

The African Commission upheld a similar position in Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, holding that ‘[i]n contrast to other international human rights instruments, the African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. Therefore limitations on the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or special circumstances.’353 While it might be criticised as an unrealistically high standard to expect states never to derogate from rights even during legitimately declared states of emergency, occasioned by, for example, flooding, it is understandable in the African context, where emergencies have been abused.354 In case of the ICESCR, the travaux préparatoires of the ­ICESCR do not reveal any specific discussion on the issue of whether or not a derogation clause was considered necessary, or even appropriate. Thus the possible reasons for its ­omission are open to speculation. It is possible that this could have been as a result of a combination of factors, including: (i) the nature of the rights protected in the Covenant; (ii) the existence of a general limitations clause in Article 4 of the ­Covenant; and (iii) the ‘more flexible and accommodating’ nature of the general obligation contained in Article 2(1).355 [1.88]  In General Comment 3 (1990), the Committee confirmed that states parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of all of the rights enunciated in the Covenant—eg at least essential healthcare, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs and the most basic forms of education (see chapter two). Accordingly, the CESCR has taken the view that core obligations arising from the rights recognised in the Covenant are non-derogable. This is clear from some of the Committee’s General Comments cited below: CESCR, General Comment 14, highest attainable standard of health para 47: ‘It should be stressed, however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out …, which are non-derogable.’

351 

ECHR, Art 15. Communication No 74/92 (1995), para 21; (2000) AHRLR 66 (9th Annual Activity Report). 353 Communication Nos 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), para 41; (2000) AHRLR 212 (12th Annual ­Activity Report). 354  F Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 252–53. 355  P Alston and G Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 217. See also Craven, above n 244, 27. 352 

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CESCR, General Comment 15, the right to water para 40: ‘A State party cannot justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out … which are non-derogable.’

[1.89]  It can thus be argued that without a clause providing for derogation in the ICESCR, core obligations arising from ESC rights cannot be derogated from in an emergency, including a situation of military occupation. This position is defensible because, in times of emergency, inequality and discrimination increase for marginalised groups (such as women and girls, persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS, ethnic minorities, and indigenous and migrant communities), who suffer double or perhaps multiple discrimination.356 The rights of these groups, therefore, deserve more, rather than less, protection during emergencies, if necessary by seeking international cooperation and assistance. Prolonged periods of violence and armed conflict often result in a breakdown of systems and infrastructure, including education and health systems, leaving persons with disabilities more vulnerable.357 For example, during the conflict in Libya in 2011, a range of actions was taken by government forces that had the effect of impeding or preventing altogether access to medical care. These actions included ‘refusing assistance in the immediate aftermath of demonstrations, later interrupting access to hospitals, taking action against medical personnel and allegedly abducting persons from hospitals’.358 [1.90]  Similarly, the armed conflict in Syria in 2013 was characterised by widespread violations of the right to health: The deliberate targeting of hospitals, medical personnel and transports, the denial of access to medical care, and ill-treatment of the sick and wounded, has been one of the most alarming features of the Syrian conflict … Government forces and affiliated militias interfere with and instrumentalise medical care to further strategic and military aims … Government forces deny medical care to those from opposition-controlled and affiliated areas as a matter of policy. The policy is implemented through attacks on medical units, by endangering hospitals, targeting medical personnel, and interfering with patients receiving treatment. Victims relay harrowing accounts of the wounded and sick languishing at checkpoints unable to reach medical treatment, coming under renewed attack in hospital and doctors providing impartial aid being arrested and targeted. There is also evidence that some anti-Government armed groups have attacked hospitals in certain areas … Violence against healthcare has significant compound effects, causing dramatic increases in mortality among the sick and wounded. The breakdown of medical services in wartime disproportionately affects vulnerable segments of the population, such as children under the age of five, nursing mothers, the disabled and elderly.359

[1.91]  In addition, armed conflicts involve sieges and attacks on food security,360 ­large-scale internal displacement of people, psychological and emotional distress 356 

Muñoz, above n 333, paras 88–99. generally Human Rights Watch, As If We Weren’t Human: Discrimination and Violence against Women with Disabilities in Northern Uganda (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2010); Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education (Paris, UNESCO, 2011). 358  See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc A/HRC/17/44 (12 January 2012) para 129. 359 See Assault on Medical Care in Syria, UN Doc A/HRC/24/CRP.2 (13 September 2013) paras 1 and 38. 360  See, eg, United Nations, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the ­Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/24/46 (16 August 2013) paras 171–90. 357  See

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caused by unemployment and traumatic disorders related to the armed conflict, and diversion of resources from ESC rights.361 Due to the diversion of resources to military or police needs, conflicts often reduce the availability of resources, which may, at times, be detrimental to the progressive realisation of ESC rights. Despite the negative consequences of armed conflict, the CESCR has confirmed that: it is precisely in situations of crisis, that the Covenant requires the protection and promotion of all economic, social and cultural rights, in particular of the most marginalized and disadvantaged groups of the society, to the best of its ability under the prevailing adverse conditions.362

[1.92]  In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall Advisory Opinion),363 the ICJ asserted the applicability of the ICESCR in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It cited Concluding Observations of the CESCR and also stated that Israel ‘is under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been trans­ferred to Palestinian authorities’.364 Relevant provisions in­clude the right to work (Articles 6 and 7); protection and assistance accorded to the family and to children and young persons (Article 10); the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and the right ‘to be free from hunger’ (Article 11); the right to health (Article 12); the right to education (Articles 13 and 14); and the right to take part in cultural life (Article 15). The ICJ also stated that, save through the effect of provisions for derogation, ‘the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict’.365 [1.93]  Similarly the UN General Assembly confirmed in 1970 the applicability of human rights norms in times of armed conflict, stating that ‘Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict.’366 All UN member states are required to respect human rights obligations in all situations, including when states implement measures adopted by the UN Security Council in the name of international peace and security. In principle, respect for human rights applies to situations of emergency caused not only by armed conflict, but also by natural disasters or other types of emergency. It extends to ESC rights as protected by the ICESCR and other UN human rights treaties, too. Thus the CESCR has rejected the view that ESC rights do not apply during armed conflicts: The Committee rejects the State party’s assertion regarding the distinction between human rights and humanitarian law under international law to support its argument that the 361 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.24 (1998) para 5; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc E/C.12//LKA/CO/2-4 (9 December 2010) paras 29 and 35; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Serbia and Montenegro, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.108 (23 June 2005) para 23; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, UN Doc E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4 (2010) para 42. 362  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc EC.12/COL/CO/5 (7 June 2010) para 7. 363  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004 [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 43 ILM 1009 (2004). 364  Ibid, para 112. 365  Ibid, para 106. 366 See Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts, UN General Assembly Resolution 2675 (xxv), 9 December 1970, para 1.

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­ ommittee’s mandate ‘cannot relate to events in the Gaza Strip and West Bank’. The ComC mittee reminds the State party that even during armed conflict, fundamental human rights must be respected and that basic economic, social and cultural rights as part of the minimum standards of human rights are guaranteed under customary international law and are also prescribed by international humanitarian law.367

[1.94]  Therefore the applicability of rules of IHL does not by itself impede the application of human rights treaties such as the ICESCR, or the accountability of the state under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR for the actions of its authorities.368 Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, binding parties to a NIAC, requires humane treatment of persons taking no active part in the hostilities, and that the wounded and sick be collected and cared for. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR), in Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina,369 stated that its ­authority to apply IHL could be derived from the overlap between norms of the AmCHR and the Geneva Conventions. The Inter-American Commission stated, ‘[i]ndeed, the provisions of Common Article 3 are essentially pure human rights law … Article 3 basically requires the State to do, in large measure, what it is already legally obliged to do under the American Convention’.370 Customary IHL (evidence of a general state practice accepted as law)371 also affords special protection to hospitals, medical units and healthcare personnel.372 [1.95]  Some of the General Comments of the CESCR have confirmed this position. For example in General Comment 15, on the right to water, the Committee noted that ‘during armed conflicts, emergency situations and natural disasters, the right to water embraces those obligations by which States parties are bound under international humanitarian law’.373 This includes the protection of objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, including drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, protection of the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage, and ensuring that civilians, internees and prisoners have access to adequate water.374 Thus, the absence of a clause allowing derogation in times of public emergency in the ICESCR indicates that the Covenant generally continues to apply in times of emergency induced not only by armed conflict, but also by natural disaster or any other type of emergency;375 and, as a minimum, states cannot 367 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.69 (31 August 2001) para 12. CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.90 (23 May 2003) para 31. 369  Juan Carlos Abella v Argentina, Report No 55/97, Case 11.137, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev at 271 (1997). 370  Ibid, fn 19. 371  Statute of the International Court of Justice,1946, Art 38; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3. 372  See ICRC, Customary IHL, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. 373  CESCR, General Comment 15, para 22. For the interrelationship of human rights law and humanitarian law, the Committee noted the conclusions of the ICJ in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Request by the General Assembly, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 25. 374  CESCR, above n 373, citing Arts 54 and 56, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Art 54, Additional Protocol II (1977), Arts 20 and 46 of the third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 375  See E Mottershaw, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 12(3) International Journal of Human Rights 449; RJ Barber, ‘Protecting the Right to Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: Standard in International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 432. 368 

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derogate from the Covenant’s core obligations. In the words of the CESCR, ‘because core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster’.376 Does this mean that states can derogate from noncore ­obligations under the ICESCR, provided they comply with the general rules of derogation? The Committee’s use of the word ‘non-derogable’ in relation to core obligations might be interpreted as implying that other non-core obligations are indeed derogable. ­However, it is vital to note that the statement of the Committee was not a general reference to derogations under the Covenant but a specific example of the non-­derogable nature of core obligations in the context of poverty. Therefore, it cannot be taken as being conclusive on the question of whether or not states can derogate from non-core aspects of ESC rights. Given the nature of the rights protected in the Covenant, the existence of a general limitations clause in Article 4 and the fact that states are not required to do more than what the maximum available resources permit, derogations from the ICESCR in situations of conflict, war, emergency and natural disaster would be unnecessary. In particular, the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of ESC rights, as protected in Article 3 of the ICESCR, ‘sets a nonderogable standard for compliance with the obligations of States parties as set out in articles 6 through 15 of ICESCR’.377 [1.96]  Since impunity for gross human rights violations and serious violations of IHL is a major obstacle to the enjoyment of ESC rights,378 states must firmly combat impunity by investigating all cases of alleged violations of human rights and serious ­violations of the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international­ armed conflict, prosecuting and sentencing those responsible in (post-)conflict ­situations379 at least for violations amounting to war crimes.380 Such crimes include extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects and units, or against vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance; attacking or bombarding towns, villages, dwellings or buildings that are undefended and which are not military objectives; and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities.381 [1.97]  The need to respect human rights at a time when individuals and groups may be ‘at their most vulnerable’, namely during armed conflict, is now firmly and very well

376 

CESCR, ‘Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR’, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.59 (21 May 2001) para 18. CESCR, General Comment 16, para 17. 378  CESCR, Concluding Observations: DRC, UN Doc E/CN.12/COD/4 (2009) para 6. 379  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc EC.12/Col/CO/5 (21 May 2010) paras 12, 15, 16, 28. 380  Case of The Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v El Salvador, Inter-American Court Of Human Rights, (Merits, reparations and costs), Judgment of 25 October 2012, paras 285–86. 381  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc 2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002, Art 8; The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012). 377 

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established.382 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated: During times of armed conflict, all persons must now be more aware of the obligations upon them in relation to fellow combatants and protected persons, particularly civilians. Thus, it is hoped that the Tribunal and other international courts are bringing about the development of a culture of respect for the rule of law and not simply the fear of the consequences of breaking the law, and thereby deterring the commission of crimes.383

[1.98]  It is important to note that in recent years there has been an increase in threats and attacks by NSAs and military counter-operations, which have had a negative impact on ESC rights of women and girls, who are the prime target of such threats and attacks. There have been public threats against female students, teachers and professors by various NSAs, as well as an escalating number of attacks on educational institutions, in particular on a large number of girls-only schools.384 Thus, it is necessary to address gender-based violence during and after a conflict. This would require states to [p]revent, investigate and punish gender-based violence by non-State actors in conflictaffected areas, including by adopting specific investigative procedures, gender-sensitive training and codes of conduct for police, military, lawyers, magistrates, psychologists and health professionals, as well as institute measures to increase access to justice that are responsive to the needs of victims of gender-based violence and provide adequate reparation to affected women and girls.385 [t]ake the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of attacks and threats against educational institutions which undermine the fundamental rights of women and girls, in particular, the right to education, and to ensure that perpetrators of such acts of violence are promptly investigated, prosecuted and punished.386

[1.99]  While states may at the end of hostilities ‘grant the broadest possible amnesty’ to persons who have participated in the armed conflict,387 blanket amnesties should not be extended to serious human rights violations388 nor should ‘amnesties in relation to serious international crimes, based on a duty to investigate and prosecute these crimes and to punish their perpetrators’.389 Violations of all human rights, including

382 ICTY, Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić, Case No IT-02-60/1-S, 2 December 2003, available at http://www. icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf, para 86. 383  Ibid, para 89. 384  See, eg, CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Pakistan, UN Doc CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4 (27 March 2013) para 27. 385  Ibid, para 14(a). 386  Ibid, para 28(c). 387  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, Art 6(5). 388  See, eg, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Barrios Altos v Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C No 75, para 41: ‘This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights law.’ 389  See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 3 November 2011, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/ default/files/documents/courtdoc/E51_15_EN.PDF, para 53.

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ESC rights, whether committed by state officials390 or NSAs, must be addressed in the context of transitional justice.391 This includes ‘processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.392 Thus transitional justice incorporates the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures, including, among others, individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting of public employees and officials, or an appropriately conceived combination thereof, in order to, inter alia, ensure accountability, serve justice, provide remedies to victims, promote healing and reconciliation, establish independent oversight of the security system and restore confidence in the institutions of the State and promote the rule of law in accordance with international human rights law.393

[1.100]  Although, at the time of writing, ‘no international treaty explicitly ­prohibits the granting of amnesty in respect of graves breaches of fundamental human rights’,394 it is not disputed that international bodies have considered amnesty laws incompatible with certain treaty provisions on human rights, in particular those relating to the provision of effective judicial remedies for any violations of human rights.395 Thus ‘blanket’ amnesties, which prevent legal proceedings against all persons without distinction and without any form of accountability, ‘would seriously undermine the States’ duty to investigate and punish the perpetrators of such acts [grave breaches of fundamental human rights]’.396 [1.101]  States should also refrain from granting immunity from criminal prosecution or punishment to heads of state and other state officials for international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide), which applies to gross violations of ESC rights. Such crimes include intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of

390 

See, eg, Barrios Altos v Peru, above n 388. See also Human Rights Council Resolution on Transitional Justice and Human Rights, UN Doc A/ HRC/RES/12/11 (12 October 2009) para 13. 392 See Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (March 2010), available at http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf, 2. 393  UN Doc A/HRC/RES/12/11, para 4. 394  Marguš v Croatia, App no 4455/10 (Grand Chamber of ECtHR, 27 May 2014) para 131. 395  See, eg, HRC, Rodríguez v Uruguay, Communication No 322/1988, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, 9 August 1994, para 12.4: ‘The Committee moreover reaffirms its position that amnesties for gross violations of human rights and legislation such as the Law No 15,848, Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado [Limitations Act or Law of Expiry] are incompatible with the obligations of the State party under the Covenant. The Committee notes with deep concern that the adoption of this law effectively excludes in a number of cases the possibility of investigation into past human rights abuses and thereby prevents the State party from discharging its responsibility to provide effective remedies to the victims of those abuses. Moreover, the Committee is concerned that, in adopting this law, the State party has contributed to an atmosphere of impunity which may undermine the democratic order and give rise to further grave human rights violations.’ 396  Marguš v Croatia, above n 394, para 138. The Court noted in para 139: ‘A growing tendency in international law is to see such amnesties as unacceptable because they are incompatible with the unanimously recognised obligation of States to prosecute and punish grave breaches of fundamental human rights. Even if it were to be accepted that amnesties are possible where there are some particular circumstances, such as a reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation to the victims, the amnesty granted to the applicant in the instant case would still not be acceptable since there is nothing to indicate that there were any such circumstances.’ 391 

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warfare, including wilfully impeding relief supplies;397 wilfully causing great suffering to the body or health of one or more persons during an armed conflict;398 extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity;399 intentionally directing attacks (in the context of an international armed conflict) against civilian objects, eg civilian houses, schools, health centres, hospitals;400 genocide by deliberately inflicting ‘conditions of life’, eg deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes, calculated to bring about physical destruction intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such;401 and the crimes against humanity of ‘extermination’402 and ‘persecution’403 based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.404 It is vital to note further that statutes of international criminal tribunals provided that: The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.405

G.  Extraterritorial Application and Scope of the Covenant [1.102]  The extraterritorial application of international human rights treaties, including the extraterritorial scope of ESC rights, has emerged as one of the pressing issues in international human rights law.406 This is destined to remain so, given that actions or omissions of states parties to human rights treaties increasingly have an impact on the (non-)enjoyment of the human rights, including ESC rights, of individuals and groups

397 

Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 381, Art 8(2)(b)(xxv). Ibid, Art 8(2)(a) (iii); ICC, Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). 399  Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 381, Art 8(2)(a)(iv). 400  Ibid, Art 8(2)(b)(ii). 401  Ibid, Art 6(c). 402  Ibid, Arts 7(1) (b) and 7(2)(b). ‘“Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.’ 403  Ibid, Art 7(2)(g). ‘“Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.’ 404  Ibid, Art 7(1)(h). 405  See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY Statute), UN Doc S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), Article 7(2); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994), 33 ILM 1598, 1600 (1994), Art 6(2). See also International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Charter), 82 UNTS 280, entered into force 8 August 1945, Art 7. 406  See, eg, M Langford et al (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); B Van Schaack, ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’ (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20; K Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), focusing on the ICCPR, ECHR and CAT; SH Cleveland, ‘Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad’ (2010) 110 Columbia Law Review 225. 398 

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beyond national territorial borders.407 Treaties are generally binding upon ‘each party in respect of its entire territory’, unless ‘a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established’.408 ‘Territory’ embraces all the land, international waters and territorial sea, and the airspace above them, over which a party has sovereignty.409 But are states parties’ human rights obligations arising under the ICESCR limited to individuals and groups within a state’s territory, or can a state be liable for the acts and omissions of its agents that produce effects or are undertaken beyond national territory (eg to those individuals and groups who are not within the state’s territory but who are subject to a state’s jurisdiction or effective control)? The ICESCR, unlike the majority of other human rights treaties (eg the ICCPR, Article 2(1)), does not make any explicit reference to territory or jurisdiction. Thus, its scope of application is not specified. Although the CESCR seems to be encouraging states to regulate or otherwise impact upon acts of NSAs both within and outside its borders,410 it has not discussed state duties regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction in detail or with great clarity (in a comprehensive statement or General Comment) to explain the legal basis for extraterritorial obligations and the nature of such obligations under the Covenant. However, it has introduced some basic notions in some of its General Comments and Concluding Observations. For example, in its General Comment on the right to social security, adopted on 23 November 2007, the Committee stated: States parties should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by preventing their own citizens and national entities from violating this right in other countries. Where States parties can take steps to influence third parties (non-State actors) within their jurisdiction to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.411

[1.103]  Extraterritorial obligations in the area of ESC rights extend to: (a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory; and (b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to realize human rights universally.412

407  F Coomans and R Künnemann (eds), Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012); Van Schaack, above n 406, 52: ‘The current state of the law would thus dictate that human rights obligations exist wherever a State exercises de facto authority or control over territory, individuals, or a transaction and has the power to respect and ensure the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.’ 408  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 63, Art 29. 409 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 178. 410  In 1999, one Committee member asked ‘whether Germany exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over German nationals who committed crimes against children abroad’. See CESCR, ‘Summary Record of the 49th Meeting: Germany’, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/SR.49 (30 August 2001) para 48. 411  CESCR, General Comment 19, para 54, emphasis added. See also CESCR, General Comment 15, para 33. 412  See Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States, above n 219, Principle 8.

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A state’s extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect and fulfill ESC rights in other states arise in any of the following: (a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether or not such ­control is exercised in accordance with international law; (b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; (c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.413

[1.104]  Such situations could arise in several areas, including trade, development, investment, military support and occupation (Cyprus414 and Iraq415),416 foreign arrests (Kenya),417 foreign detentions and purported atrocities committed by security forces on the ground (Iraq),418 and bombing missions (Yugoslavia).419 Compliance with a state’s extraterritorial obligations in the area of ESC rights could be observed by carrying out (and responding appropriately to) comprehensive human rights impact assessments of laws, policies and practices, with public participation, prior to, during and after any acts or omissions bringing about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of ESC rights in other states, eg trade, development, investment, military support and occupation. Although the extraterritorial obligation to protect against human rights violations in other states was framed using weak language by the CESCR in the Comment above (ie states ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’), there is no justification for a state to do beyond its borders what it is prohibited to do at home, namely causing harm or violating ESC rights of individuals, groups and peoples in other states. In any case, CIL prohibits a state from allowing its territory to be used to cause damage on the territory of another state.420 States must desist from acts and omissions that create a

413 

Ibid, Principle 9. See, eg, the ECtHR in the following cases: Cyprus v Turkey App nos 6780/75 et al, Admissibility, 26 May 1975; Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, Preliminary Objections 23 March 1995, Series A no 310, (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Loizidou v Turkey, App no 15318/89, Merits, 18 December 1996, (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, Merits, 10 May 2001, (2002) 35 EHRR 731. 415  Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, App nos 55721/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction (ECtHR, 7 July 2011); Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, Decision of 16 November 2004, (2005) 41 EHRRR 567, para 71. 416  See, eg, F Coomans, ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 11(1) Human Rights Law Review 1; F Coomans and R Künnemann, Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford, Intersentia, 2012); and M Langford, W Vandenhole, M Scheinin and Wan Genugten (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 417  Öcalan v Turkey, App no 46221/99, Admissibility (ECtHR, 4 December 2000). 418  Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, Admissibility (ECtHR, 30 May 2000); Hassan v United Kingdom, App no 29750/09, Admissibility and Merits (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 419  Banković and Others v Belgium and Others, App no 52207/99, Admissibility (ECtHR, 12 December 2001). 420  Trail Smelter Case (US v Canada), 3 RIAA 1905 (1941). See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (8 July 1996). 414 

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‘real risk of nullifying or impairing’ the enjoyment of ESC rights extraterritorially.421 The CESCR has stated that [w]hen an external party takes upon itself even partial responsibility for the situation within a country (whether under Chapter VII of the [UN] Charter or otherwise), it also unavoidably assumes a responsibility to do all within its power to protect the economic, social and cultural rights of the affected population.422

[1.105]  States must ensure that development cooperation programmes are consistent with human rights obligations of all states involved. In particular, a state party to the ICESCR is obliged to refrain from supporting programmes in other states resulting in violations of ESC rights. In its Concluding Observations on Germany the CESCR asserted: 11.  The Committee is concerned that the State party’s development cooperation programme has supported projects that have reportedly resulted in the violation of economic, social and cultural rights, such as in the case of the land-titling project in Cambodia (arts 2.1, 11, 22 and 23). The Committee recommends that the development cooperation policies to be adopted by the State party contribute to the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Covenant and do not result in their violation.423

[1.106]  The Committee should increasingly and consistently engage more with states on the extraterritorial dimensions of their policies and omissions on the enjoyment of ESC rights abroad. It is worth noting that in 2013, a member of the Committee addressed the following questions to the delegation of Norway during the consideration of its report: Did Norway’s international cooperation projects take into consideration human rights when deciding on how to distribute aid? Was attention paid to possible violations of human rights in third countries, due to the investment of Norway’s public funds? Was it affecting the State party’s extraterritorial obligations?424

In its Concluding Observations the Committee expressed concern that the various steps taken by Norway in the context of the social responsibility of the Government Pension Fund Global had not included the institutionalisation of systematic human rights impact assessments of its investments. Thus the Committee recommended that the State party ensure that investments by the Norges Bank Investment Management in ­foreign companies operating in third countries are subject to a comprehensive human rights impact assessment (prior to and during the investment). The Committee also recommends that the State party adopt policies and other measures to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations that have their main offices under the jurisdiction of the State party, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant. The Committee draws the attention of the State party to its statement

421 

Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States, above n 219, Principle 13. General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8 (1997), para 13. 423  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (12 July 2011) para 11. 424  ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers report of Norway’ (21 November 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14016&LangID=E. 422 CESCR,

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on the obligations of State parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights (E/2012/22, annex VI, section A).

[1.107]  The Committee has also commented on extraterritorial obligations of a state in the context of companies under a state party’s jurisdiction acting abroad. In 2014 the Committee recommended that Finland ‘[a]dopt appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure legal liability of companies and their subsidiaries based in or managed from the State party’s territory regarding violations of economic, social and cultural rights in their projects abroad’.425 [1.108]  Generally the extraterritorial application of human rights treaty law finds support in the express pronouncements of the ICJ on the issue.426 This has been so in the following cases: the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004;427 the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005;428 and the case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Order Indicating Provisional Measures, 15 October 2008.429 The significance of these pronouncements to the law on the extraterritorial application of human rights treaty law builds on an earlier general statement in the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion from decades earlier.430 [1.109]  In its Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ considered the rights contained in the ICESCR as ‘essentially territorial’.431 However, the Court did not state that the ­ICESCR obligations are exclusively territorial. Indeed, state obligations under international law in general,432 and international human rights law in particular, are not territorially limited.

425 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc E/C.12/FIN/CO/6 (28 November 2014), para 10(b). 426  See R Wilde, ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders at the World Court: The Significance of the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on the Extraterritorial Application of International Human Rights Law Treaties’ (2013) 12(4) Chinese Journal of International Law 639. 427  [2004] ICJ Rep 163 (9 July 2004) (hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion). 428  Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, [2000] ICJ Rep 111; Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras 216–17 (hereinafter DRC v Uganda). 429  Order Indicating Provisional Measures, 15 October 2008, No 35/2008, [2008] ICJ Rep 353 (­hereinafter Georgia v Russia (Provisional Measures)), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14801.pdf, paras 109, 149. 430  Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16 (hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion). 431 See Wall Advisory Opinion, above n 427, para 112. See also Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others 2001-XII 333, (2007) 44 EHRR SE5, in which the ECtHR stated that ‘from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial’. For a commentary on this case see, inter alia, S Williams and S Shah, ‘Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States’ (2002) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 775; and M Happold, ‘Bankovic v Belgium and the Territorial Scope of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 7. 432  Extra-territorial responsibility has been established in international law for decades. See, eg, ‘The Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision (United States of America, Canada)’ (1941) 35 The American Journal of International Law 78, 82. It was held that ‘no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury … in or to the territory of another’.

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[1.110]  The above position was confirmed by the ICJ in its decision in DRC v Uganda, where the Court determined that Uganda had occupied portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and therefore had ‘to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence by any third party’.433 It further stated that ‘international human rights instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own ­territory, particularly in occupied territories’.434 This must be the case in particular if a human rights treaty, as with the ICESCR, does not rule out the specific application of a treaty to the actions of a state when it acts beyond its territory. The effect of the 1998 ICJ Order on provisional measures in the Georgia v Russia (Provisional Measures) case supports this approach to extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. The Court stated that it observes that there is no restriction of a general nature in [the ICERD] relating to its territorial application; whereas it further notes that, in particular, neither Article 2 nor Article 5 of [ICERD], alleged violations of which [by Russia in Georgia] are invoked by Georgia, contain a specific territorial limitation … the Court consequently finds that these provisions of [ICERD] generally appear to apply, like other provisions of instruments of that nature, to the actions of a State party when it acts beyond its territory …435

In its Order the Court called upon ‘[b]oth Parties [Russia and Georgia], within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia’, to take certain acts to comply with the Convention, ie to ‘do all in their power to ensure that public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions’.436 This assumed the extraterritorial application of ICERD to Russian forces in Georgia.437 Just like the ICERD, provisions of the ICESCR do not contain a specific territorial limitation, and accordingly they generally apply to actions of states parties when they act in other states, eg through economic sanctions and military occupation. [1.111]  In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ made it clear that state responsibility is not limited to situations where a state enjoys title but extends to situations where a state enjoys ‘physical control over territory’. The ICJ stated that South Africa, which at the time was unlawfully occupying Namibia, was accountable for any violations … of the rights of the people of Namibia. The fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law towards other States in respect of the exercise of its powers in relation to this Territory. Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States.438

This Opinion is not a decision about any specific human rights treaty. However, it concerns the ‘rights of the people of Namibia’, including ESC rights. The references

433  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Merits, Judgment of 19 December 2005, 45 ILM 271 (2006), para 178. 434  Ibid, para 217. 435  Georgia v Russia (Provisional Measures), above n 429, para 109. 436  Ibid, para 149(4), emphasis added. 437  Ibid, para 149. 438  Namibia Advisory Opinion, above n 430, 54, para 118 (emphasis added).

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to ‘obligations and responsibilities under international law towards other States’ and ‘liability for acts affecting other States’ adopt an inter-State focus, although such a focus can include human rights given that obligations of this type are contained in treaties between states, and that certain such obligations (including those at issue in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the prohibition of racial discrimination and the right to self-determination) are regarded as operating erga omnes, and thus they are generally of interest on the part of all states. [1.112]  Thus, the principal international human rights treaties—the ICCPR, Article 2(1); the ECHR, Article 1; CAT, Article 2(1); and the AmCHR, ­Article 1(1)—expressly extend state obligations both to individuals within a state’s ­territory and to those individuals who are not within the state’s territory but who are subject to a state’s jurisdiction (wherever a state factually exercises powers that affect the enjoyment of human rights).439 The term ‘jurisdiction’ has multiple meanings across different branches of the law, but as used in the present context it is meant to denote the power that a state exercises under international law over persons (both natural and legal) or territory and its inhabitants. It is not limited to the national territory of the states parties; state responsibility can be involved because of acts and omissions of state agents or authorities, whether operating lawfully or unlawfully (eg as a result of military action in another state), that produce effects (eg human rights violations) outside a state’s own territory.440 In this respect the IACmHR asserted: Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person’s humanity, each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons within a state’s territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state—usually through the acts of the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim’s 439  See, eg, HRC, General Comment No 31 (80): The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (26 May 2004) para 10; Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication no R.12/52, UN Doc Supp no 40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981), para 12.3; Ibrahima Gueye et al v France, Communication no 196/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985 (6 April 1989); IACmHR, Victor Saldaño v Argentina, Petition, Report No 38/99 (11 March 1999), OEA/ Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev, 289 (1998), para 17. The Commission stated that ‘the term “jurisdiction” in the sense of Article 1(1) is [not] limited to or merely coextensive with national territory. Rather, the Commission is of the view that a state party to the American Convention may be responsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that state’s own territory.’ On jurisdiction clauses in human rights treaties, see M Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 411–48. 440  See the ECtHR in Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, App no 12747/8, judgment of 26 June 1992, (1992) 14 EHRR 745, para 91; Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App no 15318/89, (1995) 20 EHRR 99, paras 52 and 62; Loizidou v Turkey (Merits), App no 15318/89, (1997) 23 EHRR 513, paras 52–57. This decision was confirmed in Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, (2002) 35 EHRR 30, paras 76–81; Issa and Others v Turkey, App no 31821/96, Decision of 16 November 2004, (2005) 41 EHRR 567, para 71; Medvedyev and Others v France, App no 3394/03 (ECtHR, 23 March 2010); Al-Sadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom, App no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010); Sabah Jaloud v The Netherlands, App no 47708/08 (ECtHR, 20 November 2014) para 138. For a detailed discussion of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in public international law, see generally Harris, above n 92, 227–320; Shaw, above n 29, 469–505; J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 447–506; C Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in M Evans (ed), International Law, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 309; and M Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972–73) 46 British Year Book of International Law 145.

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nationality or presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.441

[1.113]  In principle the above position should also apply to states other than US States, and also to ESC rights subject to the limits imposed by the principle of nonintervention under the UN Charter and applicable international law. The extraterritorial (transnational, external, international or third state) application of the ICESCR is supported by the reference to ‘international assistance and cooperation’ in Article 2(1) of the Covenant (see chapter two) and the reference to ‘jurisdiction’ in Article 14.442 That such obligations exist is also reflected in a number of General Comments of the CESCR that interpret state obligations as extending to individuals under a state’s jurisdiction. General Comment 1 indicates that a state party to the ICESCR has to monitor the actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis, and must thus be aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by ‘all individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction’.443 In General Comment 8 the CESCR asserted that a state affected by the imposition of economic sanctions has to ‘provide the greatest possible protection for the economic, social and cultural rights of each individual living within its jurisdiction’.444 Further, the Committee indicated that states imposing sanctions are under an obligation to take ESC rights fully into account when designing an ‘appropriate sanctions regime’, to ­monitor effectively and protect those rights of the affected persons and take appropriate steps ‘in order to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country’.445 Therefore, state obligations with respect to the Covenant apply to individuals and groups within a state’s territory, and to those individuals who are subject to a state’s jurisdiction. Hence there is an obligation to take ‘steps’ to prevent violations both within and outside a state’s borders. [1.114]  By way of example, in General Comments 14 and 15 the CESCR noted that health facilities, goods, services and water have to be accessible to everyone, ‘without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party’.446 In its Concluding Observations of 1998 on Israel, the CESCR confirmed that ‘the State’s obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective control’;447 and

441 

Coard et al v United States, Case 10.951, Report no 109/99 (29 September 1999), IACmHR, para 37. 14 of the ICESCR provides: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.’ 443  CESCR, General Comment 1: Reporting by States Parties (Third Session, 1989), UN Doc E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989), para 3 (emphasis added). 444  CESCR, General Comment 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997), para 10 (emphasis added). 445  Ibid, paras 12–14; M Craven, ‘The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in M Baderin and R McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 71, 76. 446  CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000), para 12(b); CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), para 12(c) (emphasis added). 447  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.27 (4 December 1998), para 8. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.90 (23 May 2003), paras 15 and 31. 442  Art

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that ‘the Covenant applies to all areas where Israel maintains geographical, functional or personal jurisdiction’.448 Thus, under the Optional Protocol, ‘[c]ommunications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State Party’.449 A state party to the Optional Protocol is obliged to take all appropriate measures to ensure that ‘individuals under its jurisdiction’ are not subjected to any form of ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of submitting a communication to the Committee pursuant to the Optional Protocol.450 This means that a state can be found to be in violation of its obligations under the ICESCR for actions taken by it extraterritorially, in relation to anyone within the power, effective control or authority of that state, as well as within ‘all areas where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with international law’.451 Where many actors (states and NSAs) have collectively or jointly contributed to human rights violations in another state, liability and responsibility for such violations should be divided based on the relative power of each entity in causing the violation and the ability to have ended such a violation.452 Where it is not possible to disaggregate such actions or omissions leading to human rights violations and attribute them to individual states (eg in situations where a state does not act alone but in concert with one or more other states, or as part of a multilateral effort), relevant states should be held jointly responsible under international law. [1.115]  It is vital to note that, in appropriate cases, national courts can play a key role in holding states accountable for human rights violations beyond state borders. Two examples illustrate the point. First, in National Commissioner of the South ­African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre,453 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa held that South African Police Service (SAPS) was empowered to investigate the alleged crimes against humanity involving torture (allegedly committed in Zimbabwe by certain named Zimbabwean officials against ­Zimbabwean nationals),454 irrespective of whether or not the alleged perpetrators were present in South Africa. On appeal, the Constitutional Court of South Africa confirmed that ‘presence of any kind, even anticipated presence, is not a prerequisite for an investigation into the torture allegations’.455 The Court observed that while ‘the finding that the SAPS does have the power to investigate is unassailable, the point of departure is

448 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.27 (4 December 1998), para 6. See Appendix B, Art 2. 450  Ibid, Art 13. 451  See Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 (24 January 2008), para 16. See also generally R McCorquodale and P Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 7(4) MLR 598. See also F Coomans and MT Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2004). 452  T Howland, ‘The Multi-State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2007) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 389, 408–10. 453  National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre, 485/2012, [2013] ZASCA 168 (27 November 2013). 454 It was alleged that six Cabinet Ministers and Directors General and the ruling party itself were implicated as suspects in the commission of the alleged crimes against humanity of torture. See National Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14) [2014] ZACC 30 (30 October 2014), para 62. 455  Ibid, paras 73 and 81. 449 

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that the SAPS has a duty to investigate the alleged crimes against h ­ umanity of torture, committed outside South Africa’s territory.456 The Constitutional Court observed that ‘the customary international law nature of the crime of torture underscores the duty to investigate this type of crime’.457 In the Court’s view, [t]he alleged acts of torture were perpetrated in Zimbabwe, by and against Zimbabwean nationals. None of the perpetrators is present in South Africa. However, the duty to combat torture travels beyond the borders of Zimbabwe … South Africa may, through universal jurisdiction, assert prescriptive and, to some degree, adjudicative jurisdiction by investigating the allegations of torture as a precursor to taking a possible next step against the alleged perpetrators such as a prosecution or an extradition request.458

[1.116]  However, the Court noted that extraterritorial investigation of international crimes is subject to principles of complementarity and subsidiarity, as well as practicality. This means that ‘investigating international crimes committed abroad is permissible only if the country with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prosecute and only if the investigation is confined to the territory of the investigating state’.459 Practicality requires consideration of ‘whether embarking on an investigation into an international crime committed elsewhere is reasonable and practicable in the circumstances of each particular case’.460 This requires taking into account several factors: Foremost amongst these considerations are whether the investigation is likely to lead to a prosecution and accordingly whether the alleged perpetrators are likely to be present in South Africa on their own or through an extradition request; the geographical proximity of South Africa to the place of the crime and the likelihood of the suspects being arrested for the purpose of prosecution; the prospects of gathering evidence which is needed to satisfy the elements of a crime; and the nature and the extent of the resources required for an effective investigation.461

Where does the extraterritorial obligation stop? If the SAPS is required to investigate alleged torture in Zimbabwe committed allegedly by Zimbabweans who have never set foot in South Africa, is it also required to investigate alleged torture perpetrated in Iraq and Guantanamo? In principle, some widespread or systematic violations of ESC rights (eg extraterritorial acts of torture in the form of intentional denial of food or water) causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, can be investigated by another state if a territorial state with jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to prosecute and it is practical for another state to investigate. [1.117]  Secondly, on 13 June 2007, the Judicial Committee of the UK House of Lords, the country’s supreme judicial body at the time, delivered an important ruling on the application of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 (which effectively incorporates most

456 

Ibid, paras 55 and 61(emphasis added). Ibid, para 60(b). Ibid, para 49. The Court ordered in para 84(3)(b) that ‘[t]he South African Police Service must investigate the complaint’. 459  Ibid, para 61. 460  Ibid, para 63. 461  Ibid, para 64. 457  458 

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of the rights contained in the ECHR into UK law)462 to the actions of British troops in Iraq in the case of R (on the application of Al Skeini and Others) v the Secretary of State for Defence.463 The case concerned the deaths of six Iraqi civilians in Basra in 2003. Five of them, Hazim Jum’aa Gatteh Al-Skeini, Muhammad Abdul Ridha Salim, Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi, Waleed Sayay Muzban and Raid Hadi Sabir Al-Musawi, were shot dead by British military patrols. The sixth, Baha Mousa, was arrested and died at the hands of British troops in a military base. The families of the six victims asked the UK courts to overturn the Defence Secretary’s refusal to order an independent inquiry into the killings. Thus, the House of Lords had to consider whether the Human Rights Act 1998 applied to acts done outside the territory of the UK. [1.118]  By a majority of 4:1, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, that in principle the Human Rights Act 1998 did apply to UK public authorities when they acted outside the territory of the UK in relation to a person who was within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the UK within the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR. It was ruled that Baha Mousa, who was held in a British detention centre in Iraq when he died, did fall within the jurisdiction of the UK. This ruling represented a rejection of the argument that the UK Human Rights Act has a narrower scope than the ECHR. It also demonstrated that domestic courts can apply domestic law to reaffirm the principle that human rights treaties such as the ECHR can bind states parties even when they act outside their territory. Pursuant to the judgment, British forces thus can be held accountable for violations of the rights of individuals detained by them abroad. In principle there would be no justification for limiting the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties to protecting civil and political rights given the interdependent nature of all human rights. For example, unlawful detention or torture committed by state agents abroad could involve violations of a number of ESC rights, including the rights to adequate food, housing and health, for which a state could be held accountable. [1.119]  However, the Law Lords rejected the proposition that the ECHR similarly applied to the killings of the other five victims. Their Lordships found that there was no sufficient link between the Iraqi victims and the UK, because British troops did not have effective control over the area where the killings occurred. In so finding, they followed the restrictive unanimous decision of the ECtHR Grand Chamber in the Banković case,464 although it was acknowledged that ‘the judgments and decisions

462  The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated the following: Arts 2–12 and 14 of the ECHR, Arts 1–3 of the First Protocol, and Arts 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Arts 16–18 of the ECHR, subject to any designated derogation or reservation. 463  R (on the application of Al Skeini and Others) v the Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26. 464  Banković and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, App no 52207/99, (2001) 11 BHRC 435, (2007) 44 EHRR SE5 (Grand Chamber Decision of 12 December 2001 as to Admissibility). The ECtHR stated that ‘from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial’ (para 59) and that ‘article 1 of the convention [ECHR] must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case’ (para 61).

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of the European Court do not speak with one voice’,465 thus perhaps foreshadowing a likely complaint to the European Court and further clarification of the law in the future, as shown in the next paragraph. While this might be ­dis­appointing for the five claimants, it appears to reflect the reluctance of national courts to apply standards higher than those set by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the Banković case. [1.120]  However, it is worth noting that much of the reasoning in Banković case, though not explicitly overruled at the time of writing, has been superseded by subsequent case law, in particular the Grand Chamber judgment in Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom,466 which laid down the following principles: (i) (ii)

A State’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 [ECHR] is primarily territorial; Only exceptional circumstances give rise to exercise of jurisdiction by a State outside its own territorial boundaries; (iii) Whether there is an exercise of jurisdiction is a question of fact; (iv) There are two principal exceptions to territoriality: circumstances of ‘State agent authority and control’ and ‘effective control over an area’; (v) The ‘State agent authority and control’ exception applies to the acts of diplomatic and consular agents present on foreign territory; to circumstances where a Contracting State, through custom, treaty or agreement, exercises executive public powers or carries out judicial or executive functions on the territory of another State; and circumstances where the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual outside its territory, such as using force to take a person into custody or exerting full physical control over a person through apprehension or detention. (vi) The ‘effective control over an area’ exception applies where through military action, lawful or unlawful, the State exerts effective control of an area outside its national territory. (vii) In the exceptional circumstances of the cases before the Grand Chamber, where the United Kingdom had assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in South East Iraq, the United Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question, had exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.467

The ECtHR established that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not arise ‘solely from the control’ exercised by a state over an area (the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals are held).468 It also arises from de jure and/or de facto ‘control and authority over an individual’469 outside a State’s national territory, the Court observing that

465 

See above n 463, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, [67]. Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011). 467  Chagos Islanders v United Kingdom, App no 35622/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 2012). 468  Al-Skeini v UK, above n 466, para 136. 469  Ibid, para 137: ‘It is clear that, whenever the State, through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 [ECHR] to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual.’ 466 

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‘[w]hat is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question’.470 This has been applied in later cases.471 H.  Denunciation of or Withdrawal from the Covenant [1.121]  Denunciation of a treaty takes place when a state party withdraws from its membership of that treaty. Although the ICERD,472 which was adopted one year prior to the ICESCR, expressly permits denunciation,473 the drafters of the ICESCR deliberately did not provide for that possibility. Thus, the ICESCR neither explicitly prohibits nor permits withdrawals from it. Can a state party to the ICESCR therefore withdraw from the Covenant? That is, in the absence of any explicit provision in the ICESCR regarding the possibility of its termination and denunciation or withdrawal, can a right of denunciation or withdrawal be implied into the Covenant? Or can it be stated that the drafters of the ICESCR deliberately intended to exclude the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal? [1.122]  While in principle states may withdraw, at any time, from international treaties by ‘consent of all the parties’,474 withdrawals from human rights treaties are controversial and problematic, since they do have the effect of leaving individuals and groups within the jurisdiction of a particular state legally vulnerable to human rights violations. In the absence of an express provision on withdrawal, it is arguable that states parties to the ICESCR (and to other human rights treaties silent on denunciation or withdrawal, eg ICCPR) are prohibited from denouncing or withdrawing unless: (a) It is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) A right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.475

[1.123]  In case of the ICESCR, the omission of a provision regarding denunciation or withdrawal, as well as the nature of the rights protected in the Covenant, precludes the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. State practice confirms that states have not considered withdrawals from the ICESCR necessary, as no state, at the time of writing, had ever purported to withdrawal from the Covenant. In the case of the ICCPR, in August 1997, the Democratic Republic of North Korea (North Korea), in an unprecedented move, purported to withdraw from the ICCPR by giving a notice of withdrawal, thus terminating its obligations under that Covenant, after becoming upset

470 

Ibid, para 136. See, eg, Hirsi Jamaa and Other v Italy, App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012) paras 70–82; and Castan and Others v Moldova and Russia, App nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 October 2012) paras 111–23. 472  Above n 5. 473 ICERD, Art 21: ‘A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the ­Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary General.’ 474  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 63, Art 54: ‘The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) In conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or (b)At any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.’ 475  Ibid, Art 56. 471 

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about criticism of its human rights record.476 The UN Secretary-General informed North Korea that it could not withdraw unless all the other parties c­onsented.477 In practice it is highly unlikely that all states parties to the ICCPR or the ICESCR can consent to withdrawal. North Korea did not make any objection and thus appears to have accepted this position. [1.124]  In response to North Korea’s purported withdrawal from the ICCPR, the HRC issued General Comment 26 dealing with denunciation. While the General C ­ omment was issued in the context of the ICCPR, it is equally relevant to the ICESCR, since both covenants are not of a temporary character and codify in treaty form the u ­ niversal human rights enshrined in the UDHR. According to General Comment 26: 1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain any provision regarding its termination and does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal. Consequently, the possibility of termination, denunciation or withdrawal must be considered in the light of applicable rules of customary international law which are reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. On this basis, the Covenant is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or a right to do so is implied from the nature of the treaty. 2. That the parties to the Covenant did not admit the possibility of denunciation and that it was not a mere oversight on their part to omit reference to denunciation is demonstrated by the fact that … the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which was adopted one year prior to the Covenant, expressly permits denunciation. It can therefore be concluded that the drafters of the Covenant deliberately intended to exclude the possibility of denunciation … 3. Furthermore, it is clear that the Covenant is not the type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right of denunciation. Together with the simultaneously prepared and adopted International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant codifies in treaty form the universal human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the three instruments together often being referred to as the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’. As such, the Covenant does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision to that effect. 4. The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of the State party. The Human Rights Committee has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing practice, that once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in Government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. 5. The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law does not permit a State which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Covenant to denounce it or withdraw from it.478

476  The UN Secretariat circulated the notice of withdrawal to all states parties under cover of C.N.1997. TREATIES-10, 12 November 1997. 477 See UN Multilateral Treaties, ch IV.4, note on North Korea. 478 HRC, General Comment 26 (61): Continuity of Obligations, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (8 December 1997).

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The General Comment confirms that human rights (protected in an international treaty ratified by a state), in the absence of an express provision on withdrawal, cannot be withdrawn by a state at its will, since such rights are not granted by the state in the first place. North Korea did not make any objection to the above General Comment and thus appears to have accepted this position, as confirmed by its subsequent practice, eg it submitted a second periodic report in 2000479 and replied to the Committee’s Concluding Observations on this report in 2002.480

V. CONCLUSION [1.125]  This chapter has provided a background to the international protection of ESC rights, primarily under the ICESCR. This sets the scene for the analyses that follow. Human dignity underlies all human rights and was included in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR. Thus in its resolution 421(V) E, the UN General Assembly recognised that dignity requires full enjoyment of both civil and political rights and ESC rights. It has been shown that states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights in international law. It is clear from the foregoing that ESC rights are now widely accepted by states, at least viewed from the wide ratification of international treaties protecting this category of rights. However, it has to be noted that ratification of human rights treaties was not meant to be an end in itself. Nonetheless, in practice there is still ‘a serious rift between standard-setting and implementation’.481 While the existing international human rights system as regards ESC rights is rich in human rights norms and ideals, it is largely wanting in political will and enforcement. [1.126]  As shown in paragraph 1.63 above, until December 2008, when the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was adopted, the monitoring mechanism in respect of the ICESCR was still one of the weakest in the international human rights regime. The absence of a petition system under the ICESCR made it difficult for normative standards to be specifically developed and to provide effective remedies to specific victims of violations of ESC rights. Although the Optional Protocol entered into force on 5 May 2013, a significant majority of states parties to the ICESCR have yet to ratify it.482 This means that non-state parties to the Optional Protocol cannot be held more accountable for individual or group violations of ESC rights at the UN level under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. Therefore, it is essential to ratify the Optional Protocol in order to strengthen the existing system, as accountability tends to encourage the most effect­ive use of limited resources, as well as a shared responsibility among all actors. [1.127]  Despite its limitations, the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR by the General Assembly (allowing communications by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, inter-state communications, as well as an inquiry procedure) 479 

UN Doc CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2 (2000). UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/PRK/Add.1 (2002). 481  A Bayefsky, Report on the UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000) 682. 482  By December 2015, the Optional Protocol had only 45 signatories and 21 states parties. 480 

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to complement the periodic review of reports and the ratification of the Optional Protocol by states, would enhance the protection of ESC rights once its provisions are interpreted and implemented. This is because the complaints procedure would bring real problems confronting individuals and groups before an independent international body. Although NGOs were deliberately not provided with the locus standi to bring claims directly before the Committee, they could still bring claims of alleged violations of ESC rights ‘on behalf of’ victims. This has the potential to assist victims who lack the resources and awareness to submit a petition. This is likely to encourage states to ensure that more effective local remedies are available and accessible at a domestic level in respect of ESC rights. Nevertheless, since the views and recommendations of the CESCR under the Optional Protocol would not be legally binding, the creation of a World Court of Human Rights that also considers, inter alia, claims of violations of ESC rights should be given attention in the future. [1.128]  Nonetheless, individuals would not be guaranteed ESC rights generally merely because the international human rights treaties or the treaty-monitoring bodies indicate that they are entitled to such rights. While this is useful, the ultimate determinant is what the state has implemented, or is genuinely willing to implement, at the domestic level. In addition, the awareness by individuals of their human rights and their willingness to enforce them plays an essential role. There is a need to intensify human rights education, with sustained awareness-raising and legal literacy campaigns about ESC rights, since currently a limited élite inner circle of academics, activists and politicians tends to be aware of ESC rights, relevant state reports and the Concluding Observations of a UN Committee in respect of state reports. [1.129]  It has been shown that the absence of a clause allowing derogation in times of public emergency in the ICESCR indicates that the Covenant generally continues to apply. The implication of this is significant for states parties to the Covenant, because as a minimum, states can not derogate from the Covenant’s core obligations. It has been argued that states’ human rights obligations under the ICESCR may extend to anyone within the power, effective control or authority of a state, as well as within an area over which that state exercises effective overall control. In this respect ESC rights, though essentially territorial, are not necessarily territorially limited. Thus, the ICESCR applies with regard to all conduct by states parties’ authorities or agents adversely affecting the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant by persons under a state’s jurisdiction, regardless of the location. It would be desirable for the CESCR and other treaty monitoring bodies systematically to request states parties to include information about steps taken to prevent, regulate and adjudicate extraterritorial human rights violations in their periodic reports. [1.130]  Lastly, it has been argued that the drafters of the ICESCR, like those of the ICCPR, deliberately intended to exclude the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. Thus, any state’s purported denunciation of its human rights obligations under the ICESCR (just like withdrawal from the ICCPR) has no legal effect, since states are not permitted to extinguish their Covenant obligations under both treaties via denunciation.

2 State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights I. INTRODUCTION [2.01]  The ICESCR (or ‘the Covenant’) is the most comprehensive human rights treaty on ESC rights in international law. The Covenant contains important provisions in Articles 2–5 that contain the basic obligations of the states parties, and these have implications for the responsibilities of NSAs, as shown in chapter three. In this chapter, the human rights obligations of states arising from the general provisions in Part II of the ICESCR, Articles 2, 3 and 5, are examined, since these directly inform all the substantive ESC rights protected in Part III of the Covenant. Several questions are considered in this chapter arising out of Articles 2–5 of the Covenant. Specifically, what are the human rights obligations of states parties to the ICESCR? What is the scope of ‘international assistance and cooperation’? Does international cooperation require the developed states in the North to provide the developing states in the South with resources to realise ESC rights in the latter? Does it also require states not to impose on other states measures, rules and policies that might work against the progressive realisation of ESC rights? To what extent is a state obliged to eliminate discrimination, and to promote equality, in the enjoyment of all ESC rights? Given the limited available resources, can developing states discriminate against non-nationals in the enjoyment of ESC rights? What limitations on ESC rights are permissible under the Covenant? [2.02]  In addressing the above questions, the structure of this chapter is as follows. ­Section II. examines the human rights obligations arising from Article 2(1). ­Section III. deals with the scope of the obligation to guarantee non-discrimination and to promote equality, while section IV. deals with the obligations of developing states parties to the ICESCR with respect to non-nationals in developing states. ­Section V. discusses the limitations on ESC rights and safeguards against abuse of these rights. Section VI. concludes that the ICESCR lays down clear human rights obligations for states parties, noting that while the Covenant provides for ‘progressive realisation’ and acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of ‘available resources’, it also imposes various obligations that are of immediate effect, and these can be enforced by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at the national and international levels. One of the immediate obligations is that states parties must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the states concerned in order to achieve progressively the full realisation

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of ESC rights, and to guarantee that these rights are enjoyed without discrimination (­Article 2(2) of the Covenant) and equally between men and women (Article 3 of the Covenant). It is noted that the ‘availability of resources’, although an important qualifier to the obligation to take steps, does not alter the immediacy of the obligation, nor can resource constraints alone justify inaction.

II.  ARTICLE 2(1) [2.03]  Article 2(1) of the ICESCR is fundamental to the understanding of state obligations with respect to ESC rights since it is the general legal obligation provision.1 It directly informs all of the substantive rights protected in Articles 6–15 of the Covenant. By Article 2(1): Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

It is noteworthy that although, as pointed out in the previous chapter, some states have made reservations and declarations to the Covenant (Appendix H), none has made a reservation or declaration in respect of Article 2(1). It has to be borne in mind that since the Covenant is an international treaty, the human rights obligations undertaken by states under it, and consequently by the international community, must be performed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).2 [2.04]  Similarly, the Covenant as an international human rights treaty must generally be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose’.3 This can be supplemented by recourse to the preparatory works (travaux préparatoires) of the Covenant to confirm the meaning of the treaty provisions, or to determine it where the ordinary meaning leaves the intention ‘ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.4 Thus, in interpreting human rights obligations arising from human rights treaties including the ICESCR, it is useful to consider the 1  For a discussion, see M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 106–52; B Saul et al, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 133–72. 2  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the Vienna Convention’), 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969), entered into force 27 January 1980. Art 26 provides: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to the treaty and must be performed by them in good faith.’ For a discussion, see A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 179–81. See also Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Year Book of the International Law Commission (1966), vol II, A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l, at 210–11. 3 Vienna Convention, above n 2, Art 31; Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, No 18, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 524. 4  Vienna Convention, above n 2, Art 32. For the discussion of treaty interpretation, see Aust, above n 2, 230–55. The ICJ recognised these principles as embodying CIL in Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab ­Jamahariya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, judgment of 3 February 1994, para 41.

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rules of treaty interpretation. This involves looking to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the treaty terms. This has to be done in the ‘context’ of a treaty, which means the treaty’s text, including its preamble and annexes.5 As noted in the introduction in chapter one, the Covenant’s preamble and many other human rights instruments reiterate the indivisibility of ESC rights and civil and political rights.6 Treaty terms (of the Covenant) must be interpreted in the light of the Covenant’s ‘object and purpose’, which, like other human rights instruments, is the ‘effective protection of human rights’ of individuals and groups. Effectiveness demands that treaty provisions be given full effect and that treaty-monitoring bodies adopt an ‘evolutionary’ view of human rights instruments as expanding in scope over time.7 It is in this context that Article 2 of the Covenant is examined below. [2.05]  It has been observed that ‘[r]elative to Article 2 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of the ICESCR is weak with respect to implementation’.8 Thus it has been noted: Article 2(1) itself is [a] somewhat confused and unsatisfactory provision. The combination of convoluted phraseology and numerous qualifying sub-clauses seems to defy any real sense of obligation. Indeed it has been read by some as giving States an almost total freedom of choice and action as to how the rights should be implemented.9

The language of Article 2(1) is clearly wide and full of caveats, and any assessment of whether a state has complied with or infringed its general obligation to protect rights under the Covenant of a particular individual is a complex matter subject to conflicting critiques.10 The obligation of states parties under Article 2(1) is subject to the availability of resources and is to be realised progressively. In the context of individual and collective communications, how would the CESCR apply the obligation under Article 2(1) ‘to take steps … to the maximum of its available resources’ to achieve ­progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant? More 5 

Vienna Convention, above n 2, Art 31(2). ICESCR, preamble, para 4 recognises that, ‘in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights’. 7  By way of analogy, the IACtHR has stated, in The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, (Ser A) No 16, para 114: ‘Both this Court, in the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the American ­Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1989) [Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989, Series A No 10, para 43], and the European Court of Human Rights, in Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) [judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A No 26, 15–16, para 31], Marckx v Belgium (1979) [judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A No 31, 19, para 41], Loizidou v Turkey (1995) (Preliminary Objections) [Judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No 310, 26, para 71], among others, have held that human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes over time and present-day conditions.’ 8 H Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals—Text and Materials, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 275. For the analysis of Art 2(1) of the ICCPR, see D Harris, ‘The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom: An Introduction’ in D Harris and S Joseph (eds), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United Kingdom Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 1. 9 M Craven, ‘The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in R Burchill, D Harris and A Owers (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in United Kingdom Law (­Nottingham, University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, 1999) 1, 5 (footnotes omitted). 10 H Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, ­Morals—Text and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 275; D Harris, ‘Comments’ in F Coomans and F Van Hoof (eds), The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Utrecht, SIM Special No 18, 1995) 103. 6 

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­ articularly, how would the CESCR decide whether a state should have spent more on p education ­relative to social security, health, housing, water or food? In a specific claim, how would the Committee decide whether a particular state’s resources were such that it should, for example, have provided a petitioner with a doctor/hospital treatment, an expensive drug or an operation needed to protect life (in the context of the right to health),11 or with a teacher/school (in the context of the right to education)? [2.06]  However, the nature and scope of the states parties’ obligations under the Covenant, including the provisions of Article 2(1) above, and the nature and scope of violations of ESC rights and appropriate responses and remedies, including the provisions of Article 2(1) above, have been examined by groups of experts in international law who adopted the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR in 1986 (‘the Limburg Principles’)12 and the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of ­Economic Social and Cultural Rights in 1997 (‘the Maastricht Guidelines’).13 Although the Limburg Principles and Maastricht Guidelines are not legally binding per se, they provide ‘a subsidiary means’ for the interpretation of the Covenant as ‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’. Moreover, the participants who adopted the Limburg Principles believed that they ‘reflect the present state of international law, with the exception of certain recommendations indicated by the use of the verb “should” instead of “shall”’. The participants who adopted the Maastricht Guidelines considered them to ‘reflect the evolution of international law since 1986’. The CESCR has also in numerous General Comments (Appendix D) spelt out the content of the obligations and rights under the Covenant, to which no state has ever raised any formal objections. As pointed out above, the Covenant as an international treaty must be interpreted taking into account its object and purpose, the ordinary meaning, the preparatory work and relevant practice.14 Adopting this approach, the following obligations arise from Article 2(1). A.  Obligation to ‘Take Steps … by All Appropriate Means’ [2.07]  Under Article 2(1), states15 undertake to ‘take steps … by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’ towards the full realisation 11  Harris, above n 10. In Hristoz and Others v Bulgaria, App nos 47039/11 and 358/12, 13 November 2012, the ECtHR held that there was no obligation under Article 2 of the ECHR, which protects the right to life, to allow terminally ill cancer patients access to as yet unauthorised drugs, here, an experimental anti-cancer product (MBVax Coley Fluid). 12  Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR, UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122 (Appendix E to this book). The Limburg Principles were adopted by a group of 29 participants. 13  Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1998) 20(3) Human Rights Quarterly 691 (Appendix F to this book). The Maastricht Guidelines were adopted by a group of more than 30 experts. For a commentary on these Guidelines, see E Dankwa, C Flinterman and S Leckie, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705. 14  Vienna Convention, above n 2, Arts 31 and 32. 15  The obligations of the Covenant in general and Art 2 in particular are binding on every state party as a whole. All branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level—national, regional or local—are in a position to engage the responsibility of the state party. See HRC, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) para 4.

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of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant. This obligation to ‘take steps’ by ‘all appropriate means’ gives a state party to the ICESCR a great deal of flexibility for devising a policy that will be appropriate for its particular legal, political, economic, administrative and institutional framework, and one that can respond to the particular obstacles and resistance to what a state aims to achieve, eg the elimination of discrimination against women or minorities existing in that particular state. Each state must be able to justify the appropriateness of the particular means it has chosen, and be able to demonstrate whether it will achieve the intended effect and result. The scope of this obligation was clarified by the CESCR in 1990 in General Comment 3 on the nature of states parties’ obligations, as follows:16 1. Article 2 is of particular importance to a full understanding of the Covenant and must be seen as having a dynamic relationship with all of the other provisions of the Covenant. It describes the nature of the general legal obligations undertaken by States parties to the Covenant. Those obligations include both what may be termed (following the work of the International Law Commission) obligations of conduct and obligations of result. While great emphasis has sometimes been placed on the difference between the formulations used in this provision and that contained in the equivalent article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is not always recognised that there are also significant similarities. In particular, while the Covenant provides for progressive realisation and acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect. … One of these, …, is the ‘undertaking to guarantee’ that relevant rights ‘will be exercised without discrimination …’. 2. The other is the undertaking in article 2(1) ‘to take steps’, which in itself, is not qualified or limited by other considerations. The full meaning of the phrase can also be gauged by noting some of the different language versions. In English the undertaking is ‘to take steps’, in French it is ‘to act’ (‘s’engage … agir’) and in Spanish it is ‘to adopt ­measures’ (‘a adoptar medidas’). Thus while the full realisation of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.

[2.08]  It is notable from General Comment 3 that Article 2(1) clearly imposes an ‘obligation of conduct’17 (obligation to take action—active or passive—to follow, or abstain from, a given conduct to realise the enjoyment of a particular right) to begin to take steps immediately (in a manner that constantly and consistently advances the full realisation of ESC rights). The obligation to ‘take steps’ is not qualified or limited by other considerations.18 A failure to comply with this obligation cannot be justified by reference to social, cultural or economic considerations within the state. Thus in 1998, the CESCR, while noting that sanctions and blockades of Iraq hampered the full implementation of certain rights under the Covenant, underlined that ‘the State

16  CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991). 17  Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 7. The obligation of conduct requires action reasonably calculated to realise the enjoyment of a particular right. In the case of the right to health, for example, the obligation of conduct could involve the adoption and implementation of a plan of action to reduce maternal mortality. 18  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 2; Limburg Principles, above n 12, 16 and 21.

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party remains responsible for implementing its obligations under the Covenant “to the maximum of its available resources”, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant’. Furthermore, while being aware that the embargo imposed on Iraq created ‘extremely difficult conditions with respect to the availability of food, medicines and medical articles’, the CESCR recommended that the [Iraqi] Government take all necessary measures, to the maximum extent of its available resources, to address the needs of the population, and in particular those of the most vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly and nursing mothers, in relation to article 12 of the Covenant.19

[2.09]  In addition, after beginning to take steps, Article 2(1) obliges a state to continue taking steps consistently, without any deliberate regressive action.20 The steps taken should be geared towards achieving the principal ‘obligation of result’21 (to achieve specific targets/standards), which is to achieve ‘progressively the full realisation of the rights guaranteed’ in the Covenant.22 In respect of the right to primary education, for example, the obligation of conduct could involve the adoption and implementation of a plan of action to ensure that children are going to primary schools. The obligation of result requires that children are learning to read and write. [2.10]  Steps towards the goal of full realisation ‘must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned’, and such steps must be ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted’ towards the full realisation of the Covenant rights.23 Some steps that states parties are required to take are of an immediate nature, especially in cases involving negative obligations that largely require non-interference with limited direct resource implications.24 Others, progressive in nature, may be taken over a period of time, especially those requiring largely positive obligations that may have significant direct resource implications.25 This distinction is significant in determining state compliance/non-compliance, or unwillingness or inability to comply with the Covenant obligations, as non-compliance with or violation of an obligation can only arise if compliance is due at a particular point in time. In general terms, states are required to adopt two types of measures: legislative and non-legislative. 19 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iraq, UN Doc E/1998/22 (20 June 1998) paras 253 and 281. also IACmHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc 59 rev (2000), ch VI, para 11. 21 Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 7, notes that ‘The obligation of result requires States to achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard. With respect to the right to health, for example, the obligation of result requires the reduction of maternal mortality to levels agreed at the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women.’ 22  CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 16, para 9. 23  CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999), para 43; CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000), para 30. 24  The prohibition of discrimination follows under this category. In General Comment 13, para 31, the CESCR stated, ‘The prohibition against discrimination enshrined in article 2(2) of the Covenant is subject to neither progressive realization nor the availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination.’ See also UN Commission on Human Rights, Res 2002/23, The Right to Education, (adopted 22 April 2002), UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/200 at 112 (2002) para 4(b). 25 For example, the progressive introduction of free secondary and higher education. See ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b) and (c). 20  See

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i.  Adoption of Legislative Measures [2.11]  The steps to be undertaken, whether immediate or progressive, should be by ‘all appropriate means’, which in terms of Article 2(1) includes ‘particularly the adoption of legislative measures’. Legislative measures include not only the adoption of new legislation, but also the duty to reform, amend and repeal legislation manifestly inconsistent with the Covenant.26 Does this mean that states are obliged to take legislative measures in order to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant? [2.12]  In general terms, every state has a ‘margin of discretion’ in assessing which measures are most suitable to meet the specific circumstances for implementing its respective obligations.27 However, the specific reference to ‘legislative measures’ is indicative of the preferred method of implementation. Thus, while the Covenant does not formally oblige states to incorporate its provisions into domestic law,28 the Committee has affirmed that in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in some cases may even be indispensable. For example, it may be difficult to combat discrimination effectively in the absence of a sound legislative foundation for the necessary measures. In fields such as health, the protection of children and mothers, and education, as well as in respect of the matters dealt with in ­articles 6 to 9, legislation may also be an indispensable element for many purposes.29

[2.13]  Indeed, the Committee strongly recommends, and rightly so, the incorporation of the Covenant into domestic law so that it may be directly invoked in the domestic courts.30 This involves amendment of existing laws,31 and failure to do so, when such adoption is ‘indispensable’ (eg to eliminate de jure discrimination), can amount to a violation. Unsurprisingly, in 2005 the CESCR, in General Comment 16 on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all ESC rights, stated:32 The principle of equality between men and women is fundamental to the enjoyment of each of the specific rights enumerated in the Covenant. Failure to ensure formal and substantive equality in the enjoyment of any of these rights constitutes a violation of that right.

26  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cyprus, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.28 (4 December 1998) para 26. 27  Thus, in its General Comment 14: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), para 53, the CESCR stated that ‘[t]he most appropriate feasible measures to implement the right to health will vary significantly from one State to another. Every State has a margin of discretion in assessing which measures are most suitable to meet its specific circumstances’ (emphasis added). See also CESCR, General Comment 15, para 45. 28  CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998), para 8. 29  CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 16, para 3. 30  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002), para 24; Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002), para 23; Czech Republic, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.76 (5 June2002), para 25; Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.80 (17 May 2002), para 32. See also ch 5 on the domestic protection of ESC rights. 31 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Yemen, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.92 (28 November 2003). The Committee found that ‘there are still persisting patterns of discrimination [against women], particularly in family and personal status law, as well as inheritance law’ (para 9), and ‘strongly recommend[ed] that the State party amend existing legislation in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the Covenant’ (para 28). 32  CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005), para 41.

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­ limination of de jure as well as de facto discrimination is required for the equal enjoyment E of economic, social and cultural rights. Failure to adopt, implement, and monitor effects of laws, policies and programmes to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination with respect to each of the rights enumerated in Articles 6 to 15 of the Covenant constitutes a violation of those rights.

[2.14]  Legislative measures are indispensable in the protection of all human rights, including ESC rights,33 since a sound legislative foundation provides a firm basis to protect and enforce such rights. Legislation is particularly essential to combat de jure discrimination, such as that against women, minorities, children and persons with disabilities.34 For example, with respect to discrimination against women in Iraq, the Committee recommended that ‘a thorough review of the domestic legislation be carried out in order to eliminate any remaining discriminatory legal provisions, specific remedies be made available to women victims of sexual discrimination, and information and education campaigns be carried out to that end’.35 [2.15]  Legislation is necessary in some respects at both national and international levels, for example to criminalise and prosecute gross violations of ESC rights amounting to international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide). These gross violations include: —— intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, including wilfully impeding relief supplies (a violation of the right to food);36 —— wilfully causing great suffering, ie ‘great physical or mental pain or suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons’ during an armed conflict (a violation of the right to health);37 —— extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity (a violation of the right to property, housing);38 —— intentionally directing attacks (in the context of an international armed conflict) against civilian objects, that is objects that are not military objectives, such as civilian houses, schools, health centres and hospitals (a violation of the right to housing, education, health);39 —— genocide by deliberately inflicting ‘conditions of life’, eg deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes, calculated to bring about physical destruction

33  See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 3, para 3; CESCR, General Comment 14, para 56: ‘States should consider adopting a framework law to operationalise their right to health national strategy.’ 34 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iraq, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.17 (12 December 1997), paras 13–14; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.55 (1 December 2000), paras 34, 45 and 47; CESCR, General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc E/1995/22 at 19 (1995), para 16. 35  Concluding Observations: Iraq, above n 34, para 30. For similar recommendations, see CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Tanzania, UN Doc CEDAW//C/TZA/CO/6 (18 July 2008), paras 16, 17 and 55; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, UN Doc CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6 (18 July 2008), paras 13, 14 and 44. 36  Rome Statute of the ICC, 2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002, Art 8(2)(b)(xxv). 37  Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 8(2)(a)(iii); ICC, Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). 38  Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 36, Art 8(2)(a)(iv). 39  Ibid, Art 8(2)(b)(ii).

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intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such;40 and —— the crimes against humanity of ‘extermination’41 and ‘persecution’42 based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.43 Therefore, states must change their laws so as to conform to their ICESCR obligations. [2.16]  In the context of substantive ESC rights such as health, social security and education, legislation should include: (a) targets or goals to be attained and the time-frame for their achievement; (b) the means by which the purpose could be achieved; (c) the intended collaboration with civil society, private sector and international organisations; (d) institutional responsibility for the process; (e) national mechanisms for its monitoring; and (f) remedies and recourse procedures.44 The adoption of a framework law on specific ESC rights (eg education, health, work, social security, adequate food, water and housing) has several advantages:45 (a) the content of the right as well as the obligations of state authorities can be spelled out in some detail. This helps government officials to have a better understanding of their role; (b) institutional arrangements can be made on a stable basis for a better distribution of responsibilities; (c) better coordination and more meaningful monitoring can give a precise definition of the scope and content of specific ESC rights, set out obligations for state authorities and NSAs, establish necessary institutional mechanisms and provide the legal basis for subsidiary legislation and other necessary measures to be taken by the competent state authorities; and (d) it can also establish a right to a remedy, access to free legal aid, clarify the role of human rights institutions and provide the basis for a subsidiary legislation. As shown above, the introduction or failure to repeal legislation that discriminates against individuals or groups, on any of the prohibited grounds, in the field of ESC rights is considered to be a clear ‘violation’ of the Covenant.46

40 

Ibid, Art 6(c). Ibid, Arts 7(1)(b) and 7(2)(b), ‘“Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.’ 42  Ibid, Art 7(2)(g), ‘“Persecution’” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.’ 43  Ibid, Art 7(1)(h). 44 CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003), para 50, where the CESCR recommended the adoption of framework legislation to operationalise the right to water strategy addressing similar areas. 45  See, eg, FAO, Guide on Legislating for the Right to Food (Rome, FAO, 2009). 46  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 23, para 59; CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 23, para 48. 41 

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ii. Non-Legislative Measures [2.17]  By requiring states parties to use ‘all appropriate means’, the Covenant adopts a broad and flexible approach that enables the particularities of the legal and administrative systems of each state, as well as other relevant considerations, to be taken into account.47 There are several non-legislative measures (eg the provision of judicial or other effective remedies, administrative, financial, educational/informational campaigns and social measures) that are regarded as ‘appropriate means’. States have an obligation to make judicial and administrative mechanisms available, accessible and effective, to enable individuals and groups to hold states and NSAs accountable and claim remedies for violations of ESC rights. Such remedies should include different forms of reparation, such as monetary compensation, restitution, rehabilitation and reinstatement; measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials and guarantees of non-repetition; changes in relevant laws and practices; and bringing to justice the perpetrators of violations of ESC rights. As the CESCR stated in General Comment 3 (1990): 5. Among the measures which might be considered appropriate, in addition to legislation, is the provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance with the national legal system, be considered justiciable. The Committee notes, for example, that the enjoyment of the rights recognised, without discrimination, will often be appropriately promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial or other effective remedies … … 7. Other measures which may also be considered ‘appropriate’ for the purposes of ­article 2(1) include, but are not limited to, administrative, financial, educational and social measures.

[2.18]  The measures stated above are related to different forms of accountability. These are necessary to compel a state to explain what it is doing and why, and how it is progressing, as expeditiously and effectively as possible, towards the realisation of ESC rights. Remedies may be sought from administrative authorities, ombudspersons and other national human rights institutions, courts and tribunals. For this reason, the Committee’s reporting guidelines require states to indicate the: ‘incorporation and direct applicability of each Covenant right in the domestic legal order, with reference to specific examples of relevant case law’; as well as ‘[t]he judicial and other ­appropriate remedies in place enabling victims to obtain redress in case their ­Covenant rights have been violated’.48 In order to ensure that judicial or other effective r­ emedies are accessible to everyone, including the most disadvantaged and ­ marginalised ­individuals/groups, eg poor women,49 free and adequate civil legal aid (for deserving/ arguable cases) for violations of all ESC rights is a prerequisite. This means, for ­example, that if individuals (poor/indigent litigants) do not have sufficient means to

47 

CESCR, General Comment 9, para 1. Guidelines on Treaty-specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2 (24 March 2009), paras 3(d) and (e). 49  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted 11 July 2003, available at http://au.int/en/treaties, Art 26(2). 48 

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pay for legal costs50 for ESC rights litigation, but wish to bring court proceedings for violations of any ESC right which are meritorious (not manifestly unfounded) but so complex as to be impossible to pursue without professional legal assistance, the state must provide legal aid and raise public awareness on its existence if this is ‘indispensable for an effective access to court’51 or indispensable for access to any available effective remedy. The question whether the provision of legal aid for violations of ESC rights is indispensable for effective access to court/remedy must be determined on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and will depend, inter alia, ‘upon the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself effectively’.52 In its Concluding Observations on Canada, the Committee recommended that Canada ‘ensure that civil legal aid with regard to economic, social and cultural rights is provided to poor people in the provinces and territories, and that it be adequate with respect to coverage, eligibility and services provided’.53 Similarly in its Concluding Observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of Tajikistan, the CESCR recommended that ‘free legal aid’ with regard to ESC rights be provided to ‘persons who need it’, in particular those belonging to disadvantaged and marginalised groups, and that it be ‘adequate with respect to coverage, eligibility and services provided’.54 [2.19]  It is instructive to note that the transformation of ESC rights into positive law, whether in national constitutions or in legislation, is not enough; rather, the rights must be translated into realities so that they are realised in fact. This may require comprehensive administrative measures and social action.55 Accordingly mere legislation, though essential, is not enough by itself, and other ‘appropriate means’ must be undertaken in addition to legislation to achieve the intended result. This calls for putting in place appropriate means of redress, or remedies, for any aggrieved individual or group, and appropriate means of ensuring governmental accountability.56 [2.20]  Any administrative remedies such as those provided by the national human rights commissions and ombudsperson institutions57 should be practically ‘accessible, affordable, timely, and effective’.58 In addition, they will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes that are appropriate both in their conception and their implementation. National remedies are quicker, and ­generally more convenient to use in terms of accessibility, as well as backed by more 50  This requires taking into account an individual’s financial resources and obligations, as well as the anticipated costs of proceedings for a remedy. 51  Airey v Ireland, App no 6289/73, 9 October 1979, Series A no 32, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 305, para 26. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Guyana, UN Doc E/C.12/GUY/CO/2-4 (9 October 2015), paras 10–11. 52  Steel and Morris v United Kingdom, App no 68416/01, 15 February 2005, (2005) 41 EHRR 403, para 61. 53 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/4; E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (22 May 2006), para 43. 54  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Tajikistan, UN Doc E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 (6 March 2015), para 7. 55  A Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in A Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 9, 17. 56  CESCR, General Comment 9, para 2. 57  See generally CESCR, General Comment 10: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/25 (10 December 1998). 58  CESCR, General Comment 9, para 9.

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e­ ffective arrangements for enforcement.59 The remedies may take the form of ­restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction, or guarantees of non-repetition.60 [2.21]  In addition, ‘appropriate means’ extends to fiscal policies, such as a consumption tax on sugar-sweetened beverages so as to create disincentives to consuming unhealthy foods, and using revenue raised to provide safe drinking water; reducing taxes on nutritious foods so that they are more affordable (cheaper than or comparable to unhealthy foods); and tax benefits and focused investments in agricultural production so as to encourage farmers to produce healthier foods like vegetables and fruit. It is vital to promote ESC rights (eg healthier foods) through the media and social ­channels, including radio, television and Internet advertisements. Further, ‘­appropriate means’ apply to ‘improved macroeconomic performance’, such as the reduction of foreign debt, the decrease in inflation and the growth of export capacity, all of which create an environment conducive to a more effective implementation of ESC rights.61 The CESCR has taken the view that there is an obligation, for example, ‘to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation’ of each of the rights contained in the Covenant, which is clearly implied by the obligation in Article 2(1) ‘to take steps … by all appropriate means’.62 In the light of paragraph 71 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, states should through an open and consultative process to expedite the adoption of such a comprehensive national strategy and plan of action on human rights.63 The strategy must: (a) be based upon human rights law and principles [including non-discrimination, people’s participation, accountability, transparency and independence of the judiciary]; (b) cover all aspects of the right … and the corresponding obligations of States parties; (c) define clear objectives; (d) set targets or goals to be achieved and the time-frame for their achievement; (e) formulate adequate policies and corresponding benchmarks and indicators. The strategy should also establish institutional responsibility for the process; identify resources available to attain the objectives, targets and goals; allocate resources appropriately according to institutional responsibility; and establish accountability mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the strategy.64

This means that a state must make a plan of action immediately, with clearly stated and carefully targeted policies, and execute the plan consistently with due diligence— expeditiously and in a timely manner—and in good faith, and avoid taking any regressive measures (those that have as their object or effect a decline in the enjoyment of human rights) without ‘the most careful consideration’.65

59 

Harris and Joseph (eds), above n 8, 6. Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 23; CESCR, General Comment 14, para 59. Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.41 (8 December 1999) para 3; M Dowell-Jones, ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assessing the Economic ­Deficit’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 11. 62  CESCR, General Comment 1: Reporting by States Parties, UN Doc UN Doc E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989), para 4; Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 7. 63  CESCR, Concluding Observation: Guatemala, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.93 (28 November 2003), para 46. 64  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 44, para 47. 65 Regressive measures are only valid if fully justified under strict scrutiny. See ICESCR, Arts 4–5; CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. 60 

61  CESCR,

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[2.22]  In the context of the substantive rights protected under Articles 6–15 of the ICESCR, for example, a state must have a programme, however limited its resources might be, to respect, protect and fulfil the Covenant rights. A state’s inertia or unreasonable delay in taking steps and/or the adoption of measures that constitute setbacks in enforcing guaranteed rights would be contrary to Article 2(1). As noted above, the obligations of the Covenant in general and Article 2 in particular are binding on every state party as a whole. Accordingly, states must ensure that the measures adopted are ‘reasonable’, ‘effective’ and produce results compatible with the Covenant.66 If measures are taken to incorporate civil and political rights, consideration via treaty obligations should generally be given to similar measures in relation to ESC rights, since the two sets are indivisible and interdependent.67 A state must be able to justify any difference in the measures implementing one set of rights from another set. Thus, although each state party must decide for itself which means are the most ‘­appropriate’ in the circumstances with respect to each of the rights, the ultimate determination as to whether ‘all appropriate’ measures have been taken is subject to the Committee’s review.68 It is in this context that states reports are required, to indicate the basis upon which the steps taken are considered to be the most ‘appropriate’.69 B.  Progressive Realisation and Prohibition of Retrogression i.  The Standard of Progressive Realisation [2.23]  As noted in section II.A. above, the steps taken should be geared towards obliging states to ‘achiev[e] progressively the full realisation’ of the Covenant rights. Similar language is used in other international and regional human rights instruments.70 The appropriateness of the steps taken should therefore be examined by reference to the standard of ‘progressive realisation’. What, then, is meant by ‘progressive realisation’? Does the word ‘progressive’ enable the obligations of states parties ‘to be postponed to an indefinite time in the distant future’, as argued by Hungary during the preparatory work on the Covenant?71 According to its ordinary meaning, the term ‘progressive’ means ‘moving forward’ or ‘advancing by successive stages’72 in a manner that is ‘continuous, increasing, growing, developing, ongoing, intensifying, accelerating, escalating; gradual, step by step’.73 Thus, states parties are obliged to improve or advance continuously the conditions of ESC rights, and generally to abstain from taking regressive measures (deliberate steps backwards), such as the formal repeal or suspension of legislation necessary for the enjoyment of ESC rights, the reduction or removal 66  M Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003) 337–38. 67 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Switzerland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.30 (7 December 1998) para 27. 68  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 4. 69  Ibid. 70  See, eg, CRC, Art 4; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515 UNTS 3, Art 4(2); AmCHR, Art 26. 71  10 UN GAOR para 9, UN Doc A/2910/Add.6 (1955). 72  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) 954; Chambers Family Dictionary (Edinburgh, Chambers, 1981) 613. 73  The New Oxford Thesaurus of English (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 754.

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of subsidies, without adequate alternative support measures, and the ­ reduction (without meaningful inputs of stakeholders, including civil society) in the proportion of budgetary resources allocated to sectors directly related to the ESC rights, eg health, education and housing.74 This notion of progressive realisation of ESC rights over a period of time constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realisation of all [ESC rights] will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time … reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realisation of [ESC rights].75

This obligation contrasts with the immediate obligation imposed by Article 2(1) of the ICCPR that obliges states to ‘respect and ensure’ the substantive rights under the ICCPR. Despite this, the ‘reality is that the full realisation of civil and political rights is heavily dependent both on the availability of resources and the development of the necessary societal structures’.76 [2.24]  As a result, states are required to take positive measures to realise civil and political rights.77 For example, the guarantee of humane treatment in detention under Article 10(1) of the ICCPR ‘imposes on States parties a positive obligation towards persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their status as persons deprived of liberty’.78 This necessitates the construction of a sufficient number of detention centres and the development of alternative measures to imprisonment, such as community service orders and bail arrangements to prevent overcrowding and ensure that detainees live in healthy conditions and have adequate access to healthcare and food, and otherwise ensure that conditions of detention in the country’s prisons are compatible with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.79 ­Similarly, the right to a fair trial as protected by Article 14(1) of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR encompasses the right of access to a court in cases of determination of criminal charges, and rights and obligations in a suit at law,80 and the provision of free legal aid if this is ‘indispensable for an effective access to court’,81 eg for individuals who do not have sufficient means to pay.82 Accordingly, the right to a fair trial necessitates the provision of independent and accessible organs of justice. The above examples

74 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013), paras 18 and 6. 75  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. Under the CRC, which includes ESC rights and corresponding state obligations, there is no reference to the qualifying clause ‘progressive realisation’. Thus, its obligations arise immediately, although implementation is qualified by the phrase ‘within their means’. 76  P Alston and G Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 172. See also H Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 757. 77  See, eg, A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004). 78 HRC, General Comment 21: Article 10—Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of their Liberty, (44th Session, 1992), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 33 (1994) para 3. 79  HRC, Concluding Observations: Botswana, UN Doc CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1(24 April 2008) para 17. 80  HRC, General Comment 32: Article 14—Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) para 9; Golder v United Kingdom, judgment of 21 ­February 1975, Series A, No 18, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 524, paras 34–35. 81  Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A, No 32, (1979–80) 3 EHRR 305, para 26. 82  HRC, General Comment 32, n 80 above, para 10.

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demonstrate that the notion of progressive realisation is not limited to ESC rights; it extends to civil and political rights too. [2.25]  Since the obligation upon states under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR is the progressive achievement of the Covenant rights, it might be argued that to demand their immediate implementation is not required by the Covenant. Two responses are essential here. First, as shown below, some rights under the Covenant, such as freedom from discrimination in the enjoyment of all ESC rights and core obligations, give rise to obligations of immediate effect. Thus, a state cannot argue that it is providing primary education or primary healthcare to boys immediately but will extend it to girls progressively. Similarly, the argument that a state is paying women less than men for work of equal value would not be acceptable since the right of women to equal remuneration for equal work should be implemented immediately (chapter seven). Secondly, the CESCR has explained that Article 2 ‘imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards the Covenant’s goal of full realisation of the substantive rights under the Covenant.83 However, the Committee did not specify how ‘expeditiously and effectively’ a state should achieve the full realisation of all ESC rights. In order to comply with the obligation to achieve the realisation of ESC rights ‘progressively’, states parties are required to monitor the realisation of ESC rights and to devise appropriate strategies and clearly defined programmes (including ­indicators—carefully chosen yardsticks for measuring elements of the right— and national benchmarks, or targets, for each indicator) for their ­implementation.84 A human rights approach to government actions must begin with a proper understanding of the actual situation in respect of each right, accurate identification of the most vulnerable groups, and the formulation of appropriate laws, programmes and policies.85 [2.26]  In order to monitor progressive realisation effectively, the CESCR should be in a position to measure consistently and scrutinise progress made by states by reference to reliable quantitative and qualitative data, and indicators/benchmarks in respect of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, paying particular attention to human rights impact assessments and budget analysis.86 Some of these indicators have been 83  See eg CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9; General Comment 13, para 44; General Comment 14, para 31; and General Comment 15, para 18; Limburg Principles, above n 12, 21. 84  CESCR, General Comment 14, paras 57–58; P Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332, 357–58; Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 8. For example, in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation, states made a commitment to halve, by the year 2015, the number of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water (as outlined in the Millennium Declaration) and the number of people who do not have access to basic sanitation. 85  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.59 (21 May 2001) para 34. 86  A Nolan, R O’Connell and C Harvey (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budget and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013); Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/2009/90 (8 June 2009); Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, UN Doc HRI/MC/2008/3 (6 June 2008); United Nations Development Fund for Women, Budgeting for Women’s Rights: Monitoring Government Budgets for Compliance with CEDAW (New York, UNIFEM, 2006); P Hunt, ‘State Obligations, Indicators, Benchmarks and the Right to Education’, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/11; P Hunt and G MacNaughton, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Health Indicators’ in MA Baderin and R McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 303.

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developed, inter alia, by the relevant UN specialised agencies, such as the ILO, the FAO, UNESCO and the WHO.87 For example, in assessing the realisation of the right to health, the WHO provides possible sources of data. These include: —— Service Availability Mapping (SAM), which is a free, online service that includes only government-released data; —— WHO country fact sheets; —— the WHO database, which includes census data, vital registration and population studies; and —— relevant WHO reports—eg the core goals of a good, functioning health system, as set out in the World Health Report 2000, may provide a useful set of generic indicators against which all states can be monitored with respect to their provision of the right to health (good health, responsiveness and fair financial contribution).88 Since national averages reveal little about the real situation of specific (vulnerable and disadvantaged) groups and communities, much of these data, in order to be meaningful, must be disaggregated into relevant categories, including age, sex, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic group and urban/rural divisions.89 Unfortunately, few states parties have either the requisite data or the willingness to share such detailed data with a UN supervisory body or with NGOs.90 ii.  Presumption Against Deliberate Retrogressive Measures [2.27]  There is a strong presumption that deliberately retrogressive measures taken in relation to ESC rights are generally not permissible. In determining progressive realisation, the Committee applies a strong presumption against ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures’,91 eg unjustified reductions in public investment in ESC rights. Unless otherwise fully or duly justified (absolutely necessary), ‘after the most careful consideration of all alternatives’ and ‘by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the State party’s maximum available resources’,92 the adoption of measures (legislation or policy) that cause a clear deterioration in the protection of ESC rights hitherto afforded violates the

87  See United Nations, The Specialised Agencies Useful information on these agencies is available on the website of ECOSOC at http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/institutions.shtml. 88  See WHO, The World Health Report 2000—Health Systems: Improving Performance (Geneva, WHO, 2000). For a discussion of health indicators, see WHO, Health and Human Rights, available at http://www. who.int/topics/human_rights/en/. 89  See Revised General Guidelines, UN Doc E/C.12/1991/1 (17 June 1991). 90 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Moldova, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.91 (28 November 2003) para 18, stating that ‘The Committee is concerned about the absence of adequate statistical data on social benefits since 1997 in the State party’s report.’ 91  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. 92  CESCR, General Comment 13, para 45; CESCR, General Comment 14, para 32; CESCR, General Comment 15, para 19; CESCR, General Comment 17, The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or she is the Author, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006), para 27; CESCR, General Comment 18, The Right to Work, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18 (6 February 2006), para 21; CESCR, General Comment 19, The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (4 February 2008), para 42; CESCR, General Comment 21, Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 921 December 2009), para 65.

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Covenant.93 For example, unless justified in accordance with the above criteria, ‘the re-introduction of fees at the tertiary level of education … constitutes a deliberately retrogressive step’,94 especially where adequate arrangements are not made for students from poorer segments of the population or lower socio-economic groups.95 Similarly, the reintroduction of direct user fees for health facilities, the reduction in the proportion of budgetary resources allocated for ESC rights obligations vis-à-vis increasing gross domestic product or increasing allocation to areas other than those relating to human rights, and recourse to regressive indirect taxes would have the same effect, as illustrated by the following Concluding Observations on Egypt: The Committee is concerned that the reduction in the proportion of budgetary resources allocated for health, education and housing has resulted in retrogression in the effective enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant, disproportionately impacting disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups. The Committee is also concerned at the increasing recourse to regressive indirect taxes without prior assessment of their potentially severe human rights impacts and careful consideration of more equitable revenue collection alternatives (art 2, para 1). The Committee recommends that the State party increase the proportion of its budget allocated to sectors directly related to the Covenant rights, particularly health, education, housing and food. In doing so, the State party should ensure a budget formulation process that allows for meaningful inputs of stakeholders, including civil society.96

In its General Comment on the right to work, the CESCR considered retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to work to include, inter alia, denial of access to employment to particular individuals or groups, whether such discrimination is based on legislation or practice, abrogation or suspension of the legislation necessary for the exercise of the right to work or the adoption of laws or policies that are manifestly incompatible with international legal obligations relating to the right to work. An example would be the institution of forced labour or the abrogation of legislation protecting the employee against unlawful dismissal.97

[2.28]  The prohibition of retrogressive measures is not absolute. Any retrogressive measures during an economic emergency (and financial crisis) might be justified from the perspective of the ICESCR, but only if they are: (1) temporary, (2) necessary and proportionate, (3) [directly or indirectly] non-discriminatory and aimed at mitigating inequalities, as well as at ensuring that the rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected, and (4) if they do not interfere with the minimum core content of the economic, social and cultural rights.98

In addition, deliberately retrogressive measures must be based on reasonable justification, and should have involved genuine participation of affected groups in comprehensively examining the proposed measures and alternatives; and should be subject to an 93 

Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, para 14(e). CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mauritius, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/8 (31/05/94) para 16. 95 CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) paras 22 and 41. 96  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/ /C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013) para 6. 97  CESCR, General Comment 18, para 34. 98  Statement by Mr Zdzislaw Kedzia, Chair of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, Third Committee, Item # 69 (a) (New York, 22 October 2013). 94 

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independent review at the national level.99 Some regional judicial and ­quasi-judicial bodies have confirmed the prohibition of deliberately retrogressive measures/steps taken in relation to ESC rights, eg social security.100 As noted above, progressive realisation is subject to maximum available resources. C.  Obligation to Utilise ‘Maximum Available Resources’ [2.29]  The steps that a state party is obliged to take under Article 2(1) to realise the enumerated rights progressively must be ‘to the maximum of its available resources’.101 Similar provisions are included in the CRC102 and the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (­Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).103 What is meant by this? Does it refer to the resources existing within a state? Or does it also include those resources available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance? What is meant by ‘resources’ within the scope of A ­ rticle 2(1)? Chapman noted that evaluating progressive realisation within the context of resource availability ‘considerably complicates the methodological requirements’ for ­monitoring.104 There are two practical difficulties in applying this requirement to measure state compliance with the full use of maximum available resources. The first is in determining what resources are ‘available’ to a particular state to give effect to the substantive rights under the Covenant. The second difficulty is to determine whether a state has used such available resources to the ‘maximum’. It has been suggested that the word ‘available’ leaves too much ‘wiggle room for the State’,105 making it difficult to define the content of the progressive obligation and to establish when a breach of this ­obligation

99 

CESCR, General Comment 19, para 42; Statement by Mr Zdzislaw Kedzia, above n 98. See, eg, General Federation of Employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece, Complaint no 66/2011, (­European Committee of Social Rights, adopted 23 May 2012) para 47; Case of the ‘Five Pensioners’ v Peru, IAmCtHR, Judgment of 28 February 2003, Series C no 98 (2003) paras 145–48. 101  See CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9; General Comment 13, para 44; and General Comment 14, para 31; Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 21. 102  Article 4 of the CRC provides: ‘States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation.’ Emphasis added. 103  International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), UN Doc A/61/49 (2006); 2515 UNTS 3, Art 4(2) provides: ‘With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party undertakes to take measures to the maximum of its available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of these rights, without prejudice to those obligations contained in the present Convention that are immediately applicable according to international law.’ Emphasis added. 104  A Chapman, ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on E ­ conomic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23, 31; A Chapman and S Russell, ‘­Introduction’ in A Chapman and S Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 1, 5. 105 See R Robertson, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the “Maximum Available Resources” to Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693, 694. 100 

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arises.106 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Covenant does not make an absurd (or impossible) demand: a state is not required to take steps beyond what its available resources permit. The implication is that more would be expected from high-income states than low-income states. This means that both the content of the obligation and the rate at which it is achieved are subject to the maximum use of available resources. [2.30]  The concept of resources, during the drafting process of the Covenant, was understood broadly to refer to ‘budgetary appropriations and also technical assistance, international cooperation and other elements’107 available internationally and domestically.108 The position of the CESCR regarding the meaning of a state’s ‘maximum available resources’ has been stated as follows: The undertaking by a State party to use ‘the maximum’ of its available resources towards fully realizing the provisions of the Covenant entitles it to receive resources offered by the international community. In this regard, the phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ refers to both the resources existing within a State as well as those available from the international community through international cooperation and assistance.109

The Committee does not specify the type of ‘resources’ a state is obliged to utilise. It is suggested that a wider understanding of ‘resources’ would give effective to the ‘practical and effective’ protection of ESC rights: Resource must be understood as encompassing not only financial resources, but also other types of resources relevant for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, such as human, technological, organizational, natural and information resources. Resources are also to be understood in qualitative terms and not solely quantitative.110

It follows that a state must use all available ‘resources’, including economic or financial resources, natural resources, human resources, cultural and scientific/technological resources, as well as information resources, to achieve ESC rights.111 This means that the availability of resources refers not only to those controlled by or filtered through the state or other public bodies, but also to the social resources that can be mobilised by the widest possible participation in development, as necessary for the realisation by every human being of ESC rights.112 In this respect ‘available resources’ refers to resources available within the society as a whole, ‘from the private sector as well as the

106  S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 7. 107  E/CN.4/SR/271, 14 May 1952, 5 (Mr Azkoul, Lebanese representative to the UN Human Rights Commission). 108  Ibid, 25 (Mrs Roosevelt, American delegate). 109  CESCR, Statement: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (10 May 2007) para 5. 110 See Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), ‘Resources for the Rights of the Child—Responsibility of States’, Investments for the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Children and International Cooperation (CRC article 4), 21 September 2007, para 24. 111  See S Skogly, ‘The Requirement of Using the “Maximum of Available Resources” for Human Rights Realisation: A Question of Quality as Well As Quantity?’ (2012) 12(3) Human Rights Law Review 393. 112  See A Eide, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concepts and Standards (Dartmouth, Ashgate/UNESCO, 2000); Declaration on the Right to Development (GAR 41/128, 4 December 1986), Art 2, stating in part: ‘1. The human being is a central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development. 2. All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively.’

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public. It is the State’s responsibility to mobilise these resources, not to provide them all directly from its own coffers.’113 [2.31]  As noted by the CESCR, and discussed further below in paragraphs 2.53–2.83, available resources also include those available through international cooperation and assistance, which should complement the resources available at national level. States must also use appropriate means to develop resources. These include putting in place: (a) a good public financial management system (eg an appropriate system of budget methodology, as well as a strong capacity for budget analysis in place within public administration); (b) a progressive tax (as opposed to regressive) policy,114 including measures to curb tax evasion; (c) an appropriate monetary policy, including financial regulation (which influences interest rates, exchange rates and the amount of credit available in the economy) and government borrowing.115 A proportion of national budget and other budgets must be allocated to the social sector.116 Such allocation should be sufficient. Low budgetary allocations to healthcare, education or social programmes when there are implementation gaps could show inadequate prioritisation or insufficient estimation of the funds required to realise ESC rights. Thus states have been criticised for allocating insufficient resources (budget allocations) to social sectors, as the following examples illustrate: The Committee notes with concern that the budget allocations for social sectors are insufficient, and that this impedes the steady realization of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant (art 2, para 1). The Committee urges the State party to increase to the extent possible the budgets allocated to social sectors such as housing, food, health and education and to the Ministry of Human Rights, in keeping with its obligation to make the most of its available resources, in particular by making use of the resources freed up by debt relief operations. The Committee draws the attention of the State party to its General Comment No 3 (1990) on the nature of States parties’ obligations.117 The Committee is concerned about the insufficient resources allocated to key sectors, notably social protection, health, housing, agriculture and education, which are of significant importance for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights (art 2). The Committee recommends that the State party reprioritize its allocation of resources and steadily increase the

113 

Chapman and Russell, above n 104, 11. I Saiz, ‘Resourcing Rights: Combating Tax Injustice from a Human Rights Perspective’ in A Nolan et al, Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 77 (discussing three functions of taxation from a human rights perspective: resourcing, redistribution and accountability). 115 R Balakrishnan et al, Maximum Available Resources & Human Rights: Analytical Report (New ­Brunswick, NJ, Center for Women’s Global Leadership, Rutgers University, 2011); D Elson et al, ‘Public Finance, Maximum Available Resources and Human Rights’ in Nolan et al, above n 114, 13. 116  CRC Committee, General Comment 5, General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (3 October 2003) para 51, stating: ‘No State can tell whether it is fulfilling children’s economic, social and cultural rights “to the maximum extent of … available resources”, as it is required to do under article 4, unless it can identify the proportion of national and other budgets allocated to the social sector and, within that, to children, both directly and indirectly.’ 117  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Togo, UN Doc E/C.12/TGO/CO/1 (3 June 2013) para 10. 114 

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share of the public budget available to these sectors with a view to ensuring the ­progressive realization of the rights contained in the Covenant.118

[2.32]  In order to ensure that all stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels, including legislature, judiciary, political parties, national human rights institutions, academia, media, civil society as well as bilateral, regional, inter-regional, global and multilateral donors and institutions, are involved in the process of budgetary allocation of resources (revenues and expenditures) through the national budget process, it is essential to encourage public dialogue on State budgets. Budgeting process should be transparent and participatory. Information on the criteria guiding the formulation and the implementation of national budgets, including priorities guiding the allocation of resources, should be made publicly available in an easy-to-understand language to encourage accountability and public scrutiny.119

[2.33]  Article 2(1) of the ICESCR requires states to use the available resources in an effective, efficient and equitable way, targeted to subsistence requirements and essential services.120 States are also obliged to ensure that there are sufficient resources to respect, protect and fulfil all ESC rights. To comply with this obligation, states should address all factors that adversely affect the availability and the maximum use of resources, including the prioritization exercise, the coordination between service providers and beneficiaries, the importance of having regular and independent monitoring regarding how resources are being used (eg waste …), and of ensuring that resources reach the most marginalised groups …121

For example, states must adequately implement measures to combat corruption,122 since corruption diverts available resources that could have been invested in protecting and fulfilling human rights,123 undermining commitment to ‘the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms’.124 It also affects the most marginalised and disadvantaged groups disproportionately, due to their powerlessness to change the status quo and their inability to pay bribes, creating inequalities that violate their human rights.125 118  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (24 June 2015), para 8. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013) para 6 quoted above in para 2.27. 119  CRC Committee, above n 110, para 34(a). 120  Limburg Principles, above n 12, 23, 27 and 28. 121  See CRC Committee, above n 110, para 6. 122  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defined corruption as ‘the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement’. See UNDP, Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance (New York, UNDP, 13 November 1998) 6. 123 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, UN Doc E/1999/22, paras 97 and 119; ­Mexico, UN Doc E/2000/22, paras 381 and 394. See also V Tanzi and HR Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Public ­Investment and Growth’, IMF Working Paper No 97/139 (1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/cat/­longres.cfm?sk=2353.0; Human Rights Watch, ‘Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local ­Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria’, vol 9 no 2(A), (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0107[1].pdf. 124 See South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath & Others [2000] ZACC 22, para 4 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 28 November 2000). 125  See T Pilapitiya, The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights Based Approach to Development (New York, UNDP, 2004) 5, available at http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs05/Thusitha_final.pdf.

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i.  Obligation to Eliminate Corruption [2.34]  (Grand) Corruption is closely correlated with the most serious violations of human rights,126 adversely affects a state’s ability to mobilise available resources to the maximum extent, and thus has a negative impact on the realisation of ESC rights. Acts of corruption have been understood as follows: (a) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official, his/her family member or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; (b) The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official, his/family member or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; (c) Any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official, his/her family member or any other person for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party; (d) The diversion by a public official, his/her family member or any other person, for purposes unrelated to those for which they were intended, for his or her own benefit or that of a third party, of any property belonging to the State or its agencies, to an independent agency, or to an individual, that such official has received by virtue of his or her position; (e) The offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to or by any person who directs or works for, in any capacity, a private sector entity, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of his or her duties; (f) The offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in the public or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result; (g) Illicit enrichment [the significant increase in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her income]; (h) The use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts referred to in this Article.127

[2.35]  The negative effects of corruption on human rights are clearly stated in the following observations: The Committee expresses concern that corruption, which permeates all levels of the State party’s administration, (a) reduces the resources available for the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights; (b) has led to violations of human rights in several sectors, i­ncluding in

126 See ML Wolf, The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court (July 2014), at http://www. brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/07/international-anti-corruption-court-wolf; K Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). 127  Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev 1 (adopted 27 June 2014) Art 28(1).

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the extractive industry; and (c) denies redress to victims who face corruption in the judiciary (art 2.1).128

Given that corruption negatively impacts the use of available resources to their maximum for the enjoyment of ESC rights by diverting available resources to invest in human rights, ‘resource-poor’ states (eg Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and ­Singapore) have outperformed ‘resource-rich’ states (eg Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela) in ­economic growth.129 Article 2(1) imposes an obligation on states to address the root causes of corruption and related impunity, to adopt and implement all necessary policy and legislative measures, such as a zero-tolerance policy, to combat corruption and to ensure that public affairs are conducted, in law and in practice, in a ­transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner.130 Such measures include putting in place effective preventive measures and accountability measures, as well as ensuring commensurate sanctions, such as criminal sanctions, for perpetrators of (high-level) corruption, including by monitoring the number of prosecutions and convictions in this regard,131 and by enhancing awareness-raising campaigns among politicians, members of parliament, government officials, judges, prosecutors and the police (on economic and social costs of corruption) to address the socio-cultural tolerance or acceptance of corruption. Ensuring safe, accessible and visible channels for reporting corruption; allocation of sufficient resources to transparent and independent anti-corruption institutions; effective implementation of anti-corruption law; as well as ensuring effective protection of victims of corruption, anti-corruption activists, whistle-blowers, their lawyers and witnesses help to combat and prevent it.132 [2.36]  The CESCR has stressed that states parties to the ICESCR intensify efforts (legal, structural and policy measures) to combat and prevent petty and systemic ­corruption and related impunity. For example, in May 2014, in its Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, the Committee observed: While taking note of the State party’s efforts to combat corruption, the Committee remains concerned about the prevalence of and widespread corruption in the State party, which has a negative impact on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly at the provincial and municipal levels (art 2, para 1).

128  CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Indonesia, UN Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (23 May 2014) para 9. 129  JD Sachs and AM Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth (1997) 2–3, available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/warner_files/natresf5.pdf. 130 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 9; Slovenia, UN Doc E/C.12/SVN/CO/2 (28 November 2014) para 7; Viet Nam, UN Doc E/C.12/ VNM/CO/2-4 (28 November 2014) para 12; Montenegro, UN Doc E/C.12/MNE/CO/1 (28 November 2014) para 9; Nepal, UN Doc E/C.12/NPL/CO/3 (28 November 2014) para 7; Romania, UN Doc E/C.12/ROU/ CO/3-5 (28 November 2014) para 8; and Tajikistan, UN Doc E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 (6 March 2014) para 12. 131 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013) para 7. 132  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, UN Doc E/C.12/UZB/CO/2 (23 May 2014) para 8; Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/ITA/CO/5 (9 October 2015) para 11; Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (9 October 2015) para 16(b); Guyana, UN Doc E/C.12/GUY/CO/2-4 (9 October 2015) para 18; Iraq, UN Doc E/C.12/ IRQ/CO/4 (9 October 2015) para 12. See also UN Convention against Corruption, 9 Dec 2003, GA res 58/4, UN Doc A/58/422 (2003).

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The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Enact domestic legislation to incorporate the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,133 ratified by the State party in 2006; (b) Ensure that public affairs, in law and in practice, are conducted in a transparent manner; (c) Set up awareness-raising campaigns for members and officials of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the local People’s congresses and People’s governments at all levels, as well as the organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas, on the economic and social costs of corruption, and emphasize the need for strict application of anti-corruption legislation among judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officers; [and] (d) Undertake independent and impartial investigations into all cases of corruption, no matter whether small or systemic, and hold those responsible accountable.134

Similar observations were made in 2013 with respect to Togo: The Committee considers the prevalence of corruption in the administration of the State party to be a matter of concern (art 2, para 1). The Committee recommends that the State party redouble its efforts to combat corruption and related impunity, and to ensure transparency in the conduct of public affairs, in law and in practice. The Committee also recommends that the State party adopt an anti-corruption law and enforce compliance with article 145 of the Constitution on the declaration of property and assets. The Committee further recommends that the State party take measures to draw the attention of politicians, members of parliament and national and local officials to the economic and social costs of corruption, and of judges, prosecutors and members of law enforcement agencies to the importance of the strict application of the law.135

[2.37]  In addition to domestic criminal prosecution of corruption cases, available international judicial mechanisms may be used to ensure accountability for those responsible for corruption. For example, in 2008, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), a Nigerian NGO, petitioned the ICC to ‘examine and investigate whether the systemic/grand corruption in Nigeria amounted to a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC’,136 and filed another petition in 2012, specifically in connection with an alleged $6 billion looting of Nigeria’s electricity subsidy program.137 Furthermore, in 2012 SERAP filed a request for an Advisory Opinion before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, asking the Court to ‘consider the effects of corruption on the poverty level in Nigeria, and whether the rising and systemic poverty violates specific human rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.138 [2.38]  In its assessment of whether a state party has taken reasonable steps to the maximum of its available resources to achieve progressively the realisation of the 133 

9 December 2003, GA res 58/4, UN Doc.A/58/422 (2003). Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, UN Doc E/C.12/CHN/CO/2 (13 June 2014) para 11. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Indonesia, UN Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (23 May 2014) para 9; Armenia, UN Doc E/C.12/ARM/CO/2-3 (23 May 2014) para 8; Uzbekistan, UN Doc E/C.12/UZB/CO/2 (23 May 2014) para 8. 135  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Togo, UN Doc E/C.12/TGO/CO/1 (3 June 2013), para 11. 136  SERAP v Nigeria, available at http://serap-nigeria.org/escrs-corruption-in-nigeria/. 137  Ibid. 138  SERAP, Request for Advisory Opinion No 001/2012. 134  CESCR,

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­ rovisions of the Covenant, the Committee places great importance on transparent and p ­participative decision-making processes at the national level.139 Such processes help to reduce corruption. In this respect, it is important to note that although states generally have a ‘margin of discretion’140 to decide how to allocate the available resources and to prioritise certain resource demands over others, ‘due priority’ should be given to the realisation of human rights, including ESC rights.141 Thus, it is important for every state to make appropriate choices in the allocation of the available resources in ways that ensure the most vulnerable are given priority.142 All domestic resources must be considered for use by the state, because human rights generally deserve priority over all other considerations.143 ii.  Budget Allocations to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [2.39]  A participatory budget allocation in relation to the four stages of the budget process: (a) planning, (b) enactment, (c) execution and (d) follow-up in the form of reporting, evaluating and auditing contributes to the realisation of ESC rights. States need to ensure sufficient, effective, efficient and equitable public spending for realising ESC rights. In order to assess whether the maximum available resources are being used in progressively achieving the full realisation of ESC rights, states must regularly evaluate the budget allocations made for the implementation of these rights.144 In determining state compliance with the obligation to utilise the ‘maximum available resources’, the CESCR has developed some useful indicators in its Concluding Observations. One indicator is to consider the percentage of the national budget allocated to specific rights under the Covenant (eg health, education, housing, social security), relative to areas outside the Covenant (eg considerable security and military expenditures or debt-servicing). Many resource problems revolve around the misallocation of available resources—eg purchasing expensive weapons systems rather than investing in affordable housing, primary education or primary or preventive health services and social protection.145 In 2001, for example, with respect to Senegal the CESCR stated: The Committee [was] concerned that funds allocated by the State party for basic social services … fall far short of the minimum social expenditure required to cover such services. In this regard the Committee note[d] with regret that more is spent by the State party on the military and on servicing its debt than on basic social services.146

139 

CESCR, Statement above n 109, para 11. CESCR, General Comments 14, 15 and 16, paras 53, 45 and 32 respectively. See also CESCR, Statement, above n 109, para 11, stating that ‘in accordance with the practice of judicial and other quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies, the Committee always respects the margin of appreciation of States to take steps and adopt measures most suited to their specific circumstances’. 141 Limburg Principles, above n 12, 28. See also CRC, Concluding Observations: Rwanda, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.236 (4 June 2004) para 18. 142 See A Eide, ‘The Use of Indicators in the Practice of the Committee on Economic, Social and ­Cultural Rights’ in Eide, Krause and Rosas (eds), above n 55, 545, 549. 143  Robertson, above n 105, 700. 144  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015), para 10. 145  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Philippines, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/7, para 21, stating that ‘in terms of the availability of resources, the Committee notes with concern that a greater proportion of the national budget is devoted to military spending than to housing, agriculture and health combined’. 146  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24/9/2001) para 23. 140 

Article 2(1)

 103

It is, accordingly, imperative to consider the priority or rate of resource allocation to military expenditure in comparison to the expenditure on ESC rights.147 A reordering of priorities may alleviate some of the resource burden of any state. [2.40]  Another indicator that may be applied is to consider the resources spent by a particular state in the implementation of a specific ESC right (eg education, health, housing) and that which is spent by other states at the same or a comparable level of development. In addition, it is vital to compare a state’s allocations and expenditures against international indicators, such as the UNDP’s indicator that 5 per cent of GDP should go to human expenditures (which for poor countries are specified as basic education, primary healthcare and basic water).148 [2.41]  A significant decline in the budgetary share of sectors relevant to ESC rights, eg health, education, and water, requires justification, since such a decline generally results in poor-quality services. This might include ‘a fragmented and increasingly privatized health-care system’, which results in a large percentage of the population, particularly those in vulnerable situations, being excluded from health insurance and deprived of access to health facilities, goods and services;149 and poor-quality public education, particularly in rural areas and informal settlements, and exacerbating the problem of unequal access to education for children in vulnerable situations.150 [2.42]  As noted in chapter one, following the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant as adopted by the General Assembly in December 2008, it is possible for the Committee to receive and consider communications submitted by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a state party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the ESC rights set forth in the Covenant against states parties to the Optional Protocol.151 If a communication were to be brought against a state party to the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol, and the state used ‘resource constraints’ as an explanation for any retrogressive steps taken, the Committee has indicated that it would consider such information on a country-by-country basis in the light of objective criteria such as: (a) the country’s level of development; (b) the severity of the alleged breach, in particular whether the situation concerned the enjoyment of the minimum core content of the Covenant; (c) the country’s current economic situation, in particular whether the country was undergoing a period of economic recession;

147 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (9 October 2015) paras 15–16. Eide rightly argued that ‘[t]he “expenditure of death” should be turned into “expenditure of life” (public action to combat poverty)’. See Eide, above n 55, 28. 148 UNDP, UNDP Human Development Report, Financing Human Development (1991), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1991. 149  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013) para 21. 150  Ibid, 22. 151  Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, adopted on 10 December 2008, UN GA Res. A/RES/63/117, UN Doc A/63/435 Arts 1 and 2.

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(d) the existence of other serious claims on the state party’s limited resources, for example resulting from a recent natural disaster or from recent internal or international armed conflict; (e) whether the state party had sought to identify low-cost options; and (f) whether the state party had sought cooperation and assistance, or had rejected offers of resources from the international community for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reason.152 [2.43]  The obligation to take steps to the maximum of a state’s ‘available resources’ means that in making any assessment as to whether a state is in breach of its obligations to fulfil ESC rights recognised under the Covenant of a particular individual or group, an assessment must be made as to whether the steps taken were ‘adequate’ or ‘reasonable’ by taking into account, inter alia, the following considerations: (a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights; (b) whether the state party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and nonarbitrary manner; (c) whether the state party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources is in accordance with international human rights standards; (d) where several policy options are available, whether the state party adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights; (e) the time frame in which the steps were taken; (f) whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalised individuals or groups, and whether they were nondiscriminatory­and whether they prioritized grave situations or situations of risk.153 [2.44]  In the context of an Optional Protocol, where the Committee considers that a state party has not taken reasonable or adequate steps, the Committee could make recommendations, inter alia, along four principal lines: (a) recommending remedial action, such as compensation, to the victim, as appropriate; (b) calling upon the state party to remedy the circumstances leading to a violation. In doing so, the Committee might suggest goals and parameters to assist the state party in identifying appropriate measures. These parameters could include suggesting overall priorities to ensure that resource allocation conformed with the state party’s obligations under the Covenant; provision for the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups; protection against grave threats to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights; and respect for non-discrimination in the adoption and implementation of measures; (c) suggesting, on a case-by-case basis, a range of measures to assist the state party in implementing the recommendations, with particular emphasis on low-cost ­measures. The state party would nonetheless still have the option of adopting its own alternative measures;

152  153 

CESCR, Statement above n 109, para 9. Ibid, para 8.

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(d) recommending a follow-up mechanism to ensure ongoing accountability of the state party, for example by including a requirement that in its next periodic report or within a period of six months the state party explain the steps taken to redress the violation.154 D.  Minimum Core Obligations [2.45]  Every human right contains an essential, inviolable core, ie one or more essential elements that is/are not subject to limitations or exceptions.155 When a state ratifies the Covenant, the ultimate result is to implement fully all the components of the rights recognised under the Covenant. In order to fulfil this, a state should, in circumstances where resources are scarce, first tackle certain ‘elements of the right that are the most essential or fundamental’.156 Such elements constitute the ‘minimum core content’ of a right, which translates into ‘minimum core entitlements’ for individuals/groups and ‘minimum core obligations’ for states.157 As stated by Yacoob J in Grootboom, the ‘[m]inimum core obligation is determined generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the right in question’.158 [2.46]  Generally, the ‘core content’ of a human right refers to the entitlements that make up the right, while the ‘minimum core content’ has been described as the nonnegotiable foundation of a right to which all individuals are entitled, in all contexts and in all circumstances.159 As the CESCR put it: [T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.160

It follows that the lack of sufficient resources does not exonerate a state party, including developing states, from a threshold or the ‘minimum core obligation’ to ensure, at the very least, ‘minimum essential levels’ of each of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant.161 It is not subject to the notions of progressive realisation and resource availability.162 154  Ibid, para 13. See also IDG v Spain, Communication No 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015) para 18. 155  See M Scheinin, ‘Core Rights and Obligations’ in D Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 527. 156  Chapman and Russell, above n 104, 9. 157  S Russell, ‘Minimum State Obligations: International Dimensions’ in D Brand and S Russell (eds), Exploring the Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2002) 11. 158  Government of South Africa v Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para 31 (Yacoob J). 159  The International Human Rights Internship Program (IHRIP), Ripple in Still Water: Reflections by Activists on Local- and National-Level Work on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ch 2, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/ripple/toc.html. 160  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10. 161  Ibid; D Turk, Second Progress Report of UN Special Rapporteur on ESCR, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1991/17, para 10, notes, ‘States are obliged, regardless of their level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.’ 162  P Hunt, ‘State Obligations, Indicators, Benchmarks, and the Right to Education’ (1998) 4 Human Rights Law and Practice 109; UN Doc E/C.12/1998/11, para 6(b); Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, paras 9 and 10.

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Accordingly, ‘even where the available resources are demonstrably ­inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances’.163 [2.47]  Several General Comments on specific ESC rights have followed this approach to minimum core obligations. For instance, in General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food, the Committee identified alleviation of hunger as a core obligation of the right to adequate food.164 This view has been echoed by the IACmHR, which has said that member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) are ‘­obligated …, regardless of the level of economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of [ESC] rights’.165 The African Commission has taken a similar line, stating that rights have a ‘minimum core’.166 Without the minimum core entitlements and obligations, the Covenant ‘is largely deprived of its raison d’être’.167 [2.48]  Is the minimum core in a least-developed state with limited available resources the same as the minimum core in a more-developed state with more available resources? In other words, is a minimum core relative (state-specific), universal or relatively universal? While there are different views on this issue,168 there would be no point in having a minimum core of state responsibility if it were state-specific and not universal.169 The ‘minimum core content’ that gives rise to the ‘minimum core obligations’ is, therefore, that part of a right that must be respected and protected at all times, whatever the state’s level of development and available resources. It is an absolute international minimum, and constitutes a basic level of subsistence necessary to live in dignity. Alston described the minimum core as ‘an absolute minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a state party is considered to be in violation of its obligations’.170 He rightly observed: The fact that there must exist such a core … would seem to be a logical implication of the use of the terminology of rights … there would be no justification for elevating a ‘claim’ to the status of a right (with all the connotations that concept is generally assumed to have) if its normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for the possibility that the rightholders possess no particular entitlement to anything.171

The minimum core can therefore be seen as a ‘base-line’,172 below which all states must not fall and above which they should endeavour to rise.173 It should be noted, however, that the minimum core is not static but evolves upwards over time.174 163 

CESCR, General Comment 3, para 11. CESCR, General Comment 12: Right to Adequate Food (20th Session, 1999), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) para 6. 165  IACmHR, ‘Press Communique’, No 14/93, Washington, DC, 10 August 1993, in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc 9 rev (1994) 603. 166  Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v N ­ igeria, Communication no 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60, paras 65–66. 167  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10. 168 See KG Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of ­Content (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113. 169  See G Van Bueren, ‘Of Floors and Ceilings: Minimum Core Obligations and Children’ in Brand and Russell, above n 157, 183, 184. 170  Alston, above n 84, 353. 171  Ibid, 352–53. 172  D Bilchitz, ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for the Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 1, 12. 173  F Coomans, ‘In Search of the Core Content of the Right to Education’ in Chapman and Russell (eds), above n 104, 217, 228. 174  Bilchitz, above n 172, 13–14. 164 

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[2.49]  Consequently, ‘the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally recognised human rights’,175 including the minimum core obligations of ESC rights. Every effort is required to be made to use all resources at the disposition of a state party in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, the minimum core obligations176 and to protect vulnerable members of society, even in times of severe resource constraints.177 The CESCR has emphasised three points in relation to ‘minimum core obligations’: First, because core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster. Second, because poverty is a global phenomenon, core obligations have great relevance to some individuals and communities living in the richest States. Third, after a State party has ensured the core obligations of economic, social and cultural rights, it continues to have obligations to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realisation of all rights in the Covenant.178

Thus, minimum core obligations apply at all times, and not only to developing states: such obligations have significance even to (economically disadvantaged) individuals and groups in developed states. In this way, they apply universally and establish an ‘international minimum threshold’.179 [2.50]  The fact that the minimum core content of a right must be realised immediately does not suggest that the remainder of the right is sufficiently unimportant to justify inertia, or its neglect or denial. Rather, the minimum core should be viewed as a ‘springboard’ for further action by the state.180 After the state has substantially met its minimum core obligations, it is obliged to realise progressively the remainder of the right. In this regard, states should avoid taking retrogressive steps that actually worsen access to ESC rights, such as cutting back investment in basic services like healthcare or primary education, regressive taxation and reforms to the labour market and pensions even under pressure from international lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The CESCR has pointed out that any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.181

[2.51]  The idea of a ‘minimum core content’ has been criticised, inter alia, out of concern that using the word ‘minimum’ limits the full guarantee of rights by setting a

175 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14–25 June 1993, UN Doc A/CONF157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993), 32 ILM 1661 (1993) (hereinafter ‘Vienna Declaration’), para 10. 176  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10. 177  Ibid, para 12; Limburg Principles, above n 12, 25 and 28. 178  CESCR, Statement: Poverty and the International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (4 May 2001), para 18. 179  Ibid, para 16. 180  G Van Bueren, ‘The Minimum Core Obligations of States under Article 10(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Chapman and Russell (eds), above n 104, 147, 160. 181  CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9.

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lower standard for states to meet.182 However, as Provea, a Venezuelan NGO working since 1992 to promote the right to health, noted: We consider that by establishing a minimum, uniform ‘floor’ below which a state may not descend does not weaken the right in question, provided that the content is understood as a starting point and not as the arrival point. Furthermore, establishing a framework assures a uniform basis to be respected, even by the states with insufficient economic resources or subjected to critical economic situations.183

Nevertheless, one possible weakness in the ‘minimum core obligation’ approach is that its basic assumption—that minimum state obligations are by definition affordable— may in particular contexts be untenable in practice without considerable and sustained international assistance and cooperation.184 In other words, states are assumed to have access to the resources required to meet their minimum state obligations, but in reality some may not have such resources. For example, while free and compulsory primary education is considered to be part of the minimum core state obligation, primary education in many states is not free.185 The issue that arises here is whether this is a violation of the minimum core obligations, or reflects the inability (as opposed to unwillingness) of states to meet their minimum state obligations? The answer depends on a number of factors (see paragraph 2.42 above), including whether the state had sought cooperation and assistance, or had rejected offers of resources from the international community for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reason. [2.52]  It is essential to point out that the obligation to monitor the extent of the (non) realisation of ESC rights and to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion is not subject to resource constraints.186 Accordingly, states must constantly monitor progress achieved, and must review strategies where there is no progress or where progress is insufficient. All states parties to the ICESCR must collect disaggregated data and identify vulnerable groups as the first essential step.187 The second step is to set ‘specific benchmarks or goals’188 to move progressively beyond the core content, and to harness the national resources to realise ESC rights and improve the situation of the worse-off regions or areas, and that of specific groups or subgroups that appear to be particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged.189 [2.53]  As pointed out above in paragraphs 2.30–2.31, the phrase ‘available resources’ in Article 2(1), in the view of the CESCR, extends not only to what is existing within a state, but also to resources ‘available from the international community through

182 

Russell, above n 157, 15. See Provea, Health as a Right: Framework for National and International Protection of the Human Rights of Health (Caracas, 1996) s V. See also S Leckie and M Kothari (eds), Legal Provisions on Housing Rights: National and International Approaches (Utrecht, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 1994) s III. 184  Russell, above n 157, 16. 185  See Right to Education, ‘Countries Without Free Public Primary Education Available to all School Age Children by Region’, available at http://www.right-to-education.org/. 186  CESCR, Genera Comment 3, para 11; CESCR, General Comment 1, para 4. 187  CESCR, General Comment 1, para 3. 188  Ibid, para 6. 189  Ibid, para 3. 183 

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i­nternational cooperation and assistance’.190 Therefore, where a state party is demonstrably unable to develop a plan of action for the realisation of the core obligations in respect of its minimum core obligations—such as primary education and essential primary healthcare—such a state should seek international cooperation and assistance to meet its human rights obligations for the most vulnerable groups. As regards the right to health, for example, the Committee holds that ‘it is particularly incumbent on States parties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide “international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical” which enable developing countries to fulfil their core and other obligations’.191 [2.54]  The Committee has clarified that economically developed states parties have ‘a special responsibility for and interest in assisting’ the developing countries in this regard.192 In respect of the right to primary education, the Committee holds that ‘[w]here a State party is clearly lacking in the financial resources and/or expertise required to “work out and adopt” a detailed plan, the international community has a clear obligation to assist’.193 What, then, is the content of this clear obligation to ‘assist’? E.  Obligations Regarding International Assistance and Cooperation [2.55]  Article 2(1) takes into account the fact that some steps required of states will be taken ‘through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’. This has been understood to give rise to the right to international assistance and (bilateral, regional, inter regional, global or multilateral) cooperation. The origins of this contested right may be traced to Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that one of the purposes of the UN is [t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms.

The notion of this right extends, through Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, to ­Articles 22 and 28 of the UDHR. According to Article 22 of the UDHR: Everyone … is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international c­ ooperation … of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and free development of his personality.

This was reinforced in Article 28 of the UDHR, which has been understood to require that social order (political and economic relations within states) and international order (between states) be restructured to make possible the equal enjoyment of human rights throughout the world.194 Thus all development actors (states and NSAs) should 190 

CESCR, General Comment 3, para 13. See also section II.E. below. CESCR, General Comment 14, para 45. 192  CESCR, General Comment 19, para 55. 193 CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (10 May 1999), para 9 (emphasis added). 194  UDHR, Art 28 provides: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.’ For the analysis, see A Eide, ‘Article 28’ in G Alfredsson and E Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 597. 191 

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contribute to the creation of a social and international order in which human rights, including ESC rights, may be realised.195 [2.56]  The ICESCR refers to international assistance and cooperation, or similar ­formulations, in five articles.196 Under Article 23, states parties to the ICESCR agree that international action for the achievement of the rights recognised in the … ­Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organised in conjunction with the ­Governments concerned.

This provision specifically recognises the role of not only the ratifying state, but also of other states in the achievement of ESC rights. This is because every state party has a legal interest in the performance by every other state party of its human rights obligations.197 This follows from the fact that the ‘rules concerning the basic rights of the human person’ are erga omnes obligations, and that, as indicated in the fourth preambular paragraph of both the ICESCR and the ICCPR, there is a UN Charter obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Clearly, then, the furnishing of international technical assistance is a key feature of the ICESCR. What is uncertain is the extent to which states and other actors must discharge this obligation to furnish assistance for the realisation of ESC rights. [2.57]  International assistance has also found explicit recent expression in another universally ratified binding treaty: the CRC.198 Importantly, the CRC Committee has noted that ‘[w]hen States ratify the Convention, they take on obligations not only to implement it within their jurisdiction but to contribute, through international cooperation, to global implementation’.199 The CRC Committee believes that children’s rights are a shared responsibility between the developed and the developing countries. State parties must respect and protect economic, social and cultural rights of children in all countries with no exceptions, and take all possible measures to fulfil these rights—whenever they are in a position to do so—through development cooperation. At the same time, countries with severe resource constraints have the responsibility to seek international cooperation and assistance. Thus, inaction cannot be justified by sole reliance on external support and they must at least bear the burden of demonstrating that they have made all possible efforts, to the best of their ability, to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances, in particular for the most disadvantaged and marginalized members or groups of the society.200

195  UDHR, Art 28. See also the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm, para 13(c). 196  ICESCR, Arts 2(1), 11, 15, 22 and 23. 197  See eg HRC, General Comment 31, above n 15, para 2. 198  For text, see UN Doc A/44/49 (1989); 1577 UNTS 3, Arts 4, 7(2), 11(2), 17(b), 21(e), 22(2), 23(4), 24(4), 27(4), 28(3), 34 and 35. 199  CRC Committee, General Comment 5, above n 116, para 7. 200  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion on ‘Resources for the Rights of the Child: Responsibility of States’, 21 September 2007, para 51. See also CRC Committee, General Comment 19: On Public Spending and the Rights of the Child (Article 4), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/19 (2016).

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It follows that programmes of ‘donor states should be rights-based’.201 International assistance and cooperation may be regarded as one element of the more extensive right to development that was affirmed in the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986)202 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993).203 In the year 2000, 147 heads of state and government—191 states in total—recognised explicitly in the Millennium Declaration the link between the realisation of the right to development and poverty reduction, and committed themselves to make ‘the right to development a reality for everyone’ and to free ‘the entire human race from want’.204 In September 2015, 193 states agreed to work together to achieve new goals—the Sustainable Development Goals—which include ending poverty in all its forms ­ ­everywhere by 2030. [2.58]  Scholars differ in their opinions as to whether or not drafters of the ICESCR envisaged explicitly including extraterritorial obligations (to assist other states) in the realisation of ESC rights. As a result there are divergent views on whether the reference to ‘international assistance and cooperation’ in Article 2(1) ICESCR amounts to a legal obligation on the part of states parties to engage in international development assistance, notably for the realisation of ESC rights protected in the I­ CESCR. It has been contended that, from the travaux préparatoires, states did not agree about the existence of any well-defined legal obligation upon any particular state to p ­ rovide any particular form of assistance under Article 2(1).205 Nevertheless, others have asserted that extraterritorial obligations were envisaged by the drafters of the ICESCR.206 Whatever the answer to that question, the key issue for present purposes is whether in the era of globalisation the Covenant can (or should) be interpreted as establishing extraterritorial obligations for developed states to assist developing states. It is striking to recall that the object and purpose of the Covenant, as a human rights treaty, requires that its provisions be interpreted so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.207 It is suggested below in paragraphs 2.61–2.72 that effectiveness requires that the human rights obligations in the Covenant to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ equally apply at an international level when a state deals with NSAs and

201 

Ibid, para 61. GA res 41/128, annex, 41 UN GAOR Supp (No 53), 186, UN Doc A/41/53 (1986). 203  Vienna Declaration, above n 175, paras 9, 12 and 34. 204  United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution 55/2 (8 September 2000), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm, para 11; Office of the UNHCHR, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (2002), para 215, available at http:// www.unhchr.ch/pdf/povertyfinal.pdf. As Mary Robinson observed, ‘There are not two worlds, rich and poor. There is only one. We must decide if we are committed to working together to shape it into one based on human rights and social justice, as the best hope of achieving peace and security.’ See American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting (2–5 April 2003) 12. 205  Alston and Quinn, above n 76, 186–92. 206  See F Coomans and M Kamminga, ‘Comparative Introductory Comments on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties’ in F Coomans and M Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004) 2; S Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 83–98. 207  This is a firmly established approach of the ECtHR. See, eg, Soering v UK, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, no 161, 34, (1989) 11 EHRR 439; Artico v Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A, No 37, (1981) 3 EHRR 1; and Loizidou v Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App no 15318/89, judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A, no 310, 23, (1995) 20 EHRR 99; EB v France, App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008) para 92; Saad v United Kingdom, App no 13229/03, judgment of 29 January 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 427, para 55. 202 

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other states.208 For example, in negotiations with international financial institutions, a state has to ‘take into account its international legal obligations to protect, promote and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights’.209 [2.59]  Although ‘from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial’,210 as shown in chapter one, a state’s human rights obligations are not territorially limited. Human rights obligations may extend beyond a state’s borders to areas where a state exercises power, authority or effective control over individuals, or where a state exercises effective control of an area of territory within another state.211 The ICJ acknowledged some space, albeit in a restrictive way, for the extraterritorial application of the ICESCR. In its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ held: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains no provision on its scope of application. This may be explicable by the fact that this Covenant guarantees rights which are essentially territorial. However, it is not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction. Thus Article 14 makes provision for transitional measures in the case of any State which ‘at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge’.212

[2.60]  In accordance with the above, states are legally responsible for policies that violate human rights beyond their own borders, and for policies that indirectly support violations by third parties. Thus where a corporation registered in its home state but operating abroad (through a foreign subsidiary) violates, for example, fundamental labour rights protected under the ICESCR, say through the use of forced labour, ‘it may be argued that states are under an obligation to regulate, investigate and even bring before the courts conduct of a transnational corporation under its home state jurisdiction where a “threshold of gravity” of human rights violations is at stake’.213 [2.61]  International cooperation under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR enjoins states parties to view violations of the Covenant guarantees by any state party as deserving their attention. The drawing of attention to possible breaches of the ICESCR obligations by other states parties should not be regarded as an unfriendly act but as a reflection of legitimate concern of the international community. In what follows, the obligations arising from international cooperation and assistance are discussed at three levels—to respect, protect and fulfil. 208  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) para 38. 209  Ibid. 210 ECtHR, Banković v Belgium and Others, Grand Chamber Decision of 12 December 2001, Decision no 52207/99, Reports 2001-XII, EHRR SE5, para 59. 211  See R McCorquodale and P Simons, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70(4) MLR 598, 624. 212  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 112. 213  McCorquodale and Simons, above n 211, 619. See also F Coomans, ‘Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Coomans and Kamminga (eds), above n 206, 193.

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i.  Obligation to Respect [2.62]  International cooperation requires states parties to refrain from actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the progressive realisation of ESC rights in other states.214 It follows that any activities undertaken within each state party’s jurisdiction should not deprive, at a primary level, another state of the ability to realise progressively ESC rights for individuals and groups within another state’s jurisdiction. The CESCR has made it clear that states have to respect the enjoyment of ESC rights in other states. While interpreting Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, in which the states parties to the Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the CESCR stated that to comply with their international obligations in relation to Article 12, states parties have ‘to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries’.215 States must, for example, refrain from seizure of generic medicine, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), being shipped from one state to another, as this adversely affects the enjoyment of the right to health in other states. The CESCR stated: The Committee is concerned over the adverse impact on the enjoyment of the right to health resulting from the seizure in the Netherlands by the State party of TRIPS-consistent consignments of generic medicine being shipped from one developing country to another. (art 12). The Committee urges the State party to take into account its international obligation to respect the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of health and to desist from such seizures in the future.216

A similar obligation to ‘respect’ would extend to all other substantive rights under the Covenant, including respecting the rights to food and water in other countries.217 [2.63]  States, acting independently and/or through international organisations, must refrain from imposing any conditions in bilateral and multilateral international aid that may have a negative or harmful impact on human rights, including ESC rights, of marginalised and disadvantaged groups. Similarly, states must refrain from supporting, directly or indirectly, projects, for example through economic and technical assistance, that result in violations of ESC rights in other states. In its Concluding Observations on China, the CESCR stated: While the Committee welcomes the fact that in the framework of international cooperation, the State party has provided economic and technical assistance to over 2,100 projects in more than 120 developing countries, the Committee is concerned that some of those projects have reportedly resulted in violations of economic, social and cultural rights in receiving countries (arts 2 and 11).

214  CESCR, General Comment 15, para 31. See also W Vandenhole, ‘Third State Obligations under the ICESCR: A Case Study of EU Sugar Policy’ (2007) 76(1) Nordic Journal of International Law 73. 215  CESCR, General Comment 14, para 39. 216  CESCR, Concluding Observations: The Kingdom of the Netherlands, UN Doc E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5 (9 November 2010) para 28. 217  CESCR, General Comment 12, para 36; and CESCR, General Comment 15, para 31.

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The Committee calls upon the State party to adopt a human rights-based approach to its policies of international cooperation, by: (a) Undertaking a systematic and independent human rights impact assessment prior to making funding decisions; (b) Establishing an effective monitoring mechanism to regularly assess the human rights impact of its policies and projects in the receiving countries and to take remedial measures when required; [and] (c) Ensuring that there is an accessible complaint mechanism for violations of economic, social and cultural rights occur in the receiving countries.218

[2.64]  This obligation further entails refraining from participation in decisions of intergovernmental bodies, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, that are reasonably foreseen as likely to obstruct or hinder the progressive realisation of ESC rights in other states.219 This includes refraining from supporting decisions limiting accessibility to education and health. Entitlements to ESC rights such as education and health should not be replaced by purchasing power. However, as Tomaševski noted in 2005: Progressive liberalisation of trade in education and health is replacing progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. Unless this is effectively countered, we may continue talking about economic, social and cultural rights but purchasing power will have replaced entitlements.220

[2.65]  In sum, the ICESCR imposes on states an obligation to abstain from any act or omission that may cause harm outside their territories, for example by not supporting, aiding or assisting (arming, training and equipping) rebel groups or armed conflicts in other states in violation of international law, and by not assisting corporations or other entities to violate ESC rights in other states. This is consistent with international law, which provides a general duty on states not to act in such a way as to cause harm outside their territories.221 ii.  Obligation to Protect [2.66]  At a secondary level, states are obliged to take measures such as legislation and administrative practices to ensure that all other private parties, including individuals, groups and other bodies (such as international organisations and domestically based transnational corporations), subject to their control respect the enjoyment of human rights in other states. This is part of a state’s obligation to exercise due diligence not to violate ESC rights in other states either via acts of state authorities, whether performed within or outside national boundaries, which have consequences outside its 218 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: China, above n 134, para 12. CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) para 31; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) para 31; Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.67 (24 September 2001) para 37; Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.43 (23 May 2000) para 20; United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 26. 220  K Tomaševski, ‘Unasked Questions about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998–2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 709, 710. 221  See, eg, The Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) (Arbitration Tribunal) (1990) 82 ILR 449. 219 

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own territory, or via a state’s intraterritorial omissions which have extraterritorial consequences for ESC rights, eg omission to regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporations registered within a particular state. This obligation to protect against extraterritorial violations of ESC rights has been clarified in the General Comments of the CESCR, eg on the rights to health, water and social security. In the context of the right to health, for example, the CESCR has stated: To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have … to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.222

[2.67]  A similar obligation to protect by way of legal or political means against human rights violations by third parties would equally extend to all other substantive rights under the Covenant. For example, as regards the right to water, the CESCR asserted: Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries. Where States parties can take steps to influence other third parties to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.223

Regarding the right to social security, the CESCR stated that the right should be protected extraterritorially by states parties’ preventing their own citizens and national entities within their jurisdiction from violating the right in other countries.224 In order to realise the right to adequate food, the CESCR has called on states to address the underlying causes of food insecurity, malnutrition and undernutrition (at the national and international levels) that have persisted for so long.225 The protective measures recommended to be undertaken include revising the global trade regime under the WTO, to ensure that global agricultural trade rules promote, rather than undermine, the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger, especially in developing and net food-importing countries.226 Similar protective measures are necessary to ensure that intellectual property provisions in trade agreements protect against the increase of the price of medicines, in particular for those with low incomes. As a logical conclusion, states should undertake necessary legislative and non-legislative measures to address the underlying violations of all ESC rights. This includes taking effective measures to ensure that ESC rights are taken into account in all free trade agreements and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and developing effective policies to protect ESC rights, in particular of the marginalised and disadvantaged groups, against the negative impact of such agreements.

222 

CESCR, General Comment 14, para 39. CESCR, General Comment 15, para 33. 224  CESCR, General Comment 19, para 54. 225 CESCR, The World Food Crisis, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/1 (20 May 2008) para 12. 226  Ibid, para 13. 223 

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iii.  Obligation to Fulfil [2.68]  The scope and content of the obligation to fulfil (facilitate, promote or ­provide) at a tertiary international level is somewhat uncertain. The issue here is whether developed states parties to the ICESCR are obliged to facilitate, promote and provide assistance for the realisation of ESC rights in developing states, or at least in the least-developed states.227 It is useful to consider, first, what states are considered to be ‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘least developed’ in international law. While there is no legal definition of developed, developing and least-developed countries, the following UN definition has been widely used and provides some useful guidance. According to the UN: There is no established convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe are considered ‘developed’ regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and the former USSR countries in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions.228

Least-developed countries are classified on the basis of low income; weak human assets, based on indicators of nutrition, health, school enrolment and literacy; and economic vulnerability.229 Economic growth in these countries faces long-term ­impediments—such as structural weaknesses and low human resources d ­ evelopment.230 By 2014, 48 countries were designated by the UN as ‘least-developed countries’.231 [2.69]  The practice of the CESCR indicates that full realisation of ESC rights requires international assistance and cooperation. Thus, in its General Comment on the nature of states parties’ obligations in 1990, the CESCR stated that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations,232 with wellestablished­principles of international law, and with the provisions of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development and thus the realisation of [ESC rights] is an ­obligation of all states. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position

227  ‘Developing states’ is used here in a broader context to refer not only to those states classified as the ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs)—those with per capita income under US$500—but also to those states classified as ‘other low income countries’ (OLIC), such as India, Vietnam, Nigeria and Pakistan, as well as to refer to those states classified as ‘lower-middle income countries’ (LMIC), such as China, Indonesia and the Philippines. 228  United Nations, Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, Series M, No 49, Rev 4, available in part at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 229 UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report 2004 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2004), 317–62; UNCTAD, FDI in Least Developed Countries at a Glance: 2005/6, UN Publication UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2005/7 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2006) iii. 230  World Bank, Beyond Economic Growth Student Book: Glossary, available at http://www.worldbank. org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html. 231  See Appendix J. 232  Art 55 provides, inter alia, that one of the purposes of the UN is the promotion of ‘higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development’, while under Art 56, member states pledge themselves ‘to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organisation’ to this end.

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to assist others in this regard … [I]n the absence of an active programme of international ­assistance and cooperation on the part of all those States that are in position to undertake one, the full realisation of [ESC rights] will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many countries.233

[2.70]  It follows, therefore, that states parties have a joint and individual responsibility to cooperate, especially in ‘the scientific and cultural fields’234 and in ‘providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons’, giving priority to the most vulnerable or marginalised groups.235 As regards the right to health, for example, the Committee has stressed that, ‘[d]epending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries, wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when required’.236 Similarly, with respect to the right to water, one of the underlying determinants of health, the Committee noted that, depending on the availability of resources, ‘[s]tates should facilitate realisation of the right to water in other countries’, for example through provision of water resources, financial and technical assistance, and provide the necessary aid when required.237 In the Committee’s view: International assistance should be provided in a manner that is consistent with the Covenant and other human rights standards, and sustainable and culturally appropriate. The economically developed States parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing States in this regard.238

[2.71]  According to the Committee, one example where such an obligation to assist might arise could be found in the context of Article 14 of the ICESCR.239 This requires each state party that has not been able to secure compulsory primary education, free of charge, to undertake, within two years, to ‘work out and adopt’ a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory primary education free of charge for all.240 In spite of the obligations undertaken in accordance with Article 14, a number of states parties have neither drafted nor implemented such a plan of action.241 If this is due to the lack of the financial resources and/or expertise required to ‘work out and adopt’ a detailed plan, the Committee holds that the ‘international community has a clear obligation to assist’.242 [2.72]  A number of questions arise from the Committee’s approach regarding international assistance and cooperation. What does ‘international assistance and

233 

CESCR, General Comment 3, para 14. ICESCR, Art 15(4). See also UN Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, GA res 3384 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, paras 1 and 5. 235  See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 12, para 38. 236  CESCR, General Comment 14, para 39 (emphasis added). 237  CESCR, General Comment 15, para 34 (emphasis added). 238  Ibid. 239  CESCR, General Comment 11, para 9. 240  ICESCR, Art 14. 241  By 2003, for example, in 58 states primary education was not free, or it was not compulsory, or it was neither free nor compulsory. See Right to Education, Is the Right to Education Realised in Practice?, available at http://www.right-to-education.org/. 242  CESCR, General Comment 11, para 9. 234 

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c­ ooperation’ entail? In particular, what are those (economically developed) states with a ‘special responsibility’ and in a position to assist? Are ‘poorer developing states’ legally obliged actively to seek or receive assistance, and are ‘economically developed states’ legally obliged to assist? Can a particular ‘poorer developing state’ claim or possess a legally enforceable right to (economic, technical or other) assistance from a ‘specific economically developed state’? How is the obligation to assist to be discharged? Is there a particular level of resources that a (developed) state is legally obliged to devote to international assistance and cooperation under Article 2(1)? When would a state be said to be in violation of the obligation to assist (or to be assisted)? Are receiving/ developing states obliged to devote such resources, or a significant part thereof, to the realisation of ESC rights? Admittedly, many of these questions are complex and have yet to be fully settled.243 An attempt is made below to comment on some of them. F.  The Application of International Cooperation and Assistance [2.73]  This section considers the human rights obligations arising from the application of international cooperation and assistance to: (i) developed states; (ii) developing states; (iii) NSAs. i.  Developed States: Any Obligation to Assist? [2.74]  In general, while most developed states give assistance to developing states,244 developed states have consistently denied the existence of any clear legal obligation to transfer resources to developing states.245 It has further been argued that ‘although there is clearly an obligation to cooperate internationally, it is not clear whether this means that wealthy States Parties are obliged to provide aid to assist in the realisation of the rights in other countries’.246 [2.75]  In debates surrounding the drafting of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the representatives of the UK, the Czech Republic, Canada, France and Portugal believed that international cooperation and assistance was an ‘important moral obligation’ but ‘not a legal entitlement’, and did not interpret the Covenant to impose a legal obligation to provide development assistance or give a legal title to receive such aid.247 However, if there is no legal obligation underpinning the human rights ­responsibility of 243  For a discussion about what international assistance and cooperation means in international human rights instruments, see, eg, Skogly, above n 206; ME Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007); ME ­Salomon, A Tostensen and W Vandenhole (eds), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Dutybearers (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2007). 244  PS Heller and S Gupta, Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance (Washington, DC, IMF, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2002/pdp05.pdf. 245  Alston and Quinn, above n 76, 186–91. 246  M Craven, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in R Hanski and M Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Text Book, 2nd edn (Abo, Abo Akademi University, 1999) 101. 247  See Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Consider Options regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Second Session, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/52 (10 February 2005) para 76.

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international assistance and cooperation, then inescapably all international ­assistance and cooperation fundamentally rests upon charity.248 Is such a position tenable and acceptable in the twenty-first century? Paul Hunt has stated that ‘[w]hile such a position might have been tenable in years gone by, it is unacceptable in the twenty-first century’.249 While this is still debateable, the approach of the CESCR suggests that the economically developed states parties to the Covenant are under an obligation to assist developing states parties to fulfil their core obligations with respect to the realisation of ESC rights. The CESCR has stressed that ‘it is particularly incumbent on all those who can assist, to help developing countries respect this [the core obligations of economic, social and cultural rights] international minimum threshold’.250 [2.76]  By way of illustration, after identifying core obligations in relation to the right to water, the Committee emphasised that ‘it is particularly incumbent on States parties, and other actors in position to assist, to provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical which enables developing countries to fulfil their core obligations’.251 But what is the content of the responsibility to provide international assistance and cooperation? This is not defined in international human rights treaties. It appears logical to state that since states are only obliged to realise ESC right to the ‘maximum of available resources’, equally the human rights responsibility to provide international assistance and cooperation is also subject to the resources available to a donor state (or NSA). How much should a donor state provide in light of resource availability? In the course of examination of state reports, the Committee has inquired into the percentage of gross domestic product/gross national product (GDP/GNP) that developed reporting states dedicate to international cooperation252 and overseas/official development assistance (ODA).253 The UN-recommended target/ benchmark of 0.7 per cent GDP originally proposed by the Pearson Commission in 1968 and adopted in 1970,254 as reaffirmed in the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development 1995255 and in the Millennium Development Goals,256 has been adopted by the CESCR. The CRC Committee has also endorsed this approach.257 This goal of 0.7 per cent GDP was reiterated along with other targets in the Monterrey Consensus, arising from the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development.258 248  See P Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Addendum: Missions to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC (20 October 2006); and Uganda, UN Doc A/HRC/7/11/Add.2 (5 March 2008) para 133. 249  Hunt, above n 248. 250  CESCR, Poverty and the ICESCR, above n 178, para 17. 251  CESCR, General Comment 15, para 38 (emphasis added). 252  See eg CESCR, Summary Record: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/SR.14, para 38. 253  See eg CESCR, Summary Record: Japan UN Doc E/C.12/2001/SR.42, para 10; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/SR.48, para 37. 254  GA res 2226, 25 UN GAOR Supp (No 28), para 43, UN Doc A/8028 (1970); K Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited (London, Pinter, 1993), 32. 255  UN Doc A/CONF.166/9 (14 March 1995), Commitment 9, para 1. 256 UNDP, Millennium Development Goals, available at http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml, Goal 8, Target 32. 257  CRC Committee, General Comment 5, above n 116, para 61: ‘The Committee urges States to meet internationally agreed targets including the United Nations target for international development assistance of 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product.’ 258 Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002, A/Conf.198/11.

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However, by 2000 only five states had reached or exceeded the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP in ODA.259 Most developed states (particularly the Group of Eight industrialised states: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada and Russia) were far below the level of 0.7 per cent, with an average of 0.22 per cent, ie only about one-third of the target.260 By 2007 there had not been any significant increase in ODA, as the following report indicates: In 2007, the only countries to reach or exceed the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of their gross national income (GNI) were Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, N ­ orway and Sweden. The average effort by the 22 member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was just 0.45 per cent of GNI, but when weighted by the size of their economies, total net aid flows from the DAC members represented only 0.28 per cent of their combined national income … In addition to the aforementioned countries, only Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have met the target of providing aid to LDCs amounting to at least 0.15–0.20 per cent of their GNI; the average for all DAC countries was just 0.09 per cent.261

[2.77]  The average DAC country effort in 2013 had reduced to 0.4 per cent of GNI.262 It is not unusual for the CESCR to express regret regarding this state of affairs. Thus, in May 2008, the CESCR stated as follows with respect to France: The Committee regrets that in 2007 the State party devoted only 0.39 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to official development assistance (ODA), whereas the United Nations target for ODA is 0.7 per cent of GDP for industrialised countries. The Committee further regrets that the achievement of the objective of devoting 0.7 per cent of its GDP to international cooperation has been postponed from 2012 to 2015.263

[2.78]  Consequently, the Committee ‘recommends’ and ‘encourages’ developed states parties ‘to increase [international official development assistance/cooperation] ODA as a percentage of GNP to a level approaching the 0.7 per cent goal established by the United Nations’.264 States have been criticised where the levels devoted to ­international 259 These states are Denmark (1.06%), Netherlands (0.82%), Sweden (0.81%), Norway (0.80%) and ­Luxembourg (0.70%). Source: OECD, Press Release, 20 April 2001. 260  ODA as a percentage of GDP was as follows: Belgium (0.36%); Switzerland (0.34%); France (0.33%); Finland and UK (0.31%); Ireland (0.30%); Japan, Germany and Australia (0.27%); New Zealand and ­Portugal (0.26%); Canada and Austria (0.25%); Spain (0.24%); Greece (0.19%); Italy (0.13%) and the United States (0.10%). Ibid. See also UN Wire, ‘World Bank Head Blasts Rich Nations for Record on Aid’, 5 May 2004. 261  See the MDG Gap Task Force Report 2008, Millennium Development Goal 8: Delivering on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (New York, United Nations, 2008) vii. 262 OECD, Net Official Development Assistance from DAC and Other Donors in 2013 (OECD, 8 April 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ODA%202013%20Tables%20and%20 Charts%20En.pdf. 263  CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/FRA/CO/3 (May 2008) para 12. 264  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) paras 16 and 30; France, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.72 (30 November 2001) paras 14 and 24; Finland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.52 (1 December 2000) paras 13 and 23; Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (5 June 2002) para 38; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) paras 15 and 33; Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.67 (24 September 2001) para 37; Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/CO/3 (10 June 2013) para 32; Spain, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.99 (7 June 2004) paras 10 and 27. In May 2008 the CESCR recommended that France ‘increase its official development assistance to 0.7 per cent of its GDP, as agreed by the Heads of State and Government at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey (Mexico) on 18–22 March 2002’. See CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, above n 263, para 32.

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assistance and cooperation fall below this target,265 and have been urged to ‘review … budget allocation to international cooperation’266 with a view to ensuring that the UN target of 0.7 per cent GNP is reached ‘as quickly as possible’.267 For example, in its Concluding Observations on Germany in 2011: The Committee encourages the State party to increase the level of its contribution of official development assistance, which stood at 0.35 per cent of gross national income (GNI) in 2009,268 and to achieve the international standard of 0.7 per cent as expeditiously as possible.269

[2.79]  More recent observations confirm that the CESCR considers 0.7 per cent of GNP as the ‘international standard target’, ‘internationally agreed level’ or objective to be achieved by developed states.270 Thus, in relation to the fourth periodic report of Belgium in 2013: The Committee, while appreciating the efforts undertaken by the State party, regrets that it did not attain its objective of increasing official development assistance to 0.7 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and that this assistance has tended to decrease in recent years (art 2). The Committee recommends that the State party step up its efforts to attain the objective of increasing its international official development assistance to 0.7 per cent of GDP.271

In 2014, with respect to Finland, the Committee stated, in relation to ODA: While the Committee appreciates the efforts made by the State party, it notes with concern that the international target of allocating 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance has not been yet achieved (art 2). The Committee recommends that the State party step up its efforts to meet the international target of allocating 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance.272

Other states that have donated more than this target have been commended for contributing to the realisation of ESC in other countries.273 For example, in 2013 the Committee noted ‘with appreciation’ Norway’s allocation of 1 per cent of its GNI for

265  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.52 (1 December 2000) paras 13 and 23; Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) paras 16 and 30; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) paras 15 and 33; Iceland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.89 (23 May 2003) paras 11 and 20; Spain, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.99 (7 June 2004) paras 10 and 27. 266  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) para 30. 267  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002) para 38. 268  See OECD, Net Official Development Assistance in 2009 (OECD, 14 April 2010), available at http:// www.oecd.org/investment/stats/44981892.pdf. 269  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (12 July 2011) para 33 (emphasis added). 270 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/CO/3 (10 June 2013) para 32; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/ITA/CO/5 (9 October 2015) para 13. 271  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/BEL/CO/4* (23 December 2013) para 9. 272  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc. E/C.12/FIN/CO/6 (28 November 2014), para 8 (emphasis added). 273  See eg CESCR, Concluding Observations: Denmark, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.34 (14 May 1999) para 11 and UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.102 (14 December 2004) para 5; Luxembourg, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.86 (23 May 2003) para 6; Sweden UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.70 (30 November 2001) para 7; Norway, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.109 (23 June 2005) para 3.

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official development assistance, which increased 4.3 per cent in value in spite of the financial crisis since 2009.274 Given a large and growing gap between developed and developing states, and the fact that half the world—nearly 3 billion people—live on less than US$2 a day,275 economically developed states can play a key role in enhancing the enjoyment of ESC rights in other states by granting further assistance, especially technical or economic, to developing states, targeted to the realisation of human rights, including ESC rights. The large investment requirements of developing states imply that a successful transition to increased reliance on domestic resources and private capital inflows will require more, rather than less, overseas development assistance.276 [2.80]  It should be noted that ODA may take the form of grants, as well as of loans with interest to be paid and conditions imposed on poor states, eg purchases of more expensive imports (goods and services) from ‘donor’ states than comparable goods and services available domestically or on international market, and trade liberalisation that entails a reduction in taxes, thereby reducing a state’s tax revenue. Such conditions undermine the effectiveness of ODA. [2.81]  In order to monitor the use of transferred resources, the Committee has sought to establish whether such resources are used to promote respect for the provisions of the ICESCR and whether conditionality is attached to them.277 International cooperation requires that a state (whether acting independently or through international organisations, eg the IMF and the World Bank) should not impose on another state policies, decisions or measures that might be foreseen as undermining the progressive realisation of ESC rights. If this were not to be the case, ESC rights would be rendered illusory, yet the ICESCR, like other human rights treaties, was not intended to recognise theoretical or illusory rights but rights that are practical and effective. Thus, for example, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that the human rights obligations of member states continue even after the transfer of competences to international organisations.278 [2.82]  While the Committee can investigate all such issues, it is questionable whether it can find a particular state to be in violation of Article 2(1) for the failure to devote 0.7 per cent of its GDP to international assistance, or for the failure to pursue a

274 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc E/C.12/NOR/CO/5 (13 December 2013) para 3(a). 275 UNDP, The Human Development Report 2007/2008 (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 25, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/chapters/. The report notes that ‘[t]here are still around 1 billion people living at the margins of survival on less than US$1 a day, with 2.6 billion—40 ­percent of the world’s population—living on less than US$2 a day’. 276  See UNCTAD, ‘The Challenge of Financing Development in LDCs’, 3rd United Nations ­Conference on the Least Developed Countries Brussels, 14–20 May 2001, at http://r0.unctad.org/conference/e-press_ kit/ financing.pdf. 277  See, eg, CESCR, Summary Record of the 14th Meeting: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/SR.14 (7 May 1999) para 38; CESCR, Summary Record of the 48th Meeting: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/SR.48 (31 August 2001) para 19; and CESCR, Summary Record of the 61st Meeting: Finland, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/SR.61 (21 November 2000) para 48. 278 See Matthews v the United Kingdom, App no 24833/94, Judgment 18 February 1999, (1999) 28 EHRR 361, paras 32 and 34; Waite and Kennedy v Germany, App no 26083/94, Judgment 18 February 1999, (1999) 30 EHRR 261, para 67; Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi (Bosphorus Airways) v Ireland, App no 45036/98, Judgment 30 June 2005, (2006) 42 EHRR 1, paras 152–56.

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human rights-based approach in its development cooperation policy by linking such ­assistance to human rights, including ESC rights. It would appear that a gradual or progressive increase, as opposed to an unjustified decline, in ODA would be satisfactory to the Committee. For example, in 2006 the Committee noted that Canada’s level of ODA was raised from about 0.27 per cent of GDP in 2004 to an estimated level of 0.33 per cent of GDP.279 The Committee considered this to be a positive aspect and did not criticise Canada for not devoting 0.7 per cent of its GDP to international assistance. A decline in ODA would be difficult to justify. For example, in 2015 the CESCR expressed concern over the decline in Italy’s ODA from ‘the already low figure of 0.2 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 2006 to a mere 0.15 percent in 2010’.280 It called on Italy to ‘progressively increase its official development assistance to the internationally agreed level of 0.7 percent of GNP and to pursue human rights-based approach in its development cooperation policy reflecting the rights enshrined in the Covenant’.281 It is also unlikely that the Committee can direct a specific developed state to assist a particular developing state party, since there are no criteria for doing so in the Covenant and it is unlikely that the Committee would develop this possibility in the near future. [2.83]  Interestingly, EU member states have made commitments to increase ODA over a period of time. The targets were stated as follows: (i) 0.33 per cent by 2006, according to the EU Barcelona commitment; and (ii) 0.51 per cent by 2010 and 0.7 per cent by 2015, according to the May 2005 EU Council agreement.282 While this progressive commitment to increase ODA is a step in the right direction, it is important to note that international assistance and cooperation should not be understood as encompassing only financial and technical assistance. International cooperation also includes a responsibility of states to work actively towards an ‘enabling environment’ for the realisation of ESC rights.283 This includes technology transfer, capacity-building­and supporting equitable multilateral trading, investment, financial and monetary systems that are conducive to the realisation of human rights and the elimination of ­poverty,284 both domestically and extraterritorially. This equitable system has yet to be realised. In 2006, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, noted: We see an unfair global trade regime that impedes development and an unsustainable global financial system in which poor countries repeatedly find themselves with unmanageable debt burdens. Money should flow from the rich to poor countries, but increasingly, it goes in the opposite direction.285

[2.84]  In 2002, Oxfam International estimated that an increase of 5 per cent in the share of world trade by low-income states ‘would generate more than $350 billion— 279  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Docs E/C.12/CAN/CO/4 and E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (22 May 2006) para 9. 280  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/ITA/CO/5 (9 October 2015) para 12. 281  Ibid, para 13 (emphasis added). 282  See (2006) 7(3) OECD Journal on Development 38. 283  Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28 September 2011, (2012) 34(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1084, Principle 20. 284  P Hunt, ‘Mission to the WTO’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (1 March 2004) para 28. 285  J Stiglitz, ‘We Have Become Rich Countries of Poor People’, Financial Times, 7 September 2006.

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seven times as much as they receive in aid’.286 If Africa, East Asia, South Asia and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by 1 per cent, the resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out of poverty.287 In Africa alone, this would generate US$70 billion—approximately five times what the continent receives in aid.288 Reduced poverty would contribute to improvements in the enjoyment of ESC rights such as health and education, since ‘poverty is the greatest human rights scourge of our time’,289 and indeed, ‘poverty, especially extreme poverty, is the worst form of degradation of human dignity, a denial of the most basic human rights—economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights’.290 Given this reality, international cooperation and assistance should be understood as entailing genuine special and preferential treatment of developing states so as to provide such states with better access to developed states’ markets.291 Trade based on rules fair to all states, including developing states, frees the poor in developing states from ‘exposure to the whims and fads of donors who govern access to aid budgets’.292 In this regard, states must consider ways in which the primacy of ESC rights may be ensured in trade and investment agreements. In addition, international assistance and cooperation entails procedural fairness. Thus, donor states and NSAs have a responsibility not to withdraw critical aid without first giving the recipient state reasonable notice and an opportunity to make alternative arrangements.293 Furthermore, the design, implementation and evaluation of all aspects of international assistance and cooperation should ensure the participation of civil society and the intended beneficiaries of programmes. Accordingly, donor states should make their programme evaluations public, and should report regularly, in accessible formats, to civil society groups, national parliaments, and other national, regional and UN oversight bodies. ii.  Developing States: Obligation to Seek and Use Effectively International Assistance? [2.85]  Where a developing state party to the ICESCR considers that taking steps to realise core obligations in respect of ESC rights is beyond the maximum resources available to it, or if it needs technical or other expertise to facilitate the implementation of its ESC rights obligations, it is appropriate for such a state, and may be incumbent upon it, actively to seek and accept international cooperation and assistance in order to overcome these difficulties and to fulfil its core obligations. To enable developed states and other actors in a position to render the necessary assistance, states must refrain from obstructing other states and NSAs in their legitimate efforts to ­contribute

286 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the Fight against Poverty (Oxford, Oxfam, 2002) 48. 287  Ibid, 5. 288  Ibid, 8. 289  L Arbour, ‘Using Human Rights to Reduce Poverty’ in World Bank, Development Outreach, October 2006, (Washington, World Bank, 2006) 5. 290  A Sengupta, ‘A Rights-Based Approach to Removing Poverty’ in World Bank, above n 289. 291  Report of the High Commissioner, ‘Analytical Study of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Fundamental Principle of Non-discrimination in the context of Globalisation’, UN Doc E/CN.4/ 2004/40 (15 January 2004) para 40. 292  Oxfam, above n 286, 48 293  See Hunt, above n 284; and Uganda, UN Doc A/HRC/7/11/Add.2 (5 March 2008) para 29.

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towards the enjoyment of ESC rights.294 In addition, states should not reject offers of resources from the international community for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the Covenant without sufficient reason compatible with international law. Furthermore, every effort should be made by states in need of international assistance to comply with their human rights obligations to obtain such assistance.295 By way of example, in its Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka in 1998, the Committee urged ‘the Government to seek further international assistance in its efforts to provide permanent housing to displaced persons who have been living in “temporary” shelters since the war began 15 years ago’.296 Such assistance is required to be used towards the realisation of ESC rights, giving priority to core obligations and to benefit the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.297 [2.86]  With regard to developing states receiving such assistance, the CESCR has asked states how transferred resources have been used,298 particularly whether they have benefited those most in need.299 To this end, states receiving official development funds should enhance the transparency of the receipt, management and spending of those funds.300 It is, however, uncertain whether the Committee would find non-compliance­ or a violation of the Covenant where a receiving state diverts resources from international assistance to other areas outside the Covenant, such as the ­purchase of arms or involvement in armed conflict. It is submitted that the Committee should do so, because the Covenant obliges states to use available resources (including ODA) to the ‘maximum’ effect. Accordingly, the ‘essential governmental human rights obligation is to accord priority to human rights in resource allocation’.301 This means that, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, states that receive international aid and assistance must clearly dedicate a substantial part of that aid to human rights.302 In addition, a mechanism should be put in place to ensure that all receiving states invest resources from international assistance in carrying out ‘rights-based programmes’303 consistent with the Covenant.

294  See eg CESCR, Concluding Observations: El Salvador, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.4 (28 May 1996), paras 25 and 39. 295  See eg CESCR, General Comment 4, para 10. 296  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.24 (16 June 1998), para 22. 297  CESCR, General Comment 15, para 37(f). 298  See, eg, CESCR, List of Issues: Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/Q/SUD/1 (13 December 1999) para 3: ‘Kindly provide statistics, disaggregated according to different foreign sources or States, concerning amounts of financial assistance received by the Sudan over the last five years and to what purpose that aid was directed and eventually allocated.’ 299  See, eg, CESCR, List of Issues: Venezuela, UN Doc E/C.12/Q/VEN/1 (23 May 2000) para 11: ‘The Committee, aware of the challenge the State party has had to face in reacting rapidly and effectively to the catastrophic rains and floods that have drawn a sympathetic response from the international community, would like to know the extent of international relief and the measures taken by the State party to bring it to those most in need.’ 300  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Tajikistan, UN Doc E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 (6 March 2014) para 11. 301  K Tomasevski, ‘Economic Costs of Human Rights’ in P Baehr, C Flinterman and M Senders (eds), Innovation and Inspiration: Fifty Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Amsterdam, Royal Netherlands Academy, 1999) 49, 53. 302  CRC, General Comment 5, para 61. 303  See A Sengupta, Fifth Report on the Right to Development: Frameworks for Development Cooperation and the Right to Development, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6 (18 September 2002).

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iii.  Non-state Actors: Any Obligation to Assist? [2.87]  As noted in para 2.69 above in interpreting Article 2(1), the CESCR has invoked the provisions of the UN Charter as well as Articles 22 and 23 of the ­Covenant. ­Article 22 provides: The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of other organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and specialised agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant.

The CESCR considered this provision for furnishing technical assistance to involve ‘virtually all United Nations organs and agencies involved in any aspect of international development cooperation, … agencies such as the World Bank and IMF, and any of the other specialised agencies such as ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO’.304 [2.88]  Therefore, the CESCR has insisted that the activities of international agencies should involve a human rights impact assessment so that they do not negatively impact on human rights.305 It has further questioned whether states parties (both debtor and creditor states) to the ICESCR take into account the ICESCR obligations when negotiating technical assistance.306 In effect, while debtor states are principally obliged to protect the ESC rights of those within their jurisdiction, creditor states are required to cooperate internationally to achieve progressively the full realisation of ESC rights in states parties to the ICESCR.307 This offers a potential for holding creditor states responsible for actions taken in the international economic (financial, trade or investment) institutions or other bodies that fail to respect their obligation to cooperate internationally as obliged by Article 2(1). [2.89]  Apparently, the failure of a state party to take into account its international human rights legal obligations—including those regarding the ICESCR—when entering into agreements with NSAs or with international organisations, is a violation of its international obligation to assist and cooperate. Accordingly, states parties should ensure that their actions as members of international organisations take due account of international human rights obligations. States parties that are members of international institutions, notably the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank and regional development banks, should take steps to ensure that human rights generally, and ESC rights in 304  CESCR, General Comment 2, para 2. See also CESCR, Summary Record of the 37th Meeting of the 21st Session: Solomon Islands, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/SR.37 (19 November 1999) para 26; CESCR, General Comment 19, para 82. The CESCR stated: ‘The United Nations specialised agencies and other international organisations concerned with social security, such as ILO, WHO, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and ISSA [International Social Security Association], as well as international organisations concerned with trade such as the World Trade Organisation, should cooperate effectively with States parties, building on their respective expertise, in relation to the implementation of the right to social security.’ 305  CESCR, General Comment 2, paras 6 and 8. 306  CESCR, List of Issues: Nepal, E/C.12/Q/NEP/1 (13 December 2000) para 8. 307  See J Tooze, ‘Aligning States’ Economic Policies with Human Rights Obligations: The CESCR’s Quest for Consistency’ (2002) 2 Human Rights Law Review 229, 261–62. See also S Michalowski, ‘Sovereign Debt and Social Rights—Legal Reflections on a Difficult Relationship’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 35.

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particular, are taken into account in their lending policies, credit agreements and other international measures.308 As Hunter Clark rightly put it: The World, especially the wealthy nations, can and should help [developing states in] Africa [and presumably other developing states outside Africa particularly the least developed ones]. The places to start are with debt relief; preferential, or at least genuinely open, trade relations with African states; increased aid and technical assistance; and beneficial policy making by international economic institutions like the IMF and World Bank.309

[2.90]  There are known examples of states that have incurred debts from international financial institutions and other states in questionable circumstances. For ­example, according to the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, as of 30 June 2013, ­Argentina’s total public debt stood at $196 billion, of which around $66 billion was public external debt.310 Approximately $25 billion of the public debt was owed to multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and Paris Club creditors.311 Much of Argentina’s debt crisis of 2001 was incurred during military rule from 1976 to 1983, and since there were no accounting records312 and much of the debt was not used for productive investments,313 it may therefore be considered odious or illegitimate.314 The debt is attributable to a number of factors, including questionable lending and policy advice by the IMF, a global recession and reckless lending by the international credit markets.315 During the military rule, banks, international financial institutions and other states continued to lend to Argentina, indirectly supporting an illegitimate government engaged in serious violations of human rights, including the repression and disappearance of its opponents.316 Argentina’s debt crisis of 2001 had a severe impact on the enjoyment of a broad range of ESC rights, including the rights to work, social security, adequate housing, health and education.317 In such circumstances, international assistance and cooperation entails supporting a transparent, participatory and comprehensive audit of a state’s public debt and, in keeping with the principle of shared responsibility

308  See eg W van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A Contextualised Way Forward (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2015). 309  H Clark, ‘Sustainable Economic Development: What the World Owes Africa, and What Africa Owes Itself’ (2003) 7 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 75, 94. 310 Argentina, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, Oficina Nacional de Crédito Público, ‘Deuda Pública del Estado Argentino—Datos al 30-06-2013’, available at http://www.mecon.gob.ar/ finanzas/sfinan/?page_id=37. 311  Ibid. 312  Second Federal Criminal and Correctional Court, Argentina, Case no 14.467, Olmos, Alejandro S/ Denuncia, available at http://www.dipublico.com.ar/3844/olmos-alejandro-sdenuncia/. 313 World Bank, ‘Argentina—Economic Memorandum’, vol 1, Main Report, A World Bank Country Study (Washington, DC, 1985), 17, para 1.16, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/1985/01/4392081/argentina-economic-memorandum-vol-1-2. 314  See C Lumina, Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and other related International Financial Obligations of States on the full Enjoyment of all Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/25/50/Add.3 (2 April 2014) para 75. 315  See JF Hornbeck, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the ‘Holdouts’, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, February 2013) 1–3. 316  Lumina, above n 314, paras 6, 11, 75. 317  See, eg, Lumina, above n 314, paras 49–69; E/C.12/1/Add.38, paras 10 and 28; J Morgan-Foster, ‘The Relationship of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited’ (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 577.

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between creditors and debtors for preventing and resolving unsustainable debt situations,318 unconditionally cancelling any claims they may have should the audit find these to be odious.319 Shared responsibility has implications for both creditors and debtors: For creditors, this includes the obligation to perform due diligence on the creditworthiness and ability to repay of the borrower as well as the duty to refrain from providing a loan in circumstances where the lender is aware that the funds will be used for non-public purposes or for a non-viable project. For debtor States, this entails an obligation to contract loans and use the loan funds in ways that serve the public interest and repay the debt in a timely fashion.320

[2.91]  In the light of the foregoing, states in need of assistance should seek assistance not only from other states, but also from NSAs able to assist. In this respect both the CESCR and the CRC Committee have recommended that states pursue additional avenues for cooperation and seek the assistance (for the progressive realisation of ESC rights and in the preparation of state reports) of the UN, particularly the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the relevant specialised agencies— inter alia, WHO, UNESCO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).321 Regarding the right to social security, the CESCR asserted that ‘States parties may obtain guidance on appropriate [right to social security] indicators from the ongoing work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO) and International Social Security Association (ISSA)’.322 The Committee has also indicated that, when examining the reports of states parties and their ability to meet their obligations to realise the right to social security, it will consider the ‘effects of the assistance provided by all other actors’.323 Therefore, the incorporation of human rights law and principles in the programmes and policies of NSAs, including international organisations, will greatly facilitate the implementation of ESC rights.

III.  ARTICLES 2(2) AND 3: OBLIGATION TO ‘GUARANTEE’ NON-DISCRIMINATION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY [2.92]  Since all human beings are born ‘free and equal in dignity and rights’,324 the ICESCR is emphatic on the principles of non-discrimination and equality.325 318 Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002 (A/CONF.198/11, chap I, resolution 1, annex) para 47. 319  Lumina, above n 314, para 86(a). 320  Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/20/23, Annex, (10 April 2011) para 23. 321 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) para 46; Togo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.61 (21 May 2001) para 18; Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 September 2001) para 62. See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Rwanda, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.234 (4 June 2004) para 49(e); and CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Liberia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.236 (4 June 2004) para 57(g). 322  CESCR, General Comment 19, para 75. 323  Ibid, para 84. 324  UDHR, Art 1. 325  See CESCR, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009); Craven, above n 1, 153–93, 192, concludes that, ‘In broad terms, the essence of the Covenant may be seen as to encompass an appeal to equality.’

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These two principles are included in various international human rights instruments.326 ­Non-discrimination and equality are key elements of human rights protection that states must respect, regardless of their legal traditions and their domestic law. Thus, the IACtHR has asserted that the principle of equality and non-discrimination ‘forms part of general international law’ because it is applicable to all states, regardless of whether or not they are a party to a specific international treaty.327 The CESCR has stated that ‘the philosophy of the Covenant [is] based on the principle of nondiscrimination’328 and on ‘absolute non-discrimination against women’.329 Therefore, non-discrimination, together with equality, constitutes a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights.330 These two principles apply to all ESC rights protected in the Covenant, and in virtually every international human rights instrument.331 Although the principles of equality and non-discrimination can be ­differentiated, it has to be noted that the prohibition against non-discrimination has been understood as the negative restatement of the principle of equality.332 In other words, equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative statements of the same principle.333 This is because the goal of equality is usually achieved in the first instance through a prohibition on discrimination.334 Thus, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) considered that ‘[e]quality in law precludes discrimination of any kind’.335 As Professor Hilary Charlesworth put it, the international legal understanding of equality (which she considers to be narrow) is that ‘equality means absence of discrimination and non-discrimination between groups will produce equality’.336

326  The UN Charter preamble reaffirms faith in the ‘equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’, and its Art 1(3) declares as one of the purposes of the UN the promotion and encouragement of respect ‘for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. See also UDHR, Art 2; ICCPR, Arts 2(1) and 26; ICESCR, Arts 2(2) and 3; ICERD, Art 1(1); CEDAW, Art 1; ECHR, Art 14; AmCHR, Art 1; ACHPR, Art 2; Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CIS), Art 20(2); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art 2. 327  Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 17 September 2003, IACtHR, Series A, No 18, 2003, paras 101 and 173(4). 328 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/17 (28 December 1995) para 16. 329  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriaya, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.15 (20 May 1997) para 13. 330  HRC, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (10 November 1989), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev1 at 26 (1994) para 1; CERD, General Recommendation No XIV: Definition of Racial Discrimination (22 March 1993), UN Doc A/48/18 at 114 (1994) para 1. 331  A McColgan, ‘Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination in International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 157–75. 332 N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 25. 333  W McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law, 5th edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983) 287–88. 334 R Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 176. 335  Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania (1935) PCIJ Series A/B, No 64, 19. 336  H Charlesworth, ‘Concepts of Equality in International Law’ in G Huscroft and P Rishworth (eds), Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002) 137, 145.

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A.  Prohibition of Discrimination [2.93]  The CESCR confirmed the definition of discrimination contained in several other international human rights instruments337 by stating: Discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights. Discrimination also includes incitement to discriminate and harassment.338

Thus discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in ‘relevantly similar’ or analogous situations.339 It also extends to situations where, without an objective and reasonable justification, states ‘fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different’.340 It follows from the above definition that differential treatment based on the prohibited grounds listed in para 2.94 below will be viewed as discriminatory unless the justification for differentiation is ‘reasonable and objective’.341 This will include an assessment as to whether: (i) the aim and effects of the measures or omissions are legitimate, compatible with the nature of ESC rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society; (ii) there is a clear and reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realised and the measures or omissions and their effects.342 Regional human rights bodies apply a similar definition. For example, the African Commission confirmed that Article 2 of the [African] Charter does not require all individuals in similar circumstances to be necessarily treated in the same manner, it permits the different treatment of people similarly placed if such treatment is meant to achieve a rational and legitimate purpose that does not impair the fundamental dignity of the affected persons or infringe on their enjoyments of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.343

[2.94]  Article 2(2) of the ICESCR contains an important absolute guarantee against non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the substantive rights protected in Articles 6–15 of the Covenant. By Article 2(2) of the Covenant: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

It is notable that Article 2(2) has no independent existence, since it has effect solely in relations to the rights enunciated in the ICESCR. It only prohibits discrimination 337  See, eg, ICERD, Art 1; CEDAW, Art 1; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art 2. 338  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 7. 339  Burden v United Kingdom, App no 13378/05, 29 April 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 857, para 60. 340  Thlimmenos v Greece, App no 34369/97, 6 April 2000, (2001)31 EHRR 411, para 44. 341  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 13. 342  Ibid. 343  Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front v the Republic of South Africa, Communication 335/07, 53rd Ordinary Session 9–23 April 2013, para 117. Article 2 of the African Charter provides: ‘Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.’

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(ie distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference without reasonable or objective ­criteria) in the exercise of substantive rights enunciated in the Covenant. In this respect, Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR (see section III.B. below) ‘are not stand-alone provisions, but should be read in conjunction with each specific right guaranteed under Part III of the Covenant’.344 However, the application of Article 2(2) does not presuppose a breach of one or more substantive provisions of the ICESCR, and to this extent it may be considered autonomous. A measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the Article enunciating the right in question may infringe this Article when read in conjunction with Article 2(2) for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature. Accordingly, for Article 2(2) to become applicable, it suffices that the relevant facts fall within the ambit of another substantive provision of the Covenant. It is also interesting to note that Article 2(2) makes no reference to ‘progressive realisation’ or to the availability of ‘resources’.345 Under Article 2(2), states parties to the ICESCR undertake to ‘guarantee’ that ESC rights enunciated in the Covenant will be exercised ‘without discrimination of any kind’ as to any of the prohibited grounds. The list of grounds set out in Article 2(2) above346 is notably longer than that contained in the UN Charter, which mentions only ‘race, sex, language, and religion’.347 [2.95]  However, unlike other more recent human rights instruments,348 Article 2(2) does not specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic features, membership of a national ­minority, health status, economic and social situation, and marital and family status. Such grounds may, nonetheless, be read into the Covenant in the reference to ‘other status’—a term which signifies that the list is open-ended, not exhaustive and evolves over time and context—in the text of Article 2(2). The CESCR noted: A flexible approach to the ground of ‘other status’ is thus needed in order to capture other forms of differential treatment that cannot be reasonably and objectively justified and are of a comparable nature to the expressly recognized grounds in article 2, paragraph 2. These additional grounds are commonly recognized when they reflect the experience of social groups that are vulnerable and have suffered and continue to suffer marginalization.349

Indeed, the CESCR has used ‘other status’ to broaden the prohibited grounds of differentiation to extend to discrimination on other grounds, such as mental or physical disability,350 age,351 sexual orientation and gender identity (to protect lesbian, gay, 344 

CESCR, General Comment 16, para 2. CESCR, General Comment 13, para 31. 346  Similar grounds are provided under the ICCPR, Art 26. See N Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 816–41. On race, see generally S ­Fredman (ed), Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). 347  UN Charter, Arts 1 and 55. 348  See, eg, the Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as amended by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Art 13, [1997] Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ EC) 340/173 (10 November 1997); the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJEC 364/1 (18 December 2000), Art 21. 349  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 27. 350  CESCR, General Comment 5, para 5; General Comment 15, para 13. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art 1: ‘Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 351  CESCR, General Comment 6, paras 11–12. 345 

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bisexual, transgender and inter-sex—LGBTI—persons),352 health status (including HIV/AIDS),353 nationality, marital and family status, place of residence, and civil, political, economic, social or other status, which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant.354 [2.96]  While some states parties to the ICESCR and other human rights treaties have adopted laws criminalising consensual sexual relations between persons of the same sex,355 UN treaty monitoring bodies, including the CESCR, CRC ­Committee,356 CEDAW Committee357 and HRC358—and regional human rights courts—the ECtHR359 and the IACtHR360—have recognised sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination and as falling within the scope of the right to respect for private life. Thus, a denial of ESC rights on ground of sexual orientation would be inconsistent with the ICESCR (and other international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR, Article 26).361 In Mr Edward Young v Australia,362

352  See Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to ­ exual Orientation and Gender Identity (2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/­principles_ S en.pdf; CESCR, General Comment 18, para 12(b)(i), General Comment 15, para 13 and General Comment 14, para 18; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Guyana, UN Doc E/C.12/GUY/CO/2-4 (9 October 2015) paras 24-5; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (9 October 2015) paras 19-20; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iraq, UN Doc E/C.12/IRQ/CO/4 (9 October 2015) paras 19-20; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc E/C.12/POL/CO/5 (2 December 2009) para 32; CESCR, Concluding Observations: China [Hong Kong], UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.58 (21 May 2001) para 15; Sweden, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.70 (30 November 2001) para 8; Ireland, UN Doc E/2000/22 (1999) para 127. 353  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.71 (30 November 2001) para 39; Egypt, UN Doc E/2001/22 (2001) para 180; Russian Federation, UN Doc E/1998/22 (1997) para 126; Gabon, UN Doc E/C.12/GAB/CO/1 (27 December 2013) para 12. 354  CESCR, General Comment 14, para 18; General Comment 15, para 13; see also CESCR, General Comment 20, paras 27–35. 355  See, eg, The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014 (Uganda) and Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2014 (Nigeria). In Oloka-Onyango and 9 Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 8 of 2014, [2014] UGCC 14, the Constitutional Court of Uganda held on 1 August 2014 that The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014 was enacted without quorum in Parliament and therefore unconstitutional. 356  CRC, General Comment 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/4 (1 July 2003) para 6. 357  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 27: Older Women and Protection of their Human Rights, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/27 (16 December 2010) and General Recommendation 28: the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 (16 December 2010), para 18. 358  Toonen v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (4 April 1994); Young v Austria, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (6 August 2003); X v Colombia, UN Doc CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (14 May 2007). 359  See eg Dudgeon v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 149; Norris v Ireland (1988) 13 EHRR 186; Modinos v Cyprus (1993) 16 EHRR 485; Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493; Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 548; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal (1999) 31 EHRR 1055; Karner v Austria (2003) 38 EHRR 24; L and V v Austria (2003) 36 EHRR 55; SL v Austria (2003) 37 EHRR 39. 360  Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile, Merits, Series C no 239, Judgment of 24 February 2012. 361  ICCPR, Art 26 reads: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ 362  Mr Edward Young v Australia, Communication no 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (18 September 2003).

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the HRC considered legislation denying the author a pension on the basis of his sex or sexual orientation: The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation.363 It recalls that in previous communications the Committee found that differences in the receipt of benefits between married couples and heterosexual unmarried couples were reasonable and objective, as the couples in question had the choice to marry with all the entailing consequences.364 It transpires from the contested sections of the VEA [Veterans Entitlement Act] that individuals who are part of a married couple or of a heterosexual cohabiting couple (who can prove that they are in a ‘marriage-like’ relationship) fulfill the definition of ‘member of a couple’ and therefore of a ‘dependant’, for the purpose of receiving pension benefits. In the instant case, it is clear that the author, as a same sex partner, did not have the possibility of entering into marriage. Neither was he recognized as a cohabiting partner of Mr C, for the purpose of receiving pension benefits, because of his sex or sexual orientation. The Committee recalls its constant jurisprudence that not every distinction amounts to prohibited discrimination under the Covenant, as long as it is based on reasonable and objective criteria. The State party provides no arguments on how this distinction between same-sex partners, who are excluded from pension benefits under law, and unmarried heterosexual partners, who are granted such benefits, is reasonable and objective, and no evidence which would point to the existence of factors justifying such a distinction has been advanced. In this context, the Committee finds that the State party has violated article 26 of the Covenant by denying the author a pension on the basis of his sex or sexual orientation.365

Since discrimination undermines the fulfilment of ESC rights, the ICESCR preamble stresses the equal and inalienable rights of all’, and the Covenant expressly recognises the rights of ‘everyone’ to the various ESC rights, including the right to work, to just and favourable conditions of work, trade union freedoms, social security, an adequate standard of living, health and education, and participation in cultural life. In 2015 the CESCR expressed concern at the criminalisation of homosexuality in Gambia’s Criminal Code, as well as about reports of arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals perceived to be homosexual.366 It recommended that Gambia adopt ‘comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation’ in line with Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, and ‘repeal or amend all legislation that results or could result in discrimination, prosecution and punishment of people because of their sexual orientation or gender identity’.367 The Committee further recommended that Gambia ‘take all necessary steps to combat and prevent discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, and ensure their enjoyment of all the rights enshrined in the Covenant’.368 [2.97]  Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of nondiscrimination­. Discrimination could be multidimensional (ie arise on more than one prohibited ground) or inextricably linked with other factors that affect a particular group. This would make the victim of such discrimination more vulnerable. For ­example, the CEDAW Committee observed in 2010, with respect to older women, that 363 

Toonen v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (4 April 1994). LG Danning v The Netherlands, Communication no 180/1984, Views adopted on 9 April 1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 205 (1990). 365  Young v Australia, above n 362, para 10.4. 366  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 12. 367  Ibid. 368  Ibid. 364 

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[t]he discrimination experienced by older women is often multidimensional, with the age factor compounding other forms of discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, disability, poverty levels, sexual orientation and gender identity, migrant status, marital and family status, literacy and other grounds. Older women who are members of minority, ethnic or indigenous groups, internally displaced or stateless often experience a disproportionate degree of discrimination.369

States parties must legally recognise such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the affected individuals and groups concerned, and prohibit them. [2.98]  The use of the term ‘guarantee’ implies an immediate obligation to eliminate discrimination on the prohibited grounds.370 As explained in General Comment 20 of the CESCR,371 prohibited discrimination under the Covenant covers several aspects. First, it covers de jure (or formal) discrimination, which includes ensuring that the laws and policies of states parties do not discriminate. Secondly, states parties must take steps to eliminate de facto (or substantive) discrimination, which requires states to ensure that laws, policies and practices seek to address the unequal enjoyment of ESC rights that individuals face due to discrimination (see further section III.C, below). Thirdly, it extends to direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when a difference in treatment relies directly on distinctions based on prohibited grounds—eg denying healthcare to persons of particular race, colour or descent. Such differential treatment is contrary to the Covenant if it has the purpose of impairing the exercise of particular Covenant rights. Indirect discrimination occurs when a law, policy, programme or procedure does not appear to be discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect when implemented, thus leaving the existing inequality in place, or even exacerbating it. It typically involves the imposition of a requirement that members of one particular group are less likely to be able to satisfy than others. For instance, requiring a birth registration certificate for school enrolment may discriminate against ethnic minorities or non-nationals who do not possess, or have been denied, such certificates. Similarly, the general admissions policy of some academic institutions to exclude ‘native foreign language qualifications’ (ie mother-tongue qualifications) from consideration when assessing an applicant for admission to certain courses or programmes, though equally applicable to all ‘native languages’, may constitute unlawful indirect discrimination on the grounds of race against those regarded as possessing the ‘native language qualifications’. Discrimination also includes incitement to discriminate and harassment. [2.99]  In effect, each substantive Article under the Covenant contains an additional obligation by which the state must not discriminate on any of the internationally prohibited grounds. For example, one must not be denied access to available health facilities, education or social security on the basis of race, colour, sex or other p ­ rohibited 369 

CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 27, above n 357, para 13. CESCR, General Comment 3, para 1; General Comment 11, para 10; General Comment 13, paras 31 and 43; General Comment 14, para 30; General Comment 15, para 17. See also P Alston, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Manual on Human Rights Reporting under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, 2nd edn, UN Doc GV.E.97.0.16 (Geneva, United Nations, 1997) 89. 371  UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (25 May 2009) paras 7–10. 370 

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grounds. Whereas the rights guaranteed under the Covenant apply to everyone ­without discrimination, states parties should give special attention to those individuals and groups who have traditionally been discriminated against, including women, children (particularly those belonging to the most vulnerable groups, eg girls, abandoned and orphan children, children with disabilities, children born out of wedlock, children belonging to minority ethnic groups, and children living in rural areas), minority groups, indigenous peoples, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, migrant workers, prisoners and detainees.372 In particular, states parties should take steps to eliminate discrimination against women and the girl child.373 As An-Naim put it, ‘[n]o country can develop effectively if it excludes half of the human race—half of its national population—on grounds of gender [or] … religion’.374 In addition, in those states where minorities exist, concrete measures should be undertaken to combat and eliminate discrimination against minority groups in all fields of human rights.375 Any discrimination based on any prohibited ground(s) with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of ESC rights constitutes a violation of the Covenant.376 For example, education of children from minority groups (eg those of Roma origin in Europe) in special schools, separate classes or schools for the mentally disabled has been considered discriminatory.377 [2.100]  In considering Communications under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR alleging discrimination in the rights enunciated in the ICESCR, the Committee will need to consider four key questions: —— Does the claim of discrimination fall within the scope or ambit of one of the substantive rights protected in Articles 6–15 of the ICESCR? —— Is the alleged reason for discrimination one of the grounds explicitly or implicitly listed in Article 2 of the Covenant? —— Can the applicants properly compare themselves with another class of persons which is treated more favourably? —— Is the difference in treatment justified by reasonable and objective criteria?

