Dynasties Intertwined: The Zirids of Ifriqiya and the Normans of Sicily 9781501763489

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DYNASTIES INTERTWINED

A volume in the series

Medieval Socie­ties, Religions, and Cultures Edited by M. Cecilia Gaposchkin and Anne E. Lester A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu.

DYNASTIES INTERTWINED

T H E Z I R I D S O F I F R I Q I YA A N D T H E N O R M A N S O F S I C I LY

M att K ing

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca and London

Copyright © 2022 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu. First published 2022 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: King, Matt, 1990–­author. Title: Dynasties intertwined : the Zirids of Ifriqiya and the   Normans of Sicily / Matt King. Description: Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press,   2022. | Series: Medieval socie­ties, religions, and   cultures | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021038263 (print) | LCCN 2021038264   (ebook) | ISBN 9781501763465 (hardcover) |   ISBN 9781501763489 (pdf ) | ISBN 9781501763472 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Zīrid dynasty. | Normans—­Italy—­   Sicily—­History—­To 1500. | Africa, North—­History—  ­To 1500. | Mediterranean Region—­History—476–1517. Classification: LCC DT197 .K56 2022 (print) |   LCC DT197 (ebook) | DDC 945.8/03—­dc23 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2021038263 LC ebook rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​   /20210​38264 Cover illustrations: From Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq (Book of pleasant journeys into faraway lands) / Tabula Rogeriana (Book of Roger). MS. Pococke 375, Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford. Used by permission. (Top) Fols. 187b-188a (Sicily); (bottom) fols. 102b–103a (Ifriqiya).

“Je suis un historien. C’est pourquoi j’aime la vie.” “I am a historian. That is why I love life.” —­Henri Pirenne (as quoted by Marc Bloch)

C o n te n ts

Acknowl­edgments  ix Note on Transliteration and Chronology  xi

Introduction: Writing the History of the Zirids and Normans

1

1. Geographic Orientations and the Rise of the Fatimids

27

2. The Contest for Sicily in the Eleventh ­Century

48

3. Commerce and Conflict from 1087 to 1123

72

4. The End of the Emirate and the Beginning of the Kingdom

103

5. The Norman Kingdom of Africa

135

6. The Fall of Norman Africa and the Legacy of Zirid-­Norman Interactions

166

Epilogue: The Shadow of the Banu Hilal

198

Bibliography  201 Index  231

A ck n o w l­e d gm e n ts

This book would not have been pos­si­ble without the contributions of an incredible array of scholars, librarians, archivists, administrators, editors, ­family, and friends. The foundations for this book came from my time at the University of Minnesota. I would like to thank first and foremost Michael Lower, for his tireless work in helping me learn the skills of the professional historian and educator. I am also indebted to Giancarlo Casale, Oliver Nicholson, Kay Reyerson, and Daniel Schroeter for their careful reading of my work and insightful suggestions for how to improve it. My research in Sicily, southern Italy, and Tunisia was made pos­si­ble through fellowships and grants from the University of Minnesota’s Center for Early Modern History, Center for Medieval Studies, Consortium for the Study of the Premodern World, and Department of History. The vibrant intellectual community developed at t­ hese institutions (comprising faculty, gradu­ate students, community members, visiting scholars, and staff ) was indispensable to my work, and I am grateful to have been a part of it. I would like to especially thank the many staff members who worked to ensure that I could undertake my research trips and provided me with logistical support as I planned them. I am also grateful to the librarians at the University of Minnesota who pro­cessed my interlibrary loan requests and ­were gracious enough to forgive many of the fines on my overdue library books. The University of South Florida has likewise provided me with a wealth of resources to complete this book. I am thankful to the Humanities Institute and Research & Innovation for their grants that allowed me to conduct research in Malta, Italy, and the United Kingdom during the summer of 2019. My colleagues in the Department of History have likewise been invaluable resources for helping me navigate the pro­cess of writing my book and submitting a book proposal. Our conversations about history, ­whether medieval or modern, have also been foundational for helping me evaluate the larger historiographical implications of my research. I would also like to thank the administrators in the Department of History and the librarians at USF for ensuring that I have not neglected any necessary reimbursement forms and for helping me assem­ble the materials necessary to write this book (respectively). Although COVID-19 ix

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A c k n ow l­e d g m e n ts

made it difficult to obtain some sources for the revisions made to this book, the ILL team at USF (especially Sandra Law) did an incredible job of helping me locate rare resources. I apologize to ­those scholars whose works I should have consulted for this book but was unable to do so. I am grateful to the archivists at La Trinità della Cava, the Malta National Archives, the National Museum of Archaeology in Valletta, and the British Museum for helping me locate texts, coins, and artifacts relating to Zirid–­ Norman history. If it ­were not for the summer paleography workshop hosted by Columba Stewart and the Hill Museum and Manuscript Library, I would not have had the tools necessary to read the texts and inscriptions in t­ hese archives. My advisers and professors as an undergraduate at the University of Washington—­Bob Stacey, Robin Stacey, Charity Urbanski, Joel Walker, and Alain Gowing—­were also instrumental in cultivating my love of history and providing me with the tools to critically study it. I am also indebted to a number of scholars whose advice, feedback, conversation, and participation on conference panels has helped me assem­ble this book throughout its years of preparation: John Aspinwall, Joshua Birk, Sarah Davis-­Secord, Hussein Fancy, Allen Fromherz, Laura Gathagan, Dawn Marie Hayes, Theresa Jäckh, Jeremy Johns, Alex Metcalfe, Robin Reich, Ramzi Rouighi, Tim Smit, Chuck Stanton, and Ka­li Yamboliev. I apologize profusely to anyone I neglected to include who should have been on this list. The editorial team at Cornell University Press has been nothing short of phenomenal. I am thankful to acquiring editor Mahinder Kingra for meeting with me at Kalamazoo to discuss my book proj­ect and for encouraging me to submit a manuscript to CUP. Bethany Wasik has likewise been an indispensable editor for helping collate and or­ga­nize all of the logistics surrounding the publication of this book. The series editors of Medieval Socie­ties, Religions, and Cultures—­M. Cecilia Gaposchkin and Anne E. Lester—­have graciously provided comments across multiple drafts of my manuscript and discussed their suggestions with me in multiple meetings. I am forever thankful for their intellectual engagement with my work. I would also like to show my gratitude to the reviewers of this text, Paul Cobb and Annliese Nef, for providing feedback about my work and allowing me to contact them with questions I had about their editorial suggestions. Fi­nally, I wish to thank the team at Westchester Publishing Ser­vices for their incredible work in copyediting and standardizing my manuscript. All errors in this book are my own. My ­family and friends have provided much-­needed emotional support throughout the many years in which this book was researched and written. ­There are too many of you to list ­here, but know that I am forever indebted to you for your support and compassion.

N ote o n Tr a nsl i te r ati o n a n d C h r o n o lo gy

This book uses the guidelines for Arabic transliteration established by the International Journal of M ­ iddle East Studies. ­These rules broadly specify that En­glish terms should be used where available, that diacritics should be reserved for technical terms for which ­there is no suitable En­glish equi­ valent, that Arabic names and titles should follow conventions for En­glish capitalization, and that accepted En­glish spellings should be used even if they contradict general transliteration rules (ex. Baalbek). The goal in using ­these guidelines is to create a text that is accessible to nonspecialists yet provides enough information to specialists so that they can parse relevant Arabic terms as necessary. In citations and direct quotations from translated texts, I have preserved the transliteration system used in the cited text. For example, I retain the diacritical marks in the title of Jeremy Johns’s article “Malik Ifrīqiya: The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Fāṭimids” though IJMES guidelines would specify the removal of the diacritical marks in “Ifriqiya” and “Fatimids.” I likewise preserve the transliteration of “al-­Mahdiyya” in Mohamed Talbi’s entry from the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam even though I refer to this city as “Mahdia” throughout this book. This system is by no means perfect, but I hope that it makes the references in this book as easy to locate as pos­si­ble. I have utilized in this book a combination of Gregorian and Islamic (Hijri) calendars largely based on the systems used in the original medieval sources. When discussing Arabic sources and their chronologies, I typically provide the date in the Hijri year followed by the Gregorian year(s) in parentheses. Thus, the fall of Mahdia to the Normans, which is covered primarily by medieval Arabic sources, occurred in 543H (1148–49). When discussing Latin texts, I default to the Gregorian dating system. In cases where an event is considered in detail in both Arabic and Latin sources, I alternate between Hijri and Gregorian calendars, depending on which source I am describing. When providing date ranges, I tend to default to the Gregorian system for the sake of narrative comprehension, regardless of the sources used. Thus, when I write of growing Zirid disaffection with the Fatimids, I date this to the 1040s, even though most sources to consider this situation ­were written in Arabic. xi

Figure 1.  Map of medieval Ifriqiya and Sicily. Created by the author using QGIS.

Figure 2.  Map of the medieval Mediterranean. Created by the author using QGIS.

DYNASTIES INTERTWINED

Introduction Writing the History of the Zirids and Normans

In the summer of 1123, Count Roger II of Sicily had revenge on his mind. The target of his ire was his former ally, Emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli of the Zirid dynasty, who ruled from the coastal stronghold of Mahdia in modern Tunisia—­only a few hundred miles from Roger’s capital at Palermo. The stakes in this plot w ­ ere high. Tensions between the Norman count and the Zirid emir w ­ ere drawing the attention of major players on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The year prior, a fleet ­under the control of the Almoravid dynasty of Morocco had raided Nicotera, one of Roger’s cities in southern Italy, at the behest of its Zirid allies—­and ­there was no telling how Almoravid raiders would respond to counteraggression from the Count of Sicily. The Fatimid imam-­caliph of Egypt, meanwhile, watched with concern as tension between his Zirid vassals and the Normans threatened to disrupt commercial traffic that circulated in the ­waters of the eastern and central Mediterranean. With this delicate situation in mind, Roger embargoed travel to Zirid and Almoravid lands as he mulled further action. Across the Strait of Sicily, meanwhile, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli wrestled with how to confront the growing threat posed by Count Roger. The Zirid emir and his advisers ultimately de­cided to make use of their many allies, both near and far, to c­ ounter any forthcoming aggression. They recruited Arab tribal leaders from across Ifriqiya (roughly Tunisia, eastern Algeria, and western Libya) to fight the Normans ­under the banner of jihad. Al-­Hasan also reached out to 1

2 I NT R OD U CT I ON

his overlord in Egypt, the Fatimid imam-­caliph, and pledged allegiance to him. Through this symbolic gesture, al-­Hasan hoped that the Fatimids could help broker a treaty with the Normans on his behalf. Despite their best efforts, however, Fatimid mediators ­were unable to quell the anger of Roger II, who was unsatisfied with his embargo and sought more direct action against the Zirids. The Count of Sicily ordered his fleet to set sail in July 1123. Its goal was to capture Mahdia and bring an end to the Zirid dynasty. Leading the Norman fleet ­were its two commanders, Christodoulos and George of Antioch. For the latter, this attack was personal. George had once worked as an administrator for the Zirids in Ifriqiya, but he had fled to Sicily some fifteen years prior when al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli’s grand­father had ordered the execution of his b­ rother. Having risen to prominence in the Norman administration, George was e­ ager to avenge his b­ rother and return as the conqueror of Mahdia. He and Christodoulos directed their fleet initially against the fortress of al-­Dimas, which was near the Zirid capital and u ­ nder the control of one of al-­Hasan’s Arab allies, though this alliance was flimsy enough that the Normans could bribe their way into al-­Dimas without trou­ble. This victory proved fleeting. As soon as a force of Normans had occupied the fortress, al-­Hasan and the remainder of his Arab allies struck, besieging al-­Dimas before reinforcements or supplies could reach its defenders. The besieged managed to hold onto the fortress for a week in the hopes that reinforcements would arrive, but Norman forces outside of al-­ Dimas w ­ ere unable to break through the Zirid lines. Christodoulos, George of Antioch, and their remaining soldiers could do ­little but flee back to Sicily as their trapped compatriots attempted a desperate sortie out of the fortress, only to be slaughtered by the armies of the Zirids and their Arab allies. For al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, this momentous triumph was proof of his righ­teous fight against the encroaching Normans. The Zirid emir distributed letters across Ifriqiya that thanked God for this victory, praised the might and zeal of his Arab allies, and demonized Count Roger. Seizing on this opportunity, some members of the Zirid court even pressed the young emir to consider attacking Sicily directly and to bring it once again ­under Muslim rule. Across the Strait of Sicily, meanwhile, blame for this defeat fell largely on Christodoulos. According to one account, he tore out his beard in frustration ­until his cheeks bled. Indeed, this defeat marked the beginning of his fall from grace in the court of Palermo. Within several years, Count Roger had him executed and replaced by the ascendent George of Antioch, who apparently managed to deflect any blame for the Normans’ defeat at al-­Dimas.1 1. ​This narrative is derived primarily from the accounts of al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla (Tunis: Dar al-­Arabiya Books, 1981), 335–39; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, ed. Bashar  A. Marouf and Mahmoud  B.

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Despite the vio­lence and vitriol that resulted from this encounter, relations between the Zirids and Normans calmed in subsequent years. The promise of profits from merchant traffic that circulated between Ifriqiyan and Sicilian ports was enough for the Zirid and Norman administrations to let pass (for the time being) this latest incident of vio­lence. Indeed, the Zirid defeat of the Normans at al-­Dimas was one of many interactions, some peaceful and some violent, between the lords of Mahdia and Palermo during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is ­these encounters, explored within the larger histories of ­these two dynasties and analyzed in the Mediterranean context in which they occurred, that form the heart of this book.2 Sometimes, the Zirids and Normans cooperated to facilitate their shared commercial and po­liti­cal interests. At other times, they fought for control of their territories in conflicts that drew in polities from all sides of the Mediterranean. The relationship between ­these two dynasties was never governed by an overarching ideology like jihad or crusade. Instead, both the Zirids and Normans pursued policies that they thought would expand their power and wealth—­either with the help of the other or at the expense of the other. The Zirid-­Norman relationship ultimately came to a violent conclusion when a devastating drought crippled Ifriqiya in the 1140s, which motivated the opportunistic Normans to conquer a stretch of land along the North African coast, bringing an end to the Zirid dynasty and forming the Norman kingdom of Africa. Norman rule in Ifriqiya was short-­lived, however, as internal revolts and the conquests of the Almohads drove Norman garrisons back to Sicily. The last stronghold of Norman power in Ifriqiya, Mahdia, fell to the Almohads in 1160. Combining the previously disparate histories of the Zirids and Normans into a singular integrated narrative shows the degree to which their stories are inseparable. It is impossible to understand one without the other. The analy­ sis of exchanges between ­these two dynasties reveals the substantial po­liti­cal, cultural, economic, and military connections between them and the sweeping consequences of their dynamic relationship. It also shows that, despite the eventual collapse of the Zirids at the hands of the Normans, the Zirids ­were nonetheless an active and consequential Mediterranean polity for much of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with po­liti­cal agency in­de­pen­dent of their neighbors across the Strait of Sicily. Awad (Tunis: Dar al-­Gharb al-­Islami, 2013), 1:343. This encounter is considered in greater detail in chapter 3. 2. ​Dynastic history has long been the preferred mode through which historians have categorized polities governed by Muslim rulers, although in the Eu­ro­pean tradition it has been more common for scholars to write “in terms of states created by dynasties.” Michael Brett, The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean and the ­Middle East in the Fourth C ­ entury of the Hijra, Tenth ­Century CE (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 5–7.

4 I NT R OD U CT I ON

Divergent Histories: The Zirids and the Colonizing of Medieval North Africa Scholarship about medieval North Africa is sparse when compared to works that focus on the histories of Eu­rope, the M ­ iddle East, and Iberia.3 What l­ ittle has been written about the Zirid dynasty has largely been defined by a tradition of French colonial scholarship dating back to the nineteenth c­ entury.4 According to this narrative, the Zirids peaked at the beginning of the reign of al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis (r. 1016–62), who ruled over Ifriqiya during a time of ostentatious prosperity as the emir of the Fatimid imam-­caliph of Cairo. When al-­Muʿizz renounced his allegiance to the imam-­caliph in the late 1040s, however, the Fatimids reacted by unleashing the Arab tribes of the Banu Hilal from Egypt to Ifriqiya. The Banu Hilal brought utter devastation to the region and Ifriqiya dissolved into an anarchic patchwork of city-­states. Left in the wake of ­these invasions ­were Berber tribes like the Zirids, who w ­ ere forced to abandon their inland capital of Kairouan for the coastal stronghold of Mahdia and, crippled by the Banu Hilal, existed in a state of “agony” before inevitably succumbing to the Normans.5 This narrative evokes the idea of a chaotic, barbaric medieval past in which nomadic Arabs from the tribes of the Banu Hilal regularly displaced and fought against indigenous Berbers in Ifriqiya.6 It also emphasizes the overwhelmingly negative consequences of the Hilalian invasions: their destruction of agricul3. ​In the 1970s, Harry H ­ azard claimed that in “the study of medieval history by modern scholars, North Africa has been a neglected stepchild between Egypt and Spain.” Harry W. H ­ azard, “Moslem North Africa, 1049–1394,” in A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, The ­Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. Harry W. H ­ azard (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), 459. Writing in 2018, Ramzi Rouighi echoed ­these sentiments when he wrote that “the publication of a new book about the medieval Maghrib (North Africa) is always a special event,” especially when that publication is written in En­glish. Ramzi Rouighi, review of The Near West: Medieval North Africa, Latin Eu­rope and the Mediterranean in the Second Axial Age, by Allen James Fromherz, American Historical Review 123, no. 1 (2018): 340–41. 4. ​See David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–11; Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary: Ibn Khaldūn Orientalist,” History and Theory 42, no. 1 (February 2003): 61–81; Alain Messaoudi, Les arabisants et la France coloniale: Savants, conseillers, médiateurs (1780–1930) (Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2015); Paul M. Love Jr., “The Colonial Pasts of Medieval Texts in Northern Africa: Useful Knowledge, Publication History, and Po­liti­cal Vio­lence in Colonial and Post-­Independence Algeria,” Journal of African History 58, no. 3 (2017): 445–63; Sophie Dulucq, “Writing African History in France during the Colonial Era,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History, ed. Thomas Spear, October  2018, https://­doi​.­org​/­10​.­1093​/­acrefore​/­9780190277734​.­013​.­313. 5. ​Idris titles his chapter on the reigns of the last three Zirid emirs “Agony.” He argues that the Zirid and Hammadid dynasties had been “struck to death by the anarchy born of the Hilalian invasion” and that their fall had an “inevitable dynamic.” H. R. Idris, La Berbérie orientale sous les Zīrīdes: Xe–­XIIe siècles (Limoges: A. Bontemps, 1962), 1:303, 405–6. 6. ​This perspective and its early refutation is summarized in John Wansbrough, “The Decolonization of North African History,” Journal of African History 9, no. 4 (1968): 643–50.

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tural settlements across inland Ifriqiya, their desolation of urban centers, and their disruption of long-­distance trade networks. The seeds of this school of thought first appeared in the research of scholars like Ernest Carette in the ­middle of the nineteenth ­century. Carette posited in 1853 that the arrival of the Banu Hilal into Ifriqiya resembled a fire that, “­little by l­ ittle, reduces every­ thing to ashes, both buildings and trees . . . ​[and ­causes] the ruin of cities, the devastation of orchards, depopulation and misery—­that is to say, barbarism.”7 Scholars writing in the de­cades ­after Carette engaged more seriously with Zirid history but still embraced his narrative of decline. Georges Marçais argued in 1913 that the Zirid abandonment of the inland trading hub of Kairouan “annihilated the prestige of the Sanhajan sultans [i.e., the Zirids] and unleashed anarchy” on Ifriqiya.8 In a widely read 1927 monograph, Émilie Gautier called the arrival of the Banu Hilal “the end of the world,” an event of apocalyptic significance that was a catastrophe for the Zirids and their Berber brethren.9 Charles-­André Julien likewise narrated in his 1931 book how “lands made for the cultivation of cereals or fruit-­g rowing w ­ ere wrested from their proper use, villages and secondary towns ­were choked into ruin and agriculture was permitted to exist only in a narrow strip along the coast” a­ fter the Hilalian invasions.10 Intertribal conflict in the eleventh c­ entury precipitated economic disaster as trade routes from sub-­Saharan Africa w ­ ere severed and once-­prosperous agricultural lands w ­ ere turned over to pastoralism. The ubi­ quity of the narrative pop­u­lar­ized by t­ hese academics was such that scholars outside the French acad­emy utilized it in their own work on vari­ous facets of medieval Mediterranean history.11 7. ​To Carette, the devastation caused by the Banu Hilal was such that he barely even considered Zirid history a­ fter their arrival into Ifriqiya. Ernest Carette, Recherches sur l’origine et les migrations des principales tribus de l’Afrique septentrionale et particulièrement de l’Algérie (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1853), 412–13. 8. ​Georges Marçais, Les arabes en Berbérie du XIe au XIVe siècle (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1913), 119. See also Georges Marçais, La Berbérie musulmane et l’Orient au moyen âge (Paris: Éditions Aubier-­ Montaigne, 1946). Chapter 2 considers the Sanhaja tribal confederation. 9. ​E. F. Gautier, L’islamisation de l’Afrique du nord: Les siècles obscurs du Maghreb (Paris: Payot, 1927), 388. A second edition of this text was released posthumously as E. F. Gautier, Le passé de l’Afrique du nord: Les siècles obscurs (Paris: Payot, 1942). 10. ​Charles-­André Julien, Histoire de’Afrique du nord: Des origines à 1830, ed. Roger le Tourneau, 2nd ed. (Paris: Grande Bibliothèque Payot, 1994), 414. Translation is from Charles-­André Julien, History of North Africa, trans. John Petrie (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 73. 11. ​See, for example, Harry ­Hazard, The Numismatic History of Late Medieval North Africa (New York: American Numismatic Society, 1952), 9–10, 54–56; S. D. Goitein, “Medieval Tunisia: The Hub of the Mediterranean,” in Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 310–11; E. W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors, 2nd  ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); H ­ azard, “Moslem North Africa,” 457–85; David Abulafia, “The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expeditions to Majorca and the Muslim Mediterranean,” Anglo-­Norman Studies 7 (1985): 26–49.

6 I NT R OD U CT I ON

French scholars also produced translations of medieval texts that took extreme liberties with the original Arabic source materials.12 While the act of translation is inherently one of linguistic domestication, the adaptations produced by some of t­ hese academics stretched the bounds of the idea of “translation” in the first place. Abdelmajid Hannoum, for example, has shown how William McGuckin de Slane’s influential translation of Ibn Khaldun, Histoire des Berbers (History of the Berbers), manufactured the idea of constant conflict between “the Arab nation and the Berber race” and misrepresented the French as heirs to the Roman Empire.13 French politicians who read this translation thus found historical pre­ce­dent for their own modern conflicts against groups they identified as “Berber.”14 The popularity of de Slane’s translation of Ibn Khaldun led to the “Khaldunization” of knowledge of medieval North Africa, through which the idea of a timeless “Berber” ethnicity emerged, in keeping with de Slane’s par­tic­u­lar and flawed translation.15 The most substantial study of the Zirid dynasty to date emerged from this French colonial tradition: a 1962 monograph by H. R. Idris titled La Berbérie orientale sous les Zīrīdes: Xe–­XIIe siècles (The eastern Barbary u ­ nder the Zirids: 10th–12th centuries).16 This work, which remains the standard reference for Zirid

12. ​Pierre Amédée Jaubert translated al-­Idrisi in 1836, Alphonse Rousseau translated al-­Tijani from 1852 to 1853, Edmond Fagnan translated Ibn ʿIdhari from 1901 to 1904, and William McGuckin de Slane translated Ibn Khaldun from 1852 to 1856 (in addition to translations of Ibn Khallikan and al-­Bakri). Many of ­these texts have since been republished. Al-­Idrisi, Géographie d’Édrisi, trans. Amédée Jaubert, 2 vols. (Paris: Libraire de la Societé, 1836); al-­Tijani, Voyage du scheikh et-­Tidjani dans la régence de Tunis pendant les années 706, 707 et 708 de l’hégire (1306–1309), trans. Alphonse Rousseau (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-­Islamic Science, 1994); Ibn ʿIdhari, Histoire de l’Afrique et de l’Espagne intitulée al-­Bayano’l-­Mogrib, trans. E. Fagnan (Algiers: Imprimerie Orientale Pierre Fontana, 1901–4); Ibn Khaldun, Histoire des Berberes et des dynasties musulmanes de l’Afrique septentrionale, trans. William McGuckin de Slane (Algiers: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1852–56); al-­Bakri, Description de l’Afrique septentrionale par el-­Bekri, trans. William McGuckin de Slane (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1859); Ibn Khallikan, Ibn Khallikan’s Biographical Dictionary, trans. William McGuckin de Slane (Paris: Bernard Quaritch, 1843–71). 13. ​Hannoum, “Translation and the Colonial Imaginary,” 71. The En­glish translation of the Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldun by Franz Rosenthal is similarly problematic. Aziz al-­Azmeh argues that it is a “systematic misreading” of which the only saving grace is a comprehensive index. Aziz al-­Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn: An Essay in Reinterpretation (New York: Frank Cass, 1982), 167; Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, ed. Franz Rosenthal, 2nd ed. (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1980). 14. ​Patricia Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” French Historical Studies 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 295–329. 15. ​Scholars like Ramzi Rouighi have since shown that this interpretation of ethnogenesis is untrue, as the term “Berber” was cultivated across numerous sites and chronologies during the M ­ iddle Ages. Ramzi Rouighi, Inventing the Berbers: History and Ideology in the Maghrib (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019). 16. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale. As its name implies, this work adopts the format and scope (albeit with a dif­fer­ent dynasty) of the seminal work of Idris’s doctoral advisor: Robert Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides, des origines à la fin du XVe siècle (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1940–47).

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history, exhaustively chronicles the dynasty.17 Idris draws on a host of sources, most of them Arabic, and attempts to reconcile the ambiguous and contradictory information found in them. This monograph is a substantial achievement, one that devotes more attention to the Zirid dynasty than any work of scholarship that preceded it. Nonetheless, Idris adheres to the historical trajectory found in previous accounts of the Zirids, in which the dynasty’s history is a narrative arc of rise and fall, with the catastrophic Hilalian invasions serving as the impetus for the dynasty’s collapse.18 This arc is explicit throughout the book and is easily seen in the chapter titles for the first volume of Idris’s monograph: “Genesis,” “Rise,” “Apogee,” “Catastrophe,” “Attempted Recovery,” and “Agony.”19 As French rule in North Africa drew to a close in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a new crop of scholars began to refute this portrait of the Hilalian invasions. Scholars like Mohamed Sahli, Mohamed Talbi, Yves Lacoste, Jean Poncet, Michael Brett, and Abdullah Laroui argued (with some variation) that the Zirid dynasty was not a lavish paradise prior to the arrival of the Banu Hilal.20 Rather, the delights of the Zirid court ­were a mirage that masked widespread economic trou­bles caused by recurrent drought, shifting trade routes, and the decline of plantation agriculture.21 When the Banu Hilal arrived in Ifriqiya, 17. ​Idris’s work surpasses in detail (by a substantial margin) the e­ arlier work of Lucien Golvin, Le Maghrib central à l’époque des Zirides: Recherches d’archéologie et d’histoire (Paris: Arts et Métiers Graphiques, 1957). 18. ​Despite some similarities in how French scholars approached medieval Ifriqiya, it would be an oversimplification to say that academics from Carette to Idris had uniform approaches to the history of medieval Ifriqiya. T ­ hese individuals emerged from unique circumstances and specific intellectual communities that informed their research. The so-­called École d’Alger, for example, comprised scholars like Marçais and Gautier, who tended to approach North African history from the perspective of successive invasions that rendered Algeria a nationless region. Charles-­André Julien, however, was part of a more liberal wing of historians who provided agency for Algerian sovereignty and long-­term contexts for the histories of colonized p­ eoples (in keeping with the tenets of the Annales school). Prochaska, Making Algeria French, 1–6. Julien’s collaborations with Lucien Febvre (who cofounded the journal Annales with Marc Bloch and was a tutor of Fernand Braudel) ­were particularly fruitful. Dulucq, “Writing African History in France.” 19. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:3, 39, 127, 205, 249, 303. 20. ​See, for example, Mohamed Sahli, Décoloniser l’histoire: Introduction à l’histoire du Maghreb (Paris: François Maspero, 1965); Mohamed Talbi, Ibn Khaldun et l’histoire (Tunis: Maison Tunisienne de d’Édition, 1973); Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldoun: Naissance de l’histoire, passé du tiers-­monde (Paris: François Maspero, 1966); Michael Brett, “Fitnat al Qayrawan: A Study of Traditional Arabic Historiography” (PhD diss., London University, 1970); Abdallah Laroui, L’histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthèse (Paris: François Maspero, 1975); Abdallah Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph Manheim (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1977); Radhi Daghfous, “De l’origine des Banu Hilal et des Banu Sulaym,” Cahiers de Tunisie 23, no. 91–92 (1975): 41–68; Radhi Daghfous, “Aspects de la situation économique de l’Égypte au milieu du Ve siècle/milieu du XIe siècle: Contribution à l’étude des conditions de l’immigration des tribus arabes (Hilāl et Sulaym) en Ifrīqiya,” Cahiers de Tunisie 25, no. 97–98 (1977): 23–50. 21. ​Some of ­these scholars disagree about w ­ hether surviving quantities of Zirid gold are indicative of relative Zirid wealth. Maurice Lombard, “Les bases monétaires d’une suprématie économique: L’or

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they ­were not rampaging nomads but rather mercenaries hired to fight on behalf of local governors who, at best, w ­ ere encouraged by the Fatimids to conquer Zirid lands. T ­ hese tribesmen then expanded their power in Ifriqiya from Tripoli westward in a series of campaigns that brought some po­liti­cal and economic upheaval, but not a cataclysm.22 Trade across the Sahara persisted throughout the eleventh c­ entury, sedentary communities continued to produce agricultural goods, and the po­liti­cal landscape of Ifriqiya did not descend into anarchy.23 The invasion of the Banu Hilal was a symptom rather than a cause of change in Ifriqiya. At the core of this revisionist school was the deconstruction of the writings of Ibn Khaldun, whose fourteenth-­century Kitab al-­ʿIbar (Book of examples) paints a devastating picture of Hilalian destruction that was commonly cited by colonial scholars.24 ­There is a substantial prob­lem with this narrative: it was a fabrication perpetuated by medieval Fatimid propagandists. The Arabic travelogue of al-­Tijani mentions the presence of Hilalian tribes in Ifriqiya as early as the mid-1030s, when they fought on behalf of local lords around Tripoli and ­later jockeyed for control of the city itself.25 Furthermore, a con­temporary letter from the Fatimid imam-­caliph shows that the Fatimids w ­ ere not responsible for sending the Banu Hilal to Ifriqiya to defeat the Zirids; instead, they sought musulman du VIII au XI siècle,” Annales 2, no. 2 (1947): 143–60; Michael Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth to the Twelfth ­Century AD,” Journal of African History 10, no. 3 (1969): 350; Jean Devisse, “Routes de commerce et échanges en Afrique occidentale en relation avec la Mediterranée,” Revue d’Histoire Économique et Sociale 50, no. 1 (1972): 42–73. 22. ​Poncet and Idris debated the catastrophic nature of the Hilalian invasions in Jean Poncet, “Le mythe de la ‘catastrophe’ hilalienne,” Annales 22, no. 5 (1967): 1099–120; H. R. Idris, “De la réalité de la catastrophe hilâlienne,” Annales 23, no.  2 (1968): 390–96; Jean Poncet, “Encore à propos des hilaliens: La ‘mise au point’ de R. Idris,” Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 23, no. 3 (1968): 660–62; H. R. Idris, “L’invasion hilālienne et ses conséquences,” Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale, 1968, 11–43. 23. ​Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 350. Recent scholarship by Diana Davis has further shown how the saga of the Banu Hilal in Ifriqiya was part of a larger French colonial proj­ect that aimed to glorify the supposed “breadbasket” of Roman Africa at the expense of subsequent Islamic dynasties. Diana K. Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 56–60. 24. ​Scholars further recognize the need to contextualize Ibn Khaldun in the times in which he wrote, rather than homogenizing his work with other Muslim scholars who wrote centuries apart or transposing modern Eu­ro­pean intellectual ideas onto his own theories. Gabriel Martinez-­Gros, “Que faire d’Ibn Khaldûn?,” Esprit 319, no. 11 (2005): 155–66. The corpus of scholarship written about the work of Ibn Khaldun and its reception is vast. See, for example, Walter Joseph Fischel, Ibn Khaldūn in Egypt: His Public Functions and His Historical Research, 1382–1406: A Study in Islamic Historiography (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Ahmed Abdesselem, Ibn Khaldun et ses lecteurs (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983); Ma­ya Shatzmiller, L’historiographie merinide: Ibn Khaldun et ses contemporains (Leiden: Brill, 1982); Abdesselam Cheddadi, Ibn Khaldūn: L’homme et le théoreticien de la civilisation (Paris: Gallimard, 2006); Gabriel Martinez-­Gros, Ibn Khaldûn et les sept vies de l’Islam (Arles, France: Actes Sud, 2006); Allen Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun: Life and Times (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010); Robert Irwin, Ibn Khaldun: An Intellectual Biography (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2018), 162–203. 25. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 239–41.

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to capitalize on the in­de­pen­dent victory of the Arab tribes.26 Through a major propaganda effort on the part of the Fatimids, one of their Ifriqiyan envoys was turned “into a conqueror and his return into a triumph . . . ​[passing] into the annals of the Fatimids as a story of condign punishment visited upon the erring [Zirid] sultan through the agency of the Arabs.”27 This story became popu­lar with l­ater chroniclers like Ibn Khaldun, who fit the narrative into his idea of a “fourth age” of Arabs that swept into the North Africa with both divine agency and an established Arabian lineage.28 This mythologized narrative was at the heart of French colonial scholarship and its ­later refutation.29 For this study of the intertwined histories of the Zirids and Normans, this historiographical trajectory has profound consequences. If we ­were to take for granted the perspective of the French colonial school, we would see the Zirid dynasty as “powerless in the face of the Arabian tribes” and its rulers as helpless witnesses to “the disintegration of their territory.”30 The adoption of this revisionist narrative, however, allows for a reappraisal of the Zirids and the agency that they exercised in the Mediterranean. Instead of considering Ifriqiya as an anarchic backwater and the Zirid dynasty as a powerless city-­state at the mercy of the Normans, we must instead realize that the Zirids ­were one of a handful of lords in Ifriqiya who tried to leverage the post-­Hilalian po­liti­cal landscape to their advantage, both near their base of Mahdia and across the Mediterranean in Sicily.

Divergent Histories: The Normans and the Myth of Tolerance During the mid-­late eleventh ­century, the Zirids looked across the Mediterranean to expand their po­liti­cal influence. The island of Sicily was a prime target 26. ​Michael Brett, “The Zughba at Tripoli, 429H (1037–8 A.D.),” Libyan Studies: Annual Report of the Society for Libyan Studies 6 ( January  1974): 41–47; Michael Brett, “The Ifrīqiyan Sijill of Al-­ Mustanṣir, 445 H/1053–4 CE,” in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras VI (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2010), 9–16. 27. ​Michael Brett, “The Way of the Nomad,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 58, no. 2 (1995): 258. The medieval genealogies of this episode as they relate to Ibn Khaldun (including the works of Ibn Bassam, Ibn Sharaf, and Abu al-­Salt) are summarized in Michael Brett, “Ibn Khaldun and the Invasion of Ifriqiya by the Banu Hilal (5th ­Century AH/11th ­Century AD),” in Actes du Colloque International sur Ibn Khaldoun, Alger 21–26 Juin 1978 (Algiers: Société Nationale d’Édition et de Diffusion, 1982), 289–98. 28. ​Ibn Khaldun’s focus on dynasties that form states (dawla) and continuities/breaks between them is the “cohesive conceptual glue” that holds together his narrative. Al-­Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn, 19. 29. ​Irwin, Ibn Khaldun, 52–55. 30. ​Jamil Abun-­Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 85.

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for ­these ambitions: located less than one hundred miles from the northeastern tip of Ifriqiya and in a state of po­liti­cal fragmentation. Zirid aspirations in Sicily brought them into contact with another group that sought control of the island, the Normans. Despite the geographic proximity of ­these two dynasties, their historiographical trajectories could not be more disparate. The Norman kingdom of Sicily has been the subject of substantial modern scholarly discourse, as scholars have sought to better understand the “Norman-­ness” of this multicultural kingdom and its role in the larger milieu of the medieval Mediterranean. In t­hese histories, the Zirid typically play a minor role, at best, as the objects of Norman conquest during the twelfth ­century. In the early and mid-­twentieth ­century, historians sought to better understand the circumstances through which waves of enterprising nobles and mercenaries from northern France arrived on the Italian Peninsula. T ­ hese historians—­including Ferdinand Chalandon, Charles Homer Haskins, and David Charles Douglas—­primarily considered the po­liti­cal and military histories of the Normans in the Mediterranean.31 They also sought to connect the Normans of Sicily to their cousins located in northwestern Eu­rope. Haskins and Douglas in par­tic­u­lar saw the Normans of ­England, France, Sicily, and Antioch as one ethnic unit with its origins in Viking Scandinavia, and they thought that comparisons of ­these branches of Normans could reveal deeper truths about their expansionist tendencies.32 Accounts of culture and society across ­these disparate geographies highlighted the multicultural achievements of the Normans and the supposedly tolerant socie­ties they created.33 According to ­these historians, multilingual documents produced in Norman Sicily written in Latin, Arabic, and Greek testified to the vibrant court culture of the island. ­These narratives tended to focus on the conquering Normans and their relationship to other elites, paying comparatively less attention to the popu­ lations of Greek Christians and Muslims in Sicily. Scholars since the mid-­twentieth ­century have fundamentally rewritten the history of Norman Sicily by reinterpreting the Latin and Greek texts that dominated ­earlier histories, paying more attention to Arabic-­language texts (previously 31. ​Ferdinand Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile (Paris: Librairie Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1907); Charles Homer Haskins, The Normans in Eu­ro­pean History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1915); Davis Charles Douglas, The Norman Achievement, 1050–1100 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). 32. ​Haskins argues broadly that “wherever [the Normans] went, they showed a marvelous power of initiative and of assimilation; if the initiative is more evident in E ­ ngland, the assimilation is more manifest in Sicily.” Haskins, Normans in Eu­ro­pean History, 247. 33. ​The popu­lar history of Norwich, which echoes the arguments this crop of scholars, remains influential as well. John Julius Norwich, The Kingdom in the Sun, 1130–1194 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

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analyzed by Michele Amari), and using archaeological studies.34 By expanding this corpus of sources, scholars have reappraised the characteristics of the Norman regime and the status of t­hose living ­under Norman rule, especially the Muslim majority on the island.35 The idea of a singular “Norman-­ness” across Eu­rope has been replaced with a more regional approach to Norman expansion, which, in the case of Sicily and southern Italy, involved Norman assimilation to regional cultures and the enactment of policies that frequently diverged from ­those of their brethren in E ­ ngland.36 As the Normans established hegemony in Sicily, they largely abandoned traditions from northern France or ­England when legitimizing their rule.37 Instead, they looked to the Byzantine East and the Muslim world as models for their regime—­namely, to the Fatimid court of Egypt, with whom the Normans had frequent contact.38 Scholars have likewise critiqued the nature of tolerant multiculturalism in Norman Sicily. The Normans produced documents from their chancery in multiple languages, e­ tched multilingual engravings on their royal palaces, and sponsored works written in Arabic, Greek, and Latin at the court of Palermo. ­These ­were not, however, s­ imple acts of altruism or h ­ umble acknowledgements of the cultural diversity of their island. Instead, they w ­ ere part of a larger campaign of propaganda through which the Normans—an extreme 34. ​Michele Amari, Biblioteca arabo-­sicula (Leipzig: F.  A. Brockhaus, 1857); Michele Amari, Le epigrapfi arabiche di Sicilia (Palermo, Italy: Stabilimento Tipografico Virzi, 1879); Michele Amari, Biblioteca arabo-­sicula: Versione italiana (Turin, Italy: Ermanno Loescher, 1880); Michele Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 2nd ed. (Catania, Italy: Romeo Prampolini, 1938). 35. ​The corpus of lit­er­a­ture on this topic is substantial. See, for example, Graham Loud, “How ‘Norman’ Was the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy?,” Nottingham Medieval Studies 25 (1981): 13–34; Graham Loud, “The Gens Normannorum: Myth or Real­ity?,” in Proceedings of the Fourth B ­ attle Conference on Anglo-­Normans Studies, ed. R. Allen Brown (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1982), 104– 16; Stefan Burkhardt and Thomas Foerster, eds., Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage: Exchange of Cultures in the “Norman” Peripheries of Medieval Eu­rope (New York: Ashgate, 2013); David Bates and Pierre Bauduin, eds., 911–2011: Penser les mondes normands médiévaux (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2016). For an overview of this historiography, see Sarah Davis-­Secord, “Medieval Sicily and Southern Italy in Recent Historiographical Perspective,” History Compass 8, no. 1 (2010): 61–87. 36. ​Graham Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest (New York: Longman, 2000); Alex Metcalfe, The Muslims of Medieval Italy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 37. ​Hubert Houben, “Le royaume normand de Sicile était-il vraiment ‘normand’?,” in Bates and Bauduin, 911–2011, 325–60. Roger II did borrow some iconography from Capetian France, however, as seen most explic­itly in the fleur-­de-­lis in his regalia at the Martorana. Dawn Marie Hayes, Roger II of Sicily: ­Family, Faith, and Empire in the Medieval Mediterranean World (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2020), 139–70. 38. ​Hiroshi Takayama, The Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily (Leiden: Brill, 1993); Pierre Aubé, Les empires normands d’Orient: XIe–­XIIIe siècle (Paris: Perrin, 1999); Jeremy Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily: The Royal Dīwān (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Annliese Nef, Conquérir et gouverner la Sicile islamique aux XIe et XIIe siècles (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2011); Sarah Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met: Sicily in the Early Medieval Mediterranean (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 174–241.

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minority on the island, whose rule was often perilous—­sought to control and speak for their subjects.39 The appropriation of administrative and artistic models from the Greek and Muslim worlds, including the patronage of Muslim poets and scholars, was essential to the cultivation of this lofty image of rulership.40 Beneath this veneer of tolerance was tension. Although the Normans used Muslim soldiers in their army, employed crypto-­Muslims in their court, and ­adopted Islamic traditions of rulership, latent animosity ­toward Muslims nevertheless existed at all levels of society.41 Pogroms against Sicilian Muslims in the second half of the twelfth c­ entury laid bare the limits of religious and cultural toleration in the Norman regime—­a toleration that came to an end with the rise of the Hohenstaufens.42 ­After the Normans conquered Sicily in the late eleventh ­century, they sought to bolster their standing in the Mediterranean through the emulation of Muslim dynasties, intermarriage with well-­established Christian dynasties, and po­liti­cal legitimation in the eyes of religious powers like the papacy. Scholars have studied ­these connections to assess the role of Norman Sicily against the backdrop of the larger medieval Mediterranean.43 Roger II had a number of infamous run-­ins with the Crusader states during his reign, which deterred him from any crusading endeavors, yet Norman Sicily (and southern Italy especially) nonetheless had meaningful connections to the crusading movement in both the Levant and the Reconquista in al-­Andalus.44 The Normans like39. ​Karen Britt, “Roger II of Sicily: Rex, Basileus, and Khalif ? Identity, Politics, and Propaganda in the Cappella Palatina,” Mediterranean Studies 16 (2007): 21–45; Annliese Nef, “Pluralisme religieux et État monarchique dans la Sicile des XIIe et XIIIe siècles,” in Politique et Religion en Méditerranée: Moyen âge et époque contemporaine, ed. Henri Bresc, Georges Dagher, and Christiane Veauvy (Aubervilliers, France: Éditions Bouchène, 2008), 235–54; Umberto Bongianino, “The King, His Chapel, His Church: Bound­aries and Hybridity in the Religious Visual Culture of the Norman Kingdom,” Journal of Transcultural Medieval Studies 4, no. 1–2 (2017): 3–50. 40. ​Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 67–176; Karla Mallette, The Kingdom of Sicily, 1100–1250: A Literary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 41. ​Annliese Nef, “L’histoire des ‘mozarabes’ de Sicile: Bilan provisoire et nouveaux matériaux,” in Existe una identidad mozárab? Historia, lengua y cultura de los cristianos de al-­Andalus (siglos IX–­XII), ed. Cyrille Aillet, Mayte Penelas, and Philippe Roisse (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2008); Joshua Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily and the Rise of the Anti-­Islamic Critique: Baptized Sultans (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 42. ​Julie Anne Taylor, Muslims in Medieval Italy: The Colony at Lucera (New York: Lexington Books, 2003); Annliese Nef, “La déportation des musulmans sicilens par Frédéric II: Précédents, modalités, signification et portée de la mesure,” in Le monde de l’itinérance en Méditerranée de l’antiquité à l’époque moderne: Procédures de contrôle et d’identification, ed. Claudia Moatti, Wolfgang Kaiser, and Christophe Pébarthe (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 2009), 455–77. 43. ​Giosuè Musca, ed., Il mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo visto dall’Europa e dal mondo mediterraneo: Atti delle tredicesime giornate normanno-­sveve, Bari, 21–24 ottobre 1997 (Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 1999); Philippe Gourdin and Gabriel Martinez-­Gros, eds., Pays d’Islam et monde latin: 950–1250 (Neuilly-­sur-­ Seine, France: Atlande, 2001). 44. ​Giles Constable, “The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries,” Traditio 9 (1953): 213–79; Paul Chevedden, “A Crusade from the First”: The Norman Conquest of Islamic Sicily, 1060–1091,”

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wise had substantial contact with the Fatimids of Egypt and appropriated certain administrative structures and monarchical stylings from them.45 The Norman Christian minority in Sicily maintained control over a non-­Christian majority through a series of institutional and cultural mechanisms, including the installation of new taxes that resembled the ubiquitous jizya (a head tax collected from Christians and Jews) of the Muslim world.46 Although religious minorities in Sicily w ­ ere treated as second-­class citizens, they nonetheless established substantial communities on the island where they managed to thrive—­especially relative to their Muslim and Jewish coreligionists elsewhere in Latin Christendom.47 Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 22 (2010): 191–225; Luigi Russo, “Bad Crusaders? The Normans of Southern Italy and the Crusading Movement,” in Anglo-­Norman Studies XXXVIII: Proceedings of the ­Battle Conference 2015, ed. Elisabeth van Houts (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2016), 169–80; Paula  Z. Hailstone, Recalcitrant Crusaders? The Relationship between Southern Italy and Sicily, Crusading and the Crusader States, c. 1060–1198 (New York: Routledge, 2019). 45. ​See, for example, Jeremy Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya: The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Fāṭimids,” Libyan Studies; Annual Report of the Society for Libyan Studies XVIII (1987): 89–101; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 2–10. 46. ​Jeremy Johns and Alex Metcalfe, “The Mystery at Chùrchuro: Conspiracy or Incompetence in Twelfth-­Century Sicily?,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 62, no. 2 (1999): 226–59; Alex Metcalfe, “The Muslims of Sicily ­under Christian Rule,” in The Society of Norman Italy, ed. Graham Loud and Alex Metcalfe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 289–317; Timothy Smit, “Commerce and Coexistence: Muslims in the Economy and Society of Norman Sicily” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2009); Alex Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians in Norman Sicily: Arabic Speakers and the End of Islam (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). See also Brian Catlos, Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c. 1050–1614 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Allen Fromherz, The Near West: Medieval North Africa, Latin Eu­rope and the Mediterranean in the Second Axial Age (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 47. ​On archaeology, see Annliese Nef and Vivien Prigent, “Per una nuova storia dell’alto medioevo sicïliano,” Storica 12, no. 35–36 (2006): 9–63; Lucia Arcifa, Alessandra Bagnera, and Annliese Nef, “Archeologia della Sicilia islamica: Nuove proposte di riflessione,” in Histoire et archéologie de l’Occident musulman (VIIe–­XVe siècle): Al-­Andalus, Maghreb, Sicile, ed. Philippe Sénac (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Midi, 2012), https://­books​.­openedition​.­org​/­pumi​/­25333; Annliese Nef and Fabiola Ardizzone, Les dynamiques de l’islamisation en Méditerranée centrale et en Sicile: Nouvelles propositions et découvertes récentes (Rome: Edipuglia, 2014). On toponyms, see Annliese Nef, “La nisba tribale entre identification individuelle et catégorisation: Variations dans la Sicile des Xe–­XIIe siècle,” L’identification des origines de l’islam au XIXe siècle 127 (2011/2010): 45–58; Leonard Chiarelli, A History of Muslim Sicily (Santa Venera, Malta: Midsea Books, 2011). On Jewish merchants documented in the Cairo Geniza, see S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); S. D. Goitein, “Sicily and Southern Italy in the Cairo Geniza Documents,” Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale 67, no. 1 (1971): 9–33; S. D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1973); Shlomo Simonsohn, The Jews in Sicily: 383–1300 (Leiden: Brill, 1997); Annliese Nef, “La Sicile dans la documentation de la Geniza Cairote (fin xe–­xiiie): Les réseaux attestés et leur nature,” in Espaces et réseaux en Méditerrannée (Vie–­XVIe siècle): La configuration des réseaux, ed. Damien Coulon, Christophe Picard, and Dominique Valérian (Saint-­Denis, France: Éditions Bouchène, 2007), 1:273–92; Shlomo Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Jews in Sicily (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Jessica Goldberg, “The Use and Abuse of Commercial Letters from the Cairo Geniza,” Journal of Medieval History 38, no.  2 ( June  2012): 127–54; Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Geniza Merchants and Their Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

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This scholarship has fundamentally transformed scholarly perceptions of Norman Sicily, yet it tends to deemphasize the connections between Norman Sicily and Zirid Ifriqiya.48 Scholars, in exploring Christian-­Muslim relations in the Mediterranean, have most often compared the Normans with the Fatimids of Egypt or the pre-­Norman dynasties of Sicily. The Zirids, meanwhile, are usually mentioned as the objects of Norman aggression, and North Africa is considered as one of several theaters of conflict—­alongside southern Italy and the Balkans—­through which the Norman kings of Sicily sought to extend their power. This Norman-­centric, Sicily-­centered perspective warps our understanding of the role the Zirids played in Norman and Mediterranean history. The Zirids and Normans had coexisted in the central Mediterranean for de­cades prior to the eventual Norman conquest of Zirid lands in Ifriqiya. To reduce this rich and dynamic relationship to one in which the power­f ul Norman kings gradually exerted their authority over the coast of Ifriqiya is to distort the active role the Zirids played as contesters for power in Sicily, as raiders across the Mediterranean, and as aggressors against the Normans. Bringing the histories of ­these two dynasties into dialogue forces a new narrative of the dynamics of the central Mediterranean during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, one that eschews easy trajectories of ascent and decline. The Zirid dynasty, so long obfuscated by the shadow cast by colonial interpretations of Ibn Khaldun and the Banu Hilal, deserves a thorough reappraisal as an active player in the medieval Mediterranean. So, too, should Norman Sicily be considered against this backdrop of a reinvigorated Zirid dynasty, whose proximity to and interactions with the court of Palermo makes its presence crucial to our understanding of the Normans. When ­these disparate histories are brought together in a singular narrative focused on the central Mediterranean, the numerous exchanges between the two are apparent and the Zirids consequently grow in importance.

The Medieval Sources The divergent historiographies of the Zirids and Normans have minimized scholarly appreciation of their substantial interactions. The disparity in the 2012); Marina Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community: The Jews of the Fatimid Caliphate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Marina Rustow, “Fatimid State Documents,” Jewish History 32 (2019): 221–77; Marina Rustow, The Lost Archive: Traces of a Caliphate in a Cairo Synagogue (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2020). 48. ​Nef goes further than most scholars in showing connections between the Zirids and Normans during and ­after the latter’s conquest of Sicily. Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 34–38.

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quantity of con­temporary sources to document the two dynasties further compounds this already distorted picture. Far more medieval sources exist for Norman Sicily than for Zirid Ifriqiya, and the vast majority of the documents that consider the latter are written in Arabic, a language that historians of the medieval Mediterranean have only recently begun to thoroughly incorporate alongside the more traditional Latin and Greek.49 Nonetheless, a substantial corpus of textual sources exist that document the Zirid dynasty, which, when mobilized alongside environmental and archaeological evidence, reshapes the picture of the relationship between ­these two dynasties. Arabic texts provide the most substantial accounts of the Zirids and their relationship with the Normans. In this corpus of texts, the works of Ibn al-­Athir, al-­ Tijani, Ibn ʿIdhari, and Ibn Khaldun provide the greatest detail and, as such, deserve some degree of introductory consideration.50 Although ­these four authors provide crucial (and at times contradictory) details on the Zirids, all of them wrote e­ ither de­cades or centuries a­ fter the dynasty’s disintegration in the 1140s, on the basis of histories written by the Zirid administrator Abu al-­Salt and/or the Zirid prince Ibn Shaddad.51 ­These e­ arlier works survive only b­ ecause they are embedded in direct quotations from ­later texts or in (rarely cited) narratives presented in the works of Ibn al-­Athir, al-­Tijani, Ibn ʿIdhari, and Ibn Khaldun.52 Fortunately, biographies of Abu al-­Salt and Ibn Shaddad survive in other medieval texts, which helps to inform our analy­sis of their now-­lost works. Abu al-­ Salt was born in al-­Andalus around 460H (1067–68) and studied extensively ­there before traveling to Fatimid Egypt, where he joined the royal court. As a client of the court of Cairo, Abu al-­Salt delivered lectures and wrote a number of works on medicine, philosophy, astronomy, and lit­er­a­ture.53 Eventually, though, he ran 49. ​Idris’s bibliography of sources that pertain to the Zirid dynasty is valuable, though dated. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:xiii–­lii. 50. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-­Fikr, 2000); Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­ Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, 13 vols. (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 2009); Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib. Other Arabic works to use Zirid authors include ­those of Mamluk scholars al-­Nuwayri and al-­Maqrizi, as well as the biographical dictionary of Ibn Khallikan. Al-­Nuwayri, Nihayat al-­Arab fi Funun al-­Adab, 33 vols. (Cairo: Wizarat al-­Thaqafa, 1923–97); Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-­Aʿyan wa-­Anbaʾ Abnaʾ al-­Zaman, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1977); al-­Maqrizi, Kitab al-­Muqaffa al-­Kabir, ed. Muhammad al-­Yaʿlawi, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-­Gharb al-­Islami, 1991). 51. ​The lives of ­these Zirid authors are considered in Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 85–90. See also Mercè Comes, “Abū al-­Ṣalt: Umayya ibn ʿAbd al-­ʿAzīz ibn Abī al-­Ṣalt al-­Dānī al-­ Andalusī,” in The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers, Springer Reference, ed. Thomas Hockey (New York: Springer, 2007), 9–10. 52. ​Michele Amari compiled portions of ­these texts (and ­others) in his Biblioteca arabo-­sicula, but only ­those parts that he thought had relevance to Sicily. His work, while invaluable for its thoroughness, nonetheless divorces texts from the contexts in which they ­were written. 53. ​Sumaiya Hamdani, “Worlds Apart? An Andalusi in Fāṭimid Egypt,” Journal of North African Studies 19, no. 1 (2014): 56–67; Chedley Bouyahia, “La vie littéraire en Ifriqiya sous les zirides (362–555 de l’H./972–1160 de J. C.)” (PhD diss., Paris-­Sorbonne, 1972), 165–75.

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afoul of the imam-­caliph and was imprisoned for three years. On his release, he traveled to Ifriqiya around 506H (1112–13), where he was welcomed by the Zirid emir Yahya ibn Tamim.54 Abu al-­Salt remained in Ifriqiya as a panegyrist and historian of the Zirid emirate ­until his death in 529H (1134–35).55 While working at the Zirid court, he frequently communicated with individuals in Palermo, including the high-­ranking administrator Abu al-­Dawʾ, and was thus well informed about the Norman court.56 It is from the pen of Abu al-­Salt that al-­Tijani copied a triumphant letter sent by the Zirid emir to other Ifriqiyan lords a­ fter the ­Battle of al-­Dimas (summarized at the beginning of this chapter), which is one of the few surviving texts from the Zirid court of the twelfth ­century.57 The Zirid prince Ibn Shaddad continued the narrative of Abu al-­Salt by documenting the history of his dynasty up to its fall.58 He grew up in Mahdia as part of the familial circle of emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli. When the Normans conquered the city in 543H (1148–49), he likely fled with the emir to the court of Muhriz ibn Ziyad outside of Tunis and possibly ­after that to the Almohads. ­After this, his whereabouts are unknown ­until 551H (1156–57), when he was in Palermo.59 By 571H (1175–76), he was living in Damascus and working on his chronicle about the history of the fallen Zirids. He continued writing u ­ ntil at least 582H (1186–87), when al-­Tijani reports that he conducted an interview with a man from Mahdia who was in Damascus.60 Ibn Shaddad was thus actively writing his history in close proximity to the campaigns of Saladin against 54. ​Parts of the chronology of Abu al-­Salt’s life are disputed. His move to Ifriqiya, for example, could also have happened during the reign of Yahya’s successor ʿAli. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:xvii–­ xviii; Comes, “Abū Al-­Ṣalt,” 9. 55. ​One of Abu al-­Salt’s surviving works is a letter written to the Zirid emir ʿAli about Egypt. Abu al-­Salt, “Al-­Risala al-­Misriyya,” in Nawadir al-­Makhtutat, ed. ʿAbd al-­Salam Harun (Cairo: Lajnat al-­Taʾlif wa-­l-­Tarjama wa-­l-­Nashr, 1951), 1:1–56. 56. ​Abu al-­Dawʾ was a scholar, poet, and notary in the Norman administration. Metcalfe, “Muslims of Sicily,” 298; Nadia Jamil and Jeremy Johns, “A New Latin-­Arabic Document from Norman Sicily (November 595 H/1198 CE),” in The Heritage of Arabo-­Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi, ed. Maurice Pomerantz and Aram Shahin (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 129–30. See also Adalgisa de Simone, Nella Sicilia araba tra storia e filologia (Palermo: n.p., 1999), 3–15; Barbara Graille, “Le livre des ­simples de Umayya b. ’Abd al-’Azīz b. Abī al-­Ṣalt al-­Dānī al-­Išbīlī,” supplement, Bulletin d’Études Orientales 55 (2003): 3–280. 57. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 337–39. 58. ​Mohamed Talbi, “Ibn 2ẖaddād,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. Peri J. Bearman, Thierry Bianquis, C.  E. Bosworth, Emeri van Donzel, and Wolf hart  P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005), https://­referenceworks​.­brillonline​.­com​/­browse​/­encyclopaedia​-­of​-­islam​-­2 (hereafter cited as EI2); Brett, “Fitnat al Qayrawan,” 402–4; Michael Brett, “Muslim Justice u ­ nder Infidel Rule: The Normans in Ifriqiya, 517–55H/1123–1160AD,” Cahiers de Tunisie 43 (1995): 334–35; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:xviii–­xix. 59. ​Michele Amari argues that Ibn Shaddad was an eyewitness to the Almohad conquest of Mahdia. Idris and Johns (among o ­ thers) now think that he was simply reporting the testimony of someone who was an eyewitness to the city’s capture. Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 3:486; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:xviii–­xix; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 87–88. 60. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 87.

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the Crusader states, which likely led him to draw direct comparisons between this vio­lence and that of the Zirids against the Normans.61 We must therefore read the works of Ibn al-­Athir, al-­Tijani, Ibn ʿIdhari, and Ibn Khaldun bearing in mind their two registers: that of the Zirids (Abu al-­ Salt and Ibn Shaddad) who wrote the original accounts and that of l­ater chroniclers who copied, paraphrased, or repurposed them to suit their own agendas. This complexity is compounded by the transmission of Ibn Shaddad’s text, which was circulated in at least two dif­fer­ent editions in North Africa and the Levant.62 The juxtaposition of narrations of the same scene as reported by three of ­these writers shows the overarching similarities yet subtle differences between them.63 Below are three versions of a passage from a speech that Abu al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani of Sfax gave to his son before departing for Sicily as a hostage of Roger II: Ibn al-­Athir

“Indeed, I am old in age and my end approaches. When the opportunity arises for you to fight against the ­enemy, do it. ­Don’t have sympathy for them. Do not think about me being killed. Reckon that I have already died.”64 Al-­Tijani

“Oh my son, I am old and I face death. I myself speak the truth on behalf of Muslims that when the opportunity arises for you [to fight against] ­those Christians, seize it. Forget about me and kill.”65 Ibn Khaldun

“Oh my son, I am old in age and my end nears. When the opportunity arises for you to deliver the Muslims from the rule of the e­ nemy, take it. Do not be afraid for me. Reckon that I have already died.”66 61. ​This theme, especially as it applies to the works of Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun, is considered in chapter 6. On the development of jihad ideology in the Levant, see Suleiman Mourad and James Lindsay, The Intensification and Re­orientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period: Ibn ʿAsākir of Damascus (1105–1176) and His Age, with an Edition and Translation of Ibn ʿAsākir’s The Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihad (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Michael Köhler, Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the ­Middle East: Cross-­Cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades, trans. Peter Holt (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Kenneth A. Goudie, Reinventing Jihād: Jihād Ideology from the Conquest of Jerusalem to the End of the Ayyūbids (c. 492/1099–647/1249) (Leiden: Brill, 2019). 62. ​Brett, “Fitnat al Qayrawan,” 387–425. 63. ​Ibn ʿIdhari does not rec­ord this speech in his chronicle. 64. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100. 65. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 75. 66. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:238.

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­ hese three accounts w T ­ ere built on “stones of re-­use,” as Ibn al-­Athir, Ibn Khaldun, and al-­Tijani each constructed a narrative that was originally from the work of Ibn Shaddad.67 While the overall message of this speech is recognizably similar across ­these three texts, impor­tant differences between them put on display the morph­ing of the lost original: the evocation of a collective group of Muslims, the order to “kill” or “take” action, and the mention of Christian enemies. The words of Ibn Shaddad represent the unknown shared core of this episode, which was then copied or manipulated by ­later authors. Without this original text, however, it is impossible to parse Ibn Shaddad’s exact wording or to discern with any degree of detail his authorial biases beyond his clear anti-­Norman perspective. The same holds true for the now-­lost text of Abu al-­Salt for the years prior to the mid-1130s. We are thus helped by other Arabic sources not based on the writings of Abu al-­Salt and Ibn Shaddad.68 The geo­g raph­i­cal compendia of al-­Bakri and al-­Idrisi, poetry by members of the Zirid court, ­legal rulings handed down by the jurist al-­Mazari, and letters from the Almohad chancery provide additional vantage points through which to examine the Zirids.69 So, too, do merchant letters from the Cairo Geniza (a collection of discarded texts from a synagogue in Old Cairo) consider economic conditions for Jewish traders in the central Mediterranean during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.70 ­These combined 67. ​Martinez-­Gros uses the phrase “stone of re-­use” to refer specifically to the work of Ibn Khaldun and its relationship to the work of Ibn al-­Athir, but this idea of chronicles being constructed on the foundations of e­ arlier works applies h ­ ere as well. Martinez-­Gros, “Que faire d’Ibn Khaldûn?,” 157. 68. ​In this discussion of Arabic sources, one source is intentionally absent: the seventeenth-­ century Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis (The emergence of the events of Ifriqiya and Tunis) by Ibn Abi Dinar. Some scholars who have previously considered the writings of Ibn Abi Dinar have largely treated him as if he w ­ ere an eyewitness to the events of the Norman conquests rather than an author writing centuries l­ater. Even Brett, who acknowledges that Ibn Abi Dinar might have written with an eye ­toward the events of the seventeenth ­century, uses his chronicle extensively to narrate his history of Norman involvement in Ifriqiya. The evidence suggests that Ibn Abi Dinar used the works of medieval Muslim authors in his own writings but intensified their anti-­Norman vitriol. Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis (Tunis: Matbaʿat al-­Dawlat al-­Tunisiya, 1869); Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 33–35; Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 335–39, 362–63. 69. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik (Beirut: Dar al-­Kotob al-­Ilmiyah, 2003); al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­ Mushtaq fi Ikhtiraq Akhbar al-­Afaq, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-­Thaqafa al-­Denia, 2002); Ibn Hamdis, Il canzoniere di Ibn Ḥamdîs, ed. Celestino Schiaparelli (Rome: Topografia della Casa Editrice Italiana, 1897); Ibn Rashiq, Al-­ʿUmda fi Mahasin al-­Shiʿr wa-­Adabih wa-­Naqdih (Algiers: Asimat al-­Thaqafa al-­ʿArabiya, 2007); al-­ Wansharisi, Al-­Miʿyar al-­Muʿrib, ed. Muhammad Hajji, 13 vols. (Rabat: Nashr Wizarat  al-­Awqaf wa-­l Shu’un al-­Islamiyah, 1981); Évariste Lévi-­Provençal, Trente-­sept lettres officielles Almohades (Rabat: Institut des Hautes-­Études Marocaines, 1941); Pascal Buresi and Hicham El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in the Almohad Caliphate (1224–1269): Critical Edition, Translation, and Study of Manuscript 4752 of the Ḥasaniyya Library in Rabat Containing 77 Taqādīm (“Appointments”) (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 70. ​­These documents come from a collection of some three hundred thousand manuscript fragments that w ­ ere placed in the genizah (storeroom) of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Fustat, a suburb of Cairo. An overview of the Cairo Geniza can be found in the online archive for one of its largest mod-

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sources provide further context and counterpoint to the narratives derived from Abu al-­Salt and Ibn Shaddad, illuminating the larger Mediterranean context in which the Zirids ­were operating. ­Little material culture survives from the Zirid dynasty, especially for the latter years of their rule.71 Archaeological excavations that focus on medieval Ifriqiya are few and generally have not been interested in the years a­ fter the arrival of the Banu Hilal.72 Studies about the topography of Norman Africa are likewise confined to cursory notes in the assessments of the urban landscape of Mahdia.73 A lack of archaeological evidence makes it difficult to substantiate information such as the numbers of soldiers and ships mentioned in medieval texts, which are often contradictory or intentionally manipulated to suit a par­tic­u­lar authorial agenda. As a result, I have tended to shy away from attempting to quantify the military logistics of conflict between ­these two dynasties.74 Environmental data, however, helps fill in some of the gaps left by ern collections, the Taylor-­Schechter Cairo Genizah Collection, which is ­housed at Cambridge University Library (https://­cudl​.­lib​.­cam​.­ac​.­uk​/­collections​/­genizah​/­1). 71. ​Lotfi Abdeljaouad’s study of the epigraphy of Monastir, Kairouan, Sfax, Sousse, and Tunis unfortunately did not unearth any relevant inscriptions for this study, as most surviving Zirid inscriptions are from the eleventh c­ entury or ­earlier. Lotfi Abdeljaouad, “Inscriptions arabes des monuments islamiques des grandes villes de Tunisie: Monastir, Kairouan, Sfax, Sousse et Tunis” (PhD diss., Université de Provence Aix-­Marseille, 2001). 72. ​Jean-­Louis Ballais, “Conquests and Land Degradation in the Eastern Maghreb during Classical Antiquity and the ­Middle Ages,” in The Archaeology of Drylands: Living at the Margin (New York: Routledge, 2000), 125–36; Jeremy Johns, “Islamic Archaeology at a Difficult Age,” Antiquity 84 (2010): 1187–91; Corisande Fenwick, “From Africa to Ifrīqiya: Settlement and Society in Early Medieval North Africa (650–800),” Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 25, no. 1 (2013): 9–33; Lamia Hadda, “Zirid and Hammadid Palaces in North Africa and Its Influence on Norman Architecture in Sicily” (paper presented at Le Vie dei Mercanti, 16th International Forum of Studies—­World Heritage and Knowledge, Naples, June 2018), 323–32; Corisande Fenwick, “Ifriqiya and the Central Maghreb,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Archaeology, ed. Bethany J. Walker, Timothy Insoll, and Corisande Fenwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 243–66. 73. ​Alexandre Lézine, Mahdiya: Recherches d’archaéologie islamique (Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck, 1965); Abdelkader Masmoudi, Mahdia, étude de géographie urbaine (Tunis: Université de Tunis, 1984). The recent topographic overview provided by Belhareth is useful for its images but does not add much to our understanding of the medieval city. Taoufik Belhareth, “Mahdia: Structure urbaine et enjeux de croissance,” in Workshop Tunisie: Invention paysagère des carrières de Mahdia, ed. Philippe Poullaouec-­Gonidec (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2008), 26–33. 74. ​Medieval sources often approximate the sizes of armies and navies to suit their respective narratives. Even within sources ­there are prob­lems, as is the case with Ibn Khaldun, who writes of the same encounter between the Zirids and Normans on two occasions, but says the fleet of Roger II was 250 ships in one but 300 ships in the other. Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:233, 6:214. The Zirid and Norman militaries are explored in Michael Brett, “The Military Interest of the B ­ attle of Haydaran,” in War, Technology and Society in the M ­ iddle East, ed. Vernon Parry and Malcolm Yapp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 78–88; John Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Michael Brett, “The Armies of Ifriqiya, 1052–1160,” Cahiers de Tunisie 48 (1997): 107–25; Charles Stanton, Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2011).

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written sources and material culture. In par­tic­ul­ar, annual rainfall statistics from the Old World Drought Atlas (OWDA) permit a more detailed analy­sis of the extent of drought in Ifriqiya during the ­middle of the twelfth ­century.75 In contrast, the corpus of medieval sources from Norman Sicily is rich and tracks the circumstances that drove Norman interactions with the Zirids. The Latin chronicles of Alexander of Telese, Amatus of Montecassino, Falco of Benevento (and the continuation of his work in the Ferraris Chronicle), Geoffrey Malaterra, (so-­called) Hugo Falcandus, Robert of Torigni, Romuald of Salerno, and William of Apulia narrate the po­liti­cal and military environment that drove Norman involvement in Sicily and their l­ater governance of the island.76 Like Arabic-­language chronicles, ­these Latin texts had specific goals and ­were directed to a specific audience, necessarily skewing their narratives. T ­ hese texts, however, have the benefit of being written contemporaneously or near-­ contemporaneously with the events they purport to rec­ord, which minimizes (but does not eliminate) some of the issues surrounding textual transmission that are so prominent in the Arabic-­language corpus of evidence. In contrast to the paucity of documents from the Zirid court at Mahdia, a rich corpus of texts survives from the Norman court at Palermo, including charters, lists of taxpayers (ja­rāʾid), and documents concerned with the bound­ 75. ​Edward Cook et al., “Old World Megadroughts and Pluvials during the Common Era,” Science Advances 1, no. 10 (November 2015): 1–2. Before the OWDA, studies on the climate of medieval Ifriqiya only stretched back to the thirteenth ­century. See Ramzi Touchan et al., “Long Term Context for Recent Drought in Northwestern Africa,” Geophysical Research Letters 35 (2008); Ramzi Touchan et  al., “Spatiotemporal Drought Variability in Northwestern Africa over the Last Nine Centuries,” Climate Dynamics 37, no. 1 (2011): 237–52. The utility and limits of the OWDA is examined in Matt King, “The Sword and the Sun: The Old World Drought Atlas as a Source for Medieval History,” Al-­ Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 29, no. 3 (2017): 221–34. 76. ​Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis Ystoria Rogerii regis Sicilie Calabrie atque Apulie, ed. Ludovica de Nava (Rome: Instituto Palazzo Borromini, 1991); Amatus of Montecassino, The History of the Normans by Amatus of Montecassino, trans. Prescott N. Dunbar and Graham Loud (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2004); Falco of Benevento, Chronicle Beneventanum: Città e feudi nell’Italia dei Normanni, ed. Edoardo D’Angelo (Florence: Sismel, 1998); Geoffrey Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae comitis et Roberti Guiscardi ducis fratris eius, ed. L. A. Muratori and Ernersto Pontieri (Bologna, Italy: Nicola Zanichelli, 1949); Geoffrey Malaterra, The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of His ­Brother Duke Robert Guiscard, trans. Kenneth Baxter Wolf (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Geoffrey Malaterra, Histoire du G ­ rand Comte Roger et de son frère Robert Guiscard, trans. Marie-­Agnès Lucas-­ Avenel (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2016); Hugo Falcandus, La historia o liber de regno Sicilie e la epistola ad Petrum Panormitane ecclesie thesaurarium, ed. G. B. Siragusa (Rome: Tipografi del Senato, 1897); Hugo Falcandus, The History of the Tyrants of Sicily by “Hugo Falcandus,” 1154–69, trans. Graham Loud and Thomas Wiedemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Robert of Torigni, Chronicle of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I: The Chronicle of Robert of Torigni, Abbot of the Monastery of St. Michael-­in-­Peril-­of-­the-­Sea, ed. Richard Howlett (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889); Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, ed. Carlo Garufi (Città di Castello, Italy: S. Lapi, 1935); William of Apulia, Guillaume de Pouille: La geste de Robert Guiscard [gesta Roberti Wiscardi]: Édition, traduction, commentaire et introduction, trans. Marguerite Mathieu (Palermo: Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici, 1961).

