Does Literature Think?: Literature as Theory for an Antimythical Era 0804732132, 9780804732130

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iii

DOESLITERATURETHINK?

Does Literature Think? LITERATURE

AS THEORY FOR AN

ANTIMYTHICAL

ERA

StathisGourgouris

STANFORD STANFORD,

UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA

PRESS 2003

ToNeni,

forlife

StanfordUniversity Press Stanford,California

©2003bytheBoardofTrusteesofthe LelandStanfordJuniorUniversity

Allrightsreserved. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica onacid-free, archivalqualitypaper LibraryofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gourgouris,Stathis,1958-

Doesliteraturethink?:literatureastheoryforan

antimythical era/ Stathis Gourgouris. p-

cm.

Includesindex. ISBN 0-8047-3213-2 (cloth : alk.paper)-ISBN 0-8047-3214-0 (pbk.:alk.paper) 1.Literature—Historyand criticism—Theory, etc. 2. Literatureand myth. 3.Modernism(Literature)

I.Title. PN56.M94G64 2003 809'.9112—DC21

2003001373 Originalprinting2003 Lastfigurebelowindicatesyearof this printing: 12 11 10 09 08 O0706 05 O0403 TypesetbyTimRobertsin 10/14Palatino

CONTENTS

Preface

ix

Abbreviations

XXV

1. DoesLiteratureThink?

PART1 FromLawtoMyth 2. Enlightenment andParanomia

3. TheConcept oftheMythical

49 go

4. Philosophy’s NeedforAntigone

116

PART11 Theatrical Matters

5. TheGestureoftheSirens 6. TheDreamRealityoftheRuin

161 198

PART111 Eluding theName 231

7. Research, Essay,Failure 8. ALucidDrunkenness g. DeLilloinGreece

249

Life 10.BeyondtheDamaged

323

Notes Index

343 387

292

Patience,seekers,thesecretwillcomeclearofitself! —KarlKraus

PREFACE

Modernity isoneofKleist’s marionettes. Tomakesenseofit,asmodernity’ssentientsubjects andobjects alike,wemightbeststandalongside Herr C., Kleist’s invented dancer, who claims that the art of dance

reaches itsmostprofound expression ifpursuedfromthestandpoint of a marionette. Thisstandpointismadepossiblebythecuriouscomplicityoftwoantagonistic desires:thedefiance ofearth’sgravityandthe submission tothewhimsofthepuppeteer. Themasteryofdancehinges onthedefiance of“theinertiaofmatter,thepropertymostresistant to otherwords,masteryovergravity—which isitselfpredidance”—in catedonthewillingness tosubmittothemasteryofonewhopullsthe strings,allinordertogain“theadvantage ofbeingpractically weightless.”Yetmasteryisboundtoeludethepuppetmasteraswell,HerrC. argues.Forheisdrawninto“thepathtakenbythedancer’s soul,”asthe textemphatically putsit,whichcannottakeplaceunless“theoperator transposeshimselfintothemarionette’s centerofgravity”andthusbecomeshimselfthe dancer.In effect,thisoperationimpliesat onceboth

theconfirmation andtheabdicationofmastery.Though,quitevisibly, form,anidol, thestringsofaninanimate themaster-fingers manipulate theyareinvisiblyentrancedbya movementthat flowsbackfromthe idol’stenuousjoints—asoulthatanimatestheimageof dance;animageofdancethatanimatesthedanceexperience. Bodyandsoulherecannot exchange. Thisisa curiouslyidolatrous or sequence. Atbest,theyareconorderedbyhierarchy beseparated, fromtheexpertcaHerrC.extrapolates principle. joinedbya prosthetic pacityof humancraftingof artificiallimbsto thecraftingof a mariofone’sfingers.Muchofhis onettethatwouldbeliterallyanextension

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tohuman thatseemsendemic ontechnology argument beliesa reliance Thepuppeteeris capacityevenwhenit appliesitselfto theimmaterial. hisowntranthoughineffectheonlyengineers literallya Maschinist, equationofbodyand Still,evenin thistechnological substantiation. theanimate soul,wecanhardlyclaimto knowtheorderofprinciple: ina coexistence thatcan limbscometogether fingersandtheinanimate onlymakesenseasa suspendedorder,anorderofgravitythatknows asHerrC.putsit,configurcoexistence, noground.It isanasymptotic according towhichthehuman ingthustheutmostimageofsuspension andmastery. inthebalanceofweightlessness bodyhangsmysteriously is gainedbysurrendering theburdenofone’sweight, Weightlessness bygivinguponpullingone’sweight,asitwere,inordertobepulled intotheobjectofdance.Kleist’s gestureisbuiltona curiouspoeticsof for suspension that linksthedefianceofgravityto an unwillingness self-mastery. ThetextfromwhichIhavejustdepartedonthisjourney—Heinrich vonKleist’s famousparable“OntheMarionette Theater”(1810)—is a fundamental textofRomantic aesthetics thatcoversa greatdealmore epistemic groundthanthemereantagonism betweenart andnature, whichisitsmostacknowledged contribution. Adazzlingperformance ofthedialecticsofautonomy(andthusofthedialecticofEnlightenmentitself,inlikespirittoMaxHorkheimer andTheodorW.Adorno’s famousthesis),thisparableencapsulates theproblematic experience of modernity—indeed, moreprecisely, theproblematic gravityofmodernity.I cannotthinkof a betterwayto locatetherequisitejumping-off pointforanorientation tothearguments ofthisbook,asevidentlypartialassucheffortstendtobe.Andthoughthisbookdoesnotexplicitly invokemodernity astheproblemtobesolved,nonetheless it is written infullcognizance thatitmoveswithinmodernity’s gravitational pull, evenif it prefersto embracethepoeticsof suspension espousedby Kleist’s marionettes. Forallthebrazenandsometimes remarkably inventive attemptsto discreditits relevance or evenabolishits existence, the problematic gravityofmodernity is stillwithus.Infact,onecanarguepersuasively thatmodernityis nowmoreproblematic andmoregravethanever,if

Preface

xi

fornootherreasonthanthatit isinthenatureofmodernity toembody theurgency ofitsdisavowal. When I say“initsnature”Imeanitisan essential aspectofitssocialformation: whateverhappenstobethehistoricalcontentofmodernity (assuming potentially innumerable projections),itsformative tendency todoubleuponitself,toturnitselfoverto whateverbrushesit againstthegrain,cannotbe evaded.Modernity emergesinternallydivided,conflicted, antagonistic, or dialectical— howeverwechoosetophraseit—split betweentwoprojects: theproject of autonomyandtheprojectof mastery. Thefirstconsistsin theunprecedenteddesiretobreakopentheepistemicclosurethatcharacterizesothersocialformations: namely,tocallintoquestionall“idolsof thetribe”withoutexceptionandbeyondall prohibition. Thisradical desire for interrogation is indeed limitless and noninstrumental;it is

notpresidedoverbyanysortofhigherprinciple. Itsonlyprinciple, ifit mayevenbe calledthat,is thatno principleshallremainuninterrogated,thatthereis indeednothingsacred.Thesecondprojectmaybe ofrationalandtechidentified asthedesireforthelimitless expansion nicalmastery,forthe instrumentalization of the world,forthesubmis-

sionofallthings,animateand inanimate, to thepowerofpureand Tothefirstweowetheemergence ofallemancipractical knowledge. in themodernworld,of theveryideathathuman patorymovements lifeinstrumentalized bythelawofanOtherisnotworthliving.Tothe andnowthe instancesofdehumanization secondweoweunspeakable oftheplanet. ofthetotaldestruction entirelyrealisticpossibility Thoughessentially contrary,thesetwoelementsemergetogether co-inhistorical theproblematic workintandem—hence andoftentimes to takean obviouspair.Yetit and capitalism, of democracy cidence wouldbe a seriouserrortoreduceeachelementtotheotheror toconTodo singularity. foundthetwointosomesortof(evenpolymorphous) oftheforcesofintersowouldmeanto losesightofthevitalnecessity to conaretooterrifying rogation,an actwhoseperilousdimensions contradictheirreducible template.Frommy standpoint,confronting tionof this tandemmeansconceivingit in eitherof two ways:as the andAdorno’s (accordingto Horkheimer “dialecticof Enlightenment” andterclaim,thoughfullypreparedtosubmittheirconceptualization

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whichishow ofautonomy,” orasthe“dialectic toquestion), minology thatbeandpositions ofarguments acomplex I choosetoreconfigure Castoriadis (here,again,subtotheworkofCornelius longprincipally

he himmittinghisowntermsandconceptstotheradicalinterrogation the problemsthat way,elucidating selfdemandsof us).Whichever I argue,ofourepistemoworld—regardless, menace ourcontemporary geographical locationon thisplanet(thefinepointsof difference underareutterlycrucialforanyrealhistorical amongsuchlocations comingto standingbut secondaryto thetermsI seekhere)—requires internaltendencyto takeitselfapart, to go termswith modernity’s ofitsexistence. againstthegrainofeachandeveryrealdimension Thisinternaltendency towardself-interrogation mustbecarefully minedbothforelements thatmaytendtowardself-destruction andfor elements thatmayproveresistantandevencounteractive to self-destruction.Itisneitherparticularly thoughtfulnorattentivetocurrent history’s urgentdemandstoassumetheposturethatmodernity hasrun itscourse,hasextinguished itspotential, orworseyet,hasbeenoutrun bysomesortofexternaldevelopments asyetunknownandunnamed. Thehesitantsignification “postmodernity” suggestspreciselythis shortcoming. Modernity is“unfinished” bydefinition, andonechooses to ignorethis problematic condition(orrevelin modernity’s alleged demise)atone’speril.Whether engagedwithmattersofsocialandpoliticalcultureorofphilosophy andculturaltheory,wefailtorespondto theperplexingchallenges of contemporary historyif werelyon the claimto possessthemeansofescapingthegravityofmodernity. Yet castingsuspicionon suchdefiantclaimshardlymeansthat one is boundto the orbitof modernitylikean old satellite.Thegravityof modernityworksdialectically, alternately bothascentripetalandcentrifugalforce.Weareinit—andawarethatweareinit—because weremainsuspended. Mypassionforthisprojectowesa greatdealto thesenseof being suspended in a world at once familiar,proximate,and loved, but also

enigmatic, distant,foreign,uncanny. Understanding inwhatsensethis worldhasa historydoesnotalleviate mysuspension. Itisremarkable todiscoverhowevenprofoundunderstanding of the historyof your

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xiii

conditiondoesnotprovideyouwithadequateresponsetoyourbewildermentbeforethe question“Whatam I to do?”Thequestionof praxis—for thisisthefirstquestion posedbymodernity’s conditions of suspension—becomes a quandaryinpartbecause it involves elements that exceedhistoricaljustification,becauseit thrusts itselfintoan out-

maneuverable presenttenseof decision.Itsresponsetohistoryis preciselytoforgea suspendedsenseofhistorical time.Yet,thoughourdecisiontoactintherealworldmayconstitute anincision inthehistorical fluxweinhabit,no decision cansignifyinitselfa pointoutsidethehistoricalrange.Whatonedoesmayinterruptthehistorical flux,perhaps evenopena newhorizonofpossibility anda newspacefornewdecisions to be made,but it constitutesneither archénor telos.Thus, to be

alerttotheinterruptive significance ofouractionsis,attheveryleast, toremainastonished abouthowsuchincisions actuallymakeup the historical fold. Hence, the question “What am I to do?” remains a

quandaryallaround;theconditionsofsuspensionarenotalleviated evenforthosewhomayclaimmasteryovertheartofdecision. Icannotspeakhereofthemeritofnumerousphilosophical attempts toresolvethisparadoxical condition, wherebytheinterruption ofdecisionis but anotherstitchin the historicalfabric.I willcertainlynot speakof theologicalattemptsto resolveit. Resolvingthisparadox totheprofoundreality seemsfraudulenttome,oratleastdisrespectful ofthequestion.Thequestion“WhatamI todo?”cannotbeexhausted what would makethe worldproximate,evenreby contemplating itself,insofarasitpertains tomydoing.Rather,thequestion sponsive, thanitspossibleresotome,to theonewhoistoact,is moreimportant theonewhoasks lution.Fortheonewhois toactisfirstandforemost the question. The question is the first act, and as such, in it inheres no guarantee of response,resolution,or elucidation.As radicalinterroga-

the toitsparts;itindicates andirreducible tivemode,itisself-sufficient of orprecisely, horizonofpraxistobeprimarilyoneof interrogation, “WhatamI to do?”maythusariseoutoftheenigself-interrogation. world,but itpertainstotheenigofthesurrounding maticconditions it hasbecomea maticpositionof an “I”:the“I”is itselfin question, to a questionbeforetheworld,whilecontinuing question.Becoming

xiv

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dare not makethe world a matter of transcendence,registersthe full

gravityofmodernity. intheproblematic forceofsuspension thatthisquandaryis theesLetussay,forthesakeofconvention, We subject.” ofthe“post-Enlightenment characteristic sentialhistorical problem,whoseinaugural historical canspeakthenofa constitutive or, as the conditionofan inquiringsubjectivity instanceI conceive a subjectivity formedbyvirtueofandinregardto the moreprecisely, oftheobjectofinquiry— Knowledge interrogation ofitsownposition. in thus implicated ofone’sworld—is strictlyspeaking,knowledge thisparadoxical self-interrogation. SinceHegelatleast,weunderstand entwinement: the self-inquiring (selfco-implication as a dialectical ofitselfasa condition subjectenactsa certainobjectification reflexive) to theobjective elementsofitsworldin an experiforbeingsubjected enceof historical mutability. In thisdialectical gesturethemodeof knowledge isthekeyquestion, theunknown variable intheequation. Mychoicetostagetheproblemofself-interrogation andpraxisinthe worldbyconducting a peculiarinvestigation ofliterature,asI doin thisbook,ismyresponsetothisvariable.Notcontenttofollowtheanalyticalmodelbywhichasubjectlearnsofitsexistence throughthedisintegrationof the forcesthat constituteit, the dialecticsof self-interro-

gationrequiresa praxisthatsenses thesubject-object relation,beyondits constituent parts,astheendemicenigmaofitsownexistence: endemic becausetheexternality oftheobject(world)istheconstitutive necessity ofsubjectification; enigmatic becausethisnecessityisnot determined byrulebutregisterscontingently andfiguratively, aspartoftheperformativemakingofthesubject,andthusremainsperpetually opentorevision, reiteration,interpretation.In other words, self-interrogation, as

Iconceive it,is notpropelled bytheimperative toachievesomesortof clear senseof Selfonceand for all, but is itselfan instanceof alteration,

ofpoiesis: aperformative indication ofhowencountering theworldisa creative/destructive intervention, an alterationof the frameworkof everysuchencounter. Inthisrespect,Icametothisprojectoutofasenseofbothsuspension and self-interrogation, eachprovidingthegroundlesspropulsionfor theother.Soit maybefittingthatthisbook,althoughcomplete inits

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own terms, remains suspended between the historicalexfoliationof a

philosophical formIperformed inDream Nation (inanattempttoshow history’s dreamlike elements tobe thenation’sformalattributes) and thepsycho-political investigation ofsocialpoiésis|havecurrentlyundertakenin a workinprogresson sublimation andthesecularimagination.Allthreeprojects reflect, inthebroadest possibleterms,myunremittinginsistence on the questionof how societiesimaginethemselvesand theirothersand,contiguously, ofhowsocieties formand transformthemselves and theirothers(including an evidentlyirrepressibledriveto occludesuchradicalself-formative potential). The fieldofinquiryineachcasemaybedifferent(theproduction ofnational history,thepoliticsofsublimation, or,presently, theintrinsictheoretical ofliterature), capacity butinallcasestheenigmatic objectathandishumanity’smythographic wayofforginganexistence intheworld—anotionorimagethat,ascommondenominator forallthreeprojects,cannoteludea tendency towardgenerality or abstraction. Bythesametoken, in all three cases,there is a commonhistoricalground,constituted

aroundtheepistemic horizonweidentifyinshorthandasthe“Enlightenmentuniverse.”Thus,alongsidethebroaderquestionofsociety’s and transformative force,anotherdomainof interrogation formative beit construed traauthority, emerges:whateverpertainstosubjective powerof astheperformative ditionally asagencyor,moresuggestively, as thesourceofsociety’sfigurativeor fictionalizing theimagination,

power. astheoryforan antimythiThisbook’speculiarfocuson“literature idiosyncrasy calera”risesoutofthisepistemichorizon.Thediscursive ithere, ofthisphrasewillunfoldintheessaysthat follow.Unpacking andforbeforethe workisdone,runsthedangerof preconditioning pathofthoughtina waythatwouldocclude malizinga multitudinous ona setofrecogthefactthateachmeditation its essayistic character, Nonetheless, nizableobjectsofinquiryis a trialrun,an experiment. oftheesandmytharetheprotagonists grantingthatthetermsliterature oftheattitudetheyaremade description saysthatfollow,a preliminary andmytharealreadylinkedtogetherin Literature tobeariswarranted. themostobvious inliteraryhistory, discourses avarietyof“traditional”

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asvarious Likewise, character. mythopoetic so-called beingliterature’s actionevoke,mythiofhistorical onthefictionality focused discourses calaspectsof a socialrealmoftenleadoneto considertheliterary and their produceimagesof themselves processwherebysocieties thisprocess world,evenif theydon’tquitemanageto conceptualize of literatureas such.I takesuchestablished withintheboundaries Cerasgroundwork. andmythforgranted, between literature affinities self-fictionalization is of consequences ofsociety’s tainly,thehistorical greatinteresttome,andthisdoespressmetoconsiderthequestionof thanwhatweconventionally in amuchbroaderframework literariness identifyasthedomainofliteratureproper. Yet,thisprojectisbuiltontheparadoxthatliterature alreadyexceeds itsproperboundaries byvirtueofprovidingsomething unique,somethingthatpertainstowhatifis,eventhoughtalkingaboutboth“it”and Andtheargument takesonfurther “is”canneverbeentirelyreliable. riskby claimingthatmythmaybe the language thatelucidatesthis paradox, thatmakesmoretangible whatever condition accounts forliteratureprovidinga uniqueaccessto knowledge—indeed, theoretical knowledge, asthisisidentifiedbybothphilosophyandscience—entirelywithinandbyvirtueofwhatconstitutesit as literature.Using mythisariskbecauseitrequires battlingagainstaccumulated layersof suspicion towardthenotion,atleastsincethesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Oneof my aspirations in thisbookis to dismantlethe prejudicial presuppositions ofsuchsuspicionand to imbuethesignificationofmythwitha perspective thatjettisonsthe constraints ofthe truth/falsityframework, underlining insteadmyth’sundeconstructible performativity. Mysenseofmyth,as I reiteratethroughoutthebook,is not narrative,symbolic,and archaic,but theatrical,allegorical,and con-

temporary. Itis historical throughand throughand,to mymind,the most corrosiveantimatter to the transcendental,the mystical,the reli-

gious.Oneoftenfindstheargumentthatmythtendstosubmitto—or evenfacilitate—a sortofsacralization ofidentity(asinfascism,forexample).It wouldbemoreprecisetosaythatcertainsocial-historical attitudesdresstheirdesireforthesacredinthelanguageofmyth.Thisis surelythecasewithfascism. Withthisinmind,understanding inwhat

Preface xvii

sensethe performativity unleashed by mythultimately undercutsthe relianceon transcendental authority,whichwe encountertimeand againintheforgingofcollective identification, isoneoftheprimarydimensions ofthisproject. Themeditation onmythemergedout oftheoriginalimpulseto articulatethe elusivecharacterofwhatI perceived to beliterature’s uniqueprovisionfortheoretical thinking. Butsoonit becameapparent thatthetwoperspectives (“literature as theory”and“mythasperformance”)inhabiteda peculiarco-incidence: astwoelementsofdifferent but not orderedtemporalities, a mutual“space”in what occupying maybecalled,following Castoriadis, a “magmaoftime.”Throughout the book, I often turn to the sort of relationI call co-incidence as methodological ground,particularly when I insistona dialectical apprehension. (Amagmatic senseoftemporality liberates dialectics from itspresumedlockonunitsoftime.)Intheseterms,thereisindeed a dialecticaltensionbetweentheideathatliteratureachievesauniquetheoreticalsenseoftheworldandtheideathatmythis a performative modeofworldlyknowledge. Yetthisdialectical relationcannotberesolvedsimplyby pronouncingliteraturemythopoetic.As I stageit here,literatureandmythcanneverturnintoattributesofeachother, noraretheyevertobeeachother’sproperty.Theyareneitherinterchangeablenordo theycollapseintoonecompositesingularity. Ina universe, literatureandmythmaybesaidrather post-Enlightenment workonknowledge, their in theirwork—their tostrikea co-incidence workfoknowledge. that,at theveryleast,disruptsthe Thisworkfostersan experience of reasonthatunderliestheframework tacitrelianceon transcendental knowledge(be it ethical,aesthetic,or ontological). Enlightenment Hence, the range of the question “Does literature think?” must be ex-

toadomain “Whatisliterature?” tendedbeyondtheinheritedquestion thataddressescoreattributesofthehistoryandpoliticsof knowledge whatsortoftheoretical world.Articulating inthepost-Enlightenment knowledgeliteratureachievesin its owntermstoucheson a rangeof speaking,whichpertainultiquestions,conventionally “nonliterary” intheworldasthemaker one’sorientation matelytowhatdetermines

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(andoftentimesdestroyer)of theworld.Therefore,withinthe social-

thequestion I recognize asmypointofdeparture, framework historical asa astheory”isposedina varietyofways:specifically, of“literature problemof law and constitutivelawlessness(archéor anarchy)in the

andperformativity asaproblem oftheatricality imagination; formative quotation, andtheviolence insocialpoiésis; asaproblemoftranslation, otherwords,asa ofnaming;orasa problemoffinitudein history—in Thefirstthree ofworldliness anda critiqueoftranscendence. politics roughlytothethreepartsofthebook(tiwayslistedabovecorrespond tled “From Law to Myth,” “TheatricalMatters,” and “Eluding the

tobeanelementthatpermeates Name”). Thefourthmaybeconsidered thetextthroughout, receiving mostfocused elaboration intheopening andclosingessays,whichactasbookendstothethreeparts. Attention towhatIcall“anantimythical era”maybetracedinvariousplacesthroughout thetext,albeitarticulated differently according to the particularobject/textunderreview.Basically, I consider“antimythical” whateverelementcultivatestheallureofa transcendental signifier—in essence,whateverelementoccludeshumanity’s intransigentdesiretoseekorcreatemeaning inthefiniteworld.Thoughthe mostobviously antimythical element,accordingto thisformulation, wouldbethetheological (particularly thesortoftheological practice thatprivileges theabstractandotherworldly overtheconcretecultural ritual),myunderstanding ofwhatis antimythical encompasses thesort of transcendentalist obsession associated withthemosttypicalofEnlightenment tendencies: the“rational-secular” instrumentalist abstraction,whichisasotherworldly ascanbeimagined. Thefactthatthecurrentglobalcondition hasconfigured thesetwoelements asquintessentially antagonistic(hencethe ridiculouspronouncementsof an “emancipated rationalWest”againsta “fanatically religiousIslam”)is indicative of thecharacteristic self-occultation thatenablesmodernsocietiesto suppressor renouncetheirotherwise irrepressible capacityto thinkin mythical terms.Mycontention hereisthattheapparentrelegationofthesignificance ofliterature as self-fictionalizing socialforcein contemporary history—hence, as vital mythicalpresence—correspondstoanincreasingly antimythical tendencyinsociety’s psychical

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universe. Inthisrespect, thenotionof“literature astheory”mayindeed pertainto anintrinsiccondition—to whatliteraturedoesasliterature— butit alsosignifies theclaimthatliterature istheoryfor“anantimythicalera,”inotherwords,thespecific theoretical provisionforexploring andexposing inwhatsenseacertainhistorical condition hasfashioned a crypto-metaphysics thatclaimstohaveeffectively de-mythified the world.Fromthis standpoint,to ask the question“Doesliterature think?”alsomeansto reanimatethe mythicalpowerof signification fromwithinanEnlightenment framework againstboththeological and rationalisttranscendentalism. Understanding literature’s intrinsiccapacitytotheorize theconditions oftheworldfromwhichit emerges is thus consubstantial withmyth’sgainingnewmeaning,withmyth’s bothfromtheburdenofantiquepresuppositions and disengagement fromvariouslate-twentieth-century attemptsto relegateit to a blind ofidentityreproduction. mechanism Insofarasmyargument forliterature’s uniquerelationtoknowledge alsoconstitutesan interrogationof contemporarysociety’scovertor drivefor resacralization, thisis essentially a political underhanded book:a bookconfigured ontheunderstanding thattoseekwhatever is worldly— literarypertainsto whateverissocial,historical, intrinsically of theahistorical pretensions disputes,byitsmereexistence, whatever thesacred.Bythesametoken,seekingtounderstandwhatconstitutes of anactofreadingtheconditions thepoeticelementina textsignifies socialpoiésisitself.Inpreciselythissense,thequestionof whetherand ofaesthetic asanenterprise howliteraturethinkscannotbeundertaken ofliterary in thestrictways theory.Norcanthisprojectbeconducted techcriticism,evenwhenit involvesthenecessityof close-reading niques.Thetextualinstancesfiguredhereas momentsof reading, belongto a broaderdesireto whethercursoryorin depth,ultimately of postmomentsin the socialimagination readcrucialperformative ofthe societies,withan eye towardtheinterrogation Enlightenment politicsofemergentimages,idols,orformsthatrespondtotheEnlightoftheworld. allegeddisenchantment enment’s andtheworldisframed Inthesensethatthisactofreadingliterature of foundation asmythical oftheEnlightenment withina confrontation

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doesnotentaila spiritualdesert disenchantment modernity—whereby projectsiga theology—this doesnotnecessitate and (re)enchantment byHorkheimer rubricproposed totheepistemological nifiesa response and Nodoubta personal ofEnlightenment. andAdornoasthedialectic gesturetowarda bookthatmorethantwentyyearsago idiosyncratic a certainpathofthoughtto whichI remaincommitted, inaugurated Horkheimer and this responsedoesnotmerelyseekto reconfigure oftherelationbetweenEnlightensingularunderstanding Adorno’s torethinkthewaysandmeansofthe mentandmyth,butalsoattempts in numerousindialectical methoditself.Asthereaderwillrecognize aptiintrinsicallytheoretical of literature’s stances,the performance ofmythicthoughtittheperformativity tude—or, inanotherlanguage, thinkingthat a testinggroundforthesortofdialectical self—becomes shattersanylogicofidentityandrecognizes neitherarchénortelos. Adialectical modeofthinkingthatshattersidentityprinciples andhasno useforstricttemporal orderminimizes thepossibility ofcomingtorest ata plateau(Lichtung) ofideaswherepropositional languageassumes theauthority ofnaming.Howeverwemightevaluatethephilosophical statusof such a mode,the factremainsthatwritingaboutliterature—or,

moreprecisely, writingaboutthethinkingcapacities ofpoiésis—cannot pretendtoovercome theprimacyofwriting: themostconcrete traceof themateriality ofthought. I havecometo understandthatwritinga bookis a long,arduous, persistent, buthardlycalculable processofshadingoveran areathat nonetheless doesnotceasetoresistbeingcovered. Thisprocessisalwayspeculiar. Themostprecisepreview ofwhatis tobecoveredturns outtooweitsprecision toahunch,to an intuitiveapprehension, which liesmuchclosertothepsychicterrainofthewishthanthecertaintyof intellectual projection. Nomatterhowwelltrainedwemightbeinthe imaginative cartography ofproblems to beresolved, wefailtoexperience the pleasureof realdiscoveryifwe remain fearful of our hunches,

ifweextractourintuitionfromour method,if we dismisstheexactitudeofour fantasy.Worseyet,wethusfailtorecognize theresistance thateveryobjectof inquirypresentsto theenquiringmethod—if indeedobjects entailbonafideproblems toberesolved, ifindeedmethod consistsina bonafidecommitment to resolveproblems.

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Writingthisbookhasbeensuchan experience oftensionbetween objectand method,compounded by the factthat bothobjectand methodwereselectedfortheirdefiance ofinstrumental andpropositionalknowledge. Howdoesonethinkof literature’s thinking? How doesonestandoutsideaterrainthatblursall“outside” positions? How doesonestandoutsidea terrainwhose“inside”is theonlymeansof orientation,both map and compass,both imageand ground?One doesn’t.Thisis thefirstresponse. Onedoesn’tbecausetodo sois to produceannihilating magic,tomakeselfandimagevanishat once.At the limit,to do so is to externalizethis inside,to turn literatureinside out—adreadfulprospect.One doesn’t,becausetodoit presupposes thatwhatliteraturedoesis determined onceandforall,evenifnot readilyavailabletoevidentdetermination. Yetthewholewagerinthisbookisto discover whatliterature determinesasawayofthinking intheworld:tocarelessforwhatmightdetermineliteratureandexploreinsteadwhatmightaccountforliterature’scapacitytokeepitsworkintactdespitetheonslaughtofmultiple fromeveryaspectofthehumandomain.Onedoesowe determinations thismuch—to command overwhatenliterature recognize literature’s ablesit to be transmitted,acrossculturesand times,acrosshistorical evenin defiance ofitsultimateuntranslatabilterrainsandlanguages, againstthe grainofitsultiity.Literature’s enigmatic transmittability themostconcisefigureof mightbe considered mateuntranslatability its theoreticalidiom.Asreaders,we stand beforeliteraturein the light

of Kleist’smarionettelogic.Wesubmitto an idiomaticorder,as the At itsweightlessness. powerproduces submitstowhatever marionette back awareness) thesametime,wetransmitourreading(ourhistorical totranslate,as the puppet to the work,releasedfromthe compulsion himselftothe mastermustreleasehimselffrommasteryandtranspose puppet’scenterofgravity.Theforceofreadingliterature—increasingly patterns induced andtechnologically byourmedia-bound undermined to submission between interplay residesinthissuspended ofthought— to of thealertness to takecommand idiomandreadiness literature’s uponus. historythatthisidiomimposes

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Thisbookcameoutofaprojectthatwasalongtimein themakingand privateandpublic.I amdeeply livedthroughvariousincarnations, whotooka chanceat making gratefultotheeditorsandpublishers publictheideasinthiswork,evenwhennotentirelyworkedthrough. Earlyversionsofthismaterialwerepublishedas follows:“Research, Essay,Failure (Flaubert’sItinerary),”in NewLiteraryHistory26 (1995):

Identity, andSelfandParanomia,” in Violence, 345-59; “Enlightenment editedby SamuelWeberand Hentde Vries(Stanford: Determination, StanfordUniversityPress,1997),119-49;“A Lucid Drunkenness in SouthAtlanticQuarterly97,no.2 Poeticsof Revolution),” (Genet’s: 9,no. (Spring1998):413-56;“BeyondtheDamagedLife,”in Emergences 1999):229-43;“TheConceptof the Mythical(Schmitt 2 (November 21(May2000):1487-512. LawReview withSorel)”inCardozo fromvariandthewritingofthisbookhavebenefited Theresearch ousinstances ofacademic hospitality, chiefamongthemvisitingproat:thePrograminHistoryandPhilosophy fessorships andfellowships ofScience, NationalTechnical University in Athens(Spring1995);InternationalInstituteandPrograminComparative Literature, UniversityofMichigan (Spring1998); CenterfortheCriticalAnalysisofContemporary Culture,RutgersUniversity (2000-2001); YaleCenterforInternationaland Area Studiesand Departmentof Comparative Literature,YaleUniversity(Fall2001).I believeteachingto be themost

valuable pathtoresearch, soI amprofoundly indebtedtothestudents andprojectcollaborators in theaboveinstitutions(aswellasmystudentsatPrinceton andColumbia) forthewealthofinsightintothematerialofthisbookthatIgainedfromsuchencounters. HalfwayintothisprojectI realizedthatitsheartand soulwasnourishedbymycommitment to whatEdwardSaidhasexemplified inhis workas theprojectofsecularcriticism. NothingIsaywilldojusticeto mysenseofindebtedness andappreciation forEdwardSaid’swealthof mindandbraveryofspirit,forhisunwavering loyaltytowhatevermay enrichreallivesin therealworld,forhisuncompromising loveofliterature.Beyondhisinsightful critiqueandhissupportofmyvisionover theyears,I thankhim fortheinspirationto keepthisbookengaged withtherealityofmylife. Withoutthe wisdomof AristeidisBaltasthis bookwould not have

Preface xxiii

existedat all.In thefirstincandescent vestigesoftheidea,carelessly spunduringourmanymemorable conversations, hesawmuchfurther andsharperthanI,raisingthestakesoftheargument inawaythatonly abonafideepistemologist can.Thedepthofourfriendship reaches beyondgesturesofthanksforhisgenerosity, butitcannotkeepmefrom acknowledging that,duringthemostdireoftimes,thisbookhaslived byvirtueofborrowinghisthoughtsandsometimes hisactualwords. Duringthe ten-yeartrajectory ofthisprojectandmystruggleto negotiatewithitsmanyincarnations, Ihadthegoodfortunetofindinterlocutorswithformidable mindsanda passionforrealthinking. Many ofthemhelpedmebycreating thecircumstances forthisworktofinda public;othersintervened incrucialinstances andchanged itscoursein Forthefortuneofsuchgifts,| amdeeply waystheymaynotrecognize. grateful to Gil Anidjar,JonathanArac,Andrew Benjamin,Akeel Bilgrami,Judith Butler,Hamid Dabashi,NicholasDirks,Costas Douzinas, SamiraHaj, BeatriceHanssen,Martin Harries,MarciaIan, VirginiaJack-

son,AndreasKalyvas, Dimitris Kargiotis, Vassilis Joseph Lambropoulos, Massad,John McClure,RobertMiklitsch,RosalindMorris,AamirMufti, JanMiiller,MarcNichanian,AndrewParker,YopiePrins,BruceRobbins, Gayatri Spivak,ConstantineTsoukalas,Hent de Vries,CandiceWard, MichaelWarner,SamuelWeber,Joel Whitebook.Tothose selectPrince-

(AprilAlliston, JamesBoon,StanleyCornton University colleagues Wood)who,intimesof gold,GyanPrakash, AnsonRabinbach, Michael howto continueto judgment,showedmesogracefully impoverished Caknowsnobounds.ToEduardo inthiswork,myappreciation believe dava, Carlos Forment,EdwardMitchell,DavidScott,and JimWiltgen,I

andrelentless intellect, offerthisbookingratitudefortheirinimitable withwhichtheyshowmehowmymindworks,for forthegraciousness lateintothenightthatwroteandrewrote discussions theextraordinary the world anew,for the sheerjoyof our friendship.HelenTartar,my ed-

Press,deservesthemostcreditforthisbook’s itoratStanfordUniversity anddaring,herloveoforiginalthinkher intelligence actualexistence; withmypeculiarwaysofwriting,herpatienceandcriticalpersistence ingarepresentalloverinthistext. alGourgouris, Ilostmyfather,Thymios Inthemidstofthisjourney, HewashardlyanintellectogethersuddenlyonefineAugustmorning.

xxiv

Preface

tual,buthehadabrilliantsenseoftheperformative andanuncanny skillatsubversive irony.Agreatmanypagesinthisbookwerewritten undertheshadowofresponding towhatremains withhisabsence. But thepresenceofmindandsoulforundertaking thisadventuresprings fromthetwopeoplewhoaremylife:mysonPetros,whocametothis worldeightyearsagototeachmemorethanIcouldeverimagine,and NeniPanourgia, myheart’scompanion, whosemyriadtalentsconverge in herpassionateandgracefulwayoflovinglifeandlivinglovein everysinglemomentofourmortalexistence. NewYorkandAthens June2002

ABBREVIATIONS

CM

HenriBergson, TheCreative Mind:AnIntroduction toMetaphysics, trans.MabelleL.Andison(NewYork:Philosophical Library,1946).

Corr.

GustaveFlaubert,Correspondance, ed. LouisConard(Paris,

1926-34). cP

CarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentary Democracy, trans.Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,1988); Diegeistesgeschichtliche Lagedesheutigen Parliamentarismus (Berlin: Duncker& Humblot,1996;orig.pub.1923).

cv

WalterBenjamin,“CritiqueofViolence,”trans.EdmundJephcott, in Benjamin,Reflections (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,Jovanovich, 1978),277-300;“ZurKritikder Gewalt,”in Gesammelte SchriftenII-I

(Frankfurta. M.:Suhrkamp,1991),179-203. FranzKafka,Diaries(1914-1923), trans.MartinGreenberg,with

HannahArendt(NewYork:Schocken, 1949). DE

MaxHorkheimer andTheodorW.Adorno,Dialectic ofEnlightenPress, (Stanford: StanfordUniversity ment,trans.EdmundJephcott 2002);Dialectik derAufklrung (Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1984).

DL

inKafka and JacquesDerrida,“Devantlaloi,”trans.AvitalRonnel, ed.AlanUdoff(Bloomington: Critical Performance, theContemporary Press,1987),128-49. IndianaUniversity Carl Schmitt,HamletoderHekuba:DerEinbruchderZeitin dasSpiel

1956). EugenDiederichs, (Diisseldorf:

xxvi HH

Abbreviations

Hymn“TheIster,”trans.William McMartinHeidegger, Hélderlin’s IndianaUniversityPress,1996). NeillandJuliaDavis(Bloomington:

IM

trans.RalphManAnIntroduction toMetaphysics, MartinHeidegger, heim(NewHaven:YaleUniversity Press,1959).

Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: OntheTenthAnniversary ofHis Death,”trans.HarryZohn,inBenjamin, Illuminations, ed.and introd.HannahArendt(NewYork:Schocken,1969),111-40. PL

JeanGenet,Prisoner ofLove, trans.Barbara Bray(Middletown, Conn.:WesleyanUniversityPress,1992);UnCaptifamoureux(Paris: Gallimard,1986).

FranzKafka,“TheSilence oftheSirens,” inTheComplete Stories, trans.WillaandEdwinMuir(NewYork:Schocken,1971);“Das SchweigenderSirenen,”in EinLandarztundandereProsa,ed. MichaelMiiller(Stuttgart:Reclam,1995). ™N

DonDeLillo,TheNames(NewYork:Vintage,1982).

UB

WalterBenjamin, “Conversations withBrecht,” inUnderstanding Brecht (London: Verso,1983). HannahArendt,OnViolence (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,andCo.,

1969).

DOESLITERATURE THINK?

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Mytitleresonateswiththatof a bookbyPierreMacherey, whichasks, perhapsmoreprudently, Aquoipenselalittérature? Macherey takesfor grantedthatliteraturethinksandpreferstoposethequestionofliterature’scognitive object(hencetheEnglishtranslation ofthebookasThe Object ofLiterature).! Nodoubtthisisanessentialquestion—of what does literature think? or, from another point of view,on what account

doesliteraturethink?—and Iwilltrytoengagesuchquestions, aswell. Butthelessinstrumentally definedquestionIposehereasmypointof departureis meanttoopenfurtherthefieldofnegotiation. Although shareMacherey’s myimpliedanswermightnominally assumption— namely,yes, literature doesthink—theprocessby which one comes to

holdsucha positionisatstakeanddeservesurgentinterrogation. Toputitbluntly,thewaythatliteraturethinkscastsintoallsortsof turbulencethestatusoftheactofthinking,ifnot theactualnotionof tomentionthewayswehave,sincetheeighteenth thoughtitself—not andouraccesstothem.The century,categorized modesofknowledge whatliterature thinks(what pointisnottodetermine morechallenging istheprocessby object), buthowliteraturethinks—what isitscognitive andwhat whichliteraturemightprovideus withaccesstoknowledge

2

Think? DoesLiterature

islessondetermining thismightbe.Myemphasis sortofknowledge the objectof knowledgeand moreon ascertainingthe mode of mayintheprocess)—which (thenature,theframework, knowledge theoverallimpetusof objects—with deedinvolvevariousdifferent attributedtratheentireequation,the actualcategories questioning totheprocessofthoughtandthewaywetendto measure ditionally theirconsequences. thinksbutwhetherlitThequestion isnotsimplywhetherliterature it hasa capacityto theorizethe eraturethinkstheoretically—whether conditions of theworldfromwhichit emergesandto whichit adisthequestion of underlying thesepremises dressesitself.Moreover, literature’s capacitytotheorizeintrinsically, withoutexternaltutelage (toinvoke,fora moment,Kant’swell-knownassertionabout the work

ofEnlightenment)—that is,totheorizewithouttheaidoftheanalytical methodswehavecometo consideressentialto theory,asdictatedby thecontemporary traditionofWesternphilosophyand,ofcourse,the methodsofscience,in thewaythatbothterms(philosophy andscience)havecometobeunderstoodsincetheEnlightenment. Theideathatliteraturemightharboritsownmodeofknowledge is ancient,atleastasoldastheso-called quarrelbetweenpoetryandphilosophyandPlato’snotoriousexpulsionofthepoetsfromthecityin theRepublic. ItisfairtosaythatsincePlato’sfamousdecisiontherehas beenanimplicitbutconsistent association ofthepoeticactwitha peculiar,mysterious, andevendangerous sortofknowledge. Bycontrast, anyseriousstudyofthe intersection betweentheRomantics andthe Kant/Hegel configuration inGermanphilosophy andaesthetics would recognize theinvention oftheoryasindigenous to theliterarydomain, and for certainof the Romantics(particularlyin the Jena circle),as properlyphilosophical. InRomantic aesthetics, thesingularaccessto knowledge thatliterature is supposedtoprovide(itsmysteryanddangerdutifullycelebrated) becamethebasisforan “autonomous” disciplineofliterature, bornalongsidethediscipline ofcriticism and literary theory.Itisthusconventional torecognize inthisRomantic conjuncture thesourcesofliterarymodernity. In contemporary terms,whatmight besaidtoshadowthisinquiryistheturnthat,sincethelate-1960s, theoryhastakentowardanexplicitlyliterarymodeofexpression, where

DoesLiterature Think?

3

writingitselfhasbeengrantedprimaryvalue,basedontheargument thatphilosophical discourse (andmetaphysics inparticular) isfounded ona commandofmetaphor.(This was, in part, the contributionofDer-

rida’searlywork.)Thisturnled eventually tothe institutional establishment ofliterarytheory(inanewsensethatextended theRomantic prototypebeyonditsownconceived limits)as theactivitythatcanabsorbpractically everykindofspeculative thoughtaboutcultureandsocietyin additiontotheexpressive modeofliterature itself—occasionally,onemustadmit,tothedetrimentofliterature. Itmaythusseemold-fashioned toaffirmtheintrinsic propcognitive ertiesof literature,mayperhapsevenbetrayresidualtracesofNew orRussian Criticism Formalism, orstillmoretroubling, aghostlyresurgence of the claimsof KennethBurke,Northrop Frye,or RenéWellek,

whichonceservedasinstitutional foundations fortherelationship betweenliteratureandtheoryintheAnglo-American academy. Moreover, arguingforliterature’s theoretical “autonomy” nowadaysmustcarry anadditionalburden:thelikelychargeofsimpleantiquarianism, given theincreasingtendencytoconceptualize knowledge intermsoftechnological hardwareandthedirepredictions thatthefutureofthebook Yetitisprecisely literature’s capacity asobjecthasbecomeprecarious. ofthemarket,andtocontoresistcalculation, to defytheexigencies unin thisparticularly tinuetoharborthekeyto society’s imagination itscognitive and certainandunstabletimethatinvitesustoreconsider theoretical nature. OnemightdiscerninthislastsentenceanAdornianresponsetocontensionbetweenliteraryenreality,namelythedialectical temporary andthecapitalist thinkingin general) deavor(or,asIwillargue,poietic andnowactuallyglobalofculture(alwayspotentially administration /poiéticrelationto theworldsimultaneized),wherebythe“literary” revealsthemto andsimultaneously socialantinomies ouslyembodies by negatingthem.Somuchwouldbeina largesense us,aggravated, accurate;the presenceof Adorno, refractedvia a dialecticalconfronta-

andthepeculiarstrandof “modernist tionwithBrechtand Benjamin Marxism”that they all weavetogether,permeatesthis argument a definition inproviding YetthoughIamhardlyinterested throughout. untenabletask,apartfromtheunavoidof“literatureas theory”—an

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Think? DoesLiterature

therelationofpraxisto the abletroubleofhavingalwaysto historicize amalsonotcontentto retainthedoworldfromwhichit emerges—I ground,whichiswhyIdonotinasapurelynegative mainofliterature L’Espace extraordinary MauriceBlanchot’s intomyreflections corporate thoughitsimpactasasalientpoint ofLiterature, 1955), littéraire (TheSpace Ifmyinquirytakesshapeagainstthegrain pointremains. ofdeparture atthe oftheory—a chargeIconsider, configuration ofthe“autonomous” of literature” thata “primacy doesrecognize veryleast,arguable—it intheabsenceoftheory,iffornootherreasonthan cannotbe affirmed oftheorybeinthelimitless interrogation investment theimperative which castsinto doubt both its yond its triumphantinstitutionalization,

asthinkanditsself-ascribed autonomy totalizing analyticaspirations Speaking inbluntining-work, precisely inordertoexpanditshorizon. stitutional terms,toconsiderthequestionofwhetherliteraturethinks theoretically ishardlyan“antitheory” proposition, exceptforthosewho areincurably threatened bytheoryandfetishize literature or,conversely, thosewhofetishizetheoryandarethreatenedbyits self-interrogation. Iam,ofcourse, awareoftheaffinity between myargument andHeidegger’s well-known formulation Dichten istDenken, particularly inthe wayheputitintopracticeinhisdiscussions ofHélderlin. However, my objections toHeidegger’s actualreadings(ofHélderlin, butalsoinvariablyoftheGreeks) disruptthisaffinityinfundamental ways.Thecomplexdetailsofthisdisruptioncanonlybeunraveledinfocusedelaborations.” Letmesay,asakindofpreliminary remark,thatalthoughHeidegger’sturntoHélderlin’s poetryasthephilosophical (ortheoretical) idiomin itspurestformmightprovidean interestingpointofdeparture,hisfoundational conceptualization ofthoughtas a matteroflanguage(inwhichHélderlin wouldbetheepitomeofthelanguage ofBeing,“sinceBeingspeaksGerman,” asitwere)isfarfromwhatIamtryingto explore.Heidegger’s enormouslaborof tamingHélderlin’s projectledtoa bodyofphilosophical workthatclaimsto repealpoetry’sconcealment (in anotherlanguage,to revealpoetry’sunconscious)by documenting in expertanalyticgestures,howHélderlin’s poetryis nothingotherthantheunacknowledged contentofphilosophy.Insofaras Heidegger’s desirefortheautonomy ofpoetryisgenuine,hisworkbecomes embroiled ina deadlyparadoxthatdoesnotre-

DoesLiterature Think?

5

sultin theproclaimed “endofphilosophy” butinthedisplacement of poetry—as humancreative / destructive action,as theforceofpoiein—to theworkofDasein asanalreadydetermined form. Inretrospect, Heidegger’s tirelessworkon Hélderlinand hiselevationofpoetrytothehighestactivities of thoughtmightbesaidto extendthe Athenaeum project,especiallyinsofarasit overlapswithanotherRomantic obsession: to explorein practice therealpossibilities of theClassical intheModern, inakindofsublation oftheconditions of “unfinished modernity” thattheAncient Greeksleftbehind,anobsessionthatresidesat thecoreoftheGermannationalimaginary. Forthe Romantics, thisprojectentailstheproductionofabsoluteliterature, or ofLiterature asan absolute category thatencompasses theautopoetic totalpotentia oftheimaginaentiretyofhumanthinkingactivity—the tionaspraxis—taken, inretrospect, tobetheinitialconceptualization of literature’s theoretical prowess.* IntheirinfluentialtreatmentofGermanRomanticism, Jean-Luc NancyandPhilippeLacoue-Labarthe explicitlyproposeresearching whattheycall“theoretical romanticism” (asschool,moveoutsideofanyperiodizing notionsof Romanticism ment,literarytendency, etc.),inordertodisentangle whattheyidentify asliterature’s firsttheoretical Theirargument leadsultimately instance. inventsucha nameforthemto theclaimthattheRomantics—who selvesinorderto coverup theirinabilityto namewhattheywereenofthesiggagedin—were involvedina socialproject:theredefinition and functionof the poetin theworld.Theydescribethe nificance group firstavant-garde cell—“the groupasasortofpolitical Athenaeum aninterrogwastoestablish necessity in history’—whose constitutive Thegroupaspiredtoanetwork practice. ative,self-reflexive, theoretical to thatwouldserveasmodelfora newkindoflife,andit is important dimenresidesinthepsycho-sexual thatthisavant-gardism emphasize defiesthesocio-culthatexplicitly atmosphere sionsof a “communal” however,is significance, turalnormsoftheperiod.Itsmosttrenchant practicethatdoes theoretical ofa collective theself-conceptualization fragmenproducean obviousresult,butisstructurally notnecessarily group,wecontaryandorientedtowardprocess.WiththeAthenaeum but category, ofliteratureasautonomous frontnotonlytheproduction socialpractices. orliterarytheoryasautonomous thegenresofcriticism

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ofcategories takesplacehere:namely,theory intertwining Adialectical atthesametimeaslitasbeinginitselfa literaryendeavor isperceived itsown eratureissaidtoproduceitselfintheverygestureofproducing conjuncture, stakesofthishistorical tothepolitical theory.Responding claimthattheyattempttoavoidendlessly NancyandLacoue-Labarthe thiseffort.Thoughonecouldhardlyarguewiththeprincireinventing is predicatedpreple,the historicalfactremainsthat avant-gardism Todisrereinvention, of autopoiésis. ciselyon an actofself-fashioning the isto underestimate gardtheradicalnatureofsuchself-fashioning reinvention, whichliesattheheartofallmodern powerofdisavowing appropriations oftradition. practice,which Thisinvention of literatureasabsolutetheoretical has been traditionallyidentifiedas a Romanticenterprise,is inconceiv-

notonlyin thesimple problematic, ableoutsidean Enlightenment sensethatthecategory “literature” assumesitsmodernmeaninginthe eighteenth century,butalso,moresubstantially, in thesensethatthis modernmeaningis noneotherthanthemythopoetic articulationof theanthropocentric, worldlysocialimagination thatwerecognize as

historically characteristic ofthisperiod.Indeed,thereisconsiderable meritin thediscussionof theco-emergence ofliteratureand lawas foundational imaginary institutions andsignifications atthishistorical juncture—with lawtakingoverassupremesocialarchéandliterature establishing itselfassupremeculturalarchéwithinthesameimaginary institutional framework.’ Thiscoarticulation becomesfullycomprehensibleonceweunderstandRomanticism tobe an extension ofthe Enlightenment project,conceived in itsclassicsense,in spiteofRomanticism’s explicitcounter-Enlightenment aspirations. Certainlyin theGermancase,Kant’sgrandclaimtoperceive inmoralphilosophy a poietic power—that is, formative powerparexcellence, or morepreciselyforGermans, thepowerofBildung, thepowerthatformsthesocialsubject—provides theJenaRomantics withthejustification fortheir project.ThefactthattheRomantic responseto Kantsoughttofreethe subjectfromthestructuralmoralconstraints ofreasondoesnotconstitutearuptureinthesocial-imaginary horizon.Itconstitutes rathera reconfiguration, wherebythesubjectaspirestoa different(butnotother), ideal:insteadofdeferringto a categorical moralorder,theRomantic

DoesLiterature Think?

T

subjectidentifies itselfas theimmanent agentofcreative /destructive power,sothat thepowerof thought(inKant,ethicalphilosophy) is manifested asartwork.Theotherstraininthistrajectory isHegel'sradicalizationoftheproblemofknowledgein Kant(whichbecomes,if one

adoptsHegelian terms,itsabolition), anotionthatisitselffurtherradicalized/abolished by Marx,whoopensthe horizonfora theoryof knowledge thatis assucha theoryofsociety. Aswillbecomeevident, thisparticularhorizonopenedbyMarxorientstheveryconceptualizationof “literatureas theory”and, in the last instance,theentiremedita-

tionontheproblem. Thehistorical pressuretorevisittheRomantic projectasconstitutive arché ofliteraryself-reflection (orina largersense,astheoriginofliterarymodernity itself)is enormous. NancyandLacoue-Labarthe’s treatisefollowsa longtrajectoryofsuchgestures,whetherself-acknowledgedornot,fromNietzsche andHeideggertoBenjamin andDerrida. Whileonecannotentirelyavoidsuchpressures, Ihaveahunchthatthe challengeof elucidating literature’s intrinsictheoretical capacitybecomesgreaterifwetakethequestionoutsidetheboundsofitsRomanticaffinities.Myinquirythereforeforgesanothertrajectory, onethat seeksto privilegea materialist of themostintangible configuration modesof understanding, indeedof social-imaginary significations themselves.Toposethe questionof whetherliteraturethinks,even requiresa social-imagimore,ofwhetherliteraturethinkstheoretically, asa self-consciously worldlyennaryuniversethatpositsknowledge safeguard.Thisispreciselyto diverge terprisewithouttranscendental (withits rationalist fromtheworldlinessofbothKantianphilosophy arguablyanextensionofthe Lutheranimaginary) transcendentalism, whicheveninitsmostradiofRomantic idealism, andtheworldliness figuresof itselfaroundthe transcendentalist calmomentsconstitutes genius, the sublime,the Spirit, the Absolute,and so on.°In this respect,

literatureastheoryisnot,strictlyspeaking,a aprojectthatunderstands terms. or post-Romantic whetherinpost-Kantian projectofaesthetics, meisnotwhatmight Whatconcerns At leastthatis myaspiration. butwhat truthful,or sublime, maketheliteraryobjectgood,beautiful, isto enablestheliteraryobjecttostakeouta domainofcognition—that a materialground a theoretical subject, object theliterary say,whatmakes

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(which,tomymind fromwhichonecanthinkandproduceknowledge fromwhatmakestheliteraryobject inseparable atleast,is ultimately literary). gesinvolvesa performative Stakingoutthisdomainof cognition pointintime,nota ture.It isa matterofstaginganeventat a specific ofa specifictopos,whichis act,anactofoccupation territorializing butmustbestagedaneweachtime.Aswith whyitcannotberetrieved natureofthe thecontingent onecannotoutmaneuver anyperformance, differences betweenliterarycognition act.Oneof theinsurmountable constitutive performais literature’s explicitly andanalytical processes asfoundation byPlatoatthevery tivity,” whichwasalreadyarticulated Itis important ofhisdiscovery thatmimesis isreprehensible. moment forPlatoisimelement ofmimesis thatthemostterrifying toremember personation, theactofspeakingasanother:résinhostisallosOn(Republic,393¢).Thisactis,in anelementalsense,thecoresignificance ofacting:hypokrisis. ThewholeargumentagainstthepoetsintheRepublic is predicated onanacknowledged hostilitytothetheaterandto theatricalityspecifically, a hostilitythat,thoughespousedbyonlya minority of Athenians,did have a tradition that went back to Solon.This argu-

mentisimplicitly propelled byananti-Dionysian impulseor,moreprecisely, acritiqueoftheBacchic imaginary outofwhichAthenian theater emergedasan institutionandwhoseritualinterplaybetweenreality andillusionitconfirmed throughperformative praxis(drama). Thisimpulseisunderlined byanexplicitadmission ofthepleasuresassociated withtheatricality, pleasures derivedfromwhatPlatoconsiders “alien passions” (allotria pathé,Republic, 606b),whichpoetryallegedlyincites. Thesepleasuresthreatentoturntheperformative experience intoan experienceofnature(Republic,395d), indeed,moreprecisely, intoanexperienceofnaturethatalterstheveryessence ofnature.® Afterhavinglaidoutthelogicforthenecessity ofphilosophy asthe safeguard ofthepolis,Platowillarguein BookX,witha shrewddialectical gesture,thatinordertoguardagainstpoetryonemustknowits nature.Hearguesexplicitly thatifpoetryisadangerous pharmakon (poison), one must possessanother pharmakon(cure,antidote) that would

renderpoetryapparentforwhatitis (Republic, 595b).Butto knowpoetry’snature,evenmore,tomakeitapparent,isliterallytoproduceit—

DoesLiterature Think?

9

tobringit to theasis, to engagein a theatricalgesture.Thisis entirely consistent,sincethe essentialnatureofpoetry,accordingto Plato,is mythanimated bymimesis (i.e.,impersonation, performativity, theatricality). Thelogicofthepharmakon is inthisrespect relentless; itisboth literalandparadoxical, creating outofpoetryandphilosophy twoantagonisticbut whollyintertwinedentities.As the properpharmakon, philosophy istheonlywaytoobliterate thedangerofpoetry,whichis mimesis, bytakingup theknowledge ofmimesis andindeed(re)producingthemythicnatureofmimesis—notably, by‘imitating mimesis,’ whichis forPlatopoetry’smostreprehensible aspect.Thisis exactly what happensin the Republic itself,as in mostof Plato’swritings, wherebyphilosophy isstagedasmythprecisely whenit triesmostto conquerpoeticmimesis. Platothusinaugurates an extraordinary and paradoxicaldemandforphilosophythatphilosophyhasyet to dissolve:to engageitsother(poetry)bymeansofa reciprocal diffusion into each other’s terrain. In the last instance, the aim of the Republicis

notmerelytoresolvethequarrelbetween poetryandphilosophy byexilingthepoetsfromthepolis,butto substantiate thisgesturewiththe thatthe (self-)knowledge ofpoetrybelongstophilosodemonstration phy.Inthissense,sublatedintoform(thePlatonic thequardialogue), relisneveractuallyresolvedbutisincorporated inextricably intothe ofphilosophy. performance Of course, as StanleyRosenhas demonstratedin brilliantfashion, this quarrel is constituted so as never to be resolved,on the one hand,

intertwinedas each becausephilosophyand poetryare dialectically with other’slack,and,ontheotherhand,becausethepreoccupation thecorepoliticalprobthequarrelbetweenthemservestodissimulate withoutpoetry,exattemptstoaddress:“Philosophy lemstheRepublic In orunmeasured. is immoderate actlylikepoetrywithoutphilosophy, thelast analysis,thereis no quarrelbetweenphilosophyand poetry. isnotthefirst.EvenwithinthelimitsoftheBookX Butthelastanalysis thatSocratesbeit cannotbe toostronglyemphasized oftheRepublic, ginswiththequarrelbut endswiththemythof Er.Thepedagogical or noblelie,whichis deis thatofa pharmakon functionoftheRepublic oftherecogusagainstthevitiatingconsequences signedto inoculate tothe Rosenaddsanothercomponent nitionthatjusticeisimpossible.”°

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thisinquiry:namely, picture,towhichwemustremainalertthroughout andthus,asI theentireequationthat setspoetryagainstphilosophy againstits imagination mythographic willargueatlength,setssociety’s hastermed Castoriadis propensity (whatCornelius rational-analytical atits apolitical confrontation logic”) involves “identitarian-ensemblist one waywedecidethematter,whetherbyprivileging core.Whichever theminsomeformoranother,weareengagedin sideor interweaving In thespecific orovercome. apolitical decisionthatcannotbebracketed as theoryfor an antermsof thisbook,the questionof “literature era”goesbeyondthetermsoftheancientquarrelbetween timythical antag(andcertainly beyondthecontemporary poetryandphilosophy onismbetweenliteratureandtheory)totheradicalsignificance ofthe politicalitself—indeed, moreprecisely, tohowweunderstand,evaluate,andperformtherelationofthepoliticaltothepoiétic inourownsocial-historical moment.

NotAnalysis Withthistaskinmind,insteadofarguingfora conception ofliterature incompetition orincoarticulation withphilosophy, wherebythetwo termscometohave a spatialintegrityandautonomythataffirmsboth theirdifference andtheircomplicity—which wouldbe preciselytoassumePlato’sargumentative framework—let us layphilosophymomentarilyaside.Thisalsomeanslayingasidetheissueof languageas foundational vehicleforcognition, anissuethatholdsequally(though differently) forbothPlato’sandHeidegger’s projects,not to mention thegeneralpremises ofa traditionthathascometobe knownasanalyticphilosophy. Isuggestthistentativedisjunction becauseI wantto emphasize thattheproblemofliterature’s cognitive capacityisaliterary problem(orwhatIwillhenceforth explore,throughoutthisbook,asa problemofmythographic thoughtandofknowledge asperformance), nota philosophical problemin thestrictsense.Letusthenconsiderliterature’s stagingofthoughttobethemeansthatrendersthoughta matterofpoeticlanguage,insteadofthereverse,asit is traditionally conceived,sothatpoeticlanguageitselfissaidtobearthe exclusiveelementsof literariness.In otherwords,let us considerthe claimof

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literature’sintrinsictheoretical capacitytobea performative matter,a matterof (re)framingthe conditionsofactionand perceptionwithina shiftingsocial-historicalterrain,which rendersone’srelationto the ob-

jectofknowledge aprocess(praxis) ofrestlessness andtransformation. In this respect,literature’s theoretical praxismakesthe classicdichotomy between vitaactivaandvitacontemplativa nolongerapplicable. Fromthisstandpoint,just as languageas communicative vehicle ceasesto be the fundamental basisfor literature’s uniqueaccessto knowledge, so literature’s aimto knowledge cannotbe reducedtoan objectthatcouldbe externally determined andcircumscribed. Literaturehasnoa prioricognitiveobject.Eachtextpositsitsownobjectof knowledge,each timeanew,by meansof its form,its horizonof possi-

bility(theexplicitor implicitpositionsit takesupwithinits social-historical range),and the conditionsunder whichit is read. Theseaspects makeup what we could call the text’sconditionsof production,which

includeelementstraditionallyidentifiedashistoricalcontext,linguistic idiom, cultural tradition, biographicalparameters, and so on, except that these are to be considered,not external to the text, but internal to

theoverallprocessofwriting.Whatpermeates anddiffuses theapparentself-enclosure oftheliterarytextistheextenttowhichreadingcan be considered partofits conditions ofproduction. NotethatIamnot thinkingin termsofwhathasbeencalled“reception theory,”because the text’shistorical the issuehere is not to establishretrospectively boundaries(Iconsiderthosetobeinherentin theverymomentofwrit(itssingularity) ing),buttounderstandhowthetext’sinternalexistence in comprisesthe variousmomentsand contextsof its performance, which reading is, of course,fundamental. If we were, for a moment, to focus on the reader’s location in the

generalvicinityof thetext’sstage,indeedas partofitsstaging,we bea gnosticexperience thatinvolves couldspeakofa correspondence tweenthe subjectcreatedbytheliterarytext(theentireworldmaniundeconstructibly whichisnonetheless festedin thetext'sfictionality, realas imaginarycreation)and thesubjectenactedby thereader.A inmyterms,doesnot implya mysticaladherence gnosticexperience, entities,becauseit takesplaceas a betweentwowhollyconstituted entitiesthatfashion betweentwoopen-ended skewedcorrespondence

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tandem.Thus,insofarasthetext ina sortofperformative themselves it enablesthe speaks(has somethingto say,in ordinarylanguage), tohavea senseofhis/herpositionor to havea senseof reader-subject subjecteffect domain:theparticular his/hereffectina widerhistorical experience ofindividuallocationin a spethatcreatesthedifferential frame.Wecantalkthenof a cognitiveencounter cificsocial-historical thesubjectsensingitdistancing: toaninternalideological tantamount selfaseffectand,evenmore,thesubjectreading(inthesenseofdecodofthoughtwithinthesoitselfasaspecific location ingordiscovering)

cial-historical frame. whatI mentioned in Ishouldreiterate Toavoidmisunderstanding, thepreface,namely,thatthehistoricaldetailsofthisscenepertainto subject”: sima “post-Enlightenment whatwecall,forlackofprecision, evenifnot necessarily plyput,a subjectcognizantofitssubjectivity, cognizant ofthe social-imaginary institutionofits subjectivity. This shouldn’t be restricted towhat,ina grossoversimplification oftheEnlightenmentlegacy,hasbeenpresumedto be an “autonomoussubject”—which is,inanycase,thesubjectofa historicalprojectthathas yettomanifest itselfbeyondafuturevisionofitself.WhatI calla “postEnlightenment subject”involvestheentireterrainofsignification— multiple,mutable,andultimatelyimpossible tomap—thatpertainsto thesortofself-cognition Iamdescribing andthetensionthiscognition produces relativetotheconsequences ofrealizingone’sownsubjecteffect.Tocallthisthecondition ofthe“Western subject”is,at thevery least,to demeanthe foundations ofallwhohavehistorically resisted theimperialistprojectofthe“West.”A readerof literaturein China, Uganda,orPalestine doesnotdeservetoberobbedofhis/herself-cognizantencounterwiththerealof fictionality—in the termsI amdescribing it—inthenameofsomeultimately nativistfetishism oforalor mythictradition,justashis/herresistanceto thehegemonic rationalismofthe “West”isnotultimatelysomeexoticmatter,a propertyinherentto “Otherness.” So, how does this internal dislocation within subjectificationtake

place?Whenmostfascinatedand absorbedbya literarytext, the reader-subject projectsanoftenunquestioned realityontoit.Evenreaderstrainedin recognizing anddecodingliterariness projectthisliterari-

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nessas thetext’s“unquestioned reality’—or mightonesay,without anytraceofcynicism, thattherealityofliterariness istheabyssalmirroroftherealinthetext,produced bythespecific internaldistancing thatpertainsto the“trained”reader-subject? Thisimplicit andnonverbal projection ofrealityis thefreepassageofthe readerintohisown imaginary world/reality: theimaginary thatmakesthereadera subject, thatconstructs andallowsfora subjectposition, whichinturnmakes theactof readingpossible. Surely,whatenablesusevento articulate thiscorrespondence isthesensethat,initsfull-fledged fictionality, literatureresidesat thecoreofthereal,evenmoresobecauseittakesno careto occludeitsarticulation ofthesocial-imaginary. Thisiswhythe memorable characters ofliteraturecommand an indisputable reality. whatproducesforthesubjectthesensethats/he isreal(a Likewise, realpersonin a realworld)is an imaginary thatisas “fictional” —in thesenseofbeing“constructed” or “instituted” byirreducible socialthusasrealastheworldoftheliterarytext. historical parameters—and Weonlymakesenseofthisrelationifwecometotermswiththeradicalrealityofsocial-imaginary thatgiveficsignifications, significations tionalfigurestheirsubstantive reality(betheyfiguresoftheselforthe world,of the”’fictional” or the thinkable).

Wemaythusspeakofthisprojection/passage asa transversaldithesocialimaginary traverses mension,in thesensethatthesubjective imaginaryterrainwithwhichit tentativelyentersintoskewedcorre(soasnottosay Insofarasit relativizes (notidentification). spondence outright“disrupts”)the subject’sconstitutedsenseof itselfand its world,this transversalproducesa tentativeand ephemeralopening ofthesocial-imaginary appropriation” thatallows a sortof “cognitive terms,sothatit intosubjective presumably “translatable” dimension, and enactsa self-altercreatesa newself-recognition simultaneously otherthantheknowlation.Onegainsa senseofknowingsomething thatalters edgethatcomesfromthewordsonehasread,a knowledge not only one’srelationto thosewordsbut alsothe relationto one’s Here,I takeasmypointofdeparsubject.” senseofselfasa “knowing turethe factthat the“knowingsubject”and the“objectofknowledge” wherebythesubjectisboth relation, arealreadylinkedina dialectical is elementary,at the same as and other to theobjectit encounters—this

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undialecAsingular, sinceAristotle). leastsinceHegel(ifnot,arguably, whateverthe is inadequate, encounter ofthecognitive ticaldimension oftheintellectual it leadseitherto theobliteration modeofcognition; oftheobject. facultyin thesubjectortothetotalunintelligibility ishardlydisappropriation” Thepassageofthispeculiar“cognitive towhichonegainsaccessexceeds(in muchastheknowledge cernible, byanaachieved thesenseofbeingotherthan)therelevantknowledge ofthesamedomain.Thus,onecanhavea sense lyticcomprehension onegainsinsightintoallthe andPunishment, thatin reading,say,Crime theconditions thateventually ledtotheRussianRevsecretsgoverning olution, without needing to absorbinnumerableanalyses on the sub-

ject,becausethe novel,withoutduplicatingsuchanalyses,includes I Toavoidmisunderstanding, themandyetexceedstheirboundaries. amnottalkinghereofachieving historical expertise; | amtalkingof “havinga senseofthesecrets”—and Ishallreflectmomentarily onthe inevitability ofthisallusiveandevensecretivelanguage.ThisispreciselywhatWalterBenjamin doeswithBaudelaire: thelyricpoetinthe eraofhighcapitalism. ThisiswhatwedowithShakespeare allthetime (thepoetofthe Elizabethan era),or withSophocles (theguiltyconscienceof democracy),Euripides(Atheniandecline),or, more con-

tentiously, withVirginia Woolf’s workasmodernism’s androgynous internaldeconstruction." Fromherinitialessay “ModernFiction”(1919),which hasbeencon-

sidereda manifestoof Englishmodernism,to A RoomofOne’sOwn (1928),whichis recognizedas a manifestoof modern feminism,Woolf

self-consciously soughtto subvertthe consolidation of identities, be theya matterofsexuality, orofpoliticsor aesthetics in a generalsense. Hercritiqueextendedtoliteratureitself—particularly tothedegreethat bythelate1920sitwasinstitutedasa modernistdisarticulation oftradition.Hermodeofsubversion consisted in whatsheunderstood eventuallytobeandrogynous writing,a writingfirstand foremost committedtoa differential literaryarticulation. Contrarytocertaintraditional feministcritiques, whichseein Woolf'spositiona psychological and politicalretreat—“a flightintoandrogyny” isElaineShowalter’s oftenquotedphrase—Woolf’s actualpracticeexhibitsa doublenature,explicitformalinnovationinterwoven withandrogynous subjectivity, a

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doublepraxisthatundoestheuniversalist consolidation ofbothsexualityand literatureas institutedessences. Intermsofsexuality, inparticular,thismoveis a radicalfeministgesturebecauseit unmasksan implicituniversalist aspirationinthepurecategoryof“woman,” anaspirationwhosestrictlogicofidentityplacesitsquarelyin therealmof dominantmasculinist discourse. “Itisfatalforanyonewhowritesto thinkof theirsex.It is fataltobe a manor womanpureandsimple,” Woolffamously claims,andwe cannotbuttakeseriously the notion thatthelogicof identityisdeadlyat its core.Ina fashionprofoundly againstthe grain,fora thinkeravowedlycommitted tomeditationon femalesubjectivity, Woolf recognizes thetrapoftakingsexualsingularityasanepistemic sourcefortheactofwriting.Instead, sheaffirms the singularityof writing—its radicalsocial-historical contingency—by makinginternaltothetextualprocessan undeconstructibly ambiguous subjectivity. Thegracefully ironicentranceintothenarrative ofOrlando (1928) is memorable:“He—forthere could be no doubt of his sex, though the

to disguiseit—was intheactofslicfashionofthetimedidsomething ingattheheadofa Moorwhichswungfromtherafters.”Thenarrative itsmostcontentious of beginsby introducing ground:the gendering ofgrammar, thetext“he”is pronouns. Though“he”bearsthecertainty to constitute—after all,itis“his”storyabouttobetold,beginning with a theatricalgesturethatatteststothesymbolic propertiesof“his”genintoa performative flux,whichisprecisely thiscertainty der—plunges the forceof historicalfashioning.And while, on the one hand, Orlando

powerof“thefashionofthe isa masterlytreatiseonthetransformative by their are engendered time”in the mostliteralsense—identities investsthemwitha specific clothingat thesametimethattheirclothing senseofthe dialectical performative gender(inthemostprofoundly process)—onthe other hand, Orlandois in many waysa theoretical

treatisedirectlyconcernedwiththefashioningofhistoryona grand scale. gesture—it Thishistorywillbe recountedin a boldmythographic socialhistoryof modernEnthe four-hundred-year willencompass intothe thenovel’s actualemergence gland,whichistosay,considering andapexpansion thesocialhistoryofWestern apogeeofimperialism,

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notdirectly, takesplacesymptomatically: Thisrecounting propriation. ofa medias “proper” historywould,butastheoutcome analytically, ofidentityandpresentthefashioning tationontheperilsofdisguising in Edward is theexportof identity,” ingit as nature.If “imperialism of Orinnovation succinctphrase,thetheoretical Said’sdisarmingly in disrupting stakes—consists political raisessignificant lando—which “Wehavenochoiceleftbutconfess— thesingulargrammarofidentity: quicklygiveswayto deformation hewasa woman.”Thisgrammatical thepluralitythatunderliesidentitywhenitsartifice(itssocial-historimeaningoflanguage— calnature)is madeevident.Theconventional of distinction—simstabilitypredicatedon thereliability itsanalytical plybreaksdown.Thetextgoeson:“Orlandohadbecomea woman— thereisno denyingit. Butin everyotherrespect,Orlandoremained preciselyashehadbeen.Thechangeofsex,thoughit alteredtheirfuture,didnothingwhatevertoaltertheiridentity”(138). Theproclaimed non-alteration ofidentityhasjustbecomegrammatically plural.Identityhasfallenintotravesty. Idon’twanttobelaborthepointinthiscursoryexample, butthedetailsofthespecific circumstances thatgeneratedthisnovelistic experimentaresufficiently wellknownforustorealizethatVirginia Woolf broughttothetroposofthenovelthegesturesofcross-dressing. Thisis howthenovel'sstyleisindeeda travesty, notintermsofthecommonly analyzedsenseofsatire.Mostsignificantly, uponthisfoundationally ambivalenttrope—neither one,norquitetheother—Woolf daresto build,layerbylayer,a socialhistoryofidentityformationinbothsexualandbroadlypolitical terms.Certainly, oneofthetheoretical points raisedbyOrlando isthetravestyofdomination inherentintheWest's greatprojectofcivilization, a projectwhich,it turnsout,provedtobe Civilization’s travesty. Androgyny thusbecomes morethanjusta trope ofambiguous subjectivity, whichmayor maynotthreatenthe impermeability ofsexualboundaries; itbecomes a methodofconducting socialhistory.Orlandooperatesas theactiveprincipleofhistoryacross thespanof fourhundredyears,a historyofempire,ofcourse,perceivedfromthestandpointofan essentialtranshistorical siteofoccupation(inthesenseof Freud’sBesetzung, meaningalso“investment”): thesexualized body.Thismethodofsocialhistoryiswhollyinternalto

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the modusoperandiof theliterarytext;it is foundational to its very constitution, fromWoolf's initialconceptualization ofa personal joketo itsfinalized forminthefictional biography ofaman,whichturnsoutto betheautobiography ofa womanwhois attempting to performa different(andindeeddifferential) socialgrammar. The radicalparticularityof the literarytext (usuallytaken for grantedasself-evident nature)isprecisely whatenablestheliterarytext totransform itselfintoa theoretical vehicle beyonditsapparent boundaries.Suchparticularity isnecessary toeverytheorythatacknowledges its historicity, butis almostalwayssublatedinthenameof a desired universalapplication, whicheverytheoryneedsinordertolegitimize itselfphilosophically. Literature astheory,tothedegreethatit bypasses ofphilosophy, needsneithertoocclude itsradthehegemonic epistemé icalparticularity nortosublateit intoa zoneofuniversal legitimacy. Theparticularity oftheliterarytextembodies its theoretical workasit gripsthesensesofdifferent aninreadersintimeandspace,producing definitepluralityofresponseswhileretainingitsownsocial-imaginary intact.Fromthis standpoint,the feared obstaclesto translationare over-

come,precisely makes,forexample, becausethisgrip—what Virginia Woolf'stextsretaintheirfascination beyondtheEnglishlanguage—can neverbereducedtothecomponents oftheoriginal idiom.It linguistic is reducedto thatbyreaderswhoseekit assuch,whosesubjectpositionsrelyontheinviolability ofthespecific idiom. linguistic in Atthesametime,thesensethatliteratureaffordsisnotimprisoned ofeachliterarywork,butseemsto exceedthetext’s thesingularity bothasense ofthetraditioninforming boundariessoastoencompass infiniteencountheworkand thegroundopenedupbyitspotentially thatthe terswithreadersacrossculturesandtimes.Whenwerecognize “classictexts”overcomeobstaclesto translation(despitethe evident aninweacknowledge translation), ofanideallyaccurate impossibility contexts, acrosslanguages,historical nercorethatcanbe transferred and cultural sensibilities.This inner core is a “matrix”that carries, if I

eachliterarytext’sgeneticcode.Thecodeis mayriskthe metaphor, overthe to itsfullextent,foritscommand analyzable onlypotentially ofapissototalthattheprocess ofthetext’sparticularity complexities it) gives prehendingit (whichis neverto say entirelycomprehending

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onethesenseofbeingletinona secretwhoseactualnatureultimately a sense oftenproduces Thus,readingliterature cannotbedeciphered. ofit,ina waythatmayreourarticulation exceeds thatourknowledge a “tacitdimension” concerning theorization mindusofKarlPolanyi’s ofunderstanding. even I haveinsistedon usingthe wordsenseand not knowledge, process. AsStanleyRosenhas withacognitive thoughI amconcerned Thisisthecondiaptlyput it:“Asenseisa sensefoan understanding. betweenthemeaningofa conceptor tionforourabilitytodistinguish underwhichwe asinandthecircumstances thetruthofa proposition theconceptortheproposition.”" Literadividuals cometounderstand our usualdefinitions ofknowledge in strictconceptual turechallenges terms.Instead,it demandsthatweaccountfortheimplicit,thenonpaltheperfectly contingent. It demandsa nonalgorithpable,theineffable, mic,nonpropositional, “noncognitive,” butnonetheless expertknowledge:onceyoupossessit,youdonotneedtocalculateoranalyzeyour waytothecognitive object.Youjusthave,ina deep-structural sense,a feelforthepath—you haveasense ofboththeobjectanditscontextor itshorizon.Thisprocess—as wellastheattempttodescribeitinsensible terms—stretches thelimitsofpropositional, communicative language.Macherey providesa conciseexplanation: Literarytextshaveas theirobjectthenon-adhesion oflanguagetolanguage,thegapthatconstantly divideswhatwesayfromwhatwesay aboutitandwhatwethinkaboutit.Theyrevealthevoid,thebasiclacuna onwhichallspeculation isbasedandwhichrelativizes individualmanifestationsofspeculation. Thisironicrelationship withtruth,whichdemands aboveallelsea disabusedinterpretation, meansthatliteraryphilosophy is anessentially problematic intellectual experience: itconsists inrevealing philosophical problems, expounding themand“staging” theminthetheatricalsenseof theterm,andeschewing anydefinitive, orsupposedly definitive, attempttoresolvethem,putanendtothemandsuppressthem witharguments.”

Thusfar,a seemingly untenable complex ofelements hasemerged: literature’s inviolable particularity dictatesthe termsof theoretical speculation, whoseutility,bydefinition(quatheory),mustaccedeto something generallydemonstrable, oratleastdemonstrable inhistori-

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calcontingencies otherthanthosegenerating it.In otherwords,one mustbe ableto pointtocertainelementsin theworkingofliterature thatgobeyondtheworkingsofa particular literarytextandto doso, moreover, withoutobliterating thehistorical parameters oftheseworkingparticulars. Iconsider thisdoubleness tobea dialectical contradiction,whichbecomes untenable onlyifone’smethodinsistsona singularlogic.Thepractical dimensions ofaprojectthatarguesforliterature astheorymustinvolvethedoubleworkofbothspeculative invention of categories of understanding (muchasphilosophy or sciencedoes, butnotinthetermsofphilosophy or science), aswellasempirical exofliterarytextures,whichremainstheunavoidable cavation interpretiveencounter withthemateriality ofliterarywriting.Toargueforliterature’s“non-scientificity” inthissenseispreciselytospeakof literature’sscientia. Thisisn’ttodisavowtheextraordinary poeticforceof science(nowadays mostevidentin theoretical physicsandmathematics);it is,rather,to acknowledge thatthepoiésis ofscienceis “disciplined”inspecifically scientific fashionmuchasliterature’s scientia is “disciplined” inliteraryterms." Inmyterms,thisdoubleworktakesplacewithintwospecific but wide-ranging framesofreference, whichalsoservetorearticulate cerandliteraryhistory:(1) tainproblems inboththehistoryofphilosophy existence inthe knowledge,” whichhasa longandcircuitous “intuitive thought,” (2)whatIcall“mythographic historyofmodernphilosophy; contextI havealreadydewhichI employwithintheperformative asawayofroundingout scribed.Ishallnowaddressthesespecifically at hand. theproblematic historically) (butalsogrounding Intuition

of Thedomainofintuitionatonceplungesusbackintothediscourse beingthe self-ascribed becausephilosophy, philosophy—inevitably, of spirit,oflife),hasa long truth(oflanguage, modeofcontemplating thatseemtodefyit. theverytermsofknowledge historyofconfronting problemwhenwe a philosophical Thecategoryof intuitionbecomes or separateit fromthecommonusageof thetermto meaninference

hunchand considerit a claimto “immediateknowledge”or “non-

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absentinthenoapparently Themediation knowledge.” propositional faculties wouldreferto heterogeneous knowledge” tion“immediate weacquire.In thatenableus todefinetheconceptwhoseknowledge knowledge oftheundefined, knowledge enables intuitive thisinstance, a defiofdefinition, process ofa secondary withouteventhenecessity It isthuscloseto“sense”orindeedparallel nitionafterapprehension. to it, as Rosenargues:“Our ‘sensethat. . . ‘is as heterogeneousas ‘our

extentthetwotermsare intuitionthat.. .‘ becausetoa considerable theyruninparallel andwhentheyarenotsynonymous, synonymous, eithera senseisanintuition,orelsethesense paths.Morespecifically, viaintuanalysis)is accessible to the intelligence (sayofa scientific theoretical nature,Rosengoesonto ition.” Intuition hasanimmanent sense”ofan objectbeyondan inference argue,precisely in “making otherwords,withoutnecessaraboutwhatissensibleinthisobject—in ilytranslating the“properties” ofthisobjectintopropositional terms. Makingsenseof the nonpropositional suggeststhepossibilityof achieving knowledge ofanobjectwithoutconsideration forthevarious propositions thatpertaintotheobject’s truth.Letusconsidera quotidian example: Apersoncomplainsaboutexperiencing a painthatcan nowherebetracedbyempirical, physiological methods.Wehaveno wayofestablishing thetruthofthispain,butwealsohavenoground, philosophically, todisputethetruthoftheperson’sclaim.Infact,the commontermforsuchoccasions—“psychosomatic”—illustrates perfectlythisdoubledimension ofsignification: thoughofnodemonstrablesomaticoriginsucha conditionisnonetheless, at thelevelofthe symptom, demonstrably somatic. Notethat,unlikethefashionable positionregardingliterature(“everything is subjectto interpretation”), thereisnoroomforrelativism here.Whatrestricts anddetermines this paradoxis solelythefactthatit pertainstoanexperience ofthebody. Thisisespecially relevant, sincethetrajectory of“intuitive knowledge” inthehistoryofcognitive philosophy(arguablyfromKantto Husserl toFrege)istiedup withthenotionof senseperception and,generally, witha sensuous horizonintherealmofthinking. Thekeyproblem regardingintuitionin thehistoryofphilosophy (common to phenomenologyand to analyticphilosophy)has beenthe passageof understandingfromintuition toconceptualization andevenmore,todiscur-

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sivearticulation. Inanattempttomaneuver aroundthesortofdiscus-

sionthatwouldembroilus in the antagonism betweensemantics and epistemology, whichishowthisissueis “resolved” inanalyticphilosophy,I shallrisktheidiosyncratic pathofexamining intuition notmerely asa sensuous category butasa category thatdisavows themind/body splitand approachesthe passagefromintuitionto conceptualization through,if Imaybepermitted a linguistic paradox,anessentially “nonconceptual” senseofconception.’ Inthisregard,myinterestin intuitionis inseparable frommycommitmenttothesortofworldliness andmateriality thattakesthebody— andits intimaterelationto finiteandunstablematter—as theground pointofradicalhumancreativity. Thisis exemplified in Spinoza, whose thought,inimitablycomplicated andyetat thesametimesuppleand resilient,is animated at its coreby a radical critique of the mind/body

splitandanuncompromising drivetoconsider thingsofthemind(that isto say,boththoughtanddesire—the “unthought”) fromthestandpointofencounters ofintuitionis betweenbodies.Spinoza’s privilege ofhumanthought, directly relatedtohisastutesenseofthemateriality andthishasoftenbeenidentified asthesecretofhisallure,particularly in lightof thenotoriousdifficultyofhis thinkingprocess.'® Spinoza holds that scientiaintuitiva(otherwiseknownas the “third modeof

is themostelevatedformofknowledge—in a cognitive knowledge”) V.Prop. sequencethatgoesfromrevelationtoreasonto intuition(Ethics a sequence, fortherecanbenopassage 25-32).Thisisonlynominally toreason—and although revelation fromthefirsttothesecond—from inthesecond, apprenticeship onecanonlyattainthethirdbyextensive Scientia intuitivainvolvesthe thepassageisinnowaypredetermined. ideasto ofcommon theuniversal relations passagefromunderstanding appreIt is theintuitive ofparticular essences. thedirectapprehension hensionof thesingularityofthings,whichisn’tatallto saytheirindibutdialecsense(pre-Hegelian, but,ina dialectical viduatedisolation, traverandunreproducible theirunique,irreducible, ticalnonetheless), salofuniversality. and the terms Toget a bettersenseof this complexarrangement Spinozausesto elaboratetherelationbetweenthethreemodes,I shall The“firstmodeof argument. an unschematizable riskschematizing

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inpertainsto the domainof opinionand imagination, knowledge” “parideas”(thenecessarily terms“inadequate volvingwhatSpinoza and “passiveaffections” ofour thinking) tial”imagerepresentations traces,fromallourmodesofexisascorporeal (theimagesinscribed, basedon throughvagueexperience, achieved tence).Thisisknowledge inwiththings.Suchencounters the randomcharacterof encounters cludenotonlytherealmofNaturebutalsotherealmofthe“civilstate” bymeansoferrantsigns,tantamount is achieved (wherein knowledge Spinoza byhearsay). Inoneofhismanyradicalgestures, toknowledge includesin thismodeofknowledgethereligiousstate:theexperience of Godthroughrevelation.Spinozaconsidersthe religiousstate of throughimagination/revelation— prophets—in otherwords,religion ideas.Hisradicalanti-individualtobelongtotherealmofinadequate ismandhisinterrogation ofthemind’sruleoverthebodyintraditional philosophy leadsSpinozato proclaimthattheGodofprophecyand revelationisbut mereprojection,a mentalillusion.Bythe sametoken,

it isworthnotingthatSpinoza’s useoftheimagination iscontiguous withthemodernnotionofideology. Werewetoplayin contemporary (post-Romantic) terms,we would recognizethe modernmeaningof

imagination (ascreative/constitutive force)inSpinoza’s notionofintuition.”Inthefirstmodeofknowledge, noknowledge isineffectpossible,insofarasthemindisunabletodisentangle itselffromitsimmersioninitsownfantasyorperceptionofitssovereignty. The“secondmodeof knowledge” in theEthicscorresponds to the domainofreason.Spinozais explicitabouta breakbetweenthefirst andtheothertwomodes.Thissecondmodeis the domainofunderstandingorofreachingconstitutive order,workingthroughwhatSpinozacalls“common notions” (notions thatpertaintothegeneralattributesof all bodies),whichconstitutethe primary“adequateideas” (ideaswhicharenonrepresentative in thesensethattheyembodythe very form that connectsthings and their attributes).In this domain, the

religious impulseemerges,notfromtheimagination, but from(rational)understanding. (Thus,Spinoza distinguishes explicitly thereligion ofprophetsfromthereligion ofSolomon or theApostles.) Thesecond modeof knowledge providesaccessto universality. Ifweweretoconcede,forinstance, thattheprophetsweretransmitting theLawsofNa-

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ture,wewouldhaveto saythattheyweredoingsowithoutadequate

understandingof them.That is to say,commonnotionsdo findtheir

conditions of formation intheimagination, butitistheirapplication, through the action of reason, that enablesthem to becomeadequate

ideas.Rational understanding enables ustounderstand thenecessity of things,theiruniversal potentialandpower(potentia). It diminishes the passions butthussucceeds inholdingontotheenergyoftheobject. The secondmodeofknowledge enablesanadequate affirmation oftheidea ofGod,precisely inthesensethatGodisthe(inferred) objectofintellectualunderstanding, nota prophetic imagining ora leapoffaith.Indeed,Godcannotbe imagined. GillesDeleuzearguesconvincingly thatalmostalloftheEthics(untilV.Prop.21)is writtenfromthe standpoint ofthesecondmodeof knowledge.'* ThismayexplainwhySpinoza’s relative about reticence thethirdmodeof knowledge hasbeensucha chimeraforhis interpreters.Admittedly, thediscussion ofthethirdmodeistheshortest and mostelusivesectiononthesubjectofknowledge intheEthics. Insofar asthethirdmodeofknowledge isaccessible onlythroughthesecond, it maybedeemedthepassagefromunderstanding theuniversalrelationsofcommonideastoenvisioning “directly” particularessences. It isthustheintuitive“sense”ofthesingularity ofthingsfromtheviewpoint of eternity, with the crucial understanding, however, that the

V.Prop.27-29). Spinofthebody(Ethics formofeternityistheessence is,inthisrespect,radicalandprofound. oza’santi-Cartesianism an activelaborof Spinozaspeaksof “mentalacquiescence”—not apprethinkingthroughtherelationsbetweenthings,but an embodied Thisis hardlymysticalknowledge, of theirsingularexistence. hension andindeed involves conscious application becausemysticism precisely Onthispoint,atleast, anasceticexistence.” rigoroustraining(askésis), Spinoza’snotionof intuitiveknowledgeis clearlydifferentfrom of apprehension notionthatintuitionisa mystical Schelling’s elaborate an ultimate kind—ashe puts it, of “theAbsoluteitself.”Spinozanever

devotedto tobesomething theintuitive modeofknowledge considers theAbsolute,for evenGod who is, after all,the fundamentalobjectof cognition becomes,in scientiaintuitiva,a matter of “intellectuallove”

paradoxicalnotionbasedon a sensualand (EthicsV.Prop.32-34)—a

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ofthemindthathasnothingtodowithfaith understanding corporeal assuch. orevenintellect arguesfor Balibar Etienne modeofthinking, thisparticular Pursuing inSpinoza:first,an / conscience) (consciousness twotypesofconscientia

thatbelongstothefirstmodeofknowledge aspectoftheimagination and is essentiallymoral conscience,a value-ladenview of the world;

consequence of “intuitivescience”(thethird second,the immanent expresastheadequate whichmaybeexplained modeofknowledge), as it referstotheideaofGodfrom sionofone’sownbody(singularity) of eternity.Thisviewpointiselusivesince,Spinozaartheviewpoint withdurationanda kindof postgues,eternityis usuallyconfused entirelytheparadox mortemmemory(EthicsV.Prop.34),suppressing that the eternalis the most singularmode (the body), out of which

thoughtemergesin theencounter withotherbodies.It goeswithout sayingthatbetweenthesetwomodesof conscience/consciousness thereisno continuity. Theyare,rather,separatedandlinkedbya long detourthroughreason,thesecondmodeofknowledge: theknowledge (scientia) ofcausesfoundeduponcommonnotions.Balibarconceivesof

thisasa dialectical process:conscience passesthroughnonconsciousness,whichis,strictlyspeaking,“aprocessofconsciousness withouta subject” (yetanotherinstanceofanti-Cartesianism).” Balibargoesonto arguethattheconsciousness thatemergesfromintuitiveknowledge is notbasedonafixed idea,buttakesplaceas“aprocessequatingallthe termsin thechain[theelementsofrelation]bycontinuously passing fromtheonetotheothers.””' Intuitive knowledge is thepowerofthinkingthatcirculatesamongsingularities, achieving thusa senseofrelation(andthuspresumably a senseofthewhole),withoutthefaculty thatenablesthe breakdownof the wholeto its parts,whichis the essenceof the analyticalprocess.Thisis a crucialelementin the methodology ofliterature as theory,demonstrating theactualpossibilityofachievingknowledge ofanobjectwithoutmakingnecessaryits positiona priori,making,rather,theworldof theobject(asan ensembleofsensuousand material—indeed, historical—relations) internalto

thecognitive process. Ifthetheoryofintuitiveknowledge isnotquiteelaborated in Spinoza,thisishardlythecasewithHenriBergson, arguablythemostpas-

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sionateadvocate ofintuitiveknowledge inthehistoryofmodernphilosophy.* Bergson isallthemorerelevantinthepresentdiscussion becauseofhisenormousinfluence inmodernist literarycircles,giventhat the WyndhamLewisgroup and, of course,MarcelProustwere avowed

pupilsandpractitioners ofBergsonian attitudes.ForBergson, intuitive knowledge existsin the conjunction oftwoelements: (1)knowledge and perceptionin generalareenabledbyan overallsystemofforces whosematerialgroundingis thebodyitself;(2)knowledgecan be achievedbeyondtherealmoflanguage, preciselybecauselanguage is antithetical totheexperience ofduration, whichitcannotgraspbecause wordsaredesigned tofreezeandstabilize thefluxofexperience. Thus, Bergsonchoosesto understandintuitiveknowledge asa pre-linguistic (or,certainly,extralinguistic) process,whichcouldostensibly linkhis notmerelythe dissimulating inquiryto certainFreudiancategories, techniquesof dreamingbut chieflythe processof sublimation.He speakscharacteristically of“thecinematographic methodoftheintellect,”whereaslanguageactslikea camerathatreducesmotiontoa seriesofframes,againstwhichhepositsintuition’s relaconsubstantial tionwithwhathecalls“internalduration,”whichistobeunderstood notintermsofthesuccession, or juxtaposition ofdifferent contiguity, inbutratherasa continuous fluxofaffective, statesorpsychicimages, trapsychicself-presentations(perhaps not unlike Freud’snotion of the

psyche’s primaryVorstellung).” is theclaimthattheworkof foundation Bergson’s methodological betweenthe mophilosophyemergesfromthe incommensurability mentofintuitiveknowledgeandtheagonizingprocessof elucidating language,an antagonismthat is neverrethismomentin conceptual to thelevel is“toraiseintuition imperative solved.Hisownconscious fromtheoutset,cona projectheconceived method,” ofa philosophical usageof intuitionas the immeor Schopenhauer’s traryto Schelling’s diatesearchforthe eternal,as “a questionof findingtrueduration” (CM, 30). Bergson’spersistentmeditationon temporality,in both

(thefirstindirectdialoguewithEinstein;the physicsandpsychology Jamesand,ofcourse,Freud),wasarguably second,mindfulofWilliam Like framework.™ ofhisentireconceptual dimension thefundamental articphilosophical hisotherbelovedobsession—memory—Bergson’s

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inhis isimplicated Spinoza, inthisrespect) (unlike ulationofintuition ofinontheprecision hisinsistence oftime(hence, conception peculiar ofthetempoin thesensualexperience tuition)and,symptomatically, ral, whetheras finiteor infinite,mobileor immobile,tangibleor intan-

orradically new. gible,repetitive saysoutimportantforus.WhenBergson Thislastpairis especially rightthat “to thinkintuitivelyis to thinkin duration”(CM,34)—to think,as he sayselsewhere,in mobileterms—itisbecausefor him “the

precisely becauseitis continually livingbeinghasdurationasessence elaboratingwhat isnew”(CM,93).In other words,humanity’srelation

capacity poiétic, in thesensethatitsunlimited torealityis constitutively forcreationis theverycoreofthereal,eventhoughhumanityconsisunforeseeable and tentlyoccludes it:“Asrealityiscreatedassomething new,itsimageisreflected behinditintotheindefinite past,”thuscreatingitselfaspossibility (asifhavingbeenalwaysalreadypossible), even of any thoughnothingin the pastdeterminestheprecisepossibility thing.Thereisnothingpossibleinrealitythatisn’tmadepossible, preciselyoutofhumanity’s capacitytoinhabitdurationandgeneratenew spatio-temporal dimensions in “thecontinuous creationofunforeseeablenovelty” (CM,101-4). Precisely becauserealityisceaseless motion, it remains open for us to traverse it, unlike a fixedobject,which, by

blocking outa definitespatio-temporal momentboundedbygapsall around,notonly“remainsimpermeable butconfersa senseoffixity eventotheknowingsubject” whoencounters it.Thissecondmodelhas prevailed in traditional philosophy, astherenderingofspace-time into conceptual framesimmobilizes thefluxoftherealintospecifiedmomentsofapprehension, reproducible andcommunicable, whoseotherwisepracticalutility(precisely in termsofcommunication) istakento betheactualityofexperience, andworseyet,to bethemodeinwhich realityisconstituted. Ourproblems arise,Bergson warns,when“weplaceourselvesinthe immobile towatchforthemovingrealityasitpasses,insteadofputting ourselves backintothemovingrealitytotraversewithit theimmobile positions. . . .Itisthusunderstoodthatfixedconcepts canbe extracted byourthoughtfromthemobilereality, butthereisnomeanswhatever ofreconstituting withthefixityofconceptsthemobilityof thereal”

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(CM,189).HereinliesBergson’s directcritiqueofKantianrationalism (inwhichBergson correctly identifies aresidualPlatonism), whichconfigurestheideain relation, notto theconcreteness ofa thing,buttoa disembodied law,thusconceiving knowledge asthepouringofexperienceintopreexisting abstractmodels.Instead,Bergson callsforphilosophicalretraining,a reversaloftheconceptual habitus:“Tophilosophizemeansto reversethe normaldirectionof the workingsof thought”(CM,189).Thisreversalconcerns boththeactuality ofintuition,whichinvolves,asBergsonsays,the actof“inhabiting concrete duration,”andthemorefamiliarly difficulttaskofexpressing intuition inconceptual language.Deleuzepursuesthispeculiartemporalization ofthespatialin Bergsonto aninsightthatis aptto myoverallargument.Herecognizes that“durationisalwaysthelocationandenvironmentofdifferences in kind,”asopposedtospace,whichdenotesthe “location ofdifferences indegree”; thisopensupthetemporal asthedimension of real alterity—indeed,in our terms, self-alteration—asop-

posedto thespatial,whichcharacterizes simplythedomainofaugordiminution.” mentation relation Bergson speaksofdurationasa dialectical Morespecifically, ofmoments anda unitythatrunsthroughthem betweena multiplicity areessentially unlimitedinnumberand likea thread.Thesemoments inthesensethattheproximityofmomentto certainlyimmeasurable, be canbeasclosetogetherascanpossibly momentisinfinite:moments but theycannevercollapseintoa singlepoint.Ifweassume imagined, willdisappear ina dustofmoofmultiplicity, “duration thestandpoint ments,notoneofwhichhasduration,eachonebeinginstantaneous.” oftheunifyingthread, If,on theotherhand,weassumethestandpoint “Thisunity,as I examineitsessence,will nodurationis perceptible. then appearto me as an immobilesubstratumof themovingreality, essenceof time:thatiswhatI calleternity—the likesomeintemporal emptiedofthe eternityofdeath,sinceit isnothingelsethanmovement mobilitywhich made up its life.”Durationis entirelydialectical;the er-

singularly argues,istoprivilege Bergson metaphysics, roroftraditional onehasa world “In the firsthypothesis, oneor theotherstandpoint: inmid-airwhichwouldhaveto endandbeginagainbyitsuspended abstracteternityof selfeachinstant.Inthesecond,onehasaninfinitely

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whyit to understand difficult whichonecansaythatit is especially initselfandhowitallowsthingstocoexist doesnotremainenveloped Intuitionisthemodeofinhabitingthisdialectic. withit”(CM,184-86). at Itistoplaceoneselfintheconcreteflowbetweenthetwostandpoints repetitionandetertheirextremelimits,betweenpurehomogeneous tensionanimates thisdialectical nity.Bergsoninsiststhat inhabiting ofthemateriality eachendtowardanevermoreprofoundexperience betweenthedialecofthemovement ofthetemporal. Asembodiment ticalextremes of this relation,intuition is never a single act but an in-

definiteseriesofactions,obviouslyofthesamegeneralmakeupbut dimension. Intuition eachparticular initselfandinitsownspace-time isthusalwaysactionwithinthesocial-historical, astheparadoxical figureoftheinterruption ofthehistoricalfluxwhichneverlosessightof itselfaspartofthisflux. Tobefair,myreadinghereextractsfromBergson’s conception both a dialecticas such and a social-historicalintervention,morespecifically.