372 

CESCR, General Comment 15, para 16. M Scheinin, ‘Women’s Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights’ in L Hannikainen and E Nykanen (eds), New Trends in Discrimination Law—International Perspectives (Turku, Turku Law School, 1999) 1. 374  A An-Naim, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 94, 103. 375  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Slovakia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.81 (2002) paras 9, 22 and 33; ICCPR, Art 27. 376  Maastricht Guidelines, above n 13, paras 11 and 12. Art 2 of the CEDAW obliges states to ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise’. Discrimination might attain a level of severity that constitutes a special affront to human dignity so as to amount to degrading treatment, a violation of a civil and political right. See Cyprus v Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, (2001) 35 EHRR 731, paras 302–11 (ECtHR). 377  See, eg, DH and Others v Czech Republic, App no 57325/00, 13 November 2007, (2008) 47 EHRR 59; Oršuš and Others v Croatia, App no 15766/03 (ECtHR, 16 March 2010); Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, App no 11146/11 (ECtHR, 29 January 2013). 373  See

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B.  Equality Between Men and Women [2.101]  Article 3 of the ICESCR supplements the non-discrimination guarantee in Article 2(2) by specifically making provision for equality between men and women in the enjoyment of ESC rights protected in the Covenant. Thus, under Article 3, states parties to the Covenant ‘undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the … Covenant’. This demands de jure (or formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality for men and women in the enjoyment of ESC rights. In its General Comment 16 the CESCR stated: 2. The travaux preparatoires state that Article 3 was included in the Covenant, as well as in the ICCPR, to indicate that beyond a prohibition of discrimination, ‘the same rights should be expressly recognised for men and women on an equal footing and suitable measures should be taken to ensure that women had the opportunity to exercise their rights … More­over, even if Article 3 overlapped with Article 2(2), it was still necessary to reaffirm the equal rights of men and women. That fundamental principle, which was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, must be constantly emphasised, especially as there were still many prejudices preventing its full application.’ … … 7.  The enjoyment of human rights on the basis of equality between men and women must be understood comprehensively. Guarantees of non-discrimination and equality in international human rights treaties mandate both de facto and de jure equality. De jure (or ­formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but interconnected concepts. Formal equality assumes that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men and women in a neutral manner. Substantive equality is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular groups experience.378

[2.102]  Equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all ESC rights extends to all rights set forth in the Covenant, including women’s ESC rights.379 Article 3 implies that all human beings should enjoy the rights protected in the Covenant, on an equal basis and in their totality. The full effect of this provision is impaired whenever any person is denied the full and equal enjoyment of any right protected in the Covenant. Consequently, states should ensure that men and women equally enjoy all rights provided for in the ICESCR.380 Article 3 is a recognition of the fact that the ‘human rights of women and of the girl child are an inalienable, integral, [holistic] and indivisible part of universal human rights’.381 The neglect and subordination of these rights is directly related to the neglect and subordination of women.382 Accordingly, efforts to realise ESC rights progressively cannot be effective without the meaningful

378  CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005). 379  See ch 7 and Appendix G to this book. 380  HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/ Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000) para 2. 381  Vienna Declaration, above n 175, para 18. 382  B Stark, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a Resource for Women’ in K Askin and D Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, vol 2 (New York, Transnational, 2000) 209, 243.

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participation of women at all levels.383 Similarly, the subordination of women c­ annot be overcome without the realisation of ESC rights.384 Inherent to the principle of ­equality between men and women is the concept that all human beings, regardless of sex, are free to develop their personal abilities, pursue their professional careers and make choices without the limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices.385 [2.103]  Despite this reality, ‘inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women ­throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes’.386 It follows that in order to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all ESC rights, states and other actors should give priority to the promotion of the role of women in society, and an end to all de jure and de facto discrimination against them.387 In particular, measures and programmes should be adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns, particularly in rural areas.388 [2.104]  Article 3 has to be understood in the light of the standard of equality for women under CEDAW.389 That standard requires the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, including discrimination based on sex and gender.390 As noted by the CEDAW Committee: The term ‘sex’ here refers to biological differences between men and women. The term ‘­gender’ refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women. This social positioning of women and men is affected by political, economic, cultural, social, religious, ideological and environmental factors and can be changed by culture, society and community.391 383 

Ibid. Ibid. 385  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, above n 357, para 22. 386 HRC, General Comment 28, above n 380, para 5. See also Montreal Principles, Appendix G to this book. 387  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25: On article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary Special Measures (2004) para 4. All CEDAW General Recommendations are available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx. CEDAW Recommendations 1–25 are contained in UN Doc HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol II), (27 May 2008). 388  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 387, para 10. 389  General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979. See also A Hellum and HS Aasen (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 390  According to the UN, 2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Women’s Control over Economic Resources and Access to Financial Resources, including Microfinance (New York, United Nations, 2009) ix, ‘Gender is defined as the social meanings given to biological sex differences. It is an ideological and cultural construct, but is also reproduced within the realm of material practices; in turn it influences the outcomes of such practices. It affects the distribution of resources, wealth, work, decision-making and political power, and enjoyment of rights and entitlements within the family as well as public life. Despite variations across cultures and over time, gender relations throughout the world entail asymmetry of power between men and women as a pervasive trait. Thus, gender is a social stratifier, and in this sense it is similar to other stratifiers such as race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and age. It helps us understand the social construction of gender identities and the unequal structure of power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.’ 391  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28, above n 357, para 5. 384 

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[2.105]  Gender-based discrimination refers to ‘cultural expectations and assumptions about the behaviour, attitudes, personality traits, and physical and intellectual capacities of men and women, based solely on their identity as men or women’.392 While men can experience gender-based discrimination (such as ‘exclusion of servicemen from the entitlement to parental leave, while servicewomen are entitled to such leave’,393 or payment of lower pension to a married male former civil servant than the pension paid to a married female former civil servant whose pension accrued at the same date),394 the construction that society imposes on biological difference between women and men generally results in a hierarchy that, in the distribution of power and rights, favours men and disadvantages women.395 The CESCR noted: Gender-based assumptions and expectations generally place women at a disadvantage with respect to substantive enjoyment of rights, such as freedom to act and to be recognized as autonomous, fully capable adults, to participate fully in economic, social and political development, and to make decisions concerning their circumstances and conditions. Gender-based assumptions about economic, social and cultural roles preclude the sharing of responsibility between men and women in all spheres that is necessary to equality.396

Article 3 is a reflection of the fact that women have historically not enjoyed their human rights.397 Moreover, ‘in situations of poverty women have the least access to food, health, education, training and opportunities for employment and other needs’.398 [2.106]  Six different grounds of discrimination may deprive women of the recognition or exercise of their equal human rights: (a) sex (and gender, encompassing sexual orientation, and gender identity, including women who are transgender, transsexual or intersex);399 (b) pregnancy and child bearing; (c) maternity; (d) marital status; (e) family status; and (f) family and/or household duties and responsibilities.400 [2.107]  Furthermore, certain groups of women, in addition to suffering from discrimination directed against them as women, may also suffer from multiple discrimination based on additional grounds—eg race, ethnic or religious identity, disability, age or

392 

CESCR, General Comment 16, para 14. Konstantin Markin v Russia, App no 30078/06 (Grand Chamber ECtHR, 22 March 2012) para 151. AP Johannes Vos v The Netherlands, Communication no 786/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997 (HRC, 29 July 1999). 395  See UN, above n 390, v, observing that ‘[l]ong-standing inequalities in the gender distribution of economic and financial resources have placed women at a disadvantage relative to men in their capability to participate in, contribute to and benefit from broader processes of development … Women continue to be absent from key decision-making forums shaping the allocation of economic and financial resources and opportunities, which further perpetuates gender inequality’. 396  CESCR, General Comment 16, para 14. 397  K Tomasevski, Women and Human Rights (London, Zed Books, 1995). 398  CEDAW, preamble, para 8. 399  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 32. 400  See, K Tomasevski, ‘Women’s Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concept and Standards (Ashgate, Aldershot and Paris, UNESCO, 2000) 231, 233. 393  394 

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class.401 For example, there have been cases where Muslim women have been denied education or employment on the basis of the Islamic headscarf perceived to be a religious obligation.402 Such women often suffer multiple forms of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnic origin and on the basis of religion. Such multiple discrimination may affect these groups of women primarily, or to a different degree or in different ways from men.403 As noted in paragraph 15 of General ­Comment 16 (see section III.D. below), this may require states to adopt specific temporary measures to eliminate such multiple discrimination against women, including the elimination of the causes and consequences of their de facto or substantive inequality. [2.108]  Like Article 3 of the ICCPR, Article 3 of the ICESCR underlines the Covenant’s commitment to sexual equality. The obligation under Article 3 is, therefore, to ‘ensure’ gender equality in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant. There are several other provisions in the ICESCR protecting equality between men and women. For example, Article 7 protects the rights ‘to equal remuneration for work of equal value’ and ‘equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted’ in employment. Article 13 recognises that ‘primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all’, and provides that ‘higher education shall be made equally accessible to all’. This is in conformity with the UN Charter, which affirms explicitly ‘the equal rights of men and women’ in its preamble and includes sex among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. Indeed, discrimination against women is ‘fundamentally unjust’, and violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.404 It is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their states, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family, and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women.405 However, as argued below, the principle of equality does not prevent the maintenance or adoption of temporary special measures providing for specific advantages in favour of women. C.  Eradication of De Jure and De Facto Discrimination [2.109]  Although the ICESCR prohibits discrimination, it does not provide a definition of that term. However, the CESCR has confirmed in its General Comment 16: 11.  Discrimination against women is ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.’406 Discrimination on the basis of sex may be based on 401  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 387, para 12; HRC, General C ­ omment 28, above n 380, para 30. 402  For a discussion, see M Ssenyonjo, ‘The Islamic Veil and Freedom of Religion, the Rights to Education and Work: A Survey of Recent International and National Cases’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 653. 403  Ibid. 404  Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc A/48/49 (1993), Art 1; CEDAW, preamble, para 7. 405  CEDAW, preamble, para 7. 406  As defined in Art 1 of the CEDAW.

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the differential treatment of women because of their biology, such as refusal to hire women because they could become pregnant; or stereotypical assumptions, such as tracking women into low-level jobs on the assumption that they are unwilling to commit as much time to their work as men.

Therefore, discrimination under the Covenant includes ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference’ between individuals or groups of individuals, made on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds,407 ‘unless the distinction is based on objective criteria’ and the aim is to achieve a purpose that is legitimate under the Covenant.408 [2.110]  It is important to note that non-discrimination and equality under A ­ rticles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR entail two essential obligations. First, there is an obligation to eradicate de jure discrimination (immediately/without delay).409 For example, in its Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe in 1997, the CESCR stressed the need to address de jure discrimination immediately in the following terms: Although many provisions of the Covenant are to be implemented progressively and in accordance with the maximum of the State party’s available resources, there are other rights that must be ensured immediately, such as de jure non-discrimination and protection of the cultural rights of minorities.410

Secondly, there is an obligation to take ‘effective steps’ to combat de facto ­discrimination411 on the prohibited grounds in public and private412 spheres/fields, in the enjoyment of all ESC rights. This must include adopting programmes as speedily as possible to bring to an end de facto discrimination against women, attributable to traditional practices and cultural views on women’s role in society.413 Significantly, in order to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination, states have to respect, protect and fulfil the right to non-discrimination. The obligation to respect requires states parties to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions shall refrain from discriminatory acts. The obligation to protect requires states parties to take steps to ensure that individuals and entities in their private capacity do not discriminate on prohibited grounds (see section III.E. below). The obligation to fulfil requires states parties to take steps to eliminate de jure and de facto inequality, as well as implement obligations related to non-discrimination.414

407 Revised General Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc E/C.12/1991/1 (17 June 1991) para 3; CESCR, ­General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc E/1995/22, at 19 (1995), para 15. 408  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1 Add.67 (30 Aug 2001) para 39. The Committee requested ‘the State party to take note of its position that the principle of non-discrimination, as laid down in article 2(2) of the Covenant, is an absolute principle and can be subject to no exception, unless the distinction is based on objective criteria’. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Croatia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.73 (30 November 2001) para 11. 409  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.67 (24 September 2001) paras 12 and 39; Limburg Principles, above n 12, 37. 410  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.12 (20 May 1997) para 16. 411  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.19 (4 December 1997) para 24; Limburg Principles, above n 12, 38. 412  See eg CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations (1992), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol II), (27 May 2008). 413  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.12 (20 May 1997) paras 10 and 17; I Westendorp, Women’s Right to Adequate Housing: Background Paper for Day of General Discussion on Art 3 of the ICESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/4 (4 February 2002), para 39. 414  See generally CESCR, General Comment 20, above n 325.

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[2.111]  It should be noted that discrimination is prohibited by other international human rights treaties. By way of example, Article 1 of the ICERD provides: In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.

Similarly, Article 1 of the CEDAW, which is followed in Article 1(f) of the Protocol to the African Charter, provides that the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil and any other field.

[2.112]  While these Conventions deal only with cases of discrimination on specific grounds, it is arguable, in line with the jurisprudence of the HRC,415 that the terms ‘discrimination’ and ‘inequality’ under the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference (without reasonable and objective criteria or legitimate aim under the Covenant) based on any prohibited ground, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, mental or physical disability, age, health status (including HIV/ AIDS), sexual orientation and civil, political, social or other status, and which has the purpose (direct) or effect (indirect) of nullifying or impairing the recognition, equal enjoyment or exercise by all individuals and groups, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms contained in the Covenant.416 Therefore, treatment is discriminatory or unequal if similar situations are treated differently, or if different situations are treated similarly, without reasonable and objective criteria. [2.113]  States parties are under an obligation to guarantee and ensure the right to be free from discrimination, and the equal right of women and men in the enjoyment of all rights contained in the ICESCR.417 The obligation to ensure that all individuals enjoy the rights recognised in the Covenant, established in Articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant, requires that states parties take all necessary steps to enable every person to enjoy those rights. These steps include the removal of obstacles to the equal enjoyment of ESC rights ‘not only [in] the public sphere, but also the private sphere’,418 the education of the population and of state officials, including judges, in human rights,

415  HRC, General Comment 18, above n 330, paras 6–7, 13 and 29; HRC, General Comment 28, above n 380, para 31. 416  See eg CESCR, General Comment 12, para 18. 417  See generally MA Freeman, Equality and Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/5 (5 February 2002); Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy (USA), Equal Enjoyment of the Right to Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/7 (4 February 2002). 418  CESCR, General Comment 5, para 11. See also CESCR, General Comment 14, para 26, in which the CESCR stressed ‘the need to ensure that not only the public health sector but also private providers of health services and facilities comply with the principle of non-discrimination in relation to persons with disabilities’.

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and the adjustment of domestic legislation so as to give effect to the undertakings set forth in the Covenant.419 In addition, states must require public and private institutions to develop plans of action to address discrimination. As noted above, discrimination against women is often intertwined with discrimination on other grounds, such as race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.420 States parties should therefore address the ways in which any instances of discrimination on other grounds affect women in a particular way, in order to attain the goal of equality. [2.114]  The CESCR and other treaty-monitoring bodies must fully integrate gender perspectives into all their working methods. This requires, in particular, the consideration of the gender implications of each issue discussed under each of the articles of the Covenant.421 At a national level, it is essential for states to provide for accessible mechanisms and institutions (including courts and tribunals, administrative ­authorities, national human rights institutions and/or ombudsmen) that ­provide effective remedies (such as compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, ­guarantees of non-repetition­, declarations, public apologies, educational programmes and ­prevention programmes) against discrimination in the field of ESC rights against public and private actors.422 One of the means of realising de facto or substantive equality for marginalised groups like women, rather than an exception to the norms of non-discrimination­and equality, relates to the application of ‘temporary special measures’ in favour of historically marginalised individuals and groups. Such temporary measures are examined in the next section.423 D.  Temporary Special Measures [2.115]  Although everyone is a beneficiary of human rights (UDHR, Article 22), in practice some individuals and groups are more vulnerable than others, or have traditionally been subjected to discrimination or suffered disadvantage. As shown in chapter seven, throughout the world women are in general economically, socially, politically, legally and culturally disadvantaged compared with similarly situated men. Some groups of women (such as women of ethnic and minority communities, immigrant women and women asylum seekers, women internally displaced by violence and conflict, women with disabilities, older women and women in detention) are particularly vulnerable, depending on context, and suffer more violations of their ESC rights. For example, in the UK the CEDAW Committee expressed its concern on ‘vulnerable groups of women’ in 2008, as follows: The Committee is concerned that women of different ethnic and minority communities, including traveller communities, continue to suffer from multiple discrimination, particularly in access to education, employment and health care. The Committee notes that ethnic and minority women are underrepresented in all areas of the labour market, particularly in 419 

HRC, General Comment 28, above n 380, para 3. Ibid, para 30. 421  UN, Report of the Sixth Meeting of Persons Chairing the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc A/50/505(4 October 1995) paras 23–31. 422  See ch 3; and CESCR, General Comment 20, above n 325, para 40. 423  CEDAW, Art 4(1). 420 

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senior or decision-making positions, have higher rates of unemployment and face a greater pay gap in their hourly earnings compared to men. Women of different ethnic and minority communities are also greatly underrepresented in political and public life. The Committee notes that women of traveller communities experience high numbers of miscarriages and still-births, and have the highest maternal mortality rate among all ethnic groups. It also notes that women of minority and ethnic communities suffer higher rates of depression and mental illness, while women of Asian descent have higher suicide and self-harm rates.424

[2.116]  The disadvantages faced by women, and especially by vulnerable groups of women, operate on a number of levels—international, regional, national, local, communal and familial. Treating unequals equally can have the effect of widening inequality. Therefore, in order to achieve substantive equality, such disadvantaged groups may require special protection of their rights in order to redress disadvantage and systematic discrimination, sometimes through the adoption of temporary special measures in both the public and private sectors,425 such as ‘positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women’s integration into education, the economy, politics and employment.’426 Such action may consist of measures such as ensuring that, for example, women are not denied healthcare, primary/secondary/higher education, access to employment, or social security. This is meant to ensure substantive equal enjoyment of ESC rights by addressing structural and systematic discrimination.427 Consequently, the adoption of temporary special measures for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain (vulnerable, marginalised or disadvantaged) groups or individuals requiring such protection, as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals have equal enjoyment of ESC rights, is not generally deemed as discriminatory.428 [2.117]  In this respect, Article 4 of the CEDAW provides: 1.

424 

Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.

CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/6 (18 July 2008) para 45. ‘Temporary special measures’ in its corrective, compensatory and promotional sense, is often equated with the terms ‘affirmative action’, ‘positive action’, ‘positive measures’, ‘reverse discrimination’ and ‘­positive discrimination’. In this text, and in accordance with the CEDAW, the term ‘temporary special measures’ only is used. For a discussion of these measures, see I Boerefijn et al (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating De Facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003); CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 387, para 17. 426  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 5: Temporary Special Measures, UN Doc A/43/38, 109 (1988). 427  Limburg Principles, above n 12, 37–39. 428  See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 20, para 39; CESCR, General Comment 5, para 18; CEDAW, Art 4(1); CEDAW, General Recommendation 25, above n 387; CESCR, Concluding Observations: ­Guatemala, UN Doc E/1997/22 (1997) para 140, which reads, ‘The Committee recommends that all legislative and other reforms take into account the need to promote equality and reverse the devastating effects of discrimination against the indigenous populations, in particular through affirmative action.’ 425 

144  2.

State Obligations Under the ICESCR Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.

[2.118]  The adoption of temporary special measures is not restricted to civil and political rights but extends to ESC rights. Thus the CESCR has confirmed the applicability of temporary special measures to ESC rights, and called on states to adopt these measures. For example, in 2006 the Committee noted with concern that in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, women, in particular Roma women and women living in rural areas, had only limited economic opportunities and frequently worked in the informal or low-paid sectors, or were employed in lower positions and received lower salaries than men, irrespective of their qualifications.429 It recommended that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as a state party to the ICESCR, adopt temporary special measures to ensure that women, in particular Roma and other minority women as well as women living in rural areas, have the same access to the regular labour market as men, including to senior positions, and that the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value is implemented in practice.430

The Committee has also explained that [t]he principles of equality and non-discrimination, by themselves, are not always sufficient to guarantee true equality. Temporary special measures may sometimes be needed in order to bring disadvantaged or marginalised persons or groups of persons to the same substantive level as others. Temporary special measures aim at realising not only de jure or formal equality, but also de facto or substantive equality for men and women. However, the application of the principle of equality will sometimes require that States parties take measures in favour of women in order to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination. As long as these measures are necessary to redress de facto discrimination, and are terminated when de facto equality is achieved, such differentiation is legitimate.431

[2.119]  Therefore, ‘no discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations that are contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things’.432 The need to bring disadvantaged or marginalised persons or groups of persons (such as women) to the same substantive level as others (such as men) is a legitimate purpose under the Covenant and other international human rights treaties to justify the adoption of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women. However, such measures must not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of unequal or separate standards for different groups, and such measures must not be continued after their intended objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved433 and ‘sustained

429  CESCR, Concluding Observations: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN Doc E/C.12/ MKD/CO/1 (24 November 2006) para 13. 430  Ibid, para 33. 431  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 32, para 15. However, there is one exception to this general principle: reasons specific to an individual male candidate may tilt the balance in his favour, which is to be assessed objectively, taking into account all criteria to the individual candidates. This is a requirement of the principle of proportionality. 432  IACmHR, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalisation Provision of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 (19 January 1984) para 57. 433  Ibid.

Articles 2(2) and 3

 145

for a period of time’.434 In respect of the right to education, the CESCR clearly stated in 1999 that [t]he adoption of temporary special measures intended to bring about de facto equality for men and women and for disadvantaged groups is not a violation of the right to nondiscrimination­with regard to education, so long as such measures do not lead to the maintenance of unequal or separate standards for different groups, and provided they are not continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.435

[2.120]  In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing: (a) Historically marginalised and vulnerable groups, such as women, may require states and other actors to adopt and implement temporary special measures ‘in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination’, or to eliminate disadvantage caused by past and current discriminatory laws, traditions and practices, so as to enhance the enjoyment of their human rights.436 (b) In the context of ESC rights, in some cases, the adoption of temporary special measures may be ‘necessary’ to accelerate the equal enjoyment by women of all ESC rights and to improve the de facto position of women.437 This means that in some cases states are ‘under an obligation to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination’.438 (c) Such temporary special measures encompass a wide variety of legislative, executive, administrative or other regulatory instruments, policies and practices, such as outreach or support programmes; allocation and/or reallocation of resources; preferential treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and promotion; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems.439 (d) The nature, duration and application of such measures should be designed with reference to the specific issue and context, and should be adjusted as circumstances require. The results of such measures should be monitored, with a view to discontinuing these measures when their objectives have been achieved.440 Generally, temporary special measures are legitimate to the extent that they represent ‘reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto discrimination’ and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably achieved.441 However, temporary special measures may in some exceptional circumstances need to be of a permanent nature, such as interpretation services for linguistic minorities and reasonable accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in accessing healthcare facilities.442

434 

CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 387, para 20. CESCR, General Comment 13, para 32. HRC, General Comment 18, above n 330, para 10. 437 CESCR, General Comment 16, para 35. The Comment made reference to CEDAW Committee, ­General Recommendation 25 on Art 4.1 of CEDAW (see above n 387). 438  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 9. 439  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 387, para 22. 440  CESCR, General Comment 16, para 36. 441  CESCR, General Comment 20, para 9. 442  Ibid. 435  436 

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E.  Discrimination by Non-State Actors [2.121]  The non-discrimination clause of the Covenant includes discriminatory acts of both public authorities and NSAs. The state obligation to protect (as outlined in chapter one) equally applies in the context of non-discrimination. Thus, states parties to the ICESCR are obliged to take steps to ensure that individuals and entities acting in a private capacity do not discriminate on prohibited grounds—eg imposing penalties on employers who discriminate on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, marital status or other prohibited grounds. As a result, states should take effective measures to ensure that NSAs (eg in the context of the right to adequate housing, private housing agencies, private credit providers and private landlords) refrain from engaging in ­discriminatory practices on any prohibited ground, including nationality or race.443 The appropriate measures that states parties to the ICESCR are obliged to take include the regulation of the activities of private actors with regard to areas such as education, employment, and health policies and practices, working conditions and work standards, and other areas in which private actors provide services or facilities, such as banking and housing. In FA v Norway,444 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was made aware of housing advertisements in Norway that contained discriminatory requirements, such as ‘no foreigners desired’, ‘whites only’ and ‘Norwegians with permanent jobs’.445 In response, the CERD urged Norway to take effective measures to ensure that housing agencies refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices, and ‘recommended that Norway give full effect to its obligations under article 5(e)(iii) of the [International] Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]’.446 [2.122]  To comply with states’ international human rights obligations, it is important to hold NSAs to account under national law. For example, section 8 of the South ­African Constitution places specific human rights obligations on NSAs.447 In some states, such as India, the courts have imposed human rights obligations on NSAs. In one case, for example, dealing with whether doctors could deny treatment to patients, the court held that the right to life meant that every doctor, including a doctor not working for the state, ‘had a professional obligation to extend his service with due expertise for protecting life’.448 The implication is that private doctors cannot discriminate in the provision of healthcare services. Perhaps more pertinent, in a case relating to the prevention of occupational disease, a court decided that it could give appropriate directions to the employer, be it the state or its undertaking or private employer to make the right to life meaningful; to prevent pollution of work place; protection of the environment; protection of the health of the workman or to preserve free and unpolluted water for the safety and health of the people.449 443  See generally Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Rights of Non-Citizens (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2006). 444  FA v Norway, Communication no 18/2000, UN Doc CERD/C/58/D/18/2000 (21 March 2001); UN Doc A/56/18, annex III. 445  Ibid, para 2.1. 446  Ibid, para 8. 447  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 8(2) provides: ‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.’ 448  Pt Parmanand Katara v Union of India (1989) 4 Supreme Court Cases 286. 449  Consumer Education and Research Centre v Union of India (1995) AIR 922.

Article 2(3)

 147

[2.123]  It is thus clear that states can hold NSAs to account for human rights v­ iolations under national law. In this regard, within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their functions of judicial review, courts should take account of Covenant rights where this is necessary to ensure that the state party’s conduct, together with the conduct of appropriate NSAs, is consistent with its obligations under the Covenant.

IV.  ARTICLE 2(3): NON-NATIONALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES [2.124]  As a general rule the Covenant applies equally to nationals and non-nationals ‘such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation’ residing in the jurisdiction of the state party.450 Thus, any different treatment of nationals and nonnationals may constitute discrimination and needs justification. Consequently, the Committee’s 1991 guidelines required states parties to the ICESCR to indicate in their reports: (a) to what extent and in what manner non-nationals are not guaranteed the rights recognised in the Covenant; and (b) what justification there is for any difference.451 However, Article 2(3) of the ICESCR provides: Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognised in the … Covenant to non-nationals.

[2.125]  Although the Covenant did not define ‘developing countries’ and ‘economic rights’, it has been suggested that the phrase ‘developing countries’ was meant to refer to economically weak states, particularly those that had been under colonial rule.452 This is supported by the travaux préparatoires, which indicate that the inclusion of this provision was proposed by a delegate of Indonesia in order to protect the rights of the nationals of former colonies, which had recently gained independence from colonial domination, against powerful economic groups of non-nationals who control important sectors of the economy.453 The purpose of Article 2(3) was, therefore, to end the domination of certain economic groups of non-nationals during colonial and post-colonial times.454 By way of illustration, the African Commission has affirmed that, during colonialism, 450 

CESCR, General Comment 20, para 30. CESCR, Revised General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1991/1 (Basic Reference Document), 17 June 1991, guidelines for Arts 2. CESCR, Revised General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Reports to be Submitted by State Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, para 11, guidelines for Art 2 require developing states to ‘provide information on any restrictions imposed under Article 2, ­paragraph 3’. See Appendix I to this book, para 11. 452  EV Dankwa, ‘Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the ICESCR’ (1987) 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly 230, 235; Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 44. 453  Dankwa, above n 452, 235; UNGA, Third Committee, A/5365 (17 December 1962) paras 68–69. 454  Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 43; Report of the Third Committee, 17 UN GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 43), para 68, UN Doc A/5365 (1962). 451 

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the human and material resources of Africa were largely exploited for the benefit of outside powers, creating tragedy for Africans themselves, depriving them of their birthright and alienating them from the land. The aftermath of colonial exploitation has left Africa’s precious resources and people still vulnerable to foreign misappropriation.455

As a result of this history and painful legacy, many states that were subjected to colonial exploitation have limited resources to guarantee ‘economic rights’ to non-nationals. It is in this context that they are permitted (but not required or obliged), as an exception, to determine to what extent they guarantee ‘economic rights’ to non-nationals. [2.126]  The limitation in Article 2(3) extends only to ‘economic rights’, not to ‘social and cultural rights’. It is uncertain what is meant by ‘economic rights’ in this Article, and how different such rights are from ‘social and cultural rights’. This has led to some lack of clarity in determining whether some rights—such as the rights to health, education, social security, participation in the cultural life of a community—would fall into the category of ‘economic’ rights under Article 2(3). Although generally these may be considered to be ‘social rights’ rather than ‘economic rights’, as noted in chapter one, the ICESCR does not make a clear-cut distinction between what rights are ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ and what rights are ‘economic’.456 So far, in the practice of the CESCR, no clear distinction between ‘social rights’ and ‘economic rights’ can be discerned. To date, the Committee has not dealt with Article 2(3) in any detail. Indeed, no developing state has sought to invoke it, and in any case discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited in several developing states.457 As regards education, for example, the Committee has noted ‘[t]he right to education … has been variously classified as an economic right, a social right and a cultural right. It is all of these.’458 The same could be applied to health and most other rights under the Covenant. Thus, in addition to being ‘social rights’, health, education and social security could be seen as ‘economic rights’, since these rights have economic dimensions as they enable individuals to earn a living. [2.127]  Whatever view is taken as to what rights in the ICESCR are ‘economic rights’, it has to be borne in mind that Article 2(3) is only an exception to the general rule in Article 2(2).459 Therefore, in the light of the object and purpose of the Covenant, and the universality of human rights in general, Article 2(3) should be interpreted narrowly, since what is paramount is the general right to equality and non-discrimination rather than the exception.460 This narrow interpretation applies in particular to the

455  Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v N ­ igeria, Communication 155/96, (2001) AHRLR 60, para 56. See also generally, W Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC, Howard University Press, 1982). 456  Dankwa suggested that ‘economic rights, in the context of the Covenant, are rights that enable a person to earn a living or that relate to that process’. He cited, as examples, rights to: work (Art 6); just and favourable conditions of work (Art 7); improved material conditions for teaching staff (Art 13(2)(e)); and rights to form and join a trade union and to strike (Art 8(a) and (b)). See Dankwa, above n 452, 240. 457  For example, in Africa, the ACHPR guarantees ‘every individual … without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status’ (Art 2), enjoyment of all rights under the Charter, including rights to work (Art 15), health (Art 16) and education (Art 17) (emphasis added). 458  CESCR, General Comment 11, para 2. 459  Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 43. 460  Ibid.

Article 2(3)

 149

notion of ‘economic rights’ and to the notion of ‘developing countries’.461 The latter notion, as noted in paragraph 2.125 above, refers to those (economically weak) states which have gained independence and which fall within the appropriate UN classification of a developing country.462 Most ‘Least Developed Countries’ (see Appendix J) fall in this category. [2.128]  In the context of the rights that are generally seen as ‘social rights’ (eg rights to health and education), the narrow interpretation should lead to the result that developing states parties to the ICESCR should not rely widely on this provision to discriminate against non-nationals in the enjoyment of ‘economic rights’. Similarly, Article 2(3) should not be used to deny adequate compensation to non-nationals in the event of compulsory deprivation of property owned by non-nationals in developing states in the interest of the national economy of a developing state or other p ­ ublic interest. With respect to Article 2(3), the Belgian Government declared that ‘this ­provision cannot infringe the principle of fair compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalisation’.463 This is consistent with Article 17 of the UDHR, which guarantees everyone ‘the right to own property alone as well as in association with others’ and that no one ‘shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’. Therefore, developing countries should not use Article 2(3) in a manner inconsistent with international law. In practice most developing countries protect the right to property without distinguishing between nationals and non-nationals. For example, Uganda’s Constitution (1995) protects the right to property of ‘every person’ in the following terms: 1. Every person has a right to own property either individually or in association with others. 2. No person shall be compulsorily deprived of property or any interest in or right over property of any description except where the following conditions are satisfied— (a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary for public use or in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; and (b) the compulsory taking of possession or acquisition of property is made under a law which makes provision for— (i) prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation, prior to the taking of possession or acquisition of the property; and (ii) a right of access to a court of law by any person who has an interest or right over the property.464

[2.129]  While states have adopted some laws and policies to protect e­ mployment for nationals,465 in practice developing countries have not sought to rely on ­Article 2(3) to determine the extent to which they would guarantee ‘economic rights’ to nonnationals. In any case, several developing states are parties to the Migrant ­Workers

461 

Ibid, para 44. Ibid. 463 See Declarations and Reservations to the ICESCR and Objections, Appendix H; Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Reservations, Withdrawals, Declarations and Objections under the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/3/Rev.5 (2001). 464  The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Art 26. 465  For example, in Angola, Decree no 5/95 of 7 April 1995, s 3(1) provides, ‘The national or foreign employers, that carry out their business anywhere in the country, should only resort to the use of foreign non-resident workforce, even if not paid in the event that their [employer’s] staff, when composed of more than 5 employees, is filled with at least 70% of the national work force.’ 462 

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­Convention,466 which protects several rights, including ‘economic’ rights of ­non-nationals. In Africa, for example, the African Commission considers ‘any discrimination against individuals [whether nationals or non-nationals] in their access to or enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights on any of the prohibited grounds [including national origin] … a violation of the African Charter’.467 Article 2(3) of the ICESCR does not provide a legal basis for discriminatory treatment of non-nationals in the enjoyment of ‘economic rights’ but rather reinforces the right of all peoples, including those in developing countries who lost control over their national economies during colonialism, to self-determination468 and to ‘enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth and resources’.469

V.  ARTICLES 4 AND 5: LIMITATIONS ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE [2.130]  The rights guaranteed under the Covenant do not exist in a vacuum, and so they may be subject to certain legitimate public interests or limitations in accordance with Article 4, which provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.

[2.131]  Until 2009, state practice on limitations imposed on ESC rights did not form part of periodic state reports because previous reporting guidelines did not require states to report on limitations.470 This was addressed in the new reporting guidelines in 2008, which require states to explain the scope of ‘derogations, restrictions or limitations; the circumstances justifying them; and the timeframe envisaged for their withdrawal’ in their common core documents to all UN treaty bodies.471 Whenever a state seeks to rely on the limitation clause, the onus is on the state to prove that it is justified to resort to it.472

466  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by GA res 45/158 of 18 December 1990, UN Doc A/RES/45/158. 467 African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and ­Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (2011), available at http://www. achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf, para 19; ­African C ­ harter, Art 2; ch 4 in this book. 468  ICESCR, Art 1. 469  Ibid, Art 25. 470 CESCR, Revised General Guidelines 1991, above n 451. 471 CESCR, Revised General Guidelines 2009, above n 451, para 14; Compilation of Guidelines on the Form of and Content of Reports, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.5, 29 May 2008, para 40(c). 472  See also Amnesty International v Zambia, Communication no 212/98, (12th Annual Activity Report, 1988–1999), (2000) AHRLR 325, para 50; Tanganyika Law Society & Others v The United Republic of Tanzania, App nos 009 and 011/2011, (Judgment, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 14 June 2013), para 109.

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[2.132]  As at the time of writing (October 2015), the CESCR had not adopted a ­General Comment in respect of Article 4, and its Concluding Observations had rarely addressed the question of limitations since states have generally not sought to invoke limitations under Article 5. In 2014 the CESCR observed that Article 4 required a state to ‘ensure’ that limitations on ESC rights were ‘necessary and proportionate and do not interfere with the core minimal content of the rights’.473 The Committee expressed ‘concern’ at the provisions of Article 14(2) of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as well as laws and regulations adopted for its implementation, which imposed ‘broad restrictions on the full exercise of human rights’.474 As a result, the Committee urged the state party to review the restrictions to the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights, as provided for in article 14 (2) of the Constitution and implementing regulations and legislation, so as to bring them into line with article 4 of the Covenant, and to ensure that they are necessary and proportionate and do not interfere with the core minimal content of the rights.475

[2.133]  This is consistent with the Committee’s approach to the scope of limitations on ESC rights in the context of economic and financial crises. The Committee has indicated that all austerity measures must be temporary, necessary and proportionate, and non-discriminatory; and that they must ensure the protection of the minimum core content of all ESC rights at all times and should not disproportionately affect the marginalised and disadvantaged groups.476 With respect to limitations on the right of everyone to take part in cultural life under Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, the Committee stated as follows: Applying limitations to the right of everyone to take part in cultural life may be necessary in certain circumstances, in particular in the case of negative practices, including those attributed to customs and traditions, that infringe upon other human rights. Such limitations must pursue a legitimate aim, be compatible with the nature of this right and be strictly necessary for the promotion of general welfare in a democratic society, in accordance with article 4 of the Covenant. Any limitations must therefore be proportionate, meaning that the least restrictive measures must be taken when several types of limitations may be imposed. The Committee also wishes to stress the need to take into consideration existing international human rights standards on limitations that can or cannot be legitimately imposed on rights that are intrinsically linked to the right to take part in cultural life, such as the rights to privacy, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of opinion and expression, to peaceful assembly and to freedom of association.477

473 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Vietnam, E/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (15 December 2014) para 8. Ibid. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2013), Art 14(2), provided: ‘Human rights and citizens’ rights [in the political, civic, economic, cultural and social fields] shall only be restricted when prescribed by law in imperative circumstances for the reasons of national defence, national security, social order and security, social morality and community well-being.’ 475  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Vietnam, above n 473, para 8. 476  See AG Pillay, ‘Letter from CESCR Chairperson to States Parties in the Context of the Economic and Financial Crisis’, CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW, 16 May 2012, available at http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/ cescr0512.pdf; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Vietnam, UN Doc E/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (28 ­November 2014) para 8; Slovenia, UN Doc E/C.12/SVN/CO/2 (28 November 2014) para 8; Portugal, UN Doc E/C.12/ PRT/CO/4 (28 November 2014) para 6; Greece, UN Doc E/C.12/GRC/CO/2 (9 October 2015) paras 7–8; Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/ITA/CO/5 (9 October 2015) paras 8–9; Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/SDN/CO/2 (9 October 2015), paras 17–18. 477  CESCR, General Comment 21, para 19 (emphasis added). 474 

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[2.134]  From the text of Article 4, it is clear that it was primarily intended to regulate permissible limitations under the Covenant. In this way, it was meant to be protective of the rights of individuals rather than permissive of the imposition of limitations by the state.478 It is clearly an exception to the general rule (to protect ESC rights) and must necessarily be interpreted restrictively in the light of the general rule, since the intention is to ‘regulate’ the exercise of these rights, not to extinguish them.479 Since the text of Article 5 requires the limitation to be ‘compatible with the nature of these [ESC] rights’ and ‘solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’, any limitation to the Covenant must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, which implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ or ‘a high degree of justification’ for the limitation in question.480 In particular, the limitation must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Justifications for limitations include national security or public order/safety, public health, public morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.481 [2.135]  In order for any limitation to comply with Article 4, it must satisfy three essential features. First, the limitation must be ‘determined by law’. This means that the limitation should have a basis specifically in domestic law consistent with the Covenant; the law must be adequately accessible; the relevant domestic law must be formulated with sufficient precision; and the law must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or incompatible with the principle of interdependence of all human rights. Thus, there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interference by public as well as private authorities with ESC rights, and adequate safeguards against abuse.482 [2.136]  Secondly, the limitation must be ‘compatible with the nature’ of ESC rights, meaning that the substance of the limitation shall not be interpreted or applied so as to jeopardise the essence of the ESC rights.483 Implicit in this standard is the notion that the limitation, even if justified by compelling governmental interests, must not be so framed or applied so as to limit the protected rights under the Covenant more than is necessary. [2.137]  Thirdly, the limitation should have a legitimate (and not arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory) aim, solely to promote ‘the general welfare in a democratic society’. The phrase ‘general welfare’ has been understood to mean ‘furthering the well-being of the people as a whole’,484 including their economic, social and cultural well-being.485 But such well-being must be viewed in the context of a ‘­democratic society’—a society that respects human rights set forth in the UN Charter and the

478 

Limburg Principles, above n 12, 46–47. Jayawickrama, above n 346, 184–85. 480  Ibid, 186–87. 481  See, eg, ICESCR, Art 8; ICCPR, Arts 12, 18, 19, 21 and 22; ECHR, Arts 8–11; AmCHR, Arts 12, 13, 15, 16, 22 and 32(2); ACHPR, Art 14. 482  Limburg Principles, above n 12, 48–51. 483  Ibid, 56. 484  Ibid, 52. 485  E Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Law (New York, United Nations, 1990) 176. 479 

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UDHR,486 including minority rights.487 A democratic society is characterised by ­pluralism, ‘tolerance and broad-mindedness’,488 and ‘based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives’.489 As a result, any limitation of the rights guaranteed under the Covenant must meet the proportionality test. In particular, whether there are adequate and sufficient reasons for the limitation (a pressing social need), and whether such reasons are proportionate to any limitation (legitimate aim pursued) of the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the ­Covenant.490 This restricts the imposition of limitations under the Covenant, and thus the burden rests on the state to prove that any limitations are taken in response to a pressing social need, and that the limitation of the rights protected in the Covenant is no greater than is necessary to address that pressing social need in order to ensure the continuous and effective protection of ESC rights. In no case may the limitations be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of any right protected in the Covenant, or impair the democratic functioning of society. [2.138]  In short, the elements of a permissible limitations test under existing international human rights standards on limitations can be summarised as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Any restrictions must be provided by the law…; The essence of a human right is not subject to restrictions …; Restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society …; Any discretion exercised when implementing the restrictions must not be unfettered …; For a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the enumerated legitimate aims; it must be necessary for reaching the legitimate aim …; (f) Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected …; (g) Any restrictions must be consistent with the other rights [existing international human rights standards on limitations] …491 486 

Limburg Principles, above n 12, 55. Minority rights are discussed in several works. See, eg, P Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991); AS Åkermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law (London, Kluwer Law International, 1997); H O’Nions, Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe (Aldershot and Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 2007); M Weller (ed), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005); M Weller, Universal Minority Rights: A ­Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007); TH Malloy and U Caruso (eds), Minorities, their Rights, and the Monitoring of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: Essays in Honour of Rainer Hofmann (Leiden, ­Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013). 488 See Dudgeon v UK, judgment of 23 September 1981, Series A, No 45; (1982) 4 EHRR 149, para 53. 489  Vienna Declaration, above n 175, para 8. 490  The ECtHR has applied a similar test under the ECHR. The classic formulation of the test is to be found in Silver v United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A, No 61, (1983) 5 EHRR 347, para 97. See also Nada v Switzerland, App no 10593/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 September 2013, (2013) 56 EHRR 593, para 181: ‘An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”.’ 491 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, UN Doc A/HRC/13/37 (28 December 2009) para 17. 487 

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[2.139]  Article 5(1) of the ICESCR provides for safeguards against abuse of rights guaranteed under the Covenant by the state and other actors in the following terms: Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognised herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

Similar provisions are found in other human rights treaties.492 [2.140]  In contrast to most other provisions of the Covenant, Article 5 refers not merely to a state party but rather generally to ‘any State’, ‘group’ or ‘person’. This can be taken to mean that even non-states parties to the Covenant, including NSAs (discussed in chapter three), must not engage in any activity aimed at the destruction of ESC rights. A similar provision in Article 17 of the ECHR was interpreted to mean that the general purpose of such a provision is to prevent individuals and groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own interests the principles enunciated by the Convention.493 In principle, the same general purpose is valid for the Covenant. [2.141]  In light of Article 5, any limitation of the rights guaranteed under the ­Covenant must not be greater in extent than that envisaged under Article 4.494 Thus, Article 5(1) underlines the fact that there is no general, inherent, implied or residual right for a state to impose limitations beyond those which are specifically provided for in the law.495 Article 5(2) provides that the ICESCR must not be used as a pretext to lower the level of protection granted to ESC rights under other international treaties, or under municipal law or custom.496 It is a ‘savings’ provision, which preserves the sanctity of any laws that provide a higher level of protection for ESC rights than is required by the ICESCR. Thus, individuals and groups may rely on other laws providing for more favourable protection. For example, a state party that guarantees the right to property domestically or by ratification of another human rights instrument (eg the African Charter or the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR) may not limit or derogate from this right on the basis that it has ratified the Covenant, which does not contain such a provision.

VI. CONCLUSION [2.142]  This chapter has considered states’ human rights obligations in respect of ESC rights, primarily under Articles 2–5 of the ICESCR. The Article 2(1) state obligation to ‘take steps’ to the ‘maximum of available resources’ and the Article 2(2)

492 

See eg UDHR, Art 30; ICCPR, Art 5(1); ECHR, Art 17; AmCHR, Art 29(a). Norwood v United Kingdom, App no 23131/03, Admissibility Decision of 16 November 2004, at 4. 494  Daes, above n 485, 130–31. 495  Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 57. 496  Art 5(2) of the ICESCR states: ‘No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognised or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent.’ See also Limburg Principles, above n 12, para 58. 493 See

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state ­obligation to ‘guarantee’ without reservation that ESC rights will be exercised ­‘without ­discrimination’497 are obligations of immediate effect and subject neither to ‘progressive realisation’ nor to the ‘availability of resources’. One key component of state obligations under the ICESCR arises in the context of ‘international assistance and cooperation’. As argued above, this includes the obligation to work actively towards equitable multilateral trading, investment and financial systems conducive to the elimination of poverty, a key obstacle to the progressive realisation of ESC rights. Indeed, UNCTAD noted in its 2008 report that [a]chieving a more sustainable type of economic growth and better poverty reduction and social outcomes in LDCs [less-developed countries] requires effective national development strategies, effective development aid and development-friendly international regimes for trade, investment and technology.498

[2.143]  It has been noted that Articles 2(2) and 3 oblige states to adopt and implement measures to prevent discrimination (including the adoption of temporary special measures to compensate for past discrimination or to redress disadvantage) that go beyond the enactment of legislation. This is necessary in order to ameliorate disadvantage suffered by particular groups, and to accelerate the achievement of the overall de facto or substantive equality. As noted above, Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR are not stand-alone provisions but should be read in conjunction with each specific right guaranteed under the Covenant. [2.144]  It should be observed that while the CESCR has adopted several useful G ­ eneral Comments, by 2015 it had not adopted General Comments with respect to the obligations of developing states to guarantee the ‘economic rights’ to non-nationals­in developing countries (Article 2(3)) and the general limitations on ESC rights (­Articles 4 and 5). It is possible that these Articles have not been a priority because states have generally not invoked them. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the limitations in the above Articles, a General Comment is vital to clarify their application, and to serve as a guideline in examining state reports with greater consistency. It would also assist the states parties in the implementation of the Covenant. As noted above, to be compatible with the Covenant, limitations must meet three basic conditions: (i) limitations must be ‘determined by law’; (ii) limitations must be compatible with the nature of the rights protected in the Covenant and not the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognised in the Covenant; and (iii) the purpose of the limitation must be to promote ‘the general welfare in a democratic society’. Accordingly, limitations must be ‘necessary and proportionate and … not interfere with the core minimal content of the rights’. [2.145]  While there are many breaches of human rights obligations to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights under the ICESCR, very rarely will a state assert that it is allowed to breach ESC rights within its jurisdiction. It will either deny the facts concerning 497  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.98 (7 June 2004) paras 9 and 28. The Committee noted that Kuwait’s reservations and declarations, made in respect of the provisions regarding Arts 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR, ‘negate the core purposes and objectives of the Covenant’, and encouraged Kuwait to consider withdrawing such reservations and declarations. 498 UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report 2008: Growth, Poverty and the Terms of Development Partnership (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2008) 4.

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the alleged breach, or it will try to justify its action by reference to some limitations of ESC rights. In so doing, the state in fact affirms the legal obligation to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights within its jurisdiction, as was acknowledged by the ICJ in ­Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,499 when it held that if a state ‘defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the [recognised international law] rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule’.

499 

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 185.

3 Beyond the State: Non-State Actors and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights I. INTRODUCTION [3.01]  International human rights law has traditionally focused principally on ­protecting individuals from abuse of power by states, with insufficient attention given to protection of individuals and groups against human rights violations ­emanating from the policies and activities of NSAs.1 Yet ‘terrorism [normally committed by NSAs] … constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and ­security’,2 and often results in or is ‘aimed at the destruction of human rights’,3 including ESC rights such as the rights to health and education. In recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that the policies and activities of NSAs, sometimes referred to as ‘private’ actors, as distinct from the public realm of government, can affect virtually all internationally recognised human rights, and ESC rights in particular. These NSAs include TNCs4 and other business enterprises,5 NGOs or civil society groups, international organisations including the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as armed opposition (sometimes classified as ‘terrorist’) groups. This has arisen in the context of neoliberal globalisation, which calls upon governments to relinquish regulatory control over production, trade, and investment, both domestically and across international borders, and to transfer as many assets and functions as possible to 1 See generally A Clapham (ed), Human Rights and Non-State Actors (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar ­Publishing, 2013). 2  See, eg, Security Council res 2178, S/RES/2178 (2014), 24 September 2014, preamble, first indent. 3  UN Commission on Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Resolution 2005/80 (21 April 2005), in the preamble to which the Commission reaffirmed that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights’. Also UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights and Terrorism, Resolution 2004/44 (19 April 2014), in the preamble to which, the Commission expressed serious concern ‘at the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups’. 4  A TNC (transnational corporation) is generally regarded as ‘an enterprise comprising entities in more than one country which operate under a system of decision-making that permits coherent policies and a common strategy. The entities are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others’. See UNCTAD, Transnational Corporations Statistics, available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-Corporations-Statistics.aspx. See also Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (hereinafter ‘UN Norms’), UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003), para 20 defining the term ‘­transnational corporation’ as an economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of ­economic entities operating in two or more countries—whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively. 5 See Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1 (24 June 2014).

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private actors. It also advocates restructuring government so that remaining state operations will emulate private enterprise more closely.6

It is not surprising, therefore, that TNCs are the most visible manifestation of ­globalisation. TNCs account for at least two-thirds of world exports of goods and services, of which a significant share is intrafirm trade. The number of TNCs has grown exponentially over the past three decades. By the early 1990s, there were an estimated 37,000 TNCs in the world, with at least 170,000 foreign affiliates.7 Of these, 33,500 were ­parent corporations based in developed countries.8 By 2007 the number of TNCs had risen to some 78,000, with at least 780,000 foreign affiliates, almost half of which are now located in developing countries.9 In 2009, there were around 82,000 parent company TNCs controlling around 810,000 foreign affiliates.10 Ninety per cent of these TNCs have their headquarters in developed countries; the five major home countries being France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Despite this development, NSAs are still not bound directly by existing international human rights treaties that apply to states parties. The fact is, however, that the growth in the wealth and power of NSAs has meant an enhanced potential for them to promote or undermine respect for human rights. As shown in paragraph 3.06 below, this raises two fundamental questions, which are examined in this chapter. [3.02]  Making space in the international legal regime to take account of the obligations of NSAs in the realisation of ESC rights, and their accountability for the violations of these rights, remains a critical challenge facing international human rights law today. Under traditional approaches to human rights generally, and to ESC rights in particular, NSAs are considered to be beyond the direct reach of international human rights law.11 As is well known, traditionally, human rights relations are conceptualised as ‘vertical’, in the sense that they involve the obligation of a governing actor (the state or agents of the state) towards individuals (or groups of individuals) within a state’s jurisdiction.12 This is based on the principle that the state has responsibility to guarantee human rights given that the state/individual relationship involves unequal power dynamics between the parties.13 A state’s potential to abuse its position of authority to

6  See L Philips, ‘Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatisation’ (2000) 63 Law and Contemporary Problems 111, 115. 7  See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the internationalization of R & D (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2005) 13. 8  Ibid. 9 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2007) xvi. 10 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2009) 17. 11  M Ssenyonjo, ‘Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights ­Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 10 Journal of Conflict and ­Security Law 405. 12 See, eg, W Nelson, ‘Human Rights and Human Obligation’ in J Pennock and J Chapman (eds), Human Rights (New York, New York University Press, 1981) 275; The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Philadelphia, PA, The American Law Institute, 1987) pt VII, introductory note, 144–45, does not fully commit to any position, but states, ‘how a state treats individual human beings … is a matter of international concern and a proper subject for regulation by international law’. 13  See R Higgins, Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 39–55, 146–59.

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 159

the detriment of interests of individuals and groups was the basis for human rights to insulate the latter against state interference. [3.03]  The UN Charter,14 widely considered as the centre of an international ‘­constitutional order’,15 imposes obligations on Member States to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.16 In this context, human rights are viewed primarily as being exercisable against the state, and the state has the primary responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. For example, under the two principal human rights treaties—the ICCPR17 and the ICESCR18—it is only each ‘state party’ to these Covenants that undertakes human rights obligations.19 This is binding on all branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), and on other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level— national, regional or local—and thus all government organs and authorities are in a position to engage the responsibility of the state.20 [3.04]  It is clear, therefore, that human rights treaties are principally addressed to states,21 and NSAs cannot, at present, be parties to the existing human rights ­treaties. The general obligations under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR ‘are ­bind­ing on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law’.22 In the words of the CESCR, ‘[a] State party cannot divest itself of its obligations under the Covenant by privatising governmental functions’.23 As such, the traditional view of international human rights instruments is that they impose only ‘indirect’ responsibilities on NSAs, provided under domestic civil and/or criminal law in accordance with the international and domestic human rights obligations of states. This means that NSAs are currently bound only to the extent that obligations accepted by states can be applied to them by states. The result is that a wide range of actors other than states, including international financial institutions, notably the IMF and the World Bank; international organisations concerned with trade such as the WTO; and TNCs,24 along with many others, are generally considered not to be bound 14  Adopted 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS xvi. 15 N White, ‘The United Nations System: Conference, Contract or Constitutional Order?’ (2000) 4 ­Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 281, 291. 16  See preamble to the UN Charter, together with Arts 1(3), 55 and 56; Z Stavrinides, ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3 The International Journal of Human Rights 38–48. 17  999 UNTS 171; see Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) para 4. 18  993 UNTS 3. 19  ICCPR, Art 2(1): ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’ ICESCR, Art 2(1): ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’ 20  HRC, General Comment 31, above n 17, para 4. In para 8 the HRC stated, ‘[t]he article 2, paragraph 1 [ICCPR], obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law. The Covenant cannot be viewed as a substitute for domestic criminal or civil law’. 21  See, eg CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Fifth Session, 1990), UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), para 1. 22  HRC, General Comment 31, above n 17, para 8. 23  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.90 (23 May 2003), para 11. 24  For the meaning of ‘transnational corporation’, see above n 4.

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directly by human rights law. This means that NSAs are only indirectly accountable through states, while the states will be directly liable for human rights violations committed by NSAs within their respective jurisdictions. Non-state actors are thus, by definition, placed at the margins of the international human rights legal regime. The major argument against the direct application of human rights obligations to NSAs stresses that this would carry the risk that states might defer their responsibility to these actors, which might diminish existing state obligations and accountability.25 In ­addition, where governance is weak, it is argued that shifting obligations onto NSAs to protect and even fulfil the broad spectrum of human rights may further undermine domestic political incentives to make governments more responsive and responsible for their own citizenry, which is stated to be the most effective way to realise rights.26 [3.05]  This situation threatens to make a mockery of the international system of protecting human rights generally, and ESC rights in particular, and providing ­ accountability for human rights violations. This is especially so given the fact that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a trend in all regions of the world to reduce the role of the state through privatisation of functions previously performed by governments, and to rely on private actors to resolve problems of human welfare, most of which directly relate to ESC rights to work, social security, adequate food, education, health, housing and water.27 Privatisation generally recasts these key areas not as public or social services grounded in human rights, but as ‘individual, atomized and personalized private good[s]’.28 The increasing powers of NSAs means that they are uniquely positioned to affect, positively and/or negatively, the level of enjoyment of ESC rights. Despite this, the means by which NSAs might be held accountable for human rights violations remain unclear.29 [3.06]  This chapter examines the role of NSAs in the progressive realisation of ESC rights, and the challenges posed to ‘classical’ international law doctrine by the emergence and increasing role of NSAs (ie individuals, TNCs, non-state armed groups, etc). As a subject of enormous complexity and variation, examination is restricted to two highly contentious questions: (a) How should international human rights law ensure that the activities of NSAs are consistent with international human rights standards with respect to ESC rights?

25 See K Koufa, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur: on Terrorism and Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (25 June 2004) para 55; JH Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102 ­American Journal of International Law 1. 26  J Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 819, 826. 27  See generally K De Feyter and F Gomez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). 28  See K Singh, ‘Protecting the Right to Education against Commercialization’ UN Doc A/HRC/29/30 (10 June 2015). 29  Thus, for instance, the UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998/47: Human Rights and Terrorism, ESCOR Supp (No 3) at 158, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/47 (1998), para 8 noted ‘in particular the need to study further the role and responsibility of non-State actors in the sphere of human rights’.

Definition of Non-State Actor

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(b) How should accountability of NSAs be promoted effectively when violations of international human rights law occur? The chapter is divided into seven further sections. Section II. first defines the term ‘non-state actor’. While contextualising the debate on issues surrounding the state obligation to protect against human rights violations by NSAs, section III. examines the scope and limits of the state-centred approach. Section IV. discusses the direct human rights responsibilities of NSAs with respect to ESC rights. Section V. ­considers the human rights obligations of international organisations; section VI. focuses on corporations, other business entities and human rights; while section VII. deals with non-state armed opposition groups. Lastly, section VIII. offers a number of final observations. It is concluded that in order to ensure more accountability for human rights violations by NSAs, it is relevant to extend and translate certain norms so that they clearly specify the human rights obligations of NSAs; consider the creation of specific institutions to ensure jurisdiction over the activities of NSAs (eg creation of a global ombudsman function that could receive and handle complaints of human rights violations by NSAs, or the adoption of a Statute of an International Court of Human Rights, to which NSAs, in addition to states, could also possibly become parties); and adjust assumptions that states are the only (or primary) duty-bearers of human rights obligations. Before examining the matters set out above, though, it is useful, by way of context, first to define the term ‘non-state actor’ as used in this chapter.

II.  DEFINITION OF NON-STATE ACTOR [3.07]  The term ‘non-state actor’ is virtually open-ended.30 Its meaning depends on the context in which it is used. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines has used the term ‘non-state actors’ to refer to ‘armed opposition groups who act autonomously from recognised governments’.31 In this context (of arms control), NSAs include ‘rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerrillas, liberation movements, and de facto territorial governing bodies’.32 [3.08]  Several attempts have been made to define NSAs.33 According to Josselin and Wallace, they include all organisations meeting the following three characteristics.34 First, NSAs include organisations (emanating from civil society, from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction) that are largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control. It is not clear, however, what level of governmental funding or control might disqualify

30  See P Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 3, 5. 31 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Non-State Actors and the Mine Ban, available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos-and-the-international-campaign-to-ban-landmines.html. 32  Ibid. 33  Alston, above n 30, 14–19. 34  D Josselin and W Wallace, ‘Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework’ in D Josselin and W Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001) 1, 3–4.

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an ­organisation as a NSA. Secondly, NSAs include organisations operating or participating in networks that extend across the boundaries of two or more states. Therefore, they engage in ‘transnational’ relations, linking political systems, economies and ­societies. Under this criterion, actors engaged solely at the domestic level in one state are not part of the definition, since the focus is limited to those actors with a transnational dimension. Thirdly, NSAs include organisations acting in ways that affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international relations— either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities. This is a very wide definition, and has the potential to include a diverse range of actors. [3.09]  According to the African Commission, the term ‘non-state actor’ has been adopted by the international community to refer to individuals, organisations, institutions and other bodies acting outside the state and its organs.35 Non-state actors are not limited to individuals, since some actors with the potential either to violate or to promote human rights are organisations, corporations or other structures of business and finance, as the research on the human rights impacts of oil production or the development of power facilities demonstrates.36 In this chapter, the term is used broadly to refer to all ‘actors other than states’. This includes TNCs, professional bodies, civil society groups and other NGOs. It also extends to the UN agencies, other international organisations and other relevant bodies within the UN system.37 It ­further includes international organisations concerned with trade, such as the WTO, and international financial institutions, notably the World Bank, the IMF and regional development banks.38 In addition, it applies to armed opposition groups.

III.  STATE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY NON-STATE ACTORS A.  State Obligation to Protect [3.10]  Both universal and regional human rights systems emphasise that states have a duty to protect those living within their jurisdictions from human rights violations, 35  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, 21st Activity Report 2007, annex III, para 136. 36  Ibid. See also Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60; 10 IHRR 282 (2003). 37  Examples include the WHO, the ILO, the UNDP, the FAO, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), UNESCO, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). See CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (22nd Session, 2000), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) paras 63–65; CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (29th session, 2003), UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) para 60; CESCR, General Comment 21: The Right to Social Security (43rd Session, 2009), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21 (2009) paras 75–76. 38  See W van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A Contextualised Way Forward (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2015). See, also, CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security (39th Session, 2007), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (2008) paras 82–83; CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 37, para 64.

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and this duty is also generally agreed to exist under CIL.39 Therefore the existing human rights regime rests upon the bedrock role of states to protect against violations of human rights by NSAs. It is well established that [s]tates must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.40

As shown in chapter two, according to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, each state party to the Covenant undertakes the obligation to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

[3.11]  Thus states are required by Article 2(1) to adopt legislative measures41 and/ or non-legislative measures (eg the provision of judicial or other effective remedies, administrative, financial, educational/informational campaigns and social measures) to protect ESC rights.42 Legislative measures include the adoption of legislation to provide jurisdiction to national courts to hear cases with a view to holding NSAs accountable under national law for violations of international law, eg the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), also known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),43 or the Dutch Civil and Criminal Codes,44 and also the duty to reform, amend and repeal legislation manifestly inconsistent with the progressive realisation of ESC rights.45 It is essential to revise existing laws in order to protect individuals and groups against human rights violations by NSAs. One example is the amended UK Companies Act, which requires directors to ‘have regard’ to such matters as ‘the impact of the company’s operations

39  See generally J Ruggie, ‘State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations Core Human Rights Treaties: An Overview of Treaty Body Commentaries’, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 (13 February 2007). 40 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, Principle 1. 41  See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), para 3; CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 37, para 56: ‘States should consider adopting a framework law to operationalise their right to health national strategy.’ 42  CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 41, paras 5 and 7. 43  28 USC § 1350. This 1789 statute allows foreign plaintiffs, referred to as ‘aliens’, to bring any civil action for torts only, committed in violation of the ‘law of nations’ (CIL), eg violation of freedom from ­slavery and forced labour (John Doe I, et al, v UNOCAL Corp, et al, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir 2002)). The ATS provides that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’. For d ­ is­cussion, see S Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford, Hart ­Publishing, 2004) ch 2. See also Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884–87 (2d Cir 1980); Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004); Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 133 SCt 1659 (2013); Suhail Najim Abdullah Al Shimari and Others v Caci Premier Technology Inc; Caci International Inc, US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, No 13-1937, 30 June 2014, available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/usca4_CACI_06302014.pdf. 44  Burgerlijk Wetboek [Dutch Civil Code], Art 6:162; Wetboek van Strafrecht [Dutch Criminal Code], Art 51; Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Arrondisse mentsrechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague], 30 January 2013, Case no C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580 (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854). 45 See eg CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cyprus, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.28 (4 December 1998) para 26.

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on the community and the environment’.46 In addition, states must repeal laws used by NSAs to discriminate against individuals and groups in the enjoyment of ESC rights. In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia,47 the African Commission found the Lunatics Detention Act of the Gambia incompatible with several provisions of the ACHPR48 because it failed, inter alia, to ‘meet standards of anti-discrimination and equal protection of the law’.49 The Commission strongly urged the Government of the Gambia to repeal the Act and replace it with a new legislative regime for mental health compatible with the ACHPR. [3.12]  The state obligation to protect requires states to take measures to prevent NSAs (third or private actors/parties)50—individuals, groups, corporations and other ­entities, as well as agents acting under their authority51—from interfering with ESC rights. Such measures include, for example, the adoption of legislation or other nonlegislative measures to ensure that NSAs, including all business enterprises domiciled in a state’s territory and/or jurisdiction, respect all human rights, including ESC rights, throughout their operations. For example, to protect workers, including (women) migrant domestic workers, recruited or placed by private employment agencies, against abusive and fraudulent practices;52 to protect women against (domestic) violence, discriminatory labour practices, sexual exploitation, trafficking and harmful ‘traditional’ practices; to ensure that NSAs do not engage in the marketing and dumping of hazardous or dangerous products;53 to regulate the marketing, advertisement and promotion of unhealthy foods to the population, especially children, by NSAs, to reduce the visibility of unhealthy foods, and to increase the visibility of healthier options by, for instance, requiring supermarkets to place fruits and vegetables in more accessible and visible places;54 to protect pupils in (privately managed) schools against sexual abuse by teachers,55 and to protect against the use of inhuman or degrading 46  See Companies Act 2006, which came into effect 1 October 2007, s 172(1)(d) of which provides that ‘[a] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to … (d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment’. 47  Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, Communication no 241/2001, 16th Annual Activity Report, (2003) AHRLR 96. 48  21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986, Arts 2, 3, 5, 7(1)(a) and (c), 13(1), 16 and 18(4). 49  Communication no 241/2001, above n 47, para 54. 50 See X and Y v Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A, No 91, (1986) 8 EHRR 235; Hatton and Others v UK, App no 36022/97, judgment of Grand Chamber of 8 July 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 611, para 98 (ECtHR); Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C, No 4 (IACtHR), holding that a State has a positive duty to prevent human rights violations occurring in the territory subject to its effective control, even if such violations are carried out by third parties; Union des Jeunes Avocats v Chad, Communication no 74/92, 9th Annual Activity Report 1995, (2000) AHRLR 66 (African Commission). 51  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 37, para 23. 52 See ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No 189), entered into force 5 September 2013, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189, Art 15. 53  A Eide, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concepts and Standards, (Aldershot, UNESCO Publishing, 2000) 127. 54 A Grover, ‘Unhealthy Foods, Non-Communicable Diseases and the Right to Health’, UN Doc A/HRC/26/31 (1 April 2014) para 64(f). 55  O’Keeffe v Ireland, App no 35810/09 (Grand Chamber ECtHR, 28 January 2014). The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found, by 11:6, that the Irish state had failed to meet its obligation to protect a schoolgirl, Ms O’Keeffe, aged 9, from the sexual abuse to which she had been subjected by the school principal, a lay teacher, in 1973 whilst a pupil in Dunderrow National School, a state-funded primary school privately owned by the Catholic Diocese of Cork and managed by a priest on behalf of an Archdeacon.

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disciplinary measures, such as corporal punishment or public humiliation, in p ­ rivate schools so as to protect the child’s dignity and right to education.56 In addition, states must protect against the illegal exploitation of natural resources (eg control of most of the mining areas, illegally trading and smuggling minerals such as gold and ­diamonds)57 by NSAs, since such exploitation reduces the resources at the disposal of the state to enable it to fulfil its ESC rights obligations, and thus has a negative impact on rights holders. [3.13]  The obligation to protect, therefore, generally entails the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay of laws, regulations and other measures, so that individuals and groups will be able freely to realise their rights and freedoms. This demands that the state protect against harmful activities carried out by NSAs and prevent human rights violations by NSAs, through creating and implementing the necessary policy, legislative, regulatory, judicial, inspection and enforcement frameworks. For example, where areas involving state obligations with respect to ESC rights (eg social security schemes, health and education systems) are operated or controlled by NSAs, states parties to the ICESCR retain the r­ esponsibility for administering the relevant national system and ensuring that private actors do not compromise equal, adequate, affordable and accessible social security, health and education systems.58 To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system must be instituted—one that includes independent monitoring, genuine public participation and the imposition of penalties for non-compliance.59 In Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy,60 the ECtHR stated that the Article 2 of the ECHR, which protects the right to life,61 ‘enjoins the State not only to refrain from the “intentional” taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.62

56  CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999), para 41: ‘[C]orporal punishment is inconsistent with … the dignity of the individual. … A State Party is required to take measures to ensure that discipline which is inconsistent with the Covenant does not occur in any public or private educational institution within its jurisdiction.’ See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.55 (7 June 1996) para 18, where the Committee expressed ‘its concern at the acceptance in the legislation of the use of corporal punishment in school, as well as within the family. It stresses the incompatibility of corporal punishment, as well as any other form of violence, injury, neglect, abuse or degrading treatment, with the provisions of the Convention.’ See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Guyana, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.224 (30 January 2004) paras 31–32; India, UN Doc CRC/C/5/Add.228 (30 January 2004) paras 44–45; Indonesia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.223 (30 January 2004) paras 43–44; Japan, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.231 (30 January 2004) paras 35–36; Papua New Guinea, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.229 (30 January 2004) paras 37–38; Campbell and Cosans v UK, judgment of 25 February 1982, Series A, No 48, (1982) 4 EHRR 293 (ECtHR). See also CRC, Art 28(2); CRC Committee, General Comment 8: The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (42nd Session, 2006), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/8 (21 August 2006) paras 16–29; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc CAB/ LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999, Art 11(5). 57  Y Weyns et al, Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic (Antwerp, International Peace Information Service, 2014) 28 and 33. 58  On social security, health and education, see chapters 8, 9 and 10, respect­ively. 59  See eg CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 38, para 46. 60  Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, App no 32967/96 (ECtHR, 17 January 2002). 61 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, 213 UNTS 222, Art 2(1) provides: ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’ 62  Calvelli and Ciglio, above n 60, para 48.

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­ ccording to the Court, this obligation applies to both public and private health proA fessionals, and requires [s]tates to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable … In the specific sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision, to be obtained. Disciplinary measures may also be envisaged.63

[3.14]  With respect to the right to work, under Article 6(1) of the ICESCR, states parties recognise the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.

To this end, the CESCR has noted: Obligations to protect the right to work include, inter alia, the duties of States parties to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to work and training and to ensure that privatisation measures do not undermine workers’ rights. Specific measures to increase the flexibility of labour markets must not render work less stable or reduce the social protection of the worker. The obligation to protect the right to work includes the responsibility of States parties to prohibit forced or compulsory labour by non-State actors.64

[3.15]  It follows that a state’s ‘failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to work of others’ amounts to a violation of the right to work.65 For example, the failure to protect workers against unlawful dismissal, or against being subjected to forced or compulsory labour, slavery or servitude by NSAs, would be a clear violation of a state’s positive obligation to protect, as held by the ECtHR in the case of Siliadin v France.66 Similarly, a state’s failure to protect employees from dismissal by NSAs on prohibited grounds, such as on account of health status like HIV-positive/AIDS infection, amounts to a violation of the right to work, as well as of the rights to respect for private life and the prohibition of discrimination.67

63 

Ibid, paras 49 and 51. CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work, adopted on 24 November 2005, UN Doc E/C.12/ GC/18 (6 February 2006) para 25. Under Art 2 of the International Labour Convention (No 29) C ­ on­cerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (adopted on 28 June 1930 by the General Conference of the ILO at its 14th Session, Geneva, Switzerland, entered into force 1 May 1932), the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ is defined to mean ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’. 65  CESCR, above n 64, para 35. 66  Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01 (judgment of 26 July 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 16. 67 See IB v Greece, App no 552/10 (ECtHR, 3 October 2013). See also Kiyutin v Russia, App no 2700/10 (ECtHR, 10 March 2011). 64 

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[3.16]  In Siliadin v France, the ECtHR considered the issue of whether France had fulfilled its positive obligations to effectively protect Siliadin (the applicant) against forced labour or servitude, as required by Article 4 of the ECHR.68 The applicant, a Togolese national, Ms Siliadin, who was an adolescent girl and a minor (less than 16 years old) at the ­relevant time, had worked for years for Mr and Mrs B for almost 15 hours a day, seven days a week, without respite, against her will and without being paid. The applicant was unlawfully present in a foreign country and was afraid of being arrested by the police. She was entirely at Mr and Mrs B’s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred. In these circumstances, the Court considered that Ms Siliadin had, at the least, been subjected to forced labour and had been held in servitude (ie obliged to provide services under coercion) within the meaning of Article 4 of the ECHR at a time when she was a minor. The Court considered that the criminal legislation in force at the material time had not afforded the applicant specific and effective protection against the actions of which she had been a victim. [3.17]  In paragraph 112 of the judgment, the Court noted in accordance with contemporary norms and trends in this field, the member States’ positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penalisation and effective prosecution of any act aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation [slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour].

It emphasised (in paragraphs 121 and 148) that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably required greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies. Consequently, the Court concluded that France had not fulfilled its positive obligations under Article 4. This decision marks the first recognition by the ECtHR that Article 4 of the ECHR, concerning slavery, servitude and forced labour, imposes positive obligations on states to protect individuals from being subjected to forced labour by NSAs.69 [3.18]  Perhaps one of the most controversial decisions on state responsibility for human rights violations by NSAs is the case decided by the African Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe.70 Amongst other things, the Commission decision addressed the responsibility of Zimbabwe for the violations of human rights committed by the ruling political party, ZANU (PF), and other militia. The Commission absolved Zimbabwe from responsibility for human rights violations

68  Art 4 provides: ‘(1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. (2) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.’ 69  See also H Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 585, 592, stating that ‘Siliadin v France presents Council of Europe Member States with a challenge to adopt clearer and stronger laws to criminalise trafficking for forced labour. This is despite the fact that only one Member State has yet ratified the Council of Europe’s new convention on people trafficking. They will be expected, in order to fulfil their positive ­obligations under Article 4, to establish adequate and clear criminal offences in relation to forced labour prac­tices, slavery and servitude, and to impose appropriate sentences, especially where children are involved.’ 70  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, annex III, 21st Annual Activity Report, 54, (2006) AHRLR 128. For a commentary, see C Beyani, ‘Recent Developments in the African Human Rights System 2004–2006’ (2007) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review 582, 604–08.

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committed by ZANU (PF) and its associated militia, on the ground that they were ‘non-state actors’.71 The Commission drew a thin line of distinction between the ruling party, ZANU (PF) as a NSA, and the Zimbabwean Government. In its opinion, ZANU (PF) was a political party in Zimbabwe, just like any other party in the ­country, which was distinct from the Government. According to the Commission: It [ZANU (PF)] has an independent identity from the government with its own structures and administrative machinery, even though some of the members of the Zimbabwe ­Government—cabinet ministers, also hold ranking positions in the party. For example, ­President Robert Mugabe is the President and First Secretary General of the Party.72

[3.19]  The Commission’s manner of attribution of responsibility under the special regime of human rights law is open to question. While purporting to apply the decision of the IACtHR in Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras,73 in which that Court held that a state fails to comply with its duty to protect human rights when it allows private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights, the African Commission adopted an elastic view of the effect of that decision.74 The Commission reasoned that what would otherwise be wholly private conduct is transformed into a constructive act of a state if there is a lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or respond to it as required by the A ­ frican ­Charter. On this faulty premise, the Commission concluded that the complainant had not ­demonstrated collusion by the Zimbabwean state either to aid or to abet the NSAs in committing violations of human rights, and equally had failed to show that Z ­ imbabwe remained indifferent to the violence that took place. Consequently, the Commission failed to find that Zimbabwe had not fulfilled its obligations within ­Article 1 of the African Charter. The correct interpretation of the findings of the IACtHR in Velásquez Rodríguez, however, is that the responsibility of the state for human rights is engaged when there is failure to prevent violations by NSAs where the possibility of such violation is reasonably foreseeable.75 Transformation of private conduct into a constructive act of the state is not the point, and the search for evidence of collusion was ­unnecessary.76 The possibility of violations of human rights was clearly reasonably foreseeable in the aftermath of the referendum, and violence did indeed break out in Zimbabwe. It was not disputed that such violations had taken place. Instead, the dispute centred on the attribution of such responsibility. The Commission ignored its own resolution condemning Zimbabwe for violating human rights under the Charter with impunity,77 and it gave no weight at the merits stage to the statement it had made when deciding the admissibility of the complaint. The requirement for c­ ollusion before holding a state responsible for human rights violations by NSAs is likely to

71 

Communication no 245/2002, above n 70, para 136. Ibid, para 138. 73  IACtHR, Series C No 4 (1988). 74  Beyani, above n 70, 606. 75  On this issue in the context of the ECHR, see Akkoç v Turkey, App nos 22947/93 and 22948/93, (2000) 34 EHRR 1173. 76  Beyani, above n 70, 606. 77 See Resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe adopted by the African Commission ­during its 38th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, the Gambia, 21 November–5 December 2005, annex III, 20th Activity Report, 101. 72 

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undermine the effectiveness of a state-centred approach to protect individuals and groups within a state’s jurisdiction against human rights violations, whether emanating from the state or from other actors. [3.20]  In practice, various factors limit the effectiveness of a state-centred approach to protect against human rights violations by NSAs, without holding NSAs directly liable for human rights violations. First, states, especially developing states where ­governance challenges are greatest, or states that have just emerged from or are still in conflict, as well as states where the rule of law is weak and levels of corruption high, may lack the institutional capacity to enforce national laws and regulations against NSAs, eg TNCs doing business in their territory, even when the will is there.78 ­Secondly, developing states may be reluctant to take the (costly) measures necessary to ensure human rights compliance by NSAs, in order to compete internationally for investment from NSAs.79 To attract foreign investment, host states offer investor protections through bilateral investment treaties and host government agreements, in which they usually undertake to treat investors fairly, equitably and without discrimination, and to make no unilateral changes to investment conditions.80 Some bilateral agreements promise to ‘freeze’ the existing regulatory regime for the project’s duration, which can be 50 years for major infrastructure and extractive industries projects.81 These agreements are treated as ‘commercial agreements’ and disputes arising are generally treated as ‘commercial disputes’ in which human rights play little, if any, role.82 Thirdly, home states of TNCs may be reluctant to regulate against extraterritorial harm by these corporations because the permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial effect remains poorly understood, or out of concern that those corporations might lose investment opportunities or relocate their headquarters.83 B.  Protection Against Discrimination [3.21]  As noted in chapter two, the principle of non-discrimination is at the core of international human rights law. Protection against human rights violations by NSAs is essential in the area of discrimination, since the elimination of discrimination is fun­da­mental to the universal enjoyment of human rights, including ESC rights, on a basis of equality. Some human rights treaties require states specifically to combat discrimination by NSAs, by prohibiting discrimination as regards specific groups (eg ­discrimination on the basis of race and discrimination against women) by ‘any persons, group or organisation’84 or by any ‘enterprise’85 (including acts of national

78 J Ruggie, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 February 2006), para 27. 79  J Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 14. 80  Ibid, para 34. 81  Ibid, para 35. 82  Ibid, para 37. 83  Ibid, para 14. 84  See ICERD, Art 2(1)(d). 85  CEDAW, Art 2(e).

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c­orporations operating extraterritorially)86 and within specific contexts, such as ‘bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit’.87 This includes state responsibility ‘for private acts if they [NSAs] fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights’ or to investigate and punish acts involving human rights violations by NSAs, and for providing compensation.88 Thus, states are obliged to ensure that NSAs do not engage in discrimination. For example, the appropriate measures that states parties are obliged to take to protect women against discrimination include ‘the regulation of the activities of private actors with regard to education, employment and health policies and practices, working conditions and work standards, and other areas in which private actors provide services or facilities, such as banking and housing’.89 [3.22]  It is important to recall that Article 2(2) of the ICESCR prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, among other grounds.90 As observed in chapter two, ­discrimination includes ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination’ and which has the ‘intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing’, of human rights. Between individuals or groups of individuals, made on the basis of any of the p ­ rohibited grounds,91 ‘unless the distinction is based on objective criteria’.92 Therefore, discrimination might arise when ‘States treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification’.93 A distinction will not be based on an objective and reasonable justification if it does not p ­ ursue a ‘­legitimate aim’, or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.94 Discrimination might also occur ‘when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat d ­ ifferently persons whose situations are significantly different’.95 Similarly, there might be discrimination 86  CEDAW, General Recommendation 28: Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 (16 December 2010) para 36. 87  Ibid, Art 13(b). 88  CEDAW, General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, UN Doc A/47/38 (1992), para 9. 89  CEDAW, General Recommendation 28, above n 86, para 13. 90  ICESCR, Art 2(2) provides: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ 91  See CESCR, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009), para 7; Discrimination also includes incitement to discriminate and harassment. See also CESCR, General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc E/1995/22 at 19 (1995), para 15; CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005), para 11. 92  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1 Add.67 (30 August 2001) para 39. The Committee requested ‘the State party to take note of its position that the principle of non-discrimination, as laid down in article 2(2) of the Covenant, is an absolute principle and can be subject to no exception, unless the distinction is based on objective criteria’. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Croatia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.73 (30 November 2001), para 11. 93  Thlimmenos v Greece, App no 34369/97, judgment of 6 April 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 411, para 44. 94  Koua Poirrez v France, App no 40892/98 [2003] ECHR 459, para 46; Gaygusuz v Austria, App no 17371/90, [1996] ECHR 36, para 42. 95  Thlimmenos v Greece, App no 34369/97, judgment of 6 April 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 411, para 44.

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as a result of a state’s failure to monitor and regulate the conduct of NSAs to ensure that they do not discriminate in the field of ESC rights. For example, where a state fails to ensure that NSAs do not treat persons in analogous situations differently without providing an objective and reasonable justification, and where a state does not ensure that NSAs, without an objective and reasonable justification, do not fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different. [3.23]  Significantly, as noted in chapter two, the principle of non-discrimination mentioned in Article 2(2) of the Covenant is immediately applicable and is neither subject to progressive implementation nor dependent on available resources.96 It is reinforced by Article 3 of the ICESCR, which provides for the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of the ESC rights it articulates.97 This provision is founded on ­Article 1(3) of the UN Charter98 and on Article 2 of the UDHR.99 In relation to NSAs, the CESCR noted in its General Comment 16: 19.  The obligation to protect requires States parties to take steps aimed directly towards the elimination of prejudices, customary and all other practices that perpetuate the notion of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, and stereotyped roles for men and women. States parties’ obligation to protect under Article 3 of the ICESCR includes inter alia, the respect and adoption of constitutional and legislative provisions on the equal right of men and women to enjoy all human rights and the prohibition of discrimination of any kind; the adoption of legislation to eliminate discrimination and to prevent third parties from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of this right; the adoption of administrative measures and programmes, as well as the establishment of public institutions, agencies and programmes to protect women against discrimination. 20. States parties have an obligation to monitor and regulate the conduct of non-state actors to ensure that they do not violate the equal right of men and women to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights. This obligation applies, for example, in cases where public services have been partially or fully privatised.100

[3.24]  It is thus clear that while only states are parties to international human rights instruments protecting ESC rights, and only states are held accountable for compliance with these instruments, states are nevertheless required to consider regulating the responsibility resting on NSAs to respect ESC rights.101 A state’s failure, for ­example, to prohibit racial discrimination in the admission of students to private educational institutions would be a clear violation of the obligation to protect the right to ­education.102 Similarly, a state’s failure to ensure that private health professionals and private healthcare facilities comply with relevant national and international 96 

CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 91, para 33. Art 3: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.’ 98  Above n 14. 99  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810, 71 (1948). 100  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 91, paras 19 and 20 (emphasis added). 101  See, eg CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or she is the Author, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006), para 55. 102  See ICERD, Arts 5(e)(v) and 2(1)(d). Art 2(1) (d) provides: ‘Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization’. 97  ICESCR,

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human rights standards on healthcare (eg a failure to ensure that private health service ­providers/institutions do not discriminate against women) is a clear violation of the right to health.103 As correctly noted by the CEDAW Committee: [T]he State is directly responsible for the action of private institutions when it outsources its medical services and that, furthermore, the State always maintains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions. In line with article 2 (e) of the Convention [CEDAW], the State party has a due diligence obligation to take measures to ensure that the activities of private actors in regard to health policies and practices are appropriate.104

Nevertheless, the IACtHR may have moved away from the traditional view when it recognised that the right to non-discrimination ‘gives rise to effects with regard to third parties’, including in private employment relationships, ‘under which the employer must respect the human rights of his workers’.105 C.  Global Actors/Institutions [3.25]  The main international institutions that form the backbone of the current international economic system, and which have had an impact on ESC rights, are the IMF,106 the World Bank107 and the WTO.108 It is noteworthy that ‘[t]oday the IMF and World Bank lend exclusively to developing and emerging economies. Furthermore, their loans are linked to [externally imposed] conditions that increasingly impinge on the domestic policies of the state’.109 Similarly, the unfair trade rules and policies of 103  Maria de Lourdes da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, Communication no 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/ C/49/D/17/2008 (27 September 2011). 104  Ibid, para 7.5. 105 IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18, 17 Sep­tember 2003, paras 100 and 146. 106  For an introduction to the IMF, see IMF at http://www.imf.org/external/; E Riesenhuber, The International Monetary Fund under Constraint: Legitimacy of its Crisis Management (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001) 3–73. See also F Gianviti, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund’ in P Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 113. 107  The ‘World Bank Group’ consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) created in 1946; the International Finance Corporation (IFC) established in 1956; the I­ nternational Development Association (IDA) created in 1960; the International Centre for Settlement of Investment ­Disputes (ICSID) operational in 1966; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 1988. For an overview of these institutions, see The World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org/; I Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, vol I (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) 7–15; I ­Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, vol III(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); DL Clark, ‘The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 205; K Marshall, The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity (London, Routledge, 2006); W van Genugten, The World Bank Group, the IMF and Human Rights: A Contextualised Way Forward (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2015). 108 See C Dommen, ‘Raising Human Rights Concerns in the WTO: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 1; G Loibl, ‘International Economic Law’ in M Evans (ed), ­International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 689; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner, ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights’ E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (27 June 2001). For overview of the WTO, see B Hoekman and M Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); J Wouters and B De Meester, The World Trade Organisation: A Legal and Institutional Analysis (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2007); P Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); S Lester, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008). 109 UNDP, Human Development Report (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 114.

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the WTO (such as dumping of products of interest to African states, such as ­cotton; lack of duty-free, quota-free access to markets in rich states for least-developed­ ­countries; overly complex rules of origin; and non-tariff barriers) impede the capacity of developing states to raise resources from trade to invest in ESC rights.110 With respect to such global actors, it has been observed: States determine the policies of some global actors, including the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. When determining the policies of such global actors, a State must conform to its international human rights duties and must be respectful of other States’ international human rights obligations. How a State discharges its duties when determining the policies of global actors must be subject to monitoring and accountability procedures as outlined in the preceding section.111

[3.26]  Therefore, influential states parties to human rights treaties, as members of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, are obliged to do all that they can ‘to ensure that the policies and decisions of those organisations are in conformity with the obligations of states parties under the Covenant [ICESCR]’.112 This may be achieved by, for example, voting against policies such as Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to be implemented by states seeking IMF/World Bank loans, where such policies fail adequately to integrate ESC rights and make provision for adequate social safety nets (SSNs) or human rights impact assessments. As a matter of law, a state’s failure to take into account its human rights obligations when entering into agreements with NSAs would amount to a violation of the obligation to respect human rights. To this end, the CESCR noted, with respect to the right to work, that: The failure of States parties to take into account their legal obligations regarding the right to work when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States, international organisations and other entities, such as multinational entities, constitutes a violation of their obligation to respect the right to work.113

[3.27]  Similarly, when states are dealing with NSAs, the obligation to protect demands that states take into account their domestic and international human rights obligations in all their activities with NSAs (including global actors such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO) to ensure that the ESC rights, in particular, of the most vulnerable, disadvantaged and marginalised groups of society, are not undermined.114 110 Oxfam, Africa and the Doha Round: Fighting to Keep Development Alive (Oxfam Briefing Paper, November 2005), available at http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africa-and-the-doha-roundfighting-to-keep-development-alive-114077. 111 OHCHR, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (10 September 2002) para 244, available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/povertyreductionguidelines.html. 112 See the Concluding Observations of the CESCR: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 26; Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (5 June 2002) para 37; Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.43 (23 May 2000) para 20; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) para 31; Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) para 31; Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add. 67 (24 September 2001) para 37. 113  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 91, para 33. 114  The CESCR has affirmed this position in several of its Concluding Observations. See, eg, Colombia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.74 (30 November 2001) para 29; Ecuador, UN Doc UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.100 (7 June 2004) para 53; Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000) para 28; Morocco, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.55 (1 December 2000) para 38; Honduras, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.57 (21 May 2001) paras 30 and 34; Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.63 (24 September 2001) para 29.

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In a highly indebted state, this would mean that the state must give priority to the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil its international human rights obligations over the obligations relating to membership and agreements with the IMF and the World Bank.115 It follows, therefore, that it is legitimate, for example, for a debtor state to ‘integrate fully human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’,116 or to refuse to implement loans and credit conditions that conflict with its international human rights obligations assumed under the UN Charter and international human rights treaties, if this is necessary to ensure that its human rights obligations are duly protected.117 However, in practice the need for financial resources (in the least-developed states) could outweigh human rights considerations, which limits the practical effectiveness of this approach. [3.28]  In order to ensure that human rights issues are integrated into the policies of global NSAs, there is a need for more concerted engagement with such actors. It is essential to ensure that there is greater complementarity between the basic tenets of international economic law and international human rights law, while also combating some of the recent theorising that seeks to privilege trade law.118 In addition, it is necessary to re-engage in a dialogue with the member states of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, who, in the final analysis, will be vital to a determination of the extent to which the policies and decisions of these global actors are in conformity with the human rights obligations of states parties.119 D.  Remedies Against Violations by Non-state Actors [3.29]  When violations of human rights by NSAs occur, the state must not acquiesce to, or grant amnesty for, such violations. The state is obliged to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence120 to prevent, punish and investigate the harm caused by NSAs,121 and, where appropriate, to provide access to effective and ­transparent 115  This conclusion can be drawn from the recommendations of the CESCR. See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005) para 36; Concluding Observations: ­Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 September 2001) para 60. 116  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Senegal, above n 115, para 50. 117  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zambia, above n 115, para 36. 118 See, eg, E Petersmann, ‘Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human Rights Law into the Law of Worldwide Organization: Lessons from European Integration’ (2002) 13(3) ­European Journal of International Law 621. For a response to Petersmann, see P Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13(4) European Journal of ­Inter­national Law 815. See also L Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Co-existence?­’ (2004) 22(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 167, and the references cited below in n 258. 119 See, eg, CESCR: Concluding Observations, United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 26; Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) para 31; France, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.72 (30 November 2001) para 32; Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.67 (24 September 2001) para 37; ­Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000) para 31. 120  Due diligence has been defined as ‘the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or discharge an obligation’. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn (St Paul, MN, West/Thomson, 2004) 488. 121 See, eg, R McCorquodale and R La Forgia, ‘Taking off the Blindfolds: Torture by Non-State Actors’ (2001) 1(2) Human Rights Law Review 189, 217; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.100 (7 June 2004) para 35. The Committee strongly urged ‘the State party to ­implement legislative and administrative measures to avoid violations of environmental laws and rights by

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judicial or other appropriate remedies at the national level to any ­person or group who is a victim of a violation of any ESC rights by NSAs. All victims of human rights violations by NSAs should be entitled to appropriate, timely and effective remedies that are enforced—not merely charity or philanthropy—such as adequate reparation, which may, inter alia, take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantee of non-repetition, changes in relevant law and public apologies. In ­Zimbabwe NGO Forum v Zimbabwe,122 the African Commission considered the offer of ­clemency made by the Zimbabwean Government to the ZANU (PF) and other militia for ‘­politically motivated’ offences committed between January and July 2000. The ­Commission held that by pardoning ‘every person liable for any politically motivated crime’, the Clemency Order had effectively prevented the complainant or any other person from bringing criminal proceedings against persons who could have committed the acts of violence during the period in question, and the complainant had been denied access to local remedies.123 Thus the Commission held that this act of the state ‘did not only prevent victims from seeking redress, but also encouraged impunity, and thus [­Zimbabwe] reneged on its obligation[s] in violation of Articles 1 and 7(1) of the African Charter’.124 It is therefore clear that since blanket amnesties for human rights violations encourage impunity, states should refrain from grant of such amnesties to NSAs for human rights violations. [3.30]  In its Concluding Observations on state reports, the CESCR has urged states to protect against human rights violations by NSAs. Some few examples are cited below for illustrative purposes. In 2001 the CESCR strongly urged Honduras to adopt and implement legislative and ‘other measures’ to protect workers from the occupational health hazards resulting from the use of toxic substances, such as pesticides in the banana-growing sector and cyanide in gold-mining industries.125 Similarly, in 1997, the CESCR was alarmed at reports that the economic rights of indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation were being exploited with impunity by oil and gas ­companies, which signed agreements in circumstances that were clearly illegal, and that the state party had not taken adequate steps to protect the indigenous peoples from such exploitation.126 The Committee recommended to the Russian Federation that ‘action be taken to protect the indigenous peoples from exploitation by oil and t­ ransnational companies’. See also Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (­Maastricht, 22–26 January 1997), reproduced in (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691, para 18; RP ­Barnidge, ‘The Due Diligence Principle under International Law’ (2006) 8(1) International Community Law Review 81. 122  Zimbabwe NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, annex III, 21st Annual Activity Report, 54, (2006) AHRLR 128. 123 See the Commission’s previous jurisprudence on amnesties: Communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 and 196/97, Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Diop et al, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des Veuves et Ayants Droit, Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania, annex V, 13th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 11 May 2000, AHG/222 (XXXVI), 138; 8 IHRR 268 (2001). 124  Zimbabwe NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, above n 122, para 215. Art 1 of the ACHPR obliges states ­parties to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights protected in the Charter, while Art 7(1) guarantees every individual the right to a fair trial. 125  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Hondurus, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.57 (21 May 2001) paras 24 and 38. 126  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.13 (20 May 1997) para 14.

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gas ­companies’.127 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, following privatisation, employers arbitrarily dismissed employees, or failed to pay employees’ salaries or social security contributions in a timely manner.128 The CESCR Committee recommended that ‘the State party takes effective measures to ensure that [private] employers respect their contractual obligations towards their employees, namely by refraining from arbitrarily dismissing them or by paying their salaries or social security contributions on time’.129 [3.31]  However, states where human rights protection is most needed are often those least able to enforce that protection against NSAs such as TNCs, which possess much desired investment capital or technology, and which wield unprecedented power and influence in local and global markets and domestic and international affairs.130 As noted above, the scale of NSA power is illustrated by the fact that by 2009 there were some 82,000 parent company TNCs controlling around 810,000 foreign affiliates and millions of suppliers.131 For the fiscal year ended 31 January 2015, the sale of the world’s biggest company, Wal-Mart, for $485.7 billion, made it larger than the economies of all but the world’s 30 richest nations.132 Given the current limitations of state power with respect to NSAs, what is presently required is to secure broad agreement among NSAs as to their human rights responsibility and the effect­ive implementation of norms applicable to NSAs,133 so that they are directly accountable to human rights standards for their actions that impact on human rights, particularly those of ­vulnerable groups, such as women.134 Non-state actors should not be complicit in human rights abuses. Such complicity could arise in several ways: (i) where an NSA has knowingly funded, supported (actively, openly and deliberately) or benefited from human rights abuse; (ii) where an NSA complies with national laws and policies that are manifestly in violation of international human rights;135 or (iii) where an NSA has been a silent witness of systematic human rights abuse committed by a ­government or o ­ thers.136 Establishing an effective framework acknowledging the 127 

Ibid, para 30. CESCR, Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc E/C.12/BHI/CO/1 (24 January 2006) para 15. 129  Ibid, para 36. 130 P Redmond, ‘Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and Com­pliance’ (2003) 37(1) The International Lawyer 69; P Macklem, ‘Corporate Accountability under Inter­ ­ national Law: The Misguided Quest for Universal jurisdiction’ (2005) 7(4) International Law Forum 281. 131 UNCTAD, World Development Report 2009, above n 10, 17. 132 See Walmart, ‘Walmart Announces Q4 Underlying1 EPS of $1.61 and Additional Strategic Investments in People & E-Commerce’, at https://a248.e.akamai.net/f/121/1/1/phx.corporate-ir.net/ ­ media_files/IROL/11/112761/4Q15/Q4FY15_earnings_release_final.pdf. If Walmart were a country, its sales would rank it 28th in the world in GDP. That’s right behind Norway and ahead of Austria. 133  Commission on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). 134  R McCorquodale, ‘Women, Development and Corporate Responsibility’ in S Rees and S Wright (eds), Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility: A Dialogue (Sydney, Pluto Press, 2000) 174; J ­Oloka-Onyango, ‘Who’s Watching “Big Brother”? Globalization and the Protection of Cultural Rights in Present Day Africa’ (2005) 4 Human Rights Quarterly 1245. 135  See, eg, Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Race to the Bottom’: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship, 10 August 2006, HRW Index No C1808, 30-72, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ china0806/. 136  See I Khan, ‘Understanding Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion Beyond Existing Laws’, Business Human Rights Seminar, London: 8 December 2005, Amnesty International Index: POL34/001/ 2006 (21 March 2006), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol34/001/2006/en/. 128 

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human rights responsibilities of NSAs remains a challenge. One of the main problems in such arrangements is the question of to whom the NSAs will be responsible and accountable in respect of ESC rights, which is now addressed in section IV. below.

IV.  DIRECT HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES OF NON-STATE ACTORS WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS [3.32]  While there is no doubt that the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR envisage positive or negative obligations of states, and that the procedures for the implementation of the ICCPR and the ICESCR envisage actions only against states, it is obvious that NSAs—groups or persons—can also act in violation of the human rights of other persons enumerated in the above instruments.137 As noted above, this is particularly true in the case of ESC rights, given the general marginalisation of this category of rights. For example, many companies operating in South Africa during the apartheid era not only followed the discriminatory laws of that time, but some of them also aided and abetted the South African Government’s policies—by providing technology, infrastructure and other means to implement its policies.138 This affected not only civil and political rights, but also ESC rights. [3.33]  As noted above, human rights law has traditionally concentrated on the actions of states. The assumption has been that it is states that have the obligations both to protect human rights and to ensure that human rights are not infringed, either by the state (or its agents) or by NSAs. But in the era of globalisation, how credible is this concentration on state action? A plethora of NSAs now act on the international stage with an enhanced potential, given their greater powers, to promote or undermine respect for human rights. But what direct human rights responsibilities, if any, do NSAs have under human rights law? A.  Responsibilities of Non-state Actors in International Human Rights Instruments [3.34]  Do international human rights instruments establish direct legal responsibilities for NSAs? There is a duty on NSAs to respect human rights, including ESC rights, and thus NSAs must be held responsible for human rights violations. The ILC A ­ rticles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts indicate that responsibility for human rights violations ‘may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’.139 The UDHR, arguably, establishes the basis of

137  See, eg, the ECtHR acknowledgement in Ireland v UK, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A, No 25, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 25, para 149, that ‘it is not called upon to take cognizance of every single aspect of the tragic situation prevailing in Northern Ireland. For example, it is not required to rule on the terrorist ­activities in the six counties of individuals or groups, activities that are in clear disregard of human rights’ (emphasis added), quoted by C Warbrick, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges (Aldershot, Dartmouth/UNESCO, 1998) 225. 138  Khan, above n 136, 6–7. 139 ILC, Final Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), Art 33(2).

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r­esponsibilities for NSAs. The Declaration’s foundational basis for human rights in the UDHR was based on the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’, which was considered to be ‘the foundation of f­ reedom, justice and peace in the world’. The recognition of every ­individual’s ­inherent dignity demands that every actor (state or non-state) must, at the very ­minimum, respect human rights. Human rights declared in the UDHR were not restricted to imposing obligations on the state. Indeed, the word ‘state’ hardly appears in the Declaration. Article 29 of the UDHR provides that everyone has ‘duties to the community’. In its preamble, the UDHR provides: [E]very individual and every organ of society … shall strive … to promote respect for these rights and … to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.

[3.35]  This statement recognises that human rights obligations apply not only to states but also to NSAs, in particular to ‘every individual’ and ‘every organ of society’. Non-state actors such as corporations can be seen as ‘organs of society’, and therefore as responsible under the UDHR to respect human rights.140 As Louis Henkin put it, ‘[e]very individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all.’141 Thus NSAs should avoid infringing the human rights of others, and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved. This requires taking adequate measures for the prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation of human rights violations a NSA may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships.142 More significantly, it implies that NSAs may shoulder more than the negative obligation engendered by human rights, since they are obliged to ‘secure’ the observance of human rights. As Barbara ­Alexander noted, ‘if the drafters of the [Universal Declaration] intended to limit the scope of who should promote and recognise human rights to public, state actors, they could have used the phrase “every State” rather than “every organ of society”’.143 [3.36]  However, the UDHR provision reproduced above simply sets a common ­standard for achievement; it does not equate to legally binding effect. Nonetheless, it is strengthened by other provisions in legally binding international human rights treaties. For example, both the ICESCR and the ICCPR expressly declare in their preambles that the individual is ‘under responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights’ recognised in the Covenants. It is important to note that the operational paragraphs in both Covenants do not address the issue of NSAs explicitly. Common Article 5(1) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR provides that the Covenants should not be interpreted as implying

140  See, eg, J Paust, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations’ (2002) 35(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 810. 141 L Henkin, ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ (1999) 25(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17, 25. 142  UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, above n 40, Principles 11 and 17(a). 143  See, eg, BC Alexander, ‘Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Developing Countries: Is there a ­Violation of the International Human Rights to Health?’ (2001) 8(3) Human Rights Brief 12, 14.

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for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights … recognised herein …

But it was not intended to establish substantive legal obligations on individuals or groups, and the treaty bodies have not interpreted it as such.144 [3.37]  While international human rights treaty obligations ‘do not … have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law’, ie they take effect as between NSAs only under domestic law,145 it is increasingly recognised that NSAs have responsibilities regarding the realisation of human rights, including ESC rights. In its interpretation of the ICESCR, the CESCR has recognised that various private actors have responsibilities in this regard. With respect to the right to health, for example, the CESCR has stated unambiguously: While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all members of society—individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society ­organisations, as well as the private business sector—have responsibilities regarding the realisation of the right to health.146

[3.38]  The implication here is twofold. First, states should provide an environment that facilitates the discharge of such human rights responsibilities of NSAs. It follows that there may be circumstances in which a failure to progressively realise ESC rights as required by Article 2(1) of the ICESCR would give rise to violations by states p ­ arties of those rights, as a result of those parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures, or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities. In Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria,147 it was alleged that the military government of Nigeria had been directly involved in oil production through the state oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), the majority shareholder in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), and that these operations had caused environmental degradation and consequent health problems to the Ogoni people. It was argued that this breached several rights guaranteed under the ACHPR.148 The African Commission observed, inter alia:149 Undoubtedly and admittedly, the government of Nigeria, through NNPC has the right to produce oil, the income from which will be used to fulfil the economic and social rights of Nigerians. But the care that should have been taken … and which would have protected the rights of the victims of the violations complained of was not taken. To exacerbate the

144  M Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd rev edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 2005) 111. 145  HRC, General Comment 31, above n 17, para 8. 146  CESCR, General Comment 14, para 42; See also CESCR, General Comment 12, para 20. See also CRC, General Comment 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (27 November 2003), para 56, which states that the state duty to respect ‘extends in practice’ beyond the state and state-controlled services and institutions to include ‘non-State services and organisations’. 147  Communication no 155/96, above n 36. 148  Specifically, alleged violations of Arts 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the ACHPR. 149  Communication no 155/96, above n 36, para 54.

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s­ ituation, the security forces of the government engaged in conduct in violation of the rights of the Ogonis by attacking, burning and destroying several Ogoni villages and homes.

The Commission concluded: [D]espite its obligation to protect persons against interferences in the enjoyment of their rights, the Government of Nigeria facilitated the destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such internationally established principles, the Nigerian Government has given the green light to private actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, its practice falls short of the minimum conduct expected of governments, and therefore, is in violation of Article 21 of the African Charter.150

[3.39]  Consequently, states must ensure that there are accessible, transparent and effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms to regulate the conduct of NSAs such as TNCs, in order to ensure compliance with human rights responsibilities.151 [3.40]  Secondly, NSAs—local, national, regional and transnational—should take into account the human rights dimension of their policies and activities. At the very ­minimum NSAs must in all situations not infringe (do no harm to) the rights of others. Soft law mechanisms such as the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of ­Principles ­Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,152 as well as the OECD Guidelines for ­Multi­national Enterprises (revised in 2011),153 proclaim that NSAs, including multinational enterprises and firms, should respect the human rights of those affected by their activities as recognised in the UDHR and the corresponding international c­ ovenants. Although various non-legally binding codes of conduct that take into account some human rights issues have been adopted by a number of TNCs (eg not to use child labour), this is only a step in a long journey towards ­accountability.154 ­Obviously v­ oluntary codes are only respected by those who choose to respect them, and too often the codes are not respected when there is a clash with ‘hard commercial interests’.155 Each NSA must do all in its power to ensure that there are no human rights violations within its sphere of influence, and that it also does not benefit from human rights abuses by other parties.156 In the context of the right to 150  Ibid, para 58. Art 21(1) of the ACHPR provides: ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.’ 151  See, eg, R Wai, ‘Transnational Lift off and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an era of Globalisation’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209. 152  Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204th Session (Geneva, November 1977), as amended at its 279th Session (Geneva, November 2000), ILO Official Bulletin, Series A, No 3 (2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf. 153  Adopted in 1976 (revised in 1979, 1984,1991, 2000 and 2011). The Guidelines are also available at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/. 154  See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Company Policy Statements on Human Rights, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/Policies. See also C McCrudden, ‘Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: The Sullivan and MacBridge Principles’ in D Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 418. 155  See N Howen, Business, Human Rights and Accountability (Copenhagen, 21 September 2005), available at http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Business_Human_Rights_and_Accountability.pdf. 156 KM Leisinger, On Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights (Basel, April 2006), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Leisinger-On-CorporateResponsibility-for-Human-Rights-Apr-2006.pdf.

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health, for ­example, pharmaceutical companies have a ‘soft law’ human rights responsibility under the multilateral corporate codes of conduct to respect developing states’ efforts to protect the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment for all, including disadvantaged individuals, communities and populations, such as children, the elderly and those living in poverty.157 However, there is no external body that sets standards for the voluntary codes, and no independent adjudicating body to assess human rights impact assessments and compliance or to award remedies in the event of non-compliance. It is therefore less surprising that Patrick Macklem has described a voluntary corporate code as ‘at best a form of public relations for powerful multinationals and at worst a misleading seal of approval affixed by those with no legitimate claim to judge these matters’.158 [3.41]  It is also vital to note that both universal and regional human rights instruments prohibit both states and NSAs from engaging in any activity aimed at the destruction of human rights. For example, Article 30 of the UDHR states that groups or persons have no right to ‘engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein’. Similarly, both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, in common Article 5(1)—using language almost identical to that of ­Article 30 of the UDHR—stipulate: Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

[3.42]  Similar provisions can be found in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man159 (Articles 29–38), the ECHR (Article 10(2)), the AmCHR160 (­Articles 13, 17 and 32) and the ACHPR (Articles 27–29). Although these provisions are widely considered as mere guidelines for the behaviour of both individuals and states, as opposed to imposing any direct accountability on NSAs,161 they are not without legal implications. At the time of writing, the jurisprudence on these provisions is scarce, but the CERD has commented that a person’s exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression carries special duties and responsibilities, specified in Article 29(2) of the UDHR, ‘among which the obligation not to disseminate racist ideas is of particular importance’.162 [3.43]  In sum, these provisions clearly apply not only to states but also to NSAs— groups and individuals. They forbid the abuse of human rights and the misuse and

157  See generally, L Ferreira, ‘Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations’ (2002) 71 Fordham Law Review 1133; Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to Medicines, annex, UN Doc A/63/263 (11 August 2008). 158  See Macklem, above n 130. 159  OAS Res XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948). 160  OAS Treaty Series No 36; 1144 UNTS 123. 161  See the study prepared for the Sub-Commission by the Special Rapporteur, Ms E-A Daes, Freedom of the Individual under Law: An Analysis of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Geneva and New York, United Nations, 1990), Human Rights Study Series No 3, para 2. 162  CERD, General Recommendation XV on Art 4 of the Convention, UN Doc HRI.1 at 68 (1994), para 4.

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exploitation of human rights instruments as a pretext for violating human rights.163 As the CESCR has observed with respect to the right to work: Private enterprises—national and multinational—while not bound by the Covenant, have a particular role to play in job creation, hiring policies and non-discriminatory access to work. They should conduct their activities on the basis of legislation, administrative measures, codes of conduct and other appropriate measures promoting respect for the right to work, agreed between the government and civil society. Such measures should recognise the labour standards elaborated by ILO and aim at increasing the awareness and responsibility of enterprises in the realisation of the right to work.164

[3.44]  Therefore, while only states are parties to the existing human rights treaties, and thus are ultimately accountable for compliance with them, all members of society (including NSAs—individuals, local communities, trade unions, civil society, private sector organisations, food and beverage industry) have responsibilities regarding the realisation of ESC rights. As a minimum, NSAs must respect the human rights obligations of states. They must, therefore, refrain from acts or omissions that violate human rights. Respecting ESC rights requires NSAs not to adopt, and to rescind policies, administrative measures and programmes that do not conform to states’ human rights obligations, including those that apply to ESC rights. For example, food and beverage industries (operated by NSAs), including supermarkets and fast food restaurants, have the responsibilities to refrain from funding and publicising biased research; to refrain from advertising unhealthy products to children, in accordance with national laws and regulations; to desist from promoting false and misleading health claims about their products; to invest in and influence healthier food choices; and to market and promote healthier options, eg by indicating nutritional information and the composition of the available foods, so that consumers can make informed dietary decisions.165 [3.45]  It should be noted that the shift in state sovereignty accompanying globalisation has meant that NSAs are increasingly getting more involved in activities that impact (directly and/or indirectly) on human rights, and have gained more power to violate them.166 Therefore, limiting human rights obligations to states alone would defeat the object and purpose of human rights, since [h]uman rights are about upholding humans and protecting individuals and groups from oppressive power primarily in the context of the communities within which they live. That oppressive power can come from any source [which may be a State or a NSA]. It does not have to be political; it can be economic, social, cultural, or any other type of power.167

163  See, eg, P Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) 105; and T Opsahl, ‘Articles 29 and 30: the Other Side’ in A Eide, G Alfredsson, G Melander, LA Rehof and A Rosas (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1992) 465. 164  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 64, para 52. 165 A Grover, ‘Unhealthy Foods, Non-Communicable Diseases and the Right to Health’, UN Doc A/HRC/26/31 (1 April 2014) paras 29–32. 166 See D Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Globalised World’ (2002) 25 Boston College ­Inter­national and Comparative Law Review 273. 167 See R McCorquodale, ‘Overlegalizing Silences: Human Rights and Non-State Actors’ (2002) 96 American Society of International Law Proceedings 384, 387.

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[3.46]  According to the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador, NSAs—in this case referring to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front—are subject to ­inter­national human rights law. In the words of the Commission, ‘[w]hen insurgents assume government powers in territories under their control, they too can be required to observe certain human rights obligations that are binding for the State under ­international human rights law’.168 As shown below, this view should extend to all other NSAs exercising powers akin to, or even greater than, those of a state, especially in the field of marginalised ESC rights.169 For example, NSAs must not ‘develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or b ­ iological ­weapons and their means of delivery’.170 The use of such weapons is not only harmful to human life and health, but also constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Similarly, NSAs must refrain from violating human rights generally. In order not to undermine the purpose of human rights treaties (protecting human dignity), they must be interpreted to apply to activities of NSAs. In this respect, it must be noted that although the CRC specifically provides that States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind …

the CRC Committee has confirmed that the Convention applies to NSAs: At this juncture, there is no international legally binding instrument on the business ­sector’s responsibilities vis-à-vis human rights. However, the Committee recognizes that duties and responsibilities to respect the rights of children extend in practice beyond the State and Statecontrolled services and institutions and apply to private actors and business enterprises. Therefore, all businesses must meet their responsibilities regarding children’s rights and States must ensure they do so. In addition, business enterprises should not undermine the States’ ability to meet their obligations towards children under the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto.171

[3.47]  However, the great majority of NSAs pay little more than lip service to ESC rights and are based in, or funded by those living in, developed states; they tend to be concerned primarily with civil and political rights. This means that most NSAs are able to violate ESC rights without being questioned.172 This is partly because of the view that ‘economic and social human rights are costly to secure’,173 or that ESC rights are non-binding ‘principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations

168 

UN Doc S/25500, annex, 20. J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in the Age of Globalisation: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18(4) A ­ merican University International Law Review 851; M Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach ­ (­Cambridge, Polity, 2002) 166; S Agbakwa, ‘Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights’ (2000) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177, 178. 170  Security Council res 2118, S/RES/2118 (2013) (27 September 2013) para 19. 171  CRC Committee, General Comment 16: State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the Business ­Sector on Children’s Rights, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/16 (17 April 2013) para 8. 172 C Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights’ (1999) 21(1) Human Rights Quarterly 56. 173  See, eg, P Harvey, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 363, 471. 169  See

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that are justiciable’.174 Such views reflect the marginalisation of vulnerable individuals and groups, who are meant to be the primary beneficiaries of this category of rights. It is vital to note that the continuing reluctance to accord ESC rights the same level of recognition and enforceability as is accorded to civil and political rights demonstrates the ‘gendered’ character of international human rights law.175 This is because it is generally girls and women as a social class and as primary care-givers who most acutely experience the violation and non-realisation of this category of rights and face several obstacles that impede them from realising their right to access justice.176 [3.48]  It is important to recall that treaties are made to be performed.177 Non-state actors, therefore, should not (as a minimum) contribute to a state’s failure to comply with a treaty obligation concerning ESC rights.178 Indeed, human rights treaties are of a special character, since such treaties are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and p ­ urpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their n ­ ationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States.179

If this object and purpose is to be meaningfully achieved, NSAs must not under­mine state efforts to comply with their human rights obligations. In order to avoid this, NSAs can undertake ‘due diligence’ when examining (i) the country contexts in which their activities take place, to highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose; (ii) the human rights impacts their own activities may have within that context— eg in the case of businesses, in their capacity as producers, service providers, employers and neighbours; (iii) whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities, such as with business partners, suppliers, state agencies and other NSAs.180 Therefore, there is a dire need for NSAs to take more seriously their human rights responsibilities with respect to ESC rights on the international, regional and domestic fronts.181 174  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observation: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 11; and UN Doc E/C/12/1/Add.19 (12 December 1997) para 10. See also V Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries, Policy Research Working Paper 3006 (World Bank, Development Research Group, 20 March 2003) 16. 175 H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (­Manchester, Man­chester University Press, 2000) 231–44; D Buss and A Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005). 176 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 33: Women’s Access to Justice, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/33 (3 August 2015); chapter 7 in this book. 177  P Reuter, Introduction to Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (London, Kegan Press, 1995) para 44. 178  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969, UKTS (1980) No 58, vol II, Art 26, providing: ‘Every treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ (Although this provision of the VCLT does not apply directly to NSAs since they are not ‘parties to it’, the object and purpose of the VCLT would be defeated if NSAs were to undermine states’ obligations to perform treaty obligations in good faith. Indeed, Art 26 of the VCLT might be seen as declaratory of CIL.) See D Harris, International Law: Cases and Materials, 6th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) ch 10; A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) ch 10. 179 IACtHR, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry in Force of the American Convention, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of 24 September 1982, para 29. See also European Commission on Human Rights, ­Austria v Italy, App no 788/60, (1961) 4 European Yearbook of Human Rights 116, 140. 180  Ruggie, above n 79, paras 57 and 81. 181  S Ruxton and R Karim, Beyond Civil Rights: Developing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the UK (Oxford, Oxfam, 2001) 1–49; C Puta-Chekwe and N Flood, ‘From Division to Integration: Economic,

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B. Responsibility of Non-state Actors Under International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law [3.49]  In situations of armed conflict, NSAs should respect the standards of ­international humanitarian law (IHL). In addition to requiring states parties to regulate NSAs, IHL contains relevant obligations that bind NSAs (eg insurgents and armed rebel groups, paramilitaries, private military contractors, organised criminal groups and vigilantes) as parties to an armed conflict. For example, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949182 and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)183 oblige ‘each party to the conflict’ to treat ‘humanely’ persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by ­sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Humane treatment includes respect for the ESC rights of affected individuals and groups. Thus prisoners of war and persons who find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals, must have access to sufficient food and potable water to keep them in good health, and to necessary clothing, adequate shelter and medical attention.184 The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)185 protects in Article 54 objects indispensable for the survival of civilians, stating: 1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

A similar provision is found in Article 14 of Protocol II.186 Protocol II specifically provides that persons deprived of their liberty for reasons relating to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained, shall, to the same extent as the local civilian population, ‘be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as

Social, and Cultural Rights as Basic Human Rights’ in I Merali and V Oosterveld (eds), Giving Meaning to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 39; and generally T Merish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Manual on Presenting Claims (New Haven, CT, Yale Law School, 2002). 182  See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31 (GC I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85, (GC II); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135 (GC III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV), 75 UNTS 287. These conventions entered into force 21 October 1950. 183  1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978. 184  GC III, Arts 20, 26, 29 and 46; GC IV, Arts 85, 89 and 127. 185  1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978. 186  Above n 183.

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regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict’.187 [3.50]  Under existing international human rights law, although NSAs cannot become parties to international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR, it must be noted that in certain circumstances, in particular where an armed group with an identifiable political structure exercises significant control over territory and its population, NSAs are obliged to respect international human rights. Gross violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law could entail individual criminal responsibility for genocide,188 war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression under international criminal law,189 including for members and leaders of non-state armed groups190 and private military contractors. For example the following serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts are war crimes as well as serious violations of ESC rights: (iv)

Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives; (ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions; (xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.191

It is clear from the foregoing that IHL seeks to protect against threats to ESC rights that occur particularly during the conduct of hostilities.192 As the world becomes increasingly internationalised, decisions, policies and ­operations of NSAs may have significant effects on the lives (and human rights) of

187 

Ibid, Art 5(1)(b). See eg Vasiliauskas v Lithuania, App no 35343/05, judgment of 20 October 2015. 189  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 280, entered into force 8 August 1945; ­Control Council Law No 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, (1946) 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council res 955, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (1998), entered into force 1 July 2002. 190  See, eg, ICC, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 Trial Chamber I’s Judgment of 14 March 2012; The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Trial Chamber II’s Judgment of 7 March 2014. 191  Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 189, Art 8(2)(b). 192  See G Giacca, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 164–228. 188 

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i­ ndividuals and groups in local communities. Some five examples—the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, TNCs and non-state armed groups—are briefly reviewed below.

V.  HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS [3.51]  It is well established that international organisations are subject to ‘general rules of international law’.193 Given that such organisations are established by states, it would be unreasonable (and absurd) to permit them to violate or contribute to ­violations of human rights obligations of states on the basis that they are not parties to human rights treaties. This would render the protection of human rights illusory. As the ECtHR has stated: The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they attribute to these organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution. It should be recalled that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective. This is particularly true for the right of access to the courts in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial.194

This section considers the human rights obligations of three international organisations: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. A.  The IMF, the World Bank and Human Rights [3.52]  Until recently, the IMF and the World Bank had shown very little interest in human rights when dealing with states, claiming that these were ‘political’ issues within a country’s domestic affairs.195 This was first clearly manifested when both the IMF and the World Bank declined the invitation from the UN Commission on Human Rights to participate in the drafting of the ICESCR.196 In its response, the IMF expressed interest in the work of the Commission on Human Rights, but stated that ‘the limits set on our activities by our Articles of Agreement do not appear to

193  Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt [1980] ICJ Rep 73, 89–90. 194  Waite and Kennedy v Germany, App no 26083/94, (2000) 30 EHRR 261, para 67. 195  For an overview of the case for and against using the World Bank to enforce and/or monitor human rights, see H Moris, ‘The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable Partnership or Mismatched ­Alliance?’ (1997) 4 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 174. 196  UN Economic and Social Council, Cooperation Between the Commission on Human Rights and the Specialised Agencies and other Organs of the United nations in the Consideration of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/534 (28 March 1951), annex, 4–5.

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cover this field of work’.197 Similarly, the World Bank also declined the invitation to participate in the elaboration of the Covenant by stating that ‘since the activities of the International Bank do not bear directly upon the work of the Commission, the Bank does not plan to send a representative to attend the Commission’s forthcoming ­meeting’.198 Likewise, in the 1960s the UN General Assembly passed a series of ­resolutions successively ‘inviting’, ‘urging’ and ‘requesting’ the World Bank to stop lending to South Africa and Portugal because of their respective apartheid and colonial policies, but the Bank insisted on its apolitical character and approved several loans in defiance of the UN resolutions.199 Thus, the Bank provided economic support and moral sanction to oppressive governments. [3.53]  Both institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—may affect the lives and rights of people through their policies, and in case of the World Bank through the projects it funds directly.200 For example, the IMF and World Bank’s requirements of structural adjustment programmes and the policy of privatisation of hitherto public enterprises (without adequate social safety nets) has, in some respects, had a negative effect on ESC rights, in particular of the disadvantaged and marginalised groups in several states.201 In 1999 the CESCR made the following observation with respect to the implementation of structural adjustment in Cameroon: The Committee notes that the Government’s economic reform programme for 1998/99, which implemented the structural adjustment programme in Cameroon approved by the ­International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Caisse française de développement, while increasing the real GDP growth rate has impacted negatively on the enjoyment of ­economic, social and cultural rights by increasing poverty and unemployment, worsening income distribution and causing the collapse of social services.202

197 

Ibid. Ibid. 199  See SA Bleicher, ‘UN v IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism’ (1970) 24 International Organisation 31. 200  See DD Bradlow and C Grossman, ‘Limited Mandate and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and IMF’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 411, 426; B Sadasivam, ‘The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human Rights Agenda’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 630, 648–49. 201 This has been noted in several Concluding Observations of the CESCR. See, eg, Algeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.71 (30 November 2001) para 9; Argentina, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.38 (8 D ­ ecember 1999) para 10; Bulgaria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.37 (8 December 1999) para 9; Cameroon, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) para 10; Colombia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.74 (30 November 2001) para 9; Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000) para 10; Honduras, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.57 (21 May 2001) para 10; Republic of Korea, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.59 (21 May 2001) para 12; Nepal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.66 (24 September 2001) para 11; Netherlands, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.25 (6 June 1998) para 10; Nicaragua, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/14 (4 January 1994) paras 5–6; Romania, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/4 (30 May 1994) para 8; Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 September 2001) para 10; Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/18 (5 January 1994) paras 5 and 7; Solomon Islands, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.33 (14 May 1999) para 10; Venezuela, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.56 (May 2001) para 8. See also Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Expert Seminar on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 7–10 February 2001, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/54/Add.1 (21 March 2001) para 14. 202 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) para 10. 198 

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[3.54]  Despite this, the IMF and the World Bank have argued that they are bound by their Articles of Agreement to be ‘non-political’ in their approach and give due regard to ‘only economic considerations’.203 In paying limited or no attention to human rights, it has been stressed that there is a ‘need to honour the charter of each organisation and to respect the specialisation of different international organs as reflected in the statutory requirements of their respective charters’.204 It is claimed, for example, that drawing the World Bank, which is an international financial institution, directly into politically charged areas, with their typical vagaries and double standards, can only politicise its work and jeopardise its credibility, both in the financial markets from which it borrows and in the member countries to which it lends.205

To this end, Shihata has argued: The role of the Bank is to promote the economic development of its member countries. Its success in this role helps to create an environment for the enjoyment by individuals in these countries of all their human rights. … But it demeans the organisation to ignore its charter and act outside its legal powers.206

[3.55]  Likewise, the IMF has argued that human rights are the responsibility solely of individual governments and that ‘rights cannot be realised in the absence of structural adjustment’.207 The IMF has also stated that human rights protection was not explicitly included within its mandate,208 and that its founding Charter specifies that (as a monetary agency) it pays attention only to issues of an economic nature209 and requires it to ‘respect the domestic social and political policies of members’.210 For instance, in 2001 the IMF General Counsel François Gianviti, in an informal opinion, rejected the applicability of the ICESCR to the Fund on the grounds that the o ­ bligations imposed by the Covenant applied only to states, not to international organisations such as the IMF.211 He further stated that the norms contained in the Covenant have not attained

203  See, eg, IBRD Articles of Agreement, available at http://go.worldbank.org/0FICOZQLQ0, Art IV, s 10, Art III, s 5(b); IDA Articles of Agreement, available at http://www.worldbank.org/ida/articlesagreement­/IDA-articles-of-agreement.pdf, Art V, s 6, Art V, s 1(g); Articles of Agreement of the IMF, 2 UNTS 39, Art IV, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm, s 3(b). For the analysis, see I ­Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures, vol II (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 557–76; Shihata (2000), above n 107, 155–86; J Gold, ‘Political Considerations are Prohibited by ­Articles of Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for the Use of Resources’, IMF Survey (­Washington DC, IMF, 23 May 1983) 146–48. 204  I Shihata, ‘Democracy and Development’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 635, 638. 205  Shihata (1995), above n 203, 578; Shihata (2000), above n 107, 152. 206  Shihata (1995), above n 203, 567 and 574. 207  UN Doc E/C4/Sub2/1991/63, para 7. It is argued that costs from SAPs are short term and give rise to greater long-term benefits. It is also claimed that further deterioration would occur in the absence of SAPs. 208  E/C.12/1994/SR.20, paras 1 and 18. 209  J van Themaat, ‘Some Notes on IMF Conditionality with a Human Face’ in P De Waart, P Peters and E Denters (eds), International Law and Development (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 229; B Rajagopal, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the IMF and Human Rights’ (1993) 11 Boston International Law Journal 81, 93; G Bird, ‘The IMF and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy Options’ (1996) 50(3) International Organization 477. 210  IMF Articles of Agreement, above n 203, Art IV, s 3(b). 211  See Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights and the International Monetary Fund, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/WP.5 (7 May 2001) para 56.

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a status under general international law that would make them applicable to the Fund independently of the Covenant.212 [3.56]  The question that arises here is whether the IMF and the World Bank will be acting outside their charters or legal powers when they respect (or even protect and promote) all human rights in the formulation of their policies and activities. In other words, are human rights issues ‘political’ affairs, and thus barred from any consideration by the two institutions? In fact, except for references to ‘raising conditions of labour’213 and ‘maintenance of high levels of employment and income’,214 there are no direct mentions of human rights in the Articles of Agreement of the two institutions. In addition, the two institutions are not parties to human rights treaties protecting ESC rights,215 and accordingly not bound, strictu sensu, by human rights treaties, and have not accepted the implementation mechanisms for existing human rights treaties. [3.57]  It is essential to note that in the agreements between the ECOSOC and the IMF216 and the World Bank,217 entered into in accordance with Articles 63 and 57 of the UN Charter establishing the the IMF’s and World Bank’s status as UN specialised agencies, greater autonomy and independence from the UN is conferred on the two institutions,218 and neither human rights nor even Articles 55 and 56 of the UN ­Charter are referred to. However, Article 103 of the UN Charter links the two institutions’ Articles to the Charter. Article 103 reads as follows: In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

In the preliminary objections phase of the South-West Africa cases, Judge Jessup noted that while Article 103 of the Charter uses the expression ‘international agreement’, there ‘appears to be no reason to interpret this Article as excluding any treaty, convention, accord, or other type of international engagement or undertaking’.219 Later in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ itself concluded that ‘all regional, bilateral, and even multilateral, arrangements that the Parties to this case may have made … must be made always subject to the provisions of Article 103’.220

212 

Ibid. IBRD Articles of Agreement, above n 203, Art I (iii). 214  IMF Articles of Agreement, above n 203, Art I (ii). 215  Art 26(1) of the ICESCR refers only to states as being capable of becoming parties, and it would seem that international organisations cannot directly become parties to the Covenant. 216 Agreement entered into force 15 November 1947, printed in Selected Decisions of the IMF and Selected Documents, 13th issue (IMF, Washington, 1987) 475. 217  Agreement between the UN and the IBRD. (The Agreement formalised the relationship between the UN and the IBRD. It was approved by the UN General Assembly on 15 November 1947.) See World Bank Group Archives, at http://go.worldbank.org/GXFDYZK180. 218  For example, Art 1(2) of the Agreement between the UN and the IMF states, inter alia, that ‘[t]he Fund is a specialized agency. … By reason of the nature of its international responsibilities … the Fund is, and is required to function as, an independent international organisation.’ The IBRD/UN Agreement has a similar provision. 219  South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa), Preliminary Objections [1962] ICJ Rep 319, Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, 407 (footnote omitted). 220  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), Jurisdiction and Admissibility [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 107. 213 

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[3.58]  This means that Article 103 covers also the Articles of Agreement of both the IMF and the World Bank. Although this provision can be read in many ways,221 it has been taken to suggest that the aims and purposes of the UN—maintenance of peace and security, and promotion and protection of human rights—constitute an international public order to which other treaty regimes and the international organisations giving effect to them must conform.222 As one member of the ILC stated in 1982, Article 103 of the UN Charter means that ‘the UN Charter … [is] hierarchically superior to … any other treaty, whether earlier or later’.223 As such, it has a direct influence on the way in which human rights come into play in terms of the policies of the IMF and the World Bank.224 Therefore, the IMF and the World Bank Articles of Agreement should be interpreted and applied in a manner that respects all human rights. To achieve this, the IMF and the World Bank (through their credit agreements and policies) must refrain from undermining the human rights, including ESC rights, of all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups. This calls for the integration of human rights into the formulation of the policies of the two institutions. [3.59]  In fact human rights issues are implicitly part of the development225 mandate of the World Bank, and are central to the success of the poverty alleviation programmes of the Bank and the IMF. Respect for civil and political rights promotes participation and more accountability, which leads to better performance of government projects funded by the Bank.226 Conversely, substantial violations of civil and political rights are related to lower economic growth,227 which limits the available resources necessary for development and the progressive realisation of ESC rights. [3.60]  As a result of several criticisms of the World Bank policies, the Bank has acknowledged in its Comprehensive Development Framework that ‘[w]ithout the protection of human and property rights, and a comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible’.228 It has also noted that ‘creating the conditions for 221  For a discussion, see R Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 583. 222  See D Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 159, 178. 223  (1982) I Yearbook of the International Law Commission 20, para 12. 224  SI Skogly, The Human Rights Obligations of the World and the International Monetary Fund (London, Cavendish, 2001) 27. 225  The UN Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by GAR 41/128 of 4 December 1986, states in its preamble that ‘all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that, in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, and social rights’. See also I Brownlie, ‘The Human Right to Development’ in D Hunter et al (eds), International Environmental Law and Policy (New York, Foundation Press, 1998) 331; A Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, Anchor Books, 1999); AK Sengupta, Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, submitted in accordance with Commission Resolution 2001/9, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/WG.18/2 (20 Decem­ber 2001) paras 9–10. 226 J Isham, D Kaufmann and LH Pritchett, ‘Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of ­Government Projects’ (1997) 11(2) World Bank Law Review 219. 227  See, eg, R Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997); R Barro, ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’ (1991) 106(2) Q ­ uarterly Journal of Economics 407. 228  See Comprehensive Development Framework, at http://go.worldbank.org/O3CN35INY0 or http://www.worldbank.org/cdf.

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the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development’.229 Thus, the World Bank issued a set of guidelines linking its activities to human rights,230 and acknowledged that ‘ensuring sustainable development requires attention not just to economic growth but also to environmental and social issues’,231 including poverty and inequality reduction and prevention of armed conflicts and terrorism.232 In the Bank’s view, ‘ending global poverty is much more than a moral imperative—it is the cornerstone of a sustainable world’.233 To this end the World Bank, together with the IMF, has since 1995 been active in designing mechanisms to address the issue of debt burden, culminating in what came to be known, in 1996, as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative,234 which was later broadened in October 1999 to increase the number of eligible countries under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. For a debtor country to qualify for this initiative, it must demonstrate, inter alia, that it will ‘implement a full-fledged poverty reduction strategy, which has been prepared with broad participation of civil society, and an agreed set of measures aimed at enhancing economic growth’.235 [3.61]  It is worthy noting, first, that although the alleviation of poverty and debt relief is essential for enjoyment of ESC rights, the Bank, like the IMF, still lacks a c­ oherent and explicit human rights policy to fully integrate human rights into the ­poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), and the debt relief measures it offers are not enough to lift HIPCs out of poverty. Secondly, the Bank’s approach to human rights is limited, as it fails to take into account all human rights. The Bank has claimed that it is ‘concerned by human rights’ but ‘its mandate does not extend to political human rights’.236 What human rights are ‘political’? It is vital to develop a broader approach to human rights that takes into account all human rights. As Roberto Danino, the then General Counsel of the World Bank, argued, the Bank’s objectives and activities are deeply supportive of human rights, and that a more explicit approach to human rights is not

229  World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank (Washington DC, World Bank, 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/hrintro.htm. 230  IBRD/World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank (Washington DC, The World Bank, 1998). For a background to status of human rights in the World Bank, see Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM), In the Name of Development: Human Rights and the World Bank in Indonesia (Jakarta, ELSAM, 1995) 13–33. 231  IBRD/World Bank, World Development Report 2003: Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World (Washington DC, The World Bank, 2003) 1. 232  Ibid, 2 and 157. See also the World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (Washington DC, The World Bank, 1995), available at http://go.worldbank.org/UWYLBR43C0. 233  Ibid, 184. 234  Shihata (2000), above n 107, 365–79. There are about 40 HIPCs, most of which are located in subSaharan Africa. 235  ‘IMF and World Bank Support Debt Relief for Uganda’, IMF Press Release No 00/34 (2 May 2000). 236 World Bank, Bank Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Chad-­ ­ Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Chad Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project, and Chad Management of the Petroleum Economy Project (no date), x, para 16, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/Management Response051001.pdf; I Shihata, ‘Political Activity Prohibited’ in I Shihata, World Bank Legal Papers (­Leiden, Brill, 2000) 219.

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only consistent with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement but is essential if the institution is to fulfil its poverty reduction mission of economic growth and social equity in a changing world.237 Similarly, in 2006 the new World Bank General Counsel, Ana Palacio, expressed support for the incorporation of human rights concepts into the work of the World Bank.238 [3.62]  It has to be noted, however, that internationally recognised human rights (whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural) are of international concern that transcends ‘political affairs’ and the autonomous jurisdiction of a state.239 In this respect, both the IMF and the World Bank, as subjects of international law, have human rights obligations, since ESC rights are a part of general international law that is binding outside the treaty regimes, and therefore create binding obligations for the IMF and the World Bank.240 As a result, since the projects funded by the World Bank and programmes of the Bank and the IMF impact on the enjoyment of human rights, it is essential to ensure that they do not negatively impact on or violate human rights, even if they are to lead to economic development in the long run. International human rights instruments must not be subordinated to the charters of the international financial institutions or agencies in question when, as a matter of law, the reverse should be the case.241 [3.63]  In conformity with Articles 22 and 23 of the ICESCR, the IMF and the World Bank should (through their lending policies and credit agreements) cooperate effectively with states to implement ESC rights at the national level, bearing in mind their own mandates. The minimum core obligation incumbent directly upon both the World Bank and the IMF, as specialised agencies of the UN system and subjects of international law, is a duty of vigilance to ensure that their policies and programmes do not facilitate breaches of their member states’ human rights treaty obligations.242 This calls for putting in place a clear and consistent human rights impact assessment policy243 in connection with project/programme identification, preparation, appraisal, loan ­negotiation, implementation and evaluation (post-audit) for the World Bank, and similar stages in negotiations and the release of funds for the IMF.244

237 See R Danino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, Senior ­Vice-President and General Counsel, World Bank, January 2006. 238  A Palacio, ‘The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank’ [2006 October] Development Outreach 35–37, available at http://go.worldbank.org/RR8FOU4RG0. 239  JD Ciorciari, ‘The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement’ (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 331; G Brodnig, The World Bank and Human Rights: Mission Impossible?, Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy Working Paper, T-01-05, 18. 240  See A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State-Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 147–49. 241  J Oloka-Onyango and D Udagama, Human Rights as the Primary Objective of International Trade, Investment and Finance Policy and Practice, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11 (17 June 1999) para 33; Skogly, above n 224, 108–09. 242 M Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ­International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 295. 243  K Tomaševski, ‘International Development Finance Agencies’ in A Eide et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 403, 410. 244  Skogly, above n 224, 163–66.

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[3.64]  This would ensure, at the very minimum, that the policies and programmes of the two institutions (such as privatisation of social security schemes, healthcare and education) in pursuit of their respective charter obligations do not violate existing human rights standards.245 With respect to Zambia, for example, the CESCR expressed its concern in June 2005 ‘about the fact that privatized social security schemes in the state party have not been financially sustainable, thereby leaving its beneficiaries without adequate social protection’.246 It recommended that Zambia’s obligations under the Covenant be taken into account in all aspects of its negotiations with international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, so as to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Covenant are duly protected, for all Zambians, and, in particular for the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups of society. The Committee refers the State party to its statement to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization adopted at its twenty-first session in 1999 (E/2000/22E/C.12/1999/11, annex VII).247

[3.65]  Therefore, there is an urgent need for explicit integration of international human rights into the policies, programmes and projects of the World Bank and the IMF, including these bodies’ poverty-reduction strategies,248 to make them ‘effective, sustainable, inclusive, equitable and meaningful to those living in poverty’.249 As the Bank has acknowledged in its communication entitled Human Rights: FAQs:250 The World Bank needs to undertake analytic work to examine how human rights fit within the constitutional framework and what positive contribution they could make to the development process. While the World Bank is not an enforcer of human rights, it may play a facilitative role in helping its members realise their human rights obligations.251

[3.66]  However, it is important to note that there are some obstacles within the World Bank and the IMF to the effective integration of human rights into their activities. For instance, the Bank and IMF primarily consist of economists and financial experts who specialise in lending techniques that can be measured quantitatively without adequate attention to human rights.252 In addition, the Bank and the IMF Executive Board members and staff lack human rights training, hence there has been internal

245  IMF Staff, Policies for Faster Growth and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Role of the IMF (December 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/120100.htm. 246  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005) para 22. 247  Ibid, para 36. 248  For guidelines, see OHCHR, Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (10 June 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/povertyfinal.html. See also E ­Carrasco, ‘Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods system: Can the IMF, World Bank, and the GATT/ WTO Promote an Enabling Environment for Social Development?’ (1996) 6 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems i–xx; OECD and World Bank, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences, and Challenges (1st edn, OECD, 2006; 2nd edn, OECD, 2013). 249 CESCR, Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (10 May 2001) para 13. 250  World Bank, Human Rights: FAQs, available at http://go.worldbank.org/72L95K8TN0. 251  Ibid. 252  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the ­Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, Addendum: Missions to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington DC (20 October 2006) and Uganda, UN Doc A/HRC/7/11/Add.2 (5 March 2008) para 111.

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resistance to the application of human rights in these institutions.253 Furthermore, although the programmes and policies of the World Bank and the IMF affect the lives (and human rights outcomes) of individuals and groups living in developing states in both positive and negative ways, the decision-making involved in the programmes and policies of these organisations often fails to take into account particular circumstances existing in developing states.254 One possible reason for this is the unequal representation of developing states on the Executive Boards—eg while Sweden has 1.09 per cent of the total voting power on the Executive Board of the IMF, Mozambique has only 0.06 per cent.255 Therefore, it would be useful to provide human rights training to the executive directors and staff of these organisations (to build and develop their ­capacity in human rights analysis), and to strengthen the voice of developing states in the decision-making processes in these organisations through the development of democratic and transparent structures on the Executive Boards of the World Bank and the IMF, which could be achieved by giving equal voice to developing states, in terms of both their voting capacity and their membership on the Board.256 B.  The WTO and Human Rights [3.67]  The WTO was established by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement),257 which was signed in April 1994 and entered into force on 1 January 1995. This agreement binds WTO members (numbering 162 as of November 2015),258 most of which are states parties to international human rights treaties protecting ESC rights as well as civil and political rights. The WTO Agreement and other agreements annexed to it established legally binding obligations on states parties relating to several areas, including trade in goods, trade in services, trade in agriculture and protection of intellectual property rights.259 The raison d’être of the WTO is to promote free trade by establishing rules for the reduction and eventual elimination of barriers to trade between states. The possibility of conflict between states’ trade and human rights obligations can mean, de facto, that states would pay more attention to trade rules than to human rights obligations,260 due to the stronger enforcement mechanisms under the WTO compared to mechanisms for the ­protection

253 

Uganda, UN Doc A/HRC/7/11/Add.2, above n 252, para 112. Ibid, para 119. 255  Ibid. 256  Ibid, para 120. 257  33 ILM 1143 (1994); http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 258  See list of WTO members at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 259 See WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ final_e.htm. 260  See generally S Joseph, Blame It on the WTO? A Human Rights Critique (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011); S Joseph, D Kinley and J Waincymer (eds), The World Trade Organisation and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2009); J Harrison, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007); A Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). 254 

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of ESC rights. Should the WTO respect (protect or even promote) human rights? In May 1998 the CESCR asserted that international organisations [such as the WTO], as well as the governments that have created and manage them, have a strong and continuous responsibility to take whatever measures they can to assist governments to act in ways which are compatible with their human rights obligations and to seek to devise policies and programmes which promote respect for those rights.261

Based on the above, it can be stated that the WTO, as an international organisation for states, has a responsibility to assist states to respect human rights. Some WTO ­agreements specifically refer to the ‘protection of human health or safety’ or ‘the environment’, all relevant to the protection of ESC rights, as legitimate objectives.262 Indeed, the realms of trade, finance and investment are in no way exempt from human rights principles, and ‘the international organisations with specific responsibilities in those areas should play a positive and constructive role in relation to human rights’.263 The WTO system has the potential to contribute to the development and to the realisation of broader ESC rights, by stimulating economic growth and thereby helping to ­generate the resources that are needed for the fulfilment of such rights.264 [3.68]  However, the relationship between human rights and trade through the WTO is far more complex.265 The preamble to the WTO Agreement, which sets out the ultimate objectives of the WTO, does not explicitly refer to human rights. Instead it refers to the following objectives: increase in standards of living; steady growth of real income and effective demand; attainment of full employment and economic growth patterns compatible with sustainable development; and expansion of production of, and trade in, goods and services.266 The preamble also proclaims that ‘there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially 261  CESCR, Globalisation and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (11 May 1998), UN Doc E/1999/22-E/C.12/1998/26, para 5. 262  See, eg, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 UNTS 120 (1994), available at http://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf, Article 2.2 of which provides, ‘Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products.’ See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1867 UNTS 187 (1994), available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf, Art XX(b). 263  CESCR, above n 261. 264  See RD Anderson and H Wager, ‘Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: The Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy’ (2006) 9(3) Journal of International Economic Law 707. 265  See R Howse, ‘Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann’ (2002) 13(3) European Journal of International Law 651; R Howse, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice’ (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 945; and E Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Rejoinder’ (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 955. 266  See WTO Agreement, above n 257. For a discussion, see P Van den Bossche and W Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 82–103; S Lester et al, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) 63–72, M Matsushita et al, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).

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the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development’.267 Thus, although the WTO Agreement does not make explicit reference to human rights, the language of the preamble demonstrates a recognition by [the] WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this preambular language reflects the intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.268

However, it is essential to note that although trade liberalisation has wealth-generating potential, such liberalisation does not necessarily create and lead to a favourable environment for the realisation of ESC rights.269 In this regard, it is important to consider ways in which the primacy of human rights, including ESC rights, may be ensured in the WTO. [3.69]  Sustainable development is broad enough to include respect for human rights. The right to (sustainable) development implies the right to improvement and advancement of economic, social, cultural and political conditions. The essence of the right to development is the principle that the human person is the central subject of development and that the right to life encompasses human dignity with the minimum necessities of life.270 As stated in the Declaration on the Right to Development: The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised.271

Sustainable development ensures the well-being of the human person by integrating social development, economic development, and environmental conservation and protection. One aspect of sustainable development implies that the basic needs of the human being (eg education, health services, adequate food, housing, employment and social security) are met through the implementation and realisation of human rights. Viewed in this context, the WTO has to take into account all human rights, including ESC rights, in accordance with the objective of sustainable development. [3.70]  The case for linking the protection of human rights apart from workers’ rights to membership of the WTO rests partly on the idea that states that violate or turn a blind eye to human rights infractions should not be allowed to participate in the

267 

WTO Agreement, above n 257, preamble. US-Shrimp, WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998: VII, para 153. 269  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Docs E/C.12/CAN/CO/4 and E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (22 May 2006) para 68. 270  The Right to Development, The Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/72, ESCOR Supp (No 3), 229, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/72 (1998) para 3(a). 271  Adopted by GA res 41/128 of 4 December 1986, annex, 41 UN GAOR Supp (No 53), 186, UN Doc A/41/53 (1986) Art 1(1). 268 

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i­ nternational trading system.272 This view, in turn, rests on the premise that such exclusion will cause these states to change their actions or omissions. Thus, the case for linkage between trade and human rights depends on the power of the WTO to decree trade sanctions.273 As Matsushita has noted, there are numerous problems with the above reasoning: First, what human rights would the WTO seek to enforce? Arriving at an agreement on this would not be possible now. Second, there exist long established international and regional regimes for the promotion and enforcement of human rights, such as the [former] UN Commission on Human Rights [replaced by the Human Rights Council],274 the UN [Human Rights] Committee, and the European Court of Human Rights. Adding the WTO to these regimes would accomplish little and would pose the danger of conflicting interpretations and decisions. Third, although trade sanctions have emotional appeal to punish human rights violations, empirical studies have established that trade sanctions seldom accomplish their objectives and are not effective in accomplishing their objectives. Fourth, if the WTO ever were to try to become a human rights enforcement agency, there is little chance its dispute settlement mechanism would survive; it soon would be engulfed in compliance problems, and the WTO itself would be under threat.275

[3.71]  Despite the above observations, the WTO has a role to play in the progressive realisation of human rights, including ESC rights. Although the WTO cannot transform into a human rights organisation, it must take steps: (a) not to undermine human rights obligations of its member states; and (b) to acknowledge fully the human rights effects of its agreements (mainly on the poor in developing states, particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs)) in order to maintain sustainable development and its own credibility. Some WTO Agreements, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights276 (TRIPS Agreement), the General Agree­ment on Trade in ­Services277 (GATS), and the Agreement on Agriculture278 (AoA) can impact on human rights, eg the rights to health, education and food.279

272 See, eg, M Matsushita et al, The World Trade Organisation: Law, Practice, and Policy, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 923–24. 273  Ibid, 924. 274  The Council was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by res 60/251, UN Doc A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006). 275 Matsushita et al, above n 272, 924. 276  33 ILM 1197 (1994); 1869 UNTS 299. The TRIPS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ legal_e/27-trips.pdf. See also Report of the UN High Commissioner, The Impact of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (27 June 2001); CESCR, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/15 (14 December 2001); AR Chapman, ‘The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection’ (2002) 5(4) Journal of International Economic Law 861; D Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008). 277  33 ILM 1167 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf. 278  1867 UNTS 410, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf. 279  See, eg, S Joseph, Blame It on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011); C Blouin, N Drager and R Smith (eds), International Trade in Health Services and the GATS: Current Issues and Debates (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006); Right to Education, Wither Education?: Human Rights Law Versus Trade Law, available under ‘Global Issues’ at http://www.right-to-education.org/.

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i.  TRIPS and the Right to Health [3.72]  The TRIPS Agreement is a comprehensive ­multi­lateral agreement that sets detailed minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual ­property rights.280 The forms of intellectual property pro­ tection covered by the TRIPS Agreement most relevant to the enjoyment of the right to health include patent protection (over new medical processes and products such as pharmaceuticals), trademarks (covering signs distinguishing medical goods and services as coming from a particular trader) and the protection of undisclosed data (in particular test data).281 For example, patent protection of a pharmaceutical allows the intellectual property right holder to exclude competitors from certain acts, including making, using, offering for sale, s­ elling or importing the drug (without the owner’s consent) for a minimum period of 20 years.282 Where the subject matter of a patent is a process, a patent prevents the third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.283 This period of exclusion theoretically allows the right holder to recoup some of the costs involved in medical research. Since most patents are owned by corporations, the protection offered by the TRIPS Agreement primarily protects business and corporate interests and investments. In practice, intellectual property protection under the TRIPS Agreement can affect medical research, and this can bear upon access to medicines. [3.73]  Although it has been stated that the claim that the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO are blocking access to medicines in poor countries is ‘demonstrably false’,284 intellectual property protection can affect the enjoyment of the right to health, and related human rights, in a number of ways. For example, patent protection can promote medical research by helping the pharmaceutical industry shoulder the costs of testing, developing and approving drugs. However, the commercial motivation of intellectual property rights encourages research, first and foremost, towards ‘profitable’ diseases, while diseases that predominantly affect people in poor countries— eg river blindness—remain under-researched.285 Further, intellectual property rights may affect the use of traditional medicines such as those of indigenous peoples. While existing intellectual property protection can promote health innovations by indigenous and local communities, the particular nature of this knowledge and the knowledge holders might require significant amendment to be made to intellectual legislation for 280  Apart from establishing minimum standards for various forms of intellectual property protection, the TRIPS Agreement also allows WTO member states to adopt measures to protect public health and nutrition, and to protect against the abuse of intellectual property rights in certain cases. The Agreement makes disputes between WTO members concerning respect for the minimum standards subject to the WTO dispute-­settlement procedures. See CM Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options (London, Zed Books, 2000); CM Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). 281  See Paul Hunt, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health on His Mission to the World Trade Organization’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (1 March 2004) para 41. 282  TRIPS Agreement, Arts 33 and 28. 283  Ibid, Art 28(2). 284 Matsushita et al, above n 272, 718. 285  Hunt, above n 281, para 42.

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protection to be comprehensive. Furthermore, some traditional medicines have been appropriated, adapted and patented with little or no compensation to the original knowledge holders and without their prior consent, which raises questions for both the right to health and cultural rights.286 [3.74]  In addition, the exclusion of competitors as a result of the grant of a patent can also be used by patent holders as a tool to increase the price of pharmaceuticals.287 High prices exclude some sections of the population from accessing medicines. Given that the right to health includes an obligation on states to provide affordable essential medicines according to the WHO essential drugs list, intellectual property protection can adversely affect the right to health. In other words, in some cases intellectual property protection can reduce the economic accessibility of essential medicines. This issue was considered by the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court in AIDS Access Foundation v Bristol-Myers Squibb.288 The AIDS Access Foundation, and two patients living with AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) due to infection with HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), alleged that Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Thai Department of Intellectual Property had ‘conspired to intentionally delete’ the dose restriction in a patent application for didanosine. They argued that this could have the effect of restricting access to this particular HIV/AIDS treatment. In its judgment, the Thai Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court ruled that because pharmaceutical patents may lead to high prices that limit access to medicines, patients may challenge their legality. The Court asserted the ­primacy of human life in trade agreements, as recognised internationally by the Doha ­Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The Court held that the TRIPS Agreement must be ‘interpreted and implemented so as to promote the rights of members to protect ­public health, especially the promotion and support of access to medicines’. The Court also held that ‘lack of access to medicines due to high prices prejudices the human rights of patients to proper medical treatment’. [3.75]  It is important to note that Articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement include some flexibility in such circumstances, permitting WTO members to authorise third parties to use the subject matter of a patent (ie manufacture and sell pharmaceuticals at a lower price) without the authorisation of the patent holder, subject to certain limitations, including payment of ‘adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorisation’.289 Nonetheless, such flexibilities are, in reality, only available to those WTO members that have a domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement allows unauthorised working of the patent where sale is ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such use’. This could limit the ability of countries that cannot make pharmaceutical products to import cheaper generics from countries where pharmaceuticals are patented. Thus, poorer countries without adequate manufacturing capacity might not be able to benefit from

286 

Ibid. Ibid, para 43. 288  AIDS Access Foundation v Bristol-Myers Squibb, Black Case No Tor Por 34/2544 (1 October 2002). 289  TRIPS Agreement, Art 31(h). 287 

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this fl ­ exibility. Accordingly an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to allow pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licences to be exported to countries lacking production facilities should be supported.290 It is interesting to note that the WTO received from Canada, on 4 October 2007, the first notification from any government that it has authorised a company to make a generic version of a patented medicine for export under special WTO provisions agreed in 2003. The triple-combination AIDS therapy drug, TriAvir, can now be made and exported to Rwanda, which is unable to manufacture the medicine itself.291 [3.76]  While LDCs—see Appendix J—do not have to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, until 1 July 2021,292 and do not have to protect patented pharmaceutical products until 2016,293 several LDCs have adopted domestic legislation to implement TRIPS Agreement standards due to pressure. Since the TRIPS Agreement makes it more difficult for developing states, particularly LDCs, to meet their human rights obligations to make medicines available and accessible to the poor, it is preferable to exempt them from having to protect and enforce pharmaceutical patents and clinical data submitted to obtain marketing approval until they ­graduate from ‘least-developed’ status. [3.77]  The TRIPS Agreement further requires WTO member states to ‘provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof’.294 ‘Plant varieties’ include new seed varieties—­genetically modified seeds—which might be more nutritious and more resistant to diseases, pests or adverse weather conditions. Thus the TRIPS Agreement permits companies to commercialise seeds (food sources), which may increase food prices, thereby making food, a key underlying determinant of the right to health, less accessible to the poor. Indeed, most states have been pressured to adopt patents for plant varieties (granting monopoly rights to breeders) developed in Europe by the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).295 While farmers are permitted to re-use seeds, they cannot sell produce from those harvested seeds. This threatens the enjoyment of the rights to food and health for the poor. ii.  Agreement on Agriculture and the Right to Food [3.78]  Facilitating international trade in agricultural products may contribute to alleviation of freedom from hunger, as protected by Article 11(2) of the ICESCR, 290  See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6 December 2005, WT/L/641, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/wtl641_e.htm. 291  See WTO, Canada is First to Notify Compulsory Licence to Export Generic Drug (4 October 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/trips_health_notif_oct07_e.htm. 292  WTO, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64 (12 June 2013). 293  WTO, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for LeastDeveloped Country Members for Certain Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, IP/C/25 (1 July 2002). 294  TRIPS Agreement, Art 27(3)(b). 295  See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (of 2 December 1961, as Revised at Geneva on 10 November 1972, on 23 October 1978, and on 19 March 1991) 815 UNTS 89, ­available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm.

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by ­facilitating food imports from regions with a food surplus to regions with a food ­deficit. Article 11(2)(b) of the ICESCR recognises ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’ and requires states parties to take, individually and through international cooperation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) … (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.

Thus food imports and exports are a means to realise the fundamental right to be free from hunger. In practice, there are serious concerns regarding the compatibility of the AoA296 and the realisation of the right to adequate food. [3.79]  Permissible protectionism (the use of high tariffs by developed states against agricultural products from developing states) under the AoA affects the availability and accessibility of external markets for agricultural goods in which many developing states have a comparative advantage. Thus agricultural exports from low-income developing states to high-income states face high tariffs, three to four times higher than the barriers applied to trade between high-income states.297 Similarly, farmers in developing countries, as well as underdeveloped industries in developing states, have been exposed to competition from subsidised agricultural products from the developed world.298 This exacerbates underdevelopment and poverty in developing states, and therefore undermines the progressive realisation of ESC rights in the poorest states. iii.  Aligning WTO Policies with States’ Human Rights Obligations [3.80]  As an international organisation for states, the WTO should ensure that its ­policies and decisions are in conformity with the human rights obligations of its ­member states. As noted by the CESCR since 1998 and by the UN’s Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in August 1998, the WTO should consider the human rights impact of trade and investment policies by recognising human rights as the primary objective of trade, investment and financial policy.299 This is because human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements ­belonging to individuals and, in certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities. Intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement (section V.B.i. above)

296 

Above n 278. Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads—Aid, Trade and in an Unequal World (New York, UNDP, 2005) 127. 298  Negative effects of the AoA were acknowledged in the 1993 Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Program on Least Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, GATT Doc LT/UR/D-1/2 (1993). 299  Sub-Commission Resolution 1998/12 (20 August 1998); Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Third Ministerial Conference of the Word Trade Organisation (Seattle, 30 November–3 December 1999), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/9 (26 November 1999) para 2. See also J Oloka­Onyango and D Udagama, Globalisation and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Preliminary Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (15 June 2000), Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 2001/10 (2 July 2001), and Final Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14 (25 June 2003). 297 UNDP,

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are generally of a temporary nature, and may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited; in contrast, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person.300 Thus, the WTO should take existing state obligations under international human rights instruments fully into account. The Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha ­Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (August 2003), allowing countries producing generic copies of patented drugs under compulsory licence to export drugs to countries with no or little drug-manufacturing capacity, is an example of how human rights (eg the right to health) could be taken into account by the WTO.301 [3.81]  As a satisfactory human rights situation also improves the objectives of the WTO, human rights and the WTO mandate are not necessarily contradictory but mutually support each other. The WTO trade policies should contribute to economic growth and development so as to enhance opportunities for reduction and eventual elimination of poverty, and thereby increase available resources. In turn WTO ­member states should invest available resources to enhance the poor’s access to education, healthcare, adequate food, water, adequate housing, social security and employment. The WTO should, therefore, play a role in promoting human rights in a systematic or deliberate manner. This could be achieved in several ways including the following: First, through its multilateral treaty framework that promotes principles of nondiscrimination­, rule of law, economic liberalism, and peaceful dispute settlement, the WTO can be said to promote and protect human freedoms. Second, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits WTO Members to participate in action involving trade sanctions decreed by the United Nations in cases of threats to peace and security. Moreover, WTO Members are permitted to use investment and trade as positive incentives to promote human rights in cases where infringement of WTO norms are not at stake.302

[3.82]  While the WTO, like the World Bank, is not an enforcer of human rights, it may play a facilitative role in helping its members (numbering over 160) realise their human rights obligations.303 It is therefore necessary for the WTO member states to re-engage the WTO in human rights to ensure that these are taken into account, recognising, as the former WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, observed, that WTO rules are based on the same values as human rights—‘individual freedom and responsibility, non-discrimination­, rule of law, and welfare through peaceful cooperation 300  CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1 (c), of the ICESCR), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) para 2. 301  See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (November 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf; Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 (September 2003). See also WTO, [Doha] ­Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (20 November 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/ minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf, para 6 of which stated, ‘under WTO rules no country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements’. 302 Matsushita et al, above n 272, 924. 303  See WTO members, above n 258.

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among individuals’.304 States must ensure that the application of international trade instruments shall not undermine, either directly or indirectly, the progressive realisation of ESC rights, including ‘the right to health, access to medicine, inputs, services or ­scientific and technological breakthroughs’.305 The WTO dispute settlement body may be legally required to address arguments that human rights may be a relevant legal context for interpreting WTO rules.306 iv.  Human Rights as ‘Public Morals’ Under the WTO [3.83]  Human rights may be considered by the WTO dispute settlement body (panel and Appellate Body) to be part of the ‘public morals’ protected by various WTO agreements. For example, Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV(a) of the GATS 1994 provide that nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures … necessary to protect public morals.

Public morals in the WTO have been understood as ‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’.307 While the content of these standards for member states ‘can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values’,308 such standards include respect for human rights. The protection of public morals under the GATS and GATS raises the following question: to what extent may WTO member states impose trade restrictions based on moral or ethical concerns? [3.84]  The public moral concerns, as established by the WTO panel in the European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, may derive from conduct that is wholly extra-territorial to the member state.309 EC— Seal Products involved challenges brought by Canada and Norway against several regulations comprising the ‘European Union (EU) Seal Regime’,310 involving ‘products, either processed or unprocessed, deriving or obtained from seals, including meat,

304  P Lamy, ‘Towards Shared Responsibility and Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic Policy’, Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy, Coorganised by the International Council on Human Rights and Realizing Rights, Geneva, 13 January 2010, available at http://www.wto.org/ english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm. 305  Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, Art 421. 306  See E Petersmann, ‘The “Human Rights Approach” Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 605. 307  United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US— Gambling), WT/DS285/R (Report of the Panel, 10 November 2004) para 6.465; China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Report of the Panel, 12 August 2009) para 7.759. 308  US—Gambling, above n 307, para 6.461. 309 See, eg, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R; WT/DS401/R (25 November 2013) (EC—Seal Products). 310  Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Trade in Seal Products, [2009] OJ L286/36.

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oil, blubber, organs, raw fur skins and tanned fur skins, as well as articles made from fur skins and oil’.311 The EU Seal Regime prohibits all seal products, whether they are made exclusively of seal or contain seal as an input. The Regime makes an exception with regard to the import and/or placing on the market of seal products in three situations, namely when they result from IC [Inuit Community] hunts, MRM [Marine Resource Management] hunts, or in the case of Travellers imports [products brought by EU citizens for personal use].312

Canada and Norway alleged that the EU had committed various violations of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, the GATT 1994, as well as the AoA. The Panel stated that the objective of the EU Seal Regime is to address the moral concerns of the EU public with regard to the welfare of seals, in particular: (a) ‘the incidence of inhumane killing of seals’; and, (b) EU citizens’ ‘individual and collective participation as consumers in, and exposure to (“abetting”), the economic activity which sustains the market for’ seal products derived from inhumane hunts. … Overall, based on its design and expected operation, we find that the ban under the EU Seal Regime is capable of making a contribution to preventing the EU public from being exposed on the EU market to products that may have been derived from seals killed inhumanely in Canadian or Norwegian hunts.313

The Panel concluded that the EU Seal Regime is ‘provisionally deemed necessary’ within meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994.314 This ruling confirmed that animal welfare may also be a matter of right and wrong within a particular WTO member state, and therefore may also fall under the rubric of ‘public morals’. [3.85]  If public morals extend to animal welfare, do (or should) they also extend to human welfare or human rights? Although there is no uniform conception of morals within the WTO member states, the term ‘public morals’ could arguably include human rights (recognised in international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR, ratified by a vast majority of the WTO member states and reflecting fundamental values) within its scope, such as freedom from discrimination, slavery, child labour and forced labour.315 It follows that the protection of public morals allows, or should allow, WTO member states to impose measures protecting ESC rights. For example, a ban on products that have a negative impact on ESC rights such as a healthy environment (eg destroy the rainforest in the Amazon), harm child labourers (eg at rubber plantations in Africa), or advance blatant government corruption (eg in Africa and Asia) and thereby divert available resources to invest in the progressive realisation of ESC rights.

311 

EC—Seal Products, above n 309, para 2.6. Ibid, para 7.105. 313  Ibid, paras 7.410 and 7.448. 314  Ibid, para 7.639. See also Appellate Body report in the EC—Seal Products WT/DS400/AB/R; WT/ DS401/AB/R (22 May 2014). 315 See OHCHR, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to ­Protect Human Rights (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Publications/WTOen.pdf, 9. 312 

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VI.  CORPORATIONS, OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS A.  Corporations and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [3.86]  Activities of corporations, both domestic and transnational, have grown exponentially in recent years. Activities and operations of corporations, both national and transnational, regardless of size, sector, location, ownership and structure, may impact directly on human rights of individuals and groups (local communities) in different ways. Corporations have the capacity to contribute to the progressive realisation of ESC rights by creating employment and raising capital, and innovating technology (which can lead to new products, eg computers and related software and new ­medicine) capable of raising standards of living. Corporations employ millions of ­people in many states, thus facilitating the progressive realisation of the right to work. For example, in February 2014, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc (Walmart), one of the largest private employers in the US and Canada, employed 2.2 million associates globally, including approximately 1.3 million in the US.316 For the fiscal year ended January 2013, Walmart Consolidated net sales reached $466.1 billion for the year,317 greater than the GDP of 168 countries in the same year.318 [3.87]  Corporations thus have the capacity to violate or contribute to the violations of ESC rights. For example, some corporations have historically manifested not only willingness but also an ‘ardent desire to employ forced labour’319 or use slave labour;320 employed child labourers; discriminated against certain groups of employees (such as racial minorities and women); discouraged trade unions; failed to provide safe and healthy working conditions; exposed individuals to toxic chemicals;321 marketed to children products harmful to health, such as cigarettes and alcohol; and been responsible for environmental degradation and contamination arising from business activities, which can compromise rights to health, food security, and access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Oil spills, for decades resulting from the activities of corporations in Niger Delta region, have caused damage to the environment in the region and destroyed crops, damaged the quality and productivity of the soil that communities

316 Walmart, ‘Corporate and Financial Facts’, available at http://news.walmart.com/walmart-facts/ corporate-financial-fact-sheet. 317  Ibid. 318  IMF, World Economic Outlook Database: October 2013, available at http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx. 319  Doe v Unocal Corp, 110 F Supp 2d 1294, 1310, citing United States v Krupp, Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 31 July 1948, 1439–40, ‘the Krupp firm had manifested not only its willingness but its ardent desire to employ forced labor’. 320  The United States of America v Carl Krauch et al, US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 30 July 1948, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol VIII, 35. 321  Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India, Supreme Court of India, Order 15-02-1989 in Civil Appeals Nos 3187–89; Amnesty International, India: Clouds of Injustice: Bhopal Disaster 20 Years On, Index Number: ASA 20/015/2004 (2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/015/2004, at 1, ‘Twenty years ago around half a million people were exposed to toxic chemicals during a catastrophic gas leak from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. More than 7,000 people died within days. A further 15,000 died in the following years. Around 100,000 people are suffering chronic and debilitating illnesses for which treatment is largely ineffective’.

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used for agriculture, and have contaminated water used for drinking, fishing and other purposes.322 Selling or leasing land to investors can deprive local populations of access to natural resources linked to their subsistence and cultural heritage; the rights of indigenous peoples and individuals (not be forcibly removed from their traditional lands) may be particularly at risk in this context.323 Thus, human rights NGOs have paid attention to reporting on the activities of TNCs since the late 1990s.324 [3.88]  What, if any, legal responsibilities do corporations have for violations of ESC rights under international law? In 2007, the UN Special Representative of the ­Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, noted: The traditional view of international human rights instruments is that they impose only indirect responsibilities on corporations, ie responsibilities provided under domestic law in accordance with States’ international obligations. In contrast, some observers hold that these instruments already impose direct legal responsibilities on corporations but merely lack direct accountability mechanisms. For example, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, explaining that its proposed norms reflect and restate existing international law, attributed the entire spectrum of State duties under the treaties—to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil rights—to corporations within their spheres of influence.325

‘Spheres of influence’ refers to both to (i) impact, where the company’s activities or relationships are causing human rights harm; and (ii) whatever leverage a company may have over actors that are causing harm.326 [3.89]  Corporations are increasingly recognised as ‘participants’ at the international level, with the capacity to bear some rights and duties under international law.327

322 See SERAP [Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project] v Federal Republic of Nigeria, General List No ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12 (14 December 2012). See also Platform, Counting the Cost: Corporations and Human Rights Abuses in the Niger Delta (London, Platform, 2011), available at http://platformlondon.org/nigeria/Counting_the_Cost.pdf; O Oluduro, Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, Intersentia, 2014) ch 4. 323  See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/47/1 (2007), Arts 10 and 26; CRC Committee, General Comment 11: Indigenous Children and their Rights under the Convention, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/11 (12 February 2009) para 35. 324  See, eg, Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron-toc.htm; Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudanprint.pdf; Human Rights Watch, ‘Race to the Bottom’: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf; I Khan, ­Understanding Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion beyond Existing Laws (2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL34/001/2006/en. 325  See Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) para 35. 326 See John Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 68. 327  In 1949, the ICJ stated ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the needs of the community.’ See Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179. See also A Clapham, ‘Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 899.

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As noted in para 3.86 above, corporations are capable of both breaching all internationally recognised human rights and contributing to their protection. For example, (­foreign) companies can contribute to the realisation of ESC rights in a state where they operate by paying appropriate taxes that contributes to available resources that can be invested in the realisation of ESC rights, and create employment and productive investment. On the other hand, (foreign) companies can undermine the realisation of ESC rights by using child labour, providing unsafe working conditions, placing restrictions on trade union rights, practising discrimination against female workers or minorities, causing or contributing to harmful impact on the right to human rights, eg health, food, water, including of indigenous peoples, and the natural e­ nvironment,328 and exploiting a state’s natural resources through, for example, paying low taxes and taking most of the profits abroad. In 1999 the CESCR took note of the fact that in the Solomon Islands, ‘the major share of the country’s natural resources is exploited by foreign companies which pay low taxes, if any, to the Government and, by taking most of the profits abroad, leave only few benefits to Solomon Islands’.329 In addition, as noted in section V.B.i. above, policies and practices of some pharmaceutical companies (eg not contributing to research and development for neglected diseases, or lobbying for more demanding protection of intellectual property interests than those required by TRIPS, such as additional limitations on compulsory licensing) may constitute obstacles to the implementation by states of the right to the highest attainable ­standard of health and, in particular, their endeavours to enhance access to medicines.330 [3.90]  However, the question of what precise responsibilities corporations have in relation to human rights, and to ESC rights in particular, has received far less a­ ttention.331 Although adverse business impacts on human rights are not limited to the contexts outlined below, the worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm have occurred where governance challenges were greatest—disproportionately in ­low-income countries, in countries that often had just emerged from or were still in conflict, and in countries where the rule of law was weak and levels of corruption high.332 The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997–2004 offers a good example of how corporations can violate human rights in a state in conflict, through direct and indirect involvement (complicity) in human rights abuses where judicial and government institutions are weak and unable to counter corporate abuses.333 In ­October 2002, the UN Panel of Experts listed 85 companies, mostly based in the 328 See CESCR, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties regarding the Corporate Sector and ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011) para 1. 329 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Solomon Islands, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.33 (14 May 1999) para 10. 330  See Paul Hunt, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’, UN Doc A/63/263 (11 August 2008) para 23. 331 See John Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 53. 332  Ibid, para 16. 333 See D Leader, ‘Business and Human Rights—Time to Hold Companies to Account’ (2008) 8(3) International Criminal Law Review 447. See also several articles in a special Issue on ‘Transnational B ­ usiness and International Criminal Law’ in (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice, available at http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/3.toc.

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West, which it declared had violated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.334 The allegation against many of these companies was that they were fuelling the armed conflict in the DRC in order to retain their control over the country’s natural resources, in that finance flowed from them to the various armies via trade in natural resources, thus providing an incentive for continued conflict.335 Some of the companies were accused of entering into direct business relationships with various combatants, others with purchasing raw materials along their supply chain from the DRC.336 [3.91]  Like other NSAs, corporations, as specialised economic ‘organs of society’, have a responsibility to respect human rights in all situations. This responsibility may be derived, first, from national laws under which corporations operate; and, s­ econdly, from codes of conduct337 and soft law instruments, such as the ILO ­Tripartite D ­ eclaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,338 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,339 the UN Global Compact principles,340 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,341 as well as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.342 The UN Global Compact asks businesses to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption: Human Rights   P  rinciple 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and  

Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.

Labour  

 rinciple 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recogniP tion of the right to collective bargaining;

334 See UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1027. 335  Ibid. 336  Ibid. See also Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002). 337  See University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, All Business Codes of Conduct, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/allcodes.html. 338 (1978) 17 ILM 422. Adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204th Session (Geneva, November 1977) as amended at its 279th (November 2000) and 295th Session (March 2006), 4th edn, 2006, available at http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/ index.htm. 339  (1976) 15 ILM 967. The OECD updated the Guidelines in 2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ inv/mne/48004323.pdf. The 2011 Guidelines include ch IV on human rights, which is based on the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework. 340  United Nations Global Compact, The Ten Principles, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ abouttheGc/TheTenprinciples/index.html. 341  UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). Approved 13 August 2003, by UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Resolution 2003/16, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (2003). 342  UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011). The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its res 17/4 of 16 June 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/17/4, 6 July 2011.

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Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;

 

Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and

 

Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Environment   P rinciple 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;  

Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and

  P rinciple 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. Anti-Corruption   P  rinciple 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.343

[3.92]  It is not surprising that major companies increasingly claim that they respect human rights,344 in order to protect their reputation, reduce the risk of disruption through strikes, protests and boycotts, and enhance their attractiveness to current and future employees. While states have not adopted binding international human rights standards with respect to corporations, they, together with business and civil society, have drawn on some of international human rights instruments in establishing soft law standards and initiatives. These provide a framework for further development of corporate responsibility and accountability for human rights in the future, in which human rights treaties will play a key role. Chapter IV of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) recognises: States have the duty to protect human rights. Enterprises should, within the framework of internationally recognised human rights, the international human rights obligations of the countries in which they operate as well as relevant domestic laws and regulations: 1. Respect human rights, which means they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved. 2. Within the context of their own activities, avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts and address such impacts when they occur. 3. Seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their business operations, products or services by a business relationship, even if they do not contribute to those impacts. 4. Have a policy commitment to respect human rights. 5. Carry out human rights due diligence as appropriate to their size, the nature and context of operations and the severity of the risks of adverse human rights impacts. 6. Provide for or cooperate through legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts where they identify that they have caused or contributed to these impacts.

343 

United Nations Global Compact, above n 340. J Ruggie, ‘Human Rights Policies and Management Practices: Results from Questionnaire ­Surveys of Governments and Fortune Global 500 firms’, UN Doc A/HRC/4/35/Add.3 (28 February 2007). 344 See

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[3.93]  States should increasingly require ‘parent’ companies to report comprehensively on the global operations of the entire enterprise; and provide the opportunity for victims of corporate transnational human rights violations to sue foreign subsidiaries of TNCs where a parent company might be held liable under the applicable foreign law. The CESCR has specifically advised that ‘States parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have their main offices under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant’.345 This will help to move beyond encouraging corporations to respect human rights to obliging them to do so. It is vital to note that since many victims of corporate violations lack the resources or ability to bring cases against corporations, legal sources of accountability should be supplemented by ‘informal non-legal sources of pressure, such as that exercised by NGOs, consumers, the media, investors, employees, and shareholders’.346 [3.94]  States must adopt adequate and effective measures to ensure that corporations do not violate ESC rights, including when operating in other states. In this regard, when commenting on Chinese and Germany companies, the CESCR stated: The Committee is concerned about the lack of adequate and effective measures adopted by the State party to ensure that Chinese companies both State-owned and private, respect ­economic, social and cultural rights, including when operating abroad (art 2, para1). The Committee recommends that the State party: (a) Establish a clear regulatory framework for companies operating in the State party to ensure that their activities promote and do not negatively affect the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural human rights; and (b) Adopt appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure legal liability of companies and their subsidiaries operating in or managed from the State party’s territory regarding violations of economic, social and cultural rights in their projects abroad. The Committee draws the attention of the State party to its statement on the obligations of State parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights (E/2012/22, annex VI, section A).347 The Committee expresses concern that the State party’s policy-making process in, as well as its support for, investments by German companies abroad does not give due consideration to human rights (arts 2.1, 11, 22 and 23). The Committee calls on the State party to ensure that its policies on investments by German companies abroad serve the economic, social and cultural rights in the host countries.348

[3.95]  In Europe, two EU Regulations that are binding on all EU member states have influenced the approaches of the member states to holding corporations accountable. First, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 (Brussels I) provides that the national courts

345 CESCR, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties regarding the Corporate Sector and ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2011/1 (12 July 2011) para 5. 346  S Joseph, ‘Liability of Multinational Corporations’ in M Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 612, 627. 347  CESCR, Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, UN Doc E/C.12/CHN/CO/2 (23 May 2014) para 13. 348  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (12 July 2011) para 10.

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within the EU have jurisdiction over all who are domiciled in their jurisdiction.349 For corporations, Brussels I defines domicile as the location of a corporation’s ‘statutory seat’, ‘central administration’ or ‘principal place of business’.350 This definition applies generally to all EU-domiciled corporations.351 The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU has held that Brussels I prohibited the UK courts from declining jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non conveniens (being the argument that the particular court was not the most appropriate forum for the case to be heard) for corporations domiciled in the EU.352 Secondly, Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 (Rome II) provides a uniform rule that the applicable law of a claim shall be the law of the state where the damage occurred, irrespective of the state where the claim is brought.353 This rule, however, has limited exceptions. For example, the applicable law may be that of the forum state, where the law of the state in which the harm occurred does not effectively protect human rights,354 where the event is manifestly more closely connected with another state355 or where the application of that law would conflict with the public policy of the state in which the claim is brought.356 [3.96]  In the absence of domestic legislation that enables claims to be brought against a corporation for ESC rights violations occurring extraterritorially, reliance could be placed on the law of tort (in particular negligence) in a state where a parent corporation has its central administration. The argument is that a parent corporation domiciled in one state (eg in the UK) owes a duty of care to victims in another state affected by the operations of the corporation, even if through a subsidiary. Thus, in Chandler v Cape,357 a claim was brought against a UK parent corporation for injury (asbestosis caused by asbestos dust exposure) suffered by employees of a subsidiary corporation. The Court of Appeal held: In summary, this case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as in the present case, (1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection.358

[3.97]  In appropriate cases, extraterritorial litigation has helped to create the necessary pressure on corporations to settle cases out of court, in order to protect their

349  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I), [2001] OJ L12/1, Art 2(1). 350  Ibid, Art 60. 351  Some very limited exceptions to this rule exist. Ibid, Arts 23 and 27. 352  Case C-128/01, Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-553. 353  Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L199/40, Art 4(1). 354  Ibid, Art 16. 355  Ibid, Art 4(3). 356  Ibid, Art 26. 357  Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, Case No B3/2011/1272, available at http://www.bailii.org/ ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/525.html. 358  Ibid, [80].

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r­ eputation, as the following two examples demonstrate. The first case concerned human rights violations that allegedly occurred in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. The case supports the view that US corporations, like individuals, can be liable under the ATCA/ATS (see paragraph 3.11 above) for complicity in serious human rights violations. In Doe v Unocal,359 the plaintiffs, 15 villagers in the area where a pipeline was being constructed, alleged that during the construction by Unocal (a US oil and gas corporation) of the Yadana gas pipeline project in Myanmar, which stretches through Myanmar into Thailand, Unocal hired Myanmar’s military for security. It was claimed that the defendants directly or indirectly subjected the villagers to forced labour, ­murder, rape and torture. In their case against Unocal in the US under the ATCA, the Burmese villagers claimed that Unocal was liable on the basis of its complicity in the military’s human rights violations.360 In 2002, Judge Pregerson of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote an opinion for the panel, holding that, as constructed by international jurisprudence, Unocal could be held liable under the ATCA on the basis of aiding and abetting abuses that it knew about and substantially assisted through practical encouragement or support.361 In 2005, before the jury trial began, the parties agreed to a settlement and the case was dismissed, with the requirement that it cannot be brought to court again in the future.362 Unocal agreed to compensate the 14 surviving plaintiffs (Burmese peasants) for an undisclosed amount, stating: Although the terms are confidential, the settlement will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling plaintiffs and their representatives to develop programs to improve living conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of people from the pipeline region. These initiatives will provide substantial assistance to people who may have suffered hardships in the region. Unocal reaffirms its principle that the company respects human rights in all of its activities and commits to enhance its educational programs to further this principle. Plaintiffs and their representatives reaffirm their commitment to protecting human rights.363

[3.98]  The second example involves three cases brought in the US partly under the ATCA (ATS) against Shell Petroleum, NV, formerly the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Shell),364 and the former Managing Director (Brian Anderson) of Shell’s ­Nigerian subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).365 Shell was accused of complicity, aiding and abetting the Nigerian Government in the alleged 359 

John Doe I, et al, v Unocal Corp, et al, 395 F.3d 932 (9 Cir 2002). Burmese citizens sued Unocal in the US because they did not expect to get justice in domestic courts, as ‘the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed, particularly in the handling of political cases’. See US Department of State, Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 (Department of State, 1999) 815. 361  John Doe I, et al v Unocal Corp, et al, above n 359. However, in Re South African Apartheid Litigation [Khulumani, et al v Barclays]  346 F Supp 2d 538 (SDNY, 2004), Judge Sprizzo rejected the notion that ­aiding and abetting liability is contained within the ATCA, and concluded that if Congress had intended such liability to be covered by the ATCA, it would have expressly included such a provision. 362  John Doe I, et al, v Unocal Corp, et al, 403 F.3d 708 (9 Cir 2005). 363  Earth Rights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v Unocal, 21 March 2005, available at http://www.earthrights.org/legal/final-settlement-reached-doe-v-unocal. Shortly thereafter, Unocal was acquired by Chevron. 364 See Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum, No 96 Civ 8386 (1996); Wiwa v Shell Petroleum Development Company, No 4 Civ 2665 (2004). See also Wiwa v Royal Dutch/Shell, available at http://www.earthrights.org/ legal/wiwa-v-royal-dutchshell. 365  Wiwa v Anderson No 01 Civ 1909 (2001), complaint available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wiwa_ Complaint_03_01.pdf. 360  The

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violations of the law of nations against the Ogoni people in Ogoni region of the Niger Delta. The Government used deadly force and conducted massive, brutal raids against the Ogoni, with the motive of restarting oil operations on Ogoni territory. Shell was further accused of colluding with Nigerian Government forces in crimes against humanity and gross human rights abuses, including the execution of writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists on 10 November 1995. Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, two leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni ­People (MOSOP) were hanged, and others were detained and ­tortured, ­including Owens Wiwa. In Wiwa v Royal Dutch Shell,366 corporate liability under ATCA was extended to foreign corporations if they maintained ‘continuous and systematic ties to the US’. On 8 June 2009, 13 years after the first case was filed in 1996, Shell, without admitting responsibility for human rights violations, settled the three cases by agreeing to pay US$15.5 million as a ‘humanitarian gesture’, for c­ reation of a trust to benefit the Ogoni people to ‘support initiatives in education, skills ­development, agriculture, small enterprise development and adult literacy’, and the reimbursement of certain fees and costs of litigation.367 [3.99]  Extraterritorial litigation makes it more difficult for corporations to evade liability. This can discourage corporations from destroying the local environment and exploiting human rights abuses for their own profit.368 It can also lead to admissions of liability (and compensation) for human rights violations. For example, on 3 August 2011, following a class action lawsuit filed at the High Court in London, Shell admitted liability for two massive oil spills in Bodo village in Ogoni, Nigeria.369 B.  Corporate Criminal Responsibility [3.100]  The question of whether corporations can be held accountable for i­ nternational crimes has been the subject of much debate over the past number of years. While international criminal law has focused on individual criminal ­responsibility,370 it is possible in principle to extend criminal liability to corporations for corporate complicity in international crimes.371 For example, in January 2014, Judge David Baragwanath 366 

Wiwa v Royal Dutch Shell, 226 F.3d 88 (2000). Shell, ‘Shell Settles Wiwa case with Humanitarian Gesture’, 8 June 2009, available at http:// www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/media/news-and-media-releases/2009/shell-settlement-wiwa-case08062009.html. 368  See X Han, ‘The Wiwa Cases’ (2010) 9 (2) Chinese Journal of International Law 433; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland (Nairobi, UNEP, 2011). 369  See J Vidal, ‘Shell Accepts Liability for Two Oil Spills in Nigeria’, Guardian, 3 August 2011, available at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/03/shell-liability-oil-spills-nigeria?guni=Article:in%20 body%20link: ‘SPDC accepts responsibility under the Oil Pipelines Act for the two oil spills both of which were due to equipment failure. SPDC acknowledges that it is liable to pay compensation to those who are entitled to receive such compensation.’ 370 See A Cassese and P Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford ­University Press, 2013); R Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd edn (­Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014); I Bantekas, International Criminal Law, 4th edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). 371 A Clapham, ‘Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups’ (2008) 6(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 899; A Van Baar and W Huisman, ‘The Oven Builders of the Holocaust: A Case Study of Corporate Complicity in International Crimes’ (2012) 52(6) British Journal of Criminology 1033. 367 See

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of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) determined that two media organisations, together with two officials from the organisations, could be prosecuted for contempt.372 This was the first time an international criminal tribunal had found it had jurisdiction over corporations. Article 1 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon373 states that the Tribunal ‘shall have jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons’. [3.101]  Does the ordinary meaning of the term ‘person’ encompass legal, as well as natural, persons, especially in the context of a Statute that mentions ‘his or her’, ‘him or her’ and ‘himself or herself’ in relation to the accused no fewer than 28 times, but does not use the term ‘it’ in relation to the accused even once? Judge David Baragwanath did not mention this provision in his analysis but noted that ‘no … provision of the Statute or Rules expressly limits the scope of contempt proceedings to ­natural persons’.374 He rather concluded that the Tribunal cannot have jurisdiction over legal persons for the core crimes, but that ‘whether a legal person can be an accused under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute [dealing respectively with the applicable criminal law and individual criminal responsibility] is a very different question from whether a legal person can be held in contempt for knowingly and wilfully interfering with the administration of justice’.375 The judge drew the distinction by stating that offences against the administration of justice are designed to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and, ‘under the highest procedural standards, corporate entities cannot be any more entitled than natural persons to interfere with the judicial process’.376 While this is correct, it remained unclear why criminal prosecution was not limited to those individuals (editors and/or employees in this case) responsible for contempt. [3.102]  Where national law (eg Lebanese law, which the STL applies) provides for criminal jurisdiction over corporations, national courts and international tribunals applying relevant domestic law can apply criminal sanctions to corporations. In the words of the STL Appeals Panel: It would be an oddity for a Lebanese company to face criminal sanction in Lebanon for interfering with the administration of justice with respect to cases before Lebanese Courts and at the same time enjoy impunity for similar acts before an internationalised Tribunal guided by Lebanese law in carrying out its judicial work.377

Corporate criminal responsibility provides a mechanism for preventing and punishing human rights abuses committed by companies.

372 See In the Case Against Akhbar Beirut SAL Ibrahim Mohamed Al Amin, Redacted Version of Decision in Proceedings for Contempt with Orders in Lieu of an Indictment, Case No STL-14-06/I/CJ/, 31 January 2014. 373  Security Council res 1757 (2007) (emphasis added). 374  Case No STL-14-06/I/CJ/, above n 372, para 21. 375  Ibid, paras 23–24. 376  Ibid, para 24. 377  Akhbar Beirut, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, STL-14-06/PT/AP/AR126.1 (23 January 2015) para 59.