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aries of estates (ḥudūd). Documents like ­these are indispensable for understanding the mechanisms of Norman governance on the island—­especially with regard to Muslims and the fate of rural populations.77 In addition, a host of Latin texts written outside the confines of Norman territory, often by authors hostile to the Normans, documents their broader relations with Eu­ro­ pean and Mediterranean powers.78 Although less is found about the Zirids and Normans in the Greek tradition, the poetry of a Norman noble exiled to the island of Gozo during the 1140s is a notable exception.79 Beyond ­these written sources, scholars have conducted substantial archaeological and art historical work on Norman Sicily (relative to Ifriqiya), which allows us to better assess both the dynamics of agricultural life on the island and the artistic programs ­adopted by elites.80 ­These sources, taken together, permit a reassessment of interactions between the Zirids and Normans, as well as the larger Mediterranean context in which ­these interactions happened. That said, narrative gaps remain and make it difficult at times to parse the details of ­these narratives. In the following chapters, I am forthcoming about ­these lacunae and suggest what might have happened during the years for which ­little information is given in the source materials. I have done this largely by analyzing nearby entries in medieval sources as well as drawing comparisons with geographies for which more surviving evidence exists. Further, I tend to see gaps in the written sources as indicative of times of relative peace, since the majority of entries from ­these 77. ​Many of ­these documents are assembled (albeit with numerous errors) in Salvatore Cusa, I diplomi greci ed arabi di Sicilia pubblicati nel teto originale (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1982). An ongoing proj­ect sponsored by the Eu­ro­pean Research Council, Documenting Multiculturalism: Coexistence, Law and Multiculturalism in the Administrative and L­ egal Documents of Norman and Hohenstaufen Sicily, c.1060–­c.1266, aims to assem­ble updated critical editions and translations of all administrative and ­legal documents from Norman and Hohenstaufen Sicily written in Arabic, Latin, and Greek. Details about this proj­ect are at https://­cordis​.­europa​.­eu​/­project​/­id​/­787342​.­ See also Horst Enzensberger, “Chanceries, Charters, and Administration in Norman Italy,” in The Society of Norman Italy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 117–50; Graham Loud, “The Chancery and Charters of the Kings of Sicily (1130–1212),” En­glish Historical Review 124, no. 509 (August 2009): 779–810. 78. ​Among ­these sources, the chronicle of William of Tyre is the most detailed. It can be found in the original Latin in William of Tyre, in Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1853), 201:209–1068 (http://­patristica​.­net​/­latina​/­) (hereafter cited as PL), and translated into En­glish in William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea, trans. Emily Babcock and August Krey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). 79. ​Joseph Busuttil, Stanley Fiorini, and Horatio  C.  R. Vella, Tristia ex Melitogaudo: Lament in Greek Verse of a XIIth-­Century Exile on Gozo (Valletta: Best Print, 2010). 80. ​Ernst Kitzinger, The Mosaics of St. Mary’s of the Admiral in Palermo (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1991); Arcifa et al., “Archeologia della Sicilia islamica,” section 4.1; Thomas Dittelbach, “Counter-­ Narratives in 12th ­Century Norman Art and Architecture,” in Urban Dynamics and Transcultural Communication in Medieval Sicily, ed. Theresa Jäckh and Mona Kirsch (Paderborn, Germany: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2017), 141–57; Allesandra Molinari, “Sicily,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Archaeology, ed. Bethany J. Walker, Timothy Insoll, and Corisande Fenwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 335–54.

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texts focus on instances of conflict. Gaps in narrative sources also mean that it is necessary at times to draw broad conclusions from one or two pieces of evidence. This is particularly true when looking at the economic networks in which the Zirids and Normans operated. A single letter from the Cairo Geniza or a passing reference in an Arabic chronicle sometimes represents the only evidence of commercial contact between Ifriqiya and Sicily for more than a year. ­These singular references nonetheless indicate a larger infrastructure that enabled such overseas travel to happen on (at least) a semi-­regular basis.81 That said, when ­there are contradictions between medieval sources, I have tried to be forthcoming (often in footnotes) about t­ hese narrative dissonances and their implications. At times, I have also used anachronistic and problematic identifiers for the sake of narrative comprehension. Thus, Banū Zīrī of Arabic sources becomes the “Zirids” and al-­Muwaḥidūn becomes the “Almohads.” I use t­ hese terms in a po­liti­cal sense to consider the ruling dynasty and the lands they governed, while likewise acknowledging that ­these groups ruled over diverse ­people and that the borders of their lands w ­ ere amorphous. I also use “Norman” as a broad po­liti­cal category to denote the ruling dynasty in Sicily and southern Italy established in the eleventh ­century. Despite its ambiguity and diversity, the term is frequently evoked in medieval sources and is entrenched in modern scholarship. We should note, however, that t­ here ­were shifting conceptions of what it meant to be “Norman,” that ­there ­were dif­fer­ent groups of Normans across Eu­rope and the Mediterranean with their own identities, and that the majority of ­people living in the Norman kingdom of Sicily w ­ ere non-­ Normans of varied ethnicities and confessional identities. Issues surrounding the geographic limitations of power and ethnic/tribal/dynastic affiliation are discussed in greater detail in chapter 1. I also use the admittedly broad categories “Latin Christian,” “Greek,” and “Muslim” to refer to areas where po­liti­cal power was in the hands of a dynasty that had nominal allegiance to the pope of Rome, the patriarch of Constantinople, or the reigning Sunni caliph/Shiʿa imam-­caliph (respectively). T ­ hese terms obfuscate regional diversity and the ambiguity of religious identity, but are nonetheless useful for categorizing territories in which a given religious tradition had the greatest po­liti­cal and cultural traction.82 When referring to regions in the Mediterranean basin, I use the term “central Mediterranean” 81. ​Michael McCormick, Origins of the Eu­ro­pean Economy: Communications and Commerce, AD 300– 900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3; Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 25. 82. ​König argues that ­these categories “can only serve as terminological tools to circumscribe permeable cultural spheres subject to constant change.” Daniel König, Arabic-­Islamic Views of the Latin West: Tracing the Emergence of Medieval Eu­rope (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1.

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to broadly refer to the Italian Peninsula, Sicily, the region of Ifriqiya (the specifics of which are discussed in chapter 1), and intermediate islands between ­these territories. I trust that ­these anachronisms, while straying from the vocabulary of the medieval sources, help make the narrative more easily digestible and consequently meaningful for readers of the twenty-­first c­ entury.

Chapter Overview This book traces the intertwined and interdependent histories of the Zirids and Normans from their dynastic origins through the fall of the Norman kingdom of Africa in 1160.83 Chapter  1 considers the geo­g raph­i­cal context in which ­these two dynasties operated by analyzing the topography, climate, and borders of medieval Ifriqiya and Sicily. The ambiguous bound­aries of Ifriqiya in both Arabic and Latin sources make it difficult to quantify the extent of power among medieval dynasties ruling in the region, especially outside of coastal urban centers. The Aghlabids, Fatimids, Zirids, and Normans nonetheless benefited from the wealth produced by substantial commercial networks that passed between Ifriqiya and Sicily, including profitable long-­distance trade that originated in sub-­Saharan Africa. The Zirids stood to inherit this wealth by virtue of their ser­vice to the Fatimid dynasty, a Shiʿa group whose apocalyptic message was well received in much of Ifriqiya and the Maghreb. When the Fatimids moved their capital from Ifriqiya to Egypt at the end of the tenth c­ entury, they appointed their loyal Zirid generals as emirs of Ifriqiya—­ thus initiating Zirid rule in the region. The early history of the Zirid dynasty and its initial interactions with the Normans are explored in chapter 2. On their appointment as emirs of Ifriqiya, the Zirids waged perennial wars against rival tribes across northwest Africa and eventually met their match in the form of the Banu Hilal, who drove 83. ​The proliferation of scholarship on the Normans when compared to the Zirids has led me to emphasize the latter over the former at times, especially with regard to dynastic origins (chapter 2). At the same time, the more substantial corpus of con­temporary sources from Norman Sicily necessitates increased scrutiny of Norman perspectives on occasion, such as when discussing the Norman kingdom of Africa (chapter  5). My emphasis on trans-­dynastic connections at times precludes detailed discussions of internal politics in Ifriqiya and Sicily, although I have attempted to include them insofar as they are relevant to this overarching narrative of Zirid-­Norman history. This trend in the field of Mediterranean studies of focusing almost exclusively on geo­g raph­ic­ ally disparate connections has fallen u ­ nder scrutiny in recent years. Ramzi Rouighi, “A Mediterranean of Relations for the Medieval Maghrib: Historiography in Question,” Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 29, no. 3 (2017): 201–20. See also W. V. Harris, ed., Rethinking the Mediterranean (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Brian Catlos and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., Can We Talk Mediterranean? Conversations on an Emerging Field in Medieval and Early Modern Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

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the Zirids from their inland capital of Sabra al-­Mansuriya to the coastal stronghold of Mahdia in the m ­ iddle of the eleventh c­ entury. The displacement of the Zirids to coastal Ifriqiya re­oriented their foreign policy t­ oward the Mediterranean and especially Sicily, where they sought to expand their power. Zirid armies arrived on the island and made alliances with local rulers, as did another group of enterprising newcomers to Sicily: the Normans. In a handful of military encounters between the two dynasties, the Normans emerged victorious and forced Zirid armies off the island. Nonetheless, both groups eventually de­cided that conflict was less profitable than mutually beneficial trade, which led to the establishment of a commercial partnership between them. The increasingly tenuous relationship between the Zirids and Normans from 1087 ­until the Zirid victory at the B ­ attle of al-­Dimas in the summer of 517H (1123) is the focus of chapter 3. The fruitful trading partnership between the two dynasties weathered a Pisan-­Genoese campaign against Mahdia in 1087 as well as the First Crusade, but it was disrupted when the Ifriqiyan governor of Gabès tried to forge an alliance with the Normans in the early twelfth ­century to further his own commercial goals. The Zirids subsequently formed an alliance of their own with the Almoravids of Morocco to destabilize Norman power in Sicily, which led to a successful raid on Norman lands. The Normans responded to this aggression by sending an army to Ifriqiya, which the Zirids and their Arab allies dispatched at the ­Battle of al-­Dimas. This was a meaningful victory for the Zirid emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, who sent a letter to his neighbors that highlighted his victory over the tyrannical Normans and extolled the righ­teous zeal of his allies. Chapter 4 explores the events leading to the collapse of the Zirid dynasty in 543H (1148–49) and the foundation of the Norman kingdom of Africa. Relations between the two dynasties largely stabilized a­ fter the B ­ attle of al-­ Dimas, as the Zirids looked to expand their power in Ifriqiya and the Normans campaigned in southern Italy. The Normans ­were far more successful in their expeditions than the Zirids, who, having lost their Almoravid and local Arab allies, w ­ ere forced to turn to the Normans for aid when Mahdia was besieged in 529H (1134–35). This Zirid-­Norman victory proved pivotal in the history of the two dynasties, for it marked the beginning of a gradual ascent of Norman control over the affairs of coastal Ifriqiya. In the years ­after 529H (1134– 35), Roger II and his admiral George of Antioch used Ifriqiya’s exploitable dependence on Sicilian grain to their advantage. The Zirids, meanwhile, proved unable to muster sufficient support to assert their larger Mediterranean ambitions. This po­liti­cal fracturing was compounded by a nearly decade-­long drought in Ifriqiya—­attested in both the medieval sources and the Old World

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Drought Atlas—­that brought hardship, emigration, and death to the Zirids and other local lords. T ­ hese ­factors allowed the opportunistic Normans to conquer the littoral of Ifriqiya from Tripoli up to Tunis by 1148, thus forming the Norman kingdom of Africa. The policies and consequences of Norman governance in North Africa are considered in chapter 5. King Roger II and his successor William I ruled their African coastal cities through local Muslim governors, who w ­ ere appointed to their positions through traditional Islamic practices like the bestowal of robes of honor. In most of the cities they conquered, the Normans played ­little role in the day-­to-­day management of their lands. Nonetheless, they made structural changes in the region that proved consequential. The Norman kings installed garrisons in Ifriqiyan cities, changed the tax structure to benefit Christians, and signed contracts with local governors to ensure their fealty. Jewish merchants, deterred by years of vio­lence between the Zirids and Normans, also forsook the ports of Ifriqiya, which allowed Italian Christian merchants more room to conduct commerce. ­These changes denigrated the Muslim majority of Ifriqiya and ultimately paved the way for ­f uture revolts against Norman rule. On the death of Roger II in 1154, his son William I faced widespread unrest in southern Italy that occupied his military resources for the first several years of his reign. In Ifriqiya, too, trou­ble was brewing for the Normans. Chapter 6 explores how local governors, drawing on a regional tradition of holy war against Christians and prevailing l­egal opinions from Maliki scholars, revolted against Norman rule during the mid-1150s and reduced Norman governance in the region to Mahdia, Zawila, and Sousse. The final blow to Norman Africa came courtesy of the Almohads from the Maghreb, who conquered Mahdia and ended Norman rule in Ifriqiya in 554H (1159–60). The Almohads instituted policies of forced deportation for many Ifriqiyan tribal leaders, which fundamentally realigned the regional po­liti­cal landscape. In Sicily, meanwhile, William I made no effort to reconquer his lost African possessions, and his successors instead forged lucrative trading contracts with the Almohads during the 1180s. Although medieval Christian authors paid l­ ittle attention to the rise and fall of Norman Africa, Muslim writers like Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun kept alive the memory of Zirid-­Norman conflict by presenting Norman aggression as one theater of a monolithic “Frankish” assault on the lands of Islam that spanned the Mediterranean. This book examines the interconnected histories of the Zirids and Normans without shying away from its many ambiguities and contradictions. It also challenges long-­held narratives about medieval Ifriqiya and Sicily. The study of the Zirid-­Norman relationship reveals the extent to which both dynasties ­were

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involved in each other’s affairs, and the frequent encounters, both peaceful and violent, this mutual involvement precipitated. By analyzing the history of the Zirids alongside their Norman neighbors, and not seeing the eventual Norman conquests in Ifriqiya as inevitable, this book further demonstrates the importance of the history of the Zirids to Mediterranean history during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

C h a p te r 1

Geographic Orientations and the Rise of the Fatimids

The intertwined histories of the Zirids and Normans are geo­g raph­ic­ ally centered on the littoral of the central Mediterranean: Sicily, the Italian Peninsula, the region of Ifriqiya, and a handful of intermediate islands located in the Strait of Sicily. The bound­aries of Norman power in Sicily and southern Italy are fairly explicit in medieval sources, but the same cannot be said of Zirid authority in Ifriqiya. Arabic and Latin sources from the M ­ iddle Ages provide varying conceptions of the borders of Ifriqiya, which makes it difficult to gauge the scope of Zirid control in this amorphous region. Although the bound­aries of Zirid authority are difficult to quantify, it is nonetheless clear that both the Zirids and Normans governed territories in the central Mediterranean that ­were part of a shared trading network stretching from sub-­Saharan Africa to Eu­rope. The productivity (or lack thereof ) of ­these lucrative shipping lanes was a crucial component of the relationship between t­ hese two dynasties in times of both peace and conflict.

The Amorphous Bound­aries of Ifriqiya and Africe From the late tenth through the mid-­twelfth centuries, the Zirids governed lands that comprised stretches of modern Tunisia, eastern Algeria, and western Libya. This is a territory that medieval Arabic writers called “Ifriqiya” and 27

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medieval Latin writers called “Africe.” ­These authors, however, had varied conceptions of this region’s bound­aries, which makes pinning down the borders of Ifriqiya and Africe an exceedingly difficult if not fruitless endeavor. By analyzing ­these geographies as medieval writers saw them, we can nonetheless better understand historical conceptions of land held by the Zirids and (­later) Normans on the African continent, to better evaluate the geo­g raph­i­cal limitations of their power. The etymological origin for the Arabic term “Ifriqiya” derives from the Roman province Africa Proconsularis.1 Defining the precise geo­g raph­i­cal limits of this province was a ­great concern to the Romans from the time of its founding in 146 BCE.2 Scipio Africanus, the first governor of Africa Proconsularis, ordered the digging of a ditch (the Fossa regia) along the southern border of the territory from Tabarka to Thaenae, dividing the Roman world from that of nearby indigenous ­peoples in Numidia.3 Subsequent Roman governors and emperors constructed fortifications across the province as its borders changed from the second c­ entury BCE ­until the fifth c­ entury CE. Julius Caesar, for example, used the Fossa regia to mark the border between Africa Vetus (Old Africa, or the old bound­aries of Africa Proconsularis) and Africa Nova, which comprised newly conquered territories in Numidia.4 Further east, in Libya, Roman emperors in the second c­ entury CE constructed a line of fortifications and watchtowers—­now called the Limes Tripolitanus—to protect against threats from the south.5 The bound­aries of Roman territories on the African continent dissolved in the fifth c­ entury with the invasion of the Vandals, but the idea of Africa Proconsularis persisted. When the Byzantine emperor Justinian reconquered much of North Africa in the 530s, he ­adopted the victorious title of “Alan, Vandal, and Africa Conqueror” to evoke the idea of a restored Africa Proconsularis.6 ­After his African conquests, Justinian established the Praetorian prefecture of Africa, which l­ater became known as the Exarchate of Carthage. The holdings 1. ​In ancient Latin sources, the territory is also called Provincia Africa or simply Africa. Afer (pl. Afri) was a Latin name for the p­ eople of Africa, particularly in the context of the ancient Mediterranean before the fall of Carthage to the Romans in the second ­century BCE. Mohamed Talbi, “Ifrīḳiya,” EI2. 2. ​Abun-­Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 34. 3. ​Pliny the Elder, for example, describes the ditch as separating the “old and new” provinces in Africa. Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia 5.3.25. Text accessed at https://­bit​.­ly​/­PlinyNH5. 4. ​J.  B. Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 18–21. 5. ​P. Trousset, Recherches sur le Limes Tripolitanus du Chott el-­Djerid à la frontière tuniso-­libyenne (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1974). 6. ​Andy Merrills and Richard Miles, The Vandals (Malden, MA: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2010), 96–97. The imperial proj­ect of Justinian in Africa is discussed in Peter Heather, Rome Resurgent: War and Empire in the Age of Justinian (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 237–40, 270–79.

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of this Byzantine administrative division included most of the North African coast.7 The Exarchate of Carthage persisted ­until Muslim armies conquered North Africa in the seventh ­century. A ­ fter ­these campaigns, authors writing in Arabic began to refer to the territory of Ifriqiya as being roughly the same area as the former province of Africa Proconsularis. Although modern scholars agree that the name “Ifriqiya” was “undoubtedly” derived from the Latin Africa, medieval writers had other ideas about the origins of the term.8 The geographer al-­Bakri, for example, argued that it was derived from an Arab ancestor named Ifriqish ibn Abraha al-­Raʾish.9 Alternatively, the historian Ibn Abi Dinar asserted that the territory derived from the Arabic root faraqa, which broadly means “to separate,” ­because Ifriqiya separated the Maghreb in the west from Egypt (Miṣr) to the east.10 Medieval Muslim authors not only disagreed about the origins of the term “Ifriqiya,” they also disputed its bound­aries. The earliest references to the region come from the ninth ­century, when the writers Ibn ʿAbd al-­Hakam and al-­Baladhuri considered it to extend from Tripoli in the east to Tangiers in the west—­roughly corresponding to the lands held by Gregory the Patrician, a Byzantine exarch of Africa.11 Another author from the ninth c­ entury, Ibn Khordadbeh, adhered to a po­liti­cal definition of Ifriqiya by describing it in the context of the ruling Aghlabid dynasty.12 Al-­Bakri, who lived during the eleventh 7. ​Byzantine North Africa comprised the provinces of Zeugitana, Byzacena, Tripolitania, Numidia, Mauretania Sitifensis, and Mauretania Caesariensis. ­These provinces ran from the Atlantic Ocean up to the eastern edge of the Gulf of Sirte in Libya. Walter E. Kaegi, Muslim Expansion and Byzantine Collapse in North Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4–6; Simon Samuel Ford, “Carthage, Exarchate of,” in Oxford Dictionary of Late Antiquity, ed. Oliver Nicholson (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1:298. 8. ​Talbi, “Ifrīḳiya,” EI2. See also Amar Baadj, Saladin, the Almohads and the Banū Ghāniya: The Contest for North Africa (12th and 13th Centuries) (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 7. 9. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalikwa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:193. 10. ​Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis, 7–9. See also Natalie Zemon Davis, Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-­Century Muslim between Worlds (New York: Faber and Faber, 2006), 125–52. 11. ​Gregory the Patrician was the exarch of Africa ­until he was killed during the first Muslim invasion of North Africa in 647. The bound­aries of Byzantine power in North Africa are disputed, especially around the time of the Muslim conquests. Kaegi, Muslim Expansion, 44–47, 145. On the physical transformation of Ifriqiya during this time, see Philipp von Rummel, “The Transformation of Ancient Land-­and Cityscapes in Early Medieval North Africa,” in North Africa u­ nder Byzantium and Early Islam, ed. Susan T. Stevens and Jonathan P. Conant (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2016), 105–18; Corisande Fenwick, “The Fate of the Classical Cities of Ifriqīya in the Early M ­ iddle Ages,” in Africa–­ Ifrīqiya: Continuity and Change in North Africa from the Byzantine to the Early Islamic Age, ed. Ralf Bockmann, Anna Leone, and Philipp von Rummel (Leipzig: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2019), 137–55. 12. ​Ramzi Rouighi, “The Mediterranean between Barbaria and the Medieval Maghrib: Questions for a Return to History,” Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 32, no. 3 (2020): 313. Ibn Khordadbeh puts Ifriqiya alongside the Maghreb and Egypt in his geography. Ibn Khordadbeh, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 5.

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c­ entury, wrote that Ifriqiya extends from Barqa (Libya) in the east to Tangiers (Morocco) in the west and from the Mediterranean in the north to the Bilad al-­Sudan (Land of the Blacks) to the south.13 During the reign of the Hafsids (r. 1229–1574), the city of Bougie was placed alternately in the eastern Maghreb and Ifriqiya.14 ­These varied conceptions of Ifriqiya meant that the region itself was often an “ideological aspiration” rather than a fixed territory, with its borders changing depending on the authorial agendas of individual writers.15 The Zirids ­were one of a number of Muslim dynasties during the ­Middle Ages that held lands in this amorphous territory. Although some medieval sources bestow the honorific title “emir of Ifriqiya” on Zirid lords, the bound­ aries of their power ­were far more restricted than this designation implies. As ­will be discussed in the coming chapters, the Zirid emirs waged perennial conflicts against tribes that lived on the peripheries of their territories, particularly in inland regions of modern-­day Tunis and Algeria. Which areas the Zirids could effectively govern, tax, and legislate was contingent on keeping t­hese nomadic groups at bay or u ­ nder their jurisdiction—­a real­ity that could frequently change based on the results of a given season of military campaigns. Like the movements of t­ hese nomadic p­ eoples across North Africa, the limits of Zirid authority in Ifriqiya ­were fluid.16 During the twelfth ­century in par­ tic­u­lar, Zirid power was concentrated along the coastline of modern-­day Tunisia and western Libya, from roughly Tripoli in the east to Tunis in the west. When considering the breadth of Zirid power and authority in Ifriqiya, we thus must bear in mind both con­temporary conceptions about this amorphous region and the l­imited scope of Zirid power within it. The bound­aries of the Latin Africe ­were even more wide-­ranging than the Arabic Ifriqiya. Geographers in medieval Eu­rope typically saw the world as divided between three landmasses (Asia, Eu­rope, and Africa) that ­were sepa13. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:193. Some geographers even considered Sicily to be an “appendage” of Ifriqiya. Nef, “L’histoire des ‘mozarabes’ de Sicile,” 265–66. 14. ​Ramzi Rouighi, The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate: Ifriqiya and Its Andalusis, 1200–1400 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 4–6. 15. ​Many Muslim geographers of the medieval period based their knowledge of Africa (especially sub-­Saharan Africa) on the works of ancient Greek scholars. John Hunwick, “A Region of the Mind: Medieval Arab Views of African Geography and Ethnography and Their Legacy,” Sudanic Africa 16 (2005): 107–8. 16. ​Geographies of time w ­ ere one way medieval p­ eoples mea­sured the breadth of their territories. One of the first Sanhaja chieftains to govern in the western Sahara was said to have territory that comprised an area “three months long and three months wide.” Tadeusz Lewicki, “The Role of the Sahara and Saharians in Relationships between North and South,” in General History of Africa: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh ­Century, ed. M. Elfasi (Berkeley, CA: Heinemann, 1988), 3:309. See also Zayde Antrim, Routes and Realms: The Power of Place in the Early Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

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rated by the Mediterranean Sea and surrounded by a large exterior ocean.17 First described by Isidore of Seville and then widely ­adopted across medieval Eu­rope, this geo­g raph­i­cal paradigm is reflected in a chronicle written at the monastery of Saint Peter in Erfurt during the twelfth ­century (central Germany). When referencing Roger II’s conquest of the island of Djerba in 1135, it mentions Byzantine and German fears about the expansion of Norman territory to include Africe, a landmass that is “known to be the third part of the world.”18 In Norman Sicily, scholars w ­ ere enmeshed in the scholastic traditions of both Latin Eu­rope and the Muslim world; consequently, their conceptions of the territory of Africe w ­ ere dif­fer­ent from ­those of Isidore of Seville and the chronicle from Erfurt.19 The chronicle of (so-­called) Hugo Falcandus, for example, uses the term “Affrice” to mean only the city of Mahdia.20 The scholar and archdeacon Henry Aristippus, meanwhile, holds that Africa is one of several territories held by the Norman king William I, “whose rule Sicily, Calabria, Lucania, Campania, Apulia, Libya, and Africa applaud, whose conquering right hand is felt in Dalmatia, Thessaly, Greece, Rhodes, Crete, Cyprus, Cyrene, and Egypt.”21 A charter of William I paints a grandiose picture of the territory ­under control of the Norman monarch by claiming that he is the “most serene and unconquered king of Sicily and Italy and also of the entire kingdom of Africa”—­a title that evokes a g­ rand (though unclear) territory across the Strait of Sicily.22 The variation in perceptions of the idea of Africe both within and outside the borders of the Kingdom of Sicily is evident. When medieval authors refer to Norman rule in Africa and the lofty title of “king of Africa,” therefore, we should acknowledge that the bound­aries suggested in 17. ​Wesley M. Stevens, “The Figure of the Earth in Isidore’s ‘De Natura Rerum,’ ” Isis 71, no. 2 (1980): 268–77. 18. ​ Monumenta Erphesfurtenisa, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, SS rer. Germ., 42:171, https://­ www​.­dmgh​.­de (hereafter cited as MGH, by division, volume, page). The author of this text likely wrote it ­after the Normans’ campaigns in North Africa during the 1140s. 19. ​Hubert Houben, Roger II of Sicily: A Ruler between East and West, trans. Graham Loud and Diane Milburn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 98–113. 20. ​The name “Hugo Falcandus” is a pseudonym provided by the other­wise unknown author of this chronicle. The author’s use of the term “Africa” is made explicit in his account of the loss of the city to the Almohads in 1160: “When [the Sicilian fleet], returning from Spain, could now be seen by the sentries of the Almohads, the soldiers that w ­ ere in Africa (Affrice), with their spirits restored, began to raise shouts, to insult the enemies, and to point out the approaching galleys . . . ​When now the fleet was drawing near the land, a huge clamor sprung up in the city (urbe) with the joyfulness of the soldiers.” Falcandus, La historia o Liber de regno Sicilie, 78–79. See also Falcandus, History of the Tyrants of Sicily, 29–53. 21. ​Henricus Aristippus, Phaedo: Interprete Henrico Aristippo, ed. Laurentius Minio-­Paluello (London: Warburg Institute, 1950), 90. 22. ​Horst Enzensberger, ed., Guillelmi I: Regis diplomata (Cologne: Böhlau, 1996), document 13.

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their texts are as varied as ­those of the Muslim authors writing about Zirid lands in Ifriqiya. The ambiguity of the territory of Ifriqiya and Africe across medieval sources makes it difficult if not impossible to pin down the precise borders of lands governed by the Zirids and Normans on the African continent during the ele­ venth and twelfth centuries. Therefore, instead of trying to draw maps of territories with vague edges and unclear bound­aries, I use urban centers as points of reference to gauge the extent of Zirid and Norman power on the African continent and have provided maps that focus on urban centers instead of terrestrial borders.23 Cities are the locations most frequently mentioned in con­ temporary sources and thus provide the clearest sense of who controlled a certain location at a certain point in time.24 This style of cartography likewise leaves undesignated lands outside of urban areas that ­either are unexplored in medieval sources or ­were the subject of frequent regime changes. Fortunately, medieval sources are less ambiguous when considering Norman territories within Sicily and southern Italy. Surviving documents from the Norman court provide considerable evidence of Norman settlement and taxation patterns across Sicily and the extent of their holdings on the Italian Peninsula.25 So too do outside chronicles and charters provide documentation of the Normans’ presence in ­these territories.26 Papal acknowledgement of Roger II as the “King of Sicily, of the duchy of Apulia, and of the principality of Capua” further legitimated the Norman king and defined the bound­aries of his lands to contemporaries using well-­established territorial pre­ce­dents. Nonetheless, the extent to which the Normans could exercise control in t­ hese territories varied. Internal dissent and external invasion (both in Sicily and southern Italy) proved threats to Norman power, especially when Roger II was still competing for papal recognition as the king of Sicily. Thus, although the “Kingdom of Sicily” stretched from western Sicily to the eastern edge of the Italian Peninsula, the Normans w ­ ere unable to exert their authority over 23. ​This approach echoes that of Ronnie Ellenblum, whose research on the frontiers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem emphasizes the importance of cities as opposed to concrete bound­aries outside of ­these strongholds. Ronnie Ellenblum, Crusader ­Castles and Modern Histories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 134. 24. ​Even so, control over urban centers was not necessarily as concrete as city walls might indicate. Muhriz ibn Ziyad, for example, was a twelfth-­century lord who ruled from the ruins of ancient Carthage, which are located just outside the city of Tunis. Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:234–36; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:232–35. 25. ​See, for example, Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 91–211. 26. ​On bilingual Norman charters as an “expression of a cross-­cultural interaction,” see Julia Becker, “Charters and Chancery ­under Roger I and Roger II,” in Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage: Exchange of Cultures in the “Norman” Peripheries of Medieval Eu­rope, ed. Stefan Burkhardt and Thomas Foerster (New York: Ashgate, 2013), 95.

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the breadth of this kingdom on numerous occasions—­especially in the case of inland Sicily.27

The Movement of Winds, Goods, and ­Peoples The physical geographies of Ifriqiya (however it is defined) and the Kingdom of Sicily are essential to understanding the interconnected histories of the Zirids and Normans. They helped shape the economic, po­liti­cal, and societal structures that both dynasties inherited, which in turn influenced ­later exchanges between them. The Zirids and the Normans ruled over lands that had meaningful geographic and climatological differences despite their relative proximity. Issues of agricultural versus pastoral production, the capacity to produce life-­sustaining wheat, the safety of merchants passing safely through ports, and the vulnerability of populations to drought proved crucial to the Zirid-­Norman relationship. As such, it is necessary to discuss in some level of detail the physical landscape over which t­ hese powers ruled and the larger trans-­Mediterranean commercial environment in which their lands functioned. The northern stretches of modern-­day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (which roughly correspond to the amorphous bound­aries of medieval Ifriqiya) share similar environmental features that are defined by east-­west stretches of varying elevation.28 Along the coast, ­these areas share a Mediterranean climate that features hot summers and mild winters. The vast majority of rainfall occurs during the winter months and feeds regional agricultural production. Land along this stretch of coastline receives more rain than coastlines further to the east in modern-­day Libya and western Egypt. Moving inland, the lands of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia become more mountainous. The southern edge of Ifriqiya culminates in the Atlas and Anti-­Atlas Mountains, which stretch from the western edge of Morocco into Tunisia. On the southern side of t­ hese mountains lies the Sahara Desert, which separates North Africa from the rest of the continent. The size of the Sahara is such that it was traversable in the medieval world only via camel caravans that traveled along planned routes from oasis to oasis. 27. ​Annliese Nef and Vivien Prigent, “Contrôle et exploitation des campagnes en Sicile,” in Authority and Control in the Countryside: From Antiquity to Islam in the Mediterranean and Near East (6th– 10th ­Century), ed. Alain Delattre, Marie Legendre, and Petra Sijpesteijn (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 313–66. 28. ​Kaegi, Muslim Expansion, 48. Braudel’s description of North Africa as “a poor land, without ­water” and with “sparse vegetation” is a misrepre­sen­ta­tion of the region. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 1:174.

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Of par­tic­u­lar importance to the interconnected narratives of the Zirids and Normans is the coastline of North Africa that extends from roughly Algiers in the west to Tripoli in the east. During the M ­ iddle Ages, much of this land was arable, particularly in the Mitidja of Algeria and in the valley along the Medjerda River in Tunisia.29 Fertile soil in t­ hese areas allowed for the cultivation of cereal grains like wheat and barley, as well as the planting of orchards. Without proper irrigation, however, the production of agriculture in this region was perilous. Annual rainfall varied considerably, and without proper access to aquifers or aqueducts, harvests risked failing in dry years. The northern reaches of Algeria and Tunisia ­were also home to a variety of flora that provided timber during the ­Middle Ages.30 Moving southeast along the coast of Tunisia, the landscape becomes more arid but still productive.31 Urban centers like Sousse and Sfax w ­ ere home to vast orchards of olive trees used for the production of olive oil, one of the area’s major exports. Al-­Bakri describes the environs of Kairouan and Gafsa, which contained pistachio trees and orchards with diverse fruits, while other inland cities like Nefusa and Tozeur produced sugar, dates, and bananas from their own orchards.32 As in the arable lands of northern Tunisia and Algeria, the cultivation of t­ hese goods was contingent on having adequate ­water, which could arrive via rain, aqueducts, or aquifers. In urban centers of the region, raw materials w ­ ere pro­cessed to make textiles, pottery, soap, and tanned animal hides. In addition to agricultural production, the breeding of camels and ­horses was a substantial industry in Ifriqiya. ­These animals’ military uses, their utility in transporting goods in caravans, their meat, and their hides made them a staple in both rural and urban areas.33 The p­ eople of Ifriqiya also reared sheep, as seen in a ­legal opinion (fatwā, pl. fatāwā) from the area of Constantine (modern-­day Algeria), which mentions that the value of short-­tailed sheep was not less than that of big-­tailed sheep.34 Agricultural and pastoral production in Ifriqiya was further complemented by commercial traffic that passed through its cities. It is perhaps most construc29. ​Kaegi explains the thirteen micro-­regions of North Africa in some detail. Kaegi, Muslim Expansion, 48–64. See also Baadj, Saladin, 6–10. 30. ​Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 179–84. 31. ​Economic production in Zirid Ifriqiya is explored in Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:622–41. See also Baadj, Saladin, 26–28. 32. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:224–25. 33. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:631; Jean Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes in West Africa,” in General History of Africa, vol. 3, Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh C ­ entury, ed. M. Elfasi (Berkeley, CA: Heinemann, 1988), 378–81. 34. ​Evidence from inland Ifriqiya indicates that dogs ­were also bred for consumption. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:631–32.

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tive to think of Ifriqiya as a region bounded by two seas. To the north, merchant ships traversed the Mediterranean Sea, moving goods between its coastal cities and many islands. To the south, caravans navigated the vast “sea” of the Sahara Desert, trading goods at oases before arriving at northern termini in North Africa. Ifriqiya was a liminal zone between t­hese two seas, which contributed to merchant traffic in its markets.35 The taxes rulers in Ifriqiya like the Zirids levied on merchants’ wares ­were an impor­tant source of gold for their trea­suries.36 Bordering Ifriqiya to the south is a sea of sand and rock that covers over 30 ­percent of the African continent. The Sahara Desert, the largest hot desert in the world, was home to a network of trade routes during the ­Middle Ages in which merchant caravans—­well equipped with camels to transport their wares—­hopped between oases. Although ­these networks of exchange are poorly documented in medieval sources, Arabic geographies provide snapshots of them at irregular intervals.37 Trans-­Saharan trade depended primarily on the exchange of goods between Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali in West Africa and northern termini in the Maghreb, Ifriqiya, and Egypt.38 ­These regions are separated by over 1,200 miles of desert, which is navigable via camel caravans through a carefully plotted series of oases.39 Although the Sahara Desert receives on average less than 100 millimeters of rainfall per year, this rain along with under­g round aquifers is enough to support modest plant life to sustain caravans on their voyages across the desert.40 South of the Sahara, along a stretch of savanna in much of modern-­day Mali, w ­ ere cities large enough to support the mining of gold ore from deposits 35. ​­These commercial routes ­were not static; they ­were influenced by larger po­liti­cal and economic trends. Thus, although Sicily and Ifriqiya are located at the geographic center of the Mediterranean, medieval p­ eoples did not necessarily perceive them to be of central importance. Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 21–24. 36. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:621–22. 37. ​Geographers like Ibn Hawqal, al-­Bakri, and al-­Idrisi describe t­hese routes in detail, likely ­because of the danger associated with deviating from established roads. Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 370–71. 38. ​Virginie Prevost, L’aventure ibāḍite dans le Sud tunisien: Effervescence d’une région méconnue (Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 2008), 363–75. 39. ​On the role of Ouargla in this network, see Cyrille Aillet, “Wārjlān, un foyer de l’ibadisme médiéval aux marges du Sahara,” in L’ibadisme dans les sociétés de l’Islam médiéval, ed. Cyrille Aillet (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 207–43. 40. ​On the veracity of claims made in medieval Arabic geographies and the difficulties associated with using them to corroborate other sources, see Karen C. Pinto, Medieval Islamic Maps: An Exploration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). For al-­Idrisi and his world, see al-­Idrisi, La première géographie de l’Occident, trans. Henri Bresc and Annliese Nef (Paris: Flammarion, 1999); Jean-­Charles Ducène, “Les œuvres géographiques d’al-­Idrīsī et leur diffusion,” Journal Asiatique 305, no. 1 (2017): 33–41; Jean-­ Charles Ducène, “al-­Idrīsī, Abū ʿAbdallāh,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., ed., Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson, 57 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2007–), https://­ referenceworks​.­brillonline​.­com​/­browse​/­encyclopaedia​-­of​-­islam​-­3 (hereafter cited as EI3).

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that dotted the region.41 The cities of Awdaghust, Tadmakka, and Ghana served as impor­tant centers of exchange for routes that passed north into Ifriqiya, including to the inland hubs of Kairouan and Ouargla, during the early and central M ­ iddle Ages.42 From roughly the seventh ­century onward, caravans of dromedary camels (originally imported from the Arabian Peninsula) provided the power and endurance needed to traffic merchants and their wares across the Sahara. This journey was an arduous one. The length of trans-­Saharan voyages is difficult to determine with any degree of precision, although scholars estimate a one-­way trip from southern Mali to Kairouan could take around three to five months, depending on the environmental conditions and the health of the camels.43 In most cases, however, traders would not travel the entirety of this route on their own. Instead, they would travel part of the journey u ­ ntil they reached an oasis where they could barter their goods at a satisfactory price—­a practice similar to that of the long-­distance trade networks that spanned the Silk Road in Asia.44 The danger of crossing a landscape as inhospitable as the Sahara Desert makes it all the more likely that local Berber merchants with intimate knowledge of its immediate geography ­were responsible for leading individual legs of caravan journeys. Despite the dangers of caravan travel across the Sahara, t­ hese trade routes ­were im­mensely profitable.45 Ifriqiyan merchants traded salt and textiles alongside precious stones, pottery, glassware, silver, hides, wheat, dates, soap, and raisins to traders coming from the other side of the Sahara. T ­ hese goods w ­ ere 41. ​E. Ann McDougall, “The Sahara Reconsidered: Pastoralism, Politics, and Salt from the Ninth through the Twelfth Centuries,” African Economic History 12 (1983): 263–86. Many of the sources for the history of West Africa during the ­Middle Ages are compiled and translated in Nehemia Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins, eds., Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History, trans. J. F. P. Hopkins (Prince­ton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2000). See also Ralph A. Austen, Trans-­Saharan Africa in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Michael Gomez, African Dominion: A New History of Empire in Early and Medieval West Africa (Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 2018). 42. ​Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 375, 407, 418. See also Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 349– 64; Claudette Vanacker, “Géographie économique de l’Afrique du Nord selon les auteurs arabes du IXe siècle au milieu du XIIe siècle,” Annales 29, no. 3 (1973): 659–80; Michael Brett, “Islam and Trade in the Bilad al-­Sudan, Tenth–­Eleventh ­Century A.D.,” Journal of African History 24, no. 4 (1983): 431– 40; Sarah M. Guérin, “Exchange of Sacrifices: West Africa in the Medieval World of Goods,” The Medieval Globe 3, no. 2 (2017): 97–123. 43. ​Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 403–13. 44. ​Amira K. Bennison, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 199–204. Devisse argues that “we have the impression that the merchants from the north, the in­ for­mants of the authors we use, did not have access to the gold-­mining areas but had contact with black traders whom we are just beginning to get to know.” Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 425–26. 45. ​Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 357–58; Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 389–98, 418; Efraim Lev and Zohar Amar, Practical Materia Medica of the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean According to the Cairo Genizah (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 68–70; Sarah M. Guérin, “Forgotten Routes? Italy, Ifrīqiya and the Trans-­ Saharan Ivory Trade,” Al-­Masāq: Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean 25, no. 1 (2013): 70–91; Baadj, Saladin, 19.

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exchanged primarily for gold, ivory, and slaves, which ­were then transported back to North Africa along the same arduous route whence t­ hese merchants came.46 Gold, which had par­tic­u­lar importance for its role in coinage and art, provided much of the metallic content for coins that the Fatimids, the Zirids, and the Umayyads of Córdoba minted in their early years. As the Normans conquered Sicily in the eleventh ­century, they became engaged in this network of exchange and thrived in l­ater years by supplying Sicilian grain for Zirid goods (especially gold). The extent of this exchange was such that the Normans ­were able to mint gold coins for circulation in their kingdom—­the only Eu­ro­pean power at the time to do so.47 When goods from sub-­Saharan Africa reached the ports of Ifriqiya, merchants often trafficked them across the Mediterranean (especially to Sicily) via a network of maritime trade routes. Like the unforgiving heat of the Sahara Desert, the turbulent currents of the Mediterranean ­were often dangerous. Nonetheless, the profitability of trading across t­ hese ­waters meant that Ifriqiya was a crucial node in this larger network of exchange. Maritime commerce during the central M ­ iddle Ages was conducted on light galleys that ­were largely at the mercy of prevailing winds, which tended to run across the Mediterranean Sea from the northwest to the southeast.48 ­These winds meant that medieval merchants could reliably travel from west to east across the Mediterranean, but sailing in the opposite direction was difficult.49 Furthermore, winds traveling from the north to south frequently led to the development of large and dangerous waves along the coast of North Africa. Power­f ul winds traveling north from the Sahara Desert, called the “sirocco,” likewise complicated maritime traffic attempting to reach the coast of North Africa. Seasonal changes also dictated the navigability of the Mediterranean. Frequent storms in the late autumn, winter, and early spring made the summer months the safest for sailing, both for merchants and soldiers.50 46. ​Slaves trafficked to Ifriqiya from sub-­Saharan Africa ­were used as laborers on agricultural lands and as soldiers in armies. Although the trafficking of slaves across the Sahara into Ifriqiya likely declined in the eleventh c­ entury, the Zirid emirs still used them as elite bodyguards in their armies. Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 353–56. 47. ​P. Grierson and L. Travaini, Italy III: South Italy, Sicily, Sardinia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 76–125. 48. ​Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:305–8; John Pryor, “Winds, Waves, and Rocks: Routes and the Perils along Them,” in Maritime Aspects of Migration, ed. Klaus Friedland (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1989), 71–75. 49. ​Data from the f­ourteenth c­ entury indicates that traveling the same route west to east often took twice as long as east to west. Pryor, “Winds, Waves, and Rocks,” 73. 50. ​Horden and Purcell argue that Pryor’s analy­sis neglected Arabic-­language sources and, as a result, underestimated the use of shipping lanes in the southern Mediterranean. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, 12–101; Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (New York: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2000), 137–43.

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Despite the dangers of sailing to the southern shores of the Mediterranean, medieval merchants ­were ­adept at navigating its ­waters and trafficked a variety of goods across shipping lanes that minimized risk. One of the most common nautical trade routes ran from Egypt to Ifriqiya to Sicily. Merchants sailing west along the coast of North Africa tended to hug the coastline to avoid the northwestern-­southeastern winds of the open sea ­until they reached Tripoli. From t­ here, they could e­ ither sail north ­toward Sicily or continue west along the coast.51 If they opted for the latter route, merchants received some refuge on reaching the eastern coast of modern-­day Tunisia, where it was safer to navigate through three gulfs (the Gulf of Gabès, the Gulf of Hammamet, and the Gulf of Tunis) that ­were sheltered from some of the Mediterranean’s more violent weather systems. From Ifriqiya, merchants sailed to Sicily and then de­cided w ­ hether to continue north along the Italian coast, east ­toward the Balkans, or south back to Egypt. Extreme variance in wind patterns makes it difficult to quantify the average length of time it took merchants to navigate the Egypt–­Ifriqiya–­Sicily route. Current estimates indicate that it could take from two weeks to nearly two months to travel from Alexandria to Sicily, with most voyages prob­ably taking around three to four weeks.52 The varied length of voyages and the danger associated with them was such that merchants typically undertook only one long-­distance trip across the Mediterranean per sailing season.53 The possibilities and perils of trade between Ifriqiya and Sicily are made explicit in a number of medieval sources. The Book of Curiosities of the Sciences and Marvels for the Eyes, which was written during the first half of the eleventh c­ entury in Fatimid Egypt, contains a detailed description of the city of Mahdia and a list of anchorages between it and Palermo as well as the distances between them.54 Accounts of individual voyages along this route are found in another set of sources: the collection of Judeo-­Arabic manuscripts 51. ​Ruthy Gertwagen, “Geniza Letters: Maritime Difficulties along the Alexandria-­Palermo Route,” in Communication in the Jewish Diaspora: The Pre-­modern World, ed. Sophia Menache (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 78–85. 52. ​Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:313–26; Abraham Udovitch, “Time, the Sea and Society: Duration of Commercial Voyages on the Southern Shores of the Mediterranean during the High M ­ iddle Ages,” in La navigazione Mediterranea nell’alto medioevo (Spoleto, Italy: La Sede del Centro, 1978), 508–14. 53. ​This stands in contrast to trade practices in ancient Rome, which typically saw merchants make one and a half trips between Alexandria and Rome per sailing season. Udovitch, “Time, the Sea and Society,” 514. 54. ​A facsimile of this text alongside a transcription and translation of its contents can be found in Yossef Rapoport and Emilie Savage-­Smith, An Eleventh-­Century Egyptian Guide to the Universe: The Book of Curiosities (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 130–35, 467–69. The level of detail found in this map and its description of Mahdia, which is matched in this text only in comparable maps of Sicily and Tinnis, shows the importance of this city and its radiating trade routes to the Fatimids in the eleventh ­century. ­These three ports helped make the Fatimids “a Mediterranean power.” Yossef Rapoport and

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known as the Cairo Geniza. ­These firsthand accounts of the travels and travails of Jewish merchants based in Fustat (now a suburb of Cairo) show that merchants navigating the Mediterranean preferred to take routes that ­were close to land, where t­here ­were less extreme winds and the promise of safe mooring in ports. Indeed, on days with good visibility, the route between Ifriqiya and Sicily could be navigated without losing sight of land.55 Intermediate islands between the two regions—­Djerba, Pantelleria, Lampedusa, Linosa, Malta, and Gozo—­made the voyage safer than trying to traverse the open sea directly from Alexandria to Sicily.56 Still, travel between Ifriqiya and Sicily was by no means risk ­free. Letters from the Cairo Geniza mention the perils of traffic along this route (including shipwrecks and marauding pirates), while other medieval texts tell of the Zirids and Normans losing their fleets to Mediterranean storms in the Strait of Sicily.57 Although rec­ords from the Cairo Geniza provide the most detailed rec­ords of commercial traffic moving across the southern and central Mediterranean, its merchants accounted for only a portion of maritime trade.58 The most frequent kind of seaborne commerce was prob­ably the transportation of goods (and ­people) across short distances, often between ports ruled by the same dynasty, called “cabotage.” Few sources document this form of exchange, though passing references in medieval sources force us to infer the existence of a substantial web of local trade that was of ­little concern to most medieval writers. Modern scholars estimate that this “small-­scale” movement of goods was “prob­ably responsible in aggregate for many more of the movement of goods and p­ eople” around the Mediterranean than the long-­distance commerce described in the Cairo Geniza or (­later) in the cartulary of Giovanni Emilie Savage-­Smith, Lost Maps of the Caliphs: Drawing the World in Eleventh-­Century Cairo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 155–56. 55. ​Horden and Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 127. 56. ​A handful of islands in the central Mediterranean ­were uninhabited. One letter from the Cairo Geniza tells of a ship that was swept away by a storm near Sicily and forced ashore on a deserted island. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:322. 57. ​See, for example, Simonsohn, The Jews in Sicily, document 122; Moshe Gil, “Shipping in the Mediterranean in the Eleventh ­Century  A.D. as Reflected in Documents from the Cairo Geniza,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 67, no. 4 (2008): 250–51, 264–71. 58. ​Scholars disagree about how well the merchants of the Cairo Geniza represent overall networks of trade in the medieval Mediterranean and about how to best utilize the distinct genre of the merchant letter (risāla). Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis, xxxvi–­xli; Goldberg, “Use and Abuse of Commercial Letters,” 131–35. Scholars likewise disagree about the relationship between Geniza merchants and Muslim l­egal authorities—­especially with regard to the role that reputation and coalition-­ building played in ­these encounters. Avner Greif, “Reputation and Co­ali­tions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,” Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989): 857–82; Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, “Contract Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised,” Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 421–44; Avner Greif, “The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal?,” Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 445–69.

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Scriba.59 Ifriqiya was part of ­these long-­and short-­distance trade networks that connected it to the rest of the Mediterranean, especially to Sicily. When merchants from Ifriqiya arrived in Sicily, they w ­ ere confronted with a landscape that, despite its proximity to coastal North Africa, had distinctive characteristics and a divergent economy. The most striking difference in the landscapes of the two regions is elevation. Sicily, the largest island in the Mediterranean, is dominated by hills and mountains due to its location on the edge of the Eurasian and African tectonic plates. The highest point on the island is Mount Etna, which is the tallest active volcano in Eu­rope at nearly eleven thousand feet above sea level, dominating the landscape over Catania on the east-­central coast of the island.60 Across the island are smaller mountain ranges separated by fertile valleys used for agriculture. This mountainous landscape, especially in the northern stretches of the island, has historically made Sicily difficult to govern, even if a dynasty like the Normans exercised nominal authority over the entire island. The presence of well-­fortified towns and fortresses atop mountainous peaks across Sicily testifies to the difficulty that armies and administrators had in penetrating and retaining control over the island’s interior.61 As in the littoral of Ifriqiya, Sicily’s climate is characterized by hot, dry summers and cold winters. At the same time, though, the island is prone to getting more rain in the winters than the shores of North Africa, due to localized weather patterns that define the Mediterranean and its “extremely complex” climatology.62 Even within the island itself, t­ here is substantial variation between the wetter northern coast of the island, where weather systems from Eu­rope bring cool air, and the southern coast, where sirocco winds from Africa produce more arid conditions. Nonetheless, the interior of the island is well suited for agricultural production when supported with adequate irrigation from Sicily’s numerous rivers.63 Although farmers in ancient and medieval Sicily produced a number of agricultural products, the most impor­tant of them was durum wheat. This type of wheat, unlike other variations cultivated in Eu­rope, could survive the ­handling and time required to ship it across the Mediterranean due to its high 59. ​Horden and Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 140. See also Braudel, Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, 1:296. 60. ​D. K. Chester et al., Mount Etna: The Anatomy of a Volcano (New York: Springer, 1985), 1–12. 61. ​The beginning of geographer Ibn Hawqal’s description of Sicily mentions the substantial number of mountains and fortresses t­ here. Ibn Hawqal, Kitab Surat al-­Ard, ed. J. H. Kramers, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 118. See also Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 215–27. 62. ​Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, 15. 63. ​Clifford R. Backman, The Decline and Fall of Medieval Sicily: Politics, Religion, and Economy in the Reign of Frederick III, 1296–1337 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12–22.

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gluten content.64 As such, durum wheat has been a staple of crop of Sicily since the time of the Roman Republic and was frequently exported (alongside wheat from the province of Africa Proconsularis) to feed the p­ eople of Rome.65 Cultivation of this cereal grain continued through the Norman period, and it was a crucial export for the island. Arable land in Sicily was not used solely for the cultivation of durum wheat. Al-­Idrisi provides a detailed sketch of the agricultural capacity of the island in the m ­ iddle of the twelfth ­century, especially along the coasts, where orchards produced an array of fruits and vegetables that ­were irrigated through Sicily’s networks of rivers.66 Elsewhere, medieval sources note the production of “silk, cotton, sugar-­cane, indigo and henna,” among other resources on the island.67 This diversity, which expanded during Byzantine rule and continued to grow u ­ nder vari­ous Muslim lordships on the island, provided Sicily with a wealth of agricultural resources. The growth of Palermo as a metropolitan center from the ninth c­ entury onward led to the creation and maintenance of particularly robust irrigation systems in the northwest corner of the island to feed the city’s growing population.68 Cities like Palermo also served as industrial centers where mineral resources like silver and iron could be refined for domestic use or for exportation. Although Sicily (particularly the city of Palermo) was the center of power during the reign of Roger II, the Norman kingdom of Sicily comprised not only this island, but also much of southern Italy. ­These lands w ­ ere separated from Sicily via the Strait of Messina, a short but dangerous passage whose location between two tectonic plates led to unpredictable tides and hazardous ­waters. Across this narrow strait are the historic regions of Calabria (the toe of Italy’s boot) and Apulia (the heel of the boot), which formed the majority of the Normans’ possessions in southern Italy. T ­ hese territories, like Sicily, are predominately mountainous landscapes that are difficult navigate and ­settle. On the coastlines, however, w ­ ere a number of productive cities that served as ports for Mediterranean trade: Amalfi, Salerno, Naples, Gaeta, Taranto, and 64. ​David Abulafia, The Two Italies: Economic Relations between the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Northern Communes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 35–36. 65. ​Geoffrey Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 6, 105–6. 66. ​David Abulafia, “Local Trade Networks in Medieval Sicily: The Evidence of Idrisi,” in Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval Mediterranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor, ed. Ruthy Gertwagen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012), 157–66. 67. ​Abulafia, Two Italies, 36–38. 68. ​Alex Metcalfe, “Dynamic Landscapes and Dominant Kin Groups: Hydronymy and Water-­ Management in Arab-­Norman Western Sicily,” in Urban Dynamics and Transcultural Communication in Medieval Sicily, ed. Theresa Jäckh and Mona Kirsch (Paderborn, Germany: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2017), 97–100. See also Theresa Jäckh, “­Water and Wealth in Medieval Sicily: The Case of the Admiral’s Bridge and Arab-­Norman Palermo (10th–13th Centuries),” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: ­Water 6, no. 5 (2019).

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Bari.69 Along ­these coastal areas, traders exchanged local grains and timber for gold, silk, and other luxuries from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean that they could then sell elsewhere.70 Local towns and monasteries benefited from this economic productivity, as seen in the substantial trea­suries they held as early as the ninth ­century.71 At their closest points, Ifriqiya and Sicily are separated by less than one hundred miles across the Strait of Sicily. Although the regions had distinct climates and economic systems during the medieval period, they w ­ ere nonetheless tied together via shared commercial, po­liti­cal, and cultural networks that stretched from sub-­Saharan Africa to Eu­rope via the Mediterranean Sea. The remainder of this chapter begins to unpack ­these shared networks by considering the dynastic origins of the Zirids in Ifriqiya by way of their Fatimid overlords. The Fatimid foundation of the city of Mahdia, which was a capital of the Zirid dynasty and (­later) the centerpiece of Norman Africa, is an apt place to begin this narrative.

The Foundation of Mahdia Mahdia was born out of a revolution in the ninth c­ entury CE when a sect of Muslims within the Sunni Abbasid caliphate began to develop religious beliefs that ­were rooted in messianic prophecy.72 Adherents of this sect believed in the 69. ​Writing during the tenth ­century, the geographer Ibn Hawqal notes that Amalfi is “the richest city of Longobardia, the most noble and illustrious in its conditions, the most affluent and opulent.” Translation is from Patricia Skinner, Medieval Amalfi and Its Diaspora, 800–1250 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 224. In 971, Venice (­under the power of the Byzantines) forbade trading certain strategically impor­tant items like wood planks to Muslim locations—­a sanction that applied to three ships about to sail from Venice to Mahdia and Tripoli. Louis de Mas Latrie, Traités de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les arabes de l’Afrique septentrionale au moyen âge (Paris: Henri Plon, 1866), 12; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:124. 70. ​Barbara Kreutz, “Ghost Ships and Phantom Cargoes: Reconstructing Early Amalfitan Trade,” Journal of Medieval History 20 (1994): 352–56. Citarella argues that the port was “unique and had no parallel in the economy of the High ­Middle Ages” ­because of its role in facilitating trade between Italy, the Byzantine Empire, and North Africa. At the same time, though, the city’s reliance on this commerce ultimately led to its eclipse by ports in Sicily and elsewhere in Italy. Armand Citarella, “Merchants, Markets and Merchandise in Southern Italy in the High M ­ iddle Ages,” in Mercati e mercanti nell’alto medioevo: L’area euroasiatica e l’area mediterranea (Spoleto, Italy: La Sede del Centro, 1993), 281. See also Armand Citarella, “Patterns in Medieval Trade: The Commerce of Amalfi before the Crusades,” Journal of Economic History 28, no. 4 (December 1968): 531–55; Dominique Valérian, “Amalfi e il mondo musulmano: Un laboratorio per le città marinare italiane?,” Rassegna del Centro di Cultura e Storia Amalfitana 39–40 (2010): 199–212. 71. ​Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 48–52. 72. ​Overviews of this history can be found in Michael Brett, “The Fatimid Revolution (861–973) and Its Aftermath in North Africa,” in The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 2, From c. 500 BC to AD 1050, ed. J. D. Fage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 589–636; Farhad Daftary, The Ismā’īlīs:

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imminent return of imam Ismaʿil ibn Jafar, who was the seventh imam in a chain that began with ʿAli, the cousin and son-­in-­law of the Prophet Muhammad, and his wife Fatima, who was the d­ aughter of the Prophet Muhammad and the namesake for the Fatimid dynasty. Ismaʿil’s name and his position as the seventh imam lend themselves to other names for this sect, the “Ismaʿilis” or “Seveners.”73 While awaiting the imam’s return, this messianic movement sought to establish a state for itself and eventually to overthrow the Abbasids. Its members found receptive audiences for their message across the Islamic world, including in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, but their preaching was received with substantial enthusiasm in the Maghreb, far from the Abbasid capital in Baghdad.74 The Ismaʿilis began a systematic campaign of preaching in northwest Africa, hoping that their anti-­Abbasid and pro-­messianic rhe­toric would find a receptive audience.75 Due to the preaching of missionaries called dāʿī, particularly one named Abu ʿAbd Allah, this revolutionary movement found traction in Ifriqiya and the Maghreb among indigenous Kutama Berbers. Although the Kutama ­were likely motivated more by the promise of po­liti­cal power than any specific doctrine preached by the Fatimids, their enthusiasm for this Ismaʿili messianic movement was substantial, and they formed the core of Abu ʿAbd Allah’s army.76 By the late ninth ­century, t­ hese forces proved a real threat to the Aghlabid dynasty, a Sunni group that governed Ifriqiya and Sicily on behalf of the Abbasid caliphate.77 For the Fatimids, the seizure of Aghlabid territories meant that they would be one step closer to their goal of claiming Abbasid lands in the Islamic heartland as their own. They saw Ifriqiya as a base from which they could launch ­future campaigns against Egypt and the Levant. The Fatimids eventually defeated the Aghlabids in Ifriqiya with the capture of Kairouan in 909, and they extended this campaign with the prolonged Their History and Doctrines, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 73–268; Paul Walker, Exploring an Islamic Empire: Fatimid History and Its Sources (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002); Hamid Haji, Founding the Fatimid State: The Rise of an Early Islamic Empire (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Paul Walker, “The Ismāʿīlī Daʿwa and the Fatimid Caliphate,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. 1, Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 120–49; David Bramoullé, Les Fatimides et la mer (909–1171) (Leiden: Brill, 2019). 73. ​Ismaʿilis are one branch of the larger Shiʿa movement, which has numerous subsects based on a given group’s interpretation of messianic prophecy. 74. ​Walker, “Ismāʿīlī Daʿwa,” 124. 75. ​The earliest Fatimid sources for the journey of the Ismaʿilis from Salamiyya in Syria to Sijilmasa are rooted in the ideas of messianic prophecy. Walker, Exploring an Islamic Empire, 112–69; Daftary, Ismā’īlīs, 4–6. See also Farhad Daftary, Ismaili Lit­er­a­ture: A Bibliography of Sources and Studies (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). 76. ​Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, The Berbers (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 92–94. 77. ​The most extensive history of the Aghlabid dynasty and its fall is Mohamed Talbi, L’émirat aghlabide (Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien-­Maisonneuve, 1966).

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conquest of Sicily over much of the tenth ­century. Nonetheless, the degree to which the Fatimids w ­ ere able to exact meaningful control across the rugged terrain of Sicily is disputed. The Aghlabids had strug­gled to penetrate the island’s interior and instead focused their efforts on maintaining control over its profitable coasts.78 The Fatimids likewise focused initially on coastal possessions and preserved Aghlabid (and thus ­earlier Byzantine) institutions related to taxation and landholding.79 The Fatimids also inherited other Aghlabid traditions relating to warfare. The Aghlabids had a “robust tradition of maritime raiding” through which they launched naval campaigns against Christians in Sicily and southern Italy in order to show themselves to be defenders of Islam.80 The religious ideology that undergirded ­these campaigns, especially in Sicily, and the economic boon that t­ hese campaigns brought to the Aghlabids, has led some modern scholars to refer to this strategy as an “economy of jihad.”81 The Fatimids, although informed by Ismaʿili ideology instead of the Sunni agenda of the Aghlabids, replicated ele­ments of this holy war within their own domains, which would (in time) influence the Zirids.82 Fatimid campaigns in Ifriqiya and Sicily provided substantial landholdings for the nascent dynasty of ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi, the spiritual and secular leader of the dynasty. ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi claimed direct descent from Fatima and ʿAli, which provided him with supreme authority as both the imam and caliph of the so-­called Fatimid state. This assertion of power was in keeping with Ismaʿili ideology, which held that leaders of their community ­were divinely appointed through a line of succession that passed from the Prophet Muham78. ​Annliese Nef and Vivien Prigent, “Guerroyer pour la Sicile (827–902),” in La Sicilia del IX secolo tra Bizantini e musulmani, ed. Simona Modeo, Marina Congiu, and Luigi Santagati (Caltanissetta, Italy: Sciascia, 2013), 13–40; Annliese Nef, “Reinterpreting the Aghlabids’ Sicilian Policy (827–910),” in The Aghlabids and Their Neighbors: Art and Material Culture in Ninth-­Century North Africa, ed. Glaire D. Anderson, Corisande Fenwick, and Mariam Rosser-­Owen (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 76–87. 79. ​Research that combines the scant written sources about early Muslim Sicily with archaeological and epigraphic evidence has shown the survival of Byzantine institutions and disputed the idea of a uniform Islamization of the island. Nef and Prigent, “Per una nuova storia,” 62–63; Annliese Nef and Vivien Prigent, La Sicile de Byzance à l’Islam (Paris: De Boccard, 2010); Arcifa, Bagnera, and Nef, “Archeologia della Sicilia islamica,” section 4.3; Annliese Nef, “Quelques réflexions sur les conquêtes islamiques, le pro­ cessus d’islamisation et implications pour l’histoire de la Sicile,” in Les dynamiques de l’islamisation en Méditerranée centrale et en Sicile, ed. Fabiola Ardizzone and Annliese Nef (Bari: Edipuglia, 2014), 47–58. 80. ​Bramoullé, Les Fatimides, 105–7. 81. ​Annliese Nef, “La Sicile dans l’ensemble aghlabide (827–910),” in Héritages arabo-­islamiques dans l’Eu­rope méditerranéenne, ed. Catherine Richarté, Roland-­Pierre Gayraud, and Jean-­Michel Poisson (Paris: La Découverte, 2015), 108. 82. ​In the eleventh-­century Book of Curiosities, Sicily is called “the largest of the Islamic islands and the most honourable on account of its continuous military expeditions against the e­ nemy—­may God forsake them!—­and the perennial efforts of its ­people and governors in this re­spect,” which gives some indication of this so-­called economy of jihad. Rapoport and Savage-­Smith, Eleventh-­Century Egyptian Guide, 457.

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mad to ʿAli.83 Therefore, Fatimid leaders fulfilled the roles of both religious leader (imam) and communal leader (caliph), fusing the two into an all-­ powerful imam-­caliph who had theoretical command over the entire community of Muslims. Despite this assertion of power, ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi and his successors nonetheless governed over a religiously heterogenous population of Muslims, many of whom had been trained in the Sunni traditions of the Aghlabids and w ­ ere thus hostile to the ideas of this foreign movement. This religious tension eventually led to revolts against Fatimid rule in the tenth ­century, echoes of which persisted during Zirid rule a ­century ­later. Although based on an Ismaʿili ideology that bestowed supreme power on the imam-­caliph, the early Fatimid government in Ifriqiya nonetheless maintained many of the mechanisms of its Aghlabid antecedent. The primary changes to governance in Ifriqiya w ­ ere to symbols of outward authority, like 84 the call to prayer and coinage. The most potent of ­these symbols was the imam himself—­ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi bi-­Allah (the Mahdi by God)—­who arrived in the Ifriqiyan city of Raqqada early in 297H (910).85 In commemoration of the many Ismaʿili victories in the region, he ordered the construction of the eponymous city of Mahdia on the eastern coast of modern-­day Tunisia. In Shawwal 308H (February–­March 921), the Mahdi moved into the imposing palatial complex that formed the heart of his city.86 Mahdia’s palace, mosque, and port ­were built on a narrow peninsula that jutted out eastward into the Mediterranean Sea, ­toward the Abbasid caliphs whom the Mahdi sought to dethrone.87 The only access point to Mahdia by land was through a formidable western gate. On the southern end of the peninsula was a large harbor, protected with a chain that extended between two towers located at its entrance. A large mosque dominated the central area of the peninsula as a symbol of the Mahdi’s spiritual power.88 Over the years, as the population of Mahdia outgrew the peninsula on which it was built, many of its p­ eople moved to the suburb of Zawila, located to the west of the fortified peninsula. Ibn Hawqal, who wrote a geography of the world in the mid-­ late tenth ­century, describes Mahdia as a small town, founded by and named 83. ​Walker, Exploring an Islamic Empire, 4–9. 84. ​Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 98. 85. ​Maurice Canard, “Fāṭimids,” EI2. 86. ​The most extensive study of Mahdia’s medieval topography comes from Lézine, Mahdiya. See also Mohamed Talbi, “al-­Mahdiyya,” EI2. 87. ​On Mahdia during Fatimid rule, see Lucien Golvin, “Mahdiya à la période fatimide,” Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée 27 (1979): 75–98. 88. ​F. Mahfoudh, “La grande mosquée de Mahdia et son influence sur l’architecture médiévale ifriqiyenne,” in L’Egypte fatimide, son art, son histoire, ed. Marianne Barrucand (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris–­Sorbonne, 1999), 127–40. See also Talbi, “al-­Mahdiyya,” EI2.

