Durandus of St Pourcain: A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas (Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs) [1 ed.] 0199282315, 0199282319, 9780199282319

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OX F O R D T H E O LO G I C A L M O N O G R A P H S Editorial Committee M. McC. ADAMS P. M. JOYCE O. M. T. O’DONOVAN

M. J. EDWARDS D. N. J. MACCULLOCH C. C. ROWLAND

OXFORD THEOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS

KARL RAHNER AND IGNATIAN SPIRITUALITY Philip Endean (2001) EZEKIEL AND THE ETHICS OF EXILE Andrew Mein (2001) THEODORE THE STOUDITE The Ordering of Holiness Roman Cholij (2002) HIPPOLYTUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus J. A. Cerrato (2002) FAITH, REASON, AND REVELATION IN THE THOUGHT OF THEODORE BEZA JeVrey Mallinson (2003) RICHARD HOOKER AND REFORMED THEOLOGY A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace Nigel Voak (2003) THE COUNTESS OF HUNTINGDON’S CONNEXION Alan Harding (2003) THE APPROPRIATION OF DIVINE LIFE IN CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA Daniel A. Keating (2004) THE MACARIAN LEGACY The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern Christian Tradition Marcus Plested (2004) PSALMODY AND PRAYER IN THE WRITINGS OF EVAGRIUS PONTICUS Luke Dysinger, OSB (2004) ORIGEN ON THE SONG OF SONGS AS THE SPIRIT OF SCRIPTURE The Bridegroom’s Perfect Marriage-Song J. Christopher King (2004) AN INTERPRETATION OF HANS URS VON BALTHASAR Eschatology as Communion Nicholas J. Healy (2005)

Durandus of St Pourc¸ain A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas

ISABEL IRIBARREN

1

3

Great Clarendon Street, oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oYces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York ß Isabel Iribarren, 2005 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Iribarren, Isabel. Durandus of St. Pourc¸ain: a Dominican theologian in the shadow of Aquinas/ Isabel Iribarren. p. cm. ISBN 0-19-928231-5 (alk. paper) 1. Trinity–History of doctrines–Middle Ages, 600-1500. 2. Durandus, of Saint-Pourc¸ain, Bishop of Meaux, ca. 1275-1334. 3. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. 4. Theology, Doctrinal–History–Middle Ages, 600-1500. I. Title. BT109.I75 2005 230’.2’092–dc22 2005018651 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn ISBN 0-19-928231-5 978-0-19-928231-9 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

To Philip

Preface The highly analytical nature of the discussions which occupied medieval university theologians has earned them an unfortunate reputation. The familiar Renaissance parody—how many angels can dance on the point of a needle?—Wnds currency even today, helping to perpetuate the image of late scholasticism as some sort of second Dark Ages: an unlit interlude between the humanism of the twelfth century and the renewed optimism of the Wfteenth. Even the best equipped scholar can shy at the intricacies which are better dismissed as historically irrelevant and philosophically obscure. R. W. Southern, who otherwise devoted much of his work to the golden age of scholasticism, neatly summarizes this mixture of admiration and baZement caused by the later reWnements: It is not an exaggeration to say that, with all their gaps and weaknesses, the works of these twelfth-century masters reshaped European society, whereas the technically much more accomplished works of their successors have their place in histories of theology or philosophy, and only tangentially in the history of the development of European government and society.1

The following book seeks to address the historian’s dismay. In attempting to reconstruct the main episodes of a theological controversy in a way both intelligible to the non-specialist and respectful of the rigorous argumentation of its protagonists, I hope to bring out the historical relevance of these debates and, in doing so, to challenge the inherited idea of an ossiWed scholasticism, out of touch with its environment. The controversy which marked Durandus of St Pourc¸ain’s career took place—as perhaps all far-reaching controversies do—in a political matrix; in a milieu, that is, in which a whole range of participants had special interests. Indeed, the opinion of the Paris masters, as it gradually crystallized into a collective and relatively homogeneous voice, not only met the needs of the time (as the masters attempted to deWne highly sensitive issues like the Wlioque), but also gained considerable ascendancy in the public sphere, as pope and king contended for university support in a bid to make academic consensus an instrument of universal control or (in the king’s case) national self-determination. My aim is thus predominantly historical, as indeed are the questions I shall engage with. My material, however, is densely theological, consisting as it does 1 R. W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the UniWcation of Europe, ii (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 5.

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of academic expositions of the Trinity. I am therefore hoping that the book will be of interest not only to historians but also to theologians. As anyone trying to ride two horses at once is in danger of falling oV both, so I have courted this danger in seeking to expound highly technical issues while keeping the historical ‘tempo’. Historians will Wnd long passages of Trinitarian theology in a language which echoes its Aristotelian origins, and often forfeits rhetorical Xuency to argumentative rigour. Theologians, on the other hand, may at Wrst Wnd my allusions to the historical dimension a distraction, appearing to cramp an exposition which a purely systematic approach would have rendered more eVective. In the end, I can only hope to have contributed a little to the task (much remains to be done) of luring the historians’ guild into the scholastic classroom. My choice of controversy—there is a wide gamut of controversies to choose from in the scholastic period—responds to both theological and historical interests. The conXict between Durandus and the Dominican order reXects fourteenth-century doctrinal tensions vividly. Covering a period of almost twenty years, this controversy saw the confrontation of two Wrst-rate Dominican theologians, at a time when the order was fully engaged in promoting the theological authority of Thomas Aquinas. Hervaeus Natalis was a leading member of the order and a hard-line adherent to Thomist doctrine, who saw in Durandus an independent spirit of great destabilizing potential and in much need of correction. Joseph Koch’s seminal work2 had long ago pointed out the central role which the controversy with Durandus played in the defence and promotion of Thomism. But whereas a good number of works have appeared in the past decades dealing with topics indirectly related to the conXict with Durandus, very few have engaged directly with the issues involved in it in a way which brings out their true historical and doctrinal signiWcance. A closer look at the way the controversy developed—a look which has necessarily required a punctilious handling of the theological material—has yielded a picture of the debate far more gratifying than the clear-cut clash of ‘Thomists’ and ‘anti-Thomists’ which the conventional literature has rehearsed so far. ‘Thomism’ was a fairly protean notion in the early fourteenth century, subject to the interpretation which the leading Dominicans of the time saw Wt to enforce. Likewise, Aquinas did not rise to canonical status on a Dominican platform alone. Franciscan intellectual achievements had much to contribute. That fact, by itself, calls for a revision of the standard account of the reception of Aquinas’s teaching by secondgeneration Thomists. What has been conventionally presented as an internal Dominican quarrel was in fact a clash between two distinctly Franciscan 2 Joseph Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano OP: Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1927).

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Preface

doctrinal trends, as Hervaeus borrowed from Scotist insights, while Durandus opted for the older Franciscan school of Bonaventure. In the broader picture, the rapid headway made by Thomism is also a symptom of currents at work in the fourteenth-century church, which ran deeper than the internal histories of one or the other religious order. Aquinas’s Neapolitan origin made him readily congenial to John XXII, an Avignonese pope who came from the same world and who felt naturally inclined to promote his own theologian— especially at a time when the Parisian theological establishment was beginning to turn to the king as a more obvious patron. That Durandus was favoured within papal circles, despite his reputation among Dominicans, further testiWes to the pope’s priorities, as he sought to form a theological entourage of his own, away from Paris. As a theologian overshadowed by the rising Wgure of Aquinas, Durandus has been traditionally condemned to a minor role in the greater narratives of the period. His ‘maverick’ status has placed him on a historical tangent. This fact nevertheless presents the historian with a rare opportunity. It makes Durandus’s case a privileged standpoint from which to see certain otherwise hidden features of early fourteenth-century scholasticism. Durandus’s career reXects—as that of a more central author could not—the changing pattern of thought and practice in those decades. The doctrinal tensions which rent this period are wonderfully illustrated in Durandus’s double sobriquet of doctor modernus and doctor resolutissimus: an independent spirit prepared to espouse the most original views, while refusing to capitulate to recent magisterial trends. It is the joy in illuminating the neglected that from a historically forsaken character we rediscover his century. This book is a revised and expanded version of my doctoral thesis ‘The Trinitarian Controversy between Durandus of St Pourc¸ain and the Dominican Order in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Limits of Theological Dissent’, submitted at Oxford University in 2001. In bringing the work to its present stage I have beneWted from the assistance and good advice of various people. I am especially grateful to Richard Cross, the thesis supervisor and editorial adviser for this book, whose sharp remarks kept me mindful of the technical subtleties, while instructing me away from unnecessary complicatedness. Alexander Murray provided invaluable support, helpful advice, and lucid comments at every stage. I want to thank him for his patience in reading the script, and for his generosity in lending me his copy of the printed version of Durandus’s commentary for handy consultation throughout the preparation of this book. Jean Dunbabin, who Wrst suggested—or rather warned me about—Durandus, oVered continuous support and encouragement, and always showed an active interest in my work. My thanks, too, to

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Russ Friedman, who shared his works and thoughts, helping me towards a fairer assessment of Franciscan and Dominican idiosyncrasies, and whose reading of the preliminary draft yielded very constructive comments. He also facilitated access to essential primary sources, without which this book could not have been completed. My debt in that respect is more directly to the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library of St John’s Abbey and College, for providing a facsimile copy of the Wrst recension of Durandus’s commentary, and to the Institut de Recherche et d’Histoire des Textes for their promptness in providing a copy of Hervaeus’s tracts. At the earlier stages of the thesis I beneWted from the insights of its examiners, Cecilia Trifogli and John Marenbon. Henry Mayr-Harting oVered invaluable academic support at crucial times, and David D’Avray made helpful observations. I Wrst became interested in medieval theology during the course of my undergraduate degree in Caracas (1991–6), when the works of R. W. Southern fortuitously fell into my hands. Inspired by Southern’s scholarship, I decided to come to Oxford, where I began graduate work in 1997 on a Dervorguilla Scholarship granted by Balliol College. I am deeply indebted to Maurice Keen and Revd Douglas Dupree, who oVered indispensable support during those early stages. Other institutions have provided much assistance in later years. Linacre College oVered me a Junior Research Fellowship for the academic year 2001–2. The College’s welcoming environment gave a promising start to my postdoctoral research. An Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellowship funded my research during the year 2002–3, a period in which Berlin’s urban charisma provided the necessary displacement to face the initial stages of thesis revision. In October 2003, St John’s College, Oxford, elected me for a three-year Junior Research Fellowship, making it possible for me to complete the preparation of the thesis for publication. At the beginning of my tenure at St John’s, I was kindly invited by Ruedi Imbach to participate at the presentation of the critical edition of Durandellus’s Evidentiae at Fribourg University, Switzerland. This event allowed me to revisit the Dominican controversy with Durandus from a broader perspective, the result of which has shaped much of the conclusion of this book. Others who have helped me along the way, in conversation or shared material, are Chris Schabel, Sylvain Piron, Alain Boureau, Andrea Robiglio, Rafael Toma´s Caldera, Vı´ctor Krebs, and Martin Lenz. My deepest gratitude goes to my parents, for their unswerving conviction; to my brother Leopoldo, my most cherished and stimulating interlocutor; and to my dearest friend, Philip Broadbent, to whom I dedicate this book. I. I. October 2004

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Contents Abbreviations

xii

Introduction

1

Part I. The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

17

1. Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council and its Tradition

19

2. Aquinas on the Trinity

29

3. Varieties of Distinction

51

Part II. The Controversy 4. Hervaeus Natalis’s Commentary on the Sentences

89 91

5. The opinio singularis: The First Recension of Durandus of St Pourc¸ain’s Commentary on the Sentences

108

6. Hervaeus’s Quodlibetal Disputations

145

7. Durandus’s Response: The Paris Quodlibets

163

8. The Censure

182

9. The Aftermath of the Censure

198

10. The Corrective

218

11. The Second Censure and the ‘Thomist Turn’

235

12. The Final Recension of Durandus’s Commentary

254

Conclusions: Durandus’s Enlightened Conservatism

275

Bibliography

285

Index

297

Abbreviations P RI M A RY S O U RC E S Acta, ed. Reichert

Anselm De Processione Aquinas De Ente De Pot. De unione Verbi De Ver. Expositio In Metaph. In Phys. Quodl. SCG Sent. ST Aristotle Cat. Metaph. Phys. ‘Articuli in quibus’

Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. B. M. Reichert Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 3 and 4, vol. i (Rome, 1889), ii (1899). De Processione Spiritus Sancti De Ente et Essentia De Potentia De unione Verbi Incarnati De Veritate Expositio super secundum decretalem In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio Quaestiones Quodlibetales Summa Contra Gentiles Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Summa Theologiae

Categoriae Metaphysica Physica ‘Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris fratris Thomae’ ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’ ‘Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. primo scripto super Sententias et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis’ Augustine Contra Maximinum Contra Maximinum Haereticum Arianorum Episcopum Libri duo De div. Quaest. De diversis Quaestionibus octaginta tribus De Trin. De Trinitate

Abbreviations Boethius De Persona De Trin. Bonaventure Chartularium Sent. Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring Duns Scotus Lect. Ord. Rep. Durandus of St Pourc¸ain A Sent. B Sent. C Sent.

Quodl. Aven. Quodl. Paris. Giles of Rome Sent. Godfrey of Fontaines Quodl. Henry of Ghent Summa Quodl. Hervaeus Natalis Correctiones De articulis Quodl. Reprobationes Sent. John of Naples Quaest. disp. Quodl.

xiii

De Persona et naturis duabus De Trinitate Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. DeniXe and E. Chatelain, vol. 2 (Paris, 1891) Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. N. M. Ha¨ring (Toronto, 1966). Lectura Ordinatio Reportata Parisiensis

First recension of Sentences commentary Second recension of Sentences commentary Third recension of Sentences commentary, repr. In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentarium (Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1964) Quodlibeta Avenionensia Quodlibeta Parisiensia In Petri Lombardi Sententiarum lib. I commentarium Quaestiones Quodlibetales Summa quaestionum ordinariarum Quodlibeta Correctiones supra dicta Durandi de Sancto Porciano in primo quolibet De articulis pertinentibus ad IV libros Sententiarum Durandi Quodlibeta Reprobationes excusationum Durandi In quatuor libros Sententiarum Commentaria Quaestionis variae Parisis disputatae Quodlibeta

xiv Peter Lombard Sent. Richard of St Victor De Trin.

Abbreviations Sententiae in quatuor libros distinctae De Trinitate, ed. J. Ribaillier (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958). SERIES

AHDLMA CCSL PB PL Repertorium Scriptores

[]

Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du moyen aˆge Corpus Christianorum Series Latina Les Philosophes Belges Migne, Patrologia Latina F. Stegmu¨ller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi T. Kaeppelli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 3 vols. (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1970–93). Manuscript sigla Indicate editorial comments in transcriptions from manuscripts or in English citations. Indicate added material in transcriptions from manuscripts.

Introduction The learned world of the centuries succeeding Durandus of St Pourc¸ain’s career conveys almost contradictory accounts of his intellectual evolution and allegiances. On the one hand, literary historians of the Wfteenth and sixteenth centuries describe Durandus as a thinker who had initially subscribed to Thomism and had only later impugned its main tenets.1 On the other hand, Wfteenth-century catalogues and registers often appear to attribute William of la Mare’s Correctorium to Durandus, suggestive rather of the anti-Thomist reputation which his writings subsequently acquired and the general polemical character with which they passed to posterity.2 What makes it harder for us today to assess Durandus’s intellectual persuasion before the conXict with the Dominican order is the fact that we know very little of Durandus’s life before 1307. He was born in Auvergne sometime around 1270/5, and there is evidence that in 1303 he was in residence at the Dominican monastery of St Jacques in Paris.3 Around 1307/8 Durandus composed a Wrst recension of his commentary on the 1 See e.g. the Dominican Antonius Florentinus (1389–1459), Historiarum Opus: ‘Durandus magister super sententias scripsit, qui prius fuit sectator doctrinae S. Thomae, sed postea satis impugnator, nescio, quo spiritu ductus.’ Also Trithemius (1462–1516), De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis, who recorded that Durandus was ‘S. Thomae primo defensor, postea vero acerrimus impugnator. Cuius mutationis causa quaedam Xuctivaga fertur, cui ego Wdem nec facile tribuere debeo, nec temere denegare.’ Both quoted by J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.: Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 26 (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1927), 187. 2 See e.g. Darmstadt MS 345 and Venice Marciana MS Z.L. 129. Cited by Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 188. 3 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 396–408. Durandus’s name is found in a document concerning Philip the Fair’s appeal in 1303 for a general council against Pope Boniface VIII. For the chief references on Durandus’s life and career, see J. Koch, ‘Die Magister-Jahre des Durandus de Sancto Porciano, O.P. und der KonXikt mit seinem Orden’, in Kleine Schriften, ii (Rome: Edizione di storia e letteratura, 1973), 7–118. Also P. Fournier, ‘Durand de SaintPourc¸ain, the´ologien’, Histoire litte´raire de la France, xxxvii (Paris, 1938), 1–38. For the conXict between Durandus and his order, see J. Koch, ‘Die Verteidigung der Theologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin durch den Dominikanerorden gegenu¨ber Durandus de S. Porciano’, in Kleine Schriften, ii (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1973), 127–68; C. Michalski, ‘Die vielfachen Redaktionen einiger Kommentare zu Petrus Lombardus’, Miscellanea F. Ehrle, i (Rome, 1924), 221–6.

2

Introduction

Sentences,4 a work which was then allegedly circulated outside the order in a premature state and against its author’s will.5 It is now generally agreed that this Wrst recension constituted a preliminary work prepared in some Dominican studium before Durandus’s actual reading of the Sentences as a student in Paris.6 To judge by the content of this Wrst work, and considering that the commentary usually represented the Wrst opportunity which a bachelor had to propound his opinion on central theological issues, it is highly improbable that Durandus could have been a follower of Aquinas before 1307. Durandus’s early commentary was very badly received by Dominican authorities. To begin with, in its open departure from fundamental Thomist theses it appeared to disregard the capitular legislation of Saragossa in 1309,7 4 For the date of composition of Durandus’s early commentary, the main sources are all agreed on sometime c.1307, 1308 at the latest. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 60–72; A. De Guimares, ‘Herve´ Noe¨l (m.1323): E´tude biographique’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 8 (1938), 46–8; Repertorium, 84–92; Scriptores, 1. 339–50; A. Maier, ‘Literarhistorische Notizen u¨ber P. Aureoli, Durandus und den ‘‘Cancellarius’’ nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77bis in Barcelona’, in Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsa¨tze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1964–77), esp. 146–53. 5 This account is taken from the epilogue of the Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary (between 1318 and 1327), 423rb: ‘Scripta super quatuor Sententiarum libros iuvenis inchoavi. Siquidem, quod in primis dictaveram et scripseram, fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum antequam fuisset per me suYcienter correctum. Propter quod hoc opus solum, quod per se omnes libros incipit: ‘‘Est Deus solus in caelo revelans etc.’’ tanquam per me ditum et correctum approbo.’ This passage also testiWes to the greater signiWcance which Durandus’s contemporaries ascribed to his prima lectura. Only the third version of the commentary, however, is acknowledged by Durandus as a throroughly revised piece of work. Following J. Koch’s established nomenclature, I will henceforth refer to the three versions of Durandus’s commentary as respectively A, B, and C. 6 Evidence about the lectors in mendicant studia shows that friars who arrived at the university in order to become masters of theology often had experience as teachers at various levels in their order’s schools. This means that they would have completed at least one reading of the Sentences previous to the reading required by the university. It is now believed that version A of Durandus’s commentary corresponds to that pre-university reading, and was the result of lectures held in some Dominican provincial studium. See Maier, ‘Literarhistorische Notizen’, 151–2. This seems further conWrmed by the fact that in the censure list of 1314 Durandus’s preliminary reading is often referred to as quaternus originalis rather than prima lectura. The most recent chronological and palaeographical assessment of the three recensions of Durandus’s commentary is found in C. Schabel, I. Balkoyiannopoulou, and R. L. Friedman, ‘Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourc¸ain on Foreknowledge and Future Contingents’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 71 (2001), esp. 184–215. For the Paris statutes on the reading of the Sentences, see Chartularium, ii. 698 n. 1189. Also A. Maieru`, University Training in Medieval Europe, tr. and ed. D. N. Pryds (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. xiv; W. J. Courtenay, ‘Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century’, in J. Hamesse (ed.), Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universite´s me´die´vales (Louvain: Institut d’E´tudes Me´die´vales, 1994), 346. 7 See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 38.

Introduction

3

in which Aquinas’s teaching had been recommended as the order’s favoured doctrinal line. Moreover, the work’s premature dissemination had blatantly overlooked the required preliminary examination and approval by the order’s authorities, against the recognized practice since the 1250s. Dominican authorities expediently removed Durandus’s problematic work from the scientiWc scenery, as a result of which Durandus was compelled to write another, fairly compliant recension of his commentary. This second recension corresponded in all probability to Durandus’s Wrst reading of the Sentences at the University of Paris, held between 1310 and 1312.8 Since no conclusive evidence has been gathered about the existence or manuscript location of a middle recension of book I, we have to make do with the Wrst recension as the only source for Durandus’s early teaching on the Trinity. The uproar which the Wrst commentary provoked, together with the heterogeneous whole which came to form the double recension, could explain the contradictory reports of later centuries. Some accounts show acquaintance only with Durandus’s original draft, a piece of decidedly non-Thomist persuasion. Hence the historical perception of Durandus as a Wgure not unlike Robert Kilwardby, one of those rare Dominicans who openly diverted from Aquinas’s position. This also explains the attribution of la Mare’s Correctorium to Durandus. On the other hand, since the Wrst script was removed fairly quickly from public access, the philosophical impact of Durandus’s work would have only been weakly felt in the highly compliant middle version of his commentary, which, compared to the original, could easily be regarded as ‘Thomist’. If we then take into account the later reception of the Wnal nonThomist recension, it is hardly surprising that Wfteenth-century historians should have regarded Durandus as a fallen Thomist. In 1312, and despite his recently acquired notoriety, Durandus obtained the licentia docendi, thus beginning the two-year period of necessary regency 8 This is contrary to J. Koch’s theory (Durandus de S. Porciano, 49–57, 60–3, 72–4), according to which A corresponded to Durandus’s prima lectura at Paris. See Schabel et al., ‘Peter of Palude’, esp. 184–215. This article gives a clearer idea of the MS location of A and the existence and dating of a B version of bk I. In essence, the article concludes that (1) Koch’s arguments for the non-existence of bk I of Durandus’s B version are not decisive; and (2) P. T. Stella’s theory that Pierre used the ‘real’ A version and that the Paris MS 14454 is really the B version is very unlikely. Based on textual sources, the article suggests instead that a middle version of bk I of Durandus’s commentary, composed c.1310–11, could have been used by Pierre de la Palud in his own commentary. Since there is no conclusive palaeographical evidence for this suggestion, in this study I will not examine Pierre’s textual references to Durandus’s commentary. Another good source for the middle recension of Durandus’s commentary, and one of the earliest testimonies we have of a threefold recension, is Bernard Lombard’s commentary (1327/8, Leipzig MS 542). This work includes thorough comments and quotations from all three versions of Durandus’s commentary, thus shedding light on the evolution of the middle recension from A to C.

4

Introduction

as master in theology.9 Although in the end he occupied this position for less than a year, it proved long enough to enable the production of two quodlibetal disputations.10 Durandus’s premature departure was owed to his appointment in early 1313 as lector at the papal curia in Avignon. The new master was due to succeed the Dominican William Peter Godino, who had been recently elected cardinal. The post at the papal curia was a good promotion for Durandus, and the respite from the poisoned air at Paris was very welcome. Apart from his functions as lecturer, the new master was also expected to act as papal chaplain. In return he would receive a fairly good salary, free lodgings, and coverage for travel expenses on journeys involving papal legations. Durandus taught in Avignon for an initial period of over four years, during which he determined in three quodlibetal disputations between 1314 and 1316.11 Although Clement V would have been fully aware of Durandus’s situation and his recent confrontation with the Dominican authorities, it is hardly probable that the pope’s new appointment would have responded to open deWance, let alone disapproval of the order’s doctrinal line. More likely, the choice of Durandus testiWed to the little importance which the papacy ascribed to internal disputes, which it would not allow to come in the way of its policy of attracting prominent intellectuals to the court. In this spirit, and obviously satisWed with the master’s performance, the succeeding Pope John XXII ratiWed Durandus’s post. Durandus stayed in Avignon probably uninterruptedly until August 1317.12 Meanwhile, the Dominican alarm continued to reverberate in subsequent general chapters. In 1313 the general chapter in Metz reinforced conformity with Aquinas’s teaching and promoted it as the ‘common opinion’.13 Durandus’s case was gradually surpassing its initial disciplinary nature to acquire 9 That Durandus incepted without apparent resistance from the order’s authorities is all the more remarkable considering that the provincial of France at the time (and since 1309) was Durandus’s chief opponent, Hervaeus Natalis. As provincial of France, one of Hervaeus’s main duties was the government of the Dominican house of St Jacques, where he would have exercised direct inXuence over university appointments. See De Guimares, ‘Herve´ Noe¨l’, 57–60. 10 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 105–18. Also P. Glorieux, La Litte´rature quodlibe´tique de 1260 a` 1320, i (Le Saulchoir, Kain: Revue des sciences philosophiques et the´ologiques, 1925), 50–108; ii (1935), 70–5. 11 As in any other studium, in Avignon quodlibetal disputations were held in addition to the ordinary ones. Apart from the customary teaching, Durandus’s activities at the papal court included occasional solemn lectures on systematic theology and biblical exegesis. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 119–28. 12 See G. Mollat, Jean XXII (1316–1334): Lettres communes, analyse´es d’apres les registres dites d’Avignon et du Vatican, i–iv (Paris, 1904–12); A. Coulon, Lettres secre`tes et curiales du pape Jean XXII relatives a` la France, extraites des registres du Vatican (Paris, 1906); E. Go¨ller, Die Einnahmen der Apostolischen Kammer unter Johann XXII, 1316–1378 (Paderborn, 1910); K. H. Scha¨fer, Die Ausgaben der Apostolischen Kammer unter Johann XXII (Paderborn, 1911). 13 Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 64.

Introduction

5

recognizable doctrinal undertones. This change had much to do with the hard line adopted by Berengar of Landorra, master general of the order and zealous upholder of the order’s intellectual standards and doctrinal uniformity. Following this line, in the same year Berengar appointed a commission of theologians for the purpose of inquiring into the orthodoxy of Durandus’s commentary in both its versions. The examination yielded ninety-three suspect theses, which were oYcially censured on 3 July 1314.14 The list draws from both recensions of Durandus’s commentary. The Wrst recension is often referred to as scriptum antiquum or quaternus originalis; the second as scriptum novum, sometimes prima lectura.15 The list seems to rely mainly on Durandus’s original draft, indicating where applicable changes or omissions in the revised recension. Interestingly, then, Durandus’s mitigated recension made little diVerence to the greater importance the authorities attached to the early commentary as a more truthful testimony of Durandus’s intent. The censure list was eventually delivered to Durandus, who was then given the opportunity to either defend or revoke his views. He subsequently produced a pie`ce justiWcative, known as the Excusationes, in which he attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the order’s more severe charges. This oYcial justiWcation, unfortunately not extant, was later presented for examination to the provincial of France, Hervaeus Natalis. Hervaeus responded promptly with another tract, known as the Reprobationes excusationum Durandi, in which he sought to invalidate Durandus’s pleas and reinforce the legitimacy of the order’s measures.16 The censure, and Hervaeus’s added pressure, had obviously not suYced in lessening the impact of Durandus’s writings, for in 1316 the general chapter in Montpellier decided to reinforce the previous legislations on doctrinal uniformity, calling on all provincial chapters to tighten control of the content of lectures and writings issued within the order. More to the point, the prominent members were requested to devise some means whereby deviant teaching could be eVectively eradicated.17 In obedience to the capitular entreaty, in 1317 a second inquiry into Durandus’s writings was Wxed, this time looking into those theses which seemed to 14 The complete list is contained in Le Mans MS 231, fos. 146va–149vb. It has been edited by J. Koch as ‘Articuli nonaginta tres extracti ex Durando S. Porciano O.P. primo scripto super Sententias et examinati per magistros et baccalarios Ordinis’, in Kleine Schriften, ii (Rome: Edizioni di storia eletteratura, 1973), 52–72 (54–7 for bk I). 15 In those articles which correspond to bk I no reference is made to a second recension. Although this could be adduced in support of J. Koch’s thesis that there is no extant middle version of Durandus’s commentary, this is still not decisive evidence. For that matter, the list also fails to mention a middle recension for bk IV, of which there are nevertheless known copies. 16 The little we know from Durandus’s Excusationes has been indirectly conveyed through Hervaeus’s Reprobationes contra excusationum Durandi (Reims MS 502). The latter dates probably from the winter of 1314. 17 Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 93.

6

Introduction

deviate speciWcally from Aquinas’s doctrine. This second censure amounted to a list of 235 non-Thomist articles.18 Dominicans were evidently determined to make a precedent of Durandus’s case. The hidden agenda was however more ambitious than a mere disciplinary rebuke: the premature dissemination of Durandus’s original commentary was just a convenient blunder they could fasten on to in order to launch their doctrinal programme. Providentially, in the year the second censure was issued Durandus was appointed for the recently instituted diocese of Limoux, probably as a reward for the various diplomatic tasks he had successfully accomplished during his time in Avignon. He was now free from Dominican jurisdiction. The awaited emancipation was however short-lived, since owing to problems extraneous to Durandus the new diocese had to be dissolved. Shortly after, in July 1318, Durandus was transferred to Le Puy, a bishopric which also proved to be a mixed blessing. The new oYce came with strings attached: by an oath which was apparently customary to this diocese, Durandus was induced to disclaim all temporal jurisdiction over his canons, his clergy, and their servants, thereby severely thwarting his authority. After the bishop’s maladroit handling of the situation, the canons reported to the curia that they regarded themselves as subject directly to the pope. In 1322 Durandus appealed to John XXII, and on a second hearing in November 1325, Durandus lost the case and his bishopric.19 Although Durandus’s troubles did not always meet with the desired result, papal favour did not dwindle. Durandus was regarded as a capable legate and on several occasions he was entrusted with diplomatic missions on cases which required able arbitration.20 It was as theologian, however, that Durandus 18 The list has been edited as ‘Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae’, in Koch (ed.), Kleine Schriften, ii. 72–118 (72–82 for bk I). 19 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 417–27; Fournier, ‘Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain’, 11; Mollat, Jean XXII, no. 16045 (29 Aug. 1322); C. K. Brampton, ‘Personalities at the Process against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–1326’, Franciscan Studies, 26 (1966), 20–1. Despite the eventful bishopric, Durandus had a very high idea of his oYce and indeed welcomed the appointment. It is indicative in this respect that whereas in his early commentary the studious bachelor favours the contemplative over the active life (A Sent. III d. 35 q. 1), in the Wnal recension of his work the bishop commends the greater virtues of the active life, since apart from promoting self-discipline and spiritual perfection, it is principally involved in spreading the good to others. The bishop’s life is in this respect ‘nobilior et perfectior’ (C Sent. III d. 35 q. 2). Durandus’s ardent concern for the salvation of souls also determined his unfavourable response in 1322 to the question of Franciscan poverty (Vat. Lat. MS 3740, fos. 124r–136v). 20 One such mission, which met with a happy outcome, took place in May 1317 when Durandus was between oYces. The mission involved the reconciliation of two knights who had been in long-standing feud. The parties were to agree to the truce on pain of excommunication in case of contumacy. Durandus proved to be uncompromising, and upon witnessing the excommunication of the more deWant knight, the other party readily agreed to the legate’s

Introduction

7

proved his real value. The pope often consulted him on diYcult cases, and his respect for the theologian’s judgement seems conWrmed by Durandus’s extended stay at the papal court. Durandus’s theological competence was put to the test on three notable occasions. The Wrst one was in 1318, in the case of the rebel ‘fraticelli’, who were ultimately imputed with heresy.21 Then in 1322, during the poverty controversy with the Franciscans, in which Durandus contributed again with an unfavourable opinion.22 Finally in 1326, when Durandus took part in the commission of theologians appointed to investigate into the orthodoxy of William of Ockham’s Sentences commentary.23 Durandus also proWted from the extended stay in Avignon in order to work on a Wnal recension of his commentary. He accomplished a full revision of the Wrst three books between 1318 and 1325, a task he probably undertook with little calm and between oYces. The whole was not issued until 1327, when Durandus had already been over a year in oYce at the bishopric in Meaux.24 terms and the truce was reached. The Wrst knight later appealed to the pope and was ultimately absolved from the ban. For the Wrst Avignon period of Durandus’s career, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 396–408. 21 The case concerned the fraticelli of Marseilles, who contested episcopal jurisdiction over Franciscan dress code and vow of poverty. The case was submitted to several bishops and to masters and bachelors of theology at the curia, and was considered at a regular assembly—and not as part of the papal general inquiry on poverty. The commission reached a verdict, and in May 1318 the fraticelli were sentenced as heretics. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 429. 22 Durandus’s opinion on the issue of poverty is found in Vat. Lat. MS 3740, fos. 124r–136v. In 1322, the pope circulated the following question among the prelates and masters at the curia: ‘An dicere, quod Christus et apostoli nihil habuerunt in proprio vel in communi, sit haereticum.’ In addition to the theological issue, Durandus considered the practical aspect of the applicability of the Franciscan idea of poverty, enquiring ‘Utrum nihil in proprio vel in communi habere sit perfectionis.’ On the Wrst question, Durandus suspended his judgement replying that the scriptures remain silent on whether Christ and his apostles enjoyed use of fact (usus facti) without proprietas and dominium (124va). On the second question Durandus is more unequivocal, rejecting the Franciscan opinion that the possession of consumables in common ‘per modum dominii’ is detrimental to religious perfection. According to Durandus, when it comes to consumables, proprietas cannot be separated from dominium. 23 For an account of the process against Ockham in 1326, see A. Pelzer, ‘Les 51 Articles de Guillaume d’Occam censure´s en Avignon en 1326’, Revue d’histoire eccle´siastique, 18/2–3 (1922), 240–70; F. HoVmann (ed.), Die Erste Kritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutterell (Breslau: Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie, 1941); Brampton, ‘Personalities’, 4–25, where special attention is given to Durandus’s participation. It speaks for the pope’s impartiality at least in this case, that he should have appointed Durandus as one of the six theologians in charge of examining Ockham’s opinion—an opinion which in some aspects shared the same basic orientation as Durandus’s own. 24 Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 75–6, assigns the year 1317 as the terminus a quo for the Wnal recension, since in the prologue Durandus refers to objections raised against him by John of Naples in the latter’s Wrst Quodlibet, from 1317. Koch places the terminus ad quem sometime c.1327, based on the fact that in bk IV Durandus refers to his episcopal status in Meaux, which he acquired in Mar. 1326. The Wrst three books, however, must have been completed c.1325 and not later, from Durandus’s insertion at the beginning of bk IV that ‘we are still in the Roman

8

Introduction

The eventful conditions of the composition of the Wnal recension are often reXected in its piecemeal approach to certain questions. On the whole, however, this work reveals the intellectual maturity and conWdence provided by years of controversy and, no less, by the freedom which the new status had guaranteed. In March 1326 Durandus was transferred to the bishopric in Meaux, an oYce marked by the dispute over the beatiWc vision, which took the better part of the years from 1331 to the pope’s—and Durandus’s own—death in 1334. For a theologian who had fallen foul of the magisterial circle at Paris but was favoured by the papacy, Durandus was now in a particularly diYcult position. The issue of the beatiWc vision had divided the theological establishment between Paris and Avignon and, for the Wrst time since Boniface VIII’s notorious pontiWcate, the pope’s orthodoxy was put under serious doubt.25 Durandus aligned himself with the magisterial opinion, which was eventually supported and promoted by Philip VI in an opportunistic move to undermine papal credibility. After the uproar which the pope’s unusual view had caused, at the end of 1332 the masters were invited by the pope to debate the issue at the court in Avignon. Durandus’s tract De visione Dei quam habent animae sanctorum ante iudicium generale26 earned the pope’s hostility and an inquiry into the orthodoxy of Durandus’s position. Durandus did not live to see the Wnal outcome of this controversy, but the magisterial view which he had shared was vindicated three years later by the succeeding pope, Benedict XII. In 1336 the matter was Wnally settled in a papal bull, and curia’. See also Catalogue des manuscrits en e´criture latine, portant des indications de date, de lieu ou de copiste, 3, ed. M.-Th. D’Alverny et al. (Paris, 1974), 457–9, according to which the Wrst three books of Durandus’s Wnal recension were composed between 1318, when Durandus was bishop of Le Puy, and 1325, when he became bishop of Meaux. 25 For a full account of the controversy, see C. Trottman, La Vision be´atiWque, de`s disputes scolastiques a` sa deWnition par Benoıˆt XII (Rome: E´cole Franc¸aise de Rome, 1995). The conXict was triggered by a sermon given by the pope on All Saints Day in 1331, in which he advanced the opinion that the blessed souls would not enjoy the beatiWc vision until the Day of Judgement. John XXII made it clear that he was not speaking in his oYcial capacity as pope, but was only advancing an individual opinion subject to debate. The pope’s opinion nevertheless met with open disapproval from magisterial quarters, who supported the common view that the saints enjoyed the beatiWc vision from the time of death. The masters perceived the pope’s unusual opinion as jeopardizing the penitential teaching of the Church and the value of purgatory. The masters’ resentment was aggravated by the awkward situation created by the pope’s ambivalent position, whereby he had contradicted the established magisterial opinion but refused to determine on the matter oYcially. The conXict eventually became a power struggle between pope and king over control of the university, forcing the question on whether the decisive doctrinal authority resided in the pope or the masters. The controversy outlived the pope, who died in 1334 with severely impaired credibility. See also Chartularium, ii. 414–35. 26 Durandus’s treatise is found in Vat. Lat. MS 4006, 307r–312r. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 431–4.

Introduction

9

Durandus’s own account was commended by the pope as that of an antiquus famosus magister in theologia. Durandus died on 10 September 1334, having led a life punctuated by controversies both within and outside his order. Time and perspective, however, gradually allowed for a fairer assessment of Durandus’s place and signiWcance in the history of doctrine. Less than half a century later Jean Gerson, Chancellor of Paris University, commended Durandus’s works alongside those of Bonaventure.27 It is signiWcant that Durandus should have been paired with the leading theologian of the old Franciscan school, for it seems to support the hypothesis that Durandus’s deviation from Thomism could have responded to similar motives as Bonaventure’s limited sympathy for Aristotelian philosophy. Indeed, as we shall see in the following pages, Durandus’s theological inclinations bear recognizable aYnity to Bonaventure’s. On the other hand, that Durandus’s dissident views should have found an echo in the chief exponent of Conciliarism and such a zealous reformer as Jean Gerson projects the controversy between Durandus and his order into the broader arena of the incipient breach between papal doctrinal prerogatives and the Paris schools’ own claim for theological authority. Later and elsewhere, in the sixteenth century the University of Salamanca established a chair dedicated to the reading and systematic defence of Durandus’s doctrine. A master of the same university energetically defended the Dominican’s alternative views and reduced the censure list of 1314 from ninety-three to twenty-six articles!28 The heading of a copy of Durandus’s commentary owned by an eighteenthcentury German bishop encapsulates the perennially equivocal reception of Durandus’s legacy: Durus Durandus jacet hic sub marmore duro. An sit salvandus, ego nescio nec quoque curo.29 Of Durandus’s adversaries, I have drawn particular attention to Hervaeus Natalis, not only for his status within the Dominican order (he became provincial of France in 1309 and general master in 1318), but also because most of Durandus’s polemical energy is invested in responding to Hervaeus’s criticisms. Indeed, Durandus’s eventual attempts at compromise 27 In a letter to the students of the College of Navarre, Gerson proclaims: ‘Juvant quaestiones doctorum super Sententias, et praesertim illorum qui purius et solidius conscripserunt, inter quales meo judicio dominus altissiodorensis, Bonaventura et Durandus utique resolutissimus numerandi videntur’ (quoted by Fournier, ‘Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain’, 35). No less Xattering is the description of Durandus in Scriptores, ii. 586: ‘Vir fuit ingenii praesentia clarus, omni scientiarum genere excultus, tenacis memoriae, facili praeditus eloquio, quo mire ac feliciter mentis conceptus exprimebat: sed qui tantus dotibus fretas privatis suis sensis nimium adhaesit. Unde relicta quam in scholis imbiberat S. Thomae doctrina, hoc fraino coerci non patiens, genis se totum permisit suo.’ 28 See Fournier, ‘Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain’, 38; Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 208. 29 A legend had it that this was the epitaph on Durandus’s grave in Meaux. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 395. There is however no evidence to support this.

10

Introduction

are elaborated upon what he perceives to be Hervaeus’s preferred opinion. Hervaeus (d. 1323)30 has passed to history as one of the leading representatives of second-generation Thomists, and one could say that after becoming general master in 1318, his life blended with that of the order. A conservative intellect, more critical than truly creative, his ability as a dialectician mainly concentrated in defending the doctrinal orthodoxy of the order shaped after Aquinas’s teaching. This is illustrated in the protagonistic role Hervaeus played in the controversy with Durandus. He took a leading part in the compilation of both censure lists, seeing in Durandus’s innovations a sign of pride and scandalous behaviour which stood in clear contrast with Hervaeus’s own monastic ideal of a ‘modest and measured language’.31 Not satisWed with the measures which his rank imposed him to take on the matter, Hervaeus took personal care in responding to Durandus’s works in a number of tracts, and even engaged in an ongoing quodlibetal exchange with the fallen Dominican.32 Judging by his role in the controversy with Durandus, which Hervaeus took as a personal crusade, and by his instinctive wince at anything which bore the whiV of dissidence,33 one might be tempted to settle for the epithet of ‘champion of Thomism’. But this would be rash and make matters much less interesting than they truly are, for a closer look into Hervaeus’s intellectual temper and theological competence reveal an undercurrent of doctrinal eclecticism and synthetic force which compels a revision of both the man and the evolution of Thomism. Indeed, Hervaeus’s open-mindedness towards non-Thomist sources is remarkable, and the fact that he succeeded in feeding the new ideas into a coherent body of doctrine made him a formidable 30 For a biographical study of Hervaeus, see B. Haure´au, ‘Herve´ Ne´de´lec, general des Fre`res Preˆcheurs’, Histoire litte´raire de la France, xxxiv (Paris, 1914), 308–51; De Guimares, ‘Herve´ Noe¨l’, 5–77. Hervaeus read the Sentences at Paris in 1302 and obtained the licence in theology in Easter 1307. He occupied the French chair between 1307 and 1308, until his appointment as provincial of France in 1309. He was unanimously elected master general of the order in 1318, a role which he fulWlled until his death in Aug. 1323. 31 Words from a circular composed by Hervaeus and addressed to all the members of the order after the general chapter in Florence (1321). See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 228. 32 Apart from the Reprobationes, mentioned above, and the two censure lists, Hervaeus produced Correctiones super dicta Durandi in Quol. Aven. I in 1315; De articulis pertinentibus ad IV libros Sententiarum Durandi (Reims MS 502, fos. 117rb–128vb) in 1314–16; and Evidentiae contra Durandum super quartum sent. (Monast. MS 175, fos. 193ra–216va) in 1317–23. Of Hervaeus’s twelve Quodlibets, II (1308) and IV (1309/10) engage directly with aspects of Durandus’s thought. 33 Apart from the numerous tracts written against Durandus’s views, Hervaeus also dedicated critical works to James of Metz and Henry of Ghent. Repertorium, 166, records two contemporary treatises written by Hervaeus c.1301/7, one against James of Metz, entitled ‘Contra Jacobum de Metz’ (Le Mans MS 231, fos. 150–75), the other against Henry of Ghent, ‘Contra Henricum de Gandavo’ (Vat. Borgh. MS 315).

Introduction

11

opponent while checking otherwise obtuse bigotry. With Hervaeus Durandus possibly encountered a more challenging adversary than Aquinas himself would have ever been, for Hervaeus’s Thomism was both reinvigorated by the conviction of second generations and rendered more resilient by the incorporation of later developments. Fittingly, Hervaeus devoted the last years of his life in preparing the grounds for Aquinas’s canonization, an event which, together with John of Naples, he actively promoted.34 By the time the canonization took place in July 1323, however, Hervaeus was already ill and a month away from his death. In the following pages I propose to examine the Trinitarian controversy which developed in the years 1308 to 1325 between Durandus and leading representatives of his order. I would like to tell the story of this controversy following two intertwined threads formed on the one hand by the evolution of Durandus’s theology and on the other by the growth of a Dominican sense of corporate identity. I hope to show how the conjunction of accidents and general intention shaping Durandus’s thought reXects to a great degree the doctrinal transformation which the Dominican order underwent after the death of Thomas Aquinas in 1274 and before his canonization in 1323. Durandus’s not entirely Thomist tendencies were perceived as highly inopportune, for they belonged to a time when Aquinas’s doctrinal authority was still a matter of dispute within the order. Thus, Durandus’s independent approach made manifest the split which the order’s identity was suVering at the time between an internal endeavour for doctrinal uniformity and the external pull for keeping up to date with competitive intellectual standards. Moreover, with the emergence of a normative sense of ‘Thomism’ in the background, the controversy with Durandus becomes illustrative of the everincreasing tensions between a doctrinally jealous papacy and the masters’ claim for theological authority.

THE ISSUES Three main issues run through the controversy and give each chapter of this study its basic structure. 34 For an account of the process of canonization, see P. Mandonnet, ‘La Canonisation de saint Thomas d’Aquin’, Me´langes Thomistes, Bibliothe`que Thomiste, 3 (Paris and Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1923), 3–47; M. Grabmann, ‘Die Kanonisation des hl. Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Bedeutung fu¨r die Ausbreitung und Verteidigung seiner Lehre im 14. Jahrhundert’, Divus Thomas, 1 (Freiburg, 1923), 233–49.

12

Introduction

(i) The connection between the category of relation and its foundation Is this connection to be understood as a type of identity or as a type of distinction? If a type of identity, how to explain it in a Trinitarian context so as to avoid a reduction to one absolute reality? If a type of distinction, how to qualify it in order to check both a multiplication of divine realities and the introduction of accidentality in God? Underlying this issue is the question of the reality of relation. Is relation individuated independently of its foundation? If so, does it count over and above its foundation? The Wrst question generally refers to the formal identity—the quiddity or deWnition—of relation, whereas the second question refers to its real identity—its ontological value or ‘being’. How do these aspects interact in the divine? Can relation preserve its own formal identity without introducing accidentality into God? On the other hand, can relation assume the reality of the essence while preserving its capacity to distinguish the persons from one another?

(ii) The divine processions This issue ultimately concerns the notion of real distinction in God, and speciWcally the type and degree of distinction which can be allowed without sacriWcing divine unity and simplicity. Is real distinction in God restricted to the distinction between the persons by way of origin? Are those relations found within one and the same person really distinct? If so, is that person as a result divided? Scholastic theologians articulated these questions in terms of ‘opposite’ and ‘disparate’ relations.35 ‘Opposite relation’ is the relation which obtains between the two correlate terms of the same process of production. Active generation (or paternity) is related to passive generation (or Wliation) by opposition. ‘Opposite relations’ are alternatively known as ‘relations of 35 As it gained currency in the 14th cent., the terminology of ‘opposite’ and ‘disparate’ relations to describe two types of relative distinction in the divine was coined by Henry of Ghent in Summa, a. 54 q. 6, 92rE: ‘Quia sunt quaedam relationes originis et oppositae ut quae sunt in diversis personis quarum una procedit ab alia, et quaedam disparatae ut quae sunt in eadem persona a qua procedunt diversae diversimode vel in diversis diversimode procedentibus ab eadem . . . Et suYcit ista relationum diversitas in ipsis etiam si neuter eorum procederet ab alterutro.’ (My italics.) The remote source is Anselm, De Processione, 1. 185. Oppositio relativa and relationes disparatae are terms used by both Durandus and Hervaeus in questions dealing with the divine processions and their connection to each other. Aquinas prefers to speak of ‘relations of origin’ when referring to relative opposition. He tends to use the psychological terminology of ‘mode of the intellect’ and ‘mode of the will’ instead of ‘disparate relations’ when referring to the processions of the Son and of the Spirit respectively.

Introduction

13

origin’, since they account for the constitution and distinction of the persons. Active generation and passive generation refer to the process of origin which accounts for the constitution of the Son, while active spiration and passive spiration refer to the process of origin which accounts for the constitution of the Spirit. Since the terms of the procession require each other, the persons involved are simultaneous in the order of origin, such that there is no temporal order of priority between them. And since the processions are informed by the same nature, the persons are also equal in divinity—that is, they are consubstantial. ‘Relations of origin’, or the more scholastic ‘opposite relations’, thus constituted the Augustinian solution against forms of subordinationism. ‘Disparate relation’ is the relation which obtains between two terms belonging to diVerent processes of production, such that they are founded on the same person as active principle, but end in diVerent products. Active generation and active spiration are disparate relations because they are both founded on the Father, but whereas active generation ends in the Son, active spiration ends in the Spirit. Thus, unlike opposite relations, disparate relations can be found in one and the same person without division because they do not account for the origin of a distinct person. Scholastic theologians were agreed that only in the case of disparate relations can a plurality of real relations coexist in the same person. The problem arose when attempting to explain the connection between diVerent processions which were not opposed to each other, such as the passive generation of the Son and the passive spiration of the Spirit. If the Son’s generation and the Spirit’s spiration are not connected by origin and origin is the only source of personal distinction in God, how can we distinguish between the second and the third persons of the Trinity? Are the two processions to be connected by origin in order to provide a suYcient explanation for personal distinction? If so, how can we avoid a division between one and the same person? As we shall see, these were some of the problems involved in explaining the double procession of the Spirit from Father and Son, a sensitive doctrinal issue also known as the Wlioque.

(iii) The divine persons This issue is twofold. First, is the characteristic mark of a person its selfsubsistence or its incommunicability? Secondly, and in a Trinitarian context, do the divine persons signify primarily substance or relation? If substance, how can we avoid tritheism? If relation, how can we avoid modalism—i.e. reducing the persons to distinct modes of being of the essence? The loci classici

14

Introduction

for scholastic discussions of this issue are Boethius’ De persona et naturis duabus and Richard of St Victor’s De Trinitate. Boethius’ deWnition is responsible for the introduction of the notion of rationality as an essential feature of a person, and as intrinsically linked to a person’s self-subsistence.36 In dealing with the Trinity, scholastics generally understood ‘subsistence’ as the property of an individual substance whereby it exists of itself and is not dependent on another. Thus, parts as well as inherent or dependent wholes do not subsist of themselves but only as contracted or ‘possessed’ by a concrete form. Subsistence was therefore associated with independent existence, rather than with what an individual shares or does not share with other individuals of the same nature. In this sense, subsistence is not incompatible with communicability or repeatability. Characteristic of Richard of St Victor’s deWnition37 is the notion of incommunicability, which rather emphasizes the feature of unrepeatability of an individual substance. ‘Incommunicability’ was associated with a property which cannot be shared, and which cannot constitute a form of something. Trinitarian accounts which prioritized divine unity and the consubstantiality of the persons normally favoured Boethius’ deWnition, since it suitably underlined the common subsistence shared by the essence and the three persons. The underlying issue was not merely to explain how the supposita constitute distinct persons, but more importantly, how they constitute divine persons. On the other hand, those accounts which laid the stress on the distinction between the persons, tended to distance themselves from Boethius’ deWnition and subscribe rather to Richard’s. These accounts were more concerned with establishing a criterion for personhood which could eVectively convey what makes the persons unrepeatable and thereby distinct from the communicable essence—a distinction which the Boethian feature of ‘subsistence’ appeared to blur, with the risk of reducing the trinity of persons to one absolute substance. This book is divided in twelve chapters, which I have grouped in two main parts. Part I (Chapters 1 to 3) deals with the background to the controversy with Durandus. Part II (Chapters 4 to 12) is occupied with the course of the controversy proper, and its chapters are arranged in chronological order, as this seems to provide a better sense of the development of the dispute. Chapter 1 of Part I introduces the doctrinal background to the controversy, 36 Boethius, De Persona, p. 214, 3. 171–2: ‘Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.’ For a complete study of Boethius’ concept of ‘person’, see C. Schlapkohl, ‘Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia’: Boethius und die Debatte u¨ber den PersonbegriV, Marburger theologische Studien, 56 (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1999), esp. 120–3. 37 Richard of St Victor, De Trin. 4, c. 18, p. 181. 1–2: ‘ divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia.’

Introduction

15

mainly looking at those authors who contributed the basic terminology and insights which informed later discussions on the Trinity in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. I have made these contributions converge in one tradition, exempliWed by the doctrinal programme put forward by the dogmatic deWnition of the Trinity at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. The contrast between Durandus’s position and the accepted Dominican view will often be read against the backdrop of this more or less uniWed doctrinal tradition. Chapter 2 oVers an account of Aquinas’s teaching on relations in the context of Thomist general metaphysics and Trinitarian theology. Aquinas’s account will serve as the main sounding board for judging the diVerent interpretations of Thomism throughout the discussion and, by the same token, the extent of Durandus’s dissent. Chapter 3 examines the accounts which various scholastic theologians gave of a notion central to medieval discussions of the Trinity, that of ‘distinction’. The theologians I deal with, namely Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus, have been chosen not only for their general contribution to the development of Trinitarian theology, but also, and more immediately, because their treatment of the issue established the main lines of argument running through and focusing the discussion between Durandus and Hervaeus. Some of the fundamental features in the contrasting positions of Durandus and Hervaeus appear foreshadowed in the earlier accounts, and some familiarization with the latter could prove valuable in identifying the main sources and theological allegiances of the two Dominicans. Likewise, an acquaintance with accounts of non-Dominican contemporaries of Aquinas could also help towards assessing the extent to which Dominicans in the early fourteenth century were prepared to draw from sources alien to Thomism. Part II is occupied with the controversy proper, focusing on the polemical exchange between its two main characters, Durandus and Hervaeus. Chapter 4 presents Hervaeus’s early Trinitarian account from book I of his Sentences commentary. This account will serve to show how Hervaeus’s Wrst elaboration of Aquinas’s teaching was already potentially compatible with an eventual incorporation of Scotist conceptions and vocabulary. Chapter 5 considers the Wrst recension of Durandus’s commentary, a valuable correlate to Chapter 4 in conveying Durandus’s initial teaching on the Trinity as it was Wrst intended and before the conXict with his order. Chapters 6 and 7 introduce the quodlibetal exchange between Hervaeus and Durandus, sustained between the years 1308, roughly when Durandus’s early commentary was made public, and 1317, date of the second censure list. The quodlibetal discussion between the two Dominicans reXects the fast-moving pace of the controversy, and is valuable documentation of the clash between Durandus’s theological priorities and those of mainstream Dominicans.

16

Introduction

The Wrst censure of 1314 represents the climax of the conXict. Chapter 8 will be occupied with an examination of the relevant articles, thus providing a privileged standpoint from which to assess the sorer issues and the underlying criteria of the Dominican commission. Chapters 9 and 10 present the aftermath of the censure and the ‘forensic’ turn which the discussion took in the years immediately following. Chapter 9 centres on Hervaeus’s tracts in response to Durandus’s attempts at defence. These tracts present valuable material in providing Hervaeus’s conWdent justiWcation of the censure, and more signiWcantly, his hard-line view on church authority in the context of professional theological debate. Chapter 10 introduces the apologetic Avignon Quodlibets, Durandus’s most conspicuous attempt at conciliation, followed by Hervaeus’s cold reception in the Correctiones. Hervaeus’s last tract also points the way to the ‘Thomist turn’ which the controversy later assumed, and which materialized in the second censure of 1317. In dealing with this censure, the main purpose of Chapter 11 is to bring to light the chief features of fourteenth-century elaborations of Thomism, in its twofold connection to the notion of a ‘common opinion’ and the accepted interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics. Chapter 12 concludes with the Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary, thus settling the record with Hervaeus and his order. By establishing a comparison between this work and the early commentary I hope to be able to assess the eVect of the previous years of controversy on the evolution of Durandus’s Trinitarian theology. Is Durandus’s mature position a compromise solution advanced in order to appease the Dominican authorities? Or is Durandus Wrm in his ideal of intellectual freedom, his position rather proWting from years of critical exchange?

Part I The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

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1 Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council and its Tradition In their study of the Trinity, theologians in this period inherited a solution originally inspired by the theology of Peter Lombard, and Wrst established in its dogmatic form by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. The logical way— following Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction—to explain a trinity in God was to pose a real distinction between the divine essence and the persons. This solution, however, ran contrary to dogma, since it seemed to violate God’s simplicity. In an attempt to arrive at a conclusive deWnition, the Lateran decree ‘Damnamus’ established the following: There exists a certain supreme reality . . . which truly is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the three persons together and each one of them separately. Therefore in God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity, since each of the three persons is that reality . . . This reality neither begets nor is begotten nor proceeds . . . 1

The immediate motive behind the council’s statement on the Trinity was to condemn Joachim of Fiore’s conception of divine unity as nothing more cohesive than a unity of collection among the persons.2 Joachim had objected to Peter Lombard’s notion of the essence as a quaedam summa res which does not participate in the generational acts, on the grounds that the Lombard was thereby positing a fourth reality in God, the three persons and the divine 1 ‘Nos autem . . . credimus at conWtemur cum Petro, quod una et quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineVabilis, quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet earundem, et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina . . . et illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens . . .’ (My italics.) Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N. Tanner (London, 1990), 232. 2 See F. Robb, ‘Intellectual Tradition and Misunderstanding: The Development of Academic Theology on the Trinity in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries’, Ph.D. thesis, (University College London, 1993), 12–22. Robb makes an excellent study of medieval interpretations of the dogmatic formula of the Trinity issued by the Fourth Lateran Council, in connection with the recurrent preoccupation with the question of whether the divine essence begets.

20

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

essence.3 The Lateran decree thus reappropriated the term ‘quaternity’ and inverted its value by associating it instead with Joachim’s error. In its canonical sense, ‘quaternity’ came to signify the error incurred by denying the absolute unity of the essence as a singular substance—just as Joachim had done in his rejection of the Lombard’s quaedam summa res in favour of a ‘unity of collection’. The notion of the essence as a reality common to the three persons became the normative starting point for any orthodox explanation of the Trinity. The Lateran Council had been convoked by Innocent III, and was of momentous importance not only in its oYcial statement on the Trinity, but in its ratiWcation of the Dominican and Franciscan orders. The formal recognition of the mendicants was indicative of the role which Paris theology had assumed in the deWnition of orthodoxy. Indeed, at the centre of the council’s deWnition of the Trinity is Peter Lombard’s conception of the essence as a quaedam summa res. This is an indication not only of the key Trinitarian issues of the time, but also of the credit ascribed to a particular theologian. Peter Lombard had the rare distinction of being mentioned by name in a conciliar decree. In this connection, Fiona Robb has argued that the condemnation of Joachim’s view at the Lateran Council was an orchestrated initiative of the schools at Paris.4 In face of Joachim’s attacks to the Lombard, theologians in Paris were eager to clear the university name from disrepute. According to this view, the major force behind the condemnation of Joachim was the ‘magisterium’. (Interestingly, the Wrst legislation of the University of Paris was drafted in the same year of 1215 by Robert of Courc¸on, one of the masters during that period.) The masters’ desire for professional recognition, the thesis goes, had gained momentum, and the Lateran Council was evidence of this new magisterial ‘authority’. The adoption of the Lombard’s Sentences from the late twelfth century onwards as the standard theological reference had uniWed theological practice. Theologians were now working according to the same theological agenda, thus facilitating the growth of an academic tradition and, with it, a certain doctrinal consensus. From that time onwards we can speak of a more or less recognizable communis opinio magistralis, destined to last, with alternating fortunes and some exceptions, well throughout the thirteenth century. Hand in hand with the formation of a magisterial community was the professed papal support (as testiWed in the Lateran decree) of the Lombard’s Sentences. That the papacy no longer ignored doctrinal developments in the schools 3 Robb believes that Joachim’s obsession with the error of quaternity derives from the interaction of his Trinitarian theology with his theological understanding of history as the realization of the immanence of the three divine persons in the historical process. Within this frame, the suggestion of a ‘fourth reality’ was unacceptable. Ibid., esp. 200–3. 4 Ibid. 13–18, 171–88, 223–30.

Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council

21

should not be underestimated, for the papacy’s change of attitude towards ‘professional’ theological debate was a key element in the development of Paris’s institutional and intellectual awareness.5 Another factor which could have determined the Fourth Lateran Council was the twelfth-century rivalry between Gilbert of Poitiers and the Lombard on the question of divine unity.6 Gilbert had provided an alternative explanation for the Trinity in his textual commentary to Boethius’ De Trinitate.7 According to Gilbert, some categories, like substance, quantity, and quality, signify that by which something which is, is; other categories do not signify the thing (res), but only as it were the circumstances of that which is.8 The latter Gilbert calls ‘relative categories’. Unlike the absolute categories, relative predication signiWes something ‘extrinsically attached’ (extrinsecus aYxa) to the thing. Relatives are not predicated secundum se, and do not derive from the thing’s own being but only in a comparison with another (ex alieno adventu).9 Place, time, and so on, contribute minimally to a thing’s being (minime conferre ut aliquid sint), even though that to which they are referred has itself to be something (aliquid).10 Accordingly, Gilbert argued that in God the relative properties are in the persons and in the essence not intrinsically (interius), but ‘externally attached’. The underlying assumption is that, if the properties are identical to the essence, then it becomes diYcult to explain how the persons are distinct through the properties and not through the essence. Moreover, if the properties are identical to the essence, then the persons would be identical to their properties, which is tantamount to 5 Ibid., esp. 74–122 on the inXuence of the Lombard, and 170–88 on the role of the papacy in the decision-making process. Under Innocent III the councils functioned as forms of ratiWcation rather than intellectual debate. There was a predetermined programme, which in the Lateran Council was deWned by the theologians’ consensus on the Trinity, and the Council was convoked to formally endorse it. Paris theologians thus assert their role as guarantors of orthodoxy. 6 On the rivalry between the Lombard and the Porretan ‘schools’, ibid. 94–117, and 209–15. 7 The standard edn. of Gilbert’s commentary on Boethius is The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. N. M. Ha¨ring (Toronto: PontiWcal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966). For a study of Gilbert’s Trinitarian account in connection to his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, see M. E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity as found in his commentaries on Boethius, Analecta Gregoriana, 56 (Rome: Gregorian University, 1951); and M. A. Schmidt, ‘Gottheit und Trinita¨t nach dem Kommentar des Gilbert Porreta zu Boethius ‘‘De Trinitate’’ ’, Studia Philosophica, supplementum 7 (Basle, 1956). 8 See Gilbert, Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring, 135. 99: ‘Non enim subsistens tantum sed subsistentia appellatur ‘‘substantia’’ eo quod utraque accidentibus, diversis tamen rationibus, substant. Subsistens igitur est substantia non qua aliqua rerum est aliquid—nihil enim subsistent est aliquid—sed est illa substantia quae est aliquid. Subsistentia vero est substantia non cui quid nitatur, quo ipsa aliquid sit, sed qua solum subsistens est aliquid id est est—homo vel est Deus ut quilibet illorum praenominatorum.’ Likewise, the categories of quality and quantity are not something (aliquid) ‘just’ or ‘great’, but are that by which something is ‘just’ or ‘great’. 9 Ibid. 139. 3. 10 Ibid. 137. 109, 139. 2.

22

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

Sabellianism—in general lines, the view that reduces the distinction of the persons to a mere succession of modes of the one Godhead.11 Gilbert’s view was the object of much criticism, notably from Bernard of Clairvaux, who accused Gilbert of having introduced a quaternity in God by separating God (the essence) from his divinity (the persons and personal properties). Bernard brought his accusation to the Council of Reims in 1148 and, although it never amounted to a formal condemnation, during the debate the pope issued a doctrinal decision which brought some discredit to Gilbert’s view.12 As in Joachim’s case later, so in Gilbert’s the error of ‘quaternity’ was seen as the result of separating the reality of the essence from that of the personal properties. Both Joachim and Gilbert felt uncomfortable with placing any term denoting unity (such as ‘God’ or ‘essence’) as the subject of a proposition about the divinity. As they saw it, the subject had to be a concrete individual and not an abstract: ‘the Father is the essence’, and not ‘the essence is the Father’. Otherwise, they believed, the Trinity would be reduced to one absolute substance. Their emphasis on relative distinction was thus motivated by an abhorrence of the type of unity exempliWed in the Sabellian error. In his Sentences the Lombard takes issue with Gilbert’s view of divine unity.13 His refutation of Gilbert’s arguments is based on the principle that the only way to preserve divine simplicity is by asserting the identity between properties and essence, and between properties and persons. Distinction rests on the fact that the properties are not in the essence in the same way as they are in the persons. Thus, paternity and Wliation are really identical to the essence but really distinct from each other, without thereby entailing a breach in divine unity.14 Taking on this tradition, Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the Lateran decree of 121515 makes a tacit connection between the Porretan error and Joachim’s discredited view. The principle that the essence cannot form the subject of a proposition about the Trinity constitutes, according to Aquinas, an ill-founded way of safeguarding divine unity. As Aquinas sees it, the nodal 11 Ibid. 142. 17–148. 45. In an attempt to safeguard the unity of the Godhead, ‘Sabellians’ (after Sabellius, an otherwise unknown early 3rd-cent theologian of Roman origin) failed to assert the independent subsistence of the persons, teaching that in the Godhead the only diVerentiation is by a mere succession of modes—hence the alternative name of ‘Modalism’. 12 For Bernard’s accusation of Gilbert, see Bernard of Clairvaux, De Consideratione ad Eugenium Papam, in Opera omnia, ed. J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais, iii (Rome, Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), p. 479, 7. 15. For an account of Gilbert’s Trinitarian theology in the context of the Council of Reims, see A. Hayen, ‘Le Concile de Reims et l’erreur the´ologique de Gilbert de la Porre´e’, AHDLMA 10 (1935), 29–102. 13 Peter Lombard, Sent., I d. 33 c. 1. 6–9. 14 Ibid. I d. 33 c. 1. 10. 15 Aquinas, Expositio, 428–31.

Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council

23

point in the Lateran decree is the notion of ‘commonality’ of the essence, which lies at the centre of the Lombard’s conception of the essence as a quaedam summa res. Aquinas’s equation between commonality and unity involved mainly two claims: Wrst, a claim on unity, whereby everything that is in the divine is really identical to the essence, and by that fact subsistent; secondly, a claim on commonality, whereby only if the essence is distinct rather than common to the persons can it be numbered as a fourth thing over and above the persons. The underlying assumption is that only what is really distinct can entail plurality,16 such that to posit a real distinction between the essence and the persons ipso facto entails numerical plurality in God. Fourteenth-century Dominicans identiWed this as the main problem.17 Following a Thomist reading of the Council, they associated the term ‘quaternity’ with the thesis of a real distinction between the essence and relations. In order to avoid a multiplication of divine realities, it was perceived as necessary to posit a real identity between the divine substance and relations.18 The principle that in the divine unity rests on commonality is the combined inheritance of Augustine and Anselm. One of Augustine’s main contributions to the medieval debate on the Trinity had been the application of the Aristotelian category of relation to the question of divine distinction. In an attempt to solve the Arian stalemate between the consubstantiality of the persons and divine unity, Augustine had reasoned that, whenever we speak of the persons in common, we speak of them ‘absolutely’, i.e. in reference to the divine substance, whereas when we speak of the persons individually and distinct from one another, we refer to them ‘relatively’, i.e. according to relation. The relation of paternity constitutes the Father as a distinct person from the Son, just as the relation of Wliation accounts for the Son as a distinct person. Since this distinction is established ‘relatively’ it does not jeopardize the identity of Father and Son to the essence. Father and Son are thus distinct according to their relation to one another but not according to substance.19 16 Ibid. 429. 1193: ‘nihil connumeratur aliis nisi quod ab eis distinguitur . . . Ita, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, scilicet divina essentia vel natura, non potest dici, quod tres personae et illa res sunt quatuor, quia illa res non est aliquid a tribus personis.’ 17 See e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II (1308) q. 7 a. 2 47ra (s. 6.2 below). 18 I believe with Robb, however, that the question underlying the notion of quaternity at the time of the Lateran Council was more immediately connected to that of the generation of the essence. As a reading of the conciliar condemnation, Aquinas’s focus on the commonality of the essence is anachronistic. See also Bruno Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz: Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, ed. R. Haubst, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen, begru¨ndet von C. Baeumker, 42/1 (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1967), 381–2. 19 Augustine, De Trin. 5. 8. 1–6 (CCSL 50. 1): ‘quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter sed relative; tantamque vim esse eiusdem substantiae in patre et Wlio et spiritu sancto ut quidquid de singulis

24

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

Underlying Augustine’s understanding of relation was a standard interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy, according to which the categories signify a division between substances and accidents, so that whatever is not a substance necessarily inheres and eVects composition. Hence the importance of asserting a real identity between essence and relations in the divine, for otherwise there was the risk of introducing accidentality into God. Medieval theologians inherited this view, which they elaborated by applying the Aristotelian distinction between the ratio and the esse of a category. The possibility of separating the ratio of relation from its esse presented obvious advantages, in that it enabled an account of distinction which excluded the introduction of accidentality in God. Relation establishes distinction between the persons only according to its ratio of ‘being towards another’: the Father is distinct from the Son only in so far as he is referred to the Son by paternity. The esse of relation is identical to the subsistent being of the essence, thereby losing its accidentality. Father and Son remain distinct without thereby jeopardizing divine simplicity. Anselm’s inXuence on the medieval debate on the Trinity was perhaps more direct than Augustine’s, in that Anselm may be the earliest source for the notion of ‘opposition of relation’ (relationis oppositio)—or ‘opposite relations’, as the term gained currency in fourteenth-century Trinitarian discussions. In De Processione Spiritus Sancti Anselm elaborated his view on relative distinction in connection to his defence of the double procession of the Spirit (the Wlioque).20 As Anselm propounded it, since distinction in the divine is explained solely by origin, the Spirit cannot be distinct from the Son unless it is understood to proceed also from the Son and not only from the Father.21 In order to avoid positing an absolute identity between Son and Spirit, it was therefore necessary to establish a relation of origin between the two ad se ipsos dicitur non pluraliter in summa sed singulariter accipiatur.’ Also ibid. 9–12; De Civitate Dei, 11. 10. 17–19 (CCSL 48): ‘ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur.’ See also I. Chevalier, S. Augustin et la pense´e grecque: Les Relations trinitaires (Fribourg: Librarie de l’Universite´, 1940). 20 The Wlioque (‘and the Son’) designates the dogmatic formula for the double procession of the Spirit. The formula was added by the Latins to the Nicene creed, and ever since it has been a particularly sensitive issue separating the Eastern from the Western Church. Attempts at reconciliation were made at the Councils of Lyons (1274) and Florence (1439), but the union proved to be short-lived. 21 Anselm, De Processione, 1. 182. 4–16: ‘Quare non potest Wlius aut spiritus sanctus esse pater, quamvis deus sit pater, et unus idemque deus sit pater et Wlius et spiritus sanctus. Sed pater de quo est Wlius, non potest esse qui de se est. Spiritus vero sanctus qui existit de patre procedendo, non est ille qui est de patre nascendo. Sed nec pater de quo est spiritus sanctus, potest esse ille qui de se est; nec Wlius qui existit de patre nascendo, est ille de eodem patre est procedendo, id est spiritus sanctus. Cum autem apparebit quia spiritus sanctus est de Wlio, tunc quoque palam erit quia propter hoc nequit esse Wlius spiritus sanctus et spiritus sanctus Wlius.’

Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council

25

persons.22 Anselm sharpened Augustine’s view, however, by deWning relations of origin speciWcally as those obtaining between the opposite ends of a process of production. One of the advantages of the notion of relative opposition was that it allowed to predicate consubstantiality while preventing a confusion of the persons. Whereas the persons can be said to be from each another (ab invicem) and thereby consubstantial, they cannot be predicated of each other (de invicem).23 The Son is constituted in his being by passive generation, such that ‘the Son is from the Father’ is true, and ‘the Son is of the same substance of the Father’ is true, but not ‘the Son is the Father’.24 Father and Son are both identical to the essence but not to each other, so even though they share in the same substance they cannot be predicated of each other. Relative opposition thus established consubstantiality without jeopardizing the distinction between the persons. Anselm summarized this insight in his principle that ‘in God there is perfect unity where opposition of relation (relationis oppositio) does not prevent it’.25 This principle governed Anselm’s account of the Wlioque and became the backbone of subsequent accounts, mainly of Thomist persuasion, of the divine processions. According to Anselm’s principle, origin presupposes essential communicability. The divine processions consist primarily in the communication of the essence from one person to the other through origin. That the Son co-spirates with the Father is therefore explained by the fact that the Father communicates the power of spiration to the Son; and since the Father owes this power to the essence, the essential equality between the persons is guaranteed in the double procession.26 22 Ibid. 1. 183. 7–14: ‘De patre quidem necesse est eum esse, quia nulla obviat oppositio . . . In his omnibus nihil obviat consequentiae unius identitatis, nisi aliqua de praedictis oppositio.’ 23 Ibid. 1. 179. 12–14: ‘Haec itaque sola causa pluralitas est in deo, ut pater et Wlius et spiritus sanctus dici non possint de invicem, sed alii sint ab invicem, quia predicatis duobus modis est deus de deo.’ 24 Ibid. 1. 180. 27–31: ‘Supradicta vero relationis oppositio, quae ex hoc nascitur, quia supradictis duobus modis deus est de deo, prohibet patrem et Wlium et spiritum sanctum de invicem dici, et propria singulorum aliis attribui.’ See also Monologion, in Opera omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 1. 38. 56. 18–31 and 43. 60. 1–11. 25 Anselm, De Processione, 1. 181. 1–4: ‘Sic ergo huius unitatis et huius relationis consequentiae se contemperant, ut nec pluralitas quae sequitur relationem transeat ad ea, in quibus praedictae simplicitas sonat unitatis, nec unitas cohibeat pluralitatem, ubi eadem relatio signiWcatur. Quatenus nec unitas amittat aliquando suum consequens, ubi non obviat aliqua relationis oppositio, nec relatio perdat quod suum est, nisi ubi obsistit unitas inseparabilis.’ (My italics.) Also ibid. 16–18: ‘Considerandum quoque est quomodo relationum pluralitas obviet unitatis consequentiae, si prius posuerimus aliqua ex iis in quibus nulla obsistit oppositio.’ (My italics.) The underlying principle remains the same: in the divine real distinction is coextensive with relative opposition. 26 Anselm, De Processione, 1. 183. 19–31: ‘Quod qui negat , neget etiam necesse est unum solum deum esse aut Wlium esse deum aut spiritum sanctum esse deum aut deum esse de deo . . . Non est Wlius aut spiritus sanctus de patre, nisi patris essentia, quae una est illi cum Wlio

26

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

Underlying this explanation was the claim that the essence, and not relation, is the principle of production in the divine. This was perceived as crucial for preserving divine equality and avoiding an order of priority between Father and Son on the one hand and the Spirit on the other.27 That the essence accounts for the processions, however, was not to say that the essence actually begets or participates in divine generation, in a way that would jeopardize its unity. Anselm’s point, as was Augustine’s in his understanding of the Nicene ‘God from God’, was that the persons are equal in divinity because the processions are governed by the same power. This meant that the processions rested on the univocal communication of the essence to the three persons. Origin only establishes distinction through unity;28 that is, only when relative opposition presupposes identity can we explain how the persons are distinct from each other while remaining equal in divinity. That the essence accounts for the processions was to constitute the point of departure of Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology, and mainstream Thomists will appropriate Anselm’s insight to legitimize this view. Characteristic of this view was a very strict understanding of origin, whereby the Spirit must proceed principaliter from both Father and Son in order to avoid a prioritization of one person in respect to the other.29 Aquinas was also to adopt a hard line on the notion of et spiritu sancto . . . Eodem modo quando conWtemur spiritum sanctum esse de deo patre: si idem deus est pater et Wlius, sequitur secundum eandem deitatis unitatem, ut sit de Wlio. Necesse ergo spiritum sanctum esse de Wlio, si potest monstrari Wlium non esse de illo.’ See also R. Perino, La dottrina trinitaria di Sant’Anselmo, Orbis Catholicus (Rome: Herder, 1952), esp. 135–49. 27 Anselm, De Processione, 2. 190. 2–17: ‘Nam si esse spiritum sanctum de patre est causa ut sit de deo: cum dicitur esse de patre, non est intelligendum quod sit de hoc, quod pater deus est, idem est de divina essentia; sed de hoc quod deus pater est, id est de hoc unde refertur ad Wlium. Erit ergo divina essentia in spiritu sancto non de deitate patris, sed de relatione; quod stultissimum est dicere . . . Credendum et conWtendum est ideo esse de patre spiritum sanctum, quia est de deo. Non autem magis est pater deus quam Wlius, sed unus solus verus deus pater et Wlius.’ (My italics.) See also Monologion, 54. 66. 21–8: ‘quia non ex eo procedit in quo plures sunt pater et Wlius, sed ex eo in quo unum sunt. Nam non ex relationibus suis quae plures sunt—alia est enim relatio patris, alia Wlii – sed ex ipsa sua essentia quae pluralitatem non admittit, emittunt pater et Wlius pariter tantum bonum.’ Cf. Augustine, Contra Maximinum, 2. 14. 771 (PL 42). 28 Anselm, De Processione, 2. 187. 17–32: ‘Videtur itaque quod spiritus sanctus non sit per aliud a patre alius, nisi quia ab illo habet esse quod est; quamvis alio suo modo quam Wlius . . . Patet quia in existendo habet unde alius est.’ 29 Anselm, De Processione, 9. 201. 11–202. 16: ‘Sicut nobis dicitur, ne omnino separent Wlium a patris communione in hac sancti spiritus processione, asserunt eum de patre per Wlium procedere. Utique nihil aliud intelligi potest, quo ostendere possint spiritum sanctum per Wlium de patre -sicut aiunt -procedere. Cum enim pater et Wlius non diVerant in unitate deitatis, nec spiritus sanctus procedat de patre nisi de deitate: si eadem deitas est Wlii, nequit intelligi quomodo procedat de deitate patris per deitatem Wlii et non de eiusdem Wlii deitate, nisi forte quis dicat spiritum sanctum non procedere de deitate patris sed de paternitate, nec per deitate Wlii sed per Wliationem; quae opinio sua de patenti fatuitate soVocat.’ (My italics.) Also ibid. 14. 212. 10–27, where Anselm makes a connection between a strict understanding of origin and the avoidance of subordinationism.

Prolegomena: The Fourth Lateran Council

27

origin, believing with Anselm that distinction other than by relations of origin risks subordinationism. What I have called here the ‘Lateran tradition’ does not necessarily denote a clear-cut account of the Trinity, but rather a general doctrinal direction articulated through centuries of interpretation of the conciliar text. These currents of interpretation converge in an idea of Trinitarian orthodoxy informed by the theologies of Augustine, Anselm, the Lombard, and, for early fourteenth-century Dominicans, Thomas Aquinas. The reception of these theological authorities was not uncontroversial, and what ultimately counted as ‘orthodox’ was an accepted interpretation of these authors rather than a regurgitation of their statements in crudo. It was against this processed interpretation of Lateran orthodoxy that fourteenth-century Dominican accounts of the Trinity had to reckon. For Dominicans of Thomist persuasion, Lateran orthodoxy involved mainly three doctrinal features: First, the view of the essence as a singular substance which enjoys perfect unity. This view prescribed essential unity as point of departure for any orthodox explanation of the Trinity, and was exempliWed by the Lombard’s conception of the essence as a quaedam summa res. This view was contrasted with the claim, attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers, that the only way to preserve the trinity of persons is by establishing a real distinction between essence and relations. This way of proceeding was associated with the error of ‘quaternity’ as the result of counting the trinity of persons over and above the essence, yielding four divine realities. Secondly, the notion of ‘commonality’ whereby everything that is in the divine is really identical to the essence. The reality of the essence is communicated by real identity to the three persons without thereby entailing division. Underlying this view was the claim that the principle that accounts for the processions is the essence and not relation. Accordingly, the Wlioque was understood to hinge on the consubstantiality of Father and Son: the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, because the Son shares in the power of spiration communicated to him by the essence through generation. This guaranteed both that the processions were univocal, i.e. according to the same essential power, and that the persons remained equal in divinity. Thirdly, the view that real distinction is coextensive with relative opposition. This implied that anything beyond the distinction between one person and the other entails numerical plurality in God. The combined inheritance of Augustine and Anselm, this explanation was summarized in the principle that ‘in God what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity’. Relative opposition was thus perceived as the only way to guarantee the real distinction between the persons while preserving their absolute identity with the essence. This view was underpinned by a standard interpretation of

28

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

Aristotelian philosophy, according to which whatever is not a substance necessarily inheres and eVects composition. In order to avoid the introduction of accidentality into God, it was perceived as necessary to assert the real identity between relations and the essence, such that distinction would rest solely on the ratio of relation as a reference towards something other. In what follows, I will attempt to show how these doctrinal strands run through Aquinas’s account of the Trinity and underlie the interpretation of Thomism by second-generation Thomists. The reading of Aquinas’s theology within the parameters of Lateran orthodoxy is crucial for our understanding of the evolution of Thomism, in that it is deeply connected to the eVort by fourteenth-century Dominicans to invest Aquinas with theological authority. Aquinas’s interpretation of the Lateran decree encapsulated, in a textual commentary, what fourteenth-century Dominicans were endeavouring to establish in a wider context: a doctrinal connection between Thomist theology and church orthodoxy. By the same token, the Lateran reading of Aquinas’s theology will serve as a criterion for judging Durandus’s own account in its contrast with the accepted idea of orthodoxy.

2 Aquinas on the Trinity By 1286 there was already clear evidence that the Dominican order had begun to shape its sense of identity on the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. In that year, the general chapter of Paris commanded its friars to teach and defend according to Aquinas, thus actively promoting the Thomist doctrine within the order.1 Doctrinal allegiance to Aquinas was repeatedly emphasized in subsequent Dominican legislation, notably that passed in Saragossa in 13092 and Metz in 1313.3 On this second occasion all ‘novel opinions’ were banned in favour of the ‘common doctrine’. The equation, evident in these legislations, between Thomism and the ‘common opinion’ began to take shape as the controversy with Durandus developed. The speciWc content of the ‘common opinion’ for individual critics such as Hervaeus Natalis and John of Naples was however a matter of interpretation and did not necessarily coincide in a strict sense with what Aquinas actually said. It is the task of subsequent chapters in this book to establish more precisely what this ‘common opinion’ represented in connection with the particular development which the Thomist doctrine underwent in the mind of leading Dominicans such as Hervaeus Natalis. 1 See Acta, ed. Reichert, i. 235. As early as 1278 we Wnd evidence in the Dominican legislation of the order’s increasing identiWcation with the teaching of Aquinas. For a standard history of the Dominican order and the signiWcance of Thomism for the shaping of the order’s identity, see W. A. Hinnebusch, The History of the Dominican Order in the Middle Ages, ii (New York: Alba House, 1973), esp. 154–71. 2 See Acta, ed. Reichert, Acta, ii. 38: ‘Volumus et districte iniungimus lectoribus et sublectoribus universis, quod legant et determinent secundum doctrinam et opera venerabilis doctoris fratris Thomae de Aquino, et in eadem scolares suos informent, et studentes in ea cum diligentia studere teneatur. Qui autem contrarium faecisse notabiliter inventi fuerint nec admoniti voluerint revocare, per priores provinciales vel magistrum ordinis sic graviter et celeriter puniantur, quod sint ceteris in exemplum.’ 3 Ibid. ii. 64–5: ‘Cum doctrina venerabilis doctoris fratris Thomae de Aquino sanior et communior reputetur, et eam ordo noster specialiter prosequi teneatur, inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo, audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris praedicti, nec recitare aut conWrmare aliquam singularem opinonem contra communem doctorum sententiam in his, quae ad Wdem vel mores pertinere noscuntur, nisi reprobando et statim obiectionibus respondendo . . . Nullus etiam ad studium Parisiense mittatur, nisi in doctrina fratris Thomae saltem tribus annis studuerit diligenter.’

30

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

This chapter will concentrate on the Thomist account of the Trinity, in the form in which Aquinas originally propounded it. For this purpose I shall follow the three main issues of relation, the processions, and the divine persons. The fundamental tenets of Aquinas’s Trinitarian teaching on these three aspects are mainly laid out in his Sentences commentary, the disputed questions De Potentia, and the Summa Theologiae.

2.1. RELATION With respect to categorical relations,4 Aquinas holds that for each of the nine accidental categories there is a distinction between the accidental being common to all categories, and the ratio which deWnes each particular category.5 The accidental being (including that of relation) consists in inhering in a subject,6 and to that extent an accident is said to eVect composition with its subject. With respect to their ratio, that of absolute accidents, such as quality and quantity, is distinct from the ratio of relation, since absolute accidents can only be understood as existing in a subject (esse in), that is, as inhering.7 The ratio of relation, on the other hand, does not imply inherence, but only signiWes a condition towards another (esse ad aliud ).8

4 For a comprehensive study of Aquinas’s theory of relations, see A. Krempel, La Doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas: Expose´ historique et syste´matique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). See also Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), esp. 13–39. 5 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 3; I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1; De Pot. q. 8 a. 4 ad 5; ST I q. 28 a. 2. 6 See Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7 a. 9 ad 7: ‘ipsa relatio quae nihil est aliud quam ordo unius creaturis ad aliam, aliud habet in quantum est accidens et aliud in quantum est relatio vel ordo. In quantum enim accidens est, habet quod sit in subiecto, non autem quod ad aliud sit quasi in aliud transiens, et quodammodo rei relatae assistens. Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens, licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio . . . quia sua ratio non perWcitur prout est in ipso subiecto, sed prout transit ad aliud . . .’ (My italics.) 7 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 3: ‘Quantitas enim habet propriam rationem in comparatione ad subiectum. . . . Ad aliquid autem . . . non importat aliquam dependentiam ad subiectum, immo refertur ad aliquid extra.’ See also Sent. I d. 30 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Ea quae absolute dicuntur, secundum proprias rationes ponunt in eo aliquid in quo dicitur [i.e. in subiecto], ut quantitas et qualitas.’ 8 Aquinas, In Phys. 3, lect. 1 n. 6: ‘Relatio . . . consistit tantum in hoc, quod est ad aliud se habere.’ In De Pot., q. 7 a. 9 ad 7, Aquinas states that as an accident, relation is in its subject, and is thereby something inherent. But according to its ratio as relation, it is only a condition towards something other (esse ad ).

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In this respect, relation does not add anything to the being of its subject, nor does the arrival of a new relation change anything in its subject.9 This is explained by the fact that the accidental being of a real relation is identical to the accidental being of its foundation.10 It is rather the change in one of the terms of the relation which determines the presence or absence of a relation: only if Paul grows to Peter’s height, or vice versa, is it possible to speak of a relation of equality between the two. And just as the arrival of a relation does not add anything to the subject being related, the same is true when the relation disappears.11 In Aquinas’s view, two terms are really related if (i) the terms are really distinct extra-mental things; (ii) there is a real foundation in one of the terms for its relation with the other term; (iii) there exists a real order between the terms identical in being but diVerent in ratio from its foundation.12 To take the example above, Paul and Peter are really related because (i) Paul and Peter are really distinct individuals; (ii) the accident of quantity (‘height’) in Paul enables a relation of equality with Peter’s height; (iii) Paul’s height is really referred to Peter’s height, such that this reference does not constitute a distinct thing from Paul’s height, but merely ‘orders’ it to Peter’s height. The speciWc character of a relation (its being ad aliud ) is thus determined 9 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3; De Pot., q. 7 a. 8 ad 5 and a. 9 ad 7. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. 5. 2 (225b10–13). 10 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7 a. 8 ad 5: ‘Non oportet ad hoc quod de aliquo relatio aliqua de novo dicatur, quod aliqua mutatio in ipso Wat, sed suYcit quod Wat mutatio in aliquo extremorum.’ That accidents do not enjoy existence (esse) in themselves and apart from their subject is an essential feature of Aquinas’s metaphysics. An accidental being results only from the union of an accident and its subject, whereby the union does not give rise to an essential, but only accidental, unity. For the chief features of Aquinas’s metaphysics, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), esp. 199–255. 11 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3: ‘Quandocumque aliquid quod est de ratione rei tollitur, oportet quod ipsa res auferatur, sicut, remoto rationali, destruitur homo. Ad rationem autem relationis quae habet fundamentum in re, duo concurrunt, sc. fundamentum rei, quod est quantitas, quae est causa huius relationis; est etiam aliud de ratione eius, sc. respectus ad alterum. Et utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui relationem: vel per destructionem quantitatis, unde ad hanc mutationem sequitur per accidens mutatio relationis; vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum, remoto illo ad quod referebatur: et tunc relatio cessat nulla mutatione facta in ipsa. Unde in illis in quibus non est relatio nisi secundum hunc respectum, veniunt et recedunt relationes sine aliqua mutatione eius quod refertur.’ Cf. In Metaph. 5, lect. 17 n. 1027. 12 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7 a.11; Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1. In a mutual relation both terms are really related to each other, such that there is a certain ‘order’ of one towards the other. One of the terms is ordinabilis towards the other: ‘ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem ad invicem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum—quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo—ut utrumque ordinabile ad aliud’ (De Pot., q. 7 a. 11). The relation between God and creatures is non-mutual because the action upon which the relation is founded only takes place in creatures (Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1).

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by its relative term,13 whereas its reality is explained by its foundation.14 What makes a relation real is therefore not its ratio, but the absolute accident which serves as its foundation. In virtue of the identity with the reality of the absolute accident on which it is founded, relation (in creatures) is real, is an accident, and inheres in a subject. The category of relation is then only diVerent from absolute accidents in that its ratio does not necessarily consist in inhering in a subject, but in connoting another term. According to Aquinas, relation has, among all the categories, ‘the lowest and most imperfect form of being’.15 His reasoning is that relation comes to a thing already constituted in its being, and as such cannot be a constitutive part of that thing—i.e. it cannot inform it. [T]he weakness (debilitas) of the being (esse) of relation is considered according to its inherence in a subject. For relation does not introduce anything absolute in its subject, but only in its reference (per respectum) towards another. Hence the greater suitability of relation for divine predication, since the less relation adds the less it contravenes [divine] simplicity.16

The view that relation has some sort of diminished being formed part of a standard interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics17 which accorded a certain ontological priority to substance above the accidents. Underlying Aquinas’s claim, however, is an ambiguity inherent in his account of subsistence, speciWcally the connection between esse and subsistence. This ambiguity yields two diVerent readings of relation and its reality.18 The standard Thomist 13 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 27 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Cum enim relatio dicatur secundum ad alterum, diVerentiae relationis erunt secundum quod est ad diversa.’ Cf. Sent. I d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4; De Ver., q. 21 a. 1; ST I q. 28 a. 2. 14 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 ad 3: ‘Quamvis relationi, ex hoc quod ad alterum dicitur, non debeatur quod sit res quaedam, est tamen res aliqua secundum quod habet fundamentum in eo quod refertur.’ Cf. ST III q. 2 a. 7 ad 2. 15 Aquinas, SCG 4. 14. 12: ‘Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam . . . et relatio realiter substantiae adveniens, et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet.’ Also Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 ad 2: ‘Ens minimum, sc. relatio’; De Pot., q. 2 a. 5: ‘Relatio creata habet esse debilissimum, quod est eius tantum.’ Cf. De Ver., q. 27 a. 4; De Pot., q. 9 a. 5 ad 2. Note that only categorical relations have ‘diminished being’; divine relations share in God’s perfect being, and relations of reason have no being whatsoever. 16 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 3 ad 4: ‘debilitas esse relationis consideratur secundum inhaerentiam sui ad subiectum: quia non ponit aliquid absolutum in subiecto, sed tantum per respectum ad aliud. Unde ex hoc habet magis quod veniat in divinam praedicationem: quia quanto minus addit, tanto minus repugnat simplicitati.’ 17 Aristotle, Metaph. 14. 1 (1088a22–b4). 18 I was made aware of this ambiguity in Aquinas’s account of subsistence by Richard Cross’s study of 13th-cent. Christology, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), esp. 7–8, 246–8. In discussing Aquinas’s ‘oYcial’ and ‘unoYcial’ accounts of the connection between esse and subsistence, Cross concludes that the best way to read Aquinas is in terms of an esse theory of subsistence. According to this theory, what is required for subsistence is the possession of proper esse.

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view asserts that esse is the mark of subsistence, such that esse is a feature that only a subsistent thing like a suppositum or an absolute accident can possess.19 On this account relation has a derived sort of existence, because it is not of itself subsistent but rather depends on the reality of its foundation. That is, relation requires the presence of its foundation (Paul’s height in our example) to explain it. On this reading, the ‘weakness of being’ of relation does not imply that relation has proper esse, but rather that relation is really identical to its foundation. The ontological value of relation thus belongs to its accidental being (esse in) alone, and not to its ratio (esse ad ). Thomists like Hervaeus preferred this reading of Aquinas’s view, for it seemed to sit more comfortably with a Lateran understanding of essential unity. On other occasions, however, Aquinas seems to suggest that what is required for subsistence is the possession of ‘proper’ esse—in which case esse is a feature not only of a suppositum but also of a non-subsistent object such as a relative accident or Christ’s human nature.20 On this account relation is the subject of its own esse, however minimal, which it communicates to its foundation by referring it to something other. Relation is thus individuated independently from its foundation, even if it fails to be a subsistent thing. Mainstream Thomists would generally distance themselves from this account, for it was the sort of reading that could lead to a Porretan distinction between essence and relation. The equivocation between the two senses of esse appears illustrated in Aquinas’s discussion over the ratio and the esse of relation. The distinction between the ratio and the esse of a relation was useful in explaining how divine relations can be really in the divine without introducing composition in God. Following a classic Augustinian line, Aquinas holds that relations assume the subsistent reality of the essence and remain as relations only according to their ratio ‘towards another’. Since it is according to the ratio of relation that we establish distinction in God, it was important for Aquinas to determine in which way relations can be said to be real in God according to their own ratio.21 The ambiguity lay in deWning whether the ratio of relation connotes 19 See e.g. ST III q. 2 a. 2; III q. 17 a. 2: ‘Naturam enim signiWcat essentiam speciei, quam signiWcat deWnitio . . . Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem diVert natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum signiWcatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui.’ 20 For Aquinas’s alternative account, see Quodl. IX q. 2 a. 2; ST III q. 4 a. 2 ad 3; SCG 4. 43. 3804–5. 21 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 5: ‘Ratio autem relationis est ut referatur ad alterum. Potest ergo dupliciter considerari relatio in divinis: vel per comparationem ad essentiam, et sic est ratio tantum; vel per comparationem ad illud ad quod refertur, et sic per propriam rationem relationis relatio realiter distinguitur ab illo. Sed per comparationem relationis ad suum correlativum oppositum distinguuntur personae, et non per comparationem relationis ad essentiam.’

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an extra-mental reality or whether it is just the result of the operation of the intellect. On the one hand, Aquinas holds that ratio is ‘what the intellect apprehends about the signiWcation of some noun’.22 For things which are capable of deWnition, their deWnition is their ratio, understood here as a name of second intention.23 On the other hand, for Trinitarian reasons Aquinas is eager to clarify that this is not to say that ratio is purely the result of the operation of the intellect, in the sense of ens rationis. For when we take ratio to signify the deWnition of a thing, there is something in the reality of the thing itself that corresponds to the deWnition and gives grounds for our intellect to make such an attribution.24 In attempting to clarify this point, Aquinas says that relations in God are secundum esse and not merely beings of reason. Now esse can be understood either as the act of being, which in the divine is the essence alone, or as the ‘quiddity’ or nature of a thing, as that which we signify in a deWnition. Aquinas holds that it is in this second sense only that relation and essence have diVerent esses, because the quiddity of relation is to refer to another, whereas that of the essence is to be in itself. The ratio of relation which remains in the divine is therefore its esse in the sense of ‘quiddity’.25 Thus, when we say that in God paternity and essence are distinct, we mean that, were they deWnable, the quiddity (or esse in the second sense) of paternity would be distinct from the quiddity of the essence. And although ‘quiddity’ is the result of second intentional knowledge, there is nevertheless something in 22 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 3: ‘ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de signiWcatione alicuius nominis. Et hoc in his quae habent deWnitionem est ipsa rei deWnitio.’ I borrow the English translation from R. L. Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent’s Use of the ‘‘Verbum Mentis’’ in Trinitarian Theology: The Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione WlosoWca medievale, 7 (1996), 138. 23 ‘Intentio’ is the Latin term used to denote the reality of the thing known considered as known. First intentions are natural signs of extramental entities and second intentions are natural signs of Wrst intentions. See Boethius, In Categorias, 159 (PL 64). See also C. Knudsen, ‘Intentions and Impositions’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982: paperback edn., 1996), 484–5. 24 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 3: ‘ dicitur esse in re in quantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut signiWcatum signo’. Also Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3: ‘In omnibus autem intentionibus hoc communiter verum est, quod intentiones ipsae non sunt in rebus, sed in anima tantum: sed habent aliquid in re respondens, sc. naturam, cui intellectus huiusmodi intentiones attribuit.’ 25 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1: ‘relationes istae non sunt tantum secundum dici ad aliquid, sed etiam secundum esse. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod deWnitio est oratio signiWcans quid est esse; deWnitio enim quidditatem rei signiWcat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae . . . ; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod signiWcat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod ‘‘est’’ dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae . . .’

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God’s reality which responds to the ratio of relation, enabling us to conceive distinction in the divine. The ratio of relation is thus real, not in the sense of adding a reality to God, but in the sense of corresponding to something real in God.26 In other words, to claim that the relation of, say, paternity is in God only according to its ratio is a way of saying that paternity is in God not by inhering in the essence, but by virtue of really constituting the Father—who is identical to the essence. Aquinas rejects the Porretan opinion on the grounds that the very notion of relation as something ‘extrinsically attached’ to its foundation presupposes a separation of the ratio of relation from its reality in the essence.27 As Aquinas sees it, by reducing relation to its ratio, Gilbert was depriving relation of its reality and consequently both jeopardizing divine simplicity and removing the grounds for real distinction. Against this view, Aquinas contends that divine relation is real because it is founded on the reality of the essence, such that their real identity guarantees both God’s simplicity and the real distinction between the persons—for unless relation assumes the reality of the essence it lacks the ontological value to establish a real distinction.28 In order to be real, therefore, distinction in God must presuppose real identity. Aquinas thus makes the Lateran connection between the Porretan opinion and the error of quaternity. Only if essence and relations are really identical can we safeguard divine simplicity, for otherwise than in creatures, everything in God is his nature.29 Divine unity rests therefore on the communicability of the essence, whereby the persons and relations acquire the subsistent mode of being of the essence. Note, however, that Aquinas diVerentiates between the 26 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3: ‘cum dicitur quod est alia ratio paternitates et essentiae in divinis, non accipitur ratio secundum quod est in ratiotinante tantum, sed secundum quod est nomen intentionis, et signiWcat deWnitionem rei . . . ; si intelligatur ibi aliquid deWniri, alia erit deWnitio paternitatis et alia deWnitio essentiae . . . Est enim in deo unde possunt rationes diversae ibi convenire: et ideo non sequitur quod deus sit rationes illae, sed quod sit tantum habens eas.’ 27 For Gilbert, see Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring, 148. 42–4: ‘Theologicae vero personae quoniam eius, quo sunt, singularitate unum sunt et simplicitate id quod sunt, essentiarum oppositione a se invicem aliae esse non possunt. Sed harum, quae dictae sunt, extrinsecus aYxarum rerum oppositione a se invicem aliae et probantur ut sunt.’ 28 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Istud ergo esse paternitatis non potest esse aliud esse quam esse essentiae; et cum esse essentiae sit ipsa essentia, et esse paternitatis sit ipsa paternitas; relinquitur de necessitate quod ipsa paternitas secundum rem est ipsa essentia; unde non facit compositionem cum ea.’ 29 This is equivalent to Aquinas’s statement that ‘in deo est idem habens et quod habetur’ (Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3). That is, in God the personal properties in concrete and the essence in abstract are really identical. Note the contrast with Gilbert of Poitiers, who, aiming to preserve the trinity of persons, makes a distinction between concrete (id quod ) and abstract (id quo) in God.

36

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communicability of the essence as a transmission of its reality to the persons, and a portrayal of the essence as a common nature predicable to many. Aquinas unequivocally rejects the view that the divine essence is a (special kind of) universal, mainly on the grounds that a universal is numerically divided among its instances, something which contradicts divine simplicity.30 The quiddity of an ordinary common nature (as a genus or a species) is distinct to its being (esse), such that the particular instances of the universal ‘humanity’ constitute diVerent human beings which only conceptually share in that common nature. We say thus that ‘Socrates is a man’, but not that ‘Socrates is humanity’. The deWnition of humanity is not identical to the beings which instantiate it, for otherwise ‘this man’ would be identical to ‘that man’, and Socrates and Plato would constitute the same individual.31 In God, by contrast, the quiddity and the esse of the essence are really identical. Accordingly, we say that the three divine persons are really (that is, in their being) identical to the essence, forming a real and not only a conceptual unity with it.32 For Aquinas, then, predicability necessarily entails divisibility: the predication of the concept ‘humanity’ entails the real divisibility of the concept into a plurality of individual human beings. Conversely, indivisibility entails incommunicability. An individual is indivisible because incommunicable, just as a common nature is divisible because communicable. The divine essence is an individual substance, and although communicable to the three persons, it is not so in the way a common nature is, because the divine essence remains numerically one and undivided in the three persons.33 Divine communicability presupposes the identity between the quiddity and 30 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 3: ‘in divinis est accipere commune et proprium, quamvis non sit accipere universale et particulare. Ad hoc enim quod sit universale et particulare, exigitur aliqua diversitas realis, quidditas communicabilis, et esse quod proprium est. Et talis diversitas non potest esse in divinis.’ A notable representative of the view of the divine essence as a special kind of universal is Duns Scotus. I will discuss this aspect of Scotus’s Trinitarian theology in s. 3.3 below. 31 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 2: ‘Omne quod est in genere, habet quidditatem diVerentem ab esse, sicut homo; humanitati enim ex hoc quod est humanitas, non debetur esse in actu; potest enim cogitari humanitas et tamen ignorari an aliquis homo sit. Et ratio huius est, quia commune, quod praedicatur de his quae sunt in genere, praedicat quidditatem, cum genus et species praedicentur in eo quod quid est. Illi autem quidditati non debetur esse nisi per hoc quod suscepta est in hoc vel in illo. Et ideo quidditas generis vel speciei non communicatur secundum unum esse omnibus, sed solum secundum unam rationem communem. Unde constat quod esse suum non est quidditas sua.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 1 ad 1; I d. 19 q. 4 a. 2; ST I q. 30 a. 4 ad 3; I q. 40 a. 3. 32 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 8 q. 4 a. 2: ‘In deo autem esse suum est quidditas sua: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset acquisitum sibi ab alio, et non haberet esse per essentiam suam. Et ideo deo non potest esse in aliquo genere.’ 33 For Aquinas’s equation between indivisibility and incommunicability, see e.g. ST I q. 13 a. 9: ‘natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est . . . : sequitur quod hoc nomen ‘‘deus’’ incommunicabile quidem sit secundum rem . . .’

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the esse of the essence, and not, as in ordinary universals, a division of the common quiddity into a plurality of individuals. For Aquinas, then, divine communicability signiWes the transmission of the mode of being of the essence to the three persons, whereby the persons are said to participate in the divine being.34 The divine essence is ‘common’ to the persons in this sense only, and it is in this way that Aquinas believes to be avoiding the error of quaternity: for ‘what is common is not distinct’, and only when we separate the essence from relations do we multiply the realities in God.

2 . 2 . T H E P ROC E S SI O N S According to Aquinas, the principles of distinction in God are relations of origin, on account of which only the persons can be really distinct from each other.35 Aquinas restricted real distinction in the divine to relative opposition, for he saw it as the only way both to safeguard the essential equality of the persons and to avoid a quaternity in God. The terms of a relation of origin are necessarily equal and simultaneous, so that to posit real distinction beyond the distinction established by origin would be tantamount to introducing an order of priority in the divine.36 By the same token, distinction by opposition also avoids real distinction between the persons and the essence. Father and Son are really distinct when referred to each other by origin, but not in reference to the divine essence.37 For it is not contradictory to say that the Father is really identical to the essence in virtue of his being, and really distinct from the Son in virtue of the relation of paternity.38 Distinction by relative opposition is, therefore, a distinction according to supposita.39 For in so far as relative opposition can only obtain between the terms of a relation of origin, only the divine supposita can be really distinct. 34 Aquinas, Sent., d. 13 q. 1 a. 3: ‘Secundum rem, sicut dicimus essentiam esse communem tribus personis, et unamquamque personam distingui per id quod sibi est proprium.’ 35 Aquinas, ST I q. 36 a. 2: ‘Non autem possunt esse in divinis aliae relationes oppositae nisi relationes originis.’ See also Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2: ‘omnis autem distinctio formalis est secundum aliquam oppositionem.’ 36 Aquinas, SCG 4. 24. 8: ‘In relationibus vero omnibus super actionem vel passionem fundatis [e.g. ‘curing’ and ‘being cured’], semper alterum est ut subjectum et inaequale secundum virtutem, nisi solum in relationibus originis, in quibus nulla minoratio designatur, eo quod invenitur aliquid producere sibi simile et aequale secundum naturam et virtutem.’ Cf. De Pot., q. 2 a. 4; q. 7 a. 9. 37 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 2 a. 5; ST I q. 39 a. 1. 38 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 3; De Pot., q. 7 a. 6. 39 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 30 a. 2.