Bergson himselfwouldprobablydisavowdialectics altogether, butthat wouldbea stubbornanti-Hegelian gesture,morethananythingelse. Incidentally, my takingsomelibertieswith Bergson’s textowesan enormous benefittowhatmightbethemostseriouscritiqueofBergson byanotherexemplary poeticepistemologist, namely, GastonBachelard andhisLaDialectique deladurée(Dialectics ofDuration, 1950). Bachelard correctly identifiesBergson’s weakness toresideinhiscompulsion towardcontinuous temporality andhispersistentignoringof theepistemological significance ofpause,rest,interruption, suspension, ormore generally, thezeropointofthoughtasactionbeforethevoid.Bachelard arguesthatthe “fragmentation of timeis duelessto the behaviorof thingsin spacethantotheshatteringofourdecisions inthecourseof time,”a conditionthatourintuitiveapprehension cannotaffordtoignore.”Inotherwords,ourintuitioninheresa temporalinterruptiveness,whichispreciselyhowit isrenewed,howit remains‘true’toits performative singularity, itsuniqueimpersonation ofanobjectin time. Bachelard’s dialectics isinthisrespectcloseto WalterBenjamin’s call fora “dialectics ata standstill” asthenecessary modebywhichdialecticalthoughtwilldisengageitselffromtheexigencies ofabstractrationality(Hegelian or otherwise) andbegraspedin the—poetic, I would say—language of image.

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Toreturnto Bergson then,intuition differssubstantially fromanalysisprecisely intermsofrelationtothecognitive object. Whileintuition describes anact“bywhichoneistransported intotheinteriorofanobjectin orderto coincide withwhatis uniqueandconsequently inexpressible aboutit... , analysis,onthecontrary, istheoperation which reducestheobjecttoelements alreadyknown,common toit andtoothers”(CM,161-62).” Intermsofmyargument, thisinteriorization suggestsacertainimpersonation oftheobject, akindofperformative transcriptionoftheobject’s locationintoa contextual ofsubco-incidence ject positions.Thisis neithera matterof sympathetic collapseinto identitywiththeobjectnora matterofimitation, ofaestheticmimesis. Ifnothingelse,itimpliesan imaginary of one’ssubjectpodislocation sition,which is potentiallydrivenby the desireto adopt an Archimedean (i.e.,objective) pointofknowledge. Fromthisangle,intuitionmaybeseenasoneoftheelementsin literature’s caperformative pacityto disruptthetraditional philosophical desireforcognition, the masteryoftheworldthroughconceptual privilege. Still,thequestion ofhowintuition istobearticulated, ifnotwithanalyticalor conceptualarmory,remainsa problem.Bergson concedes thatoftentimes, in philosophical certainly writing,thisisunavoidable. Butthisis exactlywhyphilosophical languagetends,at thelimit,to of materiality, espetheforceoftheintuitiveapprehension obliterate and fetishismof itsown ciallyas it tendstowardthe self-occultation toconconceptual framework. Bergson suggeststhat,asanalternative Inan explicitly anti-Plawetry to thinkimagistically. ceptualization, tonicgesture,he reversesthetraditionalpropertiesofconcreteimages modeof arguingthattheimageistheexpressive andabstractconcepts, ofworldlythings,whileabstractconceptualization directapprehension of Thus,thephilosopher processofapprehension. involvesa figurative intuitionneverceasesbeingessentiallya poet—inthe full-fledged ofthings materiality thespatio-temporal meaningofpoiésis—inhabiting from“within”the worldofthe and thinking/creating/transforming lantoadoptanalyticorconceptual necessary object.Whenit becomes whilenever ofintuitionperformsaccordingly, guage,thephilosopher repressingthe senseofinhabitingconcretemobility,knowingthatin the last instance “one can pass from intuition on to analysis,but not

fromanalysisto intuition”(CM,180).

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Myth

intheparticuto recognize arché: Letusreturntoourmethodological toposeitsownthethatenableliterature larityofatextthoseelements understood thisasthefundaBergson oreticaltermsandobjectives. creative mind,ashecalledit,a powerhe mentalpowerofhumanity’s rendering propensity formythological laterlinkeddirectlytosociety’s AsaninI wouldreiteratethiswithdifferentemphasis. of reality.** imagination, theliteraryactliesat theheartof stanceof thecreative theabilityofsocieties mythographic capacity: whatwemaycallsociety’s ofimages,thoughts,histories, togenerateand sustainan assemblage and alwaysplayed etc.,sprungfroma specifichistoricalimagination wherebytheymay serveas inout in an arenaof socialcontention, for aswellas fieldwork stancesofa community’s self-representation exigency emerge.Literapotentialself-alteration, shouldthathistorical ture’smythographic potentialbecomescrucialin ourpost-Enlightenmentworld,whoseexplicitlyideological aspirationis a generaldemythification ofculturebymeansofrationalandsecularpractices,as wellasbytherevivalofreligiousexclusivity anda peculiarobsession forthemystical. Whenone traditionally thinksof literatureas mythological or mythopoetic, oneusuallymindsthetracesofancientmythsrecastin contemporary light.Attentionusuallyfallson thecontentofliterary textsoronthenewframingthata retellingofclassiccontentrequires. However, I amlessinterestedin addressingthe genreof retoldand transformed mythical tales, as I am less interested, for example, in

“philosophical” novels,wherebyliteratureismerelyplacedin theserviceofthebattleofideas,itsmythicalpropensity restrainedinfavorof a disguisedexpositionofconceptualagonistics. Instead,this inquiry presupposes thatmythisa particularmodeofsocialthought,and,indeed,thatmythicthoughtproducesa particularmodeofknowledge. Thekindofsenseexperience characterizing theimplicitandintangible butnonetheless “expert”cognitionthatliteratureaffordsisofthesame orderas theexperience ofthemythical. Tosaythatliterature’s theoreticalcapacity islinkedtomythdoesnotmeanto exploremythascontent(therecirculation ofnarratives ofparticularmythsortheallegedly

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archetypal Gestalt ofmythical tales).Rather, ittakesmythtobeamatter ofperformative action:literally, according to whattakesplacein the theater,but also,metaphorically, accordingto thetirelesscapacityof humankindto createfables,legends,and storiesin order to dramatize

theotherwise incommensurable puzzleofhumanexistence. Theprimarymetaphoric terrainforthissortofperformative process remainsthespaceoftheancientAthenian theater,particularly initsesoteric (that is, constitutive, immanent) relation to the being of the

polis—to theessenceofpolitics. Insofarasmythis performatively articulated(and,in the Greektradition,this goes as farbackas the Homeric

epics),”it deploysa constitutive poeticelement,a creative(thusalso destructive) forcethataltersidentificatory terms.Asself-altering agent, theperformance ofmythinthepolisbecomes a specific formofsocial thoughtwhosepoliticsis signified essentially asapoeticenterprise. My ownunderstanding ofmythicthoughtisbuiltonthisparticular socialtowhichtheperformativity ofmythunhistorical occasion, according doesitsoriginary or archetypal authoritybystagingitsinterrogation, andineffect,historization. mythicthoughtin pluralization, Refiguring thiswaydepartssubstantially fromErnstCassirer’s widelyrecognized andreproducedterminology andliesclosertoHansBlumenberg’s criticalelaboration,as we shallseeshortly.Cassirer’sshortcomings, in what is otherwisea formidableand innovativeedifice,residein his ul-

timateconviction thatmythicthoughtisanarchaicmodeofsocialexin thepost-Enlightenment worldiseithera whosepresence pression, matterofinfantileculturalresidue(therelicofmythinFreud’saccount whichhe ora matterof aestheticneoprimitivism, oftheunconscious) Hisunwillofmodernliterature. chieflywiththeenterprise identifies force,asbeingas mythicthoughtascontemporary ingnessto confront ofany“arastheimaginary imaginary vitalto thepost-Enlightenment unpreparedto confrontNazism’s chaic”culture,lefthimprofoundly ofmyth.” uniquelyperversetechnologies Tospeakofmythicthought,inmyterms,istodisrupttheantagonisin modern ofmythwithlogos,asithasbeenfashioned ticcoarticulation Mythicthought ofresidualPlatonism. variousinvocations philosophy’s counterto anylogicthat counterto mythology, mustbe envisioned talesofidentityandself-affirinspinning themythical wouldconsume

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leastofallincontemmation.Thisisnotusuallyhowmythispresented, which, tradition theory,whichdrawsona philosophical poraryliterary mythtoexilefromthecity(toan apolitical sincePlato,condemned ofthemimetic rangingfromthefalsehood undercharges nonexistence) oftruth.It appropriation irrationalist facultyitselftomyth’sunabashed mythwithfalseshouldbepointedoutthatthelonghistoryofequating philosophy issharedequallybyrationalist hood,falsity, oratbest,fiction metaphysics ontheonehand,andbyapocalyptic andsecularmentality, Ipropose that thishistory, mysticism, ontheother.Against andreligious three potential byinterrogating wereevaluate thenotionanditscomplex (3)mythas (2)mythaslogicofidentity; domains: (1)mythasfalsehood; areofdirepolitforce.Tomymind,allthreedomains poetic/theoretical icalsignificance, and I willaddressthisspecifically.

Thenotionofmythasfalsehood isofmodernconceptual fashioning: theoutcomeoftherelentless questforthetruthbyrationalistphilosophyandapocalyptic religion alike.AsPaulVeynehasdemonstrated in his bold treatiseDidtheGreeksBelievein theirMyths?,the dilemmaof

truthor falsehood wasirrelevant—indeed, conceptually alien—to the ancientunderstanding ofmyth.*! Veynearguesforahistorical imaginationthatisnotslavetothecompulsion fortruth—inanotherlanguage, notslavetophilosophy. Herecognizes thattheexigencies actingupon historyas archivalandarcheological practice—whose object,having vanishedintotemporalnonexistence, demandsto be reconstituted as theverytestoftruth’svalidity—are foreigntoancienthistorians, who conceive theirtasktobethedocumentary inscription ofthepresentfor the sakeof the future. For thosehistorians,the world of myth is incor-

poratedin thistaskas evidence oftheimaginary horizonoftheworld theydescribe. “FortheGreeks,a mythictraditionistruedespite themarvelous”(60)inthesensethatthetruthofmythisitsveryfigurativeness, itsfictionality, theallegorical wayin whichit fashionstheworld.The fictional/allegoricalcharacterof mythwasnot unknownto the ancients,as Plato’svehement resistance to it demonstrates. Infact,Plato’s direresponsedemonstrates thetruthstatusofmyth;mythproducesan altogether realsenseofpolitical dangerandmustbe counteracted. Veyne pointsoutthattheGreeks bothbelieved anddidnotbelievein theirmyths.Thisis neithera contradiction nor a paradoxin a Greek

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conception oflife,inwhichbeliefisneverdevoidofinterest. Mythsare subjected totheinterestofbelief(ornonbelief) according to social-historicaldemands,alwaysnegotiated withina worldlydomain,regardlessof their otherworldlycontent.Thus,“criticizing mythsdid not meanprovingtheywerefalsebutrediscovering theirtruthfulbasis” (59).Thefactthatthetragicpoets,forexample, stagedmythsinthetheaterwhilebeingentirelyawareoftheirmarvelous or magicalstatus doesnotmeantheyrejectedthenotionthatlegendshavea truebasis. Theconcernwiththe true/falseoriginofmythis a modernconcern, springing outoftheimaginary thatproclaims thetasksofbothhistory andphilosophy (butnotliterature orpolitics) tobedevoidofinterest. Yetmythensuresthatbothtruthandfalsehood willnotbean absolute matterbyplacingtruthinthedomainofliteratureandpoliticsandby rescuingfalsehood fromthedomination ofmorality. Likewise, noabsolutedefinitionofmythispossible,perhapsbecausethesignification ofmythrelativizes theantinomytruth/falsehood. Thefactthatmyth eludesabsolute is arguably themostpalpable ofits definition evidence performative relationto thesocial-historical, whichcanneverbesubsumedin whateveridentificatory mythmightmobilize ina processes givensocial-historical Thevalueofarchaicmythintheconmoment. temporaryworldishardlyitsidentificatory ancestralimposition(the tales),butitsperformative recirculation ofundyingmythical canonical positionas“thewatchdogofthought,”inVeyne’s phrase—which beground, inourtime,sincethecognitive comesurgentandmoredifficult and thesacred,hasbecomeincreasingly burdenedbybothscientificity forthesosignificance Inits forcefully antimythical. untranscendental withit,Greekmythinparticcietiesthatcreatedit andcommunicated andplasticity ofmythic toremindusof themateriality ularcontinues socrucial and theatricality thought,bearingthesortofperformativity flair. theoretical tomodernliterature’s IshouldclarifythatwhenIspeakofGreekmythIamnotconcerned andcatalytic with the mythof theGreeks,despiteits overwhelming ofpost-Enlightenment orthepoeticimagination presencein modernity, thefact ingeneral.IinvokeGreekmythifonlytoacknowledge societies in varioussocial-histhat,thoughmythisa modeofhumancreativity ofmyth,likethelanguageofphilosophy, thelanguage toricalregisters,

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Greek.Thinkingat the is—thusfarinhistory,anyway—unavoidably meanspreofitsradicalconsequences, limitofthisposition,cognizant ofGreekmythoutsideitssociselynotlosingtrackofthesignification situation, outsideitsdynamicroleinthesocial-imaginary cial-historical to invokethesocial-imagoftheancientpolis.Byextension, institution worldis inaryofGreekmythinthecontextofourpost-Enlightenment rendering ofGreekmythsinconboththeunexamined toproblematize by is characterized temporary garbandtheclaimthat“our”modernity it is oftheworld.Fromthisstandpoint, thesuccessful demythification equallymisguidedto considerGreekmythimmortalizedor tranmomyth’sownperformative scended. Itismorefruitfultoreexamine ofitsownsocial-imaginary, aswellasto mentandmodeinthecontext recastit,indifferential andalwaysself-interrogative ways,asa performativemodeinthesocial-imaginary termsofthepresent.Myaspirationthroughout thisinquiryistotracethisrecastingincertainaspects of modern literaturebecause,to restatethe obvious,I considerit essen-

tialtothearticulation ofliteratureastheoryfortheantimythical erawe inhabit. Contrarytothisperformative andcontingent understanding ofmyth isthetendency todefinemythgenerally intermsofeitheroriginary or identitarian fictions. Suchfictions exist,buttheyarehardlyimmanent tomyth.Rather,Iseethemasa specific social-historical contentofmyth thattendstowardtheself-referential, themonomaniacal, thetotalitarian:demonstrably myth’smostdestructive manifestation. Thehistoricalculmination ofsuchcontentis whatJean-Luc NancyandPhilippe Lacoue-Labarthe call“theNazimyth,”inanextraordinary essaywith thesametitle.*Despitethebrilliance ofthisessay,I believeitsargumentisprofoundly misguided anddemandsclosercriticalattentionas a succinct wayintooursecondpointofinterrogation: mythasidentity. Unlikewhatonemightinferfromits title,theessayon “the Nazi myth”isnotan interrogation ofthemythofNazism,butanexplication ofthenatureofMyth,towhich,presumably, Naziideologyprovidesan exemplary decipherment. Technically speaking,thisis tantamountto elevatingNazidiscourseintosomethingworthyof philosophical inquiry,whiledenigrating thestatusofmythtoatotalizing, identificatory process. Theauthorsconstrueasfactandtakeaspointofdeparture the

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notionthatmythenablesthetotalmerging ofSubjectandStateintoa tautological association, whichistheessenceoffascism.Theirbasic reasoning isthatGermanhistoryisbuiltonan exclusive problematic of identity, whosetwentieth-century manifestation isa uniquely German configuration ofa racistideology(Nazism): “wecouldperfectly describetheemergence ofGermannationalism as thelonghistoryofappropriation ofthemeans ofidentification” (NM,299/ 39).Atonce,one pausesat the logicofexclusivity atwork.InwhatwayisGermanhistorymoreidentitarian thananyothernationalhistory?Thisis a big questionthatremainssurprisingly unaddressed, although ithasconsiderable historical andphilosophical merit.Thoughobviously nonationalhistorycaneverbe institutedoutsidean identificatory /identitarianlogic,itispropertoGermany tosaythatitsproblematic ofidentity concurswiththe rise of modernnationalhistoryas a genre(whose great authorialincarnationswere arguablyMichelet,Ranke,and Macauley), in contradistinctionto England or France, for example,

whose traumaticnational-identitary imaginariesare consolidated around“pre-modern” events(theBattleofHastingsandtheNightof St.Bartholomew Thisdistinction, shouldit Massacre, respectively).* holdunderrigoroushistorical couldactuallybeofserviceto scrutiny, theauthors’presumption, yetit remainscuriouslyabsent.Instead,an evenmoreunjustified departurepointisproclaimed: thedefinitionof (adefinition cleverly presented mythas“anidentificatory mechanism” a one-way astheargumentunfolds, hereasanoptionwhichbecomes, street).

leadstoanaprioriconofassertions co-incidence Thisunexamined ofthe thetrajectory clusionthat,nomoreandno less,predetermines andnowhere elsethatthe “itisintheGermantradition entireargument: of ofmythwiththequestion ontheencounter mostrigorousreflection is elaborated”(NM,297/ 32,myemphasis).Giventhe identification argument,evenif weassumethatGermany’s optionforthisone-way theparathecase,Germanybecomes uniquenessisindeedhistorically digmaticelement,not ofwhat myth does(under certain social-historical

sothat,rightaway, butofwhatmythis(nowandforever), conditions), insteadofspeakingof the “Nazimyth,”the authorsarespeakingof “mythas Nazi.”

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disandprecise byanimpassioned isoccluded Thisghastlyslippage of thePlatonic inheritance of Germany’s cussionoftheimplications themythosversuslogosantagonism thatinaugurates fearofmimesis theauthors exclusion ofpoetry—which, philosophy. Plato’s inWestern theplasticformingor mimeticactivity: remindus,isthequintessential the ranksofphiloofimages,themasteryof idols—from deforming task” called“anorthopedic pedagogyiscleverlyandcorrectly sophical that (NM,297/ 33).| wouldadd,notmerelywithsimpleplayfulness, task,insofar as Platorecognized,despite his proit is alsoan orthopaidic

oftheproperpaideia prejudices, thatthequestion foundanti-democratic thebodyandsoulofthepolis.Butthegistofhistaskwasto remained thusbarringacexilepoeticsfromthesphereoftheradicalimagination, Lacouecesstomythicthoughtbyreducingittosheermimeticactivity. Labarthe andNancyadoptthisPlatonicfiguration ofmimesiswithout questionandproceedtoargue—again, notwithouthistoricalmerit— thatthehistoryofradicalthoughtinGermany, fromtheRomantics onward(obviously Kantisexempted, andthisisa majorissuethatmakes sensebutdeserveselaboration), isinvolved basically inananti-Platonic project:thatis,in theformidable attemptto reversetheconquestof mythosbylogos. Thisattemptisconducted withina historical contextofmimesisthat startswiththegradualdefeatofChristianity inEuropeandtheadvent ofClassicism. Germany camebelatedlyintothiscontext,anditsidentificatory problems thenbecamefurthercomplicated bythedifficulty of havingtoimitatetheGreeksina differentway—very specifically, ina waythatsurpasses theimitation oftheGreeks bytheFrench(exemplified, fromthe Prussianpoint of view,by the consequences of Napoleonic culture).Thisbecomes, then,Germany’s doublebind:tobe liketheGreeksandyetnottobeliketheGreeksbecausetheothersare (NM,298-300/ 34-42).Accordingto Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy,this bindis“solved” (withschizophrenic aftereffects) in twoways.Inthe firstinstance, bothGreeceandtheotherimitatorsofGreecewillbesublated(aufgehoben) ina processthatwillyielda “healthyGermany”: Germany’sbonafideentranceintobothhistoryand essence.One might addto theauthors’primarilyHegelianreferences thefactthat,in this specific configuration, nextto HegelstandsWilhelm vonHumboldtas

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author of the institutionalizationof Bildung.In the second instance,an-

otherGreecemustbefoundas autoscopic object:thereinlies,simply speaking,thecruxof theJenaproject,ofwhichHegelwas alsopart. Whilethe first“resolution” is properlyphilosophical, the secondis properlyphilological (althoughthetwoobviously overlapinthelongue durée,following thedifferent philosophical grammar ofNietzsche and Fett thenHeidegger)—keeping, in fact,Germany’s“schizophrenia” intact (NM,301/ 44). Thus,theargumentgoes,“theconstruction ofmythwillbenecessarilyboththeoretical andphilosophical, conscious ifyouwill,evenifitis carriedoutin theelementofpoetry”(NM,302/ 45).Thisconsciousness willenablethedialectical interweaving of theprelogical (unconscious) “richness ofmythicproduction” withtheabstractuniversality ofthelogos.InthehistoryofGermany, theauthorsconclude, thisdialectical productionofmyth,sincetheJenaRomantics andparticularly sinceWagner andNietzsche, rendersaesthetics andphilosophy inseparable. Theconceptualepitomeofthisdialectical interweaving willbearguablyWagner’snotionoftheGesamtkunstwerk andtheinventionofmusic-drama asa form,withoutwhichseveralcrucialeventsinthecourseofGerman culturewouldnothavebeenpossible.* Oneoughttobecareful,however,nottoremainsimplyat thegroundpointofWagner,readingthere merelytheproto-language oftheNazipolitical invocation ofthemusicdramaform.Itwouldbemorefruitfulinsteadto unfoldthedialectical byreadinghimagainstthegrainoftheNazi strandsofWagnerhimself, ofBrecht’s epictheater(whichispremyth,perhapsfromthestandpoint sevenunprecedented Syberberg’s ciselywhatanimatedHans-Jiirgen houropusHitler:A FilmfromGermany). and Nancyarecorrectin concluding Inanycase,Lacoue-Labarthe Properlyspeaking,myth themythological. that“mythisnot,therefore, But isa powermorethanit isa thing,anobject,or a representation.” takingthenextsteptodefinethispower,theauthorsassertthat“myth ofanindiforcesanddirections isthepowertogatherthefundamental invisible, nonempirical vidualora people,thepowerofa subterranean, identity”(MN,305/ 53).In otherwords,againtheyoptforan identigatheringup thetribesthroughanuntracetarianidiomofdefinition: wherebyidentitysuddenlyachieves ableprocessofidentityformation,

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ofinsightstatus.Thiscuriouscoexistence andtranscendental invisible persiststhroughout. with obsessiveassumptions ful assessments “mythical Hence,the nextstatementis, strictlyspeaking,illogical: ofan imtheprojection poweris thepowerofthedream,”—yes—“of thereisnological,predeFrankly, agewithwhichoneidentifies’”—no. projection, termined passagebetweenthedreamandan identificatory baffledby warnedus.Thereaderisconsistently asFreudhastirelessly understanding ofmyththatpersistswithinanastutedean absolutist in of myth—nominally determinations ofthe contextual construction fallsinto Theobsession culturein general. Germany, butin“Western” thecategoryofmythsince linewiththegeneraltendencyto demonize thattheauthorswillgoontoatfascistusage,anditismereeventuality significasignifications, indeedmonotheistic tributetomythreligious singularity. tionsintheformoftotalbeliefandtypological (ifnotin Thisisnotthepropervenuetoelaborateonthehistorical factepistemic) divergence betweenmythandmonotheism.” Theglaringdisjunction ismissedbecausetheconstitutive monomaniacal principleofthisessayistoshowthatonlytheNazissucceeded increating “themythofMyth.”Inthisregard,a standardprincipleofnationalist logicthatpotentiallypertainsto all modernhistoricalsituationsis gracedwithaninviolable singularity thatelevatesit toparadigmatic, transhistorical status.Thedeconstructed objectbecomesa demon.The mythicalisonceagainconfounded withthemystical.Andgiventhat thehistorical substance oftheNazimythinitsvariousstagingswasindisputablyfoundedonmassmystery,onneo-primitive ritualconstitutedaroundtheprimalBlutundBoden, a monadistic (indeedmonomythical) desireisthusmetonymically reconstrued hereastheessence oftheentirecategoryofmyth.* Lacoue-Labarthe and NancytaketheNaziclaimconcerning“the clarityofthe mythicexperience” forgranted,thuslosingsightofthe factthattheallegedclarityofmythisa specificideological instancein specificsocial-historical conditions. Nothingprecludes norguarantees clarityin myth,as Atheniantragedydemonstratestimeand again. Evadingthis historicalhorizon,theprofound traditionof collectiveself-

interrogation stagedby thepolisin theformofAtheniantheater,one cannotbut arriveat the haplessconclusion that “thelogicof mythis

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nothingbutthelogicofitstotalself-fulfillment [auto-effectuation]’ (NM, 310/ 67).Bytheendoftheessay,mythhasbecome a tautological and totalizingconceptuponwhichtheNaziimaginaryretroactively exercisesa monopolyof signification. Although I certainlysharetheauthors’investment inthenotionthatNazism shouldnotbeencountered simplyas a momentof historical aberrationbut insteadas an outgrowth(yet,intheformofmutation, neitherpredetermined norinsurmountable)of the “Western”tradition,historydoes not permit us to

bend the two components of Nazisymbolic logic(“mimetic willto identityandself-fulfillment ofform”)intothe contentofmythtout court. Iwouldargueinsteadthatit ispreciselyintheserviceof“ageneral deconstruction ofthehistoryinwhichourownprovenance lies”—Laand Nancy’sconcludingevocation—that an undercoue-Labarthe thatstagescommunal selfstandingofmythasa performative element imagesand representations forcollectiveself-interrogation becomes urgent.Inordertodisjointhetraditional ofmythwithlocoarticulation gos,wemustenvisiona mythicthoughtcounterto mythology.” Nationalistmythsaremytho-logical insofarastheyarejustlymodesofnalogiccanachievesociety’s tionalistlogic.Butno nationalist absolute ofmythicthoughtwithin Ourtaskistodiscernthoseinstances closure. logicandperformothersortsof societythatruncountertonationalist imaginings,reiteratingperhapsin newand multiplewaysThomas Mann’sexplicitcall,deliveredin a commenton his novel JosephandHis Brothers,to takemythout of Fascisthands.*”

mythas poWhichbringsme to the finalpoint of interrogation: force.I havebeenessentiallyarguingthat mythic etic/theoretical whereneitheran inauniverse inaliteraryuniverse: thoughtflourishes noran apocalyptic (religious-metaphysianalytic(historical-scientific) mythicthoughtwouldbe holdssway.Jnthisuniverse, cal)imaginary capacityto(re)imagsociety’s poiétic, manifesting seenas constitutively ineitselfradicallyin termsof creatingoneselfas an other.Theideaof is whollyopdomainof self-alteration mythas the social-imaginary notionsofmythasoriginandmythas idenposedto bothtraditional tity,and I evokeit herenot asa naturalconditionbut as a specificsocial-

poeticdocuments tothemostrevolutionary historicaloption,traceable

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of human history,as wellas to the fewersuch instancesof revolution-

aryaction. reofHansBlumenberg’s Inthisrespect,I reiteratetheimportance ofthe ofalltheoriesofmyththatrelegateit toelements lentlesscritique or premodernsocial remotepastandits “reincarnations”—primitive organization,relicsof the unconscious,“childhoodof man,” fetishism

insteadformythaspresentnostalgia—arguing aesthetic ofthearchaic, day “logic”in thesenseofscientia,with noobligationwhatsoeverto the

determines mythtobea explicitly logicofscience. Indeed,Blumenberg whichis,moreover, gracedwithan autonomous modeofknowledge, symbolic (fromscience,reason,analysis,etc.)domainof generating assumption is thatmyth forms.Blumenberg’s centralanthropological ofreality,” existsasa responseto theencounterwith“theabsolutism withouta clearlydefinedbiologiandtheterroritincursfora “species calniche.”*! Inotherwords,theabsenceofanexclusive naturalenvironmentthatcompensates forspecies-weakness andthusmakesthe presence ofrealityterrifyingly andabsolutely Otherprovokestheconstitutively humanresponse:themobilization ofa radicalimagination thatpossesses thepowertotransform realityintoa fantasyobject,apoeticentity.Inthisframework, cavedrawingsarenotreadasmimeticinterpretations ofrealitybutasactivities offashioning reality,projecting uponrealitytheimagesitfailstoprovideconcretely andinstinctively. “Theabsolutism ofrealityisthusopposedbytheabsolutism ofimages andwishes”(8),sothat“significance arisesasa resultoftherepresentationoftherelationbetweentheresistance thatrealityopposestolife andthesummoning upofenergythatenablesonetomeasureuptoit” (75).Suchsignificance is embodiedin sedimentedformin the multitudeofmythological figuresthatstillwanderinourmidstacrossculturesandtimes. Blumenberg’s workhelpsus understandin whatsensemythoperatesbeyondthespatio-temporal, inwhatsenseit isneitherlocalizable norchronologically determined, whichmayexplainwhy,forexample, it flourished in modernistliterature,wherethedismantling of strict space-time boundaries hadbecome a self-conscious theoretical pursuit. Yet,by the sametoken,mythicnarrativesarecharacterized by a con-

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stancyat thecorethatenableslimitlessvariation. Theythussurvive (trans)historically withouthavingto submitto thedogmatic struggle that faces,say,sacred texts, whoseword is givenonce and forall and

whosesurvival thushingesonthe(oftenviolent) conquest ofthesocialimaginary. Thefascistappropriation ofmythcaninthesetermsbeseen

as an overt sacralizationof myth,whosepsychological component wouldbe a fetishization of a disembodied, singular,exclusionary truth—holy in themostformalprofoundsensethoughscandalously profaneatthesametime.Thatthisperverse development isoftenmisreadis indicativeof an inadequate theorization of society’s mythographicpropensity.One need not go backto Nancyand LacoueLabarthebut remember,rather, the late work of Ernst Cassirer,other-

wiseoneof the mostintriguingstudentsof mythicthought,who inthecaseofNazimythanexplicitauthorization ofmythby conjures andcunningartisans,” byanovertfictionalization “skillful conducted of languagethatis presented hereasa willfulpolitical of reanimation mythoutsidetheboundsofsociety’s poeticimagination—one might say, outside the “harmless”domain of literature.”This positionas-

sumesthatmythcanactuallybeauthorizedoutsidethe“literary”domain,broadlyspeaking. Inresponse, Iwouldinsistonmyth’s“authorandgoontoconsiderliteratureneitherharmlessnor less”constitution dowiththesocial-imaginary harmfulinitsnaturebutconsubstantial main—hence,not a domain of human activity that can be closed off, neutralized, or outmaneuvered.To say this is hardly to turn social praxis into an aestheticmatter,but it does mean to make literature (or,

matter.If a political thedomainof fantasy) speaking, psychologically

ispoand fantasy(fictionality) socialactionorpoliticsis notaesthetics isnotamatterof litical,thenmyth’sdestinywithintheNaziimaginary ofpoliticsina naturebutofhistory.TheNazimythisanaesthetization demonization justasthesubsequent juncture, specificsocial-historical ofmythinvariousquarters(asa reactiontotheNazicase)itselfreveals bytheorizing Thetaskistoreversethisdemonization acertaininterest. forboth its hismyth’shistoricity,whichis to account,simultaneously,

modernity. andits transhistorical toricalsingularity theNazimythrequiresthatweconInotherwords,deconstructing

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and trajectory ofa certainhistorical-cultural frontit bothasexpression allitsown.Thetwo witha modeofsignification mutation assingular toassumingthat instances arenotthesame;thiswouldbetantamount culminates inNazism.Nosociety, “Western” culturemetaphysically not even themost totalitarian,is ever constitutedon an absolute,self-

Imagesarealwaysproducedbetweenthecracks— fulfilledimaginary. emergefrom themselves indeed,imagesproducethecracks—which solidsocialasdoesthepresumably thesamemagmaofsignification itfoundation. Thoughtraditionalwaysworkstoperpetuate imaginary elements. Thisisan emerging contrary self,itdoessobyincorporating and certainlyunpreongoingprocess,circuitous,retrogressive, thework dictable—a processinwhosetermswemightbestunderstand willremainirreofcultureinthemakingofhistory,inwhichliterature

placeable. Whileretaining morearchaic notionsofcultureascultivation,asBildung orwhatevermightlinkittothe“civilizing process,” we mustalsoextendtheworkofculturetohistoricalelementsthatdocumenthumanity’s radicalcapacityforlimitless(re)invention, thoseelementsthatchallenge presumedculturalnormsandoftensubvertthem, forgoodorforill.Inthisrespect,wemightreconceptualize theworkof cultureasa performative terrain,wheresocietynotonlyritualizesits

hopesandfears,itsvaluesandbeliefs, itsfantasies aboutitselfandits others,butalsostagesotherimagesofitself,otherself-representations thatmay,undercertainhistorical conditions, leadto self-interrogation andindeedself-alteration. Theperformative elementsofmythographic thoughtanditstheoretical potential, asI understand it,belongprecisely inthisterrain. Interrogating mythfromthisstandpoint alertsustotheconcrete and unavoidable political stakesinarticulating howa theoretical capacity mightinherewithinliterature. Putotherwise: themythicdomaingrants usa uniqueapprehension ofhowthepoeticisinterwoven withthepolitical.Byvirtueof its performative nature,society’smythographic imagination canneverbeexhausted inthefact/event ofitshistorical realization. Mythscanalsoexercise a historical forceasimaginedalteritiesof societywithoutinstrumental regard.Thepoeticsof self-alteration(a self-propelled otheringthatmustunderliethepossibility of

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radicalshiftin anysociety) isnotreducible to itswords,indeedto its word(ofpromise, ofdefinition, etc.).Poiesis, asalteringforce,doesnot workby puttingforwarda definiteprojectto be organized andinstitutedinsomespecified future;itworksindefinitely andinfinitely both becauseit is irreducible toitsparts(thatis,singular) butalsobecause it is interminably reproducible eachtimeanew. Society’s mythographic capacityresidesat the coreof whatCorneliusCastoriadis names“social-imaginary institution,” aprocessconcerningthewaysocieties constitute andnegotiatetheiridentities outof an expressly force,animatedin humanity’s creative/destructive deepestpsychicreservoir, which,undercertainconditions ofencountering the social-historical, opensup thepossibility of self-alteration. In the lastinstance, onemaysaythatsocieties controltheirdestinies totheextentthattheyrecognizetheeffectsoftheirownmythopoetic production.Mythis,in thisrespect,alwaysco-incident withhistory,unlike whatisusuallyargued—namely thata mythicalworldisprehistorical, whichmeansthatinvokingmythincontemporary termsistantamount to dehistoricizing society. Iargue—and | feel thattheexcontemporary perienceofliteratureprovidesthebestidiom—for a mythistorical sense oftheworld.Mythistoréma istheGreekwordfornovelorfiction,more generally. AndIwouldliketoextendtheterm,onthebasisofitsliteral betweenthemythssocieties meaning,toaccountfortheintersection plustheirothtorepresentthemselves create(andrecreateincessantly) whichare ofmyth’sgeneration, ersand the historicalcontingencies to pattern.Mythisalwaysconthemselves incessantandirreducible Tospeak narratives. thoughgivenreadilyto transhistorical temporary, istospeakofacontinuously foundations thusofsociety’s mythistorical and yet unpreshiftingground,whosepathis riverlike,explicable arebothlimitedby dictable,becausehistoryandthesocialimagination theireventandyetlimitlessintheirproject. Thisis perhapsthelimitinthehandlingofmyth(indeedthedialecseminal and Adorno’s inHorkheimer ticofmythand Enlightenment) ofmyentireproject. book,whichisimbeddeddeepin thefoundations Theradicalelementofthatbookarguablyresidesinputtingfortha nothe asa standpointfromwhichto understand tionof thetranshistorical

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achievethisbyplacing Theauthorsfamously playofhistory. dialectical Thisrelation relation tothehistorical. ina dialectical thetranshistorical is a sort of chiasmus,which canbe seen from two angles.If the tran-

axisthatinterit isthehorizontal isa matterofdiachrony, shistorical thetemporalsingucontingent, sectstheverticalaxisofthehistorically irreducible sense.If, larityoftheevent,historyin itsmostimmediate, action isthenarrative ofhuman/social ontheotherhand,thehistorical through time, then the transhistoricalis the vertical intersection,the

constituted senseofJetztzeit) interruption (inBenjamin’s synchronous thatperofthehuman/socialimagination bytheformalcharacteristic occupyeitherpositionorbear mitsradicalalteration. Mythcanvariably themultiplicity ofsignification thatatteststoallfourreference pointsof thechiasmus.Horkheimer andAdorno oftenforgettheradicalpotentialofmyth,eitherbecausetheyareafraidthattherational,emancipatoryfaculties oftheEnlightenment willbeforever abolished (asinfascism)—though theyareequallyafraidofEnlightenment’s ownself-destructivepotential(deathcamps,the hydrogenbomb)—orbecause theyrelegatemyth,somewhatnostalgically, totheprimordialpowers ofnature,thusfallingpreytotheintricacies ofthedialecticitself. Thetaskistounderstand mythasa thing-of-the-world, notaspartof thenetherworld. Hencetheemphasisonmythin performance, myth staged.Thiswouldhavetobe articulated contra,let us say,Wagner’s “invisible theater,”but closertoBrechtorBeckett strippingtheprocess of productionand receptionto the barebone.In Horkheimerand Adorno’sterms,this means that myth is the world of disenchantment,

wheretheprocessof disenchantment islaidbare(whichistosaythat thesourceofenchantment is alsolaidbare),withoutthisbeingtranslated into another enchantment,in turn, like the self-mythologyof a

“rational” Enlightenment. Thisself-mythology servesastheclassicformulaforthetransitionfrommythos tologosand,of course,forthetriumphof philosophyover literature.Mysuggestionis to entertain, again,literature’s fancyinorderto cometo termswithitsrelationto knowledge, a relationthatcannotbeappropriated byphilosophical logosbecauseitdoesnottakeplacesingularlyinthedomainoflogos,but alsopartakesofthedomainof mythos. Anditcannottakeplacesingu-

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larlyinthedomainoflogos because oneofthecharacteristics oflogos is toeffacethecontoursofitsdomain,toappeardisembodied. Literature savesus fromthatbecauseitdrawsourattentiontotheperformative necessityofmythos, remindingusinwhatwayspleasureandknowledge—in themostprofound senseofbothwords—were atonetimeintertwinedwithpoliticallifeintheancienttheater.

PART I

FromLawtoMyth

Enlightenment andParanomia

Thefocusofthisessay,inrelationto theoverallproject, isbothsuccinct anddeceptive. Ontheonehand,itdoesnotaddress directly thequestion of “literatureas theory,”exceptforan importantpassageconcerning Kafka,thoughitdoesaddressthecomplexities ofwhatIhavecalled“an antimythical era.”Ontheotherhand,itengages coreelements ofthe overallequation: mostofall,thenecessity ofconfronting theEnlightenmentas mythical foundation ofmodernsociety, whichpertainsbothto howwe understandthe socialimagination for which(andthrough which)literaturemightperformitstheoretical workandhowliterature itself,asa specific social-imaginary institution ofmodernity, mightprovidethemeansofa certaintension,refraction, resistance, or perhaps evensubversion of modernity’s rulingimagination. Thatthesocialimaginaryinstitutionof literature,as I argue,emergesin co-incidence withthesocial-imaginary institution oflawiskeytounderstanding how the Enlightenmentactsas mythicalfoundation.It is important,however,

nottoforgetthat“foundation” inthiscasehardlysuggestssolidityor even,in temporalterms,a permanentpointof departure.Thisisbecause,

entirely horizonandtherefore ontheonehand,mythisa performative and,ontheotherhand,because the bythesocial-historical; permeable onrevolutionfoundsa newmodeofrulingpredicated Enlightenment ary violence,on the self-alterationof foundation.The essaytakes this vi-

in ofalmostnaturalized violence thecuriousomnipresence olence—and theentrypointto societies—as thedailyconductofpost-Enlightenment imagibetweentheEnlightenment oftherelation a widerinterrogation signification. nationand lawasitscentralsocial-imaginary MalcolmX,withhis In his famous“Messageto the Grassroots,” 49

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ofrevdefinition humor,givesa bare-bones in-house caustic inimitable, heargues,istraceable ofrevolution, action.Theauthenticity olutionary youdon’tdo “inarevolution inviolence: investment toanunrestricted Whatever shocksuchstateyou'retoobusyswinging.”’ anysinging; racialpoliticsat mentsmayhaveproducedinthecontextofAmerican acceptednotion.Revobya traditionally thetime,theywerepropelled of atleastsincethefoundations withviolence, lutionis consubstantial riverofblood.Theso-called republic werelaidona veritable theFrench and established, amongotherthings,thenecessity AgeofRevolution modeofradicalsocialaction.This sanctityofviolenceastheinevitable coarticulation wasnotputintoquestionuntilthelastthreedecadesof discredited afterthedemiseofthespirit thetwentieth century. Already of the 1960s,the Marxistmodelof revolutionaryviolencewas disman-

tledbeforetheBerlinWallviaabarrageofsocialskepticism aboutthe legitimacy ofanysortoftransformative actionthatbypassessociety's legal boundaries. What remainscurious, however,is that, while violenceas means of socialchangeis now widely disavowed,socialvio-

lenceasamodeofdailycontention (whichistosay,asameansofdaily life)isenjoying uncontested prominence. Thisparticularcontradiction—a disavowalof transformative violenceinthemidstofa widespread institution ofviolence—is atthecore ofmyargument. Thiscontradiction sumsupthefundamental andduly occludedduplicitythat drivesthehistoryof “modernWesternsocieties”:thefactthata regimeoflegallyconstituted rightsoflibertyand equalitywasinstitutedonthebasisofunrestricted, illegitimate, andessentially indiscriminate socialviolence. Thepresentconditions ofmost modernsocieties bearwitnesstoanintricateweavingofviolence atthe coreofsocietalinstitution. Thisis whytheAmerican massmediacan launchanapparentinvestigation ofa phenomenon withthedisarminglyblunttitle“Violence, a NationalPastime,” asIremember a major television programhavingdonea fewyearsago.Evenwhentheyvoice concern, thegeneralnonchalance ofboththeAmerican rulingeliteand thepublicatlargeisstriking.Nodoubt,violence in theUnitedStatesis perfectlyself-evident,but what does this mean, exactly?Where does this evidence reside? Where is it directed—meaning,how does it be-

comeperceptible, andforwhom?Isthematterdomestic orgeopolitical,

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andwhatisthedifference, ifany,whereAmerican society isconcerned? Andwhatmightliebehindthisself-evidence? a permanence? an immanence? a history? Simplysaid,thereisa general historical marking tothiscondition. It marksour cultureas modern,whichisn’ta matterof pinpointingits preciseorigininhistoryandingeography butofdistinguishing themomentwhenhistorical praxislendsitselftothedemandsofa different processofsocialsymbolization. Tracing thegenealogy of violence in modernsociety isinsufficient; whatmatters mostistointerrogate what lendstherelationbetweenviolence andourcontemporary worldanalmost naturalquality.To examinea socialphenomenon that has achievedthestatusofnaturemeanstofacetheworkofsociety’s imaginary.Whichistosay,wemustbepreparedtoaddresssociety's mythic domain,theinterminable fluxofself-representations outofwhichand isdibywhichsocietyaltersitself.Forthisreason,myinterrogation rectedtowardthesignificance andfunction oftheinstitution oflawas the organizingmatrixof modernsociety’sproductionof meaning, which is, in another sense,the performanceof its foundationalfantasy.

to say“our”cultureis to riskattributinga restrictive Incidentally, whosehistorical“substance” cannotbe pronounto a substantive clearly determined, a risk that becomesnecessaryif one is not to es-

asa historical beinginthemakingofculture,inchewone’scomplicity deed, in the making of historicaltime itself.Assumingthis risk, I shall focuson what is oftencalled“Westernculture”(withallthecatachrestic

instanceinthecourseofthis aspectsoftheterm)andthecontemporary nogeisthatit recognizes condition culturaltradition,whoseidiomatic This geographical mutation. core,thatitenjoysa continuous ographical itself thatbelieves ofa tradition mutability, characteristic geographical islinkedtotheshift senseofmodernity, tobefoundedonanexclusive of above,a shiftintheparameters I mentioned insocialsymbolization Iwouldplacethisshiftat thepoint praxis.Broadly speaking, historical as whenlawwasinstitutedastheprimaryagentofsocialorganization, ofarcheitperhapstherepresentation agency, analmost“autonomous” andaspointofgovself(intheGreeksense:bothaspointofdeparture theadventofEnlightenment terms,thisconcerns Inhistorical ernance). ofsociety inwhichthequestion framework thoughtasanewsignifying

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ispositedasa worldlyaffair,asa secularspherethatcastsdoubtonthe ofthedivine. boundaries impermeable couldberaisedtothisclaim.First,ifwetake Twosortsofobjections workLawandRevomonumental pointHaroldBerman’s asa reference lution,the splitwithinthe Westernlegaltraditionthatgaveriseto a bodyof lawoutsidetheChurchwasdueneitherto thegreatrevolubefore norto theEnglishRevolution century, tionsof theeighteenth humanismthatpreor Renaissance them,noreventotheReformation ceded it all; it was due, rather, to what Bermancallsthe Papal Revolu-

of bytheleadership tionof1075to 1122.Inaseries ofradicaldecisions oflegalpluralism, Berman seesthefirstinstitution theCatholic Church, For polityfromsecularpolitics.” oftheecclesiastical “thedifferentiation of Westernlegalhistory Berman, thismomentsignifiestheUrsprung andtheRomans): (despitethelongtraditionthatgoesbacktoJustinian a revolutionary eventthatinstitutesWesternhistoryasa characteristic trajectory ofrevolutionary practiceswithinthedomainofthelaw.The American andFrenchrevolutions, inthisrespect,arepredicated onan alreadyrevolutionary legalimagination thatsubscribes toa notionof law which “containswithin itselfa legalscience,a meta-law,by which

itcanbebothanalyzedandevaluated.”

Though I donotdoubtthebasicframework ofBerman’s argument (whoseeccentricity anderuditionI particularlyvalue),somethingin theerawecalltheAgeofEnlightenment ortheAgeofRevolution sets it apartfrompreviousincarnations ofthe revolutionary imaginaryin thehistoryoftheWesternlegaltradition.Simplyput, thisistheconceptualization ofautonomyasasocial andpoliticalproject:thenotion thatlegislation is potentially withinthecapacityofeveryrationalindividual.Thearticulation ofthisproject—from theepistemological tenets of Lockeand the ScottishEnlightenment (and their influenceon Thomas Jefferson) to themoralmetaphysics ofKant—hinges onanaltogetherdifferentconceptualization ofsubjective agency. In fact,anticipatingtheargumentbelow,I wouldsaythattheprojectof autonomy inaugurates the modern subject as we now understand it, that is, as a

primarilylegalentitywhoseexternal(social) boundaries aresanctioned byasetof“inalienable” rightsandwhoseinternalimagination adheres tothebeliefthattheserightsareindeedinalienable (thattheyrepresent

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one’sirrevocable independence beforethelaw,thesafeguard ofself-determination). Evenif wegrantthe historical originsof secularlawto the High MiddleAges,wecannotspeakofa secularization ofone’srelationto thelawuntiltheeighteenth century, inotherwords,untilsocietyinstitutesan internalized conviction ofone’srightto determine whatis right.Thisconviction isinternalized attheleveloftheindividual imaginary—indeed,seen from the reverse angle, it is tantamount to the

imaginary institution oftheindividual.* Butthisisnottosay—and here wecometo thesecondpossibleobjectionto my genealogy—that the adventof Enlightenment lawmanagedtocleartheboardofreligious conceptions, notevenat thelevelofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions. Quitethe contrary, in fact—which is wherethe problembeginsand whytheproblem Still,theEnlightenment beginsthere.* didreconfigure themeaningoflawona radicallydifferentfoundation(byalteringthe termsof one’srelationto the law),despitethe persistence of the imaginarythatpermeatesthehistoryoftheWesternlegal monotheistic and FrenchConstitutions tradition.Toput it bluntly,the American the social-imaginary even overwrote networkoftheHolyScriptures, in credibility thedollarbillstillbanksitssymbolic though,forexample, themotto“InGodwetrust.”Thefactofthisoverwriting cannotbedisputed, though it must be encounteredas a foundationalcontradiction.

ofcourse,is alwaystospeaktentaTospeakof the Enlightenment, a fundamental duplicinvolves tively,bothbecausetheEnlightenment a mythological anethnocentric universality, ity(asecularmetaphysics, is proetc.)andbecausetheidiomof theEnlightenment rationality, ishardlyaninaccurate designafoundlyplural(theFrenchlesLumieres and on thismatter,startingwithHorkheimer tion).Thescholarship attemptto delineateits dialectic,is enorAdorno’sgroundbreaking mousandcannotoccupyus here.Thefocusofthisargumentis thegein withinthedomainofthelawinmodernsocieties ofviolence nealogy order to elucidatethe foundationalantinomiesof its socialimagination,

ifnothing ofthe Enlightenment, a matterthatinvolvesa discussion of lawas understanding else,on thegroundthatthe Enlightenment’s social wasinstitutedthroughactsofinordinate theprojectofautonomy violence.

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a journeythat circuitous, is somewhat progression Theargument’s boththe asrule(meaning ofEnlightenment startswiththeexamination of ofa setofrulesofsocialbehavioraswellastheinvention institution rule—ofpower—asan exclusivedomainof the law),extendsto a dis-

/ forceandlaw’sintrinsicoutofviolence cussionoflaw’smonopoly and concludeswitha discussionof the imaglawnature,its paranomia,

of in relationtotheperformance inaryco-incidence oflawandliterature figuresserveasthejourney’s guides,alEnlightenment myth.Several beTheyremainintertwined wayspartialand mutuallycontentious. becausetogethertheypointtothe causetheymakeeachotherpossible, that between lawandviolence andtothemythicparameters complicity perception of preservesuchcomplicity tothisday.If the traditional whathasalreadybeenaccomplished historically beforethisjourneybeginscanbesummedupinthenotionof“progress frommythos tologos,” thenmyimpetus hereistounravelinsteadthetransition fromnomos to mythos, thetransitionfromlawtomyth.°Wecanconsiderthispassage fromlawtomythtobeaparticulartrajectory ofthinkingaboutform,in whichlawismodernity’s formandmythisthespecific modeofperformativethinkingaboutformthatdisruptsanynotionofformasa transcendental principle. Thepassagefromlawtomythisnotretrospective, acaseofhistorylookingoveritsshoulder—unless itisthehistorypersonifiedbyWalterBenjamin’s angelwho,werehetodarelookoverhis shoulder as he is being blown backward into the future, would face

mythinitsmoment ofself-alteration outofthevoid.Mythisnottheexclusiveprivilegeofarchaicsocieties. Itisalwayscontemporary, foritis linkedtosociety’s imaginary, its capacitytomakeand to alterhistory. In thisrespect,mythis whatpresidesoverthe Enlightenment’s socalleddisenchantment oftheworld.° Enlightenment asRule InresponsetothequestionWasistAufkldrung?, KantproposesthatEnlightenment hingeson theunfetteredexerciseofthoughtinthepublic sphere.Althoughheisquickto paydeference totheState’sinstrumentalauthoritythatsanctionsthispublicsphere,theproposition inauguratesa ruptureinthewaythatboththoughtandruleshallbeexercised

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henceforth: “Enlightenment isman’sreleasefromhisself-incurred tutelage[selbstverschuldeten Unmiindigkeit]. Tutelage isman’sinability touse hisunderstanding withoutdirectionfromanother.”” ThegistofKant’s argument pointsto Enlightenment astheexercise offreethoughtconductedagainsta self-incurred unfreedom, a self-limitation intheprivatespherethatIwouldtranslateas self-generated heteronomy.® The significance of thisheteronomy, this“enchanting” paradox,is often blurredbecause whatisaccentuated istherecognition thatitis “self-incurred.”Thus,evenwhenKantproposesEnlightenment as a sortof ethicalself-interdiction (presumed tobetheprimarygestureofself-determination), heistakentoaffirmtheEnlightenment astherealization of thehumanwill,as society’sawakeningto the capacityof human will.Informaltermsatleast,Enlightenment thoughtisfiguredliterally asa projectof autonomy. Humanfreedombecomespossiblebecause thefettersofhumanity areself-made andthuscanbeunmade. inKant’s Puttingasidefora momentthisdebilitating contradiction horizon,wemightfinditdifficulttodisputetheunravEnlightenment elingin thedomainof self-conception andconstitutionofEuropean bythismodeofthought.IftheEnlightenment prosocieties generated jectisat allusefulasa social/ culturalentity,itisusefulinsofarasit claimstheattributesof—anewsetofrulesor,even establishes—or more,a newmodeofruling.Whatliesat thefoundationofEnlightenmentthoughtas socialruleis thetacitinstitutionoflawasthecaulthe argument Henceforth, dronofsociety’simaginarysignifications. goes,societywillnolongerbe linkedbyallegoryto a divineuniverse byaseries of a worldlyaffair,guaranteed butwillbecomeexclusively sentencesthat handsocietythe giftofactingasa subject.Thisis the ofIndepenas theDeclaration sourceandpurposeofsuchdocuments oftheRightsofManandthe dence,theBillofRights,theDeclaration andsoon. Citizen, thisruptureasthetransitionfromsubjecEtienneBalibaridentifies tus—themedievalsenseofbeinga subject,beingsubjected(toa lord,a agentandpoliticalsubject,the theindividual subjectum: king,etc.)—to

anextraordinary in“thecitizen” Inotherwords,herecognizes citizen.’ a institution, ofself-altering Ina radicalprocess doublesubjectification. ofthelaw:thelimitoflaw’s itselfthearché considers givencommunity

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aswellaslaw’s (whatlendslawitsclaimsto governance) justification becauseeachmemberofthis possible Thisbecomes limitless beginning. his/ thiscommunity andeveryonewhoimagines community—each himselforherselfasanentityofthiscommunity— hers,whoimagines simulassumestheburdenof thelaw.Whatenablesthisparadoxical taneity,wherethe singularandpluralare retaineduntainted,is the projects,as theyareputforthin the oftwoincompatible coarticulation Declaration oftheRightsofManandtheCitizen:equalityandliberty. of Balibaremploysan avowedlybaroquephrase(“theproposition ofthefundamentally conequaliberty”) toopenupthecontemplation revolutionary idiom.’Ashe tradictory termsof theEnlightenment’s withinwhichlimitsequality goesontoargue,the taskofdetermining taskof this idiom, andlibertybecomeidenticalis the paradoxical whosemodality constitutes a rupturebecauseitisdetermined tounify opposites andwhoseresistance toresolution testifiestoitsintrinsically differential andcontested character. Balibararguesconvincingly thatrevolutionary lawbreakswiththe longhistoryofnaturallaw,includingthoseproponentsofnaturallaw (Locke,Rousseau)who facilitatedthe emergenceof revolution.He is

particularly successful indispelling traditional hangupsconcerning the exclusivity ofclassrule(orclassideology) thatallegedly permeated the newconstitutional statutes.Hiswholeargumentservesto unveilthis document asideologically heterogeneous andantagonistic—indeed, as a siteofclassstruggle.He underplays, however,the extentto which hauntingshadowsofthepastareanimatedprecisely bythefundamentalcontradictions thatdrivethisnewrelationtolaw(implementation of equalrecognition or equaldistribution ofwealthversusindiscriminate freedom ofassertion; universal aspiration versusdiversityofsocialrelations;permanent revolution versuspermanent institution ofpower). Because theDeclaration oftheRightsofManandtheCitizenisde facto aninstitutionofthenationalimaginary, thetaskofassumingtheburdenof thelawbecomesabstracted intoaninvocation ofthe“national will”(“thewillofthepeople”), whichassumes inturnatranscendental authorityofenormous, enchanting powers." ThereisnoreasontobelievethattheAmerican caseisanydifferent. ThefamousopeningoftheAmerican Constitution establishes thepeo-

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pleastheundisputed subjectofthelawoftheland:theutterance “We, thepeople”enactsa supremesubjectification ofpowerbehindwhich thereis no backdrop, no justification. Thelawentailsan irreducible subject whoseplurality is deceiving. Theheterogeneity andevenrelativeautonomyofthethirteenstates,gainedandaffirmed bytherevolutionary schismfromroyalsingularity, issubsumed inthenewimaginarysingularity createdandlegallyboundbytheConstitutional utterance.Constitutional lawis alwaysanactofnationalization, nomatter whatmightbeitsclaimtotheuniversality ofrights. ButtheAmerican caseisparticularly intriguing becausethisnationalizingutterancewasperformedtwice.TheDeclaration of Independenceshouldnotbeseenasthehistorical andphilosophical precedent oftheConstitution, butpartofthesamemultifocal flashattheoriginof thenationalimaginary whosetimeframeisasortofsimulinstitution, taneityin suspension. (Thisis whyit isirrelevant,forourpurposes, thattheDeclaration of Independence isnot,strictlyspeaking, a legal GarryWillshasgivenusa persuasive ofthemuldocument.) narration ofAmerican tiple(re)generative moments national foundation between to unionby 1776and 1789,despitehis insistentfocusonthe resistance Themostelementary claimoftheDeclaration of thesignateur states.'’* is thedemandforself-rule posedagainstthesingularity Independence elsewhere: of a rulerwhois therebydisplacedto an unbridgeable necessary forone “Whenin thecourseofhumanevents,it becomes themwith peopletodissolvethepoliticalbandswhichhaveconnected another,and to assume,amongthe powersoftheearth,theseparate Godentiandequalstationtowhichthelawsofnatureandofnature’s tlethem,a decentrespecttotheopinionsofmankindrequiresthatthey Inother shoulddeclarethecauseswhichimpelthemtotheseparation.” words,despitethestrongsocialandculturalaffinityofthestateswith beofIndependence ofBritishsociety,theDeclaration thecommunity ofthenecessityofa newimaginedcomginswithan announcement munity.Onlyif Britishsocietywaspreparedto adopttheframework couldweconsiderthis andprinciplesofthisnewimaginedcommunity thatroseagainstit. culturalaffinitystrongerthantheimagination in theboundaries enclosed Whatwehaveinthisopeningparagraph, is anepiprecisesinglesentence, ofahighlyrefinedandgrammatically

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universethatenablesandjustitotalityoftheconceptual grammatic actofwriting.It ishere,in thisintroductory fiesthisrevolutionary partthatfollows(orthedeclaraphrase,morethaninthedeclarative textsthat mustspellout thenatureof tivepartsof Constitutional as ruleregistersunrights),thatthedecisivepowerofEnlightenment Whatcomesacrossis thecalmcertaintyof a scientific challenged. form,recognizesthe forceof treatisewhich,in pure Enlightenment causality, andtheimperathedutyofdemonstrable naturalnecessity, tiveofjustifyinghistoricalactionbeforethecourtof worldlylaw.In other words, we are dealing with an act of political dissolution, an

whichis simultaneously an actof erasureof historical boundaries, radicalinstitution, anassumption ofnewepistemological boundaries. Howelsearewetoaccountfortheextraordinary statementthatfollows:“Weholdthesetruthstobeself-evident”? Willsarguesthatthetraditional interpretation thatwantsJefferson to have copied Locke’smaximson self-evidenceis misguided.Rather,the

influence atworkhereisThomasReid,oneofthemajorfiguresofthe Scottish Enlightenment, whosenotionofself-evidence ismuchcloserto thecognitive qualities ofso-called common sense.WhileforLocke, selfevidenttruthisamatterofuncontestable andirreducible identity(“the sameisthesame”),fromwhichitisimpossible todeduceanything,for Reid(and, accordingto Wills,forJefferson),self-evidenttruth is a kind

ofdirectapprehension ofreality, a proto-cognitive leveluponwhicha complexity ofideascanbebuilt.Reid’shumbleempiricism suitsJefferson’sphilosophical designsbehindtheformulation of the Declaration ofIndependence. ButWillsunderestimates thefactthatthisallegedly empiricistgroundingdoesnothingtodispelthetranscendental overtonesofthisphrase,whichinthecontextofarevolutionary actassumes almostmagicalqualities. “Weholdthesetruthstobeself-evident” initselfcastsa spell.Itisa doublegesture.Ontheonehand,itcementsthesupremeauthorityof thesubjectwe:we,theundersigned, theoneswhoexercise our“understandingwithoutdirectionfromanother”(torememberKant),theones

whocometogether because werecognize andshare(orhavea sharein) the powerof self-evident truth.On the otherhand,“we”are also “all”—insofar asthereiteration ofthisphraseis“We,thepeople’”—all

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who declareour independence,which is all those whom the Declara-

tionfindsasaddressees, allwhowillbehenceforth, byvirtueofouract, thesubjectofthelaw(butalsosubject tothelaw).Theself-evidence of truthallowsus to subjectify thegeneralwill,whichisto unifythepluralityofparticular desirestowarda sharedobject.Thisobject isthelaw, " literallytheconstitutional element, theutterance thatinstantly appears asthefocalpointfromwhichemanates allmeaning, thesourcefrom whichcollectiveidentityis conferred(andin whichit is alsoconfirmed).Thelaw,therefore, comestonameits subject(s) by anactof writingin whichthesubjectthatmakesthelaw(“We,thepeople”)occludesitself.Itisa disappearing act,anactofmagic,inwhichthelegislativewillof a community(indeed,the nation)simulatesthe divine authoritytoname,tofoundthelaw,andthenlaysitselfastherecipient, beforethelaw."Butinthelastintheaddressee beforethisauthority, stancethisisa substantive act:a subjectactsbywritingitselfintothe Morethana simulation, thisisa replacement of positionoftheSubject. thedivinedecree;it isessentially a matteroftakingtheplaceofdivine of its power.Bythetimeof the namingand thereforea reiteration oftheRightsofMan FrenchNationalAssembly’s official Declaration and the Citizen,this reiterationis explicit(“inthe presenceof the SupremeBeingand withthehopeofhisblessingand favor”)andthe lawisliterallypronounced“sacred.” divine Thepeoplethus institutesitselfas a sortof ventriloquist power,certainaboutitsworldlydomainbutalsodesiringtranscenden“weholdthesetruthstobe assertion Theunfathomable talauthority.° anda callto a confession is thereforesimultaneously self-evident” of Reasonthat makesall myth,as social faith—inthe transparency by is in practiceconcealed force,obsolete.Thisfaileddemystification (hencethedisastrous beingpresentedas a theoryof demythification today).Butsincethisimofthe twonotionsstillprevalent conflation (to a “conscious” imposture isinevitably postureofdivineknowledge desireistosupplantdivineauthority), thedegreethatthistext’sexplicit thenit isa sociallypsychoticposture,a socialcontractwiththe void. rule:itsfasciofEnlightenment andviolence Hereinliestheseduction selftropeanditsuncompromising nationwiththeabyssasgenerative rationality.'° ofthisabyssintheguiseofatextualized occultation

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ofrealviolencethat Tryingto cometo termswiththeconditions toinstiofthelawsoughttherefore thenewscripture madeit possible, vitorationalize ofviolence—literally, a rationality tuteandsafeguard by rationality, thetermsof society’s olence.Itdidsoby representing (ofwhatis rational overthemeansofdefinition holdinga monopoly ofthelaw thisiswhytheinterpretation andwhatisnot).Incidentally, (andthevastarmiesit commandsatitsservice)is so crucialto itsfoun-

of itisnotodd tosaythattheDeclaration dation.Fromthisstandpoint, inthe expression theRightsofManandtheCitizenfounditslegendary of Independence Reignof Terror,whilethe AmericanDeclaration ofthePlainsIndians. servedasthetotemicalibifortheextermination mytholButweneednotgosofarback.Asweshallsee,thisparticular actionofthelaw,a ogyofrationalviolence definesthecontemporary contradictory conditionthatfinallyorchestrates theEnlightenment’s ownremythification ofsociety. Whatneedstobe explored, then,isin whatsensethecontradictory termsofthisremythification bothmake possibleaninsightintothefoundational co-incidence oflawandviolenceandperhapsaffordusthecapacitytoenvisionitsundoing.

LawandtheMonopoly ofViolence In makinglaw the primarysocialinstitution,the Enlightenment broughtforthafundamental contradiction. Itexposedwhathadalways beenimplicitin theverymakeupof lawbut had neverbeenacted upon,sincetheultimatereferentof medievallawlay in the distant realmof“divinejustice.”TheEnlightenment madeit possibleto see that lawis alwaysauthorizedforce,that lawcannotbe dissociatedfrom

thematterofitsapplicability (andthusenforcement).'” Thismeanstwo things:first,thatforceisimmanentto law,sincethenotionoflawwithoutitsapplication andenforcement becomes nonsensical; second,that thequestion ofjustice inrelationtothelawcannolongerbeavoided.It mustbeposed,andwhatallowsittobeposedistheinevitability oflaw enforcement. Ifthelawcouldexistasaninstitutionwithouteverhavingtofacethepossibility ofitsenforcement, thenthequestionofitsbeingjustor unjustwouldbeirrelevant. Forcethusbecomesprimaryto the wholediscussion;it is what accountsforthe law’sauthority,what

grantsitauthorization.

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Thisnewco-incidence betweenforceandjusticeina contextthatallegedlygroundssocialautonomy alsoaccountsforthecharacteristic complicitybetweenlaw and violencein modern societies.Here, Ben-

jamin’s insightintotheintertwined natureofa “law-making force”(die rechtsetzende Gewalt) anda “law-preserving force”(dierechtserhaltende Gewalt)—a naturesupposedto ensurethatthe twomomentsofthe samedo notcollapse intoeachother—is paramount.'® Notethatthe wordGewalt carriesnotonlytheco-incident meanings offorceandviolence,butalsothenotionofsovereign rule,legitimate power(whichis precisely whatDerridaseizesuponto underline thatlawisauthorized force).In thisrespect,Benjamin’s textisjustasmuchan attempttoestablishthecriteriaforapproaching thenatureofpower,formovingtowardacritiqueofwhatlendslegitimacy / sovereignty to power.The evidentanswerisviolence, buttherealquestion iswhatsortofviolence (whoseimplicit extension wouldbewhatsortoflegitimacy). Therefore, the issue posited is what constitutesthe rule of law “behind”power,

whichisalsotosay,whatisthepositionoflawintheveryconstitution ofrule,particularly rule. Enlightenment Inpost-Enlightenment societies agents(theagentsof law-preserving lawenforcement, thepoliceforce)participate in thelegitimation of a law-making role.Ofcourse, powerbyactually assuming theconverse isalsotrue,andBenjamin knowsitwell,althoughhedoesnotaddress oftenintroduce or ithere:law-making bodies(parliaments, legislators) in summaryfashion—as “statesofexcepmodifylaws,andsometimes order.Theblurringof the singularpurposeof preserving tion”—for ina discourse Lawisbynecessity involved limitsishardlysurprising. Itsnominalpurpose,if nothingelse,is toset oflimits,of boundaries. societytorespectthoselimits.Butweknowthat limitsand discipline Whateverforce the discourseof limitsis by definitionambiguous. fromwhatisbeing drawsthelimitalsoopensitselfto contamination (de)limited.Thus,the meansoflaw’ssocialdisciplinecanbe saidtoexistin a constantsee-sawstrugglewiththepowerexertedbythenotion

of maybe perhapsthe mostdramaticexpression of limits.Violence iswhatmakestheperformance law’sencounterwithitslimit.Violence of this encountervisible,what makes the blurringof the limit visible

ofthelimit). inmindthatthebluristhepropercondition (keeping Consider,for a moment,a muchdiscussedexamplefromrecent

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of thesocialfabric,evenif memorythatbroughtabouta dissolution pojustfora fewdays:thebeatingofRodneyKingbytheLosAngeles but Thisbeatingwasnotanisolatedincident, liceanditsramifications. theLosAngeles between relationship ofthehabitual infactanexample is Mycontention policedepartmentandthe city’sblackpopulation. policeactionishardlyengagedinsimplelaw thatinthisrelationship thepoliceismeanttolaydownthelaw Onthecontrary, enforcement. ofproperbehaviorforboth in thestreets,to imposethe parameters subjects,forbothitself(subjectof and“law-abiding” “law-enforcing” thelaw)and thoseirrevocablyotherto it (subjecttothelaw).Whatbe-

visiblehereisthatthedidacticmethodofthelaw,the comespainfully violence. isunabashed meansofenlightenment, Yetwhentheviolence oflawbecomes visibleisprecisely whendifferences areregistered: thedifference betweenthelaw’sinstitutionand preservation,but alsothe differencebetweenthosewho speak the law

andthoseaddressed bythelaw.Curiously, whenthepoliceexpressthe violenceof the law (whichis,at the limit,the foundationof theirlegiti-

macy/ sovereignty) theirstatusasthelaw’saddressees(since,ascitizens,inprincipletheycanneverevadethelaw)seemstodropoutof sight.Thatthepoliceareabovethelaw—or,moreprecisely, thatthey arewiththelawandnotnecessarily withinthelaw—was aptlydemonstratedinthiscasebytheelaborate orchestration oftheaccusedpolicemen’strialandthetriumphant(iffrantic)stylewithwhichthelegalapparatus(whichincludedthecity’sentiregoverningmechanism) arrivedat theirinitialacquittal. Theway thatthepolicemen’s firsttrial wasconducted revealed, withnoambiguity whatsoever, thatsuchhard evidence of “law-making violence” issomething thattheliberalsocial institution mustrepressat allcost(considering thata possibleoutbreak ofviolence bytheenragedblackcommunity wasamatterthatthecity’s officials haddiscussed openlyandhadevenweighedinasa cost). Iftheexperience ofsocialupheavalinthe1960staughtus anything aboutthe limitsofliberalism’s allegedcapacityforself-regulation, it wouldbe thatwhenpoliceviolencereachesuncontrolled heightsin “democratic” societies,the institution is undergoing a crisis.What causesthe crisisis not merelythat society’slaw-makinghas been turned over to the police, but that it registers as an event on a mass

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scale.Thisdoesnotmeanmereextension ofwitnesstestimony beyond theparticularity ofan event'scircumstances, beyondthepresenttense ofallthoseimplicated inthesceneofviolence. Inamediaage,thescene ofviolence alreadyincludes notmerely thoseindividuals wholiterally giveandtakethebeating,but theentiremechanism ofspectatorship thatsurrounds them.Official mediacoverage succeeds ingeneralizing the event'ssingularity by virtueof suspending its actualtimeframe andreconstructing it on thebasisofmassdissemination oftheimage. Thissortofmassvisibility leadstoa certainstreamlining ofthefieldof vision,a conditionwherehistorybecomes a blur.Althoughwemust not underestimate the historical importance of socialviolence being broughtintoeveryone's livingroominthe1960s(theeffectswerequite real and verifiable),we also cannotdiscountthe factthat this orches-

tratedvisibility ofviolence didmuchmoreforthelaunching oftelevisualculturethanfortheactualproblems inthesocialarena.IntheRodneyKingcase,however,themassdissemination ofwitnesstestimony hada stunning Theanswerastowhyshouldberatherobvious: impact. it was random video taping, a chancewitness, an amateur,unsched-

uledact.Thefactthatitwasimmediately absorbedintothemassmedia itsimpactbecausetheeventofitsranapparatusdidnotcompromise domwitnessing couldnotbeeffaced. Itwasstructurally to guaranteed beunerasablepreciselybecauseit wasnot orchestrated, preciselybeatitscore,a locusoutsidethescene,therebymaking causeit registered, thefactthatpoSuddenly, anindelibleprintofitshistorical singularity. liceviolenceagainstblackmen washabitualpractice(and rather urbanpopulawidelyknownintheheartsandmindsoftheAmerican camethroughinitstotality,inthe repressed) tion,evenif extensively likesomuchgravitational condensed brutaltotalityofitsrandomness, matteron thesurfaceofa single,random,blackbody.Thefullforceof thelawmakingits markonthebody,blowbyblow,wasvisuallydeinthe oftheApparatus descriptions scribedinawaythatrivalsKafka’s of thelawwassudis to say,thatthe violence PenalColony—which state. denlyseenin itsbaremythical is emaninsuchmoments thatpoliceviolence recognizes Benjamin promisethatlinksthelegaldecreetoits cipatedfromtheinstrumental bethedistance proposedresults.Itbreaksthepromisebyeliminating

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andpurpose,meansandends:“the‘law’ofthepotweeninstrument licereallymarksthepointatwhichthestate,whetherfromimpotence withinanylegalorder[Rechtconnection orbecauseoftheimmanent throughthelegalordertheempirisordnung], cannolongerguarantee calendsthatitdesiresat anypriceto attain”(CV,287/ 189).In other oflawandorderasan isliterallytheconjunction words,policeviolence of betweenlaw’scontemplation endin itself.Itisalsotheconjunction violenceand the violentdeed, to use RobertCover’sterms, and there-

ofthechasmthatkeepsthetwophasesdistinct. foretheelimination ismadebetweenthepsycircumstances distinction Under“ordinary” tothelawandtheexperichological violence thatensuresobedience This thatmakesphysicalviolenceunnecessary. enceof socialization distinction issubjected toa ceaseless negotiation thattendstowardits abolition,which is whatcharacterizesthe limit-spaceof law’sexistence:

“Weretheinhibition perfect,lawwouldbeunnecessary; wereitnotcapableofbeingovercome throughsocialsignalslawwouldnotbepossible.”"° Wereturnthentotheoriginary co-incidence oflawandviolence, a co-incidence that is structurally essential and unavoidable.In fact,

Coverargueswithconsiderable authoritythatviolence,as a general principle inConstitutional law,isnotexplicitly statedbecauseitisunderstoodintheveryideaofgovernment. Violence existsatthecoreof Constitutional power,inthesensethattheConstitution grantspowerto theState(inthenameofthePeople)topracticeviolenceoverthepeople,whiletheofficeofthejudgeincludesa fullysanctionedandab-

solved“homicidal quality.””° Yetitseemsin thenatureoflawandordertooccludeitsoriginsinviolence, to occludethe fact that law and forceare intertwined, inplain

viewofthehistorical legacyofmodernConstitutional law,whichtestifiesto its violentgeneration. Thisconditionof self-concealment isso widely(thoughnotcategorically) practicedinthehistoryofhumansocietiesthatoneistemptedtoengageitinpsychological terms.Society’s self-occultation seemsparadigmatic ofits desireforheteronomy. Or rather,theheteronomy ofsocietyismerelytheeffectofself-occultation, aneffect,however, thathastakenon theattributes ofa cause.!Onerepressespreciselywhatisconstitutively traumatic:the originaryevent thatencumbers onewiththeburdenofself-determination. Thiseventis

Enlightenment andParanomia 65 constitutivebecause it continuouslyexercisesan enchantingallure, a

dominating desire,andsimultaneously (byvirtueofthisdomination) a catastrophic threat.Acondition ofunalloyed self-determination both servesasthefoundation ofsubjectivity andposesthethreatofannihilatingit underits unbearable weightof responsibility. Inthissense, everysystemoflawandorderisnotonlypredicated onbutalsomaintainedbya violence thatatanytimecoulddissolveit.Thisisprecisely whylawhasan “interestina monopolyofviolence”; itknows at some deepstructural levelthattheviolence it unleashes asitsfoundation will eventually leadtoitsdemise. This notion,whichBenjaminliberallyuses,is knownprimarily throughitsWeberian variant,“themonopoly oflegitimate violence”— itselfpossiblya legalistic of a notionchampioned modification by Friedrich Engels.Buttheinsertionoflegitimacy intothephrasemakes fora superfluous ofviolence condistinction becauselaw’smonopoly sistspreciselyinitsdelimiting/ dictatingwhatis legitimate. Thevery actofnamingandrepresenting thelegitimate isa monopoly act,a mo(andthusenforcing) theboundaries orlimitsof nopolyofauthorizing the law.Whateverexistsoutsidetheseboundariesis always,potentially,underelimination. Thisobjectoflaw’sannihilating violence issideclared,intheeyesofthelaw,tobethepersonification multaneously of daresexistoutsidetheeconomy ofviolence:theoutlaw—whatever bourTherefore, because thelaw,outsidethebordersofthelegitimate. it begeoislawand orderisalwayson thebrinkof (self)destruction, comesimperativetobuilda societythatremainsincontrolofitsselfandsoon a taskthatrequiresevergreaterviolence generatedviolence, restshiscritiqueof Benjamin Onthisuntenablecondition adabsurdum. whichisineffecta critiqueof order,hiscritiqueofviolence, bourgeois law. Enlightenment He also reads this paradox, however,as the source that makes violencein a revolutionarysituationcredible,for it providestheconditions

ofsomenewlawin someindetermiforthefoundation ofpossibility onlyoncetheprojectedimage— natefuture,whichcanbe envisioned islaunched:a kindofjusticethatoccurs its foundation the facade—of in a futureanterior.Thisabsurdandutopianmomentis theconstituinstituoflawingeneralasa social-imaginary condition tive,temporal

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“Lawistheprojection tion.ConsiderRobertCover’sexplicitstatement: by an Coverframeshisargument futureuponreality.” ofanimagined anextremecaseofresisof martyrdom, analysisof thephenomenon othersourceof lawin thenameofan envisioned tanceto established to law.Martyrsareliterally(in theGreeksenseof theterm)witnesses lawaskernelofthelaw.Foralthougheverysociety’s thisimaginary providesa ofsocialreality,it simultaneously pirestoan organization windowon its imaginaryreality:not whatsociety(orreality)isbut defipartakesofthesamerevolutionary whatitoughttobe.Martyrdom mentions,ascertainmembersofsocietywillingly ancethatBenjamin fora different(notyet instituted)ought,justas sacrificethemselves someothersmightbe willingtokillfora different(notyet instituted) ought.”

Transformative Violence before theLaw Cover’sunderstanding oftheexcessoflawshadesintoa certainpoli-

ticsofself-alteration thatlinksviolent actiontosociety’s transformative (creative / destructive) desire.Contrarytobourgeois liberalhistory,the historyofMarxismhadtakenthisassociation forgranteduntilit was “forced”intoa radicalreassessment in thefaceofitsfailure.Butwe mustreopenthequestionofthisfailurenotintactical/ strategicterms, butwithaneyetoitsproblematic relationtothedemocratic imaginary, whichcontinues togeneratea discourse onjusticewhilepreserving intact(and,ofcourse,hiddenbehindthenotionofjusticeitself)theprofoundviolenceof itsinstitution.Evenifoneisdrawnto a theoretical abolitionof violencefromone’srevolutionary horizon,the increasing violence ofdailyorder—the kindofviolence thatoverturnstheboundariesbetweenthelegaland the criminal,the boundariesbetweennomarchyandanarchy—does not allowtheprivilegeor,inanotherlanguage,doesnotpermitthe theoretical blissof nonviolenttransformativeaction. HannahArendthasarguablyprovidedthemostarticulate critiqueof revolutionary violence in heraccountof theturbulenteventsin1968-69 inbothEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Theargument’s impetusistheassessment oflate-sixties studentradicalism andcallforoutrightviolence

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ina worldlyarenawheretechnology hasreachedsuchdestructive potential—a worldwhere“peaceis the continuation of war by other means”—that violence hasbeenrendered a meaningless concept.Her glancerevealsa rathersanguine butmelancholy viewofa generation of youththatknowsexclusively an existence ofimminent andtotalcatastrophe—the generationof“thosewhoheartheticking”(V,18),those whoareso alerttothetangiblepotentialoftimeendingthattheyhave nosenseoftimepastor timefuture.Thosewhohearthetickinghave notimeleftto hearhistory.Thus,theyapproachthematterofsocial transformation entirelyunawareof (andindeeduninterested in) the legacyofsocialtransformation. Theyarerevolutionaries whodonot know revolution,and Arendt goes to extensive length to show how

such apologistsfor violence—who rangefromstudentleadersto exoticdeification Sartre’s ofFanon—have nosenseofMarx’s ownunof violencein revolutionary derstandingof the significance action. underwhichArendtwasthinkingseem Surely,theradicalconditions Irefernotmerelyto radicalconditions ofinsurrecdistanttoday—and tionthroughout theworldduringthe1950sand1960s but,justassignificantly, tothecurrentdownplaying ofnuclearannihilation bythose inpower(whospeakshamelessly of “tactical renuclearweapons”), witha placingthemainfeartheyhadoncefostered (“duckandcover”) illusionofcontrol.Thisnew and ultimately paralyzing thoughtless ashiftatthelevelofbothconception ofrealityconstitutes management todaythatwecannotaffordtoignore,shouldwe andaffectin society in presentopenseriouslythequestionofviolenceandtransformation dayterms. inandalwayspresent, critiqueisilluminating Allthesame,Arendt’s distinctionbesofaras it proposesand meditateson a fundamental par excelpredicament tweenviolenceand power,the revolutionary thenecestoviolence shefollowsEngelsinattributing lence.Basically, ofpowerasa whilesheconceives of instruments, sityofimplements, action. it is to be foundin numbers,in collective socialcondition; are but words to in“Power,strength, force,authority,violence—these

they areheldtobesyndicatethemeansbywhichmanrulesoverman; (V,43).Arendtwrites becausetheyhavethesamefunction” onymous inthemultiple herthinking suggests here,butthestatement inEnglish

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hernotionofpowerwithinthismulTounderstand registers ofGewalt. weneedtokeepinmindthatshedoesnotsubscribe tiplesignification, anequation equation, basedona command-obedience toa definition traditionofan“imperato theJudeo-Christian thatsheseesaccording absentfromEnlightenoflaw”andasbeingessentially tiveconception use“obenotionsofgovernment mentlaw.ForArendt,Enlightenment to dience”in regardtothelaw(andnotanothermanorGod,according theidiomofruleror master)in termsofconsentto supportthe laws a different Thisisostensibly createdby themajorityofthe citizenry. whichmay thelegacyofcivildisobedience, kindofobedience—hence elicit violence (the State’s)or be deemed criminal, but is conducted

withrespecttowardtheinstitution oflawinwhosename paradoxically lawiscalledintoquestion.Civildisobedience, a particular undesirable ideally,decriesthelawascriminal—the lawasperpetratorofa crime againstthecitizen—and demandsthata particular lawbeabolished in orderfortheinstitution oflawtobesaved.Itisnonsensical toconsider civildisobedience ina contextwherelawispersonalized in thefigure ofa singularruler. InArendt’swords,then:“Poweris theessenceofallgovernment, but violenceis not. Violenceis by nature instrumental;likeall means,it

alwaysstandsinneedofguidanceandjustification throughtheendit pursues.Andwhatneedsjustification bysomething elsecannotbethe essenceofanything. . . [powerisanend-in-itself], theverycondition enablinga groupofpeopletothinkandactintermsofthemeans-end category. . .. Powerneedsnojustification, beinginherentintheveryexistenceofpoliticalcommunities;what it doesneed is legitimacy.. . . Le-

gitimacy, whenchallenged, basesitselfonanappealto the past,while justification relatestoanendthatliesinthefuture.Violence canbejustifiablebut it will neverbe legitimate”(V,51-52).In this schema,vio-

lenceneednotanddoesnotpayregardsto history;ifnotquiteahistorical,itisa counter-historical entity,whichispreciselywhytheaggravationof an experienceof time’sending(of an imminentend to history)

manifestsitselfwithsuchindiscriminate violence.(Sheisspeakingin termsof‘68radicalism, butthepointcouldbemadejustaswellforthe FrenchNationalAssembly’s dismantling ofChristiancalendartime,as muchas it couldbe madeofChristianmillenarians,etc.).In termsofthe

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argumentthatengagesus here,thiscontra-historical condition extends totheproblematic actionofthelawitself:theviolence oflawmeansat onceboththe dehistorization and thedelegitimization of law.Like

Cover,Arendt understandslaw’s violenceas quintessentiallylawless,

butevenmore,shesuggeststhatthecondition oflaw’sviolence is tantamounttothedesignation ofitslossofpower. Thispathofthinking leadsherto disputetheextension ofanylegitimacywhatsoever toviolence, andtherefore to situateviolence in an antinomian relationto power:whereviolence canhavetheupperhand, itmaydestroypower—in thesensethat“outofabarrelofa gungrows the mosteffectivecommand”(V,53)—butit mustalwaysremainsub-

stantivelyhandicapped withregardto power,insofaras violence can nevergeneratepower.Inthisrespect,Arendtdoesrecognize a revolutionarysituationintheeventsofMay‘68,forexample, butsheexplains thefailureofrevolutionary realization asresidingintheabsence ofcollectivereadinesstoassumetheresponsibility ofpower.Shearguesthat mereviolenceagainstinjustice, proceeding outofrage,becomes“irrational”—henceimpotent—themomentit is “rationalized,”the moment

itbecomesstrategy(V,66).Atbest,violence againstinjustice is“morea weaponofreformthanof revolution” (V,79),meaningthatviolence maybe catalyticfora fundamental of society,but can reinstitution It is a formidable arguneveritselfbe creativeof suchreinstitution. ment,evenif,not unlikeAdornointhesameperiod,it isanargument desire, thedaringofagenthelegitimacy ofrevolutionary thatdisregards evenatthecostofdebiliboundaries, erationto alteritsownhistorical failurecanjustifyboth history’s tatingfailure.Thefactthatin retrospect insightof ArendtandAdornodetractsnothingfromeithertheultimate ofitsexecution.” theirargumentortheabusiveshortsightedness consistsin positingan antinocritiqueofviolence Inshort,Arendt’s mianrelationbetweenviolenceandpower:“Powerandviolenceare theotheris absent... .Thisimwhereonerulesabsolutely opposites; asnon-vipliesthatitis notcorrecttothinkoftheoppositeofviolence powerisactuallyredundant.Violence olence;tospeakof non-violent ofcreatingit” (V,56).Forall candestroypower;it is utterlyincapable itsinsight,however,thisargumentdoesnotresolvetheissueof transsake), forherargument’s force(soasnot tocallit“violence,” formative

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thedomainof forceencounters insofaras transformative particularly Itseemsthat,deindeed,thedomainoflaw’sviolence. thelaw—and, totheahistorical ofMarxascorrective invocation spiteherinsightful activismofstudentradicals,ArendtforgetsMarx’sprofoundunderofviolenceandlawthroughout condition standingoftheinterwoven thatshadowsinadvancethe thepolitical historyofcapital,a condition preciseand lumiitself.AsEtienneBalibar, revolutionary imaginary andlaw(in between violence us:thedialectic nousasalways,reminds thedialecticbetween a bourgeois orderwewouldsay,moreprecisely, betweenclass violence andrights)goeshandinhandwiththedialectic passagethrough andclassstruggle, inasortofrecurring exploitation (Balibar’s image).Whattakesplacein history’s ScyllaandCharybdis thetrenchesofclasswarfaretakesplaceintheimaginary ofthebourgeoisstate,thoughindifferent terms:“excess of‘physical’ violence over the law [droit],without whichthe law would not exist;but also,excess of the law over ‘bare’violence,which thus codifiesit and legitimizes

it.”*Balibar’s essaydemonstrates, contraArendt(thoughhedoesn’t addressher),thatviolence maybeinextricable fromthehistoryofsocial-historical transformation sincethebourgeois era,preciselybecause itisalreadyembedded inthesocial-imaginary ofbourgeois lawandorder.Thisisn’ttosayviolence isaninevitable path;Balibarsuggeststhat wepursuethepathofconceptualizing an “anti-violence” (whichhe distinguishes fromnonviolence, a courseofaction,in his argument, thatstillexistswithinthedialectical imagination oflaw/ violence). My interest here, however,is the conditionof law’sviolencespecifically,as

a wayofelucidating thetricksoftheEnlightenment imaginary, sowe shallproceedinthisdirection.

TheLawlessness ofLaw Thepolice,as thevanguardof theentirecourtapparatus,exemplifies thecontradictions oflawasa socialinstitution.Embodying bothlawenforcingand law-making capacities, thepolicebecomesthespiritof the law: in Benjamin’sterms, its Geist,which, of course, also means its

ghost.The policethus embodieslaw’sphantasm,what constantly hauntstheimaginary institution ofthelawbyanimating, byoffering a

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bodytolaw’sphantomcondition. Thepoliceforce,as theghostofthe law that must return to enforce(and, by dialecticalextension,under-

mine)thelaw,mustdo soexplicitly: itmustbemadevisibleinitsuniform(ity)—its formlessness, its blue/ blackgunslinging phantomnature—inordertoexistand,moreimportantly, inordertomakelawexist.Thisradicaluniformity, thecategorical natureoftheuniform,lends thepolicea singularity thateffaces therealityofeachindividual policeman,in thesamewaythatpoliceviolence temporarily exemptsthepoliceman fromhispositionofcitizenbeforethelaw.Theuniformishow thepoliceacquires a propername,a namethateffaces thepluralityof citizennamesandyet,paradoxically, assigns thepolicea ubiquitous nature.LikeBalzac’s imageofthepeasantry astheone-headed beastwith twentymillionarms(LesPaysans, 1844), thepoliceisbothradically singularandubiquitous, andformless, bodyandfulluniform full-fledged whichis alsofoundafledgedghost.Inthiscategorical formlessness, tion,thepoliceexemplifies law’spureaesthetics ofviolence.” apureaesthetics ofviolence in Notethegravityofthiscontradiction: asocialcondition ofanethicsoffreedom sancrestingontheinstitution tionedbylaw.Benjamin rightlypointsoutthatthepoliceisa radical thatina democracy thepolice disruption ofdemocratic logic—indeed, viforitmustexercise anorderofdespotic cannotbutactillegitimately, olencewhicha trulydemocratic polityoughttohavedissolved: “[Poghostly likeitsnowheretangible,all-pervasive, lice]powerisformless, states.Andthoughthe in the lifeof civilized apparition[Erscheinung] appearthesame,itcannotfinally policemay,inparticulars, everywhere wheretheyrepresent,in bedeniedthattheirspiritislessdevastating andexecuthepowerofa rulerinwhichlegislative monarchy, absolute than vereinigt], tivepowerareunitedina totality[Machtvollkommenheit [Bestehen], elevatedby nosuch wheretheirconstitution in democracies ofviodegeneration relation,bearswitnesstothegreatestconceivable In otherwords,policeviolencein a monarlence”(CV,287/ 189-90). of itsexregardless orderisperfectly“legitimate” chical(ortheocratic) sincethenondelegitimate), areperfectly cesses(orrather,itsexcesses on(divine) itspredication mocraticstatehasnoneedtorenderinvisible prinsociety’s foundational thepoliceviolates Ina democracy, violence. onlawand societyis predicated forademocratic ciplesbydefinition,

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domainaspartofhis/ herpoliticalprattem, orderbeingeverycitizen’s thisposiInoccupying specialist. notthetaskofanother,a designated thepolicealsobearsout theequally enforcer, tionof thedesignated oftheviolence at voluntaryoblivion factofdemocracy’s foundational oflawitself.” itsorigins,theviolence self-occultation bothexposesmodernsociety’s Thus,policeviolence mechanismand its it. It is bothsociety’srepressive and safeguards egoanditsbaddream.Allthis of memory, bothsociety’s mechanism oflawandorderthatwe obto thegeneralmystification contributes radRevolution’s inAmerican society:theAmerican serveparticularly formof ofthenationasthequintessential icalandviolentmystification law.This ofmonarchical legalityfoundedontheradicaldemystification foundational mystification oflawandorder—of lawasorder(andindeed,asrationalorder)—increasingly deepensasAmerican societybecomesincreasingly violent.Hence,thespecialization ofAmerican mass cultureintheproduction ofcopshows,a genrethathasrefinedandfinallybecomeindependent ofthecrimemysterythatprevailsinpopularnineteenth-century andearlytwentieth-century literature. Thisfascination withthebusinessoflawandorder,whichisalsoa celebration ofviolence,cannotbe disentangled fromthe fascination with law and order’sunderside:the violenceof criminality.It, too,has

a longtraditionin post-Enlightenment fiction,particularly inthenineteenth century.From WilliamGodwin’snovel CalebWilliams,to Balzac’s ultimate master-criminal,Vautrin, to SherlockHolmes’s great

Other,Moriarty,nineteenth-century literatureis rife with suchinstances.ButintheAmerican imaginary thegreatcriminal, theoutlaw, isa figureofgreatdistinction, somuchsoas toembodyAmerican society’sgeneralculturaldistinctions. IfAmerican societyis paradigmaticallyfoundedontheprimacyoflaw(theBillofRights), it isalsoco-incidentally foundedonthephantasmatic allureoftheoutlaw—the Wild West,thefrontier, andsoon:theerrantlonerwhoforgeshisownrights, insomeimprovisational fashion, ashegoesalong.Obviously, thisco-incidence isonlyrecognized retrospectively. Fromthestandpoint ofongoingAmerican history,thetimelagbetweenthePuritanethoswhoseEnlightenment variationledtotheBillofRightsandthefrontierethosthat commanded thegreatterritorial expansion inthenameofsuchrightsis

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retroactively erased.Theinevitable andnonnegotiable conflict between lawandoutlawexercises intensefascination inthepopularimagination (fromJohn Ford’sWesternsto BladeRunner,fromtheCivilWar to Taxi

Driver). Interestingly enough,intheclassicpopularnarratives, thenotorietyofthename—what makesthisconflict memorable—seems tolie on the side of the outlaw.The outlaws have names:JesseJames,Al Capone,CharlesManson.Thelaw isultimatelynameless,uniform.Or,

toput it fromthereversepointofview(butin essencethe same),the lawhascometooccupy(besetzen) theterritoryof theNameinits fullfledgedmetaphysical void.Thelawremainsnamelessbutalsocommandstheveryterritoryof naming.Letus notforgetthat,although outlawsmayachievelegendary statusbyvirtueoftheirlawless actions, itistheactofbeingdeclared outlawsthatsealsthenotoriety oftheir name.Thereisnothinggratuitousorfolkloric abouttheWanted! signin thehistoryoftheWestern.Whatiswantedis thename(muchasthe namedan outlawasaresult). wantedmanis officially Thefanaticalobsession oflawandorderwithwhatisothertoitgoes Byitsconstitutive beyondmeredialectical antagonism. nature,lawenforcement imaginescriminals theJ.EdgarHoovercharaceverywhere; terismerelya symptom.Tointerpretthissymptomasparanoidwould bea mistake.Onthe contrary, it testifiestoan obsessive-compulsive intheallureof thelaw’sownentrapment thatdemonstrates condition thelawisnotexemptfromthepopularfasthecriminal. Inthisrespect, cinationwith thegreatoutlaw.Derridaisrightto pointoutthat“the is adbeforethe‘thegreatcriminal’ people’sshudderof admiration times, asinprimitive whotakesuponhimself, dressedtotheindividual Nodoubt,thereissomethestigmaofthelawmakerortheprophet.”** at levelsofgreatexthingprimitiveaboutoutlawbehavior,especially particularly, imagination, cess.Withinthedomainofan Enlightenment thatrefuses acondition condition, theoutlawreturnsustoa prerational to recognizethe newcovenantof rightsand in sodoingunveilsthe arguable void,thefactthatitstruthis neither foundational covenant’s Inotherwords,thesublimeallure butself-evident. nordemonstrable andClydefiguresspringsfromthefactthattheir of,say,theBonnie outlawexcessreachesdeepintothemythicalpowerofthelaw,thevioitselfat thelevelof flesh Thispowerregisters lenceofitsfoundation.