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a­ fter ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi, that is a two-­day journey from Kairouan.89 He writes of the port being used to traffic goods from many lands and of the city containing many homes that are surrounded by fertile land and beautiful scenery. The spiritual and economic significance of Mahdia should not obfuscate the practical considerations that went into the founding of the city. Located on a strategic peninsula and heavi­ly fortified, Mahdia was built to defend the Mahdi and his supporters. Although the early Fatimids had drummed up substantial support for their Ismaʿili movement among certain Berber tribes, their religious sect was still a minority in North Africa. Indeed, the Mahdi’s rise to power in Ifriqiya had drawn the animosity of a number of groups in Ifriqiya. Abu ʿAbd Allah and some of his Kutama allies, who had orchestrated most of the Fatimids’ early conquests in Ifriqiya, turned against the Mahdi soon a­ fter his succession. The Mahdi was able to suppress this revolt, however, and execute the man who was once among his most fervent supporters.90 Another point of contention was the inland city of Kairouan, a bastion of Sunni jurists who w ­ ere unenthusiastic at the prospect of governance by an Ismaʿili regime. ­These scholars ­were part of the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), which was the most popu­lar ­legal tradition in Ifriqiya and the Maghreb during the ­Middle Ages.91 A central component of the Maliki school of l­egal scholarship was intolerance of non-­Sunni sects in Islam like Ismaʿilism. For ­these jurists, Fatimid rule was an unwelcome prospect and they thought it righ­teous to resist it. The Fatimids thus clashed with other hostile groups in much of North Africa and Sicily, including the Sunni Umayyads of Córdoba, who used their allies among Zanata Berbers to attack Fatimid (and l­ater, Zirid) lands. The Fatimids likewise strug­gled to maintain control over Sicily, whose population was initially unwilling to accept Fatimid domination.92 The most potent threat to Fatimid rule, however, came from the Kharijites of Tripoli, who revolted during the 940s.93 Led by Abu Yazid, this rebellion nearly unseated the Fatim89. ​Ibn Hawqal, Kitab Surat al-­Ard, 71. Ibn Hawqal derived much of the information in his chronicle pertaining to North Africa from the ­earlier geography of al-­Istakhri, who wrote during the ­middle of the tenth c­ entury. André Miquel, “Ibn Ḥawḳal,” EI3; Antrim, Routes and Realms, 109; Tarek Kahlaoui, Creating the Mediterranean: Maps and the Islamic Imagination (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 90. 90. ​The c­ auses for this insurrection are unclear. Walker thinks it is likely that the Kutama regarded Abu ʿAbd Allah as the victorious conqueror of Aghlabid lands, not ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi, who displayed a “style of rule largely foreign to their traditions and expectations.” Walker, “Ismāʿīlī Daʿwa,” 130. 91. ​The basis for the perspectives of the Maliki school comes from the writings of Malik ibn Anas, who died in Medina in 179H (795–96). Nicole Cottart, “Mālikiyya,” EI2. 92. ​Hugh Kennedy, “Sicily and al-­Andalus ­under Muslim Rule,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 3, c.900–­c.1024, ed. Timothy Reuter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 664–67. 93. ​This sect of Muslims originated during the First Fitna of 656–61 when they protested diplomatic arbitration between ʿAli and his adversaries. Although shunned by many Sunni and Shiʿa Muslims, they found refuge in parts of inland Ifriqiya as well as on the island of Djerba. One group of Muslims from this movement are the Ibadis, who ­were more moderate than some of their Kharijite

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ids from Mahdia ­after a grueling siege, but the Fatimids’ successful defense of the city led to the eventual suppression of the Kharijite revolt.94 By the ­middle of the tenth c­ entury, the successors of ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi ­were in firm control of most of Ifriqiya and much of the Maghreb. In the wake of his victory over Abu Yazid, the Fatimid imam-­caliph Ismaʿil al-­Mansur moved his capital to the site of the camp where he had fi­nally defeated the Kharijite leader. Located just outside of Kairouan, the city of Sabra al-­Mansuriya became the new home of the Fatimid administration, though Mahdia continued to prosper as a port for these inland hubs.95 It also served as a con­ve­nient point from which the Fatimids could launch military campaigns against their newest target for expansion: Egypt. Following their consolidation of power in North Africa, the Fatimids launched a successful expedition against Egypt in 358H (968–69). Soon ­after, the Fatimid imam-­caliph al-­Muʿizz relocated his capital to the newly constructed city of Cairo, where the dynasty was able to more effectively launch campaigns against Abbasid strongholds in the Levant. The departure of the Fatimids to Egypt spurred the imam-­caliph to delegate rule in Ifriqiya to one of his loyal vassals as a regional emir. Al-­Muʿizz selected for this position Bulukkin ibn Ziri, whose governance marked the beginning of Zirid rule in Ifriqiya.

brethren and broke with them during the late seventh and early eighth centuries. On the Ibadis during the time of the Zirids and Normans, see Prevost, L’aventure ibāḍite, 183–254; Paul M. Love Jr., “An Ibadi Islandscape: Ibadi Communities on Djerba in the Medieval Period,” in L’ibadisme dans les sociétés de l’Islam médiéval, ed. Cyrille Aillet (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 190–206. 94. ​Several khutbahs of the Fatimid imam-­caliphs survive from t­ hese campaigns. Paul Walker, Orations of the Fatimid Caliphs: Festival Sermons of the Ismaili Imams (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 101–11. 95. ​Archaeological studies of Sabra al-­Mansuriya are exceedingly difficult to conduct due to past looting (especially by inhabitants of nearby Kairouan), though what l­ittle survives testifies to substantial artistic links between it and Sicily. Marianne Barrucand and Maurad Rammah, “Sabra al-­Mansuriyya and Her Neighbors during the First Half of the Eleventh C ­ entury: Investigations into Stucco Decoration,” Muqarnas 26 (2009): 349–76.

C h a p te r 2

The Contest for Sicily in the Eleventh ­Century

The Zirids of Ifriqiya and the Normans of Sicily maintained regular contact during the mid-­late eleventh ­century. Their respective capitals of Mahdia and Palermo ­were separated by only 220 miles, a voyage navigable by boat along well established commercial lanes. The close proximity of the Zirid and Norman dynasties during this time, however, belies the far-­ flung origins of both groups. The Zirids emerged from the Sanhaja tribal confederation at the doorstep of the Sahara Desert that entered into a larger conflict between rival Ismaʿili and Sunni dynasties in North Africa and al-­Andalus. The Normans of Sicily, meanwhile, had their origins over one thousand miles away in the Duchy of Normandy in northern France, and before then, on Viking ships that sailed from Scandinavia to mainland Eu­rope and the British Isles. The pro­ cess through which the Zirids and Normans came into contact with each other took the better part of a ­century. This chapter explores the emergence of ­these two dynasties, with a par­tic­u­lar emphasis on the site of their first meetings—on the battlefields of a po­liti­cally fractured Sicily. The Zirids first came to power in the late tenth c­ entury as emirs of Ifriqiya ruling on behalf of the Fatimid imam-­caliph. Governing Ifriqiya proved a difficult task. The Zirids waged frequent campaigns in western Ifriqiya against Zanata Berbers who were supported by the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba, and fought to suppress internal revolts led by Sunni jurists in Kairouan. When the Zirid emirs delegated military authority on Ifriqiya’s western frontier 48

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to their Hammadid cousins, t­ hese commanders promptly seceded and carved a division between western and eastern Ifriqiya that persisted for over a c­ entury. Although the Zirid court of the early to mid-­eleventh ­century was renowned for its cultural output and ceremonies, beneath this outward display was an economy that was suffering from repeated droughts, emigration, and the eroding of agricultural infrastructure that had sustained Ifriqiya for hundreds of years. ­These long-­standing issues made the Zirid regime vulnerable to external invaders, who emerged in the 1030s and 1040s in the form of the confederation of tribes known as the Banu Hilal. Although initially allies of the Zirid emirs, the armies of the Banu Hilal eventually conquered large swaths of land in Ifriqiya for themselves, driving the Zirids (and Hammadids) to the coast and vastly reducing the extent of their territories. Nonetheless, the Zirid emirs retained in their new capital of Mahdia some of their trea­sury and a sizeable fleet, which they used to campaign actively across the Mediterranean. They focused much of their attention on Sicily in the hopes of establishing a foothold on an island that was as po­liti­cally fractured as it was eco­nom­ically productive. ­These campaigns brought the Zirids into conflict with another group that similarly sought to leverage po­liti­cal disunity on the island to their own advantage: the Normans. As the Zirids traced their dynastic origins to the south, the Normans traced theirs to the north. Enterprising waves of Norman mercenaries from northern France, particularly the sons of Tancred de Hauteville, sailed to the Italian Peninsula to fight on behalf of Lombard lords against their Byzantine rivals. T ­ hese mercenaries eventually began to carve out territories of their own as they both assimilated to many of the cultural norms of southern Italy and drew the ire of local populations who resented the destruction that came with their arrival. As the Norman grip on the peninsula strengthened, one subset of Normans led by Roger I and his ­brother Robert Guiscard saw an opportunity to further extend the bounds of their power in nearby Sicily. ­After the Normans made an alliance with a local Sicilian Muslim noble in the early 1060s, they began a thirty-­year campaign that eventually saw the entirety of the island fall ­under Norman control. Initial contacts between the Zirids and Normans in Sicily ­were hostile. Armies from both sides, each with their respective local allies, met in pitched ­battle on a handful of occasions. The Normans emerged triumphant in t­ hese encounters and managed to win nominal control of Sicily by 1091. The Zirids, despite their best efforts, ­were unable to secure a lasting foothold on the island and instead opted to conduct state-­sponsored raids against southern Italy and Sicily. As the Normans solidified control over Sicily, however, the competing dynasties realized it was more advantageous for both groups to

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cease hostilities in ­favor of a peaceful commercial partnership. Subsequent treaties led to a fruitful trading relationship between the two powers that persisted into the twelfth ­century.

The Origins and Rise of the Zirids The Zirid emirs of Ifriqiya w ­ ere part of a group of indigenous African p­ eoples that fall ­under the umbrella category “Berber”—­a term that has had varied definitions in the ancient, medieval, and modern worlds. Broadly speaking, Berbers are an amorphous ethno-­linguistic group from Africa who speak Berber languages, most of whom have origins in northern and western Africa. ­These Berber dialects are classified as part of the Afro-­Asiatic (Hamito-­Semitic) language ­family and are still actively spoken in countries across northwestern Africa, most prominently in Morocco and Algeria.1 The term “Berber” itself, though, has its origins outside of Africa. It was first used in antiquity by the Greeks and Romans, who used it to refer to the incomprehensible languages spoken by outsiders, ­whether located in North Africa or northern Eu­rope.2 The word “barbarian” in modern En­glish has its root in this conception of the “Berber” as an uncivilized outsider. ­Today, North Africans who identify as Berber prefer to call themselves “Imazighen,” which means “­free ­people” in the Tamazight language and does not have this historically negative connotation. Medieval Arabic writers transformed the term “Berber” into a more specific designator by using it to refer to groups of non-­Arab indigenous inhabitants of North Africa whom Arab authors sought to categorize.3 No cohesive definition of the Berbers existed in the centuries ­after the Muslim conquests of North Africa—­instead, vari­ous perceptions of the Berber emerged from diverse po­liti­cal, social, and religious circumstances in the Muslim Mediterranean. ­There ­were “multiple sites of Berberization and thus multiple historical origins” for ­these p­ eoples.4 Some authors thought that Berbers w ­ ere t­hose who lived across the Red Sea from neighboring Arabia. ­Others thought they lived among ­those in the Sudan (a geographic term indicating the place where ­people with dark skin lived).5 In the face of this ambiguity, medieval authors 1. ​Brett and Fentress, Berbers, 3. 2. ​Abderrahman El Aissati, “Ethnic Identity, Language Shift, and the Amazigh Voice in Morocco and Algeria,” Race, Gender & Class 8, no. 3 (2001): 58–59. 3. ​Ramzi Rouighi, “The Berbers of the Arabs,” Studia Islamica 1 (2011): 100–101. 4. ​Rouighi, Inventing the Berbers, 9. 5. ​H. T. Norris, The Berbers in Arabic Lit­er­a­ture (New York: Longman, 1982), 33–35; Rouighi, “Berbers of the Arabs,” 86–87.

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categorically sorted Berbers into tribes to make sense of their internal hierarchies, the names of which are still used to identify Berber groups ­today. Ibn Khaldun’s genealogical interpretation of Berber origins and tribal identifications, which ­were fundamental to his overarching theory of history, has had an outsized impact on modern understandings of medieval Berbers.6 In his Kitab al-­ʿIbar (Book of examples), Ibn Khaldun divides the Berbers into three main tribal confederations: the Masmuda, Zanata, and Sanhaja.7 Each of t­hese three confederations had a unique ancestry, dialect, and broad stretch of African territory ­under their control. The Masmuda w ­ ere based in Morocco, primarily in mountainous areas along the Atlas Mountains. The Zanata w ­ ere broadly dispersed across North Africa but w ­ ere most numerous in the central Maghreb in Algeria. Fi­nally, the Sanhaja confederation of tribes, to which the Zirids belonged, ­were concentrated near the northern edge of the Sahara Desert.8 Ibn Khaldun estimates that nearly seventy branches of the Sanhajan confederation stretched across Ifriqiya and the Maghreb. Although ­these tribes had their origins in the Sahara Desert, part of this confederation—­a branch called the Talkata—­migrated north to help the Fatimids in their wars against Zanata tribesmen. One of the leaders of this group was Ziri ibn Manad, whose military exploits on behalf of the Fatimids led him to be recognized by the Ismaʿili dynasty.9 In 324H (935–36), the Fatimids appointed him governor of the city of Achir in north-­central Algeria, a location from which Ziri could launch campaigns near the western borders of Fatimid territory.10 Ziri directed ­these campaigns against Zanata Berbers fighting on behalf of the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba. In effect, the Sanhajan Zirids and the Zanata served as proxy armies for the Fatimids and Umayyads on their western and eastern frontiers, respectively. Ziri ibn Manad was also instrumental in helping the Fatimids suppress the revolt of Abu Yazid during the 940s. His loyalty and success on the battlefield led the Fatimid imam-­caliph to appoint his equally capable 6. ​Rouighi, Inventing the Berbers, 86–87. 7. ​Irwin, Ibn Khaldun, 54. A fourth group, the descendants of Butr—­comprising the Nefzawa, Luwata, and Banu Fatan—­also feature in Ibn Khaldun’s history. Allen Fromherz, Ibn Khaldun, 137. 8. ​The origins of the Sanhaja are disputed. Some scholars have attempted to compare sources beginning with Herodotus to look for consistencies in their descriptions of the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa. ­Others have focused on how Arabic-­language sources of the ­Middle Ages interpreted the origins of the Sanhaja. For an example of the former, see Richard L. Smith, “What Happened to the Ancient Libyans? Chasing Sources across the Sahara from Herodotus to Ibn Khaldun,” Journal of World History 14, no. 4 (December 2003): 459–500. For examples of the latter, see Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:3–7; Helena de Felipe, “Berber Leadership and Genealogical Legitimacy: The Almoravid Case,” in Genealogy and Knowledge in Muslim Socie­ties: Understanding the Past, ed. Sarah Bowen Savant and Helena de Felipe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 55–70. 9. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:205–6; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:245–46; Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 322–23. 10. ​Lucien Golvin, “Le palais de Ziri à Achir (Xe siècle J. C.),” Ars Orientalis 6 (1966): 47–76.

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son, Bulukkin ibn Ziri, to be emir of Ifriqiya when the Fatimids relocated to Cairo in 358H (968–69).11 When the Fatimids departed Ifriqiya, they left their Zird lieutenants to fend for themselves.12 Fatimid officials in Cairo had l­ittle interest in the internal affairs of Ifriqiya. Their preoccupations with the region revolved around the tax revenues that the Zirids supplied to them, the occasional lavish exchange of gifts with their vassals, and the ceremonial appointment of new emirs to ensure continued loyalty to the Fatimid administration.13 To this end, they left a handful of administrators in Ifriqiya to aid the Zirids in their governance, though this did ­little to address po­liti­cal fractures between the Ismaʿili Fatimids, Sunnis in Kairouan, Kharijite Muslims, and Zanata Berbers that persisted across Ifriqiya and often led to conflict.14 Although the Zirids w ­ ere largely successful in campaigns against their po­liti­cal rivals, they nonetheless ruled over lands with meaningful divisions that would lead to the fracturing of the Zirid emirate at the beginning of the eleventh ­century. Despite ­these po­liti­cal divisions, the economy of Ifriqiya was productive. In the tenth c­ entury, Ifriqiya was strategically positioned to be an entrepôt for the myriad of goods that circulated across commercial routes that ran north–­ south from northern Eu­rope to sub-­Saharan Africa and east–­west across the Mediterranean.15 The hub of trade in Ifriqiya was Kairouan and nearby Sabra al-­Mansuriya, with Mahdia serving as the coastal port for traffic passing through them. The geographer al-­Bakri, writing in the eleventh c­ entury on the basis of e­ arlier sources, describes the extent of commercial traffic in the Zirid port: “The port [of Mahdia] is used by ships from Alexandria, Syria, Sicily, al-­Andalus, and other places. Its harbor, excavated from hard stone, has room for thirty ships. Two towers stand on e­ ither side of it and between them is a chain made of iron. If I wanted to enter the port, I would send to the guards of the two towers, who would remove the chain ­until the ship entered. Then, they would stretch it back as it was. This provides us safety if the ships of the Rum ­were to attack the city.”16 Trade passing through Ifriqiyan markets provided substantial revenues to the Zirid emirs. According to al-­Bakri, customs duties from the bustling markets of Kairouan and Sabra al-­Mansuriya amounted to around twenty-­six thousand dirhams per day.17 In addition, the 11. ​­These campaigns are considered in Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:28–30. 12. ​Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 353. 13. ​Michael Brett, “The Diplomacy of Empire: Fatimids and Zirids, 990–1062,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 78, no. 1 (February 2015): 149–59. 14. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:39–126. 15. ​Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 354–60; Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 149–65. 16. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:203. 17. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:198; Laroui, History of the Maghrib, 145.

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steady stream of Muslim pilgrims traveling to and from Mecca fed an economic system that required networks of caravanserai, inns, and associated industries.18 Bulukkin ibn Ziri and his successors governed over markets that ­were part of this larger commercial system and reaped the financial benefits of this trade through customs duties. The volume of commercial traffic that passed through Ifriqiya provided substantial wealth to Bulukkin ibn Ziri and his successors, but it did l­ittle to address systemic changes to the under­lying economic infrastructure of the region. In the years ­after the Islamic conquests of the seventh ­century, Muslim lords of Ifriqiya used slave ­labor to produce a surplus of goods that fueled prosperity into the tenth ­century.19 ­These slaves ­were acquired primarily through military conquest, a real­ity that proved a prob­lem when the conquests ceased in the tenth c­ entury. The system of agricultural lands that had once produced cereal grains, wine, and olive oil was slowly replaced with a dif­fer­ent economic system. Nomadic pastoralism increased, particularly in inland Ifriqiya, and the irrigation infrastructure of Ifriqiya fell into a state of disrepair. Nearer to the coast, the cultivation of cereal grains persisted but with the inclusion of other crops like date palms, vegetables, and citrus fruits.20 Bulukkin ibn Ziri inherited this changing economy, although his administration was focused more on military conquest than economic policy.21 During his reign, Bulukkin campaigned across the Maghreb and expanded his holdings in modern-­day Algeria and Morocco, particularly at the expense of Zanata groups allied with the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba. ­These victories ­were enough for the Fatimid imam-­caliph al-­ʿAziz to grant him rule over all of the dynasty’s western dominions except for Sicily, which was governed by the Kalbid dynasty, and the city of Tripoli, which was governed by another Berber dynasty.22 Although Bulukkin excelled on the battlefield, his campaigns came at a heavy financial cost. In 366H (976–77), Bulukkin and his administrators levied a particularly heavy tax on the ­people of Ifriqiya in an apparent attempt to raise funds for the Zirid army in the face of declining revenue 18. ​The Zirids inherited a Fatimid tax system that included customs duties, the zakat, taxes on caravans, and taxes on goods produced on large agricultural estates. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:603–27; Heinz Halm, The Fatimids and Their Traditions of Learning (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1997), 355–65. 19. ​Mohamed Talbi, “Law and Economy in Ifrīqiya (Tunisia) in the Third Islamic ­Century: Agriculture and the Role of Slaves in the Country’s Economy,” in The Islamic M ­ iddle East, 700–1900, ed. A. L. Udovitch (Prince­ton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981), 237–39. 20. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:622–41; Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 258–59. 21. ​Brett describes Bulukkin as a “warrior belonging to the distant and dif­fer­ent world of the central Maghrib, who of necessity left the administration of the heartland of Ifrīqiya to the wide discretion of the officials in charge.” Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 324. 22. ​Daftary, Ismā’īlīs, 162.

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b­ ecause of substandard agricultural production.23 This financial hardship was compounded by internal dissent within the administration of the Zirid regime. Bulukkin had delegated much of the quotidien responsibilities of Ifriqiyan governance to Fatimid-­appointed chancellors, some of whom had ambitions of their own. The power of ­these bureaucrats caused Bulukkin to fear that they might try to push him out of the region’s financial center (Kairouan, Sabra al-­Mansuriya, and Mahdia) and relegate him to the western city of Achir, which had been the base of operations for his ­father.24 This tension between the Zirid emirs of Ifriqiya and their chancellors came to a head during the reign of Bulukkin’s son, al-­Mansur, who r­ ose to power ­after the death of his f­ ather in 373H (983–84). Al-­Mansur sought to assert the power of the Zirid dynasty and to minimize its de­pen­dency on the Fatimids.25 He ordered the assassination of two assertive Fatimid officials living in Ifriqiya in order to take more direct control over the government. He further announced that his son, Badis, would be his heir apparent, a move that broke with the Fatimid tradition of appointing the next Zirid emir. Al-­Mansur also moved his court from Achir to Sabra al-­Mansuriya, solidifying Zirid control over the most prosperous area of Ifriqiya and allowing the emir to showcase his wealth through a series of building proj­ects in and around the city. Al-­ Mansur’s attitude ­toward his Fatimid lords is best seen in his declaration to the nobles of Kairouan, reported by Ibn ʿIdhari: “I am not one of ­those who gets appointed and dismissed by a stroke of the pen, for I have inherited the kingdom from my f­ ather and my ancestors.”26 The Fatimids chose not to react with vio­lence against al-­Mansur for ­these acts of insubordination, busy as they ­were with their campaigns in the Mashriq. Instead, they allowed the situation to calm over the course of several years as the Zirids campaigned on their western frontier.27 In 382H (992–93), relations between the Fatimids and Zirids normalized when the former acknowledged Badis as heir apparent. This inaction on the part of the Fatimids showed their desire to formally mark Ifriqiya as part of their lands u ­ nder the administration of the Zirids, even if the imam-­caliph had ­little control over them. The Fatimids ­were more concerned with tax revenues they could extract from the Zirid emirs than control over the daily operations of the Ifriqiyan bureaucracy.28 23. ​Talbi, “Law and Economy in Ifrīqiya,” 249. 24. ​Brett, “Fatimid Revolution,” 624. 25. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:66–78. 26. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:259. Translation is from Amin Tibi, “Zīrids,” EI2. 27. ​The Fatimids bestowed on al-­Mansur the honorific title ʿUddat al-­ʿAziz (Instrument of al-­ ʿAziz), a title that flew in the face of the actions of the Zirid emir. Brett, “Fatimid Revolution,” 626. 28. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:513–18; Brett, Rise of the Fatimids, 359.

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Al-­Mansur was succeeded in 386H (996) by his son Badis, who pledged his loyalty to the Fatimids in a lavish ceremony. During this ostentatious display, a Fatimid envoy invested Badis with customary robes of honor and a contract that invested in him the right to rule Ifriqiya as emir of the Fatimids.29 In the tradition of his ­father and grand­father, Badis campaigned against rival Zanata groups in modern-­day Algeria for much of the first ten years of his reign. During ­these campaigns, Badis required the support of his u ­ ncle Hammad, to whom he promised lands conquered at the expense of the Zanata. Hammad founded the city of Qalʿa in 398H (1007–8) and soon a­ fter, revolted against Badis in 405H (1014–15) by transferring his allegiance to the Abbasids of Baghdad.30 Badis responded to the Hammadid revolt by laying siege to Qalʿa and winning an initial victory over his u ­ ncle. This campaign came to a sudden end, however, when Badis died unexpectedly in his sleep, forcing the Zirids back to Sabra al-­Mansuriya. Ifriqiya was thus divided between the Hammadid dynasty to the west and the Zirid dynasty to the east—­a schism that persisted ­until the fall of the Hammadids in the twelfth c­ entury.31 The city of Tripoli in eastern Ifriqiya also proved a prob­lem for the Zirids. At the beginning of the eleventh ­century, the Zirids and Fatimids became involved in a dispute over who had the right to appoint the city’s governor.32 The assertive Zirids thought that they had the right to dictate internal affairs in Ifriqiya and should therefore control succession in the city, while the Fatimids looked to retain control over the governor’s appointment. The resulting civil unrest provided an opportunity for a group of Zanata warriors, who had been displaced as a result of previous campaigns in western Ifriqiya, to seize the city. The so-­called Banu Khazrun remained major players in Tripoli across the eleventh century. 29. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:268–69; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:88. 30. ​H. R. Idris, “Ḥammādids,” EI2. See also Lucien Golvin, Recherches archéologiques a la Qal’a des Banu Hammad (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1965). 31. ​Another offshoot of the Zirid dynasty in Ifriqiya was the Zirids of Granada, who carved out territory in southern al-­Andalus during the eleventh ­century (c. 1013–91). The originator of this dynasty was Zawi ibn Ziri, who was the ­brother of Bulukkin ibn Ziri. Although Zawi and Bulukkin had initially worked together on campaigns in western Ifriqiya, Zawi opposed the succession of his grand-­nephew Badis and acknowledged the authority of the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba. Zawi and his loyal followers arrived in al-­Andalus at the beginning of the eleventh ­century, initially ­under the ser­vice of the Umayyads of Córdoba. Eventually, Zawi turned on his lords and ended up settling in the environs of Granada, where they remained in power u ­ ntil the end of the eleventh ­century. Although Zawi tried to convince his followers to return to Ifriqiya and claim the land that was (in his mind) rightly theirs, he was unable to persuade them to do so. On this narrative history, see Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:91–95; Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Po­liti­cal History of al-­Andalus (New York: Longman, 1996), 141–43; Brian Catlos, Infidel Kings and Unholy Warriors: Faith, Power, and Vio­lence in the Age of Crusade and Jihad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 26–28. 32. ​Michael Brett, “The City-­State in Medieval Ifriqiya: The Case of Tripoli,” Cahiers de Tunisie 34 (1986): 80.

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Al-­Muʿizz and the Banu Hilal The Zirid emir Badis ibn al-­Mansur died while campaigning against the Hammadids in late 406H (1016) and was succeeded by his son, al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis. The reign of al-­Muʿizz proved decisive in the history of the Zirid emirate, for it saw the arrival of the Banu Hilal into Ifriqiya. The conquests of this confederation of tribes resulted in the realignment of the po­liti­cal structure of the region from one based around the Zirid court of Sabra al-­Mansuriya to one in which lords governed from individual cities. Al-­Muʿizz became one such ruler when the Banu Hilal displaced the Zirid emir from his capital to the coastal stronghold of Mahdia, where he and his successors reigned ­until the ­middle of the twelfth c­ entury. The eventual displacement of al-­Muʿizz from his ancestral throne was by no means inevitable when the young emir ­rose to power at the age of nine. Nonetheless, the early years of his reign ­were marked by religious vio­lence. On his succession, al-­Muʿizz was faced with widespread anti-­Ismaʿili pogroms that led to the massacre of the Ismaʿili population in Kairouan and other cities in Ifriqiya.33 Al-­Muʿizz himself was nearly assassinated—­twice—by Sunni conspirators in Kairouan, which led him and his advisers to crack down on dissent in the city with an iron fist.34 In Shawwal 407H (March–­April 1017), Zirid forces besieged the mosque of a prominent Sunni leader in Kairouan and executed him. The army then set fire to the commercial center of the city and looted merchants’ goods as they found them. This destruction of Kairouan put an end to anti-­Ismaʿili pogroms during the reign of al-­Muʿizz. With internal dissent in Kairouan crippled, the Zirid emir moved to finish the expedition his f­ather had started against the Hammadids. A ­ fter a bloody campaign in the summer and autumn of 408H (1017), the two sides made peace with a deal that included a marriage alliance between the two dynasties.35 With his western border secure, al-­Muʿizz looked to the two other theaters through which he could expand his dynasty: to the Banu Khazrun in the southeast and to Sicily, where the ruling Kalbid dynasty was waning in popularity and power.36 The results of ­these campaigns w ­ ere mixed. He managed to subdue the Banu Khazrun at Tripoli and to retain control over the eastern 33. ​Mohamed Talbi, “al-­Muʿizz b. Bādīs,” EI2. 34. ​Talbi speculates that the Hammadids might have been ­behind ­these revolts to keep the Zirids distracted from campaigning against them. Talbi, “al-­Muʿizz b. Bādīs,” EI2. 35. ​The Zirids and Hammadids remained at peace u ­ ntil the death of Hammad in 419H (1028– 29). Hammad’s successor, al-­Qaʾid ibn Hammad, broke this peace and fought against the Zirids for several years. The two rivals made peace in 434H (1042–43). Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:158. 36. ​During the early years of al-­Muʿizz’s reign, much of Zirid policy was formed by an inner council of advisers to the child emir. One overbearing vizier, Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad ibn al-­

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reaches of Ifriqiya, a feat that led H. R. Idris to call al-­Muʿizz the first “truly Ifriqiyan Zirid.”37 Al-­Muʿizz was less successful in Sicily, where his expeditions (considered in more detail l­ater) w ­ ere unable to establish a lasting foothold on the island. By all accounts, al-­Muʿizz presided over a wealthy court that sponsored poetry, ­music, calligraphy, and ornamental works in the style of the Fatimid court in Cairo.38 Beneath the surface of this gilded court, however, was a troubled economy.39 The apparent neglect of aqueducts and other systems of irrigation that had been essential to the Ifriqiyan economy had dire consequences for the Zirids and their ­people, especially t­ hose in rural areas. Ifriqiya was hit with a severe famine in 395H (1004–5), which caused a wave of emigration.40 The region suffered from five more famines from 1018 to 1056, which brought more emigration, disease, starvation, and a decline in agricultural production.41 Fatwas indicate that ­those who remained in Ifriqiya needed to import Sicilian grain (paid for primarily with gold) for their own consumption.42 In addition, merchants navigating the network of trade routes that connected sub-­Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean increasingly began to focus on western and eastern termini in the Maghreb and Egypt, respectively, which decreased the amount of trade goods coming into Zirid lands.43 Evidence of commercial trou­bles in Ifriqiya during the reign of al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis is explicit in a handful of merchant letters from the Cairo Geniza. Some merchants wrote negatively of Ifriqiya ­because of confusion stemming from military campaigns. Ephraim ibn Ismaʿil al-­Jawhari, for example, wrote a letter to a contact in Kairouan that mentions “bad news” from the city about Hasan, was executed 413H (1022) at the order of the fifteen-­year-­old emir. Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:211. 37. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:165. 38. ​Notable Zirid court figures from the eleventh ­century include Ibn Sharaf, Ibn Rashiq, and al-­ Raqiq. D. J. Wasserstein, Julie Scott Meisami, and Paul Starkey, “Ibn Sharaf Al-­Qayrawānī,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic Lit­er­a­ture, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1:371; G. J. H. Van Gelder, Julie Scott Meisami, and Paul Starkey, “Ibn Rashīq Al-­Qayrawānī,” in Meisami and Starkey, Encyclopedia of Arabic Lit­er­a­ture (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1:363; Russell Hopley, “Raqiq al-­ Qayarawani, al-­,” in The Dictionary of African Biography, ed. Emmanuel Kwaku Akyeampong and Henry Louis Gates (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 182–83. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:771– 823; Bouyahia, “Vie littéraire en Ifriqiya,” 133–34, 286–92; Laroui, History of the Maghrib, 144–46. 39. ​Al-­Muʿizz himself wrote on the practice of bookmaking, which still survives ­today. See Martin Levey, “Mediaeval Arabic Bookmaking and Its Relation to Early Chemistry and Pharmacology,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 52, no. 4 (1962): 1–79. 40. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 395H, 9:88. 41. ​Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 75. 42. ​At the same time, Sicilians required Ifriqiyan imports of olive oil for their consumption. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:655–56, 665–68; Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 348–49. 43. ​Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 348; Devisse, “Trade and Trade Routes,” 403–26.

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a revolt against Zirid rule and says that “bad rumors abounded.”44 This conflict had negative consequences for the markets of Ifriqiya, as testified by another letter from the same time, which tells of a merchant being unable to sell flax at a profit in Mahdia and moving his business to Sicily.45 Other merchants mention stagnation in the marketplaces of Ifriqiya. In a letter from 1049, Barhun ibn Isaac Taherti laments that Mahdia “is poor and anything that arrives in large quantities has no market.”46 Another letter reports delays in setting sail to Mahdia b­ ecause the armed guard boats that had to escort the merchants had yet to be properly equipped.47 Despite the issues that t­ hese merchants encountered in Ifriqiyan markets, ­there are a number of other letters from the 1030s and 1040s that provide no evidence of prob­lems ­doing business in the region. In the above letter from 1049, for example, Barhun’s critique of Mahdia can be juxtaposed with his statement that some items in short supply ­will nonetheless “sell well and be in demand.”48 Other merchant letters discuss Ifriqiya as a market for goods including flax, oil, pearls, indigo, pepper, soap, spices, textiles, silk, tin, carpets, hides, and saffron.49 Although the economy of al-­Muʿizz suffered from conflict and larger economic trends, merchants still conducted business in Zirid cities with some degree of regularity. Widespread economic changes in Ifriqiya during the eleventh ­century ­were complemented by po­liti­cal ones. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, a confederation of Arab tribes called the Banu Hilal gradually began to migrate from Egypt into Ifriqiya.50 The timeline for their movements is unclear.51 Ibn Hawqal describes the Banu Hilal being pre­sent at the oasis of Farafra west of the Nile River sometime in the tenth ­century.52 Over the next hundred years, 44. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 47. On the movement of Geniza communities from Ifriqiya to Egypt, see Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:31–33. 45. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 48. 46. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 69. Some Geniza merchants blamed al-­Muʿizz for the suffering of Jews in the region. One letter refers to him as “the evildoer.” Moshe Gil, “The Jewish Merchants in the Light of Eleventh-­Century Geniza Documents,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 46, no. 3 (2003): 311. 47. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 52. 48. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 69. Even during times of conflict and bad markets in Ifriqiya, it was still common for Geniza merchants to ship staple goods (like flax) to the region. One letter, for example, relates a merchant loading 180 bales of flax at Mahdia despite the turmoil in nearby Kairouan. Goldberg, “Use and Abuse of Commercial Letters,” 145. 49. ​See, for example, Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, documents 51, 52, 54, 60, 69, 77, 86. 50. ​Another tribal confederation called the Banu Sulaym also took part in this migration, though they initially only went as far as modern-­day Libya. ­Later, in the thirteenth ­century, they migrated west into modern-­day Tunisia and displaced many Hilalian lords. Brett, “Way of the Nomad,” 262; Michael Lecker, “Sulaym,” EI2. 51. ​Brett, “Zughba at Tripoli,” 41–42. 52. ​Ibn Hawqal, Kitab Surat al-­Ard, 155–56; Brett, “Way of the Nomad,” 258.

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t­ hese tribes slowly moved westward ­until they reached Ifriqiya. They are first mentioned being in the region in the late 1030s, when members of a Hilalian subdivision called the Banu Zughba served in the army of emir al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis before becoming entangled in the internal politics of Tripoli.53 Over the next de­cade, they continued to expand westward, which eventually brought them into conflict with the Zirids. As the Banu Hilal moved west into Ifriqiya, meaningful changes in the Zirid dynasty caused further changes to the region’s geopo­liti­cal landscape. Al-­ Muʿizz had maintained an amiable relationship with the Fatimids during the first several de­cades of his reign.54 As the years progressed, however, Zirid loyalty to the imam-­caliphs in Egypt began to falter. Spurred by anti-­Ismaʿili pogroms of the mid-1010s, the ­people of Ifriqiya ­were increasingly split between ­those loyal to the Ismaʿili doctrine of the Fatimids and t­ hose who adhered to the tradition of Maliki Sunnism based in Kairouan. The rise of Maliki Sunni ideology in the court of al-­Muʿizz put pressure on him to disown the Shiʿa Fatimids. So too ­were the Zirids obliged to provide tribute to their Fatimid lords in Cairo, which put a burden of taxation on an already fragile economy, with few immediate benefits for the emirs or p­ eople of Ifriqiya. T ­ hese circumstances led al-­Muʿizz to renounce his allegiance to the Fatimids of Cairo in ­favor of their rival dynasty, the Abbasids of Baghdad. The date of the Zirid break from the Fatimids is uncertain, but it must have occurred by the end of the 1040s, when coins w ­ ere minted in the name of the Zirid emir and the khutbah was read in name of the Abbasid caliph.55 This change of loyalty effectively made the Zirids an in­de­pen­dent dynasty with the Abbasid caliph used as a legitimizing figurehead. The Zirids’ break from Cairo meant that they needed to marshal support among vari­ous Berber groups in Ifriqiya to combat the ascendent Hilalians. This proved a difficult task. Ifriqiya was in the midst of a substantial drought in the late 1040s and early 1050s due to years of below-­average rainfall, which spurred emigration and ­limited the military capacity of local lords.56 When the Banu Hilal clashed against the Zirids and their allies at the ­Battle of Haydaran 53. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 267; Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 92–93. 54. ​Al-­Muʿizz received customary gifts and honorary titles from his Fatimid overlords during the first ten years of his reign. Brett, “Diplomacy of Empire,” 151–58. 55. ​­Hazard, Numismatic History, 53–56, 90–93. Epigraphic evidence likewise confirms this Zirid break from the Fatimids. Lotfi Abdeljaouad, “Les relations entre les Zirides et les Fatimides à la lumière des documents épigraphiques,” Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 139 (April 2015): 147–66. See also Norman D. Nicol, A Corpus of Fāṭimid Coins (Trieste: G. Bernardi, 2006), 307–13. 56. ​Ronnie Ellenblum, The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate Change and the Decline of the East, 950–1072 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 155–58; King, “Sword and the Sun,” 232–34.

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in the spring of 443H (1052), the result was a decisive Hilalian victory.57 Al-­ Muʿizz attempted to salvage his emirate by marrying his d­ aughters to leaders of the Banu Hilal, but this had ­little effect. The Banu Hilal sacked Kairouan in Ramadan 449H (November 1057), and al-­Muʿizz retreated to the coastal stronghold of Mahdia. Rival poets in the Zirid court, Ibn Rashiq and Ibn Sharaf, composed poems dedicated to the fall of the glorious city, with the former mourning that the city had once outshone both Cairo and Baghdad in splendor.58 Once the emirs of Ifriqiya, the Zirids ­were reduced to governing Mahdia and its suburb of Zawila. The Hammadids, too, lost much of their inland territory to the Banu Hilal, and they relocated their capital to the port of Bougie in modern-­ day Algeria.59 The Fatimids of Cairo took advantage of the victories of the Banu Hilal by dispatching an envoy to Ifriqiya amid ­these conquests. The envoy received the submission of the defeated Zirids, who w ­ ere forced to renounce their loyalty to the Abbasids and once again submit to the Fatimids. In the de­cades ­after the defeat of the Zirids, the Fatimids consciously manipulated their role in the Hilalian conquests by claiming that the arrival of the Banu Hilal in Ifriqiya was their own d­ oing—­a punishment for the Zirids’ insubordination in the 1040s.60 This narrative was a carefully constructed fabrication that helped to bolster the standing of the Fatimid dynasty, which was suffering from civil and economic strife in the ­middle of the eleventh ­century. It was this propagandizing narrative that gained traction in a number of l­ater Arabic chronicles, most prominently that of Ibn Khaldun, who described the invasion of the Banu Hilal as a swarm of locusts upon Ifriqiya sent by the Fatimids.61 While the Banu Hilal did not bring w ­ holesale destruction, they nonetheless facilitated economic change. Conflict in the 1050s had an adverse impact on traders in Ifriqiya. One letter from the Cairo Geniza describes how Muslim traders fleeing Kairouan in 1053 ­were killed and had their stomachs searched ­because the “Bedouin” (i.e., Banu Hilal) thought that the traders had swal57. ​The threat of the Banu Hilal was such that the Zirids and Hammadids, perennial rivals up to this point, joined forces at Haydaran. Idris, “Ḥammādids,” EI2; Michael Brett, “Fatimid Historiography: A Case Study—­The Quarrel with the Zirids, 1048–1058,” in Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D. O. Morgan (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1982), 47–60. 58. ​Michael Brett, “The Poetry of Disaster: The Tragedy of Qayrawān 1052–1057 CE,” in Continuity and Change in the Realms of Islam: Studies in Honour of Professor Urbain Vermeulen, ed. Kristof d’Hulster and Jo Van Steenbergen (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2008), 77–90; Nizar  F. Hermes, “ ‘It Eclipsed Cairo and Outshone Baghdad!’: Ibn Rashīq’s Elegy for the City of Qayrawan,” Journal of Arabic Lit­er­a­ture 48, no. 3 (2017): 270–97. 59. ​The history of Bougie is exhaustively documented in Dominique Valérian, Bougie: Port maghrébin, 1067–1510 (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2006). 60. ​Brett, “Way of the Nomad,” 258. 61. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:20.

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lowed dinars.62 The same letter also reports the plundering of shops and a caravanserai near the city. Another letter from 1058 mentions that a recent loss of twenty dinars “does not compare with the losses we suffered in Kairouan.”63 For some merchants, economic trou­bles persisted in Ifriqiya into the 1060s as well. Salama ibn Musa Safaqusi, for example, writes that one of his partners should have “congratulated [him] on [his] escape from Mahdia” and from “annihilation and the terrible situation, which I should not want anyone to endure.”64 Letters like ­these testify to the negative impact of the Hilalian invasions on merchants.65 In the face of this vio­lence and risk to the lives of merchants, commerce nevertheless persisted in Ifriqiya’s cities. Despite the dangers of travel to Ifriqiya (and Sicily) in the m ­ iddle of the eleventh c­ entury, the promise of wealth in their markets was enough to motivate some merchants to continue trading ­there.66 Rural production also changed as a result of the arrival of the Banu Hilal. Since ­these tribes w ­ ere predominately pastoralists, they repurposed much of the lands of Ifriqiya (particularly inland areas) to accommodate their lifestyle. The production of cereal grains and other foodstuffs in inland Ifriqiya, which had already been declining in quantity due to drought and the disintegration of inland infrastructure, suffered another setback. Al-­Idrisi, for example, notes the economic erosion caused by the Banu Hilal in his description of a road leading from inland Ifriqiya to Tripoli. He writes that “all of the places that we have recounted on this road are deserted. . . . ​[Their] structures w ­ ere destroyed, their ­people wiped out, and their goods have dis­appeared.”67 ­These economic changes forced local lords on the Ifriqiyan coast to import additional foodstuffs—­particularly Sicilian grain—in order to feed their ­people.68 62. ​Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 186. 63. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 122. 64. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 151. 65. ​Another letter from 1056 mentions that “a ­whole group of our men died in North Africa.” Although the reason for the death of t­ hese merchants is not explored, it is likely that they fell victim to the endemic vio­lence of the 1050s between the Zirids and Banu Hilal. Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 108. Jessica Goldberg argues that during the eleventh ­century, ­there was an increase from 1 to 5  ­percent in the nonarrival of goods “due to port closings, ship diversions, piracy, and seizure caused by po­liti­cal events.” Goldberg, Trade and Institutions, 325. 66. ​The quantity of surviving Geniza letters decreased rapidly during the second half of the eleventh ­century. The reason for this decline is likely tied to a decrease in trade for merchants from this community, although this does not necessarily indicate a decline in overall trade. Goitein, “Medieval Tunisia,” 310–12; Nef, “Sicile dans la documentation,” 278. 67. ​Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:297. 68. ​A study by Jean-­Louis Ballais found that soil erosion, a pro­cess associated with agricultural use, was ­limited during the time of the Hilalian conquests. Thus, it is likely that the Banu Hilal’s main effect in the region was “to substitute pastures for cultivated fields” in order to support their livestock. Ballais does note, however, that urban areas with access to irrigation did not see this change in soil

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The Zirids witnessed ­these changes to Ifriqiya’s economy and society from their new capital of Mahdia. Emir al-­Muʿizz died shortly ­after his relocation ­there in 454H (1062–63). His reign of forty-­seven years had seen a fundamental change in the po­liti­cal and economic geography of the region. In the early years of his reign, the Zirids had been the dominant force in Ifriqiya. By the end of his reign, however, the dynasty was only one of many Berber and Arab families that ­were competing for supremacy in a po­liti­cally decentralized landscape of local rulers governing over (for the most part) individual city-­states. Nonetheless, the Zirids had at their disposal a degree of wealth, commercial contacts, and military infrastructure that would allow them to continue vying for control over Ifriqiya and the other territories in the central Mediterranean in the de­cades a­ fter the death of al-­Muʿizz.

The Normans in Southern Italy and Sicily As the reign of al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis in Ifriqiya drew to a close, the reign of the Normans in southern Italy and Sicily was just beginning. This group of so-­ called Normans had its origins in northern France and, before then, in Scandinavia. During the eighth ­century, Norse Viking raiders launched attacks across northwestern Eu­rope from their feared longships.69 The size and frequency of ­these raids intensified in the ninth c­ entury, especially in northern France, u ­ ntil t­ hese Vikings established permanent settlements in the region. The Carolingians formally acknowledged the presence of t­ hese invading north-­ men (hence “Norman”) in 911 when Charles the S­ imple signed a treaty with the Viking leader Rollo, in which he was granted control of the territory of Normandy. In subsequent de­cades, the Normans absorbed vari­ous ele­ments of Carolingian culture—­including their language and religion—­into their territories and proved themselves capable governors.70 Although isolated episodes of Viking/Norman raiding occurred in the Mediterranean as early as the ninth c­ entury (the specifics of which are unclear), Norman involvement in southern Italy began in earnest at the beginning of erosion, which indicates that agricultural production continued in coastal cities, including t­ hose like Tripoli and Gabès. Ballais, “Conquests and Land Degradation,” 133–34. 69. ​Marjorie Chibnall, The Normans (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 3–37. On Norman identity in Normandy, see Elisabeth van Houts, “Qui étaient les Normands? Quelques observations sur des liens entre la Normandie, l’Angleterre et l’Italie au début du XIe siècle,” in Bates and Bauduin, 911–2011, 129–46. 70. ​On Norman ethnic identity, tradition, and heritage, see Stefan Burkhardt and Thomas Foerster, “Tradition and Heritage: The Normans in the Transcultural M ­ iddle Ages,” in Burkhardt and Foerster, Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage, 1–18.

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the eleventh c­ entury.71 At the time of the Normans’ arrival, governance in southern Italy was divided. Byzantine governors ruled over the regions of Apulia and Calabria at the behest of the emperor at Constantinople.72 Lombard lords, meanwhile, administered to the western coastal area of Campania through a patchwork of relatively fragmented principalities.73 It was common for Lombard lords to fight against familial rivals, at times dragging Byzantine governors into conflict as well. Added to this po­liti­cal unrest ­were attacks from Muslim governors in Sicily, which strained the resources of lords ruling on the western coasts of Italy. The Normans entered this milieu around the year 1000, when a Lombard lord recruited Norman pilgrims returning from Jerusalem to fight against his Muslim rivals.74 Successive waves of Normans migrated to Italy to fight on behalf of the Lombards and, eventually, to govern their own territories. By the m ­ iddle of the eleventh ­century, the Normans had become potent forces on the peninsula—­due in no small part to their military prowess and their frequent intermarriages with Lombard elites.75 A handful of the most successful Normans w ­ ere sons of a petty lord from Normandy named Tancred de Hauteville, including the ­brothers Robert Guiscard and Roger I, whose ­careers in southern Italy ­were central to the ­later Norman conquest of Sicily. Rapid Norman expansion in southern Italy came at a cost. Lombard and Byzantine lords despised ­these invaders for conquering lands that ­were once theirs, the nearby papacy was wary of the Normans’ expansionist tendencies, the Holy Roman Empire resented the Normans for conquering lands that they claimed as their own, and many in southern Italy resented the looting that 71. ​Ann Christys, Vikings in the South: Voyages to Iberia and the Mediterranean (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015). 72. ​For overviews of the Norman conquests of southern Italy and Sicily, see Donald Matthew, The Norman Kingdom of Sicily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9–32; Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 60–185; Nef, Conquérir et gouverner la Sicile, 60–233. 73. ​The term Lombard comes from the Germanic ­peoples who invaded Italy during the sixth ­century. Their gradual assimilation into the society of southern Italy was such that by the eleventh ­century, they can “can be considered as, in our terms, native Italians.” Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 12. 74. ​The Latin chronicles of Geoffrey Malaterra, Amatus of Montecassino, and William of Apulia provide the most detailed accounts of the arrival of the Normans in southern Italy. John France, “The Occasion of the Coming of the Normans to Southern Italy,” Journal of Medieval History 17, no.  3 (1991): 185–205; Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 4–8; Graham Loud, “Southern Italy in the Eleventh ­Century,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 4, c.1024–­c.1198, ed. David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-­Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2:97–102. 75. ​It is unclear how long the Normans remained attached to their northern French heritage and how long the Lombards felt separate from the Normans. On the integration of Norman lords in southern Italy, see Graham Loud, “Norman Traditions in Southern Italy,” in Burkhardt and Foerster, Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage, 35–56; Rosa Canosa, “Discours ethniques et pratiques du pouvoir des normands d’Italie: Sources narratives et documentaires (XIe–­XIIe siècles),” in Bates and Bauduin, 911–2011, 341–56.

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came part and parcel with the Normans’ conquests.76 ­These varied grievances against the Normans came to a head at the ­Battle of Civitate in 1053, when the Normans defeated a co­ali­tion of Papal, Lombard, and German forces. This victory led Pope Leo IX, who had been captured in the b­ attle, to sign treaties that w ­ ere favorable to the Normans. Six years l­ater, Pope Nicholas II invested Robert Guiscard with the lands of Apulia, Calabria, and (once the Normans conquered it) Sicily. Roger was appointed (in theory) as the count of Sicily and a vassal of Robert. The ­brothers wasted ­little time in beginning their conquests. In 1061, they landed on Sicily’s eastern shores—­the first step in a thirty-­year series of campaigns that would bring the island ­under Norman control. When the Normans set foot on Sicily, the island was divided among a number of Muslim lords who ruled in the wake of the disintegration of the Kalbid dynasty.77 This pro­cess of po­liti­cal decentralization was over a ­century in the making. During the tenth ­century, the Fatimids engaged in prolonged campaigns in Sicily that eventually brought the island u ­ nder their nominal control. In 948, they appointed a member of the Banu al-­K alb (hence “Kalbid”) tribe to govern the island on their behalf. The rise of the Kalbids in Sicily bore some similarities to the rise of the Zirids in Ifriqiya. Both dynasties distinguished themselves through military prowess on behalf of the Fatimids, particularly at their most vulnerable hour during the revolt of Abu Yazid. While the Zirids clashed with Fatimid administrators within a generation of the Fatimids’ departure for Egypt and eventually broke with them entirely, however, no such conflict occurred in Sicily. The Kalbids served as loyal emirs for the Fatimids by developing infrastructure, reaping the profits of the trade routes that ran through their ports, and waging campaigns against Christian lords when it was advantageous to do so.78 Nonetheless, the Kalbids strug­gled to exercise authority over the entirety of Sicily, especially in its rugged interior and eastern parts. Centuries of Islamic rule in Sicily spurred Islamization and the spread of the Arabic language.79 The Aghlabids, Fatimids, and Kalbids enacted laws that 76. ​­These communities and their responses to Norman aggression are considered in Barbara Kreutz, Before the Normans: Southern Italy in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 150–58. 77. ​The Arabic chronicles of Ibn Khaldun, Ibn al-­Athir, Ibn ʿIdhari, and al-­Nuwayri are the most informative texts for the history of Muslim Sicily, though t­ here are numerous lacunae and contradictions in ­these sources. Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 25–69. 78. ​Muslim Sicily and its larger Mediterranean connections (including the Kalbid-­Fatimid relationship) are considered in Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 116–65; Bramoullé, Fatimides et la mer, 471–91. 79. ​Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 18. See also Dominique Valérian, ed., Islamisation et arabisation de l’Occident musulman (VIIe–­XIIe siècle) (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2011).

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favored their coreligionists at the expense of Christians, such as levying the jizya head tax on non-­Muslims, which spurred the conversion or emigration of Christians. The Fatimids and Kalbids also invested in the construction of mosques and waged campaigns against Christian lords in eastern Sicily and southern Italy, further alienating Christians living u ­ nder their rule. Islamization was further accelerated at the beginning of the eleventh c­ entury by the migration of Muslims from North Africa who ­were fleeing economic hardship due to famine and whose presence is evident from toponyms in the southwestern part of the island.80 By the ­middle of the eleventh ­century, Christians tended to be clustered t­ oward the eastern edge of Sicily, where they w ­ ere clos81 est to their coreligionists in southern Italy. Chris­tian­ity persisted in pockets of inland Sicily, too, where it was sometimes syncretized with Islamic devotional practices.82 The economy that the Kalbids cultivated and that the Normans l­ater inherited included agricultural production in rural areas, manufacturing in cities, and revenue generated from commercial networks that passed through Sicily’s ports. By the time of the Normans’ arrival on the island, laborers on the island produced a variety of goods including grain, rice, sugarcane, dates, citrus fruits, papyrus, silk, and cotton.83 Kalbid Sicily also benefited from being at the intersection of trade routes that ­were essential to the exchange of agricultural products, industrial goods, and luxuries.84 The expanding economy of Sicily led to population growth, particularly in the capital of Palermo, which may have grown to one hundred thousand p­ eople by the eleventh 80. ​Kennedy, “Sicily and al-­Andalus,” 667; Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 38. 81. ​Houben, Ruler between East and West, 12. Metcalfe argues that “it is likely that, by the mid-­eleventh ­century, Sicily was mainly Muslim and almost every­one understood Arabic.” Metcalfe, “Muslims of Sicily,” 290. See also Annliese Nef, “La désignation des groupes ethniques de la Sicile islamique dans les chroniques en langue arabe: Source d’information ou topos?,” Annales Islamologiques 42 (2008): 57–72. 82. ​Ibn Hawqal noted this practice with disdain in his description of Sicily. Ibn Hawqal, Kitab Surat al-­Ard, 118–31. He likewise disparagingly wrote about the coast of Sicily being a haven for “the unemployed and the godless” as well as “pimps and perverts.” See also Metcalfe, “Muslims of Sicily,” 289–93; William Granara, “Ibn Hawqal in Sicily,” Alif: Journal of Comparative Politics 3 (Spring 1983): 94–99. 83. ​The idea of Muslim rule in Sicily causing a “green revolution” in the countryside is disputed and, in recent years, has been the subject of scrutiny. The original argument is found in Andrew M. Watson, “A Medieval Green Revolution: New Crops and Farming Techniques in the Early Islamic World,” in The Islamic M ­ iddle East, 700–1900, ed. A. L. Udovitch (Prince­ton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1981), 29– 58; Andrew M. Watson, Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques, 700–1100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). A discussion of this idea’s legacy and refutation can be found in Horden and Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 257–63; Michael Decker, “Plants and Pro­gress: Rethinking the Islamic Agricultural Revolution,” Journal of World History 20, no. 2 (June 2009): 187–206; Paolo Squatriti, “Of Seeds, Seasons, and Seas: Andrew Watson’s Medieval Agrarian Revolution Forty Years ­Later,” Journal of Economic History 74, no. 4 (2014): 1205–20. 84. ​Nef, “Sicile dans la documentation,” 282–91.

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­century.85 Although the Kalbid emirs of Sicily profited from the fruits of the Sicilian economy, they w ­ ere unable to unite the island u ­ nder their rule.86 Beginning in 1015 and extending ­until the end of the dynasty in 1053, the Kalbids ­were confronted with internal revolts and external invasions that destabilized their dynasty. The disintegration of Kalbid central authority eventually led to the creation of small lordships across the island that historians have compared to the ṭaʾifa principalities of al-­Andalus.87 Thus, in 1061 Robert Guiscard and his ­brother Roger set foot onto an island without a centralized po­liti­cal authority but with substantial economic infrastructure. The ­brothers exploited this disunity to their advantage from the very beginning of their conquest in 1061 to take Messina, which secured their foothold on the island. While some Muslim Sicilian rulers w ­ ere content to capitulate to ­these invaders, ­others resisted them. Muslim governors forged alliances with their coreligionists based not only in Sicily, but also in Ifriqiya, where the Zirids w ­ ere happy to use this po­liti­cal unrest to expand their own influence. The stage was set for first contact between the Zirids and the Normans.

The Zirids and Normans Clash in Sicily During the 1060s and 1070s, the Zirids and Normans fought over territories in Sicily, each seeking to leverage local alliances and rivalries to their advantage. The eventual Norman conquest of the island was by no means a forgone conclusion in ­these de­cades. Instead, both dynasties looked to make the most of their military resources through diplomacy, raiding, and (on occasion) open combat. Despite some Zirid success in the western half of Sicily, it was the Normans who succeeded at establishing their authority on the island. Norman armies ­under the command of Roger I conquered the entirety of Sicily by 1091, marking the permanent end of Muslim rule on the island and halting Zirid attempts at expansion across the Strait of Sicily. During the first hundred years of Zirid rule in Ifriqiya, its emirs had shown ­limited interest in Sicily.88 They certainly had knowledge of the po­liti­cal situation on the island, as bouts of emigration between the two regions punctu85. ​Kennedy, “Sicily and al-­Andalus,” 668. 86. ​Metcalfe theorizes that Kalbid taxation practices contributed to their unpopularity on the island. Nef and Prigent, however, see continuity in taxation practices between Byzantine and Islamic Sicily, thus pointing to other potential c­ auses for unrest on the island. Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 62–63; Nef and Prigent, “Contrôle et exploitation,” 354–55. 87. ​Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 82–85. 88. ​­There is no trace of Zirid interference in Sicily up to the reign of al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:126.

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ated the early eleventh ­century.89 Relations between the Zirids and Kalbids nonetheless appear to have been peaceful, as both dynasties w ­ ere vassals of the Fatimid imam-­caliph in Cairo and benefited from trade that circulated between the ports of Mahdia, Palermo, and Alexandria. The strength of their relationship was such that in 416H (1025–26), al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis sent a fleet to Sicily to help repel a Byzantine invasion of the island, but it was destroyed by a winter Mediterranean storm.90 The defensive alliance between the Zirids and Kalbids against the Byzantines did not last. The Zirids u ­ nder al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis—­increasingly seeing themselves as in­de­pen­dent from the Fatimids and thus not bound to assist the Kalbids—­soon began to interfere in Sicilian affairs expressly for their own bene­ fit. The most substantial Zirid intervention in Sicily during the reign of al-­ Muʿizz came in the 1030s, when a rebellious group of Kalbid nobles sought Zirid military aid to dethrone the Kalbid emir.91 Al-­Muʿizz accepted this invitation, and the Zirid army ­under the command of a son of al-­Muʿizz succeeded in defeating the emir, who was promptly executed. This victory was short lived. For unknown reasons, the Zirids and their Sicilian Muslim allies turned on each other and the outnumbered Zirid army was forced to flee. In the following de­cades, the disintegration of the Kalbid state and subsequent po­liti­ cal unrest among ṭaʾifa rulers in Sicily precipitated further Zirid intervention. The results w ­ ere disastrous for al-­Muʿizz. In the winter of 444H (1052), his fleet was destroyed by a Mediterranean storm, striking another blow to a Zirid military that was already stretched thin ­after the ­Battle of Haydaran.92 ­After his displacement to Mahdia, al-­Muʿizz looked to Sicily as a pos­si­ble point of expansion for his fledgling emirate.93 His first opportunity came in 89. ​In early 1015, disaffected Kalbid nobles led a major revolt in Sicily supported by Berbers and slaves on the island. Kalbid forces defeated this uprising and expelled many Berbers from the island, likely ­those from the Kutama tribe. It is likely that at least some of ­these Berbers migrated back to Ifriqiya and the lands of al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis. Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 73–79. 90. ​Ibn al-­Athir is the only author to mention this event. Idris posits that Ibn al-­Athir might have conflated the sinking of t­hese ships with a similar catastrophe in 1052. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­ Tarikh, year 416H, 9:164; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:168. 91. ​Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 84–85. 92. ​The timeline of this sinking is controversial. Ibn al-­Athir reports in an entry for the year 484H (which discusses much of the history of Norman-­Muslim conflict in Sicily) that the Zirid fleet sank in the month of Rajab 444H (1052). Amari argues, however, that the destruction of this fleet occurred some ten years l­ater in 1061 b­ ecause Ibn al-­Athir’s entry on this sinking is located next to his description of the B ­ attle of Castrogiovanni, which other sources agree happened in 1061. Cobb and Loud echo Amari in their own works, and I echo Idris’s skepticism of this thesis, though I am uncertain why he has chosen to date this sinking to the year 1051. Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 3:82–85; Paul M. Cobb, The Race for Paradise: An Islamic History of the Crusades (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 53; Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 156; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:171. 93. ​Davis-­Secord, Where Three Worlds Met, 185–89.

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1061, when he sent an army to Sicily at the request of Ibn al-­Hawwas to fight the invading Normans. The Latin chronicle of Geoffrey Malaterra mentions a “multitude of Africans and Sicilians” that confronted the Norman army of Roger I near the town of Castrogiovanni (modern Enna).94 The result of this ­battle—­the first recorded interaction between the Zirids and Normans—­was a decisive Norman victory. The Zirids and their allies w ­ ere routed and the spoils of the Normans w ­ ere such that “anyone who had lost his h ­ orse in the ­battle could expect . . . ​ten ­horses in exchange.” This victory was the first in a series of pitched b­ attles in Sicily that resulted in Norman triumphs over co­ali­ tions of Sicilian Muslims and the Zirids. Emir al-­Muiʿizz ibn Badis died in 454H (1062–63) ­after a reign of over forty years. He was succeeded by his son Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz, who continued the expansionist policies of his ­father in Sicily.95 The surviving medieval sources provide only snapshots of the Zirid presence on Sicily, although from t­hese sporadic narratives ­there emerges a picture of an Ifriqiyan dynasty that was heavi­ly involved on the island across the 1060s. Tamim’s first excursion into Sicily came in 455H (1063) when he sent an army to the island u ­ nder the command of his sons Ayyub and ʿAli. In the summer of 1063, an army comprising Zirid soldiers and their Muslim allies marched against the Normans. They met at Cerami in northeastern Sicily. The result of the b­ attle was another Norman victory. Seeking revenge for their defeat, a co­ali­tion of “Africans and Arabs” launched a surprise raid on the Normans, although this ambush was ultimately unsuccessful due to the battlefield heroics of Roger I.96 ­These defeats led the Zirid princes to avoid direct confrontation with the Normans for the time being and instead to look ­toward western Sicily to expand their authority. Ayyub established himself in Palermo and ʿAli did so in Agrigento. The ­brothers ruled ­these cities for the better part of five years, but their governance was unpop­u­lar. Medieval sources are unclear about the cause of popu­lar unrest against the Zirid princes, but modern historians have specu94. ​Malaterra’s mention of “Africans” in this context almost certainly refers to the Zirids, while “Sicilians” refers to Muslim Sicilians. Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:34; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 93–94. The translation of Lucas-­Avenel is useful for the first two books of this text. Malaterra, Histoire du G ­ rand Comte Roger, vol. 1. chap. 17. 95. ​The Zirids ­under Tamim also campaigned in Ifriqiya during the 1060s and 1070s, often against the Hammadids and their allies in coastal cities near Mahdia. For example, Tamim vied for control in the cities of Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax. In t­hese campaigns, Tamim forged alliances with sympathetic local rulers. This included one pact with a branch of the Banu Hilal against the Hammadids. In 470H (1077–78), however, Tamim and the Hammadids made peace through another marriage alliance. The details of ­these campaigns are explored in Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:251–74. 96. ​Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:41–46; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 107–8; Malaterra, Histoire du G ­ rand Comte Roger, vol. 2, chap. 35.

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lated that the presence of an outside power, especially one from an external Berber dynasty, precipitated conflict.97 ­After another Norman victory against Muslim forces in 1068, this time at Misilmeri near Palermo, the Zirid princes ­were ousted from power and sent back to Ifriqiya. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Zirids retained some presence in Sicily a­ fter the departure of Ayyub and ʿAli. For example, Malaterra tells of a successful raid that Saracen forces carried out in 1072 near Cerami that resulted in the death of Serlo II of Hauteville. According to this narrative, the victorious Saracens ate Serlo’s heart and then sent the heads of his men “for the honor” of the king of Africa.98 Although this story may have been embellished for dramatic effect, the specific mention of the king of Africa (i.e., Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz), shows that Malaterra suspected continued cooperation between the Zirids and Sicilian Muslims. Meanwhile, the Normans continued to extend their control over Sicily and laid siege to Palermo in 1071.99 The loss of Palermo, which was by far the largest and most resplendent city in Sicily, would strike a serious blow to the f­ uture of Muslim rule on the island. Tamim therefore attempted to break the Norman siege by sending a fleet to Sicily, but he was unable to dislodge the Normans.100 Palermo fell to the Normans in January 1072, which prompted a changed in Zirid policy t­oward the Normans. Instead of engaging them in pitched ­battle on Sicily, Tamim began a campaign of maritime raiding that made the Zirids infamous to Christian rulers in the central Mediterranean.101 In 1074, a Zirid fleet sacked Nicotera (southern Italy) on the feast day of Saint Peter, a­ fter the ­people of the city had overindulged in wine. The next day, the fleet negotiated ransoms for some of their captives before returning to Mahdia.102 A year ­later, the Zirid fleet sacked the city of Mazara in southwest Sicily. This time, though, members of this expedition lingered in the city in an attempt to take its fortified citadel. Roger I took advantage of the vulnerable Zirid position. His soldiers snuck into the city u ­ nder the cover of darkness and ambushed the unsuspecting Zirids. The result of the ambush was a Norman victory, which sent the Zirids 97. ​Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 95–97. 98. ​Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:54; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 127. 99. ​On the response of Muslim authors to the Norman conquest and rule over Sicily, see Annliese Nef, “Dire la conquête et la souveraineté des Hauteville en arabe (jusqu’au milieu du XIIIe siècle),” Tabularia 15 (2015): 1–15. 100. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:285. 101. ​Many scholars have referred to Zirid “piracy.” I prefer to use the term “raiding” ­because piracy implies a lack of accountability to a government or administration. By all accounts, Zirid raiding was an integral part of their foreign policy ­after the Hilalian invasions. “Privateering” is another potential alternative. Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 30; Brett, “Muslim Justice u ­ nder Infidel Rule,” 333. 102. ​Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:61; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 138.

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back to Mahdia and preserved the Normans’ hold on the southwest coast of Sicily.103 The picture that emerges from t­ hese encounters is one of Zirid intervention in Sicily that evolved from land campaigns on the island in the 1060s to raiding expeditions in the 1070s. Over time, however, Tamim de­cided that conflict with the Normans was not in his best interest. The Normans arrived at a similar conclusion. The two sides therefore negotiated a truce and trade agreement sometime in the late 1070s or early 1080s—­neither Latin nor Arabic sources provide an exact date. The reason for the eventual reconciliation of the two rival dynasties was economic. As is evident from commercial sources like the letters of the Cairo Geniza, the first two de­cades of the Norman conquest of Sicily had negative effects on trade in and around the island. One merchant who was forced to emigrate from Sicily to Tyre in the 1060s wrote that “nothing good has remained in Sicily.”104 Other merchants mention the perils of conducting trade on the island, as in a letter in which a merchant informs his friend that the Normans had conquered most of Sicily and left the island in a “bad and deplorable state,” and that many Jews t­ here had sought to flee to North Africa.105 With this decrease in merchants frequenting Sicilian (and in all likelihood Ifriqiyan) ports, the Zirids and Normans de­cided that peaceful cooperation would be more beneficial than continued conflict. The details of ­these commercial treaties are unknown but implied by l­ater episodes in which the Normans declined to collaborate with Christian powers to attack the Zirids. The treaties must have outlined terms of peace between the two dynasties and established the protocol for a trading relationship between the courts of Mahdia and Palermo. This commercial partnership provided clear benefits for both sides, as safer w ­ aters across the central Mediterranean allowed for increased maritime traffic and encouraged further investment in trade. The Zirids also stood to gain from the guaranteed and regular importation of Sicilian grain (among other goods), which was reciprocated by the Norman desire for gold and olive oil.106 The Zirid emirate of Ifriqiya underwent meaningful changes in the tenth and eleventh centuries that set the stage for their ­later involvement in Sicily. The substantial territories that the Zirids controlled when the Fatimids appointed 103. ​Amari speculates that Tamim might have lost up to 150 ships in this attack. Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 3:151. 104. ​Simohnson, Jews in Sicily, document 131. 105. ​Simohnson, Jews in Sicily, document 158. See also documents 161–64. 106. ​Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 348–49.

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them as governors eroded in the face of both internal and external pressures. Berber tribes in western Ifriqiya loyal to the Ummayad caliphate of Córdoba fought frequently against the Zirids and their Fatimid overlords. Likewise, Sunni Muslims clashed with the Ismaʿili Zirids and their supporters. ­These divisions—­when combined with an economic system that was suffering from eroding agricultural infrastructure, drought, and emigration—­proved unsustainable. The revolt of the Hammadids and the gradual migration of the Banu Hilal reduced Zirid control in Ifriqiya substantially. By the ­middle of the ele­ venth ­century, the Zirids w ­ ere forced from their inland capital of Sabra al-­ Mansuriya to the coastal stronghold of Mahdia. Prior to the 1050s, Zirid interest in Sicily had been ­limited. The dynasty’s involvement in the island grew, however, ­after the dynasty was displaced to Mahdia and forced to look to new frontiers for expansion. Zirid military expeditions in Sicily brought them into contact with the Normans, who similarly looked to expand their power on the island. Both the Zirids and Normans made alliances with lords in Sicily to further their own po­liti­cal ends, the Normans concentrating on the east of the island and the Zirids on the west. While the Zirids w ­ ere able to gain control over Palermo, the most populous and profitable port of Sicily, for about five years in the 1060s, they ­were ultimately unable to overcome both the military cunning of the Normans and the volatile internal politics of Sicily. The Zirids w ­ ere effectively driven out of Sicily by the early 1070s, at which point they focused their larger Mediterranean policy on a campaign of maritime raiding. The Normans, however, spared themselves from Zirid galleys by signing a commercial treaty with the court of Mahdia near the end of the eleventh ­century. The resulting trading partnership between Mahdia and Palermo was foundational to the dynasties’ peaceful relationship that extended into the twelfth c­ entury, although it was soon to be tested by other Christian powers who sought to destroy the Zirid emirs and their marauding navies.

C h a p te r 3

Commerce and Conflict from 1087 to 1123

The profitability of commerce flowing between Ifriqiya and Sicily was such that the Zirid-­Norman trading partnership survived both a joint Pisan-­Genoese expedition against Mahdia in 1087 and the First Crusade of 1096–99. Treaties between the two dynasties began to fray during the 1110s, however, as the Zirids looked to reclaim Ifriqiyan cities that had been lost to the Banu Hilal and sought further control over regional maritime commerce. When the Ifriqiyan governor of Gabès cultivated his own treaty with the Normans against the wishes of the Zirids in 511H (1117–18), conflict ensued. The Zirids then formed an alliance with the Almoravids of Morocco against the Normans, which led to a raid on Norman lands. Roger II responded to this act of aggression by invading Ifriqiya in 517H (1123–24) and threatening the Zirid capital of Mahdia itself. The Zirids, backed by their regional Arab allies, won a decisive victory over this invading Norman army and circulated letters to lords across Ifriqiya that boasted of the righ­teous jihad they had waged against the unbelievers. Although ­these violent encounters fed latent tension between the courts of Mahdia and Palermo, commercial exchange between the two dynasties persisted and continued to loom large in interactions between them.