38

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

If the principle of real distinction in God is relative opposition, those relations which are not directly opposed are not really distinct. Paternity and common spiration are not really distinct in the Father because they belong to diVerent processes of origin and do not constitute opposite ends of the same process. Paternity and common spiration are relations founded on the same suppositum, the Father, on account of which they can only be distinct according to reason—i.e. according to the ratio of relation, whereby paternity and spiration connote diVerent terms in the Father.40 Underlying this claim is Anselm’s principle that in the divine what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity.41 Since real distinction in God is restricted to opposition, those relations which are common to one suppositum (as paternity and common spiration are to the Father), or that which is common to two supposita (as common spiration is to both Father and Son), are not really distinct.42 Aquinas’s governing insight is that numerical plurality obtains only between really distinct objects.43 Father and Son are two numerically distinct persons because they are really distinct on account of the opposite relations of paternity and Wliation. By contrast, paternity and common spiration do not amount to two numerically distinct things because they are not really distinct—i.e. they are not opposed by origin. This also explains why in the divine there can be only three persons (constituted by paternity, Wliation, and active spiration), and yet four real relations (the three personal properties and common spiration).44 Aquinas thus commits himself to the Lateran emphasis on the commonality of the essence, and accordingly maintains that the power that accounts for the processions lies primarily in the essence, according to some 40 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2. Aquinas could be here criticizing Bonaventure’s position in Sent. I d. 13 a. 1 q. 3. Aquinas uses the term ‘relations of disparity’ (relationes disparatae) only rarely to describe those relations which do not belong to the same process of origin. He presumably avoided using the term because of its associations with an emanationist account of the processions, which he considered insuYcient for establishing distinction in God (see Sent., d. 11 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 10 a. 4). 41 Anselm, De Processione, 1. 181. 2: ‘Totum est unum in deo, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 31 a. 2; De Pot., q. 10 a. 2. 42 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 28 a. 3; Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 2: ‘relationes oppositae sunt personae, et sunt duae personae, sicut duae relationes; sed relationes quae sunt in eadem persona non oppositae, sunt quidem duae relationes vel proprietates, sed non duae personae, immo una persona’. 43 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 27 q. 1 a. 1. Also Expositio, 429. 1193: ‘nihil connumeratur aliis nisi quod ab eis distinguitur.’ 44 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 10 q. 1 a. 5: ‘Non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis. Et ratio huius est, quia in divinis propter essentiae simplicitatem non potest esse distinctio secundum aliquod absolutum, sed secundum relationem, et tantum secundum relationem originis, quae non potest constituire personam, si signiWcet in communi . . .’

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relation.45 Active generation is therefore explained as the communication of the divine reality from Father to Son according to paternity. Paternity is not that by which the Father generates, but that which constitutes the person who generates by virtue of (the power communicated by) the essence. The essence is therefore the principle of production, whereas relation is the immediate agent.46 And since relation is really identical to the essence, the only reality involved in the processions is the essence. The processions are thus ‘univocal’, because they originate from and end in the same nature; and as acts of the same nature, the processions are essentially equal.47 It was therefore important for Aquinas to identify the generative power with the essence, because he saw it as the only way to safeguard the equality of the persons and the unity of the essence through the processions. The principle of essential communicability also governs Aquinas’s account of the Wlioque. For Aquinas, as it is for most Dominicans, the Wlioque responds to the need of explaining the constitution of the third person of the Trinity as distinct from the second person.48 Since in the divine real distinction obtains 45 Aquinas, ST I q. 41 a. 5: ‘Potentia generandi signiWcat divinam essentiam.’ This is also the Lombard’s view in Sent. I d. 7 c. 2: ‘dicimus quia non est potens nisi natura: eius [i.e. patris] enim potentia natura est vel essentia’. 46 Based on an objection levelled by Giles of Rome against Aquinas, C. Luna has drawn attention to an evolution in Aquinas’s position on the issue of divine production. In his Sentences commentary and in De Potentia, Aquinas claimed that the power of production lies as it were between essence and relation, such that it signiWes the essence but connotes a relation. See Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3: ‘Potentia spirativa dicit aliquid quasi medium inter essentiam et proprietatem, eo quod dicit essentiam sub ratione proprietatis: sic enim actus notionalis ab essentia egreditur, non sicut ab agente, sed ab eo quo agitur. Generatio non egreditur ab essentia inquantum est essentia, sed inquantum est paternitas’; De Pot., q. 2 a. 2: ‘in ratione potentiae includitur quodammodo paternitas, etiam quantum ad id quod est generationis principium. Et propter hoc cum aliis dicendum est, quod potentia generandi simul essentiam et notionem signiWcat.’ Cf. Sent. I d. 7 q. 1 a. 2. Giles criticized Aquinas on the grounds that this position was tantamount to introducing a third category in the divine apart from substance and relation, in a way that seemed to jeopardize divine unity (see Giles, Sent. I d. 11 princ. 2 q. 3). As a result, Aquinas sharpened his position in ST I q. 41 a. 5, in which he stated less ambiguously that the generative power signiWes the essence. See C. Luna, ‘Essenza divina e relazioni trinitariae nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tomaso d’Aquino’, Medioevo: Rivista di storia della WlosoWa medievale, 14 (1988), esp. 11–27. See also Paul Vanier, The´ologie trinitaire chez saint Thomas d’Aquin: Evolution du concept d’action notionnelle (Montre´al: Institut d’E´tudes Me´die´vales, 1953), esp. 39–41, who sees a Dionysian inXuence in Aquinas’s earlier view. 47 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 ad 1: ‘Natura communicatur per actum naturae, communiter loquendo; sed determinata communicatio debet esse per actum naturae sub aliqua propria ratione acceptae; et ideo communicatio quae est per spirationem, est actus divinae naturae, inquantum habet rationem spirationis.’ See also ST I q. 4 a. 3. 48 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Spiritus sanctus procedit a Wlio, hoc enim remoto, inevitabiliter removetur distinctio Wlii et spiritus sancti. Cum enim divinae personae secundum nihil absolutum distinguantur, oportet quod omnis ipsarum distinctio sit secundum relationem originis. Unde si spiritus sanctus et Wlius non distingueretur per hoc quod unus est ab alio, oporteret quod uterque esset una persona.’ Also De Pot., q. 10 a. 5: ‘dico autem, quod si spiritus

40

The Doctrinal and Philosophical Background

only by relations of origin, the task is to establish a relation of origin between the Son and the Spirit. Aquinas’s solution is derived from Anselm, and fundamentally conforms to Lateran orthodoxy. The Son spirates the Spirit by virtue of the power of spiration which is communicated to him by the Father.49 In Aquinas’s terms, the Spirit ‘comes from’ (egreditur) the essence, not as its agent (spirante), but as the principle by which the Father and the Son spirate.50 The Spirit then proceeds (procedit) from Father and Son according to one common spiration.51 Aquinas’s explanation of the Wlioque thus rests on the consubstantiality between Father and Son as foundation for the relation of origin between Son and Spirit. On this account the generation of the Son plays an essential role in the spiration of the Spirit, for it is through generation that the Son acquires the power to spirate. As we shall see in Chapter 5, Durandus will challenge the Thomist claim on the role of passive generation in spiration in favour of a strictly relational account—i.e. one articulated in terms of the relation of origin between Son and Spirit. The advantage Aquinas—and later Thomists—sees over a purely relational explanation, however, is that an account based on essential communicability is more likely to safeguard the unity of the essence and the equality of the persons throughout the processions.52 In his reading of Anselm, Aquinas believes that only when the processions are said to originate and end in the same nature, can they be considered the result of univocal communication. Univocal communication implies both that the principle of action is the same for all processions, and that the processions are sanctus non sit a Wlio, nec aliquo modo Wlius sit principium processionis spiritus sancti, impossibile est quod spiritus sanctus a Wlio personaliter distinguatur, et etiam impossibile est quod processio spiritus sancti diVerat a Wlii generatione . . .’ 49 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2: ‘Spiritus sanctus dicitur manere in Wlio . . . , quia virtus spirativa est in patre, et a patre est in Wlio’; a. 3: ‘pater et Wlius spirant spiritus sanctum, inquantum sunt unum in potentia spirativa’. See also Sent. I d. 7 q. 1 a. 2. On this count, Aquinas could be understood as claiming that passive generation and active spiration are opposite (and not disparate) relations. Since the Son spirates by virtue of the power of spiration communicated by the Father in generation, one could say that passive generation is suYcient for active spiration. 50 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 2: ‘omnis actus refertur ad duo originaliter, sc. ad agentem, et ad principium actionis. Agens autem est ipsum suppositum . . . , et principium actionis est aliqua forma in ipso . . . conditionem agentis vel operantis, sic procedit spiritus sanctus a patre et Wlio inquantum sunt plures et inquantum sunt distinctae personae . . . conditionem principii actionis, sic dico, quod procedit ab eis inquantum sunt unum . . . , ab uno principio, quod est principium huius actus qui est spirare, quo una et simplex persona spiritus sancti procedit.’ Also ibid., a. 4. 51 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3: ‘spiratio egreditur ab essentia, non sicut a spirante, sed sicut a principio spirationis, inquantum habet rationem alicuius notionis quae est communis patre et Wlio, quae dicitur communis spiratio: et ita spirativa potentia dicit essentiam sub ratione talis prorpietatis. Et ideo dico, quod procedit spiritus sanctus a patre et Wlio, inquantum sunt unum in essentia, et in aliqua notione, sc. in communi spiratione.’ 52 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 10 a. 5 ad 11: ‘Talis processio non est prius secundum intellectum quam communio . Unde non oportet quod, remota communione, remaneat processio . . .’

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thereby equal in nature.53 Aquinas subscribes to Anselm’s strict understanding of the Wlioque, according to which the Spirit proceeds principaliter from both Father and Son, and rejects as categorically as Anselm any subordination of the Son’s power to spirate. To say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through (per) the Son seems to downgrade the divinity of the Son and jeopardize the consubstantiality of the persons.54 For two theologians who were appointed to seek doctrinal accommodation with the Eastern Church,55 they did not precisely facilitate negotiations on this issue.56 The double procession of the Spirit is an assumption already found in Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity. This model used the analogy of intellect and will to explain the distinction between the second and third persons. Just as the operation of the will presupposes the product of the intellect, the procession of the Spirit results from the product of generation.57 The scholastics inherited this model as authoritative,58 and even when they did not fully endorse it, it was a doctrinal element which they had to take into account in their treatments of the Wlioque. Aquinas is very ambiguous in his 53 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 ad 1: ‘Et hoc intendit Anselmus, quod impossibile est dicere, quod processiones, quae terminantur in naturam, non sit aliquo modo natura principium, cum sit ibi quasi communicatio univoca.’ For Anselm, see De Processione, 2. 190. 2–17: ‘Nam si esse spiritum sanctum de patre est causa ut sit de deo: cum dicitur esse de patre, non est intelligendum quod sit de hoc, quod pater deus est, id est de divina essentia; sed de hoc quod deus pater est, id est de hoc unde refertur ad Wlium. Erit ergo divina essentia in spiritu sancto non de deitate patris, sed de relatione; quod stultissimum est dicere . . . Credendum et conWtendum est ideo esse de patre spiritum sanctum, quia est de deo. Non autem magis est pater deus quam Wlius, sed unus solus verus deus pater et Wlius.’ Also ibid. 10. 205. 18–21; 14. 212. 10–27. 54 For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 12 q. 1 a. 3: ‘omne medium aliquo modo distinguitur ab his inter quae medium dicitur. Cum autem in spiratione pater et Wlius sint duo spirantes, inquantum sunt unum in potentia spirativa, possumus loqui de actu spirationis per comparationem ad ipsos spirantes, vel ad principium spirandi sicut virtute cuius Wt spiratio. Si autem consideremus ipsum principium, sc. potentiam spirativam, cum in hoc non distinguantur pater et Wlius, non potest dici spiratio esse a patre mediante Wlio. Si autem consideremus ipsos spirantes qui distincti sunt, et secundum hoc praebent suppositum spirationi: quia Wlius est ex patre et spiritus sanctus simul a patre et Wlio.’ (My italics.) For Anselm, see De Processione, 14. 212. 10–27: ‘Constat inexpugnabili ratione spiritum sanctum esse de Wlio, sicuti est de patre, nec tamen esse quasi de duobus diversis, sed quasi de uno.’ Also ibid. 9. 201. 11–12: ‘Sicut nobis dicitur, ne omnino separent Wlium a patris communione in hac sancti spiritus processione, asserunt eum de patre per Wlium procedere . . . Cum enim pater et Wlius non diVerent in unitate deitatis, nec spiritus sanctus procedat de patre nisi de deitate . . . [Q]uae opinio sua se patenti fatuitate soVocat.’ (My italics.) 55 In 1098 Urban II appointed Anselm to expound the doctrine of the double procession at a meeting with the representatives of the Greek Church at Bari. Anselm prepared his De Processione Spiritus Sancti for this purpose. Aquinas had undertaken a similar responsibility for the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, and although he died on the way to the Council his Contra errores Graecorum was a main reference during the proceedings. 56 On this count at least, Aquinas’s aYnity with Anselm has distanced him from a more Augustinian—and conciliatory—understanding of the role of Father and Son in the procession of the Spirit. See Augustine, De Trin. 15. 26. 57 See Augustine, De Trin., esp. bk 15. 58 A notable example is Henry of Ghent, in Summa, aa. 54–60. See Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, esp. 164–74.

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reception of Augustine on this issue. Whereas at times he appears to reject the psychological explanation as unsuitable,59 at others he makes gestures towards incorporating it, albeit with some qualiWcations.60 Aquinas’s main reservation with the psychological model is that the distinction between the divine attributes of intellect and will is at best insuYcient for explaining the distinction between the persons. That the persons proceed according to diVerent modes, i.e. by way of the intellect and by way of the will, is not suYcient to render them distinct persons. Such an explanation would entail that the Son and the Spirit are distinct according to reason only—as the divine attributes are distinct according to reason only—resulting in a confusion of persons akin to Sabellianism.61 The relational model based on origin seems to Aquinas preferable. As Aquinas reasons, any sort of operation or procession is deWned and distinguished from another not by itself but by virtue of its principle. In the divine the processions are governed by origin, such that distinct processions must begin at diVerent terms and end in diVerent terms. Only when it can be established that the Son spirates the Spirit can we say that they belong to distinct processions and thereby constitute distinct persons.62 Any other diVerence in their modes of procession must by necessity presuppose relative opposition.63 59 There are plenty of instances, but see e.g. Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2: ‘alii dicunt quod diVerentia sumitur ex hoc quod generatio est processio naturae, et processio spiritus sancti est processio voluntatis. Sed hoc etiam non competit . . .’ Ibid. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Nec hoc remoto posset dici quod distinguerentur personaliter Wlius et spiritus sanctus per diversum modum procedenti a patre, ut quod Wlius procederet per modum naturae, et spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis.’ Also De Pot., q. 10, aa. 2 and 4. 60 Aquinas, ST I q. 27 a. 3, a. 4: ‘Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis: et intantum potest habere rationem generationis . . . Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellintis . . . in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris . . .’ 61 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Cum enim divinae personae secundum nihil absolutum distinguantur, oportet quod omnis ipsarum distinctio sit secundum relationes originis . . . Nec hoc remoto posset dici quod distinguerentur personaliter Wlius et spiritus sanctus per diversum modum procedenti a patre, ut quod Wlius procederet per modum naturae, et spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis. Ille enim modus diversus aut diceret diversitatem per oppositionis relationis, et sic rediret idem quod prius, aut diceret diversitatem in absolutis; et tunc vel realem diversitatem, et sic compositionem in deo; vel diversitatem rationum . . . , et hoc non suYcit ad distinctionem personarum.’ Also Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2: ‘voluntas et natura in divinis solum ratione distinguuntur. Unde talis distinctio, realis distinctionis ratio esse non potest, quia principium non est debilius principiato.’ 62 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 10 a. 2: ‘Nulla autem processio nec operatio nec motus habet speciem a se, sed sortitur speciem a termino vel a principio. Unde nihil est dictum, quod processiones aliquae distinguantur seipsis; sed oportet quod distinguantur penes principia . . . Et sic solus ordo processionum qui attenditur secundum originem processionis, multiplicat in divinis.’ As we shall see in s. 3.2, Henry of Ghent claims by contrast that distinction by modes of emanation is prior to personal distinction. See Summa, a. 54 q. 6; a. 60 q. 2. 63 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2: ‘Unde concedo quod nisi spiritus sanctus esset a Wlio, non esset assignare distinctionem realem inter Wlium et spiritum sanctum;’ De Pot., q. 10 a. 5: ‘Ubi

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On the other hand, Aquinas appears to recognize some useful features in the psychological explanation. In the Wrst place, the idea that the Spirit proceeds from the product of generation (just as the operation of the will presupposes the product of the intellect) seems to imply the consubstantiality of Father and Son as the explanatory principle for spiration. This shows a fundamental aYnity with Aquinas’s explanation of the Wlioque, based likewise on the power communicated from Father to Son through generation. Both accounts rest on the claim that the processions are governed by the essence, a claim which had the advantage of enabling an account of the processions while avoiding an order of priority between the persons.64 Secondly, the psychological model restricts the number of processions to two (one according to intellect and the other according to will), thereby keeping the number of persons to three—since distinction is based on origin, two processions yield three persons only.65 At least on the basis of these two aspects, Aquinas could Wnd common grounds with the psychological model. Central to both accounts is the emphasis on the unity of the essence, described here in terms of consubstantiality, as starting point for any explanation of distinction in God. Likewise, both models operate on the assumption that an account of distinction should aim at restricting (rather than counting) the number of persons to three in order to avoid positing a quaternity in God. Both accounts thus bore recognizable aYnity to Lateran orthodoxy. It is precisely along Lateran lines that Aquinas would sometimes make gestures towards incorporating the psychological model into his explanation of the processions. That the Spirit proceeds from the Son by mode of the will, just as the Son proceeds from the Father by mode of the intellect, is not to say that in God there is a distinction between the attributes of intellect and will. Rather, that the Son proceeds according to the mode of intellect is a way of conceptualizing how he is conceived by the Father by way of similitude. Just as the product of the intellect is in the intellect according to the mode of the knower, the Son proceeds from the nature of the Father as its one source. The Spirit proceeds according to will in the sense of being the product of the love ergo non est oppositio relativa in divinis, non potest esse realis distinctio, quae est distinctio personalis . . . [D]iverso modo procedere non possent, nisi spiritus sanctus a Wlio esset.’ See also Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 10 a. 4. 64 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 10 a. 5: ‘Talis processio, sc. spiritus sancti, qui procedit quasi amor et communio et nexus patris et Wlii, non est prius secundum intellectum quam communio. Unde non oportet quod, remota communione, remaneat processio.’ 65 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 10 q. 1 a. 5: ‘In divinis autem non potest esse nisi duplex modus originis, secundum quod omne agens dividitur in agens a natura et agens a voluntate . . . Duas processiones . . . quarum una est per modum naturae et vocatur generatio, et alia per modum voluntatis et vocatur spiratio . . . Et ideo erit una persona quae est ab alia per generationem, et hic est Wlius, et alia quae est alia per spirationem, et hic est spiritus sanctus. . . . Habemus una persona, a qua est aliquis per generationem et spirationem, sicut pater.’

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of Father and Son, which, unlike the product of the intellect, proceeds from a double source.66 We thus Wnd Aquinas resorting to the common grounds provided by the Lateran emphasis on the commonality of the essence (the consubstantiality of Father and Son), enabling him to make an intelligent use of the psychological model without compromising the terms of his relational account. Aquinas ultimately understands the modes of procession of intellect and will according to origin. The rationale for personal distinction still rests on opposite relations. But rather than downgrading the psychological explanation to purely metaphorical terms, Aquinas boils it down to Lateran principles where the two can meet. The essential connection between the intellectual procession of the Son and the procession of the Spirit according to will is based on the assumption, dear to Aquinas, that the principle that accounts for the processions is the essence. For Aquinas the psychological model is useful not in its conception of the Son as Word, but rather in the consubstantiality it ascribes to Father and Son—not to speak of the priority which the model seems to ascribe to the intellect over the will, which played into the hands of classic Thomist philosophy67 and facilitated the explanation of the double procession of the Spirit.68

66 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2: ‘Dico . . . quod est in divinis aliqua processio secundum quam una persona procedit ab una; et haec est processio generationis, secundum quam Wlius est a patre, et ideo dicitur esse per modum naturae vel intellectus; procedit enim ut Wlius et ut verbum: quia in utroque modo istarum processionum, sc. naturae et intellectus, est unius ab uno processio. Item est aliqua processio in divinis quae est simul a duobus, sc. ab eo qui procedit et ab eo a quo procedit . . . Et inde est quod ista processio dicitur per modum voluntatis esse, quia per consensum ex duobus volentibus potest unus amor procedere.’ Cf. Sent. I d. 10 q. 1 ad 1 and ad 2; ST, I q. 27 aa. 3–5; De Pot., q. 2 a. 4 ad 7; q. 10 a. 2 ad 22; q. 10 a. 5 ad 2. See also Vanier, The´ologie trinitaire, esp. 18–39. 67 According to Aquinas, the will is a rational appetite in so far as it is moved by the intellect. The intellect has thus priority over the will in moral acts, since it is the intellect that presents to the will its ultimate aims. See Sent. II d. 24 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 82 a. 1 ad 2; De Ver., q. 24 a. 6. In this connection, Hervaeus Natalis makes a remark which is revealing of the aYnity which Thomist Dominicans were prepared to recognize in the psychological model. In De articulis, a work which will appear later in the controversy, Hervaeus says in response to Durandus: ‘etiam quod dicitur, quod verbum non est causa amoris, falsum est et contra communem modum, quo dicimus, quod intellectus movet voluntatem. Et quod dicitur, quod bonum cognitum est quod movet, verum est, sed non nisi metaphorica cognitione, et ideo semper motio voluntatis praesupponit motionem intellectus’ (a. 5 p. 455. 480–5, ed. Takada). See also J. B. Karolec, ‘Free Will and Free Choice’, in Kretzmann et al., Cambridge History, esp. 633–6. 68 Aquinas, ST I q. 27 a. 3: ‘Non enim est processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi: nihil enim potest voluntate amari, nisi sit in intellectu conceptum . . . [I]ta, licet in deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus, tamen, quia de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus, habet ordinis distinctionem processio amoris a processione verbi in divinis.’

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R. L. Friedman has argued69 that, representing a predominantly Dominican line, Aquinas makes only a ‘metaphorical’ use of the psychological model based simply upon a ‘numerical resemblance’ whereby the Son proceeds from one and the Spirit from two sources.70 Friedman bases his argument on an essential connection he perceives between the psychological model and an emanational account of the processions.71 Friedman is making a valid point, and I agree with him that Aquinas does not make a literal use of the psychological explanation, in that he does not believe that the Son is literally Word or that his generation has anything to do with an intellect in the strict sense.72 But I do not believe that the subscription to a relational account of the processions necessarily excludes the psychological explanation, or that the only acceptable reading of the psychological model is according to an emanational account of the processions. Aquinas’s stress on relations of origin is not divorced from a successful incorporation of the psychological model, and the Thomist thesis that the essence, and not relation, ultimately accounts for the processions, makes the relational account at least compatible with the psychological explanation. My contention is that, despite his caution, Aquinas was not simply paying lip service to Augustine’s authority. His interpretation of the psychological model is not only coherent, but fundamentally compatible with his philosophy and his Trinitarian priorities. I believe there are 69 I refer mainly to R. L. Friedman, ‘Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325’, Studia Theologica, 53 (1999), 13–25. See also Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, esp. 164–82. Friedman identiWes two divergent theological traditions in what he perceives as a predominantly Franciscan account in contrast to a predominantly Dominican account of the Trinity. In broad lines, Friedman states that the Franciscans believe that the way in which the divine persons have been originated (or ‘emanate’) from the essence suYces in accounting for their distinction. On the other hand, the Dominican account, led mainly by Aquinas, emphasizes the notion of relation in its explanation of personal distinction. Accordingly, the Father is distinct from the Son, not so much on account of their diVerent ways of originating from the essence, but because the Son originates from the Father in the process of generation. See also A. Stohr, ‘Die Hauptrichtungen der spekulativen Trinita¨tslehre in der Theologie des 13. Jahrhunderts’, Theologische Quartalschrift, 106 (1925), 113–35; Michael Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatoris des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, ii (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1930), 650–5; Vanier, The´ologie trinitaire, 33–6. 70 See Friedman, ‘Divergent Traditions’, 20–1: ‘Dominicans, following Aquinas, denied that the emanations contributed to the distinction of the persons; for them only the relation account explained personal distinction. Thus, for Dominicans the Son was like a mental word, and this metaphor helps human beings to get a little way towards understanding God’s trinitarian reality.’ Also ‘Relations, Emanations’, 156–7. 71 Friedman believes that it is through Henry of Ghent’s combination of the emanational account with the psychological model of the Trinity that philosophical psychology became an integral part of Franciscan Trinitarian theology. See ‘Divergent Traditions’, 20. 72 See e.g. Aquinas, ST I q. 34 a. 2: ‘Unde verbum, secundum quod proprie dicitur in divinis, signiWcat aliquid ab alio procedens: quod pertinet ad rationem nominum personalium in divinis, eo quod personae divinae distinguuntur secundum originem.’

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suYcient grounds to propose a broader understanding of the psychological model, one that would incorporate the Thomist reading as an equally valid one.73

2.3. THE DIVINE PERSONS The agenda on this issue was set out by the Lateran claim that the essence is ‘the three persons together and each one of them separately’. Scholastic theologians inherited this claim, and saw it as their task to devise a way in which the constitution of the persons as individual substances could be explained while preserving their commonality with the essence. The crux was to reconcile the plurality of persons with their equality. In dealing with this issue, Aquinas begins by asserting that, since in the divine commonality accounts for unity, nothing common can be constitutive of the persons. The constitution of a person must therefore imply something proper (proprium) and distinct (determinatum). In the divine what is proper and distinct can only be explained by relations.74 In order to constitute a person in his being, a relation must: (i) express origin; (ii) be ‘proper’ (propria) to only one person; (iii) express the dignity (dignitas) of the person. There are two types of relation of origin: qui ab alio, signifying a passive product or that which proceeds from something other; and a quo alius, signifying an active principle or that from which something other proceeds. The latter, a quo alius, expresses dignity (as an active principle), but can only be constitutive of a person if determined by a speciWc mode of procession. Aquinas then shows that there are only two modes of procession, according to nature and according to will, called respectively (active) generation and 73 See Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, 180–1, where he contrasts the ‘relational’ tradition of thinking the Trinity, with Aquinas as main exponent, and the Augustinian psychological model. According to Friedman, the distinctive mark of the Augustinian tradition is the notion of the Son as Word or concept, which makes the ‘Franciscan’ use of this model the only valid interpretation. In the broader reading I propose, a feature of the psychological explanation could also be the consubstantiality of Father and Son (i.e. of the intellect and its product) as the principle of spiration (i.e. of the operation of the will). In this reading, the model is not only useful in explaining the double procession, but also fundamentally akin to the Thomist priority of intellect over will. On this point at least I believe that Aquinas could also be counted within the Augustinian tradition. 74 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 10 q. 1 a. 5: ‘in divinis propter essentiae simplicitatem non potest esse distinctio secundum aliquod absolutum, sed secundum relationem, et tantum secundum relationem originis, quia non potest constituire personam, si signiWcet in communi; sed oportet quod signiWcet aliquid proprium et determinatum. Habet enim se loco diVerentia constitutivae respectu personae, quam oportet esse propriam.’

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(active) spiration. In so far as these two modes are not opposed but are found in one and the same person, they are constitutive of only one person, namely the Father.75 As for the relation of origin qui ab alio, it does not as such suYce for the constitution of a person, because it does not express dignity (for it is passive) and because it is common to the persons of the Son and the Spirit (since they both proceed). In order to be constitutive of a person, the relation qui ab alio must be speciWed by a mode of procession: that is, according to (passive) generation, or according to (passive) spiration. Since these two modes cannot be found in one and the same person but are rather opposed, they account for the constitution of two persons: one proceeding according to generation, the Son, and another proceeding according to spiration, the Spirit.76 Aquinas thus shows that there are three divine persons only, who are personally distinct by virtue of their proper relations of origin.77 The task is then to explain how personal distinction is consistent with the claim that in the divine there is only one substance. Aquinas’s reply is based on the notion of ‘dignity’, which he set as the third condition for personhood. The underlying question is, how can relations of origin express ‘dignity’? In other words, what makes the persons ‘divine persons’ and not simply ‘personal relations’? Just as relations account for whatever is individual and distinct in the divine, the essence accounts for the dignity of the divine reality. The term ‘dignity’ refers then to the subsistent mode of being of the divine nature,78 so that the persons express dignity when they are constituted by relations of origin which have assumed the subsistent mode of being of the divine essence.79 This is 75 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 10 q. 1 a. 5. 76 Ibid. 77 This is another instance in which Aquinas makes use of the psychological analogy for the processions, while remaining committed to the principle of relative opposition. 78 See Aquinas, ST III q. 2 a. 2 ad 2: ‘personalitas necessario intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem, inquantum ad dignitatem et perfectionem eius pertinet quod per se existat, quod in nomine personae intelligitur.’ (My italics.) Aquinas thus associates the ‘dignity’ of a person with its ‘being per se’, i.e. with its subsistence understood as the independent existence characteristic of substances. In a Christological context, Christ’s human nature, as an assumed substance, does not have of itself dignity, but only on account of the divine suppositum to whom it is united. Ibid.: ‘Dignius autem est aliqui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis, quasi per se existens, propriam personalitatem habet in Christo autem existit in persona verbi. Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatem formae, tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine, propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma completiva.’ 79 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 10 a. 5 ad 12: ‘nisi enim paternitas esset divina essentia, nullatenus hoc nomen ‘‘pater’’ signiWcaret personam, sed solum accidens relativum personae. Paternitas ergo, in quantum est divina essentia, constituit hypostasim subsistentem in divina natura; in quantum vero est relatio, distinguit; in quantum vero est proprietas, convenit uni personae et non alii, in quantum vero est notio, est principium innotescendi personam.’

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what Aquinas means when he says that divine persons are constituted by ‘subsistent’ relations.80 Relations are constitutive principles of the persons only when understood per modum substantiae,81 that is, as subsistent beings really identical to the divine nature. Central to Aquinas’s account is the idea that subsistence, rather than incommunicability, more appropriately describes the property which makes an individual substance a ‘person’. According to Aquinas, the name ‘person’ signiWes ‘some individual’ (individuum vagum), by which he means ‘a common nature with a determinate mode of existing characteristic of a singular being, that is, self-subsistent’.82 In Aquinas’s interpretation of Boethius’ deWnition,83 a person is Wrst and foremost some nature, not in the sense of a common property or a form, but in the sense of the principle which accounts for the person’s reality and subsistence. The note of individuality refers to the mode of being characteristic of singulars, that is, subsistent existence.84 ‘Person’ is then a concept of Wrst intention: it deWnes a thing with a way of existing which is ‘of itself ’. Aquinas thus interprets Boethius’ deWnition in a way that makes it readily applicable to the divine persons. In order to preserve the equality of the persons, the concept of person must be univocal when ascribed to the three divine persons.85 This entails that the persons must signify primarily the 80 Aquinas, ST I q. 29 a. 4: ‘Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens in subiecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia: unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit . . . Persona igitur divina signiWcat relationem ut subsistentem.’ (My italics.) Cf. Sent. I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; I d. 27 q. 1 a. 2; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 7; q. 9, aa. 1–2. Paul Vanier sees in Aquinas’s understanding of the persons as subsistent relations an Augustinian emphasis on relation rather than on essential communicability (The´ologie trinitaire, 68–75). I would however argue that Aquinas’s identiWcation of the esse of relation with the substantial being of the essence testiWes precisely to his strong emphasis on essential communicability. 81 Aquinas, Sent. I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3: ‘Et ideo dico, quod ‘‘persona’’ in divinis signiWcat relationem per modum substantiae. Ipsa enim relatio, quae est distinguens, est distinctum, quia paternitas est pater. Et quia ‘‘persona’’ signiWcat quid distinctum, existens in natura aliqua, ideo constat quod signiWcat relationem, inquantum ipsa relatio est ad ipsum relatum, et inquantum ipsum relatum est subsistens in tali natura.’ (My italics.) Cf. ST I q. 36 a. 4. 82 Aquinas, ST I q. 30 a. 4: ‘individuum vagum, ut aliquis homo, signiWcat naturam communem cum determinato modo existendi qui competit singularibus, ut sc. sit per se subsistens distinctum ab aliis . . . Hoc autem nomen persona non est impositum ad signiWcandum individuum ex parte naturae, sed ad signiWcandum rem subsistentem in tali natura.’ Cf. Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3; I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3. 83 Boethius, De Persona, 214. 3. 171–2. 84 Note the contrast with Boethius, for whom a person is Wrst an individual substance which is then qualiWed by a (rational) nature. For Aquinas a person signiWes Wrst some nature, qualiWed by an individual mode of existence. See e.g. ST I q. 29 a. 4: ‘Persona igitur, in quacumque natura, signiWcat id quod est distinctum in natura illa.’ Also Sent. I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3: ‘hoc nomine, ‘‘persona’’, signiWcat enim rem ipsam, cui accedit intentio individui’. 85 Note that Aquinas’s claim on the univocity of the concept of person does not entail that ‘person’ is an essential form shared by the three persons. Aquinas is speaking here of a

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divine nature and only secondarily their personal properties.86 That relation should constitute the persons, understanding by relation a subsistent property, was important for mainly two reasons. First, only if the characteristic mark of the persons is something subsistent can they participate in the dignity of the divine nature, and thereby preserve their essential equality.87 Second, only if relations assume a subsistent mode can they eVectively distinguish the persons from one another without thereby introducing another reality into God.88 Keeping with the Lateran tradition, the real identity between essence and relations is what most eVectively safeguards the simplicity of the essence while avoiding the risk of quaternity. Aquinas’s Trinitarian theology is a successful articulation of the salient features of Lateran orthodoxy. Central to Aquinas’s account is the notion of the commonality of the essence, in virtue of which, Aquinas believes, divine unity is safeguarded in the trinity of persons. This commonality Aquinas understands primarily as the power of the essence to transmit its subsistent nature to the persons and to relations, so that both persons and relations can be said to be really identical to the essence. From this main principle Aquinas derives two conclusions: Wrst, distinction in the divine is restricted to relations of origin; secondly, the persons are equal in divinity and really distinct from one another. The Wrst tenet checks the error of quaternity; the second avoids subordinationism in God. As the conXict with Durandus developed, these tenets came to constitute the main sounding board for judging the acceptability of Durandus’s doctrine. As will become apparent, however, Hervaeus Natalis’s own reading of Aquinas was not dismissive of contributions alien to Thomism, and it was the successful combination of these sources with Aquinas’s theology which ultimately constituted much of the content of the ‘common opinion’ against which Durandus had to reckon. The diVerent ways in which Durandus and Hervaeus dealt with their Thomist inheritance were in great part inXuenced community of reason and not of a real commonness in the way that the essence is common to the three persons. See Aquinas, ST I q. 30 a. 4. 86 Aquinas, De Pot., q. 10 a. 5 ad 12: ‘Sic ergo secundum ordinem intellectus, primum est quod sit personam constituens; secundum quod sit distinguens; tertium quod sit proprietas; quartum quod sit notio.’ Cf. ST I q. 30 a. 4; Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3. 87 Underlying the idea that the dignity of a nature guarantees its equality is the notion of a substance which cannot be ‘assumed’ by or mixed with a higher form of being. The divine persons are then all equal in their divinity in that they are constituted by relations which are themselves really identical to the subsistent mode of being of the essence. 88 Aquinas, ST I q. 29 a. 4; I q. 40 a. 4; Sent. I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 7: ‘Relatio enim, in quantum est relatio, non habet quod subsistat vel subsistere faciat; hoc enim solius substantiae est. . . . Ipsa paternitatis relatio, in quantum est constituens hypostasim patris, quod habet in quantum est idem substantiae divinae, praeintelligatur generationi; secundum vero quod distinguit, sic generatio paternitati praeintelligatur.’

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by the teaching of theologians such as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. But before examining their contribution to the debate, I would like to consider the account of Aquinas’s Franciscan contemporary, Bonaventure, whose position informed later scholastic discussions of the Trinity. The following chapters will examine these sources under the unifying issue of ‘distinction’, thus completing the intellectual background to the conXict with Durandus.

3 Varieties of Distinction Scholastic debates on the Trinity were often presented in terms of a discussion over the notion of ‘distinction’. Theologians in this period had inherited the Lateran claim whereby the essence is really identical to ‘the three persons together and each one of them separately’. This claim presented a theological problem which both motivated and beneWted from philosophical attempts at establishing suYcient conditions for real distinction while avoiding the theologically unwelcome result of a multiplication of divine substances. This involved devising a way of disengaging the notion of the ‘reality’ of the distinction from that of its numerical value, a problem which was in its turn linked to the question of the connection between a substance and what is real. Does real distinction obtain only between substances? If so, what counts as a substance? In this chapter I want to consider three diVerent accounts of distinction, namely those of Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus. These authors have been selected not only because they testify to alternative receptions of Lateran orthodoxy at around Aquinas’s time, but more importantly for our purposes, because they directly or indirectly informed the terms of the discussion between Durandus and Hervaeus.

3 . 1. B O NAV E NT U R E In his commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure identiWes three modes according to which diversity can arise.1 First, diversity can obtain according to a mode of being (modus essendi), like being in itself and being in another. In this way we say that substances are essentially distinct (diversitatem essentialem) from accidents. This type of diversity is not found in God, because in God there is only one mode of being (i.e. in itself), and all that we can essentially predicate of him is his substance. Secondly, diversity can obtain 1 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. un. q. 4.

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according to a mode of understanding (modus intelligendi), when we know one and the same thing according to diVerent means of apprehending it (rationem sive medium cognoscendi). In this way, diverse means of knowing God give rise to diVerent rationes in God: ‘God’ is predicated of the divine according to substance, whereas ‘good’ signiWes quality and ‘great’ signiWes quantity. Thirdly, diversity can arise according to diVerent modes of reference (modi se habendi), as when we consider a thing absolutely, in reference to itself (ad se) as a substance, or relatively (ad aliquid), in reference to something other. This kind of distinction is less than essential diversity (by modus essendi), which entails composition, and greater than a mere diVerence in modes of understanding, where there is no real distinction. This third mode of diversity involves real unity and real plurality,2 and constitutes Bonaventure’s basic means of explaining personal distinction in the divine. When we speak of the essence we consider the divine reality in its unity and absolutely, whereas when we speak of relation we consider divine reality as a plurality of three persons related to one another. And although the distinction between absolute and relative is real (i.e. founded on the thing itself), it does not give rise to composition. As either absolute or relative it is the same essential reality that is involved.3 Bonaventure understands the type of diVerence involved in diverse modi se habendi as a ‘distinction of reason’ founded on the thing itself, where ‘distinction of reason’ involves all types of distinction that are not essential. As Bonaventure expounds it, a distinction of reason can obtain in either one of three ways: Wrst, by mode of apprehending (a parte nostrae apprehensionis), and in this way God diVers from his attributes of goodness, greatness, omnipotence, and so forth. Likewise, in this way the essence diVers from relations when relations are compared to the essence, thus assuming the same subsistent reality.4 Secondly, distinction of reason can obtain by a ‘diVerence of attribution’ (secundum diVerentiam attributionis), when a mode is attributed to one thing which is not attributed to another. In this way essence and relations diVer when relations are compared to their terms, because relations, and not the essence, assume a mode of reference.5 Thirdly, distinction of 2 Ibid. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4 ad 3, 398b: ‘secundum modum se habendi . . . non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re’. 3 Ibid. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4, 398a–b. Also I d. 33 a. un. q. 2 ad 2, 575b: ‘modus non dicit compositionem, quia transit in substantiam, nec dicit solum intellectum, quia res est et manet respectu obiecti’. 4 Ibid. I d. 33 a. un. q. 2, 575b: ‘relatio ratione comparationis ad subiectum transit in substantiam, et ideo proprietas est divina substantia’. 5 Ibid.: ‘ratione vero comparationis ad terminum sive obiectum remanet; et quantum ad hoc est distinctiva et diVert ab essentia, non quia dicat aliam essentiam, sed alium

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reason can also arise according to a ‘plurality of distinction’ (pluralitatem distinctionem). This type of distinction obtains between two things which, although founded on one and the same essence, are suYciently distinct so that one cannot be predicated of the other. In this way one divine person diVers from another divine person, and one relative property from another relative property. Although constituted by the same divine essence, the Son cannot be predicated of the Father, or paternity of Wliation.6 The Wrst diVerence of reason is minimal and entirely based on the operation of the intellect. The other two are real in the sense that they correspond to some reality in the thing itself (respondent a parte rei).7 The persons are then distinguished by virtue of some relation which is really in the divine, and according to its quiddity ‘towards something other’. Since the reference towards something other does not add anything in the thing itself, the persons can be really distinct relatively without thereby aVecting the absolute reality of the essence.8 In this sense, Bonaventure believes that a real diversity which does not eVect composition is more properly called ‘distinction’. ‘Distinction’ is thus the diversity which arises in a subject in its comparison with a plurality of objects. The diversity is based on the reference towards something other rather than on the subject itself. In this way paternity and common spiration are distinct in the Father in his comparison to the Son and the Spirit respectively. Paternity and common spiration are really distinct in the Father, but since the plurality arises only in comparison with something other, it does not introduce composition in the Father. Composition obtains only when the diversity arises in respect to the subject itself, when the plurality ‘meets’ in one subject. In this way ‘rational’ modum se habendi, qui per comparationem ad essentiam vel personam dicit modum, nihil addens’. 6 Ibid. I d. 26 a. un. q. 1 ad 2, 453a. The diVerence according to a ‘plurality of distinction’ corresponds to the Thomist distinction by relative opposition. Both cases involve real distinction and plurality, but not such that it would entail an essential diversity. 7 Ibid. I d. 26 a. un. q. 1, 453a. As we saw in s. 2.1, Aquinas propounds a distinction according to the ratio of relation which, like Bonaventure’s distinction ‘of reason’, corresponds to some reality in the thing itself but does not imply an essential plurality. But despite the similarities, the correspondence between these two notions should not be overstated. Aquinas’s distinction of reason rested on the assumption that there is no ‘middle distinction’ between essential distinction and one based solely on reason. The idea of a ‘middle distinction’, such as that implied by Bonaventure’s distinction ‘of reason’, did not seem to have a place within Aquinas’s tight metaphysics of ratio and esse. On this count, Bonaventure’s notion of distinction was a signiWcant development. 8 Ibid. I d. 26 a. un. q. 1 ad 3, 453a–b. Also I d. 19 p. 3 q. 2 ad 4: ‘Quod paternitas non est aliud re ab essentia, est tamen aliud ratione . . . et ratio illa per comparationem ad essentiam non est nisi modus , sed per comparationem ad aliam personam est res.’

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and ‘animal’ are distinct in respect to some human being, such that this human being is composed of rationality and animality. In the divine, by contrast, there is distinction only in respect to the term of the relation and not to its subject, so that we can speak of distinct personal properties in one substance but not of a diversity of substances.9 Bonaventure’s ‘middle distinction’ according to modi se habendi was a signiWcant development, in that it provided an intermediary choice between essential distinction and a distinction of reason which could prove particularly useful for explaining a trinity in a simple God. Bonaventure’s middle distinction was also of wider import in that it gave new meaning to the notions of absolute and relative. These notions were ultimately derived from Augustine, and Bonaventure’s development is based on a subtle analysis of the meaning of ‘substance’. ‘Substance’ can be predicated either of what is ‘of itself ’ (per se), or of what is ‘towards itself ’ (ad se). The Wrst pertains to all subsistent things and is predicated ‘essentially’; the second includes not only what is subsistent but also what is absolute, and is predicated ‘quidditatively’. Divine relations can be predicated according to substance in the sense of being per se because they assume the subsistent reality of the essence. But they cannot be predicated according to substance in the sense of being ad se, because they are by deWnition (quidditatively) ‘towards something other’.10 Relations can thus be really identical to the divine essence as beings per se and at the same time account for personal distinction by virtue of their quiddity ad aliud. What Aquinas attempted to do by distinguishing between esse as essential act and esse as quiddity,11 Bonaventure does by establishing a distinction between being per se and being ad se. Bonaventure thus disengaged the feature of subsistence from absolute things, such that not only absolute substances but also relative beings can be said to be subsistent. The primary distinction is then not between subsistent and non-subsistent objects, but between absolute and relative beings. As Bonaventure propounded it, however, the distinction between absolute and relative was still articulated in terms of the Aristotelian priority given to substances. He just provided diVerent nomenclature for the same insight: only absolute substances have proper esse. Esse is a feature which belongs to both substances and relations, but unlike substances, relations do not have proper esse. In Bonaventure’s terms: relation is subsistent (per se) but not 9 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 8 p. 2 a. un. q. 1 ad 4, 166b. 10 Ibid. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4 ad 4, 398b–399a: ‘substantia dicitur dupliciter: aut ens per se, aut ad se. Si ut ens per se, sic omnia et relativa et absoluta dicunt in deo substantiam . . . Si autem dicatur substantia ut ens absolutum, non comparatur, sic dicitur secundum substantiam, quod dicitur ad se. Et sic . . . nomina relativa secundum substantiam non dicuntur.’ 11 See s. 2.1. See also Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, 142 and n. 30.

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absolute (ad se). An absolute thing is of itself subsistent, whereas a relation is subsistent only by virtue of its dependence on an absolute thing. In other words, relation requires the presence of an absolute thing to explain its reality. Following this line, Bonaventure rejects the Porretan opinion,12 which purportedly ascribed a being of itself to relation, and asserts instead that relation is not essentially a thing but only ‘of a thing’. Bonaventure would therefore accept that in the same essential reality absolute and relative can coexist, since relation does not add a fully actual being to its foundation.13 By the same token, the whole which results from an absolute thing and a relation does not form an accidental unity because relation is not the sort of thing which inheres in its subject. In the divine relation assumes the subsistent reality of the essence and remains as relation only according to its quiddity ‘towards something other’. For all its standard features, however, Bonaventure’s shift from a substanceaccident metaphysics to one of absolute and relative drew attention to an alternative template of analysis which could prove useful for Trinitarian discussions. As I hope to show in following chapters, Durandus will take this cue and develop the Bonaventurean model into an idiosyncratic ontology of absolute and relative which will ultimately escape standard Aristotelian parameters.14 Since relation is per se but not ad se, Bonaventure holds that only relation can account for personal distinction in God, ‘for nothing is referred or ordered towards itself ’.15 When it comes to the divine, however, Bonaventure

12 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 33 a. un. q. 2, 575a: ‘Sed ista positio [Porretani] manifeste improbata est, quia necesse est, quod sit divina essentia, si est aliquid.’ 13 Ibid. I d. 26 a. un. q. 1 ad 6, 453b–454b: ‘ ipsum quod refertur non est nisi relatio et respectus purus . . . hoc est impossibile esse neque in deo neque in creatura, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus [De Trin. 7. 1. 2], ‘‘omne quod refertur est aliquid, excepto es quod relative dicitur;’’ alioquin relationis esset relatio. Et ita patet, quod omnis proprietas relativa sive sit in deo sive in creatura, necessario diVert aliquo modo ab eius cuius est proprietas, et magis in creatura quam in creatore. Et intelligantur omnia haec, sicut prius assignatum est, quoniam omne respectivum fundatur super aliquid absolutum.’ Also Sent. I d. 26 a. un. q. 3 ad 4, 458b: ‘quod sic diVerat esse et referri, quod unum non possit ab altero separari secundum rem—quia ibi unum sunt—sed solum secundum intellectum nostrum’. 14 I am not suggesting here that Durandus was advisedly borrowing from Bonaventurean insights, or that Durandus’s position is directly informed by Bonaventure’s metaphysics of absolute and relative. Drawing from the recognizable aYnity between the two positions, I am simply pointing at the possible scenario that Durandus could have been inspired by a Bonaventurean theological insight, which he then developed in a direction not anticipated by Bonaventure. Bonaventure’s account formed part of the common repertoire of alternative Trinitarian models, and Durandus was presumably conversant with it. Alternatively, Bonaventurean insights could have well reached Durandus via Henry of Ghent, whose Trinitarian doctrine owed much to Bonaventure. 15 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 9 a. un. q. 2, 183a: ‘ratione relationis est distinctio, quia nihil ad se refertur nec ordinatur’. The Lateran resonances are here apparent. The issue of the essence as not

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makes a distinction between relation as a mode of reference (modum se habendi) and relation as denoting origin. Reference alone is not suYcient for personal distinction, for two properties can be referred to one another (like paternity and innascibility in the Father) without thereby constituting two distinct persons. Only when relation is understood according to action and passion can it account for personal distinction, since by necessity action and passion involve a reference from one subject towards some other subject. This type of reference is called ‘relation of origin’, and the distinction it involves is a distinction according to supposita.16 This is not to say however that distinction according to supposita contravenes divine simplicity. ‘According to supposita’ means that the relation of action and passion begins and ends in distinct subsistent beings as distinct rather than as subsistent.17 For suppositum in the divine primarily signiWes distinction, in contrast to the essence which primarily signiWes something common. Bonaventure summarized this idea nicely: ‘that the essence is simple means that it is [common to] a plurality; but that a suppositum is simple means that he is not [common to] a plurality’.18 A person is by deWnition a distinct individual, i.e. numerically one and distinct from other individuals. The essence is by contrast common to many in its unity, i.e. numerically one but repeated in all three persons. In fundamental agreement with Lateran orthodoxy, Bonaventure believes that the unity of the essence rests precisely on its commonality. The diVerence between essence and person is then by mode of reference, since person is towards something other in a relation of origin, whereas the essence is only towards itself and does not partake in the generational acts. In Bonaventure’s terms, the persons are beings per se, whereas the essence is being ad se. The persons are relative beings which require the essence to explain their subsistent reality; the essence is absolute, and as such of itself subsistent. Distinction by modum se habendi and distinction by origin are not coextensive, for origin suYces for personal distinction whereas a pure reference participating in the generational acts formed the immediate backdrop to the Lombard’s notion of a quaedam summa res. 16 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 9 a. un. q. 2, 183a–b: ‘in relatione secundum se non est motus in creaturis nec origo in divinis . . . Ergo necesse est, quod sit distinctio in supposito . . . Ratione vero talis relationis est distinctio personalis; quia generare et generari, cum dicant relationem per modum actionis et passionis, dicunt eam in supposito et respectu suppositi. Et ideo, quia relatio inter extrema notat distinctionem, patet quod distinctio est ibi suppositorum.’ See Aristotle, Phys. 5. 1, and Metaph. 5. 15, in which he mentions three ways of understanding relation, one being according to action and passion. 17 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 8 p. 2 a. un. q. 1 ad 2, 166a–b. 18 Ibid. I d. 9 a. un. q. 2 ad 2, 183b: ‘simplicitas essentiae est, quod sit in pluribus; sed simplicitas suppositi est, quod non sit in pluribus’.

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does not. But how are ‘reference’ and ‘origin’ related in the constitution of a person? For even though the Father is distinct from the Son by the relative property of paternity, he would not be the Father had he not generated the Son. Is the Father the Father because he generates or does he generate because he is the Father? Bonaventure maintains that the Father is the Father because he generates,19 for it is on account of his active generation that he is related to the Son by paternity. According to Bonaventure, origin constitutes the ratio of relation, such that the relation of paternity signiWes active generation and not vice versa.20 Underlying Bonaventure’s conception of relations of origin is also an interesting objection (whether or not intended by Bonaventure as such) to what became a characteristically Thomist distinction between constitutive properties and relations of origin.21 Aquinas resorted to the distinction between properties and relations of origin in order to explain how the persons could be distinct according to relation and yet convey the dignity that belongs to subsistent natures. The persons are distinct by origin but are constituted by subsistent properties—i.e. personal relations which assume the subsistent reality of the essence. The constitution of divine persons cannot rest on relations of origin alone, for otherwise the reality of the persons would be downgraded—since relations are not fully actual beings—and their essential equality jeopardized—Father and Son would be greater than the Spirit because they, and not the Spirit, include common spiration. In this account, 19 Bonaventure often uses the word fecunditas to denote the property of the Father as generator. It is also with this fecunditas that he will identify the principle of emanation in the divine. See Sent. I d. 13 a. un. q. 13; I d. 27 p. 1 a. un. q. 2. See also Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, esp. 144–58. 20 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 27 p. 1 a. un. q. 2, 469a–b: ‘generatio potius est ratio paternitatis, quam e converso . . . Est pater, quia generat . . . Patet per diVerentiam assignatam inter generationem et esse patrem. Nam secundum propriam rationem generatio dicit emanationem sive originem, paternitas dicit habitudinem. Constat autem, quod origo est ratio habitudinis, non habitudo ratio originis est. Et ideo generatio est ratio paternitatis, non e converso.’ This is not to say that Bonaventure is here establishing a real order of priority between relations and emanations. The question is rather about the way our intellect conceives the connection between ‘relation’ and ‘origin’. Bonaventure is clear that this order of priority is only according to our way of understanding (secundum rationem intelligendi). Note also the diVerence with Aquinas, who believes rather that the personal properties explain the processions. See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3; De Pot., q. 10 a. 5 ad 12; ST, I q. 30 a. 4. Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, 150 (and n. 48), explains the diVerence between Aquinas and Bonaventure on this issue as a contrast between ‘Augustinian-Anselmian’ and ‘neo-Platonic’ motivations respectively. 21 For reasons of chronology, I hesitate to designate Bonaventure’s argument as a direct criticism of the Thomist position. Aquinas formulated his distinction between ‘relation’ and ‘constitutive property’ in his commentary (I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3) and also in the Summa (I q. 29 a. 4; I q. 40 a. 4). Both theologians read the Sentences around the same time in the mid-1250s, in which case it is conceivable that Bonaventure could have been referring to Aquinas’s position in the commentary. It is only in the Summa, however, that Aquinas takes issue with Bonaventure’s claim that origin is suYcient for personal distinction.

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therefore, the essence must account for the processions in order to guarantee the equality of the persons. Bonaventure, by contrast, would not accept that one could consistently separate personal properties from origin in God without compromising divine simplicity. He maintains instead that ‘no name can be proper to one person unless it denotes a reference towards something other’.22 That is to say, origin is the ratio of personal relation, so that a divine person is inconceivable as distinct unless in a relation of origin to another person. Origin has to be appropriated to the persons, for otherwise the common essence would be understood as partaking in the generational acts at the expense of its simplicity. As Bonaventure summarizes it, emanations must primarily signify a relation of origin between a principle and a product, whereby the power which accounts for the processions must primarily denote property and not commonality.23 Bonaventure and Aquinas coincide in their claim that divine unity hinges on the commonality of the essence. They are also agreed that both essence and relation have a role in the generational acts. The dispute is rather over which of the two, essence or relation, is the principle that accounts for the processions. Aquinas claimed that the processions hinge on the power communicated by the essence to the persons. Bonaventure held rather that the processions describe relations of origin, since origin is what makes the persons distinct. In both cases the aim is to safeguard divine unity. But whereas the underlying idea in Aquinas’s position is that unity is guaranteed by the equality of persons, for Bonaventure unity is safeguarded by excluding the essence from anything that denotes distinction. The diVerence is minimal,24 but nonetheless revealing of diVerent tendencies in the understanding 22 Bonaventure, prologue to Sent. II: ‘Hic autem distinctionem obviare videntur quam plura . . . [N]ullum nomen in divinis potest esse proprium personae, nisi dicat respectum ad alterum . . . Ergo, circumscripta relatione per intellectum, iam non erit proprietas . . .’ 23 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 7 a. un. q. 1, 136a: ‘potentia generandi dicit ad aliquid in divinis de se . . . quoniam potentia dicit habitudinem originalis principii ad principiatum . . . hinc est, quod principium de sui ratione non tantum est essentiale appropriatum per additionem, immo etiam dicit proprium personae . . . immo dicit proprium, et ita ad aliquid de se’. Also ibid., ad 4, 137a: ‘potentia dicit habitudinem ad originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et personae ad personam’. 24 Note also that, like Aquinas, Bonaventure distances himself from a strict interpretation of the psychological model. Although Bonaventure identiWes intellect and will as the sources of the existence of the two emanations, he does not believe that the distinction between intellect and will suYces for personal distinction. He claims rather that the persons are distinguished by relations of origin—i.e. generation and spiration. See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 13 a. 1 q. 3, 236a–b: ‘Si quantum ad esse, sic habent rationem essendi a suis perfectis principiis et fecundis. Quia enim in deo est perfectissima natura . . . quae habet rationem principii. Et quia vera et perfecta et propria est fecunditas naturae, ideo veram et propriam habet emanationem; et haec est generatio. Similiter intelligendum est de spiratione quantum ad voluntatem. Unde ratio, quare huiusmodi vere sunt in Deo, est vera fecunditas naturae et voluntatis. Si autem

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of Lateran orthodoxy (to which both theologians subscribe), tendencies which could be taken in diVerent and not always reconcilable directions.25

3 . 2 . H E N RY OF GH E N T Henry of Ghent (c.1217–93) adopted a line of thought which emerged as the opposition to some of the innovative ideas condemned in Paris in 1277—a condemnation in which, as is well known, he took an important part as a member of the commission of theologians assisting Bishop Tempier. It is then not surprising to Wnd some contrast between Henry’s Trinitarian account and the standard Thomist view. This contrast is particularly evident in the notion of ‘modes of being’, central to Henry’s account, and Bonaventurean in inspiration.26 In general lines, Henry holds that we can predicate of a thing by signifying the thing itself, in its essence, or by signifying the thing as having a certain mode of being. In the Wrst instance, a thing (res) is signiWed in its full ontological status as an extra-mental reality. In the second instance, a thing is signiWed under a certain mode of being which has no reality whatsoever considered apart from its foundation on the thing itself. According to Henry, relation is such a mode of being which draws its entire reality from its foundation. Thus, if we say that ‘Socrates is as tall as Plato’, we are predicating a relation of equality between Socrates and Plato, whereby Socrates acquires a mode of being ‘towards Plato’. This mode of being ‘towards another’ characteristic of relation does not have in itself any ontological value, unless, Henry says half-heartedly, we understand ‘thing’ to signify not only fully actual things, but also the modes of things.27 loquamur quantum ad diVerre, dicendum, quod se ipsis diVerunt . . . , quia omnis distinctio in divinis venit a modis originis et relationis.’ (My italics.) 25 I am thinking on the one hand of Henry of Ghent’s emanational account, and on the other of Hervaeus Natalis’s claim that the essence governs the processions. Henry’s account is of Bonaventurean inspiration, whereas Hervaeus’s derives from Aquinas. For Henry, see Summa, aa. 54–60; also Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, esp. 164–74. For Hervaeus, see s. 4.2 below. 26 For Bonaventure’s inXuence on Henry’s Trinitarian account, see Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, esp. 164–74. 27 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IX q. 3, 56. 85–9: ‘relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus quidam rem habendi ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei, nisi extendendo rem ut etiam modus rei dicatur res . . .’ (My italics.) For Henry’s quodlibets, see Opera omnia, ed. R. Macken (Louvain and Leiden: Publications Universitaires and Brill, 1979– ). The series includes the critical ed. of Quodl. I, II, VI, VII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. For the quodlibets used in this study, see: Quodl. VII, ed. G. A. Wilson, Opera omnia, x (Louvain, 1991); Quodl. IX, ed. R. Macken,

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Henry was never conclusive in tackling this problem, and this left it open for interpretation. On the one hand, he was well aware of the theological diYculties implied in denying all reality to modes. For if the divine persons are to be distinguished according to the diVerent modes in which they emanate from the essence, then something has to be said for the reality of modes, lest the plurality of the persons is jeopardized and the divine reduced to an absolute essence. On the other hand, if modes are said to have proper reality distinct from their foundation, there is the risk of tritheism. In this section I want to examine Henry’s modal doctrine in its connection to the issue of distinction in the divine. The best sources for Henry’s account of the Trinity are the Summa quaestionum ordinariarum28 and the Quodlibets. The Summa contains all of Henry’s lessons at the time of his ‘ordinary disputes’, running chronologically parallel with his quodlibetal disputations. Both works were composed in the period from 1276 to 1292.29 Henry’s view of relation as a mode of being is best understood within the context of his general metaphysics. The starting point of Henry’s metaphysics is the notion of being. It is a primary concept in the sense of logical priority, for all other notions are contained in this concept.30 Henry develops this view in terms of an Augustinian theory of divine ideas,31 according to which every thing (res) has its own idea in God, and every thing has being (esse)32 on account of its imitation of the divine essence. The creatures’ intrinsic Opera omnia, xiii (Louvain, 1983). For the quodlibets not yet published in the Louvain series, I will use the J. Badius ed. of 1518, reprinted as Quodlibeta magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemnis, 2 vols. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1961). 28 For Henry’s Summa, 3 vols. have appeared in the Louvain Opera omnia series: xxvii (aa. 31–4); xxviii (aa. 35–40); and xxix (aa. 41–6). For the articles pertinent to this study, see Summa, aa. 31–4, ed. Macken, Opera omnia, xxvii (Louvain, 1991); Summa, aa. 41–6, ed. L. Ho¨dl, Opera omnia, xxix (Louvain, 1998). For the articles that have not yet appeared in this series, I will use the J. Badius 1520 edn., reprinted as Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, 2 vols. (New York: Franciscan Institute, 1953). 29 See J. Paulus, Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendences de sa me´taphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. xiv–xvii. Paulus proposes the dates of c. 1279 and c. 1285–6 for a. 32 q. 5 and a. 55 q. 6 respectively. Cf. J. Go´mez CaVarena, ‘Cronologı´a de la ‘‘Suma’’ de Enrique de Gante por relacio´n a sus ‘‘Quodlibetos’’ ’, Gregorianum, 38 (1957), 133. See also Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 40–2. 30 Cf. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina [Metaphysica], ed. S. Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain and Leiden: E. Peeters and Brill, 1977–83), tract. I, cap. 5. 31 Henry, Quodl., VII qq. 1–2, 5. 45–51: ‘Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel rationes aeternae, quae divina intelligentia continentur, secundum quas formatur omne quod oritur, et quarum participatione sit ut sit, quidquid est, quo modo est.’ Henry understands ‘participation’ as ‘imitation’, which is how an example is said to participate of its exemplar cause. For Augustine, see De div. Quaest. 46. 2 (CCSL 44), 71–3. See also E. Gilson, Introduction a` l’e´tude de Saint Augustin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1969, 4th edn.), 260. 32 By esse Henry means not an individual being but a universal essence. That is, Peter’s own individual being is not an idea in God, but rather his humanity is (esse humanitatis). See Henry, Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 3. 4–12.

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possibility is therefore founded on the divine ideas as God’s knowledge of his essence not only in itself but also as capable of being imitated by others. These relations of imitability are the divine ideas, as the various ways in which God’s essence can be imitated. The terms of these relations are the essences of creatures, which are real in so far as they possess ‘essential being’. In this sense, an idea is not a deWnition (ratio), but a thing under the aspect of essence, that is, a thing as species specialissima.33 Accordingly, all second intentions, like relation, genera, diVerences, individuals, and privations, do not constitute proper ideas in God.34 Following Avicenna, Henry states that the quidditas or the essence of a thing can have three types of existence (esse): as a singular in extra-mental reality, in the intellect only, or in itself. Accordingly, an essence can be considered under three diVerent aspects: as existing outside the intellect; as existing only mentally; or as existing in itself as an absolute thing and previous to its particular existence outside the mind or as a universal.35 Concerning the third aspect, Henry understood Avicenna to hold that essences cannot only be considered in this absolute way, but can also exist absolutely. Henry thus asserts that an essential being has a mode of existing which is in itself an essence, prior to its being in the intellect as a universal or in extra-mental reality as a particular thing.36 According to Henry, then, a ‘thing’ (res) is whatever is a nature or an absolute essence,37 which in its turn can be a rational entity (‘thing’ from the Latin reor, to suppose, to imagine, to believe), or an entity of extra-mental reality (‘thing’ from the Latin ratitudo, Wxed, established, settled).38 ‘Real thing’, therefore, includes what actually exists, whether necessarily (only God) or contingently (all creatures), and all possibles. Creatures can exist essentially as possibles, and can only begin to exist actually at creation, as ‘existential beings’ (esse existentiae). All things which exist in extra-mental reality, like categorical beings, enjoy the ontological status of existential beings.39 33 Ibid. VII qq. 1–2, 8. 5–7: ‘idea autem non est ratio nisi rei sub ratione completi in natura et essentia, quae non est nisi in specie specialissima’. 34 Ibid. VII qq. 1–2, 18. 30–3: ‘isti octi modi entium proprias ideas in deo non habent: intentiones secundae, relationes, artiWcialia, genera, diVerentiae, individua, privationes et numeri’. 35 Ibid. VII qq. 1–2, 18–19. 43–57: ‘Quidditas est essentia rei, licet solum duplex esse habet, unum sc. in singularibus extra intellectum, aliud in ipso intellectu, quadruplicem tamen habet considerationem. Unam ut est in ipsis singularibus extra. Aliam, ut habet esse in intellectu. Aliam ut abstrahitur a singularibus et iterum applicabile est eisdem per praedicationem. Quartam vero habet considerationem secundum se et absolute, ut humanitas non est nisi humanitas tantum, cui alia accidunt, sc. esse in singularibus et esse in intellectu, esse universale, esse particulare . . .’ 36 Ibid. III q. 9; Quodl. I q. 9; Summa, a. 43 q. 2. 37 Henry, Quodl. V q. 6. 38 Ibid. VII qq. 1–2; Quodl. V qq. 2 and 6; Summa, a. 21 q. 2. 39 Henry, Quodl. III qq. 2 and 9.

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A category is then a thing (res) to which it pertains (convenit) to exist.40 Each category, including relation, has two components: being (esse) and ratio. The being of a category is whatever is included by essence in some categorical order, and its ratio is the mode of being proper to a speciWc categorical order.41 Accordingly, the categories can be considered in three ways: (i) by signifying the thing in itself and absolutely; (ii) by signifying the thing as having a certain mode of being; or (iii) by signifying the mode of being in itself and apart from the thing. According to (i) some categories, like substance, quality, and quantity, signify real things in themselves. As such, they participate in the divine essence either by being in itself, like substances, or by inhering in another, like the accidents of quality and quantity. In Henry’s ontology, then, the only created things that properly exist are substances, qualities, and quantities.42 According to (ii) there is another type of accidents, which Henry classiWes under the generic term of ‘relative’ accidents, and which are not things in themselves but only ‘as it were of the thing’ (quasi rei).43 These accidents are only modes, and signify a thing only under the ratio of the subject on which they are founded. This way of understanding a category Henry calls secundum rationem characterizationis: that is, the mode of being of a category assumes the ‘character’ of the subject upon which it is founded, be it a substance, a quality, or a quantity. Henry understands this ‘characterization’ as a ‘determination’ (determinatio) of the mode of being by its subject: the mode of being is as it were a genus determined (‘diVerentiated’ in the Aristotelian sense) in its being by its foundation.44 The category acquires its reality by virtue of this determination and is only then considered a name of Wrst imposition (nomen primae impositionis).45 By contrast, if (iii) 40 Henry, Quodl. V q. 2, 154v: ‘praedicamentum est res cui convenit esse’. See also Summa, a. 32 q. 5; Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 22. 28–52. 41 Henry, Summa, a. 32 q. 5; Quodl. XV q. 5, 577r; Quodl. V q. 2, 154v. 42 Henry, Quodl. V q. 6. Also Quodl. VII q. 1–2; VIII q. 2; XV q. 5; Summa, a. 32 q. 5. 43 This sharp division between categories which refer to absolute things and the last seven which refer to ‘relative’ things is derived from Boethius: ‘Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei; quodque illa quae ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero ut non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo aYgant.’ See Boethius, De Trin. 4. 177. 269–78. Henry quotes Boethius in Summa, a. 32 q. 5, 199r. 44 Henry, Quodl. IX q. 3, 56. 82–9: ‘Quam quidem realitatem contractam a fundamento respectu habitudinis indeterminatae, Simplicius appellat diVerentiam . . . Propter quod saepius alibi diximus quod relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento . . .’ Henry draws heavily from Simplicius in his view on the categories, especially when applying the terms nomen primae impositionis or secundae impositionis. 45 Ibid. IX q. 3, 55–6. 52–89. Names of Wrst imposition are conventional signs of extra-mental entities, whereas names of second imposition are conventional signs of mental entities. See Boethius, In Categorias, 159 (PL 64). Also C. Knudsen, ‘Intentions and Impositions’, in Kretzmann et al., Cambridge History, 484–5.

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the accident signiWes the mode of being alone, the accident remains a name of second imposition (genus generalissimum), that is, the name of a concept without proper reality.46 Since only what is a thing or signiWes a thing (nomen primae impositionis) is an idea in God, modes of being considered simply as nudus modus are not in their own right ideas in the divine mind, and are not ‘things’ in any strict sense.47 Relation is a mode of being, such that it can be considered as ‘characterized’ by its foundation, or as a mode of being only. Relation can be said to be a real thing only when understood together with (cointelligendo) its foundation.48 As a mode of being it signiWes a condition towards another (esse ad aliud) which an absolute thing (a substance, a quality, or a quantity) can acquire. As a pure mode, however, relation has minimal ontological value and is a being only in a qualiWed sense (secundum quid), as the ‘disposition’ (dispositio) which an absolute thing can have towards something other.49 Likewise in God, relation is an aliquid only in the sense that it assumes the reality of the essence, preserving what is proper to it as ad aliquid by a comparison with its term.50 In this sense, Henry holds that divine relation is ‘that thing (res) to which it corresponds being (esse) not absolutely but in a respect towards something other’.51

46 Henry, Quodl. IX q. 3, 56. 85–9; Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 31–2. 72–84. 47 Ibid. VII qq. 1–2, 35. 54–68: ‘cum idea non est nisi rerum, idcirco relationum et respectum dicimus non esse aliquas proprias ideas’. 48 Henry, Quodl. IX q. 3, 80–1. See Simplicius, De Predicamentalibus, in Commentaire sur les Cate´gories d’Aristote, ed. A. Patin, W. Stuyven, and C. Steel, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 5 1, 232. 1. 6–11: ‘ad aliquid simul esse natura.’ 49 Henry, Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 32. 92–33. 4; Quodl. XV q. 5, 577v: ‘Caetera vero novem respectu illius dicuntur entia aliquid et quasi secundum quid et diminute: quia non dicuntur aut sunt entia, nisi quia sunt dispositiones entis simpliciter quod est substantia.’ Like Aquinas, Henry also adopts the standard Aristotelian understanding of relation as a ‘diminished being’. See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 ad 2; De Pot., q. 2 a. 5; De Ver., q. 27 a. 4; SCG 4. 14. For Aristotle, see Metaph. 14. 1 (1088a23–b3). For a concise study of Henry’s view on real relation, see J. Decorte, ‘Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation’, in M. Bertagna and G. Pini (eds.), Documenti e studi sulla tradizione WlosoWca medievale, 7 (Brepols: Societa` Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino, 1996), 183–211. 50 Henry, Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 111r; Quodl., III q. 4, 52r: ‘Relatio in deo et secundum rem et secundum rationem sui generis cadit in substantiam comparata absolute ad ipsam substantiam; comparata vero ad substantiam in respectu ad suum terminum et oppositum respectu substantiae, sic manet secundum rationem sui generis.’ Also Quodl. V q. 2, 154v: ‘sicut contigit de respectu omnium relationum quae sunt in deo, in quo praedicamentum relationis cum transfertur ad deum, idcirco ratione rei subiectae at accidentalitatis suae quam dicit in creaturis non manet, sed transit in substantiam, et manet solum ratione esse ad aliud. Ita quod esse ad aliud est commune relationi in creaturis et in deo. Sed ex parte realitatis quam contrahit relatio a suo fundamento hic et ibi est tota diversitas.’ 51 Henry, Quodl. V q. 2, 155r: ‘praedicamentum relationis in deo est res cui convenit in se esse non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud’.

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This claim taken in itself could lend itself for two alternative readings.52 On one reading, relation is the sort of thing that has esse, but unlike substance and absolute accidents it is the derived esse of modes and not proper (per se) esse. As will be argued in following chapters, Durandus’s theory of modes will be inspired in this sort of reading to buttress a Trinitarian account which required the claim that non-subsistent things such as modes could have their own esse. Given Henry’s ontology, however, and the priority accorded to absolute over relative accidents, this does not seem a reading that Henry would have countenanced. On another reading, non-subsistent things like relation have no esse apart from their foundation, such that relation can be said to be a thing (res) only in the sense that it is really (ex natura rei) founded on a thing.53 That this is likely to be Henry’s preferred view is further conWrmed by the type of objection he raises at this point against the Aegidian view of relation. Henry criticizes Giles of Rome’s thesis that on account of its ‘real order’ divine relation can acquire a dual reality, as a substantial thing in reference to the essence and as a ‘relative thing’ when compared to its term. For Henry, the reference which relation draws towards another is only a mode of being of its foundation, deprived of any reality in its own right.54 Inverting the order of inference between relation and its reality proposed by Giles, Henry maintains that it is precisely because relation acquires the reality of its foundation that it can be said to refer really to its term.55 If the reality of relation were determined by its term, as Giles propounded, then a father would have as many paternities as he has sons.56 That a relation may refer to 52 For a summary of Henry’s two accounts of subsistence, see R. Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 257–63. 53 Henry, Quodl. IX q. 3, 56. 85–9: ‘relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento . . . et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei . . .’ Also Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 111v: ‘Sed tunc non est disputatio nisi de nomine, appellando extenso nomine rem quod alii appellant modum rei. Attamen si sic respectus possint dici res, hoc non est nisi quia ex natura rei fundantur in vera re.’ 54 Henry, Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 111v. For Giles, see Sent. I d. 33 princ. 1 q. 3, 171vbP–172raD, 172vaK–L. 55 Henry, Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 111v: ‘Quia enim realiter et ex natura ipsius rei fundantur in re secundum dictum modum ut dicantur res ex ordine ad fundamentum, ideo etiam realiter respiciunt obiectum, et dicuntur res in ordine ad obiectum, non autem ex ordine ad obiectum. Non enim respicere obiectum realiter dat eis quod sunt res etiam in comparatione ad obiectum; immo e converso, quia enim sunt res ex ordine ad fundamentum, etiam sunt res in ordine ad obiectum, et etiam realiter respiciunt obiectum.’ (My italics.) 56 Ibid., a. 55 q. 6, 111r: ‘licet non appellatur res simpliciter, quia etsi respectus qui sequitur ex natura rei, possit dici res vera aliquo modo, hoc non convenit ei ratione illa et comparatione qua est ad aliud, sive ex eo quod est respectus, aut relatio. Aliter enim non esset una res sed plures, neque una realitas sed plures, respectus ille qui esset ad plures terminos. Et sic non esset una relatio secundum rem qua unus est aequalis duobus, neque una paternitas qua unus est pater duorum Wliorum in creaturis, cum sint duo terminos ad quos, quod falsum est . . . relatio quod ipsa est res vera sive realis, hoc accipit ab alio, ut a suo fundamento.’

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diVerent terms is not a causa propter quam, but a causa sine qua non of its reality. Relation, therefore, both in creatures and in the divine, does not need to be a thing in order to be real: it is real because it assumes the reality of its foundation.57 Henry believes that Giles’s understanding of the dual nature of relation as esse and ratio amounts to some version of the Porretan error. As Henry sees it, the idea that divine relation acquires a reality of its own only when compared to its term is fundamentally akin to Gilbert’s view of relation as ‘extrinsically attached’ to the essence. In both cases the reality of relation is rather denied by asserting its ontological autonomy in respect to its foundation. The point Henry wants to make is that only when divine relation acquires the reality of the essence can it be considered a real relation at all. Relation does not lose but rather acquires esse as it assumes the reality of the essence.58 The way to avoid the Porretan error is therefore by establishing a real identity between relation and the esse of its foundation and not by separating them. By the same token, a divine quaternity is avoided by asserting the identity between relation and the essence, and not by reducing relation to an extrinsic device for explaining distinction in the divinity.59 According to Henry, real identity obtains between two objects when they constitute the same thing (res). Real distinction obtains only between subsistent things, such that they constitute a plurality of natures. Relation and its foundation are not really distinct because relation does not introduce another nature over and above that of its foundation.60 In God essence and relation 57 Henry, Quodl. III q. 4, 52vV: ‘Et sic relatio habet esse reale, in quantum ipsa quidditas, quae habet unum esse in singularibus et in subiecto, se ipsa habet esse ad aliud, et id quod est res absoluta secundum unum esse, induit rationem respectus secundum aliud esse sive ad aliud esse. Et haec est natura relationum quae sunt relativa secundum esse et per se . . .’ Underlying Henry’s view of the reality of relation is the equation between what is a ‘thing’ and what is ‘real’. As I will discuss later, Durandus rather distinguishes between the two. According to his view, relation can possess esse without entailing composition, because ‘thing’ and ‘real’ are not coextensive. Underlying this view is Durandus’s claim that esse is a feature which also nonsubsistent things can have. 58 Ibid. V q. 2, 155r: ‘ manet solum quo ad illud quod sibi proprium est, quo distinguitur et a substantia et a quolibet accidente alio, quod est ratio praedicamenti relationis, scilicet ad aliud esse nudum . . . Sed non est relationi propria realitas alia a realitate sui fundamenti in deo sicut neque in creaturis. Neque similiter essentia alia est relationis in deo ab essentia sui fundamenti, sicut neque in creaturis.’ 59 Henry, Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 112r: ‘ esset ergo necessario secundum opinionem Porretani res extrinsecus aYxa, quemadmodum et ille modus videtur esse quiddam aYxum substantiae in quantum res est, secundum dictam opinionem, quae non ponit quod istam realitatem habeat a subiecto, sed potius ab obiecto, licet aliam realitatem habeat a fundamento, ut scilicet quod plures respectus habeant a fundamento quod sint res et una res, sed a diversis obiectis quod sint diversae res’. 60 Henry, Quodl. V q. 6, 161r: ‘Res hic appellatur non Wgmentum et ens secundum animam tantum, quod dicitur a reor reris, neque respectus aliquis . . . Unde re diVerunt quaecumque

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constitute one real unity and are distinct only according to ratio. By ratio Henry means a certain mode in which an object presents itself to our cognition, so that it could well be presented under another mode. Thus, two things diVer according to reason when, constituting the same thing and the same concept, they are presented to our cognition in diVerent ways; just as a deWnition (rational animal) and that which is deWned (man) are two diVerent ways of understanding the same thing.61 Henry thus limits rational distinction to diVerent ways of describing the same thing and the same concept of that thing. He leaves the notion of intentional distinction to cover that slightly stronger distinction which obtains between concepts which signify things. For Henry, the essence (esse essentiae) of a thing takes part in the cognitive act, mediating between the object known and the knower. Henry thus introduces ‘intentional’ distinction as a midway distinction between rational and real distinction, which obtains between the various esse essentiae of a thing. As Henry understands it, intentio is one of the principles which constitute the reality of a simple essence. An intention is capable of being conceived independently of any other principle constitutive of the same essence, and is diVerent from that essence in a way which cannot be said to be real in any proper sense.62 In the presence of a real unity, the intellect expresses the nature of that unity in diverse concepts which do not overlap, even though they all reveal something of the same fundamental unity. Henry speaks of intentions in this sense to mean that the intellect ‘tends towards’ (intentat) a determinate note constitutive of the essence, while neglecting the others.63 An intentional distinction can therefore only occur within what is really the same thing, such that the distinction between the intentions of ‘rational’ and ‘animal’ in the same man does not entail a dissociation within the same man, but only the potential realization of these intentions in other beings.64 Although an intentional plurality is Wrst acknowledged in a concept, unlike a diversas naturas et essentias important secundum rem . . . Nullus enim respectus aliquid rei ponit praeter rem eius super quod fundatur.’ 61 Henry, Quodl. V q. 6, 161v: ‘idem re et intentione conceptum diversis modis concipiendi dicit diVerre secundum rationem inquantum concipitur uno illorum modorum et non alio, sicut patet in conceptione deWnitionis et deWniti, et in diversitate divinorum attributorum.’ 62 Paulus, Henri de Gand, 220–1. 63 Henry, Quodl. V q. 6, 161r: ‘Sed appellatur hic intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicuius . . . Unde dicitur intentio quasi intus tentio: eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determinate tendit, et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid eiusdem rei.’ 64 Ibid. V q. 6, 161v: ‘Diversitas intentionum non potest esse nisi inter illa quae uniuntur in eodem secundum rem: ita quod conceptus unius penitus excludit conceptum alterius, et e converso.’

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distinction of reason it is previously founded on the thing itself to which those concepts pertain.65 According to Henry, there are two ways in which a really identical thing may have diVerent intentions. First, intentional distinction proper obtains between two concepts which belong really to the same thing but neither of the concepts includes the other. One instance of this is diverse concepts of diVerences which occur in the same thing, as rational, sensitive, and vegetative concur in the same man. In ‘man is a rational animal’, the concepts of ‘rational’ and ‘animal’ when predicated of the subject ‘man’ connote in him not distinct parts but the whole of his essence. Those concepts are not parts integrating a concrete whole, but ingredients of an abstract essence perceived by the intellect and with a mode of composition diVerent from the real.66 In this case intentional distinction occurs in its highest degree.67 The other type of intentional distinction involves a lesser degree of diVerence, since the concept of one of the terms includes the other, but not conversely. Thus, the concept of species includes the notion of genus and diVerence, but the latter do not include that of species. Likewise, relation includes in its deWnition the notion of its foundation, but the latter does not include that of relation. On these grounds, Henry maintains that, in God, relation does not properly constitute an intention and does not in the strict sense diVer intentionally from the essence. For essence and relation in God cannot be related in a way which could imply diVerent concepts or intentions. Essence and relation diVer rather by reason, according to a diVerent way of describing the same intentional and real unity.68 Divine relation does not add another intention (conceptus) into God, but is only distinct from the essence by modes of predication (diversitas secundum rationes praedicamentales), according to which a diVerent type of name (nomina) is assigned.69 Note, therefore, that Henry does not accept in God any type of distinction based on Wrst intentional knowledge. Since absolute (summe) identity implies real 65 Ibid. IV q. 4; Paulus, Henri de Gand, 222–5. 66 Ibid. IV q. 4, 143v–144r; XI q. 3, 188r. 67 Ibid. V q. 6, 161r–v and q. 12, 171r. 68 Ibid. V q. 6, 161v: ‘conceptus respectus sicut entis conceptum essentiae, non e converso . . . id quod alterum continet non diVert intentione ab illo quod ab eo continetur, nisi ratione alterius partis contente in signiWcato eiusdem . . . ipsum totum quod alterum continet non proprie dicitur intentio, neque proprie dicitur diVerre intentione ab eo quod est sicut pars eius . . .’ 69 Ibid. V q. 6, 163r: ‘In deo enim fundatur respectus super ipsam divinam essentiam non secundum aliam rationem esse quam illam quae est essentiae ut est essentia. Et ideo secundum illam cadit in signiWcatione relationis, ut paternitatis et Wliationis, licet secundum aliam proprietatem impositionis nominis, absque omni diversitate intentionum. Sed est solum inter essentiam, ut est essentia, et ut induit rationem relationis, diversitas secundum rationes praedicamentales secundum quas nomina imponuntur.’

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unity, in God essence and relation must constitute indiscernible intentions, i.e. relation must have the same constitutive ‘notes’ as the essence and signify the same real thing. On the other hand, separability entails real plurality, such that a real plurality found in the same thing necessarily eVects composition.70 The composition which obtains between diVerent intentions is weaker than the composition obtained between two absolute things; for there is a greater distinction between things than there is between intentions. A fully actual thing includes a plurality of intentions which eVect composition only virtually (in virtute) and as it were in potency—just as a genus virtually contains a plurality of diVerences. Thus, for example, in one and the same man, rationality eVects composition with animality in the sense that rationality contains the lesser perfection of animality. This weaker kind of composition obtains only according to reason, for supposing that the intellect did not conceive the whole perfection of man, man would remain the same substance but would not actualize its distinct intentions—i.e. the intentions would remain as potential perfections of man. An intentional distinction, therefore, supposes not a disassociation within the same being but the possibility of a separate realization in diVerent beings. Animality and rationality cannot be separated in man, but we can Wnd animality in other things than man. It is this gradation of natural beings into greater and lesser perfections that causes composition within the same concept. Two objects are therefore intentionally distinct when one can be conceived without the other, because one can exist without the other in other things but not in the same thing.71 Given Henry’s strong understanding of the identity between essence and relation in God, it is not surprising that he should have distanced himself from a relational account of the processions of the type propounded by Aquinas or even Giles. For Henry the cause and the ratio per se of there being distinct relations in God is the divine essence as the foundation (and thereby realitygiver) of all the divine properties. The divine essence is the quiddity by virtue of which one relation is distinct from another relation. Consequently, the processions are distinguished from one another not because one is ordered towards the other, or because one is from the other, but because they emanate according diVerent modes from the same substance.72 70 Henry, Quodl. V q. 12, 171r. 71 Henry, Summa, a. 27 q. 1, 25: ‘dico diVerre intentione quaecumque de se formant diversos conceptus, quorum unus non includit omnino alterum, qui non sunt nisi eorum quae in diversis sunt diversa re, etsi in eodem sunt idipsum re. Quaecumque enim huiusmodi sunt, unum eorum contingit intelligi sine altero . . .’ (My italics.) 72 Henry, Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 111v: ‘proprietates emanationum inter se distinguuntur . . . quia diversemode Xuunt, vel potius sunt quasi diversi Xuxus ab eadem substantia. Unde et personae

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The Father is then distinct from the Son not because the Son is from the Father but because the Son emanates from the essence according to a diVerent mode. The property (Wliation) which results from generation and which constitutes the Son, presupposes the mode in which the Son ‘emanates’ from the divine essence. The distinction between emanations is then prior to the distinction between the persons by opposite relations. In Henry’s ‘emanational’ account the Wlioque loses relevance because Son and Spirit are already distinct by their diVerent modes of emanating from the essence and not in virtue of their relation of origin.73 By this Henry does not mean to deny that the persons originate from each other, but simply that opposite relations are not suYcient for personal distinction, such that they must presuppose a distinction by modes of emanation. Even if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, they would still be distinct on account of their ‘disparate relations’, that is, by virtue of their diverse ways of emanating from the Father. But whereas disparate relations are suYcient principles of personal distinction, opposite relations make the persons ‘properly’ (proprie) distinct.74 The Son and the Spirit are suYciently distinct by virtue of their diverse modes of proceeding from the Father; they are however ‘properly’ distinct on account of the opposite relations (Wliation and spiration respectively) which are in them ‘properly’ rather than only in respect to something other (i.e. the Father). Overall, Henry’s Trinitarian theology is fairly consistent with Lateran orthodoxy. Henry’s distinct emanational account, on the face of it far removed from relational theories defended by Thomists, served to underscore the notion of the essence as an absolute unity which does not participate in inter se sunt diversae non tam quod una procedit ab altera quam quia diversimode procedunt ab eadem . . . Unde cum una persona ab alia emanat, non tam sunt diversae quia una ab altera est quam quia constituuntur diversis proprietatibus emanationum.’ For a fuller description of Henry’s emanational account, see Friedman, ‘Relations, Emanations’, 164–80. Friedman believes that Henry was inXuenced by Bonaventure’s approach, but what Bonaventure thought of as a conceptual model of personal distinction, Henry developed into an ontological explanation. 73 Henry, Summa, a. 54 q. 6, 92r: ‘si Wlius et spiritus sanctus non distinguerentur ab invicem nisi quia a Wlio procedit spiritus sanctus, ea ergo ratione qua spiritus sanctus procedit alio modo a patre quam procedat ab eodem Wlius, non distinguitur spiritus sanctus a Wlio. Et si sic, ergo eadem ratione nec emanatio qua spiritus sanctus procedit a patre ut procedit ab ipso distinguitur ab emanatione qua Wlius procedit a patre; et ulterius nec vis spirativa qua a patre emanat spiritus sanctus a vi generativa qua a patre emanat Wlius. Et sic Wlius et spiritus sanctus in quantum ambo procedunt a patre non sunt distinctae personae, sed unica . . .’ 74 Henry, Summa, a. 54 q. 6, 92r: ‘Etsi enim spiritus sanctus ponatur procedere a patre, et Wlius similiter, et neuter ab altero, tamen Wlius a spirito sancto distingueretur, licet aliter et non ita proprie . . . quam modo. Quia sunt quaedam relationes originis et oppositae ut quae sunt in diversis personis quarum una procedit ab alia, et quaedam disparatae ut quae sunt in eadem persona a qua procedunt diversae diversimode vel in diversis diversimode procedentibus ab eadem. Primo modo diversae relationes sunt in patre et Wlio, secundo modo in patre respectu Wlii et spiritus sancti, et in spiritu sancto et Wlio respectu patris. Et suYcit ista relationum diversitas in ipsis etiam si neuter eorum procederet ab alterutro.’

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the generational acts. Moreover, connected to Henry’s notion of essential unity is his rejection of any claim ascribing proper esse to modes independently of their foundation. Apart from rendering a relational account more diYcult, divesting modes from actual existence guarded Henry from the temptation of separating essence and relation in order to explain distinction in God. In Henry’s mind, Giles had capitulated to this temptation, which made his view dangerously compatible with the Porretan opinion. In line with the Lateran tradition, Henry’s rejection of a real distinction between essence and relation is closely connected to an attempt to avoid positing a quaternity in God. But more importantly, and what decidedly positions Henry within this tradition, is that underlying his rejection of a real distinction is an understanding of distinction as a type of non-identity rather as an ontologically based diVerence. The degree of distinction between two terms is not determined by their type of reality, but by their lack of absolute identity. Henry thus claims that essence and relation are distinct according to reason, not because relation lacks esse, but because relation is not separable in any real or intentional way from the essence. Hence Henry’s rejection of any distinction in God beyond rational distinction, as the only one compatible with the absolute unity of the essence. As I will attempt to show in the following chapters, it was precisely the connection which Durandus made of an ontological understanding of modes with the claim of real distinction which triggered the polemic with his order.

3 . 3 . J O H N D U N S S C OT U S In attempting to avoid contradictory predicates such as ‘communicable’ and ‘incommunicable’ about God, Franciscan theologians conceived a type of distinction which obtained prior to the operation of the intellect but did not suYce for real distinction as that found between two substances. The main epistemological assumption was that distinction in concepts responds to a real distinction in things. This greater degree of diVerence existing ex natura rei had its roots in Bonaventure’s theology. As was shown in section 3.1, Bonaventure distinguishes three types of distinction: essential distinction according to modes of being; distinction in predication according to modes of understanding one and the same thing; and distinction according to modes of referring (modi se habendi) to a thing, depending on whether it is considered absolutely or relatively.75 Bonaventure understood the distinction between essence and relation according to this third type of distinction. 75 Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. un. q. 4; I d. 26 a. un. q. 1; I d. 5 a. 1 q. 1.

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Relation is considered absolutely when compared to the essence, but when referred to its opposite term it retains its relative character. Following this line, Franciscan scholars advocated an intermediary distinction between a real and a purely rational distinction. Duns Scotus inherited this tradition, but he was to elaborate the notion of a middle distinction into his more comprehensive ‘formal distinction’.76 Scotus deals with the notion of formal distinction77 in all three versions of his commentary on the Sentences.78 It is at the centre of Scotus’s Trinitarian concerns as a way to reconcile the simplicity of the divine nature with the plurality of persons. As Scotus usually proceeds on this issue, he Wrst deals with the epistemological matter of explaining our diverse conceptions of a simple divine nature; and secondly he explains the nature of this distinction. I will treat these issues separately. On the question of the compatibility of a simple nature with a plurality of persons, the Lectura and the Ordinatio follow the same line of reasoning.79 76 It is a matter of debate whether Bonaventure’s middle distinction was a direct forerunner of Scotus’s formal distinction. Bonaventure’s insight is clearly in the background of Scotus’s formal distinction, but with some diVerences. Bonaventure’s less-than-absolute distinction is restricted to the connection between personal properties and the essence, and the properties between one another. Scotus’s formal distinction is broader, also found in the divine attributes between one another, and between the attributes and the divine essence. Bonaventure understands the distinction between the divine attributes and the essence rather as a distinction according to reason (Sent. I d. 22 a. 4). See B. Jansen, ‘Beitra¨ge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis’, Zeitschrift fu¨r katolische Theologie, 53. 3–4 (1929), esp. 317–44. 77 Literature on Scotus’s formal distinction is extensive and is often found scattered in monographs devoted to Scotus’s philosophy and theology. See e.g. R. Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. 43–5 (divine substance and attributes), and 69–70 (Trinity); also The Physics of Duns Scotus: The ScientiWc Context of a Theological Vision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), esp. 7–8; M. McCord Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity and Distinction’, Franciscan Studies, 36 (1976), esp. 25–43; A. Wolter and M. McCord Adams (eds.), The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. 27–41. 78 See Lect. and Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4. Rep., I d. 33 qq. 1, 2, and 3. For a chronology of the diVerent recensions of Scotus’s commentary, see C. Balic, Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences: E´tude historique et critique (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1927). Scotus began to comment on the Sentences at Oxford between Oct. 1298 and June 1299. This work is known as the Lectura, and sometimes also as prima lectura. In 1300 he began an edited version of the Wrst two books, a work known as the Ordinatio or opus exoniense. Scotus then lectured on the Sentences at Paris from 1302 to 1303, but did not complete this commentary until c.1305, when he was allowed to return to Paris after his exile in 1303. This Reportatio, also known as reportatio examinata, consists of Scotus’s lecture as copied down or ‘reported’ by one of his students and later examined by Scotus himself. Scotus’s whole Lectura and Ordinatio I, and dd. 1–3 of bk II, are contained in Opera omnia, ed. C. Balic (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950– ), i–vii. The rest of bk II and bks III–IV of the Ordinatio, and books II–IV of the Reportatio, are published in Opera omnia, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons: Durand, 1639; repr. Paris: Vive`s, 1891–5), vi–x and xi respectively. For book I of the Reportatio (as yet not printed), I will use Oxford, Balliol College, MS 205. 79 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 246–57; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 377–88.

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Scotus’s argument is centred on the notions of suppositum as incommunicable and essence as communicable. The relation between essence and suppositum can be understood either as the relation between a universal and a singular, or as the relation between a quo and a quod, in which sense the essence is said to communicate to the suppositum in the way that form informs matter.80 Scotus thus distinguishes between two senses of communicability. There is communicatio per identitatem, the way in which a universal is communicated to a singular, and there is communicatio per informationem, the way in which form is communicated to matter. Scotus claims that the divine essence possesses both kinds of communicability.81 As a universal, it is communicated by real identity to the three persons; as a form, it endows the persons with their essential being. The essence is not however just like any other common nature. Unlike ordinary common natures, the essence is not divided in its instances because it is really identical to them in its simplicity. By the same token, the essence is not just like any other form. The notion of a formal principle perfecting matter pertains to composite wholes and is not applicable to the absolute unity of the essence. The essence is the ‘form’ of the suppositum only in the sense that it accounts for the being (esse) of the suppositum. Likewise, the supposita should not be understood as nonsubsistent parts of a whole but rather as subsistent beings united to the essence in real identity.82 Scotus’s argument on the compatibility between the unity of essence and the plurality of persons ultimately rests on the concept of the inWnite being of the divine nature, a concept to which Scotus repeatedly resorts.83 On account of its inWnity, the essence can include a plurality of supposita without entailing a division in its nature. Although the essence is endowed with perfect being in each suppositum, its being is nevertheless not exhausted in the supposita. The 80 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 246–7; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 378. 81 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 248–9; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 379–80. 82 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 249–51; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 381–7: ‘natura quaecumque est communicabilis pluribus per identitatem, igitur et natura divina est communicabilis . . . Non est autem divisibilis, ex quaestione unitate dei. Igitur, communicabilis sine divisione . . . [S]i talis unitas stet cum pluralitate et non ex imperfectione illius quod est ‘‘unum’’, ergo substracto omni eo quod est imperfectionis ex utraque parte, potest stare perfecta unitas cum pluralitate . . . [R]emanebit forma habens perfectam unitatem, sed non informans materiam, sed dans totale esse, et hoc pluribus distinctis, quae non erunt partes unius totius, sed erunt per se subsistens. Et tunc erit una natura dans totale esse pluribus suppositis distinctis. Ergo, essentia divina, quae est penitus illimitata, a qua aufertur quidquid est imperfectionis, potest dare totale esse pluribus suppositis distinctis.’ 83 According to Scotus, the concept of ‘inWnite being’ entails all other divine perfections. It is at the centre of his theology, functioning as the main divide between divine and created attributes. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 39–41.

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essence can possess other modi essendi.84 It is this lack of adequacy between the inWnity of the essence and the persons’ determinate (i.e. incommunicable) being which enables the coexistence of simplicity and plurality within the same nature. The inWnity of the essence suYces for the real identity between the plurality of the persons and the unity of the essence. There is no need to resort to a third reality which would be identical to the essence and the persons and according to which the unity of the essence could be reconciled to the plurality of the persons. The inWnity of the essence, of itself, absorbs into one absolute unity the incompatibility between diverse modes of being. The type of identity based on inWnity is one in which one term ‘virtually includes’ (virtualiter continet) the other term. The divine essence is capable of including all relations in its being (i.e. it is related to them by real identity); essence and relation are however distinct according to their quiddity, according to their formal deWnition.85 I will develop the notion of ‘formality’ in a moment, when dealing with formal distinction. But it will be useful Wrst to examine the implications of Scotus’s description of the essence as an inWnite being. In a recent study, Richard Cross has suggested86 that underlying Scotus’s depiction of the essence as an inWnite nature is a conception of the divine essence as an ‘immanent’ universal. An ‘immanent’ universal is ‘numerically one object that is really predicable of—that is, really repeated in—each of its instances, such that the object is somehow a real component of each of its instances’.87 Whereas ordinary common natures are numerically divided into their instances so that the instances are said to be subjective parts of that common nature, the divine nature is really repeated by identity in each of its 84 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 256: ‘essentia autem divina haec, licet habeat perfectum esse in uno supposito, non tamen habet in hoc supposito omnem modum essendi quem potest habere’. Cf. Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 387. 85 Scotus, Ord. I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 215: ‘non sic paternitas habet ad deitatem identitate adaequata secundum perfectionem, quia non est inWnita.’ Also Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 272, 275: ‘Et haec diVerentia potest dici ‘‘virtualis’’, quia deitas virtualiter continet paternitatem, et tamen ratio formalis unius non est ratio formalis alterius ante . . . intellectus.’ Cf. Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 401–2. See McCord Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 42: ‘x is not adequately identical with y when one of them exceeds the other or vice-versa, either according to predication or to perfection’. 86 I am referring to R. Cross’s articles, ‘Divisibility, Communicability, and Predicability in Duns Scotus’s Theories of the Common Nature’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 11 (2003), 43–63, and ‘Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology (forthcoming, 2005). For the second of these articles I rely on an unpublished copy, so page references will naturally not coincide with the forthcoming journal pagination. I am grateful to the author for providing me with a copy of the articles before publication. 87 Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 49–50; ‘Duns Scotus on Divine Substance’, 1–2. For Scotus, see Ord. I d. 2 q. 2 aa. 1–4 nn. 380–1.

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instances (i.e. the divine persons) without thereby jeopardizing its numerical unity.88 The essence is really repeated in the persons while remaining numerically one and the same.89 When it comes to the divine essence, then, Scotus accepts a more extreme realism based on a fundamental distinction between the divisibility of a common nature into many parts and the predicability of numerically one nature of its diVerent exempliWcations.90 Scotus’s main point is not that ordinary common natures are not really communicable, but that they enjoy a certain kind of communicability which is strictly related to their divisibility, while the divine nature is communicable without division. He is thus making a distinction between communicability with divisibility, as found in ordinary common natures, and communicability without division, which is only possible in an inWnite nature like the divine essence.91 The divine nature is such in its simplicity and essential unity that it cannot be divided. Thus, individuality does not necessarily entail impredicability (i.e. incommunicability), for in the case of the divine essence an individual can be exempliWed without entailing division.92 Scotus’s main claim, therefore, is that the communicability of the essence obtains between numerically singular terms. The divine essence is communicable because indivisible, such that an extra-mental item that is really inWnite can be predicated of more than one thing.93 88 In this sense, Cross prefers to speak of ‘exempliWcation’ rather than ‘instantiation’: ‘an exempliWcation is a substance that bears a relation to a universal property or nature’, such that the universal nature is not numerically divided in its exempliWcations. Unlike a created common nature which is divided in its instances, the divine essence has exempliWcations in that it is communicated without division (‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 51–2). 89 This is also the basic insight underlying Boethius’ distinction between ‘iteration’ and ‘enumeration’. Boethius claims that in some cases plurality is not entailed by number but by the repetition of that by which we enumerate. Thus, when we predicate of the Father that he is the essence, and of the Son that he is the essence, and of the Spirit that he is the essence, we are not enumerating three distinct divine essences, but rather predicating one and the same essence of the three persons. We are enumerating the things which are the essence, and not that by which they are the essence. The essence ‘repeats’ itself in Father, Son, and Spirit, without thereby losing its essential unity. See Boethius, De Trin. 3. 171–3. 90 See Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 57–63. For Scotus, see Ord. II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 nn. 37 and 39. 91 See Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 56–7. For Scotus, Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 381. 92 See Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 56–7. For Scotus, Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 367; Ord. III d. 1 q. 2 nn. 5–6. Note the contrast with Aquinas, who rather equates individuality with indivisibility. See e.g. De unione Verbi, a. 2 ad 9: ‘natura humana assumpta a verbo dei, in quantum est individua, habet quod non possit esse in multis; et secundum hoc dicitur incommunicabilis.’ 93 See Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 54: ‘The only sort of nature that can be numerically one in all its supposita is an inWnite nature’; ibid. 58: ‘communicability without divisibility entails inWnity’. Also ‘Duns Scotus on Divine Substance’, 38 n.: ‘Scotus’s crucial unicity claim is that the divine essence is indivisible.’

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In his account of the essence as an immanent universal, Scotus makes an interesting link between communicability and individuality (i.e. indivisibility). He disengages incommunicability and individuality, such that any individual is communicable and what is incommunicable is not properly an individual. The surprising result is that the persons, in their incommunicability, are not individuals, and only the essence, because communicable, is an individual. Underlying this claim is Scotus’s equivocal understanding of ‘substance’ either as an indivisible particular—only the essence—or as an incommunicable particular—the persons. In an attempt to avoid the Joachimite inference of quaternity, Scotus argues that the essence is not susceptible to the same substance description that would apply to the persons (the essence is a primary substance, the persons are not). Consequently, essence and persons cannot form a plurality of univocal things that could be counted as ‘four’. As an immanent universal, the essence is an inWnite substance that is repeated in, rather than added to, the three persons.94 For Scotus the communicability of the essence and the incommunicability of the personal properties are characteristics which exist prior to the operation of the intellect. This seems to suggest that there must be a distinction of some kind between the essence and the personal properties. Franciscan tradition had propounded that the same essential being is capable of ‘containing’ a plurality of rationes prior to the operation of the intellect.95 Scotus initially develops the notion of formal distinction in the terms laid out by this tradition. He maintains that the divine intellect perceives the distinction between the essence and the personal properties in terms of distinct formal objects (‘formalities’), such that the ratio of one is not included in the ratio of the other.96 This distinction is described as ‘minimal’ in the order of things 94 See Cross, ‘Duns Scotus on Divine Substance’, 8–10, 22 n. For Scotus, see Ord. I d. 5 q. 1 un. n. 12. As Cross explains (1–3), there were two chief ways of understanding the Lateran claim of the essence as a ‘quaedam summa res that neither begets nor is begotten, and does not proceed’. One way involved denying that the divine substance is a universal, lest it led to tritheism (the persons being three divine substances participating in the substantial being of the essence). This was the way proposed by Augustine, adopted almost unanimously in the medieval West. The other way of explaining the claim considered the divine essence as an ‘immanent’ universal which remains numerically the same in its exempliWcations. This was the way proposed by the Greek Fathers, and later espoused by Scotus—although Cross claims that the Eastern traits in Scotus’s account were only accidental. 95 See e.g. Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 26 a. un. q. 1. Also Peter John Olivi, Quaestio de Trinitate, ed. M. Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatoris des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, 2/2, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 29/1 (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1930), in which he propounds a diversity of real rationes outside the order of the intellect. See also Jansen, ‘Beitra¨ge’, 517. 96 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 261–4; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 390–4: ‘intellectus paternus habeat essentiam et proprietatem tanquam duo obiecta formalia . . . et ita habent aliquam distinctionem ante actum intelligendi’.