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enoralsoseemstoexercise andblood,whichiswhythegreatcriminal andClyde,sexfilmaboutBonnie moussexualpower.Inthelegendary of shouldbeengagedbeyonditsobviousdimension ualexplosiveness to brilliance fashion, anditwasArthurPenn’sscenographic Hollywood outlawsmeettheirdeath stagethelastscene,wherethenowmythical sexualized crescendo. atthehandsofthelaw,insucha self-consciously deathwitha drivethatisitselfa Thelawthusdesirestheoutlaw’s intheoutmatter.Butthisisbecausethereissomething life-and-death betothelaw.Paranomos istheonewhoissimultaneously lawendemic sidethelawandontheothersideof thelaw—onewhois, in thisrespect,against the law but alsowith the law,proximateto the law’sdomain. There is, in other words, a similar functioningof the Greek

par(a)ounotionofmetaphysics: preposition paraasin thecornerstone Lawmakwith(in)theessence,theessenceaspresence. sia,a presence ingviolence in“primitive times”showednomechanism forveilingits lawlessfoundation, becausethepresenceofthelawinthemajorityof casesbelongedtoanirretrievable Outside:thepresenceofthedivine. TheEnlightenment imaginary soughttoeliminatetheviolentmemory ofthislawlesslawmaking figurebytextualizing a constitutional law whoseoriginwasitsownrationality, whichwas,moreover, thoughtto beinalienable andself-evidently true.Anyonewhodidnotaccedeto this self-evidence wasnecessarily eitherinsaneor self-consciously alien. Butprecisely because theoutlaw(paranomos) makestheparadoxical remainder oftheviolentarchéofthelawemergein its repressed plenitude,heproducesan uncannymirroringeffect.Riskinga generalization,| wouldarguethatmirroringis alwaysa heteronomous activity, if onlybecausean alienand ultimately unreachable otherpresidesover one’sconstitution ofidentity. Ifthisistrue,thentheidentityofEnlightenmentlawhingesnecessarily onthelawof another.Andif thisother isnolongerGod—because thisisno longerhistorically possible, given thattheCitizenhas takenoverthe rightsofGod—then theotherof the lawcannotbutbeliterallytheothersideof thelaw:lawlessness. The outlawfigureinmodernsocietyexercises enchantingfascination and yetproducesthedesireforitsjustelimination becauseitstandswitness, notonlytotheoriginaryviolence of thelaw,butto law’sconstitutively

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lawlessnature.At thesametime,thepolice(which,aswesaw,shares the sameimaginary configuration) completes themirroringbybeing theoutlawofthelaw,theexemplary expression ofthelaw’sownparanomia. Thisperfectco-incidence ofmutually reflective imagesmighthelp illustrate bettertheparadoxes oftheinstitution oflawinmodernsocietyand theviolenceit seemsincreasingly to incurinsteadofabating. The master lesson,however,is to be found in Franz Kafka’srepresenta-

tionsofthelegalapparatusinhismythical renditions ofmodernsociety,whichmayexplainwhywecontinue to refertooursocialexperienceas“kafkaesque.”

TheLawlessness ofLiterature Kafka,a brilliantethnographer ofmodernsociety,wroteunhesitantly aboutthebodyastheterrainofhistory,asthemostpalpablelocation of society’s otherwiseimaginaryandintangible investment / occupation (Besetzung) ofthelaw.Kafka’smythographic imagination exposesthe undersideofthecapitalist imaginary thatexplicsocial-imaginary—an itlypositsthevaluesoffreechoiceinthemarketplace,thesanctioned What righttoactfreelyinafreemarketofrights(toaction,toopinion). desireforexpansion isthe silences initsinfinite thispositingeffectively factthatitexistsasmechanism, asa self-engendering machineofsigniin ficationsand identityformationsin brutalrepetition.”Everything aspirationfora disemKafka’sworldpointsto an undeconstructible a paradoxicalnotionwhosecost(depictedwith bodied“autonomy,” ofthelawon istheinscription violence) fidelity toitsintrinsic stunning one’sactualbody.WhatKafkainvitesusto contendwithis theinterlawtoveilitsradicaldisengageofself-engendering minablecapacity mentfromtherealmofhumanactionand to reignby meansof the andengagethatit isin factproximate delusion,theself-occultation, derived, areheteronomously ofautonomy able.InKafka,alldepictions desireisdraggedthroughthemostinsufferandanyreal,autonomous ofdegradation. ableprocess ofbeing“beforethelaw”(vordemGesetz) thepredicament Certainly, thatfeedsthevimirroring oftheheteronomous isaperfectillustration beforethelaw—inthatdevolenceofthelaw.Thecitizenliespowerless

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heseeks astatingphrase,“therehe sitsfordaysandyears”—because hisidentityin relationtotheinvisible,eveninconceiv(andconstructs) justice:hisown society’s torepresent able,alienentitythatheimagines rights.But in doing so, he abdicateshis rights,he consentsto live with-

thushe evengainingaccesstohis rights—and out rights—without his identitybychoosingasa mirrorthevoid;he dies.Heconstructs triesto mirrorhimselfontheabyssbehindthegate,theabyssupon upon Themonstrousrealization whichthelawinstitutesits mystique. inalienable hisdeaththatthegatetothelawwashisandhisonly—his thefundamental duplicitythatliesat theabyssal right—demonstrates originofthelaw:thefactthatthelawmustactinorderto preserveitby violence—and self.Hence,the violationof the citizen—intimidation the law’s lawlessness:“in Kafka’suniverse, law is lawlessin a formal

ismerelya mythified expression ofour sense.”*° ButKafka’s universe ownhistorical condition, andI wouldgosofarastosaythatbyvirtue ofKafka’s mythification thehistorical registersmoredramatically, the painofhistoryisactuallymadepalpable. Thepreposition’s stunningambivalence inthefamousparable“Before the Law” announces, at the very instance of the title (before a nar-

rativetakesplace,beforethestoryofthelawisposited),thedisembodiedautonomy ofthelaw.Thetwonotionsof“before”(inadvanceof andin thepresenceof)canceleachotherout.Thelawis a radical boundary, a chasmthatseparatesandunitessimultaneously, which meansthatnothingcanenteritsspace;it containseverything andis self-contained.Thus,neither the man nor the doorkeeperis ever in the

presence ofthelaw,andneither,ofcourse,precedesthelaw,forthereis noarché(nobeginning butalsonoauthority)outsidethedomainofthe law.JacquesDerrida’s well-known theorization of this paradoxical topography isoneofhismostskillfulmoments andrivalsthetheoreticalrichnessofKafka’s original.Hisconclusion thatboththemanand thedoorkeeper standbeforethelawwithoutbeingcapableoffacingthe law(becausethelawdemandsthattheystandin oppositionto each other,thattheystandbeforeeachother)is essentialto understanding thatthelawoperatesbymeansofself-interdiction, whichleadstothe paradoxical conditionthatlawfostersa self-generated interdiction in allthosenamedas subjectsof/to thelaw:“Thelawis forbidden.But

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thiscontradictory self-prohibiting leavesman‘free’ inthematterofselfdetermination, althoughhisfreedom lapsesinthat,throughself-interdiction,he cannotenter.”*!This descriptionis strikingin its accuracy;it

mightwellserveas theultimateprécisoftheparable.Thecrucialnotionhereisthatthelawisnotforbidding butforbidden—meaning, itis forbidding toitself.Thereliesthepossibility ofhumanity’s self-determination,Derridaargues,apossibility thatends,however, themoment onecomesin contactwiththelaw,whenself-determination becomes in factself-interdiction. Yet,I wouldadd,asdefense againsttheinadvertent emergence of negativemetaphysics, thatone’scontactwiththe law,asKafkadepictsit throughout hiswork,isalwaysenforced ascontact with the law of an Other,which is, strictlyspeaking,an impossible

contactor,moreprecisely, possibleonlyinsofarasit iscontactwiththe experienceof force(Gewalt). WhatKafka’scharacterscometo “realize”

alwaysatthepointofself-destruction isthevoiduponwhichtheiracis founded, a voidaffirmed tion(including theirdestruction) precisely because the self-alterationof the law (or even, more important,self-alteration before the law)—whichis, after all, the quintessentialgesture of realself-determination—is unaccountablyoccluded,disfiguredinto a

Inotherwords,thislawis forbidden preheteronomous authorization. ciselybecausecontactwithitsarché(originand authority)is (self-)made

ofthelawinfinitely tobe forbidden, whichis whyKafka’s depiction ofembodying infinity, bymeansofcontaining postpones—postpones entranceto itsdomain. asymptosis—one’s ofthelawinKafkais herethattheproblematic Derridarecognizes andtheparaitself:“theplayofframing ofliterature theproblematic sysupsetsthe‘normal’ whichsomehow doxicallogicofboundaries, structureofreferentiality” anessential whilerevealing temofreference, (DL,146).Literaturebecomesan event the moment the particularinter-

outsidethe sectswith thegeneral,henceit is an eventinconceivable occursas oflawandliterature Theco-incidence archéof Enlightenment. oftherightoftheparticular(rightofproperty, aresultoftheinstitution of the individual,of the signature, etc.) intertwinedwith the sover-

argues,inmodeigntyofthegeneral(theRightsofMan).Thus,Derrida todowith hassomething ernsocietyliteraturelegislates—‘literature’ the drama of naming,the law of the name and the name of the law”

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againstthelawthatprotectsit subversively, it legislates (DL,131)—but hedoesrecandpreservesit.ThoughDerridadoesn’tquiteelaborate, subversion resides ognizethedramaticnatureoftheaction:literature’s where ofthemythistorical, thetheatricality element, initsperformative thedramatizing bymythos, entailsthetakeoveroflogos performativity ofmython thestageforittobetheorized. of “literaessaygoestotheheartoftheentireproblematic Derrida’s tureas theory”engagedhere,evenif notquitein thesameterms. Surely,the mainquestion,whetherKafka’sliteratureis literaryor questionof posesthecontiguous philosophical (whichimmediately emergesatcenterstage:“it isalsoliterary), whetherthephilosophical récitproposesa powerful, philois difficultto saywhetherKafka’s sophicalellipsisorwhetherpure,practicalreasonretainsanelementof thefantasticorofnarrativefiction.Oneofthequestionsmighthave beenputforthassucha pronouncement: Whatifthelaw,withoutbeingtransfixed byliterature,werepossibleonlyunderthesameconditionsasliteraryworks?”(DL,133).Ishalldelayherethesignificance of DerridaframingthisconcernthroughKant’sHasif” imperative,to whichweshallreturnbelow,andconsiderratherhisfocusonthe“Iiterary”conditions ofthelaw.OneofthemanyradicalaspectsofKafka’s vision—indeed, whatmakesKafka’s workparadigmatic ofliterature’s intrinsictheoretical capacity—is therecognition anddepictionoflaw’s mythographic condition. Suchcondition is nota matterofnature,but ofhistory—meaning, thoughlawinthehistoryofsocieties seemsalwaysimplicated in a mythicalfoundation (whoseformandcontent varyaccordingto the social-imaginary horizonat work),to saythat Kafka’s lawismythographic, perhapseven“literary” asa rule,ispreciselyto placeitinanEnlightenment universe, insofarastheEnlightenmentimaginaryconsistsin this peculiarperformanceof myth throughthe“disembodied” textualauthorization (constitutionality) of thelaw.It goeswithoutsayingthatthemythistorical textureofTheTrial ispossibleonlywithintheframework ofabourgeois Stateofrights,despitethenovel’sresidualimperialscenography, whichisderivedfrom Kafka’s socialenvironment. IfJosephK.existedwithinamedievaltale, hispredicament wouldhardlyregisteran impression; it is hisbelief thathehasrightsbeforethelaw—indeed, therighttobebefore thelaw— thatmakesthetotalviolation ofhisrightsnightmarish.

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To refine,therefore,the argumentfor the co-incidence or,as Derrida

says,the“sharedconditions ofpossibility” between theimaginaries of lawandliteraturewouldrequirelookingat thecorehistorical conditionsthatDerridaaptlyunderlines inhisessay:theinterwoven nature ofthe particularand the universalright,asan imaginary institution, that pertains to both literatureand the law as textualentities.There,we

wouldre-encounter thefactthatthistextuality isitselftheunavoidable phenomenal natureof theEnlightenment imagination whoseforcelaw andliterature shareattheirorigin.Theconfiguration oflawinsocieties derivedfromtheEnlightenment isliterarybecause itis mythographic, onemightsay,because theEnlightenment’s own“mythical foundation” rests on the inalienableprominence of writing,wherebythe law achievesits authorityinsofaras it istextualized. Yet,as wesawabove, thispromimence ofwriting,thistextualization, assumesa ghostlypresenceintheverymomentoftheConstitutional utterance “We,thepeople,”occludingthusboththeoriginandauthority(arch)ofthelaw,so thatitstruthshallbecomeself-evident andlawshallbe institutedasa workssubversively disembodied experience. Literature againstthelaw preciselyinthatitbringsthissenseofdisembodied archébackontothe textualstage—in thatit remythifies it,wemightsay—and thusopensthe of thelawto judgment,tocriticalperforinstituted“self-evidence” ofliteratureisnotmerelytracemance.Inthisrespect,thecriminality of Plato’sexpulsion ofthepoets ablebacktothemetaphoric instance rule.Orrather,thearfromthepolisas prerequisite of philosophical logosposits chaicmetaphor isinstantiated everytimethephilosophical itselfas politicalarché,as the law of the land. Thisis, of course,what

forbetterorworse—this theEnlightenment imagination, characterizes realandreis perfectly the dialecticof Enlightenment, ambivalence, mainsso farunresolved. Thus,even if the distinctionbetweenliteratureand philosophy the in thisessayas a wayof delineating (whichDerridainterrogates givenbylaw,a sui isa categorical ofliterature) legislation subversive whichechoesthearchaicquarrelbetweenpogenerislawofdistinction (whichisn’t distinction literature’s ratherdirectly, etryandphilosophy defianceofthe onitsperformative restsprecisely tosayitsdefinition) calaw.Alongtheselinesof thinking,onemightsaythatliterature’s because it is indeedautonomous, pacityfortheoryis intrinsicbecause

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bothLaw(“thelawofthe positsitsownlawbyinterrogating literature

autonomyemerges law.Literature’s land”)and itselfas categorical ruleofthephiloinregardtothedisembodied thusoutofitsparanomia sophicallogos,outof the criminalbodythat exposesphilosophy’s to anpointthatit isimpossible haunts.WhileI agreewithDerrida’s a texttobe literary,Iwould swerthequestionof what/whojudges suggestthat whatevercriticalresponseto thisquestion nonetheless in Derrida’s own“juridical performative” mayexist(asliterature’s terms), it would have to be itself “literary.”Just as literature has no a

inprioricognitive objectbutmustposeitsobjecteachtimeanew—to itcannotbejudgedin termsothertoit, stantiateit performatively—so the as‘literary’performance, butmustposit,in its veryinstantiation andinterrogation. Thisself-determinacriticaltermsofitsrecognition tion,thisparanomic autonomy, hardlysuggestsinsularityoruniformity atthecore.Onthecontrary, innotsubmitting totheexternallawofan Other(say,in‘traditional’ terms,philosophy), itenablesanencryption oftheotherin theveryprocess(inKafka’sterms,theperformative trial, derProzess)of constitutingits literariness.Thisencryption,how-

ever,isa symptomofresistancetotheheteronomous command.It is thusreadableonlyfromthestandpointofa languagecommanded by thedemandsoflogos, bythedemandsofphilosophy, andtoreadit as anythingotherthana symptomwouldentailanuninterrogated subscriptiontosuchdemands. In an eloquentresponseto Derrida’s readingof Kafka,Rodolphe Gaschépointsoutthissamecondition: “Itisfromthatencrypted possibilityofthephilosophical thattheliterarity of‘Before theLaw’isengendered, or becomesintelligible. Kafka’stextisthusa literarytexton conditionthatit doesnotentirelybelongto literature, but thatit also refers,bymeansofthevirtual‘presence’ withinitofthepossibility ofa philosophy ofthemorallaw,to anOther(ofit).”°* Without disputing Gasché’s (andDerrida’s) commitment toa nondefinitional relationality ofliterature(tophilosophy, butalsoto science), I woulddisputetheimpulsewithinthisremarktocontinuetolocatetheliteraryby meansof thephilosophical, evenifbythenegativegestureofidentifying philosophyasliterature’s encryption. Iamnotconvinced thatthisdirectionis therightoneforpullingus out ofthemireofthearchaicquarrel.We

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misstheprofoundradicalism ofKafka’s gestureifweopttotraceand identifyhis literariness in an allegedly encryptedmorallaw.On the contrary,I would argue, Kafka’s“literariness’”—which is tantamountto

saying,his superiortheoretical in theautonomyof aptitude—resides his utterancefromthe constraints oflogos,in hisuncannyandinimitablegestureofentwining mythandhistory.Bluntly speaking, Kafka’s writingisanaffronttoallmorallaw,iffornootherreasonthanthatit in concretesomaticlanguage, demonstrates, thedespoticauthorityof morallaw:thefactthatmorallawforbidseventheslightest inklingof

self-interrogation. Kafka’smythistorical writingthusworksagainstthegrainof society’sself-occultation, againstsociety’s needto turnthemythicalinto the mystical.Hismythification ofthelawmightbe thecritiquethat Benjamin sourgently seeks.ForBenjamin readsthemythical through thedivine—or, perhapsmoreaccurately, byinsertingthedivineinthe middle,in betweenthemythicalandthelegal.Acontradiction arises herebetweenBenjamin’s gestureandthelanguageitevokes,a contrawiththecharacteristic thatdistindictionthatresonates ambivalence entireoeuvreandresidesatthecoreofhisdesire: guishesBenjamin’s theantagonism andredemption (andtheconstant betweenrevolution failureto turn one into another).In locatingthe divineat (or as) the middle,Benjamin seekstooutperformthearchic,torenderthedivine Yet,inoccupyingthemiddle,thedivinecannot disruptiveoranarchic. but alsobecomea medium,a means(mittel,meson)thatmediatesthe this bysublating betweenthemythicandthelegal(nomic) discrepancy locationoffuturereto an alwaysalreadyunsignifiable discrepancy demption. In this sense, middle/mittel/mesonis messianic.It is amid-

notsimplyasdivinearché,as theorigin dlethatcontainsthebeginning, of the law,but as themeansto thelaw’spromise.Thepromiseofrefamousphrasenear ofBenjamin’s thesignificance demptioniscertainly violenceisbloodypowerover ofhisessay:“Mythical the conclusion purepoweroveralllifefor merelifeforitsownsake,divineviolence it” thesecondaccepts sacrifice, thesakeoftheliving.Thefirstdemands (CV,297/ 200).Thestatementfollowsthe assertionthatdivineviolence expiation(“lethalwithoutspillingblood”),whilemythic is bloodless is a violence”) equateswith“lawmaking violence(whichBenjamin

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bloody affair,where “bloodis the symbolof merelife.”I would argue

of conception bya monotheistic is madepossible thatthissyllogism thustragic— myth,whichwillalwaysfailto grasptheabyssal—and ocspeaksofdivineviolence ofmyth.WhenBenjamin performativity ofthelocurring“forthesakeoftheliving,”heevokesanembodiment ofelemental ontheannihilation holdpredicated gosanditssalvational becauseandinpossible precisely (oftheliving)becomes life.Salvation meaning also sofarastheirlifeisnottheirowntobeginwith(kat’archén, ofthediautonomy “asa rule”).Onlyif weassumepureunmitigated oflawover monotheistic conception vine—which is theparadigmatic wetalkaboutanact“forthesakeofthelivingthat merelife—could bearstheauthorityoftheOther.” InaparticularlydeftreadingofBenjamin’s essay,TomMcCallconin “purifying” violence ashe tendsthatBenjamin neverquitesucceeds wishes,bothbecause“themythicshadesimperceptibly intothemessianic”andbecausedivineviolence itselfpartakesofthemythicthe momentitisarticulated: “itperforms asa mythical textBenjamin’s own philosopheme ofthepure.”“t Whatenablesthisblurringistheconstitutivelyambiguous [zweideutig] natureofviolence,whichin Benjamin’s description doesnotdifferfromthelimit-logic oflawitselfin Kafka’s parable.Onecannothelpbutposethequestioninbrutalliteralness: whatisviolencewithoutblood?Fromthestandpointoftheinstituting imagination (humanity’s psychicabyss),thereisonlyoneanswer:guilt. Inthisrespect, a divineviolence—but alsothesovereignty ofthedivine [g6ttliche Gewalt|—becomes traceablein thehumanrealmonlyas the resignation ofsovereignty, whichis to say,a heteronomous blisssustainedbyguilt,wheretoresignis alsoto re-sign, toabdicateone’sauthorization bysubscribing toanother. Thisbecomesclearerif we considerthat arguablythe greatest shadowoverBenjamin's conception ofthemythicinthistextiscastby GeorgesSorel’sinimitable Reflections onViolence (1908). Sorel’sfigure deservesa separateinterrogation and willoccupyusin thenextchapter,inconjunction withBenjamin’s othergreatshadow,CarlSchmitt. Letme add, however,as a kindofprescientremarkforthisdeferredin-

terrogation, butalsoto theextentthatit pertainsdirectlytothereading ofBenjamin pursuedhere,thatalthoughBenjamin encountersSorel’s

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argument onitsownterms,he transforms it intheverymoment ofhis response. Hethusperformsa doublegesture: he appropriates thesignificational forceofSorel’s argument whilerenaming thetermsofsignification. Benjamin wasoneofthefewwhounderstood philosophicallyin whatsensetheexemplary instance ofviolence signified by Sorel’sanarchisttheorization ofthegeneralstrikeundoestheviolent logicoftheStateprecisely becauseitispropelledbythecatalytic power ofthe mythicimagination. YetSorel’srevolutionary figuration of the mythical, whichisbothcatalytic andconstitutive intheradicalprojection of an undecidablefuture,is transformedin Benjamin’sessayinto

the pure redemptiveviolenceof the divineagainstthe mythical.I wouldarguethatonthisstriking(re)naming, wherethetermsofthe OnecometobearthecontentofitsOther,hingesthewagerofwhether thelawlessness oflawcaninfactbecome ormustremain deconstructive ofa self-occluded oforder. foundational metaphysics

KantafterKafka ThewageroverBenjamin’s ambivalence towardthemythicdramatizes theimpossible proximity tothelawina waythatfacilitates the(re)stagingofKafka’s lawlessuniverseatthecoreofKant’scategorical ethical of myth backintoBenuniversal.By readingKafka’sperformance jamin’sambivalence, wemightbeabletorecasttheCritique ofViolence ofKantianEnasthemeansthatexposestheoccludedperformativity Tobe morespecific: whereasin Kafkathelawexistsina lightenment. eipresent,inKantthelawisalwayselsewhere, suspendedmythical (utopic)bydeortobeimagined.Itisplaceless thertobe remembered to thelawotherthanbypretending sign,becauseonecannotencounter is example law.Kant’s ethicsisuniversal beit,toactasifone’spersonal deofunbindingoneselffroman intentionally famous:thelegitimacy themomentitisimagined ceitfulpromisemadeunderduresscollapses Noethicaldecision,nomatterhowwarrantedona asuniversallaw.*° personal level,can achievethe status of ethics, if it does not submit to

ofbeinguniversallaw.The pretense(hypokrisis) theregimeoffigurative asifuniversalis, of course,anothersortof promise,a performative stage). (forafterall,topretendisalwaystoactona self-made promise

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a futuresetbeforeus lawoccursin a timeofprecedent(pro-mis): Kant'’s byan actinthepresent,butalsoa presentthatfollowsa universalthat logic,to thesameambiguous hasbeensetbeforeus in time.Obeying inKant’sstagedmomentofthelawis tofindourselves findourselves beforethegateofthelawlikethepoormanfromthecountryinKafka’s parable. Yet,in a perfectreversalof Kafka’sparable,whichallowsus a at theheartof het(autonomy) glimpseof tragicself-determination imbedded attheheart heteronomy eronomous law,thereisanoccluded beindeeda perverseidentification ofautonomy, ofKant’sprescription ethicalpositing that tweenthetwo.Theformallawofpersonhood—the terms—turns makesonea subject,a politicalsubjectin Enlightenment out to be alien,unknowable,to our being.” It existsbecauseit willhave

verb tenseof promise—a universalvalidity.For cometo bear—the Kant,thisimpossible passagefromthepersonaltotheuniversalistobe achieved bythemysterious waysofpracticalreason,thereasonthatis ultimately boundbyfaithintheother’sreason,whichineffectneutralizesanysortof self-interrogation ofbothReasonandtheOther.The “mysterious waysofpracticalreason”involvenoneotherthantheperformative momentofan “asif”narrative—in termsofourreadingof theEnlightenment imaginary, theco-incident narrativeoflawandliterature.”Themomentofnarratingthe“asif”universalisa momentof thesubjectfictionalizing itselfasa legalentityinthefullEnlightenment sense:asbothlawgiverandcitizenofthelaw,bothsubjectofandsubjecttothelaw.Thisisa momentoffictionindeed—a story,a legend,a narrativethatmediatestheutopiaof thelaw,a guaranteedpassageto utopiathatveilsutopia,thatacts“asif”thereis a toposof fulfillment: theuniverseof rights.J. HillisMillerrecognizes that Kant’srule,his forceoflaw,involves a performative teleologythatistantamounttoa self-occultation oftheabyssal realmofdecision. ButunlikeMiller’s attributionofnecessity tothisself-occultation, basedontheinherentfailureoflanguageitselfto performthepromise(trueofthelegislatoras muchas theprophet), | wouldinsistonthehistorical dimension ofthis self-occultation, particulartoKantas anexemplary instanceof theEnlightenmentlegalimaginary.As the promiseof reasonis ultimately basedon faithin theother’sreason,itfailstoexercisecriticalreflection overtheabyssal, nonrational terrainoflaw’sviolence.

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Ourrelationship tothisviolenceisalwayssingular,muchasourrelationto the lawis singular.Butthishardlymeansindividual—autonomous in Kant’ssenseoftheterm.Anynotionofindividual autonomyisnotonlytheepitome ofidentitary logicbutforallpractical purposesimpossible. Autonomy meansfreedomonlyasa socialentity/ act,alwaysdifferential andantagonistic, pluralandpolemical. Itisalwayssocialautonomy: society—as theaggregate ofpolitical subjects, as koinonia politon—giving itselfthelaw.Thisaggregate is neverachieved bya pluralization of thepersonal(“asif”universal) thata notionof straightnarrativeimplies.Whattakesplaceis ratheran “allegorical transferenceof a non-sequitur,”which, since it is allegorical,keeps the

nonsequiturintact.*Althoughmodernsociety’s imaginary relationto thelawis,asa rule,occluded, Enlightenment lawinstitutes a plurality at thelegislative arché(“We,thepeople”),whoserealpowerhingeson its existingina radicalpresentthatkeepsthelawperpetually ina state ofbeingmadeandunmade.Thequintessentially natureof duplicitous thislawanditsviolentrule(Gewalt) law’smythicambiguity at conceals thesametimethatitalsoforbidsthemomentofdecisive pureviolence. Tofallpreytosuchduplicity istocloseonceandforallthegateofthe law.Thelaw remainsopenonlyinsofarit canbemadeand unmade, whichistosaythatitkeepsopen,unconcealed, itshistorical being.To knowthatthelawcanbemadeandunmadeistoknowthatbeingsubwith matter;itistobareourcomplicity jectof/ tothelawisa historical theviolenceofthelaw,a violence whichisneverredemptive andnever

pure. senseofself-limitation Thisknowledge requiresan uncategorizable no thatrecognizes a self-limitation at thecoreof politicalsubjectivity, principlebecauseithastodoneitherwithana prioriprincategorical nor cipleof (moral)actionthatdisguisesthenecessityof obedience, Self-limitation withana prioritamingof desirethatbegsrepression. a sortofOdyssean masteryof the doesnot meanself-interdiction, tothedemoconditionpeculiar It isa historical Sirensbyself-binding. desirenot todesireabbasedon the paradoxical craticimagination, sideisthedesirenottodesirethe solutepower,whosesupplementary besecurityofabsolutelaw.”Thisdesireisparadoxical transcendental desireofthepsycheforomcauseit goesagainsttheprimalmonadistic matter,thedeofdesireasa historical itisthusan instance nipotence;

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of its self-cognizant imagination byacertain historical sireproduced praxis.Inother andlimitedashistorical asimagination beinglimitless withoutlimit,whichisalsoto words,wearetalkingofself-limitation thatocnotionofthelimit,self-limitation say,obeyingtheparadoxical anddiffuses: thelimit,thedomainthatbothinterrupts cupies[besetzen] inturnthe asexercise attheethicallimitthatorchestrates self-limitation limitless actofpolitics. processinis the mediating self-limitation Fromthisstandpoint, notmerelyinthattogiveoneselfthelawrequires volvedinautonomy, locatingoneselfatthelimit(andindeedasthelimit)ofthelaw,but even a self-generated processofothfurther,in thatautonomypresupposes possibleonlywhenone’slimitsareone’sown ering,a self-alteration is externally byanother.Inthisrespect,self-limitation andnotimposed anaskesis thatknowsnofearbefore a poeticact—properly speaking, theother,whichiswhyit canhardlybecalledascetic.Itgoeswithout sayingthatwhateversocial-imaginary limitisfiguredastheproperty of an other, whetherthisother is termedReason,Liberty,the ironlaws of history, or radical Otherness, it defines a heteronomous politics

which,strictlyspeaking,isnopoliticsat all.Kanthimselfexemplifies anasceticperversion ofautonomy inthefaceofthelimitless capacity of the human imagination,whose autonomous command of the limit

loomsbeforehimlikea terrifying chimerical object.Hisunderstanding ofself-limitation isactually oneofself-interdiction, sothathisownfundamentalinsight—“understanding withoutdirectionfromanother”— issubsumed intothegroundofsomething thatwillalwaysprecedeit: theinternalization ofdisembodied uninterrogated law.”Thisisactually the Enlightenment’s state ofmadness,a mode ofbeingthat suffersfrom

experiencing itselfastherefraction ofdivinewill—neither itsagent,nor itsflock.Lostandabandoned beforetheterrorofautonomy, theterror offacingsocietyas one’sown creation/destruction, Kant’spractical reasonofferstheguarantee,thelegalcover,forsociety’s automatism. Kantsymptomatically foreshadows theterrorofKafka’s world:the dialectic ofEnlightenment as Kafka’s mythslayitbare.However, Kant lacksKafka’smythographic capacityto stagethis terroras the very sceneofself-interrogation andself-determination. Kafka’s senseofthe law’sformallawlessness stages,bya kindofBrechtian negative didac-

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tics,theentirepredicament oflivingin Kant’sheteronomous world.In thisworld,whenthegateofthelawisshutforever, anabyssisopened beforeus,the chasmthatcarriesas a signthe letterK.Whatdoesit meantooccupytheposition ofK.?Thismaybethemostundecidable questioninthetwentieth century.Fullycognizant oftherulesofundecidability, I wouldnonetheless riskresponding to thisquestionby pointing tomodernity’s obsession withAntigone—not asananswer, but asa responselinkedto the questionby parabolic likeness, in Kafka’s sense(Gleichnis). NotAntigone, thefigure,thewoman, butthestaging ofthefigure,thesocialpredicament thatthewomanhelpsstagebefore us(forshealsofacesonceandforalltheforeboding gateofthelawas it is shut beforeher,as sheis shut insideit).Asweshallsee laterin the essayspecifically devotedtothisissue,Antigone hasnothingtodowith theresistanceof kinshipto Staterule,norisit thetaleofsomebrave anddefiantrevolutionary heroine,norisit theparadigmatic idiomof Dasein.Modernphilosophy’s needforAntigonetestifiesto theinterminablepowerofstagingmythbeforethepolis.Itsignifies the“mythic foundationof thought,”whichmeanstraversingthe phantasm,the screenprojection, ofGodandleaving Godfarbehind.Inthistrajectory, onelooksoutfromtheposition oftheabysstoseethatbothnomos and archéandanarchy, canneverbesublated, thattheyarealwaysin anomtia, crisis:objectsofkrinein. Andhowiskrineinevertobepresented,tobe Byplacingmythonthestage,byperforming mythinall (self-)taught? justasits thatispolitical bydefinition, itsundecidability, a performance the inordertomakepossible ofundecidability isapedagogy pedagogy emergenceof decision(krisis)in each oneof us.For the Athenians,both

demonomaniac Antigoneand Kreonaretragicin theirtransgressive, the thelaw,theotherfornotrespecting fornotrespecting cisions—one relationbethisundecidable playdemonstrates myth.TheSophoclean point, vantage fromourcontemporary tweenthesetwoelements—read optsformythagainstthelaw, fromlawto myth.Antigone a transition insane,outlaw."! andthisiswhatmakesherthegreat,ifsocially world,ourworld,istherevoluThemomentofAntigonein Kafka’s It demonseeksin a pureelsewhere. tionarymomentthatBenjamin strateswithouta doubtthat themythicis notembodiedin the legal thelegalhasdevouredthemythic.Butit is Onthecontrary, (nomic).

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forstillunableto overthrowthe easyto forgetthis cannibalization, fromoursecularshoulders,” monotheism weightof“Judeo-Christian” weforgetthatthemythicmeansnothingoutsidea “pagan”imaginary from isperfectly suitedtothetransition ofthenomic (whilethelegality society, imaginary). Ina “polymythical” toanatheistic themonotheistic mythicthoughtdoesnotsigdistinction, toremember OdoMarquard’s Gewalt, asBenjamin isledtoargue,forthesimple nifya law-preserving dispersalatthecore,a societywhere reasonthatit entailsanimaginary truth and falsehoodcoexist,not as antagonisticpartnersbut as mutu-

Ina pluralityofmodalwithoutguarantee. allynegotiable possibilities neverdevoidofinterbeliefitselfisbydefinition itiesofbelief—where isnolawtobe preserved, but onlythe est,neverdisinterested—there toinstituteitselfandyetalwaysrecall daringofthesocialcommunity (inthesense,ofbothremindand repeal)itsown institutions.”

at a peculiar Wearenow,asaworldnurturedbytheEnlightenment, juncture: following theendofacenturythatdemonstrated thedialectic ofEnlightenment atitsfiercestantinomy. Thishistorical junctureisconsumedby apocalyptic fantasies,darkdesiresthatconveytremendous anxietyattheprospectthattheprojectof“autonomy” mayfinallyfail. Theallureofsuchfantasies confirmsthatthe Enlightenment (ascondensedinKant’sparadigmofautonomy—freedom ofcontention inthe publicsphere,ethicalorderintheprivatesphere)notonlyfailedtodisenchanttheworld,but insteadfedanexplosivecoreof repressedviolencethatreturnedto swallowliberalinstitutions witha vengeance. In whatwereresolutely ancienttimes,Antigone issueda warningagainst thepropensityofanthropos toplaygodalone:monos phronein. Theadventofa monotheistic God,a humaninvention,arrivedas vengeance onallthosewholeftthetheaterwithoutthinking. Theexplosion ofrepressedviolence againstthisGod(thedecapitation oftheKing,thedaringerasureofthecalendar, Nietzsche's inimitable pronouncement) was inturndupedbyitsownantithetical force,andmonotheistic desirewas furtherstrengthened bytheradicalimaginaryinstitution ofa textual atheistlaw.Kafkamerelyletthisinstitution resoundinitsannihilating silencethroughtheenigmaticidiomofa literaturehe thoughtbetter burned. After the end of the twentieth century, Kafkateaches us that this is

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hardlytheendofmodernity, but ratherthe timewhenmodernity’s abyssalnaturemightpassfromprojecttoexperience. Ifthefoundations ofmodernity arelegal—predicated onfoundations ofauthority presumedmystical—then wemightwanttotraversetheterrainofthelegalanditsmystical guilt(thecomplicity withviolence) andencounter, withanineffable senseofmortality(whichisnothingbutthemostsensuousdevotionto life),theorderofthemythical.Letus notforget, however,thatbeforetheeyesofEnlightenment lawmythisconstitutively criminal;it belongs to the order of the outlaw.In modern society,

wherelawasorderrulesunencumbered, mythisdangerous becauseit accedesto the most forbidden (I’interdit:the interdicted,but also the in-

between thenecessary and terstitial),“ because itopensupthehorizon thecontingent andthereforedemandsacrobatic alertnesstotheslipperymysteries oflife. Tomakethetransitionfromlawto mythis to dareimaginethe worldbeyondtheorderofthesacred.Mythexistsatthelimitofthesacred.Tobeat thislimitisactuallytoembodythemomentofethicaldecision,the moment of krisis.The moment of ethical decision—whichis

andisalalwaysa politicaldecision(adecisionopento contention) waysa socialactin its fullsingularity(theinstanceof socialautonomy)—isjust that instance, not beforethelaw,but besidethelaw,the mo-

whenmythisstaged(asIinterdit)inanever-transimentofparanomia, tionaltheaterofhistory.

oftheMythical TheConcept

astheintersection astheoryisbestarticulated Thequestion ofliterature betweenthe poeticandthepolitical.It is oftenthecasethat writing a achieves political, bothbygenreandbyintention, whichisexplicitly indeeda certainpoetics,withoutwhichits highlevelofperformativity, inthe forcewouldseemdoubtful. I saythiswithoutthinking historical leastthat the forceof politicalwritingcouldbe reducedto mere rhetoric. Onthecontrary, Iwouldarguethatsuchforcecouldbetraced tothepoliticalgravityofthespecificpoeticprincipleat workin each case,goingfurthertosuggestthattheintersection betweenthepoetic andthepoliticalmaybeinfactanentwinement. Inthisrespect,thereis muchtolearnabouthowliteraturethinksofitsworld(ofthepolitical universewhichgivesitexistence) byinterrogating inwhatsensepoliticalinvocationsof this universebear an immanent,ifunacknowledged,

“iterariness.” Anexemplary artistinthissortofpolitical writingisCarlSchmitt, so thatthetaskofrecastingtheclaimofliterature’s theoretical disruption ofsocialidentificatory mechanisms throughtheprismofpolitical writingmakesan encounterwithSchmitt(andcertainofhispoliticalconversations) imperative. Theconversations I havein mindarespecificallywithGeorges Sorel,WalterBenjamin, andHansBlumenberg. They not onlyhappento be politicalconversations whoseperformative termsarecharacteristically “literary”butalsoedifythemselves bynegotiatingwiththeconceptofmyth.Infact,I wouldarguethatthough theseconversations takeplacelargelyinearly-twentieth-century terms, theyprovidean incisivewayofinterrogating the “antimythical” tendenciesofcontemporary historical reality,whichclaimstohavebecome go

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“postpolitical” and showsdefinitesigns of turningto theological modesofunderstanding andacting.Thisturnisarguably propelled by thedesperation thatfollowsa historical-epistemological void,theloss ofa stableaxisofmeaning thatcharacterizes whatweidentify symptomatically astheeraof “globalization” and“fundamentalism.” Thehard reality of such a void becomesinevitablewhen a historicaluniverse,for

reasonsthatinthisjuncturestillremainindecipherable, subjects thepoliticaltonearlyexhaustive self-occultation. Myhunchisthatmyth—in thespecifically performative wayIuseit here—has muchtooffertotheprocessofdisintegrating theself-occultationofthepolitical. Schmitt, inparticular, emergesasanintriguing interlocutorin thisprocessnotonlybecausehistheorization ofthe“conceptofthepolitical” hasbeensoinfluential andbecause hewashimself an exemplary politicalcreature(withallconceivable ramifications of thisnotion)butmoreso, frommy standpoint, becausehe understood theprofound ofthemythical, evenifintermsmarredbyhis importance politicaldecisionsandhis theologically motivatedlimits.In thisrespect,the“conceptofthemythical” becomespossibleexpressly onaccount of Schmitt,and it is conducted more or less as a fragment of a

continuingBegriffsgeschichte (towhichthisbookisin partdedicated), whichisdelineated herespecifically bySchmitt’s withSorel, encounters andBlumenberg. Benjamin, of Thecruxof the matteris neitherto decidethe significance by somesortofdistribuSchmitt’s workin ourtimenortodetermine, tive logic,which of Schmitt’sconceptsand ideas are useful and which

ofSchmitt asawriterandthinkerisinarenot.Althoughanassessment tothetaskof raisingcertainquestionsandunevitable,it is secondary passagethroughhistory. coveringcertaintrailsin thewakeofSchmitt’s On theconandhardlyinnocent. Thispassagewashardlynegligible trary, Schmitt’salertness to the most subtle shifts in historicalcontin-

a longlifeina troubledcenturysurfeitedwithinnugencythroughout merableuntimelydeathsresultedin a historicalpassageof unusual by thegreatlydeferred,inas evidenced and magnitude, complexity deed retroactive,disturbance(I mean the term literally,not pejora-

tively)hiswritingscontinuetoproducenowadays.Myownencounter butonlytothe partakesofthisdisturbance, withSchmittnecessarily

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fortheinquirythat motivation itashistorical extentthatit incorporates follows. tack concerningthe Thepresenttext resumesan argumentative thatI Political Theology in Schmitt's ofnationalsovereignty question whichrecognizes Thatargument, inDream Nation. proposed previously thinking, tendencies inSchmitt's andoftencontradictory thecircuitous Schmitt upasfollows. Although terms,canbesummed anditsspecific termsexposesthesecretmetaconsistently andin themosttrenchant cannot liberalism, hisownStatistmetaphysics physicsofconstitutional socialandpolitical order. butprovidea blueprintfora heteronomous contribution ofSchmitt’s thoughthemostimportant Morespecifically, realnatureof Theology isprecisely tounmask theheteronomous Political liberalism)thatclaimsto safeguardsoa politicalorder(constitutional

ciety’s autonomy, hisunderlying logicdemonstrates—how consciously ofitsimplications Iamnotprepared tosay—that national sovereignty istheenemyofsocialautonomy. Consequently, fromthestandpointof thepoliticalperson,oftheactivecitizeninthepolis,Schmitt'stheoryof sovereignty mustconclude in a politicsofsubjugation, indeedin the kindofsubjugation thatdemandsthesacrifice ofcriticalinterrogation totheinnertruthofanapocalyptic originofhistory,asweencounterit ineverymonotheistic order. Inregardtothelastpoint,mypositionechoesHeinrichMeier’sthesisthatatthecoreofSchmitt’s understanding oftheworldreignsanintransigent Christianimagination.” Muchevidencepointstothisconclusion, evenwhen we take intoaccountthat Schmitt’sthought is deliber-

ately open to historicalcontingencyand thus does not unfold continuously froman unadulterated source.Thispositiondoesnot amounttotherathernarrowpronouncement thatSchmittwasaboveall a Catholicthinker,but recognizesthat his epistemological universe emergesfroma monotheistic orderwhich,in thelastinstance,undoes hisotherwiseacutepoliticalunderstanding ofhistory.UnlikeMeier,I seenodistinction betweenpoliticaltheologyandpoliticalphilosophy; I findbothtermshighlyquestionable, ifnot untenable, and I shallreturntothisattheend. My initialconcern,as the groundwork for Schmitt’sencounter with the mythical,is Schmitt’sencounterwith Marxistdialectics,despite the

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ideological abyssbetweenthem.Indeed,Schmitt's greatest political enemy(atleastintheWeimar period)wasnotliberalism or parliamentarismbut Marxism, precisely becausein the 1920sMarxism constitutedan equallyuncompromising andactualforceagainstliberalism andparliamentarism. Howelseareweto interpretthefactthathalfof Schmitt'sinitialtreatiseonparliamentary democracy is occupiedwith extensivepolemicsagainstMarxistphilosophical categories? Iwouldarguethat,inthelanguage ofSchmitt's figuration ofthepolitical onthe basisofthe friend-enemy principle, Marxism emergesasthe enemy who“enables” andit isprecisely self-constitution, ofitsradical because foundational as enemy—and significance here the textualevidence putsSchmitt’s tohisownprinciple intoquestion—that adherence the realmagnitude of enmityis consistently veiled.Marxismis foremost a philosophical enemy, whichiswhy,afterhedispenses withtheRomantic ofliberalist ideology metaphysics, Schmittmustconducta disintegrationofdialecticsin thesameterms,as a logicalimmanencethat forever defers the moment of decision in politics. Nonetheless,a question

asanunwhichis methodologically crucialtomydiscussion emerges Ofwhatuseis a deconstructible remainderfromthis confrontation: polemical methodwithoutdialectical understanding? I shalllimitmyreadingto the lasttwochaptersin TheSpiritualHistorical SituationofContemporary (knownin transParliamentarism whichareconcerned lationas TheCrisisofParliamentary Democracy), with, as Schmitttermsit, the rationalistdialecticsof Marxismand the

Myconcernislessthe irrationalistviolenceof anarcho-syndicalism. tends argumentthat SchmittcatapultsagainstHegelandMarx—he viewofditostagehisattackonthemostidentitaryandteleological morethe argumenthe unleashesonGeorgesSorelin alectics—and thelastchapter.Evenfroma cursorylookat the text,Sorelemerges as a formidable enemy, toward whom Schmitt reveals a definite,

ofdesire,a barelyrealized ambivalence thoughbarelydiscernible, impetusofthearthatfurtherfuelsthepolemical traceof admiration polemical in Sorelthe sameunabashed gument.Schmittrecognizes spiritashisown,whichdaresto exposeone’swritingto full-fledged withwhichthetextpursuesits eneenmity,matchingthe vehemence theologimiesto thedead-endoftheirinnerlogic.ButwhileSchmitt's

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callyinspiredforcecanimplanta corrosiveelementat thecoreof any it runs agroundon Sorel’smythicalundermetaphysics, rationalist articulabrilliantanarchic becauseSorel’s precisely standing ofhistory, arche. tionofmythshowsthatmythhasnocore,nosingular mediatesthisencounteris Bentextthathistorically Theprovocative whichis situatedbe(1921), jamin’s“Towarda CritiqueofViolence” way,in inBenjamin’s inimitable andSorelandsucceeds, tweenSchmitt to sovereignty. Afterhisenraisingthe issueofmythas a challenge theatricaltheory,Benjamin’s and Brechtian counterswithSurrealism ofhisowntermsledhimeventuallyto a moredireconceptualization ofmyth.Inhislaterwork,whenhe elaborates alectical understanding in the notesthat on his notionof the dialecticalimage(principally formed the Passagenwerk, but alsoon various drafts and fragmentsdat-

ingafter1928),Benjamin againbecomesa valuableresourceforelucidatinghowa performative dialecticsofmythcanwithstandtheenveloping powersof“political theology.” Schmitteitherdidnotkeepup withBenjamin’s trajectory orheneverreallyunderstoodhim;hisonly gesturetowardBenjamin isa reciprocal elaboration—in theformofa n” the Trauerspiel “correctio —on thesis,where,unpredictably,Schmitt's

observations pointto a theoryoftragedythatactuallyunlocksmyth fromthebindsofpoliticaltheology—a gesturethatI seeasBenjaminian,ifnotevenSorelian. Itakeupthisparadoxical momentinSchmitt's oeuvreattheconclusion oftheessay,asaninternally deconstructive instancethatdemonstrates the untenability ofpoliticaltheology before thepoliticalchallenge thatSorel’sthoughtplacesin Schmitt'sway: mythwithoutarchéortelos. The greatGermandramatic poet HeinerMiilleronce commented,“Carl

Schmittistheater. Histextsaretheatrical performances. Iamnotinterestedinwhetherhewasrightor not.Hisbesttextsaresimplygreatperformances.”* I amfascinatedby thiscomment,not leastbecausethe manwhomadeitwasdecidedlyagainstanyintellectual orpoliticalfad and celebrated,with a notoriously consistentlack of compromise, his

beingout ofjointwiththe times.Tomy mind,no othercommentaddressesthequestion“Whysuchfascination withCarlSchmitt?” more incisively thanMiiller’s casualremark.Miillerrestagesthequestionby

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foregrounding theactofthinkingas form,whichisattheheartofthe matterwheneverweseekto evaluate thesignificance ofhumanthinkingasaction—indeed, frommystandpoint, asactioninan inescapably political universe. Miiller’s gesture restores theinherent performativity ofphilosophical thinking,usuallysubsumed inthenameoflogicalargumentation,objectivereasoning,and, more oftenthan not, a moralis-

ticrighteousness whoseunstatedaimisto concealthecomplicity of a discoursewithitsideological location. Miiller’s restaging iscrucialforSchmitt’s legacyinatleasttwoways: (1)it providesan alternativeaccountof the recentfascinationwith Schmitt—a reasonotherthantheallegedmisapprehension ofhistheorieswhich,forexample,fuelsSchmitt’s patronage byvariousneofederalisttendencies in politicaltheory,sometimes hailingfromtheLeftbut also from more traditional conservative domains; (2) it realigns

Schmitt’s avowedpreference forpolemical structures, notonlytoreveal ontheconcrete ofhiswriting theimpactofthispreference materiality (whichiswhatmakeshiswritingsoseductive), but,moreimportantly, tochallenge Schmitt’s polemical structuresfromthestandpointoftheatricality, fromwhatIdiscusshereintermsofa performative dialectics ofmyth—incidentally, theveryidiomofMiiller’s theater. Tospeakof thoughtfromthe standpoint of theatricality is to acknowledge theagonisticperformativity ofallthought:thefactthatall cell)takes inahermit’s thought(evenwhatmightbesilentlyconducted whereinitisalwaysdialectically placewithinan arenaofcontention, public friendlyoradversarial, engagedwithits interlocutor—whether andarordertoproblematize realor imaginary—in or self-referential, concern.Inthisrespect,no ticulatea dialogicandthus “collective” withintheboundsofhis/hersingularviewthinkeris evercontained actitself. point,but alwaysexceedsthembyvirtueoftheperformative senseof totheoriginal art,according Theartoftheaterisahypocritical theatrical signifiwhichinadditiontoitsexplicitly theGreekhypokrisis, ofan other. fromthestandpoint cationalsomeanstheactofresponding isalwaysa pomatrix,theatricality intermsofitsoriginary Conceived itisa meansbywhichthepolisstagesitsself-represenliticalattribute; a dramaticperhistoricalterms,involves tation,which,in concretely verytermsof its socialformanceof its mythicalfoundations—the

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Castoriadis wouldsay—forthepurposesof as Cornelius imaginary, of the critique(keepingin mind,again,the significance theoretical ofmythisa Thedramaticperformance andkrisis). Greektermstheasis mayormaynot thestagedself-representation affairwhereby dialectical (atleastin the an Aufhebung and therefore leadto self-recognition, Hegeliansense)is by no meansguaranteed.In thissense,Athenian in today’spoliticaluniverseprecisely tragedybecomesparadigmatic in theconfinesofthe becausein its owntimeit wasnot exhausted essentiallyunperstage.As an art formlivingin history—though politicalrangesincethe fourthcentury formablein its full-fledged B.C.E.—it exemplifies thewaysinwhichthepolis(longdeadasa socialhistorical entitybutstilllivingasa social-imaginary form)continuesto exercise itsimagination. Schmitt’s encounter withSoreldemandsthissortofdialectical confrontation, andhisperformative polemicsagainstwhatSorelhadalreadyestablished—in a rivalperformative gesturetitledReflections on Violence (1908)—is conducted withsuperbtheatricalintuitionbeforethe audienceofa historical momentwiththehighestpoliticalstakes:postSpartacist Weimar society. LikeSchmitt, Sorelwasanidiosyncratic, controversial, andanomalousfigurein Europeanintellectual history.Assessinghisirascible andunpredictable character, IsaiahBerlinrightly compares himwithKarlKraus* (whichresonates correctly in lightof Benjamin’s fascination withboth)andproceedsto describehistendenciesin termsthatcouldapplyequallytoSchmitt:vehemently antiliberalandantibourgeois; animatedbyanavowedly polemical desire;suspiciousof the Enlightenment legacyand its democraticinstitutions; privileging actionoverdiscussion; occasionally drivento anti-Semitism,insofarasheidentifies intellectual cosmopolitanism, whichhedetests,withJewishculture.°Moreover,as with Schmitt,the consistentap-

propriation ofSorel’s workbyboththeLeftandtheRight(oftenintheir extremepositions) makes a politicalevaluation ofhishistorical significancehighlyproblematic. Sorel’s influence inhislifetime mayhavebeengreaterabroadthanin France,wherehebecameincreasingly isolatedas an intellectual and wasneverreallypartofthesyndicalist movement he advocated with suchpassion.Sorelhada significant (andlikeSchmitt,diverse)impact on Italianintellectual andpolitical circles,dueprimarilytohisfriend-

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shipwithBenedetto Croce(whotranslated Reflections onViolence and proclaimed himtheVicoofhisage),butalsoduetobothMussolini’s andGramsci’s explicit interestinhispositions.® TheEnglish translator of Reflections onViolence wasT.E.Hulme,who,alongwithWyndham Lewis,broughtSorel’swork within the Vorticistliterarycircle,which

espoused a similaraesthetics offormonthebasisofcreative violence.’ ThelinkherewasHulme’s affinitywithHenriBergson, whosephilosophicalcategories werereconfigured by Sorelin a uniquelycreative understanding oftheroleof intuitionandélanvitalin revolutionary politics.Sorel’sincorporation ofBergson’s ideasintothepolitical domainnotonlybecomes crucialin tandemwithSorel’s contribution to myargument abouttheperformativity ofmyth,butconstitutes initself alineofargument thatenables ustoseeinwhatsensethepolitical and thepoeticareintertwined inthesocietalimagination. Sorel’spoliticsis thusa poetics;heviewssocietyasa theatrical stage;hismethodofanarchyas praxisis tantamountto the methodofliteratureas theory. kepthisdistancefromSorel’s ofhisphilosophy Bergson politicization but acknowledged Sorel’sseriousness andskillin understanding and positions:“It seemsto me thatSorel’s elaboratinghis philosophical spiritistoooriginalandindependent tobeenlistedunderthebannerof hisclaims;he isnota disciple.Buthe acceptscertainofmyviews,and whenhecitesmeheshowsamanwhohasreadmewithgreatattention meperfectly.’”* andwhohasunderstood bothSchmittandSorelina longBenjamin’s gestureofincorporating thetheothatarticulates meditation standinghistorical-philosophical in suggeststhatSorel’spresence logicaltogetherwiththemythological Twoaspectsof washardlynegligible.’ Weimarpoliticalconsciousness and forbothBenjamin agravefascination onViolence exercise Reflections Schmitt:(1)thepassionateadvocacyofthegeneralstrikeas theabofmythassocigesture,and(2)thetheorization soluterevolutionary Bothaspectsexposeand chalety’sprimarymodeforself-alteration. lenge, in dramatic fashion, the questionablenature of secularization

allegedlyachievedby standardbourgeois and legal egalitarianism creBothaspectsareintertwinedin theirsimultaneously democracy. thegeneralstrikeasthe force:thusSorelrecreates ativeanddestructive mythinaction. greatproletarian andhisfirstgesture the meritsofthischallenge, Schmittrecognizes

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terms,this to Marxism.In philosophical is to degradeits connection dithoughttoHegelian-Marxist ofSorel’s meansthatanyconnection polemical whichinSchmitt’s ordiscounted, alectics mustbedisproven universewould have to be seenas a compliment,as an act of raising

to thestatusof an enemyworthyofseriouspursuit. thischallenge Tothedegreethatitclaimsto asfollows: proceeds Schmitt’s argument conaction,dialectics a methodofrevolutionary organizetheoretically a deInsofarasit prescribes contradiction. juresupaninsurmountable historicalschemeaccordingto an immanentlogic,it velopmental thatwouldsignifythemomentof theinterruption makesimpossible alterationbecause,as Schmittargues,echoinghis posirevolutionary [Auspointisthatan exception Theology, “theessential tioninPolitical ofdevelopment nahme] nevercomesfromoutsideintotheimmanence [Entwicklung].”"° Because ofitsbuilt-in methodological absorption ofall Hegeliandialectics, according toSchmitt, negationandcontradiction, provides norealmeansofethicaldecision, butratherpresentsitselfas theactualization ofthereal-rational:“If[Hegelian]worldhistoryis also the world court, then it is a processwithout a last instanceand without

a definitive disjunctive judgment”(CP,56/ 69). ThisparticularargumentunderliesSchmitt’s attemptto showthat theMarxistdesirefordictatorship (oftheproletariat) as a practical meansofabolishing liberalbourgeoisorder—and tothedegreethatit follows a dialectical methodinspiredbyHegelian categories—has resultedinaduplicitous position. Ontheonehand,ithasparticipated in thepracticalimpossibility ofdictatorship, insofarasit hascontributed, alongwiththerestofbourgeois liberalism, tothe“dissolution ofthe absolutecharacterof moraldisjunction” (CP,57/ 69).On theother hand,theveryprocessofdialectical absorptionofcontradiction and disjunction hasproduced a practical permanence ofdictatorship bythe systematic rationalist principle overthesingularandaccidental nature ofhistory. Thepractical outcome ofthissecondmanifestation wouldbe thenotionofaphilosophical vanguardthatwouldrepresent theworld spiritin itsdevelopment (intheHegelian strain),orthevanguardrevolutionary partythatwouldcontrolthesignifications ofrevolutionary action(intheLeninistBolshevik strain).Attheheartof Marxism,Schmitt thusseesanabsolute logicthatforcesallelements totheirmostextreme sothattheycanbeoverturned, historically, bydialectical necessity.

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In thisschema, thoughtitselfbecomes proofthathistoryhasinfact takenplace,giventhatthe presentmomentof intellectual judgment merelyrevealstheoutcome ofsomedialectical contradiction unfolded inthenowdeceased past.According toSchmitt's readingofdialectical Marxism, onceit becomes possibleforconsciousness tograspthepresentmoment, thecontradiction hasalready beenhistorically completed andresolved: “Thethinkeronlyknowscomingthingsconcretely inthe negative, asthedialectical contradiction ofwhatis alreadyhistorically finished.Hediscoversthepastas development intothepresent,which heseesinitscontinuous evolution andifhehascorrectly [Entwicklung]; understoodit and correctlyconstructed it, then thereis thecertainty thatthis,asathingperfectly known,belongstotheconsciousness ofa stagethathasalreadybeenovercome andwhoselasthourhasarrived” (CP,61/ 73).Marxism’s allegedscience consists, according to Schmitt, in “anevolutionary thatmakes metaphysics [Entwicklungsmetaphysik] into a criterionforprogress[Fortshritt]” (CP,63/ 75). consciousness Howeverwe evaluate the accuracyof this statement,it nominallyex-

plainswhyinterwarMarxistcirclesplacedsuchemphasis on correctnessofunderstanding andwhyclassconsciousness specifically became themostunderscored andnegotiated theoretical domaininearly-twenLukacs, Gramsci). Marxism(Lenin,Luxemburg, tieth-century I shallforegoherethe obviouscritiquethatcomesto mind—that and withthestatutesofthemostprogressivist judgesMarxism Schmitt of (Ifnothingelse,thedialectics viewofHegelian dialectics. teleological and Adornowouldcast,indistinctways,theirspectraldisBenjamin Instead,Ishalltakeas mypointofdeparproofoverthisassumption.) isintrinthatdialectical Marxism conclusion tureSchmitt'sfascinating becauseitclaimsto action,precisely sicallyincapableofrevolutionary ofits philosophical havethelogicof historyundercontrol.Regardless (oreven historical)accuracy,this positionis crucialbecauseit enforces Marxallrevolutionary namely, a singulartrackinSchmitt'sargument: culprits)proism(inhistime,LeninandTrotskyweretheeponymous ceedswitha theoryofdirectactionthatundoestheHegelian-inspired dictatorship”—the desire toward,as he calls it, “an educational of the despoticrule of enlightenedreasonby the representatives praxis. turnsinsteadtoa whollyirrationalist Spirit—and forcedoesn’tevenobeythedictatesofthedrivetoThisirrationalist

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whoselogicpoints,afterall, oftheproletariat,” ward“thedictatorship positionSchmitthadalready ofJacobinrationalism—a toanemulation developedin TheDictator(1921).Inhis ownwords:“Thisis nota ratiointoitsown itselfthrougha radicalexaggeration nalismthattransforms ofrational utopias,butfinallya newevaluation opposite andfantasizes thought,a newbeliefininstinctandintuitionthatlaystoresteverybeandwouldalsorejectthepossibilitythat mankind liefin discussion dictatorthroughaneducational couldbe madereadyfordiscussion (CP,66/ 78).Inthissense,SchmittplacesBolship[Erziehungsdiktatur]” tradition,whichin hismind shevikactionin the anarcho-syndicalist grid andtowardartasmethodological tendstolookawayfromscience forunderstanding socialexistence andsocialactionandwhoselegacy extendsfromProudhon andBakunin (throughBergson) toSorel." Therearetwothingstobe saidhere.(1)Schmittfollowsa courseof

analysisthatmustreducethebasisofrevolutionary actiontoanirrational principle;this is a dead-endpoint,in the sensethat it is the only

possibleoutcome—an evolutionary endpoint—drawn fromhisanalysis ofdialectical thought.(2)Bymerelogicalconsequence, Schmittmust beginhisdiscussion ofSorel’smythological theorybyconfiningmyth to irrationalism. Todo this,he reducestherichconceptualization of Sorel’s notionofmythentirelytotheBergsonian category ofintuition— whichisitselfproblematic, sinceBergson’s intuitionisnotat allirrational—meanwhile ignoringthelong,albeitpeculiar,trajectoryofthe notionof intuitionin Westernrationalistphilosophy, including,not least, its importancein Kant.

Perhapsthemostinteresting andrevealing aspectofSchmitt's argumentregardingthelegacyofSoreloccursinthecourseofhisjuxtapositionofProudhonwithDonosoCortés,whomheproclaims tobeSorel’s precursor fromtheothersideofthepolitical divide.Itisparticularly revealinginsofaras Schmittconsidersthepassionof DonosoCortés againstsocialism toresideinthebeliefthatsocialism isthegreatestenemy,“something enormous, greaterthanliberalmoderation, becauseit wentbacktoultimateproblems andgavea decisiveanswertoradical questions—because it hada theology” (CP,70/ 82,myemphasis). No doubt,Schmittabsorbedboththelogicandthepassionofthisposition at thecoreofhispoliticalthinking,whichiswhy,as I suggested at the

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outset,Marxismishisrealenemyandthepolemics againstMarxism is a theological life-and-death matter.ThisiswhySorelissucha formidableenemyand simultaneously whyhe is treatedwithsuchambivalence:becauseat theoriginofSorel’s privilege ofpraxisresides, notintellectual clarity,butcreative/destructive passion.Toconsiderthispassion religious,however,not to mentiontheological, is profoundly

erroneous.” FollowingDonosoCortés’sperceptionthat syndicalistactionis basednoton “thedialectically construedtensionsofHegelianMarxism”but on “theimmediateintuitivecontradiction ofmythicimages” (CP,70 / 82),Schmittproclaimsthat Sorel’smartialélan,as he callsit,

hasnothingtodowithamilitarism oftheSpirit.Schmitt readscorrectly Sorel’shatred of all intellectualism,centralization,and uniformity,and he understandsfully that Sorel’ssenseof creative/ destructiveforce,al-

ways pluraland anonymous,strikesagainstthe rationalismand monismthat leadsto the educationaldictatorshipof a dogmatic HegelianMarxism.The most creativegestureof proletarianforce, intotheplaceofpower,whichisto Schmitt argues,istousherviolence say,toinstituteanentirelynewmeansofstruggle,torefusethemeans oftheparliamentary game,whichisboundtoparalyzeallproletarian action. Facingthe formidableoppositionof Sorel,Schmitttakesup two pointsofcritique.Thefirstisofa practicalnatureandmoreorlesssugtacticsofanarcho-syndicalgeststhatthe irrationalist insurrectionary anaffirmative politics(aswewouldsayintoismcanneverconstitute political day’sterms)becauseat somepointanarcho-syndicalism’s termsof strugglewouldinevitablyhave to confrontthe economic domesticatoa certainbourgeois sphere.Thiswouldleadbydefinition orderof rulein theliteralsenseof a domestic tionof principles—to (CP,73/ 86).Schmittfortifiesthisstandpointbypointingto oikonomia categoryrestrictedto the West, as a social-historical the bourgeoisie actioninRussiawassuccessful. forhimwhyBolshevik whichexplains in termsofpoliticaleconomy Theanomalyofthe Russianrevolution posesa notoriousproblemforMarxistcircles.Schmittexplainsthe actionhas nothingto do with the eventas evidencethat Bolshevik act,the anexplicitly anti-Western itsignifies Marxistculturaltradition:

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efbourgeoisie—in withouta capitalist ofa society proletarianization (thetermheremustresoundbothliterally ofsociety fect,a nationalization andin its usualeconomicterms).Buildingon Sorel’sownassessment,”*

again,theBolsheviks RussiaMuscovite arguesthat,inmaking Schmitt wasstronger thanthemythoftheclassstrugprovedthatnationalism becomesthebasis correctobservation gle(CP,75/ 88).Thishistorically for another,rather typicalSchmittianformalism.It leads to the ques-

thatthestrongest mythinthemodernworldisnationable conclusion a Machiavelposition ofattributing andtotheembarrassing tionalism whomSchmittthenquotesasa vilianpolitical realismtoMussolini, socialism aninferiormythology. sionarybraveenoughtoproclaim Thistrajectory precludes Schmitt's realengagement withtwoessentialelements in Sorelwhich,tomymind,formthecruxofhiscontribuofthegeneralstrikeashistoritionto politicaltheory:thesignificance elcalform(aspurepraxis) andthenatureofmythasa social-imaginary ement.Thetwoareintertwined. Sorelconceives thegeneralstrikeas theexemplary instanceofviolence thatundoestheviolentlogicofthe Stateprecisely becauseit ispropelledbythecatalyticpowerofmythic imagination. Heseesthegeneralstrikeasa figurewhoseimportance liesmoreinitspotentiality andlessinitseventuality, sinceeveninthe strictesthistorical termsthegeneralstrikerarelyoccupiesthestatusof event. The general strike,Sorelargues,exists in the domain of myth,

and preciselythisinsightmakesSorel’scontributioninvaluable.He claimsfromtheverybeginning that“proletarian violencechangesthe aspectofalltheconflicts inwhichit intervenes.”Proletarian violence isnotofthe sameepistemic orderas bourgeois politicalviolencebecauseitexposestheso-called primordial rightsofmanasbeing a historicalconstruct; it demonstrates thattherightsof manpossessclass content.'° Thegeneralstrikepromisesnothingshortofparalyzing society.Itdisregards bourgeois society’s foundational right:thefreerightto produce,to developeconomically withoutobstacle. Thecatastrophic promiseofthegeneralstrikethusoperatesat thelevelofsocial-imaginarysignification witha senseofcertaintyirreducible toits parts,impervioustoanalytictechnique: suchistheintuitiveknowledge ofmyth. Anticipating theusualobjections, Sorelquicklyclarifiesthatmyths areneitherillusionsnorfacts(RV,23/ 33).Mythsareincommensurable

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tofactsbecause theymayexceed facts,muchasrevolutionary desire(or

utopianvision)canneverbeexhausted inthefact/ eventofrevolution. Yetmythsarealsonotillusions because mythsaredemonstrable historicalforces: imagined alterities ofsocietythatmakehistorical actionpossible.'® Themaincharacteristic of myth,according toSorel,isinfinity, whichisalsosaidtoinclude a senseofindefiniteness. Socialism, astheoryonly,is ultimatelyreducibleto its words,indeedto its word(of promise, of definition,etc.). But praxis, exemplifiedfor the anarcho-

syndicalist Sorelbytheactofthegeneralstrike,“putsforwardnodefiniteprojectoffuturesocialorganization” (RV,27/ 39),andisthusirreducible: indefinite andinfinite bothbecause itis irreducible toitsparts (thatis,singular) but alsobecauseit isinterminably reproducible each timeanew.” Whatenables Soreltomakethisargument isBergson’s of philosophy withinduration, a pastmoment inone’slife,unresingularity whereby thoughitis,maybereinserted inthehistorical flowasthebapeatable sisforapresentmomentofdecision. Sorelbelievesthatsocietyiscapable of suchcatalyticmomentswhereby,in a fashionreminiscent of Vico’sricorso(or,in anotherregister,H6lderlin’sUmkehr), an imagined

byinvoking theexperience ofthepast,notinorder alterityis achieved torepeatit,butinordertopeelofftheaccumulated inertiaofcultureon havenothing Suchrecursive moments thewaytoarejuvenated history. a momentof aboutthem.Thegeneralstrikeexemplifies instrumental imaginedalterity,whetherit willactuallysucceedornot.Inthesame failure(thefactthatitwon’tleadtoa takeover waythatitsinstrumental withanequallyradical ofpower)doesnotprecludeitsreoccurrence potentialeachtime,itsactualityisalwayssingularand transformative moment."* exhaustedinitsownhistorical betweentheendsin view Thereis in thisrespect“a heterogeneity and the endsactuallyrealized”(RV,135/ 179),whichisSorel’swayof therelationbetweentheoryandpraxis.Itispraxis,moreso describing thantheory,that“takesplace”inthedomainofmyth,anditisthevery preirrevocable thatpraxisholdsovertheory—an lackofspeculation regisplanis irrelevant—that futureas analytical sentwhosepotential Thegeneralstrikeis“the violence. tersthemythicnatureofproletarian ofiman organization is whollycomprised, mythin whichSocialism

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whichcorreallthe sentiments agescapableofevokinginstinctively . .. ofwaragainstmodernsociety. spondtothediversemanifestations cannotgive whichlanguage ofSocialism Wethusobtainthatintuition instanweobtainitasa whole,perceived uswithperfectclarity—and becomes understanding 137/ 182). Thisinstantaneous (RV, taneously” exceeds it. becausethegeneralstrikeisanactwhoseviolence possible Asthe act is exhaustedin a theaterofpowerin whichorder(ofone generates thesortof violence kindoranother) alwayswins,proletarian ofsocialidentitiesthatnopowercan aboutthecontention knowledge of arare theorization liquefy.InSorel’shands,thisdynamicbecomes ofrealityishardlytheconideological forcein whichthe“distortion” butis insteadtheverymeansthatkeepsreality duitofself-alienation opentoself-alteration.”” Sorelisrighttopointoutthatthemythicdimensionofproletarian violence hasnothingto do withutopianyearning.Inthesensethat mythis an irreducibleexpressionof “collective” conviction(notattainedbyrationalanalysisbut intuitedasintegralexperience), it is a radicallanguageofthemomentwhichdoesnotbeardissectionand classification atthelevelofhistoricaldescription. Thesocial-imaginary ofthegeneralstrikeisbydefinition catalyticofsocialorder;itsvery conceptualization enactsanabolitionofthatorder.Bycontrast,utopia isaprojected modelwhichinvitesdiscussion “likeanyothersocialinstitution.”Utopias,accordingtoSorel,areconcreteprojections, which arethereforedefiniteandlinkedto thepresentbyanalogy.Mythsare notprojections. Theyarealwayspresentandyet,insofarastheydon’t belongto the order offact,theyareindefiniteand indeterminate,hence

beyondanalogy.Theradicalpresentof the generalstrikeenactsa “framingofa futurein someindeterminate time”(RV133/ 177),but it isnotutopianbecauseit lacksteleology, whetherconceptual oractual. Sorel’stermssuggestthatviolence performs myth,notthereverse.And proletarian violence is asortofantinomic condition totheparanomia of bourgeois law. Schmitteitherdoesnot seeor doesnotwantto confrontthisargumentonitsterms.Thisisquiteunlikehim,forheconsciously cultivated the dismantlingof his enemyby appropriatingthe logicof enemy terms.Notconfident thatIcansubjectSchmittto a phenomenological

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psychoanalysis onthisissue,I wouldnonetheless underline, aspointof departure foraninterpretation, hiswarningattheconclusion ofhisargumentonSorel:“Ofcourse,theabstractdangerthiskindofirrationalismposesisgreat.Thelastremnants ofsolidarity andafeeling ofbelonging together willbedestroyed inthepluralism ofanunforeseeable numberofmyths.Forpolitical theology thisispolytheism, justasevery mythispolytheistic” (CP76/ 89,myemphasis). Thisastuterecognition oftheessentially polytheistic imaginary of mythis tantamount toa confession: political cannottolerate theology thepluralindeterminacy ofmyth,becausepolitical theology ispossible onlywithintheboundaries ofa monotheistic imagination. Theimmediateandobviousimplication isthattheterrainofthemythical is outandthatthetwodomains are sidetheboundaries ofpolitical theology Theinstance ofSchmitt's latecritiqueofHans essentially incompatible. Blumenberg (asan afterword toPolitical Theology II)suggests, ifnothing else,thatSchmittwasperfectlyconsciousofthisincompatibility and thathewasalsocommitted tothetheological archéofhispolitical thinking throughouthis life.Schmitt’s replyto Blumenberg’s arguments aboutlegitimation andsecularization isformedaccording tohisearly thesison the crypto-metaphysics of secularization, whichdelineated onceandforalltheterrainof“politicaltheology”asa project.Thus, Schmittwillimputeto Blumenberg a forcedde-theologizing thatconwhileBlumenberg tinuestooccludetherealityofsecularmetaphysics, fromthelanwillcounterthatsecularthoughtmerelyreappropriates The andsilenced mythical elements.” guageoftheologyitssuppressed theirincompatibility parallels twopositions areeachother’snegation; betweenmythand politicaltheology,whichis the incompatibility entireprojectisa meditahardlysurprising,giventhatBlumenberg’s thinking. tiononmythical notoriousandunwaveringvigilanceagainstalldevelopSchmitt’s tohisown politicsthatposea challenge mentsin actualandtheoretical hisatwouldcommand thatBlumenberg madeitinevitable positions anadtentionlateinhislife.Thisisn’tmerelya matterofencountering etc.)but,more legitimacy, versaryonthesameterrain(secularization, thisterrainin a foebecauseheconceptualizes important,counteracting a positionalmostbecomes terms.Inthisrespect,Blumenberg’s mythical

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thatitlacksthepoexception withthesignificant lateversionofSorel’s, to Sorel’sforcefulchallenge whichcharacterized liticalexpediency with turnedhimfromfoetoadversary andtherefore Marxism Hegelian Still,in the same a distinctive(evenif repressed)markof ambivalence. episwasdeeplytroubledbySorel’sinsurrectionary waythatSchmitt chaltemology intheWeimaryears,heis disturbedby Blumenberg’s Thecontestedgroundis thesisinthe1970s. lengetohissecularization

terms.Judgformedwhenmythupturnsthebasicpolitical-theological onSorel,whichI citedabove, oftheargument ingfromtheconclusion disruptionof his Schmitthadbeenawareof myth’sepistemological Attempting to diffusethe foundations sincetheearly1920s. project’s Schmittnever chargesofirrationalism, threatbyraisingoversimplified takesupthecruxofthechallenge, whichherecognizes explicitly asthe threatof“polytheism.” Blumenberg renewsandactuallyraisesthestakesofthischallenge becausehetoofoundsa projectondismantlingtheinheritedassumptionsoftheEnlightenment’s purgeof“other-worldly” categories inhistory.Whereas Schmitt’s denudingofEnlightenment authoritydesiresa reconstitution oftheological categories forhistorical thinking,BlumenbergdisputesthenotionthattheEnlightenment signifiesmodernity’s momentoftranscending orobliterating mythandproceedstorecuperatethepresence ofmythwithinEnlightenment thoughtitself.Inother words, Blumenberg’sseminalWorkonMythis a continuationof the Di-

alectic ofEnlightenment project—a dialectical continuation, inwhichEnlightenment isrescuedbymeansofmyth.Thisisn’tas far-fetched asit seems,considering thatHorkheimer and Adorno’s projectessentially consistsin a philosophical outwittingofmyththrougha specificexerciseof Enlightenment thoughtthatwouldbeconscious andcriticalof itsownmythological propensities.”! Onedoesn’tneedtoconsiderthematterfromthisstandpoint, however,in ordertorealizethata chasmseparatesSchmitt'sandBlumenberg’scritiquesof Enlightenment andsecularization. Schmitt’s answer tohiscorrectreadingof themetaphysics ofsecularization isthefamous thesisin Political Theology accordingtowhichtheexceptionthatguaranteessovereignty is,in thelanguageof jurisprudence, analogousto themiracleintheology. Inthelastinstance, thisanalogical gestureisac-

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tuallytautological becauseit subscribes toan explicitmetaphysics; it de-secularizes a secularism thathasbeendiscovered to bemetaphysicalin essence,afterall.Blumenberg, by contrast, countersthemetaphysicsofsecularism with a realhistorical alternative. Hisconcern with mythgoesbeyondthe standardnotionof mythas narrativeoforigin (thearch-tales of the world).He investigates mythas present-time logic,as history’sscientia inthestrictsense:a modeof knowledge that commands a generative domainofsocial-symbolic formsautonomous fromthegenerative logicofscience orreason—which iswhySchmitt's chargeof Blumenberg’s scientismisat the veryleastmyopic.Forour limitedpurposeshere,it suffices tonotethatBlumenberg understands mythtobea modeofknowledge thatcounters the“absolutism ofreality”andtheintrinsicterrorthisentailsbyprocessing andfashioning realitythroughimaginative invention.Inpsychoanalytic terms,thisunofmythical wouldbe tantamount totheworkof derstanding thinking theintervention intoandappropriation ofrealitybysocisublimation: ety’spsychicforces,by meansof its radicalimagination.” Mythic thought,inthisrespect,isirreducibly historical; itcannotprecedea society’s imaginary.” WhenSchmittspeaksfromthestandpointofpoliticaltheology, this ofmythisananathema. Asheconsistently argues,startunderstanding andPolitical Form(1923), it is tantamountto ingwithRomanCatholicism as Sinceheconfigures “mythical thinking” theworkoftheAntichrist. servesto consolidate imageprojection thatoccasionally an irrationalist being myth(theexemplar thesocialbody,asinthecaseofnationalist Schmittisboundto seemythasanelementthat fascism), Mussolini’s whetherasarchéorastelos.Amostintriguing surpassesthehistorical, schemaisa briefforayintoliterarycritifromthisconsistent deviation wherein (1956), ofTimeintheTheater TheRupture orHecuba: cism,Hamlet conofhistory’srelationto tragedyyieldssomerevealing a discussion force.Thissmalltextmaybe considclusionsaboutmythas historical theTrauerspiel toWalterBenjamin’s deferredresponse eredSchmitt’s avenues sis,whichwasitselfpartiallyindebtedtothemethodological explicittributeto toBenjamin’s according Theology, openedbyPolitical Schmittina letterthathasbecomenotorious.ThoughIcanonlytreat thistextin passing,Ibelievethatitdeservestoshakeitsminorstatus

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viewson thenatureof inSchmittstudies,notmerelyforitsintriguing theissueof histragedybut forthewayinwhichSchmittaddresses withhistory)bymeansofa theoryof tory(andmyth’simplication hisown“political-theological” tragedywhich,tomymind,challenges categories.” In his usual way,Schmittconductshis fleetingobservationson tragedyviaanunderlyingcritiqueofthetraditionofGermanliterary the Romanticsalwaysat the criticism, whichhas operated—with Schmittreads thelyricsubjectoverthedramatic. helm—by privileging ofpoetryinGermanliterarythoughtasbothcauseand theprominence and (sinceGoethe)towardaestheticautonomy effectofthepropensity historicalthecreativegenius.Hisargumentisbasedonan exemplary ofGermannationalculturein sociological accountofthedevelopment an essentially State-less transitionfrombaroquefeudalordertoninecomparateenth-century capitalism, a pointhehadalreadydeveloped tivelyin his essay“TheFormationof the FrenchSpiritby Jurists” (1942).6 Veryschematically, thepointofcomparisonis not onlythe Frenchmodel—where theprivilegeofthedramaticartsisexemplified bystrongStateinstitution andthemutationofcourtlyliteratureintothe seventeenth-centurycourt Classicismof Racine or Corneille—but, more important,the Englishmodel,whoseown strong Trauerspiel tra-

ditionis ableto mutate,unlikeGermany’s, intothebonafidetragic worldofShakespeare. Schmittarguesthatin Elizabethan Englandthereis asyetnoinstitutionalizedtheatricality; societyisinternally, as it were,in a theatrical condition. Shakespeare’s emergence andeventual establishment ofthe GlobeTheaterchronicles theexternalization ofsocialtheatricality into artisticform,a formthatactualizes social-historical demandsina distinct,performative momentofculture.Shakespeare’s success,accordingtoSchmitt,isduenot to hisinventive geniusbuttohisextraordinaryalertnesstothegénieof a realitythatremainsexcessively performativeoutsidethestructurallimitations ofa centralized culturalorder: “Thesurplusvalue[oftragedy]lieswithinthe objectiverealityof tragedyitselfhappening,intheenigmaticinvolvement andentanglementofindisputably realpeoplein theunpredictable courseof indisputablyrealevents.””” Shakespeare maybesaidtogenerate culture,not

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insofarasheinventsa newculturalpractice, butinsofarasherealizes on thestagesociety’s ownmythological performativity. Thevanguard nature of Hamlet,with its circuitous,ambivalent,self-reflexive, and even

convolutedstructures,is for Schmittan exemplaryinstanceof the mythification of a precisesocial-historical moment.It isa casewhere “theplayonstagecouldappearwithoutartificiality as theaterwithin theater, asalivingplaywithintheimmediately presentplayofreallife” (HH,43),instituting a doublingeffectwhichissetupforfurtherexternalizationwithinitsowndomainina kindofmiseenabimeexemplified bythefamousplay-within-a-play sectionin Hamlet. Here,Schmittconstructs an insightful argument: “Theplaywithina playinActIIIofHamlet notonlyisnolookbehindthescenes,butisthe playproperrepeatedbefore the curtains.Thispresupposes a realistic coreof themostintensepresent-ness andactuality. ... Onlya strong coreofreality[Aktualitatskern] couldstanduptothedoubleexposure of itself thestageuponthestage”(HH,45).Inotherwords,because reality hasnotyetsacrificed itsspontaneous toa culturalinstitutheatricality tion presidedoverby the (theatrical)orderoftheState,theboundaries betweenit andthe theaterarestillopenandrealitythusleansonthe veryproduction oftheplay,conferring uponitnotmerelyretrospective butreal-time Itisrealinterpretive significance productive significance. ity,not dramaticinvention, thatbringsaboutthegrandinnovation Schmittcalls“theHamletization of thehero,”a modernmythifying and indecisionuponthe classic gesturethat enforcesambivalence realmofheroicactionindrama.ThisgesturedoesnotbelongtoShakeit belongstoShakespeare’s Moreprecisely, speare;itbelongsto history. whichopens atear in theplay’s tohistory’s performance, attunement mayflowthroughit,so thatdrama space-time unityso thathistorical (whichat thisverymomentbecomes onstageandhistory’s dromenon thisgesThough interwoven. aneventastheater)canbeperformatively integrityoftheplayas pure turemayseemtodisruptthe“classical” ofthefigureof it enablesthetransformation artisticentity,nonetheless SchmittarHamletfromdramaticpersonato myth(andconcurrently, totragedy). gues,theplayHamletfromTrauerspiel meansnothingoutsidea performative Thismomentofmythification hereinliesthe reality—and ofa specific social-historical actualization

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not ofthetragicformasa politicalforce,aformgenerative, significance is the finaland insurmountable ofthepolis:“[Tragedy] constitutive, Apoetcanandshouldinventa greatdeal, limitofliteraryinvention. ... coreoftragicaction[Handlung]. buthecannotinventtherealistic is theoriginoftragicauthenticity, Thecoreoftragicaction[Geschehens], thatnomortalcanimagineit,nogeniuscan soirrevocable something it.. . . Intragedy,thecommonpublicsphere(whichin every construct is the author,theactors,andthe audience) encompasses performance andplaybuton accepted rulesoflanguage notbasedonthecommonly reality”(HH,47). ofa sharedhistorical thelivedexperience oeuvreas figureswithinSchmitt’s Regardless ofhowthisstatement aconcisepresentation oftragedythatenablesusto awhole,it provides understandwhy mythis notmerelythesourcetextof tragedy(the buttheactualreality storyuponwhicha specificdramaisconstructed) thatenablesdramaasa formtoexist.Athenian tragedyalreadyshowed whymythisnotoriginarybutcontemporary, astheimplicitimaginary thatlendsa community thenecessarycoherence to put intopractice (andperhapsintoquestion)itsowninstitutions. Thiscoherence does notnecessarily implycohesion orhomogeneity. Ittestifiestothebarest elements of a shared historicalexistencewithin which a subversive,

self-altering imaginary maypotentially developand,dependingonthe institutional conditions, flourish. Theknowledge ofmythassourcetext, whichthecommunity possesses, isinvestedin theperformance notas originbutasreality,as present-tense mythicthoughtthatwillthenenablethejudgment(krisis) ofthegiventragedyasaspecificperformative instanceofmyth.Toputitotherwise, intragedymythdoesnotpreside as originbut is enactedas drémenon, beyondtheboundariesof the stage,forthesimplereasonthattheentirepolisisreminded bythetheatricalexperience thatitspoliticalsubstanceis predicated on itsown theatricality. Thepolitical community isconstituted notonlyinbutas theatron; itistheaterassuch. Historically speaking, Athenian tragedyisanexemplary momentof performative myththatfostersinterrogation of existinginstitutions, and thishistorical naturecannotbe disavowed whenonespeaksof tragedyasa form.ThisisthestepthatSchmittdoesnotmakebecause hisreadingofHamlet as tragedy—otherwise insightfulin pointingto

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history’scomplicity withmyth—sees tragedyasmereconfirmation of society’shistoricalmyth(s),neverraisingthequestionof tragedyas a modeofinterrogation ofsociety’s historical myth(s). Thecrossroads of theatrical realityonandoffstagedemands a dialectical apprehension thatcarriesno instrumental guarantee,sinceeventhemostclassical (Aristotelian) resolution onstageisimmediately undermined bytheirresolute criticalpraxisofthespectator polity.Thisisanotherpointthat Schmitt misses,no doubt because he would find the dialecticalunde-

cidability ofancientdemocratic politicsintolerable onprinciple. Inthe process,healsomissesBenjamin’s oftheinevitably understanding politicalsignification oftheatricality ateveryspecific historical frame. Schmittconcludes hisHamletorHecuba withabriefappendix thatrespondsdirectlyto Benjamin’s readingofHamlet. Trauerspiel Heconductsa conciseexplanation ofEngland’s peculiarhistorical maneuver aroundtheinstitution ofmodernpolitical by sovereignty exemplified Francebyshowing howEngland passesdirectlyfromanexClassicist power,froma traditional emplaryfeudalordertoa navalimperialist terrestrial existence tomaritimeglobalexpansion—to whichhelinks,in fact,the extraordinaryoccurrenceof the industrialrevolution.England,

forSchmitt, enacteda realrevolution, farbeyondthe “revolutionary progress”fromtheStateofLouisXIVtotheStateoftheCitizen.Ashe occursin theverylastphaseof putsit,theShakespeare phenomenon whichhemeansin twosenses:“barEngland’s “barbaric” existence, ofEurope,but Sovereign baric”fromthestandpointofthe“civilized” ofasocietypoisedtoenteranasconstitutive condition also“barbaric” politicsof whichwillleavethe“civilized” otherphaseofcivilization, behind.If,therefore,theplayisperceivedin termsofthe sovereignty is essentially thepointof of power—which historicalrepresentation ofthehero”documents the “Hamletization Schmitt’s analysis—then classaboutto malaiseofabewildered andintellectual thehopelessness reality. historical besweptbyan incomprehensible ofthehero”the tothe“Hamletization insightfully attributes Schmitt elementthatdistortsand thenewimaginary statusof tragicmyth—as theclassicalhero’srelationwithfatum(thoughSchmitt reassembles hiscarriesa veritable doesn’tphraseit in quitetheseterms)—which his conversely, of history—or, perception toricalforce.ButSchmitt’s

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cementedin a determinateorderthat perception—is metaphysical reads setof terms.ThusSchmitt intoa specific everything translates ofreligious explanation ofHamlet'smalaiseastheoutcome Benjamin's ofa onthehopelessness meditation crisisandnotasadeeplyhistorical Schmittatoverreligion. worldlyhistorythathasemergedvictorious subwhileinfactBenjamin a residualtheologism, tributesto Benjamin mergeshimselfin religiousmetaphorinordertoexplodetheological assurancefromwithin. Schmitt’sact is tantamount to self-occultation,

succeedsinevokingthe historiwouldputit. Benjamin as Castoriadis a form dimensions ofaculturalmomentbyexploring cal-philosophical demonstrates preciselythathistorymaybe untotalizwhoseJetztzeit able, undecidable, and indecisive but is nonetheless a terrain—a

Contraryto Schmitt, Ben“stage”—on whichanythingcanhappen.** jaminreads“Hamletization” notastheoutcomeofclassbewilderment ForBenjamin, indecision is the butasa radicalmomentofrealization. sortofpraxisthatemergesfromthehopelessknowledgeofhistorical multivalence ina worldthatdeniesthepossibility oftranscendence. Thus, Benjamin’sagreementwith Schmitton the factthat Hamletis dis-

tinctfromtheGermanTrauerspiel (andthusexemptedofitshistorical failure)hingesonacontrarythesis:Hamlet isa documentofthisradical momentofhistorical realization. Schmitt'sencounterswithBenjaminand Blumenberg in his later writingsaremarkedby thesameoccludingambivalence he had extendedtoSorelin the 1920s.Wesawrepeatedlyhow pointsofagreementwereeitherbasedoncontrarytermsorwerearticulatedsimultaneouslywithcontradictory conclusions. Indeed,beyondthecritiqueof depoliticization inherentinthemetaphysics ofliberalism, whichstillremainshis mostchallenging contributionto politicaltheoryand the mostcoherentaspectofhisworkthroughout, Schmitt’s methodological duplicityis mostrigorously articulated in hisattemptsto encounter mythwith thearmoryof politicaltheology.Anyattemptto denyor evento resolvethisessentialduplicityinSchmitt’s thinking—whereby hisassociation withNazismisoftendismissed asmereopportunism— canonlyleadto “Schmittianism,” toan ideological reproduction inthe mostpejorative sense.WhatmakesthethoughtofCarlSchmittworthy ofdiscussionis preciselythis duplicity, this continuous“Hamletiza-

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tion”elevated tothestatusofmethod.” Schmitt himself confirms this insightwitha quip,whoseoff-the-cuff toneisasexemplary ofhisduplicityasisthecontentofhiswords.Duringhisinterrogation bytheAlliesatNuremberg, Schmitt atonepointresponds: “TheDr.CarlSchmitt mythis puremyth.CarlSchmitt isquiteapeculiar individual, notjust a professor;he is also a compositeof variousindividuals,” adding shortlyafterward, “Iamanintellectual adventurer.”* Theavowalof adventurism shouldnot shieldthe disavowalof myth.Indeed,theavowedadventurist logicpoints,behindtheexplicit denialofthemythofCarlSchmitt, to an equivalent, hiddendesireto gainthestatusofmyth.Buta questionis immediately posed:Which myth?the vital insurrectionary forceof Sorelianpraxis?the tragic of historyin Hamlet? mythification the all-potentnationalistmythof Mussolini? thetheological politicsofthekatechon? Schmitt's duplicity sincehehasreserved forallat makesanydefinitive answerdifficult, least one occasionof more or lessdirect avowal.In his relationto Sorel, however,whateverinstanceof identificationis claimedwould have to

besubjected totheruleofambivalence. EvenifinfactSchmitt didsubscribetoSorel’smythicalthinking,hedidsoonlyintermsofitsvitalist andpolemical hedidhisbesttorepress own aspects. Otherwise, Sorel’s notsomuchhisMarxism buthisanarchic impetusbehindtheseaspects: vision. In instanceswhen, operating from the other side of his ambivalence, Schmittexpresses his fear for Sorel’sirrationalism,he aims to

harnessSorel’svitalismto theprinciplesof order.In thissense,we might say that, ifSchmittis at all Sorelian,he is an authoritarianandhi-

in a contradiction whichis,forallpracticalpurposes, erarchicSorelian, to claiming speaking,it wouldbe tantamount terms.Philosophically thatSchmittobviconcept—a contradiction thatmythisa theological that the extraordinary comment ifweremember ouslyunderstands, Democracy, closeshis analysisof Sorelin TheCrisisofParliamentary and ofsolidarity “Thelastremnants worthrepeating: whichiscertainly a feelingofbelongingtogetherwillbedestroyedin thepluralismofan thisispolytheism, theology numberofmyths.Forpolitical unforeseeable (CP76/ 89,myemphasis). justaseverymythispolytheistic” theology Political isliterally apocalyptic. Theclarityofthisstatement theforceofmythis quitecorrectly, mustbetheenemyofmythbecause,

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atthecore.Thisis theonly (“unforeseeable”) diverseandindeterminate intothe couldbe translated waythatthechargeofmyth’spolytheism lantermsofthisessay,sinceoptingto considermythin a theological In the strictesttermsof Schmitt’s guageleadsto severeconfusion.

when onlyininstances theological phrase,mythcanbesaidtobecome intoa sinmonologically dispersed forcesareconsolidated itsmultiple, dulycelebrates. whichSchmitt gularend,asinthecaseofnationalism, of monomythical “Political theology”has roomforthe singularity thinking(inOdo Marquard’ssenseofthe term)becauseit is ofthe same

butnothingis thiswouldbethecaseinthelastinstance, order.Surely, Schmitt’s duplicitous moresignificant, in regardto understanding beforetheedifice thanraisingthequestion ofthelastinstance method, ofpoliticaltheology. Fromthisstandpoint,an enormousquestionemergesin regardto theactualsignification ofthenotion“political theology,” whichgoes beyondSchmitt’s usagebutincorporates intoits(ill)logical whirlwind theimplications ofSchmitt's claims.Inwhatsensecouldanybodyof thoughtthatconsidersitselfessentially politicalspringfromanapocalypticorigin,whichmeanshavingsubjecteditselftoa heteronomous arché,to an unquestionablelawofan Other?*!Simultaneously, a second

questionarises,entirelyinterwoven withthefirst:Inwhatsensecould politicalthinkingspringfroma monological (ormonomythical) point ofview?I don’tmeantosayfromanindividualpointofview,forall politics,totheextentthatit involvespoliticalsubjects,mustbeexperiencedunderthedemandofsingulardecision—this is thebarenecessity ofsubjectivity insociety, thebarestsenseofpolitical life.Butthemonologicalpointof viewinherentin a monomythical-monotheistic imaginarycannevertransform itselfintotheantagonistic multiplicity embodiedin theactualhistoricalnatureofpoliticalpraxis—which is to say,oflifeina neverquitedefinitearenaofcontention wherethemomentofdecisionisfacedwithoutguarantee. Forthisreason,thenotionof politicaltheology, despiteits longand illustrious traditioninthehistoryofChristianthought,is strictosensu nonsensical. Theology hasnothingtodowiththepolis,notonlyhistoricallybutepistemologically. Itcanonlybelinkedtopoliticsmetaphorically,as Blumenberg hasargued,theverylinkthatpropelsitsself-oc-