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VII.  NON-STATE ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS [3.103]  Non-state armed groups, including terrorists (eg the Taliban, so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’,378 Boko Haram and Al Qaida), insurgents in opposition to government and deaths squads (militias) supporting repressive regimes, may violate human rights of civilian populations and prisoners they capture. By definition, ­terrorist acts (and in some cases counter-terrorism measures) have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights, including ESC rights.379 Terrorist acts are criminal acts committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.380

[3.104]  Recent examples of violations of human rights (including violations of ESC rights) and violations of international humanitarian law by non-state armed groups include abuses committed by the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’ (ISIS). Some violations committed by ISIS include: attacks on social and cultural practices, including weddings, musical events and traditional ceremonies; destroying religious sites, which did not contain any military objectives; systematically expelling minority communities (Kurdish civilians); cutting off supplies of food and electricity in the predominantly Kurdish region of Ayn Al-Arab (Kobane); holding detainees in dirty and overcrowded cells, and denying them medical treatment; confining women and girls to their houses, excised from public life; conscripting and enlisting children for active combat roles; and exploiting schools to indoctrinate children.381 Other nonstate armed groups have committed serious violations of human rights, for example violations of the right to education of children, especially of girls, by closing or attacking schools, by the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan,382 and by Jama’atu ­Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad 383 (nick-named Boko Haram)384 in Nigeria.385 Boko Haram was opposed to the right to education, in particular to ‘Western’ 378  The group has used several names, including ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ or ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’ (ISIS), and ‘Islamic State’ (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah). 379  See M Scheinin, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc A/HRC/6/17 (21 November 2007). 380  Security Council res 1566 (2004), UN Doc S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004) para 3. 381  See Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, UN Doc HRC/CRP/ISIS (14 November 2014) and A/HRC/30/48, (13 August 2015). See also Security Council res 2249, UN Doc S/RES/2249 (20 November 2015). 382  See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Pakistan School Killings: Zeid Calls for United Front against “Savage Extremism”’ (16 December 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/News Events/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E. 383  This means ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’. 384  Boko Haram, loosely translated from the local Hausa-Fulani language, means ‘Western education is forbidden (or sinful)’. 385  For example, on 14 April 2014, Boko Haram abducted at gun point more than 200 girls from a boarding school in Chibok, in Borno State in the northeast of Nigeria, and reportedly subjected them to forced labour, forced marriage, rape and sexual violence. See Human Rights Watch, Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp: Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2014), available at http://features.hrw.org/features/HRW_2014_report/Those_Terrible_Weeks_in_Their_Camp/assets/ nigeria1014web.pdf.

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education, which it claimed corrupted the moral values of Muslims, especially girls. Thus, since 2009, Boko Haram has perpetrated several attacks against civilian individuals and places, including schools, markets, churches, and towns and villages.386 [3.105]  Non-state armed groups have been actively involved in the majority of ­contemporary non-international armed conflicts.387 This is partly reflected in the fact that four early situations (Uganda, the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Mali) referred by states to the ICC concerned rebel armed groups. Thus, the first completed trials before the ICC were for acts committed by rebel leaders.388 Non-state armed groups reaching a certain level of organisation (military or political structure) and control over territory and population should respect international humanitarian law and human rights law. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II thereto address parties to the conflict, which include organised non-state armed groups.389 Common Article 3 provides: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) v iolence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

386 

Ibid, 57. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2011), available at http://go.worldbank.org/1BOIJMD8H0, 52. See also United Nations, Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List, available at https://www.un.org/sc/resources/ files/consolidated.pdf. 388  The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (ICC Trial Chamber I’s Judgment, 14 March 2012); The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 (ICC Trial Chamber II’s Judgment of 7 March 2014). 389  Trial Chamber I of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4, Judgment (2 September 1998) para 611; ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 119; IACtHR, Abella v Argentina, Report no 55/97, Case no 11.137, 18 November 1997. 387 

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The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

[3.106]  Thus, all parties to the conflict, including non-state armed groups, are obliged to refrain from attacking or interfering with humanitarian facilities, vehicles and personnel, and to refrain from harming civilian populations, including through sexual violence or destroying food or water systems. In 2004 the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone confirmed: It is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties. Customary international law represents the common standard of behaviour within the international community, thus even armed groups hostile to a particular government have to abide by these laws.390

Wilful killing, directing an attack against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, destruction of property, pillaging, conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities,391 sexual slavery and rape during an armed conflict are all subject to individual criminal liability amounting to war crimes.392 Among the war crimes set out under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is ‘intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to … education … provided they are not military objectives’.393 As noted above, while international criminal law has focused on individual criminal responsibility, it is possible in principle to extend criminal liability to NSAs, including rebel groups as such.394 [3.107]  Most existing human rights treaties do not address non-state armed groups directly. Two exceptions are notable. First, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (­CRC-OPAC),395 which by its terms applies to NSAs. It provides in Article 4(1) that Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.

In 2014 the Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluded: Non-State armed groups have perpetrated the war crime of enlisting and using children below the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, and have recruited and used children under the age of 18 years in hostilities contrary to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They also committed the war crime of torture on children.

390  Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), SCSL-2004-14-ar72€ (31 May 2004) para 22. 391  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 (ICC Trial Chamber I’s Judgment, 14 March 2012). 392  See, eg, ICC, The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, above n 388. 393  Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 189 Art 8(2)(e)(iv). 394  Clapham, above n 371; Van Baar and Huisman, above n 371. 395  GA res A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000.

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­ hildren’s right to education has been denied by the use of schools as military bases and C training camps.396

[3.108]  Secondly, Article 7(5) of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) states, inter alia, that ‘members of armed groups’ are prohibited from denying internally displaced persons ‘the right to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter’.397 In addition, they are prohibited from recruiting children, or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities in any circumstances; and from forcibly recruiting persons, kidnapping, abduction or hostage taking, and engaging in sexual slavery and trafficking in persons, especially women and children.398 Although only states can presently become parties to human rights treaties, armed opposition groups, like other NSAs, remain subject to the demand of the international community, first expressed in the preamble to the UDHR, that every organ of society shall strive to promote respect for human rights. Accordingly, it can be stated that ‘[a]t a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international law (ius cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State collective entities, including armed groups. Acts violating ius cogens—for instance, torture or enforced disappearances—can never be justified.’399 [3.109]  Non-state actors can also be held criminally responsible for the crime of aggression. The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights envisions acts of aggression being committed by NSAs, stating that: ‘Crime of Aggression’ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state or organization, whether connected to the state or not of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations or the Constitutive Act of the African Union and with regard to the territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party.400

The above definition of ‘aggression’, unlike one in the Rome Statute,401 is not limited to the acts of aggression committed by State leaders but also includes acts of aggression attributable to persons in a position of leadership over non-state entities, such as organised groups engaged in internal (or international) conflicts or terrorist groups.

396  Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/25/65 (12 February 2014) para 84. 397 Adopted by African Union Summit on 23 October 2009, entered into force 6 December 2012, ­available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties. 398  Ibid. 399  ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/HRC/19/69 (22 February 2012) para 106. 400  Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the 23rd Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 27 June 2014, Art 28M(A). 401  Rome Statute of the ICC, above n 189 Art 8bis; M Politi, ‘The ICC and the Crime of Aggression: A Dream that Came Through and the Reality Ahead’ (2010) 10(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 267.

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VIII. CONCLUSION [3.110]  This chapter has examined the challenge posed by NSAs to ESC rights, ­focusing on state obligations to protect against human rights violations by NSAs and human rights responsibilities of NSAs, including international organisations, corporations and non-state armed opposition groups. Two key questions arise from the foregoing analysis: —— How should international human rights law ensure that the activities of NSAs are consistent with international human rights standards? —— How should accountability of NSAs be promoted effectively when violations of international human rights law occur? Although there are no straightforward answers to these questions, from the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn. [3.111]  First, international human rights law is historically, and will remain (at least in the near future), essentially state-centred. States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect for and protect human rights recognised in international as well as national law, including ensuring that NSAs respect human rights. This means that states have to protect human rights against violations by NSAs: individually, as home as well as host states, and collectively through ‘international cooperation’. As noted above, when violations by NSAs occur, states are obliged to investigate, punish, and provide effective and appropriate remedies through accessible, transparent and effective judicial as well as non-judicial mechanisms of accountability. Remedies may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation, and punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines), as well as the prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition. Currently, there are limited direct human rights obligations for NSAs. Consequently, international human rights law should continue to hold the state responsible within its jurisdiction to ensure that the activities of NSAs, including corporations operating abroad, are consistent with international human rights standards. As noted in 2015 by the Human Rights Committee with respect to Canadian companies operating abroad: … the Committee is concerned about allegations of human rights abuses by Canadian companies operating abroad, in particular mining corporations, and about the inaccessibility to remedies by victims of such violations. The Committee regrets the absence of an effective independent mechanism with powers to investigate complaints alleging abuses by such corporations that adversely affect the enjoyment of the human rights of victims, and of a legal framework that would facilitate such complaints (art. 2). The State party should (a) enhance the effectiveness of existing mechanisms to ensure that all Canadian corporations under its jurisdiction, in particular mining corporations, respect human rights standards when operating abroad; (b) consider establishing an independent mechanism with powers to investigate human rights abuses by such corporations abroad; and (c) develop a legal framework that affords legal remedies to people who have been victims of activities of such corporations operating abroad.402

402 

HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (13 August 2015) para 6.

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States should ensure that agreements with NSAs, including international investment and trade agreements, are entered into with full transparency and participation of affected groups, by conducting open discussions before, during and after negotiation of the agreements. However, as noted above, states in which protection of human rights against violations by NSAs is most needed are often those least able to enforce them against NSAs such as international financial institutions and TNCs—the main driving agents of the global economy, exercising control over global trade, investment and technology transfers—who possess much-desired investment capital or technology. [3.112]  Secondly, given the current limitations of state power with respect to NSAs, it is necessary that NSAs (defined broadly to include international organisations) accept/recognise some moral human rights obligations. There is no logical ground for saying that individuals and groups should have less protection against human rights violations by NSAs than they would have against the state.403 However, at present NSAs have no clearly defined legal obligations to respect human rights, apart from compliance with the legal regime of the particular state in which they are operating. Nevertheless, they undoubtedly do have a role to play in the progressive realisation of ESC rights. As this chapter makes clear, the era of NSA respect for ESC rights has arrived. Within their respective ‘spheres of activity and influence’, NSAs have two main obligations: (a) to comply with the national law of the state in which the NSA operates, as well as any relevant legislation of the state where it is domiciled; (b) to respect human rights by refraining from any conduct that will or may encourage a state to act in a way that is inconsistent with its obligations arising from national and international human rights law. Non-state actors have the responsibility to use ‘due diligence’ in ensuring that their activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights violations, and that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from human rights violations of which they are aware or ought to have been aware.404 The question is how this can be realised legally: should NSAs be directly liable for their violations of ESC rights under international human rights law, or should they continue to be indirectly liable through states; and should states have a duty under international human rights law to ensure redress for the acts and omissions of NSAs that violate ESC rights within their respective jurisdictions, as part of their due diligence obligation? [3.113]  Although there is no consensus on the above issue,405 it is clear that in the era of globalisation, it is not enough to look only to the state as the primary actor

403 

Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22, [50]. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (26 August 2003) para 1. 405  See, eg, U Baxi, ‘Market Fundamentalisms: Business Ethics at the Altar of Human Rights’ (2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 1; and John Ruggie, ‘Reports of the Special Representative of the Secretary­General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (2006) and A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) (critical of the UN Norms). But see D Kinley and R Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 447 (supportive of UN norms). 404  See

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to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Various factors have contributed to this development. They include: (a) the privatisation of functions previously performed by states; (b) the ever-increasing mobility of capital and the increased importance of foreign investment flows, facilitated by market deregulation and trade liberalisation; (c) the expanding impact and responsibilities of multilateral organisations such as the WTO affecting broader society;406 (d) the enormous growth in the role played by ­trans­national civil society organisations, many of which now have multimillion-dollar budgets, employ very large staff and perform public-type functions in a large number of states; (e) a rise in the impact of organised non-state armed groups violating human rights or controlling territory and population, and aspiring to gain international legitimacy; and (f) the growth of international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and its associates, and international criminal networks, such as drug cartels, which are not confined to any one state and some of whose activities have become global in scope.407 In view of these developments, it is necessary that a considerable number of actors other than states, including multilateral institutions (eg the IMF and the World Bank) and TNCs, should equally be obliged to respect human rights. In short, therefore, human rights should be everyone’s responsibility. As NSAs grow ever larger and more complex, they must give careful attention to respecting human rights in all of their activities, and to providing appropriate remedies where those activities result in violations of human rights. Thus, NSAs should support the emerging global framework for human rights responsibilities of NSAs as a means to achieve good governance, encourage participation, strengthen their own anticorruption controls and provide assistance in ways that strengthen the human rights obligations of states.408 [3.114]  Consequently, making space in the legal regime to take account of the role of NSAs in the realisation of ESC rights, and their effective accountability for violations of ESC rights, remains a critical challenge facing international human rights law today. In order to ensure more accountability for human rights violations by NSAs, it is relevant to build strong accountability mechanisms to influence their policies and activities, and to provide remedies for victims. One recommendation is for human rights treaties to allow NSAs, in particular international organisations, to become contracting parties so that they can be sued before competent bodies.409 The International 406  See, eg, WTO, The WTO at Twenty: Achievement and Challenges (2015), available at https://www.wto. org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wto_at_twenty_e.pdf. 407  HJ Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 1385–431. 408 World Bank, Global Monitoring Report 2006: Millennium Development Goals: Strengthening Mutual Accountability, Aid, Trade, and Governance (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006) 177, noting that ­‘­inter­national financial institutions (IFIs) are essential parts of the global governance framework, especially for poor countries. Their efforts include bolstering their own anticorruption controls, improving transparency, encouraging adherence to internationally recognized standards and codes, and working with their clients to encourage domestic accountability.’ 409 See, eg, Femi Falana v African Union, App no 001/2011 (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Judgment of 26 June 2012) paras 69–71.

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Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol allow for ‘regional integration organisations’ to become parties where those organisations are ‘constituted by sovereign states of a given region, to which member states have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this convention’.410 Similarly, Protocol No 14 to the ECHR allows for the EU to become a party to the Convention and its Protocols, so that complaints could eventually be brought against the Union before the ECtHR.411 Another step forward is to consider the creation of a global ombudsman function that could receive and handle complaints against NSAs, or to consider the adoption of the Statute of the International Court of Human Rights, to which NSAs (including intergovernmental organisations such as the UN; international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank; the WTO; TNCs; and organised opposition movements) could also possibly become parties in addition to states.412 A 2010 proposal for a World Court of Human Rights provides that NSAs could make declarations, bringing themselves within the jurisdiction of this court.413 In this arrangement, it should be possible to bring claims of human rights violations (including violations of ESC rights) not only against the state but also directly against NSAs. As Nowak has noted, ‘[i]n principle, any non-State actor might be interested, for various reasons including upholding ethical standards, marketing, corporate identity or a genuine interest in strengthening human rights, to recognise the jurisdiction of the World Court of Human Rights’.414 As privatisation, outsourcing and downsizing place ever more public or governmental functions into the hands of NSAs, the human rights regime must adapt to those changes if it is to maintain its relevance.415 It is in this context that there is increasing recognition that ‘it is essential to ensure human rights obligations fall where power is exercised, whether it is in the local village or at the international meeting rooms of the WTO, the World Bank or the IMF’.416 [3.115]  It is vital for the effectiveness of international human rights law that NSAs respect and protect human rights, in order to ensure that they remain relevant for all members of the international community. In order to meet the responsibility of NSAs

410  UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), Arts 42–44. The European Union (EU) signed the Convention on 30 March 2007, the first time in history the EU has become a party to an international human rights treaty. 411 Art 59(2) of the ECHR provides that ‘the European Union may accede to this Convention’, as amended by Protocol No 14 to the ECHR which entered into force on 1 June 2010. In Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, the CJEU held: ‘The [draft] agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU [the Treaty on European Union] or with Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. 412  See M Nowak, ‘The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 251, 256–57. 413  J Kozma, M Nowak and M Scheinin, A World Court of Human Rights—Consolidated Statute and Commentary (Neuer Wissenschaftliche, Verlag, 2010) 33–34. 414  Nowak, above n 412, 257. 415  See generally K De Feyter and F Gomez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Oxford, Intersentia, 2005); Clapham, above n 1. 416  M Robinson, ‘From Rhetoric to Reality: Making Human Rights Work’ (2003) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 1, 5–6; M Robinson, ‘Shaping Globalisation: The Role of Human Rights’ in American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting (Washington, DC, American Society of International Law, 2003) 1.

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to respect human rights, such actors should have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and circumstances, including: (a) A [publicly available] policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; (b) A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights; (c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.417

There is a need for the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO to root their policies in core human rights principles such as non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and accountability.418 It is also essential for them to adopt human rights policy statements or codes of conduct on human rights, which expressly recognise the importance of human rights generally and ESC rights in particular, in relation to all their strategies, policies, programmes, projects and activities. This would give greater legitimacy to ­difficult and contested policy choices, and strengthen policy coherence and coordination among these actors. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly important that all decision-making by NSAs—local, national, regional and global—should take human rights issues into account consistently and comprehensively. As a minimum, policies and programmes of NSAs must not facilitate breaches of states’ human rights treaty and customary obligations. International financial institutions should pay greater attention to the protection of ESC rights in their lending policies, structural adjustment programmes, poverty alleviation programmes and credit agreements. Whether international human rights law will develop to adequately protect against violations of human rights by NSAs, and to hold effectively all NSAs directly accountable for violations of ESC rights, remains to be seen. The challenge that faces human rights activists is to reflect on the most appropriate manner in which to enhance the obligations of NSAs with respect to ESC rights. As a starting point, it is necessary to integrate consistently the human rights principles of non-­discrimination, monitoring, democratic participation and accountability at each step of the process of making and applying the policies and decisions of NSAs. In the final analysis, global rules binding on NSAs are necessary because most of these actors have outgrown the ability of many individual states to regulate them effectively.

417 

UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, above n 40, Principle 15. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, UN Doc HRI/MC/2008/3 (6 June 2008) para 10. 418 

4 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights I. INTRODUCTION [4.01]  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights1 (African Charter) is widely known as the first international human rights treaty to protect the three ‘­generations’ of human rights—including civil and political rights, ESC rights, and group and peoples’ rights—in a single instrument, without drawing any distinction between the justiciability or implementation of the three ‘generations’ of rights.2 The African Charter protected ESC rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights. By Article 1 of the African Charter, states parties to the African Charter ‘shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms’ enshrined in the Charter and ‘undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them’. Significantly, the Preamble to the African Charter proclaimed the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all rights by providing that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.

[4.02]  Thus, the African Charter protects all human rights—civil, political, economic, social and cultural—under the same heading (‘Human and Peoples’ Rights’), lending support to the view that all rights protected in the Charter place legally binding obligations on states parties to respect, protect and fulfil them.3 In this respect, ESC rights in the African Charter are as justiciable as any of the other rights enumerated therein. However, despite the legal protection of ESC rights in Africa, it is undisputed that the state of such rights in Africa is generally poor. Reflecting this reality, in 2014, 1 

OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), ratified by 53 member states of the African Union. a discussion see generally M Ssenyonjo (ed), The African Regional Human Rights System (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012); F Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 214; MD Evans and R Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986–2006, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); and F Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human for Human Dignity and Sustainable Development in Africa (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003). 3  See, eg, Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi & Others v Republic of Sudan, Communication no 368/09, para 92, available at http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/368.09/: ‘[t]he Commission considers that if a State Party fails to respect, protect, promote or fulfill any of the rights guaranteed in the Charter, this constitutes a violation of Article 1 of [the] African Charter’. 2  For

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65 per cent of states parties to the African Charter were at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index4 (based on life expectancy at birth, mean and expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita) in states classified as having ‘low human development’, reflecting lower levels of realisation of ESC rights.5 [4.03]  This chapter provides a background to the protection of ESC rights in the ­African regional system. It considers the legal protection of ESC rights in the ­African regional system, with special emphasis on the African Charter (section II.), the interpretation by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) of ESC rights protected in the African Charter, based on the African Commission’s jurisprudence on ESC rights (section III.), ending with concluding observations (section IV.).

II.  THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CHARTER [4.04]  Despite the protection of all human rights in the African Charter without separation of civil and political rights from ESC rights, only a modest number of ESC rights were explicitly included in the Charter. This was due to a ‘minimalist’ approach adopted during its drafting, which, at the time, was in line with the notion ‘to spare … young states too many but important obligations’.6 Thus, the African Charter only explicitly recognises the following individual ESC rights: —— —— —— —— ——

the right to property (Article 14); the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions (Article 15); the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health (Article 16); the right to education (Article 17(1)); and the protection of the family and cultural rights (Articles 17(2) and (3), 18(1) and (2), and 61).

The Charter also protects some group rights in Articles 19–24, including the rights to self-determination, free disposal of wealth and natural resources, economic, social and cultural development, national and international peace and security, and a g­ eneral

4  Human Development Index (HDI) is a ‘composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living’. See UNDP, Human Development Report 2014—Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience (New York, UNDP, 2014) Technical note 1, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en, for details on how the HDI is calculated. 5 The following African states were classified as having ‘low human development’: DRC, Central African Republic, Chad, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, Mozambique, GuineaBissau, Mali, Liberia, Malawi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti Togo, Sudan, Benin, Uganda, Senegal, Lesotho, Mauritania, Tanzania, Comoros, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Nigeria, Cameroon, Rwanda, Angola, Swaziland and Kenya. See UNDP, Human Development Report 2014, above n 4, 160–63, ‘Table 1: Human Development Index and its components’, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components. 6 See Rapporteur’s Report on the Draft ACHPR, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt (II) Rev 4, para 13; Viljoen, above n 2, 215.

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satisfactory environment. Most of these rights may be seen, at least in part, as ­collective ESC rights. [4.05]  Significantly, with the exception of the right to property, there are no rightspecific norm-based limitations on ESC rights in the African Charter. However, it is accepted that all Charter rights may be subjected to general limitations set out in Article 27(2), which provides that the rights and freedoms of each individual ‘shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest’. According to the African Commission, Article 27(2) of the African Charter provides the only ‘legitimate reasons’ for the general limitation of the rights and freedoms under the Charter.7 It follows that limitations on ESC rights, like limitations on other rights, ‘cannot be derived solely from the popular will’8 but must be justified by reference to the public interests specified in Article 27(2). The Commission’s jurisprudence requires that ‘the justification of limitations must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which follow’,9 and that ‘any limitations on rights must be proportionate to a legitimate need, and should be the least restrictive measures possible’.10 In addition, the African Charter does not contain a specific derogation clause. This has been interpreted to mean that derogation from ‘the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or special circumstances’.11 Thus states parties to the African Charter cannot, in any circumstances whatsoever, justify non-compliance with at least the core obligations with respect to ESC rights under the African Charter, even in real public emergencies (ie exceptional situations of crisis that affect the whole population and constitute a threat to the organised life of the community of which the state is composed).12 [4.06]  Although the African Charter protects ESC rights, as shown in section III. below, it does so in very general and extremely vague terms. The provisions lack specificity and require innovative interpretation (by the African Commission and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights) in the light of present-day conditions, to enable states parties to understand and implement their obligations. Specific interpretation is essential if states parties are to give effect to the object and purpose of the Charter, which is to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms’ effectively

7  Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, Communications nos 279/03 and 296/05 (2009), 28th Activity Report, para 165 (COHRE case). Decisions of the African Commission are reported in the Annual Activity Reports of the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights (Activity Reports) available at http://www.achpr.org/activity-reports/. 8  Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, Communication no 211/98 (2001), 14th Annual Activity Report, para 70 (emphasis added). 9  Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Communication nos 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), 13th Annual Activity Report, para 42 (emphasis added). 10  Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (Endorois case), Communication no 276/2003 (2009), 27th Annual Activity Report, para 214. 11  Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Communications nos 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), 13th Annual Activity Report, para 41; Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad, Communication no 74/92 (1995), 9th Annual Activity Report, para 21; Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, Communication nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97–196/97 and 210/98 (2000), 13th Annual Activity Report, annex V, para 84; and COHRE case, above n 7, paras 165 and 167. 12  Lawless v Ireland, App no 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 15, para 28.

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in Africa,13 which would then enable them to implement the relevant ESC rights. It seems the vague wording was designed to permit a degree of ‘flexibility’ in the application and subsequent interpretation of the African Charter by the competent bodies.14 [4.07]  Among the individual ESC rights, which are fundamental for human survival and for living a life of dignity, explicitly protected in the ICESCR15 but not explicitly included in the African Charter, are the rights to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; to social security; and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The rights to water and sanitation, to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working hours, periodic holidays with pay, remuneration for public holidays, and to form and join trade unions are also not explicitly protected in the African Charter, despite the fact that they were so protected in the ICESCR.16 Relatively more detailed ESC rights are covered in later African human rights treaties protecting specific, more vulnerable groups—children, women, the youth and internally displaced persons—in particular the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;17 the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol);18 the African Youth Charter;19 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons.20 [4.08]  Thus, so far, in its growing ‘case law’, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has most frequently dealt with civil and political rights, such as the rights to a fair trial, freedom of speech, and freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.21 This is partly because most Communications brought before the Commission by civil society actors, such as NGOs, have 13 

African Charter, above n 1, preamble, para. 11. Report of the Rapporteur, OAU Ministerial Meeting on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, The Gambia, 9–15 June 1980, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Draft RPT.rpt (II), para 13. 15  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976, Arts 6–15. The vast majority of African UN member states (48 states) have ratified the ICESCR. 16  Ibid. 17  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999. See, eg, Arts 11 (right to education); 12 (leisure, recreation and cultural activities); 14 (right to health); 15 (protection against child labour); 18 (protection of the family); and 21 (protection from harmful social and cultural practices). 18  Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, Maputo, 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/protocol-african-charter-humanand-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa. The Protocol protects ESC rights in Arts 12 (education and training); 13 (economic and social welfare rights); 14 (health and reproductive rights); 15 (food security); 16 (adequate housing); and 17 (positive cultural context). The Protocol provides for special protection for elderly women, women with disabilities and women in distress in Arts 22–24. 19  Adopted by the African Union Assembly in July 2006, entered into force 8 August 2009, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-youth-charter. The Charter protects several rights, including property (Art 9); education (Art 13); freedom from poverty (Art 14); employment (Art 15); health (Art 16) and culture (Arts 20 and 25). 20  Adopted by the Special Summit of the African Union held in Kampala, 22 October 2009, entered into force 6 December 2012, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-convention-protectionand-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa. Under Art 3(b), states undertake to ‘[p]revent political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and marginalisation, that are likely to cause displacement of populations or persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion’. 21  Between 1988 and 2014 the African Commission had published decisions in over 200 cases (called ‘Communications’), of which slightly less than half were inadmissibility decisions. 14  See

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tended to raise issues relating to civil and political rights. Only a few ESC rights cases have been brought before the Commission. This is despite the fact that many individuals and more vulnerable groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the inhabitants of rural and deprived urban areas, landless persons, women, children, households headed by women, families living with HIV/AIDS, persons with disabilities, refugees and internally displaced persons, still live in (extreme) poverty.22 This is made worse by high levels of corruption and impunity, as well as institutional and political crises,23 leading to widespread denials and violations of ESC rights. For example in 2009 in the DRC, 75 per cent of the population lived in extreme poverty, 83 per cent of the population had no access to safe drinking water, while 70 per cent had no access to hygienic sanitation facilities and only 1 per cent of the population had access to electricity.24 [4.09]  While life expectancy at birth in the year 2014 in some non-African states (such as Andorra, Austria, Belgium, China (SAR), Australia, Canada, Finland, France, ­Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, ­Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom) was over 80 years, in several states that are party to the African Charter (such as Angola, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, DRC, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) it was below 52 years.25 Fifty per cent of the 536,000 deaths of women that occur every year due to complications during pregnancy, childbirth or the six weeks following delivery are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with unsafe abortion being one of the major causes.26

III.  THE INTERPRETATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS BY THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS [4.10]  The African Commission is the oldest human rights complaint-handling body in Africa. It was established by the African Charter (Article 30) and, since 1989, the has been receiving and determining cases (‘Communications’) from individuals and NGOs on alleged human rights violations in Africa. It has through the years developed a valuable and uniquely African body of human rights case law, which has given teeth to the African Charter. The most important Communications on ESC rights are considered below, to demonstrate the contribution of the African Commission to the justiciability of ESC rights in Africa. [4.11]  In jurisprudential terms, decisions of the African Commission on ESC rights made before 2001 found violations of ESC rights, but they did not adequately develop

22  See UNDP, Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development (New York, UNDP, 2010) 86, 97–98. 23  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009) paras 7, 11 and 24. 24 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (16 December 2009) para 29. 25  UNDP, above n 22, 160–63. 26 UN, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009 (New York, United Nations, 2009) 26.

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the normative content of ESC rights protected under the African Charter. This failure to develop norms also generally applied to the civil and political rights jurisprudence of the Commission pre-2001. The Commission’s decisions generally failed to delineate the freedoms and entitlements arising from specific rights protected in the African Charter. The Commission did not feel at ease in developing rights where there was little concrete international jurisprudence.27 In fact, the UN system, particularly the CESCR, in the 1990s was just developing the normative content of ESC rights and the nature of state obligations.28 Expert guidelines on violations of ESC rights were only made in 1997.29 These had not been applied in specific cases at either national or international levels. Until 2010 the African Commission lacked principles and guidelines to fully explain the content of ESC rights protected in the African Charter and the nature of states parties’ obligations on the implementation of such ESC rights.30 However, most decisions of the Commission on ESC rights decided on the merits from 2001 have relied increasingly on international human rights law to develop the normative content of some ESC rights under the African Charter. The decisions have become longer, with more elaborate reasoning. [4.12]  The Commission has applied the analytical framework of ‘respect, protect, promote, and fulfil’ typology of state obligations to ESC rights under the African Charter to develop its jurisprudence.31 The Commission’s improved approach to ESC rights may be attributed to several other factors with a direct impact on the Commission’s work, including ‘Commissioners who were prepared to articulate reasons more clearly, by better secretarial support,32 and through improved contribution of pleadings by the parties’, as well as the greater and increasingly critical engagement of states.33 Furthermore, NGOs with a focus on ESC rights have been essential in

27 See Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/ Communities (ACHPR/IWGIA, 2005), available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/ African_Commission_book.pdf. 28  The CESCR clarified the scope of several substantive rights, such as the right to adequate housing, the right to adequate food and the right to education, in the 1990s. See CESCR, General Comments 4, 7, 12 and 13. 29  See Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, 22–26 January 1997 (1998) 20(3) Human Rights Quarterly 691. 30  See Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted at the 47th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 12 to 26 May 2010, and formally launched at the Commission’s 50th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 24 October to 7 November 2011), available at: http://www.achpr.org/files/ instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf. 31  Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, paras 44–47 (SERAC case); Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, annex III, (2006), 21st Annual Activity Report, 54, para 152. However, this analysis is not always applied consistently by the Commission. For example, in the COHRE case, above n 7, 66, para 191, the Commission stated the ‘State has an obligation under Article 14 of the African Charter not only to respect the “right to property”, but also to protect that right’. No reference was made to the state obligation to promote and to fulfil the right to property. The obligation to promote was only made with reference to ‘cultural rights’ in para 248. 32  At the time of writing a small full-time secretariat, but inadequately resourced, based in Banjul, The Gambia, and headed by a Secretary, provides continuity and administrative support to the Commission. It does the necessary legal research and prepares draft decisions for the Commissioners. By 2014 the Commission’s secretariat telephone lines were not really functional, e-mail was erratic and fax lines were not operational. See 36th Annual Activity Report, paras 36–37. 33  F Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 354.

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bringing ESC rights cases before the Commission and further improving the quality of legal ­arguments before the Commission in favour of ESC rights. Such NGOs include the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC),34 the Center for Economic and Social Rights, and the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project.35 The approach of the Commission to ESC rights cases is examined below, with a particular focus on ESC rights explicitly protected in the African Charter (namely, rights to property, health, education, work and cultural life) and ESC rights implied in the African Charter by the African Commission (namely, rights to housing, food, social security, water and sanitation). A.  Right to Property [4.13]  Article 14 of the African Charter provides: The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

The term ‘property’ is not defined. Thus, what falls within the notion of ‘property’ in Article 14 remains unclear. Unlike Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which specifies the beneficiaries of the right to property as being both natural and legal persons,36 Article 14 of the African Charter is silent as to the beneficiaries of the right. Are they limited to individuals (and groups of individuals), or do they extend to legal persons, such as business entities, including corporations? [4.14]  Apart from the fact that the content of the right to property and its beneficiaries are not defined in Article 14, the permissible restrictions—references to ‘public need’ or the ‘general interest of the community’—are broadly framed. There is no explicit mention of ‘prompt, effective and adequate compensation’ prior to the compulsory deprivation of property. In several Communications the Commission found a violation of the right to property under Article 14 without indicating the scope of this right. For example, in John K Modise v Botswana,37 the complainant had been deported four times from Botswana. He claimed a violation of the right to property under Article 14, alleging that he had suffered heavy financial loses, since the Government of Botswana had confiscated his belongings and property. The Government of

34 

See, eg, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) v Nigeria, Communication no 370/09. See, eg, Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v Libya, Communication no 378/09; SocioEconomic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Communication no 338/07, available at http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/338.07/. The case was declared admissible by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice in SocioEconomic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission, Suit no ECW/CCJ/APP/0808 (27 October 2009). 36  Art 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR provides: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ 37  John K Modise v Botswana, Communication no 97/93 (2000), 10th Activity Report. 35 

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Botswana did not refute this allegation. In these circumstances, the Commission found ‘the above action of the government of Botswana an encroachment of the Complainant’s right to property guaranteed under Article 14 of the Charter’.38 There was no attempt to clarify the normative content of the right to property. It appears, however, that the Commission’s finding is consistent with the general principles of international law, which require that non-nationals are protected against arbitrary expropriations and, in case of lawful expropriations, are entitled to prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the loss of their property.39 [4.15]  Indeed, only a few examples of the right to property can be derived from the Commission’s case law. In Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, land was considered ‘property’ for the purposes of Article 14 of the Charter,40 although in later cases the Commission stated that the ‘right to property necessarily includes a right to have access to property of one’s own and the right … for one’s property [not] to be removed’,41 invaded or encroached upon.42 This inclusive (non-exhaustive) statement of the right to property was broadly framed, but it failed to define what is meant by ‘property’. The precise scope of the right to property remained unclear. In particular, it was uncertain whether the right to property entailed a right of everyone to own private property, or was limited to the protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property. Even in its more recent decisions on the right to property, the Commission did not examine the normative content of the right.43 [4.16]  Since 2001, the Commission has interpreted the scope of the right to property in the African Charter by stating that it encompasses two main principles.44 The first, which is of a general nature, provides for the principle of ownership and peaceful enjoyment of property.45 This means that everyone is entitled to peaceful enjoyment of their (existing) possessions, including the right to dispose of their property. The Article does not guarantee a right to acquire possessions. The role of the state is to respect and protect this right against any form of encroachment, and to regulate the

38 

Ibid, para 94. James and Others v United Kingdom, App no 8793/79, 21 February 1986, (1986) 8 EHRR 123, paras 61–63. 40  Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, Communications nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), 13th Annual Activity Report, para 128, stating that ‘[t]he confiscation and looting of the property of black Mauritanians and the expropriation or destruction of their land and houses before forcing them to go abroad constitute a violation of the right to property as guaranteed in Article 14’. 41  Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, Communications nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 (1998), 12th Annual Activity Report, para 77 (emphasis added). 42  Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Communications nos 140/94, 141/94, 145/95 (1999), 13th Annual Activity Report, para 55. 43 See Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Republic of ­Zimbabwe, Communication no 284/2003 (2009), 26th Annual Activity Report, annex 3, para 179. The Commission simply stated that ‘[t]he confiscation of the Complainants’ equipment and depriving them of a source of income and livelihood is also a violation of their right to property guaranteed under Article 14’, without articulating the normative content of the right to property. See also Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Interights v Cameroon, Communication no 272/2003, 27th Annual Activity Report, annex 3, paras 33–36. 44 See Interights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, and Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communication no 373/2009 (formerly 242/2001) (2010), 28th Annual Activity Report, para 44. 45  Ibid. 39 

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exercise of this right in order for it to be accessible to everyone, taking public interest into due consideration.46 The second principle provides for the possibility, and conditions of deprivation, of the right to property.47 Article 14 of the Charter recognises that states are in certain circumstances entitled, among other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the ‘public or general interest’, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose.48 The confiscation of private property without a legitimate aim (a showing of a public or general interest of the community) and proportionate justification (a fair balance between the individual interest and the collective or general interest of the community) would be arbitrary and in violation of Article 14. However, the Commission has not yet defined the concept of ‘public or general interest’. It is clear, nonetheless, that its scope is very wide, encompassing ‘legitimate public interest objectives such as economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice’,49 for example the protection of nature and forests,50 the protection of natural heritage,51 and the protection of the historical and cultural heritage. [4.17]  The African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights52 confirmed the broad nature of the right to property under the African Charter, observing: 53. The right to property is a broad right that includes the protection of the real rights of individuals and peoples in any material thing which can be possessed as well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony. The concept also includes the protection of a legitimate expectation of the acquisition of property. It encompasses the rights of the individual, group or people to peaceful enjoyment of the property. The right may be limited by the State in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the law and the principle of proportionality. 54. Protected under this article are rights guaranteed by traditional custom and law to access to, and use of, land and other natural resources held under communal ownership. This places an obligation on State Parties to ensure security of tenure to rural communities, and their members.53

[4.18]  Thus, the notion of ‘property’ may arguably be understood as covering all ­manner of things that have an economic value, including both real (immovable) and personal (movable) property, for example company shares, intellectual property (such as patents, trademarks, copyrights) and Internet domain names, as well as possessions (such as telecommunications and broadcasting licences, fishing rights, planning permissions, rights flowing from leases, an enforceable judgment or arbitration award against the state, and social security benefits where national law provides for such an entitlement). It also includes a ‘legitimate expectation’, which must be of

46 

Ibid, para 43. Ibid, para 44. 48  Ibid. 49  African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 30, para 55(c) (emphasis added). 50  Turgut and Others v Turkey, App no 1411/03 (ECtHR, 8 July 2008). 51  Anonymos Touristiki Etairia Xenodocheia v Greece, App no 35332/05 (ECtHR, 21 February 2008). 52  Above n 30. 53  Ibid. 47 

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‘a nature more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision’,54 or where there is settled case law of the domestic courts confirming its existence. Thus, the right to property in the African Charter entails a wider range of obligations on states parties, including obligations to: (a) Ensure peaceful enjoyment of property and protection from forced eviction. This obligation implies that the State shall protect the enjoyment [of the right to property] in all its forms, from interference by third parties as well as its own agents. (b) Define by law the terms and conditions for the acquisition, nationalisation or expropriation of property based on acting in the public interest at all times. (c) Ensure that ‘public need or in the general interest of the community’ as expressed under the Charter serves legitimate public interest objectives such as economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice. (d) Ensure effective public participation and transparency in any acquisition process. (e) Ensure that compensation for public acquisition of property fairly balances the rights of the individual and the wider interests of society. In general, compensation should be reasonably related to the market value of the acquired property. However, in certain circumstances public interest may require less than market value compensation or, exceptionally, none at all. (f) To ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including indigenous populations/communities who are victims of historical land injustices, have independent access to and use of land and the right to reclaim their ancestral rights, and are adequately compensated for both historical and current destruction or alienation of wealth and resources. This may include land redistribution programmes implemented according to the due process of the law. States should protect traditional land ownership, while ensuring gender equality. (g) To prevent unfair exploitation of natural resources by both state and non-state national and international actors. (h) To ensure equitable and non-discriminatory access, acquisition, ownership, inheritance and control of land and housing, especially by women. This includes the obligation to take measures to modify or prohibit harmful social, cultural or other practices that prevent women and other members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups from enjoying their right to property, particularly in relation to housing and land.55

[4.19]  It is clear that the right to property extends to collective claims of indigenous peoples’ rights to land. Thus in the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya,56 it was alleged that the Government of Kenya, in violation of Article 14 of the African Charter, forcibly removed the Endorois community57 from their ancestral lands, without proper, prior consultations or adequate and effective compensation. The Commission found, among others, a violation of Article 14, noting, inter alia, that not only had the state denied the Endorois community all legal rights in their

54  Ramaer and Van Willigen v The Netherlands, App no 34880/12 (ECtHR, 23 October 2012) para 81; Gratzinger and Gratizingerova v Czech Republic, App no 39794/98 (ECtHR, 10 July 2002) para 73. 55  African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 30, para 55. 56  Communication no 276/2003 (2009), above n 10. 57  The Endorois are a semi-nomadic indigenous community of approximately 60,000 people, who for centuries have earned their livelihoods from herding cattle and goats in the Lake Bogoria area of Kenya’s Rift Valley.

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ancestral land, rendering their property rights essentially illusory, but, with the aim of creating a Game Reserve, the state had violated the very essence of the right itself, and could not justify such an interference with reference to ‘the general interest of the community’ or a ‘public need’.58 The decision is noteworthy because the Commission emphasised the African Charter’s protection for collective claims to land rights as property by indigenous communities. It marked the first time the Commission had recognised indigenous peoples’ rights over traditionally owned land under the African Charter. B.  Rights to Health and Education [4.20]  Article 16(1) of the African Charter, which protects the right to health, reads: Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.

Article 16(2) then obliges state parties to take the ‘necessary measures’ to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick. Clearly, Article 16 does not define the content of the right to the ‘best attainable state of physical and mental health’, neither does it indicate the specific measures states are required to undertake to implement this right. [4.21]  Article 17(1) of the Charter, which protects the right to education, provides only: Every individual shall have the right to education.

Unlike Article 13 of the ICESCR, which elaborates on the content of the right to education, the content of the right in the African Charter that ‘every individual’ is entitled to enjoy was not defined at all. The general character of this provision leaves more questions than answers. Does Article 17 guarantee access to pre-school education, the right to free and compulsory primary education to all, a right to have secondary education generally available and accessible to all, and a right to the accessibility of higher education on the basis of capacity? The objectives of education are also not stated. Clearly, then, such a general formulation of the right to education leaves it widely uncertain. [4.22]  The Commission’s pre-2001 case law on health and education found violations of both rights on relevant facts, without developing the normative content of either right. For example, in Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v Zaire,59 it was alleged, inter alia, that the mismanagement of public finances, the failure of the Government to provide basic services, the shortage of medicines, and the closure

58 

Communication no 276/2003, above n 10, paras 215 and 238. Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v Zaire, Communications nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1996), 9th  Annual Activity Report. This decision was taken at the 18th Ordinary Session, Praia, Cape Verde, ­October 1995. 59 

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of universities and secondary schools for two years amounted to a violation of the African Charter. The Commission simply stated as follows: 47. Article 16 of the African Charter states that every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, and that States Parties should take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people. The failure of the Government to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and the shortage of medicine as alleged in communication 100/93 constitutes a violation of Article 16. [emphasis added] 48. Article 17 of the Charter guarantees the right to education. The closures of universities and secondary schools as described in communication 100/93 constitutes a violation of Article 17.

[4.23]  The Commission then held, without legal reasoning, that the facts constituted ‘serious and massive violations’ of several provisions in the African Charter, including Articles 16 and 17. While these findings were commendable in so far as they applied the notion of ‘serious’ violations to ESC rights, which traditionally has been used with respect to civil and political rights, it can be noted that the Commission merely restated the relevant provisions of the African Charter. Articles 16 and 17 do not provide details as to the content of the rights to education and health. It would have been preferable first to identify the normative content of such very general provisions before concluding that the provisions had been violated. However, the Commission did not take the opportunity to do so. Thus, apart from the Commission’s stating that the acts/omissions listed above constituted violations of the rights to health and education, the normative content of the rights to health and education under Articles 16 and 17 remained unclear. [4.24]  Later decisions made in the period 1997–2000—such as Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola,60 International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria,61 and Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania62—did little to address the normative content of the relevant provisions on ESC rights in the African Charter. [4.25]  For example, the decision in International Pen and Others v Nigeria found a violation of the right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter without identifying the content of the right. In this case it was alleged that Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer, Ogoni activist and President of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, was arrested in 1994, was severely beaten during the first days of his detention, and was held for several days in leg irons and handcuffs. He was also denied access to hospital treatment and the medicine he needed to control his blood pressure. He was held in very poor conditions. In these circumstances, the Commission found that 60  Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola, Communication no 159/96 (1997), 11th Annual Activity Report. This decision was taken at the 22nd Ordinary Session, Banjul (Gambia), on 11 November 1997. 61  International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria, Communication nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998), 12th Annual Activity Report. Done at Banjul, 31 October 1998. 62  Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, Communication nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), 13th Annual Activity Report. Done at Algiers, 11 May 2000.

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[t]he responsibility of the government is heightened in cases where an individual is in its ­custody and therefore someone whose integrity and well-being is completely dependent on the actions of the authorities. The state has a direct responsibility in this case. Despite requests for hospital treatment made by a qualified prison doctor, these were denied to Ken Saro-Wiwa, causing his health to suffer to the point where his life was endangered. The government has not denied this allegation in any way. This is a violation of Article 16.63

While it is clear from the foregoing that the denial to prisoners (who are vulnerable or a marginalised section of the population) of access to hospital treatment or access to doctors while their health is deteriorating is a violation of the right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter, the nature and scope of prisoners’ right to health was not clearly discerned.64 [4.26]  In Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania,65 the African Commission had another opportunity to clarify the scope of prisoners’ right to health but failed to do so. In this case, the Government detained members of black ethnic groups in Mauritania after it was criticised by them for marginalising black Mauritanians. Prisoners were detained in the worst conditions. They received only a small amount of rice each day, without any meat or salt. Some of them had to eat leaves and grass. The prisoners were forced to carry out very hard labour day and night, and they were chained up in pairs in windowless cells. They were given only one set of clothes and lived in conditions of very poor hygiene. They were regularly beaten by their guards and kept in overcrowded cells. They slept on the floor without any blankets, even during the cold season. The cells were infested with lice, bedbugs and cockroaches, and nothing was done to ensure hygiene and the provision of healthcare. As a result, some of the prisoners had died in detention. In finding a violation of Article 16 on the basis of the facts above, the Commission stated: The State’s responsibility in the event of detention is even more evident to the extent that detention centres are of its exclusive preserve, hence the physical integrity and welfare of detainees is the responsibility of the competent public authorities. Some prisoners died as a result of the lack of medical attention. The general state of health of the prisoners deteriorated due to the lack of sufficient food; they had neither blankets nor adequate hygiene. The Mauritanian State is directly responsible for this state of affairs and the government has not denied these facts. Consequently, the Commission considers that there was violation of article 16.66

[4.27]  Thus, a violation of the right to health was established on the facts based on state responsibility for detention centres, without defining the content of the right to health of prisoners. Therefore the scope of the prisoners’ right to health under the African Charter remains unclear. This is despite the fact that prisoners in some ­African states still face several difficulties, impacting negatively on their right to health, including overcrowding, poor hygienic and sanitary conditions, lack of sleeping space, food 63  Communication nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, above n 61, para 114. See also Media Rights Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, Communications nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96, 12th Annual Activity Report, para 88. 64  For a discussion of prisoner’s right to health, see R Lines, ‘The Right to Health of Prisoners in International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 4(1) International Journal of Prisoner Health 3. 65  Above n 62. 66  Ibid, para 122.

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and water, the absence of adequate healthcare, including for pregnant women and HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis patients, as well as the absence of specialised facilities for prisoners and detainees with disabilities.67 [4.28]  From 2001, the Commission relied on the ICESCR and the General Comments of the CESCR to develop the normative content of right to health under the African Charter, as illustrated by the following cases. In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, the African Commission stated that the right to health includes ‘the right to health facilities, access to goods and services to be guaranteed to all without discrimination of any kind.’68 It observed that, having due regard to high levels of poverty in Africa, the African Commission would like to read into Article 16 the obligation on the part of states parties to the African Charter to take ‘concrete and targeted steps’, while taking full advantage of ‘available resources’ (within a state and from international ­assistance/cooperation), to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind.69 In the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights(CESR)v Nigeria70 (SERAC case), the complainants alleged that the Nigerian Government had violated the right to health and the right to a clean environment, as recognised under Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter, by failing to fulfil the minimum duties required by these rights.71 This, the complainants alleged, the Government did by: (i) directly participating in the contamination of air, water and soil, and thereby harming the health of the Ogoni population; (ii) failing to protect the Ogoni population from the harm caused by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), instead using its security forces to facilitate the damage; and (iii) failing to provide or permit studies of potential or actual environmental and health risks caused by the oil operations. Unlike in the previous cases, the Commission commented on the normative content of the right to a healthy environment under Articles 16 and 24 by stating as follows: 52. The right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under Article 24 of the African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the State to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which Nigeria is a party, requires governments to take necessary steps for the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene. The right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health enunciated in Article 16(1) of the African Charter and the right to a general satisfactory environment

67  See, eg, Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, UN Doc CAT/C/ETH/CO/1 (November 2010) para 26. 68  Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, Communication no 241/2001, 16th Annual Activity Report, para 80. 69  Ibid, para 84. 70  Above n 31. Done at the 30th Ordinary Session, held in Banjul, The Gambia from 13–27 October 2001. For a comment on this case, see D Shelton, ‘Decision Regarding Communication 155/96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria’ (2002) 96(4) American Journal of International Law 937. 71  Art 24 of the African Charter reads, ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.’

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favourable to development (Article 16(3)) already noted obligate governments to desist from directly threatening the health and environment of their citizens. The State is under an obligation to respect the just noted rights and this entails largely non-interventionist conduct from the State for example, not from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal measures violating the integrity of the individual. 53. Government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter must also include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.

[4.29]  Applying the above standards to the facts of the case, the Commission concluded that although Nigeria had the right to produce oil, it had not protected the rights of the Ogoni under Articles 16 and 24. Thus, the Commission read the rights to health and to a clean environment together. [4.30]  In a decision adopted in 2009, the COHRE case,72 the Commission further elaborated on the scope of the right to health under Article 16 of the African C ­ harter by relying on the interpretation of the right to health in international law. In this Communication, the complainants alleged gross, massive and systematic violations of human rights by the Republic of Sudan (involving destruction of homes, livestock and farms, as well as the poisoning of water sources) against the indigenous Black ­African tribes in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, in particular members of the Fur, Marsalit and Zaghawa tribes. It was claimed that the Republic of Sudan was complicit in looting and destroying foodstuffs, crops and livestock, as well as poisoning wells and denying access to water sources in the Darfur region in violation of Article 16. The Commission gave the right to health meaningful content by relying on the normative definition of the right to health as spelt out by the CESCR in General Comment 14 on the ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health’.73 The Commission stated: 209. In its General Comment No 14 on the right to health adopted in 2000, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sets out that, ‘the right to health extends not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as, access to safe and portable water, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition, and housing […]’. In terms of the General Comment, the right to health contains four elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality, and impose three types of obligations on States—to respect, fulfil and protect the right. In terms of the duty to protect, the State must ensure that third parties (non-state actors) do not infringe upon the enjoyment of the right to health. 210. Violations of the right to health can occur through the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States. According to General Comment 14, ‘states should also refrain from unlawfully polluting air, water and soil, […] during armed conflicts in violation of international humanitarian law […]. States should also ensure that

72  Above n 7. Adopted during the 45th Ordinary Session, held between 13–27 May 2009, Banjul, The Gambia. The decision was not made public until July 2010. 73  UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000).

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[4.31]  Applying this understanding of the right to health—as extending to healthcare and the underlying determinants of health—to the facts, the Commission found that ‘the destruction of homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells exposed the victims to serious health risks and amounts to a violation of Article 16 of the Charter’.75 It is likely that in appropriate Communications in the future the Commission will continue to rely on the General Comments of the CESCR to interpret ESC rights under the Charter, as it did in the Endorois,76 the SERAC and COHRE cases. [4.32]  By 2014 the Commission decisions had not yet addressed the scope of the right to education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter. For example, in Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon,77 the complainants alleged that Cameroon had violated Article 17 of the Charter, because it was destroying primary education in the Southern Cameroons by underfunding and understaffing. It was also alleged that Cameroon imposed inappropriate reform of secondary and technical education. It was further alleged that the state discriminated against Southern Cameroonians in the policy regarding admission to the Polytechnique in Yaoundé, and refused to grant authorisation for registration of the Bamenda University of Science and Technology, thereby violating Article 17 on the right to education. The African Commission found that there was no violation of the right to education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter, without elaborating on the content of this right, because the ‘Complainants did not substantiate the allegations’.78 This was a missed opportunity to clarify the scope of the right to education under the African Charter. [4.33]  However, the scope of the right to education was clarified by the African Commission in its Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter.79 The Commission indicated that the right to education ‘encompasses pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary, adult education and vocational training’.80 Among others, Article 17(1) entails state obligations to ‘ensure’ that: (a) ‘all children enjoy their right to free and compulsory primary education’; (b) secondary (including technical and vocational) education is made ‘generally available and accessible to all by all appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education’;

74 

COHRE case, above n 7, paras 209–10. Ibid, para 212. 76  Above n 10, para 200, citing with approval General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, UN Doc E/1992/23, annex III, at 114 (1991), para 18; and General Comment 7: Forced Evictions and the Right to Adequate Housing, UN Doc E/1998/22, annex IV, at 113 (1998), para 14. 77  Kevin Mgwanga Gumne et al v Cameroon, Communication no 266/2003 (2009), 26th Annual Activity Report, annex IV, para 145. 78  Ibid, para 149. 79  African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 30, paras 68–71. 80  Ibid, para 70. 75 

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(c) higher education is made ‘generally available and accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by all appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education’; (d) vocational training and adult education/literacy is ‘accessible and affordable’; and (e) all educational programmes are of a ‘high quality and appropriate to the needs of society’.81 In addition, the right to education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter entails obligations to: respect the liberty of parents and guardians to establish and choose schools for their children; respect parents’ religious convictions;82 ensure the safety of schoolchildren by taking measures to ‘address physical and sexual abuse by other students, teachers, staff or principals’;83 ensure academic freedom and institutional autonomy in all institutions of higher learning;84 and ensure that all children, including those belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups (eg orphans, pregnant school girls, children with disabilities, children with real or perceived HIV/AIDS status, working children, children of migrant workers and prisoners), enjoy equal access to and progress in the education system.85 [4.34]  It is important to note that the jurisprudence of the African Commission on ESC rights has also had a direct impact at the level of sub-regional protection of human rights in Africa, as reflected in the decisions of African sub-regional institutions giving prominence to the justiciability of ESC rights. For example, in Socio-Economic­ Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission,86 the plaintiff claimed before the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court) a violation of the right to education under Article 17 of the African Charter due to alleged lack of adequate implementation of Nigeria’s Compulsory and Basic Education Act 2004 and the Child’s Rights Act 2004. The ECOWAS Court considered whether it had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim involving an alleged violation of the right to education under Article 17. Relying on Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty establishing the ECOWAS Court87 and Article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS,88 the Court held that ‘it is well established that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are justiciable before this Court’.89 The Court dismissed the Government’s contention that education is ‘a mere directive policy of the government and not a legal entitlement of the citizens’, concluding that

81 

Ibid, para 71. Ibid, para 71(h). 83  Ibid, para 71(q). 84  Ibid, para 71(j). 85  Ibid, para 71(p)–(y). 86  Above n 35. 87  Art 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol grants the Court jurisdiction to determine cases of violations of human rights in member states of ECOWAS. 88  Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, available at http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revisedtreaty.pdf. Art 4(g) affirms and declares the adherence of ECOWAS member states to the ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’. 89  SERAP case, above n 35, para. 20. 82 

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the contention that ‘the right to education is not justiciable as it falls within the directive principles of state policy cannot hold’.90 The decision is in line with the jurisprudence of the African Commission, which establishes that all rights under the African Charter, including ESC rights, are justiciable. C.  Right to Work [4.35]  In protecting the right to work, Article 15 of the African Charter simply provides: Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.

The Charter does not define the scope of the right to work, nor the content of ‘equitable and satisfactory conditions’. The Commission has accepted that [t]he right to work should not be understood as an absolute and unconditional right to obtain employment. Rather, the State has the obligation to facilitate employment through the creation of an environment conducive to the full employment of individuals within society under conditions that ensure the realisation of the dignity of the individual. The right to work includes the right to freely and voluntarily choose what work to accept.91

[4.36]  State obligations on the right to work include: —— the prohibition of slavery and forced labour; —— to ensure the right to freedom of association; —— to provide adequate protection against unfair or unjustified arbitrary and constructive dismissal, and other unfair practices; —— to adopt and implement a national employment strategy and plan of action based on and addressing the concerns of all workers and the unemployed; —— to ensure equality and non-discrimination in access to decent work, equal pay for work of equal value, and promotion without discrimination of any kind; —— to prevent child labour through criminalisation of the worst forms; and —— to ensure the right of everyone to ‘equitable and satisfactory conditions of work’.92 Such conditions arguably extend to the right to form and join trade unions, including the right to strike, and cover safe and hygienic working conditions, fair remuneration, rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours, periodic holidays with pay, public holidays with pay and parental leave. This protection should also be specifically extended to and developed for persons working in the informal sector, including those employed in domestic work, agriculture and/or in family enterprises.93

[4.37]  At the time of writing the Commission had not developed case law under ­ Article 15, with the exception of one decision involving unfair dismissal.

90 

Ibid. African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 30, para 58. 92  Ibid, para 59. 93  Ibid, para 59(h). 91 

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In Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon,94 the complainant, Mr Mazou was a magistrate who was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment by a military ­tribunal without trial, without witnesses and without a right to defend himself, for hiding his brother who was later sentenced to death for an attempted coup d’état. After his release he was not reinstated in his former professional capacity as a magistrate, even after the Government granted an amnesty to all persons sentenced to a punishment of imprisonment and/or fine. The Commission found that by not reinstating Mr Mazou in his former position after the Amnesty Law, the Government had violated his right to work under Article 15 of the African Charter, because it had prevented Mr Mazou from working in his capacity as a magistrate, ‘even though ­others who have been c­ ondemned under similar conditions have been reinstated’.95 While the Commission’s decision could be understood to imply that Article 15 protects the right not to be deprived of employment unfairly or in a discriminatory manner, it is silent on the normative content of the right to work. Does the right to work include an absolute and unconditional right to obtain employment, or is it limited to the right of every human being to decide freely to accept or choose work? D.  The Right to Cultural Life [4.38]  With respect to cultural rights, Articles 17(2) of the African Charter provides: Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community.

The scope of the ‘cultural life’ in which ‘every individual’ may make a choice to take part is not defined. The African Commission has given Article 17(2) a broad interpretation, encompassing individuals’ participation in cultural life: Article 17 of the Charter is of a dual dimension in both its individual and collective nature, protecting, on the one hand, individuals’ participation in the cultural life of their community and, on the other hand, obliging the state to promote and protect traditional values recognised by a community. It thus understands culture to mean that complex whole which includes a spiritual and physical association with one’s ancestral land, knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a member of society—the sum total of the material and spiritual activities and products of a given social group that distinguish it from other similar groups. It has also understood cultural identity to encompass a group’s religion, language, and other defining characteristics.96

[4.39]  If Article 17(2) of the African Charter is interpreted in light of Article 15 of the ICESCR, ‘cultural life’ should be interpreted as encompassing, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter, and the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build their world view representing their encounter with the external forces affecting 94  Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon, Communication no 39/90 (1997), 10th Activity Report. 95  Ibid, para 29. 96  Communication no 276/2003, above n 10, para 241.

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their lives.97 Although the right to take part in cultural life of the community includes ‘the inalienable right [of any people] to organise its cultural life in full harmony with its political, economic, social, philosophical and spiritual ideas’,98 cultural practices must be consistent with international norms on human and peoples’ rights.99 Thus, participation in cultural life under Article 17(2) of the African Charter cannot be invoked to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, or to limit their scope. [4.40]  States therefore have the duty to tolerate cultural diversity or multiculturalism and to introduce measures that protect identity groups different from those of the majority/dominant group in accordance with international human rights law. The Commission has thus interpreted Article 17(2) as requiring governments to take measures ‘aimed at the conservation, development and diffusion of culture’, such as promoting ‘cultural identity as a factor of mutual appreciation among individuals, groups, nations and regions; […] promoting awareness and enjoyment of cultural heritage of national ethnic groups and minorities and of indigenous sectors of the population’.100 E.  Non-discrimination in the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [4.41]  States parties to the African Charter have a general obligation to eliminate discrimination, formally (in law) and substantively (in practice), in the enjoyment of ESC rights, since non-discrimination is a ‘fundamental principle’ in international human rights law essential to the exercise and enjoyment of all human rights, including ESC rights.101 In this regard, Article 2 of the African Charter emphatically stipulates: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

[4.42]  Relying on comparative human rights law, the Commission has stated that a violation of the principle of non-discrimination arises if: equal cases are treated in a different manner; a difference in treatment does not have an objective and reasonable justification; and there is no proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed.102 The Commission has further stated that to determine whether a person

97  CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, UN Doc E/C.12/ GC/21 (21 December 2009) para 13. 98  See Cultural Charter for Africa, adopted 15 July 1976, entered into force 19 September 1990, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/cultural-charter-africa, preamble. 99  See African Charter, above n 1, Arts 60 and 61. 100 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, 1989, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/ guidelines_national_periodic_reports, guidelines for Art 17(2). 101  Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, Communication no 313/05 (2010), 28th Annual Activity Report, annex IV, para 218. 102  Ibid, para 219, citing Marckx v Belgium [1979] ECHR 2; Proposed Amendments to the ­Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion Oc-4/84, 19 January 1984, IAmCtHR (Ser A) No 4 (1984) para 57; HRC, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) para 13.

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has been the victim of discrimination or not, the allegation has to be weighed against the three tests set out above: Was there equal treatment? If not, was the differential treatment justifiable? Was the aim of the difference in treatment proportionate to the aim sought and means employed? These three benchmarks are cumulative requirements and hence the non-compliance with any of the three requirements makes a treatment discriminatory.103

[4.43]  It can be discerned from the Commission’s jurisprudence that states parties to the African Charter have a general obligation not only to refrain from discrimination on the prohibited grounds,104 but also to take temporary special measures in favour of marginalised groups that suffer historical or persistent prejudice, in order to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination.105 As the Commission has clearly stated, ‘in certain cases, positive discrimination or affirmative action helps to redress imbalance’.106 [4.44]  It is to be noted that discrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by everyone, on an equal footing, of all the rights and freedoms protected in the African Charter.107 It is not limited to the specific grounds listed in Article 2 above, but also includes another general ground—‘other status’—given that the ‘nature of discrimination varies according to context and evolves over time’.108 Thus, the Commission has accepted that ‘other status’ includes ‘disability, age or sexual orientation’,109 grounds of discrimination not explicitly mentioned in Article 2. There seems to be no good reason why ‘other status’ should also not include grounds such as marital and family status, gender identity, health status, place of residence, and economic and social situation. [4.45]  The Commission has found mass expulsion of non-nationals to be discriminatory. In Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola,110 103 

Communication no 313/05, above n 101, 116, para 222. See, eg, Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola, Communication no 159/96, 11th Annual Activity Report, para 39. 105  Communication no 276/2003, above n 10, para 196. Art 18(4) of the African Charter specifically provides, ‘The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.’ 106  Communication no 276/2003, above n 10, para 196. 107  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, 21st Annual Activity Report, para 170. For similar definitions, see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4 January 1969, Art 1; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), UN Doc A/34/46, entered into force 3 September 1981, Art 1; and International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), entered into force 3 May 2008, Art 2. See also the HRC, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) paras 6 and 7; and the CESCR, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009), para 7. 108  CESCR, General Comment 20, above n 107, para 27. 109  Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, 21st Annual Activity Report, para 169. However, the Commission refused to grant observer status to the Coalition of African Lesbians, allegedly ‘because the activities of the said Organisation do not promote and protect any of the rights enshrined in the African Charter’. See 28th Activity Report, EX.CL/600(XVII), para 33. 110  Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola, Communication no 159/96 (1997), 11th Annual Activity Report. 104 

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it was alleged that the Angolan Government rounded up and expelled West African ­nationals (Senegalese, Malian, Gambian, Mauritanian and others) on its territory between April and September 1996. Those affected lost their belongings. The Commission observed that ‘[m]ass expulsions of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nationality, religion, ethnic, racial or other considerations “constitute a special violation of human rights”’.111 It was further noted that [t]his type of deportations [sic] calls into question a whole series of rights recognised and ­guaranteed in the Charter; such as the right to property (article 14), the right to work (­article 15), the right to education (article 17 paragraph 1) and results in the violation by the State of its obligations under article 18 paragraph 1 which stipulates that ‘the family shall be the natural unit and basis of society’.112

[4.46]  However, the Commission did not indicate the content of the rights to property, work and education, nor how such rights were called into question. It concluded that the deportation of the West African nationals from Angola constituted a violation of Articles 2 (non-discrimination), 14 (right to property) and 18 (protection of the family) of the African Charter, without interpreting the normative content of these rights.113 It also remained unclear why there was no finding that the other ESC rights explicitly protected in the Charter, in particular the rights to work and education, were also violated, yet in another case the Commission stated that ‘[b]y forcibly expelling the two victims from Zambia, the State has violated their right to enjoyment of all the rights enshrined in the African Charter’.114 In short, beyond the fact that mass expulsion of non-nationals is discriminatory on the basis of origin, the decision is of limited jurisprudential value to the normative content of the relevant ESC rights under the African Charter. F. Rights Implied in the African Charter: Rights to Housing, Food, Social Security, Water and Sanitation [4.47]  In the SERAC case,115 the Commission further innovatively interpreted the Charter through implying other rights not expressly protected therein. This was done by reading into the African Charter the rights to adequate housing and food. The Commission stated that although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health (Article 16), the right to property (Article 14) and the protection accorded to the family (Article 18(1)) is a prohibition on the wanton destruction of shelter, because when housing is destroyed, property, health and family life are adversely affected.116 The Commission 111 

Ibid, para 16. Ibid, para 17. 113  In addition the Commission found violations of Art 7 (1)(a), and Art 12 (4) and (5). Art 7(1)(a) deals with the right to an appeal to competent national organs, while Art 12(4) provides that ‘[a] non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law’. Art 12(5) prohibits mass expulsion of non-nationals. 114  Amnesty International v Zambia, Communication no 212/98 (1999), 12th Activity Report, para 52 (emphasis added). 115  Communication no 155/96, above n 31. 116  Ibid, para 60. 112 

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concluded that the ‘combined effect of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter or housing’.117 [4.48]  With respect to the right to food, it was argued that it is implicit in the ­African Charter, in such provisions as the right to life (Article 4), the right to health (­Article 16), and the right to economic, social and cultural development (Article 22). The Commission accepted that the right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings, and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such other rights as health, education, work and political participation.118 It then stated that the ‘­African Charter and international law require and bind Nigeria to protect and improve existing food sources and to ensure access to adequate food for all ­citizens’.119 By its violation of the rights protected in Articles 4, 14, 16, and 18(1) of the African Charter, the Commission found that the Nigerian Government had trampled not only upon the rights explicitly protected, but also upon the rights to adequate housing and food implicitly guaranteed. Thus states parties to the African Charter are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights implicitly protected in the Charter. [4.49]  With respect to housing, for example, in the COHRE case,120 the Commission stated that it agreed with the UN Committee Against Torture in Hijrizi v Y ­ ugoslavia,121 that forced evictions and destruction of housing carried out by NSAs amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, if the state fails to protect the ­victims from such a violation of their human rights.122 Relying on the UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinhero ­Principles),123 the Commission confirmed that ‘States shall take steps to ensure that no one is subjected to displacement by either State or non-State actors’.124 [4.50]  It should be noted that the Commission might be criticised for creating additional rights in the Charter to which states never consented (and thus compromise legal certainty or the rule of law). However, implying rights in the Charter is in line with the Commission’s Reporting Guidelines, which require States to report on rights not explicitly protected in the Charter (eg the right to an adequate standard of ­living;125 the right to social security;126 and rights to rest, leisure, limitation of working hours, holiday with pay and trade union rights).127 Moreover, these rights are protected in other international human rights treaties, such as the ICESCR, to which the vast majority of African states are parties without reservations. This approach of implying rights in the African Charter found support in the Statement on Social, Economic and

117 

Ibid. Ibid, para 65. 119  Ibid. 120  Communications nos 279/03 and 296/05, above n 7. 121  Hijrizi v Yugoslavia, Communication no 161/2000, UN Doc CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2 December 2002). 122  COHRE case, above n 7, para 159. 123  UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (28 June 2005), annex, para 5.4. 124  COHRE case, above n 7, para 203. 125  Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, above n 100, paras II.A.31–34. 126  Ibid, para II.18. 127  Ibid, paras 9, 10, and 17. 118 

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Cultural Rights in Africa, adopted on 17 September 2004 in Pretoria, South Africa.128 This Statement, which has since been adopted by the Commission,129 asserts that the ESC rights explicitly provided for under the African Charter, read together with other rights in the ­Charter, such as the right to life and respect for inherent human dignity, imply the recognition of other economic and social rights, including the right to shelter, the right to basic nutrition and the right to social security.130

The effect of this interpretation is to read into the African Charter all ESC rights not enumerated in the Charter. [4.51]  In the COHRE case,131 the Commission reaffirmed that Article 16 of the ­African Charter implicitly protects the rights to adequate food and housing, including the prohibition on forced evictions, and also guarantees the right to water. All these are underlying determinants of health. No state has challenged ‘implied’ rights in the Charter, suggesting that the Commission’s approach reflects a contemporary reading of the African Charter that is consistent with international human rights law. However, the current discrepancy between the explicit wording of the Charter and its interpretation by the Commission leaves the Charter exposed as an ‘outdated document in need of revision to ensure that it actually says, loud and clear, what it has been interpreted by the Commission to say’.132

IV. CONCLUSION [4.52]  It is clear from the Commission’s decisions that states parties to the African Charter are obliged to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ all ESC rights explicitly protected in the Charter (rights to property, health, education, work and cultural life) and those implied in the Charter (such as the rights to adequate housing, food, social security, water and sanitation). Despite the initial reluctance to develop the normative content of ESC rights under the African Charter and corresponding human rights obligations for states and NSAs, by and large, the jurisprudence of the African Commission since 2001 has displayed advances in the field of ESC rights. Despite long delays that have generally continued to characterise the Commission’s complaints procedure, the Commission has made a generous and progressive interpretation of the African Charter, which confirms that ESC rights are justiciable, subject only to restricted limitations, and non-derogable during emergency situations. The Commission has read into the Charter some important ESC rights, and has adopted its Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of ESC Rights, elaborating the substantive

128 

For the text, see (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 182. Resolution on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa, ACHPR /Res.73(XXXVI)04 (2004). 130  Statement on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in Africa, above n 128, para. 10. See also African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 30, paras 77–92 (implying rights to housing, social security, food, water and sanitation in the African Charter). 131  Above n 7. 132  See C Heyns, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’ (2003–2004) 108 Penn State Law Review 679, 691. 129 

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provisions of the Charter on ESC rights. In the process the Commission has expanded the scope of ESC rights under the African Charter. [4.53]  The Commission has found violations of ESC rights in almost all admissible cases. Its decisions have evolved, from less detailed decisions finding violations without elaborating on the normative content of ESC rights into fully reasoned decisions drawing on international human rights jurisprudence. Increasingly, the Commission has made detailed ‘recommendations’ as to remedies for victims of ESC rights violations, directed at states found in violation of ESC rights. For example, in the COHRE case,133 after finding that Sudan ‘unleashed a punitive military campaign which constituted a massive violation of not only the economic, social and cultural rights, but other individual rights of the Darfurian people’,134 the Commission recommended that Sudan ‘should’ take ‘all necessary and urgent measures’ to ensure protection of victims of human rights violations in the Darfur region, including to: (a) conduct effective official investigations into the abuses, committed by members of military forces, ie ground and air forces, armed groups and the Janjaweed militia for their role in the Darfur; (b) undertake major reforms of its legislative and judicial framework in order to handle cases of serious and massive human rights violations; (c) take steps to prosecute those responsible for the human rights violations, including murder, rape, arson and destruction of property; (d) take measures to ensure that the victims of human rights abuses are given effective remedies, including restitution and compensation; (e) rehabilitate economic and social infrastructure, such as education, health, water, and agricultural services, in the Darfur provinces in order to provide conditions for return in safety and dignity for the IDPs and Refugees; (f) establish a National Reconciliation Forum to address the long-term sources of conflict, equitable allocation of national resources to the various provinces, including affirmative action for Darfur, resolve issues of land, grazing and water rights, including destocking of livestock; (g) desist from adopting amnesty laws for perpetrators of human rights abuses; and (h) consolidate and finalise pending Peace Agreements.135

[4.54]  The Commission’s recent practice further requires states to report on the implementation of its ‘recommendations’ within a defined period of time. This is included in the Commission’s Activity Reports. This development is a significant step forward towards a more effective mechanism for adjudication of ESC rights violations. The Commission’s jurisprudence emphasises that ESC rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated with other human rights. As the Commission stated, ‘there is no right in the African Charter that cannot be made effective’.136 In this respect, the ­Commission has lived up to the expectation of the African Charter, which, in the Commission’s own words, ‘departs from the narrow formulations of other regional

133 

Communications nos 279/03 and 296/05, above n 7. Ibid, para 224. 135  Ibid, para 229. 136  SERAC case, Communication no 155/96, above n 31, para 68. 134 

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and universal human rights instruments by weaving a tapestry which includes the three “generations” of rights: civil and political rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and group and peoples’ rights’.137 [4.55]  This provides a potential legal basis to challenge policies contributing to human rights violations in Africa, such as poverty, high levels of corruption and inappropriate resources allocation. The real challenge remains how to eliminate poverty in Africa, which denies millions of people the enjoyment of ESC rights.138 It is now up to states, NGOs, national human rights institutions, activists, lawyers, universities and other members of civil society to support the Commission’s jurisprudence on ESC rights, and to explore further coherent and strategic ways and means by which ESC rights might become a reality in the lives of individuals and groups in order ‘to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa’.139 This may be achieved through, inter alia, coordinated efforts to enhance interaction among all the actors concerned, including the various components of civil society, by increasing public awareness of ESC rights, advocating for legislative reform, increased budgetary allocation to ESC rights and effective use of available resources, as well as increased litigation of strategic ESC rights cases at national, regional and international levels. Since most African states ‘are developing countries with scarce resources’,140 they are not obliged to achieve more than what available resources permit. The obligation under the African Charter is to invest a state’s ‘resources in the best way possible to attain the progressive realisation of […] economic, social and cultural rights’.141 [4.56]  Given that the African Charter complements human rights protection at the domestic level where the rights protected in the Charter should be realised, African states should ensure that the ESC rights protected in the Charter are given full legal effect in domestic law, that the Charter rights are made justiciable and that effective remedies (eg compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of nonrepetition, and public apologies) are available for victims of all violations of ESC rights at the domestic level. In this respect, it is essential to adopt domestic legislation, national plans, policies and systems to give ESC rights the same level of protection as is given to civil and political rights, since this is indispensable in complying with state obligations under Articles 1 and 2 of the African Charter.142

137 

COHRE case, above n 7, at para 149. See also the African Charter, above n 1, preamble, para 7. Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, above n 68, para 84, the African Commission stated that ‘it is aware that millions of people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally because African countries are generally faced with the problem of poverty which renders them incapable to provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of this right’. 139  African Charter, above n 1, preamble. 140  Communication 266/2003, above n 77, para 206. 141  Ibid. 142 See, eg, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, ­Chapter A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Section 1 of this Act provides that the provisions of the African Charter shall ‘have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria’. See also Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project v Nigeria, Communication 300/2005 (2008), 25th Activity Report, paras 65–69. 138 In

5 The Domestic Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected in International Law I. INTRODUCTION [5.01]  For international human rights treaties, including those protecting ESC rights, to be effective at a national level, state obligations must be ‘reflected in the content of the domestic law’.1 This is mainly because it is often through domestic (sometimes termed ‘national’, ‘municipal’ or ‘internal’ law) law and domestic institutions, such as courts, tribunals and human rights commissions, that international law is most easily enforced, since domestic institutions are relatively more accessible than international institutions. There is also a lack of significant enforcement measures in international law, especially with respect to ESC rights. [5.02]  There are two principal theoretical constructs (‘dualism’ and ‘monism’), with a number of variations in the literature, advanced to explain the relationship between international law and domestic law: The first doctrine is called the dualist (or pluralist) view, and assumes that international law and municipal law are two separate legal systems which exist independently of each other. … The second doctrine, called the monist view, has a unitary perception of the ‘law’ and understands both international and municipal law as forming part of one and the same legal order.2

The monistic theory postulates that ‘national and international law form one single legal order’, or at least a number of interlocking orders which should be presumed to be coherent and consistent.3 Monism maintains ‘the primacy of international law’ in the event of conflict between international law and domestic law.4 On this basis, international law can be applied directly within the domestic legal order. Yet dualism ‘stresses that the rules of the systems of international law and municipal law exist

1  R Higgins, Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 96. See also generally CESCR, General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (1998); A Rosas and M Scheinin, ‘Implementation Mechanisms and Remedies’ in A Eide et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 425, 452. 2  P Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edn (London, Routledge, 1997) 4. 3 J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 48. 4  A Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001)162.

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separately and cannot purport to have effect on, or overrule, the other’.5 In case of a conflict between international law and domestic law, dualism assumes that a national court would apply domestic law, or at least that it is for the domestic system to decide which rule is to prevail. Generally, however, irrespective of the system or theoretical approach—monism or dualism—through which international law is incorporated in the domestic legal order,6 following ratification of an international instrument that is ‘in force’, it is ‘binding’ upon the parties and must be performed in ‘good faith’ and given full effect in the domestic legal order.7 [5.03]  As shown in chapters one and two, the obligations arising under the ICESCR in general, and Article 2 of the Covenant in particular, are binding on every state party as a whole. It follows that irrespective of domestic law states are under a general obligation to act in conformity with the rules of international law and will bear responsibility for breaches of it, whether committed by the legislative, executive or judicial organs,8 and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level—national, regional or local.9 This results from a well-established principle of international law that states cannot invoke their domestic legal systems—internal laws and procedures—as justification for not complying with international treaty (human rights) obligations.10 Thus, there is a general obligation for states to modify the domestic legal order to be in conformity with their international treaty obligations.11 But international law leaves the method of achieving this result (described in the literature by varying concepts of ‘incorporation’, ‘adoption’, ‘transformation’ or ‘reception’) to the domestic jurisdiction of states.12 However, as Ian Brownlie points out, ‘in general a failure to bring about such conformity is not in itself a direct breach of international law, and a breach arises only when the state concerned fails to observe its obligations on a specific occasion’.13 Thus the most appropriate ways and means of implementing the ICESCR 5 M Shaw, International Law, 7th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 93. See also M Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 81. 6  See D Harris, Cases and Materials in International Law, 7th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 61–89; Shaw, above n 5, 92–140. 7  See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (Vienna Convention or VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331, Art 26; Cassesse, above n 4, 162–81; CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—Dependent Territories, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002), UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 24; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002) para 23; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.80 (17 May 2002) para 32. For a discussion of treaties and domestic law, see A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 159–77. 8  Shaw, above n 5, 138. 9  HRC, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) para 4. 10 In Polish Nationals in Danzig (1931) PCIJ, Series A/B, no 44, 24, the PCIJ stated that, ‘according to generally accepted principles … a State cannot adduce against another State its own constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force’. See also the Free Zones (1932) PCIJ, Series A/B, no 46, 167, where the Court held, ‘It is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations.’ 11  Vienna Convention, above n 7, Art 27, provides that ‘[a] party [to a treaty] may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’; Art 8 of the UDHR provides ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’ See also Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (1925) PCIJ Series B No 10, 20. 12  Malanczuk, above n 2, 64. 13  I Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 7th edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2008) 35.

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at a domestic level will vary from one state to another. As the CESCR has noted with respect to non-discrimination and the equal right of men and women in the enjoyment of all ESC rights: Every State party has a margin of discretion in adopting appropriate measures in complying with its primary and immediate obligation to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all their economic, social and cultural rights. Among other things, States parties must, inter alia, integrate into national plans of action for human rights, appropriate strategies to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.14

[5.04]  Generally, although there are others methods of protecting human rights at a domestic level, the primary method is through constitutional provisions, particularly the entrenchment of a chapter on human rights in the constitution or domestic statutes protecting human rights: for example, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993; the UK Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998; the Irish European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003; the Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act 2004; the Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006; and the Australian Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.15 While constitutional provisions have been widely used to protect civil and political rights, there is no reason in principle why this should not be extended to ESC rights, given that the two sets of rights are mutually reinforcing. This chapter examines the domestic protection of ESC rights. It is divided into four further sections. As a starting point, section II. examines the position of the CESCR on the application of the ICESCR on the national plane. This establishes the basis for a critical consideration of some examples of the application of the ICESCR on the national plane (section III.). An examination is then made of the role of independent national human rights institutions in the promotion and protection of ESC rights (section IV.). The chapter ends with some concluding observations (section V.).

II.  THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ON THE NATIONAL PLANE [5.05]  How can the ICESCR be applied effectively at a domestic level? The CESCR addressed this question in General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant.16 The General Comment emphasised several important aspects considered in this section. First, the Committee affirmed the principle of direct and immediate application of the Covenant. In the words of the Committee: In general, legally binding international human rights standards should operate directly and immediately within the domestic legal system of each State party, thereby enabling

14  CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/3 (2005). 15  See generally K Gledhill, Human Rights Acts: The Mechanisms Compared (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015); P Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999); N Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional, and International Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 95–129. 16  CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1.

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i­ndividuals to seek enforcement of their rights before national courts and tribunals. The rule ­requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies reinforces the primacy of national remedies in this respect. The existence and further development of international procedures for the pursuit of individual claims is important, but such procedures are ultimately only supplementary to effective national remedies.17

[5.06]  Secondly, the Committee stated that the means used to apply the Covenant should be ‘appropriate’ and subject to ‘review’, as part of the Committee’s examination of the state party’s compliance with its obligations under the Covenant.18 It should be noted that the Covenant does not stipulate the specific means by which it is to be implemented in the national legal order. As the CESCR acknowledged, ‘there is no provision obligating its comprehensive incorporation or requiring it to be accorded any specific type of status in national law’.19 Thus, the precise method by which Covenant rights are given effect in national law is a matter for each state party to decide. This means that states in practice enjoy a margin of discretion or appreciation in deciding what methods are the most effective in a particular domestic context. In accordance with the practice of judicial and other quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies, the Committee, as an international treaty body, always respects the margin of appreciation of states to take steps and adopt measures most suited to their specific circumstances.20 Nonetheless, the Committee noted that the ‘means used should be appropriate in the sense of producing results which are consistent with the full discharge of its [ICESCR] obligations by the State party’.21 [5.07]  Thirdly, in order for the means chosen to implement the Covenant to be appropriate, they must be ‘adequate’ and ‘effective’.22 The Committee noted that an analysis of state practice with respect to the domestic implementation of the Covenant shows that states have used a variety of approaches. The approach of states to the Covenant depends significantly upon the approach adopted to treaties in general in the domestic legal order. Some states have failed to do anything specific at all. Of those that have taken measures, some states have transformed the Covenant into domestic law by supplementing or amending existing legislation, without invoking the specific terms of the Covenant. Some states have entrenched some ESC rights in national constitutions as justiciable rights.23 Other states have protected some ESC rights in bills of rights and the rest in a separate part of the constitution which sets out (non-justiciable) ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’.24 Yet others have recognised most ESC rights as

17 

Ibid, para 4. Ibid, para 5. Ibid. 20  CESCR, Statement: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1 (10 May 2007) para 11. 21  CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1, para 5. 22  Ibid, para 7. 23 See, eg, Constitutions of Argentina (1994); Benin (1990); Brazil (1988, as amended); Cape Verde (1990); Colombia (1991); Ecuador (2008); Kenya (2010); Finland (1999); Hungary (adopted 1949, and heavily amended in 1989); Latvia (adopted 1922, a chapter on Fundamental human rights was added only by amendment in 1998); South Africa (1996); Spain and a number of United States state constitutions. 24 See, eg, the Constitutions of Uganda (1995), Malawi (1994), Namibia (1990) and Ghana (1992). For discussion, see DM Chirwa, ‘A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection of ­Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49 Journal of African Law 207; S Gloppen and FE ­Kanyongolo, ‘Courts and the Poor in Malawi: Economic Marginalization, Vulnerability, and the Law’ 18  19 

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(non-justiciable) ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ only.25 Significantly, some states, for example Norway, have adopted or incorporated the ICESCR into domestic law, so that the Covenant’s terms are retained intact and given formal validity in the national legal order.26 This has often been done by means of constitutional provisions according priority to the provisions of international human rights treaties over any inconsistent domestic laws.27 The Committee, however, noted that whatever the preferred methodology, several principles follow from the duty to give effect to the Covenant, and must therefore be respected: First, the means of implementation chosen must be adequate to ensure fulfilment of the obligations under the Covenant. The need to ensure justiciability … is relevant when determining the best way to give domestic legal effect to the Covenant rights. Second, account should be taken of the means which have proved to be most effective in the country concerned in ensuring the protection of other human rights. Where the means used to give effect to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights differ significantly from those used in relation to other human rights treaties, there should be a compelling justification for this, taking account of the fact that the formulations used in the Covenant are, to a considerable extent, comparable to those used in treaties dealing with civil and political rights.28

[5.08]  Fourthly, while the Covenant does not formally oblige states to incorporate its provisions into domestic law, the Committee considered that the direct formal adoption or incorporation of the Covenant in national law (such as a constitutional bill of rights) is desirable, suggesting that this is the most appropriate and effective way of applying the Covenant. Indeed, direct incorporation avoids problems that might arise in the translation of treaty obligations into national law, and provides a firm basis for the direct invocation of Covenant rights by individuals in national courts.29 Although it is quite rare for treaties to have a status equal to or higher than the national constitution, this is stipulated in the constitutions of some states, including Argentina (­Article 75.22), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article III.b.3), the Netherlands (­Article 94) and Venezuela (Article 23), all of which have ratified the ICESCR. Most constitutional provisions of states parties to the ICESCR in Africa,30 Asia,31 Europe,32

(2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 258; and JC Mubangizi, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-economic Rights in Selected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation’ (2006) 2 African Journal of Legal Studies 1. 25  See, eg, the Constitutions of Bangladesh (1972); Ghana (1992); Ireland (1937, as amended); India (1949, as amended); Sierra Leone (1991); and Nigeria (1999, as amended). 26  In 1999 Norway adopted the Human Rights Act of 21 May 1999, which incorporated the Covenant into domestic law, stipulating in s 3 that the Covenant takes precedence over any other legislative provisions that conflict with it. The CESCR welcomed this incorporation. See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.109 (23 June 2005) para 4. 27  CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1, para 6. 28  Ibid, para 7 (emphasis added). 29  Ibid, para 8. 30  See, eg, Algeria (Art 132), Benin (Art 147), Burkina Faso (Art 151), Cameroon (Art 45), Cape Verde (Art 11.4), Central African Republic (Art 69), Chad (Art 222), Cote d’Ivoire (Art 87), DRC (Arts 176 and 215), Djibouti (Art 37), Guinea (Art 79), Mali (Art 116), Madagascar (Art 132.3), Mauritania (Art 80), Niger (Art 132), Senegal (Art 98), Togo (Art 140) and Tunisia (Art 32). 31  See, eg, Cambodia (Art 31.1), Kazakhstan (Art 4.3), Oman (Art 72), Tajikistan (Art 10) and TimorLeste (Art 9). 32 See, eg, Albania (Art 122), Andorra (Art 3.4) Armenia (Art 6), Azerbaijan (Art 151), Belarus (Art 116), Bulgaria (Art 5.4), Croatia (Art 134), Cyprus (Art 169.3), Czech Republic (Art 10), Estonia

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Latin ­America and the Caribbean,33 providing for direct applicability of international (human rights) treaties, stipulate that these treaties have primacy over national legislation. For example, according to Article 190 of the Constitution of Rwanda 2003, international treaties and agreements ‘shall be more binding than organic laws and ordinary laws’, meaning that they have precedence over domestic law and can be applied directly in the domestic legal order. Some constitutional provisions, for example Article 31 of the Constitution of Cambodia, oblige states to respect human rights as stipulated in several international human rights instruments such as ‘the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenants and conventions related to human rights, women’s and children’s rights’. [5.09]  Fifthly, adequate protection of the Covenant at the domestic level requires monitoring and accountability of states and relevant NSAs. Accountability utilises many different mechanisms, including human rights commissions, administrative bodies, impact assessments and judicial proceedings. It is important because it provides individuals and groups with an opportunity to understand how those with responsibilities have discharged their duties. It also provides those with responsibilities with the opportunity to explain what they have done and why. It can help to identify what works well so that it can be repeated, and what does not work, so that it can be reconsidered. Where there has been a failure, accountability requires redress. It is striking to note that ‘rights and obligations demand accountability: unless supported by a system of accountability, they can become no more than window-dressing’.34 Accordingly, the adequate protection of human rights needs accessible, transparent and effective accountability mechanisms to ensure that rights are respected and, where they are not, that victims can find redress.35 Courts and national human rights institutions, endowed with appropriate powers, can play a key role in ensuring that a state’s conduct is consistent with its human rights obligations, including ESC rights. [5.10]  It is not enough to incorporate the ICESCR in domestic law without recognising that ESC rights are justiciable in domestic courts. Thus, in the Concluding Observations of the CESCR on Norway in 2005, the Committee stated: In the light of the Supreme Court ruling in the ‘KLR case’ (Supreme Court Reports 2001, p 1006), which states that international treaties that have been incorporated into national legislation can only be directly applied when it is possible to derive concrete rights and duties from their provisions, the Committee reaffirms the principle of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights and that all economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable, (Art 123), France (Art 55), Georgia (Art 6.2), Greece (Art 28.1), Italy (Art 117), Lithuania (Art 138.3), Montenegro (Art 9), Poland (Art 91.2), Republic of Moldova (Art 4.2), Romania (Art 20.2), Russian Federation (Art 15.4), Slovakia (Art 11), Slovenia (Art 8), Spain (Art 96.1), The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Art 118) and Turkey (Art 90). 33  See, eg, Bolivia (Arts 410.ii and 13.iv), Chile (Art 5.2), Colombia (Art 93), Costa Rica (Art 7), Cuba (Art 12.B and Art 20 of Civil Code), Ecuador (Arts 417, 424, 426 and 428), El Salvador (Art 144.2), ­Guatemala (Art 46), Guyana (Art 15a), Haiti (Art 276.2), Honduras (Art 18), Nicaragua (Art 10.2), ­Paraguay (Art 137.1) and Peru (Arts 32 and 55). (All of these states have ratified the ICESCR, CEDAW and CRC, with the exception of Andorra and Haiti, which have ratified CEDAW and the CRC only.) 34 CESCR, Statement: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (4 May 2001) para 14. 35  CESCR, Statement: Human Rights and Intellectual Property, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/15 (14 December 2001) para 10.

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and urges the State party to ensure that all the provisions of the Covenant are given effect by its domestic courts. In this regard, the Committee refers the State party to its general comment No 9 (1998) on domestic application of the Covenant.36

The enjoyment of the rights recognised under the Covenant can be effectively assured by the judiciary in many different ways, including direct applicability of the Covenant, application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of domestic law. Thus, the CESCR has pointed out that ‘[n]eglect by the courts of this responsibility is incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which must always be taken to include respect for international human rights obligations’.37 [5.11]  Lastly, in order to ensure that individuals and groups whose ESC rights have been violated can seek redress or effective remedies at a domestic level, states parties to the ICESCR and other human rights treaties protecting ESC rights should ensure that domestic courts and administrative bodies are empowered to make reparation. This should include, but not be limited to, restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction for individuals whose rights have been violated, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition, and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of ESC rights violations. In this respect, the CESCR stated: The right to an effective remedy need not be interpreted as always requiring a judicial remedy. Administrative remedies will, in many cases, be adequate and those living within the jurisdiction of a State party have a legitimate expectation, based on the principle of good faith, that all administrative authorities will take account of the requirements of the Covenant in their decision-making. Any such administrative remedies should be accessible, affordable, timely and effective. An ultimate right of judicial appeal from administrative procedures of this type would also often be appropriate. By the same token, there are some obligations, such as (but by no means limited to) those concerning non-discrimination,38 in relation to which the provision of some form of judicial remedy would seem indispensable in order to satisfy the requirements of the Covenant. In other words, whenever a Covenant right cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies are necessary.39

[5.12]  It is essential to note that the right to an effective remedy may in certain circumstances require states parties to provide for and implement preventive, provisional or interim measures to avoid continuing violations and to endeavour to repair at the earliest possible opportunity any harm that may have been caused by such violations. For example, with respect to forced evictions (the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection), the CESCR noted: Appropriate procedural protection and due process are essential aspects of all human rights but it is especially pertinent in relation to a matter such as forced evictions which directly

36 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Norway, above n 26, para 23. CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1, para 14. 38  Pursuant to Art 2(2) of the Covenant, states ‘undertake to guarantee’ that the rights therein are exercised ‘without discrimination of any kind’. For a discussion see ch 2. 39  CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1, para 9 (emphasis added). 37 

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invokes a large number of the rights recognised in both International Human Rights Covenants. The Committee considers that the procedural protections which should be applied in relation to forced evictions include: (a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions and where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.40

With respect to the right to adequate housing, cases from South Africa demonstrate that courts have a critical role to play in protecting the most vulnerable members of society, for example by enforcing protection from arbitrary eviction,41 ensuring that the state has devised and implemented within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing,42 and that in case of evictions the above procedural protections are applied, in particular engaging meaningfully with those affected both individually and collectively.43

III.  EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ON THE NATIONAL PLANE [5.13]  The following examples of domestic law applications of the ICESCR have been selected because they demonstrate the diversity of mechanisms for implementing the ICESCR and represent a broad geographical range. First, two examples from Europe: the United Kingdom (which represents perhaps the purist form of a dualist approach) and Italy (which represents an example of a monist approach). Secondly, two examples from Africa: South Africa (because its 1996 Constitution incorporates a wide range of ESC rights in the Bill of Rights, and claims of violations of these rights have been tested before courts) and Uganda (because its 1995 Constitution protects some ESC rights in the Bill of Rights and some as ‘directive principles’). Thirdly, one example from Asia: India, because of the important contribution made by the Supreme Court of India to the development of international jurisprudence in favour of the

40  CESCR, General Comment 7: Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing, UN Doc E/1998/22 (1997), annex IV at 113, para 16. See also IDG v Spain, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015). 41 See MC Denneboom Service Station CC and Another v Phayane [2014] ZACC 29; Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality and Others [2014] ZACC 17; S Wilson, ‘Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Protection from Arbitrary Eviction: Lessons from Mandelaville’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 535. 42  See, eg, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, The Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Irene Grootboom and others (‘the Grootboom case’), Case CCT 11/00, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 43  See the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 3 Others, Case CCT 24/07, [2008] ZACC 1, para 13.

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justiciability of ESC rights, through its proactive interpretations of the constitutional guarantees of the fundamental rights in light of the Directive Principles. For example, as shown below, the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted the right to life broadly, to include the right to a livelihood, and this has been used to protect some ESC rights. A.  United Kingdom i.  The Covenant in the United Kingdom [5.14]  The UK signed the ICESCR on 16 September 1968 and ratified it on 20 August 1976 (see Appendix C to this book) with some reservations.44 However, the ICESCR has not been, and is not expected to be, incorporated into domestic law.45 Only rarely has the Covenant been cited by the courts in the UK or mentioned in Parliament.46 In addition to the ICESCR, the UK has ratified a number of other principal international human rights treaties, protecting some ESC rights, including the ICCPR, although by 2008 the UK was the only member state of the European Union not to be a party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; the ICERD; the CEDAW; the CAT; the CRC; and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRC-AC).47 By 2008 the UK was not yet a party to some international human rights treaties—namely the Migrant Workers Convention, the I­nternational Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and ­Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,48 and the International Convention for the ­Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance49—which can enhance the protection of human rights, including ESC rights. At a regional level, the UK is a state party to the E ­ uropean Social Charter (1961)50 and signed the revised European Social Charter (1996).51 Both charters protect a number of economic and social rights. [5.15]  As noted in paragraph 5.22, although there has been a proposal to introduce a ‘British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities’, at the time of writing the UK did not have a single written constitution or a general bill of rights defining the status of ­ratified 44  The UK made reservations to Arts 6, 7(a.i), 8(b.1), 9, 10(1) and (2), 13(2a), and 14 of the ICESCR; and a declaration on Arts 2(3), and 1 of the Covenant (Appendix H to this book). CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, above n 7, para 9: ‘The Committee also welcomes the delegation’s statement that the State party is currently in the process of reviewing its reservations to international human rights instruments, with a view to withdrawing those that have been superseded by legislation or practice.’ 45  See the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Fifth Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5 (31 January 2008) para 51; CESCR, Summary Record of the 36th Meeting: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1997/SR.36 (27 November 1997) para 45. 46  See E Bates, ‘The United Kingdom and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in M Baderin and R McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 257, 264. 47  UN, International Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Recent Reporting History under the Principal International Human Rights Instruments, UN Doc HRI/GEN/4/Rev.4 (15 May 2004) 187–88. 48  GA res A/61/611 (2006), entered into force 3 May 2008. 49  UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP.1/Rev.4 (2005). 50  CETS No 035, entered into force on 26 February 1965. The UK signed the Charter on 18 October 1961 and ratified it on 11 July 1962, and the Charter entered into force for the UK on 26 May 1965, available at http://conventions.coe.int/. 51  CETS No 163, entered into force on 1 July 1999. The UK signed the revised Charter on 7 November 1997 but has yet to ratify it.

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international treaties in domestic law. In the absence of a written constitution, the two main sources of constitutional law are legislation and judicial precedent.52 One of the fundamental principles of its unwritten constitution is that of legislative ‘parliamentary supremacy’.53 The legislative supremacy of Parliament means that there are no legal limitations on the legislative competence of Parliament.54 As Dicey put it, Parliament ‘has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’.55 [5.16]  The classic exposition regarding the status of international treaties in UK domestic law was given by Diplock LJ in Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, as follows: Where, by a treaty, Her Majesty’s Government undertakes either to introduce domestic legislation to achieve a specified result in the United Kingdom or to secure a specified result which can only be achieved by legislation, the treaty, since in English law it is not self-operating, remains irrelevant to any issue in the English courts until Her Majesty’s Government has taken steps by way of legislation to fulfil its treaty obligations. Once the Government has legislated, which it may do in anticipation of the coming into effect of the treaty, as it did in this case, the court must in the first instance construe the legislation, for that is what the court has to apply. If the terms of the legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given effect to, whether or not they carry out Her Majesty’s treaty obligations, for the sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties (see Ellerman Lines v Murray; White Star Line and US Mail Steamers Oceanic Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Comerford), and any remedy for such a breach of an international obligation lies in a forum other than Her M ­ ajesty’s own courts. But if the terms of the legislation are not clear but are reasonably capable of more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes relevant, for there is a prima facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law, including therein specific treaty obligations; and if one of the meanings which can reasonably be ascribed to the legislation is consonant with the treaty obligations and another or others are not, the meaning which is consonant is to be preferred. Thus, in case of lack of clarity in the words used in the legislation, the terms of the treaty are relevant to enable the court to make its choice between the possible meanings of these words by applying this presumption.56

[5.17]  It is clear from the above that for international treaties to be given full application in the UK, domestic legislation is required. In the absence of such legislation, international treaties would be limited to interpreting ambiguous legislation. As explained by the House of Lords in Maclaine, international treaties have to be incorporated, or implemented, by legislation into the UK law before courts will give them full effect: It is an established principle of English law that the terms of a treaty do not, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law in the United Kingdom. They cannot effect any alteration 52  AW Bradley and KD Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 16th edn (Harlow, Longman, 2015) 11–19. 53  Ibid, 45–74. For discussion, see I Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights: A Critical Introduction, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 21–55. 54  Bradley and Ewing, above n 52, 53. 55  AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 5th edn (London, Macmillan, 1897) 38. 56  Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116, 143–44.

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in English domestic law or diminish existing rights or confer new or additional rights unless and until enacted into domestic law by or under the authority of Parliament. When a treaty is so enacted, the courts give effect to the legislation and not to the terms of the treaty… [A]s a matter of the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, the Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament. Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the law by legislation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res inter alios acta from which they cannot derive rights and by which they cannot be deprived of rights or subjected to obligations; and it is outside the purview of the court not only because it is made in the conduct of foreign relations, which are a prerogative of the Crown, but also because, as a source of rights and obligations, it is irrelevant.57

[5.18]  The case above makes it clear that the power to conclude treaties in the UK is an exercise of the Royal Prerogative, being part of the monarch’s powers exercised by the executive. As Parliament is the only national institution of the UK that can make law, the courts have required treaties to be incorporated, or implemented, by legislation into the UK law before courts will give them full effect. In general, most human rights treaties to which the UK is a state party have not been incorporated directly into law, although it is recognised that ambiguous legislation will be interpreted in the way that is most consistent with the international obligations of the UK, including unincorporated treaties.58 Where a change in the law is necessary to enable the UK to comply with a treaty or convention, legislation should be introduced to give effect to the relevant obligation; but no such specific incorporation is necessary to require or enable the Government to determine how to give effect to such treaty obligations or, if they may be effectuated by administrative action, to take such action.59 [5.19]  Although the UK gives effect to its obligations under the ICESCR by means of specific laws, policies and practices that implement the various rights set out in the Covenant,60 as mentioned in paragraph 5.14 above, it has not incorporated the I­ CESCR into the domestic legal order, and accordingly the Covenant cannot be directly invoked before the courts. The general position of the UK with respect to the ICESCR has been stated in its third periodic report (of 1996) to the CESCR, as follows: As regards the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the greater part of its provisions do not purport to establish norms which lend themselves to translation into legislation or justiciable issues, but are statements of principle and objectives. The United Kingdom has, both before and since the coming into operation of the Covenant, taken measures, including legislation and the adoption of policies and programmes, which advance the same principles and objectives as are set out in the Covenant. Where an instrument such as the Convention imposes a more precise obligation not hitherto reflected in the common law, 57  Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 474–75, 500. See also JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry, Tin Council Cases [1990] 2 AC 418; R v Lyons [2002] UKHL 44; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin). 58 See Garland v British Rail Engineering [1983] 2 AC 751, 771. 59 See the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (3rd periodic report), UN Doc E/1994/104/Add.11 (17 June 1996) para 8. 60 See the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (4th periodic report), UN Doc E/C.12/4/Add.8 (28 February 2001) para 2.01.

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existing legislation or administrative procedures, it is the practice of the United Kingdom to bring the law or procedure into line with the obligation.61

[5.20]  The UK did not provide specific examples to show how the alleged ‘practice’ of bringing UK law or procedure into line with the ICESCR had been implemented to date. As the CESCR concluded in 1997, the position of the UK, that provisions of the Covenant, with certain minor exceptions, constitute principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations, and that consequently the provisions of the Covenant cannot be given direct legislative effect, is ‘disturbing’.62 The Committee suggested that the UK take ‘appropriate steps’ to introduce the ICESCR into legislation, so that the rights covered by the Covenant might be fully implemented.63 The Committee noted that the UK had, through the HRA 1998, taken such action with respect to the ECHR,64 and expressed the view that it would be appropriate to give similar due regard to the obligations of the Covenant.65 In the absence of a compelling justification for this difference in the methods used to apply civil and political rights and those used to apply ESC rights, the conclusion of the CESCR is defensible, given that the two sets of rights (those protected in the ECHR and the ICCPR on the one hand, and those protected in the European Social Charters and the ICESCR on the other hand) are interdependent. It is also important to emphasise that the HRA 1998 provides the potential to provide indirect or collateral benefits to ESC rights or interests through civil and political rights protected in the ECHR in accordance with positive obligations engendered by Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR,66 but this has not been fully explored.67 This is because the ECHR ‘does not protect economic and social rights, explicitly (with the exception of the right to education [and the right to property]) or impliedly’.68 61  See above n 59, para 9. See also A Vierdag, ‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 Netherlands Year Book of International Law 69, 103, stating that ‘What are laid down in provisions such as Articles 6, 11 and 13 of the ICESCR are consequently not rights of individuals, but broadly formulated programmes for government policies in the economic, social and cultural fields.’ 62  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.19 (4 December 1997) para 10. 63  Ibid, para 21. 64  For an introduction to the HRA 1998, see H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 4th edn (Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 157–298; M Amos, Human Rights Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). 65  CESCR, above n 62, para 21. 66 See, eg, A Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004); E Brems, ‘Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Goss (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 135. 67  See generally E Palmer, ‘The Role of Courts in the Domestic Protection of Socio-Economic Rights: The Unwritten Constitution of the UK’ in F Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006) 129. 68  C Warbrick, ‘Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in M Baderin and R McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 241. See also Anna Pancenko v Latvia, App no 40772/98, Admissibility Decision (ECtHR, 28 October 1999). The applicant complained before the ECtHR about her socio-economic problems in Latvia, including her indebtedness for communal charges in respect of her flat, unemployment, and the absence of free medical assistance or financial support from the state to ensure proper subsistence. The Court recalled ‘that the Convention does not guarantee, as such, socio-economic rights, including the right to charge-free dwelling, the right to work, the right to free medical assistance, or the right to claim financial assistance from a State to maintain a certain level of living’.

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[5.21]  Notwithstanding the above comments of the CESCR, the UK has not changed its position regarding the domestic implementation of the Covenant. Thus, in terms of their legal status, ESC rights in the UK legal system have been, and currently seem destined to remain, ‘the poor cousins of … civil and political rights’.69 Unsurprisingly, in 2002 the CESCR deeply regretted that although the UK had adopted a certain number of laws in the area of ESC rights, the Covenant had still not been incorporated in the domestic legal order, and that there is no intention by the state party to do so in the near future.70 The Committee reiterated its concern about the state party’s position that the provisions of the Covenant, with minor exceptions, constituted principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations that are justiciable, and that consequently they cannot be given direct legislative effect.71 The Committee concluded by stating: Affirming the principle of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, and that all economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable, the Committee … strongly recommends that the State party re-examine the matter of incorporation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in domestic law. The Committee points out that, irrespective of the system through which international law is incorporated in the domestic legal order (monism or dualism), following ratification of an international instrument, the State party is under an obligation to comply with it and to give it full effect in the domestic legal order.72

In light of the above observations, the UK should ensure that the ICESCR is given full legal effect in its domestic law, that ESC rights are made justiciable and that effective remedies are available for victims of all violations of ESC rights.73 [5.22]  It should be noted that in 2014 the Conservative Party in the UK released a paper entitled ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK—The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws’, in which it set out plans to scrap the HRA 1998, the domestic statute which incorporated most of the ECHR into UK law, allowing for rights protected in the ECHR to be directly invoked before and applied by UK courts.74 The HRA 1998 would be replaced by a new legislation—Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or ‘British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities’.75 It is recommended that were such legislation to be 69  See the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 21st Report 2003–04, HL Paper 183/ HC 1188, para 163, available at http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/183/18302.htm, noting that ‘In a culture of respect for human rights, the economic. social and cultural rights embodied in the International Covenant should not be regarded as the poor cousins of the civil and political rights incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act … [T]he two sets of rights are not distinct and should not be divided.’ 70  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, above n 7, para 11. 71  Ibid. 72  Ibid, para 24. 73 CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 (12 June 2009) para 13. 74  The Paper outlining the Conservatives’ Proposals was published in the Guardian, 3 October 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/interactive/2014/oct/03/conservatives-human-rights-actfull-document. 75 See Background to Proposals for a British Bill of Rights and Duties, SN/PC/04559 (3 February 2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN04559/background-to-proposals-for-a-britishbill-of-rights.

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passed, it should be aimed at strengthening the status of international human rights, including ESC rights, in the domestic legal order, and provide effective protection of those rights across all jurisdictions. If the UK ever withdraws from the ECHR, it would undermine a regional system for protection of human rights in Europe built up over more than 60 years. This ‘would be a disservice to Europe, the rule of law and to the peaceful settlement of disputes’.76 For example, in R (Bernard) v Enfield London Borough Council,77 the High Court found that the local authority had acted unlawfully and incompatibly with Article 8 of the ECHR (respect for private and family life), by failing (for 20 months) to provide suitable accommodation for a family that included a severely disabled woman (following a stroke) aged 48 years.78 The court recalled that Article 8 may require public authorities to take positive measures to secure respect for private or family life.79 It considered that Article 8 placed an obligation on the local authority to take positive steps, including the provision of suitably adapted accommodation, to enable Mrs Bernard and her family to enjoy their family life. The court held that suitably adapted accommodation was important not only because it would facilitate family life (for example, enabling Mrs Bernard to move around her home more freely and help to look after her children), but also because such accommodation would secure her ‘physical and psychological integrity’, which is protected by Article 8. This ‘would have restored her dignity as a human being’.80 The court stated that the failure of the local authority to provide suitable accommodation ‘condemned the claimants to living conditions which made it virtually impossible for them to have any meaningful private or family life for the purposes of [that] Article’. It ruled that ‘just satisfaction’ for the failure required an award of compensation, and awarded Mrs ­Bernard £10,000 damages under the HRA 1998. Similarly, in R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte B and Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants,81 the Court of Appeal considered the provision of benefits to asylum seekers in order to protect them from destitution. It was held that regulations that deprive a very large number of asylum seekers of the basic means of sustaining life itself have the effect of rendering their ostensible statutory right to a proper consideration of their claims in the UK valueless in practice, by making it not merely difficult but totally impossible for them to remain in the UK to pursue those claims.

76  D Harris et al, The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) vii. 77  R (Bernard) v Enfield London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 2282 (Admin) (25 October 2002), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2002/2282.html. 78  She suffered from hemi paralysis and had almost no use of her right arm and leg. She had very limited mobility and was dependent on an electrically operated wheelchair. She was doubly incontinent and also suffered from diabetes. She was cared for by her husband, the first claimant, who also looked after their six children, whose ages ranged from between 20 to 3 years old. 79  Bernard, above n 77, [31], citing Marckx v Belgium [1979] 2 EHRR 330, at para 31; Botta v Italy [1998] 26 EHRR 241, at paras 32–34. 80  Ibid, [33]. 81  R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte B and Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, QBCOF 96/0462/D, QBCOF 96/0461 and 0462/D (21 June 1996), available at http://www.refworld.org/ docid/3ae6b72a0.html.

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ii. Why has the United Kingdom not Incorporated Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected in the Covenant? [5.23]  It is clear from the foregoing that the UK has not incorporated the ICESCR in the UK’s domestic law despite the strong recommendation of the CESCR cited above. The UK Government responded to the Committee’s observations by stating that it was ‘not convinced’ that it could incorporate the rights contained in the ICESCR in a meaningful way within the British legal system.82 Why was/is the UK not convinced? The Government advanced four main reasons. [5.24]  First, it was claimed that the rights in the ICESCR are too vaguely expressed and would only raise expectations and encourage time-consuming and expensive litigation against public bodies. The Government argued that ‘some of the rights contained in the Covenant are not clearly defined, the main example is the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11)’.83 According to the Government, it was unclear how domestic courts would fairly assess claims brought under this article and similarly ambiguous articles, since the standards are likely to vary between individuals.84 For example, it is not clear how courts could judge whether there had been an absence of general progress in a particular case, where an individual claimed that he or she had not fully enjoyed the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (Article 12).85 But is the ‘ambiguous’ nature of some articles in the ICESCR a sufficient reason for their non-incorporation in domestic law? Cannot these rights be applied in concrete cases? It is my view that one of the benefits of domestic legal protection (incorporation) of ESC rights is to clarify the content of these rights in a specific national context, while increasing the accountability of states and relevant NSAs. This could consolidate efforts to provide effective remedies for violations of these rights. Indeed, as shown in chapter ten, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health can be incorporated in national law and enforced at a domestic level. Economic, social and cultural rights as protected in the ICESCR are no more imprecise than civil and political rights protected in international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and ECHR. A number of civil and political rights, including freedom from torture, and from inhuman and degrading treatment, have benefited from domestic legal protection and judicial development at a national level. It is likely that even ESC rights could be developed in a similar way. [5.25]  Secondly, it was contended that enforceable ESC rights in domestic law involve the courts (unelected judges) in exercising too much power by making decisions about resources and priority setting that they are ill equipped to take. The Government stated that it was also constrained by limited budgetary resources in progressively realising the rights contained in the Covenant thus a judicial decision that the Government should have made greater progress in one area, for example health, would imply a reduction in the investment into another area, for example education.86 82 See the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5th periodic report), UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5 (31 January 2008) para 74. 83  Ibid. 84  Ibid. 85  Ibid. 86  Ibid.

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In other words, according to the claims brought in court, the Government would have to continue to shift its priorities and investments.87 This is a restatement of the traditional critique of ESC rights as too institutionally complex to implement.88 Unelected judges are said to lack the legitimacy and/or the competence to deal with the rights in the ICESCR,89 and thus such decisions, it is argued, should remain the exclusive domain of democratically accountable institutions of government—the executive and legislature.90 The critique, simply put, is: how can courts, without a bureaucracy of policy expertise, create government prerogatives or oversee policies involving complex issues regarding the allocation of a limited budget such as social security, adequate housing, education or healthcare?91 This view has traditionally been upheld by the courts. For example, in R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority, ex parte B, Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed: It is common knowledge that health authorities of all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet. They cannot pay their nurses as much as they would like; they cannot provide all the treatments they would like; they cannot purchase all the extremely expensive medical equipment they would like, they cannot carry out all the research they would like; they cannot build all the hospitals and specialist units they would like. Difficult and agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. This is not a judgment which the court can make.92

This objection is overstated, because the judiciary can still play the role of making the state accountable by, for example, requiring it to explain whether resources have been spent the way they should have been (in accordance with the law) and whether particular groups or individuals have been excluded. In this way the judiciary can legitimately remind the state that it is under a duty to respect, protect or fulfil ESC rights within the available resources in a specific domestic context. [5.26]  Thirdly, the Government stated that the ‘progressive realisation of the rights contained in the Covenant can be achieved in different ways depending on the political views of the Parliamentary majority supporting the Government’.93 According to the Government, some people might judge that the realisation of these rights requires ‘targeted interventionist policies’, while others might judge that the best chances for improvement come from ‘de-regulating the market and allowing individual economic initiative’ to achieve the standards set out in the ICESCR.94 The Government argued that, for example, for some people, the right to adequate housing (Article 11) may mean being provided with a shelter when they cannot provide for themselves, while for other people it means the Government providing an economic environment in which they can earn sufficient income to be able to afford accommodation.95 It then 87 

Ibid. K Boon, ‘The Role of Courts in Enforcing Economic and Social Rights’ (2007) 39 George ­Washington International Law Review 449, 452. 89  C Fabre, ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 263, 280. 90  Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? Government response to the Committee’s Twenty-ninth Report of Session 2007–08, 19 January 2009, HL Paper 15 HC 145, 2008–09, 19–20. 91  Boon, above n 88, 472. 92  R v Cambridgeshire Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] EWCA Civ 49, [1995] 1 WLR 898 (CA), ­available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1995/49.html. 93  5th periodic report, above n 82, para 74. 94  Ibid. 95  Ibid. 88 See

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concluded that ‘it would be inappropriate for courts to have the last word in what is ultimately governmental economic policy’. It is true that it is not for the courts to determine government economic policy, and indeed the ICESCR, like other human rights treaties, does not require any particular economic policy. Every state has a margin of discretion in deciding the appropriate economic policy. Nonetheless, within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their functions of judicial review, courts should take account of ESC rights, as protected in the ICESCR and other human rights treaties, where this is necessary to ensure that the state’s conduct is consistent with its international human rights obligations.96 [5.27]  Lastly, the Government asserted that individuals in the UK are already empowered under a variety of legislation, regulations and administrative rules to challenge government policy in the area of ESC rights.97 For example, individuals can petition their local Member of Parliament, or file a complaint against a public authority for failing in its duties—support and advice is available through the Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, a range of NGOs and the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).98 Further, although the HRA 1998 does not explicitly protect ESC rights, it (together with some other laws) does offer some limited opportunities for judicial intervention in cases involving some ESC rights of vulnerable individual and groups, such as asylum seekers and immigrants. [5.28]  While some aspects of ESC rights could be enforced under the existing framework, as shown by the above cases, it is not sufficiently comprehensive to cover all ESC rights protected under the ICESCR. Even before the incorporation of most of the ECHR into UK law, some civil and political rights could be enforced, but this did not stop the Government from incorporating most of the ECHR. It is, therefore, still useful to re-examine the matter of incorporation of the ICESCR (or enforceable ESC rights) into domestic law. [5.29]  The effect of the view that unincorporated treaties cannot give rights or obligations in the UK is that claims based on the ICESCR are non-justiciable by the courts, ie not subject to legal enforcement unless given effect by legislation. As a result, individuals and groups that are victims of violation of Covenant rights that are not incorporated into domestic law, or which are not indirectly protected by other treaties, are unable to challenge such violations before domestic courts. For example, the UK has failed to incorporate the right to strike, as protected by Article 8 of the ICESCR, into domestic law. In this respect, the CESCR has expressly stated: The Committee considers that failure to incorporate the right to strike into domestic law constitutes a breach of article 8 of the Covenant. The Committee considers that the common law approach recognising only the freedom to strike, and the concept that strike action constitutes a fundamental breach of contract justifying dismissal, is not consistent with protection of the right to strike. The Committee does not find satisfactory the proposal to enable employees who go on strike to have a remedy before a tribunal for unfair dismissal. Employees participating in a lawful strike should not ipso facto be regarded as having committed a breach of 96 

CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1, para 14. 5th periodic report, above n 82, para 74. 98  Ibid. The EHRC was established by the Equality Act 2006 and came into being on 1 October 2007. See EHRC at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/. 97 

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an employment contract. The Committee is also of the view that the legally accepted practice of allowing employers to differentiate between union and non-union members by giving pay raises to employees who do not join a union is incompatible with article 8 of the Covenant.99

[5.30]  Since the poor and groups frequently subject to discrimination, such as racial minorities and women, have often been victims of violations of ESC rights, nonjusticiability­or non-incorporation of such rights in a state’s domestic law tends to reinforce the marginalisation of vulnerable groups in society. For example, the CEDAW Committee noted that women of different ethnic minority communities, ‘including Traveller communities, continue to suffer from multiple discrimination, particularly in access to education, employment and health care’.100 It was also noted that ethnic and minority women are under-represented in all areas of the labour market, particularly in senior or decision-making positions (eg despite recent improvements, the numbers of women and ethnic minorities in the judiciary remain at low levels),101 have higher rates of unemployment and face a greater pay gap in their hourly earnings compared to men.102 It further noted ‘the lack of positive media portrayals of ethnic and minority women, elderly women and women with disabilities’.103 With respect to the right to work, the CEDAW Committee was concerned about the persistence of occupational segregation between women and men in the labour market and the continuing pay gap, one of the highest in Europe, where figures showed that the average hourly earnings of full-time women employees amount to approximately 83 per cent of men’s earnings,104 in addition to the high unemployment rates of women with disabilities.105 Therefore, this indicates that there are some issues involving ESC rights that require attention. In this respect it is especially important to avoid any a priori assumption that the rights under the ICESCR should be considered to be objectives that cannot be given direct legal effect in domestic law. In fact, many of them are stated in terms that are at least as clear and specific as those in other human rights treaties, the provisions of which are regularly deemed as capable of direct legislative effect. B.  South Africa i.  The Covenant in South Africa [5.31]  The Republic of South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 12 January 2015 (see Appendix C to this book). It is also a state party to other international human rights treaties (protecting some ESC rights), including the ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, Optional Protocols I and II to the ICCPR, 99  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.19 (4 December 1997) para 11; UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002), above n 7, para 16. 100  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc CEDAW/C/UK/CO/6 (10 July 2008) para 292 and UN Doc CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7 (30 July 2013) para 60. 101  See HRC, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6 (21 July 2008) para 292 and UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 (17 August 2015) para 12. 102  UN Doc CEDAW/C/UK/CO/6, above n 100, (10 July 2008) para 292. 103  Ibid, para 274. 104  Ibid, para 286. 105  UN Doc CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7, above n 100, para 46.

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Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRC-AC) and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography CRC-SC.106 At a regional level, South Africa is a state party to, inter alia, the ACHPR,107 which protects some ESC rights. The ratification of the ICESCR and its incorporation into South African domestic law would strengthen the efforts of South Africa to meet its obligations in guaranteeing ESC rights under its jurisdiction.108 As shown below, the post-apartheid Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996 and took effect on 4 February 1997. It has been described by Sunstein as ‘the most admirable constitution in the history of the world’.109 It recognises the importance of international law in interpreting and applying domestic law, and protects some aspects of ESC rights listed under the ICESCR.110 This has provided a legal basis for the South African Constitutional Court to deliver judgments dealing with the rights of access to health, adequate housing, water, electricity, and basic sanitation.111 [5.32]  Article 231(4) of the South African Constitution provides: Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 106 See UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratification Status for South Africa, at http:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=162&Lang=. 107 Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 108  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: South Africa, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.122, (23 ­February 2000), para 11. 109  CR Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001) 261. One of the main sources of admiration is the inclusion of a range of justiciable social and economic rights together with civil and political rights in the Constitution, thus recognising the indivisibility of human rights. 110  For a discussion of ESC rights in South Africa, see M Langford et al, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014); DM Davis, ‘Socioeconomic Rights: The Promise and Limitation—The South African Experience’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 193; C Mbazira, Litigating Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2009). 111  See eg Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (Soobramoney); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (Grootboom); Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (TAC); Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (Khosa); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, CCT 53/03) [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others (CCT74/03) [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others (24/07) [2008] ZACC 1, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); Residents of the Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) [2009] ZACC 16; 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others (CCT 31/09) [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); Joseph v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of KwazuluNatal and Others (CCT12/09) [2009] ZACC 31; 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another (CC) [2011] ZACC 33; 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC).

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Article 232 states: Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.

The Constitution further provides in Article 233: When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.

[5.33]  In S v Makwanyane and Another,112 in the context of section 35(1) of the interim Constitution,113 which required courts (when interpreting the Constitution) to have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of rights entrenched in the Constitution, Chaskalson P stated: [P]ublic international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights].114

[5.34]  The relevance of international law in interpreting a Bill of Rights was explained by the High Court of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, in September 2001 in Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council.115 In this case an urgent application for interim relief was filed by the residents of a block of flats whose water supply was allegedly unlawfully discontinued. Bundler AJ granted an order for interim relief, to restore the water supply, pending the final determination of the application. In furnishing reasons for this order the Judge stated that he relied on international law to interpret the Bill of Rights, ‘where the Constitution uses language similar to that which has been used in international instruments. The jurisprudence of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is plainly the model for parts of our Bill of Rights, is an example of this.’116 The Court quoted General Comment 12 of the CESCR, on the Right to Food (this case pre-dated the adoption of UN General Comment 15 on the Right to Water), in explaining the duty to respect ‘rights of access’; and the Court c­ ommented that ‘General Comments have authoritative status under international law’.117 112 

S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). S 35(1) of the interim Constitution provided, ‘In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.’ 114  S v Makwanyane, above n 112, para 35 (footnotes omitted). 115  Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council, Case No 01/12312 2002 (6) BCLR 625. 116  Ibid, para 15. 117  Ibid, paras 17–18. 113 

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(As noted in chapter 1, although G ­ eneral Comments are not legally binding under international law, they represent expert interpretation by relevant treaty-monitoring bodies. Therefore, it is legitimate to take General Comments into account in interpreting and applying relevant domestic law.) [5.35]  In accordance with the above approach, in the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,118 the South African Constitutional Court cited paragraph 10 of General Comment 3 of the CESCR119 in an attempt to identify the content of a minimum core obligation of the right to adequate housing. Paragraph 9 of General Comment 3 was also quoted in full to explain the Committee’s analysis of the progressive realisation of the right to housing. Similarly, in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2),120 in an attempt to define the ‘minimum core’ of section 27(1) of the South African Constitution, the Constitutional Court made reference to the concept ‘minimum core’ as developed by the CESCR in General Comment 3. The Court quoted paragraph 10 of General Comment 3 to explain what is meant by the term ‘minimum core’ and to apply this concept to section 27(1) of the Constitution (paragraph 26). This approach is commendable since it gives effect to the view that, irrespective of the system through which international law is incorporated in the domestic legal order—monism or dualism—following ratification of an international instrument, the state party is under an obligation to comply with it and to give it full effect in the domestic legal order. Compliance necessarily entails taking into account the views of the relevant treaty-monitoring bodies. [5.36]  However, although the Court purported to follow international law by referring to General Comment 3, the approach it adopted differed significantly from that which had been developed in international law. As noted in chapter two, while the idea of the minimum core obligations in international law requires a state to ‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’,121 according to the Court, the real question in terms of the South African Constitution is ‘whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right afforded by section 26 are reasonable’.122 Thus, the Court avoided engaging with the identification of the core content of the right in

118  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), paras 29–33 (Grootboom), available at http://www. constitutionalcourt.org.za/ uhtbin/cgisirsi/20080402104447/SIRSI/0/520/J-CCT11-00. For a discussion of the Grootboom case, see C Scott and P Alston, ‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 206; P De Vos, ‘Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 258; S Liebenberg, ‘The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 232; J Sloth-Nielsen, ‘The Child’s Right to Social Services, The Right to Social Security, and Primary Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 210; and R Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391. 119  CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991). 120  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 121  CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 119, para 10. 122  Grootboom, above n 118, para 33.

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question (access to adequate housing). In summary, the concept of reasonableness adopted by the Court provides far less clarity about the core content of the right.123 ii. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected Under the South African Constitution [5.37]  Economic, social and cultural rights protected under the South African Constitution 1996 include the rights of access to adequate housing (section 26); access to healthcare, food, water and social security (section 27); children’s rights to basic nutrition, shelter, basic healthcare services and social services (section 28); the right to education (section 29); rights to take part in cultural life (sections 30–31); rights of prisoners to ‘adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment’ (section 35); a number of labour rights, including the right to form trade unions and the right to strike (section 23); a right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being (section 24); and the right to property (section 25). It is useful to note some of these sections in further detail below. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 Housing 26.(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. Health care, food, water and social security 27.(1) Everyone has the right to have access to a. health care services, including reproductive health care; b. sufficient food and water; and c. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. Children 28.(1) Every child has the right a. … b. to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment; c. to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; d. to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;

123  See DM Davis, ‘Socioeconomic Rights: Do They Deliver the Goods?’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 687.

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e. to be protected from exploitative labour practices; f. not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or (ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social development; … (3) In this section ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18 years. Education 29.(1) Everyone has the right a. to a basic education, including adult basic education; and b. to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible.

(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account a. equity; b. practicability; and c. the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.

(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions that a. do not discriminate on the basis of race; b. are registered with the state; and c. maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational institutions. (4)  Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions. Language and culture 30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. Cultural, religious and linguistic communities 31.(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community a. to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and b. to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.

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Arrested, detained and accused persons 35(2)(e) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to ­conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.124

[5.38]  Section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the state ‘to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’, and the courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that these rights are protected and fulfilled. Importantly, the relevant rights accrue to ‘everyone’, and this has been understood to include non-nationals resident in South Africa. In Khosa v Minister of Social Development,125 citizens of ­Mozambique who had permanent resident status in South Africa challenged certain provisions of legislation, the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, that limited entitlement to social grants for the aged to South African citizens, and which prevented children of nonSouth African citizens in the same position as the applicants from claiming any of the childcare grants available to South African children (regardless of the citizenship status of the children themselves). The applicants alleged that the exclusions ­violated the constitutional obligation to provide access to social security, infringed their constitutional rights to life and dignity, limited their right to equality and amounted to unfair discrimination, and infringed the rights of their children. Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, writing for the majority,126 held that the Constitution protected ‘everyone’ with the right to have access to social security, and that this included those residing legally in the country. The exclusion of permanent residents from the legislative scheme amounted to unfair discrimination and was unreasonable. The importance of providing access to social assistance to all who live permanently in South Africa, as well as the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access would have, far outweighed the financial and immigration considerations on which the state relied. [5.39]  While Mokgoro J accepted the concern that ‘non-citizens may become a financial burden on the country’ as a legitimate one,127 on the evidence in this case she found that the cost would not place an additional burden on the state and, indeed, would not constitute ‘a huge cost’ but ‘only a small proportion of the total cost [of the social security budget]’.128 The Court characterised permanent residents as ‘part of a vulnerable group in society’.129 It concluded that the social security programmes enjoyed by South African citizens had ‘a serious impact on [their] dignity’ and, accordingly, found that the relevant legislation violated both the right to equality and the right to social security of permanent residents.130 124  For discussion of this section, see M Pieterse, ‘The Potential of Socio-economic Rights Litigation for the Achievement of Social Justice: Considering the Example of Access to Medical Care in South African Prisons’ (2006) 50 Journal of African Law 118. 125  Khosa v Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 126  Ibid. Chaskalson CJ, Langa DCJ, Goldstone J, Moseneke J, O’Regan J and Yacoob J concurred in the judgment of Mokgoro J. 127  Ibid, para 58. 128  Ibid, para 62. 129  Ibid, para 74. 130  Ibid, para 76. In a dissenting judgment, Ngcobo J, with Madala J concurring, found that the relevant legislation (s 3(c) of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992) is a reasonable limitation of the right of access to social security. The state has insufficient resources to provide for everyone within its borders and is entitled

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[5.40]  Although the majority decision in Khosa is to be welcomed, at least in so far as it appeared to be unfettered by the reasonableness standard that had dominated the three earlier cases brought under sections 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution,131 the Court’s reluctance to extend social security to temporary residents does not appear to be consistent with international law, in particular with the ICESCR. As noted in chapter two, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR prohibits discrimination on several grounds, including nationality. With respect to social security, the CESCR has noted that ‘where non-nationals, including migrant workers, have contributed to a social security scheme, they should be able to benefit from that contribution or retrieve their contributions if they leave the country’.132 The reference to ‘migrant workers’ is not qualified by the duration of their stay in a receiving state, and thus appears to be wide enough to include both temporary and permanent non-nationals resident in a given state. Mokgoro J noted that both permanent residents and citizens contribute to the welfare system through the payment of taxes, and the lack of congruence between benefits and burdens created by a law that denies benefits to permanent residents almost inevitably creates the impression that permanent residents are in some way inferior to citizens and less worthy of social assistance.133 The same reasoning, however, could be applied to temporary residents who have paid taxes to justify their right to social security benefits. [5.41]  It has to be noted that despite the constitutional protection of ESC rights afforded by the South African Constitution, the language used in most sections offers limited protection compared to the standards under the ICESCR. With respect to housing, for example, which has been a central issue before the South African Constitutional Court,134 the following differences can be pointed out: (a) the Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing, while section 26 of the Constitution provides for the right of access to adequate housing; (b) the Covenant obliges states parties to take appropriate steps, which must include legislation, while the Constitution obliges the South African state to take reasonable legislative and other measures.135 The same applies to healthcare, food, water and social security under section 27. ­Significantly, the right of access to is not the same as the right to. ‘Access to’ ­primarily to prioritise its citizens. The Act has the legitimate purpose of encouraging self-sufficiency in immigrants. Furthermore, it is important that the provision of these benefits does not create an incentive to immigrate to South Africa. 131  The three cases were Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (Soobramoney); Grootboom, above n 118; and Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (TAC). 132  CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (2008), para 36. 133  Khosa, above n 125, para 100, citing GM Rosberg, ‘The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government’ (1977) Supreme Court Review 275, 311. 134  For discussion, see L Chenwi, ‘Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions’ (2008) 8(1) Human Rights Law Review 105; E Grant, ‘Enforcing Social and Economic Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing in South Africa’ (2007) 15 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; S Wilson, ‘Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Protection from Arbitrary Eviction: Lessons from Mandelaville’ (2006) 22(4) South African Journal of Human Rights 535. 135  Grootboom, above n 118, para 28.

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implies that one can only claim access (without discrimination) to what is already available.136 On the other hand, the ‘right to’ (as used, for example, in section 28 above regarding children’s rights) implies an entitlement to the protected right even when it may not be available, ie a state would be obliged to make it available (where this is beyond the state’s available resources, a state would need actively to seek international assistance and cooperation). It is therefore not surprising that the CRC Committee welcomed section 28 of the South African Constitution (‘right to’), noting that the Committee expresses appreciation for the efforts made by the State party in the area of legal reform. In this regard, the Committee welcomes the new Constitution (1996), in particular article [section] 28, which guarantees children a number of specific rights and freedoms also provided for under the Convention.137

[5.42]  Given the constitutional protection of ESC rights in the Bill of Rights, the South African Constitutional Court has noted remarkably that [t]he question is therefore not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under our [South African] Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case. This is a very difficult issue which must be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis.138

Although the South African Constitutional Court has examined important cases involving ESC rights, the judgments have not yet properly defined the scope and content of children’s ESC rights protected in the Bill of Rights.139 In addition, in some cases, the Constitutional Court has been reluctant to define the scope of ESC rights, and to impose additional policy burdens on the Government or exercise supervision over the executive.140 This was clear in the three earlier cases—Soobramoney, Grootboom and TAC.141 Indeed in TAC, in rejecting some form of supervisory jurisdiction, the Court stated that there was no reason to believe that the Government could not execute the court order.142 However, more than two years after the court order, there had not been full implementation by any of the relevant government agencies, suggesting that in some cases court supervision might be necessary, at least to confront administrative inefficiency and inertia. Follow-up pressure was needed in some provinces to achieve compliance, including the filing of a contempt of court action against one provincial authority. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) mobilised people to campaign for the right to health using a combination of human rights education, HIV treatment literacy, demonstration, and litigation. As a result of these campaigns,

136  It may be possible to interpret ‘access to’ widely. See, eg, TAC, above n 131, para 125 (discussed in ch 10), where the Court observed that the ‘increases in the budget … will facilitate [access to Nevirapine for the HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies]’. 137  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: South Africa, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.122 (23 February 2000) para 3. 138  Grootboom, above n 118, para 20. See also Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 4 SA 744, (1996) 10 BCLR 1253 (CC), para 78. 139  See S Rosa and M Dutschke, ‘Child Rights at the Core: The Use of International Law in South A ­ frican Cases on Children’s Socio-economic Rights’ (2006) 22(2) South African Journal of Human Rights 224. 140  See DM Davis, ‘Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “Deference Lite”?’ 22(2) South African Journal of Human Rights 301. 141  See above n 131. 142  TAC, above n 131, para 129.

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the TAC was able to reduce the price of medicines, prevent hundreds of thousands of HIV-related deaths, and to force significant additional resources into the health system and towards the poor.143 [5.43]  The problem with the limited wording in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution was encountered by the South African Court in Soobramoney.144 The case involved a 41-year-old unemployed diabetic who suffered from chronic renal failure.145 His condition was irreversible, but his life could be prolonged by means of regular renal dialysis.146 He had exhausted his personal funds and requested treatment at the state hospital in Durban.147 However, the hospital was unable to provide this treatment because of the limited facilities that were available for kidney dialysis in the public sector.148 Under the guidelines developed by the hospital, dialysis machines were reserved for patients eligible for kidney transplant, but Mr Soobramoney was not eligible for a transplant because of his complicated medical history.149 The applicant claimed before the South African Constitutional Court, which is the highest court in South Africa in all constitutional matters, violations of rights to life,150 health151 and emergency medical treatment.152 [5.44]  The Court, inter alia, rejected the claim that the positive right to health under sections 27(1) and (2) required the state to make additional resources available for dialysis treatment, noting that the regional health budget was already overspent153 and that a dramatic increase in the health budget would be required to accommodate all similarly situated patients in South Africa, which would imperil other state social obligations.154 Madala J, in his concurring opinion, framed the issue before the Court as ‘whether everybody has the right of access to kidney dialysis machines even where resources are scarce or limited’.155 He concluded that no such right existed where the treatment would not cure the patient but ‘merely’ prolong his life,156 and suggested that a ‘massive education campaign’ about kidney disease might be warranted.157 The majority opinion did not suggest that the state should do anything further (including through international assistance and cooperation) to respond to the epidemic of kidney disease.158 This approach would be necessary to enhance the realisation of ESC rights. For example, the CRC Committee has encouraged South Africa to prioritise ‘budgetary allocations and distributions to ensure implementation of the economic,

143  See M Heywood, ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health’ (2009) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 14. 144  Soobramoney, above n 131, further considered in chapter 10. 145  Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696, 1698. 146  Ibid. 147  Ibid, 1699–70. 148  Ibid, 1699. 149  Ibid, 1699. Only 39% of the patients with chronic renal failure met these guidelines: ibid, 1705. 150  South African Constitution, s 11 (‘Everyone has the right to life’). 151  Ibid, s 27(1) and (2). 152  Ibid, s 27(3). 153  Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1704. 154  Ibid, 1705. 155  Ibid, 1708. 156  Ibid, 1710. 157  Ibid, 1711. 158  Ibid.

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social and cultural rights of children, to the maximum extent of available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation’.159 The case illustrates that healthcare needs must be seen in the light of the population at large and the demands on other services. As long as the relevant guidelines are reasonable, non-discriminatory, made in good faith, and applied fairly and rationally, the Constitutional Court will uphold them. [5.45]  It is important to note that in the early cases, the South African Constitutional Court placed emphasis on the availability of resources. Justice Chaskalson observed that ‘the obligations imposed on the State by ss 26 and 27 are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources’.160 Similarly, in Grootboom, Justice Yacoob stated ‘s 26 does not expect more of the State than is achievable within its available resources’.161 It should be noted, however, that the ‘availability of resources’, although an important qualifier to the rights to have access to adequate housing, healthcare services, sufficient food and water, and social security under sections 26 and 27, does not alter the immediacy of the obligation to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures’ to achieve the ‘progressive realisation’ of these rights. Similarly, resource constraints alone should not justify inaction. Where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for the state to ensure the ­widest possible enjoyment of the rights protected in sections 26 and 27 in the prevailing circumstances. Even in times of severe resource constraints, the state must protect the most disadvantaged and marginalised members or groups by adopting relatively lowcost, targeted programmes. [5.46]  It remains the case that the South African Constitutional Court has not defined the scope and normative content of the right to have access to adequate housing. The Court has placed emphasis on the reasonableness of the measures taken by the state and meaningful participation, or engagement, with rights-holders before eviction. In the case of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road,162 the City of Johannesburg sought to evict men, women and children from two buildings in Berea, in the Centre of Johannesburg inner city. This was part of an overall clearance policy under the Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration Strategy, in which evictions had been carried out in the middle of the night and without notice, under Apartheid-era laws and regulations. The City alleged that the living conditions were unhygienic and constituted a fire hazard, but had refused to offer the occupiers (poor families), who had moved in after the flight of white South Africans from the inner cities in the immediate post-Apartheid days, alternative accommodation. In this case, forced eviction would likely result in the residents becoming homeless or having to relocate to slum areas on the far periphery of the city, and thus they would be cut off from livelihood opportunities in the city centre.

159  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: South Africa, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.122, (23 February 2000) para 15. 160  Soobramoney, above n 131, para 11. 161  Grootboom, above n 118, para 46. 162  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others (24/07) [2008] ZACC 1, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (19 February 2008).

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[5.47]  Before hearing the case, the Constitutional Court ordered the parties to engage in a meaningful dialogue to see if they could agree on a mutual solution. The p ­ arties reached an agreement that was endorsed by the Court in November 2007. The agreement provided for the occupiers of both properties to be provided with affordable, safe accommodation in the inner city of Johannesburg where they might live ‘secure against eviction’, which was one of the key requests of the applicants. While the ­agreement provided a victory for the residents of the two buildings, several policy issues were referred back to the Court for consideration and decisions in 2008. The Court’s enquiry into the reasonableness of the City’s action turned on whether the City had adequately consulted or ‘engaged’ with the potential evictees. The Court found: The City has shown a willingness to engage. As a result, the desperate situation of the occupiers has been alleviated by the reasonable response of the City to the engagement process. There is no reason to think that future engagement will not be meaningful and will not lead to a reasonable result … Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increased understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the process.163

While the requirement for ‘engagement’ in this case was focused on evictions specifically, it extends potentially to other policies that may involve displacement and thereby affect enjoyment of ESC rights. In short, whenever the state or any other actor at any level desires to implement redevelopment policies that may involve displacement, it must engage with interested individuals and civil society groups. C. Uganda i.  The Covenant in Uganda [5.48]  Uganda (from October 1962, when the country gained independence from ­British colonialism) has a post-colonial history marred by widespread human rights violations,164 and for many years it experienced further serious human rights violations resulting from a long armed conflict in Northern Uganda.165 Poverty, especially among women in rural and remote areas (who form the majority of women in Uganda), particularly older women and women with disabilities, has been a major cause of violations of ESC rights.166 In this regard, the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights in Uganda recommended in 1994 that the state and the people of Uganda should always vigorously pursue the attainment for all of ESC rights, including: (a) economic prosperity and equitable distribution of opportunities and wealth; (b) a fairly reasonable quality of life; (c) affordable universal health care; 163 

Ibid, paras 34 and 15. See generally The Republic of Uganda, ‘The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations’ (Kampala, October 1994). 165 Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten—Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in ­ Northern Uganda (September 2005), vol 17, no 12(A), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/ uganda0905.pdf. 166 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7 (5 November 2010) paras 39, 41 and 45. CEDAW Committee expressed ‘its concern at the fact that 31 per cent of the Ugandan population—women, in the majority—still lives below the poverty line’.  164 

280  (d) (e) (f) (g)

Domestic Protection of ESCR adequate shelter; clean water; a reasonable standard of education; healthy and safe environment, etc.167

[5.49]  The supreme law of Uganda is the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (as revised in 2005),168 and under Article 2, any other law is considered to be void if inconsistent with the Constitution. As shown below, the Constitution defines the status of international treaties, including the ICESCR, in domestic law. Uganda ratified the ICESCR in 1987 without any reservation or declaration (see A ­ ppendices C and H of this book). Uganda’s 1995 Constitution requires Uganda to respect and comply with international law, agreements, treaties and convention obligations.169 In addition to the ICESCR, Uganda has ratified, generally without reservations, a number of international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol,170 the CEDAW, the ICERD, the CRC and its two Protocols, the CAT, the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families,171 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as its Optional Protocol.172 At a regional level, Uganda has ratified the ACHPR173 and its Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights;174 the African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa;175 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;176 and the Protocol to the Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol).177 These instruments provide a framework for legislation and policy at the national level to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights for those within Uganda’s jurisdiction. [5.50]  Although Uganda has not incorporated the ICESCR in domestic law, a wide range of policies and legislative measures have been adopted to protect some rights

167 

The Republic of Uganda, above n 164, 624. The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2005. Constitution 1995, Arts 286, 52(1)(h), and para XXVIII of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy (see para 5.52 below). 170  Uganda entered a specific reservation on Art 5 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, stating, ‘The Republic of Uganda does not accept the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider a communication under the provisions of article 5 paragraph 2 from an individual if the matter in question has already been considered under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.’ 171  Uganda entered a reservation on Art 18 of the Migrant Workers Convention, stating, ‘The Republic of Uganda cannot guarantee at all times to provide free legal assistance in accordance with the provisions of article 18 paragraph 3(d).’ 172  See United Nations International Instruments: Chart of Ratifications as at 31 December 1996, UN Doc ST/HR/4/Rev.15. Uganda ratified the ICESCR on 21 April 1987 and the ICCPR on 21 July 1995. See also OHCHR, Uganda, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/UGIndex. aspx. 173  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67.1. 174  OAU Doc OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev.2 (1997). 175  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.3. 176  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/153/REV 2. 177  Available at http://www.au.int/en/content/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-rightswomen-africa. Uganda ratified the Maputo Protocol with reservation on two provisions under Art 14 on health and reproductive rights—women’s right to control their fertility and authorisation of abortion in specific circumstances. 168 

169  Uganda

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enumerated in international human rights treaties, including some aspects of ESC rights. Legislative measures adopted include: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

the Children’s Act, Cap 59, Laws of Uganda (2000); the Land Act Amendment (2004); the Access to Information Act (2005); the Employment Act (2006); the Equal Opportunities Commission Act (2007), which provides a legal basis to challenge laws, policies, customs and traditions that discriminate against women, as well as the National Equal Opportunities Policy; the amendments to the Penal Code prohibiting defilement of girls and boys (2007); the Domestic Violence Act 3 (2010), criminalising violence in a domestic setting; the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act 5 (2010); the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (2010); the International Criminal Court Act (2010), criminalising sexual exploitation of women during conflict situations; the Whistleblower Protection Act (2010); and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012).

[5.51]  Despite such impressive ratifications, there are still several problems in terms of compliance with Uganda’s human rights obligations under the international instruments listed in paragraph 5.49 above. Two problems are noted here. First, there is limited political will to comply with international human rights obligations with respect to ESC rights, including the failure to submit timely reports178 and to incorporate international human rights treaties on ESC rights into domestic law and policies. It is therefore not surprising that Uganda submitted its initial state report to the CESCR only in July 2012,179 25 years after ratifying the ICESCR, despite having submitted some reports to other UN treaty-monitoring bodies, in particular the HRC, the CERD, and the CAT, CEDAW and CRC Committees.180 Various excuses have been given for this delay, including the limited capacity to draft the report and disagreements as to which government ministry is responsible for drafting it.181 Secondly, Uganda, as a highly indebted poor country, has had a high debt burden.182 Over the years the priority accorded to payment of this debt has undermined investment in the progressive realisation of ESC rights.183 Although Uganda has been a beneficiary of debt relief under 178 As of September 2013, Uganda had seven reports that were overdue, including on the ICERD, ICCPR, CAT, CRC, Migrant Workers Convention (initial), CRC Optional Protocol (armed conflict) and CRC Optional Protocol (sexual exploitation). 179  Uganda’s Initial State Report to the UN Committee on ESC Rights, July 2012, E/C.12/UGA/1. 180  See Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights at http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?country=ug. 181  See Uganda Human Rights Commission, Tenth Annual Report 2007, 117. 182  International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA), Uganda: Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis, (IMF, 30 November 2007) and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Debt Sustainability Analysis (IMF, December 2014). .Uganda’s external debt has increased froms US$1.5 billion (13% of GDP) at end-2006/07 to US$7.5 ­billion as at the end of June 2014, (28.5% of GDP). 183  See Report Submitted by the Independent Expert on the Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies and Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Bernards Mudho, Addendum: Mission to Uganda, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/47/Add.1 (1 March 2004); Report submitted by Ms Katarina Tomaševski, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education Addendum Mission to Uganda, 26 June–2 July 1999, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/6/Add.1 (9 August 1999) paras 29–34.

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the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, ­its external debt remains very high,184 and still impacts upon the state’s available resources to invest in ESC rights. Even then, available resources have not been targeted to the progressive realisation of ESC rights. This has had a disproportionate impact on the realisation of such rights, including the lack of access to healthcare by disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups. For example, in March 2015, Uganda had a chronic shortage of health workers—more than 21,000 healthcare posts (about 40 per cent) were unfilled—largely because of low pay and poor working conditions. Although a number of healthcare professionals are trained in Uganda, upon qualifying, several (doctors, nurses and midwives) leave the country every year for better-paid jobs in western states, as well as in some African states with better remuneration and working conditions, eg Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa.185 It is certainly the case that the ICESCR has had a very low profile within Ugandan law, and has generated little domestic discussion. [5.52]  Regarding the status of international treaties in Uganda’s domestic law, the position is as follows: The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 International Agreements, Treaties and Conventions 286 where— (a) any treaty, agreement or convention with any country or international organisation was made or affirmed by Uganda or the Government on or after the ninth day of October, 1962, and was still in force immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution; or (b) Uganda or the Government was otherwise a party immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution to any such treaty, agreement or convention, the treaty, agreement or convention shall not be affected by the coming into force of this Constitution; and Uganda or the Government, as the case may be, shall continue to be a party to it. Uganda Human Rights Commission 51(1) There shall be a Commission called the Uganda Human Rights Commission. 52(1)(h) The Commission shall have the following functions to monitor the Government’s compliance with international treaty and convention obligations on human rights. National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy XXVIII Foreign Policy Objectives (i)  The foreign policy of Uganda shall be based on the principles of— a. … b. respect for international law and treaty obligations; … 184 IMF, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (17 September 2015), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. 185  See S Okiror, ‘Plan to Export Medics “Threatens Uganda’s Epidemic Response”’ (IRIN, 11 March 2015), available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/101219/plan-to-export-medics-threatens-uganda-sepidemic-response.

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[5.53]  Uganda adopted the so-called ‘dualist’ approach to international treaties.186 Under the 1995 Constitution, the Ugandan President, or a person authorised by the President, is empowered to make treaties, conventions, agreements, or other arrangements between Uganda and any other country or between Uganda and any international organisation or body, in respect of any matter.187

As may be seen in paragraph 5.52 above, the Constitution further provides that any treaty, agreement or convention with any country or international organisation to which Uganda was a party before the coming into force of the 1995 Constitution (such as the ICESCR) shall continue to be binding on Uganda.188 However, as Parliament is the only national institution of Uganda that can make domestic law, treaties have to be ratified, or incorporated, through legislation by Parliament before courts can give them full effect.189 This means that for a ‘ratified instrument to become municipal law, it is debated by Parliament, a bill is passed and a law is then made’.190 Therefore, the official Ugandan position is that the various human rights instruments [ratified by Uganda including the ICESCR] are not directly enforceable by the courts or other administrative authorities. They first have to be transferred into internal laws or administrative arrangements.191

It follows that only treaties negotiated by the executive and ratified by Parliament become part of Uganda’s domestic laws and stand on a par with other Acts of Parliament.192 [5.54]  As yet, the Ugandan Parliament has not incorporated any human rights treaty in domestic law. The consequence is that claims based on unincorporated treaties are considered non-justiciable by the Ugandan courts. In this regard, the Uganda Constitutional Court has explicitly stated in the Ssemwogerere case: The International Human Rights Conventions mentioned in the petition [in this case referring to the ICCPR and the ACHPR] are not part of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Therefore, a provision of an Act of Parliament cannot be interpreted against them. This issue [of the domestic applicability of such treaties to Uganda] was therefore, misconceived.193

[5.55]  The finding expressed above would in principle equally apply to the ICESCR in Uganda. It is regrettable that the Ugandan Constitutional Court has taken such a narrow view in relation to international human rights treaties to which Uganda is a 186  Under this approach, a treaty signed and ratified by the executive is considered as binding the state at the international level, but the rights and obligations created by the treaty have no effect in domestic law, and individuals cannot derive rights and obligations unless legislation is in force to give effect to the treaty. See Lord Oliver in Maclaine Watson v Dept of Trade [1989] 3 All ER 523, 544–45, HL; Aust, above n 7, 167; JG Starke, Introduction to International Law (London, Butterworths, 1989) ch 4. 187  Uganda Constitution 1995, Art 123(1) and (2). 188  Ibid, Art 286. 189  Ibid, Art 79; the Ratification of Treaties Act 1998 (Act No 5 of 1998). 190  See Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: Uganda, UN Doc HRI/CORE/ 1/Add.69 (7 March 1996) para 40. 191  Ibid, para 41. 192  See, eg, The International Criminal Court Act 2010; GP Tumwine-Mukubwa, ‘International Human Rights Norms in the Domestic Arena’ (1996) 3 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 33, 35. 193  PK Ssemwogerere v The Attorney General of Uganda, Constitutional Petition No 5 of 2002.

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state party. It suggests that individuals within Uganda’s territory may not generally invoke the rights guaranteed under such human rights treaties before the domestic courts since courts can not give them direct effect. Unlike the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC),194 Ugandan domestic courts have so far not made any explicit reference to the ICESCR in any of their judgments, even as an aid to interpretation. The effect is that the Covenant enjoys a very low profile. [5.56]  Nonetheless, it is desirable that where Parliament has not incorporated into domestic law a human rights treaty to which Uganda is a party, it may still be referred to, and followed at least as an aid to interpretation of domestic law—whether constitutional, statute or common law—if uncertain, ambiguous or incomplete.195 Thus, courts should construe the chapter on human rights under the Constitution not in a narrow way196 (which excludes international human rights treaties to which Uganda is a state party) but broadly and purposively, so as to give effect to Uganda’s international human rights obligations and the effective protection and promotion of the indivisible and interdependent nature of all human rights. This may be achieved by applying international human rights jurisprudence (including the General Comments of the CESCR) to fill the gaps in domestic law and/or as an interpretative principle to assist in the ascertainment of the meaning of the rights guaranteed in the chapter on human rights under the Constitution.197 It is interesting to note that in January 2009, Uganda’s Supreme Court made reference to the UDHR and the ICCPR when deciding on the constitutionality of the death penalty in Uganda.198 It would appear, however, that applying a ‘dualist’ approach, an international treaty cannot prevail over a clearly worded domestic statute that contradicts it.199 But this was not the position in the case of Ssemwogerere, considered above.

194  The UHRC frequently refers to international human rights instruments in its application of human rights in the Constitution. See eg Sam Muwonge v Capt Sulaiti Mwesigye and Others, Complaint no 202/1998, where the Commission applied the definition of ‘torture’ in the CAT. 195  Tinyefuza v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition no 1 of 1996; Unity Dow v Attorney General (1992) LRC (Const) 623, 656–57; Bangalore Principles, nos 4 and 7, (1988) 14 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1196; T Maluwa, ‘The Incorporation of International Law and its Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey’ (1998) 23 South African Yearbook of International Law 45. 196  See L Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, ‘The Judiciary and Enforcement of Human Rights: Between Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint’ (2002) 8(2) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 145. 197  M Kirby, ‘Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Norms’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Human Rights 109, 125; and Matia v Uganda, Appeal to the High Court of Uganda, Criminal Revision Cause no MSK-00-CR-0005 of 1999 (30 June 1999), Commonwealth Human Rights Law Digest 3, 66. The High Court considered the decision of the HRC in Lubuto v Zambia, Communication no 390/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/55/D/390/1990/Rev.1 (1995), in determining which factors should be considered in Uganda to establish whether a delay in a criminal trial is unreasonable (the period between laying of the charge and the completion of proceedings, or up to the time when the issue of delay is raised). 198 See Attorney General v Susan Kigula & 417 others, Constitutional Appeal no 03 of 2006, [2009] UGSC 6, http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/supreme-court/2009/6. See also Centre for Health, Human Rights & Development v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 64 of 2011 [2015] UGCC 12 (13 October 2015). 199 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, HL, per Lord Bridge and Lord Ackner. In general the UK cases are persuasive in the Ugandan courts, because the ­Ugandan ‘judiciary administers a system of law which in Uganda includes the Constitution, statutes enacted by Parliament, common-law principles derived from English law and customary law’. See UN, Core Document forming part of the Reports of the States Parties: Uganda, UN Doc HRI/CORE/1/Add.69 (7 March 1996) para 23.

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ii.  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Protected Under Uganda’s Constitution [5.57]  The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda is grounded in basic human rights principles, including non-discrimination and equality for everyone, with specific provisions to ensure the human rights of vulnerable groups, including women, persons with disabilities, children and minorities.200 There are three main mechanisms of human rights monitoring and accountability: (a) via the courts of law (especially the High Court, Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court);201 (b) via the UHRC;202 and (c) via the Equal Opportunities Commission,203 whose functions include ‘monitor[ing] the compliance, in Uganda, with the provisions of international and regional conventions, treaties and other instruments to which Uganda is a party, that relate to or are relevant to the functions and objects of the ­Commission’.204 The Commission is empowered to rectify, settle or remedy any act, omission, circumstance, practice, tradition, culture, usage or custom that is found to constitute discrimination or marginalisation, or which otherwise undermines equal opportunities, through mediation, conciliation, negotiation, settlement or other dispute resolution mechanism.205 [5.58]  It is important to note that the enactment of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution was preceded by the establishment of a Constitutional Commission in 1988. The Commission reaffirmed the need to ensure that the Bill of Rights section of the Constitution gives effect to the basic needs and rights of the people.206 However, the Commission considered that not all rights were amenable to enforcement or judicial review in the same way. This gave rise to the idea that some rights should be included in the Constitution as unenforceable and non-binding principles to guide the implementation of the Constitution, because, according to the Commission, ‘these rights cannot all be realised and given full effect immediately’.207 Hence, Uganda’s 1995 Constitution protects human rights in two sections, namely, a (justiciable) chapter on ‘human rights and freedoms’, which contains mainly civil and political rights; and a section (perceived as non-justiciable) entitled ‘National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy’, in which the majority of ESC rights are to be found.208 While Uganda’s 200  Uganda Constitution 1995, Arts 21, 33, 34, 35 and 36; M Ssenyonjo, ‘Women’s Rights to Equality and Non-discrimination: Discriminatory Family Legislation in Uganda and the Role of Uganda’s Constitutional Court’ (2007) 21(3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 341. 201 Art 50 of the Constitution provides for access to the courts by those persons whose rights and freedoms have been infringed. 202 Art 53(2)(c) of the Constitution invests the UHRC with quasi-judicial powers to provide a legal remedy in cases where there has been infringement of human rights. 203 Art 32 of the Constitution establishes the Equal Opportunities Commission to address issues of discrimination for marginalised groups. 204  The Equal Opportunities Commission Act 2007, Art 14(2)(g). 205  Ibid, Art 14(3). 206  Uganda Constitutional Commission, The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission: Analysis and Recommendations (Entebbe, Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, 1993), 147. 207  Ibid, 99 and 159; J Oloka-Onyango, Interrogating NGO Struggles for Economic, Social and C ­ ultural Human Rights in Contemporary Utake [Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania]: A Perspective from Uganda (­Kampala, Makerere University, 2006) 15–16. 208  See Uganda Constitution 1995.

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1995 Constitution breaks new ground in several different respects, in so far as the protection and enhancement of ESC rights is concerned, it does not go very far.209 Chapter IV of the Constitution, which protects human rights, places more emphasis on civil and political rights than on ESC rights. The only provisions found in the Bill of Rights relating to ESC rights under Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, and thus considered enforceable, are limited to the protection from forced labour;210 protection from deprivation of property;211 a general right to education;212 a right to a healthy environment;213 a lukewarm articulation of the right to work;214 and a broad right to culture.215 The Constitution makes special reference to the human rights of vulnerable groups, including ­minorities,216 children,217 persons with disabilities218 and women.219 [5.59]  Some of the relevant Articles protecting ESC rights are set out below to show the scope of the rights protected. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 Article 26 Protection from deprivation of property (1) Every person has a right to own property either individually or in association with others. (2)  No person shall be compulsorily deprived of property or any interest in or right over property of any description except where the following conditions are satisfied— a. the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary for public use or in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; and b. the compulsory taking of possession or acquisition of property is made under a law which makes provision for— (i) prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation. prior to the taking of possession or acquisition of the property; and (ii) a right of access to a court of law by any person who has an interest or right over the property. Article 30 Right to education All persons have a right to education. Article 39 Right to a clean and healthy environment Every Ugandan has a right to a clean and healthy environment. 209  J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Poverty, Human Rights and the Quest for Sustainable Human Development in Structurally-Adjusted Uganda’ (2000) 18 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 23, 31. 210  Uganda Constitution 1995, Art 25(2). 211  Ibid, Art 26(1). 212  Ibid, Art 30. 213  Ibid, Art 39. 214  Ibid, Art 40. 215  Ibid, Art 37. 216  Ibid, Art 36 reads: ‘Minorities have a right to participate in decision-making processes, and their views and interests shall be taken into account in the making of national plans and programmes.’ 217  Ibid, Art 34 and the Children Act, Ch 59, Revised Laws of Uganda (2000). 218  Ibid, Art 35, stating that ‘Persons with disabilities have a right to respect and human dignity, and the State and society shall take appropriate measures to ensure that they realise their full mental and physical potential.’ 219  Ibid, Art 33. For a discussion, see M Ssenyonjo, ‘Towards Non-discrimination Against Women and De Jure Equality in Uganda: The Role of Uganda’s Constitutional Court’ (2008) 16 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1.

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Article 40 Economic rights (1) Parliament shall enact laws— a. to provide for the right of persons to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions; b. to ensure equal payment for equal work without discrimination; and c. to ensure that every worker is accorded rest and reasonable working hours and periods of holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. (2) Every person in Uganda has the right to practise his or her profession and to carry on any lawful occupation, trade or business. (3) Every worker has a right— a. to form or join a trade union of his or her choice for the promotion and protection of his or her economic and social interests; b. to collective bargaining and representation; and c. to withdraw his or her labour according to law. (4) The employer of every woman worker shall accord her protection during pregnancy and after birth, in accordance with the law. Article 37 Right to culture and similar rights Every person has a right as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others. Article 32 Affirmative action in favour of marginalised groups … (2)  Laws, cultures, customs and traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or any other marginalised group to which clause (1) relates220 or which undermine their status, are prohibited by this Constitution.

[5.60]  Article 20(2) requires that the rights and freedoms of the individual and groups enshrined in the Bill of Rights ‘shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and agencies of Government and by all persons’. It is clear from the list above, however, that the Bill of Rights under Uganda’s 1995 Constitution does not expressly protect many ESC rights protected in the ICESCR, which Uganda ratified on 21 April 1987.221 It does not expressly protect the following rights: social security; an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; and the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. As noted above, the majority of these rights were confined to a section of the Constitution referred to as the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, which was not subject (at least in the minds of the framers of the Constitution) to legal enforcement.222

220  Art 32(1) obliges the state to ‘take affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing imbalances which exist against them’. 221  See UN, Recent Reporting History, HRI/GEN/4/REV.2 (7 June 2002) 184. 222 See inter alia, paras VI (gender balance); XIII (protection of national resources); XX (medical ­services); XXI (clean and safe water); and XXII (food security and nutrition) of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.

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[5.61]  However, the Constitution recognised that [t]he rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental and human other human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned.223

The question here is whether ESC rights that are not expressly protected in the Bill of Rights can be read into this general provision, which protects other human rights ‘not specifically mentioned’. Although the scope of this Article has not yet been clearly delineated by Uganda’s Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, it would appear that the text is wide enough to be interpreted as incorporating into Uganda’s constitutional framework all human rights guaranteed under international human rights treaties to which Uganda is state party, including those guaranteed under the ICESCR and African Charter. But even if the courts were to take this view, there is still another conceptual question: why should the Constitution expressly guarantee civil and political rights and then ‘protect’ most ESC rights only implicitly? Undoubtedly, such a position relegates most ESC rights to ‘second-class’ human rights, a position that is incompatible with the principle of the indivisibility and interdependent nature of all human rights. [5.62]  As shown below, it is in the National Objectives that the rights to health, water, natural resources, food security and nutrition are addressed. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 I.  Implementation of Objectives (i) The following objectives and principles shall guide all organs and agencies of the State, all citizens, organisations and other bodies and persons in applying, or interpreting the Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions for the establishment and promotion of a just, free and democratic society. … XIV. General Social and Economic Objectives The State shall endeavour to fulfil the fundamental rights of all Ugandans to social justice and economic development and shall, in particular, ensure that— (i) (ii)

all developmental efforts are directed at ensuring the minimum social and cultural wellbeing of the people; and all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, health services, clean and safe water, work, decent shelter, adequate clothing, food security and pension and retirement benefits.

The language used in the National Objectives does not adequately bind and impose obligations on the state to realise ESC rights. Rather, it is provided that the ‘objectives and principles shall guide all organs and agencies of the State’, and that the state obligation is to ‘endeavour to fulfil’ (ie not simply to ‘fulfil’) the fundamental rights.

223 

Uganda Constitution 1995, Art 45.

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[5.63]  While such National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy may be useful in interpreting the provisions in the chapter on human rights,224 as noted above, they were regarded generally as being aspirational and not justiciable—not subject to legal adjudication—in the strict sense.225 In short, the Constitution imposed moral obligations at best, but without provision for an enforcement mechanism. Since it is primarily ESC rights that are found in this part of the Constitution, the effect is that courts cannot investigate alleged violations, and accordingly courts cannot provide effective remedies in the event of a state’s (or NSA’s) failure to respect, protect and fulfil most ESC rights. The Constitutional Court has refrained from reviewing on the merits claims of alleged violations of ESC rights, for example the state’s failure to provide basic indispensable health items in public health facilities for expectant mothers, leading to a higher maternal mortality rate in Uganda.226 The Court asserted that these are questions of ‘a political nature’ and that it ‘is bound to leave certain questions of a political nature to the Executive and the Legislature to determine’. This suggests that Ugandan courts have been reluctant to review matters involving policy formulation and implementation, as well as inadequate resources allocation to ESC rights. This is likely to change in the future because on 30 October 2015 the Supreme Court of Uganda made an order directing the Constitutional Court to proceed and hear constitutional petition No 16 of 2011, seeking remedies for non-provision of basic maternal health items in public health facilities leading to higher maternal mortality rate in Uganda, on its merits observing that: … although the political question doctrine has limited application in Uganda, the Constitutional Court erred in law when it struck out the appellant’s petition without hearing it on its merits on grounds that they had no jurisdiction and that the petition raised political questions …227

As a result of the unwillingness of courts in Uganda to examine issues of violations of ESC rights, since the enactment of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, jurisprudence relating to ESC rights in Uganda has been scant, with the possible exception of the rights protected in the Bill of Rights, notably the right to property, some aspects of the right to education (notably the case of Dimanche Sharon et al v Makerere University228 discussed in chapter eleven), the right to health and the right to a healthy environment.229 224  See GP Tumwine Mukubwa, ‘The Uganda Constitution, 1995 and Human Rights: Interpretation and Enforcement of Chapter Four Rights and Freedoms’ in PM Walubiri (ed), Uganda: Constitutionalism at the Cross-Roads (Kampala, Uganda Law Watch Centre, 1998) 1, 13–14; B De Villiers, ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: Indian Experience’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 29; B De Villiers, ‘The Socio-economic Consequences of Directive Principles of State Policy; Limitations on Fundamental Rights’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 188. 225  See Uganda Constitution 1995, National Objectives, Objective I(i); D Davis, ‘The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Rights in A Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles’ (1992) 8(4) South African Journal on Human Rights 475, 486–88. 226  Centre for Health Human Rights and Development and Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition no 16 of 2011, [2012] UGCC 4, http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court/2012/4. 227  Centre for Health Human Rights and Development and Others v Attorney General, Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No 1 of 2013, (30 October 2015), Judgment of Hon Lady Justice Dr Esther Kisakye. 228  Constitutional Appeal no 2 of 2004 [2006] UGSC 10 (Supreme Court of Uganda, 1 August 2006), arising out of Constitutional Cause no 1 of 2003 (Constitutional Court of Uganda, 24 September 2003). 229  Oloka-Onyango, above n 209, 24–30; BK Twinomugisha, Fundamentals of Health Law in Uganda (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2015), http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2015_08/2015_08.pdf; Center for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD), Mugewra David & others v Nakaseke District Local

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Even in these areas, there is no well-developed jurisprudence as to the scope of these rights, and no reference to the ICESCR. One way forward is for human rights advocates to bring appropriate cases before the courts (through public interest litigation) and for the courts to apply the Bill of Rights in the light of the Directive Principles relevant to ESC rights.230 Using this approach, advocates for women’s rights to equality and non-discrimination have made significant developments against discriminatory laws, some of which affected women’s ESC rights.231 [5.64]  Litigation has also been helpful in challenging discriminatory laws in Uganda on the basis of sexual orientation, such as Uganda’s Anti Homosexuality Act 2014 (passed on 20 December 2013 without quorum in Parliament). The Act, according to its long title, was intended to ‘prohibit any form of sexual relations between persons of the same sex; prohibit the promotion or recognition of such relations and to provide for other related matters’.232 It imposed a maximum life sentence for consensual same sex/gender sexual activity among adults.233 In Prof J Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v Attorney General,234 it was claimed, amongst other things: That the Anti Homosexuality Act 2014 in criminalising consensual same sex/gender sexual activity among adults, is in contravention of obligations with regards to the rights guaranteed under international Human Rights instruments ratified or acceded by Uganda, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights; and in contravention of Objectives XIV, XXXVIII(i) (b) of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, Articles 2(1) &(2), 8A, 20 45 and 287 of the Constitution.235

The Constitutional Court held that the Act was null and void because it was enacted without quorum. On this basis, it was not necessary to consider other grounds for challenging the petition. Thus, the Court did not consider the compatibility of the Anti Homosexuality Act 2014 with Uganda’s obligations under international human rights treaties, including the ICESCR and the ICCPR.236 As noted in chapter two, the practice of the CESCR confirms that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of Government, High Court Civil Suit No 111 of 2012 (30 April 2015). The court found that the deceased did not receive the timely, immediate and emergency obstetric care that she needed to overcome the obstructed labour condition she was in. 230  See judgment of Egonda-Ntende J in Tinyefuza v Attorney General, Constitution Petition No 1 of 1996, 16–8; Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka and Others (1992) 3 SCC 666, para 9; Minerva Mills Ltd and Others v Union of India and Others (1981) (1) SLR 206 at 257; CC Aikman, ‘Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy in India’ (1987) 17 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 373; J Narain, ‘Judicial Law Making and the Place of Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution’ (1985) 27 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 198. 231  See Ssenyonjo, above n 219. 232  Anti Homosexuality Act 2014, http://www.ulii.org/files/Anti-Homosexuality-Act-2014.pdf. 233  Ibid, s 2. 234 Constitutional Petition no 08 of 2014, [2014] UGCC 14 (1 August 2014), http://www.ulii.org/ug/ judgment/constitutional-court/2014/14. 235  Ibid. 236 In Mr Edward Young v Australia, Communication no 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (18 September 2003) para 10.4. The HRC held that the prohibition against discrimination under Art 26 of the ICCPR also comprises discrimination based on sexual orientation. It found that Australia had ‘­violated Art 26 of the covenant [ICCPR] by denying the author a pension on the basis of his sex or sexual orientation’.

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discrimination under Article 2(2) of the Covenant.237 Thus, in General Comment 20, the Committee stated: ‘Other status’ as recognized in article 2(2) includes sexual orientation. States parties should ensure that a person’s sexual orientation is not a barrier to realising Covenant rights, for example, in accessing survivor’s pension rights. In addition, gender identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination; for example, persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex often face serious human rights violations, such as harassment in schools or in the work place.238

[5.65]  It is important to note that while the Constitution prohibits discrimination and guarantees equal protection of the law,239 it prohibits in Article 32(2a) marriages between persons of the same sex.240 The Penal Code Act, under sections 145 and 146, punishes homosexual acts as ‘unnatural offences’.241 Thus, persons perceived to be involved in same-sex relations face discrimination and related violations of human rights.242 [5.66]  In 2014, the African Commission was ‘[a]larmed that acts of violence, discrimination and other human rights violations continue to be committed on individuals in many parts of Africa because of their actual or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity’.243 It strongly urged states ‘to end all acts of violence and abuse, whether committed by state or non-state actors’, including by enacting and effectively applying appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing all forms of violence, including those targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identities, ensuring proper investigation and diligent prosecution of perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures responsive to the needs of victims.244 [5.67]  Following the amendment of Uganda’s Constitution in 2006, a new provision, Article 8A, was inserted into the 1995 Constitution. This provision, which refers to the ‘National Interest’, stipulates as follows: Uganda shall be governed based on principles of national interest and common good enshrined in the national objectives and directive principles of state policy.245 237  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc E/C.12/POL/CO/1 (2 December 2009) para 12. 238 CESCR, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art 2, para 2) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (25 May 2009) para 32 (references omitted). 239  Uganda Constitution 1995, Art 21. 240 Uganda Constitution 1995, Art 32(2a) provides ‘[m]arriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited’. 241  Penal Code Act (1950), Cap 120, s 145 provides: ‘Any person who—has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; has carnal knowledge of an animal; or permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.’ Under s 146, ‘Any person who attempts to commit any of the offences specified in section 145 commits a felony and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.’ 242  See, eg, Kasha Jacqueline & 3 others v Rolling Stone ltd and Another (Kasha-1), High Court Miscellaneous Cause no 163/2010 (30 December 2010); Jacqueline Kasha Nabagesera 3 others v Attorney General and Another (Kasha-2), Miscellaneous Cause 33/ 2012, [2014] UGHC 49, (24 June 2014), available at http:// www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/high-court/2014/85. 243  Resolution on Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 275, available at http://www.achpr.org/ sessions/55th/resolutions/275/, Preamble. 244  Ibid, para 4. 245  Uganda Constitution 1995, as amended on 15 February 2006, Art 8A. The amendment was introduced by s 4 of Act 11/2005 (emphasis added).

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The new provision arguably makes it mandatory (rather than merely desirable or recommended) for the state to take into account all the principles of national interest and common good enshrined in the National Objectives.246 Thus, by virtue of Article 8A, it is arguable that the State is now under a legal and mandatory duty to observe, respect, promote and protect all the rights enshrined in the [National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy] in much the same way as if they had been incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.247

This provides an opportunity to subject the state and NSAs to greater judicial accountability for alleged violations of ESC rights. [5.68]  Poverty, high levels of corruption and (de jure or de facto) impunity in Uganda have a direct negative impact on human rights, including ESC rights, in Uganda over many years.248 As noted in chapter two, corruption diverts available resources away from basic services, such as health, water, food and education, needed to meet ESC rights obligations. For example, financial resources in Uganda for health programs have been diverted for private gain, like the $4.5 million diverted from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in 2005 by Ministry of Health ­officials,249 and the $800,000 diverted from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations in 2006 under Ministry of Health.250 Donor funding worth US$12.7 million received from Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (earmarked for rebuilding Karamoja and Northern Uganda, a region ravaged by a 20-year armed conflict) was misappropriated from the Office of the Prime Minister in late 2012.251 In order to eliminate impunity for alleged perpetrators of acts of corruption, Uganda, as a state party to UN Convention against Corruption252 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,253 must promote transparency in governmental affairs,

246  J Oloka-Onyango, The Problematique of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Globalized Uganda: A Conceptual Review (Kampala, Human Rights and Peace Centre, Makerere University, 2007) 57. 247  Ibid. 248  In the 2013 UN Human Development Index report, Uganda ranked 162 out of 187 countries, lower than in previous years. Human Rights Watch, ‘Letting the Big Fish Swim’: Failures to Prosecute HighLevel Corruption in Uganda (Human Rights Watch, 2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ reports/uganda1013_ForUpload_1.pdf. 249  The Global Fund, The Office of the Inspector General, ‘Follow Up Review of the Global Fund grants to Uganda,’ 9 September 2009, 6. 250  Uganda v Hon Jim K Muhwezi and Three Others, High Court of Uganda at Kampala, Anti-Corruption Division, Case no ACD-CSC-97 of 2010, Ruling, 31 July 2012, available at http://www.igg.go.ug/static/files/ publications/CRULING_FOR_JIM_MUHWEZI__3_OTHERS.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Uganda: Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (17 November 2014), available at http:// www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/uganda-sumission-un-committee-economic-social-and-cultural-rights. 251  ‘Human Rights Watch, above n 248. See also ‘Scandinavian Countries Ask Uganda to Return Stolen Aid’, Agence France-Press, 28 January 2013, available at http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/scandinaviancountries-ask-uganda-return-stolen-aid. Karamoja’s poverty rate was at 75% and Northern Uganda’s poverty rate was at 40%. 252  9 Dec 2003, GA res. 58/4, UN Doc A/58/422 (2003). 253  Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly, Maputo, 11 July 2003, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_ COMBATING_CORRUPTION.pdf.

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strengthen its anti-corruption systems, and investigate and prosecute successfully all cases of corruption, including prosecution of high-level government officials.254 [5.69]  There is a need to transform ESC rights, labelled as ‘directive principles’ in Uganda’s Constitution, into justiciable rights. This will be in line with state practice, as reflected in recent constitutions in other (East) African states, protecting ESC rights in the bill of rights. For example, Article 43 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 protects every person’s right: (1)(a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; (d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; (e) to social security; and (f) to education. (2)  A person shall not be denied emergency medical treatment.

At the time of writing there were proposals to entrench a wide range of justiciable ESC rights in Tanzania’s Constitution, including the rights to work and to favourable conditions of work; property; clean and safe environment; education; freedom to engage in activities which promote and develop the arts, academics, creativity and innovation; and the rights of vulnerable groups such as prisoners, detainees, children (including nutrition, healthcare and housing), youth, women, the elderly, minorities and persons with disabilities.255 Zambia’s Constitution 2014, Article 52(1) provides: A person has the right, as prescribed, to— (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

health care services; decent housing; food of acceptable standard; clean and safe water; decent sanitation; social protection; and education.

The Constitution also provides in Article 58(1): The State shall take reasonable measures for the progressive realisation of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

254 By 2013, all ministers prosecuted for corruption-related offences had been acquitted. These were ­ inister of Health, Jim Muhwezi; State Minister of Health, Mike Mukula; State Minister of Health, Alex M Kamugisha; Minister for Works, John Nasasira; Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sam Kutesa; and Minister of Gender and Labour, Rukutana Mwesigwa. See, eg, Flt Cpt George M Mukula v Uganda, High Court of Uganda at Kololo, Anti-Corruption Division, HCT-00-AC-CN-0001 of 2013, Judgment, 13 March 2013, available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/high-court/2013/6-3. 255  The Proposed Draft Constitution of Tanzania 2014, Arts 43–56.

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D. Italy i.  The Covenant in Italy [5.70]  Italy ratified the ICESCR on 15 September 1978 (see Appendix C to this book) and signed its Optional Protocol in 2009. It has also ratified several principal international human rights treaties, notably the ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, CRCAC and CRC-SC, with the exception of the Migrant Workers Convention.256 It also ratified or acceded to the International Convention on the Protection and ­Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,257 and the Optional Protocol thereto, in 2009; and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish T ­ rafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,258 in 2006. At a regional level, Italy is a state party to the ECHR and its Additional Protocols, the European Social Charter (1961),259 and the revised European Social Charter (1996).260 As noted in ­section III.A.i. above, both Charters protect a number of ESC rights. In addition, Italy ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, in 2010; and the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, in 2007. These instruments provide a framework for legislation and policy at the national level to protect vulnerable groups. [5.71]  Italy has adopted several legislative, institutional and policy measures conducive to the realisation of ESC rights protected in the ICESCR. Legislative measures adopted include: (a) Act No 62/2011 on the protection of the relationship between mothers in prison and their minor children, in April 2011; (b) Act No 112/2011 on the establishment of the National Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents, in July 2011; (c) Act No 38/2006 concerning the fight against the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography also via Internet, in February 2006; (d) Act No 54/2006 on provisions on the separation of parents and shared custody of children, in February 2006; (e) Act No 296/2006, which makes education mandatory for at least 10 years and increases the minimum age for working from 15 to 16 years, in December 2006; (f) Act No 7/2006 on provisions concerning the prevention and prohibition of the practice of female genital mutilation, in January 2006.261

256 

UN Doc HRI/GEN/4/Rev.4 (15 May 2004), above n 47, 85. UN Doc A/61/49 (2006). UN Doc A/55/49 (vol I) (2001). 259  CETS No 035, entered into force on 26 February 1965. Italy signed the Charter on 18 October 1961, ratified it on 22 October 1965 and the Charter entered into force for Italy on 21 November 1965. See Council of Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/. 260  CETS No 163, entered into force on 1 July 1999. Italy signed the revised Charter on 5 May 1996, ratified it on 5 July 1999 and the Charter entered into force for Italy on 1 September 1999. See Council of Europe, at http://conventions.coe.int/. 261  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4 (31 October 2011) para 2. 257  258 

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(g) Act No 11/2009, which introduced a crime of stalking and mandatory detention of perpetrators of acts of sexual violence; (h) Legislative Decree No 198/2006, by which the code of equal opportunities between women and men was adopted, and Legislative Decree No 5/2010, by which the code has been further supplemented and amended; (i) Unified Text incorporating Chamber Act 2426 and Chamber Act 2956 B of 28 June 2011, aimed at increasing the participation of women in the boards of ­publicly-traded companies or those with a public participation.262 [5.72]  The Italian Constitution protects some ESC rights, such as the right to property (Article 42); the freedom to undertake economic initiatives (Article 41); the right to work and to freely choose one’s work, as well as the right to form trade unions (Article 39); labour rights, including the right to equal and favourable conditions of work (Articles 35–36), trade union rights and the right to strike (Articles 38–40); equal terms of work for men and women (Article 37); social security (Article 38); the right to health, including free medical care to ‘the indigent’ (Article 32); the right to education (Articles 33–34); a minimum standard of living for those who are in need (Article 38); and the protection of the family, in particular mothers and children (Articles 29–31). Generally, international treaties in Italy can be, and in fact have been (eg in the case of the CRC and the ICCPR), applied directly by the Italian courts, and Italy applies the principle of the primacy of international human rights standards over national legislation in case of conflicts of law.263 Article 10 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic states: The Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised principles of international law.264

The phrase ‘generally recognised principles of international law’ can be understood to refer to all aspects of international law, including customary and treaty rules such as the ICESCR. [5.73]  Despite the legal framework in place, the Italian courts have not directly applied most rights under the ICESCR, because they are regarded as being ‘non-justiciable’. Very few court rulings refer explicitly to the Covenant.265 Italy’s position, that some ESC rights (such as the right to adequate housing) are not justiciable, has been criticised by the CESCR as follows: 13. The Committee is concerned that the State party still considers that some economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to adequate housing, are not justiciable since they entail financial burdens upon the State. In this regard, the Committee notes the scarcity of court decisions in which the Covenant has been invoked. … 262 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/6 (2 August 2011) para 5. 263  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.41 (27 November 1995) para 3; HRC, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.94 (18 August 1998) para 3. 264  The Constitution of the Italian Republic (as amended on 17 January 2000) is available at https://www. senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. 265 CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.43 (23 May 2000) para 9.

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29. Affirming the principle of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, the Committee encourages the State party to reconsider its position regarding the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the Committee considers that the State party remains under an obligation to give full effect to the Covenant in its domestic legal order, providing for judicial and other remedies for violations of all economic, social and cultural rights. In this respect, the Committee draws the attention of the State party to its General Comment No 9 on the domestic application of the Covenant. 30. The Committee recommends that the State party provide appropriate training to the judiciary, prosecutors and other officials responsible for the implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Covenant to ensure that those rights are consistently enforced in courts of law.266

However, some of the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Italy have had a positive impact on the progressive enjoyment of ESC rights. For example, in 1996 the Supreme Court of Italy found that corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in schools could no longer be considered as lawful, noting: There are two reasons for this: the first is the overriding importance which the legal system attributes to protecting the dignity of the individual. This includes ‘minors’ who now hold rights and are no longer simply objects … at the disposal of their parents [or teachers]. The second reason is that, as an educational aim, the harmonious development of a child’s personality, which ensures that he/she embraces the values of peace, tolerance and co-existence, cannot be achieved by using violent means which contradict these goals.267

Although the Court did not refer to the right to education (as guaranteed under ­Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR), its decision had a positive impact on that right. As the UN CRC Committee has affirmed, ‘the use of corporal punishment does not respect the inherent dignity of the child nor the strict limits on school discipline’.268 Similarly, the CESCR confirmed that ‘corporal punishment is inconsistent with … the dignity of the individual’.269 Indeed, the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary school measure not only impacts on the well-being of children, it is also a violation of the child’s right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,270 266  CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.103 (14 December 2004) paras 13, 29 and 30. 267  Cambria, Cass, sez VI, 18 Marzo 1996, [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th Penal Section, 18 March 1996], Foro It II 1996, 407 (Italy). 268  CRC Committee, General Comment 1: The Aims of Education, UN Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (17 April 2001), para 8. See also CRC, General Comment 8: The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/8 (2 March 2007); CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.55 (7 June 1996) para 18. 269 CESCR Committee, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para 41. 270  See CRC Committee, General Comment 8, above n 268; CRC, General Comment 13: The Right of the Child to Freedom from all Forms of Violence, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/13 (18 April 2011). See also S B ­ itensky, ‘Spare the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: International Law’s Mandate Against All Corporal Punishment of Children’ (1999) 21 Whittier Law Review 147; D Pollard, ‘Banning Child Corporal Punishment’ (2003) 77(3) Tulane Law Review 755; Save the Children, Ending Corporal Punishment of Children: Making It ­Happen (London, Save the Children, 2001) 9–16. In the context of the ECHR, for example, the European Human Rights Commission, in Y v UK, App no 14229/88 (Commission Decision, 8 October 1991), considered four hits on the buttocks through trousers of a 15-year-old boy with a cane by a headmaster of a private school as degrading treatment under Art 3 of the ECHR. In A v UK [1998] 2 FLR 959, the Court unanimously held that the repeated beating of a 9-year-old boy by his stepfather with a garden cane, leaving

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as well as of the child’s right to education.271 However, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling on the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools, Italy has not yet passed legislation explicitly prohibiting all forms of corporal punishment in all settings, including in the home.272 ii.  Discrimination in the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Italy [5.74]  One key issue affecting the progressive realisation of ESC rights and other human rights in Italy is the severe marginalisation and discrimination of vulnerable groups, in particular the Roma, Sinti and Camminanti, foreigners and Italians of foreign origin; and reluctance on the part of the police and authorities to provide adequate protection to the victims, and to investigate claims of discrimination effectively, remains an area of concern.273 There have been reported instances of hate speech, including statements, racist discourse/violence, stigmatisation and stereotypes directed against Roma, Sinti, Camminanti and non-citizens, including people of African descent, attributed to politicians and disseminated in the mass media and on the Internet, particularly on the social networks.274 By 2007, Italy had not yet established a national human rights institution for the protection and promotion of human rights,275 which could help in addressing alleged cases of discrimination. [5.75]  In 2004 the CESCR noted that ‘the Roma on the whole live below the poverty line and are discriminated against, especially in the workplace, if and when they find work, and in the housing sector’.276 The Committee noted that many Roma lived in camps lacking basic sanitary facilities on the outskirts of major Italian cities; and that life in the camps had a major negative impact on Roma children, many of whom abandoned primary and secondary schooling in order to look after their younger siblings, or to go out begging in the streets in order to help increase their family income.277 Although the CESCR recommended that Italy ‘step up its efforts to improve the situation of the Roma population, inter alia by replacing camps with low-cost houses; … by providing better education for Roma children; and by strengthening and implementing anti-discrimination legislation, especially in the employment and housing ­sectors’,278 by 2011 the Roma still lived in deplorable economic situations, e­ xperiencing social bruises on his thighs and buttocks for a week, amounted to ‘torture or inhuman or degrading punishment’ contrary to Art 3 of the ECHR. See also Tyrer v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1; Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293; Costello Roberts v UK (1993) 19 EHRR 112. 271 

See chapter 11. Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4 (31 October 2011) para 34. The Committee was ‘concerned at the prevalence of corporal punishment in the home, in particular that many parents still find it appropriate to use slapping as a means of discipline’. 273  See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Italy, UN Doc CAT/C/ ITA/CO/4 (16 July 2007) para 21. See also HRC, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CCPR/C/ITA/ CO/5 (24 April 2006) para 11. 274  CERD, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/16-18 (4 April 2012) paras 17– 18, 20, 25; CERD Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/15 (16 May 2008) paras 15 and 22; HRC, above n 273, para 12. 275  UN Doc CAT/C/ITA/CO/4, above n 273, para 8. 276  CESCR, above n 266, para 10. 277  Ibid. 278  Ibid, para 23. 272  CRC

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exclusion and conditions of de facto segregation in camps, in which they lacked access to the most basic facilities, and school attendance by Roma children was still low.279 Targeted forced evictions of the Roma and Sinti families have rendered several Roma and Sinti families homeless.280 This has negatively affected school enrolment and the attendance of children (girls) from these communities,281 a violation of the right to education. It has also affected the fulfilment of their rights to health, an adequate standard of living and social security.282 Perhaps the CERD’s 2008 recommendation, recalling its General Recommendation 27,283 ought to be considered once more: [That] the State party develop and implement policies and projects aimed at avoiding segregation of Roma communities in housing, to involve Roma communities and associations as partners together with other persons in housing project construction, rehabilitation and maintenance. The Committee further recommends that the State party act firmly against local measures denying residence to Roma and the unlawful expulsion of Roma, and to refrain from placing Roma in camps outside populated areas that are isolated and without access to health care and other basic facilities. The Committee … recommends that the State party strengthen its efforts to support the inclusion in the school system of all children of Roma origin and to address the causes of dropout rates, including any cases of early marriage, in particular of Roma girls, and, for these purposes, to cooperate actively with Roma parents, associations and local communities.284

[5.76]  The equality provisions in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution do not include non-citizens, regardless of their immigration status.285 Thus, non-citizens experience difficulties in the enjoyment of ESC rights, in particular their rights to education, adequate housing, employment and health. For example, according to Law 133/2008, non-citizens cannot access rent reimbursements offered by the state authorities without providing a certificate of residence for a minimum of 10 years.286 Furthermore, families without a residence permit (undocumented migrants) have no right to social services, including access to healthcare and education.287 Act No 94/2009 on public security criminalises undocumented entry and stay in Italy, and thus deters undocumented migrants from seeking access to social services for fear of criminal ­prosecution. Consequently, this has a serious negative impact on the enjoyment of 279  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4 (31 October 2011) para 79; UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/15, above n 274, paras 14 and 20. The HRC in 2006 was concerned by Italy’s ‘policy to consider Roma as “nomads” as well as its camp-based policy towards them’, and about widespread reports that the Roma population lived in ‘poor, unhygienic housing conditions on the margins of Italian society’. The HRC was also concerned that that the Roma were ‘not protected as a minority in Italy, on the basis that they do not have a connection with a specific territory’. It recalled that ‘the absence of connection with a specific territory does not bar a community for qualifying as a minority under article 27 of the Covenant [ICCPR]’. See HRC, above n 273, paras 21–22. 280  CERD, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/16-18 (4 April 2012) para 15. 281  Ibid, para 20; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ITA/CO/6, paras 34–35. 282  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4 (31 October 2011) para 24(a). 283  Discrimination against Roma (57th Session, 2000), UN Doc A/55/18, annex V, 154. 284  UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/15, above n 274, paras 14 and 20. 285  Art 3 provides ‘All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions.’ (Emphasis added). 286  CERD, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/16-18 (4 April 2012) para 23. 287  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc CRC/C/ITA/CO/3-4 (31 October 2011) para 68.

