Doctrine, Dynamic and Difference: To the Heart of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Differentiated Consensus on Justification 9780567660732, 9780567236654

Citation preview

Series Editor Gerard Mannion, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Series Editorial Committee Michael Attridge, St Michael’s College, University of Toronto Paul Avis, Church House, Westminster, Editor of Ecclesiology Mark Chapman, Ripon Theological College, Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire Paul Collins, University of Chichester Peter De Mey, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Michael Fahey, Boston College, USA Fr K M George, Old St Joseph’s Seminary, Kottayam, India

Bradford Hinze, Fordham University, New York Paul Lakeland, Fairfield University, Connecticut, USA Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Duke University, USA Paul Murray, Durham University Gareth Powell, Cardiff University Anthony Reddie, Queen’s Foundation, Birmingham, UK Gemma Simmonds, Heythrop College, University of London Kenneth Wilson, University of Chichester

Series Editorial Advisory Board Michael Attridge, St Michael’s College, University of Toronto Paul Avis, Church House, Westminster Mark Chapman, Ripon Theological College, Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire Julie Clague, Glasgow University Paul Collins, University of Chichester Peter De Mey, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Michael Fahey, Boston College, USA Fr K M George, Old St Joseph’s Seminary, Kottayam, India Janette Gray, Jesuit Theological College, Parkville, Victoria, Australia Roger Haight, Union Theological Seminary, New York Nicholas Healy, San Diego University, California Bradford Hinze, Fordham University, New York Paul Lakeland, Fairfield University, Connecticut, USA Mohan Larbeer, Tamilnadu Theological Seminary (TTS), Madurai, India Richard Lennan, Western Jesuit Theological Institute, Boston MA, USA Gerard Mannion, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Duke University, USA

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Mark Mason, University of Chichester Michael Montgomery, Chicago Theological Seminary Paul Murray, Durham University Timothy Muldoon, Boston College, USA John O’Brien, Lahore, Pakistan Neil Ormerod, Australian Catholic University, Sydney Peter Phan, Georgetown University Gareth Powell, Cardiff University Paul Pulikkan, University of Calicut Anthony Reddie, Queen’s Foundation, Birmingham, UK Henk de Roest, University of Leiden Gemma Simmonds, Heythrop College, University of London Jutta Sperber, Church of Peace, Bayreuth and the University of Rostock, Germany Gesa Thiessen, Milltown Institute, Dublin Ola Tjørhom, Stavanger, Norway Steven Shakespeare, Liverpool Hope University, UK Steve Summers, University of Chichester Michael Walsh, Heythrop College, London, UK Kenneth Wilson, University of Chichester Henk Witte, University of Tilburg.

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To Luc

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Acknowledgements

It is my pleasure to thank everyone who has in one way or another contributed to the realization of this book. First of all, I want to thank Prof. Dr. Peter De Mey, the promoter of my dissertation on which this book is based. I am deeply grateful to Paul Yiend, for proofreading the whole text. I also wish to express my gratitude to the reading committee, professors Jared Wicks, Risto Saarinen and Terrence Merrigan, for their efforts and their helpful comments, and to Michael Root and William Rusch for their valuable observations and their encouragement. Over the last few years, I have had the opportunity to be in touch with many other people involved in ecumenism, through the Belgian AnglicanRoman Catholic Committee, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft ökumenische Forschung-Ecumenical Research Forum and the Ecclesiological Investigations network. These contacts with fellow-ecumenists have given me a broader and more concrete perspective on the relationship between Christian churches. A special thanks goes to Gerard Mannion, Series Editor of Ecclesiological Investigations, and to Thomas Kraft and the people of T&T Clark/Continuum. Finally, I want to thank my family and friends, who have supported me along the way. They showed me that life is always far more important than reflection. In a very special way, I thank Mieke, Mozes, Marieke and Sam, who are the joy in my life. When I started the research project that has led to this book, I was not very familiar with ecumenism. At that moment, neither the doctrinal dialogues between Christian churches nor the practical issues relating to their living together had ever been the object of serious theological reflection for me. I started this research because of a systematic theological interest in soteriological issues. This interest was largely the result of my experience of teaching at the Chishawasha Regional Seminary in Harare (Zimbabwe) from 2004–2006. At the same time, living in Zimbabwe had been a unique experience of the diversity of Christian churches, especially