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cultation:“politicaltheology”is a metaphorical theologywhose metaphoric actconsists precisely inconcealing itsmerenatureof“theologyaspolitics.”** Forthisreasonalso,apartfrom a strictlyhistoriographicalutilitywithinthetermsofthehistoryofreligion,Heinrich Meier’s elaborate attempttodistinguish between political theology and political philosophy occludes thematterfurther. Fromthestandpoint of myargument, ifthetermpolitical theology isnonsensical, thetermpoliticalphilosophy ismerelytautological. Asinterrogative reflection onthe significance ofhumanlife,philosophical praxisis notpossible without thepolitical,asbothgroundandcommunity. Hence,theconceptofthe politicalcanneverbeexhaustedinthesheerformalism ofconflict—of enemyOtherness as self-constitutive arché.Inthesimplestsense,once weextractfromthepoliticalanyinstrumentalist orexpedient elements (whosemeaningispossiblealways andonlyintermsofappropriation of Statepower),thentheologycannotbepoliticalandphilosophy isalwayspolitical—hence, theuntenability ofattempting tocontrastthem isahistoonepreference. Thepolitical andtojudgeSchmittaccording that ofacertainsocial-imaginary torical,notontological, manifestation interrogation. daresconceivesocietyas the outcomeofinterminable goesintohiberisderailed,thepolitical Themomentthisinterrogation is,in somanywords,our nationat bestandoblivionat worst—this correcttodayin the ageof“identitypolitics,”“political predicament Onlyifgroundedinthepremisethat ness,”and “conflictresolution.” nothingis sacred,that alljudgmentis opento question,canthemoalldeOtherwise, mentofdecisionsignifya momentoftransformation. totheworshipofOrder. cisionwillremainsubjugated

NeedforAntigone Philosophy’s

NotYet

ofmyth,particularly Itisanoldstorytoseeintragedythe(re)staging (and,tosomeextent, asitpertainstothewaytheancientpolisexercises exorcises) the antagonistic nature of its foundational imagination,

whichiswhy,inbasicterms,tragedymaybethemostovertlypolitical inthehistoryofculture.Butitis exercises ofart(techné) ofallritualistic maturityat itspointofdealsopartofthestorytolocatephilosophy’s parturefromthetragichandlingofmyth.Suchis,rathersimply,the momentmarkedbybothPlato’sandAristotle’s understanding ofthe poeticas therealmofmimesis.Theircuriousaffinityon thismatter

(placedwithinfundamentally different philosophical projects) attests tothecreation ofanewstandpoint fromwhichthefoundational imaginationofthepolisishenceforth stagedandexercised. Apointofdeparturehasatleasta doublesignification: tobeginand to leave behind, to be derived fromand to discontinue.A paradoxical

naturethushauntsthistransitional moment:whathasalwaysbeen considered themomentofphilosophy’s maturityhasalsoalwaysbeen figuredasitstruebirth.Thepsychological gravityofthisdoublecondition, as far as “Westernculture” is concerned,has been immense. The

institution ofphilosophy inclassical Greeceprovidestheassurance of origin—which thusenablesmodernity’s ownself-ascription ofmaturityinthegrandprocessofcivilization (wherebytheGreeksarefigured as thechildhoodofmankind,in Marx’sfamousassertion)—atthesame

timeasit instillsa profoundanxietyaboutnotbeingtheorigininoneself(modernity’s otheragonizingfoundational principlesinceLocke’s claimfortabularasaorKant'scallforself-tutelage). Thisanxietyisman116

Philosophy’s Need forAntigone aay

ifestedin the tremendousenchantment that pre-Socratic (andin a sense,pretragic) thoughtholdsforthetradition ofmodernity, andparticularlyforthe Romantic imagination, arguablythe mostbrazenof modernity’s self-inventions. Thisisa chimeric enchantment, foritconsistsin an apotheosisof philosophy’s prematurity, hencea longingfor completion, forcomingof age.Because desireforthepurityandinnocenceofchildhood cannotbedivorcedfromtheanxietyofnotbeingon one’s own, which is the definition of maturity, the relationbetween

modernityand philosophyis characterized by a fundamental need. Andbecausethedifference betweenphilosophy’s prematurity (itscoincidence withthe“Orphicrealm”)andphilosophy’s “proper” birthis measuredby the emergence anddemiseoftherealmof tragedy,one mightsay,perhapsrathersimply,that modernphilosophy is determinedbyitsneedforthetragicelement. Underlying thisneedisthedeeperimplication ofspeculative reflectionwiththecreativeimagination, whoseidiomis mythandwhose inGreeceresidesintheperformative trailofpocommunal articulation etry,fromepictolyrictochoralode.Thegenealogies ofthisimplication aremultipleandcontested: fromSophocles andPlatotoNietzsche and Heidegger,the territorybetweena tragicanda philosophical poiésis rangesfromcoincidence tomutualannihilation, yetitsoriginarycomOne ofthepolitical alwaysremains central. plicitywiththesignificance ina tragicor cannotdisputethat,in Athens,stagingthepoetic(whether idiom)wasalwaysa matterofpolitical significance— a philosophical thedifference betweenthetwoidiomsresidinginthemanner(thepoetofthepolis.TheprojectofEnlightenment ics)ofstagingtheimaginary arculminating thiscomplicity, intheeighteenthcenturyrearticulated a totalpractice totheorize guablyintheattemptbytheJenaRomantics poeticsasa wayof staginga newvisionofcommunity. ofphilosophical Ifonefollowsthistrainofthought,theancientquarrelbetweenpobecausethe maynotbesoancientat all—precisely etryandphilosophy tobeundercontinues andcontention objectoftheirmutualconcern thequestionof inthelastinstance, standingthehumanpredicament: action within a socialcollective(however looselywe conceiveit). This

is a questionof thewaysandmeansto knowledge—self-knowledge processof ina conscious aboveall,whosemeaningremainsimplicated

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in a Greekwayoflife. as initially privileged institution, autonomous detail.SincePlatosoughttodiisaspecific here,however, Ourconcern the ofphilosophy, minishtheartsofpoetryinfavoroftheautonomy the poetic/tragicaccessto knowledgehas requestionconcerning Tospeakofphilosophy’s mainedtheghostlyhauntofallphilosophy. need is to enterthis spectraldomain,where—inadditionto the mythi-

realm”—the elinthe“Orphic ofpoetryandphilosophy calco-incidence towhichpoetryhas isowingtotheghostlyexistence ementofhaunting on its ownauinsistence beenrelegatedsincemodernphilosophy’s ofReasonortheSpirit). topoiesis (theself-institution is withinitsowndomain—this Philosophy’s originsaresupposedly theimplicitprinciple,theunwrittenlaw,thatholdsswayovertheEnbutalso,morespecifically, lightenment’s ontological presuppositions huattempttooutwittheKantianchasmbetween overHegel'sexplicit Yet,asGeorgeSteinerhasaptly manactionandobjective phenomena. putit,“tophilosophize afterRousseauandKant,tofinda normative, of condition conceptual phrasingforthepsychic,social,andhistorical man,istothink‘tragically.’”’ Inasense,theenigmatic consequences of thissortofassertion areatstakehere.Nodoubtthenotoriousobsession ofmodernphilosophysinceHegelwithGreektragedytestifiesto the powerofthedramaticpresentation ofknowledge—even more,to the dramaticmethodbywhichknowledge becomesaccessible, notonlyto oneselfbut in-between selves,in thewaythata communitycomesto knowitself.ForSteiner, Hegelisthemodeldramatistofmodernphilosophy(therealheirto Plato,in thisrespect),preciselybecausehis methodisexplicitly founded onaninternally stagedself-polemic.? The greatestcontribution ofHegelian dialectics (oncethedesirefortheAbsoluteissubtractedfromit)residesin theun-logical (almostnonsensical)simultaneity ofaufheben, wheredissolution, conservation, augmentation,suspension,apprehension, annulment,and so on simultaneously participate,in total complicityand antagonism,in the performance of signification. Hegel’sverborchestrates notionsasgestures,turningidentity(anditslogic)intoa performative, dynamic,and ultimately ec-static matter.Dialectical thoughtpresupposes theperformanceof thinkingagainstoneself,of actingagainstthegrainof one’s identity,whichis whydialecticsisunlogicalin a strictsense:it defies

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thetermsofidentitary logic,notmerelyby makingcontradiction the keystone ofthought,butbysplittingidentityfromwithin,abasicgestureofotheringoneselfthatmayexplainwhyMarxfoundin dialectics themethodfortheorizing theconditions ofsociety’s self-alteration. Hegel’sexplicitlydramaticmethodof thinkingemergesout of a ofthinkers community andartistswhosoughttotheorize theconsubstantialtaskofliteratureandcriticism, whiledrawingtheirconceptual termsfromtheintersection betweentragedyandmyth.Emblematic of thisassociation isthefamousfragment“TheOldestSystem-Program of GermanIdealism,” whichannounces a returntothereignofpoetryas theall-embracing modeofscience andart,basedonanunderstanding ofphilosophy astherealmofthesensuous, inaliteralrendering ofthe Greekmeaningofaesthetic, whichisalsounequivocally mythological: “mythology mustbecomephilosophical in orderto makethe people reasonable, andphilosophy mustbecomemythological in orderto makethephilosophers Inthegreatcontroversy overthe sensuous.”* ofthefragment—although itwasfoundinHegel’s authority handwritingamidsthispapers,itisbelieved tohavebeenwrittenbySchelling in collusionwith Hélderlin—emerges aboveall the materialtraceof Hegel’sassociation witha communal visionthatmadepoetrythearché andtelosofphilosophy (assuming thefullrangeoftheGreekterms,not merelythebeginningandtheend,butalsothelawandaim).Whatever onemakesoftheultimaterelationbetweenHegelianphilosophy and GermanIdealismassuch(aratherentangledmatter),thepointremains that Hegel’sdesirefor philosophyto reachtheAbsolute,a project of the Spirit, whose nature maybe defined as a sort of Gesamtkunstwerk

myth emergesout oftheliminalfoldbetweenpoetryandphilosophy, theGermanresponseto thelate-eighand reason,thatcharacterizes intertermsofthisresponse—the Theexplicithistorical teenthcentury. oftheGertheinvention andRomanticism, Aufkldrung sectionbetween Anenofthe Greek—is insurmountable. manthroughthe (re)invention tire national-imaginaryinstitutionwasbuilt (but alsodestroyed)on this

continuingunabatedto thisday.I underline basis,withramifications grounding,foreventhoughthiswillnotbe thisas a pointofindelible essential. it remains nonetheless directlytheobjectofourattention, need.TheveryquesThetaskathandistoenquireintophilosophy’s

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instances:(1)the tionarisesfromthe conflationoftwocontradictory andGerman Romanticism forcethatfuelsthecoreofGerman historical thedesiretoattainthe withthedesireforpoetry—specifically, Idealism (2)the speculation; inthecourseoftheoretical ofpoiesis Greekmeaning an self-engendering, thatassertsphilosophy’s ofimmanence ideology ideologywhoseoriginsharkenbacktoa certainPlatonismbut whose viewof inanEnlightenment rootsarealreadygrounded contemporary intothetroubledcoreofRomantitheworldanddeeplyassimilated presentinHegel,asDerridaarisacutely cism.Thebasiccontradiction Thereis a not needisnotyetphilosophy. guedearlyon:“Philosophy’s announced init.Now,reaPhilosophy—already—is yetofphilosophy. proposition: philosophy essential philosophy’s son’sandthusHegelian hasitsbeginning onlyinitself.... Howarethesetwoaxiomstobereconlyproceedsfrom/byitself,and yetit is the onciled:philosophy daughterofaneedoraninterestthatisnotyetphilosophy?”* Thequestionis posedin connection withAntigone specifically—

whichisthecruxofthematter,thoughwemustdeferexamining itfor a littlelonger—precisely becauseSophocles’ dramaformsthebasisof Hegel’sinvestigation of the ethicalpredicament (thedramaof Sittlichkeit) in the dialectical processof theSpirit’sself-manifestation. Whenoneconsiders thistobeastagingoftheprocessofphilosophy itself,thegravityofthedecision toturntotragedyassourceandexample shouldbeperfectly clear.Thedecision isnotHegel's,thoughhesignsit withouthesitation. It is a decisionpropelledbyphilosophyitself,by philosophy’s need.Thisiswhythespecificity ofchoosingAntigone is notyettheissue(althoughit istheissueina deepersense,asweshall seeinduetime).Thequestionraisedonthegroundof a notyetofphilosophy—the not-yetofsomething thatmustbeitsownsource—has to beadialectical one:howdoes(modern)philosophy proceedoutof(ancient)tragedyandyetinspiteof(ancient)tragedy? Insofaras Hegelian Sittlichkeit isnottheissuebuta symptom ora pretextfortherealquestion, Derrida’selaboration, which pertains to Antigonein particular,

doesnotquiteaddressthequestionofphilosophy’s needor,rather,addressestheneedofacertainstrainofphilosophy forwhichHegelisalwaysat the helm.Toput it thisway:evenif thisstagingof Hegelian ethicscan be said to representphilosophy’s need—ahighlycon-

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testablepoint—the not-yetdoesnotresidein thefamilyandhencein religion(theguardianofkinship), as Derridagoesonto argue,butin theateritself:as historicalinstitution,as form,as social-imaginary. The

not-yetofphilosophy—as a domainthatrevealsflashesofaninstitutingimaginary—exists alreadyinthetheater,sincetheneedforphilosophy(notphilosophy’s need)animates thetheatrical experience inthe polis.It formstheanimaof mythicthoughtin performance—in anotherlanguage, whateverenablestheinstitutions ofthefamilyandreligiontoberitualizedoutsidethemselves, inanother(altered) gesture ofsublimation. Anticipating matterssomewhat, thismaybe rephrased asfollows. Thenot-yetof philosophy ishypokrisis:> theperformative drivenecessarytodrawuponthe possibility ofmeretruthandseekit againstall odds.(Thisistheavowedtaskofmodernphilosophy.) But/ypokrisis is alsotheoriginary thedrive,underpinning thecriticalfaculty. impulse, Themomentof decision/judgment (krisis)is whattheaterturnsinto skill(techn@). Thehypocritical facultydissolves the solidityofmind (Geist) andturnsitagainstthegrainofitself:suchisthedialectical gesture. It also turns krisisinto a politicaloccasion,a matter that concerns

theentirepoliticalbody,a subjectfora pluralmind,a pluralsubject. Fromtheretrospective positionofa philosophy alreadyinstituted,mature,andinneedofseekingitsprematurity (i.e.,fromRomanticism onandpoward),tragedyoccupiestheliminalspacebetweenphilosophy inordertoinbutwhatintervenes etry.Itisnotthespacein between, terdictthe between,to contaminatethe boundaries. If,as Steinerargues,

and poetryto be “intuitively bothphilosophy conceived Romanticism senit isbecause theRomantic performed,” groundedanddialectically of ancienttragedyanditsown sibilitymadepossiblea (re)emergence Thoughtin parametersof actionin regardto achievingknowledge. the ofphronein, determination tragedyispraxis.Thisis thedialectical mostcrucialverbinthedramaofAntigone. needforthetragichanphilosophy’s articulates succinctly Antigone this dlingof mythicalthought.In thehistoryof modernphilosophy, fromthedeepcaseissochargedthatitdemandsinterrogation specific whatconasitisoftencalled—of thegroundwork, estinterior—from interropraxis,inthesamewaythatananalytical stitutesphilosophical

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impulses andoriginary lookstoimmanent gationof(psycho)pathology need;the tophilosophy’s Antigone is,inasense,endemic fordiagnosis. presupthatis whatendemia relationis a conditionof infusion—for fromwithinasthe tragedyworksonphilosophy poses.Thisparticular indeliblehistoricaltraceofthe actualconditionsofthought,a trace that

graftedontotheskin)nowlivesinsidethebody. (ifoncepresumably toanafonphilosophy amounts thisdramaexercises Theenchantment centuryseemsto worldofthenineteenth fliction. Theentireintellectual tellswithpredictable elohavefallenunderitsspell,a storythatSteiner withidealobsessions thegeneralGothic-Romantic quence.Certainly ized friendship,siblingeroticism,liveburial,and extrasensorycommu-

nicationwiththedeadmakeAntigone’s desirea particularly attractive Thedramaticframemakes figureforaesthetic speculation. rhetorical foranoverwhelming tapestryofculturalreference, particularly asthe offilnineteenth-century symbolic configuration sumtotalofEurope’s iationandpatrimonyofculturefindsitsmirrorinAntigone’s predicament.SurelySteiner’s insightthatthetwentieth centuryismarkedbya momentous shiftintheimaginary ofkinshipat thehandsofFread— fromthehorizontal linesbetweenbrotherandsistertotheverticallines betweenparents and children,or in other words,fromthe virginsister

totheincestuous father—is itselfworthyofanexclusive study. AlthoughallthismayexplainwhySteinercountssomeonehundred thousandtranslations and imitations of Antigone in Germanalone acrosstherangeofliteraryandmusical artinthelasttwocenturies,’ it explainsneithertherigorousphilosophical attentionAntigone getsin the nineteenthcentury nor the extensionof this tradition, in more and

moreexperimental orliteraryfashion,duringthepositivelyFreudian (Oedipal) twentiethcentury.Nextto Hegel’sfamoususeof thedrama astheparadigm ofethicalsubstance (Sittlichkeit) in thePhenomenology ofSpiritor Kierkegaard’s useofit inEither/Or (1843)standthe famous interpretations of Antigone in Heidegger's Introduction toMetaphysics (1935)and laterin hislectureon Hélderlin’s“DerIster”(1942).Indeed,

philosophy’s compulsive turntoAntigone becomesevengraverinrecentyearswithlengthydiscussions in JacquesLacan’sseminaron L’Ethique delapsychanalyse (1961)andJacquesDerrida’sGlas(1974), in additiontonumerousinstances infeministphilosophy fromLuceIri-

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garay’sinfluential sectionin Speculum (1975) andseveralsubsequent publications untilLeTemps deladifférence (1989), totherecentsubversivereadingbyJudithButlerin Antigone’s Claim(2000). Thereissufficientevidence toconsider thisproliferation a post-World WarIIphenomenon, which is to say that next to the fundamentalmeditationon

philosophy’s needbelongsa morehistorical argumentthatevaluates Antigone’s useasa therapeutic gestureina worlddefinedbyCulture havingbecometheagentoftheannihilation ofculture.Thesepostwar philosophical (re)stagings co-exist withnumerous “literary” renditions (Anouilh,Brecht,Bdll,Kluge,Orff);an exhaustivediscussionwould

havetoaddressthesignificance ofthedouble dramatic frametheyform together.Overall suchreimaginings presidesa greatand undecon(inGermany isdiffistructible shadow,whoseinfluence particularly) cult to estimate:Hélderlin’sfamoustranslationof Sophocles(1805),

whichsignifies notonlyanoriginalpoeticcreation buta philosophical positioninitself. _ Moreimpressive thanthisimpressive list,however, and certainly morepuzzling,is not that this dramahas servedso manymajor butthatithasservedsomanydifferent, ifnotsimplyinphilosophers, and positions.In the great compatible, philosophical interrogations modernphilosophical is profoundlydifferential, enterprise—which andthereissomequestionwhetherit canbearticuevenparadoxical, arché, a pointof hasservedasthenecessary latedasa whole—Antigone innerneofphilosophy’s originand rulethatbearsthedetermination thisarchémerelyconfirms (re)staging cessity.Theprojectof repeatedly paraancientorigins,thoughthehistorical theessenceofphilosophy’s inthelimitless different: namely, meterseachtimeremainirreducibly of collective life,the questionof being of the conditions terrogation properlyphilosophwith/inthepolis.Inotherwords,thereissomething icalaboutthewaythisdramastagesmyth,issuinga demandformultithatcorrespondto theconcretehistoricalcondiple counter-stagings mytheachtimeanew. tionsofproducing needfor | wouldarguethatmodernphilosophy’s Morespecifically, Antigone emergesfromthe desiretooccupythe realmofdecision,of Thisdesireworksasa project. witha philosophical judgment(krisis), forvariousdomainsofpraxis,bearingdifferent commondenominator

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sublationof kinshipthat names.ForHegel,it concernsthedialectical for Derrida(in reading opensup the civicspaceto consciousness; thatmight totheradicalimprintofethicalsingularity ittestifies Hegel), for Lacan(againin reading releaseonefromthecryptof dialectics; intelligibility at figuringofsymbolic thechimerical Hegel),itsignifies demandthatethicsbebased thelimitofthesocialandtheprovocative figure;forIrigaray,in a and catastrophic onthisuntamable precisely ofslightlyshiftingpositionsovertheyears(oftenalso longsequence groundofwoman’s it provides theambiguous commenting onHegel), actionthatchallenges the denaturalizing naturalandsimultaneously forButler, itservesasthespringverynatureoftheethicalsubstance; ofthereiteratedidealityof kinshipin order boardforan interrogation world. ofkinshipinthecontemporary figuration toseekanalternative oftheontological idiomof ForHeidegger, it contains thearch-grammar Dasein, thetermsofphilosophy’s veryexistence—a crucialdifference I shalladdressshortly. Hegel'sreverence forAntigone iswellknown:“themostmagnificent andsatisfying workofartamongallthesplendorsoftheancientand themodernworlds.”* Inthe Phenomenology ofSpirit,theSophoclean tragedybecomesemblematic ofthedeathlyconflictbetweenkinship and the State,the twoformalprinciplesof Sittlichkeit, whosemutualde-

struction provides theoccasion forethical consciousness torecognize itselfin the faceof its task.Herewe must keepin mind,againstthe for-

mulaicinterpretations ofthisschema,thatHegeldoesnotsetupa simple,evenif dynamic,opposition(human/divine, Kreon/Antigone, etc.),buta setofopposedsideswhereeachincludesinitspositionits ownopposite. (Hereinliesthedramatic formofthedialectical method.) Hegel’svanguardgesturehasbecomethefoundationof philosophical revisitingsof the drama, even when the discursiveor historicaldimen-

sionsareradicallydifferent. Thecompulsion todressthepraxisofphilosophyinAntigone’s gesturesrequiresreconfiguring Hegel’sowngestures,reperforming themin the literalsenseof theGreekherméneia. Morethana matteroftraditional practiceintheenterprise ofthought thatrequiresworkingthrougharticulations ofthepast,this constant restaging ofHegelalongside theneedforAntigone isowingtotheprimacyofethicswhichisparticular totwentieth-century philosophy. This

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primacymayhavebeengainedbytheradicaldemands oftheEnlightenmentinadditionto Hegel’s ownambition toovercome Kant’s linkof ethicsto the categorical parameters oflaw,but it wasdriventodramaticurgencyaftertheannihilation ofallprinciples oflawduringthe SecondWorldWar.No doubt, Antigoneposes the questionofthesite of

law’s emergencewith the irreduciblepervasiveness of mythical thought.ButI wouldarguethatitsexemplarity astheethicaldramais dueaboveallto modernity’s ownmythmaking needs.Hegelwasthe firstto articulate thisneedin suchterms—to makeethicsthegroundof a mythological thus commandsa sort of primordial project—and power,a mythicpowerof hisown.Atthesametime,however, he has becometheexclusive reference pointinaveryspecific courseofspeculativethoughtthatultimately limitsthesphereofmythographic vision. Whileheshallremainalwaysa cornerstone ofphilosophy’s needfor Antigone byvirtueofbeingthefirsttoperceive intragedyphilosophy’s potentialtoengagewithmyth,Hegelprovidedthisengagement witha languagethatultimately—after numerousrestagings inrecentyears— thesubstance ofphilosophy’s needwithintheneedtoarticuconceals Thediscourse onethicsmaybeessential and latetheethicalsubstance. paramounttoa devastatedWesternimaginaryinthelatterhalfofthe twentiethcentury,butit obscurestherealdimensions ofthisdevastawhoselanguageancienttragedy tion,dimensionsof self-knowledge, ofsociety’s relationtoitsmythmaking stillholdsinstore:thelanguage isnotoneof In thisrespect,thequestionlaidopenbyAntigone capacity. onthesiteoflaw’s Eventhematterofmeditating ethicsbutofpoetics. sosucarticulates is a matterofpoetics,forwhatAntigone emergence aquestion ofhowthelawcomestobeimagined, cinctlyis thequestion thatmakesallotherquestionsofhowthelawisexercisedsecondary. but by discovsinceGreeklawemergesnotbyrevelation Particularly toarpractices fromcustomary metastasis a self-interrogative ery—as questionoflaw’semerticulatedrulesofpoliticalorganization—the equationbut mustbe pregencecanneverbe solvedby a finalized problemwhosesolution asa dramatic performed sentedagonistically, is possibleonlyin its indefinite(re)staging.Jean-PierreVernanthasar-

spacebethatthedomainof tragedyistheinterstitial guedexplicitly imagmythic/heroic thoughtandtheconstitutive tweenlegal/political

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spacethatisitselfmarkedbyanit,aninterstitial inationthatunderlies intermsofthis spacethatoccupies, thetwosides—a tagonism between essay,theprecisetensionbetweenlawandmyth.’ a logicalconstruction. thatGreeklawishardly reiterates Vernant poeticacts, foundational thelawisoneofsociety’s Surely,imagining wouldputit) that creation(asCastoriadis anactof social-imaginary Tragedyitselfis butitsdestiny. mind(Geist) contains notonlysociety’s a uniquecreationofa specific(andtoa largeextentunreproducible) existence occupiesthe uniquebecauseits historical social-imaginary, of existence andunreproducible samemomentas theunprecedented as ritual polis,butevenfurther,becauseits existence thedemocratic byplacingtheimaginary ofthepolisin andpoeticformis determined thetheaterforcollective interrogation. Thesocial-imaginary institution oftheAthenianpolisispreciselywhattragedyre-presents, notmerely intermsofsymbolic action,butintheactualtermsofdailyliving.The institution oflawinthepolisispredicatedontheextraordinary question“Wheredoeslawcomefrom?”Thisquestionisnotposedonce andforall,notauthorized witha telos,butposedindefinitely, because thequestionoflaw’semergence isalwaysopensinceitsauthorization is constantly renewedby thepoiein-prattein of the citizens.Consequently,thelawofthepolisnotonlyisneithereternalnorsystematic, butis constitutively differential andagonistic, encompassing a range ofsignifications fromtheexplicitly religious (say,thejusticeofZeus)to themosthistorically institutional, fromthewidestpossiblemeaningof sacreddikéto themostbrutaldefianceofthelawin thenameofresponsibility tojustice.InAntigone specifically, “thewordnomosmaybe usedwithprecisely opposedconnotations bydifferentprotagonists. Whattragedydepictsisonedikéinconflictwithanother,a lawthatis notfixed,butrathershiftingandchanging intoitsopposite.” Ineffect,thequestions posedbyAthenian dramaarepropelledbya socialimagination thatdarestoputtheoriginsofthelawintoquestion andtherebyconstitute a community onthebasisof autonomy, onits command over the domain of the law,not viceversa. Antigoneis an ex-

traordinary poeticachievement becauseit documents theentirerange ofpossibilities withwhicha necessarily problematic institutionoflaw challenges thecommunity. In this sense,Antigone’s desireto bury

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Polynices“isa violationoflawas wellas the grounduponwhichall lawarises”"—a dialectical poietic desirethatbearsthefullrangeofpoeticviolence necessary toan autonomous society’s self-alteration. ConsideringthusthatSophocles’ dramaultimately performs theimaginary ofautonomy, therearetwomajordomainsofinquiry,obviously interrelated but nonethelesssuccinctin their own problematic:(1)thehis-

toricalquestionofphilosophy’s needforAntigone and(2)theconsubstantialnatureoflaw’semergence withsociety’s poeticimagination. I willforegointhiscontextdiscussion oftheseconddomain(which was tentativelybroachedabove in “Enlightenmentand Paranomia”); its

detailsandcomplexity arevastandbeyondthescopeofthisessay.The termsofourdiscussion havealreadysituatedusinthefirstdomain, althoughit shouldhavebecomeclearbynowthat,despiteHegel’s primacyandtheenormous to revisithispath,philosophy’s compulsion needforAntigoneis inadequately evaluatedinthelanguageofethics. ethicsis incapacitated beforetheradicalundecidability of Traditional the real,whichancienttragedyso thoroughlyperforms.Fromthe standpointofmodernity, Antigone exposesethicsastheguardianofthe real,astheforcethatpolicesthereal(sincetheimaginaryofthepolis guaranteesnosafeguard,ashistoryafterallconfirmed), andit ispreofancientdrama(notitscontent,butthecontentof ciselythisvigilance toenneedsin itsownambition itsform)thatphilosophy desperately restagingsof snarethe truth of the real. Of all twentieth-century isHeitothislongtrailofethicalreadings thegreatexception Antigone, compulsion philosophy’s degger,whonotonlyrefusestoacknowledge bymakingthestandarddetourthroughHegel,butperformsthetaskas the originaryhypokrisis. Heidegger's if it weretheinitialmeditation, interpreofethics,despitenumerous languageisotherto thelanguage disexplicitly Itisn’tthatHeidegger tiveattemptstoarguethecontrary. rather,itisthat andproject; inethicsas language avowedparticipation ethos he chosetragedy(andlatermodernpoetry)as a philosophical ofethics:“ThetragediesofSophocles— thatshattersthe aspirations theethosin isevenpermissible—preserve providedsucha comparison their sayingsmore primordiallythan Aristotle’slectureson ‘ethics.’”"

sense,toarguethat“itis twisted,inadialectical Evenwheneloquently theveryrefusaltoissueanethicalcodethatabidesby theethicalcom-

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ethicsthatundoesthe a primordial presupposes mand”"—which (inthesenseof groundofallethicalcodes,a momentthatretroactively worksagainstthegrainofeverypresentethicallaw—Heiandenken) groundedin a degger’sprojectresists,refusestwice.It is ultimately asthearchéandtelos perceived whichHeidegger meditation onpoiésis, Inofthought,thehingebywhichtheuniversemaybe unconcealed. dialecticaltwist I deed,it wouldbe moreapt to employDouzinas’s silencing gesturetowardHegel, quotedabovetoaddressHeidegger’s in philosophy’s needforAntigonenotby participating whichconfirms dramaticerosof compulsion (philosophy’s thetermsofphilosophy’s a newsetofterms formittakes),butbyinitiating Sittlichkeit, whichever andevenhigherstakes:Antigone’s immanentpositionin thetaskof thought. Forthisreason,Heidegger’s acknowledged antecedent isHélderlin,

nota philosopher, butallthemoreathinkerbecause a poet.Ofcourse, Heidegger’s caseiswhatremainsproperlyunderinquiryhere—for itis philosophy’s needweareconcerned with,whileHélderlin’s casebelongstotheseconddomainI mentioned aboveandmustbedealtin thoseterms.Nonetheless, as a wayof furtherframingthematter,I wouldnotethatHélderlin’s owntransgressive recastingofAntigone standstobothHegelandHeidegger asretroactive elucidation, a genealogical shadowcastfromthestandpointofthefuture.HGlderlin’s actisliterallya translation (metaphora) ofAntigone intothe permanent momentofmodernity, a metaphorization ofthe tragicidiomintothe languageofradicalcontemplation ofthepresent,thephilosophical act parexcellence. Thisshouldresoundwith Lacoue-Labarthe’s crucial identification ofAntigone asthetragedywhichisatoncethemostGreek andthemostmodern.'* Whatmakesthisparadoxreadableanddocumentstheuniquedoublehistorical natureofAntigone isexemplified in anactoftranslationthatmaycarry“unprecedented interpretiveviolence,” a violenceworthyof beingdeemedtragic.In both cases (Hélderlin’s and Heidegger’s), a Greektextis restagedin a German language thatkillsit inordertobeinfusedwithitslifeforce.Thefact thattranslation is anunstablelife-and-death gameis nowadays amply theorized.At issue hereis whether (and how) in each performanceof

translationthe theoretical capacityof the “original”literarytext

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emergesin itsplenitude,albeitfullysynchronized withthehistorical demands ofitsstagedpresent.Inthisrespect, theensemble ofsignificationspresidingin the“original” performative momentcanneverbe effacedbytheotherwise “free”reignoftransgression thattheperformanceoftranslation necessarily implies. Anti-goné Mysenseof howandwhyAntigone’s enchantment sustainsitselfas philosophy’s openwoundrequiresa fewremarksontheancienttextitselfbeforewe encounterHeidegger’s translation. Anumberof recent literarycommentaries onAntigone haveunburdenedtheplayfromits Hegelianschema,pointinginsteadtothepeculiarity ofAntigone’s role notonlywithinthe traditionoftragedy,butmoresignificantly within thecontextofbothsocialcustomandmythicconvention. Obviously, thereisnowaytodisregardtheparadoxthattheherointhisdramaisa woman.Thisisn’ttosaythattheplaydemandsanexclusively feminist understanding,but rather that Antigone,insofaras she takeson the hy-

pokrisis ofthetragichero,is“deliberately” constructed totakeonsomething beyondthe representation and defenseof kinshipvalues (woman’s domain).TheSophoclean figureofAntigone a exemplifies disruptiverenderingoftheverystructureofthetragichero,whichin signifiontheessentialpolitical effectmeansa disruptivemeditation thisinlightofthefactthat,unlike canceoftragedyitself.| emphasize of the heroinbothepicand lyricpoetry, theestablishedsignification thetragicheroisalreadya disruptivefigureinsofaras—toparaphrase tragedytheheroishardlya modelbuta problem,anagent Vernant—in abouthimselfandallothers. anduncertainty ofambiguity allowsustoasTheknowndateoftheplay’sproduction(442B.C.E.) discusis explicitlyaddressingthecontemporary sumethatSophocles byProwhichwasspearheaded sionaroundthemeaningofanthropos, isindeedthemeasureofall Ifanthropos saying."° tagoras’swell-known ofhiscontentbecomesimperative. things,a moreexplicittheorization to interrogatea worldconstituted Thetask oftragedyis generically at itscore,indeedtotheorize withtheenigmaticpresenceofanthropos whomustmakehiswayalanthropos, theconditionsofthisenigmatic

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togowithoutthegodsandyet ofdecision waysthroughthecrossroads notagainstthem.Buthere,thefactthatawomanistobearthiscontent means,inthemostbasicsense,thatshemustengagewiththerealmof inthreecruevidenced a transgression produces men,whichinevitably cialdomains. (theyare attachment to herbrotherPolynices 1.First,herobsessive phrase”)mustbeunderstood bound”inKarlReinhardt’s “demonically erotic, of profounddesire,whichis undoubtedly as an expression over norhysteric.'* Thecontroversy thoughneitherplainlyincestuous proclaims thatonlyfor whereAntigone theauthenticity oflines903-15, a brother’sdeadbody(notforahusband’sora child’s)wouldshedefy offereda rewardtoanyone thecity’slawisnotorious. Goethefamously despiteAristotle’s whocouldprovethattheselineswereinterpolated, explicitreferenceto themwithouttheslightesthintofdoubtingtheir authenticity.” Certainly, thisextreme illustration ofAntigone’s passions testifiesto a siblingrelationbeyondmerecustomarybounds—one moreinthemanysuchconditions ofbeyond whosedireconsequences theplaydramatizes. Herpassionate justification pointstoa siblingrelationship guardedbytherulesofphilia beyondthejurisdiction ofthe word’smerereference tokinship:rulesofphiliathattraditionally guide relationsbetweenwarriorsandheroes(friendship andcommunalbelongingto thepolis).”? Asagentof reconstituting philiain the city, Antigonecutsacrosskinshipandgenderlines.Thisis indeeda transgression,but what submits it to sanctionsresidesin the monomaniacal fashionin which it is conducted(as I explainbelow).Against Kreon,

Antigone doesnothesitatetojustifyheractionsasthenaturalprerogativeofonewhosebeingisinterwoven withsuchlove:outoisynechthein, allasymphilein ephyn(1.523),meaning,“Itisinmynaturenottosharein hatingbuttoshareinloving.””! 2.Inthesamevein,herinvolvement inthepublicburialpracticesof warriors(atraditional maleritual)isagainnotdictatedbykinshiployalty,but by heroicconvention. Indeed,analogousto mattersofphilic loyalty, herstrugglewithKreonresembles thebattlesoverthedeadbetweenHomeric warriorsintheIliad.”Inthisrespect,justaswithPolynices,sheisalso“demonically bound”inaclashofdesirewithKreon. To beboundtogetherdefiesthelogicofmereopposition, thelogicofoth-

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erness.Antigone is implicated ina matter,orin away,beyondherotherness.Or,fromanotherstandpoint,her otherness(her womanhood)is

itselfopentoher transgression. If weassumethatAntigone’s desireto burythedeadbrotherisexclusively withinthedomain ofkinship rules (exclusively withinwoman’s domain), thenitisalsotantamount toaviolationofthoserulesinsofarasit ensuresAntigone’s ownirreversible exclusion fromtheritesofmotherhood. Inthissense,“sheneverbecomesa woman,”asIrigarayhasargued,ifonlybecause“shehasdigested the masculine,at least partially,at least for a moment.””Of

course,thepartiality, the temporary suspension ofsexualidentity—indeed,theveryactofcannibalization—is thereto confirm thatsheis indeedawoman(theonewhowillneverbecomea woman) whoplaysin aman’sdomain,asifaman,neverquiteamanandyetdestined, bythis sameasif,nottoarriveatbeinga woman. Thisseemstometobetheactualfeministproblematic in thistext(andparticularlyin lightofthe logicin thefamousodetothebridalchamber/tomb thatincludesthe linesGoethefoundsooutrageous): a logicindeedequivocal, paradoxical,outrageous, butwithouta doubtauthentic—not because Aristotle confirmsit but becausethe politicaluniverseofthetragicformdemandsit. ThisisalsotheactualmeaningofHegel’srecognition thatAntigone notbecauseshebears signifies“theeternalironyofthecommunity”: poliswithitself the(masculine) theprincipleofnegationthatreconciles theprincipleofsuspension, butbecausesheembodies pastitsexcesses, with/inthepolispushesthelimitsofintellibecauseher performance gibility.CarolJacobsarguespreciselyinthisvein,in a vigilantreading (throughtheterrainof bothHegelandIrigaray)thatturnsonthefigofdust:thedustAntigone initiallysprinklesonher uralsignificance menand dustedoffbyKreon’s corpse,whichisthenproperly brother’s as a gestureof specifically, thedust-stormthatfollows.Thedust-storm inthe theshadowyrangeofnature’scomplicity naturethatreiterates question socialdramatizedthroughouttheplay,raisestheambiguous textnevermakesit clear)ofwhetheritistheagencyof (possibly—the whilealsobeingtheagencythat thebodyandnotAntigone, covering remenfromclearviewofAntigone’s coversthespyingeyesofKreon’s thefigurethat Jacobsseesin Antigone libation. peatedtransgressive

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leavesnotraces:thefigurewhodoesnotproperlyburythedead,for markagainsttheimthenshewouldleavebehindboththenegative of reconstitution properlawandthepositivemarkofthecommunity’s insofarasshe theproperlaw.Sheistheeternalironyofthecommunity questionmark,“notbecausesheburiesthe remainsthecommunity’s shemakesa markthatcannot manorbecauseshefailsto,butbecause beproperly located,becausethiswomanat least,Hegelnotwithstanding,neitherburiesnorfailstobury,neitherleavesherbrotherabove nor below,neither universalizesnor fails to universalizethe male, be-

isnotintelligible tothosearoundherand,percausewhatsheperforms figure isrighttoreadthissuspended haps,noteventoherself.”Jacobs withinandagainsttheauthority ofthenatural,butmissimultaneously reads(orrather,readssymptomatically) thetext’sfiguration ofthenaturalasbearingtheexternalmarkofanthropos. Whatthedramaproposesastheessenceofanthropos istheundecidable destinyofa fundamentally multitudinous beingagainstthesingularity oflaw(whether civicor familial),and whileAntigoneembodiesthis in her actions,she

failsit in herreasoning.Weshallreturnto thisbelowviaHeidegger. 3.Finally, Antigone demandstobeseenastheepitomeofdike.Inher disobedience, shedramatizes a foundational conflictindemocratic politics—not simplythestrugglebetweenrulesofkinshipandstatelaws, butthestrugglebetweenthenomicandthemythicintheattempttoexploreandnegotiate themeaning ofautonomy. It isusefulto remember here FromaZeitlin’sconsiderationofThebesas an anti-Athens,a space

bornoutofthemythiccontradiction betweenautochthony andfratricide,a kindofdarkmirrorthatcastsa “shadow totheidealized city.”* Ifthetheaterliterally functions asthe“otherscene”ofthepolis—where thepolisgetstostageitself,tostageitsmythicalbeing—then Thebeson stage is the “other scene” of the “other scene.” It is theater itself, the

veryessenceofthetragicspace,literallyand figuratively the toposof tragedy(wheretragicthingshappen,includingtheindeterminate elementthatmakesthetragichappen).Risingout of thisconventionally stagedotherness, Antigonedramatizes fortheAtheniansthequestion oflocatingthesiteoflaw’semergence, a questionwhoseanswercan never be definitiveand final (that would be law’stomb),a question whoseownsitemustbe thepluralbodythatmakesup thetheater(in all sensesof theverb).

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Therichpolyvalence ofAntigone’s nameexemplifies thestruggleof allthoseelements. Thepreposition antimeansboth“inopposition to” and“incompensation of”;gonébelongsina lineofderivatives ofgenos (kin,lineage,descent)andmeanssimultaneously offspring, generation, womb,seed,birth.Onthebasisofthisetymological polyphony (the battleformeaningat thenucleusofthenameitself),wecanarguethat Antigoneembodies bothanopposition ofkinshiptothepolis(incompensationforitsdefeatbythedemos reforms), aswellasan opposition tokinship,”expressed byherattachment toa siblingbymeansofadisruptivedesire,philiabeyondkinship.Buthernamealsoembodiesopposition at a generative level, an otherness at the core, for it may be

eitheras “generated inplaceofanother””oralso“bornto translated oppose,””* whichistosay:bearing(generating) opposition/compensation.Afreerrenditioncouldeasilybe“inplaceofa mother,”whereby thewombthatgeneratesoppositiondisplacesthemotheraspremier figureofsocialization, asthefirstpedagogue ofsublimation. Antigone, thezero a figureproduced/institutedbyincest,cannotbutexemplify pointintheideologyofsocialreproduction, inallsensesoftheword, wheregenosandgonébecomemutuallyexclusive—they producezero. hernamecomestosignify“antigeneration,”® notthesafeTherefore, guardingofkinshipbut itsannihilation.

TheTrapofSingularity betweena transgressive Onerecognizesthatthisperfectco-incidence appealfortheaffirmation othernessat thecoreandthecompensatory testimony ofchthonicpowersmakesthisparticulartragedycompelling a disThepassagecontaining processofautonomy. totheantagonistic whenthechotilledtheoryofthisprocessisthefamousfirststasimon pollatadeinakouden natureofanthropos: rusannouncestheformidable even inextravagance Surpassing pelei(Il.332-75). deinoteron anthropou asa whole,Heideggeris Hegel’softenquotedreverenceforAntigone knowntohavesaidthateveniftheentirecorpusofGreekphilosophy remnantofthisode and literaturewassuddenlylost,thefragmentary oftheGreekspirit.” allthebasicelements wouldsufficeto reconstruct Theclaimis immenseand Heideggerapplieshimselfto thetaskof

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witha mannerconsciousof its immense(ungereading/translating proportion. heuer) (1935),Heideggerturns to these to Metaphysics In his Introduction oftheunitybehisdiscussion inordertoelucidate versesofSophocles In 1942,he willrepeatthis tweenthoughtandbeingin Parmenides. as butbasically in thesamelanguage, amplified reading,considerably onHdlderlin’s hymn“DerIster.”It is partofa lecturecoursecentered demandsarenot different. thatthecontextual crucialto understand ThatParmenides andHélderlinspeakthesamelanguageisoneofthe hastooffer,aleapacrosshistorical thatHeidegger mostdaringinsights ofthoughtthatonlya concentrated difference to thedeepestaffinities by presentcanensure.Thisis achieved encounter withone’shistorical wayof translation in its mostdynamic,mobile,errantsense.The like thecatalytic agentoftranslation, Sophoclean odebecomes literally acidpermeating surfaces ofmeaning inalldirections. Theodeservesas thetextonwhosetranslation spinstheessenceofWesternmetaphysics initsentirety, andHeidegger showsnoreluctance toendorseitwithhis ownspin:anothertextbearingthephilosophical presencethattranslatesParmenides intoHélderlinandviceversa,butaboveallthepresenceoftranslation itself,thecurrencybywhichpoetryenrichesphilosophy’swealth.Translation, asHeidegger says,meansnotalackbutthe “innerprivilege”ofa work,whichmobilizesan understanding that doesnotstreamline meaning(betweentwoormorelanguages, histories,conceptual universes, etc.),butshatterstheeasybridgesbetween mountain rangessothatthepeaksof thoughtacrosstimeremainintact inmutualrecognition. Makingthisstrategya habitualpracticewhenconfrontingtheinnatelyand transgressively multivalentGreeklanguage,Heideggeris motivated bypoeticinvention andtranslatestheode’skeytermdeinon asunheimlich (asopposedtothemore“accurate” ungeheuer, a termestablishedbyHélderlin andrecirculated in manymodernrenditions, includingBrecht’s).* Hedoesrecognize thatdeinon meansterrible(inthe senseofformidable, awe-inspiring, marvelous, evil,horrifying) and alsopowerful(inthesenseofoverpowering, ofpossessing totalcapacity,demonicpotency), butindesiringto renderthe liminalelementof the term (thefactthat alongwith awe comeswonderand indeed

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strangeness), he optsfor strange,unfamiliar, uncanny:“thatwhich castsus out ofthe ‘homely,’that is,the customary,familiar,secure”(IM,

151).The liminalis the essential,in the sensethat it evokesthe total groundoccupiedandpermeated bytheterm’sevidentqualities(fearful,powerful, nonhabitual). Tonamedeinon uncannymeanstonameit intotality, Heidegger argues,notbyaddinganothernotiontothemanifoldbutby “grasp[ing] theconcealed groundoftheunityofmanifold meanings..., graspingthedeinonitselfinitsconcealed essence”(HH, 64).Theuncannynatureofanthropos, superiorto everything(kouden deinoteron), is owingtothetendency ofanthropos to surpassthelimitsof thefamiliar, desiringa dwellingwithintheunfamiliar, withintheliminalspace.Hegoeson: Theunhomely[Unheimische] preventsus frommakingourselvesat home

andthereinitisoverpowering [Uber-wiiltigende]. Butmanisthestrangest of allnotonlybecausehepasseshislife[reality] amidthestrangeunderstood inthissense[i.e.,“un-canny”—des soverstandenen Un-heimlichen], butbecausehedepartsfromhiscustomary, familiar limits,becauseheistheviolentone,who, tendingtowardthe strange[Unheimlische] in the senseof the overpowering,surpassesthelimitofthefamiliar[Heimische]. (IM,151)

Heidegger’s chiefontologicalpreoccupations areevident.Presiding overthejourneyofhumanexistenceis alwaysa yearningforhomewhichcanonlybeaccessed coming,for“beingathome”(Heimischsein), beingathomeisbutajourneyinthe bymeansofradicalestrangement: directionof otherness,it istocometotermswiththefactthat “homethebasichumancharacness”isanalienterrain.Intheseterms,deinon, underthefigureof“notat toSophocles, isrecognized teristicaccording esmerelystrange,asitisusuallytranslated,butalienated, home”—not tranged, subjectedtothedomainof thestrange.Thisregistersthesense ofthe uncannybothasinternalsentimentand as external“objective” ofBeing,butitis event.Thehumanbeinglivestheuncannyexperience the the mostuncanny(deinotaton)*—in alsoitselfuncanny—indeed beyondthelimitsofitsproperbeing. wayit pursuesBeing(Dasein) striking Letusrecordat thisjuncture,evenifin passing,Heidegger’s in his ofunheimilich on thesignificance disregardofFreud’smeditation glaris especially Theomission famousessay“The‘Uncanny’(1919). ofboththis ingbecauseFreuddelvesintothe multiplesignifications

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negates,in exemplary thetermit grammatically termand heimlich, oflanguage. drawingupontheutmostflexibility fashion, philological forin toHeidegger, discovery wouldhavetobetroublesome Freud’s tothevariousstrainsof relationofunheimlich thenegative hisargument paradoxical totheprofoundly Heimisitselfnegatedinturnaccording ofthefact,Freudargues,thatheimitself.Because meaning ofheimlich lich“on the one hand,meanswhat is familiarand agreeableand, on the other hand, what is concealedand kept out of sight,heimlichis a word

untilit finally inthedirection ofambivalence, whosemeaning develops isin somewayor unheimlich. Unheimlich withitsopposite, coincides DrawingfurtheronSchelling’s definiothera subspecies ofheimlich.”*° isunheimlich thatoughttohaveremainedsecret tionthat“everything andhiddenbuthascometolight”(376),Freudbringshismeditation on thiscuriousrelationtoaconclusion thatcertainlydisturbsHeidegger’s reliance onthedeinon elementofsurpassing thelimitsofallfamiliarity fortherisksofanunheimlich life.Freud'sfiguringthatthecoremeaning ofheimlich hingesona development towardambivalence enableshim toperceive theoccasion ofunheimlich asadoublegesture,wherethefamiliarthathaslongbeenconcealed burstsforthin a resurgentform whichis uncannily defamiliarized withouteverbeingtotallyunfamiliar.As Freud concludes,“the unheimlich is what was onceheimisch[not

itsnegation butitsreiteration inrepressed form];theprefixunisthetokenofrepression” (399). Heidegger returnstoa discussion ofdeinos asunheimlich inthelectureonH6lderlin’s encounterwithSophocles deliveredas a summer coursein1942. I underline thedate,notonlybecauseit is imperative in thecaseofHeideggertoretrievefromhisabyssalruminations onTime theZeitgeist thathauntsthem,but alsobecauseoftheoccasionofHeidegger’sdirectreference to the historical outsideof the lecturehall: America’s entryintothe Warand therelationship betweentheGreeks andNationalSocialism. Indeed,thelogicofunheimlich stretches beyond theetymological evocation ofhomeandhomecoming tothehistorical particular: “Coming intoone’sown[involves] whateverbelongstothe fatherland ofthe Germans. Whatever is ofthe fatherland is itselfat home with [bei= in the presenceof] motherearth” (HH, 49). The

chthonicpresence assuresus thatHélderlin’s fatherlandis alsoHei-

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degger’sown,as is thenecessary encounter withtheforeignelement thatwillsafeguard theunadulterated experience ofHeimat. Butthisis alwaysa historical encounter, and theforeignhasa specific content. TheforeignistheGreek: “ForHélderlin [butwemustadd:forHeidegger],theGreekworldiswhatis foreignwithrespectto thehistorical humankind oftheGermans. . ..Because Hélderlin’s [Heidegger’s] relationshipto the Greekworld is, to put it in catchwords,neitherclassi-

cal,norromantic, normetaphysical, Hélderlin’s [Heidegger’s] tietothe Greekworldisnotlooserbutrathertheopposite, itismoreintimate [inniger)” (HH,54).WhatisuncannythenisHeidegger’s faithinandloyaltytotheformidable tradition ofhistorical ontology thatproclaims: to be Greekis to be German.“WelearntheGreeklanguageso that the canfindits concealed essenceofourownhistorical commencement wayintotheclarityofourword”(HH,66)—surely a remarkthatwould havemadeFichteandHumboldt proud.* Buttoreturnspecifically to thecommentary onAntigone: Heidegofdeinos isobviously soundinits ger’sargumentation inhistranslation ownterms,andhisoptionforunheimlich isnottechnically wrong(albeit thetermtoaratherindeterminable Yet limiting metaphorical attribute). it presupposes a courseofinterpretive actionthatlateronin thepaswhatisanexsagewilllead—soasto sustainitsrhetoricalorder—to text.I make oftheSophoclean traordinary(ungeheuer) disfigurement ofits weight.Butwearedealingwith thisremarkin fullcognizance a traitforwhichhe usualpoeticlicense, something beyondHeidegger’s butrevered.Itisnota matterofa poeticsoferror isnotonlyrecognized is in thistranslation butofan erringpoetics.Thecreativetransgression oftheancienttext’soriginalmeaning,butof anactof destruction—not beand,therefore, Antigone theentirehorizonofwhatmakesSophocles’ enablesHeideggerto speak.Heideggerproceedsto translatethe fato mellon erchetai aporosep’ouden mousversein line 360pantoporos; hecomesto nothingin thefuturewithoutre(roughly, “all-resourceful; andwithoutissue, journeying, inexperienced source”)as “everywhere (IM,151).Theerroroccurson twopoints:in hecomestonothingness” andaporos betweenpantoporos the “pause/punctuation” disregarding and in omittingthewordtomellon(thefuture). couto perceivean antinomic ThefirstinstanceallowsHeidegger

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wherethereisn’tone,inorderto producean pling(pantoporos/aporos) onhiswayto an (ypsipolis/apolis) echoin thelateractualsuchcoupling (IM,152).Butthetextdisputesthiscorreofdeinotaton interpretation andwithgoodreason.PorosinGreekmeansbothresource spondence, liketheHomeric issomewhat andpassageorpath,andthuspantoporos making an Odysseanfigure,all-resourceful, orpolytropos, polyméchanos possessingthe capacity(the resources— one’spassageeverywhere, muchlikedeinos.” poroi)tomakeone’spassageeverywhere—indeed, ussay,deprivedof doesmeantheoppositeinbothaspects—let Aporos butalsointermsof waysandmeans,notmerelyintermsofresources hereservesnopurposewithoutitsassocidirection—but itsinvocation omits“thefuture”and ationwiththemodifier “thefuture.”Heidegger or “everywhere venas“everywhere journeying” translatespantoporos turingforth”andaporosas “inexperienced andwithoutissue”or “experienceless withoutanywayout.”*Inotherwords,inadditiontodisregarding thecrucialpauseandomittingthetemporaldesignation, pantoporosis renderedin one of its meanings(porosas journey,not resource),thus makingaporosa paradoxicalshadowto pantoporos (withinwhichitisalsosupposedly contained) ina timelessequation,so thatthephrase“tocometonothing”istheninterpretedasanontologicalcondition,an elementofBeing:“Beyondall this [violence against the familiar]manbecomesthe strangestof beingsbecause,withoutis-

sueonallpaths,heis castoutofeveryrelationto the familiarandaté (ruin,catastrophe) befallshim.Itisnothardtoseethat thispantoporos aporos containsaninterpretation ofdeinotaton (IM,152).Inthisrespect, deinotaton servestoendowcatastrophe withontological permanence. Butthisendowment isimpossible fortworeasons. First,ina worldof time(inhistory)nothinghasontological permanence as such,exceptas a figureof endlessly deferrable actualization. Ontological permanence istrueonlyas potential; it is a figureofspeculation whoseactualpermanenceresidesin rhetoriconly.Second,in Greekterms,catastrophe canneverbe privilegedovercreation(orviceversa).Onlytheir endless

co-implication, theiragonistic co-incidence, whoseoutcomeisultimately undecidable, couldbe presentedin thefigureof “ontological permanence”(shouldonewant to usesuchlanguage). Hereinmightreside Heidegger’s realnihilism(anaccusation oftenaimedat himwithout

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carefulconsideration), a gestureagainsthisowncreative figureofhistoryasthesiteoftheopeningtowardBeing. CharlesSegalarguesthatthe“triumphant ‘resource’ [poros] mayalso bethe‘path’thatleadstothedark‘roads’whichKreonhasto traverse at the end.” Moreover, the versecouldalsobe translatedas “Resourcelessman comesto the nothing(ness)that is his future,”where aporos mightsignifytheother,destructive sideofdeinos, insofarasporos

isalsoassociated withthenotionoflimitversusthelimitless chaosof cosmogony.” Still,thepresence of“thefuture”(whetheras foreshadowingreference tothedestinyofbothheroesorasgeneral statement regardinganthropos) forbidstheHeideggerian poeticedifice,whereby the uncannynatureofman consistsin his endless(thatis, timeless)desire

towanderwithoutissuebeyondallfamiliarandsecurelimits.Omitting to translatetomelloncommitsthephraseto a readingoferchetai asa verbcarryingtheactionofanthropos: “mancomestonothing.” TheinterpretiveviolencethatHeideggerexplicitly invokesincallingforunconcealmentresults in mere violent concealment.In Sophocles’verse,

thepresence oftomellon makesthegrammatical bicontentoferchetai directional. Eitherresourceless manhasnofuturecomingorresourcelessmancomestonothinginthefuture(ortothenothingness thatishis future,asinSegalabove).Theimportance ofGreekthought—fitisinode,asHeidegger argues—resides deedexemplified inthisSophoclean guarofpositionsandattributes(without inthedialectical intertwining ofotherness notinaparadoxical self-containment anteeorresolution), ofthepolis,theunrethatpreservesa singularessence.Inthelanguage ofpositions speaksintermsofself-altersolveddialectical intertwining domesticates singularity language,paradoxical ation;in Heidegger’s permanence. alterityand speaksasinalienable disarmsthesublimemo(mis)translation Heidegger’s compulsive mentof the nextverse,whichdeclaresthattheonlythingbeyondthe feuxinouk is death:Aidamonon of anthropos capacity(theresources) (“onlyfromHadesis therenowayout”).Solongashumanity epaxetai thefutureis itsown so longas itispantoporos, mobilizesitsresources, noranalienforce),allexpredetermined domain(neithercategorically ofdeath.The moment ceptforthedomainmarkedby theinevitable ofmortalwiththeknowledge offuturetimeisinterwoven knowledge

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it isasenseofirepitomizes theGreekimaginary, ity,andifsomething comprehensible bymeansofwhichtimebecomes revocable mortality limit,andthe Deathistheabsolute andagainstwhichtimeisabolished. whatdramatizes—stages, ofdeath’sabsoluteis precisely knowledge passage turnsintopraxis—humanity’s makestheatrical/theoretical, (poroi). ofitsresources aswellasthelifelongdeployment (poros, poreia) asfollows: anversescouldberephrased oftheSophoclean Theessence andcan makeeverythingcometo pass,but thropos is all-resourceful too, for,hispassing.Heidegger, thereisonethinghehasno resources recognizesthat “maniswithoutissuein thefaceofdeath,”but bypass-

ingits significance in Greekthought,hederivesfromitan ontological presenttense: thatsubjectstimetoa permanent condition, a condition “Insofaras manis,he standsin theissuelessness ofdeath”(IM,158). He thus continuesdownhiswaywardpassageby assumingthat pantoporos/aporos isa paradoxical pair,liketheypsipolis/apolis lateron: nomous pareiron chthonos theont’enorkon dikanypsipolis; apolisototomé kalonxynesti tolmas charin. | wouldtranslatethis(aimingforitscomplex accuracyat theexpenseofits poeticgrace)as:“whenheweavestogetherthelawsoftheearthandtheswornjusticeofthegods,herises highalongwithhiscity;butheiscastoutofthecitywhenforthesake ofdaringheconsortswithignoblematters.”Thegoodcomesoutofinterweaving (pareirein) thelawsofthepoliswithdivinejustice.Then, manbecomes ypsipolis, whichmeansnotaboveorbeyondthepolis,but embodying thesublime(ypsos) ofthepoliswithinthepolis.Thetermis indeedcomplex andodd;Steinersuggests “itmaywellbea Sophoclean coinage,” whileheaddstothemanymeanings ofapolisthenotionthat, bymeansofthebreachofsocialcontract, a manwithouta cityisineffectitsdestroyer(whichisprecisely whythechorusconcludestheode withthefuriousinvective ofneveraccepting sucha personin itsinnermosthearth).”' Certainly, in thecontextoftheplaytheconditionofapoliswouldapplybothtoAntigone andKreon.Thedramatic actiontestifiesthatapolisbecomes whoever thinksandactsalone:monos phronein (Il.707-9).Thetwosidesofthelaw(human/divine, State/family,etc.) arenotas mutuallyexclusiveastheyappearat firstglancesincethey can be interwoven, and it is preciselyin the sensethatKreonand Antigoneresistthisinterweaving (pareirein) andpursueeachotherto

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destruction by followingthelawof monos phronein thattheybecome apoleis.* Tothinkandactaloneina democratic polisisplainlyself-destructive, aswellas anaffronttothepolis.Perhaps,onemightargue that thisself-destructive relationto thoughtandpraxis(topolitics) is precisely whatspursHegel’s remarkthat“thereis immanent inboth Antigone andKreonsomething thatin theirownwaytheyattack,so thattheyaregrippedandshattered bysomething intrinsictotheirown being.”* Heidegger’s subsequent attemptistoopenuptherangeofsignificationanddeliberately translatepolisbytheessential-indeterminate Da (“there”), grounding, asitwere,theessence ofhistorical being:“Thepolisisthehistorical place,thethereinwhich,outofwhich,andforwhich historyhappens”(IM,152).Butthis maneuver(whichsoundsasifit is

madeonthesideofhistorybutisinfactentirelyahistorical) comesat thecostof forgetting thatthe polissignifiesneithercitynorplace, strictlyspeaking,and certainlynot merespatialdesignation,even or philosophically. Thepolisislinkedtoa differential metaphorically theensemble ofpolites. speaksof autonomous plurality, (Thucydides Athenians, not Athens; Themistoclesinterprets the oracle of the

“woodenwalls”by assumingthat the polis is mobile:it can be “moved”intotheships.)Thisdifferential pluralitydoesnotonlyconstitutein itselfa politicalsubject,butit alsoembodiesthesubjectofa a collectiveknowledge specificpolitics,a politicswhichdemands Thecrucial to self-interrogation. emergingoutofa sharedcommitment realization here is, as Peter Euben has expertly argued, that “political

is politicalnot onlybecauseof its subjectmatter,butbeknowledge causeof the wayit is constitutedand expressed,”a commentthat principlethat governsanysuchdiscussion: echoesan unavoidable “whatispolitiandinterrogate toevenattemptto understand namely, calis itselfa politicalissue.”™ to be Inthis respect,apolisdoesnotmeanmerelyto be displaced, of ofthefamiliar, toa lifeoutsidethewalls,tobedeprived condemned to be not-there.It doesmeanall that,but at a the home, tobe unheintisch,

meansto apolis Fundamentally, level,a levelofconsequence. secondary action,unintegrated ofcommunal be singular,deprivedof plurality, (hence, partial): alone and deprived of the city’s mind (monos

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thisishardly ofpolitics. ForHeidegger, deprived essence, phronein)—in iswhataccountsforthecrea problem,sincethisradicalsingularity ativeforceofBeing:“withoutcityandplace,lonely,strange,andalien, without issue amid the essent as a whole, at the same time without statuteand limit,withoutstructure and order,becausethey themselves

ascreatorsmustfirstcreateallthis”(IM,152-53). Fromthis standpoint,“alone”embodiesthe ultimatepower of cre-

ationasa sublimeinstanceofBeing,whichis notonlyperfectlyundramaticprivilege of onlyinlightofHeidegger’s Greek(significant Yet but alsopreciselywhattheplaycondemns. Greeksignification), phrase invokingNietzsche’s wheninthefamousRectoraddress(1933), of [Verlassenheit] speaksof“theforsakenness “Godisdead,”Heidegger the articulating mantodayinthemidstofwhatis,”heis unwittingly perfect,apolitical terrorofbeingapolisinthemodernworld.Thisisthe terrorthatphilosophy hasbeencalledupon,sinceitsPlatonicinception,toencounter (dulyforgetting, ofcourse,thatitsverycreationwas predicatedonthecreationofsucha conditionforthe“poeticimpersonatorsoftruth”).SurelySocrates’ decisiontodieunjustlyinsteadof enjoyinglifeasapolis(adecisionmadewithoutfearandwiththeserenityofconviction) showsuswheretheurgencyofphilosophy resides. Heidegger’s rumination onNietzsche’s pronouncement intermsofbeing forsakenfailsto understandNietzsche’s ownradicalpotential: namely,manwithoutGodisnotforsaken(notapolis)but freetobear theenormous weightofhisowndefinition, ofhisowndetermination of limit—in otherwords,theweightofself-limitation, whichisthemost crucial element of worldly action (and thus of democraticexistence).

Heideggerbristlesat thosewhoderivetheconceptof the political fromthestudyoftheGreekpolis: Todayonecanscarcely read a treatiseorbookontheGreekswithout everywhere beingassuredthathere,withtheGreeks,“everything” is“politically” determined. Inthemajority of“research results,”theGreeksappearas thepureNational Socialists. Thisoverenthusiasm onthepartof academics seemsnoteventonoticethatwithsuch“results”it doesNationalSocialism anditshistorical uniqueness [geschichtlichen Einzigartigkeit] noserviceatall,notthatitneedsthisanyhow.... Onedoesnoservice whatsoever toourknowledge andevaluation ofthehistorical singularity

Philosophy’s Need forAntigone 143 [geschichtlichen Einzigkeit] ofNational Socialism ifoneinterprets theGreek worldinsucha wayastosaythattheGreeks wereallalready“National Socialists.” (HH,80,86)

Ofcourse,thiscanbereadas Heidegger’s irritationwithpartyhacks (mainlythechiefideologues KrieckandRosenberg) andtheirbrutehellenizingmythology, but whatmustnotbemissed,besidestheextraordinarydesireto saveNationalSocialism fromvulgarity, istheeagernessto depoliticize Greekthought.Thisisexplicitly takenupastheremovalof the polisfromthelanguageof politics,butit isin effectthe abolition ofpolitics fromthelanguage ofthepolis.Theoperational justification isthattoexplaina thingin derivative termsisa tautological Fairenough, exercise. butwhatremainsasuncrackable coreisthehistoricalspecificity of politicsintheancientpolis,whichisan element thatgoesbeyond(ina sense,precedes) thelogosofthepolis(meaning, notmerelywhatmakesthepolisspeakorgivesit reason,butevenits raisond’étre). Thisinadequacy leadsHeideggertoanabsurdquestion thatrevealsthehardlimitofhisinventive “Whosays maneuverability: thattheGreeksbecausethey‘lived’inthepolis,werealsointheclearas to the essenceof the polis?” (HH,80).The question is absurd because

hisanswertoit—“perhaps thenamepolisisprecisely thewordforthat realmthatconstantlybecamequestionable anew”—is preciselywhat contentofthepoliswasallabout:thesensethatthe theradicalpolitical lawwasopento question,thatitwasmadebythe polisandtherefore that couldbeunmadebythepolis.ThisisthetragiccoreofAntigone that“we cannotcrack,sothathisinvocation translation Heidegger’s (HH,81)resonates mustthinkmoreGreekthantheGreeksthemselves” violence. withthehollowsolitudeofhisinterpretive fromtheRecresignation Presentedmerelya yearafterHeidegger’s a turn in HeitoMetaphysics alreadysignifies torship,AnIntroduction a turntowhat degger’sthoughttowardtheGreeksor,moreprecisely, remainsunthoughtby virtueof theGreeksand inthepoeticlanguage of theGreeks.Thisturndelineatesthe cruxofwhat isusually (Sprache)

of somewhat (makingthetemporaldesignation called“lateHeidegger” thatHélderlin bythecentralposition atthisjuncture abluff),solidified intermsofthe work,specifically occupyin Heidegger’s willhenceforth German.”This projectof inventinga Greecethatis quintessentially

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matterresidesatthecoreoftheentireHeidegger complex enormously bytheso-called whichishardlydesignated Nazism, question regarding ofwhatis account political forthatisa secondary affair,” “Heidegger issue.The“Heidegger primarybecauseit isa philosophical politically nordoesit concernHeidegger’s affair”is nota matterofbiography, go.Hence,thosewhoattackhimandthoseeagerto person,asscandals evenif in thescrupulous, asengaged defendhimonthisground—all thesameevioftheevidence, measuring alwayspartisanbydefinition, dence,now succinct,knowable,and perhaps even “measurable”—are

essentially offthesubject. whichisto say,in Thissubjectisaboveallthesubjectofphilosophy, ofpolitical Being.Ifanya foundational senseitisthesubjectofpolitics, istheoneprecisely oneinthetwentieth centuryistoknow,Heidegger in synchronic becausehesoughttoraisethequestionof philosophy fashionfromParmenides to Nietzsche.Thequestionof philosophy wouldnothave a historical existence ifitweren’tfortheimaginaryof thepolis.Thepolisisphilosophy’s historical Dasein—perhaps themost succinct(although stillabstract)waytoexpressphilosophy’s needfor tragedy,theneedforpoetryinpublicagonisticperformance. Inthisrespect, the political,not the ontological,is at stake in a discourseof Be-

ing.Beingistheontological faceofwhattakesplace,whathappens (in the sense of event, of dromenon)in the polis. In the last instance,this

evadedHeidegger’s understanding because, forallhisgenuineloveof Greekthought,heexcisedfromit theelementsoferosandthepsyche (andhencethepolistoutcourt).4° The“Heidegger affair”isfashioned by thisexcision ata deeperlevel,inevitably psychological, whichinvolves Heidegger’s culturalprejudices (derived fromhisruralpetty-bourgeois fearofcosmopolitan life),aswellashispersonalpathologies andpetty ambitions.” Thereisa needfora psychoanalysis ofHeidegger in a phenomenologicalsense(inthewayofBachelard) thatwouldreadhisNazismasa peculiarnature:thenational(ist) prejudices ofa stubbornly provincial man,whoessentially neverlefttheimaginaryofhismountainvillage andwhowasantibourgeois in a mosttypicalruralfashion.Hisobsessionwitha GermanHeimischsein (understood alsoas “being-at-homein-the-nation”) and hisdesperateattemptsto articulatethe uncanny

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perspective ofone’sforeignness within,facilitated byacertainculturalpolitical climateofenormous symbolic appeal,wasexpressed byanevidentphilosophical denialof cosmopolitan life.In theearlytwentieth century, thecosmopolitan domainlargelybelonged toa revolutionary internationalist culture,highlypoliticized—which istosay,hardlyapolis.That “assimilated”Jews (German-Jewishthinkerswhoessentially

thoughtinGreekterms,beingsuperiorpupilsofHumboldtian Bildung in its post-Nietzschean reconfiguration) constituted thegreatmajority ofthiscultureinGermany isahistorical fact.Heidegger’s attraction to Nazismwasalsofedbyhis aversiontothisparticularhistoricalpresence.NotthatHeidegger was,strictlyspeaking,anti-Semitic; rather,he wasmotivated by a classcomplexagainst(mostlyMarxist) cosmopolitanism,whoseparadoxical contentconsisted insignificant ranksofhellenizedJews,a surprisingnumberofwhomneverceasedtobe(evenafterAuschwitz) sentimentally German.* Thebestmeditations on Heidegger's crossroads betweenseekingto thinkontheothersideofthepolitical(theunthoughtpolisbeforethe toa political thatturnedpolitics logos) andbeingcommitted movement intoa totalideologeme usuallyraisethequestionofHeidegger’s failure asa philosophical problem.”Inresponse,Iwouldargueratherplainly (thisisnot theappropriatecontextforelaboration) thatthecomplex psychicelementsthatledHeideggertoembracethisideologeme and theattitudeitrepresented werethenecessary elementsofhisextraordinaryworkof/on thinking.Thisisnot at all to saythat Heidegger’s thought is immanentlyfascist,as Adorno is known to have said,unless

consistspreonewereto understandthat Heidegger’s “immanence” thepolisasa worldlyelementforthesake ciselyinseekingto eliminate simply words,tolmas charin, Sophoclean ofthinkingof(its)Dasein—in of forthe sakeofdaring.Thereis no failurebecausetheimmanence fact,inthewaythatAdornowouldunderthought—in Heidegger’s Thetotaldesiretobeapolis. inHeidegger’s standimmanence—consists forthewhole thiscondition precisely itarianpoliticsoffascismachieves ofsociety(whichiswhyitcarriesa suicidallogic).Oncewedispense problem,the failureas a philosophical withthe notionof Heidegger’s questionof integralstatusofhispraxisconcernsthemostfundamental natureandtouchestheheartofGermanculture political philosophy’s

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knewbetterthananyonethatthe Heidegger anditsGreekobsession. isGreek,andyethe soughttoshowthatthe ofphilosophy language inthedoublesenseoftethe“endofphilosophy” endofthislanguage, in Greek—is fieldis demarcated los—but hereagainthesignificational hadalreadybeenconceptualground.Thistrajectory rootedinGerman butHeidegger proandlaterbyNietzsche, izedbytheJenaRomantics particularly intermsofthenatureofa videditsrigorousexpression, language he never ceased to overturn. For this reason and no other,

decision to lend the servicesof his thoughtto Heidegger’s political Nazism,even for a “moment”(buthow doesone measureahistorical

fiihren,is a moment?), evenin theridiculousambitionofderFiihrer philosophical matterofthefirstorder.Thisdecisionwillhauntforever Heidegger’s readingofGreekthoughtandrenderit foreverincorporeal:a thoughtsingularly committed todeathratherthanlife,a thought death-driven.®

TheTheatrical Pedagogy oftheLaw ThedramaofAntigone performsinexemplary fashiontheperilsofsingularityanddeath-driven thought.WhenthechorusreferstoAntigone asautonomos (1.821),it alludestoher actingalonein thepursuitofcivic

praxis,outsideconventions, insingularfashion.Thisfanaticposition doessuggestasortofmadness(practicing philiawithoutothers),while at the levelof desiresuchexclusive(andthus asocial)autonomypre-

supposesa self-engendering and,in thatrespect,a violationofkinship.*!Theimportance ofthisself-engendering gesture,of course,is muchgreaterthanitsviolation ofkinship,insofarasit isa violationof theself-limitation fundamental tosocialautonomy. Singularautonomy isunacceptable intheGreekworld,whetherdemocratic ornot;ifnothingelse,thisisthemarkofthemythofPrometheus. Antigone’s praxis maybe signifiedasan actof socialautonomy—the justdefianceofa heteronomous order—but herreasoning issingularandthusa violation ofherpraxis.JudithButlerencapsulates thisparadoxical autonomyin anincisivereadingoftheperformativity inAntigone’s claim“Iwillnot denymydeed”—a claimtorefusetoperforma denialwithoutnecessarilyclaimingtheact.Therefusal,Butlerargues,is not anattemptto

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escapeculpability but anattemptto escapebeingforcedtoadmitculpability.Itisa refusalofthelawoftheOther,whichin thiscasehappenstobesovereign law,thelawofKreon.Antigone’s autonomy inthis gestureconsistsintherefusaltosubmittoKreon’s presumed autonomy of the State—inall senses,fromAntigone’sstandpoint,a heteronomous

order.In an evocative passagethatI mustquoteat length,Butlerargues: [Antigone] assumes thevoiceofthelawincommitting theactagainst the law.Shenotonlydoesthedeed,refusingtoobeytheedict,butshealso doesitagainbyrefusingtodenythatshehasdoneit,thusappropriating therhetoricofagencyfromCreonhimself. Heragencyemerges precisely throughherrefusaltohonorhiscommand, andyetthelanguage ofthisrefusalassimilates theverytermsofsovereignty thatsherefuses. . . .The claiming becomes anactthatreiterates theactitaffirms, extending theact ofinsubordination byperforming itsavowalinlanguage. Thisavowal, paradoxically, requires asacrifice ofautonomy attheverymomentin whichitisperformed: sheassertsherselfthroughappropriating thevoice oftheother,theonetowhomsheisopposed;thusherautonomy isgained throughtheappropriation oftheauthoritative voiceoftheonesheresists,

thathaswithinittracesofasimultaneous refusalandasanappropriation similation ofthatauthority.

Thissimultaneity is notmerelyparadoxical butthoroughly (self-)destructive. Topushthemattertoitsmorepreciselimit,wecouldaddthat herrealautonomy, whichcouldonlybearticulated, Antigonesacrifices in thelastinstance,bya politicaloverturningofunjustrule(Kreon’s thatcouldneverbethe handlingof thelaw)—apoliticaloverturning outcomeofa singulargesture,unlessthissingulargestureinitiatedthe cohesionforpraxisagainstunjustrulebytheentirepolis. symbolic language multivalent Letus considerfora momentthewonderfully directquestion“Doyouadmitordoyou ofthedramaitself.ToKreon’s kaiphemi response isliterally denythatyouhavedonethis?”Antigone’s drasaikoukaparnoumaitomé(1.443),translated,rather literally,as “and I

bytwo sayI did it andI do notdenyit.”Thesentenceis constructed merelya conjunction phraseslinkedby therepetitionof“and’”—not oftwodistinctactionsmeanttobetakenas reiteration butanemphatic one.Thesecondpartof the sentenceis a doublenegativeof sorts:

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whichis shadowed isa verbofnegation(Ideny,I refuse), aparnoumai (I do not oukaparnoumai awkwardly: hereby twonot’s.Somewhat deny) to mé(the not)—thenot having done it, she means, in direct play-

may Kreon’s useofthesamemodule.Doublenegation back,mirroring terms,butinthiscase,theaffirmation ingrammatical meanaffirmation admission ofguiltbefore thatKreonseeksin hisownlanguage—the hangsin theair,an eluthelaw—is notuttered.Instead,a vagueness consistentelusionof thelaweven sivenessthatsignifiesAntigone’s is whenshehascometobebeforethelaw.Thefirstpartofthesentence Phémi signifies, ratherplainly,“Isay”’—linked evenmoreproblematic. a (voice) butalsophemé, ofnotionsaroundphoné totheentireinventory ofunknownorigin,unknown voiceshavtermsuggesting knowledge ingspoken,ina stunning rangeofconsequential notionsfromoracleto rumor.In addition,phémiis alsolinkedto theverbsphadandphaino: namely,tobringtolight(phds), tomakeapparent(phainesthai), tomake known.Inthisrespect,thecorrecttranslation “IsayIdidit”couldeasilybe,justascorrectly, “rumorhasitIdidit”or“itappearsI didit.”To bemorepreciseto thecomplexity ofthelanguage,wecannotneglect that, grammatically, the agentof rumoror of makingapparentis Antigone herself;norcanweignorethatsheisequallytheobjectofrumor,of revelation,as sheis alsoundeniablyforcedto submitto the law.

Itisdifficulttodecidejusthowconscious Antigoneisofherparadoxicalgestures, howmuchsheknowsofherself—if itisevenprudent tospeakatallofself-consciousness inthecontextofancientdrama.But wecancannotdenythat,truetotheambiguity ofhername,totheambiguityofherfilialnature,Antigone’s claimsarenevertobetakenuncritically, asifshewereindeedtherepresentative ofaprinciple thatlies beyondinterrogation. Thuswhenthechoruscondemns Antigone for espousingan exclusive(andexclusionary) autonomy,we cannotpresumetheyhaveforgotten (ordisengaged herfrom)herpreviousgrand claimtorepresent the“unwritten andunfailing ordinances ofthegods” (agrapta kasphale theonnomima, |. 454).Thestatusofthisclaim,itschallengeto thepolis,doesnothingeon whetherAntigone’s exclusionary autonomyis simplya hubristiccondition,but on howthiscondition mightelucidatethemeaningofautonomywithinthecontextofself-interrogation. Itisstrikingthatthisclaimtoautonomy is predicated onthe

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“anwritten.” If thispredicate is narrowly readasthelawofthegods pureand simple,thenher autonomyis notonlyfalse(adelusion)but also,as a consequence ofa falseclaim(inGreekterms),hubristic.On the

otherhand,ifthe“unwritten andunfailing” determines theoriginary matrixfromwhichhumanlawis instituted(notmerelyasthedomainof customarypracticesandrulesofkinship,butin Castoriadis’s sense,as themagma ofsocial-imaginary significations outofwhichthedemocraticpolisitselfemerges),thenAntigone’s autonomyis realandlegitimate,asit posesa challenge tothetyrannyoftheunwavering written law:thedecree,the heteronomous utterance,Kreon’skérygma (1.454). TheradicalmarkofAthenian theveryformofthededemocracy, mocraticpolis, consistsof no laws written in stone,sacredand inalien-

able.Thisistheparadoxical culmination ofalongprocessinthearchaic worldthatbindstogether theinstitution oflaw,asthegroundwork ofa innercohesion, withtheinventionofwriting.Whetherit community’s isMoses,Hammurabi, Solon,orLycurgus, whetheritislawbydespotic revelationorbymetastasisfromcustomtorule,society’s predilection forlegalorderpartakes ofthepathofwriting,evenwhiletheprevalent imaginary cohesionmaystillbethegesturalandtheoral.Inthecaseof democratic law,thissimpleassociation istwisted-into profoundambiguity.Sincewrittenlawisnotsacredbutopentocontention andalteration,“unwrittenlaws”—which existatthesignificational boundaryof lawas such,henceAntigone’schoiceofthe term nomima(customs)and

as challenges fromwithintheranksofthepolis. not nomos—emerge appears,asa Theyare afterall endowedwithequalstanding:nomos word,aroundtheendofthesixthcenturyB.c.£.inAthens,justasthe graduallyfades,comingintofullinstitution) wordthesmos (customary reforms inthecontextoftheCleisthenes existence fledgedinstitutional In archéof the community.” as theprevailing thatestablishisonomia intomeaningin otherwords,fromtheverymomentof itsemergence eqstrivestowardpolitical polis,nomos metonymically thedemocratic ofprivileges (dividing,delimiting) uitability,towardan equalnemein hardlysuggests anddutiesin regardto the polis.Suchequitability it enablesdifferOnthecontrary, samenessorabolitionof difference. enceto takepartinthepoliticalprocessasthepowerofeachcitizento intosindifference strivefortheautonomyofall,insteadoftranslating

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entailunequal thatultimately beforethelaw,positions gularpositions marksthe moto nomos Thepassagefromthesmos politicaldemands. unacceptable, imposed lawbecomes mentwhenanynotionofexternally evenifit isthelawthatappealstothehigherauthorityofprimordial existsoutsidethesigbecausethishigherauthority kinship—precisely anditisinthissenseheteronomous. domainofisonomia nificational ofunwritten lawsthat Butthisdoesnotputanendtotheinvocation (whether divineruleorruleofkinship). harkenbacktotheprimordial ina comParticularly Nolawcanput anend tothesocialimagination. oflawitselfbeingsubjecttoan enmunityfoundedontheinstitution the desire to contest the writdemic—entddémd,as it were—isonomia,

tenlawbyappealtotheunwritten isentirelylegitimate. Bythesametoacategory in “unwritten laws”donotmerelycomprise ken,however, reaction tothepossibleinadequacy ofwrittenlaw(perhapsevenaselementsofresidualaristocracy againstthe inscribedauthorizationof democratic isonomia), buta categorythatitselfundergoesan internal development whichincreasingly distances itfromthereligious practice thatnominally givesitauthority, bringingitclosertothesocial,thecustomary.™ Antigone’s invocation of“unwritten laws”asunquestionably divine(andforsomeinterpreters, absolutely authoritative) maybedue to Sophocles’ believedpreference forequatingthedivinewithwhateverisincommensurable, apersonal viewthatmaynotnecessarily representthecity’sprevalent orientation. (Herodotus, forexample, recognizesthedivineauthority oftheunwritten, butinhighlyrelativeterms andalwaysviatheprismofsocialpractice.) Allthesame,sincedivine orderin theGreekimaginary providesno guarantee ofcosmicorder, evenif“unwritten laws”wereascribed a purelydivinenature,theiractual practicewould be de facto social: a matter of politicalherméneia,

opentotheperformance ofthecitizens. Antigonethusseesherselfasthepremierperformerof“unwritten laws,”castigating Kreonforover-performance (oude.. .agraptakasphale theonnomima dynasthai thneton onth'hyperdramein, ll.454-55).Sinceno law isguaranteed,one’srelation to the law is a matter of self-limitation;

thisis the fundamental wagerof democraticpolitics.Onecan interpret/ perform(herméneuein) the law,but one cannotoutperformit (hy-

perdramein). Precisely becausethereis no divinecourtoflawand in

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Athensno priestseverpresidedasjudgesor legislators, “divinelaws” haveas guarantorand interpreterthepoliticalkrisisof individualcitizens.Thus,theunwrittenandunfailing nomima ofthegodsliterally“revert” to human customs;they are reabsorbedinto the realm of tradi-

tionalcommunal practices fromwhichalllawemerges, asPlatohimself acknowledges (Laws,793a).Wehavethuscomefullcircletoseethat,althoughtheinstitution oflawwithouttheinvention ofwritingwould not havebeen possiblein the waywe now understandit, tragedy showsthatin thedemocratic polisbothwrittenandunwrittenlawisa matterofperformative contention, neitherfrozenin sacredwritingnor mysteriously entombed intheoutreaches oftheunwritten.*° Thisiswhy,contraHeidegger (butalsocontraDerrida’s readingof Hegel),thereisnowhereinAntigone alawofsingularity thattakesona ifthedramateachesusanything, itis lawofuniversality.” Certainly, Thechoprecisely thatthesetwo“laws”canbeinterwoven (pareirein). rus ultimatelycondemnsthelawof singularityas practiced(differently)bybothKreonandAntigone. Sophocles stagesthismatterwitha thelawofsingularity withinthelogicof brillianttwistby presenting bothprotagonists intheguiseofuniversal claim:theuniversal asone,as lawforbiddingcontention. Inonesense,Antigonedoesrepresentthe (wereweto interprettheunwrittothissingularuniversal opposition But fromwhichlawemerges). archéofsignifications tenastheagonistic a singulardefailureisthatsheassertsinthisopposition Antigone’s drama thatis Kreon’s.Antigone’s sire—nota desirefor singularity, butin sheactsagainstsingularity onthiscontradiction: hingesprecisely singularfashion. kouden Sophoclesseems to suggestthat what makesanthropos andall-encompassing; is elemental (theclaimto comparison deinoteron capacitytocreatehisbeing. itwouldincludethegods)isa self-taught ofthemiddlevoiceintheverbedidaxmeaning Thisis theparadoxical kaiastynomous kaianemoen phronema Kaiphthegma ato(“taughtoneself”). thought (phthegma), taughthimselflanguage Anthropos orgasedidaxato: and the institutingpassionsor lawmakingtemper (phronéma), Heideggertranslatescuriouslyas the fortiorgas)—which (astynomous iiberdie poweroverthecities(denMutderHerrschaft tudeofsovereign Heidegger thinking. ofdemocratic abolition onemoreeffective Stiidte),

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over hasanypowerof invention disputesthatanthropos categorically theseelements: doesnotmean:maninvented,but:he foundhiswayto Thewordedidaxato

one,the theviolent andthereinfirstfoundhimself: theoverpowering wielderof power[dieGewaltdesalsoTatigen].... Theviolenceofpoetic

oftheactionthat ofbuildingconfiguration, speech,of thinkingprojection, thatmanhas,butatamingand offaculties createsstatesisnota function

undFiigen derGewalten] byvirtueofwhich ofpowers[Bandigen ordering theessentopensupassuchwhenmanmovesintoit [butalsostepsintoits it:einriickt]. (IM,156-57). place,succeeds

andwaywardpasreading:aresourceless Butthisis,ifI may,anaporon sagethat deliberatelyalienatesthe terrainof Greekthought.Forto thoseelements (ofculedidaxato asmakingone’swaytoward translate tureandsociety)alreadytheretobefoundmeanstopredicateoneself one whichistheresomehow—no ontheoriginary mysteryoflanguage, knows how, no one can know but after the fact of “taming and order-

ing”:“Language istheprimordial poetryinwhicha peoplespeaksbeing”(IM,171).Moreimportant, thispathofthoughtabolishes theprofoundlyambiguous figureofsimultaneity (ordoublenature)ofhuman existence thatSophocles dramatizes. Andmoreprecisely, itshiftsthesimultaneitybetweenbeingandtheworld(whichisparamountin the practice ofsocialautonomy inAthens)toaninternalsimultaneity ofthe contradictory aspectsofbeing—pantoporos/aporos, as Heideggerreads it—on the way toward a world already there, where Beingwill en-

counteritsowndisclosure. Inthislight,letusreviewtwopassagesofequalacrobatic eloquence, butofenormousdifference inwhatcouldbe termedopennessat the limit.Heidegger writesoftheuncanniness ofman’sviolence: Forman,ashejourneys everywhere, isnotwithoutissueintheexternal sensethathecomesupagainstoutwardbarriersandcannotgoon.Inone wayor anotherhecanalwaysgofurtherintotheetcetera. Heiswithoutissuebecausehe isalwaysthrownbackintothepathsthathehimselfhas laidout:hebecomes miredinhispaths,caughtinthebeatentrack,and thuscaughthecompasses thecircleofhisworld,entangles himselfinappearance, andsoexcludes himselffrombeing.Heturnsroundandround in hisowncircle.(IM,157-58)

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HereisCastoriadis, anavowedcriticofHeidegger, ontherealmeaning oftheverbedidaxato anditsuseinthemiddlevoice: When I teachmyselfI givemyselfsomething I don’thave(otherwise, why should I giveit?),butalsosomethingIdo have(otherwise, whoelsegives it?).Theapparentnonsenseisdispensedwithonceweunderstandthatthe self-propelled energyoftheself-taught creates(bringsintoexistence) both the“content” andthe“subject” thatmutuallydetermine themselves, that eachotherandcoexist. presuppose

Thereisa mutualmotifinthesepassagesofencircling oneselfor,more accurately, ofcircumscribing oneselfwithoneselfat thecenter.Both have a mutual point of departure, whichis the textof Sophocles,and

yettheirobviousdivergence doesnotresideindifferent interpretations butindifferentdeparturepointsofreading.Heidegger’s perfectlycompassedcircleis thegreatinternalvoidwhereonerecognizes theuncannysenseofBeing.Castoriadis, ontheotherhand,recognizes that theunmatched powerofthehumanimagination (kouden deinoteron) is implicatedin a foundational co-incidence withthesocialinstitutionit creates,without which, however,the horizon of creationwould not ex-

ist.Whathecallselsewhere “theprimitive circleofcreation” isa circle whose Beingis nowhere, since in itself it accounts for the meaning of

social-hisBeing,a meaningthatisalwaysinevitablya human—thus, torical,worldly—affair.In other words, Castoriadis’scircleis neverbro-

interin Heidegger’s kenbyrevelation (by“unconcealment”—aletheia, abyssal) grounding(logically pretation), whichiswhyhisontological poofreligion. IntermsofSophocles’ doesnotbelonginthediscourse etic testimony of Greek thought, this abyssal circle,where creation co-

allowsus to glimpsethe incides withalterity(thedomainof edidaxato), itselffromthe impulsethatleda peopleto(re)conceive extraordinary Atsuchlevelofradical matrixof thetribeintothematrixofthedemos. “will”isinvolvedinwhatSophoa pre-logical imaginaryinstitution, orgas:institutionscannotbe createdand susclesnamesastynomous action.” tainedwithoutpassionate becauseit serves institution Atheniantheateris a radicalimaginary passionsand todramatizetheterrainbetweentheinstituting precisely andstillanintertwined intheirprofoundly theinstitutedrules(nomoi), fromtheponature.Thisiswhatmakestragedyinextricable tagonistic

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that natureofthiscomplicity litical,andit is thegravelyambiguous statementsas PierreVidal-Naquet’s shadowssuch unequivocal is a Castoriadis’s “democracy or Cornelius “tragedyis the political” political Otherwise, to speakoftragedyasimmanently tragicregime.” anarchaic relationistopoliticize oftheproblematic withoutcognizance forminmodernterms.Ina recentwork,NicoleLorauxbuildsa boldar-

gumentagainstwhat she considersthe deliberatepoliticizationof Athenian,asshe puts it)by Atheniantragedy(indeed,of everything critics.”Sheclaimsinsteadthattragedywasremanycontemporary movedfromtheagoraspacetothespecialsiteofthetheaterbecauseits conchiefpurposeforthecitywasthe ritualizedworkof mourning, thesisthanshe explicitlyadcluding(muchcloserto theAristotelian consistedmorein catharticexperimits)thatAthenianspectatorship Surelythereismuchto encethanintheexperience ofself-interrogation. commend inthisargumentandincorporate fromit:theimportance of tragedy’s occupying itsownphysicalspace,whichdoesnotallowus simplytoequatewhatgoesonin thetheatricalexperience withwhat goesonintheexperience oftheagora;thefactthattragedyremainsa performative activitylinkedtoallaspectsofDionysian ritual,whether in form (music, dance, lyric)or in purpose (memorialization,lament,

intoxication, perhapsevencatharsis); thecritiqueofuninterrogated conceptions ofpoliticsinwhichthepolistendstobefiguredasaself-sufficient,integral,or undifferentiated entity;or,finally,de-emphasizing tragedy’s pedagogical roleinfavorofwhatsheidentifies asthepsychagogical functionofthetheatrical experience, whichcentersmore“onthe forceofsuffering(pathos)than thepower of acting (drama).”

Whatgalvanizesthesepositionsis Loraux’sbringingintoprominencethenotionsofmortality andalterityascounterforces tothekind of“promised” immortality andself-affirmation thatthepolisallegedly providesits citizens—one easilyrecallscertainreadingsof Pericles’ “Funeral Oration”in suchterms.Butmybasicunderstanding ofthe ancienttextsthemselves is thatmortalityand alterityarehardlymarginalin the languageof thedemocraticpolis—tothecontrary.Certainly,as Vernanthasargued,therecanbenosenseofselfintheGreek imaginary exceptinthesenseofexistence beforetheeyesofanother.*! Andthe veryprocessby whichthisimaginarybecomesdemocratic

Philosophy’s Need forAntigone 155

hingesonthefactthatautonomy enablesandis enabledbyself-alteration.Lorauxrecognizes this convergence withotherness—she says aphoristically, “theotherisoneandthesame,andwhendead,theone isliketheother.”YetI findit atleastpuzzling howpersistently sheconsidersthisan elementoftragedy’s “anti-political” nature,assheputsit explicitly. Likewise, hercommendable insistence ontragedy’s beinga lessoninmortality seemstomisrecognize thefactthatthislessonisthe mostimportant political lessonofall.Thetragicsenseofone’sfinitude is precisely whatsustainsthepassions(orgas) ofautonomy. Asthereis nosenseofdivinetranscendence, one’sactionsintimeandintheworld aretheultimatemarkofone’sunmasterable being,a markthatinthe contextofthedemocratic polissurpasses theHomeric notionofindividualheroickleos andisexpressed asthedesiretocreate,interrogate, and assumethelawasa politésin a collective bodyof limitless contentionanddifferentiation. suchpassionforautonomy, butfailsbecause Antigone exemplifies shechoosesto exerciseit withoutthepolis(philiawithoutothers),a choicethatin theAthenianmindsetwouldbetantamounttomadness (mania). Afterall,suchsingularityisn’tevenreservedfor thegods, whosesenseofjusticeisnotmerelymultivalent butalwaysa matterof unlike Unlikephilosophy (andcertainly, fierceandruthlesscontention. theology), tragedyisa techné ofespousing,notresolving,thedifferential equationsof the law—inthe lastinstance,a technéwroughtof andself-interroforthesakeofcontradiction enigmaandcontradiction aspectofAtheniantragedy,asWalgation.Indeed,the“epoch-making” explicitstaging totragedy’s it, isdueprecisely ter Benjamin identified oflawinthepolisandthe anddifferential constitution oftheagonistic out of whichsocialautonomyemerges. contingency mythographic withtheself-inthe“end”oftragedyasaformconsubstantial Likewise, ofthepolisanditslaw(i.e.,politicsin thestrictestsense)arterrogation eradisengage guablyoccurswhentragediansin the post-Euripidean infavorofretheirdramaticmaterialfromthegreatmythicinventory ByArisdraftingcertainsuccessfultragicplotsof theirpredecessors. Itisarguably exercise. totle’stime,tragedyhaslapsedintoa formalist of the performativity moreprecisely, no longermythographic—or, But experience. ofthetheatrical astheanima mythisnolongertraceable

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tragedyas form,pureandsimple,meansin effectits depoliticization, an totragedybecoming whichinancienttermswouldbetantamount apolisform,a dead form.”

failureis endemicto Onemightsay,of course,thatAntigone’s elementofhumancharacargumentfortheoudendeinoteron Sophocles’ ter.Nothingprecludesthe humanpowerof creationfromleadingto totragedyitself— Butthisisalsoafailureimmanent (self-)destruction. thesensethat “everyworkoftragedyknowsitselfasa failure”*—in humannaturetobe enigina societythatconceives tragedyemerges and respondsby inventinga form matic(becauseutterlycontingent) eithertoresolve stagethisenigma,unconcerned thatwouldcollectively Thiswouldsuggestan forcesinvolved. ortoappeasethecontradictory farbeyondits didacticutilityin epistemological richnessforAntigone This Aufhebung, orHeideggerian Dasein. Aristotelian catharsis, Hegelian constitutive failuretopresentresolution hashauntedanyphilosophical Modern thatsoughtintragedyitsidealparadigm. projectofmodernity philosophy’s constitutive incapacity—to maketheradicalcontingency of life its point of departure—isfigured,in the last instance,by tragedy’s failure.Yetsuchan endemicconditionof “failure,”which demonstrates withgreatviolencetheabsence(ifnotimpossibility) of absoluteLaw,indicatesthepointat whichthepresumablyunfailing heteronomous sovereignty ofmodern“rational” lawmightbeundone. Theremaythusbeanotherwaytoperceivephilosophy’s needin the contemporary world:as modernity’sneed for the embodimentof mythiccontingency, a needconceived inthewayHeidegger speaksof Not(meaning notmerelyneed,butaffliction, distressful necessity, perilouswant),whenhespeaksofone’sencounter withhistoryinDasein. Exemplified as performative knowledge inan archaicformwhose social-historical momenthas vanishedbut whosesocial-imaginary traceshavebeenincorporated intactinitsverygenre,mythicthought in our timemay thusbecomephilosophy’s antidoteagainstmodernity’safflictionby history’sambiguous,undecidable,enigmatic, unerasable presence.As pharmakon to modernity’s self-incurred relativizationof thoughtand time,tragedyreinstates,in themidstofthe sovereignty of reason,the performative parametersof the mythographicimagination, whereby questions ofUrsprung aremadea matter

Philosophy’s Need forAntigone 157

of contingency, politicalcontention,negotiation,and decision.In tragedy,nooneconquers,neithergodsnorhumans,neithernecessity norwill,neitherlawnormyth.Itisn’tthattragedyprecludes resolution in orderto be displacedas ethicalreconciliation in reality(Hegel). Rather,asdocumentofthepredicament of(social)autonomy—of the struggletogiveoneselfthelawwithoutinstitutinga transcendental finality—tragedy isa formofsociety’s creativeimagination thatembod(andinstiiesthechaoticpooloutofwhichsocietystrivestoimagine ina quintessential expression tute)itselfas other.Itisa revolutionary sense,becauseitallowsustoglimpse—it putsonstage,itperforms, for ustosee,totheorize—the languageofself-alteration.