Examples of Application of the ICESCR

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ESC rights of undocumented migrant children and families.288 Asylum seekers have been particularly vulnerable. In Hirsi Jaama and others v Italy,289 an Italian naval ship picked up asylum seekers, Somali and Eritrean nationals, at sea, who were planning to seek refuge in Italy. They were returned to Libya (whence they had come), where there was a risk they would be removed to Eritrea and Somali. The ECtHR held that this violated Article 3 of the ECHR, as there was a ‘real risk’ that the asylum-seekers would be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment for having left their countries in an irregular manner. [5.77]  In addition, undocumented migrant workers in Italy from various parts of the world, in particular from Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, have suffered violations of their human rights, in particular of their ESC rights, including alleged ill-treatment, exploitation or abusive working conditions, low wages received after considerable delay, long working hours and situations of bonded labour, whereby a part of their wages is withheld by employers as payment for accommodation in overcrowded lodgings without electricity or running water.290 In order to address discrimination, it is essential to take resolute action to counter any tendency, especially from politicians, to target, stigmatise, stereotype or profile people on the basis of race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin, or to use racist propaganda for political purposes.291 In addition, measures should be taken to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in working conditions and work requirements, including employment rules and practices with discriminatory purposes or effects, in accordance with CERD General Recommendation 30 on non-citizens.292 E.  Ecuador, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia [5.78]  Apart from the Italian Constitution, there are certain other national constitutions that apply international treaties directly. For example, Ecuador’s C ­ onstitution of 2008 establishes the direct applicability of the human rights set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments, the principle of non-discrimination­in the exercise of human rights and the enforceability of human rights by judicial mechanisms such as constitutional protection actions. Articles 10, 11(3) and 417 respectively provide: Persons, communities, peoples, nations and communities are bearers of rights and shall enjoy the rights guaranteed to them in the Constitution and in international instruments. The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party.

288 

Ibid. Hirsi Jaama and others v Italy, App no 27765/09, 23 February 2012, (2012) 55 EHRR 627. See also Saadi v Italy, App no 37201/06, 28 February 2008, (2009) 49 EHRR 730. 290  UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/15, above n 274, para 17. See also Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François Crépeau, on his Mission to Italy, UN Doc A/HRC/23/46/Add.3 (30 April 2013). 291  UN Doc CERD/C/ITA/CO/15, above n 274, para 15. 292  64th Session, 2004, UN Doc CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3. 289 

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In the case of treaties and other international instruments for human rights, principles for the benefit of the human being, the non-restriction of rights, direct applicability, and the open clause as set forth in the Constitution shall be applied.

Thus international human rights treaties ratified by Ecuador (such as the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol; the CAT and its Optional Protocol; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance) are directly applicable. Significantly, the Constitution of Ecuador 2008, incorporates a wide range of human rights, including a number of ESC rights enshrined in the ICESCR.293 In 2012 the CESCR noted, with appreciation, the direct application of the Covenant and the use of the Committee’s jurisprudence, its General Comment No 4, on the right to adequate housing (art 11, para 1, of the Covenant) and its General Comment No 15, on the right to water (arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) as references for judicial interpretations of the law in Case No 1207-10-EP, Decision 148-12-SEP-CC (extraordinary action for injunction in respect of the right to housing); Case No 1586-2008RA (constitutional action of amparo in respect of the right to work); and Case No 0907-2008RA (constitutional action of amparo in respect of the right to education).294

[5.79]  In Norway, the Human Rights Act of 21 May 1999295 incorporated the ICESCR into domestic law, stipulating in section 3 that the Covenant takes precedence over any other legislative provisions that conflict with it.296 Similarly, under ­Article 16 of the Constitution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003), the ­ICESCR takes precedence over the law of Serbia and Montenegro and that of the Republics.297 The direct applicability of the ICESCR should be encouraged, as it provides a firm legal basis for the domestic courts to reinforce the domestic application of ESC rights. Appropriate training of the judiciary, prosecutors and other officials responsible for the implementation of human rights is necessary so as to treat ESC rights as interdependent in practice with civil and political rights. [5.80]  Article 118 of the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1991 provides: The international agreements ratified in accordance with the Constitution are part of the internal legal order and cannot be changed by law.

Thus, in the hierarchical position of the legal norms, international agreements take precedence over domestic laws. This means that individuals may automatically invoke the provisions of international human rights treaties to which Macedonia is a state

293 

See Constitution of Ecuador 2008, Arts 11–74. CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations: Ecuador, UN Doc E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (13 December 2012) para 8. 295  See Act of 21 May 1999 No 30 (as amended 1 July 2003) Relating to the Strengthening of the Status of Human Rights in Norwegian Law. This law clearly stipulates that the ECHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR (including its two Protocols) carry the full effect of domestic law. It further stipulates that should domestic law come into conflict with any of the above-mentioned treaties and protocols, the international treaties and protocols take precedence. 296 CESCR, Concluding Observations: People’s Republic of Norway, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.109 (23 June 2005), para 4. 297  Art 16 provides, ‘The ratified international treaties and generally accepted rules of international law shall have precedence over the law of Serbia and Montenegro and the laws of the member states.’ 294 

Examples of Application of the ICESCR

 301

party (including the ICESCR and the ESC),298 and the courts and administrative agencies are under an obligation to apply them directly. However, at the time of writing, neither the ICESCR nor the ESC had been directly invoked or applied in court proceedings, which indicates a lack of awareness among legal professionals and the judiciary about the ESC rights protected in several treaties ratified by Macedonia. This means that in legal practice, both the ICESCR and ESC, just like other human rights treaties, such as CEDAW,299 have not been given sufficient visibility or central importance as legally binding human rights instruments, and have not been used as the legal basis for measures, including legislation and policy measures. There is a need to ensure that international human rights treaties ratified by states, as legally binding instruments, are sufficiently known and applied by public authorities and the judiciary as a basis for legislation, policies and court decisions. F. India i.  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in India [5.81]  India ratified the ICESCR in 1979, but it has been slow in complying with its reporting obligations under the Covenant.300 It has also ratified several international human rights treaties, notably the ICCPR, ICERD and CRC,301 as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified in 2007; the Optional Protocols to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and on the involvement of children in armed conflict, ratified in 2005; and ILO Convention No 105 on Abolition of Forced Labour, ratified in 2000. However, international treaties are considered to be ‘not self-executing in India’, and thus it is necessary to take steps to incorporate the provisions of the ratified international treaties fully into domestic law, so that individuals may invoke them directly before the domestic courts.302 It is also vital to reconceptualise ESC rights in India, because the realisation of the rights protected in the ICESCR are considered as ‘entirely progressive in nature’ and the Covenant is not given its full effect in India’s legal system due to the absence of relevant domestic legislation.303

298 Macedonia has ratified several human rights treaties, including the: ICESCR; ICCPR; ICERD; CEDAW; CAT; CRC; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. It has also ratified: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure, in 2012; ILO Conventions no 183 on Maternity Protection (2012), no 177 on Home Work and no 187 on the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, both in 2012; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, both in 2011; the Optional Protocol to the CAT, in 2009; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, in 2007; and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, in 2009. 299 See CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, CEDAW/C/MKD/CO/4-5 (1 March 2013) para 8. 300  See UN, Combined Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of India, UN Doc E/C.12/ IND/5 (1 March 2007). India submitted its second to fifth periodic reports to the CESCR after a 15-year delay. 301  UN Doc HRI/GEN/4/Rev.4 (15 May 2004), above n 47, 85. 302  HRC, Concluding Observations: India, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (4 August 1997) para 13. 303  CESCR, Concluding Observations: India, UN Doc E/C.12/IND/CO/5 (May 2008) paras 8–9.

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[5.82]  On a positive note, there are frequent references to the provisions of international human rights instruments by the Indian courts, in particular the Supreme Court.304 In its Constitution India has guaranteed human rights that can be enforced by an application to the High Court and the Supreme Court.305 The rights have been guaranteed in a chapter on ‘fundamental rights’, which forms Part III of the Constitution, Articles 14–35, protecting rights to equality, life, personal liberty, prohibition of forced labour, freedom of religion and minority rights. In 2002, the Constitution (86th Amendment) Act was adopted. This provided for the right to free and compulsory education for all children aged 6–14 in the following terms: Article 21A The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.

[5.83]  The Constitution of India also contains the ‘Directive Principles of State ­Policy’ (Part IV of the Constitution, Articles 36–51), containing mainly ESC rights, such as the rights to work, education, health, and protection of the environment.306 Some key Directive Principles are set out below: Directive Principles of State Policy, Constitution of India (As modified up to 1 December, 2007) Article 39(e): Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing—that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength. Article 41: Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want. Article 43: Living wage, etc, for workers The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social 304  See, eg CERD, Concluding Observations: India, UN Doc A/55/38 (1 February 2000) para 46: ‘The Committee appreciates the contribution made by the Supreme Court of India in developing the concept of social action litigation and a jurisprudence integrating the Convention into domestic law by interpreting Constitutional provisions on gender equality and non-discrimination.’ For a discussion of the Indian Supreme Court, see B Neuborne, ‘The Supreme Court of India’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 476. However, the CESCR has expressed its concern at ‘the non-implementation of court decisions by state authorities’. See CESCR, E/C.12/IND/CO/5, above n 303, para 9. 305  See Constitution of India (updated up to 98th Amendment Act 2012), Arts 226 and 32, Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, at http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html. It was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949. It has been in effect since 26 January 1950. For a classic study of the Indian Constitution, see G Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1966). 306  See CC Aikman, ‘Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy in India’ (1987) 17 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 373; J Narain, ‘Judicial Law Making and the Place of Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution’ (1985) 27 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 198.

Examples of Application of the ICESCR

 303

and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. Article 47: Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. Article 48A: Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.

[5.84]  It is expressly stated in Article 37 of the Constitution of India that the Directive Principles above ‘shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws’. However, the Indian Supreme Court’s approach is that ‘directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed. … These principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to each other.’307 This creative and interpretative exercise has overcome the apparent limitation by emphasising that the fundamental rights and Directive Principles are complementary, ‘neither part being superior to the other’.308 [5.85]  As shown below, this approach has enabled the Court to interpret the limited rights guaranteed in the chapter on ‘fundamental rights’ broadly to include ESC rights. For example, the right to life under Article 21, which appears as a classically formulated civil and political right and provides that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law’, has been applied in light of the Directive Principles of State Policy to include the right to a livelihood, which includes several ESC rights. Significantly, legislative and other measures have been adopted by India to promote the enjoyment of ESC rights.309

307 

Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka and Others (1992) 3 SCC 666, para 9. See VR Krishna Iyer J in State of Kerala v NM Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310, 367, para 134. For a discussion of judicial enforcement of ESC rights in India, see S Muralidhar, ‘Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights: The Indian Scenario’ in F Coomans (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2006); J Kothari, ‘Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 171. 309  See in particular the 2006 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act; the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which recognises employment as a matter of right; the 2005 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act; the ‘Sarva Shikasha Abhiyan’ (Education for All) programme adopted in 2005; the ‘National Rural Health Mission’, launched in 2005, aimed at providing accessible, affordable and accountable quality health services; the four-year time-bound plan, ‘Bharat Nirman’, aimed at upgrading rural infrastructure, launched in 2005; the 2005 Right to Information Act, aimed at ensuring government accountability; the 2004 amendments to the Indian Divorce Act and the Hindu Succession Act, widening the scope for women to exercise their rights to divorce, ownership and inheritance; the 2003 amendment to the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994; the 2002 308 

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ii.  Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in India [5.86]  In several Indian Supreme Court rulings the right to adequate housing (shelter) has been upheld as related to the right to life.310 The Court has also interpreted the right to life as encompassing the workers’ right to health: [T]he right to health and medical care to protect his [the workman’s] health and vigour while in service or post-retirement is a fundamental right of a worker under Article 21, read with [the Directive Principles] Articles 39(e), 41, 43, 48-A and all related articles and fundamental human rights to make the life of the workman meaningful and purposeful with dignity of person.311

In Francis Coralie Mullin, the Court interpreted the right to life broadly to include the basic necessaries of life, such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter. Bhagwati J stated: We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation protanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights.312

[5.87]  The above line of reasoning was followed in several later cases. For example, in Unnikrishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh the Court held the ‘right to education to be implicit in the right to life because of its inherent fundamental importance’.313 Similarly, in Olga Tellis & Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation & Others,314 the State of Maharashta and the Bombay Municipal Council decided in 1981 to evict all pavement and slum dwellers from the city of Bombay. The residents claimed that such action would violate the right to life under Article 21, since a home in the city allowed them to attain a livelihood, and they demanded that adequate resettlement be provided if the evictions proceeded. The Court declined to provide the remedies requested by the

Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, making education free and compulsory for all children aged 6–14; and the 2000 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, as amended by the 2006 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act. In May 2008 the CESCR noted these measures with satisfaction. See CESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/IND/CO/5, above n 303, para 4. 310  See, eg, Francis Coralie v The Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 2 SCR 516; Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corp (1985) 3 SCC 545; Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame and Others (1990) 1 SCC 520; and Chameli Singh and Other v State of Uttar Pradesh JT (1995) 9 SC 380. In Shantistar Builders v Narayan K Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520, the court stated that ‘[t]he right to life … would take within its sweep the right to food … and reasonable accommodation to live in’. 311  Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC) v Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42, 43. 312  Francis Coralie Mullin, above n 310, 529 B–F. 313  Unnikrishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645, 738, para 183. 314  Olga Tellis & Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation & Others (1986) AIR 180 SC, (1985) 2 Supp SCR 51.

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applicants but found that the right to a hearing had been violated at the time of the planned eviction. The Court held that the right to life, in Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassed means of livelihood, and observed: The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes like livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life … If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pendantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.315

[5.88]  However, the right to a livelihood was not absolute, and deprivation of the right to livelihood could occur if there was a just and fair procedure undertaken according to law. The Government’s action must be reasonable in the circumstances of the case, and any person affected must be afforded an opportunity to be heard as to why that action should not be taken. In the present case, the Court found that the residents had been given the opportunity to be heard by virtue of the Supreme Court proceedings. While the residents were clearly not intending to trespass, the Court found it was reasonable for the Government to evict those living on public pavements, footpaths and public roads. This was because ‘footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public’316 and that ‘[n]o one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorisation’.317 The Court declined to hold that evicted dwellers had a right to an alternative site, but instead made orders that: (i) sites should be provided to residents presented with census cards in 1976; (ii) slums in existence for 20 years or more were not to be removed unless land was required for public purposes, in which case alternative sites must be provided; (iii) high priority should be given to resettlement. The case exemplifies the use of the right to life to advance ESC rights, in particular the right to housing. It provided an important procedural guarantee that evictions, in circumstances in which inhabitants would be deprived of their livelihoods, must be in accordance with the procedure established by law or stand in violation of the right to life. [5.89]  In another case,318 a youth organisation wrote a letter to the Court, alleging that women in a ‘Care Home’ were compelled to live in subhuman conditions. The Court interpreted Article 21 on the right to life in light of several Directive Principles,319 and 315 

Ibid, 2.1 and 2.2. Ibid, 3.5. 317  Ibid, 3.6. 318  Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v State of Bihar (1988) Supp SCC 734. 319  Art 38, the promotion of welfare; Art 39(f), protection of children; Art 39A, the promotion of equal justice; and Art 42, just and humane working conditions. 316 

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held that the state is required to protect the weaker sections of society. It thus ordered the state to offer suitable alternative accommodation and to ensure that a doctor visit the ‘Care Home’ daily. In the case of MC Mehta v Union of India,320 Mehta, an active social worker, filed a writ petition to restrain industries from discharging trade effluents into the River Ganges. In ordering the tanneries to close down unless their effluent was subjected to a pre-treatment process, the Supreme Court referred to the right to life (Article 21) in conjunction with Article 48A of the Directive Principles, and noted that the ‘closure of tanneries may bring unemployment, loss of revenue, but life, health and ecology have greater importance to the people’. Such an approach would be appropriate to reinforce ESC rights in many other states that include ESC rights in national constitutions as ‘Directive Principles’ (or do not protect this category of rights at all) but protect the right to life in a Bill of Rights. [5.90]  A case from Venezuela illustrates the importance of the Indian Supreme Court’s approach of interpreting the right to life broadly in order to protect some aspects of ESC rights. In Cruz Bermudez et al v Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social,321 more than 170 people living with HIV/AIDS alleged that the Ministry of Health had failed to supply prescribed anti-retroviral drugs. They claimed that this violated their rights to life, health, liberty and security of the person, equality, and the benefits of science and technology. The Supreme Court dismissed the claims based on the rights to liberty, security of the person and equality, but stated that the right to health and the right to life of the petitioners were closely linked to the right to access the benefits of science and technology. The Court made orders directing the Ministry to provide anti-retroviral drugs, medications necessary for treating opportunistic infections and diagnostic testing, free of charge for all Venezuelan citizens and residents. The Ministry was also ordered to develop the policies and programmes necessary for this treatment and assistance, and to reallocate its budget as necessary to carry out the Court’s decision. After a series of such actions, the Court decided that the remedy need not be limited to the specific petitioners but could be extended to benefit all those in a similar situation. [5.91]  It is clear from the foregoing that the right to life may be interpreted to include the right to livelihood, and the rights to adequate housing, healthcare and access to the underlying determinants of health. At least Article 21 of the Indian Constitution has been interpreted to include within its scope the rights to a clean environment, food, clean working conditions, emergency medical treatment, free legal aid and release from bonded labour.322 However, victims of violations of ESC rights face ­several

320 

MC Mehta v Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 463. Court of Justice of Venezuela, Case no 15.789, Decision no 916 (15 July 1999); Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions (COHRE), Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Legal Practitioners Dossier (Geneva, COHRE, 2006). 322  See Kothari, above n 308. In addition to the cases cited above, see Subhash Kumar v Bihar (1991) 1 SCC 598 (environment); Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India and Others WP (Civil) No 196/2001, 23 July 2001 (food); Consumer Education and Research Centre v Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42 (working conditions); Parmanand Katara v Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 248 (emergency medical treatment); Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 623 (free legal aid); and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 (release from bonded labour). 321  Supreme

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obstacles, including the high costs of litigation, long delays in court p ­ roceedings and the ­non-implementation of court decisions by government authorities.323 G. Canada [5.92]  Canada acceded to the ICESCR on 19 May 1976. It is also a state party to several other human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW and its Optional Protocol, ICERD, CRC and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It has also adopted some legislative and institutional measures to enhance the protection of human rights eg (a) adoption of the Human Rights Act of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, in 2010; (b) adoption of the Domestic Relations Act in Prince Edward Island that legalises same-sex marriage, in 2008; and (c) changes in Ontario’s human rights system that allow direct complaints to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.324 Canada still ranks among the top 11 states in the Human Development Index of the UNDP.325 On the average, Canadians generally enjoy a high standard of living, and Canada has the capacity to achieve a high level of realisation of all ESC rights. [5.93]  Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 entrenched a judicially enforceable Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter), which primarily protects civil and political rights, including the right to life and security of the person (in section 7), equality (­section 15), freedom of conscience, thought, expression, peaceful assembly and association, as well as freedom from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Canada’s Charter does not explicitly protect ESC rights, with the exception of the protection of minority language education rights in section 23. The principal areas of concern with regards to ESC rights in Canada were identified by the CESCR as follows: The lack of legal redress available to individuals when governments fail to implement the Covenant, resulting from the insufficient coverage in domestic legislation of economic, social and cultural rights, as spelled out in the Covenant; the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms for these rights; the practice of governments of urging upon their courts an interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms denying protection of Covenant rights, and the inadequate availability of civil legal aid, particularly for economic, social and cultural rights.326

[5.94]  The Canadian Supreme Court has held that ‘the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified’, including the ICESCR.327 If this approach is applied consistently to ESC rights, the federal, 323 

CESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/IND/CO/5, above n 303, paras 9 and 13. HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (13 August 2015) para 3. 325  See UNDP, Human Development Report 2013, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (New York, UNDP, 2013), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Summary.pdf, at 15. 326  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, E/C.12/CAN/CO/4, E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (22 May 2006) para 11(b). 327  Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 1056–57. 324 

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provincial and territorial governments should promote interpretations of the ­Canadian Charter of Rights and other domestic law in a way consistent with the Covenant. In ESC rights cases, within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their functions of judicial review, courts should take account of ESC rights ‘where this is necessary to ensure that the State party’s conduct is consistent with its obligations under the Covenant’.328 [5.95]  Due to the lack of explicit protection of ESC rights in Canada, the judicial protection of ESC rights has largely relied on the interpretation of provisions on equality and ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person’ in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as shown below. [5.96]  Section 15 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

[5.97]  The Canadian Supreme Court interpreted the above provision as protecting substantive equality, with a particular focus on addressing the needs of historically disadvantaged groups,329 including the protection of sexual minorities.330 This may require the Government to take ‘positive action’ or ‘special measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups are able to benefit equally from government services’, for example the provision of a publicly funded sign language interpretation service in the public healthcare system to ensure that deaf persons enjoy the same quality of healthcare as is available to hearing persons.331 However, the Supreme Court later stressed that ‘the legislature is under no obligation to create a particular benefit’ but that it is free to ‘target the social programs it wishes to fund as a matter of public policy’, provided this is done in a non-discriminatory manner.332 The implication is that the absence of explicit ESC rights in the Canadian Charter has left the Supreme Court to choose whether or not to subject claims of violations of ESC rights to judicial scrutiny. [5.98]  Section 7 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Does section 7 encompass ESC rights, ie does it oblige the state to ensure that individuals within its jurisdiction are not deprived the basic necessaries of life, such as

328  CESCR, E/C.12/CAN/CO/4, E/C.12/CAN/CO/5, above n 325, para 36, citing the Committee’s General Comment 9, above n 1, and Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 791, 2005 SCC 35. 329  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143. 330  Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493. 331  Eldridge v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 624, paras 73, 77 and 83. 332  Vriend v Alberta, above n 330, para 41.

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adequate food, housing, healthcare, social security? In Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General),333 the Supreme Court of Canada (Chief Justice McLachlin) read section 7 restrictively, stressing its negative character: Even if s 7 could be read to encompass economic rights, a further hurdle emerges. Section 7 speaks of the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s 7 places a positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or security of the person. Rather, s 7 has been interpreted as restricting the state’s ability to deprive people of these.334

However, the Chief Justice accepted that ‘[o]ne day s 7 may be interpreted to include positive obligations’, since the Canadian Charter must be viewed as ‘a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’.335 The possibility to read ­section 7 widely in the future to include positive obligations to protect ESC rights of vulnerable individuals and groups under the Charter was not closed. [5.99]  In Victoria (City) v Adams,336 a group of homeless people erected overhead shelters in the form of tents, tarps and cardboard boxes at a local park in the City of Victoria. The City sought a permanent injunction (legal order requiring the homeless to refrain from erecting shelters) and declaration that such structures contravened the Park Regulation Bylaw and Streets and Traffic Bylaw. The City had a documented shortfall of spaces in homeless shelters. The defendants argued the bylaws were unconstitutional, infringing ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person’ under section 7 of the Canadian Charter. Judge Ross, in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, concluded that the prohibition in the Bylaws against the erection of temporary shelter in the form of tents, tarpaulins, cardboard boxes or other structures exposes the homeless to a risk of significant health problems or even death. The prohibition constitutes a deprivation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the persons protected under s 7.337

This was the first case in Canada to recognise the right to adequate housing as a component of the right to life, liberty and security of the person in the Canadian Charter. On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial decision with only minor changes.338

IV.  TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF THE COVENANT: THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS [5.100]  The World Conference on Human Rights, held in 1993, in the Vienna ­Declaration and Programme of Action, reaffirmed ‘the important and constructive 333 

Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429. Ibid, para 81. 335  Ibid, para 82. 336  Victoria (City) v Adams [2008] BCSC 1363. 337  Ibid, para 155. 338  Victoria (City) v Adams [2009] BCCA 563. 334 

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role played by national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights’, and encouraged ‘the establishment and strengthening of national institutions’.339 Independent national human rights institutions (NHRIs) can play a key role in their capacity as advisers to the competent authorities, in their role in remedying human rights violations, in the dissemination of human rights information and through education in human rights.340 [5.101]  Independent NHRIs are an important mechanism to promote and ensure the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights. The establishment of such bodies falls within the commitment made by states parties upon ratification of the ICESCR to ensure the progressive realisation of ESC rights. As noted in chapter two, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR obligates each state party to take steps … with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the [Covenant] rights … by all appropriate means.

One such means, through which important steps can be taken, is the work of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.341 It is therefore essential that full attention be given to ESC rights in all of the relevant activities of these institutions, including: (a) The promotion of educational and information programmes designed to enhance awareness and understanding of economic, social and cultural rights, both within the population at large and among particular groups such as the public service, the judiciary, the private sector and the labour movement; (b) The scrutinizing of existing laws and administrative acts, as well as draft bills and other proposals, to ensure that they are consistent with the requirements of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; (c) Providing technical advice, or undertaking surveys in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, including at the request of the public authorities or other appropriate agencies; (d) The identification of national-level benchmarks against which the realization of Covenant obligations can be measured; (e) Conducting research and inquiries designed to ascertain the extent to which particular economic, social and cultural rights are being realized, either within the State as a whole or in areas or in relation to communities of particular vulnerability; (f) Monitoring compliance with specific rights recognized under the Covenant and providing reports thereon to the public authorities and civil society; and (g) Examining complaints alleging infringements of applicable economic, social and cultural rights standards within the State.342

339  Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14–25 June 1993, UN Doc A/ CONF.157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993) para 36. 340  Ibid. 341  CESCR, General Comment 10: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/25 (14 December 1998) para 1. 342  Ibid, para 3.

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[5.102]  The majority of existing NHRIs can be grouped together in two broad categories: (a) human rights commissions, special commissions established to ensure that the laws and regulations concerning the protection of human rights are applied effectively;343 and (b) ombudsmen, a group of persons generally appointed by the parliament acting on constitutional authority or through special legislation, to protect the rights of individuals who believe themselves to be the victim of unjust acts on the part of the public administration. Accordingly, the ombudsman will often act as an impartial mediator between an aggrieved individual and the government.344 Another less common, but no less important variety are the ‘specialised’ national institutions that function to protect the rights of a particular vulnerable group, such as ethnic and linguistic minorities, indigenous populations, children, refugees or women.345 The institution, whatever its form, should be able, independently and effectively, to monitor, promote and protect ESC rights. [5.103]  As affirmed in the Vienna Declaration, states should establish NHRIs (or review their status and effectiveness) having regard to the ‘Principles relating to the status of national institutions’ (the ‘Paris Principles’).346 These minimum standards provide guidance for the establishment, competence, responsibilities and composition, including pluralism, independence, methods of operation and quasi-judicial activities of such NHRIs. Some key principles are outlined below: (1) A national institution shall be vested with competence to protect and promote human rights. (2) A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence. (3) A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities: a. To submit to the government, parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the request of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matter without higher referral, opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the protection and promotion of human rights. The national institution may decide to publicize them. These opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports, as well as any prerogative of the national institution, shall relate to the following areas: (i)

Any legislative or administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial organization, intended to preserve and extend the protection of human rights. In that connection, the national institution shall examine the

343  See Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (‘the Paris Principles’), GA res 48/134 of 20 December 1993, Annex, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r134.htm. 344  See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ FactSheet19en.pdf. 345  Ibid. 346  The Paris Principles were endorsed by the Commission on Human Rights in March 1992 (res 1992/54) and by the GA in its res A/RES/48/134 of 20 December 1993.

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Domestic Protection of ESCR legislation and administrative provisions in force, as well as bills and proposals, and shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate in order to ensure that these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights. It shall, if necessary, recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and the adoption or amendment of administrative measures; (ii) Any situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up; (iii)  The preparation of reports on the national situation with regard to human rights in general, and on more specific matters; (iv)  Drawing the attention of the government to situations in any part of the country where human rights are violated and making proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, where necessary, expressing an opinion on the positions and reactions of the government; b. To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation; c. To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation; d. To contribute to the reports which States are required to submit to United Nations bodies and committees, and to regional institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations, and, where necessary, to express an opinion on the subject, with due respect for their independence; e. To cooperate with the United Nations and any other agency in the United Nations system, the regional institutions and the national institutions of other countries which are competent in the areas of the protection and promotion of human rights; f. To assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools, universities and professional circles; g. To publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular racial discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through information and education and by making use of all press organs.347

[5.104]  The effectiveness of NHRIs in the promotion and protection of ESC rights, including the rights of vulnerable groups such as children, depends on several aspects. The following is an indicative, but not exhaustive, list of such aspects: mandate and powers; establishment process; resources; pluralistic representation; provision of remedies; accessibility and participation. These aspects have been explained by the ­Committee on the Rights of the Child as follows: Mandate and powers 8. NHRIs should, if possible, be constitutionally entrenched and must at least be legislatively mandated. It is the view of the Committee that their mandate should include as broad a scope as possible for promoting and protecting human rights, … incorporating civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. … 9. NHRIs should be accorded such powers as are necessary to enable them to discharge their mandate effectively, including the power to hear any person and obtain any information and document necessary for assessing the situations falling within their competence. … 347 

Paris Principles, above n 346, annex.

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Establishment process 10. The NHRI establishment process should be consultative, inclusive and transparent, ­initiated and supported at the highest levels of Government and inclusive of all relevant elements of the State, the legislature and civil society. In order to ensure their independence and effective functioning, NHRIs must have adequate infrastructure, f­ unding …, staff, premises, and freedom from forms of financial control that might affect their independence. Resources 11. While the Committee acknowledges that this is a very sensitive issue and that State parties function with varying levels of economic resources, the Committee believes that it is the duty of States to make reasonable financial provision for the operation of national human rights institutions. … The mandate and powers of national institutions may be meaningless, or the exercise of their powers limited, if the national institution does not have the means to operate effectively to discharge its powers. Pluralistic representation 12. NHRIs should ensure that their composition includes pluralistic representation of the various elements of civil society involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. They should seek to involve, among others, the following: human rights, antidiscrimination­and children’s rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including child- and youth-led organizations; trade unions; social and professional organizations (of doctors, lawyers, journalists, scientists, etc); universities and experts, including children’s rights experts. Government departments should be involved in an advisory capacity only. NHRIs should have appropriate and transparent appointment procedures, including an open and competitive selection process. Providing remedies for breaches of children’s rights 13. NHRIs must have the power to consider individual complaints and petitions and carry out investigations, including those submitted on behalf of or directly by children. In order to be able to effectively carry out such investigations, they must have the powers to compel and question witnesses, access relevant documentary evidence and access places of detention. They also have a duty to seek to ensure that children have effective remedies—independent advice, advocacy and complaints procedures—for any breaches of their rights. Where appropriate, NHRIs should undertake mediation and conciliation of complaints. 14. NHRIs should have the power to support children taking cases to court, including the power (a) to take cases concerning children’s issues in the name of the NHRI and (b) to intervene in court cases to inform the court about the human rights issues involved in the case. Accessibility and participation 15. NHRIs should be geographically and physically accessible to all …, in particular the most vulnerable and disadvantaged, such as (but not limited to) children in care or detention, children from minority and indigenous groups, children with disabilities, children living in poverty, refugee and migrant children, street children and children with special needs in areas such as culture, language, health and education. … 18. NHRIs must have the right to report directly, independently and separately on the state of [human] rights to the public and to parliamentary bodies. In this respect, States

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Domestic Protection of ESCR ­ arties must ensure that an annual debate is held in Parliament to provide parliamentarp ians with an opportunity to discuss the work of the NHRI.348

[5.105]  Several states have established NHRIs to promote human rights. The example of the UHRC in Uganda (see paragraph 5.55 above) is considered below to give an indication of the potential role of such commissions in the promotion and protection of all human rights, including ESC rights, in developing states. It should be noted, however, that there are several obstacles (see paragraphs 5.107–5.108 below) that can impact negatively on the role of NHRIs in such states. The UHRC was established in November 1996, following the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Uganda to establish a permanent and independent Commission.349 This was endorsed by the Uganda Constitutional Commission.350 When Uganda’s Constitution was adopted in 1995, the UHRC was constitutionally entrenched,351 and effectively began operations in 1997. The relevant provisions relating to the establishment, functions, powers and independence of the Commission are set out below: The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 Uganda Human Rights Commission 51.(1) There shall be a Commission called the Uganda Human Rights Commission. (2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairperson and not less than three other persons appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament. (3) The Chairperson of the Commission shall be a Judge of the High Court or a person qualified to hold that office. (4) The Chairperson and members of the commission shall be persons of high moral character and proven integrity and shall serve for a period of six years and be eligible for re-appointment. Functions of Human Rights Commission 52.(1)  The Commission shall have the following functions: a. to investigate, at its own initiative or on a complaint made by any person or group of persons against the violation of any human right; b. to visit jails, prisons, and places of detention or related facilities with a view to assessing and inspecting conditions of the inmates and make recommendations; c. to establish a continuing programme of research, education and information to enhance respect of human rights; d. to recommend to Parliament effective measures to promote human rights. including provision of compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

348  CRC Committee, General Comment 2: The Role of Independent National Human Rights Institutions in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2002/2 (2 15 November 002). 349 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Uganda: Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (October 1994). The Commission recommendations were reproduced in (1996) 3(1) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 140. 350  See Uganda Constitutional Commission, above n 206. 351  See Uganda Constitution (1995), Arts 51–59.

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e. to create and sustain within society the awareness of the provisions of this Constitution as the fundamental law of the people of Uganda; f. to educate and encourage the public to defend this Constitution at all times against all forms of abuse and violation. g. to formulate, implement and oversee programmes intended to inculcate in the citizens of Uganda awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people; h. to monitor the Government’s compliance with international treaty and convention obligations on human rights; and i. to perform such other functions as may be provided by law. (2) The Uganda Human Rights Commission shall publish periodical reports on its findings and submit annual reports to Parliament on the state of human rights and freedoms in the country. (3) In the performance of its functions, the Uganda Human Rights Commission shall— a. establish its operational guidelines and rules of procedure; b. request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency or person in the performance of its functions; and c. observe the rules of natural justice. Powers of the Commission 53.(1) In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall have the powers of a court— a. to issue summons or other orders requiring the attendance of any person before the Commission and the production of any document or record relevant to any investigation by the Commission; b. to question any person in respect of any subject matter under investigation before the commission; c. to require any person to disclose any information within his or her knowledge relevant to any investigation by the Commission d. to commit persons for contempt of its orders. (2) The Commission may, if satisfied that there has been an infringement of a human right or freedom order— a. the release of a detained or restricted person; b. payment of compensation; or c. any other legal remedy or redress. (3) A person or authority dissatisfied with an order made by the Commission under clause (2) of this article, has a right to appeal to the High Court. (4) The Commission shall not investigate— a. any matter which is pending before a court or judicial tribunal; or b. a matter involving the relations or dealings between the Government and the Government of any foreign State or international organisation; or c. a matter relating to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. Independence of the Commission 54. Subject to this Constitution, the Commission shall be independent and shall not, in the performance of its duties, be subject to the direction or control of any person or control authority.

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55.(1) The Commission shall be self-accounting and all the administrative expenses including salaries, allowances and pensions payable to persons serving with the Commission shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund. (2) The Chairperson and other members of the Commission shall be paid such salaries and allowances as Parliament may prescribe. Removal of Commissioners 56. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the removal of a Judge of the High Court from office shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to the removal from office of a member of the Commission. Staff of Commission 57. The appointment of the officers and other employees of the Commission shall be made by the Commission in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Parliament to make laws regarding functions of Commission 58. Parliament may make laws to regulate and facilitate the performance of the functions of the Uganda Human Rights Commission.

[5.106]  It is notable from the above that the UHRC has several functions (a wide constitutional mandate), inter alia, to investigate, on its own initiative or following a complaint by any person or group of persons regarding the violation of any human right (there is no need to prove a direct interest in the matter), and to monitor the Ugandan Government’s compliance with international treaty and convention obligations on human rights.352 The independence of the Commission (which is a fundamental aspect of its success in the protection and promotion of human rights)353 is guaranteed, at least in theory.354 To ensure independence, the Commissioners are guaranteed security of tenure,355 and expenses of the Commission are charged to the consolidated fund.356 In addition, the salaries and allowances of the Commissioners are left to Parliament to prescribe,357 and Parliament is required to ensure that adequate resources and facilities are provided to the Commission.358 [5.107]  However, in practice, the Commission’s independence is capable of being undermined in two essential respects. First, the Chairperson and all the Commissioners are appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament,359 which is largely controlled by the President. As one scholar has noted, the appointment procedure is 352  Ibid, Art 52; the Uganda Human Rights Commission Act, 1997 (Act No 4 of 1997), Uganda Gazette No 29 vol XC (2 May 1997), Ch 24, Revised Laws of Uganda 2000, s 8. 353  See, eg, UN Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Professional Training Series No 4 (Geneva, Centre for Human Rights, 1995) 10; Paris Principles, above n 346; H Kanzira, ‘The Independence of National Human Rights Bodies in Africa: A Comparative Study of the CHRAJ, UHRC, and SAHRC’ (2002) 8(2) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 174. 354  Uganda Constitution (1995), Art 54. 355  Ibid, Art 56. Commissioners serve a renewable term of six years, enjoy the same terms and conditions of service as judges, are immune from civil proceedings and are protected against arbitrary removal from office. 356  Ibid, Art 55; Uganda Human Rights Commission Act (1997), s 13. 357  Ibid, Art 55(2). 358  Uganda Human Rights Commission Act (1997), s 13. 359  Uganda Constitution (1995), Art 51(2).

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flawed in that ‘it gives the President too great an influence in the exercise’.360 This is worsened by the fact that the nomination and selection process is carried out without involvement of the civil society, particularly local human rights organisations.361 As a result, a number of Commissioners were not appointed primarily on the basis of performance or experience in the field of human rights but mainly because of allegiance to the regime in power.362 Therefore, the system of appointment of members of the Commission needs to be reviewed363 so that it is ‘consultative, inclusive and transparent’, including an open and competitive selection process.364 [5.108]  Secondly, the Commission lacks adequate financial and human resources due to budgetary/economic constraints.365 Uganda very much depends on aid: in 2013 the amount of official development assistance received was US$1,692,560,000.366 The Commission acknowledged that in 2014/15 it ‘grappled with the continued heavy reliance on development partners to fund its core human rights activities’.367 Despite this, the Commission is constantly underfunded. This has affected some of its core activities, since the Commission cannot open up enough regional offices to make it more accessible.368 As a result, the Commission lacks the basic requirements to function effectively. For example, the Commission ‘cannot hire sufficient staff or acquire adequate transport, office equipment and furniture’369 necessary to discharge its functions. In 2015 the CESCR was concerned about ‘the insufficient budgetary resources’ allocated to the Commission and noted that this ‘negatively affects’ the Commission’s ability to carry out its mandated activities.370 It was also concerned about Uganda’s ‘failure to implement decisions taken by the Commission and to follow up on reports issued by the Commission’.371 The Committee encouraged Uganda to ‘increase allocation of resources for the effective functioning of the Commission, in line with the

360  See J Hatchard, ‘A New Breed of Institution: The Development of Human Rights Commissions in Commonwealth Africa with Particular Reference to the Uganda Human Rights Commission’ (1999) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 28. 361  See entry on ‘Uganda’ in Human Rights Watch, Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa: Protectors or Pretenders? (Human Rights Watch, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ africa/. 362  J Matshekga, ‘Toothless Bulldogs? The Human Rights Commission of Uganda and South Africa: A Comparative Study of their Independence’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 68, 88–89. 363  See J Sarkin, ‘Reviewing and Reformulating Appointment Processes to Constitutional (Chapter 9) Structures’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 587. 364  See CRC Committee, General Comment 2, above n 348, paras 10 and 12. 365  See eg UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 85, observing that in the Financial Year 2013/14 UHRC received funds from five development partners. UHRC received Uganda Shillings (UGX) 1.99 billion from Democratic Governance Facility (DGF); UGX 0.45 billion from UNDP; UGX 0.12 billion from German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ); UGX 0.12 billion from United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) and UGX 1.1 billion from Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). UHRC also received UGX 0.66 billion from JLOS through the sector wide approach to development. 366 The World Bank, Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, http://data.­ worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD. 367 UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 86. 368  M Sekaggya, Challenges Facing New National Human Rights Institutions: Uganda’s Experience, Paper Presented to the Training of the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission (Sheraton Kampala, Uganda, 3 March 2008, on file). 369 UHRC, Annual Report (2001–02), para 1.87. 370  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc E/C.12/UGA/CO/1 (24 June 2015) para 9. 371  Ibid.

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Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris Principles)’ and to ‘implement decisions taken by the Commission and to follow up on its reports’.372 [5.109]  However, amidst all these difficulties, the UHRC has in some respects acted ‘independently of the government’, based on the fact that the Commission has exposed to the public human rights violations resulting from the Government’s actions or inactions, and has further determined crucial decisions against the state and governmental officials in regard to human rights abuses.373 However, most alleged abuses deal with civil and political rights—torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; deprivation of the right to personal liberty (detention beyond 48 hours); and deprivation of the right to life, and only a few cases have raised issues related to ESC rights such as deprivation of the right to property, denial of child maintenance, alleged violation of the right to education, discrimination, unlawful termination from work and denial of remuneration.374 To cite one example, in Allen Atukunda v Hon Col Kahinda Otafiire,375 the Commission Tribunal found a Cabinet Minister, who also doubled as the Minister of Water, Lands and the Environment as well as a colonel in the Ugandan national army, to have neglected or abandoned his parental responsibility for his two sons, aged six years and two years, contrary to section 6 of Uganda’s Children Act.376 The Minister was ordered to pay a specified sum of money to the mother for the maintenance of the two children, and to pay school fees for the schoolage child. While it is not known whether the Minister complied with this decision, the Commission was firm in its findings and orders to protect children’s ESC rights. [5.110]  The Commission is required to publish periodic reports on its findings, and to submit annual reports to Parliament on the state of human rights and freedoms in the country.377 Since 1997 the Commission has published an annual report in which it makes its recommendations,378 though most of the recommendations do not appear to have been implemented. This raises questions as to the impact of these recommendations in the absence of the necessary political will to implement them. Generally, the reports document human rights concerns and comment on the general human rights situation in the country in a specific period. In this way, the Commission has ‘a potentially crucial role to play in promoting and ensuring the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights’,379 by acting as a mechanism for the domestic 372 

Ibid.

373 Most

complaints were brought against State authorities (Uganda Police Force, Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, Uganda Police Service and local Governments). UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (­Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 26. A number of the Commission awards were against the Attorney General. See UHRC, 10th Annual Report (2007) 27. See also Tugume Mariam Rajab v Attorney General, Complaint no UHRC 776/1998, in which the Commission found that Sheikh Idris Yusuf Lwazi disappeared and died as a result of ‘negligence on the part of state agents’ and awarded Uganda shillings 36 million (about £12,000) as adequate compensation to Sheikh Lwazi’s family. 374  See UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 20–21. 375  Complaint no UHRC 228/2003 (decision of 6 February 2004). 376  Ch 59, Revised Laws of Uganda 2000. S 5(1) provides: ‘It shall be the duty of a parent, guardian or any person having custody of a child to maintain that child and, in particular, that duty gives a child the right to: (a) education and guidance; (b) immunization; (c) adequate diet; (d) clothing; (e) shelter; and (f) medical attention.’ A parent in this section means a father or a mother of the child. 377  Uganda Constitution (1995), Art 51(2). 378  Some of the Commission’s Annual Reports are available at the UHRC website at http://www.uhrc. ug/pub.php. 379  See CESCR, General Comment 10, above n 341, para 3.

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i­ mplementation of Uganda’s international human rights obligations and the strengthening of human rights protection by complementing the courts.380 The Commission can also develop appropriate normative content of different human rights through its monitoring, reporting and judicial processes. [5.111]  In the performance of its functions, the Commission has the powers of a court and, if satisfied that there has been an infringement of a human right or freedom, it is empowered to order the release of a detained or restricted person, payment of compensation, or any other legal remedy or redress.381 In practice the Commission’s approach to the complaints before it has involved mediation/conciliation, tribunal hearings, advice and referrals to the appropriate authorities for redress including ordinary courts of law, justice centres, the Family and Child Protection Unit of the police, the Professional Standards Unit (PSU) of police, legal aid service providers, the Probation Office of the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and clan leaders.382 A party aggrieved with the decision of the Commission has a right of appeal to the High Court of Uganda.383 [5.112]  It is useful to note that while several states have established NHRIs, there is a tendency to compromise their independence and to pay very limited attention to ESC rights in contrast to civil and political rights. What has been the approach of the UHRC to ESC rights? A review of the Commission’s first report in 1997 indicated that the Commission generally paid ‘much less attention to these [ESC] rights’, and had mainly focused on the traditional civil and political rights.384 Although the Commission later changed its approach, it regarded some ESC rights as unjusticiable. For example, the 2003 Annual Report of the UHRC stated that ‘the state cannot be [held] accountable to lack of good health. It is in this vein that it is said that economic, social, and cultural rights are not justiciable’.385 This position, however, as shown in chapters two and ten, is no longer tenable (if it ever was), since all ESC are justiciable and states can, in appropriate cases, be held accountable for the failure to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights, including the right to health. [5.113]  Increasingly, the Commission has paid more attention to ESC rights, and this has been reflected in a few cases it has handled with respect to this category. One example of the right to education indicates the role of the Commission in promoting education. A number of cases have been brought before the Commission involving actions against parents (in particular fathers) who neglected to pay their children’s school fees. On the basis of Article 34 of Uganda’s Constitution, the Commission has ordered

380  See LC Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and human Rights Protection’ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 2; J Hucker, ‘Bringing Rights Home: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions’ in F Butler (ed), Human Rights Protection: Methods and Effectiveness (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 29. 381  Uganda Constitution (1995), Art 53(1) and (2); the UHRC Act 1997, ss 18–26. 382  See UHRC, Annual Report (1999), para 2.11 and UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 27, 30–43. 383  Uganda Constitution (1995), Art 53(3). 384  See, eg, A Makubuya, ‘Breaking Silence: A Review of the maiden report of the Uganda Human Rights Commission’ (1999) 5 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 213, 217. 385 UHRC, Sixth Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2003) para 15.02.

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fathers to pay for the education of their children.386 The Commission also addressed the issue of corporal punishment in schools in the case of Emmanuel Mpondi v The Chairman, Board of Governors Nganwa High School.387 There, the Commission considered whether on the facts there was a violation of the right to education. Mpondi, who was a student in the respondent’s school, was severely physically punished by two teachers, apparently prompted by the student’s attempt to enter the staffroom at the request of another teacher to fetch something, leading to hospitalisation. Following his treatment and return to school, he was sent home to collect school fees. However, his sponsor refused to pay his school fees until the school administration had either punished the two teachers, or clearly indicated the specific action they would take against them. As a consequence, Mpondi was forced to leave the school. The Commission settled the case by ordering financial compensation for the boy. In dealing with the issue of the claimant’s right to education, the Commission stated: In our view the evidence shows that Mpondi’s education at Nganwa High School was interfered with. We hold the respondents responsible for the interference. We find on a balance of probabilities that Mpondi’s right to education was violated by the respondents.388

[5.114]  Although the Commission did not substantiate its reasoning in the Mpondi case (eg no reference was made to the specific constitutional provision on which the decision was based (Article 30, Uganda’s Constitution, 1995); there was no elaboration of the reasons on which the Commission based its findings; and the scope of the right to education was not examined), the decision is important in three essential respects. First, the Commission conceptualised the punishment to which a student was subjected in terms of human rights, rather than as simply a tort or negligent wrong. Secondly, it awarded compensation for the specific violation of the right to education, aside from the award it made relating to the inhuman and degrading treatment to which the claimant had been subjected. Thirdly, the case demonstrates that NSAs (in this case teachers and the school) can be held accountable for violations of all human rights, civil and political (eg violation of freedom from subjection to inhuman and degrading treatment) as well as ESC rights (violation of the right to education). [5.115]  But even in the context of civil and political rights, it is acknowledged that the Commission faces the challenge of ensuring that victims of human rights violations are actually paid the amounts awarded by the tribunal as compensation.389 It is unclear whether failure to pay awards is due to unwillingness or inability to ­comply with the Commission’s decisions. Given that the Commission has in some cases held the Ugandan Government to account for its omissions or actions, it is unsurprising that, in September 2003, the Government recommended that the Commission be

386  See FW Juuko and C Kabonesa, Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Contemporary Uganda: Right or Privilege? (Kampala, Human Rights & Peace Centre, 2007) 21–22, citing the following cases: Kaifumba Estolia v Bareberaho Ezekiel, Complaint no UHRC/MBA/32/2002; Eva Nanwanye v Itaaga Bosco, Complaint no 187 of 2004; Mirembe Margaret v Dr Mukubwa Tumwine, Complaint no UHRC 373 of 2000; Susan Kaasa v Major Godfrey, Complaint no UHRC/J/LOG-12/2002; and Rose Namande Kaduyu v George Mugisha, Compliant no 197 of 2003. 387  Complaint no 210 of 1998, reported in [1999–2002] UHRR 68. 388  Complaint no 210 of 1998, above n 387, para 11 at 71. 389 In 2006, the Government accumulated Uganda shillings 959,828,161 in awards. See UHRC, 9th Annual Report 132.

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a­ bolished, and proposed the transfer of the Commission’s functions to the Inspectorate of Government.390 In this respect the UN HRC observed: 7. While acknowledging the important role of the Uganda Human Rights Commission in the promotion and protection of human rights in Uganda, the Committee is concerned about recent attempts to undermine the independence of the Commission. It is also concerned about the frequent lack of implementation by the State party of the Commission’s decisions concerning both awards of compensation to victims of human rights violations and the prosecution of human rights offenders in the limited number of cases in which the Commission had recommended such prosecution. The State party should ensure that decisions of the Uganda Human Rights Commission are fully implemented, in particular concerning awards of compensation to victims of human rights violations and prosecution of human rights offenders. It should ensure the full independence of the Commission.391

Although the Commission was not replaced, state compliance with the Commission’s decisions and recommendations remains unsatisfactory.392

V. CONCLUSION [5.116]  The above survey of the domestic protection of ESC rights has considered the application of the ICESCR on the national plane in some selected states: the UK, South Africa, Uganda, Italy, India and Canada. Although the focus has been primarily on these states, many of the points made have general application to other states. From the foregoing, two concluding remarks should be emphasised. First, the real protection accorded to the rights recognised under the ICESCR depends on the constitutional framework in a particular state. While some states protect ESC rights as legally binding, a number regard ESC rights as non-legally binding ‘principles and objectives’. But the CESCR has insisted that ESC rights should not be downgraded to ‘principles and objectives’.393 The exclusion of many ESC rights from justiciable human rights is highly detrimental to the full realisation of all human rights, and may amount to a regressive step that contravenes a state party’s human rights obligations under the ICESCR.394 Given that the justiciability of ESC rights has the potential to improve the quality of the lives of the most vulnerable and marginalised members of society, and may contribute to social transformation, it is desirable that these rights should be applied by the relevant accountability mechanisms, including the courts and 390  See Proposal no 3.10 of the Proposals of the Government of the Republic of Uganda for the amendment of the [1995] Constitution, September, 2003. The Inspectorate of Government is established under Art 223 of the 1995 Constitution (consisting of the Inspector-General of Government (IGG) and two Deputy Inspectors-General). It is empowered, inter alia, to promote and foster strict adherence to the rule of law; eliminate corruption, abuse of authority and of public office; promote good governance; and stimulate public awareness about the values of constitutionalism. See Uganda Constitution (1995), Arts 225 and 226; Inspectorate of Government Act, 2002 (Act No 5 of 2002), s 8. 391  HRC, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/UGA (4 May 2004). For similar observations, see the Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc CAT/C/ CR/34/UGA (21 June 2005) paras 8 and 10(k). 392 UHRC, The 17th Annual Report (Kampala, UHRC, 2015) 211–13. 393  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.31 (10 December 1998) para 52. 394  See also Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Convention to Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, UN Doc E/2001/22, Annex VIII, para 4.

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human rights commissions.395 Justiciability of these rights at a domestic level is one of the means of self-defence for millions of impoverished and marginalised individuals and groups worldwide, particularly in the least-developed states.396 As shown by the Indian example, strategic litigation supported by a strong civil society movement is still an important strategy for the increased recognition and enforcement of ESC rights. This should be combined with several other factors, including training of judicial officers and lawyers on the justiciability and enforceability of ESC rights, social campaigns, research and political will. [5.117]  Secondly, there is no settled state practice relating to the application of the ICESCR in domestic law. Some states have failed to do anything specific at all. Of those that have taken measures, some states have transformed the Covenant into domestic law by supplementing or amending existing legislation, without invoking the specific terms of the Covenant. Others have adopted or incorporated it into domestic law, so that its terms are retained intact and given formal validity in the national legal order. It has to be emphasised: 3. Questions relating to the domestic application of the Covenant must be considered in the light of two principles of international law. The first, as reflected in article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,397 is that ‘[A] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. In other words, States should modify the domestic legal order as necessary in order to give effect to their treaty obligations. The second principle is reflected in article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’398

[5.118]  The central obligation in relation to the ICESCR is for states parties to give effect to the rights recognised therein ‘by all appropriate means’. As shown above, one such means, through which important steps can be taken to achieve progressively the rights recognised in the ICESCR, is the work of independent NHRIs. Therefore, states parties to the ICESCR must ensure that the mandates accorded to all NHRIs include the protection and promotion of all ESC rights. The other appropriate means is to develop the possibilities of judicial remedies. Although the ICESCR contains no direct counterpart to Article 2(3)(b) of the ICCPR, which obligates states parties to, inter alia, ‘develop the possibilities of judicial remedy’, a state party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic legal remedies for violations of ESC rights would need to show either that such remedies are not ‘appropriate means’ within the terms of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, or that, in view of the other means used, judicial remedies are unnecessary. As the CESCR has stressed, ‘[i]t will be difficult to show this and the Committee considers that, in many cases, the other means used could be rendered ineffective if they are not reinforced or complemented by judicial remedies’.399 395  M Pieterse, ‘The Potential of Socio-Economic Rights Litigation for the Achievement of Social Justice: Considering the Example of Access to Medical Care in South African Prisons’ (2006) 50(2) Journal of African Law 118. 396  DM Chirwa, ‘A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49(2) Journal of African Law 207. 397  UNTS, vol 1155, 331. 398  CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 1. 399  Ibid, para 3.

6 State Reservations to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights I. INTRODUCTION [6.01]  Some states have sought to modify the way in the ICESCR will apply to them by means of reservations or interpretive declarations. The capacity of a state to make reservations to international treaties, including human rights treaties, illustrates the principle of state sovereignty, whereby a state may refuse its consent to particular provisions so that these do not become binding upon it.1 However, reservations to human rights treaties are a major problem, since the effects are generally to weaken protection for, or even legally deny, some rights to individuals or groups of individuals within that state. It is therefore not surprising that complex questions have arisen with respect to the validity of reservations to human rights treaties and the legal consequences of invalid reservations.2 Unlike some treaties—such as such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,3 the Convention against Discrimination in Education,4 the CRC,5 the Slavery Convention,6 the ECHR,7 the European Convention for the 1  M Shaw, International Law, 7th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 662–670. See also A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 114–44. 2  This matter was a subject of study by the ILC under the direction of Special Rapporteur, Mr Alain Pellet (1993–2011). See, eg, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1; (2011) Yearbook of ILC, II, pt 2; Report prepared by Mr Alain Pellet, Meeting with Human Rights Bodies, UN Doc ILC(LIX)/RT/CRP.1 (26 July 2007); Twelfth Report on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/584 (15 May 2007); Eleventh Report on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/574 (10 August 2006); Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/558 (1 June 2005); Addendum UN Doc A/CN.4/558/ Add.1 (14 June 2005) and UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2 (30 June 2005). See also generally I Ziemele (ed), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004); and I Ziemele and L Liede, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: From Draft Guideline 3.1.12 to Guideline 3.1.5.6’ (2013) 24(4) European Journal of International Law 1135. 3  2187 UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002. Art 20 provides: ‘No reservations may be made to this Statute’. See M Fitzmaurice, ‘On the Protection of Human Rights, the Rome Statute and Reservations to Multilateral Treaties’ (2006) 10 Singapore Year Book of International Law 133–73 at 158–60. 4  429 UNTS 93, entered into force 22 May 1962, Art 9 provides (emphasis added), ‘Reservations to this Convention shall not be permitted.’ 5  UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990, Art 51(2) provides (emphasis added): ‘A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.’ 6  Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery, 226 UNTS 3, entered into force 30 April 1957, Art 9 stating that ‘No reservations may be made to this Convention’. 7  213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953. Art 57 of the ECHR provides: ‘1. … Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article. 2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.’ For discussion, see P van Dijk et al (eds), Theory and

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Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment8 and the WTO Agreement9—the ICESCR (or ‘the Covenant’),10 like the ICCPR,11 neither prohibits the formulation of reservations and declarations either expressly or impliedly, nor mentions any permitted type of reservation(s). Yet the General Assembly made an ‘express demand in 1952 that concrete provisions on the permissibility and legal effect of reservations be adopted in the two Covenants, as well as various [UK] initiatives in this direction’.12 In addition, McNair, in 1961, urged that states should insert into multilateral treaties (such as the ICESCR) express provisions on reservations.13 [6.02]  In fact, upon the ratification of the ICESCR, some states have limited their legal obligations under the Covenant by formulating some reservations, at times disguised as ‘declarations’, ‘understandings’, ‘explanations’ or ‘observations’, as to some of the Covenant provisions.14 While a declaration is a unilateral statement that purports to clarify the meaning or scope attributed to the treaty or some of its provisions, a reservation is defined as [a] unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.15

Although not as seriously afflicted by reservations as some other human rights treaties, particularly CEDAW16 and the CRC,17 the Covenant has nonetheless been

Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2006) 1101–15; and B Rainey, E Wicks and C Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 107–12. 8 

ETS No 126, entered into force 1 February 1989, Art 21, available at http://conventions.coe.int. Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994), Art XVI.5 provides, ‘No reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agreement.’ 10  993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976. 11  999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. 12  M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 2005) xxviii, citing, inter alia, GA res 546 (VI) and UN Docs E/CN.4/L.345 and Add.1 (24 March 1954); A/C.3/1353 Rev.1. 13  AD McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961) 169–70. 14  For a list of such reservations (hereinafter ‘Declarations’), see Appendix H to this book. See also UN Treaty Collection at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&lang=en. Objections are also available on this website (hereinafter ‘Objections’). 15  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention or VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969), entered into force 27 January 1980, Art 2(1)(d). 16  1249 UNTS 13; 19 ILM 33, entered into force 3 September 1981. See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (10 April 2006). See also Division for the Advancement of Women at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendations 4 and 20, Reservations to the Convention, Sixth Session, 1987, UN Doc A/42/38 (15 May 1987) 78, and 11th Session, 1992, UN Doc A/47/38, (24 June 1992) 2, respectively; CEDAW Committee, Working Paper on Reservations in the Context of Individual Communications, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2008/II/WP.2 (20 May 2008); and WA Schabas, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1997) 3(1) William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law 79. By 31 December 2010, 59 of the 186 states parties had entered reservations or declarations to CEDAW or one of its provisions; 21 states had registered one or more objections. 17 GA res 44/25 (20 November 1989), UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), 1577 UNTS 3, entered into force 2 ­September 1990. For the text of declarations and reservations to the CRC, see UN Treaty Collection 9 Agreement

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s­ ubjected to some broad reservations. Only a few states have made objections18 within 12 months of communication of the reservations, suggesting that most states have silently ‘approved’ such reservations.19 [6.03]  As of 14 June 2014, 42 of the 162 states parties to the ICESCR had, between them, entered several declarations and reservations of varying significance to their acceptance of the obligations under the Covenant,20 to which only 14 states made objections.21 The scope of these reservations includes the following aspects: (i) the exclusion of the duty to recognise particular rights in the Covenant;22 (ii) ‘the right to postpone’ certain rights in the Covenant;23 and (iii) general reservations couched in broad terms, often directed to ensuring the continued supremacy of certain domestic legal provisions over some or all provisions of the Covenant.24 Yet, unlike most other human rights treaties, the Covenant lacks a specific clause on declarations and reservations. This has given rise to several questions, examined in this chapter. First, what reservations to the ICESCR are permissible or impermissible in international human rights law? Secondly, who should decide whether a reservation under the ICESCR is permissible or impermissible? Thirdly, if a reservation under the Covenant is impermissible, what is the legal effect of such an impermissible reservation? And lastly, are some of the existing state reservations to the Covenant incompatible with the object

at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en. For the analysis, see WA Schabas, ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1996) 18(2) Human Rights Quarterly 472; and K Hashemi, ‘Religious Legal Traditions, Muslim States and the Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Essay on the Relevant UN Documentation’ (2007) 29(1) Human Rights Quarterly 194. 18  See Objections, above n 14. For the definition of the term ‘objection’, see ILC, Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.665 (11 May 2005) paras 2.6.1 and 2.6.2. 19  Art 20(5) of the Vienna Convention provides that ‘unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later’. Although this rule may not reflect CIL, it is now accepted practice. See UN Depository Practice, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depository of Multilateral Treaties, UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1 (New York, United Nations, 1999) paras 213–14 and the Twelfth Report on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, paras 214–17. It is arguable, however, that no time limit applies to objections against reservations, which are inadmissible under international law. 20 See Declarations, above n 14. States which have formulated reservations to the ICESCR include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia. These constitute about 27% of the states parties to the Covenant. 21  See Objections, above n 14. These are Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These constitute only about 9% of the states parties to the Covenant. 22  See, eg, Declarations, above n 14, Denmark, Japan and Sweden. 23  Ibid. Barbados, for example, reserved the right to postpone: ‘(a) The application of sub-paragraph (a) (1) of article 7 of the Covenant in so far as it concerns the provision of equal pay to men and women for equal work; (b) The application of Article 10(2) in so far as it relates to the special protection to be accorded mothers during a reasonable period during and after childbirth; and (c) The application of article 13(2)(a) of the Covenant, in so far as it relates to primary education.’ The Government of Madagascar reserved ‘the right to postpone the application of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, more particularly in so far as relates to primary education’. Zambia made a similar reservation. 24  See section III. below.

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and purpose of the Covenant (ie the Covenant’s essential rules, rights and obligations), and thus impermissible? If so, how should reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant be treated by the CESCR (‘the Committee’)? The approach and methods used to address these questions involve examining the texts of selected state reservations in the light of the object and purpose of the ­Covenant, while taking into account the general law of treaties as contained in the Vienna ­Convention,25 any objections made by states, Concluding Observations of the CESCR and relevant jurisprudence of other human rights bodies. [6.04]  The number of reservations, their content and their scope may undermine the effective implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the obligations of states parties, or make state obligations obscure. It is important for states parties to know exactly what obligations they, and other states parties, have in fact undertaken under the Covenant. Although there have been scholarly analyses of reservations to human rights treaties generally, the focus has been on other human rights treaties (such as the ICCPR and its first Optional Protocol, CEDAW, CRC and some regional human rights instruments) but not on the ICESCR.26 Despite this, up to 2015, the Committee, comprised of 18 experts with recognised competence in the field of human rights monitoring and the implementation of the Covenant by states parties, had not had a single general discussion on reservations, and has yet to adopt a comprehensive written position on the matter. [6.05]  According to Committee member Philippe Texier, the Committee has not discussed the issue of reservations to the Covenant because ‘the number of reservations relating to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was not large, and mainly concerned articles 6 to 8’.27 Are reservations to Articles 6–8 necessarily compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant? This raises the ­question of whether it is the number or the nature of reservations that should trigger the Committee’s interest in the matter. How many states need to make reservations to the Covenant before the number could be considered as ‘large’? Is it not the

25 

Above n 15. eg, WA Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform’ (1994) 32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39; AE Montalvo, ‘Reservations to the American Convention on Human Rights: A New Approach’ (2001) 16 American University International Law Review 269; CJ Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No 24(52)’ (1997) 46(2) ICLQ 390; G McGrory, ‘Reservations of Virtue? Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago’s Reservation to the First Optional Protocol’ (2001) 23(3) Human Rights Quarterly 769; R Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’ (2002) 96(3) The American Journal of International Law 531; K Korkeli, ‘New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2002) 12(2) European Journal of International Law 437; J Riddle, ‘Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’S Reservation Regime under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process’ (2002–03) 34 The George Washington International Law Review 605; JL Tillson, ‘The Role of Reservations and Declarations before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Las Hermanas Serrano Cruz Case and the Future of Inter-American Justice’, Bepress Legal Series Working Paper 921 (27 January 2006); and S Linton, ‘ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] States, Their Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed ASEAN Commission on Women and Children’ (2008) 30(2) Human Rights Quarterly 436. 27  See Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/5 (4 July 2006) para 8. See also The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with Respect to Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, UN Doc HRI/MC/2005/5 (13 June 2005) para 20. 26 See,

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case that the (wide) scope and impact of some of the existing reservations, as opposed to the number, would necessitate an examination of reservations to the Covenant? [6.06]  This chapter examines the permissibility of reservations to the ICESCR and discusses some selected reservations to demonstrate that certain of them have significant effects on state obligations under the ICESCR. It argues that it is useful to adopt a carefully drafted General Comment or Statement on reservations to the ICESCR to give an indication to present states parties, and to those states that are not yet parties, of what reservations are compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. A clarification of the law in this area may provide useful guidance to states in the formulation of reservations, however named, to the Covenant. It may also help to develop the law on reservations to the Covenant. Such a development would help all states not to enter reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, and enable the better protection of ESC rights. [6.07]  The chapter adopts the following structure. Section II. considers what reservations are permissible (or not permissible) under the ICESCR, and how invalid reservations to the ICESCR should be treated by the treaty-monitoring body. Section III. discusses some questionable reservations based on reservations made by Kuwait, ­Pakistan and the Republic of Turkey upon ratifying or acceding to the ICESCR. The selection made was based on the need to examine some of the existing widest and much more general reservations to the ICESCR (ie reservations that appear to be too ‘sweeping’ to raise the question whether they are compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant). Although the states considered in this section could be regarded either as Muslim-majority states or, with the exception of Turkey, to an extent as ‘Islamic’ states (as their national constitutions provide for the supremacy of, or protect some aspects of, Islamic law or shari’a),28 their reservations to the ICESCR were not stated to have been motivated by Islamic law. While these states are not representative of the world at large, their reservations reflect the nature of questionable reservations to the ICESCR and would raise similar issues if made to other human rights treaties. In section IV. reservations entered by these selected states are compared with reservations of other states, drawing examples from Africa and Europe, where a number of states have also made declarations/reservations to the Covenant. Are the latter different from the ones made by the selected states and, if so, in what way and why? Section V. concludes that reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant are invalid (null and void) and thus devoid of any legal effect. It is pointless to maintain such reservations. It is noted that in the spirit of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in 1993, states are encouraged ‘to regularly review any reservations with a view to withdrawing them’,29 particularly those that appear to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICESCR. It is observed that the CESCR can play a key role in this crucial and difficult area by examining reservations

28 See US Commission on International Religious Freedom, available at http://www.uscirf.gov/ countries/turkey. Turkey is a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population. 29  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993), part II, paras 5, 26, 39 and 46 (‘the Vienna Declaration’).

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to the Covenant more systematically in a General Comment or in a comprehensive statement, and, when applicable, in its Concluding Observations on state reports.

II.  PERMISSIBLE RESERVATIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN INVALID RESERVATION [6.08]  In this section, two issues are examined. First, what reservations are permissible (or not permissible) under the ICESCR, given that the Covenant does not expressly exclude or permit the possibility of reservations? Secondly, who should decide whether a reservation under the ICESCR is invalid? And if a reservation under the Covenant is invalid, what is the legal consequence of such an invalid reservation? A.  Permissible Reservations: The ‘Object and Purpose’ Test [6.09]  Reservations are generally permissible in international law as a compromise between the objectives of preservation of the integrity of the normative text of the treaty (so that all parties are equally bound) and the maximisation of ratifications to (or universality of participation in) the treaty.30 From one perspective, reservations to human rights treaties detract from the protection of individuals, which is the purpose of international human rights law, and thereby weaken—or in some cases totally undermine—the overall effectiveness of human rights norms.31 Yet another perspective is that reservations are a legitimate, perhaps even desirable, means of accounting for cultural, religious, economic or political diversity across nations.32 However, even if reservations could play an important and legitimate role, the absence of a specific prohibition or limitation, in either form or content, on reservations in the ICESCR does not mean that any reservation is permitted in any form. Reservations must meet conditions of formal validity (ie submitted in writing, communicated to other parties, and not submitted too late). In accordance with the rules of CIL that are reflected in

30  As noted by the HRC, ‘Reservations may serve a useful function to enable States to adapt specific elements in their laws to the inherent rights of each person as articulated in the Covenant.’ See HRC, General Comment 24 (52): General Comment on Issues relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (4 November 1994) para 4. 31  Schabas, above n 17, 472. See also CEDAW Committee, ‘Statements on Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc A/53/38/Rev.1, 1998, 47–50, para 14, stating that ‘Reservations to any human rights treaty limit the application of internationally accepted human rights norms at the national level.’ 32  E Neumayer, ‘Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 32(6) Journal of Legal Studies 397; Chairpersons of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, UN Doc A/47/628 (10 November 1992) para 60.

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Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention, reservations can therefore be made, provided they are not ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’.33 [6.10]  A reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it has a ‘serious impact on the essential rules, rights or obligations indispensable to the general architecture of the treaty, thereby depriving it of its raison d’être’.34 This might arise if a reservation (i) were to impair an essential element, (ii) which is necessary to the general thrust of the treaty, (iii) and thereby compromises the raison d’être of the treaty.35 This must also include all interpretative declarations the effect of which is that of reservations. This is consistent with the practice in other existing international human rights treaties, such as the CEDAW,36 the CRC37 and the ICERD,38 all of which protect some ESC rights and expressly prohibit reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the respective treaties. The object and purpose of the treaty is determined by taking into account the treaty’s terms in their context, in particular the title and the preamble, the preparatory work and the circumstances of its conclusion, and, where possible, the subsequent practice of the parties.39 [6.11]  This is also in line with the conclusions reached by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, in the case concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘the 1951 ICJ Advisory

33 Section 313 of the Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), is to the same effect. For a discussion of ‘Object and Purpose’, see U Linderfalk, ‘On the Meaning of the “Object and Purpose” Criterion, in the Context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ­Article 19’ (2003) 72(4) Nordic Journal of International Law 429. The HRC has accepted reservations not incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR. See, eg, the series of cases involving members of the Breton linguistic minority and the French reservation to Art 27 in TK v France, Communication no 220/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/220/1987 (8 November 1989); MK v France, Communication no 222/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/222/1987 (8 November 1989); SG v France, Communication no 347/1988, UN Doc CCPR/ C/43/D/347/1988 (1 November 1991); GB v France, Communication no 348/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/ 348/1989 (1 November 1991); RLM v France, Communication no 363/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/44/D/363/1989 (6 April 1992); CLD v France, Communication no 439/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/439/1990 (8 November 1991). See also Cabal and Pasini v Australia, Communication no 1020/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (7 August 2003); Craig Minogue v Australia, Communication no 954/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/954/2000 (11 November 2004); Harward v Norway, Communication no 451/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/451/1991 (16 August 1994); and Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v France, Communication no 549/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 (1997). 34 See Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, p 14, para 89, Guideline 3.1.5; and Note by the Special Rapporteur on Draft Guideline 3.1.5, Definition of the Object and Purpose of the Treaty, UN Doc A/CN.4/572 (21 June 2006) 3, paras 7–8. 35  International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Ninth Session (7 May–5 June and 9–10 August 2007), GAOR 62nd Session, Supp No 10, A/62/10, 75. 36  Art 28(2) of the CEDAW, above n 16, provides: ‘A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.’ 37  Art 51(2) of the CRC, above n 17, provides: ‘A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.’ 38  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195, entered into force 4 January 1969. Art 20(2) of the ICERD provides: ‘A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to it.’ 39  See Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, Guideline 3.1.5.1.

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Opinion’ or Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case).40 It follows that since the ICESCR is silent on the matter of reservations, a reservation to the Covenant has to pass the compatibility (object and purpose) test to be valid. It is, however, debatable whether a state’s reservation to certain provisions in the Covenant is ‘compatible’ or ‘incompatible’ with the object and purpose of the ICESCR, since this is not defined in the ­Covenant.41 The question then remains, what is the object and purpose of the Covenant? [6.12]  It is useful to note that modern human rights treaties in general (including the ICESCR) are not multilateral treaties of a traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of states parties.42 They are not ‘mere reciprocal agreements between Contracting States’43 but concern ‘the endowment of individuals with rights’.44 Their object and purpose is the legal protection of basic rights of individual human beings, and groups of individuals in some contexts, from infringements by the state and NSAs given their increasing role and power in the international legal system.45 Each of these rights carries with it corresponding obligations, primarily for the state. In the words of the CESCR, the ‘overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant … is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in question’.46 It follows, then, that at the very minimum, states parties to the Covenant are under an obligation ‘not to raise any obstacle’ (whether by way of reservations or otherwise) to the exercise of the rights recognised in the Covenant.47 [6.13]  Although, in accordance with state practice, not all reservations to the substantive provisions of a human rights treaty are inherently incompatible with the object

40  Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 29. The Advisory Opinion (7:5 vote) sanctioned the entering of reservations to international obligations subject the object and purpose of the treaty. The ICJ noted that: ‘The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of objecting to them.’ 41  In general the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty is subject to different views. See, eg, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (hereinafter Congo v Rwanda), ICJ, judgment of 3 February 2006, para 67; and Joint Separate Opinion of Judges ­Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para 21. 42  See, eg, the IACtHR, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention (Arts 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 September 1982, IACtHR (Ser A) no 2 (1982), paras 29–30; Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts 4(2) and 4(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 8 September 1983, IACtHR (Ser A) no 3 (1983), para 50; European Commission on Human Rights, Austria v Italy, App no 788/60, (1961) 4 European Yearbook of Human Rights 116, 140; HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 17. 43  Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v Turkey, App nos 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, Commission Decision of 4 March 1991 on the admissibility of the application, (1991) 68 DR 242. 44  HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 17. 45  See ch 3. 46  CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Fifth Session, 1990), UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III, 86 (1991), para 9 (emphasis added). 47  ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 180–81, para 112 (Wall).

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and purpose of a particular treaty, the following reservations would arguably be difficult to reconcile with the object and purpose of the ICESCR: (a) reservations worded in vague, general language that do not allow their scope to be determined; (b) reservations that offend peremptory or higher norms of general international law (jus cogens)48 or obligations that concern or bind all states (obligations erga omnes), for example freedom from racial discrimination.49 These are prohibited because they might threaten the integrity of the peremptory norm, the application of which must be uniform, and would inevitably affect the ‘quintessence’ of the treaty. In the context of the ICESCR, a state’s obligation to take steps on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with Articles 2(1), 2(2) and 3 of the Covenant cannot be subjected to reservations, because ‘the philosophy of the Covenant [is] based on the principle of non-discrimination and on the idea of the universality of human rights’;50 (c) reservations that offend norms of CIL.51 In September 2003, the IACtHR asserted that the principle of equality and non-discrimination ‘forms part of general international law’ because it is applicable to all states, regardless of whether or not they are a party to a specific international treaty;52 (d) any reservation by which a state purports to exclude or modify the application of a treaty provision in order to preserve the integrity of its domestic law incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. For example, a reservation to preserve discrimination against women in accordance with domestic law would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant, because the Covenant is predicated on the principles of ‘absolute non-discrimination against women’ and their full enjoyment of all the rights enjoyed by their male counterparts.53 In addition, a reservation to the core obligations arising from the ‘minimum essential levels’ of the rights protected under the Covenant—including rights to food, education, health, water, the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of

48  Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 53 defines a ‘peremptory norm’ of general international law (also called jus cogens, Latin for ‘compelling law’) as ‘a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’. On jus cogens, see U Linderfalk, ‘The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?’ (2008) 18(5) European Journal of International Law 853; and A Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 9(3) The European Journal of International Law 491. 49  See ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, (Belgium v Spain) Judgment, [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32–34 (Judgment of 5 February 1970); and CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 57. 50  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/17 (28 December 1995) para 16. 51  HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 8. This is debatable. See Pellet, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/ Add.1 (14 June 2005), above n 2, paras 116–29. 52  Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 17 ­September 2003, IACtHR (Ser A) no 18 (2003), available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/ series_A_OC-18.html, paras 101 and 173(4). 53  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriaya, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.15 (20 May 1997) para 13.

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the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic ­production of which he or she is the author, the right to work and the right to social security54—would largely deprive the Covenant of its raison d’être,55 and thus be unlikely to be compatible with the Covenant’s object and purpose. The Committee confirmed that a state party cannot, in any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with these core obligations, which are ‘nonderogable­’.56 To justify such reservations to non-derogable obligations, a state would bear a ‘heavy onus’.57 One reason for core obligations of ESC rights being considered non-derogable is because their suspension is irrelevant and unnecessary to the legitimate derogations from human rights obligations in times of national emergency (eg the undertaking to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind, and to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all ESC rights in Articles 2 and 3 would deserve greater, rather than less, importance in times of national emergency so as to protect vulnerable groups against discrimination). B.  Consequence of an Invalid Reservation [6.14]  Two issues are addressed briefly in this section. First, who should determine the validity of a reservation to the ICESCR? Is it a matter exclusively for a reserving state and those making objections, or should the CESCR itself pronounce on the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the ICESCR, when the need arises? Secondly, what legal consequence should follow the determination of a reservation to the ICESCR as invalid (unacceptable, irregular, impermissible or inadmissible)? i.  Who should Determine the Validity of a Reservation? [6.15]  In recent years there has been a tendency for some states, and certain commentators, to view the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion (see paragraph 6.11 above) as stipulating a regime of inter-state laissez-faire in the matter of reservations, in the sense that while the object and purpose of a convention should be borne in mind, both by those making reservations and by those objecting to them, everything in the final analysis is left to the states themselves.58 According to this view, nobody beyond the states

54  CESCR, General Comments 11 (para 17), 13 (para 57), 14 (para 43), 15 (para 37), 17 (para 39), 18 (para 31); 19 (para 59), respectively, all available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/ CESCRIndex.aspx (under ‘General Comments’). 55  CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 46, para 10 (emphasis added). 56  CESCR, General Comments 14 (para 47) and 15 (para 40), above n 54. See also CESCR, Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (10 May 2001) para 18. 57  See also HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 10. 58  Congo v Rwanda, above n 41, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para 4. In 2003, Professor Malcolm N Shaw stated, ‘At the moment, unless the particular treaty otherwise provides, whether a reservation is impermissible is a determination to be made by states parties to the treaty themselves.’ See MN Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 828. He maintained the same position in 2014. See Shaw, above n 1, 668.

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t­ hemselves has anything to say on reservations. It should, however, be noted that the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion did not foreclose legal developments in respect of the law on reservations, and should not be read in such a restrictive way.59 [6.16]  In its 1997 Preliminary Conclusions on reservations to normative multilateral treaties, including human rights treaties, the ILC stated that where these treaties are silent on the subject, the monitoring bodies established thereby are competent to comment upon and express recommendations [not to assess] with regard, inter alia, to the admissibility of reservations by States, in order to carry out the functions assigned to them.60

This was seen as an important concession from the ILC, which had previously considered that only states parties to a treaty could express opinions as to whether a reservation was valid or not.61 Nonetheless, the ILC still considered that it was not for human rights treaty bodies to decide on the consequences of an invalid reservation, and that it was the reserving state that has the responsibility to take action. [6.17]  In July 2003, members of the ILC met with members of the HRC to discuss General Comment No 24 and the 1997 Preliminary Conclusions. Following the discussion, the position of the ILC seems to have evolved since then, to the effect that ‘human rights treaty bodies are competent to assess the permissibility of a reservation, when the issue comes before them in the exercise of their functions, including the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty’.62 However, human rights treaty bodies ‘may not substitute their own judgment for the State’s ­consent to be bound by the treaty’.63 Indeed, the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the topic of ‘Reservations to treaties’, Alain Pellet, proposed draft guideline 3.2.1, which states that where a treaty establishes a body to monitor application of the treaty, that body shall be competent, for the purpose of discharging the functions entrusted to it, to assess the validity of reservations formulated by a State. A treaty monitoring body may, for the purpose of discharging functions entrusted to it, assess the permissibility of reservations formulated by a State or an international organization. The conclusions formulated by such a body in the exercise of this competence shall have the same legal effect as that deriving from the performance of its monitoring role.64

[6.18]  The practice of the relevant human rights bodies supports this view. For example, the ECtHR, the IACtHR and the HRC have not followed the laissez-faire

59  Congo v Rwanda, above n 41, Joint Separate Opinion, para 13; R Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International Court of Justice’ (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 745, 746–47. 60  See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 49th Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, Official Records of the General Assembly, 52nd Session, Supp no 10, UN Doc A/52/10, para 157 (emphasis added). 61  See CEDAW Committee, Working Paper on Reservations in the Context of Individual Communications, UN Doc CEDAW/ /C/2008/II/WP.2 (20 May 2008) para 7. 62  GAOR, 6th Session, Supp no 10 (A/64/10), Report of the International Law Commission 61st session (4 May–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2009) 289–90 (emphasis added). See also KL McCall-Smith, ‘Reservations and the Determinative Function of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2012) 54 German YBIL 521. 63  GAOR, above n 62. 64  See A/CN.4/558/Add.2, 30 June 2005, above n 2, annex.

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approach attributed to the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion; they have pronounced on the compatibility of specific reservations to the ECHR, the AmCHR and the ICCPR, respectively.65 They have not thought that it was simply a matter of bilateral sets of obligations, left to individual assessment of the states parties to the convention concerned. The practice of such bodies is not to be viewed as ‘making an exception’ to the law as determined in 1951 by the ICJ, but rather as a development of the law to meet contemporary realities or to cover what the Court was never asked at that time, and to address new issues that have arisen subsequently.66 In addition, the practice of the ICJ itself reflects this trend. For example, in 2006 in Congo v Rwanda,67 the ICJ considered the impact of Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The ICJ made its own assessment of the compatibility of such a reservation68 and went beyond, noting that a reservation had been made by one state which did not occasion an objection by the other. The Court found that Rwanda’s reservation ‘does not appear contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention’.69 The ICJ’s opinion supports the view that the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty (by extension the permissibility or impermissibility of a reservation) is subject to assessment by the competent (judicial and quasi-judicial) bodies as part of their functions. Should the CESCR assess the compatibility of reservations to the ICESCR with the object and purpose of the Covenant? [6.19]  As noted in chapter one, the compliance of states with their obligations under the Covenant is monitored by the CESCR.70 This Committee was established in 1985 by a decision of the ECOSOC of the UN,71 merely to ‘assist’ it in the ‘consideration’ of state reports.72 Thus, the Committee is not a body established by treaty, but a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. It has the primary responsibility for ‘monitoring’ the implementation of ESC rights guaranteed under the Covenant.73 All states parties are obliged to 65  See, in particular, Belilos v Switzerland, judgment of 29 April 1988, ECHR (1988) Series A, no 132, (1988) 10 EHRR 466; Loizidou v Turkey, judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A, no 310, (1995) 20 EHRR 99; The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, IACtHR (Ser A) no 2 (1982); Restrictions to the Death Penalty; Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, IACtHR (Ser A) no 3 (1983); Rawle Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, HRC, Communication no 845, UN Doc CCPR/ C/67D/845/1999 (31 December 1999). This trend was observed in a Joint Separate Opinion cited in n 41 above, para 16. 66 See Congo v Rwanda, above n 41, paras 16 and 22. 67  Ibid. 68  Ibid, para 67. 69 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep 246, para 72. In its later decision on jurisdiction (above n 41, para 67), the majority found that ‘Rwanda’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention bears on the jurisdiction of the Court, and does not affect substantive obligations relating to acts of genocide themselves under that Convention. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot conclude that the reservation of Rwanda in question, which is meant to exclude a particular method of settling a dispute relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, is to be regarded as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.’ 70  See K Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (Antwerp, Intersentia, 1999). 71  ECOSOC Decision 1985/17. By Arts 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, states parties to the Covenant are required to submit reports, at intervals defined by ECOSOC, on the ‘measures which they have adopted’ and ‘the progress made’ in achieving the observance of the rights in the Covenant. 72  ECOSOC res 1985/17, 28 May 1985 (in UN Doc E/1985/85, p 15) para f. 73  See CESCR, Report on the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, UN Doc E/1999/22 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 1999) para 24.

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submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being implemented. The Committee can effectively monitor the measures adopted and the progress made if it can determine the extent of each state party’s obligations under the Covenant, whether in its consideration of periodic reports, or through claims by states or individuals under the Optional Protocol, and this necessarily involves addressing the issue of the legality of reservations. In particular, whether a reservation is permissible, and whether it is compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. [6.20]  With respect to reservations, the approach of the CESCR has so far involved the following ‘quasi-diplomatic’ methods. First, the Committee has made positive remarks welcoming a state party’s adherence to the Covenant without any r­ eservations.74 It has also welcomed a state party’s statement that it was in the process of reviewing human rights treaty reservations, with a view to withdrawing those superseded by legislation or practice.75 Where a state has withdrawn reservations to the Covenant (Articles 1 and 7), the Committee has warmly welcomed the withdrawal.76 All these examples indicate that the Committee considers the ratification of the Covenant without reservations, or the withdrawal of the existing reservations, as the preferred option, and as a positive aspect in line with the object and purpose of the Covenant. As the Committee has stated: when a State has ratified the Covenant without making any reservations, it is obliged to comply with all of the provisions of the Covenant. It may therefore not invoke any reasons or circumstances to justify the non-application of one or more articles of the Covenant, except in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant and the principles of general international law.77

[6.21]  Secondly, the Committee has encouraged reserving states parties either to withdraw ‘reservations to the Covenant that have become redundant’,78 or to withdraw reservations to substantive rights (such as Articles 6–8 and 13) and to withdraw reservations to other human rights treaties (such as the ICCPR and the CRC), without further explanations and without coming to the conclusion whether the reservations in issue are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.79 In 2008, in

74 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc E/1998/22 (20 June 1998) para 67. Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 9. 76  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, UN Doc E/2002/22 (adopted 11 May 2001) para 166. 77  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/5 (30 May 1994) para 9. 78  UK, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79, above n 75, para 43. 79  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: The [Democratic Republic of the] Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.45 (23 May 2000) para 29, in which the Committee recommended ‘that the State Party withdraw its reservation to article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Covenant’; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, UN Doc E/2002/22, 2001, para 191, where the Committee recommended that the state party ‘withdraw its reservation to Article 6 of the Covenant and the interpretative declaration replacing its former reservation on article 8’; Japan, UN Doc E/2002/22, 2001, para 613, where the Committee urged Japan ‘to consider the withdrawal of its reservations to articles 7(d), 8, paragraph 2, and article 13, paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the Covenant’; New Zealand, UN Doc E/2004/22, 2003, para 198, where the Committee encouraged New ­Zealand ‘to withdraw its reservation to article 8 of the Covenant’; Netherlands, UN Doc E/1999/22, 1998, para 225, in which the Committee encouraged the Government ‘to carry out its intention to withdraw its reservation to the Covenant concerning the right to strike’; Sweden, UN Doc E/2002/22, 2001, para 739, where the Committee recommended that Sweden ‘withdraw its reservation to Article 7(d) of the ­Covenant’; 75  CESCR,

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State Reservations to the ICESCR

the Concluding Observations of the CESCR on the Netherlands Antilles, the Committee noted that the right to strike was recognised in the state party, but regretted that the state party had not clarified ‘the reasons for maintaining its reservation to article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant in respect of the Netherlands Antilles’.80 The Committee recommended that ‘the State party give more serious consideration to withdrawing the reservation to article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant’, but without stating the reason(s) for considering the withdrawal of the reservation and when to consider the withdrawal.81 The Committee also did not request the state party to provide the reasons for maintaining the reservation as a follow-up measure within a defined period of time. In addition, the Committee did not state that the declaration was invalid. This cautious approach appears to be a result of fear that states will resent any intervention regarding the legality of reservations, and that they might possibly respond by denouncing the Covenant or the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.82 [6.22]  In addition, a more strict approach declaring reservations invalid might discourage some states that have not yet ratified the Covenant from considering ratification in the future subject to some reservations. Although a state may not be able to legally withdraw from the ICESCR, since the ICESCR, like the ICCPR, does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal from the Covenant,83 from a practical perspective it is desirable to take into account the possible reaction of states to severing reservations made to the ICESCR from consent to be bound.84 As yet, most states have maintained their reservations. [6.23]  Other UN treaty-monitoring bodies have also examined relevant reservations, although for some time there has been no agreed common approach among these bodies.85 It is worth noting that apart from the HRC, other committees

Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc E/2003/22, 2002, para 283, in which the Committee recommended that Trinidad and Tobago ‘withdraw its reservation to Article 8 of the Covenant’; CESCR, Concluding ­Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.72, 23 November 2001, para 25, where the Committee recommended that France ‘withdraw its reservation with regard to article 27 of the ICCPR’ and CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/FRA/CO/3 (9 June 2008), para 49, where the Committee recommended that France ‘withdraw its reservation to article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’. 80 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Netherlands Antilles, UN Doc E/C.12/NLD/CO/3/Add.1 (31 ­January 2008) para 14. 81  Ibid, para 33. In April 2008, the HRC recommended that a state immediately withdraw a reservation it considered to be ‘vague and extremely wide’ and as ‘offending peremptory norms of international law’. See HRC, Concluding Observations: Botswana, UN Doc CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1 (24 April 2008) para 14: ‘The State party should immediately withdraw its reservation to article 7 of the Covenant, and should also withdraw its reservation to article 12 of the Covenant.’ 82 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, Art 20(1), provides that ‘[a]ny State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations’. 83 See also HRC, General Comment 26 (61): Continuity of Obligations, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.8/Rev.1 (8 December 1997). 84  When the HRC applied its General Comment 24 (52) in Rawle Kennedy (represented by the London law firm Simons Muirhead & Burton) v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication no 845, UN Doc CCPR/C/ 67/D/845/1999, 31 December 1999, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Optional Protocol with effect from 27 June 2000 and did not re-accede. 85  See generally UN, ‘The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with Respect to Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties’, UN Doc HRI/MC/2005/5, 13 June 2005.

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have not ­pronounced on the validity of reservations in the context of individual ­communications.86 It is interesting to note that some UN treaty-monitoring bodies have encouraged states to withdraw reservations to the ICESCR. On one occasion, for example, the CRC Committee noted with concern that the reservation made by the Government of Kenya to Article 10(2) of the ICESCR ‘limits the family support available to women in employment before and after childbirth’, and recommended that Kenya ‘[s]trengthen the support available to women before and after childbirth by ­taking appropriate measures including the removal of the reservation to paragraph 2 of article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, of 1966’.87 This indicates that it may be possible for other UN treaty-monitoring ­bodies (committees), with the competence to examine state reports and individual communications, to consider issues relating to ESC rights, including reservations, in the context of the relevant treaties. [6.24]  It may be questioned whether the CESCR is under an obligation or simply has the option of entering into a ‘reservations dialogue’ with states? Given the mandate of the Committee, as a body monitoring state obligations under the Covenant, and the fact that a reservation becomes an integral part of the treaty, it is arguable that a ‘reservations dialogue’ with the relevant states is more of an obligation than an option. Moreover, any meaningful interpretation of a treaty calls for an interpretation of any reservation made thereto.88 Therefore, as a body monitoring the Covenant, the CESCR should consistently determine (i) whether a statement is a reservation or not; and (ii) if so, whether it is a valid reservation; and (iii) whether to give effect to a conclusion with regard to validity.89 Thus, reservations to the ICESCR must of necessity be interpreted by the CESCR by reference to relevant principles of general international law, within the general context of the Covenant and taking into account its object and purpose. ii.  The General Consequences of an Invalid Reservation [6.25]  What are the consequences of an invalid reservation? While a detailed discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this chapter, a reservation that does not

86 See Report on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2008/5, 29 May 2008. To date, only the HRC has itself had to pronounce on the legal effect of reservations in the context of individual communications in the case of Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, above n 84. In Stephen Hagan v Australia, Communication no 26/2002, UN Doc CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003), decided by the CERD, in para 4.7, the state party had invoked its reservation to Art 4 of the ICERD, but the Committee made no reference to this issue in its merits decision. Similarly, in Salgado v United Kingdom, Communication no 11/2006, UN Doc CEDAW/ C/37/D/11/2006 (2007), the state party argued before the CEDAW Committee that the Communication was manifestly i­ ll-founded because its subject matter fell within the reservation in relation to Art 9 entered upon ratification. The Committee decided that the communication was inadmissible ratione temporis, as well as for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and did not itself pronounce on the reservation. 87  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc CRC/C/KEN/CO/2 (19 June 2007) paras 36(b) and 37(b). 88  Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, IAmCtHR (Ser A) no 3 (1983) paras 62–66. 89  See Final Working Paper submitted by Françoise Hampson, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (19 July 2004) para 37.

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meet the conditions of formal validity and permissibility is ‘null and void, and therefore devoid of any legal effect’.90 Such a reservation is not in force ab initio, by the very nature of the reservation made and not following objections from other parties. This leads us to another question: what is the status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to the ICESCR or other human rights treaty? This has been a subject eliciting different views, since this was not specified in the Vienna Convention. It could conform to one of the following three options: (a) The state remains bound by the treaty, except for the provision(s) to which the reservation related.91 This means that a state should be bound by the obligations of the treaty beyond the limits foreseen in that reservation. (b) The invalidity of a reservation nullifies the instrument of ratification as a whole, and thus the state is no longer a party to the agreement until it makes it clear that it is prepared to be a party without reservation.92 (c) An invalid reservation can be severed from the instrument of ratification, such that the state remains bound by the treaty, including the provision(s) to which the reservation related (the severability option).93 However, the Vienna Convention is silent on severance, because it only regulates the consequences of permissible reservations and objections to them. It neither rejects nor supports the severability approach. Which of these three options would enhance the object and purpose of the ICESCR while respecting state consent, given that ‘in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent’?94 [6.26]  While there is no consensus on this issue, both the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion and Article 19 of the Vienna Convention imply that if the reservation is not compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, it is not capable of being accepted.95 In that case, there are only two possibilities, depending on whether or not a reservation constituted an ‘essential condition’ of ratification: (i) either the state does not become a party to the treaty at all (clearly an undesirable outcome, as this does not enhance the protection of human rights); or (ii) unless a contrary intention is expressed or such intention is otherwise established, it becomes a party without the benefit of the ‘reservation’.96

90 

Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, Guideline 4.5.1. See ECtHR, Belilos v Switzerland, above n 65; Weber v Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, ECHR (1990) Series A, no 177, (1990) 12 EHRR 508. 92  In its Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951 on Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, above n 40, 23, the ICJ (7:5) advised that ‘a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention’ (emphasis added). 93  For a discussion, see R Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent’ (2002) 96(3) The American Journal of International Law 531; RE Edwards, ‘Reservations to Treaties: The Belilos Case and the Work of the International Law Commission’ (2000) 31(2) University of Toledo Law Review 195. 94  Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, above n 40, 21. 95  Ibid, 23, quoted in n 92. 96  Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, Guideline 4.5.3. 91 

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[6.27]  Can a prohibited reservation or a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty be severed? According to the HRC: The normal [but presumably not automatic] consequence of an unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party. Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.97

The above position triggered critical comments by certain states, notably the US, the UK and France, mainly based on the principle of state consent, noting that severability is in opposition to state consent.98 Although the HRC did not rely on any legal grounds in coming to this view, the above position is defensible where a reservation is not essential in the sense that a state would have ratified the treaty without it.99 Where a reservation constituted an essential part of a state’s consent to be bound or a sine qua non of ratification, it is arguable that a State which purports to ratify a human rights treaty subject to a [an essential] reservation which is fundamentally incompatible with participation in the treaty regime cannot be regarded as having become a party at all—unless it withdraws the reservation.100

Some members of the HRC supported this view in Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago.101 Similar comments were made by Sir Hersh Lauterpacht in his dissenting opinion in the Interhandel case, in which he stated that if a ‘reservation is an essential condition of the acceptance in the sense that without it the declaring State would have been wholly unwilling to undertake the principal obligation, then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation’.102 [6.28]  However, if an essential reservation is found to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, it is invalid. It follows that such an invalid reservation is to be considered null and void, meaning that a state will not be able to rely on such a reservation and, unless a state’s contrary intention is incontrovertibly established, will remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation.103 In such a case, a state should be invited to make a careful review of an incompatible reservation with a view to withdrawing it, with ‘the presumption, which may be refuted, that the State would prefer to remain a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation,

97  HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 18 (emphasis added). This position has so far been applied by the HRC only in Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, above n 84, in which the Committee set aside a reservation. 98  See UN, Report of the Human Rights Committee 1995, UN Doc A/50/40, vol I (New York, United Nations, 1996) 126–24 (observations by the USA and the UK); and UN, Report of the Human Rights ­Committee 1996, UN Doc A/51/40, vol I (New York, United Nations, 1997) 104–06 (observations by France). 99 See also R Moloney, ‘Incompatible Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Severability and the Problem of State Consent’ (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 155, 168. 100  Observations by the UK on General Comment No 24 (52), above n 30, in (1995) 16 Human Rights Law Journal 426. 101  Above n 84, individual, dissenting opinion of Committee members Nisuke Ando, Prafulachandra N Bhagwati, Eckart Klein and David Kretzmer (hereinafter ‘Kennedy dissent’), para 16. 102  Switzerland v United States (Interhandel case) (1959) ICJ Rep 6, 95, 117 (emphasis added). 103 See Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2007/5, 9 ­February 2007, para 7.

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rather than being excluded’.104 As yet there have not been any major difficulties with states parties to the ICESCR on the subject of reservations, even where the Committee examined the articles to which reservations were made.105

III.  QUESTIONABLE RESERVATIONS [6.29]  The most problematic reservations to human rights treaties, including the ­ICESCR, are those that subject a treaty, or some of the core provisions of a treaty, to the national constitution (‘constitutional reservation’), or to the domestic law generally, of a reserving state. Some selected examples of such reservations by Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey are considered in this section to give an idea of their scope and permissibility. As shown below, Kuwait made a reservation in respect of Articles 2(2), 3 and 8, and an ‘interpretative declaration’ in respect of Article 9. Kuwait subjected Articles 2(2) and 3 to ‘Kuwaiti law’. Pakistan made a very general reservation subjecting the provisions of the Covenant to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Republic of Turkey declared that it will implement the provisions of the Covenant only to the states with which it has diplomatic relations; and reserved the right to interpret and apply the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the Covenant in accordance with the provisions under Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. These important reservations are discussed below. In particular, the question is asked: are these reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant? If not, what is the effect, if any, of such reservations? Are these reservations different from reservations made by other states? A.  Kuwait’s Reservations [6.30]  Upon accession to the ICESCR on 21 May 1996, Kuwait made an ‘interpretative declaration’ regarding the non-discrimination and equality provisions—­Articles 2(2) and 3—of the ICESCR. By Article 2(2), the states parties to the ICESCR undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the … Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Under Article 3, the states parties undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all ESC rights set forth in the Covenant. Non-discrimination­and the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all human rights are two of the fundamental principles recognised under international law and enshrined in the main

104 See Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/5, 4 July 2006, para 16(7). The ECtHR, in the case of Belilos v Switzerland, above n 65, concluded that the willingness of Switzerland to be a party to the ECHR was ‘stronger’ than its willingness to maintain the reservation in question. See also Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, Guideline 4.5.3. 105  Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, above n 103, para 7. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.41 (8 December 1999) paras 23 and 39; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (9 June 2006) paras 16 and 34.

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international human rights instruments.106 The ICJ stated in the Namibia case that ‘to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin … [constitutes] a denial of fundamental human rights’.107 In September 2003 the IACtHR noted that ‘[a]t the existing stage of the development of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens’, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws.108 [6.31]  These two principles are at the core of the Covenant and apply to all substantive rights recognised in the Covenant. As the CESCR has pointed out, ‘[t]he equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is a mandatory and immediate obligation of States Parties’.109 As a ‘mandatory’ obligation, it is clearly not subject to reservations. Article 3 sets a non-derogable standard for compliance with the obligations of states parties as set out in Articles 6–15 of the ICESCR.110 However, notwithstanding the fundamental nature of these provisions, Kuwait made the following ‘interpretative declaration’: Although the Government of Kuwait endorses the worthy principles embodied in article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3 as consistent with the provisions of the Kuwait Constitution in general and of its article 29 in particular, it declares that the rights to which the articles refer must be exercised within the limits set by Kuwaiti law.

[6.32]  One question arising from the above declaration is whether such a declaration described as ‘interpretative’ must be regarded as a ‘reservation’? Another question is: can a state formulate such a ‘declaration’ in order to safeguard the application of its domestic law if it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the ­Covenant? In addressing these questions, as a starting point, in such cases ‘it is necessary to ascertain the original intention of those who drafted the declaration’111 and to ‘look behind the title given to it and seek to determine the substantive content’.112 Clearly the intention of Kuwait’s declaration was to subordinate Kuwait’s obligations under the Covenant to its national law, without specifying the ‘limits set by Kuwaiti law’. The declaration, in the absence of further clarification, could be seen as having been intended to ensure that Kuwait accepted what was already the (less-demanding­) law of Kuwait.113 Kuwait’s constitutional guarantees of non-discrimination, as stated in 106  With respect to ESC rights, see generally CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005). 107  See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 57. 108  Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, above n 52, para 101. 109  Ibid, para 16, citing CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 46 (emphasis added). 110  Ibid, para 17. 111  Belilos v Switzerland, above n 65, para 48. 112  Ibid, para 49. 113  See, eg, CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.96 (26 October 1998) para 17: The Committee was ‘concerned that neither the Constitution nor legislation fully conforms to article 2 of the Convention [on the Rights of the Child], and does not specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of … colour, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’. The Committee was also ‘concerned at the existence of some laws, regulations or

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Article 29 of the Constitution, are limited to race, origin, language and religion.114 This is relied on by Kuwait to defend its discriminatory laws, eg discrimination against women under the various laws in force in Kuwait—such as those on nationality, ­marriage, inheritance, polygamy, parental authority or insurance rights—that still exist and hamper women’s equal enjoyment of ESC rights.115 Accordingly, Kuwait’s ‘interpretative declaration’ amounts to ‘a unilateral statement’, made by a state, when acceding to the ICESCR, whereby it purports to ‘exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’.116 As such, it must be regarded as a ‘reservation’. [6.33]  The reservation does not indicate in precise terms the domestic legislation or practices referred to, and thus offends the principle that reservations must be specific and transparent. Specificity requires that reservations are not couched in terms that are too vague or broad for it to be possible to determine their exact meaning and scope. Transparency enables the committee that monitors states parties’ compliance with their obligations under the ICESCR (the CESCR),117 those under the jurisdiction of the reserving state and other states parties to know what obligations of human rights compliance have or have not been undertaken.118 What are the ‘limits set by Kuwaiti law’ to which the Covenant is subjected? Does Kuwaiti law, for example, support non-discrimination against women, and the equal rights of men and women, in the enjoyment of all ESC rights? In 2004 the CEDAW Committee noted that while the general principles of equality and non-discrimination are guaranteed in Articles 7 and 29 of Kuwait’s Constitution and contained in domestic legislation, there is a lack of specific definition of discrimination against women, in national law, in accordance with Article 1 of the CEDAW.119 Furthermore, the Committee noted with concern that restrictions on women’s employment, as well as protective employment legislation, policies and benefits for women, perpetuate traditional stereotypes regarding women’s roles and responsibilities in public life and in the family.120 [6.34]  In addition, given that ‘the elimination of discrimination is fundamental to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights on a basis of equality’,121 a reservation to Articles 2(2) and 3 may be considered as offending peremptory norms,122 and accordingly such a reservation would not be compatible with the object and purpose practices which are discriminatory towards non-Kuwaitis and girls, especially with regard to the right to education and inheritance’. 114  See the Constitution of the State of Kuwait, 1962, Art 29 of which provides, ‘All people are equal in human dignity, and in public rights and duties before the law, without distinction as to race, origin, language or religion.’ Several prohibited grounds of discrimination in international human rights law are omitted, including the ground of ‘sex’. 115 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc E/C.12/KWT/CO/2 (19 December 2013) para 10. 116  Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 2(1)(d). 117  CESCR, General Comment 1: Reporting by States Parties (Third Session, 1989), UN Doc E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989). 118  HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 19. 119  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc A/59/38 (18 March 2004) para 64. 120  Ibid, para 72. 121  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 106, paras 3 and 41. 122  See Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 53; see also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Monaco, UN Doc E/C.12/MCO/CO/1 (13 June 2006) paras 8 and 16.

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of the Covenant. This is especially so because the elimination of de jure, as well as de facto, discrimination, whether direct or indirect, is required for the equal enjoyment of ESC rights,123 as well as the civil and political rights of women.124 Thus, Kuwait’s reservation casts doubt on Kuwait’s commitment to the object and purpose of the Covenant. Commenting on similar ‘interpretative declarations’ of Kuwait regarding non-discriminatory and equality guarantees in the ICCPR (Articles 2(1), 3 and 23 of the ICCPR, as well as the ‘reservations’ concerning Article 25(b) of the ICCPR protecting the right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections), the HRC noted that these raised ‘the serious issue of their compatibility with the object and purpose of the Covenant’.125 In particular, the HRC noted that Articles 2 and 3 of the ICCPR ‘constitute core rights and overarching principles of international law that cannot be subject to “limits set by Kuwaiti law”. Such broad and general limitations would undermine the object and purpose of the entire Covenant’.126 In principle this equally applies to reservations to Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR, protecting essential obligations under the Covenant. [6.35]  Given the general nature of Kuwait’s ‘declaration’ regarding essential obligations in Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR, it has been a subject of objections by a number of states, including Finland, Italy and Norway. One would have expected more objections from other states parties to the Covenant, since such objections may lead to withdrawal or modification of some reservations. However, for the great majority, political considerations seem to prevail. Objecting to reservations may be seen (albeit incorrectly) as intervening in the affairs of another state, and thus be perceived as an unfriendly act in international relations. The cooperative interplay among states, and the fact that there is no incentive to object to any reservations in a human rights treaty such as the ICESCR, explains why states do not object to incompatible reservations, regardless of how antithetical they may be to the rights protected by the Covenant. Some states may not have objected because of their belief that they need not object to invalid reservations. Nonetheless, the objections of some states parties are useful in illustrating the problem of Kuwait’s reservation. For example, in its objection, the Government of Finland stated: [A]ccording to the interpretative declaration regarding article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3 the application of these articles of the Covenant is in a general way subjected to national law. The Government of Finland considers this interpretative declaration as a reservation of a general kind. The Government of Finland is of the view that such a general reservation raises doubts as to the commitment of Kuwait to the object and purpose of the Covenant and would recall that a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant shall not be permitted.127 123  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 106, para 41, stating that ‘Failure to adopt, implement and monitor effects of laws, policies and programmes to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination with respect to each of the rights enumerated in articles 6 to 15 of the Covenant constitutes a violation of those rights.’ 124  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc A/59/38 (18 March 2004) paras 60–61. 125  HRC, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc CCPR/CO/69/KWT (27 July 2000) para 5. 126  Ibid. The Committee concluded in para 6 that ‘the interpretative declaration regarding Articles 2 and 3 contravenes the State Party’s essential obligations under the Covenant and is therefore without legal effect and does not affect the powers of the Committee. The State party is urged to withdraw formally both the interpretative declarations and the reservations.’ 127  Objections, above n 14, Finland, 25 July 1997.

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[6.36]  Similarly, with regard to the declarations and the reservation made by Kuwait, the Government of Italy considered ‘these reservations to be contrary to the object and the purpose of this International Covenant’, noting that the said reservations include ‘a reservation of a general kind in respect of the provisions on the internal law’.128 It is useful to note that a reservation that consists of a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not clearly define for the other states parties the extent to which the reserving state commits itself to the Covenant, and therefore may raise doubts as to the commitment of the reserving state to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant. The application of such a reservation is also subject to the general principle of treaty interpretation according to which ‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.129 In other words, states should modify their domestic legal orders as necessary in order to give effect to their treaty obligations.130 However, all the governments of the objecting states (Finland, Italy and Norway) stated that their objections did not preclude the entry into force in its entirety of the Covenant between the state of Kuwait and each of the objecting states. This left ambiguous the effect of the reservation on Kuwait’s obligations under the Covenant. Such a statement is regularly found in objections to human rights treaties and illustrates the political dilemma faced by the objecting states.131 Kuwait did not withdraw its reservation and did not reply, and so its position remains unknown as to whether it agreed that the entire Covenant came into force for it, despite its reservation. [6.37]  In addition to the above, Kuwait also made an ‘interpretative declaration’ regarding Article 9, stating that ‘[t]he Government of Kuwait declares that while Kuwaiti legislation safeguards the rights of all Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti workers, social security provisions apply only to Kuwaitis’. This ‘declaration’ is broad. It is not restricted to a particular category of non-Kuwaitis, such as undocumented (‘illegal’) immigrants, but extends to all categories of non-Kuwaitis, including longterm residents or permanent residents, temporary residents legally staying in Kuwait, refugees and asylum seekers. This ‘declaration’ (a reservation in substance for the reasons stated above) is thus problematic, because it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of Article 9, one of the core articles in the ICESCR, in its application to Kuwait. [6.38]  Article 9 of the ICESCR provides: The States Parties to the … Covenant recognise the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance. (Emphasis added)

128  Ibid, Italy, 25 July 1997. Norway, in its objection of 22 July 1997, observed, ‘In the view of the ­ overnment of Norway, a statement by which a State Party purports to limit its responsibilities by invoking G general principles of internal law may create doubts about the commitment of the reserving State to the objective and purpose of the Convention and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of international treaty law. Under well-established treaty law, a State is not permitted to invoke internal law as justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations.’ 129  Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 27. 130  CESCR, General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant (19th Session, 1998), UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (3 December 1998) para 3. 131  See Objections, above n 14; Aust, above n 1, 132.

Questionable Reservations

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This provision, which protects the right to social security, is of ‘central importance’ in guaranteeing human dignity for all persons when they are faced with circumstances that may deprive them of their capacity to realise their ESC rights in full.132 These circumstances might arise, inter alia, from: (i) lack of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old age or death of a family member; (ii) unaffordable access to healthcare; or (iii) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependants.133 The right to social security encompasses ‘the right to access and maintain benefits, whether in cash or in kind, without discrimination’ in order to secure protection from such circumstances.134 Thus, the right to social security is vital for ensuring that everyone is able to live a life with dignity, without the fear of losing income or other support that is essential for maintaining an adequate standard of living, accessing healthcare, and caring for children and other dependants. [6.39]  Since the right to social security in Article 9 extends to ‘everyone’ within a state’s jurisdiction, core obligations of the right to social security require, inter alia, that all persons should be covered by the social security system, especially individuals belonging to the most disadvantaged or marginalised sections of the population (including non-nationals), in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds.135 Non-nationals, including permanent residents, are ‘part of a vulnerable group in society’, and their exclusion from social security schemes violates both the core rights to equality and non-discrimination on the basis of nationality.136 In the context of Kuwait this is essential, in view of the fact that the number of nonKuwaiti nationals exceeds the number of Kuwaiti citizens in Kuwait.137 Article 2(2) of the Covenant proscribes discrimination, inter alia, on grounds of nationality, and the Covenant contains no express jurisdictional limitation. Where non-nationals, including migrant workers (such as non-Kuwaiti workers in Kuwait), have contributed to a social security scheme, they should be able to benefit from that contribution, or retrieve their contributions if they leave the country.138 In any case, ‘the migratory status of a person can never be a justification for depriving him [or her] of the enjoyment and exercise of his [or her] human rights’, including the right to social security.139 As noted by Germany and Sweden in their respective objections to Kuwait’s ‘declaration’, ‘the declaration regarding Article 9, as a result of which the many foreigners working on

132  See CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (adopted 23 November 2007) para 1. 133  Ibid, para 2. 134  Ibid. 135  Ibid, paras 2, 23 and 59(b). 136  See also Khosa v Minister of Social Development, 4 March 2004, (2004) (6) SA 505 (CC), 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (South African Constitutional Court), Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, writing for the majority, paras 74 and 76. 137  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc A/59/38 (18 March 2004) para 76. 138  See CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 132, para 36. In para 37, the CESCR stated: ‘Nonnationals should be able to access non-contributory schemes for income support, affordable access to health care and family support. Any restrictions, including a qualification period, must be proportionate and ­reasonable. All persons, irrespective of their nationality, residency or immigration status, are entitled to primary and emergency medical care.’ 139  Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, above n 52, para 134.

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Kuwaiti territory would, in principle, be totally excluded from social security protection, cannot be based on article 2(3) of the Covenant’.140 [6.40]  The final reservation made by Kuwait concerned Article 8(1)(d) of the ­Covenant, and stated ‘The Government of Kuwait reserves the right not to apply the provisions of article 8, paragraph 1(d).’ Do states have a right not to apply Article 8(1) (d) of the ICESCR? To answer this question, it is useful to recall that by Article 8(1) (d), the states parties undertake to ensure: … (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.

From the text, it is notable that while a state can subject the right to strike to its national laws, in the absence of necessity in a democratic society, a state has no general ‘right’ to postpone the right to strike, as this would deprive individuals and groups of this right so as to render it meaningless. A general right to postpone the right to strike would be difficult to reconcile with the object and purpose of the Covenant. A state can only regulate the exercise of the right to strike in accordance with its domestic law. However, the relevant domestic law must be in conformity with the Covenant, which requires in its Article 4 that limitations have to be compatible with the nature of these rights [protected in the Covenant] and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.

In effect, laws regulating the right to strike must conform to the principle of proportionality. It is difficult to see how not applying a right to (a peaceful) strike can promote the ‘general welfare’ in a democratic society so as to be compatible with the Covenant. In 2013 the CESCR observed: Notwithstanding the fact that strikes have taken place in the State party, the Committee expresses concern that the right to strike is not protected by law and that the State party has maintained the reservation to article 8, paragraph 1 (d), of the Covenant (art 8). Based on information from the State party that strikes are not prohibited, the Committee calls on the State party to withdraw its reservation to article 8, paragraph 1(d), of the Covenant and establish safeguards for the exercise of the right to strike.141

[6.41]  The wide scope of Kuwait’s reservations attracted some concern on the part of the CESCR. In 2004, for example, the Committee noted with concern the reservations and declarations Kuwait had made in respect of the provisions of Articles 2(2), 3, 8(1) (d) and 9 of the Covenant.142 The Committee expressed its concern, like other human rights treaty bodies, about the lack of clarity regarding the primacy of the Covenant over conflicting or contradictory national laws, and regarding its direct applicability

140  Objections, above n 14, Germany (10 July 1997); Sweden (23 July 1997). By Art 2(3), ‘developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognised in the … Covenant to non-nationals’. 141 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc E/C.12/KWT/CO/2 (19 December 2013) para 21. 142  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.98 (7 June 2004) para 9.

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and justiciability in national courts.143 In this regard, the Committee noted that there was no case law in Kuwait on the application of the Covenant.144 However, instead of considering Kuwait’s declarations and reservations as invalid and of no legal effect, the Committee took a cautious attitude, encouraging Kuwait to consider withdrawing reservations and declarations entered upon the ratification of the Covenant, in the light of the fact that they negated the core purposes and objectives of the Covenant.145 In 2013 the Committee reiterated its concern about the reservations and declarations made by Kuwait in respect of the provisions of Articles 2(2), 3, 8(1)(d), and 9 of the Covenant. It called on Kuwait ‘to consider withdrawing its reservations and declarations’, which, according to the Committee, are ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant’.146 [6.42]  While the Committee made this useful finding, it did not state categorically that any particular reservation or declaration was invalid. This left open to speculation the question whether a reservation or declaration which negates (or is incompatible with) the core purposes and objectives of the Covenant is invalid and without legal effect. Can a reservation which negates the ‘core purposes and objectives of the Covenant’, or a reservation ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant’, be valid? Although the Committee avoided addressing this question explicitly, it is implicit in its recommendation (urging Kuwait to consider withdrawing its reservations) that such reservations offend Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention, and thus are invalid. [6.43]  It is arguable that reservations incompatible with the core purposes and objectives of the Covenant should not have been made in the first place,147 and accordingly no other state party is capable of accepting them since they are invalid or inadmissible. The approach applied by the CESCR follows the view of the ILC, in its Preliminary Conclusions of 15 July 1997, that in the event of inadmissibility of a reservation, it is the reserving State that has the responsibility for taking action. This action may consist, for example, in the State’s either modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or withdrawing its reservation, or forgoing becoming a party to the treaty.148

However, as yet, Kuwait has neither modified/withdrawn its ‘declarations’/­reservations, nor forgone becoming a party to the Covenant. It is preferable to withdraw such reservations so as to comply with the object and purpose of the Covenant. While the cautious approach applied by the CESCR is a useful starting point, it is submitted that

143 

Ibid, para 8. Ibid. 145  Ibid, para 28. 146  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, above n 141, para 6. See also CRC, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc CRC/C/KWT/CO/2 (29 October 2013) para 8; HRC, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2 (8 November 2011) para 7; CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Kuwait, UN Doc CEDAW/C/KWT/CO/3-4 (8 November 2011) paras 13–14. 147  Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 19(c). 148  See Preliminary Conclusions of the International Law Commission on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties, in the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-ninth Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, Official Records of the General Assembly, 52nd Session, Supp no 10, UN Doc A/52/10 (1997) para 157(10). 144 

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where a state consistently ignores considering withdrawal or reformulation of a clearly incompatible reservation, for which a withdrawal is necessary, the Committee should move towards a stronger position to declare the incompatible ‘declaration’/reservation invalid, and without legal effect. In such a case it is likely that a state party committed to the object and purpose of the Covenant would find it pointless to maintain such declarations/reservations. Although such a state might be unhappy at the result, and arguably has the option of withdrawing from the Covenant, it is unlikely to do so in practice for good political reasons, such as avoiding criticism regarding its lack of commitment to minimum international human rights standards. In addition, as noted above, a state may not be able to legally withdraw from the Covenant, since the ­ICESCR, like the ICCPR, does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal.149 B.  Pakistan’s Reservations [6.44]  Pakistan signed the ICESCR on 3 November 2004. Upon signature, Pakistan made the following ‘declaration’ to the ICESCR, subjecting the application of the provisions of the Covenant to the provisions of national law, namely the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: While the Government of [the] Islamic Republic of Pakistan accepts the provisions embodied in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it will implement the said provisions in a progressive manner, in keeping with the existing economic conditions and the development plans of the country. The provisions of the Covenant shall, however, be subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.150

[6.45]  Although Pakistan’s statement was said to be a declaration, it is a reservation in substance, since it is in fact a unilateral act aimed at precluding or modifying the legal effect of the provisions of the ICESCR. This reservation is problematic in two respects. First, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared that it ‘will implement the [ICESCR] provisions in a progressive manner, in keeping with the existing economic conditions and the development plans of the country’. This formulation is extremely broad. What specific provisions of the Covenant would be implemented in a ‘progressive manner’ and how progressive is the manner? Does this refer to the entire Covenant, including minimum core obligations? What is meant by ‘­progressive’ in this context? It may be argued that the term ‘progressive’ was derived from ­Article 2 of the ICESCR, and used in a similar manner. The term ‘progressive’ realisation, as used in Article 2 of the Covenant, has been understood to impose ‘an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards the full realisation of the rights protected in the ICESCR.151 It is not clear whether Pakistan’s ­reservation would be understood in a similar way. Since some fundamental obligations resulting from the ICESCR, including in particular the principle of non-discrimination­found in ­Article 2(2) thereof, are not susceptible of progressive implementation, and are thus to be guaranteed with immediate effect, the ‘declaration’ represents a significant

149  150  151 

See also HRC, General Comment 26 (61), above n 83, paras 1–5. Declarations, above n 14, Pakistan. CESCR, General Comment 3, above n 46, para 9.

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­ ualification of Pakistan’s commitment to guarantee the human rights recognised in q the Covenant.152 There is no doubt that the elimination of discrimination immediately is fundamental to the enjoyment of ESC rights on the basis of equality. This obligation frequently requires the adoption and implementation of appropriate legislation, and does not necessarily require significant resource allocations. Although Article 2(1) of the Covenant allows for a progressive realisation of the provisions, this may not be invoked as a basis for discrimination. [6.46]  Secondly, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan also declared that the provisions of the Covenant ‘shall, however, be subject to the provisions of [its] Constitution’. What specific provisions? As noted above, the object of reservations is to exclude or modify ‘the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application’ to reserving states.153 This is intended to avoid vagueness and generality of the reservations, which make it impossible for other states parties to take a position on them. As such, general reservations must be deemed incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. It is noteworthy that Pakistan made a similar ‘declaration’ to the CEDAW, stating that ‘[t]he accession by [the] Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the [CEDAW] is subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’.154 In effect, international human rights treaties are subordinate to Pakistan’s Constitution. Unless this is intended to bring domestic law into conformity with the Covenant, this may constitute a total negation of ratification. Apparently what Pakistan did was to indicate that it was unwilling to assume any commitment other than the one already provided by its Constitution. [6.47]  As noted in paragraph 6.30 above, principles of equality and non-discrimination­ are central to the ICESCR. Does Pakistan accept the principles of non-discrimination and equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all ESC rights? While Pakistan’s Constitution, in its Articles 25(2) and 27, stipulates equality before the law, including on the basis of sex, neither the Constitution nor any other appropriate legislation contains a definition of discrimination that encompasses both direct and indirect discrimination in accordance with international human rights law (such as Article 1 of the CEDAW), or provisions on the equality of women with men in line with Article 3 of the Covenant. [6.48]  Regarding the right to work, for example, Article 18 of Pakistan’s Constitution provides: Subject to such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business.

While this provision guarantees the right to work (of citizens) to both men and women, it is subject to qualifications ‘prescribed by law’. Some laws in Pakistan do not allow women to work in certain kinds of jobs, ostensibly for ‘health and safety reasons’ and

152 

Objections, above n 14, Germany (8 November 2004) and Norway (17 November 2005). Vienna Convention, above n 15, Art 2(1)(d) (emphasis added). 154  See United Nations Treaty Collection at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en. 153 

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during certain hours at night.155 Such laws could result in the potential discriminatory impact on women’s employment which is not specifically prohibited in both public and private sectors.156 What possible protection, then, can the Covenant provide to individuals and groups—especially to the most vulnerable ones such as women, nonnationals and ethnic, religious and racial minorities—in Pakistan if it is hierarchically inferior to Pakistan’s Constitution? [6.49]  Pakistan’s Constitution requires all existing laws to be ‘brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah’, and that ‘no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions’.157 This means that the effect of Pakistan’s declaration is to subject every provision of the Covenant to the general injunctions of Islam, without specifying them. Such a general reservation does not appear to be consistent with the object and purpose of the Covenant.158 Although when ratifying the Covenant Egypt declared that ‘taking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and the fact that they do not conflict with the text annexed to the instrument [ICESCR], we accept, support and ratify it’,159 subjecting the ­Covenant to the general injunctions of Islam is not free from problems. This is especially so because such injunctions are highly vulnerable to different interpretations over time and in different societies, so that it is not easy (given the nebulous, general, unlimited and undefined scope of the reservation) to establish clearly the obligations assumed by Pakistan under the Covenant. In 2003, for example, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concurred with the Chamber’s view that [i]t is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, … particularly with regard to its … rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.160 155  The Mines Act, 1923, s 23-C provides ‘No woman shall be employed in any part of a mine, which is below the ground. No woman shall be allowed to work in a mine, above ground between the hours of 7 pm to 6 am.’ The Factories Act, 1934 provides in s 45 that ‘No woman shall be allowed to work in a factory except between 6 am and 7 pm. Except with the permission of the Government, no woman or young person shall be employed in any establishment otherwise than between the hours of 9.00 am and 7.00 pm.’ 156  See Pakistan: Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports of States, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ PAK/1-3 (3 August 2005) 21–23. 157  See the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, adopted in 1973, Art 227, available at http:// www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/. 158  See also CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/ CO/2 (8 April 2008) paras 4, 9 and 10: ‘The Committee notes that a general reservation has been made by the State party to the Convention whereby in case of a conflict between the provisions of Islamic law and those of the Convention, the State party gives precedence to Islamic law. … The Committee is concerned about the general reservation made upon ratification of the Convention by the State party, which is drawn so widely that it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. The Committee urges the State party to consider the withdrawal of its general reservation to the Convention, particularly in light of the fact that the delegation assured that there is no contradiction in substance between the Convention and Islamic Sharia.’ 159  Declarations, above n 14, Egypt. 160  Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, Apps nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, judgment of 13 February 2003, (2003) 37 EHRR 1, para 123 (Grand Chamber); and judgment of 31 July 2001, 35 EHRR 3, para 72 (Chamber). In para 128 the Grand Chamber cited examples of alleged ‘discrimination based on gender of the parties concerned, as in polygamy and privileges for the male sex in matters of divorce and succession’. In contrast, the African Commission avoided making comments on sharia in Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, Communication no 236/2000, paras 39–41, decision made at the 33rd Ordinary Session in Niamey, Niger, 15–29 May 2003, (2003) AHRLR 153, 16th Annual Activity Report.

Questionable Reservations

 351

However, the Court did not analyse the legal status of women in sharia, and the different interpretations of sharia, before making this broad (and rather debatable) conclusion. [6.50]  Does Pakistan interpret the injunctions of Islam as providing for equality between men and women in the enjoyment of all human rights, including ESC rights? Some human rights scholars believe that if the primary source of Islam, the Quran, is interpreted in its ‘proper’ and ‘social’ context, it ‘never discriminates on the basis of gender’, and they criticise ‘out of context interpretation’ that reflects the masculine and patriarchal prejudices of the interpreters161 or ‘narrow interpretations of Islamic texts by authorities’.162 This view has been supported by the CRC Committee, noting that ‘the universal values of equality and tolerance [are] inherent in Islam’.163 However, some interpretations of sharia are against the enjoyment by women of equality with men.164 Indeed, a renowned Islamic scholar, Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-Munajjid, has asserted that [t]hose who say that Islam is the religion of equality are lying against Islam. … Rather Islam is the religion of justice which means treating equally those who are equal and differentiating between those who are different. No one who knows the religion of Islam would say that it is the religion of equality. … Not one single letter in the Qur’an enjoins equality, rather it enjoins justice.165

[6.51]  Although it is arguable that justice is genderless, and thus entails the principle of equality, in justifying the above view Al-Munajjid observes, inter alia, that with regard to testimony or bearing witness, the Quran states that the testimony of one man is equivalent to the testimony of two women.166 While this might be regarded as

161  See, eg, NA Shah, ‘Women’s Human Rights in the Koran: An Interpretive Approach’ (2006) 28(4) Human Rights Quarterly 868, 903. See also NA Shah, Women, the Koran and International Human Rights Law: The Experience of Pakistan (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) 14; MDJ Western, ‘Islamic “Purse Strings”: The Key to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East’ (2008) 61 Air Force Law Review 79. 162  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.145 (21 February 2001) para 6; Qatar, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.163 (6 November 2001) para 9; Saudi Arabia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/ Add.148 (22 February 2001) para 6. 163  Ibid. Representatives of Islamic states, such as the Saudi Arabian delegation before the CEDAW Committee, have also assured the Committee that ‘there is no contradiction in substance between the Convention [on the Elimination of Discrimination of Discrimination against Women] and Islamic ­Sharia’. See CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Saudi Arabia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (1 ­February 2008) para 10. 164  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.15 (20 May 1997) para 13. The Committee noted that ‘the State party has advanced certain arguments against the ­enjoyment by women of certain family and civil rights on the basis of Sharia law’. 165  See Islam Question and Answer, ‘Does Islam Regard Men and Women as Equal?’ at http://islamqa. info/en/1105, citing Quran 16:90 and 4:58. 166  Ibid. His view is based on the interpretation of the Qur’anic verse known as ‘verse of indebtedness’, Al-Baqarah 2: 282, which prescribes writing financial/debt contracts as a precautionary measure and having such contracts witnessed in these terms: ‘When you deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. … And get two witnesses out of your own men. And if there are not two men (available), then a man and two women, such as you agree for witnesses, so that if one of them (two women) errs, the other can remind her.’ See A Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Quran (Birmingham, Islamic Dawah Centre International, 2007); and M Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and M Muhsin Khan, Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Quran in the English Language (Riyadh, Darussalam, 1996).

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an overgeneralisation, since the Quranic text referred to specifically addressed business transactions at a time when women were not generally heavily involved and experienced in business, this interpretation could have influenced the Qanun-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) 1984 in Pakistan, under which a woman cannot be an attesting witness to a legal contract.167 This de jure discrimination, in the form of the lack of capacity and the value attached to a woman’s evidence, may adversely affect women, particularly those in business and with legal careers. It also perpetuates patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted traditional and cultural stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family, in the workplace and in society,168 which negatively affects women’s enjoyment of human rights. [6.52]  From the foregoing, it is clear that there are different interpretations of some aspects of the application of Islamic injunctions. Pakistan’s ‘declaration’ was couched in terms that were too broad and imprecise for it to be possible to determine its exact meaning and scope. It is not clear whether it would adopt an attitude consistent with the object and purpose of the Covenant in that regard, by reconciling rights protected in the Covenant (including equality between men and women) with its interpretation of Islamic texts. [6.53]  As Denmark and Finland noted in their objections, the general subordination of the Covenant to Pakistan’s Constitution, without specifying which provisions or contents, makes it unclear (for other states parties) to what extent the Islamic Republic of Pakistan considers itself bound by the obligations of the treaty, and therefore raises concerns as to the commitment of the Islamic Republic to the object and purpose of the Covenant.169 Shelton observed that ‘[t]hese general subordination reservations are the most questionable because they deny the very reason for adoption of human rights treaties: the establishment of minimum standards with which domestic laws should be brought into conformity’.170 In objecting to this ‘declaration’, France noted, for example, that ‘such a declaration is general in scope and unclear and could render the provisions of the Covenant null and void’.171 The Government of the Federal R ­ epublic of Germany was of the opinion that this declaration left it ‘unclear to which extent the Islamic Republic of Pakistan considers itself bound by the obligations resulting from the Covenant’.172 Indeed, as pointed out by the Netherlands, ‘a reservation as formulated by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is thus likely to contribute to ­undermining

167  See Pakistan: Combined Initial, Second and Third Periodic Reports of States, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ PAK/1-3 (3 August 2005) 116, para 474. 168 See CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Pakistan, UN Doc CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3 (11 June 2007) paras 28–29. 169 Declarations, above n 14, Austria, 25 November 2005; Denmark, 17 March 2005; Finland, 15 ­November 2005; Spain, 15 November 2005. 170  D Shelton, ‘State Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ (1983) 1 Canadian Human Rights Yearbook 205, 227. 171  Objections, above n 14, France, 11 November 2005. 172  Ibid, Germany, 8 November 2004. See also Objection of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 17 August 2005, stating that: ‘The Government of the United Kingdom note that a reservation to a Convention which consists of a general reference to national law without specifying its contents does not clearly define for the other States Parties to the Convention the extent to which the reserving State has accepted the obligations of the Convention. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore object to this reservation made by the Government of Pakistan.’

Questionable Reservations

 353

the basis of international treaty law’.173 Unsurprisingly, an unusually high number of Western states parties to the ICESCR, namely Denmark, Finland, Latvia, the ­Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, objected to the above-mentioned declarations, and considered them to be reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. [6.54]  More importantly, these states noted that their objections did not preclude the entry into force of the Covenant between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and each of them, some adding ‘without Pakistan benefiting from its declaration/­reservation’.174 This approach went further and ignored the plain fact that the reserving state had made it clear that it was willing to be bound subject to a condition. The question raised here is: should reservations to human rights treaties that subject the Covenant to domestic law incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty be disregarded, or should this be left to the reserving state? What would happen in cases where the reserving state did not determine the appropriate action to be taken as no mechanism exists to oblige the state to take action? Is Pakistan bound by the Covenant despite its reservation? [6.55]  If one or more contracting states have objected to the reservation as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, the reserving state should decide whether or not it is prepared to be a party without the reservation. However, Pakistan, following the pattern of most reserving states, did not reply to the above objections, and consequently it is not known whether it agrees that the Covenant comes into force despite the incompatibility of its reservation. As noted above, a state is not entitled to make a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, and no other state is capable of accepting it even if no formal objection is made. [6.56]  Therefore, it is necessary to make a careful review of Pakistan’s general reservation with a view to withdrawing it without delay, with the presumption, which may be refuted, that Pakistan would prefer to remain a party to the Covenant without the benefit of the reservation rather than being excluded. This involves undertaking a comprehensive and systematic review and revision of all domestic legislation (which necessitated the reservation), in order to achieve full compliance with all the provisions of the Covenant. Pakistan might wish to follow its earlier practice with respect to withdrawal of general reservations, in particular its withdrawal on 23 July 1997 of the general reservation it had entered to the CRC, by withdrawing its reservation to the ICESCR.175 Regarding a similar reservation to the CEDAW to the effect that accession to the Convention was subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the CEDAW Committee has urged Pakistan ‘to withdraw its declaration to the Convention without delay’.176

173 

Ibid, the Netherlands, 7 October 2005. See, eg, ibid, Latvia, 10 November 2005. Pakistan’s reservation to the CRC (objected to by the Governments of Denmark and the Netherlands) stated, ‘[p]rovisions of the Convention shall be interpreted in the light of the principles of Islamic laws and values’. See UN Treaty Collection, above n 14. 176  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Pakistan, UN Doc CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3 (11 June 2007) para 13; CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4 (27 March 2013) para 10 (emphasis added). 174  175 

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C.  Turkey’s Reservations [6.57]  Turkey signed the ICESCR on 15 August 2000 and ratified it on 23 ­September 2003. Upon ratification, Turkey made the ‘declarations’ and ‘reservation’ set out below: The Republic of Turkey declares that it will implement the provisions of this Covenant only to the States with which it has diplomatic relations. The Republic of Turkey declares that this Convention is ratified exclusively with regard to the national territory where the Constitution and the legal and administrative order of the Republic of Turkey are applied. The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to interpret and apply the provisions of the paragraph[s] (3) and (4) of … Article 13 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in accordance [with] the provisions under the Article[s] 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.177

[6.58]  Two issues in particular arise out of these ‘declarations’ and the ‘reservation’. First, are Turkey’s ‘declarations’ used as, or intended to be, reservations? In other words, are these ‘declarations’ in fact an attempt (as in the definition of ‘reservation’) ‘to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’? Secondly, do these ‘declarations’ and ‘reservations’ raise doubt as to the commitment of Turkey to the object and purpose of the ICESCR? [6.59]  While caution should be exercised before pronouncing a ‘declaration’ to be a ‘reservation’, an examination of Turkey’s ‘declarations’ in fact reveals that they are reservations in effect. Clearly, the ‘declarations’ modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the Covenant in their application to Turkey in two essential respects. First, the declarations limit the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant only to those states with which the Republic of Turkey has diplomatic relations. This modifies the scope of the Covenant by excluding states parties that do not have diplomatic relations with Turkey. As noted by the Government of Greece, ‘this declaration in fact amounts to a reservation’, and more importantly, this reservation is incompatible with the principle that inter-state reciprocity has no place in the context of human rights treaties, which concern the endowment of individuals with rights.178 [6.60]  Indeed, human rights treaties, and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of inter-state exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals and, in certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities with rights or fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements. In general, therefore, as noted above, the principle of inter-state reciprocity has no place under human rights treaties.179 In this respect the HRC has observed that although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between states allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, this is not the case with human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction.180 Accordingly, Turkey’s reservation purporting to apply the principle of inter-state reciprocity to the ICESCR,

177 

Declarations, above n 14, Turkey. Objections, above n 14, Greece, 11 October 2004. 179  See also HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 17. 180  Ibid, para 8. 178 

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in the absence of further clarification, raises a serious doubt as to the commitment of the Republic of Turkey to the object and purpose of the Covenant. [6.61]  Secondly, the ‘declaration’ limits the Covenant ‘exclusively with regard to the national territory where the Constitution and the legal and administrative order of the Republic of Turkey are applied’. This territorial limitation means that Turkey intended to exclude the application of the Covenant from its, or its agents’, acts and omissions that produce effects or are undertaken beyond national territory (eg not to apply the Covenant to those individuals and groups who are not within the T ­ urkey’s territory but who are subject to Turkey’s jurisdiction). By implication, it does not apply in a part of Turkey’s territory where the Constitution is not applied, which could result in the complete non-applicability of the Covenant to persons subject to its jurisdiction in situations where its troops or police forces operate abroad. This is a clear modification of the legal effect of the Covenant which, as shown in chapter one, is not territorially limited but intended to apply to ‘all individuals within its [a state’s] territory or under its jurisdiction’,181 ie in the entire jurisdiction of a state party. It is useful to note that the ICESCR contains no provision on its scope of application. This may be explicable by the fact that this Covenant guarantees rights that are essentially ­territorial.182 However, as noted by the ICJ, ‘it is not to be excluded that it [the ICESCR] applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction’.183 A state party’s obligations under the ICESCR ‘apply to all territories and populations under its effective control’.184 It does not matter whether or not the Constitution is applied in a territory. By way of example, in General Comments 14 and 15 the CESCR noted that health facilities, goods, services and water have to be accessible to everyone, ‘without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party’.185 Turkey’s ‘declaration’ is, therefore, incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. In order to ensure that all persons under Turkey’s jurisdiction and effective control are afforded the full enjoyment of ESC rights enshrined in the ICESCR, Turkey should give serious consideration to withdrawing its declaration/reservations. [6.62]  It is therefore not surprising that some states objected to Turkey’s declarations and considered them as amounting to reservations. For example, in its objection of 26 November 2003, Cyprus stated that ‘[t]hese reservations create uncertainty as to the States Parties in respect of which Turkey is undertaking the obligations in the Covenant, and raise doubt as to the commitment of Turkey to the object and purpose of the said Covenant’.186

181 

CESCR, General Comment 1, above n 117, para 3 (emphasis added). Wall, above n 47, para 112. 183  Ibid. 184  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc E/C.12/l/Add.90 (23 May 2003) paras 15 and 31. 185  CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para 12(b); CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003) para 12(c) (emphasis added). 186  Declarations, above n 14, Cyprus. 182 ICJ,

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State Reservations to the ICESCR

[6.63]  Regarding Turkey’s reservation, as noted in paragraph 6.57 above, the Republic of Turkey reserved the right to ‘interpret and apply’ the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the Covenant in accordance with the provisions under ­Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.187 Before examining the effect of Turkey’s reservation, it is relevant to consider the scope of ­Article 13(3) and (4) of the Covenant. Article 13(3) has two elements: the first is that states parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. As noted by the CESCR, this permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics, if it is given in an unbiased and objective way, respectful of the freedoms of opinion, conscience and expression.188 Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with Article 13(3), unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.189 [6.64]  The second element of Article 13(3) is the liberty of parents and guardians to choose schools other than public schools for their children, provided the schools conform to ‘such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State’. This has to be read with the complementary provision, Article 13(4), which affirms ‘the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions’, provided the institutions conform to the educational objectives set out in Article 13(1) and certain minimum standards.190 These minimum standards, which must be consistent with the educational objectives set out in Article 13(1), may relate to issues such as admission, curricula and the recognition of certificates.191 Article 13(4) has been interpreted by the CESCR to permit: everyone, including non-nationals, … the liberty to establish and direct educational institutions. The liberty also extends to ‘bodies’, ie legal persons or entities. It includes the right to establish and direct all types of educational institutions, including nurseries, universities and institutions for adult education. Given the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity and effective participation in society for all, the State has an obligation to ensure that the liberty set out in article 13(4) does not lead to extreme disparities of educational opportunity for some groups in society.192

[6.65]  The effect of Turkey’s reservation is to subject the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the Covenant to Turkey’s national law, in particular the provisions under Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

187 

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is available at http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/. CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para 28. 189  Ibid. 190  The educational objectives set out in Art 13(1) ICESCR are as follows: ‘They [states parties to the ICESCR] agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.’ See also CRC, Art 29; CRC Committee, General Comment 1: The Aims of Education, UN Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (17 April 2001). 191  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 188, para 29. 192  Ibid, para 30. 188 

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 357

Two questions do arise here. First, is this reservation compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, given that it subjects an international treaty (the ­ICESCR) to Turkey’s domestic law (without specifying the content of the domestic law)? In other words, is the subjection of the Covenant to domestic law compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant or the broader view of international law? ­Secondly, are the provisions of Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey consistent with paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the ICESCR? [6.66]  Regarding the first question, as noted above, it is fairly well established that questions relating to the domestic application of the Covenant must be considered in the light of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that ‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. Thus, states should modify the domestic legal order, as necessary, in order to give effect to their treaty obligations.193 Although Article 27 of the Vienna Convention is in a part entitled ‘Observance, Application and Interpretation of Treaties’, and not in a section dealing with ‘reservations’, once the question of the validity of the reservation has been resolved, Article 27 can be invoked to limit the applicability of Turkey’s reservation. Viewed from this perspective, Turkey’s reservation could be regarded as having no legal effect in as far as it purports to subject the interpretation and application of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the ICESCR to Turkey’s Constitution. [6.67]  As regards the second question, it is questionable whether Articles 3, 14 and 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey are consistent with paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 13 of the ICESCR. Article 3 provides: The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.

Article 14 states: None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights.

While Article 42 provides that ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education’, it also states that the scope of the right to education shall be defined and ‘regulated by law’, and that the provisions of international treaties are reserved. More specifically, Article 42 provides: No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law.

As a result of this provision, women and girls whose mother tongue is not Turkish may face multiple forms of discrimination in access to and achievement in education.194

193  194 

CESCR, General Comment 9, above n 130, para 3. CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Turkey, UN Doc A/60/38 (28 January 2005) para 371.

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[6.68]  Since the Articles considered above subject the right to education to T ­ urkish domestic law, which is not specified, the reference to certain provisions of the ­Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is of a general nature and does not clearly specify the content of the reservation.195 Unless this reservation is understood, as noted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to mean that the relevant ­Articles and domestic law will be interpreted and applied in such a way that protects the essence of the freedoms guaranteed in Article 13(3) and (4) of the ­ICESCR,196 it creates serious doubts as to the commitment of the reserving state to the object and purpose of the Covenant.197 In view of this reservation, is Turkey willing to change the relevant domestic laws to be compatible with the Covenant? The rights contained in the Covenant should be respected, protected and fulfilled in a state party’s jurisdiction. Even though such a widely formulated reservation lends itself to a number of different interpretations, its common denominator is that it essentially renders i­neffective the relevant Covenant rights, which would require any change in national law to ensure compliance with the Covenant obligations. In this respect, no real international rights or obligations under Articles 13(3) and (4) have thus been accepted until the withdrawal of the reservation. Accordingly, the CESCR has been ‘concerned’ about ­Turkey’s reservation to the effect that it will interpret and apply the provisions of ­Article 13(3) and (4) of the ICESCR in accordance with its C ­ onstitution.198 The Committee recommended that Turkey ‘withdraw its reservations to the Covenant, in particular the reservation to article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4, with a view to applying their provisions and interpreting them in the light of the jurisprudence of the Committee’.199 [6.69]  It is instructive to consider briefly the nature of reservations and declarations made by other states in other parts of the world, to establish whether these are different from those made by Pakistan, Kuwait and Turkey. A few examples are considered below.

IV.  RESERVATION BY OTHER STATES: EXAMPLES FROM AFRICA AND EUROPE [6.70]  This section compares the reservations entered by Kuwait, Pakistan and ­Turkey, considered in section III. above, with the reservations and declarations made by other states. Selected examples are drawn from African and European states, because some of these states have made several reservations or declarations to the Covenant. Are reservations and/or declarations of these states different from the ones made by the three states considered in above and, if so, in what way and why?

195  See Objections, above n 14, Finland, 13 October 2004, noting that ‘The Government of Finland therefore wishes to declare that it assumes that the Government of the Republic of Turkey will ensure the implementation of the rights recognised in the Covenant and will do its utmost to bring its national legislation into compliance with the obligations under the Covenant with a view to withdrawing the reservation.’ 196  Ibid, Germany, 13 October 2004. 197  Ibid, Portugal, 13 October 2004; Sweden, 30 June 2004. 198  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Turkey, UN Doc E/C.12/TUR/CO/1 (12 July 2011) para 6. 199  Ibid.

Reservation by Other States

 359

A.  Reservations by African States [6.71]  By December 2015, eight African states—Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa and Zambia—had entered reservations or made declarations to some provisions of the ICESCR.200 Apart from the interpretative declarations of Algeria and Libya, most of these reservations and declarations have not attracted objections from other states parties. This is partly because, unlike the reservations/declarations considered in section III. above, reservations by African states have been more specific, often quite precise in their formulation, and apparently not generally incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. [6.72]  A few examples are mentioned here for purposes of illustration only. The ­Government of Madagascar stated that it reserves the right to postpone the application of Article 13(2) of the Covenant, more particularly in so far as relates to primary education, since, while the Malagasy Government fully accepts the principles embodied in the said paragraph and undertakes to take the necessary steps to apply them in their entirety at the earliest possible date, the problems of implementation, and particularly the financial implications, are such that full application of the principles in question cannot be guaranteed at this stage.201 Zambia made a similar reservation.202 While it is difficult to claim that postponing free and compulsory primary education is compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, in particular with the minimum core obligations of the right to education,203 the reservations of ­Madagascar and Zambia are, unlike those of Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey, limited only to the application of Article 13(2), particularly in so far as it relates to primary education. Rwanda also made a reservation in respect of the right to education. The reservation stated, ‘The Rwandese Republic [is] bound, however, in respect of education, only by the provisions of its Constitution.’204 This reservation, like that of Pakistan, subjected the right to education to the Constitution of Rwanda, without specifying the relevant constitutional provisions. While this is problematic, based on the reasons stated above with respect to general constitutional reservations, this reservation did not extend to other provisions in the Covenant covering rights other than the right to education. Thus, it was not as broad in formulation as the reservations of Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. Similarly, South Africa limited its declaration to the right to compulsory and free primary education under Articles 13(2)(a) and 14 of ICESCR by subjecting this right to ‘available resources’. [6.73]  In short, the scope of reservations by African states to the ICESCR is generally limited to some specific provisions in the Covenant, either with respect to the right to self-determination or with respect to some substantive rights mainly perceived 200 

See Declarations, above n 14. Ibid, Madagascar. Ibid, Zambia. 203  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/6 (3 June 1993) para 18, stating that ‘the obligation of States parties to the Covenant to ensure that “primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all” applies in all situations including those in which local communities are unable to furnish buildings, or individuals are unable to afford any costs associated with attendance at school’. 204  Declarations, above n 14, Rwanda. Art 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 (as amended), provides that ‘[e]very person has the right to education’ and that ‘Primary education is compulsory. It is free in public schools.’ It is silent on secondary and higher education. On 15 December 2008 Rwanda withdrew its reservation. 201  202 

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to be resource intensive, such as the right to education. This indicates that African states parties to the Covenant did not consider that there were problems in complying with their obligations under the Covenant. Moreover, most rights recognised in the ­Covenant are also protected in the African Charter205 to which 53 African states are parties,206 and are further protected in other human rights treaties in Africa, in particular the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child207 and the ­Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa.208 Under the ­African Charter, ESC rights are unequivocally justiciable as any of the other rights (eg civil and political rights).209 Reservations to rights already protected by regional human rights instruments would be unnecessary. B.  Reservations by European States [6.74]  Some European states, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden and the ­ United Kingdom, have made reservations and declarations to certain provisions in the ­ICESCR. The natures of the reservations entered by these states are generally different from those of Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey because they are limited to some specific provisions of the Covenant, and are generally not too wide in scope so as to negate the core purpose of the Covenant. Thus, these reservations, like those of ­African states considered above, have not attracted objections from other states parties. For purposes of illustration of the scope of key reservations by European states to the ICESCR, a summarised overview is presented below. [6.75]  Belgium made an interpretative declaration with respect to Article 2(2) and (3) only. Belgium’s declaration states that with respect to Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, the Belgian Government interprets ‘non-discrimination as to national origin as not necessarily implying an obligation on States automatically to guarantee to foreigners the same rights as to their nationals’.210 According to Belgium, the term should be understood to refer to ‘the elimination of any arbitrary behaviour but not of differences in treatment based on objective and reasonable considerations, in conformity with the principles prevailing in democratic societies’.211 The declaration does not appear to be contrary to the Covenant, because discrimination under the Covenant has been understood to exclude differences based on reasonable and objective criteria.212 205  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), Arts 15–17 and 20. Notable omissions from the Charter include the rights to social security and to an adequate standard of living, including ‘adequate food, clothing and housing’, and the right to water. 206  See AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters at http://www.au.int/en/treaties. 207  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). The Charter was adopted on 11 July 1990, and entered into force 29 November 1999. 208  Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003, available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties. 209  See ch 4. 210  See Declarations, above n 14, Belgium. 211  Ibid. 212  Non-discrimination ‘prohibits differential treatment of a person or group of persons based on his/ her or their particular status or situation, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status, such as age, ethnicity, disability, marital, refugee or migrant status’. See CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 106, para 10.

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With respect to Article 2(3), the Belgian Government declared that it ‘understands that this provision cannot infringe the principle of fair compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalisation’.213 No objection has been made to this declaration and the CESCR has not made any comment.214 [6.76]  Bulgaria made a declaration concerning Article 26(1) and (3) of the I­ CESCR, and noted that these provisions were of a ‘discriminatory nature’ because they deprived a number of states of the opportunity to become parties to the Covenant. Hungary, Romania and Ukraine made similar declarations, and these have not given rise to any objection. [6.77]  Denmark restricted its reservation, made at the time of ratification in 1972, to Article 7(d), noting that ‘[t]he Government of Denmark cannot, for the time being, undertake to comply entirely with the provisions of Article 7(d) on remuneration for public holidays’. Although Denmark’s reservation to Article 7(d) included a temporary element by reference to ‘the time being’, Denmark had by 2015 continued to maintain its reservation. Given that the right to periodic holidays with pay forms part of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, this reservation should be reviewed with a view to ‘withdrawing it’.215 Sweden entered a similar reservation in connection with Article 7(d) of the Covenant in the matter of the right to remuneration for public holidays. Although this is a very specific reservation, it is undesirable to maintain it. Thus, in 2001 the CESCR noted that Sweden has maintained its reservation with regard to Article 7(d) of the Covenant concerning the right to remuneration for public holidays.216 It recommended that ‘the State party withdraw its reservation to article 7(d) of the Covenant’.217 [6.78]  France’s declaration extended to five Articles in the Covenant. First, the ­Government of the Republic declared that ‘Articles 6, 9, 11 and 13 are not to be interpreted as derogating from provisions governing the access of aliens to employment or as establishing residence requirements for the allocation of certain social benefits’. Secondly, it declared that it will implement the provisions of Article 8 in respect of the right to strike in conformity with Article 6, paragraph 4, of the European Social Charter, according to the interpretation thereof given in the annex to that Charter. This declaration has not been controversial, and thus the CESCR has not commented on it.218 [6.79]  Reservations of Ireland were restricted to Articles 2(2) and 13(2)(a). The first reservation, to Article 2(2), stated that [i]n the context of Government policy to foster, promote and encourage the use of the Irish language by all appropriate means, Ireland reserves the right to require, or give favourable consideration to, a knowledge of the Irish language for certain occupations. 213 

Ibid. See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Belgium, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.54 (1 December 2000), UN Doc E/C.12/BEL/CO/3 (4 January 2008) and UN Doc E/C.12/BEL/CO/4* (23 December 2013). 215  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Denmark, UN Doc E/C.12/DNK/CO/5 (6 June 2013) para 5. 216  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Sweden, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.70 (30 November 2001) para 21. 217  Ibid, para 32. 218  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/FRA/CO/3 (May 2008); and UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.72 (30 November 2001). 214 

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The second reservation, to Article 13(2)(a), provided: Ireland recognises the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide for the education of children, and, while recognising the State’s obligations to provide for free primary education and requiring that children receive a certain minimum education, nevertheless reserves the right to allow parents to provide for the education of their children in their s [sic] provided that these minimum standards are observed.

Given the specific nature of these reservations and the fact that they do not negate the core purposes of the Covenant, the CESCR has not made any critical comments.219 [6.80]  Malta made a declaration to Article 13 of the ICESCR, stating that the ­Government of Malta is in favour of upholding the principle affirmed in the words ‘and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions’. However, having regard to the fact that the population of Malta is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, it is difficult, given limited financial and human resources, to provide such education in accordance with a particular religious or moral belief in cases of ‘small groups’, cases of which are exceptional in Malta. Although Malta’s declaration is limited to Article 13, it has the potential to lead to a lack of respect for religious minorities in schools. It is thus understandable that the CESCR has encouraged Malta ‘to withdraw its declaration made upon ratification under ­article 13 of the Covenant’.220 [6.81]  The Kingdom of the Netherlands made a reservation with respect to ­Article 8(1)(d) in the case of the Netherlands Antilles, ‘to ensure that the relevant obligation under the Covenant does not apply to the Kingdom as far as the Netherlands Antilles is concerned’. Clearly this is a very specific reservation limited only to the right to strike in the Netherlands Antilles. The CESCR has noted that the right to strike is recognised in the Netherlands, but regretted that the state party has ‘not clarified the reasons for maintaining its reservation to article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant in respect of the Netherlands Antilles’.221 It recommended that the state party give ‘more serious consideration’ to withdrawing the reservation to Article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant.222 [6.82]  Norway made reservations to Article 8(1)(d) of the Covenant, to the effect that the current Norwegian practice of referring labour conflicts to the State Wages Board (a permanent tripartite arbitral commission in matters of wages) by Act of Parliament for the particular conflict, shall not be considered incompatible with the right to strike, this right being fully recognised in Norway.

This declaration does not affect the substance of the right to strike and has not been a principal subject of concern.223

219 

See eg CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (5 June 2002). CESCR, Concluding Observations: Malta, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.101 (14 December 2004) para 27. For a discussion of religious education in public schools, see C Evans, ‘Religious Education in Public Schools: An International Human Rights Perspective’ (2008) 8(3) Human Rights Law Review 449. 221  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Netherlands Antilles, above n 80, para 14. 222  Ibid, para 33. 223  No reference is made to Norway’s declaration in the Concluding Observations of the CESCR. See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.109 (23 June 2005), UN Doc E/C.12/ NOR/CO/5 (13 December 2013). 220 

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[6.83]  Lastly, upon ratification of the Covenant, the Government of the United ­Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK) made specific reservations to several provisions in the Covenant, including Articles 1(3), 2(3), 6, 7(a)(i), 8(1)(b), 9, 10(1) and (2), 13(2)(a) and 14.224 Most of these reservations are now redundant and have not been a cause for particular concern.225 The UK reserved the right to interpret article 6 as not precluding the imposition of restrictions, based on place of birth or residence qualifications, on the taking of employment in any particular region or territory for the purpose of safeguarding the employment opportunities of workers in that region or territory.

It also reserved the right to postpone the application of sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (a) of Article 7, in so far as it concerns the provision of equal pay to men and women for equal work in the private sector in Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands.226

In addition, the UK reserved the right not to apply sub-paragraph 1(b) of Article 8 in Hong Kong.227 Furthermore, while the UK recognised the right of everyone to social security in accordance with Article 9, it reserved ‘the right to postpone implementation of the right [to social security] in the Cayman Islands and the Falkland Islands because of shortage of resources in these territories’. No state has objected to any of these reservations. Unlike reservations of Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey, the UK’s reservations to the Covenant were limited to specific provisions in the Covenant and to specific territories. Most of these have been superseded by legislation or practice. In this respect the CESCR welcomed the UK delegation’s statement in 2002 that the UK was in the process of reviewing its reservations to international human rights instruments, with a view to withdrawing those that had been so superseded.228 The Committee encouraged the UK ‘to withdraw its reservations to the Covenant that have become redundant’.229 However, apart from declarations and reservations placed in respect of territories for which the UK is no longer responsible (eg the Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, the Solomon Islands, Southern Rhodesia and Tuvalu), all other declarations and reservations have been maintained.230 Thus, in 2009 the CESCR recommended that the UK ‘give serious consideration to withdrawing its reservations to articles 1, 2, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the Covenant, especially those that have become obsolete’.231

224  See the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Fifth Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5 (31 January 2008) para 54. 225  Ibid. See also The United Kingdom Parliament, Joint Committee on Human Rights—Seventeenth Report 2004–5, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/99/9907.htm. 226  The reservation on Art 7(a)(i) is maintained (but is void for Hong Kong and the Solomon Islands as the UK is no longer responsible for these territories). See UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5, above n 224, para 53. 227  Ibid. The reservation on Art 8(1)(b) is void as the UK is no longer responsible for Hong Kong. 228  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 9. 229  Ibid, para 43. 230  See UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5, above n 224, para 53. 231  CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 (12 June 2009) para 40.

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V. CONCLUSION [6.84]  This chapter has considered four main questions: —— What reservations to the ICESCR are permissible or impermissible? —— Who should decide whether a reservation under the ICESCR is permissible or impermissible? —— If a reservation under the Covenant is impermissible, what is the legal consequence of such an impermissible reservation? —— Are some of the existing state reservations to the Covenant incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant and thus impermissible? If so, how should reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant be treated by the CESCR? [6.85]  Regarding the first question, it is clear from the foregoing that only reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant, ie the Covenant’s essential rules, rights and obligations, are permissible. Accordingly, reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant—which is to establish clear obligations for states parties in respect of the full realisation of ESC rights—are impermissible. [6.86]  The question whether a reservation is compatible (and thus permissible) or incompatible (and thus impermissible) with the object and purpose of the Covenant is subject to interpretation by the CESCR. This could arise mainly in two situations: (i) the consideration of periodic reports submitted by states; and (ii) the examination of individual or group petitions or communications. However, until the Optional ­Protocol to the ICESCR providing for the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications is ratified by a vast majority of states with reservations to the ICESCR, the latter option will not be available in practice to the CESCR.232 The ratification of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR by states is necessary, because it would, inter alia, confer upon the Committee a quasi-judicial function, and create an additional mechanism to allow the Committee to examine relevant reservations in specific cases. [6.87]  At present the Committee has one main option, to assess reservations during its consideration of periodic reports by states parties. Although this is a limitation compared to other treaty-monitoring bodies, the Committee has some flexibility, necessary to interpret the Covenant as a living instrument. A well thought-out and carefully drafted General Comment or Statement on reservations to the ICESCR could clarify the Committee’s general approach to reservations. Concluding Observations could then refer to this General Comment or Statement. [6.88]  To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Covenant, account should be taken of the following:233 (a) the indivisibility and interdependence of the rights set out in the Covenant; (b) the importance that the right (or rights) which is (or are) the subject of the reservation has (or have) within the general architecture of the Covenant; and 232  233 

See discussion of the Optional Protocol in ch 1 of this book. See Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties, above n 2, para 7.

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(c) the seriousness of the impact the reservation has (or is intended to have) upon a particular right, relevant rights or the Covenant as whole. As the above survey demonstrates, impermissible reservations include general and broad reservations subjecting the Covenant to domestic law incompatible with the Covenant, or those extending to minimum core obligations which are non-derogable, and thereby depriving the Covenant of its raison d’être. [6.89]  With respect to the third question, as argued above, reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant should be treated as invalid, and therefore of no legal effect. This is in accordance with the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. While cultural and religious specificities may be taken into ­consideration in order to develop adequate means to ensure respect for universal human rights, including ESC rights, they cannot jeopardise the implementation of human rights treaties. Unless a state chooses to withdraw from the Covenant, which may not be legally possible (since the ICESCR does not provide for withdrawal), such reservations should generally be severable, meaning that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving state without benefit of the reservation, however phrased or named. However, as yet the Committee has not applied this approach, although it has encouraged states to review and withdraw relevant reservations.234 [6.90]  The Committee seems to have taken into consideration the realities of the situation by engaging states in a dialogue. The CESCR can advance this by requiring reserving states through their reports to explain: (a) the nature and scope of reservations or interpretative declarations; (b) the reason(s) why such reservations were considered to be necessary and have been maintained; (c) the precise effect of each reservation in terms of national law and policy; and (d) any plans to limit or modify the effect of reservations and ultimately withdraw them within a specific time frame.235 Where applicable, the Committee could highlight the lack of consistency among reservations formulated to apply to certain provisions protected in more than one treaty, and encourage the withdrawal, whether total or partial, of a reservation on the basis of the availability of better protection in other international conventions resulting from the absence of a reservation to comparable provisions.236 [6.91]  As to the last question, some of the existing reservations to the ICESCR, as shown in section III. above, do not appear to be compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. While it cannot generally be said that states that have entered no or limited reservations (such as those considered in section IV.), or that have removed existing ones, are necessarily doing any better with regard to the respect, protection

234  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Monaco, UN Doc E/C.12/MCO/CO/1 (13 June 2006) paras 8 and 16. 235 See Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2007/5 (9 ­February 2007) para 16(9); HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 30, para 20. 236  Ibid.

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and fulfilment of ESC rights than those that have entered broad reservations (such as those states discussed in section III.), reservations to any human rights treaty ‘clearly indicate the degree of commitment of the reserving State to full compliance with a particular treaty’.237 [6.92]  Although there is no legal obligation under the ICESCR, and no express provision for the withdrawal of reservations, it would be in accordance with the ­Covenant’s object and purpose, and the spirit of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in 1993,238 to envisage that laws and practices which necessitated reservations in some states would be examined carefully, progressively amended or repealed to ensure that the states parties complied, without reservation, with all the Covenant’s provisions. This has certainly happened on some occasions,239 and some of the reservations formally withdrawn appear clearly to have been incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.240 Indeed, it is pointless to maintain reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant since they are devoid of any legal effects, ie they are null and void. However, the formal removal of such reservations is still useful as an indication of a state’s express commitment to its international human rights obligations.

237 See UN, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 18th and 19th Sessions (containing CEDAW Committee’s Statements on Reservations to CEDAW), UN Doc A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998) 47, 48–49, para 14. 238  Vienna Declaration, above n 29, para 5. 239  The states that have withdrawn some reservations to the ICESCR (on the dates shown in brackets) include: Belarus (30 September 1992); Denmark (14 January 1976); DRC (21 March 2001); Malta (upon ratification 13 September 1990); New Zealand (5 September 2003); Rwanda (15 December 2008). 240  For example, on 21 March 2001, the Government of the DRC informed the Secretary-General that it had decided to withdraw its reservation made upon accession, which read as follows: ‘Reservation: The Government of the People’s Republic of the Congo declares that it does not consider itself bound by the provisions of Article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4. … In our country, such provisions are inconsistent with the principle of nationalisation of education and with the monopoly granted to the State in that area.’

7 Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights I. INTRODUCTION [7.01]  Women’s ESC rights, which are interrelated with women’s civil and political rights, include, but are not limited to, rights to: (a)

an adequate standard of living, including food and freedom from hunger; water; clothing; housing and freedom from forced eviction; continuous improvement of living conditions; (b) the highest attainable standard of mental and physical health throughout a ­woman’s lifecycle, including reproductive and sexual health and freedom; (c) equal inheritance and ownership of land and property; (d) social security, social protection, social insurance and social services, including special assistance before, during and after childbirth; (e) training and education; (f) freely chosen work, as well as just and favourable conditions of work, including fair wages, equal remuneration and protection from sexual harassment and sex discrimination at work; (g) form and join trade unions; (h) protection from economic exploitation; (i) protection from coerced and uninformed marriage; (j) a clean and healthy environment; (k) participation in cultural life; (l) claim and enjoy the benefits of patents and intellectual property; (m) nationality, and to bestow nationality on children; (n) freedom from trafficking and exploitation, and the recognition of the human rights of trafficked persons (see Appendix G to this book, paragraph 1). [7.02]  While individual situations of women differ significantly due to such factors as location, class, ethnicity, disability, sexuality and age, in many instances women face barriers different from and additional to those faced by similarly placed men, impacting negatively on women’s equal enjoyment of ESC rights with men. Therefore, ESC rights have a particular significance for women, because, as a group, women are disproportionately affected by poverty, and by social and cultural marginalisation.1

1  See Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 760, 763 (‘the Montreal Principles’), Appendix G to this book.

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The inequality in the lives of women that affects women’s enjoyment of ESC rights is deeply embedded in history, tradition and culture.2 Most women have been denied the equal enjoyment of their human rights with men, in particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom (broadly culture), or as a result of overt or covert discrimination. Many women have been victims of multiple forms of discrimination due to the intersection of sex with other prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, discussed in chapter 2, resulting in compounded vulnerability and disadvantage. [7.03]  Thus, some women are more vulnerable than others, and vulnerability will vary according to context, but vulnerable women generally include the following: ethnic, religious and racial minorities; indigenous women; internally displaced women; ­refugee women; women combatants; the girl child; non-nationals; women living in rural areas; elderly women; women with disabilities, or who are sick or wounded; migrant women and trafficked women. Underlying each of these vulnerable groups is the fact that individuals and groups suffering the most from human rights violations—the poor in general and poor women in particular—often lack the political voice needed to claim or assert their human rights. Consequently, the effective protection and realisation of women’s ESC rights is an important element of international human rights. [7.04]  This chapter examines the relationship between culture and the realisation of women’s ESC rights, with particular reference to Africa, where culture remains a key obstacle to the realisation of women’s human rights generally and to ESC rights in particular. Due to the limitations of space, the intention here is not to address all ­cultural issues but to consider some cultural obstacles and threats that have caused major difficulties. Although African states have ratified several human rights instruments protecting women’s human rights, generally the severe political, economic and social difficulties facing African states have had a negative impact on efforts to respect, protect and fulfil women’s ESC rights. The prevalence of prejudicial traditional practices and customs that legitimise women’s inequality, particularly prevalent in rural areas of most African states, hamper the effective implementation of human rights generally, and of vulnerable groups of women in particular. Although obstacles affect the realisation both of women’s civil and political rights as well as of ESC rights, traditional practices and customs disproportionately affect ESC rights, since traditionally this category of rights has often been marginalised rather than prioritised.3 2  Ibid. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: [Democratic] Republic of the Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.45 (23 May 2000) para 17, stating that ‘The Committee is equally concerned about discrimination against women. Marriage and family laws overtly discriminate against women (for instance, adultery is illegal for women but, in certain circumstances, not for men; while the Legal Code provides that 30 per cent of the deceased husband’s estate goes to the wife, in practice the wife often loses all rights of inheritance). Domestic violence, including rape and beatings, is widespread but rarely reported, and there are no legal provisions for punishing the offenders. Furthermore, despite the provision in Congolese legislation that endorses the principle of equal pay for equal work, women in the formal sector are under-represented and encounter discriminatory promotion patterns. Women in rural areas are especially disadvantaged in terms of education and employment conditions, including wages.’ See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Afghanistan, UN Doc E/C.12/AFG/CO/2-4 (7 June 2010) para 18. 3  See, eg, J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in the Age of Globalisation: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18(4) American ­University International Law Review 851; S Skogly, ‘Crimes Against Humanity-Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights’ (2001) 5(1) International Journal of Human Rights 58.

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In turn this marginalisation disproportionately affects women, since women’s lives are lived out largely in the private sphere and women experience disproportionate levels of poverty and resource inequality.4 The chapter adopts the following structure: ­section II. provides a brief background to women’s ESC rights; and section III. provides an overview of human rights of women, drawing examples from Africa. ­Section IV. examines prejudicial cultural practices as an obstacle to the realisation of women’s ESC rights. Section V. concludes that the promotion of women’s human rights advances society as a whole, and that cultural obstacles must be addressed to realise women’s ESC rights.

II.  BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT [7.05]  In 1995, the UN reported that ‘[h]uman development[,] if not engendered, is endangered’, and observed that ‘in no society today do women enjoy the same opportunities as men’.5 Over 20 years later, discrimination against women persists not only in developing states,6 but also in more developed states, including Germany,7 ­Luxembourg8 and the Netherlands.9 Several practices deny women equality with men and the equal enjoyment of ESC rights with men. A few examples are cited below for purposes of illustration of some gender-based difference in treatment. Article 187 of the ­Turkish Civil Code requires women, upon marriage, to change their names, either by taking the husband’s name or by creating a hyphenated hybrid, even if both spouses agree that a married woman should use her maiden name alone or freely choose a joint family name.10 The husband’s name remain unchanged in both of these scenarios.

4  F Banda, ‘Understanding Women’s Economic and Social Human Rights’ (2007) 12(2) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 232, 237. 5  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 1 and 29, available at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/reports/256/hdr_1995_en_complete_nostats.pdf. The term ‘women’ is used in this chapter to mean persons of the female gender, including girls. 6  S Tamale, ‘Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Women’s Links to Resources’ (2004) 48(1) Journal of African Law 50. 7  In 2001, for example, the CESCR observed, ‘Like the ILO, the Committee is concerned about the persisting impediments to women in German society, in terms of promotion in employment and equal wages for work of equal value, both in the private and public sectors, and especially in federal bodies and academic institutions, despite the efforts of the State party to give a new impetus to the equal participation of women in the labour market.’ CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.68 (24 September 2001) para 19. See also HRC, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/ DEU (4 May 2004) para 13, noting that the ‘number of women in senior positions is still very low’ and that there are ‘wide disparities, in the private sector, of remuneration between men and women’. 8  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Luxembourg, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.86 (23 May 2003) para 22, stating that ‘The Committee notes with concern that women are still underrepresented in the work force. While taking note that the disparities between wages of men and women have been reduced, the Committee also notes with concern that the current level of wage difference (women receiving 15 per cent lower wages than men) remains a matter of concern.’ 9  CESCR, Concluding Observations: The Kingdom of the Netherlands, UN Doc E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5 (9 November 2010) para 14, stating, ‘The Committee remains concerned that, in spite of advances made in all the constituent countries of the State party, women still do not enjoy economic, social and cultural rights on the same level as men.’ 10 Law no 4721, 7 December 2002, available at http://www.justice.gov.tr/basiclaws/turkish_civil.pdf. Art 153 of the former Turkish Civil Code (as amended by Law no 4248 of 14 May 1997), now Art 187 of the

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This practice, based on ‘tradition[,] derives from the man’s primordial role and the woman’s secondary role in the family’, and has been considered to be discriminatory.11 The high prevalence of violence against women, in particular domestic violence, also remains an issue of concern. In a 2002 Joint Declaration of Special Rapporteurs on Women’s Rights, it was noted: Violence against women and girls is perpetrated in every country in the world. This occurs in situations of peace and conflict. However, the State agents and private actors responsible are not held to account. This climate of impunity encourages the persistence of such violations.12

[7.06]  As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has pointed out, although slavery was officially abolished more than 150 years ago, ‘domestic s­ lavery’ persists in Europe and concerns thousands of people, the majority of whom are women.13 This is also true in other jurisdictions. In Africa, for example, the consequences of slavery still persist in some states such as Mauritania and the Republic of Niger, to the detriment of women.14 In every state for which data are available, for example, notwithstanding favourable legislation, women’s average wages are less than those of men, regardless of education,15 and women experience the onus of the ‘double duty’.16 It is, therefore, less surprising that, worldwide, over 60 per cent of those working in family enterprises without pay are women.17 In several developing states, every day millions of women and young girls are forced to spend hours collecting and carrying water for their families (restricting their opportunities and their

new Civil Code enacted on 22 November 2001, provides that ‘[m]arried women shall bear their husband’s name. However, they can make a written declaration to the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths on signing the marriage deed, or at the Registry of Births, Marriages and Deaths after the marriage, if they wish to keep their maiden name in front of their surname’. 11  In 2004 the ECtHR found, in the case of Ünal Tekeli v Turkey, App no 29865/96 (ECtHR, 16 ­November 2004), that the the difference in treatment in question in the Turkish Civil Code was in violation of Art 14 (non-discrimination) in conjunction with Art 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the ECHR. 12 UN, Joint Declaration of Special Rapporteurs on Women’s Rights, 8 March 2002, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/news2002/jointdeclaration.pdf. The Declaration was made by Ms Marta Altolaguirre, Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and its consequences, UN Commission on Human Rights; and Ms Angela Melo, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See also reports of UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and its Consequences, available at http://www.ohchr. org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx. 13 ECtHR, Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01, judgment of 26 July 2005, (2006) 43 EHRR 16, para 111. 14  African Commission, Bah Ould Rabah v Mauritania, Communication no 197/97, 17th Annual Activity Report (2004) AHRLR 78, (2005) 12 IHRR 872, para 29. Mme Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger, 27 October 2008, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08. 15  UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Progress of the World’s Women (New York, United Nations, 2000) 92. 16 AM Cotter, Gender Injustice: An International Comparative Analysis of Equality in Employment (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004) 93–215. ‘Double duty’ refers to the reality that women worldwide who join the paid labour force, nevertheless continue to shoulder more than their fair share of household and family responsibilities. 17 See UN, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005 (New York, United Nations, 2005) 16, ­available at http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/MDGBook.pdf, noting that ‘In the home, women perform most of the chores. This work is also unpaid, often little valued and not reflected in national production statistics.’

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choices), a ritual that reinforces gender inequalities in employment and education.18 Women are often subjected to discriminatory employment practices, such as the requirement to present a non-pregnancy certificate to gain employment or to avoid dismissal from ­employment.19 There have been cases in which women have suffered adverse employment actions due to pregnancy (a natural condition/characteristic­ unique to women only), such as the conducting of heightened scrutiny of work and refusal to allow a change in shifts and work extra shifts.20 In 2014 the CESCR expressed regret in connection with reported information about ‘dismissals, nonrecruitments or non-renewals of [fixed-term] labour contracts owing to pregnancy, childbirth or maternity leave’.21 [7.07]  Thus, notwithstanding comprehensive international and domestic laws proscribing sex discrimination and promoting equality (see section III. below), the human rights of women are ‘systematically denied’22 and ‘women [are] poorer than men across class, race, national, economic and ethnic lines’.23 It is therefore not surprising that women are generally ‘over-represented in low-paid employment’24 and in parttime jobs. The 2008 Concluding Observation of the HRC on France, below, offers a useful illustration: The Committee remains concerned that, despite legislative and policy measures adopted by the State party to promote gender equality, women are underrepresented in high-level and managerial positions in the State, territorial, and hospital civil service as well as in the private sector. The wage gap between men and women, the overrepresentation of women in parttime jobs, and high unemployment rate among women belonging to racial, ethnic or national minorities also continue to be significant.25

Despite significant achievements in the quest for women’s equality, in particular since the entry into force of CEDAW,26 accepted by 188 states by October 2014—over 90 per cent of the members of the UN—ensuring gender equality in all states remains

18  See UNDP, Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, v, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/. 19  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico, Future UN Doc E/C.12/CO/MEX/4 (17 May 2006) para 15, stating that ‘The Committee reiterates its concern about the practice of employers in the maquiladora (textile) industry to require women to present non-pregnancy certificates in order to be hired or to avoid being dismissed.’ 20  See, eg, Peguy Delva v The Continental Group, Inc, no SC12-2315 (Supreme Court of Florida, 17 April 2014), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2014/sc12-2315.pdf. 21  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc E/C.12/FIN/CO/6 (28 November 2014) para 19. 22  Human Rights Watch, ‘Women’s Rights in Middle East and North Africa’, at http://www.hrw.org/ women/overview-mena.html. See also Amnesty International, Human Rights for Human Dignity: A Primer on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (London, Amnesty International Publications, 2005) 50–51; and SD Ross, Women’s Human Rights: The International and Comparative Law Casebook (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 23  Cotter, above n 16, 273 (footnote omitted). 24  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Liechtenstein, Future UN Doc E/C.12/CO/LIE/1 (19 May 2006) para 13. 25  HRC, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (31 July 2008) para 13. 26 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA res 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No 46), 193, UN Doc A/34/4, entered into force 3 September 1981. For a commentary on CEDAW see MA Freeman et al (eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of ­Discrimination Against Women (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).

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an enormous challenge.27 To look at Africa in particular, the following statement by the African Union Chairperson in 2007 merits citation: Violence against women and girls has assumed unprecedented levels across Africa. … ­Harmful traditional practices against women and girls such as female genital mutilation, ­virginity tests, early and forced marriages and widow inheritance continue to bedevil continental efforts towards gender equality and women’s empowerment. The situation of women in conflict situations in Africa is deplorable. Gross human rights violations are perpetrated against civilians in general but against women and girls in particular.28

[7.08]  Most violations of women’s ESC rights (eg the right to education, which plays ‘a vital role in empowering women’ to participate fully in their communities)29 often continue unchallenged, since they are regarded as not justiciable and thus ‘not-quite-rights’.30 The overwhelming majority of children deprived of basic education, and adults unable to read, are female—in 2014 more than 35 million girls in developing countries were noted as attending school, with two-thirds of these representing ethnic minorities.31 Many girls are excluded from education because of several ­factors ­including ‘inadequate capacity of the system, economic disadvantage, location, pregnancy, child marriage, disability, voluntary migration or their status as refugees brought on by situations of conflict’.32 The denial of women’s ESC rights in turn undermines ­women’s ability to enjoy their civil and political rights, which then limits women’s capacity to influence decision- and policy-making in public life as well as limits ­women’s ability to gain access to justice on an equal basis with men.33

III.  HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN TO EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION: AFRICAN EXPERIENCES [7.09]  As noted in chapter two, all human beings are born ‘free and equal in dignity and rights’.34 As a result, the principles of non-discrimination and equality represent 27  See eg OECD, Report on the Gender Initiative: Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship (Paris, OECD, 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/education/48111145.pdf; A list of states parties to CEDAW is available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx? Treaty=CEDAW&Lang=. 28  Statement by the African Union Chairperson, Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, in Celebration of the International Women’s Day of 8 March 2007 (on file with the author). 29  CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para 1. 30  K Tomasevski, ‘Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-theScenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998–2004’ (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 205, 216 noting that ‘As the Cold War has not ended as yet within the [UN Commission on Human Rights], economic, social and cultural rights are still a casualty.’ 31  CEDAW, Concept Note on the Draft General Recommendation on Girls’/Women’s Right to Education para 3.6. K Watkins, The Oxfam Education Report (Oxford, Oxfam, 2000) 3, noted, ‘Two-thirds of the children not in school—and a similar proportion of adults who are illiterate—are female.’ 32  Ibid. See also CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Togo, UN Doc CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/3 (3 February 2006) paras 24–25. Togo’s Ministry of Education Circular no 8478/MEN-RS prohibits pregnant schoolgirls or students from attending school. This partly accounts for the high dropout rate of girls, owing to pregnancy and early and forced marriage and their low enrolment rates in higher education. 33  See CEDAW, General recommendation No 33: Women’s Access to Justice UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/33 (3 August 2015). 34  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), Art 1.

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the core principles upon which human rights law is established, as reflected in various international and regional human rights instruments.35 The ICESCR, following the UDHR, protects ESC rights of ‘everyone’ (ungendered term) rather than rights of ‘all men’.36 However, the Covenant does not specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of ‘gender’, because at the time it was adopted in 1966, the concept of gender had not become part of the international agenda.37 The ICESCR prohibits discrimination based on several grounds, including ‘sex’. The term ‘sex’ here refers to ­biological differences between men and women.38 Yet the term ‘gender’ refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men, and society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women.39 The CESCR has interpreted discrimination on the basis of ‘sex’ to include gender-based discrimination, by asserting: Since the adoption of the Covenant, the notion of the prohibited ground ‘sex’ has evolved considerably to cover not only physiological characteristics but also the social construction of gender stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, which have created obstacles to the equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, the refusal to hire a woman, on the ground that she might become pregnant, or the allocation of low-level or part-time jobs to women based on the stereotypical assumption that, for example, they are unwilling to ­commit as much time to their work as men, constitutes discrimination. Refusal to grant paternity leave may also amount to discrimination against men.40

[7.10]  The ICESCR takes account of some sex-based differences in the protection of some ESC rights. Article 7(a)(i) specifically protects women’s right to equal pay for equal work by recognising the right of everyone to [f]air wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work.

[7.11]  The main women’s human rights instruments in Africa—most notably the ACHPR (or ‘the African Charter’),41 and the Protocol to the ACHPR in Africa (‘African Women’s Rights Protocol’ or ‘the Protocol’)42—prohibit discrimination 35 

See ch 2, section III., dealing with non-discrimination and equality. A Fraser, ‘Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women’s Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 853, 888. Women delegates to the UN Commission on Human Rights rejected the view that the word ‘men’ referred to all human beings. 37 See C Chinkin, ‘Gender and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in E Riedel, G Giacca and C Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and ­Challenges (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 134. 38  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28: The Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 (16 December 2010) para 5. 39  Ibid. 40  CESCR, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2 July 2009) para 20. 41  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. For the analysis, see C Heyns, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’ (2004) 108 Penn State Law Review 679. 42  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6 (11 July 2003); reprinted in 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 40, entered into force 25 November 2005. 36  See

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and protect the equal enjoyment of the rights of men and women.43 It is accordingly widely recognised that international norms of non-discrimination and equality, which demand that particular attention be given to vulnerable groups (such as women) and individuals from such groups, are integral elements of the international human rights normative framework sometimes categorised as norms of jus cogens.44 In the ­Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ referred to the category of erga omnes obligations as including specifically ‘the basic human rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’.45 As the ICJ stated in the Namibia case, ‘to enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin … [constitutes] a denial of fundamental human rights’.46 Although discrimination on the ground of sex was not included specifically in the category of jus cogens above,47 it would also be difficult for a state or an NSA to justify a difference in treatment in the enjoyment of human rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and cultural, based on the sole ground of sex (even if this were to be based on traditional, religious or cultural practice, or domestic laws and policies).48 A. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Rights of Women in Africa [7.12]  The African Charter contains four main provisions protecting women against discrimination. First is the general non-discrimination clause contained in Article 2 of the Charter, which provides: Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as … sex.

This is then reinforced by Article 3 of the Charter, which deals with equal protection of ‘every individual’ in the following terms: 1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.

43 

African Charter, Arts 2, 3, 18(3). W Vandenhole, Non-Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005); A Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19(3) European Journal of International Law 491; A Hameed, ‘Unravelling the Mystery of Jus Cogens in International Law’ (2013) 84(1) British Yearbook of International Law 52. 45  Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32. 46  See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 57. 47  For a discussion see H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, ‘The Gender of Jus Cogens’ (1993) 15(1) Human Rights Quarterly 63. 48  A similar approach has been applied by the ECtHR. The Court requires ‘very weighty reasons’ before a difference of treatment on the sole ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the ECHR. See, eg, Burghartz v Switzerland, App no 16213/1990, judgment of 22 February 1994, [1994] ECHR 2, para 27; Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland, App no 14518/89, judgment of 24 June 1993, (1993) 16 EHRR 405, para 67. 44  See

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Thirdly, for the avoidance of doubt, Article 18(3) of the African Charter, which generally deals with the protection of the family, provides: The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions. (emphasis added)

Lastly, Article 60 of the Charter states that the African Commission will draw ­inspiration from international human rights instruments (such as CEDAW). In view of the above provisions, which clearly prohibit discrimination against women on the basis of sex, any discrimination against women in their access to or enjoyment of ESC rights on any of the prohibited grounds is a violation of the African Charter. Why, then, was it considered necessary to adopt an additional protocol to the African ­Charter on the Rights of Women? [7.13]  The answer lies in the fact that the above provisions were considered not to be adequate to address the human rights of women in Africa. For example, while ­Article 18 of the African Charter prohibits discrimination against women, it does so only in the context of the family. In addition, explicit provisions guaranteeing the right of consent to marriage and equality of spouses during and after marriage are absent. These omissions are compounded by the fact that the Charter places emphasis on traditional African values and traditions, without addressing concerns that many customary practices, such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage and wife inheritance, can be harmful or life-threatening to women. By Article 18(2) of the Charter: The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognised by the community.

Under Article 29(7) of the Charter, the individual has a duty to preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society.

What are the ‘positive African cultural values’? Can this be interpreted as protecting discriminatory cultural practices against women? [7.14]  The scope of ‘positive African cultural values’ is subject to interpretation. Given that gender inequality in Africa is entrenched in all societal structures, positive African cultural values could possibly reinforce masculine and patriarchal prejudices that are discriminatory against women. However, if this is interpreted in light of the overall object and purpose of the African Charter, Article 29(7) cannot be properly interpreted as trumping the non-discrimination provisions in the Charter.49 Thus, taken in its totality as a human rights treaty, it is arguable that the ‘positive ­African values’ described in the Charter are those that are consonant with international human rights standards, including the principles of equality and non-discrimination­. In this respect, a progressive and liberal construction of the African Charter as a ‘living

49  See C Beyani, ‘Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women’s Rights in the African Human Rights System’ in R Cook (ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 285.

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instrument’ would clearly leave no room for the discriminatory treatment of women, since ‘positive African cultural values’ imply ‘an obligation on the State to ensure the eradication of harmful traditional practices that negatively affect human rights’.50 The adoption by the African Commission, in Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, of the definition of discrimination drawn by the HRC in General Comment 18, which itself is based on CEDAW Article 1 and CERD Article 1, suggests that there can be no derogation from the equality principle, not even for culture.51 Lastly, the African Commission guidelines to states on reporting, which are based on CEDAW reporting guidelines, encompass both public and private sphere violations.52 Interpreting the African ­Charter in light of the present-day conditions as well as its object and purpose would thus entail holding a state responsible for human rights violations by NSAs (including individuals, groups, corporations and other entities, as well as agents acting under their authority) where a state fails to prevent NSAs from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of human rights of women,53 or in some contexts holding NSAs directly responsible for violations of women’s human rights. [7.15]  By and large, however, by its failure to make explicit provisions to critical issues affecting women, such as custom and marriage, it has been argued that the African Charter inadequately protects women’s human rights.54 It is against this background that during its 23rd Session, held in April 1998, the African Commission endorsed the appointment of the first Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa, with a mandate that included working towards the adoption and ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, and making recommendations geared towards improving the situation of women in Africa.55 What are the prospects of Africa’s Protocol on Women’s Rights? B. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [7.16]  The Protocol was adopted on 11 July 2003 during the Second Ordinary Heads of States and Governments Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique. It was a long-awaited realisation, as it had taken eight years for the draft text of this c­ ritical 50 African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and ­ ultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted at the African CommisC sion’s 47th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, the Gambia, from 12 to 26 May 2010, available at http:// www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr_instr_guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf (­Principles and Guidelines). See also M Mutua, ‘The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation’, a­ vailable at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/mutua.pdf, at 9. 51  See African Commission in Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, Communication no 211/98, para 63, (2001) AHRLR 84, 14th Annual Activity Report; HRC, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination (37th Session, 1989) UN Doc UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) 26. 52  F Viljoen, ‘State Reporting under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Boost from the South’ (2000) 44(1) Journal of African Law 110. 53  See the African Commission in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Communication no 245/2002, annex III, 21st Annual Activity Report, 54, discussed in ch 3. 54  M Wandia, ‘Rights of Women in Africa: Launch of Petition to the African Union’ (June 2004), available at http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/1944.html. 55  African Commission, Special Rapporteur on Rights of Women, available at http://www.achpr.org/ mechanisms/rights-of-women/; F Banda, ‘Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women’s Rights Comes into Force’ (2006) 50(1) Journal of African Law 72.