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preceding the operation of the intellect.97 Scotus accepts Bonaventure’s distinction according to modi se habendi and explains this type of middle distinction in terms of a ‘virtual diVerence’ occurring between two objects which are really identical, but where the formal quiddity of one lies outside the formal quiddity of the other. By ‘virtual diVerence’ Scotus means not that relation is potentially in the essence as in its cause (which would take from the common meaning of ‘virtual’ as virtus, potency), but that relation shares in the reality of the essence but not in its formality. That is to say, relation is really identical to the essence, but is capable of deWnition independently from the essence.98 By ‘deWnition’ here Scotus does not mean a mental concept caused by the intellect, but rather the quiddity of a thing, its essential description as the result of Wrst intentional knowledge. The formal distinction functions then as an intermediary diVerence between the diVerence in modes of understanding and the real distinction between substances. As in the diVerence in modes of understanding, so in the formal distinction the intellect plays a part in recognizing the diVerent deWnitions (i.e. quiddities). But in common with a real distinction, in the formal distinction the intellect does not cause this diVerence in rationes, but the diVerence is originated in the things themselves. That is, the truth of ‘the essence is not formally identical to relation’ does not hinge on the predicative copula formed by the intellect, but on the nature itself of the essence and of relation. Their distinction is then best described as a ‘formal non-identity ex parte rei ’. It is a distinction prior to the operation of the intellect, but which does not entail the real separability of its terms.99 Scotus prefers to explain the formal distinction according to a scale of degrees of identity—and not of distinction—in which simple or absolute identity is placed as the highest form of unity. Simple identity, however, 97 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 270–1. 98 See Scotus, Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 400–3, 406: ‘Breviter ergo dico quod in essentia divina ante actum intellectus est entitas a et entitas b, et haec formaliter non est illa, ita quod intellectus paternus considerans a et considerans b habet ex natura rei unde ista compositio sit vera ‘‘a non est formaliter b,’’ non autem praecise ex aliquo actu intellectus circa a et b.’ As Cross synthesizes it, ‘formal distinction is the sort of distinction whose terms are not things but properties (i.e. quiddities)’ (‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 54). 99 Scotus, Ord. I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 194: ‘Hoc declaro, quia ‘‘includere formaliter’’ est includere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali . . . sicut autem deWnitio bonitatis in communi non habet in se deWnitionem sapientiae in communi, ita nec inWnita bonitas non habet in se inWnitam sapientiam . . . Est igitur aliqua non-identitas formalis sapientiae et bonitatis, in quantum earum essent distinctae deWnitiones, si essent deWnibiles. DeWnitio autem non tantum indicat rationem causatam ab intellectu, sed quidditatem rei. Est ergo non-identitas formalis ex parte rei, et intelligo sic, quod intellectus componens istam ‘‘sapientia non est formaliter bonitas,’’ non causat actu suo collativo veritatem huius compositionis, sed in obiecto invenit extrema, ex quorum compositione Wt actus verus.’ Cf. Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 272, 275.

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does not necessarily include formal identity.100 In God, the essence and the personal properties are the same real being but do not have the same formal ratio. Placed within the scale of identity, the formal distinction must be rather understood in its negative form as a ‘formal non-identity’101 which, by virtue of the inWnite being of the essence, does not compromise God’s simplicity. The essence, as the ultimate form which actualizes everything that is really in God, is capable of including all divine realities in a relation of real identity.102 We Wnd a similar account in book I, question 1, of the Reportata. On this occasion, however, Scotus begins with a criticism of the Thomist view. Scotus argues that Aquinas contradicts himself when he propounds a diVerence of reason between essence and relations, and yet maintains that relations connote a certain respectus that the essence does not connote. If relation is to constitute the divine person in its personal esse, then it must be understood as a respectus distinct from the essence ex natura rei, that is, independently from the operation of the intellect.103 Scotus also targets the Aegidian view,104 100 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 275: ‘et in unitate simplici secundum rem adhuc potest esse diVerentia formalis’. Also Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 403: ‘unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas . . . ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo. In proposito autem essentia non includit in ratione sua formali quiditativa proprietatem suppositi, nec e converso. Et ideo potest concedi quod ante omnem actum intellectus est realitas essentiae qua est communicabilis, et realitas suppositi qua suppositum est incommunicabile; et ante actum intellectus haec realitas formaliter non est illa . . .’; n. 408: ‘identitas realis non necessario concludit identitatem formalem’. 101 Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 275; Ord., I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 404. 102 Scotus, Ord. I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4, n. 209: ‘Ista non-identitas formalis stat cum simplicitate dei, quia hanc diVerentiam necesse est esse inter essentiam et proprietatem . . . et tamen propter hoc non ponitur compositio in persona. Si ergo in una persona possint esse duae proprietates absque compositione, multo magis, vel saltem aequaliter, possunt esse plures perfectiones essentiales in deo ‘‘non formaliter eadem’’ sine compositione, quia illae proprietates in patre non sunt formaliter inWnitae, essentiales autem perfectiones sunt inWnitae formaliter . . .’ Also n. 213 (ad 1): ‘In divinis . . . nihil est forma secundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis, quia nec informans nec pars. Est tamen ibi sapientia in quantum est quo illud—in quo est ipsa—est sapiens, et hoc non per aliquam compositionem sapientiae ad aliquid quasi subiectum, nec quasi sapientia illa sit pars alicuius compositi, sed per veram identitatem, qua sapientia propter sui inWnitatem perfectam perfecte est idem cuilibet cum quo nota est esse.’ 103 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 1, 144v–145r: ‘Hic dicit quod relatio existens in deo est eadem essentia secundum rem solum diVerens ab ea secundum intelligentiae rationem quam diVerentiam speciWcat. In respondendo ad unum argumentum dicens ipsum diVerre ab essentia . . . ut importat respectum ad oppositum, qui respectus non importatur nominem essentiae. Et secundum hoc dicit quod in deo non est aliud essentia relationis et essentiae . . . Ex quo videtur quod non posuerit ibi maiorem distinctionem proprietatem ab essentia quam sapientiae ab essentia, quarum neutra exprimeret divinam perfectionem nec essentiam eius, nec comprehenderit totam signiWcationem eius . . . Sed contra, ista . . . verba sibi ipsis contradicitur. Tunc enim primo dicit quod relatio diVert ab essentia secundum intelligentiae rationem, secundo dicit rationem ad oppositum non sit essentia ex uno enim sicut oppositum alterius . . .’ 104 There is some confusion regarding the attribution of this opinion. Although in the margin it is marked as Henry’s opinion (opinio Henrici), the terms in which Scotus presents it

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according to which essence and relation diVer only according to reason, but when compared to its opposite term relation diVers from the essence as a relative thing from an absolute thing. Scotus believes that this conception ultimately posits too great a distinction in God. Since relation formally includes a reference towards something other, if we follow Giles’s criterion relation would always be really distinct from the essence, no matter what the term of comparison.105 Scotus propounds instead a diVerence ex natura rei (i.e. independent from the operation of the intellect) between essence and relation,106 a type of diVerence which he Wnds well articulated in Bonaventure’s modal distinction. Essence and relation thus diVer according to modes of reference (modi se habendi) without eVecting composition, because in virtue of its inWnity the essence is capable of containing everything that is not incompatible with it (continet omnia quae sibi non repugnat).107 When one of the formal realities are reminiscent rather of Giles of Rome’s position. The same opinion is found in similar terms in Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 146v. Hester G. Gelber, ‘Logic and the Trinity. A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335’, Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1974), 80, believes that the attribution to Henry is a mistake in the margin of the Reportata, and that the opinion is clearly that of Giles. 105 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 1, 145r–v: ‘est opinio Henrici in Summa [read Aegidii] quod relatio ut rescipit essentiam diVert ab ea sola ratione, et ideo non est simplicior relatio quam persona. Ut autem comparatur ad oppositum, sic realiter diVert ab ea ut res respectiva a re absoluta. Et secundum hoc, licet ut comparatur ad invicem non distinguantur realiter, ut tamen relatio comparatur ad oppositum, realiter distinguuntur realitate respectiva sua ab essentia . . . Sed contra istam opinionem et priorem similiter quantum ad primam partem arguo sic. Relatio ut comparatur ad essentiam, aut comparatur ad oppositum, aut non. Si sic et comparatur ad oppositum distinguitur realiter ab essentia. Ut autem comparatur ad essentiam distinguitur sola ratione ab ea . . . Ergo, relatio ut respicit essentiam non respicit essentiam, quia impossibile et incompossibile est relationem esse nisi respectu alicuius termini . . . Oportet ergo aliter evadere compositum per comparationem quam dicere quod relatio et essentia comparata inter se non distinguuntur realiter, quia tanta est distinctio relationis et essentia quanta est ens ut comparatur ad oppositum . . .’ 106 Ibid. I d. 33 q. 1, 145r: ‘Nam relatio ex natura relationis et non tamen per actum intellectus est respectus ad oppositum, essentia ex natura rei est ad se. Ergo, ex natura rei si sit ibi relatio est distinctio eius ab essentia eius praeter intelligentiae rationem.’ Also 145v: ‘Dico ergo ad quaestionem . . . quod essentia distinguitur a proprietate et e converso non tantum secundum considerationem intellectus sed ex natura rei.’ 107 Ibid. I d. 33 q. 1, 146r: ‘Vel potest dici secundum alium doctorem antiquum, scilicet Bonaventuram, quia nec diVerunt tantum ratione nec omnino realiter, sed quasi medio modo, quia dicunt eadem rem secundum modum diversum habendi eam . . . Et ex hac distinctione solvit multa argumenta quae probant proprietatem non esse essentiam . . . Et ista distinctio quam ponit inter essentiam et proprietatem potest dici modalis, quae est ex natura rei praeter actum intellectus. Nec ista distinctio modalis arguit compositionem in persona, quia licet modus non sit illud cuius sit modus, tamen ille modus propter inWnitatem illius cuius est, scilicet essentiae, identitate praedicatur de illa et est idem cum illa eo quod non facit compositionem cum ea ratione inWnitatis per quam continet omniam quae sibi non repugnat.’ See also Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147v: ‘InWnitum autem est cuilibet sibi composibili idem, cui repugnat etiam

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involved in the distinction is inWnite, the distinction does not entail composition. Consequently, a plurality of formal objects in God does not render his simple being composite. Scotus’s initial conception of the formal distinction was allegedly criticized as positing a plurality in God incompatible with divine simplicity, a criticism which has been referred to by later scholarship to explain the slight change in Scotus’s position recorded in book I, questions 2 and 3, of the Reportata.108 Based on this change, Hester Gelber109 divided the development of Scotus’s formal distinction into two discernible stages. The Wrst stage corresponds to the period between 1298 and 1302, and is rendered, as we have seen so far, in book I of the Ordinatio and Lectura, and in book I of the Reportata, distinction 33, question 1. The second stage corresponds to the years 1302–5, and is found in book I of the Reportata, distinction 33, questions 2 and 3. Gelber argues that at a Wrst stage Scotus explains the formal distinction as a type of real distinction which is however less than absolute. He restricts the scope of this distinction based on the ontological status of the terms of the distinction, which are not fully actual beings but diversa obiecta formalia.110 Motivated by criticism, at a second stage Scotus corrects his view. As before, he describes the formal distinction as less than absolute, but this time he qualiWes the distinction not according to the ontological status of its terms, but according to the type of logical relation which the distinction itself involves. Thus, Scotus will no longer speak of ‘formalities’, but of a distinction between two fully actual things (rei et rei), which does not however entail the real separability of its terms.111 aliquo alio perWci vel actuari, quia sic esset composibile cum illo addito et per consequens non esset simpliciter inWnitum.’ 108 F. Wetter attributes the change in Scotus’s approach to a dispute which supposedly took place during the years 1302–3 between Scotus and some of his colleagues in Paris, including the Chancellor of the University at the time, Godfrey of Fontaines. See F. Wetter, Die Trinita¨tslehre des J. Duns Scotus, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 415 (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1967), 64–9. However, it has been shown that Wetter’s account is not founded on solid evidence. First of all, it is no longer accepted that Godfrey of Fontaines was ever Chancellor of Paris. Secondly, and after he had examined the same material, P. Glorieux concluded that the dispute to which Wetter later alludes took place in 1312 and concerned the Scotist Thomas Wylton. The Chancellor of Paris at the time was Francis Caracciolo. The evidence therefore does not support Wetter’s account that Scotus felt compelled to modify his teaching on account of external pressure. See P. Glorieux, ‘Duns Scotus et les ‘‘notabilia Cancellarii’’ ’, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 24 (1931), 3–14. A. Maier conWrmed Glorieux’s conclusion in ‘Literarhistorische Notizen’, 139–73. I am grateful to Richard Cross for pointing this out to me. 109 See Gelber, ‘Logic and the Trinity’, 60–102. Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 25–43, endorses Gelber’s thesis with some modiWcations. 110 Scotus, Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 392–4, 402. 111 See e.g. Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147r–v.

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Although there is a perceptible development in Scotus’s conception of the formal distinction, I am inclined to think that it has more to do with the sharpening of an early account that could lend itself to misunderstandings, than with a signiWcant change of direction. At both stages and at all eVects Scotus seems to handle the terms of the formal distinction as fully actual beings, even if in the later Reportata he makes it more explicit that the nub of the formal distinction is the logical relation between the terms rather than their ontological status. It is symptomatic in this respect that the main instance in which Scotus speaks of formalities in the sense of ‘formal objects’ is while attempting to explain how the formal distinction obtains prior to the operation of the intellect, and not merely as the result of abstractive knowledge.112 Scotus is thus making a point about the type of distinction rather than about the ontological status of the terms of the distinction. The intellect recognizes the presence of diverse rationes, and it is in this sense that Scotus uses the terms ‘intuitive cognition’ and ‘formal objects’. On the other hand, he is reluctant to speak of a distinction between ‘things’ (rei et rei), presumably because he fears that put in these terms the formal distinction could suggest real separability113—and the chief advantage of the formal distinction is to provide the tools for a real distinction which does not entail real separability. Scotus is then clear that what lacks in actuality is the distinction itself, because even though it involves actual things (nihil est ibi in potentia), it does not entail their real separability.114 At both stages, then, Scotus understands the 112 See Scotus, Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 392–4: ‘intellectus paternus habeat essentiam et proprietatem tamquam duo obiecta formalia . . . Intellectus ille [i.e. patris] nihil intelligit nisi intuitive . . . Cognitio autem intuitiva est obiecti ut obiectum est praesens in existentia actuali . . . duo obiecta formalia distincta . . . et secundum propriam existentiam actualem terminant intuitionem ut obiecta, et ita habent aliquam distinctionem ante actum intelligendi.’ See also Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 261–4. 113 See e.g. Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 402: ‘potest vocari ‘‘diVerentia virtualis’’, quia illud quod habet talem distinctionem in se non habet rem et rem, sed est una res, habens virtualiter sive praeeminenter quasi duas realitates, quia utrique realitati ut est in illa una re competit illud quod est proprium principium tali realitati, ac si ipsa esset res distincta: ita enim haec realitas distinguit et illa non distinguit, sicut si illa esset una res et ista alia.’ (My italics.) It is clear from this passage that res et res refers not to the ontological status of the terms of the distinction, but to the fact that they are not separable as two things are—hence the addition sed est una res. The terms of the distinction are fully actual beings since as divine realities they owe their being to the essence, which is a perfect form. See e.g. Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 272: ‘Unde est diVerentia virtualis, quia unum non est res alia ab alio, sed est in eo perfecte idem sibi, distinguitur tamen formalis ratio unius a formali ratione alterius.’ (My italics.) The terms are endowed with the perfect reality of the essence, whereby they are not ‘diminished beings’ in any sense, either as beings of reason or as modes. 114 See Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 400: ‘Sed numquid haec distinctio dicetur realis? Respondeo. Non est realis actualis, intelligendo sicut communiter dicitur, ‘‘diVerentia realis actualis’’ illa quae est diVerentia rerum et in actu, quia in una persona non est aliqua diVerentia rerum,

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formal distinction as a real distinction which does not entail real separability. Although he does eventually sharpen his position, I do not believe that he changes his mind on what is really at stake in the formal distinction. In questions 2 and 3 of the Reportata, Scotus thus makes it unambiguously clear that the formal distinction is not deWned by the ontological status of the entities involved in the distinction, but by their relation of non-identity. The distinction is still propounded in terms of a middle distinction between a diVerence of reason and a real distinction. A diVerence of reason (such as that proposed by Aquinas) is inappropriate because it would imply that a mere ens rationis—a diminished being—constitutes the divine persons. This would result in some version of Sabellianism whereby the divine persons are not actual beings but mere ‘modes’ of the divine essence.115 Scotus also rejects all forms of real distinction. He includes in this group the Aegidian opinion and, interestingly, Bonaventure’s distinction according to modi se habendi.116 propter simplicitatem divinam; et sicut non est realis actualis, ita non est realis potentialis, quia nihil est ibi in potentia quod non est in actu.’ (My italics.) For this discussion see also R. Cross, ‘Scotus’s Parisian Teaching on Divine Simplicity’, in O. Boulnois et al. (eds.), Duns Scot a` Paris 1302–2002: Actes du colleque de Paris, 2–4 September 2002, Textes et E´tudes du Moyen Age, 26 (Brepols, 2004), 519–62. 115 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 146v: ‘Quidam dicunt quod essentia et relatio distinguuntur tantum secundum intelligentiae rationem et nullo modo realiter . . . [A]rguo contra sic. Quaecumque distinguuntur tantum ratione, aut utrumque aut alterum est ens rationis. Sed nec essentia nec relatio originis est tantum ens rationis fabricatum per actum intellectus. Ergo, non tantum distinguuntur sola intelligentiae ratione . . . [E]ssentia in divinis si esset tantum ens rationis a qua oriuntur omnes relationes originis . . . , nihil esset in divinis ens reale sed tantum ens diminutum. Relatio etiam originis non est ens rationis, quia si sic cum persona constituantur in esse personali per relationes originis, sequeretur quod personae non distinguerentur realiter, quod est error Sabelli.’ 116 It has been argued that the opinion Scotus is referring to in q. 2 of the Reportatio is not Bonaventure’s but rather that of Godfrey of Fontaines in his Quodl. VII q. 2 (PB 3), 283: ‘personae intelligantur distinctae ex hoc quod unam et eandem essentiam habent secundum alium et alium modum habendi. Unde alietas personarum consistit in alietate modi habendi essentiam . . . ; sed iste alius et alius modus habendi essentiam divinam in alia vel ab alia et alia persona non est nisi ipsa proprietas relativa per quam et constituitur persona in esse personali et ab alia distinguitur et ad aliam refertur relatione originis. Isti enim modi habendi essentiam divinam distincti non sunt nisi hi: habere eam, scilicet non ab alio, sed sicut a quo alius . . .’ I would however argue that Scotus is rather referring to Bonaventure’s formulation of the modal distinction. At issue in Scotus’s criticism is the notion of a qualiWed type of real distinction based on the ontological value of the terms involved. Formulated in this way, it echoes Bonaventure’s distinction according to modi se habendi as a midway distinction between a mere distinction of reason and the highest degree of real distinction obtaining between two separable substances. This appears further conWrmed by d. 33 q. 1 (146r), earlier in the same Reportata, in which Scotus engages in a discussion over real distinction and explicitly attributes the ‘modal distinction’ (distinctio modalis) to Bonaventure, as that obtaining within the same reality according to ‘diVerent modes of possessing’ it (secundum modum diversum habendi eam). It would thus seem gratuitously misleading for Scotus to allude, under the same label and within the same context, to the position of another author. Moreover, Godfrey develops the notion of ‘modes of possessing’ within strict Trinitarian parameters, identifying modes with relations of origin as

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According to Scotus, Giles maintains that essence and relation are really distinct as absolute thing and relative thing. But when two really distinct things form a unity, they are necessarily related as potentiality is to actuality, thereby eVecting composition. Divine simplicity is therefore jeopardized.117 Against Bonaventure’s position, Scotus argues similarly that, if relation has its own reality as a relative mode, then it cannot assume the mode of being of the essence but rather remains in the divine according to its distinct reality. By postulating that relation has reality as a mode, Bonaventure is then implying that essence and relation are distinct as two separate things (i.e. as a fully actual thing and a mode), thereby entailing numerical plurality.118 Again, divine simplicity is compromised. As before, Scotus replies that essence and relation are distinct prior to the operation of the intellect, but in a qualiWed way (secundum quid). In a crucial passage, Scotus presents two ways of understanding this less-than-absolute distinction: According to one way . . . secundum quid refers to reality, and in this way the previous opinions [i.e. Giles and Bonaventure’s] held that essence and relation are distinct secundum quid because relative reality is not said to be a fully actual reality (realitas simpliciter), but in a restricted sense of reality as ‘relative’ [reality], as the Wrst opinion holds. Likewise, the second opinion holds that relation is some mode over and above (super) the essence, and that this mode is not a fully actual thing (res simpliciter) but a the principles of personal distinction. Bonaventure’s notion of distinction according to real modes seems therefore a more likely reference, because more directly relevant to the—philosophical and not only Trinitarian—contrast which Scotus wants to draw with his own formal distinction. 117 Scotus, Rep., I d. 33 q. 2, 146v–147r: ‘Alia opinio ponit quod essentia et relatio distinguuntur realiter non tamen simpliciter, sed re absoluta et re relativa. Et secundum hanc opinionem esset dicendum quod simplicitati personae non repugnat talis distinctio realis . . . Contra . . . arguo quod non est talis distinctio realis inter proprietatem et essentiam. Quia ex quibuscumque distinctis ex natura rei est aliquod unum, alterum eorum est actus et alterum potentia. Si ergo essentia et relatio qualitercumque distinguuntur ex natura rei et ex eis est persona, ergo alterum eorum erit actus et alterum potentia. Et per consequens persona divina erit composita ex natura rei, quae destruit simpliciter simplictatem eius . . .’ For Giles, see Sent. I d. 33 princ. 1 q. 3, 172rb E–G. 118 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 146v–147r: ‘Opinio etiam ponens relationem distingui ab essentia secundum alium modum se habendi realem, poneret simplicitatem personae divinae bene posse compati talem distinctionem modalem ab essentia, quae pro tanto potest dici realis quia non est per operationem intellectus . . . Contra . . . oportet . . . maiorem identitatem ponere relationis ad essentiam quam quod sit actus essentiae ipsam respective informans. Item . . . relatio transit in essentiam secundum communes opiniones magistrorum, quod verum est. Tunc arguo, illud quod manet ac si nullo modo transiret, non transit substantiam . . . Sed si relatio realiter realitate sua distincta ab essentia manet ac si nullo modo transiret, ergo sic transit in essentiam quod non transit in creatura . . .’ Cf. ibid., d. 33 q. 1, 146r: ‘Vel potest dici secundum alium doctorem antiquum, scilicet Bonaventuram, quia nec diVerunt tantum ratione nec omnino realiter, sed quasi medio modo, quia dicunt eadem rem secundum modum diversum habendi eam . . . Et ista distinctio . . . est ex natura rei praeter actum intellectus.’

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mode of such a thing. But it is not in this way that I hold that essence and relation are really distinct secundum quid, because otherwise it would imply (esset sensus) that the distinction between essence and relation is distinctive of the realities secundum quid— which is inconvenient, because the essence is a fully actual thing (res simpliciter), since it is formally inWnite. According to another way, the qualiWcation secundum quid can refer to the distinction itself, in the sense that essence and relation are ex natura rei distinct secundum quid. In this sense it is true that the distinction between essence and relation obtains between two fully actual things (rei et rei simpliciter), but that the distinction itself is secundum quid.119

Scotus thus understands Giles and Bonaventure’s positions as positing a real distinction restricted by the ontological value of its terms. Scotus dismisses both opinions on the grounds that one of the terms of the distinction is an inWnite being, and as such capable of containing all divine realities in a relation of real identity. Note that Scotus’s point is not that these opinions posit too strong a distinction, but that their understanding of the terms of the distinction is ill focused. Both opinions fallaciously treat the essence as a discrete reality over and above relative things or modes. Unlike the persons and the relative properties which constitute them, the essence is both indivisible and communicable in its inWnity, and as such its reality cannot be restricted in any way.120 Scotus shows preference for the second way of understanding the secundum quid, whereby what restricts the scope of the distinction is the nature of the distinction itself, rather than the nature of the realities distinguished.121 Essence and relations are understood as two actual things (rei et rei simpliciter), but it is their identity which fails in actuality, both according to formal identity (because they have diVerent rationes) and adequate identity (by 119 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147r–v: ‘Dico quod essentia et relatio sic distinguuntur quod ante omnem actum intellectus haec proprietas distinguitur ab essentia secundum quid; sed distinctio aliquorum realis secundum quid potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo . . . secundum quid referatur ad realitatem, et sic opiniones priores dixerunt essentiam et relationem distingui secundum quid, quia realitas relativa non dicit realitatem simpliciter sed cum determinatione realitatis relative, ut dicit prima opinio. Secunda etiam opinio ponit quod relatio dicit aliquem modum super essentiam qui modus non est res simpliciter sed modus talis rei; sed non sic pono ego essentiam et relationem distingui secundum realiter, quia tunc esset sensus quod distinctio essentiae et relationis est distinctiva realitatum secundum quid, quod est inconveniens quia essentia est res simpliciter cum sit formaliter inWnita. Alio modo potest haec determinatio secundum quid referri ad distinctionem ut sit sensus quia essentia et relatio ex natura rei distinguuntur secundum quid et sic est verum quia distinctio essentiae et relationis est rei et rei simpliciter sed distinctio est secundum quid.’ (My italics.) 120 The insight is that the essence ‘surpasses’ the properties in perfection in a way which prevents univocal predication. It is what Scotus terms ‘lack of adequate identity’ (Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 148r), which I will treat below. 121 See also Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 3, 149r: ‘distinctio secundum quid, non quod aliquid distinctorum sit res vel ens secundum quid, sed quod distinctio eorum sit secundum quid quae attenditur penes non identitatem formalem et non identitatem adaequata . . .’

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virtue of the inWnity of the essence). Note that by ‘two actual things’ (rei et rei) Scotus is not wanting to suggest an absolute distinction between two separable things. Rei et rei rather underscores the fact that the distinction obtains between two fully actual—and not ontologically restricted—realities, so that the secundum quid hinges not on their ontological status, but on their type of distinction. According to Scotus, an absolute (real) distinction requires four conditions: (i) that the terms distinguished are actual and not diminished beings; (ii) that they have a formal and not a virtual esse (unlike an eVect which is virtually in its cause); (iii) that they have a distinct and proper being and not ‘confused’ (confusum) or mixed; (iv) that they are absolutely non-identical (distinctionis perfectae et non identitas).122 The Wrst three conditions concern the ontological status of the relata, whereas condition (iv) concerns the type of non-identity existing between them. Really distinct things satisfy all four conditions. Essence and relations are fully actual beings, but they fail to satisfy condition (iv) of absolute non-identity. It is on account of their mode of nonidentity and not on account of their being that their diVerence is less than absolute.123 Essence and relation are then distinct secundum quid ex natura rei. But how is this non-identity to be understood? According to Scotus relative nonidentity signiWes either a lack of formal identity or a lack of adequate identity. Two things are said not to have formal identity when one does not pertain per se and primarily to the understanding of the other; that is, when neither is included in the formal ratio of the other, though they may be really identical. 122 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147v: ‘Ad hoc quod aliqua simpliciter distinguantur quatuor requiruntur conditiones. Prima est quod sit aliquorum in actu et non in potentia tantum, quia non distinguuntur ea quae sunt in potentia in materia et non simpliciter quia non sunt in actu. Secunda est quod est eorum quae habent esse formale non tantum virtuale, ut eVectus sunt in sua causa virtualiter et non formaliter. Tertia conditio est quod est eorum quae non habent esse confusum ut extrema in medio et miscibilia in mixto, sed eorum quae habent esse distinctum propriis actualitatibus. Quarta conditio est quae sola completiva est distinctionis perfectae et non identitas, ut patet per Philosophum 5 Metaphysicae, c. 9, ubi dicit diversum et distinctum esse et idem esse non.’ 123 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147v: ‘Illa ergo distinguuntur perfecte quae secundum esse eorum actuale, proprium et determinatum, sunt non eadem simpliciter, et illa secundum quid distinguuntur quae non habent non identitatem simpliciter sed non identitatem secundum quid. Diversitas autem in omnibus tribus conditionibus primis, salvata identitate, est distinctio secundum quid, quia non est non identitas nisi secundum quid. Essentia vero et relatio habent tres primas conditiones, quia non habent esse potentiale nec virtuale nec confusum, sed actuale, formale, et proprium et determinatum, quia essentia est ita perfecte secundum omnes tres primas conditiones . . . Similiter, paternitas est ita perfecte ibi . . . Eis tamen non competit quarta conditio, quae est completiva distinctionis, scilicet non identitas simpliciter quam non habent, sed tantum secundum quid . . . Potest enim essentiae et relationis distinctio vocari distinctio secundum quid ex natura rei, quia est eorum non identitas secundum quid ac si utrumque ex natura rei actualiter et proprie et determinate existeret sine alio.’

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In this way, a divine person is formally the same as the divine essence and formally the same as its personal property because both are included in its deWnition. But the converse is not true, because neither the divine essence nor the personal property is formally the same as the divine person, since the divine person is not included in either of their deWnitions—were they deWnable.124 What is being denied here is a form of identity. Adequate identity, on the other hand, obtains when two things are precisely the same in that one does not exceed the other either in predication (secundum praedicationem) or in perfection (secundum virtutem et perfectionem). The essence and the personal properties fail to be adequately identical in both respects. The personal properties exceed the essence in predication because the essence can be predicated of the three persons only according to their reality, whereas the properties are predicated of the persons as pertaining to them not only really, but also formally and according to their rationes. In other words, properties and persons not only share a common real foundation (the essence), but can also be predicated of one another conversely (convertibiliter) because they have the same deWnition. The essence, however, exceeds the properties in perfection because it is formally inWnite.125 124 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147v–148r: ‘Dicuntur autem aliqua habere non identitatem formalem quando unum non est de per se et primo intellectu eius alterius, ut deWnitio vel partes deWnitionis sunt de intellectu deWniti, sed quando neutrum includitur in formali ratione alterius, licet tamen sint eadem realiter sicut ens et unum dicuntur eadem . . . Nunc autem si essentia et relatio in divinis deWniretur, neutrum caderet in per se deWnitione alterius nisi ut additum. Ergo, essentia non est de formali intellectu paternitatis nec e converso, sed diVerunt formaliter et habent non identitatem formalem et quidditativam, quia formalis ratio essentiae est esse ad se, formalis ratio relationis esse ad alterum, quae diVerunt quidditative, et tamen propter non identitatem formalem non sequitur quin unum simpliciter sit idem alteri . . . propter inWnitatem alterius extremi.’ Formal identity is therefore asymmetrical, for even if person is formally identical to property, it is not the case that property is formally identical to person. See Cross, ‘Scotus’s Parisian Teaching’, 540–1. See also Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 40. 125 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 148r: ‘Item essentia et proprietas non sunt eadem identitate adaequate cuius sunt illa quorum neutrum excedit alterum, sed est praecise illud neque magis neque minus, ut deWnitio et deWnitum. Sed non adaequata in identitate dicuntur illa quorum unum excedit aliud vel unitas unius excedit unitatem alterius, sicut se habet animal ad hominem. Essentia autem et proprietas non sunt eadem adaequate. Excessus autem vel non adaequatio unius ad alterum potest intelligi dupliciter: vel secundum praedicationem et non convertibiliter, ut se habent animal et homo secundum praedicationem inadequatae, quia animal dicatur de pluribus quam homo. Alio modo, secundum virtutem et perfectionem, ut homo est quid quam animal, vel forma quam natura. Primo modo proprietas transcendit essentiam . . . quia de pluribus formaliter praedicatur quam essentia . . . [A]bstrahitur ab . . . illa . . . , scilicet paternitate, Wliatione, et spiratione est communis eis communitate rationis et praedicatur de eis formaliter et in quid, et sic proprietas non est eadem essentia adaequate secundum praedicationem. E converso autem essentia excedit proprietatem secundum virtutem et perfectionem, quia ipsa est formaliter inWnita, non sic aliqua proprietas personalis. Ergo, non sunt eadem adaequate secundum perfectionem et virtutem.’ Adequate identity is symmetrical, and therefore stronger than formal identity: two objects can be formally identical and yet fail to

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Scotus concludes that, by reason of the formal non-identity between essence and relation, the identity of two relations with the essence does not necessarily render these relations identical to each other. In other words, Scotus believes that the indiscernibility of two identical terms126 does not necessarily hold when they lack in formal identity.127 This principle is, according to Scotus, only applicable when the identity of the extremes with one another is of the same nature as the identity of the extremes with the middle term.128 In the syllogism ‘the essence is the Father’ and ‘the essence is the Son’ therefore ‘the Father is the Son’, the identity between essence and persons is real and not formal, so that it cannot entail formal identity without incurring fallacy. The notion of formal non-identity thus turns an apparently valid syllogism into fallacious reasoning.129 Scotus’s conception of the formal distinction and its implications conform to the Lateran understanding of unity and distinction in the divine. Scotus believes that the relevant type of distinction in the divine is one which rests not on the reality of its terms but on their relation of identity. The formal distinction thus presupposes an essential identity, which Scotus further underscores with his chief claim that the essence is indivisible in its commube adequately identical. See Cross, ‘Scotus’s Parisian Teaching’, 541–2. See also Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 42. 126 The principle of the ‘indiscernibility of identicals’ states that ‘for all x, y and F, if x is identical with y, then x is F if and only if y is F ’. See Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 7, 42–3. 127 Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 148r: ‘Item, quia non est identitas formalis essentiae ad relationem nec e converso, ideo non oportet quod cuicumque unum convenit formaliter quod conveniat alterius, ut si patet secundum paternitatem referatur quod secundum essentiam referatur. Item, quia paternitas et essentia non sunt eadem adaequate, non oportet quod una proprietas sit eadem alterius, licet sint eadem essentiaee, quia quando aliqua duo comparantur ad aliquod tertium . . . quia neutrum est adaequate ipsum, non oportet illa esse eadem inter se licet sint eadem tertio . . . Ita in proposito essentia divina est inWnita formaliter et nulla proprietas est formaliter inWnita, et ideo non oportet quia si aliqua proprietas est eadem essentiae . . . quod propter hoc duo proprietates sunt eadem inter se, quia absolute a tertio afertur causa identitatis eadem earum.’ See also Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 414–15. 128 Richard Cross argues that, although Scotus’s objections to extreme realism seem to appeal to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, Scotus does not believe that the Trinity raises any serious diYculties for this principle. As Cross sees it, the exempliWcation of the essence by the persons is not regarded by Scotus (despite his terminology) as a form of identity (and hence within the scope of the principle), but as ‘a way of talking about a relationship in which the nature is not divided up into its various instantiations’. In this reading, Scotus’s conception of the essence as an immanent universal (and therefore as inWnite) would not conXict with a subscription to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals. See Cross, ‘Divisibility, Communicability’, 57–63. 129 Scotus, Rep. I d. 34 q. 1 n. 3. See Gelber, ‘Logic and the Trinity’, 120–7. Gelber considers the diVerent ways in which, dealing with the conXict between Trinitarian predication and Aristotelian logic, theologians in the 14th cent. attempted to identify fallacies in Trinitarian syllogisms which seemed to be logically correct, but the conclusions of which were contrary to faith. For Aristotle, see De sophisticis elenchis, 1 (166b10–14, 166b28–30, 167b1–3).

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nicability—and hence inWnite. The description of the essence as an inWnite being also checks the inference of quaternity, since, as an inWnite nature, the essence cannot be numerically added to the divine realities but rather contains them all indivisibly. This section concludes Part I of this study, and with it the intellectual background to the dispute between Durandus and his order. As I hope to show in the next chapter, the insights underlying Hervaeus Natalis’s Trinitarian thought bear recognizable aYnity to Scotist conceptions. Already in his early commentary on the Sentences, Hervaeus incorporates into his view the conception of the essence as a special kind of universal, a conception which eventually commits him to a modiWed version of the formal distinction. As will become apparent, although some Scotist claims are not in principle concordant with Aquinas’s thought, Hervaeus succeeds in elaborating them in a way that makes them at least compatible with the accepted interpretation of ‘Thomism’.

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Part II The Controversy

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4 Hervaeus Natalis’s Commentary on the Sentences Hervaeus Natalis’s commentary on the Sentences (1302–3)1 is an interesting piece of work in its doctrinal eclecticism. The treatment of some of the questions has the character of a commentary on Aquinas’s teaching, and reveals the breadth of Hervaeus’s knowledge of the Thomist corpus. At the same time, underlying Hervaeus’s account is an intelligent development of Thomist theses which, not altogether deviating from Aquinas, prepares the ground for further elaboration along Scotist lines. As the impasse with Durandus develops, we shall see how Hervaeus gradually incorporates, and openly endorses, elements alien to Aquinas’s theology. The compound aspect of Hervaeus’s thought is worth remarking because it lies in contrast to a simpler, meeker image of this Dominican as the ‘champion of Thomism’. In this chapter I shall examine Hervaeus’s Trinitarian theology as presented in the commentary on the Sentences. Following the plan initially proposed for this study, I shall Wrst consider Hervaeus’s account of relation, then the processions, and Wnally the divine persons.

4.1. RELATION Following a Lateran agenda, Hervaeus introduces the issue of relation by Wrst establishing that relations are really in God, a claim which he contrasts to the Porretan view that relations are ‘extrinsically attached’ to the essence. Hervaeus’s reasoning relies heavily on Aquinas, as he lays out mainly three conditions for a real relation: Wrst, relation must rest on a real foundation; secondly, the term of the relation must be a real thing; thirdly, there must be a 1 See Repertorium, 164; De Guimares, ‘Herve´ Noe¨l’, 48. The ordinatio version of Hervaeus’s commentary was probably composed c. 1309. See Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 73–7 n. 14.

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mutual reference between the terms such that one term necessarily requires the other and vice versa (coexigant se).2 To take an example, the relation of paternity in God fulWls all three conditions: Wrst, it is founded on the Father who owes his reality to the essence; secondly, the term of the relation is the Son who owes his reality to the essence; thirdly, Father and Son are mutually referred to each other. The governing principle underlying these conditions is the capacity of the essence to communicate its reality to the persons. The communicability of the essence ensures that the persons and their relations are in God by real identity such that they are real and equal in divinity.3 Hervaeus rejects the two alternative claims whereby relations are in God by inherence or are extrinsic to the persons. The latter he identiWes with the Porretan opinion. Hervaeus understands the Porretan to be saying that relations are not in God by real identity, but only according to the ratio of relation, that is, in virtue of a reference to something extrinsic. Hervaeus contends that, if true, this view would entail that in God there are as many types of distinction as there are relative terms. And since there are four divine relations, this would result in a quaternity of relative things in God.4 2 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 118aB–bA: ‘quinque ponuntur esse de ratione relationis realis. Duo sumuntur ex parte subiecti. Primo, relatio supponit aliquod fundamentum reale in eo cuius est ut subiecti. Secundo, quod fundamentum illud in illo quod refertur, secundum quod refertur, sit reale . . . Duo autem requiruntur ex parte termini. Unum est quod terminus ad quem est relatio sit res quaedam . . . Secundum est quod sit diversus realiter ab alio correlativo. Quia cum relatio sit illud quo aliquid refertur ad aliud, oportet quod relatio realis sit illud quo aliquid referatur ad illud quod est aliud realiter, cum eiusdam ad seipsum non sit relatio realis. Tertium, quod sint eiusdem rationis . . . , scilicet quod fundamenta coexigant se, ita scilicet quod unum non praecedat aliud . . .’ Cf. Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7 a. 11; Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1. 3 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 118bB: ‘relationes divinae sunt reales, quia fundamentum habent reale in eo quod refertur, et etiam secundum quod refertur includit illud fundamentum realem, sicut paternitas in patre fundatur super essentiam divinam, et secundum etiam quod pater includit essentiam divinam realiter in eo existentem ut principium communicativum ipsius essentiae . . . Et similiter Wliatio in Wlio fundatur super eandem essentiam divinam ut est realiter communicata, et in eo per communicationem existentem realiter utraque etiam est ad realem terminum et realiter a se distinctum, puta pater ad Wlium et Wlius ad patrem. Et sunt etiam eiusdem ordinem, quia ambo sunt extra genus aequaliter et illimitate ex aequo se respicientes.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1; I d. 28 a. 2; De Pot., q. 8 a. 2, sed contra. 4 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 118bB–D: ‘Propter simplicitatem divinam relationes ipsae sunt ipsae purae personae, nihilominus tamen dicuntur esse in persona, quia ad hoc quod dicatur aliquid esse in alio per modum quo forma est in habente formam, sicut divinitas in deo, et paternitas in patre, non requiritur quod ly dicat transitum reale, sic sc. quod id in quo est, et illud quod est in eo sint re diversa, ita quod unum non sit aliud realiter sed suYcit quod diVerent ratione et modo signiWcandi. Sic autem diVerunt pater et paternitas. Et ideo, paternitas postest dici in patre. Necessitas autem quare oportuit dicere paternitatem esse in patre non per inhaerentiam sed per identitatem . . . Modo relatio dicitur esse in persona, non per oppositum ad esse personam . . . sed dicitur esse in persona per oppositum ad esse extra . . . Et hoc fuit necessarium dicere propter illos qui dicebant talem denominationem Weri non ab aliquo

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In examining the type of identity which obtains between essence and relation,5 Hervaeus deals with the opinion, presumably that of Bonaventure, that essence and relation are not really identical but diVer according to a real mode of being (secundum modum essendi realem).6 Hervaeus’s response to this opinion is instructive in that it foreshadows much of his criticism against Durandus’s view. Hervaeus raises two objections against this opinion. First, two really distinct things cannot constitute a unity except by composition. Since this would contradict divine simplicity, essence and relation cannot be really distinct. Consequently, essence and relation are really identical. According to Hervaeus, then, a distinction according to modes amounts to a real distinction. Central to Hervaeus’s argument is the Thomist thesis that real distinction necessarily entails numerical plurality, so that to posit a real distinction between essence and relation inevitably leads to a multiplication of realities in God. Hervaeus maintains instead that a distinction according to modes is pertinent only if ‘real’ refers to the reality of the modes and not to their plurality: a distinction according to ‘real modes’ and not a ‘real distinction’. In this sense, ‘modal distinction’ obtains between two really identical things when one of them—and not the other—is distinct from a third term. The two things are then said to be distinct according to their diVerent mode of referring to that third term. Essence and paternity are thus distinct only according to the mode in which paternity, but not the essence, is really distinct from the Son.7 extrinseco assignante, sicut Porretanus, secundum quam viam relationes reales non fuissent realiter in deo, sed secundum denominationem quandam ab extrinseco.’ For Gilbert, see Commentaries, ed Ha¨ring, 139. 3, 148. 42–4. See also Ch. 1 of this study. 5 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1, 130a (‘Utrum proprietas relativa sit realiter essentia divina’), esp. aa. 3 and 4. Curiously, nowhere in his commentary does Hervaeus deal directly with relations in creatures. 6 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 3, 132aC; also d. 32 q. 1, 134aD: ‘Dicunt ergo quidam, quod si relatio accipiatur pro ut dicit habitudinem, et essentia ut dicit absolutum; et persona ut constituitur ex utroque, sic: nec essentia est relatio vel proprietas, nec persona est proprietas vel essentia. Quia nec essentia dicit habitudinem, nec est habitudo; nec habitudo est quidam absolutum, nec constitutum ex utroque est alterum. Unde diVerunt, non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum modum realem.’ 7 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 3, 132aB–D; also I d. 32 q. 1, 134bA–B: ‘quando dicitur in divinis esse plura realia, realitas potest referri, vel ad ea quae dicuntur plura, vel ad ipsam pluralitatem. Ut si dicam quod in divinis sunt plures perfectiones realiter . . . ut sit sensus quod perfectiones quae plures dicuntur . . . sunt realiter in divinis, et hic sensus est verus. Potest etiam referri realitas ad ipsam pluralitatem, ut sit sensus quod pluralitas istarum perfectionum . . . sit realis vel secundum rem. Et hic sensus . . . falsum est.’ Also 135aA–B: ‘Illi ergo qui dicunt proprietatem et essentiam diVerre secundum modum realem, si intelligant modum realem positivum, secundum quem unum numero realiter se habeat per additionem ad aliud et faciat diVerentiam realem positivam inter ipsa ad invicem comparata, falsum est. Quia tunc esset compositio in divinis. Si autem intelligatur minus proprie per modum realem modum secundum quem unum eorum dicitur distingui ab aliquo a quo aliud non distinguitur, sic potest

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Hervaeus’s second objection amounts to a similar claim. In God, that which ‘has’ (habens), namely the suppositum, and that which ‘is had’ (habitum),8 namely the essence, are essentially and really the same, and diVer only in respect to a third term.9 The propositions ‘the essence is the Father’ and ‘the Father is paternity’ are both true because the essence is really and essentially the Father just as the Father is really and essentially the relation of paternity. The essence and the Father are not really distinct from each other but only in so far as the Father, through paternity, includes a reference to the Son which the essence does not include. This reference does not, however, amount to a real distinction between the Father and the essence because it is not predicated of their reality but only in a comparison to something other.10 In Hervaeus’s view, then, the transitivity of identicals does not necessarily hold when one of the identical things connotes a relative term.11 That is to say, Hervaeus denies that ‘if the essence is identical to the Father, and the Father is identical to paternity, then the essence is identical to paternity’. The conclusion is false, because by paternity the Father and not the essence connotes a reference to the Son, such that even though both essence and paternity can be predicated of the Father, essence and paternity cannot be predicated of each

concedi, quod secundum talem modum negativum in comparatione ad tertium diVerunt, inquantum unum eorum realiter est distinctum ab aliquo, a quo aliud non est distinctum, sed realiter unum.’ 8 The terms habitum to denote something abstract or a common nature, and habens to denote something concrete or a particular property, were standard for distinguishing between nature and suppositum. It was thus common usage to refer to Christ’s human nature as that which ‘is had’ or assumed by the divine suppositum, and to the divine suppositum as that which is capable of ‘having’ or assuming a nature. Hervaeus presumably wants to articulate the connection between essence and relation in terms of nature and suppositum respectively. The essence is then analogously understood as a common nature, and relation as a concrete property constitutive of a suppositum. See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 134aC: ‘ut per personam accipiamus concretum, puta deum vel patrem per essentiam, puta divinitatem vel paternitatem. Et si quaeretur utrum persona sit essentia est quaerere utrum in divinis abstractum sit concretum. Et de hoc dictum fuit, quando quaerebatur quomodo diVerent natura et suppositum.’ 9 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 3, 132aB–C: ‘Quia in divinis habens et habitum, exceptis illis quorum unum habet aliud sicut unum relativum habet aliud, sicut pater habet Wlium, omnia sunt unum realiter. Sic illa quorum unum est essentialiter alterum inter se non habent diVerentiam realem . . . Et ideo . . . essentia et proprietas non habent diVerentiam realem inter se, sed in habitudine ad tertium’. Underlying this argument is Anselm’s principle that ‘totum est unum in deo, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio’ (De Processione, 1. 181. 1–4). 10 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 3, 132aC–D: ‘Unum enim ipsorum importat habitudinem ad aliquem terminum, a quo non exigit distinctionem realem, nec importat ipsum ut distinctum realiter . . . Sed paternitas importat illud quo pater rescipit Wlium, ut oppositum terminum, realiter a se distinctum. Et ideo importat diVerentiam in distinctione reali, et in comparatione ad tertio. Sed inter se quantum ad illud quod sunt, nullam diVerentiam realem habent.’ 11 Transitivity is a property of real identity in creatures: ‘for all x, y, and z, if x is identical to y, and y is identical to z, then x is identical to z ’. See Adams, ‘Ockham on Identity’, 6–7.

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other.12 Granted that essence and paternity are really identical, we must not infer from this that the essence is also related by opposition to the Son. It is more appropriate to say that the essence is that thing (res), the Father, which is related by opposition to the Son. By the same token, from the real identity between essence and paternity we cannot infer that paternity is something absolute—for this would imply that the Father is not related to the Son by opposition, which is blatantly false. Again, it is preferable to say that paternity is that thing (res), the essence, which is absolute. In other words, ‘absolute’ does not refer directly to paternity, but to that thing—the essence—which is really identical to paternity.13 The point Hervaeus wants to make here is that divine simplicity requires that distinction always presupposes real identity, such that in the divine it is always preferable to state a qualiWed identity than to assert a real distinction. Distinction in God must always be mediated by real identity. Note that Hervaeus has so far avoided the standard explanation of distinction in terms of the ratio and the esse of relation. Instead he has preferred to explain distinction in logical terms as lack of transitivity, suggesting a midway distinction which is stronger than a mere diVerence of reason but which falls short of separability. Tellingly, Hervaeus distances himself from the current esse–ratio division because he sees it leading to an ill-conceived form of middle distinction. As will become apparent, the middle distinction that Hervaeus will countenance hinges on the qualiWed identity between two terms rather than on their (qualiWed) ontological value. The aYnity with Scotus is already recognizable. The recourse to the twin notions of the esse and ratio of relation is common to Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome,14 as the main device for 12 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 134bC: ‘Notandum tamen est, quod licet essentia et proprietas inter se non habeant diVerentiam realem, sed sunt una res simpliciter, tamen unum eorum dicit oppositionem ad aliquid, ad quod nullam oppositionem dicit aliud, ut unus importat distinctionem realem ab aliquo, a quo aliud nullam distinctionem realem importat. Sicut paternitas importat oppositionem ad Wlium et importat distinctionem realem ab eo, a quo nulla distinctionem realem importat essentiam.’ 13 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 134bD–135aA: ‘Et ideo non dicimus quod essentia dicat habitudinem ad patrem . . . , nec denotetur essentia se habere ad Wlium ut ei oppositum et ab eo distinctum. Tamen ista est vera ‘‘essentia est illa res quae est habitudo ad Wlium’’. . . Quia ex hoc non ponitur circa essentiam distinctio a Wlio, sed identitas ponitur inter essentiam et illam rem quam distinguitur a Wlio. Similiter, si dicatur quod paternitas est aliquid absolutum, falsum est. Quia denotatur non tantum identitas inter paternitatem et rem absolutam quae est essentia, sed etiam denotatur quod paternitas caret oppositione relativa. Sed haec est vera, scilicet quod ‘‘paternitas est illa res quae est absoluta’’. Quia haec absolutio non importatur circa paternitatem, sed circa illam rem quae est eadem cum paternitate secundum rem.’ 14 For Aquinas, see ST I q. 42 a. 3; I q. 28 a. 2; Sent. I d. 33 q. 1; De Pot., q. 8 a. 2; q. 10 a. 3. For Bonvanture, see Sent. I d. 19 p. 3 q. 2 ad 4; I d. 26 a. un. q. 1 ad 3. For Giles, see Sent. I d. 33 princ. 1 qq. 2 and 3.

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explaining a plurality within the unity of the essence. As the standard explanation runs, relation loses its accidental being and assumes the substantial mode of being of the essence, remaining in the divine only according to its ratio as a reference towards something other. Relation is then really identical to the essence, and distinct from it only according to its reference to an opposite term. The chief advantage of this twofold understanding of relation is that it restricts distinction to the ratio of relation without thereby compromising its real identity with the essence. Divine simplicity is thus safeguarded. Hervaeus is critical of this twofold understanding of relation mainly in its Aegidian form. As Hervaeus reports, Giles claims that compared to its opposite term, relation is real (re), while compared to its foundation, relation is only a being of reason (ratio).15 Hervaeus Wnds this opinion problematic mainly in its implication that numerically one and the same thing can be simultaneously a being of reason and an extra-mental reality. The ontological status of a thing is an absolute datum about that thing and not the result of a comparison with something else. What can, however, be qualiWed is the relation of identity between two things. The relation of paternity is always real (res) regardless of its term of comparison, but it does not for that reason necessarily entail a real distinction—for whereas it is really distinct in comparison to its opposite term it is not so in comparison to its foundation.16 Hervaeus claims that it is fallacious to determine distinction on the basis of the ontological status of the terms involved. For whereas identity and distinction express a logical relation between two terms, the reality of a thing is an absolute feature of that thing. What Hervaeus ultimately Wnds problematic about the twofold understanding of relation is that in its attempt to secure divine simplicity, it appears to reduce relation to a being of reason at the expense of its reality in the essence.17 Hervaeus is aware that Aquinas’s 15 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 4, 132aD–bA: ‘Dicunt aliqui quod ratio huius est, quia relatio quantum ad esse transit in substantiam in divinis, sed manet quantum ad rationem quidditativam, secundum quam se habet per additionem ad essentiam, nec transit in substantiam. Ratio autem quidditativa relationis requirit quod sit realiter distincta ab opposita relatione, non autem a suo fundamento. Unde dicunt quod relatio comparata ad oppositum terminum est re, sed comparata ad fundamentum est ratio . . . Ex his ostendunt, quare cum pluralitate relationum stet unitas essentiae.’ 16 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 4, 132bC–D: ‘ deYcit in hoc quod ponunt relationem realem comparatam ad unum esse rem, et comparatam ad aliud esse rationem. . . Nunc autem impossibile est quod idem numero sit indiVerens ut possit esse ens rationis . . . et ens reale extra animam. Unde illud quod est res semper cuicumque comparatur est res . . . Et similiter paternitas in divinis, cuicumque comparetur semper est res, sed non diVert re ab omni eo cui comparatur, quia non diVert re a fundamento, sed a termino.’ 17 In this respect, Hervaeus could be implying a connection between the Porretan error and the Aegidian understanding of the ratio and being of a relation. As Hervaeus sees it, both Gilbert

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position—which also beneWts from this twofold understanding of relation— could be open to the same criticisms that he has levelled at Giles’s theory. He therefore hastens to add that when Aquinas (aliquis doctor antiquus) holds that relation is only ratio when compared to its foundation, what Aquinas means is not that relation loses any actuality or becomes an intentional being, but that the distinction between relation and its foundation does not entail composition—and in this sense only can we say that the distinction is according to reason. Giles’s error is thus to have ascribed an ontological value to relation based on the logical connection with its foundation.18 Hervaeus’s understanding of the connection between essence and relation reveals some aYnity to Scotus’s view.19 Both Hervaeus and Scotus regard divine relation as a fully actual being which is not thereby really distinct from the essence. As we shall see, it is a constant feature in Hervaeus’s position that real things can relate as such without thereby entailing real distinction. This chief tenet renders Hervaeus’s view fundamentally compatible with the Scotist formal distinction, which also requires the idea that a real thing does not necessarily entail real distinction. This common tenet will eventually make possible a development of Hervaeus’s view along distinct Scotist lines. This understanding of distinction naturally leads Hervaeus to formulate a theory about the inWnity of the essence as the main grounds for reconciling a plurality of relations with divine unity.20 Finite beings are metaphysically incapable of including a plurality without thereby eVecting composition. Only an inWnite being can preserve its real and numerical identity with things that between themselves are distinct.21 Although at this stage Hervaeus makes and Giles avoid a real distinction between essence and relation by reducing the latter to a being of reason. Henry of Ghent had also made this connection between the Porretan error and the Aegidian opinion. See Summa, a. 55 q. 6, 112r; Quodl. V q. 2, 155r. See also s. 3.2 above. 18 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 4, 132bD–133aA: ‘Et ideo si inveniatur dictum ab aliquo doctore antiquo, quod relatio comparata ad suum fundamentum si ratio, non est intelligendum quod relatio comparata ad fundamentum sit ratio sive secunda intentio, sed hoc pro tanto dicitur quia eius diVerentia a fundamento est diVerentia secundum rationem, non autem quod ipsa relatio sit ratio.’ 19 For Scotus, see e.g. Rep., I d. 33 qq. 2–3. Only bk I of Scotus’s Lectura (c.1300) pre-dates Hervaeus’s commentary (1302). Scotus’s Reportata, from c.1302–3, is roughly contemporaneous. Given the aYnity with Scotus, it is likely that Hervaeus was conversant with some version of Scotus’s teaching. It is of course also possible that both theologians arrived at the same conclusions independently of each other. 20 Henry of Ghent had developed a similar theory in a Christological context. See Quodl. VI q. 7, 75–6: ‘non potest natura esse in pluribus nisi sit illimitata, cuiusmodi est natura divina, quae ex se singularitas quaedam est non suppositi, sed naturae . . . Quae quidem fecunditas non potest esse nisi in natura illimitata, propter quod natura limitata non potest pluribus suppositis communicari distinctis relative relatione originis, quae ex illa natura oriatur . . .’ 21 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1 a. 4, 133bA; also I d. 32 q. 1 ad 1, 135aD: ‘in illis in quibus propter inWnitatem suam unam re absoluta potest esse quaedam plura, scilicet plura relata

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only a timid advance of this view, it is worth remarking because it not only reveals further aYnity with Scotus,22 but also brings to light the logical connection between the formal distinction and the conception of the essence as an inWnite nature. Indeed, the Wrst seems to imply the second: if relation is (formally) distinct from the essence as a fully actual being without thereby compromising the unity of the essence, then the essence has to be an inWnite nature. For only an inWnite nature can hold a plurality of real things without division.

4.2. THE PROCESSIONS The issue of the processions of the Son and the Spirit and their relation to each other was a particularly sensitive one in Trinitarian discussions, not only in its connection to the Wlioque, but also, and more tellingly, in what it revealed of the degree of distinction a theologian was prepared to allow in the divine. In examining the distinction between the processions, Hervaeus takes issue with the emanational account, according to which distinction in the divine is explained by diVerent modes of emanation from the divine essence.23 Among the arguments Hervaeus advances against this account, the following appear to be the most relevant. First, the emanational account does not provide suYcient grounds for explaining how opposite relations can create a stronger distinction than disparate relations. The contrast between opposite and disparate relations becomes irrelevant, since both seem to constitute equivalent modes of being of the divine essence. Secondly, that the processions should be distinct regardless of whether or not they are related by opposition seems blatantly at odds with Anselm’s principle. According to the Thomist rendering of Anselm’s principle, in God what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity.24 Proceeding ab absurdo, if the realiter distincta, potest aYrmatio et negatio veriWcari, secundum distingui et non distingui, de his quae sunt unum re. Ita quod unum eorum distinguatur ab aliquo et aliud non distinguatur ab eo, non contradicit.’ 22 Scotus also appeals to the inWnity of the essence in order to ground the coexistance of the essence with a plurality of relations. See Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 256. 23 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 79bD–80aA: ‘Secundum quosdam . . . in divinis . . . in una et eadem essentia poterunt fundari plures relationes separatae propter distincta supposita in quibus sunt. Unde licet tales relationes disparatae non habeant oppositionem, quia tamen sunt in suppositis distinctis per oppositionem, erunt distinctae.’ Presumably the target here is Henry of Ghent. 24 Anselm, De Processione, 1. 181. 2. For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 31 a. 2; De Pot., q. 10 a. 2.

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Son as generated is not opposed to the Spirit by origin but is distinct from it merely by virtue of disparate relations, it follows that the Son communicates passive generation to the Spirit. Consequently, passive generation is not distinct from passive spiration, which is obviously false. In order to be distinct, therefore, Son and Spirit must be related by opposition.25 Thirdly, if both disparate and opposite relations are understood equally as relations between a principle and a product, then either everything in the divine involving an active principle entails relative opposition, or relations of origin are reduced to their correlative terms. In the Wrst case, the (disparate) relation of the Son to active spiration (spirare) would suYce for constituting a distinct person. The result would then be two persons: the Son as generated, and another Son as active spirator. In the second case, the persons would merely constitute diVerent properties of the essence—that is, active generation would not end in the constitution of the Son, but would only signify a property of the Father. Either way, this account fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the Trinity.26 Hervaeus’s main response to the emanational account is an attempt to underpin Anselm’s principle by establishing the necessity of distinguishing in the divine between communicability and relative opposition. With this purpose in mind, he sets about proving two main conclusions. First, in the divine commonality entails real identity. For any two relations founded on one and the same suppositum (e.g. active generation and active spiration in the Father) they are really (realiter) identical to each other and necessarily constitute the same thing (res). By the same token, for any relation common to two supposita (e.g. active spiration is common to Father and Son), it is really identical to both. Hervaeus reasons as follows: everything that is in the divine assumes the subsistent being of the essence, for otherwise it 25 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 80aA–B: ‘Ista autem positio in multis deWcit: primo, quia non reddit causam quare plus habeant distingui generari et spirari, quam generare et spirare . . . Secundum, quia secundum Anselmum ‘‘persona producens communicet personae productae omne id in quo ei non opponitur.’’ Si persona Wlii, secundum quod genitus, nullo modo habeat oppositionem ad spiritum sanctum, sed tantum disparationem . . . , sequitur quod Wlius communicabit spiritui sancto generari, et sic generari non distingueretur a spirari . . .’ 26 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 80bC–81aA: ‘ista via non suYcientem causam assignat distinctionis realis inter generationem et spirationem . . . Ista enim positio non plus dat causam distinctionis inter generari et spirari, quam inter generare et spirare . . . Secundum etiam dictum deWcit. Primum, quia in divinis illud quod est principium alicuius . . . non distinguitur ab eo realiter . . . Et ideo, licet aliquo modo Wlius sit principium spirationis activae dictae, non tamen oportet quod realiter distinguatur ab ea. Et sic non videtur suYcere praedicta ratio. Item generatio saltem passive dicta non est principium Wlii, immo est ipse Wlius. Ergo, ad probandum distinctionem inter generari et spirari nihil valet ista deductio . . . Item illae rationes quae non ostendunt quomodo diversimode accipitur principium et principiatum necessario realiter diVerunt, nec aliquam diVerentiam ponunt inter processiones prout accipiantur active vel passive. Et ideo insuYcienter dicunt.’

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would inhere and eVect composition. By necessity, then, real distinction can only obtain between subsistent beings, such that whatever is found in one and the same suppositum must be really identical to that suppositum. In line with Lateran orthodoxy, Hervaeus believes that what restricts the number of persons to three is the claim that essential unity rests on commonality. Just as the essence does not add in the number of persons because it is common to all three, active spiration does not add another reality to Father and Son because it is common to both supposita.27 Secondly, since in God real distinction can only obtain between supposita, real distinction must be restricted to relative opposition.28 Relative opposition is the relation which obtains between a principle and a product in a process of origin. Father and Son spirate the Spirit, on account of which Father and Son are related by opposition to the Spirit and constitute distinct persons from it. As for Aquinas, for Hervaeus the Wlioque hinges primarily on the communicability of the essence and only secondarily on the relation between Son and Spirit. The opposition of the Son to the Spirit is Wrst explained by the communication of the power of spiration from the Father to the Son through generation.29 Underlying this view is Hervaeus’s claim that the processions 27 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81aC–bA: ‘ea quae sunt in divinis in eodem supposito non sunt diversae res, nec realiter ab invicem diversa. Probo tripliciter: primo, quia cum omne quod est in divinis sit subsistens, quia nihil est ibi inhaerens secundum rem, alioquin esset ibi compositio, oportet quod in divinis ubi sunt dare duo diversa realiter . . . oportet quod sint duo diversa subsistentia. Sed duo diversa subsistentia . . . sunt duo diversa supposita, et per consequens ea quae sunt ibi unius suppositi non possunt esse diversae res . . . Tertio, quia sicut se habet essentia ad tres personas et earum relationes, quibus est communis, ita se habet communis spiratio ad personas et relationes earum quibus est communis. Sed essentia non ponit in numerum realem cum personis et earum relationibus. Ergo, nec similiter spiratio communis est res diversa a patre vel Wlio . . .’ See also Sent. I d. 27 q. 1, 120bD–121aA. Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; I d. 33 q. 1 a. 2; ST I q. 28 a. 3. 28 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81aC–bB: ‘Secunda est, quod in divinis non potest esse distinctio realis, nisi per relationes oppositas . . . [Q]uaecumque in divinis distinguuntur realiter, oportet quod pertineant ad diversa supposita, nec potest esse quod sint in eodem supposito . . . [Q]uod patet Anselmum, qui dicit quod persona qualibet producens productae opponitur . . .’ 29 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81bD–82aA: ‘de ratione spirati est quod sit productus ab aliquo alio producto, quod in divinis non potest esse nisi genitus . . . quia licet Wlius sit a patre spirante productus, hoc tamen ei accidit eo modo quo accidere potest esse in divinis, quia scilicet non est de sua ratione quod producatur a spirato vel spirante, quia possito per impossibile quod pater non spiraret, adhuc potest intelligi generare. Sed e converso non posset, quia cum de ratione spirati sit quod sit productus a producto per generationem, non posset intelligi pater spirare nisi praeintelligitur generare. Nam quod est a genito sicut productum a producente, est etiam necessario a generante. Et ideo spirari et spiratus habent oppositionem relativam et ad generai et ad generare.’ Hervaeus would thus endorse the psychological model only as a way of explaining the logical priority of generation in respect to spiration. Like Aquinas and most Dominicans, Hervaeus rejects this model when it is connected to a strictly emanational account. See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 82aA–B: ‘Solet enim dici quod distinguuntur dictae processiones quia una est per modum intellectus et alia per modum voluntatis . . . Sed hoc accipitur per

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consist chieXy in the communication of the divine essence from one person to the other.30 The main advantage of this claim is that it guaranteed the essential equality of the persons throughout the processions. In God there is no order of priority between principle and product because the power which governs the processions is the essence and not personal relations. Relative opposition becomes intelligible only when it presupposes essential communicability. So far Hervaeus has oVered suYcient explanation for real distinction in God based on opposite relations. Active and passive generation are really distinct as opposite terms in a process of origin by virtue of which a distinct suppositum, the Son, is constituted. The account of distinction by opposition thus committed its followers to restrict real distinction to the persons and aYrm real identity in every other respect. The disadvantage with this model of distinction is that it was at a loss in oVering a suYcient explanation for the type of distinction obtaining between relations which lack opposition. How can active generation and active spiration be distinct if they are both founded on one and the same suppositum? Likewise, how is common spiration related to the two distinct supposita of Father and Son? On the one hand, disparate relations (i.e. relations which lack opposition) cannot be distinct by virtue of origin because they would then introduce a real plurality within one and the same suppositum, thereby compromising divine simplicity. On the other hand, disparate relations ought to be somehow distinct because they belong to distinct processes of origin even if they do not suYce for the constitution of a distinct person. In the Father active generation belongs to (i.e. is part of the explanation of) the procession of the Son, while active spiration belongs to the procession of the Spirit. The issue of disparate relations was a thorny one in Trinitarian theology, for it required explanation of a type of distinction which was necessary but not suYcient for the constitution of a suppositum. On one explanation, the connection between relations is controlled by their foundation, such that if any two relations owe their reality to one and the same foundation, they constitute one and the same thing (res). The identity between two relations is governed by their foundation as principle of reality. Active generation and active spiration thus constitute one and the same thing because they are founded on one and the same suppositum, the Father. comparationem ad ordinem productionum inquantum productum per spirationem habet de sua ratione quod sit productum a producto per actum dicendi; et sic necessario habet ordinem ad verbum dictum, sicut quodammodo velle habet ordinem ad intelligere . . . quia scilicet habens modum voluntatis est ille qui producitur a duobus, sed ille qui producitur ab uno habet modum natura sive intellectus, ita tamen quod produci a duobus . . . non suYceret nisi inquantum hoc includitur spiratum esse a genito.’ 30 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81aA–B: ‘principium in divinis dicitur dupliciter, scilicet suppositum producens et forma qua agit, scilicet ipsam essentiam’.

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Hervaeus rejects this opinion in its main presupposition that the reality of a thing should account for its numerical identity. In God the unity of the essence does not account for the unity of relations as relations; as realities, however, relations constitute one substance. That paternity and Wliation owe their reality to one and the same substance does not mean that they are really identical to each other. If we follow that principle, common spiration would amount to two relations because it is founded on Father and Son as two distinct supposita. But this is obviously false. Therefore, in God the principle that accounts for the reality of relations does not necessarily account for the numerical identity of relations.31 Central to Hervaeus’s argument is a crucial distinction between the numerical identity of a thing (what makes it only one thing) and its reality. When we speak of ‘two things’, we can refer to the things themselves that are two, or to their duality. The proposition ‘substance and relation are really in the divine’ is false if it signiWes that they are numerically two, for substance and relation are distinct only according to reason. But if it signiWes that substance and relation are realities in God, then the proposition is true. Likewise, active generation and active spiration are two relations in the Father in so far as they are referred to diVerent terms, namely Son and Spirit. As realities, however, active generation and active spiration constitute numerically one thing which is not divided by its diVerences (non dividuntur diVerentiis eius). The diVerence of relative terms does not introduce a numerical plurality in the Father. Underlying this idea is Hervaeus’s claim that commonality entails real identity, so that if active generation and active spiration coincide in one and the same suppositum they are by necessity really identical. Active generation and active spiration, as is the case with all disparate relations, constitute one reality and are distinct only according to reason.32 31 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 27 q. 1, 120bD–121aB: ‘Alii autem tenentes quod relationes non sunt duae res, sed una, hoc declarant sic. Quia ut dicunt relatio habet quod sit res ab eo in quo est, vel sicut in subiecto, vel sicut in fundamento secundum quod relatio esse habet a termino . . . Manente identitate eius a quo relationes habent quod sint res, manet identitas realis in relationibus quae sunt una res . . . Sed quicquid sit in creaturis, in divinis hoc non potest stare. Quia unitas fundamenti non potest dare relationibus unitatem realem rei relate, alioquin paternitas et Wliatio essent una res, cum habent idem fundamentum numero. Nec etiam unitas suppositi, quia si unitas suppositi daret unitatem realem relationibus existentibus in eodem supposito, sequeretur e contrario, quod ad diversitatem suppositorum, esset diversitas in relationibus. Hoc autem est falsum, cum una relatio numero sit in duobus suppositis . . . Unitas autem fundamenti . . . non suYcit ad dandam unitatem realem relationibus in divinis.’ 32 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 27 q. 1, 121aB–bB: ‘Est autem hic opus duplici distinctione . . . Quando aliqua realia dicunt duo vel duae res, realitas illa potest referri vel ad illa quae dicuntur quaedam duo, vel ad ipsam dualitatem. Sicut quando dico quod ista duo, scilicet substantia et relatio sunt realiter in divinis, potest referri realitas vel ad ipsa quae dicuntur duo, ut sit sensus quod tam substantia quam relatio sunt realiter in divinis, et hoc verum est. Vel potest referri ad

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The distinction between the reality of a thing and its numerical identity will constitute Hervaeus’s main line of attack in the discussion with Durandus. That Hervaeus will eventually develop this distinction in terms compatible with the Scotist formal distinction makes the contrast with Durandus all the more signiWcant. If res can refer to the numerical identity of a thing disengaged from its ontological status, the fact that relation is real should not necessarily entail that it is really distinct from the essence. In Scotist terms, essence and relation can be really identical and yet formally distinct. In this view, the distinction according to ‘modes of being’ as an alternative middle distinction becomes unnecessary and, indeed, problematic. By presupposing an equation between the reality of a thing and its numerical identity, real modes can only multiply rather than restrict the realities in God and compromise his simplicity.33

4. 3 . TH E DI V I NE PE R S O N S Hervaeus subscribes to the Thomist opinion whereby a person signiWes some individual (individuum vagum) of self-subsistent existence. With Aquinas, Hervaeus believes that subsistence, rather than incommunicability, is the characteristic mark of a person, for it is this feature that best conveys the ‘dignity’ that corresponds to a person’s nature.34 In elaborating this opinion Hervaeus makes a distinction, also found in Aquinas, between a being (ens) of reason and a community (communitas) of reason. Aquinas makes this distinction in order to distinguish a concept’s istam dualitatem, ut sit sensus quod dualitas substantiae et relationis in divinis sit pluralitas vel dualitas realis, et hoc falsum est. Quia in divinis distinctio istorum inter se non est realis, sed secundum rationem. Quando ergo quaeritur utrum paternitas et communis spiratio sint una res, si quaeratur quantum ad realitatem quam important extrinsece ut termini ad quem sunt ipsae, non debent dici unum re . . . Ratio . . . est ipsa, quaecumque sunt illa quae conveniunt in aliquo, in tantum sunt unum in illo, in quantum non dividuntur diVerentiis eius . . . Quia sola oppositio relativa facit diVerre realiter in divinis. Ergo, paternitas et communis spiratio sunt una res, non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum rem in divinis.’ (My italics.) 33 Recall Hervaeus’s criticism above, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 135aA–B. 34 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 112aC–bA: ‘Aliis videtur quod ‘‘persona’’ non signiWcet intentionem, sed rem absolutam substratam intentioni . . . quae dicitur individuum vagum in natura intellectuali. Unde signiWcat illud quod est unum numero, sive subsistens incommunicabile in natura intellectuali. Et quod ita sit potest ostendi sic, hoc nomen ‘‘persona’’ impositum est ad signiWcandum suppositum naturae intellectualis, secundum quod quandam dignitatem importat. Intentiones autem secundae non important aliquam dignitatem, sed res substrata intentionibus . . . Ex his patet quod deYnitio quam dat Boetius de persona est bona . . . quia cum persona dicat suppositum naturae habentis dignitatem, scilicet naturae intellectualis vel rationalis . . .’ For Aquinas, see De Pot., q. 7 a. 9; ST I q. 30 a. 4.

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univocity from its universality. This enables him to predicate ‘person’ of all three divine supposita while rejecting the claim that ‘person’ is something like an essential attribute shared by the supposita in the manner of a genus or a species.35 Hervaeus develops the full implications of Aquinas’s insight and, as I hope to show, this will actually take him closer to Scotus and distance him from the Thomist account. According to Hervaeus, a community of reason such as that signiWed by a universal concept does not necessarily obtain between beings of reason. For when we predicate individually of Socrates that he is a man, and individually of Plato that he is a man, the individual man each of the occurrences of ‘man’ signiWes is not a being (ens) of reason but a real being. The common nature, however, by which we predicate ‘man’ of both Socrates and Plato signiWes a concept and is predicated of them according to reason. The common nature is thus divided into its individual instances and is a unity according to reason only. In God, however, the notions of commonality and numerical identity change. Otherwise than in ordinary common natures, in God what is common to many (i.e. the essence) is also numerically one in them (i.e. the divine persons), so that we Wnd in the divine a relation of predicability between two numerically singular beings.36 In God the ‘commonality’ itself is real (secundum rem), and not only the things which participate in it. The essence is predicated as a singular being of the persons by real identity, and not only according to reason. But there is a caveat: in God not everything that is real (quod dicit rem) is for that reason numerically one in the three divine persons. Paternity, Wliation, and common spiration are all real relations, but they do not thereby constitute numerically one thing in Father, Son, and Spirit. Relation is real (dicit rem) in God, but its commonality to paternity, Wliation, and spiration is only conceptual. The same applies to the concept of person, which, although univocal to the three divine persons, does not thereby constitute numerically one attribute shared by them.37 35 See e.g. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3: ‘persona secundum rem non est communis patre et Wlio, quia non est numero una persona utriusque, sicut una numero essentia. Sed sicut habens rationem communem est commune habentibus rationes speciales et proprias in quibus distinguitur, nec tamen est universale, quia non est secundum aliud et aliud esse in patre et Wlio.’ (My italics.) The commonality of ‘person’ is also one of the central topics in Augustine’s De Trin. 7. 4–6, esp. 4. 37–76; 4. 110–17; 6. 41–52. 36 Tellingly, whereas in the context of ordinary common natures Hervaeus seems to subscribe to nominalism, when it comes to the Trinity he asserts a real identity between the divine ‘common nature’ and its ‘instances’. For Hervaeus on universals, see Sent. II d. 3 q. 2 a. 1. 37 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 112bB–C: ‘Ad secundum [i.e. quod persona dicat rem absolutam substratam intentioni] dicendum quod diVert aliquid esse ens rationis, et eius communitatem esse communitatem rationis. Nam quando dicitur Socrates est homo, Plato est homo, et sic de singulis, ly homo non dicit ens rationis, sed ens reale. Sed eius communitas sive unitas secundum quam dicitur esse quid commune multis, vel quid unum in multis, non est

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For Aquinas, the point of distinguishing between univocity and universal commonality was simple: in univocal predication the same undivided reality governs all individual instances; in universal predication the common nature is divided in its individual instances. Aquinas thereby rejected universal predication in God, for he saw it as jeopardizing divine simplicity. The crucial claim on simplicity is that the essence is the only reality involved in the divine. But in Hervaeus there is an interesting development taking place. Rather than distinguishing between univocity and universal predication, when it comes to the Trinity, Hervaeus reduces universal predication to a univocity claim. In his view the best way to safeguard divine simplicity is not by separating predicability from indivisibility, but rather by understanding predicability in terms of indivisibility. Like Aquinas, then, Hervaeus says that the essence is communicable to (i.e. predicable of) the supposita in its univocity. But unlike Aquinas, Hervaeus maintains that the two are not unconnected. For Hervaeus, one explains the other: the univocity of the essence accounts for its predicability. Motivated by a Thomist preoccupation, Hervaeus has ultimately laid the foundations for an eventual adoption of the Scotist conception of the essence as a special kind of universal. Hervaeus’s solution to another aspect of the issue of divine persons is by contrast thoroughly Thomist, to the point that it sometimes reads like an exercise of concordantia of Aquinas’s theses.38 The issue at hand is whether ‘person’ signiWes primarily relation or substance. Voicing Aquinas’s opinion, Hervaeus maintains that, although divine person includes both relation and substance, it primarily signiWes a substance.39 Relations distinguish the divine communitas secundum rem sed secundum rationem . . . Quando ergo dicitur quod illud quod est commune secundum rem in divinis est unum numero in omnibus personis, verum est accipiendo commune secundum rem illud quod non solum dicit ens reale, sed etiam eius communitatem et unitatem secundum rem, sicut patet de essentia divina. Sed non oportet quod omne quod dicit rem in divinis sit unum in numero in omnibus personis, alioquin cum paternitati et Wliationi sit commune hoc quod dico relatio, quae rem veram dicit, sequeretur quod utraque esset una relatio numero, quod falsum est. Quia ly relatio dicit rem, eius tamen communitas non est communitas sive unitas secundum rem. Et sic patet de ortu huius nominis persona et eius signiWcatione in generali.’ (My italics.) 38 There is much in Hervaeus’s initial writings which reads like a commentary on Aquinas’s opinion. A case in point is Hervaeus’s Defensio doctrinae fratris Thomae (written between 1307 and 1309), presenting a true expositio reverenter of Aquinas’s teaching. See E. Krebs, Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik: An Hand der bisher ungedruckten ‘Defensio doctrinae S. Thomae’ des Hervaeus Natalis, in C. Ba¨umker (ed.), Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Texte und Untersuchungen, 11 3–4 (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1912). 39 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 113aC–bA: ‘Persona includit utrumque, scilicet substantiam et relationem, non ut relatio est, sed ut est proprietas distinctiva . . . Persona divina subsistit per divinam substantiam, quia per eam omne quod est in divinis habet esse. Esse autem distinctum et incommunicabilem habet per relationem ut proprietas distinctiva. Esse relativum non est tamen de ratione personae, cum persona sit suppositum distinctum in natura substantiali intellectuali.’

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persons, not as relations, but formally understood as properties which are apt to distinguish in a substantial being (inquantum sunt proprietates natae distinguere in esse substantiae).40 Relations constitute the persons only in so far as they distinguish them, and relations distinguish the persons only in so far as relations assume the subsistent being of the essence. It is a central feature of the Thomist position that relation, as relation, should presuppose the constitution of the persons as subsistent beings, such that, as principles of distinction, relations must respond to formally subsistent beings. This idea is fundamentally concordant with the thesis that real distinction in the divine should be restricted to a plurality of supposita rather than be determined by the reality of relation as relation.41 In the counterfactual situation that relation were abstracted from divine person, Hervaeus holds that the plurality of persons would remain if by relation we understand ‘relative being’ rather than ‘subsistent property’. The plurality of persons is compromised only if we abstract the substantial mode of being assumed by relations, leaving the nudus respectus. The ultimate principle and warrant of divine distinction is therefore the subsistent being of the essence communicated to relations. The underlying idea is that, in order to safeguard equality in the plurality of persons, there must be a formal univocity between the principle of distinction and that which is distinguished. In God that univocity is grounded upon the communicability of the essence, such that relation is capable of distinguishing between the persons only if relation assumes the subsistent mode of being of the essence. Characteristic of Hervaeus’s intellectual development at this stage is the coexistence of a staunch Thomism with an unprejudiced attitude towards the insights of non-Thomist theologians. Hervaeus’s commentary on the Sentences oVers valuable material on both counts. First, Hervaeus’s solutions to crucial Trinitarian questions already reveal an aYnity to Scotus’s teaching, which will eventually allow Hervaeus to build more explicitly upon Scotist insights—speciWcally the notion of formal distinction and the conception of the essence as a special kind of universal. That Hervaeus’s theology was from the start akin to Scotus’s ideas must not be underestimated, since it obliges us to revise an over-simplistic view of ‘Thomism’ current in the years following Aquinas’s death and before his canonization. As Hervaeus’s case shows, 40 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 119aB: ‘proprietas relativa non est ratio istius distinctionis ut relatio est, sed ut proprietas nata distinguere in esse subsistentiae. Quia relatio, ut relatio, non constituit illa quae referuntur, sed potius praesupponit constituta.’ This echoes Aquinas’s tenet that relations are constitutive of the persons only per modum substantiae, that is, speciWcally as subsistent properties. See Aquinas, ST I q. 29 a. 4. 41 Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 119aB: ‘Et ideo omnis pluralitas in divinis oportet quod sit pluralitas plurium realiter subsistentium, et per consequens plurium suppositorum.’

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‘Thomism’ and the notion of ‘common opinion’ initially attached to it did not necessarily consist in a regurgitation of Aquinas’s theses, but sometimes allowed for the intelligent use of other sources. On the other hand, Hervaeus’s commentary displays the attitude common to most leading Dominicans at this time, of treating Aquinas as an authoritative source which it was appropriate to expound rather than criticize. Hervaeus belonged to that group of ‘second generation Thomists’ who, like John of Naples and Pierre de la Palud, had engaged in the preservation and elaboration of the theological inheritance of Aquinas. It was a concerted eVort to re-establish Aquinas’s reputation and credibility, impaired as these had been by the controversies of the 1270s. Hervaeus’s responses are always formulated with the conscious motivation of interpreting Aquinas’s main theses, even when their elaboration might ultimately lead to new directions. As will become apparent, this ambivalent handling of Thomism will also play an important role in the censorship against Durandus. Although the motives of the censorship responded to a clear attitude of ‘reverence’ towards the Thomist corpus, the criterion for judging Durandus’s theology was not always uniformly ‘Thomist’. All in all, Hervaeus was best equipped among Dominicans for leading the crusade against Durandus. For not only does Hervaeus reveal considerable knowledge of Aquinas’s writings; he also expounds them in a manner calculated to reconcile, rather than critically evaluate, their basic tenets.

5 The opinio singularis: The First Recension of Durandus of St Pourc¸ain’s Commentary on the Sentences Durandus’s initial teaching on the Trinity is found in book I of the Wrst recension of his commentary, a work composed around 1307–8, probably when Durandus was a bachelor of theology in some Dominican provincial studium and before his actual reading of the Sentences as a student in Paris.1 In this early work Durandus advances the controversial claim that essence and relation are really distinct in God, a claim which he articulates in terms of a modal doctrine in principle indebted to Henry of Ghent, but which Durandus takes in a direction ultimately incompatible with both Henry’s metaphysics and the Thomist position. Although this Wrst recension reveals the features of an unWnished draft, it oVers valuable material in that it shows Durandus’s position before he came into conXict with his order. The prima lectura can present, in a way in which even the most uncompromising passages in the Wnal recension cannot, Durandus’s initial point of departure, and the motives behind the Trinitarian doctrine for which he became notorious. Following the tripartite structure proposed at the beginning, this chapter will Wrst examine Durandus’s account of relation; second, the processions; and third, his view of the divine persons.

1 The standard MS reference for version A of bk I of Durandus’s commentary is Paris, BnF lat. MS 14454, fos. 31r–114v. However, a more reliable source, in its completeness and legibility, is Melk, Stiftsbibliothek MS 611, fos. 41r–129v. Unless indicated otherwise, I will use the Melk MS for this study. I am very grateful to Russell L. Friedman for making this source available to me. For more details on the palaeographical reception of Durandus’s A, see the Introduction to this book.

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5.1. RELATION In the standard treatment theologians in this period gave to this issue, the status quaestionis derived from the Lombard’s Sentences: ‘Whether personal properties are identical to both the persons and the divine essence’.2 A fundamental identity between essence and relation was assumed, and the task was to qualify that identity. This reading forestalled from the outset a rejection of any version of the Porretan claim of real distinction, and implicitly sanctioned the more common thesis of real identity. This set the agenda for subsequent theologians’ treatment of the question. Against this background, Durandus’s way of introducing the issue already announces an idiosyncratic account. He raises two questions: whether real relation is some thing (res), and if aYrmative, whether it is something other (alia res) from its foundation. Addressing the Wrst question, Durandus claims that relation is a thing (res) for two reasons: Wrst, its being (entitas) does not depend on the operation of the intellect; secondly, as one of the categories, ‘real being’ (ens reale) can be predicated of relation. On both counts, relation is of itself (secundum se) a real being (ens reale).3 Note that Durandus uses ‘real being’ (ens reale) and ‘thing’ (res) interchangeably to signify extra-mental objects. In answering the second question, Durandus presents three alternative positions. The Wrst, most probably that of Duns Scotus, claims that relation in creatures is another thing (alia res) from its foundation, and eVects composition with it.4 As Durandus presents the main argument, relation can arrive in a thing without causing an inherent change (mutatione) in the thing itself (secundum aliquod absolutum) but only in reference to something other. Since a reference towards another implies a plurality of things (for a 2 Sent. I d. 33 c. 1: ‘Utrum proprietas personarum sint ipsae personae et deus, id est divina essentia.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Utrum relationes divinae sint essentia divina’; ST I q. 28 a. 2: ‘Utrum relatio in Deo sit idem quod sua essentia’; Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1: ‘Utrum proprietas relativa sit realiter divina essentia’; Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 125vb: ‘Utrum proprietas relativa sit realiter idem cum essentia’. 3 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 125vb–126ra: ‘Quantum ad primum patet breviter quod relatio est aliqua res dupliciter. Primo, scilicet illud cuius entitas non dependet ab operatione intellectus, est res et non solum ratio. Sed realis relatio est talis, quod eius entitas non dependet ab operatione intellectus. Ergo, ipsa est res et non solum ratio. Secundo, scilicet omne superius praedicatur secundum aliquam sui aceptionem de quolibet inferiore. Sed ens reale quod dividitur in decem praedicamenta ab Aristotele in 5 Metaphysicae est superius ad relationem, quae est unum de decem praedicamenta. Ergo, praedicatur de relatione. Ergo, relatio secundum se est quodam ens reale.’ 4 For Scotus, see Ord. II d. 1 q. 5, esp. his criticism of Henry of Ghent’s distinction of reason in nn. 200–15 and nn. 231–6.

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thing cannot be really related to itself), relation and its foundation are really distinct and entail composition.5 The idea behind this argument is that composition can arise between a relation and its foundation, such that they form a composite whole distinct from the one which obtains between an absolute accident and a substance. The Wrst objection Durandus raises against this view focuses on the second part of its conclusion, namely on the implication that something can ‘arrive’ in a thing by a change in something other. According to Durandus, action and passion in one suppositum form a relational unit such that it cannot explain or bring about the action in another suppositum. The relation between an active principle and its product describes a complete action that cannot be mediated or explained by another action. To say that action a could result in action a1 falsely implies that a relation is nothing beyond its relative terms—that is, that there is nothing in itself ‘relational’ over and above the two absolute things which are related.6 As we shall see in later chapters, the understanding of action in terms of relation will constitute a central feature of Durandus’s thought and the guiding claim in Durandus’s account of the processions. The second objection raised by Durandus is based on an idea which will be central to the whole commentary, namely that absolute accidents belong to a diVerent metaphysical order from relative accidents. Against Scotus’s claim that relation eVects composition with its foundation, Durandus holds that if this were true of creatures, then it would also have to be true of God. Following a standard Augustinian insight, Durandus argues that whereas absolute accidents like quality and quantity lose their accidentality in God and assume the being of the essence, relation does not lose its relative character, for otherwise the persons could not be distinguished from one 5 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126ra–rb: ‘Addunt tamen isti quod relatio potest alicui advenire de novo nulla facta mutatione in ipso secundum aliquod absoluto, sed solum in alio . . . Est ergo intentio istorum quod relatio realis in creaturis dumtaxat diVert realiter a suo fundamento et facit cum eo compositionem, et nihilomanus potest alicui advenire per alterius mutationem.’ 6 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126rb: ‘sicut distinctorum suppositorum sunt distinctae actiones, ita et distinctae passiones seu receptiones. Sed duo relativa supposito distincta sit huius distinctas actiones, quod ex actione unius aliquid nullo modo est agens nec secundum aliquid absolutum nec secundum aliquid relativum vel respectu. Ergo, simpliciter ex hoc quod unum patitur vel recipitur vel mutatur nullo modo aliquid recipit aliud absolutum vel relatum vel qualitercumque patitur sive mutatur.’ Scotus could however escape Durandus’s objection, based on his claim that change is nothing over and above a succession of forms. A change belongs to the category to which the underlying form belongs, whereas for Durandus change is a relational unity between two terms. Scotus therefore sees no inconvenience in saying that a relation can ‘newly arrive’ in a form, in a way similar—but weaker—to how a new colour ‘arrives’ in a form. Just as a change in colour pertains to the category of quality by inherence, so the new relation between two white things pertains to the category of quality by ‘reference’. See Scotus, Ord. II d. 2 p. 1 q. 4, nn. 171–2, 181, 183; Ord. II d. 1 q. 5, nn. 234–6. See also Cross, Physics of Duns Scotus, esp. 214–26.

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another. According to Durandus, then, the relational account of distinction relies on the idea that relation has a diVerent metaphysical behaviour from the absolute categories.7 In Durandus’s analysis, Scotus’s claim of composition overlooks the main ontological advantage of relation, namely that as a nonabsolute reality it can establish real distinction without eVecting composition. What eventually worried leading Dominicans, however, is that Durandus’s metaphysics seemed to be treating relation in creatures and in God on an equal footing. As the objection to Scotus shows, Durandus makes an inference from the way relation functions in creatures to the way relation must function in God. This appeared to suggest that in both cases he was handling the same sort of reality. The second opinion presented by Durandus corresponds to the standard Thomist view. According to this view, relation is really identical to its foundation but connotes something other which its foundation does not connote.8 The idea behind this view is that the reality of the relation is nothing over and above the absolute accident upon which it is founded because the connotation of an external term does not imply inherence, but merely refers the foundation to something other. This oVered obvious advantages for the Trinity, since the connotation of a relative term could explain the distinction between the persons without thereby introducing composition in God.9 Although Durandus Wnds this position more satisfactory than the Wrst one, he worries about its theological implications. For if it were true that essence and relation are really identical, then it would be diYcult to explain how the 7 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 126rb–va: ‘si in creaturis respectus facit realem compositionem cum fundamento, videtur quod similiter faciat in divinis cum utrabique persona cum realem relativum et reale fundamentum. Nec est simile de aliis praedicamentis, quia secundum Boetium et Augustinum praedicamenta absoluta transferent in divinam substantiam. Deus enim est sine quantitate magnus et sine qualitate bonus. Sed relatio non sic transit deus, enim non est sine relatione pater. Ergo, aliud in dictum videtur esse de relatione et aliquid de aliis praedicamentis.’ 8 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126va: ‘Secunda opinio tenet alterum extremum, scilicet quod relatio non dicit intrinsice aliud quam suum fundamentum sed idem realiter, extrinsice tamen connotat aliud quod non est ipsam, sed ad quod est ipsam tamquam ad rem . . . [I]mpossibile est dare duas diversas res coniunctas simul quin sit in vera compositio. Sed in divinis essentia et relatio non faciunt compositione. Ergo, non sunt diversae. Et pariter ratio est de aliis, ut dictum fuit.’ 9 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126va: ‘licet albedo Socratis et eius similitudo cum Platone albo non sunt duae res quantum ad illud quod intrinsice sunt duo, per idem realiter et formaliter Socrates sit albus et similis Platoni albo, cum similitudo importat extrinsece ad aliquam rem ad quam est, scilicet conformatio qualitatem in Platone quam tamen non importat albedo. Et similiter est in aliis.’ For Aquinas, see In Metaph. 7, lect. 4 nn. 1352–3; Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3; I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 7 a. 8 ad 5; q. 8 a. 4 ad 5; ST I q. 28 a. 1. Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1; I d. 32 q. 1.

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persons are distinguished by relations and not by the essence.10 Durandus’s reasons for rejecting the Thomist thesis of real identity are presented in the explanation of two related claims. These claims will help to clarify Durandus’s own position later. (i) The Wrst claim amounts to a criterion of real identity: For any two objects, if they are not the same thing (res) adequately and conversely (adaequate et convertibiliter), they are not in every mode really identical (omnibus modis idem realiter), for they are not [really identical] according to that mode, namely adequately and conversely, which is a real mode (quidam modus realis) . . . But those [objects] which are not in every mode really identical are really distinct according to some mode (diVerunt aliquo modo realiter).11

Durandus articulates real identity in terms of ‘adequate and converse identity’, where ‘adequate and converse identity’ constitutes a real mode (quidam modus realis) of a thing. Real identity is thus explained in modal terms: two objects are really identical when they constitute one and the same thing according to the same mode. The sort of identity propounded here is rather strong, for it requires the quidditative coincidence of its terms. That is, for any two objects x and y to be really identical, (i) x must be included in the deWnition of y, such that (ii) y is also included in the deWnition of x. They must not only be formally identical, but also adequately identical: their relation of identity must entail convertibility. Durandus would then subscribe to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, whereby if two objects are really identical, their deWnitions must coincide in a symmetrical relation. In Durandus’s analysis, this relation of identity has important ontological implications, for the coincidence of the quidditative components of the objects involved implies that the two objects share the same real mode of being.12 10 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126va–vb: ‘Haec opinio est convenientior et eam tenet Magister in lettera . . . tamen nec Magister solvit ad unam modicam rationem quam fecit ad hanc personae non distinguitur per relationes. Ergo, relationes non sunt omnino idem quod essentia nec vidi vel audivi doctorem hanc materiam tantum, tamen quin proWteor quod incompossibile est in hac materia intellectui satisfacere. Propter quod nec ego hoc intendo nec possum nec scio, sed tango diYcultates quae sunt contra hanc positionem.’ As a young bachelor commenting on the Sentences for the Wrst time, Durandus is fully aware of the impact which his position could cause. He is expressing an opinion not only contrary to Thomist teaching, but also fundamentally at odds with the Lombard’s theology and the Lateran tradition derived from it. He therefore uses cautious language in order to protect himself against possible charges of contumacy or intended doctrinal deviation. 11 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126vb–127ra: ‘illa quae non sunt eadem res adaequate et convertibiliter non sunt omnibus modis idem realiter, quia non illo modo scilicet adaequate et convertibiliter, qui est quidam modus realis . . . Sed quae non sunt omnibus modis idem realiter diVerunt aliquo modo realiter.’ 12 The following passage is illustrative of the contrast between Durandus’s understanding of identity and the Thomist view: ‘Si autem connotatio sit ex parte rei, sic videtur impossibile

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(ii) By the same token, a diVerence in modes is suYcient for real distinction: For any two objects, if one is one thing (res), and one can be found according to its reality (realiter) without the other, they are not absolutely and entirely (simpliciter et omnimode) the same thing (res) but many (plures). But in God essence and paternity are related in such a way, for one of them [i.e. the essence] is one thing and is found according to its reality without the other. Since whereas the essence is found in the Son, paternity is not—otherwise the Son would be identical to the Father. Therefore, essence and paternity are not absolutely and entirely (simpliciter et omnimode) one and the same thing . . . 13

As Durandus understands it, essence and paternity are not in every mode identical, because the essence can be found according to its reality in something other—the Son—in which paternity cannot be found. This lessthan-absolute identity is suYcient for real distinction, Durandus reasons, because it implies the non-coincidence of two realities. Real distinction thus requires that at least one of the terms is a real object, and that it is capable of existence without the other. Durandus therefore rejects a middle distinction between a rational and a real distinction, and holds that if the objects which are distinct are real, their distinction is real. What makes a distinction real is not that it is extra-mental, but that the objects it holds between are real.14 And since in Durandus’s ontology—as we shall see shortly—modes are real, modal distinction is a kind of real distinction. A third position which Durandus seems inclined to defend15 represents a middle way between the other two: relation is another thing (alia res) from its foundation but does not eVect composition with it. In Durandus’s analysis, and in a way reminiscent of Henry of Ghent’s modal doctrine,16 there are in quod eorum quae sunt idem realiter, unum connotet aliquid quod non connotet aliud. [C]onclusionem diYcile est intelligere, scilicet quod quando aliqua sunt eadem res, quod una connotet extrinsece aliquid quod non connotet altera.’ (A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127rb.) That Durandus should Wnd the Thomist position unintelligible underlines the fact that he is operating on very diVerent metaphysics and a diVerent idea of what counts as real. In his view, the Thomist claim that two identical things can connote diVerent realities is not only false but also unintelligible. 13 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126vb: ‘Illa quorum quodlibet est una res et unum invenitur realiter sine alio, non simpliciter et omnimode sunt eadem res sed plures. Essentia autem divina et paternitas sunt huiusmodi, quia quodlibet est una res et una invenitur sine alia. Quia essentia divina in Wlio est in quo tamen non est paternitas, alioquin Wlius esset pater. Ergo, essentia et paternitas non sunt simpliciter et omnimode una res . . .’ 14 Thus, what for Hervaeus is a qualiWed type of identity, non-convertible identity is for Durandus a type of real distinction. See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 135a–b. 15 For an indication of this, see Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb: ‘Ista opinio, si esset vera, evitaret multas diYcultates circa distinctionem personarum . . .’ 16 See Henry, Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 31.47–71; Quodl. V q. 2, 154v.

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reality three diVerent modes of being (modum essendi): being ‘in itself ’ (essendi in se et per se), being ‘in another’ (essendi in alio), and being ‘towards another’ (essendi ad aliud ). The Wrst mode pertains to complete substances, the second to all—accidental—forms (omnibus formis), and the third to all relations.17 For all three cases, Durandus claims, the thing which serves as foundation is really distinct from its mode: For any two objects, if they are related in such a way that, once united, they can be separated so that one preserves its integrity without the other, they are really distinct, provided one of them is a thing (res). But being (esse) ‘in itself ’ or ‘of itself ’ and those [things] on which it is founded are thus [related]; for the mode of being (modus essendi) ‘in itself ’ or ‘of itself ’ is founded on a complete substance, and the mode of being (modus essendi) ‘in another’ [is founded] on an inherent form, as it is [for] an accident. But it appears that each nature preserves its integrity without such a mode, just as the human nature in Christ does not subsist of itself, and the accidents in the Eucharist do not exist in another [i.e. do not inhere] . . . Therefore, such modes of being are really distinct from those [things] on which they are founded.18

For Durandus real distinction is thus explained in terms of separability. A substance is really distinct from its mode of being, because in the anomalous situation that it were to shed its mode of being ‘in itself ’, it could nevertheless continue to exist without subsisting. Christ’s human nature is such a case of a non-subsistent substance. Likewise, an absolute accident is really distinct from its mode of being ‘in another’, because if the accident were to shed its mode of being, it could continue to exist without inhering in a substance. In this way, the accidents of bread and wine in the Eucharist continue to exist without inherence. An object’s separability is thus connected to its self-subsistence (its ‘integrity’ as an absolute thing), such that dependent objects like modes, or parts, are by deWnition not separable. In Durandus’s analysis, therefore, real distinction of the type that implies separability must 17 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va: ‘Tertia opinio tenet mediam viam, scilicet quod relatio est alia res a suo fundamento et tamen non facit compositionem cum ipsam. Primum probatur primo ratione communi ad divinas relationes et ad illas quae sunt in creaturis. Sic nos distinguimus in rebus triplicem modum essendi, scilicet essendi in se et per se, essendi in alio, et essendi ad aliud. Primus modus convenit subiectiis completis, secundus convenit omnibus formis, tertius convenit omnibus relationis.’ Presumably by omnibus formis Durandus meant inherent forms, i.e. those forms which add to a thing’s perfection as accidental properties, and as such distinct from substantial forms. 18 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va: ‘Illa quae sic se habent quod unita possint separari, sic quod unum maneat in integritate naturae suae sine alio, diVerunt realiter, si tamen unum sit res. Sed esse in se vel per se et ea in quibus haec fundatur sunt huiusmodi; fundatur enim modus essendi in se vel per se in substantia completa, et modus essendi in alio in forma inhaerente ut est accidens. Videmus autem quod utraque natura manet in integritate sua absque tali modo, sicut natura humana in Christo non per se subsistit, et accidentia in sacramento non existunt in alio . . . Ergo tales modi essendi diVerunt realiter ab his in quibus fundatur.’

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involve at least one self-subsistent thing. In the case of substances and absolute accidents, then, it is true that they could preserve their actuality without the features of subsistence and inherence respectively, such that their being is really distinct from their mode of being. Likewise, Durandus claims, relation is separable from the absolute accident on which it is founded: the ‘whiteness’ of Socrates can continue to exist without its relation of similarity to the ‘whiteness’ of Plato.19 The validity of Durandus’s argument rests on his theory of the analogy of being between absolute and relative: ‘Thing’ (res) is said analogically . . . of absolute and of relation (relatio), but primarily and absolutely (per prius et simpliciter) of what is absolute, whereas secondarily and in a qualiWed way (per posterius . . . et secundum quid ) of relation, and more so of the relation which is not a thing but only in so far as it is a real mode of being towards something other.20

As Durandus propounds this theory, there is an order of priority between absolute and relative, such that absolute things, because fully actual, constitute the controlling meaning of ‘thing’, whereas relative things, because non-subsistent, constitute the subordinate meaning. Relation is a thing not primarily but only secondarily, in so far as it is the mode of a thing and requires the presence of that thing in order to subsist. By the same token, an absolute thing is metaphysically prior to relation, in the sense that relation ‘presupposes’ the thing on which it depends. Durandus’s ontology thus covers both things and modes, for if modes can be real and yet non-subsistent, it follows that ‘being’ is a feature that not only absolute things but also modes can have. In this light, the claim that relation has being in so far as it modiWes a thing should be understood in a strong ontological sense to mean that relation is, in all its actuality, ‘of a thing’. Relation is not merely a way of 19 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va: ‘Sicut se habent modi essendi in se et in alio ad ea in quibus fundantur, ita se habet modus essendi ad aliud ad illud in quo fundatur. Sed modus essendi in se et modus essendi in alio diVerunt realiter ab illis in quibus fundantur. Ergo, similiter modus essendi ad aliud, qui est ipse respectus relativus, diVert realiter a suo fundamento.’ 20 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128ra: ‘res analogice dicitur . . . de absoluto et de relatio, sed per prius et simpliciter de absoluto, per posterius autem de relatio et secundum quid, et magis de relatione quae non est res nisi quia realis modus essendi ad aliud res.’ (My italics.) The last line recalls Henry of Ghent’s view in Quodl. IX q. 3: ‘relatio realitatem suam contrahit a suo fundamento, et quod ex se non est nisi habitudo nuda, quae non est nisi modus habendi quidam rem ad aliud, et ita non res quantum est ex se, sed solummodo modus rei, nisi extendendo rem ut etiam modus rei dicatur res . . .’ As we shall see in what follows, Durandus takes on Henry’s warrant to include modes of being in his ontology. This leads Durandus, in a way that Henry would not have countenanced, to ascribe an ontological value to relations independently from their foundation. The diYculties arise when relations, deWned as modes of being, are made to function within the divine unity.