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Testing the Zirid-­Norman Partnership During the 1060s and 1070s, the Zirids had seen ­little success against the Normans in Sicily. Nonetheless, other Zirid expeditions against Christian lords and merchants ­were more effective. Near the beginning of 1087, for example, Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz sent the Zirid fleet on a raid in the eastern Mediterranean that would have profound consequences for the Zirid-­Norman relationship in the coming de­cades. On this voyage, the navy captured a ­family of eastern Christian (possibly Armenian) officials who had fallen out of f­avor with their Byzantine lords.1 On their arrival in Mahdia, the ­family requested that they be brought before Tamim, who enlisted their ser­vices as accountants. One young administrator from this ­family, a man named George, ­rose quickly in the Zirid government and was eventually appointed governor of Sousse, likely around the year 482H (1089–90).2 George of Antioch, as he is commonly called ­today, would come to play a pivotal role in dictating the relationship between the Zirid, Norman, and Fatimid courts on his defection to Palermo in the early twelfth ­century. For the moment, however, he remained a servant of the Zirid emir. Other examples of Zirid raiding can be inferred from l­ater sources.3 Geo­ ffrey Malaterra mentions a tense but ultimately nonviolent encounter between the Normans and a Zirid fleet near Taormina in eastern Sicily in 1079. In Geoffrey’s narrative, the Normans are immediately wary of nearby Zirid vessels, which had been “plundering across the sea in the habit of pirates.”4 The immediate reaction of Roger I and his soldiers to the presence of Zirid ships near Sicily was to assume they ­were pirates—an indication of the prevalence of t­ hese raiders in the w ­ aters around the island. And it was not just the Normans who w ­ ere wary of Zirid vessels. The pervasiveness of Zirid raiding in the central Mediterranean was such that two rival city-­states, Pisa and Genoa, united for an expedition aimed at conquering Mahdia and putting an end to the dynasty.5 This 1087 expedition is detailed in a triumphant Latin poem 1. ​Al-­Maqrizi, Kitab al-­Muqaffa al-­K abir, 3:18–20. Translations of this entry are found in Adalgisa de Simone, “Il mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo visto dall’Islam africano,” in Musca, Mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo, 276–85; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 80–84. 2. ​Johns speculates that George’s appointment likely came in 482H (1089–90) following an attack on Sousse by Malik ibn ʿAlawi. Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 81. 3. ​Zirid ships raided unspecified lands in central Italy in 411H (1020–21), but their plunder was seized on their way back to Mahdia by Pisan and Genoese ships. A Pisan raid on the city of Bône in 1034 further implies additional raids undertaken by Zirid (or Hammadid) forces that motivated the Pisans to strike back against them. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:125–26, 167. 4. ​Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:66; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 147–48. 5. ​Medieval sources disagree on the year of this expedition, although Cowdrey’s analy­sis of the Latin and Arabic shows that 1087 is most likely the year when it took place. H. E. J. Cowdrey, “The

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called the Carmen in Victoriam Pisanorum, which explains how the Zirids’ expansive pillaging justified this expedition:6 [Tamim]7 with his Saracens was devastating Gaul, He was taking captive all the ­peoples who hold Spain, And on e­ very bank of the sea he was disturbing Italy; He was pillaging Roman territory as far as Alexandria. ­There is not a place in the w ­ hole world nor island in the sea, Which the dreadful faithlessness of [Tamim] has not disturbed; Rhodes, Cyprus, Crete, and at the same time Sardinia, ­Were disturbed, and with ­those, noble Sicily. Hence the captives ­were shouting out to the redeemer very loudly, And through the ­whole world they ­were weeping most bitterly; They cry out to the Pisans with a wretched lamentation; They w ­ ere stirring up the Genoese with a mournful cry.8 This poem cites the piratical activities of Tamim’s ships, which took Christian captives and pillaged cities across the Mediterranean, as being the driving force for the expedition against Mahdia.9 Although this poem is likely exaggerating to some degree the scope of the Zirid menace for the sake of bolstering the mission of the Pisans and Genoese, ­there is nonetheless a kernel of truth to ­these claims, as is evident from the unification of two rival city-­states for this expedition.10 This poem indicates that Tamim, a­ fter negotiating a truce with the Normans in the late 1070s or early 1080s (likely sometime a­ fter the 1079 encounter mentioned in Malaterra), focused his raiding on non-­Norman Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” En­glish Historical Review 92, no. 362 ( January 1977): 2–8. See also William Heywood, A History of Pisa: Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 34–35; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:285–87. 6. ​The entirety of this poem is found in the original Latin in Cowdrey, “Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” 24–29. En­glish translations and analyses of the poem are found in Matt King, “Perceptions of Islam in the Carmen in Victoriam Pisanorum,” Hortulus 11, no.  2 (Spring 2015), http://­bit​.­ly​/­2qkXk57; Alasdair  C. Grant, “Pisan Perspectives: The Carmen in Victoriam and Holy War, c.1000–1150,” En­glish Historical Review 131, no. 552 (October 2016): 983–1009. See also Charles Dalli, “The Siculo-­African Peace and Roger I’s Annexation of Malta in 1091,” in De Triremibus: Festschrift in Honour of Joseph Muscat, ed. Toni Cortis and Timothy Gambin (San Gwann, Malta: Publishers Enterprises Group, 2005), 268–69. 7. ​The Carmen refers to Tamim as “Timinus.” 8. ​Verses 7–9 in Cowdrey, “Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” 24. 9. ​Ibn al-­Athir echoes this sentiment. He writes that Tamim’s maritime raids against Christian lands provided the motivation for this attack. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 481H, 10:77. 10. ​Con­temporary poetry from the Zirid court of Tamim reinforces this evidence. The poet Abu Musa, for example, composed eight works about Christian men and w ­ omen for the Zirid emir, indicating an “unusual authorial predilection” for Christians that was prob­ably tied to Tamim’s raiding and desire for control of Sicily. Nathaniel A. Miller, “Muslim Poets u ­ nder a Christian King: An Intertextual Reevaluation of Sicilian Arabic Lit­er­a­ture ­under Roger II (1112–54) (Part II),” Mediterranean Studies 28, no. 1 (2020): 69.

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forces like the Pisans and Genoese. As a result, ­these Italian cities united to retaliate against Zirid aggression. The cause of this expedition was such that Pope Urban II provided spiritual support for the attack, which helped inspire the Pisans to wear pilgrim badges on the expedition nearly a de­cade before the First Crusade.11 Pisan and Genoese ships on this expedition first arrived at the intermediate island of Pantelleria. Muslims stationed on the island sent carrier pigeons to Mahdia warning of the impending attack, although this was to no avail, for Tamim and his forces ­were away on campaign elsewhere in Ifriqiya. The subsequent Pisan-­Genoese attack on the suburb of Zawila was a successful and bloody affair, as described in the Carmen: ­ here was no h T ­ ouse nor road in all of [Zawila],12 Which is not red and discolored with blood. ­There w ­ ere so many wretched corpses of the Saracens, Which now exhale a stench throughout the one hundred thousand [of them]. The one city is laid waste; they hurry to [Mahdia], And they stretch out to leap to the high palaces; Where King [Tamim] was standing, miserable enough, He who was despising God, as he [thought himself] unconquerable.13 The Carmen reports that the attack on Zawila was a devastating success, a perspective confirmed in an Arabic elegy (qaṣīda) that describes the attack from the perspective of the Zirids. It refers to the Pisans and Genoese as “serpents” whose numbers ­were so g­ reat that they seemed like “clouds of locusts” or “swarms of maggots.”14 Despite their numbers, however, the Pisans and Genose ­were unable to penetrate the main fortress of Mahdia and instead turned to diplomacy to resolve the stalemate. They first offered the city to Roger I of Sicily, for they w ­ ere unable to commit the forces to hold it themselves. Due to previous contracts between Roger and the Zirids, he refused, thus “upholding his ­legal obligations” to the Zirid emir.15 The Pisans and Genoese then turned to Tamim, who had evidently returned from his expeditions in Ifriqiya, to negotiate a price for leaving the city. The final sum they agreed was 11. ​Cowdrey, “Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” 21–23. 12. ​Zawila, the suburb of Mahdia, is rendered as “Sibilia” in the Latin text. 13. ​Verses 39 and 40 in Cowdrey, “Mahdia Campaign of 1087,” 26. 14. ​This poem was written by Abu al-­Hasan ʿAli ibn Muhammad ibn al-­Hadad and preserved in al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 332. See also Heywood, History of Pisa, 38–39. 15. ​Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:87. Translation is from Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 179.

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substantial, ranging (depending on the source) from thirty thousand to one hundred thousand dinars. This treaty also specified that Tamim was to release his Christian captives and that the Zirid emir would grant favorable trading privileges to the Pisans and Genoese.16 With t­ hese conditions fulfilled, the Pisans and Genoese returned to Italy with the spoils of war.17 Likely traveling with the victors was one of Tamim’s sons, who was taken as a hostage as part of this treaty to ensure that the Zirids would cease their raiding.18 The consequences of the 1087 Pisan-­Genose campaign for the Zirid dynasty are unclear. ­There are no surviving documents that attest to the state of the Zirid trea­sury at the end of the eleventh c­ entury, which makes it difficult to quantify the impact of the payment (what­ever the sum) and the trading privileges (what­ever their details) specified in this treaty. The actions of the Zirid emirs in the years ­after the attack, however, indicate that the attack did not cripple the dynasty. In 498H (1104–5) Tamim repelled a Byzantine fleet that had sought to prevent a Zirid fleet from leaving Mahdia, presumably b­ ecause of raids it had been conducting in the eastern Mediterranean. The resulting ­battle was a victory for the Zirids in which Tamim’s sailors killed “a ­great number” among the Byzantines.19 Tamim’s ambitions ­were not restricted to plundering the Mediterranean; he also campaigned in Ifriqiya to recover lands that had been lost during the reign of his ­father.20 ­These expeditions ­were concentrated on the coastline against the cities of Sousse, Sfax, Gabès, Tunis, and Tripoli, as well as the island of Djerba. Amid ­these campaigns, Tamim had to contend with some internal dissent, including revolts in Sfax and Gabès, the former of which involved the capture of his son (and eventual successor) Yahya. When the dust settled at the end of Tamim’s reign in 501H (1107–8), the Zirid dynasty held Mahdia, Sousse, Sfax, and the agricultural lands that surrounded t­ hese cities. The rest of coastal and inland Ifriqiya was ­under the control of other dynasties. Although the lands over which Tamim governed w ­ ere geo­g raph­i­cally

16. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 331–32; Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae, 5:87; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria, 179. Variations in the medieval sources are discussed in Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:288–90. 17. ​Karen Rose Mathews, “Other ­Peoples’ Dishes: Islamic Bacini on Eleventh-­Century Churches in Pisa,” Gesta 53, no. 1 (2014): 5–23. 18. ​An 1126 treaty between Pisa and Amalfi mentions a son of Tamim serving as a town crier in Pisa. It is also pos­si­ble, as Bonaini suggests, that the son of Tamim fled to Pisa ­after the death of his ­father. Francesco Bonaini, “Due carte Pisano-­Amalfitane dei secoli xii e xiv,” in Archivio Storico Italiano ser. 3, vol. 8, no. 1 (1868): 3–8; Grant, “Pisan Perspectives,” 1008. 19. ​This attack is not corroborated in other sources. Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:333. See also Houben, Ruler between East and West, 33. 20. ​­These campaigns are summarized in Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:291–302.

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l­imited, his expansive raiding had brought him into contact with Christian powers across much of the central and eastern Mediterranean. The Normans also expanded their territorial gains in the late eleventh ­century, though on a much larger scale than the Zirids. By 1091, Roger I and his Norman allies had conquered the entirety of Sicily as well as the nearby island of Malta.21 ­These conquests put a small group of Norman administrators in control of a diverse population that was primarily Muslim but also contained substantial minorities of Greek Christians and Jews. On the ­whole, Roger reached peace settlements “swiftly and amicably” with Sicilian Muslims, who ­were allowed to practice their religion freely.22 Indeed, Muslim soldiers had been integral in assisting the Normans with their conquest of the island, and, as a result, many Muslim administrators remained in power­f ul government positions in the nascent Norman government.23 Nonetheless, Muslims u ­ nder Norman rule still suffered economic hardship ­because of their confessional identity. The Norman administration imposed on Muslims (and other non-­Christians) a poll tax that was reminiscent of the jizya but had considerable variation across the island. Many of the newly installed Christian landlords in Sicily preferred to rent their lands to fellow Christians.24 Muslims on the island also witnessed an infusion of wealth for the Latin church. Throughout the late tenth c­ entury, Roger I established bishoprics and sponsored church infrastructure on the island with the approval of the papacy. He also provided incentives for Christian settlers to migrate to Sicily. ­These changes in the society and po­liti­cal hierarchy of Sicily caused Muslims to emigrate from the island to other Muslim lands (including Ifriqiya), as documented in ecclesiastical registers for churches with rec­ords from the eleventh ­century.25 Alongside this influx of Christian immigrants to Sicily was a change in rhe­ toric that the Normans brought to their administration, which elevated Roger I as the “restorer of Chris­tian­ity” to the island.26 A charter from 1087, for example, praises him for leading the campaigns through which “the Christian name is 21. ​It is unclear who governed Malta when the Normans first conquered it, though the discovery of a Fatimid quarter dinar minted in Mahdia in 1080 indicates that it was u ­ nder Fatimid control, possibly via their Zirid vassals. Martin R. Zammit, “Ḍuriba bi-­Mālṭa ‘Minted in Malta’: Deciphering the Kufic Legend on the Fāṭimid Quarter Dinar,” Melita Classica 3 (2016): 209–15. 22. ​Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 33–39. 23. ​Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 33–80. Ibn al-­Athir even reports that the Normans “honored Muslims” ­after their conquests, Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 484H, 10:92. See also Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 508–9. 24. ​Overviews of the early years of Norman governance in Sicily can be found in Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 173–85; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 31–62; Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 30–54; Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 237–301. 25. ​Metcalfe, Muslims of Medieval Italy, 114–24. 26. ​Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 179.

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uplifted, the clergy and the Christian p­ eople are enlarged, [and] truly, the multitude of Saracens is scattered.”27 Roger’s investment in ecclesiastical infrastructure also brought him substantial authority over clerics in his lands. In an unpre­ce­ dented move for the rulers of Christendom, Pope Urban II pledged to Roger and his legitimate heirs “not to appoint legates to his lands without his prior consent, to entrust the count himself with the oversight of churches instead of a legate when he felt this was appropriate, and [to give] him the right to veto the attendance of bishops at papal councils.”28 ­These privileges laid the foundation for ­later conflict between the Kingdom of Sicily and the papacy when Roger II and ­later popes both sought to assert their rights over clerics on the island. In the years a­ fter the Norman conquest of Sicily and Malta, relations with the Zirids remained stable as p­ eople and goods flowed between the dynasties’ ports.29 An episode from the chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir testifies to the strength of their treaties. According to this narrative, envoys from Baldwin of Bologne, a leader of the First Crusade, came to Sicily and informed the Normans of his plan to take Ifriqiya (presumably en route to Jerusalem) and thus to become their neighbor. Roger repudiated this attempted alliance with a massive fart and suggested that this flatulence was a better course of action than invading Ifriqiya. He explains this rationale: If [the Crusaders] come to me, I ­shall require vast expenditure and ships to convey them to Ifriqiya and troops of mine also. If they take the territory it ­will be theirs and resources from Sicily ­will go to them. I ­shall be deprived of the money that comes in ­every year from agricultural revenues.30 If they do not succeed, they ­will return to my lands and I ­shall suffer from them. Tamim ­will say, “You have betrayed me and broken the agreement I have [with you].” Our mutual contracts and visits w ­ ill be interrupted. . . . ​ Between me and the ­people of Ifriqiya, however, are oaths and treaties.31 27. ​Antonio De Amico and Raffaele Starrabba, eds., I diplomi della cattedrale di Messina (Palermo: Tipografia Michele Amente, 1888), 1–2. 28. ​­These privileges are known as “apostolic legation.” Loud emphasizes that, although unpre­ce­ dented, this papal bull affirmed what was already happening in practice, since Count Roger had substantial authority over the monasteries he founded and funded. Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 231–33. 29. ​Dalli, “Siculo-­African Peace,” 269–74. 30. ​­These “agricultural revenues” are literally rendered as “money from the price of crop yields” or māl min thaman al-­galāt. I suspect that this statement, however, reflects the state of Zirid-­Norman trade more in the m ­ iddle of the twelfth c­ entury than at the end of the eleventh c­ entury. Ibn al-­Athir is the only chronicler to write of this event, and he did so on the basis of Ibn Shaddad, who was likely not even alive for this supposed encounter. Ibn al-­Athir, ever the fan of foreshadowing and showing collusion between Franks, might have been transposing Roger II’s exploitation of Ifriqiyan need for Sicilian grain onto Roger I. 31. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 491H, 10:126. Translation is from Ibn al-­Athir, The Chronicle of Ibn Al-­Athir for the Crusading Period from al-­Kāmil fī’l-­Ta’rīkh, trans. D.S. Richards, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 1:13.

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Roger I valued having the Muslim Zirids as his trading partner and was unwilling to involve himself in the conquest of their lands. Nonetheless, Ibn al-­ Athir quotes Roger I as foreshadowing the eventual Norman conquests of Zirid lands by having him say, “The lands of Ifriqiya w ­ ill be waiting for us and when we find the strength, we ­will take it.”32 Although this story pre­sents an evocative instance of potential collaboration between the Normans and leaders of the First Crusade, it would be unwise to take this story at face value. The meeting between Roger I and the envoys of Baldwin of Bologne occurs only in the chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir, who had a concerted goal of presenting the Franks (i.e., Latin Christians) as a monolithic force that sought to invade all the lands of Islam.33 This story fits all too well with the idea of collusion between dif­fer­ent groups of Franks to attack Muslim lands in both North Africa and the ­Middle East. Even if this story is apocryphal, however, Ibn al-­Athir’s inclusion of information about treaties between the Zirids and Normans is evocative. It reinforces the narrative of the 1087 Pisan-­Genoese expedition, in which Roger refused to take Mahdia on the basis of his agreements with the Zirids, and solidifies the idea of the Normans valuing their economic alliance of the Zirids over the idea of military conquest. The inclusion of this story in Ibn al-­Athir’s chronicle further indicates that the pretense of the Normans refusing to attack the Zirids ­because of their treaties was (at the very least) feasible to his audience.

The Ascent of Yahya ibn Tamim and the Regency of Roger II The deaths of Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz in 501H (1107–8) and Roger I in 1101 had ­little impact on the relationship between the Zirids and Normans. The trading partnership between the two dynasties persisted even as their next generation of rulers, Yahya ibn Tamim and Roger II, both took steps to extend their power in the central Mediterranean. Yahya continued the policy of aggressive 32. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 491H, 10:126. Ibn al-­Athir, who frequently foreshadows events relating to Ifriqiya, makes a similar reference to the Normans’ eventual conquest of Ifriqiya when he describes the conquest of Sicily. He writes that the Normans conquered the islands between Mahdia and Sicily and stretched their conquests to include the coast of Ifriqiya. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 484H, 10:92. 33. ​This theme is explored in chapter 6. D. S. Richards, “Ibn Al-­Athīr and the ­Later Parts of the Kāmil: A Study of Aims and Methods,” in Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D. S. Richards (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1982), 76–108; Cobb, Race for Paradise, 39–40; Françoise Micheau, “Ibn Al-­Athīr,” in Medieval Muslim Historians and the Franks in the Levant, ed. Alex Mallett (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 52–83.

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Mediterranean raiding that had become a staple of Zirid foreign policy ­under his ­father. Meanwhile, Roger II looked to cultivate support for his regime by intervening on behalf of captive monks and asserting control over clerics in Sicily. In the years prior to 511H (1117–18), the most meaningful interaction between the Zirids and Normans was the defection of George of Antioch from Ifriqiya to Sicily, a move that had lasting consequences for the Mediterranean policy of Roger II. During the late eleventh ­century, Roger I used his many ­children, both legitimate and illegitimate, to bind the nascent Norman administration to himself.34 This plan for po­liti­cal centralization was hindered by the death of his last living son in 1091, which made it imperative for Roger to have more male ­children to continue his bloodline. His third and last wife, Adelaide del Vasto, bore him two male ­children: Simon (b. 1093) and Roger II (b. 1095). When Count Roger died in 1101, Adelaide became regent to the elder Simon and then, on his death in 1105, to Roger II. Ruling over the entirety of Sicily and Calabria in the name of her youn­gest son, Adelaide faced the formidable task of maintaining the administration of large and demographically diverse lands. Nonetheless, she was a member of a prominent Ligurian noble f­ amily and proved a capable ruler. She suppressed at least one major revolt that cropped up during the beginning of her reign, and she ­adopted the royal titulature of her late husband with the grandiose title of “the g­ reat lady, the queen of Sicily and Calabria, the protector for the religion of Chris­tian­ity.”35 The decisiveness with which Adelaide governed kept the borders of Sicily and Calabria intact for Roger II during his minority.36 Adelaide’s regency also brought about meaningful po­liti­cal and cultural changes to the Norman administration.37 For the majority of her reign, Adelaide ruled from the eastern port city of Messina. Although Adelaide and Roger II in theory laid claim to the entire island of Sicily, their sphere of influence was largely restricted to the northeastern portion of the island and to southern Calabria in Italy. To broaden the power of her court, Adelaide en34. ​Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, 179. 35. ​Jeremy Johns, “I titoli arabi dei signori normanni di Sicilia,” Bollettino di Numismatica 6–7 (1986): 13. 36. ​The extent of civil unrest in Sicily during the regency of Adelaide is disputed. See Hubert Houben, “Adelaide ‘del Vasto’ nella storia del regno normanno di Sicilia,” in Mezzogiorno normanno-­ svevo: Moansteri e castella, ebrei e musselmani, ed. Hubert Houben (Naples: Liguori, 1996), 81–115; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 24–29; Graham Loud, “Norman Sicily in the Twelfth C ­ entury,” in Luscombe and Riley-­Smith, New Cambridge Medieval History, 4.2:446. 37. ​A paucity of administrative rec­ords makes it difficult to cata­log the bureaucratic changes that accompanied Norman ascent in Sicily. Alex Metcalfe, “Language and the Written Rec­ord: Loss, Survival and Revival in Early Norman Sicily,” in Multilingual and Multigraphic Manuscripts and Documents of East and West, ed. Giuseppe Mandalà (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2018), 3–31.

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couraged Lombard immigrants to ­settle in Sicily, which continued a pro­cess of Latin Christianization that Roger I had encouraged.38 The settlement of Christians in western Sicily paved the way for the transfer of the center of Norman power in Sicily from Messina to Palermo in 1112.39 Roger II grew up in this changing environment, though ­little is known about the details of his childhood beyond a few likely apocryphal tales. Alexander of Telese, a chronicler who held Roger II in g­ reat esteem, foretells the child’s aptitude as a ruler in an anecdote about a fight he had with his older ­brother Simon: “When they fought, each with [their] companies of boys gathered together, Roger the younger had the upper hand. Whence, deriding his ­brother Simon, he said, ‘Certainly it is more fitting that I, triumphant, should hold the honor of ruling ­after the burial of our ­father than you. Wherefore, when I become master, I w ­ ill appoint you e­ ither as a bishop or even the Roman Pope, for which you are more competent.’ ”40 Beyond fanciful stories like t­ hese, it is pos­si­ble to draw some broader conclusions about Roger II’s upbringing and education. Around 1105, Adelaide appointed a man named Christodoulos as emir, a position that made him “a sort of prime minister” of Roger’s lands and a tutor for the young count.41 Christodoulos was a native Sicilian, likely a Latin-­Christian convert from Islam or Greek Orthodoxy, who had been raised in the island’s hybrid Arabo-­Greek culture. ­Under the tutelage of Christodoulos and Adelaide, Roger II was exposed to a variety of languages and 38. ​Vera von Falkenhausen, “Zur Regentschaft der Gräfin Adelasia del Vasto in Kalabrien und Sizilien (1101–1112),” in Studies in Honour of Cyril Mango, ed. Ihor Ševčenko and Irmgard Hutter (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1998), 87–115. 39. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 78. On the development of Palermo and the Normans’ attempts to appropriate spaces in the city to bolster their reign, see Vera von Falkenhausen, “I ceti dirigenti prenormanni al tempo della constituzione degli stati normanni nell’Italia meridionale e in Sicilia,” in Forme di potere e struttura sociale in Italia nel medioevo, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977), 321–77; Theresa Jäckh, “Space and Place in Norman Palermo,” in Jäckh and Kirsch, Urban Dynamics and Transcultural Communication, 67–95. 40. ​Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis, 112:7; Graham Loud, Roger II and the Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 65. Another anecdote about Roger’s childhood is recorded in Snorri Sturlason’s Heimskringla, in which King Sigurd of Norway stops in Sicily en route to the Holy Land. While ­there, “King Sigurd took the duke by the hand, led him up to the high-­seat, and gave him the name of ‘king’ and the right of being king over the realm of Sicily; before, t­ here had been jarls over that realm.” Snorri Sturlason, Heimskringla, or The Lives of the Norse Kings, ed. Erling Monsen and Albert Smith (New York: Dover, 1990), 104. 41. ​Christodoulos’s title was amiratus, which can be translated as “emir” or “admiral.” This position did not have any fixed duties; instead, the title was an honorific that was used sparingly. Léon-­Robert Ménager, Amiratus–­Ameras: L’émirat et les origines de l’amirauté (XIe–­XIIIe siècles) (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), 20–26; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 71–74; Adalgisa de Simone, “Note sui titoli arabi di Giorgio di Antiochia,” in Giorgio di Antiochia: L’arte della politica in Sicilia nel XII secolo tra Bisanzio e l’Islam, ed. Mario Re and Christina Rognoni (Palermo: Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici Bruno Lavagnini, 2009), 283–308.

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cultures that would benefit him as he prepared to govern Sicily and Calabria.42 Alexander of Telese also rec­ords (in a somewhat less fanciful though still likely embellished account) that a young Roger II was keen to study the inner mechanisms of government. As a youth, he reportedly looked over rec­ords of public taxation to ensure that the riches of his trea­sury ­were properly spent.43 During Roger II’s formative years, his counterpart in Ifriqiya, Yahya ibn Tamim, was developing a reputation for aggressive naval campaigns in the Mediterranean. Yahya assumed control of the Zirid throne in 501H (1107–8) on the death of his ­father Tamim. He inherited a small strip of coastal territories in Ifriqiya that included Sfax, Sousse, and Mahdia. Other dynasties governed the other major cities of Ifriqiya: the Banu Khurasan in Tunis, the Banu Dahman in Gabès, the Banu al-­Rand in Gafsa, and ­either the Banu Khazrun or the Banu Matruh in Tripoli (the sources are ambiguous).44 Yahya’s right to rule amid t­ hese rival dynasties was symbolically bolstered by the Fatimids, to whom he pledged his allegiance at the beginning of his reign and with whom he exchanged ceremonial gifts.45 During Yahya’s reign, Zirid galleys attacked Christian powers in Lucania, Salerno, Amalfi, Sardinia, Genoa, and southern France.46 The force of ­these raids was such that, according to Ibn Khaldun, Yahya was able to extract tribute from some of his victims.47 Zirid raiding also extended east to Byzantine ­waters, although ­these raids ­were not always successful. During one expedi42. ​Roger II prob­ably knew some Arabic, Latin, and “some form of Romance dialect” used in the Norman court. The extent to which he knew Greek is unknown, although it is likely he had much less exposure to it than Arabic or Latin. Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 103. On the contribution of Greek administrators in the court of Palermo, see Vera von Falkenhausen, “The Greek Presence in Norman Sicily: The Contribution of Archival Material,” in Loud and Metcalfe, Society of Norman Italy, 253–87; Vera von Falkenhausen, “The Graeco-­Byzantine Heritage in the Norman Kingdom of Sicily,” in Burkhardt and Foerster, Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage, 57–78. 43. ​Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis, 112:82. A translation of this text can be found in Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 78. 44. ​Giovanni Oman, Vassilios Christides, and Clifford E. Bosworth, “Ṭarābulus al-­3ẖarb,” EI2; Brett, “City-­State in Medieval Ifriqiya,” 81–84. 45. ​The relationship of Yahya’s pre­de­ces­sor, Tamim, with the Fatimids is relatively unexplored in medieval sources. Johns argues that during the reign of Tamim, “­there is only one recorded contact between the two courts, and that of no g­ reat significance.” Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 94. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:255; Ghāda al-­Ḥijjāwī al-­Qaddūmī, trans., Book of Gifts and Rarities (Kitāb al-­Hadāyā Wa al-­Tuḥaf) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 46. ​ Annales Cavenses, MGH, SS, 3:191. This report is collaborated in Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:213 and Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, I:336–37, the latter of whom reports that the fleet of Mahdia returned from the lands of the Rum in the year 507H (1113–14) with many captives. 47. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:213. I translate this text with the amendment given for footnote 2 in this edition of Ibn Khaldun’s text, in which the word “Ifriqiya,” which does not make sense in this context, is replaced with al-­Franja. Although Louis de Mas Latrie takes this word to mean the lands of southern France, the vagueness of the word al-­Franja means that t­ hese raids could have been carried out virtually anywhere in the Christian Mediterranean. Mas Latrie, Traités de paix et de commerce, 34.

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tion in 503H (1109–10), for example, the Byzantines intercepted a Zirid fleet and captured six ships. Despite this defeat, Ibn al-­Athir reports that the strength of the Zirid military was such that in subsequent years “­there was no defeat for the army of Yahya by sea or land.”48 A poem written by the Zirid panegyrist Ibn Hamdis in 509H (1115–16) helps to corroborate the extent of this raiding, for it celebrates the arrival of a Byzantine envoy bearing gifts and a request for peace, which Yahya accepted.49 Significantly, this extensive Zirid raiding campaign in the central and eastern Mediterranean did not extend to the lands of Roger II. The commercial treaties put in place by Tamim ibn al-­ Muʿizz and Roger I persisted u ­ nder their sons at the beginning of the twelfth ­century. While coastal raiding brought with it the promise of plunder and wealth for the Zirid trea­sury, in the case of Sicily, this material gain was less lucrative than the previously established trading partnership. Although the focus of Yahya’s military efforts was on Mediterranean raiding, he also campaigned in Ifriqiya during the first several years of his reign. In 501H (1107–8), he captured the c­ astle of Kelibia on the coast of Cap Bon and, several years ­later, appointed two of his sons as the governors of Sfax and Sousse.50 ­These appointments proved unpop­u­lar, however, as the p­ eople of Sfax rebelled against their new governor and sacked the royal palace. It was only by spreading dissent among the ranks of the p­ eople that Yahya managed to break their unified front and quash the uprising. Several years ­later, in 509H (1115–16), Yahya married his d­ aughter Badr al-­Dawja to the Hammadid emir al-­ʿAziz in an attempt to preserve the truce that his pre­de­ces­sors had cultivated with their cousins in Bougie.51 As with the Normans, it was in the best interests of the Zirids to maintain friendly relations with their Hammadid neighbors to the west. The military campaigns that Yahya conducted across the Mediterranean and in Ifriqiya did not preclude his patronage of the arts and sciences. Ibn al-­Athir extolls Yahya’s virtues and the court of the Zirid emir: “Yahya was just to his ­people, firmly in control of affairs of state and a man­ag­er of all his circumstances. He was merciful to the weak and the poor, giving much in alms to them. He used to f­ avor the men of religion and learning and he himself was

48. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 503H, 10:224. 49. ​Ibn Hamdis, Canzoniere di Ibn Ḥamdîs, 405–7. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:308–9. 50. ​Ibn al-­Athir, year 501H, 10:211. The accounts of Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun disagree about whom Yahya appointed as governor of Sfax. Ibn al-­Athir writes that Yahya appointed his son Abu al-­ Futuh in 503H (1109–10). Ibn Khaldun, meanwhile, writes that Yahya appointed his son and f­ uture successor ʿAli in 508H (1114–15). Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 503H, 10:224; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:213. 51. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:337.

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knowledgeable in history, ancient lore, and medicine.”52 The apparent magnanimity of Yahya, however, did not extend to all members of his administration. George of Antioch, the eastern Christian official who had been captured and then employed in the Zirid administration, had enjoyed a productive relationship with Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz, but the same was not true of his relationship with Yahya. Tensions between the two first cropped up sometime during the reign of Tamim. According to the Egyptian chronicler al-­Maqrizi, George’s younger ­brother, an adolescent named Simon, had been collecting information about the ­family of the Zirid emir to convey to his older ­brother. Simon reported some of this information (presumably to George) that Yahya had said, which angered Yahya such that he ordered that Simon be strangled.53 It is unknown w ­ hether this order was carried out (the lack of any mention of Simon in f­ uture years indicates that it was), but the end result was a ­bitter feud between George of Antioch and Yahya. When Yahya succeeded his f­ ather in 1108, George feared for his safety. He wrote to the high-­ranking administrator and tutor of Roger II, Christodoulos, requesting aid from the Norman administration. Christodoulos obliged, and George managed to escape aboard a galley that had docked at Mahdia in 502H (1108–9). The defection of George of Antioch to Palermo provided Roger II with a capable administrator who knew the inner workings of the Zirid government in Ifriqiya.54 The reaction of Yahya to t­hese events, however, is unexplored in the sources. In the short term, George of Antioch’s flight did not lead to enmity or vio­lence between the courts of Palermo and Mahdia. Perhaps Yahya was glad to be rid of an administrator whom he had suspected of conspiring against him? What­ever his reaction, the trading partnership between the two dynasties remained intact. Regular commercial exchange passing between Zirid and Norman ports was of such importance that the defection of a prominent administrator did not inspire ­either dynasty to forsake their mutual treaties. George of Antioch’s flight from Ifriqiya further highlights the degree of connectivity between the courts of Palermo and Mahdia.55 George had sufficient knowledge of the Sicilian court and was comfortable enough with its 52. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 509H, 10:240. Translation is from Richards, Chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir, 1:175. 53. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 81. The timeline of ­these events is unclear; they may have happened in the midst of a revolt that Yahya waged against his ­father during the 1090s. Al-­ Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 51–52; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:294–96. 54. ​Simone, “Mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo,” 276–77; Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 311–14. Details on George of Antioch’s f­ amily and influence in the Mediterranean can be found in Catlos, Infidel Kings and Unholy Warriors, 64–68. 55. ​Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 592–93.

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administrators to write to them requesting asylum. Likewise, Sicilian officials knew enough about this Zirid official and his standing in the court to welcome him into their administration. This episode thus provides a glimpse of not only tensions between the Zirid emirs and their administrators, but also the degree to which open lines of communication existed between the Zirids and Normans. It was through t­ hese lines that the two dynasties undoubtedly communicated frequently about other economic, po­liti­cal, and military ­matters—­the details of which scarcely survive except in extrapolations made from the writings of officials like Abu al-­Salt and Abu al-­Dawʾ.56 Roger II’s coming of age in 1112 had l­ittle impact on the relationship between the courts of Palermo and Mahdia. The first documented interaction between Roger II and an Ifriqiyan lord came in 1114 when Hammadid raiders seized a group of monks who ­were returning from Sardinia to (presumably) the abbey of Montecassino. According to the Chronicle of Montecassino, on hearing news of the monks’ capture, the abbot of Montecassino sent some men with ransom money to the Hammadids. T ­ hese men, though, w ­ ere blown off course and landed in Sicily. When Roger II heard of the monks’ mission, he was “led by love of the most Holy F ­ ather Benedict” and intervened on 57 their behalf. Roger told the Hammadid emir that the monks should be returned to their monastery “if he should desire to delight in his love and to enjoy his peace.”58 The Hammadid emir al-­ʿAziz obliged and released the monks.59 This account shows that the Normans and Hammadids had open diplomatic contact during the early years of Roger II’s reign.60 While the Hammadids did not hesitate to seize Christian monks in what was likely one of many state-­sponsored raids (reminiscent of their Zirid cousins), they ­were willing to negotiate with Roger II for their release. The response of the Norman count likewise shows his willingness to cooperate with the Hammadids, though t­ here is a threatening subtext to it as well. If the Hammadids refused to return their captives, would it mean that t­ here would be no peace between them and the Normans? This diplomatic exchange, although it was ultimately 56. ​Johns argues that “the two courts ­were clearly in almost constant contact” during the early twelfth ­century. Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 89–90. 57. ​ Chronica monasterii Casinensis, MGH, SS, 34:516. 58. ​ Chronica monasterii Casinensis, MGH, SS, 34:516. 59. ​The Chronicle of Montecassino calls al-­ʿAziz the “king of the city of Calama.” This title is derived from the original Hammadid capital of Qalʿa, which, unbeknownst to the author of this chronicle, had not been governed by the Hammadids since the arrival of the Banu Hilal. During the early twelfth ­century, the Hammadids governed from the coastal city of Bougie. 60. ​Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande, 1:369–70; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 32–35.

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nonviolent, contained undertones of potential conflict if the Hammadids did not act as the Norman count wished. Roger’s decision to help the monks of Montecassino was also a calculated po­liti­cal move meant to show his loyalty to Christian monastic communities despite the tension between him and Pope Paschal II. As mentioned ­earlier, Pope Urban II had granted Roger I and his heirs unpre­ce­dented powers over clerics in their domains. The Normans ­were given oversight of churches, could veto the attendance of bishops at papal councils, and had the right to voice their approval or disapproval of papal legates to their lands. ­These expansive rights became the subject of scrutiny early in the reign of Roger II, as both Pope Paschal II and the Norman count jockeyed for control over clerics in Norman lands. In 1112, Roger placed the Latin archbishop of Reggio Calabria ­under his direct authority. Two years l­ater, the archbishop of Cosenza complained to Pope Paschal II that Roger “had forced him . . . ​to return to a monastery.”61 ­These assertions of power proved unpop­u­lar with Paschal, who sent a sternly worded letter to Roger in 1117 in which he reminded the Norman lord to “not fight against the Church but . . . ​to assist it” and warned him to “not judge or suppress bishops but to venerate them as the representatives of God.”62 Roger II’s prolonged dispute with the papacy motivated the Norman count to opportunistically intervene on behalf of the captured Montecassino monks so that he could demonstrate his loyalty to Christian clerics even as he looked to exert his authority over them. This posturing over control of clerics in Sicily was the first round in a decades-­long fight between Roger II and Latin Christian spiritual leaders. Across the Strait of Sicily, ­little is known about Yahya ibn Tamim’s administration u ­ ntil his death ­under mysterious circumstances on the day of the Festival of Sacrifice in the spring of 509H (1116). The accounts of Yahya’s death are disputed in the chronicles of Ibn ʿIdhari and Ibn al-­Athir, but both authors agree that his death had unexpected consequences for the relationship of the Normans and Fatimids de­cades down the line.63 Ibn ʿIdhari recounts how three men dressed as alchemists mortally wounded Yahya and killed his vizier at the Zirid palace in Mahdia in 509H (1115–16).64 While suffering from his wounds, Yahya banished his son al-­Futuh to the fortress of Ziyad (located between Mahdia and Sfax) for his suspected role in the plot, then died soon ­after, on the day 61. ​Houben, Ruler between East and West, 34. 62. ​Philipp Jaffé, ed., Regesta pontificum romanorum: Ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII (Berlin: Veit et Socius, 1851), 516. 63. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:310–15. 64. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:338.

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of the Festival of Sacrifice. Yahya’s successor ʿAli ­later exiled al-­Futuh and al-­ Futuh’s f­ amily to Egypt. Ibn al-­Athir tells a similar story, set in the year 502H (1108–9), when three alchemists failed to assassinate Yahya but succeeded in killing his adviser, Abu al-­Hasan.65 Following Yahya’s narrow escape, he exiled his ­brother (not son) Abu al-­Futuh ibn Tamim to the fortress of Ziyad and executed several conspirators, including several men with “the clothing of the ­people of al-­Andalus.” ­After Yahya’s death in 509H (1115–16), his successor ʿAli sent his ­uncle Abu al-­Futuh, Abu al-­Futuh’s wife Ballara, and their son al-­ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh to Egypt. As discussed in chapter 6, this move had profound and unforeseen consequences, for al-­ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh eventually r­ ose through the ranks of the Fatimid court and used his position to undermine the relationship between the Fatimids and Normans.66 The overlapping details of the assassination plot against Yahya as provided by Ibn ʿIdhari and Ibn al-­Athir highlight the precariousness of the Zirid emir’s administration. Yahya was wary of the machinations of his immediate f­ amily. Perhaps this was a well-­founded sentiment—he himself had been involved in a revolt against his f­ ather’s rule in the 1090s.67 While Yahya acted in the tradition of his f­ ather by sending his sons to govern cities, he was also distrustful enough of his ­brother or son (depending on the chronicler) to implicate him as a conspirator in the assassination attempt. In the absence of detailed rec­ ords about the inner workings of the Zirid administration, anecdotes like ­these help inform our perception of how tenuous the Zirid emir’s power was over his governors, many of whom ­were members of his immediate ­family.

The Affair at Gabès, 511H (1117–18) Yahya ibn Tamim asserted Zirid power in the central Mediterranean through expansive raiding campaigns u ­ ntil his death in 509H (1115–16). U ­ nder the rule of his son ʿAli, the Zirids continued ­these expeditions and went a step further by trying to monopolize regional maritime commerce against the wishes of the governor of Gabès. This strategy ultimately led to the first instance of conflict between the Zirids and Normans since the conquest of Sicily, which took the form of a naval standoff in 511H (1117–18) outside the city of Gabès. 65. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 502H, 10:221. 66. ​Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-­Aʿyan wa-­Anbaʾ Abnaʾ al-­Zaman, 6:215–16; Paul M. Cobb, Usama Ibn Munqidh: Warrior Poet of the Age of Crusades (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005), 38–42. 67. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 74–76.

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Although Arabic sources differ on the details of the campaign, they agree that this encounter led to a hardening of attitudes between the once-­friendly dynasties. ʿAli in par­tic­u­lar was so wary of Roger II that he formed an alliance with the Almoravids, a Berber dynasty based in the Maghreb, to invade Sicily. The fallout from this affair at Gabès and the establishment of the Zirid-­ Almoravid alliance was foundational to tensions between the Zirids and Normans that persisted for the next de­cade. During the first several years of his reign, ʿAli sought to expand his influence through a series of campaigns in Ifriqiya. He brokered a treaty with the lords of Djerba in which they agreed to stop raiding local ­waters.68 Soon ­after, ʿAli forced the governor of Tunis to submit to his rule and conquered Mount Wasilat (located between Tunis and Kairouan).69 Then, in the spring of 511H (1117–18), he looked to assert Zirid economic supremacy on the Ifriqiyan coast by interfering in the commercial activities of the lord of Gabès. Ibn al-­Athir and al-­Tijani provide detailed but differing accounts of this encounter.70 Both authors agree that the inciting incident was the construction of a merchant ship by the in­de­pen­dent governor of Gabes, Rafiʿ ibn Makan al-­Dahmani, against the wishes of the Zirid emir.71 Fearing further retaliation from the Zirids, Rafiʿ requested aid from Roger II in keeping his ship at sea. Roger obliged and sent his own fleet to Gabès. When ʿAli saw the Norman fleet traveling to Gabès, he retaliated by dispatching his own ships. The two fleets met in the ­waters off the coast of the city. The result of this standoff is disputed. Ibn al-­Athir relates how the Normans withdrew from this standoff in what was presumably some sort of negotiated truce (he provides no indication of vio­lence). ʿAli then defeated Rafiʿ and his Arab allies in a series of ­battles outside of Gabès, Mahdia, and Kairouan. At the request of Arab tribes and other nobles in Ifriqiya, ʿAli and Rafiʿ made a peace treaty in which Rafiʿ was permitted to continue governing Gabès. Al-­ Tijani, however, recounts how the Norman fleet proceeded from the ­waters off Gabès to the coast of Ifriqiya, where Rafiʿ invited the soldiers into the city for a feast.72 It was at this moment that the Zirid squadron arrived and am68. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 509H, 10:239–40. 69. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 510H, 10:243–44. 70. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 98–100; Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 511H, 10:247. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:319–24. 71. ​This narrative is also found in less detail in Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:339–40; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:212–13; al-­Nuwayri, Nihayat al-­Arab fi Funun al-­Adab, 2:164–65. 72. ​The Zirids and Normans deployed light war galleys for their fleets (called a dromon in certain sources). ­These ships featured a sail (sometimes more than one) alongside oars for propulsion. The primary goal of engagement for ­these ships was not to sink opposing ships, but to board and capture them. Pryor refers to them as “­really huge rowing shells” ­because of their ability to hold large num-

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bushed the banqueters in an act of aggression that ʿAli undertook in defiance of advice from his closest advisers. The result was a decisive victory and the deaths of many Normans. ʿAli followed this victory by defeating his rivals at Gabès, Mahdia, and Kairouan.73 Although the accounts of Ibn al-­Athir and al-­Tijani differ on the details of this encounter, fortunately for us, t­ hese specifics are less impor­tant than the overarching consequences, on which the two authors agree: rising estrangement and animosity between the courts of Palermo and Mahdia. Ibn al-­Athir relates that soon ­after the incident, Roger II addressed ʿAli in inappropriate terms and then sent him an insulting letter. ʿAli responded by building up his fleet and planning to invade Sicily with the help of the Almoravid dynasty. The expansion of the Zirid navy and the threat of a Zirid-­Almoravid alliance was enough to cause Roger II to back down.74 Like Ibn al-­Athir, al-­Tijani sees the Gabès affair as the reason for increased tensions between Roger II and ʿAli. He goes further, however, and details additional actions taken by the Zirid emir against the Normans. At an unspecified time ­after his victory at Gabès, ʿAli ordered property belonging to Roger II in Mahdia to be seized and for Norman agents in the city to be imprisoned.75 When an envoy from Palermo arrived in Mahdia, ʿAli promptly released the goods and prisoners, which did not satisfy an angered Roger II. The Norman count sent a second envoy to the Zirid emir with a letter containing so many threats and insults that ʿAli did not respond to the message. Both Ibn al-­Athir and al-­Tijani write that this episode at Gabès caused increased tension and posturing between the Zirids and Normans. Roger II’s first interaction with the Zirids thus marks a dramatic departure from the more passive policies of his f­ ather. He was willing to insert himself directly into Ifriqiyan affairs by intervening on behalf of a local governor against the wishes of the Zirid emir. Likewise, ʿAli ibn Yahya was willing to break with the tradition of his f­ather by engaging in a confrontation with the Normans and attempting to bully them by seizing their goods and agents in Mahdia. The expansionist desires of both dynasties in the 1110s ­were strong enough to risk bers of sailors relative to their size. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War, 65. See also John Pryor and Elizabeth Jeffreys, The Age of the Dromon: The Byzantine Navy c. 500–1204 (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 67–127. 73. ​A panegyric from Muhammad ibn Bashir (and preserved in al-­Tijani) relates the preparations that ʿAli made in building up his imposing forces against the “Rum.” Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 99–100. Ibn Khaldun writes that ʿAli defeated the Christian forces of Roger II in ­battle, though he does not provide additional details on this encounter. Perhaps this lends additional credence to the account of al-­Tijani? Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:221–22. 74. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 511H, 10:247–48. 75. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 333–35.

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the commercial partnership that had defined the Zirid-­Norman relationship in past de­cades. Central to the Gabès affair was economic and po­liti­cal power in Ifriqiya, and no clear victor emerged in this clash. Emir ʿAli sought to limit the commercial capabilities of the governor of Gabès so that the Zirids of Mahdia could mono­ polize trade in a section of the Ifriqiyan coast around their capital. Conversely, the plight of Rafiʿ of Gabès provided an opportunity for the Normans to expand their influence across the Strait of Sicily and (possibly) to secure additional commercial contracts with other Ifriqiyan governors. The centrality of economic considerations to the Gabès affair is substantiated in an entry from the chronicle of Ibn ʿIdhari for the year 512H (1118–19), which narrates how envoys from Sicily arrived in Mahdia demanding new contracts for trade.76 Although Ibn ʿIdhari does not explore the specifics of this contract, it is likely that the Normans’ demands ­were tied to the conflict at Gabès that had happened a year prior. The Gabès affair also shows ʿAli ibn Yahya’s relative power over local lords in Ifriqiya and, to a more ­limited extent, over the Normans of Sicily. The singular might of the Zirid army was enough to overcome the alliance of Rafiʿ of Gabès and vari­ous Arab tribes in Ifriqiya across several land confrontations. Furthermore, ­after ʿAli’s encounter with the Norman navy (­whether violent or not), Roger II did not respond with military force against the Zirids. His preferred course of actions was to taunt the Zirid emirs with inappropriate language and to demand new trading contracts—­a strategy that ultimately failed when ʿAli built up his own fleet. Roger was unable or unwilling to confront the Zirid navy in 511H (1117–18). He was also unable to bully the Zirids b­ ecause of the strength of ʿAli’s fleet and (­later) his diplomatic connection with the Almoravids. The picture to emerge from this episode, then, is one in which the Zirids wielded some level of regional power. They defeated a co­ali­tion of local lords in Ifriqiya, negotiated or defeated the Norman navy, and renovated their own navy as a show of power that forced Roger II to re­spect their autonomy. Events happening around the same time as the affair at Gabès show that Ifriqiya was just one of several areas across the Mediterranean where Roger II sought to expand his influence and legitimize his dynasty. Around 1117 or 1118 (the exact date is unknown), the Norman count married Elvira Alfónsez, ­daughter of the late Alfonso VI of Castile and León.77 At the time of Alfonso VI’s death in 1109, he had claimed the titles of “Emperor of the w ­ hole of Spain” and “Emperor of the two religions.”78 Alfonso VI had also worked with the 76. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:340. 77. ​On the marriages of Roger II, see Hayes, ­Family, Faith, and Empire, 33–74. 78. ​Bernard Reilly, The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 1031–1157 (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-­ Blackwell, 1996), 74–98.

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papacy to introduce Roman liturgical practices into his kingdom and undertaken successful campaigns against Muslim rulers in al-­Andalus during the late eleventh c­ entury.79 Although Elvira did not hold any lands and had ­little chance of obtaining them, this marriage still had clear po­liti­cal overtones. Elvira’s ­family ruled a religiously divided land on the Mediterranean and her ­father had waged campaigns against Muslim rulers, a situation reminiscent of that of Roger II. Elvira also had demonstrable connections to the esteemed counts of Burgundy in France.80 Marrying the ­daughter of Alfonso VI bolstered Roger’s own standing by connecting him to one of the preeminent families of al-­Andalus, and by extension, France. Roger’s desire to strengthen Norman ties to the powers of the western Medi­ terranean might have been related to his simultaneous loss of power in the Latin East. Following Roger’s coming of age in 1112, his ­mother Adelaide married King Baldwin I of Jerusalem on the condition that, should the ­couple not produce an heir, Roger would inherit the kingdom.81 The prob­lem with this marriage was that Baldwin was already married to an Armenian w ­ oman named Arda of Edessa, a fact that Baldwin’s vassals brought up when he, still heirless, fell ill in the winter of 1116. T ­ hese vassals, with the help of the patriarch of Jerusalem (and possibly Pope Paschal II), forced Baldwin to end his marriage to Adelaide, who promptly returned to Sicily in 1117. Roger II was furious. William of Tyre relates that this affair fostered in Roger a “mortal hatred” of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which caused him not to offer aid to the Crusader states during the l­ater years of his reign.82 Nonetheless, as we ­will see, Roger retained an interest in the Crusader states, especially the Principality of Antioch, insofar as he could look to incorporate them into his own domain. The encounter between the Zirids and Normans at Gabès in 511H (1117– 18) should be contextualized within the larger ambitions of both ʿAli ibn Yahya and Roger II. ʿAli had spent the early years of his reign vigorously campaigning in the cities of Ifriqiya, looking to regain the domains that had been lost u ­ nder his great-­grandfather al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis. The city of Gabès, which had once been controlled by the Zirid emirs, was one such city over which ʿAli sought to expand his reach. Roger II likewise looked to expand his authority on a much 79. ​Simon Barton, “Spain in the Eleventh C ­ entury,” in Luscombe and Riley-­Smith, New Cambridge Medieval History 4.2:179–81. See also Bernard Reilly, The Kingdom of León-­Castilla ­under King Alfonso VI, 1065–1109 (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1988). 80. ​Dawn Marie Hayes shows how the Normans would have benefited “significantly from associating themselves with the prestige of Alfonso and his pre­de­ces­sors.” Hayes, ­Family, Faith, and Empire, 42. 81. ​Houben, based on the evidence that Patriarch Arnulf of Jerusalem was in Rome in 1116, speculates that Pope Paschal II’s potential involvement in this affair might have caused relations between him and Roger to sour. William of Tyre, PL, 201:507–8; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 29, 35. 82. ​William of Tyre, PL, 201:519–20.

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larger, Mediterranean-­wide scale. He married into a power­ful Iberian f­amily, tried to worm his way into the line of succession of the Kingdom of Jerusalem via another marriage alliance, and sent a navy to the Ifriqiyan coast to intercede on behalf of a local governor. Although Ifriqiya was only one theater of this larger campaign of opportunistic assertiveness that Roger II undertook in the 1110s, it would assume greater importance a de­cade l­ater due to the looming threat of an alliance between the Zirids and Almoravids.

The Zirid Victory at the B ­ attle of al-­Dimas, 517H (1123–24) Tensions between the Zirids and Normans persisted into the early 1120s. ­After the Almoravids raided southern Italy with the backing of their Zirid allies, the Normans launched an assault on Ifriqiya in 517H (1123–24). This campaign ended in disaster for Roger II, as much of his army was massacred at the fortress of al-­Dimas near Mahdia. For the new Zirid emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, this campaign was a dramatic victory. Two panegyrics written in the aftermath of this victory depict the Zirids as a Muslim dynasty triumphant in the face of Christian aggressors, with the power to unite local tribes u ­ nder the banner of jihad.83 In the wake of the Zirid-­Norman encounter at Gabès in 511H (1117–18), ʿAli ibn Yahya took precautions against Roger II’s rising assertiveness in Ifriqiya by preparing his navy and contacting the Almoravids in Marrakesh about working together to invade Sicily.84 The timing was right for such an alliance. The Almoravids had dramatically expanded their lands ­under the reign of Yushuf ibn Tashfin (d. 1106) to include much of the Maghreb and al-­Andalus. The initial de­cade or so of the reign of his son ʿAli (d. 1143) continued this prosperity to some degree (although the latter half of his reign was marked by the gradual erosion of Almoravid authority).85 This prosperity, combined with a long-­established tradition of maritime raiding and rhe­toric of jihad in Almoravid circles, made the prospect of forming an expedition against the Christian lord of Sicily a welcome premise for the lords of Marrakesh.86 83. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 337–39. 84. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 98–100; Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 511H, 10:247–48. 85. ​Bennison, Almoravid and Almohad Empires, 54–57. 86. ​Hicham El Aallaoui, “Les échanges diplomatiques entre Islam et monde latin (milieu XIe–­ milieu XIIe siècle): La transition entre l’époque des taifas et la dynastie Almoravide,” Oriente Moderno 88, no. 2 (2008): 249–70. See also Ronald Messier, The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).

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Emir ʿAli ibn Yahya died in 515H (1121–22) before this campaign could come to fruition. The attack eventually materialized u ­ nder ʿAli’s son al-­Hasan, who 87 succeeded him at the age of twelve. An Almoravid fleet raided the city of Nicotera, located on the coast of Calabria in southern Italy, at the beginning of 516H (spring/summer 1122).88 The details of the raid are not considered in any medieval sources, though its severity was enough to provoke Count Roger to act against both the Almoravids and their Zirid allies. He mobilized his navy and put an embargo on travel to Ifriqiya and “the lands of the Maghreb.”89 Seeing ­these actions from Roger, for the first time during his reign al-­Hasan reached out to the Fatimid imam-­caliph al-­Amir and pledged his allegiance to him.90 In ­doing this, al-­Hasan was acting in the tradition of his ­father and grand­father, both of whom had pledged allegiance to the Fatimids early in their reigns.91 Al-­Hasan had motivations that went beyond ancestral tradition, however, for he also hoped the Fatimids could assist him against an impending Norman invasion. The role of the Fatimids as an intermediary between the Zirids and Normans during the early twelfth c­ entury is a curious one. In theory, the Zirids remained vassals to the Fatimids, a power dynamic made explicit through lavish ceremonies and the exchange of gifts that inaugurated the reign of a new Zirid emir. The Fatimid caliphate benefited from tribute payments provided by the Zirids and both dynasties benefited from commerce that circulated between their ports. At the same time, however, the Fatimids ­were unable to provide an essential ser­vice to their vassals: protection. The Fatimid imam-­ caliphs, occupied with campaigns in the Levant against the newly formed Crusader states and troubled by internal unrest, ­were unable to provide their Ifriqiyan governors with military assistance. The Zirids w ­ ere left to fend for themselves, as they had done for over one hundred years. When al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli provided his ceremonial oath of allegiance to his Fatimid overlord in 516H 87. ​In the early years of his reign, al-­Hasan relied on the help of older advisers and generals to govern, first a eunuch named Sandal and then a general named Abu ʿAziz Muqaffaq. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­ Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 515H, 10:275. 88. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 517H, 10:285–86. A letter from the Cairo Geniza written by Abraham ibn Habib at an unknown date mentions an Almoravid raid consisting of a fleet of seventeen ships, which could be a reference to this 1122 raid or to another that occurred in 1127 (to be considered shortly). Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1978, 1:308; Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis, xlii. 89. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 517H, 10:285. 90. ​Ibn Muyassar relates that al-­Hasan sent an envoy to Cairo and pledged his allegiance to the imam-­caliph in Jumada I 517H (summer 1123). It is likely, therefore, that this envoy arrived while Roger was building up his fleet but before he attacked the Zirids. Ibn Muyassar, Al-­Muntaqa min Akhbar Misr, ed. Ayman Fu’ad Sayyid (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1981), 93; Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 94–95. 91. ​Yahya and ʿAli received Fatimid envoys in 505H (1111–12) and 511H (1117–18). Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:336, 339.

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(1112–23), therefore, he likely hoped that this show of deference would lead the imam-­caliph to step in as his diplomatic broker. Besides the ties that nominally bound the Fatimids to the Zirids, the imam-­ caliph also had a vested interest in cultivating a positive relationship with the Normans in Sicily. Indeed, the courts of Cairo and Palermo “maintained close, friendly, and regular contact with each other” during the early twelfth c­ entury even though the Normans had conquered the island that had once been u ­ nder 92 Fatimid control. One of the reasons for this peaceful coexistence was economic. Trade routes that connected Sicily, Ifriqiya, and Egypt provided customs duties for the trea­suries of both dynasties. Letters from the Cairo Geniza, although relatively scarce in the twelfth ­century, nonetheless show continued exchange across this triangular network of Mediterranean trade.93 In addition to this commercial link, a personal connection between administrators in Cairo and Palermo facilitated cooperation between the two dynasties. It requires some degree of explanation. In the wake of the First Crusade, a number of prominent Armenian Christian families emigrated from Asia Minor and the Levant. Some of them sought employment in Muslim administrations, as was the case with a man named Bahram, who ­rose through the ranks of the Fatimid government to become a vizier of the imam-­caliph.94 George of Antioch (who very well may have been Armenian Christian, though his lineage is contested) also found employment in the Muslim world in Ifriqiya.95 While ­under the employ of the Zirids, George of Antioch undoubtedly had contact with their Fatimid overlords in Cairo, which included correspondence with high-­ranking administrators like Bahram. When George defected to Sicily, his relationship with Bahram facilitated friendly exchanges between the Fatimids and Normans. Indeed, the chronicler al-­Maqrizi mentions that Roger II “dispatched George [of Antioch] 92. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 267. See also Dominique Valérian, “Les ports d’Ifriqiya et les stratégies maghrébines des califes fatimides dans le Maghreb central,” ed. Annliese Nef and Patrice Cressier, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée: Les Fatimides et la Méditerranée centrale Xe–­XIIe siècles 139 (2016): 93–106. 93. ​See, for example, Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, documents 171, 176, 177. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 239–43. 94. ​The rise of Bahram in Fatimid Egypt caused friction between the predominately Muslim populace and Christians living u ­ nder Fatimid rule. The c­ areer of Bahram is considered in detail in Seta B. Dadoyan, The Fatimid Armenians: Cultural and Po­liti­cal Interaction in the Near East (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 90–102. 95. ​The familial networks through which George and Bahram ­were connected are explored in M. Canard, “Une lettre du calife fatimite al-­Hafiz (524–544/1130–1149) à Roger II,” Atti del Convegno Internationale di Studi Ruggeriani 1 (1955): 125–46; Adalgisa de Simone, “Ruggero II e l’Africa islamica,” in Il mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo e le crociate: Atti delle quattordicesime giornate normanno-­sveve, Bari, 17– 20 ottobre 2000 (Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 2002), 275–85; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 258–67; Catlos, Infidel Kings and Unholy Warriors, 206–12.

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as an ambassador to Egypt” many times during his reign.96 Diplomatic exchanges between George and Bahram w ­ ere further complemented by cultural ones, through which the Normans ­adopted many parts of the Fatimid administration and appropriated ele­ments of its rulership.97 It is likely that the Normans had similar nonviolent exchanges with local Ifriqiyan lords like the Zirids and Hammadids. The evidence for this is spotty but evocative. Certain cursive styles of calligraphy, which were used in Sicily during the early to mid twelfth century, were common in con­temporary Ifriqiya and the Maghreb but not in Fatimid Egypt.98 Diplomatic correspondence between administrators like Abu al-­Salt in Ifriqiya and Abu al-­Dawʾ in Sicily likely facilitated the Norman adoption of Ifriqiyan writing styles. The Normans ­were potentially influenced by the architecture of the Hammadid (and then Hilalian) palace of Qalʿa, which contained one of the earliest examples of muqarnas honeycomb vaults in the southern Mediterranean, for some of their own palaces utilized similar vaulting.99 The stylings of Muslim Sicilian poets like Ibn Bashrun at the court of Palermo also drew on con­temporary lit­er­a­ture found in much of the Muslims world, especially in Ifriqiya and the Maghreb.100 It is thus more than “probable that the contacts between Palermo and the north of the African continent . . . ​­were multiple,” despite the poor documentation of them.101 Against the backdrop of peaceful cultural exchange between the Zirids, Fatimids, and Normans, however, ­there was latent po­liti­cal tension. For the Fatimids, who benefited from peace in the central Mediterranean, it was in their best interests to keep the Zirids and Normans from open conflict during 96. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 81. 97. ​One striking example of this is the Normans’ use of a ceremonial parasol to shade their kings. It was rare for the Norman kings to be seen in public, and the use of this ostentatious parasol, which was gifted by the Fatimids sometime in the twelfth c­ entury, was one such adoption of Egyptian rulership. Ibn Hammad, Histoire des rois `obaïdites: Les califes Fatimides, ed. M. Vonderheyden (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1927), 14–15. See also Britt, “Roger II of Sicily,” 28–29; Jeremy Johns, “I re normanni e i califfi fatimiti: Nuove prospettive su vecchi materiali,” in Del nuovo sulla Sicilia musulmana: Gornata de studio (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1995), 9–50; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 113–34; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 265–66. 98. ​Jeremy Johns, “Le iscrizioni e le epigrafi in arabo: Una rilettura,” in Nobiles officinae: Perle, filigrane e trame di seta dal Palazzo Reale di Palermo, ed. Maria Andaloro (Catania, Italy: Giuseppe Maimone, 2006), 60–63. 99. ​Lucien Golvin, “Les plafonds à Muqarnas de la Qal’a des Banû Hammâd et leur influence pos­si­ble sur l’art de la Sicile à la période normande,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée 17 (1974): 63–69. 100. ​Miller argues that the “biographical profile of the poets pre­sent in Sicily u ­ nder Roger [II] and, more importantly, their texts themselves, reveal a cadre of administrators in dialogue with other Arabophone Muslims around the Mediterranean, particularly in Mahdiya and the rest of North Africa.” Miller, “Muslim Poets,” 199. 101. ​Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 169.

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the 1120s. Therefore, when al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli reached out to his overload in Cairo a­ fter the 1122 Almoravid raid on Norman lands, the Fatimid imam-­caliph intervened with Count Roger and, according to the thirteenth-­century Fatimid historian Ibn Muyassar, restored peace between the two dynasties.102 The details of this peace are not explored, however, nor are they mentioned in other sources. Indeed, if the imam-­caliph al-­Amir did manage to broker a truce between the Zirids and Normans at all, it did not last long. In the summer of 517H (1123) Roger II dispatched a fleet to attack Mahdia.103 Al-­Hasan had anticipated this attack, though, and gathered a number of “­people from the lands of the Arabs” to assist him in the impending ­battle, which provided him with the military support to contest the Norman military in open conflict for the first time since the affair at Gabès.104 The Norman fleet, meanwhile, was commanded by Christodoulos and George of Antioch, who conquered the island of Pantelleria before landing on the small island of al-­Hashi, about ten miles from Mahdia. The two commanders spent a day sailing around Mahdia, sizing up its fortifications, but when they returned to the island, they found that a Zirid raid had plundered their camp and killed many of their soldiers. The next day, the remaining Normans set off for the fortress of al-­Dimas, which was located near Mahdia on the Ifriqiyan coast.105 The commanders of the expedition bribed the unnamed Arab commander of the ­castle and entered it without opposition.106 This victory quickly soured, however, when the combined forces of al-­Hasan and his Arab allies surrounded al-­Dimas. The Normans who managed to escape to their ships, including commanders Christodoulos and George of Antioch, ­were forced to turn back to Sicily. Their comrades at al-­Dimas resisted the Zirids and their allies for a week and attempted (unsuccessfully) to negotiate for their lives before they ­were slaughtered in a doomed sortie out of the fortress. On hearing of the fate of this 102. ​Ibn Muyassar, Al-­Muntaqa min Akhbar Misr, 93; Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 94–95. 103. ​The attack took place in late July 1123. Idris’s narrative notes minor variations between Arabic texts. I prefer the narrative of al-­Tijani based on its (ostensibly) direct quotations from Abu al-­Salt. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:334–42; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 85–86. On this b­ attle generally, see Simone, “Ruggero II e l’Africa islamica,” 107–13. 104. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 517H, 10:285–86. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:335; William Granara, “Ibn Hamdis’s al-­Dimas Qasida: Memorial to a Fallen Homeland,” in Poetry and History: The Value of Poetry in Reconstructing Arab History, ed. Ramzi Baalbaki, Saleh Said Agha, and Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 2011), 252. Johns identifies this island as a small archipelago ­today called Le Sorelle. Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 85. 105. ​Idris thinks that this fortress was located on a promontory between Mahdia and Monastir at the ruins of the ancient site of Thapsus. Johns supports this conclusion. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:336; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 85. 106. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 335–36. Ibn al-­Athir relates that the Normans took al-­Dimas, but he does not mention this bribery. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 517H, 10:285–86.

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expedition, a member of the Norman court (possibly Christodoulos) pulled at his beard out of frustration ­until it bled.107

The Zirids and Jihad The Zirid victory at the ­Battle of al-­Dimas was a momentous triumph for the young emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli. In commemoration of his victory, he sent out a letter to his Muslim neighbors in Ifriqiya. The letter, which survives intact in the travelogue of al-­Tijani, is one of the few from the Zirid court of the twelfth ­century.108 Written by the Zirid historian and panegyrist Abu al-­Salt soon ­after the victory, this letter portrays the b­ attle as Muslims united against an evil Christian ­enemy: The lord of Sicily was obstinate in the tyranny of his trespassing. He persisted in his aggression and his injustice. The evil of [Roger’s] intent and the wickedness of his scheming compelled him to oppress the side of Islam. He thought that this plan would be easy [to accomplish], its desired goal so close. Thus he mobilized and gathered an army. He called upon [his soldiers] to fight and prepared reinforcements. And when [he] thought that his affairs ­were in order and that he had finished his plan—­which was to be his annihilation!—­his fleet set out ­toward Mahdia—­God defend it!—­with three hundred ships bearing on their decks thirty thousand soldiers and about one thousand cavalry. But its departure was inauspicious from the start and bound to misfortunes, as preordained for [Roger] was the destruction of equipment and the perdition of souls. For one of the first ­things with which God rewarded him as part of His most beautiful design, and which He brought forth from His providence, the truth of which is not effected without the deepest gratitude, was to send on them a wind that moved them ­toward destruction. It came upon them with the cold of the w ­ ater and the heat of fire. Their destruction befell them, alternating between the piercing of spears and the flashing of blades. . . . Then, we sought assistance by summoning the Arab tribes that lived around us. They drew near in band upon band. The arrival of the torrent, 107. ​Johns writes that it “is highly pos­si­ble” that the person who pulled on his beard was Christodoulos. Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 86. 108. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 337–39. Idris wrote a loose translation of this letter in a short 1951 article. Al-­Tijani, Voyage du scheikh et-­Tidjani; H.R. Idris, “Analyse et Traduction de Deux Textes de l’époque Ziride,” in 70ème Congrès de l’A.F.A.S. (Tunis: Nicolas Bascone & Sauveur Muscat, 1951), 209–16. An En­glish translation of the letter can be found in Brett, “Armies of Ifriqiya,” 111–13.

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which was a very violent commotion and surged in waves, came. All of them came with intentions of pure jihad.109 The rest of the letter complements the above passage. It gives a detailed description of the Muslim victory at al-­Dimas and demonizes the Norman invaders. The letter ends by giving thanks to God, who has “has triumphed for the hand of Islam, elevated it, and granted it victory. He, who has destroyed, ruined, debased, and driven away idolatry.”110 The rhe­toric of this letter is clear in its pre­sen­ta­tion of a Zirid dynasty triumphant over the Normans. First, it extolls the virtues of the Arabs who fought on behalf of al-­Hasan. The Zirid emir, mindful of the threat posed by the Normans, sought to keep his coreligionists on his side by highlighting their prowess in ­battle and mobilizing rhe­toric of jihad. This alignment of Muslim powers against the Christian Normans represents a substantial diplomatic change when compared to the affair at Gabès several years e­ arlier. The alliance that had once existed between governor Rafiʿ of Gabès and Arab tribes in 511H (1117–18) against al-­Hasan gave way to a new one between al-­Hasan and Arab tribes in the summer of 517H (1123). This loyalty was not absolute, however, since an undisclosed sum of money was able to spur the defection of the Arab commander of al-­Dimas. This encounter suggests the fluidity of the po­liti­cal landscape in twelfth-­century Ifriqiya, which unfortunately is vis­i­ble to us only in irregular intervals during times of conflict. Reading between the lines of this panegyric, we can also see how Zirid power was contingent on the emir’s ability to form alliances with other Ifriqiyan powers. This victory was only pos­si­ble with the help of Arab tribes, whom al-­Hasan was ­eager to praise in his letter, so that he could keep them loyal to his cause. Christodolous and George of Antioch’s ability to bribe the Arab commander of al-­Dimas shows the fickleness of the alliances between Ifriqiyan leaders—­they could be undone by the exchange of gold. Al-­Hasan was well aware of ­these diplomatic realities and used the rhe­toric of jihad to try to bind his coreligionists into a more lasting alliance against the Christian Normans. The Zirids ­were thus a prominent regional force, but, as ­will soon be apparent, not one with the divinely manifest power described in this letter. The importance of the Zirid victory at the B ­ attle of al-­Dimas is confirmed in another panegyric—­this one written by the poet Ibn Hamdis, who used the 109. ​I am grateful to Paul Cobb for his help in translating this portion of al-­Tijani’s letter. D. S. Richards states that Ibn Shaddad wrote this victory letter, but the chronicle of Ibn ʿIdhari specifically mentions that Abu al-­Salt wrote it. Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:343; Richards, Chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir, 1:246. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:335. 110. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 339.