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new human rights instrument to be adopted. On 25 November 2005, the Protocol came into force, having received the required 15 ratifications. By 2014, 10 years after the adoption of the Protocol, only 36 (out of 54) African states had ratified it.56 The reluctance to ratify the Protocol is itself indicative of the approach of African states to the protection of women’s human rights. However, human rights instruments in Africa have historically taken a long time to ratify and come into force due to the lack of political will. For example, the African Charter, adopted in 1981, only came into force five years later in 1986; the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights came into force in 2004, six years after its adoption in 1998, and even then ratification has remained poor;57 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,58 which was adopted in 1990, took nine years to come into force. [7.17]  The Protocol protects the civil and political rights of women, their ESC rights and also their collective rights.59 Apart from re-emphasising and extending UN instruments on human rights of women, the Protocol enshrines human rights and gender equality in the mainstream of African affairs,60 an objective and principle of the ­African Union.61 The specific rights protected under the Protocol are, broadly, the rights to: non-discrimination (Article 2); dignity (Article 3); life, integrity and security of the person (Article 4); equal marriage rights regarding separation, divorce or annulment (Articles 6 and 7); access to justice and equal protection before the law (Article 8); participation in the political and decision-making process (Article 9); peace (Article 10); protection of women in armed conflicts (Article 11); education and training (Article 12); economic and social welfare rights (Article 13); health and reproductive rights, including a woman’s right to have ‘medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus’ (Article 14);62 food security (Article 15); adequate housing (Article 16); live in a ‘positive cultural

56  The first 21 states to ratify the Protocol were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, the Gambia, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. These were followed by Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, ­Swaziland, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 57 By 2014, only 27 (out of 54) African Union member states had ratified the Protocol establishing the African Court, while only 7 states (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda and ­Tanzania) had made a declaration under Art 34(6) allowing individuals and NGOs direct access to the African Court. 58  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999. 59  See M Ssenyonjo, ‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: Introductory Note’ (2004) 11 IHRR 859; M Baderin, ‘Recent Developments in the ­African Regional Human Rights System’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 117. 60  VO Nmehielle, ‘Development of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade’ (2004) 11(3) Human Rights Brief 6. 61  Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force 26 May 2001, Art 3(h) states that ‘The objectives of the Union shall be to: Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights.’ Art 4(1)(l) provides: ‘The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: Promotion of gender equality.’ See K Stefiszyn, ‘The African Union: Challenges and Opportunities for Women’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 358. 62  See also HRC, Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v Peru, Communication no 1153/2003, UN Doc CCPR/ C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005).

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context’ (Article 17); a healthy and sustainable environment (Article 18); sustainable development (Article 19); widows’ rights (Article 20); and inheritance (Article 21). The Protocol contains special provisions protecting elderly women (Article 22), women with disabilities (Article 23) and women in distress (Article 24). Some human rights, such as the rights of women to vote, to property and to participate in the cultural life of the community itself, are not specifically mentioned. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this was deliberate. [7.18]  Article 26 of the Protocol states the obligations of the state parties in the ­following terms: 1. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of this Protocol at national level, and in their periodic reports submitted in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter, indicate the legislative and other measures undertaken for the full realisation of the rights herein recognised. 2. States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures and in particular shall provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective implementation of the rights herein recognised.

[7.19]  The above provision makes it clear that states are obliged to ‘ensure’ the implementation of the Protocol, including ESC rights of women at a national level, without a qualifying ‘progressive realisation’ clause. In particular, states parties are obliged by Article 5 of the Protocol to take all ‘necessary legislative’ and ‘other measures’ to eliminate harmful practices that adversely affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international standards, including: (a) creation of public awareness in all sectors of society regarding harmful practices through information, formal and informal education and outreach programmes; (b) prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female ­genital mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them; (c) provision of necessary support to victims of harmful practices through basic services such as health services, legal and judicial support, emotional and psychological counselling as well as vocational training to make them self-supporting; (d) protection of women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and intolerance.

[7.20]  Protection against various ‘forms of violence, abuse and intolerance’ includes adopting and implementing measures to prevent violence against women, and to mitigate its impact on the physical and mental health of survivors. Such measures include the criminalisation of rape, domestic violence and sexual assault; adequate punishment of offenders; community mobilisation and education; counselling and education of men and women; training of health and law enforcement personnel to ensure humane and sympathetic treatment of victims; counselling and rehabilitation of survivors of violence; and provision of alternative and safe housing programmes for women fleeing situations of domestic violence.63

63 

African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 50, para 67(ii).

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[7.21]  Unlike some human rights treaties,64 the Protocol neither prohibits the formulation of reservations (either expressly or impliedly) nor mentions any permitted type of reservation(s). During the drafting of the Protocol, it was suggested by member states of the Southern African Development Community that reservations should be expressly prohibited, but this suggestion was not taken up.65 While this position was adopted to secure wider ratification of the Protocol by African states that consider that they have difficulties in guaranteeing all the rights in the Protocol but can nonetheless accept the generality of obligations in that instrument, it left some questions unaddressed. First, what reservations are permissible (or not permissible) under the Protocol, given that it does not exclude or permit the possibility of reservations? ­Secondly, who should decide whether a reservation under the Protocol is invalid? Is it a matter exclusively for a reserving state and those states making objections, or should the A ­ frican Court itself pronounce on the compatibility with the object and purpose, when the need arises? And what legal effect should follow the determination of a reservation to the Protocol as invalid (unacceptable, irregular, impermissible or inadmissible)? [7.22]  As noted in chapter six, in accordance with the rules of CIL as reflected in ­Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,66 reservations can be made to the Protocol, provided they are compatible with its object and purpose. A ­reservation would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol if it has a ‘serious impact’ on the essential rules, rights or obligations indispensable to the Protocol’s general architecture, thereby depriving the Protocol of its raison d’être.67 This must also include all interpretative declarations the effect of which is that of reservations. Possible reservations that might be contrary to the object and purpose of the Protocol include reservations that offend peremptory or higher norms (jus cogens),68 or obligations that concern or bind all states (obligations erga omnes)

64  See, eg, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953 (European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR). Art 57 ECHR provides: ‘1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the ­Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this article. 2. Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned.’ See also the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 429 UNTS 93, entered into force 22 May 1962, Art 9 of which provides, ‘Reservations to this Convention shall not be permitted.’ See also Supplementary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery, 226 UNTS 3, entered into force 30 April 1957, Art 9 stating that ‘No reservations may be made to this Convention.’ 65  On the drafting history of the Protocol, see F Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) 66–79. 66  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention or VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969), entered into force 27 January 1980, Art 19. 67  See also A Pellet, Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005) 14, Guideline 3.1.5, and UN Doc A/CN.4/572 (21 June 2006) 3, paras 7–8. 68  Vienna Convention, Art 53 defines a ‘peremptory norm’ of general international law (also called jus cogens, Latin for ‘compelling law’) as ‘a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’. On the effect of jus cogens, see U Linderfalk, ‘The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?’ (2008) 18(5) European Journal of International Law 853.

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and norms of CIL.69 For example, a reservation to the obligation to combat all forms of discrimination against women (Article 2) in the enjoyment of all human rights, including ESC rights, would not be acceptable. Similarly a state may not reserve an entitlement not to take the necessary steps at the domestic level to give effect to the rights protected in the Protocol (Article 26). Reservations to CEDAW made by Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania and Morocco specifically referred to the ­traditional male-centred interpretations of Islamic law (sharia).70 In particular, Egypt’s reservation to Article 16 of CEDAW, concerning the equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and upon its dissolution, states: The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the husband shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully and shall also make a payment to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife’s rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge’s ­ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of the husband.71

[7.23]  The CEDAW Committee has urged states to expedite the steps necessary for the withdrawal of such reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.72 In particular, the Committee’s view is that Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW are central to the object and purpose of the Convention, and that, in accordance with Article 28(2), reservations to those provisions should be withdrawn.73 However, states have continued to observe these reservations in practice, and thus violate the human rights of women. [7.24]  As noted in chapter six, the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty is subject to assessment by the competent (judicial and quasijudicial) bodies. Accordingly the African Commission, in the course of monitoring the legislative and other measures undertaken by states for the full realisation of the rights recognised in the Protocol (Article 26), and the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (in the course of the interpretation of matters arising from the application or implementation of this Protocol under Article 27), should

69  See HRC, General Comment 24 (52): General Comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant [ICCPR], UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) para 8. For discussion, see CJ Redgwell, ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No 24(52)’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 390; EA Baylis, ‘General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 17 Berkeley Journal of International Law 277; K Korkeli, ‘New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2002) 13(2) European Journal of International Law 437; S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 797–819. 70  See Reservations to CEDAW at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm. 71  Ibid. 72  See the CEDAW Committee’s statement on reservations in the report on the 19th Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, 53rd Session, Supplement No 38, UN Doc A/53/38/Rev. 1, part two, ch I. 73  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc A/56/38 (2001) para 327; UN Doc CEDAW/C/ EGY/CO/7 (5 February 2010) para 14. The Committee urges the state party to review and withdraw the reservations to articles 2 and 16, which are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention’.

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assess the compatibility of reservations to the Protocol on Women’s Rights in Africa with the object and purpose of the Protocol. In doing so, account should be taken of the following:74 (a) (b) (c)

the indivisibility and interdependence of the rights set out in the Protocol; the importance that the right which is the subject of the reservation has within the general architecture of the Protocol; and the seriousness of the impact the reservation has (or is intended to have) upon a particular right, relevant rights or the Protocol as whole.

Impermissible reservations under the Protocol are likely to include any general and broad reservations subjecting the Protocol to domestic law incompatible with the ­Protocol, or those extending to minimum core obligations that are non-derogable and which thereby deprive the Protocol of its raison d’être. [7.25]  The African Commission can advance the protection of women’s rights in Africa by requiring reserving states, through their reports, to explain: (a) (b) (c) (d)

the nature and scope of reservations or interpretative declarations; the reason(s) why such reservations were considered to be necessary and have been maintained; the precise effect of each reservation in terms of national law and policy; any plans to limit or modify the effect of reservations, and ultimately to withdraw them within a specific time frame.75

Where applicable, the African Commission, in its recommendations to states, could highlight the lack of consistency among reservations formulated to certain provisions protected in more than one treaty, and encourage the withdrawal, whether total or partial, of a reservation on the basis of the availability of better protection in other international conventions resulting from the absence of a reservation to comparable provisions. On its part, the Court should treat reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol as invalid, and therefore of no legal effect. Unless a state chooses to withdraw from the Protocol, such reservations should generally be severable, meaning that the Protocol will be operative for the reserving state without benefit of the reservation, however phrased or named. C.  The State of Women’s Rights in Africa in Practice [7.26(a)]  Every state in Africa is party to at least one international treaty prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the enjoyment of human rights, or party to an international treaty providing for the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all human rights. Despite this, it is essential to note that [w]omen are often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights, in particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom, or as a result of overt or covert discrimination. Many women experience distinct forms of discrimination due to the intersec-

74 

Pellet, above n 67, para 7. also Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2007/5, para 16 (9); HRC, General Comment 24 (52), above n 69, para 20. 75  See

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tion of sex with such factors as race, colour, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status, such as age, ethnicity, disability, marital, refugee or migrant status, resulting in compounded disadvantage.76

[7.26(b)]  For example, persons with mental disabilities are often subjected to: human rights abuses, including rape and sexual abuse, by other users or staff of mental health facilities; forced sterilisation; confinement; violence and torture; the administration of treatment without informed consent; grossly inadequate sanitation; and a lack of food.77 However, women with mental disabilities are especially vulnerable to forced sterilisation and sexual violence, a violation of their sexual and reproductive health rights.78 Moreover, women with disabilities who belong to ethnic and racial minorities often experience compounded disadvantages due to the intersection of sex with ­ethnicity and race, though this has been historically neglected.79 This is because [c]ertain forms of racial discrimination may be directed towards women specifically because of their gender, such as sexual violence committed against women members of particular racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed conflict; the coerced sterilization of indigenous women; abuse of women workers in the informal sector or domestic workers employed abroad by their employers.80

In Libya, for example, there are ‘numerous reports about the existence of racial prejudices against Black Africans, which on some occasions has led to acts of violence against them’.81 Women have been the worst victims, since the human rights of women are often subordinated to rigid social norms reportedly condoned and reinforced by the Libyan Government.82 [7.27]  Consequently, there are circumstances in which discrimination (on grounds of disability or race) only or primarily affects women, or affects women in a way or degree different from men. For example, women often have less access to education and healthcare than men, and this compromises their opportunities for employment and advancement.83 For instance, in Botswana, women ‘refugees have access neither to the Anti Retroviral (ARV) Therapy Programme nor the Prevention of Motherto-Child Transmission of HIV Programme’.84 Therefore, despite the ratification of

76  CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (11 August 2005) para 5. 77  P Hunt, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/51 (11 February 2005) para 9. 78  Ibid, para 12; KL Raye, Women’s Rights Advocacy Initiative: Violence, Women, and Mental Disability (Mental Disability Rights International, 1999); L Dowse and C Frohmader, Moving Forward: Sterilisation and Reproductive Health of Women and Girls with Disabilities (Rosny Park, Women with Disabilities ­Australia, 2001); SLT Julia, Women, Disability and Mental Distress (Farnham, Ashgate, 2015). 79 CESCR, General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities (11th Session, 1994), UN Doc E/1995/22, 19 (1995) para 19, stating, ‘Persons with disabilities are sometimes treated as genderless human beings. As a result, the double discrimination suffered by women with disabilities is often neglected.’ 80  CERD, General Recommendation 25: Gender Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/55/18 Annex V (20 March 2000) para 2. 81  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc E/C.12/LYB/CO/2 (25 January 2006) para 12. 82  Human Rights Watch, Libya: A Threat to Society? Arbitrary Detention of Women and Girls for ‘Social Rehabilitation’, February 2006, vol 18, no 2(E), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/libya0206/. 83  CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18 (6 February 2006) para 13. 84  CERD, Concluding Observations: Botswana, UN Doc CERD/C/BWA/CO/16 (4 April 2006) para 19.

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human rights instruments by the majority of African states, women in Africa still continue to be ‘victims of discrimination and harmful practices’ which violate their human rights.85 The key obstacles to the realisation of women’s human rights in Africa have deep cultural roots. The next section examines some selected prejudicial cultural practices affecting women’s realisation of ESC rights.

IV.  PREJUDICIAL CULTURAL PRACTICES AND CUSTOMS AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE REALISATION OF WOMEN’S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA A.  African Culture in General [7.28]  The term ‘culture’ is broad and vague: the concept of culture can refer to many things, varying from cultural products, such as arts and literature, to the cultural process or culture as a way of life.86 Anthropologists commonly use the term ‘culture’ to refer to a society or group in which many or all people live and think in the same ways.87 Culture includes ‘inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared bases of social action’.88 During the General Discussion on ‘The right to take part in cultural life’, held by CESCR at its 7th Session in 1992, it was stated that culture meant a ‘way of life’.89 The UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity defines culture as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, encompassing, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ‘ways of living together, value systems’, traditions and beliefs.90 Such a wide understanding is also reflected in HRC’s General Comment 23 on the rights of minorities, according to which ‘culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular “way of life associated with the use of land resources”, especially in the case of indigenous peoples’.91 In this respect, culture is a macroconcept, which subsumes religion as an aspect of culture.92 [7.29]  Although a number of African states have ratified treaties that guarantee the equality of men and women, and have incorporated the principles of equality and non-discrimination into national constitutions, the persistence of deep-rooted, adverse patriarchal attitudes and firmly entrenched stereotypical behaviour with respect to the

85 

African Women’s Rights Protocol, above n 42, preamble, para 12. Y Donders, Cultural Life in the Context of Human Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/40/13 (9 May 2008). See ch 12 on cultural rights. 87  F Raday, ‘Culture, Religion, and Gender’ (2004) 1(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 663, 665–66. 88 See Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, HarperCollins, 1999) 385. 89  UN Doc E/C.12/1992/2, para 213. 90 See UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO General Conference, 31st Session, 2 November 2001, preamble. 91  UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 8 April 1994. 92  Raday, above n 87, 665. 86  See

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role of women and men in the family and society limits the full implementation of the human rights of women.93 The widespread and continuing existence of harmful traditional practices in African states affects the equal right of men and women to the full enjoyment of all human rights.94 While it is acknowledged that culture (as reflected in customary law in Africa) in some cases can protect some human rights of women, the prevalence in Africa of certain harmful traditions, customs and cultural practices (often enforced as customary law which is largely patriarchal and systematically oppressive toward women) leads to substantial discrimination against women, thereby preventing them from fully exercising their human rights.95 Although ‘everyone’ has a right to cultural participation,96 including cultural rights of specific groups,97 ­African cultures and traditions as they presently exist are mainly made for and by men.98 Some of these discriminatory cultures are now reflected in state practice and enforced by domestic courts.99 In Eritrea, for example, while participation in National Service ­creates eligibility for access to land and other economic resources, women are exempt from National Service on grounds of marriage, thus losing eligibility for access to land and other resources.100 This serves to perpetuate women’s subordination in the family and society, and constitutes a serious obstacle to women’s enjoyment of their human rights, including ESC rights. [7.30]  Some of these cultures are enforced through discriminatory laws. For example in Nigeria, section 26(2) of the Constitution does not allow a Nigerian woman to transmit her nationality to her foreign spouse on the same basis as a Nigerian man;

93 See, eg, CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Mali, UN Doc CEDAW/C/MLI/CO/5 (3 February 2006) para 17; Egypt, UN Doc A/56/38 (2 February 2001) para 325; Cameroon, UN Doc A/55/38 (26 June 2000) paras 53–54; Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc A/55/38 (1 February 2000) paras 230–32; Guinea, UN Doc A/56/38 (31 July 2001) paras 122 and 138; United Republic of Tanzania, UN Doc A/53/38/Rev.1 (6 July 1998) paras 229–30. 94 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005) para 10, noting that ‘the persistence of customs and traditions harmful to women’ is one of the factors impeding the implementation of the ICESCR. 95  Ibid, paras 14, 23, 32. In para 23, the CESCR was ‘concerned about the harsh living conditions of widows and girl orphans due to, among other things, harmful traditional practices such as “widowcleansing­”, early marriages and denial of inheritance’. Similarly, in para 32 the CESCR noted that in Zambia, ‘traditional attitudes [against the education of girls] continue and that discrimination against girl children is prevalent in the State party’. See also Raday, above n 87, 663–715. 96  See ICESCR, Art 5(a); UDHR, Art 27(1), stating, ‘Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community’; CERD, Art 5(e)(vi); the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘the Protocol of San Salvador’), Art 14; and African Charter, Art 17(2). 97  See ICCPR, Art 27; CEDAW, Art 13(c); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), GA res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No 49) at 167, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990, Art 31; and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, GA res 45/158 of 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003, Art 31. 98 J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Who’s Watching “Big Brother? Globalization and the Protection of Cultural Rights in Present Day Africa’ (2005) 27(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1245, 1268. 99  See, eg, Senate Gabasheane Masupha v The Senior Resident Magistrate for the Subordinate Court of Berea and Others, Case no C of A (Civ) 29/2013, Judgment of 17 April 2014, Court of Appeal of ­Lesotho, [2014] LSCA 22, available at http://www.lesotholii.org/ls/judgment/court-appeal/2014/22 (upholding ­discriminatory customary succession to the Chieftainship). 100  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Eritrea, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3 (3 February 2006) para 14.

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section 55 of chapter 198 of the 1990 Labour Act of Nigeria prohibits women from working at night in certain sectors of employment; section 360 of the Criminal Code classifies sexual assault against female victims as a misdemeanour; and section 55 of the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria allows wife battery as chastisement as long as ‘grievous harm’ is not inflicted. The latter term is defined as loss of sight, hearing, power of speech, facial disfigurement or life-threatening injuries.101 In more traditional areas of Nigeria, the courts and police have been reluctant to intervene to ­protect women who formally accused their husbands of abuse if the level of alleged abuse did not exceed customary norms in the areas.102 This has denied women in Africa ‘the right to live in a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies’ affecting their lives.103 The right of everyone to cultural participation seeks to encourage the active contribution of all members of society to the progress of society as a whole. As such, it is intrinsically linked to, and is dependent on the enjoyment of, other human rights, such as the right to own property alone as well as in association with others;104 the freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds;105 the right to the full development of the human personality;106 and freedom of movement.107 [7.31]  Women are often denied travel documents just because they are female— they are subjected to legal or de facto requirements that prevent them from travelling (to access employment or education), such as the requirement of consent of a third party to the issuance of a passport or other type of travel documents to an adult woman. One case from Libya demonstrates the effect of violations of women’s ­freedom of movement on women’s enjoyment of other human rights. In Loubna El Ghar v Libyan Arab ­Jamahiriya,108 the author, of Libyan nationality, had lived all her life in Morocco with her divorced mother, and held a residence permit for that ­country. As a student of French law at the Hassan II University, Casablanca, she wished to continue her studies in France and to specialise in international law. To that end, she applied to the Libyan Consulate in Morocco for a passport, beginning in 1998. In 2002, the Libyan consul indicated to the author that it was not possible to issue her a passport but that she could be given a laissez-passer (travel document) for Libya, by virtue of a ‘regulation’ that was explained neither orally nor on the laissezpasser itself. The passport application submitted to the Libyan Consulate was thus

101  US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005, Nigeria, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 8 March 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2005/61586.htm. According to the 2003 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), 64.5% of women and 61.3% of men agreed that a husband was justified in hitting or beating his wife for at least one of six specified reasons, including ‘burning food and not cooking on time’. 102  US Department of State, above n 101. 103  African Women’s Rights Protocol, above n 42, Art 17(1). 104  See UDHR, Art 17; ICERD, Art 5(d)(v); Protocol no 1 to the ECHR, Art 1; the AmCHR, Art 21; and African Charter, Art 4. 105 See UDHR, Art 19; ICCPR, Art 19(2); ECHR, Art 5; the AmCHR, Art 13; and African Charter, Art 9. 106  See UDHR, Art 26(2); ICESCR, Art 13(1). 107  ICCPR, Art 12(2) provides, ‘Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.’ 108  HRC, Communication no 1107/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/1107/2002 (15 November 2004).

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rejected without any explanation of the grounds for the decision, the only comment being that since the author ‘is a native of Morocco and has not obtained a passport, this travel ­document [laissez-passer] is issued to enable her to return to national territory’. The HRC ­considered that ‘this laissez-passer cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute for a valid Libyan passport that would enable the author to travel abroad’.109 It ­concluded that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Covenant (ICCPR) insofar as the author was denied a passport without any valid justification and subjected to an unreasonable delay, and as a result was prevented from travelling abroad to continue her studies.110

The HRC urged ‘the State party to issue the author with a passport without further delay’ and to ‘take effective measures to ensure that similar violations do not recur in future’.111 It is clear that the refusal to issue a passport to a female student on the basis of an ‘unwritten regulation’ (ie apparently because the applicant was female and she had no consent from a third party, namely her father) in this case not only violated her freedom of movement (a civil and political right), but also prevented her from travelling abroad for further studies (a violation of the right to education—an ESC right).112 [7.32]  It is, therefore, not surprising that many features of customary law in Africa effectively operate ‘against the dignity, welfare or interests of women [and] undermine their status’.113 Generally, it has been noted that [t]raditional cultural practices reflect values and beliefs held by members of a community for periods often spanning generations. Every social grouping in the world has specific traditional cultural practices and beliefs, some of which are beneficial to all members, while others are harmful to a specific group, such as women. These harmful traditional practices include female genital mutilation (FGM);114 forced feeding of women; early marriage; the various taboos or practices which prevent women from controlling their own fertility; nutritional taboos and traditional birth practices; son preference and its implications for the status of the girl child; female infanticide; early pregnancy; and dowry price.115

109 

Ibid, para 7.2. Ibid, para 8. 111  Ibid, para 9. 112 See also LE Chamblee, ‘Rhetoric or Rights?: When Culture and Religion Bar Girls’ Right to ­Education’ (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 1073. 113 Oloka-Onyango, above n 98, 1268, citing the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), Arts 33(6), 32(1); and Cultural Objective xxiv in the preamble, which encourages the incorporation into aspects of Ugandan life of all cultures and customary values consistent with fundamental rights and ­freedoms and human dignity. 114  Female genital mutilation (FGM, also referred to as ‘female circumcision’ or ‘female genital cutting’) ‘is the practice of partially or wholly removing the external female genitalia or otherwise injuring the female genital organs for non-medical or non-health reasons’. See CEDAW and CRC Committees, Joint General Recommendation/General Comment no 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and no 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (4 November 2014) para 18. 115  Fact Sheet No 23, Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, ­available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/factsheet23en.pdf. 110 

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In the African context, the main harmful traditional practices include ‘the practice of female genital mutilation,116 as well as scarification and ritual killing of children’,117 corporal punishment (in the family, schools and other institutions),118 the high level of acceptance of domestic violence towards women,119 forced and/or early marriages,120 polygamy (more specifically polygyny—a man having more than one wife) and the denial of inheritance rights to women.121 Many customary laws discriminate against women, mainly in the areas of inheritance, marriage and divorce.122 These areas are, therefore, key to a deeper understanding of why women in Africa do not enjoy their human rights. Yet some states have made only limited efforts to address directly such discriminatory cultural practices and stereotypes, and maintain that ‘women themselves are primarily responsible for changing their position of disadvantage’.123 How can women change such entrenched discriminatory position without the necessary political will to confront holistically discriminatory laws and entrenched cultural practices? Since ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and

116  M Marie-Hélène and d J Palmieri, Confronting Female Genital Mutilation: The Role of Youth and ICTs in Changing Africa (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2011); CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000) para 16: ‘The Committee further notes with concern that the percentage of women who are victims of FGM remains alarmingly high: WHO statistics for 1995 showed an estimated 97 per cent prevalence of FGM (“Female Genital Mutilation: An Overview”, WHO, Geneva, 1998, p 13)’; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Eritrea, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3 (3 February 2006) para 18, stating that ‘the Committee is concerned at the high incidence of female genital mutilation in the country and the State party’s reluctance to expedite the adoption of legislation aimed at eradicating this practice’. 117  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.257 (13 April 2005) para 56. In respect of Uganda, the CRC Committee expressed its concern in 2005 that FGM is still ‘widely practised’ in Uganda: CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc CRC/C/UGA/CO/2 (23 November 2005) para 55. 118  In Nigeria, for example, the sharia legal code prescribes ‘penalties and corporal punishment such as flogging, whipping, stoning and amputation, which are sometimes applied to children’. CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, above n 117, para 38(d). See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, above n 117, para 39, noting that ‘[w]hile taking note that corporal punishment has been prohibited in schools by a circular of the Ministry of Education, and in the penal system under the Children’s Act, the Committee remains concerned that corporal punishment is still traditionally accepted and widely practised in the family and in other settings’; G Muhwezi, ‘Teacher’s Canes Paralyse Student’, Sunday Monitor 30 July 2006; and Lawfulness of Corporal Punishment: Uganda, available at http://www. endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/progress/reports/uganda.html (May 2006). 119  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, above n 117, para 44. See also CG Bowman, ‘Theories of Domestic Violence in the African Context’ (2003) 11 American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 847. 120  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Nigeria, above n 117, para 54. 121  See, eg, The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Bringing Equality Home: ­Promoting and Protecting the Inheritance Rights of Women—A Survey of Law and Practice in Sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva, COHRE, 2004); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 ­September 2001) para 15, noting that discriminatory practices against women and girls in Senegal include ‘polygamy, restricted access to land, property, housing and credit facilities, and the inability to inherit land’. 122  See, eg, PO Davies, ‘Marriage, Divorce, and Inheritance Laws in Sierra Leone and their D ­ iscriminatory Effects on Women’ (2005) 12(3) Human Rights Brief 17; B Oppermann, ‘The Impact of Legal ­Pluralism on Women’s Status: An Examination of Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States’ (2006) 17 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 65. 123  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Togo, UN Doc CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/3 (3 February 2006) para 14.

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interrelated’,124 inequality affects the enjoyment of all human rights of women. For example, inequality in civil and political rights undermines the exercise and enjoyment of women’s ESC rights and vice versa. The next section discusses a selection of cases of violations of women’s human rights in Africa, focusing especially on some traditional customs in the areas of inheritance, polygyny and divorce. B.  Right to Inheritance [7.33]  Equal inheritance and ownership of land and property is an ESC right.125 ­Article 21 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa protects this right in these terms: 1. A widow shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her husband. A widow shall have the right to continue to live in the matrimonial house. In case of remarriage, she shall retain this right if the house belongs to her or she has inherited it. 2. Women and men shall have the right to inherit, in equitable shares, their parents’ properties.

[7.34]  However, in many African states, women cannot inherit under the relevant ­customary law, which applies the rule of male primogeniture. In Zambia, for example, customary land, which represents over 80 per cent of all land, is traditionally inherited by the man’s family in accordance with rules of male primogeniture, ‘to the detriment of widows and, especially, girl children’.126 It is a widely-held view that ‘a [married] woman is property because she’s been bought, so how can property own property?’127 Disappointingly, discriminatory provisions were entrenched in Zambia’s 1996 Constitution. As noted by the CEDAW Committee, Zambia’s 1996 Constitution contains contradictory provisions … whereby article 11 guarantees the equal status of women and article 23(4) permits discriminatory laws to exist in the area of personal law, namely: … devolution of property on death, or other matters of personal law and customary law with respect to any matter.128

Undoubtedly, this provision is a serious flaw in the legal protection of women’s human rights, and it fosters patriarchy and discriminatory practices against women, including ‘early marriage, payment of dowry (lobola), the practice of property division after

124  UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, I A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993), para 5. 125  Appendix G to this book, para 1. 126  CESCR Committee, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005) para 27. 127  COHRE, above n 121, 143. 128  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc A/57/38 (21 June 2002) para 230. Art 11 of Zambia’s Constitution (1996), on fundamental rights and freedoms, protects various civil and political rights for all Zambians, regardless of, inter alia, sex. This provision also prohibits the taking of property without appropriate compensation. Disappointingly, however, Art 23(4) of the Constitution specifically excludes from the application of the non-discrimination clause to all law: ‘(c) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law; (d) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe, of customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons’.

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the death of a husband (property-grabbing), sexual cleansing, and polygamy’.129 It is, therefore, necessary to repeal Article 23(4) of the Zambian Constitution, which permits discrimination in the area of law that affects women most.130 Zambia’s 2013 Draft Constitution protects women against discrimination. For example, Article 27 provides that ‘[a] person shall not be discriminated against, except under a law that provides for affirmative action’. The Constitution further guarantees equal treatment between men and women and an ‘equal right to inherit’.131 [7.35]  Three examples of discriminatory customary inheritance laws from Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana are considered below to illustrate the necessity to eliminate discriminatory laws against women in inheritance. i. The Magaya Case [7.36]  Suprisingly, in some cases, where customary law contravenes international human rights or the statutory law, the customary law continues to be upheld and applied.132 Perhaps the best case to illustrate this point is the decision of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Venia Magaya v Nakayi Shonhiwa Magaya.133 The main issue was whether a woman (a 58-year-old named Venia Magaya) could inherit her father’s estate if he died without a will. At the community court (which was presided over by a female officer), Venia was indeed appointed as heir to the estate of her father. However, Venia’s half-brother from her father’s second wife and other male relatives then contested this appointment. They argued before the magistrate’s court that customary law does not permit a daughter to inherit from her father’s estate. The magistrate agreed with this argument and substituted one of the half-brothers as heir. Venia then appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. Denying that a woman could indeed inherit on account of the custom of the community from which she came, the learned judge in the case upheld discrimination against women and observed that the ‘nature of African society’ dictates that women are not equal to men, especially in family relationships. The judge noted that ‘the woman’s status is therefore basically the same as that of any junior male in the family’.134 The 5:0 ruling by the male judges awarded the father’s estate to the woman’s half-brother, making ­reference to discriminatory African cultural norms, which say that the head of the family is a patriarch, or a senior man, who exercises control over the property and lives

129 CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Zambia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ZMB/CO/5-6 (19 September 2011) para 13. 130  Ibid, para 14. 131  Draft Constitution of Zambia 2013, Art 51, provides: ‘(1) Women and men have the right to equal treatment and opportunities. (2) Women and men have an equal right to inherit, own, use, administer and control property.’ At the time of writing, the Draft Constitution had not come into effect. 132  HRC, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.89 (8 April 1998) para 12. 133  Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Judgment no SC.210/98/Civil Appeal no 635/92, 1999 (1) ZLR 100 (Magaya case). For analysis of this case, see DM Bigge and A von Briesen, ‘Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women’s Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v Magaya’ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 290. 134  Magaya case, above n 133, 10.

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of women and juniors.135 The Court noted that the woman could not inherit ‘because of the consideration in the African society which, amongst other factors, was to the effect that women were not able to look after their original family (of birth) because of their commitment to the new family (through marriage)’.136 [7.37]  The Supreme Court found further that, although the practice of preferring males is discriminatory, it did not contravene the Zimbabwean Constitution, as it does not forbid discrimination based on sex in the distribution of a deceased person’s estate under customary law. Indeed, section 23 of the Zimbabwean Constitution137 allows blatant discrimination in several areas, including ‘the application of African customary law’.138 Essentially, the Supreme Court elevated discriminatory customary law above human rights obligations. Given the fact that human rights are ‘fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities’, and that ‘human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person’,139 it is important not to elevate customary norms over the human rights of women. In this respect, the Magaya decision has been described as ‘outrageous’ and as ‘one of the world’s most egregious cases of court-condoned discrimination’.140 [7.38]  Unfortunately, the Magaya decision is not an isolated one, since numerous ­ jurisdictions around Africa regularly give more weight to cultural practices that support patriarchy and discrimination than they do to the rights of women.141 This ­limits women’s access to land (the most valuable economic resource and main source of income in developing African states) and thereby reinforces women’s economic dependence on men, a fact that perpetuates women’s vulnerability, insecurity and the attendant human rights violations. Undoubtedly, the continued existence of, and adherence to, customary laws entrenches discrimination against women, particularly in the context of the family. Such prevailing traditional and socio-cultural attitudes towards women contribute to the perpetuation of negative images of women, which limits women’s participation at the decision-making level and impedes their ­emancipation.142 As the HRC observed: Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. … States parties should ensure 135  COHRE, above n 121, 169 observed ‘The Magaya case should be seen as a warning to all women— that all the laws in the world will amount to nothing if they continue to be interpreted by discriminatory men.’ 136  Magaya case, above n 133. 137  At the time of writing, the Constitution was last reformed in the year 2000. Shortly after the decision, Venia Magaya died in 2000, homeless and destitute. See generally Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust (WLSA), Venia Magaya’s Sacrifice: A Case of Custom Gone Awry (Harare, WLSA, 2001). 138  Section 23(3) states that ‘[n]othing contained in any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection (1)(a) [which provides that ‘no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect’] to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters: (a) adoption, ­marriage, divorce and inheritance … (b) the application of African customary law’. 139  CESCR, General Comment 17, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) paras 1 and 2. 140  COHRE, above n 121, 162 and 169. 141  Oloka-Onyango, above n 98. See also Mifumi (U) Ltd & Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Appeal No 2 of 2014 (Supreme Court of Uganda, 6 August 2015). 142  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe UN Doc A/53/38 (14 May 1998) para 139.

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that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant [ICCPR] rights.143

[7.39]  One way of ensuring that the implementation of customary laws does not ­violate women’s right to equality is to interpret those laws in the light of present-day conditions and international human rights obligations of states. Under this approach, customary laws must be interpreted in a way that promotes the equal enjoyment of all human rights—civil, political and ESC rights—by men and women. It follows that the courts would be able to strike down, for example, the rule of male primogeniture in the African customary law of succession. This would ensure that the meaning and application of customary law can vary so as to adapt to new and enhanced ideals of human rights protection. The following two cases from South Africa and Botswana adequately illustrate this point. ii. The Bhe Case [7.40]  In the Bhe case in South Africa, there was a constitutional challenge to the rule of male primogeniture as it applies in the African customary law of succession.144 In this case the deceased’s partner (Ms Nontupheko Bhe) had two minor children, both extramarital daughters, by the deceased (Mgolombane), who died intestate. The daughters had failed to qualify as heirs to the intestate estate of their deceased father. The court appointed the deceased’s own father as sole heir to the deceased’s estate, in accordance with the relevant domestic law.145 The general rule (custom) was that only a male relative of the deceased could qualify as heir in the case of intestacy. Women did not participate in the intestate succession of deceased estates. In a monogamous family, the eldest son of the family head was his heir. If the deceased was not survived by any male descendants, his father succeeded him. If his father also did not survive him, an heir was sought among the father’s male descendants, related to him through the male line.146 [7.41]  The application in the Bhe case was made on behalf of the two minor daughters of Ms Nontupheko Bhe and her deceased partner. It was contended that the impugned provisions and the customary law rule of male primogeniture unfairly discriminated against the two children, in that they prevented the children from inheriting the estate of their late father. In the Shibi case,147 similar reasons prevented Ms Shibi from inheriting the estate of her deceased brother. The South African Human Rights

143 HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000), para 24. 144 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Nonkululeko Letta Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, ­Khayelitsha and Others, Case CCT 49/03, 2004 (2) SA 544 (C) 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (Bhe case); Shibi v Sithole and Others, Case CCT 69/03 (Shibi case); South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case CCT 50/03 (15 October 2004) (SAHRC case). 145  The Black Administration Act of 1927, s 23, read with the regulations published thereunder, as well as s 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, purported to give effect to customary law. Extramarital children were not entitled to succeed to their father’s estate in customary law. 146  Bhe case, above n 144, para 77. 147  Shibi case, above n 144.

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Commission and the Women’s Legal Trust were permitted direct access to the Constitutional Court in the third case,148 which was brought in the public interest and as a class action on behalf of all women and children prevented from inheriting by reason of the impugned provisions and the rule of male primogeniture. [7.42]  The South African Constitutional Court held that the exclusion of women from heirship, and consequently from being able to inherit property, was in keeping with a patriarchal system which reserved for women a position of subservience and subordination in which they were regarded as perpetual minors under the tutelage of fathers, husbands or heads of the extended family. Basing its decision on sections 9 (equal protection) and 10 (right to dignity) of the South African Constitution,149 the ­Constitutional Court found, rightly, that excluding women from inheriting on the ground of gender is, ‘a form of discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under this constitutional order’.150 The Court noted that customary laws ‘have over time become increasingly out of step with the real values and circumstances of the societies they are meant to serve and particularly the people who live in urban areas’.151 Langa DCJ, writing for the majority of the Court, held, inter alia: The principle of primogeniture also violates the right of women to human dignity as guaranteed in s 10 of the Constitution as, in one sense, it implies that women are not fit or competent to own and administer property. Its effect is also to subject these women to a status of perpetual minority, placing them automatically under the control of male heirs, simply by virtue of their sex and gender. Their dignity is further affronted by the fact that as women, they are also excluded from intestate succession and denied the right, which other members of the population have, to be holders of, and to control property … In denying female and extra-marital children the ability and the opportunity to inherit from their deceased fathers, the application of the principle of primogeniture is also in violation of s 9(3) of the Constitution.152

It was concluded that the primogeniture rule as applied to the customary law of succession cannot be reconciled with the current notions of equality and human dignity as contained in the Bill of Rights. As the centerpiece of the customary-law system of succession, the rule violates the equality rights of women and is an affront to their dignity. In denying extra-marital children the right to inherit from their deceased fathers, it also unfairly discriminates against them and infringes their right to dignity as well. The result is that the limitation it imposes on the rights of those subject to it is not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society founded on the values of equality, human dignity and freedom.153 148 

SAHRC case, above n 144. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, s 9, provides, ‘(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. … (3) The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth’. S 10 of the Constitution provides, ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’ 150  Bhe case, above n 144, para 91. 151  Ibid, para 82. 152  Ibid, paras 92–93. 153  Ibid, para 95. 149  The

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[7.43]  The above decision shows that courts can play a positive role in developing women’s human rights jurisprudence. Judicial oversight is crucial in ensuring that women are protected against discriminatory laws.154 However, the impact of progressive judicial decisions is limited if court decisions are not adequately enforced. iii. The Mmusi Case [7.44]  The case of Molefi Silabo Ramantele v Edith Modipane Mmusi and Others155 considered whether the Ngwaketse customary law rule in Botswana—which provides ‘that only the last born son is qualified as intestate heir to the exclusion of his female siblings’—violated the constitutional right to equality under section 3(a) of the C ­ onstitution of Botswana. The case involved four sisters—Edith Mmusi, Bakhani Moima, Jane Lekoko and Mercy Ntsehkisang—who argued that they were entitled to inherit the family home as they had used their own finances to renovate the property and had taken care of their mother prior to her death. Their claim was challenged by their half-brother’s son, Molefi Silabo Ramantele, who argued that under Ngwaketse customary law in Botswana, the family home was inherited by the youngest son, and thus he was entitled to inherit his late father’s estate. [7.45]  The case was initially heard by the Lower Customary Court, which found in favour of Ramantele. This decision was appealed to the Higher Customary Court, which found that the homestead belonged to the sisters in effect. This was appealed to the Customary Court of Appeal, which ordered Mmusi to vacate the family home, as under the customary law rule it now belonged to the last-born son. A further appeal was made to the High Court of Botswana, which decided in favour of the four ­sisters on the basis that the rule of Ngwaketse customary law violated women’s right to equality under section 3(a) of the Constitution.156 The Court of Appeal, in a unanimous judgment, held that the homestead belonged to all of Silabo’s and Thwesane’s children, which effectively meant that Edith and her sisters inherited the homestead. Lesetedi JA declared that ‘the Ngwaketse Customary Law of inheritance does not prohibit the female or elder children from inheriting as intestate heirs to their deceased parents’ family homestead’,157 noting: A customary rule that denies those children of a deceased parent who played a major role in developing a particular part of the estate for the benefit of the deceased, a right on intestacy

154  More examples from Uganda support this position. See M Ssenyonjo, ‘Towards Non-Discrimination Against Women and De Jure Equality in Uganda: The Role of Uganda’s Constitutional Court’ (2008) 16(1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. 155  Molefi Silabo Ramantele v Edith Modipane Mmusi and Others, CACGB-104-12, [2013] BWCA 1 (Court of Appeal of Botswana, 3 September 2013) (Mmusi case), available at: http://www.africanlii.org/ sites/default/files/Mmusi-Court-of-Appeal-Judgment_0.pdf. 156  Edith M Mmusi and Others v Molefi S Ramantele, MAHLB-000836-10, [2012] BWHC 1 (The High Court of Botswana, 12 October 2012), available at http://www.africanlii.org/bw/judgment/highcourt/2012/1. S 3(a) of the Constitution of Botswana 1966 provides, ‘every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest to each and all of the following, namely—(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law …’. 157  Mmusi case, above n 155, para 105(1)(b).

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to any share of that asset, in favour of a child who has refused to play any part in the building up and maintenance of that part of the estate, without any compensatory award, goes against any notion of fairness, equity and good conscience. It does not qualify to be given the status of a law nor should it be applied or enforced by the courts. … It is axiomatic to state that customary law is not static. It develops and modernizes with the times, harsh and inhumane aspects of custom being discarded as time goes on; more liberal and flexible aspects consistent with the society’s changing ethos being retained and probably being continuously modified on a case by case basis or at the instance of the traditional leadership to keep pace with the times.158

The judge observed that during the last 30 years, a lot of changes must have happened, including the constitutional values of equality before the law, demonstrating that ‘there is no rational and justifiable basis for sticking to the narrow norms of days gone by when such norms go against current value systems’.159 This confirmed that a court would have to apply the customary law to the particular facts of the case ‘against the benchmarks of justice, equity and good conscience’.160 Consequently, any customary law or rule which discriminates in any case against a woman unfairly solely on the basis of her gender would not be in accordance with humanity, morality or natural justice. Nor would it be in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.161

[7.46]  It can be noted that the Constitutional Court in South Africa and the Court of Appeal of Botswana took a progressive view of culture—by taking into account human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination—while the Supreme Court in Zimbabwe placed emphasis on the domestic constitutional provisions and avoided interpreting these in light of the well-established human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination. The cases considered above also lead to some interesting questions: for example, why did the South African Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeal in Botswana give such a progressive view of customary laws compared to the Supreme Court in Zimbabwe? Is it because of the differences in the socio-political dynamics at play in these jurisdictions? [7.47]  Undoubtedly, however, African governments need to take a more proactive role at a national level by introducing concrete measures to abolish all discriminatory customs and practices, including by extending gender-sensitive training to the judiciary. In the context of inheritance, it is essential to note that Article 21 of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, which protects the right to inheritance, can be used as a minimum standard to which all the customary laws on inheritance in Africa must be subjected. In addition, the codification of family and customary laws, incorporating only those customary laws and practices that promote gender equality and the empowerment of women, has the potential to enhance the realisation of women’s human rights in Africa.

158 

Ibid, paras 50 and 77. Ibid, para 80. 160  Ibid, (Concurring Judgment of Kirby JP), para 33. 161  Ibid, para 36. 159 

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C. Right to Marry and Found a Family: Same-sex Marriages and Polygamous Marriages i.  Right to Marry and Found a Family [7.48]  Article 18(1) of the African Charter protects the family as ‘the natural unit and basis of society’. This protection of the family has been understood also to imply ‘the right to marry’. Among others, this includes state obligations to: (a) Guarantee in law and practice the rights of all persons to enter into marriage with their full and free and personal consent. (b) Abolish such customs, customary laws and practices as may affect the freedom of choice of a spouse. (c) Ensure that no marriage is entered into by parties less than 18 years old.… (d) Ensure the equal rights and responsibilities of spouses during marriage and at its dissolution.162

[7.49]  By Article 10(1) of the ICESCR, the states parties to the Covenant recognise the right of ‘intending spouses’ to enter a marriage based on ‘free consent’, and thus to found a family: The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.163

[7.50]  Other international human rights treaties protect the family in various ways. For example Article 23 of the ICCPR protects the family as ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society’,164 and recognises the ‘right of men and women of ­marriageable age to marry and to found a family’.165 It further stipulates that No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.166

and obliges states parties to the ICCPR to take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.167

[7.51]  Regional human rights treaties also protect the right to marry and found a family. For example, Article 12 of the ECHR provides: Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

162 

African Commission, Principles and Guidelines, above n 50, para 95. ICESCR, Art 10(1) (emphasis added). 164  ICCPR, Art 23(1). 165  ICCPR, Art 23(2). See Ms Juliet Joslin et al v New Zealand, Communication no 902/1999, UN Doc A/57/40 at 214 (17 July 2002); S Joseph and M Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 666. 166  ICCPR, Art 23(3). 167  ICCPR, Art 23(4). 163 

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While national law ‘must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired’,168 a state may impose limitations on such matters as ‘marriage age, consanguinity, the number of spouses, consent, and capacity’,169 as well as restricting a marriage of convenience between a foreigner and a national ‘entered solely for the purpose of securing an immigration advantage’.170 Since ‘marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from one society to another’, the national authorities are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society by providing what unions constitute marriage.171 [7.52]  The concept of the ‘family’ is not defined in the African Charter. It is likely, though, that when the Charter was adopted in 1981, the right to marry, implied by the protection of the family, was clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different sexes. It did not extend to same-sex marriages. Similarly, the concept of the ‘family’ is not defined in either the ICESCR or the ICCPR. While Islamic law traditionally restricts the family to marriage between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other,172 a ‘broad interpretation’ of the family as ­understood in a particular state’s society and domestic law and practice has been ­preferred in the practice of UN treaty-monitoring bodies.173 This may include a ‘nuclear’ family (a family consisting of just the parents and their children), an ‘extended’ family (a ­family consisting of children, parents, grandparents and sometimes in-laws sharing one household), married heterosexual couples174 (with or without children), unmarried couples and their children, for example as a result of ‘cohabitation’,175 single parents and their children, and divorced or widowed persons with children.176 168 

Rees v UK, App no 9532/81, 17 October 1986, Series A, no 106, (1987) 9 EHRR 56, para 50. See DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warwick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 755 (references omitted). 170  O’Donoghue and Others v UK, App no 34848/07, 14 December 2010, (2011) 53 EHRR 1, para 83. 171  Schalk and Kopf v Austria, App no 30141/04, 24 June 2010, (2011) 53 EHRR 683, para 62. 172  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993), Art 5: ‘(a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of making a family. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from exercising this right. (b) The society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and facilitate it, and shall protect the family and safeguard its welfare.’ 173  HRC, General Comment 16: The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation (1988), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994) para 5; Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v France, Communication no 549/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 (29 July 1997) para 10.3. 174  Joslin v New Zealand, above n 165, paras 8.2 and 8.3. The HRC Committee held that ‘mere refusal to provide for marriage between homosexual couples’ did not breach the ICCPR given that Art 23(2) of the ICCPR defines the right to marriage by using the term ‘men and women’, rather than ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’ and ‘all persons’. This has been understood as recognising ‘marriage only [as] the union between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other’. 175 HRC, Balaguer Santacana v Spain, Communication no 417/1990, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/417/1990 (27 July 1994) para 10.02: ‘Some minimal requirements for the existence of a family are however necessary, such as life together, economic ties, a regular and intense relationship etc.’ 176  HRC, General Comment 19: Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses (1990), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 (2003) para 2; Wim Hendriks, Sr v The Netherlands, Communication no 201/85, UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/201/1985 (12 August 1988) para 10.3: ‘The words “the family” in article 23, paragraph 1 [ICCPR], do not refer solely to the family home as it exists during the ­marriage. The idea of the family must necessarily embrace the relations between parents and child. Although divorce legally ends a marriage, it cannot dissolve the bond uniting father—or mother—and child; this bond does not depend on the continuation of the parents’ marriage. It would seem that the p ­ riority given to the child’s interests is compatible with this rule.’ 169 

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The ECtHR has recognised same-sex couples as constituting an unmarried ‘­family’, since this concept is not linked to marriage.177 While same-sex couples can enjoy ­family life due to a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards them in some (mainly EU member) states,178 the Grand Chamber confirmed in the case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria179 that the right to marry under Article 12 of the ECHR does not extend to same-sex couples: 54. The Court notes that Article 12 grants the right to marry to ‘men and women’. The French version provides that ‘l’homme et la femme ont le droit de se marier’. Furthermore, Article 12 grants the right to found a family. 55. The applicants argued that the wording did not necessarily imply that a man could only marry a woman and vice versa. The Court observes that, looked at in isolation, the ­wording of Article 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the marriage between two men or two women. However, in contrast, all other substantive Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to ‘everyone’ or state that ‘no one’ is to be subjected to certain types of prohibited treatment. The choice of wording in Article 12 must thus be regarded as deliberate. Moreover, regard must be had to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between partners of different sex.

Given the recent extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples in some EU member states (and, indeed, in some other states including the United States and South Africa), the traditional understanding of marriage may be reconsidered in the future through judicial re-interpretation so that marriage is understood to apply to same-sex couples. ii.  Polygamous Marriages [7.53]  Although polygamy is considered to be one of the practices ‘harmful to women and girls’, alongside child marriage and domestic violence,180 it is still practised or permitted in some states, whether legally or illegally, and there are many women in polygamous relationships. Some traditional practices in Africa are so firmly established that, while from an international human rights perspective, they are considered as contrary to women’s equality with men, they are recognised even in the African W ­ omen’s Rights Protocol. One of the clearest examples is polygamy,181 which, ­according to the

177 

X and Y v UK, App no 9369/81, 3 May 1983, (1983) 32 DR 220. See, eg, X and Others v Austria, App no 19010/07, 19 February 2013, 57 EHRR 405; Vallianatos and Others v Greece, Apps nos 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013. 179  Schalk and Kopf v Austria, App no 30141/04, 24 June 2010, (2011) 53 EHRR 683. 180  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 11. 181  The term ‘polygamy’, in social anthropology, can be defined as any form of marriage in which a person has more than one spouse. It covers both polygyny (the state or practice of one man having more than one wife simultaneously), or polyandry (one woman having more than one husband simultaneously), or, less commonly, as polygamy (one person having many wives and many husbands at the same time). In this chapter, ‘polygamy’ has been used to mean polygyny. For a discussion of polygamy, see S Chapman, Polygamy, Bigamy and Human Rights Law (Philadelphia, PA, Xlibris Corporation, 2001). 178 

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UN HRC, discriminates against women and violates their dignity. In the words of the HRC: It should also be noted that equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry implies that polygamy is incompatible with this principle. Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against women. Consequently, it should be definitely abolished wherever it continues to exist.182

A similar position has been applied by the CESCR. For example, in 2006, in its ­Concluding Observations on Morocco, the CESCR noted ‘with regret’ that polygamy, despite the restrictions placed on it by Morocco’s new Family Code, continues to be practised in Morocco. The Committee recalled that ‘polygamy is a violation of a ­woman’s dignity and constitutes discrimination against women’.183 It recommended that Morocco ‘abolish polygamy once and for all’.184 On another occasion the ­Committee stated that ‘polygamy, a practice which is very often incompatible with the economic, social and cultural rights of women, is widespread in Nigeria’.185 ­Further the Committee was ‘concerned’ that, despite the amendments to Algeria’s Family Code in 2005, polygamy is still allowed, and recommended that further revisions be made to the Family Code ‘to ensure that polygamy is outlawed’.186 [7.54]  If polygamy violates the dignity of women and is very often incompatible with the ESC rights of women,187 why is it recognised in the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa? Article 2(1) of the Protocol provides that States Parties shall combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. …

And under Article 2(2): States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.

More specifically, under Article 5: States Parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international standards.

182  HRC, General Comment 28, above n 143, para 24. See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations (13th Session, 1992), UN Doc A/49/38 at 1 (1994) para 14; General Recommendation 28, above n 38; General Recommendation 29: Economic Consequences of Marriage, Family Relations and their Dissolution, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/29 (26 February 2013) paras 21, 27 and 28; General Recommendation 31, above n 114, paras 24–27. 183  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Morocco, UN Doc UN DocE/C.12/MAR/CO/3 (2006) para 15. 184  Ibid, para 38. 185  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Nigeria UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.23 (13 May 1998) para 22. 186  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Algeria UN Doc E/C.12/DZA/CO/4 (7 June 2010) para 14. 187  African Women’s Rights Protocol, Art 3(1): ‘Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human and legal rights.’

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[7.55]  One would have expected such prohibited harmful cultural and traditional practices which are contrary to international human rights standards to include polygamy. Nevertheless, the Protocol states in Article 6(c): States Parties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national legislative measures to guarantee that: … (c) monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are ­promoted and protected …

[7.56]  The above provision might be interpreted as recognising polygamy. This might be seen as being consistent with the African Charter, which makes it a ‘duty’ of the state and the individual to promote and protect the morals and ‘traditional/cultural values’ recognised by the community.188 Clearly, then, African states parties to the Protocol are only obliged to ‘encourage’ monogamy. This is a weaker obligation since, in its ordinary and natural meaning, the obligation to ‘encourage’ only extends to ‘inspire with the courage or confidence’.189 The obligation is not to eliminate polygamy immediately. During the drafting of the African Women’s Rights Protocol, there was a vigorous debate on whether polygyny should be abolished. While non-governmental organisations demanded its abolition, government experts actively resisted its abolition, because ‘Shari’a and many customary personal law systems recognised the rights of men to marry more than one wife’ and that its abolition would result in ‘hardship being suffered by women already in polygynous unions’.190 It is recognised under the Protocol that it is possible to ‘promote’ and ‘respect’ women’s rights in polygamous marital relationships, although it is less clear as to how this can be achieved in practice. By implication, therefore, polygamy under the Protocol is not seen as one of those practices which violate the dignity of women or constitute inadmissible discrimination against women (at least in the short term). [7.57]  Given the fact that polygamy in Africa is deeply entrenched, it is considered to be very difficult to ban it outright, and if it were banned it might cause harm to many women living in these relationships, whose only protection at the moment might be provisions under the impugned customary law. Therefore, the approach taken was seen as offering necessary flexibility, reflecting the realities of the situation in Africa and the difficulties involved in agreeing to a regional human rights treaty on women’s human rights on a continent where most states have plural legal systems covering ­different

188  African Charter, Art 18(2): ‘The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognised by the community.’ Ibid, Art 29(7): ‘The individual shall also have the duty: … To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the ­promotion of the moral well being of society’. 189 See Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, HarperCollins, 1999) 510. 190  F Banda, ‘Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women’s Rights Comes into Force’ (2006) 50(1) Journal of African Law 72, 77. See also F Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) 70–71.

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cultural, ethnic and religious groupings.191 This is especially the case given the fact that certain states in Africa (eg Egypt and Sudan) apply aspects of Islamic law (­sharia) that are interpreted by some scholars as enjoining ‘justice’ (Quran 16: 90) but not ­providing for ‘equality’ between men and women,192 and which permit a man to marry up to four women.193 Such interpretation of the Quran has been contested on the basis that the Quran ‘never discriminates on the basis of gender. It is the ­interpretation of the Quran, reflecting masculine and patriarchal prejudices of the interpreters, that is discriminatory’.194 Indeed, depending on the way Islamic injunctions in the Quran are interpreted and applied, they may contribute towards the realisation of women’s human rights. This view has been supported by the CRC C ­ ommittee, which noted that ‘the universal values of equality and tolerance [are] inherent in Islam’.195 It is also interesting to note that representatives of Islamic states, such as the Saudi A ­ rabian delegation before the CEDAW Committee, have also emphasised that ‘there is no ­contradiction in substance between the Convention [on the Elimination of Discrimination of ­Discrimination against Women] and Islamic Sharia’.196 The Cairo ­Declaration on Human Rights in Islam confirms that while a ‘woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform’, the ‘husband is responsible for the maintenance and welfare of the family’.197 [7.58]  It has to be noted, however, that the recognition of polygamy is difficult to reconcile with the views of the HRC set out in paragraph 7.54 above, and those of the CEDAW Committee. According to the CEDAW Committee: Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependants that such marriages

191 Banda,

Women, Law and Human Rights, above n 190, 71. example, a renowned Islamic scholar, Sheikh Muhammed Salih Al-Munajjid, asserted: ‘Those who say that Islam is the religion of equality are lying against Islam. … Rather Islam is the religion of justice which means treating equally those who are equal and differentiating between those who are different. No one who knows the religion of Islam would say that it is the religion of equality. … Not one single letter in the Qur’an enjoins equality, rather it enjoins justice.’ See Islam Question and Answer, ‘Does Islam Regard Men and Women as Equal?’ at http://islamqa.info/en/1105. For the interpretation of the Quranic provisions regarding women, see generally M Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Musnad, Islamic Fatawa Regarding Women (Riyadh, Darussalam, 1996). 193  A Mashhour, ‘Islamic Law and Gender Equality—Could There Be a Common Ground? A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 562; J Allain and A O’Shea, ‘African Disunity: Comparing Human Rights Law and Practice of North and South African States’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 86; W Amien, ‘­Overcoming the Conflict between the Right to Freedom of Religion and Women’s Rights to Equality: A South African Case Study of Muslim Marriages’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 729. 194  See, eg, Niaz A Shah, ‘Women’s Human Rights in the Koran: An Interpretive Approach’ (2006) 28(4) Human Rights Quarterly 868, 903. See also J Rehman, ‘The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 108, 123, asserting that in the development of the classical schools of Islamic law, ‘the Islamic jurists frequently adopted male-centric approaches towards women’s rights and family laws’. 195  See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations, Egypt, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.145 (21 F ­ ebruary 2001) para 6; Qatar, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.163 (6 November 2001) para 9; Saudi Arabia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.148 (22 February 2001) para 6. 196  See CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Saudi Arabia, CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (1 ­February 2008) para 10. 197  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993) Art 6. 192  For

Prejudicial Cultural Practices and Customs

 401

ought to be discouraged and prohibited. The Committee notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, and breaches the provisions of article 5(a) of the Convention.198

Thus the Committee has called on states permitting the practice to ‘take necessary legislative measures to prohibit polygamy’.199 [7.59]  Article 5(a) of the CEDAW, which has been ratified by several African states and is substantially similar to Article 2(2) of the African Women’s Rights Protocol, provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women …

Since polygamy is considered by UN treaty-monitoring bodies as violating women’s rights to equality with men contrary to Article 5(a) of the CEDAW, would the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or another court to replace it), which under Article 27 of the African Women’s Rights Protocol is ‘seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of this Protocol’,200 similarly interpret polygamy as violating Article 2(2) of the Protocol? While the Court’s interpretation remains to be seen, a similar interpretation would be consistent with the view that the ‘Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned’,201 without prejudice to ‘more favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights of women contained in the national legislation of States Parties or in any other regional, continental or international conventions’.202 Under Article 60 of the African Charter, the African

198 

CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 21, above n 182, para 14. eg, CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Pakistan, UN Doc CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4 (27 March 2013) para 38(e). 200  The first judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights were elected on 22 January 2006. On 1 July 2008, a statute was adopted providing for the merger of the institutions of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice to become the ‘African Court of Justice and Human Rights’. See Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Assembly/AU/13(XI). Before this statute entered into force, it was amended by a ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ adopted by AU Heads of State and Governments on 27 June 2015. This amending protocol provides for establishment of a new court—‘African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights’. 201  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights, 9 June 1998, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), Art 6. 202  African Women’s Rights Protocol, Art 31. 199  See,

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Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

­ ommission, and arguably the Court, since it complements the protective mandate of C the African Commission,203 is required to draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of … the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [and] other instruments adopted by the United Nations … of which the parties to the present Charter are members.

Such instruments undoubtedly include the CEDAW. [7.60]  It is possible that if the Protocol were to be interpreted in line with the CEDAW, the obligation to ‘encourage’ would be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Protocol, which is to establish clear human rights obligations for states parties in respect of the full realisation of the human rights of women. The increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of equality and non-discrimination as the fundamental values of democratic societies. Therefore, the Court should have regard to the fact that the Protocol is a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.204 As stated in the preamble to the Protocol, its objective is to ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to enjoy fully all their human rights.205

Three specific obligations arise here: to protect, to promote and to realise. [7.61]  The obligation to protect requires states parties to take steps aimed directly towards the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices that perpetuate the notion of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, and stereotyped roles for men and women.206 The obligation of states parties to protect under the ­Protocol includes, inter alia, respect for and the adoption of constitutional and legislative provisions on the equal right of men and women to enjoy all human rights, and the prohibition of discrimination of any kind; the adoption of legislation to eliminate discrimination and to prevent third parties or private actors (individuals, groups, corporations and other entities as well as agents acting under their authority) from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of women’s human rights, including ESC rights;207 and the adoption of administrative measures and programmes, as well as the establishment of public institutions, agencies and programmes, to protect women against discrimination.208 203  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, above n 201, Art 2. 204  A similar approach has been used by the ECtHR in interpreting the ECHR. See, eg, Selmouni v France App no 25803/94, judgment of 28 July 1999, (2000) 29 EHRR 403, para 101; Tyrer v the United Kingdom, App no 5856/72, judgment of 25 April 1978, (1979–80) 2 EHRR 1, para 31. 205  African Women’s Rights Protocol, preamble, para 14 (emphasis added). 206  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 76, para 19. 207 See Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 (15th Annual Activity Report), para 44; Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad, Communication no 74/92 (2000) AHRLR 66 (9th Annual Activity Report) (African Commission); X and Y v Netherlands (1985) Series A no 91, 32 (ECtHR); Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C, no 4 (IACtHR), holding that a state has a positive duty to prevent human rights violations occurring in the territory subject to its effective control, even if such violations are carried out by third parties. 208  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 76, para 19; African Women’s Rights Protocol, Art 2.

Prejudicial Cultural Practices and Customs

 403

[7.62]  States parties have an obligation to monitor and regulate the conduct of NSAs to ensure that they do not violate the equal right of men and women to enjoy civil and political, and ESC rights.209 This obligation applies, for example, in cases where public services have been partially or fully privatised,210 or where rebel armed movements— such as the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda—violate human rights, including subjecting women to torture (eg rape), forced marriage or sexual slavery,211 or where armed groups execute women based on allegations of adultery.212 [7.63]  The obligation equally applies where NSAs formulate policies that discriminate against women. A 1992 case from Zambia illustrates this point.213 This case involved challenging a NSA, the Intercontinental Hotel, which had a policy of refusing women entry unless they were accompanied by a male escort. The hotel justified the policy as a necessary measure against prostitution. A security guard stopped a woman (Longwe) when she tried to retrieve her children from a party at the hotel. On another occasion, the same hotel refused Longwe admittance when she had arranged to meet a group of women’s activists in the hotel’s bar. Longwe made a claim at the Zambian High Court, arguing that the hotel’s actions violated her right to freedom from discrimination under both Zambia’s Constitution and Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the CEDAW. The High Court of Zambia noted that Zambia, being a party to international treaties such as the African Charter and the CEDAW, must respect and conform to the notion of gender equality. Reading international instruments and the Zambian Constitution in conjunction, the Court held that discriminating acts on the basis of gender carried out by NSAs violated the plaintiff’s fundamental equality rights and women’s rights. This case is notable because it applied human rights obligations to NSAs. The implication is that states must put an end to discriminatory actions affecting women’s equal enjoyment of human rights with men, ‘both in the public and the private sector’.214 In particular, states should implement laws and policies to ensure that ‘pregnancies must not constitute an obstacle to employment and should not constitute justification for loss of employment’.215 [7.64]  The obligations to promote and realise (fulfil) require states parties to take steps to ensure that, in practice, men and women enjoy their civil, political and ESC rights on a basis of equality. Such steps should include, but not be limited to, the ­following.216 First, the availability and accessibility of appropriate remedies for

209 

CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 76, para 20; see ch 3. Ibid. See also generally K de Feyter and F Gomez (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). 211  M Ssenyonjo, ‘Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and Human Rights Violations’ (2005) 10(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 405. 212 Amnesty International, ‘Somalia: Girl Stoned was a Child of 13’, 31 October 2008, available at https://www.amnesty.ie/news/somalia-girl-stoned-was-child-13; Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape’ 14 April 2015, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/ iraq-isis-escapees-describe-systematic-rape. 213  Sara H Longwe v Intercontinental Hotels, 1992/HP/765 (1993) 4 LRC 221 (High Court of Zambia). For discussion, see T Kankasa-Mabula, ‘The Enforcement of Human Rights of Zambian Women: Sara Longwe v Intercontinental Hotel revisited’ (1989–92) 21–24 Zambia Law Journal 30. 214  HRC, General Comment 28, above n 143, para 4. 215  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 83, para 13. 216  CESCR, General Comment 16, above n 76, para 21. 210 

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v­ictims, such as ­ compensation, reparation, restitution, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition, declarations, public apologies, educational programmes, prevention programmes, revised policies, benchmarks and implementation programmes.217 Domestic courts must not shy away from confronting discriminatory customary practices against women. A decision of the Nigerian Court of Appeal, affirmed by the Supreme Court, shows how domestic courts can enforce human rights of women.218 This case involved a challenge of a local custom in Nigeria known as nrachi or ­idegbe.219 This custom involves the performance of a ceremony whereby a man could keep one of his daughters perpetually in his home, unmarried, in order to care for the children, especially males, to succeed him (and thereby perform the ‘women’s traditional role’). Relying upon Article 2 of the CEDAW, the Nigerian Court of Appeal found the custom to be discriminatory on the basis of sex, and in violation of the right to marry and women’s equality rights. The Court stressed the importance of eliminating ­discriminatory ­customary practices in order to give international human rights practical effect. In holding that a female child can inherit from her deceased father’s estate without the nrachi ceremony being performed, the Court observed: In view of the fact that Nigeria is a party to the Convention [CEDAW], courts of law should give or provide teeth to its provisions. That is one major way of ameliorating the unfortunate situation Virginia found herself in, a situation where she was forced to rely on an uncouth custom not only against the laws of Nigeria but also against nature.220

Secondly, the establishment and maintenance by states parties of appropriate effective venues for redress against human rights violations, including violations against ESC rights. Such venues include independent courts and tribunals, administrative mechanisms, and national human rights and women’s commissions that are accessible to all on the basis of equality, including the poorest and most disadvantaged and marginalised women. Thirdly, the design and implementation of policies and programmes to give long-term effect to the civil, political and ESC rights of both men and women on the basis of equality. These may include the adoption of temporary special measures to accelerate women’s equal enjoyment of their rights, gender audits and genderspecific­allocation of resources.221 Lastly, the promotion of equal representation of men and women in public office and decision-making bodies, and the promotion of

217  CEDAW, General recommendation No 33: Women’s Access to Justice UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/33 (3 August 2015); Montreal Principles, above n 1, para 36; African Women’s Rights Protocol, Art 25. See also generally D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 218  Muojekwu v Ejikeme [2000] 5 Nigerian Weekly Law Reports 657, 402. 219  This situation usually arises when a deceased man leaves an estate but no surviving male issue to inherit it. The idea underlying this practice is to save the lineage ‘from extinction’. The daughter, now considered an idegbe or nrachi, is entitled to inherit both movable and immovable property from her deceased father’s estate. The legal interest vests in her until she gives birth to her own children. However, if she bears sons and daughters, the sons rather than the daughters succeed her in accordance with the rule of primogeniture. 220  Muojekwu v Ejikeme, above n 218, 410. 221  See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25: Temporary Special Measures A/59/38 Part I; CEDAW/C/2004/I/WP 1/Rev.1 (2004); I Boerefijn et al (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003).

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participation of men and women in development planning, decision-making and in the benefits of development and all programmes related to the realisation of all human rights. [7.65]  As noted above, the custom of polygamy is considered in international human rights law to be discriminatory against women. How does polygamy discriminate against women? One common response is that it gives men rights to treat women as ‘property’. Thus, Wing and Smith have stated: This custom can place women at a severe disadvantage by treating wives as commodities to be bought and sold. Even in cases where women’s rights to inheritance and child support are ­recognised, polygamy leaves less to split among the wives. Polygamy is also one of the major reasons African men have difficulty supporting their families placing heavier burdens on women to produce and support their children. … A major problem exists since women bear a risk of getting infected [with HIV] by men who have multiple partners/wives.222

[7.66]  Viewed in this context, Article 6(c) of the African Women’s Rights Protocol may be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the African states parties to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal of monogamy (and thus an implied obligation to progressively eliminate polygamy). If the Protocol were to be read in such a way as not to establish such an obligation to move towards monogamy, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être, since polygamy, as shown above, has been held as amounting to discrimination against women. However, attempts to o ­ utlaw polygamy in Africa on the above basis are likely to be opposed by those who argue that the practice protects women223 and is recognised in sharia.224 Indeed, attempts to restrict polygamy in Uganda through the Domestic Relations Bill 2005 were largely resisted by Muslims on the above grounds.225 Similarly, Kenya’s ­Marriage Act 2014 recognises polygamous heterosexual marriages (in accordance with customary and Islamic law)226 by defining marriage as ‘the voluntary union of a man and a woman in a monogamous or polygamous union’.227 It specifically provides that ‘[a] marriage celebrated under customary law or Islamic law is presumed to be polygamous or potentially polygamous’.228 This was done after UN treaty-monitoring bodies had concluded

222  AK Wing and TM Smith, ‘The New African Union and Women’s Rights’ (2003) 13 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 33, 40, 45 (footnotes omitted). See also EN Mayambala, ‘Changing the Terms of the Debate: Polygamy and the Rights of Women in Kenya and Uganda’ (1997) 3(2) East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 200. But see MC Ali, Who Practices Polygamy? (The Institute of Islamic Information and Education, n.d), available at http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/339/viewall/whopractices-polygamy/, who argues that ‘The truth of the matter is that monogamy protects men, allowing them to “play around” without responsibility. … Men are the ones protected by monogamy while women continue to be victims of men’s desires. Polygamy is very much opposed by the male dominated society because it would force men to face up to responsibility and fidelity. It would force them to take responsibility for their polygamous inclinations and would protect and provide for women and children.’ 223  See, eg, Ali, above n 222. 224  See, eg, M Salih Al-Munajjid, The Ruling on Plural Marriage and the Wisdom Behind It, available on the website of Islam Question and Answer, at http://islamqa.info/en/14022. 225  See ‘New Domestic Relations Bill is Acceptable to Most Ugandans’, The New Vision, 13 July 2008. 226  The Marriage Act 2014, ss 43, 48–49. 227  The Marriage Act 2014, s 3(1). As the bill was being debated, one male member of Kenya’s ­Parliament, Mohammed Junet, declared, ‘When you marry an African woman she must know the second one is on the way, the third one is on the way, the fourth one is on the way.’ 228  Ibid, s 6(3).

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that polygamous marriages in Kenya undermine the non-discrimination­provisions and are incompatible with Kenya’s human rights treaty obligations, for example under the ICCPR and CEDAW.229 They recommended that Kenya bring ‘all marriage laws under the prohibition of polygamy’,230 and that it should ‘take ­concrete measures to prohibit polygamous marriages’.231 Instead of prohibiting such marriages, Kenya has continued to protect them legally. D.  Right to Equality and Divorce [7.67]  States are obliged to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, ‘[t]he same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution’.232 However, traditional divorce law in many states in Africa either discriminates against women or contains provisions that may place women at a disadvantage. For example, in Egypt, sharia is the primary source of legislation, and practices that conflict with the Government’s interpretation of sharia are prohibited.233 Women seeking divorce through unilateral repudiation by virtue of Act No 1 of 2000 (khul), must in all cases forgo their rights to financial support and, in particular, to their dowries.234 This leads to financial discrimination against women, and may bar women from seeking divorce through unilateral repudiation. In 2013, the CESCR was ‘concerned that there continue to be laws that discriminate against women in the context of divorce and inheritance’ in Egypt.235 [7.68]  In some states, women have to meet stricter evidentiary standards than men to prove grounds for divorce. In Uganda, for example, before 15 October 2004, husbands were able to divorce their wives solely on the grounds of adultery, whereas for a wife to petition for divorce, she had to prove adultery plus an additional ground.236 Uganda’s Constitutional Court, on 11 March 2004, held that these provisions were inconsistent with Articles 21 (equal protection), 31 (equal rights in marriage) and 33 (right to dignity) of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution.237 In a leading judgment, Twinomujuni JA stated that ‘[i]t is, in my view, glaringly impossible to reconcile the impugned provisions

229 

HRC, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/KEN (29 April 2005) para 10. Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7 (5 April 2011) para 46. 231  HRC, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc CCPR/ /C/KEN/CO/3 (31 August 2012), para 7. 232  CEDAW, Art 16(1)(c). 233  See entry on ‘Egypt’ in Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222499.pdf. Art 2 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2014) provides that ‘Islam is the religion of the state … [t]he principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation’. 234  HRC, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc CCPR/CO/76/EGY(28/11/2002) para 8; CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc A/56/38 (2 February 2001) para 328. 235 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Egypt, UN Doc. E/C.12/EGY/CO/2-4 (13 December 2013) para 9. 236 These included: incest, bigamy, polygamy, rape, sodomy, bestiality, cruelty or desertion. See the Divorce Act (cap 249), Laws of Uganda 1964, s 4(2)(b). 237  Constitutional Court of Uganda at Kampala, Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v The Attorney General, Constitutional Petition no 2 of 2003 (10 March 2004). Art 21 provides: ‘All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law.’ 230  CEDAW

Prejudicial Cultural Practices and Customs

 407

of the Divorce Act with our modern concepts of equality and non-discrimination­ between the sexes enshrined in our 1995 Constitution’.238 [7.69]  This was a landmark case in the history of the rights of women to equality and non-discrimination in Uganda, for three reasons. First, the Court was unanimous in declaring the impugned provisions of the Divorce Act null and void. The state did not appeal against this judgment to the Supreme Court, Uganda’s highest appellate court, implying that it was in total agreement with the Constitutional Court’s ­judgment. ­Secondly, the effect of declaring the impugned provisions of the Divorce Act was understood in later cases to mean that ‘the grounds of divorce stated in section 4(1) and (2) [of Uganda’s Divorce Act] are now available to both sexes and therefore, provide for equal justice’.239 As one High Court judge noted, ‘after constitutional petition No 2 of 2003, each of the grounds for divorce specified in Section 4 of the Divorce Act, Cap 249, is available equally to both the husband and the wife’.240 Understood in this context, the decision of the Constitutional Court is in accordance with Uganda’s international human rights obligations under the ICCPR and CEDAW. The HRC interpreted the ICCPR as requiring that the ‘grounds for divorce and annulment should be the same for men and women’.241 Thirdly, the Constitutional Court signalled that it would in the future declare similar discriminatory laws null and void if legal challenges were mounted. Indeed the Court appears to have directly invited future petitions challenging discriminatory laws.242 In her judgment, Lady Justice Mpagi-Bahigeine stated: There is urgent need for Parliament to enact the operational laws and scrap all the inconsistent laws so that the right to equality ceases to be an illusion but translates into real substantive equality based on the reality of a woman’s life, but where Parliament procrastinates, the courts of law being the bulwark of equity would not hesitate to fill the void when called upon to do so or whenever the occasion arises.243

[7.70]  This is a welcome development, consistent with the right for ‘women and men [to] enjoy the same rights in case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage’.244 To eliminate discrimination against women: Unequal power relations between women and men in all spheres of life, including marriage and divorce, must be acknowledged and changed, and the entrenched disadvantage caused by this power imbalance must be addressed if women are to achieve the equal exercise and equal enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights.245

238  Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v The Attorney General, above n 237, judgment of ­Twinomujuni  JA. 239  See Judgment of Hon Justice LEM Mukasa-Kikonyogo, DCJ (18 November 2005) in Pamela Sabina Mbabazi v Henry Mugisha Bazira, Civil Appeal no 44 of 2004. Kitumba JA and Steven BK Kavuma JA agreed with Mukasa-Kikonyogo, DCJ. 240  Dr Speciosa Wandira Naigaga Kazibwe v Eng Charles Nsubuga Kazibwe, High Court Divorce Cause no 3 of 2003, judgment of VF Musoke-Kibuuka of 9 October 2004. 241  HRC, General Comment 28, above n 143, para 26. 242  Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v The Attorney General, above n 237. 243  Ibid, judgment of Mpagi-Bahigeine. 244  African Women’s Rights Protocol, Art 7. 245  Montreal Principles, above n 1, para 5.

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Upon dissolution of marriage, women should have equal rights to property acquired during marriage, in line with Article 16(1)(h) of the CEDAW, including the right to an equitable sharing of the joint property deriving from the marriage.

V.  CONCLUSION: THE DUTY TO UPROOT CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO ENHANCE WOMEN’S ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS [7.71]  This chapter has focused on only a handful of the many cultural issues that arise in the debate over the protection and promotion of women’s human rights, including ESC rights. It cannot be disputed that ‘human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights’.246 It is evident from the foregoing that despite a wide range of human rights instruments protecting the human rights of women, much remains to be done to realise these rights in practice, especially for vulnerable groups of women. In the African context, while the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa sets a strong legal basis for the protection of human rights of women at a regional level, its application remains replete with difficulty. As noted above, nearly 10 years after the adoption of the Women’s Rights Protocol, only 36 (out of 54) African states had ratified it. Why are other states not ratifying (at least with some reservations) if they are committed to the human rights of women? To date, the reluctance to ratify the Protocol raises some questions as to the commitment of states to the regional protection of women’s human rights in Africa. In addition, the prevailing harmful traditional practices and theological premises (broadly speaking ‘culture’) have had a disproportionately negative effect on the realisation of women’s human rights. In the words of the HRC: Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. … States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant rights.247

[7.72]  The key question here is: what are the underlying dynamics that make culture, as an obstacle to women’s human rights in Africa, so entrenched and difficult to change? Cultural obstacles in Africa have been deeply entrenched for centuries, and most states have not adopted immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, to combat discrimination against women. As required by both the CEDAW (Article 5(a)) and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (Articles 2 and 12), it is now time for states to take ‘appropriate measures’, both legislative and non-legislative, to modify ‘social and cultural patterns of conduct’ to eliminate prejudices and practices based on the idea of the inferiority of women or on stereotyped roles of either sex.

246  UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, UN Doc A/Conf 157/23 (1993) paras 1, 18; the Fourth World Conference on Women, Declaration and Platform for Action, Beijing, UN Doc A/Conf 177/20 (1995) para 213. 247  HRC, General Comment 28, above n 143, para 5.

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It is, therefore, ­necessary for African states to give urgent attention to the general duty of states to adopt practical measures to achieve gender equality, and to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through public ­education;248 developing and implementing a national gender plan; integrating gender sensitisation and human rights education at all levels of education, including teacher training; gender budgeting; direct participation of women in policy development and implementation design; and by developing and applying qualitative and quantitative human rights indicators that facilitate the identification of the causes of exclusion and discrimination against women.249 [7.73]  However high the barriers, change is possible. What is so deeply rooted may be uprooted or transformed, especially through public education to challenge stereotypical gender roles through textbooks, academic instruction and patterns of participation in the education process. Continuous education, including education on ESC rights, will help to enhance the participation of women, overcome entrenched forms of resistance and transform certain cultural practices. Education is vital for the establishment of a culture where human rights are understood, respected and promoted. With respect to some cultural practices, such as polygamy, internal dialogue with the community between proponents and opponents of the practice may open a path to change that is more likely to be effective than any state attempt to criminalise it.250 [7.74]  It must be realised that in the era of globalisation, it is no longer enough to focus just on the state as the only bearer of human rights obligations. As shown in chapter three, a wide range of NSAs, including individuals, groups, corporations and other entities, should equally be obliged to respect and protect (where appropriate) the human rights of women. Some human rights treaties make this duty specific. For example, Articles 2(e), 2(f), and 11 of the CEDAW oblige states to take ‘appropriate measures’ to eliminate discrimination against women by ‘any person, organisation or enterprise’. Under Article 25(a) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, states parties undertake to ‘provide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or freedoms … have been violated’. These remedies may be against the state or NSAs (such as a discriminatory private employer in hiring, remuneration and promotion). [7.75]  There is, consequently, a need to interpret the African Women’s Rights Protocol as a living instrument. This requires the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or any other court that will replace it ie the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) to develop a framework within which the accountability for violations of human rights of women should be that not only of the state but also of other actors. In this context, it would be possible not only to bring claims of human rights

248  Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, Art 2(2). See also CEDAW, Art 10(c); CERD, Art 7; CRC, Art 12(1). 249  C Chinkin, ‘Gender and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in E Riedel et al, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 134. 250  See A An Na’im, ‘State Responsibility under International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Law’ in R Cook (ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) ch 7.

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violations of women’s rights against the state, but to do so directly against NSAs. This would help to address discrimination in the ‘private’ sphere of the workplace, school and home. In the case of Africa, it would therefore be very beneficial if the African Court were to seek to develop the Protocol in an objective and dynamic manner, by taking into account the increasingly higher standards for the protection of human rights. In this respect, it is useful to view culture as a dynamic aspect of every state’s social fabric and life, and therefore as subject to change. As Steiner writes, Culture is plastic, made and remade through the course of history, not unshakable and essentialist in character but in many respects contingent, open to evolution and to more radical change through purposeful human agency informed by human rights ideals.251

[7.76]  Viewed in this context, cultural practices discriminatory against women must be grasped not as static objects, but as historical processes. Non-discriminatory customary law and human rights, rather than being mutually exclusive, can and should complement each other. The cases of Bhe in South Africa, Mojekwu in Nigeria and Mmusi in Botswana provide some good examples of this. As noted above, courts in these countries applied human rights standards of equality and non-discrimination, without discarding culture. While it is necessary to uphold cultural life and diversity, it is equally essential to uphold human dignity of all women, and of all men, on the basis of equality. Whether the African Court will live up to this expectation remains to be seen. Of course, it is unlikely that the Court will meet this aim if the African Union does not provide it with adequate material, financial and moral support to allow it to function independently. Where domestic remedies have been exhausted, NGOs should be active in bringing cases before the Court in order to develop women’s human rights jurisprudence in Africa. [7.77]  Lastly, it must be recognised that passing, and even enforcing, laws or t­ reaties protecting human rights of women, while useful, does not guarantee equality. As shown above, despite the existence of several international instruments prohibiting discrimination against women and mandating equality, discrimination and inequality persist in practice. Indeed, the great irony is that women have been charged with, and have often found security in, maintaining discriminatory customs and tradition, thus institutionalising the discrimination against themselves through the education and socialisation of children.252 Therefore, while it is necessary to pay more attention to further implementation of the existing human rights instruments, educating the wider public about the need to eliminate customary practices which discriminate against women at the global, regional, national and local levels would enhance the struggle to realise women’s human rights in Africa. To appreciate this point, one needs to two simple questions: How many African women have heard about the existence, let alone the content, of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa? Why do the majority of the African women ‘support’ the very practices that discriminate against them? 251  HJ Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 753, 777. 252  See Keynote Address by HE Mrs Julia Dolly Joiner, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Commission of the African Union, Symposium on the African Union’s Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (Khartoum, The Sudan) (21 January 2006), on file with the author.

Conclusion

 411

[7.78]  It has been noted that during the drafting process of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, ‘there was a lack of wide consultation among relevant organisations, with the document being largely in the domain of the working group at the Commission. Consequently, the Protocol is little known among NGOs, governments or the population in Africa’.253 Even after the ratification of the Protocol by some states, not much has been done to ensure that it is known widely within the jurisdiction of ratifying states. In the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa of 2004,254 heads of states and government in Africa committed themselves to initiate and launch within two years sustained public campaigns against gender-based violence, and to reinforce legal mechanisms to protect women at the national level and end impunity for crimes committed against women. Beyond this Declaration, there does not appear to have been, so far, a practical commitment to human rights of women. Why are most African states not translating women’s rights into real rights that might be enjoyed in practice? [7.79]  It is suggested that African states and other actors should increase efforts, individually and through international cooperation, to promote gender equality in the enjoyment of ESC rights, including: (a) (b) (c) (d)

raising public awareness on gender equality with a view to eradicating gender role stereotypes in the family and the society; adopting and implementing temporary special measures with a view to addressing gender discrimination in the areas of education and employment; prohibiting all forms of discrimination, direct and indirect, as well as harassment, against women; and increasing the participation of women in leading positions in decision-making bodies at all levels.

[7.80]  It is essential to design and implement comprehensive education and ­awareness-raising programmes targeting women and men at all levels of society, with a view to creating an enabling and supportive environment within which to transform and change discriminatory laws, customs and stereotypes, and allowing women to exercise their human rights, including ESC rights. The promotion of gender equality must be made an explicit component of all national development strategies, policies and programmes, in particular those aimed at poverty alleviation and sustainable development, including poverty reduction strategies. Special attention must be paid to the needs of rural women255—who often lack access to adequate health services,

253  R Murray, ‘Women’s Rights and the Organisation of African Unity and African Union: The ­Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa’ in D Buss and A Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) 251, 263. 254  Third Ordinary Session, 6–8 July 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Assembly/AU/Decl.12 (III) Rev.1 255  R Nakayi et al, ‘The Women’s Movement in Africa: Creative Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’ (2005) 11(2) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 265, 299 and 302, noting that ‘Elitism has blurred the goals of the Women’s Movement [in Africa]. Often the elite women seem to be out of touch with the issues that affect rural poor women. … There is a need to find ways and means of making rural and other disadvantaged women more visible in the movement.’

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access to education, clean water and sanitation services, access to justice and access to credit facilities—and women heads of household. States should realise that cultural ­practices that deny women the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, as well as the opportunity to access economic resources and assets necessary for their economic, political and social empowerment, violate their human rights, including the rights to development and self-determination. These violations and denials of ­women’s human rights continue to bolster the marginalisation of women, feminisation of poverty, HIV/AIDS and insecurity in Africa—none of which is in the best interests of any single African state. It is not too late to recognise that promoting and defending women’s equal enjoyment of human rights with men advances society as a whole and contributes to the realisation of ESC rights.

Part II

Substantive Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

414 

8 Right to Work and Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work: Articles 6, 7 and 8 Article 6 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual. Article 7 ICESCR The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. Article 8 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (b) The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organisations;

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(c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d) The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country. 2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorise States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

I. INTRODUCTION [8.01]  The right to work is an important human right recognised in several international human rights instruments.1 Work is the most common source of individuals’ income and thus a means to an end—human survival. In addition, several regional legal instruments recognise the right to work in its general dimension, and affirm the principle that respect for the right to work imposes on states parties an obligation to take measures aimed at the realisation of full employment.2 Similarly, the right to work has been proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, which provides, ‘Social development requires the assurance to ­everyone of the right to work and the free choice of employment.’3 The ICESCR, as laid down in Article 6 above, deals more comprehensively than any other instrument with this right.4 The ICESCR proclaims the right to work in a general sense in its A ­ rticle 6, and explicitly develops the individual dimension of the right to work through the recognition in Article 7 of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, in particular the right to safe working conditions. The collective dimension of the right to work is addressed in Article 8, which enunciates the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his/her choice, as well as the right of trade unions to function freely.5 Several ILO

1 See, eg, UDHR, Art 23; ICESCR, Arts 6–7; ICCPR, Art 8(3)(a); ICERD, Art 5(e)(i); CEDAW, Art 11(1)(a); CRC, Art 32; International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), Art 27; and the Migrant Workers Convention, Arts 11, 25, 26, 40, 52 and 54. 2  See, eg, the European Social Charter of 1961, Part I, Art 1 and the Revised European Social Charter of 1996, Part II, Art 1; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, Art 15; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art 15; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 6; the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, Arts 30–32; and the Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1995, Art 14. 3  GA res 2542 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, Art 6. 4  CESCR, General Comment 18: The Right to Work, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18 (6 February 2006) para 1. 5  For a discussion of Art 8, see C Fenwick, ‘Minimum Obligations with Respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in A Chapman and S Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 53.

Introduction

 417

c­onventions further recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work.6 The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998 recognises the following as ‘core labour standards’: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (as a means of introducing, maintaining and defending just and favourable conditions of work); freedom from forced or compulsory labour; freedom from child labour; and the right to non-discrimination in employment. [8.02]  Although the right to work has been described as ‘the right to be economically exploited’, only a right to wage-earning labour, and ‘a duty to work’, ie a duty imposed on individuals to disassociate themselves from state support,7 the importance of the right to work has been aptly summarised by the CESCR as follows: The right to work is essential for realising other human rights [including the rights to life, education, health, housing, and adequate food] and forms an inseparable and inherent part of human dignity. Every individual has the right to be able to work, allowing him/her to live in dignity. The right to work contributes at the same time to the survival of the individual and to that of his/her family, and insofar as work is freely chosen or accepted, to his/her development and recognition within the community.8

[8.03]  This chapter deals with three aspects of the right to work based on existing international human rights standards, namely: (a) non-discrimination, with particular reference to non-nationals, equal pay for men and women, and health status; (b) freedom from slavery and forced or compulsory labour, human trafficking and exploitative child labour; and (c) the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment. Limitations on space and the need to examine the selected areas comprehensively are the basis for the choices made here. As globalisation stimulates international migration more than ever, clarifying the application of the right to work in the context of non-nationals and freedom from forced labour has important implications for protecting the human rights of immigrants (including the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment and trade union-related rights) and victims of forced labour. The structure

6  See, eg, Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No 1); Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 1921 (No 14); Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention 1928 (No 26); Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No 30); Forty-Hour Week Convention 1935 (No 47); Protection of Wages ­Convention 1949 (No 95); Minimum Wage Fixing (Agriculture) Convention 1951 (No 99); Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 (No 100); Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1957 (No 106); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111); Minimum Wage Fixing ­ ­Convention 1970 (No 131); Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) 1970 (No 132); Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No 138); Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention 1979 (No 153); Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No 155); Protocol of 2002 to the Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No 155); Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 1981 (No 156); Night Work Convention 1990 (No 171); Part-Time Work Convention 1994 (No 175); Maternity Protection ­Convention 2000 (No 183); The Convention concerning the promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health 2009 (No 187); Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (No 189). These conventions are available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12000:0::NO:::. 7  See G Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work—The Value of Work’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross, Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 341. 8  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 1.

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of this chapter is as follows. Section II. examines the application of non-discrimination and equal protection in employment, with particular reference to non-nationals and equal pay for men and women. It has been held that freedom of movement, protected in international human rights treaties, does not grant an individual the right to enter an alien state without that state’s consent.9 If a state is entitled to control the entry of aliens to its territory, does this mean that the state can determine whether or not nonnationals can work in its territory? To what extent can non-nationals (migrants) claim, and enjoy, the right to work in a host state? Section III. deals with freedom from slavery, forced and compulsory labour, human trafficking and exploitative child labour. Section IV. examines the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment and section V. considers trade union-related rights. Section V. contains concluding remarks.

II.  NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT [8.04]  The right to work comprises many aspects, which have been developed in particular through the ILO Conventions.10 The essence, however, is non-discrimination in guaranteeing the opportunity to have fulfilling and dignified work under just and favourable conditions, which include fair wages (entailing a minimum wage above the poverty line and a living wage) affording a ‘decent living’ or an adequate standard of living for oneself and one’s family, determined by prevailing social and economic conditions such as the cost of living; equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction, including ‘equal pay for equal work’; safe and healthy working conditions, in particular prevention of occupational accidents and diseases;11 an equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in employment, based on merit through fair and transparent processes; daily and weekly rest periods, leisure, and the reasonable limitation of daily and weekly working hours; paid annual leave and entitlement to other forms of leave, such as sick leave, maternity, paternity and parental leave, paid public holidays and flexible working arrangements (eg the ability to work at home, flexible time, job sharing) across all sectors and for all types of workers, including part-time and temporary workers; as well as freedom from all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment.12 [8.05]  As summarised in General Comment 18 of the CESCR, the core obligation of the right to work in the context of Article 6 ICESCR is the obligation to ensure non-discrimination and equal protection in employment, including protection of 9  See, eg, HRC, General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, 11 April 1986, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 18 (1994) para 5, stating that ‘The Covenant does not recognise the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory. However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.’ 10  See ILO Conventions at the ILO website, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 11  ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No 155), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrument_id:312300. 12  See VB Gomes and RR Leão, Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work, UN Doc E/C.12/54/R.2 (20 January 2015).

Non-discrimination and Equal Protection

 419

more ­vulnerable workers, such as women workers, migrant workers, domestic workers, workers with disabilities, agricultural workers, workers in the informal sector, young and older workers, self-employed workers and unpaid workers. In this General ­Comment on the right to work, the CESCR noted that the core obligation of the right to work includes at least the following requirements: (a) To ensure the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups, permitting them to live a life of dignity; (b) To avoid any measure that results in discrimination and unequal treatment in the private and public sectors of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups or in weakening mechanisms for the protection of such individuals and groups; (c) To adopt and implement a national employment strategy and plan of action based on and addressing the concerns of all workers on the basis of a participatory and transparent process that includes employers’ and workers’ organizations. Such an employment strategy and plan of action should target disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups in particular and include indicators and benchmarks by which progress in relation to the right to work can be measured and periodically reviewed.13

However, in practice, discrimination in employment remains a concern. For example, the gender pay gap is still a global problem, and persons belonging to ethnic, national or religious minorities in many states face discriminatory practices in employment, especially in managerial and high-ranking posts in many areas, in both the public and the private sector. Persons belonging to minorities in France, especially women, most notably those with North African or Arabic names, still face ‘serious discriminatory practices’ in the field of employment that prevent or limit their equal access to employment.14 [8.06]  Job-selection practices must not be discriminatory. The US Supreme Court, in its decision in the case of Griggs v Duke Power Co,15 established the disparate impact test, after black employees at an electricity generating plant had brought proceedings on the ground that their employers’ practice of requiring them to hold a high school diploma or to pass an aptitude test, even for the least well-paid jobs, was discriminatory. Fewer blacks had managed to obtain the diploma or pass the standardised tests. The Supreme Court stated:16 The [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] requires the elimination of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race, and, if, as here, an employment practice that operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, it is prohibited, notwithstanding the employer’s lack of discriminatory intent. … The Act does not preclude the use of testing or measuring procedures, but it does proscribe giving them controlling force unless … they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance …

13 

CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 31. Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (31 July 2008) para 25. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/FRA/CO/3 (9 June 2008) para 14. 15  Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424 (1971), available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supremecourt/401/424.html. 16  Ibid. 14  HRC,

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The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. … Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.

[8.07]  In addition to the right of access to employment and non-discrimination in employment, other core obligations of the right to work include freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of exploitative forms of child labour, and the prohibition of slavery and of forced or compulsory labour.17 These core obligations are derived from core rights that are also set out in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.18 Article 2 of this Declaration requires all ILO members ‘to respect, to promote and to realise’ the following rights: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. [8.08]  Like other human rights recognised in the ICESCR, the right to work applies to ‘everyone’ within the jurisdiction of a state party, including nationals and nonnationals. Thus, states are obliged to respect the right to work by, inter alia, avoiding measures (eg arbitrary closure of business premises19 and arbitrary detention leading to loss of employment) which may prevent individuals from working.20 In the Mazou case, the African Commission asserted that such measures constitute a violation of the right to work under Article 15 of the African Charter.21 Mr Mazou, a Cameroonian national, was a magistrate in Cameroon. He was imprisoned in 1984 by a military tribunal without trial, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for hiding his brother who was later sentenced to death in connection with an attempted coup d’état.

17 OECD,

Trade, Employment and Labour Standards (Paris, OECD, 1996) 26. Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, June 1998, available at http://www.ilo.org/ declaration/lang--en/index.htm. For comment on this Declaration, see P Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime’ (2004) 15(3) European Journal of International Law 457; and BA Langille, ‘Core Labour Rights—The True Story (Reply to Alston)’ (2005) 16(3) European Journal of International Law 409. 19  Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Republic of Zimbabwe, Communication no 284/03, 26th Annual Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 325, para 179, where the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held: ‘The action of the Respondent State to stop the Complainants from publishing their newspapers, close their business premises and seize their equipment resulted in them and their employees not being able to express themselves through their regular medium; and to disseminate information. The confiscation of the Complainants’ equipment and depriving them of a source of income and livelihood is also a violation of their right to property guaranteed under Article 14. By closing their business premises and preventing the Complainants’ and their employees to work [sic], the Respondent State also violated Article 15 of the Charter.’ 20  Denton v The Director-General, National Intelligence Agency and Others, HC241/06/MF/087/F1, 24 July 2006, (2006) AHRLR 241 (High Court of the Gambia) para 31. 21 See Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon, Communication no 39/90, 10th Annual Activity Report, (2000) AHRLR 57. Art 15 of the African Charter reads, ‘[e]very individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions’. 18  International

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Even after he had served his sentence, in April 1989, Mazou continued to be held in prison and was only released following the intervention of Amnesty International on 23 May 1990. However, he continued to be held in detention at his residence until an amnesty was passed in 23 April 1991. Mr Mazou was later freed, but he was not reinstated in his position as a magistrate even after, inter alia, petitioning the President of the Republic for reinstatement. In these circumstances the African Commission found that by not reinstating Mr Mazou to his former position after the amnesty, the Government had violated Article 15 of the African Charter, because it had prevented Mr Mazou from working in his capacity of a magistrate even though others who had been condemned under similar conditions had been reinstated. [8.09]  Therefore, the right to work has been described as a ‘right to social inclusion’.22 Discrimination in employment must be eliminated. The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111) defines discrimination to include any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.23

The ICESCR—in Article 2(2), and in Article 3 read together with Article 6—prohibits any discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation or civil, political, social or other status, which has the intention or effect of impairing or nullifying exercise of the right to work on a basis of equality.24 In Hoffmann v South African Airways (SAA),25 SAA refused to employ Mr Jacques Charl Hoffmann (the appellant) as a cabin attendant, saying that he was unfit for world-wide duty because of his HIV status. It was held that ‘the denial of employment to the appellant because he was living with HIV impaired his dignity and constituted unfair discrimination’.26 [8.10]  Nationality is clearly a prohibited ground of discrimination in the enjoyment of all ESC rights, including the right to work and employment-related benefits.27 The prohibition of discrimination on this ground has been stressed by human rights bodies. A decision of the ECtHR in the case of Gaygusuz v Austria28 illustrates the point. In this case, Gaygusuz, the applicant, was a Turkish national who had worked in Austria, where he had paid contributions under the Austrian social security scheme. He had experienced periods of unemployment and periods when he was unfit for work.

22  JL Rey Pérez, ‘The Right to Work Reassessed: How We Can Understand and Make Effective the Right to Work’ (2005) 2(1) Rutgers Journal of Law & Urban Policy 217, 234. 23 ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111), Art 1.1, adopted 25 June 1958, entered into force 15 June 1960, 362 UNTS 31. 24  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 12(b)(i). 25  Hoffmann v South African Airways, Case CT17/00, 2000 (11) BCLR 1235 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 28 September 2000). 26  Ibid, para 40. The Court at para 64(d) ordered SAA ‘forthwith to offer to employ Mr Jacques Charl Hoffmann as a cabin attendant; provided that should Mr Hoffmann fail to accept the offer within thirty days of the date of the offer, this order shall lapse’. 27  See also the Migrant Workers Convention, Arts 1(1) and 7. 28  Gaygusuz v Austria, App no 17371/90, judgment of 16 September 1996, (1997) 23 EHRR 364.

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He applied for an advance on his retirement pension as a form of emergency assistance, but was refused because he was not an Austrian national. He complained that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR (non-discrimination) in ­combination with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (right to property). The Court noted that a difference of treatment is discriminatory, for the purposes of Article 14 of the ­Convention, if it ‘has no objective and reasonable justification’, ie if it does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.29 It found a breach of Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 1, noting that the difference in treatment between Austrians and non-Austrians as regards entitlement to emergency assistance, of which Mr Gaygusuz was a victim, was not based on any ‘objective and reasonable justification’.30 [8.11]  As noted in chapter two, the principle of non-discrimination is immediately applicable, and is neither subject to progressive implementation nor dependent on available resources. According to Article 2 of ILO Convention No 111,31 states parties should declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.

But while in principle discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited, as noted in paragraph 8.10 above, in practice non-nationals are subjected to restrictions with respect to their right to work, according to their legal status in the host state. When ratifying the ICESCR, France and the UK entered an ‘interpretative declaration’ and a reservation respectively, to allow the imposition of restrictions on the access of ‘aliens’ to employment.32 In most cases these restrictions depend on whether nonnationals are long-term residents, temporary residents, refugees and asylum seekers, undocumented (‘illegal’) immigrants or migrant workers.33 Do restrictions on the right to work of non-nationals constitute prohibited discrimination or reasonable/justifiable differential treatment? We examine this question further in section II.A. below. A.  Non-nationals: Migrant Workers [8.12]  Although current international law does not protect a general unqualified right of a foreign national to work in another state, it does prohibit discrimination against migrant workers on grounds such as ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. The ECtHR found discrimination where Austria differentiated between nationals and

29  Ibid, para 42. The Court stated that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention’. 30  Ibid, para 50. 31  ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111), above n 23. 32  See the text in Appendix H to this book. 33  For a discussion, see H Lu, ‘The Personal Application of the Right to Work in the Age of Migration’ (2008) 26(1) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 43.

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non-nationals­in the emergency advance payment of accrued pension entitlements.34 The Court of Appeal found that some provisions of the UK’s State Immunity Act 1961 (granting blanket immunity from the jurisdiction of UK courts in respect of proceedings concerning the employment of the members of an embassy and discriminating on the basis of nationality) were incompatible with Articles 6 and 14 of the ECHR and infringed Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.35 The ICESCR does not specifically indicate whether or not the Covenant rights apply to non-nationals (at least in developed states). However, the text of the Covenant protects the rights of ‘everyone’,36 and prohibits discrimination on the basis of one’s national origin in A ­ rticle 2(2). Thus, the CESCR has interpreted the Covenant rights as extending to ‘­everyone’ within the jurisdiction of the state party,37 presumably including both nationals and non-nationals (‘foreigners’, ‘foreign nationals’, ‘foreign workers’, ‘immigrants’ or ‘migrant workers’) in general.38 With respect to the right to work, the Committee has clarified that ‘the labour market must be open to everyone under the jurisdiction of States parties’.39 The protection of ‘everyone’ is very broad, and is likely to include full equal treatment and positive protection of the right to work of vulnerable groups such as refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers, including migrant domestic workers and women migrant workers.40 The CESCR confirmed the prohibition of discrimination under the ICESCR to include non-nationals, such as migrant workers, regardless of legal status and documentation.41 In General Comment 20, the CESCR stated: The ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights, eg, all children within a State, including those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive education and access to adequate food and affordable health care. The Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation.42

[8.13]  Nevertheless, the CESCR has not explicitly stated whether ‘everyone’, when applied to the category of non-nationals, is limited only to those holding a long-term or permanent residence permit, or whether it extends to temporary residents lawfully residing in a state (eg foreign students) or even to undocumented (non-documented,

34 

Gaygusuz v Austria, above n 28. Fatima Ahmed Benkharbouche & Minah Janah v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Libya and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 33. 36  See, eg, ICESCR, Arts 6, 7(a), 8(1)(a), 9, 11, 12, 13(1), 15(1)(a) and (b). 37  See, eg, CESCR, General Comment 1, para 3; General Comment 8, para 10; General Comment 12, para 14; General Comment 13, para 52; General Comment 14, para 12(b); General Comment 15, para 16, Appendix D to this book. 38 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Liechtenstein, UN Doc E/C.12/CO/LIE/1 (19 May 2006) paras 11 and 25. 39  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 12(b) (emphasis added). 40 See Lu, above n 33, 57–63; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 26: Women Migrant Workers, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (5 December 2008); Migrant Workers Convention; ILO Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (No 189), adopted 16 June 2011, entered into force 5 September 2013, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P121 00_INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460. 41  CESCR, General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2009), para 30. 42  Ibid. 35 

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irregular, unauthorised or so-called ‘illegal’)43 immigrants.44 In some Concluding Observations, the CESCR has urged states to take all necessary measures to ensure that undocumented immigrants in a state party ‘enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights fully and without discrimination’.45 Presumably this includes the right to work of undocumented immigrants, given that the principle of non-discrimination applies to everyone. In it Concluding Observations on Japan, the CESCR stated: The Committee is concerned at reports of unfair treatment of migrant workers, including those with irregular migration status, asylum-seekers and refugees, in spite of the fact that they are protected by the same labour laws as nationals (art 7). The Committee recommends that the State party reinforce its laws and regulations so as to eliminate unequal treatment of migrant workers, including those with irregular migration status, asylum-seekers and refugees. The Committee also calls on the State party to raise awareness of the applicability of labour laws to all workers, irrespective of their migration status.46

However, in practice states are reluctant to protect undocumented immigrants’ right to work,47 and thus immigrants in this situation are often subject to exploitation by employers due to the fear of losing their job or being deported.48 In light of this reality, the CESCR has welcomed the regularisation of migrant workers,49 and recommended that ‘the regularisation of the situation of these illegal residents, through the delivery of residence permits or naturalisation, is necessary’.50 The CERD has supported this view. Thus, in its Concluding Observations on the Dominican Republic in 2008, the CERD noted that the ‘State party should reconsider the status of people who have been in its territory for a long period with a view to regularising their stay’.51

43  See Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, General Comment 2: The Rights of Migrant Workers in an Irregular Situation and Members of their Families, UN Doc CMW/C/GC/2, 28 August 2013, para 4, citing GA res 3449, para 2, noting that ‘[t]he use of the term “illegal” to describe migrant workers in an irregular situation is inappropriate and should be avoided as it tends to stigmatise them by associating them with criminality’. 44  Between 10 and 15 per cent of the world’s international migrants are in an irregular situation. See International Labour Office, International Labour Migration: A Rights-based approach (2010) 32. 45 See eg CESCR, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.16 (12 ­December 1997) para 34. 46  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/C/3 (10 June 2013) para 21. 47  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, above n 45, para 17: ‘[T]he Committee is still preoccupied by the situation of Haitian illegal workers and by the situation of their children. It notes that approximately 500,000–600,000 Haitian illegal workers reside in the Dominican Republic, some of them for one or two generations, without any legal status and any protection of their economic, social and cultural rights.’ In Abdul Aziz, Cabales and Bakandali v the UK, App Nos 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, judgment of 28 May 1985, (1985) 7 EHRR 471, para 78, the ECtHR held that immigration control in order to protect the domestic labour market was ‘without doubt legitimate’. 48  The preamble to the Migrant Workers’ Convention notes that ‘workers who are non-documented or in an irregular situation are frequently employed under less favourable conditions of work than other workers and that certain employers find this an inducement to seek such labour in order to reap the benefits of unfair competition’. 49  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.103 (26 November 2004) para 8, stating that ‘[t]he Committee welcomes the regularisation of the status of 700,000 migrant workers in the State party’. 50  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, above n 45, para 34. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Spain, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.99 (7 June 2004) para 24, in which the Committee ‘encourages the State party to promote the legalisation of undocumented immigrants so as to enable them to enjoy fully their economic, social and cultural rights’. 51 CERD, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, UN Doc CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (March 2008) para 14.

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Regularisation is encouraged because it is the most effective measure to address the extreme vulnerability of migrant workers and members of their families in an irregular situation.52 One question arising from these observations is whether there is a human right to regularise undocumented residency, at least for long-term undocumented immigrant workers? [8.14]  At present, international law does not protect a human right to regularisation of unauthorised residency in a given state. This is reflected in Article 35 of the Migrant Workers Convention, which provides: Nothing in the present part of the Convention [Part III protecting human rights of all migrant workers and members of their families] shall be interpreted as implying the regularisation of the situation of migrant workers or members of their families who are non-documented or in an irregular situation or any right to such regularisation of their situation.

Accordingly, while human rights bodies have recommended regularisation in light of the fact that other methods such as forced removal, mass expulsions and voluntary return have been both expensive and ineffective,53 and indeed at times have involved violations of other human rights,54 it is still for a state to consider whether or not to regularise unauthorised residency. [8.15]  In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to propose that states parties to the ICESCR are under an obligation to respect the right to work by, inter alia, refraining from ‘denying or limiting equal access to decent work for all persons’, especially disadvantaged persons including migrant workers.55 The term ‘migrant worker’ refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national.56 Migrant workers and members of their families frequently find themselves in a situation of vulnerability owing, amongst other things, to ‘their absence from their State of origin and to the difficulties they may encounter arising from their presence in the State of employment’.57 Most of the above-mentioned categories of non-nationals (long-term residents, asylum ­seekers and undocumented immigrants) may actually or potentially be migrant workers.58 Thus, migrant workers require protection as a vulnerable group. 52  Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, General Comment 1: Migrant Domestic Workers, UN Doc CMW/C/GC/1 (23 February 2011) para 52. 53  See, eg, D Casciani, ‘An Illegal Immigration Amnesty?’, BBC News, 14 June 2006, available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4989874.stm. 54  See, eg, HRC, Concluding Observations: Dominican Republic, UN Doc CCPR/CO/71/DOM (3 April 2001) para 16: ‘The Committee is gravely concerned at the continuing reports of mass expulsions of ethnic Haitians, even when such persons are nationals of the Dominican Republic. It holds mass expulsions of non-nationals to be in breach of the Covenant since no account is taken of the situation of individuals for whom the Dominican Republic is their own country in the light of article 12, paragraph 4, nor of cases where expulsion may be contrary to article 7 given the risk of subsequent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, nor yet of cases where the legality of an individual’s presence in the country is in dispute and must be settled in proceedings that satisfy the requirements of article 13. The State party should guarantee the right of every Dominican national not to be expelled from the country and ensure that all persons facing deportation proceedings are covered by the safeguards established in the Covenant.’ See also D Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularise Illegal Stay?’ (2008) 57(1) ICLQ 87. 55  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, paras 18 and 23. 56  See Migrant Workers Convention, Art 2(1). 57  Ibid, preamble. 58  Lu, above n 33, 70.

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[8.16]  Although there are other legal instruments protecting the rights of migrant workers,59 the Migrant Workers Convention so far offers the widest protection. For example, unlike the (revised) European Social Charter, which protects only migrant workers and members of their families who are nationals of other parties ‘lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the Party concerned’,60 the Migrant Workers Convention protects all migrant workers and members of their families within a territory or subject to the jurisdiction of a state party.61 However by 24 May 2014, the Convention had only 37 signatories and 47 ratifications.62 Significantly, all states parties to the Migrant Workers Convention were from developing states without any industrialised state party. This suggests that industrialised states, the main recipients of migrant workers, are still reluctant to accept the standards of the Convention. [8.17]  Regional human rights treaties protect all migrants against refoulement63 and collective expulsion.64 It is important to note that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) held in an Advisory Opinion that while a state and individuals in a state are not obliged to offer employment to undocumented migrants, but where an employment relationship is established, a migrant worker is entitled to equality of treatment, regardless of his or her migratory status: 133. Labor rights necessarily arise from the circumstance of being a worker, understood in the broadest sense. A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity, immediately becomes a worker and, consequently, acquires the rights inherent in that condition. The right to work, whether regulated at the national or international level, is a protective system for workers; that is, it regulates the rights and obligations of the employee and the employer, regardless of any other consideration of an economic and social nature. A person who enters a State and assumes an employment relationship, acquires his labor human rights in the State of employment, irrespective of his migratory status, because respect and guarantee of the enjoyment and exercise of those rights must be made without any discrimination. 134. In this way, the migratory status of a person can never be a justification for depriving him of the enjoyment and exercise of his human rights, including those related to employment. On assuming an employment relationship, the migrant acquires rights 59  See, eg, the following ILO Conventions and Recommendations: the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No 97), 120 UNTS 70, entered into force 22 January 1952; the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No 143), entered into force 9 December 1978, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/ normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312288; the Recommendation concerning Migration for Employment (No 86), adopted 1 July 1949, reproduced in 1 International Labour Conventions and Recommendations 508; the Recommendation concerning Migrant Workers (No 151), adopted 24 June 1975, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100: 0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:R151; the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No 29), 39 UNTS 55, entered into force 1 May 1932; and the Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (No 105), 320 UNTS 291, entered into force 17 January 1959. 60  See European Social Charter (revised), Art 19; and Appendix to the European Social Charter (revised), para 1. 61  See, eg, Migrant Workers Convention, Art 7. 62  See The Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention on Rights of Migrants, available at http://www.migrantsrights.org/. 63  See ECHR, Art 3; AmCHR, Art 22, para 8; and ACHPR, Art 5. 64  See Protocol 4 to the ECHR, Art 4; AmCHR, Art 22(9); ACHPR, Art 12(5); and the Arab Charter, above n 2, Art 26(1).

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as a worker, which must be recognized and guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of employment. These rights are a consequence of the employment relationship. 135. It is important to clarify that the State and the individuals in a State are not obliged to offer employment to undocumented migrants. The States and individuals, such as employers, can abstain from establishing an employment relationship with migrants in an irregular situation. 136. However, if undocumented migrants are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the labor rights corresponding to workers and may not be discriminated against because of their irregular situation. This is very important, because one of the principal problems that occurs in the context of immigration is that migrant workers who lack permission to work are engaged in unfavorable conditions compared to other workers. … 173.(9) That the State has the obligation to respect and guarantee the labor human rights of all workers, irrespective of their status as nationals or aliens, and not to tolerate situations of discrimination that are harmful to the latter in the employment relationships established between private individuals (employer-worker). The State must not allow private employers to violate the rights of workers, or the contractual relationship to violate minimum international standards.65

[8.18]  This entails equal treatment of foreign and domestic workers. Accordingly, maintaining different rates of payment of pensions for foreign and domestic workers is discriminatory.66 Similarly, the arbitrary expulsion of foreign workers is a violation of the right to work. With respect to Libya, the CESCR stated as follows: The Committee also expresses its concern at reports that during the second half of 1995 thousands of foreign workers were arbitrarily expelled from the State party and were not given adequate compensation. It further regrets that there was no possibility for a legal or judicial remedy against those expulsions. The Committee is alarmed that the justification given by the delegation for this action was that foreign workers were the cause of many of the State party’s social problems, such as violent crime, immoral activities, black market transactions, drug trafficking, trafficking in women and the spread of communicable diseases. Such a rationale is unacceptable to the Committee and a clear violation of the Covenant.67

[8.19]  Despite the fact that states are ‘not obliged to provide work permits to foreign residents’, migrant workers (foreigners) who are entitled to a work permit should not be discriminated against in access to employment,68 or in enrolment in the vocational guidance and training courses to which national workers are entitled. As confirmed by the CESCR in Concluding Observations on Portugal:69

65 IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 (17 September 2003), (Ser A) no 18 (2003). 66 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.15 (20 May 1997) para 15. 67  Ibid, para 16 (emphasis added). 68  CERD, Concluding Observations: Denmark, UN Doc A/57/18 (1 November 2002) para 120. 69  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Portugal (Macau), UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.53 (1 December 2000) paras 11, 18–19.

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11. The Committee expresses its concern about cases of intolerance and discrimination with regard to Roma people, refugees and immigrants. The Committee also notes with concern that foreign workers cannot enrol in the vocational guidance and training courses to which Portuguese workers are entitled. … 18. The Committee urges the State party to intensify its efforts to create a culture of tolerance and to eliminate all forms of discrimination, in so far as they affect women, Roma, asylum seekers and immigrants. 19. The Committee urges the State party to allow foreign workers to enrol in the vocational guidance and training courses to which Portuguese workers are entitled.

[8.20]  The African Charter specifically prohibits the arbitrary expulsions of nonnationals.70 Expulsions are arbitrary where they are not in accordance with a state’s domestic law and a state’s international legal obligations, such as international human rights treaties to which a state is a party.71 In this regard, the African Commission, in Modise v Botswana,72 ruled that ‘while the decision as to who is permitted to remain in a country is a function of the competent authorities of that country, this decision should always be made according to careful and just legal procedures, and with due regard to the acceptable international norms and standards’. International human rights norms and standards require states to provide non-nationals with the necessary forum to exercise their right to be heard before deporting them. In Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana,73 Mr Kenneth Good, an Australian national teaching at the University of Botswana, had his employment terminated after his expulsion from ­Botswana on 31 May 2005. This followed the publication of a co-authored article (entitled ‘Presidential Succession in Botswana: No Model for Africa’) concerning presidential succession in Botswana in February 2005, in Good’s capacity as Professor of Political Studies at the University of Botswana. The article criticised the Government and concluded that Botswana was a poor example of African presidential succession. The President of Botswana, exercising the powers vested in him by section 7(f) of the Botswana Immigration Act, decided to declare Kenneth Good an undesirable inhabitant of, or visitor to, Botswana.74 Good was not given reasons for this decision, neither was he given any opportunity to contest it. He took his case to the ­Botswana High Court and the Court of Appeal. Both courts rejected his application on the ground that sections 11(6) and 36(a) of the Botswana Immigration Act prevented them from

70  Art 12(4) of the African Charter provides that a non-national legally admitted in a territory of a state party to the Charter may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law. 71  Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, Communication no 313/05, 28th Annual Activity Report, para 204. 72  Modise v Botswana, Communication no 97/93, 10th Annual Activity Report, (2000) AHRLR 25, para 84. 73  Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, above n 71. 74  Botswana Immigration Act 1966, s 7(f) reads, ‘any person who, in consequence of information received from any source deemed by the President to be reliable, is declared by the President to be an undesirable inhabitant of or visitor to Botswana’, shall be a prohibited immigrant and such person’s entry into or presence within Botswana is unlawful. Botswana’s Immigration Act 1966 was revoked by a new Immigration Act in 2011, Act No 3 of 2011.

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reviewing the decision of the President.75 The African Commission found that the deportation of Kenneth Good without his being provided with a chance to be heard was not justifiable on the basis of domestic laws or the pretext of national security.76 It concluded that the existence and application of sections 11(6) and 36 of the Botswana Immigration Act violated, inter alia, Article 12(4) of the African Charter.77 [8.21]  In addition, the African Charter provides that the mass expulsion of non nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.78

The African Commission held that mass expulsions, particularly following arrest and subsequent detentions, denied victims the opportunity to establish the legality of their expulsions in the courts.79 Thus, the Commission did not find mass expulsions of non-nationals consistent with the African Charter in its decision on a communication alleging violations of the Charter by Angola on the occasion of the expulsion of certain nationals of West African states in 1996.80 The Commission observed: African States in general and the Republic of Angola in particular are faced with many ­challenges, mainly economic. In the face of such difficulties, States often resort to radical measures aimed at protecting their nationals and their economies from non-nationals. Whatever the circumstances may be, however, such measures should not be taken at the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights. Mass expulsions of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nationality, religion, ethnic, racial or other considerations ‘constitute a special violation of human rights’.81

[8.22]  Although the Commission did not conclude in this case that there had been a violation of the right to work under Article 15 of the African Charter, the Commission held that ‘this type of deportations [sic] calls into question a whole series of rights recognised and guaranteed in the Charter; such as … the right to work (article 15)’.82 Nonetheless, in cases where the effect of arbitrary expulsion of foreign workers based on nationality leads to loss of employment of those expelled, there is no reason in principle for not finding a clear violation of the right to work. Indeed the African Commission found a violation of the right to work under Article 15 of the African Charter in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (Merits).83 75  Botswana Immigration Act 1966, s 11(6) provides that ‘No appeal shall lie … against any notice that the person is a prohibited immigrant by reason of any declaration by the President under Section 7(f) and no court shall question the adequacy of the grounds for any such declaration’; and s 36 provides that ‘(a) No person shall have the right to be heard before or after a decision is made by the President in relation to that person under this Act. (b) No person affected by any such decision shall have the right to demand any information as to the grounds of such decision nor shall any such information be disclosed in any court.’ 76  Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, above n 71, para 207. 77  Ibid, para 208. 78  African Charter, Art 12(5). 79  Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) v Republic of Zambia, Communication no 71/92, 20th Ordinary Session, Grand Bay, Mauritius, October 1996, 7th Annual Activity Report, (2000) AHRLR 321. 80  Union Inter Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme and Others v Angola, Communication no 159/96, 11th Annual Activity Report, (2000) AHRLR 18. 81  Ibid, para 16. 82  Ibid, para 17. 83  Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (Merits), Communication no 292/2004, 24th Annual Activity Report, (2008) AHRLR 43.

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In this Communication, victims were Gambians, who were non-nationals lawfully working in Angola. They were arrested, detained and subsequently deported from Angola on the grounds that ‘foreigners were not permitted to engage in mining activities in Angola’ without judicial review.84 The African Commission found: As indicated above, the respondent state has regrettably not forwarded any arguments to refute any of the allegations made in this communications [sic] including the alleged violation under article 15 of the African Charter. The facts indicate and the African Commission agrees that the abrupt expulsion without any possibility of due process or recourse to national courts to challenge the respondent state’s actions severely compromised the victims’ right to continue working in Angola under equitable and satisfactory conditions. Accordingly, the African Commission holds that the respondent state’s actions of arbitrary arrest, detention and subsequent deportation resulted in persons who were lawfully working in Angola losing their jobs in a manner that is in violation of article 15 of the African Charter.85

[8.23]  In some of its General Comments, the CESCR has gone further to specify that non-nationals, as a vulnerable group, should be given special attention. For example, in its General Comment 19 on the right to social security, the Committee stated that ‘[w]hereas everyone has the right to social security, States parties should give special attention to those individuals and groups who traditionally face difficulties in exercising this right, in particular … refugees, asylum-seekers, … [and] non-nationals’.86 In principle, this special treatment of non-nationals may apply even to other rights, including the right to work. [8.24]  Special attention should be extended to undocumented migrant workers, especially women and girls, given that they suffer slavery-like conditions, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour as domestic servants.87 Women make up the ‘overwhelming majority’ of migrant workers engaged in domestic work.88 The CEDAW Committee noted: Undocumented women migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse because of their irregular immigration status, which exacerbates their exclusion and the risk of exploitation. They may be exploited as forced labour, and their access to minimum labour rights may be limited by fear of denouncement. They may also face harassment by the police. If they are apprehended, they are usually prosecuted for violations of immigration laws and placed in detention centres, where they are vulnerable to sexual abuse, and then deported.89

[8.25]  States with domestic workers abroad can implement a number of measures to protect such workers against their exploitation and abuse. In its Concluding Observations on Indonesia, the CESCR stated: While noting that the State party has concluded bilateral agreements on benefits for migrant domestic workers with several countries, the Committee raises concern about the continuing 84 

Ibid, para 75. Ibid, para 76. 86 CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (adopted 23 November 2007), para 31. 87  See, eg, Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01 (ECtHR, 26 July 2005), (2006) 43 EHRR 16; CN v The United Kingdom, App no 4239/08 (ECtHR, 13 November 2012). 88  Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, General Comment 1, above n 52, para 1. 89  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 26: Women Migrant Workers, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (5 December 2008) para 22. 85 

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reports of exploitation and abuse of nationals of the State party employed as domestic workers abroad. The Committee is also concerned at placement fees which are either disproportionally charged against the salary of domestic workers or, when paid by employers, have led to conditions akin to slavery for domestic workers (art 7). The Committee urges the State party to: (a) regulate the operations of placement agencies, including the imposition of placement fees, so that they do not lead to human rights violations, such as non-payment of wages or contemporary forms of slavery; (b) continue to establish agreements with recipient countries with the aim of protection not only of the economic and social rights of domestic workers but also against their exploitation and abuse; (c) provide support to victims of exploitation and abuse as well as for the reintegration of returnees; (d) address the root causes of migration of domestic workers.90

[8.26]  The above approach is generally consistent with the principle of nondiscrimination­and equality as protected in most human rights treaties. One exception would have been the ICERD.91 This Convention protects the right to work in ­Article 5(e)(i) in the following terms: In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: … (e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: (i) The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration …

However, Article 2 of the ICERD provides: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.

Does this mean that states parties to the ICERD may treat non-nationals differently from nationals, with respect to the right to work, without reasonable and objective criteria? [8.27]  According to earlier jurisprudence of the CERD, the exclusion of nonnationals from access to certain occupations, if allowed by national law, was considered legitimate and thus not as racial discrimination. This was expressed in the views of the CERD in GAC Enkelaar v France.92 This Communication was submitted on 90  CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Indonesia, UN Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (23 May 2014) para 18. 91  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA res 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS 195. 92  GAC Enkelaar v France, Communication no 2/1989, UN Doc CERD/C/39/D/2/1989 (1991), (1994) 2 IHRR 353. For a review of the work of the CERD, see P Thornberry, ‘Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective’ (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 239.

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behalf of Demba Talibe Diop. Mr Diop, a Senegalese lawyer, was denied access to the Bar Association in Nice, France. He met all the statutory requirements for the exercise of his profession as a lawyer except one: French nationality, as required by French law for practising lawyers in France.93 The lawyer claimed to be the victim of a violation by France of Article 5 of the ICERD, alleging that he was denied the right to work on the ground of national origin. [8.28]  As to the alleged violation of Article 5(e) of the Convention, the Committee noted that the rights protected by Article 5(e) are of ‘programmatic character, subject to progressive implementation’.94 The Committee considered that it was not within the its mandate to see to it that these rights were established; rather, it was its task to monitor the implementation of these rights, once they had been granted on equal terms.95 In so far as the author’s complaint was based on Article 5(e) of the Convention, the Committee considered it to be ill-founded. The Committee noted that the refusal to admit Mr Diop to the Bar was based on the fact that he was not of French nationality, not on any of the grounds enumerated in article 1, paragraph 1. The author’s allegation related to a situation in which the right to practice law exists only for French nationals, not to a situation in which this right has been granted in principle and may be generally invoked; accordingly, the Committee concludes that article 1, paragraph 1, has not been violated.96

This conclusion was reached without applying objective and reasonable criteria requirements, such as the ground for different treatment having a legitimate aim and being proportionate to such aim. This approach legitimises discrimination against non-nationals in employment and is difficult to reconcile with the ICESCR prohibition of discrimination in Article 2(2) and its protection of everyone’s right to work in Article 6. Certainly, this wide interpretation of the exception undermines the principle of non-discrimination and equality. [8.29]  It is interesting to note that since 2004, the CERD appears to have adopted a more restrictive approach to the exception in Article 1(2) of the ICERD. This is clear from its General Recommendation 30, which states that Article 1(2) must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognised and enunciated in particular in the UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR.97 The ­Recommendation further noted that ‘human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons. States parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognised under international law’.98 It affirmed the standard criteria for justifying ­differentiation

93  Art 11, para 1, of the French Act No 71.1130 of 31 December 1971 stipulated that no one might accede to the legal profession if he was not French, except as provided for in international conventions. 94  GAC Enkelaar v France, above n 92, para 6.4. 95  Ibid. 96  Ibid, para 6.6. 97 CERD, General Recommendation 30: Discrimination against Non-citizens (64th Session, adopted 1 October 2004), UN Doc CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) para 2. 98  Ibid, para 3.

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based on citizenship or immigration status: a legitimate aim and the principle of proportionality.99 The Committee recommended that states should adopt a wide range of measures to curb racial discrimination, including ‘[removing] obstacles that prevent the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by non-citizens, notably in the areas of education, housing, employment and health’.100 While recognising that ‘States parties may refuse to offer jobs to non-citizens without a work permit’, it emphasised that ‘all individuals’ are entitled to the enjoyment of labour and employment rights, including the freedom of assembly and association, once an employment relationship has been initiated until it is terminated.101 [8.30]  The CESCR has relied on the Migrant Workers Convention to interpret Article 6 of the ICESCR. This will increasingly give the Migrant Workers Convention an independent normative authority to influence the development of standards applicable to migrant workers under the Covenant. This is significant given that all migrant workers, regardless of irregularity with regard to stay or employment, are entitled to certain rights under the Migrant Workers Convention, including: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

non-discrimination (Article 7); freedom from slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour (Article 11); freedom from collective expulsion (Article 22); remuneration and other conditions of work equal to those of nationals (Article 25); the right to join trade unions (Article 26); equal treatment in social security (Article 27); the right to receive emergency healthcare (Article 28); and respect for cultural identity (Article 31).

Documented or regular migrant workers enjoy additional rights, including: (a) the right to form associations or a trade union in the state of employment for the promotion and protection of their economic, social, cultural and other interests (Article 40); (b) equality of treatment with nationals of the state of employment in relation to— (i) access to educational institutions and services, (ii) access to vocational guidance and placement services, (iii) access to vocational training and retraining facilities and institutions, (iv) access to housing, including social housing schemes, and protection against exploitation in respect of rents, (v) access to social and health services, provided that the requirements for participation in the respective schemes are met, (vi) access to cooperatives and self-managed enterprises, and (vii) access to and participation in cultural life (Article 43);

99  Ibid, para 4, stating that ‘[u]nder the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim’. 100  Ibid, para 29. 101  Ibid, para 35.

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(c) protection of the unity of the families of migrant workers (Article 44); (d) the right to transfer their earnings and savings (Article 47); (e) equality of treatment with nationals of the state of employment in respect of— (i) protection against dismissal, (ii) unemployment benefits, (iii) access to public work schemes intended to combat unemployment, (iv) access to alternative employment in the event of loss of work or termination of other remunerated activity (Article 54(1)); and (f) the right to seek remedies for breach of contract by an employer (Article 54(2)). [8.31]  In summary, the right to work, like other ESC rights, should generally equally be enjoyed by non-nationals (whether documented or undocumented, regular or irregular), especially long-term or permanent residents. Any differential treatment based on nationality or migration status amounts to discrimination, unless the reasons for such differentiation are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, are necessary in the specific circumstances and are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.102 The fundamental principles and rights at work set out in the eight fundamental ILO ­Conventions103 apply to all migrant workers, irrespective of their nationality and migration status. The ILO Convention No 111 provides three ‘objective reasons’ that may justify differential treatment: (a) treatment based on the inherent requirements of the job (Article 1(2)); (b) any measures affecting an individual who is justifiably suspected of, or engaged in, activities prejudicial to the security of the State (Article 4); and (c) special measures of protection or assistance provided to vulnerable or disadvantaged individuals or groups (Article 5).104 B.  Equal Remuneration of Men and Women [8.32]  Historically, women have been disproportionately represented in undervalued and poorly paid jobs, for example in unskilled jobs, carer jobs, domestic work, ­part-time jobs, agriculture, health and education. This was partly based on gender stereotypes regarding ‘women’s aspirations, preferences, capabilities and “suitability” for certain jobs’, as well as the responsibilities of women.105 In contrast, men have dominated occupations and professions that are better remunerated. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles recognised that the ‘principle that men and women should receive

102 See CESCR, General Comment 20, above n 41, para 13; HRC, General Comment 18: Nondiscrimination­, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26, para 13. 103  Conventions No 29 (1930) concerning Forced Labour; No 105 (1957) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour; No 138 (1973), concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment; No 182 (1999) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour; No 87 (1948) concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; No 98 (1949) concerning the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining; No 100 (1951) concerning Equal Remuneration; and No 111 (1958) concerning Discrimination (Employment and Occupation). These conventions are available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/info/publications/WCMS_095895/lang--en/index.htm. 104  Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILO No 111), 362 UNTS 31, entered into force 15 June 1960. 105  ILO CEACR, General Observation, adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007) para 2.

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equal remuneration for work of equal value’ is of ‘special and urgent importance’.106 The right to work entails the right to equal remuneration for work of ‘equal value’ across all sectors, organisations, enterprises and professions, when assessed by objective criteria including skills, responsibilities, effort required by the worker and working conditions. This is emphasised in several human rights instruments. Article 23(3) of the UDHR declares that ‘Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration.’ The ICESCR recognises the right of all workers to ‘fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind’.107 This means that rates of remuneration must be established without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, discussed in chapter two, such as distinctions based on sex,108 race,109 disability110 and membership of a particular group such as Indigenous Peoples.111 Both the UDHR and the ICESCR refer to ‘remuneration’ without defining it. Remuneration is understood to include the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker’s employment.112

[8.33]  Regional human rights instruments protect the wider right to ‘equal remuneration’ for work of ‘equal value’ for women and men, or just the more limited right to ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. Under Article 4(3) of the European Social Charter, contracting parties undertake to recognise the right of men and women workers to ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. Article 7(a) of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and ­Cultural Rights obliges state parties to guarantee in their internal legislation remuneration that guarantees, as a minimum, to all workers dignified and decent living conditions for them and their families, and ‘fair and equal wages for equal work, ­without ­distinction’. Article 34(4) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 p ­ rohibits discrimination between men and women in ‘the right to receive equal remuneration for equal work’.113 The African Charter provides that every individual ‘shall receive

106 

Treaty of Versailles 1919, available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles.htm, Art 427. ICESCR, Art 7(a) (i). 108  ICESCR, Art 7(a) (i) specifically refers ‘in particular [to] women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work’. See also ILO Convention No 100, above n 103. 109  ICERD, Art 5(e)(i) provides that ‘States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms’ in the enjoyment of the ‘rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration’ (see para 8.26 above). 110  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art 27(1)(b), obliges states parties to ‘[p]rotect the rights of persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others, to just and favourable conditions of work, including equal opportunities and equal remuneration for work of equal value, safe and healthy working conditions, including protection from harassment, and the redress of grievances’. 111 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/RES/61/295, 2 October 2007, Art 17(3), provides that ‘[i]ndigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, employment or salary’. 112  ILO Convention No 100, above n 103, Art 1(a). 113  The Arab Charter, above n 2, Art 34(4), provides ‘There shall be no discrimination between men and women in their enjoyment of the right to effectively benefit from training, employment and job protection and the right to receive equal remuneration for equal work.’ 107 

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equal pay for equal work’ (Article 15), and its Protocol on Women’s Rights calls for ‘equal remuneration for jobs of equal value for women and men’ (Article 13(b)). As noted in paragraph 8.32 above with regard to human rights instruments, it can be concluded from these regional instruments that remuneration, and in particular equal remuneration for work of equal value, is an essential aspect of the right to work. Not surprisingly, the African Commission, in Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania,114 held that ‘unremunerated work is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the dignity inherent in the human being’.115 Indeed, unremunerated work against one’s will may amount to forced labour (see section III.C. below).116 [8.34]  It is important to note that ‘equal remuneration’ applies to work of ‘equal value’, ie the worth of a job for the purpose of computing remuneration: The concept of ‘work of equal value’ lies at the heart of the fundamental right of equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, and the promotion of equality. Due to historical attitudes and stereotypes regarding women’s aspirations, preferences and capabilities, certain jobs are held predominantly or exclusively by women (such as in caring professions) and others by men (such as in construction). Often ‘female jobs’ are undervalued in comparison with work of equal value performed by men when determining wage rates. The concept of ‘work of equal value’ is fundamental to tackling occupational sex segregation in the labour market, which exists in almost every country, as it permits a broad scope of comparison, including, but going beyond equal remuneration for ‘equal’, ‘the same’ or ‘similar’ work, and also encompasses work that is of an entirely different nature, which is nevertheless of equal value.117

The European Court of Justice accepted that work performed predominantly by male pharmacists was prima facie work of equal value to work performed exclusively by women speech therapists, for which the employer had to show that ‘that difference [in rates of remuneration] is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex’.118 [8.35]  To eliminate discrimination against women, states should adopt and enforce legislative and other measures to guarantee women equal opportunities in work and career advancement and other economic opportunities. The measures listed in the following human rights instruments provide a useful starting point:

114  Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, Communications nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97, 196/97 and 210/98 (joined), 13th Annual Activity 146, (2000) AHRLR 146. 115  Ibid, para 135. 116  See IACmHR, María Mejía v Guatemala, Case 10.553, Report no 32/96, 16 October 1996, in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1996, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc 7 rev at 370 (1997) para 62. 117 ILO, Giving Globalisation a Human Face (Geneva, ILO, 2012) para 673. 118  Dr Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health, Case C-127/92, [1994] 1 All ER 495, ECJ, available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/1993/C12792.html, paras 15–19.

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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women119 Article 11 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: (a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; (b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment; (c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training; (d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work; (e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave; (f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa120 Article 13: Economic and Social Welfare Rights States Parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and other measures to guarantee women equal opportunities in work and career advancement and other economic opportunities. In this respect, they shall: (a) promote equality of access to employment; (b) promote the right to equal remuneration for jobs of equal value for women and men; (c) ensure transparency in recruitment, promotion and dismissal of women and combat and punish sexual harassment in the workplace; (d) guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation, and protect them from exploitation by their employers violating and exploiting their fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws and regulations in force; (e) create conditions to promote and support the occupations and economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal sector; (f) establish a system of protection and social insurance for women working in the informal sector and sensitise them to adhere to it; (g) introduce a minimum age for work and prohibit the employment of children below that age, and prohibit, combat and punish all forms of exploitation of children, especially the girl-child; (h) take the necessary measures to recognise the economic value of the work of women in the home;

119 

CEDAW, UN Doc A/34/46, entered into force 3 September 1981. Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, entered into force 25 November 2005. 120 

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(i) guarantee adequate and paid pre and post-natal maternity leave in both the private and public sectors; (j) ensure the equal application of taxation laws to women and men; (k) recognise and enforce the right of salaried women to the same allowances and entitlements as those granted to salaried men for their spouses and children; (l) recognise that both parents bear the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of children and that this is a social function for which the State and the private sector have secondary responsibility; (m) take effective legislative and administrative measures to prevent the exploitation and abuse of women in advertising and pornography.

[8.36]  The denial of access to work to particular individuals or groups on the basis of any of the prohibited grounds discussed in chapter two, without reasonable and objective criteria, would amount to discrimination. Cases of discrimination might arise in several contexts, such as unequal pay for men and women for work of equal value, inequalities as regards recruitment, training, promotion, termination and social security, and patriarchal constraints on women’s opportunities and working c­ onditions.121 Laws promoting equal opportunities for men and women must be applied ‘strictly’ in both public and private employment sectors, as observed by the CESCR in its ­Concluding Observations on Ukraine: The Committee recommends that the State party train judges, labour inspectors and officers of the State Employment Service to apply strictly the Law on Equal Rights and Opportunities for Men and Women and the amended Labour Code, with a view to combating gender discrimination in the public and private employment sectors, in particular at the recruitment stage, conduct awareness raising campaigns for employers, employees and the general public, and ensure that fines or other appropriate sanctions are imposed on employers who discriminate against women, and that the victims of such discrimination have access to effective remedies, including compensation. It urges the State party to further enhance vocational training, job training and retraining opportunities for unemployed women and women employed in low-paid jobs.122

[8.37]  It should be noted that not every distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job is discriminatory. Thus ILO Convention No 111 states: Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.123

For example, it may not be discriminatory on the basis of religion to exclude from teaching jobs female teachers who wear a face-veil (niqab) as a religious practice, because facial expressions are essential to effective teaching. Thus, in Aishah Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council,124 the Employment Appeal Tribunal in ­London upheld the findings of the Employment Tribunal that a decision to suspend

121  ILO, Equality in Employment and Occupation: General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Geneva, International Labour Office), 75th Session, 1988, at 111–12; and 83rd Session, 1996, at 25–38. 122 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ukraine, UN Doc E/C.12/UKR/CO/5 (23 November 2007) para 36. 123  ILO Convention No 111, above n 103, Art 1.2. 124  [2007] IRLR 434 (Employment Appeal Tribunal).

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a teaching assistant, for refusing an instruction not to wear her veil in class when assisting a male teacher with pupils, was not direct discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Although it was indirectly discriminatory on that ground, the suspension was lawful, being proportionate in support of a legitimate aim.125 [8.38]  Although explicit policies of providing lower pay for women have for the most part been relegated to the past, the continued persistence of the gender pay gap remains a clear example of structural gender discrimination.126 Globally, women earn approximately 77.1 per cent of what men earn (a pay gap of 22.9 per cent), though in some countries women earn considerably less, and it is estimated that another 75 years will be needed to bridge the gap.127 Eliminating the gender pay gap requires that states and NSAs, including public and private employers’ and workers’ organisations, take more proactive measures to raise awareness, make assessments, and promote and enforce the application of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value.128 In the CESCR’s Concluding Observations on Japan in 2013: The Committee notes with concern that the pay gap, in particular between men and women, remains considerable in the State party, in spite of progress made (art 7). The Committee calls on the State party to raise awareness of the illegality of the application of different rates for men and women for work of equal value and of the obligation of employers in this regard to provide accessible and effective remedies in case of discrimination in remuneration. The Committee also recommends that the State party train labour inspectors in the application of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value and take other measures to ensure effective enforcement of applicable legislation.129

C.  Health (HIV) Status and the Right to Work [8.39]  It is well established that ‘people living with HIV are a vulnerable group with a history of prejudice and stigmatisation’.130 Such people are frequent victims of discrimination, either directly by states, for example restricting the issue of residence permits to foreign nationals who could not show their HIV‑negative status,131 or by employers dismissing employees or refusing to offer jobs to prospective employees, on account of their being (or being perceived to be) HIV-positive. In Hoffmann v South African Airways (SAA),132 it was concluded that ‘the refusal by SAA to employ the appellant as a cabin attendant because he was HIV positive violated his right to equality guaranteed by section 9 of the Constitution’.133 Denial of employment to

125  Ibid, paras 58–74. The Tribunal accepted that a face-veil obscured a person’s face and mouth, which would be a barrier to effective learning by children. 126  ILO, above n 117, para 668. 127  Ibid, paras 668–69. 128  Ibid, para 669. 129  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/CO/3 (10 June 2013) para 19. 130 See Kiyutin v Russia, App no 2700/10 (ECtHR, 10 March 2011) para 64. 131  Ibid. 132  Hoffmann v South African Airways, Case CT17/00, 2000 (11) BCLR 1235 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 28 September 2000). 133  Ibid, para 41.

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i­ ndividuals due to HIV-positive status condemns HIV victims to ‘economic death’. As Tipnis J observed in MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitant v M/s ZY and another:134 In our opinion, the State and public Corporations like respondent No 1 cannot take a ruthless and inhuman stand that they will not employ a person unless they are satisfied that the person will serve during the entire span of service from the employment till superannuation. As is evident from the material to which we have made a detailed reference in the earlier part of this judgment, the most important thing in respect of persons infected with HIV is the requirement of community support, economic support and non-discrimination of such person. This is also necessary for prevention and control of this terrible disease. Taking into consideration the widespread and present threat of this disease in the world in general and this country in particular, the State cannot be permitted to condemn the victims of HIV infection, many of whom may be truly unfortunate, to certain economic death. It is not in the general public interest and is impermissible under the Constitution. The interests of the HIV positive persons, the interests of the employer and the interests of the society will have to be balanced in such a case.

[8.40]  The history of prejudice and stigmatisation for people living with HIV/AIDS has been expressed by the ECtHR as follows: From the onset of the epidemic in the 1980s, people living with HIV/AIDS have suffered from widespread stigma and exclusion, including within the Council of Europe region (see, in particular, Recommendation 1116 (1989) on AIDS and human rights, and point 9.2 of Resolution 1536 (2007) …). In the early years of the epidemic when HIV/AIDS diagnosis was nearly always a lethal condition and very little was known about the risk of transmission, people were scared of those infected due to fear of contagion. Ignorance about how the disease spreads has bred prejudices which, in turn, has stigmatised or marginalised those who carry the virus. As the information on ways of transmission accumulated, HIV infection has been traced back to behaviours—such as same-sex intercourse, drug injection, prostitution or promiscuity—that were already stigmatised in many societies, creating a false nexus between the infection and personal irresponsibility and reinforcing other forms of stigma and discrimination, such as racism, homophobia or misogyny. In recent times, despite considerable progress in HIV prevention and better access to HIV treatment, stigma and related discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS has remained a subject of great concern for all international organisations active in the field of HIV/AIDS. The UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS noted that the stigma ‘increase[d] the impact of the epidemic on individuals, families, communities and nations’ … and UN Secretary General Mr Ban Ki-moon acknowledged that ‘to greater or lesser degrees, almost everywhere in the world, discrimination remain[ed] a fact of daily life for people living with HIV’ (6 August 2008).135

[8.41]  Discrimination at work on account of HIV status is very well illustrated by the case of IB v Greece, decided by the Chamber of the ECtHR in October 2013.136 Since 2001 the applicant, IB, had worked in a company that manufactured jewellery. The company employed 70 employees. In January 2005, IB told three of his colleagues about his fear that he had contracted HIV; this was subsequently confirmed by a test. The three colleagues wrote a letter to the company director, (erroneously) alleging that IB had AIDS and asking for his dismissal. Information about IB’s health began

134  135  136 

MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitant v M/s ZY and another, AIR 1997 (Bombay) 406, 431. Kiyutin v Russia, above n 130, para 64. IB v Greece App no 552/10 (ECtHR, 3 October 2013, available in French only).

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to c­ irculate around the company. IB recounted that he was immediately stigmatised by his co-workers and that he was treated like a pariah who did not have the right to work.137 The employer invited an occupational health doctor to come speak to the employees, to reassure them about the (non-existent) risk to their own health and the precautions to be taken. Nonetheless, 33 of IB’s co-workers (around half of the company’s employees) later sent a letter to the director, inviting her to dismiss IB in order to ‘preserve their health and their right to work’.138 Two days later, the employer dismissed IB, paying him the allowance provided for under Greek law, to preserve good working relations within the company. [8.42]  The dismissal of IB was upheld by the Greek Supreme Court, thereby ‘justify[ing] the fears of employees, on a manifestly incorrect premise, namely the “contagious” nature of the applicant’s illness’.139 This was done without explaining why the interests of the employer outweighed those of the employee.140 Shortly afterwards IB was employed by another company. He alleged before the ECtHR that there had been a violation of his right to a private life (Article 8 of the ECHR) and that his dismissal was discriminatory (Article 14 of the ECHR). The Court concluded that the IB had been a victim of discrimination on account of his health status, because he had been treated less favourably than another colleague would have been on account of the fact that he was HIV-positive, in breach of Article 8 taken together with Article 14 ECHR. The Court recognised that [p]eople with HIV are forced to cope with many problems, not only medical type, but also professional, social, personal and psychological and especially rooted prejudices sometimes even among the most educated.141 … Moreover, the Court notes that the provisions relating to non-discrimination contained in international instruments provide protection to people living with HIV. In this context, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations recognised the carrier status of HIV as one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. In addition, an increasing number of specific international instruments contain provisions designed for HIV, including in particular the prohibition of discrimination in employment, such as Recommendation No 200 of the ILO on HIV and AIDS in the world of work.142

[8.43]  The judgment confirms that persons living with HIV must not be denied the right to work without objective and reasonable justification. It is important to note that the ECtHR did not consider the question of ‘reasonable accommodation’ for persons with HIV-related illness, possibly because in this case the Greek Court of 137 

Ibid, para 59. Ibid, para 10. Ibid, para 88, reading in French, ‘elle a cependant fondé sa décision, pour justifier les craintes des salariés, sur une prémisse manifestement inexacte, à savoir le caractère “contagieux” de la maladie du requérant’. 140  Ibid, para 90. 141  Ibid, para 80, stating in French, ‘Les personnes porteuses du VIH sont obligées de faire face à de multiples problèmes, de type non seulement médical, mais aussi professionnel, social, personnel et psychologique et surtout à des préjugés parfois enracinés même parmi les personnes les plus instruites.’ 142  Ibid, para 84, stating in French: ‘Par ailleurs, la Cour note que les dispositions relatives à la nondiscrimination contenues dans divers instruments internationaux accordent une protection aux personnes atteintes du VIH. Dans ce contexte, le Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels des Nations Unies a reconnu le statut de porteur du VIH comme un des motifs de discrimination prohibés. De plus, un nombre croissant d’instruments internationaux spécifiques prévoient des dispositions conçues pour les séropositifs, incluant notamment l’interdiction de la discrimination en matière d’emploi, telle la Recommandation no 200 de l’OIT concernant le VIH et le sida dans le monde du travail.’ 138  139 

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Appeal had found that IB’s HIV-positive status had no effect on his ability to carry out his work, and there was no evidence that it would have an adverse impact on his contract.143 But what if it had a negative impact on his ability to work and he had been required to take some time off to deal with his health, or what if he had become less efficient in his job as a result of his health status? Could his dismissal not raise an issue of discrimination then? It would still be discriminatory if a person was still medically fit to work. In such a case ‘reasonable accommodation’ is necessary where a person with HIV requires, say, to take some time off work to deal with his or her health, given that ‘denial of reasonable accommodation’ is also ‘discrimination on the basis of disability’.144 ‘Reasonable accommodation’ means any necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.145

Thus ILO Recommendation 200 requires specifically that [p]ersons with HIV-related illness should not be denied the possibility of continuing to carry out their work, with reasonable accommodation if necessary, for as long as they are medically fit to do so. Measures to redeploy such persons to work reasonably adapted to their abilities, to find other work through training or to facilitate their return to work should be encouraged, taking into consideration the relevant International Labour Organization and United Nations instruments.146

[8.44]  A particularly serious violation of the right to free choice of work is slavery, and slavery and forced or compulsory labour are considered in the next section.

III.  FREEDOM FROM SLAVERY AND FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOUR A.  General Overview [8.45]  The right to work includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his or her living by work which he or she ‘freely chooses or accepts’.147 This right to freely choose or accept work ‘implies not being forced in any way whatsoever to exercise or engage in employment’.148 Thus, the absence of forced labour and the 143 

Ibid, paras 86–87. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), Art 2, defines ‘Discrimination on the basis of disability’ to mean ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation.’ 145  Ibid. 146 ILO Recommendation 200: Recommendation 200: Recommendation concerning HIV and AIDS and the World of Work (17 June 2010), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/99thSession/texts/ WCMS_142613/lang--en/index.htm, Art 13. 147  ICESCR, Art 6(1). 148  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 6. 144  International

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existence of ‘freely chosen employment’ is an essential aspect of the right to work.149 States are under the obligation to respect the right to work by, inter alia, prohibiting forced or compulsory labour and refraining from denying or limiting equal access to decent work for all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups, including prisoners or detainees.150 It is in this context that international human rights instruments protect everyone from slavery or servitude, and from forced or compulsory labour. For example, Article 8 of the ICCPR151 provides: 1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude. 3.(a)  No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

[8.46]  Freedoms from slavery and servitude under the ICCPR are non-derogable rights.152 A proposal to add the qualification ‘involuntary’ to servitude was rejected by the drafters of the Supplementary Convention on Slavery 1956 and of the ICCPR on the ground that ‘It should not be possible for any person to contract himself into ­bondage.’153 It follows that consent cannot make slavery or servitude lawful, since ‘[p]ersonal liberty is an inalienable right which a person cannot voluntarily a­ bandon’.154 The HRC has noted that states ‘must provide information on measures taken to p ­ rotect women and children, including foreign women and children, from slavery, disguised inter alia as domestic or other kinds of personal service’.155 Therefore, there are positive obligations on states to ‘take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to work’,156 and to ‘enforce laws prohibiting forced labour, child labour and child prostitution and to implement programmes to prevent and combat such human abuses’.157 [8.47]  Regional human rights instruments equally prohibit slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour. For example, Article 5 of the African Charter158 prohibits ‘all forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery … [and the] slave trade’. States are also obliged to adopt and enforce legislative and other measures to ‘guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation, and protect them from exploitation by their employers’.159 In addition, states are obliged to ‘punish all 149  Employment Policy Convention 1964 (No 122), entered into force 15 July 1965, 569 UNTS 65. See also the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 (No 105), entered into force 17 January 1959, 320 UNTS 291. 150  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 23. 151 UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. For discussion, see S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 329–49; M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 2005) 193–209. 152  ICCPR, Art 4(2). 153  UN Doc A/2929, 33. 154  Report of the Commission in the Vagrancy Cases, 19 July 1969, Series B, no 10, 91. 155  HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3) (68th Session, 2000), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000) para 12. 156  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 22. 157  HRC, Concluding Observations: Brazil, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.66 (24 July 1996) para 31. 158 Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982), entered into force 21 ­October 1986. 159  See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Art 13(d).

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forms of exploitation of children, especially the girl-child’.160 This requires states to adopt domestic regulations or policies to prevent and combat child labour, and to protect children from economic exploitation and involvement in work that is hazardous and impacts negatively on their rights to health, education and development.161 This should be done in full compliance with ILO Convention No 182 (1999) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour,162 and ILO Convention No 15 138 (1973) concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment.163 [8.48]  Article 4 of the ECHR164 provides: 1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.165

Like Article 8 of the ICCPR, Article 4 of the ECHR makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from the prohibitions of slavery and servitude is permissible even in times of public emergency threatening the life of a nation.166 Similarly, under Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights167 it is provided: 1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women. 2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

It is notable that none of the above instruments defines the terms ‘slavery’, ‘servitude’ or ‘forced labour’. These concepts are examined further in sections III.B.–D. below. B.  Slavery, Servitude and Human Trafficking [8.49]  ‘Slavery’ is widely understood to refer to ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are ­exercised’.168 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY observed that the law does not know of a ‘right of ownership over a person’. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention speaks more guardedly ‘of a person over whom any or all of 160 

Ibid, Art 13(g). CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya UN Doc CRC/C/KEN/CO/2 (2 February 2007) paras 61–62. 162 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention), (No 182), adopted 17 June 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000, 2133 UNTS161, 38 ILM 1207 (1999). 163  Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No 138), adopted 26 June 1973, entered into force 19 June 1976, available at http://blue.lim.ilo.org/cariblex/pdfs/ILO_Convention_ 138.pdf. 164  For discussion, see B Rainey, E Wicks and C Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 198–212; DJ Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 279–86. 165  For discussion, see H Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 585. 166  ECHR, Art 15(2); Siliadin v France, above n 87, para 112. 167  For discussion, see T Melish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Manual on Presenting Claims (New Haven, CT, Orville H Schell Jr Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, 2002) 269–78. 168 Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (­Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 LNTS 253, signed in Geneva on 25 September 1926, entered into force 161  See

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the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.’ That language is to be preferred.169

The Appeals Chamber went on to say that in the case of contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with ‘chattel slavery’, but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical personality; the destruction is greater in the case of ‘chattel slavery’ but the difference is one of degree.170

[8.50]  ‘Servitude’ means ‘an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of slavery’.171 Thus, it is a state or condition of a slave; bondage or the state or condition of being subjected to or dominated by a person,172 involving ‘a particularly serious form of denial of freedom’.173 It is an aggravated form of compulsory labour, distinguished from forced labour by the victim’s feeling that the situation is permanent.174 [8.51]  The modern manifestation of slavery and servitude is ‘trafficking in persons’ (human trafficking), affecting predominantly girls and women (of low socio-economic status, and the primary trafficking flows are from developing states to more affluent states), while the majority of perpetrators are male.175 ‘Trafficking in persons’ has been understood to mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.176

Victims, including children from disadvantaged and marginalised groups, are trafficked mainly for commercial sexual exploitation, followed by forced labour or 9 March 1927, Art 1(1). See also R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1 (High Court of Australia, 28 August 2008). For comment, see J Allain, ‘R v Tang: Clarifying the Definition of “Slavery” in International Law’ (2009) 10  Melbourne Journal of International Law 246, available at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/ download19b61.pdf. 169 

Kunarac, Judgment, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A (ICTY Appeals Chamber,12 June 2002) para 118. Ibid, para 117. 171  Siliadin v France, above n 87, para 123. See also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of ­Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 UNTS 3, Arts 1 and 7. 172 See Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow, HarperCollins, 1998) 1405. 173  See the European Commission’s report in the case of Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, 9 July 1980, Series B, no 44, p 30, paras 78–80; (1982) 4 EHRR 443. 174  CN and V v France, App no 67724/09 (ECtHR, 11 October 2012). 175 M Dragiewicz (ed), Global Human Trafficking: Critical Issues and Contexts (London, Routledge, 2015); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014 (New York, United Nations, 2014); US Department of State, 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report (June 2014); Sector Project against Trafficking in Women (eds), Challenging Trafficking in Persons: Theoretical Debate and Practical Approaches (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005). 176  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Anti-Trafficking Protocol), UN Doc A/55/49 (vol I) (2001), entered into force 25 December 2003, Art 3(a). 170 

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­services,177 slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. Thus, human trafficking, within and across national borders, is a serious violation of human rights and a threat to the human dignity of trafficked persons.178 As recognised by the ECtHR, human trafficking itself may be considered to run counter to the spirit and purpose of protection from slavery or servitude, forced or compulsory labour.179 The Court stated: The Court considers that trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere … It implies close surveillance of the activities of victims, whose movements are often circumscribed … It involves the use of ­violence and threats against victims, who live and work under poor conditions …180

[8.52]  States must adopt and implement legislative and other measures, including criminal prosecution, so as to prevent, combat, punish and eventually eliminate human ­trafficking in the countries of origin, transit and destination. Article 6 of CEDAW provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

In addition, states are required to protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights, including all their ESC rights. Attention must be given to addressing factors that increase vulnerability to trafficking (and associated human rights violations), including inequality, poverty, high youth unemployment, and all forms of discrimination and prejudice in many countries of origin.181 C.  Forced or Compulsory Labour [8.53]  The term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ has been understood to mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.182

The three elements of this definition are: (i) work or service; (ii) the menace of any penalty; and (iii) the lack of a voluntary offer.183 The notion of any ‘penalty’ includes 177  UNODC, above n 175; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (21 May 2010) para 17; ILO, Forced Labour, Human Trafficking and Slavery, available at http://www.ilo.org/ global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm. 178  Anti-Trafficking Protocol, above n 176; Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, ETS No 19, Warsaw, 16.V.2005, entered into force 1 February 2008. 179  Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010) para 279; M and Others v Italy and Bulgaria, App no 40020/03 (ECtHR, 31 July 2012). 180  Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, above n 179, para 281. 181  See Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, UN Doc A/HRC/10/16 (20 February 2009) paras 49–50. 182  Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Forced Labour Convention), No 29 of 1930, adopted on 28 June 1930 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, 39 UNTS 55, Art 2(1). 183  For discussion of these elements, see ILO, Eradication of Forced Labour, General Survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No 105), Report III (Part 1B) (Geneva, ILO, 2007) 20, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ standards/relm/ilc/ilc96/pdf/rep-iii-1b.pdf.

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‘penal sanctions’ and ‘a loss of rights or privileges’,184 such as ‘promotion, transfer, access to new employment, the acquisition of certain consumer goods, housing or participation in university programmes’.185 A penalty ‘can also take subtler forms, of a psychological nature, such as threats to denounce victims to the police or immigration authorities when their employment status is illegal’.186 [8.54]  For a person to show that he or she has been subjected to forced labour, it should be shown that a state or a private party ordered that person to perform personal work or a service involuntarily (it must be performed against the person’s will), and that punishment or a comparable sanction was threatened if this order was not obeyed.187 In CN and V v France,188 an adolescent girl (CN) from Burundi arrived in France at the age of 16. She was forced to work as an unpaid domestic worker, and her passport was confiscated by her employers Mr and Mrs M. The girl, who did not attend school, was responsible for all the household chores at the home of Mr and Mrs M, part of a family of nine, and had to take care of their disabled son. She worked seven days a week, with no day off and no pay, rising early and going to bed late (and sometimes even having to get up in the middle of the night to take care of the disabled boy), and she had no time for leisure activities. The ECtHR noted: 78. In the present case the Court notes that Mrs M regularly threatened to send the applicants back to Burundi, which for the first applicant represented death and abandoning her younger sisters … It also notes that according to her observations the first applicant had done the work required of her under the threat of being sent back to her country of origin … In the opinion of the Court, being sent back to Burundi was seen by the first applicant as a ‘penalty’ and the threat of being sent back as the ‘menace’ of that ‘penalty’ being executed. 79. The Court therefore concludes that the first applicant was subjected to ‘forced or compulsory labour’ within the meaning of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention [ECHR] by Mr and Mrs M.

[8.55]  The ECtHR further requires that, to amount to forced labour, the obligation to perform work should be unjustifiable or oppressive in its nature, or its performance must constitute an avoidable hardship.189 Thus forced labour does not include a requirement that professional persons (pupils on training) such as lawyers offer their services without their consent to others if such requirement is not ‘so excessive or disproportionate’.190 Similarly, it is not forced labour for an employer to require an employee to move to another job,191 or to require an unemployed person to agree to

184  International Labour Conference (ILC), 14th Session, Geneva, 1930, Record of Proceedings, 691; see also Forced labour, General Survey of 1968, para 27; Abolition of Forced Labour, General Survey of 1979, para 21. 185  ILO, above n 183. 186  CN and V v France, above n 174, para 77. 187  Nowak, above n 151, 201. 188  CN and V v France, above n 174. 189  Van Der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 EHRR 163; Iversen v Norway, App no 1468/62, (1963) 6 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 278, 328. 190  Van Der Mussele v Belgium, above n 189, para 37. 191  Antonov v Russia, App no 38020/03 (ECtHR, 3 November 2005).

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accept suitable employment or work placement as a condition of receiving unemployment benefit.192 [8.56]  The term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ also does not include the following: (i)

Any work or service … normally required of a person who is under detention in consequence of a lawful order of a court, or of a person during conditional release from such detention; (ii) Any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognised, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors; (iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community; (iv) A ny work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.193

The above activities (prison labour,194 military service,195 emergencies and civic obligations) are grounded on the governing ideas of the general interest, social solidarity and what is normal in the ordinary course of affairs—examples of what might loosely be called community service.196 Relevant human rights treaties do not mention how the conditions for and limits on the imposition and performance of forced labour are to be defined in the exceptional cases above. However, such rules can be found in relevant ILO Conventions, eg ILO Convention No 105 concerning the abolition of forced labour197 and Convention No 29 concerning forced or compulsory labour.198 For example, Article 1 of ILO Convention No 105 prohibits the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour: (a) As a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system; (b) As a method of mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development; (c) As a means of labour discipline; (d) As a punishment for having participated in strikes; (e) As a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.

[8.57]  The elimination of forced labour remains a challenge, given that millions of individuals globally are victims of the practice.199 Women and girls comprised 55 per cent of victims in 2012.200 The Asia-Pacific region accounted for 56 per cent of total forced labour, Africa 18 per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean 9 per cent, and

192  Schuitemaker v Netherlands, App no 15906/08 (ECtHR, 4 May 2010); Bernadette Faure v Australia, Communication no 1036/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1036/2001 (2005). 193  ICCPR, Art 8(3)(c). See also ECHR, Art 4(3); AmCHR, Art 6(3). 194  Twenty-one Detained Persons v Federal Republic of Germany, App nos 3134/67, 3172/67 and 31883206/67, (1968) 11 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 528. 195  W, X, Y, and Z v United Kingdom (1968) 11 Yearbook 562. 196  Schmidt v Germany (1994) 18 EHRR 513, para 22. 197  320 UNTS 291, entered into force 17 January 1959. 198  39 UNTS 55, entered into force 1 May 1932. 199  See ILO, ‘ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour 2012: Results and Methodology’ (Geneva, ILO, 2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_182004/lang--en/ index.htm. The ILO estimates that ‘20.9 million people are victims of forced labour globally, trapped in jobs into which they were coerced or deceived and which they cannot leave’. 200  See ILO, above n 199, Executive summary, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_ norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_181953.pdf.

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the developed economies 7 per cent.201 Thus, Article 4 of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930,202 provides: 1. Each Member shall ensure that all victims of forced or compulsory labour, irrespective of their presence or legal status in the national territory, have access to appropriate and effective remedies, such as compensation. 2. Each Member shall, in accordance with the basic principles of its legal system, take the necessary measures to ensure that competent authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of forced or compulsory labour for their involvement in unlawful activities which they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subjected to forced or compulsory labour.

[8.58]  Significantly, the Protocol extends the right to effective remedies to include undocumented migrants, who might otherwise be labelled ‘illegal’ because of their immigration status. It also provides a basis for states to take measures to allow competent authorities ‘not to prosecute or impose penalties’ on victims of forced or compulsory labour, who have been forced to become involved in unlawful activities ‘as a direct consequence of being subjected to forced or compulsory labour’. It is less clear whether the ‘entitlement not to prosecute’ will be that significant a requirement in practice. It presumably still gives competent state authorities the ability to prosecute forced labour victims engaged in ‘unlawful’ behaviour, like sex work or drug offences, even if they were compelled into it. Thus, this seems more like an aspirational goal than a provision that will mandate immediate changes in state conduct. [8.59]  The prohibition of forced labour, slavery and servitude underlines the fact that respect for the individual and his or her dignity is expressed through the freedom of the individual regarding the choice to work, while emphasising the importance of work for personal development as well as for social and economic inclusion.203 Freedom from slavery is recognised as part of CIL.204 Given that in light of present-day conditions ‘forced labour is a modern variant of slavery’,205 its prohibition should be given similar status. D.  Protection against Exploitative Child Labour [8.60]  International law protects children (including vulnerable groups of children, eg street children, children with disabilities, minority and indigenous children, r­efugee children and migrant children) from economic and social exploitation (such as s­ exual exploitation and trafficking), and from work that is likely to be hazardous to the physical or mental health and morals of children, or which hampers children’s education

201 

Ibid. Adopted during 103rd Session, Geneva, 11 June 2014, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_246615.pdf. 203  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 4. 204  See American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Law (St Paul, MN, West, 1989) para 702; UDHR, Art 4. See also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970 [1970] ICJ Rep 3, paras 33–34; Mme Hadijatou Mani Koroua v The Republic of Niger, 27 October 2008, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States) para 81. 205  John Doe I, et al, v Unocal Corp, et al, 395 F.3d 932 (9 Cir 2002) para 4. 202 

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and (physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social) development.206 ­Article 10(3) of ­ICESCR provides: Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. ­Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.

Special measures of protection include the adoption of legislative, administrative, social, educational and other measures in order to ensure that children who are ­otherwise stateless can acquire nationality,207 and that children are protected from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous by providing for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment, appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment, and appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of protection from economic and social exploitation.208 [8.61]  Despite the near universal ratification of the CRC, it is an undeniable reality that millions of children around the world are involved in child labour (as miners, prostitutes, soldiers, drug smugglers or bonded labourers), with 85 million undertaking hazardous work.209 Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the region with the highest incidence of child labour. Poverty is one of the prime causes of such exploitation. It is thus not a coincidence that sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific have the highest percentages of economically active children between the ages of 5 and 14,210 and also the highest percentage of people living on less than US$1.25 a day.211 [8.62]  It is universally accepted that children, by virtue of their physical and ­mental immaturity, need special protection from economic exploitation.212 At the ­international level, the need to protect children from exploitative practices was formally acknowledged early in the twentieth century. The League of Nations included the protection of children within the ambit of its work on eliminating slavery and the

206 

CRC, Art 32(1). Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative on Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v The Government of Kenya, Decision No 002/Com/002/2009 (African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 22 March 2011). 208  CRC, Art 32(2). 209 ILO-IPEC, Marking Progress against Child Labour: Global Estimates and Trends 2000–2012 (Geneva, ILO, 2013). 210  Ibid. See also World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014 (Washington DC, World Bank, 2014) 2.S. 211 See JM Diller and DA Levy, ‘Child Labour, Trade and Investment: Towards the Harmonization of International Law’ (1997) 19 American Journal of International Law 663. See also UN, Contemporary Forms of Slavery, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/3/Add.1 (26 May 2000) paras 65–83. 212  The Slavery Convention did not specifically refer to child slavery as a particular category in its definitions of slavery and the slave trade, but the Supplementary Convention made a specific reference to the exploitation of ‘the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour’ in addition to an explicit prohibition of debt bondage regarding both adults and children. The Supplementary Convention also contains an implicit prohibition of the exploitation of the labour of young girls through early marriage. See Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 UNTS 3, adopted on 30 April 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957, Art 1. 207 

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 451

slave trade.213 In addition, the League of Nations, in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, stated that children must be protected against ‘every form of exploitation’.214 Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR protect children against exploitation. Thus, Article 24(1) of the ICCPR provides that every child has the ‘right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor’. Article 10(3) of the ICESCR echoes the requirement of numerous ILO conventions (considered below) that states should specify a minimum age below which ‘the paid employment of children should be prohibited and punishable by law’. [8.63]  The ILO Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No 138)215 and its accompanying ­Minimum Age Recommendation No 146216 are the principal international instruments dedicated to eradicating child labour in general. They require ratifying states to implement national policies to progressively raise the minimum age for admission to the workforce, to ensure the fullest physical and mental development of young persons. The Minimum Age Convention applies to all sectors of economic activity and covers children whether or not they are employed for wages. The Minimum Age Convention was introduced to prevent the exploitation of child labour by setting the minimum age for work at not less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling but not less than 15 years (14 years for countries in which the ‘economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed’).217 The Convention allows children to do ‘light work’ between the ages of 13 and 15 (12 years in developing countries).218 The minimum age for ‘hazardous work’ likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of a child is set at 18 years.219 [8.64]  In view of the huge numbers of children employed in contravention of the ­Minimum Age Convention, and in an apparent effort to give a clear signal about which forms of exploitation states should give priority to eliminating, the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 1999 (No 182) was adopted by the International Labour ­Conference in June 1999,220 together with Recommendation No 190 on the same subject.221 In Article 3 the Convention defines ‘the worst forms of child labour’ as comprising: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; 213  Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, adopted 26 September 1924, League of Nations OJ Spec Supp 21, at 43 (1924). See also the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, proclaimed by GA res 1386 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, principle 2. 214  Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, above n 213, para 4. 215  Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, adopted 19 June 2015, entered into force 19 June 1976, (ILO Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No 138)), available at http://www.ilo.org/ dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C138. 216  Recommendation concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, adopted 26 June 1973, 38 ILM 1207 (1999), entered into force 19 November 2000. 217  ILO Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No 138), above n 215, Arts 1 and 2(3). 218  ILO Minimum Age Convention, above n 215, Arts 7(1) and (4) and 2(4). 219  Ibid, Art 3(1). 220  See Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, No 182, above n 162. 221  Recommendation concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation), 1999 (No 190), adopted 17 June 1999, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R190.

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(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; (d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.

[8.65]  It can be noted from the foregoing that due to the vulnerable state of children, states are obliged to protect them from economic exploitation and harmful work,222 as well as from ‘the worst forms of child labour’.223 States are also obliged to protect children from ‘all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse by implementing relevant national, bilateral and multilateral measures’;224 from the risk of abduction, sale or trafficking;225 and ‘against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child’s welfare’.226 Regional human rights instruments reiterate the need to protect children. To mention one example, Article 15 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child227 specifically provides: Every child shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.228

Economic exploitation often arises out of all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery.229 It is in this context that states are obliged to abolish: Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour.230

[8.66]  Despite the long-established prohibition of child labour in international law, the former UN Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 1993/79, noted that the exploitation of child labour has remained a widespread phenomenon of a ‘serious nature’ in various parts of the world. Conscious of the harm that the practice of child labour causes to children all over the world, the Commission adopted the Programme of Action for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour. The Commission recommended that all states should adopt, as a matter of priority, the necessary ­legislative and administrative measures, ‘with a view to the absolute prohibition of employment of children’ in the following seven sectors: (a) Employment before the normal age of completion of primary schooling in the country concerned; (b) Under-age maid service; 222  For example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), GA res 44/25, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, Art 32 recognises the child’s right to be protected from economic exploitation and from ‘performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development’. See also ICESCR, Art 10; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 7(f). 223  Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, No 182, above n 162, Art 3. 224  CRC, Art 34. 225  Ibid, Art 35. 226  Ibid, Art 36. 227  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999. 228 See also ICESCR, Art 10; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 7; Worst Forms of Child Labour ­Convention, No 182, above n 162, Art 3(d). 229  See Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, No 182, ibid, Art 3(a). 230  Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, above n 212, Art 1(d).

Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labour

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(c) Night work; (d) Work in dangerous or unhealthy conditions; (e) Activities linked with prostitution, pornography and other forms of sexual trade and exploitation; (f) Work concerned with trafficking in and production of illicit drugs; (g) Work involving degrading or cruel treatment.231

[8.67]  Nevertheless, for millions of human beings throughout the world, full e­ njoyment of the right to freely chosen or freely accepted work remains a remote p ­ rospect,232 especially in private households with respect to child labour and trafficking.233 In 2013, the ILO estimated that 168 million children worldwide, accounting for almost 11 per cent of the child population as a whole, were engaged in child labour, with 85 million children in hazardous work that directly endangered their health, safety and moral development.234 Although some developing states, such as Angola, have ratified relevant ILO Conventions on child labour—Conventions Nos 138 and 182—many children continue to work in such states (without monitoring) below the legal age for employment.235 Thus the CRC Committee made the following recommendations for Angola to address the problem of child labour: (a) Strengthen its efforts to prevent children under the legal age for employment from working; (b) Seek innovative strategies whereby children who have completed their primary education who choose to work can combine working with continued education; (c) Establish an inspection system in order to ensure that work performed by children is light work and not exploitative; (d) Develop targeted programmes to protect the rights of children separated from their parents and working in the streets; (e) Seek technical assistance from ILO/IPEC.236

[8.68]  While these recommendations were specific to Angola, they are generally relevant to other developing states facing similar problems. As noted by the CESCR below, eliminating child labour requires investing adequate resources commensurate with the magnitude of the problem: The Committee is concerned about the large number of children involved in labour, including in hazardous work. The Committee is also concerned that measures taken, which in 2014 for

231 

Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1993/79, para 20. CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 4. 233  Two major treaties have been adopted in this area in this decade: United Nations Protocol to Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Trafficking Protocol) 2000, A/RES/55/25, annex II, UN Doc A/45/49 (vol I) (2001), entered into force 25 December 2003; and Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005, ETS No 197. 234  See ILO-IPEC, above n 209, vii. Asia and the Pacific had the largest numbers (almost 78 million or 9.3% of the child population), but Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the highest incidence of child labour (59 million, over 21%). There were 13 million (8.8%) children in child labour in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the Middle East and North Africa there were 9.2 million (8.4%). Agriculture was the most important sector in which child labourers were found (98 million, or 59%), followed by services (54 million) and industry (12 million)—mostly in the informal economy. 235 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Angola, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.246 (3 November 2004) para 64. 236  Ibid. 232 

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instance seek to reach out to 15,000 children, are not commensurate with the extent of the problem which concerns millions of children (art 10). The Committee urges the State party to pursue its efforts aimed at combating child labour, including by (a) taking measures and investing resources commensurate with the extent of the problem; (b) ensuring effective labour inspections in the domestic work as well as in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery sectors, and holding employers exploiting child labour accountable; (c) providing rehabilitation to victims of child labour; and (d) undertaking awareness-raising campaigns with a view to addressing the social acceptance of the worst forms of child labour.237

[8.69]  Thousands of ‘hidden slaves’ are still held and forced to work in several parts of the world, including in the United States238 and in Europe. As noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: [S]lavery continues to exist in Europe in the twenty-first century. Although, officially, slavery was abolished over 150 years ago, thousands of people are still held as slaves in Europe, treated as objects, humiliated and abused. Modern slaves, like their counterparts of old, are forced to work (through mental or physical threat) with no or little financial reward. They are physically constrained or have other limits placed on their freedom of movement and are treated in a degrading and inhumane manner. Today’s slaves are predominantly female and usually work in private households, starting out as migrant domestic workers.239

[8.70]  Although some states have adopted laws criminalising modern forms of (domestic) slavery,240 regrettably, by 2001 none of the Council of Europe Member States had expressly made domestic slavery an offence in their criminal codes.241 Across West Africa, millions of (poorly educated) girls—and less often boys—are effectively sold into slavery as ‘domestic workers’ to work in the households of non-family ­members.242 In states such as Togo, there is ‘continuing discrimination against women and girls with respect to access to education, employment, inheritance and political ­representation’.243 This gives rise to many violations of women’s rights, including their freedom from forced labour, slavery or servitude. Some girls or women, for e­ xample, are trafficked to work as prostitutes or domestic workers in Europe.244 In 2005, the CRC Committee welcomed the legislative and other efforts aimed at providing protection of children from economic exploitation in France.245 However, it observed that in France, ‘illegal networks of forced labour continue to operate and that foreign

237  CESCR, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Indonesia, UN Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1 (23 May 2014) para 23. 238  See Free the Slaves and the Human Rights Center of the University of California, ‘Hidden Slaves: Forced Labour in the United States’ (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 47. 239  Recommendation 1663 (2004), adopted on 22 June 2004, paras 1–2. 240  See eg United Kingdom’s Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Cap 30), available at http://www.legislation.gov. uk/ukpga/2015/30/pdfs/ukpga_20150030_en.pdf. 241  Recommendation 1523 (2001), adopted on 26 June 2001, para 9. 242 See UNICEF, Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, in Africa, 2nd edn (­Florence, Innocenti Research Centre, 2005); IRIN, Nigeria: Domestic Workers or Modern Day Slaves? (Lagos, IRIN, 2006). For discussion of slavery in Niger, see H Duffy, ‘Hadijatou Mani Koroua v Niger: Slavery Unveiled by the ECOWAS Court’ (2009) 9(1) Human Rights Law Review 151. 243  HRC, Concluding Observations: Togo, UN Doc CCPR/CO/76/TGO (28 November 2002) para 22. 244  See, eg, UNICEF, above n 242. 245 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.240 (30 June 2004) para 52.

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children fall victims of networks which are not countered vigorously enough’.246 One example was considered by the ECtHR in the case of Siliadin v France247 under Article 4 of the ECHR. This case is discussed below in some detail because of its relevance to the issues of forced labour, servitude and modern forms of slavery. i.  Siliadin v France: The Facts248 [8.71]  The applicant, Ms Siwa-Akofa Siliadin, was born in 1978 and lived in Togo until the events that ultimately brought her case before the Court. On 26 January 1994, aged 15 years and 7 months, she was brought to France by Mrs D, a French national of Togolese origin. The applicant entered France on a Togolese passport with a three-month tourist visa. The agreement reached between Mrs D and the applicant’s family was that she would work at Mrs D’s home until the cost of her air ticket had been reimbursed, and that Mrs D would attend to her immigration status and find her a place at school. In reality, the applicant became an unpaid housemaid for Mr and Mrs D and her passport was taken from her. During the period that she lived with Mrs D, from January to October 1994, the applicant had been employed by the latter, first, to do housework, cook and look after her child, and, secondly, without remuneration, in Mrs D’s clothing business, where the applicant also did the cleaning and returned to the rails clothes that customers had tried on. [8.72]  In the second half of 1994, Mrs D ‘lent’ the applicant to Mr and Mrs B, who had two small children, so that she could assist the pregnant Mrs B with household work. Mrs B also had another daughter from a first marriage who stayed with her during the holidays and at weekends. The applicant lived at Mr and Mrs B’s home, her father having given his consent. This arrangement became permanent after Mrs B gave birth to her fourth child and told the applicant that she had decided to keep her. The applicant subsequently became a general housemaid for Mr and Mrs B. She worked seven days a week, without a day off, without pay (except for a few gifts from Mr B’s mother, who gave her one or two 500 franc notes), and was occasionally and exceptionally authorised to go out on Sundays to attend Mass. Her working day began at 7.30 am, when she had to get up and prepare breakfast, dress the children, take them to nursery school or their recreational activities, look after the baby, do the housework, and wash and iron clothes. In the evening she prepared dinner, looked after the older children, did the washing up and went to bed at about 10.30 pm. In addition, she had to clean a studio flat, in the same building, which Mr B had made into an office. The applicant slept on a mattress on the floor in the baby’s room; she had to look after him if he woke up. [8.73]  In December 1995, the applicant escaped from the B family. She then lived and worked for a different family for five or six months. She was given appropriate accommodation and food, and received a salary of 2,500 francs per month. Subsequently, in obedience to her paternal uncle, who had been in contact with Mr and Mrs B, she

246  247  248 

Ibid. Siliadin v France, above n 87. Ibid, paras 9–45.

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returned to the B family upon the request of her paternal uncle. She was promised that her immigration status would be regularised, but this did not occur. In fact, as the French courts later found, Mr and Mrs B had used her fear of arrest and deportation as a way of controlling her. The applicant’s situation remained unchanged: the applicant continued to carry out household tasks and look after the couple’s children. She slept on a mattress on the floor of the children’s bedroom, then on a folding bed, and wore second-hand clothes. Her immigration status had still not been regularised, she was not paid and did not attend school. [8.74]  Later, having recovered her passport, the applicant again escaped, with the assistance of a neighbour and the Committee against Modern Slavery,249 which in turn filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office about the applicant’s case and also assisted with her application to the Court. In 1998, Mr and Mrs B were prosecuted under Articles 225-13 and 225-14 of the French Criminal Code. Article 225-13 prohibits obtaining services without payment or for payment which is manifestly disproportionate to the work carried out, by taking advantage of the person’s vulnerability or state of dependence. Article 225-14 prohibits subjecting someone to working and living conditions that are incompatible with human dignity by taking advantage of vulnerability or a state of dependence. Mr and Mrs B were also charged with employing an alien without a work permit, but this last charge is irrelevant to the Article 4 issues. [8.75]  In 1999, the French court of first instance convicted Mr and Mrs B under ­Article 225-13 but not Article 225-14. They found that the applicant was in a state of vulnerability and dependence in her relationship with the B family, particularly because of the fact that the applicant was unlawfully resident in France, was aware of that fact and feared arrest, and that Mr and Mrs B nurtured that fear while promising to secure her leave to remain—a claim that was confirmed by her uncle and her father—and by the fact that she had no resources, no friends and almost no family to help her. It was established that she had not been paid adequately. However, that court was of the view that the offence under Article 225-14 had not been made out because the working conditions, while harsh, were not incompatible with human dignity. The court concluded that, while it seemed established that employment regulations had not been observed in respect of working hours and rest time, this did not suffice to show that the working conditions were incompatible with human dignity, which would have implied, for example, frequent extremely cruel treatment, frequent insults and harassment, the need for particular physical strength that was disproportionate to the employee’s constitution and having to work in unhealthy premises, which had not been the case in this instance. It appears that the court did not take into account the fact that the applicant was a child. Article 225-13 set a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment plus a fine, but the court ordered 12 months’ imprisonment, of which seven were suspended, plus a fine and an order for compensation to be paid to the applicant. Mr and Mrs B appealed against this decision. [8.76]  In 2000, the Paris Court of Appeal quashed the judgment at first instance, thus reversing the convictions under Article 225-13. The Court of Appeal found that it had not been established that the applicant was in a state of vulnerability or dependence 249 

In French, Le Comité contre l’esclavage moderne.

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 457

since, by taking advantage of her ability to come and go at will, contacting her family at any time, leaving Mr and Mrs B’s home for a considerable period and returning without coercion, the girl had, in spite of her youth, shown an undeniable form of independence, and vulnerability could not be established merely on the basis that she was an alien. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal acquitted the defendants of all the charges against them. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, but the Public Prosecutor did not, which meant that the acquittals stood and the only issue before the Court of Cassation was the award of compensation. The Court of Cassation agreed that the Court of Appeal had erred in its application of Article 225-13, and the case was remitted to the Versailles Court of Appeal. In 2003, the Versailles Court of Appeal found that the offence had been made out and therefore ordered compensation:250 the acquittals remained unaffected. [8.77]  After the Paris Court of Appeal decision, and the refusal of the Public ­Prosecutor to seek review of the acquittals, the applicant initiated her application to the ECtHR on 17 April 2001. Relying on Article 4 of the ECHR, the applicant alleged that the criminal law provisions applicable in France did not afford her sufficient and effective protection against the ‘servitude’ in which she had been held, or at the very least against the ‘forced and compulsory’ labour which she had been required to ­perform. In other words, her claim was that the defendant state had failed in its positive obligation to have adequate criminal offences in place to protect her rights under Article 4 of the ECHR. The application was declared admissible on 1 February 2005, and the judgment was issued less than six months later. The Court had to consider whether France had afforded sufficient protection to the applicant, and whether the applicant was held in slavery or servitude and subjected to forced labour. ii.  Siliadin v France: The Decision State Obligation to Protect [8.78]  First, the Court accepted that the obligation to protect the right to be free from slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour includes the responsibility of states to prohibit forced or compulsory labour by NSAs.251 The Court stated: [L]imiting compliance with Article 4 of the Convention only to direct action by the State authorities would be inconsistent with the international instruments specifically concerned with this issue and would amount to rendering it ineffective. Accordingly, it necessarily follows from this provision that Governments have positive obligations, … for example, to adopt criminal-law provisions which penalise the practices referred to in Article 4 and to apply them in practice.252 250  On 3 October 2003 the Paris industrial tribunal delivered judgment following an application submitted by the applicant. It awarded her €31,238 in respect of arrears of salary, €1,647 in respect of the notice period and €164 in respect of holiday leave. 251  See also CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) para 25. 252  Siliadin v France, above n 87, para 89. See also N v The United Kingdom, App no 4239/08 (ECtHR, 13 November 2012) para 81. The Court concluded that ‘the investigation into the applicant’s complaints of domestic servitude was ineffective due to the absence of specific legislation criminalising such treatment’.

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[8.79]  The Court went on to state that in accordance with contemporary norms and trends in this field, the member states’ positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention must be seen as requiring ‘the penalisation and effective prosecution of any act aimed at maintaining a person in such a situation’.253 The Court considered that the criminal law legislation in force in France at the material time (Articles 225-13 and 225-14 of the Criminal Code) did not afford the applicant, a minor, ‘practical and effective protection’ against the actions of which she was a victim, since slavery and servitude were not as such classified as offences under French criminal law.254 The Court therefore found that there had been a violation of France’s positive obligations under Article 4 of the ECHR.255 It is submitted that a state’s obligation with respect to trafficked children should not be limited to having criminal laws but should extend to the regularisation of their immigration status, housing and education. Slavery [8.80]  On the basis of the Slavery Convention of 1926, the Court found that the applicant’s situation did not amount to slavery, as Mr and Mrs B did not exercise a right of ownership over her. The Court noted: Although the applicant was, in the instant case, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that Mr and Mrs B exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an ‘object’.256

Although the Court identified the key element of slavery as ‘ownership’, in accordance with the 1926 Convention, this requirement has not always been applied strictly, in the sense of legal ownership. The ICTY, in Kunarac,257 asserted that ownership was an essential element of slavery, but found that slavery had been established in circumstances which could just as easily be described as ‘control’ rather than ownership. The Strasbourg Court’s strict application of the definition of slavery could in some cases be inadequate to protect victims of modern slavery. However, in this case, the applicant’s situation did fall within the categories of forced labour and servitude. Forced Labour [8.81]  As to forced labour, the Court had regard to the ILO Forced Labour Convention 1930, which uses language similar to that of Article 4(3) of the ECHR. The ILO Forced Labour Convention 1930 defines, as noted in paragraph 8.53 above, forced labour as involuntary work which is ‘exacted … under the menace of any penalty’ and also performed against the will of the person concerned, that is, work for which the person ‘has not offered himself voluntarily’.258 The Court found that although 253 

Siliadin v France, above n 87, para 112. Ibid, paras 141–48. Ibid, para 149. 256  Ibid, para 122. 257  Kunarac and others, Judgment, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T (ICTY Trial Chamber III, 2001). See also the decision of the High Court of Australia in The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39. 258  Siliadin v France, above n 87, para 117. 254  255 

Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labour

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the applicant was not threatened by a ‘penalty’, the fact remained that she was in an ‘equivalent situation in terms of the perceived seriousness of the threat’.259 Accordingly, she was covered by this definition because, taking into account her age and immigration status, she was menaced by the fear of arrest by the police because of her irregular status.260 Likewise, in her situation, she was effectively ‘not given any choice’ as to whether or not she worked for Mrs D or the B family, and therefore met the nonvoluntariness criterion.261 Servitude [8.82]  The Court further agreed that the applicant, a minor at the relevant time, had been held in servitude, as she was deprived of her autonomy and was subject to ­coercion.262 In this regard, the Court adopted the distinction between forced labour and servitude drawn by the Commission in Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, by which servitude includes ‘in addition to the obligation to provide certain services to another … the obligation on the “serf ” to live on the other’s property and the impossibility of changing his status’.263 The Court concluded that the applicant, a minor at the relevant time, was held in servitude within the meaning of Article 4 of the ECHR because: 1. In addition to the fact that the applicant was required to perform forced labour, the Court notes that that this labour lasted almost fifteen hours a day, seven days per week. Brought to France by a relative of her father’s, she had not chosen to work for Mr and Mrs B. As a minor, she had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated, and had no means of subsistence other than in the home of Mr and Mrs B, where she shared the children’s bedroom as no other accommodation had been provided. She was entirely at Mr and Mrs B’s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and she had been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred. 2. In addition, the applicant, who was afraid of being arrested by the police, was not in any event permitted to leave the house, except to take the children to their classes and various activities. Thus, she had no freedom of movement and no free time. 3. As she had not been sent to school, despite the promises made to her father, the applicant could not hope that her situation would improve and was completely dependent on Mr and Mrs B.264

[8.83]  The case of Siliadin indicates that violations of the right to work may be a result of not only acts or omissions of the state but also of acts or omissions of NSAs. A state’s failure to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons within its jurisdiction from infringements of the right to work by third parties, or to regulate effectively the activities of NSAs, including individuals, groups or corporations, so as to prevent them from violating the right to work of others (such as not to hold individuals in slavery or servitude, or not to subject individuals to forced labour) amounts to a violation of the right to work.265 259 

Ibid, para 118. Ibid. Ibid, paras 119–20. 262  Ibid, paras 123–29. 263  Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, above n 173, para 79. 264  Siliadin v France, above n 87, paras 126–28. 265  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 251, para 35. 260  261 

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IV.  RIGHT NOT TO BE UNFAIRLY DEPRIVED OF EMPLOYMENT [8.84]  The right to work includes ‘the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment’.266 States are thus obliged, inter alia, to protect against unfair termination of employment, particularly as regards certain workers who are more vulnerable, eg migrant workers, domestic workers, older workers and pregnant women workers. The ILO Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer267 (No 158) has been invoked by the CESCR to define the scope of the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment: ILO Convention No 158 concerning Termination of Employment (1982) defines the lawfulness of dismissal in its article 4 and in particular imposes the requirement to provide valid grounds for dismissal as well as the right to legal and other redress in the case of unjustified dismissal.268

[8.85]  The ILO Convention No 158 establishes basic principles applicable to termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, namely, the requirement for a valid reason for termination, notice to the worker and an opportunity for the worker to defend himself or herself before termination, and a right to appeal to an independent body. Article 4 of the Convention provides: The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.