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describing the reality of absolute things, but has actual existence as a mode.21 In Durandus’s analysis, therefore, relation is individuated independently of its foundation—because it has real identity as a mode—but cannot be counted over and above its foundation—because it is dependent on it. According to Durandus, the relevant connection between a thing and its mode is dependence and not inherence.22 A mode is not in its foundation in the sense in which absolute accidents inhere in their substances. A mode depends on the thing that serves as its foundation rather in the sense that it requires the presence of that thing to explain it. When it comes to modes and their foundations, then, Durandus disassociates the feature of inherence from that of dependence: a thing and its mode form a metaphysical unity distinct from an accidental one.23 Durandus develops this point in his defence of the claim that relation and its foundation do not eVect composition: That [thing] which is said of itself (per se), such as an absolute [thing], eVects composition with an absolute thing (re absoluta), but that which is said to be a thing secondarily and in a qualiWed way eVects composition with nothing, neither with absolute nor with relative (relato) . . . [F]or it is not the case that any one thing can eVect composition, but only absolute [things] which are said to be [things] primarily and absolutely [can eVect composition].24 21 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 2, 102vb–103ra: ‘tale esse non est aliud quam referri . . . [R]elatio inquantum relatio non habet nisi referri . . . Si est referri qua ratione habet referri, eadem ratione habet dare tale esse, scilicet relatum esse.’ Also I d. 33 q. 1, 127rb: ‘cuius essentia est relatio eius esse est referri. Sed essentia albedis non est referri. Igitur essentia albedinis non est relatio. DiVerunt ergo realiter, quantum se habent ut fundamentum et respectu.’ For Durandus, therefore, the existence and the essence of a thing go together, such that for every being that has some degree of actuality, it constitutes a distinct essence. Durandus’s account of the union between essence and existence bears a striking similarity to that of Godfrey of Fontaines. As we shall see, in the related issue of the connection between esse and subsistence, Durandus follows Godfrey’s theory of subsistence almost verbatim. Cf. C Sent. I d. 34 q. 1. For Godfrey on essence and existence, see Quodl. III q. 1 (PB 2), 158, 163–4; on subsistence, see Quodl. VII q. 5 (PB 3), 304–14. 22 For the diVerent ways in which an accident can function in its substance, see Cross, Metaphysics, esp. 33–50. 23 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13, q. un., 64rb–va: ‘subsistere et inhaerere solum absolutis conveniunt. Relatio enim quae est modus essendi ad aliud et quicumque modus essendi sive in se sive in alio non subsistit per se nec inhaeret fundamento suo, ea quod non est res absoluta a suo fundamento.’ Note the similarity with Bonaventure’s position in Sent. II d. 1 p. 1 a. 3 q. 2: ‘Triplex enim est relatio: quaedam quae fundatur super proprietatem accidentalem, sicut aliqui dicuntur similes quia albi; quaedam quae fundatur super dependentiam essentialem, sicut dependentia materiae ad formam; quaedam quae super originem naturalem. Prima relatio addit aliud super essentiam; tertia relatio nihil addit aliud nisi pure esse , sicut patet in divinis; media relatio dicit aliquid quod est quodammodo idem, quodammodo aliud.’ Like Durandus later, Bonaventure also distinguished between dependence and inherence in the connection between relation and its foundation. 24 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128ra: ‘dictam per se qualis est absoluta facit compositionem cum re absoluta, sed illud quod dicitur res secundario secundum quid cum nullo facit

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Composition obtains only between two separable subsistent things when one inheres in the other, such that if a mode were to eVect composition with its foundation it would ipso facto entail that the mode is a subsistent thing.25 Unlike absolute things, a mode is not the sort of reality that can eVect composition, and this is connected to a mode’s metaphysical features as a non-subsistent reality. Durandus’s account thus yields two kinds of real distinction: (i) in a strong sense, real distinction holds between two separable subsistent things, such that they constitute a plurality of distinct objects capable of composition; (ii) in a qualiWed sense, real distinction obtains between a subsistent thing and a mode, such that they constitute numerically one object without eVecting composition.26 The problem arises in a Trinitarian context, when Durandus’s theory of the analogy of being also leads him to claim that essence and relation are really distinct in God: The divine essence and the relation (relatio) founded on it, diVer as much as the foundation and the respect (respectus) founded on it diVer in creatures. For in both [God and creatures] absolute and relative (absolutum et relatum) are found according to the proper quiddity (propriam rationem) of each, but [absolute and relative] do not eVect composition in one any more than in the other. Now, it is the case that in creatures there is an order of nature (ordo naturae) according to priority and posteriority (secundum prius et posterius) between a foundation and its relation (respectum), in which the foundation and the relation (respectus) do not thereby constitute distinct natures eVecting composition. Therefore, it is the same in the divine.27 compositionem nec cum absoluto nec cum relato . . . [Q]uia non quecumque res faciunt compositionem, sed solum absolutae quae per prius et simpliciter dicuntur.’ 25 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127vb–128ra: ‘Secundum probatur sic, quod relatio non facit realem compositionem cum suo fundamento . . . Si enim esse in alio faceret compositionem cum accidente, puta cum albedine cui convenit et in quo fundatur, tunc esse in alio esset quodam res cui conveniret esse in alio realiter ab ipso primo diversus . . . Sed ei quod est esse in alio non potest competere esse in alio realiter ab ipso diVerens, alioquin esset processus in inWnitum. Quia secundo esse in alio competeret tertium esse in alio et tertio quartum, et sic semper, quod est inconsequens. Ergo, esse in alio non facit compositionem cum suo fundamento, et per eandem rationem nec esse ad aliud.’ 26 Note the contrast with Hervaeus, who claims rather that real distinction necessarily entails composition (see Sent. I d. 31 q. 1, 132a). Indeed, Durandus is aware of the diYculties involved in defending his claim of non-composition: ‘Ista opinio, si esset vera, evitaret multas diYcultates circa distinctionem personarum; nihilominus tamen illud quod est manifestum in ea, scilicet quod diversae res non faciunt compositionem, non omnino videtur eYcaciter probatum.’ (A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb.) Considering the circumstances under which A was issued (prematurely disseminated against the athor’s will), one wonders whether these lines were meant as a provisional note that Durandus was making to himself for deeper consideration on the matter. 27 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. 1, 61rb–va: ‘tantum diVerunt essentia divina et relatio in ipsa fundata quantum diVerunt in creaturis fundamentum et respectus in ipso fundatus. Utrobique enim invenitur absolutum et relatum secundum propriam rationem utriusque, sed nec in uno

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Just as in creatures absolute and relative are really distinct without eVecting composition, so in God relation is really distinct from the essence without thereby introducing accidentality. In both cases, Durandus’s modal doctrine enables him to claim that real distinction does not entail composition when one of the terms is a relative mode and not a fully actual thing. Durandus’s conception of modes goes hand in hand with his ontological approach to distinction. Both aspects are pivotal in his explanation of the Trinity, for if relation is to explain how the persons in God are really distinct, then relation itself has to constitute a real object.28 More problematic, however, is Durandus’s resulting claim that in God there is an ‘order of nature’ whereby the essence, as absolute, is prior to relation—just as in creatures relation ‘presupposes’ the presence of an absolute thing in order to explain it. By ‘order of nature’ Durandus does not mean a real succession between two numerically distinct natures, but rather that, as the mode ‘of a thing’, relation ‘by nature’ (i.e. according to its quiddity) and independently of the intellect presupposes that ‘thing’ which it modiWes. The theological implications of Durandus’s view of relation are well illustrated in the Wnal passage to this question: When it is claimed that for every thing that is not the divine essence, it is a creature, it is necessary to add that [it is a creature when it is] not the essence and also not the property of the divine essence. The reason for this is that neither what is created, nor any action in creatures, can have relation as its immediate term, but [must be] mediated by [its] foundation.29 Therefore, that relation (relatio) is created or uncreated is to be established from (ex) the foundation . . . 30 faciunt compositionem plus quam in alio. Nunc est ita quod in creaturis est ordo naturae secundum prius et posterius inter fundamentum et suum respectum, non obstante quod fundamentum et respectus non sunt distinctae naturae facientes compositionem. Ergo, idem est in divinis.’ 28 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127ra: ‘paternitas et Wliatio diVerunt realiter, aut ergo realitate fundamenti, aut alia. Non realitate fundamenti, quia in illa conveniunt. Ergo, diVerunt alia realitate. Ergo, praeter realitate fundamenti oportet ponere in paternitate et Wliatione alia realitate, alioquin nullo modo diVerunt inter se realiter.’ Underlying this claim is the idea that real distinction requires a real object to explain it, such that only what is real can have an explanatory function. See Cross, Metaphysics, 50 and 93–4: ‘if a form F-ness is that in virtue of which something is F, then F-ness must itself exist’. In other words, ‘an explanation requires an explanatory object’. 29 According to Durandus, the Aristotelian principle that relation cannot be the end term of an action holds only in creatures and not in God. As will be shown in the following section, when it comes to the Trinity Durandus advisedly distances himself from this aspect of Aristotelian metaphysics. 30 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb–va: ‘Cum dicitur omni quod non est essentia divina est creatura, dicunt quod oportet plus addere quod non sic essentia nec proprietas essentiae divinae. Cuius ratio est, quia nec creato nec quaecumque actio in creaturis potest terminari immediate ad relationem, sed mediante fundamento. Et ideo quia relatio sit creata vel increata indicandum est ex fundamento . . .’

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The background to this passage is the argument commonly adduced in favour of the claim of real identity between essence and relation.31 The argument is based on the disjunction that ‘for every thing, if it is not created it is divine’, so that if relation in God is not created it is necessarily identical to the essence. Behind Durandus’s alternative division between absolute and relative is a distinct view of the Trinity, whereby what is at stake is not so much the real identity between essence and relation, but the avoidance of antiTrinitarian reductions to one absolute substance. Durandus’s priority is thus to ensure the reality of relation as distinct from the reality of absolute things. As he argues, since relation is a mere mode dependent on a thing, it is not for relation to determine whether its foundation belongs to one metaphysical order or the other. All that the relation of paternity implies is a reference from a father x to a son y, such that only when we know that x is the Wrst person of the Trinity and not Peter the father of John, can we say that ‘paternity’ is a divine and not a created relation. The fact that relation, as a non-discrete item, cannot determine between the two orders, suggests to Durandus a more primitive metaphysical division obtaining rather between absolute and relative. Durandus challenges the canonical disjunction between created and divine, arguing rather that divine relations are divine and not created, not because there is no other ontological choice, but because their dependence on the divine essence places them in the divine order. The very reality of relation as a mode implies that it cannot inform its foundation any more than it can constitute an object numerically distinct from it. Durandus’s claim of real distinction proved deeply controversial. Not only did he appear to be treating divine and created realities on an equal footing, but, coupled with his understanding of real distinction in terms of separability, he also appeared to be multiplying the realities in God. From a Thomist perspective, resting on the assumption that only subsistent things have proper being,32 Durandus’s modal doctrine appeared to be allotting a distinct ontological realm to relation, such that not only the ratio but also the being of relation counts over and above the divine essence. As the development of the 31 See e.g. Aquinas, ST I q. 28 a. 2 sed contra: ‘Omnis res, quae non est divina essentia, est creatura. Sed relatio realiter competit deo. Si ergo non est divina essentia, erit creatura . . .’ Cf. Hervaeus, De relationibus, in Subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimus tractatibus, ed. M. A. Zimara, 53vb–70vb (Venice, 1513; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1966), q. 1, 55ra, in which Hervaeus cites this argument as ‘propositio Bernardi’. For Hervaeus, as for Aquinas, ‘created’ and ‘uncreated’ are exhaustive disjuncts. 32 Central to the Thomist view of the primacy of substances over accidents is the idea that an accident does not enjoy proper esse apart from its subject. This reductionist view of accidents is also exempliWed in Aquinas’s claim (see De Ente, c. 6) that an accidental being results only from the union of an accident and its subject. Thus, an accident has being only in a qualiWed sense. See Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 255.

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controversy will conWrm, the connection with the Porretan error was ‘an inference with a conspicuous handle to it’.33 Furthermore, Durandus’s indiscriminate use of the analogy between absolute and relative led his opponents to believe, not surprisingly, that he was introducing a real order of priority in God.34 Durandus was fully aware of the theological risks involved in his modal doctrine, and we shall see how, as the controversy developed, he made eVorts to tone down his claim of real distinction.35 But by ascribing a distinct being to relation Durandus was not intending to introduce a third ontological realm. Rather, he was attempting to describe a type of being which, in all its actuality, was still incapable of eVecting composition. For this purpose, he propounded his theory of the analogy of being, which presented the distinction between absolute and relative as a preferable alternative to the standard Aristotelian division between substance and accidents.36 The relevant distinction held therefore not between subsistence and inherence, but between subsistence and dependence. As a result, absolute accidents became metaphysically closer to substances than to relative accidents. The main advantage of this template of analysis was that it enabled an explanation of real distinction which did not restrict distinction to substances, while at the same time checking the risk of composition. That real distinction could be explained without recourse to absolute things was particularly useful for an account of the Trinity, a doctrine which required a solid theory of distinction rid of the equally unwelcome threats of tritheism and accidentality. In propounding his alternative metaphysics, therefore, Durandus was most probably thinking as a theologian, and his governing insight of 33 The aYnity between Durandus and Gilbert is signiWcant. Gilbert’s reasons for understanding divine relations as forms ‘extrinsically attached’ to the essence seem to respond to the same theological insight behind the identiWcation of relations with modes of being. The way both theologians see it, if relation assumes the subsistent being of the essence, each person would signify a distinct subsistence with the result of tritheism. Therefore, in order to safeguard the Trinity while checking the risk of composition, relation has to be really diVerentiated from the essence in a way that does not add in the number of realities—i.e. either ‘extrinsically’, or as a mode of being with a diminished esse. 34 Both censure lists register the controversial eVect of Durandus’s claims. See e.g. ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, a. 12; and ‘Articuli in quibus’, a. 13. For a discussion of the censured articles, see Ch. 8 and 11 below. 35 Symptomatically, the quoted passage is excluded from the Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary. In C Durandus divides the question into two separate issues concerning categorical relations (d. 30) on the one hand and divine relations (d. 33) on the other. His parallel treatment of both in A presumably led the Thomists to infer that he was applying categorical realities to God. 36 The Thomist view, by contrast, follows a standard Aristotelian line. See Aquinas, In Phys. 5, lect. 9 n. 885: ‘primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens. . . . Divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantia et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.’

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disengaging real distinction from composition was in all likelihood aimed at buttressing his Trinitarian account. In this light, Durandus’s view appears to have been modelled, at least in principle if not matched by its conclusions, on Henry of Ghent’s teaching on modes. Durandus inherited from Henry three main ideas: (i) an understanding of the categories according to the threefold classiWcation of modes into being in itself, being in another, and being towards another; (ii) the identiWcation of relation with a pure mode of being which does not eVect composition with its foundation; and (iii) the understanding of the Trinity in the light of this notion of relation.37 Thus, Henry’s modal doctrine suited Durandus’s needs in that it provided the necessary metaphysical tools for establishing a type of real distinction which did not ipso facto eVect composition. But despite the recognizable aYnities, Durandus’s modal doctrine could not strictly be inferred from Henry’s metaphysics. Henry’s claim that only subsistent things have proper esse already positioned him in diVerent coordinates, and Durandus’s notion of relation as a distinct modal reality violated Henry’s caveat that a mode cannot be counted as a reality independently of the absolute thing on which it is founded.38 As will become apparent in what follows, Durandus’s theological use of the modal doctrine had much more in common with the sort of view propounded by Bonaventure—a view which, after all, was not improbably channelled through Henry. In particular Durandus’s understanding of the modal distinction as a less-than-absolute distinction based on the reality of its terms could certainly claim some Bonaventurean ancestry.

5 . 2 . T H E P ROC E S SI O N S That Durandus allowed for a broader understanding of real distinction in the divine is a logical consequence from his notion of relation as a mode of being. 37 Paulus, Henri de Gand, 187. For another example of a Dominican following a metaphysics of modes inspired on Henry’s teaching, see James of Metz, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 3 (Troyes MS 992, 57vb–58ra); A Sent. I d. 26 q. 3 (Troyes MS 992, 55ra–57vb). See Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 438– 60; J. Koch, ‘Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.’, AHDLMA 4 (1929–30), 169–232. Also my article, ‘Henry of Ghent’s Teaching on Modes and its InXuence in the Fourteenth Century’, Mediaeval Studies, 64 (2002), 111–29. 38 It is improbable, on the other hand, that Durandus could have been following an Aegidian version of the modal doctrine. Despite some apparent coincidences between the two positions— like e.g. the notion of a res relativa—Giles’s claim of real distinction between essence and existence, together with his theory that esse is the mark of subsistence, distance him from Durandus and place him closer to Aquinas. Giles also holds that a thing can be simultaneously

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For on account of its (diminished) reality, a mode of being can, in its own right, establish real distinction without thereby necessarily entailing either numerical plurality or composition. The full implications of Durandus’s claim of real distinction become clearer when modes are made to function in a strictly Trinitarian context. This section will be occupied with the way in which Durandus’s modal doctrine aVects the explanation of the divine processions. The question at hand concerns the type of distinction which obtains between the processions of the Son and the Spirit. According to Durandus, a procession describes an irreducible relation between two directly opposite terms, an active principle and a passive product, belonging to the same process of origin.39 Action and passion are thus understood in strict relational terms, such that the relation between a principle and a product cannot admit of mediation between its terms: one term is immediately ‘from the other’. Thus, the procession of the Son signiWes the relation of origin between active generation and passive generation, such that active generation is identical to the relation of paternity and passive generation is identical to Wliation. Likewise, common spiration and passive spiration constitute opposite relations in the procession of the Spirit. Each procession describes a relative unity, and Wliation cannot mediate the procession of the Spirit any more than a passive product can account for the origin of a diVerent product.40 Having laid out the template of analysis, Durandus’s discussion of this question focuses on a criticism of the Thomist position, which Durandus contrasts with his own, preferable explanation of the processions. As Durabsolute and relative, an idea which Durandus’s disjunction between absolute and relative axiomatically excluded. More tellingly, Giles is prepared to accept that relation eVects composition with its subject, an outcome which Durandus’s metaphysics of modes was designed to check. In a word, the similarities between Durandus and Giles’s position appear to be only accidental. All in all, Giles’s inXuence in this controversy appears to have been minimal, only conWned to an occasional allusion as the opinion of another quidam. Neither Durandus nor Hervaeus seems to have shaped his view in contrast or in adherence to that of Giles’s. For Giles on relations, see Sent. I d. 20 princ. 1, q. 1; I d. 27 princ. 1 q. 1; I d. 31 princ. 1 q. 2; I d. 33 princ. 1 qq. 1–3. 39 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 62va: ‘de ratione processionis solum est quod procedens sit ab alio, exclusis enim ab actione et passione omni motu et mutatione et innovatione, remanaret soli respectus a quo aliud et quod ab alio’. Also I d. 29 q. 1, 116rb: ‘principium accipiatur pro actuali habitudine seu relatione producentis ad productum.’ 40 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 62vb: ‘processio in divinis non sit motus vel mutatio media inter personam producente et illam a qua procedit. Si dicat tantum respectum ut quod est ab alio cum correspondet oppositus respectus et a quo aliud qui respectus constituit et distinguit personas, patet quod generatio activa est idem quod paternitas vel relatio paternitatis, et generatio passiva est idem quod Wliatio vel relatio Wliationis. Spiratio autem sive active sive passive accepta sit idem cum relationibus correspondentibus.’ Durandus advanced a similar argument in his Wrst objection to Scotus’s view of the connection between relation and its foundation. See s. 5.1. above.

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andus summarizes the Thomist view, active generation and active spiration are not really distinct, whereas passive generation and passive spiration are.41 This conclusion follows from a twofold claim: (i) commonality entails real identity. For any two objects found in one and the same suppositum, they are not really distinct according to some mode (aliquo modo). Just as the divine essence does not add in the number of persons because it is common to all three, so, in the same way, whatever is common to two supposita—e.g. active spiration in respect to Father and Son—is really identical to them and does not entail numerical plurality. Real identity is therefore incompatible with a plurality of subsistent objects.42 (ii) Real distinction obtains only by opposition in a relation of origin, such that only the supposita can be really distinct.43 On the basis of these two claims, Thomists have contended that, just as active generation and passive generation are really distinct because they are opposite terms in the relation of origin of the Son, so passive generation and passive spiration are really distinct because they constitute opposite terms in the relation of origin which accounts for the constitution of the Spirit. Therefore, the product of generation is related by origin to passive spiration, such that spiration proceeds directly from passive generation.44 41 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63ra: ‘quidam dicunt quod generare et spirare non diVerent realiter, generari tamen et spirari realiter diVerunt’. For Aquinas see Sent. I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; I d. 33 q. 1 a. 2; De Pot., q. 10 a. 2; ST I q. 28 a. 3; I q. 30 a. 2. Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81a–b. Tellingly, whereas on this occasion Durandus refers to the Thomist view as ‘quaedam opinio insiYciens’, in the Wnal recension he presents it as ‘quidam modus qui a multis reputatur verus’ (C I d. 13 q. 2, 47vb)—i.e. the ‘common opinion’. I take this as indicative of how the censure against Durandus, especially the second ‘Thomist’ list, obliged him at least to moderate his tone. 42 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63ra–rb: ‘Prima est, quod ea quae sunt in divinis in eodem supposito non diVerunt aliquo modo realiter . . . [U]bi sunt plura realiter diversa quorum quodlibet est subsistens, ibi sunt plura supposita . . . Necesse non possunt ergo diVerre realiter quae sunt in eodem supposita . . . [S]icut se habet essentia divina ad omnia quae sunt in divinis, quia in omnibus communis ita se habet quocumque aliud quod est pluribus commune ad ea quibus est commune. Sed essentia divina non ponit in numerum realem cum aliquo quod sit in divinis, quia communis stat in eodem supposito . . .’ 43 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63ra–rb: ‘illa qua conveniunt in omnibus in quibus non opponuntur non possunt diVerre nisi per oppositionem. Sed in divinis supposita conveniunt in omnibus in quibus non opponuntur, quod patet per Anselmum, qui dicit quod persona producens necesse communicat personae productae omnia in quibus ei non opponitur. Ergo, in divinis nulla potest esse diVerentia realis nisi per oppositionem.’ This constitutes the Thomist reading of Anselm’s principle: ‘Totum est unum in deo, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio’ (De Processione, 1. 181. 2). 44 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63vb: ‘productum et producens in quantum huius opponuntur relative. Sed spiratus est per se a genito . . . Ergo, opponuntur relative, et per consequens generari et spirari relative opponuntur . . . Si autem spiratus opponitur quia est ab ipso, necessario est quod opponatur generanti quia est ab ipso saltem mediante genito, et ita spiratus realiter diVert a genito et generante et spirari a generari et generare, quia aliquod modo opponuntur.’ Note however that Aquinas never expressely advances the claim that passive generation and passive spiration are related by opposition. See e.g. Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 2; ST I

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Durandus’s arguments against the Thomist view can be summarized as follows. First, and against (i), any two emanations which originate in the same suppositum but do not end in the same term are not really identical, in so far as they diVer in their relative term (re relata). Thus, even though active generation and active spiration coincide in the Father, they are really distinct according to their relative terms: active generation ends in the Son whereas active spiration ends in the Spirit. Consequently, and contrary to the Thomist opinion, active generation and active spiration are really distinct—if not opposite—relations.45 Secondly, and against (ii), two passive products cannot ensue directly (inmediate) from the same action. According to this principle, passive generation is the direct result of active generation, whereas passive spiration is the direct result of active spiration. Therefore, and contrary to the Thomist opinion, passive generation and passive spiration cannot be directly opposed in a relation of origin.46 Durandus rejects the Thomist position mainly on the grounds that it presupposes an understanding of all processions according to relative opposition, whereby whatever is not opposed is necessarily communicated, and contends rather that real distinction in God is not coextensive with relative opposition.47 That is, real distinction is not restricted to the supposita, but can q. 36 a. 2. This is rather an inference from Aquinas’s central tenet that the essence is the power that accounts for the processions, an inference which only later Thomists spell out. See e.g. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81b–82a: ‘spirari et spiratus habent oppositionem relativam et ad generari et ad generare’. See also Durandellus, Nicolai Medensis (Durandelli) Evidentiae Contra Durandum, ed. P. T. Stella (Tu¨bingen and Basle: A. Francke Verlag, 2003), vol. 1, I. 7, p. 106: ‘Primus est contra illud quod dicit sanctus Thomas, Ia Parte, q. XXXVI, a. 2, scilicet quod spiratus est per se a genito, quod licet explicite non dicat, tamen ex dictis suis ibidem necessario colligitur.’ (My italics.) 45 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63vb: ‘sciendum est quod haec opinio deWcit in positione et in rationibus positionis. In positione quidam quantum ad hoc quod ponit quia generare et generari nullo modo diVerunt realiter a communi spiratione quia idem iudicium est de emanationibus et relationibus . . . Quod patet primo sic, illa quae non possunt convenire eidem respectu eiusdem non sunt idem realiter saltem re relata, quia relationis esse est ad aliud esse. Sed generare et spirare vel generari non possunt convenire eidem respectu eiusdem, generare enim competit patri respectu Wlii tantum, sed solum spirare respectu spiritus sancti. Rursus, generari et spirare competunt Wlio, sed generari respectu patris, spirare autem respectu spiritus sancti tantum. Ergo, spirare non est idem realiter saltem re relata cum generare et generari.’ 46 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. 1, 63vb–64ra: ‘Quinto sic: ab una actione inmediate non possunt esse duae passiones. Sed generari et spirari sunt duae passiones vel emanationes dictae passivae. Ergo, non possunt esse ab unica actione inmediate, sed generari est inmediate a generare, et spirari inmediate a spirare. Ergo, generare et spirare non sunt una actio sed duae realiter diVerentes, sicut et passiones eis correspondentes.’ 47 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64va: ‘non enim sunt incompossibilia in eodem supposito quacumque realiter distinguuntur.’ See also ibid. 65ra: ‘licet omnia opposita sunt distincta, tamen non omnia distincta sunt opposita, nec in formis absolutis nec in relationibus . . . In plus enim est distinguere quam opponi. Cum igitur relationes secundum propria rationem manent

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obtain between non-subsistent beings. It is therefore not necessarily the case that real distinction entails a plurality of subsistent objects; otherwise it would be impossible to distinguish between processions in the same person.48 Thus, according to Durandus there can obtain a plurality of emanations in one and the same suppositum when they constitute distinct relative unities ending in diVerent terms. Likewise, essence and relation are really distinct in one and the same suppositum in so far as they are not adequately and conversely identical in their reality (ex natura rei).49 Underlying Durandus’s argument against the Thomist position is his metaphysics of absolute and relative, which Durandus combines with the standard Augustinian insight that real distinction in the divine is according not to substance but to relation. As Durandus argues, a divine person is formally a suppositum on account of a relative property, and formally subsistent solely on account of the essence. Since the supposita signify only one substance, the principle of distinction in God cannot be according to substance, but rather in virtue of their relations to one another. Rejecting the Thomist equation between real distinction and distinction by opposition, Durandus maintains that divine simplicity is guaranteed precisely because real distinction is not according to substance. The principle of subsistence in God is the essence, and ‘only the supposita subsist; relations, by contrast, are only a respect towards another; neither do they subsist of themselves, nor does anything subsist on account of them’.50 As we shall see, this claim was to in divinis, poterat invicem in eis alia distinctio quae non est ratione cuiuscumque oppositionis sicut est inter paternitatem et communem spirationem vel inter generare et spirare.’ 48 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64ra–rb: ‘Quod . . . dicitur in minore quod ubicumque in divinis sunt plura realiter distincta quodlibet eorum est per se subsistens, falsum est non solum de hiis quae sunt in eodem supposito, sed etiam in diversis suppositis.’ Also ibid. 64va: ‘Pluralitas, ergo, respectu relationum in eodem supposito nullo modo est pluralitas subsistentium suppositorum nec eorum per quae supposita divina subsistunt.’ 49 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64ra: ‘In prima quidem suppositione qua dicitur quod in divinis ea quae sunt in eodem supposito non possunt diVerre realiter, est defectus. DiVerunt enim aliquo modo realiter in eodem supposito essentiae et relatio saltem quia non sunt idem adaequate et convertibiliter etiam ex natura rei . . . , et plures relationes sunt in eodem supposito realiter diVerentes, ut in patre paternitas et communis spiratio, et in Wlio Wliatio et communis spiratio.’ 50 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64rb: ‘Licet enim suppositum divinum sit id quod subsistit, tamen per aliud sit formaliter suppositum et per aliud subsistit. Constituitur enim in esse suppositi formaliter et completive per proprietatem relativam. Subsistit autem solum per essentiam vel substantiam, quae sicut est una in pluribus suppositis, sic in eis est una subsistentia. Unde distinctio divinorum suppositorum non est secundum distinctionem subsistentiarum. . . . Sola autem essentia vel substantia est per quam subsistunt, relationes autem non subsistunt secundum se nec per eas aliquid subsistit, sed solum refertur.’ This constitutes Durandus’s reading of Augustine, De Trin. 5. 6: ‘quia et Pater non dicitur Pater nisi ex eo quod habet Patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur . . . Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia: quia hoc non secundum

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prove highly contentious, for it appeared to Thomists that Durandus was positing two principles of reality in God, i.e. the divine substance and relation.51 Durandus develops his position as follows. The principles of distinction (prima distinguentia) in God must establish distinction (i) of themselves (se ipsis) and (ii) on account of their entire reality (secundum se tota). That is, they must be suYcient and exhaustive explanations of distinction, such that neither do they presuppose a previous distinction, nor does their reality include something common. The supposita fail to satisfy both conditions, for one and the same suppositum can include a real distinction—e.g. active generation and active spiration are really distinct in the Father—just as two supposita can share in the same common reality—e.g. spiration is common to Father and Son. Thus, the supposita can include communicable and incommunicable realities, whereby they cannot provide a suYcient explanation for real distinction in God.52 In Durandus’s view, only relation satisWes both conditions, since the very reality of relation as a mode determines that, if the relative term changes, the relation itself changes.53 To take an example, if father x is related by paternity to son y and son z, there is the relation of paternity P1 of father x to son y, and the relation of paternity P2 of father x to son z. Although both relations P1 and P2 are found in one and the same father x, P1 and P2 are really distinct from each other because they signify diVerent modes of reference of father x. And substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum . . .’ Note the contrast with Hervaeus, who claims, following a Thomist view, that there is only one type of reality in God, namely the divine substance. See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 120b. 51 This claim was to be judged heretical in art. 6 of the 1314 censure list. See Ch. 8 below. 52 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64vb: ‘Est ergo intelligendo quod generare et spirare realiter diVerunt, similiter generari et spirari. Ratio huius diVerentiae non est sumenda ex parte suppositorum, tamen quia in divinis suppositis invenitur aliud unum et idem numero vel essentia divina et communis spiratio in patre et Wlio, et rursus in eodem supposito sunt plura quae realiter diVerunt, tamen quia supposita non possunt esse prima distinguentia. Cuius ratio est, quia prima distinguentia debent diVerre se ipsis et secundum se tota, quia si in aliquo conveniret et in aliquo diVereret non essent primae diVerentiae, sed constituita ex primis diVerentiis cum aliquo alio. Sed supposita non diVerent secundum se toto, sed conveniunt in aliquo. Ergo, non sunt prima distinguentia nec ex distinctione eorum sumenda est causa et ratio distinctionis aliorum . . .’ 53 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 65ra: ‘Et si quaeratur ratio distinctionis istorum [i.e. inter paternitatem et communem spirationem vel inter generare et spirare], dicendum quod se ipsis distinguitur et non per aliquid aliud qua sunt prima et simpliciter se ipsis distinguuntur et non per aliquid aliud . . .’ Also ibid. 63vb: ‘illa quae non possunt convenire eidem respectu eiusdem non sunt idem realiter, saltem re relata, quia rationis essentiae est ad aliud esse’. Also I d. 11 q. 2, 57ra: ‘Relata autem potius sunt ad aliud, et quia sunt ad aliud et ideo non distinguuntur nisi per hoc quod sunt ad aliud, per alium et alium respectum, eo quod respectus pluriWcatur iuxta numerum terminorum. Ideo talia distinguuntur a pluribus per plures respectus. De numero autem talium sunt personae divinae, quae sunt et dicuntur relativae.’

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since real distinction according to modes does not entail numerical plurality, father x does not thereby become two numerically distinct fathers. Thus, neither can one and the same relation include two distinct terms—otherwise it would ipso facto constitute two relations—nor can two distinct relations share common terms—otherwise they would constitute one and the same reference. Likewise in God, active generation and active spiration are really distinct, for even though they are both found in the Father, active generation is in the Father in respect to the Son, whereas active spiration is in the Father in respect to the Spirit. Since it belongs to the nature of relation to include a reference towards something other, a diVerence in the terms suYces to make them distinct realities. Therefore, relation constitutes a suYcient principle for real distinction.54 Durandus distinguishes between two kinds of relative distinction in the processions: ‘direct’ opposition (oppositio directa) and ‘indirect and concomitant’ opposition (oppositio indirecte et concomitative). Direct opposition obtains between two relations when they cannot coexist in the same person (propter incompossibile oppositorum in eodem supposito), such that they constitute corresponding terms in the same process of origin. This is the case between active and passive generation in the constitution of the Son, and between active and passive spiration in the constitution of the Spirit. Direct opposition is then suYcient for numerical plurality between the persons.55 However, direct opposition alone cannot account for all real distinction in God, for we can Wnd a plurality of relations coexisting in one and the same suppositum. This is the case when the relative terms pertain to diVerent processes of origin, such that their distinction does not result in the constitution of subsistent object.56 This type of real distinction is according to indirect opposition, and obtains when one of the terms can coexist with the direct opposite of the other.57 Thus, passive generation and passive spiration 54 Note the contrast with Aquinas, who claims that the processions cannot be distinguished of themselves. De Pot., q. 10 a. 2: ‘Nulla autem processio nec operatio nec motus habet speciem a se, sed sortitur speciem a termino vel a principio. Unde nihil est dictu, quod processiones aliquae distinguantur seipsis; sed oportet quod distinguantur penes principia vel penes terminos. . . . Et sic solus ordo processionum qui attenditur secundum originem processionis, multiplicat in divinis.’ 55 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 65ra: ‘omnis relationes se ipsis diVerunt ad invicem realiter, sed quaedam diVerunt specialiter secundum suppositum, et illae sunt tantum inter quas est oppositio directa, ut inter generare et generari, et similiter inter spirare et spirari.’ 56 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. 1, 65ra: ‘inter quas est oppositio indirecte et concomitative, sicut inter generare et generari ex una parte et spirari ex alia . . . Ita quod oppositio non est ratio distinctionis realis simpliciter, sed tantum illius quae est secundum suppositum specialiter propter incompossibile oppositorum in eodem supposito.’ 57 James of Metz oVers a clear explanation of indirect opposition in his A Sent. I d. 13 q. 1, 42rb: ‘nihil est idem cum aliquo quod potest stare cum suo opposito.’ Although it is indeed

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are indirectly opposed, because the direct opposite of passive spiration—i.e. active spiration—can coexist with passive generation in the Son. Thus, whereas for Thomists there is direct opposition between passive generation and passive spiration, for Durandus their relation is only indirect and concomitant.58 Not surprisingly, the resulting explanation of the Wlioque is decidedly nonThomist. Durandus disengages passive generation from active spiration in the Son and argues as follows: the direct product of generation is passive generation, and the direct product of active spiration is passive spiration; therefore, passive generation takes no part in the relation of origin which constitutes the Spirit as a distinct person. Passive generation is not suYcient for spiration, but is only a causa sine qua non.59 In order to safeguard the Wlioque, a clause to which he also subscribes,60 Durandus claims that the Son takes active part in the procession of the Spirit, not as the product of generation, but as spirative power (vis spirativa). It is thus by sharing in active spiration with the Father that the Son is related to the Spirit by origin, so that the relevant relation is not that between passive generation and passive spiration, but that between active spiration and passive spiration. As Durandus understands it, then, it is as spirans and not as generatum that the Son is opposed to the Spirit by origin.61 possible that Durandus may have borrowed the notion of indirect opposition from James (James was a fellow Dominican and both recensions of his commentary pre-date Durandus’s A), this notion is more likely to have derived from Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VII q. 4. I am grateful to Russell L. Friedman for pointing this out to me. 58 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64vb: ‘spiratus non est per se et directe a genito nec a generato, ut isti dicunt, sed indirecte et concomitative, et illud facit quod diVerunt secundum suppositum sine qua diVerentia ad hoc possent diVerre realiter si essent in eodem supposito’. 59 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 1, 54rb: ‘generare et generari habent oppositionem ad spirari mediatam, licet non inmediatam . . . [P]ater per generare sit principium Wlii, et per consequens per ipsum est principium spiritus sancti, licet mediatum, quia per ipsum generare communicatur Wlio vis spirativa qua producitur spiritus sanctus.’ 60 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 1, 53vb: ‘Haec autem opinio [i.e. graecorum] non potest habere veritatem quantum ad hoc quod dicunt spiritum sanctum non procedere a Wlio’; ibid., q. 2 ad 1, 55vb: ‘si spiritus sanctus non procederet a Wlio . . . non possent diVerre personaliter sed solum sicut una persona diVert a se ipsa secundum diversas proprietates . . .’ 61 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 59vb–60ra: ‘esse productum vel genitum non est esse producentem vel spirantem, nec esse genitum est ei ratio per se spirandi alterum. Sed vis spirativa et quamvis hoc non sit in Wlio nisi per generationem, tamen ipsa generatio per accidens se habet ad spirationem, quia si Wlio esset vis spirativa non per generationem habita sicut est in patre, ad hoc Wlius spiraret et non spiraret inquantum genitus . . . Nullo ergo modo generans inquantum generans est spirans, nec genitus inquantum genitus est spirans . . . Ergo, spiratus non est per se nec a genito nec a generante . . .’ This is consistent with Durandus’s claim that Father and Son constitute one principle of spiration, since despite their being two supposita, they spirate on account of one spirative power. See A Sent. I d. 29 q. 2, 116vb: ‘Vis autem spirativa quae est ratio producendi spiritum sanctum est una in patre et Wlio. Ideo concedendum est patrem et Wlium esse unum principium spiritus sancti non obstante pluralitate suppositorum propter unitatem principii quo spirant.’ Cf. I d. 11 q. 3, 58rb.

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Underlying this argument is Durandus’s view that an active principle (a quo est aliud) and a passive product (quod est ab alio) constitute a basic relational unity, which precludes any intermediate procession between active spiration and passive spiration. The divine persons are constituted by origin, such that for one and the same person there can only be one essential production. In this connection, Durandus is prepared to use the analogy of accident for the procession of the Spirit. Thus, just as an accident arrives in a complete substance, spiration arrives in Father and Son as persons already constituted in their being. In this sense, spiration is not ‘essential’ but rather concomitant to the constitution of Father and Son.62 As we shall see at the end of this section, this claim leads Durandus to propound, albeit timidly, an order of priority between the processions. Note, however, that for all its idiosyncrasy, Durandus’s account of the processions still falls within Dominican parameters broadly understood. For Durandus, the formal principle for personal distinction remains, as in the Thomist view, relative opposition. Like Thomists, too, he distances himself from the emanational account and appeals to Anselm’s principle in support of the relational view.63 However, Durandus’s reading of Anselm diVers from the Thomist one on a crucial point. Durandus restricts the scope of Anselm’s principle to direct opposition, such that indirect relations like passive generation and passive spiration—i.e. the crux of the Thomist account of the Wlioque—escape the relevant parameters. Thus, on this reading, Durandus is able to claim rightful Anselmian ancestry for his own account of the Wlioque: since what is not directly opposed is communicated, and Father and Son are opposed by generation only, the Father communicates spirative power to the Son. Therefore, Durandus concludes, Father and Son are really distinct from the Spirit by active spiration only, and not by passive generation, as Thomists want.64 62 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 2, 56rb: ‘Si solus pater esset producens inquantum generans et inquantum spirans, una sola productio esset essentialis per quam constituitur in esse personali, ut non est secundum generare. Alia vero accidentalis pro tanto quia adveniret personae iam constitutae, scilicet spirare. Similiter circa unam et eandem personam productam una processio esset essentialis, scilicet generare, correspondens ei quae est generare. Alia vero accidentalis, scilicet spirare, quia advenit personae iam constitutae. Isto enim modo est aliquid accidentale in divinis.’ Also I d. 12 q. un., 60ra: ‘inter generationem Wlii et spirationem spiritus sancti est quidem ordo originis, sed non per se et directe, sed indirecte et concomitative et quasi per accidens’. 63 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 2, 55ra–va: ‘Haec opinio non potest stare, quia dato quod essent tales diversi modi emanendi, tamen non suYceret ad personalem distinctionem productorum.’ For Henry’s emanational account, see Summa, 55 q. 6, 111v; 54 q. 6, 92r. 64 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64va: ‘ad auctoritatem Anselmi qui dicit quod persona producens communicat personae productae omnem illud in quo ei non opponitur, dicendum quod hoc intelligendum est de aliis a proprietate personali, illa enim semper est incommunicabilis sicut et persona dicit quid incommunicabile. Omnia autem altera sunt communicabilia,

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Durandus’s reading of Anselm is governed by the claim that relation, rather than the essence, accounts for the processions. As was made clear above, Durandus identiWes the processions with relations in a one-to-one basis. The underlying insight is that, if the persons are distinguished by relations, then relations—rather than the essence—must also account for the processions. According to Durandus, the essence takes part in the processions only as communicable principle (principium communicatonis) and not as principle of production (principium productionis), for the essence, unlike the supposita, is not produced but is rather communicated. His reasoning is that, since a procession describes a relation between a principle and a product, its terms must be by deWnition distinct from each other, for nothing can be related to itself. Consequently, the essence in its commonality cannot account for the production of a distinct person.65 Durandus thus distinguishes two principles within one and the same suppositum: a principle of production which accounts for his constitution as a distinct person, and a communicable principle which guarantees his consubstantiality with the other persons.66 In a way remarkably similar to Bonaventure’s account,67 the distinction Durandus makes between a productive and a communicable principle is motivated by a necessity to exclude the essence from the generational acts in order to safeguard the trinity of persons. In this view, relations and not the essence must account for individuation, making the supposita formally relaquae tamen realiter diVerunt in eodem supposito ab eo quod est incommunicabile.’ Also I d. 11 q. 1, 54ra–va: ‘pater communicat omnia quae habet Wlio excepto eo in quo ei opponitur. Sed pater non opponitur Wlio quo ad spirationem, sed solum quo ad paternitatem et innascibilitatem, quia spirans inquantum spirans non opponitur nisi spirato. Filius autem non est spiratus sed genitus. Ergo, pater communicat Wlio activam spirationem. Si sic, ergo spiritus sanctus communiter a patre et Wlio . . . Si autem pater communicat Wlio activam spirationem, non repugnat distinctionem patris et Wlii quae est per paternitatem et Wliationem, et ideo communicari potest . . .’ 65 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 43vb: ‘tam essentia quam relatio habent rationem principius in generando vel spirando . . . [Q]uia unum habet tamquam communicatum et non productum, scilicet essentia quae non est productam sed tantum communicatam, aliud autem habet tamquam vero productum, scilicet proprietatem relativam. Et utrumque requiritur ad veram generationem. Sicut enim non esset vera generatio si nihil produceretur secundum totum supponeretur quocumque illud communicaretur, ita non esset vera generatio si totum produceretur et nihil communicaretur . . . Et hoc patet primo sic: principium quo producens aliud necesse est realiter distingui a termino quo productum ipsam productionem terminat, est secundum suppositum quin terminus productionis suppositum constituit. Principium autem communicandi non oportet realiter distingui ab eo quod communicatur vel quo communicatio terminatur. Nunc est ita quod in generatione Wlii relatio Wliationis est illud quo producto terminatur et est constitutiva suppositi, essentia autem est illud quod communicatur vel communicatio terminatur.’ 66 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 44rb: ‘illud quod in Wlio est solum productum est illud quo productio Wlii terminatur. Sed in Wlio nihil est productum nisi sola relatio Wliationis, et non essentia quae nullo modo est producta. Ex hiis autem duabus constituitur persona Wlii.’ 67 See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 7 a. un. q. 1, 136a, and ad 4, 137a.

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tional substances. By contrast, the Thomist understanding of divine production is closer to the Lombard’s insight of a quaedam summa res, in that it is guided by the assumption that the unity of the essence is better preserved by stressing its commonality throughout the generational acts. In this view the essence and not relations must account for the processions, thus ensuring that the persons are really identical to the essence.68 Durandus’s claim that relation is the principle that accounts for the processions is however profoundly un-Aristotelian. According to Aristotle, relation cannot constitute the principle or the term of an action. Since action signiWes a movement from potentiality to actuality, it must by necessity end in a fully actual thing and not in a diminished entity such as relation.69 Although Durandus subscribes to this principle in creatures,70 when it comes to the Trinity he contends that the claim that the persons are constituted by relations commits us to denying the validity of Aristotle’s principle. For the very notion of ‘relations of origin’ as principles of individuation requires the idea that relations—and not the one divine substance—govern the processions.71 Durandus is then prepared to question standard Aristotelian metaphysics for the sake of a consistent account of the Trinity—and if Thomist supporters of the Aristotelian view remain sceptical, he deWantly invites them to refer to his arguments showing the greater probability of his own metaphysics.72 On similar grounds, Durandus rejects the psychological model as a helpful explanation of the processions. Durandus argues that, even if it may be the 68 As we saw, Aquinas identiWes the productive principle with the essence. The motive behind this view is to secure that the processions result from a ‘univocal act’—i.e. an act beginning and ending in the same nature. In this view, Durandus’s claim that the processions end in relation would seem to jeopardize the equality of the persons. The Son would then exceed the Spirit in perfection, since he includes both Wliation and spiration. See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 aa. 2–4; ST I q. 36 a. 4 ad ultimum; In Phys. 5, lect. 3 n. 661; 5, lect. 1 n. 645. 69 See Aristotle, Phys. 3. 1 (201a9–b5); 5. 1 (225a30–b13); Metaph. 5. 15 (1021a). Cf. Aquinas, In Metaph. 5, lect. 17 n. 1027. 70 See above, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb
va . 71 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 41vb–42ra: ‘sicut Aristoteles negavit quod relatio posset esse terminus actionis, ita negasset et multo fortius quod relatio posset suppositum constituere. Et quia non tenemus Aristotelem quantum ad hoc, immo dicimus quod relatio in divinis constituit suppositum. Ideo oportet negare id quod convenienter se habet ad hoc, scilicet quod relatio non possit esse terminus actus vel etiam principium. Dictum etiam fuit quod non omnino similiter loquendo est de potentia generandi in deo et in creaturis, sicut nec de generatione et supposito generante.’ 72 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 44va: ‘si autem alicui videtur mirum quod respectus possit esse principium vel terminus productionis, miretur etiam quo modo constituit suppositum et quo modo oppositi respectus sunt in eadem essentia cum enim generatio sit mirabilis. Oportet consequenter dicere ea quae Wdes ponit de tali generatione et longe aliter quam de principiis generationis naturalis. Qui vult tenere hanc opinionem quae probabiliter tenendi potest et ad intentionem fratris Thomae videtur dicitur declinare in questionibus De potentia, potest rendere ad rationes praecedentis opinionis.’ For Aquinas, see De Pot., q. 10 aa. 4 and 5.

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case in creatures that an act of the will presupposes the product of an intellectual operation, the product of a voluntary act does not formally imply that it should proceed from the product of an intellectual operation. This is a fortiori the case in the Trinity, where the processions are governed by opposite relations. For, even though it may be the case that the procession of the Spirit presupposes the generation of the Son, it does not for that reason pertain to passive spiration that it should proceed from the product of generation.73 Thus, the claim that relation accounts for production in the divine made Durandus, perhaps more than any other Dominican, profoundly unreceptive of the psychological model.74 By contrast, the claim that the essence, rather than relation, accounts for the processions immediately placed the Thomist view much closer to the psychological model. Indeed, both accounts shared the same insight that the processions consist in the communication of essential power from one person to the other. There is one Wnal point without which Durandus’s account of the processions would not seem complete. As we saw in the previous section, the theory of the analogy of being led Durandus to claim that there is an ‘order of nature’ between the essence, as absolute, and relation, as a mere mode. Guided by the same insight, on this occasion Durandus claims that there is a ‘natural order of priority’ between disparate relations within one and the same suppositum. Durandus reserves the term ‘disparate relations’ for those relations existing in one and the same suppositum, and between which there is no opposition at all, direct or indirect. Disparate relations typically obtain between two active principles founded on the same person but ending in diVerent terms, such as active generation and active spiration in the Father. Although their foundation is the same, active generation ends in the Son whereas active spiration ends in the Spirit. And since, for Durandus, relation includes its term by identity, the diVerence in terms suYces for real distinction between the two 73 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 60vb–61ra: ‘non est de ratione spirationis quod sit per modum voluntatis, sed competit ei haec denominatio per habitudinem ad creaturas, ex hoc quod supponitur esse a duabus . . . unde dicit modo spiratio sit a duobus aut supponat aliquam priorem emanationem qualitercumque hoc sit per se vel per accidens semper potest dici esse per modum voluntatis . . . [Q]uia licet emanatio per modum voluntatis supponat quandam aliam, tamen non est de ratione producti per modum voluntatis quod sit a producto per priorem emanationem, sicut patet in creaturis ex quibus hoc nomen tractum est amor enim quamvis supponat verbum tamen non est a verbo tamquam a principio producente ipsum. Et similiter potest dici quod spiratus supponit aliquid productum per generationem, sed non probatur quod sit ab illo tamquam a principio productivo.’ 74 See e.g. A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 60vb: ‘Quod autem arguunt alii quod de ratione spirati est quod sit ab aliquo prius producto, dicendum quod non est verum sed solum quod sit ab aliquo habente vim spirativam. Nec est de ratione virtutis spirativae quod sit in aliquo producto, nec de ratione producti per generationem est per se directe quod habeat vim spirativam, sed solum concomitative . . .’ Durandus’s rejection of the psychological explanation is a corollary of this.

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relations: active generation and active spiration are really distinct in the Father.75 Consequently, and against the Thomist tenet, for Durandus commonality does not necessarily entail real identity.76 The question of the connection between one disparate relation and another was a thorny one, and Durandus was well aware of the diYculty.77 Lacking in opposition, disparate relations seem to escape the Anselmian disjunction between opposition and commonality which had proved so useful, for Thomists and non-Thomists, in explaining distinction in God. For when it came to opposite relations, Anselm’s principle eVectively neutralized their distinction by attributing it to the constitution of a distinct person, and asserting real identity in every other case. But when it came to disparate relations, between which neither opposition nor absolute identity are in question, Anselm’s principle seemed to lose applicability, and the claim of real distinction became as a result more problematic. Thomists safely opted for a distinction according to reason only, thus abiding by their principle that commonality entails real identity. But for Durandus the question was not so easily worked out, for his notion of relation as essentially including a reference committed him to a very strict view of identity and distinction whereby the minimal diVerence between relative terms suYces for real distinction.

75 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un. ad 2, 65rb: ‘Et cum dicitur quod in divinis omnia sunt idem ubi non obviat oppositio relationis, dicendum quod Anselmus loquitur de sola identitate quoad suppositum. Inter autem processiones est oppositio indirecte et concomitative, et ideo diVerunt secundum suppositum; sed inter processiones activas ut sunt generare, et spirare, non est oppositio propter quod licet diVerant realiter non tamen secundum suppositum.’ (My italics.) 76 The contrast with James of Metz on this matter sheds some light in the controversial implications of Durandus’s claim. James’s Trinitarian account, like Durandus’s, is heavily indebted to Henry of Ghent’s modal doctrine, and James’s conception of relation as a mode of being equally leads him to assert a real distinction between disparate relations. But whereas Durandus explicitly distinguishes between disparity and all kinds of opposition, James treats disparate relations as a type of opposition, thus neutralizing their eVect under Anselm’s disjunction between opposition and commonality. This move ultimately enables James to agree with the essentials of Thomist teaching. It is symptomatic in this respect that, although James was also targeted by Hervaeus’s criticism, the Dominican censorship was decidedly stronger in Durandus’s case. For James, see A Sent. I d. 13 q. 1, 42rb. Cf. Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 378. 77 See e.g. A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 62vb–63ra: ‘et sic est diYcilius assignare quomodo diVerunt cum non opponantur, sicut diYcile est assignare quomodo paternitas et communis spiratio diVerent, et similiter quomodo diVerant Wlius et spiratio activa’. Also I d. 12 q. un., 61rb: ‘comparando ad invicem relationes disparatas de quibus est magis dubium, cuius ratio est quia relationum disparatarum una natura potest esse prior nec posterior alia nisi ratione fundamenti secundum quod unum fundamentum est prius vel posterius alio in utroque extermorum vel saltem in alio, quia positis fundamentis suYcientibus relationum necesse ponuntur relationes. Sed in relationum divinarum non potest esse prius aut posterius . . .’ In C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 47vb, Durandus manifests the same dismay. It appears therefore to have been an issue which he found particularly trying.

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Distinguishing between disparate relations appeared then to be a hairsplitting task—and a theologically dangerous one at that. Durandus’s main diYculty concerning disparate relations has to do with the way in which they are ‘ordered’ to their foundation. The combined inheritance of Augustine and Athanasius proscribed an order of priority between the persons, allowing only an order of origin whereby one person is ‘from the other’.78 Thus, for those cases in which relations describe origin the problem of an order of priority does not arise. The terms of an opposite relation imply each other, rendering them by deWnition equal and simultaneous: the Father is not the Father without the Son, and the Son is not the Son without the Father.79 But is the Father the Father without active spiration? If so, does that mean that the procession of the Spirit is ‘secondary’ or ‘nonessential’ to the generation of the Son? Put more bluntly, is the Spirit in any sense secondary to Father and Son? Durandus is very ambiguous in his answer to these questions, and his hesitant tone makes it diYcult to tell whether he is in fact subscribing to the reported view. What follows is my attempt at reconstructing Durandus’s view from what the early, unrevised commentary can yield. According to the solution which Durandus seems inclined to support, there is an ‘order of natural presupposition’ (ordo naturalis praesuppositionis) between one disparate relation and another.80 By this Durandus does not mean to imply a 78 For the Athanasian creed, see H. Denzinger and P. Hu¨nermann (eds.), Enchiridion symbolorum, deWnitionum et declarationum de rebus Wdei et morum, 37th edn. (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), n. 75, 25. For Augustine, see Contra Maximinum 2. 14. 8. 775 (PL 42): ‘verum haec non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae; non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero’. 79 Durandus is indeed very careful not to posit an order of priority between opposite relations. The persons are formally constituted by opposite relations, so anything beyond an order of origin would entail inequality between the persons. See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61vb: ‘non est simile de relationibus disparatis et de oppositis et de personis per eas constitutis, quod enim productum supponat producens, verum est ubi producens per suum producere non constituitur, ut est in suppositis absolutis. Ubi autem producens constituitur per suum producere, ut in divinis, non est sic. Quia producere et produci simul sunt nec potest unum aliquo modo praexistere alteri nec per consequens personae per hoc constitutae habent ordinem praesuppositionis.’ Also ibid., 61vb–62rb: ‘Ad auctoritatem Athanasii . . . patet ex dictis quod vere postea arguitur quod sicut se habet pater ad Wlium sic pater et Wlius ad spiritum sanctum. Dicendum quod non est verum, quia pater et Wlius constituuntur relationibus oppositis, quae sunt simul natura et intellectu. Sed pater et Wlius respectu spiritus sanctus constituuntur relationibus disparatis. Et ideo inter eos potest esse ordo prioris et posterioris, non solum secundum intellectum sed etiam secundum naturalem praesuppositionem.’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 27 q. 1, 105va–vb: ‘Paternitas autem simul est cum Wliatione, cum sunt relationes oppositae.’ 80 The term ‘order of priority according to natural presupposition’ is distinctively used by Scotus in his explanation of the divine processions. Scotus is however very careful to limit the scope of this term to signify a priority formed by our intellect ex natura rei. That is, divine reality is such that it enables us to conceive an order of priority between the processions. In this sense, that the persons of the Father and the Son are prior to the procession of the Spirit by ‘natural

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distinction of natures of the kind that would obtain between two absolute things, nor does he mean an order of temporal succession, for in the divine all is eternal. Rather, that common spiration ‘naturally presupposes’ the Son’s generation means that common spiration does not account for the constitution of the persons of Father and Son, but comes to, and thereby presupposes, the persons of the Father and the Son already constituted in their being.81 Common spiration is thus ordered to the persons of Father and Son in the same way as a relative being is ordered to an absolute thing. Durandus is well aware of the theological implications of this statement, for it could well be perceived as blatantly contradicting the authorities of Augustine and the Athanasian creed.82 As we shall see in following chapters, this is exactly how leading Dominicans understood it,83 as a result of which Durandus eventually felt compelled to modify his view. This is in fact one of the very rare instances in which Durandus manifestly corrects his previous position. presupposition’ means that, were the Father and the Son separable from the Spirit per impossibile, the Father and the Son would be prior to the Spirit. See Scotus, Ord. I d. 13 q. un. n. 80. As we shall see in Ch. 12, in the Wnal recension of his commentary Durandus will refer to this notion in its Scotist meaning, but now distancing himself from it. See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 12 q. 1, 46va, n. 24. 81 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61va: ‘licet fundamentum et respectus non sint duae naturae facientes compositionem, sunt tamen duae res extendendo nomen rei ut est commune absolutum et relatum, et harum rerum est ordo naturalis praesuppositionis. Quantum autem ad relationes disparatas patet idem sic: illud quod non est constitutivum personae sed advenit iam constitutae supponit illud quod constituit personam et non e converso. Sed communis spiratio non constituit personam aliquam sed advenit personae iam per aliud constitutae, per paternitatem et Wliationem. Ergo, communis spiratio supponit naturaliter paternitatem et Wliationem, et non e converso. Illud autem est prius secundum naturam quod naturaliter praesupponitur . . .’ The same insight governs Durandus’s Christological claim that the human nature is like an accident of the divine suppositum, because it arrives in a substance already complete in its being. See C Sent. III d. 6 q. 4, 226ra, nn. 7–8. 82 Durandus’s hesitant tone throughout the question testiWes to this. See A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61vb–62ra: ‘Vel aliter et magis consequens dictis, scilicet quod inter personas est talis ordo praesuppositionis quod utique necesse est dicere saltem de personis procedentibus per diversas origines, ut sunt Wlius et spiritus sanctus. Quia qualis ordo ponitur inter origines oportet quod ponatur inter personas per eas procedentes. Origenes autem non sunt directe oppositae sed disparatae, ut visum est, et habent inter se ordinem praesuppositionis quare et personae. Et dicunt isti quod Athanasius in Symbolo et Augustinus Contra Maximinum non intendunt excludere a divinis oridinem prioris et posterioris secundum naturalem praesuppositionem, sed solum secundum durationem propter aliquas haereses insurgentes contra aeternitatem Wlii et spiritus sancti. Nescio tamen si hoc tutum est asserere, tantum dictum sit de ordine personarum secundum rem.’ (My italics.) This passage is conspicuously absent from C. See also A Sent. I d. 12 q. un. ad 1, 62ra: ‘licet in trinitate creata sit prius et posterius, non tamen in increata, licet visum est aliqui dicunt esse prius et posterius non quidem durationem sed reali praesuppositionis’. Ibid., ad 2, 62ra: ‘Principium est ex quo est aliud et non prius quod est aliud, quamvis secundum alios videtur genitum et spiratum sit ordo non solum originis sed naturalis praesuppositionis.’ 83 See a. 5 of the 1314 censure list (‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55), and a. 13 of the 1316 censure list (‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 74).

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In Thomist minds, Durandus’s account of the processions seemed like an avalanche of misconceptions which, starting with the core distinction between absolute and relative, seemed to increase in threat as it reached Trinitarian grounds. Indeed, as Thomists saw it, Durandus’s initial theory of real distinction between essence and relation inevitably led to the claim that relation, and not the essence, accounts for the processions, which in its turn determined Durandus’s rather idiosyncratic view of the Wlioque, with the disastrous result of an order of priority between the processions. Durandus’s distinction between production and communicability was thus seen as an instance of the basic distinction between absolute and relative. But what was initially contained within the limits of philosophical error ended up unleashing unsavoury theological repercussions. For, more worryingly, by understanding the processions as relations rather than focusing on essential communicability, Durandus was, Wrst of all, multiplying the principles of reality in God, and secondly, disengaging the procession of the Spirit from any essential connection to the generation of the Son. And this, in Thomist minds, was tantamount to undermining the very foundations of the Wlioque.

5.3. THE DIVINE PERSONS Both Durandus and mainstream Thomists were agreed that the divine persons are formally subsistent and incommunicable. They disagreed, however, in identifying the principles of subsistence and incommunicability, and in the connection between the two. This issue involved mainly two questions: (i) the question of subsistence, i.e. the connection between a nature and a suppositum; and (ii) the question of what constitutes the distinctive mark of a person: its subsistence or its incommunicability. (i) Durandus’s theory of subsistence is intrinsically linked to his theory of the analogy of being. As was made clear earlier, Durandus believes that nonsubsistent objects such as modes have their own, if secondary, esse. He does not subscribe to the theory that makes esse the mark of subsistence, for esse is a feature that a non-subsistent object can have. Central to this view is Durandus’s claim that essence and esse go together, so that every thing that is in itself an essence (including modes), has its own esse. A mode’s minimal entity is suYcient for its actual existence. A mode fails to be subsistent, however, because it depends on an absolute thing. In other words, what makes a thing subsistent is not the possession of actual existence (modes enjoy the same feature), but independence. Durandus understands independence as the mode of being of a thing which exists ‘in itself ’ such that it does

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not formally involve a respect towards something other. In creatures, only absolute (i.e. non-relational) things have independent existence and are therefore subsistent. The distinction between subsistence and non-subsistence is then a modal one, since what makes a thing subsistent is the possession of the mode of being ‘in itself ’.84 According to Durandus, therefore, the acquisition of the mode of being ‘in itself ’ is necessary for a suppositum. This is not to say that a suppositum is itself a mode or a relative thing—for, as was made clear, absolute things are really distinct from their modes. Rather, by appealing to a mode as a criterion for subsistence Durandus wants to say that a nature cannot be distinguished from its suppositum by anything absolute.85 In examining the connection between nature and suppositum, Durandus distinguishes the question of subsistence from the question of individuation.86 The relevant question here is not what an individual suppositum adds to a common nature (the question of individuation), but how the abstract nature—a thing’s quiddity—is connected to the concrete thing 84 See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. II q. 1 pp. 174. 11–175. 14: ‘res per se subsistens est res absoluta, habens talem modum essendi ex sua independentia’. Cf. A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va (see s. 5.1 above). This is very similar to Henry of Ghent’s later account (post-1286), according to which independence is a suYcient condition for subsistence. Henry also believes that the change from non-subsistence to subsistence is a modal one. See Henry, Quodl. X q. 8. For an account of Henry’s theory of subsistence, see Cross, Metaphysics, 257–62. 85 Durandus rejects the claim, presumably that of Giles of Rome, that subsistence could be explained by the possession of accidental properties. See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1 a. 2 (Paris BnF Ms 14454), 85ra–rb: ‘Hoc autem positio deWcit . . . in hoc quod ponit quod natura contrahit quendam modum ex unione cum accidentibus . . . Sed forma perWcit suam substantiam per se ipsam immediate et non per aliquid immissum . . . , For Giles, see De Compositione Angelorum 5 (In D. Trapp, ‘Aegidii Romani de Doctrina Modorum’, Argelicum, 12 (1935), 470–2); Sent. II d. 3 princ. 1 q. 1 a. 2. On this count, Durandus appears to have followed Godfrey of Fontaines’s criticism of Giles verbatim. See Godfrey, Quodl. VII q. 5 (PB 3), 306. 86 At this point Durandus embarks in a long discussion concerning the Thomist view of subsistence. Durandus is aware that his view deviates from the standard Thomist account, but he oVers an interpretation of Aquinas’s view which allows him to escape possible criticism from Thomist quarters. According to Durandus, when Aquinas claims that nature and suppositum are really distinct, he is in fact dealing with the problem of individuation and not with the issue of subsistence. Durandus cites from a crucial passage in ST III q. 17 a. 2 (the passage commonly aduced in favour of Aquinas’s standard account of subsistence) in order to show that the question at hand is what a suppositum adds to the nature (problem of individuation) and not how the abstract deWnition of a thing is connected to the concrete thing it deWnes (subsistence question). Durandus contends that, since he is dealing with the second sort of question, his claim of real identity cannot be read as contradicting the Thomist view. Tellingly, this discussion is excluded from C. For the full text, see Durandus, A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1 a. 2 (Paris BnF Ms 14454), 85vb. The distinction between the problem of individuation and the question of subsistence is more conspicuous in Christological accounts, since it was agreed among scholastics that Christ’s human nature was an individual nature. Aquinas is notoriously ambiguous on this question, and Durandus’s rather ad hoc discussion of his intended meaning testiWes to the sensitiveness of the question among Dominicans. For a complete account of this problem, see Cross, Metaphysics, esp. 1–24.

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which possesses the nature.87 According to Durandus, nature and suppositum formally signify the same thing, but diVer in their mode of signiWcation: the nature ‘humanity’ signiWes a human being in abstract, whereas the suppositum signiWes the same human being by way of ‘possessing’ the nature, i.e. by connoting a respect towards that nature: [T]here is another way of putting it [i.e. the connection between nature and suppositum] which I believe to be truer, namely that suppositum and nature (that is, concrete and abstract), whether taken universally as ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, or singularly as ‘this man’ or ‘this humanity’, do not imply anything diVerent in [what concerns] their main signiWcate (de principale signiWcato), but [imply] completely the same thing. According to their mode of signiWcation, however, the suppositum, or the concrete, connotes something that the nature does not connote . . . For the abstract signiWes the nature in itself (secundum se) without a respect (habitudine) towards something other. And, therefore, according to its mode of signiWcation it does not connote anything beyond the nature. But the concrete signiWes [the same thing] by mode of possessing (habentis) the nature, as a man possesses humanity.88

The concrete ‘man’ and the substantial form ‘humanity’ have the same deWnition, i.e. they formally describe the same object. But they cannot be predicated of each other because ‘man’ connotes a reference to the nature that ‘humanity’ of itself does not connote. That is, ‘man’ signiWes ‘humanity’ by mode of ‘possessing’ (i.e. contracting) humanity. The diVerence between ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ is therefore a modal and not a formal one: both terms describe the same object but according to diVerent modes of signiWcation. This modal diVerence does not amount to a numerical one, for recall that, according to Durandus, the presence of diVerent realities does not entail plurality when one of the realities is a mode and not an absolute thing. A suppositum is not an object over and above the nature. 87 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1 a. 2 (Paris BnF Ms 14454), 85ra: ‘suppositum et natura possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo accipitur suppositum per singulare, ut hic homo vel haec humanitas, et sic quaerere an suppositum sit idem quod natura vel addat alium super eam est quaerere de principio individuationis. Et hoc modo non tractatibus . . . Alio modo potest accipi suppositum et naturam ut suppositum dicatur concretum et in universali, ut homo, et natura dicatur abstractum, ut humanitatem. Et hoc modo tractatibus nunc.’ The similarities between Durandus and Godfrey of Fontaines in the layout and handling of this question are marked, and one could only infer that Durandus borrowed heavily from Godfrey on this matter. For Godfrey, see Quodl. VII q. 5 (PB 3), 300–1. 88 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1 a. 2 (Paris BnF Ms 14454), 85va: ‘alius modus dicendi quod credo veriorem, scilicet quod suppositum et natura, hoc est concretum et abstractum, ut sunt accepta in universali ut homo vel humanitas, sive in singulari ut hic homo et haec humanitas, non important aliud diversis suum realiter de principali signiWcato, sed idem penitus. Sed ex modo signiWcandi suppositum seu concretum aliquid denotat [sic] quod non connotat natura . . . Abstractum enim signiWcat naturam vel rem absque habitudine ad aliquid aliud. Et ideo ex suo modo signiWcandi non connotat aliquid praeter naturam. Concretum autem signiWcat per modum habentis naturam, ut homo habens humanitatem . . .’

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Two related conclusions follow from this. First, in creatures, what is subsistent is by that fact singular. In creatures there is no need for an account of individuation because subsistence itself explains individuality: being a suppositum implies being an individual. Secondly, the created suppositum does not include anything common or repeatable in another suppositum of the same nature. In creatures the suppositum is nothing other than the ‘contracted’ (i.e. individualized) nature, so that whatever pertains to the suppositum is by that fact singular. The nature is therefore numerically multiplied in the supposita, so that each suppositum is a distinct instantiation of that nature. Connected to this view is Durandus’s nominalist understanding of universals, according to which nothing real is a universal, such that whatever exists in extra-mental reality is by that fact singular.89 This aspect of Durandus’s thought is relevant, for as we shall see in Chapter 12, it will play a crucial role in Durandus’s rejection of the Scotist conception of the essence as a special kind of universal. In God, by contrast, the divine suppositum is not formally identical to the essence. This claim is connected to Durandus’s view that an account of individuation is not relevant in creatures, whereas divine reality requires an account of how the distinct persons are constituted (principium constituendi suppositum). Since in the divine the supposita constitute one subsistent reality, it becomes necessary to explain how they are constituted into three supposita—otherwise the Trinity would be reduced to one absolute suppositum. According to Durandus, the constitutive principle of the divine persons is relation, so that what constitutes a suppositum and what makes him distinct from other supposita formally signiWes a relation.90 The divine supposita are 89 Durandus’s theory of universals is worthy of a separate study. SuYce it to say for our purposes that, according to Durandus, a universal is formally the result of an act of the intellect, such that a universal is nothing beyond the abstract denomination of an object divested from its individuating features. A universal cannot be related to a singular thing by identity. See Durandus, C Sent. II d. 3 q. 7, 140. 7–12: ‘primum cognitum ab intellectu non est universale, sed singulare . . . [U]niversale vel conditio universalis non praecedit actum intelligendi, immo Wt per actum intelligendi . . . [E]sse enim universale non est aliud quam esse intellectum absque conditionibus singularitatis et individuationis, ita quod esse universale est sola denominatio obiecti ab actu sic intelligendi . . . [F]rivolum est dicere quod universalitas Wat in rebus, quia universalitas non potest esse in rebus, sed solum singularitas . . . Item universalis est unum per abstractionem a multis et de multis de quibus dicunt . . .’ 90 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 101vb: ‘sicut se habet proprietas in communi ad constituendum suppositum, sic tales proprietas ad constituendum tale suppositum. Si ergo ratio proprietatis est ratio constitutiva supposito, oportet quod ratio proprietatis absolutae ut absoluta est sic constitutiva suppositi absoluti, et quod ratio proprietatis relativae ut relativa est sic constitutiva suppositi relativi. Et ita relatio sub ratione relationis habet aliquid suppositum constituere, et per consequens distinguere ab alio supposito’. Also ibid., q. 2, 120ra–rb: ‘de intellectu formali personarum acceptum secundum suam specialem rationem et nomen sunt relationes secundum specialem rationem’.

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therefore relational things, unlike created supposita which are absolute.91 This entails that the created suppositum has a natural tendency to subsist92—in Durandus’s terminology, it is ‘in itself ’—whereas the divine suppositum is formally ‘towards another’ and requires the essence as principle of subsistence. Thus, in each divine suppositum we Wnd something—the essence— common to and repeatable in the other two supposita, and something—the relative property—which makes him really distinct from the other two. The Son is distinct from the Father in virtue of Wliation only, and not in virtue of the essence. The Son is therefore not entirely, and of himself, distinct from the Father because he shares the same essence with the Father. Otherwise than in the created suppositum, who is distinct because subsistent, in the divine suppositum individuality and subsistence do not go hand in hand. And because relational, the divine supposita can be distinct from each other without entailing a multiplication in nature. Relying on his claim that the divine supposita are formally relational, Durandus rejects the Thomist view that the persons are constituted by constitutive properties as distinct from relations of origin.93 As Thomists argue, a thing cannot be constituted in its being and distinguished from others of the same nature by something extrinsic. But relations of origin signify external processions from one person to another, whereby they are suYcient for distinguishing one person from another, but not for constituting the persons in their being. Therefore, only intrinsic forms can be constitutive of the persons.94 Durandus rejects the notion of ‘constitutive property’ as a ‘middle principle’ which is neither absolute nor relative. ‘Absolute or relative’ is an exhaustive disjunction, whereby establishing a distinction between constitutive properties and relations of origin would ipso facto make the 91 Henry of Ghent makes the same distinction between created and divine supposita. See Quodl. XI q. 10. 92 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 100ra: ‘suppositum proprie dictum est quid subsistens completum ultima completione in illa natura . . . [S]uppositum non est nisi illud quod per se subsistit . . . signiWcat ut habens, non ut res habita . . .’ 93 See Aquinas, ST I q. 40 a. 2 and a. 4; I q. 28 a. 3; I q. 29 a. 4; I q. 39 a. 1; Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 2; De Pot., q. 8 aa. 3 and 4. Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 119a; I d. 23 q. 1, 113a. 94 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 101rb–va: ‘Alii dicunt quod magis proprie debet dici quod personae divinae distinguuntur et constituuntur per proprietates . . . quam per origines . . . Cuius ratio est, quia constitutio rei in se et eius distinctio ab alia re debet Weri per aliquid quod sit rei intrinsecum. Sicut in creaturis sit per formam origines non signiWcantur ut intrinsice personis, sed potius ut actus progrediens a persona in personam, quasi via media, sicut generatio signiWcatur ut via vel actus procedens a generante ingenitum. Ergo, per origines non debent dici personae constitui vel distingui, sed per illa quae sunt in personis tanquam formae intrinsice et immanentes, et hoc sunt relationes vel proprietates qua se habent ad personas aliquo modo sunt formae ad totum constitui. Quaere, etc . . . Quia relatio ut relatio non habet nisi referre id cuius est relatio, sed non constituere. Sed hoc habet inquantum proprietas . . .’

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properties absolute and not relative.95 At the root of Durandus’s argument is his identiWcation of the processions with opposite relations in a one-to-one basis, such that origin and opposition are simultaneous to the constitution of a divine person.96 (ii) Concerning the second question, Durandus understands Aquinas to claim that ‘person’ is a concept of Wrst intention signifying some individual (individuum vagum) of a rational nature. As we saw, central to the Thomist position is the idea that ‘person’ must primarily signify self-subsistence, a note which Aquinas sees as connected with the dignity characteristic of persons, and which mere (second) intentions such as ‘incommunicability’ cannot convey.97 Durandus rejects this opinion on two counts. First, the subject variable ‘some individual’ is communicable to many, just as a generic or speciWc nature is shared by those things of which it is predicated. Like ‘some individual’, ‘person’ could well designate whatever is of an intellectual nature, for example, some angel, or some man, such that it is still divisible into individual angels or individual men. In order to convey the notion of incommunicability which pertains to its deWnition, therefore, the concept 95 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 27 q. 1, 105rb–va: ‘qui excludit rationem relativa ponit rationem absolutam . . . Patet ergo . . . quod qui intelligit personam divinam prius constitutam quam relatam, intelligit eam constitutam per proprietatem absolutam, qui intellectus est falsus.’ Also I d. 26 q. 1, 101va–vb: ‘falsum est dictae quod persona divina constituatur per aliquid sub ratione proprietatis, quia si ratio proprietatis opponitur rationi relationis, ratio proprietatis est ratio absoluta. Sed impossibile est intelligere vere quod suppositum divinum sit constitutum per aliquid sub ratione absoluta. Ergo, etc.’ 96 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 102vb: ‘Origines enim non sunt nisi ipsaemet relationes a quo aliud et quod ab alio, et non fundamentum earum. Illud enim est essentia fecunda, unde qui praeintelligit personas originibus aut origines relationibus, male intelligit. Sed simul intelligenda est persona constituta cum sua relatione et origine.’ (My italics.) Cf. I d. 27 q. 1, 105va–vb: ‘generari non potest praeintelligi ei quod est generare, sed simul sunt secundum intellectum. Generare autem simul est cum paternitate . . . Paternitas autem simul est cum Wliatione, cum sunt relationes oppositae.’ Also ibid. 106ra: ‘ tale enim simul dicit intelligi constitutum et originans vel originatum et relatum, et non unum prius quam alterum’. 97 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 23 q. un., 93vb: ‘Alius modus dicendi est quod persona signiWcat non intentionem sed rem subiectam intentioni. Dicunt isti quod sicut ‘‘homo’’ non signiWcat intentionem speciei sed rem subiectam intentioni, et aliquis homo signiWcat rem subiectam intentioni quae est individuum vagum in natura humana specialiter, ita ‘‘persona’’ signiWcat naturam subiectam intentioni quae est individuum vagum in natura intellectuali generaliter et non ipsam intentionem. Quod probatur dupliciter. Primo sic, hoc nomen persona impositum est ad signiWcandum suppositum naturae intellectualis secundum quod dignitatem quandam importat. Intentiones autem non important aliquam dignitatem, sed res subiectae intentionibus. Universalitas enim non importat maiorem dignitatem in homine quam in equo. Ergo, etc. Secundo sic, nomen personae imponitur est ad signiWcandum aliquid dignum laude. Intentiones autem non dicunt aliquid dignum laude vel vituperio. ‘‘Homo’’ enim convenit soli rei habenti dominii sui actus.’ For Aquinas, see ST I q. 29 a. 1; I q. 30 a. 4. Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 112a–b.

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‘person’ requires the attribution of a particular note.98 Secondly, the idea that ‘person’ should imply a certain dignity, is in Durandus’s mind at best irrelevant to the question. If ‘dignity’ were essential to the notion of person, Durandus retorts sarcastically, not all supposita of an intellectual nature would be persons, but only the virtuous ones.99 According to Durandus’s preferred view, ‘person’ is a name of second intention, signifying the concept (rationem) of incommunicability. By ‘intention’, however, Durandus does not mean a universal concept in the sense of genus or species, but certain conditions of a thing, as for example its singularity, individuality, personality.100 An intention is in this sense a real ‘note’ of a thing, independently of the operation of the intellect. By claiming that ‘person’ signiWes the concept of incommunicability, Durandus is therefore saying that incommunicability is the essential note of a suppositum.101 The 98 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 23 q. un., 93vb–94ra: ‘Impossibile est enim quod ‘‘persona’’ dicat solam rem subiectam intentioni qua est individuum vagum. Cuius ratio est, quia res subiecta intentioni quae est individuum vagum de natura sua est communicabilis pluribus et tot sicut natura subiecta intentioni speciei. De toto enim praedicatur aliquis homo sicut homo. Sed res cui communicat esse persona vel res quae est persona non est communicabilis immo incommunicabilis, ut dicit deYnitio personae, quod persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis substantia. Ergo, etc. Item, res subiecta intentioni quae dicitur individuum vagum importatur per terminum signiWcantem naturam generis et speciei addito signo particulari, ut aliquod animal vel aliquis homo. Res ergo subiecta intentioni individui vagi in natura intellectuali bene potest designari per hoc nomina quae sunt, scilicet quaedam natura intellectualis, quidam angelis, quidam homo. Quod autem signiWcetur per hoc nomen persona, valde extraneum est.’ 99 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 23 q. un., 94ra–rb: ‘Quod autem isti arguunt per se valde facile est solvere dicendo ad primum quod nomen personae impositum est ad signiWcandum intentionem suppositi non absolute sed tantum in natura intellectuali, quae super alias dignitatem importat. Et ob hoc solum est nomen ad dignitatem pertinens, non ratione formalis signiWcati quae utrobique est una, scilicet intentio singularitatis, sed ratione naturae subiectivae. Suppositum enim dicit individuum non quodcumque sed subsistens et completum. Per idem ad secundum quod tamen includit quaedam satis frivolum, scilicet quod persona importat aliquod dignum laude. Constat autem quod laude de nullus est dignus nisi virtuosus. Si ergo persona signiWcat aliquid dignum laude, sequitur quod non esse suppositum intellectualis naturae dicetur persona, sed solum virtuosis, quod est absurdum. Licet enim origo nominis personae fuit a reputatione laudis cum Wctione cuiusdam larvae, tractum est tamen ad signiWcandum suppositum intellectualis naturae, puto quod utiuntur nomine personae aequivoce, quandoque scilicet pro intentione, et sic deYnitur a Boethio et Richardo, quandoque vero pro re subiecta, ut cum dicitus quod ‘‘talis est bona persona’’ .’ 100 The claim that ‘person’ signiWes a second intention is usually associated with Henry of Ghent. Durandus is in all likelihood alluding to Henry here, especially in his understanding of ‘intention’ not as a universal concept but as one of the principles which constitute a simple essence in its reality. In Henry’s metaphysics, essence, existence, genus, diVerence, are not distinct essences but ‘notes’ discernible within the essence by the operation of the intellect. For Henry on ‘person’, see Summa, a. 53 qq. 7 and 8; Quodl. IV q. 4; VII q. 8. For the notion of ‘intention’, see mainly Quodl. V q. 6, 161r–v. 101 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 23 q. un., 93va–vb: ‘nomen personae signiWcat intentionem, quod probatur dupliciter. Primo sic, illud quod dicit individuum in omni genere est suppositum in

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advantage of claiming that ‘person’ signiWes a concept, rather than a thing, is that as an extra-mental thing, ‘person’ connotes a generic term communicable to the things of which ‘person’ is predicated. But this would overlook the central feature of a person, namely unrepeatability, which the intention of incommunicability appears to convey less ambiguously. Moreover, the notion of ‘incommunicability’ is also theologically preferable, since it establishes a more clear-cut contrast between the divine persons and the essence, which the note of subsistence associated with Boethius’ deWnition seems to blur. For if subsistence is what makes the persons equal in divinity, Durandus reasons, what makes them distinct supposita has to be something generically distinct from a substance, i.e. a non-subsistent note. It is then as non-subsistent modes that relations account for incommunicability in the divine and constitute the persons. In Durandus’s analysis, therefore, relation amounts to a distinct intention from that of the essence as subsistent.102 In this sense, Durandus’s understanding of ‘person’ reveals more aYnity to Richard of St Victor’s deWnition, which brings to the fore the feature of incommunicability rather than that of subsistence.103 On the other hand, Durandus’s reservations regarding Boethius’ deWnition could be taken as genere substantiae. Persona in genere intellectualis naturae secundum individuum et suppositum sunt nomina intentionum et non rerum. Ergo, et persona. Secundo sic, omnia nomina signiWcantia res aliqua sunt in praedicamento sub aliqua intentione, sicut substantia sub intentione generis, homo sub intentione speciei, Socrates sub intentione individui vel suppositi. Sed persona non est res sub intentione generis vel speciei vel suppositi. Ergo, etc. Minor probatur, quod enim non sit res sub intentione generis vel speciei, patet quia de ratione rei cui convenit esse genus vel speciem est quod sit pluribus communicabilis, ut patet ex deYnitionibus generis et speciei, quae sunt esse praedicabile de pluribus diVerentibus speciei vel numero. De ratione persona est quod sit incommunicabilis, ut patet ex deYnitione eius quam ponit Boethius [Richardus?]. . . . Est enim persona naturae rationalis individua substantia secundum Boethium, accipitur autem hoc intentio non pro ratione quam format intellectus circa rem, ut sunt genus, species, et huiusmodi, quia individuatio et singularitas non sunt in rebus per intentionem sed ex natura rei. Sed vocantur hic intentiones large conditiones rei ex opposito correspondentes universalibus intentionibus proprie dictis, ut singularitas, individuatio, suppositatio personalis, qua contrahent speciem, sicut species genus.’ 102 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. un., 94va: ‘illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum, et incommunicabile, est constitutum ex essentia et relatione. Sed persona est huiusmodi, quare etc. Sed in divinis quicquid subsistit subsistit per essentiam vel substantiam. Quicquid distinguitur et est incommunicabile hoc habet proprietatem relativam. Ergo, illud de quo persona dicitur in divinis includit essentiam et relationem sive proprietatem relativam, ut pater et Wlius et huiusmodi, quae et si imponatur ad signiWcandum a sola relatione, tamen ut accomodantur divinis important totum constitutum ex relatione et essentia.’ Also ibid., ad 1, 94ra: ‘omnem nominem pertinens ad personas importat relationem vel tanquam illud quod formaliter signiWcetur, ut pater et Wlius vel tanquam illud de quo dicitur. Et sic nomen personae importat relationem, quia de relatio praedicatur . . .’ Note the diVerence with Henry of Ghent, who rather claims that in God there is only one intention, that of the essence, which is distinct from relation according to reason only. See Quodl. V q. 6, 163r. 103 See De Trin. 4. 18, p. 181. 1–2: ‘ divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia’.

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reminiscent of Gilbert’s motives for rejecting it—an aspect which Thomists could bring out to Durandus’s disadvantage. Gilbert perceived in this deWnition an ambiguity between what is individual, what is personal, and what is singular, and opted rather for his own criterion that a person is an individual rational substance who is not a part of anything. In theological use, therefore, the concept of person does not obey the same conditions as it does in the case of creatures, for otherwise Father, Son, and Spirit would be ‘parts’ of the divine essence. Again, the Porretan associations were right at hand.104 Predictably, Durandus’s view that relations, as non-subsistent modes, are constitutive of the persons was resented by Dominican authorities. Following an account of the Trinity which focused rather on essential communicability, Dominicans were led to conclude that Durandus’s account of the divine persons made them composites of a subsistent nature and a non-subsistent mode of being. More profoundly, then, what earned Durandus’s view the unfavourable epithet of opinio singularis was the notion of relation as a nonsubsistent being which, quite literally, escaped divine consubstantiality. By deWning relations as modes of being which convey real identity and real distinction, Durandus was triply accountable for introducing numerical plurality in God, for establishing an order of priority between the processions, and for jeopardizing the simplicity of the divine persons. These were the worrying conclusions which leading Dominicans such as Hervaeus and John of Naples reached. Of the morass of propositions condemned as heretical in the censure of 1314, one proposition refers to the positing of real distinction within one and the same person, another to the thesis of real distinction between essence and relations.105 The fact that the two claims appear within the same article is signiWcant. It points to the fundamental connection which Dominicans made between Durandus’s problematic thesis of real distinction, and his notion of relation as a mode of being capable of creating distinction beyond opposition. But before the censure was issued, these controversial points were brought to Durandus’s awareness by Hervaeus’s Quodlibets, thus inaugurating the quodlibetal discussion between the two theologians. 104 See Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring, 145. 30, 146. 34, also 148. 42–4. 105 See ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55, a. 6.

6 Hervaeus’s Quodlibetal Disputations Hervaeus Natalis’s Quodlibets inaugurated perhaps the most notable quodlibetal duel in late scholastic theology. Almost immediately after Durandus’s prima lectura had become known, Hervaeus became engaged in the criticism of Durandus’s views, particularly his teaching on Trinitarian relations. Durandus in his turn dedicated an important part of his Paris and Avignon Quodlibets to refuting Hervaeus’s arguments. Since the issuing of the 1513 edition of Hervaeus’s Quodlibets, it has been customary to refer to the Wrst four as the quodlibeta maiora and the last seven as the quodlibeta minora. Although the minora are generally considered as a rather unsystematic fusion of quodlibets by other authors,1 they are nevertheless valuable to the extent that they discuss opinions not dissimilar to Durandus’s main line. The maiora, on the other hand, belong to the time when Hervaeus was a master in theology from around Easter 1307 until 1312, when he became provincial of France. They are the most interesting of Hervaeus’s quodlibetal disputations, not least because the adversary is almost always identiWable and because they correspond to the time when Durandus’s work was Wrst being acknowledged by the learned world in Paris. Not all of Hervaeus’s quodlibets, however, address Durandus as the main adversary. Especially in the early quodlibetal disputations the adversary can be identiWed with fair accuracy: Quodlibet I (1307) deals primarily with Duns Scotus and his view on categorical relations; Quodlibet II (1308) focuses partly on 1 So e.g. Quodlibet IX is usually overlooked because it appears to be a blend of Godfrey of Fontaines’s Quodlibets III and IV. For the purposes of this study, however, I will not abide so closely by this division, and will refer to the minora when illustrative. For the complete edn. of Hervaeus’s Quolibets, see Subtilissima Hervei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus, ed. M. A. Zimara (Venice, 1513; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1966). For the dating of the Quodlibets, the main sources seem to agree on the following dates: Quodl. I: 1307; Quodl. II: 1308; Quodl. III: between 1309 and 1318, during Hervaeus’s time as provincial of France. Repertorium suggests 1308–12 for Quodl. IV. R. L. Friedman believes that this quodlibet comes from Hervaeus’s time as regent at Paris between 1307 and 1309, based on the fact that here Hervaeus responds to Peter Aureol. None of the sources assign speciWc dates to Quodl. V–X, the minora. See also P. Mandonnet, ‘Premiers Travaux de pole´mique thomiste’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et The´ologiques, 7/1 (1913), 46–70.

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Durandus’s theory of relations, which had just become known and indeed spread beyond Dominican premises; Quodlibet IV (1309/10) examines Peter Aureol’s view on relations. The present chapter will consider those questions in Hervaeus’s Quodlibets which either directly deal with Durandus, or treat subjects relevant for the subsequent discussion with him. In chronological order, I will examine Hervaeus’s Quodlibet I question 9 (1307); Quodlibet II question 7 (1308); and Quodlibet IV question 7 (1309/10).

6.1. QUODLIBET I (1307) Although Hervaeus’s Wrst quodlibet was composed before Durandus’s prima lectura was made public, it remains valuable because it contains Hervaeus’s view on categorical relations, curiously overlooked in his commentary. Question 9 examines the distinction between categorical relation and its foundation on an absolute accident, ultimately pointing at the broader issue of the possibility of founding a real plurality on numerically one thing.2 Hervaeus opens the question by giving an account of two contrary opinions. The Wrst opinion, most probably that of Bonaventure, holds that relation and its foundation are distinct ex natura rei and somehow according to reality (quodammodo realiter), but not in a way that eVects composition.3 Hervaeus qualiWes this type of distinction as a ‘modal distinction’. The second opinion, probably that of Duns Scotus, states that relation and its foundation diVer as distinct things (res) and eVect composition with each other.4 As Hervaeus reads them, these two opinions share the claim that relation and its foundation are in some way (quodammodo) really distinct by virtue of the reality which relation adds to its foundation. That relation is a reality distinct from its foundation is grounded on the thesis that relation belongs to one of the categories, which constitute an ontological division of real things.5 2 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 20va–vb. On this matter, see also Quodl. VII q. 15: ‘Utrum relatio in creaturis addat aliquid reale supra fundamentum faciens compositionem cum eo.’ 3 Recall that Bonaventure propounded a distinction according to modi se habendi lying midway between an essential distinction and a mere distinction of reason. See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. un. q. 4. 4 See Scotus, Ord. II d. 1 q. 5 nn. 228, 229. Cf. Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va; Quodl. X q. 1 a. 1, 168va. 5 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 20vb: ‘Iste autem duae opiniones conveniunt in hoc quod utraque ponit quod relatio et suum fundamentum quodammodo diVerunt realiter, et quantum

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Against both opinions, Hervaeus rejects their main tenet, namely that relation constitutes a reality distinct from its foundation. He argues instead that relation is distinct from its foundation only according to the ratio of relation, i.e. according to the relative term it connotes. A relative term does not inhere in its foundation in the way that an accident eVects change in its subject. Therefore, relation does not add another reality over and above its foundation in a way that would entail real distinction.6 In explaining the type of connection which holds between relation and its foundation, Hervaeus relies on Thomist terminology. Relation can relate to its subject either directly (in recto) or indirectly (in obliquo).7 Relation does not add another reality to its foundation in what it signiWes in recto, because the being of relation is identical to its foundation. Thus, the relation of similarity between two white things presupposes that the subject of the relation is to begin with white, such that the similarity between the two terms adds nothing over and above their whiteness. It is only when we take into account the relative term of a relation—i.e. what relation signiWes in obliquo—that relation connotes a reality distinct from its foundation.8 For ‘relation only diVers from its foundation in the way in which it diVers from what is absolute; but it does not diVer from what is absolute except by the connotation of a relative term’.9 ad realitatem quam ponit relatio in suo subiecto seu fundamento. Et hoc probant . . . divisio entis extra animam in entia extra animam debet esse in diversas res. Sed divisio entis in substantiam etc. est huiusmodi. Ergo, relatio dicit diversam rem a substantia et quantitate et qualitate. Et sic de aliis in quibus fundatur.’ 6 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 21ra. See also Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47vb; Quodl. VII q. 15, 143va: ‘relatio non propter hoc dicitur plus ponere in subiecto in quo est quantum in termino ad quem est, quia aliquid addit supra suum fundamentum, sed quia in subiecto in quo est ponit suum fundamentum, in termino autem ad quem est nihil ponit, licet in eo aliquid exigat’. 7 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 21rb: ‘Nunc . . . opinionem quam credo esse vera. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod relatio importat duo. Unum in recto quod ponit in suo subiecto, et aliud in obliquo, scilicet terminum ad quem. . . . Relatio est qua subiectum habens eam formaliter refertur. Sed hoc non esset nisi in sua ratione includeret illud quod ponit in subiecto quod refertur. Quia autem includat terminum ad quem est in sua ratione, patet . . . quia ratio relationis consistit in hoc quod est ad aliud se habere. Sed illud ad quem se habet est terminus ad quem. Ergo etc.’ In In Metaph. 7, lect. 4 nn. 1352–3, Aquinas uses the terms in recto and in obliquo to explain the way in which an accident (including relative ones) can relate to its subject. An accident relates to its subject in recto when the subject serves as its foundation and whole reality. An accident relates to its subject in obliquo when the subject adds only a speciWc diVerence to the accident’s reality. 8 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 21rb: ‘Relatio quantum ad id quod dicit in recto et ponit in subiecto non dicit aliam rem a suo fundamento, immo eandem sub alia rationem tamen . . . Sed quantum ad terminum ad quem est, dicit aliam rem a suo fundamento, ita quod positio ista stat in hoc quod relatio non dicit aliam rem a fundamento suo nisi terminum ad quem.’ 9 Ibid.: ‘relatio non diVert a fundamento nisi sicut ab absoluto, sed non diVert ab absoluto nisi per hoc quod importat terminum ad quem’.

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‘Whiteness’ is predicated of a white thing absolutely because it signiWes a quality in the thing; ‘similarity’, by contrast, is predicated relatively in that it connotes a reference to some other white thing. And since the relative term does not inhere in its subject, it does not eVect any changes in the thing on which it is founded. Thus, like Aquinas, Hervaeus holds that something changes only if there is a change in it. In so far as the accidental being of the relation is the same as that of its foundation, the addition of a relative term cannot produce any intrinsic change.10 However, and here unlike Aquinas, Hervaeus is prepared to accept that in virtue of the connotation of a relative term, relation actualizes some potential feature in its foundation. The relation of similarity between white thing a and white thing b actualizes the potentiality which white thing a possessed in order to be related to another white thing. Thus, in virtue of the connotation of the term ‘white thing b’ it is true that ‘white thing a is similar to white thing b’. Like Durandus and most non-Thomist theologians, however, Hervaeus disassociates this actualizing function from the feature of inherence which relative accidents do not possess.11 Relation actualizes its foundation’s potentiality to refer to something other without thereby introducing any changes in it. This double feature, whereby relation is really identical to its foundation and yet actualizes some potentiality in it, played an important role in accounts of the Trinity, for it enabled an explanation of divine relations which checked both the introduction of accidentality into God and the Porretan reduction of relations to ‘extrinsic’ realities. In this quodlibetal question Hervaeus has attempted to show that although relation belongs to a distinct categorical order from its foundation, it does not 10 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1; I d. 30 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 7 a. 9 ad 7. Cf. Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va–vb; Quodl. X q. 1 a. 1, 168vb–169ra; Quodl. VII q. 15, 143va–vb: ‘Et quod dicit Philosophus quod ‘‘advenit alicui de novo sine sui mutatione’’ [Aristotle, Phys. 5. 9] non est intelligendum quod relatio quantum ad illud quod est adveniat de novo alicui sine mutatione eius in quo est, sive in quo acquiritur, sed intelligendum est quod per illam relationem prius existentem de novo incipiat referri ad aliud ad quod prius non referabatur, illo alio facto de novo.’ 11 Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 21va: ‘licet . . . relationes non dicant aliquid diversum re ab ambobus fundamentis simul acceptis, tamen unaquaeque earum importat aliquid diversum re ab unoquoque absoluto per se accepto. Nam similitudo Socrates una cum albedine Socratis importat albedinem Platonis ut cuius est, et e converso. Sed albedo eius secundum se accepta non importat albedinem Platonis, nec e converso . . . Nam relationes simul acceptae ut sic mutuo se important, sed absoluta mutuo se non important. Unde ad veriWcandum de Platone quod sit similis Socratis requiritur aliqua realitas quod non requiritur ad veriWcandum quod sit albus.’ Cf. Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va–vb: ‘relatio dicatur advenire fundamento, non per alicuius adventum sibi inhaerentis et diversi ab eo, sed per adventum alicuius coexistentis de novo, ad quod de novo dicitur per illud quod prius erat in eo . . . [L]icet relatio non addat aliquid super fundamentum per inhaerentiam, addit tamen aliquid per coexistentiam eius ad quod dicitur illud quod refertur.’

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thereby add another reality to its foundation in a way that could eVect composition.12 Hervaeus has grounded this conclusion on mainly two reasons: Wrst, unlike absolute accidents, relation adds to its foundation only in obliquo—i.e. by actualizing a reference and not by inherence; secondly, unlike substances, the reality of relation depends entirely on the reality of its foundation. Although abiding on the surface by Thomist parameters and terminology, Hervaeus’s position lay in fact closer to that of his fourteenthcentury contemporaries. The telltale element is Hervaeus’s acceptance of the claim that an accident can actualize a passive feature in its subject without inhering in it. In Aquinas by contrast these two functions are always connected.

6 . 2. Q U OD L IB E T I I ( 1 3 08 ) Of Hervaeus’s second Quodlibet, question 7 is of particular interest in that it directly deals with Durandus’s view. The question at hand, deriving from a discussion centred on the Scotist notion of univocity, is whether in the divine there is a common name which can be univocally predicated of absolute and relative.13 Again, the underlying issue concerns the type of distinction that holds between relation and its foundation. Alluding to Durandus’s opinion,14 Hervaeus argues that the claim that divine relation is really distinct from the essence imposes a categorical understanding of substance and relation in God.15 Given that, in God, relation loses its accidental being and assumes the reality of the divine substance, Durandus’s claim of real distinction would falsely imply that relation preserves its categorical being as an accident distinct from the divine substance. The only way to explain the real identity between essence and relation is therefore by disengaging divine reality from all categorical predication. It is interesting to note in this respect that the clash between Hervaeus and Durandus also had its roots in divergent views of the Aristotelian categories. Hervaeus follows the traditional account according to which the categories mirror an ontological 12 In this respect, see also Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47vb; Quodl. VII q. 15, 143va: ‘divisio entis in praedicamenta est divisio entis in ea quorum unumquodque est res, sed non oportet quod diversitas eorum in qua dividitur ens sit semper diversitas realis . . .’ 13 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 46vb: ‘Utrum aliquod unum nomen commune univocum conveniat in divinis absoluta et relata diversimode.’ For Scotus, see Lect. I d. 3 q. 3. 14 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127ra. Also s. 5.1 above. 15 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 46vb: ‘si relatio in divinis dicat rem diversam a fundamento, ut quidam ponunt, tunc videtur quod relatio divina esset determinata ad praedicamentum et similiter substantia’.

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division between substances and accidents.16 In this view, a real distinction between essence and relation would be tantamount to a classiWcation of the divine according to categorical realities, which would result in an introduction of accidentality into God. By contrast, in Durandus’s account the categories are a division into the diVerent modes of being which things can acquire. The relevant dividing line is not between substances and accidents but between absolute and relative. On this view, the distinction between essence and relation does not necessarily imply that relation introduces accidentality in the undesired sense, that is, the sense whereby it would eVect composition. But for Hervaeus, holding rather that real distinction obtains only between substances and absolute accidents, the idea that relation could be a reality distinct from its foundation and yet not constitute an absolute thing was metaphysically unintelligible.17 In his view, the problem presented itself as a clear disjunction: either relation adds to the number of realities in God—as Durandus appeared to be implying—or relation constitutes the same reality as its foundation—which was the orthodox option.18 To reinforce his point, Hervaeus adduces Durandus’s response to the common argument that, for every thing, it is either a creature or it is the divine. As we saw, according to Durandus, relation cannot of itself verify whether it is a created or a divine reality, because relation is a mere mode and not a fully actual thing.19 Hervaeus criticizes Durandus on the grounds that such a distinction between relative and absolute leads to introducing a third ontological division, whereby relations constitute a reality apart from the created and the divine orders. In this sense, Hervaeus argues, Durandus’s 16 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 1, 46va–vb: ‘ens vel quidcumque praedicamentum essentiale dictum de diversis praedicamentis non dicitur secundum unam rationem univocam de eis, immo dicitur secundum diversas rationes. . . . Dico igitur quod cum in analogo sunt duo: quorum primum est diversitas rationum signiWcatarum partientium analogum. Secundum est illas res habere connexionem secundum attributionem unius ad alterum, vel ambarum ad aliquam tertiam causam analogiae inter diversa praedicamenta . . . Sicut quantitas et qualitas ad substantiam.’ 17 See Hervaeus, De relationibus, q. 1 a. 1, 55rb–va: ‘omne illud quod qualitercumque habet esse oportet quod habeat esse innixum alteri vel non innixum . . . Tunc ergo aut relatio divinis habet esse innixum aut non . . . Si innitur . . . innitatur per inhaerentiam . . . Si autem non innititur . . . sequitur quod relatio sit substantia et subsistens . . . Ergo, essentia et relatio erunt duo subsistentia realiter distincta, et per consequens duo supposita . . . Et sic . . . sequeretur quod in divinis essent quatuor supposita, quia essentia faceret distinctum suppositum a relationibus . . .’ 18 As we shall see shortly, however, Hervaeus’s rejection of the thesis of real distinction goes together with the claim that the essence as an inWnite being is common to all relations without divisibility—a claim which is fundamentally akin to the Scotist conception of the essence as a special kind of universal. Thus, what initially seems like an espousal of Aristotelian orthodoxy in order to reject Durandus’s metaphysics, will eventually lead to a rather un-Aristotelian notion of common nature. 19 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb–va. Also s. 5.1 above.

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position is not dissimilar to Gilbert of Poitiers’s notion of relation as something ‘extrinsically attached’ (assistens vel diversum) to the divine.20 Hervaeus’s criticism, however, relies on a misrepresentation of Durandus’s ontology of absolute and relative. For Hervaeus falsely assumes that, according to Durandus, ‘thing’ is predicated univocally and not analogically of absolute and relative, such that they both count as numerically distinct objects liable to composition.21 On this assumption, Hervaeus then retorts with the familiar claim that relation and its foundation constitute the same actual being, and are distinct only according to the relative term which relation connotes.22 As the issue stands, however, both Hervaeus and Durandus agree that divine relations are divine because they are founded on the divine essence. But whereas for Hervaeus this tenet rests on the validity of the claim of real identity between relation and its foundation, for Durandus it hinges on the claim that relation, as a mode, necessarily depends on a fully actual thing. Following a Thomist understanding of distinction, Hervaeus could only understand Durandus as positing a third ontological realm.23 More revealing is the association Hervaeus subsequently makes between Durandus’s thesis of real distinction and the Porretan error. Hervaeus claims that Durandus’s opinion, like Gilbert’s, is tantamount to positing a quaternity in God, whereby the essence constitutes a fourth thing apart from the three relational supposita.24 In Hervaeus’s interpretation of the Lateran decree 20 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra: ‘quando dicitur quod omnis res aut est deitas aut creatura, dicunt quod non est verum, sed dici debet quod omnis res aut est deitas aut creatura aut proprietas deitatis sive dei. Sed istud dictum videtur mihi male dictum. Quia si ista distinctio esset bona, tunc ratio Boethii contra Porretanum quae a tota ecclesia reputatur bona esset nulla. Quia sicut ipse arguit contra Porretanum, omne quod est aut est creator . . . aut creatura. Et hoc probat ipse, quod relatio non se habet ut assistens vel ut diversum quod a deitate vel a deo, ut ponebat Porretanus. Sequeretur etiam quod aliquid diversum a deitate vel a deo esset per se necessario esse, quod est falsum.’ For Gilbert, see Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring, 145. 30, 146. 34. Cf. Aquinas, ST I q. 28 a. 2, sed contra; De Pot., q. 8 a. 2. 21 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra: ‘ubicumque est unum compositum ex pluribus diVerentibus re, est vera compositio. Sed relatio cum essentia habent aliquam unitatem, alioquin persona una non comprehenderet utrumque. Igitur, si relatio realis diVert ab essentia realiter, faciunt compositionem.’ 22 Ibid. 47vb: ‘esse fundamenti et esse relationis quantum ad illud quod sunt unus et idem actus essendi aliter et aliter conceptus. Quia secundum quod est actus alicuius secundum quod est in se tale, puta album vel nigrum dicitur esse fundamenti, secundum autem quod illud idem esse dicitur ad alterum est esse relationis.’ 23 Ibid. 47ra: ‘dicunt alii quod non oportet quod illa quae diVerunt realiter sicut modus rei et res cuius est faciant compositionem, sicut secundum eos est de relatione et fundamento in creaturis . . . Sed istud nihil est. Quia iste modus aut est aliqua res in rerum natura, aut nulla. Si nulla, igitur nihil. Si est res aliqua, aut est alia res a fundamento, aut non. Si non, hoc est contra eos. Si sic, tunc oportet dicere quod illud quod est unum ex modo et fundamento sit realiter compositum.’ 24 Ibid. ‘si proprietas est diVerens realiter ab essentia in divinis erit quaternitas rerum. Quia omnis re diversa ab alia ponit in numerum. Sed illud est error condemnatus in concilio generali

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‘Damnamus’,25 the quaternity condemned by the Council refers generically to four realities, rather than speciWcally to four substantial beings. That is, the positing of a real distinction in God beyond personal distinction is suYcient, according to Hervaeus, to introduce a quaternity into God. According to this reading, by stating that relation is a reality distinct from the essence Durandus was automatically introducing a quaternity of four realities. Whether these realities are relative or absolute is inconsequential in Hervaeus’s understanding of the issue, because ‘quaternity’ refers to the type of distinction and not to the type of realities involved. Underlying Hervaeus’s reading of the Council is the Thomist claim that real distinction is equivalent to numerical plurality (ponit in numerum), such that, if relations are really distinct from the essence their reality necessarily counts over and above the essence. As Hervaeus understands the issue of quaternity, therefore, the sensitive distinction is not that between relations and the essence as relational and substantial realities respectively, but between relations and the essence as realities tout court.26 Alluding to Durandus’s claim of separability between things and their modes, Hervaeus argues that there are two degrees of separability. In a strong sense, separability obtains between two objects when one can be found without the other. Thus, a man can exist without the accident of whiteness. In this sense separability entails real distinction, such that one thing constitutes an object numerically distinct from the other. In a weaker sense, separability obtains between two objects when, even though they may constitute a real unity, one of the objects is found in some thing in which the other object is not found. Thus, even though the divine essence could not exist without either paternity or Wliation, the essence is found in the Father, extra de Wde catholica ‘‘Firmiter credimus’’ [i.e. ‘‘Damnamus’’].’ (My italics.) This further conWrms the view suggested above that 14th-cent. Dominicans reappropriate the term ‘quaternity’ to refer to the thesis of real distinction between essence and relation—and hence to the Porretan error—rather than directly to Joachim’s criticism of the Lombard. Although the authority of the Lateran Council is commonly adduced in support of this redeWnition, this reading of the conciliar condemnation is not strictly correct. 25 See Decrees, ed. Tanner, 232. 26 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra: ‘Dices quod illud, scilicet ponere quatuor res in divinis, non est error condemnatus quantum ad hoc quod in divinis sint quatuor res, sed quantum ad hoc ut videtur quod Ioachim ponebat in divinis quatuor personas et essentiam quandam personam distinctam ab aliis. Sed hoc nihil est. Primo quidem: quia sicut patet ex textu illius decretalis, Ioachim nunquam posuit essentiam esse quandam personam distinctam ab aliis personaliter. Sed possuit eam esse rem distinctam a personis, quae quidem res nec generat nec generatur nec spirat nec spiratur. Hoc etiam patet ex textu illius decretalis, scilicet quod falsum sit dicere quod essentia sit deitas realiter diVerens a personis vel proprietatibus personalibus.’ Again, this is another misinterpretation of the decretal text: the error of quaternity was not incurred by Joachim, but was rather Joachim’s charge against the Lombard’s conception of the essence as a quadeam summa res which is not included in the generational acts.