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for someone who originated from a traditionally Roman Catholic country. So, in a sense, this book is rooted in this Zimbabwe experience. I would like, therefore, to dedicate it to the Christians of that beautiful country, whose faith and sense of community were constantly before my eyes as I read and wrote. Pieter De Witte Leuven, 10 May 2011 Feast of Saint Damien of Molokai

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Abbreviations

AC ARCIC BSLK CA CaJ CKS CS DH DNK-LWB EKD ELCA ELCF FC GER-DER GC GÖK JBF JD1, JD2, JD3 JDDJ LA LG LCMS LK LWF

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The Apostolicity of the Church: Study Document of the LutheranRoman Catholic Commission on Unity Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche Confessio Augustana (Augsburg Confession) Church and Justification The Church as Koinonia of Salvation: Its Structures and Ministries Communio Sanctorum: die Kirche als Gemeinschaft der Heiligen Denzinger/Hünermann (Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen) Das Deutsche Nationalkomitee des Lutherischen Weltbundes Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland Evangelical Lutheran Church in America Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland Formula of Concord Die Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre: Dokumentation des Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsprozesses Report of the Joint Lutheran-Roman Catholic Study Commission on ‘The Gospel and the Church’ (‘Malta Report’) Gemeinsame Ökumenische Kommission Justification by Faith (Common Statement) The three versions of the JDDJ (‘Geneva’, ‘Würzburg I’ and ‘Würzburg II) The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification The Leuenberg Agreement Lumen Gentium – Dogmatic Constitution on the Church The Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod Lehrverurteilungen-kirchentrennend? Lutheran World Federation

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Abbreviations NCCB ÖAK PCPCU UR VELKD

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National Conference of Catholic Bishops (USA) Ökumenische Arbeitskreis evangelischer und katholischer Theologen Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity Unitatis Redintegratio – Decree on Ecumenism Vereinigte Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Deutschlands

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Introduction

This study investigates the consensus expressed in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (JDDJ) in 1999 by representatives of the Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic church. It is not an exhaustive historical study of the process towards the JDDJ. It focuses rather on systematic theological and methodological aspects of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue on justification. From a systematic theological point of view, ecumenical dialogue texts are intriguing documents, because they have to express the traditional views of the churches very accurately, while at the same time exploring the openness of these views to other ways of understanding the theological issues that are at stake. This tension between tradition and openness is the basic challenge for ecumenical dialogue and ecumenical reception. Ecumenism has to take into account fundamental differences between the Christian churches, move beyond stereotypical interpretations of these differences and find out whether the flexibility of one’s own tradition allows for a greater appreciation of the viewpoint of the dialogue partner, or even a recognition of its doctrines as true Christian teaching. Hence, the main title of this work is: Doctrine, Dynamic and Difference. One of the problems for a study on the JDDJ is the fact that it has been the object of strong criticism from some theologians, which has led to an equally strong defence by others. Many authors writing on the LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue on justification have a clear conviction about whether or not the JDDJ should have been signed. This implies that most of the secondary literature has a polemical edge. The question as to whether or not the signing was a good idea will not be dealt with here. This study attempts rather to understand both the process that has led to this specific form of consensus and the critical reactions it has triggered. This does not mean that this research is wholly indifferent to the project of ecumenism, but it is based rather on the conviction that understanding is more valuable for ecumenism than polemics. Reception of the ecumenical dialogues in the churches should imply that those who have a more sceptical attitude toward ecumenism be also involved in the discussion. No progress is made