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occasion of this triumph to advocate for a broader jihad against the Normans in Sicily itself. The content of this poem is best understood in the context of Ibn Hamdis’s life and his personal relationship to Sicily, where he was born around the 1050s. Sometime a­ fter the Normans conquered Palermo in 1072, he fled to Seville and lived ­there ­until about 1091. While in al-­Andalus he “fashioned a poetics of exile, a stylized language of the philosophical and emotional aesthetics of being away from one’s rightful place in the world” through the hybridization of conservative and progressive themes in Arabic lit­er­a­ ture.111 The poetry of Ibn Hamdis thus recalled his homeland and at times used imagery relating to jihad to persuade Muslim lords to reconquer it.112 He brought ­these themes with him to Ifriqiya and the Zirid court, where he fled ­after being forced out of Seville due to internal po­liti­cal tensions.113 The frustration that Ibn Hamdis felt being so geo­g raph­i­cally close to Sicily yet so far from the island as it had existed during his youth is apparent in his poetry. While ­under the patronage of the Zirids, Ibn Hamdis wrote a number of poems that advocated for the Zirid conquest of Sicily and made emotional appeals for jihad against the Normans. Around the year 1091, he composed an ode (no. 27) to Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz that laid out his desire for his patron to conquer the island. ­After lamenting the hardships of his exile and placing blame on infighting between Muslims in Sicily, he juxtaposes the grandeur of Tamim with his own desire to see Sicily freed from the infidel Normans: My nights in the two Mahdiyyas are like the pearls [that I draw] from your nearness [and arrange] on top of the breastbone, Nights that passed like pearls arranged in necklaces of the passing years If I wanted to aim at the moon with a glance, I would see Tamīm in the heavens of glorious deeds! If my land was f­ ree, I would go to her, with a resolve that deems travelling an absolute necessity But my land, how can I liberate it from the shackles wielded by the hands of the infidel usurpers?114 111. ​William Granara, “Remaking Muslim Sicily: Ibn Ḥamdīs and the Poetics of Exile,” Edebiyāt 9 (1998): 167. See also Simone, “Mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo,” 272–73. 112. ​Granara calls this rhetorical strategy a “poetics of jihad.” William Granara, Narrating Muslim Sicily: War and Peace in the Medieval Mediterranean World (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2019), 99–141. 113. ​At the Zirid court, Ibn Hamdis lived in the intellectual network of Ifriqiyan scholars like Abu al-­Salt as well as Sicilian administrators like Abu al-­Dawʾ. Miller, “Muslim Poets,” 195–96. 114. ​Translation is from Nicola Carpentieri, “At War with the Age: Ring Composition in Ibn Ḥamdīs No. 27,” in Islamic Sicily: Philological and Literary Essays, ed. Mirella Cassarino (Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, 2015), 43.

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He continues l­ ater in the poem to appeal to the brave emirs of the Zirids to exact revenge on the Normans of Sicily, where so many other Muslims had failed: When a p­ eople strays from guidance, they are upright, how can the fixed stars deviate from their course? How many of them [are endowed] with true courage, when they turn to attack, they only think of ­going forward and not on the outcome. His military expedition is split into two fronts, as one attacks the king in a chess game from each side When they do not raid the lands of the Rum, they enter the bowels of swift ships on sturdy ­horses They would die the death of glory in the thick of ­battle, while cowards die in the arms of buxom maidens They stuffed cushions with the dust of holy war, that are placed ­under their shoulders for burial They fell, like falling stars fall, into the pit of decay, leaving b­ ehind the black of darkness on the world. . . . ​115 When Ibn Hamdis wrote this poem in the early 1090s, he clearly hoped to motivate the Zirid emirs to undertake a holy war against the Normans before they could solidify their power in Sicily. This did not come to pass ­under the reign of emirs Tamim, Yahya, or ʿAli.116 With the victory of al-­Hasan at al-­ Dimas, however, Ibn Hamdis (now in his seventies) saw an opportunity to extort his patrons to wage a larger conflict against Norman dominion in his homeland by appealing to the teenager who sat atop the Zirid throne.117 Throughout this elegy (qaṣīda), Ibn Hamdis utilizes “both the literal and figurative discourses” of jihad: God has willed that you have victory, and that faith destroy what disbelief has erected; And that He render the pagans disgraced ­after dispensing His justice on them; and humiliation and subjugation follow them wherever they go. . . . 115. ​Carpentieri, “At War with the Age,” 44. 116. ​Ibn Hamdis composed twelve panegyrics to Yahya and twenty-­seven to ʿAli. T ­ hese poems “consciously manipulate poetic license, or indulgence, to document and eulogize Muslim Sicily’s decline and the rise of Norman supremacy over the central Mediterranean” and in Ifriqiya “undoubtedly found a new and exciting resonance and po­liti­cal immediacy among the highly engaged and concerned audience that was not pre­sent in Seville.” Granara, “Ibn Hamdis’s al-­Dimas Qasida,” 250. 117. ​It was not only Ibn Hamdis who evoked this kind of rhe­toric. ­After the Zirid defeat of the Normans outside of Gabès, the poet Muhammad ibn Bashir referred to the Normans as al-­jāhilīn (the ignorant). Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 99–100.

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The army of God waged b­ attle on them with the [force of the] wind; such that no mortal could withstand such an attack. . . . Arabs they w ­ ere, who launched a holy war against the ʿAjam,118 [like] brave lions launching their war against a herd of swine. Whenever the summons, “Oh you, our protectors,” are voice, then they rise to the call, in their fold the most honorable noblemen . . . Squadrons from ­every tribe came forth to perform jihad; ­there is no excuse for whoever neglects it. Through them, God has strengthened Muhammad’s religion, and his divine providence bestowed protection on them. . . . [Al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli] has protected the [sacred] land of Islam like a lion devouring with both claws but only receiving a scratch. A young ruler who conducts himself like one much older; God forbade that arrogance be connected to him. . . .119 The remainder of this poem expands on t­ hese themes—­praising al-­Hasan and the Arab tribes that brought him victory, extolling the virtues of jihad, and evoking the evils of the unbelieving Normans.120 Although it would be foolish to accept without question the grandiose picture of the Zirid court and its emirs that Ibn Hamdis pre­sents to his readers across his panegyrics, his per­sis­ tent use of jihad rhe­toric is evocative. Using the “well-­honed weapon of classical Arabic rhe­toric,” Ibn Hamdis intimately tied Zirid campaigns against the Normans (both ­those that happened in Ifriqiya and ­those that he hoped would happen in Sicily) to the idea of jihad.121 His poetry shows that some in the Zirid court sought to pre­sent conflict against the Normans as a holy war, and that Ibn Hamdis himself thought that this kind of religiously inspired appeal would find an audience with the Zirid emir and among his court. In the absence of detailed rec­ords from the Zirid court during the twelfth ­century, Abu al-­Salt’s letter and Ibn Hamdis’s poem following the ­Battle of al-­Dimas provide a power­f ul glimpse into the mentality of the Zirid court as its relationship with the Normans soured. T ­ hese writings demonstrate the 118. ​ ʿAjam is a pejorative term meaning someone whose native tongue is not Arabic and who did not have the cultured upbringing of a Muslim, Arabic-­speaking society. 119. ​Translation is from Granara, “Ibn Hamdis’s al-­Dimas Qasida,” 253–56. 120. ​Granara argues that the degree of detail pre­sent in this poem was evidence of Ibn Hamdis’s awareness of the “real­ity of Muslim weakness” compared to Roger II, which led him to poeticize and mythologize the victory at al-­Dimas. Given the narrative presented throughout this chapter, I find this interpretation unconvincing. Granara, “Ibn Hamdis’s al-­Dimas Qasida,” 257. 121. ​Granara, Narrating Muslim Sicily, 138.

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coldness between the Zirid emirs and Roger II that Arabic chronicles mention in passing.122 Abu al-­Salt’s invective against the lord of Sicily is framed as part of a broader assault on Islam itself, and the victory that the Zirids won over the Normans is thus construed along triumphant, religious lines. Ibn Hamdis, ­eager to return to his Sicilian homeland, evokes the idea of jihad to encourage al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli to undertake ­f uture campaigns against the Normans. T ­ hese letters, although inflated with praise for the lords of Mahdia by virtue of their authors and audience, nonetheless show that in the 1120s, the Zirids saw themselves as triumphant executors of jihad in the face of their Christian foe. From the establishment of trading contracts at the end of the eleventh ­century through the Zirid victory at al-­Dimas, the relationship between the Zirids and Normans underwent dramatic changes. Initially, the profitability of exchange with the Zirids was such that the Normans u ­ nder Roger I had declined to participate in expeditions against them. The early twelfth ­century, however, saw a fracture in this relationship due to the Zirids’ attempts at asserting their strength in Ifriqiya as well as the Normans’ growing po­liti­cal aspirations across the Mediterranean. ­These initial exchanges favored the Zirid emirs. They repelled a Norman fleet in 511H (1117–18) when Roger II sided with the governor of Gabès against them, and they followed this with a series of victories against a co­ali­tion of Arab tribes. Several years ­later, the Zirids forged an alliance with the Almoravids that led to a raid against Norman territory and a victory at the ­Battle of al-­Dimas, which members of the Zirid court presented as a righ­teous jihad against unbelievers. The Zirids had the upper hand against the Normans in this clash for supremacy in the central Mediterranean, though this power dynamic would soon unravel in the 1130s.

122. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 511H, 10:247–48; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:342–43.

C h a p te r 4

The End of the Emirate and the Beginning of the Kingdom

The ­Battle of al-­Dimas did not mark the end of peaceful diplomatic relations between the Zirids and the Normans. Despite this Norman defeat and bombastic rhe­toric from al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, relations between the two dynasties calmed ­until 521H (1127–28), when the Almoravids (at the behest of the Zirids) launched another raid against Norman lands. This encounter, however, was soon eclipsed by po­liti­cal developments in southern Italy that occupied Roger II for the better part of a de­cade. During ­these years, the Zirids waned in power due to the collapse of their alliances, while the Norman po­liti­cal and military apparatus ballooned in strength ­under the able hands of Roger II and George of Antioch. As a Hammadid-­led co­ali­tion approached the walls of Mahdia in 529H (1134–35), the Zirids requested aid from the Normans, who acquiesced and went a step further by seizing the island of Djerba for themselves. The years following the Norman conquest of Djerba saw the gradual ascent of the Normans over the Zirids. The continued deterioration of emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli’s alliances, environmental crises, and dissent among local Ifriqiyan governors crippled Zirid power in the central Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Roger II extended his power during the 1130s through campaigns in southern Italy that led to his eventual recognition as king of Sicily. With his continental territories secured, George of Antioch conducted campaigns on an almost annual basis in Ifriqiya during the 1140s. ­These attacks culminated 103

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in the seizure of Mahdia and the Ifriqiyan littoral from Tripoli up to Tunis by the summer of 1148, which marked the foundation of the Norman kingdom of Africa. For the first time since the Islamic conquests of the seventh ­century, the coastline of Ifriqiya was controlled by a Christian dynasty. Meanwhile, the last Zirid emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, fled Mahdia and was subsequently captured by his Hammadid rivals.

Another Almoravid Raid, 521H (1127–28) ­ fter the B A ­ attle of al-­Dimas, sustained tension between the Zirids and Normans erupted during the pivotal year of 1127, when Roger II conquered the islands of Malta and Gozo, an Almoravid fleet raided several cities in Sicily, and Duke William II of Apulia and Calabria died. The first two of t­ hese events highlight the continued animosity between the Normans and Muslim leaders on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The third event, meanwhile, provides an explanation for Roger II’s lack of concern for Ifriqiyan affairs for much of the late 1120s and early 1130s. Arabic sources provide few details about the affairs of al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli between the B ­ attle of al-­Dimas and the second Almoravid raid against Norman lands. More is known about Roger II, who continued to expand his power.1 He invested most of his time in the affairs of southern Italy. During the early years of his reign, Count Roger was subservient to William II, the duke of Apulia and Calabria (whose ­father was Roger Borsa and grand­father was Robert Guiscard). Although the two jockeyed for power in southern Italy during the early 1120s, Roger was able to dramatically expand the scope of his power when they signed a peace treaty in 1122 that was brokered by Pope Callixtus II. By the terms of this treaty, Roger agreed to provide military and financial support to William and in return, William conceded his shares of Calabria, Messina, and Palermo to Roger II. This effectively put Roger in complete control of Sicily and Calabria. Near the end of 1123, having recovered from his defeat at al-­Dimas, Roger campaigned in Calabria to solidify his rule. The territories secured during t­ hese years strengthened the Norman monarchy and paved the way for excursions that Roger conducted several years ­later across the Strait of Sicily. The first of t­ hese expeditions was aimed at Malta and a handful of other unnamed islands in the central Mediterranean. This was not the first Norman 1. ​This history is summarized in Matthew, Norman Kingdom of Sicily, 19–21; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 36–38.

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attack on Malta. Roger I had conquered (or raided) the island in 1091, but the next mention of it comes in the chronicle of Alexander of Telese, who briefly rec­ords Roger II’s conquest of Malta and Gozo in 1127.2 In the intervening years, the islands had presumably fallen into the hands of a Muslim lord, whose identity and allegiances are unknown.3 The most detailed account of Roger II’s island conquests comes from the Tristia ex Melitogaudo, a Greek poem composed by a member of the Norman court exiled to Gozo during the ­middle of the twelfth c­ entury. The anonymous author dramatically summarizes the Norman conquest: The most resplendent of all the leaders, Having mustered only a small naval expeditionary force And a host of spear-­bearing archer-­infantry, Sailed to Melitogaudos [Malta and Gozo], the country of Hagar, [and] Not having been dismayed at the impudence of the godless [sons of Hagar], Having encircled [them] with diverse engines of war, He subdued [them] with the might and main for the Lord. When he saw, on the one hand, ­these [inhabitants] Invoking only the heresiarch, the all-­abominable Mohammed, He banished from the country their sheikhs, With all their h ­ ouse­holds and [their] black slaves, not indeed a few. He, on the other hand, brought out into the open The pious inhabitants of the place, together with the bishop, 2. ​The timeline of ­these events is ambiguous in con­temporary texts, but it is pos­si­ble to infer their order. Alexander of Telese puts Roger’s island conquests as taking place before Duke William’s death on July 28, 1127. Based on the short amount of time between the Almoravid raid on July 17, 1127 and the date of William’s death, it is most likely that Roger seized t­hese islands before the Almoravids attacked the Sicilian coast. Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis, 112:97. 3. ​Maltese scholars have contested the religious composition of the island during the time of the Normans’ conquests in 1091 and 1127. The most accepted theory at pre­sent is that Islam was a pre­sent force on both Malta and Gozo from the time of the island’s conquest in the tenth ­century through Norman rule of the island. See Godfrey Wettinger, “The Arabs in Malta,” in Malta: Studies of Its Heritage and History (Valletta: Mid-­Med Bank, 1986), 87–104; Charles Dalli, Malta: The Medieval Millennium, Malta’s Living Heritage (Valletta: Midsea Books, 2006), 51–91; Michael Cooperson, “Al-­Ḥimyarī’s Account of Medieval Malta: A Reconsideration,” in Fuzzy Bound­aries: Festschrift füe Antonio Loprieno, ed. H. Amstutz et al. (Hamburg: Widmaier Verlag, 2015), 347–51. Luttrell goes further and argues that the population was exclusively Muslim by the time of Roger I’s conquest in the eleventh c­ entury. Anthony Luttrell, “Approaches to Medieval Malta: Studies on Malta before the Knights,” in Approaches to Medieval Malta, ed. Anthony Luttrell (London: British School at Rome, 1975), 1–70; Anthony Luttrell, “The Christianization of Malta,” in The Malta Year Book 1977, ed. B. Hilary (Msida, Malta: De La Salle ­Brothers, 1977), 415–21; Anthony Luttrell, “L’effritement de l’Islam: 1091–1282,” Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée 71 (1994): 49–61.

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Who, having departed from the Pact of old, Got rid of the hated ­things by which they used to invoke Mohammed.4 This account of the Norman conquest of Malta and Gozo, written around twenty years a­ fter the event, shows the triumph of the Christian Normans over native Muslims. The conquest is presented as a b­ attle fought with the approval of God against the Hagarenes (a Latin term for Muslims, based on their supposed descent from the biblical Hagar).5 It would be irresponsible, however, to take the word of this author as indicative of all the varied motivations that went into the Norman conquest of Malta and Gozo. The exiled author of this poem had e­ very reason to want to return from his imprisonment on t­ hese backwater islands to the metropolis of Palermo. His praise of the Christian conquerors and condemnation of the Muslim population of the island are likely a reflection of his attempts at stitching together a narrative that would appeal to George of Antioch and the Norman court. Instead of approaching ­these island conquests from solely this perspective, we can also see them as part of the Normans’ larger plan for po­liti­cal and commercial control in the central Mediterranean. Malta and Gozo, located only fifty-­five miles from the coast of Sicily, ­were ideal locations from which hostile powers could launch raids on Sicilian lands—­they had been used as pirate bases in de­cades prior.6 By conquering ­these islands, Roger II inhibited raiders in the area and gained for himself a strategic base off the coast of Sicily en route to Ifriqiya.7 It is likely that the Norman conquest of Malta and Gozo was accompanied by a less successful attack that stretched to the coast of Ifriqiya itself—­though the details of this campaign are obfuscated by inconsistencies in con­temporary 4. ​Translation is from Busuttil et al., Tristia ex Melitogaudo, 166–67. See also M. Puccia, “L’anonimo carme di supplica a Giorgio di Antiochia e l’elaborazione dell’idea imperiale alla corte di Ruggero II,” in Re and Rognoni, Giorgio di Antiochia, 231–62. The translation given by Busuttil, Fiorini, and Vella has been the subject of controversy for its pre­sen­ta­tion of Christians on Malta during the early Islamic conquests of the island. Stanley Fiorini, Tristia ex Melitogaudo Revisited: Objections, Clarifications, Confirmations (Valletta: Best Print, 2010); Marc Lauxtermann, “Tomi, Mljet, Malta: Critical Notes on a Twelfth-­Century Southern Italian Poem of Exile,” Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 64 (2014): 155–67; Stanley Fiorini and Horatio C. R. Vella, “Reactions to Tristia ex Melitogaudo: A Response,” Literatūra 58, no. 3 (2016): 75–87. 5. ​John Tolan, Saracens: Islam in the Medieval Eu­ro­pean Imagination (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 10–11. 6. ​Idris, La Berbérie orientale, 1962, 1:338; Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 31; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 41. 7. ​It is pos­si­ble that the Normans also seized other islands in the central Mediterranean around this time. Wieruszowski, for example, argues that Roger conquered the island of Pantelleria. Helene Wieruszowski, “The Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades,” in History of the Crusades, vol. 2, The ­Later Crusades, 1189–1311, ed. Harry ­Hazard, Robert Wolff, and Kenneth Setton (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 21.

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sources. William of Tyre, who provides the most detailed Latin-­language account, rec­ords how the Normans launched a fleet in the summer of 1127 ­toward the province of Africa (prob­ably in a continuation of the e­ arlier Malta-­Gozo campaign).8 The Normans first eyed Djerba. A letter from the island, reproduced by al-­Hilati but written by an unknown author at an unknown date, mentions that the “Christians” attacked Djerba in 521H (1127–28).9 Following this raid, William of Tyre rec­ords how an “African” (potentially Zirid) fleet repulsed the Normans and chased them all the way back to Sicily, where it raided Syracuse, massacred many ­people, and enslaved the rest.10 Arabic sources corroborate this raid, though they indicate that it was conducted by an Almoravid fleet, which returned to the Maghreb laden with slaves and plunder.11 They also elaborate that this latest encounter further alienated Roger II from the Zirid emir al-­Hasan, whom he suspected was once again collaborating with the Almoravids.12 The disputed and incomplete details of this encounter make it difficult to draw overarching conclusions about it. It is pos­si­ble that ­these sources, which ­were written de­cades or centuries ­after the events themselves, ­were conflating this 1127 campaign with other, more firmly established ones in 517H (1123–24) or 529H (1134–35), or that ­there ­were other smaller encounters around ­these dates that would other­wise be unrecorded.13 What appears likely, however, is that the Normans, Zirids, and Almoravids undertook opportunistic raids during the 1120s through which they sought to destabilize their foes and fill their own trea­suries. Indeed, the Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris (Chronicle of Alfonso the emperor) points to more widespread Almoravid aggression against Sicily. It mentions that the commander of the Almoravid navy would “sail through the Mediterranean to attack the area of Ascalon and the regions of Constantinople, Sicily, the town of Bari and other coastal towns . . . ​attacking and devastating, 8. ​William of Tyre, PL, 201:571. 9. ​Al-­Hilati, Ra­saʾil, ed. Muhammad Gouja (Beirut: Dar al-­Gharb al-­Islami, 1998), 42–43. See also Tarek Kahlaoui, “Ibadi Jerba: Surviving the Early Ḥafṣids (13–14th Centuries),” Journal of North African Studies 26, no. 4 (2021): 631–41. 10. ​William of Tyre, PL, 201:571. For William of Tyre’s reliability on Sicilian affairs, see Wieruszowski, “Norman Kingdom of Sicily,” 21; Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 75. 11. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 339; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:214. No Arabic sources mention the Norman conquest of Malta or an attack on the coast of Ifriqiya itself. 12. ​Ibn Khaldun refers to the Almoravid commander as Ahmed and al-­Tijani calls him Muhammad. Al-­Tijani might have mistakenly recorded this name, however, since he says the leader of the 1127 raid was also the leader of the 1122 raid, whose name (according to al-­Tijani himself ) was ʿAli. Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 335–39; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:214. 13. ​It is pos­si­ble that William of Tyre is conflating this 1127 encounter with the Norman attack on al-­Dimas in 1123, though his details about the retaliatory Zirid raid on Sicily do not line up with other narratives for that par­tic­u­lar ­battle. Similarly, it is pos­si­ble that the Djerban letter recorded in al-­Hilati is misdating the Norman conquest of Djerba in 1135.

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massacring and slaughtering the Christians.”14 Another section of the chronicle mentions that Almería was a haven for Almoravid pirates who would “strike at Constantinople, Sicily, or even at Barcelona.”15 Although the author may have exaggerated the suffering and extent of ­these raids, ­these passages nonetheless suggest multiple Almoravid raids conducted against Norman lands.16 The timeline for t­hese expeditions is vague, however, and con­temporary sources saw fit to rec­ord in any level of detail only two such expeditions—­which perhaps ­were the most substantial ones. The Normans’ attack on Malta, Gozo, and coastal Ifriqiya in 1127 represents an impor­tant change in the policy of Roger II. Unlike his previous incursions into the region, when Roger reacted to a request from an Ifriqiyan lord or responded directly to an act of aggression against him, this attack placed Roger on the offensive. The reason for this change of tactics was likely tied to the ascent of George of Antioch to the position of emir, which took place in 1126. Al-­Maqrizi provides the most detailed explanation of George of Antioch’s rise to power.17 He explains how George and Christodoulos had shared power in Sicily when Roger came of age. Over time, though, George slandered Christodoulos to such an extent that Roger eventually had Christodoulos executed. Roger initially sought to appoint as a replacement Abu al-­Dawʾ, a poet and administrator who had contacts in the Zirid court and was likely responsible for much of the Normans’ correspondence with Mahdia during the early twelfth c­ entury, but he refused the position.18 Roger then appointed George of Antioch. This change in personnel in the Norman administration corresponds to a radical change in policy ­toward Ifriqiya and is unlikely to be a coincidence. George played a formative role in planning the 1127 campaign, which involved proactive attacks on the islands of the central Mediterranean and the coast of Ifriqiya.19 This expedition further aligned with the ever-­expanding commercial, po­ liti­cal, and military aspirations of Count Roger II in the central Mediterranean. 14. ​Simon Barton and Richard Fletcher, Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris, in The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 248. 15. ​Barton and Fletcher, Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris, 208. 16. ​The theme of revenge was central to this chronicle and the author drew on the style of the Old Testament and classical authors like Virgil and Ovid to convey it. Despite t­ hese thematic considerations, Barton and Fletcher argue that “the importance and reliability of the CAI [Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris] as a historical source are beyond question.” Barton and Fletcher, Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris, 151–55. 17. ​Al-­Maqrizi, Kitab al-­Muqaffa al-­K abir, 3:18–20. 18. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 86–90; Jamil and Johns, “New Latin-­Arabic Document,” 129–30. 19. ​It is pos­si­ble that Roger II’s preferred choices for the successor to Christodoulos, first Abu al-­ Dawʾ and then George of Antioch, indicate his increased interest in Ifriqiya, as both of t­ hese individuals had clear connections to the Zirid regime.

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Treaties that the Norman administration negotiated roughly contemporaneously with the conquest of Malta and Gozo show ­these inflated ideas of Norman power. In the spring of 1128, Roger II concluded a series of treaties with Savona (a Genoese protectorate in northwestern Italy) that are preserved t­ oday in three documents.20 In t­hese treaties, the Savonese agree not to harm the ­people or boats of Roger II in “the entire sea, which is from Numidia up to Tripoli, and all the sea and all the land that is between us.” Roger’s assertion that t­ hese w ­ aters and coastal lands, which span from roughly Algeria to Tripoli (Libya), fell u ­ nder his sphere of influence indicates that he sought maritime control over much of the south-­central Mediterranean.21 ­These treaties further show that Roger was actively seeking to requisition naval equipment in what was essentially state-­sponsored piracy or privateering, presumably to support his own interests.22 The fortification of the Norman navy through this tactic allowed Roger to undertake campaigns in the Mediterranean with increased frequency—­against Malta, Gozo, and Ifriqiya in 1127; on the Italian Peninsula in the late 1120s; and in Ifriqiya during the 1130s and 1140s.23 As Roger was negotiating t­ hese treaties with Savona, he was also looking for allies in the western Mediterranean to combat the Zirid-­Almoravid alliance. He found one in the form of Raymond Berengar III, count of Barcelona.24 In the beginning of 1128, the two counts finalized a treaty by which Roger agreed to provide aid and counsel due to the “multiple incursions of Saracens in parts of Hispania.”25 According to the treaty, Roger would provide fifty ships, several of his vassals, and an unspecified number of soldiers to aid the armies of Raymond. The target of this expedition is not specified in the treaties, other than “Hispania.” It is pos­si­ble, however, that Roger and Raymond ­were planning to 20. ​Carlrichard Brühl, ed., Rogerii II: Regis diplomata latina (Cologne: Böhlau, 1987), document 10. 21. ​Abulafia argues that unwritten agreements ­were in place between the Genoese and Normans during the reign of Roger II, basing his argument on the language of treaties written during the reigns of Roger’s successors. Abulafia, Two Italies, 69–71. 22. ​The line between privateering and piracy in the M ­ iddle Ages was a blurry one. The case study of Trapelicinus tackles some of the ambiguities surrounding commerce, vio­lence, and politics in the Mediterranean. Enrica Salvatori, “Corsairs’ Crews and Cross-­Cultural Interactions: The Case of the Pisan Trapelicinus in the Twelfth ­Century,” Medieval Encounters 13, no. 1 (2007): 32–55. 23. ​Abulafia argues that part of the terms of this first treaty, which specified that the captured galley and crew from Savona must provide forty days of ser­vice to Roger, w ­ ere meant for a forthcoming naval expedition to North Africa. Wieruszowski similarly sees the terms of this treaty as helping Roger prepare for his “­f uture role as lord of the African sea.” Wieruszowski, “Norman Kingdom of Sicily,” 21; Abulafia, Two Italies, 65–68. 24. ​Raymond previously formed alliances with other Christian rulers against Muslim powers in the Mediterranean. He also campaigned in Muslim-­held Ibiza, Majorca, and the Balearic Islands. Reilly, Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 174–80. See also Lev Kapitaikin, “ ‘The ­Daughter of al-­ Andalus’: Interrelations between Norman Sicily and the Muslim West,” Al-­Masāq: Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean 25, no. 1 (2013): 113–34. 25. ​Brühl, Rogerii II diplomata, document 9; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:397.

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attack the Balearic Islands, from which the Almoravids had been launching their raids on Christian lands.26 Wherever Roger and Raymond intended for this campaign to go, nothing of it materialized b­ ecause of the repercussions of an unexpected death on the southern end of the Italian Peninsula.27 Amid Roger II’s treaty negotiations and campaigns in the central Mediterranean, Duke William II of Apulia and Calabria died childless on July 28, 1127. Roger sought to usurp his dukedom immediately by virtue of their shared Hauteville heritage, a move that brought him into conflict with both the papacy (which had a legitimate claim to William’s duchy) and lords in southern Italy. Pope Honorius II threatened Roger with excommunication, raised his own troops for an impending war, and invested a rival claimant to the dukedom.28 Roger responded by campaigning in Italy during the summer of 1128, which occupied virtually all of his military resources and rendered him unable to help Raymond in Iberia. ­These expeditions w ­ ere the first of many through which Roger sought to establish himself as the sole ruler of Sicily, Apulia, and Calabria. Embroiled in t­ hese affairs, Roger did not commit himself militarily to the affairs of Ifriqiya for nearly a de­cade.29

Conflict in Mahdia and Djerba, 529H (1134–35) ­ fter the campaigns of 521H (1127–28), ­there is no evidence of conflict beA tween al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli and Roger II for the better part of eight years. Instead, both sides pursued their own interests on their respective sides of the Mediterranean while continuing to benefit from commercial traffic that passed through their ports. This policy of nonintervention came to an end in the summer of 529H (1135), when al-­Hasan sought an alliance with the Normans against a co­ali­tion of Ifriqiyan lords who had attacked Mahdia. The subsequent 26. ​Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 3:384–85. 27. ​Chalandon argues that the reason this treaty fell through was ­because Raymond did not ratify it during the eight days that followed the arrival of Roger’s envoys. The basis on which he makes this claim is unclear. Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande, 1:378. 28. ​Houben, Ruler between East and West, 43–46. 29. ​While ­these years did not see direct Norman intervention in Ifriqiya, t­ here w ­ ere impor­tant developments in Roger II’s use of Christian rhe­toric in his royal titles. In the m ­ iddle of the 1120s, Roger began to deliberately alter his royal titles in charters to reflect what he saw as his role as defender of Chris­tian­ity. In his correspondence with Raymond III, Roger refers to his rule as “by the grace of God” and directs his galleys to be sent “in the ser­vice of God and the aid of the armies” of Hispania. Another charter, from 1126, is the first in which Count Roger pre­sents himself as “defender and shield, by the authority of God, of the Christian religion.” Charters in subsequent years also see Roger using Christian rhe­toric in his titles. He claims to be a “helper and shield of Christians” and an “increaser of the churches of God and the weapons and shield of Christians.” Brühl, Rogerii II diplomata, documents 7, 9, 13, 14.

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Zirid-­Norman victory marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the two dynasties, in which the Normans asserted a substantial degree of po­liti­cal authority over affairs in Ifriqiya. In the wake of Duke William II’s death in 1127, Roger devoted much of his time and resources to securing the loyalty of lords on the Italian Peninsula, many of whom ­were hostile to him and enjoyed the support of Pope Honorius II. The death of Honorius in 1130 presented an opportunity for Roger to gain recognition for his rule when the subsequent papal election resulted in the contested appointment of Pope Anacletus II, whom Roger supported, and Pope Innocent II, who enjoyed the support of most of the rest of Eu­rope. Roger and his advisers argued the need for a “king of Sicily” to Anacletus, who agreed and crowned Roger on Christmas Day 1130.30 This coronation was met with fierce opposition from supporters of Pope Innocent II and lords in southern Italy, leading to further conflict that lasted through the 1130s.31 Although Roger’s military energies in the years following the death of Duke William II ­were firmly fixed on the Italian Peninsula, he still looked for ways to gain influence elsewhere in the Mediterranean through diplomacy and subterfuge. In 1130, for example, Roger jumped at the opportunity to assert his hereditary right in Antioch when Prince Bohemond II of Antioch died and left his ­daughter Constance, still a minor, as heir.32 When a council of nobles from Antioch chose Raymond of Poitiers to wed Constance, they feared Roger would try to prevent Raymond from traveling to Antioch, in order to advance his own line’s claim. A wary Raymond thus set out on his journey incognito in 1135 to avoid the traps Roger had laid in ­every coastal city in Apulia. ­Those traps proved unsuccessful as Raymond, dressed as a h ­ umble pilgrim, managed to evade Roger’s sentries and safely sail to Antioch. ­There is no evidence of such subterfuge between Roger II and al-­Hasan in the early 1130s, as trade between their lands continued. In 1134, Roger II gave the monastery of San Salvatore in Messina the right to export wheat from their lands to “Africa” in exchange for olive oil.33 Across the Strait of Sicily, al-­Hasan 30. ​The coronation mantle of Roger II, which was made in Palermo in 528H (1133–34), depicts two lions lunging at two camels. The overtones of the subjugation of Muslims by Christians, as depicted by the camels and lions, respectively, are clear. On the coronation mantel, see Isabelle Dolezalek, Arabic Script on Christian Kings: Textile Inscriptions on Royal Garments from Norman Sicily (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 165–90. 31. ​For details, see Houben, Ruler between East and West, 60–66. 32. ​Roger II’s paternal cousin, Bohemond I, had captured Antioch during the First Crusade. Bohemond I’s son and heir, Bohemond II, was therefore Roger II’s first cousin once removed. William of Tyre, PL, 201:599–600, 624–27. 33. ​David Abulafia, “The Crown and the Economy ­under Roger II and His Successors,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 37 (1983): 5.

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apparently displayed a similar attitude of nonintervention in Norman affairs, though con­temporary sources are largely ­silent about ­these years. He clashed with his Hammadid rivals outside of Mahdia in 521H (1127–28), for unknown reasons.34 The chronicler Ibn ʿIdhari, as if to assure his readers that he had not forgotten to include the life of the Zirid emir, mentions in 523H (1128–29) that “al-­Hasan ibn Ali was the emir of Ifriqiya, as he was the year before,” and in 528H (1133–34) that “the rulers of Ifriqiya w ­ ere the same as in the preceding 35 year.” The scarcity of documentation, however, does not mean that al-­Hasan and other governors in Ifriqiya ­were wholly idle. To shine some light on the history of Ifriqiya in ­these years, it is necessary to use ­later entries from Arabic chronicles. Ibn al-­Athir’s documentation of 529H (1134–35) is particularly revealing. In this year (likely in the summer of 1135), the Hammadid emir Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz launched an expedition against the Zirid capital of Mahdia.36 The impetus for this was al-­Hasan’s preferential treatment of a certain Ifriqiyan lord named Muhriz ibn Ziyad, who had command of a large group of Arabs.37 His act of favoritism (the nature of which is unspecified) made other lords envious and caused them to ask the Hammadid emir Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz to invade Mahdia. Spurred by this request and letters from discontented shaykhs in Mahdia, Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz gathered his forces. The Hammadid army, led by Muttarif ibn Hamdun and accompanied by a large number of Arabs allies, besieged Mahdia. The Hammadid fleet dominated the seas outside of Mahdia and the army pressed ahead ­toward the walls. Although the army managed to sack the suburb of Zawila, the tide of b­ attle turned quickly. The account from Ibn al-­Athir details al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli’s heroism: Al-­Hasan ordered the opening of the sea-­facing gate and he was the first of the p­ eople to exit it. He bore himself forth and cried out to ­those who ­were with him, “I am al-­Hasan!” When ­those who ­were fighting him heard this, they called out to him, saluted him, and retreated from him out of re­spect for him. Then, at that moment, al-­Hasan sent 34. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:344. 35. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:344–45. 36. ​Ibn ʿIdhari is alone in asserting that the Hammadid attack on Mahdia came in the year 530H (1135–36). Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:345–46. 37. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 529H, 11:17–18. Following the argument of Idris, I suspect that Ibn al-­Athir has mistaken “Maymun” for “Muhriz” in this entry. Muhriz ibn Ziyad was a veteran Arab leader from the Banu Riyah who ruled at the fortress of al-­Muʿallaqa near Tunis. When al-­Hasan was forced to flee Mahdia in 543H (1148–49), he went to the lands of Muhriz b­ ecause he had long maintained a good relationship with him. This circumstantial evidence of friendship between al-­ Hasan and Muhriz, combined with the similar spellings between Muhriz (‫ )محرز‬and Maymun (‫)ميمون‬, makes me suspect this error. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:342.

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out his fleet from the harbor. Four ships from the fleet [of the ­enemy] ­were taken and the remaining [ships] w ­ ere defeated. Then, help arrived from Roger the Frank, lord of Sicily, at sea in the form of twenty ships, which encircled the fleet of the lord of Béjaïa [Bougie]. Al-­Hasan ordered them set f­ree, which they w ­ ere. Then, Maymun ibn Ziyad arrived with a large group of Arabs to assist al-­Hasan. When Muttarif [ibn Hamdun] saw this and that support was coming for al-­Hasan by land and by sea, he perceived that he did not have the power [to defeat] them. So he departed from Mahdia disappointed. Roger the Frank ostensibly made right [the situation] with al-­Hasan such that t­here was the conclusion of a truce and an agreement. Despite this, [Roger] was constructing a fleet and increasing its numbers.38 In this account from Ibn al-­Athir, al-­Hasan mounts a brave defense against the Hammadids and their allies, but the day is ultimately won by reinforcements coming from the Normans. Ibn al-­Athir, who frequently foreshadows Norman aggression in his chronicle, also hints at the eventual Norman conquest of Zirid lands by mentioning Roger II’s construction of a fleet. This intervention on the part of Roger II represents a significant departure from the events of previous de­cades, when al-­Hasan formed alliances against the Normans that facilitated coastal raids against their territories. No medieval sources provide an explanation for the shifting alliances in Ifriqiya or al-­Hasan’s decision to seek aid from his onetime rival across the Strait of Sicily. We are therefore forced to speculate that the ever-­changing po­liti­cal landscape of Ifriqiya had shifted once again—­this time to the misfortune of the Zirids, whose loyalty to Muhriz ibn Ziyad caused other lords in the region to feel alienated. So too ­were shaykhs in Mahdia so discontent with the governance of al-­Hasan that they wrote to the Hammadid emir requesting that he invade Zirid lands.39 Al-­Hasan, without Almoravid aid or the help of other nearby allies, was forced to turn to the only other prominent lord in the region, Roger II, to help repel the Hammadid attack. Roger’s decision to intervene on behalf of the Zirid emir was not a s­ imple act of altruism, however, but an opportunistic intervention to further the Normans’ power and protect their commercial interests in the central Mediterranean. The signing of a truce between the Zirids and Normans ­after this ­battle 38. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 529H, 11:17–18. 39. ​The reasons for this internal unrest in Mahdia are unexplored in the sources. It could have been tied to the preferential treatment that al-­Hasan had provided to certain Arab lords or to treaties that the Zirid emir had made with the Normans. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 529H, 11:17– 18; Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis, 90.

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shows that Roger wanted to ensure the continuation of the trading partnership that had been so sorely tested in previous de­cades. In all likelihood, Roger was able to renegotiate what­ever contracts he had in place with the Zirids to ensure better and more lucrative opportunities for Sicilian merchants. Norman intervention on behalf of the Zirids thus provided Roger with the leverage he needed to ensure f­ uture Zirid cooperation and advantageous commercial contracts in Ifriqiya. Al-­Hasan’s plea for aid also gave Roger a pretense for expanding his own domains in Ifriqiya. Following his intervention at Mahdia, a Norman fleet attacked and conquered the island of Djerba, which had long been a haven for piracy by the local Ibadi population (according to Zirid and Norman sources).40 Ibn al-­Athir describes how the p­ eople of Djerba had “exceeded the proper bounds such that they w ­ ere not u ­ nder the authority of a sultan and ­were known for wickedness and committing highway robbery.”41 Roger’s decision to come to the aid of al-­Hasan was likely tied to his desire to bring the troublesome island of Djerba u ­ nder his control too—as he had attempted almost a de­cade ­earlier with his attacks on Malta, Gozo, and potentially Djerba itself. This strategic island, which provides access to major port cities in Ifriqiya around the Gulf of Gabès, would come to serve as a base from which Roger II could more closely monitor the affairs of Ifriqiya. News of Roger’s conquest of Djerba soon reached the Eu­ro­pean mainland. In August 1135, Emperor Lothair II held a court at Merseburg (modern-­day Germany), where a Byzantine lord and priest along with Venetian envoys beseeched the court to take action against Roger. They argued that Roger had “conquered Africa, which is known to be the third part of the world, from the king of Greece” and usurped the royal name t­here.42 The delegates then promised to send a fleet to assist the armies of Lothair II should he undertake an expedition 40. ​The Djerbans’ reputation for piracy was likely tied to Ibn Shaddad’s hatred of the Ibadi community of Muslims on Djerba. E ­ arlier Zirid attacks against the Ibadis show that the dynasty strug­gled to keep them ­under its control. Al-­Idrisi likewise notes the difficulty of keeping the Djerbans ­under Norman rule. The sandbanks around the island make it perilous for ships to attack; it is even pos­si­ble at low tide for camels to cross to the island from mainland Ifriqiya. Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:305–6; Virginie Prevost, “La chaussée d’al-­Qantara, pont entre Djerba et le continent,” in Autour de la géographie orientale . . . ​et au-­delà: En l’honneur de J. Thiry, ed. L. Denooz and X. Luffin (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2006), 165–88. On the Ibadis, see Gabriel Baer, “al-­Ibāḍiyya,” EI2; Tadeusz Lewicki, Les ibadites en Tunisie au moyen âge (Rome: Signerelli, 1959); Valerie Hoffman, The Essentials of Ibadi Islam (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012); Martin H. Custers, Al-­Ibāḍiyya: A Bibliography, 2nd ed. (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag AG, 2017). 41. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 529H, 11:18. The Tristia ex Melitogaudo somewhat corroborates this. It states that the Normans “threshed the impudence of Djerba that vaunted herself above ­every race by its evils.” ­Whether this is an allusion to piracy or religious heterodoxy is unclear. Busuttil et al., Tristia ex Melitogaudo, 171. 42. ​ Monumenta Erphesfurtenses, MGH, SS rer. Germ., 42:171–72.

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against Roger. Although the Norman king held only Djerba and a series of Mediterranean islands at the time of this council, the extent of his conquests was perceived differently by the Venetians and Byzantines, who sought to emphasize (or exaggerate) their scope in order to spur the German emperor to action. Indeed, this plea was sufficient to persuade the Germans to launch a coordinated campaign with their allies in Italy to impede the Normans.

The Expansion of Norman Power in the Mediterranean From roughly 1135 to 1142, medieval sources rec­ord few direct interactions between the Norman and Zirid courts. Instead, both groups jockeyed with other Mediterranean powers to expand their influence. For Roger II, this meant securing southern Italy, scheming in the principality of Antioch, and maintaining friendly relations with the Fatimid caliphate. The Zirids u ­ nder al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli w ­ ere less successful in their plans for expansion, as they continued to clash with their Hammadid rivals over f­ avor with the Fatimid court. The beginnings of a catastrophic drought in Ifriqiya further weakened the dynasty and contributed to the decision of the Normans to attack Mahdia in 536H (1141–42). This campaign marked the beginning of nearly annual campaigns in Ifriqiya that spanned most of the 1140s and resulted in the fall of the Zirid dynasty. Roger II’s capture of Djerba in 529H (1134–35) was an outlier in his Mediterranean policy during the 1130s. For the greater part of this de­cade, Roger committed his resources to southern Italy, where he fought against a host of rival lords. T ­ hese campaigns attracted the attention of the German emperor Lothair II, who thought that he had an ancestral right to southern Italy and thus sent an army to the peninsula in 1137 to combat the advancing Normans.43 This expedition was undertaken with the support of Pope Innocent II and comprised an army led by Lothair, a Pisan navy, and auxiliary forces from Roger’s opponents on the Italian mainland. Although Roger initially tried to negotiate with Lothair, his efforts proved fruitless, and the German army conquered a number of cities in Italy, most prominently Salerno, which surrendered on Roger’s order in August 1137. The capture of Salerno ultimately proved fateful to the expedition. The Pisans found the terms of the city’s surrender unfavorable to them, so they removed themselves from the expedition and signed a peace treaty with 43. ​The main sources for this invasion are the Annalista Saxo, Annales Cavenses, Annales Pisani, Regesta imperii, and the chronicles of Otto of Freising, Hugo Falcandus, and Romuald of Salerno. The campaign is summarized in Houben, Ruler between East and West, 66–73.

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Roger. Without a supporting navy, Lothair subsequently withdrew from the peninsula. With this invading army gone, Roger brought his army to the Italian mainland in late 1137 and began to conquer the cities he had lost. He made favorable concessions to cities that had remained loyal to him during the campaigns. For example, he provided the merchants of Salerno with trading rights equal to ­those that Sicilian merchants enjoyed in the city of Alexandria.44 The success of ­these conquests did not sit well with Pope Innocent II, whose support of Lothair II against Roger had widened the divide between the papacy and Kingdom of Sicily. Two years ­after the withdrawal of German soldiers from Italy, in 1139, Innocent personally led an army against Roger. The result was a decisive Norman victory in which Roger’s forces ambushed the papal army and captured Innocent. It was u ­ nder this duress that the pope recognized Roger II as the king of Sicily, of the duchy of Apulia, and of the principality of Capua.45 Armed with the papal recognition that he had long sought, Roger brought ­under his authority ­those cities in Italy that had resisted him. By mid-1140, the entirety of Italy south and east of the Papal States belonged to Roger and his sons. While conducting ­these campaigns, Roger schemed once again to bring Antioch ­under his control. He had already tried and failed to inherit the Kingdom of Jerusalem through his ­mother’s marriage to King Baldwin I and to usurp the Principality of Antioch by hindering the arrival of its legitimate successor, Raymond of Poitiers. The opportunity for Roger to insert himself into the affairs of Antioch a second time presented itself when a cleric from southern Italy named Arnulf persuaded him that the city’s patriarch, Ralph of Domfront, had been responsible for helping to bring Raymond to power.46 When Ralph traveled to Rome and southern Italy, Roger therefore had him arrested and his property confiscated. Ralph, however, was a gifted orator. He managed to convince Roger that he was actually on terrible terms with Raymond of Poitiers and that he would support the Norman lord should he seek the throne of Antioch. It was well within Ralph’s power, for example, to annul the marriage between Raymond and Constance (the ­daughter of the previous lord of the city) on the grounds that she was underage when the marriage 44. ​Brühl, Rogerii II diplomata, document 46. The letter between the Fatimid imam-­caliph al-­Hafiz and Roger II likely confirms ­these trading privileges, as it mentions how ships of Roger II, George of Antioch, and two ambassadors ­were to receive exemption from import and export taxes. As Canard suggests, the two ambassadors very well could have been from Salerno. Canard, “Une lettre du calife,” 133–34. 45. ​Technically, the duchy of Apulia and principality of Capua ­were given to Roger II’s sons, Roger and Alfonso, although it was clear that the lords of t­ hese two territories ­were subservient to Roger II. 46. ​William of Tyre, PL, 201:624–627. The life of Ralph of Domfront is explored in Bernard Hamilton, “Ralph of Domfront, Patriarch of Antioch (1135–40),” Nottingham Medieval Studies 28 (1984): 1–21.

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was solemnized. On returning to the Latin East, however, Ralph was unable to win over the nobility of Antioch. His eventual imprisonment effectively put an end to Roger II’s latest attempt to take the city. Although the court at Palermo failed to establish a foothold in the Latin East, the Norman administration continued to maintain productive ties with the Fatimid caliphate, spurred by the friendship between their respective administrators, George of Antioch and Bahram. The importance of this relationship is revealed in a letter sent by the Fatimid imam-caliph al-­Hafiz to Roger II in late 1137 or early 1138. The letter survives t­ oday in a l­ater transcription by Mamluk historian al-­Qalqashandi that showcases how the Fatimid chancery corresponded with foreign powers.47 The content of this letter indicates that it was one of many exchanged between t­hese two dynasties. In it, al-­Hafiz acknowledges the Norman attack on the island of Djerba in 529H (1134–35), which Roger II had evidently mentioned in a previous letter. Al-­Hafiz does not criticize Roger for taking the island but instead suggests that Roger had done him a ­favor by destroying this refuge of pirates. He then thanks Roger for intervening on behalf of his personal trading vessel, which a Sicilian admiral protected a­ fter it was erroneously seized. In return for this generosity, al-­Hafiz ordered that his admirals give the same protection to Roger’s ships as they would to his own, and that import/export taxes be waived for any ships belonging to Roger, George of Antioch, and two ambassadors (potentially from Salerno). Al-­Hafiz also acknowledges Roger’s previous thanks for releasing some Sicilian captives and notes that this is a generosity he would not bestow on any other Christian king.48 ­These niceties aside, the bulk of this letter concerns the treatment of Bahram, the Armenian vizier who had been so essential in promoting amicable relations between the Fatimids and Normans. When al-­Hafiz sent this letter, Bahram had been ousted as vizier by a Muslim governor named Ridwan ibn Walakhshi and was being confined in a monastery in Cairo.49 Roger had requested in a previous letter that Bahram be freed. The lengthy response from al-­Hafiz, which Johns argues was prob­ably written by Ridwan ibn Walakhshi himself, details Bahram’s crimes and promises that a trustworthy person from the Fatimid court ­will visit Sicily to expand on its contents. In short, the Fatimid administration was unwilling to f­ ree Bahram.50 47. ​Al-­Qalqashandi, Subh al-­Aʿsha (Cairo: al-­Muʾassasa al-­Misriyya, 1964), 5–6:458–63. My analy­sis of this letter echoes that of Canard and Johns. Canard, “Une lettre du calife”; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 258–67. 48. ​Al-­Qalqashandi, Subh al-­Aʿsha, 5–6:459–61. 49. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 261–62; Catlos, Infidel Kings and Unholy Warriors, 207–12. 50. ​The letter concludes with a panegyric devoted to Ridwan, the ac­cep­tance of a Sicilian scribe’s apology for writing the incorrect caliphal title in a previous letter, the acknowl­edgment that Roger’s

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The Norman administration’s concern for the well-­being of Bahram shows the centrality of the personal relationship between him and George of Antioch to the larger Norman-­Fatimid dynamic. It might also indicate larger Norman ambitions in Antioch. Since Bahram and George ­were both from the same larger Antiochene kinship network, Roger’s intervention on behalf of Bahram could have been tied to his larger ambitions in the city. With Bahram on his side, Roger could have potentially leveraged to his own advantage any po­liti­cal power that Bahram had e­ ither as a member of the Fatimid government, as a member of the Antiochene nobility, or as an ethnic Armenian with a substantial cohort of followers.51 Johns speculates that “it is not difficult to imagine how interested Roger, his Antiochene vizier, and Bahram might all have been in such a scheme.”52 This letter to the Fatimids can potentially be viewed as yet another scheme by Roger II to cultivate his own power in the Principality of Antioch. Turning to Ifriqiya, al-­Hafiz’s letter also proves that the Fatimids w ­ ere aware of the Normans’ conquest of Djerba and even looked on it favorably. As with many of the Normans’ other diplomatic relationships in the Mediterranean, economic considerations w ­ ere at the heart of this par­tic­u­lar interaction. The Fatimids supported the Norman attack on Djerba ­because it eliminated pirates who sought to interrupt maritime commerce and provided prisoners destined for Egyptian markets.53 This latter consideration is apparent in a letter from the Cairo Geniza, which states that “­there arrived the prisoners of Djerba” in Egypt on October 14, 1136, including a captive cantor named Isaac ibn Ṣedaqa, who was sold to an Egyptian individual.54 Norman attacks in the central Mediterranean both eliminated piracy that interfered with Fatimid trade and provided slaves to be sold in Fatimid markets. Even though the Fatimids had a claim to Djerba through their Zirid vassals, this theoretical claim to power was worth less to them than the promise of commercial wealth. gifts to the Fatimids had arrived safely, and a statement about al-­Hafiz’s desire to receive more news about Sicily. Al-­Qalqashandi, Subh al-­Aʿsha, 5–6:462–63. 51. ​Dadoyan, Fatimid Armenians, 99–101. 52. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 263. The connection between Roger II, the Fatimid court, and his ambitions in Antioch was not lost on the seventeenth-­century historian Ibn Abi Dinar. Although his narrative is not supported in any con­temporary medieval sources, he wrote that that Roger II’s expeditions “stretched to the East” and that he even “conquered Antioch.” It is pos­si­ble that Ibn Abi Dinar was confusing Roger II with one of his Hauteville relatives like Tancred, who was deeply involved in the internal politics of the Crusader states. Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis, 89. 53. ​On Djerban piracy and the Fatimids, see Canard, “Une lettre du calife,” 129–31; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 260. 54. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 324; Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:117–18.

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Despite substantial military investment in southern Italy, Roger II had not lost sight of affairs abroad during the 1130s. His opportunistic attack on Djerba in 529H (1134–35), scheming in the Principality of Antioch, and negotiations with the Fatimid caliphate show his continued investment in the greater Mediterranean. Across the Strait of Sicily, the actions and motivations of the Zirid emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, are difficult to divine. None of the surviving primary sources detail the fate of the Zirids or Hammadids from 529H to 535H (1134–41).55 Still, entries from Arabic chronicles describing the early 1140s provide a glimpse at mounting tensions between t­hese Ifriqiyan dynasties, which would l­ ater devolve into conflict. In 536H (1141–42), a Hammadid prince sent gifts to the Fatimid imam-caliph on board a ship that was in the port of Alexandria.56 The Fatimid imam-caliph received t­ hese pre­sents favorably and subsequently loaded the Hammadid vessel with gifts of his own (alongside goods from other merchants) before the ship returned to Bougie. Also in the port of Alexandria at this time was a Zirid ship. When the two vessels tried to leave Alexandria, a Fatimid port official s­ topped the Zirid ship from leaving and permitted the Hammadid one to depart. Ibn ʿIdhari notes that the Fatimid official ­stopped the departure of the Zirid ship ­because he wanted to facilitate a closer Hammadid-­Fatimid relationship and b­ ecause of rumors of tensions between the Fatimid imam-caliph and his Zirid vassals.57 When news reached al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli of this incident, he assumed that it was the result of Hammadid scheming. The Zirid emir retaliated by capturing the Hammadid ship (presumably as it was passing through Zirid w ­ aters) and repurposing it for his own fleet. This episode provides some indication of the diplomatic posturing that occurred in Ifriqiya following the Norman conquest of Djerba in 529H (1134–35). Despite the lack of rec­ords of vio­lence in ­these years between the Zirids and Hammadids, the relationship between the two dynasties was tense as both looked to increase their power through their interactions with Fatimid Egypt.58 55. ​Environmental data for ­these years indicates consistently wet summers and, based on no evidence to the contrary, adequate harvests. Old World Drought Atlas, 1134–40 (hereafter cited as OWDA). 56. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:346; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 339–40. 57. ​The Fatimids’ desire to conduct trade with the ports of North Africa makes sense given the po­liti­cal turmoil in Egypt at this time. The Fatimid caliph al-­Hafiz had emerged triumphant against rebellions in 1134 and 1137. By 1141, al-­Hafiz had stabilized his rule and sought to promote trade out of Egypt. Michael Brett, “Abbasids, Fatimids and Seljuqs,” in Luscombe and Riley-­Smith, New Cambridge Medieval History, 4.2:716. 58. ​Commerce between the Hammadids and Fatimids could indicate that the Hammadids had renounced their allegiance to the Sunni Abbasids and, like the Zirids, reverted to Shiʿism and allegiance

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The role of the Fatimid official who permitted the blockade of the Zirid vessel remains a mystery. Fagnan and Idris speculate that he might have been working in secret for the Hammadids, which is perhaps the most likely explanation for this episode, in the absence of further evidence.59 Assuming this is true, we are confronted with an encounter in which the Hammadids actively undermined Zirid commercial interests in the eastern Mediterranean; the Zirid response to this collusion was to seize the Hammadid vessel.60 This episode between the Hammadids and Zirids was soon overshadowed by a much greater threat to Zirid autonomy. ­Later in 536H (likely the spring/ early summer of 1142), George of Antioch attacked the port of Mahdia. The Norman fleet seized a number of Zirids vessels, including the one that al-­ Hasan had seized from the Hammadids, but s­ topped short of trying to capture the city proper.61 This raid left al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli in a less-­than-​desirable position. Shortly ­after the attack, the Zirid emir was forced to contact Roger so that grain could be transported between Sicily and Ifriqiya, which at the time was suffering from the beginning of a deadly famine (discussed below). This brief encounter shows that the Normans had undoubtedly emerged as the more power­ful dynasty in the central Mediterranean by the early 1140s. The Zirids ­were reliant on Norman grain for their own survival and ­were unable to stop the Normans from inserting themselves into Ifriqiyan affairs. Roger II, meanwhile, had e­ very motivation to assert greater control in Ifriqiya, as that would allow the Normans si­mul­ta­neously to negotiate advantageous trade contracts, to exact revenge on the Zirids for their previous transgressions, and to further remove threats of piracy from the Ifriqiyan coast. According to Ibn al-­Athir, the Norman raid on Mahdia in 536H (1141–42) was met with a sense of betrayal in the Zirid court, for Roger II had broken to the Fatimids. The timeline for this reversal of loyalties is unclear, though it is plausible that it happened shortly ­after the relocation of the Hammadids to Bougie in the 1050s. 59. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Histoire de l’Afrique et de l’Espagne intitulée al-­Bayano’l-­Mogrib, trans. E. Fagnan, 1:460; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:347. 60. ​The Fatimids’ ability to retaliate militarily against the Zirids and Hammadids for their transgressions had been hindered since the beginning of the twelfth c­ entury. In 1105, the Fatimid navy lost twenty-­five ships and two thousand sailors when a storm drove its fleet to the shores of the Levant and into the hands of the Franks. Then, in 1123, the Venetians defeated a Fatimid fleet near the city of al-­ʿArish. Yaacov Lev, “A Mediterranean Encounter: The Fatimids and Eu­rope, Tenth to Twelfth Centuries,” in Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval Mediterranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor, ed. Ruthy Gertwagen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2012), 137. 61. ​Ibn ʿIdhari alone mentions a Norman attack on Tripoli in 537H (1142–43), which other chronicles date to 541H (1146–47). Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:436; Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 240.

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treaties between the two dynasties.62 In all likelihood, Ibn al-­Athir was referring to the most recent iteration of t­hese treaties, forged a­ fter the Zirid-­ Norman victory at Mahdia in 529H (1134–35). T ­ hese contracts therefore must have theoretically guaranteed the safety of Zirid vessels from Norman aggression, or at least included provisions about the Normans not interfering in Ifriqiyan commerce. They also likely mandated joint cooperation when Zirid lands w ­ ere threatened, for Roger II l­ater campaigned in Ifriqiya ostensibly on behalf of the Zirids (as discussed below). Al-­Tijani’s account corroborates that of Ibn al-­Athir. He describes how Roger had stationed jawāsīs (spies or agents) in Mahdia who wrote to him about the weakness of the Zirid navy and about commerce in the city, so that Roger could strike at the most opportune moment.63 Reports from ­these spies led the Normans to raid the city—an attack that was the first of many, culminating in the conquest of Mahdia in 543H (1148–49). This encounter shows that much had changed between the Normans and Zirids since the 1120s. The pressure that al-­Hasan had been able to exert over the Zirids through his alliances with the Almoravids and local Arab lords was gone. Instead, we see a Zirid dynasty that the Normans could bully with impunity. What had caused this dramatic change? The first f­ actor was the stabilization of the Kingdom of Sicily following Roger II’s second coronation in 1139 and the completion of his conquests in southern Italy.64 With his realm firmly intact, Roger could reap the economic, military, and po­liti­cal benefits of ruling over one of the most prosperous regions of the Mediterranean. The treaty that the Normans struck with Savona provided the foundation for expanding the Norman navy by requisitioning ships. When the conquest of southern Italy was complete, Roger could use t­ hese ships to bully the Zirids and, at the same time, expand his own navy by seizing Zirid vessels. Meanwhile, the Zirids w ­ ere unable to compete with the ascendant Normans. Their alliance with the Almoravids dis­appeared during the 1120s as the Almoravids had to devote increasing resources to combat the upstart Almohads in the Maghreb. Local Ifriqiyan lords, too, ­were unwilling to support the Zirids in the wake of the joint Zirid-­Norman victory at Mahdia in 529H (1134–35). ­These disadvantageous po­liti­cal developments during the 1130s ­were complemented by environmental catastrophe in the 1140s. It had long been 62. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 536H, 11:47. 63. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 340. 64. ​Loud, “Norman Sicily in the Twelfth ­Century,” 452.

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commonplace for lords in Ifriqiya to import grain from Sicily into their cities during times of conflict and drought (this is testified across much of the eleventh ­century), but this exchange had been a mutually beneficial one through which Sicilian merchants ­were supplied with goods like olive oil and gold.65 Benjamin of Tudela, a Jewish rabbi who visited Sicily in the 1170s, summarizes this commercial relationship: “Sicily’s main export is wheat, of which most goes to North Africa. In times of commotion in North Africa, when Muslims fight among themselves or when Muslim lands are set upon by Berbers or by pagan tribes, the consequent food shortages ­there swell Sicily’s coffers with the tax on grain exports.”66 This commercial dynamic described by Benjamin of Tudela collapsed during the 1140s, when a prolonged drought in Ifriqiya from 537H (1142–43) to 543H (1148–49) devastated agricultural production, caused massive depopulation, and depleted the trea­suries of local lords. No longer able to purchase Sicilian grain without loans or some other form of financial consideration, the Zirids and their neighbors ­were vulnerable to the ascendent and aggressive Normans. The significance of the famine was such that it is described by all of the major Arabic sources that chronicle the Zirid dynasty in the twelfth ­century—­Ibn al-­Athir, Ibn Khaldun, al-­Tijani, and Ibn ʿIdhari. Of t­hese authors, Ibn al-­Athir provides the most detail for the scope of the famine in an entry for the year 542H (1147–48): “This year ­there was a famine in Ifriqiya, which lasted a long time. It had begun in the year 537H (1142–43). It had a terrible effect on the population, who even resorted to cannibalism. ­Because of starvation the nomads sought the towns, and the townspeople closed the gates against them. Plague and g­ reat mortality followed. The country was emptied and from w ­ hole families not a single person survived. Many p­ eople traveled to Sicily in search of food and met with ­g reat hardship.”67 The descriptions by other Arabic chroniclers complement the picture painted by Ibn al-­Athir. The chronicle of Ibn ʿIdhari mentions a “massive famine” in Ifriqiya.68 Ibn Khaldun similarly reports a mass migration of ­people from Ifriqiya to Sicily and, in Ifriqiya, cannibalism and mortality rates such that the dead outnumbered the living.69 Al-­Tijani likewise refers to many p­ eople d­ ying 65. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:655–56, 665–68; Brett, “Ifriqiya as a Market,” 348–49. 66. ​Benjamin of Tudela, The World of Benjamin of Tudela: A Medieval Mediterranean Travelogue, ed. Sandra Benjamin (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1995), 278. 67. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:63. Translation is from Richards, Chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir, 2:16–17. 68. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:347. 69. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:233.

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from a “­g reat calamity” that aided Roger II’s attack on Tripoli in 541H (1146–47).70 The uniformity of the Arabic sources in describing this famine gives some sense about its cataclysmic impact on p­ eople living in Ifriqiya during the 1140s.71 Lest we think that ­these above accounts ­were exaggerating or using tropes like cannibalism to highlight the extent of drought, environmental data supports the descriptions of the drought given by the likes of Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun. Data from the Old World Drought Atlas (OWDA) indicates the cause of this famine and helps to quantify its scope in the 1140s.72 According to the OWDA, e­ very summer from 1143 through 1149 in Ifriqiya is classified as “moderate” to “extreme” drought according to the Palmer Drought Severity Index metric.73 Per this metric, a result of “0” indicates an average amount of rainfall for a given region. Ascending numbers from 0 indicate progressively more rainfall and descending numbers progressively less rainfall. The map below shows composite data from 1143 to 1149, which highlights the per­sis­tence and severity of drought in Ifriqiya during this time period.

70. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241. 71. ​The personal stories of ­those who suffered from drought in Ifriqiya are largely lost, but a glimpse of the kind of desperation that this catastrophe facilitated can be found in the ­legal rulings of al-­Mazari. In one case, al-­Mazari mediated a conflict that revolved around a w ­ oman seeking to sell her jewelry in Sicily in exchange for wheat. W ­ hether this w ­ oman was desperate for wheat of her own or e­ ager to exploit vulnerable Ifriqiyan markets, this evidence points to the widespread need for Sicilian grain in Ifriqiya during times of drought. Al-­Wansharisi, Al-­Miʿyar al-­Muʿrib, 8:208. See also Sarah Davis-­Secord, “Muslims in Norman Sicily: The Evidence of Imam al-­Mazari’s Fatwas,” Mediterranean Studies 16 (2007): 61–62. Documents from the Greek monastery of St. George’s of Tròccoli (near Caltabellotta in southwest Sicily) show that Ifriqiyan immigrants from a handful of cities w ­ ere pre­sent in Sicily by 1141. It is likely, though, that ­these mi­g rants arrived in Sicily before this famine occurred. Vera von Falkenhausen, Nadia Jamil, and Jeremy Johns, “The Twelfth-­ Century Documents of St.  George’s of Tròccoli Sicily,” Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 16 (2016): 30. 72. ​This dataset comes from tree rings (a field called dendrochronology). On this discipline, both generally and in its North African context, see Fritz Hans Schweingruber, Tree Rings: Basics and Applications of Dendrochronology (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1989); Ramzi Touchan, D. M. Meko, and A. Aloui, “Precipitation Reconstruction for Northwestern Tunisia from Tree Rings,” Journal of Arid Environments, no. 72 (2008): 1887–96; James Speer, Fundamentals of Tree-­Ring Research (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010). 73. ​Data from the OWDA uses the JJA ( June–­July–­August) PDSI metric to mea­sure relative rainfall, which is common in the field of dendrochronology. William Alley, “The Palmer Drought Severity Index: Limitations and Assumptions,” Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology 23 ( July 1984): 1100–1109; T. R. Heddinghaus and P. Sabol, “A Review of the Palmer Drought Severity Index and Where Do We Go from H ­ ere?,” in Proceedings, 7th Conference on Applied Climatology (Boston: American Meteorological Association, 1991), 242–46; Nathan Wells, Steve Goddard, and Michael Hayes, “A Self-­Calibrating Palmer Drought Severity Index,” Journal of Climate 17 ( June 2004): 2335–51.

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Figure 3.  Map of rainfall in Ifriqiya and Sicily from 1143 to 1149 CE using ( JJA) PDSI. Old World Drought Atlas, http://­drought​.­memphis​.­edu​/­OWDA​/­, based on data from Cook et al., “Old World Megadroughts and Pluvials during the Common Era,” Science Advances 1, no. 10 (November 2015): 1–9.

When this data is combined with medieval sources, the environmental and humanitarian catastrophe in Ifriqiya becomes clear.74 Lack of rainfall in Ifriqiya created unfavorable conditions for growing crops across the region for much of the 1140s. This unusually dry weather caused crop failures and forced ­people to rely on imports of grain from Sicily, which drove up prices and stretched the limits of local economies.75 Although families may have been able to afford 74. ​This map was created through the Tree-­Ring Drought Atlas Portal at the University of Memphis. It is easier to discern differences in relative rainfall when viewing ­these maps in color. The above black-­and-­white map can be replicated at OWDA, http://­drought​.­memphis​.­edu​/­OWDA​/­Composite​ .­aspx. This data is derived from Cook et al., “Old World Megadroughts.” 75. ​Accounts from a 1311 famine in Djerba may provide some sense of how ­people coped with drought in ­earlier centuries—­for instance, by using sawdust from palm trees to make bread. Numerous anecdotes in l­ater Ibadi sources about nourishment, food, and scarcity show how pervasive the thought of drought was in the region. Virginie Prevost, “Nourritures médiévales: L’alimentation au

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foodstuffs to accommodate for one or two poor harvests, the per­sis­tence of this drought drove them to the brink. When their savings w ­ ere exhausted from inflated prices, they had l­ittle choice but to move elsewhere or starve. Nomads from inland Ifriqiya, whose voices are largely unrecorded in con­temporary chronicles but who must have also felt the consequences of this drought, moved to cities, and t­hose who could afford to traveled elsewhere in the Mediterranean—­primarily to nearby Sicily, which conversely had generally favorable climatic conditions for crop yields during the 1140s. It is likely that the Zirid emirs needed to take out loans from the Normans in order to feed their royal court, which indicates that the once-­substantial trea­sury of the dynasty had been depleted.76 This change in climate aligns with a substantial change in Norman policy ­toward Ifriqiya. Beginning with their expedition against Mahdia in 536H (1141–42) and extending through 543H (1148–49), the Normans launched attacks against vari­ous cities in Ifriqiya on an almost annual basis. Through ­these campaigns, the Normans conquered much of coastal Ifriqiya, bringing an end to the vari­ous dynasties that ruled ­there—­including the Zirids.

The Formation of the Norman Kingdom of Africa The Normans’ first campaign ­after their attack on Mahdia came one year ­later, in 537H (1142–43) against the city of Tripoli. The most detailed accounts of the attack come from the Arabic chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir and the Latin Ferraris Chronicle, which diverge on the motivations for the Norman attack but agree on its outcome. According to Ibn al-­Athir, Roger II attacked Tripoli ­because it had been “rebellious t­oward al-­Hasan” in defiantly installing a new governor.77 Maghreb d’après les sources ibadites (xie–­xiiie siècle),” in Travelling through Time: Essays in Honour of Kaj Öhrnberg, ed. Sylvia Akar, Jaakko Hämeen-­Anttila, and Inka Nokso-­Koivisto (Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2013), 401–17. 76. ​Ibn Abi Dinar notes that al-­Hasan was unable to pay back Roger’s agents for money that the Norman king had loaned to him, which led to “coldness” between the two. This statement is likely an inference made from Ibn Abi Dinar’s reading of Ibn al-­Athir and al-­Tijani. Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis, 93. 77. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 537H, 11:47–48. See also al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 173–74, and Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232. Although it was located on an impor­tant trade route that linked Egypt to Ifriqiya and the Maghreb, “virtually nothing” is known of the city in the years preceding the Norman attack. ­There are even conflicting reports from the Arabic chronicles about the ruling dynasty when the Normans attacked. Al-­Tijani and Ibn Khaldun write that the Banu Khazrun governed the city, while Ibn al-­Athir writes that the Banu Matruh held power ­there. Michael Brett speculates that it is more likely that the Banu Matruh w ­ ere governors of Tripoli at the time of the Norman attack in 1143, b­ ecause they “played a leading part in the re­sis­tance to the Normans of Sicily, in the government of the city by the Normans, and in the freeing of the city from the Normans.” Brett, “City-­State in Medieval Ifriqiya,” 82.