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where Wliation is not found, and conversely, the essence is found in the Son, where paternity is not found. In other words, Wliation is not formally (formaliter) included in the Father, even though it is that thing which is in the Father, namely the essence. In this second sense, separability does not necessarily entail numerical distinction, but only non-convertible identity (quod non sit idem convertibiliter). As Hervaeus sees it, therefore, Durandus subscribes only to the Wrst sense of separability, which leads him to the problematic claim that the essence can exist without the divine relations.27 In order to avoid the false conclusion in the syllogism ‘this essence is paternity’, ‘this essence is Wliation’, therefore ‘Wliation is paternity’, Hervaeus Wnds it unnecessary to establish a real distinction between essence and relation. The via media between an absolute identity and an absolute distinction does not lie in the positing of a third type of reality, but in a qualiWcation of the type of identity. As Hervaeus nicely explains it: ‘to be identical does not necessarily mean to be found in the same’.28 Real identity may hold between two objects even when one of them includes something in its deWnition which the other does not include. Thus, for Hervaeus, the principle of indiscernibility of identicals does not hold between objects which are not formally identical. For even though the Father formally includes both essence and paternity, it is not the case that the essence formally includes paternity, or vice versa. Likewise, although the Son formally includes both essence and Wliation, it is not the case that the essence formally includes Wliation, or vice versa.29 Denying the indiscernibility of identicals entails non-transitivity: even though Wliation is really identical to the essence, and paternity is really identical to the 27 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47rb: ‘aliquid inveniri sine alio intelligi potest dupliciter. Uno modo, quod inveniatur illo alio simpliciter non existente, sicut homo posset inveniri si nulla esset albedo. Et istud quod isto modo potest inveniri sine alio dicit aliam rem ab alio . . . Alio modo potest dici aliquid inveniri sine alio non quia hoc sit alio simpliciter non existente, sed quia est aliqua res quae non est illud aliud et quod invenitur sic sine alio. Non sequitur quod sit simpliciter diversum re ab eo, sed suYcit quod non sit idem convertibiliter cum eo. Et iste modo essentia divina invenitur sine relatione non primo modo. Nam essentia divina non potest esse non existente paternitate sive Wliatione. Sed bene essentia divina est paternitas quae non est Wliatio, et essentia divina est Wliatio quae non est paternitas . . . Ideo non conceditur simpliciter quod Wliatio sit in patre . . . sicut illud quo formaliter pater est pater, tamen vere potest dici quod Wliatio est illa res quae est in patre, quia scilicet est essentia quae est in patre . . . Ideo conceditur simpliciter quod pater est in Wlio et Wlius in patre propter identitatem essentiae, quae est in utroque supposita eorum distinctione.’ 28 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47rb: ‘Quod ideo dico quia ‘‘idem’’ proprie non est ‘‘in seipso’’.’ Note the aYnity with Scotus, who also advocated a middle distinction based on the relation of identity between two objects and not on their reality. See Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 esp. nn. 270–5; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 esp. nn. 403–8; Rep. I d. 33 qq. 2–3; d. 34 q. 1. 29 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47rb–va: ‘Nam paternitas non est omnis res quae est essentia, quia non est Wliatio; est tamen realiter idem quod essentia, non dicens rem aliam ab essentia, sed dicit bene rem aliam ab aliquo quod est idem realiter cum essentia.’ (My italics.)

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essence, it does not thereby follow that Wliation and paternity are identical with each other. Alternatively, Hervaeus explains the Trinitarian syllogism by resorting to the notion of non-adequate identity. Non-adequate identity obtains between two really identical objects when one exceeds the other in perfection or predication. According to Hervaeus’s reasoning, just as ‘humanity’ includes more than Socrates and Plato together, thus rendering the conclusion ‘Socrates is Plato’ false, so the Trinitarian syllogism is not valid because the subject of the premisses—i.e. the essence—involves more (est in plus) than the predicates—i.e. paternity and Wliation—together.30 Unlike an ordinary universal, however, the essence in its inWnity can comprehend all its instantiations without thereby entailing divisibility. On account of its inWnity, numerically one and the same essence can be really identical to relations which, between themselves, involve opposition.31 It is signiWcant that when explaining the lack of adequacy between essence and relations Hervaeus should draw a parallel between the common nature ‘humanity’ and the divine nature. As we shall see shortly, this prepares the ground for Hervaeus’s more explicit espousal of the Scotist conception of the essence as a special kind of universal which does not entail divisibility. Whether it is spelt out as non-convertible identity or as lack of adequacy, for Hervaeus all distinction in God must presuppose an essential identity in order to safeguard divine unity. For Durandus, by contrast, the unity of the essence is the result of qualifying a real distinction that has already been established. In Hervaeus’s view Durandus was, as it were, starting from the wrong end. What Hervaeus found most dangerous in Durandus’s position was not so much its ascribing a reality to relation independently from the essence, but its Wrst ascribing a reality to relation in order then to infer a qualiWed type of real distinction. As we saw, according to Durandus’s modus operandi, the claim of non-composition is made to follow from the premiss 30 See Hervaeus, De relationibus, q. 1 ad 2, 56va: ‘Sicut si posset esse quod unus homo esset Socrates et Plato, sicut unus deus est pater et Wlius . . . Et sic est in proposito, quia eadem essentia in plus se habet secundum praedicationem quam habet hoc relatio vel illa, et quam haec persona vel illa.’ 31 Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va: ‘syllogismus expositorius non habet locum quando subiectum in utraque propositione est in plus quam quodlibet praedicatorum. Unde non sequitur ‘‘homo est Socrates’’, ‘‘homo est Plato’’, igitur ‘‘Socrates est Plato’’. Nunc autem ita est quod essentia divina in plus se habet quam hoc relatio vel illa, quia una et eadem essentia numero est hoc relatio et illa. Et idem esset in creaturis si idem homo esse posset Socrates et Plato.’ See also Quodl. VII q. 15, 143va: ‘deus immo dicitur illimitatus ad genus et speciem quia per essentiam suam absque coexistentia cuiuscumque alterius diversi per essentiam ab eo habet quicquid perfectionem . . . , ab eo habet oppositas relationes’.

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that relation is only a mode and not a fully actual thing.32 As Hervaeus reasoned, however, one must Wrst assert the real identity between essence and relation, and then, upon that basis, qualify the identity as non-converse.

6.3. QUODLIBET IV (1309/10) Question 7 of Hervaeus’s fourth Quodlibet is perhaps the most relevant for our purposes in that it presents a thorough criticism of Durandus’s view on divine relations. Although at times rather long-winded and repetitive, this question also goes a signiWcant way towards clarifying Hervaeus’s understanding of identity and distinction, this time from an explicit Scotist standpoint. Hervaeus introduces the question with the claim that both communicability and incommunicability are found in the essence without thereby involving contradiction. There seem to be, therefore, diverse modes of identity in the divinity, such that seemingly contradictory statements can be predicated of the same thing. The issue at hand is then how to explain identity in the divine when communicability and incommunicability are both found in the divine ex natura rei, i.e. according to its reality and independently from the operation of the intellect.33 Hervaeus identiWes the twin notions of ‘communicability’ and ‘incommunicability’ as the nodal point in the explanation of the conciliar deWnition namely, ‘the essence is the three persons together and each one of them separately’. As we shall soon discover, Hervaeus’s hidden agenda is to present Durandus with a convincing interpretation of the Lateran decree which would Wnally settle the issue on quaternity. This issue was a delicate one and still a matter of much debate with Durandus, since underlying it was the 32 As has been already suggested, Durandus’s way of proceeding may reXect his theological preoccupation to safeguard the real trinity of persons against any form of anti-Trinitarianism, especially in its Sabellian form. 33 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 1, 95rb: ‘identitas convertibilis et identitas inconvertibilis sint in divinis diversi modi ex natura rei. Quia illi duo modi sunt diversi ex natura rei, quorum unus compatitur aYrmationem et negationem sine contradictione, alius autem non. Sed praedicti modi sunt huiusmodi. Nam extrema identitas inconvertibilis, scilicet pater et essentia compatiuntur aYrmationem et negationem, sicut esse incommunicabile et esse non incommunicabile. Extrema vero identitas convertibilis non compatiuntur ista, quod scilicet essentia sit communicabilis et quod ipsa eadem sit non communicabilis. Ergo, etc.’ Recall that Scotus also uses ‘communicability’ and ‘incommunicability’ as token terms for reconciling unity and plurality in the divine. See Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 394; Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 n. 259; Rep. I d. 33 q. 1, 145r. This is also the Wrst time that the term ex natura rei appears in a strict Scotist sense in the discussion with Durandus.

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more profound question of the connection between Thomist teaching and church authority, and the degree to which Durandus’s theses could be pinned down as a matter of conciliar legislation. Hervaeus’s treatment of this question centres mainly on the defence of two conclusions: Wrst, communicability and incommunicability are really in the divine, founded on the essence and the persons respectively; secondly, communicability and incommunicability are really distinct, not as entailing two separate substances, but according to the way in which they refer to a third. Concerning the Wrst conclusion, Hervaeus understands communicability according to predication,34 and distinguishes two ways in which an object can be predicable in common to many. An object can be predicable to many according to reason only, in such a way that the object is really divided among its instantiations. Thus, ‘humanity’ is predicated in common of Socrates and Plato according to reason only—i.e. as a concept—for Socrates and Plato are not numerically one man but are really distinct human beings.35 On the other hand, an object can be predicable in its reality, such that numerically one and the same object is really repeated in its instantiations without incurring divisibility. This is the case in the divine, where the essence is predicated in its singularity of all three persons.36 Note, however, that although communicability is understood according to predicability, this is not to say that communicability is necessarily secundum rationem. For although it is true that in the Trinity the intellect predicates the 34 Cf. Scotus, Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 246–57; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 377–88. On the predicability of the divine essence, see Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 388–415; d. 4 p. 2 q. un.; In Metaph. 7. 18. 35 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 1, 96ra: ‘communicabile dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet secundum transfusione, sicut quando dicitur quod essentia communicat Wlio vel spiritui sancto. Alio modo secundum praedicatione, sicut hoc modo quod dico essentia est quodam praedicabile commune de personis. Et tale commune potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, pro eo quod est commune pluribus non tamen est idem in eis secundum rem. Sicut homo est communis Socrati et Platoni, non tamen est idem homo secundum rem quod convenit Socrati et Platoni. Non enim Socrates et Plato sunt unus homo numero. Et sic aliquo modo persona est commune quodam tribus personis, quia tres personae non sunt una persona realiter. Tamen in hoc diVert inter creaturas et personas divinas, quia in creaturis illa qua communicant vel conveniunt in aliquo communi praedicabili non conveniunt in aliqua re una numero. Sed personae divinae, licet non sunt una persona, sunt tamen aliqua una res absoluta, quia sunt una essentia numero.’ 36 Ibid.: ‘Alio modo potest praedicabile commune accipi quod unum et idem numero ens convenit pluribus. Sic in divinis una et eadem essentia numero est plures personae. Et istud est in divinis singule. His praemissis, pono quantum ad propositum . . . quod communicabile et incommunicabile sunt realiter in divinis, et accipio ad nunc communicabile pro eo quod est commune secundum praedicationem.’ Also ibid., a. 2, 98ra: ‘quoddam est communicabile vel commune quod realiter unum et idem numero convenit pluribus nec pluriWcatur in eis, sicut essentia divina convenit pluribus personis una numero existens, nec pluriWcatur in ipsis. Et hoc est singulare in divinis quantum ad praedicata essentialia.’

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essence of the three persons, the essence is not for that reason predicated according to the mode of the intellect. The predicability of the essence is founded upon its reality: it is ex natura rei. As Hervaeus understands it, when we predicate of an object ex natura rei we predicate of it as an extramental reality (realiter), in contradistinction to predicating of the same object as an intention in our mind. We predicate of it according to what belongs to its reality independently of any mental operation, so that, even if the same object can be apprehended by our intellect, it does not on that ground become the result of an intellectual operation. Thus, ‘animality’ is predicated ex natura rei of a dog when we refer to the extra-mental dog and not merely to the intellectual object ‘dog’. Ex natura rei is then a mode of predicating the identity of a thing.37 The communicability of the essence to the persons is thus ex natura rei, since it refers to a real unity. By contrast, the communicability we Wnd in a genus or a species is according to reason only, because it is founded on a conceptual and not a real unity. The common nature ‘humanity’ is numerically divided into the plurality of its individual instances, such that there is no community of identity strictly speaking, but only one according to reason.38 In this sense, when we ask whether there is real communicability in God, we are in other words inquiring whether the divine essence is communicable by identity to the three persons. Hervaeus thus narrows down the notion of real communicability to the notion of real unity: the essence is really communicable as a unity when, as numerically one thing, it is repeated in its individual instances by identity. To be communicable without divisibility is therefore to be communicable by identity.39 37 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 1, 95va: ‘illud dicitur convenire alicui ex natura rei sive realiter per oppositum ad hoc quod est convenire alicui rei secundum esse quod habet in anima . . . [I]llud quod convenit rei secundum esse quod habet obiective in intellectu distinguatur contra esse reale non quantum ad illud quod est obiective in intellectu, sed quantum ad sic esse obiective in intellectu. Quia scilicet illud quod convenit rei secundum sic esse distinguitur contra illud quod convenit rei in esse reali. Et sic est verus intellectus. Verbi gratia: homini esse abstractum a Socrate et a Platone non convenit in esse reali, sed tantum prout obiicitur intellectui, ut cognitum in cognoscente sine istis, scilicet Socrate et Platone et consimilibus.’ 38 Ibid. 95va–vb: ‘unitas communis dicitur esse realis quando sc. illa unitas convenit illi communi in esse reali circunscripto tali esse obiectivo: sicut si ego dicerem quod unum et idem subiectum est commune pluribus formis adinvicem succedentibus, unitas enim talis subiecti non convenit sibi secundum esse obiective [sic] in intellectu tantum, sed secundum esse reale est enim unum subiectum numero plurium formarum succedentium subinvicem’. 39 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 96ra–rb: ‘essentia una existens realiter convenit omnibus personis et cuilibet earum qua sunt plures realiter et ex parte rei est fundamentum. Secundum quod verum est quod unaquaeque persona realiter est essentia . . . Ita quod verius et realius est in divinis talis communitas quam in creaturis. Quia licet in creaturis inveniatur pluralitas realis partium substantivarum et fundamentum reale secundum quod commune vere et realiter convenit unicuique contento sub eo, sicut patet de homine Socrates et Plato, tamen deWcit

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As for the second conclusion, Hervaeus claims that, although the essence is communicable in its singularity to the three persons, the persons are not for that reason reduced to numerically one reality. The persons include opposition, on account of which they are incommunicable and distinct from the essence, which is communicable.40 The essence and the persons are nevertheless not distinct in a way that entails numerical plurality, but only according to the diVerent ways in which they refer to a third. This type of distinction Hervaeus calls ‘non-converse identity’. As we saw in the previous section, two objects are non-conversely identical when, even though they constitute the same reality, one of them is predicable of a third of which the other object is not predicable. In this way, the essence and the Father are non-conversely identical because, even though they are the same reality, the essence, and not the Father, is predicable of the Son.41 Hervaeus also articulates this type of non-identity in terms of a lack of adequacy, whereby the essence in its inWnity ‘surpasses’ or exceeds the persons.42 On account of its inWnity the essence can be predicated without divisibility of all the persons together, whereas Father and Son cannot be predicated of each other, because they involve opposition.

trium, quia commune non est idem realiter in pluribus partibus substantivis. Socrates enim et Plato non sunt idem homo realiter. In divinis vero eadem numero essentia est qua est plures personae.’ The Scotist resonances are obvious here. See Scotus, Ord. II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 nn. 37, 39; Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 367, 381; In Metaph. 7. 18 nn. 17–20. 40 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 98rb: ‘licet personae sint idem in tertio quia sunt unum in essentia, tamen inter se non sunt una res relata nec una persona, et habent inter se distinctionem realem’. 41 Ibid. 96rb: ‘quaecunque se habent realiter ad aliquid tertium secundum aYrmationem et negationem, diversimode se habent realiter ad illud tertium. Sed sic se habent essentia et persona aliqua determinata, puta essentia et pater ad aliquam personam, puta Wlium. Quod vere et realiter pater non est Wlius, essentia vero vere et realiter est Wlius. Ergo, etc.’ Also ibid. 98ra; a. 3, 99rb: ‘quia unum istorum non est idem alteri, scilicet essentia personae secundum totum ambitum illorum quibus essentia est eadem et quibus convenit, unde idem est ac si dicatur quod unum eorum non est idem realiter tot quot alterum est idem. Et respectu eorum quae sic sunt idem aYrmatio et negatio eiusdem non implicat contradictionem . . .’ Hervaeus can thus claim to comply with Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, whereby ‘aYrmation and negation cannot be predicated at one and the same time of the same subject’. See Metaph. 6. 8 (1011b). 42 Hervaeus, Quodl., IV q. 7 a. 1, 95vb: ‘dicendum quod convertibilitas et inconvertibilitas accipienda est penes adaequationem et inadaequationem eius, secundum quod dicuntur converti. Unde identitas convertibilis dicitur illorum quae secundum identitatem sunt sibi adaequata, ita scilicet quod cuicumque unum eorum est idem et reliquum, et e converso.’ Also ibid., a. 2, 98ra: ‘praedicatum quod est persona qualitercumque sumptum non potest adaequari secundum praedicationem praedicato quod est essentia propter alium et alium modum communitatis. Nam essentia est omnis persona et omnes et quaelibet, quod nullo modo potest convenire communiquod pluriWcatur in illis quibus convenit.’ Scotus also understands inadequate identity and non-converse identity as two ways of expressing the same type of nonidentity, and he also appeals to the inWnity of the essence in order to explain the inadequacy of the essence in respect to the persons. See Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 148r.

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Thus, like Scotus, Hervaeus also establishes a metaphysical link between the inWnity of the essence and its predicability without division.43 Convertibility and adequacy thus imply a certain comparison, such that we cannot say of the same thing that it is not conversely or adequately identical to itself. At issue, therefore, is a qualiWed type of identity, predicated of an object not in itself but in relation to another.44 Since the essence and the Father constitute the same reality, we therefore do not say that they are distinct from each other, but rather that they are distinct in the diverse ways in which they refer to the Son. As Hervaeus reasons, any two objects which form a unity without composition cannot be distinct from each other, because such a distinction would involve opposition, and thereby result in numerical plurality. The point Hervaeus is trying to make here is that, in order to establish relative identity in the divine, it is not necessary to claim, as Durandus does, that essence and relation are distinct realities, but only that they are not adequately or conversely identical. The diVerence between ‘communicability’ and ‘incommunicability’ in the divine is not explained according to reality but according to the diVerent ways in which the essence and the persons are predicable of a third. Again, as with Scotus, what is being qualiWed here is the relation of identity between two objects, not their reality.45 43 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 3, 99va: ‘duo faciunt ad hoc, scilicet inWnitas essentiae et ipsam non includere oppositione ad aliquam personarum secundum relativam oppositionem oppositarum personarum. Quia ex hoc quod est inWnite perfectionis potest una existens esse in pluribus suppositis.’ Cf. Hervaeus, De relationibus, q. 1 ad 6, 57ra: ‘quidem essentia est ipsamet diversa supposita quorum nulli opponitur. Et ideo quando praedicatur pater de essentia nunquam praedicatur oppositum de opposito, nec impeditur quin in eadem essentia possit esse aliud suppositum. Et hoc propter inWnitatem suam, ita quod sicut in creaturis eadem una specie potest esse in diversis suppositis cum oppositis respectibus, ita haec essentia una numero propter inWnitatem suam . . .’ (My italics.) 44 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 1, 95vb: ‘sicut nihil dicitur aequale vel inaequale sibi ipsi sed in comparatione ad aliquid re vel ratione diVerens ab eo, ita essentia nihil dicitur convertibile vel inconvertibile absolute sibi ipsi proprie loquendo.’ Also ibid., a. 2, 99ra–rb: ‘inconvertibilitas essentiae ad patrem non debet dici inconvertibilitas alicuius ad se ipsum simpliciter et absolute sed cum determinatione, ut dicatur quod est inconvertibilitas essentiae cum eo quod est id ipsum quod essentia non adaequate. . . . Hoc enim solum facit quod aliquid non sit idem realiter adaequate cum alio, quia unum eorum potest supponere pro aliquo, quod est aliud re ab alio.’ Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 31 q. 1, 132a. Again, like Scotus Hervaues explains the notion of convertible identity in terms of a comparison. See Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 1, 145v–146r; q. 2, 147v–148r. 45 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 96rb: ‘non oportet ad hoc quod aliqua se habeant diversimode ad tertium secundum aYrmationem et negationem quod realiter inter se diVerent quod una res non sit alia, sed suYcit quod non sit idem adaequate et convertibiliter. Ex hoc enim quod unum convenit pluribus quam aliud potest unum eorum de aliquo negari de quo aYrmatur aliud, scilicet illud quod pluribus convenit.’ Cf. Hervaeus, De relationibus, q. 1 ad 2, 56va: ‘Ad hoc quod aliquod inveniatur in aliquo formaliter in quo non invenitur aliud, non requiritur quod talia diVerant realiter, sed suYcit quod non sint idem convertibiliter . . . Non sequitur diVerentia realis: suYcit enim quod unum eorum se habeat in plus secundum praedicationem quam aliud . . .’

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In his commentary, Hervaeus had stated that for something to be really in the divine it does not need to constitute a numerically distinct reality. Following from this basic insight, in the Quodlibets Hervaeus has inferred two conclusions: Wrst, essence and relations are really in God—i.e. they are ex natura rei and not merely as the result of our mode of understanding; secondly, essence and relations constitute the same actual reality and are distinct only in their comparison to a third—i.e. in their diVerent modes of predicability. The insight behind Hervaeus’s notion of non-convertible identity is a basic distinction between the real identity and the formal identity of a thing. The real identity of a thing is what governs its numerical unity—i.e. what makes it indivisible46—while a thing’s formal identity is what governs its quidditative unity—i.e. the intelligible aspect that makes it the thing it is. Thus, when we say that relations are really in the divine, we are saying in other words that relations are found in the divine as predicable objects—that they are ‘denominatively’ in the divine—and not that they are numerically distinct realities apart from the essence. By the same token, when we say that the reality of relations is identical to the essence, we are claiming that essence and relations constitute the same actual reality, and not numerically two objects. Formal identity, however, and not real identity, is based on a relation which two identical objects have to a third thing.47 Thus, whereas the reality of relation is ‘absolutely’ the reality of the essence, the formality of paternity is distinct from the formality of the essence in reference to the Son, because the essence, but not paternity, is predicated of the Son.48 The notion of convertibility is thus only applicable to the formal identity of a thing and not to its real identity. The aYnity with Scotus is remarkable. Scotus’s view of distinction, too, is governed by the basic distinction between a thing’s reality and its formality, and Scotus, too, articulates the notion of formal non-identity in terms of a qualiWed distinction (referatur ad distinctionem) rather than in terms of a qualiWed reality (referatur ad realitatem).49 Thus, both theologians Wnd their media via by focusing on the relation of identity between two things, 46 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 98va; also 99ra: ‘identitas sive unitas nihil aliud est quam entitas sive realitas indivisa . . . [Q]uod sic realitas patris est realitas essentiae non tamen est ei adaequata secundum praedicationem, ita identitas patris non est identitas essentiae non adaequata ei secundum praedicationem . . . , secundum rationem.’ 47 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 99ra: ‘quae important oppositionem . . . bene possunt convenire alicui in habitudine ad illud cui licet sit idem non tamen est idem adaequate. Unde talia opposita possunt convenire eis quae sunt idem realiter et simplicissime dum tamen non sunt idem adaequate.’ 48 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 98vb: ‘non est simpliciter concedendum quod identitas essentiae cum patre sit identitas eiusdem ad seipsum; sed debet dici quod est identitas alicuius ad illud quod simplicissime est ipsum, licet non adaequate’. 49 See Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147r–v.

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rather than on their ontological value. Strikingly, therefore, Hervaeus’s notion of non-converse identity is ultimately more directly indebted to Scotus than to Aquinas. Aquinas does not accept a midway distinction between a real distinction and one of reason, and the Thomist distinction of reason presupposes that at least one of the objects is a being of reason. Thus, the distinction between essence and relation is according to reason because it does not involve the real being of relation but only its ratio. A distinction ex natura rei, such as that propounded by Scotus, is unintelligible within these parameters because it presupposes an understanding of ratio as the result of Wrst intentional knowledge and not merely as a being of reason—a notion which Aquinas never handled in its strict sense. What Hervaeus did, therefore, was to develop Aquinas’s conception of ratio into the Scotist notion of formal identity. For Durandus, by contrast, what lies behind the trinity of persons is not diverse kinds of identity but diverse kinds of reality. He operates on an understanding of distinction which centres on the reality of the objects involved, rather than on their relation of predicability, in such a way that distinction always expresses some ontological value. Working on this assumption, Durandus inevitably imposed an ontological reading on Hervaeus’s notion of non-converse identity.50 In Hervaeus’s view, however, Durandus’s account of modal distinction presupposed a fallacious equation between the real identity and the formal identity of a thing. According to Hervaeus, Durandus misunderstood the formal non-identity between essence and relation as a distinction between distinct realities.51 In this light, that Durandus’s thesis fell within the conciliar condemnation seemed like a foregone conclusion.52 The result is a profound unintelligibility between the two positions. Hervaeus believes Durandus to be multiplying the realities in God, while

50 See e.g. Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127ra–rb. 51 See also Hervaeus, De relationibus, q. 1 a. 1, 55ra: ‘aliud est habere aliquam non identitatem et non habere omnem modum identitatis. Quia in prima quae est aYrmativa, licet de praedicato negato aYrmatur quaedam non identitas, et per consequens ponitur quaedam diversitas, quia idem et diversum inmediate dividunt ens. Sed hoc quod est non habere omnem modum identitatis non potest habere aliquam identitatem, sed negat omnem identitatem habere vel modum identitatis. Nunc autem non sequitur quod si aliqua non habent omnem identitatem vel omnem modum identitatis, ergo habent aliquam non identitatem vel aliquem modum non identitatis . . . Unde non sequitur quod si essentia et relatio non habent identitatem convertibilem quod habeant aliquam non identitatem, ita quod propositio sit aYrmativa sed de praedicato negato . . . Non semper non identitas infert nullam identitatem, quia negatio preposita alicui non facit ipsum teneri pro omni concreto sub eo . . .’ 52 Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 4, 100ra–rb: ‘quod essentia et persona diVerent realiter, sic scilicet quod hoc realiter non sit illa, est error damnatus per concilium generale capitulo ‘‘Damnamus’’, ubi dicitur quod essentia est tres personae et quaelibet personarum’.

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Durandus believes Hervaeus to be implying an anti-Trinitarian reduction to one absolute substance. Thus, before the 1314 censure list was issued, Durandus already had clear signs that Scotus could serve as a relatively safe ground for compromise. As we shall see, Durandus eventually makes gestures towards adopting Scotus’s formal distinction, in the hope that it could bridge the gap between Hervaeus’s non-convertible identity and his own modal distinction. Nevertheless, as Durandus’s Parisian Quodlibets will show, the gestures towards compromise were only half-hearted, for Durandus was not entirely prepared to abandon his ontology of modes of being.

7 Durandus’s Response: The Paris Quodlibets In 1312 Durandus became master in Paris. He Wlled this position for less than a year, since in early 1313 he was transferred to Avignon as lector in the papal curia. Despite its brevity, however, Durandus’s stay in Paris was long enough to yield two quodlibetal disputations.1 We possess two versions of the Wrst Paris Quodlibet, most probably corresponding to a double recension. The Wrst recension was probably composed sometime around Easter 1312, the second not until sometime after 1317.2 The two versions oVer valuable material in that they convey the transition from Durandus’s early commentary to his mature position in C. Durandus is no longer writing as a bachelor. He is now determining as a master and aware of the greater responsibility which the new academic status attached to his views. In this respect it is interesting to note a recognizable aYnity between Durandus’s view in the prima lectura and that of the Wrst recension of the Paris Quodlibet, reXecting a continuity we only see 1 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 105. Glorieux, La Litte´rature quodlibe´tique, i, 170, maintained, by contrast, that the shortness of Durandus’s career as a master in Paris did not leave any grounds to assume the existence of second Quodlibet. Glorieux seems to have revised this opinion, ibid. ii. 70–5, in which he acknowledges, with Koch, a second Paris Quodlibet. 2 For the authenticity of the double recension of Durandus’s Quodl. Paris. I, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 93–108, who bases his statement on a comparison with A and C commentaries. Vat. Lat. MS 1076, fos. 9vb–19ra, contains the Wrst recension, as ‘Wrst quodlibet’. Vat. Lat. MS 1075, fos. 31va–39ra, contains the revised version, which appears in the fourth place after the three Avignon Quodlibets (composed between Advent 1314 and Advent 1316). For the dating of these two versions, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 109–16. The Carmelite Guido Terreni discusses the Wrst recension thoroughly in his Quodlibet I q. 1 (Vat. Burgh. MS 39), composed c.1313. By Lent 1313 Durandus was already in Avignon, however, which leaves us with 1312–early 1313 as the most likely date. As for the second recension, in his Reprobationes (Autumn 1314) Hervaeus refers to Quodl. Paris. I as Durandus’s ‘Wrst quodlibet’. This reference is excluded from the second recension in Vat. Lat. MS 1075, which, together with the fact that Durandus groups this recension with the three Avignon Quodlibets, suggests some time after 1317 as a possible date of composition. Adding to the evidence is the fact that the second recension introduces terminology characteristic of the Avignon Quodlibets. For an edn. of Durandus’s Wrst Parisian quodlibet, see Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. Quol. Paris. I (Q. I–Q.IV), ed. T. Takada, Series of Hitherto Unedited Texts of Medieval Thinkers, 4 (Kyoto, 1968). I shall use Takada’s edn. for the Wrst recension, altering the punctuation when clarity demands it. For the second recension I rely on my own transcription of the MS sources. I am grateful to Russell L. Friedman for making Takada’s edn. available to me.

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compromised in the years after the censure. As for the second Paris Quodlibet, from Advent 1312, it appears to be an unrevised reportatio of Durandus’s determination. Since it deals primarily with moral issues it need not concern us here.3 This chapter will mainly rely on the Wrst recension of the Wrst Paris Quodlibet, highlighting the changes introduced in the second recension when they have a point to illustrate. I shall concentrate on question 1, for much of it is occupied with Durandus’s response to Hervaeus’s quodlibetal criticisms against the thesis of real distinction. In examining this issue, it will be best to deal Wrst with relations in the created order, then with divine relations.4

7.1. CATEGORICAL RELATIONS Durandus’s point of departure on this occasion varies in two fundamental aspects from the early commentary. First, in the commentary Durandus does not treat categorical relations separately from Trinitarian relations. That this is so in the Quodlibets suggests that Hervaeus’s criticisms could have compelled Durandus to sharpen his position in order to avoid more misunderstandings—in particular the idea that he imposed a categorical understanding of divine relations. Secondly, whereas the commentary is mainly concerned with the ontological issue of deWning the reality of relations as modes, the Quodlibets centre on distinction and its connection to the claim of composition. Durandus seems to have become aware, most probably through Hervaeus’s criticisms, that the real crux of his overall position lies not so much in his modal doctrine, as in his ontological understanding of distinction—i.e. one based on the reality of the terms involved and not on their relation of identity. As we saw, Durandus introduced the notion of modes of being to enable a type of real distinction which would counter the risk of composition in God. This move was severely criticized by Hervaeus as precisely entailing division in God. Thus, on this occasion Durandus has perhaps reasoned that shifting the status quaestionis from the type of reality conveyed by relations to the proof against composition is likely to work in his advantage. 3 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 117–19; Glorieux, La Litte´rature quodlibe´tique, ii. 51. Durandus’s Quodl. Paris. II is contained in its entirety in Paris BnF MS Lat. 14572. 4 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 (9vb–13rb) p. 1. 6–8: ‘Utrum omnia illa, quae diVerunt realiter in eodem supposito, faciant compositionem’. Cf. Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1, 31va–35va.

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For if he can demonstrate that, in creatures, composition does not obtain between modes, the passage from that claim to the safeguarding of God’s simplicity by means of modes appears easier to ground, and indeed preferable. In this respect, it is signiWcant that the Quodlibets present the Thomist opinion as claiming that relation and its foundation are really distinct without eVecting composition, thus attempting—however bluntly—to establish common grounds with Durandus’s preferred position.5 Durandus wants to distance himself from an ontological approach to the question which would only underscore the contrast with the Thomist position—a position ever more assimilated to Hervaeus’s terminology and outlook. Gaining wisdom from the Wrst confrontation with Hervaeus, Durandus now decides to turn the issue around, from the ontological value of relation to an explanation of real distinction—allegedly assumed by both parties—which could check the inference of composition.6 Durandus advances four possibilities. Relation is either (i) really identical to its foundation; (ii) really identical to its term; (iii) formally identical to both its foundation and its term; or (iv) a middle reference (habitudo media) which is really distinct from both its foundation and its term.7 Against (i), Durandus argues that if relation were really identical to its foundation it would not be essentially and formally (essentialiter et formaliter) a respect, but something absolute. But this contradicts the very essence of relation, which, unlike its foundation, is a mode of being towards another (esse ad aliud) and not a fully actual thing with a mode of being towards itself (esse ad se). From this, Durandus infers that relation and its foundation are essentially and formally (essentialiter et formaliter) distinct.8 As was already made clear, 5 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 p. 7. 18–21: ‘Alia opinio est, quae dicit quod relatio diVert realiter a suo fundamento, et tamen non facit compositionem cum eo, quia illud per quod relatio diVert a suo fundamento non ponitur in eodem subiecto cum fundamento.’ Cf. Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126va: ‘secunda opinio [i.e Thomae] tenet . . . quod relatio non dicit intrinsece aliud quam suum fundamento sed idem realiter, extrinsece tamen connotat aliud quod non est ipsam, sed ad quod est ipsam tamquam ad rem’; ibid. 127va: ‘Tertia opinio [i.e. Durandi] tenet mediam viam, scilicet quod relatio est alia res a suo fundamento et tamen non facit compositionem cum ipsam.’ 6 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 p. 2. 1–12: ‘Quaestio ista, quamvis mota fuerit in terminis communibus Deo et creaturis, tamen specialem diYcultatem habet in divinis, in quibus Wdes ponit distinctionem realem personarum et proprietatum personalium. Et aliqui doctores etiam in eadem persona ponunt pluralitatem realem aliqualiter vel ex natura rei, quae est modus loquendi magis velatus inter essentiam et relationem et inter duas relationes . . . Omnes tamen hoc ponentes negant compositionem in Deo.’ 7 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 p. 10. 13–16: ‘Si vero sit aliqua realitas, aut est realitas sui fundamenti praecise, aut realitas sui termini praecise, aut realitas utrumque formaliter et quidditative, aut est habitudo media diVerens realiter ab utrumque.’ 8 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 10. 17–11. 3: ‘Sequuntur duo inconvenientia . . . Primum est, quod relatio non erit essentialiter respectus, quia illud quod est essentialiter

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Durandus articulates the formal distinction in terms of a real distinction. Underlying this move is the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, to which Durandus subscribes, and which commits him to reject a middle distinction between a real distinction and one of reason. The essence (ratio) and the reality (esse) of a thing go hand in hand, such that a diminished being like relation necessarily constitutes a distinct essence from that of its foundation which is rather a fully actual being. Relation is a distinct reality from absolute things because relation formally signiWes a mode of being towards another which absolute things do not signify. In other words, two things cannot be really identical which are not quidditatively the same.9 Thus, unlike Hervaeus and Scotus, Durandus makes an equation between the real identity of a thing and its formality. On similar grounds, Durandus rejects the claim that (ii) relation is really identical to its term, for it would imply that the reality of relation is distinct from its foundation according to something absolute.10 Durandus contends that two objects cannot be diVerentiated according to something extrinsic, but only according to some essential note, as deWned by their ratio. Relation is formally a respect towards another, such that it is as a relational and not as an absolute reality that it is distinct from its foundation.11 A similar inconsistency would follow if we hold, alternatively, that (iii) relation is formally absolutum non est essentialiter respectus. Sed si relatio est praecise realitas sui fundamenti, ipsa est praecise, essentialiter et formaliter quoddam absolutum sicut et suum fundamentum. Ergo, ipsa non erit essentialiter et formaliter respectus, quod videtur magnum inconveniens et contra deWnitionem eius, quia ratio relationis est esse ad aliud, ratio autem absoluti non est esse ad aliud, sed ad se.’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va. 9 See Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 11. 14–12. 1: ‘impossibile est quod eidem rei respectu eiusdem conveniat simul connotare vel exigere aliud, et non connotare vel exigere illud, nisi eidem rei respectu eiusdem conveniant contradictoria realiter, quod est impossibile. Et conWrmatur, quia eidem nomini non potest convenire simul connotare aliquid et non connotare signiWcative. Ergo, eidem rei non potest convenire simul connotare vel exigere aliquam rem, et non connotare vel non exigere eadem realiter.’ For Durandus, the ratio or quiddity of a thing is its deWnition as the result of Wrst intentional knowledge. See Quodl. Aven. III (Advent 1316) q. 1 a. 1 p. 230. 21–6. 10 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 12. 21–13. 5: ‘Si autem detur secundum membrum sc. quod relatio sit praecise realitas sui termini, sequuntur eadem inconvenientia quae dicta sunt, et per easdem rationes adhuc sequitur quaedam magna absurditas, sc. quod realitas relationis posset esse distincta secundum suppositum a realitate sui fundamenti, quia terminus relationis frequenter est in alio supposito quam sit fundamentum.’ 11 Ibid. 14. 15–15. 4: ‘Per hoc enim quod importaret praeter fundamentum solum terminum ad quem, non posset diVere ab absoluto, cum utrumque sit absolutum, nisi forte sicut diVerunt dua absoluta ab uno absoluto. Quam diVerentiam nos non quaerimus. Et iterum nihil diVert ab altero realiter, quidditative et formaliter per illud quod est extrinsecum a sua formali et reali quidditate. Sed terminus, quem relatio connotat in obliquo secundum istos, non est intrinsice de reali et formali quidditate relationis, sed se habet omnino extrinsice etiam secundum dictum eorum.’ Durandus is clearly alluding here to the Thomist position.

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identical to both its foundation and its term. If this were the case, the similarity between the whiteness of Plato and the whiteness of Socrates would be essentially the same as the whiteness in Socrates, and conversely, the whiteness in Plato would be identical to his similarity to Socrates. The similarity of Socrates to Plato and the similarity of Plato to Socrates would then be one and the same thing, which is tantamount to saying that there is no relation between them.12 Durandus thus reduces (i)–(iii) to the same absurd conclusion whereby relation would be distinct from its foundation according to something absolute. This leaves the claim that relation is (iv) a middle reference (habitudo media) really distinct from both its foundation and its term, but not according to something absolute (realitas secundum se). As Durandus argues, if relation is to have any being, it must be distinct from its foundation by virtue of the same essential feature that makes it distinct from what is absolute. This feature cannot be the external connotation of a relative term, as Thomists like, but rather the very essence of relation as a mode of being towards something other.13 Durandus’s subsequent argument in favour of real distinction runs along the same lines as the argument in the early commentary, with both cases centred on the claim of separability between things and their modes and the underlying theory of the analogy of being. Two aspects which are new to the quodlibetal account are however worth mentioning. The Wrst is the explicit use of Aristotelico-Thomistic terminology when explaining categorical relations. Two instances of this are Durandus’s introduction of the terms secundum esse and secundum dici to describe the distinction between real relations and relations of reason,14 and the description of real relations as possessing a 12 Ibid. 13. 7–14. 1: ‘Si autem detur tertium membrum sc. quod realitas relationis sit realitas utriusque sc. fundamenti et termini formaliter et quidditative, adhuc sequuntur eadem inconvenientia quae prius, et possunt eodem modo deduci. Et praeter haec sequitur aliud inconveniens satis absurdum, sc. quod similitudo Socratis ad Platonem sit aequaliter albedo Socratis ad Platonem. Essentialiter includit albedinem utriusque, et per consequens similitudo Socratis ad Platonem et Platonis ad Socratem esset una numero tantum, quia quaelibet includeret easdem partes numero et essentialiter et aequaliter, et iterum nulla relatio esset aliquod unum, sed plura formaliter quae sunt adeo inconvenientia, quod non credo aliquem intelligentem hoc sentire.’ 13 Ibid. 14. 2–15: ‘Relinquitur ergo, quod . . . ipsa sit realitas habitudinis mediae realiter diVerens ab utroque [i.e. realitate sui fundamenti et realitate termini], vel ipsa non est aliqua realitas secundum se. Ad rationes istorum dicendum est per interemptionem maioris, quia relatio si sit aliqua realitas, diVert a suo fundamento per aliud quam per terminum ad quem. Et cum probatur quod relatio non diVert a suo fundamento, nisi per illud per quod diVert ab absoluto, verum est. Et cum dicitur in minore, quod ratio non diVert ab absoluto, nisi per hoc quod importat terminum ad quem, falsum est, immo diVert primo et per se, per hoc quod est essentialiter quidam respectus unius ad alterum.’ 14 See Aristotle, Cat. 7 (8a28–35). For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 30 q. 1 a. 2; De Pot., q. 7 a. 10 ad 11; ST I q. 13 a. 7.

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‘minimum of entity’ (minimum de entitate)15 on account of their status as mere modes and not beings possessing a mode. Already in his commentary Durandus had described real relations as beings secundum quid with a derived ontological value in comparison to their absolute analogues. This is the Wrst time, however, that he uses the term ‘minimum of entity’ to explain this analogy. In doing so he is no doubt aware of its distinct AristotelicoThomistic connotation,16 and is presumably attempting to establish a middle ground between the two positions by articulating the Thomist terminology according to his metaphysical framework of absolute and relative. On the other hand, Durandus presumably introduced the Aristotelian terms for distinguishing real relations from relations of reason in order to isolate real relations and underscore the claim that real distinction—i.e. the distinction which obtains between real objects—does not necessarily lead to composition. Forestalling the Thomist objection that if composition does not obtain between relation and its foundation, then relation cannot be a real object, Durandus wants to make it clear that even though we are indeed speaking of a real object, its ontological features are such that it cannot eVect composition.17 Durandus wants to challenge a view of distinction which could compromise his account of relations, as he prepares the terrain for the subsequent discussion on the Trinity.18 15 See Aristotle, Metaph. 14. 1 (1088a 20–7), in which he refers to relations as the least of all extra-mental realities. For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 2 ad 2; De Pot., q. 8 a. 1 ad 4. 16 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 17. 18–18. 4: ‘res dicitur analogice de re absoluta et de respectu, sed per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta. Per posterius autem et secundum quid de respectu qui non est res, nisi quia est realis modus essendi, unde habet minimum de entitate, quia est solum modus entitatis, et non est entitas habens modum, sed modus tantum.’ (My italics.) Cf. Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128ra: ‘res analogice dicitur a nobilitate de absoluto et de relatio, sed per prius et simpliciter de absoluto, per posterius autem de relatio et secundum quid, et magis de relatione quae non est res nisi quia realis modus essendi ad aliud res’. 17 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 15. 11–20. 15: ‘relatio potest accipi dupliciter: Uno modo pro respectu reali existente in rerum natura consequente ad suum fundamentum per se . . . Alio modo accipitur relatio praedicamentaliter, et sic quantum est de necessitate praedicamenti relationis non dicit respectum realem, sed denominationem realem . . . Si ergo primo modo accipiatur relatio, dicendum est, quod talis relatio diVert realiter a fundamento suo, non tamen facit compositionem cum ipso . . . [I]llud, quod dicitur res secundario et secundum quid, cum nullo facit compositionem . . . Si autem accipiatur relatio solum pro eo, quod suYcit ad relationem praedicamentalem . . . , sic dictum est, quod talis relatio non diVert realiter a fundamento, et per consequens non facit compositionem cum eo, quia talis relatio non semper est aliquid in rerum natura quod sit essentialiter respectus, sed est sola denominatio respectiva alicuius subiecti ex natura plurium consurgens . . .’ 18 See Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 39. 8–40. 18: ‘probatur . . . quod non faciant compositionem dato quod diVerent realiter, quod videtur multis impossibile . . . Propter hoc enim solum videntur facere si diVerent realiter, quia diversae res non possunt esse simul in eodem sine compositione . . . Quod autem illud non sit verum, patet primo quia . . . paternitas et Wliatio et spiratio in divinis diVerent realiter, et tamen non solum in eodem supposito non est

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The second aspect worth remarking in Durandus’s quodlibetal account is the more explicit description of modes as non-accidental properties. In the commentary, the contrast between modes and absolute accidents was only inferred from the distinction Durandus makes between the functions of dependence and inherence. But in the Quodlibets Durandus elaborates this insight by using the whole–part analogy—a Thomist favourite.19 Unlike absolute accidents and their subjects, which form a composite whole, a mode is like a ‘quantitative part’ (pars quantitativa) which does not inhere in its foundation but rather ‘coexists’ with it without eVecting composition.20 There are ways other than inherence in which a part can relate to its whole, but only inherence is connected to composition. Durandus thus disengages the function of dependence from that of inherence, reserving the latter for his own metaphysics of absolute and relative. Durandus’s gestures towards compromise are nevertheless dramatically counterproductive. The recourse to the whole–part analogy only serves to isolate Durandus’s metaphysics of absolute and relative, thus widening the gulf separating it from the standard Aristotelico-Thomistic division into substance and accidents. Furthermore, the chain of reasoning which connects diminished beings to non-inherence and to non-composition underlines the contrast with the Thomist view, according to which composition hinges not on the reality of the objects involved but on the type of distinction which holds between them. Thus, despite the shift of the status quaestionis Durandus continues to treat the issue in ontological terms.21 compositio, sed totaliter a Deo et a divinis . . . Ergo, realis diVerentia non semper facit compositionem . . . [P]luralitas rerum non facit compositionem in aliquo supposito, nisi quia talis pluralitas est in una subsistentia . . . [Q]uia omnis compositio est duorum vel plurium, quorum unum est per se subsistens et omnia alia sunt ei inhaerentia, quia in omne compositione est dare aliquod per se subsistens respectu cuius alia quae inhaerent, faciunt compositionem cum eo inter se.’ (My italics.) 19 See Cross, Metaphysics, 51–64. Although Cross refers to this model in a Christological context, the underlying insight is the same. 20 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 17. 7–19. 6: ‘omne quod componitur ex aliquibus permanentibus, se habet ad illa sicut totum ad partes. Partium autem quaedam sunt quantitativae, quarum una non est in alia, sed iuxta aliam positione diVerens. Aliae vero se habent ut materia et forma substantialis, vel ut subiectum et forma accidentalis. Constat autem, quod esse in alio et accidens absolutum in quo fundatur, puta quantitas vel qualitas, non faciunt unum compositum, tamquam partes quantitativae positione diVerentes. Item nec ut materia seu subiectum et forma, quae faciunt unum compositum, quatenus unum est in alio informative vel inhaerenter . . . Sic igitur patet, quod relatio sive quicumque respectus, qui est realis et actualis dependentia vel coexigentia alterius, diVert realiter a suo fundamento, et tamen non facit compositionem cum ipso.’ 21 Durandus’s ontological approach is clearly revealed in his reply to Hervaeus’s own reading of the issue. Ibid. 9. 23–10. 8: ‘non videtur ire ad intellectum quaestionis, quia quaestio est de reali diVerentia vel de reali identitate relationis et sui fundamenti, quae est quaestio metaphysica et non est de diVerentia nominum, quae est quaestio grammaticalis. Sed res absoluta vel relatio

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At the root of Durandus’s misWred approaches is a profound unintelligibility in respect to the new Scotist dimension assumed by the Thomist position. Ironically, the task would have been made easier had the strict Thomist parameters been preserved, particularly Aquinas’s rejection of a midway distinction between a real distinction and one of reason. Although that would have led to contrary conclusions, at least on this count Durandus could have claimed to be speaking the same metaphysical language. But now the matter seemed obscured by Hervaeus’s introduction of a middle distinction articulated in Scotist terms. Durandus’s dismay is made evident on several occasions throughout the question, in particular concerning the notion of ex natura rei as a description of Wrst intentional reality.22 The very notion of an object which is supposed to have extra-mental reality but only functions denominatively had no place in Durandus’s metaphysics.23 One can only think of Durandus’s doctrine of modes as a doubly misWtting Procrustean bed.

7.2. DIVINE RELATIONS Durandus dedicates this part of his Quodlibet to refuting the conception of the essence as a special kind of universal predicable as numerically one object. He sees this description connected to the Scotist notion of formal distinction in suo esse reali non habet rectum nec obliquum, sed solum voces signiWcativae, quae pertinet ad grammaticam. Ergo, ad quaestionem de identitate vel diversitate rerum secundum suam realitatem non est respondendum per distinctionem inter rectum et obliquum.’ For Hervaeus, see Quodl. I q. 9 a. 2, 21rb. 22 See e.g. Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 p. 2. 5–9: ‘Et aliqui doctores etiam in eadem persona ponunt pluralitatem realem aliqualiter vel ex natura rei, quae est modus loquendi magis velatus inter essentiam et relationem et inter duas relationes . . .’; p. 20. 11–18: ‘Et forte hoc intellexerunt illi de secunda opinione [i.e. Hervei], qui dicunt, quod relatio importat unum in recto et aliud in obliquo, quia istud pertinet solum ad denominationem sumptam ex diversis rebus, non conWctam per actum intellectus. Et si sic intellexerunt, non video, quod in hoc male dicant quantum ad relationes praedictas, quae fundatur super quantitatem et qualitatem.’ (My italics.) Durandus’s criticisms reveal the degree in which the Thomist position had been assimilated to Hervaeus’s interpretation according to Scotist insights. 23 Underlying Durandus’s criticism of the Scotist formal distinction is the view that the categories are a division of extra-mental beings, such that the distinction between one category and another is by necessity real. In this light, the idea—in Durandus’s reading a Thomist one— that relation is distinct from its foundation only according to its formality seems to contradict the claim that relation belongs to a diVerent category from its foundation. See Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 23. 16–24. 12: ‘Et ideo dicendum est aliter, quod divisio entis extra animam non est in decem praedicamenta secundum formales eorum rationes, quia nullum praedicamentum in se constituitur, vel ab alio distinguitur non concurrente operatione intellectus . . . Ergo ens extra animam non distinguitur in decem praedicamenta secundum formales rationes

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ex natura rei, and is well aware of Hervaeus’s use of it in connection to the inWnity of the essence and the thesis of non-converse identity. Durandus presents two alternative ways of explaining the connection between essence and relations. The Wrst corresponds to the Thomist account, the second to his own preferred opinion. Symptomatically, Durandus’s presentation of the Thomist position on this occasion is a reproduction of Hervaeus’s quodlibetal arguments.24 Against the claim that essence and relations are non-conversely identical, Durandus argues that if any two objects constitute numerically one thing, they are by necessity conversely and adequately identical. Since the divine essence is a singular being, it follows that whatever is really identical to it must be so in an adequate way.25 Durandus admits of a lack of adequacy only between a whole and its parts, or between a universal and one of its individual instances. A whole is more than any of its parts, just as the universal ‘humanity’ surpasses each of its individual instances because it includes all instances of human beings. We say, then, that there is a lack of adequacy between ‘humanity’ and ‘this individual human being’. But essence and relation are singular objects constituting a simple unity, on account of which the notion of non-adequate identity, as understood by Hervaeus, cannot apply. The lack of adequacy, whereby the essence in its inWnity can comprehend all relations, by necessity results in real distinction. But since essence and relation form a simple unity, Durandus reasons, the distinction between them cannot be such that it amounts to composition. Essence and relation are therefore really distinct in a qualiWed way, i.e. according to some mode (diVerunt aliquo modo realiter).26 Durandus’s analysis of a eorum, quibus constituuntur et distinguuntur, sed dividitur ens extra animam in decem praedicamenta, quoad res quae praestant suYciens fundamentum decem modis praedicandi, ut sit realis praedicatio et non conWcta.’ I discuss this issue in more detail in s. 12.1 below. 24 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 28. 14–29. 13: ‘Illa, quorum quodlibet est una res, et unum invenitur in aliquo supposito sive alio, non sunt simpliciter et omnino eadem res. Sed essentia divina et paternitas sunt huiusmodi, quia essentia divina est in Wlio, in quo tamen non est paternitas. Ergo, essentia divina et paternitas non sunt simpliciter et omnino eadem res . . . Et hoc non sequitur quod essentia divina et paternitas diVerent realiter, sed solum quod non sunt idem convertibiliter.’ For Hervaeus, see Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47rb. 25 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 p. 29. 14–21: ‘quando aliqua sunt talia quod quodlibet eorum est simpliciter simplex et sumptum in sua singularitate, si unum est alteri idem realiter, necessario videtur esse idem cum eo adaequate et convertibiliter. Sed essentia divina et relatio sunt huiusmodi, quia quaelibet est quaedam singularitas et quaelibet simpliciter simplex. Ergo, si sunt idem realiter, sequitur quod sunt idem et adaequate et convertibiliter.’ 26 Ibid. 30. 1–33. 5: ‘quod aliqua sint idem realiter et non convertibiliter, non potest contingere nisi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia unum sumitur in sua singularitate et aliud in sua universalitate ut Socrates et homo . . . Alio modo, quando utrumque sumitur in sua singularitate, sed unum se habet ad alterum per excessum, quia non omne quod est unius est alterius, et sic totum et pars non sunt idem adaequate . . . [Q]uae non sunt omnibus modis idem realiter diVerunt aliquo modo realiter. Sed essentia et relatio secundum istam rationem non sunt idem

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middle distinction thus inevitably reverts to pattern: for any two singular objects, if they are not identical in every mode, they are really distinct according to some mode. As Durandus understands it, lack of adequacy and non-convertibility are relations of predicability which cannot apply to a singular object because, as singular, it is incompatible with any notion of universality. Since the divine essence is a singular individual, the qualiWed distinction which obtains between essence and relation must be according to types of reality, and not to a type of non-identity which only holds between modes of predication. Following Scotus’s lead, by contrast, Hervaeus sees no problem in articulating the communicability of the essence in terms of predicability, where predicability is a relation that obtains between numerically singular items. In this view, the capacity of the essence to repeat itself in each of its instances without divisibility is explained by its inWnity. Following the same issue, Durandus addresses Hervaeus’s objection that the expository syllogism does not apply when the subject in the premisses includes more than both predicates together.27 Against this view, Durandus argues that in the Trinitarian syllogism the essence cannot be said to be in plus to any relation because the essence is a numerically singular reality. When the subject of the premisses is understood in its singularity, the idea of an ‘excess’ over the predicates does not arise, as it does by contrast in the case of a universal comprehending a plurality of instances. In Durandus’s view, what makes the Trinitarian syllogism invalid is that it falsely predicates a real identity between the essence and a mode of being, when it concerns rather a real distinction. The problem lies in the premisses and not in the form of inference. The expository syllogism is as invalid in the Trinity as it would be for Socrates and Plato if we predicated a real identity between them: ‘Socrates is Plato’ is as false as ‘paternity is Wliation’. What makes the Trinitarian conclusion false is not a ‘universal’ quality in the essence which cramps the inference, but an ontological disparity between essence and relations. And since we are dealing with singular objects, this disparity cannot be articulated in terms of an ‘excess’ in the modes of predicability, but rather as a real distinction between a thing and its mode. Essence and relations are really realiter omnibus modis. Ergo, diVerunt aliquo modo realiter . . . [N]ec est simile quod addunt pro simili, quia albedo et color, si accipiantur in eodem et in sua singularitate, sunt idem realiter et convertibiliter. Albedo vero et color, si sumantur in universali, non sunt idem convertibiliter propter maiorem ambitum generis quam speciei. Nos autem loquimur de essentia et relatione in sua singularitate, et ideo non est simile.’ (My italics.) Durandus is thus unequivocal in his rejection of the conception of the essence as a kind of universal. 27 See Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va.

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distinct because the essence is absolute and of itself subsistent, whereas relations are non-subsistent modes and fall short of actual reality.28 Durandus’s preferred view rests on an exclusive disjunction between absolute and relative. In his own words: For every thing, if it is essentially a respect (respectus essentialiter) according to its entire being, it is not absolute according to any feature of itself. But paternity is essentially a respect (respectus) according to its entire being. Consequently, [paternity] is not something absolute according to any feature of itself. [Paternity] is not therefore the essence . . . [This is because] relative (respectus) and absolute constitute the primary ontological division (primae diVerentia entis) [and] cannot coexist (incompossibiles) within the same simple nature.29

In Durandus’s view, absolute and relative are mutually exclusive essences and thereby wholly distinct beings. Again, the contrast is not between modes of predicability, but between types of reality. In this light, to claim that paternity is really identical to the essence, as Thomists do, is tantamount to saying that the Father is constituted solely by the essence and not at all by relation. As a result, the divine supposita would be absolute beings like the essence, and divine relations would be entirely superXuous. This is exactly how Durandus understands the Thomist claim that the divine supposita are formally subsistent—rather than incommunicable—beings.30 28 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 34. 11–35. 8: ‘Cum ergo dicitur quod syllogismus expositorius non habet locum quando subiectum est in plus quam quodlibet praedicatorum, certe verum est. Sed oportet quod ex forma arguendi habeatur quod subiectum non sit in plus. Hoc autem habetur ex hoc, quod subiectum accipitur in sua singularitate, et ob hoc non potest esse in plus quam quodlibet praedicatorum. Et cum additur quod eodem modo posset probari quod pater esset Wlius accipiendo in subiecto ‘‘hic Deus’’, dicendum est quod non, quia ‘‘hic Deus’’ stat pro supposito. Aut ergo pro alio et alio in utraque praemissarum, et tunc non est idem subiectum sed est syllogismus expositorius vel ex quatuor terminis, aut stat in utraque praemissarum pro eodem supposito, et tunc altera praemissarum necessario erit falsa vel utraque, quia si stat in utraque pro supposito patris, maior est vera et minor est falsa. Et ideo non est mirum, si semper sequitur conclusio falsa. Non sic autem potest dici de essentia quae non potest stare pro pluribus essentiis, sed pro una simplicissima tantum. Et ideo si praemissae sunt verae, oportet necessario quod conclusio sit vera, nisi plus addatur vel aliud dicatur.’ 29 Ibid. 36. 15–37. 3: ‘Omne illud quod secundum se totum est respectus essentialiter, secundum nihil sui est absolutum. Sed paternitas secundum se totam est essentialiter respectus. Ergo, secundum nihil sui est aliquid absolutum. Non ergo est essentia . . . [Q]uia respectus et absolutum sunt primae diVerentia entis incompossibiles in eadem natura simplici.’ Note the contrast with Henry of Ghent, who holds rather that one and the same thing can be both absolute and relative. See Henry, Quodl. VII qq. 1–2, 32. 92–33. 4; Quodl. XV q. 5, 577v. 30 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 37. 18–38. 16: ‘Si autem sint idem et non convertibiliter, hoc est quia essentia est in plus quam paternitas, quia non omnes quod est essentia est paternitas, licet omne quod est paternitas sit essentia, tunc arguitur sic. Sola essentia per se potest constituere quicquid ipsa constituit cum eo quod secundum totum est essentia, quia illud quod secundum se totum est essentia non est aliud quam essentia. Ergo, essentia cum illo est sola essentia, quia solus est idem quod non cum alio. Sed paternitas

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Even the most well disposed readers would have inferred a multiplication of divine realities from Durandus’s statement. That Hervaeus did is no surprise. Faced with this argument, Hervaeus would have claimed that relative and absolute can coexist in numerically one and the same reality when this reality is an inWnite nature. However, Durandus is immune to this objection, and the reason lies in question 3 of the same Quodlibet. In explaining the metaphysical disparity between relative and absolute, Durandus claims that relation is not the sort of reality which could formally signify a perfection. He understands perfection according to a thing’s ontological value, such that it is a feature that only absolute things can have and by virtue of which they add to the goodness of their nature. But relation cannot of itself determine the degree of perfection of a thing, because as a mode it comes to its foundation already constituted as a fully actual being. Likewise in the divine, relation cannot add to the perfection of the supposita, for otherwise the Son, who includes Wliation and common spiration, would be more perfect than the Spirit who does not include Wliation.31 The same argument applies to a thing’s Wniteness or inWnity. Durandus understands Wniteness as the perfection predicated of a thing according to quantity: that is, Wniteness or inWnity is a quantitative way of talking about a thing’s perfection. Thus, an inWnite being is that being which enjoys the greatest quantity of perfection (quantitas perfectionis). Again, neither inWnity nor Wniteness is coextensive with relation, for these features are only applicable to absolute things.32 Durandus would secundum se totam est essentia. Ergo, quicquid constituit essentia cum paternitate sola essentia constituit secundum se. Sed essentia cum paternitate constituit suppositum patris. Ergo, sola essentia constituit ipsum, et eadem ratione sola essentia constituit suppositum Wlii et suppositum spiritus sancti. Hoc autem est falsum, quia superXuerent divinae relationes et quodlibet suppositum esset absolutum sicut essentia per quam formaliter constitueretur, et iterum unum absolutum constitueret formaliter plura absoluta, quae omnis sunt impossibilia.’ 31 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 3 pp. 78. 3–81. 20: ‘quicquid est in rerum natura absolutum, quantum est ex parte rei, est perfectio . . . [D]icitur perfectio solum de illo quod ponit gradum bonitatis vel nobilitatis in aliquo . . . [R]ealis relatio non potest dicere perfectionem nec in creaturis nec in divinis. Quod non in creaturis, patet sic. Relationes vel sunt per se consequentes fundamentum suum . . . , vel sunt accidentaliter advenientes . . . Sed nec primi respectus nec secundi ponunt gradum bonitatis vel nobilitatis in eo in quo sunt . . . Quod autem relatio in divinis non dicat perfectionem . . . patet . . . sic. Perfectio ponit gradum nobilitatis et bonitatis in eo in quo est. Sed relatio divina non ponit talem gradum in supposito in quo est, quia tunc illud suppositum esset melius et nobilius alio supposito non habente illam relationem, quod est falsum.’ 32 Ibid. 85. 16–87. 19: ‘relatio divina non est formaliter Wnita nec inWnita . . . quia quod non est quantum . . . quantitate perfectionis . . . [Q]uia Wnitum et inWnitum solum quantitati congruunt . . . Quod autem non sit quanta quantitate perfectionis, patet quia quod non est perfectio, non est formaliter quantum quantitate perfectionis . . . [R]elatio divina, dato quod secundum se esset aliqua perfectio sicut et essentia, non tamen esset perfectio induens rationem quanti, et per consequens non est Wnita nec inWnita . . . Quod autem consuevit dici quod omne creatum est Wnitum, intelligendum est de suppositis et perfectionibus absolutis quibus competit realiter esse

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thus escape Hervaeus’s objection that an inWnite essence neutralizes numerical plurality, for talk of numerical plurality is only meaningful when it concerns absolute things and not relations. Relations do not add to the number of things any more than they increase the degree of perfection of a thing.33 The same insight governs Durandus’s rejection of the standard argument that, for every thing, it is either a creature or the divine. Relying on this disjunction, Hervaeus had objected that Durandus’s thesis of real distinction entailed either that relations in God are created, or that they form a separate ontological realm, and hence the frequent allusion to the Porretan error.34 However, Durandus’s view of relations escapes the division of reality into created and uncreated beings, a division which is relevant for absolute things only. As modes of things, relations require the existence of absolute things to determine whether they belong to the created or to the uncreated order. In Durandus’s view, Hervaeus’s claim that the disjunction should also apply to relations falsely presupposes that relation possesses the sort of perfection which is only true of absolute things.35 The same reasoning would account for Durandus’s rejection of any talk of an ‘excess’ in predicability, which both Hervaeus and Scotus are fond of using when accounting for the lack of adequacy of the divine essence in respect to relations. Although Durandus certainly accepts that the divine essence is an inWnite being, his metaphysics cannot articulate the quantitative comparison which the term ‘excess’ implies. After the Wrst recension of the Paris Quodlibets, Durandus’s view passes a turning point, though it is not until the Wnal composition of the commentary that it will crystallize into a mature position. This new stage is announced by quantum quantitate . . . perfectionis.’ The understanding of Wniteness and inWnity according to the category of quantity is of Aristotelian origin. See Aristotle, Phys. 7. 2 (246a10); 8. 10 (267b 17). Scotus has a similar understanding of inWnity and perfection in terms of quantity, whereby a being is more or less perfect according to whether it is inWnite or Wnite. In contrast to Durandus, however, Scotus believes that relation is Wnite, and in that sense ‘less’ than the inWnite essence. See Scotus, Quodl. V q. un. 33 By the same token, Durandus would be immune to Scotus’s argument that the repeatability of numerically one object is possible only if that object is inWnite. 34 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 128rb–va. For Hervaeus, see Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra. 35 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 p. 49. 12–22: ‘propositio est vera de eo quod est res proprie et simpliciter habens esse et modum essendi, non autem de re dicta secundum quid, quae est solum quidam realis modus essendi. Cuius ratio est, quia nec creatio nec quaecumque actio in creaturis potest unaquaque determinari ad relationem immediate, sed solum mediante fundamentum. Et ideo, quod relatio sit creata vel increata iudicandum est ex fundamento, ratione cuius competit sibi creari vel esse increabile. Non ergo sola essentia divina est increata, sed omnis respectus in ea fundatus . . .’ There is therefore a sense in which for Durandus ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ constitute as it were transcendental modes of being prior to the division into categories. Before deWning whether a thing belongs to one or another order of reality, it must Wrst be determined whether it is absolute or relative.

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the so-called confessio. This was a report Durandus is said to have sent to the Carmelite Guido Terreni, approximately a year after he completed the Wrst recension of the Paris Quodlibets, i.e. around 1313. What is especially valuable about the confessio is that it presents a vivid summary of a moment of transition in Durandus’s thought, as Durandus makes his Wrst hesitant attempts at reconciliation with his order’s position—a position by now clearly shaped after Hervaeus’s view. At this stage, however, a year before the censure of 1314, Durandus was still trying to justify, rather than excuse, his view on Trinitarian relations. Two aspects in the confessio are worth noting. First, Durandus’s theological motives become more evident in his vehement reproof of Sabellianism.36 Second, Durandus shows clear signs that he is aware of both Hervaeus’s move towards the Scotist view of formal distinction, and Hervaeus’s equation of Durandus’s thesis of real distinction with the Porretan error. Thus, while attempting to justify his position as more expeditious in avoiding Sabellianism, Durandus tries to reconcile his view with the Scotist line. With this twofold purpose, he pleads for two concessions. First, that against the Sabellian reduction of relations to one absolute reality, the Porretan position is at least preferable. Second, that a real distinction amounts to nothing more than the claim that the essence is found where relation is not found, which is precisely what the Scotist distinction ex natura rei asserts.37 In this way, 36 It is not immediately apparent why Durandus would have shown such a strong reaction against Sabellianism, or why Sabellianism in particular represented such an imminent threat in Durandus’s mind. One wonders if this reaction could be owed to a recent controversy, or simply to a concern on Durandus’s part that his modal doctrine could be misinterpreted as disguised modalism. 37 Despite its length, it is worth reproducing the full passage in the confessio: ‘Dicunt [i.e. Hervaeus] enim, quod opinio [Porretani], quae ponit, quod essentia et relatio diVerunt realiter sic, quod relatio sit res alia ab essentia, ei extrinsecus assistens vel inhaerens, est haeretica, quia relatio esset creatum et faceret compositionem. Opinio autem [Scoti et Hervaei], quae ponit quod essentia et relatio non diVerunt realiter, si intelligatur sic, quod essentia sit tantum idem relationi quod relatio non sit realis modus habendi essentiam, diVerens ab essentia non solum secundum conceptum nostrum, sed ex natura rei sic, quod essentia divina est realiter et formaliter in aliquo supposito, in quo non est omnis modus habendi naturam et omnis relatio, ipsa est magis heretica quam prima [i.e. Porretani], quia est condemnata haeresis Sabelliana . . . , et per symbolum Nicenum, . . . et per documentum Athanasii et per Innocentium in . . . ‘‘Firmiter’’ et ‘‘Damnamus’’. Unde tenentes primam viam [i.e. Porretani] non ponunt quod relatio diVerat ut assistens vel inhaerens, sed dicunt quod diVert ab essentia realiter, quia essentia invenitur ubi relatio non inenitur. Et haec sententia ut summe catholica est tenenda. Tenentes autem secundam viam [i.e. Scotus et Hervaeus] non intendunt excludere diVerentiam inter relationem et essentiam realem, quae est quod essentia invenitur in supposito aliquo, in quo non invenitur relatio omnis et modus habendi realiter. Igitur illae opiniones in re non diVerunt, sed in verbis. Unde isti [i.e. Scotus et Hervaeus], nolentes litigare de verbis, tenent pro veritate quod essentia et relatio non sic realiter diVerunt, quod sint duae res, quarum una sit assistens alteri extrinsecus vel ei inhaerens, sed solum sic diVerunt ex natura rei, quod relatio realis omnis non invenitur in supposito, in quo invenitur essentia; quia tamen maior est idemptitas essentiae

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Durandus wants to clear his position from all suspicion of heresy, while he convinces Dominicans that a real distinction according to modes is ultimately compatible with formal non-identity. Despite Guido’s sceptical response, Durandus’s attempt to reconcile the two views should not be dismissed as a mere subterfuge. For Durandus is genuinely concerned to justify the preferability of a real distinction, and he does so—however precariously—by portraying real identity as Sabellian. Furthermore, by equating his notion of real distinction with the Scotist distinction ex natura rei, he has prepared the grounds for a reconciliation of his view with the order’s oYcial stance as voiced by Hervaeus. Just as we noticed certain shared features in Durandus’s early commentary and the Wrst recension of the Paris Quodlibet, revealing a continuity in his thought over that period, so there is a similar resemblance of features between the confessio and some passages in the second recension of the Quodlibets,38 as if, again here, Durandus’s thought were gaining momentum in its new direction. Granted that the second recension was composed in the aftermath of the censures (possibly after 1317), one is tempted to think of it as Durandus’s rather precipitate amends before the calmer times of the bishopric could induce a more judicious approach to the issues. Indeed, as we shall see in what follows, the second recension shows all the signs of eventful times.39 As he realizes its potential for compromise, Durandus begins to use the Scotist terminology more profusely, at times even appearing to subscribe to the formal distinction. Thus, instead of bluntly stating that essence and relation are really distinct, on this occasion Durandus restricts his claim by et relationis quam diversitas, et sancti magis utuntur sermone, quod sint idem re, quam quod distinguantur ut plures; et quia distinctio realis magis et per prius dicitur de diVerentia rerum compositionem facientium, inhaerentium vel extrinsecus assistentium, ideo magis debet dici, quod sunt idem realiter, quam quod distinguantur.’ Guido reacts sceptically: ‘Multum miror, si opinio, quam ante illam confessionem improbaverunt, sc. quod essentia et relatio sint idem re, ut communiter a catholicis ponitur, sit eadem in re cum illa, quam defenderunt in re, quare de probabilitate unius vel improbabilitate super aliam se intromiserunt; sed de verbis, ut dicunt, nolunt litigare . . . Quare pro nihilo in confessione est insertum.’ Quoted by Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 107 n., from Guido Terreni’s Quodl. I, Vat. Burgh. MS 39, in which Guido engages with Durandus’s Quodl. Paris. I q. 1. For Guido’s criticism of Durandus, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 109–13. 38 See esp. Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2 pp. 45. 3–47. 11 (Vat. Lat. MS 1075 fos. 34vb–35ra). 39 Takada’s edn. incorporates the additions of the second recension into the Wrst, thus forming a monolithic—if not altogether coherent—piece of work. Although undoubtedly more convenient for a systematic study of Durandus’s thought, the historical approach of this study compels me to look at the second recension separately. This division responds not only to methodological purposes, but also to telling changes in content—otherwise it becomes diYcult to explain how Durandus suddenly begins to endorse the Scotist view of distinction when a few paragraphs earlier he has been arguing against it. For the following I will therefore rely on my own transcription of question 1 of the second recension, i.e. fos. 34va–35va of Vat. Lat. MS 1075.

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saying that essence and relation are really distinct, not as numerically two things (diversae res), but according to reality (ex natura rei) and not merely according to our mode of understanding.40 However, Durandus’s endorsement of the distinction ex natura rei is arguably an unqualiWed adoption of the Scotist formal distinction. As the second recension shows with almost suspicious insistence, Durandus will only articulate the Scotist view of distinction in terms of his doctrine of modes. Divine relations are no more than modes of possessing the essence, Durandus maintains, and are distinct from the essence according to reality (ex natura rei)—i.e. ‘the essence is formally in some suppositum in which some mode of possessing the essence is not’.41 As the confessio already revealed, Durandus is intent upon showing the validity of the claim of real distinction in order to achieve the twofold purpose of avoiding Sabellianism42 and disengaging his position from the Porretan 40 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 34vb (cf. Takada, p. 45. 3–9): ‘Alio modo potest intelligi essentiam et relationem diVerre realiter, non quod sint tales diversae res . . . sed quia diVerunt ex natura rei et non solum secundum conceptum nostrum, nec solum diVerentiam nominum. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod essentia divina et relatio diVerent, nisi velimus clare incidere in talem haeresim Sabellianam.’ Also ibid. 34vb–35ra (cf. Takada, p. 47. 7–11): ‘Non est tamen extendendus modus loquendi, ut dicatur absolute et sine determinatione quod essentia et relatio diVerent realiter, sed semper cum determinatione hac realiter, id est, ex natura rei non extendendo vim vocabuli, sed potius restringendo.’ Durandus’s surrendered words carry the ring of the censure behind them. 41 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 34vb (cf. Takada, pp. 45. 10–47. 11): ‘Ad cuius declarationem advertendum est, quod relatio divina non est aliud quam modus habendi essentiam divinam, ut qui est ab alio per generationem . . . Isti autem modi habendi essentiam divinam, quamvis non sint alia res ab essentia nec subsistens nec inhaerens, diVerunt tamen ab essentia non solum diVerentia nominum nec secundum conceptum nostrum solum, sed ex natura rei, videlicet, quod in aliquo supposito divino est essentia formalis, in quo non est formaliter quilibet modus habendi essentiam. Necessarium est ergo ad evitandum praedictum errorem [i.e. haeresim Sabellianam] quod relatio divina et essentia diVerant non solum secundum conceptum nostrum . . . sed ex natura rei ita, videlicet, quod in aliquo supposito est essentia divina, in quo tamen non est quaelibet relatio seu quilibet modus habendi essentiam divinam.’ (My italics.) Also ibid. 35va (cf. Takada, p. 54. 8–10): ‘relatio non est formaliter essentia, nec essentia formaliter est relatio, sed diVerunt ex natura rei sicut res et modus habendi rem’; and 35va (cf. Takada, p. 55. 2–21): ‘suppositum divinum constituitur ex essentia et relatione tanquam ex duobus non solum diVerentibus secundum conceptum nostrum aut secundum nomen, sed ex natura rei sicut res et modus habendi rem, quam diVerentiam quidam vocant formalem . . . [F]ormaliter loquendo essentia non est formaliter paternitas, nec essentia est Wliatio, quin immo paternitas et Wliatio sunt modi habendi essentiam divinam qui ex natura rei diVerunt ab ea, quamvis non sint alia res nec subsistens nec inhaerens.’ (My italics.) 42 The number of times Durandus mentions the risk of Sabellianism within this question is remarkable. Apart from the instances cited above, see also Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 34vb–35ra (cf. Takada, pp. 46. 21–47. 7): ‘Et si hanc diVerentiam negaret prima opinio [i.e. Porretani], quae dicit quod essentia et relatio nullo modo diVerunt realiter, quia non sunt idem realiter convertibiliter, incideret clare in haeresim Sabellianam, ut visum est. Si autem secunda opinio [i.e. Hervei et Scoti], quae dicit quod diVerunt realiter essentia et relatio, intendat solum ponere talem diVerentiam inter essentiam et relationem, sc. quia diVerunt ex natura rei modo supra exposito, ipsa est vera et catholica.’ Thus, here as in the confessio Durandus’s fear of

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error.43 This required an espousal of the sanctioned terminology without any compromise to his own doctrine of modes. The result was a double metaphysical language which obscured matters even further.44 This double language is particularly evident in Durandus’s rejection of the view of quaternarism imposed by Hervaeus’s reading of the Lateran Council. After a very lucid explanation of the conciliar text, against what he deems as Hervaeus’s near-sighted interpretation,45 Durandus attempts to defend his own view from all suspicion of quaternarism. The defence centres on two arguments. First, the Council did not condemn a quaternity of realities Sabellianism is such that he is even prepared to justify a Porretan version of real distinction if that is what it takes to avoid an anti-Trinitarian understanding of real identity. 43 See e.g. Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I (second recension), 35rb (cf. Takada, p. 51. 2–7): ‘Nos autem non dicumus relationes esse extrinsecus assistentes, sed existentes in essentia divina sicut in suo fundamento, a quo diVerunt ex natura rei, aut quia non sunt idem convertibiliter, ut isti dicunt, aut quia non sunt idem formaliter, ut alii dicunt, quamvis non sint alia res nec subsistens nec inhaerens, sed solum modus habendi rem.’ 44 One instance of this is the contrast between the Wrst and the second recension in Durandus’s explanation of the Trinitarian syllogism. The gist of Durandus’s argument in the Wrst recension was that, since the essence is a singular being, the invalidity of the syllogism cannot lie in the essence being ‘more’ than the predicates together. The syllogism is invalid because the real identity predicated in the premisses is false (Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 34. 8–35. 8). In the second recension the reasoning is diVerent. See Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 35va (cf. Takada, p. 55. 9–21): ‘Cum enim primo dicitur [supra], quod quando aliqua sunt talia quod quodlibet eorum est simpliciter simplex, et caetera, dicendum est quod verum est, si talia sint idem formaliter. Essentia autem et relatio, quamvis non sunt diversae res . . . , diVerunt tamen formaliter ex natura rei . . . Et ideo utraque propositio illius syllogismi expositorii neganda est, loquendo de formale praedicatione.’ How the formal distinction is supposed to sit with Durandus’s previous acceptance of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals remains an open question. 45 This passage is almost identical in both recensions. See Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 59. 15–60. 20, and Quodl. Paris. I q. 1. a. 2 (second recension), 35rb (cf. Takada, pp. 51. 15–53. 1): ‘Quidam autem doctor [i.e. Hervaeus] qui male vidit textum . . . dicit quod ex textu illius decretali ‘‘Firmiter credimus’’ apparet, quod Joachim posuit essentiam distinctam a personis non personaliter quasi esset quarta persona, sed quasi quandam rem quae haec generat nec generatur, nec spirat nec spiratur, et innuit per hoc quod sic ponere est condemnatum quamlibet quaternitatem rerum. Et mirandum est, quomodo aliquis doctor ausus fuit hoc dicere et multo plus quomodo ausus fuit hoc scribere, quia in tota decretali ‘‘Firmiter credimus’’ nullum verbum Wt abbate Ioachim nec in bonum nec in malum. In sequenti vero decretali quae incipit ‘‘Damnamus etc’’ Wt mentio de abbate Ioachim, sed non dicitur quod posuit tres personas et essentiam quartam rem. Sed dicitur ibi, quod ipse imposuit hoc magistro Petro Lombardo qui compilavit Summas per hoc arguens eum de quaternitate personarum. Ioachim enim sicut verissimus Arrianus posuit quod pater et Wlius non sunt unum in essentia vel natura, nisi collective sicut multi homines sunt unus populus et multi Wdeles una ecclesia . . . Et quantum ad utrumque reprobatur ibidem per concilium: quantum ad illud quod ponit personas divinas diVerre aequaliter essentialiter et in nulla essentia una secundum numerum convenire; quantum ad hoc quod dicit magistrum Petrum Lombardum errasse in hoc quod ponebat quod sint tres personae, pater generans, Wlius genitus, et spiritus sanctus procedens. Et iste est clarus sensus illius decretalis quantum ad omnem hominem, qui intelligit, quid signiWcatur per nomen.’ For Hervaeus’s reading of the conciliar text, see Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra.

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(quaternitas rerum)—for no theologian would deny that there are four real relations in God—but a quaternity of absolute things. Secondly, the claim of real distinction does not lead to quaternarism when real distinction is understood not according to numerical plurality but according to real modes of possessing the essence. On both counts the view of relations advocated by Durandus is theologically harmless.46 In sum, the running theme in the second recension, as in the confessio, is the modal understanding of the Scotist formal distinction together with a persistent rebuttal of Sabellianism. It is as if, through sheer repetitiveness, Durandus were trying to convince himself, as he tries to convince his order, that the sanctioned Scotist distinction is preferable not only as a compromise but also for theological reasons. Durandus’s acknowledgement of the Scotist vocabulary thus comes over as little more than a conciliatory gesture towards the Dominican authorities. Worth remarking, however, is the distinctive Bonaventurean ring in Durandus’s modal interpretation of the Scotist distinction.47 As we shall see, this hybrid between a Scotist formal distinction and the Bonaventurean modal distinction, so characteristic of the second recension of the Quodlibets, is all-pervading in Durandus’s post-1314 stance.48 The equation between formalities and modes will become a constant feature in the last version of the commentary, and give Durandus’s position an aYnity with the older Franciscan school curiously greater than that with Scotus. Thus, as the controversy develops, what was initially presented as an 46 Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 35rb–va (cf. Takada, p. 53. 1–20): ‘Quia sensus in nullo est contra propositum, quia non ponuntur plures personae quam tres, de quarum qualibet communis praedicatur essentia et e converso . . . Nusquam ergo condemnata est quaternitas rerum, cum omnes doctores catholici ponant quaternitatem relationum realium in divinis. Et si esset quaternitas rerum, nihil esset contra propositum nostrum, quia non ponimus quod relatio sit alia res ab essentia nec subsistens nec inhaerens, sed solum realis modus habendi essentiam divinam, qui ex natura rei in tantum diVert ab essentia quod in aliquo supposito invenitur essentia, in quo non invenitur quilibet modus habendi eam.’ Tellingly, the Wnal reasoning is new to the second recension. Cf. Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 p. 61. 1–3: ‘Nusquam ergo condemnata est in divinis quaternitas relationis sed personarum, ut de diVerentia essentiae et relationum aliquid determinatum.’ 47 See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4 ad 3, 398b: ‘ secundum modum se habendi . . . non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re’. Cf. Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2 35va (cf. Takada, p. 54. 8–10): ‘relatio non est formaliter essentia . . . , sed diVerunt ex natura rei sicut res et modus habendi rem’. 48 Heralding this new stance is Durandus’s rather resigned note at the end of the second recension: ‘personae divinae diVerunt realitate fundamenti formaliter ex natura rei sicut res et modus habendi rem, quamvis non sit alia realitas neque subsistens neque inhaerens. Et quamvis istae positiones non suYciant intellectui secundum humanam rationem, non est tamen mirandum, quia sunt pro defensione conclusionis Wdei, quae est super omnem humanam rationem, respondendo obiectionibus quae possunt Weri contra articulos Wdei. Si quis autem circa hoc salva Wde melius scit dicere, hoc mihi placitum erit . . .’ (Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 35va (cf. Takada, pp. 55. 22–56. 7).)

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internal quarrel between competing interpretations of Aquinas, emerges as a more basic contrast between two distinctively Franciscan ways of understanding distinction. Ironically, and for all his vindication of Thomist orthodoxy, Hervaeus’s acceptance of the Scotist contribution is less controlled than Durandus’s. On the other hand, Hervaeus’s reception of Scotus need not be entirely divorced from a pledge to Thomism. Hervaeus inherited from Aquinas the twofold understanding of an accident according to its ratio and its esse. This made it comparatively easier to derive an analogous distinction between the formal identity and the reality of a thing—the governing insight in the Scotist notion of formal distinction. For Durandus, by contrast, this move ran into conXict with his metaphysics of absolute and relative, a metaphysics governed rather by the assumption that the essence and the being of a thing go together. On this assumption, the reference towards something other constitutes the very being of relation and makes it essentially distinct from absolute things. This claim is profoundly at odds with any view that takes the distinction between formal and real identity as basic. Thus, the same motives that distance Durandus from the Dominican line also explain his restrained acceptance of the Scotist insights. At the root of it all is Hervaeus’s reinvention of Thomism.

8 The Censure In 1309, the Dominican general chapter in Saragossa commanded that every member of the order should teach and determine according to the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.1 The recommendation of Thomist doctrine was in all likelihood issued with Durandus’s prima lectura in mind, and in that sense it is perhaps the Wrst testimony of a Dominican oYcial disapproval of Durandus’s teaching. Durandus’s work had been allegedly circulating outside the order without approval from the authorities, owing to overzealous followers who had secretly disseminated the work in a premature state.2 In 1313, shortly after Durandus had left Paris in order to assume his functions in Avignon, the general chapter in Metz made another attempt at establishing a doctrinal directive within the order. In addition to denouncing all ‘novel’ opinions deviating from the common teaching, on this occasion the order’s authorities determined that all writings issued by Dominicans should be corrected and approved by the master general before being allowed to circulate.3 The opinio communi magistrorum, understood here in contradistinction to ‘novel opinion’ or opinio singularis, generally referred to the relative unanimity accorded by the magisterial body to some deWnition or the solution to

1 Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 38. For the full text, see Ch. 2 above. 2 See Durandus’s epilogue to the Wnal recension of his commentary (C Sent. 423rb), in which he relates this episode and gives some indication of the status he accords to the primum scriptum within his work. 3 See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 64–5: ‘inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo, audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris praedicti, nec recitare aut conWrmare aliquam singularem opinonem contra communem doctorum sententiam in his, quae ad Wdem vel mores pertinere noscuntur, nisi reprobando et statim obiectionibus respondendo . . .’ (My italics.) For the full text, see Ch. 2 above. That this legislation had Durandus in mind appears further conWrmed by the fact that in various passages in A (see for instance I d. 8 q. 5) Durandus uses similar phraseology to claim that he is only ‘reciting’ an opinio singularis. On the terms established by the decree, however, not refuting a false opinion was tantamount to maintaining it. Dominican legislation includes prohibitions against scripta curiosa already by 1243 (Acta, i. 26) and again in 1244 (Acta, i. 29). Prohibitions against the publication of texts which have not previously been examined by superiors appear in 1254 (Acta, i. 69) and again in 1256 (Acta, i. 78).

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some question. It was in other words the ‘received opinion’, and although not ranking in binding power with the dicta authentica, by the middle of the thirteenth century the dicta magistralia began to acquire some degree of authority against which members of the magisterial body had to reckon.4 The Dominican legislation against Durandus witnesses this transition, in which the magisterial opinion was beginning to acquire some form of theological authority. This decree also reXects the strict doctrinal line adopted by Berengar of Landorra, the order’s master general since 1312, for whom the preservation of Aquinas’s teaching went hand in hand with the upholding of the order’s intellectual standards and doctrinal uniformity. Following this line, in the course of the year 1313 Berengar appointed a commission of theologians with the purpose of examining Durandus’s works, i.e. the Wrst and second recensions of the commentary.5 Hervaeus Natalis was head of the commission. Pierre de la Palud was in charge of examining books I and III, and John of Naples books II and IV.6 The three Dominicans could not have been better chosen. That Hervaeus was appointed to the leading role is no surprise, for not only did he now enjoy an inXuential position as provincial of France,7 but his Wrst confrontation with Durandus had also educated his nose and provided him with inside knowledge into his defendant’s way of thinking. Although less incisive a hound, Pierre was a Wgure of increasing importance within the order, and his sympathies lay clearly on the Thomist side. He was well acquainted with Hervaeus’s circle in Paris, apart from being closely 4 For an examination of the use and evolution of these terms, see M. D. Chenu, ‘ ‘‘Authentica’’ et ‘‘Magistralia’’: Deux Lieux the´ologiques aux XII–XIII sie`cles’, Divus Thomas, 1 (Piacenza, 1925), esp. 266–75. 5 The commission uses the term scriptum antiquum to refer to the early commentary, and scriptum novum to the middle recension B. For the palaeographical status of B, see Schabel et al., ‘Peter of Palude’, esp. 184–215, and the Introduction to this book. 6 For the proceedings of the censure and the members of the commission, see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 68–72, 200–7, 410–17; also ‘Philosophische und theologische Irrtumslisten von 1270–1329: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Zensuren’, in Kleine Schriften, ii, esp. 439–41. The members of the commission appear listed as follows (‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, 53): masters in theology: Hervaeus Natalis (lic. 1307), Yvo Cadomensis (lic. 1311), John of Parma (lic. 1313), Pierre de la Palud (lic. 1314); bachelors in theology: John of Naples (lic. 1315), Theodoric of Saxony (read the Sentences c.1311), John of Prato (lic. 1318); biblical bachelors: James of Lausanne (lic. 1317), Yves of Leon; and the deputy master Matthew of Rome (of Ursini, later cardinal). 7 Hervaeus was appointed provincial of France in Sept. 1309. One of the chief tasks of the provincial was the general direction of St Jacques, the Dominican headquarters in Paris. In this capacity Hervaeus would have exercised considerable inXuence in the election of those bachelors who would be sent to Paris to read the Sentences. He thus enjoyed easy access and close control of the doctrinal tendencies circulating in the order, and the misadventures of Durandus’s prima lectura would have hardly escaped his scope of vision. See De Guimares, ‘Herve´ Noe¨l’, 56–62.

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associated to Berengar, who did much to promote his career as canon lawyer.8 It is indicative of the respectability that John of Naples enjoyed among his fellow Dominicans that while still a bachelor he should have been appointed as one of the main compilers. Indeed, his reputation is well accounted for by his in-depth knowledge of the Thomist corpus, revealed in the censure list by his thorough and well informed entries.9 The result of this Wrst scrutiny into Durandus’s work was a list of ninety-three articles, of which some were deemed erroneous, others false, and others even heretical.10 The list was submitted for consideration at the General Chapter of 1314, and made into an oYcial censure on 3 July 1314. Before examining the relevant articles, it is worth remarking that the 1314 list amounted to a censure, and not to a prohibition or a condemnation.11 8 For a highly enjoyable and very informative study of Pierre’s life and career, see Jean Dunbabin, A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. 36–42. Pierre was an assiduous recorder of data, and we know that in his commentary (c.1310) he scrupulously copied out whole passages from Durandus’s own commentary. So, if not the sharpest of critics, Pierre was at least well acquainted with Durandus’s position. 9 For a standard account of John of Naples’s life, see C. Jellouschek, Johannes von Neapel und seine Lehre vom Verha¨ltnis zwischen Gott und Welt (Vienna, 1918). For John’s Trinitarian doctrine and career as a Dominican, see R. Schneider, Die Trinita¨tslehre in den Quodlibeta und Quaestiones disputatae des Johannes von Neapel O.P. (þ1336) (Munich: F. Scho¨ningh, 1972); also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 285–314; and ‘Die Magister-Jahre’, 113–17. John read the Sentences in Paris in 1310–11, entered the Dominican order c.1313/14, and became a master in theology in 1315. His commentary on the Sentences is unfortunately not extant, but a fairly complete account of his Trinitarian thought is found in his Quodlibets (mainly V, VI, VII, and XI) and his disputed questions (mainly 13, 29, and 30). The Quodlibets are contained in Tortosa, Bibl. Capitular, MS 244, fos. 6vb–165vb. The disputed questions have been printed as Joannis de Neapoli O.P. . . . Quaestiones variae Parisis disputatae . . . (Naples, 1618; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1966). 10 Each article is accompanied by the judgement of the commission. The judgement is assumed to be always unanimous except for two articles on the question of heavenly movement: art. 22 (from book II d. 15 a. 3), deemed false by John of Naples only; and art. 23 (from book II d. 15 a. 1), deemed false by four members only. In addition to these, arts. 9, 41, and 60 include the remark that one censor was in disagreement with the general judgement. Koch, ‘Irrtumslisten’, 438–40, classiWes the judgement of the commission under four headings: (1) haereticum (ten articles); (2) error and erroneum (thirty-eight articles); (3) against the Church and the Fathers (Wve articles contra Ecclesiam, thirteen contra doctrinam sanctorum, twenty periculosum); (4) falsum (twenty-one articles). Some articles have combined judgements as ‘heretical and false’, or ‘dangerous and erroneous’. 11 For the distinctions between these, see J. M. M. H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200–1400 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. x–xii. For other works touching on academic censure and academic freedom, see J. M. M. H. Thijssen, ‘Academic Heresy and Intellectual Freedom at the University of Paris, 1200–1378’, in J. W. Drijvers and A. A. MacDonald (eds.), Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 217–28; L. Bianchi, Censure et liberte´ intellectuelle a` l’Universite´ de Paris (XIIIe–XIVe sie`cles) (Paris: L’Ane d’Or, Les Belles Lettres, 1999); J. Miethke, ‘Bildungstand und Freiheitsforderung (12. bis 14. Jahrhundert)’, in J. Fried (ed.), Die Abendla¨n-

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A censure, unlike a prohibition, does not limit itself to preventing the dissemination of dangerous views, but also judges their truth or falsity. Unlike a condemnation, however, a censure has a limited scope, and is not necessarily valid at all times and for all Christians. Durandus’s censure was handled entirely within his religious order, and he was not made accountable as a member of the university.12 Durandus’s adherence to a dissenting opinion was only perceived as such within his order, for only the order’s statutes had explicitly pronounced the doctrine of Aquinas as their oYcial curriculum. The master general was therefore exercising internal disciplinary—rather than doctrinal—jurisdiction, for Durandus had acted disobediently by disseminating his commentary without the authorities’ preliminary approval and against the order’s regulations of 1309 and 1313. Thus, the master general had jurisdiction over Durandus’s case only in so far as it involved the infringement of regulations to which members of the order were bound by vows.13 In this light, the 1314 censure was intended, at least in principle, to regulate what a member of the order could say or discuss in disputations, and not what could be thought or claimed as certain.14 dische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1991); W. J. Courtenay, ‘Inquiry and Inquisition: Academic Freedom in Medieval Universities’, Church History, 58/2 (1989), 168–81; W. J. Courtenay, ‘The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages’, in B. C. Baza´n, E. Andu´jar, and L. Sbrocchi (eds.), Les Philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age (Actes du XIe Congre`s International de Philosophie Me´die´vale, Ottawa, 17 au 22 aouˆt, 1992), iii (New York: Legas, 1995), 1659–67; Mary M. McLaughlin, ‘Paris Masters of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries and Ideas of Intellectual Freedom’, Church History, 24 3 (1955), 195–211; Walter P. Metzger, ‘Academic Freedom and ScientiWc Freedom’, Daedalus, 107 1 (1978), 93–114; P. Classen, ‘Libertas scolastica—Scholarenprivilegien—Akademische Freiheit im Mittelalter’, in J. Fried (ed.), Studium und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1983). 12 See Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 5–6. According to Courtenay, ‘Inquiry and Inquisition’, 175–7, it is a feature of the late 13th and early 14th cents. to censure an intellectual by internal action and without recourse to episcopal or papal courts. Already in the second decade of the 14th cent., however, during the pontiWcates of John XXII and Benedict XII, there is not only increased complexity in the juridical process of censuring erroneous teaching, but also an attempt to refer those cases directly to the papal court. As Courtenay sees it, the magisterium did not lose its right to examine and judge, but rather its ‘place of business’ changed from the university classroom to the papal curia. A classic example of this is the censure against William of Ockham at Avignon in 1326 (Durandus was incidentally one of the six theologians appointed for this task). See Pelzer, ‘Les 51 articles’; also Brampton, ‘Personalities’. 13 See Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 6–8. In similar fashion, the jurisdiction of the chancellor over the bachelors and masters was based on oaths which bound them to obey the rules of the university and faculty. 14 See McLaughlin, ‘Paris Masters’, 202–7. As was the case with William of la Mare’s Correctoria in the 1280s, Durandus’s work was only to be read accompanied by a copy of the 1314 censure list. See also M.-M. Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study . . .’: Dominican Education before 1350, Studies and Texts, 132 (Toronto: PIMS, 1998), 159; J. Koch, ‘Ein neuer Zeuge fu¨r die gegen Durandus de S. Porciano gerichtete thomistische Irrtumsliste’, in Kleine

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Four articles in the censure list deal with the issues of relation and distinction in God, namely articles 3, 5, 6, and 13. Two of them, articles 6 and 13,15 were deemed heretical by the commission; article 3 was censured as ‘dangerous’, and article 5 as ‘erroneous’.16 In examining these articles I will centre on two issues. First, the quaestio facti, which enquires whether the extracted articles are actually found in the work(s) being examined. I will thus attempt to locate the article reference within Durandus’s work. Secondly, the quaestio iuris, which considers whether the articles are censurable, and if so in what degree. This entails clarifying the criterion underlying the commission’s judgement.17

8.1. THE THREAT Article 3 considers Durandus’s view on the principle of production in God: In distinction 7, q. un., recounting (recitando) the third mode in which some explain it, [Durandus] says that relation is the principle of production whereas the essence is the principle of communicability (communicandi), and that, in the Son, relation alone is the principle and term of the production; and then he enquires which of these [two] should be rather considered as the generative power, and he says that relation; then he says that, although the essence is not the immediate principle of generation insofar as [generation is regarded as a] production, [the essence] is nevertheless its [i.e. of the production] fundamental principle; then he says that this opinion can be held as probable, and rebuts the opposing [arguments]. Dangerous.18

Schriften, ii. 124. This article presents new evidence from Barcelona, Archivo del Cabildo Catedral MS 35, containing bks III and IV of Durandus’s Wnal recension. As Koch reports, the 1314 corrections have been annotated in its margins, thus alerting the reader about the conXicting doctrine while directing him to the relevant passage in Aquinas’s writings. 15 See ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, 54–7. Although art. 13 records no explicit judgement, its similarity to art. 6 makes it safe to assume that it was also judged heretical. See Koch, ‘Irrtumslisten’, 438. 16 Courtenay, ‘Inquiry and Inquisition’, 174–5, notes that the categorization of condemned propositions into types or degrees of censure is an innovation of the later 13th cent. Thus, at the time of John XXII’s papacy, the theologians who were appointed to examine Peter John Olivi’s Postilla super Apocalypsim were instructed to see ‘utrum ipsos articulos haereticos, aut erroneos, seu temerarios censeremus’. See Koch, ‘Irrtumslisten’, 441. 17 See Koch, ‘Irrtumslisten’, 445. Also Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 23–4. After the scholar had been denounced for disseminating false teaching, the preliminary examination of his work focused on two questions: Wrst, whether the suspect had already upheld and disseminated certain views (quaestio facti); second, whether these views were erroneous (quaestio iuris). 18 ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 54: ‘[3] D. 7 q. unica recitando tercium modum dicendi aliquorum, dicit quod relatio est principium producendi, essentia vero principium commu-

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A ‘dangerous’ view, as opposed to one which is simply ‘erroneous’, is being judged for its potential theological repercussions rather than for what it explicitly states. Thus, Durandus’s view on relation as the power of production in God posited a threat because it could ultimately lead to problematic theological conclusions. These conclusions had to do with the Wlioque—an issue which will be only explicitly considered in the second censure list19— and what was problematic about them was Durandus’s underlying reading of Anselm’s principle that ‘in God what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity’.20 As we saw, Durandus’s reading of Anselm diVers from the Thomist, in that Durandus places the accent on opposition rather than on communicability. For Durandus, if the processions are to result in the constitution of distinct persons, then the principle governing the processions must also explain personal distinction. And since the essence is common to the three persons, the principle of distinction and production must lie in relation and not in the essence.21 A procession is then an opposite relation between an active principle and a passive product resulting in the constitution of a distinct person, such that there can be no talk of a mediating relation of production. In the case of the procession of the Son, the issue seems quite clear: the Son results from the opposite relation between active generation and passive generation. But when it comes to the procession of the Spirit, the issue is obscured by the appearance of a third party, upsetting the symmetry between active principle and passive product. The Greeks cut the Gordian knot by excluding the role of the Son and making the Father the sole principle of spiration, so that the Spirit results from the opposite relation between active and passive spiration, whereas the Son results from the opposite relation between active and passive generation. But this would be tantamount to rejecting the Wlioque, a clause which Latin theologians embraced as guaranteeing the distinction between the persons of the Son and the Spirit. Thus, in order to account for a second procession while preserving the Wlioque, Durandus decided to dissolve any nicandi, et quod in Wlio sola relatio est terminus productionis et producta; et postea inquirens quid istorum potius debeat dici potentia generandi, dicit quod relatio; postea dicit quod, licet essentia non sit immediatum principium generationis quoad productionem, est tamen principium eius fundamentale; postea dicit quod haec opinio probabiliter teneri potest, et respondet ad opposita. Periculosum.’ 19 See ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 74 a. 12. 20 Beyond Dominican interpretations of Anselm’s principle, the doctrinal connection of this principle with the Wlioque was a natural one to make, since Anselm deWned this principle in the context of his work on the procession of the Spirit (see De Processione, 1. 181. 2). The problematic inference which Dominicans drew from Durandus’s account was therefore not necessarily tendentious. 21 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 43vb. Also s. 5.2 above.

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direct connection between the product of generation and the product of spiration—the basis of the Thomist explanation—and make the Spirit a ‘concomitant’ result of the relation between Father and Son.22 To Dominicans, this solution not only led to an order of priority between the processions—an issue which will occupy article 5 below—but also seemed to undermine the Wlioque. In their minds, both threats appeared to originate from the same source: Durandus’s atypical reading of Anselm, according to which opposition governs communicability. Moreover, the threat was not only theological but also philosophical, for Durandus’s understanding of relation as the principle of production was a decidedly un-Aristotelian idea. In Aristotelian metaphysics, an action describes a movement from potentiality to actuality, so that it must necessarily end in a fully actual thing and not in a diminished entity such as relation.23 As we saw, however, Durandus takes exception to this principle when it comes to the Trinity. He contends on avowedly un-Aristotelian grounds that the notion of distinction required by the divine commits us to explain the processions in relational terms.24 Thus, in the interests of a sound Trinitarian theology and against the threat of tritheism, Durandus was prepared to challenge basic Aristotelian tenets. Needless to say, for Thomists this was not theological bravado but destabilizing metaphysics.

8.2. THE ERROR Article 5 concerns the issue of an order of priority between absolute and relative. The article reads as follows: In distinction 12, q. un., towards the end of the response (positionis) and while reciting (recitando) the opinion of others, [Durandus] shows (probat) that, in the divine, the foundation is prior to relation by nature and by natural presupposition, and not only according to the intellect or by reason, and, likewise, that one disparate relation is prior to another [disparate relation] by nature. He then responds to the arguments brought against this opinion; at the end, however, he says: ‘But I do not

22 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 2, 56ra–rb. Also s. 5.2 above. 23 See Aristotle, Phys. 5. 1 (225a30–b13); Metaph. 5. 15 (1021a). Cf. Aquinas, In Metaph. 5, lect. 17 n. 1027. 24 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. un., 41vb–42ra. Also s. 5.2 above.