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when the overcoming of polemics between the churches leads merely to a hopeless polemics within those churches. Understanding is the key. The research questions can be summarized then as follows. (1) How did a consensus on justification emerge in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue? (2) What does an official reception of the dialogue results by way of a differentiated consensus mean for the churches, in the light of their views on justification and on ecclesial unity? (3) How does the JDDJ summarize these dialogue results in terms of content? (4) How can one understand the critical reactions against the content of the JDDJ and its methodology? Obviously, many choices had to be made when this study was written, and many aspects could have received a stronger emphasis: the way the LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue on justification has benefited from exegetical insights; Luther’s own interpretation of justification; other bilateral and multilateral dialogues on soteriology and ecclesiology; the relationship between the JDDJ and the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues on the church; the non-theological factors that had an effect both on the dialogue itself and on the reactions it caused. It is clear, however, that limitation is intrinsic to scholarly research. The fact that we focused specifically on the theme of justification as a systematic theological issue was not an arbitrary choice. It was based on the conviction, which is strengthened by this research, that the most fundamental problems in the whole discussion on the JDDJ are theological problems concerning the essence of Christian faith. Both the methodology of the dialogue and the passionate polemical debates it generated are only understandable in the light of a fundamental reflection on the content of the teaching on justification, which is, for believers, a matter of life and death. This study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 offers a fundamental reflection on the idea of legitimate doctrinal differences. It focuses primarily on the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ which was discussed extensively by ecumenical theologians prior to the emergence of the notion of ‘differentiated consensus’. Even though the idea of a fundamental difference between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism may seem somewhat out-dated, a careful analysis of the way this concept has been used reveals some basic issues pertaining to the method of the JDDJ: the relationship between language and reality and the necessity of doctrinal demarcation Chapter 2 discusses the work of Otto Hermann Pesch and of the Finnish school of Luther research. Both have developed theological interpretations of justification which have played an important role in the

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Introduction

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Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. The aim of this chapter is not to give an exhaustive overview of all Lutheran and Roman Catholic theological developments that are relevant for ecumenism. The work of Pesch and the Finnish theologians exemplifies rather the kind of ‘dynamic’ within the two traditions that has made a differentiated consensus on justification possible. Chapter 3 deals with the most relevant Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues that were received in the JDDJ. The main focus is on the American and the German Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues on justification. What is important about these documents is not only the way the theme of justification is presented, but also the fact that they show how the issues of reception and of doctrinal demarcation emerged in the dialogue. The concluding chapter, Chapter 4, studies the JDDJ itself in the light of the previous chapters. The main part of this chapter consists of a detailed analysis of the document. The process of its textual history shows once more the dynamic nature of the ecumenical dialogue. The Conclusion harvests the results of our research and summarizes them in the light of our research questions. In the last pages we will briefly refer to some more recent Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues and their relation to the JDDJ.

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Chapter 1

The Joint Declaration on Justification and the Problem of Difference

I. Introduction The consensus on justification by faith expressed in the JDDJ is a differentiated consensus. It is an agreement that is considered sufficient for overcoming the rejections and condemnations between Lutherans and Roman Catholics on the issue of justification. Still it does not imply doctrinal uniformity. The Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification remain different, and as different doctrinal ‘configurations’, they are said to be open to each other and to give expression to the same theological concerns. Language, and more particularly the problem of translation, is a helpful model to understand the kind of doctrinal unity-in-difference that one finds in the JDDJ. If one translates the small conversation ‘Thank you’ – ‘You’re welcome’ into German or French, one may get rather divergent results like ‘Danke’ – ‘Gern geschehen’ and ‘Merci’ – ‘Je vous en prie’. Comparing word by word the English sentence ‘You’re welcome’ with its translations can lead to bewilderment. There is hardly a literal connection to the French and the German expressions. Only when one takes into account the whole system of grammar, vocabulary, syntax and linguistic practice of the respective languages, one perceives how similar attitudes of generosity and gratitude are expressed in the three languages. In other words, a fruitful encounter between people who speak different languages is only possible when they avoid making too rash literal comparisons between individual words or sentences. Instead they should take into account the differences between the linguistic systems in their entirety. Similarly, the LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue attempts to overcome direct comparisons of individual doctrinal statements (which often seem to contradict one another) by showing how such statements reveal their truth only within the overall structures of Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching. Unity is uncovered only by taking difference into consideration.