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Acting ostensibly on behalf of his Zirid neighbor, Roger sent a fleet to Tripoli. The Norman navy arrived at the city in June 1143 but was rebuffed from its walls. Soon ­after, the ­people of Tripoli ­were reinforced by a group of unnamed Arabs, and t­hese combined forces defeated the Normans, who w ­ ere forced to flee. The Norman fleet compensated for this loss by sailing west and raiding Jijel, a coastal Hammadid town located in modern-­day Algeria.78 The Ferraris Chronicle (a continuation of the work of Falco of Benevento), meanwhile, describes how “certain citizens of Tripoli” came to Sicily and promised to surrender their city and rule it on behalf of the Norman king.79 Roger obliged and sent forces ­under George of Antioch to besiege the city in 1143. When the Normans arrived at Tripoli, though, the men who had requested Roger’s aid in the first place “acted with treachery” and the siege failed. The Ferraris Chronicle does not mention the subsequent raid on Jijel or any ­f uture Norman campaigns in Africa.80 While the accounts of Ibn al-­Athir and the Ferraris Chronicle thus provide dif­fer­ent motivations for the arrival of the Normans at Tripoli, t­hese divergences are minimal in the larger context of Norman military movements in Ifriqiya. In both accounts, Roger intervenes in Tripoli ­because of po­liti­cal factionalism but is unable to take the city itself. The Norman attack on Tripoli was the second expedition launched against a major Ifriqiyan city in two years. This increasing Norman assertiveness in the region did not escape the eyes of the Fatimid caliphate. Ibn Muyassar reports that the Fatimids dispatched a messenger to Roger in 537H (1142–43) to discuss his recent campaigns against the Zirids (Mahdia), Hammadids ( Jijel), and other Ifriqiyan lords (Tripoli).81 The Fatimids of Cairo, who had previously benefited from the Norman conquest of Djerba, sought to ensure that ­these attacks would similarly help their position. The details of ­these talks are unknown, but the per­sis­tence of Norman campaigns in subsequent years indicates that the two dynasties reached an agreement through which the Normans could conduct annual campaigns in Ifriqiya without fear of Fatimid reprisal. Indeed, the relationship between the Normans and Fatimids remained stable over the next several years, even as George of Antioch led attacks against the Hammadid town of Brashk in 539H (1144–45), the lands around Tripoli in the same year, and the Kerkennah Islands in 540H (1145–46).82 Although 78. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 537H, 11:48. 79. ​Augustus Gaudenzi, ed., Ignoti monachi Cisterciensis S. Mariae de Ferraria chronica et Ryccardi de Sancto Germano (Naples: Presso la Società, 1888), 27. The textual history of this chronicle is considered in Loud, Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, 55–58. 80. ​I am inclined to believe the Arabic sources b­ ecause of their specificity and quantity, and ­because of the Ferraris Chronicle’s general lack of concern with Norman involvement in Africa. 81. ​Ibn Muyassar, Al-­Muntaqa min Akhbar Misr, 134–35. 82. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, years 539H and 540H, 11:51–53, 54–55.

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the Zirids claimed nominal authority over the Kerkennah Islands and protested the Norman conquest of them (which is further evidence of per­sis­tent treaties between the two dynasties), Roger claimed that the p­ eople of the islands ­were not subjects of the Zirid emir. ­These campaigns set the stage for sweeping Norman conquests in Ifriqiya. From 1146 to 1148, Roger II launched annual campaigns in Ifriqiya that resulted in the piecemeal conquest of cities along its coast. During this three-­ year period, Roger avoided conflicts on the Italian Peninsula so that he could focus his military efforts on the southern Mediterranean. According to the Ferraris Chronicle, Roger “conceded and confirmed a truce” with the papacy ­because of his desire “to acquire the African kingdom and Tripoli in Barbary.”83 Around the same time, Roger II narrowly averted conflict with his rivals in Germany, who had finalized a marriage alliance with the Byzantines with the eventual goal of invading southern Italy.84 This nascent alliance failed to act against Roger, however, as the fall of Edessa in 1144 and the subsequent Crusade to retake it led both Conrad III of Germany and Louis VII of France take up the cross. Conrad’s commitment to this expedition averted the threat of a joint attack by the Germans and Byzantines.85 Roger even used the impending Crusade to his advantage. Fearing the arrival of thousands of unruly Frankish and German troops, the Byzantine emperor Manuel I withdrew soldiers from the edges of his kingdom to Constantinople. This allowed George of Antioch to raid more vulnerable Byzantine outposts on the western edge of the Adriatic Sea in the spring of 1147.86 Roger also reached out to the French king Louis VII, offering to provide supplies for Louis’s upcoming Crusade and to send one of his sons on the Crusade if Louis agreed to take his army through the Kingdom of Sicily. By routing Louis through Sicily, Roger hoped to improve his standing with the French monarch and to increase the chance of f­ uture cooperation. What­ever scheming Roger envisioned ultimately went unrealized, as Louis elected to travel through Constantinople instead.87

83. ​Gaudenzi, Ignoti monachi Cisterciensis, 28; Houben, Ruler between East and West, 90–92. 84. ​John Kinnamos reports that a Byzantine envoy named Basil Xeros placed Roger “on an equal plane of greatness” to the emperor Manuel. When Roger’s embassy arrived in Byzantium, though, the emperor treated it as a joke, which infuriated Roger. Romuald of Salerno similarly reports that Roger sent envoys to the emperor but that they w ­ ere imprisoned. Iōannēs Kinnamos, Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus, trans. Charles M. Brand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 75–76; Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:229–30. 85. ​Houben, Ruler between East and West, 88–90. 86. ​A detailed narrative and chronology of t­ hese raids is found in Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 92–97. 87. ​Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem: The Journey of Louis VII to the East, ed. ­Virginia Gingerich Berry (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), 10–15.

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With the threat of a German-­Byzantine alliance gone, the stage was set for Norman conquests of the Ifriqiyan littoral that would form the core of the Norman kingdom of Africa. The first of t­ hese conquests was Tripoli. In the summer of 541H ( June 1146), George of Antioch led a fleet against the city. Unlike in the assault that had taken place several years e­ arlier, this time the Normans had the advantage of arriving in the midst of chaos. A group in Tripoli had expelled the ruling Banu Matruh and appointed an Almoravid as governor. As the Normans laid siege, fighting erupted in the city between factions supporting the Banu Matruh and the Almoravids. This chaos helped the Normans storm Tripoli and capture many inside the city walls.88 ­After the initial sacking of Tripoli, George of Antioch issued a proclamation granting sanctuary for t­hose who had fled, at which point many returned.89 Eventually, the Normans appointed a member of the Banu Matruh to govern Tripoli on their behalf. Roger encouraged immigration to the city and “[its] affairs ­were rectified.”90 The following year, in 542H (1147–48), the Normans attempted to take the city of Gabès. Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun provide the greatest level of detail on this episode.91 In the 1140s, Gabès was ruled by the Banu Dahman. The governor of the city, a man named Rushayd, died in 1147 and left b­ ehind two sons, Muhammad and Muʿammar. Although Muʿammar was the older son and the expected successor to Rushayd, one of Rushayd’s advisers named Yusuf expelled him and installed the younger Muhammad as governor, effectively giving Yusuf control over the city. Over time, however, Yusuf grew unpop­u­ lar in Gabès ­because of his reputation for molesting the ­women of Rushayd’s harem, one of whom was a member of the Banu Qurra tribe. When her ­brothers living outside Gabès heard of this situation, they set out to retrieve her. Yusuf refused to give her up, however, so the members of the Banu Qurra united with the exiled b­ rother Muʿammar and complained to emir al-­Hasan about Yusuf. The Zirid emir attempted to mediate ­these rising tensions but was unsuccessful. Yusuf responded to this nascent alliance between the Zirids and Banu Qurra by offering his allegiance to Roger II. The Norman king accepted Yusuf ’s offer, which once again set the stage for conflict with the Zirids. Both Yusuf and 88. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241. 89. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232, 6:223. He places this attack in the year 540H (1145–46) in the latter citation and in the year 541H (1146–47) in the former. I prefer the date of 541H (1146–47) due to its corroboration in other sources. 90. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55. 91. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:61; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232–33.

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al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli sent envoys to Sicily to explain their sides of the developing situation. According to Ibn al-­Athir, Yusuf ’s envoy spoke negatively of al-­Hasan and blamed him for the diplomatic crisis at hand. When al-­Hasan heard about this accusation, he intercepted the ill-­speaking envoy on his way back to Gabès. He paraded the envoy on a camel through Mahdia as a crier proclaimed, “This is the recompense for anyone who tries to make the Franks lords of Muslim lands.”92 The ­people of Mahdia then stoned the envoy to death. In the wake of this execution, al-­Hasan and Muʿammar attacked Gabès. This attack was supported by the ­people of Gabès, who w ­ ere already in the midst of revolting ­because of Yusuf ’s submission to Roger. Al-­Hasan was welcomed into the city, and he promptly executed Yusuf. The Banu Qurra took their s­ ister away from the harem, Muʿammar became the governor of Gabès, and Yusuf ’s b­ rother, ʿIsa, fled to Sicily. This incident at Gabès reveals much about the po­liti­cal landscape of Ifriqiya in the midst of the Normans’ conquests. Although Roger II had subjugated Tripoli and a number of islands in the central Mediterranean by 542H (1147–48), local rulers ­were still able to resist the growing power of the Normans by making regional alliances, as shown through the combined strength of al-­ Hasan ibn ʿAli, the Banu Qurra, and the p­ eople of Gabès. Conversely, this episode also shows the extent to which Roger II had become something of a power broker in Ifriqiya. Yusuf sought the Normans’ protection from al-­Hasan and his allies, knowing that Roger had the strength to resist them. When al-­ Hasan and Yusuf sent envoys to the Kingdom of Sicily, they did so ­because of the power that Roger asserted in Ifriqiya and their desire to remain in his good graces. Although al-­Hasan had demonstrable power, the outside influence of the Kingdom of Sicily was impossible to ignore. The dynastic strug­gle in Gabès, although clearly precipitated by familial politics, was also exacerbated by environmental turmoil. Ibn al-­Athir reports that the famine in Ifriqiya in the summer of 542H (1147) was the worst since the beginning of the drought. Data from the Old World Drought Atlas provides some context for this famine, for it is in this year that extreme drought (as quantified by the Palmer Drought Severity Index) stretched across Ifriqiya and the eastern Maghreb. Amid this drought and po­liti­cal unrest, the Normans resumed their campaigning a year l­ater, in 543H (1148–49), with the conquest of Mahdia and a handful of other nearby cities.93 According to Ibn al-­Athir, Roger knew of 92. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:61–62. 93. ​OWDA 1147. This map was created through the visualization software provided by the University of Memphis at http://­drought​.­memphis​.­edu​/­OWDA​/­SingleYearRecon​.­aspx, with data derived from Cook et al., “Old World Megadroughts.”

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Figure 4.  Map of rainfall in Ifriqiya and Sicily in 1147 CE using ( JJA) PDSI. Old World Drought Atlas, http://­drought​.­memphis​.­edu​/­OWDA/ based on data from Cook et al., “Old World Megadroughts and Pluvials during the Common Era,” Science Advances 1, no. 10 (November 2015): 1–9.

the devastating drought afflicting Ifriqiya and was angry at himself for not using the chaos at Gabès as justification for conquering other lands in Ifri­ qiya.94 In the summer of 1148, therefore, he sent out George of Antioch with a fleet to conquer Mahdia from al-­Hasan.95 First, George captured a Zirid ship off the island of Pantelleria and sent out messenger pigeons with fake messages saying that the Norman fleet was sailing to Constantinople. George intended to launch a sneak attack on the city ­under cover of night, but this plan was thwarted by unfavorable winds. The Norman fleet thus sailed to 94. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:63. 95. ​The Annales Siculi states that this attack happened in 1149, but it is contradicted in e­ very other source that considers the conquest of Mahdia. This text was initially thought to have been an appendix to the chronicle of eleventh-­century chronicler Geoffrey Malaterra, but now it is more commonly read as a work that merely drew heavi­ly on Malaterra. Charles Stanton, “Anonymus Vaticanus: Another Source for the Normans in the South?,” Haskins Society Journal 24 (2013): 79–94.

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Mahdia on the morning of 2 Safar 543H ( June 22, 1148). George sent to al-­ Hasan a message saying that his fleet was seeking revenge for the removal of Muhammad ibn Rushayd from Gabès. He asked that al-­Hasan assist the Normans with reinstalling Muhammad in accordance with their treaties. Al-­ Hasan responded by convening a council of leading scholars and nobles to discuss the dire situation at hand. Although the council urged al-­Hasan to fight the Normans, al-­Hasan de­cided that it was in the p­ eople’s best interests to abandon the city. Ibn al-­Athir reports his rationale: I am scared that he is g­ oing to disembark, encircle us by land and by sea, and block us from supplies. We do not have food to support us for a month. We ­will be seized by force. I reckon that saving Muslims from capture and death is more virtuous than ruling. [George of Antioch] asked from me an army against Gabès. If I do this, then I am not allowed to aid unbelievers against Muslims. But if I refuse, he w ­ ill say, “The peace between us is destroyed.” [George of Antioch] only wants to hinder us ­until he can bar us from the land. We do not have the energy to fight him. My judgment is that we set out with [our] ­family and ­children and leave the city. ­Those who want to do as we do should hasten with us.96 Following this council, al-­Hasan ordered Mahdia’s inhabitants to evacuate the city with their families and what­ever they could carry. Most followed his order, although some de­cided to hide with Christians and in churches. Near the end of the day, the winds turned and permitted the Norman fleet to set sail to Mahida, which they entered without re­sis­tance.97 Norman soldiers sacked Mahdia for two hours before George of Antioch declared safe passage for ­those wishing to return to the city, provided they pay a tax.98 As in Tripoli, this (relative) generosity prompted many ­people to return unharmed. The Norman conquest of Mahdia was only the beginning of George’s campaigns that summer. Soon ­after taking the city, George of Antioch sent out fleets against the nearby ports of Sousse and Sfax.99 Sousse capitulated without re­sis­tance on 12 Safar 543H ( July 2, 1148).100 The ­people of Sfax, however, 96. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:64. 97. ​Ibn ʿIdhari refers to the capture of Mahdia as an “atrocious” (al-­shanʿāʾ) occurrence. Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:347. 98. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:233. 99. ​Ibn ʿIdhari is alone in suggesting that Roger seized Sfax in 538H (1143–44). Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­ Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:346. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:358–61. 100. ​Ibn al-­Athir reports that the governor of Sousse, a son of the emir al-­Hasan, had joined his ­father in flight following the capture of Mahdia. Al-­Tijani writes that Sousse was instead ­under the authority of Jabbara ibn Kamil from the Riyad branch of the Banu Hilal. It is pos­si­ble to see t­ hese

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joined with “many Arabs” to resist the invading force. Nonetheless, the Norman army emerged victorious on 23 Safar 543H ( July 13, 1148), imprisoning the surviving men and enslaving the ­women. Following this victory, safe passage was proclaimed, the townspeople returned to Sfax, and ­those who could have paid the ransom on their loved ones. Roger II initially appointed a scholar named Abu al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani as governor, but he requested that Roger instead appoint his son, ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan. Roger obliged and took Abu al-­Hasan as a hostage back to Sicily to ensure compliance from ʿUmar. Much like the ­people of Mahdia, the Normans “treated ­gently” the ­people of Sousse and Sfax. Roger even sent out letters to “all of the ­people of Ifriqiya” guaranteeing “safety and good promises.”101 ­After conquering Sousse and Sfax, George of Antioch moved with his fleet to the ­castle of Kelibia, located on the peninsula of Cape Bon near Tunis. Following his arrival, a group of unspecified Arabs engaged the Normans in open combat and emerged victorious. This failed attack was the last documented military endeavor of George of Antioch in Ifriqiya during 543H (1148–49) and the next several years. ­These combined conquests established the so-­called Norman kingdom of Africa, which extended from Tripoli up to Tunis. Implicit in this description of Norman lands is the (likely peaceful) submission of Gabès, which is the only major coastal city in Ifriqiya not named in the Norman conquests.102 The fate of Tunis in ­these conquests is unclear. Although Ibn al-­Athir sets the bound­aries of Norman control from Tripoli “up to Tunis,” the chronicles of Ibn ʿIdhari and ʿAbd al-­Wahid al-­Marrakushi both hint at the city paying tribute (or attempting to pay tribute) to the Normans.103 The former mentions that the governor of Tunis planned to send a ship full of wheat to lands controlled by the Normans, presumably as some sort of payment. The p­ eople of Tunis, however, revolted against the governor ­because they did not want to see their grain used to feed Christians. W ­ hether this revolt ­limited the involveaccounts as not mutually exclusive and to imagine Sousse “commanded at the time by a nominal Zirid governor and by an omnipotent Riyad emir.” Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:359. 101. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:65. 102. ​The importance of control over Mediterranean commercial lanes to the Norman state is seen in the description of Roger II’s kingdom from the Ferraris Chronicle: “And [Roger II] created one kingdom from all the provinces that are contained between three seas: from the east is the ­Great Sea, which is beyond Sicily; from the south is the Tyrrhenian Sea, which is between that kingdom and Africa and Mauritania; from the south is the Adriatic Sea, which is between that kingdom and Greece and Sclavonia and Hungary; from the west holds the bound­aries of the province of Campania.” Gaudenzi, Ignoti monachi Cisterciensis, 26. 103. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:65; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:348–50; ʿAbd al-­Wahid al-­Marrakushi, Al-­Muʿjib fi Talkhis Akhbar al-­Maghrib, ed. Reinhart Dozy (Leiden: Brill, 1881), 162. Although Ibn ʿIdhari provides this description of p­ eople in Tunis attempting to transport grain to Sicily, he also mentions that the name of the Banu Khurasan was proclaimed up to the Almohad conquest, which may indicate that the Normans did not have control of the city.

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ment of the Normans in appointing a governor in Tunis is left unexplored. ʿAbd al-­Wahid al-­Marrakushi, meanwhile, mentions that the Normans had granted the Khurasanid dynasty, which had been in control of Tunis for much of the twelfth ­century, a right to rule the city, though the details of this contractual relationship are unclear.104 In any case, con­temporary sources do not mention any revolts against Norman control in Tunis, nor do they mention any Norman power in the city when the Almohads laid siege to it during the 1150s—so if the Normans did manage to extract tribute from its governors, this relationship did not last long. With the completion of ­these conquests, the Normans controlled maritime ports on the northern and southern shores of the central Mediterranean from which they could extract lucrative tax revenue.105 ­These Ifriqiyan cities and nearby islands also provided strategic bases from which the Normans could patrol the ­waters of the central Mediterranean to root out any pirates that sought to interfere in this commerce.106 The Fatimid caliphate, which continued its “policy of tacit approval” of Norman intervention in Ifriqiya, stood to benefit from the stability that Norman rule might bring to the central Mediterranean.107 For the Zirids, the Norman conquest of Ifriqiya was an unmitigated disaster that displaced the emir al-­Hasan from his court at Mahdia. Immediately 104. ​Ibn ʿIdhari and Ibn Khaldun provide (at times contradictory) accounts of Tunis’s internal politics. In 543H (1148–49), the governor of Tunis was Maʿadd ibn al-­Mansur, who planned to send wheat to the Normans. When the ­people of Tunis heard this, they revolted. Local shaykhs took control of Tunis and appointed a local judge as their leader. Fearful of retaliation, the judge first sought to put Tunis ­under the protection of the veteran Arab lord Muhriz ibn Ziyad. The p­ eople of Tunis refused to give allegiance to an Arab lord, however, and revolted against this arrangement. Tunisian leaders eventually asked for Abu Bakr ibn Ismaʿil ibn ʿAbd al-­Haqq ibn Khurasan (a member of the Khurasanid dynasty, which had previously governed Tunis) to rule the city. He accepted and ruled for seven months ­until he was assassinated. Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:349–50; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:217–19. The fourteenth-­ century chronicle of Andrea Dandolo claims, on the basis of unknown sources, that Tunis paid tribute to the Normans. Andrea Dandolo, Chronica per extensum descripta, ed. Ester Pastorello, 2nd ed. (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1958), 243; Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 35. 105. ​Stanton’s claim that the 1140s saw Roger’s “long-­postponed plans to claim the coast of North Africa” come to fruition is overstated. I prefer Johns’s thoughts on the long-­term thinking of Roger II. He argues that “we should certainly be careful not to ­mistake the characteristic opportunism of medieval rulers for carefully planned and articulated policy.” Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 89; Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 99. 106. ​The centrality of ­these expeditions to Roger II’s foreign policy is clear from his lack of military involvement elsewhere on the Mediterranean during the year 543H (1148–49). As his navy was campaigning in Ifriqiya, a joint Venetian-­Byzantine fleet launched a prolonged assault on a Norman outpost at Corfu off the coast of Greece. Although the attack eventually failed, Roger’s decision to not send reinforcements to this strategic fort indicates the significance of his Ifriqiyan expedition. Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 98–99. 107. ​Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 263. Johns further argues, “While we cannot show that the two monarchs w ­ ere actually in league over Norman activity in Africa, t­ here is sufficient evidence to conclude that Roger had reason to be confident that the Fāṭimid ruler would not intervene on behalf of his Zīrīd vassal.” Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 97.

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following the conquest of Mahdia in 543H (1148–49), al-­Hasan and his ­family fled to the lands of Muhriz ibn Ziyad, whom al-­Hasan had previously favored “over all the Arabs and treated generously.”108 En route, though, he encountered an Arab lord named Hasan ibn Thalib, to whom he owed money and to whom he was forced to give his son Yahya as a hostage.109 When al-­Hasan reached the friendly lands of Muhriz, he remained t­here in comfort for several months before purchasing a ship, with the goal of sailing to Egypt. George of Antioch got wind of this plan, however, and deployed ships to capture al-­ Hasan. Abandoning his initial scheme, al-­Hasan sought to travel west to the Almohad caliph, ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin, who reigned in modern-­day Morocco. In order to reach his lands, al-­Hasan had to travel through the territory of his rival, the Hammadid emir Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz, who had “openly rejoiced” on hearing of the fall of Mahdia.110 Despite securing the right to safe passage through Hammadid lands, al-­Hasan and his sons ­were imprisoned on their arrival at Jazaʾir Bani Mazghannan (modern-­day Algiers). For the time being, the last Zirid emir would remain jailed and at the mercy of his rival. The Normans’ conquest of Djerba in 1135 was the first episode of conquest in a thirteen-­year period that eventually saw much of the Ifriqiyan coastline fall to Roger II. During t­ hese years, the Normans si­mul­ta­neously invoked their treaties with the Zirids and disregarded t­ hose same treaties to bully the emirs of Mahdia, whose attempts at resisting Norman domination became increasingly futile. Nonetheless, it took a favorable set of po­liti­cal and environmental circumstances for the court of Palermo to dethrone the Zirids and their neighbors. Po­liti­cal stability in the Kingdom of Sicily and the lack of an external threat from Eu­rope during the 1140s allowed Roger to devote more of his resources to campaigns in the southern Mediterranean. This period also coincided directly with a time of unpre­ce­dented drought in Ifriqiya that caused widespread death, emigration of its ­people, financial catastrophe, and infighting between local lords. The Zirids, whose alliances and armies had ­earlier helped to keep the Normans at bay, could no longer withstand their strength. The Normans’ annual campaigns against Ifriqiya culminated in sweeping conquests in 543H (1148–49) and displaced the Zirid emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli from his ancestral throne.

108. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:64–65. 109. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:233. 110. ​Ibn al-­Athir also notes that Yahya had been denigrating al-­Hasan previously and had also “published his faults” in slandering letters presumably circulated throughout Ifriqiya. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­ Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 547H, 11:79.

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The Norman Kingdom of Africa

The Norman conquests of 543H (1148–49) put Roger II and his administration in control of the coast of North Africa from Tripoli up to Tunis. Although he never set foot on the African continent, Roger made his conquests known through his selective deployment of the title “king of Africa,” which was also used by Roger’s son and successor, William I. The occasional use of this lofty title, however, belies a relatively hands-­off approach to governance in Ifriqiya that revolved around bolstering the economy of a region crippled by a de­cade of war, drought, and emigration. The Normans ruled their African territories primarily through proxy Arab and Berber governors. They appointed ­these local lords using traditional Islamic customs like the ceremonial bestowal of robes and the distribution of contracts that specified the terms of their investiture. It was only in Mahdia and the islands of the central Mediterranean that the Normans took direct control of their cities and w ­ ere more involved in their quotidian operations. Po­liti­cal stability in Ifriqiya u ­ nder the Normans helped to facilitate economic growth. The Normans ­were lenient in their treatment of urban populations in Ifriqiya, sponsored building proj­ects in cities they conquered, and encouraged immigration. ­These policies proved a boon for Christian traders, parti­ cularly t­ hose from Genoa, but ­were detrimental to Jewish merchants, who had suffered from de­cades of sporadic conflict in the region. Christians living in

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Ifriqiya further benefited from the Normans’ tax structure, which imposed a jizya-­style tax on non-­Christians. They also reaped the benefits of a church that the Normans provided with an influx of wealth to better tend to Christian communities. Although Roger II and William I did not undertake radical po­ liti­cal or economic changes to the po­liti­cal structure of Ifriqiya, the small changes they did make nonetheless altered the power dynamics of Ifriqiya to ­favor Christians at the expense of the Muslim majority. This hierarchical change spurred discontent and, along with troubling undercurrents of anti-­Islamic attitudes in the court of Palermo, ultimately contributed to revolts against Norman rule during the mid-1150s. Attempting to reconstruct the society of Norman Africa is a difficult task. Most texts that document its history ­were written ­after the twelfth ­century on the basis of ­earlier, now-­lost sources. Even ­these texts provide only fleeting glimpses into how the Normans administered their Ifriqiyan territories, usually as brief background information to preface a more detailed discussion of conflict between the Normans and the ­people over whom they ruled. In the following analy­sis, I therefore use passing mentions about Norman governance alongside relevant con­temporary evidence from Sicily to make generalizations about the fate of Ifriqiya ­under Norman rule. I also use the islands between Sicily and Ifriqiya—­Malta, Gozo, and Djerba in particular—as points of reference from which to consider the Normans’ actions in Ifriqiya proper. ­These islands, like the coast of Ifriqiya, each had a Muslim majority, w ­ ere located across major shipping lanes in the central Mediterranean, and w ­ ere conquered by the Normans during the mid-­twelfth ­century. The actions of the Normans on t­hese islands therefore likely reflects to some degree their attitude ­toward governance in Ifriqiya.

The Kings of Africa Neither Roger II nor William I physically campaigned in Ifriqiya or even set foot on its shores. Even though the Norman kings had (at best) l­imited interest in personally administering to the affairs of their subjects in Ifriqiya, they still sought to proj­ect their power over it by occasionally deploying the title “king of Africa” (rendered as rex Africe in Latin and malik Ifriqiya in Arabic) and permitting its use in their courts. Evidence for the adoption of this title comes piecemeal in the form of a handful of charters, scattered Latin texts from within and outside the Kingdom of Sicily, and two gold dinars minted in Mahdia. With this title, the Norman kings and their po­liti­cal allies sought to

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show Norman supremacy over the ambiguous territory of Africa in ways that would have resonated with a par­tic­u­lar audience.1 ­Limited evidence from the Kingdom of Sicily suggests that the Norman kings sporadically utilized the title rex Africe or used language of Norman domination in Africa to show the extent of their territories.2 K.  A. Kehr’s 1902 book, Die urkunden der normannisch-­sicilischen könige (The documents of the Norman-­Sicilian kings), contains a footnote that quotes a now-­lost charter in which Roger II is mentioned as “our lord [Roger], most serene and unconquered king of Sicily and Italy and also of the entire kingdom of Africa, crowned by God, pious, blessed, always a triumphant Augustus.”3 The anony­ mous Historia Sicula, which was possibly written when Roger II held the coastline of Ifriqiya, also describes him as “the most power­f ul King of Sicily, Tripoli, and Africa.”4 Similarly, Roger II might have commissioned a sword and seal that bore the rhyming Latin phrase Apulus et Calaber, Siciulus michi servit et Afer (the Apulian, the Calabrian, the Sicilian, and the African serve me).5 Although this phrase does not explic­itly name Roger as the king of Africa, it 1. ​The title rex Africe is discussed in Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya”; Matt King, “The Norman Kings of Africa?,” Haskins Society Journal 28 (2017): 143–66. 2. ​Roger II and William I w ­ ere the first monarchs to deploy this title. Some Latin chronicles used the title rex Africe in reference to ­earlier rulers in the region, both Muslim and Christian, but ­these rulers did not deploy the titles themselves. See Bartholomew of Lucca in Historia Ecclesiastica Nova, MGH, SS, 39:376; Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:163; Matthew Bailey, “Charlemagne as a Creative Force in the Spanish Epic,” in Charlemagne and His Legend in Early Spanish Lit­er­at­ ure and Historiography, ed. Matthew Bailey and Ryan D. Giles (New York: D. S. Brewer, 2016), 17. 3. ​I suspect this charter is from Naples, given its similarity to the Neapolitan charter of William I (to be considered shortly). If this is the case, it was likely destroyed during World War II. K. A. Kehr, Die Urkunden der normannisch-­sicilischen Könige: Eine diplomatische Untersuchung (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1902), 246. See also David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 321–23. 4. ​It is this passage that provides the most concrete evidence for dating the Historia Sicula between roughly 1146 and 1154. John Aspinwall and Alex Metcalfe, “Norman Identity and the Anonymous Historia Sicula,” in Sicily: Heritage of the World, ed. Dirk Booms and Peter John Higgs (London: British Museum, 2020), 133–34. 5. ​Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 41, 48–49. Famed Icelandic historian Snorri Sturluson, writing in the thirteenth ­century, attests to the existence of this sword. Sturlason, Heimskringla, 610. See also Ralph Niger, Radulfi Nigri chronica, ed. Robert Anstruther (London: The Society, 1851), 84. A poem from Rouen written in the twelfth ­century includes similar lines: You mighty Roger, you mightiest of kings; Conqueror of Italy and Sicily, and Africa Feared by Greece and Syria, and even Persia. M. Richard, Notice sur l’ancienne bibliothèque des échevins de la ville de Rouen (Rouen: Alfred Péron, 1845), 163; Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 597; Benjamin Pohl, “Keeping It in the F ­ amily: Re-­reading Anglo-­ Norman Historiography in the Face of Cultural Memory, Tradition and Heritage,” in Burkhardt and Foerster, Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage, 232–33.

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nonetheless asserts Norman rule over the p­ eople of Africa as well as t­ hose in the Kingdom of Sicily. William I also occasionally defined the bound­aries of his kingdom to include Africa. A royal charter written in July 1156 in Naples pre­sents William I as “most serene and unconquered king of Sicily and Italy and also of the entire kingdom of Africa, crowned by God, pious, blessed, always a triumphant Augustus.”6 This document, which evokes the victories of William in the face of a revolting populace, indicates the grandeur of his reign and the varied territories that he governs—­including Africa. Eight other charters from the city of Molfetta, which was loyal to William throughout peninsular rebellions in the mid-1150s, likewise praise William as the “king of Sicily, Italy, and Africa.”7 A dedicatory introduction to a translation of Plato’s Phaedo written by Henry Aristippus in 1160 also mentions the bounds of William’s rule, which is applauded by ­those in “Sicily, Calabria, Lucania, Campania, Apulia, Libya, and Africa.”8 Hearkening back to chapter 1, it is unknown what exactly the bounds of “Africa” are in the context of ­these texts, though the pre­sen­ta­ tion of Africa alongside territories like Sicily and Italy indicate that some in the Norman court envisioned their African possessions as a distinct region in their kingdom. Evidence outside of the Latinate tradition also indicates that the Norman monarchs considered Africa to be part of their kingdom. In 1149, a priest of Roger II named Grisandus (or Grizant) financed the construction of a chapel and accompanying headstone for his recently deceased ­mother, Anna.9 The headstone contains inscriptions in Latin, Greek, Arabic, and Judeo-­Arabic that commemorate Anna and the chapel in which she was laid to rest. The inscriptions in Arabic and Judeo-­Arabic refer to Roger as the ruler of Ifriqiya as well as a host of other territories. The Arabic inscription calls him “the king of Italy, Lombardy, Calabria, Sicily, and Ifriqiya,” while the Judeo-­Arabic one simi6. ​Enzensberger, Guillelmi I diplomata, document 13. 7. ​Two of t­ hese documents w ­ ere likely lost during the destruction of the Archivio Napoli in World War II, but they survive ­today in a compilation of charters by Carabellese. Six other documents that mention William I as king of Africa are presently ­housed in the monastery of La Trinità della Cava (also known as Badia di Cava) in the city of Cava de’ Tirreni. Archivio La Trinità della Cava, Pergamene, Box 29, document 106 and Box 30, documents 1, 3, 4, 6, and 54. See also Francesco Carabellese, Le carte di Molfetta (1076–1309) (Bari: Commissione Provinciale di Archeologia e Storia Patria, 1912), documents 22 and 29. On this archive, see Joanna Drell, Kinship and Conquest: F­ amily Strategies in the Principality of Salerno during the Norman Period, 1077–1194 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 14–17. 8. ​Aristippus, Phaedo, 90. See also Mallette, Kingdom of Sicily, 154–56. 9. ​Jeremy Johns, “The Quadrilingual Epitaph of Anna, ­Mother of Grisandus, a Priest in the Cappella Palatina, Palermo,” in Visual Arts, Material Culture and Lit­er­a­ture in ­Later Byzantium (1081–­ca.1330), ed. Foteini Spingou (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

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larly refers to him as “the g­ reat king, the lord of Italy, Lombardy, Calabria, Sicily, and Ifriqiya.”10 ­These two inscriptions, which ­were displayed in a chapel in Palermo, advertised to an audience literate in e­ ither Arabic or Judeo-­ Arabic that the bounds of Norman rule stretched across the Mediterranean to Ifriqiya.11 The titulature found in royal charters, swords, and seals pertaining to Norman Africa thus trickled down to elite levels of society and had some presence outside of the royal court. In Ifriqiya itself, Roger II and William I presented themselves as kings in triumphant issues of gold coinage minted in Mahdia.12 Two gold dinars survive that refer to the Norman monarch as “king” (malik): one minted in 543H (1148–49) and another in 549H (1154–55). T ­ hese coins ­were issued to commemorate Roger II’s conquest of Mahdia and William I’s accession to the throne, respectively, although neither explic­itly names the Norman monarch as malik Ifriqiya.13 ­These coins contain lines of text on both sides, engraved in concentric circles of Arabic text, which are translated as follows:14 Coin #1: Obverse

(Outer margin) Struck by order of the sublime king (al-­malik al-­muʿẓẓam) Roger, the power­ful (al-­muʿtazz) through God, in the city of Mahdia in the year 543 (Inner margin) Praise be to God, it is fitting to praise him and, indeed, He is deserving and worthy [of praise] (Center) King (al-­malik) Roger

10. ​Although Roger II is not exactly named malik Ifriqiya in the Judeo-­Arabic inscription, he is proclaimed “lord” (ṣāḥib) of Ifriqiya alongside his other illustrious title, “the ­g reat king.” In the Arabic text, for “king,” the word mālika is used instead of the more standard malik, in keeping with practices from the royal chancery, in which Roger is called al-­mālika al-­malikiya (the reigning king). 11. ​Hubert Houben, “Between Occidental and Oriental Cultures: Norman Sicily as a ‘Third Space’?,” in Burkhardt and Foerster, Norman Tradition and Transcultural Heritage, 22–26. 12. ​Roger II had experimented with using the title malik on his Arabic-­language coins minted in Sicily since around 1130. The previous generation of Norman lords, including Roger I and Robert Guiscard, also used this title at times. Johns, “Titoli arabi”; Grierson and Travaini, Italy III, 14:77–79, 104–6, 438–42. Far less coinage survives from medieval North Africa. See ­Hazard, Numismatic History, 56. 13. ​­These Norman dinars first came to light in a 1930 article by H. H. Abdul-­Wahab in Revue Tunisienne, which fortunately contains several pictures of the coins, for their current location is unknown. I would like to thank Michael Bates and Abdelhamid Fenina for trying to help me track down ­these coins. H.  H. Abdul-­Wahab, “Deux dinars normands de Mahdia,” Revue Tunisienne 1 (1930): 215–18. T ­ here are striking similarities between ­these coins and con­temporary Fatimid ones, on which Zirid coins ­were likely based. 14. ​­These translations are from Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 92–93.

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Coin #1: Reverse

(Outer margin) Struck by order of the sublime king (al-­malik al-­ muʿẓẓam) Roger, power­f ul (al-­muʿtazz) through God, in the city of Mahdia in the year 543 (Inner margin) Praise be to God, it is fitting to praise him and, indeed, He is deserving and worthy [of praise] (Center) The power­f ul (al-­muʿtazz) through God Coin #2: Obverse

(Outer margin) Struck by order of the Guide (al-­Hādī) according to the command of God, King (al-­malik) William, in the city of Mahdia in the year 549 (Inner margin) Praise be to God, it is fitting to praise him and, indeed, He is deserving and worthy [of praise] (Center) King (al-­malik) William Coin #2: Reverse

(Outer margin) Struck by order of the Guide (al-­Hādī) according to the command of God, King (al-­malik) William, in the city of Mahdia in the year 549 (Inner margin) Praise be to God, it is fitting to praise him and, indeed, He is deserving and worthy [of praise] (Center) The Guide (al-­Hādī) according to the command of God The text of ­these coins reflects the po­liti­cal strategy that dictated the Norman presence in Ifriqiya. As the Normans adapted regional customs like the distribution of robes of honor and the creation of contracts for recently conquered cities (discussed below), so too did they create coins that had direct pre­ce­dent. The concentric circles of Arabic text are modeled directly on the design of Fatimid and Zirid dinars, although the Normans also included their own Arabic titulature on this coinage by presenting themselves as malik instead of the more traditional Ifriqiyan title of emir.15 William I even appropriated the idea 15. ​­These honorifics derive from the ʿalāma, which was (in essence) the signature of Islamic rulers during the classical period, often used in place of a name. The Fatimids made use of the ḥamdala, a specific form of the ʿalāma. Halm, Fatimids and Their Traditions, 48–49. The term malik had a negative connotation for rulers in early Islam b­ ecause the Qurʾan refers to God as al-­malik al-­ḥaqq (the true king). Consequently, early Muslim rulers thought it was inappropriate to refer to anyone other than God as malik. Qurʾan, 20:114. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:509–13; Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1980), 185–88; Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), xlix; Patrick Morgan, “Tokens of His Rule: The Royal Image on the Coins of Roger II,” Comitatus: A Journal of Medieval and Re­nais­sance Studies 50 (21–44): 30–33.

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of the Mahdi—­a figure central to the nascent Almohad movement—­and applied it to his own kingship (as considered in the next chapter).16 This scattershot evidence shows that the Norman kings deployed the titles rex Africe and malik Ifriqiya in situations where it was advantageous for them to do so—as in Naples, where William I sought to display the breadth of his rule in the face of an unruly populace. Works like the Historia Sicula and Henry Aristippus’s translation of the Phaedo, meanwhile, ­were created in close proximity to the court of Palermo. Perhaps the authors of t­ hese texts employed an overly grandiose and nonofficial title for their patron in the hopes that their own ­careers would be advanced? What­ever the case, the Norman kings ­stopped short of enveloping this title into their official titulature on charters and diplomas produced from the court of Palermo. The isolated examples provided above show that the Norman monarchs experimented with the idea of calling themselves “kings of Africa,” but they s­ topped short of employing it alongside their more traditional (and papally sanctioned) titles of land owner­ship in Sicily and southern Italy.

Conquerors but Not Crusaders The campaigns that Roger II undertook in Ifriqiya during the 1140s happened amid a wave of crusading fervor and holy war, supported by the papacy, that extended across much of Latin Christendom.17 Preachers led by Bernard of Clairvaux lobbied Christian monarchs to take up the cross in support of the Second Crusade, German lords campaigned against pagan tribes in eastern Eu­rope with papal support, and En­glish Crusaders allied with Christians in al-­Andalus to conquer Lisbon.18 Although Norman campaigns in Ifriqiya ­were contemporaneous with ­these violent encounters of Christians against 16. ​The Fatimid caliphate recognized the Normans as malik. In the 532H (1137–38) letter of al-­ Hafiz to Roger II, the latter is called “the king of the island of Sicily and Longobardia and Italy and Calabria and Salerno[?] and Melfi.” Al-­Qalqashandi, Subh al-­Aʿsha, 5–6:458–63. The 1123 letter that al-­ Hasan ibn ʿAli distributed to the p­ eople of Ifriqiya following his victory over Roger II called him the ṣāḥib Siqiliyya (lord of Sicily). Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 337. 17. ​On the role of the Normans in the crusading movement, see Hailstone, Recalcitrant Crusaders?, 93–126. In general, southern Italian nobles had far more ties to the crusading movement than t­hose in Sicily. Graham Loud, “Norman Italy and the Holy Land,” in The Horns of Hattin: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, Jerusalem-­Haifa 1987, ed. Benjamin Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak ben-­Zvi, 1992), 49–63. See also Iris Shagrir, “Franks and Normans in the Mediterranean: A Comparative Examination of Naming Patterns,” Medieval Prosopography 30 (2015): 59–72. 18. ​Constable, “Second Crusade,” 236; Wieruszowski, “Norman Kingdom of Sicily,” 16; Jonathan Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 61–114; Jonathan Riley-­Smith, The Crusades: A History, 3rd ed. (New York: Bloomsbury,

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non-­Christians, it is clear that Latin authors did not see them as ideologically connected. The language used in medieval Latin texts to describe Roger’s involvement in Ifriqiya is short and concise. The usual tropes associated with the crusading movement—­the suffering of Eastern Christians, the taking up of the cross, papal approval of the expedition—­are nowhere to be found in ­these narratives. The message to emerge from this disparity is clear: Roger II and William I w ­ ere not Crusaders and the wars they waged in Ifriqiya ­were not Crusades. ­There are a handful of Latin texts that consider both the campaigns of Roger II in Ifriqiya and the Second Crusade, some written by authors outside the Kingdom of Sicily and some within it. The Gesta Normannorum ducum (Deeds of the Norman dukes) by Robert of Torigni is one of the former.19 Writing in Normandy during the m ­ iddle of the twelfth c­ entury, Robert devotes a passage of his chronicle to the preaching of the Second Crusade and the subsequent campaign to the Holy Land. Robert notes how the preaching of Bernard of Clairvaux motivated Christians across borders to take up the cross in 1146: Inspired by the miracles that happened in the Holy Land, and by the spectacle of manifold affliction and humility brought h ­ ere by the conveyances that arrived, driven by the stories of the hardships to which Christians in the Holy Land ­were exposed by the raids of the pagans, by the preaching of Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, a man of authority not to be scorned, to whom Pope Eugenius had brought this office; Louis, king of France; Conrad, emperor of Germany . . . ​and an innumerable multitude from other lands, not only knights and laymen, but also bishops, clerics, and monks, took up the cross and prepared themselves for the expedition to Jerusalem.20 Robert of Torigni pre­sents the preaching and execution of the Second Crusade as appealing to all Christians and having clear religious overtones, expressed most overtly in the taking up of the cross. Robert follows this narrative with a handful of disconnected events, including Norman conquests in Africa: “The church of Tournai began to have its own bishop, since before the time of Saint Eligius, it had been conducted ­under the church of Noyon. 2014), 124. On the classification of crusading and the substantial scholarly discourse surrounding it, see Norman Housley, Contesting the Crusades (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-­Blackwell, 1986). 19. ​This chronicle was originally written by William of Jumièges and then extended by Orderic Vitalis and (­later) by Robert of Torigni. Elisabeth M. C. Van Houts, “The Gesta Normannorum Ducum: A History without an End,” Anglo-­Norman Studies 3 (1980): 106–18. 20. ​Robert of Torigni, Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I, 4:152.

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Duke Geoffrey decently restored the roofs of the tower of the ­castle of Rouen, which had been damaged during a siege. King Roger of Sicily captured the province of Tripoli in Africa from the pagans.”21 Robert of Torigni thus provides a brief mention of Norman conquests in Africa but does not give them any of the religious fanfare found in his description of the Second Crusade, even though they w ­ ere carried out against “pagans.” This same trend holds true for other chronicles written outside the Kingdom of Sicily, including the continuation of the chronicle of Sigebert of Gembloux.22 This text sets up the Second Crusade by mentioning the many “abominations carried out” during the sack of Edessa and the “fear and anxiety” experienced by Christians as a result of its capture by the Turks. It then relates how Louis VII of France along with “princes of the king and an innumerable multitude” set off to the Holy Land a­ fter having been marked by the cross. Although the expedition of this “army of God” ultimately failed, as related in entries for the years 1146 to 1149, the religious ele­ment of the expedition is central and in keeping with the tenets of campaigns t­oday called Crusades.23 This rhe­toric of holy war is not found in the chronicle’s brief description of Roger II’s campaigns in Africa. It notes that Roger “sent a navy to the coasts of Africa” and captured “Affrica, Suilla, Asfax, Clippea, and many other forts.”24 Although the chronicle then mentions that Roger restored an archbishop to Affrica [Mahdia], it does not mention Roger’s religious zeal driving forward this campaign, nor is ­there a dramatic recounting of the miseries suffered by African Christians at the hands of the Zirid emirs. Like the chronicle of Robert of Torigni, the continuation of the chronicle of Sigebert of Gembloux makes a clear distinction between the campaign of Roger II and ­those of Crusaders. Other chroniclers from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, including William of Tyre and Romuald of Salerno, exhibit similar trends.25 ­These texts pre­sent a clear divide between the Second Crusade and Norman campaigns in Africa. Contemporaries of t­ hese expeditions writing from within 21. ​Robert of Torigni, Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I, 4:153. 22. ​This chronicle was originally written by Sigebert, a monk who lived at the Benedictine abbey of Gembloux (modern Belgium). When he died in 1111, the chronicle was continued by a handful of other monks. One such continuation, t­ oday called the Continuatio Praemonstratensis (Continuation of the Praemonstratensian), considers both the Second Crusade and Norman intervention in Africa. Jeroen Deploige, “Sigebert of Gembloux,” in Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle, ed. R. G. Dunphy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1358–61. 23. ​ Sigeberti Gemblacensis chronica, MGH, SS, 6:452–53. 24. ​The cities h ­ ere are Mahdia, Zawila, Sfax, and Gabes. Sigeberti Gemblacensis chronica, MGH, SS, 6:454. 25. ​William of Tyre, PL, 201:571, 659–60; Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:226–30.

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Latin Christendom saw the Second Crusade as motivated by the suffering of Eastern Christians, preached by righ­teous leaders like Bernard of Clairvaux, and undertaken by a substantial cohort of believers who took up the cross. No such rhe­toric is found in descriptions of Norman Africa. Instead, Latin authors tend to briefly mention the campaigns of Roger II against cities on the African coast.26 Some chroniclers reference the material ambitions of the Norman monarch, but none cite religious zealotry as a cause for ­these expeditions. Likewise, t­hese texts make no mention of the papacy, of the Norman monarchs taking crusading vows, or of the usual planning associated with undertaking an expedition as grueling as a Crusade.27 Despite the surface-­level similarities between the Normans’ African conquests and expeditions like the Second Crusade (both w ­ ere campaigns of Latin Christians attacking Muslims in the Mediterranean during the 1140s), ­these endeavors ­were distinct in motivation, execution, and reception.

The Politics of Norman Africa The po­liti­cal apparatus that the Normans developed on the Ifriqiyan littoral was likewise distinct from that of the Crusader states (and the rest of the Kingdom of Sicily, for that ­matter).28 For most of the major cities on the Ifriqiyan littoral, the Normans played a largely symbolic role. In accordance with me26. ​A potential mention of Roger II’s campaigns in Ifriqiya being motivated by religious devotion comes from the pen of Peter the Venerable, abbot of the Benedictine abbey of Cluny. In the spring of 1150, Peter wrote a letter to Roger II in which he asks the Norman king to campaign against the Byzantine Empire, which he blamed for the failure of the Second Crusade. He evokes the memory of Roger’s warlike virtues in his victories over the Saracens, who resided in a land “hostile to God.” He further praises Roger II for working to expand the Christian faith in this Saracen land. It is unclear, however, if Peter is referring to Sicily, Ifriqiya, or both. Peter then pleas with Roger to unite with his rival Conrad III on an equally noble expedition against the Byzantines. Letter 162 in Peter the Venerable, The Letters of Peter the Venerable, ed. Giles Constable (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 1:394–95.See also Helene Wieruszowski, “Roger II of Sicily, Rex-­Tyrannus, in Twelfth-­Century Po­liti­cal Thought,” Speculum 38, no.  1 (January  1963): 74–75; Benjamin Kedar, Crusade and Mission: Eu­ro­pean Approaches ­toward the Muslims (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 1984), 101; Gregory A. Smith, “Sine rege, sine principe: Peter the Venerable on Vio­lence in Twelfth-­Century Burgundy,” Speculum 77, no. 1 (January 2002): 23–24. 27. ​Charters produced in the Norman court at Palermo reflect con­temporary chronicles. In the 1120s, Roger II began including religious rhe­toric in his title, referring to his rule as being “by the grace of God” and to himself as a “defender” of Chris­tian­ity, among other t­ hings. This tradition continued throughout his reign, but t­ here is no discernible difference between t­ hese titles before, during, and ­after Norman conquests in Ifriqiya. Brühl, Rogerii II diplomata, documents 7, 9, 13, 14. 28. ​On governance in the Crusader states, see Ronnie Ellenblum, Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Christopher MacEvitt, The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Catlos, Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, 128–62.

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dieval Islamic tradition, Roger II bestowed robes of honor on his appointed Berber or Arab governors, distributed a contract that specified the terms of each governor’s obligations to the Normans, took hostages to ensure the loyalty of his new subjects, and left a garrison to enforce order. The daily administration of ­these cities was left to ­these Ifriqiyan governors. Such was not the case in the de facto Norman capital of Mahdia, which was ruled initially by admiral George of Antioch before passing to an unknown member of the Norman administration. So too w ­ ere Norman-­controlled islands between Sicily and Ifriqiya placed u ­ nder the authority of Norman officials rather than proxy governors. The pro­cess through which the Normans established their authority over cities in coastal Ifriqiya—­specifically Gabès, Sfax, Sousse, and Tripoli—­had a clear pattern and method of execution that was dependent on w ­ hether the city had surrendered peacefully or w ­ hether it had been defeated by force. When a city surrendered peacefully, the governor was made to wear a robe of honor in return for the right to rule the city. This was the case at Gabès in 542H (1147–48), when the usurper Yusuf pledged his allegiance to Roger II. Ibn al-­Athir quotes Yusuf as saying to Roger (presumably via a letter or envoy), “I want from you a robe of honor and the contract for the government of Gabès so that I am a representative for you just as you made the Banu Matruh at Tripoli.”29 The treatment of other cities that surrendered peacefully was similar to Gabès. At Sousse, for example, the p­ eople “­were treated courteously” when they surrendered peacefully in 543H (1148–49), with Roger sending them letters with guarantees of safety.30 The Normans also distributed robes of honor in cities that initially resisted their conquest, though not before some blood was shed. Following the conquest of Tripoli “by the sword” in 541H (1146–47), the Normans seized w ­ omen and property throughout the city.31 Although many fled Tripoli, they returned when the Normans issued a proclamation that they would not be harmed. Roger II then bestowed robes and a contract on his newly appointed governors, the Banu Matruh. A similar pro­cess happened in 543H (1148–49) in Sfax, which fell a­ fter fierce fighting.32 The survivors w ­ ere enslaved and t­ hose who had fled w ­ ere permitted to return to the city and pay the ransoms of t­hose who had been captured. Roger II’s pre­sen­ta­tion of a khilʿa (robe of honor) to his vassals shows his desire to maintain the po­liti­cal status quo in Ifriqiya despite this change in 29. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:61. 30. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:65. 31. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55. 32. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:65.

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administration.33 This ceremonial pro­cess was common throughout the Muslim Mediterranean to the extent that “the conferring of robes of honor was a ubiquitous symbol of bonding between a superior and an inferior.”34 Both Sunni and Shiʿa rulers bestowed the khilʿa on their favored subjects, ­whether man or ­woman, slave or ­free person, Muslim or nonbeliever. Rulers could bestow a variety of robes on their subjects, including robes of appointment, viziership, ­pardon, and honorable dismissal.35 The bestowal of khilʿa was a well-­documented practice in the Fatimid caliphate, where an inventory of gifts lists robes distinguished by the amounts of precious materials like silk, gemstones, and gold they contained.36 The Zirids likewise distributed khilʿa and gifts to their subjects on the succession of a new emir. When Yahya succeeded Tamim in 501H (1107–8), he distributed large sums of money to his subjects.37 When ʿAli succeeded Yahya in 509H (1115–16), he gave robes of honor and gifts to his nobles.38 ­After the formation of the Norman kingdom of Africa, Roger II sought to maintain this status quo through similar acts. He bestowed robes of honor on his new governors and adapted the Zirids’ practice of giving money or gifts to their subjects. ­After the conquest of Mahdia, for example, George of Antioch presented (unnamed) Arab tribes large sums of money.39 This act both symbolized the generosity of the new ruler and provided a financial disincentive for potentially rebellious groups to foment dissent. The Normans sought to govern Ifriqiya in the tradition of the Zirid emirs they had deposed and to minimize the negative effects of this transfer of power by adhering to local traditions. Roger II’s bestowal of khilʿa on his Ifriqiyan governors was distinct from how he treated local governors and cities during his campaigns in southern Italy in the 1130s. Instead of distributing robes to rebellious lords in this region, he typically killed or exiled the leaders of cities that opposed him, as was 33. ​Norman Stillman, “4ẖẖilʿa,” EI2; Fahmida Suleman, “Gifts and Gift Giving,” in Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, ed. Josef W. Meri (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1:295–96; Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, 285–86. 34. ​Gavin R. G. Hambly, “From Baghdad to Bukhara, from Ghazna to Delhi: The Khilʿa Ceremony in the Transmission of Kingly Pomp and Circumstance,” in Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture, ed. Stewart Gordon (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 215. 35. ​Dominique Sourdel, “Robes of Honor in ʿAbbasid Baghdad during the Eighth to Eleventh Centuries,” in Gordon, Robes and Honor, 141. 36. ​Paula Sanders, “Robes of Honor in Fatimid Egypt,” in Gordon, Robes and Honor, 232–33. For an account of the Fatimids bestowing robes of honor and a contract to rule on Saladin (who would ­later usurp the Fatimid dynasty), see Jonathan Phillips, The Life and Legend of the Sultan Saladin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 59–60. 37. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 501H, 10:210–211; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:305–6. 38. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:338. 39. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:64–65.

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the case with Roger of Plenco and Tancred of Conversano, respectively.40 In contrast to his practice of simply appointing governors in Ifriqiya, Roger was often directly involved in the conquest of cities in Italy and had deep-­seated rivalries with many of their leaders. His means of asserting power, therefore, alternated between acts of kindness to appease local populations and acts of extreme force to scare them into submission.41 Roger II’s approach in securing the loyalty of his governors in Ifriqiya was therefore distinct from his tactics on the Italian Peninsula. ­These disparate methods of conquest indicate that the Norman administration’s treatment of Ifriqiyan lords was informed by George of Antioch’s intimate knowledge of the Zirid court, and that the Norman conquerors sought to emulate Muslim po­liti­cal customs to pre­sent their administration in tems relatable to ­those they now governed. The individuals on whom the Normans conferred robes of honor w ­ ere members of elite Ifriqiyan families. In Sfax, Roger II initially wanted to appoint a member of the ʿulamaʾ, Abu al-­Hasan, but at Abu al-­Hasan’s request chose instead his son, ʿUmar ibn al-­Hasan.42 In Gabès, he appointed Muhammad ibn Rushayd, whose b­ rother had e­ arlier clashed with the usurper Yusuf over control of the city. In Sousse, he appointed Jabbara ibn Kamil al-­Fadighi, who had previously been an ally of the Zirids.43 In Tripoli, Roger appointed a member of the Banu Matruh, which had vied with the Almoravids for control of Tripoli prior to the Normans’ conquest.44 ­These appointments show that Roger sought to keep intact the status quo in his African cities. His governors ­were already established elites and, in the case of Sfax, Roger considered the wishes of the local leaders in determining who was to rule. In the cities of Gabès, Sfax, Sousse, and Tripoli, the po­liti­cal relationship between the Normans and their governors was detailed in an ʿaqd or ʿahd (contract) that Roger II sent to his governors.45 ­These contracts contained provisions about the religious freedom of Muslim communities and protocols for the administration of justice.46 They also likely included provisions about tax40. ​Loud, Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, 93, 191. 41. ​An overview of ­these conquests can be found in Houben, Ruler between East and West, 60–74. 42. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100. 43. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 30. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:358–59; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 291. 44. ​Ibn al-­Athir writes that Abu Muhammad ibn Matruh was the name of the appointed governor, while al-­Tijani notes that it was Abu Yahya ibn Matruh al-­Tamimi. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­ Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241–42. 45. ​An ‘aqd is a contract and an ‘ahd is a covenant. Both are used in Islamic law for the ­legal act of a contract, and ‘ahd is often “a virtual synonym” of ‘aqd. Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 349; Brett, “City-­State in Medieval Ifriqiya,” 83; Wael B. Hallaq, “Contracts and Alliances,” in Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1:431. 46. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 242.

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ation, which Norman officials and garrisons enforced, and other quotidian affairs that medieval chroniclers did not see fit to detail. As with the rest of the Normans’ policies for establishing rule over Ifriqiya, t­ hese contracts ­were presented to governors in a style that was familiar to them. The administration of Palermo was well equipped by the 1140s to write Arabic script in the style of an Islamic chancery, specifically emulating that of the Fatimids and Zirids.47 Although the specifics of ­these contracts are lost, we can be reasonably sure that their provisions ­were communicated in a way that was accessible to local governors. The Normans followed established po­liti­cal conventions in Ifriqiya by taking hostages from the families of t­ hose they appointed as governors. During the conquest of Tripoli in 541H (1146–47), George of Antioch took hostages from the city’s rival ruling parties—­the Almoravids and Banu Matruh.48 Once Roger II de­cided to appoint a member of the Banu Matruh as governor, he returned the Almoravid hostages but kept the ­others. At Sfax, Roger appointed ʿUmar ibn al-­Hasan as governor and took his ­father Abu al-­Hasan hostage. When ʿUmar ibn al-­Hasan revolted against Norman rule in 551H (1156–57), William I tried to use ʿUmar’s captive ­father as leverage to suppress the revolt, a strategy that ultimately failed.49 This practice of taking hostages to ensure the loyalty of vassals was common among medieval rulers across Eu­rope and the Mediterranean.50 The leverage that lords could exert over vassals by threatening their f­ amily members helped ensure the loyalty of parties that may not have had their best interests at heart. This was certainly the case in Norman Africa, where hostages helped to ensure at least nominal adherence to Norman policies (for the time being). In addition to installing governors, the Normans appointed qadis (judges) to mediate judicial disputes for a city’s Muslim population. Al-­Tijani describes how Roger II appointed the jurist Abu al-­Hajaj Yusuf ibn Ziri as qadi of Tripoli, with the power to ­settle the lawsuits of all Muslims, a power that Christians in the city could not oppose.51 No Arabic chronicles mention the names of judges appointed in other Ifriqiyan cities, but based on al-­Tijani’s descrip47. ​Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 351–52; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 193–211, 252–53; Jeremy Johns and Maria Andaloro, “The Arabic Inscriptions of the Norman Kings of Sicily: A Reinterpretation,” in The Royal Workshops in Palermo during the Reigns of the Norman and Hohenstaufen Kings of Sicily in the 12th and 13th ­Century (Catania, Italy: 2006), 324–37. 48. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55. 49. ​The fate of hostages from other cities in Ifriqiya that revolted against Norman rule is unknown. If the fate of Abu al-­Hasan is representative, they met an unpleasant end. 50. ​Adam  J. Kosto, “Hostages during the First C ­ entury of the Crusades,” Medieval Encounters 9, no. 1 (2003): 3–31; Adam J. Kosto, Hostages in the M ­ iddle Ages (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 51. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 242.

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tion of Tripoli, it is pos­si­ble that qadis w ­ ere appointed to administer to Muslim communities in other cities ­under Norman control. The Normans also stationed garrisons in their Ifriqiyan cities. Al-­Tijani reports, for example, that the Normans kept an army comprising “Muslims, Sicilians, and ­others” in Tripoli.52 The practice of fielding interfaith armies (presuming that al-­Tijani’s “Sicilians” ­were Christians) had been commonplace in the Norman regime since the reign of Roger I and was continued during Roger II’s conquests in Ifriqiya, where the presence of Muslims loyal to the Norman king may have provided some solace to indigenous Muslims wary of the idea of being governed by a Christian.53 This mixed garrison remained in the city ­until the ­people of Tripoli revolted against Norman rule in 553H (1158–59).54 In Mahdia, too, the Normans kept a garrison that was able to successfully withstand a siege in 551H (1156–57) and repulse the attackers back to Zawila.55 Although the presence of Norman soldiers in other Ifriqiyan cities is not explic­itly mentioned in surviving sources, it can be inferred from the need for governors to fight against “Franks” (al-­Franj) living in their towns during the revolts of the mid-1150s.56 The presence of Norman garrisons in Ifriqiya did not mean that Roger II and William I sought to rule with an iron fist. Indeed, based on the few described interactions between the Normans and their Ifriqiyan governors, the court of Palermo was restricted in what it could ask of them outside of their contractual obligations. In 548H (1153–54), for example, a co­ali­tion of tribes “from Tripoli to the furthest Maghreb” united against the encroaching armies of the Almohads.57 This co­ali­tion included the Norman governor of Sousse, Jabbara ibn Kamil al-­Fadighi. Looking to support this alliance, Roger offered five thousand of his own knights to fight with them on the condition that the participating Arab tribes provide hostages. The co­ali­tion refused, however, ­because they sought aid only from other Muslims. Although the alliance was promptly crushed by the Almohads, the ability of Jabbara ibn Kamil to refuse Norman military aid indicates that he had some degree of autonomy in governing Sousse and could form po­liti­cal relationships in­de­pen­dent of the 52. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241. 53. ​Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 33–79. 54. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 242. It is unknown how many soldiers ­were stationed in Tripoli or other Ifriqiyan cities; their numbers w ­ ere likely few, though, based on the speed with which the ­people of vari­ous Ifriqiyan cities w ­ ere able to overthrow Norman rule. 55. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:101. 56. ​At Sfax, for example, ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan told his p­ eople, “Let a group from among you climb the walls and a group proceed to the housing of the niṣāra [native Christians] and the franj [Franks], all of them, and kill them all!” Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100. 57. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:92–93.

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Normans.58 At Tripoli, too, the qadi Abu al-­Hajaj refused the demand of the Normans to curse the Almohads from his pulpit ­because it was “not in the contract between them.”59 ­These two examples demonstrate that local leaders retained certain rights and autonomy in their contractual relationship with the Normans.60 In Mahdia, the situation was dif­fer­ent. With the departure of the Zirid emir and his ­family, the Normans needed to fill the power vacuum in the city. Medieval sources do not provide direct evidence for whom the Normans appointed to rule Mahdia, but they hint that George of Antioch played a significant role in its early governance. Following the capture of Mahdia, he distributed the wealth of the Zirid court to local Arab tribes, sent soldiers to the countryside to inform Mahdia’s displaced inhabitants that the city was safe, and thwarted the plot of the displaced Zirid emir to travel to Egypt.61 George also used Mahdia as a base of operations from which to secure the loyalty of Gabès, Sfax, and Sousse. ­After ­these conquests, he launched an unsuccessful attack on the c­ astle of Kelibia on Cape Bon before he “withdrew to Mahdia.”62 ­These events led Ibn Khaldun to call George of Antioch the “lord of Mahdia.”63 In the years following the Norman capture of Mahdia in 543H (1148–49), the administrative role of George of Antioch is less concrete. George led campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean for several years before his death in 546H (1151–52).64 ­There are no surviving rec­ords of his return to Mahdia, but based on his prior involvement in the city, it is conceivable that he governed or took an active role in managing it. Indeed, the centrality of George of Antioch to the conquests and governance of Norman Africa was such that Adalgisa de Simone referred to him as Roger II’s “alter ego for African politics.”65 Even less is known about the governance of Mahdia ­after George of Antioch’s death in 546H (1151–52). Al-­Idrisi vaguely indicates that “a governor in the ser­vice of the ­g reat king Roger” lived in Mahdia, though he does not 58. ​On issues of po­liti­cal in­de­pen­dence in cities governed by medieval Muslim lords in Ifriqiya, see Fukuzo Amabe, Urban Autonomy in Medieval Islam: Damascus, Aleppo, Cordoba, Toledo, Valencia and Tunis (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 165–84. 59. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 242. 60. ​Johns argues that Roger II was acting “exactly as a Muslim ruler would have done” with regard to governance in Ifriqiya. Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 291. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can speculate that the Normans followed this strategy in other cities that they seized along the coast, like Bône. The only evidence for this city comes from al-­Idrisi, who mentions that Roger II installed a governor from the Banu Hammad at Bône following its conquest in 548H (1153–54). Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:291. 61. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:63–64. 62. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:64. 63. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:233–34. 64. ​Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 129–32. 65. ​Simone, “Ruggero II e l’Africa islamica,” 128.

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specify anything about this person.66 The individuals most commonly named in conjunction with Norman Ifriqiya during this time, though, are George of Antioch’s successors, Philip of Mahdia and Maio of Bari. Philip, who might have been sold as a slave in Mahdia, led a campaign against the city of Bône in 548H (1153–54) and then returned to Mahdia with captives, which indicates that he used the city as a base from which to launch this attack.67 Several years ­later, Maio acted as the chief adviser to William I during the revolts in Ifriqiya against Norman rule, so it would be unsurprising if he had been involved to some degree in the administration of Mahdia.68 ­There is also evidence that the Normans actively promoted Chris­tian­ity in Mahdia, although the details for this are slim. We know from Ibn al-­Athir that churches existed in Mahdia during the reign of the Zirids, for some Muslims sought refuge in them when George of Antioch conquered the city.69 The Latin chronicles of Sigebert of Gembloux and Robert of Torigni also mention that Roger II installed an archbishop of Mahdia and that William I appointed an archbishop in the suburb of Zawila, respectively.70 ­Little e­ lse is known about the infrastructure for Chris­tian­ity in the city beyond what is found in the inventories of the Cathedral of Mahdia and the Church of Saint Nicholas, which survived the Almohad conquest of the city in 1160 thanks to the efforts of Archbishop Cosmas of Mahdia.71 The inventories of ­these two Mahdian churches detail dozens of textiles, books, and ecclesiastical accoutrements that range from priests’ gold rings to old towels. Although ­these inventories are too vague to make any definitive statements about the places or dates of production of individual items, they still provide evidence of a church that the Normans had revitalized to some degree.72 They describe a variety of “old” and “very old” artifacts alongside newer and 66. ​Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:283. 67. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:93. 68. ​Falcandus, La historia o Liber de regno Sicilie, 24–28. 69. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:64 70. ​ Sigeberti Gemblacensis chronica, MGH, SS, 6:454; Robert of Torigni, Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I, 4:191. 71. ​­These inventories w ­ ere first published in L. Garofalo, Tabularium regiae ac imperialis capellae collegiate divi Petri in regio panormitano palatio (Palermo: Regia Typographia, 1835). They w ­ ere ­later republished in Henri Bresc, “Le royaume normand d’Afrique et l’archevêché de Mahdiyya,” in Le partage du monde: Échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée médiévale, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris: Publications of the Sorbonne, 1998), 362–66. 72. ​Dolezalek’s study of the inventories concludes that “evidence of specific textile connections . . . ​ is hard to find,” and while certain parallels can be observed between garments described in the inventories and surviving ones in Sicily, ­these styles w ­ ere common in the Mediterranean and are impossible to pin down to one location. Isabelle Dolezalek, “Textile Connections? Two Ifrīqiyan Church Trea­sures in Norman Sicily and the Prob­lem of Continuity across Po­liti­cal Change,” Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 25, no. 1 (2013): 104.

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more ostentatious items.73 This juxtaposition indicates that a recent (i.e., Norman) presence in Mahdia brought an injection of wealth to the once-­ailing church that enabled the purchase or commission of new paraphernalia for priests to better administer to Christians.74 ­These renovated Christian spaces ­were vis­i­ble to ­people living in Mahdia in ways that are suggested by t­ hese inventories: improvements to ecclesiastical infrastructure, the spectacle of ostentatiously clothed priests, and the sound of church bells.75 Con­temporary texts do ­little to help us reconstruct the presence of Chris­ tian­ity in areas outside of Mahdia during the time of the Norman kingdom of Africa. Surviving sources testify to the gradual shrinking of Christian communities in Ifriqiya from the mid-­eleventh through the mid-­twelfth ­century.76 When the Normans conquered the Ifriqiyan coastline, they governed over cities that w ­ ere predominately Muslim with small pockets of indigenous Christians alongside Christian merchants who conducted business in the region. No direct evidence from the cities of Gabès, Sfax, Sousse, and Tripoli testifies to the establishment or enhancement of churches ­under Norman rule. Circumstantial evidence, however, supports the idea that the status of the church was elevated to some degree in ­these cities. Newly arrived Christian merchants and soldiers required places to pray and priests to administer religious ser­vices. It is likely that similar to the Mahdian churches, other churches in Ifriqiya re73. ​Item #23 from the inventory of the Cathedral of Mahdia reads, “One ­great gold ring of a bishop with a ­great sapphire and four smaller jacinths, two emeralds and two dark-­green emeralds and four pearls and four smaller pearls.” Other entries are less descriptive. Entry #4 from the inventory of the Church of Saint Nicholas describes “another silver cross decorated with bronze,” and entry #41 from the same inventory mentions “four old palliums.” Bresc, “Royaume normand d’Afrique,” 363–66. 74. ​The cata­log from Archbishop Cosmas contains only items that could be evacuated from Mahdia before the arrival of the Almohads. It is pos­si­ble that other items had to be left ­behind for lack of space, particularly large items like altarpieces. 75. ​The liturgical language of ­these churches, Latin, could also have altered the religious soundscape of the cities, which had been dominated by the Islamic call to prayer. Dominique Valérian, “La permanence du christianisme au Maghreb: L’apport problématique des sources latines,” in Valérian, Islamisation et arabisation, 149. 76. ​Pope Leo IX wrote two letters to the bishops of Carthage and Gummi (Mahdia) near the end of 1053 in which he lamented how at one point the African church held a council of 205 bishops, but now ­there w ­ ere only five bishops. J. P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae Latina, vol. 143 (Paris, 1853), 727–31. Twenty years ­later, Pope Gregory VII mentioned in a letter that although fewer than three bishops remain in North Africa, the bishop of Carthage would retain his supremacy t­ here. He also corresponded with the Hammadid emir al-­Nasir and approved the appointment of a bishop to administer to Christians in his lands Gregorii VII Registrum, MGH, Epistolae, Epp. Sel., 2.1:39–40, 287–88. On the decline of Chris­tian­ity in medieval North Africa, see Mohamed Talbi, “Le christianisme maghrébin de la conquête musulmane à sa disparition: Une tentative d’explication,” in Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, ed. Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi (Toronto: Medieval Institute Publications, 1990), 313–51; Prevost, L’aventure ibāḍite, 320–27; Valérian, “Permanence du christianisme au Maghreb”; Brett Whalen, “Corresponding with Infidels: Rome, the Almohads, and the Christians of Thirteenth-­Century Morocco,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 41, no. 3 (2011): 487–513.