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himself:liketravelingmerchantswhohastilyspeculatein received ideas. to considerthisvoyageasbeing It wouldnotbe an exaggeration ofthenineteenthcentury’smostcharchartedacrosstheintersections Indeed,wemightsaythatBouvard practices. andindomitable acteristic theterritorywhichtravelersandphilolopathdelimits andPécuchet’s werewetoconsiderthenotionofphilology co-inhabit, gistsultimately providedbyErnestRetothedefinition initsbroadestsense,according nan, one of its most illustriousfigures:namely,the rather anatomicalvi-

acutediscurPhilology’s sionof“theexactscienceofmentalobjects.”

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(bybothFoucaultin Les siveaffinitywithanatomyiswelldocumented butastheprecisedissection andSaidinOrientalism), Motsetleschoses nodoubtfindsitsmostarofculture,philology andgrandsurveillance (1877) Prayerto theAcropolis in Renan—whose ticulateexpression ofintellectual maninthenineas“thesummation described Flaubert inisitselfrelatedtoanatomy, teenthcentury”(Corr.8:7).Buttraveling ownactual ofculture; Flaubert’s inthediagnosis sofarasitparticipates “Atravelerislikea travelnotesprovideuswitha startlingexample. dearfriends, quipsanotherofFlaubert’s doctor,hecansayanything,” (1853). Moreover, likephilolThéophile Gautier,inhisConstantinople ogy,whichinthenineteenth centuryhadfashioned itselfintoaninvinciblescience, traveling atthattimepropelledoneintoadefactoposition retrospectively theinci(Oneneedonlyentertain ofexpertknowledge. siveironyintheexplication thatgracestheentryORIENTALIST intheDictionnaire: “Manwhohastraveledwidely.”) Beingdiscoursetravelers,BouvardandPécuchetdo travelwidely, andtheymostcertainlyalsotravelin haste.Andas theyareby all meansintrepid,theyincarnatethusthefullgamutofreceivedideasregardingtravel:“TRAVELER: Always‘intrepid.’” Theirdauntlessness in the faceof ignorance,confusion, and failureprovides us with another

instanceoftheco-incidence betweentravelingand writingintheworld oflabétise, fornexttotheprescription ofhasteastheessenceofwriting intheDictionnaire figuresa command whichisaclassicintheworldof platitudes: Do“everything necessary forthesakeofwriting.”Allparodicintentionsaside,onewouldbehardpressednottorecognize inthe twoParisiansof Chavignolles theabsolutelyuncompromising stance thatcollective doxareveresinthemostprofoundservantsofArt.Inthis respect, Bouvardand Pécuchetmay be idiots, but in the universe of id-

iocytheyareartists. Thisisnota mockingcharacterization. InBouvard etPécuchet, wesee thetwofriendsmovefrombeingcopyists ina realworldthathasdepriveditselfofitsimagination to becomingeverrenewably innocent experimenters ina worldunfolding at theprecipice ofa self-referential imagination that allowsno externalbreach.Thusthey proceedundaunted,takingoneventhemostmysterious orcapricious domainsof humanknowledge because, paradoxically, theyarenotburdened with

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theweightof receivedideas,despiteoperatingaccordingto theirimposeddemands. Theymayactasorgansofa particular discipline each time,but inpassingso rapidlyfromonediscipline to anothertheyexperiencethemselves as virtuallyself-constituted authorities. Weread: “Pécuchet consulted theBiographie Universelle, andundertook torevise Dumasfrom a scientific pointofview.”° Pécuchet hereactswiththedesire to reinstate Dumas’sauthority—inso many words, to restore the

authorityof literature.Thefactthathequicklygivesup onDumasis notexperienced ashisownfailurebutasthefailureoftheobject, Dumas’sallegedlabyrinth of“error.”Inthisfashion,Pécuchet’s ownauthority,hisown essenceasAUTHOR, is substantiated.”

Thesetwocharacters relentlessly imbuetheobjectsthatsurround themwith whatevermeaningtheywish.Theyact likesomedual Adam,namingandrenaming objects, notions,eventsinwaysthathave littletodowiththeirsocialenvironment. Theysubjecteverything and everyonearoundthemtoa novelistic experience. Considertheepisode withthebaptismalfont,whichtheystealfromthecemeteryatChavignollesduringtheirstintin Celticarcheology. Discovering thepiece, theyproclaimitanancientbasinusedforthedrainingoffofbloodduringoldDruidceremonies. Whenthecuréconfesses tohavingactually witnessedtheirstealingit,theyrespondat firstwithutterincredulity. Protestingthat anywaythe baptismalfontwasno longerin active in frontofthecuréitsbonafideproperties— use—thatis,recognizing that theystillrefuseto returnit and go on to affirmto themselves madethemattachedtoCelticism ofsuchapiecesomehow “ownership Whenfinallypressedbythemayorto returnitat in Normandy” (114). seriesofarguments: allcosts,theyreplywitha remarkable Firsttheholywaterstoupwasnotneeded,anditwasnota holywater arguments. Then stoupanyway.Theywouldproveitbya massofscientific intheirwillthatitbelongedto thecommune. theyofferedtoacknowledge Theyevenproposedbuyingit. ... repeated. Pécuchet “Andanyhowitismyproperty!” Duringthesedebateshehadseenthesouptureenagainseveraltimes,and inhishearthadgrownthedesire,thethirst,theitchforthispieceofchina. Ifitwereagreedheshouldhaveit,hewouldreturnthebasin.Otherwise not.

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Wearyor afraidof scandal[thecuré]gaveup the tureen.(116)

thelimitsofalllogic,asitisbasedon thatstretches Thisisanargument mutuallyexclusive andoftentimes a seriesofrapidlyinterchangeable namingsofthesameobject.Inthisfreneticcourseofconstantrenamall establishedsocial ing, all conventionalrulesof signification—hence

andrewritten into abolished propertyrelations—are codes,including holdsthekey.Theyareinanotherlanguageto whichonlyPécuchet theyaretransposed intothe authority; scribedentirelywithPécuchet’s ofhisnovel.Inthis theymakeuptheelements realworldofhisfiction; world,onetakesno losses.Theactualfontmaybe returnedto its Moreover, properplace,butits“real”meaningremainsunchallenged. itisexchanged foranotherobject,thetureen,whoseactualuseisagain exactlyat the of no interest.For it entersthe orbitof (re)signification

placeoccupied bythebasinoftheDruids,onlytospurthetwofriends onwardtothestudyofporcelain making,theceramics ofancientGaul, andfromthereontoa studyofthehistoryofFrance!

Thiseventisreminiscent ofthefamouscontroversy inDonQuixote regarding Mambrino’s helmet.Inthis,theknighthaschosentowearas headgearanupturnedbarber’sbasinmadeofbrass,whichhedeclares tobethefamousgoldenhelmetofMambrino thatmakesitsbearerinvincible. WhenSanchoPanzadesperately attemptstodissuadehismasterfromembarkingonyetanotherfollybyremindinghimthatthisis merelya barber’sbasin,DonQuixoteproceedswitha logicsimilarto Pécuchet’s. Herevealsthematterasa problemofnaming,whichisessentiallygovernedby whateverrulesofenchantment pertainto the context.In thiscase,althoughtheobjectmayactuallybe a barber’s basin,itisreallyMambrino’s helmet,andone’sinabilitytoperceiveitas such—presumably theresultofenchantment by eithergoodor evil spirits,dependingonthecircumstances—substantiates thisrealityby safeguarding theobject’s essence forhimalone,therightful owner.It is a formidable logic,byallaccounts.* ItisreallythelogicthatmakesDon Quixote,andalsoBouvardandPécuchet, whattheyactuallyare—the authorial logicthatlendsthemthepowertoreconstitute therelationsof meaning insucha wayas tomakeeveryone submitto thehorizonof theirworld,whichtoallotherscanneverbeanythingbutfiction. ThatBouvard andPécuchet cometooccupyanauthorialposition,of

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course,implicatesthemdirectlyin a complicitous relationship with Flaubert. Manycriticshavepointedoutthatthetwofriendseventually cometospeakasFlaubert, especially atthepointwheretheriftbetween theirworldandtheworldof thevillagers becomes difficult evenfor themto ignore.Thephraseisfamous:“Thena lamentable facultydevelopedintheirminds,thatofnoticing stupidityandfindingitintolerable”(217).Itisundoubtedlya Flaubertian moment,considering that whenhebeganthisbook—which hethenconsidered subtitling AnEncyclopedia ofHuman Stupidity—Flaubert waspropelled bya desire,inhis words,“tovomiton [his]contemporaries” (Corr.6:425).However, I wouldcontendthatFlaubert wasentangled inthewebofhisowncharactersmuchbeforetheyweremadetodevelopa similardisposition. Earlyonin the writing,hecomplains: “Thisisa diabolical book!I’m afraidthatmybrainisabouttoevaporate.IsitbecauseI amso replete withmysubjectthatthe stupidityofthesetwofellowshasinvaded and Pécuchet ocme?”(Corr.7:189).Anda fewmonthslater:“Bouvard cupymetosuchanextentthatIhavebecomethem.Theirstupidityis mine,andI’mdyingofit... .Onehastobeundera cursetothinkup suchabook!”(Corr.7:237). Ofcourse,thecurseisprecisely whatengendersthebookinthefirst place,providing bothitsmeansanditsend.Itisthecurseoflabétise itself,which, as FrancoiseGaillardhas pointed out, is an activatingforce

whosethreatresidesin theriskof“beingdraggedintothedisastrous enoughof turbulenceof its action.”’Flauberthimselfwas conscious fromwhichoneoughttodefendonethisforcenotonlyas something it.It touseagainsttheveryworldthatcultivates self,butassomething that“ifitwere ofhisearliestplansfortheDictionnaire is characteristic properlydone,anyonewhoreaditwouldneverdareopenhismouth utteringone ofits pronouncements” again,for fearof spontaneously (Corr.3: 67).Thisis indeedthe profoundessenceof the Dictionnaire.

a textthatwouldharnessthegreatpowerofI’idée Flaubertenvisioned a culture’s recuein sucha waythattheveryutterancewhichsymbolizes exert phrasesa cultureuttersin itssleep—would thoughtlessness—the upon its users a paralyzingfear,a consciousmuteness.It is, as he createa textthataimsatnothingless vision—to wouldsay,a diabolical AsPierre thanturningthelanguageofanageintoitsownantimatter.

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Machereyhas pointed out, Flaubert’swork (and Bouvardet Pécuchet

and ofinhalation by thedoublecondition is characterized specifically) consistsin hisofthereal,wherebytheartisticenterprise exhalation tory’s waste management,as it were—and Flaubert’sexcremental

a hilarioustryat compost imposeson the twocharacters imagination mindsas theveryessenceofalintheirtroubled reconfigured making and total creation,whichis in realityperfectdestruction chemical provides uswitha metaphorinsightisthatFlaubert waste.Macherey’s (asdisproduction andconsumption ofthreading together icalinstance levelinordertoencaprelations) atthemostmaterialist tilledcapitalist andmetastasis ofthereal.'” voracious incorporation sulateliterature’s Thisiswhatit meanstowanttowritea textthatwould“reconcile the publicto [its]tradition,”a textwhosewordswould notbe in the

wastomakeculturaluttoitsauthor. TheDictionnaire leastattributable terancepalpableassocialpraxis;itwastoinvoketheauthorialpowers ofsociety’s logos, erasingintheprocessthetracesofauthority. Admittedly,a paradoxical figuringhereaffectsthemeaningofsocialpraxis. Theutterance oflabétise associalpraxischronicles history’s ownfarce, lablague ofpoliticsandprogress,insucha waythatontheoccasion of the coupof NapoleonIII,for example,Marx’ssarcasticeloquence comestoconcurwiththewisepronouncements ofFlaubert’s dearMonsieur Bouvard.Ifthis soundsextravagant,considerFlaubert’sown ad-

missionthatafterthePrussianvictoryof1870thepublicbétise hadsubmergedhimin its murkydepths,an admissionallowedin thesame breathwiththefollowing utterance: “1870hasdrivenmanypeopleinsane,madeothersimbeciles, or leftsomeenraged. I put myselfin this lastcategory.”Whatmightbe termedas thelogicof Bouvardand Pécuchet isthuslinked,beyondwhatevermightbethehorizonofthe authorialirony,to the author’ssocialrage.The Dictionnaire, which,let

usnotforget,wastocoverbut a fewpagesof theplannedopusthetwo heroesweretocopyin thesecondpartof thebook,isthedistilledexpressionof thissimultaneous feelingofsubmergence in socialidiocy andintractable rageagainstit.TheDictionnaire thusconstitutes a doubleerasureoftheauthorialutterance: theexpression ofanenragedsubjectis theundeterred utterance ofsocialidiocyitself. No doubt, the same impetus liesbehind writing Bouvardet Pécuchet.

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Whatatonetime,regarding theDictionnaire, Flaubert haddescribed as a text“writtenin sucha waythatthereaderwouldnotknowwhether heis beingmadefunofornot[quelelecteur nesachepassionsefoutde lui,ouiounon)”(Corr.2:238)hadbecome,by the timeof Bouvard et Pécuchet, evenmoreexplicit: “Thisismy(secret) purpose: tobewilder thereadertosucha pointthatit makeshimcrazy”(Corr.8:175).Considering thatFlaubert hadcollected nearlyfourhundredpagesofquotations,whichhe plannedto release as thebook’ssecondvolume,the

seriousness ofthisclaimcannotbesoeasilydismissed. Indeed,herelies the keythat setsthis particularworkapartfromtheothers,even though,asIhavealreadymentioned, it partakesofallofFlaubert’s concerns,fromArtas representationtoArtas construction.Flaubert’senor-

mousresearch forBouvard etPécuchet (involving allegedly somefifteen shouldnotbeseenmerelyasa matterofmastering hundredvolumes) the subjecthe was to writeabout(as it was,for example,with Itgoesbeyondmerehistorical totheactualgatherSalammbé). research ingandordering—that is,copying—the vastbodyofquotations thatthe twofriendsthemselves wereto spendtherestoftheirnovelistic life copying.In otherwords,Flauberthimselfhad alreadyenteredthe worldofthecopyists beforetheyhadcomeintoproperexistence, and hewastodoitagain,alongwiththem,inthebook.” methodwiththe precision MarcelProust,whostudiedFlaubert’s andartistryofonewhofullyunderstoodthegravesignificance ofcreatinga fictionalworldwithinwhichhewouldthenbeboundasaupersontotakeup the wassurelythemostappropriate thor/subject, tobring andPécuchet—fail thatallthree—Flaubert, Bouvard, copying theirhistorical finitude.Inhis tolifebecausetheycannotoutmaneuver andMusicalTastesofBoumasterlyfragment“TheSocialAmbitions Proustcopiesnotonlythestyleofdepictingthe vardand Pécuchet,” Bouvardand Pécuchetuniversebut the structural/textural forcethat, at

Onecannot up theauthorialpersona. swallows theleveloflanguage, etPécuchet avoidfeelingthathehascopiedsomepassagefromBouvard inthenovel’spages: somewhere itself,surelytraceable Bouvard feltsure,toexpressone’s Andyetit oughtnotbesodifficult, withforcethoughtsclearly.Butclarityisnotenough,gracetoo(combined and logic.Headdedirony.Butin elevation, vivacity, fulness)isnecessary,

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moreoftenthannotitfaopinionironyisnotindispensable; Pécuchet’s him.Inshort,everybody thereaderwithoutbenefiting tiguesandconfuses isto desirefororiginality theexcessive toBouvard, writesbadly.According ofourmorals.’* itisduetothedecadence toPécuchet, blame;according

ofsigtotheabyssaltransposition abandonment Proust'sself-conscious aninstanceof nifications is thorough.Thepassageisaboutliterature, Bouvardand Pécuchetas literary critics,whichcanonlybea recircula-

ididéesrecues. Inthisworldofrecirculating tionofliterarycriticism’s value,its likeanyothertwo-bitexchange iocy,evenironyisnegotiated moralism. “Headded fatehanginginthebalanceofinsipidbourgeois irony”thereforeemergesas a strangelyambiguousand disruptive ittosignalthegatethoughwhichthe phrase.Whileonemightconsider authorisabsorbedintothetext,itmightalsobesaidtomake,byvirtue ofthistext’sfanatical expulsion ofallsignificational grounding, thefigureoftheauthorsuperfluous. NoauthorcanaddironytoBouvard et Pécuchet—onthe one hand, because irony abounds in it (as the formal

foundation ofitsstyle)andyet,ontheotherhand,becausenoironycan flourishinBouvard’s andPécuchet’s uncannyabilitytoshiftcontinuallytheterrainofsignification, frommeaningtomeaninglessness and back,ina limitlesstrajectoryofinvestmentanddivestmentofunderstanding.Becausenoauthorcanaddironyto Bouvard etPécuchet, the ironistauthorisboundinsideitsorbitlikemattertrappedinanabyssal gravitational pull. Inretrospect, wecansafelysaythatFlaubertsoughtthroughouthis lifetocreateafictional worldthatwouldsuckrealityintoitsorbit.Perhapsonlyinthiswaycanhebesaidtohavebeen arealist, thoughin thisway,also,Borges canclaimhimasa precursor. Bouvard etPécuchet wasarguablythe culmination ofthenovelwhoseworlddemandsits authorto be a centralelement,to forgean existenceimmanentto the process ofthenovel'sinception, evenbeforethisnovelistic worldcan besaidtobefullyconstituted. Flaubert’s complicity, notjustintheconstructionofBouvard andPécuchet butin theiractualtask,is total.This isevidentin manyexasperated remarksinhislettersbutalso,moreimportantly,in that it producesthe styleof the novelitself,where Flaubert’s frequentuseofstyleindirect libreaimstoquoteeitherofhis characters whilestripping themofquotation marks,in suchawaythat hisownthoughtsmayenterthetextwithoutbeing“quoted” astheau-

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thor’s.WeknowhowmuchFlaubertdetestededitorializing—this he sawas Balzac’s majorflaw—but hereheprovides anaddedeffect:he inscribes directlyintothework’sstyletheelimination ofthedistancebetween author and subject.In this, the twoare certainlynot abolished,as

isoftenargued.Theybecomeinsteadfullyco-incidental andcomplicit. In thisway,thesocialworldopensup toitsinfusion bythefictional, and theworldofthenovelopensuptotherealmoftheoretical thought. Flauberthimselfseemswellattunedtothisdoubleopeningfroma ratherearlyage:“IfI wereeverto takeanactivepartin theworld,it wouldhavetobeasa thinkeranddemoralizer” (Corr.1:43).Thelatter mustbetakenliterally. Itmarksthepointwhereliterature invadesthe social,peelingoffthemanyencrustedlayersof receivedideasthat makethesocialfabricappearuncleft,morallyintact—which iswhyliteraturemaybeatcertaintimesdeclared anaffronttopublicmorals.By thefactthatFlaubert thathiscourseofactionwill contrast, anticipates resideintherealmofthoughtsubstantiates thecourseofhisliterary choices,of which Bouvardet Pécuchetis but the culmination.This is a

courseinwhichliterature theory,whichisnottosaythatitbebecomes comessomething otherthanliteraturebutthatit occupies thespace whereimagination andcontemplation becomeone. the contoursof thisspacemakesthe itineraryof the Recognizing horizonthematrix modernnoveltangible.It providesasconstitutive thatenablesProust’stoponymicmemoryto grantthehistoryof the insightintolaw orguidesKafka’s theatrical psychea preciselocation; ofthebody; aswriting’s harnessing asasetofautonomous inscriptions, ofhistoryasa branchoffanorinspiresBorgestounveilthediscipline ofstyle. thepredicament Thismatrixrevealsultimately tasticliterature. wewouldsaythatstylederivesitsmeaningfromitsproTraditionally, ofstyle Yettheoperations jectedpowertoundothemagicoflidéerecue. isagainnot ofthoughtitself—which arenoneotherthantheoperations thoughitistosaythat exercise, tosaythatthoughtissimplya formalist totheChaosoflife,theanticompanion thoughtisForm,thenecessary mattertotheformalityofl’idéerecue.Assuch,thought/styleisessenalthough ofcomprehension, beyondtheboundaries tiallyconstituted “Ihavea need necessary: onceit hasmadeitspresencefelt,it becomes (Corr.2:83)."* confesses things,”Flaubert tosayincomprehensible possibly etPécuchet specifically—cannot Bouvard ButFlaubert—and

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bemadethesourceof thisitinerary,thematricialpointof departure. canFlaubertbe placed,as EugenioDonatoultiNor,by implication, matelyargued,“atthe end oftime”writing“forthe endoftime.” Flaubertsignifies,as I havesaidbefore,a nodalpoint;by hisown word, he occupiesthe territoryof transition.FromAthens, in 1850,he writes:

comeonthescenetooearly andIandtherestofus—have “We—you andleastglamthemostdifficult andtoolate.We'llhaveperformed (Corr.2:279).Theforceofthisinsight orousofall tasks:transition” theparadoxical tensewhich hingesonthe useofthe future-anterior, futurewhereitisthen thehistorical moment intoanunknown projects Thistenseisalsothetenseoftravel,and letfreetooperateretroactively. itisaswellthetenseofincompleteinsofarasitpertainstoknowledge, to the ownsubmission ness.Wethusreturn,bymeansof Flaubert’s regimeofthetransitional, tothetrajectory ofBouvardandPécuchet. It isaninterminable trajectory, butnotbecausethebookisleftunfinished, forafterallthebookis closedandhasremainedsosinceit leftthe printer’sshopin1881. Itisaninterminable trajectory becauseinasense this book is an endless reinscriptionof an inviolablerhythm,what An-

drewMcKenna hascharacteristically calledthe“rhythmofresearch, essay,failure.”'°

ItistruethatinBouvard etPécuchet Flaubertpaintsaworldinwhich instrumental reasonhasbotcheditsowninstrumentality; whetherspeculativeorempirical, allactivity ofthoughtisreduced eventually toafanaticalskepticism. Paradoxically, underneaththisskepticism, which motivates Bouvard andPécuchet andwhichguarantees thefailureof theiractions,lies thephantomofIidéeregue.Thiskindof fanaticalskep-

ticismis itselftheprivilegeof Jabétise,as it is cultivatedin orderto avoidexamining thingstotheirfullextent,andthustoensurean essentialdistancefromtheobjectandfromtheinquiring activityitself, whileretaining theappearance ofunflustered authority. Perhapsthisis howwemightconstrueFoucault's decisionthatBouvardandPécuchet are“acategorical beings”in thesensethat“theyconfuseallaspectsof realitywitheveryformofpossibility [whichis]whythemostimprobableeventsconform tothemostnaturaloftheirexpectations.”"” Bouvard andPécuchet’s stupidity, according toFoucault, consists inbotching the verylogicofcategorization, sothattimeandagaintheyemergeanew,

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intheirowneyes,asgroundbreaking authorities, whileinreality, likea distillation ofthemostinsufferable idéerecue, theyarebutthegroundlessauthorities ofnothing.ButwewouldsurelymissFlaubert’s truly subversivepower were we to leave it at that. Flaubert,that profound materialist,sought throughouthis work to fashion a literature that

wouldbehistory’santimatter. Andso,liketheprojected functionofthe Dictionnaire, in Bouvardet Pécuchetthe extraordinaryoperationsofla bé-

tiseresultinitsownneutralization. Likeeverything elsein thebook,la bétise endsupin failure; itsettlesnowhere, unabletoseizeonanything permanently, deprivedoftheauthority ofanydiscourse. Andsonothingremains. Oralmostnothing—the returnofthesame: thetwocopyistswhochoseto travelthewaysof knowledge finally cometorealizethattheirdesiredencyclopedic project inheres intheactivityoftheirprofession, onceconsidered thankless. Theywillsitdown to copy,muchin thesamewaythatsometenyearsearliertheysat downto masterall disciplines, to dauntlessly travelthroughknowledge.Andtheywillcopymuchthesamething,thesamediscourses they set out to master, the same books they once read; indeed, in Fou-

cault’swords,“theywillcopyeverybook,and unquestionably they willcopyBouvard etPécuchet. Because tocopyistodonothing;itistobe Thisisa grandmoment offailure. Infact,it thebooksbeingcopied.”'* is the culmination of all the failures the book so tirelesslydocuments,

foritisinterminable. thismoment asthetriumphofstyle,where LeoBersani hasidentified cultureoutofits projectsof mastery “stylecaressesan encyclopedic butimpoYetfailureisanything andintoa liberalizing impotence.”” pertendstostrikeusas a sophism impotence” tence.And“liberalizing witha hapswritteninhaste,becausehereliberationmarksimpotence undoing, power,grantingita trajectorythat,bymeansofa dialectical merelychannelsus backintothepathofmastery.Instead,failurecan project— inherentto theencyclopedic assomething onlyberecognized Thisistrueallthemoresince,for oritssublation. neveras itsnegation Flaubert thelegacyoftheEnlightenment, allhissuspicionconcerning projectassuch. strikeoutagainsttheencyclopedic doesnot ultimately bythedesiretodestroyitsinstrumenButhedoesderideit—engaged et in theprocessofthisderision(whichisBouvard talistambitions—and

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inconclusiveness, heunveilsitsquintessence: itsfundamental Pécuchet), thecorethatmakestheencyclopedic project afoiltomastery. makesmasteryimpossible, butthushemakesthought—the Flaubert absolute complicity between literature andtheory—interminable. “Ineptitudeconsistsin wantingto reachconclusions,”he underlinesin a

letterfromDamascus to hisfriendLouisBouilhetduringoneofhis fleetingmomentsoftravel(Corr.2:239).Fortheremainingthirtyyears ofhislife,withundaunteddevotion,Flaubertwouldrefinethe self-un-

doingofthisinsightintostyle.

A LucidDrunkenness forEdward Said

TheHalf-Life oftheTwentieth Century Infusingtheendofthetwentiethcenturywitha forward-looking gaze to someabyssal,unknown,but nonetheless impendingend(of“history,”of “ideology”) hasbecomecustomary. Repressed intheallureof thisabyssalgazeistheknowledge thattheendismeasuredby a preciselydelineated historical pastwhichshadowsit completely. While rushingtopeerovertheotherside,weforgetthatthegroundonwhich westandis constantly slippingalongwithus.Thisgroundishistory’s greatshadow,animated bythetwentieth century’s founrevolutionary dations,whetherweunderstandthemintermsoftheexplosive legacy ofmodernism inartsandlettersorofmicrophysics intheworldofscience,or,mostsignificantly (considering itsenormously lastingaesthetic power),intermsofthe1917proletarian revolution inRussia.Although banteredaboutrecentlyasa categoryofnostalgia,revolutionhasbecomeendemictothetwentiethcentury,asmuchbyvirtueofhistorical factasbyvirtueofa certainhistorical pride.Witnesstothetwentieth ofrevolutionary magcentury’sclaimtobethecenturyofrevolution, AgeofRevolution oftheso-called nitude,istheextensive refiguration Whether (thelateeighteenthcentury)intoits immediateprogenitor. oftheEnthepresence theagentofsalvationordestruction, considered lightenmentin thetwentiethcenturyhasemerged,via an extraordiof astheUrsprung ofresearchandcontemplation, naryaccumulation

modernity. ofstandard Butthematteris burdenedwitha peculiarsubversion theendofthiscenturyisagtimebyhistoryitself.Although calendrical 249

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itsactualmeaningis indelibly obsessions, gravatedby millenarian theSecthatcutsacrossitsmidpoint: markedbytheeventandoutcome rootedinthe obviously occurrence, ondWorldWar.Thisextraordinary originsbutalsoraisingagainstthemtheformicentury’s revolutionary dablepresenceofa monsterchild,gaverisetoa seriesofeventsthat Thenewtechoneachother’sradicalsignification. rapidlycollapsed (deathcamps,the hydrogenbomb) nologyof massextermination ofsocialism orbarbarismmoredesperately posedtheglobaldilemma and genealogy (political revolutionary andconcretely thantheslogan’s infancy. Againstthecenaesthetic), whichharkensbacktothecentury’s foundations, globalhistorysincethelate tury’sexplicitrevolutionary manifestation 1940shasbeendirectedtowardanevermoreexpansive which,asHannahArendtreadily oftheepistemic powerofrevolution, recognized somethirty-five yearsago,hasexceeded andoutlivedevery oneofitsvariousideological justifications.’ Underthelogicofmassex-

termination, theworldexploded inasteadyoverturning oftheterminologyoforderon allfronts,identifiable in turnby a multitudeof names: decolonization,national liberation,civildisobedience,anti-imperialism,youth culture, cultural revolution,antiwar movement,racial

and sexualliberation,urbanwarfare,ecologicalresistance.

Probably nothingsincetheeraofNewWorlddiscovery cancompare tothegeographical andgeopolitical upheavalcharacterizing thepostwar era.Nor was thereeversuchextensivesocialand culturalrearrangement as hasoccurredin thelastfiftyyears.Nationalborders andculturalboundaries havebeendrawn,redrawn,anderasedwitha stunningrangeofviolence, analogous tointernallinesofsocio-cultural definition beingchallenged, destroyed, andreconstructed. Inapeculiar sense,thetwentieth centuryactually beginsat itshalfway point,which meansitmustbe measured in termsofitshalf-life, oddlyappropriate considering thatoneofitsexclusive contributions tohistoryistheirreversibleimpactofthe“atomicage.”Or,moreaccurately, thetwentieth centurybeginstwice:onceas a categorically revolutionary era, then againasaneraofannihilation. Thereisadoubleoriginatwork,withall the paradoxical consequences thenotionimplies.Asecondorigin,by virtueofcomingsecond,asit were,cannotclaimthetotalauthority of originassuch.Itcanneitherbenorerasethesourceofitssignificance—

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in thiscase,the markofa social(andcultural)orderauthorizedand of-

tenactuallyachievedby revolutionary action. Yeta secondoriginimpliesa weakness inthefirst,a literallackofdetermination. Bytheveryinterruption itincurs,a secondorigindraws thelimitspaceofthe first,a finitespacethatcomesaboutif onlyby virtueofestablishing a sequence ofnumbers.Inthisrespect,thesecond originassumes a determinant forcesimultaneously castbackward and forwardin history,whichisin effecttosaythatit takesoverthereinsof in all directions,forwhathas beenandwhathas to be. signification Withits revolutionary foundations thusunerasable, thetwentieth centuryreemerged at itshalfwaypointwithalltheelementsofan other. Theepistemic effectoftheeventsofWorldWarIIconsists initshaving insertednexttothelegacyofrevolution therealexperience ofannihilation,whichwas,moreover, concretely recognized asa globalreality. Fromthispointon,revolutionand annihilation, as antagonistic epistemicagentsthatimplyeachother’scoherence, globalreality permeate inanunprecedented way.Andthetwentieth cutinhalfandrecentury, asa radiating finallycomestobeasa disturbance constituted half-life, oflife’srelationtotime:thelegacyofa doubleoriginand,consequently, thesimultaneous ofcircularity andtermination thatcontamipresence natesbothoriginandtelos.Whatdistinguishes thiscenturyistheenormouspoliticalandepistemological radiationfromeventsthat,though unremaincuriously alive,feedingonthefrenetically longconcluded, foldingpresentthatallegedlyerasesthem. ofthelatetwentiethcenturyasan already-preTospeak,therefore, Itis essence. sentcondition ofthefutureistofailtoengageitshistorical conditionthatrendersalltelenotonlytoimposeanendona historical the butalsotocommitthegraveerrorofexorcising ologyproblematic, indoublepastbyrhetorically ambiguouspresenceof a determinant cenOften“late-twentieth latedevelopment. vokingan insubordinate whichdescribesthe tury”bears a latentaffinityto “late-capitalism,” (asa departurefromthe industrial currentstateofglobaleconomics moreor existence thatprecededit),whoseownhistorical capitalism Inthisrespect,“late WarII phenomenon. lesstestifiestoa post-World conditionofthetwentieth denotestheparticulareconomic capitalism” centuryassuch,notitsallegedlatephase.Thus,intermsofbothglobal

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“latetwentiethcentury”isa shadowy historyandglobaleconomics, fora timethathasnotacaphantomerain mourning term,suggesting onholdingthe“latetwentiethcentuallytakenplace.Anyinsistence is usefulness, tury”inplace,inordertostudyitbeyondmererhetorical bodyoftimeitisleavingbefrustrated byitsaffinitywiththedecaying whoseoriginanddurationarethemselves century” hind:a “twentieth unstablenotions. Whateverthe case,nocredibleargumentcanbemadeagainstthe generativerole that revolutionplayedin the century’simaginary, ofthetwentieth Oneofthelessons itspansfiveortendecades. whether seemsboundtooutuniverseofrevolution centuryisthatthesymbolic statuesof liveitshistory.Whatever erasurewassignifiedbycountless LeninbeingtorndownalongwiththeBerlinWallwasmatchedbythe recentexhumation ofCheGuevara’s bones,whichbroughthisdisembodied,symbolic presence backintohistory.Thosewhohavepronouncedrevolution a deadwordinourtimeareboundtoperceivethe recentflurryofworldwide mediareportage onCheGuevara—both imageandhistoryhavingbeenrecountedwithrelishanddetail—as one morecommercial exerciseofpostmodern nostalgia.Suchpronouncementsmayevenservegenuinepolitical ends,buttheyarepredicated on abeliefinpolitics asadomain ofinstrumental efficacy byrepressing the knowledge ofpoliticsasa boundless arenaofantagonistic imaginaries whosehistorical termsmaybeprecisely documented, butwhoseresolutionremainslargelyunpredictable andopentohistorical accident. Theepistemicsignificance of revolution belongsto theseconddomain.Ifrevolution hasanymeaningatall—ifthecountless liveslostin itsnameleavebehinda demandon historythatcannotbe outmaneuvered—it isbecauserevolution makespalpable, oftenagainstthegrain ofreality,humanity’s capacitytoalteritsowndestiny,its ownassured understanding ofitself.Therevolutionary projectisprofoundly a matterofcognition, ofgainingknowledge intoselfandother,oftenat the priceof death. Perhapsthis is whythe enormoussymbolicweight bornebytheMarxisttraditionin thetwentieth centuryisonlymatched bythatofpsychoanalytic theoryandpractice. Ifnothingelse,theco-incidence betweenthecentury’s entranceintothestreamoftimeand the singularinstanceofa theoryofthehumanimagination openingitself

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upto theworldoftheunconscious (thepublication ofFreud’sTheInterpretation ofDreams in 1900)is uncannilyemblematic. Andalthough Freud’sownlife and testamentcoversthe entireperiodbeforethe twentiethcentury’sdefinitive occurrence, the psychoanalytic project generateda falloutof suchmagnitudeastobecomethe meansof detectingtheparameters ofthiscentury’s half-life. Certainly, Freud’slast majorworksaspiretomakepsychoanalysis accountable totheworkof cultureitself,tolendthepsychoanalytic projecta broaderepistemologicalfoundation, whichwouldultimately directitsinsightintotheunconscious mindtowardsociety’s drivestocollective perversion, self-defailedsublimation. structive totemism, Thegrandoverturning oforderthatsignifies thetwentieth century inthewayIhavesuggested takesplaceintheextremest terms possible ofa deathculturethatspringsfromthenameofCulture,consistent with Freud’swarningsin Civilization andIts Discontents, although graverthanhismostunconscious fears(ifonlybecauseitexposedthe deathdriveofCultureasresiding inthemostrefinedfoldsoftheEuropeantradition). Thepsychoanalytic projectentersthedomainof“social at thepointwhenthe historical science” workingsofdeathculture thedecade-long oftheHolocaust andthe (whether systematic building exceedall“scientific” GulagortheinstantoftheflashoverHiroshima) Thus,whilenotlinkeddirectlytothe associalphenomena. explanation (like,say,Marxistepistemology), psychoanalyimaginary ofrevolution ofdisorderand sisremainscentral,foritengageswiththeknowledge andalteration. Itdoes fordissolution hencewithhumanity’s prospects in its prejudicesincorporated so despitetheprofoundethnographic daringto placehisown narcissistic legacysinceFreud’sextraordinary inquirywithuniunderthescopeofa “scientific” dreamsandfantasies therevolutionary Indeed,nothingdemonstrates versalistaspirations. morethantheplasticityofits owntermipotentialof psychoanalysis ofthemostradicaltheorizations nology, whichremainsat theforefront into ofpsychoanalysis andprejudicial fantasies thatput thenarcissistic question. And yet, the actuality of revolution—theconcretesense of reality

dreamlifeofeveryperintheoverwhelming thatbecomes perceptible beyondthecognitive situation—is arevolutionary sonwhoexperiences

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ina strictsense. epistemology orpsychoanalytic realmofeitherMarxist moment the revolutionary and transience, In itssublimeturbulence the consistsin one’sencounterwithsociety’sradicalimagination: cacreative/destructive abyssaldomainfromwithinwhichhumanity’s beyondlogicand intention,prudenceand pacitiesare unleashed, all the recognized limitsofself.Fromthisperspective, fear—beyond according to situation insightsintoarevolutionary profound) (possibly categoriesof explicationare essentially Marxistor psychoanalytic retroactiveconstructions.Theycannotbe otherwise,becausein orderto

imaginaryinherentin a dojusticeto theradicalcreative/destructive experience, theymustencounter itwiththesameradical revolutionary capacityto createan objectanew.Thismustbe literallya poeticencounter.If the revolutionary projectis a matterof cognition—in the blankfaceofannihilation andtheindeterminate violenceofself-alteration—then it isa matterofpoeticcognition, ofa syntheticandnotanalytic, allusiveand not demonstrable,understanding.In the final in-

stance,societies controltheirdestinies totheextentthattheyrecognize theeffectsoftheirownmythopoetic production. Thistaskisasmucha matterofpolitical action,asitisamatterofaculture’s capacityforselfreflection. I submittheseellipticalremarksasanovertureto myperhapscontestablechoiceto addressthe significance of Marxismand psychoanalysisin thelatetwentiethcenturybywayof a man whoengaged revolutionary experience, withoutapology, asa fundamentally poetic experience—indeed, as a poeticproject.Myunderlying assumption hereisthata poeticsensibility isessentialtoanyradicalenterprisethat seeks,withoutcompromise, to topplea recognized orderof selfand other.Becausea revolutionary project,by definition, mustmobilizea highlyinventiveandunpredictable processof self-propelled othering,a radiatingpoeticforcemustalwaysburnat theheartoftheproject, even ifnotentirelyunderstood,evenifnot(asis mostoftenthe case)entirely undercontrol.Regardless of a givenrevolutionary project'sparticular social-historical parameters,politicalobjectives, and ideological demands—all ofwhicharefundamental andoutmaneuverable—a poetic praxisoperatesat its core,whethermodernhistory’s“professional” revolutionaries acknowledge itornot.

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Thisis notto saythatpoetsmakerevolution, letalonethatpoets makestalwart revolutionaries; a simpleinvocation ofhistory’s memory of Rimbaud shouldput thematterto rest.Butit is to say,againstthe grainofourdesireto understand thepuzzlingmoments ofsocialdisorderbyappealing tothecalming orderof“scientific” analysis, thatthe puzzlingenterpriseofa poeticapprehension of the worldshouldbe givenprecedence. Marxhimself,honestenoughto recognize theprimacyofBalzac intheenterprise ofsocialanalysis, wasoftengivento poetic methodsin his own work,of which The18thBrumaireofLouis

Bonaparte remainsa superlative Suchpoeticengagement instance. with historysignifiesa necessary ofsociety’s understanding mythological nucleusbehindeveryconcretehistoricalaction.It concernsand addressessociety’s andtherefore, asamatterof mythistorical foundations, method,notvocation,itisnotthesoleprivilegeofpoets.’OnecanarguethatDostoyevsky’s Crime andPunishment orThePossessed provides the mostarticulateand syntheticinsightintowhataccountsforthe eventualoutbreakof the Russian Revolutionor,by the sametoken,that

Jules Michelet’sgrand storyof the FrenchRevolution(or France,in

general)is animatedby an equalspiritofinventive(poetic)underComingtotermswithsociety’s radicalimagination (thecrestanding. ative/ destructiveforceof self-alteration)demands accessto mythistor-

ofanyongoing it requirespoeticthought,irrespective icalknowledge; ideological manipulations. but consideringthatthe revolutionary It maysoundparadoxical, legacyof the twentiethcenturydoesnotfullyrealizeitselfuntilitenthesethoughtsecho countersthe silencingpowerof annihilation, Adorno’sfamouswarningthat poetryafterAuschwitzis barbarism. terms. withAdorno’s yetin thissenseconsistent Theechoisnegative, histhoughtby Adornowillreviseanddramatize InNegative Dialectics, asanexception“therightofthetorturedmanto scream,” recognizing of all syntax.Ofcourse,his therebyattributingtopoetrythedefiance oflyricplenitudeonceannihiinvectiveagainsttheongoinglegitimacy intact.Yet,inthisdoubleconremains lationhasbeenitselflegitimized thoughtcontainsthegrammarofhistorybrushingit ception,Adorno’s againstthegrain.Ashistorytellsit, the privilegeoftheworldofthe withtheradicalimagination butitsrelation lyricsubjectis annihilated,

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is not abolished.Rather,it is reconfigured,so as to open itselfup to the

doesnotspeak. external, beyondallsyntax,towhatever mostradically next secondorigin.Andinthisrespect, comespoetry’s AfterAuschwitz to PaulCelanstandsJeanGenet. Genet’s Identicide

thefigureofthewitnessexemplified Genetproblematizes Obviously, by Celan’spoetics,which takes Adorno’sdoubt at its most literal and

vagrant thusopensit upto itsfullextent.Genetis a paradigmatically figurewhosepassagethroughtheterrainofthetwentiethcenturyeffectsa strange, amalgamatedtestimonyto both survival and mutation.

Hemakesfora caseinsurvivalagainstalloddsaswellasa storyof ofa voyageagainstsocietyitself.If profoundasociality, thetrajectory thisfigureshowsanyconsistency atall,itdoessoasawitnessofdisplacementandmutability—social, political,sexual,geographical. Bastard,thief,homosexual, vagabond areGenet’s avowedpersonae, never tobedomesticated orsocialized, testifying tosociety’s disappearance. Fewartistsrecognized soradicallythattheirauthoritywasfirstand foremosta construction byanother,conferreduponthemoftenbythe enemy(social convention), butinthisrespectusableasaweapon:tokill theauthorized selfalongwiththeentiredomainofvaluesthatmadeit possible.Countlesstimesincountlessinterviews, Genetrepeatedthat hebecamea writerinordertogetoutofprisonand thathisliteraryauthoritywasasham,unworthyofconversation, yetusefultothosewho hadnovoicetoexposetheshamtheywereactuallyliving.Evenhis “sainthood,”inventedby Jean-PaulSartre,who made him famousand

thereforepowerful,wassomethingthatGenetrejectedand unmasked by showingto the worldsainthood’sfundamental debilitation: he stoppedwritingliteraturefornearlythirtyyears.Genetwasfondofsimultaneously showingtherealimpotenceofpowertogetherwithits capacityforannihilation. Ararewitnessofthetwentiethcentury’s core antagonismbetween revolution and annihilation,he was all the more

rareforknowingnoguiltandseekingnoartisticredemption. ButGenetalsoepitomizes thetwentiethcentury’s doublelife.By virtueofbeingabandonedtothepublicdomainshortlyafterhisbirth

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(1910), Genetbecame committed toa lifeonthemargins, wheresubsocieties,alwaystenuousand artificially heldtogether(oftenbyforce), challenge society'sverylegitimacy byperpetuating theirowninstitution.Orphanage, fostercare,reformschool,prison,thearmy:alldefinedGenet’scommunal experience towardadulthood—the institutionalsafeguards againstthedangersofexcessthatEnlightenment society must name, identify, and circumscribein order to control the

meansof producingtheboundaries oflegality.Genet’sparticulartrajectorythroughthesesocially constructed outsidesisaggravated byhis intransigent andguiltlesshomosexuality, whichbecamethebasisfor hislifelongpursuitofan intuitivephilosophical conceptualization of criminality. Genet’sexplicitcoarticulation ofwriterandcriminal, beyondthecodifiedromanticattributesoflepoetemaudit, isthekeytodecipheringboththegloriousnegationofhisearlyworkandthesurrealisticaffirmation of his latework,wherethe revolutionary takesthe

placeofthecriminal. Thenearlythirty-yearchasmbetweenearlyandlatework,which notonlyprovesinsurmountable tohisbiographers andcriticsbutalso explodesthecategoryof matureworkbeyondrecognition, suggests thatGenet,likethetwentiethcenturyhesooddlyshadowed, ismarked bya doubleorigin.Inthefirstphase,essentially endedby1949with Genet’sofficialpardonbythestate,weseea thiefwho,thougha school anauteur dropoutat twelve,becamea masteroftheFrenchlanguage, andinutterlymysterious ofthefirstorderina processthatremained totheveryend.*Whatisstunningaboutthisperiodis comprehensible (inadditiontoa theproductionoffiveproseworksinrapidsuccession thatscandalVillon) debutofpoemswritteninthetraditionofFrancois andSartre ofParis(Cocteau andartisticcommunity izedtheintellectual nature(decriminal notably),notmerelybecauseoftheirunabashedly pictingthe livesof prisoners,prostitutes,thieves,murderers,and themoreshocking literariness—all butbytheirextraordinary queers), itself.° Inthesetexts,the inbeingthevoiceofcriminality andeloquent ofculofthepanoply anauthorbytakingcommand becomes criminal ture, which has condemnedhim toa life ofcrime,in order to transform

thislifeintoan objectofculture:“ThelanguageI knowbestis thelanmycondemnain.Thetribunalspronounced guageI wascondemned

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truththat,in theparadoxical French.”° Genetrecognized tionspeaking bylaw,the a societyfoundedontherightsofman,ofmansanctioned oflaw, beyondthelanguage territories ofcultureconquered language life hiscriminal ofwhatisright.Sohefashioned beyondthelanguage into a work of art without shame, and the underside of the law was

languageof literaryscandal. suddenlygracedwiththeemancipatory coincided andfirstliteraryrecognition Genet'’s legalemancipation “sainthood,” whichSartrepredicated withtheoddityofhisproclaimed on thedictumthatGenethadchosenthe criminallifesocietyhad formulation, grantedhim.Thereisa certaintruthtothisexistentialist makinghimselfintosomethingalreadyconbutthesecretofGenet’s matthanexistential—a ceivedbytheenemywasmuchmoretheatrical funImpersonation wasoneofGenet’s terofmaquillage, notmorality. and performative hisintrinsically decentered damentalprinciples; senseofselfallowedhimto exploitthenatureofsocialrolesbyembodying theminanexternalizing gesture. Hisoriginasanauthorconsistedincopying hisselffromtherealmoflifeintoa stagedsituation thatexploded boththeoriginalcopyingmold(theprocessofreproduction), and the framework of exhibition. Thus did Genet, the

bastard/thief /homosexual/vagabond, become a literaryfigure. Butliterarystatusentailsa lifeoflegality(citizenship) thatmakesthe

literaryenterprise difficult bymaking writingirrelevant tolife.Genet’s newlegality,achievedby thesociallegitimacythatart provides,deprivedhimoftheparanomic legitimacy (criminality) ofwriting.Theresultwasa decadeof confusionand occasionalsenseof impotence,dur-

ingwhichGenetnonetheless sealedhisextraordinary literarypresence witha dynamic,if continually self-subverting, forayintothetheater. Thispoeticoutburstagainstandbeyondthemythification ofhisperson wasthelastflashofthecriminal imagination againstsymbolic authority,theconcentrated dregsofexcess.ButitalsoburiedGenetdeeperundertheweightoflegitimacy, thelegitimacy ofart’ssubversion ofsocial order,whichhe,a criminal,recognized asa glorioussham.Duringthe 1950s,whilethetwentiethcenturywasbeingreconstituted underthe logicofannihilation, Genetmeticulously setsouttoannihilate hisliterarypersona,initiallyby producing a stylizedmeta-theater thatshortcircuitstheaesthetic alibioftheatricality itselfand,finally, byreducing

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himselfto thesilencehe thoughthe (andhis work)deserved. He therebydenounced, innouncertain terms,thefraudulent statusofhis legend,whichproducedno gravityofart butthenoveltyofan illicit show,noproperreadersbut scandalized voyeurs: Idon’thavereadersbutthousands ofvoyeurswhospyonmefromthe windowthatgivesontothestageofmypersonallife.... AndI’msickened bythisinterestthatisawakened bythescandalous person I usedtobe.I wishthatpeoplewouldleavemealone.I wanttostartsomething entirely new.I donotwantpeopletotalkaboutme,nordoIwantnewspapers to publishthingsaboutmywork.I wanttobefinishedwiththislegend.”

Outofthisexplicitself-annihilation, anotherGenetemerged: theextinguished poetwhograntedhislegendary nameandthelegitimacy of hisillegitimate pastlifetothosewhocriminalized themselves intheact offashioning a revolutionary languagefromthesocialvoid,deterritorializedorsimplygroundless. ThedeathofAbdallah, arguably Genet’s dearestlover,markstheturningpoint,beginning witha failedactatactualself-annihilation (Genet’s suicideattemptin 1967). Ishallreturnto this context,but note the co-incidence of personal void with the radical senseof the overthrowof realityduring the late 1960s,whichGenet,en-

tirelyoutsidethelimitsofhisgeneration, wasableto embracewith emptiness, a Atthepointofutterpersonal genuineclarityandpassion. Genetachievedtheselflesszerodegreeofunimpededself-reference, nessrequiredtograntone’ssignaturetothevoiceofanother.Encapsuofturningthe convergence astheculmination latingthisparadoxical overtotheother,Genetreturned selflessly rubricofone’sself-reference totheauthorityofliteratureinhislastwork,whichisalsoquiteliterally publisheda monthafter amoureux, thelastremnantofhislife.UnCaptif ofthe author's Genet’sdeath(1986),isnominallya memorial-chronicle

personalvoyagetoanavowedlyalienterrain,hisriseoutof a spaceof bytheeventsofMay‘68,toexperialreadyanimated self-annihilation, duringtwo encelifeagain:in themidstoftheBlackPanthercommunity monthsofillegalentryintheUnitedStates(spring1970)and,moreexfightersat campsinJordandurinthecompanyofPalestinian tensively, fifteenmonthsofseveralvisitsbetween ing a totalof approximately 1970and 1972.°

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Genet's Self-Alteration amoureux is anamalgamofpersonalmemoirs Atfirstglance,UnCaptif thatconceptualize intwocommunities involvement froman eccentric ofrevoluexistence to theprecarious throughcommitment themselves haunted thelastinstance,anexistence tionarythoughtandaction—in dimension tothis ofdeath.Thereisadeepontological bytheimminence knowledge ofhisownimminent notleastbyvirtueofGenet’s project, deathas a result of throatcancer.To understandthis ontologicalstake,

ofthetext’shistorical gentheparticular conditions weneedtoconsider esis—namely, whatmadeGenetreturnto literatureas thenecessary cultivation of self-erasure. aftersucha deliberate modeof expression Whiletheexperiences withtheBlackPanthersandthe Palestinians a long-term devotionto profoundly affectedGenetandspearheaded thepoliticalessayastheonly“legitimate” modeofwriting(legitimate because ofitsimmediate use-value inthepolitical arena),theyfailedto coalesceinto an artisticexpression,evenin the limitsenseof the term,

despiteGenet’softenagonizingdesire(andthecopiousnoteshecollected).’ Thefinalturningpointthistimewashisaccidental firsthand witnessoftheimmediate aftermathoftheSabraandShatilamassacres (September 1982):“Quatreheuresa Chatila,”a celebratedpiecethat stripshistorybarewithstunninglyricismandthepassionofimmediacy,appearedaboutfourmonthsaftertheseevents.Thisextraordinary firsthandexperience ofannihilation, dramatizednodoubtbythehistoricalaccidentofGenet’spresenceinnearbyBeirut,whichbroughthis personalwanderings intoperfectco-incidence withhistory’smerciless dismantling of thelimitsofthepersonal,instigated a poeticencounter with the violenceof the world, his first in decades.Yet another en-

counterwithAdorno’s aporiaconcerning thepossibility ofpoetry(or life)afterAuschwitz,Genet’sresponseto history'sinarticulatepain amidsttheheapsofruinedbodiesinShatilamusthaveincluded a responseto his own puzzlementoverhis daring to act as history’s mythopoetic agentwithoutsuccumbing to thenarcissism of thepoetrevolutionary. Withintwoyears,thelong-envisioned projectofa bookaboutthe Palestinian experiencewas composedentirelyfromscratch,from shardsofmemorythattheexperience ofmassacred liferekindled. The

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palpable presence ofannihilation madepossible a poeticinvocation of revolutionary liferootedin thecellsofmemoryasa powerful loveexperience. WhatmakesUnCaptif amoureux formidable fromtheoutset— evenbeforewegetdrawnintothegreatmythistorical intricacies ofthe writing—resides in itsbeingsimultaneously a workoflifeaffirmed by love(ofloveforand by the world’sconstructed others)anda workof

mourning(forthedeathofthosenamedin itspagesandthenameless multitudemassacred in Shatila,andforthedyingwitness,JeanGenet himself).'° Genet’sfirstliterarypublication intwentyyears,affirming lifeand glorifyingfinitudeinthesamegesture,provedto beanimatedby the explicitdesireto disruptthepublic’s complacency thathadcharacterizedhisworkthroughout. Againstthebackdropofthevoyeuristic devouringofGenet’s scandalous name,thetext’sforcein annihilating the fetish“Genet” derivesfrombindingtheauthorialpersonatoa loveencounterwithotherness intheprocessofsignifying is,otheritself—that nessina processofrevolution, itselfanencounter betweenthehistoricalandthe mythological. Genethadbecomea celebritybyself-consciouslycultivatinga criminalpersonathat was to animatethe worldofhisfiction.Onecouldgosofarastosaythathe mythological had fictionalized a Genetwhobecamerealinhisnovels.Hedescribes this principlein TheThief’sJournal(1949),a work “meantto indicate whatI amtoday,as I writeit. It is nota questoftimegoneby[une ismy buta workofart whosepretext-subtext recherche dutempspassé], oughttoresound against Theobvious Proustian reference formerlife.”"' (orpre-and thesplitofone’slifeintobeforeandafterfictionalization Proust ofthecriminal). fromtheviewpoint existence, post-authorized realizedthatonemustbringone’slifetoanendin ordertoachievelife infictionor,evenmore,inordertogivelifetofictioninthemostconof this cretesense. Hisfiction,therefore,becamethe memorial-chronicle

roombecame doubleprocessofdeathand life,muchas hiscorklined in Genet’slan(or self-imprisonment, thespaceof self-entombment thebirthofauthoroflifeinfiction, guage)thatenabledthegeneration aspired,Genet ialvocation.LikeProust,towhosegeniushe explicitly tobring oflanguage theriskofknowingtheincapacity putintopractice backtolife,to doanythingotherthanmark themomentofexperience

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He bywhatwecallmemory. signified ofexperience thedeathmoment isalwaysprefromProustthatthetimeofautobiography understood serviceforalifelonggonewhosevoid senttime,thetimeofmemorial veritableact of poiésisduring thecreationof lifeanew—a energizes asthe personaerasesitselfinan actofreinvention whichtheauthorial isprobably the Journal history,aslegend.TheThief’s subjectofmythical project inasimilar ofGenet’s works,involved Proustian mostexplicitly overstepping oflifeas fictionin the of poeticsur-vie,thelegendary making. unWriting againstthenameofhisprisonnovels,Genetnonetheless oftheprojectbegunwithThe derstoodhislastworkasa continuation Thief’s Journal,wheretherealityof an alreadylegendaryexistence inthealwayspresenttenseofbeingread: reachesitspoeticculmination “TrefusetoliveforanyotherendthantheveryonewhichI foundto containthefirstmisfortune: thatmylifemustbe a legend,in other words, legible, and that the reading of it must give birth to a certain

newemotion I callpoetry. I [thethiefwhobecomes poet]amnolonger anything, onlya pretext.”Desiring tofosteranotherpoeticexperience withhislastwork,Genetrevisitshissignaturerhetoricalfiguresand stagingtechniques(impersonation, betrayal,gesture,masquerade, transsexuality, chance), savethattheautography’’ composedhereisnot limitedtosomesortoftheatrical identicide butdaresthefullrangeofa culturalmythography. In the last instance,a radicaland undeconstructible difference betweenGenet’spreviousworksandthelastone makesUnCaptif amoureux aprismwhencehislifework canbeassessed. IfGenet'slifewasatonetimetheself-avowed pretextforwritinghimselfoutofprison,thewritingofhislastworkis thegiftoflifetoJean Genet,thiefnolonger,whohadtostealonelasttime—from deathitself.Genetwasexplicitin this respectabouthis wholeexperience: “Whatnonsense! I’veneverhelpedthePalestinians. They’ve helpedme tolive.” UnCaptifamoureux wasliterallya matteroflifeforGenet,of affirminglife in the knowledgeof imminentdeath—notmerelylife “within”thesingularity ofthebody,however, butlifeoutthereinthe world:collective, amorphous, ephemeral. Thisloveofworldlylifecoalesces intoapoeticcorewhenfacedwith thedramaticfinalityandpermanence ofShatila.There,Genetrealizes

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whathaskepthimalivesincehissuicideattempt: beingheldcaptiveby a lovethat circumvented theusualidentitarymirroring.TheEnglish translation ofthetitleasPrisoner ofLove missesthemultiple nuances of theFrench. Theauthoris notonlya prisoneroflovebutalsoa prisoner inlove,a prisonercapturedbylovebut alsocaptivated bylove.The thiefwhofashionedhimselfas scandalous poeticmythinorderto extricatehimselffromprisonandthencourageously admittedto theirrelevance ofhisart in a “freelife”finallydiscovers, at the pointof death,a wayto reassumethevalueandart ofpoeticcreationby fashioninga self-determined captivity inthedeterritorialized orgroundless domainofsociety’s others.Whatmakesthisdiscovery possibleisanelementthat permeatesGenet’sworkthroughout,notunlikea thread weavingtogetherthe doubleorigin:a polemicalattitudethat Genet neverabandoned, evenat hismostdespondent,evenwhenheabandoned literature.Indeed, the very abandonmentof literature,drawn in

andheldtoparticular (neverasamatterofabstract princircumstances ciple,ethicalor aesthetic),was due to this polemicalcore:

Idon’tknowwhyRimbaud chosesilence. Isaidthathehadunderstood whyhehadnochoicebutsilence. Asforme,sinceallmybookswerewritteninprison,it seemsI havewrittentheminordertogetoutofprison.

Outsideofprison,writinghadnomorereasontobe.Mybooksdidgetme outoftheslammer, butafterwards, whatistheretosay? But this is not a casualmatter,despite the tone.On the contrary,Genet’s

drivenby application to thewritingofliteraturewastotalandtireless, mashisextraordinary energy,yetequallymeticulous, rareobsessional teryof the literarylanguagebeinga consciousstratagem:“I had to understand me.” I call ‘mytorturers’ makesurethatthosewhom Ifthereasonforwritingwastogetoutofprison,thepurposeofwritthatmadeprisonpossible—not ingwastoaddressthesocialinstitution (autography norevenofconfession fordesireofmercyorjustification, forit exposesits inherentperforforbidsthecredibilityofconfession mativity).Genet’ssuccessin makingclassicalFrenchthelanguageof a caseofthesubgesture.Morethan matterwasapolemical scandalous alterntakingon thelanguageofthemaster,it wasa gestureofsimply therealityofhislanguage. speakingtothemasterinhisownlanguage, the whether,as Genetquicklyadds,“actually, It makesnodifference

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real torturers don’t read me... they don’tgive a fuck,” for the aim is

wassubcorrectlanguage Thisaesthetically widerandmoreambitious. whererulesoflogicalor moral unpredictability, jectedto syntactical wereturnedinsideout,sothatthetrivialandperverse subordination language. Crimiappeardeckedoutinthefullgloryoftheestablished nal literatureconsistsin the actof forcingdominantcultureto en“Percounterits ownlawlessundersideinitsownexaltedlanguage: haps,writingiswhat'slefttoyouwhenyou'vebeenchasedawayfrom is alsotosay,when yourgivenlanguage[laparoledonnée]’""’—which authorityenablesyoutogiveyour youhavebeendeprivedofwhatever word.Theoutcome, ineffect,isthatyoubecomeliterarywhenyouare nolongerabletobecredible.Whenrealitydiscreditsyou,youcannot surviveexceptbybecoming a legend—legible byothermeans. Genetneverlostthesenseofbeingsociallydiscredited, evenwhen heknewhehadaccumulated considerable artisticcapitalandcouldextendhiscreditto theworld’sdisenfranchised. Hisnomadicexistence fromhotelto hotel—his refusaltoownproperty,toallowhimselfa domesticlife,a permanenthome—was symptomaticof the senseof homelessness andasociality hefelthehadinheritedfrombirth.Butit wasalsoa chosenconditionof“socialirresponsibility,” whichenabled his“immediate socialengagement.”'* Thisclearlyanomalous pairingof socialirresponsibility andengagement defiesallethicalcategorization, at leastin termsofany post-Enlightenment ethics,but it isthekeyto understandingGenet’spower.Thisradicalprovisionality (theother sideofimmediacy), as EdwardSaidhasargued,characterizes Genet’s wordsin allcontextsdueto “hisunceasing searchforthe freedomof thenegativeidentitythatreducesalllanguagetoemptyposturing, all actionto the theatricsof a societyhe abhors.”" The provisionalword,

takingtheplaceofthegivenword,discredits thediscourse ofpromise (foundationalto both Kantianethicsand bourgeoisliberalpolitics),a

positionthatGenetwouldeventually cometo holdin fullconsciousnessofits risksanditsconsequences.

ThePolitics ofImpersonation On this basis,Genetfindslovein the ranksof communitiesthat have

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beensociallyandpolitically deprivedofpromise,ortobe moreaccurate,communities thathavebeenfora longtimeatthewrongendofsociety’spromises, brokenbypromises, andifI mayindulge,robbedofa promisedland.If thereis a centralimpetusto UnCaptifamoureux, a bookwithouta centerin an inimitablesense,it wouldhaveto be Genet’sdesireto approach, intherealmofliterarylanguage, theimaginaryterrainofa peoplewithoutterritory.Notquitethedesireto approachthe territoryof the Other,as a politically correctreadingof Genetwouldinevitably conclude, butapoetic chronicle oftheplenitude oftheself—the collective self—of theotherasit arisesoutoftheexperienceofsocialgroundlessness or deterritorialization. (Parenthetically, theparadoxical notionof“poeticchronicle” suggests bothhistorical account and historicalinvention,and it cannot be otherwise:you cannot

writethehistoryoftheotherastruth,onlyas poetry.) Oneofthefirst thingsthatGenetrealizesaboutthePalestinians isthattheirterritorial mobilizes a nationalimaginary wherenonewasnecesdispossession sarybefore,a self-representation asanautonomous entityinaphantasmaticworldofplenitudeandpoeticpleasuremanifested concretely as force.*” inthedomain offantasy—the revolutionary Autonomy national dramatically achieved withoutnationalterritory. Indeed, imaginary—is it is theprerequisite to gainingan autonomous territory,althoughit noractualautonomyuponacguaranteesneitherterritorialacquisition uponnationhood. quisition, Ina muchdiscussedsceneofUnCaptif amoureux, Genetdescribes a fedayeen playingagameofcardswithanuncanny groupofPalestinian ofa tennismatch.Inthe ofdetail,withthedrearyceremony formality tothe Genetinterjects a reference courseofhismeticulous description, inwhichthedeadaretreatedtoa JapanesegameofObon,a ceremony actingoutthe tasteoftheworldofthelivingviaanentirecommunity’s oflife.The ofthedeadwiththebodilycomplexity clumsyencounters laughterbytheliving,who, in tenderlymocking ceremony culminates a tasteoflifetothoseimhavebrieflybrought withironyandaffection, mobileskeletalfeatures.Genetthengoesoncasuallytoinformtheastonishedreader:“Thegameofcards,whichonlyexistedbecauseofthe playedatplayrealisticgesturesofthefedayeen—they’d scandalously ing,withoutanycards,withoutacesorknaves,clubsorspades,kings

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werelike activities methatallthePalestinians’ or queens—reminded suchsolemnity exacting theObonfeast,wheretheonlythingmissing, Here, presentin a smile,waswhatevermustnotbecomeapparent.””! oftheimaginary performance realityfindsitsmatchina meticulous withofself-representation, thatcastslackasthevehicleofaffirmation, oflack. theactuality inthisperfectmasquerade, outevershadowing, of oftheactualexperience Genetconsiders thisincidentemblematic a withthefantasyofautonomy, anditsconsubstantiality dispossession a theghostlylifeofa revolutionary, doubleexistence thatexemplifies destrucdailylifesituatedat theborderofdeath.Thereareimmediate “fortoplayonlywith ofthisdisembodying performance, tivevestiges . . .allthe symbolsof gestureswhenyourhandsoughttobeholding power,makesyoufeela fraud,andbringsyouclosetoschizophrenia. Playingcardswithoutcardseverynightisakindofdrymasturbation” (PL28/ 52).Theritualmagnification ofterritorialdispossession and deprivation of symbolic powerin a conspiratorial showofcollective emptygesturesbecomesa vacantexercisein self-reference, without pleasure, whennotaccompanied byanactualreversaloftheconditions oflackand dispossession in reality—hence, Genet’sfundamentaldifferentiationbetweentherealmsofartandrevolution(towhichweshall

return). Whilecharmed bythisperformance (forhevalueshighlysuch theatricsof gesture),Genetalsorecognizesits cost—absorption into abyssalnonexistence: “Thecardswereneitherpresentnorabsent.For metheywerelikeGod:theydidn’texist.... Theendofthegamewas itsbeginning: nothingat thestartandnothingat thefinish.. . .Their gestureswerein dangerofbecoming uselessaccording tothelawofthe theater:theyweresubstituting therehearsalforthe performance... . Absencewasintheirhandsjustas it wasundertheirfeet”(PL107-8/ 178-79). Everything adjoinsa disembodied existence, wherethemost objective materiality is absence(ofland,ofnation,ofvictory,ofreception,ofplay,ofobject), a fullyincorporated absencethatpermeates the entirehorizonoflife.Andyet,thisextraordinary image—this deathre-

hearsal—occupies Genet'’s attention obsessively, becauseitalsoexemplifies,almosttheoretically, thefactthata politicsofdispossession and deterritorialization is a theatrical politics,specifically, a politicsofimpersonation.

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Impersonation isacrucialprinciple inGenet’s work,simultaneously a performative deviceand an ontological exigency. Fromhis earliest self-consciousness, Genetrecognized thatheinhabited—indeed, heembodied—a falsityaccording tobourgeois society’s standardmeasures of truth.Genetisthematrilineal name.Notonlyis thefatherabsent,but heisunknown, unsignified. Thenameofthefatherisliterally anempty sign,notjustthevoidofpowerbutavoidedidentification. Thismakes Geneta man withoutheritage,withoutproperlaw(and,of course, withoutproperty).Signified by a negativeOedipalnaming,Genet comestobearthemother’snameasthesignoflegalidentityina societythatorganizes thelawofidentityandpropertyaroundthenameof thefather.”Moreover, hisalready-disjointed genealogy isrupturedfurtherwhentheoriginalbearerofthisnamingpromptlyabandonshimto histerrifying singularity. Thismanwithoutproperlaw,thisfalseson,is thenrebornintothelawofthestate,a foundling withtheAsregistered sistancePublique,and fromthenon consistentlyencumberedwithfalse

origins,a falsefamily,a falsevillage.Manyyearslaterhe willannounce:“Iamperhaps a Blackinwhiteorpinkskincolor,buta Black nonetheless. Idonotknowmyfamily.”** Amanwhoselineagehasbeen anderasedlikethelineageofAfrican appropriated slavesrecognizes thecontingent authorityofskincolor.Thisisn’ttosaythatGenetdid inwhiteAmernotunderstandthatto theworldat large(particularly ica),hewasprivilegedwithrecognition becausehewaswhite.Onthe thisprivilegeto supporttheBlackPancontrary, heexploited precisely callwithouthesitathers.WhatenablesGenettoanswerthePanthers’ tion is his own sense of the permeableboundariesof self,which abol-

withtheother fromtheencounter ishestheconditionofself-mirroring In the absenceofpreof identification. andexposesthe “mysteries” mustbestagedaneweachtime—a theencounter scribedboundaries, lifeandwork of theotherthat definesGenet'’s theatricalexperience throughout. himGenetabandoned bypressuresofidentification, Unconstrained likeachild:“Whatdiditmean,mypink family Panther selftotheBlack andwhitepresenceamongthem?This:for twomonthsI wastobe . .. David’sson.Ihada blackfatherthirtyyearsyoungerthanmyself. made hadsomehow Hewasverycarefulwithme,asifmyweakness

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notto recognizein thisselfmedear”(PL,261/ 427).It is impossible at ofbeingfathered—fathered thegenuinepleasure amusednarration fashion: aBlackfathertoachildwitha lastandinthemostappropriate blackpast, now a world-wornman well into his sixtiesturning to the

of ofa thirty-year oldutopianwhoseexperience innocentselflessness enforced experience ofthemargin.Notto a strictly theworldhadbeen makea big deal of it, but Genetwas quite consciousof the theatrical

hishointhiscase,notleasttheparticularinflection playofidentities mosexuality gaveto thispaternalprojectionontoa man whowasinevitablylockedintothePanthers’ collective productionofimagesof virilemasculinity. Thisgenuinerecognition ofafatherinDavidHilliard (theParty’sNationalChiefofStaff,whoservedas Genet’spersonal guidethroughout hisstay)isprecededbya jokeonthepartofGenetto theeffectthatHilliardwasin facthismother(forhistendercareat one time of a flu-riddenGenet),a commentthat amused the Panthers

greatlyandprompted Genettoanastonishing seriesofthoughts: Theyoftenamusedthemselves bymixingupthesexesandcatchinggrammaroutinsexism, buttheirwholeblockandtackle,perfectly moulded, wasmuchinevidence throughtheirtrousers.Itwasalongtimebeforethe sculpture wasexploited. Imeanaspower.TheBlacks’ natural,thoughto theWhitesexcessive, virilitywasperceived asexhibitionism, butwas aimedatnoneotherthantheexhibitionist profusionofwhitebosomsat partiesgivenforthePanthers. . . . Inanyevent,trouserswerecutinanalmostFlorentine style,andthedoctrinewasexpounded inanostentatious manner.Logically enough,theBlackshad movedonfromline-engraving to sculpturein the round.(PL,260/ 426)

Theinvocationof DavidHilliardas “mother”operatesonseveral discursiveregisters.It hardlyabolisheshisfatherlyfunction;on the contrary, Genet,a resoluteorphan,wouldseekto reconstitute thesymbolicpresenceofbothparentalfigures,whiletheOedipalantagonism betweenthemwouldbequiteuselesstohimat thisstage.Genetnotes preciselysuchdiffusionofsexualsignifiers in thedailymodesof addressandself-identification thatthePanthercollective playswith,and inthiscontextwecansurmisetheamusingovertones evokedbyassociationwiththeexclamatory useof “mother” inBlackslang.Thepassagereveals Genet’s astuteperception thatthegender-bending playin

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BlackPantherlanguage arisesfromanexplicitmasculinist confidence asa theatrical alienation effectthattempers,in the luxuryof in-house relations,therigorousexigencies ofperformative virilityintheWhite world.Thissortofarguably“innocent” linguistic transvestism—innocentbecauseitdoesnotgofarenough,becauseit cannotbearthefull burdenofits assumptions (perfectly understandable, giventhesocialhistoricalconditions ofits enunciation)—nonetheless pointstotheexplosiveandceaseless performativity oftheBlackPanthercommunity. Although Genetrevealshispolitical preferences byslipping intonaturalistterminology, hestillmanagestoconvey a senseoftheplasticity of thiscollective language. So-called Panther rhetoric, a notorious kindof wordmongering thatwreakedhavocin the discursivemarketplace, wasessentiallyan imagisticdevice,sharingin thegeneralsymbolic havocthatthePanthersperformedwithevidentrelish.ButGenetunveils,withdelicateirony,thepictureofa discourse thathashistorically drawnthemostformidable andinviolable linesofbattle—straight lines of difference—but isnonetheless internallyfondofa sensualroundness:inclichéterms,a phallicgeography inregardstotheenemybuta terrainofborderless inclusion forone’sown. Thepoliticallogicbehindthisdichotomy wastherealization thata Blackrevolutionwouldhaveto disruptan age-oldmasteryoverthe ofBlack andWhite, whosemanifest contentofracialantagsignification for Themajorbattlefield onismhadalwaysbeenspecifically sexualized. which thisterrainofsymbolic signification, thePanthers wasprecisely rightoff,perhapsagainstthegrainofthePanthers’ Genetrecognized whoaspiredtospeaklesswiththeirsymownimageas revolutionaries workwasenbolicpresencethanwiththeirguns.Therevolutionary byapconscience anattackon thepeople’ssymbolic tirelytheatrical: ofmeanidiom,byaspectacular manipulation themaster’s propriating ing. The Panthers’modeof war at the levelof the imagewas America becausetheseextravagant, tobourgeois particularly shocking Blackmenwithgunswerea stepaheadofthemediaage; otherworldly framedefora 1970smass-media theyweretoobig, tooexcessive, system. tothesymbolic challenges andneutralize signedtoappropriate (This is ultimatelywhy the Pantherswere, more or less,picked offone

onlywithinthebarrelframeofa byone;theirexcesswascontainable

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bymeansofthespectaclewas inthespectacle gun.)Theirintervention bytheveryrealandconstant a tragicproductofdespair,exaggerated threatofdeath,of extinction.

of invisibility thecanonical ThePanthersdidsucceedin abolishing Blacknessin America.As Genet put it, the Panthers attacked first and

exercised was a theatrically bysight.Theirmajorachievement foremost bymeansof invisibility ofBlackAmericans subversion ofthehistorical insuchcon(Genetsays)self-fashioning butelegant” an“extravagant their realityinadefiningway—that creteterms—the termsofdressing legacyof“Black is theaesthetic tracesremainvisibleeventoday.Surely, Beautiful,”to which the Panthers’performancecontributed radical

(andthuslasting)features,is evidentin thewideacceptanceofBlack imagesofself-representation inpopularculturethroughout the1970s, but alsoin theirelaboraterevivalduringthe 1990s.At the sametime, however, theproliferation ofsuchself-images signalsthedisarmament andappropriation ofBlackradicalculture—in effect,itspoliticalerasure.Genet’stheatrical mindenableshimtodeconstruct therelationbetweenthePanthers’ semiotics ofactionandthesymbolic fieldthatdeterminestheirreception. Atheatrical performance intherealworldprovidesnosafeguard forexcess.Realityisunforgiving. Genet’smostdramaticexampleofreality’sharshnesstowardthe

symbolic isDavidHilliard’s reluctance tojoinhimatStonyBrookfora lectureonbehalfofthePanthercause,obliquely expressed asfearofthe locallandscape: “Therearestilltoomanytrees.”Theoddityof the commentsendsGenetdowna pathofexemplary decipherment that goesto the heart of theBlack/Whitedividein America:a different modeofconceptualization oftheworld(ora differentsocial-imaginary, wecouldsay),whoseoriginaltracesareconcretely andindeliblyhistorical.Fora Black“thesightofa treereviveda terrorthatwasnotquite a thingof the past,whichleftthemouthdryandthevocalchordsimpotent.... Whatseparatesusfromthe Blackstodayisnotsomuchthe colorofour skinorthetypeofourhairasthephantom-ridden psyche weneverseeexceptwhena Black, insimultaneously humorous andsecretivefashion,dropsa phrasethatseemsto usenigmatic.It not only seemsenigmatic; it is so”(PL,46/ 69). Theenigmatic terrainitself servesasconcrete evidence oftheradicalhistorical difference marking

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thetwosidesinAmerica’s racewar.Thesymbolic contentofeventhe mostseemingly innocent objects inrealityembodies thishistorical differencematerially.Symboliccontentleavesreal traces,and realinno-

cenceisriddenalloverwithtracesofrealguilt.ThishardrealityispreciselywhythePanthers’ theatricality hadasrealan impactasdidthe bulletfromagun(“thePanthers canbesaidtohaveovercome through poetry,”Genetconcludes), but itisalsowhyitprovedeventually tobe theirownundoing. ThePanthers werevictimized bythemateriality oftheirownphantasms,theveryphantasmsthatgavethemtheirsenseofradicaldifferenceand,byextension, theirrevolutionary fearlessness. Itisa paradoxicalandtragiccondition, asmostformidable theatrical expressions of societyhavebeenthroughtheages.Genetdescribesthe Panthersas “haunted byfearsandfantasies I’dneverknowexcept inironical translation”;“hauntedbynegatives—‘anti’-forces—a rejection ofeverykind ofmarginality tomarginality strivingwithanequallystrongattraction anditsstrangeecstasies”; “hauntedbytheideaofdeath,whichthey translatedintolooting”(PL,259/ 424).OnerecallsFrantzFanon’srethat“aNegrois forever in combatwithhisownimage,”” bealization isnothis ofself-fashioning, causeat somelevelhisimage,regardless own.MuchofwhattheBlackmovements ofthesixtieswereaboutinvolvedthisagonizingattempttogainmasteryovertheproductionof a taskofthemostradicalsocialimaginatheirownimage,ultimately Atthelevelofrevolutiontaskparexcellence. tion—therevolutionary actof X-inghisnameis of thesameorder arysignification, Malcolm’s 1792“YearOneoftheRevoluproclaiming astheNationalAssembly’s tion” and abolishing the Christian calendar. The Panthers, however,

obwithsuchindefatigable, of newself-images tookto thisproduction bytherapidity energythattheywereoutrun,outperformed, sessional oftheirowninvention.Drivenbya realitytheaterentirelyout ofcontrol—which,moreover,aimed to consumethe very boundariesof stag-

of imagesthatexing—thePantherscavedin to an overproduction byanastronomias ifpropelled ceededanycapacityforself-reflection, cal metabolismthat ultimatelyburned the cellularstructureof the organismtoa crisp. forceofsymbols, attunedtothisannihilating Genetwasparticularly

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it in ParisduringtheeventsofMayamidst havingalreadywitnessed evenbriefly. Invigorated hisgenuinejoyatseeingFrancedismantled, action,Genetcomofrevolutionary perhapsby thisjoyfulexperience sojournwiththe in his two-month mittedhimselfto the movement eventsin Parisaswell)witha Panthers (laterstagingvarioussolidarity thatthe Panin thefaceofviolentconfrontation resoluteequanimity thershadsurelyneverseeninaWhitemanbefore.Therearetwoways to accountforthis:(1)Genet’salmostinnatesenseofhimselfasa crimduetohisuncompromising inal,and(2),hisacutesenseofautonomy musthavebeena ForthePanthers, Genet’scriminality homosexuality. attribute, a palpable credibility. Giventheirimageofratherinwelcome hishomosexuality wouldlikelyhave flexible sexualpolitics, however, YetnowhereinGenet’s reflections isthere beenasourceofpuzzlement. theslightest hintofdiscomfort oneitherside.Genet’shomosexuality figures justasunproblematically ashisWhiteness, muchasitdoesfor Genetinanyothercontext—entirely a matterofself-evidence, unworthyofdiscussion. Knowing Genet,thereisnothingastonishing inthis position,norin hisuncensoreddescriptions ofthePanthers’obvious eroticism or thepoeticpowersinherentin Blackculture(whichfrom anothermouthwouldsoundalarming,tosaytheleast).EdmundWhite devotessomethoughtful pagesofhisbiographytothisissue,reporting thatGenetneverhidhiseroticdesiresandevenperformed a danceina pinknegligeeforDavidHilliardanda groupofPanthersonenight,aftertakinga heavierthanusualdoseof Nembutal (hewasa longtime regularuser).ThePanthers considered thisimpromptu performance (unusualevenforGenet)a highlytheatricalexpression oftheflexibility ofsexualidentity, a positionechoedsoonafterby HueyNewton'sfamouspaperfromprison,arguingforgreatersensitivityto gayand women’sliberationmovements and fortheParty’sexplicitsolidarity withtheirpositionsonthecommongroundofrevolutionary action,an astonishing statementgiventhecontextand the timeperiod.Genet himself,withcharacteristic lackofself-importance, reportedthatthe Panthers hadmuchmoreurgentconcerns thanhissexualpreferences. It is worthnoting,however, thatthe PantherslaterinvitedGenetto writeanarticleonhomosexuality ontheirbehalf,astheyconsidered himtheappropriate voicetoarticulatethisposition.”

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Thepointis surelynotthatGenetchangedtheviewsoftheBlack Panthers onthenatureandhistoryofsexuality, butthathissense(and performance) of homosexuality—interwoven withhissenseofcriminality—converged withthe performative politicsof revolutionizing identity,as practiced byboththeBlackPanthersandthePalestinians. Genetarguedrepeatedly thatbeingacriminalisinterwoven withbeing homosexual, andhisrelationtobothwasabsolutely guiltless. Thecurrentactivistnotionof “homosexual culture”wouldseemabsurdto Genet,forhe conceived homosexual lifeasa processofconstantsubversionandalienation, a criminalpracticeby definition. Hesawhis own homosexuality as the commonlanguage,the vitalizingspinal cord,thatranthroughthecriminaltrajectory ofhislifefrom“bastardhood[to]treason,[to]therefusalofsocietyand finally[to]writing,that istosay,a returntosocietybyothermeans.”Asthelanguage ofcriminality, boretheuniquepedagogical burdenofarticulathomosexuality ingsociety’s contradictions aswellasthemeansofsubverting society’s capacityto assimilatecontradictions. impliesan exisHomosexuality tential paranomia,not merelya transgressionof the law,but an existence beside (and besides)the law,a kind of affirmativelawlessness:“The

rulesarenotpreexistent in[any]interrogating conscience, nor[written] eachtime.They oftheLaw.Therulesmustbeinvented onsomeTablets aremoreaestheticthanmoral,andit isbecausetheyareuncertainthat oneinventsthem.Theruleswhichguideme onediscovers them—or and that I invent are against rules, I mean againstthe law.””

ofBetrayal andthePoetics Transpolitics AnyseriousstudyofGenet’ssexualpoliticsnowadayswouldhaveto betweenan astonishing cometo termswiththeapparentcontradiction literaturedatingbackto the productionof homosexual avant-garde anda resoluteresistanceto engagingin “gay-affirmative” late-1940s politicsall toward“antibourgeois” politics,despitea deepgenerosity becauseinrealitythereis overtheglobe.I say“apparentcontradiction” hismiliofhissensibility, tothedomestication none.Genet’sresistance thenegationof all to articulating commitment tantand unmitigated homosexuality identity,wenthand inhandwithhisuncompromising

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ofidentitypoliticstoday. forthediscussion andhasmajorimplications fromaround1952,when lettertoSartre(probably Inanextraordinary ofwritingliterGenetwastryingtotheorizeforhimselftheirrelevance heattemptsto articuatureinthecontextofhisfreedomandlegality), in imagination includinghomosexual latea theoryofhomosexuality, isthathomosexuality basicassumption tosocialorder.Genet’s relation developsoutofthe diffusesexualityofchildhoodin responseto the crisisthatariseswith ofdeathandtheexistential traumaticrealization notaspursuitofself-preservaadolescence. Thiscrisisgetssublimated biological reproduction, henceheterosextionbyothermeans(chiefly ualdesire),but ratheras refusaloflife’scontinuationin favorofendless

pleasure ontheinevitable waytodeath.Desire, inthesecondcase,is channeled tofunereal representations, ritualsofde-generation, that,insofaras theybecomeactionsin reality,cannotbutproducesociety’s wrath.“Thesignificance ofhomosexuality isa refusaltocontinuethe world”and“toaltersexuality” by “struggling against[theworld’s] uselessmanliness.” Transvestism, Genetargues,doesnotinvolve“nostalgiaabouttheideaofthewomanonemighthavebeenwhich[now] feminizes;rather, it’s the bitter need to mock virility,”to become a

womanwhoembodiestheincapacityto continuelife.In pederastic love,thebelovedis investedwithdesirebecause(orinsofaras)he will

havethefateof thelover—acertaindeath.“Thebelovedbecomesthe objectordained to ‘represent’death(the lover)in life.”In this respect,

thebelovedbecomesa double,a reproduced self,thebearerofself-reproduction (withoutanother)who,as Genetrepeatsthroughouthisletter, is essentiallysterile,henceantisocialin a fundamentalsense. Insofar

asthisfunerealimaginarydoesnottranslateintoanyconcreteaction wherebydeathwouldbecomeactual(suicide,murder),it isactivatedas

pureimagination, at onceeroticandpoetic.“Thesuddenrefusalofthe responsibility tolive”breathesconcrete lifeintoeitheraneroticcreation ofoneself(whereby “mypleasurewillbeendless”) or a poeticcreation ofthissameeroticismin language.“Apoemisonlytheactivityof a funerealtheme.Itis(definitely) its socialization, a struggleagainstdeath. Thethemesoflifeproposeactionandforbidthepoem.”Inotherwords, poetryobeysthesameimaginaryofdesireashomosexuality, whichis againstthe virilityof lifeand society(in the straightsenseof both

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words)andthusgains—oreven,generates—a lifethatsocietycriminalizesandultimately seeksto destroy. Thepoetic/erotic imaginary of homosexuality derivesfromdeathbut,insofarasitis actualized, provokesa lethalresponse from,whichthenbecomes theagentorbearerof death.” Whatemerges fromthisimprovised theorization (beyond theobsessionwithsexualizing death,whichfeminists havetheorizedasa particularlymaleobsession) is homosexuality conceived as a bearerof nonidentityandpoeticdestruction—the formerinvolvinga peculiar sidestepping ofthe self-other determinant relationbyan endlessnomadiccondition ofimpersonation, andthelatteraparadoxical actofaltering(othering) theorderofrealitybyelevatingantisocial activities to myth.Thetwopresupposeeachotherandarein effectintertwined. workconsistently thatimpersonation istheiniGenet’s demonstrates tialactofhomosexual love,whichisconstituted notas reciprocal relationwiththeotherbutas theatrical To stagingoftheotherin oneself. this extent, all of Genet’swork is theatricalin the ancientperformative

senseofpoeticactivity, a pointcorroborated by thefactthatGenet namedhimselfa poet(whenhedidnotnamehimselfa thief),never novelist,playwright,or intellectual—culminating inhisfrequentevocationsof UnCaptifamoureux as a Homericenterprise,whoseprecedent,barnone,wasTheIliad.Poetryandhomosexuality areultimately a radicalexternalthatpresupposes linkedbya mutualperformativity Homoizationoftheimaginaryat workbeyondidentitaryconcerns. essence,a poetics sexualitythusyieldsa poeticsof non-identity—in byEdencapsulated againstthelaw,a poeticsofcriminality—perfectly oftwo phrasesregardingGenet’sintenwardSaidin the conjunction and“poeticdefla“gesturalimpropriety” tionsin his playTheScreens: andimproper, isalwaysincendiary Genet’s performativity gration.”*! but in undoing morality, bourgeois notin thebanaltermsofoffending of identity. the verytermsofbourgeoismorality:the configuration of the Whatthe poet performsis alwaysa skewedrepresentation world, becausethe world is never settledto beginwith;that the world

of isthedeepestmeaning processofperformance itselfis incontinual its intrinsicallyconflictual(thatis,political)nature.

ofthereal,an attemptto Ifpoetryis involvedinan impersonation

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ofimitaintheimitation itisinvolved theatricality, history’s transcribe tion(forGenet,a notionfreeof the problematicsof authenticity).The

ofGenethimself thisprocessistheoccasion incident thatbestdescribes inthePalesSudanese officer byMubarak, aBlack beingimpersonated presence deflection forGenet’s tiniancorpswhoservedasintellectual withthe Panthere(aswellasanimplicitlinkto Genet’sexperience outsiderwho,unlikeGenet,isreallyontheinthers):a larger-than-life andSpinoza orofGodanddancein speaksofrevolution side,Mubarak imitation toa gesturebyGenetin mocking asinglephrase.Responding of him, Mubarak declares “Now I'll imitate Jean imitating me,”

prompting thisreactionfromtheauthor: theleftisontherightisnothyourself intheglass,onceyourealize Seeing ing.Nothingbesideseeingyourselfthereunderthetrees,withouta mirror, talkingandwalkingabout,socruellydepictedbythevoiceoftheSudanese,thegesturesofhisarms,histhighs,hisneck,themovements ofhis wholebody.. .. Heimitatedme[ilmereprésenta] goingupanddownsome stepsofmuddyearth.ThankstohimIsawbeforemea giganticfigureoutlinedagainstanalmostblacksky,descending inthedistance,though nearby,abitstoopedwiththewearinessofageandfrommarchingupand downhills—a marchthatbecamefabulous beforeme,ashighastheclouds overNablus—limping attheendoftheday.Thelimpwassimplified and exaggerated, butjustlikethewayIwalked[fidéle @madémarche habituelle}. 1 realizedI waslookingat myselfforthefirsttime,notintheso-called mirrorofthepsychebutthroughaneyeoreyesthathadfoundmeout,not onlyhillbyhillbutstepby step,stoopedover,descending a staircasecutin stone.Everyone hadseenmeandreconstituted me.(PL,211-12/ 348-49)

Genetdescribes hisexperience ofthisperformance withmixedfeelings ofcrueltyandadmiration.Thestagingforbidsanykindofauthenticor realisticrepresentation; MubarakimitatesJeanimitatinghim,technicallyimpersonating himselfthroughanother.Genetmaybetheactual objectofrepresentation here,embodiedin Mubarak’s gestures,but he isnotanobjectofreflection; heiseffectively amediating object, a pretext(asGenetwouldsay on anotheroccasion)for Mubarak’spoetic performance. Ontheotherhand,Genetdoesrecognize himselfin this mediation, butwhatherecognizes isa representation, agesturalpoem thatreconstitutes himina fabularsetting,a supernaturaltheater.The

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limp,at once“simplified” and “exaggerated,” represents, precisely throughthisuntenable simultaneity, notmerelyhiswayofwalkingbut, indeed,hiswholewayofbeingin theworld,hisdémarche. Although Genetnotestheaudience’s laughter, hedeniesanyparodicelements in theperformance. Mubarak’s impersonation isdescribed withthereverenceaccordedto a theatricalinterpretation (in the Greeksenseof herméneia: dramaticpresentation), whichreflectsontheabilities ofthis giganticactortorendertheelderly,limpingGenetas a mythicalfigure (notunlikeanOedipusapproaching Colonus). Nothingin thisimpersonation inspiresidentification (asthe“psyche’smirror”) byeithertheactorortheacted,whichmaybewhyGenet acknowledges feelinga hint ofcrueltyin theperformance. If thereis something disturbing in theexperience, it isduenottoan encounter with one’sdeeper,perhapsevenrepressed,identity,but to the encounterwithone’simageexternalized beyondits identitaryboundaries. It constitutesan externalizationfor Mubarakas well,an exorcism

ofGenet'’s overhisinnerbeing.Thisisexplained byGenet’s possession ofwhathadspurredhimontothemocking imretroactive elucidation thatresultedin theSudanese a full itationofMubarak improvising Genetactinfrontofthetroops:a privatescene,accidentally witnessed byGenet,ofMubarakdancingnexttohiscartoa RollingStonessong blastingout ofa carstereoin theJordaniandesert,circa1971—“barewithhisgraying theelderlyBlack, footandwearingonlyhistrousers, at a nonexistent guitar,hisrighthandworking fuzzyhair,strumming whereyoupluckthestrings,hisleftcomingandgoingonanimaginary neck”(PL,212/ 349).Mubarakneverforgavethisviolationofaprivate but ritual(whichGenetterms“catchinghimdancingas if in Africa”), asthehyperreal oftheperformative encounter forGenetthisisanother (the“airguitar”remindinghimofthecardgamewithoutcards).Toamounttoan objectlessononhowthepoeticsof gethertheseincidents whichhasforofidentification, exceedstheboundaries impersonation (including forboththepoliticsofself-fashioning midableimplications aswellas thepoliticsofaddressing theprospectsforself-alteration), theother.” (andindeed,dressing) is ofimpersonation anotherscenewherethepoetics Genetdescribes SixIsraeliagentswithlongblondhair,posingas three hardlyinnocent.

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inBeirutto queercouplesinlove,getnearenoughtothreePLOofficers andundiscovered. killthematpointblankrangeandescapeunharmed a fromthestandpointofunwrapping Genethandlestheentireincident ofpotenas moments ofrehearsal legendtotraceitsvariousmoments act.Whatconofthespecific beyondtheboundaries tialtransformation oftheincident withinthetime-frame cernshimisnotwhathappened butin switchedfromactingtoaction”), assuch(whenthey“suddenly bytheevent:thegradualprocessof thecontinuum oftimeinterrupted forreality)and the subsequent dressingup forthe part (rehearsals theEdenicrealityoftheiridenprocessofundressing, ofreconquering tity: Sixcurlyblondewigs,a bitofredonthelipsandblackaroundtheeyesare notmuchtohavebroughtsuchunsuspected dismaytothestreetsofBeirut.

whoneverceasedfeelinglikemen Theinwardlaughteroftransvestites mayhaveechoedtheterrorofrealtransvestites, afraidofbeingfoundout throughtheirprattlingvoices(notquitelikewomen’s) andtheiroldgestures,thoughusingalltheireffortstodisguisethem.ButthesixcurlyhairedIsraeliscouldn’t affordtoforgetforaninstantthattheyweremen, trainedtokillandwithmusclesmeantforfighting.Thestrangeness of theirsituationlayinthegentlefemininedelicacyoftheirmovements, and theirtransformation fromonemomenttothenextintotheprecisegestures ofmurderers—not murderesses. Theyknewhowtokisstongueontongue, headsononeside,andpenisonpenis;butallthatwasfacileandcameeasilytomind.Whatwasmoredifficult andtooklongertolearnwashowto lifta hairverylightlyoffthebeloved’s brow,orflickaladybugoffhis shoulders. Therehearsals, inastreetinIsrael,musthavetakensometime.