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know whether it is safe to make such an assertion’.25 Yet he still does not respond to the arguments put forward in favour of this opinion. Erroneous.26

The irresolution expressed in the last statement, together with the fact that Durandus is reported to have only ‘recited’ rather than ‘asserted’ the erroneous opinion, could have acted as mitigation of the threat in his position. Hence, perhaps, the commission’s judgement of ‘erroneous’ rather than ‘heretical’, for there is no evidence of pertinacity. Nevertheless, and as previous legislations had made clear,27 Durandus had incriminated himself by failing to respond to the arguments brought forward in favour of the opinion in question. For it was understood within the intellectual practice of scholastic disputations that to leave an argument unanswered was tantamount to subscribing, if timidly, to the opinion it intended to support. In this light, Durandus appeared to be pronouncing the erroneous opinion with some responsibility. As to its doctrinal content, the article draws attention to the way Durandus’s thesis of real distinction aVects the explanation of the processions. Two claims are explicitly mentioned in this article: Wrst, that in God the essence is prior to relations by ‘natural presupposition’; second, that one disparate relation is prior to another by ‘natural presupposition’. Both claims can be found in A.28 What is not explicit, or even implicit, in Durandus’s argument is that an order of ‘natural presupposition’ should necessarily lead to real priority, and thereby (as the commission seems to conclude) to a distinction of natures. As has been made clear, underlying the claim of an order of priority is Durandus’s thesis of the analogy of being according to which relations are ‘things’ only in the secondary sense in which they are modes of things. As a mode, relation depends on an absolute thing—i.e. relation 25 In Koch’s edn. (‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55) this line is rendered as ‘Nescio tamen si est totum tantum asserere.’ It may be questioned whether totum should here read tutum, which makes more sense within the context, if Durandus was expressing his qualms. This reading would also have the support of the original in A: ‘Nescio tamen si hoc tutum est asserere, tantum dictum sit de ordine personarum secundum rem’. The reading totum may represent a scribal mistake in the MS Koch was using, or a slight oversight on Koch’s part. 26 ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55: ‘[5] D. 12 q. unica versus Wnem positionis recitando opinionem aliorum probat quod in divinis fundamentum est prius natura et naturali praesuppositione et non solum intellectu vel ratione quam relatio et una relatio disparata similiter natura prior est alia. Respondet ad ea quae contra hoc adducit; in Wne tamen dicit sic: ‘‘Nescio tamen si est totum [read tutum] tantum asserere.’’ Non tamen respondet ad rationes, per quas hoc probavit. Error.’ Cf. 1317 censure list, a. 13. 27 See Acta, ed. Reichart, ii. 64–5, for Dominican decisions at the general chapter of Metz in 1313. 28 For the Wrst claim, see Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61rb–va; for the second claim, ibid. 61va. See also ss. 5.1 and 5.2. above.

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requires an absolute thing in order to explain it, and in that sense relation comes to a thing already constituted in its being. The notion of an order of priority is thus another way of explaining the relation of dependence between a mode and a thing. And since composition only obtains between absolute things as the result of inherence, the dependence of a mode on a thing does not lead to composition. Yet, any reference to Durandus’s explicit claim that ‘relation and its foundation are not distinct natures eVecting composition’ would have been of no avail, for it would have not been taken as an indication of orthodoxy, but of bad metaphysics. To Dominican minds, to claim that one object is prior to some other object by nature, and yet does not constitute a numerically distinct nature, was at best a non sequitur and at worst a surreptitious way of multiplying divine realities. Taking a Thomist view of distinction, Dominicans could not understand how a mode could be individuated independently from its foundation without counting over and above it as a numerically distinct object. According to this view, the priority of absolute over relative could only lead to a multiplication of natures. Durandus’s claim of an order of priority between disparate relations is governed by the same insight that for any two objects x and y, if y is a fully actual being and x is not constitutive of y and x arrives in y, x naturally presupposes y.29 Common spiration arrives in Father and Son as persons already constituted by active and passive generation respectively. Consequently, common spiration naturally presupposes active and passive generation. The persons are constituted by opposite relations, such that those divine relations which do not involve opposition necessarily presuppose fully constituted beings. In the mind of Dominican authorities, however, Durandus’s claim of an order of priority between the processions was the result of a misconception of the Augustinian doctrine of an ordo naturae.30 At the root of this misconception was Durandus’s thesis that the processions are explained by relation rather than by the essence. Durandus’s emphasis on relation as the principle of production in the divine allowed for an explanation of the processions which was not strictly based on essential communicability, and thus inevitably upset their univocity and simultaneity. On this count, Durandus was also held accountable on the Athanasian creed,31 according to which, in God ‘there is neither priority nor posteriority’. 29 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61va: ‘illud quod non est constitutum personae sed advenit iam constitutae, supponit illud quod constituit personam et non e converso.’ 30 Augustine, Contra Maximinum, 2. 14. 8. 775 (PL 42): ‘verum haec non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae; non quod alter prior esset altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero’. 31 Also known as ‘Quicumque vult’ for its opening words. See Denzinger and Hu¨nermann, Enchiridion symbolorum, n. 75, 25: ‘Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil maius aut minus: sed totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales.’

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Again, that Durandus excluded an order of priority between opposite relations, explicitly subscribing to an order of origin between the persons, was of no avail. For, by giving an explanatory role to disparate relations beyond relative opposition, he was perceived to have unavowedly fallen into some form of subordinationism. As Dominicans understood it, by contrast, Augustine’s ordo naturae implied that the processions are governed by one and the same nature, in such a way that their simultaneity is guaranteed together with the essential equality of the persons. Underlying this reading is Aquinas’s basic claim that the power that accounts for the processions is the essence, rather than relation, whereby the processions consist in the communication of the divine essence from one person to the other.32 In this view, origin rests on communicability, and opposition always presupposes a relation of real identity. By inverting the terms and making communicability conditional upon relative distinction, Durandus was seen to be contradicting Anselm’s principle whereby in God ‘what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity’. The Dominican commission could claim, in sum, that Durandus had contravened the common opinion shared by Augustine, the Athanasian creed, and Aquinas, and synthesized in the Anselmian principle. Durandus’s view of relations as principles of distinction and production inevitably led to inequality. On these grounds it veered dangerously in the direction of some version of Arianism. However, and for all the obvious theological repercussions of this issue, the article’s recurrent mention of a distinction of ‘natures’ suggests that what is at stake here is not so much Durandus’s view on disparate relations—at this stage vague and hesitant enough to be truly dangerous—but the underlying claim of separability between things and modes, on which the thesis of an order of priority, and indeed Durandus’s whole metaphysics, seemed to rest. That this was what truly preoccupied Dominican minds seems further conWrmed by the very next article, and the charge of heresy imposed on it.

8 . 3 . T H E H E RE SY Article 6 brings Durandus’s thesis of real distinction to the foreground. The article reads:

32 See Aquinas, ST I q. 42 q. 3 and ad 2; Sent. I d. 12 q. 1 a. 1; I d. 20 a. 3 qq. 1 and 2; De Pot., q. 10 a. 3.

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In distinction 13, q. un., before the middle of the solution (positionis), [Durandus] says that, in the divine, only the supposita subsist, whereas relations do not subsist. Within the same distinction, q. un., towards the end of the solution (positionis), he says that active generation and active spiration are really distinct in the Father, and, similarly, that passive generation and active spiration [are really distinct] in the Son, and that in the same suppositum there is a plurality [of things] which are really distinct; and earlier in the solution (solutione) to the third argument of the Wrst opinion in the second article of the main response (positionis), he said that the essence adds in the number of things (numerum rerum) with relations, and, in the same question, that essence and relation are really distinct. We consider all this to be heretical.33

By being judged ‘heretical’, Durandus was being placed in a category of intellectuals whose errors did not consist so much in a straightforward denial of Christian doctrines, as in an adherence to certain views the full implications of which were theologically heterodox, although not explicitly stated as such. Nevertheless, a heretical proposition always involved the pertinacious assertion of a false opinion, and although deWnitions varied, was standardly understood as implying some degree of contradiction to the scriptures or to conciliar decisions.34 An ‘erroneous’ or a ‘false’ statement, of the kind imputed to Durandus, related to philosophical matters or ‘venial’ theological errors, and had usually been pronounced in a spirit open to rectiWcation.35 Already at Wrst glance, Pierre’s bewildered accumulation of claims reveals the doctrinal connection which Dominicans had made between Durandus’s doctrine of modes and his thesis of real distinction. At least four theses are involved in this article: (i) in God, only the supposita subsist, and not relations; (ii) there is a real plurality in one and the same suppositum; 33 ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55: ‘[6] D.13 q.unica ante medium positionis dicit quod in divinis sola supposita subsistunt, relationes autem non subsistunt. In eadem d. q. unica circa Wnem positionis dicit, quod generare et spirare in patre realiter diVerunt et similiter generari et spirare in Wlio et quod in eodem supposito sunt plura, quae realiter diVerunt; et prius in solutione ad tertium argumentum primae opinionis in secundo articulo positionis dixerat, quod essentia ponit in numerum rerum cum relationibus, et in eadem quaestione quod essentia et relatio diVerunt realiter. Totum hereticum reputamus.’ Cf. 1317 censure list, aa. 9, 14, 26, 36–8. 34 As P. Nold has noted in the context of the poverty controversy (1322–3), contradiction to scripture was common to all the deWnitions of heresy, whereas the place accorded to Church determinations was more subject to interpretation: Pope John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 52, 91, 97, 171–2. 35 The diVerence between ‘erroneous’ and ‘heretical’ was clear to medieval intellectuals. Godfrey of Fontaines, for instance, observed that errors are faults which endanger our salvation, and only become heresies when defended with pertinacity. See Godfrey, Quodl. III q. 10 (PB 2), 208. For the speciWc connection between heresy and pertinacity, see A. Daniels, Eine lateinische Rechtfertigungsschrift des Meister Eckhart (Mu¨nster: AschendorV, 1923), 2. See also Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 2–4, in which he draws an account of ‘academic heresy’ based on Jean Gerson’s short treatise De Protestatione circa materiam Wdei.

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(iii) essence and relations are really distinct; (iv) the essence adds in the number of things with relations. Underlying (i) and (iii) are three theses central to Durandus’s Trinitarian theology: Wrst, relation is by nature a nonsubsistent mode of being; second, the essence is by nature a subsistent thing; third, the essence is the principle of subsistence in God.36 From these theses Durandus concluded that (i) the supposita, and not relations, subsist and (iii) relation is really distinct from the essence. That (ii) there is a plurality of numerically distinct objects in one and the same suppositum, and that (iv) the essence counts over and above relations, however, could not be fairly inferred from Durandus’s theses. That this should have been the natural Dominican conclusion betrays an interpretation of Durandus’s view based on Thomist metaphysical parameters. According to Aquinas, and Hervaeus after him, numerical plurality necessarily obtains between two real objects when one is really distinct from the other, and, conversely, two real objects are really distinct when they constitute numerically distinct realities. In other words, numerical plurality and real distinction are equivalent.37 Underlying this view is the Thomist claim that only subsistent objects are real, such that real distinction necessarily obtains between numerically distinct realities.38 Applied to the Trinity, since in the divine there is only one reality and that reality is subsistent, everything that is in the divine is by that fact subsistent. This entails that divine relations are real only in so far as they assume the subsistent mode of being of the essence. By the same token, only as subsistent realities can relations introduce real distinction between one person and another, since, as pure reference, relation only introduces the connotation of a relative term, which is insuYcient for real distinction. As principles of distinction, therefore, relations must ‘suit’ formally subsistent beings.39 As a result, all plurality in the divine is restricted to a plurality of supposita, which both safeguards the simplicity of the essence and is wholly consistent with the Thomist claim that distinction can only obtain between subsistent beings.40 36 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 63vb–64vb. Also ss. 5.1 and 5.2 above. 37 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 9 q. 1 a. 1: ‘quaecumque distinguuntur realiter, unum eorum est alia res ab alio’; Expositio, 429. 1193: ‘nihil connumeratur aliis nisi quod ab eis distinguitur’; also Sent. I d. 34 q. 1; I d. 13 q. 1 a. 2; De Pot., q. 8 a. 2. Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 135aA–B. 38 See Aquinas, ST I q. 29 a. 1; I–II q. 55 a. 4 ad 1; I–II q. 110 a. 2 ad 3. 39 In this sense, Hervaeus would claim that relations act as principles of distinction not as relations, but formally understood as properties which naturally distinguish in a substantial being: ‘inquantum sunt proprietates natae distinguere in esse substantiae’. (Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 113aC–bA.) This claim echoes Aquinas’s tenet that the divine persons signify relations per modum substantiae, i.e. as formally subsistent beings. See Aquinas, ST I q. 28 a. 2; I q. 29 a. 4; I q. 34 a. 2 ad 1; I q. 30 a. 2. 40 See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 25 q. 1, 119aB: ‘omnis pluralitas in divinis oportet quod sit pluralitas plurium realiter subsistentium, et per consequens plurium suppositorum’.

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By holding that relation is really distinct from the essence, however, Durandus was understood to be claiming that (iv) relation is a distinct reality adding to the essence in the number of things, and that (ii) there is a numerical plurality in one and the same suppositum. Again, this could not be fairly inferred from Durandus’s view of distinction unless one made the Thomist equation between real distinction and numerical plurality, a claim based, moreover, on a theory of subsistence wholly alien to Durandus’s metaphysics of absolute and relative. According to this view, not only subsistent things but also non-subsistent modes are real, so that real distinction can obtain between things and their modes without necessarily leading to numerical plurality. Moreover, once the being of relation is identiWed with its deWnition as a relative mode, the classical Thomist division between the being and the ratio of relation—crucial for explaining distinction in God—becomes irrelevant. In Durandus’s view, relation is essentially a reference, such that the relative term is essentially included in the being of relation. Put in Thomist terms: the ratio of relation becomes its very being. It is then precisely on account of its ratio that relation is really distinct from absolute things which do not involve a reference. On this view, therefore, the only way to explain distinction in God without incurring tritheism is by appealing to relation as a non-subsistent being. The Thomist distinction between being and ratio becomes not only irrelevant, but also theologically problematic. Article 13 of our list also refers to Durandus’s thesis of real distinction, and is essentially a repetition of the doctrinal content of article 6 just examined. But whereas article 6 is drawn from Durandus’s account of the processions, the present one addresses Durandus’s thesis in the context of his modal doctrine. Article 13 is still worth considering for the following reason: it registers a contrast between Durandus’s assertive tone when he discusses divine processions (article 6) and his recitative tone when he is expounding his metaphysics of modes of being (article 13). Before explaining why this contrast is important, we should take a look at the article itself: In distinction 33, Wrst question, [Durandus] shows (probat) through many reasons, which he does not rebut (respondet), that the divine essence and relation are really distinct. And he rebuts (respondet) a certain [argument] which is adduced against it, and [rebuts] in common [those arguments] adduced by others. But on this occasion he does not attribute all these [reasons] to himself but to others, although he had earlier said [i.e. d. 12 q. un.] that [essence and relation] are really distinct and add in the number of things, as has been noted in article 6 above. And he says that not all that is not the divine essence is created, since divine relation is neither the divine essence nor a creature.41 (My italics.) 41 ‘Articuli nonginta tres’, pp. 56–7: ‘[13] D. 33 q. prima probat per multas rationes, ad quas non respondet, quod essentia divina et relatio diVerunt realiter. Et respondet ad quaedam quae

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To have noticed the diVerence between Durandus’s two treatments of the same issue was either extremely perceptive of Pierre (to whom we owe this article) or the lucky upshot of his otherwise ill focused criticisms. In either case, the contrast between the two modes of exposition is signiWcant. It both records a protective measure on Durandus’s part and reveals the motives behind his overall position. By advancing his modal doctrine of relations, Durandus did not want to make a metaphysical claim. Rather, his concern was theological. Faced with the task of having to explain real distinction in a simple God, Durandus propounded his modal doctrine as the most theologically viable. It was a metaphysical expedient pursuing a theological purpose. Durandus’s nagging awareness of the risk of Sabellianism seems to conWrm this assumption, reinforced in this instance by the contrast registered between the hesitant tone which qualiWes Durandus’s metaphysical account and the greater conviction with which he approaches the theological hurdles. As Durandus sees it, only by identifying relations with non-subsistent modes can we avoid the diYculties inherent in the Trinitarian question, mainly in the form of a Sabellian reduction to one absolute substance—hence the reassuring undertone accompanying the claim of real distinction. Thus, and giving Pierre his credit, what article 13 may be censuring is not so much the appeal to a modal doctrine, but the use of modes to buttress the theological thesis of a real distinction between essence and relations. This is reinforced by Pierre’s subsequent reference to the by now familiar argument adduced in favour of real identity, whereby for every being, it is either divine or created. As we saw, this disjunction became part of the standard repertoire of Hervaeus’s quodlibetal criticisms against Durandus,42 for it brought forward with particular clarity the disturbing feature of Durandus’s thesis of real distinction, namely its ontological dimension. For by attributing an explanatory role to the being of relation as a mode, Durandus was seen to be either breaching the disjunction—by adding a middle ontological realm—or imposing a categorical template on divine reality. The Wrst was profoundly un-Aristotelian, the second clearly heterodox. Either way, the charge of heresy seemed justiWed. The Dominican imputation of heresy is not to be explained by Thomist zeal alone. Durandus’s view was idiosyncratic, and at odds with Thomist metaphysics. That might make it erroneous, or philosophically false, or taken contra hoc adducit et communiter ab aliis adducuntur. Haec autem omnia attribuit non sibi sed aliis in loco isto, licet prius dixerit, quod diVerunt realiter et ponunt in numerum rerum, sicut supra notatum est in sexto articulo. Et dicit quod non omne illud quod non est essentia divina est creatura, quia relatio divina nec est essentia divina nec creatura.’ (My italics.) 42 See Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra. For Durandus’s reply, see Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 p. 49. 12–22. See also ss. 6.2 and 7.2 above.

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as symptomatic of disciplinary disobedience. But Durandus had shown himself a cautious theologian, and one ready to revise his opinion where detrimental to faith. He could hardly be accused of pertinacity. To make a charge of heresy stick, it was necessary to show that, by deviating from Aquinas, Durandus’s view was impugning Church doctrine. It is indicative in this respect that Hervaeus would always appeal to the authority of the Lateran Council, with speciWc reference to the question of ‘quaternarism’ brought forth by the decree ‘Damnamus’. As we saw earlier, Hervaeus’s reading of the decree was deeply grounded on Thomist metaphysics, by which real distinction is suYcient for numerical plurality.43 Hervaeus’s understanding of church authority, and its eVect on the controversy, will be considered in the following chapter. For the moment, I would like to draw attention brieXy to the Thomist dimension of Hervaeus’s interpretation of the Council, or, to be more precise, one aspect of that dimension. The connection which Hervaeus wants to establish between the Thomist view and Church doctrine is governed by an endeavour—shared by most leading Dominicans of the time—to incorporate Aquinas’s teaching into the repertoire of received ideas, thus guaranteeing its share in the ‘common opinion’—the opinion, that is, accepted by the majority of university theologians as a satisfactory explanation for the doctrinal questions opened by Church councils. Behind the rapid headway made by Thomism as a doctrinal authority within the Dominican order, therefore, stood a programme whose aim was to seal an agreement between Thomist teaching and Church doctrine.44 As we shall see, this programme reached an important stage in 1317, with the second censure against Durandus. Unlike the theological careers of other academics found guilty of disseminating false teaching—notably that of Giles of Rome which resulted in his exile from the University of Paris—that of Durandus was not greatly aVected after the censure. He kept his post as lecturer in theology at the papal curia in Avignon, and in 1318 was even promoted to episcopal status. In such cases of academic censure the person, rather than his teachings, was rarely condemned, and the censure itself had little more than illustrative value, intended to serve as an example, for others, of the type of statements which were 43 See Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra, and Durandus’s response in Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2, pp. 59. 1–61. 3; Quodl. Paris. I (second recension) q. 1 a. 2, 35rb–va (cf. Takada, pp. 51. 7–53. 20). Also s. 7.2 above. 44 Indicative of this collective eVort is the incorporation since 1313 of Aquinas’s writings into the Dominican standard curriculum, together with the explicit instruction to all friars that they should expound the Lombard according to the mind of Aquinas. Mulchahey, ‘First the Bow’, 155, reads the connection between the Lombard and Aquinas as an index of the strongly conservative tendencies in Dominican education.

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heretical or ill sounding.45 This is not to say that Durandus survived the censure entirely unscathed. He was compelled to revise his work, mitigating his tone and, in some instances, partially abandoning his previous views. Durandus’s case is in this respect emblematic of the way a theologian might introduce changes to adjust his doctrine along the lines directed by the censure. Having ‘recanted’ in this way, Durandus was spared the more severe measures applied in cases of obstinacy. But in the long run, two factors saved Durandus from further reprimands. He had not knowingly or willingly maintained views contrary to faith. And he placed a timely reliance on papal protection. Indeed, Durandus’s appointment to the bishopric of Le Puy in the nick of time in February 131846 (Hervaeus became master general of the Dominicans in June that year) served as safe-conduct from further action against him. It was better able to do so for a reason more signiWcant even than the upturn in a particular friar’s career. The papacy’s apparent disregard for Dominican internal quarrels seemed, already, to herald an incipient division between the papal idea of orthodoxy and the magisterial ‘common opinion’.47 45 In this respect, Courtenay, ‘Preservation’, 1662–5, observes that one procedure of dissemination of such censure lists was to attach them to theological MSS, particularly copies of the Lombard’s Sentences, with the purpose of preventing students using that text from falling into the same erroneous statements. The context and audience of the preserved lists was therefore primarily theological and aimed at students of theology. Tellingly, Le Mans MS 231, which contains the 1314 censure list against Durandus (fos. 146va–149vb), is bound together with Durandellus’s Evidentiae (fos. 1–146r), Hervaeus’s criticism of James of Metz (150ra–175rb), and, most interesting, a Concordantia dictorum Thomae (177r–207) by an unknown Thomist. 46 This was Durandus’s second episcopal appointment. In Aug. 1317 Durandus had been promoted to the bishopric in Limoux, but this proved to be a very short-lived diocese. Durandus thus saw himself back in Paris sooner than he had hoped, since Paris was by then dominated by Hervaeus’s circle. For a more detailed account of Durandus’s career, see the Introduction to this book. 47 The pope’s patronage of Durandus is even more baZing when we think that this is the same man, John XXII, who paid so much heed to Hervaeus’s opinion on apostolic poverty at the time of the controversy, who so avidly read Aquinas’s work, and who Wnally canonized him in 1323. For John’s reliance on Hervaeus’s opinion on poverty, see Nold, Pope John XXII, 153–4, 161, 168–9.

9 The Aftermath of the Censure A copy of the censured articles was in all likelihood handed over to Durandus, for immediately after the censure he applied himself to justifying his position, particularly concerning those claims which had been judged more severely by the commission.1 The Excusationes (autumn 1314), as Durandus’s apologia came to be known, is unfortunately not extant, but we have indirect access to it through Hervaeus’s response in the Reprobationes excusationum Durandi (winter 1314?).2 One of the virtues of this document is that it conveys an idea of the psychological climate following the censure, marked on the one hand by Durandus’s preoccupation with mitigating his view and preventing further aggravation, and on the other by Hervaeus’s eVorts to legitimize the censure. Much of the Reprobationes is thus occupied with Hervaeus’s forensic evaluation of Durandus’s position in the light of the allegations advanced in the excusatio. But more signiWcantly, this rigorous assessment of Durandus’s intellectual behaviour brings to light Hervaeus’s view on theological authority, and the sphere of legitimacy he accords to the professional exercise of theology. 1 Academics charged with holding erroneous or heretical views were given the opportunity to defend themselves, and so Durandus was probably asked to submit a written answer to the charges levelled against him. See Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 28. 2 Hervaeus’s Reprobationes is contained in Reims MS 502, fos. 112v–116v and 128v–131v. This MS is a crucial source for the controversy with Durandus in the period immediately following the censure, for it assembles a variety of writings by Hervaeus, all dealing in some way or another with the censure. Its contents give us an idea of its unifying theme: (1) Hervaeus’s comments on Durandus’s Excusationes on those questions concerning faith (Reprobationes, fos. 112vb–113va) and (2) morality (Reprobationes, fos. 113va–116vb); (3) Hervaeus’s justiWcation of the commission’s judgement of bk I of Durandus’s commentary (De articulis, fos. 117rb–vb on art. 3, fos. 118ra–va on art. 5, fos. 118va–119ra and 122vb on art. 6, fos. 120rb–121ra on art. 13); (4) Hervaeus’s justiWcation of the censure on bks II and III (De articulis, fos. 122vb–128vb); (5) cont. of Hervaeus’s comments on Durandus’s defence, mainly on questions of morality (Reprobationes, fos. 128vb–131va). See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 222–9, in which he reproduces some passages from Hervaeus’s Reprobationes. For this chapter I will rely on my own transcription of the MS. The Reprobationes was possibly composed in winter 1314, certainly after the censure and more or less contemporaneous with Durandus’s Avignon Quodlibet of Advent 1314. After the censure was issued, the controversy became more public and less circumscribed to the structure of classroom disputations. The pace of the polemical exchange becomes quicker and precise dating as a result increasingly diYcult.

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Just as the Reprobationes centres on Durandus’s defence, De articulis pertinentibus ad primum librum Sententiarum Durandi,3 a work roughly contemporary with the Reprobationes, focuses on the censure list, and has something of the character of a scientiWc examination of the list’s most controversial articles. As soon becomes apparent, Hervaeus’s underlying agenda is to oVer a justiWcation of the authorities’ measures against Durandus. It is indicative of the respect Durandus already enjoyed as a theologian, that, as head of the commission, Hervaeus should have felt it his duty and taken the trouble to respond to Durandus (Reprobationes) and justify the order’s judgement (De articulis) before the learned world. Indeed, it was in the interests of the order that such a justiWcation followed the censure as soon as possible, and no Dominican other than Hervaeus was in a better position to do so.4 On the other hand, the fact that Durandus, by this time already a lector at the papal court, felt compelled to produce his Excusationes, suggests that he was still subject to Dominican jurisdiction and could not aVord to leave the censorship unanswered.5 This chapter will consider the immediate eVect which the censure had in the discussion between Hervaeus and Durandus. I shall Wrst examine the Reprobationes, drawing attention to Hervaeus’s view of ecclesiastical authority in the context of professional theological debate. Although not a strictly theological matter, this is an aspect which provides much of the backdrop to the controversy and further illustrates the nature of the polemical exchange between Hervaeus and Durandus. Secondly, I shall consider De articulis, which brings us back to theological debate and presents Hervaeus’s assessment of Durandus’s view in the light of the censure. As we shall see, Hervaeus’s evaluation foreshadows the second censure and, with it, the ‘Thomist’ turn which the debate will later assume.

3 De articulis mirrors the structure of the censure list, and its treatment of Durandus’s commentary makes direct references to the censured articles. This suggests that De articulis was composed around the second half of 1314 at the earliest, possibly the beginning of 1315. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 236–40. Articles 1–5 (Reims MS 502, fos. 117ra–118va) have been edited by T. Takada, ‘Die gegen Durandus gerichtete Streitschrift des Hervaeus Natalis De articulis pertinentibus ad primum librum Sententiarum Durandi’, Studia Anselmiana, 63 (Rome, 1974), 439–55. For a. 6 and 13 I will rely on my own transcription of the MS sources. 4 The opening words of the Reprobationes reveal the order’s awareness of the importance of an oYcial pronouncement: ‘illa quae hic dico non dico irreverentiam vel sigillationem cuiusque, sed potius sit requisitus a meis superioribus ad declarationem veritatis quam frater habens credo’ (Reims 112vb). 5 In Hervaeus’s Correctiones supra dicta Durandi in primo quolibet, a tract succeeding the Reprobationes and which will be discussed later, the expression ‘articuli missi in primo quaterno’ is frequently used in reference to the Excusationes. This seems to conWrm the suggestion that Durandus’s Excusationes was submitted to the order superiors, and that he was therefore still dependent on their judgement. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 231–3.

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As reported in the Reprobationes, Durandus defends himself by various expedients. First of all, he attempts to undermine the legal status of the censure by pointing out that the articles have been extracted from a work which was not intended for publication.6 By this Durandus wants to claim that he is not accountable for opinions belonging to a work which was not in a condition to be disseminated publicly. On other occasions, Durandus appeals to the meaning (sensus) of individual articles, claiming that the commission understood a proposition in a diVerent way from the one intended. Thus, in article 1 of the Reprobationes, concerning the type of distinction between the divine essence and relation, Durandus is reported to have claimed that he did not simply say that the essence is distinct from the persons and their relations, but that they are in some mode (aliquo modo) distinct, in that they are ‘not adequately and conversely the same’. In this light, Durandus contends, the claim that essence and relation are really distinct must be exonerated from all error.7 In other instances, Durandus challenges the validity of the charge of heresy by contending that the claim of real identity is not found in the scriptures or in the writings of the saints, and rather reinforces his position by adducing the authority of Augustine.8 A common strategy to which Durandus also resorts is to distinguish between what has been said assertive and what has been said recitative or disputative.9 In this way, Durandus could 6 See Durandus’s remark in the epilogue to the Wnal recension of his commentary (C Sent. 423rb). See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 68. 7 As Hervaeus reports: ‘Quantum ad articulum tangentem habitudinem essentiae divinae ad proprietatem relativam secundum unitatem vel diVerentiam . . . sciendum, quod modus quo volunt quidam excusare dicta sua diversa de habitudine essentiae divinae ad relationes et personas, est quod dicunt se non dixisse simpliciter essentiam diVerre a relationibus et personis, sed aliquo modo, quia non sunt eadem convertibiliter adaequate, dicentes omnem errorem excludi a dictis suis per hanc expositionem.’ (Reprobationes, 112vb–113ra.) Cf. Durandus, A Sent. I dd. 13 and 33; ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, aa. 6 and 13. For a similar plea, see a. 8, in which Durandus protests that the censors are proceeding inWdeliter towards his view, and giving an account which is fundamentally truncate (Reprobationes, 129va). Cf. Durandus, A Sent. II d. 44 q. 4; ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, a. 38. See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 85. 8 Reprobationes, 113rb: ‘Et dicit sic: ‘‘cum dicitur ‘essentia est paternitas’ et e converso, dicendum quod ista praepositio non includitur in sacra scriptura nec in dicitis sanctorum si recolatur, sed potius contrarium insinuatur ab Augustino, qui dicit quod ‘pater non est eo pater quo deus.’ Sed constat quod est pater paternitate et deitate deus. Ergo, etc.’’ Secundum eum videndum quod haec non est veriWcanda ‘‘essentia est paternitas et paternitas est essentia.’’ ’ 9 See e.g. Durandus’s precautionary remark in A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 62ra: ‘Nescio tamen si hoc tutum est asserere, tantum dictum sit de ordine personarum secundum rem’; ibid., ad 1: ‘licet in trinitate creata sit prius et posterius, non tamen in increata, licet ut visum est aliqui dicunt esse prius et posterius . . .’ See also Reprobationes, 116rb–va: in Hervaeus’s report, the commission stated that ‘recitat opinionem, quod in Christo non est perfectior beatitudo

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always claim that the commission did not represent his views accurately, and that although the suspect views did occur in his text, he did not maintain them as part of his position but only for the purposes of disputation.10 True understanding is therefore crucial to preserve the binding force of the censure, and in this light Hervaeus’s Reprobationes is an attempt both to clarify the commission’s motives, and to examine the validity and suYciency of Durandus’s expositio excusativa.11 Although Hervaeus’s thorough analysis leaves no doubt that he is seriously engaged with Durandus’s view in an assessment which is both objective and cleared of tendentious judgement, the task must have weighed all the heavier on his shoulders for his being, we can surmise, aware that at stake was also the credibility of the order’s commission—which he had chaired—and the legitimacy of an imputation of heresy on the views of a theologian who was well respected within papal circles. It is therefore no surprise that Hervaeus should devote considerable energy to discussing the true intent of Lateran decree ‘Damnamus’, in an attempt to establish whether Durandus’s thesis of real distinction falls within the scope of the conciliar determination. For if he can prove, Wrst, that the church has indeed determined on this matter, and second, that Durandus’s claim contradicts this decision, the commission’s charge of heresy would appear justiWed. Hervaeus’s cross-examination of each issue centres on four questions: (i) what has the church determined on this issue? (ii) What did Durandus claim in previous works?12 (iii) How does Durandus justify this claim? (iv) Is his essentialis quam in angelo; et licet salvat tripliciter rationem opinionis, tamen conWrmat eam’. To this Durandus pleads: ‘Sed ad hoc dicit, quod non conWrmat, quia recitare opinionem non est conWrmare eam.’ Cf. Durandus, A Sent. III d. 14 q. 1; ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, a. 51. 10 In this respect, recall the contrast registered in the 1314 list (aa. 6 and 13) between Durandus’s treatment of the question in d. 13 and in d. 33. Another formula frequently adduced for mitigating the defendant’s responsibility over the suspect view was pro non dicto habeatur. Durandus appeals to this formula in the preface to the Wnal recension of his commentary: ‘et hunc modum, deo adiuvante, tenere volumus, ut nihil scribamus, vel doceamus, sacrae scripturae dissonum. Quod si per ignorantiam, vel inadvertentiam aliquid dissonum scribeamus, ipso facto pro non scripto habeatur.’ (My italics.) See Bianchi, Censure et liberte´, 63–7. 11 See Thijssen, Censure and Heresy, 30–1: ‘The defenses, apologies, excusations, and recantations demonstrate that judges and defendants were entangled in a complicated hermeneutical game. The defendants focused on the intention of their words; the judge and his consultants, on the other hand, were concerned with the potential eVect of the defendant’s words on the audience.’ Thijssen refers to the latter as the prout sonat principle (31–3), after Bernard McGinn’s ‘Eckhart’s Condemnation Reconsidered’, The Thomist, 44/3 (1980), 412. For further explanation of this principle, in contrast to the reverenter exponere principle applied to authorities, see Bianchi, Censure et liberte´, 53–67; Miethke, ‘Bildungsstand’, 240. 12 Hervaeus bases his examination on Durandus’s early commentary and on the Wrst Paris Quodlibet. He thus has access both to what Durandus has said as a bachelor and what he has determined as a master. As we shall see, although Durandus could appeal to the diVerence in

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justiWcation suYcient to exonerate his previous view?13 Addressing the pressing question of the connection between essence and relations, Hervaeus claims that the Lateran decree explicitly condemns a quaternity of realities (res) in God. According to his interpretation, ‘realities’ is understood in the generic sense, whereby the term ‘quaternity’ refers to the positing of ‘four realities’ into God, regardless of whether the realities involved are substantial or relational realities.14 In Hervaeus’s reading, then, by claiming that essence and relation are really distinct, Durandus had introduced a quaternity of four realities into God, such that the relative properties count over and above the essence. As Hervaeus saw the matter, therefore, the church had indeed determined on divine relations, and Durandus’s claim of real distinction contradicted this determination.15 Hervaeus remains generally unconvinced of Durandus’s attempts at justiWcation. He sees a basic discordance between Durandus’s defence and what he has stated assertive in previous works.16 Despite Durandus’s claims to the contrary, Hervaeus argues that Durandus has held a real distinction assertive, and he bases his judgement on the following reasons. First, Durandus proves academic status in his favour, Hervaeus presents this contrast as rather compromising the credibility of Durandus’s defence. 13 See Reprobationes, 112vb: ‘Primum est ostendere quid, secundum quod credo, tenet Wdes catholica de hoc. Secundum est, utrum modus per quem excusantur quaedam dicta quae videntur aliquibus respondere huic veritati sit suYciens ad excusandum ea.’ Also 128vb–129ra: ‘primo, ponendo quid tenendum sit de hoc; secundo, ponendo dicta istius; tertio, excusationem; quartum, ponendo est insuYcientia vel suYcientia excusationis’. 14 Indicative of the underlying philosophical issues, much of Hervaeus’s eVort in disproving Durandus’s defence is spent in refuting Durandus’s claim that only subsistent things can count as numerically distinct objects. Thus, in Hervaeus’s view Durandus’s defence amounts to nothing because by claiming a real distinction he was automatically multiplying the realities in God. See e.g. Reprobationes, 112vb: ‘Ergo impossibile quod in una et eadem persona sint plures proprietates quantum ad illud quod sunt inter se realiter diVerentes. Et sic patet primum, videlicet quod in divinis secundum sententiam concilii non quaternitas aliquarum rerum.’ 15 Reprobationes, 112vb: ‘Quantum ad primum, sciendum quod secundum sententiam concilium generalem quod habetur extra ‘‘De summa trinitate et Wde catholica’’ capitulo ‘‘Damnamus’’, in divinis non est aliqua quaternitas re solum quae sint supposita, sed re qualitercumque accipiuntur. Secundo, quod essentiae est relatio et de invice praedicantur dicendo ‘‘hoc est hoc.’’ Tertio . . . ex habens infero correlativo quod positione diVerentiam relationem, quod scilicet ‘‘hoc non sit illud,’’ est aparte contra determinationem praedicti concilii generalis.’ 16 See e.g. Reprobationes, 113ra: ‘Licet autem positio quae ponit, quod essentia et relatio sunt idem realiter, non tamen convertibiliter, excludat omnem errorem, non tamen videtur mihi, quod excuset dicta illorum, de quibus hic agimus. Et hoc probo duplici medio: primo, accipiendo rationem directe ex dictis eorum; secundo, ostendo quod declinant, ut videtur, in opinionem contrariam huic, per quam se volunt nunc excusare . . . Ex hac materia apparet quod ipse ponit in divinis aliquam distinctionem realem . . . quod est contra illam opinionem quae ponit non convertibiliter et contra expressa sententiam generalis, ut patet ex dictis.’ Also 113rb: ‘Et sic patet quod sua dicta distincte concludunt hanc, quod essentia non est relatio, et hanc, quod non omnis distinctio realis qua est in divinis est per oppositionem.’

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the thesis of real distinction by a greater number of arguments without responding to them, while he rejects their opposite as insuYcient;17 secondly, he reduces all the other opinions to this thesis; and thirdly, the claim of real distinction determines his response to the opposite arguments.18 In this light, Durandus’s failure to respond to the arguments contrary to the Thomist opinion was tantamount to asserting them. In his defence, Durandus could appeal to the diVerence in his academic status at the times he wrote the diVerent works, and claim that what he has said as a bachelor in the commentary cannot carry the same weight as what he has determined as a master in the quodlibets. But Hervaeus forestalls Durandus’s appeal and turns it to his disadvantage, by showing, rather, that Durandus has not changed the basic orientation of his earlier position in reformulating it as a magisterial determination. Durandus seems therefore further compromised.19 More striking is what Hervaeus has to say about church authority in the sphere of theological practice. In the preface to article 7, Hervaeus states that a theologian’s licence to determine on a particular question depends on whether the question concerns an article of faith, or is a matter of ‘common opinion’.20 In the Wrst case, concerning questions on the Trinity or the divine 17 Hervaeus provides a variety of examples. See Reprobationes, 113rb: ‘illa positio in qua videtur magis declinare est opposita positioni de unitate non convertibili, quia ista positio qua ponit quod essentia nec est persona nec relatio est manifeste opposita positioni de identitate non convertibili. Sed secundum eum, tertia opinio in quantum videtur magis declinare est huius . . . Item ad idem, ipsi dicunt quod tertia positio multa inconvenientia evitat qua non evitat secunda . . . Secunda opinio est realiter illa quam vocat insuYcientem 13a distinctio quaestio unica . . . [I]n suo quolibet quaestio secunda, dicit quod secundum opinionem ponentem identitatem non convertibilem, vel impossibile vel nimius diYcile est salvare distinctionem personae sine contradictione manifesta . . . [P]ost impugnare secundam, nec respondet ad impugnationes vel alii respondeat ad aliquas responsiones communes, tertiam vero quam post conWrmat nec ad conWrmationes respondet, cum tamen illa sit falsa.’ Cf. Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 62vb: ‘Circa quod proceditur sic, quod ponetur primo quaedam positio insuYciens . . . Quantum ad primum, sciendum est quod quidam dicunt quod generare et spirare non diVerant realiter . . .’ Also II d. 30 q. 2 (referring to the Thomist opinion): ‘quod ista non satisfaciunt intellectui’. 18 Reprobationes, 115vb: ‘Primo sic, quia uniusquisque videtur illam opinionem asserere vel saltem illam magis tenere, quam magis rationibus conWrmat et illis rationibus conWrmantibus non respondet, et cuius oppositum cum suis rationibus videtur repudiare . . . Secundo sic, quia illam opinionem videtur aliquis tenere vel saltem magis in eam declinare, in quam ponit omnes modos dicendi, quos recitat, reduci . . . Tertio sic, illam opinionem videtur vel simpliciter asserere vel saltem magis tenere, secundum quam respondet ad argumenta facta ad contrarium . . . Quarto sic, illam positionem videtur quis tenere, secundum quam solam prosequitur plures articulos tangentes materiam, de qua est illa positio . . .’ See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 228. 19 See Reprobationes, 113rb: ‘Quantum autem ipse declinet in tertiam vel super vel magis quantum in secundam, probatur sic: quia semper ultimo recitat eam consuetudo, autem est tam doctorum quam baccalariorum ponere ultimo opinionem in quam magis declinant.’ 20 Article 7 enquires whether the church has the right to release a subject who has converted to faith from obedience to his unbelieving lord, and so the question calls forth a discussion over

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processions, a theologian must not simply respond recitative, let alone against church doctrine, but always assertive and in agreement with what has been established by the church. Anything less should be suspect of heresy.21 In this light, and if we are to follow Hervaeus’s reading of the Lateran determination, Durandus’s thesis of real distinction was clearly heretical—as articles 6 and 13 of the censure list had established—and his insuYcient assertion of church doctrine indicative of pertinacity. The second case concerns questions which have not been oYcially determined by the church but on which there is a recognizable consensus among the received opinions. The theologian is then advised to prefer that opinion which tends to agree more with what has been commonly established. A preference for one’s own opinion—the opinio singularis—over the interpretation of the maior pars is indicative of a presumptuous intellect.22 Thus, Durandus’s independence of spirit and the ecclesiastical authority. Reprobationes, 129ra: ‘sciendum quod articuli qui ponuntur disputandi a theologis, possunt se habere in triplici diVerentia. Uno modo, quod simpliciter sint determinati auctoritate sacrae scripturae vel auctoritate ecclesiae; v.gr. de articulo trinitatis, de processione spiritus sancti e patre et Wlio. Alio modo, quod non explicite habeatur determinatio eorum ex auctoritate sacrae scripturae vel ecclesiae, magis communis tamen doctrina doctorum et sanctorum declinat in unam partem quam in aliam; v.gr. de resurrectione Christi media nocte vel diluculo. Tertio modo, potest esse articulus quod nec Wde nec determinatione ecclesiae nec auctoritate sacrae scripturae est determinatus ad aliquam partem, nec auctoritas sanctorum vel determinatio declinat in unam partem plus quam in aliam, sed est mere indiVerens, sicut si quaereretur utrum in coelo et in inferioribus sit materia eiusdem rationis.’ See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 225. Since we are dealing here with Durandus’s statements on the Trinity, I will ignore the third group of ‘philosophical’ articles. 21 Responsiones, 129ra: ‘Quantum ad secundum sciendum, quod in respondendo ad articulos primi modi [i.e. articuli determinati auctoritate sacrae scripturae vel ecclesiae] non licet respondere recitando utrumque modum nec etiam dimittere utrumque modum tanquam possibilem teneri, et multo minus licet modum oppositum articulo determinato auctoritate sacrae scripturae vel ecclesiae simpliciter tenere vel magis approbare; et hoc probo, quia illud, quod est manifeste haereticum, asserere ut possibile teneri, est illicitum. Sed quidquid est contra determinationem sacrae scripturae vel ecclesiae commune dicitur, tale debet haberi pro heretico manifesto; ergo, asserere talia possibilia teneri est illicitum . . . In talibus responsio determinata debet simpliciter asserere, ut videtur, illud, quod sic determinatum est auctoritate sacrae scripturae aut ecclesiae et oppositum reputare tanquam haereticum. Si autem aliquis in talibus articulis transiret recitando tantum, neutrum reprobans, etsi non haberetur talis expresse heretico, quia nullam partem asserit probabilem vel improbabilem, tamen videtur haberi satis pro suspecto, quia quantum est ex parte talis processus, talis videtur dimittere in dubio talem articulum, cum tamen eum debeat habere pro certo; nec licet in tali materia dicere absolute, non videt rationem, quare hoc teneatur, quia in tali materia auctoritas sacrae scripturae vel ecclesiae est suYciens ratio, nec aliam necesse est quaerere; potest tamen dicere, quod non videt rationem naturalem hoc concludentem.’ See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 225. 22 Reprobationes, 129ra: ‘Quantum ad articulos secundi modi [i.e. de doctrina communis doctorum], licet non oporteat necessario declinare in hanc partem aut in illam, tamen magis declinare in illam, a quam videntur doctrina communis et sancti magis discordare, videtur mihi non esse tutum et esse praesumptuosum, maxime cum nullus debeat praeWcere suum ingenium tot et tantis.’ See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 225. Cf. Aquinas, ST I q. 1 a. 8 ad 2: ‘Sed tamen sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus [i.e. philosophorum] utitur quasi extraneis argumentis

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failure to subscribe to the standard Thomist view was perceived at best as a cavalier gesture—a gesture which met its corrective in 1317 with the second censure list. Hervaeus leaves a great degree of latitude to church authority. In his view this is connected to the considerable weight he attributes to conciliar determinations, second only to scriptures.23 The rightful exercise of natural reason is limited to strictly philosophical questions, or issues which bear little or no relevance to church doctrine; every other matter falls under the jurisdiction of the church.24 In an arresting contrast, Durandus’s preface to C reveals a more autonomous view of theological practice. According to Durandus, when the issue does not directly concern an article of faith, the theologian’s arguments must be grounded on reason, and not on the authority of some recent doctor—no matter how famous. Human authority is ultimately of no value if it proves to be contrary to truth. In an interesting reversal of Hervaeus’s view, to Durandus it seems a temerity to dare place the authority of some doctor before that of the church Fathers. An undue reverence to magisterial opinion hinders an impartial inquiry of truth, and Durandus, for his part, places greater value on assenting to reason than to human authority.25 et probabilius. Auctoritatibus autem canonicae scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim Wdes nostra revelationi apostolis et prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt. Non autem revelationi, si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta.’ 23 Reprobationes, 129ra–rb: ‘si hoc inveniatur patenter determinatur auctoritate ecclesiae, scilicet quod ecclesia hoc possit, est tenendum simpliciter ut verum, et oppositum est falsum. Quia ex hoc ipso quod ecclesia determinat est suYciens ratio quod hoc sit tenendum, licet naturalem rationem eius non possumus videre, quia sicut iam dictum est, illud quod manifeste habetur determinatur auctoritate ecclesiae, sive in moribus sive in aliis, habendum est tanquam verum de hiis qui pertinet ad Wdem dirigentem sive in moribus sive in aliis . . .’ (My italics.) For an interesting parallel with Hervaeus’s view on ecclesiastical authority within the context of the poverty controversy, see Nold, Pope John XXII, esp. 52, 97, 173. Nold refers (97 n. 22) to Tierney’s term of ‘ecclesiastical Wdeism’ to describe those views of ecclesiastical authority which place the determination of the church at a level with scripture. See B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150–1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 176. 24 This is entirely in concord with the statutes of the Dominican constitution and, not surprisingly, with the capitular decisions of 1309 and 1313, in which Hervaeus exercised considerable inXuence as newly appointed provincial of France. See ‘Constitutiones antiquae Ordinis Fratris Praedicatorum’, ed. A. H. Thomas, in De oudste constituties van de Dominicanen, Voorgeschiedenis, tekst, bronnen, ontstaan en ontwikkeling (1215–1235), Bibliothe`que de la Revue d’Histoire Eccle´siastique, 42/2 (Louvain, 1965), 363. 30; 698. 1189. 25 Despite its length, the passage is worth reproducing here: ‘Modus autem loquendi, ac scribendi, in caeteris quae Wdem non tangunt, est ut magis innitamur rationi, quam auctoritati cuiuscumque doctoris, quantumcumque celebris, vel solemnis. Et parvi pendatur omnis humana auctoritas, quando per rationem elucescit contraria veritas. Quamvis enim captivandus sit intellectus noster in obsequium Christi, et in his quae Wdem tangunt plus acquiescere debeamus auctoritati sacrae scripturae, quam cuicumque rationis humanae, quia divina notitia, quam exprimit sacra scriptura, plus excedit humanam notitiam, quam humana notitia bestiales.

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Durandus still sees, then, a recognizable contrast between authentica and magistralia—a contrast which the emergent notion of ‘common opinion’ was beginning to erode. He refuses to place the ‘common opinion’ on a level with the Church Fathers, and sees it as a sign of intellectual mediocrity to submit blindly to the authority of ‘some doctor’. In contrast to Hervaeus, whatever is a matter of ‘common opinion’ is for Durandus subject to rational disputation, and cannot rank with canonical authority. Reason should yield to better judgement only when it concerns the authority of the Fathers. In this light, the Dominican censure was an audacity reXecting badly upon the order’s engagement with true scientiWc inquiry.26 In his own mind, Durandus could not have been infringing the order’s statutes when he was being faithful to the authority of the ancient Fathers. That his opinion was qualiWed as ‘novel’ and ‘dangerous’ had more to do with a rising climate of Thomist ‘orthodoxy’ within the order than with doctrinal deviation. In sum, whereas, for Hervaeus, Thomist teaching was a matter of doctrine to be expounded salva Wde, for Durandus, it was the opinion of another quidam.

Tamen omnis homo dimittens rationem propter auctoritatem humanam, incidit in insipientiam bestialem, et comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis. Quis enim nisi temerarius existens, audeat dicere, quod magis sit acquiesciendum auctoritati cuiuscumque doctoris, quam auctoritati sanctorum doctorum sacrae scripturae, Augustini, Gregorii, Ambrosii, et Hieronymi, quos celebritate condigna sancta romana ecclesia sublimavit? . . . Ex quibus patet, quod compellere sed inducere aliquem, ne doceat vel scribat dissona ab iis, quae determinatus doctor scripsit, est talem doctorem praeferre sacris doctoribus, praecludere viam inquisitioni veritatis, et praestare impedimentum sciendi, et lumen rationis [Matt. 5: 15; Luke 11: 33; Mark 4: 21], non solum occultare sub modio, sed comprimere violenter. Nos igitur plus rationi, quam cuicumque auctoritati humanae, consentientes, nullius puri hominis auctoritatem rationi praeferimus, attendentes, quod omnibus existentibus amicis sanctum est praehonorare veritatem, quam omnis terra invocat, coelum etaim ipsum benedicit, benedictus Deum veritatis.’ (C Sent. 1. 12) 26 Durandus’s statement bears remarkable similarity to another famous discussion on ‘academic freedom’. Referring to the 1277 condemnation by Bishop Tempier, Godfrey of Fontaines states: ‘Veruntamen, si certa ratione vel auctoritate appareat quod sit vera pars quam praelatus condemnat tanquam falsam et erroneam aut si etiam non sit omnino certa, sed probabilem veritatem contineat ita quod, ratione probabilitatis, possit tanquam verum probabile sustineri sive etiam circa illud possint esse opiniones contrariae, videtur talis excommunicatio et condemnatio erronea, quia per illam impeditur inquisitio et notitia veritatis. Verum tamen singularis persona non habet se opponere . . . ; sed esset instandum apud praelatum quod talem condemnationem et excommunicationem revocaret. Quamvis enim malum contra salutem ex hoc non eveniat, tamen malum contra perfectionem intellectus ex hoc contingit; nam homines non possunt libere tractare veritates quibus eorum intellectus non modicum perWceretur.’ (My italics.) See Godfrey, Quodl. VII q. 18 (PB 3), 403–4; also Quodl. XII q. 5 (PB 5), 102. See also Bianchi, Censure et liberte´, 83.

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9.2. DE ARTICULIS Based on the agenda dictated by the censured articles, Hervaeus’s twofold purpose in De articulis is to disprove Durandus’s main arguments, and by doing so provide a rationale for the commission’s judgement. The general atmosphere of the debate is very much like that of the quodlibetal exchange, only this time Hervaeus is not merely advancing his opinion as master, but arguing in his authority as provincial of France and spokesman of the order. The work appears then less engaged in dialectical exercise, and all the argumentative force is spent in invalidating the dissident view.27 The present section will consider four articles, mirroring those examined in the censure list: article 3, on the principle of production in God; article 5, on an order of priority in the divine; article 6, on the distinction between the processions; and article 13, on Durandus’s claim of real distinction between essence and relation. Articles 3 and 5 concentrate on the doctrinal point of production in God; articles 6 and 13 focus rather on Durandus’s view of distinction. I shall look at Hervaeus’s examination of these articles according to this twofold thematic division. It is indicative of the danger Dominicans perceived in Durandus’s view on divine production that Hervaeus’s eVorts at dismantling it were centred on a defence of the Wlioque. As Hervaeus saw it, Durandus denied an order of origin between the processions of the Son and the Spirit, based on two fundamental claims: Wrst, relation and not the essence is the principle of production in God, such that the processions describe an unmediated relation of origin between an active principle and a passive product; secondly, for any being x which arrives in a fully actual being y, x is not constitutive of y, such that x and y are really distinct and y is prior to x. On this basis, Durandus advanced two conclusions: Wrst, the Son takes part in active spiration, not as the product of generation, but as sharing in active spiration with the Father; 27 The following passage from a. 3 (ed. Takada, p. 445. 165–70) sums up Hervaeus’s intention in this work: ‘Ad istum articulum non intendo alias rationes adducere, quia alias probavi, quod potentia generandi vel producendi dicit absolutum et non relatum; quod non sic intelligo, quod in divinis essentia non sit relatio, vel absolutum non sit relatum realiter et formaliter, sed hoc ideo dico, quia si realiter diVerent, ut ille false ponit, absolutum esset principium producendi et non relatum.’ The point is not therefore to raise further objections against Durandus’s view, but to outweigh it with the sanctioned opinion. See also a. 13, 120va: ‘Ad evidentiam autem istorum sciendum, quod illae hic quaedam ponit de relatione in generali quibus alibi videndi, et ideo aliis obmissis directe intendo respondere ad articulum. Dico ergo, quod ponere diVerentiam realem in divinis praeter diVerentia quae est inter personas, repugnat divinae simplicitate et catholica veritati deWnitae saltem implicite extra ‘‘De Wde catholica’’.’

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second, passive generation is prior to passive spiration, because passive spiration arrives in the person of the Son already constituted as a fully actual being by passive generation.28 In response to this account, much of Hervaeus’s reasoning in articles 3 and 5 is directed towards proving the necessity of an order of origin between passive generation and passive spiration. The gist of Hervaeus’s argument in article 3 is that Durandus’s distinction between productive and communicable principle equivocates between two senses of ‘principle’, i.e. ‘formal’ principle and ‘eVective’ principle.29 Based on this false assumption, Durandus reasoned that since the persons are formally constituted by relations, relations should also account for personal origin—i.e. what makes the persons distinct supposita must also be what constitutes them into being. As a result, Durandus was led to establish a rigid notion of opposition which made it incompatible with communicability, thus Xying in the face of Anselm’s principle whereby ‘in God what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity’.30 According to Durandus, by contrast, passive generation cannot take part in the active procession of the Spirit, because, as a product, passive generation cannot explain the origin of another product. Durandus’s understanding of production in God was therefore perceived as seriously undermining the Son’s participation in spiration—the core of the Wlioque.31 At the root of Hervaeus’s criticism lies the question of how ‘action’ should be categorized.32 According to Durandus, ‘action’ is an instance of relation, 28 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 11 q. 2, 56rb; I d. 12 q. un., 59rb–va, 60va–vb, and 62rb. Also s. 5.2 above. 29 The distinction between ‘formal principle’ and ‘eVective principle’ or agent is Thomist in inspiration. See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3: ‘Potentia spirativa dicit aliquid quasi medium inter essentiam et proprietatem, eo quod dicit essentiam sub ratione proprietatis: sic enim actus notionalis ab essentia egreditur, non sicut ab agente, sed ab eo quo agitur. Generatio non egreditur ab essentia inquantum est essentia, sed inquantum est paternitas.’ 30 De articulis, a. 6, 119ra: ‘est etiam contra mentem Anselmi, qui vult probare ibi quod spiritus sanctus proceditur per illud principium, quia quidquid habet persona communicans communicat alteri exceptis alibi in quibus opponitur. Propter quod pater communicaret spiritu sancto spirationem si generari et spirari nullo modo opponerent.’ 31 De articulis, a. 3 p. 445. 174–83: ‘quando dicitur: ‘‘Illud quod convenit alicui, ita quod non alteri, ,’’ verum est accipiendo formaliter. Et sic etiam pater per revelationem diVert a Wlio, scilicet formaliter. Unde per illud, per quod sibi convenit esse generans formaliter, diVert a Wlio, et hoc est generare. Si autem accipiatur eVective vel principialiter, est falsa, quia non oportet, quod illud per quod pater est producens causaliter vel principialiter, sit illud in quo diVert a Wlio . . .’ Also p. 446. 190–5: ‘Quod autem dicitur, quod solo principio productivo producens est producens totaliter vel omnino, falsum est, quia per ipsum producere formaliter producens est producens. Sed per principium producendi est producens causaliter et principative.’ 32 I use the term ‘action’ for convenience, aware that in this context ‘action’ should be deprived of all meaning connoting motion or change. It is nevertheless unclear whether for Aristotle motion is an instance of passion, or whether it should be reduced to the substantial form which undergoes the change. See Aristotle, Cat. 9 (11b1–2) for the Wrst account, and Phys. 3. 1 (200b32–201a3) for the second. See also Cross, Physics of Duns Scotus, 214–20.

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such that every action describes an ‘atomic’ relation between an active principle and a passive product. In this account, action hinges on the Wnal constitution of a distinct product, rather than in the succession of one form from one term to the other. In Hervaeus’s view, by contrast, action is determined by the form which undergoes the ‘change’, such that action belongs to that category to which the underlying form belongs. In this account, action consists in the communication of a form from one term to the other, and the stress is on continuity rather than on the Wnal eVect. In the divine processions, the essence is the form which is communicated from one person to the other, and in this sense Hervaeus will say that the processions are governed by the essence as their active principle.33 Following this insight, Hervaeus rejects Durandus’s description of the processions in strictly relational terms, and argues that the idea of an exclusive disjunctive between productivity and communicability does not fare any better in explaining the double procession from one principle.34 He claims, instead, that communicability is not detrimental to personal distinction, and argues for the preferability of the Thomist thesis that the essence, rather than relation, governs the processions. The essence in its communicability acts as formal principle, whereas relation is the ‘agent’ according to which the divine nature is communicated, for example, as generation or as spiration. In line with Lateran orthodoxy, Hervaeus’s guiding assumption is that only when the processions begin and end in the same nature can we say that the resulting persons are equal in divinity and that divine unity is consequently safeguarded.35 33 De articulis, a. 3 p. 444. 151–8: ‘Aliud quoddam argumentum ego [i.e. Hervaeus] feci, sclicet quod principium producendi est fundamentum relationis eius ad productum; relatio autem non potest esse fundamentum ipsiusmet vel pars fundamenti. Respondent primum . . . , quia dicunt, quod nec in divinis nec in creaturis relatio producentis ad productum fundatur super principium producendi, sed super actum producendi. Unde et Philosophus dicit quod pater et Wlius dicuntur, quia hic egit et hic passus est.’ Also p. 447. 231–41: ‘Responsio autem, quam dat ad rationes non valet, nam convenit ad illam, quae fundatur super habitudinem relationis ad fundamentum, quando dicitur quod fundamentum relationis producentis et producti fundantur super agere et pati. Dico, quod si agere et pati dicunt formaliter relationes, quod falsum est . . . Nam relatio agentis ad passum fundatur super principium activum agentis, a quo denominatur passum ut habens causam eYcientem. Relatio vero passi actu ad agens fundatur super formam productam, a qua denominatur agens ut habens eVectum factum, ita quod in creaturis super principium activum fundatur habitudo ad passivum.’ (My italics.) 34 De articulis, a. 3 p. 446. 208–15: ‘si paternitas et communis spiratio in patre essent diversas res, colorem aliquem haberent, quod dicit. Sed si sunt una res quantum ad id quod sunt inter se, aequalis diYcultas est, quommodo illa res sit principium duarum emanationum, sicut de essentia divina. Immo maior, quia ex unitate hinc inde manet diYcultas aequalis, quomodo sunt duae emanationes. Ulterius vero ponendo relationem esse principium, remanet diYcultas, quomodo relatio ut relatio sit principium per se vel terminus cuiuscumque productionis.’ 35 De articulis, a. 3 p. 447. 254–9: ‘Ad aliam vero rationem, quae fundatur super rationem univocae productionis, quando dicunt, quod in divinis non est univoca productio proprie, quia

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Hervaeus saw a direct link leading from Durandus’s prioritization of relation over communicability to the positing of an order of priority in God. Although Durandus only timidly advanced an order of priority between passive generation and passive spiration, his failure to respond to the opposite arguments gave the alarm signal. Indeed, Hervaeus’s discussion of article 5 betrays serious unease, and portrays Durandus’s claim as verging on frank heterodoxy. This time, therefore, Hervaeus does not hesitate to call in the authority of the ancient Fathers to reinforce the magisterial consensus. The joint inheritance of Augustine and Athanasius, he points out, expressly proscribes an order of priority in God, admitting only an order of origin whereby one person is ‘from’ the other (hoc est ex hoc) and not ‘after’ the other.36 As before, Hervaeus places Durandus’s strict understanding of opposition at the root of his divergent account of the processions, and contends that nothing prevents the product of one action from functioning as the active principle in another. One and the same reality, Hervaeus argues, can function as a product according to what it is—i.e. its quiddity (illud quod est)—or as a principle according to what makes it so—i.e. its nature (a quo est). Thus, in his quiddity as a suppositum, the Son is the product of generation and counts over and above the Father as another spirator; but as partaker in the divine nature, he constitutes one and the same active principle with the Father.37 It is therefore through generation that the Father communicates the power of scilicet forma non communicatur cum actu sibi communicatio, puta natura divina non communicatur Wlio cum actu generandi, nihil est, quia univocatio productionis praecise et directe attenditur penes convenientiam in forma communicata a producente producto.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3 ad 1: ‘Natura communicatur per actum naturae, communiter loquendo . . . Et hoc intendit Anselmus, quod impossibile est dicere, quod processionis, quae terminatur in naturam, non sit aliquo modo natura principium, cum sit ibi quasi communicatio univoca.’ For Anselm, see De Processione, 10. 205. 18–21; 14. 212. 10–27. 36 De articulis, a. 5 p. 453. 428–33: ‘Istud autem dictum, quantum falsum sit et periculosum, ostendunt dicta sanctorum et etiam doctorum modernorum, qui numquam prius et posterius re in divinis ponunt, sed magis oppositum. Unde Augustinus dicit, quod in divinis est ordo quo ‘‘hoc est ex hoc,’’ non autem quo ‘‘hoc est post hoc.’’ Et in Symbolo Athanasii dicitur ‘‘nihil prius aut posterius, nihil maius aut minus,’’ etc.’ For Augustine, see Contra Maximinum, 2. 14. 8. 775 (PL 42). For Athanasius, see Denzinger and Hu¨nermann, Enchiridion symbolorum, n. 75, 25. 37 De articulis, a. 5 pp. 451. 389–452. 392–8: ‘spiratum est a spirante per se, si ly ‘‘per se’’ reduplicet suppositum ut est agens, sed ab habente principium spirativum est per se, si ly ‘‘per se’’ reduplicet principium producendi. Nunc autem ita est, quod . . . impossibile est quod spirare conveniat primo spiranti nisi mediante aliquo producto cui communicetur vis spirativa. Et propter hoc inducunt magistri quod pater per se loquendo et spirat immediate quantum ad vim spirativam, inquantum vis una et eadem est in eo et Wlio, quae est principium producendi spiritum sanctum, sed mediante et per se quantum ad supposita, quia impossibile est patrem spirare spiritum sanctum nisi per virtutem communicatam alteri supposito.’ The background to this argument is the magisterial formula for the double procession, whereby the Spirit proceeds from one spirative power but from two spirators. See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 12 q. 1 a. 3; Scotus, Ord. I d. 12 q. 1 nn. 45–6.

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spiration to the Son, so that the Son can only spirate by virtue of the spirative power he acquires as the product of generation. Consequently, passive generation is necessary for the act of spiration.38 In this sense, Hervaeus will say that Father and Son are constituted as distinct persons not only by generation but also by spiration. And here is precisely where the theological import of the Wlioque lies: spiration does not arrive in Father and Son already constituted as fully actual beings, but becomes constitutive of their persons.39 Again, Durandus’s understanding of the processions strictly in terms of direct opposition rendered unintelligible any notion of a mediated process of origin—the guiding insight in Anselm’s principle and the psychological model.40 Thus, by dismissing the Thomist account of the Wlioque, Durandus was automatically challenging church authority and positing an order of priority in God. The commission’s judgement seemed well justiWed. 38 De articulis, a. 5 p. 452. 413–16: ‘nec Wliatio nec generari est principium spirandi, sed natura communicata per generationem, cuius communicatio per generationem necessario requiritur ad spirandum, propter quod spiratio per se habet ordinem ad generationem . . .’; p. 452. 402–12: ‘etsi produci non sit producere, tamen productum habens per productionem suam virtutem producendi est per se producens et productio sua, per quam habet talem ordinem ad productum ab eo. Ea ratione, qua ista propositio conceditur per se ab omnibus, quod . . . in per se ordinatis quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati, et similiter quidquid est principium alicuius principii, est principium principiati ab eo. Nec sequitur, quod pater solus spiret vel quod principia spirandi sint in patre et Wlio, ut iste falso imaginatur, quia principium producendi in divinis non est relatio sed essentia . . .’ 39 De articulis, a. 5 p. 454. 460–71: ‘omnis proprietas facit ad constitutionem personae in divinis quantum ad eius esse distinctum universaliter ab aliis, quia pater per solum generare non distinguitur ab omni, quia non a spiritu sanctu sed tantum a Wlio. Et similiter Wlius non distinguitur per generari ab omni, sed tantum a patre, non autem a spiritu sancto. Spiritus autem sanctus aut per spirare distinguitur ab utroque, scilicet a patre et Wlio, quia patet oppositum reale utrique. Quare autem paternitas et Wliatio dicantur proprietates personales, dico quod hoc ideo est, quia incommunicabiles, non quia praeter has requirat pater et Wlius proprietatem distinguentem a spirato. Unde dicit Anselmus de processu spiritus sancti, quod per hoc distinguuntur personae divinae, quia unus est, qui a nullo et a quo alii, et alius, qui ab alio et a quo alius, et tertius, qui ab aliis et a quo nullus.’ 40 Hervaeus’s endorsement of the psychological model on this occasion is quite signiWcant. De articulis, a. 5 p. 454. 472–80: ‘Quantum autem ad illud, quod omissum est de ordine emanationum et de modo voluntatis, quod improbant illi, dico quod non solum secundum quamdam similitudinem invenitur in divinis modus intellectus et voluntatis et modus naturae et voluntatis, ut scilicet unus dicatur Wlius vel verbum et alius spiritus sanctus, quia tunc ista convenirent divinis metaphorice sed non secundum rem, quod falsum est. Unde est ibi modus intellectus et voluntatis, quia est ibi secundum rem natura intellectiva et volitiva et est ibi productum a non producto, et productum a producto per se et habentia ordinem et distinctionem.’ (My italics.) As we saw already in his commentary, the need to explain a ‘mediated’ relation of origin for the Wlioque incited Hervaeus to recognize some aYnity in the psychological model: just as the operation of the will presupposes an intellectual product, the generation of the Son has a role in explaining the procession of the Spirit. The Wlioque was therefore an issue which sensitized Dominicans to the beneWts of the psychological analogy. See Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81bD–82aA. See also Aquinas, Sent. I q. 27 a. 3 and a. 4; De Pot., q. 10 a. 5, and my discussion of this issue in s. 2.2 above.

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Much of the discussion on Durandus’s view of distinction in article 6 is occupied with Hervaeus’s criticism of its underlying account of subsistence, and speciWcally of Durandus’s answer to the question of what counts as a numerically distinct thing. As we have seen, Durandus advanced a modal doctrine based on his theory of analogy of being between absolute and relative. According to this theory, absolute things such as substances, and the accidents of quality and quantity, are fully actual things capable of independent existence; whereas relations are merely non-subsistent modes of being dependent on absolute things. In Durandus’s view, then, both things and modes have being, but only things count as numerically distinct objects. On this basis, Durandus claimed, Wrst, that real distinction holds not only between fully actual things but also between things and their modes; and secondly, that numerical plurality obtains only between subsistent things. This enabled Durandus to assert that, in God, essence and relation are really distinct, without thereby introducing a plurality of subsistent objects or the risk of composition. Hervaeus sees matters diVerently. Following a Thomist line, he claims that only substances and absolute accidents are real, such that reality is divided into things which subsist and things which inhere. Everything else is either a being of reason or a divine reality. In this view, real distinction necessarily holds between numerically distinct objects, and composition obtains by virtue of an accident’s inherence in a substance.41 In contrast to created things, in God there is no accidentality because there is no inherence. Everything is identical to the subsistent reality of the essence. Relations in God assume the subsistent reality of the essence, and it is as subsistent properties— rather than as non-subsistent modes—that they are constitutive of the supposita. As a result, in God only the supposita are really distinct, whereby only the persons count as numerically distinct objects.42 41 De articulis, a. 5 p. 453. 450–4. 459: ‘Ad secundum dicendum primo, quod nihil advenit alii in divinis realiter, alioquin esset ibi inhaerentia realis, et quod dicitur ab isto, quod inhaerere vel non inhaerere est contradictio absolutorum; et ego dico, quod hoc nihil est dictum, immo est contradictorio omnium, quia omne quod est aut est inhaerens aut non inhaerens, nisi contradictio habeat medium. Et si dicat saltem non oportet, quod sit inhaerens vel subsistens, et ego dico, quod oportet, quod sit vel innitens alteri vel subsistens, nec est dare medium, et ideo adveniens secundum rem oportet quod sit inhaerens vel innitens, quorum utrumque impossibile est convenire alicui existenti in divinis.’ 42 De articulis, a. 6, 119ra: ‘subsistere vel inmixus per inhaerentiam sive per modum partis convenit omni rei de mundo, in divinis autem nihil potest esse inhaerens vel inmixum vel dependens . . . Quod autem dicit quod quaecumque distincta in divinis non sunt incompossibilia in eodem supposito, ostensum est esse falsum, quando probatum est quod quaecumque distincta in divinis sunt distincta supposito, quia sunt distincta subsistentia.’ Also 122vb: ‘relationes sunt realiter ipsa supposita . . . et etiam ipsa substantia, ratione cuius omnia in divinis subsistunt . . . [Q]uia constituunt suppositum, quod non esset verum nisi essent

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In Hervaeus’s view, Durandus’s claim that relation is individuated independently from its foundation, but is not numerically distinct from it, was at best contradictory. Since real distinction necessarily obtains between numerically distinct objects, to aYrm one while denying the other courts a contradiction. As Hervaeus saw it, Durandus’s claim rested on the false assumption that two objects could be really distinct (modum diVerentem re) without constituting diVerent things (res alia). In this sense, a modal distinction such as that propounded by Durandus amounted to the positing of numerical plurality ‘adverbially’ (adverbialiter) but denying it ‘denominatively’ (nominaliter). That is, it predicates of two objects that they are ‘really’ distinct while denying that they are ‘two’ (distinct objects).43 Hervaeus’s insight in identifying ‘modes of being’ with adverbial predication is worth remarking, for it points to the heart of his quarrel with Durandus’s view. As Hervaeus understood it, modes of being are properties ‘adverbially’ connected to a thing, in that they signify ‘the mode’ in which a thing is, rather than the quiddity—the ‘what it is’—of a thing. Thus, if it is true that relation is only a mode, as Durandus claims, then it must necessarily constitute the same reality with its foundation, adding only the connotation of a relative term. To infer a real distinction either incurs contradiction or introduces numerical plurality. Moreover, Durandus’s strategy of disassociating dependence from inherence in order to avoid composition seems futile if he retains the claim of real distinction between modes and things. In this light, Durandus’s doctrine of modes appeared as an unlikely middle ground which, rather than reconciling identity and distinction, had the opposite eVect of introducing accidentality in God.44 One aspect in Durandus’s claim of real distinction which particularly troubled Hervaeus was that it implied a treatment of divine relations on an res subsistentes . . . [R]es incommunicabilis non constitueret suppositum in esse suppositali si non esse subsistentes . . . [O]mnia quae sunt in divinis habeant subsistere, quia omnis res quae est in divinis est ipsa substantia . . . [S]i non subsistunt habens esse inhaerens vel inmixtum alteri . . . et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod pluriWcatio relationum non pluriWcat supposita . . .’ 43 De articulis, a. 5 p. 453. 442–7: ‘Falsum autem supponit, scilicet quod in creaturis relatio dicat modum diVerentem re a fundamento et non dicat rem aliam a fundamento, quia tam in divinis quam in creaturis dicere aliqua positiva diVerre realiter et non dicere diversas res, est contradicere, quia qui hoc ponunt, diversas res adverbialiter ponunt et negant nominaliter.’ Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1, 135aA–B. See also Aquinas, Sent. I d. 9 q. 1 a. 1: ‘Quaecumque distinguuntur realiter, unum eorum est alia res ab alio.’ 44 De articulis, a. 6, 118vb–119ra: ‘Et quando dicit quod relationes et ista quae dicunt modum non habent subsistere nec inhaerere: primo dico, quod modalia eorum nihil sunt, quia omnis modus oportet quod sit res quaedam . . . nec oportet ire in inWnitum, quia Wnaliter oportet devenire ad rem, quae est Wnis modus essendi.’ Also 122vb: ‘De illo dicto in d. 13 quod sola supposita sunt quae subsistunt, relationes autem non subsistunt . . . si non subsistunt habens esse inhaerens vel inmixtum alteri . . . Unde videtur quod ad istam positionem sequeretur quod essentia divina sit quasi quodam subsistens absolutum habens plura accidentia sibi inhaerentia.’

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equal footing with created relations.45 As has been shown, by drawing the ontological line between absolute and relative, Durandus was under no formal obligation to treat divine relations as a diVerent type of metaphysical object from created relations. Quite the contrary, the main advantage of this ontological divide lay in its enabling a notion of relative distinction stout enough to withstand anti-Trinitarian threats of reduction to one absolute substance. Subscribers to the standard substance–accident division, meanwhile, were compelled to treat categorical relations as essentially diVerent from relations in God. For otherwise than created relations, divine relations lose their accidentality and assume the subsistent being of the essence. In this light, therefore, Durandus’s analysis seemed to be imposing a categorical template on God’s inWnite reality, thereby yielding a composite substance. Not surprisingly, then, Hervaeus devotes article 13 to buttressing the view of the essence as an inWnite reality which in its commonality is capable of absorbing all distinctions without division. Remarkably, in Hervaeus’s account this Scotist conception of the essence is dovetailed with the Lombard’s notion of a quaedam summa res, the notion sanctioned by the Lateran Council. As we shall see, Hervaeus understands both conceptions to be guided by the same insight that the unity of God’s nature rests on its commonality— i.e. on the real identity of the essence with the three persons. The result of this skilful exercise of doctrinal synthesis is that, while revamping the Thomist outlook with Scotist insights, Hervaeus also succeeds in making a Thomist reappropriation of Lateran orthodoxy. Fittingly, Hervaeus opens the discussion by rehearsing his view on the true import of the Lateran deWnition and the ensuing condemnation on quaternity. On this occasion, however, the conciliar text is not the subject of discussion, but only serves to bring to the foreground the issue of divine unity exempliWed in the Lombard’s conception of the essence.46 The canonical 45 See e.g. De articulis, a. 5 p. 452. 420–4: ‘Primum probat sic: quia sicut se habet relatio ad fundamentum in creaturis, ita et in divinis. Sed in creaturis prius est fundamentum realiter relatione. Ergo, etc . . . Maior probatur, quia sicut in creaturis relatio non dicit aliquam rem absolute sed modum, nec facit compositionem cum fundamento, ita in divinis.’ Cf. Durandus, A Sent. I d. 12 q. 1, 61rb–va; s. 5.1 above. 46 De articulis, a. 13, 120va–b: ‘Extra ‘‘de summa trinitate et Wde catholica’’ dicitur quod magister Petrus Lombardus, licet ponet essentiam nec generare nec generari, nec spirare nec spirari, non tamen ponebat quartam rem realiter distinctam a personis sicut imponebat ei abbas Ioachim. Unde concilium generale concordans cum magistro Petro Lombardo . . . Et sic sequitur quod concilii generalis, quo dicitur quod illa res quae est essentia est unaquaeque illarum personarum est falsam, quod est temerarium dicere sic. Ergo, dico quod dicere quod relatio comparata ad essentiam non sit eadem res quod ipsa sed alia res realiter ab ipsa diVerens, non solum reputo falsum sed errorem, et dicto concilii generalii contrarium.’

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opening thus serves to revalidate the charge against Durandus’s view and, by the same token, ensures that the subsequent presentation of Hervaeus’s view carries all the weight of church authority. Hervaeus’s argument is based on a crucial distinction between a universal whole and an integral whole. A universal whole obtains between a common nature and its instantiations, whereas an integral whole is the composite of a substance and its parts. As we shall see, Hervaeus makes this distinction in order to isolate the notion of universal whole as the suitable analogy for divine unity. As Hervaeus understands it, Durandus’s claim of real distinction is rooted in a misconception of divine reality whereby the essence, because singular, cannot be predicated in common of relations. The result is a conception of divine unity analogous to that of an integral whole, whereby each person constitutes a substantial whole composed of essence and relation as its parts. This view is however theologically undesirable, because divine simplicity precludes all talk of composition and requires rather a real identity between essence and relations. Consequently, Hervaeus distances himself from the integral-whole analogy associated to Durandus’s view, and seeks instead to show the preferability of the universal-whole analogy of Scotist inspiration.47 Although a universal whole is not properly speaking in the divine, . . . such a whole is nevertheless found in the divine, even according to reality (etiam realiter). Now, the essence is paternity, and Wliation, and passive spiration, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, who are not identical to one another and are numerically one and the same essence, such that the essence is more (in plus) than any one relation. Whereby ‘every thing (res) which is paternity is the essence’ is true, but not conversely, because not every thing (res) which is the essence is paternity, since Wliation is the essence but not paternity.48

47 De articulis, a. 13, 120va–b: ‘si essentia realiter diVert a relatione, ita quod sicut duae res quarum una res non est alia, persona includeret aliquam rem diversa ab essentia . . . quia persona includeret essentiam et relationem . . . Quando ergo quaeritur utrum essentia et relatio sint totaliter idem, sceindum quod totalitas integralis in divinis nullo modo locus habet nisi secundum rationem intelligendi. Quia si persona comprehendat essentiam et relationem, non tamen componitur ex eis sicut ex partibus integrantibus, quia persona sit unaquaeque earum et una sit altera, ut patet ex dictis.’ Scotus draws a similar distinction between ‘communicatio per informationem’ and ‘communicatio per identitatem’. See Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 379–80. For Scotus on the essence as a special kind of universal, see Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 367, 381; d. 5 q. 1 un. n. 12. 48 De articulis, a. 13, 120vb: ‘Totum autem universale, etsi non sit proprie in divinis, tamen . . . tali totalitati est in divinis etiam realiter. Nam essentia est paternitas et Wliatio et spiratio passiva, pater et Wlius et spiritus sanctus, quorum unus non est aliud et sunt eadem essentia numero, ita quod essentia in plus se habet quam aliquam relationum. Unde ista est vera, ‘‘omnis res quae est paternitas est essentia’’ sed non e converso, quia non omnis res quae est essentia est paternitas, quia Wliatio est essentia tamen non est paternitas.’

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Again, the underlying insight is a fundamental distinction between the real identity and the formal identity of a thing. Whereas real identity is predicated of a thing absolutely, i.e. of itself, formal identity is predicated of a thing in its comparison to another term and without detriment to its real identity. By equivocating between real and formal identity, Hervaeus contended, Durandus misconceived the essence as an integral whole, and was led to posit a real distinction between essence and relation.49 The main advantage of the universal-whole analogy is that it enables us to qualify the identity between essence and relations without resorting to a qualiWcation of their reality. That the essence is ‘more’ than relations does not mean that the essence possesses greater actuality than relations—for everything in God has perfect being—but that the predicability of the essence is greater than the predicability of any one relation. The essence is ‘more’ because, like a common nature, it is not exhausted in any one of its instantiations. Unlike a common nature, however, the essence is predicable without division, such that it is repeated in its singularity in each and every one of its instantiations. In this account, therefore, to enquire whether the essence is entirely (totaliter) identical to relation is to enquire, not whether the entire reality of the essence is the entire reality of relation, but whether relation is really and conversely the same as the essence. Hervaeus thus translates Scotus’s conception of the essence as universal into his own notion of non-converse identity.50 To conclude, attention must be drawn to an aspect of De articulis which could otherwise be easily overlooked, namely, Hervaeus’s heavy reliance on 49 De articulis, a. 13, 120vb: ‘Et per hoc patet ad quandam instantiam quam facit iste contra istam solutionem, quia . . . sic arguit, quia illa quae non sunt convertibiliter idem re non sunt omnino totaliter eadem res. Et hoc verum est quod non sunt totaliter eadem secundum totalitatem universalem, licet sint omnino comparata ad invicem eadem res per oppositum ad non esse omnino idem secundum totalitatem integralem.’ Hervaeus’s fundamental distinction between formal and real identity is clearly rendered in the following passage (120vb): ‘Unde ratio procedit ab insuYcienti, quia debet dici quod realitates quibus diVerunt paternitas et Wliatio, aut sunt realitas fundamenti, aut alia a fundamento, aut sunt eadem realitas cum eadem realitate fundamenti, non tamen totaliter. Et tunc distinguendum est de totaliter sicut prius, et dicendum quod eadem realitas, sed non totaliter secundum totalitatem universalem, ut dictum est.’ (My italics.) Thus, relation is really the essence, but the reality of relation is not entirely identical to the reality of the essence. 50 De articulis, a. 13, 120vb: ‘Si autem loquimur de totalitate totius universalis et quaeretur utrum essentia sit eadem realiter cum relatione, idem est quaerere . . . utrum relatio, scilicet paternitas, sit eadem realiter et convertibiliter cum essentia, sic scilicet quod omnis res quae est essentia sic paternitas, et e converso. Et sic essentia non est eadem realiter totaliter relationum, quia nulla relatio est convertibiliter eadem cum essentia . . . Nunc autem essentia et relatio, licet sint eadem totaliter per oppositum ad non esse totaliter eadem totalitatem integralem, non tamen sunt idem realiter secundum totalitatem universalem, quia non convertibiliter.’

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magisterial authority throughout the discussion.51 This is signiWcant for mainly two reasons. It suggests that much of the battle between Hervaeus and Durandus was fought on magisterial territory, and that Durandus was thereby being judged according to the degree in which his view agreed with— or rather dissented from—the maior pars, and not necessarily according to church orthodoxy in the traditional sense. The Thomist account of the Trinity, and more importantly, the Thomist explanation of the Wlioque, were thus considered a matter of received opinion, which, although not commanding the immediate acquiescence of matters of faith, could be imposed with relative legitimacy if one was prepared to accept some sense in which the magisterial opinion was authoritative. The second reason why it is signiWcant that leading Dominicans felt entitled to judge Durandus on the basis of magisterial authority is that it testiWes to the mission, with which second-generation Thomists identiWed, of introducing a normative use of Aquinas’s teaching by incorporating it into the bulk of received ideas exempliWed in the Lateran tradition. This sense of mission will become more apparent in the second censure list, in which Durandus’s view will be judged against Thomist—i.e. magisterial—criteria. As we shall see, many aspects of the second list betray Hervaeus’s contribution, as we recognize the doctrinal line developed in the latest confrontation with Durandus. This sheds new light in De articulis as a work of transition which not only looks back at the recent censure, but also prepares the grounds for one to follow. 51 So e.g. a. 5: ‘Et propter quod inducunt magistri, quod pater per se loquendo et spirat immediate . . .’ (p. 452. 394–5); ‘ista propositio conceditur per se ab omnibus’ (p. 452. 405); ‘ostendunt dicta sanctorum doctorum et etiam doctorum modernorum, quid numquam prius et posterius re in divinis ponunt, sed magis oppositum’ (p. 453. 428–9); ‘quod verbum non est causa amoris, falsum est et contra communem modum’ (p. 455. 481–2); a. 6: ‘commune dictum doctorum est quod spiritus sanctus procedet a patre . . . immediationem virtutis spirativae . . .’ (118vb); a. 13: ‘concilium generale concordans cum magistro Petro Lombardo . . . quod essentia nec generat nec generatur . . .’ (120va).

10 The Corrective The eVect of Dominican pressure on Durandus’s view reached its highest point in the Avignon Quodlibets.1 In the Paris Quodlibets Durandus was still trying to justify his position and was making no unwarranted concessions to the ‘common opinion’. But after 1314, two changes occurred in the direction of his discussion. He started to moderate his position by omitting ill-sounding terminology; and he shifted the focus of the debate towards the notion of distinction and away from the metaphysical issue of modes of being. After all, it was not Durandus’s modal doctrine in itself which earned the charge of heresy; it was the use of this doctrine to buttress the claim of real distinction. The censure, and no less Hervaeus’s subsequent criticisms, had served to highlight the main points of friction with the Dominican position. It is not surprising, therefore, to Wnd a close connection between the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet and the 1314 censure list—the Wrst three quodlibetal questions mirror articles 13, 6, and 5 of the list respectively—the censured articles serving as some kind of doctrinal signposts for Durandus’s quodlibetal determination. Durandus had presumably taken this quodlibetal disputation as an opportunity to make public acknowledgement of the Dominican corrective. The Dominican reception of Durandus’s ingratiatory gestures was cool. Hervaeus’s Correctiones super dicta Durandi in primo Quodlibet Avenionensi (henceforth Correctiones) is to the Avignon Quodlibets what the earlier Reprobationes was to Durandus’s Excusationes.2 Like the Reprobationes, the Correctiones also belongs to the ‘forensic’ stage of the controversy which followed 1 Durandus produced three Avignon Quodlibets, held respectively in Advent 1314, Advent 1315, and Advent 1316. The close connection between the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet and the 1314 censure list, together with the fact that the commission’s work was only Wnalized on 3 July 1314, suggest Advent 1314 as the earliest possible date for the Wrst Quodlibet. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 119–28. The three Avignon Quodlibets have been edited by P. T. Stella, Quolibeta Avenionensia Tria, Textus et Studia in Historiam Scholasticae, Cura PontiWcii Athenaei Salesiani (Zu¨rich: Pas-Verlag 1965). 2 The Correctiones has been edited by P. T. Stella as an appendix to Durandus’s Avignon Quodlibets, in Quolibeta Avenionensia, 293–326. In this work Hervaeus often refers to Durandus’s Excusationes as the ‘primum quaternum’, which seems to suggest that the Excusa-

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the 1314 censure, and is designed to assess the validity and soundness of Durandus’s self-justiWcation. On this occasion, the object of Hervaeus’s evaluation is Durandus’s Wrst Avignon Quodlibet. Hervaeus is thus resuming and bringing to a conclusion the quodlibetal discussion which had been sustained by the two masters for almost a decade. But the Correctiones was not intended merely as a quodlibetal riposte. The title of Hervaeus’s latest tract was not haphazard, and the conspicuous allusion to the Correctoria controversy is revealing not only of the threat which Durandus represented in Dominican minds, but also of the way Hervaeus perceived his own mission. Durandus, to him, was a reminder of the unsavoury times of the 1270s controversies. By launching a renewed ‘corrective’, this time from Dominican quarters, Hervaeus may well have been hoping to re-establish Aquinas’s reputation, impaired as it had been by the condemnation of 1277 (Aquinas’s name was not cleared from that condemnation until 1325). The Correctiones, so Hervaeus appears to have calculated, would chase away the ghost of the condemnation, and by doing so close a chapter in the history of Thomism, opening the way for a new stage of regained conWdence in the order’s intellectual tradition—a stage which the ‘Thomist’ censure against Durandus was about to inaugurate. In what follows, I shall look Wrst at Durandus’s Wrst Avignon Quodlibet, questions 1 and 3.3 Unlike the examination of other works by Durandus, I will consider the Avignon Quodlibets less for their theological content than as an index of the Dominican impact on Durandus’s position. I shall therefore go over the familiar doctrinal points cursorily, pausing only to notice those

tiones, as the accompanying Reprobationes, precede the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet. The latter would then constitute the ‘secundum quaternum’ of Durandus’s apologia. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 231–3. 3 Question 2, on the distinction between the processions, does not register any changes that are not already treated in more detail in questions 1 and 3. I will therefore overlook it here. One passage in question 2 seems worth noting, however, if only because it testiWes to the common perception of the divine processions as a highly complex and doctrinally ambiguous issue: ‘Quidquid autem sit verius dicere, aut quod paternitas non sit spiratio, aut quod sit idem, quamvis non adaequate et convertibiliter, diversae sunt opiniones; non solum diversorum doctorum, sed etiam eiusdem in diversis locis; quarum discussio requirit longiorem tractatum, quam sit principale propositum. Et quia secundum quamcumque illarum opinionum sequitur quod paternitas et spiratio, et similiter Wliatio et spiratio, diVerent aliquo modo realiter, seu ex natura rei, licet talis locutio non sit extendenda, sed potius restringenda pro eo quod talis diVerentia tenet inWmum gradum inter diVerentias reales, et est realis secundum quid et non simpliciter, ideo ad praesens illarum opinionum discussio dimittatur’ (p. 67. 19–28). Durandus makes sure to warn his audience that the issue at hand belongs to a fairly uncertain chapter of doctrine—thus, an accusation of heterodoxy on these grounds would seem at least unjustiWed. Cf. Quodl. Aven. II q. 3 (Advent 1315), which deals with the same question and is almost an exact repetition of the content of I q. 2.

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The Controversy

changes in Durandus’s position which may have represented his response to external pressure. After studying Durandus’s Quodlibets in this way, I shall then look at Hervaeus’s reaction in the Correctiones.

10.1. THE FIRST AVIGNON QUODLIBET The opening question of the Avignon Quodlibets is one which had by now gained in topical signiWcance: ‘whether the divine essence and relation are in some way really distinct’.4 The way the debate had developed, the status quaestionis had shifted from enquiring whether essence and relation are really identical—the weight of the proof being placed on the Thomist position—to the type of distinction which obtains between essence and relation. Granting that essence and relation are not identical in every way, the task is to examine the way in which they fail to be absolutely identical: are essence and relation distinct as two diVerent intentions in the same reality? Are they distinct as a thing is distinct from the mode of a thing? Or are they distinct only in so far as the essence is predicated of some term of which relation is not predicated? The Wrst thing that strikes us in Durandus’s presentation of the question is that the value of the dialectical terms has been inverted. Durandus’s previous arguments in support of a real distinction are now set out as representing the contrary opinion, whereas Hervaeus’s familiar criticisms have been promoted to the rank of the favoured view. More striking still is that, in some perverse form of self-sabotage, Durandus adduces the Lateran condemnation of quaternarism against the claim of real distinction. Durandus’s position thus reveals the signs of retreat. However, and as I hope to show, although this inverted stage sets the general tone of the quodlibetal disputation, Durandus’s distinct ontological approach reasserts itself from the outset, announcing a very diVerent development, and ultimately dictating the way in which Durandus articulates the approved view.5

4 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 45. 6–7: ‘utrum divina essentia et relatio diVerent aliquo modo realiter’. 5 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 47. 3–20: ‘cum idem et diVerens dividant omne ens, sicut ens dupliciter accipitur, sic identitas et diVerentia. Ens autem uno modo accipitur pro ente, quod habet esse in re extra, circumscripta omni operatione intellectus; et istud vocatur ens reale. Alio modo, dicitur ens illud quod non habet aliquam entitatem nisi per operationem intellectus. . . . Similiter, est quaedam identitas et diVerentia realis, quaedam vero secundum rationem. Quia illa diVerunt realiter, quae diVerunt ex natura rei extra animam existentis, circumscripta operatione intellectus; et per oppositum, illa quae sunt in re extra praedicto modo et non diVerunt sic, sunt idem realiter’.

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According to Durandus, every distinction which is not strictly and purely of reason but according to reality (ex natura rei) and independently of our intellect, is real according to some mode (aliquo modo realis).6 As Durandus understands it, ex natura rei is not merely a way of predicating the reality of a thing, but has some deWnite ontological value.7 A distinction ex natura rei is one determined by the reality of the terms involved, so that, just as there are degrees of being, there are degrees of real distinction. Thus, in Durandus’s theory of the analogy of being, the highest degree of being belongs to absolute things, whereas at the other end of the scale there are relative beings which possess a diminished ontological value because they are quidditatively modes of things and not fully actual things.8 Accordingly, there is (i) real distinction properly speaking, which can obtain either between two subsistent things constituting numerically distinct objects, or between a subsistent thing and an inherent accident, together resulting in a composite whole; and there is (ii) a weaker type of real distinction, which obtains between an absolute thing and a mode. This last type of distinction is real only secundum quid and in a qualiWed way (cum determinatione). The distinction which holds between the divine essence and relations is of this type.9 Durandus is well aware that the crux of his position lies precisely at this point, i.e. in the inference from the reality of modes to the claim of real distinction in God. So in this question he invests considerable energy in explaining the metaphysical import of 6 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 53. 9–11: ‘Omnis diVerentia, quae non est pure et praecise secundum rationem, sed est ex natura rei excluso omni actu rationis, est aliquo modo realis.’ 7 For the contrast with Hervaeus’s understanding of ex natura rei, see Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 1, 95va. 8 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 47 21–48. 21: ‘cum reale dicatur a re, manifestum est quod gradus in identitate et diversitate reali est secundum gradum qui invenitur in re vel in natura rei. Res autem non dicitur univoce de omnibus de quibus dicitur, sed aequivoce vel analogice, hoc est, secundum plures rationes, quarum una attributionem habet ad alteram. Cum, enim, rerum quaedam sint absolutae, et quaedam puri respectus, res dicitur per prius et simpliciter de re absoluta, de qua dicitur formaliter praedicatione dicente ‘‘hoc est hoc’’. . . ; per posterius autem et secundum quid solum dicitur de respectu, qui non est res vel ens reale, nisi quia est rei, tanquam modus essendi eius . . . quia nihil talium est entitas secundum se, nisi quia formaliter est modus entitas, et totus conceptus essentialis et formalis talium est esse alterius . . .’ 9 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 50. 25–51. 15: ‘Et quia identitas realis et diVerentia ex natura rei consurgit . . . , ideo illa dicuntur diVerre realiter primo et simpliciter, quae sic sunt diversae res, quod utraque est per se subsistens, propria et distincta subsistentia, ut duo supposita in creaturis, vel etiam unum per se subsistens et alterum inhaerens, sicut corpus et albedo eius, quia tales res per prius et simpliciter dicuntur res et entia realia. Illa, autem, quae non sunt diversae res, sed unum eorum est res absoluta . . . , alia vero est modus essendi solum et non res habens modum essendi, non dicuntur diVerre realiter nisi per posterius et secundum quid . . . [D]iVerentia essentiae et relationis in divinis non est pure et simpliciter secundum rationem . . . [N]on est dicendum simpliciter et absolute quod diVerent realiter . . . [N]ecessario oportet dicere quod diVerant aliquo modo realiter, saltem secundum quid et cum determinatione.’ The similarity between this analysis and Bonaventure’s position is remarkable. See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4, 398a–b; I d. 33 a. un. q. 2 ad 2, 575b. Also s. 3.1. above.

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modes, so as to minimize further misrepresentations—especially of the type that would see his position as leading to the unwelcome result of composition in God. Thus, Durandus takes pains to isolate the metaphysical features of modes from those of parts, and disengage the function of dependence from that of inherence.10 In Durandus’s analysis, there are three ways of articulating the less-thanabsolute distinction which obtains between essence and relation. According to one way, essence and relation are distinct in so far as they are not adequately or conversely identical, such that the essence can be predicated of some term—Wliation—of which paternity cannot be predicated. This is clearly the Thomist opinion as voiced by Hervaeus.11 According to another way, essence and relation are distinct just as a thing and a mode of possessing that thing (modus habendi rem) are distinct, such that they diVer ex natura rei and formally speaking (formaliter loquendo). That is, essence and relation are distinct not merely according to some third term, but in the sense that the essence is not formally relation or vice versa.12 Note that in Durandus’s use of the term, otherwise than in Scotus and Hervaeus’s, ‘formally’ does not designate merely a way of predicating the quiddity of a thing, but implies positive ontological value: the formality of a thing goes together with the 10 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. pp. 48. 23–50. 24: ‘partes . . . compositi, scilicet materia et forma, vel subiectum et accidens, sunt res, quarum sunt illae habitudines seu modi essendi qui importantur per componi vel compositionem, qui modi sunt in alio et in quo aliud, et eis denominative convenitur . . . [S]ed essentia vel quidditas seu entitas horum modorum, tota consistit in hoc quod est esse huius . . . Ex quo sequuntur duo. Unum est, quod nulli modo essendi competit per se esse subsistens, vel esse alteri inhaerens . . . Secundum est, quod nullus modus essendi facit compositionem cum re, cui convenit denominative . . . Cuius ratio est, quia omnis talis compositio est per hoc, quod una res inhaeret alteri . . .’ Also pp. 52. 20–53. 9: ‘relatio divina non sic est alia res ab essentia, quasi sit ei inhaerens, nam ad hoc sequeretur quod in Deo esset compositio, quod est inconveniens; nec est alia res ab essentia, quasi sit per se subsistens propria et distincta subsistentia, quia sequeretur quod essent plures dii . . . Qualis res, ergo, est relatio divina? Utique solus modus essendi vel habendi essentiam divinam . . . Modus autem essendi, sic acceptus, praecise nec inhaeret nec subsistit . . .’ For very similar accounts, see Quodl. Aven. I q. 2 pp. 65. 25–67. 18; II q. 3 pp. 184. 10–186. 2; II q. 1 pp. 174. 11–175. 20. 11 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 53. 18–22: ‘Illa autem determinatio diversimode ponitur a diversis. Quidam, enim, dicunt quod essentia et relatio diVerunt quia non sunt idem adaequate et convertibiliter. Nam paternitas est essentia et nihil aliud, sed essentia divina est paternitas et aliqua res, quae non est paternitas, videlicet Wliatio, et sic essentia est in plus quam paternitas.’ Cf. Hervaeus, Sent. I d. 32 q. 1; I d. 31 q. 1 aa. 3 and 4; Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2. 12 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 53. 24–54. 5: ‘Alii autem dicunt, quod essentia et relatio diVerunt sicut res et modus habendi rem illam, cuius modi sit entitas et conceptus, ut dicamus, non quod sit alia res ab essentia, nec subsistens, nec inhaerens, sed quod huius. Et diVert, hic modus, ab essentia, ex natura rei; non solum quia essentia est in aliquo supposito, in quo non est quilibet modus habendi eam, sed etiam quia formaliter loquendo non ita proprie dicitur quod paternitas sit essentia, vel e converso, sicut si diceretur quod paternitas est modus essendi vel habendi essentiam divinam ut a quo est alius per generationem.’ Cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 55 q. 6. Also Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. un. q. 4.

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thing’s degree of actuality. Understood in this sense, formal distinction is considerably stronger than non-converse identity, for it predicates that essence and relation are diVerent sorts of reality with diVerent degrees of actuality. According to a third way, Wnally, essence and relation are formally (formaliter) distinct ex natura rei, even though they are really the same thing. As Durandus notes revealingly, ‘this sense of ‘‘formally’’ (hanc formaliter) I fail to understand unless it coincides with either one of the ways presented above’.13 According to Durandus, then, the Scotist formal distinction is unintelligible if it presupposes real identity. In Durandus’s metaphysics, in which the formality of a thing goes together with its being, the claim that two objects are formally distinct—i.e. are diVerent sorts of reality—but constitute the same being is simply contradictory. It is nonetheless interesting that Durandus should group Hervaeus’s non-converse identity together with his own modal distinction, rather than with Scotus’s formal distinction, especially after considerable evidence from previous discussions that Hervaeus favours the Scotist view as the most suitable way to articulate distinction in God. On the other hand, and as we have already seen, Durandus has his own interpretation of non-converse identity, an interpretation which does not necessarily coincide with Hervaeus’s, but which places non-converse identity closer to a type of real distinction than to a qualiWed type of identity. For Durandus it is essential that a distinction ex natura rei, however understood, amounts to a real distinction, and does not stop short at some sort of qualiWed identity— lest (he adds characteristically) we incur Sabellianism. A formal distinction, as conceived by Scotus, must then be reduced to a distinction according to formalities, where ‘formality’ designates the sort of reality a thing is, according to its degree of actuality.14 As the exposition proceeds, then, it is the everlurking risk of Sabellianism, rather than a tactical reappropriation of the Thomist opinion, which motivates Durandus to draw a common denominator from Hervaeus’s view and his own.15 13 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 54. 10–11: ‘Alii autem dicunt, quod essentia et paternitas diVerunt formaliter, quamvis sint idem identitate; unde concedunt quod haec est vera ‘‘paternitas est essentia identitate,’’ sed haec est falsa ‘‘paternitas est formaliter essentia,’’ quia diVerunt formaliter ex natura rei, et hanc formaliter non intelligo, nisi coincidat cum aliquo dictorum modorum.’ This is clearly a reference to Scotus’s opinion in Ord. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 403–9; I d. 8 p. 1 q. 4 n. 209; Lect. I d. 2 p. 2 qq. 1–4 nn. 270–7. 14 See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 57. 16–19: ‘hanc formalitatem non intelligo, nisi coincidat cum aliquo praedicatorum modorum, et maxime cum illo modo, quo dicitur quod relatio non est formaliter et proprie essentia, sed modus habendi eam, quamvis non sit alia res ab ea, nec subsistens, nec inhaerens . . .’ 15 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 54. 12–19: ‘Verumtamen, quicumque istorum trium modorum detur, praeter quos nullus est adhuc datus, nec forte potest dari, semper sequitur necessario quod essentia et relatio diVerunt realiter, et si non simpliciter absolute, tamen aliquo

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Durandus’s interpretation of the distinction ex natura rei introduces an ontological streak foreign to the views of both Scotus and Hervaeus. As we have seen, for Scotus and Hervaeus the modal doctrine is not the best way of explaining distinction in God, because by virtue of its inWnity the essence is capable of absorbing all modal diVerences into one simple nature. In their view, distinction in God must rather be explained in terms of relations of predicability holding between a common, inWnite nature and an incommunicable relation. Therefore, by failing to understand the Scotist formal distinction in terms of predicability, Durandus was also dismissing the conception of the essence as an inWnite nature common to all divine realities. For Durandus, a healthy Trinitarian doctrine requires that a lack of convertibility, as a lack of formal identity, should result in real distinction of the kind which obtains between incommensurable realities. The risk of Sabellianism made Durandus reluctant to accept the Scotist conception of the essence as a kind of universal, for he associated the notion of universality with a type of conceptual commonality which threatened to blur the real distinction between the persons.16 To sum up, then: rather than eVect a profound revision of his previous view, Durandus in this Quodlibet has simply expounded his original statements in formulae more congenial to Dominican ears. In a manner reminiscent of his confessio to Guido Terreni, Durandus has on this occasion attempted to portray his view as the ideal middle way, by a twofold strategy: Wrst, by casting his notion of distinction ex natura rei against the stronger numerical distinction, thus toning down the eVects of the claim of real distinction by disengaging it from the risk of composition; secondly, by establishing a connection between a qualiWed type of identity and the risk of Sabellianism, thereby showing the preferability of a real distinction. modo, saltem secundum quid, vel cum determinatione; qualiscumque sit illa determinatio, circa quam, quamvis sit praedictarum opinionum diversitas, omnes tamen in hoc conveniunt quod ista diVerentia est ex natura rei aliquo modo realis, nisi velint incidere in haeresim sabellianam . . .’ 16 This seems further conWrmed in another passage, in Quodl. Aven. III q. 1 a. 3 pp. 250. 25–30: ‘Cum enim dicunt primo, quod esse certum de aliquo quod sit ens, et ignorare utrum sit substantia vel accidens, non est habere unum conceptum communem essentialiter ad substantiam et accidens, sed est habere conceptum certum de aliquo absoluto . . . , et ignorare quasdam conditiones accidentales . . .’ For Durandus, then, the portrayal of the essence as a common nature amounted to a neutralization of all real distinction in the divine. In this light, question 1 of Quodl. Aven. III, on the analogy between absolute and relative, appears as Durandus’s justiWcation of the absolute-relative division as theologically preferable to the standard substance-accident division. On this matter, see also Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 58. 10–19: ‘sub hac distributione qua dividitur omnis res [i.e. omnis res vel est deitas vel est creatura], non cadit relatio, quae ut sic non est res sed est rei, et tota eius quidditas est ut huius vel cuius, et non hoc vel ut quod . . .’