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ceived infusions of wealth from e­ ither the Normans or private donors, so that clerics could better administer to ­these populations. The l­ittle evidence to survive from the islands between Sicily and Ifriqiya indicates that the Normans took an active role in governing them, too. ­After the attack on Djerba in 529H (1134–35), the Normans maintained a presence on the island that proved to be disruptive for the indigenous Ibadi communities. The paucity of evidence from Djerban Ibadi sources about the continuation of rule of the ʿazzāba (council of Ibadi notables) on the island during the ­middle of the twelfth ­century led Virginie Prevost to conclude that Djerba was governed by the Normans directly.77 This lack of evidence for native Djerban governance on the island, combined with the Djerbans’ revolts against Norman rule in 548H (1153–54) and 551H (1156–57), indicates that the Normans had some form of established presence on the island and suppressed to some degree indigenous po­liti­cal structures ­there.78 Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Normans w ­ ere able to exercise control over the entirety of Djerba. The Ibadi inhabitants of the island had long been located on the peripheries of major empires—­both Christian and Muslim—­ which led them to construct substantial networks of coastal and inland fortifications for their own protection.79 Mosques, built both above ground and below ground, served as places of prayer and defensive hubs through which locals could resist outside rule.80 The lack of urban centers on Djerba during the medieval period, as indicated by archaeological evidence, meant that the population was scattered across the island in small estates that tended to cluster 77. ​Prevost, L’aventure ibāḍite, 203–9, 233–34. Paul Love similarly concluded that Ibadi texts from the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries indicate a “volatile period of po­liti­cal change in the Maghrib” and give the impression of an Djerban “community u ­ nder constant threat.” Paul M. Love Jr., Ibadi Muslims of North Africa: Manuscripts, Mobilization, and the Making of a Written Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 64–65. Farhat Jaʿbiri referred to the time of the Norman invasion as a time when the “system was weak.” Farhat Jaʿbiri, Nizam al-­ʿAzzaba ʿInda al-­ʿIbadiya al-­Wahbiya fi Jarba (Tunis: INAA, 1975), 197–98. See also Abu Zakariya, Kitab Siyar al-­Aʾimma wa Akhbarihim, ed. Ismaʿil al-­ʿArabi (Algiers: Dar al-­Maghrib al-­Islami, 1979). 78. ​Brett, on the basis of Ibn Abi Dinar’s chronicle, also argues that the Normans appointed their own governor for the island. Ibn Abi Dinar, Al-­Muʾnis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa-­Tunis, 95; Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 348. Prevost, too, states that “it is certain that Djerba is the region that suffered the most cruelty from the Norman attacks” in Ifriqiya. Prevost, L’aventure ibāḍite, 234. 79. ​Archaeological work conducted on Djerba reveals l­ittle about settlement patterns during the twelfth ­century. The thirteenth-­century campaigns and occupation of the island by the admiral Roger of Lauria left a more substantial mark on the island’s physical landscape. Nonetheless, Holod and Kahlaoui argue that Ibadi mosques on the island ­were used to maintain the local “po­liti­cal, social, and administrative structure at a distance from the rule of the invaders.” Renata Holod and Tarek Kahlaoui, “Guarding a Well-­Ordered Space on a Mediterranean Island,” in The Archaeology of Medieval Islamic Frontiers: From the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea, ed. A. Asa Eger (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2019), 61. 80. ​Virginie Prevost, “Les mosquées ibadites du Maghreb,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, no. 125 (2009): 217–32.

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around mosques.81 Although the Normans w ­ ere likely able to establish a foothold over part of the island, it would not have been pos­si­ble for them to subjugate the entire the island without a substantial military investment.82 In any case, the survival of Ibadi communities on Djerba well past the twelfth ­century testifies to their enduring presence even in the face of Norman invasion. At Malta and Gozo, which are located some fifty-­five miles off the coast of Sicily, ­there is also evidence for Norman governance. A document from 1198 rewards the ­people of Malta and Gozo for their loyalty to the Norman monarchy by making the island part of the royal demesne.83 Written in both Latin and Arabic, the document also exempts the Christians of the islands from paying a tax that King Roger II had imposed on them previously for killing a Muslim. The ability (or even desire) of Roger to levy this tax during his reign indicates direct royal involvement on ­these islands. Likewise, ­there must have been some form of administrative infrastructure in place on the islands to facilitate the collection of this tax. With no evidence that specifically considers Pantelleria and the Kerkennah Islands, we can speculate that the Normans treated them similar to Djerba, Malta, and Gozo.

The Economy of Norman Africa Norman governance in Ifriqiya brought economic growth through the improvement of local infrastructure, the resettlement of cities, and the promotion of trade. ­These actions helped bolster the economy of the struggling Ifriqiyan littoral, which had been suffering from years of drought and emigration. Despite this overall growth, the effects of economic stabilization w ­ ere uneven. Muslims living in Ifriqiya ­were forced to pay a jizya-­style head tax that the Normans levied on non-­Christians. Merchant letters from the Cairo Geniza indicate that years of on-­and-­off conflict in and around Ifriqiya had an overwhelmingly negative effect on commerce for members of Jewish community, many of whom left the region. Their abandonment of Ifriqiya left openings for Christian traders from Italy, who prospered from increased business ­under the Normans and (­later) the Almohads. Economic improvements that the Nor81. ​Holod and Kahlaoui, “Guarding a Well-­Ordered Space,” 68. 82. ​Even con­temporary sources indicate the difficulty that the Normans would have had in conquering the entire island. Al-­Idrisi writes that the p­ eople of Djerba are “seditious and prone to renouncing their allegiances.” Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:305–6. He also confusingly mentions a second island adjacent to Djerba, the origins of which are unclear. Virginie Prevost, “Zîzû, l’île mystérieuse d’al-­Idrîsî,” Acta Orientalia Belgica 18 (2005): 323–38. 83. ​Jamil and Johns, “New Latin-­Arabic Document,” 112.

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mans brought to the southern shores of the Mediterranean thus favored Christians at the expense of Muslims and Jews, which contributed to revolts against Norman rule in the 1150s. Prior to the arrival of the Normans in Ifriqiya, the region’s economy had under­gone seismic changes for the better part of a c­ entury. The rise of groups like the Banu Hilal led to the repurposing of much of the agricultural land in inland Ifriqiya for pastoral use and as a result, infrastructure like aqueducts fell into disuse. Catastrophic drought in the 1140s likewise led to widespread starvation and emigration. Although p­ eople living in Ifriqiya still produced a variety of goods for consumption and export, medieval geographers paint unflattering pictures of some Ifriqiyan cities in the mid-­twelfth ­century as compared to e­ arlier accounts.84 Al-­Bakri, who wrote in the 1060s, glowingly describes the many suburbs, markets, and caravanserai of Gabès. He notes its three ports and mentions that it is the only city in Ifriqiya to produce silk.85 The state of Gabès as described by the geographer al-­Idrisi in the 1150s, however, is much dif­fer­ent. Al-­Idrisi mentions that the port is in a terrible condition and that the p­ eople of the city often resort to banditry.86 Although he mentions the plentiful olive trees that grow in the city, he does not mention silk production or the many suburbs that al-­Bakri highlighted. Al-­Idrisi likewise writes that the city of Sfax, although populous, had “buildings, markets, and commerce” that w ­ ere “diminished from what they once ­were.”87 A priority for the conquering Normans, therefore, was to return the region to some degree of economic prosperity in order to enrich the Kingdom of Sicily.88 The Norman fleet led by George of Antioch treated the cities it conquered in Ifriqiya mildly compared to how the Normans had acted in similar conquests undertaken by Roger II in Sicily and southern Italy. The Normans briefly looted the cities in Ifriqiya that resisted, before sending messages of safe conduct. Although the Normans certainly brought death and destruction to ­these places—­ particularly Sfax and Djerba—­this destruction was minimal compared to the devastation of some of Roger II’s conquests in southern Italy. At Venosa, for 84. ​Idris, Berbérie orientale, 2:625–30. 85. ​Al-­Bakri, Al-­Masalik wa-­l-­Mamalik, 2:189–92. 86. ​Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:279–80. Although medieval geographers must be read skeptically due to their frequent reliance on ­earlier works and tropes relating to miraculous occurrences, al-­Idrisi’s departure from the work of al-­Bakri in this circumstance indicates that his information came from contemporaries and was not reused from e­ arlier compendia. His mention of the toponym Antijan in Djerba, for example, is unique to his chronicle and indicates he had access to sources familiar with the island ­after the Normans’ 1135 conquest. Annliese Nef, “Al-­Idrīsī: Un complément d’enquête biographique,” in Géographes et voyageurs au moyen âge, ed. Henri Bresc and Emmanuelle Tixier du Mesnil (Nanterre: Presses Universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2010), 60–61. 87. ​Al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:281. 88. ​Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 595–96.

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example, where the ­people of the city had sided with his rival Tancred of Conversano, Roger punished them with “such cruelty ­towards Christian ­people as has scarcely or ever been heard of in our ­century.”89 At Montepeloso, Roger executed a traitorous governor by hanging, then sacked the city and burned it to the ground.90 At Bisceglie, Trani, and Bari, he destroyed the fortifications and resettled parts of the population to quell unrest.91 The disparate treatment of cities in southern Italy and Ifriqiya indicates dif­fer­ent motives for conquering them. In southern Italy during the 1130s, Roger often used a combination of vio­lence and leniency to ensure the submission of its ­people. In Ifriqiya, George of Antioch showed relative restraint ­toward the local populations, both elites and commoners, to facilitate economic growth. This recovery came in several forms. Ibn al-­Athir reports that following the Norman conquest of Tripoli in 541H (1146–47), the Normans remained in the city for six months to fortify the walls and dig a moat around them.92 While the Normans worked on t­ hese improvements, displaced residents returned to the city and affairs ­there returned to normal. In other cities that suffered infrastructural damage due to the Normans’ conquests, it is likely that Norman garrisons worked on similar proj­ects. Unfortunately, no archaeological evidence survives of Norman building proj­ects in Ifriqiya. Lézine speculates that the remains of one tower in Mahdia might be of Norman construction, but provides l­ittle evidence to pin its construction down to the twelve years of Norman rule t­ here.93 Since Lézine’s examination of the tower, the tower has been altered by Tunisian authorities, rendering it even more difficult to judge its historical merits—­though it is still locally known as the “Tour Normande.”94 The Norman administration also encouraged immigration to its Ifriqiyan holdings. Al-­Tijani notes the settlement of many Franks in the city of Sfax a­ fter its conquest.95 Ibn al-­Athir similarly mentions that p­ eople from Sicily and the lands of the Rum (a broad term typically applied to the Byzantine Empire, though ­here it may just mean Christian lands generally) ­were encouraged to immigrate to Tripoli.96 Robert of Torigni also rec­ords that William I sought 89. ​This description comes from the chronicle of Falco of Benevento, who was critical of the Norman monarchy. Translation is from Loud, Creation of the Kingdom of Sicily, 204. 90. ​Alexander of Telese, who was a supporter of Roger II, justifies this harsh treatment on the grounds that King Zedekiah met a similar fate when he betrayed Nebuchadnezzar. Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis, 112:44–45. 91. ​Alexander of Telese, Alexandri Telesini abbatis, 112:47. 92. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55. 93. ​Lézine, Mahdiya, 57–58. 94. ​Masmoudi, Mahdia, 350. 95. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 74–75. See also Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 354. 96. ​Ibn al-­Athir writes that “the ­people of Sicily and the Rum ­were compelled to travel” to Tripoli. This could indicate that Roger II and/or the Byzantines made refugees immigrate to the city. Richards,

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Figure 5.  The so-­called Norman Tower of Mahdia c. 1965. Alexandre Lézine, Mahdiya: Recherches d’archaéologie islamique (Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck, 1965), photo­graph 52. Copyright held by Éditions Klincksieck, Paris, 1965.

to s­ ettle Christians in Zawila during the 1150s, around the same time that he appointed an archbishop t­ here.97 Although ­these texts indicate that the Normans sought to repopulate their coastal holdings in Ifriqiya, they do not provide specifics about the p­ eople who immigrated to Ifriqiya aside from the broad designators mentioned above. During the twelfth c­ entury, the Kingdom of Sicily was home to diverse communities of Christians, Muslims, and Jews of varying ethnicities and socioeconomic classes. ­These immigrants to Ifriqiya could have been drawn from any of ­these groups. I expect, however, that the Norman kings encouraged immigration from ­those (predominately Muslim) groups that had been driven from Ifriqiya to Sicily in the 1140s—­especially too, is uncertain of the intent of this sentence. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 541H, 11:55; Richards, Chronicle of Ibn al-­Athir, 1:380. 97. ​Robert of Torigni, Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I, 4:191.

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Figure 6.  The so-­called Norman Tower of Mahdia, pre­sent day. Photo­graph by Seif Allah Bouneb, https://­www​.­flickr​.­com​/­photos​/­78838522@N05​/­7223875940​/­in​/­photostream. Licensed ­under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0) license.

given the increasingly tenuous relationship between Muslims and Christians in Sicily during the ­later reign of Roger II and the reign of William I. The Normans’ actions in Ifriqiya show that their intention was to facilitate the revival of coastal cities in order to promote commerce through them.98 But did the Normans’ plan for commercial growth work? ­Were ­these changes enough to offset the years of vio­lence that had afflicted the central Mediterranean? The answer to t­ hese questions depends on the group in question. For Jewish merchants, Norman involvement in Ifriqiya had negative consequences that led them to largely abandon the region. For Italian Christian merchants, the presence of the Normans in Ifriqiya led to new commercial opportunities that worked in tandem with their larger efforts to conduct trade across the southern Mediterranean. Merchant letters from the Cairo Geniza show the perils of conducting commerce in the central Mediterranean due to vio­lence between the Zirids and Normans. One letter from 1136 tells of captives taken during the Norman con98. ​David Abulafia argues that the Normans “took care to treat the Mahdiyyans well; the royal court knew that Mahdiyya was an impor­tant trade centre, and t­ here was ­g reat anxiety lest business should be transferred elsewhere.” Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 34.

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quest of Djerba, including one Jewish cantor, arriving in Egypt to be ransomed in Fatimid markets.99 Another letter, written by the merchant Abu Sa’id, specifies that his boat encountered the Norman fleet that had conquered Djerba. Although the non-­Christians on board his boat ­were horrified, they ­were not harmed. He then mentions that he arrived safely in Bougie, which was controlled by the Hammadids, and did “profitable business” ­there.100 The fear that Abu Sa’id’s fellow travelers felt on seeing the Norman fleet supports the idea that conflict between the Normans and Ifriqiyan lords cultivated an atmosphere of fear among local inhabitants and merchants conducting business in the area. Vio­lence directed against Jewish populations in and around Ifriqiya during the 1130s caused some families to emigrate. An 1136 Geniza letter mentions that famine and debts, potentially caused by the Norman attack on Djerba, led a man to sell his large home on the island for ninety dinars.101 A letter from the ­middle of the twelfth c­ entury likewise bemoans the situation in Tunis, where prices w ­ ere high “in t­ hese difficult times.”102 In another letter, this one from 1140, a merchant laments the fate of Ifriqiya: “I entered Sicily with my ­family coming from Tunis ­because of the privations suffered ­there and the horrors witnessed in Ifriqiya and also b­ ecause of my longing for you. I intended to travel to Egypt via Sicily, for it is no longer pos­si­ble to travel to Egypt directly from Ifriqiya. . . . ​If you intend to move [from Egypt], the best t­ hing is to come to Sicily (or, Palermo), for the spices of the Orient sell ­here well.”103 This merchant, dismayed by the horrors of Ifriqiya and its failing markets, urges his fellow traders to focus on Sicilian markets. In the years a­ fter 1140, when vio­lence between the Zirids and Normans escalated, the reputation of Ifriqiya among the Geniza merchants fell even further.104 A letter written by Abraham Yiju around 1148—at the pinnacle of drought in Ifriqiya and Norman aggression in the region—­testifies to the bleakness of the situation: Find out who is the best of the sons of my ­brother Joseph or the sons of your s­ ister Berakha, so that I may marry him off to my ­daughter. ­After your coming ­here, we ­shall live in Aden or Fustat or Alexandria, if it ­will 99. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 324; Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:117–18. 100. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 324. 101. ​Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:283. 102. ​Simonsohn, Jews in Sicily, document 176. 103. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 325. 104. ​The jurist al-­Mazari wrote a number of ­legal opinions that pertain to trade conducted by Muslim merchants between Sicily and Ifriqiya. Unfortunately, the chronological scope of ­these cases is so broad (from roughly the end of the eleventh ­century ­until 1141) that it is difficult to use them to pin down trends in trade during specific years or even de­cades. Davis-­Secord, “Muslims in Norman Sicily,” 59–66.

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not be pos­si­ble for us to go to al-­Mahdiyya or to Ifriqiya, namely, to Tunis or Qayrawān. Every­thing, of course, is in God’s hand. . . . ​I heard what happened to the coastland of Ifriqiya, Tripoli, Djerba, Qarqanna, Sfax, al-­Mahdiyya, and Sūsa. No letter, however, from which I could learn who died and who remained alive, has arrived. By God, write exact details and send your letters with reliable ­people to soothe my mind.105 For Abraham Yiju, the Norman conquest of the Ifriqiyan littoral brought destruction and uncertainty. He did not know who in his community had survived the devastation, and he was unsure if he would be able to travel t­ here in the ­future. While the letter testifies to the continued presence of Jews in Ifriqiya up to the Norman conquests, it does not provide an optimistic view of their ­future. Many Jews likely emigrated. Goitein shows, for example, that the ­family of a man named Perahya (a nephew of Abraham Yiju) left Ifriqiya around the time of the Norman conquest of Mahdia in 1148 and moved to the port of Mazara in Sicily, where conditions for Jews w ­ ere more favorable.106 The letters of the Cairo Geniza thus indicate that conflict between the Normans and Zirids during the twelfth ­century had adverse effects on Jewish merchants and their families. The commercial void left by the emigration of Jews from Ifriqiya was filled by Christian traders. The ascent of ­these merchants, specifically Genoese ones, is most explicit in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba, which is the first systematic rec­ord of trade from Genoa and the oldest extant cartulary from Eu­rope.107 It contains 1,306 ­legal acts written between 1154 and 1164, some of which detail the involvement of Genoese merchants in Sicily and Ifriqiya.108 In t­ hese entries, 105. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 206. 106. ​Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 201–6, 327–30; Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis, 34–35. On the Jews of Norman Sicily, see Benjamin of Tudela, World of Benjamin of Tudela, 278–82; David Jacoby, “Silk Crosses the Mediterranean,” in Le vie del Mediterraneo: Idee, uomini, oggetti (secoli XI–­XVI), ed. G. Airaldi (Genoa: ECIG, 1997), 55–79; Henri Bresc, Arabes de langue, juifs de religion: L’evolution du judaïsme sicilien dans l’environnement latin, XIIe–­XVe siècles (Paris: Éditions Bouchène, 2001); Henri Bresc, “La Sicile médiévale, terre de refuge pour les juifs: Migration et exil,” Al-­Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean 17, no. 1 (2005): 31–46; Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 493–96; Simonsohn, Between Scylla and Charybdis, 77–93. 107. ​Mario Chiaudano, ed., Il cartolare di Giovanni Scriba (Turin: S. Lattes & C. Editori, 1935). Cartularies ­were books, usually made of paper, in which a notary recorded l­egal acts on a variety of subjects. With the appropriate witnesses, documents in ­these cartularies “carried the force of law, and hence the cartulary served as a repository of memory in a society still overwhelmingly oral.” Steven Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 55. 108. ​David Abulafia and Erik Bach have carried out exhaustive work on the content of t­hese contracts. Erik Bach, La cité de Gênes au XIIe siècle (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1955); David Abulafia, “L’attività commerciale genovese nell’Africa normanna: La città di Tripoli,” in Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi sulla Sicilia Normanna (Palermo: Istituto di storia medievale Università di Palermo, 1973), 1–8; Abulafia, Two Italies, 89–122.

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Genoese trade with Tripoli is mentioned on three separate occasions from June 1157 to July 1164. The chronological scope of t­ hese charters is significant, for it begins during and extends beyond the time when the Normans controlled the city.109 The first entry, dated June  1157, involves Albertono de Custode, Oberto Corso, and Enrico Fledemerio creating a societas (commercial u ­ nion) with plans for Enrico to conduct business in Tripoli that summer and the following summer.110 The next, dated September 1160, sees the banker Baldwin and Oberto Transasco forming a societas for trade to Tripoli and elsewhere.111 The third, dated July  1164, describes a loan from Geremino to Vassallo di Minuta, which included a ship that had previously been trading in Tripoli.112 Although t­ hese charters provide clear evidence of Genoese trade passing through Tripoli during and ­after Norman control of the city, the content of ­these charters only scratches the surface of Italian-­Ifriqiya trade during the mid-­twelfth c­ entury. The format of Giovanni Scriba’s cartularies is such that only one destination of a given venture is supplied, which Abulafia calls the “first place of destination.”113 As such, it is difficult to know ­whether Genoese merchants trading in Tripoli also conducted business in other Norman ports on the coast of Ifriqiya such as Gabès, Mahdia, Sfax, and Sousse.114 Other entries from this cartulary show that Genoese merchants ­were actively trading in Tunis from 1155 onward, so it is pos­si­ble that they also trafficked their goods to other nearby Ifriqiyan ports.115 Likewise, it is unknown how the trading patterns of ­these Genoese merchants compared to traders in other cities like 109. ​The Genoese possibly enjoyed special trading benefits in Tripoli based on a contract made between Palermo and Genoa in 1156. This contract, made by two Genoese consulars on behalf of the commune, details the reduced taxes that Genoese merchants would pay at Norman ports. Although Norman cities in Africa are not considered explic­itly, it is pos­si­ble that some of the trading privileges granted to them in this treaty extended to the Normans’ African ports. Enzensberger, Guillelmi I diplomata, document 18. See also Abulafia, Two Italies, 94. 110. ​Chiaudano, Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, 1:99. A societas was one of three forms of contract used in the cartulary. In a societas, both partners contributed capital for a trading venture. One of the partners traveled to the designated location, sold the capital, and then the two partners divided the net profits between themselves. This is distinct from the commenda, in which a traveling partner took capital from an investor and traded it in return for a share of the profit, and the sea loan, in which a partner borrowed money for a venture and promised to pay a specified sum in return. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 56. 111. ​Chiaudano, Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, 1:414. 112. ​Chiaudano, Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, 2:217. ­There are two other contracts in the cartulary that refer to the city in the names of traders, but they do not mention the city aside from t­ hese names. Chiaudano, Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, 2:187, 219–20. 113. ​Abulafia, Two Italies, 111. 114. ​In Genoa, Tripoli was a “common destination” for sea loans during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Quentin Van Doosselaere, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 129–30. 115. ​Chiaudano, Cartolare di Giovanni Scriba, 1:17, 41–42, 107, 127, 198, 209, 262, 410, and 2:83–84, 156, 163–164, 202, 231, 240.

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Palermo and Pisa, both of which had economic connections to Norman Africa.116 Genoese commercial interests in North Africa extended far beyond the Normans’ ephemeral conquests of the Ifriqiyan littoral. Genoa negotiated a treaty with the Almohads at the beginning of the 1160s and regularly renewed treaties that secured the protection of Genoese merchant ships in Almohad lands.117 By 1182, port cities in Ifriqiya accounted for 37 ­percent of overall Genoese trade.118 This traffic is reflected in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba, in which t­ here are seventy-­three contracts that involve North Africa (excluding Egypt), most which directed trade to the ports of Bougie and Tunis.119 For comparison, Scriba rec­ords eighty-­four contracts for trade in Sicily and fifty-­ eight for Alexandria. The total value of the contracts from North Africa was ₤6,103, whereas Sicily and Alexandria accounted for ₤6,689 and ₤9,031, respectively. From this we see that contracts for the cities of North Africa comprised a substantial and profitable portion of the cartulary.120 Unfortunately, no quantitative data exists with which to contrast this activity with e­ arlier Genoese trading patterns.121 Anecdotal evidence, including accounts of the 1087 Pisan/Genoese attack on Mahdia and a 1136 Genoese raid on Bougie, indicates Genoese interest in profiting from coastal Ifriqiya prior to the establishment of the Norman kingdom of Africa.122 A lack of charter 116. ​Mohamed Ouerfelli, “Les traités de paix et de commerce entre Pise et l’Égypte au moyen âge,” in L’autorité de l’écrit au moyen âge (Orient-­Occident) (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2009), 45–57. On ­later Pisan correspondence with the Almohads, see Pascal Buresi, Travis Bruce, and Mehdi Ghouirgate, “Les usages linguistiques dans les relations entre Almohades et Pisans (début XIII e siècle),” in Les langues de la négociation du moyen âge à l’époque contemporaine (Rennes, 2012), https://­ halshs​.­archives​-­ouvertes​.­fr​/­halshs​-­01453185​/­document. 117. ​Remie Constable, Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900–1500 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42–44; Baadj, Saladin, 68–69. 118. ​David Abulafia, The ­Great Sea: A ­Human History of the Mediterranean (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 298. 119. ​Bach, Cité de Gênes, 50–51; Abulafia, Two Italies, 99. 120. ​When all overseas contracts are totaled, North Africa comprises 18 ­percent (₤6,103/₤33,905) of total trade in the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. Abulafia, Two Italies, 99; Michel Balard, “Notes sur le commerce entre l’Italie et l’Égypte sous les Fatimides,” in L’Égypte fatimide: Son art et son histoire (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris–­Sorbonne, 1999), 627–33. 121. ​The Pisans also traded with the Almohad caliphate and other Muslim powers in the central and western Mediterranean. Constable, Trade and Traders, 42–44; Dominique Valérian, “Les marchands latins dans les ports musulmans méditerraneéns: Une minorité confinée dans des espaces communautaires?,” Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée, 107–110 (September 2005): 437–58; David Abulafia, “Christian Merchants in the Almohad Cities,” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 2, no. 2 (June 2010): 251–57. 122. ​Epstein chronicles the gradual shift in Genoese trading interests t­ oward the eastern Mediterranean during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, so it is pos­si­ble that Genoese trade was more focused on Ifriqiya and the Maghreb in the years prior to the creation of Scriba’s cartulary. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 38–53; Georges Jehel, L’Italie et le Maghreb au moyen âge: Conflits et échanges du VIIe au XVe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), 67.

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or tax-­based evidence, however, inhibits any direct statistical comparison with the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba. In addition, we o ­ ught not to use this cartulary as indicative of the practices of all merchants operating in Genoa. Giovanni Scriba was working with a small slice of the Genoese mercantile community.123 This invaluable set of contracts reveals Genoese trade with Ifriqiya during Norman and Almohad rule, but it should not be used to make overarching claims about the collective trading interests of this one city. Norman governance in Ifriqiya also brought changes to taxation through the collection of a jizya-­style tax.124 This was an innovation of the administration of Norman Sicily: the adaptation of a head tax that Muslim lords levied on Christians and Jews into a tax that the Christian Normans levied on Muslims and Jews. Arabic sources indicate that the Normans levied this tax on their Ifriqiyan territories.125 Ibn Khaldun wrote that Roger II took over the coast of Ifriqiya and “placed on its ­people the jizya” around the year 1148.126 In other parts of his chronicle, Ibn Khaldun also individually mentions the cities of Tripoli, Sousse, Sfax, Mahdia, and Djerba being subjected to the jizya.127 Although the institution of this tax provided revenue for the Norman trea­sury, the mechanisms by which it was collected are unknown. Collection of the tax likely fell to local governors, who then forwarded its revenue to Norman officials in their respective cities for transportation to Palermo.128 What­ever the efficacy of this tax or the method of collection, the jizya had substantial po­liti­cal 123. ​Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 55–56. 124. ​­There is insufficient numismatic evidence to make a convincing argument about pos­si­ble changes to coinage that the Normans may have made in Ifriqiya. The existence of two triumphal Norman dinars shows that they minted coins in Mahdia, but nothing e­ lse is known about the circulation of Ifriqiyan-­minted coins u ­ nder Norman rule. The last surviving coin from Ifriqiya in the years before the Norman conquests was a 461H (1068–69) coin from the governor of Sfax, Hammu ibn Malil. H ­ azard states that “no coins are recorded from the other local Arab and Berber rulers of cities or tribes in Tunisia, Tripolitania, or eastern Algeria during this turbulent period, though some few of them may have minted a ­little gold.” ­Hazard, Numismatic History, 56; Grierson and Travaini, Italy III, 14:77–79, 104–6. 125. ​Metcalfe, “Muslims of Sicily,” 296, 316; Annliese Nef, “Imaginaire impérial, empire et œcuménisme religieux: Quelques réflexions depuis la Sicile des Hauteville,” Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales 24 (2012): 232–33. 126. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:213. 127. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:231–34. This evidence throws into question the argument of Michael Brett, who wrote that it was conceivable that the jizya was levied in cities u ­ nder direct Norman control like Mahdia, but that the Normans did not do so in cities ruled by local Arab or Berber governors “on psychological grounds.” He speculates that the “gentleness” of the ruling Normans extended to “Muslim pride as well as Muslim pockets,” which makes the the application of the jizya unlikely. Brett, “Muslim Justice u ­ nder Infidel Rule,” 350. Abulafia and Idris, among o ­ thers, state that the Normans levied the jizya on the p­ eople of Ifriqiya. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:360; Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 34; Catlos, Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, 106. 128. ​In the context of Sicily, the poet Ibn Qalaqis urged his patron Abu al-­Qasim to cease collection of the jizya, which was a burden to the Muslims of Syracuse. Adalgisa de Simone, Splendori e misteri di Sicilia in un’opera di Ibn Qalāqis (Soveria Mannelli, Italy: Rubettino Editore, 1996), 88–91.

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implications, as it elevated Christians to a position of economic superiority over the Muslim majority in Ifriqiya. The Normans also sought to profit from their Ifriqiyan territories through the imposition of custom duties in Ifriqiya ports. The details of t­hese taxes are largely unmentioned in medieval sources, but circumstantial evidence indicates the centrality of ­these duties to Norman Africa. During the twelfth ­century, the Normans and local governors of Ifriqiya came into conflict most often over issues of shipping and commerce. Roger II had even stationed spies in Mahdia to monitor the strength of trade through the city.129 Norman garrisons, likely complemented by government officials from Sicily, may have taken over from ­these spies once the Norman conquests in Ifriqiya ­were completed. Furthermore, given the improvements that the Normans made to cities they conquered, it would be foolish to assume that they did not seek to recoup ­these costs through the levying of customs duties akin to the taxes they collected in Sicily.130 The l­imited pool of evidence indicates that the Normans made small but meaningful changes to the economies of the port cities u ­ nder their control. Like Norman po­liti­cal power in Ifriqiya, though, the reach of economic changes brought about by the court of Palermo was l­imited to coastal urban centers. In accounts of the Norman conquests of 543H (1148–49), urban populations often fled from cities ­under attack to the countryside, where the Normans had no influence, before the attackers issued a call for safe passage and allowed local populations to return.131 In Almohad letters that detail their own Ifriqiyan campaigns in the 1160s, no mention is made of Norman influence in inland Ifriqiya.132 This evidence indicates that p­ eople in inland Ifriqiya—­ however many remained a­ fter years of drought—­continued to live as they had before the Norman conquest, save for possibly accommodating a brief influx of city dwellers who had fled to the countryside. Although the Normans governed their cities in Ifriqiya with relative leniency and made efforts to adhere to local customs, the small changes that they made—­the installation of new governors, the stationing of garrisons, the levy129. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 340. 130. ​In Sicily, Roger controlled economic production across large tracts of demesne land and taxed merchants in his ports. Although Roger did not seek similar control of land in Ifriqiya, we should assume that he sought to profit off his ports as he did in Sicily. Abulafia, Two Italies, 31–48, 59–84. 131. ​Ibn al-­Athir mentions that the Normans controlled lands “up to around Kairouan,” which is located some thirty miles off the coast of Ifriqiya. This indicates that, at best, the Normans had control over port cities and some of the agricultural land around them. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:65. 132. ​Lévi-­Provençal, Trente-­sept lettres, 99–121.

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ing of the reversed jizya, the encouragement of immigration to Ifriqiya, and the increased presence of Christian merchants in port cities—­nonetheless had meaningful consequences for ­people living t­here. Muslims living in Ifriqiya, who had long received preferential treatment from their coreligionists in power, ­were subject to new taxes to support their Christian overlords ruling across the Strait of Sicily. While Norman governance brought some semblance of economic recovery, this larger social upheaval was not sustainable and would eventually contribute to revolts against Norman rule.

C h a p te r 6

The Fall of Norman Africa and the Legacy of Zirid-­Norman Interactions

The po­liti­cal, economic, and religious changes that the Normans facilitated in Ifriqiya altered the dynamics of power in the region to f­avor Christians at the expense of indigenous Muslims, who ­were the overwhelming majority in Norman-­held cities. T ­ hese societal transformations, when combined with long-­standing Maliki ­legal traditions and a regional history of holy war, led to revolts against Norman rule during the 1150s. F ­ actors outside of Norman control further contributed to the destabilization of their rule. A new power in the Maghreb, the Almohads, undertook a series of conquests that brought their armies adjacent to Norman territories in Ifriqiya. The ascent of William I in Sicily also facilitated internal and external conflicts that strained the resources of his kingdom. When widespread revolts against Norman governance in Ifriqiya began in the mid-1150s, William was unable to quell them. Norman possessions in Ifriqiya w ­ ere reduced by 553H (1158–59) to only Mahdia, Zawila, and Sousse. The death blow to Norman Africa came several years l­ater when an Almohad army led by ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin captured Mahdia in January 1160. ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin, who had e­ arlier rescued the Zirid emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, then put al-­Hasan in charge of the city alongside another Almohad governor. The Zirid dynasty, which began as a line of emirs subservient to the Fatimids, thus passed to the Almohads, providing one of its many local governors.

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Roger II, Norman Africa, and the Mediterranean The campaigns that Roger II had undertaken in Italy, Ifriqiya, and the eastern Mediterranean during the last twenty years of his reign expanded the frontiers of the Kingdom of Sicily but also made many enemies for the Normans. When William I inherited the throne from his ­father in 1154, t­ hese animosities boiled over in the form of internal unrest and external invasions. Although William was largely successful in suppressing this discord, his preoccupation with threats in Italy and Eu­rope left his Ifriqiyan possessions neglected. ­After the conquest of Mahdia in 543H (1148–49), Roger II engaged in efforts to expand the bound­aries of the Kingdom of Sicily. He set his gaze east to Constantinople in an attempt to deter a looming alliance between the Byzantines and the Germans.1 George of Antioch launched an ambitious raid that penetrated the port of Constantinople, and then defeated a Byzantine navy in the eastern Mediterranean in 1149. Around the same time (and possibly on the same expedition), he rescued Louis VII of France from a hostile Byzantine fleet that had captured the French king while he was returning from the disastrous Second Crusade.2 The Norman king may have even had a hand in persuading certain groups in the Balkans to revolt against Byzantine rule in the autumn of 1149.3 Ibn al-­Athir wrote that Roger “would have ruled all the lands of Ifriqiya” had he not devoted his navy to t­ hese expeditions in the eastern Mediterranean.4 While t­ hese campaigns provided additional plunder and prestige for Roger II’s navy, they also contributed to continued animosity between the Normans and Byzantines that would lead to ­future conflict. Roger’s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean ­were enhanced by his second and third marriages, which connected him to elite families in western Eu­ rope that had a storied history in the crusading movement. His first wife, Elvira of Castille, had died in 1135 from a disease that had also nearly killed him. Roger was inconsolable a­ fter her death and withdrew from the life of his court to such an extent that for a time rumors circulated of his own death.5 1. ​Roger also intervened in German affairs by hosting Welf VI, a rival to Emperor Conrad III, in 1148/49  in the hopes that Welf would be sympathetic to the idea of causing trou­ble for Conrad. Houben, Ruler between East and West, 90. 2. ​The details and chronology of this incident are unclear. I follow the narrative presented by Stanton, which rejects the story given in the Byzantine chronicle of John Kinnamos. Stanton argues that a Sicilian fleet gave assistance to a fleet of Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine that was being attacked by a Byzantine navy. Then, Roger brought Louis and Eleanor to safety in Calabria and met with the French king for three days at Potenza in August 1149. Houben, Ruler between East and West, 93; Stanton, Norman Naval Operations, 98–102. 3. ​Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande, 1:146–47. 4. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 544H, 11:73. 5. ​Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 103–5.

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He did not remarry ­until 1149, when he wed Sibylla of Burgundy. The same po­liti­cal overtones that had characterized the marriage of Roger and Elvira ­were pre­sent in this second marriage.6 Sibylla’s ­brother governed an impor­ tant duchy in Burgundy that straddled French and German territories, and this ­family also had a long-­running commitment to crusading.7 Roger II, always looking for opportunities to expand his power in Antioch and Jerusalem, potentially saw this marriage as a way to further his interests in the Latin East. The u ­ nion between Roger and Sibylla did not last long. Sibylla died from a miscarriage in 1150, severing the Kingdom of Sicily’s tie to the House of Burgundy. Roger quickly sought another bride, and his eventual choice of Beatrice of Rethel shows his continued interest in the Crusader states.8 Beatrice came from an esteemed ­family that could trace its lineage to Charlemagne and had substantial power in the Latin East: her cousin was Melisende, the queen of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The marriage of Roger and Beatrice in 1151 came during a time of steep divisions in Jerusalem, as Melisende and her son Baldwin wrestled for the loyalty of elites in the Crusader states who w ­ ere shaken by the cataclysmic failure of the Second Crusade. In view of Roger’s ­earlier attempts to insert himself into the affairs of the Crusader states, it is likely that he saw this marriage as a way of furthering his power in the Kingdom of Jerusalem given the right circumstances. An opportunity for Roger II to insert himself in the Crusader states did not materialize in the early 1150s. On the opposite edge of the Mediterranean, however, seismic po­liti­cal changes occurred that would have a lasting impact on Norman Africa and the deposed Zirid emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli. During the 1140s and early 1150s, ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin, the caliph of the Berber dynasty known as the Almohads, established his authority in the Maghreb and much of al-­ Andalus by overthrowing the ruling Almoravids. The Almohads saw themselves as unique among the dynasties of the Maghreb. They rejected much con­temporary Maliki jurisprudence and instead sought to return to two of the oldest sources of Islamic law, the Qurʾan and hadith.9 They also discouraged pilgrimage to Mecca, instituted a new call to prayer, minted square coinage, and abolished the protected status of Jews and Christians (the dhimma), which had been a hallmark of Muslim governments for centuries.10 Without 6. ​Hayes, ­Family, Faith, and Empire, 61–63. 7. ​Jonathan Riley-­Smith, “­Family Traditions and Participation in the Second Crusade,” in The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Michael Gervers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 101–8. 8. ​Hayes, ­Family, Faith, and Empire, 64–72. 9. ​Maribel Fierro, “The ­Legal Policies of the Almohad Caliphs and Ibn Rushd’s Bidāyat al-­ Mujtahid,” Journal of Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1999): 227–28. 10. ​Jean-­Pierre Molénat, “Sur le role des almohades dans la fin du christiansme local au Maghreb et en al-­Andalus,” Al-­Qanṭara 18 (1997): 393–401.

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this protected status, Christians and Jews u ­ nder Almohad rule lived a precarious existence, and many chose to emigrate even as the Almohads si­mul­ta­ neously negotiated treaties with Italian city-­states (especially Pisa and Genoa) to allow Christian merchants to trade in their ports.11 ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin thus utilized “all the material, ideological and symbolic resources at his disposal, regardless of mutual contradictions” to legitimize his rule, a strategy that would have significant repercussions in Ifriqiya.12 During the 1150s, the Almohads rapidly expanded east from the Maghreb into western Ifriqiya.13 In 547H (1152–53), ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin deposed the last Hammadid emir, Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz, bringing an end to the dynasty.14 ­These conquests proved a boon for the Hammadid’s prisoner, the Zirid emir al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli. Following the Almohad capture of Bougie, ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin made al-­ Hasan a “close companion” and bestowed on him a “high position” in the Almohad ranks.15 Although his exact title and role in the Almohad administration is unclear, al-­Hasan’s presence at the conquest of Mahdia and his l­ater role as the city’s co-governor gives some sense of his ability to ingratiate himself with the court of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin. Given the Almohads’ strict adherence to Sunni Islam, it is pos­si­ble (even likely) that al-­Hasan abandoned his Shiʿa heritage in ­favor of his rescuers’ Sunnism. The rapid conquests of the Almohads did not escape the attention of other rulers in Ifriqiya, who ­were wary of the prospect of governance from another outside power. Following the defeat of a tribal co­ali­tion at the hands of the Almohads in a b­ attle near Bougie in late 547H (1152–53), a number of Arab tribes “from Tripoli to the furthest Maghreb” met to resist ­these newcomers from the Maghreb.16 Ibn al-­Athir reports that Roger II encouraged this re­sis­tance 11. ​Mohamed Ouerfelli, “Personnel diplomatique et modalités des négociations entre la commune de Pise et les états du Maghreb (1133–1397),” in Les relations diplomatiques au moyen âge: Formes et enjeux (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2011), 119–32. 12. ​Pascal Buresi, “D’une péninsule à l’autre: Cordoue, ’Uṯmān (644–656) et les arabes à l’époque almohade (XIIe–­XIIIe siècle),” Al-­Qanṭara 31, no. 1 (June 2010): 7–8. For a discussion of the capacity for integration in the Almohad caliphate, see Pascal Buresi, “L’apogée almohade: La bataille d’Alarcos et son contexte historique,” in Averroès et l’averroïsme (XIIe–­XVe siècle): Un itinéraire historique du Haut Atlas à Paris et à Padoue, ed. André Bazzana, Nicole Bériou, and Pierre Guichard (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2005), 111–13. 13. ​ ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin’s motivations for expanding east into Ifriqiya are explored in Baadj, Saladin, 53–54. 14. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 547H, 11:79–80; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 247; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:223–24. Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz made plans to escape from North Africa via Sicily so that he could then travel on to Baghdad, but t­hese plans w ­ ere thwarted when ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin sent him to the Maghreb. He died in the city of Sale in 557H (1161–62). Some of Yahya’s ­family may have succeeding in fleeing to Sicily; o ­ thers attempted to defect but w ­ ere executed. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:363–70; Simone, “Mezzogiorno normanno-­svevo,” 286–87; Baadj, Saladin, 54–56. 15. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 547H, 11:79. 16. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:92–93; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:235–36.

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and even offered five thousand of his own soldiers to fight with this co­ali­tion on the condition that they provide hostages to him. Tribal leaders refused this offer, however, saying, “We do not ask for help from anyone other than Muslims.”17 The Almohads met this co­ali­tion at the ­Battle of Sétif in the spring of 548H (1153) and emerged victorious, taking many of the resisters’ wives and c­ hildren back to Marrakesh.18 Despite the re­sis­tance that ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin encountered on this campaign in the eastern Maghreb and western Ifriqiya, he showed leniency to ­those who had opposed him. Almohad administrators sent letters to the defeated Arab leaders, telling them that they should come to the Maghreb to be with their families. Upon receiving ­these messages, many of them indeed headed west to the Almohad court in Marrakesh. ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin treated ­these tribal leaders well on their arrival and returned their families to them, which caused them to remain loyal to him. This was a strategy common among the Almohads during their early conquests. This nascent dynasty relied on “the integration into leadership positions in the Empire of all defeated or converted enemies from previous overturned regimes” for its survival.19 Through this strategy, the Almohads ­were able to ensure the integration of tribes in the Maghreb and Ifriqiya that had once been united against them.20 Soon ­after the B ­ attle of Sétif, Roger II looked to create a buffer zone against the ascendant Almohads by expanding his own lands westward. He sent a navy ­under the command of his eunuch Philip of Mahdia to the city of Bône. With the aid of unspecified Arabs, Philip conquered the city in the autumn of 1153, took many of the inhabitants captive, and appointed a member of the Banu Hammad to govern the city.21 In the same year, likely on the same expedition, the Normans once again seized the Kerkennah Islands and attacked Djerba, whose population had presumably revolted against Norman rule.22 The timing of Philip’s attacks on the Kerkennah Islands and Djerba may have been linked to the Almohad campaigns that immediately preceded them. Per17. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:92. 18. ​Lévi-­Provençal, Trente-­sept lettres, 26–34. On the Almohads’ campaigns in Ifriqiya, see Ibn Abi Zar, Al-­Anis al-­Mutrib bi Rawd al-­Qirtas (Rabat: Dar al-­Mansur, 1972), 198–200; Baadj, Saladin, 53–56. 19. ​Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 42. 20. ​The importance of Ifriqiya to the larger Almohad plan of control in the western Mediterranean is further seen in the intimate involvement of their sovereigns, who participated in 75 ­percent of expeditions to the Maghreb and Ifriqiya but only 50 ­percent of t­ hose to al-­Andalus. Pascal Buresi and Hicham El Aallaoui, “La chancellerie almohade,” in Los almohades: Problemas y perspectivas, ed. Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006), 498. 21. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:93; al-­Idrisi, Nuzhat al-­Mushtaq, 1:291–92. 22. ​Al-­Idrisi, 1:305; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:376; Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 47, 102.

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haps the Muslim inhabitants of t­hese islands thought the time was right to revolt against the Normans and pledge their loyalty to the Almohads (as the ­people of Tripoli would do several years l­ater)? In any case, the Normans managed to suppress ­these revolts. Philip of Mahdia, though, met an unfortunate end shortly ­after returning from this successful campaign; he was tried and executed in late 1153 on charges of being a crypto-­Muslim and showing leniency to certain families of Bône.23 Although Norman territories in Ifriqiya had remained intact during the Almohads’ first excursion into the region, trou­ble was brewing for the Normans in the eastern Mediterranean. In the last few years of Roger II’s reign, the peaceful relationship between the Normans and the Fatimid caliphate soured. The deaths of the Fatimid imam-caliph al-­Hafiz, his ex-­vizier Bahram, and George of Antioch in the late 1140s/early 1150s destabilized the productive relationship that had defined the two dynasties in de­cades past. The next generation of Fatimid officials had a less generous view of the Norman administration, due in no small part to the ascendency of a Zirid prince in the Fatimid regime.24 In chapter 3, I recounted the death of the emir Yahya ibn Tamim in 1116 and the steps his successor ʿAli took to ensure his own safety. ʿAli sent pos­si­ble conspirators Abu al-­Futuh, his wife Ballara, and their son al-­ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh into exile at the Fatimid court at Cairo. The account of the 23. ​The life and death of Philip of Mahdia has received substantial scholarly attention. Philip was a court eunuch in the Norman administration, one of many employed in Palermo in a conscious emulation of the Fatimid (and possibly Zirid) court. Through this system, the Normans employed Muslim converts to Chris­tian­ity and placed them in high-­ranking government positions. According to Ibn Jubayr, who traveled to Palermo in the 1180s, many of ­these “palace Saracens” secretly practiced Islam in defiance of their Christian masters. Ibn Jubayr, Rihla Ibn Jubayr (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1964), 299–300. Philip of Mahdia was one such official. The legacy of Philip’s trial and execution is complex. While many scholars have seen this episode as laying bare anti-­Muslim sentiment in the court of Palermo late in the reign of Roger II, recent work on the manuscripts documenting the fate of Philip (which ­were written in the thirteenth c­ entury) indicates that descriptions of the trial revolved around con­temporary (thirteenth-­century) issues rather than t­hose of the 1150s. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­ Tarikh, year 548H, 11:93; Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:234–36. See also Brian Catlos, “Who Was Philip of Mahdia and Why Did He Have to Die? Confessional Identity and Po­liti­cal Power in the Twelfth-­Century Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Chronicle 1 (2011): 89; Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 212–34, 289–97; Takayama, Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, 73–114; Nef, Conquérir etgouverner, 588–91; Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 139–72; Theresa Jäckh, “Verbrechen und Strafe im normannisch-­staufischen Königreich Sizilien: Der Prozess gegen Philip von al-­Mahdiyya,” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 76, no. 1 (2020): 23–60. 24. ​Romuald of Salerno briefly mentions that “for his honor and benefit, [Roger] made peace with the King of Babylon.” This king of Babylon is prob­ably al-­Hafiz, the Fatimid caliph. The timeline and circumstances for this reconciliation, though, are vague. Romuald does not mention Roger being at war with the king of Babylon previously, and the nearest chronological event to this peacemaking is the death of John II Komnenos, the Byzantine emperor, which happened in 1143. Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:227.

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Fatimid court provided by the twelfth-­century writer and politician Usama ibn Munqidh relates their fortunes in Egypt.25 Following the death of Abu al-­Futuh in an unspecified year, his ­widow Ballara married Ibn al-­Sallar, the Fatimid vizier. By virtue of this marriage, al-­ ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh became the stepson of one of the most power­ful individuals in the Fatimid administration. Tensions between Ibn al-­Sallar and other high-­ranking Fatimid officials, however, led to his assassination in 1153 in a plot that was masterminded partly by his own stepson (and Usama ibn Munqidh himself ). Through t­hese machinations, al-­ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh, the son of Ballara and the Zirid prince Abu al-­Futuh, became the Fatimid vizier.26 The presence in the Fatimid court of this Zirid noble, who must have known about Norman conquests in Ifriqiya, facilitated a break between the courts of Palermo and Cairo. Although al-­ʿAbbas was vizier for only a year (he was killed by Frankish soldiers while fleeing Cairo in the summer of 1154), his presence in the Fatimid government nonetheless contributed to its deteriorating relationship with the Kingdom of Sicily.

The Troubled Reign of William I Roger II appointed his son William as coruler and heir to the throne on Easter 1151 in a ceremony conducted by the archbishop of Palermo without the approval of the papacy.27 When Roger died in February 1154, William I became the sole ruler of the Kingdom of Sicily—­a polity that was power­f ul, wealthy, and coveted by a host of power­f ul enemies. Pervasive conflict during William’s reign has earned him the endearing epithet “the Bad,” which is perhaps unfair given the circumstances of his rule.28 From the beginning of his reign, William was caught between a rock and several hard places. The papacy refused to recognize the validity of his rule, the Byzantines w ­ ere planning to invade southern Italy, the friendship between the courts of the Normans and Fatimids had soured, and t­here was unrest in Djerba and the Kerkennah Islands. The troubled relationships that Roger II had with his vari­ous rivals came crashing down on William in the early years of his reign, and, when combined 25. ​Usama ibn Munqidh, The Book of Contemplation: Islam and the Crusades, trans. Paul M. Cobb (New York: Penguin Classics, 2008), 26–34. See also Cobb, Usama Ibn Munqidh, 38–41. 26. ​Carl H. Becker and Samuel M. Stern, “ʿAbbās b. Abi ‘l-­Futūh,” EI2; Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 98–99. 27. ​Houben, Ruler between East and West, 96. 28. ​Graham Loud, “William the Bad or William the Unlucky?,” Haskins Society Journal 8 (1999): 99–113.

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with the ascendency of the Almohads, would lead to the destruction of the Norman kingdom of Africa. Mounting animosity between the Normans and Fatimids culminated in a Norman raid against the Fatimid city of Tinnis around 1154.29 This raid shows that the policy of nonintervention between the Fatimids and Normans during the reign of Roger II had given way to animosity, and that Norman ships ­were no longer safe along the southeastern shores of the Mediterranean. Although this falling-­out began in the early 1150s due to the deaths of prominent officials in both administrations and the ascendency of a Zirid prince as Fatimid vizier, it first led to military conflict in this raid against Tinnis during the first year of the reign of William I. The policy of neutrality in Ifriqiyan affairs that the Fatimids had a­ dopted during the 1130s and 1140s was now no longer guaranteed. Fortunately for the Normans, however, po­liti­cal unrest in the Fatimid administration meant that the imam-­caliph and his armies ­were in no position to directly threaten lands in the Kingdom of Sicily.30 In southern Italy, the threat of vio­lence was very real. During the first two years of William I’s reign, the Byzantines launched a fleet against southern Italy in retribution for years of raiding and conflict across the eastern Mediterranean. Around the same time, Norman nobles revolted against William with the encouragement of Pope Adrian IV, who did not recognize the legitimacy of the new Norman king and, thus, the Kingdom of Sicily.31 William defended his lands in largely successful campaigns across southern Italy in the mid-1150s and even conducted retaliatory raids against Byzantine territories in the eastern Mediterranean. Following t­hese victories, he was able to reach peace settlements with his enemies. William and Pope Adrian IV signed the Treaty of Benevento in 1156, which recognized the legitimacy of the Norman king.32 Several years ­later, William reached made peace with the Byzantines as well. William’s focus on affairs in Italy led to the apparent neglect of his African possessions. At the beginning of 1156, while William was campaigning in southern Italy, a series of popu­lar uprisings in Ifriqiya resulted in the Normans 29. ​The timeline of this raid is unclear. Ibn al-­Athir rec­ords that a Sicilian fleet raided Tinnis in 548H (1153–54). The Tarikh Mansuri dates a Sicilian attack on Tinnis to 549H (1154–55). The Egyptian historian al-­Maqrizi mentions a Sicilian raid against Tinnis, Rosetta, Alexandria, and Damietta in Jumada II 550H (August 1155) launched by “Roger son of Roger.” The continuation of the chronicle of Sigebert of Gembloux notes that William I launched a fleet to Tinnis in 1154. An 1156 letter from the Fatimid vizier Talaʾiʿ ibn Ruzzik to Pisa refers to a Sicilian attack on Tinnis in an unspecified year. ­These sources are considered in Amari, Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia, 3:433; Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 98. 30. ​Brett, “Abbasids, Fatimids and Seljuqs,” 715–20. 31. ​Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie, 14, 20–21. 32. ​Enzensberger, Guillelmi I diplomata, document 12. Pope Adrian IV had e­ arlier addressed him as “lord.” Houben, Ruler between East and West, 166–67.

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losing many of their coastal bases. The impetus for ­these revolts is complex and requires some explanation. Chapter 5 discussed how the Normans brought about societal changes in Ifriqiya that favored Christians at the expense of Muslims. Although this sea change contributed to uprisings against Norman rule, it was not the only motivating ­factor. As the economy of Ifriqiya rebounded from the devastating drought of the 1140s, Muslim jurists presented l­egal arguments to justify revolt against their non-­Muslim overlords. Local governors, too, had been raised in a tradition of opportunistic holy war against Christians, which easily justified vio­lence against the Normans. This movement to revolt was further buttressed by Almohad conquests across northwest Africa, which provided some Ifriqiyan lords with a Muslim dynasty to which they could pledge their loyalty. Long-­held Islamic l­ egal perspectives w ­ ere a driving f­ actor in motivating the revolts against Norman rule in the mid-1150s. In both Ifriqiya and the Maghreb, the dominant school of Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, was the Maliki school—­a vast body of l­egal rulings and customs derived from the work of the eponymous Malik ibn Anas.33 Of relevance to Norman Africa is the body of Maliki lit­er­a­ture concerning how Muslims ­ought to live when their lords are not Muslims. The l­egal rulings of the twelfth-­century jurist al-­Mazari provide the most descriptive analy­sis of this topic, written around the time of the Norman kingdom of Africa. Al-­Mazari was a Sicilian jurist who immigrated to Ifriqiya during the late eleventh ­century.34 ­After studying u ­ nder prominent Maliki jurists at Sfax and Sousse, he became head of a judicial school in Mahdia and wrote a number of fatāwā on issues pertaining to Muslims living u ­ nder and interacting with Christians, which survive ­today in a ­later compilation by al-­Wansharisi (d. 1508).35 As is customary in this genre of ­legal text, the fatāwā of al-­Mazari take the form of questions posed to and answered by him. In one l­egal opinion, for example, al-­Mazari was asked to adjudicate a dispute between three men who had formed a partnership to travel from Ifriqiya to Sicily to sell their goods.36 ­After strong winds forced the ship back to Mahdia, one member of 33. ​Cottart, “Mālikiyya,” EI2. 34. ​Summaries of the life of al-­Mazari can be found in Charles Pellat, “al-­Māzarī,” EI2; H. R. Idris, “L’école mālikite de Mahdia: L’imām al-­Māzarī (m. 536  H/1141),” Études d’orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Lévi-­Provençal (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve & Larose, 1962), 1:153–63. 35. ​Al-­Mazari’s ­legal opinions are not restricted to issues relating to Christian-­Muslim interactions. See, for example, his ruling on a commercial dispute between a Muslim and Jew in Gafsa. Camilla Adang, “A Fatwā by Al-­Māzarī (d. 536/1141) on a Jewish Silk Merchant in Gafsa,” in Jewish-­Muslim Relations in Past and Pre­sent: A Kaleidoscopic View, ed. Joseph Meri (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 162–71. 36. ​Al-­Wansharisi, Al-­Miʿyar al-­Muʿrib, 8:181–82. See also Davis-­Secord, “Muslims in Norman Sicily,” 60–61.

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this partnership declared that this voyage had ended, a proposition that the other two men in the partnership did not support. Al-­Mazari was asked to resolve this dispute, and he ruled that the business contract between the partners was finished and that the initial investments made by the three men should be returned to them.37 Other opinions from al-­Mazari concern questions about the legality of trade conducted in Christian lands (namely Sicily) and the legitimacy of judges appointed by non-­Muslim rulers. In one case from the late 1080s or early 1090s that revolved around the metallic worth of coinage in Sicily and Ifriqiya (where standards for minting differed), al-­Mazari condemned merchants traveling and conducting business in Norman Sicily b­ ecause it was “illegal for Muslims willingly to travel to a country u ­ nder infidel rule.”38 This opinion was controversial, however, and scholars in Mahdia debated the legality and necessity of trading with Sicily—­especially with regard to wheat, which was a cornerstone of commercial relations for merchants operating between Ifriqiya and Sicily. In another l­egal opinion, al-­Mazari was asked about the legitimacy of a Muslim judge handing down rulings in Christian Sicily.39 At the heart of this ­legal opinion was the question of how ʿadala (justice as defined by Islamic law) ­ought to be administered when living u ­ nder the rule of someone who exhibits ʿadawa (hostility to Islamic law). This was an impor­tant question in the context of Norman Sicily, for Muslims living on the island ­were subject to Christian administrators whose policies did not necessarily align with the standards of Islamic law. Al-­Mazari ultimately de­cided that the rulings of such a judge should be accepted, but he also said that Muslims should not live in the dar al-­ḥarb (house of war, i.e., a place governed by a non-­Muslims) u ­ nless absolutely necessary.40 If Muslims do live in this state, though, al-­Mazari thought it was better that they accept the judgment of the local Muslim judge than have no l­egal rulings whatsoever. In other words, “even bad government was better than no government.”41 If we accept the rulings of al-­Mazari to be broadly indicative of Maliki ­legal scholars living in Ifriqiya during the time of Norman dominion, we learn several impor­tant t­ hings. The first is that the rulings of Muslim judges that the Normans appointed in their cities (like Abu al-­Hajaj in Tripoli) w ­ ere valid even 37. ​Unfortunately, the date of this ruling is unknown, though t­ here are clues within the text as to its time of composition. This par­tic­u­lar case likely dates to sometime in the late eleventh or early twelfth ­century. 38. ​Davis-­Secord, “Muslims in Norman Sicily,” 64. 39. ​Al-­Wansharisi, Al-­Miʿyar al-­Muʿrib, 10:107–8. 40. ​Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 326. 41. ​Metcalfe, “Muslims of Sicily,” 296.

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though Roger II and William I ­were not Muslim. Even though Abu al-­Hajaj was living in the dar al-ḥarb, he could justly provide ­legal advice to Muslims in his community. The second is that the circumstances of Muslims living ­under Norman control in Ifriqiya ­were by no means ideal. While al-­Mazari acknowledges that sometimes it is necessary to live in this poor environment, he asserts that Muslims should endeavor to e­ ither leave or revolt if they are able. This ­legal mindset thus legitimized accepting Norman rule when the situation required it, and then revolting against Norman rule when the opportunity presented itself.42 If Maliki l­ egal judgments w ­ ere the primary form of judicial thought through which qadis and governors in Ifriqiya interpreted their submission to the Normans, why did they not resist or revolt against Norman rule sooner? The answer to this question is likely tied to drought, famine, emigration, and military conflict in Ifriqiya during the 1140s. Although the presence of Christian Normans was a b­ itter pill to swallow for many Muslims living in Ifriqiya, it stimulated the economy and allowed the region to modestly recover from the events of the previous de­cade.43 Once cities had recovered eco­nom­ically, though, the advantages of living u ­ nder Norman rule dis­appeared, thus paving the way for 44 revolt. This ­legal framework from the Maliki school was further buttressed by a tradition of opportunistic holy war in Ifriqiya. Across the twelfth c­ entury, local lords in Ifriqiya marshaled support for military campaigns against Christians from Muslim allies, sometimes using religious rhe­toric to bolster their cause. The Zirid emirs ʿAli ibn Yahya and al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli forged an alliance with the Almoravids against the Normans that took the form of raids against Norman lands in the 1120s. In 517H (1123–24), al-­Hasan boasted of the Arab tribes waging “jihad” when they defeated the Normans at the B ­ attle of al-­ Dimas.45 In 548H (1153–54), a co­ali­tion of Arab tribal leaders rejected Roger II’s offer of five thousand Norman knights to fight alongside them against the Almohads ­because they wanted aid only from other Muslims.46 ­After ʿAbd al-­ 42. ​Al-­Hasan’s decision to flee Mahdia rather than aid the Normans in their assault on Gabès was partially informed by this ­legal tradition, as the Maliki school held that it was not permissible in most situations for Muslims to aid non-­Muslims in combat. Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 340; Alan Verskin, Oppressed in the Land? Fatwās on Muslims Living ­under Non-­Muslim Rule from the ­Middle Ages to the Pre­sent (Prince­ton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2013), 19–34; Michael Lower, “Christian Mercenaries in Muslim Lands: Their Status in Medieval Islamic and Canon Law,” in The Crusader World, ed. Adrian Boas (New York: Routledge, 2015), 420–25. 43. ​Incoming grain from Sicily combined with a return to typical levels of rainfall helped the port cities of Ifriqiya bounce back from the events of the 1140s. OWDA 1149–60. 44. ​Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 359. 45. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 338. 46. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 548H, 11:92–93.

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Muʾmin conquered Mahdia from the Normans in 554H (1159–60), he tried to sway local tribes to campaign with him in al-­Andalus, promising jihad and the reconquest of lands that had been conquered “at the beginning of Islam.”47 Con­temporary sources do not make explicit all of the rhe­toric that surrounded ­these alliances of Muslim lords in Ifriqiya against Christians. Nonetheless, ­there is explicit evidence that al-­Hasan in 517H (1123–24) and ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin in 554H (1159–60) used jihad to motivate Ifriqiyan tribes to fight on their behalf. This mentality of holy war was opportunistic, though, and it applied only when it suited the interest of its rulers. We cannot ignore the multiple occasions in which Muslim rulers in Ifriqiya worked alongside Christians to achieve their po­liti­cal ends. Rafiʿ ibn Makkan al-­Dahmani of Gabès, for example, sought the protection of Roger II from Zirid aggressors in 511H (1117–18).48 Al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli likewise requested help from Roger when the Hammadids attacked Mahdia in 529H (1134–35).49 And Yusuf of Gabès asked for the allegiance of Roger in 542H (1147–48) so that he could rule the city.50 Rhe­toric of jihad is nowhere to be found in ­these encounters. Instead, local governors threw in their lot with what­ever power was best positioned to help their cause. In some cases, this involved making alliances with the Christian Normans. But when the situation called for fighting the Normans, the rhe­toric of war changed to include a religious dimension not found in intra-­Muslim conflict. This is not dissimilar to how ­legal scholars could use the writings of al-­Maqrizi to justify both ac­cep­tance of and re­sis­tance to Norman rule when it suited them. During the 1150s, when the economy of Ifriqiya was stabilizing, ­these ideologies found common ground and the result was widespread revolts against Norman rule. The above examples indicate opposition to the Christian Normans among Muslim governors and scholars. T ­ here is further evidence, however, of grassroots opposition to Norman rule among the Muslims of coastal Ifriqiya. When Yusuf usurped the governorship of Gabès in 542H (1147–48) and pledged his loyalty to Roger II, the agitated Muslim populace of the city worked with the army of al-­Hasan to overthrew Roger’s newest vassal.51 A year ­later, Ibn ʿIdhari reports that the p­ eople of Tunis overthrew their governor for simply trying to trade with the Normans.52 ­These incidents, the details of which are unfortunately lost, speak to some level of grassroots animosity ­toward Norman rule 47. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:121–22. 48. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 398–99; Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 511H, 10:247. 49. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 529H, 11:17–18. 50. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:61; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232–33. 51. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 542H, 11:61; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:232–33. 52. ​Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:349.

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among Muslims in Ifriqiyan cities. When revolts against the Normans occurred in the 1150s, they w ­ ere led by Muslim governors but supported by t­ hese masses who opposed Norman domination. Widespread distaste for Norman rule in Ifriqiya was likely reciprocated by members of the Norman elite who had contempt for the Muslims of Ifriqiya. Evidence for this mindset comes from the Tristia ex Melitogaudo, a poem written by an unknown member of the Norman nobility who sought to win back the good graces of George of Antioch and escape exile from the island of Gozo.53 In this poem, the author demeaned the Muslims that surrounded him to gain sympathy from the court of Palermo: To what end have I been flung in the midst of the trackless seas where the c­ hildren of godless Hagar [i.e., Muslims] live, [I,] not enjoying even l­ittle comforts, I, woe betide me, not drinking any wine, [not] even for the good of my stomach. . . . ​54 The author, surrounded by godless Hagarenes, is unable to enjoy the benefits of alcohol or other comforts of life. In another section of the poem, he laments that he cannot even speak to the Hagarenes without the use of interpreters, which only increases his sense of isolation: What mind may be able to comprehend the ­whole throng of evil happenings from which I, wretched me, suffered harm, even if someone ­were to be well-­versed in countless languages? For who would endure to utter, in uncouth speech, the unjust arrogances of the intemperate, the insolence, [the] lawlessness of foreigners, the hunger and thirst and seizure of ­things possessed, sleeping-­mats both of an unfortunate and of a well-­adjusted [person], and the change and the turned-­back posture, the manner of sitting and of rising up, the unholy bridlings of words, alas, the suppression of unallowed hymns?55 53. ​The author of the Tristia ex Melitogaudo did not hold a high opinion of Roger II, which could have been a cause of his exile in the first place. In the poem, Roger is compared unfavorably to Dionysius, the Tyrant of Syracuse, and Herod. Busuttil et al., Tristia ex Melitogaudo, xxix–­xxii, 69, 113, 171. 54. ​Busuttil et al., Tristia ex Melitogaudo, 171. 55. ​Busuttil et al., Tristia ex Melitogaudo, 69.

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The author of the Tristia ex Melitogaudo wrote this poem with a clear goal in mind: to escape exile from Gozo using all of the rhetorical tools at his disposal.56 Although much of the poem is filled with laudatory allusions to the Greco-­Roman world that bolstered the standing of the Kingdom of Sicily, the author also thought that outlining indigenous Muslim practices (diet, language, and worship) would win the sympathy of the Norman court by tapping into their anti-­Muslim biases. He presumably reasoned that George of Antioch and his colleagues would read or listen to this poem and have real sympathy for anyone who had to spend so much time surrounded by Muslims. By tapping into some faction of high-­ranking administrators who held unfavorable opinions about Muslims, the author thought he could escape his pre­sent situation. This disdain of some Norman elites for Muslims may have translated into quotidian interactions other­wise lost in con­temporary sources that further contributed to widespread tension in Ifriqiya.

Revolts against Norman Rule in Ifriqiya Momentum for an uprising against Norman rule was building in Sfax at the beginning of 551H (1156–57). Ibn Khaldun vaguely writes that Christians of Sfax had brought harm to Muslims, which spurred local unrest.57 The governor of the city, ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani, capitalized on this anger by leading the p­ eople of Sfax in revolt. According to Ibn al-­Athir, this revolt was almost inevitable for ʿUmar. When George of Antioch had initially conquered Sfax in 543H (1148–49), he wanted to install the ­father of ʿUmar, Abu al-­Hasan, as governor. Abu al-­Hasan, however, requested that his son be made governor, to which the Normans agreed only on the condition that they could take Abu al-­Hasan as hostage. Before leaving for Sicily, Abu al-­Hasan told his son to revolt against the Normans when “the right opportunity enables you.” Thus, in 551H (1156–57), ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani channeled the ire of his p­ eople and (if this apocryphal anecdote is believed) acted on the parting words of his f­ ather to revolt against Norman rule. Ibn al-­Athir rec­ords his 56. ​On the pos­si­ble identity of the author of the Tristia ex Melitogaudo, see Lauxtermann, “Tomi, Mljet, Malta,” 156–59; Christina Rognoni, “Leggendo l’anonimo Maltese: Alcune considerazioni su Giorgio di Antiochia,” Νέα ῾ Ρώµη: Rivista di Ricerche Bizantinistiche 14 (2017): 315–31. 57. ​Ibn Khaldun provides two slightly dif­fer­ent accounts of the revolt at Sfax. One echoes that of Ibn al-­Athir, almost to the word. The other, though, includes the statement that the Christians of Sfax brought harm to Muslims. T ­ hese two descriptions are not necessarily incompatible. Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:205, 6:224. Brett finds the second of ­these entries a more convincing explanation for the Sfaxian revolt. Brett, “Muslim Justice ­under Infidel Rule,” 356.

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call to action: “ ‘Let a group from among you climb the walls and a group proceed to the housing of the Franks and the Christians, all of them, and kill them all.’ [The ­people of Sfax] said to him, ‘But our lord the shaykh, your ­father, we are frightened for him.’ He said, ‘He commanded me to do this. If thousands from among the enemies are killed for the shaykh, then he has not died.’ The sun had not risen before they killed the Franks to the last.”58 This uprising in Sfax was successful in overthrowing Norman rule, presumably in a b­ attle that involved the defeat and massacre of the city’s garrison and administrative officials. No con­temporary sources describe t­ hese grisly details, although they do relate the fate of ʿUmar’s ­father in Sicily. When word reached William I of the Sfaxian revolt, he demanded that Abu al-­Hasan write to his son and demand his return to Norman authority. Abu al-­Hasan refused, saying that “one who has the audacity to do this ­will not return ­because of a letter.”59 Undeterred, William sent an envoy to Sfax. On reaching the city, the envoy was not allowed inside. Instead, the following day, he watched as the p­ eople of Sfax carried a coffin outside the city in anticipatory memory of the doomed Abu al-­Hasan. When William heard this, he had Abu al-­Hasan crucified.60 The revolt of ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani was the first in a succession of uprisings that occurred in Norman Africa in the mid-­late 1150s.61 Abu Yahya ibn Matruh led a revolt in Tripoli, Muhammad ibn Rushayd instigated one in Gabès, and the islands of Djerba and Kerkennah followed suit. Of ­these revolts, only the one at Tripoli is described in any detail.62 Al-­Tijani relates how the Normans demanded that Muslim religious officials in Tripoli denounce the Almohads from their pulpits—­presumably due to some level of popu­lar support for the Almohad cause. The officials, led by the qadi Abu al-­ Hajaj, refused to do so b­ ecause it was not part of the contract between the city and the Normans. Although the Normans withdrew their demand, this interaction prompted Abu Yahya ibn Matruh and other nobles in the city to plan a revolt. On an unspecified day in 553H (1158–59), the ­people barricaded the streets and defeated a Norman garrison that rode out to suppress the up58. ​Quotations from this encounter are from Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100–101. 59. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100. See also al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 75; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:237–38. 60. ​To my knowledge, this is the only account of someone being crucified in Norman Sicily. Ibn al-­Athir reports that Abu al-­Hasan “did not cease to call out to God the Almighty ­until he died.” The overtly religious tones in this narrative could indicate that Ibn al-­Athir was misrepresenting the fate of Abu al-­Hasan so that he could be portrayed as a martyr. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:100. 61. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:237–38. 62. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241–42.