Theyouthshadtobeabletoarrangethefoldofascarfandgiveahighpitchedlaugh,thenwhipoffthegladragsandbecomewarriorswhoseone objectwastokill.Reallykill.Notasinthelastactofaplay,toapplause, butforreal,withdeadbodies.I wonderifitisn’tcomparatively easyand pleasanttoslipintotenderfemininity, andhardtothrowitofftocommit a crime.(PL,160-61/ 266-67)

Literature’s astonishing capacitytotheorizetheworldtowhichit gives voicemakesany interpretivecommentaryon this passagecumbersome.Genethascaptured theentireterrainofspeculative understandingbygivingusthesecrethistorythatposesallthosequestions erased by the finalityof the historical event.He knowsthat the indelible

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event—the finalactofkilling—assures thatimpersonation willexceed identification, whereby theimmediate implication isthat,asaresultof thispoeticexcess,theothergetskilled.(Acoupleofpageslater,Genet warnsthat the Palestinians shouldbewareof “Israel’spoetryand charm.”)Yet,healsoknowsthatthe successofthe mission(notmerely themissionto killbuttoretaintheidentitaryboundaries intactinorder tokill)paradoxically presupposes a successful identification intheact ofimpersonation—a transvestism thatcreatesitsownrealityquatransvestism,arealitythatmustbeconvincing enoughtobeshared,evenfor a microsecond, by the intendedvictims.Howthendoesthis vested transvestism asit is,thoughachieved (transient withlongandrigorous rehearsal) becomederealized? Howdoesthetransvestite realitygetundressedintheaftermath? Whoassumestheresponsibility for(re)creatingthebarerealityof(generic) manwhoseidentityisnever man—the in doubt? The answer must lie in the irreversibleact of murder,when

returnsbecausetheotherisannihilated.Yet,a residuere(self-)identity inthedoubttowardwhichGenetsosubtlygestures mainsnonetheless

thememory ofthedifficulty of“undressing” attheendofthepassage: at last,at themomentofnecessity, ofbecoming managaininorderto kill—the momentthat,asfutureanterior,willhavebeenjustifying the transvestite experience, a momentthatis itselfa travestyofidentity thehistorical whatever fromwhichonecannotescapeuncontaminated, agentagainsta historythatcovresult.Thisresidueactsasa corrosive ersitstracks. ofdivestnopossibility intransvestism, Thereis thusnoinnocence ment, as it were, even where the transvestiteact is a pretext for an ac-

withthe tiondesignedtobetrayit.It is not a questionof identifying it istheotheringofyouridentity— otherintheactofimpersonation; even in the ephemeral,perhaps momentary,in-vestmentof the other—

the spaceofyourself thatoccupies(inthesenseof Freud’sBesetzung) and leaves in it the tracesof a question.No identitysurvives,for one is

in a boundunendingstreamofappearances nothingbuta potentially atdifoccasions, broughttolifeondifferent lessshadowplayinstantly thatdresstheshadtotheparticulars ferentpointsintime,according to identifythem.Theultiowswithmeaningandthusmakeit possible thelogic isthattheverynotionofidentity(including mateimplication

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oftransismarkedbyacondition thatcoversupitsphantomexistence) atthecore of(self-)images meaninga nomadicproliferation versality,* fromwhich existence thatopenoneto.amultipleand multi-figured thereisnoescapeandnoreturn,forbehindliesthevoid. oftheselfderailsanysortofpolitics(orethics) Sucha conception of theexistence basedontheother,anysortofactionthatpresupposes ofpower(for relationfromwhichtodrawconclusions anantithetical Thisis themostcrucial thedominant)orofjustice(forthe dominated). ofGenet’sentirecorpus,linkedtohis mosttroupoliticalimplication atthepoeticevocation ofbetrayal.In a provocative blingarticulation: tempt to think through this obstacle,Leo Bersani recognizesin Genet,

as a fundamental arché(originand rule),the “ambitiousintentionof tothe relationwhatsoever imagining aformofrevoltwithnocitational laws, categories,and values it would contest and, ideally,destroy.” Genet’sfundamental principleofrevoltignoresthedominantterms thatgivemeaning(indeed,identity) torevolt,eschewing anyattemptat opposition (evenparody)inanysensethatwouldacknowledge their existence.IfGenetmakes useofculture’sdominanttermsat all, Bersani

argues,hedoessoas“toexploittheirpotentialforerasingculturalre-

lationality itself(thatis,theveryprecondition forsubversive repositioningsanddefiantrepetitions).”™ Thisresultsinoutmaneuvering the privileged statusoftransgression thatenablesrevolttobecategorized as an ethicalstandard and fostersthe catastrophic,forGenet,condition

of(re)cementing theprivilegeofidentity.Fortransgression eventually becomesanalibiforthemoralupperhand,aswellasan occasiontorecede into the comfort of redemption, both of which, according to

Genet’sintransigent paranomia, constitutethe most reprehensible agentsof bourgeoiscommunalidentity.Evenmore,the identitary ethicsoftransgression ensuresthatthe memoryofhavingoncebeen oppressed will continue to determine one’s actions after liberation,

while(asBersaniarguesin hisreadingofTheMaids)genuinerevoltis possible onlywhenone’ssubjectivity hasbeentrulyaltered andcanno longerberelatedto(identified) asanoppressed subjectivity. Genet’s entirework,likehisverywayoflife,wasconducted as an onslaught onthemetaphysics ofcommunity, whichforhimamounted tothegravestdeception ofthelogicofidentity. Hisprofoundpolitical

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generosityandcommitment in thelasttwentyyearsofhislifewasan attempttopracticea politicsthatexploreda differentsortofassociation,a genuineexploration ofrevolutionary collective asa societyheld together bythecoarticulation offantasy, notbythecommunity oflaw. Theprototype remainedtheanticommunal societyofcriminals, where, contraryto our romanticvisionsofunderworldloyalty,betrayalwas thesafeguard againstmoralconvention, criminalsociety’s immediate undoing.At thislevel,tobetrayone’scomradewasparadoxically to safeguard hisstatusascriminal—in essence, nottobetray him.Notjust paradox,but an exemplary caseofthelogicofnonidentity (whichis to say,paradoxical onlyfromthestandpoint ofidentitary logic), thismode ofthoughtandactionpointstoan epistemological framework thatis continuously othering thetermsofanalysis andcalculation. Anidentity based on betrayal is entirely incalculable;it defiesthe means of deter-

mination.Sinceit canhardlybeidentified,it canhardlybe calledan identityat all.Awayofbeingthatentailslimitlessmutation,itsgeographicalprincipleisnotsimplynomadicbutgroundless. Suchgroundlessness makeseventhemostsympathetic attemptsat characterizing Genettrulypuzzling,ifnotsometimes outrightdisturbing—asinthecaseofhisstealinga paintingfromGiacometti’s studio, fromthemanhe considered worthierthananyotherhehadeverenoffriendtosubvertevenrelations countered. ButGenet’scompulsion of the greatestvaluein Genetand so (in Bersani’s ship—relations his paradoxical itself—demonstrates terms)the valueofrelationality ofsocialorderanditspowersofresenseofloyaltytohisowndefiance since withevadingdetection Obsessed andappropriation. habilitation falsified dataabouthimself hisearlycriminaldays,Genetconsistently to profilespertaining andpsychiatric andhislife.Alljuridicaldecisions bythelogicof aprioricontaminated himshouldbetakenasdiscourses giventhatGenettook the subjectthey professto knowobjectively, to theexhisfeatsofrobberyandvagabondage pridein fictionalizing asbetrayaloftheselfinresistance pertswhojudgedhim.Falsification bythepurveyorsof truthamountstojustanother toitsappropriation effectstagedagainst alienation theatrical instanceofimpersonation—a oneself.Itmeansstagingidentityso thatit revealsidentityas a matter toallthosewhowould explicit commitment Genet’s ofstaging—hence

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derealizetheir identitiesand exposethem as colonizedsites,as stages

phrase: succinct power.InEdwardSaid’sdisarmingly of imperialist “Imperialism istheexportofidentity.” useanotherofSaid’scharacteriGenet’s “fierceantinomianism”—to towhatbecomesinfactapoetics anexpliciteroticism zations—ascribes whohasnotknowntheecstasyofbetrayal[trahiofbetrayal:“anyone son]knowsnothingaboutecstasyat all”(PL,59/ 101).*Atonelevel, eroticsthat linkedtoa homosexual suchecstasymaybe specifically andthusviolatesthetraditakesexchange outofthesexualencounter readtionallyunderstood self/otherrelation.Thiswouldbe Bersani’s to “theantirelationality inherentin all homoness”and ing according positionofuttersolitudeas underpinned byGenet’s undeconstructible in themoment theonlypossibleaccess/waytotruth,whichdisappears oflanguageitselfleadsto ofdialogueorconfession, sincethedisloyalty truth’sbetrayalbytheveryencounterwiththeother,betrayalbycommunication.” Andyet,thepassagethatconcludes withthiseroticexaltationofbetrayalsketches itasbasednotmerelyontheencounter with theother,but onthetranslation oftheenemy(Genet’sterms)suchthat each position becomes the other’s shadow,in a kind of mutuality that

makeseventheirdreamsdifficult todisentangle. Toconfigure one’senemyasone’sshadowhardlysuggestsa symbiosis, forifnothingelse, thereareno longeranybodiesleft;theyhavevanishedinthetranslation,inthebetrayaloftheirownterms.Theecstasyofbetrayalisliterallyduetobeingcatapulted outsideone’sbodyandtakingformatthe pointofgroundlessness, of/asshadow. Inotherwords,Genetdissolves thesubstanceof relationality embodiedin theself/otherencounter, buthedoessobyemploying anessentialgestureofothering (translation) inordertoarticulatea dissolution of the self/other relation in the act of betrayal. Bythe same token,

Genet’slateworkdemandsthatweamendBersani’s exclusively homosexualdiscursive framing oftheproblem(whichisn’ttosaythata homosexualimaginaryis no longerat work).Genet’sevocationofbetrayalas ecstasyoccursat the outsetof a workorganizedaround Genet'’s captivityina lovethatextendsbeyondsexualpractice(includingitsdomainoffantasy)toa kindoftotallove-experience whereindividualbodiesretaintheirpalpablesensuality butremainindiscriminate

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and divestedofspecificsexualinterest.SuchwasGenet’savowedexperienceofboththe Palestinians andtheBlackPanthers,a totalcommitmenttobeingcaptiveandinlovethat,insuchcontexts, furtheraggravates thealreadydisruptive notionoftheecstasy ofbetrayal. Genetentertained betrayalexplicitly inthecaseofthePalestinians: “The day the Palestiniansbecomeinstitutionalized,I will no longerbe

ontheirside.Thedaythe Palestinians becomea nationlikeothernations,I willnolongerbethere. . . .Ithinkthatit’stherethatIwillbetray them.Theydon’tknow.”*Isthisthesamenotionofbetrayal?If so,it wouldsuggestthatatthepointofnationalinstitution, thePalestinians wouldalsobeattheepitomeoftheirfriendship withGenet,wereweto followliterallythe scriptoforiginarybetrayalin the criminalworld. Butthiswouldcancelout thepossibility ofreadingGenet’s betrayalas directedagainstinstitutionalization itself—afoolishreadinggiven everything towhichGenet’slifeattests.Acloserreadingrevealsa stunningconsistency ofpositions, despitethesecondappearingmoreconventional. Justasthebetrayaloffriendshipinthecriminalworldsafeguardstheintegrityoftheonebetrayed,sodoesbetrayalofrevolutionaries at their pinnacleof politicalachievementsafeguardtheir is thebetrayalofrevoluintegrity.Institutionalization revolutionary onlyabeovertoritual,Genetsays—and itturnsrevolution tion—for energythat trayalofthisbetrayalcouldprolongtheundomesticated revealstheepisGenet’s evidentanarchism makesrevolution possible. befamousrivalphrases:revolution of Trotsky’s temicco-incidence revolution. trayedopensthewayforpermanent In addition,however,Genet’slast work encapsulatesa poeticsof be-

significathetotalityoftheterm’svariouspolitical trayalthatembraces betrayal”of the homosexual tionsand confirmsthe “nonrelational and bothhomological to Bersani) byexceeding (according imagination ThemajorquestionemergingfromGenet’s frameworks. heterological ofa is thepossibility andthePalestinians avowedloveforthePanthers residualOrientalismat work, which would combinethe traditionalel-

thatusuallyclutementsofdiscoursewithvariousotherparaphernalia Here,I believe,Genet’spoeticsofbeofrevolution. ter the exoticism ThereisnodoubtthatUnCappolitics. trayalreachesitsmosttrenchant lifesourcesthat waswrittenasa tributeto theunexpected tifamoureux

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Genetencounteredwhen hispersonallifehad reachedthevoid,sources

toanimatehimwhentheactualvoid continued whosereverberations bebluntand ofdeathhadlockedontohim.Thelovefortheother—to total, perhapsevenvulgar,forthesakeoftheissue’sseriousness—was stanceinthelasttwenty selfless, withoutguilt.Yet,Genet’s genuine, othersuggeststhat“tobeyearsofhislifeagainstallthoseirrevocably buttoretainforhimselfthe traythemis nottoabandonthemexactly, nottobetieddown,”asEdrightnottobelong,nottobeaccountable, ofbetrayalin Genetas wardSaidnotes,inauniquecriticalrecognition of“goingnative,”oflayinga claim anactthatabolishes thepossibility ontheterritoryof theother,evenoutofgenuinelovefortheother.” Suchbetrayalensuresthatone’slovefortheotherisnotactuallyanunconscious andveiledloveofoneself againsttheother. atitscore.Ontheonehand,beThecomplete pictureisparadoxical trayalconsists in translating thetermsofyourenemy-other tothepoint of mutual entanglementof terms and dreams;on the other hand, be-

trayalbeliestherefusalto takeup thetermsofyourfriend-other as yourown,tobe entangled tothepointofbecomingoneandthesame. Thetwosidesoftheparadoxrevealthedeep-seated ambivalence of translationitself,an epistemicambivalencethat makesit, in the lastin-

stance,practically untenable. WhatGenethimselfaddstothisstringof ambivalent figures,whosetransversal logicorganizes hispoeticand politicalimaginary, is thefigureofthetranssexual: “Astheold sex fadesand,hehopes,finallydropsoffuseless,he’llbepossessed ofajoy closetomadnesswhenhereferstohimselfas‘she’insteadof‘he,’and realizes thatgrammaralsohasdividedintotwo,andthefeminine half hasturneda somersault sothatitappliestohim,whereastheotherhalf usedtobeforcedonhim.Thetransition tothenon-hairy partmustbe bothdelightful andterrible...‘Farewell tohalfofme—Idietomyself.’ Toleavebehindthehatedbutfamiliarmasculine waysislikeforsaking theworldand goingintothe monastery or a leperhouse.Toquitthe world of trousers for the world of the brassiéreis a kind of death, ex-

pectedbutfeared.Andisn’tit alsocomparable tosuicidewithchoirs singingthe‘Tubamirum’?...Atranssexual is a sortofmonsterand herocombined” (PL,52-53/ 90-91). Genetlatchesontothefigureofthetranssexual inthecontextofdis-

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cussingthehero’soddepistemological status:theboundless joyoflife inthefaceofdeath’scertainty andimminence. Theinitialcauseofreflectionistheexperience oflistening toMozart's Requiem in aBeiruthotelroom(hencethereference in thepassageabove),whichhe describes asan apotheosis ofambivalence, a lamentfordeathandyetitslife-giving glorification, a heroicencounter thatwrestsfromdeaththejoyof life.Thissamelife-and-death playoperatesat the foundations of the transsexualexperience—for Genet,a bonafideheroicpositionin our strictlygendered identitarian world.Thetranssexual betraystheidentityofsexitself,taking“sexualidentity” totheverylimitofthenotion, asrealastheworldandyetbeyondtheworld:“Escape fromtheworld atlast!Changing sexdoesn’tconsistmerelyin subjecting one’sbodyto a fewsurgicaladjustments: it meansteachingthewholeworld,forcing uponit a changeofsyntax... . (Theadjectives describing youought henceforth befeminine.) Yourstillunadjustedrighthandwillmoveto Thetranssexhidean erectionnolongerpossible”(PL,150/ 249-50).*' ualembodiesa historyofpermanenttranslation fromonetoanother, and poisedbetweentwodeaths:thebonesofoneidentityexhumed translatedintotheossuaryoftheother,andsoon,a limitlesspalindromewhereintheliteralandtheallegorical areputintomutualquestion.Suchtransversallogiccharacterizes bothbetrayalandtranssexuofself,makingofonealityandconsistsina permanent externalizatior selfa gift to the other,yet a gift of a self that vanishes;neither by theother,theidentityofbothgiverand penetratingnorswallowed receiveris renderednulland void.” fightersthatafterGenet’sdeathhisbones TherequestbyPalestinian bedistributedamongthemandscatteredovertheDeadSeabearsthe the weightofhisownprojectofinfiniteexternalization, fullsymbolic untranslationofhiswordsandbonesalike.Genet’snonidentitarian of theevanescence anddescribe enableshimto perceive derstanding situation,a twilightexistence(“entrechienet lifein a revolutionary endowsitwithan always ambivalence loup”)whosesheerspace-time isrifewith UnCaptifamoureux imminentcapacityformetamorphosis. a conditionforged ghostlyexistence, referencesto the Palestinians’ vifromboththerealityofdeathintheirdailylivesandtheimaginary byGenet’s sionthatgaverealityto theirproject,but alsoreinforced

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theuncannyrealityof presenceamongthem—by ownphantasmatic JeanGenet,the famousFrenchauthorwho chose to sharetheir moment

Genetisperfectly inhistorywithouttheslightesthintofself-interest. aware of the powerof this condition,a power marked,like everything

drew Ontheonehand,thePalestinians ambivalence. else,byprofound existence, oftheirshadowy power—out mythological a greatpower—a suchthat“theveryrealStateof Israelfindsitselfshadowedby a ishauntedby the in thesensethatallpermanence ghostlysurvival,” by whatcanreappearfromthevoidand durabilityof evanescence, Indeed,thephrase (sur-vie) thepermanence ofanyexistence. overcome “L’Etat bienréeld’Israélseconnait inFrenchisevenmorerevealing. doubléd’unesurviefantomatique” (PL,304/ 496)suggeststhatIsrael, insofaras it has achievedthehard realityof institutionalization, is now

opento a sortofcinematicdubbingin anotherlanguagethatsplits (doubles) itsnational-imaginary institution. YetGenetwonderswhetherhis ownghostlystatusas witness (taintedallthemorebyhischronicle’s formalaffinitywithdeath)may dragthePalestinians intoa streamofshadowyexistence, retroactively animatedbya ventriloquist, a puppetmaster,a “shadow-showman.” Thiswouldinvolvea certainmateriality ofdeathintheveryactofanimation,sinceshadow-theater figuresrealizea palpablerepresentation ofdeath,a deathdressedaslife(travestied) bytheubiquitousbutinvisiblepuppeteerwhodaresspeaktheirmanyvoices.Genet’slongreflection,as thebookdraws to a close,on histaskas shadow-master(a task

he equateswiththe animation—not the fulfillment—of prophecy) dwellsonthenecessary betrayalofhistoryforthesakeofmythistorical creation:“Thetransformationsof a fact intowords,signs,and seriesof

wordsandsignsbecome otherfactsthatcanneverreconstitute theoriginalthatgenerated mytranscription.” Thisinadvertent betrayal offacts (Genet’sterms) is theinevitableresultof an encounterbetweenthe po-

eticimaginationand the mythographic inventoryof society,an encounterbetweentwodreamworldsthatco-incidentally existinsideone another: WhatI recountmaywellbewhatIexperienced, butitwasdifferent inthat thedisparateness of myownexistence hadmergedintothecontinuityof Palestinian life,thoughstillleavingmewithtraces,glimpsesof,sometimes

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severances from,myformerlife.. .. Sometimes Iwonderwhether I didn’t livethatlifeespecially sothatImightarrangeitsepisodes in thesame seemingdisorderas theimagesin adream.Allthesewordstosay,thisis myPalestinian revolution, recitedin myownchosenorder.. . .Tryingto thinktherevolution islikewakingupandtryingtoseethelogicina dream.There is no point, in the middleofa drought,to inventthe neces-

sarygestures forcrossing theriverwhenthebridgehasbeensweptaway.

(PL,308-9 / 504-5) Genet'spoeticsofdisappearance hasbeenamplydiscussed inregard tothisbook,particularly in termsofGenet’s portrayalofrevolutionary existence.Theunderlyingpointisthatforeveryactoferasurein history,which is a quintessentialrevolutionarymoment,another concrete

historicalmanifestation isgenerated; historical eclipseandpoeticnamingareintertwined. Genethimselfsaysat onepointthat“eclipseisa wordfullofmeaning” andthatmeaning, literallyslidingrightoverany attemptto shedpermanentlightonit,eclipsesrepresentation. What hoversbehindthissortofobsessive metaphorizing isGenet’sunequivocalpositionregardingtherelationbetweenart andrevolutionor,if andthe youwill,betweenthedreamworldofthepoeticimagination creation.Inbothrealms,a palpable dreamworldof social-historical dreamlogicis at work,thecommonrootof humanity’scapacityto andthusitsdestinyin imaginenewforms,toalteritsself-conception theworld.Andthoughbothdreamworldsarereal,“weknowthatone unlimitedfashion. canacton [one’sownpoetic]dreamsinapractically Onecannotactontherealin an unlimitedfashion.A differentdiscidiscipline.” plineisneeded,whichisnota grammatical limitsoftherealforbidtheartist’sdelusionof Theseimpermeable being master of historical creation. Even the greatest innovations in art,

donotprecedebutfolloweventsof historical Genetarguesrepeatedly, actioncanbebasedon for“nogenuinerevolutionary transformation, of ofthebeginning actionshavethefreshness revolutionary precedents; andshoulduntheartistisnorevolutionary theworld.”Inthisrespect, theinfantasythathemightbe:in revolution, dermineanynarcissistic Thisretegrityofone’sownbodyis atstake;in art,one’sreputation.** in Un isoneofthemaintasksundertaken ofnarcissism configuration whereGenetmightbe saidto recuperatehis consisCaptifamoureux,

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beyondtheexasublimation inlifebyenacting tentlyfailedsublimation asheoften writingofa daydream, poeticfantasy—the erciseofpersonal as toprovidea writingsuitedto the hisearlywork—so characterized thatit involves. sublimation andthepeculiar imaginary revolutionary At the same time,Genetknowshistory’slessonwell:revolutionsare ephemeralentitiesand, once institutionalized,turn againstthe artists

energy.Genet whosupportedthemwithantithetical andintellectuals considersthis inevitableand indeeddesirable,for it ensuresthat art justas demandsof revolution, willneversubmitto the instrumental

Artandrevolution revolution willneverdependonartforrealization. contingency that determined bythehistorical mayenterintoanalliance relation.Genetidentifiestwostrainsin coordinates theirantithetical ofpreference. which“theremustbenoquestion artisticworkbetween Ontheonehandthereistheworkwhichservestherevolution; thisis constructive inthesensethatitdestroys bourgeois values.Thenthereis anotherkind of artistic work,essentiallyviolentand inflammatory,in

thesensethatit refusesto submitto anyvalueorto anyauthority.It disputeseventheexistenceofman.”Becauserevolutiondemandsattentionto practical matters,Genetgoesontoargue,therevolutionary capacityof art (its secondstrain) is useless,perhaps even detrimental,

whichis whysomanyartistshavemetwiththeirdestructionbefore

revolutionary tribunals. Butbyvirtueofthesameanarchist nature,art pursuesrevolution againstitsensuingdomestication. Genetconcludes

that“itisthedutyofrevolution toencourage itsadversaries: worksof art.Thisisbecause artisticwork,whichistheproductofthestruggleof theartistinisolation, tendsto contemplation, which,in thelongrun, mayturnintothedestruction ofallvalues,bourgeois orotherwise, and theirreplacement by something elsethatwillmoreandmorecometo resemble whatwecallfreedom. . . .Finally, thedefinition ofa workof artcouldbethefollowing: anobjectthatisreallyofnouse.”4” Literature isofnousein a conventional sensebecauseitis a protean entityandcanneverbepinneddown,exceptas“abarricadeto hidethe void”ofreality,asGenettentatively describesLnCaptifamoureux. Yet, inthisprocess ofdissimulation, ofonesentence overwriting thespace oftheotherandallconsistently overwriting theblankpageofreality, thepoeticimaginationregistersits own void,the void that enablesrad-

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icalself-alteration. Inthisrespect,literature—as a specifically mythographicenterprise—manifests thevoidofhistoryinsteadoferasingit. GenetbeginsUnCaptifamoureux withanexemplary meditation onthe paradoxical transparency of writtensigns,whichmaynotgivemeaningto (whichis alsotosay,erase)theblankness ofthepageinwhich historyisembodied.Thelegibility of history,heimplies,maybedue nottoitsbeingwritten,but toitsbeingread,wherereadingistobeunderstoodnotas an interpretivetask(readingbetweenthe lines),but as anactofpoeticinvention, ofwritingagainstthealreadywritten:“Readingbetweenthelinesis a levelart;readingbetweenthewords a precipitousone.... Anotherwayof puttingit: the spacebetweenthe wordscontainsmorerealitythanthetimeittakestoreadthem”(PL,3 / 11-12).Thepoliticalimplications ofthispoeticsofhistoryareimmediatelyapparenttoGenet.Disavowing hisfamous1970s comment that “the Blackswere the characters on the white page of America,”he

makesthewritingofthisbooka demonstration thatrevolutionary historymanifests itselfbyhavingdiedonthepage,asifthebloodfromits numberlessanonymous deathshasseepedthroughallthecracksand becomenotsignsandmargins,blackinkandblankspaces,butsheer texture:

TheblackwordsonthewhiteAmerican pagearesometimes crossedoutor erased.Thebestdisappear, butit’stheythatgiveformtothepoem,or arethe ratherthepoemof thepoem.IftheWhitesarethepage,theBlacks ofthepage,ornotofthepagealone. writingthatconveysa meaning—not of Whitesiswhatthewritingissetdownon,anditforms Theabundance dead, bytheabsentBlacks—the themargintoo.Butthepoemiscomposed namelessabsentBlackswhowrotethepoemwhosemeanifyoulike—the ofthe ofinvisibility ingescapesmebutnotitsreality.Lettheabsence Theyarestillactive.Radioactive. Blackswecalldeadbewellunderstood. (PL,218/ 358)

Here,themeaningofpoetrymaybe entirelyelusivetoanyonenot residinginsideit,not dead andnamelessto historyalongwithit. The poem’sreality,however,thepalpablesenseofthe poeticimagination imaginary)bleedingthroughoutthetexturesofthereal,is (society’s inWhite ThisappliesnotonlytotheBlacks comprehensible. perfectly occupiedby theZionistdream,or perAmericabuttothePalestinians

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as Genethimselfwouldput it, the Palestinians hapsmoreaccurately, dream,oneinwhichtheycome inanother’s unwittingly participating to betheblankshadowsasthedreamspaceisinvokedas tabularasa radancestry.Genet’s andbeingwrittenoverwitha new,naturalized hispresenceamong cannotbut drivehimto interrogate icalskepticism as“thedreamer insidea dream, andthePalestinians, boththePanthers the Europeansayingto a a factorof unrealityin bothmovements, wake the sleeper!’”(PL,149/ 248). dream,‘Youarea dream—don’t ofhistory’s poemwillperNevertheless, trustingthattheblood-reality meateall signs and blankness,Genet closeshis book with the daring

phrase:“Thislastpageofmybookistransparent.” Suchtrustin thehumancapacityto alteritselfwithoutlimitand antinowithoutguarantee astoenablesomeoneofGenet’smeticulous mianism toconclude bysubscribing toatransparency oftherealspeaks ofan extraordinary lucidity.Idaresaythisluciditycomesfromanintoxicating loveoflifeanda totalequanimitybeforemortality—preciselyasGenetperceives theHomeric universe,exemplified notbythe modernist Odysseus, butbythetragicAchilles, whoseshortpoeticlife, beyondritualandsacrament, becomesthemythistorical modelforall characters in UnCaptif amoureux. Whatmakessuchluciditypossibleis thetotalabsenceofanytranscendental desiresandanxieties inGenet’s lifeandwork,witha consistency anda passionthatmustbe rare. Genet’s poeticandpolitical imaginary ispaganthroughandthrough.It is terriblymisguided to callGenet“a mysticalatheist,”as Edmund Whitehasdoneonseveraloccasions; evenGenet’smostostentatious sketchesof Catholicfantasiesare paganelaborations, not unlikethe stunningdepictions ofHellin ItalianRenaissance painting.Anatheist, hesays,ishardlydangerous, forheapproaches theundersideofChristianmoralism, while“paganismputstheunbeliever backamidthesocalled‘mistsoftime,’whenGoddidn’tyetexist.Asortofintoxication andmagnanimity allowsa pagantoapproacheverything, himselfincluded,withequalrespectandwithoutunduehumility” (PL,35/ 62). Thissortofintoxication is hardly“thedestructive, panickeddrunkenness”that all revolutioneventuallyritualizes(as potlach);it is rather,as

Cornelius Castoriadis putsit,the“luciddrunkenness” ofsociety’s poeticpraxis,of what establishesthe freedomto create and explorenew

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formsofsociallife.”Thiscapacity islimitless, thoughlimited bydeath, precisely becauseitdoesnotlimittherealityofdeathbymeansofsome transcendentalafterlife.Havingde-dramatizeddeath,ashe wasfondof

saying,Genetbroughthismortality tofullrealization, whilecorrecting thefinalproofsofUnCaptif amoureux andbeginning todraftitsunrealizedsequel.

DeLilloin Greece

Thistentativeas“Tthinkfictionrescueshistoryfromitsconfusions.” coulddrawahail sertioninoneoftherareinterviewswithDonDeLillo fromhistorians,asit insinuates,withconfidentandseriofobjections ous nonchalance(DeLillo’scharacteristicstyle), that history is con-

thenovelistgoesontoattributetothewritingofficfused.Elaborating, tiona capacityforhistoricalinsightthatthewritingof historycannot possiblypossess, aclarityofperception intohistory’s ownthings: “[Fiction]canoperateina deeperway:providingthebalanceandrhythm we don’t experiencein our daily lives, in our real lives. So the novel

whichiswithinhistorycanalsooperateoutsideit—correcting, clearing up,and,perhapsmostimportantofall,findingrhythmsandsymmetriesthatwesimplydon’tencounter elsewhere.” Thishardlymeansthatliteraturehastriumphedoverhistory.Quite thecontrary,sinceaccording tothisformulation theinsightoffictionis achieved onlyashistorical insight,asthealleviation ofhistory’s confusions on its own behalf. After all, history, not fiction,is being rescued.

Ontheonehand,thisrescueoperationensuresfiction’s implication in thingshistorical,whichgoesfartowarddispellingtheclassicnotions aboutliterature’s self-referential natureatonetimeso dearto literary critics.On the other hand, however,DeLillo’sremark also implies a

particularand indeeduniquequalityinliterature’s relationtoknowledge,towhatmakesknowledge possible inhistory, andthisisthelarger issueframingthediscussion here. DeLilloinsiststhat,unliketheworkofBeckettor Kafka(whichhe identifies asplaceless andabstractandtherefore moreexplicitly theoretical),his work is attached “to real places, to color and texture, to 292

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names,to rootsandpigmentsand roughsurfaces.”? Forhim,fiction must have a locusinaliteral, not merelymetaphoricalsense—ifforno

otherreasonthanto subvertfiction’s tendencytowardself-absorption. Andyet,DeLillohas accomplished an exemplary bodyoftheoretical literaturein theverytraditionofthegreatmodernistexperimentation hecites,whichengageswithgreatsubtletytheelusivemysteries ofthe contemporary world,a literatureof uniqueperformative contemplation.?Despiteeasy-handed pronouncements on DeLillo’s postmodern techniques (whichsometimes locatehisworkin a traditionofalleged antiliterature),his entire mode of interrogationpoints to a refinedcon-

fidencein literature’s capacityto theorizethemysteryoftheworld,the elemental historical thingness.* Since the 1980sin particular,DeLillo’swork has exhibitedstriking

asanoveralltheoretical multicohesion project, despitea consistently facetedapproachto subjectmatterandnarrativelocus.Inparticular, nexttotheextraordinary ofLibra(1988)—to whoseliterarysotextures Names(1982)exemplifies litphisticationit servesasa precursor—The erature’stheoretical capacitywithstunningrichness.Inthiswork,the capacityoffictiontoabolishhistory’sconfusions istestedagainstthe ofa foundational desireinhumansocietyto harnessthe background powerofthepropername.Therefore themythical ofthis undercurrent novelandan encounterbetweentheworldofa late-twentieth-century legacyoftheTower archaicdesireis noneotherthanthetransgressive IngenofBabel:“Western” culture’sgenerativelapseintoconfusion. betweenhistory’s eral,thenovelderivesitsenergyfromanintersection marketof coreanditsdissolutionin thecontemporary mythological oftheBabelexperience, rejuvenation politicsandculture.Ina constant butthenegotioflanguages whichis nolongersimplytheproliferation market,tomakehisina globalized ationofculturalratesofexchange torymayinvolvethe strugglebetweennamingandbeingnamed,or Torenderthis evenmore,thechanceto eludethenamealtogether. itasanactintheworld,retoregister struggleorthiselusionpalpable, contemplaotherwords,thetransformative quirespoeticthought—in history’s tion of history’sconfusedpresentby meansof (re)staging

core. mythological strictstandardsof narrativelocussituatethis historicaland DeLillo’s

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oftheEastern conditions inthecontemporary crossroads philosophical called,in terriblyvague basin(orwhatis commonly Mediterranean terms, the MiddleEast),with Greeceas the centralreferentialspaceand

ishardly pointofreference Thisterritorial Indiaastheouterboundary. necessity ofthework. itistheinternal a matterofliteraryconvenience; elementas its very Thenovelputsfortha particulargeographical istorechowthisnovelthinks Tounderstand ofcontemplation. method toremindoneselfthatthefounognizea certainprimacyingeography, worldare oftoday’s theimaginary questions thatstillanimate dational terrainontheglobe,andnotmerelytheactual associated withaspecific itsmanynames.Thus presence ofthisterrainbutitsmanyhistories, Theycarrya critsignificant. placenamesinthisnovelareparticularly record,butalsoadisofmyths,anarcheological icallogic:aninventory tinctmodernity. Thoughtheterrainnamedis vast,Greeceis evidentlycentral,not weight.Toassume merelyinthenarrative framebutin methodological that somethingis central is to inhabita characteristicambiguity,to reside simultaneouslyat the core and in between, at the base of things

andintheinterstices ofthings.Inthisrespect,tobeinGreeceistobesimultaneously groundedand suspended—an acrobaticconditionthat informsboththeauthor’sownmotivation(DeLillo spentfouryearsin Greeceas a “researchbase” for the novel) and the novel’shorizon.

Keeping thisambiguity inmindasapointofdeparture,letusconsider DeLillo’s ownwordsoncemore: InTheNames, I spenta lotoftimesearching forthekindofsun-cutprecisionI foundinGreeklightandintheGreeklandscape. Iwanteda prose whichwouldhavetheclarityandtheaccuracy whichthenaturalenvironmentatitsbestinthatpartoftheworldseemstoinspireinourownsenses. Imean,therewereperiodsinGreecewhen I tastedandsawandheard withmuchmoresharpnessandclaritythanI'd everdonebeforeor since. AndI wantedtodiscovera sentence,a wayofwritingsentencesthat wouldbetheprosecounterpart tothatclarity—that sensuousclarityofthe

Aegeanexperience.®

Surely, onedoesnoteasilytakean author’swordsabouthimselffor granted,whichishardlytosaythata critic’swordsaboutanauthorare

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byruleanymoretrustworthy. Yetinreadingthisconfession, onecannot helpbeingstruckbyaratherfolkloric representation oftheGreeklandscape,akin,letus say,tothemannerofOdysseus Elytisinoneofhis ownslantedreferences totheAegean qualityofhisverse,orevenmore so, to a critic of Elytisenamored,if not necessarilywith the poet, then

surelywiththewordsthatconstructthepoet.Nonetheless, whenwe traversethisterrainofsuspicion andlookatthepassageagain,wemay bestruckby thesamecoupdefoudrethatstrikesDeLillo: “thesun-cut precision.” Indeed,fora Greekreadingthispassage,theexperience is evenmorearresting. Precision isn’tquitewhata Greekwouldusually associatewithabsorbingfromthesun,yetthefeelingonegetsfrom DeLillo’s sketching ofthisspacetantalizes becauseitsucceeds atevokingsomething mysteriously, intangibly familiar. Havingascertained thattheseremarksarenotinfacttheremarksof ofhisdistinctnaaGreekpraisinghisculturalgeniusorthefortitude ture,thelikelyresponseto suchperplexedreceptionisto invokethe memoryofthenextbestfigureto theproudHellene:thePhilhellene. thelyricturmoilofa Byronora Hélderlin, theraptureofa Suddenly, Shelleyora Humboldt, comespouringoutoftheculturalmemorycells withallof its implications: punitivedamages.From Philhellenism’s gazeto the antiquarianchastityin the necrophilic Chateaubriand’s touristinvatothelatter-day andarcheological laboratory philological sion, it has always been a matter of a sun-drenched,clear-cut,postcard

Greece. So,what istheretosayaboutonemoresuchreiterationthat underthatreclinesthe notoriousclarityoftheHellenicculturallandscape, WhatdosuchreognizesGreeceasthesourceofsensuousaccuracy? thebenefimarksrevealanewabouttheeyesurveyingthelandscape, ciary(and indeedthe privilegedobject)of this solarsurgeryof the psyche?Andhowmightthisfigureintheeyesof thosepopulatingthe elandgeographical thosepurveyorsofa specifichistorical landscape, to thesurthemselves ementwhoseemto—dareI sayit?—abandon Theangameofmutualseduction? veyinggazeinwhatisa dangerous trailsthatmake swersto suchquestionsmustretracethemultivalent toldus at the and,as DeLillo thehistoryoftheregionso “confusing” outset, can only reside in fiction.

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fortheuncannyexactitudewithwhichit TheNamesis remarkable withthecomcapitalism thedesignsofmultinational weavestogether theinanitiesoftourismwiththegenuine pulsivedesireofarcheology; thewritingofficculturalmalaise; toshakeloosetheAmerican longing command tioninaworldthathasturnedthewordintoa technological forceinvokedbyanancientcallingfortheprimacy withthemurderous questforone’sidentity ofthepropername;theabyssalandtraumatic of contemporary marriedlife.Butwhat withtheresignedloneliness foraGreekreaderisitscapacmakesthisnovelevenmoreremarkable urbanrecontemporary Greekreality(andparticularly itytoactualize inaccountsofGreek ality)inawaythat,to mymind,isunprecedented lifeby expatriated culturalobservers, artistsor otherwise. Toread DeLillo’s descriptions oftheGreekwayofdoingthingsistorealizeinDurell. stantlytheartisticpovertyofaHenryMillerora Lawrence Ontheotherhand,thissortofcomparison isnotappropriate, forit confines DeLillo tothequartersofthosetwentieth-century “loversof Greece”whose aesthetics,unwittingin their dilettantishor adventurist

pleasures, wereservingtheimperialist apparatus.It isn’tappropriate because,forone,DeLilloisa novelistofinternationalmagnitudeas yet incalculablein itsultimateramifications,a writerwiththekeenestfocus

onthepredicament ofthepresent.Nonetheless, shouldhein thiscase belocated(andthatisa question)inthecontextofWesternculture’s psychicinvestment in theEasternMediterranean world,thenhecannot butinherittheweightofthevastOrientalist andPhilhellenist legacyin

theregion. Whenthenovel’sprotagonist, JohnAxton,a riskanalystworkingin Greece forthebenefitofmultinational banking(afirmsellingpolitical riskinsurance), opensthenarrativebyconfessing hehasbeendissuadinghimselffromvisitingtheAcropolis whilelivinginAthens,DeLillo’s fictiontakeson preciselythatweight:“Theweightand momentof thoseworkedstonespromised tomakethebusinessof seeingthema complicated one,”Axtonannounces.° Toseetheworkedstonesmeans preciselyto crossthechasmbetweenculturalfantasyand realityand lookatcivilization’s phantomsfaceto face.Freudspokesuccinctly of theexperience ofthisnearlyimpossible passage,anexperience heiden-

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tifiedasderealization. Forhim,likemyriadothers,climbing theAcropolishillwasandisa ritualdictatedbyanultimately incomprehensible pulsion,an archaic(meaningalso an archic—originary, compelled) senseofsecurityin civilization. Therealization ofsucha drivecanbe quitemonstrous. FreudhadlikenedtheshockofseeingtheAcropolis in realityto the shockofseeingthe perfectlyunrealLochNessmonster. JohnAxton,riskanalyst,knowstheriskofthisencounter quitewell:“It looms.It’ssopowerfulthere.It almostforcesus to ignoreit.Oratleast to resistit” (TN,5).

Surely,the terrifyingpowerthattheAcropolis exertsbeneaththe ritualofconfirming customary thefactthatitexistsisrarelyperceptible assuch.HavingbeenburdenedsolongwiththetaskofbeingWestern constitutiveobjectof fantasy,the Acropolisdoes not Civilization’s speak.It operatesby meansof silentcoercion,exemplified in the tourist’scompulsive efforttomeetit facetofacewithoutquiteunderstandingthenatureofhisgesture—the coercion recognized byAxton (theantitourist)asthesourceofhisequallyincomprehensible denial: “Whatambiguitythereisin exaltedthings.Wedespisethem alittle”

3). (TN, Axton’spsychicuniverseisconstitutedaroundtheprofoundly estrangedobserverpositionthathisworkdemands.Inhisfieldofvision, casting qualities, objectsandgesturestakeondistinctanddisembodied agentsoflife,peras thecoordinating themselvesin the foreground fectlyanimate.Familiarculturalsignpostsfade.Suddenly,to be in Onesenses Hellenic. Greecehasnothingtodowithwhatisexpectably ofeverything around.Culturetakesplaceinthefluxsustheanimation ofcutthe inordinate exchange tainedby thebarrageofconversation, up phrases,exclamations,and incidentalsounds, all orchestratedby an

arrayofgestures: Peopleeverywhereare absorbedin conversation. . . Conversationislife,

isthedeepestthing.Weseethepatternsrepeat,thegestures language It drivethewords.Itisthesoundandpictureofhumanscommunicating. isasharednarrative, ofitself.... Everyconversation istalkasadefinition the a thingthatsurgesforward,toodensetoallowspacefortheunspoken, drawnincompletely. theparticipants sterile.Thetalkisunconditional,

(TN,52)

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that, JohnAxton,riskanalyst,realizesinstinctively Inthiswhirlwind, investto multinational fromthepointofviewofgrantinginsurance but also cultural),Greeceis high-riskterritory.Hence ment (economic

undercurrent of the (derealizing) tothedefamiliarizing hissensitivity This signposts. to/ denialofits projected cultureand hisresistance conditionaccountsforAxton’stwofoldconsciousness:on the one hand,

oftheculturesurveyed insightintowhichelements hisextraordinary gazeand,ontheother(inaconslipthroughthenetofthesurveying simultaneity thatdoesnotabolisheitherterm),hisabsolute tradictory inherentinthesortofworkthatbringshim blocking ofthesignificance to Greecein the first place,thenetworkofpower that feeds on cultural

discoversthathis surveillance. Axtonisbaffledwhenhe eventually firmisan informant frontfortheCIA.Breaking downtherulesofthe surveying gazedoesnotmeanbreakingdowntheidentity(alwaysautonomously alien)ofthesurveying subject. ButAxton’s irresolute culturaldisplacement makescertainhisfailureasa CIAinformant(emblematicof thegeneralfailureoftheCIAto everreallyunderstand whatgoesoninthatpartoftheworld—the narrativetakesplaceinthe wakeoftheIranhostagecrisis).Atthesametime,however,hispersonalalienatedconditionascosmopolitan observer, asprivatecitizenof theworld,ensureshisdecoding ofboththepsychological shardsof contemporary cultureaswellasthepsychotic patternsofa murderous cult. Paradoxically—or perhapsnot—thealertnessandsensitivity generatedby Axton’sdisplacement breaksopenthe culturalmysteryof Greeceandthusopensup the longtextoftheWest’spsychicinvestmentin the region(Philhellenism,Orientalism,etc.)so that the West's

owninscriptions onthesocial-cultural landscape canberead.Thisruns counterto—indeed replaces—archeology’s incessantneedto extract the tracesof Greece’sancestry,to excavate(or exhume)the buried in-

scriptions ofthepast.Thenovelmakesthisclashcentraltoitsperspective.Axton’s resistance to“seeingthestones”iscountered byarcheology’seagerness notmerelytoseethembuttoreadthem.Theuntenabilityof this latterdesirein a modernGreekworld,where a barrageof

fragmented orunfinished discourses reigns,whereinscriptions cannot

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bereadinanyfinalsense,is exemplified bythenovel'sotherprotagonist,OwenBrademas, thebrilliant epigraphologist fromKansaswhois theclosestpresencetothenovel’straumatic coreandwhois brought intothepicturehavingalreadyabandoned theaimsofhisvocation and takenup thetrailofa murderous nomadiccult. Brademas’s professional demiseas an archeologist iscertainlynot theoutcome ofhisstumbling upontheexistence ofthecult.Onthecontrary,hisfascination withthecultisa symptom ofhisrecognition that thephilological ambitionto decipher ancientculturesisa kindofselfreferential fantasy. Ifbeinganepigraphologist initiallymeansengaging in “aformofconversation withancientpeople”(TN,35),it soonbecomesa self-referential practice, agameofsolvingriddlesfortheirown sake,or,evenmore,a submission totheorderofthephilological object itself:thestudyoflanguage, pureandsimple,detached fromcultural thegeography oflanguage” (which lananactof“tracing conversation, guage?)ina fashionthatrendersthenotionofgeography meaningless, unsignifiable. ThereasonfortheshiftisthatsoonenoughBrademas discovers that thestonesdon’tspeakthewordsofthegrandschemeofCulture;they don’trelateanysortoftranscendent truths,insightsintothegeography of thehumanspirit.Thestonesspeakonlysoas to accountforthe so that worldly factsof life,in order to make life quantifiable,countable,

sothatsocietycanbemade understood, itsmeaningcanbe contained, toitselfandtohistory: accountable Whatthe stonessay,afterall,is routinestuff.Inventories,land salecon-

somanycows,somany tracts,grainpayments,recordsofcommodities, sheep.I’mnotanexpertontheoriginofwritingbutitseemstobethecase Palaceacbya desireto keepaccounts. thatthefirstwritingwasmotivated (TN,35) Bookkeeping. counts,templeaccounts.

to discoverthatthe Considerwhatit meansforan expertphilologist thesettlingofaccounts. writingsofancientpeoplesinvolveessentially thetranscenandreconstruct trainedtodecipher a philologist Howdoes the surface—from dentworkofculturefromthestone’smuteinanimate thathasoutgrown arrangement inanalphabetic ofmeaning suspension withthefactthattheoriginsof writingpertaintoa culits use—deal

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of betweenthepresuppositions Theconfrontation ture’sbookkeeping? objectisdramatic. ofthescientific andtheinsubordination expertise Andsoweseea manwhospendshiswaningyearstracinga wild Ofcourse,ancient patterninpursuitoftheself-referential. geographical essence; inscriptions aretiedtoplacesonthemap.Thisistheirindelible or self-referential theircontent,theirovertsignification, it supercedes in place-hunting. arecovertoperators not.Theirmoderninterpreters theyareexcivilisatrice, vanguardarmyofla mission Likecolonialism’s pertsin mapping,in de-scribingterritory.Thegreatheroicsin nineingeneral) recountgeographiteenth-century archeology (orphilology Eventhe maverick calfeats,whetherin realdirtor in the laboratory. thisattitudeinhisadmiration forthe Brademas unconsciously invokes extremes classical archeology wenttoinordertoexhaustitsobjectof inquiry:“astoryofhowfarmenwillgotosatisfya pattern,orfinda pattern,or fit togetherthe elementsof a pattern”(TN,80).He too em-

bracesa foundational unconscious formalism whichneverbecomes awarethatthepatternistheresultofa desire“tosubdueandtocodify”,thatarcheology inthenineteenth centuryis“apoliticalallegory” for imperialism(TN,80).Thus,Brademas’splacein the novelisn’tas eccentric asitmightinitiallyseem.Everyone isimplicated inanantagonismwhoseinnernecessityisa matterofgeography. Imperialism is stilla geography lesson:“It’sveryinteresting howAmericans learngeographyandworldhistoryastheirinterestsaredamagedin onecountryafteranother”(TN,58).” Awide-ranging geographical mutabilityisinterwoven in theexclusivesenseof modernitythat“Westernculture”fostersand protects. Brademas’s archeological obsession hasitsgeographical parallelinAxton’sinformation gatheringformultinational capitalistpolitics,which is whythe twocharacters convergein theircompulsive attractionto thecult.Theyarepluggedintothesametrajectory, bothactingascontemporary surveyors oftheancientroutesofculture,theterritorythat hasbeencircumscribed as Indo-European culture.Axton’sworkinvolvesdeciphering theculturalinscriptions of the present.Butthis workalsoproducesthetracesoftoday’sbookkeeping. Itleavesbehind atrailofcodedinscriptions, complex accounts ofaneconomic andcul-

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turalwarwhosepoliticsis inevitably geographical. Theseinscriptions burning at the heart of telex machineshave their own instant epigraphologists to match,whichis to saythat present-day culture leavesnothingtofutureinterpreters. Today’saccounting isitselfsubjectedto the geographical mutability it serves.Perhapsits aimis to leavenothinginitswake(atleast,thiswouldbetheidealCIAmodeof operation). Orrather,it signifies a formofculturethataspirestorender itselfanditsterritoryunaccountable, liketheoccasional travelerwho doesn’teventakepictures.Themyriadagentsof capitalist politicsin theregionconducttheirlivesandbusinessliketourists.Axtonhasno troubleadmittingthisforhimself:“I beganto thinkof myselfas a perennialtourist.Therewassomethingagreeableaboutthis.Tobea tourististoescapeaccountability. Errorsandfailingsdon’tclingto you thewaytheydoathome.You'reabletodriftacrosscontinents andlanguagessuspendingthe operationof sound thought.Tourismis the marchofstupidity”(TN,43). Afutureepigraphologist wouldfindithardtodistinguish between thetracesofstupidityandintelligence. Notmerelybecausethemass cultivation ofstupidityhasproventobeoneofcapitalism’s mostintelligentweapons,butalsobecausetheintelligence ofa culturesetondevouringtheterritoryoftheother(including theterritoryofitsrecorded brutalaboutit,a methodofunacpast)hassomething incomparably countableobliteration,crudeemptiness.Onemightconsiderthat bein ancientepigraphy beginstoseektheself-referential Brademas by an increasingly self-referenis determined causehisownexistence inthelatetwentiethcentialworld.It isasifthecostofglobalization adeeperanddeeperself-enclosure turyisa kindofculturalimploding, that must seek its historicalalibi in the elemental,the originaldissocia-

to alphabet.Thelatetionwithinlanguagethatledfromhieroglyph whowantstogobeyondculturalacepigraphologist twentieth-century countingtothe puresttracesofanarchaiclanguageisultimatelyunconcernedwith any otherculturethan his own. In an admittedly the exemplifies he isnodoubta rebel—Brademas seductiveway—for bankruptideologyof classicalarcheologyin the EasternMeditermightdicranean.Nomatterwhattheforceofloyaltytothediscipline

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ofpresentlifeovershadow andelusiveinscriptions tate,theexcessive inparticarcheology ofthegloriouspast.Classical thesilentsignposts asan apofa deadlanguagerevealed ularfalterswhentheexhumation takesplacein a worldwhere paratusfora kindofarchaicaccounting of a celebration thelivinglanguagereignsas a guiltlessend-in-itself, hehasn’tal“AGreekwillneversayanything repetition: unaccounted theunaccounttimes”(TN,4).Thisdiscrepancy, readysaidathousand abilitythatliesbetweenthelanguageofthepastandthe languageof withnaming. thepresent,holdsthekeytothenovel’sobsession wordandthing,there Behindthedesiretoname,tocoupletogether In a world is a secretdesiretoembracetheorderoftheparticular. whose archéis the interruptionof the Babelproject,such desirewould

bea response totheaporiageneratedbeforethegazeoftheuniversal whicharrivesasakindofnamelessaggregate ofmanynames,neverreducibleto anyoneexceptitsown.Thereis a categorical multiplicity hiddenineveryexpression oftheuniversal,a necessaryappropriation andtamingofthefearfulenergyoftheuntotalized particular. Thedesiretopermeatethemany-thingness oftheworld,theelusiveboundariesofthepost-Babelian word,propelsandholdsintacttheuniversal. Andyetwhatsustains theregimeofthepropername,whatjustifies the actofnaminginthelastinstance(atleastinwhatistermedtheWestern tradition), isthemostabsolute ofuniversal signs,themonadic orderitself,the lastinstanceof the Name(whichis, of course,unnameable):

God. Thisparadoxical condition accounts forthedoubledemandposed bythepropername,thesimultaneous necessity ofreadability andunreadability, translatability anduntranslatability, purereference andsubstantive essence.In his repeatedmeditationson this condition,Jacques

Derridahasinsistedonthedouble-bind ofGodhimself,thedoublebindofthemonadic institution.* According toDerrida, theTowerofBabelmythis resolved byanimpossible command, agiftwhichisalsoan injunction. Ina warofpropernames,Godinterruptstheworkofthe tribethatstillholdsintactthepowerto name(thetraditionalHebrew nameof thetribe,Shem,means“name”)by forcinguponit his own name, which is Babeland which means“confusion”:the one name for

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allnamesthatcanneverbereproduced. Godinterrupts theworkonthe Towerbytheforceofhisname,whichplungesallworkintoconfusion. Thoughitisbeyondallparticulars, ittraverseseachandeveryparticular;thoughit mustbe noone’sname,it is the nameof the One.Suddenly,theworkisboundtoa newobject:intheconfusion oftongues, theworkbecomes theworkoftranslation. Derrida identifies thearché of thisnewlaborasGod’sowndouble-bind producedby aninaccessible gift:theuntranslatable namepresentedwiththeorderthatitbetranslated—an orderproducedoutofaneworderofthings,aneworderbetweenwordsand things.Thisisanarchicdivisionwithintheproper name:“itdividesGodhimself.... Godhimselfisin thedoublebind, Godas the deconstructor ofthe Towerof Babel.Heinterruptsa coninhisname:he interrupts struction. . . He interruptsthe construction inordertoimposehisname.” himself Thereis a doubleedgeto this condition to whosecontradictory essenceweshalllaterreturn:theBabelian isbothmyth performance and deconstruction. Forthemoment,letusconsiderthisperformance astheoriginofadesirethathasscattered itstracesalloverhistory,adiasporicdesirethathasplungedhistoryintoconfusion—after all,Babel isalsothemythicalarché, thegoverning principle, ofdiaspora.Iffiction boththe is to rescuethis scatteredhistory,it is becauseit (re)enacts mythandthedeconstruction. in of globalized estrangement infuseshischaracterization DeLillo logicofthe TheNames with a fanaticfigurethatextendstheantinomic (frombothends:toname,tobenamed)toitsutBabelian performance terTheworldofinvestment bankersandriskanalysts, mostviolence. and modernAthenians,is roristsand tourists,foreignarcheologists cult.This logicof a murderous bytheBabelian suddenlypermeated Greece ofsmallcellsstrewnthroughout cultconsistsina loosestructure andtheMiddleEastanddrivenbyadesireto mergewiththemostelementalterrainofculture.Whatbindsthemtogetherisa fanaticinterest orientation. hencetheirgeographical inancientalphabets, theydrift—according moreaccurately, travel—or, Thecultmembers patternthatretracesthetrajectory mappedcircuitous toaninstinctively culture.Theyhoveraroundthe ofthe firstinstancesofpost-Babelian

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by the patternsoftheinitialdispersal,asif magnetized geographical Thisis the loopsofmatterthatfollowthefirstexplosion. gravitational oftheoriginalactofculture:carving dispersal, themultiple(re)staging, outoftheblankmatterofnaturethefirstsignofsymbolicrepresentabrokenelements tonature’shenceforth andattributing tion(writing) is abletogetclose OwenBrademas thefirstsignofidentity(naming). inthecontemimmersed tothecultbecausethecultistsarethemselves Whentheyaddress andtheyvaluehisknowledge. plationoflanguage himwiththequestion“Howmanylanguagesdoyouspeak?”theyare certain, himtheirpassword, merelyissuingtheircallingcard,offering ofcourse,thathewillrespond: Theywantedtohearaboutancientalphabets.Wediscussedtheevolution Aleph, ofletters.TheprayingmanshapeoftheSinai.Theoxpictograph. alpha.Fromnature,yousee.Theox,thehouse,thecamel,thepalmof

hand,thewater,thefish.Fromtheexternal world.Whatmensaw,thesimplestthings.Everyday objects, animals, partsofthebody.It’sinteresting to me,howthesemarks,thesesignsthatappearsopureandabstracttous, beganasobjectsintheworld,livingthingsinmanycases.(TN,116)

Brademas recognizes thatepigraphology runsintoadeadendasasimpledeviceofmappingancientcultures.Riskingthedangeroffetishizingtheobject, hebecomes areadernotofthecontentofinscriptions but of the actual existenceof inscriptions as the content of human toil, the

workofculturein itsmostelemental sense.Heonlywantsto knowlanguagesinordertogetevenclosertothematerial energyofthehuman traceonthestone.Andofcourse,themorelanguagesone knowsthe moreinclusiveand moreproximate istheencounter. Itseemsto bethe workofcivilization inreverse,a sortof timetravel,tothepointwhere ancientinscriptions assumepresenceand neednotbedeciphered.To knowmanylanguages maybeadesiretoreverseBabelfromtheinside, toresumeworkontheToweragainstthename.Thecultistsrecognize in Brademasa kindredsoul,at leasttoa certainextent.SaysAndahl,the

apostate member (whoisinthisrespectevenclosertoBrademas, thealmostmember,the fellowtraveler):“Aman whoknowslanguages.A

calmman,veryhumane.Hehasa wideandtolerantunderstanding, a capacityforcivilizedthought.Heis nothurried,heisnotgraspingfor satisfactions. Thisiswhatitmeanstoknowlanguages” (TN,207).

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Ina Babelian universe, to knowlanguages—to knowmorethanone language—means simultaneously tobefurtherimmersed inthework oftranslation andtobe increasingly freeoftranslation. Thespace-time dimensionofthissimultaneity makesits paradoxmorecomprehensible.Translation is metaphorically linkedtothecrossingofboundaries, the traversingof places,geographical movement(translatio literally meanstocrosslands).Inthissense,toknowlanguages meanstotravel, as much as it alsomeans, with equal force,to have a sense of place (in

eachplace,in manyplaces).Temporally, it meansto haveaccessto manytimeframes,to workagainsttime’slinearconstruction, against thedistancebetweenpastandpresent.Butit alsomeans,bythesame token,to havean amplesenseoftime,to belongto time.Brademas, whois sketchedas anagingbut timelessfigure,reciprocates Andahl’s whenherecognizes characterization thecult’senormouspatience,its endlessstalkingoftimeandplace,itsfinaldenialofthedynamics of Axtonalsoreachesthesameconclusions by simpleobserspace-time. vationwhenherunsacross a cellofthecultata remotevillagecaféin Mani:“Theylookedlikepeoplewhocamefromnowhere. They'descapedalltheusualassociations . .. Theywerein nohurryto findanotherplacetosit,anotherplacetolive.Theywerepeoplewhofoundalmostanyplaceasgoodas almostanyother.Theydidn’tmakedistinctions”(TN,190).

at theveryleast,theyasBut,ofcourse,theydo makedistinctions; isbasedonabsolute distinction. piretoanactwhosearbitraryviolence to(re)enact thesubthatitis possible Thecultsurvivesontheobsession limeviolenceinherentin theoriginaryinstancesofwritingandnamunwholebyculture’s ing—theshatteringofnature’sundifferentiated bounded abstractrepresentation(what in anothercontextwe couldcall

liveit throughaspurecontemhumanity’s entranceintohistory)—to Thisoriginaryviolenceholdsover theman enporaryexperience. chantingallure,andtheysetouttomergewithitbypursuinga series ofarbitrarymurders:stakingout a remoteterritoryand pouncingon passerbywhoseinitialsmatchtheinitialsoftheplace. theunfortunate suggesandhasnootherimplicitor encrypted Thelogicisinexorable goesnowhere,justhappens,all tion.An eventformsout of nowhere, (TN,169,208). simplybecause“thelettersmatched”

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maybelongtothe co-incidence”"” Sucha methodof“orthographic realm of psychosisinsofar as it motivatesan act of senselessmurder,

withinthedominant butfromanotherpointofviewit is predictable culturallogicoftheWestthathasmarkedthehistoryoftheregion.The cultinsistsoncarryingoutits arbitrarykillingsusingthemostprimitive instruments:hammers,chisels,sharp stones—thearchaic(archic)

thecultmembersbeof writing.Likegoodphilologists, instruments versedinthemediaoftheculturetheyseektoundercomeperfectly stand;theyappropriateitsmethods,its attitudesandvisions,its language.Theybeginto measureeachact,eachthought,by its correphilological anatomy. Inthistheymerelyfollowthestepsof sponding philologist ofthenineteenth ErnestRenan,arguablythequintessential

century, whoidentified theworkofphilology as a “vivisection ..., treat[ing]thelivingasweordinarilytreatthedead.”"Butwitha crucial

exception: theculttakesitsactoutofthelaboratory andintotheworld, anditdoessoexplicitly, takingthemattertoitsepistemological limit.It choosestoperformthisvivisection inactualterms,demonstrating that the epistemic or theculturalbodyis indeedmadeout of fleshand

blood.Theexperience hasa sortofcatalytic terror,ahysterical frenzy, precisely becausethemurderer’s brutalcontactwiththefleshconfirms theabsolutefinalityofhisownexistence, butalsobecauseinanother sense the flesh remains irreversiblyalien, nonresistant,noncomplicit:

“Wehitharderbecausewecouldnotstandthesoundofthehammers onherfaceandhead.HowEmmerich usedthecleftendofthehammerhead.Anythingtochangethesound.. . .Orhowlittleblood,notat all what we expected, the blood. We looked at each other, amazed at

thispaucityofblood.Itmadeus feelwehadmisseda stepalongthe way”(TN,211).

AsBrademas recognizes fromtheoutset,thepsychological condition ofthecultis a denialoftheirhumanityby totalsubmission to themost elemental, desexualized, dehumanized flesh,fleshasorganicdirt:“Dirt was their medium”(TN, 29)or “Theywere involvedin the most painstaking denial . . .intentonritualizing a denialofourelemental nature.Toeat,to expelwaste,to sensethings,to survive. . . to satisfy whatisanimalinus,tobeorganic,meat-eating, allblood-sense anddi-

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gestion”(TN,175).Theresultis a collective autism,a totallyself-encloseduniverse whoseinvented meaning appearsasperfectnatureand whoseteleological commitment is absoluteandbeyondjustification: “Themurderhasbecomepartofthe dreampoolof his self-analysis. Thevictimandtheact aretheorynow.Theyformthe philosophical basehereliesonforhissenseofself.Theyarewhatheusestolive” (IN,291).Fromthepointofviewofsociety, thiscondition exemplifies thedissociation ofthoughtfromtheworld—despite thecult’sstrictadherence(almostcollapse)betweenobjectand word—andtherefore demonstrates adeeppsychosis. Ofcourse,allcultsmakesuchbehavior necessary: thepsychotic clarityofaunifiedvision,untouched bytheinconsistencies ofeveryday life,unburdened bythedemands oftheother. Butherethedissociation is soprofoundthatno apparenttradition, as cults go, can even contain their behavior as reference.This cult has

nothingtodowithrepeating oremulating ancientrituals,whichiswhy thediscourse ofhumansacrifice, asitpertainstoancientculturesinthe to Minoantimes,is altogetherirrelevant.The regionfromBabyloni-1 contemporary discourse ofarbitrarymurders(serialkillers,massshootings,Manson-type rituals)iscloserinsignificance butstillnota matter ofdirectemulation, ofexporting. Theaffinity isdeeperandIwillreturn tounderstandthatthecultural to it shortly.Fornow,it is important firingfrom for theritualofmurderin America—“men groundwork to theearth”—and its atticrooms,unconnected highwayoverpasses, sigisalienhere.“Thereisa different variouspathological obsessions the Webarelyconsider naturehere,a deeperandausterecalculation. victimsexceptas elementsin the pattern”(TN,171).”Liketourists thecultpassesthrough passingthroughanalienterritoryuntouched, clingstotheact. theterrainofmurderwithanemptypsyche:“Nothing Nohoveringstuff.It’sabluntrecitalofthefacts”(TN,302). of excludesanycontemplation Theideologyofthecult’sviolence what is human. The kill is just initials,letters of the alphabet.Whatever

humanelementregisters,if at all,doessoat theultimatemomentof helpless ofviolating duringtheactualexperience violence, murderous whichnecessarily flesh.Onlysuchradicalself-denial, andunresisting themto theirowndeath connects in thedenialofwhatever culminates

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(witnessthefinalstageofsomemembersdyingoutofsimpleindifferoff),couldproducesuch encetolife,outofsimplyturningthemselves “Thefinaldenialofourbasereviolence emptyofhumansignification. ality,in this schematic,is to produce a death. .. . A needlessdeath. A

(TN,175).Inthisrespect,theinbymachine-intellect” deathbysystem, recedesbefore thecult’scohesion madnessthatunderlines disputable the madnessof its method,its strict structuralistmadness:“Madness

Wemightsay Wemightsaymadnessisallstructure. hasa structure. structureis inherentin madness.Thereis not the onewithoutthe other”(TN,210). with meansabsolutesynchronization Aswithanycult,membership Inallcases,a unique thesharedimaginary andtheritualsit demands. idiomdevelops, a privatelanguagethatultimately reachesbeyondits

beyondevenitsculturalmakeup,tosomething evidentsignification, vertical andpractically telepathic, aself-referential symbolism. Buthere isthemostextreme case.Language itselfisdissolved toitssmallestmaterialparticles:lettersthemselves, emancipated fromcommunicative function,separated,fixedinsequence. Self-referential symbolism undoesanysortofrecognizable symbolic orderinthesensethatlanguage functionswithoutrepresentation.These“zealotsof the alphabet”(TN,

75)operate,by theirownadmission, at a preverballevel.Theyseek recognitionat an unconsciouslevel,an unconsciousmethod, intuitive

knowledge. Preverbal isinthissense“prelinguistic” insofaras whateverissharedexistsina spacebeyondorbeforelanguage assuch;althoughwordsareused,theyare deemedworthlessbeyondthearbitrarylettersthatsignifytheirsound." Theoralityassociated withsoundwouldbedisturbingto themindsetofthecult.Witness thehysterical response tothesoundofbeating fleshtoa pulp.Thecult’slogicoriginates inwritingandspecifically in nonrepresentational writing.Whatobsessesthemis thestrangeleap fromthecommunicative desireto representtheelementsofnatureto theinventionof arbitrarysignsthat condenserepresentation to the pointofobliteration (fromtheoxpictograph toalephtoalpha),where communication becomessolelya matterofsocialconvention. Thecult’s furtherobsession witha multiplicity oflanguages, particularly ancient

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“dead”languages, isowedlesstoakindoflinguistic fetishism thana desireto delvefurtherintothealphabetic arbitrariness thatcutsacross linguistic convention betweendifferentsocieties andcultures. AsAndahlputsit, “Weare hereto carryoutthe pattern...Abecedarian. Learnersof thealphabet.Beginners” (TN,210).Althoughthepattern refersto the alphabeticcoincidenceof the finalact, the confessionre-

vealsittostandforthedesiretoreturntothearché ofBabel, theviolence ofthefirstinterruption bythename.Theviolentnatureofthefinalact reciprocates theviolenceofthebeginning. Thecultaspirestolivethis violentbeginning ona dailybasis,driftingaroundbetweenarbitrary alphabeticspaces,betweeninitialsin differentlanguages. Livingthis absurdheterochronicity iswhatturnsthearchaicintothearchic. The performance thatbringseachoccupation ofaplacetoanend,thedeath thatdemonstrates thelifeofthepattern,isthejustification forthecategorically determinant beginning: thealphaandtheomega. Suchperformance drawsitsenergyfromtheoriginaryactofsocial institutioninherentintheadventofwriting,theviolentobliteration of natureby cultureuponwhichthe constitution of humansocietyis based. Butwe are no longerin such astate; at least,what we recognize

onunderstanding cultureasa technolasourmodernity ispredicated ogyoftamingviolence. Civilization hasimposeditsrulebyrelegating thearchicviolenceofwritingto the realmof collective(cultural)subli-

its universalmation,in theprocessholdingintact(evenifrepressed) Thefactthatthecultiscaughtinthishetpropensity. ist/monotheistic accountsbothforitsabsurdity(e.g.,conducterochronous dislocation and itspsychotic in Sanskritor Aramaic) ingdailycommunication alsomakes performance relationto theworld.Yetthecult’smurderous culture. ofcontemporary evident(as forensicproof)thefoundations monstrousexperienceis inherentin the Somethingof civilization’s as turningritualinsidecult’sproject,albeitdressedup and projected outandsinkingfurtherintothesphereofthearchaicandtheelemental. it wouldappearinthe Werewe tostripthecultof thisself-projection, whetherin theterroristlogicoflatecapitalism, lightthatdistinguishes groupswithmyriadse(guerrilla urbanwarfare theformofclandestine withitsmultipletentaclesrecretcells)ortheCIA’sglobaloperations,

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netinavastcomputer reception stimulus pointsofelectronic sembling work." Thecultlivesand killsby naming.It livesandkillsby translating namesintopuresigns,by denudingthemoftheiracquiredontology mysTheactisbasedona perversely theirarbitrariness. andrestoring representation, oflanguage. Thealphabetiselemental ticalmaterialism so absolutelyelemental,however,as to be itself the element that does

It becomes itselfa name.Inandis not representable. notrepresent evitably,the momentof murderingis a momentof naming.Michalis a MikroKaminiandviceversa.Deathbecomes Kalliabetsos becomes overmattersof itoccupies aplace.Thecultdelegates meansofidentity; lifeand death—this is whatit meansto name.Thus,despiteOwen order.I wouldargue Brademas’s objections, thecultenactsa religious thatitis impossible toconceptualize anycollective condition thatbears imagination. Allcults theremotest tracesofcultlifeoutsidea religious arereligious (evenifexplicitly secular),andallreligionhasatitsbasis, whetherfullyexercised ornot,theelements ofacultcommunity. However,becauseof his profoundambivalencetoward religion,Brademas tries to convincehimselfthat theseare not “god-hauntedpeople,”since

nogodwoulddictateandacceptsuchanactdevoidofritual,devoidof tradition. Ontheotherhand,FrankVolterra, themaverickfilm-maker whoentertainstheabsurdideaoffilmingthecultinaction,characterizes them as “secular monks” who “want to vault into eternity” (TN,

203).Brademas underestimates thesignifying rangeofreligious order; Volterraoveraestheticizes an imaginarythatdisdainsrepresentation. Bothofthemneverquiteconsiderwhatitmeanstoliveup toanobsessionwith a self-referring worldandtheperversedesireto indulgeinits ultimateconsequences.

Thetorturedexplanation ofcultleaderAvtarSinghisperfectly articulateandworthconsidering at length: Theworldhasbecomeself-referring. . .. Thisthinghasseepedintothetextureoftheworld.Theworldforthousands ofyearswasourescape,our refuge.Menhid fromthemselves in theworld.Wehid fromGodordeath. Theworldwaswherewelived,theselfwaswherewewentmadanddied. Butnowtheworldhasmade a selfof itsown.Why,how,nevermind.

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Whathappensto usnowthattheworldhasa self?Howdo wesaythesimplestthingwithoutfallingintoa trap?Wheredowego,howdowelive, whodowebelieve? Thisismyvision,a self-referring world,a worldin whichthereisno escape.(TN,297)"

Tosomeextentallcultsexperience everythingas an interiority. The outerboundarycollapsesanda profoundsolipsism setsin.Objective realityasanexternalsupposition disappears, hencetheradicalinward devotionandimpenetrable separation fromallotherness. Itisperfectly logicalthattheculmination ofsuchconditions isoftenritualized mass suicide.Butherethelogichasbeenturnedinsideout,althoughtheradicalself-reference iskeptintact.Singhpaintsthepictureofa worldthat existsin permanent cultconditions. Butinsteadofhavinglostitsobjectivity,ithasgained a self,anabsolutesubjectivity. Therefore, theworld cannolongerescapefromitself;ithasnospacetoputasideitsobsessionsin orderperhapstoimagineitselfdifferently, toalteritself.The languageoftheworldhasbecomefiniteandpalindromic. Nomore nootherness, noalteration. In words,nonewwords,nonewmeanings, thistotalparanoidcollapseofsignification, Singhandhisfollowers defully,ofmakingconcrete,theimplivisea “program”of externalizing cationsofpureself-reference. Theyturnrealityintoanalphabetic equationbetweenpropernames.Whiletheremaybeactualinscriptions keepingcount,accountwiththe ninety-ninenamesof God—culture ing—the endlessnameofGodisthealphabetitself(TN,92).So,likethe deancientGodwhogavehisendlessnameto a placehe effectively stroyed,the cultbaptizesby killing.LiketheGodwhoseself-given before thecultseekstoinhabittheinsidesoflanguage, namewasBabel, bebeforetranslation fallout, theradioactive itsoutwardproliferation, ofBaThesesurvivors ofitsarbitrariness. resolution camethenecessary thebeginbelgatheragaintoseekthename,theutmostself-referent, ningwhichiscompleteuntoitself.Theyseekthesecretsof thename, thesecretpowerof namingthatcreatedcultureoutoffissuringlanbetweenwordand todoubttheassociation guageandmadeitpossible thing:“Asecretnameis a wayofescapingtheworld.Itisan opening into the self” (TN, 210).But what happens now that the world has a

self?Awayoutofwhere?Openingto where?

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Singh(or Andahlor Emmerich),howeverarticulatein his delirium,

loop,thepsychical articulate hisownself-referential cannotpossibly machinespinningoutofcontrol.Tobeina cultmeanstodothething undoesyou,toactinordertoeraseyourself,tospeak thatconstantly ceasestospeakinyourname.Singhseeksthenameinorder whatever to unnamehimself.Hewantstobewiththenamein orderto forget in hisname.Tobe himself,to forgetthehistorythat resides/speaks yourselftoanassimilation with:alreadythismeanstohavecommitted todouble ofyourbeing,todoubleyourbeingwithanother—indeed theBeyourbeingwiththename,thebeingthatisnolongerbecoming, Name.Heseeksthisnamefromthedarkestdepths ingthathasbecome securityofanonymity, ofhisbeing,forwhatheseeksistheinviolable oflosinghimselfin theterritoryoftheOther.Thegreatseductionof religionresidesinthefactthatthenameofGodguaranmonotheistic teesanonymity. TheChristian desireforthefinalsalvation ofsouls,the Second Coming, erasesthedifference ofnames,erasestheBabelproject oncemore,a secondtime,byabolishing itsmyth. Thecultmemberskillwiththebluntinstruments ofsociety’s first writers;theirvictimsare theiroriginaltexts.'®In other words,they as-

pireprecisely totheinstituting powerofmythicalaction.Butgiventhe cult’shistorical andculturaldislocation inspace-time, thismythologicalaspiration towriteasiftheworldisa tabularasaproducesanempty setof signification.Thecult’sactof writingis alsoan actof erasing;its

orthographic namingisliterallyanobliteration. Drivenbyananxiety to resisttheregimeoftheuniversal(intheirmind,exemplified intoday’s globalculture)bytakingon,likea newAdam,theactofnaming,the cultbecomes victimtoitsownlogic.Tonameis alsoto obliterate. Itis anactthaterasesanobject'shistorically contingent characteristics by inscribing uponita finalidentity.Inthissense,a nomadicinscription returnshead-ontothevoidof themonadic:theNameitself. NocultcanexistbeforetheTowerofBabeliscondemned topermanentruin,beforeit acquiresitsnameat the momentofits death.The Shemtribeembarkedon thisprojectin orderto achievethe permanenceofnamethroughthepermanence of place.“Letus makeourselvesa name,sothatwenotbescattered overthefaceofalltheearth”

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istheBiblical verse.In thisdesireforautonymy liesthedesireforautonomy.Togiveoneselfthename,to nameoneself,istogiveoneselfthe law.Inthisveryfundamental way—and thematterisbynomeansexhaustedthere—the TowerofBabelincidentis humanity’s mostprofoundmythical representation ofheteronomy. Togiveoneselfa name, justasmuchastogiveoneselfthelaw,isstagedhereasthefirstandfinal transgression, the very essenceof transgression. Thisessenceis groundedina paradox.Theoriginary desireforthename(whichisalso thelaw)reveals,bythepunishment itincurs,anarchébeforetheorigin, an unwrittenandunknownname,a lawbeforethelawismade,which turnsthisfoundational desireforautonymy/autonomy intofoundationaltransgression. Thistransgression isfoundational inaliteralsenseandtwofold. Not onlydoesit institutea selectpeopleinsofarasGodhimselfgivesthese peoplehisName(anothername)butin addition,becauseGod’sname is Babel(“confusion”—of tongues,of languages,of names),his responseto thetransgression allothers,allthosewho institutes/names willnotactuallybearhisnamebutwillbeartheeffectofhisnaming.As a mythicalnarrative,the Babelianperformance stagesthe storyof everyone'sbeingtheeffectofa namingthat comesfromelsewhere, from an elsewherename that retainsbylawits mysteriousstatus as an

perthatcannotbenamed.TheBabelincidentisthemythical elsewhere of beingnamedby theOther, formanceof heteronymy/heteronomy, whichistosay,ofbearingthenameoftheOther’slaw. relevanthereisthattheBabelincidentalsosigWhatisparticularly ofworldculsubmission nifiesanactofanothernaming:thetotalizing pointofviewof history.It is a mythof hettureto a monotheistic eronymythatmakesthenameof theOnetheoneandonlyworthy ofmultinameof history.Althoughglobalhistoryissurelycomposed or religions pointsof viewofmanydifferent plepointsof view—the whichis anotherway of saying,theconfusionof evennonreligions, participateinglobalhistory(atleast namesandlawsofworship—to theirmultiplicity requiresthateveryonerecognize sincetheCrusades) imaginary. of namesin the roundmirrorofa prevalentmonotheistic withthe cult’savoweddesireto exit Thisis perfectlycompatible

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fromhistory,ifonlybecauseitsactionsaspiretoa reversalofhumanrelationtolife:“Thisisprecisely act,analphabetic ity’sarchichistorical WetrackstaticletAnalphabet ofutterstillness. ofhistory. theopposite terswhen we read. . . a logicalparadox”(TN,291-92).Yetin order to

it inhistory.Consider theName,youmustobliterate reallyobliterate ofstealingyourenemy’snameinanimistsocieties. heretheimportance ofthecultisacluetowhathappenswhenthisanimistreTheexistence psyche. ofa monotheistic lationtohistoryisinfusedwiththeweapons alwaysbeto society’s infantileregression, regression Itis tantamount takenasa return.Forthecultisbynomeansprimiinga reenactment logic.”The putintopracticethetenetsofcomputer tive.Itsoperations members knowthisandrecognize itwhentheyspeakoftheirmodeof The is themurders)as “theprogram.” existence (whoseculmination cult’smembers aretheagentsofcivilization, havingalwaysbeen,culturally,theobjectives ofCivilization. Theyareallobsessive Westerners, operatingunderthecompulsion ofmastering theculturalorigin,hencetheirparticulargeographical orientation. Inthisrespect, theydonotdepartfromtheimaginary orderof nineteenth-century Orientalists andPhilhellenists whomadeof the Eastern Mediterranean region a canvas of endless inscriptions, the

gravestofwhichwastheconstantrecarvingofnationalborders.Both Orientalism and Philhellenism, as nineteenth-century disciplines hingingontheapparatusofphilology, arepredicatedontheobliteration of culture,onrendering cultureunreadable byplacingitsactuallanguage, philosophically speaking,undererasure. Thecultprovidesa uniqueoccasion forphilological practice,a differentsortofreading/erasing, as it involves theparadoxical condition ofanarcheological epigraphy ofculture’s shiftingpresent.WhenOwen Brademas abandons thereadingofstones,hedoesnotin factabandon thepursuitofepigraphic history. Hisshadowing ofthemysterious cult throughitsvariousincarnations intheexpansebetween Greece, theJordanian desert, and Indiainvolvesthe attempt to decipher thisother sort

ofinscription—a nomadicinscription thatcutsacrosshistories andcultures,henceisevershiftinginspaceandtime,heterochronous and heterotopic.Readingsuchaninscription meanstraversing thespace-time

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ofits fantasy,whichmoreorlessmeanssubscribing to thesignifying demandsofitsproject. ThatBrademas ultimately becomes, forallpracticalpurposes, a memberofthecult—or, atleast,complicit initsmurderousactionsby virtue of deciphering their innermostsignifying frameand yet remaining a passiveobserver—is perfectly consistent withhistrainingas anepigraphologist, a manversedinthedenuding ofnames.Intellectual (theoretical) curiosityis satisfiedat thepriceof complicity inthepractice. Yet,though“gravitationally boundto thecult”(TN,286),Brademas doesnotentirelycollapseintoitsmassdensity.Heachievestheclosest possible orbitatadistancedecided bya mutualresistance towardbeing named.Thecult’snamecontinuestoeludehim,ashesays,because he servesthepurposeofthecult’sfirstandfinalrealinterlocutor, “observer andtacitcritic,”anindication ofthecult’sdemise(TN,299).Byrefusing to revealitsname,the cultrefusestobe named,refusesto relinquishits

ButOwenBrademas byanact obsessive self-enclosure. himself responds ofuncannymirroring. WhenEmmerich askshimpointblanktoreveal his identity,Owen answers“Noone” (TN,292).Owen No one.Acu-

rioussonoricmatching, a skewedanagramofsound.IsthisOdyssean inscription themagicgestureofdeconstructing thecult’sBabelian violence?Insteadofmatchingtheinitialsfacetoface,Owenmatchesthem oralinthesoundofthesyllables—the ina sonicmirror.Hescrambles beshowthevoidofthename:Noone.Hereaches sidesofthename—to behindthedeathofthesacredscript,touthindthealphabetic stillness, inthename. inscribed tertheerasureofthename,whichissubliminally ofalostself.AtthisfiThecostofthisnegative namingistherealization he is irretrievably nalproximitytotheworldofthecult,Owenrealizes of theplains hystericevangelism tornfromthecoreofhispsyche—the thathispursuitof thoughhealsorealizes in Kansas—even community the cult was fueledby the desire to overcomethis lack.In other words,

whatturnsOwen—so Itisprecisely theinternalchasmis unbridgeable. Noone. closertoOne—to obviously The cult, on the other hand, namesitselfaccordingto the strict idiom

ofthe TheNames.Asabsurdreenactment ofits identity:TaOndémata, tribeShem,thecultinvokesitsbeinginitsnamewithlong-obliterated

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it,itsname elsethatcharacterizes Likeeverything outqualifications. in the logic.Thecultcanbearno self-reflection obeysan identitarian itsname ofrevealing whichis whytheonlyoccasion senseofcritique, bythe gestureoftheapostateAndahl,itselfactualized isthedesperate finallythe recognizes eyesofriskanalystAxton.Brademas deciphering natureofthecult’srelationtothecultureit wishestodetautological stroy:“Thekillingsmockus.Theymockourneedtostructureandclassify,tobuilda systemagainsttheterrorin oursouls.Theymakethe systemequaltotheterror.Themeansto contendwithdeathhasbeconcomedeath”(TN,308).ThisiswhyOwen’sOdysseanautonymy sistsnotonlyintherefusaltorevealhisactualnamebutin thedenudingofthecult’smonotheistic propensity, whetheritbetheideological serviceoftheNameorthebinarycomputer logicthattieszerotoone. Thenovel’sobsession withthephilosophical problemofnamingis supportedbytwootherlessexplicitobsessions (central,however,to DeLillo’s workoverall): religionandcontemporary violence.'* Onthe faceofit,thereseemstobea geographical distinction betweenthetwo. UponhisarrivalinIndia,Brademas willrecognize himselfasaChristian, not as a matter of faith but as frameworkof definition.The sug-

gestionis thatin Easternsocietiesreligionbecomesthelanguageof identity,withIndiabeingtheepitomeofmultiplicity in thisrespect,a veritabledocumentation ofthe post-Babelian instance.On the other hand,contemporary violence seemsthesoleprivilegeofAmericans, a characteristic that has becomealmostnatural,like consumerism. DeLillo himself hasbeenquiteexplicit: “Iseecontemporary violence as a kindofsardonicresponsetothe promiseofconsumerfulfillment in America.”Heelaborates in anothercontext:“Theconsequence ofnot havingthepowertoconsume isthatyouenduplivinginthestreets.””° Axtonechoeshimin the novel:“killingin America[is]a formof con-

sumerism.It’sthelogicalextensionofconsumerfantasy.Peopleshootingfromoverpasses, barricaded houses.Pureimage”(TN,115). TheNames ispredicated ontheinternationalization ofthisgeographicaldistinction.Thus,the consequences of mirroringAmericanconsumercultureandtheviolence itentailsareretracedina regiongenerallycharacterizedby a deep-seatedanti-Americanism, while,con-

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versely,religionis revealedasa fundamental obsession oftheWestern secularmind,whetherin the exampleof the repressedevangelical chaosof Brademas’s childhood or thepsychotic ruminations ofa murderouscult.Thischiasmic translation makesit possibleto reachtherealistgroundwork beneaththephilosophical concerns of thenovel.An American authorhassituatedthedemandsofhisfictioninthemythologicalpresentof multinational capital,international politics,andnationalistidiom.If“America is theworld’slivingmyth”andpossesses “a certainmythicalqualitythat terroristsfindattractive”(TN,114), thenits literatureshouldperformat thislevelofmythistorical clarity, theclarityofmythical, notquotidian, violence. Ontheotherhand,societiesthatbearthebruntof suchmythicalviolenceintheirdailylives encountertheAmerican presentat thesamelevel:“TheMideastsocietiesareata particular pitchrightnow.Thereisnodoubtorambiguity. Theyburnwithaclearvision.Theremustbetimeswhen asocietyfeels thepurestvirtueliesinkilling”(TN,115). No needto underlinethewisdomof thislaststatement,northe manytimesitwouldbeapplicable toAmerican societyitself.Butatthe narrative’sspecifichistoricaljuncture,to bear the culturalnameAmeri-

canintheterritoryoftheOthermeansmoreorlesstostandontheother sideofagun.Foritisanamethatspeakstheauthority ofoneofthelate theCIA.Itisconsistent twentiethcentury’smostpowerfuldivinities: mindthattheCIAoccupies theoretical withthenovel’sunblemished thepositionofthegodwhodestroyedtheTowerofBabelbybequeathingit hisname.Forallthosewhostruggleto translatethesignificance ofAmerican capital,culture,and politicsintotheirownnationallanoftheiractual occupation themultivalent guage(astheyexperience and virtual territory),theacronymicreferenceholdsall the terriblese-

abroadthroughoutthe 1970sand1980s crets.ThekillingofAmericans the of the failureto deconstruct wasin manywayssymptomatic myth.TheCIAdisseminated powerofthiscontemporary acronymic essenself-reference, animageofpureandimpenetrable everywhere and unpronounceable tiallythe Yahwistlogicof the untranslatable name:“IamthatI am.”?!Axton’sfailuretodetecthimselfin thelanpowertoconfusethe guageofthisnametestifiesto itsmythological

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speakits ownlanthepeoplewhoallegedly worldandparticularly livingmyth,thentheCIAisAmerica’s istheworld’s guage:“IfAmerica myth”(TN,317). thatDeLillochoosesto stagea terroristshooting, It is interesting politicsin Greeceandnotin Jordan, capitalist whichtargetsAmerican sitesofthenarrative.Thenovel othergeographical Israel,or India—the precision how,aftertheIranianrevoludocuments withconsiderable tion,Greecebecamethelandingstripforvariousoperativesof multiand American politicsduringtheirbailingout nationalcapitalism process,the most significantsuch retreat since Vietnam. Likewise,

atthistimethefullmilitantextentof Greekpopularsentiment reflected Greece’s disengagement fromdirectAmerican intervention initssocial andpoliticalpresent,following theguidelines oftheTrumandoctrine (1947)and culminating in the CIA-supported militarygovernment (1967-74). Beinga countrywitha strongleftisttradition,andgiventhe anti-imperialist tenetsofpost-’68 Europeanyouthculture,Greecealso witnessed theriseofvariousurbanguerrilla groups,themostnotorious ofwhichisthelegendary group“November 17.”Thenovelinsinuates thattheattempted shootingatLycabettus mayhavebornethisgroup’s signature,onemoreoccasionof DeLillo’s subtleinterweaving of the boundaries betweenhistoryandfiction.” TheshotfiredinbroaddaylightagainstthecomictargetofAmericansjogginginoneof Athens’sfewwoodedspaces—whether theintendedvictimwasAxtonorthebankerDavidKelleris appropriately leftambiguous (theyareinterchangeable names:Americans andagents ofmultinational capital)—cannot but resoundagainst“thesun-cutprecision”DeLillohad mentioned at the outset.Afterthecircuitousadventurehasrunitscourseandthenarrative ofnomadicinscriptions has usedup its alphabet,the text hasreturnedto thearchéof a gestural space,whosecentralitysuggeststhat it liesbothat the coreand in the interstices oflanguage. Wearetoldearlyonthat“theGreekspecific” is a characteristic that“pitsthesensuousagainsttheelemental,” a space whoseabundantlightbringsattentionto thesmallestthing,to “correctnessof detail”(TN,26).Themicroworldof the elementalencoun-

terstheboundless expanseofthesensuousinan embracethatrequires

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utmostprecision—otherwise the contentofthe worldis lost.Bythe samedialectical attentionto radicalspecificity, Axtoncan conclude: “Lifeisdifferent here.Wemustbeequaltothelargeness ofthings”(TN, 89).TheGreeklandscape, a naturewhichis fundamentally social,inducesa sensualclaritythatseemstooccupytheentiresensoryapparatusofbodyandsoul,a curiousmateriality oftheintangible. Though paradoxical intermsofrationallogic,it nonetheless registerswiththe uncannyprecisionof already-incorporated knowledge. AsBrademas reflects inoneofhisdreamlike speculative moments, oneexperiences in Greecea residualmemory, asin a metempsychosis, whichishardly translated byitsquotidiannotionofreincarnation andis rendered insteadthroughits etymological ground:“notonlytransfer-of-soul but the Indo-European reach[ing] root to breathe....We arebreathing again”(TN,113).

In Greece, youbreathetheelemental. Thisseemstobewhatthe novelarguesfor,whatsumsupitsgeographical modeofcontemplation.Theelementalwaspreciselywhatthecultalsosought,as we know,butitsprogramenforcedthestrictestsingularity possible—no nobreathingofhistory,justonearbitraryshotinthe transfer-of-soul, Thecultperceives Manias translation. desertofmind,literalalphabetic “aplacewhereitispossibleformentostopmakinghistory. . [to]inventa way out” (TN,209)becauseit misreadsits culturalreticenceas

thesilence whileAxtonrecognizes tabularasaforalphabetic inscription, ofMani,thoughopposedtothepolyglotnatureofAthens,tobeofthe “apurerightofseeing”(TN,182).Thecult sameorderof precision, any other urbanspace, neverdaresenterthe spaceof Athens—or it shareswithurban similarity whichis wherewhatever psychological itisterrifiedofthestray ends—because guerrillagroupscategorically In Athens,oneentersa whirlexcessof multipleordersof language. windof languagemodes,whichexistas if untouchedby thefallout intoxicaAxtonexperiences collective performance. fromtheBabelian tion because “the air is filled with words” (TN, 79) and, as we have seen, “gestures drive the words.” The gestural world exceedsthe al-

which ofit.Thegestural, whichis whythecultis terrified phabetic, eludesthe deathly andpunctuation, slicestheair withinterruption

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Thisiswhythecultmustinventa way blowsofwritinginstruments. fluxofhistoryis containedin thegesture theintangible out.Because and in Greece,Axtonreiterateswith characteristicvariance,“historyis intheair”(TN,97).

intangibility inawaythattrathishistorical DeLillo’s noveltheorizes theycannot,by because cannot,precisely ditionaltextsofsocialscience WhatDeLillo demands. mythistorical accountforsociety’s definition, aprosethatshouldliveupto whenhedevelops understands intuitively freeze isthatGreece eludesthepermanent sensuous precision Greece’s frameof theName,thatGreeceis in thisrespecta godlesscountry (whichhasnothingtodowiththereligionthathappensto occupythe realm,Greeklifehasbroken fantasyspace).In theeveryday nation’s awayfromtheregimeofnaming,havingoptedforthebrokenphrase, thegesture,theincidental sound,thebarrageofconversing / contesting repetition.” Itcannotbe reducedto voices,thepointless andguiltless anyphilological gridbecauseithaslongincorporated, accordingtoits imposedclassicalheritageand the conceptualriftsthat entails(to whichthecontemporary presence oftheAcropolis fragments bearsmaterialwitness),a ruinedlogos,whichiswhyin (modern)Greece“the ruinismanaged differently” (TN,179). Thebookmakesthisenigmatic proposition oneofitstheoretical projects. Axton’s ultimatereconciliationwiththeGreekelement,whosesymptomis finallyto visitthe Acropolis, isbasedontherealization thatthese“mauledstones”arenot “arelicspeciesofdeadGreecebutpartofthelivingcitybelow”(TN, 330).Thisworldlylastinstance liberates theruinfromthearcheological ideal, reentersit into the fluxof time, restoresits historicalessence.The

Acropolis inruinsstillremainstheemblemofthecitybelow,Athensin themodernworld,a worldcharacterized bythefactthatthepolis,asa socialentity,is inruins.Thislanguageofruinspellsoutallthemorethe necessitythattheplayofhistorybe elucidated by theactof fiction, whichisprecisely tosaythathistorycannotbeeluded.Ifthecult(The Names)—or whateveragencyaspiresto the categorical privilegeof naming—seeks tooccupy“a placewhereit is possibleformentostop makinghistory,” eludingthenamemaybejustthatno-place wherehistoryisinthemaking.™ Suchadifferent senseofspacemeansthattheperformance ofBabel

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wouldneedtobe reread,whichmeansthatitwouldneedtobegiven a differentlanguage.Derridasuggeststhispathwhenherecognizes that Babelspellsout“theneedforfiguration, ofmyth”andmaybedeemed “themythoftheoriginof myth,”whilealsotestifyingto“aninternal limitto [the]formalization” thathumansocietyengagesinsincetime immemorial,a limit that becomesthe mobilizingforcebehind the need

formyth,theneedforfiguration.” TheBabelian isthusnotan instance Urstructurein symbolic timebuta figurelikeaMoebius strip,whichis alsouniquelyintertwined: intertwining itselfwithitself.Derridasees there—intheirreducible multiplicity oflanguage, theincompletion of language—the groundwork ofmyth.Insofar ashehasrepeatedly presentedtheBabelianperformance asanexemplary instanceofdeconstruction,hethusdrawsimplicitly (andwithouteverelaborating it) a co-incidence betweendeconstruction andmyth. DeLillo’s novelprovidespreciselythetheoretical elaboration ofthe interstitialspacesofthisco-incidence bydrawingtheBabelian performanceintotherealityofthelate-twentieth-century world.Thisnovel teachesus to perceive,behind the deconstructivedouble-bindofGod’s interruptionof culture,its other side.Theother side of the double-bind

weknowfromreallife,is Tofacea double-bind, isthetotalcommand. asis God’sownlifeinthis to feelsurrounded.Tobethedouble-bind, ofdeconstruction meanstoexhausttheposition instance, mythological at the momentit occurs.The deconstructivecommandof Babel(“con-

Inthisrespect,onlyGodcandeconfusion”)isitselfundeconstructible. tohisdoubleobedience becomes struct.Afterhim,alldeconstruction bind.Thereisthusonlyonewayto disobeyGod:toeludehisName. oftheco-incidence between Thisis,tomymind,thedistilledsignificance instance. andmythin theBabelian deconstruction to theregimeofthenameisalsowhatenablesus Thisdisobedience frominoflanguages, toresumetheworkofculture,afterthescattering action.Inthis course,frominsidecontingent sidehistory’sfragmented sense.Or toput respect,fictionmakeshistorypossiblein a continuous it otherwise,fictionprovidesa continuumbetweentherealmof making

alterity(socialimaghistory(socialaction)andtherealmofimaginative hisnovelUnderworld, Inanessaythatmightbesaidtopreface ination). “ThenovelisthedreamreDeLillo returnstotheheartofthisproblem:

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ofrealitythathistoryneedstoescapeitsbrutal lease,thesuspension . . . Losthistorybecomesthedetailedweaveof novels. confinements isallaboutreliving things.Itisoursecondchance.”OursecFiction chasmopenedbytheimposiondchanceat Babelaftertheirreversible tionoftheName,thechasmthathasopenedlanguage(andculture)to is torecognize in thismultiplicity theforce interminable multiplicity,

thatenables societies todareimagine themselves otherwise, beyondthe Name. Thusiffictionindeedrescueshistoryfromitsconfusions—to return toDeLillo’s initialformulation—then fictionrescueshistoryfromitsBabel,fromits deconstruction by the nameof God(“confusion”). The Namesposestheradicalquestionofthissecondchanceofresuming workontheTowerandanswersit“byeludingthename.”Thegroundworkforsuchan answerpointsto theparadoxofmodernGreece,a countryofconfusion, ofconversation, ofunmarkedgesture,whichis experienced asstartlingclarity,sun-cutprecision.Readingthissortof precision hasnothingarcheological aboutit.Itresidesintheanorthographyoffiction’s futuretense,seeninTap’s(Axton’s adolescentson’s) novelfragment,thenewmythography supplantingthenovel'sactual endingthatnods,in thelastphraseofTheNames, to “thenightmareof realthings,thefallenwonderoftheworld”(TN,339).