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Durandus’s twofold aim has been to reclaim the orthodoxy of his view and establish common grounds with the Dominicans’ preferred opinion. Durandus’s eVorts remain, for all that, profoundly unconvincing, for two main reasons. One is that Durandus still retains a distinct ontological approach, based on his modal doctrine and the underlying analogy of being theory; the other, that his handling of the notion of distinction ex natura rei is unaccompanied by the appropriate theological assumptions. The association with anti-Trinitarian reductions to one absolute substance distanced Durandus from the Scotist conception of the essence as an inWnite common nature, a move which Dominican minds perceived as a reticence to embrace the Lateran model of a quaedam summa res. In order to accept that kind of view, however, Durandus would have had to tamper with the very foundations of his metaphysics, starting with the theory of the analogy of being—a theory which automatically proscribed the notion of a univocal common nature as metaphysically reductive and theologically anti-Trinitarian.17 A change like the one required seemed too demanding for an outlook like Durandus’s, inspired as it was by a rejection of all forms of anti-Trinitarianism. In this light, I cannot agree with Joseph Koch in his view of the Avignon Quodlibets as a revocation of Durandus’s opinion after the censure.18 These Quodlibets do not form a coherent whole, and to tell from the Wrst question at least, Durandus is still attempting to justify the previous view, with no more than a tactful incorporation of the approved terminology. Question 3 tells a diVerent story, for it registers a more signiWcant change in Durandus’s conception of the divine processions. With this question Durandus could have been responding to Hervaeus’s criticisms in De articulis.19 This could explain the sudden need for rectiWcation, a need which 17 See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. III q. 1 p. 232. 17–23: ‘ex natura unius secundum se et absolute accepta non potest haberi fundamentum alicuius rationis communis sibi et alteri; nec potest dici quod sit natura utriusque simul, vel saltem hoc est contra ipsos, quia dicunt quod unitas rationis fundatur super aliquid unum numero realiter. Natura, autem, duorum non est una numero. Relinquitur, ergo, quod illa conformitas sit habitudo seu respectus, quod idem est unius ad alterum, et non aliquid absolutum, ut ipsi dicunt.’ 18 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 121. That Durandus is intent upon showing the preferability of his view and clearing it from suspicions of heterodoxy is also revealed by the amount of authoritative evidence he accumulates in support of his claim of real distinction (pp. 61. 3–62. 25). Durandus’s reading of the Lateran text is also a clear attempt to escape the scope of the condemnation: ‘patet quod ibi non negatur quaelibet quaternitas, cum omnes doctores catholici ponant ibi quaternitatem relationum realium; sed solum negatur talis quaternitas qualem imponebat Ioachim magistro Sententiarum, et illa erat quaternitas personarum . . . Et hic est communis sensus decretalis, qui in nullo tangit quaestionem propositam, cum in ea nihil penitus dicatur de diVerentia essentia et relationis de qua quaesitum est, sed solum ibi agitur de numero personarum et consubstantialitate earum.’ 19 The Wrst Avignon Quodlibet was held in Advent 1314, and De articulis was composed in the second half of 1314, at the earliest. Although the chronology leaves little room to validate the hypothesis of a response to De articulis, Durandus’s way of treating the relevant issues in his

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imparts to question 3 a hesitant quality in contrast with the conWdent treatment of the Wrst question. The issue at hand is one which had been fairly rehearsed throughout the discussion, and which had been the object of Hervaeus’s most severe criticism: whether in God there is an order of priority. Following a strategy similar to the one we saw operating in question 1, Durandus mitigates the claim of an order of ‘natural presupposition’ ex natura rei by explaining it against the stronger claim of real priority, thus distancing his position from allegations of subordinationism. As Durandus reasons, there is in God an order of ‘natural presupposition’, not such that it posits two natures in a real order of priority—for in God there is only one nature—but in the sense that divine reality (ex natura rei) provides enough grounds for our intellect to preconceive the essence in respect to relations, and one disparate relation in respect to another. This is not the case between relations of origin, which are constitutive of the persons and thereby equal and simultaneous.20 As before, ‘ex natura rei’ serves as some kind of buVer notion, lessening the impact of an otherwise ill-sounding claim of a real order of priority in God. On this occasion Durandus is nevertheless more compliant. He advocates a view of the processions which grants considerable territory to the Thomist explanation of the Wlioque. Durandus appears to endorse an order of origin between the products of the processions, and, in doing so, overlooks the consequences of this claim for his thesis that a relation of origin cannot obtain between two products. In a passage entirely new to this quodlibetal question, and having an audible ring of Hervaeus’s position, Durandus holds that nothing in the Son—like his power to spirate—can precede the Father, because what the Son has he owes to the Father, and what the Father has he owes to himself. Therefore, Durandus reasons, since active spiration is in the Father, passive generation—which is in the Son—cannot precede active spiration. And since active spiration is opposite and simultaneous to passive spiration, passive generation cannot precede passive spiration but is also Quodlibet oVers suYcient grounds to presume that he was being inXuenced by Hervaeus’s tract. For those passages in De articulis which could account for the modiWcations in Durandus’s view, see a. 5, esp. pp. 452. 402–16, 454. 460–71. 20 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 p. 70. 14–27: ‘diVerentia et ordo rationis inter essentiam divinam et relationes, et inter relationes disparatas, nec non et personas per eas constitutas, non oportet quod sumatur ex aliqua comparatione divinorum ad creaturas; quin immo, in ipsis divinis secundum se, est ex natura rei suYciens fundamentum concipiendi talem ordinem; ob quam causam quidam notaverunt quod habent ordinem naturalis praesuppositionis. Non quod sint ibi diversae naturae, quarum una praesupponit aliam, quia in divinis non est nisi una natura, quae est essentia divina; sed quia ex sola natura rei, non comparando divina creaturis, praestatur suYciens fundamentum quod unum praeconcipiatur alteri. Non sic de pure absolutis . . . De relationibus autem oppositis et de personas per eas constitutis . . . non est idem iudicium.’

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simultaneous with it. Consequently, there is no order of priority, but an order of origin between passive generation and passive spiration.21 Furthermore, and following from his endorsement of an order of origin, Durandus maintains that spiration is constitutive of the persons of Father and Son. This assertion totally disregards his previous thesis that ‘for every thing that comes to a complete being, it is concomitant to it and not constitutive of it’. In words borrowed from Hervaeus, Durandus reasons that, in generation, the Father communicates to the Son not only the essence, but also the power to spirate. Therefore, active spiration is not concomitant to the persons of Father and Son, but rather constitutive of their persons, for it is by virtue of common spiration that Father and Son are distinct from the person of the Spirit. In other words, common spiration is a personal property together with paternity and Wliation.22 To complete his recantation, Durandus adds that it is only according to reason that spiration presupposes the Father and the Son, and that the notion of an order of ‘natural presupposition’ is unsuitable and long-winded.23 Durandus is thus treating passive generation and passive spiration as opposite relations, i.e. as relations of origin constitutive of the persons. This 21 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 p. 73. 25–35: ‘De relationibus disparatis, autem, patet sic idem: nihil quod sit in Wlio, praecedit quodcumque eorum quae sunt in patre, quia quidquid habet Wlius habet a patre. Pater autem nihil habet a Wlio nec a quocumque alio, sed a seipso. Sed spiratio activa est in patre. Ergo, Wliatio non praecedit ipsam. Sed processio, vel spiratio passiva, simul est omni modo simultatis cum spiratione activa, cum sint relationes oppositae. Igitur, Wliatio nullo modo praecedit secundum rem spirationem passivam, seu processionem; nec, per consequens, paternitas, quae simul est cum Wliatione. Et sic patet quod nulla relatio divina praecedit realiter aliam, neque oppositam, neque disparatam.’ Note the contrast with A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 61va: ‘Quantum autem ad relationes disparatas patet idem sic: illud quod non est constitutum personae sed advenit iam constitutae, supponit illud quod constituit personam, et non e converso. Sed communis spiratio non constituit personam aliquam sed advenit personae iam per aliud constitutae, per paternitatem vel Wliationem. Ergo, communis spiratio supponit naturaliter paternitatem vel Wliationem, et non e converso. Illud autem est prius secundum naturam quod naturaliter praesupponitur, quare etc.’ Interestingly, Durandus reproduces this passage almost verbatim in the Avignon Quodlibet as one of the arguments in contra, to which he responds according to the Thomist view. 22 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 p. 74. 25–9: ‘ita quod pater, ut est persona distincta ab omni alia persona divina, non constituitur in esse personali praecise per solam paternitatem, immo cum ea, per spirationem. Et idem est de Wlio et Wliatione, et communi spiratione. Et haec est sententia Anselmi, De Processione Spiritus Sancti, in Wne.’ In a doctrinal U-turn and borrowing from Hervaeus’s words, Durandus renders a standard Thomist explanation of Anselm’s principle. Durandus was evidently taking in Hervaeus’s recent criticism. See De articulis, a. 5, esp. p. 454. 460–71. 23 Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 p. 75. 4–14: ‘loquendo secundum rem productio spiritus sancti non praesupponit generationem Wlii, quocumque genere praesuppositionis realis, sed solum secundum intellectum . . . [Q]uod illa praesuppositio . . . habet in ipsis divinis ex natura rei suYciens fundamentum . . . Sed aliquibus videtur, et non irrationabiliter, quod ille modus loquendi est, in hac materia, impropius et nimis extensus.’

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however commits him to the oYcial reading of Anselm’s principle, whereby, in the divine, what is not related by opposition is communicated by real identity. But this reading is fundamentally at odds with Durandus’s thesis that production in God is governed by relation rather than the essence. According to this earlier view, the processions are irreducible sets of relations between a principle and a product, such that they are really distinct from each other even if it is not the case that they are related by opposition. Contrary to his previous view, then, Durandus is unavowedly restricting real distinction to opposition. Nevertheless, and despite the obvious discordance, Durandus prefers to ignore—or he underestimates—the full implications of the Thomist interpretation of Anselm’s principle. The issue of the divine processions was a doctrinal mineWeld. Presumably Durandus felt the need to revise his account in order to disengage it from a notion of priority which seemed to compromise divine equality.24 This amendment appears however as an isolated occurrence in the development of Durandus’s position, and does not seem to have been motivated by theological conviction. Like the somewhat ad hoc introduction of Scotist terminology, Durandus’s adoption of the Thomist view of the processions remains unaccompanied by the appropriate doctrinal context. To say that the products of the processions are related by origin—thus appearing to favour communicability—and give no indication of abandoning a view of divine production which favours relative distinction, seemed like a mere subterfuge. In order to comply fully with the Thomist account of the Wlioque, Durandus would have had to adopt the appropriate metaphysical parameters, of a kind which would have placed the accent not on relation but on essential communicability. But suddenly to advocate communicability over relative distinction, while preserving the metaphysical framework of absolute and relative, was a theological pastiche which can only be explained by external pressure. Durandus limited himself to pasting, as it were, Hervaeus’s words into his quodlibetal determination, in a gesture that seems almost condescending towards Dominican authorities. There is no further elaboration of the adopted opinion, where the reader—and surely the audience witnessing the disputation—would have expected a more radical change extending to the doctrine of relations. As it stands, Durandus’s endeavour to mitigate his view has led him to 24 Durandus certainly knew what he was dealing with: ‘Quidquid sit de ratione illa, an valeat vel non, diYcile enim est eYcacem rationem adducere ad ea quae tangunt materiam Wdei. Conclusiones tamen, ad quas probandas adducta est, possunt rationabiliter sustineri et defendi, nec non est ipsa ratio, dicendo quod realis pluralitas et realis prioritas requirunt realem diVerentiam, sed prioritas super hoc addit antecessionem, ratione cuius non potest inveniri in divinis, in quibus, cum unitate essentiae est sola pluralitas relationum originis, inter quas, si sint oppositae, nulla est prioritas, nec realis, nec secundum intellectum, ut dictum fuit.’ (Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 p. 73. 18–25.)

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an unlikely Trinitarian theology. The Avignon Quodlibets leave it at that, so it is for the Wnal recension of the commentary to assess the extent in which Durandus ultimately capitulates to the Dominican corrective.

10.2. THE CORRECTIONES Hervaeus’s Correctiones is occupied mainly with question 1 of the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet.25 The full import of the Correctiones goes beyond its polemical scope, however, and it amounts to something of a comprehensive abstract of the conXict between Durandus and his order. The Correctiones constitutes a Wnal recapitulation of the discussion, oVering a summary of the main arguments and a subsequent assessment of Durandus’s overall position. This valuable synthesis serves therefore not only as a conclusion to years of polemical discussion, but also as the best link to the Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary. At a Wrst glance, Hervaeus’s treatise appears somewhat daunting, for it presents an indigestible morass of arguments and counter-arguments inherited from previous discussions and an eventful intermission of oYcial intervention. The emerging pattern, however, can be reduced to two main strands issuing respectively from Durandus and Hervaeus. Durandus has claimed that essence and relation are really distinct, for they constitute two diVerent sorts of reality: the essence is an absolute being whereas relation is a non-subsistent mode of being;26 Hervaeus, meanwhile, has attempted to show the suYciency of positing a non-convertible identity between essence and relation, according to which they are distinct only in their relation of predicability of some third.27 One cannot fail to notice that Hervaeus takes very little account of Durandus’s use of the distinction ex natura rei, introduced in order to mitigate the stronger claim of real distinction. As we shall see, Hervaeus ultimately reads Durandus’s view according to pattern, and is not fooled by conciliatory remarks. In what follows, as promised, I will attempt to reduce Hervaeus’s criticisms to the essential, concentrating on those arguments which best indicate his points of friction with Durandus. Hervaeus’s criticisms go to the heart of Durandus’s position, the doctrine of modes. Hervaeus centres on two related aspects of this doctrine: Wrst, its 25 Apart from the symptomatically long treatment of question 1, the Correctiones deals brieXy with question 5, on Christ’s death; question 7, on grace and merit; and questions 9 and 10, on original sin. 26 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va–128rb; Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 30. 1–33. 5. 27 See Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra; De articulis, a. 13.

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main assumption that a non-subsistent being can be real and not an accident; second, the ontological dimension this assumption imposes on the account of distinction. On the Wrst count, Hervaeus Wnds problematic the claim that relation, as a non-subsistent mode, can possess being in its own right. As we have seen, Hervaeus follows a fairly standard reading of Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which reality is divided into substances and accidents, so that whatever is not of itself subsistent is an accident and eVects composition. In this view, the claim that a non-subsistent mode is real and distinct from its foundation would necessarily lead to composition. According to Hervaeus, relation fails to inhere in its foundation not because it is a mode, but because its being (esse) is identical to the (accidental) being of its foundation. Likewise, in God, divine relations are constitutive of the supposita not as nonsubsistent parts but as subsistent properties identical to the essence.28 As Hervaeus sees it, then, Durandus’s claim that divine relations are nonsubsistent modes seems to jeopardize precisely what they were designed to safeguard, i.e. the trinity of persons. Since the ratio of relation alone cannot account for the constitution of distinct supposita, unless relations assume the subsistent being of the essence, divine reality would inevitably be reduced to one absolute suppositum.29 Contrary to what Durandus assumes, relations in God can be understood as subsistent beings without thereby leading to tritheism or an anti-Trinitarian reduction to one absolute substance. Hervaeus is here attempting to correct Durandus’s metaphysical tendency to separate subsistence from distinction, a tendency guided by the insight 28 Correctiones, 294. 13–295. 29: ‘ubi dicit quod nulli modo essendi competit quod sit per se subsistens, nec alteri inhaerens: quantum ad subsistens, in creaturis planum est quod nullus modus ibi subsistit nisi sola substantia; quantum autem ad inhaerens, de accidentibus absolutis quae dicuntur etiam modi substantiae, certum est quod sunt inhaerentia . . . De modis autem essendi divinis, quae sunt relationes divinae, dico . . . quod, si tales modi et essentia diVerrent sicut duae res, quarum una non est alia quantum ad illud quod sunt inter se, quod modus inhaeret essentiae . . . [U]trum . . . relatio divina subsistat, dico quod sic, quantum ad illud quod est realiter. Quia omne illud cuius esse est quod est ipsum, nulli innititur subsistere; sed quaelibet divina relatio est huiusmodi, quia est esse divinum, sicut est essentia, quod quidem esse nulli innititur . . . Quia omne suppositum subsistit; sed quaelibet relatio divina incommunicabilis est suppositum.’ Cf. Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 47–50. 29 Correctiones, 295. 35–296. 26: ‘videtur mihi quod ponere quod relationes non sint subsistentes et ipse etiam actus subsistendi, est excludere plura supposita in divinis realiter, quia exclusis realiter relationibus a subsistentia, non est nisi unum subsistens realiter, non est nisi unum suppositum, nec per consequens nisi una persona. Ergo, exclusis relationibus ab eo quod est esse subsistens realiter, excluditur in divinis realis pluralitas suppositorum et personarum . . . [N]ullum suppositum potest esse, nisi subsistens, et per consequens non possunt esse plura supposita, ubi non sunt plura subsistentia . . . quia constitutum ex uno subsistente et pluribus non subsistentibus non facit plura supposita . . . Sed relationes incompossibiles, si non subsistant, requirunt quaedam distincta supposita, sed non constituunt, nec sunt ex ipsa suppositione, licet non possint esse nisi in diversis suppositis.’ Cf. ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55 a. 6. Also Durandus, A Sent. I d. 13 q. un., 64rb; s. 5.2 above.

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that, since in God singularity is signiWed by subsistence, distinction must necessarily lie in a non-subsistent reality. That relations account for distinction, Hervaeus argues, does not necessarily imply that they should constitute non-subsistent modes of being really distinct from the subsistent essence. In sum, Hervaeus concludes, Durandus’s division between absolute and relative does not apply in the divine, since the essence as an inWnite reality absorbs all categorical distinction in one simple being.30 On the second count, Hervaeus rejects Durandus’s equation between degrees of reality and degrees of distinction. According to Hervaeus, a diminished being such as relation does not necessarily eVect a less-than-absolute distinction, just as numerical plurality does not obtain only between fully actual beings. Durandus’s reading of a qualiWed distinction ex natura rei is ill focused, for it makes it dependent on the reality of its terms, thus inevitably resulting in real separability. Hervaeus prefers to follow Scotus’s reading of a distinction secundum quid, according to which secundum quid refers not to the type of reality of the terms involved, but to their relation of identity.31 In this sense, essence and relation are distinct, not from each other and in a way that would imply separability (Durandus’s sense of ‘real distinction’), but in their comparison to some third term. In other words, essence and relation are really identical but not predicable of each other, because relation and not the essence includes a reference to some other term. Since this reference stems from the formal identity of relation as a being ‘towards another’, the distinction which obtains between essence and relation is not merely of reason but ex natura rei.32 Again, underlying this view is Hervaeus’s contrast, of Scotist 30 Correctiones, 313. 2–14: ‘in Deo, cuius realitas est illimitata, et comprehendit quidquid perfectionis simpliciter est in quocumque praedicamento, non habet veritatem quod illud quod est totum respectus non sit totum absolutum . . . Et quando dicitur quod absolutum et relatum sunt primae diVerentiae entis, et incompossibiles, non habet veritatem, nisi in natura creata, in qua invenitur diVerentia realis diversarum rerum et limitatio generis ad speciem.’ 31 Correctiones, 297. 4–298. 10: ‘accipiendo quod diminuta entitas in altero terminorum faciat diVerentiam inter talia, et perfecta entitas terminorum faciat diVerentiam realem maiorem, est falsum . . . [D]iminutio entitatis non facit ad diminutionem diVerentiae . . . [Q]uod propter diminutionem entitatis in modis, res et modus, puta essentia et relatio, dicuntur diVerre secundum minus et secundum quid, si intelligat quod est inter ea diVerentia secundum quid, quia ibi non invenitur illud quod est de ratione diVerentiae realis, sed solum rationis . . . verus sensus est . . .’ Also 300. 29–35: ‘quod diVerent aliquo modo realiter, saltem secundum quid et cum determinatione, est falsa, dum tamen illa diVerentia secundum quid sit diVerentia realis, qua diVerent inter se qualitercumque realiter . . . Si diVerre secundum quid acciperetur pro diVerre secundum rationem, quae quidem diVerentia est secundum quid respectu diVerentiae realis, tunc verum est quod diVerrent secundum quid’; Cf. Scotus, Rep. I d. 33 q. 2, 147r–v. 32 Correctiones, 307. 37–8: ‘non oportet quod ea, quae non diVerunt realiter, habeant omnem modum identitatis’. Also 309. 4–6: ‘non concedo quod ex hoc quod aliquid dicatur de uno, quod non praedicatur de alio, quod diVerent realiter; sed solum sequitur quod non sunt idem convertibiliter’; 310. 12–15: ‘non est dicendum quod diVerunt sola realitate essentiae; nec etiam quod diVerunt realitate alia a realitate essentiae simpliciter. Sed est

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inspiration, between an ‘integral whole’ and a ‘universal whole’, such that the suitable analogy is that of the essence as a universal predicable of all its instantiations without division. In this sense, essence and relation fail to be ‘wholly’ identical not because the ‘whole reality’ of the essence comprises more than one relation, but because essence and relation do not have the same range of predicability—the essence in its commonality is indeed ‘more’ than relation. Thus, the relation between a universal and its instantiations is articulated in modes of identity and not in modes of being. In this analogy, then, the claim of real distinction is unsuitable and unnecessary, since a type of non-identity suYces for the avoidance of Sabellianism.33 Furthermore, Durandus’s claim that numerical plurality is restricted to substances also appears to lead to problematic theological consequences. For, since in God there is only one substance, distinction in the divine could never yield numerically three persons but only three modes of being. Hervaeus is here making a valid point. Durandus’s notion of real distinction as not necessarily entailing numerical plurality could make it diYcult to explain how the divine persons amount, in fact, to numerically three objects and not just to three relative modes, in what would seem to incur some version of modalism. Durandus’s main purpose in disengaging real distinction from numerical plurality was to reinforce the relational realities in God without thereby multiplying the number of substances. By the same token, he thought he was escaping the Lateran condemnation on quaternarism, since the dicendum quod diVerunt realitate illa, quae est essentiae realitas, non convertibiliter . . .’; 314. 18–21: ‘ possunt se habere diversimode realiter ad tertium secundum aYrmationem et negationem eiusdem modi. Et ad hoc non requiritur quod diVerant realiter, quia ad hoc suYcit quod unum possit aYrmative realiter dici de aliquo, de quo aliud negatur . . .’ Cf. Hervaeus, Quodl. IV q. 7 a. 2, 96rb; ibid., a. 3, 99rb. 33 Correctiones, 306. 28–309. 6: ‘quod aliqua esse idem totaliter . . . posset intelligi: uno modo . . . quod talis identitas universaliter distribuitur, ut hoc referatur ad modum identitatis, ut sit sensus quod ista quae non sunt idem convertibiliter non habent omnem modum identitatis . . . Quia, quae non sunt isto modo idem, non oportet quod diVerent realiter. . . . Alio modo, potest accipi esse idem totaliter secundum totalitatem integralem . . . , ut si dicatur quod pars totius integralis non est ipsum totaliter, sed ipsum totum est sibi idem totaliter . . . Et accipiendo isto modo . . . est falsa, quae dicit quod illa quae non sunt idem totaliter diVerunt realiter, loquendo de tali totalitate . . . Quando dicitur quod essentia est singularis . . . dicendum quod hoc est hoc singulare, scilicet quod una res singularis absoluta est plures res, ita quod communicabilitas eius secundum rem sit ad plures, relativas tamen. Et ideo, singularitas non impedit hoc esse in plus secundum praedicationem . . . Sed ego non concedo quod ex hoc quod aliquid dicatur de uno, quod non praedicatur de alio, quod diVerent realiter; sed solum sequitur quod non sunt idem convertibiliter.’ Also 320. 1–5: ‘Quod autem subdit . . . quod nisi ponatur talis distinctio realis inter ea, inciditur in errorem Sabellii, dico quod falsum est. Quia ad non incidendum in errorem Sabellii suYcit quod salvatur quod una persona diVerat realiter ab alia inter se. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod essentia et relatio diVerent realiter, sed suYcit identitas non convertibilis . . .’ Cf. De articulis, a. 13, 120va–b; also Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 54.

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number of relational realities has no eVect in the number of substances posited in God. The inspiration was clearly Augustinian, but the result verged on modalism.34 Durandus could presumably escape the risk by appealing to his ontology of absolute and relative. Since the division between absolute and relative is prior to the division between substances and accidents, substances need not be coextensive with absolute beings, just as relative modes need not be reduced to inherent accidents. Therefore, that the persons are three relational objects does not necessarily lead to modalism any more than it leads to tritheism. The potential allegations of modalism could also explain why Durandus was always so defensive of Sabellianism. He was acutely aware that his Trinitarian ediWce, resting as it was on a metaphysics of modes, was highly exposed to the danger of incurring some version of modalism. Hence his pains to chisel the doctrine of modes in the same stone as the claim of real distinction, in the hope of expelling anti-Trinitarian associations. Hervaeus’s Correctiones had thus made Durandus aware of two opposite risks, quaternarism and modalism. Durandus’s conception of relations as modes was a double-edged sword, for just as it seemed to guarantee real distinction in God it made this distinction dependent on non-subsistent modes—hence the risk of modalism—and introduced a type of reality distinct from the subsistent essence—hence the risk of quaternarism. Hervaeus’s ‘corrective’ had then intended to show Durandus that a modal doctrine is not the way towards a sound Trinitarian doctrine, for the very idea of a perfect unity—the core of the Lateran deWnition—automatically excludes all ontological approach to distinction as unsuitable.35 Again, Durandus appeared to be charging the bull from the wrong end. The way to Lateran orthodoxy was not through the explaining away of distinction from quaternarism, but by subscribing to the prescribed view of the essence as an inWnite, common nature. Durandus’s half-hearted gestures towards conciliation had thus, in the end, served him little. He was still, after all his eVorts, perceived as holding fast to his original view. Dominicans like Hervaeus remained sceptical of Durandus’s 34 Correctiones, 322. 10–23: ‘quod non diVeret relatio ab essentia realiter quia relatio non est res, dico quod falsum est. Quia . . . relatio est aliqua res vel nihil; et in divinis est res, cuius est modus, scilicet essentia, sine diVerentia quaecumque reali, qua diVerunt inter se. Ista, etiam, solutio est valde periculosa, qua dicitur ‘‘Si condemnaretur quaternitas rerum non excluderetur distinctio realis relationis ab essentia, quia relatio non est res.’’ Quia, si illud dictum est verum, sequitur quod nulla distinctio est in divinis, quae sit distinctio rei a re . . . Ergo, in divinis nulla est distinctio rei a re. Quod non est verum dictum, nec ut videtur sane.’ 35 Correctiones, 318. 1–15: ‘totum integrale . . . non habet locum in trinitate divina, quia illa tria, quae sunt ibi, non sic distinguntur secundum esse simpliciter, quin esse ipsorum sit unum esse absolutum . . . [S]uae unitates sunt una unitas simplicissima absoluta, non constituta ex pluribus unitatibus, scilicet unitas essentiae . . . et ipsae tres unitates.’

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engagement with the idea of modes of being, and this made them distrustful of Durandus’s true theological allegiances—especially when it came to explaining highly sensitive issues like the Wlioque. The sceptical note in the Correctiones sets the tone for the upcoming censure of 1317, a second, this time openly ‘Thomist’, attempt to uproot Durandus’s problematic theses. As I hope to show in the next chapter, many articles in this second list betray Hervaeus’s contribution, and the criteria underlying this Wnal phase of the debate between Hervaeus and Durandus are, again, strongly reminiscent of the main points of dissent highlighted by the Correctiones.

11 The Second Censure and the ‘Thomist Turn’ The censure of 1314 did not put an end to the conXict between Durandus and his order. The order’s superiors were determined to make a precedent of Durandus’s case, and in this spirit the general chapter of 1315 in Bologna reinforced previous regulations over the content of the lectures and writings circulating around the studium. Any lecturer failing to observe the common doctrine was to be expelled after a Wrst admonition.1 The general chapter of 1316 in Montpellier ratiWed this course of action, and called on leading Dominican theologians to devise an expedient by which to rectify the situation with Durandus, and eVectively remove all writings which deviated from the common doctrine.2 1 See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 81: ‘Magister studentium observabit et referet magistro ordinis in studiis generalibus et provinciali et diYnitoribus in aliis studiis, quid, quantum et quomodo lectores legent et in anno quotiens disputabunt. Insuper si docuerint contra communem doctrinam Thomae aut contra communes opiniones ecclesiae tangentes articulos Wdei, bonos mores vel ecclesiae sacramenta, aut si contra ista, aut aliquid istorum adduxerint rationes, quas dimiserint insolutas. Super quibus eos primo cum debita reverentia admonebit; quod si se non correxerint debite revocando . . . qui si invenerit ita esse, eos absolvat ab oYcio lectionum . . .’ Hinnebusch, History, 158, has suggested that the speciWc target of the 1315 general chapter was not Durandus but Hubert Guidi, a Florentine Dominican who had taught contrary to Aquinas in many points. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 401, maintains however that the general chapter was yet another attempt to prevent Durandus’s works from further dissemination. According to Koch, Guidi had already suVered suYcient punishment under the provincial chapter in Arezzo, and his case was already closed. See also M. Burbach, ‘Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation Regarding St Thomas’, Medieval Studies, 4 (1942), 154–7, who supports Koch’s thesis. 2 See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 93: ‘Item cum quidam tractatus scripta sive reportationes theologiae a fratribus nostri ordinis compilati, sine examinatione et approbatione ordinis contra constitutiones publicati, fratres a communi et salubri doctrina retrahant, et possint saltem simplicibus dare occasionem errandi, volumus et ordinamus, quod priores provinciales in suis capitulis provincialibus de consilio diYnitorum studeant de tali remedio providere, quod huic defectui salubriter obvietur, dictumque remedium quam cito potuerunt, studeant magistro ordinis intimare et ipse videat, si circa tale remedium sit aliquid immutandum . . . Magistro etiam ordinis imponimus, quod examen de mandato suo factum ex ordinatione generalis capituli Metis novissime celebrati de praedictis tractatibus, reportationibus, sive scriptis executioni mandet, secundum quod in presenti diYnitorio concorditer est conclusum.’ (My italics.) The reference to a ‘magistro etiam ordinis’, together with the allusion made to the general chapter in Metz, leaves little doubt that in 1316 the main motive for the reinforced regulations was again Durandus’s work.

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In 1317, Dominican theologians accordingly issued a second list of articles, this time concentrating on those theses in Durandus’s commentary which speciWcally deviated from the common interpretation of Aquinas’s doctrine. The examination yielded 235 articles, almost three times the number of articles in the Wrst list.3 John of Naples and Pierre de la Palud were again assigned the task of compilation. But this time John’s devoted service to the promotion of Aquinas’s teaching had been rewarded with a more signiWcant role. He was now in charge of examining the greater part of Durandus’s commentary, leaving only book III to the less zealous Pierre. The weightier and more controversial material of book I was thus left to the more judicious mind of John, assisted in this task by James of Lausanne, who contributed with an additional fourteen articles to book I.4 That Pierre’s participation was reduced to such a minor role should not surprise us. Although his sympathies lay clearly on the Thomist side, Pierre had shown himself to be ill equipped for eVective criticism. His talents cast him better as compiler than as inquisitor, while his training as canon lawyer made the scrutiny of the highly technical material of book I a task out of his depth, at a time when the turn taken by the controversy demanded a truly expert eye.5 James of Lausanne’s biblical training and unambiguous Thomism, on the other hand, provided a dependable aide to John of Naples. While still a bachelor, James had taken part in the 1314 commission, which would have provided him with some 3 See Acta, ed. Reichert, ii. 64. The list is found in its entirety in Vat. lat. MS 6736, and partly in Vat. Ottobon. MSS 87 and 180. Revealingly, Vat. Ottobon. MS 87, which belonged to the order’s house, is bound together with a copy of Durandus’s commentary. Also interesting, Vat. lat. MS 6736 includes a copy of Durandellus’s Evidentiae contra Durandus. For this study I will refer to Koch’s edn. of the list, ‘Articuli in quibus’, 72–118. Koch dates the list to early 1317, at least before autumn (Durandus de S. Porciano, 205). Both censure lists of Durandus’s errors (although the second one is likely to have superseded the Wrst) were imposed on Dominican students as obligatory reference. The corrections were written by the friars in the margins of copies of Durandus’s commentary. The imposition of this procedure bears an ironic resemblance to an analogue in 1282, when the Franciscan general chapter instructed their friars to read Aquinas’s Summa accompanied by William of la Mare’s Correctorium. 4 The ‘Additamenta’ to book I were Wrst believed to have been the work of Pierre de la Palud in cooperation with John of Naples (see Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, esp. 203–6 and 416). But later MS evidence has shown that the additional fourteen articles were the contribution of James of Lausanne, Pierre’s role being conWned to bk III. See Koch, ‘Ein neuer Zeuge’, 119–25, based on an examination of Barcelona, Archivo del Cabildo Catedral MS 35. The MS contains the Wrst book of Pierre’s commentary and a copy of the second censure list against Durandus, in which the additional articles to bk I are explicitly identiWed as being the work of James of Lausanne. 5 As we saw in the context of the Wrst censure, as an adversary to Durandus, Pierre was of a very diVerent stock from Hervaeus. As J. Dunbabin graphically puts it, ‘Pierre’s attempt to expose Durand’s weaknesses was like a man trying to trap a rat by throwing a duvet at it’ (Hound of God, 41). It is indicative that in the Wnal recension of his commentary Durandus should take no account of Pierre’s criticisms, whereas he dedicates entire passages to responding to Hervaeus and John of Naples. See also Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 262, 267, 282.

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behind-the-scenes experience and marked him as an insider to Hervaeus’s circle.6 The realignment of the commission spoke for itself. The compilers in charge of book I show unequal knowledge of Aquinas’s work. John of Naples’s entries are characteristically well informed, drawing from a wide range of Aquinas’s writings, including the Summa, the disputed questions, and quodlibetal disputations, in addition to the commentary. His judgement is well advised and very cautious, often qualiWed as ‘credo quod sit contra Thomam’—a phrasing which also underlines the fact that, with the second censure, we are entering the uncertain grounds of interpretation. Overall, John’s articles reveal a conscientious Thomist, one who was indeed actively campaigning for Aquinas’s canonization.7 James of Lausanne, on the other hand, cites almost exclusively from Aquinas’s commentary, sometimes just copying out from Pierre’s results in the Wrst list. On many occasions the content of his articles overlap, yielding a rather repetitive list and revealing poor theological discernment. His additions tend to concentrate on the metaphysical aspects of Durandus’s modal doctrine, leaving the more delicate assessment of its Trinitarian implications to John. More importantly, this second list brings to the fore the ‘Thomist turn’ which the conXict eventually assumed. As we saw, the Thomist element was embryonically contained in the Wrst list, informing the criteria underlying the judgement against Durandus’s theses. But whereas the Wrst censure was intended, at least in principle, as no more than a salutary warning to other 6 We know little about James of Lausanne, apart from a rather average theological career and colourful record as a preacher. He joined the Dominican headquarters at St Jacques as biblical bachelor in 1311, read the Sentences in 1314–16 (the title ‘Super Sententias lectura Thomasina’ has been assigned to his commentary, albeit with some doubt), and obtained the licence in 1317. Tellingly, when Hervaeus was appointed master general of the order in 1318, James succeeded him as provincial of France until the time of his death in 1321. But it is as preacher that James Wgures more prominently in the sources. His sermons reveal a rather facetious character, ready to enliven his audience with provocative ‘bishop-bashing’, and his preaching is well stuVed with acerbic satires, anecdotes, and allusions to social practices of the day. His literary style was apparently very poor, as he was more concerned with sensationalist writing than with pious and learned instruction—an interesting contrast to Hervaeus’s no-nonsense doctrinal agenda. For more on James, see B. Haure´au, ‘Jacques de Lausanne: Fre`re Preˆcheur’, Histoire litte´raire de la France, xxxiii (Paris, 1906), 459–79. 7 The signiWcance of John’s Neapolitan provenance should not be underestimated, especially in connection to the ‘Thomist cause’, within and outside the Dominican order. Aquinas, too, was a Neapolitan, and John XXII (pope since 1316), who greatly admired Aquinas and indeed canonized him, was from southern France and had earlier been chancellor at the Angevin court in Naples. It is therefore not implausible that an ‘Angevin alliance’ could have been in operation contributing to Aquinas’s investiture as a theological authority. For John XXII’s special allegiance with the Dominicans, see N. Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal–Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ch. 4, esp. pp. 116–17. For the Angevin inXuence on the campaign for canonization—and Robert of Anjou’s own participation in the ceremony—see Mandonnet, ‘La Canonisation’, esp. 19–27, and 40.

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members of the order, the signiWcance of the second censure goes beyond disciplinary matters and reveals a doctrinal agenda. Away from the Correctoria oVensive, the second list inaugurates a second phase in the promotion of Aquinas’s theological authority. This phase is characterized by an eVort to invest Aquinas’s teaching with the wider acceptance accorded to the ‘common opinion’.8 In this respect, the second censure announces Aquinas’s posthumous evolution from dictum magistrale to a full theological authority whose writings possessed, in their own right, a certain dignity with which the employment of theological language had to reckon. In this light, Durandus had contravened the spirit of the order by failing to acknowledge Aquinas’s work as theologically normative, and as such as an object of expositio reverenter rather than open criticism.9 At the sight of a renewed attack, Dominicans closed ranks in the form of a second censure. I hope at the end of this chapter to have given some indication of the doctrinal and historical signiWcance of the 1317 censure, not only in the way it aVected the controversy with Durandus, but also in the context of the promotion of Thomism as a theological authority. Rather than rehearsing the familiar theological material, my account will be restricted to an overview of the general structure of the list, drawing attention to additions or omissions in respect to the Wrst list. Comments on the theological content will be made only when illustrative of the way second-generation Thomists handled Aquinas’s writings. For the sake of clarity, I will group the articles according to the three familiar issues of relation, the processions, and the divine persons.

1 1 . 1 . R E L AT I O N The claim of real distinction between relation and its foundation had by now accumulated considerable polemical weight, since, already from the early stages of the controversy, it had been identiWed as the root of Durandus’s 8 For the notion of doctrina communis, see M.-D. Chenu, Introduction a` l’e´tude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris and Montreal: J. Vrin, 1957; citations from the 5th edn., 1993), 109–17. Also ‘ ‘‘Authentica’’ et ‘‘Magistralia’’ ’, esp. 264–75. 9 For the contrast between dictum magistrale and auctoritas in scholasticism, see Chenu, Introduction, 107–25; ‘ ‘‘Maıˆtre’’ Thomas, est-il une ‘‘autorite´’’? Note sur deux lieux the´ologiques au XIVe sie`cle’, Revue Thomiste, 30 (1925), 187–94; ‘Autor, Actor, Auctor’, Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), 3 (1927), 81–6; ‘ ‘‘Authentica’’ et ‘‘Magistralia’’ ’, 276–83. For evidence in the order’s statutes of Aquinas’s increasing authority, see Acta, ii. 38 (1309 general chapter); 64 and 65 (1313 general chapter); 72 and 81 (1314 general chapter); 93 and 94 (1316 general chapter).

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dissident view. It is this claim which earned the charge of heresy in the Wrst censure (articles 6 and 13), as it was perceived as an open contravention of the Lateran decree ‘Damnamus’. It is therefore not surprising to Wnd the number of entries on this issue multiplied in the second list. The second censure assimilates the previous judgement, but with a diVerence: it distinctly divides the metaphysical issue of Durandus’s modal doctrine from the theological question of the connection between essence and divine relation. As we shall see, in the Wnal recension Durandus will pick up on this reorganization of the issue as one less liable to misconceptions. The articles occupied with Durandus’s modal doctrine (articles 36–38 and 48) are the work of James of Lausanne. At issue is Durandus’s division of reality into absolute and relative which, buttressed by the notion of ‘modes of being’, was perceived as escaping any strict application of Aristotelian ontology. The standard interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics privileged substances over accidents, maintaining that whatever is not a substance inheres and eVects composition. In this framework, the notion of a diminished reality which is neither a fully actual thing nor an inhering accident seemed not only unintelligible but also dangerous. Article 37 is perhaps the best example of what was perceived to be at stake with Durandus’s alternative metaphysics: In the same distinction [13], he says that subsistence and inherence pertain only to absolute [things]. This is contrary to the common doctrine of saints and masters, who say that the divine persons are relational (relatae), not absolute, and it nevertheless pertains to them to subsist of themselves in the divine—a claim which otherwise he [i.e. Durandus] also supports. Likewise, the common doctrine establishes that created relation is an accident, constituting (faciens) of itself a speciWc category of accident, quidditatively distinct from all other [species of] accident. But inherence (inhaerere) pertains to any genus of accident, since the being of an accident is ‘being in’ (inesse), just as subsistence (subsistere) pertains to any complete substance independently of its nature. Therefore, in creatures, inherence pertains not only to absolute, but also to relative [accidents]. This is not to say, however, that the very same inherence inheres again, and thus in inWnity, since [inherence] itself is not an accident, of itself distinct from other [accidents], but [inherence is] only a mode.10 10 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 79 (Additamenta): ‘[37] Ibidem dicit, quod subsistere et inhaerere solum absolutis conveniunt. Contra doctrinam communem sanctorum et magistrorum, qui dicunt quod personae divinae sunt relatae, non absolutae, et tamen illis convenit proprie subsistere in divinis, etiam secundum istum. Item communis doctrina ponit quod relatio creata est accidens, faciens per se praedicamentum speciale accidentis, distinctum quidditative ab omni alio accidente; sed cuilibet generi accidentis convenit inhaerere, quia accidentis esse est inesse, sicut cuilibet substantiae completae, suae naturae derelicte, convenit subsistere. Ergo, inhaerere convenit non solum absolutis sed etiam relativis in creaturis. Non autem sic potest dici ipsum inhaerere iterum inhaerere et sic in inWnitum, quia ipsum non est accidens per se ab aliis distinctum, sed solum modus.’

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In addition to being profoundly un-Aristotelian, what worried Dominicans about Durandus’s modal doctrine were the problematic theological consequences incubated in the disjunction between absolute and relative. For if the being of relation remains unaltered as it enters the divine order—i.e. if it does not undergo any changes in its reality of the kind that would register the metaphysical diVerence between God and creatures—then it becomes diYcult to explain how divine relation escapes undesirable features, such as inherence and composition, that would otherwise belong to it as an accident. On the other hand, this article also reveals that while Dominicans would, in principle, countenance an appeal to modes, they would not be prepared to do so if the modal doctrine is accompanied by a claim of real distinction between modes and their foundation. On Thomist metaphysics, this claim would automatically make modes inherent accidents, and thereby unsuitable for accounts of the Trinity. The last statement in the censured article—otherwise rather misleading—asserting that inherence is a ‘mode’ and therefore incapable of composition, should presumably be read in this way, to signify that modes are acceptable in so far as they are really identical to their foundation.11 More signiWcant is article 48, for what it tells us about the interpretational liabilities in the transmission of Aquinas’s view to later Dominicans. The article is divided in two parts, the Wrst dealing with created relations, and the second with divine relations: In distinction 33, question 1, towards the middle of the response (positionis), he rejects the opinion whereby relation in creatures is another thing (res alia) from its foundation, eVecting composition with it. This is contrary to Thomas, in the same distinction, question 1, at the end of the response (positionis), in which he says that in creatures, the being (esse) of a real relation is distinct (aliud est) from that of the subject which is referred. And that [relations] are thereby said to inhere (inesse et insunt), and that according to this inherence (secundum quod insunt) they eVect composition of the kind which obtains between an accident and its subject. In the same distinction, [Durandus] asserts (conWrmans) the third opinion, which holds that relation is another thing (alia res) from its foundation. That it nevertheless does not eVect composition, he shows by saying that [also] in the divine relation is another thing (alia res) from the essence. In disproving the second opinion [i.e. Aquinas’s], he adduces arguments in favour [of the third opinion], undermining all 11 This reading appears further conWrmed by the subsequent article: ‘[38] Ibidem etiam dicit quod non sequitur: relationes non subsistunt, ergo inhaerent, quia modus essendi quicumque, sive in se sive in alio, non subsistit nec inhaeret. Si intelligat de modo essendi qui est ipsum subsistere vel inhaerere, quod iste modus, qui non diVert ab eo cuius est modus sicut res et res, nec sicut ens speciale distinctum, omnes concedunt, quia sic iretur in inWnitum; sed si intelligat de modo essendi, qui facit per se praedicamentum distinctum ab illo cuius est modus, quod non subsistit nec inhaeret. Contra est doctrina quae ponit quod omne ens tale aut est substantia quae subsistit, aut accidens quod inhaeret; et ita est nec est dare medium’ (ibid. 80).

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contrary arguments. This is contrary to Thomas, in his response to the same [question], in which he claims that in the divine the [personal] properties and the essence are really the same (idem re), but distinct according to reason (ratione).12

The Wrst part of the article is particularly instructive. It reveals a gap between Aquinas’s understanding of the question of categorical relations and the way later Dominicans handled the same question. James is here accusing Durandus of having rejected the claim that, in creatures, relation is really distinct from its foundation and eVects composition with it, on the alleged grounds that it runs counter to Aquinas’s opinion, according to which the being (esse) of relation is distinct from that of its subject. The Wrst aspect to note in James’s rendering of the issue is the equivocal use of the terms ‘foundation’ and ‘subject’. This is relevant because, whereas Aquinas would have subscribed to the claim of real distinction between created relation and its subject, it is not a claim which Hervaeus, for example, would be prepared to countenance.13 The problem is not one of a clear-cut clash of opinions, but responds to a more profound contrast in the way succeeding generations of Dominican theologians approached the same question. This contrast could be explained as follows. When addressing the issue of categorical relations, Aquinas had clearly distinguished between the ‘foundation’ of relation, that is, the absolute accident upon which relation is founded, and the ‘subject’ of relation, i.e. the substance which underlies the absolute accident. Relation obtains its entire reality from the accidental being of its foundation, such that it is really identical to it. On account of its accidental being, Aquinas had reasoned, relation inheres in its subject—i.e. the underlying substance— eVecting composition with it.14 Therefore, Aquinas would not have hesitated to hold that the accidental being of relation is really distinct from the 12 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 82 (Additamenta): ‘[48] D. 33 q. 1 circa medium positionis reprobat opinionem quae dicit, quod relatio est res alia a fundamento faciens compositionem cum eo in creaturis. Contra Thomam eadem d., q. 1 in Wne positionis, ubi dicit quod in realibus relationibus existentibus in creaturis aliud est esse relationis et subiecti quod refertur. Et ideo dicuntur inesse et insunt; secundum quod insunt compositionem faciunt accidentis ad subiectum. Ibidem conWrmans tertiam opinionem quae dicit, quod relatio est alia res a fundamento non faciens tamen compositionem probat, quod in divinis relatio sit alia res ab essentia; reprobando etiam secundam opinionem adducit rationes ad idem infringens omnes responsiones contrarias. Contra Thomam in positione ibidem qui dicit, quod in divinis proprietates et essentia sunt idem re, sed diVerunt ratione.’ (My italics.) For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 aa. 1–3; De Pot., q. 7 a. 8; q. 8 a. 2 and ad 6; ST I q.28 a. 2. For Durandus, see A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126ra–va, and 127va–128rb. 13 See Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47va. 14 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1: ‘In aliis autem relationibus in creaturis existentibus est aliud esse relationis et substantiae quae refertur; et ideo dicuntur inesse; et secundum quod insunt, compositionem faciunt accidentis ad subjectum; quod non convenit in divinis relationibus.’ (My italics.) Aquinas thus appears to assume that the esse of categorical relation is identical to that of the absolute accident on which it is founded.

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substantial being of its subject, just as an accident is really distinct from a substance because they pertain to diVerent categories.15 Hervaeus and contemporaries such as John of Naples presented the question not in terms of relation and its subject, but in terms of the connection between relation and the absolute accident which constitutes its foundation. Thus, they by-passed the question of relation and its subject, and enquired rather whether there is a real distinction between relation and its foundation. Rendered in this way, Hervaeus and Aquinas would have been agreed that relation and its foundation are really identical. The question thus understood, however, presented a problem which Aquinas never explicitly formulated.16 The way later Dominicans proceeded, they Wrst tackled the question in the Trinity, and from that platform approached the issue in creatures. Thus, they reasoned, just as divine relation loses its accidental being and assumes the substantial being of the essence, so in creatures the being of relation ‘assumes’ that of the absolute accident on which it is founded. As with the divine, the task then became to qualify the identity which obtains between relation and its foundation. Although Aquinas would have certainly accepted the view that created relation is really identical to its foundation, he would have thought it rather beside the point of the connection between relation and its subject. As Aquinas would have seen it, to render the question in terms of relation and its foundation—rather than of its subject—already gives away the desired conclusion of real identity. For the whole point of talking in terms of ‘foundation’ in the divine is to avoid the idea of accidentality which the term ‘subject’ connotes. Thus, and in that way characteristic of his analogical method, Aquinas would have believed that the issue of relation is best dealt with from the standpoint of the created order, and in those terms would have then attempted to explain how the being and ratio of relation function in God. Given that in God there is no talk of accidentality, Aquinas would have hardly seen the point in further inquiry upon the connection between relation and its foundation on the divine essence. Later Dominicans, even when subscribing from the outset to the claim of real identity between the divine essence and relation, still engaged with the issue of relation and its foundation as they sought to reconcile identity and distinction in God. Thus, whereas for Hervaeus the claim of real identity merely rendered the status quaestionis, for Aquinas it would have been a foregone conclusion following from the 15 See e.g. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1; I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1. On the distinguishing features of substances and accidents, see De Pot., q. 8 aa. 3 and 4; on relation as inhering in its subject, see De Pot., q. 7 a. 9 ad 7. 16 This diVerence in the status quaestionis between Aquinas’s account and that of later Dominicans has been pointed out by Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 434–6. See also Krempel, La Doctrine, 256–9, who does not seem to take this diVerence into account.

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rejection of accidentality in God. In short, for Aquinas, the problem of the type of identity which obtains between essence and relation would have been unintelligible because irrelevant. In this light, James’s claim of Thomist authority on this point appears unfounded. The implications of denying—as Durandus is charged with having denied—a real distinction between relation and its foundation in creatures, are of an altogether diVerent sort from the implications of denying a real distinction between relation and its subject. In any case, either way, Durandus’s claim of real distinction was guided by metaphysical assumptions so foreign to the Thomist outlook that it defeats the purpose of any exercise in concordantia. That Durandus rejected an absolute distinction between created relation and its foundation was a response to his modal doctrine, and not to any attempt to establish a real identity between the two terms. So much not so that the same account of relation was used to enable a claim of real distinction between essence and relation in God. It Wtted Durandus’s theological agenda to provide an explanation of relation as a being essentially distinct from its foundation and yet unable to eVect composition. On this count at least, James’s judgement was accurate, for Durandus certainly contradicted Aquinas by claiming that essence and relation are really distinct in God.17 With the remaining articles we come to an examiner in a diVerent league. John knows exactly where Durandus is coming from, has a conWdent idea of the intent of Aquinas’s claims, and is good at sharpening the otherwise ill focused articles extracted by Pierre in the Wrst censure. John’s judgement is also less vague. His articles are almost invariably accompanied by the compound verdict ‘contrary to the common doctrine and that of the church as deWned in the decree ‘‘Damnamus’’, and to all the saints, and contrary to Thomas’ (contra doctrinam communem et ecclesiae, ut patet in secunda Decretali ‘Damnamus’, et sanctorum omnium, et contra Thomam). The way to Aquinas’s canonization was being energetically paved. Of the three articles that register Durandus’s claim of real distinction in God, two, articles 14 and 26, repeat material already covered by the Wrst censure.18 I will therefore concentrate on the remaining article 9, which reads as follows: 17 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 127va: ‘Tertia opinio tenet mediam viam, scilicet quod relatio est alia res a suo fundamento et tamen non facit compositionem cum ipsam.’ Cf. Aquinas, Sent. I d. 33 q. 1 a. 1: ‘relinquitur de necessitate quod ipsa paternitas secundum rem est ipsa essentia; unde non facit compositionem cum ea . . . Et ita dicendum, quod proprietates et essentia sunt idem re, sed diVerunt ratione.’ 18 A. 14 coincides with a. 6 of the Wrst list, and a. 26 with a. 13. See ‘Articuli in quibus’, pp. 74 and 77 respectively. The only diVerence is that, whereas a. 6 of the Wrst censure combines Durandus’s modal doctrine with the claim of real distinction in God, art. 14 of the second list concentrates on the Trinitarian issue and leaves arts. 36–8 to complete the picture with created relations.

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In d. 7 q. 1 he says that it is a matter of doubt whether essence and relation are absolutely (penitus) identical according to reality (re), and distinct only according to reason (sola ratione). This is contrary to the common doctrine and [the doctrine] of the church in the second decree ‘Damnamus’, and contrary to Thomas in [ST] p. 1 q. 28 a. 2, and in disputed question 38 a. 2 [De Pot., q. 8 a. 2], in which he says that to aYrm the opposite is heretical. The same says Peter Lombard (magister) in d. 33 of the Wrst book of the Sentences a. 1.19

The content of this article belongs to the broader issue of the principle of production in God, which John tackles separately and which will be considered in the next section of this chapter. What is important to note here is that John’s intention in isolating this article from its general doctrinal context is precisely to point at the root of Durandus’s problematic claim of distinction between communicability and productivity in God. Durandus’s view on divine production was perceived as an instance of his thesis of real distinction between essence and relation, and so the most eVective way to uproot it was by going directly to the source. What this article wants to censure, therefore, is Durandus’s basic claim of real distinction between essence and relation. As John saw it, everyone—Aquinas, the Lombard, and the Lateran decree20— agreed that the claim of real distinction is tantamount to positing another reality into God. Hence the allusion which Aquinas21 and the Lombard22 make to the Porretan error, which in its turn was associated with the error of quaternarism condemned by the Lateran. In both cases, the reality of relation is asserted at the expense of its real identity with the divine essence. As we have seen, the Lombard’s reference to the Porretan error became a locus 19 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 73: ‘[9] D. 7 a. 1 dicit, quod habet pro dubio, utrum essentia et relatio sint penitus idem re nec diVerent nisi sola ratione. Contra communem doctrinam et ecclesiae in secunda Decretali ‘‘Damnamus’’ et contra Thomam p. 1 q. 28 a. 2 et q. disp. 38 a. 2 [De Pot., q. 8] ubi dicit, quod dicere oppositum est haereticum; et hoc idem dicit magister d. 33 primi Sent. a. 1.’ 20 For John’s interpretation of the Lateran decree, see Quodl. VII a. 1, 85va: ‘expresse dicitur quod in divinis est solummodo trinitas non quaternitas, scilicet rerum, non solum personarum, ut quidam [i.e. Durandus] exponunt, quia quaternitatem personarum nullus unquam posuit nec aliquis alicui imposuit . . . [D]icitur quod illa res, scilicet divina essentia, est quaelibet trium rerum, quod esset falsum si esset alia res ab eis, quia predicatio aYrmativa signiWcat identitatem praedicati cum subiecto . . . Ex hiis . . . patet, quod essentia et relatio in deo diVerunt sola ratione, quia omnis diVerentia seu distinctio est rei vel rationis et nulla media . . . Res distinctae realiter sunt plures res subsistentes realiter distinctae, quod est esse plures hypostases vel supposita realiter distincta . . . Sed essentia divina et relatio non sunt plures hypostases, supposita vel personae, ergo non sunt plures res.’ Also Quodl. XI a. 2, 164ra–va: ‘si relatio non esset res aliqua sed solum modus rei, personae divinae quae distinguuntur per solas relationes distinguerentur solum modaliter et non realiter, quod est absurdum et contra Wdem’. This is reminiscent of Hervaeus’s argument in the Correctiones, 322. 10–23. 21 See Aquinas, ST I q. 28 a. 2; De Pot., q. 8 a. 2. 22 See Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 33 c. 1; also Ch. 1 above.

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classicus in later scholastic debates on the connection between essence and relation. In this respect (and if we remember that after the Lateran decree of 1215 the authority of Peter Lombard became a token for church doctrine), the establishment of a doctrinal connection between Aquinas and the Lombard was tantamount to making Thomist teaching a matter of orthodoxy. Thus, by being non-Thomist, article 9 was automatically also heretical. That Durandus’s thesis was perceived as heretical was already known since 1314. What is new here is an explicit doctrinal link between Thomist teaching and church doctrine.

11.2. THE PROCESSIONS Three issues related to the divine processions earned an entry in the censure: the principle of production in God (a. 10), the Wlioque (a. 12), and the notion of an order of priority (a. 13). We can overlook article 13, on an order of priority, since it merely reiterates the content of its correlate in the Wrst list.23 Articles 10 and 12 are more revealing, because they shed light on the forces at work behind the promotion of Thomism. Article 10, like article 3 in the Wrst censure, deals with Durandus’s twofold claim that relation accounts for production in God and that the essence is the communicable principle underlying the processions. But, unlike Pierre’s article in the Wrst list, this article registers an evolution in Aquinas’s opinion which forces John to oVer an interpretation and settle for the most plausible explanation. As we shall see, what is particularly illuminating about John’s treatment of Aquinas’s writings is that it betrays a type of approach which was usually reserved for expounding authoritative texts. John does not dispute with Aquinas’s alternative views, but rather rephrases the ambiguities as he aims to render a more accurate solution. What we see at work, therefore, is an expositio reverenter of the Thomist texts.24 23 See ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 74: ‘[13] Eadem d. [12] et a. [1] probat quod in divinis fundamentum est prius natura et naturali praesuppositione, non solum intellectu, relatione, et una relatio disparata est similiter prior alia; et respondet ad ea quae contra hoc adducit; dicit tamen in Wne: ‘‘Nescio si est tutum tantum asserere.’’ Nec respondet ad rationes per quas hoc probavit. Contra doctrinam communem et Thomae [ST] p. 1 q. 42 a. 3, qui ponit in divinis solum prius et posterius ratione seu intellectu, et negat omne prius reale seu natura.’ Cf. ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 55, a. 5. 24 See Chenu, ‘ ‘‘Authentica’’ et ‘‘Magistralia’’ ’, 277. For the notion of expositio reverenter, see also Aquinas, Contra errores Graecorum, proemium: ‘Unde, si aliqua in dicits antiquorum doctorum inveniuntur quae cum tanta cautela non dicantur quanta a modernis servatur, non sunt contemnenda aut abiicienda; sed nec etiam ea extendere oportet, sed exponere reverenter.’ (My italics.)

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In the same d. [7] a. 1, he says that the generational power, insofar as it is communicable principle, is solely the essence; but insofar as it is principle of production, it is solely relation, just as only the essence is communicated to the Son, whereas Wliation is rather produced. I believe these [claims] are contrary to Thomas, [ST] p. 1 q. 41 a. 5 and q. disp. 32 [De Pot., q. 2] a. 2, and the same d. [7 q. 1] a. 2; who, although he appears to hold diVerent views (diversa dicere) in the works cited above, I nevertheless believe that he always tends towards the opinion that [the generational power] signiWes solely the essence and connotes relation. And at the end Durandus adds that the generational power must be rather said to be relation than the essence. This is contrary to Thomas in the works cited above. I believe also that it is unsuitably said (male dictum) that relation alone is the principle that accounts (principio quo) for the production, and that [Wliation] is rather produced.25

As we saw in section 2.2 above, Aquinas’s view on divine production had undergone a change from his early writings to his more mature position in the Summa. In his commentary, and in the disputed question De Potentia, Aquinas had claimed that the power of production lies as it were between essence and relation, such that the essence is the source of the notional acts and relation the agent. In the Summa, however, Aquinas had distanced himself from this view, claiming less ambiguously—and closer to the Lombard—that the principle of production in God signiWes the essence.26 In the present article, John is charging Durandus with teaching contrary to the Thomist view by claiming that the principle of production lies in relation rather than the essence. In John’s reading, Aquinas appears to have held by contrast that the power of production signiWes primarily the essence, and connotes relation. John is thus showing preference for the later account in the Summa. Note, however, that he does not discard Aquinas’s earlier view in De Potentia, but rather adds it to the evidence against Durandus, and explains it in a way which reinforces the more plausible solution of the Summa. 25 ‘Articlui in quibus’, pp. 73–4: ‘[10] Eadem d. [7] a. 1 dicit quod potentia generandi, ut est principium communicationis, est sola essentia; ut autem est principium productionis, est sola relatio, sicut etiam Wlio sola essentia communicatur, Wliatio autem vere producitur. Credo quod haec sunt contra Thomam [ST] p. 1 q. 41 a. 5 et q. disp. 32 [De Pot., q. 2] a. 2; et eadem d. [7 q. 1] a. 2; qui quamvis videatur diversa dicere in praedictis locis, tamen credo quod semper ad hoc declinet, quod signiWcat solam essentiam et connotat relationem. Et addit in Wne Durandus quod potentia generandi potius debet dici relatio quam essentia. Credo etiam quod sit male dictum quod sola relatio sit principium quo productionis et quod sit vere producta.’ Cf. ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 54 a. 3. 26 For Aquinas’s earlier view, see De Pot., q. 2 a. 2: ‘potentia generandi simul essentia et notionem signiWcat’. Also Sent. I d. 7 q. 1 a. 2 and I d. 11 q. 1 a. 3. For Aquinas’s later view, see ST I q. 41 a. 5: ‘Potentia generandi signiWcat divinam essentiam.’ Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent. I d. 7 c. 2: ‘dicimus quia non est potens nisi natura: eius [i.e. patris] enim potentia natura est vel essentia’. See also Luna, ‘Essenza divina’, esp. 11–27, who suggests that Aquinas sharpened his opinion as a result of a criticism levelled against him by Giles of Rome in Sent. I d. 11 princ. 2 q. 3.

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Presumably, John felt compelled to settle the matter oYcially in the second censure. Durandus, earlier in his commentary, had himself raised the question of the most ‘authentic’ interpretation of Aquinas’s view on divine production. Durandus’s solution to this question is doctrinally revealing, because it is presented in a way that suggests that Durandus saw himself as oVering an interpretation of Aquinas’s view. As we saw, Durandus claims that both essence and relation take part in the processions, but whereas the essence acts as communicable principle, relation governs the productions. The power of generation, therefore, more appropriately signiWes relation than the essence.27 Durandus casts this view against the alternative opinion which places the power of production rather on the essence.28 As Durandus understood it, the two opinions are of Thomist descent, in that they rest on the basic claim that both essence and relation take part in the processions. But whereas Durandus’s preferred view places the accent on relation, the alternative interpretation prioritizes essential communicability, for it seems to dovetail more tightly with the claim of real identity which advocates of this interpretation support. As Durandus himself subsequently reveals, the second interpretation of Aquinas’s view is that of the maior pars, who favour the later, more Lombardian, account in the Summa.29 Durandus, on the other hand, sees himself as relying on De Potentia, an account which leaves more room for a relational explanation of the processions.30 Thus, Durandus was not only knowingly challenging the standard interpretation of Aquinas, but he was doing so on the basis of Thomist ancestry. Meanwhile, what we see at work in Dominican oYcial quarters is an attempt to domesticate Aquinas’s view in a way that brings out a fundamental aYnity with Lateran orthodoxy. In an eVort to crystallize ‘Thomism’ into Lateran doctrinal parameters, John was thus openly promoting the Summa as a better rendering of Aquinas’s view. John certainly had some vision, for the promotion of the Summa as the quintessentially Thomist text heralded later developments around the second half of the Wfteenth century, when Aquinas’s Summa replaced the Lombard’s Sentences as the standard theological reference and main object of commentary. 27 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. 1, 43va–b; 44va. Also s. 5.2 above. 28 Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. 1, 42ra–b; 42vb; 43ra; s. 5.2 above. 29 See John of Naples, Quaest. disp. 29. 250bA: ‘duo declaranda et probanda sunt. Et primum est, quod potentia generativa in deo principaliter et etiam totaliter signiWcat divinam essentiam. Secundum est, quod connotat seu ex connotato importat vel includit relationem.’ Hervaeus’s interpretation coincides with that of John. See Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 81aA–B: ‘principium in divinis dicitur dupliciter, scilicet suppositum producens, et forma qua agit, scilicet ipsam essentiam’. 30 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 7 q. 1, 44va: ‘Qui vult tenere hanc opinionem quae probabiliter tenendi potest et ad intentionem fratris Thomae videtur dicitur declinare in quaestionibus De Potentia, potest rendere ad rationes praecedentis [i.e. secundae] opinionis.’

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That article 10 is occupied with an interpretational—rather than strictly doctrinal—issue is to all appearances conWrmed by John’s additional remark that Durandus’s claim that relation alone is the principle of production is male dictum. This remark is not meant to pass judgement on the doctrinal content of Durandus’s claim, but is rather commenting on the latter’s inappropriate rendering of an otherwise standard Thomist opinion. As it stands, Durandus’s claim yields a rather heterodox Thomism: by dividing productivity from communicability in God, Durandus is not only misrepresenting the Thomist view but is also, by inference, associating it to the undesirable claim of real distinction. A more suitable and safer way of rendering Aquinas’s view would be to say, as ‘orthodox’ Thomists do, that the power of production signiWes the essence and connotes relation. This enhanced reading—this expositio reverenter—yields a type of Thomism that is committed to the Lateran agenda and abides by Aristotelian metaphysics. Article 12 throws a diVerent kind of light on the process at work behind the promotion of Thomism. The article draws attention to the Wlioque, a weighty doctrinal issue which was only indirectly considered in the Wrst list.31 Not wanting to dwell on the theological implications of this issue, with this article I would rather like to point to the signiWcance of John’s having introduced the Wlioque as a separate entry in the censure list. He was fully aware that Durandus adhered to the Wlioque as the only way of distinguishing between the second and third persons of the Trinity.32 On that count, Durandus’s position was irreproachable, hence the omission of this issue from the Wrst censure. Where Durandus departed from the conventional line was in the way he explained the connection between the two processions. Accordingly, the article points at the problematic implications of making spiration a concomitant relation rather than one constitutive of the persons of Father and Son. Durandus’s account of the processions was thus seen as yet another instance of his notorious metaphysics of absolute and relative, in which relations are made to play the main role in explaining production in God.33 As we saw, 31 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 74: ‘[12] D. 12 a. 1 dicit, quod non est de ratione spirati in divinis quod sit a genito et generante nec est per se ab eis sed quasi per accidens. Credo quod hoc sit contra Thomam.’ For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 12 q. 1 a. 3; I d. 13 q. 1 a. 3; De Pot., q. 10 a. 4; ST I q. 27 aa. 3–5. For Durandus, see A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 60va–b; s. 5.2 above. Cf. ‘Articuli nonaginta tres’, p. 56 a. 11, which broaches the related issue of whether the Spirit proceeds from one or two principles. For this issue, see also ‘Articuli in quibus’, pp. 76–7 aa. 24 and 25 respectively; p. 81 a. 46 (Additamenta). 32 See Durandus, Sent. I d. 11 q. 2, 55vb; s. 5.2 above. 33 In this respect, that a. 12 should not even mention Durandus’s previous, half-hearted revocation of his account of the Wlioque is indicative of the connection Dominicans made between Durandus’s view of the processions and his metaphysics of absolute and relative. To correct the account of the Wlioque and yet retain its metaphysical presuppositions hardly amounted to a revocation at all. See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 pp. 73–5. See also s. 10.1 above.

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Hervaeus had triggered the alarm signal at an early stage in the controversy, for he perceived Durandus’s view as an open contradiction of Anselm’s principle. By the same token, he had linked Durandus’s idiosyncratic account to Durandus’s rejection of the psychological model. Thus, by now singling out this issue within the ‘Thomist’ censure, John was probably wanting to release associations deeply imbedded in the Dominican psyche, associations which would ultimately link Aquinas to impregnable bastions of the Latin Church, like Augustine and Anselm.34 In this way, John was attempting to draw Thomism into the landscape of a distinctly Latin tradition—in a way not unlike that in which the Lombard had become irrevocably associated with Lateran orthodoxy on the platform of Joachim’s blunder.

11.3. THE DIVINE PERSONS It is only with the second censure that the question of the constitution and distinction of the divine persons is brought to the fore—an issue curiously overlooked in the Wrst list. Between the ‘emanational’ account based on modes of procession, and the Dominican account based on relative opposition, Durandus’s view of personal distinction was deWnitely closer to the Dominican line. However, Durandus’s underlying claim that relations, as non-subsistent modes, are constitutive of the persons, remained fundamentally at odds with Thomist teaching. As with the Wlioque, this could explain why this issue was omitted in the Wrst list and only included in the second. On the other hand, and considering that the Wrst censure was conducted mainly by Hervaeus, that this issue was at Wrst overlooked could also suggest a diVerence between the priorities of Hervaeus and John of Naples, the latter having more ascendancy over the second censure. The fact that Hervaeus never directly touched on this issue in his numerous engagements with Durandus would be consistent with this hypothesis. Both John and James Wnd problems with Durandus’s account of the persons, and each points to crucial aspects of it. In article 21 John addresses the semantic issue of whether ‘person’ is a name of Wrst or second intention. James completes the picture with article 45, which considers Durandus’s understanding of relation as constitutive of the persons. As I hope to show, in both cases the bottom line is Durandus’s prioritization of relative distinction over communicability. Article 21 reads as follows: 34 For John of Naples’s Thomist account of the Wlioque, see Quaest. disp. 13, esp. 112–13.

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The Controversy

In distinction 23, he holds as a probable opinion that ‘person’ is a name of [second] intention. He proves this in a twofold way, and responds to those who adduce arguments against it; and at the end he says that [‘person’] is an equivocal name, since sometimes it signiWes an intention, as in Boethius’s deWnition, and at others [it signiWes] a thing underlying an intention, as when we say: ‘This is a good person’. But Thomas says in [ST] p. 1 q. 30, last article, that ‘person’ is [not] only a name of intention, but is [also] the name of a thing.35

Despite what the article suggests, Durandus was unequivocal in holding that the name ‘person’ signiWes not a substance, as in ‘some individual’, but the intention of incommunicability.36 When Durandus grants that ‘person’ may be understood as the name of a thing, he is not being equivocal about his solution, but he is rather referring to the alternative, more common use of the name, which traces it back to its juridical connotations of a ‘higher’ substance conveying dignity, as when we say ‘This is a good person’. But Durandus discards this view on the grounds that it introduces an utterly frivolous criterion, restricting the number of candidates to the ‘virtuous’ ones only.37 Not improbably, Durandus was here making a provocative allusion to Aquinas’s view that the name ‘person’ ought to convey the dignity that pertains to substances. In his earnestness, John failed to perceive Durandus’s sarcasm, and with it the true import of Durandus’s position. For Durandus, what is at stake is the distinction between the divine persons, and so ‘person’ must primarily signify the intention of incommunicability. For Aquinas and for Thomist Dominicans, on the other hand, the priority is to safeguard the equality of the persons as individuals of the same nature, so the emphasis is placed on real commonality—i.e. the shared essence—rather than on formal incommunicability—i.e. relative distinction.38 In this light, 35 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 76: ‘[21] D. 23 ponit pro probabili opinione, quod nomen personae est nomen intentionis, et probat hoc dupliciter et respondet ad quaedam, quae contra hoc adducit, et in Wne dicit, quod est nomen aequivocum, quia quandoque signiWcat intentionem, et sic deWnitur a Boetio, quandoque rem subditam intentioni, ut cum dicimus: ‘‘Talis est bona persona.’’ Thomas vero p. 1 q. 30 a. ultimo dicit, quod persona est nomen intentionis tantum sed est nomen rei.’ For Aquinas, see ST I q. 30 a. 4; Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3 and I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 11. 36 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 23 q. un., 93vb–94ra: ‘Impossibile est enim quod persona dicit solum rem subiectam intentioni, quae est individuum vagum. Cuius ratio est, quia res subiecta intentioni quae est individuum vagum de natura sua est communicabilis pluribus et tot, sicut natura subiecta intentioni speciei de toto enim praedicatur aliquis homo sicut homo. Sed res cui communicat esse persona vel res quae est persona non est communicabilis, immo incommunicabilis, ut dicit diYnitio personae, quod persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis substantia.’ 37 Ibid. 94ra–b. Also s. 5.3 above. 38 The contrast between Aquinas and Durandus on this question is already given away by the status quaestionis. For Durandus (A Sent. I d. 23 q. un.) the issue is ‘Utrum persona signiWcet substantiam an relationem’; for Aquinas, ‘Utrum hoc nomen ‘‘persona’’ possit esse commune

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Durandus’s view could be unfavourably read as implying subordinationist tendencies. Article 45 is more uncertain and appears to be confusing two diVerent issues: In d. 26 q. 1, past the middle of the response (positionis), he rejects the opinion which holds that relation constitutes the persons not as a relation, but as [constitutive] property, showing (probans) rather that [relation constitutes the persons] as relation. This is contrary to Thomas, [ST] p. 1 q. 40 last article, at the end of the response (positionis), in which he says that the personal property of the Father can be understood in a twofold way. According to one way, [it can be understood] as a relation, and as such it logically (secundum intellectum) presupposes the notional act.39 According to another way, [it can be understood] as constitutive of the person, and in this sense relation is necessarily presupposed, as he [i.e. Durandus] concedes, by the notional act.40

The Wrst part of the article addresses Durandus’s claim that relations are constitutive of the persons as relations of origin and not as properties, a claim which belongs to the broader issue of whether the persons are distinguished by relations rather than by the notional acts.41 The second part of the article refers to the question of priority between properties and notional acts, and adduces Aquinas’s view that relations are prior to origin in the constitution of the persons, such that ‘the Father generates because he is the Father’ is true but not ‘the Father is the Father because he generates’. On this second issue Durandus joins Aquinas in a common Augustinian tradition, in opposition to the emanational account which rather understands the properties to follow persons already constituted by origin.42 On the Wrst issue, however, tribus personis’ (ST I q. 30 a. 4), or ‘Utrum ‘‘persona’’ sit commune tribus personis’ (Sent. I d. 25 q. 1 a. 3). 39 The ‘notional acts’ are those ‘notes’ or personal features by virtue of which one divine person is diVerentiated from the other two. In the Father these notes are innascibility, paternity, and active spiration; in the Son, Wliation and active spiration; and in the Spirit, passive spiration. Unlike the personal properties, the notional acts are generally identiWed with acts of origin, so they do not constitute the persons but rather make them ‘discernible’ from one another. See Dictionnaire de the´ologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant and E. Mangenot (Paris: Librairie Letouzey & Ane´, 1903–30), xi. 802–5. 40 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 81: ‘[45] D. 26 q. 1 reprobat ultra medium positionis opinionem quae dicit, quod relatio constituit personam non ut relatio sed ut proprietas, probans quod immo ut relatio. Contra Thomam, p. 1 q. 40 a. ultimo, in Wne positionis ubi dicit, quod proprietas personalis patris potest considerari dupliciter: Uno modo ut est relatio, et sic secundum intellectum praesupponit actum notionalem; alio modo secundum quod est constitutiva personae, et sic oportet quod praeintelligatur, ut innuit, relatio.’ For Aquinas, see also Sent. I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3; I d. 27 q. 1 a. 2; I d. 29 a. 4; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 7; q. 9 a. 4; q. 10 a. 3; ST I q. 40 a. 2 ad 1. 41 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1, 101rb–vb. Also s. 5.3 above. 42 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1, 101rb: ‘Quidam dicunt quod distinctio personarum est per origines et non per relationes sub ratione relationum, quorum ratio est, relationes secundum

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The Controversy

Durandus’s opinion diVered from Aquinas’s, and the reference James needs to adduce in the censured article is Summa, a. 2, rather than a. 4. James’s oversight is nevertheless illustrative in itself, for it reveals the way Dominicans construed Durandus’s opinion and, more importantly, what they perceived were Durandus’s theological allegiances.43 According to Aquinas and mainstream Thomists, it is as subsistent properties and not as acts of origin that relations should constitute the persons. Underlying this view is Aquinas’s claim that ‘person’ signiWes a ‘higher’ sort of substance, such that only if the divine persons are constituted by subsistent properties can they convey the dignity that belongs to their nature. Thus, granting that relations—rather than the notional acts—are constitutive of the divine persons, relations must function ‘in the manner of a substance’ (per modum substantiae) and not merely as acts of origin.44 The persons are then distinct from one another by virtue of origin, but are formally supposita by virtue of a subsistent property. That the persons must denote a complete substance is important, for anything less would be perceived as downgrading the persons’ divinity in a way that would seem to reduce them to mere modes of the essence. Thus, Durandus’s exclusive identiWcation of relations with modum intelligendi sequuntur suum fundamentum, sed paternitas et Wliatio fundantur super origines, ex eo enim aliquas est pater quia genuit et Wlius quia genitus’; ibid. 102vb: ‘cum dicitur quod origines sunt fundamentum relationum divinarum, dicendum quod falsum est . . . Origines enim non sunt nisi ipsemet relationes a quo aliud et quod ab alio, et non fundamentum eorum . . . [S]imul intelligenda est persona constituta cum sua relatione et origine.’ 43 Predictably, John has a well deWned idea of the issue of the priority between properties and origin, and directs the reader to a more likely Thomist source. See ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 76: ‘[22] D. 27 a. 1 dicit, quod in divinis proprietas ut constituens est prior secundum rationem actu notionali, prout dicit prius a quo non convertitur consequentia; non autem est prior eo nec posterior secundum rationem actu intellectus cadente super utrumque et dicente unum prius alio qualitercumque, etiam secundum rationem, sicut dicimus intellectum divinum esse priorem voluntate. Credo quod hoc sit contra Thomam [ST] p. 1 q. 40 a. 4 et d. eadem [q. 1] a. 2 in solutione principali et quarti argumenti et q. disp. 38 [De Pot., q. 8] in solutione alicuius argumenti; qui dicit in praedictis locis, quod paternitas ut proprietas constitutiva praecedit generare, sed generari praecedit Wliationem qualitercumque acceptam, scilicet ut relatio vel ut proprietas.’ See also John, Quaest. disp. 30. 257–62. Curiously, unlike James, John does not broach the connected issue of relations and constitutive properties, which, one could argue, is more immediately symptomatic of Durandus’s deviation from Thomism. For this reason I have chosen to consider James’s rendering of the issue. Precisely because ill focused, it yields a historically more interesting case of the nature of the disagreement between Durandus and his order’s oYcial stance. 44 See Aquinas, ST I q. 40 a. 2 ad 1 and ad 4; I q. 29 a. 4; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 11; Sent. I d. 23 a. 3. See also John of Naples, Quodl. VI a. 3, 58va–59va: ‘oportet intelligere divinum suppositum constitutum per aliquid, quod non est nisi proprietas aliqua constitutiva quam quod referatur ad aliud. Ergo proprietas relativa constituit divinum suppositum non ut relatio sed ut suppositalis proprietas . . . Intellectus apprehendens rem prius esse constitutam quam relatam, excludit a constitutione personae rationem relativam . . . Sic autem excludens rationem relativam, non oportet quod ponat rationem absolutam, sed ponit rationem disparatam, sc. proprietatis suppositalis, priorem ratione relativa.’ John’s last statement was clearly meant to correct Durandus’s exclusive disjunction of absolute and relative.

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origin not only seemed to establish a precarious distinction between the persons, but was also dangerously close to some version of Sabellianism. In this light, James’s confused link of the two issues was not so misinformed, since in a Thomist template Durandus’s rejection of subsistent properties automatically portrayed Durandus as prioritizing origin over relations. In the way Thomists saw it, therefore, the disjunction was between three modes of being or three subsistent persons, and Durandus’s account was symptomatically inclined towards the Wrst. For Durandus, guided rather by the assumption that the divine persons are formally relational, the disjunction was between three relative supposita or three absolute substances. As he put it, the orthodox option was rather conspicuous. As in previous instances, the result was a profound unintelligibility based on radically diVerent agendas, where Durandus’s attempt to reinforce relative distinction ironically appeared as Sabellian, while the Thomist emphasis on divine unity and consubstantiality seemed dangerously reductionist. As a result of this second censure, Durandus was left to reckon with a series of issues in his Trinitarian doctrine which were perceived as unwelcome deviations from the accepted account of Thomism. This account presented two recognizable features. One was a standard interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, exempliWed in such tenets as the categorical division into substances and accidents, the nature of change as a movement from potentiality to actuality, and the notion of relation as deprived of ontological value apart from its foundation. The second feature was a preferred reading of Aquinas’s theses in a way which brought to light a fundamental agreement with Lateran priorities. This aspect is well illustrated by the use Dominicans made of the Lateran decree in both censures against Durandus: by connecting Durandus’s error to the Council’s condemnation, Dominicans were incorporating Thomism into the Lateran tradition. This was underlined by John of Naples’s litanylike judgement of Durandus’s theses in the second censure, undoubtedly designed to impress a seal on Dominican memories. But more signiWcantly, in its repetitive invocation of the authority of the saints in association with Aquinas’s name it was heralding the upcoming canonization of the Dominican doctor. As we shall see in what follows, the Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary will be for the most part occupied with responding to Hervaeus’s version of Thomism, especially to such controversial issues as the Scotist formal distinction and the conception of the essence as a special kind of universal. Despite their Scotist ancestry, both issues eventually assumed the character of a Thomist yardstick, a curious development when John of Naples’s unadulterated kind of Thomism would have seemed like a more obvious candidate.

12 The Final Recension of Durandus’s Commentary In wanting to impose what he saw as the fallible doctrine of some recent doctor, over the authority of the Fathers and at the expense of open scientiWc inquiry, the censure of 1317 represented for Durandus an act of tendentious obscurantism.1 The Wnal recension of Durandus’s commentary is presented under this banner of doctrinal freedom. This freedom was not unconnected with the fact that by the time this work was completed Durandus had already been made a bishop,2 and was therefore immune to Dominican jurisdiction. The Wnal recension thus holds the value of a work less constrained by external struggles and pressures. It is correspondingly better disposed to reXect the internal demands of Durandus’s thought, and incidentally helps us judge, by a comparison with his earlier works, how far he had bent his thought in response to the pressure from his order. As we are told in its concluding remark, this recension was acknowledged by Durandus as the only truthful and complete expression of his thought.3 1 See Durandus, C Sent., prologue, 1. 12: ‘compellere seu inducere aliquem, ne doceat vel scribat dissona ab iis, quae determinatus doctor scripsit, est talem doctorem praeferre sacris doctoribus, praecludere viam inquisitioni veritatis, et praestare impedimentum sciendi, et lumen rationis, non solum occultare sub medio, sed comprimere violenter. Nos igitur plus rationi, quam cuicumque auctoritati humanae, consentientes, nullius puri hominis auctoritatem rationi praeferimus . . .’ 2 See the explicit to the Wnal recension: ‘Finitur scriptum super quartum, et ita super omnes quatuor libros Sententiarum, compilatum et diligenter recognitur Wnalique manu imposita consummatum et editum per f. Durandum de Sancto Porciano doctorem sacra theologiae ordinis celeberrimi Fratrum Praedicatorum et Meldunen. Anicien. Ecclesiarum episcopum et rectorem.’ The explicit thus makes it unambiguously clear that, unlike the Wrst recension, we are dealing here with a fully revised, ordinatio version of Durandus’s commentary. See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 75–6. For this chapter I will use the printed version of the Wnal recension: In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentarum libri IIII, i (Venice, 1579; repr. Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1964). 3 See Durandus, C Sent. 423rb. In a Wnal statement revealing many years of controversy, he adds: ‘si vero aliquid minus digne laudabiliterque scriptum sit, meae ascribatur imperitiae et non malitiae, quia studium meum semper fuit inquirere veritatem, sed quia homo sum parvi ingenii, et exigui temporis non dubito, immo verissime praesumo, quod in dictis meis multa poterunt inveniri quae meliori iudicio poterunt corrigi et melius emendari, quod opto, et oro

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The early commentary constituted a premature and unWnished work which, although historically valuable for conveying Durandus’s teaching prior to the conXict, was lacking in intellectual development and doctrinal coherence. Composed at the end of the long quarrel with the Dominican authorities, the Wnal recension beneWts from material rehearsed in the recent controversy. Durandus only revised books I and II, a task he probably undertook between 1318 and 1325, a period of much disruption in his career.4 Both books rely heavily on the Paris and Avignon Quodlibets, sometimes drawing out entire passages from these works and inserting them into the old commentary text, thus forming an instructive doctrinal palimpsest. In that respect, the early commentary enjoys a uniWed character which the Wnal recension forfeited to compromise, even if it gained in articulateness and did more justice to Durandus’s intellectual vigour. To establish a clearer parallel with the early commentary, the Wnal recension, in its turn, will be examined in light of the same three issues of relation, the processions, and the divine persons. Against the background of the previous conXict, the present chapter will attempt to answer a small cluster of questions. What has been omitted in the Wnal recension in respect to the early commentary? Which changes respond to external criticism, which are owed to previous censorship, and which are introduced for methodological considerations? Is this commentary simply a polished version of the Paris and Avignon Quodlibets? Finally, does the Wnal recension represent a compromise on the part of Durandus, or a deWance to the spirit of his order in the reestablishment of his opinio singularis?

12.1. RELATION The status quaestionis on the issue of relation and its foundation has changed signiWcantly in respect to the early commentary. Durandus’s prima lectura had conveyed the standard approach set out by the Lombard’s Sentences, enquiring ‘whether the relative property is really identical to the divine essence’. As we have seen, this has been the steady line adopted by Thomists, for it suited their view of divine unity based on real identity. Departing from this line, in the Wnal recension Durandus enquires ‘whether in God essence and relation

Weri per talem qui sit veritatis amator et non aemulus reprehensor, ut tam opus meum quam correctio operis cedat’. 4 For further details on the dating of C Sent., see the Introduction to this book.

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are really distinct according to some mode’.5 The standard ‘relative property’ has been replaced by the more contentious ‘relation’, thus signalling Durandus’s distinct treatment of the issue as a broader metaphysical discussion of modes designed to inform the Trinitarian account. More revealingly, the connection between essence and relation is no longer articulated in terms of a type of identity, but is rather made to rest on the presupposition of a real distinction which it then becomes the task to qualify. Again, Durandus’s ontological approach pulls the agenda to his own familiar terrain and mode of proceeding, whereby the inference of composition is checked only a posteriori, thus achieving unity by default rather than design. Durandus’s doctrinal reassertion is however as triumphant as it is scarred, for it is equally symptomatic of the most heated points of contention with the Dominicans. Another symptom of the shift in the doctrinal weight of the question is the division of the issue into two parts. Whereas in the early commentary the matter is treated within one question (d. 33 q. 1), in the Wnal recension it has been distinctly separated into categorical relations (d. 30 q. 2) and divine relations (d. 33 q. 1). Durandus presumably wished to separate a straightforward ontological inquiry from a delicate Trinitarian issue, and in that way loosen the unwelcome link between his modal doctrine and the claim of real distinction in God. The two censures, and no less Hervaeus’s repeated criticisms, had disciplined Durandus’s doctrinal moves, away from the embarrassing dilemma of Sabellianism or quaternarism. In this respect, it is also signiWcant that Durandus chose to follow the fairly conciliatory account of the Avignon Quodlibets when dealing with divine relations, whereas in considering categorical relations he preferred to revert to the original commentary. Following the improved counsel, then, in this section the questions of (i) categorical and (ii) divine relations will be treated separately. (i) As in the early commentary, Durandus proceeds on this occasion too by examining Wrst the Thomist view on categorical relations, and then by expounding his own preferred solution. As before, Durandus rejects the Thomist thesis that relation is really identical to its foundation but distinct according to the ratio of relation. What calls for notice in Durandus’s response in this Wnal recension, however, is that it is based on a more explicit revision of the traditional account of the categories, a revision already suggested in the Paris Quodlibets but only implicit in the early commentary. According to Durandus, the Thomist view falsely presupposes that relation and its foundation can be really identical, and yet pertain to distinct categories, because 5 C Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 88. 1: ‘Utrum in divinis essentia et relatio diVerant aliquo modo realiter.’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 125vb: ‘Utrum proprietas relativa sit idem realiter quod essentia divina.’

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their rationes, understood as modes of predication, are distinct.6 For Durandus—and in this he does not necessarily disagree with Aquinas—the categories do not constitute an ontological division into things, but a division into modes of predication (Wgura praedicamenti) according to the intellect.7 This division is not wholly deprived of ontological signiWcance, however, since the modes of predication mirror the diVerent modes of being that things can acquire. Thus, substance, quantity and quality, and relation, are modes of predication which correspond respectively to the modes of being ‘in itself ’, ‘in another’, and ‘towards another’.8 The point in which Durandus diVers from Aquinas and mainstream Thomists is in his understanding of ratio. According to Aquinas’s standard account, ratio is ‘what the intellect apprehends of the signiWcation of some noun’. Ratio is a thing’s deWnition as the result of second intentional 6 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 30 q. 2, 84. 11–12: ‘Si . . . dicatur . . . quod relatio sit praecise realitas fundamenti, sequuntur duo inconvenientia contra eos. Primum est, quod relatio non erit essentialiter respectus, quia illud quod est essentialiter absolutum non est essentialiter respectus . . . quod videtur magnum inconveniens et contra diYnitionem eius esse, quia relationis ratio est esse ad aliud . . . Secundum est, quia si relatio est esse praecise idem quod suum fundamentum, sequitur quod ipsa et suum fundamentum sint formaliter unum praedicamentum, quod similiter est inconveniens. Si dicatur quod non, immo sunt diversa praedicata ratione connotati, quia relatio connotat terminum ad quem, quem non connotat fundamentum: contra, quia . . . impossibile est quod eidem rei respectu eiusdem conveniant simul connotare vel exigere aliquid, et non connotare . . .’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 126va–vb; Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 10. 17– 11. 3 (ed. Takada). For Aquinas, see De Pot., q. 7 a. 8 ad 5 and a. 9 ad 7; Sent. I d. 26 q. 2 a. 1 and I d. 30 q. 1 a. 1; ST I q. 28 aa. 1 and 2. 7 See Aristotle, Metaph. 5. 28 (1024b10–16): ‘Diversa vero genere dicuntur quorum diversum primum subiectum et non resolvitur alterum in alterum nec ambo in idem, ut species et materia diversum genere. Et quaecumque secundum diversam Wguram cathegorie entis dicuntur (alia namque quid est signiWcant entium, alia quale quid, alia ut diversum est prius); nec enim haec resolvuntur neque in invicem neque in unum aliquod.’ (My italics.) See Aquinas, In Phys. 5, lect. 9 n. 885: ‘Divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.’ 8 See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. III q. 1 p. 245. 7–20: ‘Praedictae . . . res in concreto acceptae, pertinent ad distinctionem praedicamentorum. Quia sic habent diversas Wguras, seu diversos modos praedicandi, quia quaedam dicuntur in quid, quaedam dicunt quantum vel quale, ad aliquid . . . [C]um in re extra nihil sit nisi substantia, vel quantitas, vel qualitas, vel respectus seu habitudo istorum, si distinctio praedicamentorum sumeretur secundum naturas rerum secundum se, iam non essent nisi quatuor praedicamenta, scilicet substantia, quantitas, qualitas et relatio; quod est inconveniens. Sed quia a dictis rebus Wunt praedicationes et denominationes pluribus modis, quibus se concernunt, ideo secundum pluralitatem illorum modorum sumitur pluralitas praedicamentorum.’ Also ibid. 256. 6–17. Durandus’s revision of the standard interpretation of the Aristotelian categories is not dissimilar to Peter John Olivi’s. Olivi however goes a step further and reduces the categories to predicative instruments deprived of all ontological value. See A. Boureau, ‘Le Concept de la relation chez Pierre de Jean Olivi’, in A. Boureau and S. Piron (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248–1298): Pense´e scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et socie´te´ (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), 41–55.

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knowledge, such that a distinction according to a thing’s ratio is a distinction according to reason only.9 On this view, the ratio of relation, i.e. its being towards another, does not imply a reality over and above its subject. Otherwise the subject would constitute a ‘relative’ rather than a substantial whole. Relation is not predicated of its subject ‘subjectively’, in its being, but only in respect to something other. What the ratio of relation tells us about its subject is merely that it is being referred to some other term.10 According to Durandus, by contrast, the ratio of a thing is a thing’s deWnition as the result of Wrst intentional knowledge. A thing’s ratio signiWes a thing’s quiddity in the sense of what pertains to its reality (ex natura rei) and independently of the operation of the intellect. Accordingly, a distinction according to ratio is a distinction according to reality (ex parte rei).11 In Durandus’s analysis, that is to say, in so far as the categories constitute a division according to modes of predication, they are the result of a mental operation and cannot signify the formal rationes of things, which are founded on their reality independently of our intellect.12 Following this line, Durandus claims (contrary to Aquinas) that relation is really distinct from its foundation precisely because its ratio ‘towards another’ is distinct from the ratio of its foundation as an absolute thing.13 9 See Aquinas, Sent. I d. 2 q. 1 a. 3: ‘ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de signiWcatione alicuius nominis. Et hoc in his quae habent deWnitionem est ipsa rei deWnitio.’ 10 See Aquinas, In Metaph. 5, lect. 17 n. 1028: ‘intellectus secundum quod ad aliquid dicitur, non ad hoc cuius est sicut subiecti dicitur: sequeretur enim quod idem relativum bis diceretur. Constat enim quoniam intellectus dicitur ad intelligibile, sicut ad obiectum. Si autem diceretur ad intelligentem, bis diceretur ad aliquid; et cum esse relativi sit ad aliud quodammodo se habens, sequeretur quod idem haberet duplex esse.’ Hence the conclusion of quaternarism that Thomists infer from Durandus’s realist account of divine relation. 11 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 2 q. 2, 17. 5–6: ‘quae diVerunt diYnitione diVerunt formaliter et quidditative et ex natura rei, quia diYnitio indicat quid est res . . . [Q]uicquid convenit rei secundum se et ex eius natura circunscripta omni operatione intellectus, est vere reale. Si ergo in eadem re simplici . . . inveniatur aliqua diVerentia ex natura rei circumscripta omni operatione intellectus, oportet quod illa sit realis . . . quia diYnitio indicat quid est res, ergo quae diVerunt diYnitione, diVerunt re.’ Cf. Quodl. Aven. III q. 1 p. 230. 21–6: ‘ratio . . . non est actus intelligendi, sed est deWnitio, vel quaecumque ratio indicans quid est res importata per nomen . . . [R]atio signiWcat veram rem extra intellectum . . .’ Durandus’s understanding of ratio and its concomitant distinction bears recognizable aYnity to Bonaventure, for whom a distinction according to ratio is a distinction founded on the reality of the thing, but which is less than absolute. See Bonaventure, Sent. I d. 22 a. 1 q. 4, 398a–b; I d. 33 a. un. q. 2 ad 2, 575b. See also s. 3.1 above. 12 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 30 q. 2, 85. 20: ‘divisio entis extra animam non est in decem praedicamenta secundum formales eorum rationes, quia nullum praedicamentum in se constituitur vel ab alio distinguitur nisi concurrente operatione intellectus . . . Modus autem praedicandi supponit actum intelligendi. Ergo ens extra animam non distinguitur in decem praedicamenta secundum formales rationes eorum, quibus constituuntur distinguuntur, sed dividitur ens extra animam in decem praedicamenta, quoad res quae praestant suYciens fundamentum ex modis praedicandi, ut sit realis praedicatio, et non Wcta.’ 13 Ibid. 85. 19: ‘nihil diVert a praedicamento quocumque, per hoc quod includit rem illius praedicamenti, sed per hoc potius convenit. Sed extremum qualitatis vel similitudinis est res

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In Durandus’s view, therefore, Aquinas oVers a somewhat reductionist account of relation, in that he identiWes it with the mere connotation of a term which, like its foundation, is an absolute reality. The Thomist view thus overlooks the fact that, in its quiddity as a relative thing, relation is essentially distinct from absolute things.14 Drawing verbatim from his Wrst Paris Quodlibet, Durandus asserts his position as follows: It seems to me, without prejudice of better judgement, that just as a thing of itself subsistent is an absolute thing possessing such a mode of being on account of its independence, so a thing inhering in another is an absolute thing possessing such a mode of being on account of its dependence. Whereby it should be sooner denied that there is nothing which is essentially a relation (respectus), than asserted that what is purely and essentially a relation (respectus) is in another by inhering in it subjectively. It is thus clear that relation (relatio), or whatever is a respect (respectus), which has a real and actual dependence or coexistence with another, is really distinct from its foundation and yet does not eVect composition with it. The same applies to all that is only a mode of being.15

Just as it pertains to the reality of a substance to be ‘in itself ’, and to the reality of an absolute accident to inhere in another, it pertains to the reality of relation to be ‘towards another’. Consequently, those who assert that relation inheres in another must at least be prepared to admit that there is something which is essentially a relation. That is to say, the claim that relation inheres in itself presupposes that relation is a real thing, not just the rational connotation of a relative term. In this light, the Thomist allegation that, in Durandus’s eiusdem praedicamenti cum fundamento. Est enim quaedam quantitas vel qualitas sicut fundamentum. Ergo relatio talis non diVert a praedicamento quantitatis vel qualitatis ratione extremi plusquam ratione fundamenti, sed si importaret fundamentum solum simpliciter pertineret ad praedicamentum quantitatis vel qualitatis.’ 14 Ibid. 84. 13: ‘relatio non diVert a suo fundamento nisi per illud per quod diVert ab absoluto . . . Per hoc enim quod importaret solum terminum ad quem non posset diVerre ab absoluto, cum utrumque sit absolutum . . . Et iterum nihil diVert ab altero realiter, et quidditative et formaliter per illud quod est extrinsecum a sua formali, et reali quidditate . . . [S]icut qualitas est qua formaliter quales dicimur, ita relatio est secundum quam subiectum habens eam formaliter refertur . . . [T]ota essentia et formalis quidditas relationis est in subiecto relato quod per eam formaliter refertur.’ See also Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 14–15 (ed. Takada). 15 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 30 q. 2, 84. 16: ‘Et videtur mihi, salvo meliori iudicio, quod sicut res per se subsistens est res absoluta habens modum talem essendi ex sua independentia, ita res alteri inhaerens est res absoluta habens modum talem essendi ex sua dependentia. Unde prius est negandum, quia nihil esset quod esset essentialiter respectus, quod esset ponendum, quia illud quod est pure et essentialiter respectus esset in alio subiective et inhaerenter. Sic igitur patet quod relatio vel quicumque respectus, qui est realis, et actualis dependentia vel coexigentia alterius diVert realiter a suo fundamento, et tamen non facit compositionem cum eo. Et idem est de omni eo quod est solus modus essendi.’ Cf. Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 1 pp. 18. 18–19.7 (ed. Takada); Quodl. Aven. II q. 1, p. 175. 9–20.

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account, relation eVects composition, is at best an oxymoron based on the false premiss that a real distinction can only obtain between absolute things. Relation is formally incapable of eVecting composition, because, according to its reality, it is ‘of a thing’ and not itself an absolute thing. Therefore, to claim that relation is only a relative mode of being distinct from its absolute foundation should ipso facto check the risk of composition.16 That Durandus has been borrowing from his Wrst Paris Quodlibet should be taken into account. The Paris Quodlibet belonged to a time when Durandus was still under Dominican jurisdiction and at the height of the quodlibetal dispute with Hervaeus. Thus, it was very likely in response to Dominican criticism that in this early Quodlibet Durandus placed the issue of composition in the foreground, rather than presenting it, as before, as a by-product of his modal doctrine of relation. Durandus however did not revise this question when he had the freedom to do it, invested as he was with episcopal status at the time when he was composing the Wnal recension of his commentary. A possible explanation could be as simple as a mere lack of time, preventing Durandus, as a busy bishop, from undertaking a careful revision, especially in view of the political struggles we know he was having at this period with the canons at Le Puy. Another likely explanation could be that the revision of book I took place precisely at the time when Durandus was in Avignon between oYces, having lost his cause at Le Puy and before he was transferred to the bishopric of Meaux.17 This was around 1325, a period of uncertainty in Durandus’s career as a bishop, although it was the period when, perhaps ironically, his career as a theologian was at last enjoying approval as it beneWted from papal support. The conditions were therefore not such as to encourage either a conscientious revision or renewed assault on the Dominicans. On the other hand, there is always the possibility that Durandus left the question unaltered in the Wnal recension, not for the negative reason that it was a residue of Dominican pressure, but for the positive one that it witnessed to the theological priorities which determined his modal doctrine. 16 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 30 q. 2 ad 1, 85. 23: ‘cum dicitur quod quaecumque diVerunt realiter in eodem supposito faciunt compositionem, dicendum quod verum est si utrumque sit absolutum. Si autem unum sit absolutum, et aliud sit solus respectus vel denominatio respectiva sumpta ex pluribus, talia non faciunt compositionem . . .’ See also Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 p. 50. 2–9: ‘nullus modus essendi facit compositionem cum re cui convenit denominative . . . Cuius ratio est, quia omnis talis compositio est per hoc, quod una res inhaeret alteri. Modus, autem, essendi nec per se subsistit nec per se inhaeret . . .’ 17 Around 1325 Durandus returned to Avignon, where in 1326 he took part in a commission of theologians appointed to look into the orthodoxy of Ockham’s commentary. Durandus must have then stayed in Avignon at least until Mar. 1326, when he was transferred to the bishopric in Meaux. For Durandus’s eventful episcopate in Le Puy, see Fournier, ‘Durand de Saint-Pourc¸ain’, 9–12; Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 417–31. See also the Introduction to this book.

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(ii) It is on the speciWc issue of Trinitarian relations that Durandus Wnally settles the record with Hervaeus. On this occasion Durandus borrows mainly from the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet, an apologetic piece which, as we saw, introduces Durandus’s interpretation of the Scotist formal distinction. Following the quodlibetal agenda, d. 33 focuses on the Scotist contribution to the discussion: the notion of formal distinction ex natura rei, and the conception of the divine essence as a special kind of universal. As has been made clear, for Hervaeus a distinction ex natura rei is not equivalent to a real distinction. Unlike a distinction ex natura rei, a real distinction implies separability.18 The notion of a distinction ex natura rei is thus particularly suitable for theological use, since divine reality requires a type of distinction which does not necessarily result in a plurality of substances. In Durandus’s interpretation, by contrast, a distinction ex natura rei is simply another way of explaining real distinction, where ‘real distinction’ comprises any type of distinction which obtains between real objects when at least one of them is a mode and not an absolute thing. On this interpretation, real distinction does not necessarily entail numerical plurality or composition, and so Durandus’s view seemed to oVer the same advantage of establishing distinction in God without division. As was already announced in the Avignon Quodlibet, the formal distinction ex natura rei is only intelligible within Durandus’s metaphysical parameters if it implies a real distinction according to modes and not merely, as Scotus and Hervaeus wanted, a formal non-identity.19 Again, Durandus’s metaphysical persuasions bring him closer to the old Franciscan school of Bonaventure than to the contemporary Thomist or Scotist alternatives. More telling is what Durandus has to say about the Scotist conception of the divine essence as a common nature. Durandus’s position so far has consisted in rejecting all notion of universality as applicable to the divine, on the grounds that the essence is a singular being, and as such not predicable 18 See Hervaeus, Correctiones, p. 293. 5. 27: ‘ad illud dicitur . . . quod scilicet illa sola diVerunt realiter, quae diVerunt ex natura rei . . . addo quod quaecumque diVerunt realiter quod oportet quod sic diVerent realiter, quod unum realiter non est alterum . . . Ergo, illa quae diVerunt realiter, unum non est idem re cum altero, et per consequens unum non est realiter alterum.’ 19 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 89. 23–90. 28: ‘Alii dicunt quod relatio et essentia diVerunt formaliter ex natura rei quamvis sint idem identice . . . Et hanc formalitatem non intelligo nisi coincidat cum altero dictorum modorum, vel includat utrumque, quod verius credo. Quia in hoc quod dicunt quod essentia et relatio sunt idem identice, et quod unum veriWcatur realiter de alio, includunt primo modo quo alii [i.e. Thomists] dicunt quod sunt idem realiter. In hoc autem quod dicunt quod non sunt idem formaliter sed diVerunt formaliter ex natura rei, includunt illud quod primi dicunt quod non sunt idem adaequate, et illud quod dicunt secundi [i.e. Durandus], scilicet quod diVerunt sicut res et modus habendi rem.’ Cf. Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 51. 10–54. 19.