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rising. Christians in Tripoli w ­ ere arrested and Abu Yahya ibn Matruh became the in­de­pen­dent governor of the city.63 The only rebellion that the Normans w ­ ere able to suppress during the late 1150s was in Mahdia’s suburb of Zawila. Incited by the revolt of ʿUmar at Sfax, the ­people of Zawila r­ ose against Norman control and attacked Mahdia in late 551H (1157) with the aid of “Arabs from the region,” the p­ eople of Sfax, and unspecified ­others.64 While ­these armies besieged Mahdia by land, King William I offered the first semblance of his re­sis­tance to t­ hese uprisings by supplying the defenders of Mahdia with reinforcements and a fleet of twenty galleys. His agents also managed to bribe several Arab tribes to defect when the Franks sortied out of the city.65 The remaining attackers initially continued to fight, but when the Normans looked to surround them, the fighters from Sfax fled. The p­ eople of Zawila then attempted to retreat but found the gates of Zawila locked (potentially by their former Arab allies). The Normans won a decisive victory, pillaged the suburb, and killed ­those in it. The leniency that Roger II and George of Antioch had shown when they first conquered cities in Ifriqiya had dis­appeared ­under William I. Following the Norman victory at Mahdia, William settled Christians, including an archbishop, in Zawila in an apparent attempt to take more direct control of the city.66 When the dust had settled at the end of 553H (1158–59), William had control over only Mahdia, Zawila, and Sousse, the last of which was the only city controlled by the Normans that did not revolt against their rule.67

The Arrival of the Almohads Amid widespread revolts against Norman rule, the Almohads had amassed an army and sought to complete the conquest of Ifriqiya they had started a de­ cade ­earlier. Their arrival into the region, however, was met with a mixed response. One par­tic­u­lar alliance, between ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-­ʿAziz of Tunis 63. ​Al-­Tijani places this revolt as happening in 553H (1158–59), which runs ­counter to the narratives of Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun, who write of Tripoli’s uprising in 551H (1156–57). Circumstantial evidence makes me trust al-­Tijani’s dating of Tripoli’s revolt. The presence of an Almohad army near Tunis in 552H (1157–58) may have caused William I to fear unrest in the city and demand the denouncement of the Almohads. Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 247–48; Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:384. 64. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 551H, 11:101. 65. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:237–38. 66. ​Robert of Torigni, Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I, 4:191. 67. ​The fate of Sousse during t­ hese revolts is unrecorded in con­temporary sources. Idris speculates that the Normans managed to retain control of the city u ­ ntil the arrival of the Almohads in 554H (1159–60). Perhaps its proximity to Mahdia allowed the Normans to retain greater control over Sousse than in other urban areas that revolted? Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:394.

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(a member of the Khurasanid dynasty) and Muhriz ibn Ziyad, who ruled over the nearby ruins of Carthage, stands out in showing the unpopularity of Almohad rule among some governors.68 In 543H (1148–49) a council of elders in Tunis had appointed Muhriz ibn Ziyad to be the next governor of the city, but his appointment was rejected by the ­people of the city and he was forced to flee.69 Nearly a de­cade ­later, in 552H (1157–58), an Almohad army led by one of the sons of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin besieged Tunis.70 The Almohads ­were eventually defeated by reinforcements led by none other than Muhriz ibn Ziyad. A letter sent from the governor of Tunis to Pisa corroborates this victory (and discusses commercial advantages to be given to Pisan merchants by the city of Tunis).71 ­After the siege was broken, Muhriz even allowed the Khurasanids to continue governing Tunis. The prospect of rule by an outside group like the Almohads was so unwelcome that to stop their advance, Muhriz was willing to assist the very city that had previously shunned him. This animosity t­ oward the Almohads was not shared uniformly across Ifriqiya. In Tripoli, for example, the qadi Abu al-­Hajaj refused to denounce the Almohads in 553H (1158–59), despite an order to do so from William I.72 That William felt the need to make this demand indicates anx­ie­ ties in Palermo about the rising sympathy for the Almohad cause.73 ­Others in Ifriqiya directly appealed to the Almohads for aid. In the aftermath of the failed revolt at Zawila, survivors fled to ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin in Marrakesh and implored him to defeat the Normans.74 The Almohad caliph distributed money to t­hese refugees and promised that he would undertake this expedition on their behalf. The pleas of ­these Zawilan refugees ­were reinforced by ­those of their emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, who remained in Marrakesh as a loyal adviser to the Almohad caliph and pressed him to capture Ifriqiya from the Normans. ­These f­ actors ­were enough 68. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 247–48. See also Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:218. 69. ​See footnote 105 in chapter 4. 70. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:218–19; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:349–50. 71. ​Mas Latrie, Traités de paix et de commerce, 23–26; Louis de Mas Latrie, “Documents sur l’histoire de l’Algérie et de l’Afrique septentrionale pendant le moyen âge: Relations avec Pise,” Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 5 (1848–49): 137–39. See also Silvia Orvietani Busch, Medieval Mediterranean Ports: The Catalan and Tuscan Coasts, 1100–1235 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 223–25. 72. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241–42. 73. ​Two letters from the Almohad court written in 551H (1156–57) further indicate support for their campaigns, as they include a petition from Ifriqiyan leaders that the son of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin be made the governor of the region. Although ­these letters ­were written a­ fter the Almohad victory at Sétif, the leniency with which the Almohad caliph treated Ifriqiyan leaders spurred cooperation between them. The first of t­hese letters does not contain a date, though Lévi Provençal argues that it can be dated to the beginning of 551H (1156). Lévi-­Provençal, Trente-­sept lettres, 55–66; Évariste Lévi-­ Provençal, Un recueil de lettres officielles almohades: Étude diplomatique, analyse et commentaire historique (Paris: Librarie Larose, 1942), 35–38. 74. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:118; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 344–45.

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to persuade ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin to set out with an army and navy in 553H (1158– 59), secure in the knowledge that some of Ifriqiya’s governors and p­ eople would welcome his arrival.75 The Almohad threat was apparent to William I even in the early years of his reign. William came to the throne shortly ­after the ­Battle of Sétif in 548H (1153–54), in which the Almohads had destroyed a co­ali­tion of Ifriqiyan forces and ­were well positioned to move further east into Norman-­controlled territories. When William succeeded his f­ ather, he ordered the striking of a triumphal dinar in Mahdia that was similar to the one minted in honor of his f­ ather’s victory in Mahdia in 543H (1148–49), but with a key difference in honorific titles.76 Whereas the text on Roger II’s coin refers to the dinar being struck “by order of the sublime king,” the text on William’s dinar reads that it was struck “by order of the Guide [al-­Hādī] according to the command of God.”77 This is a con­spic­ u­ous difference that is likely due to the threat posed by the Almohads, whose imperial ideology centered on the self-­proclaimed Mahdi (Guide) Ibn Tumart.78 By appropriating an Almohad title for his own coin, William sought to pre­sent himself as the equal to this ascendant dynasty and, thus, to discourage local Ifriqiyan governors from defecting to this other “Guide” from the Maghreb. The widespread revolts of the mid-1150s against Norman rule proved this strategy in­effec­tive, however, and it was not long a­ fter ­these insurrections that the Almohads came to end the Norman presence in Ifriqiya and establish their own control over the region. When ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin and his forces arrived on the western frontier of Ifriqiya in 554H (1159–60), they w ­ ere not welcomed with open arms.79 Tunis, which had already driven off the Almohads in 552H (1157–58), resisted once again.80 The plans of the city’s defenders w ­ ere foiled, though, when a group of nobles from the city covertly descended to ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin ­under the cover of night and offered their surrender, which he accepted. The Almohad army seized half the goods of the ­people of Tunis (except for ­those of the surrendering nobles, who ­were granted immunity) and ordered that the Christians and Jews in the city e­ ither convert to Islam or be executed. The governor of 75. ​Chronicles are ambiguous about the time when ­these conquests w ­ ere prepared and the strength of the force of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin. Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:384–89. On the importance of Ifriqiyan ports to the Almohads, see Christophe Picard, The Sea of the Caliphs: The Mediterranean in the Medieval Islamic World, trans. Nicholas Elliott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 170–74. 76. ​Abdul-­Wahab, “Deux dinars normands de Mahdia,” 215–17. 77. ​Johns, “Malik Ifrīqiya,” 92–93. 78. ​On Ibn Tumart’s troubled visit to Ifriqiya, see Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:326–33. 79. ​The details of ­these campaigns are considered in Lévi-­Provençal, Trente-­sept lettres, 99–121. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1962, 1:378–79, 384–400. 80. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:218–19; Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:349–50.

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Tunis, who had not been involved in ­these secret negotiations, was then exiled to Bougie. ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin installed one of his viziers as governor before departing for Mahdia, where he arrived in late July/early August 1159.81 Other Ifriqiyan lords w ­ ere more welcoming of the Almohads. Al-­Tijani, quoting directly the Zirid prince Ibn Shaddad, glowingly describes how Arab tribal leaders and their ­people flocked to the support of the Almohads as they marched across western Ifriqiya.82 Ibn al-­Athir likewise notes that advancing soldiers did not damage “an ear of corn” as they marched along the fields of Ifriqiya, and that all of the army prayed as one ­behind their imam. The swelling ranks of the Almohad army was an unwelcome sight to the Norman garrison at Mahdia, which retreated to the city’s walls at the arrival of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin. At Zawila, the Almohads marched freely into the suburb, which soon “became a flourishing town” as auxiliary forces of Berbers, Arabs, and other unspecified locals joined the army.83 Abd al-­Muʾmin, realizing it would take a prolonged siege to take the city, collected provisions of such quantity that they looked like two mountains of wheat and barley: a tangible reminder to both the besieged and the besiegers of the power of the caliph (and somewhat ironically, an indicator of the economic recovery that the region had experienced u ­ nder Norman rule). But the Norman defenders of Mahdia did not give way to the Almohads. They conducted sorties from the city and made successful attacks on the front ranks of the siege camp.84 ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin responded by erecting a wall separating his camp from Mahdia to keep the Normans at bay. He also sailed around the peninsula with al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli to assess the city’s fortifications and even asked (with apparent incredulity) how the Zirid emir had managed to lose such a well-­fortified city. While the siege dragged on, the Almohads secured the loyalty of Tripoli, Sfax, Sousse, and inland Gafsa without conflict. The city of Gabès and a number of other unspecified territories, though, briefly resisted the Almohads before capitulating to their armies. Around a month ­after the arrival of the Almohads, William I sent reinforcements to the city. In early September 1159, a fleet that had been fighting Almoravid pirates in Ibiza arrived outside Mahdia on the ­orders of the Norman king. Arabic chronicles recount that the Franks ­were horrified at the number of soldiers assembled outside the city and ­were subsequently defeated in a 81. ​Ibn al-­Athir dates the arrival of the Almohads at Mahdia to 18 Rajab 554H (August 5, 1159) while al-­Tijani places it at 12 Rajab 554H ( July 30, 1159). 82. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 346–47. 83. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:119. 84. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 347–48.

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b­ attle in the ­waters outside the city by the Almohad navy.85 The outcome of this naval b­ attle is corroborated by Romuald of Salerno, who mentions that the Norman commander Qaʾid Peter lost a naval ­battle to the Almohads at the cost of many galleys. Another Latin chronicler, Hugo Falcandus, even accuses Qaʾid Peter of being a crypto-­Muslim and of treacherously retreating from combat b­ ecause he was in in league with his coreligionists.86 ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin commemorated his victory by distributing some twelve thousand dinars and equipment to his men. The Norman fleet responded by raiding nearby Sousse and capturing the governor of the city in an apparent act of retribution for the city’s capitulation to the Almohads.87 The defenders of Mahdia, meanwhile, resisted the Almohads for another six months before fi­nally capitulating in January 1160.88 The most detailed account of the city’s fall in the Latin tradition comes from Hugo Falcandus, who emphasizes the treachery in the court of Palermo that permitted the city to fall.89 He accuses certain palace eunuchs in Palermo of sending letters to the Almohads that revealed that William I did not plan to send further assistance to the city. Falcandus also asserts that Maio of Bari, the successor to Philip of Mahdia, used Mahdia as a tool for destabilizing the rule of William I. Maio had evidently convinced the king that his popularity would be unaffected by the loss of Mahdia. Apparently, Maio believed that the ­people of Palermo would think the king had become mad for giving up such a prosperous city, revolt against him, and install Maio on the throne. Instead, Hugo Falcandus reports that many ­people in Sicily thought Maio “permitted [Mahdia] to be captured,” which caused the popularity of the king’s closest adviser to plunge.90 Whereas Falcandus’s description of the fall of Mahdia is grounded in the internal politics of the Norman court, Arabic chroniclers instead emphasize the might and generosity of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin. The Almohad caliph made 85. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:120; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 348–49. 86. ​Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:242; Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie, 25–28. Qaʾid Peter, also known as Peter Ahmad Barrun, was a leading figure in the court of William I during the early years of his reign. His life story is discussed in Johns, Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily, 222–28. 87. ​The timeline for this raid is unclear and is mentioned only in al-­Tijani. The governor of Sousse, Jabbara ibn Kamil al-­Fadighi, was taken to Sicily and eventually ransomed. Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 30. 88. ​ Évariste Lévi-­Provençal, Documents inédits d’histoire almohade: Fragments manuscrits du “legajo” 1919 du fonds arabe de l’escurial (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1928), 200–202. See also Idris, Berbérie orientale, 1:394–400. 89. ​Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie, 24–28. Nef argues that the backlash against Maio for losing Mahdia is indicative of the personal investments in Africa held by many in Norman Sicily. Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 601–7. 90. ​Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie, 25. Loud argues that ­there was an “atmosphere of suspicion, paranoia and factional dispute” in the court of William I during the time of the Almohad conquest of Mahdia. Falcandus, History of the Tyrants of Sicily, 23.

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multiple peace offers to the Norman defenders in Mahdia that initially required them to convert to Islam. Although the defenders refused ­these offers, ʿAbd al-­ Muʾmin still allowed them to correspond with the court of Palermo. Eventually, though, he won over the defenders, and the garrison surrendered the city without having to convert.91 ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin provided the defenders with ships to leave the city, but many drowned in the choppy winter ­waters of the Mediterranean and only a few reached Sicily. It is pos­si­ble that the leniency shown to the Norman knights was partially due to warnings from William I, who had threatened the Almohad caliph with the massacre of Sicilian Muslims should his soldiers be harmed. Following his entrance into the city, ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin or­ga­nized the affairs of Mahdia and repaired its fortifications. He appointed an (unspecified) Almohad to rule the city along with al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, the Zirid ruler whom the Normans had ejected twelve years prior. Both al-­Hasan and his sons received land around the city before ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin departed for the Maghreb at the beginning of February 1160.

The Legacy of Norman Africa The Almohad conquest of Ifriqiya resulted in a substantial realignment of the po­liti­cal landscape, whereby the entirety of north-­central Africa came ­under the control of one dynasty. This upheaval did not sit well with a number of Ifriqiyan tribal leaders, who did not want to swear fealty to yet another outside power. Their reluctance to submit to Almohad rule led to conflict when ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin requested aid from them in his campaigns against Christians in al-­Andalus in early 1160. Although t­ hese Ifriqiyan lords initially agreed to follow him on this campaign, they l­ater reneged. ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin then sent a contingent of his army back to corral the deserters. The two sides met at the ­Battle of Horn Mountain in 555H (1160) near Kairouan, which ended in a decisive Almohad victory. Muhriz ibn Ziyad was killed in the b­ attle, the goods and families of the deserters w ­ ere taken to the Maghreb, and the surviving Arab tribesmen w ­ ere forced to pledge their allegiance to ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin. Following this victory, Ibn al-­Athir reports that Ifriqiya was overwhelmingly “safe and peaceful” u ­ nder Almohad rule.92 Al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, the last Zirid emir, served as the co-­governor of Mahdia and Zawila alongside an Almohad vizier for about three years.93 ­After ʿAbd al-­ 91. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:120; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 349. 92. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:122. 93. ​Ibn al-­Athir writes that al-­Hasan was a governor of Mahdia, while al-­Tijani specifies that he governed Zawila. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 554H, 11:120; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 349. Ibn

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Muʾmin died in 1163, his son and successor Yusuf ordered al-­Hasan to relocate to Marrakesh—­presumably to ensure that al-­Hasan did not seek to subvert his authority. En route to the Almohad capital, al-­Hasan fell ill and died near Rabat in 563H (1167–68).94 How al-­Hasan had governed Mahdia during his final years as co-­governor and the extent of his ­actual power in the city are not known. I suspect that his presence in the city was largely ceremonial—­a physical manifestation of Almohad goodwill to the ­people of Mahdia, demonstrating that the new dynasty would honor the memory of the Zirids. This continuity of power would have helped to legitimize Almohad rule, particularly in comparison to the Christian Normans, and to minimize the risk of unrest. When al-­Hasan was recalled to Marrakesh and ­later died, it brought an end to the Zirid dynasty. Almohad rule across Ifriqiya realigned the balance of power in the region and eliminated any changes to its society that had been brought about by Norman rule. The Almohads’ policy of forced conversion to Islam reduced the indigenous Christian presence in the region.95 Furthermore, the Almohads crafted a policy of forced resettlement that saw the relocation of tribal leaders and their families from Ifriqiya to the Maghreb, where they could live in comfort u ­ nder the watchful eye of the Almohad court. This happened twice in a de­cade, once a­ fter the B ­ attle of Sétif in 548H (1153–54) and again a­ fter the B ­ attle of Horn Mountain in 555H (1160). The lenient treatment of t­ hese lords helped ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin cultivate a loyal base of power that he could leverage to his advantage—as was the case in 551H (1156–57) when he persuaded Ifriqiyan chieftains to support his right to choose his son as heir to the Almohad throne. ­These tribesmen also provided military ser­vice. The skill of ­these Ifriqiyan soldiers was such that they w ­ ere paid more than their Maghrebi counter­parts: twenty-­five dinars for an equipped Ifriqiyan cavalry, compared to only ten dinars for a Maghrebi cavalry.96 The Almohad policy of forced migrations continued ­after the expulsion of the Normans from Mahdia and into the 1190s.97 When the Almohad administration began to fragment in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Khallikan writes that al-­Hasan exercised power in Mahdia with the aid of an Almohad nāʾib (“representative” or “lieutenant”). He also specifies that the Almohads provided al-­Hasan with two farms in Mahdia and a ­house for his sons and entourage. Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-­Aʿyan wa-­Anbaʾ Abnaʾ al-­ Zaman, 6:218–19. 94. ​Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 349–50; Tibi, “Zīrids,” EI2. 95. ​Evidence exists for the ­limited survival of indigenous Chris­tian­ity, especially near Gafsa. Brett, “Muslim Justice u ­ nder Infidel Rule,” 360; Valérian, “Permanence du christianisme au Maghreb,” 149. 96. ​Baadj, Saladin, 60. 97. ​Amira K. Bennison, “Tribal Identities and the Formation of the Almohad Élite: The Salutory Tale of Ibn ‘Aṭiyya,” in Biografías magrebíes: Identidades y grupos religiosos, sociales y políticos en el Magreb medieval, ed. Mohamed Meouak (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2012), 245–72.

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t­ hese imported tribal leaders (and their descendants) took sides and drove infighting within the caliphate.98 In Ifriqiya proper, local ambivalence with regard to the Almohads became apparent in the mid-1180s when a displaced Almoravid tribe from Majorca called the Banu Ghaniya invaded Ifriqiya and captured a number of prominent cities with ease: Bougie, Algiers, Constantine, Tozeur, Gafsa, and Gabès.99 The Banu Ghaniya made alliances with Ifriqiyan tribes who ­were dissatisfied with Almohad rule, and together they managed to inflict multiple defeats on the Almohads, who sent several armies far afield to deal with this new threat. The Almohads eventually triumphed over the Banu Ghaniya in a number of ­battles in the early 1200s that eliminated the threat posed from this dynasty.100 When the Banu Ghaniya waged their campaigns in Ifriqiya, they most often clashed with the Banu Hafs, a dynasty that the Almohads had appointed as governors of Ifriqiya during the 1190s.101 As Almohad authority in al-­Andalus and the Maghreb faltered, however, the Hafsid governors of Ifriqiya, too, began to see themselves as separate from their Almohad overlords. Drawing on their hereditary connection to Ibn Tumart, the Mahdi and spiritual founder of the Almohad movement, the Hafsids removed the caliph’s name from their call to prayers at the beginning of 627H (1229) and subsequently introduced their own names into the khutbah in 634H (1236–37). The Almohad caliphate—­ stretched thin by repeated (and increasingly unsuccessful) campaigns in al-­ Andalus, po­liti­cally fractured by repeated succession crises, and torn between vari­ous ideological, tribal, and ­legal divisions—­was incapable of quelling this revolt. The Hafsids thus ruled Ifriqiya as one of several successor dynasties to the Almohads u ­ ntil the end of the sixteenth ­century. The religious overtones that had characterized Almohad campaigns in Ifriqiya against the Normans did not prevent other Christian powers in the Mediterranean from seeking to trade in Almohad ports. Genoese merchants made treaties across the 1160s with the Almohads, the Banu Ghaniya in Majorca, and Ibn Mardanish in al-­Andalus.102 The Pisans followed suit, not wanting a rival 98. ​Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, 78–80. 99. ​Abun-­Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 93–100. 100. ​Conflict between the Banu Ghaniya and Almohads in Ifriqiya has led some l­ater scholars to compare the former’s campaigns to t­hose of the Banu Hilal during the 1050s. See, for example, Georges Marçais, “3ẖāniya,” EI2. 101. ​Baadj, Saladin, 62–85. 102. ​Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 38–53; Dominique Valérian, “Gênes, l’Afrique et l’Orient: le Maghreb almohade dans la politique génoise en Méditerranée,” in Chemins d’outre-­mer: Études d’histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard, ed. Damien Coulon, Catherine Otten-­Froux, and Dominique Valérian (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2004), 827–37; Hilmar Krueger, “The Routine of Commerce between Genoa and North-­West Africa during the Late Twelfth C ­ entury,” in Latin Expansion in the Medieval Western Mediterranean, ed. Eleanor Congdon (New York: Routledge, 2013), 47–68. On this

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city-­state like Genoa to have exclusive trading rights with Muslim powers across the western Mediterranean.103 ­These contracts allowed foreign powers to establish funādiq (commercial spaces that provided essential ser­vices for visiting merchants) for the exchange of textiles, spices, foodstuffs, gold, and industrial goods.104 Ifriqiya was just one front where Christian powers on the Italian Peninsula sought to extend their commercial reach in the mid-­late twelfth ­century; Pisa concluded a favorable treaty with the Fatimids in 1154 and, despite the objections of religious officials, Fatimids and Pisans served as crew members on the same ships.105 The lucrativeness of t­ hese trade routes was such that even the Normans ­were willing to set aside their prior conflicts with the Almohads.106 In 1180, King William II of Sicily signed a treaty with the Almohad governor of Tunis, Abu Yaʿqub, to allow Norman traders to conduct commerce in their Ifriqiyan ports.107 The terms of this treaty even favored William, who received tribute from Abu Yaʿqub—­potentially to guarantee certain grain prices for shipment to Tunis.108 In the Kingdom of Sicily, the loss of Mahdia fueled unrest and conspiracy during the reign of William I. The ­g rand admiral of Sicily, Maio of Bari, was re­orientation in the context of the southern Mediterranean, see Dominique Valérian, “Les relations commerciales entre Alexandrie et le Maghreb, XIe-­XIIe siècle: de l’unité à la rupture?,” in Alexandrie médiévale 4, ed. Christian Décobert, Jean-­Yves Empereur, and Christophe Picard (Alexandria: Centre d’Études Alexandrines, 2011), 229–38. 103. ​Letters between the Pisans and Almohads reveal how both sides used a combination of personal trust, public institutes, and l­egal pre­ce­dent to facilitate economic exchange—­especially in the case of the crew of a Pisan ship looting and killing individuals in an Almohad port. Travis Bruce, “Commercial Conflict Resolution across the Religious Divide in the Thirteenth-­Century Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Historical Review 30 (2015): 19–38. 104. ​Constable, Trade and Traders, 68–106. 105. ​For Muslim rulers, the commercial utility of Italian city-­states clashed with the aid ­these polities provided to the Crusader states. Saladin even wrote a letter to Baghdad complaining of “contradictory be­hav­ior of the Pisans, Genoese, and Venetians.” Salvatori, “Corsairs’ Crews,” 39–40. See also David Jacoby, “Les italiens en Egypte aux XIIe et XIIIe siècle: Du comptoir à la colonie?,” in Coloniser au moyen âge: Méthodes d’expansion et techniques de domination en Méditerranée du 11e au 16e siècle, ed. Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris: A. Colin, 1995), 76–88. 106. ​Commercial contracts between the Almohads and Italian city-­states are more numerous in the thirteenth ­century than the twelfth c­ entury. Pascal Buresi, “Traduttore traditore: À propos d’une correspondance entre l’empire almohade et la cité de Pise (début XIIIe siécle),” Oriente Moderno 88, no.  2 (2008): 297–309; Pascal Buresi, “Les documents arabes et latins échangés entre Pise et l’empire almohade en 596–598/1200–1202: La chancellerie au cœur des relations diplomatiques,” in Documents et histoire: Islam, VIIe–­XVIe siècle, ed. Anne Regourd (Geneva: Libraire Droz S. A., 2013), 13–88. 107. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 576H, 11:225. See also Mas Latrie, “Documents sur l’histoire de l’Algérie,” 137–40; Louis de Mas Latrie, Relations et commerce de l’Afrique septentrionale avec les nations chrétiennes au moyen âge (Paris: Imprimeurs de l’Institut de France, 1886), 82–97; Abulafia, “Norman Kingdom of Africa,” 43–45. 108. ​Giovanna Palombo, “The Normans of Sicily from ‘the Other Side’: The Medieval Arabic Sources,” in Sicily and the Mediterranean: Migration, Exchange, Reinvention, ed. Giovanna Summerfield and Claudia Karagoz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 40.

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widely blamed for the fall of Norman Africa and became im­mensely unpop­ u­lar. As related by the decidedly anti-­Maio and anti-­William chronicler Hugo Falcandus, rumors spread throughout Palermo that Maio sought to usurp the Sicilian crown for himself.109 Falcandus reports that Maio had seized the royal regalia by conspiring with the queen consort and that he plotted with the help of the papacy to assassinate William himself. ­These rumors—­though likely untrue—­were enough to rouse a group of Norman elites to conspire to assassinate the g­ rand admiral, which they did in November 1160 on the streets of Palermo. William’s trou­bles did not end with the death of Maio, however. Several months l­ater, in March 1161, discontented rebels led by a handful of Sicilian nobles marched on the royal palace and captured William. While they ­were considering how to best deal with the captive monarch, the Norman army and ­people of Palermo rallied to William, demanding the release of their king. With this popu­lar support, William suppressed the attempted coup and continued to rule the Kingdom of Sicily ­until his death from natu­ral ­causes in 1166. Although William I’s reign a­ fter this coup was largely peaceful, ­there remained troubling undercurrents of Christian-­Muslim tension during it.110 ­After the execution of Philip of Mahdia near the end of the reign of Roger II, crypto-­ Muslim eunuchs of the royal court became the targets of increased scrutiny and suspicion. A series of grassroots anti-­Muslim riots in 1161, led by Italian immigrants and intensified by the loss of Norman possessions in Africa, also shows “widespread popu­lar resentment” among many Latin Christians ­toward Muslims in Sicily.111 Perhaps counterintuitively, ­these pogroms initially led to a closer connection between the Norman monarch and his Muslim subjects, as persecuted Muslims on the island flocked to their ultimate overlord for protection. William I even appointed one of his crypto-­Muslim eunuchs, Qaʾid Peter, the military commander who was partially responsible for the loss of Mahdia, as part of his intimate three-­person advisory council, the familiares regis (familiars of the king).112 The relationship between William I and Muslims in Sicily was such that Hugo Falcandus notes that Saracen ­women lamented the most over the king’s 109. ​Graham Loud, “The Image of the Tyrant in the Work of ‘Hugo Falcandus,’ ” Nottingham Medieval Studies 57 (2013): 1–20. 110. ​In 1163, Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire sought to negotiate an alliance with Italian city-­states to attack the Normans but was ultimately unsuccessful. Loud, “Norman Sicily in the Twelfth ­Century,” 457–58. 111. ​Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 207. See also Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie , 70; Romuald of Salerno, Chronicon, 7.1:246–47. 112. ​Hiroshi Takayama, Sicily and the Mediterranean in the ­Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 2019), 33–51.

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death in 1166.113 Even ­after William’s passing, crypto-­Muslim eunuchs continued to play a substantial role in the kingdom. Qaʾid Peter leveraged his proximity to the queen regent to elevate his position over other administrators as “chamberlain of the royal palace.”114 Peter’s position in the Norman court was nevertheless precarious. In the summer of 1166, ­whether due to his desire to return to his coreligionists or b­ ecause of his fear of an internal plot, he defected to the Almohads. Although the Norman kings continued to appoint crypto-­Muslim eunuchs to government posts a­ fter the defection of Qaʾid Peter, the safety of non-elite Muslims in Sicily became increasingly precarious at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth ­century as dynastic crises fueled popu­lar vio­lence and anti-­Islamic papal doctrines justified the removal of Muslims from Christian lands.115 By the end of the thirteenth ­century, when Sicily and southern Italy ­were controlled by Hohenstaufens, the indigenous Muslim community of Sicily was all but destroyed.116

A Deeper Mediterranean Legacy? Norman conquests in Ifriqiya did not have enduring resonance in Latin Christendom. Latin chroniclers writing both within and outside the Kingdom of Sicily have precious ­little to say about ­these campaigns, especially compared to Arabic source materials. Only the work of Hugo Falcandus tackles the fall of Norman Africa, and this description is mostly concerned with dysfunction and intrigue at the court of Palermo. This paucity indicates that contemporaries (or near contemporaries) of Norman Africa viewed it as peripheral to other Norman military campaigns and po­liti­cal machinations of the time, or that so l­ittle information about Norman Africa reached the shores of Eu­rope that ­these authors had ­little to write about it. Leaders who undertook campaigns in Ifriqiya a­ fter the fall of the Norman dynasty show a similar disinterest and do not recall the e­ arlier campaigns of Roger II and George of Antioch.117 113. ​Falcandus, Historia o liber de regno Sicilie, 87–91. 114. ​Tolan, Saracens, 194–96; Birk, Norman Kings of Sicily, 224. 115. ​Nef, “Déportation des musulmans siciliens,” 457–65. 116. ​See Taylor, Muslims in Medieval Italy, 1–32. 117. ​Ibn ʿIdhari intriguingly mentions two attacks of the Franks in Ifriqiya in the de­cades ­after the Almohad conquest of Mahdia: one in 558H (1162–63) that hit Mahdia and Sousse and another that raided Mahdia in 573H (1177–78). Neither of ­these attacks are corroborated in other sources, and it is unclear where Ibn ʿIdhari heard of t­ hese attacks. Perhaps William I and his successor, William II, did seek brief retribution for the fall of Mahdia in 1160? Regardless, what­ever attacks occurred during t­hese years, they did not lead to lasting changes in the relationship between the Normans and the Almohads, as the two powers brokered a commercial treaty in 1180. Ibn ʿIdhari, Al-­Bayan al-­Mughrib, 1:350.

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Louis IX of France did not mention the Normans when he invaded Tunis in 1270 as part of his second Crusade.118 Charles V did not evoke the Normans when he attacked Tunis in 1535.119 Zirid-­Norman conflict likewise does not find a place in the narratives about crusading, holy war, or Christian-­Muslim relations that w ­ ere written in the late medieval and early modern periods. The same cannot be said of medieval Arabic sources. Despite the ephemeral nature of the Norman conquests in Ifriqiya, Muslim authors interpreted them as one ele­ment of an enduring and pre­sent threat that Christians posed to Muslims on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.120 Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh (The complete history) by Ibn al-­Athir and Kitab al-­ʿIbar (The book of examples) by Ibn Khaldun pre­sent Norman involvement in Ifriqiya as part of a trans-­ Mediterranean assault on the lands of Islam. Both authors, drawing on source material ultimately deriving from the Zirid prince Ibn Shaddad, interweave narratives of Zirid-­Norman conflict in Ifriqiya and con­temporary campaigns of Christians fighting Muslims in other parts of the Mediterranean. Exchanges between the Zirids and Normans ­were thus mobilized by both authors as one component of a larger interfaith ­battle between Muslims and Christians. Ibn al-­Athir wrote Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, his longest and most famous work, while living in his f­ amily’s estate near Mosul.121 The chronicle pre­sents a year-­by-­ year summary of events in the Muslim world up to the year 628H (1230–31).122 This text is part of the genre called tārīkh: a “history,” but with the connotation of using events of the past as a way to teach by example—­specifically, to teach Muslim elites who could learn from historical individuals and dynasties.123 Ibn al-­Athir outlines his approach to the genre in the introduction of 118. ​Michael Lower, “Tunis in 1270: A Case Study of Interfaith Relations in the Late Thirteenth ­Century,” International History Review 28, no. 3 (September 2006): 504–14; Michael Lower, The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 144–73. 119. ​Otto von Habsburg, Charles V, trans. Michael Ross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 133–48; James D. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7, 145–49. 120. ​In considering the Zirids in this larger Mediterranean context, I echo the call of Hillenbrand and Cobb for scholars to consider t­hese interfaith episodes from the perspective of non–­Latin-­ Christian communities. This methodology also requires moving away from the Biblioteca arabo-­sicula of Michele Amari, which, while con­ve­nient, isolates texts from the context in which they ­were written. Hillenbrand, Crusades, 613; Cobb, Race for Paradise, 279. 121. ​The fifteenth-­century scholar al-­Sakhawi called Ibn al-­Athir a “hadith expert and g­ reat scholar,” and The Complete History “the best of all histories in recording the happenings clearly and distinctly.” Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 413. 122. ​The annalistic format of The Complete History breaks in several places. For example, the account of the rise of Ibn Tumart, which is listed u ­ nder the year 514H (1120–21), extends from 505H (1111–12) ­until 524H (1129–30). This break in form is likely due to Ibn al-­Athir’s reliance on e­ arlier sources that did not adhere to annalistic styles. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 514H, 10:266–70. 123. ​Historians ­today are dubious of many of t­ hese genealogies. In his discussion of the genre, Brett states that tārīkh “is not in fact history; it is a peculiarly Islamic genre of miscellaneous informa-

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his chronicle. He argues that previous histories had provided disparate narratives that disconnected the histories of the West (the Mediterranean and ­Middle East) and East (greater Iran and India).124 By carefully combining ­these narratives into one work about the entire umma and scrutinizing previous histories, Ibn al-­Athir thought he could create a chronicle that was closest to an objective truth.125 One such truth made apparent in the sections that discuss the Norman conquest of Sicily in 482H (1089–90) to the end of the chronicle in 628H (1230– 31) is the idea of a trans-­Mediterranean Frankish assault on Islamic lands. Ibn al-­Athir argues that the Franks sought to establish a dawla (state or dynasty) in al-­Andalus, Ifriqiya, Sicily, and Syria through a series of interrelated campaigns that posed a substantial threat to the survival of the Muslim community.126 It is within this larger framework that exchanges between the Zirids and Normans occur, and Ibn al-­Athir makes explicit the interrelatedness of Norman aggression in Ifriqiya and other instances of Frankish aggression in the Mediterranean.127 I recounted the first of t­ hese interrelated encounters in chapter 3. In 490H (1096–97), an envoy of crusader Baldwin I sent a message to Roger I that outlined his plans to invade Ifriqiya.128 One of Roger’s advisers voiced his opinion that this was a ­g reat idea b­ ecause then “the lands would become Christian lands.” On hearing this, Roger farted loudly and proclaimed, “My religion be true! That was more useful than your words!” He explained that should Baldwin take Ifriqiya, he would have to commit numerous resources to facilitate the conquests, he would lose money from the grain trade, and he would have to break his treaties with the Zirids. Although Roger refused Baldwin’s proposal, tion about humanity and the world, arranged with a passion for chronology which gives it simply the appearance of history in the Western sense.” Brett, “Way of the Nomad,” 252. Many Muslim scholars during the ­Middle Ages ­were disdainful of this methodology ­because they saw it as conflicting with the idea that ­human pro­g ress was preordained by God. François de Blois et al., “Tārīkh,” EI2. See also Fozia Bora, Writing History in the Medieval Islamic World: The Value of Chronicles as Archives (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2019), 11–23. 124. ​Azmul Kamaruzaman, Norsaeidah Jamaludin, and Ahmad Fadzil, “Ibn Al-­Athir’s Philosophy of History in Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh,” Asian Social Science 11, no. 23 (2015): 30. 125. ​Françoise Micheau, “Le Kitāb al-­kāmil fī l-­tā’rīkh d’Ibn al-­Athīr: Entre chronique et histoire,” Studia Islamica 104/105 (2007): 84–85, 100–101. Ibn al-­Athir primarily used Arabic sources for his narrative, though he also likely drew on Latin texts in his narration of the Crusades. Konrad Hirschler, “The Jerusalem Conquest of 492/1099 in the Medieval Arabic Historiography of the Crusades: From Regional Plurality to Islamic Narrative,” Crusades 13 (2014): 71–73. 126. ​Cobb, Race for Paradise, 40. 127. ​Ibn al-­Athir was not the first to do this. As early as the first de­cade of the twelfth ­century, ʿAli ibn Tahir al-­Sulami wrote about how the Norman conquest of Sicily was the first strike in a multipronged Frankish assault on the lands of Islam. Chevedden, “Crusade from the First,” 201–6. Chevedden’s argument is contested in Nef, Conquérir et gouverner, 47–49, 61–62. 128. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 491H, 10:126–27.

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he ominously foreshadowed the ­f uture conquest of Ifriqiya at the end of the episode when he said, “When we find the strength, we ­will take it!” This apocryphal episode illustrates the extent to which Ibn al-­Athir considered the Frankish campaigns in greater Syria and Ifriqiya to be related. Even though an alliance between Baldwin and Roger I never came to fruition, Ibn al-­Athir thought his audience should know about this supposed instance of Frankish collusion. The interconnectivity of Muslim-­Frankish conflicts is seen some fifty years ­later, in 539H (1144–45), during an encounter that an unnamed scholar related to Ibn al-­Athir.129 When news arrived in Sicily that a fleet of Roger II had plundered the lands around Tripoli, the Norman king asked a respected Muslim scholar, “Where was Muhammad for ­those lands and their ­people?” The scholar replied, “He was conquering for them. He witnessed the conquest of Edessa, which the Muslims have now conquered.” Although members of Roger’s court laughed at this prophecy, news reached Sicily several days ­later of the Muslim seizure of Edessa. Like the story of Roger I’s interaction with Baldwin, this episode is not found in any other Arabic sources. Instead, it was a story that Ibn al-­Athir heard from a Muslim scholar with some connections to Norman Sicily and thought prudent to rec­ord in his chronicle. Its presence in Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh once again highlights the perceived interconnectivity of conflicts between Muslims and Christians through the eyes of Ibn al-­Athir: a loss for the Muslims of Ifriqiya corresponded to a gain for the Muslims of Syria. The language that Ibn al-­Athir uses in Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh further solidifies the idea of a monolithic Christian e­ nemy—­embodied through the use of the term “Frank,” which broadly means Latin Christians.130 Although Ibn al-­Athir names individual Frankish leaders, t­ here is ­little variance in how he describes the ­people over whom they ruled or the Muslims against whom they fought.131 A leader of the Third Crusade fighting in the Latin East is a Frank, an Aragonese commander fighting in al-­Andalus is a Frank, and a Norman commander fighting in Ifriqiya is a Frank.132 Through this rhetorical strategy, Ibn al-­Athir reduces interfaith conflicts throughout the Mediterranean to this ­simple Muslim-­Frankish dynamic. Ibn al-­Athir’s use of the same term across 129. ​Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 539H, 11:51–52. 130. ​Variation in the usage of the term “Frank” means that it “never reached the status of an uncontested generic term for all Christian ­peoples of Western Eu­rope.” König, Arabic-­Islamic Views, 230. 131. ​On rare occasions, Ibn al-­Athir praises named Frankish leaders. This is true in the case of Roger II, whom Ibn al-­Athir extolls for treating Muslims well in Sicily. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 484H, 10:92. See also Metcalfe, Muslims and Christians, 100; Nef, “Dire la conquête et la souveraineté,” 4–10. 132. ​See, for example, Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh, year 496H, 10:170–71, year 497H, 10:173– 74, year 499H, 10:192–93, year 552H, 11:110–11.

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all ­these exchanges shows that he perceived t­ hese Franks and their campaigns against Muslims to be interrelated, and he hoped to convey this to his thirteenth-­ century readers. A similar strand of thought is found in Ibn Khaldun’s Kitab al-­ʿIbar, which (as discussed in the introduction) has been the subject of more scholastic inquiry than any other text written in North Africa during the M ­ iddle Ages. Ibn Khaldun utilized a host of e­ arlier sources, including the chronicle of Ibn al-­ Athir, to reinforce his idea of the cyclical nature of history.133 This methodological framework leads Ibn Khaldun to treat Zirid-­Norman conflict in two instances: the first as part of larger Frankish aggression in the Mediterranean and the second in interspersed narratives related to the histories of individual Ifriqiyan dynasties. In the latter section, the Franks (i.e., the Normans) have a fleeting presence that is ultimately undone by the Almohads.134 In the former, however, Ibn Khaldun echoes some of the narrative strategies of Ibn al-­Athir by presenting Zirid-­Norman conflict alongside other instances of Franks fighting Muslims in the Levant. Ibn Khaldun first mentions Zirid-­Norman interactions in the chapter titled, “An account of the Franks, who captured the coasts of Syria and its ports, and how they subdued them, and the beginning of their authority ­there and their fate.”135 Sections in this chapter, beginning with the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, consider the regions of the Islamic world threatened by Frankish aggression in the eastern Mediterranean, Sicily, and Ifriqiya. Al-­Andalus, which Ibn Khaldun considers in dif­fer­ent sections, is absent from this narrative; this represents a departure from Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh of Ibn al-­Athir. Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldun advocates for a broad Frankish assault on Islamic lands in the central and eastern Mediterranean, which include Ifriqiya.136 This is seen in both the narrative he tells and the vocabulary he uses to tell it. The section headings of 133. ​Circumstantial information in the Kitab al-­ʿIbar shows that Ibn Khaldun used the works of Ibn al-­Athir and al-­Tijani as the basis for his own. In his first description of the Normans’ attack on Mahdia, Ibn Khaldun writes that Roger II assembled a fleet of 250 ships. In a dif­fer­ent section of the book, though, he writes of the same attack but mentions that Roger launched a fleet of 300 ships. This discrepancy can be attributed to his use of multiple sources, for Ibn al-­Athir wrote that Roger had a fleet of 250 ships and al-­Tijani wrote that Roger had a fleet of 300 ships. Ibn Khaldun’s naming of George of Antioch similarly indicates that he used al-­Tijani as a source. On several occasions, Ibn Khaldun introduces George as “George ibn Mikhael” and “George ibn Mikhael the Antiochene.” ­These titles are found in the writings of al-­Tijani but not t­ hose of Ibn al-­Athir. Ibn al-­Athir, Al-­Kamil fi al-­Tarikh, year 543H, 11:63– 64, year 544H, 73; al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 241, 333, 341–42; Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:233, 6:214. See also Charles Issawi, “Ibn Khaldun on Ancient History: A Study in Sources,” in Cross-­Cultural Encounters and Conflicts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 51–78. 134. ​See, for example, Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 6:223–24. 135. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:209. 136. ​This section on the Franks is flanked by narratives of the Seljuq and Artuqid dynasties.

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the Kitab al-­ʿIbar show how he weaves the Normans’ campaigns in Ifriqiya (italicized) with roughly chronological events in the Levant: The lord of Damascus conquers Banias Shamas al-­Malik seizes Beaufort The Franks seize the island of Djerba in Ifriqiya The lord of Damascus conquers some of the forts of the Franks The Franks seize Tripoli of the West The Franks seize Mahdia The Franks seize Bône and the death of Roger, lord of Sicily, and reign of his son William The Franks seize Ascalon The uprising of the Muslims on the coast of Ifriqiya against the Franks, who had been triumphing ­there The reconquest by ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin of Mahdia from the hand of the Franks The Franks siege Asad al-­Din Shirkuh at Bilbeis The Franks siege Cairo137 Ibn Khaldun’s narrative alternates between events in Ifriqiya and the Mashriq. The core of the Norman conquests is told in the sections on the Franks conquering Tripoli, Mahdia, and Bône, though t­ hese are separated from other events that involve their presence in Ifriqiya: the conquest of Djerba and the Almohad reconquest. The intertwining of t­hese events with ­those in the ­Middle East, combined with the use of the term “Franks” to refer to t­ hese ­people as a collective, shows the perceived interrelatedness of ­these military campaigns. Ibn Khaldun’s rhe­toric when describing the Almohad conquest of Mahdia is also evocative. He writes of the “reconquest by ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin of Mahdia from the hand of the Franks.”138 This word choice is curious, for neither ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin nor the Almohads ever held Mahdia before this conquest. Instead, such language implies that the Almohads retook Mahdia on behalf of all Muslims from the Franks, whose conquests merely interrupted Muslim rule.139 This rhe­toric delegitimizes Norman rule as ­little more than an interlude between two more legitimate dynasties: the Zirids and the Almohads. Writing in the ­fourteenth ­century, Ibn Khaldun thus frames this centuries-­old encounter 137. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:230–43. 138. ​Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al-­ʿIbar, 5:238. The crucial word in question, irtijāʿ, has the connotation of returning something to its previous form. Thus, the conquest of ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin returns Mahdia (and Ifriqiya) to its previous form of governance by a Muslim dynasty. 139. ​Al-­Tijani similarly writes that Islam “returned” (ʿāda) to Mahdia. Al-­Tijani, Al-­Rihla, 349.

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between the Normans and Zirids/Almohads as one of many examples of Frankish-­Muslim conflict in the Mediterranean. Norman rule in Ifriqiya was short lived. When William I came to power in 1154, rebellious lords and foreign powers like the Byzantines sought to conquer his lands. With his military resources stretched across southern Italy, William was unable to combat widespread revolts in Ifriqiya that occurred during the mid1150s. ­These uprisings, which ­were driven by opportunistic governors backed by Maliki jurists and a disaffected Muslim majority in Ifriqiya, resulted in the Normans losing the vast majority of their Ifriqiyan possessions by 553H (1158–59). It took an outside force in the form of the Almohads u ­ nder ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin to fi­ nally displace the Normans from Mahdia, Zawila, and Sousse a year l­ater. The Almohads dramatically altered the po­liti­cal landscape of Ifriqiya. They deported tribal leaders to areas closer to their capital of Marrakesh, which ensured that Almohad supremacy in Ifriqiya was relatively uncontested. Nonetheless, external invasions from the Banu Ghaniya during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries strained regional infrastructure and emboldened the Hafsid governors of Ifriqiya, who soon ­after declared their in­de­pen­dence. Although indigenous Christians in Ifriqiya suffered during the Almohad conquests of the 1150s, Italian (and l­ater, Norman) merchants prospered as they flocked to Almohad ports across the southern Mediterranean. In Sicily, William I managed to hold onto his throne despite the loss of his African territories. Nonetheless, tensions between Christians and Muslims that had manifested in conflicts during the 1140s and 1150s in Ifriqiya likewise cropped up in Sicily. Grassroots pogroms against Sicilian Muslims in the 1160s ­were the first in a series of popu­lar persecutions that contributed to the decimation of ­these communities, a pro­cess made complete with the help of royal and papal doctrine in the thirteenth ­century. While the legacy of Norman involvement in Ifriqiya was virtually non­ex­ is­tent in Christian Eu­rope, it became one component of a larger narrative in Arabic chronicles. Authors like Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun, who wrote sweeping histories of the Muslim world, used Zirid-­Norman conflict to reinforce the idea of a Frankish threat to Muslim lands across the Mediterranean. Although the geo­g raph­i­cal and chronological scope of Norman involvement in Ifriqiya was minor compared to that of larger Frankish campaigns in al-­ Andalus and the Mashriq, ­these authors nonetheless saw it as a relevant third theater of conflict. By folding Zirid-­Norman interactions into this larger narrative, Ibn al-­Athir and Ibn Khaldun ensured both dynasties’ continued relevance to Muslim history into the late medieval period.

Epilogue The Shadow of the Banu Hilal

This integrated history of the Zirids and Normans has shown that the relationship between t­ hese two dynasties was a tumultuous one in which armed conflict and diplomacy operated against a backdrop of commercial and cultural exchange. It is the former issues that dominate Latin and Arabic medieval sources. The two dynasties first encountered each other on the battlefield in Sicily as both groups sought control over the island. Although the Normans emerged triumphant in t­ hese encounters, both sides ultimately de­cided that peaceful trading was more beneficial than protracted conflict. The exchange of trade goods across the Strait of Sicily became a central component of the dynasties’ relationship. Amid this commercial exchange, however, was conflict and po­liti­cal maneuvering that spanned the Mediterranean. The Zirids, whose lands had been much reduced in the ­middle of the eleventh c­ entury, sought to expand their power using the l­imited resources at their disposal: maritime raiding across the Mediterranean, alliances with the Almoravids and Fatimids, and campaigns against other governors in Ifriqiya. The Normans, meanwhile, looked to legitimize their nascent dynasty and to cultivate power through any means necessary: diplomacy, marriage alliances, po­liti­cal subterfuge, raiding, and armed conflict. The larger Mediterranean goals of the Zirids and Normans led to numerous encounters between the two dynasties. For much of the early twelfth ­century, the Zirid emirs of Ifriqiya exerted pressure on a young Roger II through their 19 8

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military strength and alliance with the Almoravids. The ascent of George of Antioch in the mid-1120s and the substantial territorial gains that the Norman army accrued on the Italian Peninsula in the 1130s, however, tipped the balance of power in f­ avor of the Sicilians. When a devastating drought gripped Ifriqiya in the 1140s, Roger II seized much of the Ifriqiyan littoral. Norman rule brought small but meaningful changes to the region as governors appointed by the Normans levied new taxes on non-­Christians, Norman garrisons and officials patrolled the streets, and the court of Palermo sponsored building proj­ects to aid in the recovery of the Ifriqiyan economy. As the region rebounded from the drought of the 1140s, the advantages of Norman rule ceased to outweigh the disadvantages for the Muslim majority of the region. Widespread revolts against Norman rule in the 1150s brought an end to Norman rule in most of Ifriqiya. The subsequent Almohad conquest of Mahdia in 1160 destroyed the remainder of Norman Africa and permitted the last Zirid emir, al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, to briefly reclaim his throne as co-­governor of Mahdia. No singular ideology (religious, po­liti­cal, or other­wise) governed relations between the Zirids and the Normans. Instead, both dynasties pursued opportunistic wars, treaties, and alliances that best benefited their circumstances. Norman policies in Ifriqiya ­were intimately connected to outside threats posed by the Germans and Byzantines, the opportunities presented by succession crises in the Crusader states, the possibility of conquering lands in mainland Italy, conflict between Christians and Muslims in al-­Andalus, and a precarious alliance with the Fatimids. The Zirids, likewise, maintained relations with the Normans in keeping with their ability to sustain alliances with dynasties in the Maghreb and Egypt, to reap the profits of trade, to bolster their trea­sury through raiding, and to sustain their economy in the face of changing agricultural production and famine. The ambitions of t­ hese two dynasties spanned the Mediterranean and their exchanges had repercussions across it—­whether that was an alliance between the Zirids and Almoravids created in response to Norman aggression, treaties between Roger II and the count of Barcelona to c­ ounter this alliance, jockeying from the Zirids and Normans to maintain a favorable relationship with the Fatimids, or the pleas of displaced natives of Ifriqiya to the Almohad caliph to dethrone the Normans in the region. Although medieval sources emphasize ­these po­liti­cal and military ele­ments of the Zirid-­Norman relationship, they also hint at deeper cultural connections that are other­wise lost to us. Correspondence between members of the courts of Mahdia and Palermo indicates that ­these individuals engaged in dialogue across the Strait of Sicily as part of a shared intellectual network. Thematic and stylistic similarities in Arabic poetry produced in Zirid Ifriqiya and Norman Sicily further hint at literary cross-­pollination that reached elite levels of society.

20 0 EP I LOG U E

The court of Palermo likewise emulated artistic styles and administrative structures of the Muslim world that most resemble the well-­documented Fatimid court, but could very well have been drawing on the poorly documented Zirid court. Fi­nally, when medieval accounts speak of the movement of p­ eoples across the Strait of Sicily, we must assume that ­those migrations came with some level of cultural exchange. Quotidian cultural interactions between t­ hose living ­under Zirid and Norman rule are largely lost, however, save for the occasional mention found in the correspondence of Geniza merchants. The historical memory of the intertwining histories of the Zirids and Normans has been uneven. While exchanges between the two dynasties ­were forgotten in the realm of Latin Christendom, they became part of a larger narrative told by Muslim authors about Frankish aggression against the lands of Islam, which persisted through the end of the M ­ iddle Ages. In modern discourse, however, the emphasis has shifted to a Norman-­centric approach that has largely sidelined the Zirids as an object of foreign conquest. This approach has done a disser­vice to our understanding of both dynasties. The sustained and substantial interactions between t­ hese two dynasties shows that our understanding of one is incomplete without the other. This integrated history of the Zirids and Normans has shown the degree of connectivity between them and, moreover, the meaningful power that the Zirids wielded in the Mediterranean even ­after their lands w ­ ere reduced in size during the mid-­eleventh ­century. As the study of the M ­ iddle Ages emerges from centuries of Eurocentric scholarship, it is likewise fitting for the Zirids and other Ifriqiyan dynasties to emerge from the colonial shadow of the Banu Hilal and into larger conversations about their role in shaping the medieval world.

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Index

Page numbers indicated with italics represent figures. al-­ʿAbbas ibn Abi al-­Futuh, 87, 171–72 Abbasid dynasty, 42–44, 47, 55, 59, 60 ʿAbd Allah al-­Mahdi, 44–46 ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-­ʿAziz, 181–82 ʿAbd al-­Muʾmin, 166, 168–70, 176–77, 182–84, 185–87, 196–97 ʿAbd al-­Wahid al-­Marrakushi, 132–33 Abu al-­Dawʾ, 16, 85, 95, 108 Abu al-­Futuh ibn Tamim, 83n50, 86–87, 171–72 Abu al-­Hajaj Yusuf ibn Ziri, 148–50, 175–76, 180–81, 182–83 Abu al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani of Sfax, 17–18, 131–32, 148, 179–80 Abu al-­Salt, 15–19, 97–98, 101–2 Abu Yahya ibn Matruh, 180–81 Abu Yazid, 46–47 Adelaide del Vasto, Countess and Regent of Sicily, 80–82, 91 Adrian IV, Pope, 173 Africa, Norman Kingdom of: economy of, 154–64; fall of, 181–86; formation of, 125–34; legacy of, 186–98; politics of, 144–54, 163–64; and royal titulure, 136–41 Africa Proconsularis, 28–29 Africe, bound­aries of, 27–33 Aghlabid dynasty, 29–30, 43–45 agriculture, 5, 33–35, 40–41, 53–54, 61–62n68, 78–79, 78n30, 155 Agrigento, 68–69 Alexander of Telese, 81–82, 104–6 ʿAli ibn Tamim, 68–69 ʿAli ibn Yahya, Zirid emir, 83n50, 87–93, 176–77 Al-­K amil fi al-­Tarikh (Ibn al-­Athir), 192–95 Almería, 107–8 Almohads: arrival into Ifriqiya, 168–74; conquest of Norman Africa by, 181–86,

196–97; Genoese trade with, 162–63; legacy in Ifriqiya, 186–91 Almoravid dynasty, 88–93, 104–10, 121–22, 128, 198–99 al-­Amir, Fatimid imam-­caliph, 93, 95–96 Anacletus II, Pope, 111 al-­Andalus, 55n31, 90–91, 92, 168–69, 188–89, 197, 199 Antioch, 91, 111, 116–17, 118, 119, 167–68 apostolic legation, 77–78, 86 archaeology, 19–21 Aristippus, Henry, 31–32 Ayyub ibn Tamim, 68–69 al-­ʿAziz, Fatimid imam-­caliph, 53–54, 85 Badis ibn al-­Mansur, Zirid emir, 54–55, 56 Bahram, Fatimid vizier, 94–95, 94n94, 117–18 al-­Bakri, 18–19, 29–30, 34, 52–53, 155 al-­Baladhuri, 29–30 Banu Dahman, 128 Banu Ghaniya, 187–88, 197 Banu Hilal, 4–5, 7–9, 19–20, 23–24, 49, 56–62, 96, 198–200 Banu Khazrun, 55, 56–57 Banu Matruh, 125–26n77, 128, 145, 147, 148 Banu Qurra, 128–29 Banu Zughba, 58–59 Beatrice of Rethel, 168 Benjamin of Tudela, 121–22 Berbers/Berber tribes: and the Banu Hilal, 58–62; and the Fatimids, 43–47; in French colonial narratives, 4–6; origins and definitions of, 48–52 Bernard of Clairvaux, 141, 142–43 Bône, 73n3, 150–51, 170–71, 195–96 Bougie (Béjaïa), 112–13, 162–63, 169–70 Brashk, 126–27 Bulukkin ibn Ziri, Zirid emir, 47, 51–54, 55n31 231

23 2 I NDE X

Byzantium: and Africa Proconsularis, 28–31; relationship with the Normans, 62–66, 114–15, 127–28, 172–73; relationship with the Zirids, 82–83 Cairo Geniza, 13n47, 18–19n70, 22, 38–40, 57–58, 93–94, 118–19, 158–60. See also Jews/Jewish communities Calabria, 62–64, 80–82, 93, 104 Carmen in Victoriam Pisanorum, 73–76 cartularies, 160–63, 160n107 Castrogiovanni, ­Battle of, 67–68 Cathedral of Mahdia, 151–52 Christodoulos, 2, 81–82, 84, 96–97, 108 churches, Christian, 77–78, 86–87, 135–36, 151–52 Civitate, ­Battle of, 63–64 climate, 33, 40–41, 121–25, 129–31. See also drought coins/coinage, 36–37, 139–41, 139n12, 163n124, 175, 183 commerce: across the Sahara, 34–37; between the Almohads and Christian powers, 188–89, 197; in the central Mediterranean, 33–42; in Norman Africa, 158–64; in Zirid Ifriqiya, 52–53, 57–58, 60–61, 89–90; and Zirid-­Norman conflict, 113–14, 118–20; and Zirid raiding, 73–79, 82–83; between the Zirids and Normans, 37, 41–42, 57, 61–62, 69–70, 120–22 Conrad III, King of Germany, 127 Constantinople, 62–63, 107–8, 127–28, 167 Crusades, 12–13, 16–17, 78–79, 91, 127, 141–44, 167–69, 191–95 crypto-­Muslims, 11–12, 170–71, 190–91 dhimma (protected status of Jews and Christians), 168–69 al-­Dimas, ­Battle of, 1–3, 15–16, 24, 92–102, 176 Djerba: and the fall of Norman Africa, 169–70, 172–73, 180–81; Norman attacks on, 103–4, 106–7, 114–15, 117–18; and the Norman Kingdom of Africa, 136, 153–54 drought, 3, 24–25, 64–65, 115, 121–25, 129–31, 134, 198–99. See also climate economy/economics: in the fall of Norman Africa, 173–74; of Norman Africa, 135–36, 154–64; of Sicily and Ifriqiya, 48–49, 52–53, 57–58, 60–61, 65–66, 70–71, 122–25 Elvira Alfónsez, 90–91 Elvira of Castille, 167–68 emigration. See migration

Falcandus, Hugo, 31–32, 184–85, 189–91 famine, 57, 64–65, 120, 122–25, 129–31 Fatimid dynasty: in the ­battle of al-­Dimas, 93–96; early relationship with the Zirids, 56–62, 66–67; and the Normans, 94–95, 117–18, 126–27, 145–46, 171–73, 188–89, 199; origins in Ifriqiya, 38–39, 42–47, 51–55; and the Zirid-­Norman relationship, 115, 117–20, 126–27 al-­Futuh ibn Yahya, 86–87, 171–72 Gabès, 87–92, 128–32, 147–48, 177–78, 180–81, 184 Genoa/Genoese, 73–76, 160–63 George of Antioch: at the ­Battle of al-­Dimas, 1–3, 96–98; death of, 171–72, 178–80; in the Norman administration, 83–85, 117–18, 126–34, 144–48, 150–51, 155–56; in Zirid Ifriqiya, 73, 79–80 Gozo, 104–7, 105n3, 108–9, 136, 154 Grisandus (Grizant) priest of Roger II, 138–39 Guiscard, Robert, 49, 63–64, 66 Hafsid dynasty, 29–30, 188, 197 Hammadid dynasty: fall to the Almohads, 168–69; and the Normans, 85–86; and the Zirids, 55–57, 60, 68n95, 70–71, 83, 111–13, 119–20, 133–34 al-­Hasan ibn ʿAli, Zirid emir: alliance with the Normans, 110–15; and the Almohads, 168–69, 182–87; defeats to the Normans, 119–21, 125–34; early reign of, 93–98, 100–102 Haydaran, ­Battle of, 59–60 holy war, 25, 43–44, 99–101, 143–44, 173–77, 179–80. See also Crusades; jihad Horn Mountain, B ­ attle of, 186 hostages, 75–76, 131–32, 144–45, 148, 149–50, 179–80 Ibadis, 46–47n93, 114, 114n40, 153–54 Ibn Abd al-­Hakam, 29–30 Ibn al-­Sallar, 171–72 Ibn Hamdis, 82–83, 98–102 Ibn Hawqal, 42n69, 45–46, 58–59 Ibn ʿIdhari, 17–18, 86–87, 90, 111–12, 119, 122–23, 132–33, 191n117 Ibn Khordadbeh, 29–30 Ibn Muyassar, 95–96, 126–27 Ibn Rashiq, 59–60 Ibn Shaddad, 15–19, 114n40 Ibn Sharaf, 59–60

I NDE X 233 Idris, H. R., 6–7 al-­Idrisi, 61, 150–51 Ifriqiya, 23, 27–33 immigration. See migration Innocent II, Pope, 111, 116 Islam: and the Almohads, 183–84, 185–86, 187; in the foundation of Mahdia, 43–44, 46; and Frankish aggression, 192–97, 198–200; Islamic law in the fall of Norman Africa, 168–69, 173–77; Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, 46–49, 168–69, 174–77, 197; and Norman Africa, 105–6, 140–41, 144–47; Sunnism, 42–49, 51–52, 55n31, 56, 169 Jabbara ibn Kamil al-­Fadighi, 147, 149–50 Jerusalem, 91–92, 116–17, 167–68 Jews/Jewish communities: and the Banu Hilal, 57–61; in Norman Africa, 135–36, 154–55, 158–60, 163–64; and the Norman conquest of Sicily, 70, 77. See also Cairo Geniza jihad, 1–2, 43–44, 92, 97–102, 176–77. See also holy war jizya. See taxes/taxation Kairouan, 4, 5, 35–36, 45–46, 47, 52–54, 56, 59–61 Kalbid dynasty, 56–57, 64–67, 67n89 Kelibia, 83, 132, 150 Kerkennah Islands, 126–27, 170–71, 172–73, 180–81 khilʿa (robe of honor). See robes of honor Khurasanid dynasty, 132–33, 181–82 Kitab al-­Ibar (Ibn Khaldun), 4–9, 192, 195–97 Latin Christendom: and the Crusades, 141–42, 143–44; and the legacy of Norman Africa, 191–92; and the Norman Kingdom of Africa, 151–55, 158, 160–63 Leo IX, Pope, 63–64, 152n76 Lombards, 62–63, 63n73, 80–81 Lothair, II, Emperor of Germany, 114–16 Louis VII, King of France, 127, 167 Mahdi, 140–41 Mahdia: ­under al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis, 52–53; attacked by the Pisans and Genoese, 73–76; conquered by the Almohads, 166, 184–86, 189–90; foundation of, 42–47; and the Hammadids, 110–15; and the Normans, 120–21, 129–31, 135, 149–52, 156, 181; “Tour Normande” in, 156, 157–­58

Maio of Bari, 150–51, 185, 189–90 Malaterra, Geoffrey, 67–69, 73 malik Ifriqiya (King of Ifriqiya), 139–41, 139n10 Malta, 77, 104–7, 105n3, 108–9, 136, 154 al-­Mansur ibn Bulukkin, Zirid emir, 54–55 al-­Maqrizi, 83–84, 94–95, 108, 177 al-­Mazari, ­legal rulings of, 123n71, 174–77 Messina, 41–42, 66, 80–81, 104 migration: as Almohad policy, 187–88; and cultural exchange, 94–96, 199–200; and Norman Africa, 128, 135–36, 156–61, 165; and the Norman conquest of Sicily, 64–67, 70–71, 77–78, 80–81; out of Ifriqiya, 57–58, 122–25 mosques, 45–46, 64–65, 153–54 Muhammad ibn Rushayd, 128, 129–31, 147, 180–81 Muhriz ibn Ziyad, 112–13, 133–34, 133n104, 181–82, 186 Muʿammar ibn Rushayd, 128–29 al-­Muʿizz ibn Badis, Zirid emir, 4, 47, 56–62, 66–68 Nicholas II, Pope, 63–64 Nicotera, 69–70, 93 Normans/Norman dynasty: alliance with the Zirids, 70–79, 110–14; and the Almohads, 169–71, 181–86; arrival in Southern Italy and Sicily, 48–49, 62–70; in the ­battle of al-­Dimas, 92–97; and the myth of tolerance, 9–14; relationship of the Fatimid caliphate with, 93–96 North Africa, geography of, 33–37 Old World Drought Atlas, 123–25, 129, 130 Palermo, 20–21, 41, 65–66, 68–70, 84–85, 104, 147–48 papacy: in the fall of Norman Africa, 172–73; and Norman expansion in southern Italy and Sicily, 63–64, 77–78, 86; and Norman kingship, 32–33, 110–11, 115–17, 172–73 Paschal II, Pope, 86 Philip of Mahdia, 150–51, 170–71, 171n23 Pisa/Pisans, 73–76, 115–16, 188–89 poets/poetry, 74n10, 82–83, 95, 98–102, 199–200 qadis (judges), 148–50, 175–76 Qaʿid Peter, 184–85, 190–91

23 4 I NDE X

Rafiʿ ibn Makan al-­Dahmani, 88–92 raiding, maritime: and the Aghlabids, 43–44; around Sicily, 69–71; and Djerba, 114–15, 120; during the reign of Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz, 73–76; during the reign of Yahya ibn Tamim, 79–80, 82–83; and the Zirid-­Almoravid alliance, 92–93, 104–10 Ralph of Domfront, 116–17 Raymond Berengar III, count of Barcelona, 109–10, 109n24 Raymond of Poitiers, 111 rex Africe (king of Africa), 136–41, 137n2 Ridwan ibn Walakhshi, 117 Robert of Torigni, 142–43, 151 robes of honor, 25, 55, 140–41, 144–48 Roger I, Count of Sicily, 49, 63–64, 66, 69–70, 75–76, 77–79, 80, 193–94 Roger II, King of Sicily: ambitions in the Crusader states, 91–92, 116–17, 141–44, 167–69; ambitions in the Italian peninsula, 110–12; in the ­battle of al-­Dimas, 1–2, 92–96; early reign of, 77–83, 84, 85–88, 89–93, 94–96, 101–2; involvement in Norman Africa, 144–54; as King of Africa, 136–41, 137n2; ­later years of reign and death of, 167–72 Romuald of Salerno, 127n84, 184–85 Sabra al-­Mansuriya, 47, 52–53, 54 Sahara Desert, 33–35 Salerno, 115–16 Saracens, 68–69, 73–74, 75, 77–78, 144n26, 190–91 Savona, 108–9, 109n23 Scriba, Giovanni, cartulary of, 39–40, 160–63 Sétif, ­Battle of, 169–70 Sfax, 76–77, 83, 131–32, 147–48, 155–57, 179–81 Sibylla of Burgundy, 167–68 Sicily: and the Fatimids, 46–47, 64–66; geography of, 40–42; Norman conquest of, 64–70, 77–79; Zirid ambitions in, 66–70 Sicily, Kingdom of: geography of, 32–33, 38–42; historiography of, 9–14; and Norman Africa, 155–56, 167–72; papal recognition of, 63–64, 77–78, 86, 111–12, 115–16, 173–74; unrest and conspiracy in reign of William I, 189–90 Sousse, 83, 131–32, 145, 147–48, 149–50, 185

sub-­Saharan Africa, 23, 27, 37, 42, 52, 57 Syracuse, 106–7 Tamim ibn al-­Muʿizz, Zirid emir, 68–70, 68n95, 73–77, 99–100 Tancred de Hauteville, 63 tārīkh (history) genre, 192–93n123, 192–95 taxes/taxation: and Bulukkin ibn Ziri, 53–54; customs duties, 52–53, 94, 164; jizya, 12–13, 64–65, 77, 135–36, 154–55, 163–65; in Norman Africa, 135–36, 147–48, 163–64 al-­Tijani, 15–18, 88–90, 120–21, 122–23, 148–49, 180–81 trade. See commerce treaties: commercial, 70–71, 75–76, 78–79, 82–83, 188–89; in the formation of the African Kingdom, 134, 146–48; peace, 104, 108–9, 120–21 Tripoli: and the Almohads, 182–83; in formation of the African Kingdom, 128; and Norman Africa, 147–50, 156, 160–62, 180–81; Norman campaigns against, 125–28; trade contracts with Genoa, 160–62, 161nn109–10 Tristia ex Melitogaudo, 104–6, 178–79 Tunis, 132–33, 133n104, 159–60, 161–62, 177–78, 181–82, 183–84, 188–89 ʿUmar ibn Abi al-­Hasan al-­Furriyani, 17–18, 131–32, 179–81 Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba, 46–47, 51–52, 55n31, 71 Urban II, Pope, 74–75, 77–78 Usama ibn Munqidh, 171–72 Venice/Venetians, 114–15, 188–90 Venosa, 155–56 William I, King of Sicily: as King of Africa, 136–41; and Norman Africa, 151, 156–58, 172–79, 181, 183, 184–86, 197 William II, duke of Apulia and Calabria, 104, 110 William II, King of Sicily, 189 William of Tyre, 91, 106–7 Yahya ibn al-­ʿAziz, 112, 169, 169n14 Yahya ibn Tamim, Zirid emir, 76–77, 79–80, 82–84, 86–87 Yusuf (of Gabés), 128–29, 145, 177–78 Zawila, 75–76, 112–13, 181, 182–83, 184, 192–93. See also Mahdia

I NDE X 235 Zirid dynasty: alliance with the Almoravids, 92–93, 104–10; alliance with the Normans, 70–79, 110–14; ambitions in Sicily, 66–70; and the Banu Hilal, 7–8, 56–62; in commerce and conflict, 73–76; conflict with the Normans, 66–70, 92–97,

115–34; geo­g raph­i­cal bound­aries of power of, 30; of Granada, 55n31; origins and rise of, 48–49, 50–55, 70–71; victory of, at the ­Battle of al-­Dimas, 92–97 Ziri ibn Manad, 51–52