10

Beyond theDamaged Life

Guilt.Thewayofguiltisalwaystoreturn.Ifnotto thesceneofthe crime,thentothesceneofplenitudebeforethecrime.Guiltfeedsonthe desireforplenitudeatthesametimeasit shattersplenitudeintoa millionpieces.Likewise, guiltunstitches timeintoa millionthreads:literallyitdefiles time,sinceitirreparably damagestheauthorityoftimeas a structuralnet,as filament. Theguiltyconscience seeksouta timebefore thebeginning,whichis an endlessseriesof befores,eachonemore

irrevocable thanthelastandevenmoreephemeral. Guiltinvokesa terminal senseofreturnprecisely becauseitisasentiment ofsomething andirreducible. Butthereisnoplacethatcansatisfythisdesireforreturn,notopostojustifythenostos,andthusguiltis a sicknessgraver thannostalgia.Theweightoftheguiltyactseversalllinks,including wanthehappyco-incidence oftimeandtheuniverse, theirintractacable deringhandinhand.Fortheguiltyconscience, theuniversesuddenly walksaloneandaway.Everything flashesby,asif blownby a great windfromthetimebefore,thetimethatexistsnolonger.Thetimeof breaks guiltisa timeofshattering, andthisiswhya guiltyconscience onedown,disruptsthevitallinkbetweenthesenseof personhood universe. When immortal achievedwithmortalityandtheimpersonal, guiltgoverns,thesouldies.It is a cruel,cheapdeath.Contrarytowhat conveysnotragicsenseoflifebecause istaught,theguiltyconscience whenoneis governedbyguiltonelosestouchwiththesublimemelanthatcouldmoveeven (abraveandnoblesentiment cholyofmortality mortalitybecomesdeservedpunishFortheguilt-ridden, anAchilles). ment.It isnolongertheplainsenseofbeinghuman,theinfinitesimal point in the universalchaos which,in the barest flashof existence,car323

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Abandonandpleasure. ofaneternityofhappiness riestheknowledge ofguiltimpliesa gestureofgreatarroingoneselftothegovernance thisnagancetowardsthenatureofbeinghuman,forit conceptualizes bargainwithimmoras a commercial tureas a processofnegotiation, talityalwaysconductedunder the scopeof someall-governing, Throughguilt,mortalitycomes principle. redemptive, eschatological undertheregimeofthelawinitsentirerange,fromthethreatofexeSolongashistorylasts,prophets redemption. cutionto metaphysical usoftherighttodefythelaw, willmobilize guiltasawayofdepriving a rightas essentialto humanityas lawitself.Kafkaknewbestthe ofhumanlife. gamesthatlawandguiltplay,tothedetriment amorous JosephK.discoverswithbitterastonishment thatthelawdoesnotseek outcrime;it isdrawnbya “natural”attractiontotheguilty,anattracofwhatissocially tiondecreedby the lawposingastheembodiment spellofthelaw.Itisthe natural.Tobeguiltyistobeunderthemagnetic repressed contentofthenotion“law-abiding,” whichisitselftheconstitutivepropertyofthenotionofCitizen(althoughcarefullyveiled). Law-abiding citizenslivewiththefearofguilt,a gravefear,foritannihilatestheirverybeing.Tosome,thispointofviewmightsignalan openinvitationtocriminality. Inonesense,it does.Theoutlaw—the onewhotrulydeservesthegravityofthenotion—knows nofearofthe otherandthereforereliesentirelyonan integralsenseofbeing.One suchoutlawwasa characterwhomadephilosophyout of themost law-abiding gesture:Socrates.Law-abiding, insofaras he tookthe abandonmentof law as a matter of lifeand death; outlaw,insofar as he

turnedlaw’sabandonment intoa gestureofphilosophy. Guilthasno placein philosophy. Whenthepraxisof philosophy is worthyof its name, it must be a guiltlessact in the faceof the incommensurablede-

mandsofhumanlife.Itmustbeguiltless,forlifeitselfis guiltless:the freelife,thelifethatdares(thoughusuallywithoutsuccess—but what issuccess?) tooutwitideologies.

NoRedemption. Thegreatandimmanent demonofrevolution in the twentieth centuryhasbeenthecultivation ofguiltabouthappiness. The revolutionary hasbeenconfronted withthisguiltbecausetheworld s/he hassoughttochangeis insufferable, aworldofgriefandinjustice.

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Happiness hasbeenthisworld’sgreatenemy,anenemyfoughtwith theweapons ofprosperity, comfort, stability, accumulation—the pursuit ofhappiness. (Happiness becametheobjectofa pursuitcalculated to bringaboutitsextinction.) Inopposition to this,therevolutionary conceptionoftheworldsoughttofashiona counter-ethos, anethosofseriousness,justice,commitment, selflessness: anasceticethos,springing fromthe eighteenth-century revolutionary imaginaryin themidstof extraordinary excess.(Rousseau andRobespierre bothcometomind.) Therevolutionary’s self-understanding requiredthatbothmindand bodyhadto bemadestrongto withstand thecorrosive, Mephistophelianwaysofa corruptanddecadentworld.Butallgreatrevolutionaries (whetherinthetraditionofLeninorStavrogin) havemisjudged thenatureofthecorrosion. Confounded bytheinvertedimageofhappiness ina capitalist world,theyreproduced thepsychicconditions thatruthlesslypursuedhumanhappinesstoextinction. became Revolutionaries somber, sad, inflexible,often even unjust (at the very least toward

themselves). Theyendedup bothvictimsandpatronsofthedeadly pursuit. Thisself-annihilating secondnaturesuitedperfectlythevoracious demandsofthecapitalistmarket.Atthismostrecentfin-de-siécle, we cansaywithrarecertaintythatcapitalism swallowed themythsofrevinwholepieces.Butthiscannibalistic olutionaries obliteration resulted liberalsocisystemof so-called in severeindigestionin thesymbolic of theendofideology— eties.Theself-congratulatory announcement desireand ofaspacewherethecollusion between theallegeddiscovery thesuddenpanic revolution issupposedly disruptedforever—reveals Theliberaltheofa groupofactorswhosemaskshaveslippedonstage. Thegreatugliaterhassuddenlygonedeadsilent,forallitsbavardage. risesup likea pall nessofa lifepursuedforthesakeof“happiness” staring,undisoverthestage,a canvasofreturnedprojections—blank, (ortheendof theendofideology Onewhoproclaims delusion. posable tocoveruptheunfilled history)islikethechildwhoinventsa language announcedthoughunmasked voidof theself.Therealend,implicitly theendofthepursuitof gravestnightmare: foralltosee,isliberalism’s

happiness. wasgrantedits ownfunereal feast,revolution In this teleological

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fanfarewith a bitter song, as bitter as the bread ofa life sacrificedto an

hadsentall whooncedared ideal.Thesamebitterness obliterating righttopower(theflameof‘68)awayfromthe posittheimagination’s ofthestreetstotheprivatizedfetishofwritingroboundless pleasure (whosekeywasnoneotherthanthemostold-fashioned mans-a-clef ofdesirelost.Butlost Itwasthebitterness privileging ofthepersonal). bythecognitive couldnotbe outmaneuvered to what?Towhatever pathsthatrevolutionlaidopen.Brutallyspeaking,itwasdesirelostto Therevolutionary impulseinthetwentiethcentury,animredemption. pulsetowardredemption inagodlessworld,turnedouttobeasphilodisastrous. Andthebittersophically unfortunate asit waspolitically nessthatcamewiththerealization thatredemptionremainedunrealizedwasneverunderstoodin itsessence:as thebitternessofa life deprivedofphilosophy, deprivedoftheunderstanding thatphilosophy is none other than the riskoflife,riskin the faceof life.Desirelostto re-

demptionandredemptionlosttoitsincarnation aspoliticalproject:a doublesacrifice ofthephilosophical risk. Adornosupplements hisfamousstatementinMinima Moralia that philosophy canberesponsibly practicedin thefaceofdespaironlyif mattersare“contemplated fromthestandpointofredemption[Erlésung],”asifbathedinmessianic light,withanenigmatic conclusion: “besidethedemandthusplacedonthought,thequestionofthereality orunrealityofredemption itselfhardlymatters.”Inmostreadings,the weightofthefirststatement hascrushedtheelusivemeaningofthesecond.Surely,themessianic lightprovedtoodazzlingtoenablea critical (whether sympathetic oradversarial) contemplation ofwhatever might eludeitsallure.The“indigentanddistorted[bediirftig undentstellt]” presentation of theworldunderthemagneticscopeofmessianic light drew upon it all the shards from the falloutof redemption,from the in-

fidel’swrathfulcrytothefaithful’s sighofrelief.Thisworld,whichdemandedrevolutionand demands—in its outmaneuverable present tense—the riskofphilosophy, wasthuspurgedunderthemaskofredemption. Whichistosay,in effect:it waspurgedoftime,formessianiclight means temporal darkness,the eliminationof instanceand duration, in-

ventionandreiteration. Redemption purgedtheworldofrevolution; it

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obliterated theimpulseto embrace discontinuity withcreativedesire. Hence,philosophypracticedfromthestandpointofredemption inevitablycame to rely upon the fine techniquesof prophecy.But prophets,thoughalwaysspeakingfromthevoid,havealsoalwaysspokenoutoffearofthevoid.Prophecy cannotmanagetheonesmalllimitlessstepthatbringsthevoidfacetofacewithlife,thatmakesthevoid oflifespeakinallitsbrilliant dailyplenitude. Prophets nevertookthe riskofphilosophy—for philosophy smilesuponyou,upontheinstance ofdeath,dailydeath.Instead,prophecy soughttoshadowdeathwith magic.Andwhilethecomfortsecuredinmagicisinitselfhardtoresist, thebankruptlegacyofrevolution inthelatetwentieth centurymade magicappearindispensable tothedesireforradicalsocialchange. Surely,onecannotactuallydetermine,usingAdorno’sphraseas measure,whethertherealityorunrealityofmagicindeedmatters.Toa child,thepurebeautyofmagicconsistsinitsindisputable reality;toan adult(tothemagician himself), thepleasureofmagicresidesinitsperfectunreality. Thisdiscrepancy inperception isnotonlyamatterofage difference, butalsoofdifference inthescopeofone’sconstitutive imagination.Fora child,therealityofmagicbearswitnesstotherealtransformational potentialofworldlythings.Toan adult,theunrealityof magicbearswitnesstohumanity’s infinitepotentialtoconjureupthe arenotequivnomatterwhattheanalogy, world.Thesetwopositions, sense,ifonlybecausewhatmakesanadultout alentinsomeformalist This oftherealityofunreality. thetacitrecognition ofachildis precisely workagainstits interminable involvessociety’s processof recognition opponent,thepsyche.It involves,in other tirelessand undefeatable words, the work of sublimation.

betweentherealityanduntoelidethedifference Adorno’s decision imperaistosomeextentdueto hisself-ascribed realityof redemption is premiercompulsion tiveto muddlethewaters.Tobesure,Adorno’s Thisleadshim inprerogatives. to free thoughtfromcompulsive hingethepointwhereeveryconcept evitablytoseekas methodological Hence,inthefamousfinaleto fromthelogicofidentity. is disengaged ofredemption theimperative he beginsbyprescribing Moralia, Minima ofwhat-is-tocapacity andtraceless as theshadowless forphilosophy oftheimcome:insimplewords,byaskingusto relyonthepossibility

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asifunabletoresistthemagicofthoughtitpossible. Butimmediately, ofimpossiconditionality healertsustotheinescapable selfunfolding, for evenitsownimpossibility bilityitself.Thoughtmustcomprehend mustbeevokedin Redemption heconcludes. thesakeofthepossible, ofthefact butnotoutsidethepresence presence, itsfullyphantasmatic ofits realityor unreality(its thatit is evoked.Hencethe irrelevance ofpresence). presence solelyonthebasisofthediscourse retrospect ofthetwentiethcentury’s untrickable In retrospect—the demomentsof transcendence—Adorno’s entirehistoryofconjured thought asthesolelocationofrevolutionary ploymentofredemption foldinanelaboratecongame.Animposturnsouttobean interesting astheonlyposistoreplaceanimpossible revolution sibleredemption future.Butunderthesamerulesofretrosiblevisionofanimpossible thisconjuringofrespection,thebarejusticeofreadingretroactively, demptionisrevealedastheveilmaskingthesignificational capacityof revolution torendertheimpossible possible withoutanysenseofprovidence,of what-is-to-come,without any prism that requiresthe source

ofmessianic light.Whatever Adorno’srhetorical(orevenideological) intention, thedialectical undecidability ofhisthoughtenablesa reading ofredemption asfalsepossibility inthesameglanceasitsmoretraditionalreading:redemption astheonlytrueimpossibility. Inpurerhetoric therealityorunreality ofthereferent hardlymatters. Paradoxically,this is alsotrue of revolution.Whereit reallycounts,on

thebarricades ofsocial-imaginary signification, therealityorunreality ofsociety’s projections orvisionsoffreedomhardlymatters.Whatmattersisthatfreedomisclaimed—somehow, mysteriously, beyondtheorderofcognition—as lifeexperience (Erfahrung), orattheveryleast,as thedesiredformoflifeexperience. Despitewhatis currentlyfashionable—aconceptual desertcross-dressed asfreeplay—the veryrangeof utopianyearningisagainat stake.It isn’t,however,a matterofthinkingupdifferentutopias.Whatmattersisto thinkutopiadifferently. The bravestrevolutionaries havealwaysbeenthosewhochanneledtheir utopianvisiontocelebrateeverydaylifeina wretchedworld.In retribution,theywereusuallythe firsttobeforcedtomockthemselves in sacrificial farcesdesignedby their owncomrades.Theyare nowa nearlyextinctspecies,havingscatteredbehindthemtracesofBacchic

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passionand Brechtian cunning.Onewonderswhethertheymaybe abouttogatheragainina worldwherethelusterofprophetsandredeemers fadesasrapidlyastheirgreedgrows. CaveTraces. InhisPhilosophy ofModern Music, Adornomakes,inhis usualstyle,a statementthat nominally belongsto anotherwork:“As farbackaswecantraceit,thehistoryofthoughthasbeen a dialectic of enlightenment.” Themysteryofthesentence liesnotin itsdeclarative part(whatthedialectic ofenlightenment is),butinitsrhetorical modifier(“asfarbackaswecantraceit”).Thedialecticofenlightenment involvesprecisely whatcanbe traced,whatis historical—in a general sense,thehistoryof humanaction(towhichthe historyofthoughtis theunderlying Theuntraceable wouldseemthustoescape evidence). theorbitofthisdialectic. Notso:theuntraceable is precisely whatthis dialectic rendersboundtoitsorbit.Tobeinvolved inthetroubleoftracingisto actouttheEnlightenment project.Totaketheriskofleaving mattersuntraceable(whileconvincedthat theycan potentially be traced) is to act with the confidenceborne in the dialecticof things:in

theinterminable ofwhatever returnstohauntyou.Inthisreupturning spect,Adorno’ssummation oftheoriginofthehistoryofthoughtbelongstothebesttradition ofrhetorical inflection. On the surface,there is no historyof thought that cannot be traced,

strucofenlightenment isobviously the“natural” andthusthedialectic ofthought(inthesense Butthehistory tureoftheprocessofcivilization. isprecisely whateverlinksthoughtto ofwhatmakesthoughthistorical) daily life, to what is immediateand mortal, to what is inevitableand

becauseit isimmediately whatis untraceable precisely ephemeral—to drawnupon,likewaterthat runsto therootof a tree.Whatmakes oflife,thatit intothepathways isthatitdisappears thoughthistorical processbywhichlifedemonuntraceable isabsorbedintheultimately strates (its) mortality.The historicalnature of thingsis the solemeans

Ifnarratedhissensible. wehaveatourdisposaltomakeimmediacy thentheeventofhistory(historyis thenarrativeoflife’smediations, senseoflife’simmediacy. registerstheever-elusive tory’seventuality) differentfrom dialectics Thisalreadyputsusina positionregarding ofthekindand theirlatter-day the one to whichbothtraditionalists

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theghostoftheAbsolute adhere.FortheoldHegelians, conquerors betweenpositionandoppothewholerangeofmovement commands but Selfofplenitude isnottheprojected sition,evenwhentheAbsolute inthesublabelievers Forfateless Otherofnegation. theunverbalized tionofHegel,bycontrast,theghostoftheOtherenjoysthecomfortof Theyfindgreat undererasure. theAbsolute beingtheperfectAbsolute: canbeputundererathattheEnlightenment comfortintheconviction sure,dulyforgettingthattheyare merelyputtingerasureunder (the scopeof)Enlightenment. Dialectics hasnothingtodowithsuchphantomgames.Atleastas dialectitheactualevidence oflifebroughtbeforelife’sindeterminacy, calthinkingenduresthefoundational discrepancy betweenposition andtime,theslantthatcharacterizes theencounter betweenthought andevent.Allrationalistphilosophy, strictlyspeaking,hassoughtto diffusethisdiscrepancy byprescribing eitheranintegralthinkingEgo or a transcendental Ideal.Buta dialecticalperceptionof thingsdemandsthedifficult stateofbeinginterminably brokenintothevarious piecesofimmanent contradiction—the contradiction thatisbothBeing anda matterofliving(asa socialbeing).Tobethusshattereddoesnot meanto lackthewholenessofaction,justas to beartheprivileged wholeness ofpositivitydoesnot(indeed,cannot)hidethedesperate shatteringinherentin everyaction.Thedialecticof enlightenment occursprecisely at thiscrossroads ofshattering andrefolding, thecrossroadsofOsirisorOrlando—not thecrossingbetweenOdysseanratio andKantianmythos. Lifeasshatteredbythewholeness ofimagination leavesa markwecantraceasfarbackasthefirst,daringhumangestureofconjuringuppiecesofnature,ofcarvingup naturewhole,on theinsidesofa cave.WhatmightlinkthisgesturetothemaskedEumenides onthedarkstageofhumantime(thegrandseduction ofthepolisbyNaturealreadyseduced)or theinventionofzero(whichat this verymomentenablesa milliondotstotraceephemeralthoughtsonmy computer screen) is the untraceable flash of history’swhirlwind, which

deservesourpassionate andtirelesscontemplation. Sincere Forgers. Legendhasit thatwhenMaoTse-tung wasasked whetherthe FrenchRevolution wasa peasantora bourgeois revolu-

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tion,he answered: “It’stooearlytotell.”!Thisismorethanjustrevolutionarysophistry abouttheultimate unpredictability ofhistory. Itisa commentaboutduplicity, theduplicityenforced by history,whichcan onlybecountered witha Pythicresponse. Atonelevel,Mao’sduplicitousutterance aimsto disturbtheeasewithwhichMarxisthistoriographyhadsettledthematterofmodeofproduction asbothsociallogic andsocialnarrative.Hisrevolutionary visionwasbasedonupturning theepistemic collusionbetweenbourgeoisand proletarian asrevolutionarysignifiers. At anotherlevel,however,Mao’senigmatic pronouncement isa sortoffurtiverenderingoftimeashistory’s undecidableandexplosive innercore.Noeventinhistoryprecludes itstemporal signification. Thougheveryeventquaeventis a fact,no event monopolizes thetruthofitsoccurrence. Whatassignsfacticity (truth)to aneventisalie,anexplosive andproductive liethatwillsafeguard history’sultimateincommensurability. Thelifeofeveryeventis tantamounttoitshalf-life ashistorical radiationthroughtime,andtheGreat Helmsman mustbeunderstood asthenuclearscientistoftimewhoenandconducted oneofthemostinsaneeventsinthehistoryof gineered theLongMarch. theLongMarchaspolitical stratsocieties: Conceiving egyis possible onlyifyoubelievethathistorical timeexistsalwaysin uncertainandunstableflux,thathistorical eventsregisternotassingular blasts but as radioactivefallout, interminablyslow and, from the

life,infactinterminable. pointofviewofeveryday isAdornianinnaturemight ToclaimthatthisMaoistmethodology beenpart had theCulturalRevolution Surely, beincurablynarcissistic. of Adorno’slife, it would have meant his brutal obliteration.Yetit

affinitybetweenthisobliterwouldbe crudetoderidetheunderlying phiatingvisionandthethoughtsofa manwhobuilta revolutionary itsurgent culture,including losophyonthenotionthatcontemporary critique,wasgarbage.Thisisnota gameofputtingtheMarxistlegacy barreltogeta taste inline,butratherofscrapingthebottomofhistory’s getspassedaroundashisofwhat'sleftbehindwhentrueknowledge are affinities) Thedregsof history(rejected tory’spreciousdistillation. but theyalsoholdthesecretsof madetobearthestigmaoffalsehoood, history’smythicpower. Ifthereisanythingcredibleinhistory,it residesin history'sconfir-

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Historyexistsbecausehuforinvention. capacity mationofhumanity’s it,butwhatisreallyradicalinthistruismisthatit manshaveinvented stands witnessto its converse:humans invent (themselvesand their

notsomenatural-transcendenbecausehistory—and others)precisely It wasforhistory’ssakethathumansinvented tal constant—exists. sucha dashingmultitudeof gods,andit wascertainlyuponhistory’s demandthatsomepeopleat someparticularpointin timeinvented aschosenby theoneandonlyGod.Nothingismorespecthemselves offalse tacularinthecourseofhumanhistorythanthegreatprocession orderoftimetheyareall gods,falsebecauseinthegrandsyntagmatic andabolished byeachother’sintrinsictruth. mutuallychallenged truthis forgedby historianswho Thissingularand paradigmatic story,toforgetheirpeople’ssigmakeittheirtasktotelltheirpeople’s nature.Theforger’ssincerityisnevertobedoubted,forhe isdevoted tothetruemodelbydefinition. Ahistoriansetsouttocopytruthwith thesamegenuineseriousness thataphilosopher seeksit.Inallfairness, neitherbehavesanydifferently fromthepoet,whodeliberately carries theburdenofcreationexnihilo.Inallthree,givena genuinecommitmenttothelimitless capacity oftheimagination, truthisgrantedthefavorsofthemostprofoundforceofinventionpossible.Thedichotomy betweentruthandfalsehood isahistorical condition. Therewasa time when truth resided in the marvelousand the figurative,and onlywhen

theethicalrepresentation oftheworldtookoverfromthemythicwas truthdivorcedfrominvention. Theconsequences forthecontemporary worldcouldnothavebeenpredicted.Themechanisms ofconcealing thetruthbecamemoreand morerefinedas the moralimperatives guardingthetruthoccupiedmoreand moreofitsterritory.Truthand lyingbecameinterchangeable ina socialuniversegovernednolonger bypolyvalence butbyequivalence: theorderoftheSame.Precisely at thispoint,afterthemostinconceivable violencewasperpetratedinthe nameofTruth,whenfalsitytookoverthereinsofmeaning, Adornorecognizedthenecessity ofreinventing thefreedom tolie:“Sincefreeand honestexchangeisitselfa lie,todenyitisatthesametimeto speakfor truth:in faceofthe lie ofthecommodity world,eventheliethat denouncesitbecomes a corrective.” Therighttospeakasa liaris to revive a philosophical practicepossibleonlyina worldwheremyth,against

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thegrainofitsallegedfalsity, isa genuinemodeofknowledge. It is to speakas a poetin a worldthathasrenderedpoetrya crime.(Inhis yearsofexile,especially, Adornowroteasan imprisoned thinker,and Minima Moralia definitely belongsto thegenreofprisonnotebooks.) Suchisthespeechactofapoetofhistory, a historian whodaresshapethe future:“Lieshavelonglegs:theyareaheadoftheirtime”—which is to saythatpoeticinventionentailsprecisely whatever leavestheundecidabilityofhistoryunresolved, whateverforgestruthoutoftheundecidabilityofliving.Thismeanstoembrace anuncalculated risk,theriskof revolution, whosepathwayscanbetracedin thelabyrinthofhumanity’sinterminable inventory ofself-creation, asmuchastheyseemto vanishin the historicalundecidability of the Great Helmsman’s rearviewmirror. Poetson theRun.In coollate summermornings,whenthe sun seemsto rise, true to its promise,as an ancientdivinityof radianceand

heat,whenyoustandbearingonyourshoulders thefullweightofthe night'svigil—the Bacchic pairingofPsyche(thelabyrinthofimmanent thought)andTime(thechthonicpoolofthought’sdefilement)—just then,when,standingstill,yousuddenlyreachup tothetreefora perfectlymaturefigwhichisdeadsureofitstime,youmayhavetouched onwhatbecomesapparentin thebarestmomentbetweenthesentifluxofhistoryinthemakandtheuninterrupted mentofphilosophy passesyouby.Tobe ing:thepassageofpoetryasit swiftly,elusively, eversoslightlybrushedbythewindsofpoetryasit vanishesyetagain madness,the manteia, possession, wasoncecalleddivineinspiration, openportaltothevoid,asinHélderlinorin Blake.Itiswhateludesthe even,in perhapstheonlything—perhaps dialecticofEnlightenment, retrospect,thedramatic,unacknowledged(henceuntheorized)wishto

put this dialecticintoa book.(It alwaysseemsto be the event—the makesthewishtheorizable.) ofthedream—that eventuality IfthepoeticimpulseistherepresseddreammaterialoftheEnlightenment,thatisbecausethefateof poetryhasbeenmarkedby itsdefianceof theregimeoforderedargument,theorderof “philosophy.” totheexplicitworshipof Whilerepressedbecauseit mustbesacrificed materialtotheEnabsolutely reason,thepoeticimpulseisnonetheless

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radicallypoieticattitudetowardthe world(whereby lightenment’s act).Cera creativeanda destructive poiésis meanssimultaneously ofphiloscoherence firstprogrammatic theeventoftheworld’s tainly, poetry’sdangerophytakesplaceinthesamegesturethatannounces signalstheinitialpassageofpoetrytoilPlato’sRepublic ousproperties. poetshave thepropertyofphilosophers, legality: oncethecitybecomes instanceoforigin,deThishistorical nochoicebuttogounderground. ofthe hasretaineditsabandonment deviations, spiteitsmultitudinous Onecouldsubbetweenpoetryand philosophy. Orphicco-incidence stantively arguethattheverynotionsexistonlybymeansoftheirdifbirth.Thisiswhytospeakof ferentiation, bymeansoftheirtwinbreach the so-called eraof thepre-Sotheerabeforethisdoubleinstitution, intention: pureandsimpleenactsa retroactive cratics,as philosophy theintentionofphilosophy toobliterate thetracesofitsmixedlineage, onceandforall.Insodoing, toeradicate poetry’s accesstoknowledge ofcourse,philosophy eradicates itselfasapoeticandpoliticalpractice, sincethepoietic elementholdsthekeytotheaccessofthepolistothe realmofalterityandself-alteration. Philosophy becomes hegemonically apolitical precisely bysubmitting itselfeithertodivinegnosisortoobjectiveratio,bygivingprecedence firsttotheologyandthentoscience. Oneisrightlysuspicious toseethematterreducedtothewhimsofa singletextproducedinancienttimes.Nonetheless, theincisionofthis textcannotbeeffaced;it isinternalized at thelevelofsocietalinstitution.Itisn’ta matterof,say,Plato’sstranglehold on signification, but ratherhisboldencapsulation ofa definitiveinstitutionin thesocialimaginary ofhistime:thefactthatphilosophy, untilthentheunnamed collective expression ofbeingthepolis,isgranted,bythissociety, bythe polisitself,anautonomous conceptualization. Thisautonomy ofphilosophy,providingpoliticswithanidealessenceandturningthepolisinto a project,is predicated onpoetry'sparanomia. Thesuspicions concerningpoetry’s “criminality” aredirectlyproportionate tothebeliefinphilosophy’s legitimate handlingof knowledge andtruth.Although Virgil’sAeneid wouldseemto demonstrate Plato’serror(theepictestament of society’sfoundational/institutional myth), Virgil’sown genealogy—to takejustonestrand—starting withDanteandarguably culminating in Pound,bearsthe full-range historicalconsequence of

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Plato’sassertion: poeticcreation isa condition ofdisplacement. Inthe post-Platonic world,theology (andlaterscience) willrelegatepoetic speechto themostsuspectregionsofthehumanpsychein thenameof truth,accuracy, andajustcomprehension oftheuniverse. Obviously, thisschematic historyhasnomeaningoutsideofwhat wecallin shorthand“Western culture.” Itwouldbe ridiculous toseek themarkofpoetry’sexpulsion intheworkofBashoorYiianHang-tao and the great tradition of Zen Buddhistpoets, or in often remarkable

versesof Sufimystics,Africangriots,or QuechuaIndians.No less ridiculous,to be sure,thanin theconsideration of,say,Beowulf or the OldNorsesagas,whichcomprise a poeticoutputincorporated intothe Western canonforthesolepurposeofproviding theculturalcontinuity andascendancy thatEuropeannational culturedesperately needed.It wouldbe,Ibelieve,a matterofelementary toarguethat explanation thediscrepancy betweenpoetryandphilosophy in “non-Western” history does not quite registerpreciselybecausephilosophynever achievesautonomy, inotherwords,becausephilosophy doesnotexist associety’s selectformofcollective self-reflection inmattersoflife.In suchinstances, isindeedpoetry’sdomain—not theEnEnlightenment ofLockean orKantianunderstanding butrathertheforce lightenment of NaturethatmakesCulturespeakin verse.It is versethatbears withinitadeepunderstanding ofthings,inferredandmysterious, amtheroadofverse butneverapproximate: biguousandundemonstrable, withinit,envelopstheterritoryofenlightenment carriesenlightenment asitgoesalongitsway. canonsoughtsuchapoetics ThatmanypoetsinthemodernWestern Theirgesture condition. totheirownpeculiar oftheOtheristestimony ofmakingtheirway gestureofdisplacement, istheself-acknowledged in vision. but daidalean outsidethecity’swalls,quixoticin sentiment Pound’s embrace of the Chinese ideograph, for example,is an errant

of rationalization technological gestureagainstthe Enlightenment’s orLorca’s thought.Itis,|mightadd,thesamegestureasMayakovsky’s oftheBrooklyn in theirapotheosis oftechnology poeticdisintegration ofthetwentiethcenturyisquintessenBridge.Thepoeticexperience ofthe Asthecenturycarriestheultimatetrajectory tiallyanachronous. itsiandantecedes poeticpositionprecedes ofEnlightenment, dialectic

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nettothe thepointofcastinga refractive Poeticposition: multaneously. thiscase,a ofdispersal—in a trajectory lightof theworld,instigating dispersalthatcastsonesetof particlesintofermenting two-pronged releaseandanotherforwardtothe darkness beforetheEnlightenment’s thought. unconscious barehorizonofhumanity’s forthisdouble thecondition ofthepoetthenbecomes Thecondition ofeachword matchtheelusiveness flight,whosespeedandtrajectory territoasitrisesabovethesurfaceofspeechandoptsforthenomadic turned paradox(whichtheRomantics riesofverse.Itisa fundamental intoself-evidence) thattheorderofthepoemisthedisorderofspeech. themountwherewhatisspoTosaythata poemspeaksistoabandon ken is revealedand to takethe road of the most alien,most untraceable

landscape. Butthenonehardlyhasthetime,thechance,tospeak,for thepoemvanisheseachtimeit isthoughttohavebeencaught,likea desertspiritthatwallowsinplayingtricksona lonetraveler.Toseize the poem:such is the poet's ironictask,the task of the most criminal,

themostfugitiveofcitiesandoflanguage,thebewildered,obsessed drifter. Poetsrunbecausetheyaremenaced byobsession. Poetsontherun areforcedtofacebeingcrushedinbetweenobsession andthelossof time.Tella poetthats/he isgoingtoofarandthelightsaresuddenly on.“Hurryupplease,it’stime”isEliot’scryofhorrorbeforehisown capacitytocontainhisobsession.Itisthepoem’scry,foreverypoem seekstoconveyitsdistasteforlimits.Lifein theundergroundmeans comfortwith obscurity—not the obscurityof meaning,as mightbe thought,buttheobscurity ofsense.Poetsarealwayson therunbecause theyseekthechancetosenseeachthingbeyonditscontractwithlanguage.Thesearethedarkestfoldsofsense,precisely whatlinksthe fleshtoknowledge. Butpoetsalsorunbecausetheymusteludethe strippingpowerof words,a powerderivedentirelyfromeachword’sreflective nakedness. Asthepoemstripseachwordtoitsbareessence,itendowseachword withthepowerto conjure upthesenseofnakedness ineveryonewho encounters it upclose.Tobea poetistoacceptthis strippingas life’s lot,but toendureitbecomesimpossible. Foreverypoem—every verse, everyshredofpoeticthought—demands thepeelingoffofonemore

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foldof beingbeforethedazzlingpresenceof thestrippedword,one moregestureofdefilement. Thisshouldbearnoneof thoseridiculous moralovertones thattendsooftentosensationalize theactofwriting (thearrogantaesthetics of self-effacement)—defilement meansinstead theliteralunwrapping ofeveryminutelayerofoursocially mummified being.Thedifficulty inbeingapoetistoacceptbeingothertotheword, toacceptwhatcannotbe enduredwithoutfallingintothecompromise ofenduring. Thebestpoetsdo notcaretocontrolwords.Theymerelyplayactseductiongames,teasinga languagethatis unforgiving. Inthisrespect, thereislittledistance betweenDantechoosing tolendeloquence toa vulgaridiomandBeckett aspiringtorenderlanguage speechless. Poeticlanguage issoconcrete thatithasnoshadow. It isa thingandyet, intheorderofthings,it is nothing. Tobecommitted toitspursuitis so absurdbythestandards oforderedlogicthattheveryexistence ofpoetsshouldputtorestwhatever remainconcerning humanaspirations ity’sinnatepropensityforrationalization. It iscertainlyat theoutermostedgeoftheabsurdthatpeoplespendtheirtimewritingpoems— and forgean identityas poets—inthecontextofa worldpoisedto abolishthetechnology oftheprintedwordina giantvacuumsuck.In thisabsurdity, poetryislivingitsmostdramaticyetexperience ofcrimof solongwithouta city,bearingno law—bearer inality.Wandering ghost—poetry life’sephemeralbeauty,fugitivefromlaw’sunbearable cracksthegrounditwalkson.Cracksoftruth,cracksontruth.Going bythemostvigunderground requiresa doublealertnessunsurpassed bothto thebrutalface totalalertnesssimultaneously ilantofaffinities: Ifpoetryhashalfa chanceatgetoffactand tothemasteryofdisguise. (Iftruthhas tingwindoftruth,itis becauseitknowsallitsdisguises. hasclaimed throughtime,it isbecausephilosophy eludedphilosophy truth’sterritoryas intrinsic.)Whatseemstobe poetry’smaskisnone fromthe itsostracism otherthanitsdeclaredabolitionbyphilosophy, as Poetryhasno needto masquerade polis,its forceddepolitization. truth, for there is nothing truer than this mask, this shape shifter,this

withform. complicity unsurpassed Poetryhasnoneedoftruthasfelosbecauseitendsbeforeinterpretato interpretation Itcompels itendsinterpretation. tionbegins—because

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demandingit and defyingit simultaneously. an abyssalteleology, ofpoetryasthebeareroftheunthepossibility WhenKantapproaches uponthisunhetouchesprecisely accessto knowledge, representable YetKantsoughtto givethismomentorder,to tenablesimultaneity. in law—albeit unrepresentable bringit intotheterritoryofcategorical intotheterriinfear.Guidance herecoiled thefinalinstance—because judgmentwasmeanttounmaskthevoidofpoeticgestoryofaesthetic TheRomantic projectcontureandorderitinto a totalityofknowledge. bind,butwithatwistthatonlyversecouldmanage: firmedtheKantian and categorical lawbecamethefragment withtheRomantics, poetry’s thetwoelements mostalienandmostincompreitsethosthesublime, Thus,until hensibleto the languageof philosophicalsovereignty. Nietzsche, theauthority ofphilosophy continued unaddressed andunchallenged. Nietzsche camefromwithinthewallsofthepolisto remindus of whatwehadlongforgotten: thatpoetryistheveryspaceofkrisis,the point where tragic life,not truth, standsbare.Whatanimatesthe poetic

gestureis the momentwhenundecidability becomestragicbecause eachandeverydecisionmustjointheuniverseofvanishingthings.In this respect,Adorno’sotherwiseradicaldictum“AfterAuschwitz,writ-

ingpoetryisbarbarism” is misguided. Soishisreformulation inNegativeDialectics, wherealthoughpoetrycouldinfactfindanexistence afterAuschwitz—as “therightofthetorturedmanto scream”—living after Auschwitzcould not, other than as vampiric existence:the endless

nightofsurvivors beingfedbyguilt,a veritablenightofhistory’s living dead.Adornoarticulates thetragictruthbutmissesitsmark.Yes,poetryandlifecannotretaintheirsubstance afterAuschwitz, butthereis no“afterAuschwitz”; thereisnoafterina historythatdoesnot cease, despiteits endlessinterruptions. Althoughpoetryandlifewillnever rise free of the smoke from the camps, this smoke, the dust from the

bonesofculture,isbuta pseudonym forlife,a namethatvanisheslike a poemina dream. Noone has encountered Adorno’struthmoreradicallythan Paul Celan,a manwhosepseudonym wasconsciously meanttobethename ofpoetrybearingthe falsenameofhistory.Celanwas alwayson the run (fromthe camps,fromwords,fromHeidegger, fromsurvival’s

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bright stones),a man whose life was to attest to Adorno’sphrase, to

bearitslogic,butalso,inbearingthislogic,todefyit.OnceCelan,inhis wanderings, encountered Kafkaandwrotea poemaboutPrague,that perfectplaceofdisplacement. ThispoembroughtAuschwitz intothe fluxof time,daringto defythenotionthatAuschwitz had stopped time.Afterall,Kafkastillstoodbeforeit,anashensoulstandingstill, Celan’stwindaggerwritingin thebloodofcenturies—wortblutgebore It was a poemthat spokeof “twodreamschimingagainsttime,” againstmemorials andlaments, againstallafter.Celangaveuphislife toshowthatwhatlivesafterAuschwitz ispoetry,thecreative/destructiveforceofhumanity’s imagination, elusiveandinterminable. Hedemandedofeachwordanerasure,theeradication ofahistorical identity fathomedasCivilization. Buttheeradication ofhistorical identityisthe historical actparexcellence. AndCelan’spoetry—which, inthelastinstance,is uninterpretablebut not unreadable—lies at the coreof the his-

toricalact:it ishistoryacting(meaningallconnotations: performance, stagingmyth,assuminga pseudonym). CelantookKafkaby the handand,liketwofugitivesfromthe regimeofmemory,theysettledunderground, working clandestinely against the clock.One,likeCassandra,was the unheard foretellerof the

theother,unseenwitnesstoitspermeating logicoftheFinalSolution; imagofculture,agentsofthetransformative nature.Superiortheorists andlament:poets. againstmemorial ination,clandestine time-benders, in the lightoffailure, faberattestingto commitment Shadowsof homo notmastersofthespiritbut workersontheshapeoflife,notpreyto reticent history:philosophers, publicvirtuebutcitizensofa desacralized Whenthepoliswantstofoolitself,itsetsasidethehemlock andimplicit. forits poets.Theyacceptit, dutifullyand freely,andtoasttheliving withanerrantverse. Life.Onewaytolookbackatlifeisasaseriesof theDamaged Beyond thanit sounds.Sinceatleast Thisislessidiosyncratic musicalmoments. ofmassculture,thisway ofmusicwiththetechnology theconvergence is itinerary Ofcourse,eachmusical-memorial toeveryone. isaccessible sothishistorycanneverattesttoa lostin infinitefoldsofexperience, collectivity.Nevertheless,such musicalmomentssettle insideeveryone

dust. specksofdust,personal likeirremovable

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theDamaged Life Beyond

Project, Adornoseemed RadioResearch InhisworkatthePrinceton ofmusic(themarcannibalization ofbourgeois torepealtheindictment HesetderHalbbildung. inhisTheorie ketingofhitculture)hedeveloped pieces,whichheindeedtreatedaspieces, tledintoplayDJtoclassical He truncatedby theshrapnelofhiscriticalcommentary. deliberately ofshattering soughttoshattertotalityinordertototalizetheexperience bythe Inasocietyself-shattered (totamperwithoneofhisaphorisms). totalityof hits (ofsound,ofword,of image),to let oneselfbe shattered,

and meansto dissociate indeed,to presideoverone’sownshattering, of itsinvincibility. Butmoresigpreemptsociety’sarrogantassurance innificantly, it alsomeanskeepingthesecretsofone’sreconstitution pseudonym. Thus, tact,likethepoetwhochoosesan anagrammatic

whatisidentified as“Reflections fromDamaged Life”beginswitharethoughnowlonginvalidated, purminderofphilosophy’s permanent, pose:“theteaching ofthegoodlife.” Unfortunately effaced bymostreadersofthisremarkable anddisruptive book, Adorno’sintroductoryreminder—whichis, firstof all, a

reminderto himself—may be theboldestand mostdisruptivestatementina textrifewithsuchstatements. Foritworkslikeanimplantin

thereader’spsyche,whoseradiating half-life disruptstheseductive malaiseof life’sdamage.Theinvocationof “thegoodlife,”evenas something lostinthepast,actsaspreemptive shattering: asantimatter tothenuclearwasteofreifiedexistence. Ineffect,whetherspecifically intendedthiswayornot,Adornoestablishes thetermsforourcommitmenttotheoriginalpoliticalimpetusofthought,to whatdistinguishes philosophy as thelanguageofthepolis.Wereittocontinuetobetrueto itsname,philosophy mustworkforlife,notknowledge. Thereis,ofcourse,anabsurditytothiscommitment: Howcanphilosophyworkforlifeinaworldthathasemptiedlifeofallcontent,that hasmummified it intoa consumerfetish?Adorno’sanswer:thepositionofphilosophy mustbetracedinthemostextravagant shatteringof thisemptyshell,ina kindofmangledsubjectivity whosedeformedexpressionlendsitasingularity thatcannotbebreached—the languageof damagedlife.Thisextremeposition,whichseemsasfarfromthepoliticalnatureof“thegoodlife”asonecanthink,is,paradoxically, whatrestorestophilosophy its risk,makingprivatelifetheaim(andtarget)of rigorousmaterialist thought,thoughtfromthestandpoint ofthemortal.

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Muchto hiscredit,Adornodoesnotallowtheirreducible subjectivity ofhisthoughtto masquerade asa socialcollective project. One’spersonaldustisnottobepondered astheashesofculture. Whencultureis dead, the risk of thought is to encounter death as somethingalive, as

light-particles refracted intheglasscasesofacorpsemuseum. Adornolivedthedeathofexileintheartificial oasiswestofDeath Valley. Hehad theextraordinary fortunetotakea personalvisionrazor sharpenedby the NurembergRalliesout fora strollon Hollywood Boulevard. Itwasn’ttoohardtorealizethatthetechnology ofdeathnot onlyconsumed cultureinorderto survive,butactuallyproduced culturethatcouldkill.Cultureanddeathwenthandinhandinaslick businessarrangement thatshunnedthehassleofideological conflict. The cultivation ofstupiditybecamethemostrefinedartofan infinitely resourceful industry, andlifeitselfbecamecapitalism’s mostprofitable andmostelusivelyfetishizedcommodity. While,in Nuremberg, the spectacular horroroftheRallieswaseventually put ontrial(undera oftelosdressed asjustice), inHollywood, theattribution ofjusspectacle ticeandtheexperience ofhorrorbecameinsteadthemostprofitably ofasocietydeadsetonembalming life.Although marketed obsessions itisevidentthatAdorno’s senseofdamaged lifecomesasarepersonal sultoflivinginexile,a GermanJewwithoutGermany, thereisnoway to disputethathisreflections springfromtheencounter withthethen LosAngeles, California. lifeinlate-forties buddingindustryofdamaged Halfacenturylater,whiletheartofmassstupidityrestsonthecushthought,wearecalledonceagaintowrestlifeaway ionsofapocalyptic ata celofbrain-death Withthetechnology fromitsruthlessprofiteers. of realbodilydeathhasexpandedtoinebratedhigh,theproduction and innocent cludeagesthatnotlongagowouldhavebeenconsidered oflifeinstipreempting thesamekindoftechnological cute.Essentially network,or estabtutes one’shomeas a super telecommunications or schools, insecondary lishesmetaldetectorsforteenagegunslingers forthosewhowishtobeparentsagainst fertilization promotesartificial itisdetheodds.Lifeisvalued,protected,andproducedeverywhere valued, incapacitated,and abused.If capitalismcan claimto be immor-

tal,thatis preciselybecauseit hasmanagedto makeprofitabletechseemstobemore mortality ofbothdeathandbirth.Although nologies

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Beyond theDamaged Life

ideological fantasyis itsdailyreality, capitalism's andmoreexclusively immortality (whetheritisthe nowentirelycenteredonanapocalyptic virtualrealityofentertainment orofevangelism, itdoesn’tmatter).As a result,nothoughtseemstoemanatefromthemortalanylonger,the onlythoughtthat can be properlycalledphilosophical, the only thoughtthatis also,simultaneously, poetic.Greatis the ironythat showsanallegedpoliticsoflife(thehumanitarian impulse)risingout oftheindustryofdeath,a skillat whichso-calledcivilizedgovernmentsareparticularly adept.Butit’shardlyironicthatphilosophy and poetrycanexistagainonlyatthelimitoflife’scourse,thesoledimensionoflifethatcannotbedamaged.Mortality canberepressed, denied, conjuredaway,butitalwaysremainsintactandirrevocable beneaththe magician’s cloak.Theco-incidence ofphilosophy andpoetrycharacterizesthedefiance inherentintheaffirmation ofbeingmortalagainstall industriesofpromiseandphantasm,againstthedamagedlife.It is a boldandtryingaffirmation thatreturnstolifeitsownbeyond,ariskfor aplenitudethatcannotbetranscended. Lifeitselfdictatesthisriskwith thesameconfident simplicityandeasethattheconditions oftheworld todaydemandweactuponan old dilemma:socialismor barbarism.

NOTES

CHAPTER1

1. PierreMacherey, TheObject ofLiterature, trans.DavidMacey(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1995); Aquoipenselalittérature? (Paris:Presses deFrance,1990). Universitaires 2. SeeChapter4,below,entitled“Philosophy’s NeedforAntigone.” 3. SeeJean-LucNancyand PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe, TheLiteraryAbsolute:TheTheory ofLiterature in German Romaniticism, trans.PhilipBarnard andCherylLester(Albany:StateUniversity ofNewYorkPress,1988); L’Absolulittéraire(Paris:Seuil,1978).Incidentally, in his LaFictiondupolitique (Paris:ChristianBourgois,1988),Lacoue-Labarthe mentionsin passingthe curiousintersection betweenHeideggerandRomanticism, butthematteris otherwiseleftunattended.

4. JacquesDerridahastheorized whathecallsthesharedconditions ofpossibilitybetweenliteratureandthelawin hisincisiveessay“Devantla loi”; trans.AvitalRonellinKafka andtheContemporary Critical Performance, ed.Alan Udoff(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1987),128-49.Anattemptto

meditateonthemultiple strainsofthisco-incidence between lawandliterature (including specifically KafkaandDerrida’s essay)istakenupfromvariousanthesection“FromLawto whichcomprise glesinthethreechaptersthatfollow, Myth.” (1968) proearlyworkKnowledge andHumanInterests 5. JiirgenHabermas’s pointforthetrajectory Idescribe, thoughitseems videsanexemplary reference probablybecauseoftheauthor’sdogmatically tohavebeenlargelyforgotten, rationalist directioninrecentyears. incerthemeritofvariousargumentsforalatentmaterialism 6. Irecognize project,as PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe tain aspectsof the Romantic-Idealist (Paris:Galilée,1986]),or,moreredesmodernes claimsforHélderlin(L’Imitation

(TheIndivisible Remainder readingofSchelling Zizek’s provocative cently, Slavoj doesnotaffordmethespacetoencounter Thisoccasion [London:Verso,1996]). 343

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WereItodiscussthemindetail,howexceptsymptomatically. sucharguments, instances beinsertedintheoverarever,I wouldstillinsistthatsuchRomantic asI ofSpinozato thatofBergson, thatlinksthematerialism chingframework elaborate below. andperformaonthequestionofperformance literature 7. Thetheoretical of J.L. sincethe incorporation andagonistic, tivityhasbeenvast,pervasive, intoliterarytheory,JacquesDerperformatives Austin’stheoryoflinguistic in elaboration critique,andJudithButler’sgroundbreaking rida’swell-known praxis.In thisongoingdiscussion, racial,queer)bodily thecontextof(feminist, to theatricality. Myinthecruciallimithasbeentherelationofperformativity ofdiscussions assumesthislimitasarché,fullycogheritance ofthiscomplex resolution. Inventuringbackandforthbetweenanexnizantofitsimpossible anda modernunofthetheater(ofteninitsarchaicparameters) plicitlanguage ashistorical reality,Imaketherelationbetween derstanding ofperformativity itselftobethemethodological hingeofthe“litperformativity andtheatricality pointtothiscomplex ofdiseratureastheory”equation. Theclassicreference andPerformance, ed.AndrewParkerandEve cussionsremainsPerformativity Kosofsky Sedgwick (NewYork:Routledge, 1995). 8. StanleyRosenarguesthatthisperversealienation ofnaturehasanunquestionable sexualcontentandmakespoetrytheagentof “thetyrannyof Eros,”sothat“thequarrelbetweenphilosophyandpoetrymayseemessentiallytobea quarrelbetweensexualrestraintandsexuallicence.”See“The QuarrelbetweenPhilosophy andPoetry,” inTheQuarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry: Studies inAncient Thought (NewYork:Routledge, 1988), 4. g. Ibid.,26.

10.Thisisn’tto saythatsuchauthorsarecognizantoftheirworkasopeningstodeepworldlyunderstanding, nomatterhowradicaltheiraspirations maybe.Indeed,thislackofself-cognizance, whichnevershadesontothefact oftheirwork’sdeephistorical significance, isprecisely whatmakestheircase— thecaseofliterature astheory—a philosophical problem. It makesfora classic discrepancy inrepresentation, acognitive asymmetry thatreleases usbothfrom havingtosettlefortheories ofthe“poet-genius” andfromhavingtocounterargumentsofhistory’sultimateunrepresentability. Thisis,forme,thecruxofthe lessonfromArthurDanto’slongandmultivalent philosophical meditations on historyand culture.Seeindicatively, Connections to theWorld(NewYork: Harper&Row,1989)andthe essayscollectedas TheBody/ BodyProblem (Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press,1999). 11. SeeStanleyRosen,TheLimitsofAnalysis(New Haven:YaleUniversity Press,1985),19.

12.PierreMacherey, TheObject ofLiterature, 234.ManyofMacherey’s terms

throughouthisbook(theatricality, internaldistancing,nonpropositionalknowl-

edge,etc.)arecontiguous withmine,thoughhe ismorereluctanttobracketthe

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categories ofphilosophy outofthediscussion (hence, histermforliterature’s theoretical capacityis“literaryphilosophy”). 13.Thisentirecomplex ofarguments hasbeenelaborated insimilarfashion butfroman epistemological standpoint andwiththeconfidence andpanache ofonewellversedinthephilosophy ofscience byPaisley Livingston inLiterary Knowledge: Humanistic Inquiry andthePhilosophy ofScience (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1988).In his subsequent book,Literature asRationality: Ideasof Agency in Theory andFiction(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991), Livingston goesevenfurthertoassertthattheliterarydomainisfundamentally involved inallassumptions aboutagencyandrationality. 14.SeeRosen,TheLimits ofAnalysis, 16-17. 15.Thisis alsoconducted, onceagaininexemplary fashion—but interms thatpertaintotheproblemofcognitive philosophy, notliterature—by Rosenin TheLimits ofAnalysis. MylessonfromRosenpermeates thisentirediscussion. 16.HenriBergson, whoinhisownwaysoughttoarticulate peculiarmeans ofintuitiveknowledge, recognized thatthesuppleness ofthisrelentlessly geometricmodeofphilosophical (“thecomplicated withthe syllogism machinery powertocrush”)wasduetoSpinoza’s opennesstohisownintuitivecoincidencewiththeobjectofcognition, “anintuitionwhichnoformula, nomatter howsimple,canbesimpleenoughtoexpress.” (SeeBergson, TheCreative Mind, trans.MabelleL.Andison[NewYork:Philosophical Library,1946],113).Interestingly,LouisAlthussersimilarlyacknowledges Spinoza’s influencein his posthumously publishednoteson Spinozain L’Unique traditionmatérialiste (Paris:Stock,1992). Hespeaksoftheparadoxthatthemostgeometric (hence, “dogmatic”) modeofthinkingproducesanimmeasurable liberation inmental processes.

readingofSpinoza, Antonio 17.Ontheotherhand,inhisgroundbreaking notionoftheimaginacarefully, Spinoza’s Negriarguesthat,whenexamined force:it is themeansbywhichthesocial tionisshowntowielda constitutive evenif oftenagainstthetermsofitsveryexiscreatesitsuniverse, collective right ofitsfaculties, perversedesirefortheself-occultation tence.Humanity’s doesnotminimize itsradicalcreative downtoitsdesireforself-enslavement, power.(Afterall,therecan be no senseof radicalcreationwithouta simultane-

onacarefulreading Negribaseshisargument oussenseofradicaldestruction.) thewritingof thetextthatinterrupted Treatise, ofSpinoza’s Theologico-Political to Spinozism Negrigoesbeyondtraditional theEthicsforfiveyears(1665-70). butindeed digression, isnotmerelyan innocuous arguethatthisinterruption Inthisrespect,thetwotextsbelongtogetherinaconoftheEthics. arefounding one Thus,Negriconcludes, outof theirmutualinterruption. tinuumcomposed imagination) canonlyreadSectionIIoftheEthics(inwhichSpinozadiscusses the Fromthisstandpoint, Treatise. in theinterruptive throughits restaging does himself faculty, thoughSpinoza looksforwardtotheintuitive imagination

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trans.Michael Anomaly, explicit.SeeTheSavage notmakesucha connection Universityof MinnesotaPress,1991),esp.86-119. Hardt (Minneapolis: trans.RobertHurley(San PracticalPhilosophy, 18.GillesDeleuze,Spinoza:

Francisco: CityLights,1988). inSpinoza,” (Intuition) “TheThirdWayofKnowledge 19.H.G.Hubbeling, StudiaSpinozana 2(1986):219-31. in the Ethics,” 20.EtienneBalibar,“ANoteon Consciousness/Conscience

8(1992): 49-50. StudiaSpinozana 21.Ibid.,48. even 22.ThepreciserelationbetweenSpinozaandBergsonisproblematic, anddivergence. Byanyacparadoxical, withvariouspointsof convergence thetraithere;however, count,itwouldtakemefarafieldtotryto disentangle of positionsdespitethe jectoryofmy argumentimpliesa definitecontiguity particofthisrelation, different social-historical terms.Foraprecisediscussion in seePierreTrotignon, “Bergson et Spinoza,” ularlyintheFrenchtradition, Spinozaau XXémesiécle,ed. Olivier Bloch(Paris:Presses Universitairesde France,1992),3-12.

23.Bergson, TheCreative Mind,32.(Henceforth quotedinthetextasCM,followedbypagenumber.) Thisbook,published asLaPensée etlemouvant (1934), was Bergson’s lastpublication:it isa collectionoftexts(includingtheclassices-

say“Introduction a lamétaphysique,” originally writtenin1903)meanttorepresenta criticalretrospective ofhisfundamental philosophical arguments, particularlythosepertaining tointuitionandduration. 24. Forthefirst,seeDurationandSimultaneity, trans.LeonJacobson(New York:Bobbs-Merrill, 1965;orig.pub.1922);forthe second,MatterandMemory,trans. N. M.Pauland W.S. Palmer,trans. (New York:Zone Books,1991;

orig.pub.1896).WilliamJamesrespondedto Bergson’s workwithevident generosity(and withclearunderstanding of his philosophical impetus, whichBergsonhimselfproudlyconfirmed), primarilyby recognizingin Bergsona greatweaponagainstneo-Kantianism. SeeJames,“Bergson and HisCritiqueof Intellectualism,” in A Pluralistic Universe (NewYork:Longman,1909),223-74.

25.GillesDeleuze, Bergsonism, trans.HughTomlinson andBarbaraHabberjam(Cambridge, Mass.:ZoneBooks,1991; orig.pub.1966), 31-32. 26. SeeGastonBachelard,LaDialectique de ladurée(Paris:PressesUniversi-

tairesde France,1950),19.

27.Nonetheless, toremember Rosen’s insight,the twoarelinkedina curiousdialectic withoutwhichtheirsingularity isdebilitating: “Without intuition, thereisateachstagenothing toanalyze. Intuition (ofsyntheses orunities)withoutanalysisis mute,butanalysiswithoutintuitionis inarticulate aswellas blind:thesoundsit utterscannotbe distinguished fromnoise”(TheLimitsof

Analysis,10).

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28.SeeBergson, TheTwoSources ofMorality andReligion, trans.R.Ashley Audraand Cloudesley Brereton(University ofNotreDamePress,1977;orig. pub.1932). Thisworksignalsa retreatfromBergson’s previouspositions, becauseit repealsthematerial dynamism ofthesubject-object relationin orderto giveexclusive privilege totheélanvital.Thus,whilerecognizing thathumanity’smythmaking force(whichincludes religion) isadefensive mechanism that shieldshumanityfromthe consequences ofits capacityto create/destroy its world—thus accepting theself-occultation ofradicalcreativity—he nonetheless constructs a hierarchical, evolutionary schema, whichespouses thesuperiority of“civilized” religionoverprimitive mythandcelebrates a mystical adherence ofthelifeforcetohumanity’s metaphysical potential.TheevolutionofBergson’sworkintomysticism doesnotmean,however, thathistheorization ofintuitionor memory, as heterogeneous materialtemporalities, is retrospectively tainted.Although onemightarguethatBergson’s latemystical vitalism ispredicatedonhisprivilege ofintuitiveknowledge overintellectual consciousness, onecanequallyarguethatthereisnonecessary, or evolutionpredetermined, aryrelation thetwophases.Thecrucialdifference, between however, isthatthe secondpositionassumesa fundamental inthoughtandeschews heterogeneity totalizing evaluations ofa thinker’s work. 29.Theexemplary workinthisregardisRichardMartin’s TheLanguage of Heroes: Speech andPerformance in theIliad(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press, 1989). Martin’s thattodiscussmythin groundbreaking argument demonstrates termsofitsperformativity isnottoimposeonitcontemporary butto categories returnit toitsfundamental lostsometime inthenineteenth historical element, centurywhenGreekmyth,particularly, viatheconvergence ofRomantic nawasthoroughly narrativized. tionalism andphilhellenism, 30.ErnstCassirer’s seminaltreatiseonmythicthoughtcomprises thewhole ofSymbolic Forms, trans.RalphManheim(New ofvolume2 of ThePhilosophy Press,1955.SeealsohisLanguage andMyth,trans.SuHaven:YaleUniversity sanneLanger(NewYork:Dover,1953). intheirMyths? AnEssay ontheConBelieve 31.SeePaulVeyne,DidtheGreeks Press, ofChicago transPaulaWissing (Chicago: University stitutive Imagination, ThesameargumentismadeexpertlybyMarcelDetienne 1988; orig.pub.1983). Mass.: Greece, trans.JanetLloyd(Cambridge, ofTruthinAncient inTheMasters ZoneBooks,1996;orig.pub.1967).IproceedwithVeyne,largelybecausehis oftheancientwiththemodernsignifiprojectattemptsa similarcoarticulation isconcerned thoughmoreinfluential, Detienne’s treatise, canceofthemythical. itisnotdiofalétheia andlessthatofmythos—hence, morewiththeelucidation of toanydiscussion rectlypertinentto thisessay,thoughsurelyindispensable inthingsGreek. investment theHeideggerian ofit,inevi32.Plato’sfondnessforwritingmythandhisexpertexecution knotof againstit,hasbeentheGordian tohissternpolemic dentcontradiction

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decisionon sincetheoutset.Therecanbeno objective commentary Platonist Themost ishardlycertainthatitevenisa contradiction. thiscontradiction—it gesquestion, tomymind,istodecidewhetherPlato’smythological interesting signofhiswork,anelementof asthesocial-historical turesaretobeinterpreted constitutively poorwhetherthereissomething ofproduction,” its“conditions or not,weshallnever andPlato(wittingly thinking, eticaboutphilosophical In know)engageswithitsverycoreandindeedsetsthetermsofthediscussion. withoutsometheoretical philosophy cannotbeconfronted eithercase,Plato’s task. articulation ofmyth.I cannotpresumeheretotakeupsuchamonumental I do underline,however,that the exileof the poets from the citywas a political

imaginary: decisionthatputintoquestionthecoreelementofthedemocratic ofmythinthetheater. thecommunal performance Nancy,LeMytheNazi(Paris: andJean-Luc 33.SeePhilippeLacoue-Labarthe L’Aube,1991).An earlierversionof the text was translatedby BrianHolmes

as“TheNaziMyth”inCritical Inquiry16(Winter1990):291-312. andpublished adjustments Allquotations referto theEnglishtranslationwithoccasional quotedinthetextandmarkedas basedontherevisedFrenchtext;henceforth NM,followed bypagenumberstoEnglishandFrencheditions. 34.QuotingHitler,theauthorsconsiderself-formation tobe realizedand incarnated in “thesacredcollective egoismwhichis theNation”(NM,310/ 66).Thoughindisputable asanassessment oftheNazimyth,thisself-identitarianlogicbecomes inturntheideological keystone oftheessay’s commitment to provingthatmythisNazi,whichraisesallsortsofproblems. 35.I havediscussedthisat lengthin “Homologia/Apologia: TheWritingof NationalHistory,” inDream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, andtheInstitutionofModernGreece (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,1996),227-66. 36.Thelistofevents,in myterms,wouldbemuchwiderandmorecontradictorythanNancyandLacoue-Labarthe presume.Itwouldinclude,forexample,BertoltBrecht’s inimitable modeofepictheaterinconjunction withHanns Eisler’s radicalmusicalpraxis,aswellastheirgraveantagonist inthe1930s: the Nuremberg Rallies. Brecht’s andEisler’s collaboration duringtheirexileinthe extraordinary Hollywooder Liederbuch is alsoan extensionof this tradition, thoughindisjointed fashion,as thelyricvoice,strippedof itstheatrical exigency(thelyricofa lifewithouta polis),isdramatizedsolelybyitsformalcoincidence witha musicalidiomconscious ofitsfragmented performativity, of itscommunal groundlessness. Likewise, thesceneofwritingtheseminalDialektik derAufklirung, in thesameexilictopos,is Horkheimer andAdorno’s ownelaboration ofthefragmented performative horizonofthemusic-drama in therealmof speculative/critical thought.Thesetwocollaborative instances shouldbe readcontrapuntally as emergingfromthe samegeographical, methodological, imaginary ground.Inthe1960s, wefindthisprinciple atwork inmuchofthenewGermancinema(Fassbinder, Kluge,Syberberg) and,more

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recently, in theremarkable musicalstagingsofHeinerMiillerby thecomposer HeinerGoebbels. 37. See,indicatively, MarcelGauchet’s grand(evenifmaculate)TheDisenchantment oftheWorld, trans.OscarBurge(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1997). Thisbrilliantbook,as wellas theenormoussubjectoftherelation betweenmythand monotheism, ispartlythe focusofmycurrentprojecton sublimation and thesecularimagination. 38.Onthenotionofthe monomythical, seeOdoMarquard’s brilliant“In Praiseof Polytheism: On Monomythical and Polymythical Thinking,” in Farewell toMattersofPrinciple (Oxford: Odeon,1989), 87-110.Hisargument is unequivocal: monomythical thinking(whichreferstoanysystemofthought thatoperatesunder a singulararché,rangingfrommonotheism tonihilism) detheworldintoastateofnarrative mythologizes atrophy. Hecallsinstead forthe sortofactionthatwilllocatethe polymythical elementin thecontemporary world,whichistoopenoneselftopoeticdaring,tocomfortwithfictionality, andtotheindefinitesplintering ofpower,beingfullycognizant ofthecostof learningtooperateunderone’sinterminable contingency. 39.Thiswouldbeanotherwaytooutmaneuver thePlatonicproblematic, which,inseekingtodiscredit mythinfavorofphilosophy, proclaimed thedisjunctionoftheconsubstantial meaningofmythosandlogos(asitexistedinthe Greektradition priortoPlato),butintheprocess endedupinapermanent, antagonistic lock-horns betweenthetwotermsthattyrannizes ourdiscussions to thisday.Fora focusedinsightintothisconfiguration, seeLucBrisson, Platon, les motsetlesmythes: Comment etpourquoi Platonnomme lemythe? (Paris:LaDécouverte,1994).

(Washington, D.C.:Library Mann,TheTheme oftheJoseph Novels 40. Thomas ofCongress,1942),21. (Cambridge, Work onMyth,trans.RobertM.Wallace 41.HansBlumenberg, here,whichIcannot Mass.:MITPress,1985;orig.pub.1979),x.Theimplication Blusublimation. pursue,is thatinFreudiantermsmythisa modeofcollective

andinterestand complexity withFreudisofenormous menberg’s contiguity deservesa studyallitsown. 42.SeeErnstCassirer,TheMythoftheState(NewHaven:YaleUniversity Press,1946),282-84. doesnotsignifya tran43.It goeswithoutsayingthat thetranshistorical

it couldbeseenasthedeep-historiOnthecontrary, ofthehistorical. scendence and betweennecessity cal,the coreformedandanimatedby theco-incidence contingency.

CHAPTER 2 1. Theremarkis madeasa critiqueofpeacefulcivilrightsmarchestothe

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critiqueis relentless,but As always,Malcolm’s tuneof “WeShallOvercome.”

whichendows double-entendre, Themusical beargued. thepointcanscarcely gestureof allusionto dance(asthe co-incident violencewiththe celebratory oratorygeofMalcolm’s throwing a punch),isoneofthenumerousinstances

ed.GeorgeBreitman(NewYork:Grove,1966),9. X Speaks, nius.SeeMalcolm Legal oftheWestern TheFormation LawandRevolution: 2. HaroldJ.Berman, Press,1983),8. Mass.:HarvardUniversity Tradition (Cambridge, (SeeTheImagiCastoriadis. herebelongstoCornelius 3. Theterminology [Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, Blamey ofSociety, trans.Kathleen naryInstitution naturalantinomy Castoriadis, I shouldaddthattheallegedly 1987].) Following betweenindividualand society,whichin allessencedoesnot exist(societyis a

isalways a socialentity)surfaces ofindividuals andtheindividual community social-imaginary institution. alongwiththisparticular tobeoneoftheworld’smost inparticular, continues 4. American society, In ofinstitutional secularization. societies whileremaining a showcase religious a brilliantexcavathe“Secular,” MarciaIanprovides hercurrentworkAmerica, hasbeenthe arguingthatinAmerica“secularization tionofthiscontradiction, engine,the method,of itssacralization”sincethe timeof the Declarationof In-

of Independence.” dependence, whichsheaptlyrefiguresasthe“Incarnation Fromthisposition, sheisabletoreadthehistorical particularity ofAmerican society, withallofitsbizarrefeatures, astheresistance oftheallegedly“secular”institution tobonafidesecularlife. 5. 1amnotignoringtherelationbetweenlogosandnomos, encapsulated by thedoublemeaningofLatinJex.ButIchoosetobracketthisparticularreductionofthelegaltologos, whichhasnothingtodowithGreekthoughtandisaltogetherduetothewritingofaChristianmetaphysics (awritingthatwasinaugurated intheGreeklanguage butdisfigured itsphilosophical idiom).This resolutely un-Greek metaphysics institutes anewnotionofnomos bythebizarre conception ofan impregnated logos: lexanimata, thepeculiarlawoftheWord becoming flesh.Whatmattersinsteadisto traceEnlightenment law,inallits ambivalence andduplicity, tothemythicframework thatanimates itsexistence. 6. ConsiderHorkheimer andAdorno’s famousphrase:“Theprogramofthe Enlightenment wasthedisenchantment of theworld[Entzauberung derWelt]. It wantedtodispelmyths,tooverthrow fantasywithknowledge” (Dialectic ofEnlightenment, trans.EdmundJephcott[Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress,2002],

1).Thisrefiguration ofthewell-known Weberian notionliterallysuggeststhe abandonment ofmagicastheoperational forceoftheuniverse, anditreflects theratherstandardEnlightenment viewofreligionassuperstition andfanaticism.It doesnotmeantheabolitionof myth;if anything,Horkheimer and Adorno’s essaycontemplates precisely therepressed mythological powerof Reasonandallthedestructive energiesthisrepression entails.Thatthisdisenchantmentof theworld,whichin effectconstitutes the particularity of our

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351

modernity, established itselfwithsuchenormous enchanting powerisanother wayto registerthehistoryoftheproblemraisedhere.Thisstoryhasbeenwrittenout with profoundinsightby MarcelGauchetin LeDésenchantement du monde(Paris:Gallimard, 1985). 7. ImmanuelKant,Groundwork oftheMetaphysics ofMorals andWhatisEnlightenment? trans.LewisWhiteBeck(NewYork:Macmillan, 1985), 86. 8. Kant’snotionofpublicandprivateis theoppositeofhowweconceive thesetoday:“Thepublicuseofone’sreasonmustalwaysbefree,andit alone canbringenlightenment amongmen.Theprivateuseofreason,ontheother hand,mayoftenbeverynarrowly restricted withoutparticularly hindering the progressofenlightenment. Bythepublicuseofone’sreasonI understand the usewhicha personmakesofitasa scholarbeforethereadingpublic.Private useI callthatwhichonemaymakeofit ina particularcivil[biirgerlichen] post or officewhichis entrustedto him” (“WhatIs Enlightenment?” 87).In other words,one’sprivate (individual)thoughtshouldenterthe publicdomainunhindered,whileone’scivicduty (ineffect,thedutyto one’sclass)is conceived

astheState’sprivatedomainandistobestrictlyadministered. Thisishowwe recognize thefullenthronement ofthebourgeois State,despitethemonarchy’s claimtorule. g. EtienneBalibar, “Citizen Subject,” trans.JamesB.Swenson, inWhoComes AftertheSubject? ed.EduardoCadavaetal.(NewYork:Routledge, 1991),33-57.

10.EtienneBalibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies onPolitics andPhilosophy beforeandafterMarx,trans.JamesB.Swenson(NewYork:Routledge, 1994),39-60. desdroitsde‘homme(Paris:Gallimard, 11. See:MarcelGauchet,LaRévolution

MacmilTheory, andtheFrench Revolution (London: 1989); BrianSinger,Society, lan,1986);Peter Fitzpatrick,“The DesperateVacuum’:Imperialismand Lawin

Revoluin Post-Modern Law:Enlightenment, of Enlightenment,” theExperience UniverEdinburgh tion,andtheDeathofMan,ed.AnthonyCarty(Edinburgh: sityPress,1990),90-106.

of Independence, Declaration America: Jefferson's 12.GarryWills,Inventing (New York:Vintage,1979).

ofthisimitation ofdivinenaming,inrelation 13.Foran incisive discussion see attemptto theorizeit in TheSocialContract, to Rousseau’s particularly of andthePossibility “IntheNameoftheLaw,”in Deconstruction SamuelWeber,

Justice,ed. DrucillaCornell,MichelRosenfeld,DavidGrayCarlson(New York:

Routledge,1992),232-53.

historythathingesonthe ofa longandcontradictory 14.Thisis evidence Reason beingworwhichfirstledtotheGoddess notionofde-Christianization, decrees shipedinsidethewallsofNotreDameandsoonafter,withtheofficial Thishistorytestifiestotheprofound ofYear2,tothecultoftheSupremeBeing. thoughtattheheartoftheEnlightbetweensecularandtheological ambiguity case.Itisdifisaparadigmatic ofwhichtheFrenchRevolution enmentproject,

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Notes

nexttotheNaOntheonehand,forexample, ficultto separatethedomains. for existeda popularmovement decreedde-Christianization tionalAssembly's worship(whichevenraisesthequestionofhow fromChristian emancipation On intheprovinces). had everbeenimplemented Christianization effectively a Catholiccountry,therevolutheotherhand,whileFranceremainsculturally embeddedinitsconis profoundly ofde-Christianization tionaryexperience TheRevolution SeeMichelVovelle, socialandculturalframework. temporary PolityPress,1991). againsttheChurch,trans.AlanJosé(Cambridge: 15. PeterFitzpatrickarguesthesamematterin differentterms:“[with]the

oftheDeity,law’srangeof of theEnlightenment domestication embodiment determinationbecomesinfinite”(““TheDesperateVacuum,’”93).Seealso notionofthecannibalization ofdivinelawand violencein StéphaneLojkine’s philosophique (“Langages et poétiquedu Dictionnaire Voltaire’s Dictionnaire voltairien,”Littératures 32[Spring1995]:35-59). 16.Seethebrilliantandexhilarating insightintothereciprocal determinationbetweenthetextualandthepoliticalimagination ofrevolutionary America inMichael Warner’s TheLetters oftheRepublic (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1990).

17.Here,andformuchofthissection,Iammerelyoutlining JacquesDerrida’spositionin “Forceof Law:‘TheMysticalFoundationof Authority,’”in

Deconstruction andthePossibility ofJustice, ed.Cornelletal.,3-67. 18.SeeWalterBenjamin, “Critique ofViolence,” trans.EdmundJephcott, in Benjamin, Reflections (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,Jovanovich, 1978),277-300; “Zar Kritikder Gewalt,”in Gesammelte SchriftenII-I (Frankfurta.M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 179-203. Henceforth citedinthetextasCVfollowed bypage numbersofEnglishandGermaneditions,withoccasional adjustments tothe translation. 19.RobertCover,“TheBondsofConstitutional Interpretation: OftheWord, theDeed,andtheRole,”Georgia LawReview 20,no.4(1986): 820. 20. Ibid.,819-20.Seealso RobertCover,“Violenceand the Word,”YaleLaw Journal95,no.8 (1986):1610.

21.Tothisend,thereismuchtolearnfromPierreClastres’s brilliantobservations,notonlyinhismonumental Society againsttheState(1974), but alsoin oneofhislastwritingsbeforehisuntimelydeath:“Archéologie de laviolence: LaGuerredanslessociétésprimitives”(1977).Clastresarguesthat primitive societyischaracterized byanimmanent centrifugal logicthatprevents“theexternalization ofa unifyinglaw,”theunifyinglogicoftheOnethateventually takesoverthereinsof representation. Fora primitive society, thediscourse of theOneisthepoweroftheOther,theradicalannihilating alteritythateventuallybecomestheState.Civilization takesplacewhenthislawofalterity(exonomy)becomes institutionalized asarché.

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353

22. SeeCover,“Violenceand the Word,”1604;Derrida,“Forceof Law,”

33-36.

23. HannahArendt,On Violence (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,andCo.,1969),

9.Henceforth citedinthetextasV,followed bypagenumber. 24.HenceArendt'sinability to appreciate inhercritiquetherevolutionary powerof the mythicalfigurations ofviolenceonefindsin GeorgesSorelor FrantzFanon,whichcallsforan imagination ofviolencethatremainsnoninstrumentalist at thecore.Fora thoughtful discussion ofthisentireintersection ofarguments, viewedthroughtheprismofproblemsincontemporary theory, seeBeatrice Hanssen,Critique ofViolence: Between Poststructuralism andCritical Theory (NewYork:Routledge, 2000). 25.EtienneBalibar, “Violence etpolitique: Quelques questions,” inLePassagedesfrontiéres (Paris:Galilée,1994),207.

26.Surely,myargumentitselfbetraysa certainkindof formalism. I acthedailyexknowledge thatfromthestandpointoftheindividualpoliceman ofa perienceislikeanyotherjob,differingonlyintheradicalunpredictability likeany gamutofemotionsfromboredomtofearforone’slife.Nonetheless, otherjob,thisjobhasitsownuniquesocialnatureinwhichindividual experienceisultimately subsumed. Understanding thesymbolic relationbetweenthe policeandthelawwouldnotbeanybetterservedbyfocusingon individual experience thanit wouldbyfocusingonthephenomenon of masspolicecorruption(thatis,criminalbehaviorina strictsense). 27. In additionto Cover’s“Violenceand theWord,”seehis “Nomosand 97,no.1(1983):4-68.ForinsightfulcommenNarrative,”HarvardLawReview

see:AustinSaratandThomasR.Kearns, taryonRobertCover’sproblematic, ofViolence,” in The Towarda Jurisprudence “AJourneythroughForgetting: ofMichigan Press, FateoftheLaw,ed.SaratandKearns(AnnArbor:University in and Law’sViolence,” 1991),209-73and DouglasHay,“Time,Inequality, ed. Saratand Kearns(AnnArbor:Universityof MichiganPress, Law’sViolence, 1992),141-73.

28.Derrida,“Forceof Law,”40.

in KafkaandtheCon29. See LawrenceRickels,“Kafkaand theAero-Trace,”

IndianaUniversity ed.AlanUdoff(Bloomington: Critical Performance, temporary Press,1987),111-27.

appendixin ErnestoLaclau, Discourse-Analysis,” 30.SlavojZizek,“Beyond in OurTime(London:Verso,1990),257. ontheRevolution NewReflections andthe 31.JacquesDerrida,“Devantla loi,”trans.AvitalRonnel,in Kafka citedinthetextasDL,fol141.Henceforth CriticalPerformance, Contemporary lowedbypagenumber. Brief 2 (AmASCA Called‘Literary,’ “ARelation Gasché, 32.SeeRodolphe sterdam,1994):26. conceptionof myth consistently 33. I would not considerBenjamin’s

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of Violence,” soattheendof “Critique althoughthisis certainly monotheistic, epic and Brecht’s laterencounterwithSurrealism anearlypiece.Benjamin’s myth, theaterwillalterhis responseto myth.Weshallreturnto Benjamin, “Theatrical forming thesection inthetwochapters andperformativity Kafka, Matters.” Theoretical in WalterBenjamin: Violence,” 34.SeeTomMcCall,“Momentary StanfordUniversityPress,1996),188, Questions, ed.DavidS.Ferris(Stanford:

paradoxisnotdistantfrommine,although 192.McCall's readingofBenjamin mythasthe Whileheconsiders ofmythisantithetical. icallyourunderstanding as“theauthorityto namethe seamlessly” speechactthat“suturesexperience ambiguous, indeedundeconstructible, perfor‘real,’” Iseeitastheprofoundly manceoftheallegorical asreal. ofMorals,19. oftheMetaphysics 35.Kant,Groundwork ne36.Thisis the premiseof GillianRose’sbrilliantand unfortunately (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). glectedDialectic ofNihilism 37.See,forexample,J.HillisMiller,TheEthicsofReading (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,1987). Thisreadingisa well-known instanceina long

historyofdiscussions ofthiskeytropeinKantianthinking. Presiding overall suchreadingsisHansVaihinger’s monumental ThePhilosophy of“AsIf”[1914], trans.C.K.Ogden(London: Routledge andKeganPaul,1924), whichattempts, notunlikeErnstCassirer’s enormousprojectofoutliningsociety’s production ofsymbolic forms,totheorizephilosophy’s “inherent” drivetowardfictionalization.However, I wouldarguethatVaihinger’s conceptualframeworkremainsconstrained bytheterminology ofmorality, sothatthefundamental performativity (indeed,theatricality) ofthe“asif”imperative is conceptualized strictlyintermsoffictionality astheadverseoftruth. 38.Weber,“IntheNameoftheLaw,”246-47. 39.Forthefullrangeofthepsychoanalytic implications of thisissue,I defer

toRenataSalecl’s excellent argument in“Democracy andViolence,” NewFormations14(1991):17-26.

40.Consider oneofthemanyobservations onthismatterbyCornelius Castoriadis,whosemeditation ontheproblemofself-limitation isthemostradical: “Inaheteronomous society, theinternalization ofthelaws,inthewidestsense oftheterm,wouldbeuselessifitwerenotaccompanied bytheinternalization ofthesupreme lawormeta-law ‘Thoushaltnotputlawsintoquestion.’ ”See “Psychoanalysis andPolitics,” in World inFragments, trans.DavidAmesCurtis (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1997),16.

41.1elaborate onthisspecific issuein “Philosophy’s NeedforAntigone,” below.Theoverallorientation ofmyargument here,despitedifferences onthe details,owesa greatdealto VassilisLambropoulos’s boldmeditationon the Greeklanguageofjudgmentandjusticein“TheRuleofJustice,”Thesis Eleven

40(1995): 1-24.

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42.understandtheproblem ofusingthisconventional term,correctly criticizedbyvariousJewishscholars asanabusiveChristian notionofcontinuous revelation, whichultimately subsumes JudaismwithintheChristianideologicalprogram.Thepolitical expediency ofmakingupthisterminordertoconsolidatea specificnational-cultural imaginaryinAmerican societyshouldbe evident.Yetmypurposehereistogobeyond a senseofhistoryin whichreligiousdoctrinal differences areofprimaryorder,soas toforeground theepistemological commongroundthatprovidesthe substantial linkin the “JudeoChristian”and remainsthe single,mostadversarial, elementto themythic: monotheism. 43.Alongtheselines,seeVivekDhareshwar’s exceptional essay“TheTrial ofPagans,”CulturalDynamics 8,no.2(1996): 119-35. Onecrucialargumentin thisessay,whosepolitical-theological detailsIhopetotakeuponanotheroccasion,is Dhareshwar'’s claimthatforpaganculturestheotherisnota problem, inthesensethatit isnota problem tobe solved,tobecomprehended within one’sowntermsof understanding. Thecontemplation oftheotherinpagan culturetakesplaceintermsthatdefinethepractices oftheother—“pagan culturesnotonlyhavenousefora theoryof culturaldifference, theywouldnot evenunderstandwhatthat means”(123).

44.According toDerrida’s argumentin “Devant laloi,”140-41. CHAPTER3

1. SeeStathisGourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, andthe Institution ofModern Greece (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press,1996), chap.1 (esp.20-22)and 160-63.

andLeoStrauss:TheHiddenDialogue, 2. SeeHeinrichMeier,CarlSchmitt UniversityofChicagoPress,1995),andThe trans.J. HarveyLomax(Chicago: Political Theology ontheDistinction between FourChapters Lesson ofCarlSchmitt: ofChicago University Philosophy, trans.MarcusBrainard(Chicago: andPolitical Press,1998).

(Cologne: Lebenin zweiDiktaturen 3. HeinerMiiller,KriegohneSchlacht: &Witsch,1992),272. Kiepenhauer intheHistory theCurrent: Essays Sorel,”inAgainst 4. IsaiahBerlin,“Georges of Ideas(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1981),315. here,whichI don’thavethe 5. Theremaybea finebutcrucialdifference as sympspaceto develop.SchmittwasdisturbedbyJewishcosmopolitanism sigwiththejuridical-theoretical tomaticofterritoriallack,givenhisobsession entity.Inaddition,hisanti-Semiconcrete geographical ofapeople’s nificance Thereisextensive enmity. tismmayalsohavebeenfueledbyprofoundreligious der Jahre1947-1951(Berlin: Aufzeichnungen evidenceof this in Glossarium:

Spinoza onSpinoza. 1991), asinthemanyvirulentattacks &Humblot, Duncker

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enemyforSchmittbecausehebearstheanathemaof emergesasa formidable beingbothan atheistand a Jew.

6. The Italianliteratureon this matteris vast.In English,see:Berlin,

“GeorgesSorel,”325-27;DarrowSchechter,“TwoViewsof the Revolution: Ideas12,no.5 (1990):637-53HistoryofEuropean Gramsciand Sorel,1916-1920,”

7. SeeWyndhamLewis,TheArtofBeingRuled(NewYork:Haskell,1972; orig.pub. 1926);T.E.Hulme,“Reflectionson Violence”(1916),in Speculations: ed.HerbertRead(London: ofArt(1924), onHumanism andthePhilosophy Essays

249-60. andKeganPaul,1987), Routledge 8. HenriBergson,Mélanges,ed.AndréRobinet(Paris:PressesUniversitaires

SeealsoShlomoSand,“Quelquesremarde France,1972),971,mytranslation. Sorel1 (1983): créatrice,” CahiersGeorges quessurSorel:Critiquede l’Evolution

Philosophy andFrenchPolitical Doctrines: 101-23; EllenKennedy, “Bergson’s 15,no. 1 andOpposition Sorel,Maurras,Péguy,andde Gaulle,”Government

(1980): 75-91.

surla violence in the and SchmittreadSorel’sRéflexions g. BothBenjamin original,asit wasn’ttranslateduntil1928(byBenjamin’s friendGottfriedSalomon,withthe“Benjaminian” titleUberdieGewalt). ErnstBloch,HugoBall, GeorgLukacs,andBertoltBrechtwereallfamiliarwithSorel’spositions. See Chryssoula Kambas, “Walter Benjamin liestGeorges Sorel:Réflexions surlaviolence,”in AbereinSturmwehtvomParadieseher,ed. MichaelOpitz and Erdmut

Wiziska(Leipzig:Reclam,1992),250-69.

10.CarlSchmitt, TheCrisisofParliamentary Democracy, trans.EllenKennedy (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,1988),56;Diegeistesgeschichtliche LagedesheutigenParliamentarismus (Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1996;orig.pub.1923),68. Henceforth citedinthetextasCP,withpagereferences toEnglishandGerman respectively; thetranslation ismodified whennecessary. Incidentally, notethe centrality ofEntwicklung inEduardBernstein's criticalreconstruction ofMarxismandtheself-fashioning ofsocialdemocracy, a termwhichSorelexplicitly andvehemently discards. 11.ForSchmitt, thisshifttothemethodology ofartconstitutes “apoliticsof unmediatedly concrete life”andgivesrisetoa politicaltheoryofmyth,ashe puts it in an articleon SorelwrittenconcurrentlywithTheCrisisofParliamentary

Democracy, in whichseveralparagraphsarereproducedverbatim.See “Die politischeTheoriedesMythus”(1923),in Positionen undBegriffe (Hamburg: HanseatischeVerlagsanstalt,1940),9-18.

12.SeeLeszekKolakowski’s “Georges Sorel:AJansenistMarxism,” inMain

CurrentsofMarxism,trans.P.S,Falla(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978),2:

149-74. 13.Georges Sorel,“PourLénine”(1919), publishedasappendixto thelast editionofRéflexions surlaviolence. 14.GeorgesSorel,Réflexions surlaviolence (Paris:MarcelRiviére,1919;orig.

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357

pub.1908),29;translatedas Reflections onViolence byT.E.Hulme(NewYork: PeterSmith,1941;orig.pub.1915),19.Allsubsequent references appearinthe textas RV,with Englishand Frenchpage numbersrespectively.The translation

hasoccasionally beenaltered. 15.In a recentanalysisof Schmitt(withoutinvokingSorel),SlavojZizek reachesthesameconclusion. Although thepositionofproletarian revolutionaryactionisobviously linkedtothepredicament oftheworking classandthe historical conditions oftheworkers’ movement, itcannotbereducedto a determinist causalrelation, inwhichclassdetermines political action.Proletarian violenceunveilsthetruthoftheclassstruggle, notbecauseit expresses a class interestpureandsimple,butbecauseit recognizes andexposestheclassinterestinallsocialantagonism. Precisely becausetheproletarian position,asasubjective commitment torevolutionary action,establishes theclassstruggle asthe lawofsocialantagonism, onecanengagein political praxisbeyondhis/her classposition. SeeZizek,“CarlSchmitt intheAgeofPost-Politics,” inTheChallengeofCarlSchmitt, ed.ChantalMouffe(London: Verso,1999), 18-37. 16.Here,thequestion ofwhethertheresultofagivenhistorical actionmay ormaynotcorrespond withitsimagined contentisirrelevant. Fromthestandpointofrevolutionary desire/vision,itiscertainly thattheimaginary irrelevant oftheOctoberrevolutiondroveitselftosuicideinKronstada fewyearslater. Asweknowfromhistory,thisdidnotmeanthedeathofthefactofworkers’ councils(theirhistoricalexistence,potentialand actual),nor did it meanthe

abolitionoftheirintrinsicrevolutionary content. 17.ThisiswhycritiquessuchasErnstFraenkel’s, whichattempttoarticulatethe relationbetweenSorelandSchmittas paralleltendencies, aremisguided.Fraenkel hasnoconceptual framework withinwhichtoplacethenononthe politicsgroundedin a meditation politicsof Sorel—a instrumentalist ortelos)—beact(i.e.,anactwithoutarché ofpraxisasananarchist epistemology butfrom ofsocialprocess politicsnotfromthestandpoint causeheperceives ofState power,inotherwords,fromanapotheosis thestandpointofachieving theoristofsoverthatSchmitt—the HowthenFraenkel concludes sovereignty. butof a Sorelianisnotsimplya matterofmisreading eignpower—becomes of totheTheory TheDualState:AContribution SeeErnstFraenkel, misthinking. (1941), trans.E.A.Shils(NewYork:OctagonBooks,1969). Dictatorship inthecontextofa discus18.It’sworthwhile remembering—particularly pointthatSorelattempts LaclauandChantalMouffe’s sionofSchmitt—Ernesto andSocialSeetheirHegemony ofa logicofcontingency. tothinkthespecificity istStrategy(London:Verso,1986),36-42.

1g.Thisis mysenseoftheargumentthatErnestoLaclaumakeswithadof the end of ideology,in which mirabledexterityaboutthe impossibility ofthe Seehis“TheDeathandResurrection Sorel’s thoughtfiguresprominently.

1,no.3(1996): 201-20. Ideologies JournalofPolitical TheoryofIdeology,”

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vonderErledigung II:DieLegende Theologie Politische 20.See:CarlSchmitt,

HansBluTheologie (Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1970),109-26; jederpolitischen

(Cambridge, oftheModern Age,trans.RobertWallace TheLegitimacy menberg, asaprogresreadingofBlumenberg Mass.:MITPress,1983),89-102.Schmitt’s categories, “evolutionary” of Blumenberg’s sivistis a grossmisapprehension andareinsteadakintoAdorno’s whichhavenothingto dowithEntwicklung

spacein transhistorical of content,whichbecomes, notionof sedimentation to form. time,immanent 21.Notethatthe proposedsequelto the book,whichHorkheimerand derAufklarung. wastobetitledRettung Adorno nevercompleted, CasinregardtotheworkofCornelius 22.I discuss thisissue,specifically 49(Spring1997): 31-43Thesis Eleven in “Philosophy andSublimation,” toriadis, differssubstanBlumenberg element, 23.Onmythas a radicalhistorical remainsthemainsourceofreferwhononetheless tiallyfromErnstCassirer, leadingoftentoa readingof enceformythicthoughtinthetwentiethcentury, mythin religious (andindeedmonotheistically driven)terms.Mycontention, tothecontrary, isthatnotonlyBlumenberg’s butbothAdorno’s andBenjamin’s not viewsofmythareprofoundly historical atthecore;thefrequent—though exclusive—use oftheological language intheirdiscussion ofmyth(particularly tendency inBenjamin) mustbeconsidered a gestureundermining thereligious toseemythification asmystification. 24.Thisletter,sentto Schmittin December 1930,wasinexcusably omitted

Scholem fromthe1966publication ofBenjamin’s Briefe bytheeditors,Gershom andTheodor W.Adorno. Theletter’scontentis innocuous: Benjamin merely book announces thathispublisher istosendSchmitt a copyofthe Trauerspiel andacknowledges hismethodological debttoSchmitt’s writings oftheperiod. Thegesture,however, hasgreatsignificance becauseitwasofferedacrossa politicaldivide(echoedlater in its omissionfromthe Briefe),and Schmitthimself

treasuredtheletter’sexistence. 25.TheissueofwhetherSchmittundermines orcontradicts himselfin the longtrajectory ofhisthoughtisrathercomplicated anddeservesa paperofits own.Tocriticize Schmittbymerelypointing athiscontradictions, inconsistencies,opportunistic deviations, etc.,istoforegothechallenge ofasubstantial critique.Hence,itisnotsurprisingthatthegroundwork ofthebestreadingsof Schmitt is therecognition ofhisessentialduplicity andunequivocal contradictions.Themethodology, theoretical impetus,or politicalaspirations of such readingsmaydifferwidely,but the intellectual engagement withSchmittis faultless.Representative instancesare Reinhard Mehring,Pathetisches Denken (Berlin:Duncker& Humblot,1989),and CarloGalli,Genealogia dellaPolitica:

CarlSchmitt elacrisidelpensiero politico moderno (Bologna: I Mulino, 1996).

26. In Carl Schmitt,Staat,Grossraum,Nomos:Arbeitenaus den Jahren 1916-1969 (Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1995),184.

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27.CarlSchmitt, Hamlet oderHekuba: DerEinbruch derZeitindasSpiel(Diisseldorf:EugenDiederichs, 1956), 46.Henceforth citedinthetextasHH. 28.MyreadingherefollowsSamuel Weber’s groundbreaking discussion of the Schmitt-Benjamin relationconcerning Trauerspiel and the exception. See “Taking Exception to Decision: WalterBenjamin andCarlSchmitt,” in Enlightenments: Encounters between Critical Theory andContemporary French Thought, ed. HarryKunneman andHentdeVries(Kampen: KokPharos,1993),141-61. 29.Themostpersuasive argumentin thesetermsis Jan Miiller,“Carl Schmitt's Method: Between Ideology, andMyth,” Demonology, Journal ofPoliticalIdeologies 4,no.1(1999):61-85.

30.SeeJosephW.Bendersky, “Schmitt at Nuremberg,” Telos 72(Summer 1978): 103.Regardless ofSchmitt'spoliticalsavvy,hisoccasional collaboration withtheNazisdisplaysmanycharacteristics similartoHeidegger’s: thescandalousnaiveté,pettyarrogance, and narcissistic ofdieFiihrer opportunism fiihren,anabsurdlygenuinebeliefinthepossibility ofdirecting thenewregime toa morecredibleandreasonable orientation. WhileHeidegger isonrecord withthe embarrassment of performing an eulogyto the Fiihrer’s hands, Schmittregistershisowneulogyinhisarticle“DerFihrerschiitzdasRecht” (1934). Inbothcases,wewouldbecommitting thegravesterrorifweconsideredsuchactionsmeresurvivalism anddid not acknowledge in themthe groundwork ofaphilosophical problem. 31. Fortifiedwiththe addedevidenceof Schmitt'sGlossarium, Heinrich Meiercallspolitical “apolitical theorythatclaimstohaveitsbasisin theology revelation.”(See“The Philosopheras Enemy:On CarlSchmitt'sGlossarium,”

Journal17,nos.1-2[1994]: FacultyPhilosophy trans.MarcusBrainard, Graduate 329.)Schmitt’s advocatesoftenaccusehiscritics(includingMeier)of abusing a bodyofprivatenotesnevermeantfor theprivilege ofaccessto Glossarium, ofthisundoubtand buildingtheircaseon grossinterpretations publication, rigorous text.Twothingsneedtobesaidhere.First,Meier’s edlyambiguous entireoeuvrewouldimmediately exempthimfrom readingthroughSchmitt's isjustanotherSchmitttexttobetaken anysuchcharge;forMeier,Glossarium writersareoftenat themercyof theirposthumous justasseriously. Second, ofanytextmustbetaken thebiographical dimensions Although publications. intoaccount(hencethedue “privacy”ofsuchnotescannotbeoutmaneuvered),

orlessauthenticbecausetheauthordid toconsiderthesetextsinappropriate If istodenytheirauthorial authenticity. wishthempublished notnecessarily theinsightthey theGlossarium noteswereprivate, precisely because anything, isallthemoresignificant. “intentions” authorial provideintoSchmitt's Age,98-101. oftheModern TheLegitimacy 32. SeeBlumenberg,

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4 CHAPTER

2. Press,1984), OxfordUniversity (Oxford: Antigones 1.GeorgeSteiner, 2. Ibid.,20-21. Systemsproof GermanIdealism[Altestes 3. “TheOldestSystem-Program Hélderlin: Essays andLettersonTheinFriedrich desdeutschen Idealismus],” gramm ofNewYorkPress, StateUniversity ory,ed.andtrans.ThomasPfau(Albany: 1988),155-56. 4. JacquesDerrida,Glas(1974),trans.JohnP.Leavey,Jr.,and RichardRand (Lincoln: University ofNebraskaPress,1986),95.

ofactinginthe 5. TheGreekuseofthetermrefersdirectlyto theart (techné) a rerendition ofanother.Butitalsomeanstomake theater,theperformative to thatis,to articulate a counter-position, sponse(totheoracle,forexample), engageinthedramaofdialectics. 6. Steiner, Antigones, 103. 7. Ibid.,173. 8. G. FE. W.Hegel,Aesthetics, trans.T.M.Knox(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1975),2:1218.

g. SeeJean-Pierre Vernant, “TheHistorical MomentofTragedy inGreece,” in Jean-Pierre VernantandPierreVidal-Naquet, MythandTragedy inAncient Greece, trans.JanetLloyd(Cambridge, Mass.:ZoneBooks,1990),23-28. 10. Ibid.,26.