[8.86]  Termination must not be arbitrary but connected with the ‘capacity’ or ‘conduct’ of the worker, or be based on ‘operational requirements’. Termination on grounds of ‘capacity’ can result from a lack of the skills or qualities necessary to perform certain tasks, leading to unsatisfactory performance.269 It also extends to incapacity to perform work as a result of non-temporary illness or injury.270 Termination of employment connected with the ‘conduct’ of the worker includes a worker’s professional misconduct (which may lead to disciplinary action and termination of employment),271 or improper behaviour, which includes in particular disorderly conduct, violence, assault, using insulting language, ­disrupting the peace and order of the workplace, turning up for work in a state of intoxication or under the influence of narcotic drugs, or the consumption of alcohol or drugs at the workplace, various acts displaying a lack of honesty and trustworthiness, such as fraud, deceit, breach of trust, theft and various disloyal activities (such as divulging trade secrets or

266 

CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 6. Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer No 158 1412 UNTS 159, adopted 22 June 1982, entered into force 23 November 1985. 268  Ibid, para 11. 269 ILO, Protection against Unjustified Dismissal (Geneva, ILO, 1995) para 94, available at http://www.ilo. org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1995-82-4B).pdf. 270  Ibid. 271  Ibid, para 90, where misconduct includes ‘neglect of duty, violation of work rules (particular mention is sometimes made of rules related to safety and health), disobedience of legitimate orders and absence or lateness without good cause’. 267  ILO

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undertaking activities in competition with the employer) or causing material damage to the property of the undertaking.272

Termination due to the ‘operational requirements’ of the undertaking generally refers to redundancy or the reduction of the number of posts available for economic or technical reasons, or due to force majeure or accident.273 It also covers reasons ‘necessitated by economic, technological, structural or similar requirements which are not connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker’.274 [8.87]  Article 5 of ILO Convention No 158 provides a non-exhaustive list of reasons that ‘shall not constitute valid reasons for termination’: (a) union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours; (b) seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers’ representative; (c) the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities; (d) race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin; (e) absence from work during maternity leave.

In addition ‘temporary absence from work because of illness or injury’ is not a valid reason for termination.275 Other invalid reasons are age and absence from work due to compulsory military practice or other civic obligations, subject to national law and practice.276 Dismissal for strike action, which is a legitimate trade union activity, constitutes serious discrimination in employment,277 and is a violation of workers’ freedom of association and right to organise.278 In 1998 the CESCR noted with concern that in 1997, the military Governor of the State of Kaduna in Nigeria issued a decree dismissing 22,000 workers of the Kaduna State Civil Service when they went on strike.279 It recommended that the rights of labour unions and syndicates should be restored and respected.280 [8.88]  Termination must follow a minimum procedure, such as ‘a reasonable period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof’. Thus Article 11 of the ILO Convention No 158 provides:

272 

Ibid, para 89. Ibid, paras 96–97. Examples include ‘rationalization or modernization of undertakings, establishments or services, a fall in production, changed market or economic conditions requiring the dismissal of one or more workers and failure of the worker to adapt to the work or technique’. 274  Ibid, para 98. 275  ILO Convention No 158, above n 267, Art 6. 276 ILO Recommendation No 166 concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer (1982) para 5. 277  ILO Convention No 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949). 278  ILO Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948). 279  CESCR, Concluding Observation: Nigeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.23 (16 June 1998) para 18. 280  Ibid, para 37. 273 

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A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a reasonable period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof, unless he [or she] is guilty of serious misconduct, that is, misconduct of such a nature that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue his [or her] employment during the notice period.281

[8.89]  Article 7 of the ILO Convention No 158 provides that termination based on conduct or performance must not take place without a prior opportunity being given to a worker to defend himself or herself, unless this is not reasonably possible. The worker should be ‘entitled to be assisted by another person’ (eg a staff delegate, trade union representative, friend or legal representative) when defending himself or herself.282 In case of termination due to unsatisfactory performance, the employer should have given the worker ‘appropriate instructions and written warning’, and the worker must have continued to perform his or her duties unsatisfactorily after a reasonable period of time for improvement has elapsed.283 When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, the employer is required to carry out consultations with the workers’ representatives concerned to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations.284 [8.90]  Violations of the right to work, such as unfair termination, are subject to the principle that victims should have access to effective national remedies in order to prevent, investigate, punish and/or redress such violations by the state or NSAs: Any person or group who is a victim of a violation of the right to work should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at the national level. At the national level trade unions and human rights commissions should play an important role in defending the right to work. All victims of such violations are entitled to adequate reparation, which may take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or a guarantee of non-repetition.285

A right of appeal to an ‘impartial body’ (not part of the employment hierarchy), within a reasonable period of time after termination, must be available to a worker who considers that his or her employment has been unjustifiably terminated.286 The impartial body could be ‘a court, labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator’ empowered to examine the reasons for termination and the circumstances, so as to determine whether termination was justified.287 This right of appeal is part of a right to a fair hearing and a right to an effective remedy for violations of human rights.288 If termination was not justified, an impartial body should ‘declare the ­termination

281 Emphasis added. Serious misconduct includes ‘theft, fraud or dishonesty; assaulting, threatening or insulting superiors or, sometimes, fellow workers; repeated violation of applicable rules (particularly those relating to safety); deliberate refusal to fulfil essential obligations under the contract of employment; disobedience of legitimate orders; habitual negligence; acts causing serious damage to property; habitual absence without leave or unpunctuality; habitually being in a state of drunkenness or under the influence of narcotic drugs during working hours; and conviction for a crime or an offence involving moral turpitude.’ ILO, above n 267, para 251. 282  ILO Recommendation No 166, above n 276, para 9. 283  Ibid, para 8. 284  ILO Convention No 158, above n 267, Art 13. 285  CESCR, General Comment 18, above n 4, para 48. 286  ILO Convention No 158, above n 267, Art 8. 287  Ibid, Arts 8 and 9(1). 288  See, eg, Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al) v Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs (IACtHR, Judgment of 24 November 2006) paras 129–31.

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invalid and/or order or propose reinstatement of the worker’, or order payment of ‘adequate compensation’ or other appropriate remedy.289 According to the ILO, compensation, in the case of termination of employment impairing a basic right, should be aimed at compensating fully, both in financial and in occupational terms, the prejudice suffered by the worker, the best solution generally being reinstatement of the worker in his [or her] job with payment of unpaid wages and maintenance of acquired rights.290

V. CONCLUSION [8.91]  The right to work forms an essential part of international human rights law. Although the right to work has been considered as an ESC right, it is also, in many ways, essential to the realisation not only of other ESC rights (such as the rights to adequate housing, food, health and education) but also to the full and effective realisation of civil and political rights. For example, the right to work is essential for realising other ESC rights, such as education, health, social security, adequate food, water and sanitation, housing and clothing. In addition, work is a means of facilitating the enjoyment of the human right to life, since work provides the major source of income in the world. Furthermore, as shown above, some aspects of the right to work, such as freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour (which have been applied to cases of domestic service and of human trafficking for sexual and other purposes), are protected by human rights treaties covering essentially civil and political rights. In this respect, the right to work epitomises the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights. [8.92]  As noted in section I. above, Article 6(1) of the ICESCR defines the right to work as the right of everyone to have the opportunity to gain his or her living by work which he or she ‘freely chooses or accepts’. This has three implications. First, it implies a right not to be forced in any way whatsoever to exercise or engage in employment. This guarantees freedom from forced or compulsory labour, slavery or servitude. The judgments of the ECtHR in Siliadin v France and Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia show clearly that Article 4 of the ECHR, concerning slavery, servitude and forced labour, imposes positive obligations on states to have a satisfactory legislative and administrative regime in place to tackle the problems of domestic labour and human trafficking, and to take necessary steps to protect victims and prevent harm to potential victims/ individuals at risk, to investigate where there is ‘credible suspicion’ of trafficking, and cooperate with other states and prosecute alleged offences. Secondly, the right to work implies the right of access to a system of protection guaranteeing each worker access to employment. This guarantees freedom from discrimination. Thirdly, the right to work implies the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.

289  290 

ILO Convention No 158, above n 267, Art 10. ILO, Protection against Unjustified Dismissal (Geneva, ILO, 1995) para 232.

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[8.93]  In Article 16(2) of the ICESCR, states parties recognise that ‘to achieve the full realisation of this right’ the steps to be taken shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment, under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

The enjoyment of the right to work by everyone requires state efforts to reduce unemployment, in particular unemployment among disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups, such as women, persons with disabilities, young people and migrant workers, including through: (a) providing the incentives for employers, in the public and the private sectors, to create new jobs, especially for women, persons with disabilities and young people; (b) reviewing the vocational education and training programmes to meet the current labour market demands; (c) taking measures targeted specifically at youth and women’s unemployment; (d) ensuring effective compliance by employers with applicable labour laws, including by establishing a functioning system of labour inspectorate to monitor all aspects of the right to work, combat discrimination at work and provide for dissuasive sanctions against employers in case of non-compliance; (e) reviewing all obstacles for women in employment and adopting temporary special measures to promote the access of women to all types of employment and occupation; (f) adopting legislative and policy measures to ensure equal pay between women and men for work of equal value and the same retirement age; (g) enhancing vocational training, job training and retraining opportunities for unemployed women and women employed in low-paid jobs; and (h) integrating a gender perspective in every state’s labour migration policies, paying special attention to the rights (eg freedom from labour exploitation, access to education, healthcare and social protection system in the countries of employment) of women migrant workers, as well as of families of migrant workers left behind or received. [8.94]  As highlighted in Article 7 of the ICESCR, the work that is protected should respect the rights of the human person, as well as the rights of workers in terms of conditions of just and favourable conditions of work, including fair and equal remuneration for work of equal value; remuneration to afford all workers a decent living for themselves and their families; safe and healthy working conditions; equality of promotion opportunities; rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay; freedom from harassment including sexual harassment; and flexible working arrangements.

9 Rights to an Adequate Standard of Living and Social Security: Articles 11 and 9 Article 11 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent. 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation­, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need. Article 9 ICESCR The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.

I. INTRODUCTION [9.01]  The right to life entails a positive state obligation to ‘generat[e] minimum living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person’.1 A life in dignity certainly requires an adequate standard of living (including adequate food,2

1 

Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, IACtHR, judgment of 17 June 2005, paras 162–65. De Schutter and KY Cordes (eds), Accounting for Hunger: The Right to Food in the Era of ­Globalisation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011); WB Eide, Food and Human Rights in Development (Oxford, ­Intersentia, 2005). 2 O

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water3 and housing)4 so that no one need resort to degrading means, such as begging, sex work, child or bonded labour, as the only way to realise access to basic subsistence needs. Therefore, the right to life includes the right to adequate food, water and ­housing.5 In the case of G v An Bord Uchtála,6 the Irish Supreme Court referred to the right to life as necessarily implying ‘the right to be born, the right to preserve and defend, and to have preserved and defended that life and the right to maintain that life at a proper human standard in matters of food, clothing and habitation’. ­Unfortunately, with millions of people living in conditions of ‘modern slavery’ across the globe, many of them men, women and children trafficked by gangs for sex work and unskilled labour,7 the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living remains a distant dream. [9.02]  This chapter examines the right to an adequate standard of living, focusing on its main components, namely, the rights to adequate food, water and sanitation, and to adequate housing. It also examines the right to social security as an essential tool in the reduction and alleviation of poverty, and thus as a way of ensuring that everyone, regardless of age or ability to work, is guaranteed the means necessary to enjoy an adequate standard of living. It does not examine the right to health, which is discussed in chapter ten. [9.03]  Article 25(1) of the UDHR declared the right of ‘everyone’ to an adequate standard of living in the following terms: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

Article 25 was reinforced by several treaties protecting the right to social security, including Article 11 of the ICESCR and Article 27 of the CRC. According to ­Article 11 ICESCR, an adequate standard of living includes ‘adequate food, clothing and housing’, and ‘the continuous improvement of living conditions’. The use of the word ‘including’ in both the UDHR and the ICESCR indicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaustive. The right to water clearly falls within 3 JM Chavarro, The Human Right to Water: A Legal Comparative Perspective at the International, Regional and Domestic Level (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2015); IT Winkler, The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Statutes and Implications for Water Allocation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012); M Langford et al, Legal Resources on the Right to Water: International and National Standards (Geneva, Centre on ­Housing Rights and Evictions, 2004); W Vandenhole and T Wielders, ‘Water as a Human Right—Water as an Essential Service: Does it Matter?’ (2008) 26(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 391. 4 J Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013); RG Bratt, ME Stone and C Hartman (eds), A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda (Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 2006); L Chenwi, ‘Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions’ (2008) 8(1) Human Rights Law Review 105. 5  See, eg, Supreme Court of India in Kishen Pattnayak & Another v State of Orissa, AIR 1989 SC 677; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v Union of India, (SC 2001), Writ Petition (Civil) no 196/2001. 6  G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 7 See The Global Slavery Index 2013, available at http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/. In 2014, an ­estimated 35.8 million people were living in conditions of ‘modern slavery’, which ‘includes slavery, ­slavery-like practices (such as debt bondage, forced marriage, and sale or exploitation of children), human ­trafficking and forced labour’.

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 467

the ­category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since access to water is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival, given that ‘an adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements’.8 [9.04]  The ‘adequate’ standard of living protected in Article 25 of the UDHR and ­Article 11 of the ICESCR is not defined, but it should be adequate for one’s p ­ hysical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. Thus, Article 27(1) of the CRC provides: States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.

This requires the eradication of poverty, given that ‘poverty constitutes a denial of human rights’,9 including the right to an adequate standard of living, by denying those living in poverty the means necessary to buy a minimum standard of food, clothing and housing. [9.05]  Despite global recognition of the importance of adequate food, water and housing to human dignity, welfare and survival, millions of people are either homeless or live in inadequate housing, and lack safe water and adequate food. A total of 842 million people (12 per cent of the global population) in 2011–13, or around one in eight people in the world, were estimated to be suffering from chronic ­hunger, regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life.10 The vast majority of such people—827 million—lived in developing regions, where the prevalence of undernourishment was estimated at 14.3 per cent.11 Over 1 billion people lived in inadequate housing, while over 100 million people were homeless.12 The number of people living in urban slums has been increasing, and in many cities, especially in developing states, slum dwellers number more than 50 per cent of the population and have little or no access to adequate shelter, water and sanitation.13 About 1.8 billion people were estimated to lack access to safe water,14 2.5 billion had no toilets, septic tanks, piped sewer systems or other means of improved sanitation, and about 1.1 billion people 8  CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (29th Session, 2003), UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) paras 2–3. 9  See CESCR, Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (10 May 2001) para 1. In para 8, the CESCR defined poverty as ‘a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights’. 10 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World (2013), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/ i3458e/i3458e.pdf. 11  Ibid. 12  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No 21 (1996), The Human Right to Adequate Housing 4. 13  See UN HABITAT, Number of Slum Dwellers Grows to 863 Million, 10 February 2014, available at https://www.cordaid.org/en/news/un-habitat-number-slum-dwellers-grows-863-million. An estimated 863 million people in 2013 lived in slums, in contrast to 760 million in 2000 and 650 million in 1990. 14  See K Onda, J LoBuglio and J Bartram, ‘Global Access to Safe Water: Accounting for Water Quality and the Resulting Impact on MDG Progress’ (2012) 9(3) International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 880. In 2010, the UN Human Rights Council was ‘[d]eeply concerned that approximately 884 million people lack access to safe drinking water and that more than 2.6 billion do not have access

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still practised open defecation.15 Governments claim lack of capacity and resources to implement programmes and undertake reforms aimed at creating the conditions for expanding access to adequate food, water and housing. The right to an adequate standard of living therefore provides a unique paradigm for monitoring the steps taken by states to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate housing, through individual and group demands and insistence upon the realisation of this basic human right. [9.06]  This chapter begins with an analysis of the obligations of the right to an adequate standard of living (section II.). It then considers the normative content of the right to an adequate standard of living, as interpreted in the international and regional regimes of human rights law and in some national constitutions (section III.). An analysis of the right to social security is set out in section IV., followed by a consideration of remedies (section V.) and concluding observations (section VI.).

II.  OBLIGATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING A.  Non-state Actors [9.07]  Non-state actors, including international organisations, national human rights institutions, civil society organisations and private businesses, have heavy responsibilities in the realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living.16 The ­ICESCR empowers the poor by recognising their rights and imposing legal obligations on ­others, such as states. With respect to the right to an adequate standard of living, adult individuals generally have the primary responsibility to realise their own rights and the rights of their dependants to adequate food, water and sanitation, clothing and housing through their own efforts and exploitation of their own resources, such as labour or land. Thus Article 27(2) of the CRC provides: The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child’s development.

B.  State Obligations [9.08]  States have the obligation to respect, protect and fulf il the right of everyone within their jurisdiction to an adequate standard of living. First, states are obliged to refrain from taking any measures that might undermine, directly or indirectly, the to basic sanitation, and alarmed that approximately 1.5 million children under 5 years of age die and 443 ­million school days are lost each year as a result of water- and sanitation-related diseases’. See The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, UN General Assembly, 64th Session, GA res 64/L.63, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/64/L.63/Rev.1* (26 July 2010) preamble. 15  United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 Update (WHO and UNICEF, 2012) 15; WHO and UNICEF, Progress on sanitation and drinking-water: 2013 Update (WHO and UNICEF, 2013) 3. See also UNICEF, Committing to Child Survival: A Promise Renewed—Progress Report 2014, (UNICEF, September 2014), available at 014. http://files.unicef.org/publications/files/APR_2014_web_15Sept14.pdf. 16  See ch 3 for discussion of NSAs.

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 469

realisation of the right to an adequate standard of living by individuals or groups (eg indigenous people). For example, the obligation to respect existing access to adequate food requires states parties not to take any measures, such as land grabbing and overexploitation of fisheries, that result in preventing such access to present and future generations.17 It also requires states to avoid adverse environmental effects on the right to food of the population, and in particular the need to assess in full the impacts of newly developed green technologies in the area of energy and in relation to access to food and water.18 [9.09]  To respect the right to water, states must, inter alia, refrain from engaging in any practice or activity that denies or limits equal access to adequate water; ­arbitrarily interfering with customary or traditional arrangements for water allocation; unlawfully diminishing or polluting water, for example through waste from State-owned facilities or through use and testing of weapons; and limiting access to, or destroying, water services and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts in ­violation of international humanitarian law.19

Some common violations of the right to water include practices such as: (i) arbitrary or unjustified disconnection or exclusion from water services or facilities; (ii) ­discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of water; and (iii) pollution and diminution of water resources affecting human health.20 In Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council,21 residents of a block of flats in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, claimed that the respondents had unlawfully discontinued its municipal water supply late on the afternoon of 21 May 2001. They had for three days attempted to seek redress through the manager of the premises, without success. The applicants sought interim relief in the form of an order on the respondent to restore the water supply pending the final determination of an application for similar relief. In granting the order Budlender AJ found: On the facts of this case, the Applicants had existing access to water before the Council disconnected the supply. The act of disconnecting the supply was prima facie in breach of the Council’s constitutional duty to respect the right of access to water, in that it deprived the Applicants of existing access. In accordance with what is sometimes called the two-stage approach, that places a burden or an onus on the Council to justify the breach.22

[9.10]  States have a duty to respect the housing found by people themselves by refraining from forced evictions (the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other

17  CESCR, General Comment 12: Right to Adequate Food (20th Session, 1999), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) para 15; CESCR, Statement in the context of the Rio+20 Conference on ‘the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication’, adopted by the Committee at its 48th Session (30 April–18 May 2012, 4 June 2012) para 6(d). 18  CESCR, Statement in the context of the Rio+20 Conference, above n 17, para 6(d). 19  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, para 21. 20  Ibid, para 44(a). 21  Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council (2002) 6 BCLR 625 (W), High Court, South Africa (Witwatersrand Local Division). 22  Ibid, para 20.

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Standard of Living and Social Security

protection) and displacements.23 Section 74 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 provides an example of a legal basis to respect the right to housing by stating that: No person may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order made after considering all the relevant circumstances.

In Peter Makani and Others v Epworth Local Board, The Minister of Local Government and Others,24 it was held that the ‘effective legal remedy for unlawful occupation of … land is an eviction order’, and that eviction orders would have to be made with ‘compassion and upon a realization that human beings, no matter how poor, must be treated with dignity’. In reviewing state reports, the CESCR has urged states to ‘refrain from forcibly evicting individuals and expropriating land in the context of development projects, including in regions traditionally inhabited by ethnic minorities’.25 [9.11]  Secondly, the obligation to protect requires measures by the state to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive others of their access to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing.26 Protection of the right to adequate food includes protecting small-scale farming and implementing plans designed to preserve it. States should take into account the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food), adopted by the FAO in November 2004, and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible ­Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, adopted in May 2012 by the FAO Committee on World Food Security, promoting the adoption of specific support measures for small farmers, by safeguarding and enhancing their access to agricultural land. States are obliged to protect ­everyone against all forms of discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of ­living. The CEDAW specifically requires that States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right: … (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, ­electricity and water supply, transport and communications.27

23  See CESCR, General Comment 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, (16th Session, 1997), UN Doc E/1998/22, annex IV at 113 (1997). 24  Peter Makani and Others v Epworth Local Board, The Minister of Local Government and Others, HH 550-14 and HC 8596/14 (Mathonsi J, High Court of Zimbabwe, Harare, 7 October 2014 and 9 October 2014). 25  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/CO/2 (10 June 2013) para 24. 26  CESCR, General Comment 12, above n 17, para 15. 27  CEDAW, Art 14(2)(h).

Obligations of the Right

 471

[9.12]  The state must protect the tenure of existing housing against interference, and adopt and enforce laws to protect adequate housing. The relevant laws must, for example: (a) provide the greatest possible security of tenure to occupiers of houses and land; (b) conform to the international human rights treaties; and (c) be designed to ‘control strictly the circumstances under which evictions may be carried out’.28 States must also ensure that the law is enforced against state agents or third parties who carry out forced evictions. In the case of forced evictions, the following procedural protections should be applied beforehand: (a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; (d) ­especially where groups of people are involved, government officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f  ) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.29

[9.13]  Thirdly, the obligation to fulfil ( facilitate) means the state must pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilisation of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security, water, clothing and the opportunity of everyone to find affordable housing.30 For example, facilitating the right to water includes putting in place a system of water supply and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water. Furthermore, whenever an individual or a group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, by the means at their disposal, states have, as a last resort, the obligation to fulfil ( provide) that right directly,31 paying attention to vulnerable individuals and groups such as women, children, youth, older persons, indigenous people, and ethnic and other minorities. The obligation to provide also applies as regards persons who are victims of natural or other disasters, taking into account the specific needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, such as older persons, persons with disabilities, and women and children. [9.14]  The obligation to fulf il, whether in terms of facilitating or providing, requires an appropriate strategy to address housing, water and food concerns in a given state. For example, in June 2013, after the CESCR had expressed concern at the ‘acute ­housing’ situation in Jamaica, including the fact that almost a quarter of the

28 

CESCR, General Comment 7, above n 23, para 9. Ibid, para 15. 30  CESCR, General Comment 12, above n 17, para 15. 31  Ibid. 29 

472 

Standard of Living and Social Security

­ opulation lived as squatters on land they neither owned nor leased, as well as the p rapid growth of squatter communities in urban areas in overcrowded, unsafe and dilapidated housing,32 it recommended that the State party adopt a comprehensive national housing strategy with a view to ensuring access to adequate and affordable housing with legal security of tenure for everyone. The Committee recalls that such strategy should: be developed based on a systematic needs assessment and consultation with and participation by affected individuals; include concrete targets and a time frame for implementation as well as an effective monitoring and feedback mechanism; and be allocated sufficient funding for effective implementation. The Committee draws the attention of the State party to its General Comment No 4 (1991) on the right to adequate housing, and requests that the State party provide information on measures adopted in this regard in its next periodic report, including information on the extent of homelessness and steps taken to eliminate the phenomenon.33

[9.15]  Deliberate failure to respect, protect and fulfil the right to an adequate standard of living amounts to a violation. Violations of the right to an adequate standard of living can occur through the direct actions or omissions of states, or of other entities insufficiently regulated by states. Acts of commission include: (a) the formal repeal or suspension of legislation necessary for the continued enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living; (b) denial of access to an adequate standard of living to particular individuals or groups, eg discrimination against and the marginalisation of minorities such as Batwa in Rwanda34 and the Roma in Portugal,35 whether the discrimination is based on legislation or is proactive; (c) the prevention of access to humanitarian (food, clothing, medical) aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations; and (d) the adoption of legislation or policies that are manifestly incompatible with preexisting legal obligations relating to the right to an adequate standard of living. Acts of omission include: (a) the failure to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating the right of others to an adequate standard of living; (b) the failure of a state to take into account its international legal obligations regarding the right to an adequate standard of living when entering into agreements with other states or with international organisations; (c) the failure to take appropriate steps towards the full realisation of everyone’s right to an adequate standard of living (eg adequate food, water, and housing);

32 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Jamica, UN Doc E/C.12/JAM/CO/3-4 (10 June 2013) para 25. Ibid. 34  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Rwanda, UN Doc E/C.12/RWA/CO/2-4 (10 June 2013) paras 8 and 23. 35 See European Roma Rights Centre v Portugal, Complaint no 61/2010, Decision on the ­Merits (­European Committee of Social Rights, 30 June 2011); Committee on the Elimination of Racial ­Discrimination, ­General Recommendation XXVII: Discrimination against Roma (57th Session, 2000), UN Doc A/55/18, annex V (16 August 2000). 33 

Normative Content of the Right

 473

(d) the failure to have a national policy on food, water and housing; and (e) the failure to enforce relevant laws.

III.  NORMATIVE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING A.  The Right to Adequate Food i.  International Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Food [9.16]  There can be no life without food, and without adequate food the body is prone to ill-health. Therefore the right to adequate food is at the core of the right to an adequate standard of living. The right to adequate food is explicitly recognised in several international human rights instruments, including Article 25 of the UDHR, Article 11 of the ICESCR, Articles 12 and 14 of the CEDAW,36 and Articles 24 and 27 of the CRC.37 [9.17]  Some rights protected in the ICCPR—such as the right to life in Article 6, protection from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in ­Article 7, and the right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person in Article 10(1)—include some aspects of the right to adequate food. Article 7 provides for minimum condition of detention, which include ‘provision of food [to prisoners] of nutritional value adequate for health and strength’.38 In Christopher Brown (represented by Allen & Overy, a law firm in ­London) v Jamaica,39 the author complained about the circumstances of his detention at St Catherine’s D ­ istrict Prison. In particular, he stated that he was locked up in his cell for 23 hours a day, that he had no mattress or other bedding, no adequate sanitation, ventilation or electric lighting, and that he was denied exercise as well as medical treatment, adequate nutrition and clean drinking water. The HRC found that these conditions constituted violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR.40

36  CEDAW, Art 12(2) provides, ‘States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation’ (emphasis added). 37  By Art 24(2)(c) of the CRC, States parties undertake to ‘combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water’ (emphasis added). By Art 27(3) CRC, states parties agree to ‘take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right [to a child’s standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development] and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing’ (emphasis added). 38  Albert Womah Mukong v Cameroon, Communication no 458/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994) para 9.3. See also Massera et al v Uruguay, Communication no R.1/5 (1979), para 10(i). The HRC found a violation of Art 7 and Art 10(1), because the author ‘was detained under conditions seriously ­detrimental to his health’. 39  Christopher Brown (represented by Allen & Overy, a law firm in London) v Jamaica, Communication no 775/1997, UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (11 May 1999). 40  Ibid, para 6.13.

474 

Standard of Living and Social Security

[9.18]  Under international criminal law, mass starvation resulting from policy decisions may constitute a crime against humanity. Individuals commit a crime against humanity41 if: (a) they commit inhuman acts with the requisite criminal intent (ie intentional ­inhuman acts); and (b) these inhuman acts form part of a ‘widespread’42 or ‘systematic’43 attack directed against a civilian population. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) also requires that the attack must be pursuant to, or in furtherance of, a state or organisational policy.44 The notion of a systematic attack already indicates the existence of an underlying policy. Thus crimes against humanity entail gross violations of human rights on a scale and at level of organisation that shock the conscience of h ­ umanity. First set out in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945, the definition of crimes against humanity has been shaped by the body of jurisprudence emanating from the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY, the ­International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and national courts. The state practice emerging from the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute and its subsequent ratification by more than 123 states has further clarified and elaborated the definition. For the most part, Article 7 of the Rome Statute and the specifications in the Rome Statute’s Elements of Crimes reflect the definition of crimes against humanity under CIL as that concept stands today.45 Mass starvation is arguably an inhuman act of a character similar to inhuman acts intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.46 Therefore in 2014, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) stated: Based on the body of testimony and other information received, the Commission finds that DPRK officials have committed crimes against humanity by implementing actions, decisions and policies known to have led to mass starvation, death by starvation and serious mental

41  For an overview of crimes against humanity, see W Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012); A Cassese, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 375. 42  Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 September 1998) para 580 stating that an attack is widespread if it involves ‘massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims’. See also Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR–96-13-T (Judgment, 27 January 2000) para 204; Prosecutor v William Sameoi Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case no ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges Pursuant to article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, para 176. 43  Prosecutor v Musema, above n 42, para 204. A systematic attack requires ‘organized action, following a regular pattern, on the basis of a common policy and involves substantial public or private resources … [T]here must exist some form of preconceived plan or policy.’ 44  The policy required under the Rome Statute does not have to be incorporated in a written document or formal statement. The policy ‘need not be explicitly defined … an attack which is planned, directed or organized—as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence—will satisfy this [policy] criterion’. See Prosecutor v Katanga et al, ICC-01/04-01/07 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges of 30 September 2008) para 396. 45  See A Cassese and P Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 105. 46  Rome Statute, Art 7(1).

Normative Content of the Right

 475

and physical injury. The underlying policy derived from the highest level of the state. While a number of the features of this policy have changed since the second half of the 1990s, when mass starvation and related deaths peaked, the Commission remains concerned that some of the elements that have led to crimes against humanity are still present.47

[9.19]  Regional human rights treaties contain provisions protecting the right to food. For example, Article 12 of the Protocol of San Salvador48 protects the right to food in the following terms: 1. Everyone has the right to adequate nutrition which guarantees the possibility of enjoying the highest level of physical, emotional and intellectual development. 2. In order to promote the exercise of this right and eradicate malnutrition, the States ­Parties undertake to improve methods of production, supply and distribution of food, and to this end, agree to promote greater international cooperation in support of the relevant national policies.

[9.20]  Although the African Charter does not contain an explicit provision protecting the right to food, in its decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria,49 the African Commission rightly interpreted the African Charter as implicitly protecting the right to food. The Commission decided that ‘[t]he right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such other rights as health, education, work and political participation’.50 This interpretation reinforces Article 15 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,51 which provides: States Parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. In this regard, they shall take appropriate measures to: (a) provide women with access to clean drinking water, sources of domestic fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food; (b) establish adequate systems of supply and storage to ensure food security.

States also undertake to take measures ‘to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water’ to every child in order that they may enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health.52 [9.21]  Article 38 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights protects the right to food of every person as part of the right to adequate standard of living, by providing: Every person has the right to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, which ensures their well-being and a decent life, including food, clothing, housing, services and the 47  See Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (7 February 2014) para 1115. 48  OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988), entered into force 16 November 1999. 49  Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/66, done at the 30th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The ­Gambia, from 13–27 October 2001, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60. 50  Ibid, para 65. 51  CAB/LEG/66.6 (13 September 2000); available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20 on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf. 52  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999, Art 14(2)(c).

476 

Standard of Living and Social Security

right to a healthy environment. The States parties shall take the necessary measures commensurate with their resources to guarantee these rights.53

ii.  National Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Food [9.22]  An increasing number of states protect the right to food explicitly, using ­different terminologies, eg ‘sufficient food’, ‘sufficient and nutritional food’, ‘appropriate food’, through constitutional provisions, national legislation and the direct applicability of international law.54 Some examples are set out below for illustrative purposes. Some states (eg Zimbabwe and Ecuador) protect the right to food of every person as an independent right, while others (eg Egypt) protect the right to food of citizens only: Article 77(b), Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 Every person has a right to sufficient food; and the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, with the limits of the resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. Article 13, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 Persons and community groups have the right to safe and permanent access to healthy, sufficient and nutritional food, preferably produced locally and in keeping with their various identities and cultural traditions. The Ecuadorian State shall promote food sovereignty. Article 79, Constitution of Egypt 2014 Food [and clean water] Each citizen has the right to healthy, sufficient amounts of food and clean water. The state shall provide food resources to all citizens. The State shall also ensure food sovereignty in a sustainable manner, and guarantees the protection of agricultural biological diversity and types of local plants to preserve the rights of future generations.

[9.23]  Some states protect the right to food as part of another broader human right, for example the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to a quality of life or the right to development. These include the constitutions of Belarus (Article 21), the Congo (Article 34.1), Malawi (Article 30.2), Moldova (Article 47.1) and Ukraine (Article 48). For example, Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus 1994 provides: Everyone has the right to a decent standard of living, including appropriate food, clothing, housing and a continuous improvement of conditions necessary to attain this.

[9.24]  Some states protect the right to food of specific vulnerable groups (eg children and/or prisoners/detainees only) without extending it to everyone. The constitutions

53  Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, reprinted in (2005) 12 IHRR 893, entered into force 15 March 2008. 54  See generally L Knuth and M Vidar, Constitutional and Legal Protection of the Right to Food around the World (Rome, FAO, 2011). Explicit protection of the right to adequate food is found in the Constitutions of: Bolivia (Art 16), Brazil (Art 6), Ecuador 2008 (Art 13), Guyana (Art 40), Haiti (Art 22), Kenya (Art 43), South Africa (Art 27.1), Zimbabwe 2013 (Art 77.b). The Interim Constitution of Nepal recognises an ­individual right to food sovereignty (Art 18.3) and as does the Constitution of Nicaragua (Art 63).

Normative Content of the Right

 477

of Brazil (Article 227), Colombia (Article 44), Cuba (Article 9), Guatemala (­Article 51), Honduras (Article 123), Mexico (Article 4), Panama (Article 52), Paraguay (­Article 54), and South Africa (Article 28.1.c) contain provisions regarding the right to food of children; Costa Rica (Article 82) protects the right to food of indigenous children; while South Africa (Article 35.2.e) also specifies the right to food of prisoners and ­detainees.55 For example, Article 44 of the the Constitution of ­Colombia 1991 provides: The following are basic rights of children: life, physical integrity, health and social security, a balanced diet …

[9.25]  Yet other states protect explicitly some aspects of the right to food (mainly recognising the right to food as part of the right to work), without protecting the right of everyone to adequate food independently or as part of another broader right. The constitutions of Brazil 1988 (Article 7.iv) and Suriname 1987 (Article 24) recognise the right to adequate food as part of the right to work: Article 7, Brazilian Constitution 1988 The following are rights of urban and rural workers, among others that aim to improve their social conditions: … IV—nationally unified minimum wage, established by law, capable of satisfying their basic living needs and those of their families with housing, food, education, health, leisure, clothing, hygiene, transportation and social security, with periodical adjustments to maintain its purchasing power. Article 24, Constitution of Suriname 1987 The state shall take care of the creation of conditions in which an optimal satisfaction of the basic needs for work, food, health care, education, energy, clothing and communication is obtained.

[9.26]  Some states protect broader rights, such as the right to an adequate or decent standard of living, to well-being, to a means necessary to live a dignified life, to development and to a standard of living not below the subsistence level, without explicitly setting out the elements of such rights. The right to a ‘decent standard of living’ is found in the constitutions of Armenia (Article 34), Bolivia (Article 158), ­Cambodia (Article 63), Costa Rica (Article 50), Czech Republic (Article 30), ­Ethiopia (­Article 43), ­Guatemala (Article 119), Pakistan (Article 38a), Romania (Article 47.1), and Turkey (Article 61, limiting the right to widows, orphans of those killed in war, the disabled and war veterans). The right to ‘well-being’ is recognised in the constitutions of the following states: Azerbaijan (Article 16), El Salvador (Article 1), Equatorial Guinea (Article 25), Eritrea (Article 21), Guinea (Article 15) and Peru (Article 2). The right to be provided with a standard of living that is not below the subsistence level is protected in four constitutions: Georgia (Article 32), Germany (­Articles 1, 20 and 28), Kyrgyzstan (Article 27) and the Netherlands (Article 20.1). The right to the means necessary to live a dignified life is also recognised in the constitutions of B ­ elgium (Article 23), Cyprus (Article 9), El Salvador (Article 101), Finland (­Article 19),

55 

Knuth and Vidar, above n 54, 21.

478 

Standard of Living and Social Security

Ghana (Article 36), ­Switzerland (Article 12), Thailand (Article 79) and Venezuela (Article 299). The right to development is recognised in the constitutions of Burundi (Article 33), Congo (Article 58), Ecuador (Article 59), Eritrea (Article 10) and Malawi (Article 30). Article 43(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995 provides: The Peoples of Ethiopia as a whole, and each Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia in particular have the right to improved living standards and to sustainable development.

Such broader rights should be interpreted as implicitly protecting, inter alia, the right to adequate food, water and housing. [9.27]  There are several states that do not protect the right to adequate food explicitly in their justiciable bills of rights but refer nonetheless to the right to food or food security, or to raising the level of nutrition and standard of living, in the provisions that set out the (perceived non-justiciable) objectives or directive principles of state policy. These include the constitutions of the following 13 states: Bangladesh (Articles 15 and 18), Brazil (Article 208.7) for pupils in elementary schools, Ethiopia (­Article 90), India (Article 47), Iran (Articles 3.12 and 43), Malawi (Article 13.10), Nigeria (­Article 16.2d), Pakistan (Article 38), Panama (Article 110.1), Papua New Guinea (Article 1), Sierra Leone (Article 8.3a), Sri Lanka (Articles 22 and 27.c) and Uganda (Objective XIV.ii). Article 27(2)(c) of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978 provides: The State is pledged to establish in Sri Lanka a democratic socialist society, the objectives of which include the realization by all citizens of an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, the continuous improvement of living conditions and the full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities.

[9.28]  As shown in chapter five, an active judiciary can transform such directive ­principles into strong legally binding constitutional human rights, for example by interpreting the right to life in the justiciable bill of rights in the light of the Directive Principles of State Policy, to include the right to a livelihood (an adequate standard of living) which includes the rights to adequate food, water and housing. However, some courts have not accepted this broader interpretation of the right to life.56 [9.29]  It is also possible to interpret constitutional provisions protecting everyone from ‘inhuman and degrading’ treatment or punishment as including protection against reductions in food or against the denial of food. Treatment may be c­ haracterised as ‘degrading’ if it ‘humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance’.57 Thus it is crucial to consider the following questions to determine whether treatment was ‘degrading’. What was the motivation for the treatment? Was its object to humiliate or debase? Treatment is inhuman or degrading if, to ‘a seriously detrimental extent,

56  See, eg, Court of Appeal of Lesotho, Khathang Tema Baitsokoli and Another v Maseru City Council and Others CA (Civ) 4/05 CONST/C/1/2004 (20 April 2004), (2004) AHRLR 195. 57  Pretty v United Kingdom, App no 2346/02, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, 33, para 52 (ECtHR).

Normative Content of the Right

 479

it denies the most basic needs of any human being’.58 Denial of food arguably attains a minimum level of severity, and may involve actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. This could arise if, for example, an asylum seeker with no means and no alternative sources of support, unable to support himself or herself, were, by the deliberate action of the state, denied shelter, food or the most basic necessities of life.59 [9.30]  Prisoners are vulnerable to violations of the right to adequate food. Protection from inhuman and degrading treatment, or from cruel and unusual or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment, can be interpreted as protecting p ­ risoners’ right to adequate food. The Eighth Amendment (Amendment VIII) to the US ­Constitution, which forms part of the US Bill of Rights, provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

On the basis of this Amendment, the US courts have decided that a state must provide inmates with ‘nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it’.60 ‘A substantial deprivation of food may be sufficiently serious to state a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment.’61 To state a claim for food deprivation in the US under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must allege both: (a) a ‘sufficiently serious’ deprivation of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’; and (b) ‘deliberate indifference’ by prison officials to a ‘substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’.62 Reduction in food rations for prisoners have been considered as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment. For example, in Rarasea v The State, the High Court of Fiji considered whether the sanctions imposed by the Commissioner of Prisons in reducing the food ration for two weeks (for a person whose prison rations were reduced as a form of punishment for having escaped from custody) amounted to cruel, inhuman, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. The Court held: Any reduction in rations … was not conforming to the Republic of Fiji undertaking to provide its people with adequate food … To reduce prison rations as a form of punishment … contravenes section 25(1) of the Constitution as amounting to degrading and inhumane treatment.63

58 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 (HL) [7], per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 59  Ibid. 60  Ramos v Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570–71 (10th Cir 1980). 61  Thompson v Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir 2002). 62  Barney v Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir 1998). 63  Rarasea v The State, Criminal Appeal no HAA0027.2000 of 12 May 2000. Art 25(1) of the Constitution of Fiji provides, ‘Every person has the right to freedom from torture of any kind, whether ­physical, mental or emotional, and from cruel, inhumane, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.’

480 

Standard of Living and Social Security

iii.  Essential Elements of the Right to Adequate Food [9.31]  In its General Comment 12, the CECSR interpreted the right to adequate food to encompass the following essential elements, namely, availability, accessibility, ­adequacy and sustainability. [9.32]  First, availability refers to the possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources, or for well functioning distribution, processing and market systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is needed in accordance with demand.64

Availability requires that food must be available ‘in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture’.65 There are three key aspects here: (i) dietary needs; (ii) free from adverse effects; and (iii) cultural or consumer acceptability. These have been explained by the CECSR in General Comment 12 as follows: 9. Dietary needs implies that the diet as a whole contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental growth, development and maintenance, and physical activity that are in compliance with human physiological needs at all stages throughout the life cycle and according to gender and occupation. Measures may therefore need to be taken to maintain, adapt or strengthen dietary diversity and appropriate consumption and feeding patterns, including breast-feeding, while ensuring that changes in availability and access to food supply as a minimum do not negatively affect dietary composition and intake. 10. Free from adverse substances sets requirements for food safety and for a range of protective measures by both public and private means to prevent contamination of foodstuffs through adulteration and/or through bad environmental hygiene or inappropriate handling at different stages throughout the food chain; care must also be taken to identify and avoid or destroy naturally occurring toxins. 11. Cultural or consumer acceptability implies the need also to take into account, as far as possible, perceived non nutrient-based values attached to food and food consumption and informed consumer concerns regarding the nature of accessible food supplies.

[9.33]  Secondly, with respect to accessibility, the right to ‘adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’.66 Accessibility encompasses both economic and physical accessibility: Economic accessibility implies that personal or household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. Economic accessibility applies to any acquisition pattern or entitlement through which people procure their food and is a measure of the extent to which it is satisfactory for the enjoyment of the right to adequate food. Socially vulnerable groups such as landless persons and other particularly impoverished segments of the population may need attention through special programmes.

64  65  66 

CESCR, General Comment 12, above n 17, para 12. Ibid, para 8. Ibid, para 16.

Normative Content of the Right

 481

Physical accessibility implies that adequate food must be accessible to everyone, including physically vulnerable individuals, such as infants and young children, elderly people, the physically disabled, the terminally ill and persons with persistent medical problems, including the mentally ill. Victims of natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone areas and other specially disadvantaged groups may need special attention and sometimes priority consideration with respect to accessibility of food. A particular vulnerability is that of many indigenous population groups whose access to their ancestral lands may be threatened.67

The accessibility of such food must be ‘in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights’.68 The prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts constitutes a violation of Article 11 of the ICESCR, as well as a grave violation of international humanitarian law.69 [9.34]  Thirdly and lastly, adequacy serves to underline a number of factors that must be taken into account in determining whether particular foods or diets that are accessible can be considered the most appropriate in given circumstances for the purposes of Article 11 of the Covenant. The notion of sustainability is intrinsically linked to the notion of adequate food or food security, implying food’s being accessible for both present and future generations. The precise meaning of ‘adequacy’ is to a large extent determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other conditions, while ‘sustainability’ incorporates the notion of long-term availability and accessibility.70 B.  The Right to Water and Sanitation i.  International Legal Protection of the Right to Water [9.35]  The right to water and sanitation is not explicitly protected in the ICESCR, but it is inextricably related to several rights protected in the ICESCR, including the rights to adequate housing, adequate food and the highest attainable standard of health. The CESCR highlighted the significance of the right to water in the following words: An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements … water is necessary to produce food (right to adequate food) and ensure environmental hygiene (right to health). Water is essential for securing livelihoods (right to gain a living by work) and enjoying certain cultural practices (right to take part in cultural life).71

[9.36]  Thus the right to water is implicitly protected in the ICESCR as one of the rights essential for an adequate standard of living.72 The right to water is also essential for the realisation of rights protected in the ICCPR, in particular the right to right to life (Article 6 ICCPR) and freedom from inhuman treatment (Articles 7 and 10 ICCPR). In interpreting Article 6 of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘[e]very human 67 

Ibid, para 13. Ibid, para 8. Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, UN Doc E/C.12//LKA/CO/2-4 (9 December 2010) para 28. 70  Ibid, para 17. 71  See CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, paras 2 and 6. 72  Ibid, para 3. 68 

69  CESCR,

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Standard of Living and Social Security

being has the inherent right to life’, the HRC considered that it would be ‘desirable’ for states parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to ‘eliminate malnutrition and epidemics’.73 Such measures include the adoption or implementation of a national water policy designed to ensure the right to equal access to safe water for everyone, necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements. In 2010, the HRC confirmed the reading of Article 6 of the ICCPR as including equal access to water, when the Committee stated in its Concluding Observations on Israel: 18.  The Committee is concerned at water shortages disproportionately affecting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, due to prevention of construction and maintenance of water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as the prohibition of construction of wells. The Committee is further concerned at allegations of pollution by sewage water of Palestinian land, including from settlements (arts 6 and 26). The State party should ensure that all residents of the West Bank have equal access to water, in accordance with the World Health Organization quality and quantity standards. The State party should allow the construction of water and sanitation infrastructure, and wells. ­Furthermore, the State party should address the issue of sewage and waste water in the occupied territories emanating from Israel.74

[9.37]  In Iskandarov v Tajkistan,75 the HRC found a violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR in respect of the state’s failure to provide adequate food and medical treatment (in respect of a skin disease contracted in detention) to a person in custody.76 Similarly, in Smith and Stewart v Jamaica,77 the HRC found a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR in respect of a state’s detention of a person in custody where the sanitary conditions were dreadful, the nutritional quality and quantity of the food were grossly inadequate, and medical care was inadequate.78 A failure to provide adequate water to a person in custody would have the same effect. [9.38]  Some international treaties explicitly protect the right to water. For example, Article 14(2) of the CEDAW provides that states parties shall ensure to women the right to ‘enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to … water supply’. Under Article 28(2)(a) of the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, states parties undertake to ‘ensure equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water services’. Article 24(2) of the CRC requires states parties to combat disease and malnutrition ‘through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water’. Given that almost

73 

HRC, General Comment 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 6 (1994) para 5. Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (3 September 2010). See also HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4 (21 November 2014) para 17(a), recommending that Israel should ‘[e]nsure and facilitate non-discriminatory access of Palestinians in the [Occupied Palestinian Territory] (OPT), including East Jerusalem, to land, natural resources, water and sanitation’. 75  Iskandarov v Tajkistan, Communication no 1499/2006, CCPR/C/101/D/1499/2006 (28 April 2011). 76  Ibid, para 6.2. 77  Smith and Stewart v Jamaica, Communication no 668/1995, CCPR/C/65/D/668/1995 (8 April 1999). 78  Ibid, para 7.5. 74  HRC,

Normative Content of the Right

 483

all UN member states have ratified the CRC—with the exception of South Sudan and the US—the right to ‘clean drinking-water’ has attained almost universal legal recognition. In 2010 the UN General Assembly recognised the existence of an independent right to water.79 [9.39]  The CESCR has noted that during armed conflicts, emergency situations and natural disasters, the right to water embraces those obligations by which states parties are bound under international humanitarian law.80 According to the CESCR: This includes protection of objects indispensable for survival of the civilian population, including drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, protection of the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage and ensuring that civilians, internees and prisoners have access to adequate water.81

[9.40]  At the African regional level, the right to water (more specifically safe/clean drinking water) is also explicitly recognised in some African human rights instruments. For example under Article 14(2)(c) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,82 states parties undertake ‘to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water’. Similarly in Article 15(a) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, states parties agree to take appropriate measures to ‘provide women with access to clean drinking water’. It should be noted, however, that the formulation of the right to water in the above African instruments is limited to ‘drinking water’. This falls below the minimum core of the right to water, which includes the need to ‘ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease’.83 ii.  National Legal Protection of the Right to Water [9.41]  As noted in chapters two and five, and in accordance with Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, states parties are required to utilise ‘all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’, in the implementation of ESC rights and obligations. Legislation to protect the right to water is indispensable for the realisation of this right at a national level, since it provides, inter alia, a legal basis for protecting the right to water and for seeking effective judicial or other appropriate remedies for violations by any persons or groups who have been denied their right to water. The right to water has been constitutionally entrenched by some states (eg ­Bolivia, the D ­ emocratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, The Maldives, Nicaragua, South Africa and Uruguay) and has been subject to litigation before national courts

79 

UN GA res 64/292, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, UN Doc A/RES/64/292 (2010). For the interrelationship of human rights law and humanitarian law, the Committee noted the conclusions of the ICJ in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request by the General Assembly) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 25. 81  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, para 22, citing Arts 54 and 56, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977); Art 54, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977); Arts 20 and 46 of GC III, and Common Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 82  OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November1999. 83  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, para 37(a). 80 

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Standard of Living and Social Security

in all regions of the world. Some examples of national constitutional provisions protecting the right to water are set out below: Article 16, Constitution of Bolivia (Constitución Política del Estado) 2009 I. Every person has the right to water and food. II. The State has the obligation to guarantee food security, by means of healthy, adequate and sufficient food for the entire population. Article 48, The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2005 The right to decent housing, the right of access to drinking water and to electric energy are guaranteed. The law establishes the conditions for the exercise of these rights. Article 12, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 The human right to water is essential and cannot be waived. Water constitutes a national strategic asset for use by the public and it is unalienable, not subject to a statute of limitations, immune from seizure and essential for life. Article 43(1)(d), The Constitution of Kenya, Revised Edition 2010 Every person has the right to clean and safe water in adequate quantities. Article 23(a), Constitution of the Republic of Maldives 2008 Every citizen the following rights pursuant to this Constitution, and the State undertakes to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights by reasonable measures within its ability and resources: adequate and nutritious food and clean water. Article 105, Political Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua (Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua) 1986, as amended to 2014 It is the obligation of the State to promote, facilitate, and regulate the provision of basic public services of energy, communications, water, transportation, road infrastructure, ports, and airports to the people, and access to these is their inalienable right. Private investments and their modalities and the concessions of exploitation to private individuals in these areas shall be regulated by law in each case. Section 27, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1(b). Everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water … 2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. Article 77(a), Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 Every person has a right to safe, clean and portable water; and the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, with the limits of the resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.

[9.42]  In states without an explicit legislative provision protecting the right to water, it is possible to read the right into the constitutional protection of the right to life, since many people die from lack of safe water. This approach has been used, for ­example, in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and India. In FK Hussain v Union of India,84

84  FK Hussain v Union of India, OP 2741 of 1988 (26 February 1990), AIR 1990 Ker 321, available at http://www.elaw.org/node/2497.

Normative Content of the Right

 485

the Indian High Court of Kerala held that the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian C ­ onstitution ‘is much more than the right to animal existence and its attributes are many fold, as life itself … The right to sweet water, and the right to free air, are attributes of the right to life, for these are basic elements which sustain life itself’.85 Similarly, in Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar, the Supreme Court of India asserted that the ‘[r]ight to live is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life’.86 On the basis of the constitutional right to life, it was held in Vishala Kochi Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of Kerala that the state ‘is bound to provide drinking water to the public’, and that the failure of the state to ‘provide safe drinking water’ to citizens amounted to a violation of the right to life.87 iii.  Essential Elements of the Right to Water [9.43]  The CESCR identified the elements of the right to water in its General ­Comment 15. According to the Committee, the human right to water entitles ‘­everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses’.88 The Committee explained that the right to water involves the following elements: 11. The elements of the right to water must be adequate for human dignity, life and health, in accordance with articles 11(1), paragraph 1, and 12. The adequacy of water should not be interpreted narrowly, by mere reference to volumetric quantities and technologies. Water should be treated as a social and cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good. The manner of the realization of the right to water must also be sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realized for present and future generations.89 12. While the adequacy of water required for the right to water may vary according to different conditions, the following factors apply in all circumstances: (a) Availability. The water supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous for personal and domestic uses.90 These uses ordinarily include drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, personal and household hygiene.91 The quantity of water available for each person should correspond to World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines.92 Some individuals and groups may also require additional water due to health, climate, and work conditions; 85 

Ibid, para 7. Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 (Supreme Court of India, 1991). 87  Vishala Kochi Kudivella Samarkshana Samithi v State of Kerala, 2006(1) KLT 919 (High Court of Kerala, 2006) para 3. 88  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, para 2. 89  For a definition of sustainability, see the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), (12 August 1992), principles 1, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 15; and Agenda 21, in particular principles 5.3, 7.27, 7.28, 7.35, 7.39, 7.41, 18.3, 18.8, 18.35, 18.40, 18.48, 18.50, 18.59 and 18.68. 90  ‘Continuous’ means that the regularity of the water supply is sufficient for personal and domestic uses. 91  In this context, ‘drinking’ means water for consumption through beverages and foodstuffs. ‘Personal sanitation’ means disposal of human excreta. Water is necessary for personal sanitation where water-based means are adopted. ‘Food preparation’ includes food hygiene and preparation of food stuffs, whether water is incorporated into, or comes into contact with, food. ‘Personal and household hygiene’ means personal cleanliness and hygiene of the household environment. 92  See G Howard and J Bartram, Domestic Water Quantity, Service Level and Health (Geneva, WHO, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/WSH0302.pdf. See also PH Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs’ (1996) 21(2) Water International 83. 86 

486 

Standard of Living and Social Security (b) Quality. The water required for each personal or domestic use must be safe, therefore free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiologic al hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health.93 Furthermore, water should be of an ­acceptable colour, odour and taste for each personal or domestic use. (c) Accessibility. Water and water facilities and services have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party. Accessibility has four overlapping dimensions: (i)

Physical accessibility: water, and adequate water facilities and services, must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population. Sufficient, safe and acceptable water must be accessible within, or in the immediate ­vicinity, of each household, educational institution and workplace.94 All w ­ ater ­facilities and services must be of sufficient quality, culturally appropriate and sensitive to gender, life-cycle and privacy requirements. Physical ­security should not be threatened during access to water facilities and services; (ii) Economic accessibility: Water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable for all. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing water must be affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the realization of other Covenant rights; (iii) Non-discrimination: Water and water facilities and services must be accessible to all, including the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds; and (iv) Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive and impart information concerning water issues.95

iv.  The Right to Sanitation [9.44]  Despite some references to ‘sanitation’ in some international human rights instruments, there is little guidance as to the meaning, scope and content of the right to ‘sanitation’. The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes96 (UNECE Protocol) provides the following definition: ‘Sanitation’ means the collection, transport, treatment and disposal or reuse of human excreta or domestic waste water, whether through collective systems or by installations serving a single household or undertaking.97

93  The Committee refers states parties to WHO, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality, vols 1–3, 2nd edn (Geneva, WHO, 1993), which are ‘intended to be used as a basis for the development of national standards that, if properly implemented, will ensure the safety of drinking water supplies through the elimination of, or reduction to a minimum concentration, of constituents of water that are known to be hazardous to health’. 94  See also General Comment 4 (1991), para 8(b), General Comment 13 (1999) para 6(a) and General Comment 14 (2000) paras 8(a) and (b), Appendix D to this book. ‘Household’ includes a permanent or semi-permanent dwelling, or a temporary halting site. 95  CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 8, para 48: ‘Individuals and groups should be given full and equal access to information concerning water, water services and the environment, held by public authorities or third parties.’ 96  MP.WAT/2000/1, EUR/ICP/EHCO 020205/8Fin, 18 October 1999. 97  Ibid, Art 2.8.

Normative Content of the Right

 487

The UNECE Protocol emphasises that the parties shall pursue the aim of [p]rovision of sanitation for everyone within a framework of integrated water-management systems aimed at sustainable use of water resources, ambient water quality which does not endanger human health, and protection of water ecosystems.98

[9.45]  It can be stated that sanitation includes the concept of basic sanitation, which refers to ‘the safe management of human excreta’,99 and total sanitation, which also covers ‘environmental cleanliness; hand washing; garbage removal and wastewater disposal’,100 given that disease-causing elements can emanate not only from human excreta but also from any decomposing organic matter. [9.46]  Although sanitation is not explicitly mentioned in the ICESCR, it is a fundamental component of the right to an adequate standard of living. It is essential for the enjoyment of other human rights, including the rights to water,101 adequate food, health, adequate housing and education.102 At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, it was noted that increased access to sanitation would ‘improve human health and reduce infant and child mortality’.103 Thus, in July 2010 the UN General Assembly recognised a conjoined right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation, and declared ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’.104 In the same year the Human Rights Council affirmed that the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.105

v.  International Legal Protection of the Right to Sanitation [9.47]  As noted in paragraph 9.46 above, the right to sanitation is not explicitly ­protected in the ICESCR. It is, however, understood to be an essential component of the right to an adequate standard of living as protected in Article 11 of the ICESCR, and as related to the right to health as protected in Article 12 of the ICESCR. Thus, the CESCR has stated: Since sanitation is fundamental for human survival and to enabling humans to live a life in dignity, the Committee reaffirms that the right to sanitation is an essential component of the 98 

Ibid, Art 6(b). Water, Tackling a Global Crisis: International Year of Sanitation (7 August 2012), available at http://esa.un.org/iys/docs/IYS_flagship_web_small.pdf, 10. See also COHRE et al, Manual on the Right to Water and Sanitation (2007), available at http://globalinitiative-escr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ COHRE-Manual-on-Right-to-Water.pdf, XVI. 100  UN Water, above n 99, 10. 101  See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights Obligations Related to Equitable Access to safe Drinking Water and Sanitation under International Human Rights Instruments, UN Doc A/HRC/6/3 (16 August 2007). 102  See CESCR, Statement on the Right to Sanitation, 18 March 2011, para 5, observing that ‘girls in many parts of the world do not go to school for lack of toilets, or lack of separate toilets for them’. 103  UN, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) 4, para 7(m). 104  UN GA, 64th Session, GA res 64/L.63, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/64/L.63/Rev.1* (26 July 2010) para 1. 105 HRC res 15/l.14, Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, UN Doc A/HRC/15/L.14 (24 September 2010) para 3. 99  UN

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right to an adequate standard of living, enshrined in article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The right to sanitation is also integrally related, among other Covenant rights, to the right to health, as set forth in article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 (a), (b) and (c), to the right to housing (article 11), as well as the right to water, which the Committee recognized in its General Comment No 15 (2002).106

[9.48]  In 1979, sanitation was explicitly included in Article 14 of the CEDAW,107 as part of the right to enjoy adequate living conditions, in an article pertaining to rural women (rather than for all women).108 Ten years after the CEDAW, the CRC obliged state parties to ‘ensure’ that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of ‘hygiene and environmental sanitation’, as a measure to implement the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health.109 Article 5(b) of the ILO Convention No 161 on Occupational Health Services110 provides: Without prejudice to the responsibility of each employer for the health and safety of the workers in his employment, … occupational health services shall have such of the following functions …: … (b) Surveillance of the factors in the working environment and working practice which may affect workers’ health, including sanitary installations.

[9.49]  States must ensure that everyone, without discrimination, has physical and affordable access to sanitation ‘in all spheres of life, which is safe, hygienic, secure, socially and culturally acceptable, provides privacy and ensures dignity’.111 vi.  National Legal Protection of the Right to Sanitation [9.50]  The right to sanitation (in conjunction with another right, for example the right to water, health, or housing) is protected in a few national jurisdictions.112 For ­example, South Africa’s Water Services Act113 provides: Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation.

106 

CESCR, above n 102, para 7. UN Doc A/34/46. 108  Ibid. Art 14(2)(h) provides: ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right: … (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.’ 109  CRC, Art 24(2)(e). 110 Convention concerning Occupational Health Services, adopted 25 June 1985, entered into force 17 February 1988, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P1 2100_ILO_CODE:C161. 111  CESCR, above n 102, para 8. 112  These are Brazil, Ecuador, India, Iran, Kenya, Algeria, Colombia, Panama, South Africa and ­Uruguay. All of them are state parties to the CEDAW, CRC and ICESCR. See K Ellis and L Feris, ‘The Right to Sanitation: Time to Delink from the Right to Water’ (2014) 36(3) Human Rights Quarterly 607, 621–25. 113  Act 108 of 1997, s 3(1). 107 

Normative Content of the Right

 489

It defines ‘basic sanitation’ as: the prescribed minimum standard of services necessary for the safe, hygienic and adequate collection, removal, disposal or purification of human excreta, domestic waste-water and sewage from households, including informal households.114

Article 66(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 guarantees several rights, including ‘environmental sanitation’: The right to a decent life that ensures health, food and nutrition, clean water, housing, environmental sanitation, education, work, employment, rest and leisure, sports, clothing, social security and other necessary social services.

Article 43(1)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 protects the right of every person ‘to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation’. vii.  Essential Elements of the Right to Sanitation [9.51]  The essential elements of the right to water considered in section III.B.iii. above apply equally to the right to sanitation. Thus, sanitation facilities must be available, accessible, safe, acceptable and affordable for all (including to individuals belonging to vulnerable and marginalised groups), without discrimination. C.  The Right to Adequate Housing [9.52]  An adequate standard of living requires that everyone has adequate housing or shelter where one can live in security, peace and dignity. Adequate shelter means more than a roof over one’s head. It means ‘adequate privacy, adequate space, a­ dequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities—all at a reasonable cost’.115 ­Nevertheless, the majority of the world’s population, particularly the most disadvantaged and marginalised groups and individuals, the poor, women, indigenous peoples and migrant workers, do not enjoy a standard of living that is close to the ‘actual enjoyment of adequate, safe or secure housing’.116 i.  International Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Housing [9.53]  The right to adequate housing is protected in Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR, as set out in paragraph 9.03 above. It is also protected in several other international human rights instruments, including Article 5(e)(iii) of the ICERD,117 Article 27 of the CRC, Article 14(2) of the CEDAW118 and Article 21 of

114 

Ibid, s 1(ii). United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (Habitat), Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, UN Doc A/43/8/Add.1 (6 June 1988), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/ docs/3641_3113_HS-185.pdf, para 5 (adopted by the UN GA in res 43/181). 116  J Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013) 134. 117  UN Doc A/6014 (1966), 660 UNTS 195. 118  UN Doc A/34/46, Art 14(2)(h). 115 See

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the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.119 Statutes of international criminal tribunals include some aspects of the right to housing in the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In particular, ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity’ is a war crime,120 and attacks on residential property can constitute ‘persecution’ as a crime against humanity.121 In dealing with the alleged comprehensive destruction of Bosnian Muslim homes and property, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that attacks on property can constitute persecution … [T]he case at hand concerns the comprehensive destruction of homes and property. Such an attack on property in fact constitutes a destruction of the livelihood of a certain population. This may have the same inhumane consequences as a forced transfer or deportation. Moreover, the burning of a residential property may often be committed with recklessness towards the lives of its inhabitants. The Trial Chamber therefore concludes that this act may constitute a gross or blatant denial of fundamental human rights, and, if committed on discriminatory grounds, it may constitute persecution.122

[9.54]  At the regional level, the right to adequate housing is explicitly protected in Article 31 of the revised European Social Charter,123 and in Article 38 of the Arab Charter on Human rights. It is important to note that Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR provides that ‘[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’. Housing is clearly part of one’s possessions, meaning that destruction of one’s house plainly constitutes a deprivation of property.124 In ­addition, Article 8(1) of the ECHR provides: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

‘Home’ generally refers to a place where one lives on a settled basis, and ‘will usually be the place, the physically defined area, where private and family life develops’.125 However, Article 8 does not protect a right to be provided with a home. This was clearly stated by the ECtHR in Chapman v United Kingdom.126 Echoing earlier case law, the Court stated: It is important to recall that article 8 does not in terms give a right to be provided with a home. Nor does any of the jurisprudence of the court acknowledge such a right. While it is clearly desirable that every human being has a place where he or she can live in dignity and which he or she can call home, there are unfortunately in the contracting states many persons who have no home. Whether the state provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a matter for political not judicial decision.127 119  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 150. Art 21 provides: ‘As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.’ 120  Rome Statute of the ICC, Art 8(2)(a)(iv). 121  Prosecutor v Kupreskic et al, Judgment, IT-95-16-T (ICTY, 14 January 2000) paras 628–31. 122  Ibid, para 631. 123  ETS No 163, entered into force 7 January 1999. 124  Ayubov v Russia, App no 7654/02 (ECtHR, 12 February 2009). 125  Giacomelli v Italy, App no 59909/00 (ECtHR, 2 November 2006), (2007) 45 EHRR 871, para 76. 126  Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 399. 127  Ibid, para 99.

Normative Content of the Right

 491

[9.55]  The individual has a right to respect for his or her home, meaning not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. Thus, the scope of the right to respect for home is wider: Breaches of the right to respect for the home are not confined to concrete or physical breaches, such as unauthorised entry into a person’s home, but also include those that are not concrete or physical, such as noise, emissions, smells or other forms of interference. A serious breach may result in the breach of a person’s right to respect for his home if it prevents him from enjoying the amenities of his home.128

[9.56]  However, in Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria,129 the applicants (who were ­gypsies of Roma origin) and their families lived for many years in the makeshift houses they or their ancestors built on state or municipal land in respect of which they were not owners and on which they never had a right to reside. The Court found that the buildings unlawfully built on the land constituted their homes for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court decided that there would be a violation of Article 8 in the event of enforcement of an eviction order against the Roma applicants from their unlawfully built houses, and noted: 132. The relevant point in this case is, nonetheless, that the disadvantaged position of the social group to which the applicants belong could and should have been taken into consideration, for example, in assisting them to obtain officially the status of persons in need of housing which would make them eligible for the available social dwellings on the same footing as others … 133. In general, the underprivileged status of the applicants’ group must be a weighty factor in considering approaches to dealing with their unlawful settlement and, if their removal is necessary, in deciding on its timing, modalities and, if possible, arrangements for alternative shelter. This has not been done in the present case.130

[9.57]  States are required to undertake measures to promote access to housing. ­Article 31 of the revised European Social Charter specifically provides: With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake to take measures designed: 1. to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; 2.  to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; 3. to make the price of housing accessible to those without adequate resource.

[9.58]  Article 31(k) of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) ­provides that ‘Member States agree to dedicate every effort to achieve … adequate housing for all sectors of the population.’131 Although not explicitly protected in the African Charter, in its decision in the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria,132 the

128 

Giacomelli v Italy, above n 125, para 76. Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria, App no 25446/06 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012). 130  Ibid. 131  119 UNTS 3. 132  Communication no 155/66, above n 49. 129 

492 

Standard of Living and Social Security

­ frican Commission rightly interpreted the African Charter as implicitly protecting A the right to adequate housing, noting: Although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the African ­Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health [under Article 16 of the African Charter], the right to property [under Article 14 of the African Charter], and the protection accorded to the family [under Article 18(1) of the African Charter] forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, property, health, and family life are adversely affected. It is thus noted that the combined effect of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter or housing which the Nigerian Government has apparently violated.133

[9.59]  The implied right to housing in the African Charter was confirmed by the ­African Commission in two later communications. In the first one, Centre for M ­ inority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya,134 the African Commission held, inter alia, that the eviction of the Endorois people, an indigenous people, from their ancestral land (around the Lake Bogoria area in the Rift Valley in Kenya) to create a game reserve for tourism, was a violation of the right to adequate housing, ‘which, although not explicitly expressed in the African Charter, is also guaranteed by Article 14’ of the African Charter protecting the right to property.135 This case marked the first time the ­African Commission had recognised indigenous peoples’ rights over traditionally owned land. The decision is also significant because the African Commission emphasised the ­African Charter’s protection for collective claims to land rights by indigenous communities, and it illustrates the way land (rather than a specific dwelling itself) is linked to adequate housing, in particular as a home, particularly for indigenous peoples. [9.60]  The second communication, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan,136 concerned acts of violence in the Darfur region of Sudan during 2003, when the Government of Sudan attempted to suppress rebel uprisings. The state allegedly sponsored the Murhaleen and Janjaweed militias, which targeted the civilian population, destroying, among other things, their properties, houses, water wells, food crops and livestock, and social infrastructure. The complainants submitted, inter alia, that forced eviction of the population from their homes and villages, coupled with the destruction of their properties and houses, constituted violations by Sudan of Article 14 of the African Charter on the right to property. The African Commission found a violation of the obligations to respect and protect the right to property: In the present communication, the Respondent State has failed to show that it refrained from the eviction, or demolition of victims’ houses and other property. It did not take steps to ­protect the victims from the constant attacks and bombings, and the rampaging attacks by the 133 

Ibid, para 60. Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Communication no 276/03, 27th Annual Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 75. 135  Ibid, paras 191 and 238. 136  Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, Communications nos 279/03–296/05, 28th Annual Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 153. 134 

Normative Content of the Right

 493

Janjaweed militia. It doesn’t matter whether they had legal titles to the land, the fact that the victims cannot derive their livelihood from what they possessed for generations means they have been deprived of the use of their property under conditions which are not permitted by Article 14. The Commission therefore finds the Respondent State in violation of Article 14.137

The African Commission’s interpretation of the African Charter to include the right to adequate housing is commendable. [9.61]  The Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa explicitly protects women’s right to adequate housing by providing in Article 16: Women shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, States Parties shall grant to women, whatever their marital status, access to adequate housing.

[9.62]  It is also important to note that regional human rights instruments prohibit inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. For example, Article 3 of the ECHR provides: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

While this guarantee does not protect the right to adequate housing, state action, such as the adoption of laws excluding some destitute late asylum seekers from state support for housing (thereby reducing them to street penury), could lead to degrading treatment. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Adam, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.138 In this case, at the start of the proceedings three asylum seekers, young men respectively from Angola, Ethiopia and the Sudan, each suffered (or, in one case, faced) a life of extreme deprivation, sleeping rough on the streets of London, not being permitted to work and denied all support. The House of Lords considered whether the imposition of that regime upon them breached their Article 3 right under the ECHR not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. Their Lordships concluded that street homelessness would cross the threshold into Article 3 degrading treatment. Lord Bingham stated: [I]f there were persuasive evidence that a late applicant was obliged to sleep in the street, save perhaps for a short and foreseeably finite period, or was seriously hungry, or unable to satisfy the most basic requirements of hygiene, the threshold [into Article 3 of the ECHR] would, in the ordinary way, be crossed.139

It follows that laws and practices denying vulnerable individuals and groups such as asylum seekers access to adequate housing may, in appropriate cases, give rise to violations of freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment. ii.  National Legal Protection of the Right to Adequate Housing [9.63]  Many national constitutions and domestic laws in an increasing number of states around the world now embody express or implied provisions on the justiciable

137 

Ibid, para 205. Adam, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 (3 November 2005). 139  Ibid, [9]. 138 

494 

Standard of Living and Social Security

right to adequate housing, and prohibit the practice of forced eviction. They further strengthen the basis for claiming the implementation of that right to adequate housing at the domestic level. Some selected examples are provided below for purposes of illustration: Section 26, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Housing 1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. Article 65, Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Seventh Revision 2005 Housing and urban planning 1. Everyone shall possess the right for themselves and their family to have an adequately sized dwelling that provides them with hygienic and comfortable conditions and preserves personal and family privacy. 2. In order to ensure enjoyment of the right to housing, the state shall be charged with: (a) Planning and implementing a housing policy that is embodied in general town and country planning documents and supported by urban planning documents that guarantee the existence of an adequate network of transport and social facilities; (b) In cooperation with the autonomous regions and local authorities, promoting the construction of low-cost and social housing; (c) Stimulating private construction, subject to the general interest, and access to owned or rented housing; (d) Encouraging and supporting local community initiatives that work towards the resolution of their housing problems and foster the formation of housing and selfbuilding cooperatives. 3. The state shall undertake a policy that works towards the establishment of a rental system which is compatible with family incomes and access to individual housing. 4. The state, the autonomous regions and local authorities shall lay down the rules governing the occupancy, use and transformation of urban land, particularly by means of planning instruments and within the overall framework of the laws concerning town and country planning and urban planning, and shall expropriate such land as may be necessary to the fulfilment of the purposes of public-use urban planning. 5. Interested parties shall be entitled to participate in the drawing up of urban planning instruments and any other physical town and country planning instruments. Articles 30 and 31, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 Habitat and housing Article 30.  Persons have the right to a safe and healthy habitat and adequate and decent housing, regardless of their social and economic status. Article 31.  Persons have the right to fully enjoy the city and its public spaces, on the basis of principles of sustainability, social justice, respect for different urban cultures and a balance between the urban and rural sectors. Exercising the right to the city is based on the

Normative Content of the Right

 495

democratic management of the city, with respect to the social and environmental function of property and the city and with the full exercise of citizenship. Article 43, The Constitution of Kenya 2010 Economic and Social Rights 1. Every person has the right— (a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; (d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; (e) to social security; and (f) to education. 2. A person shall not be denied emergency medical treatment. 3. The State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants. Article 34, The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011 Right to Housing 1. Every citizen has the right to have access to decent housing. 2. The State shall formulate policies and take reasonable legislative measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realization of these rights. 3. No one shall be evicted from his or her lawfully acquired home or have his or her home demolished save in accordance with the law. Article 74, Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 Freedom from arbitrary eviction No person may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. Article 78, Constitution of Egypt 2014 Housing The state guarantees citizens the right to decent, safe and healthy housing, in a way that preserves human dignity and achieves social justice.

[9.64]  Judicial interpretation of the right to housing/shelter by some national courts has elaborated on the content of this right. The Supreme Court of India, in Chameli Singh v State of UP & Another,140 interpreted the right as follows: Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter,

140 

Chameli Singh v State of UP & Another, 1996 AIR SC 1051.

496 

Standard of Living and Social Security

t­ herefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being.141

iii.  Essential Elements of the Right to Adequate Housing [9.65]  The CESCR specified the elements of the right to adequate housing in its General Comment 4.142 The Committee confirmed that the right to adequate housing applies to ‘everyone’, irrespective of income or access to economic resources.143 It ­follows, therefore, that individuals, as well as families, are entitled to adequate housing without any form of discrimination, for example on the basis of age, economic status, group or other affiliation, or status and other such factors in accordance with Article 2(2) of the ICESCR. The Committee explained that the reference to ‘himself and his family’ in Article 11 of the ICESCR reflects assumptions as to gender roles and economic activity patterns commonly accepted in 1966 when the Covenant was adopted: the phrase cannot be read today as implying any limitations upon the applicability of the right to individuals or to female-headed households or other such groups. Thus, the concept of ‘family’ must be understood in a wide sense.144 [9.66]  While adequate housing is determined in part by social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other factors, the CESCR identified the requirements for ­adequate housing as including the following: (a) Legal security of tenure. Tenure takes a variety of forms, including rental (­public and private) accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land or property. Notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure that guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, ­harassment and other threats. States parties should consequently take ­immediate measures aimed at conferring legal security of tenure upon those persons and households currently lacking such protection, in genuine consultation with affected persons and groups. (b) Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure. An adequate house must contain certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services. (c) Affordability. Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised. Steps should be taken by states parties to ensure that the percentage of housing-related costs is, in general, commensurate with income levels. States parties should establish housing subsidies for those

141 

Ibid, para 8. General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (6th Session, 1991), UN Doc HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.1 at 53 (1994). 143  Ibid, paras 6 and 7. 144  Ibid, para 6. 142  CESCR,

Normative Content of the Right

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

unable to obtain affordable housing, as well as forms and levels of housing finance that adequately reflect housing needs. In accordance with the principle of affordability, tenants should be protected by appropriate means against unreasonable rent levels or rent increases. In societies where natural materials constitute the chief sources of building materials for housing, steps should be taken by states parties to ensure the availability of such materials. Habitability. Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards and disease vectors. The physical safety of occupants must be guaranteed as well. The Committee encourages states parties to comprehensively apply the Health Principles of Housing145 prepared by the WHO, which view housing as the environmental factor most frequently associated with conditions for disease in epidemiological analyses, ie inadequate and deficient housing and living conditions are invariably associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates. Accessibility. Adequate housing must be accessible to those entitled to it. Disadvantaged groups must be accorded full and sustainable access to adequate housing resources. Thus, such disadvantaged groups as the elderly, children, the physically disabled, the terminally ill, HIV-positive individuals, persons with persistent medical problems, the mentally ill, victims of natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone areas and other groups should be ensured some degree of priority consideration in the housing sphere. Both housing law and policy should take fully into account the special housing needs of these groups. Within many states parties, increasing access to land by landless or impoverished segments of the society should constitute a central policy goal. Discernible governmental obligations need to be developed, aiming to substantiate the right of all to a secure place to live in peace and dignity, including access to land as an entitlement. Location. Adequate housing must be in a location allowing access to employment options, healthcare services, schools, childcare centres and other social facilities. This is true both in large cities and in rural areas, where the temporal and financial costs of getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets of poor households. Similarly, housing should not be built on polluted sites, nor in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten the right to health of the inhabitants. Cultural adequacy. The way housing is constructed, the building materials used and the policies supporting these must appropriately enable the expression of cultural identity and diversity of housing. Activities geared towards development or modernisation in the housing sphere should ensure that the cultural dimensions of housing are not sacrificed, and that, inter alia, modern technological facilities, as appropriate, are also ensured.146

145 WHO, 146 

 497

Health Principles of Housing (Geneva, World Health Organization, 1989). CESCR, General Comment 4, above n 142, para 8.

498 

Standard of Living and Social Security

IV.  THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY A.  International Legal Protection of the Right to Social Security [9.67]  A large majority of the global population (about 80 per cent) lack access to ­formal social security,147 which has undermined the realisation of the right to an ­adequate standard of living. Although ‘globally the large majority of women, men and children do not have access to adequate or any social security’,148 the right to social security is a ‘basic human right’ strongly affirmed in international law.149 The human rights dimensions of social security were clearly contained in the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, which called for the ‘extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care’.150 Several ILO conventions, ratified by some state parties to the I­ CESCR, deal with social security, including Convention No 102 concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security; Convention No 103 on maternity protection; Convention No 117 concerning the basic aims and standards of social policy; Convention No 118 concerning equality of treatment in social security; and Convention No 174 on major industrial accidents.151 Social security was recognised as a human right in the UDHR, which provides in Article 22 that ‘[e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social security’, and in Article 25(1) that everyone has a right to an adequate standard of living, which includes the ‘right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’. This indicates that the right to social security is essential whenever any human being is unable personally to secure an adequate standard of living for reasons beyond his or her control. The right was subsequently incorporated in a range of international human rights treaties (protecting ESC rights in general,152 the elimination

147  CESCR, General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (4 February 2008) para 7. Among these 80%, 20% live in extreme poverty. 148  ILO, ‘Conclusions Concerning the Recurrent Discussion on Social Protection (Social Security)’ in The Strategy of the International Labour Organization Social Security for All: Building Social Protection Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems (Geneva, ILO, 2012) 13, para 5, available at http://www. socialprotectionfloor-gateway.org/files/social_security_for_all.pdf. 149  Ibid. On social security see, generally J Van Langendonck et al (eds), The Right to Social Security (Oxford, Intersentia, 2007); P Kemp, K Van den Bosch and L Smith (eds), Social Protection in an Ageing World (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2008). 150  Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation, available at www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---…/---ilo…/wcms_142941.pdf, Art III(f ). 151  Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No 102), adopted 28 June 1952, entered into force 27 April 1955; Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (No 103), adopted 28 June 1952, entered into force 7 September 1955; Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention, 1962 (No 117) adopted 22 June 1962, entered into force 23 April 1964; Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No 118), adopted 28 June 1962, entered into force 25 April 1964; Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention, 1993 (No 174), adopted 22 June 1993, entered into force 3 January 1997, all available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=1000:12000:0::NO:::. 152  ICESCR, Arts 9 and 10. Art 10 refers to social security within the context of the protection of the family, mothers and children.

The Right to Social Security

 499

of racial discrimination,153 women,154 children,155 persons with disabilities,156 migrant workers157 and indigenous peoples)158 and regional human rights treaties.159 [9.68]  Social security is an essential tool in ‘poverty reduction and alleviation, preventing social exclusion and promoting social inclusion’.160 Through its redistributive character it is very important in guaranteeing ‘human dignity, equity and social justice’.161 Social security, in particular social and housing assistance, ensures a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources. Thus, in 2001 the ILO General Conference, in its conclusions concerning social security, stated: 2. Social security is very important for the well-being of workers, their families and the entire community. It is a basic human right and a fundamental means for creating social cohesion, thereby helping to ensure social peace and social inclusion. It is an indispensable part of government social policy and an important tool to prevent and alleviate poverty. It can, through national solidarity and fair burden sharing, contribute to human dignity, equity and social justice. It is also important for political inclusion, empowerment and the development of democracy. 3. Social security, if properly managed, enhances productivity by providing health care, income security and social services. In conjunction with a growing economy and active labour market policies, it is an instrument for sustainable social and economic development. It facilitates structural and technological changes which require an adaptable and mobile labour force. It is noted that while social security is a cost for enterprises, it is also

153  ICERD, Art 5(e)(iv) provides, ‘In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: … (iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and social services’. 154  CEDAW, Art 11(1)(e) provides, ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: … (e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave.’ CEDAW, Art 14(2)(c) provides, ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right: … (c) To benefit directly from social security programmes’. CEDAW, Art 13(a) protects the right of women to ‘family benefits’. 155  CRC, Art 26 provides, ‘1. States Parties shall recognise for every child the right to benefit from social security, including social insurance, and shall take the necessary measures to achieve the full realisation of this right in accordance with their national law. 2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, ­taking into account the resources and the circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance of the child, as well as any other consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf of the child.’ 156  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Arts 16(4), 26(1) and 28(2). 157  Migrant Workers Convention, Arts 27, 43, 45(1) and 54(1). 158  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/47/1 (2007), Arts 21–24. 159  For explicit mention of the right to social security, see, eg, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS res XXX (1948), Art XVI; Protocol of San Salvador, above n 48, Art 9; European Social Charter, ETS No 35 (1961); European Social Charter (revised), above n 123, Arts 12, 13 and 14; Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Union, [2000] OJ C364/5, Art 34; and Arab Charter on Human Rights, above n 53, Art 36. 160  CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147, para 3. 161 ILO, Conclusions Concerning Social Security (2001), ILC89-PR16-312-En.Doc (2001) 16, para 2.

500 

Standard of Living and Social Security an investment in, or support for, people. With globalization and structural adjustment policies, social security becomes more necessary than ever.162

B.  Defining Social Security and State Obligations [9.69]  Under Article 9 of the ICESCR, states recognise the right of ‘everyone’ to ‘social security’, including ‘social insurance’. While it is clear that the right to social security extends to ‘everyone’ (ie, it is not limited to ‘workers’ but extends universally to all in need, including vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as casual workers and the self-employed), the concepts of ‘social security’ and ‘social insurance’ are not defined. According to the ILO, the notion of social security covers all measures providing benefits, whether in cash or in kind, to secure protection, inter alia, from: —— lack of work-related income (or insufficient income) caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old age, or death of a family member; —— lack of access or unaffordable access to health care; —— insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult dependants; —— general poverty and social exclusion. Social security schemes can be of a contributory (social insurance) or non-contributory nature.163

[9.70]  Social security may be provided using several methods such as contributory or insurance-based schemes, non-contributory schemes, privately run schemes and community-based schemes, or a combination of more than one of the above methods. These methods have been explained as follows: 4. … (a) Contributory or insurance-based schemes such as social insurance, which is expressly mentioned in article 9. These generally involve compulsory contributions from beneficiaries, employers and, sometimes, the State, in conjunction with the payment of benefits and administrative expenses from a common fund; (b) Non-contributory schemes such as universal schemes (which provide the relevant benefit in principle to everyone who experiences a particular risk or contingency) or targeted social assistance schemes (where benefits are received by those in a situation of need). In almost all States parties, non-contributory schemes will be required since it is unlikely that every person can be adequately covered through an insurance-based system. 5. Other forms of social security are also acceptable, including (a) privately run schemes, and (b) self-help or other measures, such as community-based or mutual schemes. Whichever system is chosen, it must conform to the essential elements of the right to social security and to that extent should be viewed as contributing to the right to social security and be protected by States parties in accordance with this general comment.164

162 

Ibid.

163  ILO,

International Labour Conference, 100th Session, 2011: Report VI, Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization—Recurrent Discussion on Social Protection (Social Security) under the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2011, ILC.100/VI (ILO, 2011), 9. 164  CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147.

The Right to Social Security

 501

In addition to the above, some developing states use ‘cash transfer programmes’, which provide payments in cash to individuals or households in extreme poverty.165 Such payments may be in the form of non-contributory old-age pensions, disability grants, child support grants and widow’s allowances. These payments, when integrated within broader social security protection, can assist states in reducing poverty and fulfilling states’ human rights obligations. [9.71]  Social security is distinguished from ‘social assistance’, which is often discretionary and thus neither a right nor an obligation. A human rights approach to social security entails universal coverage, principles of equality and non-discrimination­, and giving special attention to disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups ­living in rural and deprived urban areas, or amongst indigenous peoples, ­ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities, part-time workers, casual workers, the self-employed and homeworkers, persons working in the informal economy,166 non-nationals (including migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and stateless ­persons), internally displaced persons and internal migrants.167 The social security system should provide for the coverage of the following nine principal branches of social security (social risks and contingencies): (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

healthcare; sickness; old age; unemployment; employment injury; family and child support; maternity; disability; and survivors and orphans.168

[9.72]  As observed in chapter two, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil ESC rights, including the right to social security. The obligation to respect requires states to ‘refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to social security’, including, inter alia, refraining from engaging in any practice or activity that, for example, denies or limits equal access to adequate social security; arbitrarily or unreasonably interferes with self-help or customary or traditional arrangements for social security; arbitrarily or unreasonably interferes with institutions that have been established by individuals or corporate bodies to provide social security.169

165  M Samson, Social Cash Transfers and Pro-Poor Growth (OECD, 2009), available at http://www.oecd. org/dac/povertyreduction/43280571.pdf. 166  ILO, International Labour Conference, 90th Session 2002: Conclusions concerning decent work and the informal economy, available http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/pdf/pr-25res.pdf, para 3, defines the informal economy as ‘all economic activities by workers and economic units that are—in law or in practice—not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements’. 167  CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147, paras 29–39. 168  Ibid, para 12, citing, inter alia, ILO Convention No 102 (1952) on Social Security (Minimum ­Standards), above n 151, which was confirmed by the ILO Governing Body in 2002 as an instrument ­corresponding to contemporary needs and circumstances. 169  CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147, para 44.

502 

Standard of Living and Social Security

[9.73]  States are obliged to protect the right to social security by adopting the necessary and effective legislative and other measures to prevent NSAs (third parties) from compromising ‘equal, adequate, affordable, and accessible social security’170 or interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to social security, that is, for example, to restrain third parties from denying equal access to social security schemes operated by them or by others and imposing unreasonable eligibility conditions; arbitrarily or unreasonably interfering with self-help or customary or traditional arrangements for social security that are consistent with the right to social security; and failing to pay legally required contributions for employees or other beneficiaries into the social security system.171

[9.74]  The obligation to fulf il the right to social security entails three interrelated obligations, namely, to: (a) facilitate (by taking positive measures to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to social security, eg by adopting a national social security s­ trategy and plan of action to realise the right to social security); (b) promote (by taking steps to ensure that there is appropriate education and public awareness concerning access to social security schemes); and (c) provide social security (to individuals or groups who are unable, on grounds ­reasonably considered to be beyond their control, to realise social security themselves with the means at their disposal), eg in times of emergency, such as during and after natural disasters, armed conflict and crop failure.172 [9.75]  States are obliged to ensure that social security is available, adequate and accessible. First, the right to social security requires, for its implementation, that a system under domestic law, whether composed of a single scheme or a variety of schemes, is available and in place to ensure that benefits are provided for the relevant social risks and contingencies (set out in paragraph 9.71 above).173 Secondly, benefits, whether in cash or in kind, must be adequate in amount and duration in order that everyone (beneficiaries) is able to afford the goods and services he or she requires to realise his or her ESC rights, including rights to family protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living and adequate access to healthcare, as contained in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the ICESCR.174 Thirdly, social security must be accessible in terms of coverage, eligibility, affordability, participation and information, as well physical access: (a) Coverage 23. All persons should be covered by the social security system, especially individuals belonging to the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups, without discrimination on any of the grounds prohibited under article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. In order to ensure universal coverage, non-contributory schemes will be necessary.

170 

Ibid, para 46. Ibid, para 45. 172  Ibid, paras 47–51. 173  Ibid, paras 11–21. 174  Ibid, para 22. 171 

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 503

(b) Eligibility 24. Qualifying conditions for benefits must be reasonable, proportionate and transparent. The withdrawal, reduction or suspension of benefits should be circumscribed, based on grounds that are reasonable, subject to due process, and provided for in national law.175 (c) Affordability 25. If a social security scheme requires contributions, those contributions should be stipulated in advance. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with making contributions must be affordable for all, and must not compromise the realization of other Covenant rights. (d) Participation and information 26. Beneficiaries of social security schemes must be able to participate in the administration of the social security system.176 The system should be established under national law and ensure the right of individuals and organizations to seek, receive and impart information on all social security entitlements in a clear and transparent manner. (e) Physical access 27. Benefits should be provided in a timely manner and beneficiaries should have physical access to the social security services in order to access benefits and information, and make contributions where relevant. Particular attention should be paid in this regard to persons with disabilities, migrants, and persons living in remote or disaster-prone areas, as well as areas experiencing armed conflict, so that they, too, can have access to these services.177

[9.76]  The CESCR identified the core state obligations (minimum essential levels) of the right to social security as follows: (a) To ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential health care,178 basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education. If a State party cannot provide this minimum level for all risks and contingencies within its maximum available resources, the Committee recommends that the State party, after a wide process of consultation, select a core group of social risks and contingencies;

175  The Committee notes that, under ILO Convention No 168 (1988) on Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment, (adopted 21 June 1988, entered into force 17 Oct 1991, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=1000:12000:0::NO:::) such action can only be taken in certain circumstances: (i) absence from the territory of the state; (ii) a competent authority has determined that the person concerned deliberately contributed to his or her own dismissal or left employment voluntarily without just cause; (iii) during the period a person stops work due to a labour dispute; (iv) the person has attempted to obtain or has obtained benefits fraudulently; (v) the person has failed without just cause to use the facilities available for placement, vocational guidance, training, retraining or redeployment in suitable work; or (vi) the person is in receipt of another income maintenance benefit provided for in the legislation of the relevant state, except a family benefit, provided that the part of the benefit which is suspended does not exceed that other benefit. 176  Arts 71 and 72 of ILO Convention No 102 (1952), above n 151, set out similar requirements. 177  CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147. 178  See CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 94, paras 43 and 44. This would include access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, provision of essential drugs, access to reproductive, maternal (prenatal as well as post-natal) and child health care, and immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community.

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(b) To ensure the right of access to social security systems or schemes on a non‑discriminatory­ basis, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups; (c) To respect existing social security schemes and protect them from unreasonable interference; (d) To adopt and implement a national social security strategy and plan of action; (e) To take targeted steps to implement social security schemes, particularly those that ­protect disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups; (f) To monitor the extent of the realization of the right to social security.179

V.  REMEDIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY [9.77]  As noted in chapters one and five, rights and obligations demand accountability: unless supported by an effective system of accountability, they can become no more than window dressing. Many component elements of the right to an adequate standard of living (adequate food, water and sanitation, adequate housing) and the right to social security are consistent with the provision of (international and ­domestic) legal remedies. Any persons or groups who have experienced violations of their rights to an adequate standard of living and social security should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national (before national courts, national ombudspersons, human rights commissions and similar national human rights institutions) and international levels (regional and sub-regional courts, regional human rights commissions or committees).180 For example, with respect to adequate housing, domestic courts can determine whether the leases between the lessees and the lessor were validly terminated;181 and can order the provision of temporary accommodation in emergency situations for persons evicted by private property owners.182 Depending on the legal system, the following aspects of the right to adequate housing are consistent with the provision of domestic remedies: (a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal eviction; (c) complaints against illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or private) in relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms of discrimination; (d) allegations of any form of discrimination in the allocation and availability of access to housing; and (e) complaints against landlords concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions. In some legal systems it would also be appropriate to explore the possibility of facilitating class action suits in situations involving significantly increased levels of homelessness.183

[9.78]  While reviewing reports submitted by states parties to the ICESCR, the CESCR has affirmed that states have a clear obligation to protect the right to adequate housing and provide effective remedies to victims of forced eviction. It has been concerned about 179 

CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147, para 59. Ibid, paras 77–81. See also IDG v Spain, Communication no 2/2014 UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015). 181 See, eg, Ntombizodwa Yvonne Maphango and Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (PTY) Ltd (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 13 March 2012). 182  See, eg, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (PTY) Ltd and Another, Case CCT 37/11 [2011] ZACC 33; 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1 December 2011). 183  CESCR, General Comment 4, above n 142, para 17. 180 

Remedies and Accountability

 505

the large number of forced evictions and housing demolitions that have taken place ‘without prior notice being provided or adequate alternative housing or ­compensation being offered’.184 It has recommended that state parties ‘take appropriate measures to ensure that forced evictions are used only as a last resort’.185 In addition it has called on states to ‘adopt effective legislative or other measures strictly defining the circumstances and safeguards subject to which evictions may be carried out’, in line with its General Comment 7 (1997) on the right to adequate housing and forced evictions.186 Furthermore, the Committee has also recommended that the state parties ‘ensure that victims of forced eviction are provided with appropriate compensation or alternative housing, that evictions are not carried out without those affected being consulted and that victims have access to an effective remedy’.187 Other UN human rights bodies have also criticised forced evictions. For example, the UN HRC, in its 2014 Concluding Observations on Israel, expressed ‘concern at demolitions, forced evictions and displacement’ affecting Palestinians and Bedouin citizens of Israel living in the Negev desert, and at the restricted access of Bedouins living in the Negev to ‘basic services, including adequate housing, water and sanitation, health care, education and public transportation’. The HRC recommended that Israel should: (a) Immediately put an end to conducting punitive demolitions given their incompatibility with the State party’s obligations under the Covenant and provide effective remedies to victims of destruction of property, forced eviction and forcible transfer; (b) Refrain from implementing evictions and demolition orders based on discriminatory planning policies, laws and practices affecting Palestinians, including Bedouins, in the West Bank, including the East Jerusalem periphery; remove discriminatory provisions from relevant planning and zoning legislation; provide for procedural protection and due process guarantees against forced evictions and demolitions; ensure the participation of Palestinians in the planning and zoning process and withdraw the so-called ‘Bedouin Regulation’ plan; (c) Desist from any actions that may facilitate or result in forcible transfer and forced evictions, particularly of the Bedouin communities in the central West Bank, including the eastern Jerusalem periphery, and forced displacement and dispossession of Bedouins residing in the Negev; (d) Ensure the participation of Bedouins in the Negev in any process concerning their relocation; ensure that any proposed plans for their relocation take due account of their traditional way of life and, where applicable, their right to ancestral land, and are carried out in accordance with relevant international human rights standards, in particular the principle of non-discrimination, the rights to be informed and consulted, to an effective remedy, and to the provision of adequate relocation sites, and withdraw the discriminatory Bill for the Regulation of the Bedouin Settlement in the Negev (the Prawer-Begin Bill).188

[9.79]  All victims of violations of the rights to an adequate standard of living and social security should be entitled to adequate reparation, including restitution,

184 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009) para 28. Ibid. 186  Ibid. 187  Ibid. 188  HRC, Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, (21 November 2014) para 9. 185 

506 

Standard of Living and Social Security

c­ ompensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition. Before any action is carried out by a state, or by any NSA, that interferes with the right of an individual to an adequate standard of living and social security, the relevant authorities or actors must ensure that such actions are performed in a manner warranted by law, are compatible with international human rights treaties protecting ESC rights and include: (a)  an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) timely and full disclosure of information on the proposed measures; (c) reasonable notice of proposed actions; (d) legal recourse and remedies for those affected; and (e) legal assistance for obtaining legal remedies.189

VI. CONCLUSION [9.80]  This chapter has examined the essential components of the right to an adequate standard of living, focusing on adequate food, water and sanitation, and adequate housing. These entitlements are certainly necessary for a life in dignity. It has considered the applicable international human rights standards and state obligations emanating from human rights instruments, and has provided some examples of domestic application of the right to an adequate standard of living. The chapter has also considered the significance of the right to social security, which, if implemented in practice, ensures an adequate standard of living for all those who lack sufficient resources. [9.81]  The right to an adequate standard of living entails the right to be free from poverty. Regrettably, as noted above, the implementation of the rights to an adequate standard of living and social security remains a distant dream for millions of people living in (extreme and relative) poverty.190 They lack the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for enjoyment of an adequate standard of living. Thus, the reduction and eventual elimination of poverty, particularly in states with higher numbers of people living in poverty,191 is a prerequisite, so that all human beings may enjoy an adequate standard of living. Traditionally, insufficient attention has been given to key components of the right to an adequate standard of living (eg adequate housing for disadvantaged groups) by states receiving and providing international assistance and cooperation. It is necessary to give priority to the components of the right to an adequate standard of living, through laws, policies (including international assistance and cooperation) and enforcement mechanisms.

189 

CESCR, General Comment 19, above n 147, para 78. Word Bank, Global Monitoring Report 2014/15: Ending Poverty and Sharing Prosperity (­Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2015) 2. With a poverty line as low as $1.25 per day, as the minimum amount required to secure the necessities for life, ‘[i]n 2011, just over a billion people remained in extreme poverty, around 14.5 percent of the world’s population’. 191  Ibid, noting that ‘Almost three-fifths of the world’s extreme poor are concentrated in just five ­countries: Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, and Nigeria. Adding another five countries (Ethiopia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Pakistan, and Tanzania) would comprise just over 70 percent of the extreme poor.’ 190 The

10 The Right to Health: Article 12 Article 12 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

I. INTRODUCTION [10.01]  Article 12 of the ICESCR arguably contains ‘the fullest and most definitive conception of the right to health’.1 It protects the right to the highest attainable state of physical and mental health (hereinafter the ‘right to health’), which is recognised as a human right in several international and regional human rights instruments.2 As shown in chapter one, reflecting universal values, every state in the world is now party to at least one human rights treaty that contains key provisions protecting the right to health.3 Although the right to health is generally regarded to be part of ESC rights, it is, in many respects, related to the exercise of several civil and political rights.4 There has also been growing recognition that health is not only a human rights issue, but also a fundamental building block of sustainable development, poverty reduction and 1  A Chapman, ‘Conceptualising the Right to Health: A Violations Approach’ (1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 398, 397. 2  See, eg, UDHR, Art 25; ICESCR, Art 12; CERD, Art 5; CEDAW, Art 12; CRC, Art 24; European Social Charter, Art 11; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 10; African Charter, Art 16. The term ‘right to health’ is used to express numerous human rights obligations relating to health. On the right to health, see CM Flood and A Gross, The Right to Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014); J Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013); B Toebes et al (eds), Health and Human Rights in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012); and JM Zuniga et al (eds), Advancing the Human Right to Health (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 3  United Nations Treaty Collection, at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties. aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 4  For example, in interpreting ‘inherent right to life’ under the ICCPR, the HRC considered that ‘that it would be desirable for States parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy’. See HRC, General Comment 6: Article 6 (16th session, 1982), UN Doc HRI.1 at 6 (1994) para 5.

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economic prosperity,5 as well as of international peace and security.6 International human rights law has laid down two distinct sets of norms relating to health: first, the right to health creates entitlements and freedoms for individuals and groups, with corresponding state obligations in the field of health;7 secondly, the protection of public health constitutes a legitimate ground for limiting individual human rights.8 To this end, states, as parties to human rights treaties applicable to the right to health, are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health. This commitment to ensuring the realisation of the right to health in practice has been reaffirmed by states in several international conferences.9 [10.02]  However, as the former Director General of the WHO stated in 2001, ‘One third of the world’s population still lacks access to the medicines needed for good health.’10 These are basically the poor, especially in rural areas, who cannot afford access to basic health facilities,11 with a majority living in developing states in the South, mainly in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.12 In 2002, for example, while life expectancy at birth reached 78 years for women in developed states, it fell back to less than 46 years for men in sub-Saharan Africa, largely because of the HIV/ AIDS pandemic.13 Thus, children have dramatically different life chances, depending on where they were born. In Japan or Sweden they can expect to live more than 80 years; in Brazil, 72 years; India, 63 years; and in one of several African countries, fewer than 50 years.14 As the CESCR acknowledged, for such millions of people, ‘the full 5  P Hunt, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’, UN Doc A/HRC/7/11 (31 January 2008) para 12. 6  On 18 September 2014, after a meeting called ‘historic’ by the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted res 2177, ‘[d]etermining that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola [hemorrhagic fever] outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security’. Security Council res 2177, UN Doc S/RES/2177 (18 September 2014). See also Security Council res 1308, UN Doc S/ RES/1308 (17 July 2000) and Security Council res 1983, UN Doc S/RES/1983 (7 June 2011) on HIV/AIDS. 7  See K Tomasevski, ‘Health’ in O Schachter and C Joyner (eds), United Nations Legal Order, vol 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) 859, 868. 8  For example, several rights under the ICCPR may be limited for the protection of, inter alia, ‘public health’: right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art 18); freedom of expression (Art 19)—see HRC, General Comment 10: Freedom of Expression (29 June 1983), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 11 (1994); right of peaceful assembly (Art 21); freedom of association (Art 22). 9  See, eg, the Earth Summit in Rio, Agenda 21, Ch 6, paras 1 and 12; the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, Programme of Action, 5–13 September 1994, Principle 8 and para 8.6; the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, Copenhagen Declaration, Commitment 6; Beijing Declaration, paras 17 and 30; Beijing Platform for Action, paras 89 and 106; the Habitant II conference in Istanbul, Habitant Agenda, paras 36 and 128, available at http://www.pdhre.org/rights/health.html. 10  See GH Brundtland, ‘Globalisation, TRIPS and Access to Medicines’, Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, Statement WHO/17 (9–13 November 2001). 11  See WHO, The World Health Report 2000, Health Systems: Improving Performance (Geneva, WHO, 2000), 4: ‘The denial of access to basic health care is fundamentally linked to poverty—the greatest blight on humanity’s landscape.’ 12 WHO, The World Health Report 1999: Making a Difference (Geneva, WHO, 1999) 20, notes that the ‘populations of developing countries and particularly the disadvantaged groups within those countries remain in the early stages of the epidemiological transition’. See also D Fidler, ‘Neither Science nor Shamans: Globalisation of Markets and Health in the Developing World’ (1999) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 191; O Aginam, ‘Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap and Global Health Challenges at Century’s Dawn’ (2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 603, 605. 13 WHO, The World Health Report 2003 (Geneva, WHO, 2003) ch 1. 14  Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (Geneva, WHO, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/ social_determinants/thecommission/finalreport/en/.

Introduction

 509

enjoyment of the right to health remains a distant goal’; and, moreover, such a goal is ‘increasingly remote’ for those living in poverty,15 with severe effects on children,16 as each year some 11 million children (mainly in developing states) die from preventable diseases.17 The WHO has acknowledged that ‘the persistence of deep inequities in health status is a problem from which no country in the world is exempt’.18 This is a challenge to the universal enjoyment of the human right to health that is indispensable for the exercise of other human rights19 and essential to all aspects of everyone’s life, well-being and ability to live a life in dignity. Indeed, without physical and mental health, it is difficult to enjoy other human rights. Improved health, for example, contributes to economic growth and an increase in available resources to invest in all human rights. This is achieved in four ways: (i) it reduces production losses caused by worker illness; (ii) it permits the use of natural resources previously inaccessible because of disease; (iii) it increases enrolment of children in schools and makes them better able to learn; and (iv) it frees for alternative uses resources that would otherwise have to be spent on medical care or treating illness.20 [10.03]  Despite its importance, the human right to health, like many other ESC rights, has long received relatively scant attention and intellectual development, especially when contrasted with the attention devoted to many other human rights. This has led to a lack of conceptual clarity as to the definition and scope of health as a human right, and to a lack of significant domestic and international jurisprudence on the enforcement of the right to health. It is in this context that the right to health was, at one time, considered as being ‘too vague to provide the basis for a monitorable and enforceable right’.21 Fidler referred to the human right to health as ‘an amorphous concept [such that] [n]o one is really sure what it means’,22 while Toebes considered it to be ‘a broad right that is difficult to pinpoint’.23 It is only recently that health, as an international human right, has attracted serious attention.24 15  CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para 5. See also CESCR, Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (10 May 2001) para 1, noting that ‘poverty constitutes a denial of human rights’, including health. 16  See M Mulinge, ‘Implementing the 1989 United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Overlooked Socio-economic and Political Dilemmas’ (2002) 26 Child Abuse and Neglect, The International Journal 1117. 17  See W Foege, ‘The Power of Immunisation’ in UNICEF, The Progress of Nations 2000 (New York, UNICEF, 2000) 19. 18 WHO, Everybody’s Business: Strengthening Health Systems to Improve Health Outcomes (Geneva, WHO, 2007) 1. 19  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 1. 20  See World Bank, World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 17–21. 21  P Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332, 351. 22  Fidler, above n 12, 191. 23  B Toebes, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health’ (1999) 21(3) Human Rights Quarterly 661, 679. 24  So far, the most comprehensive authoritative interpretation of the right to health at the UN level is CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15. Thus, in several respects, this chapter relies on this General Comment and draws on the reports of the former UN Special Rapporteur (Paul Hunt) on the right to health (August 2002–July 2008): UN Docs A/63/263, A/HRC/7/11, A/HRC/7/11/Add.2, A/HRC/7/11/Add.1, A/HRC/7/11/Add.3, A/HRC/7/11/Add.4, A/62/214, A/HRC/4/28, A/HRC/4/28/Add.2, A/HRC/4/28/Add.1, A/HRC/4/28/Add.3, A/61/338, A/HRC/2/7, E/CN.4/2006/48, E/CN.4/2006/48/Add.2, E/CN.4/2006/48/

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[10.04]  Even so, a number of aspects concerning the right to health have yet to be ­clarified and developed. This chapter makes such an attempt. As a starting point, it examines the relevant provisions of international and regional human rights instruments that protect the right to health (section II.), and establishes the scope and content of the right to health (section III.). It then analyses state obligations regarding the right to health (section IV.) and discusses the different levels of state obligations (section V.). A review of the major issues relating to the right to health is then made, focusing on the minimum core obligations attached to the right (section VI.), followed by a discussion of the justiciability of the right to health (section VII.). The chapter concludes by calling for increased attention to the realisation of the right to health and the putting in place of health impact assessments before implementing any policies and decisions that may undermine the right (section VIII.).

II.  INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH [10.05]  Since the early years of recorded human history, several measures have been implemented to improve human health.25 However, healthcare over the centuries remained the responsibility of families, private charities and religious organisations rather than the state.26 The concept of health based on medical intervention by the state is largely a nineteenth-century development, with its origins in Europe’s public health movement.27 This reflects a broadened sense of governmental responsibility for the welfare of its citizens.28 [10.06]  At an international level, health as a human right has been guaranteed in several international instruments since the end of World War II and the founding of the United Nations. The relevant instruments provide a legal basis for the right to health in international law, including the principles of universality, non-discrimination, progressive realisation, the fields in which actions are to be taken and the obligation to allocate sufficient resources to health. This section provides an overview of the international and regional instruments protecting the right to health, taking into account the practice of the relevant treaty-monitoring bodies. [10.07]  International instruments defining the nature and scope of the right to health can be traced from the UN Charter, which commits the UN to the realisation and Add.1, E/CN.4/2006/120, A/60/348, E/CN.4/2005/51, E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.1, E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.2, E/CN.4/2005/ 51/Add.3, E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.4, A/59/422, E/CN.4/2004/49, E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, A/58/427 and E/CN.4/2003/58. See also reports covering 2009–14: UN Docs A/HRC/11/12, A/64/272, A/HRC/14/20, A/65/255, A/HRC/17/25, A/HRC/17/43, A/HRC/18/37, A/66/254, A/HRC/20/15, A/67/302, A/HRC/23/42, A/HRC/23/41, A/68/297, A/HRC/26/31 and A/69/299. 25  See G Rosen, A History of Public Health (Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 1–3, noting that as long ago as 2000 BC, water supply and drainage systems were constructed to improve hygiene. 26  A Chapman, ‘Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health and their Relevance for South Africa’ in D Brand and S Russell (eds), Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2002) 35, 38. 27  S Fluss, ‘The Development of National Health Legislation in Europe: the Contribution of International Organisations’ (1995) 2 European Journal of Health Law 193, 203. 28  Chapman, above n 26, 38.

International Protection of the Right

 511

protection of human rights29 as one of the purposes of the UN, and which imposes obligations upon the UN and member states to, inter alia, promote human rights and solutions to ‘international … health … problems’.30 This explicit reference to the promotion of solutions to international health problems was made in recognition of the fact that ‘medicine is one of the pillars of peace’.31 [10.08]  Thus in 1946 the WHO, an international organisation for states,32 was established as a specialised agency of the UN on the premise that health is essential to international peace and security.33 According to the WHO Constitution,34 which is binding upon all states parties as a multilateral treaty,35 the ‘right to health’ is a ‘fundamental right’. Thus, the preamble to the WHO Constitution states: The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social conditions.

It is in this context that Article 1 of the WHO Constitution provides the sole objective of the WHO to be the ‘attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’. Thus ‘Health-for-All’ has become the main focus of the WHO.36 The WHO Constitution defines health broadly as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.37 This definition has been criticised for being all encompassing and too broad to be useful, as it is impossible for any state to guarantee complete physical, mental and social well-being for its population.38 In particular, the precise meaning, scope and content of ‘well-being’ or ‘social well-being’ still remains uncertain, and was neither preserved in the travaux

29  Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), adopted June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Arts 1, 55–56; Z Stavrinides, ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3(2) International Journal of Human Rights 38. 30  UN Charter, above n 29, Art 55(b) (emphasis added). 31 WHO, The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization (Geneva, WHO, 1958) 38. On the history of the Charter, see generally R Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1958). 32  In 2008 the WHO had 193 member states and two associate members. For current membership, see the WHO website at http://www.who.int/countries/en/. 33  R Scruton, ‘WHO, What and Why? Trans-national Government, Legitimacy and the World Health Organisation’, Occasional Paper No 113 (London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 2000). 34  See Constitution of the WHO as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 states (WHO Official Records, No 2, 1948, 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948; S Fluss and F Gutteridge, ‘World Health Organisation’ in R Blanpain (ed), International Encyclopedia of Laws (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1993) 9; WHO, Basic Documents, 37th edn (Geneva, WHO, 1988) 2. 35  H Schermers and N Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity with Diversity, 3rd edn (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). 36  Declaration of Alma-Ata, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6–12 September 1978; Health for All Policy for the Twenty First Century, 51st World Health Assembly (WHA), 16 May 1998, Official Records A51/5. 37  See preamble to the Constitution of the WHO. This definition was proposed by a subcommittee of the Technical Preparatory Committee that met in 1946 in preparation of the conference to establish a WHO, and it was not subsequently discussed by the Committee or the Conference that established WHO. See WHO Official Records, No 1, 1947, 16. 38  See, eg, J Boyle, ‘The Concept of Health and the Right to Health’ (1997) 3 Social Thought 5.

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préparatoires39 nor subsequently clarified in the practice of the WHO. It is submitted that ‘well-being’, in the context of the right to health under the WHO Constitution, cannot be understood meaningfully as a ‘right to be healthy’ of everyone within a state’s jurisdiction. This is because a number of factors that affect and influence individual health (such as genetic factors and individual susceptibility to ill health) are beyond the control of the state. Therefore, as shown below, later formulations of the right to health in international and regional human rights instruments protect the right to the ‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ rather than the WHO’s ‘complete physical, mental and social well-being’.40 [10.09]  Although the WHO was set up as ‘the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work’, with an explicit constitutional mandate ‘to propose conventions … with respect to international health matters’, it has not promoted lawmaking in the area of health.41 It has instead largely elaborated health standards that are ‘non-binding and most often also non-legal, relying on medical ethics rather than law’.42 It has given ‘little attention to human rights issues, apparently regarding them as unduly political and not within the technical mandate of the organisation’.43 [10.10]  In the context of the UDHR, the right to health was not guaranteed as a distinct right but was linked to and combined with the right to an adequate standard of living for the health and well-being of everyone. Thus Article 25(1) of the UDHR declares: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care.44

It has therefore been stated that ‘Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration recognises the right of everyone to health and well being, though its stress is on the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well being’.45 The right to an adequate standard of living was clearly conceived as a composite right, the enjoyment of which is dependent on the simultaneous realisation of each of its elements: food, clothing, housing, medical care or healthcare, the necessary social services and the right to social security.46

39  See Report of the International Health Conference held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946, UN Doc E/772, 20–21 (1947). 40  See UNGA, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, A2929 (1 July 1995) 320, para 34. 41  One notable exception is the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted during the 56th WHA, which took place from 19–28 May 2003, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva. 42  See Tomasevski, above n 7, 859–906. 43  V Leary, ‘Implications of a Right to Health’ in K Mahoney and P Mahoney (eds), Human Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Global Challenge (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 491. 44  Emphasis added. Art 25(2) of the UDHR protects vulnerable groups by providing: ‘Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same special protection.’ 45  See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 31. 46  A Eide and WB Eide, ‘Article 25’ in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 523, 549.

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[10.11]  Thus, Article 25 of the UDHR is an ‘integrating human rights provision, one that amalgamates rather than splits, requiring holism where there could be a danger of fragmentation’.47 Its significance as regards the right to health lies in the fact that the UDHR recognised that health was wider than medical care and included preconditions for health that are central to achieving an adequate standard of living. This has led some commentators to assert that health was referred to ‘in the amorphous context of heterogeneous rights’48 by combining it with a vague phrase ‘standard of living’.49 The question that arises here is what is ‘adequate’ for one’s health? How should this be ensured? Such questions can be answered if Article 25 of the UDHR is considered in light of numerous other human rights treaties (such as the ICESCR) that subsequently contained relatively detailed and more specific provisions clarifying the content of the right to health. [10.12]  As noted in paragraph 10.01 above, the ICESCR arguably contains ‘the fullest and most definitive conception of the right to health’.50 Article 12(1) of the ICESCR provides: The States Parties … recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

A similar formulation is contained in the CRC,51 the African Charter,52 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child53 and the Protocol of San Salvador,54 the last of which provides: Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being.55

47 

Ibid, 550. S Fox and D Young, ‘International Protection of Children’s Right to Health: The Medical Screening of Newborns’ (1991) 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal 1, 18. 49  For a discussion of the right to an adequate standard of living, see Eide and Eide, above n 46. 50  Chapman, above n 1, 397. 51  UN Doc A/Res/44/25 (1989). Art 24(1) of the CRC provides: ‘States parties recognise the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.’ For discussion, see generally G Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 297. 52  The African Charter (ratified by all 53 African states), Art 16 provides: ‘1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. 2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.’ The standard to be achieved under the African Charter is the ‘best’ rather than the ‘highest’. It is notable that this is a lower standard, since what is ‘best’ is likely to be evaluated in the context of the economic difficulties prevalent in many African states. 53  OAU Doc/CAB/LEG/24.9/49, adopted on 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999, (1991) 3 African Journal of International and Comparative Law/RADIC 173; 9 IHRR 860 (2002). Art 14(1) provides: ‘Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health.’ 54  Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988), adopted 14 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 67 (1992). 55  Art 10(1). For a discussion see S Davidson, The Inter-American Human Rights System (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997) 354. 48 

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[10.13]  It is only the European Social Charter56 (revised 1996) that adopts a ­different formulation by providing for the ‘right to protection of health’,57 placing emphasis on three distinct but related areas: (i) removal of causes of ill-health; (ii) health education; and (iii) prevention of diseases and accidents.58 Although both European Social Charters also prohibit discrimination in the implementation of the rights set forth, including the ‘right to protection of health’, the scope in terms of the persons protected (ratione personae) is narrow due to the fact that the substantive guarantees under both Charters are limited to the nationals of states parties.59 This means that the ‘right to protection of health’ under the European Social Charters does not accrue to ‘everyone’ in a state’s juridiction, a standard that is lower than that under international instruments (like the UDHR and the ICESCR) and other comparable regional human rights instruments—such as the African Charter, which guarantees the right to health to ‘every individual’, and the Protocol of San Salvador, which guarantees the right to health to ‘everyone’. [10.14]  The ICESCR (like the CRC) defines neither what is meant by ‘recognise’ nor what is meant by the ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. As a result, several questions are left unanswered.60 Does the use of the term ‘recognise’ (as opposed, for example, to ‘guarantee’) allow a state a margin of discretion in interpreting the ‘highest attainable standard’? Is the ‘highest attainable standard’ an individual, group, national or a basic international minimum applicable to the entire population? Who (international community or states) determines the content and scope of the ‘highest attainable standard of health’? How is such a level to be evaluated and measured? If it is dependent on available resources, how should such resources be determined? Is there a minimum level of investment in the health sector required of all states parties? To what extent, if at all, are the more affluent/developed states obliged to make innovations in medical technologies and treatments widely available and accessible? For this reason, some commentators have argued that Article 12

56  There are two co-existing European Social Charters, namely the 1961 European Social Charter (ETS No 35), and the 1996 Revised European Social Charter (ETS No 163)—both in force. On the ­European Social Charter generally, see D Harris and J Darcy, The European Social Charter, 2nd edn (­Ardsley, ­Transnational Publishers, 2001); R Brillat, ‘The European Social Charter’ in G Alfredsson et al (eds), I­nternational Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001) 601–06; D Harris, ‘The Council of Europe (II): The European Social Charter’ in R Hanski and M Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Turku/Åbo, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Academy, 1999) 307; D Gomien et al, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1996). 57  SD Jamar, ‘The International Human Right to Health’ (1994) 22(1) Southern University Law Review 1, 32, notes that this formulation, as opposed to the ‘right to health’, suggests a cautious approach. 58  Revised European Social Charter (1996) Art 11 provides: ‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health, the Parties undertake, either directly, or in cooperation with public or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed, inter alia: (1) to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; (2) to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health; (3) to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases as well as accidents.’ See also European Social Charter (1961), Arts 3 and 11. 59  See Appendix to European Social Charter 1961 and to the Revised European Social Charter 1996. 60  A Chapman, ‘Core Obligations related to the Right to Health’ in A Chapman and S Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 187, 188.

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of the ICESCR is imprecise and vague,61 while others have suggested that ‘[i]t is difficult to pinpoint exactly what the right to health contains’.62 [10.15]  Nonetheless, it is important to note that the key terms in this Article relate to the obligation to ‘recognise’ the right of ‘everyone’ to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. The use of the broad term ‘everyone’ reinforces the non-discriminatory nature of the right to health and the need to protect vulnerable groups, including racial minorities, women, children and refugees. For example, ­Article 5 of the ICERD63 obliges states parties to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national and ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the … the right to public health, medical care, social security and social services.64

Similarly, CEDAW65 provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality with men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.66

[10.16]  It is vital to note that ‘Women’s health is inextricably linked to their status in society. It benefits from equality, and suffers from discrimination.’67 It is therefore essential that, in protecting everyone’s right to health, states undertake measures geared towards elimination of de jure discrimination and preventing and eliminating de facto discrimination against women in the field of health, taking into account rights of women belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.68 These generally include ‘migrant women, refugee and internally displaced women, the girl child and older women, women in prostitution, indigenous women and women with physical or mental disabilities’, including those in rural areas.69 For example, in respect of women, Article 12(2) of the CEDAW provides: States Parties shall ensure to women, appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.

[10.17]  It has been suggested that the term ‘recognise’ as opposed to, for example, ‘guarantee’, allows a state a broader discretion in interpreting the right being

61 

See Tomasevski, above n 7, 859–906. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health’ in A Eide et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 169, 174. 63  660 UNTS 195, adopted by UNGA on 21 December 1965 and came into force on 4 January 1969. 64  ICERD, Art 5(e)(iv); CERD, General Recommendation 20: Non-discriminatory Implementation of Rights and Freedoms, UN Doc A/51/18 (15 March 1996) para 1. 65 Annex to GA res 34/180 of 18 December 1979, UN Doc A/34/46, 193, entered into force on 3 September 1981. 66 CEDAW, Art 12(1). CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, Article 12: Women and Health, UN Doc CEDAW/C/1999/I/WG.II/WP2/Rev.1 (1 February 1999) para 2. 67 WHO, The World Health Report 1998: Life in the 21st century—A Vision for All (Geneva, WHO, 1998) 6. 68  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, above n 66, para 6. 69  Ibid. See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 26: On Women Migrant Workers, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (5 December 2008) para 17. 62  B

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­considered.70 However, as argued in chapter two, the Covenant as a human rights treaty (including for present purposes the term ‘recognise’) must be interpreted in light of its overall objective, which is to create specific binding human rights obligations for states parties. In this respect, recognising the right to health is an acknowledgement of the fundamental nature of health, which links Article 12 of the ICESCR to Article 2.71 This creates, first, obligations on states parties to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health of everyone within a state’s jurisdiction. Secondly, states are obliged to refrain from actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health in other states. [10.18]  It is recognised, however, that the notion of ‘the highest attainable standard of health’ takes into account both ‘the individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and a State’s available resources’.72 In this sense, the highest attainable standard of health varies according to time and place. However, as argued in chapter two, there is a minimum standard below which no state should fall. In order to comply with a state’s obligation in respect of the right to health, a state must ‘take steps’ immediately towards the progressive achievement of the full realisation of the right. Article 12(2) of the ICESCR73 enumerates ‘illustrative’, but ‘non-exhaustive’74 examples of ‘steps to be taken by the States Parties … to achieve the full realisation’ of the right to health. These include those steps necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;75 (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

70  S Jamar, ‘The International Human Right to Health’ (1994) 22(1) Southern University Law Review 1, 23. 71  A/2929, 320, para 35. For a discussion of Art 2, see ch 2. 72  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 9. 73  See also CRC, Art 24(2), stating that ‘States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right [to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health] and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures: (a) To diminish infant and child mortality; (b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care; (c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care …; (d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers; (e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents; (f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services.’ Similar measures are included under Art 14(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and Art 10(2) of the Protocol of San Salvador. 74  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 7 and 13. 75  According to WHO, the stillbirth rate is no longer commonly used; instead, infant and under-five mortality rates are measured. The infant mortality rate is the number of children who die before reaching the age of one year per 1,000 live births in a given year. The child mortality rate is the number of children who die aged one to four years per 1,000 in that age group in a year. See J Ovsiovitch, ‘Reporting Infant and Child Mortality under the United Nations Human Rights Conventions’ (1998) 46 Buffalo Law Review 543.

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 517

[10.19]  It follows that states parties have immediate obligations to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps in the fields enumerated above (ie maternal, child and reproductive health; healthy, natural workplace environments; the prevention, treatment and control of diseases; and the provision of health facilities, goods and services) towards the full realisation of the right to health.76 While these steps provide a useful starting point for understanding state obligations in respect of health, ‘their generality makes it difficult to determine specific obligations involved’.77 [10.20]  In monitoring states’ compliance with obligations in respect of the right to health, states are required to indicate whether they have ‘a national health policy’ and whether a national health system with ‘universal access to primary health care is in place’.78 Furthermore states are required to indicate what measures have been taken to ensure, inter alia, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health facilities, goods and services.79 In addition, under the previous reporting guidelines states were required to provide, ‘where available’,80 indicators as defined by the WHO, relating to the ­following issues:81 (a) Infant mortality rate (by national value, sex, urban/rural division, socio-economic or ethnic group and geographical area); (b) Population access to safe water (urban/rural); (c) Population access to adequate excreta disposal facilities (urban/rural); (d) Infants immunised against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, measles, poliomyelitis and tuberculosis (urban/rural and by sex); (e) Life expectancy (urban/rural, by socio-economic group and by sex); (f) Proportion of the population having access to trained personnel for the treatment of common diseases and injuries, with regular supply of 20 essential drugs, within one hour’s walk or travel; (g) Proportion of pregnant women having access to trained personnel during pregnancy and proportion attended by such personnel for delivery, with figures on the maternity mortality rate, both before and after childbirth; (h) Proportion of infants having access to trained personnel for care. ([B]reak-downs by urban/rural and socio-economic groups for indicators (f) to (h).)

States were then required to indicate whether it could be discerned from the breakdowns of the indicators employed above, or by other means, that there were any groups in a state whose health situation was significantly worse than that of the majority of the population.82 The guidelines demanded that states define these groups as precisely as possible and give details, including an indication of which geographical

76 

CESCR, General Comment 14, para 30; CESCR, General Comment 13, para 43. Leary, ‘The Right to Complain: the Right to Health’ in F Coomans et al, The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Utrecht, SIM, 1995) 87, 88. 78  See Appendix I to this book, para 55. 79  Ibid, para 56. 80  The phrase suggests that providing this data is not mandatory, and as a result few states provide data on a disaggregated basis, and the Committee has rarely criticised states for failure to provide these data. See A Chapman, ‘Monitoring Women’s Right to Health under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1157, 1168. 81  See Compilation of Guidelines on the form and content of reports to be submitted by States Parties, UN Doc HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1 (9 May 2001) para 50. 82  Ibid, para 51. 77  V

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areas in a state, if any, were worse off with regard to the health of the population, and the measures that were considered necessary or undertaken to improve the physical and mental health situation of such vulnerable and disadvantaged groups or in such worse-off areas.83 While this may be useful in monitoring the right to health, most health data, including those for assessing maternal mortality rates in many (developing) states where it is a serious problem, are either unavailable, or incomplete and inaccurate.84 The new reporting guidelines adopted in 2008 do not require these details (see Appendix I). [10.21]  By examining state reports in respect of the right to health using the above indicators, the essence of the right to health can be generally ascertained at a particular time in a given state. However, as noted in chapter two, the lack of an individual and group petition system under the ICESCR before 2008 prevented individuals and groups from presenting specific claims of violations of the right to health at the UN level. Yet indicators, though useful, were inadequate to give a complete view of everyone’s enjoyment of the right to health. Consequently, states were not made effectively accountable. The entry into force on 5 May 2013 of the Optional Protocol providing for such communications, and its ratification by state parties to the ICESCR, should be helpful with respect to this issue.

III.  SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH [10.22]  The scope of the right to health was articulated by the CESCR in its General Comment 14 as encompassing both healthcare and access to the underlying determinants of health. The Committee stated: 4. … [T]he reference in article 12.1 of the Covenant to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ is not confined to the right to health care. On the contrary, the drafting history and the express wording of article 12.2 acknowledge that the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment.

…

11. The Committee interprets the right to health, as defined in article 12.1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and international levels.

83 

Ibid. A Yamin and D Maine, ‘Maternal Mortality as a Human Rights Issue: Measuring Compliance with International Treaty Obligations’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 563, 657. 84 

Scope and Content of the Right to Health

 519

[10.23]  From the above paragraphs and section II. above, it is clear that the scope of the right to health extends to two essential aspects: first, it is a right to access timely and appropriate ‘healthcare’; and, secondly, the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the ‘underlying determinants of health’.85 These two aspects of the right to health are examined below. A.  The Right to Healthcare [10.24]  The first element of the right to health relates to individual entitlement to access to ‘healthcare’, including preventive and curative healthcare.86 The right to healthcare guarantees an individual’s right to have access throughout his or her lifecycle to the necessary facilities and services for the diagnosis, treatment, care and prevention of diseases. This entitles individuals and groups to a system of health protection that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.87 States are also thus obliged under Article 12(2)(d) of the Covenant to take steps necessary for ‘[t]he creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’. In particular, states are obliged to ‘ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers’.88 The concept of pre-natal and post-natal healthcare includes the prevention and management of risk factors for low birth weight and premature birth; the ensuring of a clean environment for birth; the maintenance of thermal control and respiratory support; and the initiation of breast feeding immediately after birth.89 [10.25]  This provision entails a clear obligation of conduct (‘to take steps’) towards the result of assuring healthcare for all in the event of sickness. In the view of the Committee, this requires the state to ensure: (i) the provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services and health education; (ii) regular screening programmes; (iii) appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries and disabilities, preferably at community level; (iv) the provision of essential drugs; and (v) appropriate mental health treatment and care.90 This requires the state to ensure that there are functioning public healthcare facilities (including hospitals, clinics and other health-related buildings), trained medical and professional

85  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 4 and 11; Toebes, above n 62; B Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 1999) 245; J Montgomery, ‘Recognising a Right to Health’ in R Beddard and D Hill (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Progress and Achievement (London, Macmillan, 1992) 184. 86  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/5, Art 35: ‘Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.’ 87  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 8. 88  CRC, Art 24(d). See also ICESCR, Art 10(2); UDHR, Art 25(2); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 14(2)(e). Pre-natal healthcare denotes the care existing or occurring before birth, while post-natal healthcare denotes care after birth. CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15. 89 G Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) 305. 90  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 17.

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personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.91 [10.26]  The prevention, treatment and control of diseases and injury are fundamental to achieving the right to health. In recognition of this, Article 12(2)(c) of the ICESCR obliges states to take measures necessary for ‘[t]he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases’. This requires the establishment of prevention and education programmes for behaviour-related health concerns,92 including sexually transmitted diseases (in particular HIV/AIDS)93 and those adversely affecting sexual and reproductive health, and the promotion of social determinants of good health, such as environmental safety, education (including compulsory sex education in schools),94 and economic development and gender equity.95 Thus, states are required to indicate what measures have been taken ‘to provide education concerning prevailing health problems and the measures of preventing and controlling them’.96 This should extend to strengthening legislative and non-legislative measures, including awareness-raising campaigns to combat traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children,97 particularly those affecting girls, including teenage pregnancy,98 ‘early [and forced] marriage, female genital mutilation [FGM], preferential feeding and care of male children’.99 [10.27]  The right to treatment includes the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards, and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations.100 The control of 91 The WHO Model List of Essential Medicines has been updated every two years since 1977. For the 2015 version, see WHO, WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 19th edn (April 2015, rev June 2015), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/. 92  CRC, Art 24(2)(e) obliges states ‘To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents.’ 93  This is the term commonly used for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) leading to acquired immune (or immuno-) deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Transmission of this virus, the progression of the disease and the dire consequences of it are set out in lay language from para 11 onwards in the judgment of Ngcobo J in Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC). See also CRC Committee, General Comment 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/3 (2003). 94 See Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark Series, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A No 23; (1979–80) 1 EHRR 711. 95  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 16. 96  Compilation of Guidelines, above n 81, para 54. 97 See CRC, Art 24(3); CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Malawi, UN Doc CRC/C/15/ Add.174 (1 February 2002) para 50; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.160 (7 November 2001) para 48; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Tanzania, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.156 (9 July 2001) para 51; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Ghana, UN Doc CRC/C/GHA/CO/2 (17 March 2006) paras 55–56. 98  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc A/57/38 (23 August 2002) paras 147–8. 99  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 22; World Health Assembly Resolution, Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning: Traditional Practices Harmful to the Health of Women and Children (1994), WHA47.10; UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/42. 100  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 16. On 8 August 2014, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan declared the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD, or ‘Ebola’) outbreak in West Africa a ‘public health emergency of international concern’. See WHO Statement on the 1st Meeting of the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, at http://www.who. int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/ (8 August 2014).

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diseases refers to states’ individual and joint efforts to, inter alia, make available relevant technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection on a disaggregated basis, and the implementation or enhancement of immunisation programmes and other strategies of infectious disease control.101 In the reporting guidelines, states are required to ‘describe the measures taken … to prevent, treat and control epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases’.102 [10.28]  Similarly, Article 11(1) of the European Social Charter (revised 1996) has been interpreted by the European Committee of Social Rights,103 formerly the Committee of Independent Experts, as specifically requiring states to make public health arrangements generally available to ensure proper medical care for the whole population, and to take special measures to protect health of mothers, children and old people.104 ­Article 11(2) of the European Social Charter (revised 1996) has been understood to require the provision of an adequate ‘system of health education’,105 while Article 11(3) requires an adequate vaccination programme to prevent ‘epidemic, endemic and other diseases’. In the revised Charter, there is the addition of preventing ‘accidents’. This creates an obligation on states parties to ‘follow a policy of accident prevention, but each State will be able to decide on its own measures to that end’.106 Generally, the obligation on states under Article 11 entails the implementation in various fields of a very considerable number of measures, constituting a health policy in the fullest sense and geared to prevention as well as treatment of diseases and promotion of a healthy environment including measures taken for the reduction of environmental risks, in particular in the field of ‘air quality, water management, waste management, environmental noise, ionising radiation, asbestos and food safety, as well as on the institutional structures for the proper implementation of environmental legislation’.107 This includes the prevention of AIDS, air pollution caused by cars, the protection of the public from exposure of asbestos, and nuclear safety.108 [10.29]  The African Commission has held that the African Charter requires state parties to ensure that health facilities are available and accessible, and that therefore states parties must take ‘necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick’.109 Thus, the ­Commission has called on states to ensure protection against discrimination for those living with HIV/ AIDS and to develop educational programmes, and has called on the ­pharmaceutical

101 

CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 16. Compilation of Guidelines, above n 81, para 51(g). For discussion, see DJ Harris and J Darcy, European Social Charter, 2nd edn (Ardsley, NY, Transnational, 2001) 293–376. 104  Conclusions I onwards of the Committee of Independent Experts (C I) 59, cited in ibid, 150. 105  Ibid. 106  Revised Charter Explanatory Report, para 59, Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected Texts (2008) 178, para 56, available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ ESCCollectedTexts_en.pdf; Harris and Darcy, above n 103, 265. 107  See European Committee of Social Rights Conclusions 2013 (Montenegro), January 2014, 15 available http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/State/Montenegro2013_en.pdf. 108  Harris and Darcy, above n 103, 149. 109  Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire, Communications nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (joined), 10th Annual Activity Report (1995), reported in (1997) 4 IHRR 89 and (2000) AHRLR 74, para 47 (emphasis added). 102  103 

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companies to ensure affordable healthcare to African governments.110 As regards vulnerable groups, eg prisoners, the Commission has stated that the Charter obliges states to provide detainees with access to medical care,111 and that denying a detainee access to doctors, leading to a deterioration of health, violates the right to health.112 Similarly, the starvation of prisoners and depriving them of healthcare, leading to deterioration in health, have been found to be violations of the right to health under Article 16 of the African Charter, in addition to violating the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in Article 5.113 B.  Underlying Determinants of Health [10.30]  The second aspect of the right to health embraces a wide range of socioeconomic­factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation,114 safe and healthy occupational or working conditions and a healthy environment,115 and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health.116 Some of these elements form an integral relationship with already established human rights. Consequently, the right to health must be understood as a ‘right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realisation of the highest attainable standard of health’.117 [10.31]  The African Commission has held that the right to health guaranteed under Article 16 of the African Charter places a duty on states ‘to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity’, besides the more obvious requirement to

110  See Commission Resolution on HIV/AIDS Pandemic: Threat Against Human Rights and Humanity, (7 May 2001), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/29th/resolutions/53/. See also J Mann, ‘Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of the Pandemic’ in J Mann et al, Health and Human Rights: A Reader (New York, Routledge, 1999) 216. 111  International PEN and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria, Communications nos 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (joined), 12th Annual Activity Report (1998), reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 274 and (2000) AHRLR 212. 112  Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, Communications nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 (joined), 12th Annual Activity Report (1998), reported in (2000) 7 IHRR 265 and (2000) AHRLR 200. 113  Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop,/UIDH/ RADDHO, Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-droit and Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l’Homme v Mauritania (Mauritania cases), Communications nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 and 210/98 (joined), 13th Annual Activity Report, 136, reported in (2001) 8 IHRR 268 and (2000) AHRLR 146. 114  E Guisse, ‘Relationship between the Enjoyment of ESC Rights and the Promotion of the Realisation of the Right to Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation’, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/10 (25 June 2002) para 43, notes, ‘The quality of water and … sanitation is crucial for health. … [W]ater-related diseases continue to be one of the major health problems of the world’s population, particularly in developing countries, where it is estimated that some 80 per cent of illnesses and more than one third of death[s] are caused by drinking contaminated water.’ See also CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003). 115  K Cook, ‘Environmental Rights as Human Rights’ (2002) 2 EHRLR 196; D Shelton, ‘Environmental Rights’ in P Alston (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 189; A Boyle and M Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996). 116  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 4 and 11. 117  Ibid, para 9.

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supply adequate medicine.118 Accordingly, a state’s failure to provide basic services ­necessary for minimum standards of health, such as safe drinking water, and shortages of medicine as a result of proven mismanagement of a state’s resources, have been held to constitute a violation of the right to health.119 [10.32]  Regarding water, one of the key underlying determinants of health, the CESCR has stated in its General Comment 15: 1. Water is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and health. The human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights. The Committee has been confronted continually with the widespread denial of the right to water in developing as well as developed countries. Over one billion persons lack access to a basic water supply, while several billion do not have access to adequate sanitation, which is the primary cause of water contamination and diseases linked to water.120 The continuing contamination, depletion and unequal distribution of water is exacerbating existing poverty. States parties have to adopt effective measures to realize, without discrimination, the right to water … … 6. Water is required for a range of different purposes, besides personal and domestic uses, to realize many of the Covenant rights. For instance, water is necessary to produce food (right to adequate food) and ensure environmental hygiene (right to health). Water is essential for securing livelihoods (right to gain a living by work) and enjoying certain cultural practices (right to take part in cultural life). Nevertheless, priority in the allocation of water must be given to the right to water for personal and domestic uses. Priority should also be given to the water resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as water required to meet the core obligations of each of the Covenant rights.121

[10.33]  The problem of pollution and environmental degradation has also been considered in the context of the right to health. In this regard, the African Commission found, inter alia, a violation of the Article 16 guarantee of the right to health by Nigeria, through its oil production operations that caused environmental degradation and resultant health problems among the Ogoni people.122 In López Ostra v Spain, the ECtHR found that environmental harm to human health may amount to a violation of the right to a home and family and private life.123 The European Committee 118 

Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire, above n 109, para 47. Ibid. 120  According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation, 2.5 billion people still remain without improved sanitation facilities and around 900 million people still rely on unimproved drinking-water supplies. See UN Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) (Geneva, WHO, 2008). In 2000, the WHO estimated that 1.1 billion people did not have access to an improved water supply (80% of them rural dwellers) able to provide at least 20 litres of safe water per person a day; 2.4 billion people were estimated to be without sanitation. See WHO, The Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 (Geneva, WHO and UNICEF, 2000) 1, available at http://www.who. int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/globalassess/en/. Further, 2.3 billion people each year suffer from diseases linked to water: see UN Commission on Sustainable Development, Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World (New York, United Nations, 1997), 39. 121  See CESCR, General Comment 15, above n 114. See also World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Implementation 4 September 2002, para 25(c), available at http://www.un-documents.net/ jburgpln.htm. 122  Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria Communication no 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60. 123  López Ostra v Spain, App no 16798/90 (1995) 20 EHRR 277. 119 

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of Social Rights has clarified that in order for national medical and health systems to comply with the ‘right to health protection’ under the European Social Charter, they must put in place general measures to prevent air and water pollution, protection from radioactive substances, noise abatement, food control and environmental hygiene.124 In its General Comment 15, the CESCR has similarly observed: 8. Environmental hygiene, as an aspect of the right to health under article 12, paragraph 2 (b), of the Covenant, encompasses taking steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from unsafe and toxic water conditions.125 For example, States parties should ensure that natural water resources are protected from contamination by harmful substances and pathogenic microbes. Likewise, States parties should monitor and combat situations where aquatic eco-systems serve as a habitat for vectors of diseases wherever they pose a risk to human living environments.126

[10.34]  The right to health also requires states to take measures to ensure effective exercise of the right to safe and healthy working conditions,127 and to ‘formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent national policy on occupational safety, occupational health and the working environment’.128 This has been understood widely to apply to both ‘employed and self-employed workers’129 and to both private (including family businesses and home workers) and public sector workers, including civil servants.130 [10.35]  Similarly, Article 12(2)(b) of the ICESCR obliges states to effect ‘improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’. This comprises several measures, including preventive measures in respect of occupational accidents and diseases; the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable water131 and basic sanitation; the prevention and reduction of the population’s exposure to harmful substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.132

It also embraces adequate housing and safe and hygienic working conditions, an adequate supply of food and proper nutrition.133 Furthermore, the improvement of industrial hygiene obliges states to minimise, so far as is reasonably practicable, the causes of health hazards inherent in the working environment.134 It is noteworthy that

124 

Harris and Darcy, above n 103, 150. See also CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 15. 126 According to the WHO definition, vector-borne diseases include diseases transmitted by insects (malaria, filariasis, dengue, Japanese encephalitis and yellow fever), diseases for which aquatic snails serve as intermediate hosts (schistosomiasis) and zoonoses with vertebrates as reservoir hosts. 127  European Social Charter (1961), Art 3; Revised European Social Charter (1996), Art 3. 128  Revised European Social Charter (1996), Art 3(1). 129  Harris and Darcy, above n 103, 150. 130  Ibid, 70. 131  See above n 120. See also chapter 9 in this book. 132  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 15. On health environment, see also Stockholm Declaration, 1972, Principle 1; GA res 45/94; Rio Declaration, Principle 1; African Chater, Art 24; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 11; P Sands, ‘Human Rights, Environment and López Ostra Case: Context and Consequences ’ (1996) 6 EHRLR 597. 133  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 15. 134  Ibid. 125 

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the poor and marginalised suffer disproportionately from environmental harm.135 Accordingly, states must avoid ‘environmental racism’—the dumping of environmental waste, or ignoring pollution in areas inhabited by vulnerable groups, ie the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, and the mentally and physically handicapped.136 [10.36]  In this respect the right to health overlaps with, is closely interrelated with and is dependent upon the realisation of other human rights, including rights to food, housing, work and education.137 Indeed, improved nutrition, good sanitation, better education and a clean environment enhance the realisation of the right to health.138 [10.37]  A further important aspect is the participation of the population in all ­health-related decision-making at the community, national and international levels.139 In order to participate effectively, individuals should be ‘empowered to promote, preserve, and ultimately define their own health status’.140 Thus, the reporting guidelines ask states to indicate ‘what measures have been taken … to maximise community participation in the planning, organisation, operation and control of primary health care’.141 In this respect, education has an important role in empowering individuals and groups to realise the right to health.

IV.  STATE OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH [10.38]  States are obliged to make healthcare and access to the underlying determinants of health available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality.142 These elements of the right to health are examined below. A. Availability [10.39]  Availability embodies two different government obligations. First it requires a state to ensure that ‘[f]unctioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes’ are available in sufficient quantity within the state for the entire population.143 Secondly, it demands that a state ensure that the underlying determinants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate

135 

Shelton, above n 115, 257. Leary, above n 77, 90. 137  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 3. 138  A Taylor and S George, ‘Affordable Health: The Way Forward’ (1998) 2(2) International Journal of Human Rights 1, 16; A Eide, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concept and Standards (Aldershot, Ashgate, and Paris, UNESCO, 2000) 109, 152. 139  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 11. 140  A Yamin, ‘Defining Questions: Situating Issues of Power in the Formulation of a Right to Health under International Law’ (1996) 18(2) Human Rights Quarterly 398, 414. 141  Compilation of Guidelines, above n 81, para 53. 142  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12; CRC Committee, General Comment 4: Adolescent Health and Development Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/4 (1 July 2003) para 34. 143  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12. 136 

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s­ anitation facilities, are available in sufficient quantity. Therefore, availability demands that there be adequate public funding for health, in view of the fact that public health facilities are the only type of health facility to which the poor can ever have access. In the case of Mariela Viceconte v Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Mariela ­Viceconte, and the National Ombudsman, asked the court to order the G ­ overnment of Argentina to take protective measures against haemorrhagic fever, which threatened 3.5 million people.144 More specifically, they asked the court to order the G ­ overnment to produce a WHO-certified vaccine (Candid-1) for Argentine haemorrhagic fever. According to the court, it was the Government’s responsibility to make healthcare available in a situation where the existing healthcare system, including the private ­sector, was not protecting individuals’ health. In light of the Constitution’s incorporation of international treaties that recognise the right to health, the court found that the Government had not ‘fulfilled its obligations to make available the Candid-1 vaccine’. Because the private sector saw the production of the vaccine as unprofitable, the court ordered the state to produce Candid-1. B. Accessibility [10.40]  Accessibility in relation to health facilities, goods and services has four overlapping dimensions: (i) the facilities, goods and services must be accessible without discrimination; (ii) they must be physically accessible; (iii) they must be economically accessible (ie affordable); and (iv) health information must be accessible, subject to confidentiality of personal health data. i.  Equality and Non-discrimination [10.41]  The twin fundamental human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination (see chapter two) in the context of health mean that outreach and other programmes must be in place to ensure that disadvantaged individuals and groups enjoy, in law and in practice, the same access as those who are more advantaged. The UN Commission on Human Rights reaffirmed that non-discrimination in the field of health should apply to all people and in all circumstances.145 States are obliged to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination in access to healthcare and to underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and entitlements for their procurement, on any of the internationally prohibited grounds.146 This is meant to ensure access

144  Mariela Viceconte v Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Case no 31.777/96 (National Court of Appeals for the Federal Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction of Argentina, 2 June 1998). For a further discussion of the case, see V Abramovich ‘Argentina: The Right to Medicines’ in Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Achievements, Challenges and Strategies (Geneva, COHRE, 2003) 60. 145  UN Commission on Human Rights, Res 1989/11, Non-discrimination in the Field of Health, 2 March 1989. 146  See ch 2; CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 18; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.80 (17 May 2002) para 14; CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 14; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002) paras 15, 22 and 35.

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to all individuals, including marginalised groups such as women,147 persons with ­disabilities,148 older persons,149 prisoners,150 racial and ethnic minorities,151 asylum seekers and illegal immigrants,152 and persons living with HIV/AIDS.153 States must respect and embrace human rights in the National Health Strategy, ‘in line with the principles of non-discrimination and equal access to health facilities and services’.154 ii.  Physical Accessibility [10.42]  This requires health services and underlying determinants of health to be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, including in rural areas.155 This must be the case especially for those vulnerable or marginalised groups outlined in the previous paragraph.156 Physical accessibility also includes adequate access to buildings for persons with disabilities.157 iii.  Economic Accessibility [10.43]  Economic accessibility (affordability) requires that payment for healthcare services, as well as services related to the underlying determinants of health, has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are practically affordable for all.158 Equity demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households.159 In the Minister of Health v Treatment Action ­Campaign, the South African Constitutional Court considered, inter alia, whether or not the a­ nti-retroviral

147 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24: Women and Health (Article 12), UN Doc A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) para 13; L Hayden, ‘Gender Discrimination within the Reproductive Health Care System: Viagra v Birth Control’ (1999) 13 Journal of Law and Health 171. 148  CESCR, General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/13 (1994); CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002) paras 15, 22; Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, annexed to GA res 48/96 of 20 December 1993, rule 2, para 3 [Standard Rules]; UN Commission on Human Rights, res 2002/61 on human rights of persons with disabilities. 149  CESCR, General Comment 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons (13th Session, 1995), UN Doc E/C.12/1995/16/Rev.1 (1995) paras 34 and 35. 150  See UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, UN ECOSOC Res 663 C (XXIV), 31 July 1957, amended by UN ESOSOC res 2076 (LXII), 13 May 1977; African Commission Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa, (October 2002) paras 33–37. 151  See WHO, Health and Freedom from Discrimination: WHO’s Contribution to the World Conference against Racism (Geneva, WHO, 2001). 152  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 34. 153  Fighting HIV-related Intolerance: Exposing the Links Between Racism, Stigma and Discrimination, paper prepared by WHO and UNAIDS in consultation with OHCHR, August 2001. 154 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (17 May 2002) para 35; CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 54. 155  Compilation of Guidelines, above n 81, para 50. 156  CESCR Committee, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(b)(ii). 157  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Art 25. 158  CESCR Committee, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(b)(iii). 159  Ibid, para 12(b)(iii).

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drug Nevirapine was accessible.160 The Government provided ­Nevirapine, used to treat HIV, at only two research and training sites per province. The drug could also be obtained from private medical providers. As a result, mothers and their babies who did not have access to the research and training sites, and who could not afford access to private healthcare, were unable to gain access to N ­ evirapine. The Government argued that ‘until the best programme has been formulated and the necessary funds and infrastructure provided … the drug must be withheld from ­mothers and children who do not have access to the research and training sites’. ­However, the Court held that the state’s limited provision of Nevirapine was unreasonable. It ordered that the Government act without delay to provide the drug in public hospitals and clinics when medically indicated. iv.  Informational Accessibility [10.44]  In its very first session in 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(1), which stated: Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and … the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the UN is consecrated.

This includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas161 concerning, inter alia, health issues.162 In a 1985 Advisory Opinion, the IACtHR recognised that freedom of information is a fundamental human right, which is as important to a free society as freedom of expression.163 The CESCR has expressed ‘concern’ about the lack of transparency and disclosure of necessary information, and emphasised the state obligation to provide ‘comprehensive, credible and accurate information’: The Committee reiterates its concern about the lack of transparency and disclosure of necessary information regarding the safety of nuclear power installations and at the insufficient nationwide community preparation for the prevention and handling of nuclear accidents, which, in the case of the Fukushima nuclear accident, has led to negative impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights of victims (arts 11 and 12). The Committee recommends, once again, that the State party increase transparency on issues relating to the safety of nuclear power installations and step up its preparedness to nuclear accidents. In particular, the Committee urges the State party to provide the population with comprehensive, credible and accurate information on potential hazards, preventive measures and response plans, and to ensure prompt disclosure of all information when disasters occur.164

160  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, CCT 8/02, [2002] ZACC 15, 2002 (5) SA 721, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.html. 161  UDHR, Art 19; ICCPR, Art 19(2); AmCHR, Art 13(1). See also Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/31 (14 December 1995) para 35; UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/31 (4 February 1997); UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/63 (18 January 2000) para 42; ARTICLE 19, The Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Expression Legislation (London, ARTICLE 19, 2000). 162  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(b)(iv). 163  Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (IACtHR, 13 November 1985) paras 30, 32 and 70. 164  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/JPN/CO/3 (10 June 2013) para 25.

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 529

[10.45]  In three key cases, the ECtHR has held that Article 10 of the ECHR, ­guaranteeing freedom of expression, ‘basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him’.165 In the case of Guerra, the Court held that the Government of Italy was under an obligation to provide certain environmental information to residents in an ‘at-risk’ area, even though it had not yet collected that information.166 States should enhance access to health information to everyone, including persons with disabilities. In the Canadian case of Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), a group of deaf applicants challenged the absence of sign-language interpreters in the publicly funded healthcare system.167 The Supreme Court held that provincial governments had a positive obligation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to address the needs of disadvantaged groups, such as persons with disabilities. The Court decided that the applicants had a right to publicly funded sign-language interpretation in the provision of healthcare and that the failure of the authorities to ensure that the applicants benefited equally from the provincial medical care scheme amounted to discrimination. However, accessibility of information (like all other health services) must be consistent with other human rights, including the rights to privacy, confidentiality relating to personal health data, informed consent and choice.168 C.  Acceptability and Quality [10.46]  Acceptability requires a guaranteed quality of healthcare and underlying determinants of health. Thus, health facilities must be ‘scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality’.169 Medicines rejected in the North because they are beyond their expiry date and unsafe must not be recycled to the South.170 Acceptability also requires minimum standards of health and safety, or professional requirements for health personnel, which have to be set, monitored and enforced by the government, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water and adequate sanitation.171 In this respect, states are obliged to issue safety and health regulations; to provide for the enforcement of such regulations by measures of supervision; [and] to promote the progressive development of occupational health services for all workers with essentially preventive and advisory functions.172

165  Leander v Sweden, App no 9248/81, judgment of 26 March 1987, (1987) 9 EHRR 433, para 74. See also Gaskin v United Kingdom, App no 10454/83, judgment of 7 July 1989, (1989) 12 EHRR 36 and Guerra and Others v Italy, 14967/89, judgment of 19 February 1998, (1998) 26 EHRR 357. 166  Guerra and Ors v Italy, above n 165. 167  Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624 (Supreme Court of Canada, 9 October 1997). 168  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, above n 147, para 31(e); CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(b)(iv). 169  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(d). See also Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh 48 DLR (1996) HCD 438 (The Supreme Court of Bangladesh). 170  Hunt, above n 5, para 54. 171  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(d). 172  Revised European Social Charter, Art 3(2)-(4).

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Acceptability equally requires that all health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate, ie respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities, sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, as well as being designed to respect confidentiality and improve the health status of those concerned.173

[10.47]  The informed consent of patients to healthcare or treatment must be respected; and where a particular act of care, such as non-therapeutic sterilisation (a vasectomy), is being contemplated for an adult lacking capacity to consent to the procedure, it is vital to consider the best interests of a person who does not have the mental capacity to consent, after having taken into account all the circumstances.174 As regards women’s right to health, acceptable health services must ensure that ‘a woman gives her fully informed consent, respects her dignity, guarantees her confidentiality and is sensitive to her needs and perspectives’.175 In Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, a Hungarian woman of Roma origin alleged that she had been coercively sterilised.176 She had gone into labour and was taken to hospital. Upon examination, it was found that the foetus had died and a Caesarean section was urgently needed. On the operating table, she was asked to sign a form consenting to the Caesarean section, as well as a ‘barely legible note’, handwritten by the doctor, giving permission for sterilisation. The reference to ‘sterilisation’ was in a language that she did not understand. In her application to the CEDAW Committee, she alleged that this conduct constituted a violation of her right to appropriate healthcare services, as well as her right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of her children. The Committee decided that Hungary had failed to provide Szijjarto with appropriate information and advice on family planning, and to ensure that she had given her fully informed consent to the operation, and it recommended that the Government provide the applicant with appropriate compensation.177 D. Implementation of the Right to Health Through Policies and Other Operational Interventions [10.48]  Human rights-based approaches to ESC rights, including health, focus on applying general human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, ­accountability, 173 

CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 12(c). See, eg, A NHS Trust v DE (Appearing by his Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) and Others [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam), judgment of 16 August 2013, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/ de-judgment-16082013/. 175  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, above n 147, para 22. 176  Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, Communication no 4/2004, UN Doc CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004 (29 August 2006) UN Doc A/61/38 (2006) annex VIII at 366; (2007) 14 IHRR 997. 177  Ibid. The Committee stated in para 11.3 that ‘The Committee also takes note of the unchallenged fact that the author enquired of the doctor when it would be safe to conceive again, clearly indicating that she was unaware of the consequences of sterilization. According to article 12 of the Convention, States parties shall “ensure to women appropriate services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal period”. The Committee explained in its general recommendation No 24 on women and health that “[A]cceptable services are those that are delivered in a way that ensures that a woman gives her fully informed consent, respects her dignity …” The Committee further stated that “States parties should not permit forms of coercion, such as non-consensual sterilization … that violate women’s rights to informed consent and dignity”. The Committee considers in the present case that the State party has not ensured that the author gave her fully informed consent to be sterilized and that consequently the rights of the author under article 12 were violated.’ 174 

State Obligations

 531

participation, transparency, empowerment, sustainability and international assistance,178 as well as norms and obligations associated with particular human rights relevant to a given or programme: A human rights-based approach identifies rights-holders and their entitlements and corresponding duty-bearers and their obligations, and promotes strengthening the capacities of both rights-holders to make their claims and duty-bearers to meet their obligations.179

[10.49]  Such an approach may also focus on identifying specific, practical operational measures that are required by human rights standards and principles in order for states to meet their human rights obligations. For example, the following measures are required with respect to family planning: National and sub-national plans for sexual and reproductive health education, information, and services, including family planning Design plans, through a participatory process, to provide universal access (not only for married but also for unmarried people, adolescents, others marginalised by income, occupation, or other factors); to encompass all appropriate public, private, national, and international actors; and to include certain features, such as objectives and how they are to be achieved, timeframes, a detailed budget, financing, reporting, indicators, and benchmark measures. Removal of legal and regulatory barriers Remove barriers that impede access to sexual and reproductive health education, information, and services, including family planning, particularly by disadvantaged groups. Commodities Make available the widest feasible range of safe and effective modern contraceptives, including emergency contraception, as enumerated in a national List of Essential Medicines based on the WHO Model List and delivered through all appropriate public and private channels. Community-based and clinic-based health workers Train adequate numbers of health workers who are skilled and supervised to provide good quality sexual and reproductive health services, including full and accurate contraceptive information and modern contraceptives, using the local language and exercising respect for privacy, confidentiality, diversity, and other basic ethical and human rights values. Health facilities Provide health facilities that are clean, provide seating and privacy for user–provider interaction, are adequately stocked and equipped, adhere to published hours of services, and inform users of their rights. Financial access Provide state subsidies and community insurance schemes to allow access for people who would not otherwise be able to afford services.

178 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Preventable Maternal Mortality and Morbidity and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/14/39, 16 April 2010. 179  Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Guidance on the Application of a Human Rights-based Approach to the Implementation of Policies and Programmes to reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, UN Doc A/HRC/21/22, 2 July 2012.

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Monitoring and accountability Establish mechanisms that provide effective, accessible, transparent, and continuous review of the quality of services; assess progress toward equitable access and other objectives; and check that the commitments of all stakeholders are met.180

V.  LEVELS OF OBLIGATIONS [10.50]  As observed in chapter one, all human rights, including the right to health, impose three types or levels of obligations on states: the obligations to ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’.181 In turn, the obligation to fulfil contains obligations to ‘facilitate’, ‘provide’ and ‘promote’.182 A state’s failure, whether of commission or omission, or unwillingness to comply with the obligations to respect, protect or fulfil, amounts to a violation.183 Each of these levels of obligations extends to healthcare and the underlying determinants of health, as examined below. A.  Obligation to Respect the Right to Health [10.51]  The obligation to respect the right to health requires states to refrain from all acts that negatively impact, directly or indirectly, upon the right to health. States are obliged to respect equal access to available health facilities and not to impede individuals or groups in their access to existing health facilities. In particular, states are under an obligation to respect the right to health by, inter alia, refraining from a number of practices that negatively impact on the right. For example, states must refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all individuals and groups to preventive, curative and palliative health services on prohibited grounds.184 As shown in chapter seven, states are obliged in particular to refrain from generally discriminating against women and girls,185 and from imposing discriminatory practices relating to women’s health

180  J Cottingham, A Germain, and P Hunt, ‘Use of Human Rights to Meet the Unmet Need for Family Planning’ (2012) 380 (9837) The Lancet 172, 177 (footnotes omitted). 181  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 33–7; Toebes, above n 85, 311–42. 182  The CESCR has applied this typology in its General Comments. In General Comments 12 (adequate food) and 13 (education), the obligation to fulfil was interpreted to incorporate obligations to facilitate and to provide. In General Comment 14, above n 15, the obligation to fulfil was understood to incorporate an additional obligation to promote because of the critical importance of health promotion in the work of the WHO and elsewhere. 183 See CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 47–52; A Chapman, ‘Conceptualising the Right to Health: A Violations Approach’ (1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 389; A Chapman, ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23; A Chapman, ‘Monitoring Women’s Right to Health under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1157; A Chapman, ‘A Human Rights Approach to Health Care Reform’ in A Chapman (ed), Health Care Reform: A Human Rights Approach (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1994) 149. 184  See ch 2, section III. 185  CESCR, Concluding Observations, Algeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.71 (30 November 2001) paras 14 and 37; Cameroon, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.40 (8 December 1999) paras 13–14 and 3134; Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.45 (23 May 2002) paras 17, 25 and 26; Croatia, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.73 (30 November 2001) paras 9, 13, 20 and 24; Egypt, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000) paras 13, 16, 17, 20 and 27;

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status and needs,186 such as limiting access to contraceptives, sterilising a woman ­without her informed consent,187 and other means of maintaining sexual and reproductive health for women, censoring, withholding or intentionally misrepresenting health-related information for women, including sexual education and information, as well as from preventing women’s participation in health-related matters.188 [10.52]  States must also refrain from the following acts: prohibiting or impeding traditional preventive healthcare and medicines, marketing unsafe drugs, applying coercive medical treatments,189 and limiting access to means of maintaining sexual and reproductive health such as access to contraceptives.190 In addition, states are obliged to refrain from censoring or withholding health-related information, preventing people’s participation in health-related matters and limiting access to health services as a punitive measure.191 They also should not carry out, or give support to, acts that negatively impact upon human health, such as activities unlawfully polluting air, water and soil,192 for example through inappropriate disposal of industrial waste from stateowned facilities, or from using or testing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, if such testing results in the release of substances harmful to human health.193

Jamaica, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.75 (30 November 2001) para 8, in which the Committee was ‘concerned about the existence of laws which are discriminatory on the basis of sex (mostly against women …)’; Mauritius, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/18 (7 October 1996) paras 237 and 242; Iraq, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.17 (12 December 1997) paras 14, 29 and 30; Hong Kong, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.10 (6 December 1996) paras 15 and 36; Iran, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/7 (9 June 1993) para 6, in which the Committee found that the situations in Iran, ‘in which women are not permitted to study engineering, agriculture, mining or metallurgy or to become magistrates; in which they are excluded from a very large number of specific subjects at university level; and in which they need their husbands’ permission to work or travel abroad; to be incompatible with the obligations undertaken by the State party under the Covenant’; Morocco, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.55 (1 December 2000) para 16, where the Committee expressed concern about ‘persisting patterns of discrimination against women in nation legislation’; Nigeria, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.23 (13 May 1998) paras 14, 21 and 39, in which the Committee expressed ‘its concern that women suffer discrimination’, condemned ‘the continuing existence of legal provisions which permit the beating (“chastisement”) of women by their husbands’ and called on the Government ‘to cease … discrimination against women’; Senegal, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.62 (24 September 2001) paras 15 and 35; Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.63 (24 September 2001) paras 14 and 31; Togo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.61 (21 May 2001) paras 12, 15 and 20; Sudan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.48 (1 September 2000) paras 20, 24 and 34, in which the Committee stated it was ‘gravely concerned about the occurrence of flagellation or lashing of women for wearing allegedly indecent dress or for being out in the street after dusk, on the basis of the Public Order Act of 1996’; Zimbabwe, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.12 (20 May 1997) paras 10, 16 and 17. 186 

See eg CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, above n 147; Hayden, above n 147. Szijjarto v Hungary, above n 16. 188  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 34. 189  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (5 June 2002) paras 15 and 22. Coercive medical treatment is only justified on an exceptional basis for the treatment of mental illness or the prevention and control of communicable diseases, subject to applicable international standards, such as the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care. See The Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, GA res 46/119, A/RES/46/119, (17 December 1991). 190  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 34. 191  Ibid, para 34; Physicians for Human Rights, Under the Gun: Ongoing Assaults on Bahrain’s Health System (Cambridge, Physicians for Human Rights, 2012) 5. 192 M Willis, ‘Economic Development, Environmental Protection, and the Right to Health’ (1996) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 195. 193 ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, General List no 93 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge C Weeramantry), available at http://www.icj-cij.org. 187 

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[10.53]  Furthermore, to respect the right to health, states should refrain from ­deporting individuals living with HIV/AIDS to states where they may not be able to receive treatment, if their illness has reached an advanced or terminal stage.194 The case of D v United Kingdom concerned the proposed deportation by the British authorities of a man dying from AIDS to St Kitts, his country of origin.195 D had been diagnosed with HIV while in a British prison. He applied for permission to remain in the UK after the end of his prison sentence on compassionate grounds. His deportation to St Kitts would entail a loss of the medical treatment he was receiving. The ECtHR noted that the applicant was in the advanced stages of AIDS, and found that ‘the abrupt withdrawal of medical treatment caused by the deportation of D to St Kitts would expose him to a real risk of dying under most distressing circumstances and would thus amount to inhuman treatment’.196 The Court observed that an abrupt withdrawal of the care facilities provided in the respondent state, together with the predictable lack of adequate facilities, as well as of any form of moral or social support in the receiving country, would hasten the applicant’s death and subject him to acute mental and physical suffering. In view of those very exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind the critical stage which the applicant’s fatal illness had reached, and given the compelling humanitarian considerations at stake, the implementation of the decision to remove him to St Kitts would amount to inhuman treatment by the respondent state. The Court ordered that D should not be deported. [10.54]  However, in later cases the Court/Commission has been reluctant to find a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, even where the facts could justify finding a violation.197 While the reason is not always explicitly stated, it appears to be based on the allegation that finding a breach of Article 3 in cases involving claims to healthcare in other states, would open up the floodgates to medical immigration and make Europe vulnerable to becoming the ‘sick-bay’ of the world. The case of N v The United Kingdom198 provides a good example. The applicant, a female Ugandan national, then aged 23, who was HIV positive, arrived on a flight from Entebbe, Uganda, to the United Kingdom on 28 March 1998 under an assumed name. On the following day, seriously ill, she was admitted to hospital where she was diagnosed HIV positive with severe damage to the immune system (she had a CD4 count of 10; that of a healthy person is over 500) and disseminated tuberculosis. Following a long initial stay in hospital she developed a second AIDS-defining illness, Kaposi’s sarcoma, a particularly aggressive form of cancer. She was readmitted to hospital and started a prolonged course of

In 2013 the UN Security Council affirmed that ‘the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law’ and ‘a threat to international peace and security’. See UN Security Council res 2118 (2013). 194  See, eg, Arcila Henao v The Netherlands, App no 13669/03 (ECtHR, 24 June 2003), available at http:// cmiskp.echr.coe.int/. 195  D v United Kingdom, App 30240/96, (ECtHR, 2 May 1997), (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 196  Ibid, para 53. 197 See, eg, BB v France, App no 30930/96, Reports 1998-VI; Karara v Finland, App No 40900/98, (­Commission decision, 29 May 1998); SCC v Sweden (dec), App no 46553/99 (ECtHR, 15 February 2000); Bensaid v the United Kingdom, App No 44599/98, ECHR 2001-I; Arcila Henao v The Netherlands (dec), App no 13669/03 (ECtHR, 24 June 2003); Ndangoya v Sweden (dec), App No 17868/03 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004); and Amegnigan v The Netherlands (dec), App no 25629/04 (ECtHR, 25 November 2004). 198  N v The United Kingdom, App no 26565/05 (ECtHR, 27 May 2008).

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 535

chemotherapy. By 2002, after some years of treatment with anti-retroviral drugs and many setbacks, her CD count had risen to 414 and she was well. In O ­ ctober 2002, the date of the latest medical evidence in the case, she was described by Dr Meadway as ‘stable and free of any significant illness’ and, were she to remain in the UK, ‘likely to remain well for decades’. Were she to be returned to Uganda, however, her prospects would deteriorate dramatically. In this event it was Dr Meadway’s view that the formulation of anti-retroviral drugs Ms N is currently taking are not available in Uganda. Ms N’s HIV virus already has some resistance and in the future she will require a change of anti-retrovirals which is likely to include other drugs not available in Uganda. If she returns to Uganda although anti-retrovirals are available in parts of the country she would not have the full treatment required and would suffer ill-health, pain, discomfort and an early death as a result.

By an ‘early death’ it appears that Dr Meadway was suggesting death within a year, or at most two. Dr Larbalestier, a consultant physician, also reporting in October 2002, said ‘I have no doubt at all that if she is forced to return to Uganda her life span will be dramatically shortened from potentially decades of high quality life to almost certainly less than 2 years’. In these circumstances, the applicant alleged that if she were returned to Uganda she would not have access to the medical treatment she required, and that this would give rise to violations of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. [10.55]  Even on such facts, the Court held (by 14:3) that there would be no violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in the event of the applicant’s being removed to Uganda, because the applicant’s case did not disclose very exceptional circumstances, such as in D v The United Kingdom.199 The Court accepted that the quality of the applicant’s life, and her life expectancy, would be affected if she were returned to Uganda. The applicant was not, however, at the relevant time, critically ill. The rapidity of the deterioration that she would suffer and the extent to which she would be able to obtain access to medical treatment, support and care, including help from relatives, must involve a certain degree of speculation, particularly in view of the constantly evolving situation as regards the treatment of HIV and AIDS worldwide.200 In a joint dissenting opinion, Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann found that there were substantial grounds to believe that the applicant faced a real risk of prohibited treatment (under Article 3 of the ECHR) in the country of proposed removal, given that ‘in the event of removal to Uganda the applicant will face an early death after a period of acute physical and mental suffering’.201 B.  Obligation to Protect the Right to Health [10.56]  The obligation to protect the right to health requires states to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the right. In order to protect the right to health effectively, they are obliged to adopt legislation or other measures (discussed in chapters two, four and five) to ensure equal access to healthcare and health-related

199  200  201 

Above n 195. N v The United Kingdom, above n 198, para 50. Ibid, para 23.

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services provided by third parties; to ensure that privatisation of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services; to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties; and to ensure that medical practitioners and other health professionals meet appropriate standards of education, skill and ethical codes of conduct.202 In Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece,203 the European Committee of Social Rights held that in order to fulfil the right to health obligations, national authorities must engage in stronger regulatory practices to protect air quality, to prevent air pollution at local level and to help to reduce it on a global scale, including the regulation of private actors. To protect patients against medical negligence, states should adopt ‘regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives’ and ‘an effective independent judicial system … so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable’.204 This may be achieved by affording victims a remedy in the civil courts (such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision to be obtained), either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors or other health professionals concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress.205 In addition, disciplinary measures may be envisaged. [10.57]  States are also obliged to take legislative and other measures to protect individuals and groups from health infringements by third parties. To comply with this obligation, they have to take measures to protect individuals and groups from harmful social or traditional practices that interfere with the right to health. By way of example, states must take measures to prevent third parties from coercing women/girl children to undergo traditional practices, such as FGM,206 and other harmful practices, including early marriage and dowry, early pregnancy, adolescent child-bearing, taboos and practices preventing women from controlling their own fertility, nutritional taboos and differential feeding patterns, traditional birth practices, female infanticide and the preference for male children.207 Similarly, the obligation to protect requires states to discourage the production, marketing and consumption of tobacco,208 alcohol and harmful drugs.209 In addition, states must take measures to protect all vulnerable or 202 

CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 35. Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece, Complaint no 30/2005 (adopted 6 December 2006) para 203 (European Committee of Social Rights). 204  Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, App no 32967/96 (ECtHR, 17 January 2002) para 49. 205  Ibid, para 51. 206  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 35; R Cook, Women’s Health and Human Rights (Geneva, WHO, 1994) 8–9. The practice of FGM may lead to urinary and reproductive tract infections that result in infertility, menstrual disorders and difficulties in childbirth. 207  See H Embarek Warzazi, Reports of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-commission on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and the Children, UN Docs E/CN.4/1986/42 (4 ­February 1986); E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/42 (21 August 1989) and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/42/ Add.1 (22 August 1989) and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/6 (5 July 1991); and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/27 (4 July 2001). See also OHCHR, Fact Sheet No 23: Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet23en.pdf. 208  World Bank, World Development Report 1993, above n 20, 3, observed that some 1 million people worldwide die each year from tobacco-related heart disease and cancers. 209  CRC Committee, General Comment 4, above n 142, para 18. 203 

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marginalised groups in society, in particular women, children, adolescents and older persons, in the light of gender-based expressions of violence.210 They should also protect people’s access to health-related information and services from interference or limitation by third parties.211 [10.58]  States are also obliged to adopt legislation or other measures to protect against third-party interference with the underlying determinants of health. This requires them, for example, to control the environmental impact of the activities of transnational corporations.212 In Ratlam Municipality Council v Vardi Chand, the Supreme Court of India held that municipalities had a duty to protect the environment in the interests of public health.213 The Court found that ‘pollutants being discharged by big factories … [are] a challenge to the social justice component of the rule of law’; and that the preservation of public health, premised on the decency and dignity of individuals, was a non-negotiable facet of human rights requiring state action. C.  Obligation to Fulfil the Right to Health [10.59]  The obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures to facilitate (eg through the appropriate training of doctors and other medical personnel, and the provision of a sufficient number of hospitals, clinics and other health-related facilities), promote (eg medical research and health education, as well as information campaigns) or provide (in case of inability for reasons beyond control of individuals or groups to realise the right to health by the means at their disposal) healthcare and access to the underlying determinants of health.214 Thus, a state is responsible for the proper medical care of prisoners215 and others who come into the state’s care,216 including provision of medical assistance to the wounded during military operations.217 Accessibility to available health services provided by the state must not be denied in an emergency, lifethreatening situation because of an individual’s inability to pay in advance for health services.218 Provision of healthcare services is particularly essential for the poorer sections of the population. Thus, the CESCR has stressed that while there is no reason that the private sector should not be fully involved in the provision of health services, the Committee emphasises that such an approach does not in any way relieve the Government of its Covenant-based obligations to use all available means to promote access to health care services, particularly for the poorer segments of the population.219 210 

CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 35. Ibid, para 35. 212  Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003) paras 1 and 14. 213  Ratlam Municipality Council v Vardi Chand, AIR 1980 SC 1622. See also Supreme Court of ­Bangladesh, Farooque v Government of Bangladesh, WP 891 of 1994 (15 July 2001). 214  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, paras 36–37; CRC Committee, General Comment 4, above n 142, paras 19–26, 32. 215  Gagiu v Romania, App no 63258/00 (ECtHR, 24 February 2009). 216  Mojsiejew v Poland, App no 11818/02 (ECtHR, 24 March 2009). 217  Varnava and Others v Turkey, Apps nos 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 (ECtHR, 18 September 2009) para 185. 218  Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v Turkey, App no 13423/09 (ECtHR, 9 April 2013) paras 88–97. 219  CESCR, Concluding Observations, Philippines, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/7 (7 June 1995) para 20. 211 

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In this respect, the governmental obligation to promote the right to health is vital because, by its entrepreneurial nature, private actors/NSAs in the field of health220 may prove difficult to control in practice, since their concern may be more with profits than the human rights impact of their activities.221 [10.60]  In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, mental health advocates witnessed inhuman treatment of patients in the psychiatric unit of the Royal Victoria Hospital in the Gambia.222 They submitted a complaint to the African Commission on behalf of the patients detained in the unit. The principal legislation governing mental health in the Gambia was the Lunatics Detention Act, enacted in 1917, and the last amendment to this Act was effected in 1964. The complaint pointed out that, from the human rights perspective, this colonial legislation was seriously deficient in numerous respects: amongst other things, there were no provisions and requirements establishing safeguards during the diagnosis, certification and detention of the patient. The Commission held that the legislation was ‘lacking in terms of therapeutic objectives as well as provision of matching resources and programmes of treatment of persons with mental disabilities’.223 It then concluded that ‘[p]ersons with mental illnesses should never be denied their right to proper health care, which is crucial for their survival and their assimilation into and acceptance by the wider society’.224 The African Commission strongly urged the Government of the Gambia: (a) to repeal the Lunatics Detention Act and replace it as soon as possible with a new legislative regime for mental health in the Gambia compatible with the African Charter and international standards and norms for the protection of mentally ill or disabled persons; (b) pending repeal and replacement of the Act, to create an expert body to review the cases of all persons detained under the Lunatics Detention Act and make appropriate recommendations for their treatment or release; (c) to provide adequate medical and material care for persons suffering from mental health problems in the territory of the Gambia.

VI.  MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH [10.61]  In chapter two it was noted that states have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights ­enumerated in the ICESCR, including essential primary healthcare and the underlying determinants of health, in order to comply with the Covenant obligations. In the context of health, Chapman has referred to the minimum core obligation as a ‘floor’ 220  Such as individual practitioners, groups of practitioners, or facilities such as clinics, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals or other private institutions. 221  S Malby, ‘Education and Health: A Role for Private Actors in Meeting Human Rights Obligations?’ (2002) 6(3) The International Journal of Human Rights 1, 14. 222  Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, Communication no 241/2001, 16th Annual Activity Report, (2003) AHRLR 96. 223  Ibid, para 83. 224  Ibid, para 85. This decision was relied on by the Constitutional Court of Uganda in Centre for Health, Human Rights & Development v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 64 of 2011 [2015] UGCC 12 (13 October 2015).

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below which health conditions and services should not be permitted to fall.225 This applies at all times, irrespective of the availability of resources or any other factors and difficulties. As regards the minimum core content of the right to health, the Health for All and Primary Health Care strategies of the WHO provide that ‘there is a health baseline [core health obligations] below which no individuals in any country should find themselves’.226 What, more precisely, are these core obligations? In the view of the CESCR, the core obligations in respect of health include at least the following obligations (of conduct): (a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a nondiscriminatory­basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised groups; (b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone; (c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water; (d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; (e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; (f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include methods, such as right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalised groups.227

[10.62]  The emphasis on the core obligations of the right to health is, on the one hand, focused on access to, and equitable distribution of, health facilities on a nondiscriminatory­basis, provision of essential drugs and implementing a national public health strategy and plan of action. On the other hand, it centres on access to minimum essential food, safe and potable water, and housing. It thus combines both healthcare and the underlying determinants of health. The CESCR also confirmed that the following are obligations of ‘comparable priority’, meaning that after achieving the minimum core obligations (above), states are obliged to comply with these obligations: (a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child health care [including implementing policies and programmes to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity in accordance with human rights standards];228 (b) To provide immunisation against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community; (c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases;

225  A Chapman, ‘The Right to Health: Conceptualising a Minimum Core Content’, Working Paper for the Day of General Discussion on the Right to Health, 6 December 1993, CESCR, 9th Session, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/WP.24. 226 WHO, Primary Health Care: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, ­Alma-Ata, USSR, 6–12 September 1978, Health for All Series No 1, 1978, ch 3, para 50. 227  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 43. 228  See UNHCHR, Technical Guidance on the Application of a Human Rights-based Approach to the Implementation of Policies and Programmes to Reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, UN Doc A/HRC/21/22 (2 July 2012).

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(d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them; (e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on health and human rights.229

[10.63]  The foregoing lists of elements constituting core and ‘comparable’ obligations in respect of health are broad but notably omit the inclusion of freedom from serious environmental health threats such as pollution. It is submitted that this should be an additional aspect of the core content of the right to health. [10.64]  The language used by the CESCR in respect of core obligations of the right to health requires states to ‘ensure’ or to ‘provide’. This calls for more positive obligations. In view of the limited available resources and high debt burdens,230 together with inadequate infrastructure and a lack of skilled health personnel, it is doubtful, however, whether these cores can be fully implemented or fulfilled immediately in developing states (particularly the least-developed) without considerable targeted international assistance and cooperation. As noted in chapter two, it is essential to stress that other states and other actors in position to assist can play a key role in assisting developing states to fulfil core obligations of the right to health.231 Such international assistance should be carefully targeted to the minimum core obligations to enhance the realisation of the right to health. [10.65]  It is essential to stress that after realisation of the core obligations of the right to health, there remains an obligation to take effective steps towards progressive realisation of the remainder of the right. Similarly, deliberately ‘retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to health are not permissible’,232 unless after the most careful consideration of all alternatives they are ‘fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources’.233

VII.  JUSTICIABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH A.  General Overview [10.66]  The term ‘justiciability’, as used here, refers to the possibility of aggrieved individuals or groups raising claims involving alleged violations of the right to health for determination/review before domestic judicial or quasi-judicial organs. The term also refers to the right to bring cases concerning violations before international judicial or quasi-judicial organs. It has long been contended that ESC rights, as a category, 229 

CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 44. The World Health Report 1998, above n 67, 115. 231  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 45. The Commission on Human Rights res 2002/31, para 2, ‘Calls upon the international community to continue to assist the developing countries in promoting the full realisation of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including through financial and technical support as well as training of personnel.’ 232  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 32. 233  CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, Annex III at 86 (1991) para 9; General Comment 14, above n 15, para 32. 230 WHO,

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are inherently ‘non-justiciable’, meaning in this context that they are not suitable for or open to judicial enforcement or handling by courts or similar institutions, for two main reasons. [10.67] First, it is claimed that such rights are resource-intensive and ‘costly’ in nature (thereby raising issues of public finance and policy), and therefore likely to impose uncontrollable financial burdens upon states.234 It is argued that to the extent that such cases will involve public spending priorities on scarce resources, such decisions should remain the exclusive domain of the executive and legislature.235 As noted in chapter two, ESC rights are traditionally perceived as ‘positive’ (or ‘abstract’) rights, in that states are required to take action to provide them, and are therefore seen as costly, progressive and non-justiciable.236 This view is in contrast with civil and political rights, traditionally conceptualised as ‘negative’ (or ‘concrete/real’) rights, demanding freedom from the arbitrary interference of the state.237 This classical conception led to the conclusion that civil and political rights (as opposed to ESC rights) are cost-free, in that it does not cost the state anything to refrain from non-interference, and thus, the argument goes, civil and political rights can be realised immediately, which in turn renders them justiciable. [10.68] Secondly, it has been asserted that ESC rights (like health) are not justiciable due to their general and vague formulation and lack of precise definition or specificity.238 In this regard, it is argued that ESC rights are only ‘ideals’, ‘endeavours’ or ‘programmatic guidelines for government policies’/‘political goals’, as opposed to being legally binding human rights.239 It is partly for this reason that the US has at 234 See, eg, C Sunstein, ‘Against Positive Rights’ (1993) 2(1) East European Constitutional Review 35; C Fabre, ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 263, 280–83; M Mureinik, ‘Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 South African Journal of Human Rights 465. 235 Sunstein, above n 234. 236 See C Scott, ‘The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769, 833. Scott notes that ESC rights have been characterised as ‘progressive’, ‘non-justiciable’ and ‘aspirations or goals’, as distinct from civil and political rights, which are characterised as ‘immediate’, ‘justiciable’ and ‘real or legal rights’. 237 D McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 11. 238 K Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the ICESCR: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (Antwerp, Intersentia, 1999) 55, observes that ‘[t]he alleged non-justiciability in the ICESCR is generally based on two main features: the vagueness of formulation of economic, social and cultural rights contained in the Covenant; and as a result, their opaque normative contents’. See also P Alston, ‘No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic Rights Covenant’, in A Eide and J Helgesen (eds), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World: Fifty Years since the Four Freedoms Address. Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1991), 79, 86, who notes that ‘It is generally agreed that the major shortcoming of the existing international arrangements for the promotion of respect for economic rights is the vagueness of many of the rights as formulated in the Covenant [except Arts 6–9] and the resulting lack in the clarity as to their normative implications.’ 239 See, eg, M Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London, Bodley Head, 1973); E Vierdag, ‘The Nature of Rights Granted by the ICESCR’ (1978) (9) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69; C Orwin and T Pangle, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights’ in MF Plattner (ed), Human Rights in Our Time—Essays in Memory of Victor Baras (London, Westview Press, 1984) 1; R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 25; T Melish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Manual for Presenting Claims (Yale, Yale Law School, 2002) 33; MJ Dennis and DP Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health’ (2004) 98(3) American Journal of International Law 462.

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present not ratified or acceded to the ICESCR,240 despite ratification of the ICCPR in 1993. As noted in chapter five, the CESCR found the position of UK, that the ‘provisions of the Covenant … constitute principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations’, to be ‘disturbing’.241 The effect of such views is that (quasi) judicial bodies cannot investigate alleged violations, and accordingly cannot provide remedies in the event of violation of ESC rights. [10.69]  However, there is nothing inherent in the nature of ESC rights such as health that makes them unenforceable by (quasi) judicial process.242 The reasons advanced above are overstated for a variety of reasons. First, all human rights, as noted in chapter one, have a negative action component requiring few to no resources (the obligation to respect), a regulatory action component requiring some resources (the obligation to protect) and a positive action component requiring, to varying degrees, significant resources (the obligation to fulfil), leading to budgetary implications.243 In all societies, ‘negative rights’ are also protected through the apparatus of state regulation by means of legislation, police forces and related controls, and therefore cannot be said to be entirely cost-free.244 Accordingly the realisation of all human rights requires the allocation of resources.245 [10.70]  The UN HRC has confirmed that all ICCPR rights impose negative duties of forbearance and positive duties of performance on states parties.246 Thus, for example, the Article 10(1) guarantee of humane treatment in detention necessitates the construction of a sufficient number of detention centres to prevent overcrowding.247 Similarly, the Article 14(1) right to a fair trial necessitates provision of independent organs and a system for the administration of justice,248 while the Article 25(b) right to vote involves the provision of an apparatus to ensure fair elections.249 Moreover, even

240  P Alston, ‘US Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an entirely New Strategy’ (1990) 84(2) American Journal of International Law 365; F Deale, ‘The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the United States and Prospects for their Creation and Renewal’ (2000) 43 Howard Law Journal 281. 241  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, E/C.12/1/Add.19 (4 December 1997) para 10. 242  See E Kotey, ‘Some Fallacies about Rights: Of Indivisibility, Priorities and Justiciability’ in International Commission of Jurists and African Development Bank (eds), Report of Regional Seminar on ESCR (Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1999) 27; FI Michelman, ‘The Constitution, Social rights, and Liberal Political Justification’ (2003) 1(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 13. 243 See S Holmes and CR Sustein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York, WW Norton & Co, 1999) ch 1. 244  Holmes and Sustein, above n 243, 37–48. 245  J Donnelly, International Human Rights, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1998) 25, noted that ‘All human rights, however, require both positive action and restraint by the state if they are to be effectively implemented. Some rights, of course, are relatively positive. Others are relatively negative. But this distinction does not correspond to the division between civil and political rights and economic and social rights.’ P Alston and G Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the ICESCR’ (1987) 8  Human Rights Quarterly 156, 172, note that ‘the full realisation of civil and political rights is heavily dependent both on the availability of resources and the development of the necessary societal structures’. 246 M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl, NP Engel, 1993) xviii. 247  S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 34. 248  See International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Local Perspectives: Foreign Aid to the Justice Sector (Geneva, ICHRP, 2000). 249 Joseph et al, above n 247, 34.