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as a common nature.20 Hervaeus, for his part, has claimed that the communicability of the essence is not detrimental to its singularity because, as an inWnite nature, the essence is predicable of its instances while remaining one in number.21 Durandus’s Wnal response on this matter is of particular signiWcance, since it reveals one instance in which Durandus’s nominalist understanding of universals aVects his account of the Trinity. Durandus argues as follows. Given the hypothetical case that, just as the essence is supposed to be something singular but more common (in plus se habens) than the Father, so the concept ‘humanity’ were something singular but more common (in plus se habens) than Socrates, the disparity between the essence and the Father would still be of a diVerent kind from the disparity between ‘humanity’ and Socrates.22 The formality (formalitas) of Socrates would be included under the formality of ‘humanity’, so that one and the same formality would account for Socrates being formally a man, and Socrates being formally Socrates.23 But this is not the case with the divine essence and the Father. For, even granting the given hypothesis that the Father includes less (sit in minus) than the essence, the Father would still not be included under the formality of the essence in the same way as Socrates is included under the universal ‘humanity’, i.e. as an individual instantiation. Both the Father and the essence are singular beings, on account of which neither does the formality of the Father include the formality of the essence, nor does the formality of the essence include the formality of the Father. The Father is formally the Father by virtue of paternity and not of the essence, since it is by virtue of paternity that the Father is distinct from the Son.24 As 20 See Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2 pp. 32. 17–33. 1 (ed. Takada). 21 See Hervaeus, Correctiones, p. 308. 30–8. Cf. Scotus, Ord. II d. 3 p. 1 q. 1, nn. 37 and 39. 22 Durandus uses the term paternitas instead of pater when establishing the comparison with ‘Socrates’ and ‘humanity’. I will nevertheless use the term pater instead, since it seems to establish a more accurate parallel with ‘Socrates’. 23 Recall that for Durandus nature and suppositum in creatures signify the same thing but according to diVerent modes of signiWcation, such that the suppositum connotes a ‘mode of possessing’ (modum habendi) the nature. See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1, 85va (Paris, BnF MS 14454); C Sent. I d. 34 q. 1, 92. 15–16. See also s. 5.3 above. 24 Durandus’s view on the principle of individuation could perhaps shed some light on his distinction between an ordinary universal and a singular thing. In C Sent. II d. 3 q. 2, Durandus rejects the traditional theories of individuation by matter or by quantity (136. 6–13), and claims instead that the principle of individuation is nothing other than the formal principle of a thing. That is, that by which a thing is one is the same as that by which a thing is the sort of thing it is. An individual does not imply something added to nature, for an individual simply means the nature as existing. As was already made clear (s. 5.3 above), this makes an account of individuation irrelevant in creatures, because just as a common nature is numerically one according to reason, a singular is numerically one according to its reality. In the divine, by contrast, the real identity between the essence and the persons requires an explanation of how the supposita are constituted (principium constituendi suppositum: 136. 14–15). Hence the attention Durandus devotes to the notion of relation, for it is on this notion that a coherent account of the Trinity will rest.

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singular beings, therefore, the Father and the essence are distinct according to their reality (ex natura rei), i.e. according to their distinct formalities as relative and absolute being respectively. The essence as an absolute being and paternity as a relative mode constitute incommensurable realities with mutually exclusive formalities.25 In contrast to Durandus, Hervaeus claims that, as a singular reality, the divine is capable of producing objective notions of itself, such as paternity and Wliation, which are conceptually separable. Thus, paternity is really identical to the essence in that it constitutes one and the same reality, even though it does not signify the same formality. On this account, then, the divine essence is an inWnite nature capable of communicating its reality to the persons without incurring divisibility. Contrariwise, in Durandus’s view, to claim that essence and relation are separable formalities but one reality seems contradictory, for the formality of the essence as an absolute substance necessarily entails that it is really distinct from relation as a non-subsistent mode of being. On this account, the communicability of the divine nature as a universal signiWes formal communicability, such that its individual instantiations, i.e. the persons, would necessarily result into three absolute divine substances. For Durandus, then, the analogy between the divine essence and a universal leads to tritheism. Whereas for Scotus and Hervaeus the essence as an inWnite nature is predicable in its reality to a plurality of distinct formalities, for Durandus the notion itself of predicability presupposes a common formality which is 25 Despite its length, the passage is worth reproducing: ‘illa inadequatio quae est inter paternitatem et essentiam non est sicut inadequatio quae est vel esset inter Socratem et hominem, dato quod homo esset aliquid singulare sicut Socrates in plus se habens quam Socrates, quemadmodum dicimus in divinis de essentia et paternitate, quia inadequatio quae esset inter hominem et Socratem stante praedicta hypothesi non faceret diVerentiam formalem, de qua loquimur, quia Socrates continetur per se sub homine, et formalitas eius sub formalitate hominis, et ob hoc Socrates esset formaliter homo, et per idem esset formaliter Socrates, et formaliter homo. Sed in proposito de essentia divina et paternitate non est sic, quia dato quod paternitas sit in minus quam essentia, tamen non continetur sic per se sub essentia sicut Socrates sub homine sumpto universaliter, vel singulariter secundum supradictam hypothesim, quia conceptus unius puta relationis non includitur in conceptu alterius puta essentiae vel e converso sicut conceptus hominis includitur in conceptu Socratis, sed sunt conceptus formaliter separari [sic] et hoc provenit ex natura rei secundum se, et non per solam negotiationem nostri intellectus, quia pater est formaliter pater per paternitatem et non per essentiam: alioquin non distingueretur formaliter a Wlio, et per paternitatem refertur realiter ad Wlium, et non per essentiam, et totum hoc est ex natura rei . . . Et causa est, quia paternitas ut paternitas . . . est mere relatio sive relativus modus essendi, essentia autem quid mere absolutum, et ideo formalitas paternitatis ut paternitas est, non est formalitas essentiae ut essentia est, nec sub esse continetur, ut inferius sub suo per se superiori, sed sunt formalitates ex natura rei diVerentes sicut absolutum a relatione et e converso.’ (C Sent. I d. 33 q. 1, 90. 29.)

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simply inappropriate for a singular essence.26 Essence and relation are really distinct because they have diVerent formalities. Divine simplicity is nevertheless safeguarded, because as a less-than-absolute reality relation does not add in number to the essence. In this light, the guiding insight behind Durandus’s understanding of the Scotist formal distinction in terms of degrees of reality, and not of identity, becomes clearer. For only in terms of a modal distinction can we claim that the essence is really distinct from relation without thereby straying into the equally undesirable threats of tritheism, or one absolute suppositum. Here is one instance, therefore, in which Durandus’s nominalist understanding of universals determines his view of the divine essence as a singular being really distinct from relation. In the Avignon Quodlibets, Durandus had introduced Scotist terminology in an attempt to appease Dominican criticism, and in the hope of deterring further disciplinary reprimands. This did not prove a well-advised move, and remained ill at ease within a Trinitarian outlook fundamentally at odds with the very notion of universality which the Scotist notion of formal distinction implied. On the other hand, the fact that Aquinas himself had rejected all comparison of the divine essence with a universal was of no avail, for, accompanying Durandus’s similar rejection, was a metaphysics of modes of being, the full implications of which were clearly non-Thomist. In this respect, even though Hervaeus’s portrayal of the divine essence as a common nature would not have been countenanced by Aquinas, it Wtted the accepted interpretation of Thomism in so far as it was fundamentally compatible with the Thomist emphasis on communicability and, by extension, with Anselm’s principle. On this occasion Durandus thus Wnally comes to terms with the profound diVerences dividing a universalist view of the essence buttressed by a notion of distinction according to modes of predicability and his own thesis of a singular nature incompatible with any conception of universality and governed by a notion of distinction based on modes of being. While still acknowledging the alternative accounts of distinction oVered by Hervaeus and Scotus as possible explanations for the Trinity, Durandus’s explicit ontological approach in connection with the equally explicit rejection of all universality, makes of the Wnal recension a work better deWned and more 26 See Durandus, C Sent. II d. 3 q. 2, 136. 7: ‘esse autem in pluribus per realem identitatem et dici in pluribus per praedicationem essentialem est de ratione universalis. Sic enim universalis est unum in multis, et per oppositum individuum vel singulare est in uno solo et dicitur de uno solo.’ Also C Sent. I d. 35 q. 4, 96. 6: ‘de ratione singularis non est incommunicabilitas, nisi illa quae opponitur communicabilitati universali, sc. quod non sit communicabile pluribus per sui divisionem. Essentia autem divina non dividitur in suppositis, quibus communicatur, et ideo ipsa est incommunicabilis per oppositum ad communicabilitatem universalis, et hoc suYcit ad hoc quod ipsa sit vere singularis . . .’

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coherent than the previous quodlibetal questions. If not entirely reverting to the original position in the early commentary, the Wnal recension certainly reveals a maturity imparted by years of controversy.

12.2. THE PROCESSIONS Two main issues concerning the divine processions have retained their controversial force throughout the discussion, namely (i) the claim of real distinction beyond relative opposition, and (ii) the type of connection holding between passive generation and passive spiration—the issue behind the Wlioque. (i) Concerning the Wrst issue, Durandus’s view at this stage has changed little from his account in the early commentary. Real distinction in the divine is not restricted to relative opposition, for it is governed by the reality of relations as modes of being, such that a diVerence in the relative term is suYcient for a distinction according to reality. Thus, the Father, as one and the same person, can include really distinct relations like active generation and common spiration without thereby entailing a plurality of supposita.27 This view had drawn on Durandus the frequent charge of ‘quaternarism’,28 for his claim that relations suYce for real distinction was understood, in a Thomist template, as implying that relations count as realities over and above the essence.29 Thus, Durandus wanted to seize the opportunity of a Wnal revision of his work to exonerate his view of distinction from the scope of the Lateran condemnation. According to Durandus, the decree ‘Damnamus’ explicitly condemns a quaternity of persons. It implicitly condemns a quaternity of 27 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 48. 14–28, esp. n. 23: ‘quod ubicumque sunt plura realiter distincta quodlibet eorum est per se subsistens, falsum quidem est, quia non est nisi unum subsistens in divinis et est absolutum . . . Quamvis enim suppositum divinum sit illud quod subsistit, tamen per aliud formaliter est suppositum divinum et per aliud subsistit. Est enim formaliter suppositum per proprietatem relativam per quam distinguitur ab aliis suppositis, sed subsistit per solam essentiam vel substantiam quae est una numero et indistincta in omnibus. Propter quod esse subsistens nihil faciat ad pluralitatem seu distinctionem suppositorum divinorum, sed ad oppositionem incommunicabilitatis.’ 28 The issue of quaternity in connection to the Lateran decree had by now gone a long way in the discussion. In chronological order: Durandus, Quodl. Paris. I q. 1 a. 2, 13ra–b (pp. 59. 1–61. 3, ed. Takada); Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 7 a. 2, 47ra; 1314 censure, aa. 6 and 13; Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 1 pp. 58. 23–60. 18; Hervaeus, Correctiones, pp. 294. 2–12; 298. 16–300. 11; 321. 35–322. 23; and Wnally 1317 censure, aa. 9, 14, and 26. 29 See Hervaeus, Quodl. I q. 9, 21ra: ‘Quaecumque sunt diversae realitates simpliciter et in actu existentes sunt diversae essentiae.’

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things (rerum). But it does not condemn, either explicitly or implicitly, a real quaternity of relations.30 As Durandus reasons, Joachim understood the Lombard’s deWnition of the essence as a quaedam summa res to be introducing a quaternity into God, that is, ‘the three persons and the common essence as a fourth’.31 That ‘fourth’, Durandus argues, clearly refers to a person, a term which the council omits because it is tacitly understood by the preceding words, reading ‘three persons’. But Durandus’s citation of the decree excludes the Wnal statement, which speciWes that ‘in God there is a Trinity only and not a quaternity, since each of the three persons is that reality (res)’.32 The omission is signiWcant because the statement in question draws attention to the communicability of the essence, an aspect which Durandus’s relational account tends to overlook. Whereas the cited lines seem to support, at least at a textual level, Durandus’s interpretation of the decree as condemning a quaternity of persons, the Wnal statement—omitted by Durandus—on the real identity between the persons and the essence makes the case stronger for Hervaeus. According to the line set out by the Lombard and followed by Aquinas, Hervaeus checks the risk of quaternity by stressing the commonality of the essence in its real identity with all divine realities. Durandus comes from a diVerent direction, and escapes quaternity rather by disengaging the subsistent reality of the essence from the non-subsistent reality of relation, 30 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 48. 29: ‘Et sic patet quod ibi non condemnatur expresse nisi quaternitas personarum, verumtamen condemnatur expresse ibidem concomitative quaternitas rerum inter personas et essentiam . . . propter quod sicut non est inter personas et essentiam quaternitas personarum, sic nec quaternitas rerum. Sed quia una relatio non includitur in intraneitate alterius, nec de pluralitate relationum divinarum se intromisit concilium, quin immo omnes doctores fatentur quatuor relationes reales esse in divinis, ideo nec directe nec expresse nec concomitative condemnatur ibi quaternitas realium relationum, et dicere oppositum est adinventio irrationalis.’ 31 Ibid. 48. 29: ‘Magister sententiarum . . . dicit in suis sententiis quod quaedam summa res est pater et Wlius et spiritus sanctus, et illa non est generat neque genita neque procedens, unde ex hoc assumebat Ioachim quod magister sententiarum non tam trinitatem quam quaternitatem astruebat in deo, videlicet tres personas et illam communem essentiam quasi quartam. Haec sunt verba decretalis de quibus apparet quod ille imponebat magistro sententiarum quod ipse ponebat quaternitatem personarum . . . Ad quod refertur illud quartum? Utique ad personam de qua immediate praemiserat tres personas, sed textus non addit ‘‘et essentiam quasi quartam personam’’, quia ex praecedenti clare intelligebatur, et quia clausula dictaminis obviabat.’ (My italics.) Cf. Decrees, ed. Tanner, 231: ‘unde asserit, quod ille [i.e. Petrus Lombardus] non tam Trinitatem quam quaternitatem adstruebat in Deo, videlicet tres personas et illam communem essentiam quasi quartam . . .’ (My italics.) 32 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 48. 29: ‘De hac autem quaternitate personarum excusat decretalis magistrum Petro, sic dicens ‘‘nos autem sacro approbante concilio credimus et conWtemur una cum Petro quod una quaedam res est incomprahensibilis quidem et ineVabilis pater, Wlius, et spiritus sanctus, tres simul personae ac sigillatim quaelibet earundem. Et ideo in deo solummodo ternitas est et non quaternitas.’’ Haec sunt verba decretalis’. Cf. Decrees, ed. Tanner, 232: ‘et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo non quaternitas, quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res . . .’ (My italics.)

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such that divine unity rests precisely on their real distinction and not on their real identity. Thus, by prioritizing relative incommunicability over essential communicability, Durandus was perceived as running counter to the Lombard’s account and the Thomist view inspired by it. As Thomists understood the Lateran tradition, therefore, God’s Trinitarian nature is to be safeguarded by limiting the number of realities to three. Accordingly, Thomists claim that the Council quite plainly condemned the introduction of a fourth reality distinct from the subsistent reality of the essence and the persons who share in it. In this light, Durandus’s claim that as a non-subsistent being relation is really distinct from the essence, was clearly within the scope of the Council’s condemnation. For Durandus, on the other hand, God’s Trinitarian nature needs to be safeguarded not from an excess of divine realities, but from a reduction to one absolute substance. Hence Durandus’s reading of the decree, according to which the Council’s purpose had been to condemn a quaternity of persons and not of realities tout court, since a council whose aim was to defend the Trinity would ipso facto seek to resist the downgrading of the threefold divine reality. This dovetails with Durandus’s enduring conviction that the main objective of the Lateran decree, and indeed of all conciliar legislations regarding the Trinity, was rather to prevent possible reoccurrences of Sabellianism.33 To illustrate his point, Durandus draws an interesting parallel with the decree ‘Fideli’ of the Second Council of Lyons of 1274.34 By bringing this decree to the foreground, Durandus was touching a sensitive Wbre in the Dominican psyche. As is well known, Aquinas died on the way to Lyons, where he would have taken part as one of the Council’s notable members (among them were also Albert the Great and Bonaventure) in support of the cause for the Wlioque. Thus, Dominicans would perceive the double procession not only as a doctrinally central issue, but also as a matter intimately linked to the order’s esprit de corps. In essence, the conciliar decree determined that the Spirit proceeds from Father and Son as one principle, that is, by one 33 Recall Durandus’s confessio (s. 7.2 above): ‘est condemnata haeresis Sabelliana . . . per symbolum Nicenum, . . . et per documentum Athanasii et per Innocentium in . . . ‘‘Firmiter’’ et ‘‘Damnamus’’ ’. 34 The Second Council of Lyons was convoked by Gregory X in 1274, with the main purpose of bringing about the union with the Greek Church. The union was to be achieved upon Greek adherence to the dogmatic deWnition of the procession of the Spirit, in the terms rendered by the conciliar constitution ‘Fideli’: ‘Fideli ac devota professione fatemur, quod Spiritus Sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione, procedit . . .’ For the full text, see Decrees, ed. Tanner, 303–31. To my knowledge, only once before did Durandus adduce the ‘Fideli’ constitution, and that was in the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet (q. 2 p. 65. 3–8), in support of the ‘unicity’ claim that spiration proceeds from Father and Son as one principle and not as two spirative powers.

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(unica) spiration only and not two. As Durandus reads it, the decree deWned spiration as ‘one’ (unica) procession in the sense that spiration signiWes one relation of origin really distinct from the generation of the Son. Durandus thus accommodates the Council’s deWnition to his own account of the processions, and reasserts his view that the Wlioque hinges on the one power of spiration shared by Father and Son and not on the mediation of passive generation. On these grounds, Durandus charges Hervaeus with misinterpreting the words of the Council, a misinterpretation which Hervaeus forces, Durandus claims, into the representation of the Lateran condemnation. On the false metaphysics that only absolute things are real, with the implication that real identity precludes a plurality of real beings, Hervaeus erroneously infers that the relations of active spiration and passive generation must be really identical because they are both found in one and the same suppositum, i.e. the Son. In this way, Durandus contends, from an ill focused understanding of the Lyons Council—in which unica is attributed to the real identity between active spiration and passive generation—Hervaeus imposes a misrepresentation of the Lateran decree, according to which ‘quaternity’ is said to cover relations as well.35 In Durandus’s view, therefore, those councils which have determined on matters concerning the Trinity have condemned neither explicitly nor implicitly the claim of real distinction beyond opposition. On the contrary, Durandus believes that the conciliar deWnitions in question tend to favour his own views, as is particularly clear with the decree ‘Fideli’, which plainly determines that active spiration is found in the Son as a distinct relation from passive generation. By the same token, since the crucial dogmatic deWnitions had not decided on the claim of real distinction, the issue does not touch matters of faith, and Durandus’s position cannot be accountable as heretical. The claim of real distinction and the related view of disparate relations constitute a matter of opinion, and, as such, Durandus’s solution should be taken as an explanation of divine reality as probable as any other.36 35 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 49. 30: ‘Item advertant illi qui frivola et levi ratione volunt probare quod illa decretalis ‘‘Damnamus’’ excludat quaternitatem realium relationum quam eYcaci ratione convincimus, eos eam in hoc male intelligere, quia constat quod divina spiratio quaedam relatio realis est et unica, sicut concilium generale Lugdunensis determinat extra de summa Trinitate et Wde catholica c. ‘‘Fideli’’ lib. 6. Ex quo sic arguitur: sicut se habet absolutum ad absoluta, ita relatio ad relationes. Sed essentia divina una existens quantumcumque sit inWnita non potest esse eadem realiter cum pluribus absolutis realiter inter se diVerentibus, immo hoc ponere esset contradictio. Ergo, a fortiori ratione spiratio activa existens unica relatio ut iam patet ex determinatione concilii, quae etiam ut relatio est non est inWnita simpliciter, alioquin essent plura inWnita simpliciter, et plures inWnitates non possunt esse eadem realiter . . . Et sic isti male exponentes concilium primum impingunt in secundum . . .’ 36 Ibid. 49. 30: ‘unde credo quod de diVerentia relationum disparatarum nihil est determinatum per quodcumque concilium, sed est materia opinabilis et pro et contra, et quod cum

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(ii) Perhaps realizing the compromising implications of his previous ‘recantation’,37 in his Wnal account of the Wlioque Durandus reverts to his initial view, albeit still rejecting every claim suggestive of an order of priority between the processions. Calling to mind the original account in the early commentary, Durandus claimed that relation constitutes the principle of production in God, such that the processions signify distinct relations between an active principle and a passive product. Productivity goes hand in hand with relative opposition, whereby Durandus’s view of the processions is unintelligible without the appropriate metaphysics of modes of being. Countenancing his initial account, Durandus claims in the Wnal recension that passive generation and passive spiration correspond to distinct relations of production, whereby passive generation cannot be related by origin to passive spiration. The Son also spirates the Spirit, not because the Son is the product of generation, but because he also enjoys spirative power on account of his consubstantiality with the Father.38 By rejecting a connection of origin between passive generation and passive spiration, therefore, Durandus’s mature position preserves the contrast with the standard Thomist account of the Wlioque, according to which the Son also spirates the Spirit because the Father has communicated to him the power of spiration through generation. As was made clear, this account places the stress on the communicability of the essence from one procession to the other, rather than on their relative distinction. On the highly controversial issue of an order of priority, Durandus prudently decides to abide by Hervaeus’s criticisms. Following verbatim the Wrst Avignon Quodlibet, he clears his statements from all ambiguities by rejecting determinatione ultimi concilii Lugdunensis magis concordat opinio ponens eas diVerre realiter quam opposita, verumtamen, si etiam Romana ecclesia cuius est concilia condere et interpretari, determinaret certam personam in hac materia vel in quacumque alia tangente Wdem vel bonos mores illam partem absque ulla haesitatione vellem tenere. Et si quod docui vel scripsi vel in posterum docuero vel scripsero cuius oppositum praedicta sancta Romana ecclesia deYniverit vel deYniet esse sentiendum, illud revoco et volo pro revocato haberi. Interim cum opinionibus doctorum disputans.’ 37 See Durandus, Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 pp. 72. 12–75. 14. Also s. 10.1 above. 38 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 13 q. 2, 49. 31: ‘ostensum enim fuit . . . quod spiritus non est per se directe a genito vel a generante ut isti dicunt, sed indirecte et concomitative. Et illud facit quod diVerent secundum suppositum sine qua diVerentia adhuc possent diVerre realiter si essent in eodem supposito sicut generare et spirare . . .’ Also C Sent. I d. 12 q. 1, 45. 6–8: ‘Istud autem non videtur, scilicet quod spiritus sanctus sit per se a genito et generante, quia cuicumque competit quod ab ipso sit spiritus per se, ei competit quod sit spirans per se. Sed genito et generanti non competit eis per se quod ab ipsis sit spiritus . . . quia omne genitum inquantum genitum est productum, ergo nullum genitum inquantum genitum est producens, ergo nec spirans . . . Quod concedimus dicentes quod inter generationem Wlii et spirationem spiritus sancti est quidem ordo originis, sed non per se et directe, sed indirecte et concomitative, et quasi per accidens . . .’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 12 q. un., 59rb–60ra; I d. 13 q. un., 64vb.

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any claim which could suggest a real order of priority between the processions.39 As Hervaeus’s tracts and the Wrst censure made clear,40 Durandus’s initial treatment of the Wlioque had been understood in connection with the thesis of a ‘natural order of priority’ between disparate relations, such that it was made liable to subordinationist tendencies. That is, by rejecting an order of origin between passive generation and passive spiration, Durandus was understood by Thomists as automatically introducing an order of priority, whereby the procession of the Spirit presupposes the constitution of the person of the Son through generation. By the time the Avignon Quodlibet was issued, Durandus had already been made aware of the risks involved in his explanation of the processions, as a result of which, and no doubt under pressure, he decided to revise his initial account of the Wlioque. At the time of composing the Wnal recension, and already free from Dominican jurisdiction, Durandus had thus decided to revert to his previous view on the Wlioque. But he remained careful to disengage it from any claim suggesting an order of priority between the processions. The Thomist strict understanding of an order of origin as the basis of divine equality precluded any other type of connection between the processions as automatically leading to subordinationism. Aware of this, Durandus took a twofold course of action. He reincorporated his account of the Wlioque back into the parameters of his metaphysics of relation—thus redressing the rather disparate results of his previous revision—while at the same time removing all ambiguities concerning an order of priority—thus preventing a misrepresentation of his view as leading to subordinationism. The Wlioque was, and still is, a very sensitive issue, and Durandus perhaps thought it advisable to comply, this once, with the ‘common opinion’. The question of an order of priority is so far the only case in which Durandus has incorporated a deWnite change in his position. That Durandus ultimately paid heed to the Thomist qualms about an order of priority could at Wrst glance be taken to reXect the unsystematic way in which Durandus revised some passages in the last recension, which carries some signs of an 39 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 12 q. 1, 46. 21: ‘nihil quod sit in Wlio praecedit quodcumque eorum quae sunt in patre; pater autem nihil habet a Wlio nec a quocumque alio, sed a seipso. Sed spiratio activa est in patre. Ergo, Wliatio non praecedit ipsam. Sed processio seu spiratio passiva simul est omni modo simultatis cum spiratione activa cum sint relationes oppositae, ergo Wliatio nullo modo praecedit secundum rem spirationem passivam seu processionem, nec per consequens paternitas, quae simul est cum Wliatione. Et sic patet quod nulla relatio divina praecedit realiter aliam, neque oppositam neque disparatam.’ At the end of this question, he adds, echoing the Avignon Quodlibet: ‘prioritas naturalis praesuppositionis . . . aliis videatur, et non irrationabiliter, quod iste modus loquendi in hac materia sit improprius et nimis extensus’ (46. 27). Cf. Quodl. Aven. I q. 3 pp. 73. 26–35; 75. 10–14. 40 See Hervaeus, De articulis, a. 5, pp. 452. 413–453. 433. For the censure, see ‘Articuli nonaginate tres’, p. 55 a. 5.

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irregular evolution. On more careful consideration, however, Durandus could have distanced himself from the claim of an order of priority because it entailed unwelcome repercussions in his account of the Wlioque, which exposed his view as open to subordinationist tendencies. Durandus presumably wanted to avoid ambiguities of a kind which could be detrimental to his overall position. On the other hand, by re-establishing his initial account of the Wlioque, Durandus rectiWed what had Wrst appeared as a somewhat disjointed account, staggering between divergent metaphysics. Likewise, in those other instances in which he incorporated alien elements (as with the Scotist formal distinction), Durandus articulated the new opinion according to his own metaphysical framework, thereby achieving a more coherent evolution to a mature stance.

12.3. THE DIVINE PERSONS The discussion on this issue has involved mainly two aspects: (i) Wrst, the semantic question of whether ‘person’ is the name of a thing or a name of intention;41 (ii) second, and speciWcally in a Trinitarian context, whether relations, and if so in what capacity, are constitutive of the divine persons.42 On the Wrst issue, the standard Thomist account claims that ‘person’ signiWes a self-subsistent individual of a rational nature. Central to this account is the idea of a certain dignity ascribed to a person on account of its self-subsistence, and distinguishing him from other individual substances. Durandus raises mainly two objections against this view. According to the Wrst, the Thomist focus on subsistence seems to overlook the very mark of a person, namely its distinction from other individuals, which, according to Durandus, is more appropriately conveyed by the note of incommunicability.43 As before, Durandus inserts the sneering remark, now with added 41 See Durandus A Sent. I d. 23 q. un.; I d. 34, q. 1 a. 2; C Sent. I d. 23 q. 1; I d. 34 q. 1. For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 23 q. 1 a. 3; I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 9 a. 4; ST I q. 29 a. 4. For Hervaeus, see Sent. I d. 23 q. 1. See also ‘Articuli in quibus’, a. 21. As in previous instances within the Wnal recension, also in this question we Wnd the characteristic tendency to separate the divine from the created orders when it concerns delicate issues. Whereas in the early commentary the question of the constitution of the persons was dealt with within the broader issue of the relation between nature and suppositum (see A Sent. I d. 34 q. 1), in the Wnal recension it is divided into two distinct questions, one dealing with created supposita (d. 34 q. 1), and the other with the divine persons (d. 34 q. 2). 42 See Durandus, A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1; C Sent. I d. 26 q. 1. For Aquinas, see Sent. I d. 26 q. 1 a. 1; De Pot., q. 8 a. 3 ad 7; q. 9 a.4; ST I q. 29 a. 4. For Hervaeus, see Sent. I d. 32 q. 1; I d. 25 q. 1. See also ‘Articuli in quibus’, a. 45 (Additamenta). 43 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 70. 6–12.

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venom, that even though in strict theological use ‘person’ is taken as a name of intention, ‘ordinary people’ use the name more broadly to signify some thing underlying an intention, as when we say ‘this is a good person’.44 Durandus certainly seized the bishop’s licence to make an irreverent pun on the ‘common opinion’ and dismiss it as the opinion of the populace. More instructive in what it reveals of its underlying metaphysics is Durandus’s second objection. This time Durandus addresses the Thomist claim that, understood in abstract, ‘person’ does not connote either absolute or relative, for both in creatures and in the divine the notion of an individual substance cannot be said to be formally either absolute or relative.45 Durandus rejects this view, on the grounds that the mere idea that the concept of a real thing could be abstracted from the notions of absolute and relative falsely presupposes that the concept of ‘thing’ is univocal to both substance and relation. According to Durandus, nothing, not even the concept of being, can be said to be univocally predicated in common of absolute and relative.46 Underlying this idea is Durandus’s basic theory of the analogy of being and the notion central to it, that the primary ontological divide 44 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 70. 13: ‘Licet enim origo nominis personae fuerit a reputatione laudum cum Wctione cuiusdam larvae, tractum est tamen ad signiWcandum suppositum intellectualis naturae, puto ergo quod nomen personae prout Boethius et Richardus eo utuntur et describunt ipsum et prout sumitur in divinis signiWcat ratione suppositi et non rem subiectam rationi . . . vulgus tamen aliter utitur nomine personae, scilicet pro re subiecta intentioni individui vagi, ut cum dicimus quod ‘‘iste vel ille est bona persona’’. . .’ (The emphasized line is new to C.) This is one instance of Durandus’s intolerance with imprecision in language or blind repetition of common doctrines. In his determination to uncompromising inquiry, he does not hesitate to translate opinio communis into opinio vulgaris. 45 Ibid. 70. 14–71. 15: ‘Si vero signiWcet rem intentioni subiecta, ut dicit secunda opinio, adhuc posset videri alicui quod nomen personae non signiWcat substantiam nec relationem, sed abstrahit ab utroque. [P]atet per diYnitionem personae quam ponit Boethius, scilicet quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia, quod idem est, ac si diceretur, persona est suppositum, ibi enim ponitur substantia individua pro supposito vel hypostasi, vel est tanquam suppositum naturae intellectualis. Extra autem signiWcatum et intellectum huius diYnitionis est essentia et relatio . . . Si enim in divinis non esset nisi unum suppositum essentiale et absolutum, ut gentiles imaginantur, illi naturae vere competeret ratio personae.’ Again, Durandus’s account seems to be guided by the same insight which led Gilbert to reject Boethius’s deWnition. For Gilbert, see Commentaries, ed. Ha¨ring, 145. 30, 146. 34. For Aquinas, see De Pot., q. 9 a. 4; ST I q. 29 a. 4. 46 See Durandus, C Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 71. 16: ‘nullus conceptus unus realis et essentialis potest abstrahere a substantia et relatione. Nomen enim impositum secundum illum conceptum esset univocum substantiae et relationi, quod non est possibile, propter quod si persona signiWceret rem subiectam intentioni cum illa dicatur essentialiter de persona absoluta in creaturis et de relata in divinis, impossibile est quod hoc sit secundum unum conceptum abstrahentem ab utroque, quia sic esset aliquid univocum ad utrumque.’ See also Quodl. Aven. III q. 1 p. 246. 23–8: ‘ens non dicitur univoce de substantia et de caeteris praedicamentis. Quod patet sic: Illud quod de quo dicitur ens formaliter et essentialiter, et illud de quo non dicitur ens nisi quia entis, non univocantur, ut sic in ente. Sed substantia dicitur ens formaliter et essentialiter; caetera autem praedicamenta non dicuntur entia nisi quia sunt entis’; and p. 248. 11–18.

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holds between absolute and relative, rather than, as Thomist metaphysics would have it, between substance and accidents. The ontological value of a thing, and what ultimately assigns it its place within the categories, is determined by its mode of being as an absolute or a relative thing. Following this line, Durandus claims that created persons are formally absolute substances, whereas the divine supposita are formally relational beings. The contrast with the Thomist position is marked: a divine person signiWes not the subsistent essence—as Thomists propound—but an incommunicable suppositum.47 On the second issue, Durandus introduces remarkably little or no change in respect to his account in the prima lectura. Thus, as before, he criticizes the Thomist view whereby the persons are constituted by subsistent properties at the expense of relations of origin, for he sees it as tantamount to establishing distinction according to absolute, rather than relative, modes.48 As Durandus argues, if the persons are distinguished by their note of incommunicability, then it is as relative modes that relations must be constitutive of the persons. Otherwise the trinity of persons would become a trinity of absolute substances.49 Durandus is here driven, as in other aspects of his Trinitarian doctrine, by a rejection of what he perceives as a tritheistic tendency inherent in the Thomist contrast between personal properties and relations of origin. Despite Dominican criticism,50 Durandus decided to leave his account of the divine persons as it was. Perhaps he had no time to revise it, or he thought a revision was unnecessary, either because he remained convinced of his initial view, or because he considered the Dominican criticisms insuYcient to induce modiWcations. On the other hand, Dominican reaction had been less severe on this issue, and Durandus could always adduce, with a good degree of legitimacy, the combined authority of Augustine and Richard of St Victor in support of his relational account. In this light, the fact that Durandus did not introduce any changes in his position on this issue could also respond to the importance he attached to avoiding all forms of anti-Trinitarian reductionism. According to Durandus’s priorities, to make of relations subsistent 47 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 23 q. 1, 71. 17: ‘Illud de cuius ratione est quod sit subsistens, distinctum, et incommunicabile, includit in se illud per quod subsistit et illud per quod est distinctum et incommunicabile . . . Sed in divinis quicquid subsistit, subsistit per essentiam . . . quicquid distinguitur et est incommunicabile, hoc habet per proprietatem relativam.’ 48 Ibid., d. 26 q. 1, 75. 16: ‘Si ergo ratio proprietatis sit aliquid commune ad rationem relationis et formae absolutae, ponendo quod ratio proprietatis sit ratio constitutiva, non excluditur per hoc quod ratio relationis non sit constitutiva, nisi ponendo quod aliquid sub ratione absoluta sit constitutivum, quod non possit esse in divinis.’ Cf. A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 101va–b. 49 Durandus, C Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 75. 17. Cf. A Sent. I d. 26 q. 1, 101vb. 50 See e.g. a. 45 of the second censure list. ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 81.

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The Controversy

beings defeated the very purpose of introducing the category of relation in God, namely that of explaining the plurality of the persons within the absolute unity of the essence. This is the guiding insight in Durandus’s modal doctrine. The fact that Durandus remained steadfast on this issue throughout the discussion testiWes to its centrality in his thought.

Conclusions: Durandus’s Enlightened Conservatism In the preceding pages, I have attempted to reconstruct the nearly twentyyear-long controversy which took place at the start of the fourteenth century between the Dominican Durandus of St Pourc¸ain and his order’s authorities. This task has provided the opportunity to examine a number of interrelated phenomena, which together help us form a clearer picture of the intellectual landscape of the time: the rise and expansion of Thomism as a recognized theological authority; the scope and legitimacy of the professional exercise of theology; the relation between magisterial and ecclesiastical authority. At the centre of it all, it has exposed the varying forces and fortunes which shaped the theological thought of a particular Dominican master, whose ‘maverick’ status thrust him into the eye of the doctrinal storm of his day. The account has centred on three theological issues, whose recurrence throughout the controversy cast them as bearers of the polemical weight: the connection between relation and its foundation, the distinction of the divine processions, and the constitution of the divine persons. The question of the connection between relation and its foundation had been traditionally dealt with within a Trinitarian context. The basic assumption behind that tradition had been a fundamental identity between essence and relation, which it was then the theologian’s task to qualify into a trinity of persons. This programme derived from Peter Lombard’s presentation of the issue in the Sentences, a presentation which centred on a defence of the claim of real identity between the essence and the personal properties against Gilbert of Poitiers’s more problematic conception of divine relations as ‘extrinsically attached’ to the essence. Fourteenth-century theologians inherited the question in these terms, and tended to examine categorical relations only as a secondary matter. It was in this context that Durandus introduced his claim of real distinction between essence and relation in God. Durandus advanced this claim on the basis of a modal doctrine indebted, in principle, to Henry of Ghent, but which Durandus informed with an alternative metaphysics of absolute and relative ultimately at odds with Henry’s own intent.

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Conclusions

The main advantage in explaining relation in modal terms was to establish a type of being with suYcient ontological value to perform an explanatory function, but not suYcient to eVect composition or numerical plurality. This Wtted Durandus’s theological agenda, in that it facilitated a fairly competent explanation of distinction in God without jeopardizing the unity of the essence. Like Bonaventure, Durandus had opted for an ontological approach to the question—an approach which grounded distinction on degrees of reality, rather than on degrees of identity. But this solution came with compromising strings attached. It explained distinction in God on the basis of a reality which escapes essential communicability, thus sounding dangerously close to Gilbert’s claim. Thomists retorted along this line and, disclosing their allegiance to the Lombard, charged Durandus’s account with quaternarism. Durandus’s modal doctrine was only the tip of the iceberg. On the basis of his alternative metaphysics, Durandus propounded the view that relations, rather than the essence, account for production in God. On this account, the processions signify ‘relational units’, made up of an active principle and a passive product, and ending in the constitution of a distinct suppositum. The guiding assumption was that, as relations are the principles of distinction in God, so relations must account for the constitution of the persons. This assumption dovetailed neatly with Durandus’s view that the divine persons signify relational rather than absolute substances, since, in the divine, the note of incommunicability is signiWed by relation, not by the essence. Durandus thus distanced himself from Boethius’s deWnition, favoured by Thomists, since its focus on subsistence threatened to obscure the distinction between the persons and the divine substance. Again, the associations with the Porretan were apparent. With his avowed fear of Sabellianism, it was of paramount importance for Durandus to establish the Trinity of persons on the basis of a reality distinct from the subsistent reality of the essence. Thus, Durandus’s doctrinal instincts, like those of Gilbert earlier, responded more readily to threats of reductionism than to those of division. This meant, however, that the issue of divine unity, fully fortiWed on the Thomist front, was left relatively unguarded on Durandus’s, making his solution liable to the kind of criticism once levelled at the Porretan. Durandus’s modal doctrine and its accompanying claim of real distinction unleashed a series of theological consequences in blunt confrontation with Thomist priorities. Following the Lateran principle that the Trinity rests on essential communicability rather than on real distinction, Thomists identiWed divine unity as the basic Trinitarian premiss, which they saw best safeguarded by the claim of real identity between essence and relations. From this point of view, two aspects in Durandus’s account caused particular concern. First, by prioritizing relative distinction over communicability in the explanation of

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the processions, it seriously challenged the consubstantiality of the persons, which rested rather on the communication of essential power throughout the processions. By the same token, since distinction is governed by a nonsubsistent reality, Durandus saw no problem in allowing real distinction beyond relative opposition, thereby overlooking Anselm’s principle, which axiomatically excluded real distinction within one and the same suppositum. Second, and more worrying, it made the case more diYcult for the Wlioque, a doctrinal point which Thomists saw as relying on the essential connection between passive generation and spiration, a type of connection which they recognized in the psychological model but which Durandus’s relational account automatically precluded. Moreover, and to conWrm Thomist scepticism further, Durandus’s broader understanding of distinction left the door open for establishing an order of priority of some sort between one disparate relation and another. This led Durandus to claim, in an unfortunate formula, that passive spiration is ‘concomitant’ or ‘accidental’ to the persons of the Father and the Son. To Thomist Dominicans, it all seemed clear: Durandus’s account had not only jeopardized the cause for the Wlioque but had also established an order of priority in God. Not surprisingly, Durandus’s view produced an outcry. The order’s oYcials were determined to make a precedent of his case, and with this in mind they issued two censure lists, one in 1314 and the other in 1317, containing those theses from Durandus’s commentary which seemed to have the greater destabilizing potential. The censures mark a climax in the doctrinal clash, with Durandus’s independent approach on the one side and the Dominican attempt to enforce a uniform account of Thomism on the other. An examination of Hervaeus Natalis’s criticisms and the criteria behind the censures, however, has shown that the Thomist arguments hardly amounted to an unadulterated repetition of Aquinas’s teaching. Rather, ‘Thomism’, for fourteenth-century Dominicans, implied a complex doctrinal programme, summarized in the Lateran decree, and underpinned by considerable hermeneutical groundwork. Much of the groundwork rested on a standard interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, exempliWed in three main issues. First, the categories: according to the standard view, the primary categorical division is between substances and accidents, so that whatever is not a substance necessarily inheres and eVects composition. In order to avoid introducing accidentality into God, therefore, it was crucial to assert a real identity between the essence and relations. At the root of the claim of real identity was the accepted Aristotelian characterization of relation as a ‘diminished entity’ which, rather than suggesting a distinct ontological status, was taken to underline the fact that relation draws all its reality from its foundation, but contributes minimally to its foundation’s being.

278

Conclusions

Secondly, the notion of change: according to the standard explanation, change is a movement from potentiality to actuality, whereby the principle of change has to be a fully actual being and not a diminished entity such as relation. Applied to the Trinity, this meant that the processions were to be explained as univocal acts of production founded on the essence, by virtue of which the essence communicates its being from an active principle to a passive product. Only by identifying the principle of production with the essence, it was believed, could the equality of the persons and the simultaneity of the processions be preserved against subordinationism. Thirdly, the notion of ‘common nature’: although Aquinas unequivocally rejected the common-nature analogy as inappropriate for the divine essence, Hervaeus succeeded in incorporating the Scotist insight in a way that suited his interpretation of Thomism. Following Scotus, Hervaeus claimed that, as an inWnite substance, the divine essence is capable of being predicated by identity of the three persons without incurring division. On this conception, the type of identity which obtains between essence and relations is articulated in terms of modes of predication, not modes of being. Both the Scotist formal distinction and the analogous non-convertible identity propounded by Hervaeus rested on this idea. Although on the surface deviating from Aquinas’s view on the matter, Hervaeus was still respectful of the fundamentals of Thomism. First of all, the Scotist formal distinction could be seen as an elaboration of Aquinas’s distinction between the ratio and the esse of a thing. In both cases, distinction always presupposes a real identity. Secondly, the Scotist conception of the essence as a ‘common nature’ bore a profound aYnity with Anselm’s principle of communicability by identity, a principle which the Lombard’s formula of a quaedam summa res was seen to encapsulate and the Lateran decree to rehearse in an enhanced, canonical form. Thus, by virtue of Hervaeus’s admirable exercise of doctrinal synthesis, Scotist insights came to form an integral part of the fourteenth-century idea of Thomism. Hervaeus’s Thomism provides an instructive case for understanding the reception of Aquinas’s teaching by Dominicans of Thomist persuasion writing after the Correctoria controversy and before Aquinas’s canonization in 1323. The hermeneutical work behind the preservation and promotion of Aquinas’s writings was quite considerable. The credibility which Hervaeus enjoyed as a leading Dominican among members of the order, together with his competence as a theologian in his own right, accorded him signiWcant ascendancy over other possible apostles of Aquinas’s teaching—an ascendancy which at the time was perhaps only matched by that of John of Naples. Illustrative of this are those instances within the ‘Thomist’ censure of 1317, notably article 10, in which Aquinas’s view is not unequivocal, but in which

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the censor (in this case John) is still perceived to be oVering an interpretation of Aquinas’s teaching, in contrast to Durandus’s deviation from it. A more patent example is article 126, on Christ’s human existence, which explicitly refers to Hervaeus’s alternative view on the matter. Again, although in Pierre de la Palud’s report Hervaeus does not appear to comply with Thomist teaching any more faithfully than Durandus, it is the latter, not Hervaeus, who earns the non-Thomist label.1 That Hervaeus ostensibly borrowed from Scotist insights makes this all the more remarkable, given that it was a time when Aquinas’s authority was still questioned in some quarters which would not necessarily advocate the soundness of Hervaeus’s doctrinal eclecticism. That a Thomist in Hervaeus’s position should have had a comparatively liberal use of alien sources, and, for that matter, that John of Naples should have felt entitled to impose his own interpretation of Aquinas’s teaching, suggests that what was ultimately at issue in the censure against Durandus was not so much the question of which of the competing views was more authentically Thomist, but which oVered the best means to preserve Aquinas’s theological inheritance while bringing it up to date with competitive school standards. By incorporating Scotus’s latest innovations into his elaboration of Thomism, Hervaeus was seeking to buttress Aquinas’s doctrine in ways palatable to fourteenth-century sensibilities. Likewise, by attempting to Wle down the ambiguities into one ‘oYcial’ Thomist view, John was seeking to consolidate his order’s intellectual ascendancy with doctrinal uniformity. In this light, the conXict of authorities registered by the censure does not present a case of younger generations vying with out-dated conventions. It testiWes rather to the crucial role played by zealous successors in the shaping of an intellectual tradition. In this light, the Dominican backlash against Durandus appeared as one of the Wnal stages in a reaction which had started as a defence of Aquinas’s reputation after the Correctoria controversy, and had by now been transformed into an active campaign of doctrinal promotion. This campaign operated on a twofold strategy. It sought to reappropriate Lateran orthodoxy 1 ‘Articuli in quibus’, p. 96: ‘[126] Eadem d. [6] q. 2, utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse, tenet quod, licet in Christo non sit nisi unum esse subsistentiae, sunt tamen plura esse actualis existentiae et inexistentiae, et quod humana natura in Christo habet proprium esse actualis existentiae. Contra Thomam eadem d. q. 5, ubi quaerit utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse. Consideratis hiis quae dicit in corpore quaestionis videtur sentire non esse in Christo plura esse substantialia, non solum subsistentiae, sed nec existentiae. Item etiam dicit in ultima parte quod, si natura humana adveniret personae divinae accidentaliter, veraciter essent plura esse. Nunc autem quia in unitatem suppositi assumitur, non est ibi nisi unum esse, licet ad illud argumentum respondeat magister Hervaeus sustinens in Christo plura esse, et dicat quod Thomas ponit in Christo plura esse nono Quolibet q. 3; item in q. disp. De unione Verbi.’ (My italics.) This article was extracted by Pierre de la Palud from bk III of Durandus’s commentary.

280

Conclusions

for the Thomist cause, and at the same time to invest Thomism with the relative unanimity accorded to the common opinion. The two were intrinsically linked. For the fact that Thomism was promoted on a Lateran platform drew an immediate association between Aquinas’s case and the Lombard’s, and with it the incipient notion of a ‘magisterial common opinion’. Indeed, the tradition inaugurated by the canonical endorsement of the Lombard had a lot to do with the future success of Thomism. Interestingly, both Aquinas and the Lombard underwent initial disapproval by church authorities (though in neither case did this amount to a formal condemnation), followed by formal ratiWcation and eventual incorporation into the canonical literature.2 But more signiWcantly, just as the Lombard’s Sentences became the main object of commentary in the thirteenth and well into the fourteenth century, Aquinas’s Summa became the standard Dominican theological reference in the second half of the Wfteenth. This parallel evolution points to a more profound connection between the two traditions, and it may be this connection which explains why Durandus became the chosen target of Dominican reforming zeal, over other possible candidates like James of Metz or Dietrich of Freiberg, also well-known non-Thomist Dominicans. That Durandus delivered his controversial view in the framework of a Sentences commentary also has a signiWcance we should not underestimate. By the beginning of the fourteenth century the Sentences had long been established as the favoured form of theological expression, and the censure’s exclusive reference to Durandus’s commentary is illustrative in this respect. Indeed, by the time the second censure was issued, in 1317, Durandus had already produced, in addition to his commentary, Wve quodlibetal disputations and an oYcial justiWcation of his view. That the censure decided to bypass the later works and concentrate again on Durandus’s prima lectura testiWes to the importance attached to the commentary as a unifying theological reference. And that Durandus took the trouble to produce two revised versions further conWrms this impression.3 Thus, to begin with, the organ2 In referring to the Lombard, I have in mind the Christological disputes of the 1160s and the 1170s, and the condemantion of so-called ‘Christological nihilianism’ in connection with the Lombard’s name in 1170, and again in 1177, by Alexander III. It is however a matter of dispute whether or not the Lombard subscribed to the nihilistic claims. The Lombard’s Trinitarian theology, by contrast, ended in the unique privilege of the formal approbation of his doctrine in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. As for Aquinas, although it is still a matter of much debate, one could say with some certainty that his views were at least indirectly targeted by the 1277 Paris condemnation, only to be rehabilitated some Wfty years later by John XXII, with Aquinas’s canonization in 1323. 3 On the role of the Sentences commentary as an organ for publicizing theological views in later scholasticism, see R. L. Friedman, ‘The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320: General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination’, in G. R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 41–128.

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izational principles of the commentary facilitated the doctrinal contrast between Durandus and Aquinas. But more signiWcantly, in its history as a literary genre, the commentary carried a doctrinal baggage which immediately connected it with the Lateran tradition and the idea of magisterial authority. By using the commentary to publicize his theology, Durandus was already casting his views against the background of this tradition. This exposed his work to a form of systematic criticism which other, more elusive genres of literary production could have spared him. Durandus was in this way putting his case on a silver plate, as he touched, point by point, those sensitive issues which brought Dominican memories back to the unsavoury times of the 1270s. The associations with the condemnation of 1277 and the Correctoria controversy had invested Durandus’s case with symbolic value. That this was the case seems further conWrmed by the appearance of one last tract which closed the Dominican case against Durandus and inaugurated a new stage in the history of Thomism. Composed around 1325, at the end of the long quarrel with Durandus, Durandellus’s Evidentiae contra Durandum 4 contained the strands of the previous controversy and is in that way illustrative of its eVects on the resulting idea of Thomist ‘orthodoxy’. Whereas Hervaeus’s Thomism had shown the resilience of times of controversy, the Thomist elements in the Evidentiae were less malleable, and were presented in a way more suitable for commentary than interpretation. Durandellus’s tone is calmer, less contentious. The reliance of his Evidentiae on the structure of the 1317 censure list is methodological, and free of polemical undertones. These features help reveal this work’s nature and purpose. In the Evidentiae, Durandellus does not so much want to engage in criticism of Durandus (Hervaeus had performed this role admirably several years earlier), but he wants to present evidence of the soundness of Thomism by using Durandus’s discredited theses as a critical vehicle. Durandellus makes a normative use of the Thomist corpus, as he adduces quotations from Aquinas’s works for the sake of proof in his arguments against Durandus. He draws a parallel between the two positions, leaving the doctrinal contrast to speak for itself. The value of the Evidentiae thus resides in its being probably the Wrst example we possess of Aquinas’s writings being treated as a locus theologicus. Previous Dominican 4 For a recent edn. of the Evidentiae, see Nicolai Medensis (Durandelli) Evidentiae contra Durandum, 2 vols., ed. P. T. Stella, completed by M. Lanczkowski and R. Imbach, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta, 3 (Tu¨bingen and Basle: A. Francke Verlag, 2003). For a study of Durandellus’s criticism of Durandus, see Gilles Emery, ‘La The´ologie trinitaire des Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus’, Revue Thomiste, 97/1 (1997), 173–218; also M. Lanczowski and R. Wittwer, ‘Les Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus’, Revue Thomiste, 97/1 (1997), 143–56.

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Conclusions

censorship had attempted to incorporate Aquinas’s teaching into the standard list of scholastic references. Durandellus’s Evidentiae crowns this endeavour. The order’s renewed conWdence in its own intellectual tradition is also explained by two notable events occurring around the time Durandellus produced his tract. The Wrst was no less than the canonization of Aquinas by Pope John XXII in 1323; the second was the oYcial revocation, in 1325, of Bishop Tempier’s condemnation in 1277 ‘insofar as it touched on Aquinas’s doctrines’. That the condemnation was not revoked as a whole was all the more revealing of Aquinas’s selected status as a theological authority. Written around the time the veto on Aquinas’s teaching was lifted, and shortly after the canonization, the Evidentiae gains in topical signiWcance, and reXects the inXuence which the canonization exerted on the expansion and authority of Thomist teaching. To use a formula current at the time, Aquinas’s work was a ‘miracle of doctrine’. And as the pope himself said in one of his sermons, the Dominican doctor had performed ‘as many miracles as he had written articles’ (tot facerat miracula quot scripserat articulos).5 This formula not only encapsulates the crowning stage in the Dominican promotion of Aquinas, but also reveals the papacy’s strong reliance on the emergent Thomism. Indeed, the doctrinal uniformity exempliWed in Thomism appeared like a hallmark of stability at a time when the church was troubled by doctrinal quarrels with the Franciscans. (Not coincidentally, the papal bull Cum inter nonnullos, which condemned the doctrine of absolute poverty as heretical, was issued in the same year of the canonization.6) John XXII’s canonization of Thomist doctrine was in some aspects reminiscent of Innocent III’s endorsement of the Lombard at the Lateran Council. Not implausibly, Thomist Dominicans saw in John’s patronage an instance of the time-honoured agreement between the professional theologians and the papacy—an agreement which, to tell by later controversies, proved to be more precarious than initially promised. Despite attempts to moderate his position, Durandus preserved its basic orientation until the Wnal recension of the commentary. His gestures towards 5 See Grabmann, ‘Die Kanonisation’, 233–49; also Mandonnet, ‘La Canonisation’, 3–47. 6 We know that John XXII was a great admirer of Aquinas and that he dedicated much time to the personal study of his writings. It is also signiWcant that, during the agitated times of the poverty controversy, the pope appears to have made copious annotations of Hervaeus’s treatise on poverty. This seems to add to the evidence that the pope held Dominican opinion in high respect, even if he did not rely exclusively on it. For the pope’s reliance on Hervaeus’s advice at this juncture, see Nold, Pope John XXII, 153–4, 161, 168–9, and 172 n. 95. Nold is however careful to qualify the pope’s apparent partiality, shedding some light on John’s general attitude towards professional theological debate: ‘the importance of these annotations [of Hervaeus’s opinion] is not to prove that John preferred a Dominican formulation to a Franciscan one . . . On the contrary, . . . the Pope shows no sign of taking sides in this academic, theological debate’ (154).

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the incorporation of the Scotist terminology, to say nothing of his symptomatic rejection of the common-nature analogy, were less than convincing. The fact that Aquinas had shared a similar opinion on the latter was of no avail, for Durandus’s rejection was motivated by his modal doctrine and a nominalist understanding of universals, both views, needless to say, decidedly nonThomist. On the other hand, Durandus’s ephemeral capitulation to the standard Dominican account of the Wlioque had led only to an unhappy conjunction of disparate theologies. Apart from the obvious doctrinal importance of the issue, Durandus’s compliance had very possibly responded to the unwelcome association which linked his initial account of the Wlioque with the thesis of a natural order of priority. As a result of criticism, Durandus temporarily revised his account in favour of the Thomist alternative, taking particular care to shed unwelcome subordinationist resonances. This revision remained nevertheless perfunctory, and was unsupported by the appropriate metaphysics, such as might have convinced Thomists that they were dealing with a whole-hearted espousal of Lateran priorities. This demand would have been diYcult to satisfy within an outlook like Durandus’s, committed as it was to shunning all threats of anti-Trinitarian reductionism, and thereby naturally suspicious of any overstatement of divine unity. In this respect, I believe with Bruno Decker that it was Durandus’s theological conviction which ultimately led him to appeal to the modal doctrine and the accompanying theory of the analogy of being.7 Contrary to what Joseph Koch believes, Durandus’s arguments appear to have been informed by a theological agenda, an agenda which his metaphysics were expected to obey.8 That Durandus was prepared to defy the theological establishment in favour of a less palatable, but in his eyes more solid, Trinitarian doctrine is no negligible testimony of this. But what in Durandus’s mind responded to doctrinal conviction was perceived by leading Dominicans as an obstinate refusal to comply with the favoured form of theological practice. Hervaeus’s justiWcation of the censure against Durandus revealed this hardline view, expressed in his endorsement of 7 See Decker, Die Gotteslehre, 437. In this connection, we may notice an observation made by the Franciscan Alexander of Alexandria. The view of those who reject, as insuYcient, a distinction of reason between essence and relation, Alexander says, is guided by the assumption that ‘a distinction of reason leads towards a Sabellian dissolution of the Trinity. According to their view, in order to safeguard a real distinction between the persons, the relations that constitute them must signify real modes.’ Quoted by Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatoris, ii. 521. 8 See Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano, 125: ‘die Trinita¨tslehre des Durandus wesentlich in seiner Metaphysik der Relationen verankert ist’; and 192: ‘Theologie ist fu¨r Durandus—wie fu¨r die meisten seiner Zeitgenossen—angewandte Philosophie. Das theologische Interesse erscho¨pft sich fast vo¨llig in der spekulativen Durchdringung der Glaubenslehren.’

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Conclusions

centralized doctrinal authority, and the considerable latitude he accorded to church jurisdiction in the professional practice of theology—all aspects which, in Hervaeus’s view, reinforced rather than undermined the magisterial establishment. But Durandus’s failure to subscribe to Thomist teaching had not been determined by factional sentiments. Rather, Durandus saw his position as governed by the intrinsic demands of what he perceived as true doctrine, and in order to safeguard it he had even been prepared to forfeit the standard assumptions of Aristotelian philosophy. And here is where the doctor modernus gives way to the doctor resolutissimus: Durandus’s adamant use of the modal doctrine on avowed antiAristotelian grounds was motivated by theological insights fundamentally akin to those which had led Bonaventure to a reception of Aristotelian philosophy much more controlled than that exercised by his contemporary Aquinas. Not coincidentally, Durandus’s solution to the Trinitarian question would borrow in approach and content from Bonaventure’s. Thus, what has always been presented as an internal Dominican dispute between Thomists and non-Thomists emerges as a conXict between extramural theological trends represented, on the one hand, by the older Franciscan school of Bonaventure and, on the other, by the Scotist innovations. In this light, the intellectual pluralism which threatened to erode Dominican doctrinal uniformity was not introduced by Durandus any more than by Hervaeus.9 What made Durandus, not the leading Thomist, a threat, was his readiness to depart from Aristotelian philosophy. To question Aquinas on those grounds was like revisiting the 1277 condemnation. Indeed, the order’s choice of adversary had not only been insightful, but also foreboding. 9 In this respect, I cannot agree with Elizabeth Lowe’s portrayal of the debate between Hervaeus and Durandus as a clear-cut clash between Thomist and anti-Thomist views respectively. ‘Thomism’ was a rather protean concept among early 14th-cent. Dominicans, and Durandus’s non-Thomism did not systematically reXect anti-Thomist motivations, any more than those thinkers who claimed to adhere to Aquinas’s thought could be grouped into a homogeneous pro-Thomist bunch. For Lowe’s treatment of the debate in connection to the growth of Thomism, see her The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St Pourc¸ain, Studies in Medieval History and Culture, 17 (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), mainly ch. 4, esp. 90–123.

Bibliography Manuscripts Melk, Stiftsbibliothek, MS 611, fos. 41r–129v (Durandus of St Pourc¸ain, Wrst recension of Sentences commentary). Oxford, Balliol College, MS 205, fos. 1r–185v (John Duns Scotus, Reportata). Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale, MS 14454, fos. 31r–114v (Durandus of St Pourc¸ain, Wrst recension of Sentences commentary). Reims, Bibliothe`que Municipale, MS 502, fos. 112v–116v; 128v–131v (Hervaeus Natalis, Reprobationes excusationum Durandi). Reims, Bibliothe`que Municipale, MS 502, fos. 117r–128v (Hervaeus Natalis, De articulis pertinentibus ad IV libros Sententiarum Durandi). Rome, Vatican Library, MS Vat. Lat. 1075, fos. 31v–39r (Durandus of St Pourc¸ain, second recension of Quodlibeta Parisiensia I). Rome, Vatican Library, MS Vat. Lat. 1076, fos. 9v–19r (Durandus of St Pourc¸ain, Wrst recension of Quodlibeta Parisiensia I). Tortosa, Biblioteca Capitular, MS 244, fos. 6vb–165vb (John of Naples, Quodlibets). Troyes, MS 992, fos. 34va–68rb (James of Metz, Sentences commentary).

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Index accidents, absolute and relative 239 in Aquinas 30–3, 240–2 in Bonaventure 52, 55 in Durandus 110–11, 114–18, 120, 150, 169, 212, 214, 232, 239, 259 in Henry of Ghent 62–3, 64 in Hervaeus Natalis 146–9, 212, 242 see also relations, categorical; composition accidents, inherent, see composition Adams, M. McCord 73 n. 85, 79 n. 109, 86 n. 126, 94 n. 11 Aegidius Romanus, see Giles of Rome Albert the Great 267 Alexander III: 280 n. 2 Alexander of Alexandria 283 n. 7 Anselm: on filioque 24–5, 41, 41 n. 55 on order of priority 26 principle of divine unity and commonality 25–6, 27, 38, 40, 98–9, 129–30, 133, 187–8, 191, 208, 211, 227 n. 22, 228, 249, 264, 277, 278 on processions, divine 24–6 on productive principle 26 on relations, opposite 24–5 on relations of origin 24–7 rejects subordinationism 26 n. 29, 27, 41 Aquinas, Thomas: on accidents, absolute and relative 30–3, 240–2 and Anselm’s principle 26, 38, 40, 133 canonization of 11, 106, 197 n. 47, 237, 237 n. 7, 243, 253, 278, 280 n. 2, 282 on categories 32, 120 n. 36

on composition 30, 32–3, 35, 168–9, 240–3 on distinction, real 23, 35, 37–8, 39, 44, 46, 49, 123, 161, 193–4, 241–2, 260 on distinction of reason 34–5, 53 n. 7, 161, 258 rejects emanational account 251 on essence, commonality of 23, 35–7, 38–40, 44, 46, 49, 58, 123, 131, 133, 191, 247, 264, 269 on essence, unity of 22–3, 35, 49, 58–9, 131 rejects essence as universal 36–7, 105, 264, 278, 283 on essence as productive principle 38–9, 39 n. 46, 58, 132, 191, 246–7 on filioque 39–41, 43, 228, 267, 269 on identity essence-relation 34–7, 49, 241, 247 on individuation 137 n. 86 on intellect and will 43–4, 44 n. 67, 46 n. 73 and Lateran tradition 22–3, 27, 28, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 49, 59, 243–5, 280 and Lyons II Council 267 on notional acts 251–2 on person, dignity in 46–8, 57, 252 on person as individuum vagum 48, 141 on person as self-subsistent 48, 250, 252, 271 rejects Porretan error 22, 33, 35, 244 on processions, divine 37–47, 123, 123 n. 44 and psychological model 12 n. 35, 41–6, 47 n. 77, 58 n. 24, 132

298

Index

Aquinas, Thomas (Continued ) on quaternity, error of 23, 35, 37, 43, 49, 244 on ratio as quiddity 34–5, 54, 257–8 on relation, esse of 30–5, 194, 240–1, 242 on relation, ratio of 30–5, 30 n. 8, 38, 95–6, 194, 242, 256 on relation as ‘diminished being’ 32–4 on relations, categorical 30–2, 167–8, 240–2, 256, 258 on relations, disparate 38, 38 n. 40 on relations, opposite 23, 35, 37–8, 44, 46, 49, 123, 191 on relations of origin 12 n. 35, 27, 37–8, 42, 45–7, 49, 57, 123, 140, 191, 252, 270 on relations as personal properties 35, 47–9, 57–8, 57 n. 21, 140, 193, 251–3, 273 rejects Sabellianism 42 rejects subordinationism 41, 49, 270 on subsistence 32–3, 32 n. 18, 47–9, 47 n. 78, 119, 119 n. 32, 137 n. 86, 193–4, 252 on suppositum 33, 252 on universals 36–7, 105 on univocity 48, 105, 131 n. 68 Arianism 23, 191; see also order of priority; subordinationsim Aristotle: on categories 24, 27–8, 120, 149–50, 169, 230, 239, 253, 277 on change 131, 188, 208 n. 32, 253, 278 on composition 28, 239, 277 on non-contradiction principle 19, 158 n. 41 on relation as ‘diminished being’ 32, 63 n. 49, 118 n. 29, 131, 188, 253, 277 on relations, categorical 24, 56 n. 16, 167–8

and Thomism 27–8, 131, 167–9, 188, 253, 277 Athanasian creed 134–5, 190–1, 210 Augustine 200, 249, 273 on categories 24 on essence, unity of 23–4 on order of priority 26, 134–5, 190–1, 210 on person, commonality of 104 n. 35 on relation, esse of 24 on relation, ratio of 24, 33 on relations of origin 13, 23–4, 26, 27, 251 on relative distinction 23, 125, 27 rejects subordinationism 13, 23 see also psychological model Avicenna 61 Benedict XII: 8, 185 n. 12 Berengar of Landorra 5, 183–4 Bernard of Clairvaux 22 Bernard Lombard 3 n. 8 Boethius: on categories 21, 62 n. 43 on essence, unity of 74 n. 89 on person 14, 48, 48 n. 84, 143, 272 n. 45, 276 on subsistence 14 Bonaventure 51, 267 on accidents, absolute and relative 52, 55 on composition 52–4, 55, 146 on distinction, modal 52–4, 56, 70, 75, 146 on distinction, real 51, 53, 54 on distinction of reason 52, 53 n. 7, 54 on emanations 57, 57 n. 19, 57 n. 20, 58, 58 n. 24 on essence, commonality of 56, 58 on essence, unity of 51–2, 56, 58, 59 and Lateran tradition 55 n. 15, 56, 59

Index on person as incommunicable 56 on psychological model 58 n. 24 on ratio as quiddity 54, 258 n. 11 on relation, ratio of 57, 58, 95–6 on relation as mode 56 on relations, categorical 54–6 on relations of origin 56–8, 57 n. 20 rejects relations as personal properties 57–8 on subsistence 54–5, 56 on substance 54 on suppositum 56 rejects Porretan error 55 Boniface VIII 1 n. 3, 8 censure against Durandus, first (1314): 144, 182, 218–19, 235, 236, 237, 243, 249, 277 commission, members of 183, 183 n. 6, 184 and common opinion 191, 243 definition of censure 184–5 and Dominican legislation 182, 182 n. 3, 183 on filioque 187, 270 judgement of 184, 184 n. 10, 186, 186 n. 16, 187, 189, 192, 195–7, 201, 207, 245 on order of priority in God 188–91, 207, 270 on real distinction in God 190, 191–5, 207 on relation as productive principle 186–8, 190, 207 and Thomism 195–6, 243 censure against Durandus, second (1317): 196, 236, 254, 277, 280, 281 on absolute–relative analogy 239–43 commission, members of 236–7 and common opinion 235, 238, 239, 243–44 and Dominican legislation 235–8 on filioque 245, 248, 249

299

judgement of 239, 244–5 and Lateran tradition 239, 243–5, 247–9 on person as incommunicable 250 on real distinction in God 238–45, 248 on relation as mode 239–40 on relation as productive principle 244, 245–8 on relations and personal properties 251–3 and Thomism 205, 217, 219, 234, 236, 237–8, 240, 243–5, 247–9, 253, 278–9 Clement V: 4 common opinion 4, 20, 29, 49, 107, 182, 191, 196–7, 203–4, 206, 218, 235, 238, 239, 243–44, 270, 272, 272 n. 44, 280; see also magisterial authority; Thomism composition 239–40 in Aquinas 30, 32–3, 35, 168–9, 240–3 in Aristotle 28, 239, 277 in Augustine 24 in Bonaventure 52, 53–4, 55, 146 in Duns Scotus 79, 82, 146 in Durandus 110–11, 113, 116–18, 120–22, 150–1, 154–5 (A Sent.), 164–5, 168–9, 171 (Paris Quodl.), 190, 212, 221, 222, 224 (Aven. Quodl.), 239, 240–41, 243, 256, 259–60, 261 (C Sent.), 276 in Henry of Ghent 62, 67, 68 in Hervaeus Natalis 93, 100, 117 n. 26, 146–9, 150–1, 159, 212–14, 215, 230 see also accidents, absolute and relative; relations, categorical condemnation of 1277: 59, 206 n. 26, 219, 280 n. 2, 281, 282, 284 Correctoria controversy 219, 238, 278, 279, 281; see also William of la Mare

300

Index

Courtenay, W. J. 185 n. 12, 186 n. 16, 197 n. 45 Cross, R. 32 n. 18, 64 n. 52, 73–5, 75 n. 94, 81 n. 114, 86 n. 128, 116 n. 22, 118 n. 28, 169 n. 19 Decker, B. 283 Dietrich of Freiberg 280 distinction, formal: in Duns Scotus 71, 75–7, 79–81 (Reportata), 83, 83–5, 86, 160, 162, 176, 223–4, 253, 261, 264, 271, 278 in Durandus 165–6, 177–8, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 222–4 (Aven. Quodl.), 261 (C Sent.) in Hervaeus Natalis 87, 97, 98, 103, 106 (Sent.), 153, 160, 181 (Quodl.) distinction, intentional: in Henry of Ghent 66–8, 70 distinction, modal: in Bonaventure 52–4, 56, 70, 75, 146 and Duns Scotus 70, 71 n. 76, 76, 78, 81–3, 81 n. 116, 224 in Durandus 113, 117, 121, 137–8, 162 (A Sent.), 171–2, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 213, 221–3 (Aven. Quodl.), 264 (C Sent.) rejected by Hervaeus 93, 103 (Sent.), 161 (Quodl.), 213 (De art.), 224, 229–30 (Corr.) distinction, real 12, 27, 51 in Aquinas 23, 35, 37–8, 39, 44, 46, 49, 123, 161, 193–4, 241–2, 260 in Bonaventure 51, 53, 54 in Duns Scotus 81–3, 84–6 in Durandus 113–14, 117–18, 118 n. 28, 120–22, 124–7, 132–3, 144, 150, 161 (A Sent.), 164–70, 171–2, 175–7, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 190, 191–5, 212, 218, 220–1, 223–4 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 232, 243, 248, 258, 261, 265, 268 (C Sent.), 277 in Henry of Ghent 65, 66, 68, 70

in Hervaeus Natalis 93–5, 96, 97, 100–2, 106, 117 n. 26, 146–7, 150–2, 159, 193, 196, 212–13, 261 distinction ex natura rei: in Duns Scotus 76, 77, 78, 82–3, 84, 155 n. 33, 161, 261 in Durandus 170–1, 176–8 (Paris Quodl.), 221–5 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 231, 261, 263 (C Sent.) in Hervaeus Natalis 155, 157, 160–1, 171 (Quodl.), 221, 231 (Corr.), 261 distinction of reason: in Aquinas 34–5, 53 n. 7, 161, 258 in Bonaventure 52, 53 n. 7, 54 in Durandus 113 (A Sent.) in Henry of Ghent 66, 67, 70 in Hervaeus Natalis 97, 102 Dominican Order, general chapters: Paris (1286) 29 Saragossa (1309) 2, 29, 182, 185, 205 n. 24 Metz (1313) 4, 29, 182, 185, 196 n. 44, 205 n. 24 London (1314) 184 Bologna (1315) 235 Montpellier (1316) 5, 235 Dunbabin, J. 184 n. 8, 236 n. 5 Duns Scotus 50, 51 criticizes Aquinas 77, 81 on composition 79, 82, 146 on distinction, formal 71, 75–7, 79–81 (Reportata), 83–5, 86, 160, 162, 176, 223–4, 253, 261, 264, 271, 278 on distinction, modal 70, 71 n. 76, 76, 78, 81–3, 81 n. 116, 224 on distinction ex natura rei 76, 77, 78, 82–3, 84, 155 n. 33, 161, 261 on distinction, real 81–3, 84–6 on essence, commonality of 72–3, 74, 75, 83, 86–7, 172 on essence, infinity of 72–3, 74, 78–9, 83, 85, 87, 172, 224–5, 278

Index on essence as universal 36 n. 30, 72–5, 172, 224–5, 253, 261, 264, 278 criticizes Giles of Rome 77–8, 81–3 on identity, non-adequate 73, 83, 83 n. 120, 84–5, 158 n. 42 on indiscernibility of identicals 86 and the Lateran tradition 86 on order of priority 134 n. 80 on person as incommunicable 72–3, 75 on quaternity, error of 75 on relations, categorical 109–10, 145 rejects Sabellianism 81 on substance 75 on suppositum 72 on Trinitarian syllogism 86 on universals 73–5 Durandellus 236 n. 3 Evidentiae and Thomism 281–2 Durandus of St Pourc¸ain: A Sentences commentary 1–3, 5, 108, 146, 163, 183, 201 n. 12, 255, 256, 265, 269, 271 n. 41, 273 on absolute–relative analogy 115–16, 117, 119, 120, 122 n. 38, 125, 136–7, 140–1, 150–1 (A Sent.), 165–8, 173–5, 181 (Paris Quodl.), 189, 194, 212, 214, 221, 224 n. 16, 225, 228 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 231, 233, 239, 259–60, 263, 272–3 (C Sent.), 275 on accidents, absolute and relative 110–11, 114–18, 120, 150, 169, 212, 214, 232, 239, 259 on action and passion 110, 122, 124, 129, 187, 208–9 and Anselm’s principle 129–30, 133, 187–8, 191, 208, 211, 227 n. 22, 228, 249 criticizes Aquinas 111–12, 123–4, 140, 141 (A Sent.), 166–7, 173 (Paris Quodl.), 259, 271–3 (C Sent.) and Aristotelianism 55, 118 n. 29, 120, 131, 188, 195, 239–40, 253, 257 n. 8, 284

301 Avignon period 4, 7, 163, 196, 218, 260, 260 n. 17 B Sentences commentary 3, 3 n. 8, 5, 183 on beatific vision 8 as bishop of Le Puy 6, 197, 260, 260 n. 17 as bishop of Limoux 6, 197 n. 46 as bishop of Meaux 7, 7 n. 24, 8, 254, 260 and Boethius on person 143 affinity with Bonaventure 9, 55, 55 n. 14, 116 n. 23, 121, 130, 180, 221 n. 9, 258 n. 11, 261, 276, 284 C Sentences commentary 7, 7 n. 24, 8, 120 n. 35, 163, 205, 229, 253, 254–5, 260, 265, 282 on categories 120, 121, 150, 224 n. 16, 256–8, 273 and censure against 5–6, 107, 120 n. 34, 126 n. 51, 133 n. 76, 135 n. 83, 144, 176–7, 198–201, 218 n. 1, 235, 237–8, 254, 256, 270, 273, 277, 279, 280; see also censure against Durandus, first and second on Christ’s human nature 114, 135 n. 81, 137 n. 86 on composition 110–11, 113, 116–18, 120–2, 150–1, 154–5 (A Sent.)164–5, 168–9, 171 (Paris Quodl.), 190, 212, 221, 222, 224 (Aven. Quodl.), 239, 240–1, 243, 256, 259–60, 261 (C Sent.), 276 confessio of 176–80, 224 on ‘Damnamus’ decree 179–80, 265–8; see also Lateran IV Council defence, own 5, 198–201, 202–3, 218–19, 218 n. 2 on distinction, formal 165–6, 177–8, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 222–4 (Aven. Quodl.), 261 (C Sent.) on distinction, modal 113, 117, 121, 137–8, 162 (A Sent.), 171–2, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 213, 221–3 (Aven. Quodl.), 264 (C Sent.)

302

Index

Durandus of St Pourc¸ain (Continued) on distinction, real 113–14, 117–18, 118 n. 28, 120–2, 124–7, 132–3, 144, 150, 161 (A Sent.), 164–70, 171–2, 175–7, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 190, 191–5, 212, 218, 220–1, 223–4 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 232, 243, 248, 258, 261, 265, 268 (C Sent.), 277 on distinction essence-relation 108, 117–19, 120, 122, 136, 144, 150, 154 (A Sent.), 172–3, 178 (Paris Quodl.), 192–4, 212, 216, 229, 240, 243–4, 256, 264, 266–7 (C Sent.), 275 on distinction ex natura rei 170–1, 176–8 (Paris Quodl.), 221–5 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 231, 261, 263 (C Sent.) on distinction of reason 113 (A Sent.) on doctrinal authority 205–6 criticizes Duns Scotus 109–11, 110 n. 6, 122 n. 40, 166 rejects emanational account 129, 249, 251 on essence, commonality of 126, 129–30, 133, 136, 187–8, 191, 208, 228, 266–7 on essence, infinity of 174–5, 224–5 on essence, unity of 131, 154, 264, 267, 274, 276 rejects essence as universal 139, 170, 172, 172 n. 26 (Paris Quodl.), 215, 224–5, 224 n. 16 (Aven. Quodl.), 261–3 (C Sent.), 283 on essence-existence identity 166, 181 on Eucharistic accidents 114 on ‘Fideli’ decree 267–8; see also Lyons II Council on filioque 40, 122, 128–9, 136 (A Sent.), 187–8, 190, 207–8, 211, 226–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 248, 267–1 (C Sent.), 283 on Franciscan poverty 6 n. 19, 7, 7 n. 22

and Gilbert of Poitiers 120 n. 33, 144, 272 n. 45, 276 and Giles of Rome 121 n. 38, 137 n. 85 affinity with Godfrey of Fontaines 137 n. 85, 138 n. 87 and Henry of Ghent 49–50, 55 n. 14, 64, 70, 108, 113, 115 n. 20, 121, 140 n. 91, 173 n. 29, 275 and Hervaeus as adversary 5, 9–11, 145–6, 149, 225 n. 19, 226–8, 229, 256, 260, 270; see also Hervaeus Natalis, criticizes Durandus criticizes Hervaeus on categorical relations 166, 169 n. 21 criticizes Hervaeus on ‘Damnamus’ decree 268 criticizes Hervaeus on identity essence-relation 173 on identity, non-adequate and nonconvertible 112, 125 (A Sent.), 171–2 (Paris Quodl.), 222–4 (Aven. Quodl.) on indiscernibility of identicals 112, 166 on individuation 137 n. 86, 138, 139–40, 262 n. 24 on intentions 142 and James of Metz 127 n. 57, 133 n. 76 and Jean Gerson 9 and John XXII: viii, 4, 6, 7, 197 n. 47 and Lateran tradition 112 n. 10, 225, 267, 283 on modes of being 112, 113–14, 116–17, 122, 136–7, 164 (A Sent.), 169–70, 179–80 (Paris Quodl.), 194–5, 212, 218, 221–2, 225 (Aven. Quodl.), 243, 256–7, 259, 260, 264, 269, 273 (C Sent.), 275, 284 on modes as dependent 116–17, 119, 120, 151, 168, 189, 222, 259 nominalism of 138–9, 139 n. 89, 140, 171–2, 224, 262–4

Index on order of nature, essence and relations 117–18, 132 (A Sent.), 188–91, 226 (Aven. Quodl.) on order of priority, absolute and relative 115, 120, 135 (A Sent.), 188–91 on order of priority by ‘natural presupposition’ 129, 132, 134–6, 144 (A Sent.), 188–91, 207–8, 210, 226–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 269–71 (C Sent.), 277, 283 at Paris 1–4, 163, 197 n. 46 criticizes person, dignity in 142, 250 on person as incommunicable 126–7, 141–4 (A Sent.), 173 (Paris Quodl.), 250, 271, 273 (C Sent.), 276 criticizes person as individuum vagum 141 and Porretan error 120, 175–6, 178, 179 n. 42, 276 on processions, divine 122, 124–5, 130 (A Sent.), 187, 190, 194, 209–11, 219, 225–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 246–9, 269–71 (C Sent.), 276 rejects psychological model 131–2, 211, 249, 277 and quaternity, error of 179, 220, 232, 256, 258 n. 10, 265–8, 276 on ratio as quiddity 166, 166 n. 9, 258 on relation as ‘diminished being’ 122, 166, 168–9 on relation as mode 115–16, 118–19, 120, 121, 125–7, 144, 150–1, 155, 164 (A Sent.), 165–8, 172–5, 178, 180 (Paris Quodl.), 189, 193–5, 212, 221 (Aven. Quodl.), 229, 230–1, 233, 259–60, 263, 264, 265, 273 (C Sent.), 276 on relation as productive principle 130–2, 136, 186–8, 190, 207–8, 228, 244, 246–8, 269, 276 on relations, categorical 109–11, 113–14, 164–9, 240–1, 256–60, 274

303 on relations, disparate 132–4, 191, 268 on relations, opposite 124, 127–9, 132–4, 141, 190–1, 208, 210–11, 226–8, 249, 265, 269, 277 on relations of origin 122, 124, 127–9, 131, 140–1, 191, 208, 211, 226–8, 251–3, 268, 269, 270, 273 rejects relations as personal properties 140–1, 251–3, 273 and Richard of St Victor on person 143 rejects Sabellianism 155 n. 32, 176, 176 n. 36, 177, 178, 179 n. 42, 180, 195, 223, 224, 233, 256, 267, 276 rejects subordinationism 226, 270, 283 on subsistence 114–15, 117, 119, 120, 125, 127, 136–40, 143, 173, 192–4, 212, 221, 231, 239 on substance 114–15, 120, 125, 131, 143–4, 212, 232, 233, 259 on suppositum, created 125–6, 127, 130–1, 136–9, 142, 192, 262 nn. 23, 24, 273 on suppositum, divine 139–40, 143, 173, 262 n. 24, 273, 276 and Thomism vii–viii,1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 49, 112 n. 10, 113 n. 12, 181, 205–6, 228, 247–8, 252, 252 n. 43, 253, 254, 264, 267, 270, 276, 277, 279, 283, 284 on Trinitarian syllogism 172 and William of Ockham 7, 7 n. 23, 260 n. 17

emanations, see processions, divine essence, commonality of 27, 144, 276–7, 278 in Anselm 25–7 in Aquinas 23, 35–7, 38–40, 44, 46, 49, 58, 123, 131, 133, 191, 247, 264, 269 in Augustine 23–4 in Bonaventure 56, 58

304

Index

essence, commonality of (Continued) in Duns Scotus 72–3, 74, 75, 83, 86–7, 133, 172 in Durandus 126, 129–30, 133, 136, 187–8, 191, 208, 228, 266–7 in Hervaeus Natalis 92, 99, 101–2, 104, 155–9, 172, 209, 214, 233, 263–4, 266 essence, infinity of: in Duns Scotus 72–3, 74, 78–9, 83, 85, 87, 172, 224–5, 278 in Durandus 174–5, 224–5 in Hervaeus Natalis 97–8, 154, 158–9, 171–2, 174–5, 214, 224, 231, 233, 262–3, 278 essence, unity of 12, 14, 27, 276 in Anselm 25–7 in Aquinas 22–3, 35, 49, 58–9, 131 in Augustine 23–4 in Boethius 74 n. 89 in Bonaventure 51–2, 56, 58, 59 in Durandus 131, 154, 264, 267, 274, 276 in Henry of Ghent 67–8, 69, 70 in Hervaeus Natalis 102, 154, 157, 209, 214–15, 233 in Joachim of Fiore 19–20 in Lateran tradition 19–20, 27 in Peter Lombard 19–20, 23, 27, 56 n. 15, 131, 214, 225, 278 essence as universal: rejected by Aquinas 36–7, 105, 264, 278, 283 in Duns Scotus 36 n. 30, 72–5, 172, 224–5, 253, 261, 264, 278 rejected by Durandus 139, 170, 172, 172 n. 26 (Paris Quodl.), 215, 224–5, 224 n. 16 (Aven. Quodl.), 261–3 (C Sent.), 283 in Hervaeus Natalis 87–105 (Sent.), 154, 156–7, 159, 172 (Quodl.), 214–16 (De art.), 224, 232–3 (Corr.), 262–4, 278

filiation, see processions, divine; relations, opposite; relations of origin filioque 13, 25, 27, 217, 234, 245, 249, 249 n. 34, 277 in Anselm 24–5, 41, 41 n. 55 in Aquinas 39–41, 43, 228, 267, 269 defined 24 n. 20 in Durandus 40, 122, 128–9, 136 (A Sent.), 187–8, 190, 207–8, 211, 226–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 248, 267–71 (C Sent.), 283 in Henry of Ghent 69 in Hervaeus Natalis 99, 100, 207–11, 211 n. 40 Friedman, Russell L. 2 n. 6, 34 n. 22, 45, 45 n. 69–71, 46, 46 n. 73, 57 n. 20, 59 n. 26, 69 n. 72, 145 n. 1 Gelber, Hester G. 78 n. 104, 79, 86 n. 129 generation, active and passive; see processions, divine; psychological model; relations, opposite; relations of origin Gilbert of Poitiers 35 and Bernard of Clairvaux 22 on categories 21 commentary on Boethius 21, 272 n. 45 and Lateran IV Council 21, 27 on person 144, 272 n. 45 and Peter Lombard 21, 22, 244, 275 and quaternity, error of 22, 27 and relation as ‘extrinsically attached’ 21, 65, 148, 151, 275–6 see also Porretan error Giles of Rome 196 criticizes Aquinas 39 n. 46, 246 n. 26 on relation, ratio of 95–6 on relation as ‘relative thing’ 64 on subsistence 122 n. 38, 137 n. 85 Glorieux, P. 79 n. 108, 163 n. 1

Index Godfrey of Fontaines 79 n. 108, 81 n. 116, 128 n. 57, 138 n. 87, 192 n. 35, 206 n. 26 Gregory X: 267 n. 34 Guido Terreni 163 n. 2, 176, 176 n. 37, 177, 224 Henry of Ghent 50, 51 on accidents, absolute and relative 62–3, 64 on categories 62 on composition 62, 67, 68 on distinction, intentional 66–8, 70 on distinction, real 65, 66, 68, 70 on distinction of reason 66, 67, 70 on divine ideas 60–1, 63 on emanations 42 n. 62, 59 n. 25, 68–9 on essence, unity of 67–8, 69, 70 on essential being 60–1, 66 on existential being 61 on filioque 69 criticizes Giles of Rome 64–5, 68, 70 on identity essence-relations 65, 67, 70 on intentions 61, 63, 66–8, 142 n. 100 and Lateran tradition 69–70 on modes of being 59–60, 62, 63, 64, 70, 275 rejects Porretan error 65, 70 on psychological model 12 n. 35, 42 n. 62, 45 n. 71 rejects quaternity, error of 65, 70 on ratio as quiddity 66 on relation, esse of 62–5 on relation, ratio of 62 on relation as ‘diminished being’ 63 on relation as mode 59–60, 62, 63, 64–5 on relations, categorical 65, 67 on relations, disparate 69 on relations, opposite 69 on relations of origin 69 on subsistence 64, 121

305

on substance 64 on suppositum 140 n. 91 heresy 7, 189 definitions of 192, 192 n. 34, 192 n. 35 allegedly in Durandus 177, 184, 191–2, 194–7, 201, 204, 218, 239, 244–5, 268 Hervaeus Natalis: on accidents, absolute and relative 146–9, 212, 242 on action and passion 209 on Anselm’s principle 98–9 criticizes Bonaventure 93–4, 103, 146 on categories 149–50, 230 and censure against Durandus 183, 198–9, 207, 217, 234, 237, 249, 279, 283 on composition 93, 100, 117 n. 26, 146–9, 150–1, 159, 212–14, 215, 230 Correctiones 218–20, 229, 233–4 on ‘Damnamus’ decree 151–2, 155–6, 161, 196, 201–2, 204, 214–15, 268 De articulis 199, 207–17, 225 on distinction, formal 87, 97, 98, 103, 106 (Sent.), 153, 160, 181 (Quodl.) rejects distinction, modal 93, 103 (Sent.), 161 (Quodl.), 213 (De art.), 224, 229–30 (Corr.) on distinction, real 93–5, 96, 97, 100–2, 106, 117 n. 26, 146–7, 150–2, 159, 193, 196, 212–13, 261 on distinction ex natura rei 155, 157, 160–1, 171 (Quodl.), 221, 231 (Corr.), 261 on distinction of reason 97, 102 on doctrinal authority 198, 201–6, 284 affinity with Duns Scotus 15, 87, 91, 97, 98, 103, 106 (Sent.), 150 n. 18, 154, 155, 158 n. 39, 158 n. 42, 159–61, 170, 170 n. 22, 176, 181 (Quodl.), 214, 216 (De art.), 231–2 (Corr.), 278, 279, 284

306

Index

Hervaeus Natalis (Continued) criticizes Duns Scotus 145 as adversary to Durandus 5, 9–11, 145–6, 149, 229; see also Durandus, criticizes Hervaeus criticizes Durandus on absolute– relative analogy 151 (Quodl.), 195, 214 (De art.), 231 (Corr.) criticizes Durandus on essencerelation distinction 149, 152, 154, 159, 164, 176 (Quodl.), 195, 202, 202 n. 14, 203 (Repr.), 214–16 (De art.) criticizes Durandus on order of priority 207–8, 210 (De art.), 269 criticizes Durandus on real distinction 152–3 (Quodl.), 207, 213, 215 (De art.), 230–3 (Corr.) criticizes Durandus on relation as mode 229–30, 232–4 (Corr.) criticizes Durandus on relation as productive principle 207–10 (De art.), 249 criticizes Durandus on subsistence 212–14 (De art.), 229–31, 233 (Corr.) rejects emanational account 98–9 on essence, commonality of 92, 99, 101–2, 104, 155–9, 172, 209, 214, 233, 263–4, 266 on essence, infinity of 97–8, 154, 158–9, 171–2, 174–5, 214, 224, 231, 233, 262–3, 278 on essence, unity of 102, 154, 157, 209, 214–15, 233 on essence as productive principle 58, 208, 209 on essence as universal 87, 105, 154, 156–7, 159, 172 (Quodl.), 214–16 (De art.), 224, 232–3 (Corr.), 262–4, 278 on filioque 99, 100, 207–11, 211 n. 40 criticizes Giles of Rome 96

on identity essence-relation 92–5, 97, 102, 149, 151, 152–5, 159–60, 212, 214, 216, 230, 263, 266 on identity, non-adequate 154, 158–9 on identity, non-convertible 153–5, 158–61, 162, 171, 216, 222, 229, 231–2, 278 on indiscernibility of identicals 153 criticizes James of Metz 10 n. 33 and John XXII: 197 n. 47, 282 n. 6 and Lateran tradition 91, 100, 196, 209, 214–15, 233 as master general 9, 197, 237 n. 6 rejects modalism 232–3 on order of priority 101 (Sent.), 210, 226 (De art.) on person as incommunicable 155–6, 158–9 on person as individuum vagum 103 on person as self-subsistent 103, 105 on ‘person’ as univocal concept 104 rejects Porretan error 91–2, 96 n. 17, 148, 151 on processions, divine 98–101, 209–11 as provincial of France 4 n. 9, 5, 9, 145, 183 n. 7, 205 n. 24, 207 on psychological model 44 n. 67, 211, 211 n. 40 on quaternity, error of 92, 151–2, 155, 202, 214, 233, 266 on relation, ratio of 95–7, 147, 230 on relations, categorical 91–2, 146–9, 151, 242 on relations, disparate 98–9, 101–2 on relations, opposite 95, 98–101, 158–9 on relations as dependent 148–9 on relations of origin 99 on relations as personal properties 105–6, 193, 212, 230 Reprobationes 5, 198, 198 n. 2, 199, 218

Index Sentences commentary 91, 106–7 on subsistence 105–6, 212, 230 on substance 105–6, 149, 150, 212 on suppositum 94, 94 n. 8, 100, 101 and Thomism 10, 11, 29, 49, 87, 91, 105, 106–7, 156, 161, 181, 196, 206, 214, 217, 219, 253, 264, 278–9, 281 on transitivity of identicals 94, 95, 153 on Trinitarian syllogism 153–4 on universals 103–4, 154, 156–7, 215 on univocity 105, 106 identity, non-adequate: in Duns Scotus 73, 83, 83 n. 120, 84–5, 158 n. 42 in Durandus 112, 125 (A Sent.), 171–2 (Paris Quodl.), 222–4 (Aven. Quodl) in Hervaeus Natalis 154, 158–9 identity, non-convertible in Durandus 112, 125 (A Sent.), 171–2 (Paris Quodl.), 222–4 (Aven. Quodl) in Hervaeus Natalis 153–5, 158–61, 162, 171, 216, 222, 229, 231–2, 278 identity, real, see essence, unity of inherence, see composition Innocent III: 20, 21 n. 5, 282 James of Lausanne 236–7, 237 n. 6, 239, 241, 243, 249, 252, 252 n. 43, 253 James of Metz 10 n. 33, 127 n. 57, 133 n. 76, 280 Joachim of Fiore: and essence, unity of 19–20 and IV Lateran Council 19–20, 266 criticizes Peter Lombard 19–20, 249, 266 and quaternity, error of 19–20, 152 n. 26, 266 John XXII: 185 n. 12, 186 n. 16 and Aquinas viii, 197 n. 47, 237 n. 7, 280 n. 2, 282, 282 n. 6 on beatific vision 8, 8 n. 25

307

and Durandus viii, 4, 6, 7, 197 n. 47 and Franciscan poverty 197 n. 47, 282 n. 6 and Hervaeus Natalis 197 n. 47, 282 n. 6 John Duns Scotus, see Duns Scotus John of Naples 249 n. 34 and censure against Durandus 183, 236, 236 n. 4, 237, 243–4, 244 n. 20, 245–9, 250, 252 n. 43 on relations, categorical 242 and Thomism 29, 144, 184, 236–7, 237 n. 7, 243–5, 247–9, 253, 278–9 Koch, J. vii, 3 n. 8, 5 n. 15, 7 n. 24, 163 n. 1, 186 n. 14, 189 n. 25, 225, 283, 283 n. 8 Lateran IV Council: and Aquinas 22–3, 27, 28, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 49, 243–5, 280 ‘Damnamus’ decree 19–20, 151–2, 155–6, 161, 179–80, 196, 201–2, 214–15, 239, 243–5, 244 n. 20, 253, 265–8, 265 n. 28 doctrinal tradition of 15, 19–20, 23, 27, 46, 51, 55 n. 15, 56, 59, 69–70, 86, 91, 100, 112 n. 10, 196, 209, 214–15, 225, 233, 239, 243–5, 247–9, 267, 281, 283 dogmatic definition of the Trinity 15, 51 and Joachim of Fiore 19–20, 266 and Peter Lombard 19–20, 27, 56 n. 15, 214, 244–5, 266, 278, 280 n. 2, 282 and Porretan error 21, 27, 109, 244 and quaternity, error of 19–20, 27, 214, 232, 244, 265–8, 265 n. 38, 266–7 and Thomism 27–8, 196, 214–15, 217, 239, 243–5, 247–9, 253, 267, 276, 277, 278, 279–80 Lowe, E. 284 n. 9

308

Index

Luna, C. 39 n. 46, 246 n. 26 Lyons II Council 267–8, 267 n. 34 magisterial authority 9, 11, 20–1, 21 n. 5, 182–3, 197, 205–6, 217, 238, 239, 247, 275, 280, 281, 283; see also common opinion; Thomism Maier, A. 2 n. 6 modalism 13, 232–3, 252–3; see also Sabellianism mode of the intellect, see psychological model mode of the will, see psychological model MS Melk, Stiftsbibliothek, 611: 108 n. 1 MS Oxford, Balliol College, 205: 71 MS Paris, BnF lat. 14454: 3 n. 8, 108 n. 1, 137 n. 86, 138 nn. 87, 88, 262 n. 23 MS Reims, Bibliothe`que Municipale, 502: 5 n. 16, 198 n. 2 MS Vatican, Vat. Lat. 1075: 163 n. 2, 177 n. 39 MS Vatican, Vat. Lat. 1076: 163 n. 2 Mulchahey, M.-M. 196 n. 44 nature, common, see essence, commonality of; universals nature, divine, see essence Nold, P. 192 n. 34, 205 n. 23, 282 n. 6 notional acts 251, 251 n. 39, 252 Olivi, Peter John 75 n. 95, 186 n. 16, 257 n. 8 order of origin, see relations of origin order of priority 13 in Anselm 26 and Athanasian creed 134–5, 190–1, 210 in Aquinas 37 in Augustine 26, 134–5, 190–1, 210 in Bonaventure 57 n. 20 in Duns Scotus 134 n. 80 in Durandus 115, 117–18, 120, 129, 132, 134–6, 144 (A Sent.), 188–91,

207–8, 210, 226–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 269–71 (C Sent.), 277, 283 in Hervaeus Natalis 101 (Sent.), 210, 226 (De art.) see also Arianism; subordinationism paternity, see processions, divine; relations, opposite; relations of origin person 13–14 in Aquinas 46–8, 57, 141, 250–3, 271 in Augustine 104 n. 35 in Boethius 14, 48, 48 n. 84, 143, 272 n. 45, 276 in Bonaventure 56 in Duns Scotus 72–3, 75 in Durandus 126–7, 141–4 (A Sent.), 173 (Paris Quodl.), 250, 271, 273 (C Sent.), 276 in Gilbert of Poitiers 144, 272 n. 45 in Hervaeus Natalis 103–5, 155–6, 158–9 as incommunicable 13, 14, 56, 72–3, 75, 126–7, 141–4, 155–6, 158–9, 173, 250, 271, 273, 276 in Richard of St Victor 14, 143, 273 as self-subsistent 13, 14, 48, 103, 105, 141, 173, 252, 271, 276 see also relations, opposite; subsistence; substance; suppositum personal properties, see relations, opposite Peter Aureol 145 n. 1, 146 Peter John Olivi, see Olivi, Peter John Peter Lombard and Christological nihilianism 280 n. 2 on essence as productive principle 39 n. 45, 56 n. 15, 246–7 on identity essence-relation 22, 255, 275 and Joachim of Fiore 19–20, 249, 266 and Lateran IV Council 19–20, 27, 55 n. 15, 214, 244–5, 266, 278, 280 n. 2, 282

Index and magisterial authority 20, 247, 280 rejects Porretan error 21, 22, 244, 275 and quaedam summa res 19–20, 23, 27, 56 n. 15, 131, 214, 225, 278 and quaternity, error of 19–20, 152 n. 26, 214, 244, 266 Sentences 22, 247, 255, 275, 280 Philip IV, king of France: 1 n. 3 Philip VI, king of France: 8 Pierre de la Palud: and censure against Durandus 183–4, 192, 195, 236, 236 n. 4, 237, 243, 245 and Durandus’s commentary 3 n. 8, 184 n. 8 and Thomism 107, 183–4, 236, 279 Porretan error: rejected by Aquinas 22, 33, 35, 244 rejected by Bonaventure 55 and Durandus 120, 175–6, 178, 179 n. 42, 276 rejected by Henry of Ghent 65, 70 rejected by Hervaeus Natalis 91–2, 96 n. 17, 148, 151 and Lateran tradition 21, 27, 109, 244 rejected by Peter Lombard 21, 22, 244, 275 see also Gilbert of Poitiers processions, divine 12–13, 27 in Anselm 24–6 in Aquinas 37–47, 123, 123 n. 44 in Bonaventure 57–8 double, see filioque in Durandus 122, 124–5, 130 (A Sent.), 187, 190, 194, 209–11, 219, 225–8 (Aven. Quodl.), 246–9, 269–71 (C Sent.), 276 in Henry of Ghent 42 n. 62, 59 n. 25, 68–9 in Hervaeus Natalis 98–101, 209 as univocal 27, 39, 40–1, 278

309

see also psychological model; relations, disparate; relations, opposite; relations of origin psychological model: in Aquinas 12 n. 35, 41–6, 47 n. 77, 58 n. 24, 132 in Bonaventure 58 n. 24 rejected by Durandus 131–2, 211, 249, 277 in Henry of Ghent 12 n. 35, 42 n. 62, 45 n. 71 in Hervaeus Natalis 44 n. 67, 211, 211 n. 40 quaternarism, see next entry quaternity, error of: rejected by Aquinas 23, 35, 37, 43, 49, 244, 266 rejected by Duns Scotus 75 and Durandus 179, 220, 232, 256, 258 n. 10, 265–8, 276 and Gilbert of Poitiers 22, 27 rejected by Henry of Ghent 65, 70 rejected by Hervaeus Natalis 92, 151–2, 155, 202, 233, 266 and Joachim of Fiore 19–20, 152 n. 26, 266 and Lateran tradition 19–20, 27, 214, 232, 244, 265–8, 265 n. 28, 266–7 and Peter Lombard 19–20, 152 n. 26, 214, 244, 266 relation, esse of 12, 240 in Aquinas 30–5, 194, 240–1, 242 in Augustine 24 in Henry of Ghent 62–5 relation, ratio of 12, 28 in Aquinas 30–5, 30 n. 8, 33–5, 95–6, 194, 242, 256 in Augustine 24, 33 in Bonaventure 57, 58, 95–6 in Giles of Rome 95–6 in Henry of Ghent 62 in Hervaeus Natalis 95–7, 147, 230

310

Index

relations, categorical 12, 239 in Aristotle 24, 56 n. 16, 167–8 in Aquinas, 30–2, 167–8, 240–2, 256, 258 in Bonaventure 54–6 in Duns Scotus 109–10, 145 in Durandus 109–10, 113, 164–9, 240–1, 256–60, 274 in Henry of Ghent 65, 67 in Hervaeus Natalis 91–2, 146–9, 151, 242 in John of Naples 242 see also accidents, absolute and relative; composition relations, disparate: in Aquinas 38, 38 n. 40 defined 12, 12 n. 35, 13 in Durandus 132–4, 191, 268 in Henry of Ghent 69 in Hervaeus Natalis 98–9, 101–2 see also filioque; processions, divine; psychological model relations, opposite 27 in Anselm 24–5 in Aquinas 23, 35, 37–8, 44, 46, 49, 123, 191 defined 12, 12 n. 35, 13 in Durandus 124, 127–9, 132–4, 141, 190–1, 208, 210–11, 226–8, 249, 265, 269, 277 in Henry of Ghent 69 in Hervaeus Natalis 95, 98–101, 158–9 see also processions, divine; psychological model; relations of origin relations of origin 12–13 in Anselm 24–7 in Aquinas 12 n. 35, 27, 37–8, 42, 45–7, 49, 57, 123, 140, 191, 252, 270 in Augustine 13, 23–4, 26, 27, 251 in Bonaventure 56–8, 57 n. 20

in Durandus 122, 124, 127–9, 131, 140–1, 191, 208, 211, 226–8, 251–3, 268, 269, 270, 273 in Henry of Ghent 69 in Hervaeus Natalis 99 see also filioque; relations, opposite; processions, divine; psychological model Richard of St Victor 14, 143, 273 Robb, F. 19 n. 2, 20 n. 3, 20, 23 n. 18 Robert of Anjou 237 n. 7 Robert of Courc¸on 20 Robert Kilwardby 3 Sabellianism 22, 22 n. 11, 253, 283 n. 7 rejected by Aquinas 42 rejected by Duns Scotus 81 rejected by Durandus 155 n. 32, 176, 176 n. 36, 177, 178, 179 n. 42, 180, 195, 223, 224, 233, 256, 267, 276 see also modalism simplicity, divine, see essence, commonality of; essence, unity of Simplicius 62 n. 44 Southern, R. W. vi spiration, active and passive, see filioque; processions, divine; psychological model; relations, disparate; relations, opposite; relations of origin Stella, P. T. 3 n. 8 subordinationism 13, 278 rejected by Anselm 26 n. 29, 27, 41 rejected by Aquinas 41, 49, 270 rejected by Augustine 13, 23 and Durandus 191, 226, 251, 270–1, 283 see also Arianism; order of priority subsistence 14 in Aquinas 32, 32 n. 18, 33, 47–9, 47 n. 78, 119, 119 n. 32, 137 n. 86, 193–4, 252 in Boethius 14 in Bonaventure 54–5, 56

Index in Durandus 114–15, 117, 119, 120, 125, 127, 136–40, 143, 173, 192–4, 212, 221, 231, 239 in Giles of Rome 122 n. 38, 137 n. 85 in Henry of Ghent 64, 121 in Hervaeus Natalis 105–6, 212, 230 see also person; substance; suppositum substance: in Bonaventure 54 in Duns Scotus 75 in Durandus 114–15, 120, 125, 131, 143–4, 212, 232, 233, 259 in Henry of Ghent 64 in Hervaeus Natalis 105–6, 149, 150, 212 see also person; subsistence; suppositum suppositum 14 in Aquinas 33, 252 in Bonaventure 56 in Duns Scotus 72 in Durandus 125–6, 127, 130–1, 136–40, 142, 143, 173, 192, 262 n. 23, 262 n. 24, 273, 276 in Henry of Ghent 140 n. 91 in Hervaeus Natalis 94, 94 n. 8, 100, 101 see also person; subsistence; substance Takada, T. 163 n. 2, 177 n. 39 Thijssen, J. M. M. H. 185 n. 13, 186 n. 17, 201 n. 11 Thomas Aquinas, see Aquinas, Thomas Thomism 275, 281–2, 284, 284 n. 9 and Aristotelianism 27–8, 131, 167–9, 188, 253, 277 and Dominican legislation 4–6, 29, 29 n. 1, 182–5, 196 n. 44, 205, 235–6, 238

311

and Durandus vii–viii, 1, 2, 3, 9, 11, 49, 112 n. 10, 113 n. 12, 181, 205–6, 228, 247–8, 252, 252 n. 43, 253, 254, 264, 267, 270, 276, 277, 279, 283, 284 and Hervaeus Natalis 10, 11, 29, 49, 87, 91, 105, 106–7, 156, 161, 181, 206, 214, 217, 219, 253, 264, 278–9, 281 and John of Naples 29, 144, 184, 236–7, 237 n. 7, 243–5, 247–9, 253, 278–9 and Lateran tradition 27–8, 196, 214–15, 217, 239, 243–5, 247–9, 253, 267, 276, 277–80 and Pierre de la Palud 107, 183–4, 236, 279 see also Aquinas, canonization of; censure against Durandus, second; common opinion; magisterial authority Trinitarian syllogism 19, 86, 86 n. 129, 153–4, 172 universals: in Aquinas 36–7, 105 in Duns Scotus 73–5 in Durandus 138–9, 139 n. 89, 140, 171–2, 224, 262–4 in Hervaeus Natalis 103–4, 154, 156–7, 215 Wetter, F. 79 n. 108 William of la Mare 1, 3, 236 n. 3; see also Correctoria controversy William of Ockham 7, 7 n. 23, 185 n. 12, 260 n. 17