11.CostasDouzinas, “Law’sBirthandAntigone’s Death:OnOntological andPsychoanalytical Ethics,”Cardozo LawReview 16,nos.3-4(January1995):

1355:

m

12.MartinHeidegger, “Letteron‘Humanism,’” trans.FrankA.Capuzzi,in Pathmarks, ed. WilliamMcNeill(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998),269.

13.Douzinas, “Law’sBirthandAntigone’s Death,”1357. 14.PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe, “LaCésuredu spéculatif,” inL’Imitation des

modernes (Paris:Galilée,1986),52-55. 15.CostasDouzinas andRonnieWarrington, Justice Miscarried: Ethics,Aesthetics,andtheLaw(London:Harvester,1994),81.Thequotespecifically refers

toHeidegger, but,technically speaking, itholdsforHélderlin aswell.Theoverarchingquestion,whichilluminates theintersecting pointofthetwodomainsI mentioned above,istowhatextentandwhyHeidegger’s “lawlessreadingof Antigone”(86)is incommensuratewith the lawlessnessof Hélderlin’svision,

whichallowstheancienttext’smodernity toemergeintact. 16. See,indicatively:CharlesSegal,“Sophocles’Praiseof Man and the Con-

flictsof the Antigone,” in Sophocles, ed.CharlesWoodard(Englewood Cliffs, N,J.:Prentice-Hall, 1966), 72;WarrenJ.LaneandAnnM.Lane,“ThePoliticsof Antigone,” inGreek Tragedy andPolitical Theory, ed.PeterEuben(Berkeley: Uni-

Notes

361

versityof California Press,1986),164;Cornelius Castoriadis, “Aeschylean Anthropogony andSophoclean Self-Creation ofAnthropos,” trans.StathisGourgourisinAgon,Logos, Polis:TheGreek Achievement andItsAftermath, ed.Johann Arnasonand PeterMurphy(Stuttgart:FranzSteiner,2001),147.

17.Quotedin Segal,“Sophocles’ Praiseof Manand the Conflicts of the 63. Antigone,” 18.SeeCynthia Willet,“Hegel, Antigone, andthePossibility ofEcstatic Dialogue,”Philosophy andLiterature 14(1990): 277-79.Thisunfortunate conclusion aboutAntigone’s hysteriamarsan otherwiseinsightful argument. Foran intriguingpsychoanalytic of theincestuous discussion inAntigone, parameters seePatriciaJ. Johnson,“Woman’sThirdFace:A PsychosocialReconsideration

ofSophocles’ Antigone,” Arethusa 30(1997): 369-98. 19. See:BernardKnox,Introductionto TheThreeThebanPlays,trans.Robert

Fagles(NewYork:Penguin,1984),46-48;Douzinasand Warrington, Justice Miscarried, 54-55.Interestingly, RichardJebbsubscribed fullytoGoethe’s thesis, whileSteinerconsiders thispassageanexampleofSophoclean and sophistry

closetobadcomedy” 50). casuistry, “perilously (Antigones, 20.Thisargument isexpertly byLaneandLane,“ThePolitics of conducted

Antigone,” 171ff. 21.InRichardJebb’stranslation. RobertFaglestranslates itas:“Iwasborn to joinin love,not hate—thatis mynature”(TheThreeTheban Plays),86.What

is crucialin bothtranslations (andunfortunately absentfromHughLloydJones'srecentLoebedition,whereheoptsfor“Ihavenoenemiesbybirth,but I have friendsby birth”)is the notion of an intertwinednature,essentialin a

Greekconception oftheworldandparticularly significant inthisplay,where radicalsingularity isthedisastrous objectofcontention. 22. SeeJohn D. B. Hamilton,“Antigone:Kinship,Justice,and the Polis,”in (Ithaca:Cornell MythandthePolis,ed.DoraC.PozziandJohnM.Wickersham UniversityPress,1991),90.

trans.GillianGill(Ithaca: oftheOtherWoman, 23.LuceIrigaray,Speculum CornellUniversityPress,1985),219-20.SeealsoTinaChanter,“Antigone’s andSimonCritchley ed. RobertBernasconi in Re-Reading Levinas, Dilemma,” Press,1991),130-46. IndianaUniversity (Bloomington: Notes111,no. 5 24. CarolJacobs,“DustingAntigone,”ModernLanguage (1996): 901. Theaterof Selfand Societyin Athenian 25.SeeFromaZeitlin,“Thebes: 116-17. We ed.PeterEuben,102ff., Theory, Tragedy andPolitical Drama,”inGreek legendwasnot thattheAntigone Richard Jebb’s suggestion mightalsoconsider Therefusalto ofAtticdescent. widelyknownandmayhavebeenspecifically Thebes (Homer, against inSeven byAeschylus isfirstsuggested buryPolynices Ifsuch burialforthetwobrothers.) speakofa common Hesiod,andPausanias a legend gesturethatapolisconceives isthecase,I consideritanextraordinary

362

Notes

onlyinapoeticimaglaw,possible a transgressive onthebasisoftransgressing SeeSir thatalllawis opento interrogation. inarythatrestsonthecertainty CambridgeUniversity (Cambridge: RichardJebb,introductionto Antigone Press,1928),ix—x. 26. Hamilton,“Antigone:Kinship,Justice,andthePolis,”95.

Drama,”126n. inAthenian TheaterofSelfandSociety 27.Zeitlin,“Thebes: 177. 28.LaneandLane,“ThePoliticsofAntigone,” 2:380. Penguin,1960), Myths(London: 29.RobertGraves,TheGreek

30. Zeitlin, “Thebes: Theater of Self and Societyin Athenian Drama,” 125-26.

62n. andWarrington, Justice Miscarried, 31. Douzinas SeeMartin ownmountainmetaphors. Heidegger’s 32.1amparaphrasing a.M.:Vittorio Klostermann, Hélderlins Hymne “DerIster”(Frankfurt Heidegger, Hymn“TheIster,”trans. WilliamMc1984).I shallbe quoting fromHélderlin’s NeillandJuliaDavis(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1996),withocca-

references willbe andreferences totheGerman.Subsequent sionalcorrections giveninthetextasHH,followed bypagenumber. 33.MartinHeidegger,Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tiibingen:Max Niemeyer Verlag,1953).I shallbe quotingfromtheEnglishtranslationby RalphManheim: AnIntroduction toMetaphysics (NewHaven:YaleUniversity Press,1959),withexplanatory references totheGermanandoccasional correctionsinbrackets. Allsubsequent citationsappearinthetextasIM. 34.Actually, Sophocles neverusesthesuperlative deinotaton, onlya negativecomparison(kouden anthropou deinoteron). Thefinebut crucialdifferenceis

elidedina backhanded waythatemploysthestyleofcommonsenseagainst Heidegger’s ownotherwise severeconcernwithgrammatical essence.Anthropos,Heidegger argues,istwicedeinon (hencedeinotaton, bygrammatical inference)becausehe doesnot merelyinspireterroras a being(asessent)but also

becauseheparticipatesin the overpowering orderof Being(IM,149-50).Ina simpleanalyticalsense,Heidegger reconfigures the ambiguous(tosay the least)meaningofdeinon inGreekintoa quantitative doublepower.Buttherich-

nessoftheGreekdoesnotresidein thedoublemeaningitselfbutinthefact that the word’stwo (or more)meaningsare intertwined.Toshift fromambigu-

itytomultiplication ishardlya gestureofinventive translation thatunconceals meaning,but an actofviolencethatrenames. Thisisthecruxof Heidegger’s methodthroughouthiswork,whichis why hispoeticunderstanding ofthe worldisultimately prophetic andhisdiscoursetheological. Fora critiqueof Heidegger’s ruseofdeinotaton, seeDanielCoppieters de Gibson,“LesGrecset laquestion deI’‘homme: Aproposd’unelecturedeSophocle parHeidegger,” in Qu'est-ce quel'homme? Philosophie/Psychanalyse (Brussels: Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis,1982),58n. 35.See Sigmund Freud, “The‘Uncanny’”in Collected Papers,trans. James

Notes

363

Strachey(London:HogarthPress,1949),4:375-77.Subsequentpagereferences

appearinthetext. 36.Ihaveelaborated onthisextraordinary nationalimaginary convergence betweenGermanandGreekinDreamNation:Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institutionof ModernGreece,(Stanford:Stanford UniversityPress, 1996) 122-54,267-82.

37.SeeCastoriadis, “Aeschylean Anthropogony andSophoclean Self-CreationofAnthropos,” 150.Myreadinghereowes a greatdealtothisbrilliant essay. 38.Iam usingtheEnglishversionsaccording tothedifferenttranslations (Manheimand MecNeill/Davis) of Heidegger’stranslation(thesameon both

occasions) ofSophocles’ ode.Heidegger’s actual,rathercumbersome, phrasing is:“Uberallhinausfahrend unterwegs erfahrungslos ohneAuswegkommter zumNichts.” 39.CharlesSegal,Tragedy andCivilization (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press, 1981),154.

40. Ibid.,441n.

41.Steiner,Antigones, 255.Heidegger fromthe interpretsthisexclusion hearthtorefernot toapolisbut to the ultimateconditionofdeinon(ofwhichapo-

lis,forhim,isa logicalconsequence), thusattributing totheSophoclean chorus a conscious definition ofdeinon asunheimisch. 42.SeeCastoriadis, “Aeschylean Anthropogony andSophoclean Self-CreationofAnthropos,” 147-49. 43. Hegel,Aesthetics, 2:1217.

44.SeePeterEuben,“Antigone andtheLanguages ofPolitics,” inCorrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture,andPolitical Theory (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,1997),160,139. inhisrecent 45.ThismatterhasbeenexpertlyhandledbyDennisJ.Schmidt Indiana andOtherGreeks: Tragedy andEthicalLife(Bloomington: OnGermans

bookSchmidtdelvesintogreat Press,2001).In thisexhilarating University thatframetheproblems considered depthsontheentirecomplexofconditions inthischapter. in See“The‘EndofPhilosophy’?” 46.Thisinsightbelongsto Castoriadis. Oxed.andtrans.DavidAmesCurtis(Oxford: Politics, Autonomy, Philosophy, fordUniversity Press,1991),15.Notofthepresentorderbutcrucialnonetheless would be a detaileddiscussionof Castoriadis’saffinity(inthecourseof hisre-

intheirmutualemphasisonthe particularly lentlesscritique)withHeidegger, forceofpoiein. lies quotedashavingsaidthat“Heidegger 47.HannahArendtisfamously

notoriouslyalways and everywhereand whereverhe can.”(Quotedin Elzbi-

[NewHaven: Arendt, MartinHeidegger bookHannah problematic ettaEttinger’s the 28.)Despitethebook’snotoriousproblems, Press,1995], YaleUniversity

364

Notes

lyconsistent shouldnotbedoubted.Heidegger’s ofthiscomment genuineness matwouldbeatrivial, oratleastordinary, alsobyKarlJaspers) ing(confirmed Whatmattersis the terwereit toremainat thelevelofa lover’sdiscourse. Arendtherselfsharesand, statusofthelie(inwhosecomplicity philosophical statusparticuinregardto Heidegger)—a reproduces byherownadmission, on seriousness andArendt’sphilosophical larlytaintedby bothHeidegger’s beevaluated bya singlestandard wholiecannot oftruth.Philosophers matters is orNietzsche statusoftheliein Rousseau (oftruth);surely,thephilosophical

ofentirely different order.

of Heidegger reprothatevenseriousinterpretations 48.I findit revealing ofcosmopolitanism withouttheslightestinklingaboutits ducehisabhorrence toHeidegger andtheannihilating political climate political implications, specific throughothofhisday.Inthecourseofarguingforthemeritsofhomecoming viewmaybe erness,FredDallmayr writes:“Theadventurerin Heidegger’s Adbuthedoesnotqualifyforthetermdeinos. strange,exotic,or ‘interesting,’ venturers areabroador‘notathome’simplyinthemodeofnegation ordenial; bycontrast, deinos signifies uncannyestrangement precisely asamodeofselfbeing—thatmodethat doesnot findaccessto,or remainsexcludedfrom,self-

discovery. Genuineestrangement, fromthisvantage,is intimately relatedto self-being andbeing-at-home—whereas theadventurerindiscriminately substitutesthenon-home(thelandsabroad)forhome,therebylosingthesenseof

eitherplace”(TheOtherHeidegger [Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1993], 162-63). Thechasmbetweenthisunderstanding ofdeinos andtheSophoclean invocation stillpalesnexttothedistancethatseparates theformalaccuracy of thisinterpretation fromthepoliticalimplications thatdenyitscredibility and paralyzeitstheoreticalacumen. 49.Themodelmeditation remainsPhilippeLacoue-Labarthe’s LaFiction du politique (Paris: Bourgois, 1987). Seealsoitsworthycorrespondent inMiguelde Beistegui’s Heidegger andthePolitical (London: Routledge, 1998). 50.SinceHansGeorgGadamer addressedHeidegger withthefamousquestion“BackfromSyracuseNow?”the directassociation of Heidegger’s folly withPlato’sattemptto“educate”Dionof Syracusehasfoundmanyfans.But heretoothe tendencyis to turn thisdelusionintoan abstractphilosophical problem,ratherthantoseeit as essentially philosophical becauseit isfundamentallypolitical.IfanythingjoinsHeidegger and Platotogetherin their“erroneous” attempttoeducatea tyrant,itistheirgenuineandprofoundfearof democratic life.Thisshouldhardlyraiseone’seyebrows.Nothingaboutit spellsinconsistency, deviation, contradiction, or,forthatmatter,errorin respect to theirphilosophies, bothof which(forall theirobviousdifferences) arecon-

sistentlydrivenbytheunmitigated struggletophilosophically tametragicexistenceinordertoevadeitsallure.

Notes

365

51. LaneandLane,“ThePoliticsofAntigone,” 166;Zeitlin,“Thebes:Selfand

SocietyinAthenianDrama”,122. 52.JudithButler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between LifeandDeath(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,2000),11.

53.See:MartinOstwald,Nomos andtheBeginnings ofAthenian Democracy (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969); PierreLévéqueand PierreVidal-Naquet,Cleisthenes theAthenian, trans.DavidAmesCurtis(Atlantic Highlands, N,J.:HumanitiesPress,1996);JosiahOber,TheAthenian Revolution (Princeton:

Princeton University Press,1996). 54.SeeJacqueline deRomilly, LaLoidanslapensée desorigines grecque @Aristote(Paris:LesBellesLettres,1971). 55.Hyperdramein mightliterally meanoutrun,henceoverride oroverrule or prevailover.ButI seeit hereasa termof performance—not merelybecause drameinresonateswith drama,but becauseits rootconnection withdromos (race)grantsit an agonisticframeof reference.

56.Forcrucialinsightsintothecomplex andmultivalent relation between writingandsocialinstitution intheGreekworld,seeLesSavoirs del’écriture en Gréceancienne, ed.MarcelDetienne(Lille:PressesUniversitaires deLille,1988). Forour purposes,the importantessaysin the volumeareNicoleLoraux’s “Solonet lavoixde I’écrit”(95-129) andAlbertoMaffi’s“Ecritureetpratique

juridiquedanslaGréceclassique” (188-210). 57.ForDerrida theyhavea specific “thelawofsingularity content: (divine, feminine,family,natural,nocturnal)”in contrastto thelawof universality(hu-

man,virile,political, spiritual,diurnal). Theinspiration isHeideggerian andintoHegel), buthasnothingto sightfulinthisrespect(insofarasitisaddressed dowithAntigone. SeeGlas,142-46. andSophoclean 58.Castoriadis, “Aeschylean Anthropogony Self-Creation of Anthropos,” 151-52. and isrighttorecalltheconnection between phronéma 59.CostasDouzinas frenetic or the“statesofmind,saneormad,goodorevil,Dionysically phrenes, Birth passive”(“Law’s activeor apathetically cynically ataraxic,passionately (“thelawof the andAntigone’sDeath,”1340).Everycitizen’ssenseof astynomia

forceofmindandpassion. city”)passesthroughthisinterwoven (Paris:GalliEssaisurlatragédie grecque LaVoix endeuillé: 60.NicoleLoraux, mard, 1998).

etpoliinEntremythe “Sousleregardd’autrui,” 61.SeeJean-Pierre Vernant,

inMorwithintheCity-State,” tique(Paris:Seuil,1996),421-22;“TheIndividual Press),318-33. PrincetonUniversity talsandImmortals (Princeton:

viewoftragedyinthePoet62.ThequestionaboutthestatusofAristotle’s overtheages.Theoneindisicshas occupiedmyriadpagesof scholarship duringtragedy’s isthatitwasfashioned inAristotle's position putableelement point,no matterhowuncertainand a negligible irreversible decline—hardly

366

Notes

reevenunknownarethecriticalparametersoftheissue.Foranexceptional in TheAncientProblem” seeAndrewFord,“Katharsis: onthisquestion, flection

Sedgwick ed.AndrewParkerandEveKosofsky andPerformance, Performativity 1995),109-32. (NewYork:Routledge, 278. of EcstaticDialogue,” 63. Willet,“Hegel,Antigone,andthePossibility

CHAPTER5

I hadbecomeinfatuatedwitha 1. Ataroundthistimeinthemid-seventies, pieceby DanielLenz,a WestCoastcomposer,titled“TheSongofthe Sirens” (TheMontagnana Trio,Spell, ABCRecords, 1975). Itwasawell-crafted piecefor inspiration inregardtolanguage, basedonten trioandvoice,ofratherJoycean to a keyoftenwordsor short swiftvariations ofa setlyricsungaccording phrasescomposedoutofvariousphonemesfromthelyric.Musically, it was heavilychromatic, invoking a ratherneo-Romantic tonality, butforallitscharm it merelyunderlinedtheimpossibility ofcommitting theSirensmythtolanguage,evenmusicallanguage. 2. MauriceBlanchot,whoseorientationis profoundlymarkedby his earlymeditations onKafka,arguesthattheSirensepisodeintheOdyssey isa paradigmatic demonstration ofnarrationasevent—or, moretohispoint,a demonstration oftheeventofnarrationasitsownreiteration.ForBlanchot, theinabilitytoreproducetheSirensotherthanassecondarytextualizedimagesisjustan eventualityoftheir“archogenetic” relationtonarrative.(See Blanchot, TheSirens’ Song,ed.GabrielJosipovici [Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1982],59-65.)I amnotquitepreparedto acceptthisdistilled positionwithoutquestion;Kafka’sreading(andrewriting)of theHomeric instanceintheatrical terms,asIshowbelow,restagestheboundsofnarrative throughtheintrinsicandirreducibleperformativity ofthe Sirens,evenin theirsilence.

3. See“FranzKafka:OntheTenthAnniversary ofhisDeath,”inWalterBenjamin,Illuminations, ed.andintrod.HannahArendt,trans.HarryZohn(New York:Schocken, 1969),111-40. Thepiecewascommissioned by Gershom Scholemandfirstpublishedin1934inthejournalJiidische Rundschau. Duringthat yearBenjaminwasshuttlingbetweenvariousresidencesinexile(Paris,Svend-

borg,SanRemo), whenceheconducted extensive correspondence onthisissue withseveralfriends.SeeTheCorrespondence ofWalter Benjamin (1910-1940), ed. GershomScholemandTheodorW.Adorno(Chicago: Universityof Chicago

Press,1994), aswellasBenjamin’s “Conversations withBrecht,”in UnderstandingBrecht (London:Verso,1983).Henceforth citedasUB. 4. PeterUweHohendahltheorizesthebook’sfuturisticqualitybyarguing

thatgenerally “underAdorno’s gazephenomena losetheirparticularcontext”

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367

(“TheDisplacedIntellectual? Adorno’sAmericanYearsRevisited,”NewGerman

Critique 56[Spring-Summer 1992]: 92).

5. MaxHorkheimer and TheodorW.Adorno,Dialectic ofEnlightenment,

trans. EdmundJephcott(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2002),xi-xiv;Di-

alectik derAufklirung, (Frankfurt a.M.:Suhrkamp, 1984), 9-10.Henceforth, cited inthetextas DE,followed bypagenumbersto botheditions. Thetranslation is alteredwhereappropriate. 6. See“Theses onthePhilosophy of History,” inIlluminations, 261.AsErnst Blochobserved, Benjamin conceived theradicality ofpresenttimeinJetztzeit to includethefullemergence ofa pastmomentnotas “Romantic reprise”butas totalpresentification—“the polis,say,in theFrenchRevolution, wasa Now”— so that “the continuumwasexploded[and]the suddenlyrawcitationrisesbe-

foreyoureyes.”See“Recollections ofWalterBenjamin,” inOnWalter Benjamin, ed.GarySmith(Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,1988),342.

7. Thereisa substantial literatureonthisphenomenon. Forthepurposes of theargumenthere,see,indicatively: TheodorW.Adorno,“Scientific Experiencesofa European Scholar inAmerica,” inTheIntellectual Migration: Europe in ed. D. Flemingand BernardBailyn(Cambridge, Mass.: America, 1930-1960, Exiles:Essayson HarvardUniversityPress,1969),338-70;MartinJay,Permanent

theIntellectual Migration fromGermany toAmerica (NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,1986);JamesK.Lyon,BrechtinAmerica (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982).

8. Thiswouldbeinitselfa worthyproject: readingDialectic ofEnlightenment andtheentirecontextofexile,annihilation, andculturalcommerce withthe toolsofpoliticaleconomy—in otherwords,restagingthecritiqueofthe“cultureindustry” fromthestandpoint oflatecapitalism’s evidentmutability. image thecriticism likelytoberaisedagainstthecommunal g. Lunderstand I am drawinghere,andI canimaginethattermslike“theGermanpsyche,” if incertainquarters.However, eveninquotationmarks,wouldbe anathema we webrushasideourinstitutedfearof thepsychicelementin socialanalysis, whichishardlyhomogeneous acertaincommunity, seethemeritofidentifying in termsofthesocial-imaginary and lifepractices, in ideological perspective culturalorevenpoliticalheterothatflowsthroughit.Fromthatstandpoint, evenwhenthevarious affinity, a certainunconscious geneitydoesnotpreclude Whatmattersistodeterminethesostrandsareengagedin direcontradiction. and ofsuchaffinities thatenablesthearticulation framework cial-imaginary to asit pertains effortinthisregard,particularly Anexemplary contradictions. isAnsonRabinpsyche,” “German ofthe twentieth-century theconstitution and between Apocalypse German Intellectuals ofCatastrophe: bach’sIntheShadow (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997). Enlightenment Schriften(Frank10. “DieActualitatder Philosophie”(1931),in Gesammelte ofthesigdiscussion furta.M.:Suhrkamp,1972),1:341-42.Foran illuminating

368

Notes

nificanceof exakteFantasiein Adorno’s thought, see Susan Buck-Morss’s

Dialectics (NewYork:FreePress,1977), TheOriginofNegative groundbreaking 85-90.

is thebest hereBrecht’s diagnosis: “Emigration 11.Itisusefultoremember Theyarerefugeesas arethekeenestdialecticians. Refugees schoolofdialectics. Theyareabletodeofstudyischange. andtheirsoleobject _aresultofchanges is,iftheyhaveintelliducethe greatesteventsfromthesmallesthints—that howmuchtheirvicarewinning,theycalculate gence.Whentheiropponents Fluchtlingsgetoryhascostthem;theyhavethesharpesteyeforcontradictions” spriiche (Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,1961),112.

inIl/uminations, 256. onthePhilosophy ofHistory,” 12.“Theses trans.E.B.Ashton(NewYork:SeaburyPress, 13.SeeNegative Dialectics, 1973), 320.

14.Froma letter toFriedrich Pollock, quotedinRobertHullot-Kentor, “Back toAdorno,”Telos81(Fall1989):19. 15.Itcanbe alternately translatedasEnlightenment’s Salvation or Rescuing Enlightenment. SusanBuck-Morss arguesconvincingly thatAdorno’s useofRettung—a wordheborrowedfromBenjamin, forwhomitboretheidiosyncratic signification ofbeingreligious butnottheological—is closertoHegelian Aufhebung,whichAdornodeployed inexplicitly materialist terms(TheOriginofNegativeDialectics, 90-95).Thisallowsusa retroactive readingofBenjamin’s contextofusagewhichrevealstheword'smaterialisttenetsagainstanysortof transcendental necessity. 16. See“Backto Adorno,”23. 17. Horkheimerand AdornomistakenlyuseOudeis,whichtheytaketo be a

hypothetical phonicvariationtoOdysseus insomearchaicdialect.Oudeis means “noone”inanumerical sense,literally “notoneman”or“zeroman”(tothedegreethatgrammatically itisgendered asamasculine adjective). Homer’s Outis involves theindefinite tis(unaccented—when accentedit isalwaysinterrogative and means “who?”),which representsthe impersonal“one” (anyone, someone),but also, to the degreethat it followsa specificnoun (anthropostis),

modifiesspecificity towarda lessdeterminate quality,asin“anysortofman.” IntheOdyssey, it isaccenteddifferently asitbecomesa propername(notodti¢ butOdt1c), whichisbesttranslatedbytheawkward“Not-Someone.” 18.ByAdorno’s ownadmission inhislateryears,Kafkaassuch(thatis,beyond Benjamin’sinfluentialmeditations)encapsulatesthe theoreticalwork of

determinate negationthatAdornosoughtasgroundwork fora nonidentitarian dialectics. Forasuccinct account ofthisparticular intersection, seeWilliHayum Goetschel, “Kafka’s NegativeDialectics,” Journal oftheKafka Society ofAmerica 9,nos.1-2 (June-December 1985):83-106. 1g. Franz Kafka,BeinBauderChinesischen Mauer:Ungedruckte Erzahlungen

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369

undProsaausdemNachlass, ed.MaxBrodand HansJoachimSchoeps(Berlin:

Kiepenheuer, 1931). 20. Letterto GershomScholem, April25,1930.InTheCorrespondence ofWalterBenjamin, 365. 21.LettertoScholem, July20,1931, ibid.,381.Thereviewwasnotpublished inBenjamin’s lifetime, buttheletterpostdates byseventeen days a lecturethat Benjamin broadcasted onFrankfurt radiobasedontheposthumous Kafkapublication.SeeBenjamin tiberKafka, ed.Hermann Schweppenhauser (Frankfurt a. M.:Suhrkamp, 1981), 39-46. 22. Letterto Scholem, October3,1931.In TheCorrespondence ofWalterBenjamin,383-84. 23.From a notebookentry,datedJune6,1931.In Benjamin iiberKafka, 131. 24. In additionto hisendlessvacillationsoverthe trip to Jerusalem(mir-

roredinhisrepeatedinterruptions ofHebrewlessons) andhisambivalence towardcollaborative workwithBrecht,Benjamin wasatthistimeundergoing the mostdifficultperiodin his long-termfriendshipwithDoraKellner, dueto a highlycontentious histumultuous relationship with lawsuitovertheirdivorce; AsjaLacis,whichnominally broughtaboutthedivorce, reacheditsirreversible end; his intellectualfriendshipwithAdornowascemented,followinga series

of programmatic at Kéningstein aboutthenatureofdialectical conversations mainideas materialism (andAdorno’s subsequent ofBenjamin’s incorporation fromtheTrauerspiel bookin hisfirstseminarsat theUniversityof Frankfurt);his

withhashish,inwhichhesoughttheexperience ofunmediated experiments cognition, becamemorefrequent,withcopiousnotesanda seriouscommitmenttoa monograph onthesubject;a steadyproduction ofwritingsofgreat rangefounditswaytopublication (fromhisseminal essayonKarlKraustothe Menlettershe laterpublishedas Deutsche collectionof nineteenth-century schen);and yet, he drafted a will and three farewelllettersto old childhood

to friendswiththe intentionoftakinghislife,a decisionhewasnevertheless lettersfromthisperiodin postponefora gravertime.Inadditionto relevant theStoryofaFriendWalter Benjamin, see:Gershom Scholem, TheCorrespondence, ofAmerSociety TheJewishPublication ship,trans.HarryZohn(Philadelphia: trans. AnIntellectual Biography, ica,1981);andBerndWitte,WalterBenjamin: Press,1991). WayneStateUniversity (Detroit: JamesRolleston withHannah trans,MartinGreenberg, (1914-1923), 25.FranzKafka,Diaries citedinthetextasD,fol1949),189.(Henceforth Arendt(NewYork:Schocken, lowedbypagenumber.) imbuesitwith letter,butitsvehemence 26.Itturnsouttobethepenultimate ofanabsentman.Thetrialmoafinalitythatmakesthelastletterthetestimony withFelice(itselfarguably relationship tifformsthebarehorizonofKafka’s asa laboriousandpainfulnovel),asEliasCanettihasexpertlyarconstituted of Words,trans.Joachim gued in “Kafka’sOther Trial”(1968),TheConscience (NewYork:Farrar,Strauss,andGiroux,1984),60-139. Neugroschel

370

Notes

notesthisentryas wellonthewaytoan interesting 27.LillianeWeissberg

figure“chainedtoliterature” argument thatpointstoKafkaas anOdysseus but Idon’tdisputetheargument, ofsexuality. seduction againstthedebilitating glyphof bearingin mindtheundecidable I dowishto renderit ambivalent, “Singingof Kafka’sgesticlocationat anyonetime.SeeLillianeWeissberg, ed. CriticalPerformance, andtheContemporary Sirens,”in Kafka Tales:Kafka’s Press,1987),165-77. IndianaUniversity AlanUdoff(Bloomington: 28. Franz Kafka,“Das Schweigender Sirenen,”in EinLandarztund andere Reclam,1995),86-88,mytranslation.Willa Prosa,ed.MichaelMiiller(Stuttgart: evenchildishmeareads:“proofthatinadequate, andEdwinMuir’stranslation suresmayserveto rescueonefromperil.”(See“TheSilenceof the Sirens,”in 1971],430-32.)I havechosento TheComplete Stories[NewYork:Schocken, with the andnot “rescue”in consistency translateRettungas “redemption”

as termsofthisargument. Bothsensesshouldbekeptinmindsimultaneously, betweenescape escapeiscertainlya crucialtropeforKafka;the interrelation coversa strangephilosophical territoryindeed—precisely and redemption whatisatstakehere.Thoughthenotionofperilhangsalloverthisstory,the word’spresencein thissentenceis anadditionby theMuirs.Allreferences henceforth willbecitedinthetextasS,followed bynumberstobotheditions; thetranslation ismodified whenneeded. 29.One mightsay that, sinceKafka’sSirenspostdatethe legendof Odysseus, theycomeprepared.YetKafkais merelyfollowingthe pathof Homerhimself,in whichtheSirensalreadyknowofOdysseusandusethis knowledge tocraftanepicsongofseduction perfectly tailoredtotheobjectof seduction. Inthisrespect,theSirensseducebyholdinguptotheheroa soundmirrorofhiskleos, theverythingtowhichhehasdedicatedhislife,thesong thatisoneandthesamewithhisname.Likewise, havingsurvivedtheSirens, Odysseuswillhimselfbecomea Sirenandrepeattheirsongabouthimselfto thePhaecians inexchange forsafepassageto Ithacaatlast.Notethatthissort ofrepetitionisinternaltotheepicform,asPietroPucciargues,recognizing in theSirens’songan Iliadicversification (“TheSongoftheSirens,”Arethusa 12 [1979]:121-32). Thesubversivepermutationsof thiscontinuousauthorialre-

foldingin mythandepicareexpertlydiscussedbySimonGoldhillin “The Sirens’Song:Authorship, Authority, and Citation,”in WhatIs anAuthor?ed. Maurice Biriotti andNicolaMiller(Manchester: Manchester University Press,

1993), 137-54.

30.In Homer,too,thereis an explicitwarningagainstproximitypronouncedbyCirce:ostisaidreié pelase—“whoever unwittingly comestooclose” (Odyssey, bk. 12,1.41).Inother words,one mustnever get toocloseto themyth-

ical.Yetthemythicalseductress herselfnotonlyissuesthewarningbutsuggeststhemeansofdefense. Sheholdsthekeytothecounter-seduction ofmyth becausesherecognizes thevalueof anthropocentric jouissance—the valuefor theveryoptionof jouissance. Commenting explicitlyon Circe’srole,Hork-

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heimerandAdornorecognize anotherinstance ofhumanity’s forceful mastery overnatureormyth,butit is doubtfulwhethertheycanassesstheextraordinarysocial-imaginary whichwoulddemandthatmythitselfprovide humanity withtheoptiontooutwititby establishing humansovereignty overpleasure. IntheGreekworld,as tragedyshowsustimeandagain,mythis nottheadversariallimitofhumanactionbutitsarché. Theonlylimitis whatever isalways unwittingly crossedandabolishedintheactofhubris—essentially, hubrisitself. 31.InherbrilliantreadingoftheSirensepisode(whichdareseventocontemplatetheinarticulable questionoftheSirens’enjoyment), RenataSaleclarguesthatKafka’s parableperforms a reversal thatalwaysalreadyexistedatthe myth’score,disavowed bythe“patriarchical” usesof themyththroughtime: thatOdysseus namely, isa subjectofself-sufficient driveandtheSirensfemininesubjects ofdesire,whomaintain, evenagainstOdysseus’s self-sufficiency, an uncompromised jouissance. SaleclthusseesinKafkaa radicalperformance ofthemyth’sultimate todomestication. See“TheSilence ofFeminine resistance Jouissance,”in Renata Salecl, (Per)Versions of Loveand Hate (London:Verso,

1998),59-78.

32.SeeFranzKafka: TheNecessity ofForm(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press, 1991),123.Myoverallreadingof “TheSilenceofthe Sirens’—but alsothe widertheoretical contextthatframesit—confirms thetermsofCorngold’s classic meditation,namely,that Kafka’schiasmic,recursivelogicenablesa theoret-

icalknowledge ofworldlyexistence byinvertingtheopeningwherebyhistoricalpresence enterstheliterarytextandsending thebewildered readerbackinto historyattachedtotheraftofthetext’smetaphorical traces:“Kafka’s chiasms identities, andnegations butmobileanddifferentiated producenottautologies (127),for“toreadrecursively is promptinganendlessyetdirectedmeditation” thattheseterms oftheresidueof meaning toacquirethehistoricalexperience (124). leavealongthetrackoftheirsublation” of His “FranzKafka:On the TenthAnniversary 33.WalterBenjamin, 120(henceforthcited in thetextas K,translationmodDeath,”in I//uminations, ifiedwhenneedbe).

assessmentof 34.Thissameparadoxical cognitionisalsoechoedinBrecht’s “Kafkaas a visionary, Kafka’sownpointof view,as reportedby Benjamin:

Brechtsays,sawwhatwascomingwithoutseeingwhatis... . Brechtsaysof While man,a dreamer.” ofanimprecise thatit istheprecision Kafka’s precision ofhis theaccuracy aninfirmity, bookthiswouldlikelybeconsidered inBrecht’s SeeUB,108. ofhisjudgment. exceedstheboundaries assessment in Kafkais conof Gleichnis readingof thepara-logic 35.An exemplary PhiChinaandtheParableofParables,” Woodin“Kafka’s ductedbyMichael

325-37. 20,no.2(October1996): losophy andLiterature

from iswithdrawn aftermeaning oflanguage iswhatremains 36.“Gesture so Therestoflanguage—and it,anditisgesturethatwithdrawsfrommeaning.

372

Notes

gesture... .Gestureis left tomeaning—is irreducible itself,language language and resistantto overfromlanguage,fromits law.... Howeverirreducible It proclaimssomething meaningit maybe,gesturethusremainsambiguous. It is notonlyaremainbythisveryannouncement. whosearrivalisprevented itappearsbeforethedecisionbetweenmeaningandmeanderbuta threshold: Hamacher, “The andredemption” (Werner inglessness orbetweenoppression Essays onPhilosophy andKafka,” in Premises: Gesturein theName:OnBenjamin fromKantto Celan,trans. PeterFenves[Cambridge,Mass.:Harand Literature vard UniversityPress,1996],329-30.

isa highlycontestedissue,I influenceonBenjamin 37.AlthoughBrecht’s

unthatBrecht’s anti-Aristotelian theoryofthetheaterwasprofoundly believe inturnhisownthoughtsongestureand andpropelled derstoodby Benjamin equalatthe influence onBenjamin component exercises parable.ThisBrechtian ofnothnotionofgestureastheexpression veryleasttoFranzRosenzweig’s convincingly argues dispersion,as Hamacher ingnessat thecoreof Babelian (“TheGesturein the Name,”333-34).Thepoint is surelynot to speakof a Brechtian Benjamin bylocating a supposedstraininBenjamin’s workafterhis encounter withBrecht—this wouldbeanabsurdexerciseintherhetoricofinfluence. Itisrathermoreinteresting topursuethequestionofwhatisalready “Brechtian” inBenjamin bywayofhisownidiosyncrasy, sothatthe“Brechtian”is disengaged fromtheBrechtpersona,whichsupposedlyoccupiesthe discursive center.In theirvehementresistanceto Brecht’sallegedinfluence, Benjamin’s otherfriends,Scholem andAdorno,werenotonlypropelledbya senseofrivalrybutbyanunacknowledged fearofWalterBenjamin’s “intrinsically”Brechtian tendencies. 38. “OnGesticMusic”(1932),inBrechtonTheatre, ed.andtrans.JohnWillett (NewYork:Hilland Wang,1974),105.Notethat,forBrecht,theuseofGestus

(andgestisch) emerges fromaspecific understanding ofthesituation ofmusicin theatrical performance; theterminology waslikelyborrowed fromKurtWeill’s 1929essay“Uberdengestischen Charakter derMusik.”Inthesamevein,letus notethecuriousaffinity ofthispassagewithanAdornian idiom. 39.Anexceptional understanding ofthisentirecomplexofgesticspace,the performative foregrounding (alienating) ofagency, andtheultimateundoingof mimeticstructuresin thetheateristo be foundin ElinDiamond’s Unmaking Mimesis (NewYork:Routledge, 1997). 40.Quotedanddiscussed at lengthbyPhilippeLacoue-Labarthe inhisLa Fiction dupolitique, translated byChrisTurneras Heidegger, Art,andPolitics (Ox-

ford:Blackwell, 1990), 62-63.Mycomments herepresentinpartaschematic responsetoLacoue-Labarthe’s tangential discussion onthe“aesthetization ofpolitics,”whichemerges outofhisownreflection onthisBrecht-Benjamin coarticulation.Hismoreextensive argument onHeidegger isequallyfascinating and problematic andwillbeconsidered indetailelsewhere. 41.BothBrecht’s and Benjamin’s avowedattachmentto theradioand to

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Germanradiobroadcasts in particular (including Hitler’sspeeches) isevident ina varietyofdramatic(gestic) ways:theoretical essays,visionary fragments, astonished confessions in correspondence, and certainlyBrecht’s ingenious lyric“AndenKleinen Radioapparat,” whichlaterbecamepartoftheHollywooder Liederbuch. 42. SeeGoldhill,“TheSirens’Song,”150. CHAPTER 6

1. Benjamindoes mentionin passingthat thisworkis “comparable in methodto theprocessofsplittingtheatom”inthatit“liberates theenormous energies ofhistorythatareboundupinthe‘onceupon a time’ofclassical historiography.” SeeWalterBenjamin, TheArcades Project, trans.HowardEilandand KevinMcLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1999), N3,4. Henceforth citedinthetextwithreference toConvolute numberandparagraph. 2. InAdorno’slettertoBenjamin, August2,1935,TheCorrespondence ofWalterBenjamin, ed.Gershom Scholem andTheodor W.Adorno, trans.Manfred R. Jacobson andEvelynM.Jacobson (Chicago: University ofChicago Press,1994),

4993. AdornowasthefirstreaderoftheArcades Project byBenjamin’s own choice.Hewastherecipientoftheveryfirstideasasfarbackastheirfamous discussions atK6ningstein in1928andwasentrustedwithseveralexcerpts of terms theprojectindraftform.Thisisn’ttosayhefullyunderstood Benjamin’s ofthe andintentions, buthedidengagewiththemostimplicitsignifications projectin waysthatopenit up to deeperunderstanding, evenradicalizing obsomeofitselements (despitesomequestionable presuppositions). Adorno’s areofgreatinterestand as theyareknownfromcorrespondence, servations, willoccupyusbelow. 4. Inhisfamousintroduction tothePassagenwerk, RolfTiedemann speaksof tobea revoluwhichhedetermines “materialist physiognomics,” Benjamin’s isespecially usetoMarxistaesthetictheory.Hisdefinition tionarycontribution butthegeneralframework notjustregardingBenjamin fulformyorientation, itdefromtheexterior; inferstheinterior astheory:“Physiognomy ofliterature thegeneralfromtheparticular. codesthe wholefromthedetail;it represents it speaking,itproceedsfromthetangibleobject;inductively, Nominalistically apata Standstill,” See“Dialectics in therealmoftheintuitive.” commences Project, 940. pendixto TheArcades of on childhoodas centraltropein the figuration insistence 5. Benjamin’s can on itsown.Surely,Benjamin deservesseriousinterrogation awakening framebecause toa collective consciousness ofindividual transferthelanguage aresinguentitywhosefragments asanindefinite theindividual herecognizes antagorequiresanunendingprocessofdialectical larandwhoseintegration

374

Notes

tobring as“Taskofchildhood: nism,Butwhenheputsforthsuchstatements thenewworldintosymbolicspace”(K1a,3),helendstotheconditionofchild-

ashesayslateron—anenormous indexofchildhood,” hood—to the“historical Kindheit, if nothingelse,demandsthatwenot exigency. TheprojectofBerliner experience inhisconchildhood thesignificance ofBenjamin’s underestimate Hispersistent andanxiousconcernwiththenineProject. ceptionof theArcades directedtowardthecentury’s as it isincreasingly teenthcentury—particularly psychicimagesratherthanitsexplicitideas—isinlargepartan attempttoreimagesdormantinthedepthsofhisownpsychicbeing. trievethedialectical intermsofthe needstobemeasured Hisinvocation ofthepowerofchildhood destructionof asthenowirreversible traumaofexileundersuchconditions, recognizable. theGermanlifeheknewasa childbecomesterrifyingly ofLight:Theses onthePhotography ofHistory 6. EduardoCadava,Words (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997),71,72-73.Cadava’sreadingof

Benjamin’s notionofawakening isthemostcreativeandtrenchant ofall| have comeacross. 7. Anexemplary workinthisdirectionis Beatrice Hanssen’s WalterBenjamin’sOtherHistory: OfStones, Animals, HumanBeings, andAngels(Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press,1998). Regarding Benjamin’s intersection with Kafkaintheseterms,seealsoLorenzJager’smasterful essay“‘Primat dugestus,” trans.PhilippeIvernel,Europe 804(April1996):124-39. 8. Whenonethinksinsuchterms,Benjamin’s insistence onthesignificance of“awakening” shouldalsobeseenasanattempttoneutralize theNazislogan “Germany Awake!” asCadavaconvincingly argues(Words ofLight,81-84).This lends to certainof Benjamin’s crypticstatements—such as “Theimminent awakening is poised,likethe woodenhorseof theGreeks,in the Troyof dreams”(K2,4)—a highlypoliticized andpresentlyinsurrectionary character, inwhichboththearchaicandthemodern,thepastand present,themythical andthehistorical aredialectically inflamed. 9. LettertoTheodorW.Adorno,May31,1935,TheCorrespondence ofWalter Benjamin, 490.

10.Thisargument ismadeexplicitly byRogerCaillois inanessaythatexercisedgreatinfluenceonBenjamin andwasextensively quotedin the Arcades Project. Caillois’s emphasis,intermsremarkably akinto Benjamin’s, is placed onBalzac, Baudelaire, andtheearlyroman policier, andhequotesBaudelaire as beingconscious of literature’smythopoetic power—Baudelaire speaksof Balzac’s heroesasmyth-personae ofa modernIliad.SeeRogerCaillois, “Paris, mythemoderne,”LaNouvelle Revue frangaise 284(May1937): 682-99. 11.Benjamin lendstoHaussmann’s criminalarrogancethetouchof Balza-

cianmyth:“Haussmann who,facedwiththecityplanofParis,takesupRastignac’scryof‘Anousdeuxmaintenant!’” (E12,3).

12.Inperfectphilological fashion,asiffollowing totheletterthedirectives

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ofErnestRenan,Maxime du Campannounces at theoutsetthathedoesnot feigntobea historian ofParisbutrather,“giventhatParisisabody,Ihaveonly triedto practiceanatomy” (Paris: Sesorigines, sesfonctions etsaviedanslaseconde moitiéduXIXesiécle[Paris:Hachette,1875],8). 13. Letterto WalterBenjamin, August2, 1935,TheCorrespondence ofWalter

501. Benjamin,

14.Fora detailedargumentconcerning “theruinaswhole,”seeMarilyn

Mannersand Stathis Gourgouris,“On the Road to Ruin and Restoration,”

Strategies 3(Spring1990): 227-42. 15.Seeletterto TheodorW.Adorno,December 9,1938,in TheCorrespondence ofWalter 586. Benjamin, 16. Theodor W. Adorno, “Introductionto Benjamin’sSchriften,”trans. RobertHullot-Kentor, in OnWalterBenjamin: CriticalEssaysandRecollections, ed.

GarySmith(Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,1988), 12. 17. LettertoWalterBenjamin,August2,1935,TheCorrespondence ofWalter 496. Benjamin,

18.Ibid., 495, 497-08.

19.“Exposé of1935,” TheArcades Project, 9.Thetranslators havechosento renderFronas“drudgery,” whichisa correct,thoughmorefigural,meaning. Given,however, thesemantic frameofmyargument andBenjamin’s ownrenderingin hisFrenchversionofthe “Exposé” (1939)as servitude, whichencompassestheterm’sotheraspects(compulsion, slavery, bondage), Ihavechosento followtheversionbythetranslatoroftheBenjamin-Adorno (in correspondence whichAdornoreproducesthe phrase intact).All in all, however,we cannot

evadethefactthat,undercapitalist theservitude to use-value is discipline, enormousdrudgery. uniqueinsightintothis 20.ThisisalsothecruxofWinfried Menninghaus’s TheoryofMyth,”trans. essay“WalterBenjamin’s relationinhisextraordinary 292-325. GarySmith,inOnWalter Benjamin,

7 CHAPTER

trans.RuthL.C.Simms(Austin: 1.JorgeLuisBorges,OtherInquisitions, UniversityofTexasPress,1975),118.

translation of 2. Forsomereason,thisis missingfromA.J.Krailsheimer’s and whichis appendedto thePenguineditionof Bouvard the Dictionnaire, There,itsimplyreads: Penguin,1976). Middlesex: (Harmondsworth, Pécuchet | haveusedthe fromtheDictionnaire ‘Inhaste.’”Formytranslations “wriTING: Boled.Genevieve etPécuchet, deBouvard Volume versionincludedinLeSeconde leme(Paris:Denoél,1966).QuotationsfromFlaubert'slettersare takenfromthe

andareined. LouisConard(Paris,1926-34), ninevolumesof Correspondance,

376

Notes

Alltranslations byvolumeandpagenumber. dicatedintextasCorr.followed aremine,unlessotherwiseindicated.

althoughmuchhasbeenwritten(andwithamplecause) 3. Incidentally, monasticexishisownself-imposed concerns, hagiographical aboutFlaubert’s weare to understandreligious tencehasnothingreligiousaboutit—unless terms,namely,as idolatry,as psychological practicein its quintessential idolafetishism. Indeed,forFlaubertall religiouspracticeis fundamentally trous.Thereis nobetterexamplethanthefigureof Felicitéandher parrot, of configured astheecstasy isresolutely wheretheecstasy oftransubstantiation

thefetish. ofmyage—it’s chok4. “Ifeelsuchwavesofhatredtowardsthestupidity

heringme.Shitkeepscomingup intomymouth,asfromsomestrangulated nia.ButIwanttopreserveit,tocongealit,tohardenit. Iwantto makea paste century, liketheycoatIndianpagooutofitanddaubitalloverthenineteenth daswithcowdung”(Corr.4:96). 5. EdwardW.Said,Orientalism (NewYork:Vintage,1979), 113. 6. Bouvard andPécuchet, trans.A.J.Krailsheimer(Harmondsworth,Middlesex:Penguin,1976),131.Henceforthcitedin text. 7. Pécuchet’sencounterwith Dumas,oneofa handfulofFrenchauthorshe

comestoknow,enactstheDictionnaire’s prescription: “AUTHOR: Oneoughtto “know someauthors’; uselesstoknowtheirnames.”Pécuchet’s authorialintervention, whichhingesonanauthoritythatmustremainnameless, merelyconfirmsthemottoonanevenmoreelaborate level. 8. Thisiswhat,sometwenty-five yearsafterPécuchet, inhisJokes andTheir Relation totheUnconscious, Freudwouldcall“kettlelogic.”PeterStarrmakesa similar observation in “The Style of (Post-)LiberalDesire: Bouvardand

Pécuchet,” Nineteenth-Century FrenchStudies18,nos.1-2(1989-90): 145. g. Francoise Gaillard,“ALittleStoryaboutthebrasdefer;or,HowHistoryIs Made,”in FlaubertandPostmodernism, ed. Naomi Schorand Henry F.Majewski (Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress,1984),88.

10,PierreMacherey, “Flaubert’s Non-Realism,” in TheObjectofLiterature, trans.DavidMacey(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1995),178-210. 11.GustaveFlaubert,Lettresinéditesa Tourgueneff, ed. Gérard Gailly (Monaco:Rocher,1946),47.Thisisthe“natural”(i-e.,historical) extensioninthe

sensibility ofamanwho,a yearaftertheinauguration oftheregimethatwould cultivate thegroundforthePrussian military(1852), wouldsignhislettersGustavusFlaubertus Bourgeoisophobus (Corr.3:191). 12.ThispointprovidestheimpetusforRogerKempf’s excellent Bouvard, Flaubert, etPécuchet (Paris:Grasset,1990). 13. MarcelProust,Pleasures and Regrets, trans.LouiseVarese(NewYork: EccoPress,1984),103.

14.Interestingly, thiswell-known exclamation occursina letterto Maxime

Notes

377.

duCampinwhichFlaubertdescribes a rapturous experience duringhisvigil overhisnewlydeceased friendAlfredLePoittevin, hiscompanion inthought andvisionduringtheiryouth.Donatoperceptively arguesthatthisexperience ofdeath—the deaththatdeprives Flaubert’s lifeofthecomradely complicity of youthfulthought/vision—provides theimpetusforwriting:inDonato’s terms, theimpetusfortheauthor’ssignature thatmakescertaina writtentextwill leavethe smallcircleof reader-friends andfindits waytothepublisher. See “WhoSigns‘Flaubert’?” in EugenioDonato, TheScriptofDecadence: Essays on theFictions ofFlaubert andthePoetics ofRomanticism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1993),100-113.

15.SeeEugenio Donato, “Flaubert andtheQuestion ofHistory: Notesfora

CriticalAnthology,” MLN91,no.5(1976): 850-70, and“TheMuseum’s Furnace: Notestowarda Contextual ReadingofBouvard andPécuchet,” inTextual Strategies:Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed.JosuéV.Harari(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress,1979),213-38.

16.Aninspiredphrase—hence mytitle.SeeAndrewJ.McKenna, “Allodi227-44. dacticism: Flaubert100YearsAfter,”YaleFrenchStudies63(1982): 17.MichelFoucault,“TheatrumPhilosophicum,” in Language, CounterMemory, ed. DonaldF. Bouchard(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Practice, Press, 1977),188. 18.MichelFoucault, “Fantasia oftheLibrary,” inLanguage, Counter-Memory, Practice,109.

19.LeoBersani, Novel: AForum onFiction 21, “Flaubert’s Encyclopedism,” nos.2-3(1988):146. CHAPTER 8

writtenin1997for Note:ThisessayonJeanGenet’slatepoeticswasoriginally CenandPsychoanalysis LateintheTwentieth a specialSAQissue,“Marxism horizoninthisfirstsectionintury.”I havedecidedtokeepthepresent-tense centurynowbelongstothepast,hopingtountact,eventhoughthetwentieth presentisa aboutone’shistorical derlinethefactthatwritingsynchronously matterofpoeticinvention. (NewYork:Viking,1963). 1. HannahArendt,OnRevolution

2. TheSecondWorldWar,trulya globalaffair,was thefirstofa kind thattheGreatWar,despitetheambitionimbeddedin itsname,neverwas. Thelattertestifiedinstead,likemuchelsethatsurroundedit,toa still-preorderthathadexceededitsstricttemporallimvailingnineteenth-century broughtaboutthedeathofthisorder,as its.ThattheGreatWaressentially doesnotmeanthat it instituteda neworProustdemonstratesinimitably, der as such.Thehistoricalpuzzlementoverthe interwarperiod,particu-

378

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larlyevidentin politicalandculturalhistory,pointsto thesuspendednatureofanepochthatdidnotknowwhattomakeofitsfailedrevolutionary legacy. My istheGreekwordfornovelorfiction,moregenerally. 3. Mythistorema beuseof it hereextendstheterm’sliteralmeaningto coverthe intersection torepresentthemtweenthemythssocietiescreate(andrecreateincessantly) ofmyth’sgeneration. selvesandtheirothersandthehistoricalcontingencies narrathoughgivenreadilyto transhistorical Mythisalwayscontemporary, foundations is thustospeakofaconmythistorical tives.Tospeakofsociety’s

andyetunpreexplicable shiftingground,whosepathis riverlike, tinuously arebothlimitedbytheirevent dictable, sincehistoryandthesocialimagination

andyetlimitlessintheirproject. 4. William Burroughs quotesGenetassaying:“TherewastheFrenchlanguageandtherewasme.I put myselfinsidetheother,thentheworkwas done.”SeeEdmundWhite,Genet, aBiography (NewYork: Knopf,1993), 510.We shallreturntotheconceptualization revealed inthephrasing,including itsunavoidable sexualstaging. 5. JeanGenet,Notre-Dame-des-Fleurs (Monte-Carlo, 1944);Miracledelarose (Lyon,1946);Querelle deBrest(Paris,1946); Pompes Funebres (Paris,1948); Poemes (Paris1948);Journalduvoleur(Paris,1949). 6. Jean Genet, “Entretienavec Hubert Fichte” (December1975),in L’Ennemi

declaré:Texteset entretiens,ed. AlbertDichy(Paris:Gallimard,1991),165.All

translations fromtheFrencharemine,unlessotherwiseindicated. 7. Genet,InterviewwithSaadalahWannousfromthe1970s,publishedinAl Karmil(inArabic)in 1986.QuotedintranslationbyWhite,Genet,347.

8. “ThebooksI wrotepreviously wereallpartofa dream,ofa daydream. AndsinceI outlivedthisdream,thisdaydream, Ihadto takeactioninorderto achievea sort of fullnessof life”(Genet,“Affirmationof Existencethrough Re-

bellion,”Journal ofPalestine Studies16,no.2 [Winter1987]:67).

g. Thepolitical articles, speeches, andinterviews posthumously collected in L’Ennemi declaré mustbereadinjuxtaposition withUnCaptif amoureux as ifthey wereeachother’sshadow,asifhavingbroughttheenemyoutintheopenallowedGenettheoptionfinallytoreturntoan imprisoned condition (theexperienceoflove),whichmadeartpossibleagain. 10.Ontheconsubstantial natureofmassacre andcancerascatalytic experiencesfor the realizationof Un Captifamoureux,see also PatriceBougon,“Poli-

tiqueetautobiographie,” Magazine Littéraire 313(September 1993): 67-70.

11.Jean Genet,TheThief'sJournal,trans. BernardFrechtman(New York: Grove,1964),71. 12. Ibid., 119.

13.Thetermbelongsto DavidLloyd,as a wayofdistinguishing Genet’s practiceoferadicating thesourceofsubjectivity (narratingandnarrated)from

Notes

379

autobiography, whichretainsitintact.I wouldcontest,however, hisdifferentiationbetweenGenetandProustintheseterms.Theirdifferences aremany(language,style,representations of homosexuality, etc.),buttheirpointsofdeparturecoincide. SeeDavidLloyd,“Genet’s Genealogy: European Minorities and theEndsoftheCanon,” inTheNature andContext ofMinority Discourse, ed.AbdulR.JanMohamed andDavidLloyd(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1990),

369-93.

14. Unpublished note.QuotedbyWhite,Genet, 523.

15.Jean Genet,“Entretienavec BertrandPoirot-Delbech” (January1982), 230. L’Ennemi declaré,

16.Ofcourse,“thetorturers” areallthoserepresentatives ofdominant bourgeoismorality, Genet’spreferredreaders:“[instead of]homosexuals andwriters.... 1wouldhavepreferred thatthebook[OurLadyoftheFlowers] hadfallen intothehandsof Catholic bankers,orintothatchedcottages,or amongstpolicemenor concierges” (quotedin White,Genet,207). 17. “EntretienavecAntoineBourseiller” (summer1981),L’Ennemi declaré, 226. 18. “EntretienavecHubertFichte,”142.

19. EdwardW.Said,“OnJeanGenet’sLateWorks,”GrantStreet36(1990):

32. 20.“ThePalestinians becameconscious ofthemselves asanautonomous nation... onlywhenthenationwasdeprivedofitsterritory... ThePalestinian nation,unableto remainin a land whereit might,indeed,havelostits flavour,

is obligedtofindin fantasyruleswhichit observes asa meansof rigorously ... Thisindependence, savingitselffromfadingawayindreamsandidealism spirit”(JeanGenet,“The it owestoits revolutionary thispeculiarautonomy, trans.MericDobson,JournalofPalestineStudies3,no.1 [Autumn Palestinians,”

5). 1973]:

Conn..: 21. JeanGenet,PrisonerofLove,trans. BarbaraBray(Middletown,

(Paris:Gallimard, Press,1992),25;UnCaptifamoureux WesleyanUniversity 1986),47.Henceforthcitedin the textas PL,withreferencetobotheditions. areoccasionally altered. Translations thesin22.Thisactofnamingisallthemoreimportantbecauseitsignifies gularityofanothercrucialaspectofGenet'slife:hismotherwashisonlyintimanuscript,written matecontactever with a woman.In an unpublished around1973,Genetdescribeshimselfas being“strongfromneverhaving ofbirth,whenIwasstillblind, passedthroughawomanexceptatthemoment mute,and doubtlessdrowned”(quotedin White,Genet,517).Thewholeenpromigoingonhereexplainsthesymbolic sembleofpsychicantagonisms with whichconcludes nenceof Hamzaandhismotherin UnCaptifamoureux, thebook’ssingularprinanallusiontothispairasapietafigurethatconstitutes ways,butI avail widelyandin interesting ciple.Thisissuehasbeendiscussed

380

Notes

thispretext-figure principles tode-dramatize owntheatrical ofGenet’s myself andleaveit inthewings,unstagedandundiscussed. 149. declaré, avecHubertFichte,”L’Ennemi 23.Genet,“Entretien acted,theydidn’tdosoonstage. . .Itwouldbewrong 24.“IfthePanthers

toexpectthatanidealcurtaincouldbebroughtdownontheirperformances. toevernewand sweptthePanthers indisplay, inwordsandinattitude, Excess “Blackon White: greaterexcess”(PL 85/ 141).SeealsoGiséleChild-Olmsted, 35, L'EspritCréateur in Genet’sPoliticalWritings,” LanguageandRevolution no.1(Spring1995):61-69.

Genetmakesthesamepointfromanoppositean25.Inanearlierinstance, gle:“WhitehatredinAmericaissuchthatIwonderwhethereveryWhiteman hangingfromits inthiscountry,whenheplantsa tree,doesnotseeNegroes (1970),inL’Ennemi declaré, branches.” See“Introduction a LesFréresdeSoledad”

69. 26. FrantzFanon,BlackSkin,WhiteMasks,trans. CharlesLamMarkmann

(NewYork:Grove,1967),194.

27.Foraninsightfuldiscussion andframingofthisentireissue,seeWhite, Genet,526-31. 28. Genet,“InterviewwithMadeleineGobeil”(January1964),in TheSelected WritingsofJeanGenet,ed. EdmundWhite(NewYork:EccoPress,1993),45729. Genet,“EntretienavecBourseiller”(notesde travail),in L’Ennemi declaré,

398.

30. SeeWhite,Genet,383-86. 31. Said,“OnJeanGenet’sLateWorks,”36.SeealsoGenet’sownimageof

thesymbiotic co-incidence betweenpoeticinspiration andpoetichistoryastwo matchesthat,ignitedtogether,becomeonebodyinsimultaneous immolation (PL,318/ 520). 32.DianaFusshas put togetheranexceptional argumentconcerningthis disruption oftheimpersonation/identification equationintheworkofFrantz Fanon,subjecting Fanontoa resourceful feministcritiquethatalsoelicitsfrom himthemostrevolutionary aspectsofhispsychoanalytic figuringofsexuality andcolonialism. See“InteriorColonies: FrantzFanonandthePoliticsofIden-

tification,” diacritics24,nos.2-3 (Summer-Fall 1994):20-42.(Parenthetically,

manyaspectsofFanon’s andGenet’s workcanbecoarticulated, inadditionto theircommonendowment ofassimilationist prefacesby Sartre,particularly in theintersecting domainsofviolenceandpoetry,sexualityandrevolution.) 33.Thetermbelongsto FélixGuattari,inhisPsychanalyse et transversalité (Paris:Maspero,1972),but is alsospecifically appliedto Genetin “Genet retrouvé,” Cartographies schizoanalytiques (Paris:Galilée,1981),276. 34.LeoBersani,“TheGayOutlaw,”diacritics 24,nos.2-3 (Summer-—Fal

1994): 5-6.

35. Said,“OnJean Genet’sLateWorks,”38.

Notes

381

36. Trahison appliesto a rangeof notionsin English(betrayal, treachery,

treason)and is also linked,by root, to translation(as in the famousItalian phrasetradittore traduttore). ForGenet,thetermis epistemically informed with a greatrangeof activepower,an askésis at the leveloflifeitself.SeePaule Thévenin,“La trahisoncommeascése,”Magazine Littéraire 313(September

1993): 35-36.

37. Bersani, “TheGayOutlaw,”10.SeealsoGenet,“Entretien avecHubert Fichte,”L’Ennemi declaré, 176,and “Affirmation of Existence throughRebellion,”78.Bersanigoeson tosaythatsolitudeis“nota betrayaldefinedbyits oppositionto loyalty.It is betrayalofthatopposition, a betrayalopposedto nothingbecauseit consists merelyin a movement outofeverything” (“TheGay Outlaw,”12).

38.Genet,“Affirmation ofExistence throughRebellion,” 77. 39. Said,“OnJeanGenet’sLateWorks,”33.

40.Notetheimpossibility of translating intoEnglish therichinterplay of genderedpronounsinthispassage. 41.Themistranslation here(resultingintheparenthetical phraseinserted bythetranslator) isquiteinventive, giventhequandaryofthegenderless Englishlanguage, soIletitstand. 42.Genet’s viewoftranssexuality clearlyproceeds fromamaleimagination; the ambivalence beginswiththe turningofa “he”intoa “she”andnotthe otheraround.Ina psychoanalytic sense,however, thisisnota realissuebecausethetranssexual exemplifies theepistemic dissociation betweensexand genderandthusrendersthemasculinist ofself/other schema irrelevant. Moreover,nomatterwhichwaythesexualtranslation goes,itisalways“thewoman as Name-of-the-Father [that]marksthelimittothemortifying exigency ofthe trans. Kenneth Essayon Transsexuality, Other.”SeeCatherineMillot, Horsexe: Hylton(NewYork:Autonomedia, 1990),59.

43.“Genetfeelscompelled toincludethesubject's inthepordisappearance invadedbythe traititself.Itisas ifthecontentoftheportraitweremomentarily negativewhichwill henceforthbe its onlyground”(Scott photographic Durham,“Genet’s ShadowTheatre:MemoryandUtopianFantasyinUnCaptif L'EspritCreateur35,no. 1 [Spring1995]:55).Seealso:Guattari, amoureux,” et ladi“LeCliché,la métaphore, “Genetretrouvé,”274;andPatriceBougon, gression,”L'EspritCreateur35,no. 1 (Spring1995):70-77.

72. of Resistance throughRebellion,” 44. Genet,“Affirmation 45. Genet, “Entretien avec MichéleManceaux”(May 1970),L’Ennemide-

claré,57. 147. declaré, avecHubertFichte,”L’Ennemi 46. Genet,“Entretien

argumentforthe 32-33.Inthisimpassioned 47.Genet,“ThePalestinians,” inthecourseoftheirmutual,undeconofbothartandrevolution irreducibility structibleantagonism,Genetsounds much likeAdorno,despite their obvious

thisratherpeculiar in manner. EdwardSaidalonehasrecognized differences

382

Notes

but convincingaffinity,whichdeservesseriouselaboration.See“On Jean Genet’sLateWorks,”39-40.

with way,fullycommensurate inanexemplary 48.Thispointiselaborated spaces)by ofdreamsandnaturalized (downtotheveryterminology Genet’s ofSpacein ZionTerritory: TheProblematic in“AnImaginary UriEisenzweig

5,no.4(May1981): Anthropology istDiscourse,” trans.DebraBendel,Dialectical 261-85. declaré,162;Cor49. SeeGenet,“EntretienavecHubertFichte,”L’Ennemi Reader, neliusCastoriadis,“Culturein a DemocraticSociety,”in TheCastoriadis 1997),345Blackwell, ed.andtrans.DavidAmesCurtis(Oxford: CHAPTER9

AnInterviewwith 1. AnthonydeCurtis,““AnOutsiderinThisSociety’: ed. FrankLentricchia(Durham:Duke DonDeLillo,”in IntroducingDonDeLillo,

University Press,1991), 56. LiterawithDonDeLillo,” Contemporary 2. ThomasLeClair,“AnInterview ture23,no.1(1982):31.

3. DeLillo’s affinities withamodernist conceptualization arerecognized in thebetterreadingsofhiswork.See,notably,TomLeClair,In theLoop:Don DeLillo andtheSystems Novel(Champaign-Urbana: University ofIllinoisPress, 1987), whoseesinTheNames, amongotherthings,thetraditionoftheJamesian international novel. 4. Oftheslewofsuchpostmodern readingsofDeLillo,Iwouldsingleout PeterBaker’s“TheTerrorist as Interpreter: MaoIIin Postmodern Context,” Postmodern Culture4,no.2 (1994).Butit isindicativeofthedestabilizing char-

acterofDeLillo’s workthathecanbealsoberead,fromapostmodernist point ofview,toembody atraditional Romantic metaphysics. (SeePaulMaltby,“The RomanticMetaphysics of DonDeLillo,” Contemporary Literature 37,no. 2 [1996].) Thevehemence ofsuchcritiquesdemonstrates thestrainofallegedly postmodernist categories againsttheuncategorizable flux,theundercurrent of poeticthought,thatdistinguishes literature asauniquemodeofnegotiation betweenhistoryandknowledge. Incontrast, considertheadmirable readingsof JohnMcClure, particularly “Postmodern/Post-Secular: Contemporary Fiction andSpirituality,” Modern Fiction Studies 41,no.1(Spring1995):141-63. 5. DeCurtis,““AnOutsiderinThisSociety,” 60. 6. DonDeLillo, TheNames (NewYork:Vintage,1982), 3. Henceforth citedin thetextasTNfollowed bypagenumber. 7. TheremarkismadebyAndreasEliades,a shadyGreekcharacterinthe novel,whoofficially occupies apositionina multinational firmandyetmaybe a leftist“terrorist.”In whichevercase,DeLillohashis fingeron the cultural pulse.I rememberit beinga standingjokeamongfriendsinGreecethat the ReaganbombingofLibyawasa geographylessonforthe Americanmasses.

Notes

383

Themostcovetedmediaimagewasa StateDepartment spokesman witha pointerinfrontofa newlydraftedmap. 8. See,in particular, his ruminations ontheTowerofBabelmythin“Des Toursde Babel,” trans.JosephF.Graham,in Difference inTranslation, ed.Joseph F.Graham(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press,1985), 165-207, andalsoin TheEar oftheOther(NewYork:Schocken, 1985). Derrida’s conceptualization ofthedouble-bind isdrawnfromGregoryBateson’s pioneering formulation: theconditionofbeingcaughtbetweentwocommands, whosecontradiction nevertends

towardthe terms’mutual exclusionor abolition.SeeG. Bateson,D.D.Jackson, J. Haley,and J. H. Weakland,“Towarda Theoryof Schizophrenia,” Behavioral

Science 1(1956): 251-64. g. Derrida,TheEaroftheOther,102. 10.ThephrasebelongstoMatthew J.Morris,“Murdering Words:Language in Actionin DonDeLillo’s TheNames,” Contemporary Literature 30,no.1(1989):

114.

11.ErnestRenan,“Qu’est-cequ’unenation?”in Discours et conférences (Paris:Calmann-Lévy, 1922),278,my translation.

12.ThewordsbelongtoBrademas, andMatthew Morrisiscorrectinrecognizing a seriesofmisreadings byBrademas thatservetodistance himideologicallyfromthecult.Morris'scharacterization ofBrademas is,onthewhole,insightful,butI believeit isimportanttoholdontothisideaofthecult’sbearing a differentsignatureor,atleast,a different wayofsigningapatternofdestructiveactivityina regionwhosetraditionofdestruction goesbackcenturies. The iscrucial, thecult,asatheoretical figureinthemythistordistinction otherwise ofthenovel,becomes toabunchofpsychotic hipicalstaging reduced leftover pies.SeeMorris, “Murdering Words,” 118-20. in Intro13.SeealsoDennisA.Foster,“Alphabetic Pleasures:TheNames,” ducingDonDeLillo, 159. 14.“Inonesense,webarelyexist.It’sa difficultlife.Therearemanyset-

ariseoftheory andpracThecellslosetouchwitheachother.Differences backs. getsick.Somehavedied, Welosepurpose, tice.Formonthsnothinghappens. somehavewanderedoff.Whoarewe,whatarewedoinghere?”(TN,208),An-

inIndia. is repeatedasa refrainby Emmerich dahl’sdesperateself-description ofthe lifefroma member ofclandestine Itcouldeasilybea wearyconfession deortheGermanRedArmyFactionwhilein ideological ItalianRedBrigades timeframeasthe featandon therunduringmoreorlessthesamehistorical his thecultwithstrictformalism, constructs Again,although DeLillo narrative. language. historical realistsensibility endowsitwithaconcrete of summation stunning 15.ThispointofviewisechoedbyFrankVolterra’s art.It’s thetwentiethcentury:“Filmis muchmorethanthetwentieth-century mind.It’stheworldseenfromtheinanotherpartofthe twentieth-century centuryisonfilm.Itisthefilmed side... . Thisiswhereweare.Thetwentieth aboutusmoreimportant ifthereis anything Youhavetoaskyourself century.

384

Notes

The ourselves. watching onfilm,constantly thanthefactthatweareconstantly scanners, picmicroscopic wholeworldisonfilm,allthetime.Spysatellites, (TN,200).It everything” sex,war,assassinations, turesoftheuterus,embryos, thathedoesn’trealizetheincomownself-enclosure ofVolterra’s is indicative universes.Howcouldthecultagreeto become patibilityof twotautological isbasedonexwhenitsentireexistence partofthistotalscopicself-reference, logic? inpracticeitstotalizing totalityby reproducing orcisinghistorical 16.SeeLeClair,IntheLoop, 192. andconnects ittotheimperithispointconvincingly 17.LeClairdevelops alismofprintculture.Seeibid.,193-94. Violence hasalwaysbeena intertwined. 18.Thetwomaybesubstantially whilethespecofreligion(certainly monotheistic religion), primarycomponent frenzy. religious violence assumesat timesanessentially tacleofcontemporary “Iaminterestedin religionas a disciplineanda spectacle,as SaysDeLillo: something thatdrivespeopletoextremebehavior”(LeClair,“AnInterview withDonDeLillo,”26).

1g.DeCurtis,“AnOutsiderinthisSociety,’” 57. 20. MariaNadotti,“AnInterviewwith DonDeLillo,”Salmagundi100(Fall

1993): 93.

21.Thisobservation initiallybelongsto Foster,“Alphabetic Pleasures,”

159-60.

22. Theextraordinary storyofNovember17isuniquein “urbanguerrilla warfare.” Itshistoryhasunfoldedlikea grandserialnovelwithintheneohellenicimagination, spanningnearlythreedecades, andisbyallaccounts stillunfinished.(Thestunningdevelopments inJuly2002,whichbroughtaboutthe suddenarrestof a dozenmembersand hasapparentlyled to the group’s demise,figuresas theserial’smostrecent,buthardlyfinal,chapter.) November 17becamelegendaryif fornootherreasonthanthat,since1976,whenit appearedonthescenewiththeassassination oftheCIAchiefoperative inAthens, nomemberhad everbeendiscovered, and its composition was shroudedin mysteryandrumor.Thelegendwasnurtured, notmerelybythelongevity of itsmysterious existence, butbymulti-page declarations accompanying the“terrorist”actions,whoseauthorial erudition,incisive sarcasm,andsometimes impressive economic analysismadethemalluringcommodities tothemainstream press,whichcontinued publishing them,eventhoughfora timetheywereconsidereddocuments ofhightreasonandtopublishthemwasacriminalact.The paradoxical complicity (almostaneroticattraction) betweenthe mostvisible massmediaandthemostphantompoliticalentityin thecountry—the unbreachable mysterysurrounding the identityofthegrouphadin itsheyday (the 1980s)grantedthemmetaphysical cult status—wasitselfamythistorical

projecton a collective scale,a huge,Balzacian enterprisethatimplicatedthe imaginary oftheentirenation.I elaborated thelogicofthisself-fictionalization

Notes

385

and its national(ist)valuesin “NeaTaxéThymaton[NewOrderof Victims],” Planodion 17(December 1992): 615-24.Sincethe1990s,however, thegroup’sin-

creasingideological confusion (which,tonosurprise,coincided withitslossof ironyandsubversive humor)madeforratherboringfiction.Thisdegeneration wasalsofedbycontributions fromtheStateDepartment andmajorAmerican media,who,inablatantgestureofharassment andpolitical blackmail, keptusingthemystery ofNovember 17todeclareGreece a terroristhaven(including theridiculous chargesthatthegrouphadlinkstothegoverning socialist party). Therecentevents,thoughstillunresolved, havegonealongwaytodispelboth theU.S.imperialist fantasyandtheLeft’simaginary investment intheurban guerrillaromance.Yetthe torrentof self-examination theyhavecaused throughoutGreeksociety, rangingfromseriousanalysestoidioticbravadoin anunprecedented barrageofmassmediaimages,suggeststhatthegrandserialofself-fictionalization remainsunfazed. 23.Presumably thisiswhyDeLillo returnstoAthensinMaoII.Athensbecomesagainthe interstitialspacewherean Americanwriter(whois sucha to-

talreclusethathehasbecome onlyaname)andanArabpolitical radicalmeet inanobviousgestureofculturalnegotiation. From a certainpointofview,both embody a terrorist logicin respectto theculturetheyinherit.Buttheirencountercanonlybeeffectively stagedinmodernAthens,inthemidstofa culturethattakesplace(actualizesitself)in theformofunaccountablestreetnoise,

a fluxof“nameless things.” 24.Asextremeorsophisticasit mightsound,thismeditation couldhave inIndia,”althoughIamnotthe takenplacefromthepointofviewof“DeLillo toBrademas’s itbeyonda merehint.Contrary persontoundertake appropriate ofdetailandlackof betweenGreeceandIndiaasspacesofprecision distinction toweavethe thenoveldemonstrates a capacity common measure, respectively, Itis theextraorditheoretical language. twospacestogetherinoneoverarching inthesamenovel,inthesame thatmakespossible narytalentof DonDeLillo suchdifferent conceptualizations. framework, 165-66. 25.JacquesDerrida,“DesToursdeBabel,” (SepNewYorkTimes Magazine 26.DonDeLillo,“ThePowerofHistory,” 60-63. tember7,1997),

CHAPTER 10 Sincewritingthispiece,I 1. Itis inthewayoflegendsto flauntaccuracy. discoveredthat the authorityofthisanecdotehasbeenattributedas wellto Arecentsurvey,bywayof internetwisdom, andHo-Chi-Minh. ChouEn-Lai allegoripertaining narratives, inallsortsofdifferent turnedupitsinvocation prevails: orundecidability whereunpredictability callytovariousoddcontexts on society,to the projected fromthe presumedeffectof internettechnology

386

Notes

timetable ofdeveloping marketsinChina,tonewplansfor401(k)reform,to alas!thesignificance ofUNinspectors inIraq.Thoughnoonehassurelybotheredtomeditate onthisanecdotal pluralityintermsof,say,thepeculiarstrains ofAsiancommunism inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,nonetheless onecandiscerninalltheusesofthisanecdote atacitacknowledgment ofapeculiarsenseoftime,relativetowhichwhatisconstrued as“Western” temporalityisprofoundly hampered.

INDEX

Adorno,TheodorW.,x-xi,xx,3,43-44,53, 69,99,106,145,163-65, 168-79, 183,188, 191-92, 196,199,203,211,213,215,222,

224-26, 255-56, 260, 326-29, 331-33, 338-41, 348,350,358,366,368-69, 371-73, 375,381

Althusser, Louis,345 Anouilh,Jean,123

Antigone, 87-88,116-57,360,365;andkin-

ship,124,130,132-33, 146;andphilia, 130,133,146;and sexuality,130-32;and

thelaw,146-57 96,145,355 Anti-Semitism, Arendt,Hannah,66-70,250,353,363-64 Aristotle,14,116,127,130-31,154-56,

194-95, 365-66, 371

Autonomy,x, 52-53,55,75-76,82,84-86,

88-89,92,118,126-27,132-33,141,

374;and dreams,205-10,213,215, 220-21,226;and Passagenwerk, 198-28; and thecollector, 220-24;ashistorian,

202-15, 220-21, 224

Bergson,Henri, 24-30,97,100,103,206,

345, 346, 347

Berlin, Isaiah,96 Berman,Harold, J.,52

Bernstein,Eduard,356 Bersani,Leo,247,280-83,381 BlackPanthers,259-60,267-73,276,283, 290,380

Blake,William,333 Blanchot,Maurice,4, 366

Blanqui, Auguste,218 Bloch,Ernst,356,367 Blumenberg,Hans,31,40-41,90-91,

105-7,112,114-15, 349,358

146-49, 152,155,157,171,195,215,236, Boll,Heinrich,123 JorgeLuis,231,244-45 265-66, 272,298,313,334-35, 379; and Borges, autonymy,313,316;of literature,1-5, 79-81, 108,235 Autopoiésis,6, 118

Brecht,Bertolt,3,37,44,86,94,123,134,

163,179,188-95, 201,205,329,348,354, 356,366,368-69, 371-73

Bachelard,Gaston,28,144

Brisson,Luc,349 Brod,Max,182

Balibar, Etienne, 24,55-56,70

Buck-Morss,Susan, 368

Ball,Hugo,356

William,378 Burroughs, Butler,Judith,123-24,146-47,344 Byron, GeorgeGordon,295

Balzac,Honoré, 71, 72,215,245,255,374,

385

Bateson, Gregory, 383

Cadava,Eduardo,210-11,374 Caillois,Roger,374

Baudelaire, Charles,214-15,374 Beckett,Samuel,292,337 Benjamin, Walter,3,7,14,28,44,54,61,63, 65-66,70-71,81-83,87-88,90-91,94, 96-97,99,107,111-12,155,163,165,169,

Cassirer,Ernst,31,41,347,354,358 Castoriadis,Cornelius,xi, xvii,10,43,96,

356, 358, 353-54, 186-95, 178-80, 171,

290,350,354, 112,126,149,153-54,

image, 371-75; anddialectical 366-69,

198,204-5,209,213-16,220-21,223-28,

Canetti, Elias,369

358-59, 363

Celan,Paul,256,338-39

388

Index

Chateaubriand, Frangois-René, 295

Clastres, Pierre,352 Cocteau,Jean,257 Corngold,Stanley,185,371 Cortés,Donoso,100-101 96,144-45,167,298, Cosmopolitanism,

355, 364

Cover,Robert,64,66,69,353

Croce,Benedetto, 97 Dallmayr, Fred,364 DanteAlighieri,334,337 Danto,Arthur,344 Declaration ofIndependence, 55,57-60,350

65,67 Engels,Friedrich, 2,6,49-89,96, xv,xvii-xx, Enlightenment, 175,201,247, 125,127,170-71, 117-20,

anddisen333-36; 329-30, 257, 264, 249, xix-xx,44,54,176,350-51; chantment, and law,52-54,60-89;and myth,30-34,

89,106,163,168, 44,49,54,60,78-79, subject, 206;asrule,54-61; 172,176-78, Xiv,12,52,84-85

Euben,Peter,141 Fanon,Frantz,67,271,353,380 Fascism,xvi,34-39,41-42,44,107,113, 136-37,142-46,166-67,188-89,191-92,

Deleuze,Gilles,23,27 213, 348, 359, 373-74 DeLillo,Don,292-22,382-85;and archeol- Flaubert,Gustave,214,231-48,375-77 ogy,294-95, 298-304, 322;andGreece, Ford,Andrew,366 Foucault,Michel,234,238,246-47 294-298,301,303,318-20,322,385;and fiction,292-95,318,320-22,385;and Fraenkel,Ernst,357 postmodernism,293,382;and the Freud,Sigmund,16,25,31,38,122, 135-36,167,200,205-7,225-26,236,253, name,293-94, 296,301-5,309-17, 320-22,385 279,296-97, 349,376 Derrida,Jacques,2, 7, 61,73,76-80, Fuss,Diana,380

120-22, 124,151,302-3,321,343,344,

365,383

Detienne,Marcel,347,365 Dhareshwar, Vivek,355 Dialectic ofEnlightenment, x-xi,xx,43-44,

Gadamer,HansGeorg,364

Gaillard,Francoise, 241 Gasché,Rodolphe,80-81 Gauchet,Marcel,349,351

79,86,88,106,163-65,168-78,329-30,

Gautier, Théophile, 238

333,335,348,350-51, 358,367

Genet,Jean,256-91,378-82;andBlack

Dialectics,x—xii, xiv,xvii,xx,13-14,27-28, 44,93-99,101,110,118-21,124,127-28, 139,163-64,169-70,172-78,181,185-86, 189-92,195,199-200,203-5,208-9,212, 217-18,228,247,319,328-30,360,

368-69, 374;“dialectics atastandstill,” 28,198,204-5,213,224-28,373 Diamond,Elin,372 Donato,Eugenio,234,246,377 DonQuixote, 235,240

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor,14,255,325 Douzinas,Costas, 128,365

DuCamp,Maxime, 219-21, 232,234,375, 377 Dumas,Alexandre, 239,376 Durham, Scott,381 Durrell, Lawrence,296

Eisenzweig, Uri,382 Eisler,Hanns,348

Eliot,T.S.,336 Elytis,Odysseus,295

Panthers,259-60,267-73,276,283,290,

380;andcriminality, 256-58,261-64, 272-73,275,281,283;andimpersonation,258,262,264-73,275-82,380;and Palestinians, 259-60,262,265-66,273,

278-79, 283,285-87, 289-90, 379;and sexuality,256-58,268-69,272-75, 278-80,282-85,378-80 Giacometti,Alberto,281 Godwin,William,72

Goldhill,Simon,370 Gramsci,Antonio,97,99 Greekthought,4,32-34,36-37,116-10, 125-26, 129-34,137-57, 294-95, 350, 360-62,365 Guattari,Félix,380 Guevara,Ernesto,252

Habermas,Jiirgen,343

Hamacher, Werner, 187,371-72 Hanssen,Beatrice, 374 Haussmannization, 216-19,374

Index Hegel,G.RW.,xiv,2,7,14,36-37,93, 96-97,99,118-20,122,124-25,127-28, 131-33,151,156-57,167,170-71,174,. 228,330,365 Heidegger,Martin,4, 7,10,37,117,122, 124,127-29,132-46,151-53,156,167,

179,193,338,343,347,359-60, 362-65,

372 Heteronomy, 55,64,74,75,77,80,82,84,

86-87, 92,114,146-50, 156, 313,354

Hilliard,David,268,270,272

389

Kluge,Alexander,123 Knowledge,xiv—xv, 6-8, 10-14,21-26,

117-18,125,201-8,212,221,227-28, 232,

235,238,246-47, 252-55, 319,331,340, 371;and literature,xvi-xvii,xix,1-3,

11-12,18-19,201,292,334,336-38;and mythicthought,30-33,39-42,102,107, 156,227,332-33;andsense,18,20-21, 227;as performance,10-11,29,118,121, 156,189,201,203 Kraus,Karl,viii, 96,201,369

PeterUwe,366-67 Hohendahl, Hélderlin,Friedrich,4, 103,119,122-23,

128, 134, 136-37, 143, 295, 333, 360

Homer,31,130,161-64,170-78,181-82,

196,275,290,330,347,361,366,368,370

Horkheimer,Max,x-xi, xx,43-44,79, 106,

163,168-79, 183,196, 348,350-51, 358,

368,371

Lacan,Jacques,122,124,172 Laclau,Ernesto,357

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 5-7,34-39,41,

128, 192-93, 343,348, 364,372

Lambropoulos, Vassilis, 354

LeClair,Thomas,382,384 Lenin,VladimirIlyich,98-99,252,325,

Hullot-Kentor,Robert,177 Hulme,T.E.,97

Lenz,Daniel,366

Humboldt,Wilhelmvon,36,137,145,295

Lewis,Wyndham,25,97

Hypokrisis, 8,83,95,121,127,129,190,

Literature,xv—xxi; 1-19,41,44-45,187-88,

194-97 Ian,Marcia,350 Identity,14-16,29,32,34-38,74,76,118, 177,190,228,233-34,264,267-68,

273-75; 277-82, 285,296,298,304,310,

356

201-2, 212,233-36, 239,242,244-45, 247, 256-65,288-89,292;and law,6,49,54,

75-89, 146-57, 245,258,324,343; and

myth,xv-xix,119,163-64,214-15,255, 275,289,317;and sexuality,15-17,258,

273-75,370;andtranslation,xxi,13,17;

312,315-16,339,380;identicide,170-78, as theory, xv,xvii-xix, 2-7, 10,17-19,24, 256,262;identitarianlogic,10,35,37, 34,42,78-79, 90,97,182, 193, 196, 201, 85,93,118-19,192,228,263,275,280-82, 245,248,266,278,292-93,320-21,371, 285,316,327 373, 383 Intuition,19-29,97,100-102,104,121,227, Livingston, Paisley, 345 Lloyd,David,378-79 345,346,373 Locke, John,52,56,58,116,335 Irigaray,Luce,123-24,131 Loraux,Nicole,154-55,365 Lorca,FedericoGarcia,335 Jacobs,Carol,131-32 Lukaes,Georg,99,356 Jager,Lorenz,374 James,William,25,346

Luxemburg, Rosa, 99

Jaspers,Karl,364 Jefferson, Thomas,52,58 Joyce,James,164,201,366

Macherey, Pierre,1,18,242,344 X,49-50,271,350 Malcolm

Kafka,Franz,49,63,75-89,163-64, 178-89,196-97,201,211,245,292,324,

374 339,343,354,366,368-71,

Kant,Immanuel,2,6-7,20,36,52,54-55, 58,78,83-88, 100,116,118,125,168,

Mann,Thomas,39 MaoTse-tung,330-31,333 Marcuse,Herbert,166 Marquard, Odo,88,114,349 Martin,Richard,347 Marx,Karl,7,67,70,93,116,119,167,242,

335, 351 255 264, 330, 338, 176, 212, 171-72, Vladimir, 335 Mayakovsky, Kierkegaard,Soren,122 Kleist,Heinrichvon,ix-x,xxi

McCall,Tom,82,354

390

Index

McClure,John,382 McKenna,Andrew,246

Meier,Heinrich,92,115,359 Menninghaus, Winfried,375 Michelet,Jules,215,255 Miller,Henry,296

Miller,J.Hillis,84,354 Millot,Catherine,381

Mimesis,8-9,29,36,40,116,177-78, 185-86,188,190,192-95,276-77,372 Modernism,14,40,164,166,191-93,200,

217,224,235,249,290,293

7,37,88,117,142, Nietzsche,Friedrich,

144-46, 167, 193, 338, 364

November 17,318,384-85 Orff,Carl,123

Orientalism, 219-20, 222,233-34, 237-38, 283,296,298,314

Paranomia, 54,70-83,86,89,104,127,258,

273,280,323-24; ofpoetry,333-39

Parmenides,134,144 Performativity, xiv—xviii, 8-12,16-17,29,

33-34, 42,78,80,83-84, 87-89, 90,95-96,

Modernity, ix-xiv, 33-34, 41,49-51, 54,87,

108-9,118,121,125,129,146,150-51, 154,157,181,184-96,205,211,219,258,

89,106,116-17,125,127-28,156,162,

164-65, 178,195-96, 214,219-22, 235,

275-77, 293,303,309,313, 263,266-73,

249,294,300,309

339, 344, 347, 348, 354, 360, 365, 372, 380

Monotheism,38,82,88,92, 105,114,309,

312-14, 316,349, 354,355,358,384

Plato, 2, 8-10, 31-32,36,79, 116-18,120,

Morris,Matthew, 383 Mouffe, Chantal,357

Miiller,Heiner,94-95,167,349 Myth,xv—xviii, xix-xx,30-45,54,90-115, 116-19,123,125,157,162,169,182,185,

193-97, 206-7, 215,227-28, 302-3, 312-13, 317-18, 321,334,356,370-71, 378;and anarchy,94, 102-4;and litera-

142,151,195,205,334-35, 347-48, 349,

364

Poiésis,xiv,xv,Xviii-xx,3, 6, 10, 19,26,29, 39, 43, 117,120,127, 163,205, 211-12, 216,254-55,262,265,290,334;poiein,5, 126,177,187,211,217,363, 212

Polanyi,Karl,18

Political theology, 92-94,98,105-7,

ture,xv-xix,30,178,215,293-94,317;

andNazism, 31,34-39, 41-42, 136-37, 142-46,193,348;and performance, xvi-xvii, 31-34, 39,45,54,78,82,87-89, 91,95-97,104,109-10,116-17,121,123, 155-56,176,186,189,194,196,313, 320-21,339,347;and thesacred,xvi,33,

312-13, 321, 89,176-77, 41,59,81-83,

351-52, 353-54; andtruth, 32-33,

112-15, 359

Pound,Ezra,334-35 Praxis,xiii—xiv, 41,51,86,97,99,101-3,

111-12, 114-15, 121,123-24, 140,190-91, 202,208,211,242,254,290,324,357 Protagoras,129

Proust,Marcel, 25,207-8,214-15, 235,

377, 379 261-62, 243-45,

Pucci,Pietro,370

331-33,347;antimythicalera,xv,

xviii-xix,10,33-34,90,193;mythic Rabinbach,Anson,367 thought,30-34,39-42,121,125,180, Reading,11-14,17-18,153,180,182,189, 189,293;mythistorical, 43,76,78,81, 198-201,203,205,221,231,289,314,328, 164,171,180,188,199,227,255,261,286, 371 290,317,320,378,383-84;mythoReid,Thomas,58 graphic, xv, 10,15,19,30,41-43,75,78,

Reinhardt,Karl,130

86,125,155-56,262,286,289;mythopo- Renan,Ernest,237-38, 306,375 etic,xvi-xvii,6, 30,43,215,254,260,374

Naming, 72-73, 133,177-78, 235,239-40, 267,275,293,296,301-5, 309-17, 320-22, 362,379

Nancy,Jean-Luc, 5~7,34-39,41,348 Negri, Antonio, 345 Newton, Huey,272

Revolution,50,52, 56-60,65-70, 72,81,83, 97-99, 103-4,111,157,166,193,211-12,

215-18,249-57,259-61,265-66,269, 271-72,276,280-81,283,286-90,324-28,

330-31, 333,357,373,379,381 Riefenstahl, Leni,166,191-92 Rimbaud, Arthur,255,263 Robespierre,Maximilien,325

Index

391

Romanticism, 2-3,5-7,36-37,93,108,117, Theory,xv-xvii,2-4,17,103,133, 119-22,146,167,208,212,336,338,343, 157,163-65, 178,190,193,195,266,275 Thucydides, 141 347, 366-67 Rose,Gillian,354 Tiedemann, Rolf,198-99, 373 Rosen,Stanley, 9-10,18,20,344,345,346 Tragedy, 94,96,107-11, 116-22,124-29, Rosenzweig, Franz,372 132-33, 144,151-57,193-96, 290,330, Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,56,118,325,351, 371

364

Said,Edward,16,237-38,264,275,282,

284,381-82

Salecl,Renata,354,371 Sartre,Jean-Paul, 67,234,256-58, 274,380 Schelling,FW.J.,23,25,119,136,343

Schmitt, Carl,82,90-115, 356-59; and

Transcendentalism, xviii-xix,7,38,56,

58-59,85,157,190,212,290-91, 299, 302-3,310,328,330,332,351-52

Translation,xxi,13,17,44, 123,128-29,

134-39,143,178,219,271,282,284-85,

302-3,305,310-11,317,319,361,370,

375, 381

Trotsky,Leon,99,283

Marxism,93-94,98-102 Scholem,Gershom,163,179,358,366,372

Vaihinger, Hans,354 Segal,Charles, 139 Vernant,Jean-Pierre,125-26,129,154 Self-alteration, xiv,13,27,31,39,42-43,49, Veyne,Paul,32-33,347 54-55, 77,86,97,104,110,119,127,139, Vico,Giambattista,97,103 155,157,194-95, 254-55, 260,277,334 Vidal-Naquet,Pierre,153

Self-interrogation, xii-xiv,38-39,42,81,

84,86,125,141,148,154-55, 194-95

Seznec,Jules, 234

William,108-9,111 Shakespeare,

Shelley, PercyBysshe, 295 6-7,13,17,33-34,39, Social-imaginary,

Villon,Frangois,257

Violence, 49-51, 53-54, 59-85, 88-89, 97,

101-4,129,139,152,173,254,260,303,

305-12, 314-17, 332, 353,357,362,384

334 Virgil,

Vovelle, Michel, 352

41-43, 49-51, 53-55, 65,75,78-79, 86,96,

102,104,107,115,121,126,149,153,156, Wagner,Richard,37,44,191 189-90, 194,201-2,207,209-10, 215,227, Warner,Michael,352 266,270-71, 289,328,334,350, 367,371 Weber,Samuel,351,359 Weill,Kurt,372 Sophocles,87,117,120,123-24,127,129,

134-40, 145,150-53, 156,362,364

Weissberg,Lilliane,370

Sorel,Georges,82-83,90-91,93-94,96-98, White,Edmund,272,290,378 Willet,Cynthia, 361,366 100-104,106,112-13,353,356-57 Wills,Garry,57-58 Spinoza, Baruch,21-24,26,276,345,346,

355-56 Steiner,George, 118,121-22,140,361

Wood,Michael,371

Woolf,Virginia,14-17,330 xviii-xxi,21,44,153,189, 11-14,55-59,62,65,114,190, Worldliness, Subjectivity,

340-41, 195,211,242,255,280,310-11,

201,207,262,320,322,327,371

378 xv,25,107,121,133,161,253, Sublimation, 274, 288, 309, 327

Writing,xx-xxi,11,13-15,148-51,165-66, 201,219,231-36,238,256-58,260-6164,

Theatricality, xviii,8-10,30,33,38,45,78,

Zeitlin,Froma,132

37,192 Syberberg,Hans-Jiirgen,

94-95,97,104,107-11,120,132,140,

153-55, 163,184,186,190-96, 245,258, 262,264,266-72,275-77,281,286,344,

354, 372, 380

308-9, 292, 294,304-6, 273-74, 288-89, 365,375,377 312,319-20, 337-38, Zizek,Slavoj, 76,343,357