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the effective implementation of the right to non-discrimination often requires extensive positive state actions to realise the underlying value of equality, and this equally applies to procedural rights such as due process.250 Thus, the realisation of many aspects of civil and political rights requires resources, but this does not render such rights unjusticiable. [10.71]  It is submitted, accordingly, that rights falling in the category of ESC rights (such as health) can be justiciable.251 As shown in chapter five, there have been cases concerning the right to health before courts or tribunals at the national level. Some cases have also been examined before regional human rights bodies, which indicate that these rights are indeed justiciable in practice.252 Accordingly, justiciability, as a review mechanism for ensuring compliance with human rights, is essential to the attainment of all human rights.253 Unless supported by some form of accessible, transparent and effective accountability, human rights run a risk of becoming mere window dressing. [10.72]  In relation to the vagueness of the obligations arising from ESC rights, including health, it should be recalled that during the Cold War, such rights were neglected by international organisations and Western states in favour of civil and political rights.254 As a result, while the scope of civil and political rights was clarified and developed, ESC rights lacked this advantage. It has to be noted, however, that ESC rights, like civil and political rights, can be given relatively specific content, so that (quasi) judicial organs are able to assess the extent to which the state and other actors respect, protect and fulfil their human rights obligations.255 As shown above, the right to health (like other ESC rights) has content that can form the basis for judicial enforcement.256 Besides, vagueness is not only confined to the rights falling in the category of ESC rights but extends to civil and political rights too. Even then, vagueness is ‘not a rigid and static given but can be diminished by means of interpretation’.257 This process of clarification of the content of human rights is an ongoing and dynamic one.258 Indeed, the CESCR has affirmed the view that there is no Covenant right which could not, in the great majority of systems, be considered to possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions. … The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two

250  J Donnelly, ‘The Social Construction of International Human Rights’ in T Dunne and NJ Wheeler (eds), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) 87. 251  See eg KG Young and J Lemaitre, ‘Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 179. 252  See, eg, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights(CESR) v Nigeria, Communication no 155/96, 15th Annual Activity Report, (2001) AHRLR 60. 253  See MK Addo, ‘Justiciability Re-examined’ in R Beddard and DM Hill (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Progress and Achievement (London, Macmillan, 1992) 93, 104; J Hulston, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2002) 6(4) International Journal of Human Rights 29. 254  M Mutua, ‘Human Rights Ideology’ (1996) 36 University of Virginia International Law Journal 539. But see DJ Whelan and J Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 908. 255 C Fabre, Social Rights under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (Oxford, Oxford ­University Press, 2000) ch 5. 256  See also generally Brand and Russell (eds), above n 26. 257  Arambulo, above n 238, 97. 258  Hulston, above n 253, 42.

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sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.259

[10.73]  In affirming the principle of interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, the CESCR has stated clearly that ‘all economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable’.260 Indeed in many respects, ESC rights such as health261 are described with sufficient precision and clarity (even within the ICESCR) as to be justiciable.262 However, there are some elements, as with the case of civil and political rights, that need to be spelled out in more detail in terms of jurisprudence and national legislation, and tailored to the specific facts, national context, needs and resources.263 [10.74]  As a useful starting point, justiciability may extend immediately, although not exclusively, to those aspects of ESC rights that are not subject to progressive realisation (eg to ‘minimum core obligations’), such as the right to non-discrimination in access to available health facilities, the right to emergency medical care or freedom from interference with one’s health.264 Breach of the core governmental obligations stemming from these rights can be justiciable.265 As mentioned above, the CESCR has expressed ‘concern’ about, and indicated that it ‘disagrees’ with, the position that the rights under the ICESCR (including the right to health) ‘constitute principles and programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations that are justiciable’.266 It has also expressed ‘concern’ about the view that ‘some economic, social and cultural rights are not justiciable’267 but mere ‘policy objectives’,268 and expressed ‘regret’ about the failure of states to translate the rights under the Covenant into justiciable rights in the domestic legal order.269 In this respect, the incorporation in the domestic legal order of international instruments recognising the right to health can significantly enhance justiciability and should be encouraged in all cases.270 Incorporation enables courts to

259  CESCR, General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (1998), para 10. 260  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 24; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.77 (5 June 2002) para 23. 261  See VA Leary, ‘Justiciability and Beyond; Complaint Procedures and the Right to Health’ [December 1995] 55 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 105, 119, noting that ‘there is adequate proof that there is no logical or intrinsic reason to argue against justiciability of the right [to health]’. 262 UNHCHR, Report on the Workshop on the Justiciability of ESC Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/62/ Add.2 (22 March 2001) para 6. 263  Ibid. 264  M Craven, ‘The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in R Burchill, DJ Harris and A Owers (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in United Kingdom Law (Nottingham, University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, 1999) 1, 6. 265  K Tomasevski, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ [December 1995] 55 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 202, 206. 266  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 11; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Switzerland, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.30 (12 March 1998) para 10. 267  CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, E/C.12/1/Add.72 (23 November 2001) para 13. 268  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada UN Doc E/C.12/1993/5 (27 May 1993) para 21; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.31 (4 December 1998) para 52, where the Committee reiterated that ESC rights should not be downgraded to ‘principles and objectives’. 269  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Czech Republic, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.76 (5 June 2002) para 8. 270  CESCR, General Comment 14, above n 15, para 60.

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adjudicate violations of the right to health, or at least its core obligations, by direct reference to the Covenant.271 [10.75]  It has to be emphasised that the concept of justiciability is in itself very fluid and reflects differences in legal traditions and in philosophical views about the relationship between courts and the state in a given place at a given time.272 The content of what is, or is not, justiciable clearly varies over time.273 Furthermore, human rights can still be human rights even when they are not (initially) justiciable in all aspects,274 since what is paramount is the effective protection of the rights in question, be it through courts or through other mechanisms.275 As noted in chapter one, human rights should not necessarily be confused with legal rights, since they precede law and are derived not from law but from the concept of human dignity. Therefore, there is nothing in principle to prevent rights (including ESC rights such as health) being internationally and nationally recognised human rights, even if they may not be considered justiciable. Nonetheless, the development towards justiciable ESC rights on an international, regional or national level is a significant contribution towards the effective protection and enforcement of rights such as health, as it provides an effective way of checking human rights violations by the state and NSAs. As the following cases illustrate, the courts and other bodies can clarify the key concepts relevant to the right to health. B.  Progressive Realisation and Resource Availability [10.76]  The obligation to take steps to the maximum of available resources to achieve progressively the full realisation of the right to health can be, and in some cases has been, subjected to judicial accountability. For example, in South Africa the case of Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign concerned state provision of Nevirapine, an anti-retroviral drug used to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV.276 Applying the concepts of progressive realisation and resource availability, the South African Constitutional Court declared: Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government to devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV.277

271 

Ibid. C Scott and P Macklem, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in the New South African Constitution’ (1992) 144(1) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 17. 273  Ibid. See also Craven, above n 264, 2. 274  Eide, above n 138, 112. But see M Cranston, ‘Human Rights Real or Supposed’ in D Raphael (ed), Political Theory and the Rights of Man (London, Macmillan, 1967) 43, who takes the view that a right necessarily presupposes a remedy—where there is no remedy, there is no right. 275  A Eide, ‘Future Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Europe’ in A Bloed et al (eds), Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1993) 187, 214. 276  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, CCT 8/02, [2002] ZACC 15, 2002 (5) SA 721, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.html. 277  Ibid, para 135. The text of s 27(1) and (2) is set out in ch 5 of this book, s 2(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 272 

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Such a programme must include reasonable measures for counselling and testing ­pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant women on the options open to them to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and making appropriate treatment available to them for such purposes.278 As shown in chapter five, in Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court found, on the facts, that the hospital’s policy and guidelines were reasonable and fairly applied.279 [10.77]  As noted in chapter two, progressive realisation of ESC rights, including the right to health, also entails the prohibition of retrogressive measures. Retrogression was considered by the Constitutional Court of Portugal in Decision no 39/84 of 1984, a case where the Government had attempted to repeal the law that established the National Health Service. The Court found that, once a state fulfils a constitutional obligation, the Constitution protects against retrogression (in this case, the repeal of relevant legislation).280 C.  Immediate Obligations [10.78]  Some aspects of the right to health are not subject to progressive realisation and resource availability, for example equal treatment of men and women regarding access to healthcare and the underlying determinants of health. A state may not argue that it has insufficient resources to provide equal services for men and women, and that for the time being it is thus going to focus on services for men but will progressively make them available to women as the necessary resources become available. As the CESCR has confirmed, the implementation of Article 3, in relation to Article 12 of the ICESCR, requires at a minimum the removal of legal and other obstacles that prevent men and women from accessing and benefiting from healthcare on a basis of equality.281 This includes, inter alia, addressing the ways in which gender roles affect access to determinants of health, such as water and food; the removal of legal restrictions on reproductive health provisions; the prohibition of FGM; and the provision of adequate training for healthcare workers to deal with women’s health issues.282 [10.79]  In addition, provision of emergency treatment has been considered to give rise to immediate obligations that are not subject to resources availability. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court of India held that that ‘a State could not avoid this constitutional obligation [to provide emergency treatment] on account of financial constraints’.283 In this case, a man fell from a train and suffered serious head trauma. He was refused treatment at six successive state

278 

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, above n 276, para 135. Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu Natal [1998] 1 SA 765. See also Mathew Okwanda v ­Minister of Health and Medical Services and 3 others, Petition no 94 of 2012 (High Court at Nairobi, 17 May 2013). 280  Decision no 39/84 (Constitutional Court of Portugal, 11 April 1984). 281  CESCR, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All ­Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/3 (2005), para 29. 282  Ibid. 283  Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426, (1996) 4 SCC 37, (1996) SCJ 25, 29. 279 

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hospitals either because the hospitals had inadequate medical facilities, or because they did not have a vacant bed or trauma and neurological services. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether inadequate medical facilities for emergency treatment constituted a denial of the right to life. The Supreme Court declared that the right to life enshrined in the Indian Constitution (Article 21) imposes an obligation on the state to safeguard the right to life of every person, and that preservation of human life is of paramount importance. This obligation on the state stands irrespective of constraints imposed by lack of financial resources. The Supreme Court stated that denial of timely medical treatment necessary to preserve human life in governmentowned hospitals is a violation of this right. It found that it was the duty of a state to ensure that medical facilities for emergency treatment were adequately available. It required the state to ensure that primary health centres were equipped to provide immediate stabilising treatment for serious injuries and emergencies. In addition, the Supreme Court ordered the state to increase the number of specialist and regional clinics around the country available to treat serious injuries, and to create a centralised communication system among state hospitals so that patients could be transported immediately to the facilities where space was available. D.  Available, Accessible, Acceptable and of Good Quality [10.80]  As shown above, health facilities, goods and services must be available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality. All these aspects of the right to health are justiciable. A state, for example, should not discriminate against vulnerable groups, such as persons with disabilities, undocumented immigrants and children, regarding access to healthcare. For example, in Eldrige v British Columbia (Attorney General),284 the appellants, Robin Eldridge and Linda Warren, were born deaf. They alleged that the absence of sign language interpretation in the provision of healthcare subjected them to increased risk of misdiagnosis and ineffective treatment, and argued that the ­Government’s failure to include such services specifically in the relevant legislation (Medical and Health Care Services Act) violated their right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the ground of disability. The Supreme Court of Canada found unanimously that the Medical and Health Care Services Act discriminated against deaf and hard-of-hearing people, because lack of provision for sign language interpreters denied applicants equal benefits under the law. The Supreme Court held that the right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter places obligations on governmental actors to allocate resources to ensure that disadvantaged groups are able to take full advantage of public benefits. The Government had failed to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for denying medical interpretation services in light of their cost. [10.81]  In International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France,285 FIDH claimed that France had violated the European Social Charter, Article 13 (right to medical assistance) by ending the exemption of illegal immigrants with very low 284 

Eldrige v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624. International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France, Complaint no 14/2003, 3 ­November 2004, available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC14Merits_en.pdf. 285 

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incomes from charges for medical and hospital treatment. It also submitted that a 2002 legislative reform restricting access to medical services for children of illegal immigrants violated Article 17 (the rights of children and young persons). Such children had to wait three months to qualify for medical assistance, and were only accorded assistance in ‘situations that involve an immediate threat to life’. The European Committee on Social Rights drew upon the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, to support a purposive interpretation of the European Social Charter so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights. Restrictions on rights should be read narrowly. The Committee also emphasised that the Charter was complementary to the ECHR and that ‘[t]he rights guaranteed are not ends in themselves but they complete the rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights’.286 The Committee stated that the circumstances of this particular case addressed a right of fundamental importance to the individual, connected to the right to life and going to the dignity of the human being. Stating that human dignity is the fundamental value of positive European human rights law and that healthcare is a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity, the Committee concluded that ‘legislation or practice which denies entitlement to medical assistance to foreign nationals, within the territory of a State party, even if they are there illegally, is contrary to the Charter’. However, since illegal immigrants could access some forms of medical assistance after three months of residence, while all foreign nationals could at any time obtain treatment for ‘emergencies and life threatening conditions’ there was no violation of Article 13. There was a violation of Article 17 of the European Social Charter, even though children had access to healthcare similar to that afforded to adults. The Committee noted that Article 17 was inspired by the UN CRC, and that it protects in a general manner the right of children and young persons to care and assistance. The case is highly significant in two ways. First, it provides an expansive interpretation of the Charter with respect to vulnerable groups, particularly illegal migrants and children. This partially brings the European Social Charter into line with other international human rights instruments, which do not make access to rights conditional on lawful residency within a territory. Secondly, the case illustrates the use by decision-makers of a range of international legal instruments (eg the Vienna Convention and the ECHR) to complement and consolidate statements of legal obligation in the European Social Charter. By linking the Charter to the ECHR, the case reinforces the principle of interdependence. [10.82]  It should be noted that not all elements of the right to health demand many resources. This is clear from some of the cases considered above. For example, the ­Szijjarto case287 demanded respectful treatment, and in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh the court required quality controls on food imports.288 In the latter case, Dr Farooque challenged the failure of the authorities to take effective measures to deal with a large consignment of imported skimmed milk powder that contained radioactive material. The court found that the contaminated powder was a threat to health and thereby gave rise to a breach of the right to life under the Constitution of ­Bangladesh, 1972, Article 32. Through an interpretation of the Constitution of

286  287  288 

Ibid, para 27. Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, above n 176. Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh, 48 DLR (1996) HCD 438.

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Bangladesh, Article 18, which requires the state to improve the quality of health and nutrition, the court interpreted the right to life to include, inter alia, the ‘protection of health and normal longevity of an ordinary human being’. The court ordered the Government to test the consignment’s radiation level. E.  Reproductive Rights and Freedom from Non-consensual Sterilisation [10.83]  Reproductive rights rest on the recognition of the right of all couples and individuals to: —— Reproductive decision-making, including voluntary choice in marriage, family formation and determination of the number, timing and spacing of one’s children and the right to have access to the information and means needed to exercise voluntary choice. —— Equality and equity for men and women, to enable individuals to make free and ­informed choices in all spheres of life, free from discrimination based on gender. —— Sexual and reproductive security, including freedom from sexual violence and coercion, and the right to privacy.289

The right to respect for ‘private life’, as protected in human rights treaties, such as ­Article 8 of the ECHR, includes, inter alia, the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent and the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense.290 [10.84]  The CEDAW Committee discussed the scope of women’s right to freedom from non-consensual sterilisation in Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary.291 (The facts of this case are set out at paragraph 10.47 above.) Szijjarto’s civil claim against the hospital for damages for negligence failed before the domestic courts because, inter alia, the sterilisation had been medically necessary. She claimed before the CEDAW Committee that she had been subjected to coerced sterilisation by medical staff, arguing that Hungary had violated Articles 10(h), 12 and 16(1)(e) of the CEDAW. On the merits, the Committee found that Hungary had failed to fulfill its obligations under all three Articles. [10.85]  Under Article 10(h) of the CEDAW, states parties undertake to ensure access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well being of families, including information and advice on family planning.

The Committee recalled its General Recommendation 21292 on equality in marriage and family relations, which recognises, in the context of ‘coercive practices which have serious consequences for women, such as forced … sterilization’, that informed ­decision-making about safe and reliable contraceptive measures depends upon a ­woman’s having ‘information about contraceptive measures and their use, and guaranteed access to sex education and family planning services’.293 The Committee held 289 

UNFPA, Reproductive Rights, available at http://www.unfpa.org/rh/rights.htm#rights. Evans v The United Kingdom, App no 6339/05 (ECtHR, 10 April 2007). 291  Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, above n 176. 292  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, UN Doc A/49/38 at 1 (1994). 293  Above n 181, para 11.2. 290 

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that Article 10(h) guaranteed the complainant a right ‘to specific information on ­sterilization and alternative procedures for family planning in order to guard against such an ­intervention being carried out without her having made a fully informed choice’.294 The Committee concluded, notwithstanding the finding of fact by the Hungarian courts that the complainant had been in a condition to understand the situation and give informed consent, that the complainant’s state of health at the hospital and the emergency situation meant that any information and counselling she was given ‘must have been given under stressful and most inappropriate conditions’.295 Accordingly, the Committee found a failure of the state party, through the hospital personnel, to provide appropriate information and advice on family planning, which constitutes a violation of the complaint’s right under Article 10(h). [10.86]  According to Article 12 of the CEDAW, states parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement, and the post-natal period.

The CEDAW Committee cited its General Recommendation 24 on women and health,296 in which it explained that ‘acceptable services are those that are delivered in a way that ensures that a woman gives her fully informed consent, respects her dignity’. The Committee further stated that ‘States parties should not permit forms of coercion, such as non-consensual sterilization … that violate women’s rights to informed consent and dignity’.297 In the circumstances in which the complainant was taken to hospital, the Committee concluded that it is not plausible that during that period of time hospital personnel provided the author with thorough enough counselling and information about sterilization, as well as alternatives, risks and benefits, to ensure that the author could make a well-considered and voluntary decision to be sterilized.298

The Committee also took note of the unchallenged fact that the author enquired of the doctor after the operation when it would be safe to conceive again, clearly indicating that she was unaware of the consequences of sterilisation. Thus, the Committee considered in the present case that the state party had not ensured that the complainant gave her fully informed consent to be sterilised, and that consequently the rights of the complainant under Article 12 of the CEDAW had been violated. [10.87]  Article 16(1)(e) of the CEDAW requires states parties to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights.

The CEDAW Committee recalled its General Recommendation 19 on violence against women, in which it states that ‘compulsory sterilization … adversely affects women’s physical and mental health, and infringes the right of women to decide on the number 294 

Ibid. Ibid. 296  Ibid; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 24, above n 147. 297  Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, above n 176, para 11.3. 298  Ibid. 295 

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and spacing of their children’.299 The Committee found that the sterilisation surgery was performed on the complainant without her full and informed consent, and must be considered to have permanently deprived her of her natural reproductive capacity.300 Accordingly, the Committee found the complainant’s rights under Article 16(1)(e) of the Convention to have been violated. [10.88]  The Committee made the following recommendations. First, concerning the complainant, the Committee recommended that the state party provide ‘appropriate compensation … commensurate with the gravity of the violations of her rights’. This left the determination of what was appropriate to the state. Secondly, the Committee made three general recommendations to the state party, as follows: (i)

Take further measures to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Convention and the pertinent paragraphs of the Committee’s general recommendations Nos 19, 21 and 24 in relation to women’s reproductive health and rights are known and adhered to by all relevant personnel in public and private health centres, including hospitals and clinics. (ii) Review domestic legislation on the principle of informed consent in cases of sterilization and ensure its conformity with international human rights and medical standards, including the Convention of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and Biomedicine (‘the Oviedo Convention’) and World Health Organization guidelines. In that connection, consider amending the provision in the Public Health Act whereby a physician is allowed ‘to deliver the sterilization without the information procedure generally specified when it seems to be appropriate in given circumstances’. (iii) Monitor public and private health centres, including hospitals and clinics, which perform sterilization procedures so as to ensure that fully informed consent is being given by the patient before any sterilization procedure is carried out, with appropriate sanctions in place in the event of a breach.301

The case demonstrates that quasi-judicial international bodies can play a key role by making states accountable for violations of the right to health. [10.89]  Informed consent to medical procedures requires prior adequate information to be provided to patients before sterilisation. This has been considered by some domestic courts, such as the High Court of Namibia in LM and Others v the Government of the Republic of Namibia.302 The three plaintiffs were all HIV-positive women, who alleged that they had been sterilised without their informed consent because they were HIV-positive. All three plaintiffs were sterilised immediately after or during a Caesarian section. They all had children from previous pregnancies. One plaintiff was 26 years old. They signed consent forms whilst in active labour, and immediately prior to the birth of their children. Two of the three plaintiffs signed an additional consent form, which dealt specifically with the sterilisation. In all three cases, the women’s hospital records did not reflect any documentation of the process of obtaining their consent to the sterilisation, or of whether the women had been told that alternative, non-permanent forms of birth control were available to them. The High Court of 299  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 19: Violence against Women, UN Doc A/47/38 at 1 (1993) para 22. 300  Andrea Szijjarto v Hungary, above n 176, para 11.4. 301  Ibid, para 11.5. 302  LM and Others v the Government of the Republic of Namibia, Case nos 1603/2008, 3518/2008, 3007/2008, [2012] NAHC 211, available at http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHC/2012/211.html.

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Namibia considered, inter alia, whether the three plaintiffs had given their informed consent to the sterilisation procedures. [10.90]  The court held that, to decide whether or not the patients had given ‘informed consent’ prior to the surgical procedures, it must consider whether the patients had been ‘provided with adequate information in order to enable them to make informed decisions’.303 The court held that the required consent must be ‘clear and unequivocal’, and must be given ‘freely and voluntarily’ without any inducement by ‘fear, fraud or force’.304 The court concluded that the Namibian Government was not able to prove that the plaintiffs were provided with adequate information to make informed choices on whether or not to be sterilised. The notes made in the three hospital records did not indicate what type of information was given to the plaintiffs and whether alternative methods of contraception were offered.305 Thus medical practitioners must make notes on the nature of the information they have provided to the patient, in order to facilitate rational decision-making. However, the court did not address the issue of what information is required to be provided to a woman before a sterilisation, despite the availability of international standards on the information required before such a procedure.306 For example, the WHO identified six key pieces of information of which every patient should be informed before a sterilisation: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

Sterilisation is a surgical procedure. It has both risks and benefits. The procedure will prevent future pregnancies. Sterilisation is considered a permanent procedure. Refusing to be sterilised will not result in the loss of any benefits. Non-permanent forms of contraceptive alternatives are available.307

[10.91]  In LC v Peru,308 the CEDAW Committee held that Peru was in breach of its obligations under the CEDAW when it denied a girl emergency surgery as well as an abortion. The complainant, LC, was 13 years old when she was repeatedly ­sexually abused by a man about 34 years old in 2006. As a result, she became pregnant, and, in a state of depression, attempted suicide by jumping off the roof of a building next door to her house. She was taken to a public hospital, where she was diagnosed with ‘vertebromedullar cervical trauma, cervical luxation and complete medullarsection’, with ‘a risk of permanent disability’ and ‘risk of deterioration of cutaneous integrity resulting from physical immobility’. The damage to the spinal column, in addition to other medical problems, caused paraplegia of the lower and upper limbs, requiring emergency surgery. The head of the Neurosurgery Department recommended surgery in order to prevent the injuries she suffered from worsening and leaving her disabled. Even though doctors concluded that her spine needed to be realigned

303 

Ibid, para 16 (emphasis added). Ibid, para 14. Ibid, paras 20–23. 306 WHO, Medical Eligibility Criteria for Contraceptive Use, 5th edn (Geneva, WHO, 2015) available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/181468/1/9789241549158_eng.pdf ?ua=. 307  Ibid. 308  LC v Peru, Communication no 22/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (4 November 2011). 304  305 

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immediately—and even though abortion in Peru is legal where the mother’s health and life are at risk309—they refused to operate on LC because she was pregnant (because abortion on the grounds of rape or sexual abuse was not legally available). She eventually suffered a miscarriage because of the severity of her injuries. Several weeks after the miscarriage, four months after she was told she needed surgery, LC underwent the spinal procedure. She was told shortly thereafter, however, that the surgery would have little to no effect and that she would remain paralysed. It was claimed that the refusal by the doctors at the hospital to perform the therapeutic abortion violated the rights of LC to health, a life of dignity and to be free from discrimination in access to such care. The Committee found, inter alia, a violation of Article 12 of CEDAW, which protects women’s access to healthcare services, including those related to family planning and services in connection with pregnancy. The Committee recommended, inter alia, that Peru should review its laws with a view to establish[ing] a mechanism for effective access to therapeutic abortion under conditions that protect women’s physical and mental health and prevent further occurrences in the future of violations similar to the ones in the present case …310

and should ‘review its legislation with a view to decriminalizing abortion when the pregnancy results from rape or sexual abuse’.311 This requires states to develop abortion laws that are transparent and accountable to women, as well as responsive to equal protection under the law. This entails reviewing the impact of the criminalisation of abortion on women, particularly where it serves as a significant incentive for unsafe, illegal abortion.312 [10.92]  In the first case on maternal mortality to be brought before CEDAW Committee, Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil,313 Alyne Pimentel, an Afro-Brazilian woman, died at 28 years old of obstetric complications related to her pregnancy, after a health centre in Rio de Janeiro failed to provide for appropriate and timely access to emergency obstetric care. Her complaints of severe nausea and abdominal pain during her sixth month of pregnancy were ignored by the health centre, which failed to perform an urgent blood and urine test to ascertain whether the foetus had died. Alyne’s vulnerable condition required individualised medical treatment, which was not forthcoming owing to a potential failure in the medical assistance provided by a private health institution, caused by professional negligence, inadequate infrastructure and lack of professional preparedness. Alyne’s death could have been prevented, if the health centre had correctly diagnosed and treated her for intrauterine fetal death. Pimentel’s death is not an isolated case, since ‘the rate of maternal mortality [in Brazil] remains high, 309  Art 119 of the Penal Code states that ‘abortion shall not be punishable if performed by a doctor with the consent of the pregnant woman or her legal representative, if any, when it is the only way to save the life of the mother or to avoid serious and permanent harm to her health’. 310  LC v Peru, above n 308, para 9. 311  Ibid. 312  CG Ngwena, ‘A Commentary on LC v Peru: The CEDAW Committee’s First Decision on Abortion’ (2013) 57(2) Journal of African Law 310. See also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1607 (2008): Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe, 16 April 2008, paras 4, 6, 7.1 and 7.2; C ­Cosentino, ‘Safe and Legal Abortion: An Emerging Human Right? The Long-lasting Dispute with State Sovereignty in ECHR Jurisprudence’ (2015) 15(3) Human Rights Law Review 569. 313  Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, Communication no 17/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 (27 September 2011).

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indicating precarious socio-economic conditions’.314 Moreover, a disproportionately high number of victims are among the most vulnerable groups, especially ‘women of African descent’.315 As highlighted by the petitioner (Alyne’s mother), citing a WHO survey, over ‘4,000 maternal deaths occur each year in Brazil, representing one third of all maternal deaths in Latin America’.316 She claimed a violation of the right to life and health under Articles 2 and 12 of the CEDAW. [10.93]  The CEDAW Committee found that Alyne ‘was not ensured appropriate services in connection with her pregnancy’,317 and that Brazil ‘failed to comply with its obligation to ensure effective judicial action and protection’ since no proceedings were initiated in order to establish the responsibility of those in charge of providing medical care to Alyne.318 Accordingly, the Committee found Brazil in violation of Article 12(2) of the CEDAW319 and cited General Recommendation 28 (2010), para 28 of which states that ‘the policies of the State party must be action- and result-oriented as well as adequately funded’,320 and that, according to CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 24, para 27, ‘it is the duty of States parties to ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and emergency obstetric services, and to allocate to these services the maximum extent of available resources’.321 Therefore, the Committee found that the state had violated the Convention, in spite of its claims that it had made ‘qualified obstetric care’ a priority in its National Plan for Women’s Policies, noting: The lack of appropriate maternal health services in the State party that clearly fails to meet the specific, distinctive health needs and interests of women not only constitutes a violation of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Convention, but also discrimination against women under article 12, paragraph 1, and article 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate maternal health services has a differential impact on the right to life of women.322 … Pimentel Teixeira was discriminated against, not only on the basis of her sex, but also on the basis of her status as a woman of African descent and her socio-economic background.323 … [T]he State party violated its obligations under article 12 (in relation to access to health), article 2 (c) (in relation to access to justice) and article 2 (e) (in relation to the State party’s due diligence obligation to regulate the activities of private health service providers).324

[10.94]  The Committee also affirmed that ‘the State is directly responsible for the action of private institutions when it outsources its medical services and that, ­furthermore,

314 CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Brazil, UN Doc CEDAW/C/BRA/CO/6 (10 August 2007) para 29. 315  Ibid, para 11. See also Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its Mission to Brazil (4–14 December 2013), UN Doc A/HRC/27/68/Add.1 (4 September 2014). 316  Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, above n 313, para 5.1. 317  Ibid, para 7.4. 318  Ibid, para 7.8. 319  Art 12(2) of CEDAW provides ‘States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation’. 320  Alyne da Silva Pimentel v Brazil, above n 313, para 7.6. 321  Ibid, para 7.3. 322  Ibid, para 7.6. 323  Ibid, para 7.7. 324  Ibid, para 8.

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the State always maintains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions’.325 The Committee made the following general recommendations that the state: (a) Ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access for all women to adequate emergency obstetric care, in line with general recommendation No 24 (1999) on women and health; (b) Provide adequate professional training for health workers, especially on women’s reproductive health rights, including quality medical treatment during pregnancy and delivery, as well as timely emergency obstetric care. (c) Ensure access to effective remedies in cases where women’s reproductive health rights have been violated and provide training for the judiciary and for law enforcement personnel; (d) Ensure that private health-care facilities comply with relevant national and international standards on reproductive health care; (e) Ensure that adequate sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate women’s reproductive health rights; (f) Reduce preventable maternal deaths through the implementation of the National Pact for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality at state and municipal levels, including by establishing maternal mortality committees where they still do not exist, in line with the recommendations in its concluding observations for Brazil, adopted on 15 August 2007 (CEDAW/C/BRA/CO/6).326

It also recommended specifically that the state provide ‘appropriate reparation’, including adequate financial compensation, to the author and to the daughter of Alyne, ‘commensurate with the gravity of the violations against her’.327 Significantly, despite some delay, in 2014 the Brazilian Government paid compensation to Alyne Pimentel’s mother.328

VIII. CONCLUSION [10.95]  The right to health is a fundamental human right that accrues to everyone simply by virtue of being human. It is well established in existing international treaties as a legally binding human right, and its realisation is fundamental to the enjoyment of all other human rights. The right to health is closely and inextricably linked to the rights to life, human dignity, non-discrimination, equality, and the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment. While the normative content, scope and nature of states’ obligations in relation to the right to health has been a subject of debate, with limited agreement, the adoption of General Comment 14 on the right to health by the CESCR has been critical for the development of a human rights framework for the right. Despite some limitations, the Committee’s General Comment on the right to health clarifies specific legal obligations and rights. [10.96]  As argued above, the right to health includes the right to healthcare and to the underlying determinants of health. It includes freedom to control one’s health

325 

Ibid, para 7.4. Ibid, para 8.2. 327  Ibid, para 8.1. 328  Plataforma DHESCA Brasil, Relatorio sobre Mortalidade Materna (4 April 2014). 326 

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and body, and freedom from interference, such as non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. It entitles the individual to a system of health protection in which everyone can enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. States are accordingly obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ of everyone within a state’s jurisdiction, by ensuring that healthcare facilities, goods and services are sufficiently available, accessible, acceptable and of good quality. Unfortunately, for millions of people throughout the world, the full enjoyment of the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health still remains a distant goal and that, in many cases, especially for those living in poverty, this goal is becoming increasingly remote.329

The low availability of medicines, particularly in the public sector, remains a key barrier to access to affordable essential medicines in developing countries, especially for the poor.330 As noted by the African Commission, millions of people in Africa are not enjoying the right to health maximally because African countries are generally faced with the problem of poverty which renders them incapable to provide the necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of this right.331

[10.97]  The gap between the availability of, and accessibility to, health facilities in developed states and developing states is widening, and there are growing gaps between the rich and poor and between different areas within states.332 The WHO’s Commission on the Social Determinants of Health noted in August 2008 that this unequal distribution of health-damaging experiences is not in any sense a ‘natural’ phenomenon but is the result of a ‘toxic combination of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and bad politics’.333 Since generally women as a social class and as primary care-givers most acutely experience the violation and non-realisation­of the right to health, health inequalities have a gendered character. Therefore, having due regard to this depressing but real state of affairs, states are required to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind. [10.98]  As the cases considered above demonstrate, it is clear that violations of the right to health, like other violations of ESC rights, are justiciable. Accordingly, states should ensure that the right to health is justiciable in their domestic jurisdictions and that court judgments on the right to health are fully implemented (with the participation of affected communities and other stakeholders), in the same way as any other judgments on other human rights. The entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 5 May 2013 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a ­communications procedure on 14 April 2014 will strengthen justiciability at an 329 

Commission on Human Rights res 2002/31, preamble, para 6. See the MDG Gap Task Force Report 2008, Millennium Development Goal 8: Delivering on the Global Partnership for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (New York, United Nations, 2008) 35. 331  Purohit and Moore v The Gambia, above n 222, para 84. 332  WHO, above n 13, 3–22. 333  Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, above n 14, Executive Summary, 1. 330 

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i­nternational level. All these developments call for a renewal of governmental commitment and investment of appropriate human and financial resources (including an increase in the budgetary allocations to the health sector) to achieve the enjoyment of the right to health in practice, particularly by the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups. States should also carry out health impact assessments before implementation of all policies and decisions that may have a detrimental effect on health, taking into account full public participation.334

334  See P Hunt and G MacNaughton, Impact Assessments, Poverty and Human Rights: A Case Study Using the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (UNESCO, 2006), available at http://www.who. int/hhr/Series_6_Impact%20Assessments_Hunt_MacNaughton1.pdf.

11 The Right to Education: Articles 13 and 14 Article 13 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by ­every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; (e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.

Article 14 ICESCR Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.

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I. INTRODUCTION [11.01]  Although education is protected as a human right in international human rights law, in practice, in the world today, education is described in terms of market shares and competitive prices (profit-making), with university education, in particular, traded like any other service. The beneficiaries of education (learners) are increasingly conceptualised as consumers, and education as a product or a consumer good.1 This trade in education, without the necessary supervision regarding the conditions of enrolment and the quality of education provided, casts doubt as to the future of education as a human right.2 As recognised by the ECtHR, ‘education is an activity that is complex to organise and expensive to run, whereas the resources that the authorities can devote to it are necessarily finite’.3 Some aspects of the right to education have been examined in several reports of the UN Special Rapporteur.4 In a broader context, ‘education’ goes far beyond formal schooling to embrace the broad range of life experiences and learning processes that enable human beings, individually and collectively, to develop their personalities, talents and abilities, and to live a full and satisfying life within society.5 Education is both a human right in itself, and an indispensable means of realising and promoting other human rights (such as the rights to work, health, housing, food, expression, development) and basic democratic ­principles.6 1  I Macpherson et al (eds), Education, Privatization and Social Justice: Case Studies from Africa, South Asia and South East Asia (Oxford, Symposium Books, 2014). 2  See K Tomaševski, ‘Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-theScenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998–2004’ (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 205, 207; UNESCO, Globalization and the Market in Higher Education: Quality, Accreditation and Qualifications (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2002); K Kinser et al, The Global Growth of Private Higher Education, ASHE Higher Education Report Series, vol 36 no 3 (San Franisco, Wiley, 2010). 3  Velyo Velev v Bulgaria, App no 16032/07 (ECtHR, 27 May 2014) para 33. 4 See K Tomaševski, Right to Education: Preliminary Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49 (13 January 1999); Report on the Mission to Uganda, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/6/Add.1 (9 August 1999); Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/6 (1 February 2000); Report on the Mission to the United Kingdom of Great ­Britain and Northern Ireland (England), UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/6/Add.2 (9 December 1999); Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/52 (11 January 2001); Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/60 (7 January 2002); Report on the Mission to the United States of America, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/60/Add.1 (17 January 2002); Report on the Mission to Turkey, UN Doc E/CN.4/20002/60/Add.2 (27 March 2002); Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/9 (21 January 2003); Report on the Mission to Indonesia, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/9/Add.1 (4 November 2002); Report on the Mission to Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/9/Add.2 (5 February 2003); Report on the Mission to People’s Republic of China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1(21 November 2003); Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45 (15 January 2004); Mission to Colombia, UN Doc E/ CN.4/2004/45/Add.2/Corr.1 (30 March 2004). See also V Muñoz Villalobos, The Right to Education, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/50 (17 December 2004); Girls’ Right to Education, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/45 (8 February 2006); The Right to Education of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/HRC/4/29 (19 February 2007); Mission to Germany, UN Doc A/HRC/4/29/Add.3 (9 March 2007); Right to Education in Emergency Situations, UN Doc A/HRC/8/10 (20 May 2008); Right to Education of Persons in Detention, UN Doc A/HRC/11/8 (2 April 2009); Right to Education of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum-seekers, UN Doc A/HRC/14/25 (16 April 2010); Sexual Education, UN Doc A/65/162 (23 July 2010); Promotion of Equality of Opportunity in Education, UN Doc A/HRC/17/29 (18 April 2011); Financing Education, A/66/269 (5 August 2011); Normative Action for Quality Education, UN Doc A/HRC/20/21 (2 May 2012); Technical and Vocational Education and Training, UN Doc A/67/310 (15 August 2012); Justiciability of the Right to Education, UN Doc A/ HRC/23/35 (10 May 2013); Assessment of the Educational Attainment of Students, UN Doc A/HRC/26/27 (2 May 2014). 5  CRC Committee, General Comment 1: The Aims of Education, UN Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (17 April 2001) para 1. 6  See CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para 1; Tomaševski, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/52, above n 4, paras 11–14; Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Education (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013).

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This is because it empowers individuals with the skills and abilities necessary to realise, reinforce and enhance other rights. Thus, education is ‘one of the principal means available to foster a deeper and more harmonious form of human development and thereby to reduce poverty, exclusion, ignorance, oppression and war’.7 [11.02]  UNESCO has highlighted the four ‘pillars’ of learning as follows: ‘learning to live together’, ‘learning to know’, ‘learning to do’ and ‘learning to be’. Education thereby contributes to the development of personality, and enables individuals to act with greater autonomy, judgement, critical thinking and personal responsibility.8 Education is an indispensable tool for individual efforts to achieve in the course of one’s life a balanced, human rights-friendly response to the challenges that accompany a period of fundamental change driven by globalisation, new technologies and related phenomena.9 In particular, higher education is a means to ‘spur political action and to demand more social and economic rights’.10 For example, in the Indian state of Kerala, ‘higher education and political awareness made a crucial difference in health achievements which surpassed those even in states that have higher per capita spending on health and more hospital beds per person’.11 [11.03]  Although education has been variously classified as an ESC right,12 it is also, in many ways, a precondition for exercising in a meaningful way civil and political rights, such as the right to political participation, and freedoms of expression, conscience and religion.13 This is because it empowers individuals to exercise civil and political rights, and education is increasingly a ‘means to retain or to eliminate inequality’ in the exercise of all human rights.14 In this respect, the right to education epitomises the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.15 It consists of a variety of rights and freedoms for parents, children or students, and of different obligations for states, and arguably some obligations for NSAs. [11.04]  Although the importance and content of the right to education has been stressed,16 the enjoyment of the right to education, especially for girls and women, 7 

See UNESCO, Learning: The Treasure Within (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1996). Ibid. 9  CRC Committee, General Comment 1, above n 5, para 3. 10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000) ch 4, 76, available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/261/hdr_2000_en.pdf. 11 Ibid. 12  ICESCR, Art 13. 13  ICCPR, Art 18(4). 14  K Tomaševski, Education Denied: Costs and Remedies (London, Zed Books, 2003) 195. 15  See CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (10 May 1999) para 2. 16  See, eg, M Mehedi, The Realisation of the Right to Education, Including Education in Human Rights, UN Docs E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/10 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/10; F Coomans, ‘The Right to Education as a Human Right: An Analysis of Key Aspects’, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/16 (29 September 1998); Tomaševski, above n 2; D Hodgson, The Human Right to Education (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998); M Nowak, ‘The Right to Education’ in A Eide et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 245; F Coomans, ‘In Search of the Core Content of the Right to Education’ in A C ­ hapman and S Russel (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (­Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002) 217; KD Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006); K Singh, ‘Emerging Understanding of the Right to Education’, Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008, Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It?, 2008/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/69, available at unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001555/155584e.pdf. 8 

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 561

remains a distant goal for millions of individuals throughout the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia, where the goal is even becoming increasingly remote.17 Due to discrimination against girls and women in most societies, their access to education remains constrained. Thus nearly two-thirds of the world’s illiterate adults are women, a proportion that has remained unchanged for the past 20 years.18 Girls face several obstacles in schools, including being victims of sexual abuse by their teachers, the very people who are supposed to protect them.19 Nearly 58 million children aged 6 to 11 were not enrolled in school in 2012.20 The majority of children out of school (about 30 million) were in sub-Saharan Africa.21 More than 90 per cent of children with disabilities in developing countries do not attend schools.22 Children of primary school age and youths living in areas affected by armed conflict have limited access to formal education.23 Girls are disproportionately affected, since some attacks in states such as Nigeria24 and Afghanistan are directed against girls’ schools.25 Yet education can bring protection and stability, and the potential to start building a more peaceful and prosperous society.26 [11.05]  This chapter examines the scope of the right to education and the human rights obligations arising in respect of this right as protected in several international human rights instruments. A major proposition of this chapter is that the international right to education for everyone, and state obligations for giving effect to this right, are adequately protected in international law (see, eg, Articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR and section II. below), and the realisation of the right has been emphasised in several international conferences and declarations.27 A corollary is that although 17  By 2015, of the 781 million adults over the age of 15 estimated to be illiterate, 496 million were women. An estimated 58 million of primary aged children are still out of school, 31 million of them girls, the majority living in sub-Saharan Africa. See UN Statistics Division, The World’s Women 2015: Trends and Statistics, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/worldswomen.html. 18  Ibid. See also Education for All, Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2003) ch 3, 115–53, available http://www.uis.unesco.org/ Education/Documents/efa_gmr_2003-4.pdf. 19  For example, in Uganda a total of 4% of upper primary school girls (43,635 of 1,090,853 girls) were reportedly defiled by their teachers in just one year in 2007. See C Kiwawulo, ‘40,000 Pupils Defiled by Their Teachers’, The New Vision, 1 August 2008. 20 Education for All, Global Monitoring Report 2013/14: Teaching and Learning—Achieving Quality For All (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2014); Education for All, Global Monitoring Report (GMR) and the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Policy Paper 14/Fact Sheet 28: Global Progress Towards Universal Primary Education has Halted (June 2014). India, Indonesia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan each had more than 1 million children out of school. 21  Ibid. 22 UNESCO, The Right to Education for Persons with Disabilities: Towards Inclusion, available at http:// www.unesco.org/education/efa/know_sharing/flagship_initiatives/persons_disabilities.shtml. 23  Save the Children, Rewrite the Future One Year On (Save the Children, 2007) 4, available at http://www. savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/rtf_oneyearon(1)_1.pdf; Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Global Survey on Education in Emergencies (New York, Women’s Commission, 2004). 24  On 15 April 2014, a non-state armed group, Boko Haram, attacked a girls’ school in Chibok, Borno state, in northern Nigeria, abducting at gunpoint 276 school girls from their secondary school. See UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/PRST/2015/4 (19 January 2015). 25  V Muñoz, The Right to Education in Emergency Situations, UN Doc A/HRC/8/10 (20 May 2008) para 20. 26  Save the Children, above n 23, 4. 27  See, eg, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Agenda 21) ch 36, para 3; ch 3, para 2; ch 24, para 3; Copenhagen Declaration, available at http://

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The Right to Education

ratifying states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to ­education for ­everyone within a state’s jurisdiction, by making education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable,28 a number of states, especially developing states, have not yet fulfilled their obligations due to several obstacles. In considering these propositions, the present chapter begins with a brief overview of the international and regional human rights instruments that establish the right to education (section II.). This provides a solid foundation and framework to identify the scope and content of the right to education (section III.), corresponding state obligations (section IV.), academic freedom and institutional autonomy (section V.) and the right to inclusive education of persons with disabilities (section VI.). The chapter ends with concluding observations highlighting some key obstacles (section VII.).

II.  INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION [11.06]  The right to education, despite its neglect in practice, has been formally recognised at an international level in several international and regional human rights instruments adopted after the Second World War.29 It is not intended to examine all such instruments here, only a general overview is made to set the context for the subsequent discussion. A.  Protection Under the UN Charter [11.07]  The UN Charter required the UN to promote ‘international cultural and educational cooperation’ for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.30 All UN members pledged themselves to take joint and separate action, in cooperation with UNESCO (see paragraph 11.08 below), for the achievement of the purposes of the UN, including the promotion of educational cooperation.31 The Charter provided that one of the purposes of the UN was to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.32

Although the right to education was not expressly defined, it was implied by reference to ‘international problems’ of an economic, social and cultural character. In ec.europa.eu/education/policy/vocational-policy/doc/copenhagen-declaration_en.pdf, Commitment 6; Beijing Platform for Action, paras 69, 80, 81, and 82; Habitat Agenda, paras 2.36 and 3.43; World Declaration on Education for All, preamble and Art 1. These documents are available at http://www.pdhre.org/rights/ education.html. 28 

See below section IV. See JL Gomez del Prado, Day of General Discussion: Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/23 (20 November 1998). 30  Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art 55(b) (emphasis added). 31  Ibid, Art 56. 32  Ibid, Art 1(3). 29 

International Protection of the Right

 563

a­ ddition, the reference in the Charter to the promotion of human rights for all without discrimination prepared the way for the future development of the non-discriminatory nature of the right to education, as shown below by the human rights instruments that followed. [11.08]  The UN Charter provided a basis for the creation of a specialised agency in the fields of education and culture.33 As a result, UNESCO was established on 16 November 1945.34 In its preamble, the UNESCO Constitution states: [T]he education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace [is] indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute[s] a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern … [T]he States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives.35

Therefore the right to education is at the core of UNESCO’s Constitution, given that it is considered to be a duty all states are obliged to ‘fulfil’. B.  Protection Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [11.09]  The UDHR set out in detail the human rights content of the UN Charter obligations under Articles 55 and 56. Article 26 of the UDHR provides for three basic characteristics of the right to education, namely, recognition of the right to receive education, the aims of education and parental rights: 1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

It is clear that Article 26(1) proclaims a general right to education36 (at different levels: elementary and fundamental stages, technical and professional, and higher education) and that Article 26(2) sets out the central purposes to which education must be directed, namely, ‘the full development of the human personality’ and respect

33 

Ibid, Art 57. Useful information on UNESCO is available at http://portal.unesco.org/. Constitution, adopted in London on 16 November 1945 and amended by the General Conference, 52 UNTS 275–302, available at http://www.unesco.org (emphasis added). 36  See generally, P Arajarvi, ‘Article 26’ in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 551. 34 

35 UNESCO

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The Right to Education

for human rights.37 The right of parents provided in Article 26(3) guarantees parents and legal guardians a right to choose between state-organised (public) and private (fee-paying) education. C.  Protection Under the Convention against Discrimination in Education [11.10]  In 1960, the UNESCO Assembly adopted the Convention against Discrimination in Education (‘the UNESCO Convention’).38 This Convention has a twofold purpose: (i) the elimination of discrimination in education, and (ii) the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment in education.39 As made clear by Article 4 of the UNESCO Convention: The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in particular: (a) To make primary education free and compulsory; make secondary education in its different forms generally available and accessible to all; make higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of individual capacity; assure compliance by all with the obligation to attend school prescribed by law; (b) To ensure that the standards of education are equivalent in all public education institutions of the same level, and that the conditions relating to the quality of education provided are also equivalent; (c) To encourage and intensify by appropriate methods the education of persons who have not received any primary education or who have not completed the entire primary education course and the continuation of their education on the basis of individual capacity; (d) To provide training for the teaching profession without discrimination.

[11.11]  Accordingly, the UNESCO Convention obliges states parties to eliminate and prevent discrimination ‘against any person or group of persons’ in education in law and in fact.40 This includes elimination of discrimination in education against vulnerable groups such as minorities,41 refugees,42 stateless persons (persons who are 37  See also ICESCR, Art 13(1); CRC, Art 29(1); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988), adopted 14 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999, Art 13(2). 38 Convention against Discrimination in Education, 429 UNTS 93 (1960), adopted by UNESCO General Conference on 14 December 1960 and entered into force 22 May 1962. Ninety-five states were parties to the UNESCO Convention by December 2007. On the same day the General Conference adopted a (non-binding) Recommendation against Discrimination in Education, 14 December 1960, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13065&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. html, (preferred by some Member States), identical in content with the Convention. For analysis of the UNESCO Convention, see W McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983) 128. 39  See F Coomans, ‘UNESCO and Human Rights’ in R Hanski and M Suksi (eds), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Turku, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 1999) 219, 221. 40  UNESCO Convention, Arts 1(1), 3 and 4. 41  Since 2007, the ECtHR has condemned discrimination against the Roma children in access to education in the following cases: DH and Others v The Czech Republic, App no 57325/00 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007), (2008) 47 EHRR 59; Sampanis and Others v Greece, App no 32526/05 (ECtHR, 5 June 2008); and Oršuš and Others v Croatia, App no 15766/03 (ECtHR, 16 March 2010). 42 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (1951), entered into force on 22 April 1954: 144 state parties as of 1 October 2008. Art 22 provides: ‘(1) The Contracting States shall

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 565

not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its law),43 persons with disabilities,44 including ‘those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’,45 and mentally retarded persons.46 Equality of opportunity for all in their access to education is essential to achieve the full respect for and protection of all human rights. Thus, under Article 8(1) of the Declaration on the Right to Development,47 States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to … education.

[11.12]  States parties to the UNESCO Convention undertake under Article 6 ‘to pay the greatest attention to any recommendations hereafter adopted by the General Conference’ of UNESCO in the field of education. Several such Recommendations have been adopted, including: —— the Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers, adopted in 1966 (focusing, inter alia, on the rights and responsibilities of teachers); —— the Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in 1974 (which sets out guiding principles in the field of human rights education); and —— the Recommendation on Development of Adult Education, adopted in 1976 (which sets out principles to which Member States should give effect when developing and implementing a policy on adult education).48 In addition, UNESCO has a Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice,49 which explicitly rejects theories that claim that specific racial or ethnic groups are i­nherently accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. (2) The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.’ See also CEDAW Committee, General recommendation No 32 on the Gender-Related Dimensions of Refugee Status, Asylum, Nationality and Statelessness of Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/32 (14 November 2014). 43  See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 360 UNTS 117 (1954), entered into force 6 June 1960, Arts 1 and 22. 44  Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons (1975), proclaimed by GA res 3447 (XXX) of 9 December 1975, principle 6. Principle 1 defines the term ‘disabled person’ to refer to ‘any person unable to ensure by himself or herself, wholly or partly, the necessities of a normal individual and/or social life, as a result of deficiency, either congenital or not, in his or her physical or mental capabilities’. 45  International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006) (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), entered into force 3 May 2008, Art 1. 46  Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971), proclaimed by GA res 3447 (XXX) of 9 December 1975, principle 2. 47  Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 December 1986, GA res 41/128 UN GAOR, 41st Session, at 3, annex, UN Doc A/Res/41/128 annex (1987). 48  Recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO are available at http://portal. unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12026&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html. 49  Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, adopted unanimously and by acclamation by the General Conference on 27 November 1978, available at http://www.unesco.org/webworld/peace_library/UNESCO/ HRIGHTS/107-116.HTM.

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s­ uperior or inferior. It urges states to take all appropriate steps, inter alia, by ­legislation, particularly concerning education, to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all forms of racial discrimination. D. Protection Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [11.13]  Article 5 of the ICERD50 obliges states parties to guarantee the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights without racial discrimination.51 In respect of education, Article 5(e)(v) provides that States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: … (v) The right to education and training …

Schools offering programmes involving traineeships should not agree to employers’ requests to send only trainees of a particular ethnic origin. As shown in paragraph 11.96 below, in Murat Er v Denmark,52 the CERD found that a school practice of not sending students of non-Danish origin to certain employers for traineeship was in itself enough to constitute de facto discrimination towards all non-ethnic Danish students.53 According to the Committee, this constituted ‘an act of racial discrimination and a violation of the petitioner’s right to enjoyment of his right to education and training under article 5, paragraph e (v) of the Convention’.54 [11.14]  It is important to note that the elimination of racial discrimination in education often requires a state to meet the specific educational needs of racial minorities. Regarding the education of the Roma children (as compared to that of their Polish counterparts) in Poland, for example, the CERD observed in 2003: The Committee notes efforts to meet the specific educational needs of Roma children, but is concerned that in some cases these efforts have led to segregated classes having a lower standard of education than the Polish counterparts. The Committee recommends that new programmes integrate Roma children into mainstream schools as far as possible, in order to avoid discrimination, and that the State party recruit more teachers and teaching assistants from the Roma minority. The Committee invites the State party to include in its next periodic report more detailed information on this issue and on the progress achieved.55

50  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UN GA res 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969: 169 states parties as of 2 November 2003. See also Art 3(1) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, proclaimed by the UN GA res 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963 that had previously urged UN Member States to undertake particular efforts ‘to prevent discrimination based on race, colour or ethnic origin, especially in the fields of … education’. 51  CERD, General Recommendation XX (1996): The Guarantee of Human Rights Free from Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/51/18, annex VIII at 124 (1996), para 1; CERD, General Recommendation XIV: Definition of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc A/48/18 at 114 (1994), para 1. 52  Murat Er v Denmark, Communication no 40/2007, UN Doc CERD/C/71/D/40/2007 (8 August 2007). 53  Ibid, para 7.3. 54  Ibid. 55  CERD, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc CERD/C/62/CO/6 (21 March 2003) para 13.

International Protection of the Right

 567

E. Protection Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [11.15]  As regards discrimination against women in education, the CEDAW56 obliges states parties to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in education: (a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training; (b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same quality; (c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods; (d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants; (e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, including adult and functional literacy programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women; (f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of programmes for girls and women who have left school prematurely; (g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education; (h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning.57

In order to attain this, ratifying states are obliged to embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realisation of this principle.58

[11.16]  In states where religious dress has been banned in schools, appropriate measures, including monitoring, should be undertaken to ensure that girls are not excluded from schools on account of dress codes. To cite one example, in 2004, in pursuance of the principle of laïcité (secularism), the French Parliament enacted the law on the so-called ‘conspicuous’ in schools (the Act of 15 March 2004), which banned students from wearing ‘conspicuous’ or ‘ostensible’ religious symbols in French public (ie g­ overnment-operated) primary and secondary schools.59 The law provided that ‘in State primary and secondary schools, the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils

56 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA res 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp (No 46) at 193, UN Doc A/34/46, entered into force 3 September 1981. 57  CEDAW, Art 10 (emphasis added). 58  CEDAW, Art 2(a). 59  The full title of the law is Loi no 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. The bill was passed by France’s National Assembly by 494 to 36 votes, followed on 3 March by a Senate vote of 276 to 20. It was signed into law by President Jacques Chirac on 15 March 2004 (thus the technical name is Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004) and came into effect on 2 September 2004. See Journal Officiel de la République Française, 17 March 2004, 5190.

568 

The Right to Education

overtly manifest a religious affiliation is prohibited’.60 The ban on ‘overtly’ religious symbols was enacted, based on the recommendation of the Stasi Commission, to ‘safeguard public order’.61 The impact of a ban on ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols, even though phrased in neutral terms to apply to all denominations, could affect some groups more than others, given that France has made only limited provisions—through distance or computer-based learning—for students who feel that, as a matter of conscience and faith, they must wear a head-covering such as a skullcap (or kippah), a headscarf (or hijab) or a turban.62 Thus, observant Jewish, Muslim and Sikh students may be excluded from attending school in company with other French children.63 The impact of the ban has fallen disproportionately on Muslim girls and women teachers, due to France’s high Muslim population,64 for whom the wearing of the Islamic headscarf (or other forms of veiling) is considered a religious obligation or expression of personal religious faith.65 As noted by the HRC, ‘respect for a public culture of laïcité would not seem to require forbidding wearing such common religious symbols’.66 [11.17]  Several UN treaty-monitoring bodies have made recommendations calling on France to monitor the impact of the Act of 15 March 2004. For example, in 2005 the CERD recommended that France should continue to monitor the implementation of the Act closely, to ensure that it has no discriminatory effects and that the procedures followed in its implementation always place emphasis on dialogue, to prevent it from denying any pupil the right to education and to ensure that everyone can always exercise that right.67 The CRC Committee made similar observations, and recommended that France continue to ‘closely monitor the situation of girls being expelled from schools as a result of the new legislation and ensure they enjoy the right of access to education’.68 In 2008 the HRC recommended that France should re-examine Act No 2004/228 of 15 March 2004 in light of the guarantees of article 18 of the Covenant [ICCPR] concerning freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to manifest one’s religion in public as well as private, as well as the guarantee of equality under article 26.69 60 

Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, above n 59, Art 141-5-1. TJ Gunn, ‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France’ (2004) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review 419, 466. 62  HRC, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (31 July 2008) para 23. 63  Ibid. 64  There are about 6 million Muslims in France—about 10% of the population—the largest Muslim population in Western Europe, although estimates of how many of these are practising vary widely. See European Muslim Population (in 2014), at http://www.muslimpopulation.com/Europe/. See also US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013—France, 28 July 2014, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222427.pdf: ‘The Ministry of Interior estimates 8 to 10 percent of the population is Muslim’. 65  See ‘More than 100 Girls Defy France’s Headscarf Ban’, CBS News, 8 September 2004; EC Jones, ‘Muslim Girls Unveil their Fears’, BBC News, 28 March 2005; C Killian, ‘The Other Side of the Veil—North African Muslim Women in France Respond to the Headscarf Affair’ (2003) 17(4) Gender and Society 567. See also SAS v France, App no 43835/11 (ECtHR, 1 July 2014), (2015) 60 EHRR 11; A Vakulenko, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse (London, Routledge, 2012); S Amer, What is Veiling? (Edinburgh, ­Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 66  Ibid. 67  CERD, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CERD/C/FRA/CO/16 (18 April 2005) para 18. 68  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc CRC/C/155/Add.240 (30 June 2004) paras 25–26. 69  HRC, Concluding Observations: France, above n 62, para 23. 61 

International Protection of the Right

 569

[11.18]  As shown in chapter two, the elimination of discrimination cannot be achieved simply by enacting laws.70 This is especially the case regarding certain groups of women, who, in addition to suffering from discrimination directed against them as women, may also suffer from multiple forms of discrimination based on additional grounds, such as race, ethnic or religious identity, disability, age, class, caste or other factors. Such discrimination may affect these groups of women primarily, or to a degree or in ways different from men. In this respect, states may need to take specific temporary special measures to achieve de facto/substantive equality, or to eliminate such multiple forms of discrimination against women and its compounded negative impact on them.71 The obligation to eliminate discrimination against women in education requires serious attention in view of the fact that in 2003, 57 per cent of the estimated 104 million children of primary school age out of school worldwide were girls.72 The reasons cited for the denial of girls’ right to education include the need of girls to work in order to supplement family income, the power of tradition, the prohibitive cost of education, early marriage, vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, conflict and violence in schools.73 This calls for, inter alia, ‘preventive measures, including … education programmes to change attitudes concerning the roles and status of women’.74 It must be realised, however, that the elimination of discrimination against women in education is a broader issue that requires states to find solutions to the underlying causes of discrimination against women. As the CEDAW Committee has noted: The position of women will not be improved as long as the underlying causes of discrimination against women, and of their inequality, are not effectively addressed. The lives of women and men must be considered in a contextual way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically determined male paradigms of power and life patterns.75

States should intensify the application of temporary special measures in the field of education at all levels, within their national contexts, and create institution(s) responsible for designing, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and enforcing such temporary special measures. The aim of such measures must be to accelerate the modification and elimination of cultural practices and stereotypical attitudes and behaviour that discriminate against, or are disadvantageous to, women in education. F.  Protection Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [11.19]  The non-discriminatory and equality provisions of the ICCPR, as laid down in Articles 2(1), 3 and 26, may also extend to the educational obligations of states.76 70  HRC, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/ Rev.1/Add.10 (29 March 2000). 71  CEDAW, Art 4; CEDAW Committee: General Recommendation 25: Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention (Temporary Special Measures) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 282 (2004), para 12, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx. 72  Education for All, Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, above n 18, ch 2. 73  Ibid, ch 3. 74  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 19: Violence against Women (11th Session, 1992), UN Doc A/47/38 at 1 (1993) para 24(t)(ii). 75  CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 25, above n 71, para 10. 76  For a commentary on these provisions, see M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl, NP Engel, 2005) 27–82 and 597–634.

570 

The Right to Education

For example, the HRC has expressed the view that the ‘right to equality before the laws and freedom from discrimination, protected by article 26,77 requires States to act against discrimination by public and private agencies in all fields … such as … education’.78 As an example, in a case involving religious schooling in Canada, where public funding was provided to Roman Catholic schools and not, inter alia, to J­ ewish schools, the HRC stated that ‘the Covenant does not oblige States parties to fund schools which are established on a religious basis. However, if a State party chooses to provide public funding to religious schools, it should make this funding available without discrimination’.79 This means that providing funding for the schools of one religious group and not for another must be based on reasonable and objective criteria.80 [11.20]  However, where free (public) state schools coexist with (private) fee-paying schools, the HRC has found that a state ‘cannot be deemed to act in a discriminatory fashion if it does not provide the same level of subsidy for the two [public and private] types of establishment, when the private system is not subject to State supervision’.81 In a similar case, which dealt with the provision of free textbooks and school meals to children in public but not in private schools, the Committee affirmed its previous view. It observed that a state party made public-sector schooling and a variety of ancillary benefits (such as free transport by bus, free textbooks and school meals) available to all children subject to compulsory education. It nonetheless found that a state ‘cannot be deemed to be under an obligation to provide the same benefit to private school’.82 The Committee added that ‘the preferential treatment given to public sector schooling is reasonable and based on objective criteria … [A] State Party cannot be deemed to discriminate against parents who freely choose not to avail themselves of benefits which are generally open to all’.83 G. Protection Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [11.21]  The ICESCR devotes two articles, Articles 13 and 14, to the right to education. Article 13 is the longest provision in the Covenant, and the most wide-ranging and comprehensive provision on the right to education in international human rights law.84 By Article 13(1), The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education.85

77 ICCPR, Art 26; S Joseph et al, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 518. 78  HRC, General Comment 28, above 70, para 31. 79  Arieh Hollis Waldman v Canada, Communication no 694/1996, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/ 694/1996 (HRC, 5 November 1999) para 10.6. 80  Ibid. 81  Carl Henrik Blom v Sweden, Communication no 191/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/32/D/191/1985 (HRC, 4 April 1988) para 10.3. 82  G and L Lindgren and L Holm et al v Sweden, Communications nos 298/1988 and 299/1988 (HRC, 9 November 1990) UN Doc CCPR/C/40/D/298-299/1988 (7 December 1990) para 10.3. 83  Ibid. 84  See CESCR, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) para 2. 85  Emphasis added.

International Protection of the Right

 571

The travaux préparatoires indicate that in the drafting of the Covenant, it was proposed that it should provide that states parties ‘understood’ (rather than ‘recognize’) their obligations in relation to primary, secondary and higher education.86 Some doubt was expressed as to the legal significance of the words ‘it is understood’ in Article 13(2). In order to have a term with stronger legal significance,87 the word ‘understood’ was replaced with the current formulation, which reads that the states parties to the Covenant ‘recognize’ that, with a view to achieving the full realisation of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible …

The use of the term ‘recognize’ signifies the notion of progressive realisation. As the UNESCO representative explained in 1951 during the preparatory work in the Commission on Human Rights: [R]ecognition meant first and foremost that States should accept the obligation to do all in their power to achieve certain clearly defined aims, without, however, undertaking to attain them in a specified period. Admittedly, they could be achieved only by slow degrees, and the time involved would vary according to the relative magnitude of the problems of each country and the means at its disposal.88

Therefore, ‘recognition triggers the application of general State obligations under Article 2(1)’.89 [11.22]  Article 13(2) of the ICESCR lists the specific steps to be taken by states to achieve the full realisation of the right to primary, secondary and higher education.90 A similar guarantee is contained in Article 13 of the Protocol of San Salvador.91 Under Article 13(3) of the ICESCR, there is an undertaking to have ‘respect’ for parents’ or legal guardians’ ‘liberty’ to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

A similar provision is included in Article 18(4) of the ICCPR, which provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

86 

See UNGA, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, A/2929 (1 July 1955) 322–23. See Report of the Third Committee, 1957, UN Doc A/C.3/L.621, A/C.3/L.625 and A/3764. 88  UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.14/SR.1, 14 (17 May 1951). 89  P Alston, and G Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 185. On Art 2(1), see ch 2 in this book. 90  See section IV. below on state obligations. 91  Above n 37. 87 

572 

The Right to Education

H.  Protection Under the European Convention on Human Rights [11.23]  Neither the ICESCR nor the ICCPR defines the terms ‘religious’ or ‘convictions’. There is a similar provision to Article 13 of the ICESCR, under Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.92 According to this Article: No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions.

This Article has been interpreted by the ECtHR in Campbell and Cosans v UK,93 and that interpretation appears to be equally useful in understanding parents’ rights regarding their children’s education even under Article 13(3) of the ICESCR, to the extent that a state is obliged to ensure the religious and moral education of children in conformity with the parents’ own convictions. [11.24]  In the Campbell case, corporal punishment in state-funded schools in Scotland was challenged by two Scottish mothers. Both Mrs Campbell and Mrs Cosans lived in Scotland. Each of them had one child of compulsory school age at the relevant time. For both financial and practical reasons, the applicants had no realistic and acceptable alternative to sending their children to state schools. Each mother complained that the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in the school attended by her child, inter alia, failed to respect her right as a parent to ensure her son’s education and teaching in conformity with her philosophical convictions, as guaranteed by the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No 1. In concluding that Mrs Campbell and Mrs Cosans had accordingly been victims of a violation of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No 1, the Court stated in para 36: In its ordinary meaning the word ‘convictions’, taken on its own, is not synonymous with the words ‘opinions’ and ‘ideas’, … it is more akin to the term ‘beliefs’ (in the French text: ‘convictions’) appearing in Article 9—which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion—and denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. As regards the adjective ‘philosophical’, it is not capable of exhaustive definition and little assistance as to its precise significance is to be gleaned from the travaux préparatoires. The Commission pointed out that the word ‘philosophy’ bears numerous meanings: it is used to allude to a fully-fledged system of thought or, rather loosely, to views on more or less trivial matters. The Courts [sic] agrees with the Commission that neither of these two extremes can be adopted for the purposes of interpreting Article 2: the former would too narrowly restrict the scope of a right that is guaranteed to all parents and the latter might result in the inclusion of matters of insufficient weight or substance.

92  213 UNTS 262, adopted by the Council of Europe on 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954. For discussion, see DJ Harris et al, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 906–19; B Rainey et al, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 520–36; MW Janis et al, European Human Rights Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 568–600. 93  Campbell and Cosans v UK, App nos 7511/76 and 7743/76, (ECtHR, 25 February 1982), (1982) 4 EHRR 293.

International Protection of the Right

 573

Having regard to the Convention as a whole, including Article 17, the expression ‘­ philosophical convictions’ in the present context denotes, in the Court’s opinion, such convictions as are worthy of respect in a ‘democratic society’ and are not incompatible with human dignity; in addition, they must not conflict with the fundamental right of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 (P1–2) being dominated by its first sentence. The applicants’ views relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, namely the integrity of the person, the propriety or otherwise of the infliction of corporal punishment and the exclusion of the distress which the risk of such punishment entails. They are views which satisfy each of the various criteria listed above; it is this that distinguishes them from opinions that might be held on other methods of discipline or on discipline in general.

[11.25]  The above judgment makes it clear that ‘the word “convictions”, taken on its own, is not synonymous with the words “opinions” and “ideas” …; it is more akin to the term “beliefs” … and denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’.94 According to the Court, ‘religious’ convictions refer to beliefs of a ‘known religion’.95 Thus, any person whose convictions can be described as those of a ‘known religion’ will be able to argue that he or she has religious convictions. However, determining what is and what is not a ‘known religion’, to amount to ‘religious convictions’ in the context of parents’ religious convictions, may cause some difficulties. For example, is ‘Islamic fundamentalism’96 a ‘known religion’ sufficient to amount to religious convictions? It would seem that in approaching such issues, each claimed religious conviction must be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the need to preserve a democratic society. It should also be considered whether the religious beliefs in question are genuinely held (not whether they are correct), and an objective assessment must be made of the beliefs, particularly whether or not they are compatible with human dignity or with everyone’s human rights, including the right to education. [11.26]  Regarding religious and moral education, in General Comment 22, the HRC stated: The Committee is of the view that article 18(4) [of the ICCPR] permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in article 18(4), is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a religion or belief stated in article 18(1). The Committee notes that public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18(4) unless provision is made for nondiscriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.97 94 

Ibid, para 36. Valsamis v Greece, App no 21787/93 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996), (1997) 24 EHRR 294. In this case, the Court recalled its case law under Art 9 of the ECHR and acknowledged that Jehovah’s Witnesses ‘enjoy both the status of a “Known Religion” and the advantages flowing from that as regards observance’. 96  For example, in Afghanistan the Talibans’ strict interpretation of Islam reportedly prohibited women from attending schools, showing their faces, or even walking alone on the street. See M Wojcik, C Revaz and B Apt, ‘International Human Rights’ (2002) 36(2) The International Lawyer 683, 687. 97  HRC, General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art 18), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (30 July 1993) para 6. The General Comment followed the jurisprudence of the HRC in Hartikainen v Finland, Communication no 40/1978, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 74 (1984), and 95 

574 

The Right to Education

Compulsory religious or moral education in schools does not conflict with Article 18(4) of the ICCPR if given in ‘a neutral and objective way and respects the convictions of parents and guardians who do not believe in any religion’.98 In principle it appears that the above comment equally applies in the context of Article 13(3) of the ICESCR. Respect for parents’ religious convictions can be achieved by denominational neutrality, not secularism. As noted by Judge Power: Neutrality requires a pluralist approach on the part of the State, not a secularist one. It encourages respect for all world views rather than a preference for one. To my mind, the Chamber Judgment was striking in its failure to recognise that secularism (which was the applicant’s preferred belief or world view) was, in itself, one ideology among others. A preference for secularism over alternative world views—whether religious, philosophical or o ­ therwise—is not a neutral option. The Convention requires that respect be given to the first applicant’s convictions insofar as the education and teaching of her children was concerned. It does not require a preferential option for and endorsement of those convictions over and above all others.99

However, respect for parents’ religious convictions does not permit a parent to object to the integrated teaching of religious or philosophical information conveyed ‘in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner’.100 The state is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ religious and moral (or philosophical) convictions.101 [11.27]  The central obligation regarding parental rights is to ‘respect’, which means more than ‘acknowledge’ or that they must be ‘taken into account’.102 In addition to the essentially negative obligations against state interference with parents’ freedom to choose private schools for their children and with parents’ religious convictions in such schools, the state should actively respect parental convictions within public schools. This applies to all functions the state exercises in connection with education, whether academic (including the content of education and the manner of its provision) or administrative.103 [11.28]  In order to guarantee the right to establish and direct private educational institutions, while at the same time maintaining minimum standards, Article 13(4) of the ICESCR provides: No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State. William Eduardo Delgado Páez v Colombia, Communication no 195/1985, UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990). See also Leirvåg et al v Norway, Communication no 1155/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003 (2004) and Folgerø and Others v Norway, App no 15472/02 (ECtHR, 29 June 2007), (2008) 46 EHRR 1147. 98 

Hartikainen v Finland, above n 97, para 10.4. Lautsi and Others v Italy, App no 30814/06 (ECtHR, 18 March 2011), Concurring Opinion of Judge Power. 100  Kjeldsen, BuskMadsen and Pedersen v Denmark, App nos 5095/71, 5920/72, and 5926/72, (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), Series A, no 23, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 711, para 53. 101  Ibid. 102  Campbell and Cosans v UK, above n 93, para 77(a). 103  Ibid, paras 33–36; Valsamis v Greece, above n 95, para 27. 99 

International Protection of the Right

 575

By way of summary, Article 13 of the ICESCR obliges states parties to make all education, whether public or private, formal or non-formal, directed towards the aims and objectives identified in Article 13(1).104 These objectives reflect the fundamental purposes of the UN, as enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, and in ­Article 26(2) of the UDHR. However, Article 13 adds to the UDHR in three respects: it requires education to be directed to the development of human personality and the sense of dignity, in order to ‘enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society’, and to promote understanding among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups.105 The aims and objectives of education have further been expounded in several other instruments106 that closely correspond to Article 13(1) of the ICESCR, and with new elements such as the explicit reference to gender equality and respect for the environment. These new elements are ‘implicit in, and reflect a contemporary interpretation of article 13(1)’.107 [11.29]  The ICESCR further obliges state parties, under Article 14, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all.108

The ICESCR prompted more than a dozen state parties to submit reservations to its provision on the right to education, which range from acknowledgements that granting access to primary education was beyond the financial capacity of the state, to assertions that education should be treated as a monopoly of the state, or that parents should be allowed to educate their children themselves, in their own homes.109 I.  Protection Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child [11.30]  The provisions of the ICESCR dealing with the right to education, and the other human rights instruments discussed above, are reinforced by the CRC,110 which lays down the full scope of the right to education from a child’s rights perspective.111 104 

See section IV. below on state obligations. ICESCR, Art 13(1). 106  See, eg, the World Declaration on Education for All (1990) (adopted by 155 governmental delegations), Art 1; CRC, Art 29(1); the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted by 171 governmental delegations), pt I, para 33 and pt II, para 80; and the Plan of Action for the UN Decade for Human Rights Education (adopted by consensus resolution of the General Assembly), para 2. 107  CESCR, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para 5. 108  ICESCR, Art 14; CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (10 May 1999) paras 6–7. 109  CESCR, Status of the ICESCR and Reservations, Withdrawals, Declarations and Objections under the Covenant: Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/3/Rev.3. See also Appendix H to this book. 110  See also the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by GA res 1386, on 20 November 1959, principle 7 of which declares in part, ‘[t]he child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages’. 111  Under Art 1 of the CRC, ‘a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. Regarding the right to education, see S Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) 471–530; CRC, General Comment 1: The Aims of Education, UN Doc CRC/GC/2001/1 (7 April 2001). 105 

576 

The Right to Education

The Convention, the travaux préparatoires of which in respect of Article 28 indicate that it was based upon Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,112 contains the principles of free education, compulsory education, non-discrimination and equal access to education, and governs educational disciplinary measures, the objectives of education and safeguards against work that interferes with children’s primary education. Furthermore, the CRC calls for international cooperation in educational matters.113 In order not to impede a child’s right to education, Article 32(1) provides for protective measures by the state against economic exploitation of children (child labour). [11.31]  As a result of what states perceived as the demanding nature (in terms of resources) of the states’ obligations concerning education, a number of states made a variety of reservations.114 The reservations of Singapore and Malaysia offer some illustration. With respect to free and compulsory primary education under Article 28(1)(a) of the CRC, the Republic of Singapore reservation states that Singapore does not consider itself bound by the requirement to make primary education compulsory, because such a measure is ‘unnecessary in our social context’ where in practice virtually all children attend primary school, and that Singapore ‘reserves the right to provide primary education free only to children who are citizens of Singapore’.115 The reservation of the Government of Malaysia indicates that the Government subjected certain provisions of the Convention to national law. The reservation states that Malaysia accepts the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but expresses reservations with respect to articles … 28, [paragraph 1(a)], … of the Convention and declares that the said provisions shall be applicable only if they are in conformity with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of Malaysia.116

Such reservations to human rights treaties (subjecting central provisions of the treaty to domestic law that is incompatible with treaty provisions) have generally been problematic, especially when they appear to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty.117 [11.32]  Not surprisingly, therefore, some states (including Austria, Belgium and Denmark) objected to such reservations. For example, the Belgian Government ­ believed the Malaysian reservation to be ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and that, consequently, in accordance with Article 51, paragraph 2, of

112  See UN Docs E/CN.4/1985/64, paras 60, 67, 76; E/CN.4/1989/48, paras 462–63; S Detrick (ed), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the ‘Travaux préparatoires’ (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992). 113  See CRC, Arts 28–29; G Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) ch 9, 232–61. 114 CRC Committee, Reservations, Declarations and Objections Relating to the CRC, note by the ­Sec-Gen, UN Doc CRC/C/2/Rev.8 (7 December 1999). 115  Ibid, Singapore. 116  Ibid. 117  HRC, General Comment 24: Issues Relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (4 November 1994).

International Protection of the Right

 577

the Convention, it is not permitted’.118 Similarly, Denmark observed that the Malaysian reservation extended to the ‘central provisions of the Convention’, and considered the said reservation to be ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and accordingly inadmissible and without effect under international law’.119 For its part, the CRC Committee considered Malaysian reservation to be ‘not necessary’ and recommended that Malaysia expedite its ongoing efforts to review the nature of its reservations with a view to withdrawing them.120 As noted in chapter six, in line with the encouragement of states given by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 to review and withdraw reservations, the CRC Committee noted that ‘States should withdraw reservations’ to ensure full and undiluted respect for human rights.121 With respect to the Singapore reservation regarding the right to free and compulsory primary education under Article 28 (and other reservations), the Committee observed in 2011: 6. The Committee deeply regrets that, despite the recommendation in its previous concluding observations (CRC/C/15/Add.220, para 7), the State party still maintains numerous declarations on articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 37, and reservations to articles 7, 9, 10, 22, 28 and 32 of the Convention. The Committee expresses serious concerns about the continuation of declarations on and reservations to so many articles of the Convention, including the principle of respect for the views of the child, as they constitute an obstacle to the full and effective implementation of the State party’s obligation under the Convention. 7. In light of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, and in view of the significant steps already taken by the State party, the Committee urges the State party to take all necessary measures to withdraw its declarations on and reservations to the Convention, without further delay.122

Indeed, a reservation to a state’s obligation in relation to primary education undermines the minimum core obligation of a state relating to the right to education, which, as noted in chapter two, must be respected at all times. And as noted in chapter six, such a reservation is unlikely to be compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, and should be considered to be invalid. [11.33]  Although the CRC took a step forward in protecting a child’s right to education, like the ICESCR, the Convention does not impose on states the obligation to provide any type of early childhood care and pre-school education.123 This is despite UNESCO’s proposal to include an obligation on states to facilitate the provision of early childhood care and education, using all possible means, in particular for the disadvantaged child, in order to contribute to the young

118 

CRC Committee, Reservations, Declarations and Objections, above n 114 (1 July 1996). Ibid (2 July 1996). Committee, Concluding Observations: Malaysia, UN Doc CRC/C/MYS/CO/1 (25 June 2007) paras 11–12. 121  CRC Committee, General Comment 5: General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (3 October 2003) para 6. 122  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Singapore, UN Doc CRC/C/SGP/CO/2-3 (4 May 2011). See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Singapore, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.220 (27 October 2003) paras 6–7. 123  See G Van Bueren, ‘Education: Whose Right Is it Any Way?’ in L Heffernan (ed), Human Rights: A European Perspective (Dublin, Round Hall Press, 1994) 340, 341. 119 

120  CRC

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The Right to Education

child’s growth, development and to enhance his or her later success at other levels of education.124

This proposal faced opposition by many states on the ground that it would increase their educational expenditure.125 It was not seen as increasing the return on educational investment. The lack of reference to pre-school education has been described as an unfortunate omission as the opportunity to participate in pre-school education is important because children’s attitudes, for example on race, are often formed in the pre-school years.126

In addition, Article 28(1)(a) of the CRC is weaker than Article 13(2)(a) and 14 of the ICESCR in respect of primary education, since the CRC does not specify any timeframe for the progressive implementation of the principle of compulsory and free primary education.127 However, the CRC recognises under Article 28(3) that ‘international cooperation’ in matters relating to education is essential to address ‘the needs of developing countries’.128 J.  Protection Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [11.34]  At a regional level, the right to education is also firmly recognised in the three regional human rights treaties in Europe, the Americas and Africa.129 Article 17(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Charter’ or ‘the Charter’)130 simply states in very general terms: [E]very individual shall have the right to education.

In Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v Zaire, the African Commission considered, inter alia, a communication alleging a two-year-long closure of universities and secondary schools in Zaire (as it was at the time, now the DRC).131 The Commission noted that ‘Article 17 of the Charter guarantees the right to education. The closures of universities and secondary schools as described in communication 100/93 constitute a violation of Article 17’.132 Although the Commission found a violation of the right to education, it did not define the content of the right. This left the content of the right to education under the African Charter uncertain.

124  See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, E/CN.4/1989/48 (2 March 1989) 80, para 459. 125  Ibid. 126  Van Bueren, above n 113, 234. 127 D Hodgson, ‘The International Human Right to Education and Education concerning Human Rights’ (1996) 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 237. 128  CRC Committee, General Comment 5, above n 121, paras 60–64. 129  See the ECHR, Art 14, together with Art 2 of Protocol I thereto; African Charter, Arts 2 and 17(1); and the Protocol of San Salvador, Arts 3 and 13. 130  Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 131  Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v Zaire, Communications nos 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 (joint), 9th Annual Activity Report, (1997) 4 IHRR 89, (2000) AHRLR 74. 132  Ibid, para 48.

International Protection of the Right

 579

[11.35]  Article 11(3) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child133 clarifies the above general provision on education under the African Charter, by obliging states parties to ‘take all appropriate measures’ with a view to achieving the full realisation of the right to education, and in particular to: (a) provide free and compulsory basic education; (b) encourage the development of secondary education in its different forms and to progressively make it free and accessible to all; (c) make the higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity and ability by every appropriate means; (d) take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates; (e) take special measures in respect of female, gifted and disadvantaged children, to ensure equal access to education for all sections of the community.

According to the Commission Guidelines for National Periodic Reports on the right to education under Article 17(1) of the African Charter, and the African Commission Guidelines and Principles on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, states are required to report, inter alia, on the measures taken to achieve the full realisation of the right of everyone to receive compulsory and free primary education;134 on the measures taken in respect of secondary education, including technical and vocational secondary education; and on higher education and fundamental education for persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education.135 K.  Protection Under the Protocol of San Salvador [11.36]  In the Inter-American system, the Protocol of San Salvador136 provides: Everyone has the right to education.137

In Article 13(3), the states parties to this Protocol ‘recognize’ that in order to achieve the full exercise of the right to education: (a) Primary education should be compulsory and accessible to all without cost; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, should be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free education;

133 

OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999. African Commission, ‘Guidelines for National Periodic Reports’, available at http://www.achpr. org/instruments/guidelines_national_periodic_reports/ and reproduced in R Murray and M Evans (eds), Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001) 70; ‘Principles and Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr_instr_ guide_draft_esc_rights_eng.pdf, paras 68–71. Art 62 of the African Charter requires states parties to submit every two years reports on the legislative and other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the Charter. 135  Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, ibid. 136  Above n 37. 137  Ibid, Art 13. 134  See

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(c) Higher education should be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of individual capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free education; (d) Basic education should be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole cycle of primary instruction; (e) Programs of special education should be established for the handicapped, so as to provide special instruction and training to persons with physical disabilities or mental deficiencies.

Article 13(4) of the Protocol protects parents’ ‘right to select the type of education to be given to their children’, and Article 13(5) provides: Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of individuals and entities to establish and direct educational institutions in accordance with the domestic legislation of the States Parties.

L. Protection Under the (Revised) European Social Charter and the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights [11.37]  The European Social Charter of 1961138 focused on one aspect of the right to education, namely, the right to vocational guidance and training.139 Under Article 17(1) of the revised Charter 1996, the contracting parties undertake to ensure the provision of institutions and services to provide care, education and training to children and young persons up to the age of 18.140 By Article 17(2) of the revised Charter, contracting parties undertake to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed to provide to children and young persons a free primary and secondary education as well as to encourage regular attendance at schools.

In relation to Article 17, the Appendix to the revised Charter states that ‘[i]t is understood that this provision covers all persons below the age of 18 years … This does not imply an obligation to provide compulsory education up to the above-mentioned age’, since in some European states only primary education is compulsory.141 The implication of this is that ‘Article 17(2) does not require that education, whether primary or secondary, be compulsory.’142 As made clear by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,143 there is only a ‘possibility’ (ie mere ‘likelihood’)144 to receive free compulsory education. The Charter provides: 1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training. 2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education.145

138  529 UNTS 89, signed by members of the Council of Europe at Turin 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965. 139  European Social Charter (1961), Arts 9 and 10. 140  See Revised Charter Explanatory Report, para 72, Collected Texts 218. 141  Ibid, para 74. 142  DJ Harris and J Darcy, European Social Charter, 2nd edn (Ardsley, NY, Transnational, 2001) 269. 143  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01. 144  The New Oxford Thesaurus of English (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 735. 145  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 14.

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 581

[11.38]  Article 17 of the revised European Social Charter ‘complements and to some extent overlaps with the guarantee of the right to education in Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR’,146 which, as noted in paragraph 11.23 above, provides in the first sentence that ‘No person shall be denied the right to education.’ Although this Article has a negative formulation, in the Belgian Linguistic case147 the ECtHR found: In spite of its negative formulation, this provision [Article 2] uses the term ‘right’ and speaks of a ‘right to education’. Likewise, the Preamble to the Protocol specifies that the object of the Protocol lies in the collective enforcement of ‘rights and freedoms’. There is therefore no doubt that Article 2 does enshrine a right.148

Consequently, the Court held that the first sentence of Article 2 of the First Protocol enshrined, first, a right of access to educational institutions existing at a given time.149 Secondly, it enshrined a right to be educated in the national language, or in one of the national languages, so as to realise an effective and meaningful education. Thirdly, it entailed a right to official recognition of the studies an individual has successfully completed.150 The Court further held that the content of the right to education would vary from time to time and from place to place, according to economic and social circumstances. However, at the same time, it stated that ‘the negative formulation indicates … that the Contracting Parties do not recognise such a right to education as would require them to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level’.151 In this respect, it is narrower than guarantees under international human rights instruments, such as those under the ICESCR and CRC, as reviewed above.

III.  SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION A.  Scope and Content [11.39]  The ECtHR defined ‘the education of children’ as ‘the whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit their beliefs, culture and other values to the young, whereas teaching or instruction refers in particular to the transmission of knowledge and to intellectual development’.152 The UNESCO Convention states that the term ‘education’ refers to to all types and levels of education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of education, and the conditions under which it is given.153

146 

Harris and Darcy, above n 142, 269. Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium v Belgium (Belgian Linguistic), App nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, and 2126/64, Judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A, no 6; (1979–80) 1 EHRR 252. 148  Ibid, under the heading ‘B. Interpretation adopted by the Court’ para 3. 149  Ibid. 150  Ibid. 151  Ibid. 152  Campbell and Cosans v UK, above n 93, para 33. 153  UNESCO Convention, Art 1(2). 147 

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The Right to Education

The preceding survey of international and regional instruments defines the content of the right to education and corresponding state obligations, which includes: (a) provision of primary/basic education that is free and compulsory;154 (b) progressive introduction of free secondary, higher and fundamental education;155 (c) access to public educational institutions and programmes on non-discriminatory basis;156 (d) educational quality that conforms to the internationally recognised objectives;157 (e) a guarantee of parental choice in the education of their children without interference from the state or third parties, subject to conformity with ‘minimum educational standards’.158 These elements (discussed below) constitute the core obligations of states in respect of the right to education.159 B.  Levels of Education i.  Primary Education [11.40]  Several of the international human rights treaties reviewed above require ‘primary education’ to be ‘compulsory’ and ‘available free to all’.160 However, such treaties neither define what ‘primary education’ is, nor do they indicate what is meant by ‘compulsory’ or ‘available free to all’. Guidelines from UNESCO indicate that primary education relates to the first layer of a formal school system; it usually begins between the ages of five and seven year and lasts approximately six years, but in any case no less than four years.161 There is a trend to lengthen the duration of compulsory schooling beyond 11 years of age so that compulsory schooling lasts to at least the minimum age of employment.162 Primary education focuses on imparting basic learning skills and providing ‘basic education’—literacy, numeracy, skills relating to one’s health and social skills such as oral expression,163 as well as the objectives of education

154  ICESCR, Art 13(2); CRC, Art 28(1)(a); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(a); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(3)(a). 155  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b) and (c); CRC, Art 28(1)(b) and (c); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(b) and (c); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(3)(b) and (c). 156 UDHR, Art 26(1); ICESCR, Art 13(1); CRC, Art 29(1); UNESCO Convention, Art 3; ICERD, Art 5; CEDAW, Art 10. 157  UDHR, Art 26(2); ICESCR, Art 13(1); CRC, Art 29; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(2); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 12(2). 158 ICESCR, Art 13(3) and 4; ECHR, Art 2; CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 57; F Coomans, ‘Clarifying the Core Elements of the Right to Education’ (1995) 18 SIM Special 11. 159  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 57; Tomaševski, above n 14, 53; F Coomans, ‘In Search of the Core Content of the Right to Education’ in D Brand and S Russell (eds), Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2002) 159. 160 See, eg, ICESCR, Art 13(2)(a); UNESCO Convention, Art 4(a); CRC, Art 28(1)(a). UNESCO, The Right to Primary Education Free of Charge for All: Ensuring Compliance with International Obligations (Paris, UNSECO, 2008), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001591/159168m.pdf. 161 UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Paris, UNESCO, 1996) 3. 162  Tomasevski, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/6, above n 2, para 46. 163 See World Declaration on Education for All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs, World Conference on Education for All, Jomtien, Thailand, March 1990, available at http://www.un-documents.net/jomtien.htm.

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as laid down in the international human rights instruments.164 It can be enjoyed in different forms, not necessarily in the form of formal traditional school and classroom teaching.165 [11.41]  Primary education is fundamental to the development of an individual’s abilities and society as a whole, and should thus have priority in available resource allocation.166 It is part of the minimum core obligation of states, below which a state would be in prima facie violation of the right to education.167 As the CESCR observed: [T]he obligation of States Parties to the Covenant to ensure that ‘primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all’ applies in all situations including those in which local communities are unable to furnish buildings, or individuals are unable to afford any costs associated with attendance at school.168

This reinforces the compulsory nature of primary education and the requirement that primary education must be ‘free of charge’. [11.42]  The CESCR explained the meaning of the terms ‘compulsory’ and ‘free of charge’ in its General Comment 11 as follows: 6. Compulsory. The element of compulsion serves to highlight the fact that neither parents, nor guardians, nor the State are entitled to treat as optional the decision as to whether the child should have access to primary education. Similarly, the prohibition of gender discrimination in access to education, required also by articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant, is further underlined by this requirement. It should be emphasised, however, that the education offered must be adequate in quality, relevant to the child and must promote the realisation of the child’s other rights. 7. Free of charge. The nature of this requirement is unequivocal. The right is expressly formulated so as to ensure the availability of primary education without charge to the child, parents or guardians. Fees imposed by the Government, the local authorities or the school, and other direct costs, constitute disincentives to the enjoyment of the right and may jeopardise its realisation. They are also often highly regressive in effect. Their elimination is a matter which must be addressed by the required plan of action. Indirect costs, such as compulsory levies on parents (sometimes portrayed as being voluntary, when in fact they are not), or the obligation to wear a relatively expensive school uniform, can also fall into the same category. Other indirect costs may be permissible, subject to the Committee’s examination on a case-by-case basis. This provision of compulsory primary education in no way conflicts with the right recognised in article 13.3 of the Covenant for parents and guardians ‘to choose for their children schools other than those established by the public authorities’.169

[11.43]  Thus it is clear that the phrase ‘available free to all’, in Article 13(2)(a) of the ICESCR, means that primary education must be provided ‘without [direct or indi-

164 

UDHR, Art 26(2); ICESCR, Art 13(1); CRC, Art 29(1). UNESCO Convention, Art 1(2). CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 51. 167  Ibid, para 57. 168  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Kenya, UN Doc E/C.12/1993/6 (3 June 1993) para 18. 169  CESCR, General Comment 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/4 (10 May 1999). 165  166 

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The Right to Education

rect] charge to the child, parents or guardians’ at the point of use.170 However, some states still charge school fees for access to primary education, mostly in Africa and Asia.171 In many states indirect fees for primary education, (such as expenses for meals in school canteens, school transport, uniforms, medical expenses, boarding fees or provision of labour by parents for constructing, running or maintaining the school), are still widespread and very expensive for many families, thereby undermining the right to free primary education.172 Indeed states have given a limited definition of the obligation to provide ‘free’ primary education. For example, in 1995, regarding the meaning of ‘free’ basic education, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic held: Education free of charge unquestionably means that the state shall bear the costs of establishing schools and school facilities, of their operation and maintenance, but above all it means that the state may not demand tuition, that is, the provision of primary—and secondary— level education for payment. … The provision on the degree to which the government provides free textbooks, teaching texts, and basic school materials cannot be placed under the heading of the right to education free of charge. … It is clear that education free of charge cannot consist in the fact that the state bears all costs incurred by citizens when pursuing their right to education. … The expenses connected with putting the right to education into effect are a long-term investment into the life of the citizen. The state bears the essential part of these costs, however, it is not obliged to bear all of them.173

It has to be noted that this is a narrow interpretation of ‘free’ education that exonerates the state from indirect costs of education, such as contributions towards textbooks and basic teaching materials. Such a narrow interpretation may jeopardise the realisation of the right to primary education for those who are too economically disadvantaged to afford such materials. Thus, a broader interpretation of ‘free’ education is preferred. As Meron put it, generally, ‘broad interpretations of rights are necessary for the effective protection of human dignity, which is the goal of human rights law’.174 [11.44]  The compulsory nature of primary education requires states to take measures (such as the provision of schools within a reasonable distance from the children’s homes) to encourage regular attendance at schools and reduce drop-out rates.175 A state’s failure (unwillingness, as opposed to impossibility or inability) to introduce, as a matter of priority, primary education that is compulsory and available free to all, is a violation of the right to education.176 For example, in respect of the DRC 170 

Ibid, para 7. Tomaševski, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45, above n 4, para 27. See also RB Kattan and N Burnett, User Fees in Primary Education (Washington DC, World Bank, July 2004); K Tomaševski, ‘School Fees as Hindrance to Universalizing Primary Education’, Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, The Leap to Equality (2003), available at unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001469/146984e. pdf. In 2003, 91 states were charging fees for primary education. 172  Coomans (2002), above n 16, 228. 173  Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Case no PL.US 25/94, 13 June 1995, (1995) 2 Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law 151. The Court was interpreting Art 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms of the Czech Republic, which guarantees to all citizens the right to elementary and secondary education ‘free of charge’. 174 T Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) 165. 175  CRC, Art 28(1)(e); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(3)(d). 176 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), UN Doc E/1988/14, para 297; CESCR E/1992/23, para 328(d); F Coomans, ‘Identifying Violations of the Right to Education’ (1998) 20 SIM Special 125–46 at 146. 171  See

Scope and Content of the Right

 585

(formerly Zaire), the CESCR was ‘profoundly dissatisfied with the education system in the Congo’.177 It expressed the view that that ‘the fact that Zaire was not able to secure primary education free of charge was not in conformity with articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant’.178 It called on the state party to provide primary education ‘free of charge in the near future’.179 States must therefore ensure that primary education is free for all and compulsory by law,180 in addition to putting in place official state inspections to supervise this obligation with respect to parents, schools, employers and pupils. ii.  Fundamental Education [11.45]  The ICESCR guarantees the right to ‘fundamental education’ for individuals ‘who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education’.181 In General Comment 13 on the right to education,182 the CESCR explained: 22. In general terms, fundamental education corresponds to basic education as set out in the World Declaration on Education for All.183 By virtue of article 13(2)(d), individuals ‘who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education’ have a right to fundamental education, or basic education as defined in the World Declaration on Education for All. 23. Since everyone has the right to the satisfaction of their ‘basic learning needs’ as understood by the World Declaration, the right to fundamental education is not confined to those ‘who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education’. The right to fundamental education extends to all those who have not yet satisfied their ‘basic learning needs’. 24. It should be emphasised that enjoyment of the right to fundamental education is not limited by age or gender; it extends to children, youth and adults, including older persons. Fundamental education, therefore, is an integral component of adult education and lifelong learning. Because fundamental education is a right of all age groups, curricula and delivery systems must be devised which are suitable for students of all ages.

[11.46]  The text of the ICESCR does not oblige states to ‘ensure’ that fundamental education is available, but only that it ‘shall be encouraged or intensified as far as ­possible’.184 The use of the terms to ‘encourage’ (meaning to ‘inspire with confidence’185

177  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of the Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.45 (23 May 2000) para 23. 178  See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Zaire, above n 176. 179  Ibid. 180  See the Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties (hereinafter ‘Reporting Guidelines’), UN Doc HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1 (2001); and Appendix I to this book, para 59. 181  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(d); Reporting Guidelines for Article 13; UNESCO Convention, Art 4(c); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(d). 182  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, paras 22–24. 183 See World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs, adopted by the World Conference on Education for All Meeting Basic Learning Needs (Jomtien, Thailand, 5–9 March 1990) available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001275/127583e.pdf. 184  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(d). 185  Collins Gem English Dictionary (Glasgow, HarperCollins, 1992) 17.

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The Right to Education

or ‘support’)186 or ‘intensify’ (meaning to ‘make of great strength’187 or ‘escalate, step up, boost, increase, raise, sharpen, or strengthen’)188 indicate that fundamental education does not entail a heavy obligation, especially since this is even qualified by ‘as far as possible’. Nonetheless, in general terms, ‘fundamental education’ corresponds to ‘basic education’, which is a right of all age groups. It has to address basic literacy and numeracy skills, as well as basic professional skills, to enable individuals to function as members of society, to take part in social and cultural life, to generate income, to participate in community development projects, and to have access to and utilise information from a variety of sources.189 Therefore under the 2008 Reporting Guidelines, states are required to indicate ‘the measures taken to promote literacy, as well as adult and continuing education, in a life-long perspective’.190 iii.  Secondary Education [11.47]  International human rights treaties oblige states to make secondary education ‘generally available and accessible to all’. Some key texts are set out below: Article 13(2)(b) ICESCR The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right: … (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education … Article 4(a) Convention against Discrimination in Education191 The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in particular: (a) To … make secondary education in its different forms generally available and accessible to all … Article 28(1)(b) Convention on the Rights of the Child States Parties recognise the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: … (b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need. 186 

The New Oxford Thesaurus of English (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 305. Collins Gem English Dictionary, above n 185, 284. 188  The New Oxford Thesaurus of English, above n 186, 517. 189  Coomans (2002), above n 16, 227. 190  See Appendix I to this book, para 62. 191  UNESCO Convention. 187 

Scope and Content of the Right

 587

[11.48]  The requirement that secondary education ‘shall be generally available’192 signifies, ‘firstly, that secondary education is not dependent on a student’s apparent capacity or ability and, secondly, that secondary education will be distributed throughout the State in such a way that it is available on the same basis to all’.193 The state is obliged to use ‘every appropriate means’ to ensure the availability of secondary education.194 This requires states to adopt varied and innovative approaches to the delivery of secondary education in different social and cultural contexts.195 The ultimate aim should be the ‘progressive introduction of free [secondary] education’,196 which means that while states must prioritise the provision of free primary education, they also have an obligation to take concrete steps towards achieving free secondary education.197 The Reporting Guidelines198 for Article 13 of the ICESCR require states to indicate whether secondary education, including technical and vocational secondary education, is generally accessible to all, and to report on any concrete steps taken by the state towards the progressive achievement of free secondary education. The Committee has recommended that states with strong economies extend free education to secondary education. So, for example, in relation to Korea: The Committee is disturbed by a range of features of the Korean education system. Only primary education is provided free of charge. However, given the strength of the Korean economy it appears appropriate that free education should also extend to the secondary and higher sectors.199

[11.49]  In reality, many states charge fees for all levels of education.200 These fees epitomise the impossibility of making secondary education accessible and alleviating poverty through education for all those who are too poor to afford it.201 They also reflect discriminatory denials of the right to education on the grounds of poverty.202 Consequently, children from poor families, particularly girls, are denied a right of access to, at best, good-quality secondary education or, at worst, even to poor-quality secondary education. This broadens the gap between the ‘haves and have-nots’.203 [11.50]  The comparable obligation imposed by Article 28(1)(b) of the CRC is to ‘encourage’ the development of different forms of secondary education, make them

192  See ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b). See also UNESCO Convention, Art 4; the Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(b) uses a weaker phrase, ‘should be generally available’. This was used deliberately, to avoid a strict obligation. See Organization of American States General Assembly, Proceedings, Vol 1 (1986), AG/ Res 836 (XVI-O/86), available at http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/ag03800E01.pdf. 193  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 13. 194  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b); ch 2 above. 195  Ibid, ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b). 196  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(3)(b); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(b). 197  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 14. 198  See Appendix I to this book, para 60. 199 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, UN Doc E/C.12/1995/3 (7 June 1995) para 13. 200  More than 80 states lack free public primary education available to all primary school age children. See http://www.right-to-education.org/. 201 K Tomaševski, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/913 (December 2002) para 8. 202  Ibid. 203  Ibid, para 22.

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The Right to Education

available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures ‘such as’ (not ‘in particular’) the introduction of free education and financial assistance in case of need. It is notable that while the ICESCR obliges states to make secondary education ‘generally available and accessible to all’, the obligation under the CRC merely to ‘encourage’ the development of different forms of secondary education appears to be weaker (see paragraph 11.47 above). [11.51]  Apart from providing that secondary education includes technical and vocational education (TVE),204 none of the applicable treaties defines the term ‘secondary education’, which thus remains ambiguous. According to a general literal definition, it [secondary education] belongs to an amorphous zone that lies between basic [primary] education and higher education. Secondary education is a step for pupils between the ages of 11 or 12 and 18. At this level, pupils are expected to broaden their knowledge and experiences from the basic level and prepare for work or higher education.205

Technical and vocational education, as part of secondary education, ‘shall be generally available’.206 The UDHR similarly states that technical and professional education ‘shall be made generally available’.207 Neither the ICESCR, nor the UDHR or the Protocol of San Salvador defines the meaning of ‘technical’ or ‘vocational’ education. But, according to Article 1(a) of the UNESCO Convention on Technical and Vocational Education (1989),208 TVE consists of all forms and levels of the educational process involving, in addition to general knowledge, the study of technologies and related sciences and the acquisition of practical skills, knowhow, attitudes and understanding relating to occupations in the various sectors of economic and social life.209

[11.52]  In order to enable individuals to enjoy TVE, it is essential that states make the relevant information and guidance available.210 Thus, Article 28(1)(d) of the CRC obliges states to ‘make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children’. However, the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and stereotypical behaviour with respect to the role of women and men in the family and society, still limits women’s accessibility to secondary education and perpetuates direct and indirect discrimination against girls and women.211

204 

ICESCR, Art 13(2)(b); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(b). Serrant and M McClure, Secondary Education Reform: Policy Briefing Paper (Washington DC, World Bank, 2000). See also UNESCO, International Standard Classification of Education 2011 (Paris, UNESCO, 2012) 33–42. 206  ICESCR, Art 13(2). 207  UDHR, Art 26(1). 208  UNESCO Convention on Technical and Vocational Education (1989), adopted on 10 November 1989 by the General Conference of UNESCO at the 25th Session, held in Paris, entered into force on 29 August 1991, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000846/084696e.pdf#page=235. 209  See also CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 16. 210  See ILO Convention No 142, Art 3 (Convention Concerning Vocational Guidance and Vocational Training in the Development of Human Resources), adopted 23 June 1975, entered into force 19 July 1977; European Social Charter (1961), Arts 9–10. 211  See, eg, CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Uganda, UN Doc CEDAW/C/2002/EXC/ CRP.3/Add.3/Rev 1 (23 August 2002) paras 20–21; J Kwesiga, Women’s Access to Higher Education in Africa: Uganda’s Experience (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2002) chs 8–9; Villalobos, Girls’ Right to Education, above n 4. 205  TD

Scope and Content of the Right

 589

[11.53]  It is essential to note that the continually increasing complexity of human existence and the world of work, spurred along by the information society and the knowledge-based economy, demands a level of education that goes beyond seven years of primary education. As Tomaševski212 rightly pointed out: Available evidence indicates that the key to reducing poverty is secondary rather than primary education. The Republic of Korea, often cited as the model for the economic rationale behind its investment in education, has found that secondary education had the ‘crucial relationship with economic growth’.213 The South African Human Rights Commission has objected to eight years of schooling defined as ‘basic education’, deeming it acceptable under the current fiscal constraints, but urging the Government to extend it to 10 years.214 The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has found that young people have to complete secondary education to achieve an 80 per cent probability of avoiding poverty, and its subsequent research has confirmed that between 72 and 96 per cent of families where the parents have less than nine years of education live in poverty.215

iv.  Higher Education [11.54]  The right to higher education is protected in international human rights treaties. Some key provisions are set out below: Article 13(2)(c) ICESCR The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right: … (a) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education … Article 4(a) Convention against Discrimination in Education The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in particular: (a) To … make higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of individual capacity …

212  See K Tomaševski, Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights res 2001/29, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/60 (7 January 2002) para 62. 213  The Ministry of Education, ‘The Development of Education: National Report of the Republic of Korea’ (Seoul, September 1996) 1. 214  South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), ‘The Right to Education’, Policy Paper No 2, available at the website of SAHRC at http://www.sahrc.org.za/. 215 ECLAC, The Equity Gap: Latin America, the Caribbean and the Social Summit (Santiago, United Nations, 1997) 116; ECLAC, Equidad, desarrollo y ciudadanía [Equity, Development and Citizenship] (­Santiago, United Nations, 2000) 72.

590 

The Right to Education

Article 28(1)(c) Convention on the Rights of the Child States Parties recognise the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: … (a) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means …

[11.55]  There is no guidance as to what is meant by ‘higher education’ in the treaties. However, it has been understood to include education provided by post-secondary institutions, such as ‘universities, polytechnics, colleges, and other providers of higher education’.216 [11.56]  International human rights treaties do not oblige states to make higher education ‘generally available’ but only ‘accessible to all, on the basis of capacity’.217 This suggests that there is no immediate legal obligation on states to make higher education generally available to everyone. Individuals can only claim access (without discrimination, geographically and economically) to what is available on the basis of capacity. ‘Capacity’ of individuals should be assessed by reference to all their relevant ability, expertise and experience.218 Due to the limited facilities and ‘human, material and financial’ resources for higher education, it is not incompatible with the right to restrict access to those students who have attained the academic level required to benefit most from the courses offered,219 in particular to ‘those who duly applied for entrance and passed the examination’.220 [11.57]  States must avoid restrictions to women’s access to higher education. In its Concluding Observations on Iran in 2013, the CESCR stated: The Committee is concerned about the restrictions placed on access to university education, in particular affecting women (art 2). The Committee recommends that the State party take steps to lift all restrictions on access to university education, including bans on female and male enrolment, limited quotas for women in certain fields, and gender segregation in classrooms and facilities.221

[11.58]  The textual reading of Article 13(2)(c) of the ICESCR, which is followed in other relevant instruments (reviewed in sections II. and III. above), requires states to use ‘every appropriate means’ to make higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of academic (not financial) capacity,222 in particular by ‘the progressive introduction of free education’ in relation to higher education. Thus, the failure to take ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted’ measures towards the progressive realisation of higher 216  J Taylor and A Miroiu, Policy-Making, Strategic Planning, and Management of Higher Education (Bucharest, UNESCO, 2002) 19. It involves degree courses, postgraduate courses and higher diplomas. 217  ICESCR, Art 13(2)(c); UNESCO Convention, Art 4(a); CRC, Art 28(1)(c); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(3)(c); African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(3)(c). 218  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 19. 219  Patel v UK, App no 8844/80, (1982) 4 EHRR 256 (EComHR, 9 December 1980); X v UK, App no 8874/80 (1982) 4 EHRR 252 (EComHR, 9 December 1980). 220  Tarantino and Others v Italy, Apps nos 25851/09, 29204/09 and 64090/09 (ECtHR, 2 April 2013) para 46. 221  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Iran, UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/CO/2 (10 June 2013) para 9. 222 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, E/C.12/KOR/CO/3 (17 December 2009) para 33.

Scope and Content of the Right

 591

education in quantitative and qualitative terms would violate a state’s obligation.223 For example, deliberately reversing existing levels of realisation, or obstructing further realisation without sufficient justification, amounts to a violation.224 A common deliberate retrogressive measure is either the (re)introduction or the raising of fees, which has a negative impact upon students from less-privileged backgrounds. In Mauritius, for example, government-encouraged and costly private tuition that rendered access to secondary and tertiary education more difficult for the poorer segments of the population in 1994, was considered by the CESCR to have amounted to ‘the re-introduction of fees at the tertiary level of education, which constitutes a deliberately retrogressive step’.225 Despite the existence of scholarships, bursaries, loans and other types of support provided to disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups in Canada, the Committee also expressed ‘concern about the discriminatory impact of tuition fee increases on low-income persons’.226 In case of the UK, the Committee noted with concern that the introduction of tuition fees and student loans, which is inconsistent with article 13(2)(c) of the Covenant, has tended to worsen the position of students from less privileged backgrounds, who are already underrepresented in tertiary education.227

The Committee urged the UK ‘to take effective measures to ensure that the introduction of tuition fees and student loans does not have a negative impact upon students from less privileged backgrounds’.228 It concluded: In line with general comment no 13 (1999) on the right to education, the Committee encourages the State party to review its policy on tuition fees for tertiary education with a view to implementing article 13 of the Covenant, which provides for the progressive introduction of free education at all levels. It also recommends that the State party eliminate the unequal treatment between European Union Member State nationals and nationals of other States regarding the reduction of university fees and the allocation of financial assistance.229

[11.59]  Nonetheless, in several states, tuition fees for university education are increasing, despite the fact that Article 13 of the ICESCR calls for the progressive introduction of free higher education.230 Introducing a reduction of fees in higher education with a view to abolishing them, in compliance with Article 13(2)(c) on the progressive introduction of free higher education, remains a distant dream.231 Attempts to challenge fees charged in higher educational institutions before national courts have 223 

CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 43. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22–26, 1997, (1998) 20(3) Human Rights Quarterly 691, para 14(e)–(f); CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1990), para 9; CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 45; Coomans (2002), above n 16, 239. 225  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mauritius, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/8 (31 May 1994) para 16. 226  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/4; E/C.12/CAN/CO/5 (22 May 2006) para 31. The Committee recommended that Canada ‘ensure by every appropriate means that higher education be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity’ (ibid, para 65). 227  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.79 (5 June 2002) para 22. 228  Ibid, para 41. 229  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 (12 June 2009) para 44. 230  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.29 (4 December 1998) para 22. 231  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (12 July 2011) para 30, ‘[t]he Committee reiterates its recommendation calling on the State party to introduce a reduction in tuition fees into the national framework legislation regulating higher education’. 224 

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The Right to Education

been unsuccessful. For example, in the Federation of Youth Association of Ghana (FEDYAG) v Public Universities of Ghana and Others,232 the applicants sought in 2010 a declaration before the Supreme Court of Ghana that the fee-paying policy implemented by the public universities of Ghana was inconsistent with the right to education as protected in the Constitution of Ghana 1992, Article 25(1)(c). Article 25 of Ghana’s Constitution 1992 reads: 1. All persons shall have the right to equal educational opportunities and facilities and with a view to achieving the full realisation of that right— (a) basic education shall be free, compulsory and available to all; (b) secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free education; (c) higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular, by progressive introduction of free education; (d) functional literacy shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible; (e) the development of a system of schools with adequate facilities at all levels shall be actively pursued. 2. Every person shall have the right, at his own expense, to establish and maintain a private school or schools at all levels and of such categories and in accordance with such conditions as may be provided by law.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Ghana concluded that the full feepaying system as implemented by Public Universities of Ghana did not infringe the right to education as protected in the Constitution of Ghana. The Court observed: The full fee paying policy is not unprecedented in Africa. It is implemented worldwide. What is required is that the defendants, students, parents and all stakeholders should develop adequate support mechanism[s] such as, scholarships, grants, insurance schemes and adequate student loan schemes to lessen the harsh effect of cost sharing. Until the resources are available to the state to provide free education in Ghana, the full fee-paying option would have to continue to enable more qualified Ghanaians to access public universities.

In short, the Court accepted the reality that free higher education is subject to resource availability. While this is generally consistent with the obligations of states under the ICESCR, the Court did not consider a state’s obligation to allocate sufficient resources (out of available resources) to educational institutions, including universities, so as to reduce fees in higher education. Similarly, the Court did not consider a state’s obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation in order achieve the progressive realisation of free higher education. [11.60]  The comparable specific obligation under Article 28(1)(c) of the CRC is to ‘[m]ake higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means’. Although in many respects this follows the text of the Covenant, it would appear to be weaker in as far as it does not specifically oblige states to ensure progressive introduction of free higher education.

232  Federation of Youth Association of Ghana (FEDYAG) v Public Universities of Ghana and Others, Writ no J1/5/2009 (27 July 2010).

Scope and Content of the Right

 593

[11.61]  There has been an ongoing process of state withdrawal from funding higher education. This was spurred in part by the overall policy of structural adjustment under the IMF and the World Bank.233 With particular reference to the education sector, increased state withdrawal from funding higher education and encouragement of private educational services was ‘recommended’ by a World Bank study on education in sub-Saharan Africa.234 The World Bank claimed that ‘[p]ublic investment in Universities and Colleges brings meagre returns compared to the returns for primary and secondary education and higher education magnifies inequalities’.235 [11.62]  Influenced by such arguments, many governments in developing states cut tertiary-level education funding and introduced a policy known as ‘cost-sharing’ in state-owned tertiary institutions.236 This meant that students formerly sponsored by the government had to contribute in terms of fees and other levies towards the total cost of education. ‘Cost-sharing’ also meant a shift in international assistance from funding universities and other institutions of higher learning. As a result, higher educational institutions have been starved of public funds, and higher education has been redefined from being a free public service to ‘a freely traded commodity’.237 It is of interest to note that the World Bank recently acknowledged the fact that ‘[h]igher education is no longer [and indeed has never been] a luxury, it is essential to national, social and economic development’.238 Primary and secondary education alone cannot help developing states to get into the global economy.239 The Bank has accepted the reality that investment in tertiary institutions is important if poor countries are to succeed in the era of globalisation.240 Thus, ‘[t]o focus exclusively on basic education would effectively doom a country’s efforts to secure a hold on the global economy’.241 It is essential to note that excessive expenditure on private education imposes great burdens on the household economy and has been the major cause of decline in quality of life for the middle classes.242 Thus, it is vital to strengthen the public education system and provide financial support to low income families to cover the associated costs of higher education, so as to eliminate discrimination against those from poor

233  On structural adjustment, see Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), Structural Adjustment: The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality—A Report on a Joint Participatory Investigation by Civil Society and the World Bank of the Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies (London, Zed, 2004). 234  See generally World Bank, Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalisation and Expansion (Washington, DC, World Bank, 1989). 235  The World Bank, Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise (Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2000) 10. 236 See, eg, JC Ssekamwa, History and Development of Education in Uganda (Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 1997) 211. 237  Tomaševski, above n 14, 111. 238  World Bank, above n 235, 14. 239  See the World Bank, Constructing Knowledge Societies: Challenges for Tertiary Education (Washing­ ton, DC, World Bank, 2000), available at go.worldbank.org/GX5J0A0KK0. The report was discussed at a meeting of education ministers in Tanzania in December 2002. See ‘World Bank Advises Uganda’, The Monitor, 24 December 2002. 240  The World Bank, Constructing Knowledge Societies, above n 239. 241  Ibid. 242 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, E/C.12/KOR/CO/3 (17 December 2009) para 33.

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The Right to Education

families,243 inequalities in the enjoyment of the right to education244 and associated risk of social exclusion.245

IV.  HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF EDUCATION A.  Making Education Available, Accessible, Acceptable and Adaptable [11.63]  In order to implement the content of the right to education, states are obliged to make education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable.246 GENERAL COMMENT 13, UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 (8 December 1999) 6. While the precise and appropriate application of the terms will depend upon the conditions prevailing in a particular State party, education in all its forms and at all levels shall exhibit the following interrelated and essential features:247 (a) Availability—functioning educational institutions and programmes have to be available in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction of the State party. What they require to function depends upon numerous factors, including the developmental context within which they operate; for example, all institutions and programmes are likely to require buildings or other protection from the elements, sanitation facilities for both sexes, safe drinking water, trained teachers receiving domestically competitive salaries, teaching materials, and so on; while some will also require facilities such as a library, computer facilities and information technology; (b) Accessibility—educational institutions and programmes have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions: — Non-discrimination—education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds (see paras 31–37 on non-discrimination); — Physical accessibility—education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some reasonably convenient geographic location (eg a neighbourhood school) or via modern technology (eg access to a ‘distance learning’ programme); 243 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, CRC/C/LKA/CO/3-4 (19 October 2010) para 62; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Lebanon, CRC/C/15/Add.169 (21 March 2002) paras 48–49. 244  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Morocco, CRC/C/MAR/CO/3-4 (14 October 2009) para 60(d). 245  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Colombia, CRC/C/COL/CO/3 (8 June 2006) para 76. 246  See Reports to the former UN Commission on Human Rights of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Tomaševski, Preliminary Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49 (13 January 1999) para 50; Progress Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/5 (1 February 2000) paras 32–65; Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/52 (9 January 2001); Annual Report, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/60 (7 January 2002) paras 22–45; Mission to China, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/ 45/Add.1 (21 November 2003) para 6; and K Tomaševski, Human Rights Obligations in Education (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005). 247  This approach corresponds with the Committee’s analytical framework adopted in relation to the rights to adequate housing and food, as well as the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education. In its General Comment 4, the Committee identified a number of factors that bear upon the right to adequate housing, including ‘availability’, ‘affordability’, ‘accessibility’ and ‘cultural adequacy’. In its General Comment 12, the Committee identified elements of the right to adequate food, such as ‘availability’, ‘acceptability’ and ‘accessibility’. In her preliminary report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education set out ‘four essential features that primary schools should exhibit, namely availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability’. See UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49, para 50.

Human Rights Obligations

 595

— Economic accessibility—education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject to the differential wording of article 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher education: whereas primary education shall be available ‘free to all’, States parties are required to progressively introduce free secondary and higher education; (c) Acceptability—the form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching methods, have to be acceptable (eg relevant, culturally appropriate and of good quality) to students and, in appropriate cases, parents; this is subject to the educational objectives required by article 13(1) and such minimum educational standards as may be approved by the State (see art 13(3) and (4)); (d) Adaptability—education has to be flexible so it can adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities and respond to the needs of students within their diverse social and cultural settings [eg children in nomadic communities and rural, isolated or remote areas, working children, children in areas suffering from armed conflict or natural disasters]. 7. When considering the appropriate application of these ‘interrelated and essential features’ the best interests of the student shall be a primary consideration.

[11.64]  The first state obligation is to ensure that ‘functioning educational institutions and programmes have to be available in sufficient quantity within the jurisdiction of the State’ (availability).248 The second state obligation is to ensure that ‘educational institutions and programmes have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State Party’ (accessibility).249 Discrimination in access to education on the basis of religion has been an issue of concern in some states, as the example of members belonging to the Baha’i community in Iran demonstrates:250 6. The Committee is concerned that the State party discriminates against religious communities other than those belonging to Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, which seriously and negatively affects the people’s enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee urges that the State party take steps to ensure that people with beliefs other than the religions recognized by the State party can fully enjoy all aspects of economic, social and cultural rights, without any discrimination. … 8. The Committee is concerned that members of the Baha’i community face widespread and entrenched discrimination, including denial of access to employment in the public sector and institutions of higher education, as well as to benefits of the pension system (art 2). The Committee recommends that the State party take steps to ensure that members of the Baha’i community are protected against discrimination and exclusion in every field, including denial of employment and benefits of the pension system. The Committee also recommends that the State party take steps to guarantee, in law and practice, the unhindered access of Baha’i students to universities and vocational training institutions, and to prevent refusals of access and expulsions of students from such institutions based on their belonging to the Baha’i community.251

248 

CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 6(a). Ibid, 6(b). See International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Iran: Punishing Stars: Systematic Discrimination and Exclusion in Iranian Higher Education (4 December 2010), available at http://www.iranhumanrights. org/2010/12/punishing-stars-dec2010/. 251  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/CO/2 (10 June 2013). 249  250 

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The Right to Education

[11.65]  States have to ‘ensure, when possible, that children belonging to minority [linguistic] groups have access to education in their mother tongue’.252 The Committee’s comments on Cambodia illustrate the need to ensure that education is accessible to minorities and indigenous communities: The Committee notes with concern that primary education is not compulsory in the State party, although the primary education net enrolment ratio has increased over the last few years and has expanded to cover most parts of the country. The Committee notes that primary education continues to be a problem for the various ethnic minorities in the north and east of the country, where there are 20 minority languages spoken by these groups as their mother tongue while the formal education curriculum has only used Khmer as the medium of instruction. The Committee also notes with concern that indigenous communities may lose their culture and language as a result of a lack of education and information in their own languages. (arts 13, 14 and 15) The Committee recommends that the State party extend the coverage of the Education Law to ensure the right to education to all Cambodian children whose first language is not Khmer.253

[11.66]  Since access to the Internet facilitates the delivery of education, states should redouble efforts so as to increase access to affordable Internet in all areas, including schools in rural areas, and in particular to disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups.254 [11.67]  The third state obligation is to ensure that education is ‘acceptable both to parents and to children’ (acceptability).255 This requires a guaranteed quality of education.256 Thus states must address factors affecting the quality of education, for example low levels of remuneration for teachers, obsolete teaching materials, tools and equipment, and excessive numbers of pupils/students per class and per teacher. The importance of good quality education is reflected in the Concluding Observations of the CESCR. So, for example, in relation to Djibouti: 35. The Committee is concerned both by school dropouts and by the high academic failure rate in the State party resulting from the poor quality of public education (art 13). The Committee encourages the State party to address the problems of poor quality public education, school dropouts and academic failure, particularly by: (a) developing an educational programme and system that is tailored to the specific situation in the country; (b) promoting inclusive education, including by providing school supplies for children from the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups; (c) investing in teacher training and enhancing the status of the teaching profession; (d) providing training at the local level for children who

252 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Armenia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.225 (30 January 2004) para 55(e); CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Greece UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.97 (7 June 2004) para 50. 253  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cambodia, UN Doc E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (12 June 2009) para 34. 254  CESCR, Concluding Observations: The Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 29: ‘The Committee notes with concern that access to the internet is limited to some urban areas. (art 15) The Committee urges the State party to redouble its efforts so as to increase access to affordable internet, in all areas and in particular to the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups.’ 255  See Tomaševski, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49, above n 4, para 62. 256  Tomaševski, above n 14, 51.

Human Rights Obligations

 597

have dropped out of school; and (e) ensuring that school canteens and water and sanitation facilities are in good working order in all public schools.257

[11.68]  Acceptability also entails respect for parents’ wishes to have their children educated in conformity with their religious, moral or philosophical convictions.258 It further requires respect for parental liberty (as individuals or an organisation) to establish and operate private educational institutions at all levels, subject to meeting educational standards set by the state.259 [11.69]  In addition, school discipline has to be acceptable and humane,260 particularly as regards the need to refrain from subjecting children, pupils/students to inhuman or degrading disciplinary measures, such as corporal punishment or public humiliation, so as to protect their human dignity.261 Corporal punishment in public or private schools (or at home) constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and may constitute torture proscribed by international human rights ­instruments.262 It is degrading treatment because it is an assault on human dignity and physical integrity, which may have adverse psychological effects.263 In Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan,264 eight Sudanese students were arrested whilst on a university picnic. They were convicted and sentenced under Islamic Shari’a, as obtains in Sudan’s Criminal Code of 1991, to fines and lashes (between 25 and 40 lashes, carried out in public on the bare backs of the students using a wire and plastic whip). They were alleged to have violated ‘public order’ contrary to Article 152 of Sudan’s Criminal Code of 1991 because they were ‘not properly dressed’ or were acting in a manner

257 

CESCR, Concluding Observations: Djibouti, UN Doc E/C.12/DJI/CO/1-2 (30 December 2013). ICESCR, Art 13(3); ICCPR, Art 18(4); ECHR Protocol 1, Art 2; Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(4); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(4). For a discussion of religious education in public schools, see C Evans, ‘Religious Education in Public Schools: An International Human Rights Perspective (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 449. 259  ICESCR, Art 13(4); Protocol of San Salvador, Art 13(5); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(7). 260  CRC, Art 28(2); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(5). 261  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 41: ‘[C]orporal punishment is inconsistent with … the dignity of the individual. … A State Party is required to take measures to ensure that discipline which is inconsistent with the Covenant does not occur in any public or private educational institution within its jurisdiction.’ See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Zimbabwe, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.55 (7 June 1996) para 18: ‘The Committee expresses its concern at the acceptance in the legislation of the use of corporal punishment in school, as well as within the family. It stresses the incompatibility of corporal punishment, as well as any other form of violence, injury, neglect, abuse or degrading treatment, with the provisions of the Convention.’ See further CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Guyana, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.224 (30 January 2004) paras 31–32; India, CRC/C/5/Add.228 (30 January 2004) paras 44–45; Indonesia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.223 (30 January 2004) paras 43–44; Japan, UN Doc CRC/C/15/ Add.231 (30 January 2004) paras 35–36; Papua New Guinea, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.229 (30 January 2004) paras 37–38; Campbell and Cosans v UK, above n 93. 262  For example, UDHR, Art 5; ICCPR, Art 7; ECHR, Art 3; African Charter, Art 5. See, eg, HRC, General Comment 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994) para 5; Bah Ould Rabah v Mauritania, Communication no 197/97, (2004) AHRLR 78, 17th Annual Activity Report; Huris-Laws v Nigeria, Communication no 225/98, (2000) AHRLR 273, 14th Annual Activity Report; A v United Kingdom, App no 25599/94 (ECtHR, 23 September 1988), (1999) 27 EHRR 611. 263  Tyrer v United Kingdom, App no 5856/72, 25 April 1978, Series A no 26, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1. 264  Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, Communication no 236/00, (2003) AHRLR 153, 16th Annual Activity Report, annex VII. 258 

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The Right to Education

considered to be ‘immoral’.265 It was averred that the acts constituting these offences comprised ‘girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with men, crossing legs with men, sitting with boys and sitting and talking with boys’.266 The African Commission found the Republic of Sudan in violation of Article 5 of the African Charter and held: There is no right for individuals, and particularly the government of a country to apply physical violence to individuals for offences. Such a right would be tantamount to sanctioning State sponsored torture under the Charter and contrary to the very nature of this human rights treaty.267

[11.70]  It is acceptable to expel a student from an educational institution as a disciplinary measure for persistent cheating in order to protect the quality of e­ ducation.268 Acceptability also requires states to ‘ensure that pregnant teenagers are given an opportunity to complete their education’.269 This might require states to ‘facilitate the readmission of girls who dropped out of school due to pregnancy by supporting them in finding adequate arrangements for the care of their babies’270 so that they have ‘an opportunity to continue with their education on the basis of their individual ability’.271 [11.71]  Acceptability further demands an appropriate curriculum, which should not be ‘excessively competitive and stressful’ as this results in ‘school absence, illness, and even in suicide by students’272 as well as resulting in an ‘increase in clinical depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder cases among students’.273 The curriculum ‘must be of direct relevance to the child’s social, cultural, environmental and economic context and to his or her present and future needs’.274 [11.72]  The final state obligation is to ensure that education has to be flexible so that it can adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities, and respond to the needs of children, pupils and students within their diverse social and cultural settings (adaptability).275 In particular, education of the child should be adapted to the internationally recognised human rights-related aims and objectives of education.276 Therefore, states are asked to 265  Ibid, para 2. Art 152(1) of Sudan’s Penal Code 1991 provides, ‘Whoever does in a public place an indecent act or an act contrary to public morals or wears an obscene outfit or contrary to public morals or causing an annoyance to public feelings shall be punished with flogging which may not exceed forty lashes or with fine or with both.’ 266  Ibid, para 3. 267  Ibid, para 42. 268  See, eg, Sulak v Turkey, App no 24515/94 (Commission Decision, 17 January 1996). 269 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Guyana: CRC/C/15/Add.224 (30 January 2004) para 48(b). See also CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Indonesia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.223 (30 January 2004) para 63(e). 270 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/KEN/CO/1 (1 December 2008) para 34(b). 271  African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art 11(6). 272  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Japan, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.67 (24 September 2001) paras 31 and 58. 273  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, UN Doc E/C.12/KOR/CO/3 (17 December 2009) para 34. 274  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 9. 275  Ibid, para 6(d). 276 CRC, Art 29 provides: ‘States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: (a) The development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest

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 599

[i]ndicate to what extent the form and substance of education in the State party are directed towards the aims and objectives identified in article 13, paragraph 1,277 and whether school curricula include education on economic, social and cultural rights.278

[11.73]  In its Concluding Observations, the CESCR frequently stresses the need for states to provide human rights education at all levels, ‘both as a subject and as methodology of instruction’.279 For example, in its Concluding Observations on Germany in 2011: The Committee notes with concern that education on human rights, including on economic, social and cultural rights, is not given sufficient attention and not systematically integrated into education curricula at various levels (art 13). The Committee calls on the State party to provide education on human rights, including on economic, social and cultural rights, to students at all levels as appropriate, and for members of all professions that have a direct role in the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights, including [judges, lawyers, law enforcement officers, immigration officers, the military,] civil servants, teachers, social workers and the police.280

B.  Levels of State Obligations: Respect, Protect and Fulfil [11.74]  The three levels of obligations on states arising from the right to education as protected in the ICESCR were addressed by the CESCR in its General Comment 13.281 The relevant paragraphs are set out below: 46. The right to education, like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. In turn, the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide. 47. The obligation to respect requires States parties to avoid measures that hinder or prevent the enjoyment of the right to education. The obligation to protect requires States parties to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to education. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) requires States to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to education. Finally, States parties have an obligation to fulfil (provide) the right to education. As a general rule, States parties are obliged to fulfil (provide) a specific right in the Covenant when an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the

potential; (b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; (c) The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; (e) The development of respect for the natural environment.’ 277 

General Comment 13, above n 6, paras 4–5 and 49. Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, UN Doc E/C.12/2008/2 (24 March 2009) para 58. 279  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Nepal, UN Doc E/C.12/NPL/CO/2 (16 January 2008) para 47. 280  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Germany, UN Doc E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (12 July 2011) para 31. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009) para 36. 281  Above n 6. 278 

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right themselves by the means at their disposal. However, the extent of this obligation is always subject to the text of the Covenant. 48. In this respect, two features of article 13 require emphasis. First, it is clear that article 13 regards States as having principal responsibility for the direct provision of education in most circumstances; States parties recognise, for example, that the ‘development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued’ (art 13(2)(e)). Secondly, given the differential wording of article 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary, higher and fundamental education, the parameters of a State party’s obligation to fulfil (provide) are not the same for all levels of education. Accordingly, in light of the text of the Covenant, States parties have an enhanced obligation to fulfil (provide) regarding the right to education, but the extent of this obligation is not uniform for all levels of education. The Committee observes that this interpretation of the obligation to fulfil (provide) in relation to article 13 coincides with the law and practice of numerous States parties.

[11.75]  As noted in the Comment above, states are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right to education. The obligation to respect the right to education requires states parties to refrain from all measures that directly or indirectly interfere with, impair, hinder or prevent the enjoyment of the right to education for all those within its jurisdiction.282 For example, states must refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all individuals and groups to all levels of education—primary or fundamental, secondary or higher—on prohibited grounds. This includes refraining from restricting access to available public educational facilities for girls and women,283 as well as for individuals from specific ethnic, linguistic or religious groups.284 [11.76]  In addition, states are obliged to refrain from prohibiting or impeding private educational institutions. A state must equally refrain from acts such as the arbitrary and forced closure of public or private schools285 that comply with minimum educational standards, approval of corporal punishments in schools, limiting access to means of maintaining education, censoring or withholding education-related information, and limiting access to education services as a punitive measure. In Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname,286 the IACtHR ordered the state, inter alia, to open a school as part of the remedy for violations of the rights of the Maroons). The Court’s reasoning was that the compensation ordered, which included a payment so that minors could continue their education, would not be realised unless the order was made. It seems that such an order was within the ‘letter and spirit’ of the AmCHR, which provides for progressive realisation of economic and social rights in Article 26.

282 M Nowak, ‘The Right to Education—Its Meaning, Significance and Limitations’ (1991) 9(4) ­Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 421. 283  See Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Situation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/18 (21 July 2000) paras 31–41. 284  See, eg, DH and Others v The Czech Republic, App no 57325/00 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007), (2008) 47 EHRR 59. 285  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 50; Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia, Apps nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 October 2012), (2013) 57 EHRR 99, para 143. 286  Aloeboetoe et al v Suriname, Merits, IACtHR, Judgment of 10 September 1993, Series C no 15, para 96: ‘The Court believes that, as part of the compensation due, Suriname is under the obligation to reopen the school at Gujaba and staff it with teaching and administrative personnel to enable it to function on a permanent basis as of 1994. In addition, the necessary steps shall be taken for the medical dispensary already in place there to be made operational and reopen that same year.’

Human Rights Obligations

 601

[11.77]  The obligation to protect the right to education requires states to take ­measures—through legislation or by other means, as shown in chapter one—to prevent and prohibit third parties (private groups and individuals) from interfering with enjoyment of the right to education. This requires, for example, the state to adopt legislation or other effective measures to regulate private education providers, and to ensure equal access to education provided by third parties by ensuring that private educational institutions do not discriminate in their admissions or exclusion policies or practices.287 Some states—for example China and Ecuador—require education to serve the ‘public interest’, not individual or corporate interests.288 Similarly, the state must ensure that third parties, including parents and employers, do not prevent (pregnant) girls, women and other disadvantaged or marginalised groups from having access to education. States also have an obligation to ensure that communities and families are not dependent on child labour289 or early marriage that interferes with children’s right to education. Protection further demands that states establish ‘minimum educational standards’ to which all educational institutions, including private ones, are required to conform. This helps to ‘ensure that access to private institutions is not available purely on the basis of the financial means of candidates, irrespective of their qualifications and suitability for the profession’.290 Similarly, a state must ensure that privatisation291 of the education sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of education;292 and ensure that teachers and other education professionals meet appropriate standards of education, skill and ethical codes of conduct. [11.78]  States must protect pupils, particularly girls who are more vulnerable to harassment, against sexual harassment by third parties, including teachers. In Uganda v

287 See Ali v United Kingdom, App no 40385/06 (ECtHR, 11 January 2011), para 58, ‘In determining whether or not an exclusion resulted in a denial of the right to education, the Court will have to consider whether a fair balance was struck between the exclusion and the justification given for that measure. It will therefore have regard to factors such as the procedural safeguards in place to challenge the exclusion and to avoid arbitrariness; the duration of the exclusion; the extent of the cooperation shown by the pupil or his parents with respect to attempts to re-integrate him; the efforts of the school authorities to minimise the effects of exclusion and, in particular, the adequacy of alternative education provided by the school during the period of exclusion; and the extent to which the rights of any third parties were engaged.’ 288  The Constitution of Ecuador 2008, Art 28 provides ‘Education shall be for general welfare of the public and shall not be at the service of individual and corporate interests’; see also the Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 1995, Arts 8 (‘Educational activities shall conform to the State and public interests’) and 25 (‘No organization or individual may establish or run a school or any other institution of education for profit-making purposes’). 289  According to the ILO, by June 2004, around 10 million children, mostly girls, worldwide were working as domestic servants in private homes, subject to abuse, health risks and violence. States with the highest rates included Indonesia with about 700,000, Brazil with 559,000, Pakistan with 264,000, Haiti with 250,000, Kenya with 200,000, and Sri Lanka with 100,000. See ILO, Helping Hands or Shackled Lives? Understanding Child Domestic Labour and Responses to It (2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/childlabour. 290  Tarantino and Others v Italy, Apps nos 25851/09, 29204/09 and 64090/09 (ECtHR, 2 April 2013), para 52. 291  ‘Privatisation’ is used here to broadly encompass a wide range of private sector involvements in the delivery of education, and is not limited to full divesture (complete transfer of a public enterprise to a private actor). 292 The CESCR took a similar view in respect of health (General Comment 14, above n 107, para 35); and in respect of water (General Comment 15; The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2003), para 24).

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The Right to Education

Muliika Geoffrey,293 the High Court sentenced a former 42-year-old head teacher of St Mary’s College, Lugazi, a boarding secondary school in Buikwe district (Uganda), to 15 years’ imprisonment for aggravated defilement of a 15-year-old secondary school pupil in his office. The head teacher had sent for the schoolgirl at 5:30am local time, and when she entered his office, he locked the door and had sex with her. [11.79]  As shown in chapter three, the CESCR has concluded that a state must also take into account its legal obligations when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states or NSAs. By implication, states are obliged to ensure that service agreements with private parties ensure that the advancement of human rights is a paramount objective. [11.80]  The obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt appropriate measures— legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures— towards the full realisation of the right to education. It can be seen as involving both an obligation of conduct (to take certain steps) and an obligation of result (to achieve a specific result), such as free and compulsory primary education or the progressive introduction of free secondary and higher education. In order to achieve this, a state is obliged, inter alia, to give sufficient recognition to the right to education in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation. The obligation to fulfil contains obligations to facilitate and to provide. [11.81]  The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) requires states to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to education in practice. A state is obliged, for example, to fulfil (facilitate) the availability of education by taking positive measures to ensure that schools and teachers are available in sufficient numbers. Article 12(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa obliges states to facilitate the realisation of the women’s right to education in the following terms: States Parties shall take specific positive action to: a) promote literacy among women; b) promote education and training for women at all levels and in all disciplines, particularly in the fields of science and technology; c) promote the enrolment and retention of girls in schools and other training institutions and the organisation of programmes for women who leave school prematurely.

States should similarly facilitate acceptability by ensuring that education is culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples, and is of good quality for all.294 [11.82]  States are also obliged to fulfil (provide for) the adaptability of education by designing and providing resources for curricula that reflect the contemporary needs of students in a changing world; and fulfil (provide for) the availability of education by actively developing a system of schools, including building classrooms, delivering programmes, providing teaching materials, training teachers and paying them

293  Uganda v Muliika Geoffrey, HCT-03-CR-SC-0182-2014 (High Court of Uganda at Jinja, Lady Justice Patricia Wasswa, 14 November 2014). 294  See CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 50; D Wilson, Minority Rights in Education: ­Lessons for the European Union from Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Raoul Wallenberg Institute/Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002).

Human Rights Obligations

 603

­ omestically competitive salaries.295 Lastly, states may fulfil (provide) the right to d education by assisting, for example through a system of scholarships, those who cannot afford fees charged for education. In this respect, Article 11(3)(e) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child obliges states to take special measures in respect of female, gifted and disadvantaged children, to ensure equal access to education for all sections of the community.

C.  Justiciability of the Right to Education [11.83]  It is important to stress that violations of the above obligations are justiciable. This section considers some of the decided cases on the right to education from international, regional and national bodies. It is by no means exhaustive, but rather seeks to show how different bodies have determined whether states, and in some cases NSAs, are complying with their obligations with respect to the right to education, especially in the context of marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups. i.  Making Education Available, Accessible and of Good Quality [11.84]  In the Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al v the State of New York et al,296 the Supreme Court of New York was asked to rule on an alleged case of discrimination in the funding afforded by the State of New York to different schools. The plaintiffs challenged the state’s funding of New York City’s public schools in relation to the effect of funding on children from minorities. Adequate funding was claimed to be measured by the securing of a ‘sound basic education’. The Supreme Court of New York had to clarify the meaning of ‘education’ as a right, and understand the content of the right by considering the meaning of a ‘sound basic education’. In this case, the Supreme Court of New York decided that in order to provide a sound basic education, the state had a duty to take steps to ensure that the following resources would be available to the city’s public school students: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

a sufficient number of qualified teachers and other personnel; appropriate class sizes; adequate and accessible school buildings; sufficient up-to-date books and technology; suitable curricula; adequate resources for students with extraordinary needs; and a safe, orderly environment.

[11.85]  In International Association Autism Europe v France,297 the European Committee on Social Rights considered a complaint that alleged that France was not t­aking

295 

CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 50. Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al v the State of New York et al, 719 NYS 2d 475 (2001). 297  International Association Autism Europe v France, Complaint no 13/2002 (European Committee on Social Rights, 4 November 2003), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/ complaints/CC13Merits_en.pdf. 296 

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The Right to Education

enough action, as required under Articles 15(1),298 17(1)299 and E300 of the revised European Social Charter, to secure children and adults with autism a right to education as effective as that provided for all other children. The Committee established that the number of children with autism being educated in either general or ­specialist schools was ‘much lower than in the case of other children, whether or not disabled’, and that there was ‘a chronic shortage of care and support facilities for autistic adults’.301 The Committee noted that Article 15 of the revised European Social Charter, in which state parties, inter alia, undertake to ‘take the necessary measures to provide persons with disabilities with … education’, applies to all persons with disabilities, regardless of the nature and origin of their disability and irrespective of their age. It thus clearly covered both children and adults with autism.302 Further, the Committee observed that Article 17(1), in particular, ‘requires the establishment and maintenance of sufficient and adequate institutions and services for the purpose of education’.303 The Committee found that ‘France has failed to achieve sufficient progress in advancing the provision of education for persons with autism’.304 It concluded, by 11:2, that ‘the situation constitutes a violation of Articles 15§1 and 17§1 whether alone or read in combination with Article E of the revised European Social Charter’.305 ii.  Prisoners’ Access to Education [11.86]  The right to education in prison applies to both remand prisoners and convicted prisoners. In Velyo Velev v Bulgaria,306 the ECtHR found a violation of the right to education, under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, in a case concerning the refusal to allow a prisoner who had never finished his secondary education to enrol in a school operating inside the prison. The applicant was a 26-year-old man who was detained on remand for 29 months on suspicion of unlawful possession of firearms. During this period, he made numerous requests to attend the school operating within

298  Revised European Social Charter, Art 15 provides, ‘With a view to ensuring to persons with disabilities, irrespective of age and the nature and origin of their disabilities, the effective exercise of the right to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community, the Parties undertake, in particular: 1. to take the necessary measures to provide persons with disabilities with guidance, education and vocational training in the framework of general schemes wherever possible or, where this is not possible, through specialised bodies, public or private’. 299  Revised European Social Charter, Art 17 provides, ‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons to grow up in an environment which encourages the full development of their personality and of their physical and mental capacities, the Parties undertake, either directly or in cooperation with public and private organisations, to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed: 1. a to ensure that children and young persons, taking account of the rights and duties of their parents, have the care, the assistance, the education and the training they need, in particular by providing for the establishment or maintenance of institutions and services sufficient and adequate for this purpose’. 300  Revised European Social Charter, Art E reads: ‘The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status.’ 301  International Association Autism Europe v France, above n 297, para 54. 302  Ibid, para 48. 303  Ibid, para 49. 304  Ibid, para 54. 305  Ibid, Conclusion. 306  Velyo Velev v Bulgaria, App no 16032/07 (ECtHR, 27 May 2014).

Human Rights Obligations

 605

the prison in order to complete his secondary education. All of these requests were refused based on a variety of reasons, in particular that remand prisoners were not entitled to education in prison and that prisoners with prior convictions, like the applicant, could not mix with prisoners who did not have prior convictions. The Court held that ‘[a]lthough Article 2 of Protocol No 1 does not impose a positive obligation to provide education in prison in all circumstances, where such a possibility is available it should not be subject to arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions’.307 [11.87]  The ECtHR examined the reasons given by the authorities to justify the refusals, rejecting all of them as being unsubstantiated. First, the Court found no evidence that remand prisoners had to be excluded from education in prison in order to protect them from harm inflicted by convicted prisoners. Secondly, the Court found that the fact that the ultimate length of pre-trial detention is uncertain at the start should not be used as a justification for depriving remand prisoners of access to educational facilities, save perhaps in cases where it is somehow clear that the detention will be of short duration. Thirdly, the argument that the applicant should be kept separately from other prisoners because of the risk that he would be sentenced as a recidivist, was considered incompatible with the presumption of innocence. [11.88]  Although the judgment reaffirmed the narrow scope of Article 2 of Protocol 1, that it ‘cannot be interpreted as imposing a duty on the Contracting State to set up or subsidise particular educational establishments’,308 it explicitly affirmed that remand prisoners enjoy the right to education. Taking into account the need for reintegration of prisoners into society, it is desirable to interpret Article 2 of Protocol 1 in light of present-day conditions. This requires that, ‘given the practical demands of imprisonment’, education must be available or ‘adequately secured’ in prisons, just like healthcare in prisons.309 iii. Non-discrimination [11.89]  Discrimination in education has been widely adjudicated. This includes discrimination on the basis of race, migratory status and religion. The US Supreme Court considered discrimination in connection with admission to public schools in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka.310 This case was a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware. Several black children (through their legal representatives) sought admission to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. The plaintiffs alleged that segregation (separate schools for white students and for black students) was unconstitutional

307 

Ibid, para 31. Ibid. 309  Kudła v Poland, App no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000), para 94, in which the Court held that, in accordance with Article 3 of the ECHR ‘the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and wellbeing are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance’. 310  Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (17 May 1954). 308 

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The Right to Education

under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its unanimous (9:0) judgment, the Supreme Court enquired: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does … Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system … We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.311

Thus the Supreme Court confirmed that separate educational facilities for white and black children are ‘inherently unequal’, even where physical facilities and other objective factors (curricula or staff) are equal. Schools must not discriminate in admissions on the basis of race. [11.90]  Discrimination in access to education on the basis of one’s ethnic origin has been an issue of concern. In Europe it has been widespread among the Roma. Since 2007, the ECtHR has condemned discrimination against Roma children in access to education in the following cases. First, in November 2007, in DH and Others v The Czech Republic,312 the applicants were 18 Czech nationals (children) of Roma origin who had been assigned to special schools for children with learning difficulties, where they received education from a more basic curriculum. They alleged, inter alia, that they had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of their right to education on account of their race or ethnic origin, in breach of Article 14, taken together with Article 2 of Protocol 1, of the ECHR. The ECtHR ruled that segregating Roma students in special schools was a form of unlawful discrimination that violated their right to education. At the same time the ECtHR noted that the Czech Republic was not alone in this practice, and that discriminatory barriers to education for Roma children are present in a number of European countries. The Court made it clear that this kind of practice can no longer be tolerated in Europe. [11.91]  Secondly, the ECtHR reiterated the principles established in the above case in Sampanis and Others v Greece.313 The Court unanimously found a violation by Greece, for effectively denying education to Roma children over a certain period of time and for the subsequent placement of the children in an annex to the local primary

311 

Ibid (emphasis added). DH and Others v The Czech Republic, App no 57325/00 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007), (2008) 47 EHRR 59. 313  Sampanis and Others v Greece, App no 32526/05 (ECtHR, 5 June 2008). 312 

Human Rights Obligations

 607

school, attended only by Roma and located five kilometres from the primary school. In the Sampanis judgment, the ECtHR went further, and pointed out that integration in schools is a fundamental element for integration into society as a whole. [11.92]  Thirdly, in Orsus and Others v Croatia,314 14 applicants complained before the ECtHR that they were segregated at primary school into Roma-only classes. The applicants were Croatian nationals of Roma origin, who had all been born and lived in Orehovica, Podturen and Trnovec in northern Croatia. They started primary school in the villages of Macinec, Podturen and Orehovica. During their elementary schooling, the first nine applicants attended both Roma-only and mixed classes before leaving school at the age of 15; the remaining five applicants attended entirely Roma-only classes. Most of the applicants were provided with additional classes in Croatian and participated in mixed group extra-curricular activities organised by their respective schools. The applicants alleged, inter alia, that their segregation into Roma-only classes at school deprived them of their right to education in a multicultural environment, and made them endure severe educational, psychological and emotional harm, and in particular feelings of alienation and lack of self-esteem. They relied on Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to education) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. The Croatian Government submitted that the applicants were placed in special schools on account of their ‘specific educational needs, essentially as a result of their low intellectual capacity measured with the aid of psychological tests in educational psychology centres’ and with parental consent.315 [11.93]  The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that there had not been a general policy automatically to place Roma pupils in separate classes in the schools the applicants had attended. However, only Roma children had been placed in separate classes in those primary schools. Consequently, there had been clearly a difference in treatment applied to Roma children, which the applicants were. The state therefore had to show that the practice of segregating Roma pupils had been ‘objectively justified by a legitimate aim and that the means of achieving that aim were appropriate, necessary and proportionate’.316 The Grand Chamber observed: 176. Discrimination on account of, inter alia, a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment … The Court has also held that no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures…. … 207. The facts of the instant case indicate that the schooling arrangements for Roma children were not attended by safeguards … that would ensure that, in the exercise of its margin of appreciation in the education sphere, the State took into account their special needs 314  315  316 

Oršušand Others v Croatia, App no 15766/03 (ECtHR, 16 March 2010). Ibid, paras 197 and 202. Ibid, para 155.

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as m ­ embers of a disadvantaged class … Furthermore, as a result of the arrangements the ­applicants were placed in schools for children with mental disabilities where a more basic curriculum was followed than in ordinary schools and where they were isolated from pupils from the wider population. As a result, they received an education which compounded their difficulties and compromised their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population. Indeed, the Government have implicitly admitted that job opportunities are more limited for pupils from special schools.

[11.94]  After deciding that ‘no waiver of the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination can be accepted, as it would be counter to an important public interest’,317 the Court, in a very closely divided opinion (9:8 votes), concluded that it was not satisfied that the difference in treatment between Roma children and non-Roma children was objectively and reasonably justified and that there existed a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means used and the aim pursued … Consequently, there has been a violation in the instant case of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No 1 as regards each of the applicants.318

[11.95]  In Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria,319 the ECtHR considered a claim of discrimination in secondary education, based on a requirement for aliens without permanent residence to pay secondary-school fees. In this case the applicants were two Russian nationals (boys) who moved to Bulgaria as young children, living with their mother in Bulgaria, who was married to a Bulgarian. The applicants had enrolled in and attended free secondary schools set up and run by the Bulgarian state, but had later (near to the end of their secondary education) been required, by reason of their nationality and immigration status, to pay school fees in order to pursue their secondary education. Under Bulgaria’s National Education Act 1991, only Bulgarian nationals and aliens with permanent residence permits were entitled to primary and secondary education free of charge. At the material time, only the mother had a permanent residence permit, although the applicants were entitled to live in Bulgaria as members of her family. In their application to the Court in Strasbourg, the applicants complained of discrimination in that they had been required to pay fees (of €800 and €2,600 respectively) to pursue their secondary education in Bulgaria, unlike Bulgarian nationals and aliens with permanent residence permits. [11.96]  The Chamber held unanimously that the fees were discriminatory in breach of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1. It was observed: The applicants—secondary school students—were, unlike others in their position, required to pay school fees. This was due exclusively to their nationality and immigration status, because under the 1991 National Education Act only Bulgarian nationals and certain categories of aliens are entitled to primary and secondary education free of charge. The applicants were thus clearly treated less favourably than others in a relevantly similar situation, on account of a personal characteristic.320

317 

Ibid, para 204. Ibid, paras 208 and 210. 319  Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria, App no 5335/05 (ECtHR, 21 June 2011). 320  Ibid, para 50. 318 

Human Rights Obligations

 609

The Court emphasised that its role was not to decide ‘whether and to what extent it is permissible for the States to charge fees for secondary—or, indeed, any—education’ but only ‘solely [to] determine whether, once a State has voluntarily decided to provide such education free of charge, it may deny that benefit to a distinct group of people’.321 The Court therefore had to determine whether there had been objective and reasonable justification for that difference in treatment. It was acknowledged that a state could have legitimate reasons for ‘curtailing the use of resource‑hungry public services—such as welfare programmes, public benefits and health care—by short‑term and illegal immigrants, who, as a rule, do not contribute to their funding’.322 Although similar arguments applied to a certain extent in the field of education, they could not be transposed there without qualification. While recognising that education was an activity that was complex to organise and expensive to run, and that the state had to strike a balance between the educational needs of those under its jurisdiction and its limited capacity to accommodate them, the Court could not overlook the fact that, unlike some other public services, education was a right that enjoyed direct protection by the ECHR. It was also a very particular type of public service, which not only directly benefited those using it but also served broader societal functions, and it was ‘indispensable to the furtherance of human rights [and] plays … a fundamental role … Moreover, in order to achieve pluralism and thus democracy, society has an interest in the integration of minorities’.323 [11.97]  The Court distinguished between primary, secondary and higher education, relying partly on the CRC and ICESCR, noting: 56. In the Court’s view, the State’s margin of appreciation in this domain increases with the level of education, in inverse proportion to the importance of that education for those concerned and for society at large. Thus, at the university level, which to this day remains optional for many people, higher fees for aliens—and indeed fees in general—seem to be commonplace and can, in the present circumstances, be considered fully justified. The opposite goes for primary schooling, which provides basic literacy and numeracy—as well as integration into and first experiences of society—and is compulsory in most countries … 57. Secondary education, which is in issue in the present case, falls between those two extremes. The distinction is confirmed by the difference of wording between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 28 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the first of which enjoins States to ‘[m]ake primary education compulsory and available free to all’, whereas the second and the third merely call upon them to ‘[e]ncourage the development of different forms of secondary education … and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need’ and to ‘[m]ake higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means’ … It is also confirmed by the differentiation between those three levels of education in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights … However, the Court is mindful of the fact that with more and more countries now moving towards what has been described as a ‘knowledge‑based’ society, secondary education plays an ever‑increasing role in successful personal development and in the social and professional integration of the individuals concerned. Indeed, in a modern society, having no more than basic knowledge and 321  322  323 

Ibid, para 53. Ibid, para 54. Ibid, para 55.

610 

The Right to Education

skills constitutes a barrier to successful personal and professional development. It prevents the persons concerned from adjusting to their environment and entails far‑reaching consequences for their social and economic well‑being. 58. These considerations militate in favour of stricter scrutiny by the Court of the proportionality of the measure affecting the applicants.324

[11.98]  In finding a violation of the right to non-discrimination in education (Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR), the Court took into account the specific circumstances of the present case, observing: (a) The applicants had not been in the position of individuals arriving in the country unlawfully and then laying claim to the use of its public services, including free schooling.325 (b) Even without permanent residence permits, the authorities had not had any substantive objection to their remaining in Bulgaria or any serious intention of deporting them. Thus, any considerations relating to the need to stem or reverse the flow of illegal immigration clearly did not apply to the applicants’ case.326 (c) It could not be said that the applicants tried to abuse the Bulgarian educational system since it was not their choice to settle in Bulgaria and pursue their education there; they came to live in the country at a very young age, because their mother had married a Bulgarian national.327 (d) The applicants could not realistically choose to go to another country and carry on their secondary studies there.328 (e) There was no indication that the applicants, who were fully integrated in Bulgarian society and spoke fluent Bulgarian, had any special educational needs that would have required additional financing for their schools.329

[11.99]  In Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosica v Dominican Republic,330 two girls born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian immigrant mothers were denied birth certificates necessary to prove that they were citizens of the Dominican Republic. Without such birth certificates they were unable to enrol in school. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considered the case under the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XII (right to education) and the AmCHR, Article 19 (rights of the child). It held that the Government had deprived the petitioners of their right to education under Article XII by discriminatorily depriving them of their legal identity under domestic law. Under the AmCHR, Article 19, as informed by the CRC, the state is obliged to provide special protections to children, including preventing economic and social degradation. Article 19 obligations include the right to education, as education gives rise to the possibility of children having a better standard of living and contributes to the prevention of unfavourable situations for the child and for society itself. The Government violated Article 19 by not extending such protections to Dominican children of Haitian descent and by taking actions which denied the petitioners the most basic rights of citizenship, including education. The IACtHR confirmed that

324 

Ibid, paras 56–58. Ibid, para 60. Ibid. 327  Ibid, para 61. 328  Ibid, paras 9, 10 and 61. 329  Ibid, para 61. 330  Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosica v Dominican Republic, Report 28/01, Case 12.189, (22 February 2001). 325  326 

Human Rights Obligations

 611

the ‘migratory status can never constitute a justification for depriving a person of the right to nationality or the enjoyment and exercise of his rights’.331 The Court ordered that the ‘State should comply with its obligation to guarantee access to free primary education for all children, irrespective of their origin or parentage, which arises from the special protection that must be provided to children’.332 [11.100]  Particular attention should be given to ‘groups with heightened vulnerabilities’, as noted by the European Committee of Social Rights in International Association Autism Europe v France.333 In this case the complainant alleged that the French Government’s inadequate educational provision for autistic persons violated the European Social Charter, including: the obligation to ensure the effective exercise by persons with disabilities of their right to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community by taking the necessary measures to provide such persons with education (Article 15(1)); the obligation to secure the right to education of all children and young persons (Article 17(1)); and the principle of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of Charter rights (Article E). It emphasised that states parties are obliged to take both legal and practical action to give full effect to Charter rights. When the achievement of a right is exceptionally complex and particularly expensive to resolve, state parties must take measures that allow them to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time with measurable progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources. States Parties must be particularly mindful of the impact that their choices will have for groups with heightened vulnerabilities as well as for others persons affected including, especially, their families on whom falls the heaviest burden in the event of institutional shortcomings.334

Since the numbers of autistic children being educated in either general or specialist schools were disproportionately low in comparison to other children, and there was a chronic shortage of care and support facilities for autistic adults, France was in violation of Articles 15(1) and 17(1), whether read alone or in conjunction with Article E. [11.101]  In Murat Er v Denmark,335 the CERD dealt with a claim of racial discrimination in education. Murat (the petitioner), a Danish citizen of Turkish origin, was a carpentry student at Copenhagen Technical School. As part of the study programme, students were offered the possibility of doing traineeships in private companies. Murat found out that the school accepted instructions from employers not to send interns of non-Danish origin. This took place on 8 September 2003, when Murat accidentally saw a note in a teacher’s hands, where the words ‘not P’ appeared next to the name of a potential employer applying for trainees to work in his company. When asked about the meaning of that note, the teacher explained to him that the ‘P’ stood for ‘perkere’ (‘Pakis’), and that it meant that the employer in question had instructed the school not to send Pakistani or Turkish students for training in that company. Murat abandoned 331 IACtHR, The Yean and Bosico Children v Dominican Republic, judgment of 8 September 2005, Series C no 130 (2005) para 156(a). 332  Ibid, para 244. 333  International Association Autism Europe v France, above n 297. 334  Ibid, para 53. 335  Murat Er v Denmark, above n 52.

612 

The Right to Education

the idea of becoming a carpenter and started work as a home carer. He contended before the CERD that, as a consequence of the school’s discriminatory practice, he was not offered the same possibilities for education and training as his fellow students, and no remedies were allegedly made available to address this situation effectively, in violation of Article 5(e)(v) of the ICERD. The school claimed that the rejection of the petitioner’s application for traineeship in September 2003 was based on his academic record. [11.102]  The CERD observed that the uncontroversial fact that one of the teachers at the school admitted having accepted an employer’s application containing the note ‘not P’ next to his name, and knowing that this meant that students of non-Danish ethnic origin were not to be sent to that company for traineeship, was in itself enough to ascertain the existence of de facto discrimination towards all non-ethnic Danish students, including the petitioner. The Committee further held that the school’s allegation that the rejection of the petitioner’s application for traineeship in September 2003 was based on his academic record did not exclude that he would have been denied the opportunity of training in that company in any case, on the basis of his ethnic origin. Indeed, irrespective of his academic record, his chances in applying for an internship were more limited than those of other students because of his ethnicity. According to the Committee, this constituted ‘an act of racial discrimination and a violation of the petitioner’s right to enjoyment of his right to education and training under article 5, paragraph e (v) of the Convention’.336 [11.103]  In Tengur v The Minister of Education and the State of Mauritius,337 the Supreme Court of Mauritius considered a claim of alleged discrimination on the basis of religion in education. In this case, the applicant alleged that the practice of reserving 50 per cent of the seats in secondary schools managed by the Roman Catholic Authority and funded out of public funds for children of Catholic faith, was discriminatory against non-Catholics. The Court had to decide whether this was unlawful discrimination or a lawful differentiation of treatment which is justifiable or valid on the ground that the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and the aim of the differentiation is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Constitution or any other law.338

[11.104]  The Court considered this claim in light of section 16 of the Constitution of Mauritius.339 Significantly, in arriving at its decision, the Court considered the provisions of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (‘UNESCO Convention’) and the ICESCR, to which Mauritius is a signatory, noting that ‘it is 336 

Ibid, para 8. Tengur v The Minister of Education and the State of Mauritius, Record No 77387, Supreme Court of Mauritius, 2002 SCJ 48. See also Mauritius, Fourth Periodic Report to the HRC, UN Doc CCPR/C/ MUS/2004/4 (28 June 2004) para 17. It should be noted that the judgment was delivered by Chief Justice AG Pillay, then a member of the CESCR. 338  Tengur v The Minister of Education and the State of Mauritius, above n 337, 13. 339  Subject to some exceptions, s 16 prohibits discrimination on several grounds, including ‘creed’. S 16(1) provides that ‘no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect’. S 6(2) provides that ‘no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting in the performance of any public function conferred by any law or otherwise in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority’. 337 

Human Rights Obligations

 613

a well-recognised canon of construction that domestic legislation, including the ­Constitution, should if possible, be construed so as to conform to such international instruments’. The Court then relied on the CESCR’s General Comment 13 on the right to education, adopted in 1999, and quoted in full paragraphs 6(b), 13, 31–34, 46 and 47 of this General Comment.340 It stated that the overall purpose behind the UNESCO Convention was to combat all forms of discrimination in education. The Court noted: The prohibition against discrimination enshrined in article 2(2) of the Covenant [ICESCR] is subject to neither progressive realization nor the availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination.

[11.105]  In light of the foregoing, the Court held that a perusal of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the UNESCO Convention and the Covenant showed clearly that no express or implied derogation was allowed in respect of the overriding principle of the specificity of the co-defendants’ schools. There is no doubt that there might be historical, social, religious and cultural reasons for such a principle, but the overriding principle of specificity inherent in the admissions policy of the co-defendants was not a permissible derogation under the UNESCO Convention, the ICESCR, or the Constitution. Consequently, the school admissions policy constituted unlawful discrimination, since Catholics had, all other things being equal, an advantage over non-Catholics in being admitted to the secondary schools run by the Roman Catholic Authority. The Court further held that it was also clear that by knowing of, and acquiescing in, such an admissions policy, the second defendant (State of Mauritius) was acting in material breach of its international obligations under both the UNESCO Convention and the Covenant. The Court concluded that the admissions policy of the co-defendants, whereby they reserved 50 per cent of seats in secondary schools for pupils of the Catholic faith, was in violation of section 16(2) of the Constitution of Mauritius.341 The defendants lodged an appeal against this declaratory judgment to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; this appeal was heard in December 2003 and was decided in the applicant’s favour. iv.  Making Education Acceptable [11.106]  Should religious symbols or religious dress be banned in schools? This issue has been much debated, especially following the ban of so-called ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols in France in elementary and primary schools by Act No 2004/228 of 15 March 2004, in accordance with the principle of laïcité (see paragraphs 11.16–11.17 above). As well as having the effect of excluding pupils who wish to observe religious symbols, a general ban on religious symbols in schools may undermine the acceptability of education. Such a ban negatively impacts on the right to manifest religion

340  341 

Tengur v The Minister of Education and the State of Mauritius, above n 337, 13–14. Ibid, 16.

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The Right to Education

in public. This point was noted in the following observation of the HRC on France in 2008: The Committee is concerned that both elementary and high school students are barred by Act No 2004/228 of 15 March 2004 from attending the public schools if they are wearing so-called ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols. The State party has made only limited provisions— through distance or computer-based learning—for students who feel that, as a matter of conscience and faith, they must wear a head covering such as a skullcap (or kippah), a headscarf (or hijab), or a turban. Thus, observant Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh students may be excluded from attending school in company with other French children. The Committee notes that respect for a public culture of laïcité would not seem to require forbidding wearing such common religious symbols. (articles 18 and 26) The State party should re-examine Act No 2004/228 of 15 March 2004 in light of the guarantees of article 18 of the Covenant [ICCPR] concerning freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to manifest one’s religion in public as well as private, as well as the guarantee of equality under article 26.342

[11.107]  This law (Act No 2004-228 of 15 March 2004) has been relied upon to justify expulsion of pupils from state schools to protect ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ through the pursuit of secularist policies. Thus in Jasvir Singh v France343 and Ranjit Singh v France,344 the ECtHR found that the expulsion of the applicants from state schools was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued: the protection of the rights and freedoms of others through the pursuit of secularist policies in state schools. The ECtHR did not find it necessary to consider whether the individual applicants posed a threat to ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, as the measures taken to pursue the constitutional principle of laïcité were considered to fall within the state’s margin of appreciation. Unlike the HRC, the ECtHR has not required states to furnish ‘compelling evidence’ to show that wearing religious attire in state schools poses a threat to the rights and freedoms of other pupils or to order at the school, so as to demonstrate that expulsions from schools on account of religious attire are necessary or proportionate.345 [11.108]  The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Şahin v Turkey, considered, inter alia, the question of whether there was a violation of the applicant’s right to education arising out actions taken by Istanbul University following upon her insisting on wearing the Islamic headscarf.346 The applicant, a university medical student and a practising Muslim, who considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf, was refused access to a lecture and written examination at Istanbul University because she refused to comply with a university circular forbidding admission of students to lectures who wore the headscarf. The applicant submitted that the ban imposed by the public authorities on wearing the headscarf clearly constituted interference with her right to education, which had resulted in her being

342 

HRC, Concluding Observations: France, above n 62, para 23. Jasvir Singh v France, Admissibility, App no 25463/08 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009). 344  Ranjit Singh v France, Admissibility, App no 27561/08 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009). 345  See, eg, Bikramjit Singh v France, Communication no 1852/2008, UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008 (4 February 2013) para 8.7. 346  Şahin v Turkey, App no 44774/98, (2005) 41 EHRR 8. 343 

Human Rights Obligations

 615

refused access to oncology examinations on 12 March 1998, prevented from enrolling with the university’s administrative department on 20 March 1998, and being refused access to a lecture on neurology on 16 April 1998 and a written examination on public health on 10 June 1998.347 The applicant asked the Court to find that the decision to refuse [her] access to the University when wearing the Islamic headscarf amounts in the present case to a violation of her right to education, as guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No 1, read in the light of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention.348

The first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be denied the right to education’. The Government claimed that the prohibition served the aims of the promotion of secularism and gender equality. [11.109]  The Grand Chamber accepted that ‘[a]lthough the provision makes no mention of higher education, there is nothing to suggest that it does not apply to all levels of education, including higher education’.349 More specifically, it stated that ‘[w]hile the first sentence of Article 2 essentially establishes access to primary and secondary education, there is no watertight division separating higher education from other forms of education’.350 Accordingly, ‘any institutions of higher education existing at a given time come within the scope of the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No 1, since the right of access to such institutions is an inherent part of the right set out in that provision’.351 As to the content of the right to education and the scope of the obligation it imposes, the Grand Chamber noted that in the Belgian Linguistic case352 it had stated: The negative formulation indicates, as is confirmed by the ‘preparatory work’ … that the Contracting Parties do not recognise such a right to education as would require them to establish at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the State has no positive obligation to ensure respect for such a right as is protected by Article 2 of the Protocol. As a ‘right’ does exist, it is secured, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, to everyone within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State.

According to the Grand Chamber, ‘[a]lthough [Article 2 of Protocol 1] does not impose a duty on the Contracting States to set up institutions of higher education, any State so doing will be under an obligation to afford an effective right of access to them’.353 Effective access to education includes a right for ‘everyone’ to benefit from existing educational facilities at a given time without discrimination. Implicit in the phrase ‘No person shall …’ is the principle of equality of treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to education.354 [11.110]  Although the Grand Chamber in Şahin v Turkey accepted that ‘the regulations on the basis of which the applicant was refused access to various lectures and 347 

Ibid, para 143. Ibid, para 125. The applicant alleged a violation of the first sentence of Art 2, Protocol 1. 349  Ibid, para 134. 350  Ibid, para 136. 351  Ibid, para 141. 352  Belgian Linguistic case, above n 147, under the heading ‘B. Interpretation adopted by the Court’ para 3. 353  Şahin v Turkey, above n 346, para 137. 354  Ibid, para 152. 348 

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The Right to Education

examinations for wearing the Islamic headscarf constituted a restriction on her right to education’,355 by a majority of 16:1 it held that ‘there [had] been no violation of the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No 1’356 for several reasons. First, the right to education is not absolute but may be subject to limitations: these are permitted by implication, since the right of access ‘by its very nature calls for regulation by the State’.357 Secondly, the right to education does not in principle exclude recourse to disciplinary measures, including suspension or expulsion from an educational institution in order to ensure compliance with its internal rules.358 Thirdly, the restriction was foreseeable by those concerned and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public order. The obvious purpose of the restriction was to preserve the secular character of educational institutions.359 Fourthly, it would be unrealistic to imagine that the applicant, a medical student, was unaware of Istanbul University’s internal regulations restricting the places where religious dress could be worn, or had not been sufficiently informed about the reasons for their introduction.360 [11.111]  In Judge Tulkens’s Dissenting Opinion, she found that the majority in the Grand Chamber ‘deprive[d] the applicant of that right [to education] for reasons which do not appear to me to be either relevant or sufficient’.361 Judge Tulkens noted that the applicant did not, on religious grounds, seek to be excused from certain activities or request changes to be made to the university course for which she had enrolled as a student.362 She simply wished to complete her studies in the conditions that had obtained when she first enrolled at the university and during the initial years of her university career, when she had been free to wear the headscarf without any problem.363 She also noted that a limitation will only be consistent with the right to education if there is ‘a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued’.364 In this respect she noted that before refusing the applicant access to lectures and examinations, the authorities should have used other means either to encourage her (through mediation, for example) to remove her headscarf and pursue her studies, or to ensure that public order was maintained on the university premises if it was genuinely at risk. The fact of the matter is that no attempt was made to try measures that would have had a less drastic effect on the applicant’s right to education in the instant case. My second point is that it is common ground that by making the applicant’s pursuit of her studies conditional on removing the headscarf and by refusing her access to the university if she failed to comply with the requirements, the authorities forced the applicant to leave the country and complete her studies at the University of Vienna. She was thus left with no alternative.365

355 

Ibid, para 157. Ibid, para 162. Ibid, para 154. 358  Ibid, para 156. 359  Ibid, para 158. 360  Ibid, para 160. 361  Judge Tulkens Dissent, in Şahin v Turkey, above n 346, para 15. 362  Ibid. 363  Ibid. 364  Ibid, para 16. 365  Ibid, para 17. 356  357 

Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy

 617

[11.112]  Lastly, Judge Tulkens observed that the Grand Chamber did not weigh up the competing interests, namely, on the one hand, the damage sustained by the ­applicant—who not only was deprived of any possibility of completing her studies in Turkey because of her religious convictions, but also maintained that it was unlikely that she would be able to return to her country to practise her profession owing to the difficulties that existed there in obtaining recognition for foreign diplomas—and, on the other, the benefit to be gained by Turkish society from prohibiting the applicant from wearing the headscarf on university premises.366 In these circumstances, Judge Tulkens considered that ‘by refusing the applicant access to the lectures and examinations that were part of the course at the Faculty of Medicine, she was de facto deprived of the right of access to the University and, consequently, of her right to education’.367 In her opinion, ‘it is ironic that young women should be deprived of that education on account of the headscarf’.368 [11.113]  Following the reasoning above, it is submitted that Judge Tulkens’ dissent remains very persuasive. The majority view excluded Şahin and other women who wore the Islamic headscarf from university education unless they refrained from practising their religion. In the context of the ECHR, Şahin v Turkey is an important decision in as far as it stated clearly that the right not to be denied education applied to all levels of education, including higher education. Although courts have been reluctant to protect wearing of various forms of dress in schools associated with Islamic religious beliefs,369 making education acceptable requires giving attention to reasonable accommodation of various manifestations of religious beliefs in schools.370 In Dzvova v Minister of Education, Sports and Culture & Others371 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe ordered a primary school to re-admit a pupil it had excluded because his dreadlock hairstyle contravened the school’s uniform policy, which required students to keep their hair cut short. It declared that expulsion of a Rastafarian from school on the basis of his expression of his religious belief through his hairstyle violated his right to freedom of religion under the Zimbabwean Constitution.

V.  ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY [11.114]  Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are important components of the right to education, as are the rights to hold opinions without interference372 and to

366 

Ibid. Ibid, para 15. 368  Ibid, para 19. 369  See, eg, Republic v The Head Teacher, Kenya High School & Anor, ex parte SMY (Suing Through Her Mother and Next Friend A B) [2012] eKLR; Judicial Review 318 of 2010 (High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 18 September 2012), available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/88818.pdf. 370  See, eg, Farai Dzvova v Minister of Education, Sports and Culture & Others, Civil Application 291/06, [2007] ZWSC 26; (2007) AHRLR 189 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Harare, 10 January 2007). 371  Ibid. 372 ICCPR, Art 19(1): ‘Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.’ HRC, General Comment 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc CCPR/ /C/GC/34 (12 September 2011). 367 

618 

The Right to Education

freedom of expression.373 Although the ICESCR does not explicitly protect ­academic freedom, the CESCR confirmed that ‘the right to education can only be enjoyed if accompanied by the academic freedom of staff and students’ throughout the education sector.374 Many states protect academic freedom in their national constitutions.375 Given that staff and students in higher education are especially vulnerable to political and other pressures that undermine academic freedom, academic freedom is of great relevance to them. Academic freedom of higher-education teaching personnel entails the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies.376

[11.115]  According to the CESCR: 39. Members of the academic community, individually or collectively, are free to pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through research, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation or writing. Academic freedom includes the liberty of individuals to express freely opinions about the institution or system in which they work, to fulfil their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the State or any other actor, to participate in professional or representative academic bodies, and to enjoy all the internationally recognized human rights applicable to other individuals in the same jurisdiction. The enjoyment of academic freedom carries with it obligations, such as the duty to respect the academic freedom of others, to ensure the fair discussion of contrary views, and to treat all without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds. 40. The enjoyment of academic freedom requires the autonomy of institutions of higher education. Autonomy is that degree of self-governance necessary for effective decisionmaking by institutions of higher education in relation to their academic work, standards, management and related activities. Self-governance, however, must be consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the State. Given the substantial public investments made in higher education, an appropriate balance has to be struck between institutional autonomy and accountability. While there

373  ICCPR, Art 19(2): ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’ 374  CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, para 38. 375  See, eg, Constitutions of Tunisia (2014), Art 33; South Sudan (2011), Art 38(2); Dominican Republic (2010), Art 63; Kenya (2010), Art 33; Algeria (2008), Art 38; Ecuador (2008), Arts 29 and 355; Kosovo (2008), Art 48; Thailand (2007), s 50; Brazil (2006), Art 206; Republic of Sudan (2005), Art 13(6); Armenia (2005), Art 40; Greece (2001), Art 16; Albania (1998, amended 2008), Art 57; Switzerland (1999, amended in 2012), Art 20; The Gambia (1997), Art 25; South Africa (1996), Art 16(1); Belarus (1996), Art 51; Uganda (1995, amended in 2006), Art 29; Malawi (1994), Arts 33 and 44; Peru (1993), Art 18; Ghana (1992), Art 21(1); Paraguay (1992), Art 74; Sierra Leone (1991), Art 25; Namibia (1990), Art 21(1); Philippines (1987), s 5; Nicaragua (1987), Art 125; Liberia (1986), Art 15; Liberia (1986), Art 15; El Salvador (1983), Arts 60–61; Turkey (1982, amended in 2007), Art 27; Spain (1978), Arts 20(1)(c) and 27; Azerbaijan (1978, amended in 1995), Art 51; Panama (1972, amended 2004), Art 105; Germany (1949), Art 5(3); Japan (1946), Art 23; Austria (1867), Art 17; Mexico (1917 amended 2005), Art 3. 376 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (11 November 1997), para 27.

Right of Persons with Disabilities

 619

is no single model, institutional arrangements should be fair, just and equitable, and as transparent and participatory as possible.377

VI.  THE RIGHT TO INCLUSIVE EDUCATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES [11.116]  School systems have typically adopted one of three different approaches to persons with disabilities: exclusion, segregation and integration: Exclusion occurs when a student is kept away from school on the basis of the existence of an impairment, without another educational opportunity on equal terms with other students being provided. Through this approach, a student with disabilities is prevented from joining the education system on the basis of age, development or diagnosis and is placed in a social welfare or health-care environment without access to education. Segregation occurs when such a student is sent to a school designed to respond to a particular impairment, usually in a special-education school system. Finally, integration is when a student with an impairment is placed in a mainstream school,378 so long as he or she can adjust to fit the standardized requirements of the school. The integration approach focuses solely on enhancing the ability of the student to comply with the established standards.379

[11.117]  It is generally acknowledged that inclusive education is the most appropriate modality for states to guarantee universality and non-discrimination in the right to education.380 Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities381 protects persons with disabilities against discrimination, and obliges state parties to ‘ensure an inclusive education system’ at all education levels and that ‘reasonable accommodation’ is provided to persons with disabilities: 1. States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to education. With a view to realizing this right without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity, States Parties shall ensure an inclusive education system at all levels and life long learning directed to: (a) The full development of human potential and sense of dignity and self-worth, and the strengthening of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and human diversity; (b) The development by persons with disabilities of their personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and physical abilities, to their fullest potential;

377 

CESCR, General Comment 13, above n 6, 39–40. The terms ‘mainstream schools’, ‘general education’, ‘regular schools’ and ‘ordinary schools’ are commonly used to refer to schools systems that receive students with or without impairments, as opposed to ‘special schools’ that only receive students with impairments. 379  See Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thematic Study on the Right of Persons with Disabilities to Education, UN Doc A/HRC/25/29 (18 December 2013), para 4, citing UNICEF, The Right of Children with Disabilities to Education: A Right-Based Approach to Inclusive Education (Geneva, UNICEF, 2012). 380  Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 379, para 3. 381  International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, above n 45. As at 4 December 2014, there were 159 signatories and 151 parties. For discussion, see G De Beco, ‘The Right to Inclusive Education According to Article 24 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Background, Requirements and (Remaining) Questions’ (2014) 32(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 263. 378 

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(c) Enabling persons with disabilities to participate effectively in a free society. 2. In realizing this right, States Parties shall ensure that: (a) Persons with disabilities are not excluded from the general education system on the basis of disability, and that children with disabilities are not excluded from free and compulsory primary education, or from secondary education, on the basis of disability; (b) Persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and free primary education and secondary education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live; (c) Reasonable accommodation of the individual’s requirements is provided; (d) Persons with disabilities receive the support required, within the general education system, to facilitate their effective education; (e) Effective individualized support measures are provided in environments that maximize academic and social development, consistent with the goal of full inclusion. 3. States Parties shall enable persons with disabilities to learn life and social development skills to facilitate their full and equal participation in education and as members of the community. To this end, States Parties shall take appropriate measures, including: (a) Facilitating the learning of Braille, alternative script, augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication and orientation and mobility skills, and facilitating peer support and mentoring; (b) Facilitating the learning of sign language and the promotion of the linguistic identity of the deaf community; (c) Ensuring that the education of persons, and in particular children, who are blind, deaf or deafblind, is delivered in the most appropriate languages and modes and means of communication for the individual, and in environments which maximize academic and social development. 4. In order to help ensure the realization of this right, States Parties shall take appropriate measures to employ teachers, including teachers with disabilities, who are qualified in sign language and/or Braille, and to train professionals and staff who work at all levels of education. Such training shall incorporate disability awareness and the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication, educational techniques and materials to support persons with disabilities. 5. States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities are able to access general tertiary education, vocational training, adult education and lifelong learning without discrimination and on an equal basis with others. To this end, States Parties shall ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided to persons with disabilities.

[11.118]  Although ‘inclusive’ education is not defined in the Convention, it is ‘obviously not equal to education in special schools, which would lead to a segregated education system’, or equal to the integration of persons with disabilities into regular schools.382 According to the CRC Committee: At its core, inclusive education is a set of values, principles and practices that seeks meaningful, effective, and quality education for all students, that does justice to the diversity of learning conditions and requirements not only of children with disabilities, but for all students. This goal can be achieved by different organizational means which respect the diversity of children. Inclusion may range from full-time placement of all students with disabilities into one regular classroom or placement into the regular class room with varying degree of inclusion, including a certain portion of special education. It is important to understand that inclusion should not be understood nor practiced as simply integrating children with 382 

De Beco, above n 381, 275.

Conclusion

 621

disabilities into the regular system regardless of their challenges and needs. Close ­cooperation among special educators and regular educators is essential. Schools’ curricula must be reevaluated and developed to meet the needs of children with and without disabilities. Modification in training programmes for teachers and other personnel involved in the educational system must be achieved in order to fully implement the philosophy of inclusive education.383

Thus, ‘equality, participation, non-discrimination, celebrating diversity and sharing good practices’ are some key values of inclusive education.384 States are therefore urged to ‘promote inclusive education for children with disabilities, including by allocating resources for the provision of reasonable accommodation and additional professional training for teachers’.385

VII. CONCLUSION [11.119]  This chapter has examined the right to education as a human right in international law. The provisions of international and regional human rights instruments have been examined to assess the adequacy of a framework that applies to state obligations relating to the right to education. As shown above, the right to education is well established in existing, widely ratified international treaties as a legally binding human right, and its realisation is fundamental to the enjoyment of all other human rights. As argued above, the right to education in international law obliges states to make (primary, fundamental, secondary and higher) education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable. Significantly, the constitutions of more than 140 states protect some aspects of the right to education,386 including academic freedom and institutional autonomy. [11.120]  Unfortunately, the gap in the availability and accessibility of education facilities between developed states and developing states is widening. The working conditions of teachers, especially in the world’s poorest states, remain miserable: most of the world’s 57 million teachers lack the resources and support they need to work effectively, a fact that affects the quality of education.387 Increasingly, education (including primary education) is not affordable for those who are disadvantaged, marginal and living in poverty. As a result, the enjoyment of the right to education, especially for girls and women (disproportionately affected by poverty), remains a distant goal for millions of individuals throughout the world, particularly in subSaharan Africa and South and West Asia, where the goal is becoming increasingly

383  CRC Committee, General Comment 9: The Rights of Children with Disabilities, UN Doc CRC/C/ GC/9 (27 February 2007) para 67. 384  Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 379, para 7. 385  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Tajikistan, UN Doc E/C.12/TJK/CO/2-3 (6 March 2015) para 36. 386  See Y Rabin, ‘The Many Faces of the Right to Education’ in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 265. 387 UNESCO, World Education Report 1998: Teachers and Teaching in a Changing World (UNESCO, 1998) available at http://www.unesco.org/education/information/wer/PDFeng/wholewer98.PDF, ch 3.

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remote.388 Such an e­ ducational model, which excludes those who are unable to pay, is ‘a recipe for ­perpetuating poverty and inequality’ because it reproduces economic and social stratification.389 Even within some developed states there are ‘grave disparities which appear to prevail in the level of education depending on the social origin of the pupil’, and there are ‘regional differences in the quality of the education provided to children’.390 In order to safeguard against exclusion and marginalisation, there is a need to put in place effective regulatory frameworks to protect against commercialisation of education by preserving education as a public good, which must not be reduced to a profit-making business by private education providers.391 This calls for a renewal of governmental commitment and investment of appropriate human and financial resources, as well as international cooperation to achieve the right to education of ‘everyone’ in practice. [11.121]  In order not to undermine state efforts to respect, protect and fulfil the right to education, NSAs should cooperate effectively with states and pay greater attention to the realisation of the right to education (particularly for the marginalised and vulnerable groups) in their policies and programmes.392 This calls for education impact assessments before implementation of all policies and decisions that may have a detrimental effect on the availability of, and accessibility to, education. The UNESCO should play a greater role in this regard, to ensure that the right to education is enjoyed at all times, including by persons with disabilities. [11.122]  The right to education—like all other human rights—brings with it a set of globally agreed norms or standards, which give rise to state obligations in relation to which effective and transparent monitoring and accountability mechanisms are required. This combination of globally legitimised norms, obligations, monitoring and accountability empowers disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and communities. This contributes to poverty reduction, equality, non-discrimination and participation. For this reason, it is essential to integrate the right to education throughout the activities of all states and NSAs in the local, national and international policymaking processes, strategies and programmes.

388  UN Statistics Division, The World’s Women 2015, above n 17; EFA, Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, above n 18, ch 2. 389 K Tomaševski, Mission to Colombia, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.2/Corr.1 (30 March 2004) para 16. 390  CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, UN Doc E/C.12/1994/19 (21 December 1994) para 12. 391  See K Singh, ‘Protecting the Right to Education against Commercialization’, UN Doc A/HRC/29/30 (10 June 2015). 392  See ch 3 above.

12 Cultural Rights: Article 15 Article 15 ICESCR 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts and cooperation in the ­scientific and cultural fields.

I. INTRODUCTION [12.01]  The term ‘cultural rights’, or ‘rights in the field of culture’, is used in this ­chapter in a limited sense to refer to human rights recognised in Articles 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR. Although cultural rights were explicitly included in the title of the ICESCR, they remained largely a neglected category of human rights compared to civil, political, economic and social rights.1 This neglect is regrettable given the significance of culture, as explicitly recognised in the 1982 UNESCO Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, which noted that culture ‘makes us specifically human, rational beings, endowed with a critical judgement and a sense of moral commitment’ and further that it is ‘through culture that we discern values and make choices’, express ourselves, question our achievements and create works through which we transcend our limitations.2

1  See J Symonides, ‘Cultural Rights: A Neglected Category of Human Rights’ (1998) 50 (158) International Social Science Journal 559; F Shaheed, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights’, UN Doc A/67/287 (10 August 2012) para 14, observes that ‘cultural rights have been the “poor cousins” of economic and social rights, receiving scant attention at the national and international levels’. 2 UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, World Conference on Cultural Policies ­Mexico City, 26 July–6 August 1982, preamble.

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It follows that respect for and promotion of cultural rights is ‘essential for the maintenance of human dignity’, as well as for fostering ‘positive social interaction between individuals and communities in a diverse and multicultural world’.3 [12.02]  Since around 1998 there has been increasing attention on cultural rights from human rights publicists4 and international bodies, as reflected partly in the appointment of the first UN independent expert in the field of cultural rights by the UN Human Rights Council in 2009.5 The first express provisions to protect cultural rights as human rights in international human rights law were contained in Article 27 of the UDHR, which declared that ‘everyone’ has ‘the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’, as well as ‘the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. Translating the above provision into treaty obligations, Article 15 of the ­ICESCR recognises the right of ‘everyone’ to three different rights, namely: (a) the right to take part in cultural life; (b) the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; and (c) the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which the individual is the author. The term ‘everyone’ in Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR may denote the individual or the collective meaning that ‘cultural rights may be exercised by a person (a) as an individual, (b) in association with others, or (c) within a community or group, as such’.6

3 CESCR, General Comment 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, UN Doc E/C.12/ GC/21, 21 December 2009, para 1. 4  See, eg, J Ringelheim, ‘Cultural Rights’ in D Moeckli et al, International Human Rights Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 286; ECtHR, Research Division, Cultural Rights in the Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2011), available at http://www. echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_cultural_rights_ENG.pdf; M Langfield et al (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 2010); F ­Francioni and M Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); E Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007); Y Donders, ‘Study on the Legal Framework of the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life’ in Y Donders and V Volodin (eds), Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges (­Aldershot, UNESCO and Ashgate, 2007) 231; Y Donders, Cultural Life in the Context of Human Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/40/13 (9 May 2008); P Thornberry, Cultural Rights and Universality of Human Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/40/13 (9 May 2008); D McGoldrick, ‘Culture, Cultures and Human Rights’ in MA Baderin and R McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 447; M Wilson and P Hunt, Culture, Rights, and Cultural Rights: Perspectives from the South Pacific (Wellington, Huia, 2000); UNESCO and H Nieć (ed), Cultural Rights and Wrongs: A Collection of Essays in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, UNESCO, 1998); R O’Keefe, ‘The “Right to Take Part in Cultural Life” Under Article 15 of the ICESCR’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 904. 5 See, eg, F Shaheed, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights’, UN Doc A/HRC/14/36 (22 March 2010); A/HRC/17/38 (21 March 2011); A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012); A/67/287 (10 August 2012); A/HRC/23/34 (14 March 2013); A/68/296 (9 August 2013); A/HRC/25/49 (23 January 2014); A/69/286 (8 August 2014); A/HRC/28/57 (24 December 2014); A/70/279 (4 August 2015), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CulturalRights/Pages/FaridaShaheed.aspx. 6  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 9.

Introduction

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[12.03]  The right to participate or take part in cultural life without discrimination was subsequently included in specialised UN human rights instruments protecting, inter alia, the cultural rights of vulnerable groups such as distinct (national, ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic) minorities,7 women,8 children,9 migrant workers and members of their families,10 persons with disabilities11 and indigenous peoples,12 to enable them to effectively access the cultural resources, activities and infrastructures necessary for the enjoyment of cultural life.13 Regional human rights instruments in America,14 Africa15 and Europe16 protect several aspects of the right to cultural rights. This chapter examines the protection of cultural rights in international human rights law, focusing mainly on the rights protected in Article 15 of the ICESCR. Following this

7  See below n 32; ICCPR, Art 27; ICERD, Art 5(e)(vi) protects the right to ‘equal participation in cultural activities’; UNESCO, Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and Their Contribution to it, 26 November 1976, UNESCO Doc 19, C/Resolutions, annex I, 29, para II(4)(f). 8 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc A/34/46, 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW), Art 13(c) oblige states to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the ‘right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life’. 9  The Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989), 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC), Art 31 provides: ‘1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts. 2. States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully in cultural and artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.’ 10  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, UN Doc A/45/49 (1990), 2220 UNTS 3 (Migrant Workers Convention), Art 43(1)(g) provides: ‘Migrant workers shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of the State of employment in relation to: … (g) Access to and participation in cultural life’. 11  International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), 2515 UNTS 3 (Convention on the Rights of Persons with ­Disabilities), Art 30(1) provides: ‘States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to take part on an equal basis with others in cultural life, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities: (a) Enjoy access to cultural materials in accessible formats; (b) Enjoy access to television programmes, films, theatre and other cultural activities, in accessible formats; (c) Enjoy access to places for cultural performances or services, such as theatres, museums, cinemas, libraries and tourism services, and, as far as possible, enjoy access to monuments and sites of national cultural importance.’ 12 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/47/1 (7 ­September 2007), Art 8311, provides: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.’ For comment, see S Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges’ (2011) 22(1) The European Journal of International Law 121; SJ Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (New York, Aspen Publishers, 2009). 13  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, paras 25–39. 14  See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS res XXX (1948), OEA/Ser.L.V/ II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) Art 13; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988) (Protocol of San Salvador), Art 14. 15  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 ILM 58 (1982) (African Charter), Art 17(2). 16  Revised European Social Charter, Art 15(3), with respect to persons with disabilities, only provides that state parties undertake to ‘promote their full social integration and participation in the life of the community in particular through measures, including technical aids, aiming to overcome barriers to communication and mobility and enabling access to transport, housing, cultural activities and leisure’. It also protects, in Art 23, the right of elderly persons to ‘play an active part in public, social and cultural life’.

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introduction, section II. examines the right to take part in cultural life, examining the meaning of cultural life, the scope and content of the right to take part in cultural life, and state obligations in relation to this right. Section III. analyses the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; section IV. considers the right of authors and inventors to benefit from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production; section V. sets out possible limitations to cultural rights; and section VI. makes some concluding observations.

II.  THE RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN CULTURAL LIFE A.  What is Cultural Life? [12.04]  The concept of ‘cultural life’ is not defined in the ICESCR. It is derived from ‘culture’, one of the most complicated words in the English language.17 The concept of ‘culture’ in international law and discourse has been defined in several ways. At least four different notions of culture may be discerned: First, culture as high culture (that is, culture in the traditional ‘classic highbrow’ sense as including art, literature, orchestra music, theatre and architecture). Second, culture as popular culture (which involves culture in less elitist terms, as including the creative expressions of the mass public, such as popular, folk and contemporary music, movies, commercial radio and television, as well as other leisure-related activities including organised sports and social events). Third, culture as a way of life, which acknowledged the fact that culture is embedded in our daily activities, and encompassed our values, beliefs, practices and our ways of doing things and thinking. [Fourth,] culture as sets of collective memories, a concept which acknowledges the aspect of culture that consists of shared ideas and beliefs of history, ancestry and of life sustained in a community of individuals’ memory, lived, signified, expressed and enacted, which gives heritage and cultural practices their meaning. Thus, for example, the spiritual relationship between indigenous people and their land is sustained by a collective memory, and so is the relationship between communities and significant historical events.18

[12.05]  The concept of culture has evolved over the years, from the narrow understanding of culture appearing in Article 27 of the UDHR as a product of the few elites—artistic and intellectual expressions by artists or authors (high culture)19—to include the expressions and the creativity of everyone, including the most disadvantaged individuals and groups in non-elitist terms (popular or mass culture). This entails broad or popular participation in, and access to, cultural goods, institutions and activities, including ‘access to concerts, theatre, cinema, sport events and other cultural activities’ (especially at the community level, including in rural and deprived urban areas) affordable for all segments of the population, as well as access to ­information

17 

R Williams, Keywords (London, Fontana, 1983) 87. Chow, ‘Culture as Collective Memories: An Emerging Concept in International Law and ­Discourse on Cultural Rights’ (2014) 14(4) Human Rights Law Review 611, 613 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 19  J Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) 217–19. 18 PYS

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t­echnologies such as the Internet.20 This trend followed developments in mass communication and an increasing recognition of cultural diversity. It is vital to note that both ‘high culture’ and ‘popular or mass culture’ have conceptualised culture as the ‘life of the mind’, given the limited focus on artistic or intellectual endeavours and expressions of creativity. The understanding of the notion of culture further expanded in scope to a conception of culture as ‘a way of life’ or ‘ways of living together’, reflecting ‘a complex web of relations and beliefs, values and motivations’,21 as recognised in UNESCO declarations: [C]ulture is an integral part of social life and that a policy for culture must therefore be seen in the broad context of general State policy, and that culture is, in its very essence, a social ­phenomenon resulting from individuals joining and cooperating in creative activities … [C]ulture is not merely an accumulation of works and knowledge which an elite produces, collects and conserves in order to place it within reach of all; or that a people rich in its past and its heritage offers to others as a model which their own history has failed to provide for them; that culture is not limited to access to works of art and the humanities, but is at one and the same time the acquisition of knowledge, the demand for a way of life and the need to communicate … [T]he concept of culture has been broadened to include all forms of creativity and expression of groups or individuals, both in their ways of life and in their artistic activities.22 [C]ulture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.23

[12.06]  The definitions above consider culture from a broader perspective as ‘a way of life’, and not merely as an accumulation of works and knowledge (intellectual and artistic activities) produced by an elite. The term ‘culture’ covers ‘all forms of creativity and expression of groups and individuals both in their ways of life and in their artistic activities’.24 Thus the term encompasses ‘those values, beliefs, convictions, languages, knowledge and the arts, traditions, institutions and ways of life through which a person or a group expresses their humanity and meanings that they give to their existence and to their development’.25 In this respect culture is central to an expression of the identity of an individual or a community, including distinctive features, ways of thinking, the social organisation of people’s lives, the ecosystem, biodiversity associated with livelihood,26 and encouraging knowledge of history, traditions and culture

20  Revised Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, E/C.12/2008/2 (24 March 2009) Art 15, para 67. 21 World Commission on Culture and Development, Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World ­Commission on Culture and Development (Paris, UNESCO, 1996) 7. 22  UNESCO Recommendation, above n 7, fifth preambular paras (a) and (c) and para 3(a). 23 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2002, available at http://www.unesco.org/­ education/imld_2002/unversal_decla.shtml, fifth preambular para. 24  Ibid, fifth preambular para (c). 25 Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, 7 May 2007, available at http://www.culturalrights.net/ descargas/drets_culturals377.pdf, Art 2(a). See also UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration above n 2, preamble, which states that ‘in its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.’ 26 UNSECO, Biodiversity in UNESCO (Paris, UNESCO, 2007); Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79, 31 ILM 818 (1992), available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.

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of various groups.27 Cultural heritage links the past, the present and the future, as it encompasses ‘group resources’28 inherited from the past that are considered to be of such value or significance today that individuals and communities, implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit them to future generations. It includes ‘tangible heritage’ (eg sites, structures and remains of archaeological, historical, religious, cultural or aesthetic value), ‘intangible heritage’29 (eg traditions, customs and practices, aesthetic and spiritual beliefs; vernacular or other languages; artistic expressions, folklore) and ‘natural heritage’ (eg protected natural reserves; other protected biologically diverse areas; historic parks and gardens and cultural landscapes).30 [12.07]  This is particularly relevant to the way of life of numerous groups whose ­cultures may differ from those of mainstream populations, in particular minorities and indigenous peoples.31 Minorities (‘groups numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position’)32 and persons belonging to minorities have a right ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination’.33 Indigenous peoples, as a collective or as individuals, are entitled to a full range of human rights, including rights to be free from forced assimilation, integration or destruction of their culture; the right to ‘the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired’; the right to their traditional medicines; and the right to enjoy the right to practise and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs, heritage and

27 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Romania, UN Doc E/C.12/ROU/CO/3-5 (28 November 2014) para 24; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Slovenia, UN Doc E/C.12/SVN/CO/2 (28 November 2014) para 28. 28  Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, adopted 27 October 2005, CETS No 199, Art 2(a). 29  UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, adopted 3 November 2003, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00006. 30  Shaheed, UN Doc A/HRC/17/38 (21 March 2011), above n 5, paras 4–6. 31  See, eg, UN Development Group, Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples Issues (New York, United Nations, 2009) 6; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, UN Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4 (16 December 2009) para 36; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc E/EC.12/TCD/CO/3 (16 December 2009) para 35; CESCR, Concluding Observations: Romania, UN Doc E/C.12/ROU/CO/3-5 (28 November 2014) para 24; and CESCR, Concluding Observations: Slovenia, UN Doc E/C.12/SVN/CO/2 (28 November 2014) para 28. 32  Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, defined a minority as: ‘A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.’ See F Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic ­Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979) para 568. 33  UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc A/47/49 (1993), Art 2(1); Capotorti, above n 32, paras 242, 568; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, HR/ PUB/10/3 (New York, United Nations, 2010). See also ICCPR, Art 27; European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS No 157, Art 10; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ETS No 148; Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion (1935) PCIJ, Series A/B no 64, 4, 17; Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Committee or Badinter Commission), Opinion 2, 31 ILM 1495 (1992), para 2.

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other forms of cultural expressions.34 While there is no universally agreed definition of ‘­indigenous peoples’, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations listed the following ­factors as relevant to the understanding of the concept of ‘indigenous’: (a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; (b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions; (c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and (d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist.35

[12.08]  This broader understanding of culture as manifesting itself in many forms, including a particular ‘way of life’ associated with the use of ancestral/traditional lands and natural resources, reflects the view of several human rights bodies, including the HRC in the context of Article 27 of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘persons belonging to … minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture’,36 the IACtHR in the context of the right to property under Article 21 of the AmCHR,37 and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the context of Article 17(2) and (3) of the African Charter.38 The CESCR supported a broad conception of culture by stating: [C]ulture is a broad, inclusive concept encompassing all manifestations of human e­ xistence … The Committee considers that culture, for the purpose of implementing article 15(1)(a), encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build their world view representing their encounter with the external forces affecting their

34  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, paras 32, 33, 36, 37 and 55(e); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n 12; ILO Convention No 107, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations, adopted 26 June 1957, entered into force 2 June 1959, 328 UNTS 247; ILO Convention No 169, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991, 72 ILO Official Bulletin 59, 28 ILM 1382 (1989). 35 Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs Erica-Irene A Daes, on the concept of ‘­indigenous people’, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (10 June 1996) para 69 (emphasis added). 36 HRC, General Comment 23: Article 27 [The Rights of Minorities], UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.5 (26 April 1994) para 7; Chief Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication no 167/84 (26 March 1990) para 33; Länsman et al v Finland, Communication no 511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/ C/52/D/511/1992 (8 November 1994) para 9.8; Apirana Mahuika v New Zealand, Communication no 547/93 (27 October 1993) para 9.3; S Joseph and M Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 832–66. 37  Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, IACtHR, Judgment of 17 June 2005, Series C no 125, paras 131–37; The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, IACtHR, Judgment of 31 August 2001, para 149; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, IACtHR, Judgment of 27 June 2012, Series C no 245, paras 145–46, 177; Saramaka People v Suriname, IACtHR, Judgment of 28 November 2007, Series C no 172. 38 See Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of ­Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya, Communication no 276/03, 27th Annual Activity Report, (2009) AHRLR 75, paras 16, 250–51; ch 4.

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lives. Culture shapes and mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and political life of individuals, groups of individuals and communities.39

It is essential to note, as recognised by the CESCR General Comment 21, that c­ ultural life ‘is an explicit reference to culture as a living process, historical, dynamic and ­evolving’,40 and that ‘the concept of culture must be seen not as a series of isolated manifestations or hermetic compartments, but as an interactive process whereby individuals and communities, while preserving their specificities and purposes, give expression to the culture of humanity’.41 Given the broader definition of culture, as shown above, what is the normative content of the right to take part in cultural life? B.  The Scope of the Right to take Part in Cultural Life [12.09]  The CESCR clarified the scope of the right to take part in cultural life under Article 15(1) of the ICESCR in its General Comment 21.42 It observed that there are, amongst others, three interrelated main components of the right to participate or take part in cultural life, namely, participation in, access to and contribution to cultural life: (a) Participation covers in particular the right of everyone—alone, or in association with others or as a community—to act freely, to choose his or her own identity, to identify or not with one or several communities or to change that choice, to take part in the political life of society, to engage in one’s own cultural practices and to express oneself in the language of one’s choice. Everyone also has the right to seek and develop cultural knowledge and expressions and to share them with others, as well as to act creatively and take part in creative activity; (b) Access covers in particular the right of everyone—alone, in association with others or as a community—to know and understand his or her own culture and that of others through education and information, and to receive quality education and training with due regard for cultural identity. Everyone has also the right to learn about forms of expression and dissemination through any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of life associated with the use of cultural goods and resources such as land, water,43 biodiversity, language or specific institutions, and to benefit from the cultural heritage and the creation of other individuals and communities; (c) Contribution to cultural life refers to the right of everyone to be involved in creating the spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional expressions of the community. This is supported by the right to take part in the development of the community to which a person belongs, and in the definition, elaboration and implementation of policies and decisions that have an impact on the exercise of a person’s cultural rights.44

With respect to access to cultural life, information and communication technologies, including the Internet, are especially important for accessing information, establishing and developing contacts with individuals and groups with similar views, as well as for expressing oneself and contributing one’s own cultural knowledge and expressions. 39 

CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, paras 11 and 13 (emphasis added). Ibid, para 11. 41  Ibid, para 12. 42  Ibid. See also UN Docs A/HRC/14/36, A/HRC/17/38 and A/HRC/20/26, above n 5. 43  CESCR, General Comment 15: The Right to Water, UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003) paras 6 and 11. 44 CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 15, citing UNESCO Universal Declaration on ­Cultural Diversity, above n 23, Art 5; and Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, above n 25, Art 7. 40 

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C.  State Obligations in Relation to the Right to Take Part in Cultural Life i.  Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil [12.10]  States are obliged to respect the right to take part in cultural life by ‘refrain[ing] from interfering, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right’ of ‘everyone’, individually or in association with others, or within a community or group, to take part in cultural life.45 This covers the adoption of specific measures to respect several aspects of the right to participate in cultural life, including respect for the cultural rights of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, minorities as well as persons belonging to minorities, migrants, indigenous peoples and persons living in poverty.46 Respect for cultural rights entails refraining from interfering with the following rights of individuals and groups: (a) To freely choose their own cultural identity, to belong or not to belong to a community, and have their choice respected; This includes the right not to be subjected to any form of discrimination based on cultural identity, exclusion or forced assimilation,47 and the right of all persons to express their ­cultural identity freely and to exercise their cultural practices and way of life. States parties should consequently ensure that their legislation does not impair the enjoyment of these rights through direct or indirect discrimination. (b) To enjoy freedom of opinion, freedom of expression in the language or languages of their choice, and the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds and forms including art forms, regardless of frontiers of any kind; This implies the right of all persons to have access to, and to participate in, varied information exchanges, and to have access to cultural goods and services, understood as vectors of identity, values and meaning.48 (c) To enjoy the freedom to create, individually, in association with others, or within a community or group, which implies that States parties must abolish censorship of cultural activities in the arts49 and other forms of expression, if any; This obligation is closely related to the duty of States parties, under article 15, paragraph 3, “to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity”. (d) To have access to their own cultural and linguistic heritage and to that of others; In particular, States must respect free access by minorities to their own culture, heritage and other forms of expression, as well as the free exercise of their cultural identity and practices. This includes the right to be taught about one’s own culture as well as those of others.50 States parties must also respect the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture and heritage and to maintain and strengthen their spiritual relationship with their ancestral lands and other

45 

CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, paras 48–49. Ibid, paras 25–39. Migrant Workers Convention, above n 10, Art 31. 48  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, above n 23, para 8. 49  On freedom of artistic expression, see, eg, Müller and Others v Switzerland, App no 10737/84 (ECtHR, 24 May 1988), (1991) 13 EHRR 212, para 27. 50  Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, above n 25, Arts 6 (b) and 7 (b). 46  47 

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natural resources traditionally owned, occupied or used by them, and indispensable to their cultural life. (e) To take part freely in an active and informed way, and without discrimination, in any important decision-making process that may have an impact on his or her way of life and on his or her rights under article 15, paragraph 1(a).51

So, for example, in relation to Vietnam, the CESCR urged the state to ‘refrain from submitting cultural policies to development objectives and to fully respect the right of ethnic minorities to take part in their cultural activities and to conserve, promote and develop their own culture’.52 In addition, the CESCR recommended that ethnic minorities be ‘fully involved’ in decision-making processes on economic exploitation of their cultural heritage. [12.11]  The obligation to protect the right to take part in cultural life requires states to take steps to prevent third parties (NSAs) from interfering in the exercise of the rights set out in paragraph 12.10 above. In addition, states are obliged to protect cultural heritage, diversity of cultural expressions,53 and cultural rights of indigenous peoples ‘deeply rooted in their ancestral lands, territories and resources’54 (ensuring that prior consultation is carried out with indigenous communities, and that ‘the free, prior and informed consent of the members of the community’ is obtained before carrying out development or investment plans or exploitation of natural resources that may have an impact on the traditional territory of indigenous peoples and culturally significant economic activities of a minority or indigenous community),55 and to prohibit discrimination based on cultural identity. The CESCR has thus stated that states are obliged to: (a) Respect and protect cultural heritage in all its forms, in times of war and peace, and natural disasters;56 Cultural heritage must be preserved, developed, enriched and transmitted to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations, in order to encourage creativity in all its diversity and to inspire a genuine dialogue between cultures. Such obligations include the

51 

CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 49. Concluding Observations: Vietnam, UN Doc E/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (28 November 2014) para 34. 53  UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted 20 October 2005, 2440 UNTS 311, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/ 142919e.pdf. 54  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Nepal, UN Doc E/C.12/NPL/CO/3 (28 November 2014) para 28. 55 See Case of Saramaka People v Suriname, IACtHR, above n 37; Kichwa Indigenous People, above n 37, para 164; Angela Poma Poma v Peru, Communication no 1457/2006, HRC, UN Doc CCPR/ C/95/D/1457/2006 (27 March 2009) para 7.6. 56 On the protection of cultural heritage, see several UNESCO Conventions at http://portal.unesco. org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html, including the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954); the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972); the Convention for the ­Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); and the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003). See also the Convention on the Protection of the Archeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations (1976); Cultural Charter for Africa (1976); Charter for the Cultural Renaissance of Africa (2006); ASEAN Declaration on Cultural Heritage (2000); and Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, above n 28. 52 CESCR,

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care, preservation and restoration of historical sites, monuments, works of art and literary works, among others.57 (b) Respect and protect cultural heritage of all groups and communities, in particular the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, in economic development and environmental policies and programmes; Particular attention should be paid to the adverse consequences of globalization, undue privatization of goods and services, and deregulation on the right to participate in cultural life. (c) Respect and protect the cultural productions of indigenous peoples, including their ­traditional knowledge, natural medicines, folklore, rituals and other forms of expression; This includes protection from illegal or unjust exploitation of their lands, territories and resources by State entities or private or transnational enterprises and corporations. (d) Promulgate and enforce legislation to prohibit discrimination based on cultural identity, as well as advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, taking into consideration articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.58

States must also respect and protect ‘a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’ from several acts committed with intent to destroy the group (physically or biologically),59 in whole or in part, since such acts amount to the crime of genocide under international law and interfere with human rights of affected groups, including their cultural rights.60 [12.12]  The obligation to fulfil requires states parties to take appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial, budgetary, promotional and other measures aimed at the full realisation of cultural rights. As noted in chapter two, the obligation to fulfil further entails obligations to facilitate, promote and provide. The obligation to facilitate the right of everyone to take part in cultural life requires states to take a wide range of positive measures, including financial measures, that would contribute to the realisation of this right, such as: (a) Adopting policies for the protection and promotion of cultural diversity, and facilitating access to a rich and diversified range of cultural expressions, including through, inter alia, measures aimed at establishing and supporting public institutions and the cultural

57  See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, above n 23, Art 7; Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, above n 53. 58  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 50. 59  These acts are: ‘(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’ See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, 78 UNTS 277, Art 2; Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), Art 4 and Rwanda, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994), Art 2; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art 6. 60  UN GA res 96(I); Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Advisory Opinion, [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 23; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (DRC v Rwanda), [2006] ICJ Rep 6, para 64; Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, para 25; WA Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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(b)

(c) (d)

(e) (f) (g)

(h)

(i)

Cultural Rights: Article 15 infrastructure necessary for the implementation of such policies; and measures aimed at enhancing diversity through public broadcasting in regional and minority languages; Adopting policies enabling persons belonging to diverse cultural communities to engage freely and without discrimination in their own cultural practices and those of others, and to choose freely their way of life; Promoting the exercise of the right of association for cultural and linguistic minorities for the development of their cultural and linguistic rights; Granting assistance, financial or other, to artists, public and private organizations, including science academies, cultural associations, trade unions and other individuals and institutions engaged in scientific and creative activities; Encouraging scientists, artists and others to take part in international scientific and cultural research activities, such as symposiums, conferences, seminars and workshops; Taking appropriate measures or programmes to support minorities or other communities, including migrant communities, in their efforts to preserve their culture; Taking appropriate measures to remedy structural forms of discrimination so as to ensure that the underrepresentation of persons from certain communities in public life does not adversely affect their right to take part in cultural life; Taking appropriate measures to create conditions conducive to a constructive intercultural relationship between individuals and groups based on mutual respect, understanding and tolerance; Taking appropriate measures to conduct public campaigns through the media, educational institutions and other available channels, with a view to eliminating any form of prejudice against individuals or communities, based on their cultural identity.61

[12.13]  To promote the right to take part in cultural life, states are required to ‘take effective steps’ to ensure that there is appropriate education and the raising of public awareness concerning this right, including the need to respect cultural heritage and cultural diversity, particularly in rural and deprived urban areas, or in relation to the specific situation of, inter alia, minorities and indigenous peoples.62 [12.14]  The obligation to provide requires states to provide ‘all that is necessary for fulfilment of the right to take part in cultural life when individuals or communities are unable, for reasons outside their control, to realize this right for themselves with the means at their disposal’.63 Some examples of the obligation to provide in this regard include: (a) The enactment of appropriate legislation and the establishment of effective mechanisms allowing persons, individually, in association with others, or within a community or group, to participate effectively in decision-making processes, to claim protection of their right to take part in cultural life, and to claim and receive compensation if their rights have been violated; (b) Programmes aimed at preserving and restoring cultural heritage; (c) The inclusion of cultural education at every level in school curricula, including history, literature, music and the history of other cultures, in consultation with all concerned; (d) Guaranteed access for all, without discrimination on grounds of financial or any other status, to museums, libraries, cinemas and theatres and to cultural activities, services and events.64 61 

CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 52. Ibid, para 53. 63  Ibid, para 54. 64  Ibid. 62 

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ii.  Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, Adaptability and Appropriateness [12.15]  States are obliged to make cultural goods and services,65 that are open to ­everyone to enjoy and benefit from, widely available (in sufficient quantities) and accessible (within physical and financial reach of all in both urban and rural areas,66 without discrimination, including accessibility for older persons, persons with disabilities and persons living in poverty); acceptable (consultations with individuals and communities should be held before adopting and implementing laws, policies, strategies, programmes and measures for the enjoyment of cultural rights); adaptable (­strategies, policies, programmes and measures adopted by the state in any area of cultural life must be flexible, relevant and respectful of the cultural diversity of individuals and communities); and appropriate (suitable or acceptable to a given cultural modality or context, that is, respectful of the culture and cultural rights of individuals and c­ ommunities, including minorities and indigenous peoples).67 iii.  Minimum Core Obligation [12.16]  The ‘minimum core obligation’ to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of the right to take part in cultural life, ‘entails at least the obligation to create and promote an environment within which a person individually, or in association with others, or within a community or group, can participate in the culture of their choice’,68 which includes the following core obligations applicable with immediate effect: (a) To take legislative and any other necessary steps to guarantee non-discrimination and gender equality in the enjoyment of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life; (b) To respect the right of everyone to identify or not identify themselves with one or more communities, and the right to change their choice; (c) To respect and protect the right of everyone to engage in their own cultural practices, while respecting human rights which entails, in particular, respecting freedom of thought, belief and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; a person’s right to use the language of his or her choice; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; and freedom to choose and set up educational establishments; (d) To eliminate any barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person’s access to the person’s own culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and without consideration for frontiers of any kind; (e) To allow and encourage the participation of persons belonging to minority groups, indigenous peoples or to other communities in the design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them. In particular, States parties should obtain their free and

65  Ibid, para 16(a). Cultural goods and service include ‘libraries, museums, theatres, cinemas and sports stadiums; literature, including folklore, and the arts in all forms; the shared open spaces essential to cultural interaction, such as parks, squares, avenues and streets; nature’s gifts, such as seas, lakes, rivers, mountains, forests and nature reserves, including the flora and fauna found there, which give nations their character and biodiversity; intangible cultural goods, such as languages, customs, traditions, beliefs, knowledge and history, as well as values, which make up identity and contribute to the cultural diversity of individuals and communities’. 66  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Brazil, UN Doc E/C.12/BRA/CO/2 (12 June 2009) para 33. 67  CESCR, General Comment 21, para 16(a)–(e). 68  Ibid, para 55.

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Cultural Rights: Article 15 informed prior consent when the preservation of their cultural resources, especially those associated with their way of life and cultural expression, are at risk.69

III.  THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND ITS APPLICATIONS [12.17]  Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR protects the right of everyone to ‘enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’.70 Some regional human rights instruments protect a similar right,71 or the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of ‘scientific and technological progress’.72 Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union73 provides that the ‘arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint’. The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and ­Biomedicine74 refers in its preamble to ‘the need for international cooperation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine’, and it declares in ­Article 2 that the ‘interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science’. Thus ‘scientific progress’ (knowledge, discoveries and technologies) and its processes, products, results, outcomes and applications in all fields of (natural and social) sciences,75 including in contemporary areas such as ‘stem cell research, nanotechnologies, nuclear energy, GMOs [genetically modified organisms], climate change, generic seeds that can be reused, cloning, ethics of science and technology, new technologies in the working environment’,76 should contribute to the ‘benefit of humanity without discrimination, particularly with regard to disadvantaged and marginalised persons and communities’.77 [12.18]  Importantly, scientific progress should contribute to the enjoyment of human rights in all states, that is, not only in high-income states but also in low- and 69 

Ibid.

70 See

Shaheed, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26, above n 5; Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications (2009), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/0018/001855/185558e.pdf; R Chapman, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the ­Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications’ (2009) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights 1; O De Schutter, ‘The Right of to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and the Right to Food: From Conflict to Complementarity’ (2011) 33(2) Human Rights Quarterly 304; WA Schabas, ‘Study of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific and Technological Progress and its Applications’ in Donders and Volodin (eds), above n 4, 273. 71  Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, 12 IHRR 893 (2005), Art 42(1). 72  See, eg, Protocol of San Salvador, above n 14, Art 14(1)(b). 73  [2000] OJ C364/1. 74  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, ETS No 164 (1997), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/164.htm. 75  The word ‘science’ is used to signify ‘the enterprise whereby mankind, acting individually or in small or large groups, makes an organized attempt, by means of the objective study of observed phenomena, to discover and master the chain of causalities; brings together in a coordinated form the resultant subsystems­of knowledge by means of systematic reflection and conceptualization, often largely expressed in the symbols of mathematics; and thereby furnishes itself with the opportunity of using, to its own ­advantage, ­understanding of the processes and phenomena occurring in nature and society’. See UNESCO, Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers, 20 November 1974, UNESCO General ­ ­Conference Res. 18 C/Res.40, 18th Session (1974), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ ID=13131&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, para 1(a)(i). 76  Venice Statement, above n 70, para 13(c). 77  Ibid, para 6.

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­ iddle- income states. In particular, scientific progress should contribute to progresm sive enjoyment of rights to food (through improved ‘methods of production, conservation and distribution of food’) and health (through ‘the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of s­ ickness’),78 as well as other rights such as ‘a clean environment, education, information, labour rights, social security, sustainable development, water, where access to science is an implicit requirement for their full enjoyment’.79 The right to enjoy the benefits of ­scientific progress must be consistent with international human rights principles such as ‘non-discrimination, gender equality, accountability and participation’, and all fields of s­ cience and its applications should pay attention to the rights of ‘disadvantaged and marginalized groups’.80 For example, given that the Internet has emerged as a ­critical platform for scientific and cultural flows and exchanges, the CESCR has called on states with limited Internet access to ‘increase access to affordable internet’ in all urban and rural areas, and in particular to ‘the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups’,81 including persons living in poverty, persons with disabilities, older persons, women and children. [12.19]  The normative content of the right to benefit from scientific progress and its applications includes at least four elements.82 First, accessibility to the benefits of science (scientific knowledge, education, information, discoveries, applications, processes, technologies and advances) for everyone, in particular marginalised populations, without discrimination. The benefits of science must be physically available and economically affordable. Secondly, contribution to science refers to (i) freedom of scientific research and opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise, and (ii) the freedom indispensable for scientific research. Scientific research includes the right to freely communicate research results to others, and to publish and publicise them without censorship and regardless of frontiers. Thus scientific enterprise must be free from political and other unjustifiable interference, while guaranteeing the highest standards of ethical safeguards by the scientific professions. Thirdly, the participation of individuals and communities, including marginalised groups (eg minorities and indigenous peoples), in decision-making. Decisions affecting science, such as funding and research priorities, science policies, emerging areas of research and new technological applications, should entail a participatory and transparent process. Lastly, under Article 15(2) of the ICESCR, states undertake to take the steps (create an enabling environment) necessary for ‘the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture’. Conservation involves the ‘identification and safeguarding of

78 

ICESCR, Arts 11(2)(a) and 12(2)(d). Venice Statement, above n 70, para 12(d). Ibid, para 12(b). 81 See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: The Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 29. See also CESCR, Concluding Observations: People’s Republic of China, UN Doc E/C.12/1/ Add.107 (13 May 2005) paras 39 and 68; and CESCR, Concluding Observations: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, UN Doc E/C.12/LYB/CO/2 (25 January 2006) para 39: ‘The Committee urges the State party to respect and protect freedom of information and expression in the State party, including on the Internet, to enable all persons under its jurisdiction to take part in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’. 82  Shaheed, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26, above n 5, paras 25–48. 79  80 

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Cultural Rights: Article 15

scientific knowledge, products and tools, including literature, databases, specimens and equipment’; development requires ‘an explicit commitment to the development of science and technology for human benefit by, for example, developing national plans of action’ to support and strengthen publicly funded research; and ‘diffusion’ encompasses the ‘dissemination of scientific knowledge and applications both within the scientific community and in society at large, including through publishing research findings’.83 [12.20]  States are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right of everyone to ‘enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’. The duty to respect includes respect for freedom of scientific research and communication (academic freedom); enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress; and protection from the adverse effects of science. Thus states are obliged: (a) to respect the freedoms indispensable for scientific research and creative activity,84 such as freedom of thought, to hold opinions without interference, and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds; (b) to respect the right of scientists to form and join professional societies and associations, as well as academic autonomy; (c) to respect the freedom of the scientific community and its individual members to ­collaborate with others both within and across the country’s borders, including the freed exchange of information, research ideas and results; (d) to take appropriate measures to prevent the use of science and technology in a manner that could limit or interfere with the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedoms.85

[12.21]  The obligation to protect requires states to take measures, including legislative measures, to prevent and preclude the utilisation by third parties of science and technologies for purposes that are detrimental to human dignity and human rights, including the rights to life, health, liberty of the person and privacy;86 and to take measures to ensure the protection of the human rights of individuals and groups ­subject to research activities by entities, whether public or private, in particular the rights to information and free and informed consent.87 [12.22]  The duty to fulfil requires states to take appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial, budgetary, promotional and other measures aimed at ensuring ‘affordable access to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications for everyone, including disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups’,88 such as minorities,

83 

Ibid, paras 46–48. ICESCR, Art 15(3). 85  Venice Statement, above n 70, para 14. States, through international cooperation and assistance in the scientific and cultural fields, must prevent the commercialisation of science and the use of scientific research (eg in areas such as toxic chemical substances or nuclear weapons) to undermine human rights. 86  See UN Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, GA res 3384 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, para 8: ‘All States shall take effective measures, including legislative measures, to prevent and preclude the utilization of scientific and technological achievements to the detriment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the dignity of the human person.’ 87  Venice Statement, above n 70, para 15. 88  Revised Guidelines, above n 20, Art 15, para 70(a). 84 

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women, children, migrant workers and members of their families, persons with disabilities, older persons, indigenous peoples and persons living in poverty. The benefits of ­scientific progress include access to medical technology, information and communication technology, use of scientific discoveries to protect food security, and a healthy and clean environment. As noted above, the obligation to fulfil entails obligations to facilitate, promote and provide by taking a wide range of positive measures, including financial measures, that would contribute to the realisation of this right, such as: (a) to adopt a legal and policy framework and to establish institutions to promote the development and diffusion of science and technology in a manner consistent with fundamental human rights. The relevant policies should be periodically reviewed on the basis of a participatory and transparent process, with particular attention to the status and needs of disadvantaged and marginalized groups; (b) to promote access to the benefits of science and its applications on a non-discriminatory basis including measures necessary to address the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized groups; (c) to monitor the potential harmful effects of science and technology, to effectively react to the findings and inform the public in a transparent way; (d) to take measures to encourage and strengthen international cooperation and assistance in science and technology to the benefit of all people and to comply in this regard with the States’ obligations under international law; (e) to provide opportunities for public engagement in decision-making about science and technology and their development; (f) to institute effective science curricula at all levels of the educational system, particularly in the State-sponsored schools, leading to development of the skills necessary to engage in scientific research.89

[12.23]  As part of international cooperation and assistance,90 it is particularly incumbent on developed states to share the benefits of scientific research and its applications with developing countries, for example through the development of international collaborative models of research and development, capacity building or technological transfer. The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights provides that ‘States should foster international dissemination of scientific information and encourage the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge’.91 It also requires that ‘benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with developing countries’.92 States have been criticised for allocating insufficient resources or a ‘low proportion of the State budget’ for scientific development and the promotion and protection of cultural rights, and called upon to ‘consider increasing the budget’ allocated for scientific development and cultural rights.93 The Supreme Court of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela found in 2001 that the failure of the Venezuelan Institute for Social Security to ensure a regular and consistent supply

89 

Venice Statement, above n 70, para 16. See ch 2. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 19 October 2005, available at http://unesdoc. unesco.org/images/0014/001428/142825e.pdf#page=80, Art 24(1). 92  Ibid, Art 15(1). 93  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Montenegro, UN Doc E/C.12/MNE/CO/1 (28 November 2014) para 26. 90 

91 

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of the drugs needed by HIV-positive persons covered by it [Venezuelan Institute for Social Security] constituted, inter alia, a violation of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.94

IV.  THE RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM PROTECTION OF THE MORAL AND MATERIAL INTERESTS RESULTING FROM ANY SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY OR ARTISTIC PRODUCTION [12.24]  Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR protect the human right of ‘everyone’ (ie every natural person as opposed to legal entities)—be they individuals or group of individuals, or communities undertaking the ‘collective authorship of indigenous peoples of their traditional knowledge and cultural h ­ eritage’95— who is the creator of scientific, literary or artistic productions (eg ­scientists, ­writers and artists) to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author’.96 Some regional instruments on human rights explicitly or implicitly protect a similar right.97 This right ‘safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural ­heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living’.98 It is thus distinguishable from intellectual property rights (eg copyrights, patents, trademarks and industrial design protection) protected by international treaties99 and domestic legislation, which primarily protect 94  López, Glenda y otros c. Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (IVSS) s/ acción de amparo. ­Expediente 00-1343. Sentencia No 487, available at http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/412539. 95  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc E/C.12/MEX/CO/4 (9 June 2006) paras 27 and 46. 96  CESCR, General Comment 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or she is the Author, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 (12 January 2006) paras 7, 8 and 32; CESCR, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property’, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/15 (29 November 2001) para 6. 97  See, eg, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, above in n 14 above, Art 13(2); Protocol of San Salvador, above n 14, Art 14(1)(c); implicitly in Protocol 1 to the ECHR, Art 1 of which provides that ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.’; and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 22 May 2004, 12 IHRR 893 (2005), Art 42(2), ‘The States parties undertake to respect the freedom of scientific research and creative activity and to ensure the protection of moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary and artistic production.’ 98  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 2. 99  See, eg, the following World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) administered treaties available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (adopted 1883, last revised 1967); the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (adopted 1886, last revised 1979); the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961); the Copyright Treaty (adopted in 1996); and the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (adopted 1971, which, inter alia, provides international protection for performers of ‘expressions of folklore’). See also the Convention on Biological Diversity, above n 26; the UNSECO Universal Copyright Convention (adopted 1952, last revised 1971), which includes Protocol 1 on the Application of that Convention to Works of Stateless Persons and Refugees, and Protocol 2 on the Application of the Universal Copyright Convention to the Works of Certain International Organisations, 943 UNTS 178; the WTO Agreement on Trade‑related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement, 1994), 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm, the potential impact of which on the rights to health and food being discussed in ch 3; DJ Gervais, International Intellectual Property: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015); P Goldstein and MT Landova, Goldstein

Benefit from Protection of Moral etc Interests

 641

‘business and corporate interests and investments’ as opposed to individual and group human rights.100 As noted by the CESCR, intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole.101

[12.25]  Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR protect both the ‘moral’ and the ‘material’ interests resulting from or directly generated by ‘any scientific, literary or artistic production’ of which a person is the author. Reference to ‘any scientific, literary or artistic production’ has been understood to refer to ‘creations of the human mind’, namely, to ‘scientific productions’, such as scientific publications and innovations, including knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities, and ‘literary and artistic productions’, such as, inter alia, poems, novels, paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, theatrical and cinematographic works, performances and oral traditions.102

The ‘moral interests’ of authors include two essential dimensions. First, the right of authors to be ‘recognised as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic ­productions’.103 Secondly, the right of authors to ‘object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, such productions, which would be prejudicial to their honour and reputation’.104 The protection of ‘material interests’ of authors is linked to the right of authors to own (­intellectual) ­property105 and the right of any worker to fair or adequate remuneration,106 and ­contributes to the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living.107 It is important to note that the duration of protection of material interests to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living ‘need not extend over the entire ­lifespan of an author’; the purpose of protection can also be achieved through ‘one‑time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the exclusive right to exploit his [or her] scientific, literary or artistic production’.108 [12.26]  States are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material benefits resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author.109 The obligation to and Trimble’s International Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Foundation Press, 2012); and GB Dinwoodie et al, International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Newark, NJ, LexisNexis, 2008). 100  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, paras 1–2: ‘Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities…]’. 101  Ibid, para 1. 102  Ibid, para 9. 103  Ibid, para 13. 104  Ibid, citing Art 6 bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, above n 99. 105 UDHR, Art 17: ‘1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’ 106  ICESCR, Art 7(a). 107  Ibid, Art 11; CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 15; ch 9. 108  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 16. 109  Ibid, para 28.

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respect requires states to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests of the author. This entails refraining from enacting laws censoring cultural activities and interfering with the freedom indispensable for creative activity,110 or ‘infringing the right of authors to be recognised as the creators of their scientific, literary or ­artistic productions’ and refraining from ‘any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action’111 in relation to, productions of authors that would be ­detrimental or prejudicial to their honour or reputation; and abstaining from ‘unjustifiably interfering’ with the material interests of authors necessary to enable them to enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living.112 The obligation to protect requires states to take effective measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the moral and material interests of authors (eg through unauthorised use) specified above.113 The obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt ‘appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures’ towards the full realisation of the right of authors’ resulting from any scientific, literary and artistic productions.114 Adequate legislation and regulations, as well as effective administrative, judicial or other appropriate remedies, for the protection of the moral and material interests of authors must be available within the jurisdiction of the states, accessible to all and of good quality.115 [12.27]  The minimum ‘core obligations’ arising from the right of authors to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production’ under Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, which are of immediate effect, were identified by the CESCR as follows: (a) To take legislative and other necessary steps to ensure the effective protection of the moral and material interests of authors; (b) To protect the rights of authors to be recognised as the creators of their scientific, l­ iterary and artistic productions and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, their productions that would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation; (c) To respect and protect the basic material interests of authors resulting from their scientific, literary or artistic productions, which are necessary to enable those authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living; (d) To ensure equal access, particularly for authors belonging to disadvantaged and marginalised groups, to administrative, judicial or other appropriate remedies enabling authors to seek and obtain redress in case their moral and material interests have been infringed; (e) To strike an adequate balance between the effective protection of the moral and material interests of authors and States parties’ obligations in relation to the rights to food, health and education, as well as the rights to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any other right recognised in the Covenant.116 110  CESCR, Concluding Observations: Vietnam, UN Doc E/C.12/VNM/CO/2-4 (28 November 2014) para 35. 111  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 30. 112  Ibid, para 30. 113  Ibid, para 31. 114  Ibid, paras 28 and 34. 115  Ibid, para 18. 116  Ibid, para 39.

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 643

V.  LIMITATIONS TO CULTURAL RIGHTS [12.28]  Article 29(2) of the UDHR provides: In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

As noted in chapter two, cultural rights, considered above, like almost all ESC rights, are not absolute rights. They are subject to the general limitations contained in ­Articles 4 and 5 of the ICESCR. Under Article 4, limitations to ESC rights must be determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.

Thus any limitations to cultural rights must be strictly ‘necessary’, ie must pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ (promoting the general welfare in a democratic society, eg by eliminating negative or harmful practices attributed to customs and traditions, that infringe upon other human rights) and be ‘proportionate’, meaning that the ‘least restrictive measures’ or means must be taken when several types of limitations might be imposed.117 [12.29]  In addition, cultural rights may not be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any other human right recognised in international law, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for under international law.118 For example, artistic freedom and expression (which pertains to culture as artistic and intellectual expression/activities) is vital to the enrichment of humanity and diversity of civilisations. It includes the right of individual artists to create works that may be ‘deeply offensive’119 or ‘offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’.120 Thus in Alinak v Turkey,121 the ECtHR stated as follows: [F]reedom of artistic expression … affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds. Those who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic society. Hence there is an obligation on the State not to encroach unduly on the author’s freedom of expression.122

However, artistic expression may be limited by the prohibition of all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance, discrimination

117  See discussion of limitations in ch 2 of this book; CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, paras 17–20. See also E Brems and L Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut”: Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 15(1) Human Rights Law Review 139. 118  ICESCR, Art 5(1). 119  HRC, General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc CCPR/ /C/ GC/34 (12 September 2011) para 9. 120  Handyside v UK, App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976), Series A, no 24, (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737, para 49. 121  Alinak v Turkey, App no 40287/98 (ECtHR, 29 March 2005). 122  Ibid, para 42.

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(including racism123 and discrimination based on sexual orientation),124 hostility and violence against ethnic, racial or religious group.125 [12.30]  Since all human rights are interrelated and interdependent, states are obliged to implement cultural rights, including the right to participate in cultural life, together with their other human rights obligations under international instruments, ‘in order to promote and protect the entire range of human rights guaranteed under international law’.126 Accordingly, the CESCR has rightly stated that while account must be taken of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, ­economic or cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental ­freedom. Thus, no one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.127

[12.31]  In particular, discriminatory and harmful cultural practices are not protected by the right to take part in cultural life. Practices are considered as ‘harmful’ if they meet the following criteria: (a) They constitute a denial of the dignity and/or integrity of the individual and a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in [international human rights instruments including the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW and CRC]; (b) They constitute discrimination against women or children and are harmful insofar as they result in negative consequences for them as individuals or groups, including physical, psychological, economic and social harm and/or violence and limitations on their capacity to participate fully in society or develop and reach their full potential; (c) They are traditional, re-emerging or emerging practices that are prescribed and/or kept in place by social norms that perpetuate male dominance and inequality of women and children, based on sex, gender, age and other intersecting factors; (d) They are imposed on women and children by family, community members, or society at large, regardless of whether the victim provides, or is able to provide, full, free and informed consent.128

[12.32]  The most prevalent harmful practices attributed to customs and traditions that conflict with human rights (of women and girls) are FGM, child and/or forced marriage, some forms of polygamy, crimes committed in the name of so-called ‘­honour’

123  See General Policy Recommendation No 7 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination (13 December 2002), para 1(a), which defines ‘racism’ to ‘mean the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons, or the notion of superiority of a person or a group of persons’. 124  Vejdeland and Others v Sweden, App no 1813/07 (ECtHR, 9 February 2012) para 55, stressing that ‘discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on “race, origin or colour”’. 125  ICCPR, Art 20(2) provides that ‘[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. See also ICERD, Art 4; Gündüz v Turkey, App no 35071/97 (ECtHR, 4 December 2003), (2005) 41 EHRR 59, para 40. 126  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 17. 127  Ibid, para 18, citing Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, pt I, para 5; Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, above n 23, Art 4. 128  CEDAW Committee and CRC Committee, Joint General Recommendation/General Comment 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and General Comment 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (14 November 2014) para 15.

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and domestic violence, including dowry-related violence.129 Other harmful cultural practices include, but are not limited to: neglect of girls (linked to the preferential care and treatment of boys), extreme dietary restrictions (forced feeding, food taboos, including during pregnancy), virginity testing and related practices, binding, scarring, branding/tribal marks, corporal punishment, stoning, violent initiation rites, widowhood practices, witchcraft, infanticide and incest. Harmful practices also include body modifications that are performed for the purpose of beauty or marriageability of girls and women (such as fattening, isolation, the use of lip discs and neck elongation with neck rings) or in an attempt to protect girls from early pregnancy or from being subjected to sexual harassment and violence (such as breast ironing/‘repassage’). In addition, many women and children throughout the world increasingly undergo medical treatment and/or plastic surgery to comply with social norms of the body and not for medical or health reasons and many are also pressured to be fashionably thin which has resulted in an epidemic of eating and health disorders.130

[12.33]  Such practices are justified by ‘stereotyped sex- and gender-based roles, the presumed superiority or inferiority of either of the sexes, attempts to exert control over the bodies and sexuality of women and girls, social inequalities and the prevalence of male dominated power structures’.131 States are obliged to combat harmful cultural practices by taking ‘all appropriate measures’, including promptly, impartially and independently investigating all harmful cultural practices.132 As the CESCR has confirmed, a state’s failure to take steps (ie to plan and adopt appropriate legislation, policies and measures and ensure that their implementation responds effectively) to ‘combat practices harmful to the well-being of a person or group of persons’ is a violation of Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.133 Therefore, the CESCR has urged states, for example, to ‘intensify efforts to prevent and combat all practices, including polygamy and domestic violence, that are harmful to women and girls’, introduce a minimum age for marriage for girls and boys in line with international standards, as well as to introduce legal provisions criminalising FGM and ensure strict implementation of the law.134 In addition, the law should provide for means of prevention, protection, ­recovery, reintegration and redress for victims, and combat impunity for harmful ­cultural practices. [12.34]  The right of authors, scientists and inventors to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from their scientific, literary and artistic productions may be limited by the need to strike an ‘adequate balance’ between this right and human rights (eg health, food, education) of others, including disadvantaged and

129 

Ibid, paras 6, 18–29. Ibid, para 8, citing CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 19: Violence against Women (UN Doc A/47/38 at 1 (1993), para 11; CRC Committee, General Comment 13: The Right of the Child to Freedom from All Forms of Violence, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/13 (18 April 2011) para 29; and Secretary General, Study on Violence against Children [Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on Violence against Children], UN Doc A/61/299 (29 August 2006) para 46. 131  CEDAW Committee, General Comment 31, above n 128, para 16. 132  See, eg, CEDAW, Art 5. 133  CESCR, General Comment 21, above n 3, para 64. 134  See, eg, CESCR, Concluding Observations: Gambia, UN Doc E/C.12/GMB/CO/1 (6 March 2015) para 14. 130 

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marginalised individuals and groups, with a view to promoting and protecting the full range of international human rights. In this regard the CESCR has observed: In striking this balance, the private interests of authors should not be unduly favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to their productions should be given due consideration. States parties should therefore ensure that their legal or other regimes for the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary or artistic productions constitute no impediment to their ability to comply with their core obligations in relation to the rights to food, health and education, as well as to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any other right enshrined in the Covenant.135

[12.35]  Therefore, states have a duty to ‘prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential medicines, plant seeds or other means of food production, or for schoolbooks and learning materials, from undermining the rights of large segments of the population to health, food and education’.136 In certain circumstances, the protection of the author’s scientific, literary or artistic productions by intellectual property rights may be limited in the ‘public interest’, subject to payment of adequate compensation.137 Intellectual property regimes should not be applied in a manner likely to obstruct the availability of and accessibility to new scientific or technological solutions to critical human problems such as food, water, health (access to medicines at affordable costs), chemical safety, energy and climate change. In addition, states should prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and dignity,138 including the rights to life, health and privacy, for example ‘by excluding inventions from patentability whenever their commercialisation would jeopardise the full realisation of these rights’.139

VI. CONCLUSION [12.36]  The foregoing survey has explored the scope of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of the author. It has also highlighted state obligations to respect, protect and fulfil various aspects of cultural rights, including cultural rights of communities who differ from dominant majorities, in particular minorities and indigenous peoples. It has shown that the concept of culture, on which cultural life is based, has evolved from protecting culture as ‘high culture’ (intellectual and artistic expressions) to protecting culture as ‘popular culture’ (in less elitist terms), and to the understanding of culture as a ‘way of life’ encompassing all manifestations of human existence, including minorities and indigenous peoples. Thus, UNESCO declared in 1976 that ‘the concept of culture has been broadened to include all forms

135 

CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 35. Ibid. 137  Ibid, para 24. 138  GA res 3384 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, above n 86, para 8. 139  CESCR, General Comment 17, above n 96, para 35. 136 

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of creativity and expression of groups or individuals, both in their ways of life and in their artistic activities’.140 [12.37]  The chapter has also observed that the right to ‘enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’ entails obligations to respect and protect respect ­freedom of scientific research and communication (academic freedom); enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress by all, including the disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups; and protection from the adverse effects of science. Adopting a General Comment by the CESCR on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications is long overdue. It has been noted that the right to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author’ applies to natural persons only and does not protect corporate interests. Lastly, it has been argued that cultural rights must be consistent with human rights under international law.141 Thus, states are obliged to eliminate negative or harmful practices attributed to customs and traditions that infringe upon other human rights (for example, human rights of women, children). It is vital to ensure the right of everyone, including women, to have equal access to, participate in and contribute to all aspects of cultural rights. This encompasses, inter alia, the right of women to actively engage in identifying and interpreting cultural heritage, and to decide which cultural traditions, values or practices are to be kept, reoriented, modified or discarded.142 Since culture is not static but linked to historical contexts and power relations, it evolves over time (ie culture is ‘­created, contested and recreated within the social praxis of diverse groups interacting in economic, social and political arenas’),143 and it is the duty of states to ensure that all cultural practices and scientific progress, as well as the right of authors to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production’, are consistent with human dignity and all human g­ uaranteed by international law. [12.38]  States are encouraged to ‘recognise officially the need to protect the cultural diversity of all minority groups’ under their jurisdiction, in accordance with applicable international law, including the provisions of Article 15 of the ICESCR, and to increase efforts to ‘preserve and promote regional and minority languages’, which can only be exercised in community with other members of the minority group, and ‘cultural heritage, inter alia by ensuring that sufficient financial and human resources be allocated to the teaching of regional and minority languages and cultures in public schools and to TV and radio broadcasting in these languages’.144

140 

UNESCO Recommendation, above n 7, para 3(a). also res 10/23 and 19/6 of the Human Rights Council, recalling that that no one may invoke ­cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law or limit their scope. 142  Shaheed, above n 1. 143  Ibid, para 2; U Narayan, ‘Essence of Culture and a Sense of History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism’ (1998) 13(2) Hypatia 86. 144  CESCR, Concluding Observations: France, UN Doc E/C.12/FRA/CO/3 (9 June 2008) paras 50–51. 141  See

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Part III

Conclusion

650 

13 The Right of Victims of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Violations to an Effective Remedy Towards a World Court of Human Rights I. INTRODUCTION [13.01]  This book has focused on the analysis of ESC rights in international law and considered some examples of the domestic implementation of these rights. It has been shown that states are obliged to ‘take steps’ to the ‘maximum of available resources’ with a view to achieving the progressive realisation of ESC rights. Such steps may be taken by each state individually or through ‘international assistance and cooperation’. In addition, states must guarantee that ESC rights will be exercised ‘without discrimination’. It has also been noted that violations of ESC rights are capable of judicial scrutiny, and that this is essential to enhance their protection and enforcement. Despite this, victims of violations of ESC rights face two major difficulties in obtaining an effective remedy: (a) the lack of effective judicial and non-judicial domestic institutions for the protection of ESC rights; and (b) the failure of states to respect, protect and fulfil their international obligations with respect to ESC rights, and the lack of effective international organs and procedures to hold states (and NSAs) accountable for their non-compliance with such international human rights obligations. Current international human rights treaties protect human beings as beneficiaries of human rights, and state parties are subject to the corresponding obligations. In areas where human rights norms have evolved to the status of CIL, they address the relationship between a state and an individual. In addition, all existing international monitoring mechanisms under existing human rights treaties are addressed to making states (not NSAs) accountable for violations of human rights. In short, while human rights are universally recognised and codified in legally binding treaties widely ­ratified by states, there are no effective mechanisms to enforce them, particularly against NSAs. [13.02]  It is important to recall that in 1947, Australia proposed the creation of an International Court of Human Rights with the power to decide in a legally b ­ inding

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manner on individual complaints.1 The Working Group on Implementation of the Commission on Human Rights, on the basis of an Australian proposal, recommended that an International Court of Human Rights be established and ‘empowered to constitute the final guarantor of human rights’, with the power ‘to give judgments against violators of human rights’.2 ‘Violators’ were not restricted to states; they could be NSAs. This proposal was strongly opposed by the then socialist states, who maintained that individual complaints would violate state sovereignty, threaten international relations and depart from the principle that individuals were not the subjects of international law.3 The proposal garnered no support. On the occasion of the ­sixtieth anniversary of the UDHR, the Swiss Government appointed a Panel of Eminent ­Persons,4 with the task of drafting an Agenda for Human Rights. This recommended the creation by treaty of a permanent, fully independent World Court of Human Rights (WCHR):5 The Consolidated Statute of a WCHR is based to some extent on the model of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and provides for a full-time court of 21 judges based in Geneva and sitting as a plenary court, three chambers of seven judges each and six committees of three judges each. In addition to handing down advisory opinions, the Court shall have jurisdiction to decide on individual complaints with respect to alleged violations of any human right contained in a total of 21 UN human rights treaties by any state party, intergovernmental organisation, transnational corporation and similar non-state actor which has voluntarily recognised the Court’s jurisdiction. The judgments of the Court as well as any interim measures of protection and orders for reparation shall be final and binding under international law. Their enforcement by the respondent parties shall be supervised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights who may seise the Human Rights Council and the Security Council to take the necessary measures in case of non-compliance. The Consolidated Statute and Commentary addresses all the frequently-asked questions about the purpose, usefulness and feasibility of establishing a World Court of Human Rights and is meant to provide a comprehensive draft for further discussion in the Human Rights Council, the General Assembly or an inter-state conference, as soon as states are ready to take up such a proposal.6

Given the fact that there is presently no international body, at the UN level, to hand down legally binding judgments against states and other actors for violations of human

1  See UN Doc E/CN.4/15(1947); A Devereux, ‘Australia and the International Scrutiny of Civil and Political Rights: An Analysis of Australia’s Negotiating Policies, 1946–1966’ (2003) 22 Australian Yearbook of International Law 47. 2  UN Doc E/600, 58 (emphasis added). 3  M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—CCPR Commentary, 2nd rev edn (Strasbourg, Kehl; Arlington, VA, NP Engel, 2005) 822. 4 The Panel was co-chaired by by former High Commissioner for Human Rights and President of ­Ireland, Mary Robinson (Ireland), and by Paulo Sérgio Pinhero (Brazil), and consisted of experts from all world regions, including Hina Jilani (Pakistan), Theodor Meron (USA), Pregs Govender (South Africa), Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Egypt), Bertrand Ramcharan (Guyana), and Manfred Nowak (Austria) as General Rapporteur. See M Nowak, ‘The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 32(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 3, 11. 5  J Kozma, M Nowak and M Scheinin, A World Court of Human Rights: Consolidated Draft Statute and Commentary (Wien, Graz, Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2010) 3–113. 6  Nowak, above n 4, 11–12.

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rights, including ESC rights, is it desirable or essential to consider the creation of a WCHR so as to create a world order in which all human rights ‘can be fully ­realised’ by all human beings?7 Or is this politically far too controversial and unrealistic?

II.  REASONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORLD COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [13.03]  The main reasons why a WCHR is needed are reviewed briefly in this section.8 First, human rights without a remedy are an empty promise. More than 60 years ago the Australian Government advanced the main argument for a WCHR to the UN Commission on Human Rights as follows: The Australian proposals for an International Court of Human Rights have been put ­forward because we favour a continuous, effective and just system of international supervision. In English law, the remedy is to us as important as the right, for without the remedy there is no right. Our basic thesis is that individuals and associations as well as states must have access to and full legal standing before some kind of international tribunal charged with supervision and enforcement of the covenant. In our view, either a full and effective observance of human rights is sought, or it is not.9

Although the Australian proposal was defeated due to the Cold War, it remains valid today. While the UN still maintains a strict separation between East and West, it cannot be denied that the original Cold War (a geopolitical struggle between the Western world, with the United States in the foreground, and the Soviet Union (USSR) and its communist satellite states) lasted from the mid-1940s to 1991. In this context, it is strange that the UN still maintains an Eastern European Group and a Western and Others Group, when most of the former Central and Eastern European states have already joined the EU. The language and spirit of UN human rights treaty monitoring still follows this Cold War spirit. As with all other rights, human rights create obligations of others, above all states, and the rights-holders should be able to hold the duty-holders accountable before an independent court. This is the simple logic of rights, duties and accountability, supported by practice from existing regional human rights systems. Indeed all regional organisations with any meaningful human rights protection system, ie the Council of Europe, the OAS and the African Union, have adopted a major human rights treaty and established a regional court—the ECtHR

7 

UDHR, Art 28. section relies on M Nowak, ‘Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human Rights’ in G Alfredsson, J Grimheden, BG Ramcharan and A de Zayas (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th Möller, 2nd edn (Leiden and Boston, Mass, Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 697; M Nowak and J Kozma, ‘A World Court of Human Rights’ University of Vienna, Austria (June 2009), available at http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt-Nowak0609.pdf, at 15–28. 9 Statement by the Australian representative on an International Court of Human Rights, undated, quoted in Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the UDHR, Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights, Research Project on a World Human Rights Court: Nowak and Kozma, above n 8, at 15. 8  This

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in Strasbourg;10 the IACtHR in San José;11 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (to be replaced by the African Court of Justice and Human Rights) in Arusha12—with the function of handing down legally binding judgments on individual complaints. If it is taken for granted (by states and NSAs) that legally binding ESC human rights obligations can be systematically violated without any legal and factual consequences, the treaties protecting such rights are not worth the paper on which they have been written. The ‘views’ and ‘recommendations’ of the CESCR on communications submitted to the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR are not legally binding, and thus compliance largely depends on the political will of the state concerned. This remains inadequate to guarantee an effective remedy. [13.04]  Secondly, the right to a judicial remedy for human rights violations must include the right of the victim to receive adequate reparation by order of the same court that hands down a decision on the alleged human rights violation.13 A WCHR could enforce the right of victims to adequate reparation. After long negotiations, the General Assembly in 2005 adopted the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.14 However, no mechanisms were developed for the practical implementation of these principles in practice. While, in theory, states may bring cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violations of international human rights instruments, inter-state procedures before the ICJ have rarely been used to address human rights ­violations.15 A WCHR could provide a solution regarding direct access to the Court by individuals. In addition to handing down binding judgments at the global level, the Court could also be empowered to order the respondent party, in a legally binding

10  See J Christoffersen and MR Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). 11  See, eg, J Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); L Burgorgue-Larsen and A Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case Law and Commentary (trans R Greenstein) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). 12 See the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Assembly/ AU/13(XI). The Protocol provides for the merger of the institutions of the African Court of Justice and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to be known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The Protocol would enter into force after ratification by 15 states. Only five states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Libya and Mali) had ratified the Protocol by 2014. See also M Ssenyonjo, ‘Direct access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights by Individuals and Non Governmental Organisations: An Overview of the Emerging Jurisprudence of the African Court 2008–2012’ (2013) 2(1) International Human Rights Law Review 17; M Ssenyonjo (ed), The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Leiden and Boston, Mass, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 13  Nowak and Kozma, above n 8, at 25. 14  GA res 60/147 (16 December 2005), UN Doc A/RES/60/147 (16 December 2005). 15  See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, [2007] ICJ Rep 43; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, [2011] ICJ Rep 70; Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Order, Order of 3 March 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep 9.

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manner, to provide adequate reparation to the victims, including restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, legal changes and other forms of satisfaction. [13.05]  Thirdly, a WCHR could hold NSAs accountable for non-criminal violations of human rights, and thereby provide a solution to one of the major challenges of international law in the twenty-first century. As shown in chapter three, states are not the only violators of human rights, but there is currently no effective institution to hold NSAs accountable for violations that do not amount to international crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It has also been shown that states are no longer able and willing to address human rights violations suffered by their populations because of the actions or policies of entities beyond their control, whether these be inter-governmental organisations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO or the EU, transnational corporations, armed (rebel or terrorist) groups or global financial market players. The Statute of the World Court could be opened for ratification by NSAs. A WCHR could enforce human rights against NSAs on the basis of voluntary commitments. [13.06]  Fourthly, the creation of a WCHR would strengthen domestic human rights protection, since a complaint would only be admissible before the WCHR after the exhaustion of all available domestic remedies, unless the application of such remedies were to be unreasonably prolonged. State parties to the WCHR Statute could be obliged to establish, maintain or designate a national court of human rights with the task of adjudicating individual or groups of individuals’ complaints in relation to alleged violations of those international human rights treaties the respective state has ratified. This requires implementing legislation to the effect that the relevant human rights treaties can be directly applied by the national human rights court. In principle, national courts would be vested with the same powers as the WCHR, which would strengthen the domestic protection of human rights, including ESC rights. The ­possibility of litigation is likely to create a chilling effect, whereby states and NSAs would refrain from violations of ESC rights. [13.07]  Lastly, the powerful UN Human Rights Council needs an even more powerful Human Rights Court as an independent counterpart. The Human Rights ­Council is the main political body of the UN dealing with human rights, composed of state ­representatives. The Council, through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) ­mechanism, has to assess the human rights performance of states on the basis of governmental, non-governmental and expert information prepared specifically for this exercise by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. This expert information includes relevant decisions, conclusions and recommendations of UN treaty bodies. The UPR mechanism would be an ideal political supervision ­mechanism for the implementation of the judgments of a future WCHR, similar to the supervision of states’ compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Council might be entitled to: (a) submit a third party complaint to the Court relating to alleged systematic human rights violations; (b) request the Court for an advisory opinion regarding the interpretation of the Statute or any of the relevant UN human rights treaties; (c) enforce the implementation of the Court’s judgments and provisional measures.

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III.  REASONS AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORLD COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [13.08]  Many arguments have been raised by governments, and restated by some ­academics, against the idea of establishing a WCHR. In an article published in 2004, Stefan Trechsel wrote: Realistically speaking, the creation of a world court for human rights is, at present time, ­neither desirable, nor necessary, nor probable. There are hardly any arguments which would let us believe that such a court could contribute to peace and security in the world today. What should, however, be pursued is a long-term development which would bring the regions of the world onto the same level as Europe, and to the extent that the parallel is justified, the ­Americas. Once a solid basis has been established, it will be at least desirable to establish a world court which would secure the uniform protection of human rights on the whole planet.16

He advanced three main reasons for this view. First, he noted that states would be reluctant to agree to submit to such a court, because they are aware of the fact that none of them is immune from allegations of human rights violations and that the process of being publicly accused of having violated human rights is disliked by states.17 Secondly, he noted that states adhering to a regional human rights system with regional human rights courts (currently the IACtHR, the ECtHR and, more recently, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights)18 may see little purpose in joining an additional universal one.19 Thirdly, he argued that, on a more practical level, an international court is a rather expensive affair, and that it might be difficult to convince states to provide the resources required for the effective functioning of a World Court.20 [13.09]  Philip Alston in 2013 asserted that ‘the WCHR is a bad idea and that time, energy and resources are not well spent in promoting it’.21 In his opinion: Most American observers will instantly dismiss such a prospect as utopian and one that will never happen because it is certain to be met with unremitting resistance by the US. But I would go further and say that the very notion of a WCHR and the very effort to promote it are, at least for the foreseeable future, a bad idea … the proposal for a court of this type is fundamentally misconceived. There are, of course, enormous practical challenges implicit in the assumption that any court could function effectively to pass judgment in response to complaints from over seven billion people. The cost would be vast, at least by the standards of any funds currently devoted to human rights protection at the international level. And the political prospects of almost any state being prepared to subject itself to a world court with

16 S Trechsel, ‘A World Court for Human Rights?’ (2004) 1(1) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1, para 70, available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?a rticle=1002&context=njihr. 17  Ibid, para 14. 18  See above n 12. 19  Trechsel, above n 16, para 15. 20  Ibid, para 17. 21 See P Alston, ‘A World Court for Human Rights is Not a Good Idea’ (2013), available at http:// justsecurity.org/2013/11/01/world-court-human-rights-good-idea/.

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such a vast jurisdiction (virtually any human right recognized in any international treaty) and potential enforcement powers would seem far from bright.22

Thus he considered it politically unfeasible, too costly, that would overburden judges, and that it would distract attention, resources and energy from more pressing endeavours. [13.10]  Philip Alston summarised his objections as follows: The first is the extent to which the proposal [for a WCHR] privileges legalism over other approaches, and assumes that the creation of a judicial structure can occur almost in a vacuum without extensive groundwork having been laid beforehand. The establishment of an institution such as a court should reflect the general acceptance of a set of values and expectations on the part of the community concerned. The leap to a universal court, and the resolution of deep and divisive issues on a global basis through judicial means is far from an appealing solution to the world’s deep-rooted human rights dysfunctions. Second, the proposal is highly hierarchical since it would vest ultimate power in the hands of a tiny coterie of judges. Such a vision is barely compatible with the values underlying a vision of an international regime governed by the rule of law and democratic institutions. Moreover, the potential for ‘capture’ of the court by state interests could easily turn this allpowerful body into a force which would foster and endorse a race to the bottom in terms of international standards. Third, a campaign to create a WCHR will only distract resources and attention away from the far more pressing and important issues that challenge the evolution of the human rights regime. They include: the need to nurture a culture of human rights at all levels of society, the creation of tailored national accountability mechanisms, the strengthening of regional systems (not just courts) especially in Asia and the Pacific and in the Arab World, the building of means by which corporations as well as international organizations can be held to account, far-reaching reform of the treaty body system, and refinement of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process to make it more targeted and demanding.

IV.  RESPONDING TO REASONS AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORLD COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [13.11]  Are the reasons set out in section III. above convincing? While those reasons should be taken into account in considering whether a WCHR is desirable, they do not appear, in my view, to be an obstacle to the creation of such a court. Although it is true that states would be reluctant to be held accountable for human rights ­violations by an independent international judicial body, it is well known that all existing regional human rights systems decided to entrust the decision on cases of alleged human rights violations to regional human rights courts, and that these courts have contributed significantly to the enhancement of international human rights law, which has, in turn, impacted upon international law in general. As noted by the President of the

22  Ibid. See also P Alston, ‘Against a World Court for Human Rights’ (2014) 28(2) Ethics and ­International  Affairs 197.

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IACtHR, the ECtHR and the IACtHR have reached a common understanding on several human rights issues, for example: That human rights treaties are endowed with a special nature (as distinguished from multilateral treaties of the traditional type); that human rights treaties have a normative character of ordre public; that their terms are to be autonomously interpreted; that, in their application, one ought to ensure effective protection of the guaranteed rights …; that the obligations enshrined therein do have an objective character and must be duly complied with by the States Parties; and that permissible restrictions (limitations and derogations) to the exercise of rights are to be restrictively interpreted.23

[13.12]  At the time of writing, in Africa, more than half of the African Union ­member states had accepted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights24 (African Court’s Protocol) and seven states (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Ghana, Rwanda, and Côte d’Ivoire) had agreed to allow direct individual access to the Court.25 The jurisdiction of the African Court extends to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court’s Protocol and ‘any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned’.26 Such relevant instruments include UN human rights treaties protecting ESC rights ratified by African States, eg the ICESCR and the CRC. This means that individuals in states parties to the African Court’s Protocol may submit cases alleging violations of ESC rights directly to the African Court. However, direct access to the African Court by individuals and NGOs remains very limited. Nonetheless, it may be stated that, at least in principle, there is broader consensus in Africa, America and Europe regarding the idea of a regional human rights court. This indicates that states have already accepted that they can be held accountable by regional human rights courts for violations of human rights. This can, in principle, be extended to a WCHR. In any case, the decision whether or not to become a party to a statute creating a World Court, should one be adopted in the future, would be optional. Those states that might be reluctant to ratify would be free not to become parties. Only the Asian-Pacific region lacks a human rights court, due to the general lack of a concrete regional human rights system.27 Sub-regional initiatives in Asia, such as in the context of the League of Arab States28

23  AC Trindade, ‘The Merits of Coordination of International Courts on Human Rights’ (2004) 2 ­Journal of International Criminal Justice 309. 24 OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III). The first twenty nine (29) States to ratify the ­Protocol were: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, G ­ ambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Cameroon. 25  See List of State Parties at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/achpr_1.pdf. 26  African Court’s Protocol, Art 3(1). 27  T Baik, Emerging Regional Human Rights Systems in Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); H Nasu and B Saul, Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region: Towards Institution Building (­Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2011). 28  See the Arab Charter of Human Rights 2004, available at https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ arabcharter2.html, which establishes an ‘Arab Human Rights Committee’ (Art 45) to ‘consider the reports submitted by the States parties’ (Art 48).

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or in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region,29 are at least at the current stage not directed towards establishing any judicial, or even quasi-judicial, protection of human rights. [13.13]  Regarding the second objection (cited in paragraph 13.10 above), most of the states parties to regional human rights treaties have also ratified the UN human rights treaties and accepted the competence of existing UN treaty-monitoring bodies, including the possibility of individual communications. In principle, therefore, it is reasonable to expect some states to accept the jurisdiction of a WCHR. In addition, some of the existing regional human rights courts, in particular the ECtHR, do not consider cases alleging violations of ESC rights. Thus, a World Court, with the potential to consider cases involving alleged breaches of all human rights, including ESC rights, would offer some extra protection and reinforce the indivisible and interdependent nature of all human rights. It would also demonstrate solidarity with states in other parts of the world beyond a particular region. While a permanent WCHR would require adequate resources for its effective functioning, this would be a necessary cost in view of its advantages. [13.14]  As noted in chapter one, while the existing international human rights s­ ystem with respect to ESC rights is generally rich in human rights norms and ideals, it remains wanting in political will and enforcement. In particular, until the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR on 5 May 2013 and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on a communications procedure on 14 April 2014, the absence of a complaints mechanism at an international level meant that normative standards in respect of ESC rights were not as developed as those in respect of civil and political rights, because the CESCR was not in a position to apply the ICESCR in specific cases beyond General Comments, Statements and Concluding Observations. In addition, victims of violations of ESC rights—individuals and groups of individuals—were not able to bring communications before the Committee where either local remedies had been exhausted or they were not effective. This reduced status of ESC rights historically disadvantaged vulnerable, marginal and disadvantaged groups such as women, because: Much of what is fundamental to economic and social rights is related to gender issues in society, real and fundamental social problems and challenges that are critical in the lives of most women, but which could easily be taken for granted by the small group of free men the 17th and 18th century philosophers had in mind when they discussed rights.30

Although the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR has addressed the historical imbalance between civil and political rights and ESC rights, ratification of the Protocol remains low.31 States are thus encouraged to consider ratifying the 29  Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2007, Art 14(1) provides: ‘In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.’ 30 M Scheinin, ‘Women’s Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights’ in L Hannikainen and E Nykanen (eds), New Trends in Discrimination Law—International Perspectives (Turku, Turku Law School, 1999) 1, 2. 31  By 2015 the following States had ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Montenegro, Niger, Portugal, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain and Uruguay.

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Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and recognise the competence of the CESCR to receive and consider inter-state communications. Enforcement through the Optional Protocol (and a WCHR) will further develop the content and jurisprudence of ESC rights.32 In its first recommendation in response to an individual complaint in I.D.G v Spain,33 the CESCR clarified some aspects of the right to housing by establishing that the state has the obligation to provide for effective and accessible remedies in foreclosure procedures related to defaulting on mortgage payments, to ensure that all appropriate legislative or administrative measures are taken to guarantee personal notification in foreclosure procedures, and to ­guarantee that legislative measures are adopted to prevent repetition of similar violations in the future. [13.15]  It is useful to recall that human rights derive from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons, with the human person as the central subject and primary beneficiary of human rights.34 The notion of human rights implies that rights-holders must have some possibility to hold duty-bearers accountable for not living up to their legally binding human rights obligations. The creation of a truly independent WCHR would provide an effective judicial accountability mechanism for human rights ­violations. As noted by the CESCR, ‘rights and obligations demand accountability: unless supported by a system of accountability, they can become no more than window-dressing­’.35 While the state holds the primary duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, as argued in chapter three, other actors, including NSAs, bear obligations, which must be subject to scrutiny. Accordingly, the adequate protection of human rights, including ESC rights, calls for accessible, transparent and effective ­accountability mechanisms to ensure that rights are respected, protected and fulfilled, and, where they are not, that victims can find an effective remedy or redress against violations of human rights by states and NSAs.36 Such redress could take several forms, including a proper investigation into gross and systematic human rights violations; interim measures to prevent further violations; and awards of damages to the victims, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

V.  ESTABLISHING THE WORLD COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [13.16]  How, then, can states and NSAs be held accountable for violations of ESC rights at an international level? As a starting point, in order to strengthen the current

32 

See eg I.D.G v Spain, Communication 2/2014, UN Doc E/C.12/55/D/2/2014 (13 October 2015). Ibid. 34  See, eg, the preambles to the UDHR, the ICESCR and the ICCPR. See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993), para 5. 35  CESCR, Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on ‘Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc E/C.12/2001/10 (4 May 2001) para 14. 36  The right to effective remedy is laid down in UDHR, Art 8, which declares that ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’ See also Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA res 60/147, UN Doc A/RES/60/147 (16 December 2005). 33 

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state reporting procedure, it is useful to ratify a complaints procedure as an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, to enable communications to be brought for and on behalf of individuals and groups dealing with specific claims of alleged violations of ESC rights. Amongst other things, this would help to develop ESC rights jurisprudence in specific cases to further clarify the scope of several substantive rights protected in the Covenant. The most effective method to implement the right to an effective remedy at the international level is to allow direct access of the rights-holders to a fully independent human rights court with the power to render legally binding judgments, and to grant adequate reparation to the victims of human rights violations.37 As observed in chapter one, the existing system of monitoring state compliance with human rights obligations under the ICESCR based on a state reporting system is a fairly weak system of accountability. Even if the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (providing for individual communications, inter-state communications and an inquiry procedure) were to receive universal ratification, it would still be weak, because the ­relevant quasi-judicial body, the CESCR, would still lack the competence to hand down any legally binding decisions. In this context, the creation of an independent WCHR to take over from treaty bodies the jurisdiction to decide on individual, group and inter-state complaints, as well as to initiate inquiry procedures, while strengthening the existing regional human rights courts, deserves serious consideration. [13.17]  How can such a World Court be established? Would it require any treaty amendments and/or abolition of the existing treaty bodies? Could it exercise its jurisdiction against states as well as NSAs? The WCHR could be created without any treaty amendment and without abolishing the existing treaty bodies, unless they were replaced by a unified treaty body for examining state reports.38 Like the ICC, it could be based on a new treaty, the Statute of the World Court of Human Rights drafted by the Human Rights Council (or a special state Conference) and adopted by the General Assembly, with jurisdiction to examine individual and inter-state complaints and hand down legally binding judgments against states parties.39 At the time of ratification, states should indicate which treaties the court can apply in cases brought against them. In addition to states, the Statute could provide for the possibility of NSAs willing to ratify the Statute becoming parties and accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to human rights in the sphere of their respective influence.40 It could, therefore, help to resolve the question of accountability of NSAs, and provide an independent judicial counterpart to the Human Rights Council as the main political human rights body of the UN,41 which could be charged with supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments. In this way, the creation of a WCHR would strengthen the ­effectiveness of international human rights law, including the judicial enforcement of ESC rights.

37  M Nowak, ‘The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 251, 254. 38 See Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006. 39  Nowak, above n 37, 255. The Court would assess whether or not the facts of a particular case amount to a violation of a specific legal norm. 40  Ibid, 256–57. 41  GA Res 60/251, 15 March 2006, A/RES/60/251.

662 

Right of Victims of ESCR Violations

[13.18]  Who should be entitled to bring applications alleging violations of human rights before the World Court? Given that this would be a human rights court to enforce rights of individuals and groups, it would be essential to provide for the possibility of applications being brought before court by or on behalf of individuals and groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a state party, since victims of human rights abuses have a much greater incentive to pursue those who commit human rights abuses and thus have shown a far greater interest in seeing that their human rights are enforced.42 In addition, provision could be made for inter-state communications, to enable the Court to receive and consider communications concerning state party claims that another state party is not respecting, protecting or fulfilling its human rights obligations under the applicable human rights treaties. Furthermore, provision could be made to allow applications directly from NSAs, including international organisations such as the EU, African Union, or the OAS, as well as NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. [13.19]  In order to reduce on the number of communications brought before the Court, a number of provisions relating to admissibility could be drafted, for example that the Court shall not consider a communication unless it has ascertained that all available domestic and regional remedies have been exhausted, and that the author of the communication must have suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the communication raises a serious issue of general importance. The Court could declare communications inadmissible on the basis of generally accepted grounds, such as those contained in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (see Appendix B). These include: —— when a communication is not submitted within one year after the exhaustion of domestic remedies, except in cases where the author can demonstrate that it had not been possible to submit the communication within that time limit; —— the facts that are the subject of the communication occurred prior to the entry into force of the Court’s jurisdiction for the state party concerned, unless those facts continued after that date; —— the same matter has already been examined by the Court, or has been or is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; —— the communication is incompatible with international human rights law; —— the communication is manifestly ill-founded, not sufficiently substantiated or exclusively based on reports disseminated by mass media; —— it is an abuse of the right to submit a communication; or —— the communication is anonymous or not in writing.

42  See M Gibney, ‘On the Need for an International Civil Court’ (2002) 6 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 47–58.

Establishing the World Court

 663

[13.20]  In sum, while international human rights law has protected the ESC rights of everyone, it has not provided effective means to enforce those rights at an international level. The implication is that states have to do more at domestic and regional levels in order to translate ESC rights into realities. But where states fail to provide effective domestic remedies, international enforcement remains helpful for victims of human rights violations. Accordingly, the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR providing for individual and group communications, among others, is a w ­ elcome development deserving of further support from all relevant actors. However, as noted above, the recommendations of the CESCR under the Protocol would not be legally binding. As such, states could afford to ignore them. Thus, ultimately, the Protocol should be seen as a step in a long journey towards the creation of a WCHR with the power to hand down legally binding judgments, and thereby empower individuals and groups to enforce their human rights, including ESC rights. But when would such a court ever be created? [13.21]  Can the WCHR be an effective vehicle to improve the lives and ESC rights of more marginalised and vulnerable individuals and groups in the world? If established, will it be able to realise its potential to adjudicate on violations on a massive scale of ESC rights? Violations of ESC rights are likely to be brought before the Court mainly by groups, or to have collective implications. A World Court may be an ideal forum to provide effective remedies to an individual or individuals complaining against a state that has infringed a specific right or specific rights. However, in many parts of the world, human rights violations often occur on a large scale, involving numerous victims and simultaneous violations of ESC rights that are grave or systematic. Since courts give findings on the facts of individual cases brought before them, their ­findings are directed at remedies for individual litigants or specified victims, making them ­generally ill-equipped to address by way of monetary compensation situations involving numerous unspecified numbers of victims or a very large affected ­population.43 Cases are usually brought by a small number of victims and not by all affected persons. Accordingly, in the absence of ‘class actions’, specific remedies are granted only to those victims who are able to gain access to the court (the parties to the dispute before the court).44 Devising a simplified procedure of dealing with ‘repetitive’ cases on the basis of established jurisprudence could help to overcome this limitation.45

43 See, eg, SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, General List No ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12 paras 113–17 (Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, 14 December 2012). 44  See, eg, Velásquez Rodríguez, Series C no 4, Judgment of 29 July 1988, IACtHR (1988). From 1991–94, between 100 and 150 persons were ‘disappeared’ in Honduras. The Inter-American Commission was ­inundated with individual complaints, but only ‘one or two of these cases’ could be ‘sent to the Court, which sits part-time’. See JM Pasqualucci, ‘Victim Reparations in the Inter-American Human Rights S ­ ystem: A Critical Assessment of Current Practice and Procedure’ (1996) 18 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 23. 45 See, eg, Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, CETS No 194, available at http://conventions. coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/194.htm.

664 

Right of Victims of ESCR Violations

[13.22]  To sum up, a WCHR is not beyond available resources to establish. It simply requires political will and commitment of states and other actors. It has the potential to contribute to several essential components of the right to access to justice46 namely: (a) Justiciability—unhindered access to the Court by victims of violations of ESC rights to claim their rights as legal entitlements; (b) Availability—since the Court would be complementary to national jurisdictions, parties would have to establish or strengthen existing national mechanisms (eg courts and quasi-judicial bodies) to consider claims for violations of human rights including ESC rights; (c) Accessibility—available mechanisms must be secure and (physically, economically, socially and culturally) accessible to all; (d) Good quality—national mechanisms must adhere to international standards of competence, efficiency, independence and impartiality; (e) Provision of effective and timely remedies for victims of violations of ESC rights; and accountability for violations of ESC rights.

46  CESCR, General Recommendation No 33 on Women’s Access to Justice, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/33 (3 August 2015).

Selected Bibliography Agbakwa, S, ‘Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights’ (2000) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177. Aikman, CC, ‘Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy in India’ (1987) 17 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 373. Albuquerque, C, with Roaf, V, On the Right Track: Good Practices in the Realization of the Right to Water and Sanitation (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Water/ BookonGoodPractices_en.pdf. Alfredsson, G, and Eide, A (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1999). Alfredsson, G, and Tomaševski, K (eds), A Thematic Guide to Documents on Health and Human Rights: Global and Regional Standards adopted by Intergovernmental Organisations, International Non-Governmental Organisations, and Professional Associations (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998). Alston, P, ‘The United Nations Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1979) 19 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 79. ——, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332. ——, ‘US Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy’ (1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 365. ——, ‘No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic Rights Covenant’ in Eide, A, and Helgesen, J (eds), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World: Fifty Years Since the Four Freedoms Address: Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1991) 79. ——, ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Alston, P (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights. A Critical Appraisal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992) 473. ——, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in Henkin, L, and Hargrove, J (eds), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century (Washington, DC, The American Society of International Law, 1994) 137. ——, ‘Establishing a Right to Petition under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ IV(2) Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 107. ——, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in United Nations, Manual on Human Rights Reporting under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments (Geneva, United Nations, 1997) 65. —— (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). ——, ‘Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspective’ in Alston, P, and Crawford, J (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 501. ——, ‘Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the International Labour Regime’ (2004) 15(3) European Journal of International Law 457. —— (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). ——, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 815.

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—— (ed), The UN and Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). —— (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Alston, P, and Goodman, R, International Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). Alston, P, and Quinn, G, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156. Alston, P, and Tomaševski, K (eds), The Right to Food (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff; Utrecht, SIM Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 1984). Alston, P, and Robinson, M (eds), Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Anaya, SJ, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (New York, Aspen Publishers, 2009). Andreassen, BA, Smith, A, and Stokke, H, ‘Compliance with Economic and Social Human Rights: Realistic Evaluations and Monitoring in the Light of Immediate Obligations’ in Eide, A, and Hagtvet, B (eds), Human Rights in Perspective (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992) 252. Andreassen, BA, et al, ‘Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries: The Case for Minimum Threshold Approach’ in Andreassen, BA, and Eide, A (eds), Human Rights in Developing Countries 1987/1988 (Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, 1988) 333. Anghie, A, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalisation, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 243. An-Naim, A (ed), Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa (London, Zed, 2002). Anton, DK, and Shelton, DL, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). Arambulo, K, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Theoretical and Procedural Aspects (Antwerp, Intersentia/Hart, 1999). Askin, KD, and Koenig, DM (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, vol 1 (New York, Transnational, 1999). —— (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, vol 2 (New York, Transnational, 2000). —— (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, vol 3 (New York, Transnational, 2001). Ayton-Shenker, D, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (United Nations Department of Public Information DPI/1627/HR, March 1995), available at http://www. un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm. Baderin, MA, and McCorquodale, R (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). Balakrishnan, R, et al, Maximum Available Resources & Human Rights: Analytical Report (New Brunswick, NJ, Center for Women’s Global Leadership, Rutgers University, 2011). Barber, RJ, ‘Protecting the Right to Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: Standard in International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 432. Bartman, A, ‘Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child? Corporal Punishment in Schools around the World’ (2002) 13 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 283. Barak-Erez, D, and Gross AM (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). Beddard, R, and Hill, DM (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Progress and Achievement (London, Macmillan, 1992). Benedek, W, et al (eds), Human Rights of Women: International Instruments and African Experiences (London, Zed Books, 2002). Beetham, D, ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?’ (1995) 43 Political Studies 41. Beiter, KD, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).

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 667

Betten, L, ‘The Implementation of Social and Economic Rights by the ILO’ (1998) 6 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 29. Betten, L, and MacDevitt, D (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996). Bilchitz, D, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). ——, ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for the Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1. Binder, G, ‘Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law’ (1999) 5 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 211. Bitensky, S, ‘Spare the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children’ (1998) 31 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 353. ——, ‘Spare the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: International Law’s Mandate against All Corporal Punishment of Children’ (1999) 21 Whittier Law Review 147. Boerefijn, I, et al (eds), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003). Bonthuys, E, ‘Realising South African Children’s Basic Socio-economic Claims against Parents and the State: What Courts Can Achieve’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 333. Boon, K, ‘The Role of Courts in Enforcing Economic and Social Rights’ (2007) 39 George Washington International Law Review 449. Bossert, T, and Beauvais, J, ‘Decentralisation of Health Systems in Ghana, Zambia, Uganda and the Philippines: A Comparative Analysis of Decision Space’ (2002) 17 Health Policy and Planning 14. Bottomley, S, and Kinley, D (eds), Commercial Law and Human Rights (Aldershot, Ashgate Dartmouth, 2002). Boyle, A, and Anderson, M (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996). Bradlow, D, ‘The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights’ (1996) 6 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 47. Bradlow, D, and Grossman, C, ‘Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 411. Brand, D, and Russell, S (eds), Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2002). Bratt, RG, Stone, ME, and Hartman, C (eds), A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda (Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 2006). Burchill, R, Harris, DJ, and Owers, A (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in United Kingdom Law (Nottingham, University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, 1999). Carmona, MS, ‘The Obligations of “International Assistance and Cooperation” under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Possible Entry Point to a Human Rights Based Approach to Millennium Development Goal 8’ (2009) 13(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 86. Carrasco, E, and Kose, MA, ‘Income Distribution and the Bretton Woods Institutions; Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social Development’ (1996) 6 Transnational and Contemporary Problems 1. Cassese, A, ‘Can The Notion of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment be Applied to Socioeconomic Conditions?’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law 141.

668 

Selected Bibliography

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Leading Cases on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Summaries (Geneva, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2005). Chavarro, JM, The Human Right to Water: A Legal Comparative Perspective at the International, Regional and Domestic Level (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2015). Clapham, A, ‘The Right to Health: Conceptualising a Minimum Core Content’, Working Paper for the Day of General Discussion on the Right to Health, 6 December 1993, CESCR, 9th Session, UN Doc. E/C.12/1993/WP.24 (1993). —— (ed), Health Care Reform: A Human Rights Approach (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1993). ——, ‘A New Approach to Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: The Review 23. ——, ‘Monitoring Women’s Right to Health under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1157. ——, ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23. ——, ‘Conceptualizing the Right to Health: A Violations Approach’ (1998) 65 Tennessee Law Review 389. ——, ‘The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 861. ——, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications’ (2009) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights 1. —— (ed), Human Rights and Non-State Actors (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013). Chapman, A, and Russell, S (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). Chenwi, L, ‘Putting Flesh on the Skelton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions’ (2008) 8(1) Human Rights Law Review 105. ——, ‘Correcting the Historical Asymmetry Between Rights: The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 23. Chinkin, C, The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-Conflict, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf. Churchill, RR, and Khaliq, U, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 417. Clair, A, ‘Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achievement’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 139. Chow, PYS, ‘Culture as Collective Memories: An Emerging Concept in International Law and Discourse on Cultural Rights’ (2014) 14(4) Human Rights Law Review 611. Clapham, A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). Coalition for Health and Education Rights, The, User Fees: The Right to Education and Health Denied, A Policy Brief for the UN Special Session on Children (New York, May 2002), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/147_1_user_fees.pdf. Costello, C, and Freedland, M (eds), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Cook, RJ, ‘Human Rights and Infant Survival: A Case for Priorities’ (1986) 18 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 1. ——, ‘International Protection of Women’s Reproductive Rights’ (1992) 24 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 645. —— (ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

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——, Women’s Health and Human Rights: the Promotion and Protection of Women’s Health through International Human Rights Law (Geneva, WHO, 1994). ——, ‘Human Rights and Reproductive Self-determination’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 975. Cook, RJ, Dickens, B, and Fathalla, M, Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating Medicine, Ethics, and Law (Oxford, Clarendon, 2003). Coomans, F, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, SIM Special No 16 (Utrecht, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 1995) 3. ——, ‘The Role of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Strengthening Implementation and Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2002) 35 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 182. —— (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic Systems (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006). ——, ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 11(1) Human Rights Law Review 1. ——, and Kamminga, M (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004). ——, and Künnemann, R, Cases and Concepts on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012). ——, and Van Hoof, G (eds), The Right to Complain and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Proceedings of the Expert Meeting on the Adoption of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, held from 25–28 January 1995 in Utrecht, SIM Special No 18 (Utrecht, SIM, 1995). Cosentino, C, ‘Safe and Legal Abortion: An Emerging Human Rights? The Long-Standing Dispute with State Sovereignty in ECHR Jurisprudence’ (2015) 15(3) Human Rights Law Review 569. Costello, C, and Freedland, M (eds), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Cottingham, J, Germain, A, and Hunt, P, ‘Use of Human Rights to Meet the Unmet Need for Family Planning’ (2012) 380 (9837) The Lancet 172. Craven, M, ‘The Domestic Application of the ICESCR’ (1993) 40 Netherlands International Law Review 367. ——, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995). Daintith, T, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights’ (2004) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 56. Dankwa, EV, ‘Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 230. Dankwa, EV, and Flinterman, C, ‘Commentary by the Rapporteurs on the Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 136. Dankwa, EV, Flinterman, C, and Leckie, S, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705. Darrow, M, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). Davis, DM, ‘The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-economic Rights in A Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 475. ——, ‘Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “Deference Lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal of Human Rights 301. ——, ‘Socioeconomic Rights: Do They Deliver the Goods?’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 687.

670 

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De Beco, G, ‘The Right to Inclusive Education According to Article 24 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Background, Requirements and (Remaining) Questions’ (2014) 32(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 263. De Felice, D, ‘Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to Respect: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2015) 37(2) Human Rights Quarterly 511. De Feyter, K, and Gomez Isa, F (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005). De Schutter, O, ‘The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and the Right to Food: From Conflict to Complementarity’ (2011) 33(2) 304. —— (ed), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013). ——, and Cordes, KY (eds), Accounting for Hunger: The Right to Food in the Era of Globalisation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011). ——, et al, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1084. De Villiers, B, ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: Indian Experience’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 29. ——, ‘The Socio-economic Consequences of Directive Principles of State Policy; Limitations on Fundamental Rights’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 188. De Vos, P, ‘Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 259. Dennis, MJ, and Stewart, DP, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 462. Detrick, S, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999). Dixon, R, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 391. Dommen, C, ‘Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organisation: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 1. Donders, Y, Cultural Life in the Context of Human Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/40/13 (9 May 2008). ——, and Volodin, V (eds), Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal Developments and Challenges (Aldershot, UNESCO/Ashgate, 2007). Donnelly, J, ‘The Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights’, in Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1989). Dowell-Jones, M, ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Assessing the Economic Deficit’ (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 11. ——, ‘The Economics of the Austerity Crisis: Unpicking Some Human Rights Arguments’ (2015) 15(2) Human Rights Law Review 193. Dorssemont, F, et al (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). Drache, D, and Jacobs, LA (eds), Linking Global Trade and Human Rights: New Policy Space in Hard Economic Times (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014). Drzewicki, K, Krause, C, and Rosas, A (eds), Social Rights as Human Right: A European Challenge (Turku/Åbo, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 1994). Du Plessis, M, ‘The Application and Influence of UN Human Rights Standards in Practice: The South African Experience’ (2002) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 452. Eide, A, ‘Realisation of Social-Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach’ 10 (1989) Human Rights Law Journal 35.

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——, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in Symonides, J (ed), Human Rights: Concepts and Standards (Aldershot, Ashgate/UNESCO Publishing, 2000) 109. ——, Krause, C, and Rosas, A (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd edn (Dordrecht and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). Eide, WB, and Kracht, U (eds), Food and Human Rights in Development: Vol I, Legal and Institutional Dimensions (Oxford, Intersentia, 2005). —— (eds), Food and Human Rights in Development: Vol II, Evolving Issues and Emerging Applications (Oxford, Intersentia, 2007). EFA, Education for All Global Monitoring Reports 2002–2015 (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2002–2015), available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/ leading-the-international-agenda/efareport/reports/. Ellis, K, and Feris, L, ‘The Right to Sanitation: Time to Delink from the Right to Water’ (2014) 36(3) Human Rights Quarterly 607. ESCR-Net, Caselaw Database: A Database of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Related Jurisprudence, Cases and Other Decisions, available at http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/. Evans, C, ‘Religious Education in Public Schools: An International Human Rights Perspective (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 449. Exeter, A, and Hermans, H (eds), The Right to Health Care in Several European Countries, Expert Meeting, held in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 27–28 April 1988 (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999). Fabre, C, ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 263. ——, Social Rights under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (Oxford University Press, 2000). Foster, M, International Refugee Law and Socio-economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). Fuenzalida, PH, and Connor, S (eds), The Right to Health in the Americas: A Comparative Constitutional Study (Washington, DC, Pan American Health Organization, 1989). Fukuda-Parr, S, Lawson-Remer, T, and Randolph, S, Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). Flood, CM, and Gross, A, The Right to Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014). Fluss, S, ‘The Development of National Health Legislation in Europe: The Contribution of International Organisations’ (1995) 2 European Journal of Health Law 193. Francioni, F, and Scheinin, M, (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). Freeman, M, ‘World Poverty: Rights, Obligations, Institutions, Motivations’ (2015) 37(2) Human Rights Quarterly 439. ——, Chinkin, C, and Rudolf, B, (eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). Gallagher, A, ‘Ending the Marginalisation: Strategies for Incorporating Women into the UN Human Rights System’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 283. Gauri, V, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries, Policy research working paper 3006 (Washington, DC, World Bank, 2003). Giacca, G, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Goldberg, P, ‘Women, Health and Human Rights’ (1997) 9 Pace International Law Review 271. Goldewijk, B, Baspineiro, AC, and Carbonari, PC (eds), Dignity and Human Rights: The Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). Gomien, D, Harris, D, and Zwaak, L, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1996).

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Gostin, OL, and Lazzarini, Z, Human Rights and Public Health in the AIDS Pandemic (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997). Ghai, Y, and Cottrell, J (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (London, Interights, 2004). Grant, E, ‘Enforcing Social and Economic Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing in South Africa’ (2007) 15 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. Grant S, ‘The Social and Economic Human Rights of Non-Citizens’ (1998) 5 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 75. Gutto, SBO, ‘Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of Implementing/Enforcing Socio-economic Rights in South Africa’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 79. Harris, DJ, ‘Collective Complaints under the European Social Charter: Encouraging Progress?’ in Kaikobad, KH, and Bohlander, M (eds), International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Leiden and Boston, Mass, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 3. ——, and Darcy, J, European Social Charter, 2nd edn (Ardsley, NY, Transnational, 2001). Harrison, J, The Human Rights Impact of the World Trade Organisation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). Harvey, P, ‘Monitoring Mechanisms for International Agreements Respecting Economic and Social Human Rights’ (1987) 12 Yale Journal of International Law 396. ——, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 363. Hellum, A, and Aasen, HS, (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional and National Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). Hendriks, A, ‘The Right to Health Promotion and Protection of Women’s Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health Under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the Women’s Convention’ (1995) 44 American University Law Review 1123. Henkin, L, ‘Economic-Social Rights as “Rights”: A US Perspective’ (1981) 2 Human Rights Law Journal 223. Hervey, T, and Kenner, J (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Legal Perspective (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003). Heymann, J et al, ‘Rights Monitoring and Assessment using Quantitative Indicators of Law and Policy: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2015) 37(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1071–1100. Heywood, M, ‘South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to Realize the Right to Health’ (2009) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 14. Hodgson, D, ‘The International Human Right to Education and Education concerning Human Rights’ (1996) 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 237. ——, The Human Right to Education (Aldershot, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1998). Hohmann, J, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). Howland, T, ‘The Multi-State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2007) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 389. Howse, R, ‘The World Trade Organisation and the Protection of Workers’ Rights’ (1999) 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131. ——, ‘Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 651. ——, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Reply’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 945. ——, and Mutua, M, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation (Montreal, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2000). Hulston, J, ‘Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights 29.

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 673

Hunt, P, Reclaiming Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996). ——, ‘State Obligations, Indicators, Benchmarks, and the Right to Education’ 4 Human Rights Law and Practice 109; UN Doc E/C.12/1998/11 (1998). ——, and MacNaughton, G, ‘Impact Assessment, Poverty and Human Rights: A Case Study Using the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (submitted to UNESCO, 31 May 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsimpact.org/fileadmin/hria_resources/ unesco_hria_paper.pdf. ——, and Mesquita, J, ‘Mental Disabilities and the Human Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 332. Jagers, M, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of Accountability (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). Jamar, SD, ‘The international Human Right to Health’ (1994) 22 Southern University Law Review 1. Jaspers, T, and Betten, L (eds), 25 Years: European Social Charter (Deventer, Kluwer, 1988). Jayawickrama, N, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002). Joseph, S, ‘Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425. ——, Blame It on the WTO? A Human Rights Critique (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). ——, Kinley, D, and Waincymer, J, (eds), The World Trade Organisation and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009). Joyce, JA, World Labour Rights and Their Protection (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1980). Kapchan, D, (ed), Cultural Heritage in Transit: Intangible Rights as Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Keller, LM, ‘The American Rejection of Economic Rights as Human Rights and the Declaration of Independence; Does the Pursuit of Happiness Require Basic Economic Rights?’ (2003) 19 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 557. Kemp, P, Van den Bosch, K, and Smith, L (eds), Social Protection in an Ageing World (Antwerp/ Oxford, Intersentia, 2008). Kende, M, The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective’ (2003) Chapman Law Review 137–160. Kenna, P, (ed), Contemporary Housing Issues in a Globalized World (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014). Kenneth, R, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 63. ——, ‘Response to Leonard S Rubenstein’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 873. Kinley, D, and Chambers, R, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447. Kinney, E, ‘The International Human Right to Health: What Does this Mean to our Nation and World? (2001) 3 Indiana Law Review 1457. Klerk, Y, ‘Working Paper on Article 2(2) and Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 250. Knuth, L, and Vidar, M, Constitutional and Legal Protection of the Right to Food around the World (Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2011), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap554e/ap554e.pdf. Koch, I, ‘The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 3. Kotey, E, ‘Some Fallacies about Rights: Of Indivisibility, Priorities and Justiciability’ International Commission of Jurists, Report of a Regional Seminar on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 9–12 March 1998 (Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1999). Kumado, K, ‘The Monitoring of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: The Review 99.

674 

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Kwesiga, J, Women’s Access to Higher Education in Africa: Uganda’s Experience (Kampala, Fountain, 2002). Lamichhane, K, Disability, Education and Employment in Developing Countries: From Charity to Investment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). Lang, A, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011). Langfield, M, et al (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice (New York, Routledge, 2010). Langford, M (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). Langford, M, et al, Legal Resources on the Right to Water: International and National Standards (Geneva, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2004). ——, et al, Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). ——, et al, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014). Lazzarini, Z, ‘Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil’ (2003) 6 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 103. Leary, V, ‘The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law’ (1994) 1 Health and Human Rights: An International Quarterly Journal 24. ——, ‘Justiciability and Beyond, Complaint Procedures and the Right to Health’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: The Review 105. Leckie, S, ‘The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach’ (1989) 11 Human Rights Quarterly 522. ——, ‘An Overview and Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1991) 13 Human Rights Quarterly 545. ——, From Housing Needs to Housing Rights: An Analysis of the Right to Adequate Housing under International Human Rights Law (London, International Institute for Environment and Development, 1992). ——, ‘Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81. ——, ‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a System Needing Reform’ in Alston, P, and Crawford, J (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 129. Lee, J, ‘The Underlying legal Theory to Support a Well-defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law’ (2000) 25 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 283. Lu, H, ‘The Personal Application of the Right to Work in the Age of Migration’ (2008) 26 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 43. Lucas, M, ‘The International Monetary Fund’s Conditionality and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Attempt to Define the Relation’ (1992) 25 Revue Belge de Droit International 104. Macpherson, I, et al (eds), Education, Privatization and Social Justice: Case Studies from Africa, South Asia and South East Asia (Oxford, Symposium Books, 2014). McBride, J, ‘The Violation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’ in Van Bueren, G (ed), Childhood Abused: Protecting Children against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998) 107. McCorquodale, R, and Fairbrother, R, ‘Globalisation and Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 735.

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——, and Simons P, ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 MLR 598. Mahon, C, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2008) 4 Human Rights Law Review 617. Mann, J (ed), Health and Human Rights: A Reader (London, Routledge, 1999). Malby, S, ‘Education and Health: A Role for Private Actors in Meeting Human Rights Obligations?’ (2002) 6 The International Journal of Human Rights 1. Mark, S, and Clapham, A, International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Matscher, F (ed), The Implementation of Economic and Social Rights: National, International and Comparative Aspects (Strasbourg, NP Engel Verlag, 1991). Mbazira, C, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice: A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press/PULP, 2009), available at http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/ pdf/2009_07/2009_07.pdf. Melish, T, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System: A Manual on Presenting Claims (New Haven, CT, Yale Law School, 2002). Merali, I, and Oosterveld, V (eds), Giving Meaning to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). Meyer, WH, ‘Testing Theories of Labor Rights and Development’ (2015) 37(2) Human Rights Quarterly 414. Michalowski, S, ‘Sovereign Debt and Social Rights—Legal Reflections on a Difficult Relationship’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 35. Michelman, FI, ‘The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 13. ——, ‘Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America away’ (2008) 6(3–4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 663. Minkler, L, ‘Economic Rights and Political Decision Making’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 368. —— (ed), The State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). Mottershaw, E, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict: International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 12 The International Journal of Human Rights 449. Mowbray, J, ‘The Right to Food and the International Economic System: An Assessment of the Rights-Based Approach to the Problem of World Hunger’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 545. Mower, A, and Glenn, J, International Cooperation for Social Justice: Global and Regional Protection of Economic/Social Rights (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1985). Müller, A, The Relationship between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Humanitarian Law: An Analysis of Health-Related Issues in Non-International Armed Conflicts (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013). Newman, D, ‘Institutional Monitoring of Social and Economic Rights: A South African Case Study and a New Research Agenda’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 189. Nielsen, R, and Szyszczak, E, The Social Dimension of the European Community, 2nd edn (Copenhagen, Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1993). Nolan, A, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011). —— (ed), Economic and Social Rights after the Global Financial Crises (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014).

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——, O’Connell, R, and Harvey, C, (eds), Human Rights and Public Finance: Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). Nowak, M, ‘The Need for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: The Review 153. ——, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003). ——, ‘The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 251. ——, ‘The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 32(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 3. O’Connell, P, Vindicating Socio-Economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences (Oxford, Routledge, 2012). Odello, M and Seatzu, F, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Law, Process and Practice (London, Routledge, 2013). Odinkalu, C, ‘Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis? Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327. ——, ‘Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Evans, M, and Murray, R (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice, 1986–2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 178. O’Keefe, R, ‘The “Right to Take Part in Cultural Life” Under Article 15 of the ICESCR’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 904. Olaniyan, K, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). Olivier, M, ‘Constitutional Perspectives on the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights: Recent South African Experiences’ (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 117. Oloka-Onyango, J, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa’ (1995) 26 California Western Law Journal 1. ——, ‘Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in the Age of Globalisation: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18 American University International Law Review 851. ——, Interrogating NGO Struggles for Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights in Contemporary Utake [Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania] (Kampala, Makerere University, 2006). ——, The Problematique of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Gobalised Uganda: A Conceptual Review (Kampala, Makerere University, 2007). ——, Equal Opportunity, Age-Based Discrimination and the Rights of Elderly Persons in Uganda (Kampala, Human Rights and Peace Centre, 2008). Otto, D, ‘“Gender comment”: Why Does the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Need a General Comment on Women?’ (2002) 14 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1. —— (ed), Gender Issues and Human Rights, vols I–III (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013). Pasqualucci, JM, ‘International indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights In Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal 51. Petersmann, E, ‘Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 845. ——, ‘Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights Law into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 621. ——, ‘The “Human Rights Approach” Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 605.

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——, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Rejoinder’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 955. Packer, C, Using Human Rights to Change Tradition: Traditional Practices Harmful to Women’s Reproductive Health in Sub-Saharan Africa (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002). Petchesky, RP, Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights (London, Zed Books, 2003). Pieterse, M, ‘The Potential of Socio-economic Rights Litigation for the Achievement of Social Justice: Considering the Example of Access to Medical Care in South African Prisons’ (2006) 50 Journal of African Law 118. Pillay, A, ‘Revisiting the Indian Experience of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: The Need for a Principled Approach to Judicial Activism and Restraint’ (2014) 63(2) ICLQ 385. Plomer, A, ‘The Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science’ (2013) 35(1) Human Rights Quarterly 143. Råberg, A, and Jeene, H, Selling Out Rights: How Policy Affects Access to Health Services in East and Central Africa (London, Save the Children, 2002). Ramcharan, B (ed), Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cases and Materials (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). ——, ‘Implementation of the ICESCR’ (1976) 23 Netherlands International Law Review 151. Razzaque, J, and Ssenyonjo, M, ‘Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Human Rights Obligations: The Status of Discussion in International Organisations’ (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 401. Redmond, P, ‘Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and Compliance’ (2003) 37 The International Lawyer 69. Rees, S, and Wright, S (eds), Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility: A Dialogue (Sydney, Pluto Press, 2000). Reisman, WM, ‘The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 86. Riedel, E, Giacca, G, and Golay, C (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Richardson, L, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (and Beyond) in the UN Human Rights Council’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 409. Robertson, R, ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the “Maximum Available Resources” to Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693. Robinson, M, ‘Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way Forward’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 866. Rosa, S, and Dutschke, M, ‘Child Rights at the Core: The Use of International Law in South African Cases on Children’s Socio-economic Rights’ (2006) 22 South African Journal of Human Rights 224. Rubenstein, LS, ‘How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 845. ——, ‘A Response by Leonard S. Rubenstein’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 879. Ruggie, J, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 819. ——, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, annex (21 March 2011). Ruiz-Chiriboga, OR, ‘The American Convention and The Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties—Non-Enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System’ (2013) 31(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 59.

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Sachar, R, The Right to Adequate Housing: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Study Series No 7 (New York, United Nations, 1996). Sajó, A, ‘Social rights: A Wide Agenda’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 38. Salomon, ME (ed), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Guide for Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (London, Minority Rights Group International, 2005). ——, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). ——, Tostensen, A, and Vandenhole, W (eds), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-bearers (Antwerp/Oxford, Intersentia, 2007). Samuel, L, Fundamental Social Rights: Case Law of the European Social Charter (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1997). Saul, B, Kinley, D, and Mowbray, J, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Schabas, WA, ‘Freedom from Want: How Can We Make Indivisibility More Than a Mere Slogan?’ (1999–2000) 11 National Journal of Constitutional Law 189. Scheinin, M, ‘Women’s Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights’ in L Hannikainen and E Nykanen (eds), New Trends in Discrimination Law—International Perspectives (Turku, Turku Law School, 1999) 1. ——, ‘The Proposed Optional Protocol to the Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Blueprint for UN Human Rights Treaty Body Reform—Without Amending the Existing Treaties’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 131. Schwelb, E, ‘Some Aspects of the Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1968) 1 Human Rights Journal 363. Scott, C, ‘The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769. ——, and Alston, P, ‘Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 206. ——, and Macklem, P, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution’ (1989) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. Scott, L, ‘Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81. Schmid, E, ‘Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights and Wrongs After Armed Conflicts: Using the State Reporting Procedure before the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights More Effectively’ (2013) 31(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 241. Sellin, J, Access to Medicines: The Interface between Patents and Human Rights. Does one size fit all? (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014). Sengupta, A, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 837. Sepulveda, M, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003). Siegel, RL, Employment and Human Rights: The International Dimension (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). Sieghart, P, An Introduction to the International Covenants on Human Rights (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988). Sifris, R, ‘Involuntary Sterilization of HIV-Positive Women: An Example of Intersectional Discrimination’ (2015) 37(2) Human Rights Quarterly 464. Singh, K, Protecting the Right to Education against Commercialization, UN Doc A/HRC/29/30 (10 June 2015).

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Shelton, D, (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). Skogly, S, ‘Crimes Against Humanity-Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social Rights’ (2001) 5 International Journal of Human Rights 58. ——, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (London, Cavendish, 2001). ——, ‘Is There a Right Not to be Poor?’ (2002) 2 Human Rights Law Review 59. ——, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006). ——, ‘The Requirement of Using the “Maximum of Available Resources” for Human Rights Realisation: A Question of Quality as Well as Quantity?’ (2012) 12(3) Human Rights Law Review 393. ——, and Gibney, M, ‘Transnational Human Rights Obligations’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 781. Sohn, LB (ed), Guide to Interpretation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2 vols (Irlington, NY, Transnational, 1994). Spring, J, The Universal Right to Education: Justification, Definition, and Guidelines (Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000). Spronk-van der Mee, S, The Right to Health of the Child: An Analytical Exploration of the International Normative Framework (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2014). Ssenyonjo, M, ‘Domestic Protection and Promotion of Human Rights under the 1995 Ugandan Constitution’ (2002) 20 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 445. ——, ‘Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights in Africa: General Overview, Evaluation and Prospects’ (2003) 9 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 1. ——, ‘The Islamic Veil and Freedom of Religion, the Rights to Education and Work: A Survey of Recent International and National Cases’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 653. ——, ‘Towards Non-Discrimination Against Women and De Jure Equality in Uganda: The Role of Uganda’s Constitutional Court’ (2008) 16 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. —— (ed), The African Regional Human Rights System (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). Stamatopoulou, E, Cultural Rights in International Law (Leiden and Boston, MA, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007). Stark, B, ‘Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New Strategy”’ (1992) 44 Hastings Law Journal 79. ——, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a Resource for Women’ in Askin, K, and Koenig, D (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, vol 2 (New York, Transnational, 2000) 209. Steiner, HJ, ‘Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 25. ——, Alston, P, and Goodman, R, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals—Text and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). Swaminathan, R, ‘Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights’ (1998) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 161. Symonides, J, ‘Cultural Rights: A Neglected Category of Human Rights’ (1998) 50(158) International Social Science Journal 559. Thielbörger, P, ‘Re-Conceptualizing the Human Right to Water: A Pledge for a Hybrid Approach’ (2015) 15(2) Human Rights Law Review 225.

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Tinta, MF, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 431. Tobin, J, ‘The International Obligation to Abolish Traditional Practices Harmful to Children’s Health: What Does It Mean and Require of States’ (2009) 9(3) Human Rights Law Review 373. ——, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). Toebes, B, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 1999). ——, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 661. ——, et al (eds), Health and Human Rights in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012). Tomaševski, K (ed), The Right to Food: Guide through Applicable International Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). ——, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 2nd edn (London, Pinter, 1993). ——, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: The Review, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Role of Lawyers 202. ——, ‘The Influence of the World Bank and IMF on Economic and Social Rights’ (1995) 64 Nordic Journal of International Law 385. ——, Women and Human Rights (London, Zed Books, 1995). ——, Human Rights Obligations: Making Education Available, Accessible, Acceptable and Adaptable, Right to Education Premiers, No 3 (Gothenburg, Novum Grafiska AB, 2001). ——, Education Denied (London, Zed, 2003). ——, ‘Unasked Questions about Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998–2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 709. ——, ‘Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998–2004’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 205. Tooze, J, ‘Aligning States’ Economic Policies with Human Rights Obligations: The CESCR’S Quest for Consistency’ (2002) 2 Human Rights Law Review 229. Tully, S, ‘A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects’ (2014) 14 (2) Human Rights Law Review 175. Twinomugisha, BK, Fundamentals of Health Law in Uganda (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2015). UNESCO (ed), Cultural Rights and Wrongs: A Collection of Essays in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, UNESCO, 1998). United Nations, 2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Women’s Control over Economic Resources and Access to Financial Resources, including Microfinance (New York, United Nations, 2009). United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction, first released September 2002, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f8298544.html. ——, Principles and Guidelines For a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf. ——, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions— Professional Training Series No 12 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2005). ——, Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, HR/PUB/10/3 (New York, United Nations, 2010). UNDP, Human Development Reports (1990–2014), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports. Van Banning, T, The Human Right to Property (Antwerp and Oxford, Intersentia, 2002). Van Bueren, G, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).

Selected Bibliography

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682 

Selected Bibliography

——, ‘Reflections on Defining, Understanding, and Measuring Poverty in Terms of Violations of Economic Social Rights under International Law’ (1997) 4 Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 273. ——, and Maine, D, ‘Maternal Mortality as a Human Rights Issue: Measuring Compliance with International Treaty Obligations’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 563. Young, KG, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 113. ——, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). Young, KG, and Lemaitre, J, ‘Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 179 Zampas, C, and Gher, JM, ‘Abortion as a Human Right—International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 249. Zuniga, JM, Marks, SP, and Gostin, LO (eds), Advancing the Human Right to Health (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).

Useful Websites African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www.achpr.org/ African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, at http://acerwc.org/ African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www.african-court.org/en/ Amnesty International, at http://www.amnesty.org/en/economic-social-and-cultural-rights Anti-Slavery International, at http://www.antislavery.org/english/ Bretton Woods Project, at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/ Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, at http://business-humanrights.org/ Centre for Economic and Social Rights, at http://www.cesr.org/ Circle of Rights, at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/toc.htm European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ socialcharter/ECSR/ECSRdefault_en.asp FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN International), at http://www.fian.org/ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.org/ Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www.corteidh.or.cr International Labour Organisation (ILO), at http://www.ilo.org/ International Network for Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, at http://www.escr-net.org/ Legal Empowerment of the Poor, at http://www.lepnet.org/ National Economic & Social Rights Initiative (NESRI), at http://www.nesri.org/ National Human Rights Institutions Forum, at http://www.nhri.net/ Nazdeek, at http://nazdeek.org Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, at http://www.ohchr.org/ Right to Education Project Oxfam International, at http://www.oxfam.org/ Right to Education Project, at http://www.right-to-education.org/ Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), at http://www.seri-sa.org/ United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at http://www2.ohchr. org/english/bodies/cescr/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, at http://unctad.org/ UNESCO, at http://en.unesco.org/ United Nations Special Rapporteurs (on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights; Adequate Housing; the Right to Education; the Right to Food; the Right to Health; the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation; in the Field of Cultural Rights), at http://www.ohchr. org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Themes.aspx War on Want, at http://www.waronwant.org/ World Bank, at http://www.worldbank.org/World Health Organisation, http://who.int/en/

Index abortions, 23, 229, 377, 552–3 access to justice, 87–9 adequate standard of living see also social security rights food see food rights global reality, 467–8 housing see housing rights ICESCR, 465, 466, 502 international law, 466–7 NSA obligations, 468 omissions, 472–3 remedies, 504–6 right to, 465–97 sanitation, 486–9 state obligations, 468–73 US attitude to, 38 water see water rights Afghanistan, 216, 561 Africa: colonialism, 147–8 corruption, 229 cultural values, 375–6 prejudice to women, 383–408 customary law, 384, 386, 390, 391, 392, 393, 404, 405 displaced persons, 219 education, 561, 593 family values, 375–6 female genital mutilation, 386, 387 health rights, 556 human rights treaties, 228 ICESCR reservations, 359–60 interdependence and indivisibility of rights, 21 life expectancy, 229 mental disability and, 382 polygamy, 387, 389, 397–406 poverty reduction, 250 women, 368, 372–83 cultural prejudices, 383–408 equality in divorce, 406–8 existing rights, 381–3 inheritance rights, 387, 388–94 Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), 411 uprooting cultural obstacles, 408–12 violence, 372 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: African Court Protocol, 658 collective rights, 16 cultural rights, 243–4, 629 cultural values, 375–6, 399 dignity and, 228 education rights, 226, 235–6, 578–9 equality, 244–6, 373–6, 435–6 ESC cases, 229–48

ESC rights, 225–50 legal protection, 226–9 list, 226 expulsions of non-nationals, 428–30 family rights, 246, 396 family values, 375 food rights, 246–8, 475 health rights, 235–40, 513, 521–2 housing rights, 246–8, 491–3 implied rights, 246–8 inheritance rights, 388 limitations on rights, 227 Maputo Protocol see African Women’s Rights Protocol non-derogability, 55 NSAs and, 180 polygamy and, 399 property rights, 231, 492–3 ratifications, 269, 280, 360, 377 slavery, 443–4 state protection from NSA violations, 168 vagueness, 227–8 water rights, 483 Women’s Protocol see African Women’s Rights Protocol working rights: gender equality, 435–6 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: economic exploitation, 452 education rights, 603 ESC rights, 228 health rights, 513 ICESCR and, 360 ratifications, 377 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: analytical framework, 230–1 case load, 228–9 creation, 229 cultural rights, 243–4, 629 discrimination: definition, 376 education rights, 240–2, 578–9 corporal punishment, 598 equality principle, 130, 244–6 non-nationals, 147–8, 150 sexual orientation, 291 working rights, 420–1, 436 ESC cases: survey, 229–48 expulsions of non-nationals, 428–30 health rights, 235–40, 521–2 environment and, 523 mental health, 538 reality, 556 state obligations, 522–3 housing rights, 491–3

684 

Index

implied rights, 246–8 jurisdiction, 401–2 limitations on rights and, 227 minimum core obligations, 106 non-state actors and definition, 162 human rights violations, 164, 167–9, 175 oil companies in Nigeria, 179–80 normative analysis, 229–30 property rights, 231–5 on public emergencies, 55 reservations and, 380–1 state obligations, 31 working rights, 242–3 non-discrimination, 420–1, 436 African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 654, 656, 658 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: aggression, 219 establishment, 377 gender discrimination and, 409–10 jurisdiction, 401 Nigerian corruption and, 101 replacement, 654 reservations and, 380–1 Uganda and, 280 African Union: aggression and, 219 Anti-Corruption Convention (2003), 292–3 Kampala Convention (2009), 219, 228 Refugee Convention, 280 regional HR protection, 653–4 African Women’s Rights Protocol: application issues, 408 contents, 377–8 cultural practices, 398 drafting, 376–7, 411 education rights, 602 equality principle, 373 food adequacy, 475 housing rights, 493 ICESCR and, 228 indivisibility and interdependence of rights, 381 inheritance rights, 394 objectives, 402 overview, 376–81 polygamy and, 398–9, 402, 405–6 ratifications, 280, 360, 377, 408 reservations, 379 state obligations, 378, 402–6 traditional practices, 397 water rights, 483 working rights, 436, 437–8 African Youth Charter, 228 aggression, 219 agriculture: Agreement on Agriculture, 201–2, 205 AIDS Access Foundation, 200 Al-Munajjid, Muhammed Salih, 351 Al Qaida, 216, 222 Albuquerque, Catarina de, 46 Algeria, 359, 398 Alston, Philip, 17, 106, 656–7

American Convention on Human Rights (1969) (AmCHR): destruction of human rights and, 181 education rights, 610 housing rights, 491 reservations, 334 American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 435 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), 181 amnesties, 60–1, 174–5, 243, 249 Amnesty International, 421, 662 An-Naim, A, 135 Andorra, 229 Angola: child labour, 453 expulsion of non-nationals, 245–6, 429–30 life expectancy, 229 animal welfare, 204–5 Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004): adequate food, 475–6 gender equality, 435 housing rights, 490 Arab League, 658 Arbour, Louise, 50 Argentina, 127–8, 255, 526 armed conflicts: amnesties, 60–1 food as warfare tool, 85 ICESCR and, 52–62 immunities, 61–2 military objectives, 85 water rights and, 483 Armenia: adequate standard of living, 477 ASEAN, 659 assistance and cooperation: Article 23 ICESCR, 110 developed states’ obligation to assist, 118–24 development right, 111 education, 578 effective use, 124–5 extraterritorial obligations, 111–12 forms, 122 fulfilment obligations, 116–18 international human rights law, 109–10 monitoring, 122 NSA obligations, 126–8 ODA targets, 119–24 protection obligations, 114–15 respect obligations, 113–14 scientific progress, 639–40 state obligations, 109–28 Australia: developed country, 116 human rights protection, 253 International Court of Human Rights proposal, 651–2, 653 life expectancy, 229 Austria, 229, 421–2, 422–3, 576 autism, 604, 611 Azerbaijan: right to well-being, 477

Index Bangladesh, 478, 484, 548–9 Belarus: adequate food, 476 Belgium: assistance and cooperation: budget, 120, 121 CESCR report (2013), 121 CRC reservations and, 576–7 education rights, 581 ICESCR reservations, 360–1 life expectancy, 229 non-nationals and, 149, 360–1 right to dignified life, 477 Bermuda, 363 bilateral agreements, 115, 169, 173, 190, 430–1, 602 Boko Haram, 216–17 Bolivia, 477, 483, 484 Bosnia Herzegovina, 176, 255 Botswana: customary law, 393–4 expulsions of non-nationals, 428–9 gender discrimination inheritance rights, 393–4 Mmusi case, 393–4, 410 vulnerable groups, 382–3 property rights, 231–2 Brazil: food rights., 477, 478 life expectancy, 508 reproductive health, 553–5 torture, 49 working rights, 477 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 200 Brownlie, Ian, 252 Brundtland, GH, 508 Bulgaria: education rights, 604–5, 608–10 housing rights, 491 ICESCR reservations, 360, 361 Burkina Faso, 658 Burma (Myanmar), 213 Burundi: right to development, 478 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990), 400 Cambodia: adequate standard of living, 477 CESCR report (2009), 596 education rights, 596 land-titling project, 65 status of international human rights law, 256 Cameroon: CESCR report (1999), 188 education rights, 240 structural adjustment, 188 working rights, 243, 420–1 Canada: assistance and cooperation, 118, 120, 123 CESCR report (2006), 88, 123, 307, 591 Charter of Rights, 307, 309 developed country, 116 EC—Seal Products and, 204–5 education rights, 570, 591 equality, 308

 685

ESC rights, 307–9 health rights, 529, 547 housing rights, 309 ICESCR and, 39 IHRL participation, 307 legal aid, 88 life expectancy, 229 right to life, 308–9 same-sex marriage, 307 standard of living, 307 TNCs, 220 vulnerable groups, 308 CAT see Torture Convention Cayman Islands, 363 CEDAW: adequate standard of living, 470 Committee see CEDAW Committee complaints, 48, 49 cultural discrimination against women, 401 education rights, 567–9 food rights, 473 health rights, 515 housing rights, 489 impact, 371–2 Italy and, 294 Nigeria and, 404 ratifications, 259, 268, 280, 307 reporting guidelines, 376 reproductive rights, 549–51 reservations, 324, 329, 349, 353, 380 sanitation rights, 488 source of law, 4, 12 temporary special measures, 143–4 trafficking in women, 446 water rights, 482 working rights, 437 CEDAW Committee: case load, 51 CEDAW and Sharia law, 400 education rights: context, 569 equality principle, 132, 137 older women, 133–4 ethnic minority women, 268 gender equality, 342 health rights: consent, 530 on Kuwait, 342 on polygamy, 400–1 protection from NSA violations, 172 reproductive rights, 549–51 on reservations, 380 Uganda and, 281 vulnerable groups of women, 142–3 on Zambia, 388 Center for Economic and Social Rights, 231 Central African Republic, 217, 229 Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, 200 CERD: case load, 51 discrimination by non-state actors, 146 education rights, 566, 568, 611–12 freedom of expression and racism, 181

686  on Roma, 298 Uganda and, 281 working rights, 431–3 irregular migrants, 424 CESCR: armed conflicts and, 53–4, 57–9 child labour, 453–4 creation, 40, 334–5 cultural rights balance of rights, 646 core obligations, 635–6, 642 definition of culture, 383, 629–30 fulfilment, 633–4 harmful practices, 645 Internet access, 637 limitations, 644 protection, 632–3 scientific progress, 647 scope, 630 derogations and, 55–6 domestic application of ICESCR, 322 domestic protection of ESC rights, 253–8 education rights, 52, 599 academic freedom, 618–19 fundamental education, 585 higher education, 590 primary education, 583–5 service agreements, 602 state obligations, 599–600 equality principle, 129–36, 138–40 gender equality, 142, 371, 373 non-nationals in developing countries, 148 extraterritoriality and, 63, 64–6, 69–70 food rights, 5, 33, 480–1 on globalisation, 26, 27–8 health rights, 508–9, 518, 555 core obligations, 539–40 environment and, 524 non-discrimination, 546 state obligations, 537 water and, 523 housing rights, 271, 496–7 ethnic minorities, 470 evictions, 505 Jamaica, 471–2 remedies, 504–5 state obligations, 660 information rights, 528 on intellectual property rights, 641 justiciability of ESC rights, 543–5 limitations on ESC rights and, 151 membership, 40 monitoring role, 39–43 NSAs and health rights, 179 international financial institutions, 194 remedies, 175–6 state protection, 171 TNCs, 208, 211 workers’ rights, 166, 182 WTO, 196, 202 recommendations, 654

Index on remedies, 87, 322, 504 reservations and, 326, 335–7, 364–5 sanitation rights, 487–8 social security rights, 430, 500, 501–4 state obligations, 31, 81, 82–5 accountability, 660 anti-corruption measures, 100–1 appropriate means, 89 assistance and cooperation, 113–18, 119–23, 125–6, 128 budgets, 102–3 core minimum obligations, 105–9 General Comments, 155–6 maximum available resources, 96–8 privatisation and, 159 protection from NSA violations, 171 remedies, 87 time scale, 92 state reports see state reports structural adjustments and, 188 temporary special measures, 144–5 water rights, 483, 485–6, 523 WCHR and, 661, 663 working rights, 94 gender discrimination, 438, 439 migrant workers, 427–8, 430–1 non-discrimination, 423–4 right to strike, 346–8 right to work, 173, 417, 418–19 unfair dismissal, 460, 461 Chad: life expectancy, 229 Chapman, A, 95 Charlesworth, Hilary, 129 child labour: Article 10(3) ICESCR, 450, 451 corporate practices, 206 minimum age, 451 practice, 450, 452–3 prohibited forms, 452–3 protection against exploitation, 449–59 state obligations, 452 WTO and, 205 children see also individual countries advertising to, 182 Convention on the Rights of Children see CRC European Convention, 294 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924), 451 labour see child labour ritual killing, 387 soldiers, 59, 218–19 China: assistance and cooperation, 113–14 CESCR report (2014), 100–1, 113–14, 211 corporations, 211 corruption, 100–1 education, 23, 601 Special Administration Areas, 229 Chow, PYS, 626 civil and political rights see also specific conventions

Index 1st generation rights, 14–15 ranking, 17–18 Clark, Hunter, 127 Cold War, 16, 18, 22, 38, 543, 653 collective rights, 16–17 Colombia: food right, 477 colonialism, 147–8, 188 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see CESCR Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination see CERD communication rights, 17 competition: right to work and, 27–8 complaints see also World Court of Human Rights admissibility, 46 cooperation, 46 criteria for review, 46 discrimination complaints, 135 inquiry procedure, 48–9 inter-state communications, 47–8 international HR conventions, 659–60 justiciability, 49 Optional Protocol, 43–51 scope, 46 standing, 46, 47, 77 compulsory labour see forced labour Congo (DRC): armed rebel groups, 217 CESCR report (2012), 42 development right, 478 education rights, 578, 584–5 ESC rights, 235–6 extreme poverty, 229 food rights, 476 human rights and armed conflict, 67 life expectancy, 229 TNCs in, 208–9 water rights, 483, 484 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women see CEDAW Convention on the Rights of the Child see CRC cooperation see assistance and cooperation Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995), 119 core minimum standards, 105–9, 271–2 corporal punishment, 296–7, 387, 572–3, 597–8 corporations: corporate criminal responsibility, 214–15 EU jurisdiction, 211–12 IHRL obligations, 206–15 TNCs see transnational corporations corruption: Africa, 229 anti-corruption conventions, 292–3 anti-corruption measures, 98–102 meaning, 99 negative effects, 99–100 OECD TNC Guidelines, 210 Uganda, 292–3 WTO and, 205

 687

Costa Rica, 477 Côte d‘Ivoire, 229, 658 Council of Europe, 369, 454, 653–4 CRC: adequate standard of living, 466, 467, 468 African Court of Justice and, 658 assistance and cooperation, 110, 119, 128 Canadian membership, 307 child labour and, 450 complaints procedure, 43, 659 CRC-AC, 218–19, 259, 269, 294 CRC-SC, 269, 294 education rights, 575–8, 610 ECtHR and, 609 higher education, 590, 592 secondary education, 586, 587–8 technical and vocational education, 588 equality principle, 132 food rights, 473 health rights, 513 housing rights, 489 Italy and, 294 maximum available resources, 95 NSAs and, 183 Optional Protocol, 556–7 ratifications, 259, 268, 280, 301, 483 reservations, 323, 324, 329, 353, 576–7 source of law, 4, 12 water rights, 482–3 CRC Committee: on Angola, 453 child labour and, 453, 454–9 education rights, 559 disabled children, 620–1 reservations, 577 secularism, 568 on Islamic values, 351, 400 on national human rights institutions, 312–14 NSAs and, 183 on South Africa, 277–8 Uganda and, 281 crimes against humanity: armed conflicts, 62, 86 corruption, 101 customary law, 20 destruction of housing, 490 extraterritoriality, 71 forms, 85–6 immunities, 61–2 non-state actors, 186, 214 starvation, 474–5 criminal law: corporate criminal responsibility, 214–15 ICTY, 60, 444–5, 458, 490 International Criminal Court, 217, 218, 323, 655 Croatia: education: Roma children, 607–8 Cuba: food rights, 477 cultural rights see also individual countries access, 630, 637 African cases, 243–4 African Charter, 226

688  balance of rights, 645–6 contribution to cultural life, 630, 637 harmful practices, 644–6 housing and, 497 ICESCR Article 15, 623 limitation on rights, 643 indigenous communities, 628–9 international law development, 624–6 limitations, 151, 643–6 meaning, 52, 623 meaning of culture, 626–30, 646–7 participation, 630, 637 protection of moral and material interests, 640–2 scientific progress see scientific progress scope, 630 state obligations, 623, 624 acceptability, 635 accessibility, 635, 637 adaptability, 635 appropriateness, 635 availability, 635 core minimum obligations, 635–6, 642 fulfilment, 633–4 moral and material interests, 641–2 protection, 632–3 respect, 631–2 survey, 631–6 survey, 623–47 traditional customs, 644–5 United States and, 38 cultural values: ACHPR and, 375–6 prejudice to African women, 383–408 uprooting cultural obstacles, 408–12 customary international law: crimes against humanity, 20 extraterritoriality, 64 human rights, 10–12 reservations and, 331 Cyprus, 64, 355, 477 Czech Republic: adequate standard of living, 477 assistance and cooperation, 118 education rights, 584, 606 Roma, 606 Danino, Robert, 192–3 debt relief, 97, 127, 192, 281–2 declarations see reservations degrading treatment see inhuman/degrading treatment democracy: globalisation from below, 27 Denmark: assistance and cooperation, 120, 292 CR reservations, 576–7 education rights, 566, 611–12 ICESCR reservations, 360, 361 Pakistani reservations and, 352, 353 working rights, 361

Index derogations: African Charter and, 55 armed conflicts and, 52–62 detention see prisoners developing countries: abortions, 23 Agreement on Agriculture and, 202 Article 2(3) ICESCR, 147–50 assistance see assistance and cooperation definition, 116 education, 578 international financial organisations and, 172–4, 195 least-developed countries, 116, 149, 197, 201 non-nationals, 147–50 structural adjustments, 188, 593 trade rules, 173 TRIPS and right to health, 199–201 use of international aid, 124–5 WTO and, 196–7 development: Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995), 119 Monterrey Consensus (2002), 119 right to development, 111, 197 national constitutions, 478 UN Declaration (1986), 111, 197, 565 sustainable development, 42, 111, 192, 197, 238, 378, 411, 478, 487, 507–8 Sustainable Development Goals, 111 World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), 487 dignity: African Charter and, 228 human rights and, 76, 660 ICESCR and, 13, 76 UDHR and, 19, 76 disability: education rights and, 603–4, 611, 619–21 Disability Convention: educational inclusion, 619–20 maximum available resources, 95 ratifications, 280, 294, 301, 307 source of law, 4, 12 United Kingdom and, 259 water rights, 482 Disappearance Convention, 259 discrimination see equality displaced persons: Africa, 229 assistance obligations, 117, 125 health, 515 housing, 247 Kampala Convention, 219, 228 Pinhero principles, 247 social security, 501 state obligations, 135 Syria, 53 vulnerability, 22–3, 36 women, 134, 142, 368 divorce, 377, 380, 387, 388, 406–8 Djibouti, 596–7

Index Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 200, 203 domestic protection see also individual countries Canada, 307–9 CESCR on, 253–8 constitutions, 253 dualism v monism, 251–2 Ecuador, 299–300 effective remedy, 257–8, 322 ESC rights, 251–322 examples, 258–309 India see India Italy see Italy Macedonia, 300–1 national human rights institutions, 309–21 Norway, 300 Serbia and Montenegro, 300 South Africa see South Africa status of international law, 255–6 Uganda see Uganda UK see United Kingdom Dominican Republic, 424, 610 Donnelly, Jack, 5 dualism, 251–2 ECLAC, 589 economic, social and cultural rights see also specific conventions; specific rights 2nd generation rights, 15–16 Africa and, 225–50 African Charter, 226–9 domestic protection see domestic protection globalisation and, 25–30 international agreements, 3–4 justiciability, 49, 540–5 list, 3 marginalisation, 19–24, 177 ranking, 17–18 regional conventions, 4 remedies, 651 vagueness, 6, 265, 543–4 ECOWAS Court, 241–2 Ecuador: development right, 478 domestic protection of ESC rights, 299–300 education, 601 food rights, 476 housing rights, 494–5 ICESCR complaint, 49 sanitation rights, 489 water rights, 483, 484 education rights see also individual countries; specific conventions academic freedom, 617–19 category of right, 52 core minimum standards, 108 corporal punishment, 296–7, 572–3, 597–8 cultural right, 52 disabled persons, 603–4, 619–21 ECOWAS Court case, 241–2 four pillars of learning, 560

 689

fundamental education, 585–6 gender discrimination, 23, 92, 139, 560–1, 567–9 global reality, 560–1, 621–2 globalisation and, 28 health and, 560 higher education, 94, 589–94 ICESCR, 570–1 Article 13, 139, 558, 570–1, 575 Article 14, 117, 558, 575 Article 18(4), 571 ECtHR and, 609–10 higher education, 589, 590–4 private schools, 574 secondary education, 586, 587 indirect discrimination, 134 institutional autonomy, 617–19 interdependence and indivisibility of HR rights, 560 international conventions, 562–81 justiciability acceptability, 613–17 availability, 603–4 non-discrimination, 605–13 prisoner education, 604–5 survey, 603–17 language, 581 levels, 582–94 pre-school education, 577–8 primary education, 582–5 Article 14 ICESCR, 117, 558, 575 free compulsory primary education, 108, 117, 139, 576–7, 583–5 private education, 37, 171, 570, 574, 593, 597, 600, 601, 622 religion and, 362, 567–8, 570, 572–4, 595, 597, 612–17 scope of right, 581–94 secondary education, 586–9 secularism, 567–8, 613–17 state obligations acceptability, 595, 596–8, 613–17 accessibility, 594–5, 596 adaptability, 595, 598–9 availability, 594–5, 603–4 fulfilment, 599–600, 602–3 levels, 599–603 non-discrimination, 605–13 protection, 600, 601–2 respect, 599, 600 sexual harassment policies, 601–2 survey, 594–617 survey, 558–622 technical and vocational education, 588 temporary special measures, 145 UN Convention, 323 United States and, 37 women, 372 Egypt: CEDAW reservations, 380 CESCR report (2013), 94, 406 food rights, 476 gender discrimination, 380, 406

690 

Index

housing rights, 495 ICESCR reservations, 359 retrogression, 94 Sharia law, 400 torture, 49 El Salvador, 183, 477 emergencies: public emergencies, 52–62, 77 environmental rights: collective rights, 16 health rights and, 523–5 Nigeria, 523 Uganda, 286 equality see also individual countries African Charter: equal enjoyment of ESC rights, 244–6 Article 2(2), 130–5, 170 core provision, 349–51 de jure and de facto, 139–42 de jure discrimination, 85, 352 definition of discrimination, 130 direct and indirect discrimination, 134 education Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), 564–6 ethnic minorities, 566 international conventions, 564–71 justiciability, 605–13 religious convictions, 567–8, 570, 572–4 state obligations, 600 grounds of differentiation, 131–2, 141 guarantee, 134 health rights, 526–7, 546, 550–1 legislative measures, 84–5 non-nationals in developing countries, 147–50 non-state actors and, 146–7, 169–72 prohibition of discrimination, 130–5 racial equality see racial discrimination reservations and, 331–2, 340–4 sexual orientation and, 131–3 state obligations, 543, 600 obligation to guarantee, 128–47 temporary special measures, 142–5 women see CEDAW; gender discrimination working rights, 415, 418–42 Equatorial Guinea, 42, 477 erga omnes obligations, 10–11, 68, 110, 331, 374, 379–80 Eritrea, 384, 477, 478 Ethiopia, 478 ethnic minorities see also indigenous communities; racial discrimination cultural rights, 631–2 culture, 628 education rights, 566, 596, 605–10 expropriation of land, 470 health rights, 527 indirect discrimination, 134 marginalisation, 472 vulnerable women, 142–3 women, 268

European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 423, 548, 580, 636 European Committee on Social Rights: education rights, 603–4, 611 health rights, 523–4, 536, 548 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): destruction of human rights (Article 10(2)), 181 discrimination, 422 education rights, 572–4, 581, 604–5, 608–9 family rights, 549 forced labour, 167, 444, 447–8, 457, 459 housing rights, 490, 493 Italian membership, 294 limitations on rights, 154 origins, 653–4 property rights, 231 reservations, 323–4, 334 right to life, 15, 165–6, 534–5 right to marriage and family, 395–6, 397 slavery, 444 torture/inhuman treatment, 493 United Kingdom and, 263–4, 267 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 636 European Court of Human Rights: case load, 51 child labour, 455–9 creation, 653–4 education rights, 581 corporal punishment, 572–3 non-discrimination, 606–10 prisoner education, 604–5 religion and, 572–4, 613–17 resources, 559 scope, 581 equality principle religion and, 350–1 sexual orientation, 132 extraterritorial jurisdiction and, 72–4 forced labour, 447–8 freedom of expression, 643 freedom of information, 529 health rights, 534–5 housing rights, 490–1 human rights and armed conflicts, 54 human trafficking, 446 international organisations’ responsibilities, 122 Italian asylum seekers and, 299 model, 652 NSAs and forced labour, 166–7 international organisations, 187 right to life, 165–6 prisoners’ treatment, 12 protection obligations, 33 reservations and, 333–4 right to life, 15 same-sex marriage, 397 WCHR and, 656, 658 work discrimination, 421–3, 440–2 European Social Charter: ECHR and, 548

Index education rights, 580–1, 604, 611 health rights, 514, 521, 547–8 housing rights, 490, 491 Italian membership, 294 migrant workers, 426 United Kingdom and, 259 European Union: Brussels I Regulation, 211–12 corporate domicile, 211–12 EC—Seal Products, 204–5 ODA commitments, 123 Rome II Regulation, 212 extractive industries, 100, 169 extraterritoriality: assistance and cooperation obligations, 111–12 complementarity, 71–2 ICESCR, 62–74 IHRL, 66–8 legislation, 214 Maastricht principles, 34–5 obligation to respect, 32–3 subsidiarity, 71–2 TNCs and, 212–14 fair trial, 91–2, 187, 228, 542 Falkland Islands, 363 family rights: African Charter, 246 African divorces, 406–8 ECHR, 549 globalisation and, 28 reproductive rights, 549–55 right to marriage and family ICESCR, 395, 396 international law, 395–7 same-sex marriage, 291, 307, 396, 397 family values, 375–6 female genital mutilation (FGM), 375, 386, 387, 520, 536, 546, 644, 645 Fidler, D, 509 Fiji, 479 Finland: assistance budget, 121 CESCR report (2104), 66, 121 Kuwaiti reservations and, 343, 344 life expectancy, 229 Pakistani reservations and, 352, 353 right to dignified life, 477 Flinterman, Cees, 18 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 470 food rights see also individual countries accessibility, 480–1 adequacy, 481 African Charter, 246–8, 475 Agreement on Agriculture and right to food, 201–2 Article 11 ICESCR, 201–2, 465, 473 availability, 480 biased research, 182 embargoes, 33 international assistance, 115

 691

international criminal law, 474–5 minimum core obligations, 106 prisoners, 479 right to adequate food elements, 480–1 international law, 473–6 national constitutions, 476–8 right to life, 465–6 scientific progress, 28 state obligations, 5 survey, 473–81 sustainability, 481 taboos, 645 tax policies, 89 TRIPS and plant varieties, 201 Voluntary Guidelines, 470 warfare tool, 85 forced labour see also slavery corporate behaviour, 206 ICESCR prohibition, 112 ILO Convention, 301 international prohibition, 442–4 meaning, 446–9 NSAs, 166–7 practice, 448–9 state obligations to protect from, 457–8 forced marriages, 372, 375, 403, 520, 644–5 foreign direct investment, 29 forum non conveniens, 212 France: assistance and cooperation, 118, 120 child labour, 454–9 education autism, 603–4, 611 laïcity, 567–8, 613–14 forced labour, 166–7, 447 gender discrimination, 371 health rights, 547–8 ICESCR reservations, 360, 361 life expectancy, 229 Muslim population, 568 reservations and, 339 Siladin v France, 455–9 TNCs, 158 working rights, 361, 419, 431–2 free trade agreements, 115, 169, 173, 190, 430–1, 602 freedom of association, 28 see also trade unions freedom of expression, 181, 528–9 Gambia: CESCR report (2015), 133 criminalisation of homosexuality, 133 health rights, 238, 538 NSA violations, 164 GATS, 204–5 GATT, 203, 204–5 gender discrimination see also CEDAW; CEDAW Committee; individual countries

692  ACHPR and, 373–6 African experience, 381–3 divorce, 406–8 inheritance rights, 387, 388–94 polygamy, 387, 389, 397–406 African Women’s Rights Protocol, 228, 280, 360, 373, 376–81 cultural expectations, 138 de jure and de facto, 136 education, 23, 92, 560–1, 567–9, 600 grounds, 138 harmful traditional practices, 644–6 health rights, 546, 550–1 healthcare, 520 ICESCR and, 373 Article 3, 131, 136–9, 171 Article 7, 139 Islam and, 350–2 legislative measures, 84–5 multiple discrimination, 138–9 older women, 133–4 prohibition, 136–9, 141 reproductive rights, 549–50, 550–1 requirements for equality, 142 reservations and, 340–4, 349–51 Sharia law, 380 Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), 411 United Nations on, 369–70 vulnerable groups of women, 142–4 working rights: remuneration, 434–9 world wide context, 369–72 Geneva Conventions: Additional Protocol I, 185 Additional Protocol II, 185, 217 Article 3, 58, 185, 217 jus cogens, 11 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924), 451 genocide, 10, 11, 16, 62, 85–6 Genocide Convention, 12, 329–30, 332–3, 334 Georgia, 67, 477 Germany: assistance budget, 120, 121 CESCR report (2011), 65, 121, 211, 599 education rights, 599 gender discrimination, 369 ICESCR and, 39 Kuwaiti reservations and, 345–6 life expectancy, 229 Pakistani reservations and, 352 right to adequate standard of living, 477 TNCs, 158, 211 Ghana, 478, 592, 658 Gianviti, François, 189–90 Gilbert Islands, 363 Global Compact, 209 globalisation, 25–30, 157–8, 177, 182 GMOs, 636 good faith: interpretation of ICESCR, 79–80 Greece: education: Roma, 606–7

Index health rights, 536 Turkish reservations and, 354 work discrimination: HIV status, 440–2 Guatemala, 477 Guernsey, 363 Guinea, 359, 477 Hariri, Rafiq, 215 health rights see also individual countries; specific conventions accessibility economic accessibility, 527–8 information, 528–9 justiciability, 547–9 non-discrimination, 526–7 physical accessibility, 527 state obligations, 526–9 African Charter, 226, 235, 513 Commission cases, 235–40 prisoners, 237–8 armed conflicts and, 56, 85 Article 12 ICESCR, 113, 507, 513, 514–15, 516 assistance and cooperation, 115, 117 education and, 560 emergency situations, 520–1, 546–7 environmental rights and, 523–5 gender discrimination, 520 generic medicine, 113 globalisation and, 28 health inequalities, 508–9, 556 housing rights and, 524 indicators, 517–18 informed consent, 530, 549–55 international law, 510–18 justiciability immediate obligations, 546–7 progressive realisation and resource availability, 545–6 reproductive rights, 549–55 survey, 540–55 life expectancy, 229, 508, 517 marginalisation, 509 non-consensual sterilisation, 549–55 NSA responsibilities, 179 policies facilities, 531 financial access, 531 health workers, 531 medicine supply, 531 monitoring, 532 regulatory barriers, 531 sexual health, 531 right to healthcare, 519–22 scope, 518–25 soft law, 181 state obligations, 507, 517–18 acceptability and quality, 529–30 accessibility, 526–9, 531 availability, 525–6, 547–9 core minimum obligations, 538–40 forms, 520 fulfilment, 537–8

Index levels, 532–8 policies, 530–2 protection, 535–7 quality, 547–9 respect, 532–5 survey, 525–40 underlying determinants of health, 522–5 survey, 507–57 tax policies and, 89 TRIPS and, 199–201, 202–3 United States and, 37 vagueness, 265, 509 water rights and, 517, 522–3 women, 530, 532–3 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative (1996), 192, 282 Henkin, Louis, 178 Higgins, Roslyn, 29 HIV/AIDS: affordable healthcare, 181, 521–2, 527–8 Africa, 229, 241 availability of drugs, 200, 306, 640 deportation of sufferers, 534–5 discrimination prohibition, 132, 141 healthcare, 527 education programmes, 520, 521 mobilisation campaigns, 276–7 prevention, 521 right to work and, 421, 439–42 South African resources, 545–6 women: non-consensual sterilisation, 551–2 holidays, 415 Honduras, 168, 175, 477 Hong Kong, 100, 229, 363 honour violence, 644–5 housing rights see also individual countries; specific conventions accessibility, 497 adequate housing elements, 496–7 ICESCR, 489, 496–7 international law, 489–93 meaning, 489 national legal protection, 493–6 affordability, 496–7 African Charter and, 246–8, 491–3 availability of services, 496 cultural adequacy, 497 habitability, 497 health rights and, 524 location, 497 Pinhero principles, 247 remedies, 504, 504–5 right to life and, 466 security of tenure, 496 state obligations, 469–71, 660 survey, 489–97 Human Development Index, 226, 307 human rights see also specific rights and freedoms 1st generation, 14–15 2nd generation rights, 15–16, 17

 693

3rd generation, 16–17 4th generation, 17 age of rights, 13 assistance and cooperation see assistance and cooperation categories, 14–18 complaints procedures, 43 dignity and, 76, 660 erga omnes obligations, 10–11 ESC rights see economic, social and cultural rights extraterritoriality see extraterritoriality interdependence and indivisibility, 5, 6, 18–19, 21, 296, 387–8, 560 international law, 7–31 jus cogens, 11, 219, 331 meaning, 13–24 NSAs and see non-state actors obligations see state obligations ranking, 17–18 remedies, 651–3 theoretical basis, 13–14 World Court see World Court of Human Rights Human Rights Committee: corporate liability and, 220 cultural discrimination against women, 390–1 cultural rights, 629 on culture, 383 education rights, 568, 570, 573, 595 equality principle, 141 education, 595 gender discrimination, 371, 386, 407 sexual orientation, 132–3 housing rights, 505 on Israel, 505 on Kuwait, 343 non-binding decisions, 50–1 on polygamy, 398, 400, 406 reservations and, 333–4, 336–7, 339, 354 on slavery, 443 state obligations, 542–3 Uganda and, 281 on Ugandan HRC, 321 water rights, 482 on withdrawal from ICCPR, 75–6 Human Rights Council: creation, 21, 44, 198 cultural rights and, 624 marginalisation of ESC rights, 22 Optional Protocol and, 46 sanitation rights, 487 UPR mechanism, 655, 657 WCHR and, 652, 655, 661 Human Rights Watch, 662 human trafficking: Anti-Trafficking Protocol, 445 European Convention, 294 slavery and, 444–6 humanitarian law see also Geneva Conventions armed rebel groups and, 217–18

694  NSA responsibilities, 185–7 prisoner treatment, 185–6 Hungary: health rights, 530, 548 ICESCR reservations, 360 Roma, 530 Hunt, Paul, 119 ICCPR see also Human Rights Committee adoption, 37 assistance and cooperation, 110 Canadian membership, 307 child labour, 451 core convention, 4–5, 12 cultural rights, 629 death penalty and, 284 destruction of human rights and, 181 detention conditions, 91 divorce and, 407 education rights, 569–70 equality, 343, 569–70 fair elections, 542–3 fair trial, 542 family rights, 396 food rights, 473 Italy and, 294 jus cogens, 11 marriage and family, 395 NSA responsibilities, 178 ratifications, 259, 268, 280, 301 reservations, 324, 334, 336 scope, 14 slavery/forced labour, 443, 448 state obligations, 82, 159, 542–3 water rights, 481–2 withdrawal from, 74–6 ICERD denunciation, 74 education rights, 566 extraterritoriality, 67 health rights, 515 housing rights, 489 inter-state communications, 48 prohibition of race discrimination, 141 ratifications, 268, 280, 294, 301, 307 reservations, 329 source of law, 4, 12 working rights, 431–3 ICESCR see also specific rights adoption, 36–9 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 658 armed conflicts, 52–62 assistance and cooperation, 110 binding nature, 252–3 Committee see CESCR complaints procedure, 43–51 core convention, 4–5, 12 cultural rights see cultural rights declarations see reservations

Index denunciation, 74–6, 77 destruction of human rights and, 181 dignity and, 13 discrimination prohibition see equality domestic implementation, 252–3 drafting, 187 education see education rights extraterritoriality, 62–74 family rights see family rights food right see food rights gender discrimination and see gender discrimination health see health rights incorporation into domestic law, 84–5 interpretation rules, 79–81 limitations on ESC rights, 55, 150–4 monitoring, 39–43, 76–7 non-derogability, 52–62, 77 non-state actors see non-state actors Optional Protocol see Optional Protocol overview, 36–76 public emergencies, 52–62, 77 ratifications, 23, 39 reservations see reservations right to work see working rights social security see social security rights socialist manifesto, 6–7 source of law, 3–4 standard of living see adequate standard of living structure, 39 substantive rights, 51–2 United States and, 6–7, 541–2 universality, 14 water see water rights withdrawal from, 74–6, 77 IMF: assistance and cooperation obligations, 126–7 board membership, 195 creation, 190 ICESCR drafting and, 187–8 IHRL obligations, 25, 159–60, 187–95 monitoring ODA, 122 non-political approach, 189 pressures, 107, 114 state protection from violations, 172–4 structural adjustments, 188, 593 immunities, 61–2, 187 implied rights, 246–8 incest, 377, 645 India: Constitution: Directive Principles of State Policy, 302–3 education rights, 23, 302, 304, 560 environmental rights, 303 ESC rights, 301–3, 304–7 health rights, 303, 304, 546–7 housing rights, 304–5, 495–6 IHRL participation, 301 international jurisprudence, 258–9 life expectancy, 508 non-state actors and, 146

Index right to life, 303, 304–7, 484–5 social security, 302 water rights, 484–5 working rights, 302, 440 indigenous communities, 175, 199, 234–5, 383, 481, 492, 596, 626, 628–9, 631–3 Indonesia: CESCR report (2014), 430–1, 453–4 child labour, 453–4 migrant workers, 430–1 non-nationals, 147 infant mortality, 482, 507, 516, 517 infanticide, 386, 536, 645 information rights: health rights and, 528–9 ICT, 17, 28 inheritance rights: Africa, 387, 388–94 inhuman/degrading treatment see also torture African cases, 228 African Charter, 522 children, 296 crimes against humanity, 20 customary international law, 11 domestic protection, 265 ECHR prohibition, 493 Geneva Conventions, 217 lack of food, 473, 478–9 lack of housing, 493 NSAs, 165–6, 247 prison conditions, 12 school discipline, 597 Uganda, 318, 320 working conditions, 453, 454 intellectual property rights, 199–201, 202–3, 640–1 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: education rights, 610 human rights and armed conflicts, 58 minimum core obligations, 106 territorial jurisdiction, 68–9 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR): creation, 654 education rights, 600, 610–11 equality principle, 129, 132, 341 freedom of information, 528 NSA violations, 168 reservations and, 331, 333–4 state protection obligations, 33 WCHR and, 656, 658 working rights: undocumented migrants, 426–7 Inter-American Development Bank, 127 inter-state communications, 47–8 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 161 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination see ICERD International Court of Justice: Barcelona Traction, 374 DRC v Uganda, 66, 67 equality principle, 341 erga omnes obligations, 374 extraterritoriality of ICESCR, 112

 695

genocide, 10 Georgia v Russia, 66, 67 human rights and armed conflicts, 54 extraterritoriality, 66–8 remedies, 654 Namibia Opinion, 66, 67–8, 341, 374 Nicaragua Opinion, 156, 190 on reservations, 329–30, 332–3, 334, 338 South-West Africa, 190 torture, 11 Wall Opinion, 57, 66, 112 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see ICCPR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see ICESCR International Criminal Court: armed rebel leaders, 217, 218 crimes against humanity, 101 reservations, 323 WCHR and, 655 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: destruction of housing, 490 on slavery, 444–5, 458 state obligations in armed conflict, 60 International Labour Organisation (ILO): child labour, 444, 451–2, 453 conventions, 4 forced labour, 301, 446–9, 458 Philadelphia Declaration (1944), 498 sanitation rights, 488 social security rights, 498–500 source of assistance, 128 TNC Declaration (2000), 180, 209 working rights, 416–17, 418, 420 equal remuneration, 436 HIV status, 442 non-discrimination, 422, 434, 438 unfair deprivation, 460–3 International Law Commission: on reservations, 333, 347 State Responsibility Articles obligations of result, 30 state obligations, 24–5 wrongful acts, 30 superiority of UN Charter, 191 International Monetary Fund see IMF international organisations: assistance and cooperation obligations, 126–8 human rights obligations, 25, 26, 122, 187–205 IMF see IMF non-state actors, 162 state protection from violations, 172–4 World Bank see World Bank WTO see WTO International Social Security Association (ISSA), 128 International Union for the Protections of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 201 Internet, 17, 233, 297, 596, 637 interpretation rules, 79–81

696  Inuits, 205 Iran, 478, 595 Iraq, 64, 72, 82–3, 85 Ireland: assistance and cooperation, 120, 292 education rights, 362 human rights protection, 253 ICESCR reservations, 360, 361–2 language, 361 life expectancy, 229 Islamic fundamentalism, 573 Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), 216 Islamic states: reservations, 327, 350 values, 400 Isle of Man, 363 Israel: adequate standard of living, 505 Bedouins, 505 CESCR report (1998), 41, 69–70 discrimination, 41 life expectancy, 229 occupied territories, 57, 58, 505 Italy: assistance budget, 120, 123 CESCR reports, 123, 295–6, 297 Constitution: ESC rights, 295 corporal punishment, 296–7 discrimination, 297–9 domestic protection of ESC rights, 294–9 ESC rights: discrimination, 297–9 ethnic minorities, 297–9 freedom of information, 529 ICESCR and, 294–7 jurisprudence, 295–7 legislative implementation, 294–5 Optional Protocol, 294 ratification, 294 immigrants, 298–9 international human right law and, 294 Kuwaiti reservations and, 344 life expectancy, 229 Roma, 297–8 Ivory Coast, 229, 658 Jamaica, 471–3 Japan: assistance budget, 120 developed country, 116 ICESCR and, 39 life expectancy, 229 TNCs, 158 Jersey, 363 Josselin, D, 161 jus cogens, 11, 219, 331 justiciability: education rights, 603–17 ESC rights, 49, 540–5 health rights, 540–55 availability, 547–9 immediate obligations, 546–7

Index quality, 547–9 reproductive rights, 549–55 progressive realisation and resource availability, 545–6 Kampala Convention (2009), 219, 228 Kenya: ESC rights, 293 foreign arrests, 64 housing rights, 492, 495 ICESCR reservations, 337, 359 polygamy, 405–6 pregnant women, 337 property rights, 234–5 sanitation rights, 489 water rights, 483, 484 Kotrane, Hatem, 45 Kpuinen, John, 214 Kuwait: equality and, 340–4 ICESCR reservations, 340–8 migrant workers, 345–6 right to strike, 346–8 social security and, 344–6 Kyrgyzstan: adequate standard of living, 477 Lamy, Pascal, 203–4 Latvia: Pakistani reservations and, 353 Lauterpacht, Hersch, 339 League of Nations, 450–1 Lebanon: corporate criminal liability, 215 legal aid, 87–8, 91 legislation: bilateral agreements and, 169 extraterritorial legislation, 214 NSA conduct, 175 regulating NSA conduct, 163 state obligations, 84–6 Lesotho, 229, 478 Libya: 2011 conflict, 56 access to medical care, 56 CEDAW reservations, 380 CESCR report (1997), 427 gender discrimination, 382, 385–6 ICESCR reservations, 359 race discrimination, 382 working rights: migrant workers, 427 life see right to life life expectancy, 229, 508, 517 Limburg Principles, 81 limitations on ESC rights: African Charter, 227 Article 4 ICESCR, 55, 150–4 Article 5 ICESCR, 152, 154, 181 conditions, 150–4 economic crises, 151 proportionality, 151–2 safeguards, 154 Lord’s Resistance Army, 403 Luxembourg, 120, 229, 369

Index Maastricht principles, 34–5, 81 Macedonia, 144, 300–1 Macklem, Patrick, 181 McNair, AD, 324 Madagascar, 359 Malawi, 476, 478, 658 Malaysia: CRC reservations, 576–7 Maldives: water rights, 483, 484 Mali, 217, 658 Malta, 360, 362 Maputo Protocol see African Women’s Rights Protocol marriage see family rights Matsushita, M, 198, 203 Mauritania: CEDAW reservations, 380 gender discrimination, 436 health rights, 237 property rights, 232 slavery and women, 369 working rights, 436 Mauritius, 591, 612–13 mental disability: Africa, 382, 538 Meron, T, 584 Mexico: CEDAW complaint, 49 CESCR report, 41 corruption, 100 resource-rich state, 100 right to adequate food, 477 torture, 49 migrant workers: Convention see Migrant Workers Convention discrimination, 422–34 forced labour, 449 irregular immigrants, 423–7 race discrimination, 431–3 regional human rights conventions, 426–31 women, 430 Migrant Workers Convention: developing country ratifications, 149–50 effect, 426 ICESCR and, 433–4 Italy and, 294 requirements, 433–4 source of law, 4, 12 Ugandan ratification, 280 United Kingdom and, 259 Millennium Declaration, 27, 111, 119 Moldova: food right, 476 monism, 251–2 Monterrey Consensus (2002), 119 Morocco, 380, 398 Mousa, Baha, 72 Mozambique: life expectancy, 229 Myanmar (Burma), 213 Namibia: HIV positive women, 551–2 national human rights institutions: accessibility and participation, 313–14 categories, 311 establishing, 313

 697

functions, 310, 311–12, 314–15 independence, 315–16, 316–17, 318, 319 mandate and powers, 312, 315, 319 pluralistic representation, 313 principles, 311–12 remedies, 313 removal of members, 316 reports, 318–19 resources, 313, 317–18 role, 309–21 staff, 316, 317 Uganda Human Rights Commission, 314–21 natural resources, 165, 207, 208–9, 233, 234, 288, 480, 629, 632 neoliberalism, 26, 157–8 Nepal: water rights, 484 Netherlands: Antilles, 336, 362 assistance budget, 120 gender discrimination, 369 ICESCR reservations, 336, 360, 362 life expectancy, 229 Pakistani reservations and, 352–3 right to adequate standard of living, 477 state protection from NSA violations, 163 status of international law, 255 New Zealand, 116, 229, 253 Nicaragua: water rights, 483, 484 Niger: slavery, 369 Nigeria: Boko Haram, 216–17 CESCR report (1998), 398 corruption, 100, 101 customary law, 404 education rights, 241, 561 environmental rights, 523 food rights, 475, 478 gender discrimination, 384–5, 404, 410, 561 health rights, 236–7, 238–9, 523 housing rights, 491–2 oil companies, 179–80, 213–14, 238 polygamy, 398 resource-rich state, 100 working rights, 461 non-discrimination see equality non-state actors see also specific actors aggression, 219 armed opposition groups, 216–19 assistance and cooperation obligations, 126–8 categories, 157, 162 corporate IHRL obligations, 206–15 ESC rights, 206–14 crimes in armed conflicts, 60 definition, 161–2 direct ESC responsibilities adequate standard of living, 468 global institutions, 187–205 humanitarian law, 185–7 ICESCR, 178–9 international human rights law, 177–84 survey, 177–87

698  discrimination by, 146–7 education rights and, 622 human rights obligations, 33–4, 157–61 IHRL status, 25, 158 international organisations see international organisations marginalisation of ESC rights, 22, 177 neoliberal globalisation and, 157–8 powers, 28–9 state protection from NSA violations cultural rights, 632 discrimination, 169–72 gender discrimination, 403, 409 global institutions, 172–4 obligation to protect, 162–9 omissions, 459 remedies, 174–7 survey, 162–77 unfair dismissal, 462 terrorism, 157, 192, 216–19, 222 TNCs see transnational corporations WCHR and, 223, 655, 661 North Korea, 74–6, 474–5 Norway: CESCR reports, 65–6, 121–2, 256–7 domestic protection of ESC rights, 300 EC—Seal Products and, 204–5 ICESCR reservations, 360, 362 international assistance, 120, 121–2, 292 Kuwaiti reservations and, 344 life expectancy, 229 Pension Fund Global, 65–6 racial discrimination: non-state actors, 146 right to strike, 362 status of international law, 256–7 Nowak, M, 223 Nuremberg Tribunal, 474 obligations see state obligations obligations of result: meaning, 29–30 ODA see assistance and cooperation OECD: MNC Guidelines, 209, 210 oil companies, 179–80, 213–14, 238 Oloka-Onyango, J, 26–7 ombudsmen, 87, 311 Optional Protocol: admissibility of complaints, 662 adoption, 46 CESCR budgetary recommendations and, 104–5 complaints procedure, 43–51, 103 discrimination complaints, 135 drafting debate, 44–6, 118 effect, 49–51, 76–7, 556–7, 661 extraterritoriality, 70 health rights, 518 remedies, 654 reservations, 46 WCHR and, 659–60, 663 Organisation of American States (OAS), 106, 653–4, 662 Oxfam International, 123–4

Index Pakistan: adequate standard of living, 477 CEDAW reservations, 349 educational discrimination, 23 equality and, 348–53 food rights, 478 gender discrimination, 23, 348–53 ICESCR reservations, 340, 348–53 Islamic Constitution, 350 Taliban, 216 water rights, 484 Panama, 477, 478 Papua New Guinea: food rights, 478 Paraguay: food rights, 477 pardons, 175 Paris Club, 127 patents, 199–201 Pearson Report (1968), 119 Pellet, Alain, 333 Permanent Court of Justice: equality principle, 129 Peru, 477, 552–3 pharmaceuticals: generic medicine, 113 health rights and TRIPS, 199–201, 202–3 HIV/AIDS and, 181, 521–2 research choices, 208 plant varieties, 201 Poland: education rights, 566 polygamy, 387, 389, 397–406, 644–5 Portugal: CESCR report (2000), 427–8 colonialism, 188 health service, 546 housing rights, 494 international assistance, 118 retrogression of ESC rights, 546 Roma, 472 poverty reduction, 111, 124, 155, 191–2, 250, 499, 507–8 Poverty Reduction Strategy Reduction Papers (PRSPs), 173, 174 primogeniture, 391–3 prisoners see also individual countries detention conditions, 91–2 education rights, 604–5 food rights, 479 health rights: African Charter and, 237–8, 522 international humanitarian law, 185–6 torture and degrading treatment, 11–12 UN Standard Minimum Rules, 91 private security, 25 privatisations, 29, 159, 160, 166, 171, 176, 188, 194, 222, 223, 536, 601 progress: right to, 37 promotion obligations, 35 property rights: African Charter, 226, 231, 492–3 African Commission cases, 231–5, 492–3 armed conflicts and, 85 developing countries, 149 ECHR, 231

Index ICESCR and, 51 UN Covenants and, 51 protection obligations, 31, 33–5 Provea, 108 public emergencies, 52–62, 77 public morals exceptions, 204–5 racial discrimination: Committee see CERD Convention see ICERD corporate behaviour, 206 customary law, 10 education, 605–12 freedom of expression and, 181 prohibition, 141 UNESCO Declaration (1978), 565–6 working rights, 431–3 rainforest, 205 recognition obligations, 36 Refugee Convention (1951): housing rights, 490 regional development banks, 126, 162 religion: education and, 362, 567–8, 570, 572–4, 595, 597, 612–13 equality and, 350–1 remedies: see also World Court of Human Rights adequate standard of living, 504–6 domestic remedies, 257–8, 322 ESC rights, 651 exhaustion of available remedies, 662 national human rights institutions, 303 NSA violations, 174–7 Optional Protocol, 654 right to, 654 state obligations, 87 reproductive health, 549–55 reservations see also individual countries African states, 359–60, 380–1 African Women’s Rights Protocol, 379 CRC, 323, 324, 329, 353, 576–7 customary law and, 331, 379–80 definition, 324 European states, 360–3 invalidity consequences, 337–40 determining, 332–7 object and purpose test, 328–32, 379–80 jus cogens and, 331 numbers, 39, 325 Optional Protocol, 46 questionable reservations Kuwait, 340–8 Pakistan, 340, 348–53 survey, 340–58 Turkey, 340, 354–8 Slavery Convention, 323 survey, 323–66 vagueness, 330, 348 respect obligations, 31, 32–3 responsibilities see state obligations

 699

Rhodesia, 363 right to life: adequate standard of living, 465–6 ECHR, 15 NSA violations, 165–6 right to water and, 466, 484–5 right to strike, 28, 242, 267–8, 272, 295, 336, 346–8, 361–2, 416, 461 right to work see working rights Roma, 297–8, 491, 530, 566, 606–8 Romania, 360, 477 Ruggie, John, 207 Russia, 120, 175–6, 440 Rwanda: African Court Protocol and, 658 Batwa, 472 CESCR report (2013), 472 Genocide Convention reservations, 334 HIV drugs, 201 ICESCR reservations, 359 status of international law, 256 same-sex marriage, 291, 307, 396, 397 San Salvador Protocol: education rights, 579–80, 588 food rights, 475 health rights, 513, 514 sanitation rights: elements, 489 health rights and, 517 ICESCR, 487 international law, 486–8 national legal protection, 488–9 state obligations, 488 survey, 486–9 UNECE Protocol, 486–7 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 214, 236–7 Saudi Arabia: CEDAW and Sharia law, 400 scientific progress: accessibility, 637 assistance and cooperation, 639–40 balance of rights, 645–6 conservation and diffusion, 637–8 cultural right, 52 fulfilment, 638–9 globalisation and, 28 participation, 637 protection, 638 protection of moral and material interests, 640–2 respect, 638 right to enjoy, 3, 28, 623, 636–40, 647 right to progress, 37 state obligations, 638–40 United States and, 38 Venice Statement (2009), 636, 639 self-determination, 11, 16, 17, 39, 68, 150, 226, 359 Senegal: CESCR state report (2001), 102 SERAC, 231, 240, 246–7 SERAP, 101 Serbia and Montenegro, 300 sharia law, 350–1, 380, 400, 405 Shell, 213–14

700 

Index

Shihata, I, 189 Shue, Henry, 18, 31 Sieghart, P, 16–17 Sierra Leone, 229, 478 Simma, B, 17 Singapore, 100, 229, 576–7 slavery see also forced labour African women and, 369 corporate behaviour, 206 customary law, 10 ECHR provision, 167, 444 hidden slavery, 454 human trafficking, 444–6 international prohibition, 442–4 Slavery Convention (1926), 323, 444–5, 450n212, 458 Smith, TM, 405 social security rights see also individual countries; specific conventions accessibility, 503–4 affordability, 503 Article 9 ICESCR, 34, 344–5, 465, 500 CESCR and, 501–4 coverage, 502 eligibility, 503 extraterritoriality, 63 globalisation and, 28 international law, 498–500 meaning, 500 methods, 500–1 non-nationals, 430 participation and information, 503 private actors and, 34 reservations, 344–6 scope, 501 social security and social assistance, 501 state obligations, 32, 500–4 survey, 498–504 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability project, 231 Solomon Islands, 208, 363 South Africa: apartheid, 177, 188 children’s rights, 272–3, 277–8 Constitution, 258, 269–79 cultural rights, 273 customary law, 392 domestic protection of ESC rights, 268–79 education rights, 273, 359 equality rights, 274–5 ESC rights, 272–9 extraterritorial jurisdiction, 70–1 food rights, 270, 272, 477 gender discrimination Blue case, 391–3, 410 inheritance rights, 391–3, 394 health rights, 272, 276–7 HIV/AIDS, 276–7 affordable drugs, 527–8 resources, 545–6 work discrimination, 421, 439

housing rights, 258, 271, 272, 275, 278–9, 494 Human Rights Commission, 391–2 ICESCR and ratification, 268 reservations, 359 status, 268–72 international human rights law and, 268–9 limited resources, 277–8 migrant workers, 274–5 minimum core obligations, 105 NSAs: prohibition of discrimination, 146 prisoners’ rights, 274 sanitation rights, 488–9 social security, 272, 274–5 status of international law in, 269–72 water rights, 270, 272, 469, 483, 484 Women’s Legal Trust, 392 South Korea, 100, 229, 589 South Sudan, 483, 495 Southern African Customs Union, 116 Southern African Development Community, 379 Soviet Union: ranking of rights, 18 Spain, 49, 229, 660 Special Court for Sierra Leone: armed rebel groups and humanitarian law, 218 Special Tribunal for Lebanon: corporate criminal responsibility, 215 Sri Lanka, 49, 125, 478 standard of living see adequate standard of living standing: ICESCR complaints, 46, 47, 77 Optional Protocol, 46, 47 World Court of Human Rights, 662 state obligations: accountability, 660 adequate standard of living, 468–73 African Women’s Rights Protocol, 378, 402–6 armed conflicts and human rights, 59–60 Article 2, 31 Article 2(1), 78, 79–128, 310 confused provision, 80–1 NSAs, 163 binding obligations, 252–3 child exploitation, 452 cooperation see assistance and cooperation core minimum obligations, 105–9, 119, 271 cultural rights, 635–6, 642 health rights, 538–40 cultural rights, 623, 631–6, 640–2 moral and material interests, 641–2 scientific progress, 638–40 education rights, 594–617, 603–17 extraterritoriality, 62–74 failures, 651 fulfilment, 31, 35–6, 105, 403–5 adequate standard of living, 471–3 assistance and cooperation, 116–18 cultural rights, 633–4 education rights, 599–600, 602–3 health rights, 537–8 scientific progress, 638–9 social security rights, 502

Index good faith, 79–80 health rights, 507, 517–18 availability, 547–9 forms, 520 immediate obligations, 546–7 quality, 547–9 survey, 525–40 underlying determinants of health, 522–5 housing rights, 469–70, 660 ICCPR, 82, 159, 542–3 international assistance see assistance and cooperation international human rights regime, 24–5 international organisations and, 25 limitations on ESC rights and, 150–4 maximum available resources anti-corruption measures, 98–102 budget allocation, 97–8, 102–5 external resources, 108–9 meaning, 95–105 tax policies, 97 non-discrimination see equality NSA violations and see non-state actors obligations of conduct, 31 obligations of result, 29–30, 83 positive obligations, 15, 88 privatisation and, 159, 160 progressive realisation, 78, 90–3, 114, 266–7 international benchmarks, 92–3 reservations and, 348–9 resource availability, 545–6 prohibition of retrogression, 90, 93–5 protection, 31, 33–5, 402–3 assistance and cooperation, 114–15 cultural rights, 632–3 education rights, 601–2 forced labour, 457–8 health rights, 535–7 scientific progress, 638 social security rights, 502 recognition, 36 respect, 31, 32–3 assistance and cooperation, 113–14 cultural rights, 631–2 education rights, 599, 600 health rights, 532–5 scientific progress, 638 social security rights, 501 sanitation rights, 488 social security rights, 500–4 survey, 78–156 taking steps, 79 access to justice, 87–9 all appropriate means, 81–90, 310 institutions, 87 legal aid, 87–8 legislative measures, 84–6, 163 national HR institutions, 310–11 non-legislative measures, 87–90 obligations of conduct, 82–3 reparation, 87 strategies, 89–90

 701

tax policies, 89 time scale, 83 temporary special measures, 142–5 typology, 31–6 vertical effect, 24, 159 water rights, 469, 471, 483 working rights, 242, 418–20, 464 state reports see also individual countries Articles 16 and 17 ICESCR, 39 CESCR function, 39–43 Concluding Observations, 40–1 education rights, 586, 587 General Comments, 42–3 Guidelines, 586, 587 non-cooperation, 41–2 procedure, 40–3 reservations and, 335, 364 state sovereignty, 29, 65, 112, 182, 211, 323, 355, 652 Steiner, HJ, 410 sterilisation, 549–55 Stiglitz, Joseph, 123 strike see right to strike Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), 173 structural adjustments, 188, 593 subsidies, 91, 101 Sudan, 239–40, 249, 400, 492–3, 597–8 Sunstein, Cass, 269 supermarkets, 29 Suriname, 477, 600 sustainable development, 42, 192, 196–7, 238, 378, 411, 478, 487, 507–8 Sustainable Development Goals, 111 Sweden: ICESCR reservations, 360, 361 international assistance, 120, 292 Kuwaiti reservations and, 345–6 life expectancy, 229, 508 working rights, 361 Switzerland, 229, 478, 652 Syria, 53, 56, 218–19 Taiwan, 100 Tajikistan, 88, 482 Taliban, 216 Tanzania, 293, 658 taxation: policies, 89, 97 TBT Agreement, 205 Tehran Proclamation (1968), 18 temporary special measures, 142–5, 245, 569 terrorism, 157, 192, 216–19, 222 Texier, Philippe, 326 Thailand, 200, 478 Toebes, B, 509 Togo, 101, 454 Tokyo Tribunal (1945), 474 Tomaševski, K, 114, 589 torture: Committee Against Torture, 51 Uganda and, 281

702 

Index

Convention Against Torture see Torture Convention customary law, 10 deportation of asylum seekers and, 299 ECHR prohibition, 493 extraterritorial jurisdiction, 72 housing rights and, 247 jus cogens, 11, 219 prisoners, 11–12 UNGA Resolution 3452/30, 11 Torture Convention, 12 armed conflicts and, 54 complaints, 48 non-derogability, 54 ratifications, 259, 268, 280, 294, 307 reservations, 324 trade policies, 124 trade unions, 3, 28, 228, 242, 272, 287, 295, 367, 415–18, 433, 462 see also right to strike transnational corporations see also non-state actors bilateral agreement regimes, 169 corporate criminal responsibility, 214–15 EU jurisdiction, 211–12 forced labour, 112 growth, 158 IHRL obligations, 25, 159–60, 206–15 ILO Declaration (2000), 180 non-state actors, 157–8, 162 powers, 29 remedies against IHRL violations, 175–6 Treatment Action Campaign, 276–7 Trechsel, Stefan, 656 Trinidad and Tobago, 339 TRIPS: Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 200, 203 generic medicine and, 113 plant varieties, 201 right to health and, 199–201 Turkey: adequate standard of living, 477 education rights, 356–8, 614–17 free expression, 643 ICESCR reservations, 340, 354–8 inter-state reciprocity, 354–5 language, 357 married women’s names, 369 torture, 49 Tuvalu, 363 Udagama, Deepika, 27 Uganda: affirmative action, 287 anti-retroviral drugs, 535 armed rebel groups, 217 CESCR report (2012), 281 children’s rights, 318 Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, 279–80, 314 Constitution, 280

ESC rights, 285–93 jurisprudence, 288–90 national interest, 291–2 objectives, 288–9, 292 same-sex marriage and, 291 Constitutional Commission, 285, 314 corruption, 292–3 criminalisation of homosexuality, 290–1 cultural rights, 287 death penalty, 284 debt relief, 281–2 divorce, 406–7 domestic protection of ESC rights, 279–93 dualism, 283 economic rights, 287 education rights, 286, 319–20, 601–2 environmental rights, 286 food rights, 478 foreign policy objectives, 282–3 health rights, 289 health workers, 282 Human Rights Commission, 282, 284, 314–21 ICESCR and, 279–84 legislative measures, 281 ratification, 280 independence, 279 international human rights law and, 280 Lord’s Resistance Army, 403 NSA obligations, 320 polygamy, 405 property rights, 149, 286 status of international law, 282–5 working rights, 287 Ukraine, 438, 476 UN Truth Commission on El Salvador, 183 UNCTAD, 155 UNECE Protocol, 486–7 UNESCO: assistance and cooperation, 128 concept of culture, 646–7 Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), 564 higher education, 589 justiciability, 612–13 scope, 581 secondary education, 586 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), 565–6 education rights, 560, 562 pre-school education, 577–8 primary education, 582 technical and vocational education, 588 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Rights, 623 objectives, 563 on state obligations, 571 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2002), 383, 427 unfair dismissal, 460–3 UNICEF, 128 United Kingdom: Bill of Rights proposal, 259–60, 263–4 CESCR reports, 261–7, 542, 591

Index corporal punishment, 572–3 domestic protection of ESC rights, 259–68 dualism, 258, 260–1 ECHR and, 263–4, 267 education rights, 262, 572–3 higher education, 591 extraterritorial jurisdiction, 71–2 family rights, 264 health rights, 265, 266 deportation of AIDS patients, 534–5 housing rights, 264, 266–7, 493 Human Rights Act, 253, 262, 267 ICESCR and, 39 Optional Protocol, 46 ratification, 259 reservations, 339, 360, 363 IHRL ratifications, 259 international assistance, 118, 120 justiciability of ESC rights, 542 life expectancy, 229 property rights, 262 right to strike and, 267–8 Royal Prerogative, 261 state protection from NSA violations, 163–4 status of international law, 258, 260–1 TNCs, 158 working rights, 363 non-nationals, 423 veil wearers, 438–9 United Nations: aggression, 219 Anti-Corruption Convention (2003), 292–3 Commission on Human Rights: child labour, 452–3 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), 111, 197 definition of developing countries, 116, 149 ECLAC, 589 ECOSOC, 39–40, 126, 190, 334 education rights, 562–3, 594–5 GA Resolution 3452/30, 11 gender equality, 139, 171, 369–70 Global Compact, 209 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 209–10 health rights, 510–11, 526 HRC see Human Rights Committee Human Development Index, 226, 307 human rights, 8, 25, 27, 159 armed conflicts and, 57 instruments, 12–13 interdependence and indivisibility, 21 monitoring, 51 right to remedy, 654 Human Rights Committee see Human Rights Committee Human Rights Council see Human Rights Council IMF and World Bank and, 190–1 indigenous people: meaning, 629 international cooperation, 109, 110, 116, 126 marginalisation of ESC rights, 22

 703

Millennium Declaration, 27, 111, 119 ODA target, 119–20 Optional Protocol and, 44–6 Organised Crime Convention, 294 Portugal and, 188 sanitation rights, 487 South Africa and, 188 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 91 superior instrument, 191 trade sanctions, 203 water rights, 483 working rights, 416 United States: Alien Tort Claims Act (ACTA), 163, 213–14 assistance budget, 120 CRC and, 483 cultural rights, 38 developed country, 116 education rights, 37, 603, 605–6 food rights, 479 health rights, 37 ICCPR ratification, 542 ICESCR and, 37–9, 541–2 Optional Protocol and, 45 prisoners’ rights, 479 progress rights, 37 ranking of rights, 18, 22 reservations and, 339 standard of living and, 38 TNCs, 158, 213–14 UN ESC rights and, 6–7 WCHR and, 656–7 working rights, 419–20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): adequate standard of living, 466, 467 categories of rights, 4 cultural rights, 623, 624, 626, 640, 641 death penalty and, 284 destruction of human rights and, 181 dignity, 76 education rights, 563–4, 588, 610 food rights, 473 freedom of expression, 181 gender equality, 171 health rights, 512–13 housing rights, 489 ICESCR/ICCPR and, 75 international assistance and cooperation, 109–10 jus cogens, 11 limitations on rights, 643 NSA responsibilities, 177–8, 219 origins, 7 property rights, 51, 149 scope, 12, 19 social security rights, 498 source of law, 3 working rights, 435 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), 639 Uruguay: water rights, 483

704 

Index

Venezuela: corruption, 100 health rights, 108, 306 HIV drugs, 639–40 resource-rich state, 100 right to dignified life, 478 status of international law, 255 Versailles Treaty (1919), 434–5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: domestic v international law, 357 reservations and, 329, 338, 347, 379–80 Vienna Declaration (1993), 18, 111, 309–10, 311, 327, 365, 366, 388, 577 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993), 44 Vietnam, 151, 632 vulnerable groups see also women adequate standard of living, 471 African conventions, 228 categories, 22–3, 36 cultural rights, 637 food rights, 476–7 health rights, 526, 536–7 ICESCR derogations and, 56 temporary special measures, 142–5, 245 women, 142–4, 368, 374 Wal-Mart, 176, 206 Wallace, Rebecca, 14 Wallace, W, 161 war crimes, 59, 61, 85, 186, 218, 490 water rights see also individual countries; specific conventions accessibility, 486 adequacy, 485 adequate standard of living, 466–7 availability, 485 core obligations, 119 elements, 485–6 health rights and, 517, 522–3 ICESCR, 481, 483 international law, 481–3 national legal protection, 483–5 quality, 486 right to life, 466, 484–5 state obligations, 115, 469, 471, 483 Whelan, Daniel, 5 Wing, AK, 405 witchcraft, 645 women see also CEDAW; gender discrimination abortions, 23 Africa, 368 cultural prejudices, 383–408 cultural values, 375–6 divorce, 406–8 existing practices, 381–3 inheritance rights, 387, 388–94 mental disability, 382 polygamy and, 387, 389, 397–406 survey, 372–83

uprooting cultural obstacles, 408–12 violence, 372 discrimination see gender discrimination education rights, 372 ESC rights, 367–412 health rights, 530, 532–3 history, tradition and, 368 illiteracy, 561 life expectancy in Africa, 229 marginalisation, 368–9 pregnancy, 517 reproductive rights, 549–55 traditional harmful customs, 644–5 trafficking in, 446 vulnerability, 142–4, 368, 374 water carrying, 369–70 working rights equal remuneration, 434–9 migrants, 430 world wide discrimination, 369–72 Women’s Legal Trust, 392 working rights see also individual countries African Charter, 226, 242–3 children see child labour elements, 94, 419 forced labour see forced labour globalisation and, 27–8 holidays, 415 ICESCR, 415–64 Article 6, 166, 415 Article 7, 415, 464 Article 8, 415–16 Article 18, 349 non-discrimination, 415 core obligations, 420 HIV/AIDS status, 421, 439–42 job selection, 419–20 nationality, 421–34 remuneration of men and women, 434–9 survey, 418–42 NSAs and, 166, 173, 182 remuneration, 415 reservations, 349–51 right to strike, 28, 242, 267–8, 272, 295, 336, 346–8, 361–2, 416, 461 right to work, 415, 416–17 slavery see slavery social inclusion, 421 state obligations, 242, 418–19, 464 trade unions, 415–16 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 209–10 unfair dismissal, 460–3 working conditions, 415 World Bank: assistance and cooperation obligations, 126–7 board membership, 195 Comprehensive Development Framework, 191 creation, 190 on education rights, 593 ICESCR drafting and, 187–8

 705

Index IHRL obligations, 25, 159–60, 187–95 monitoring ODA, 122 non-political approach, 189 pressures, 107, 114 state protection from violations, 172–4 structural adjustments, 188, 593 World Court of Human Rights: admissibility of complaints, 662 arguments against, 656–7 arguments for, 23–4, 77, 653–5, 657–60, 664 debate, 651–64 establishing, 660–4 exhaustion of available remedies, 662 goals, 51 national courts of human rights and, 655 NSAs and, 223, 655 repetitive cases, 663 standing, 662 Statute, 661 World Health Organisation (WHO): Action Programme on Essential Drugs, 539 assistance and cooperation, 128 Constitution, 511–12 core health obligations, 539 data source, 93 essential drugs list, 200 health indicators, 517 health inequalities, 509, 556 Health Principles of Housing, 497 health rights, 511–12 Model List of Essential Medicines, 520 World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), 487 WTO: Agreement on Agriculture, 201–2, 205 aligning policies with HR obligations, 202–4 assistance and cooperation obligations, 126 creation, 195

EC—Seal Products, 204–5 enforcement mechanisms, 195–6 food rights and, 115, 201–2 IHRL obligations, 26, 159–60, 195–205 membership, 195 objectives, 195 pressures, 114 public morals exceptions, 204–5 reservations, 324 state protection from violations, 172–4 TBT Agreement, 205 trade sanctions and, 203 TRIPS see TRIPS Yugoslavia, 64, 116, 247 Zaire see Congo Zambia: CESCR report (2005), 194 discrimination, 246 education rights, 359 ESC rights, 293 gender discrimination, 388–9, 403 ICESCR reservations, 359 international financial institutions and, 194 non-state actors, 403 Zimbabwe: CESCR report (1997), 140 crimes against humanity, 70–1 de jure discrimination, 140 education rights, 617 food rights, 476 housing rights, 470, 495 Magaya case, 389–91 NSA violations of human rights, 167–9, 175 Rastafarians, 617 water rights, 484 women’s inheritance rights, 389–91

706