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The issue of doctrinal difference is fundamental for the dialogue between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. One of the questions that any reflection on the methodology of the JDDJ has to address is: How is a fundamental consensus on justification possible if there are differences that can equally be called ‘fundamental’? This question contains the concepts of ‘fundamental consensus’ (Grundkonsens) and ‘fundamental difference’ (Grunddifferenz), which seem to reflect previous stages in the reflection on ecumenical methodology.1 The notion of differentiated consensus was coined precisely to overcome some of the ambiguities in these earlier concepts.2 Yet, the idea of a differentiated consensus is realistic only to the extent that it takes into account all aspects of the issue doctrinal difference. In order to bring to light these aspects, it can be helpful to reconsider some older methodological discussions. In this chapter, the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ will be analysed in order to get a clearer view on what is at stake in the debates on the differentiated consensus.

II. The Absence of a Fundamental Difference in the JDDJ In 8 paragraphs of the JDDJ, there is a shared affirmation that is each time solemnly introduced by the formula: ‘We confess together’.3 The first instance (§15) is a special case. I quote it here in full: ‘In faith we together hold the conviction that justification is the work of the triune God. The Father sent his Son into the world to save sinners. The foundation and presupposition of justification is the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. Justification thus means that Christ himself is our righteousness, in which we share through the Holy Spirit in accord with the will of the Father. Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.’ According to the commentary by the Strasbourg Institute for Ecumenical Research, this paragraph can be seen as offering two descriptions of 1

Cf. A. Birmelé and H. Meyer (eds), Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz: Studie des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung. Ergebnisse und Dokumente (Frankfurt am Main/Paderborn: Lembeck/Bonifatius, 1992). 2 H. Meyer, ‘Die Prägung einer Formel: Ursprung und Intention’, in Einheit, aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom differenzierten Konsens ed. H. Wagner (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), pp. 36–58. 3 Or in the case of §15: ‘Together we confess’.

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justification: ‘[t]he first . . . from the perspective of the action of the triune God; the second from the perspective of the justified person’.4 Although the first perspective – which was absent in the first draft of the JDDJ5 – is absolutely crucial for a right understanding of justification, it is clear that the trinitarian-Christological character of justification was never the main focus of the dispute between Lutherans and Roman Catholics.6 The really controversial issue was rather the way God’s action in Jesus Christ means salvation for the believer or, in other words, the sense in which Christ can be said to be our righteousness. The confession-formula (‘Together we confess. . .’) of §15 introduces only this second part that concentrates on justification from the perspective of the believer and in which several disputed topics are mentioned: the role of faith, merit, the renewal of the heart and good works. This ‘confession’, which is a slightly modified version of §14 of the earlier Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue statement All Under One Christ7 (1980), can be considered as one of the central statements of the JDDJ.8 It is a key phrase in the third part of the declaration, in which the ‘common understanding of justification’ is expressed. How does this statement relate to the other sentences in the JDDJ that are introduced as a joint confession? The seven other ‘confessional’ paragraphs are all situated in the fourth part of the JDDJ, that is to say in the ‘explication’ (Ger.: Entfaltung) of the common understanding. In this part, the document focuses on seven traditionally divisive topics within the one theme of justification: ‘human 4

Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification: A Commentary (Strasbourg/Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1997), p. 29. 5 D. Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (Beiheft 10) 95 (1998), pp. 140–206 (180). See also: S. Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Unitas visibilis: Studia oecumenica in honorem Eero Huovinen episcopi Helsingiensis, ed. J. Jolkkonen et al. (Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 57; Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 2004), pp. 174–94 (186–87). 6 G. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders: Rettungshandeln Gottes oder historisches Interpretament? (Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, 64; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), p. 113. 7 ‘All Under One Christ’, in Growth in Agreement: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a World Level, ed. H. Meyer and L. Vischer (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), pp. 241–47. 8 See, for instance, the address of Christoph Stier at the 1997 Assembly of the Lutheran World Federation in Hong Kong, printed in: C. Stier, ‘“Rechtfertigung aus Gnade allein” - eine Einführung in die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’, epd-Dokumentation (1997), no. 38/97, pp. 31–34 (31). See also: A. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale: progrès œcuméniques et enjeux méthodologiques (Cogitatio fidei, 218; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2000), p. 138: ‘La compréhension commune de la justification proposée dans les paragraphes 15 à 17 est le pivot de toute la DCJ [Déclaration commune concernant la doctrine de la justification]’.

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powerlessness and sin in relation to justification’ (4.1., §§19-21), ‘justification as forgiveness of sins and making righteous’ (4.2., §§22-24), ‘justification by faith and through grace’ (4.3., §§25-27), ‘the justified as sinner’ (4.4., §§28-30), ‘law and gospel’ (4.5., §§31-33), ‘assurance of salvation’ (4.6., §§34-36) and ‘the good works of the justified’ (4.7., §§37-39). It is in these sections that the method of ‘differentiated consensus’ marks the text of the JDDJ in the most striking way. Each one of them starts with a common paragraph, in which a joint conviction is expressed in the form of a confession, followed by two paragraphs articulating the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic points of view. The differences between both perspectives are recognized as legitimate in the light of the agreement verbalized in the common paragraph. One could describe the relationship between the joint confession in §15 (part 3) and the confessions in the paragraphs 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34 and 37 (part 4) in two ways. First, the confession in §15, and in fact the whole of paragraphs 15 to 17, can be seen as a basis for the rest of the document. The central idea in these paragraphs is that justification is the work of God. The addition of the theocentric first part of §15 has given more emphasis to this idea. It is on the basis of this joint recognition of justification as a work and an unmerited gift of God that the differences pointed out in part 4 become bearable. As André Birmelé puts it, the JDDJ shows that the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic approach ‘want to witness, in their difference, to the unique divine work on behalf of humankind’.9 At the same time, the ‘explication’ of the consensus and the explanations why the differences are no longer church-dividing in part 4 of the JDDJ cannot simply be deduced from the theocentric statement in part 3. The confession in §15 is too concise to fully express the common LutheranRoman Catholic understanding of the way Christ becomes our righteousness. Therefore, there is a sense in which the relationship may be reversed: the confessions in part 4 can be regarded as the basis of the confession in part 3. It is only in the further elaboration of the consensus that the ‘common understanding’ reaches its goal: to demonstrate that the existing doctrinal differences on justification need no longer be a cause of division. It is only because part 4 shows that the remaining differences do not call the

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‘Sans gommer des différences, qui ne se laissent pas gommer, il convenait de s’accorder sur un certain nombre d’affirmations qui permettent de surmonter le caractère exclusif, et par la séparateur, de chacune de ses deux démarches, et de montrer que les deux approches veulent, dans leur différence, rendre témoignage à l’unique œuvre divine au profit des humains’. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 252.

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consensus into question, that §15 remains valid as a joint confession that is more than a shallow generalizing statement. Parts 3 and 4 of the JDDJ need each other. Their mutual dependence can be stated in terms of language and reference. The emphasis on justification as an act of God in part 3 relates the different Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrinal languages of salvation to their ultimate referent: the saving action of the Triune God. It is in this sense that part 3 is the basis of part 4. Conversely, the ‘common understanding of justification’ in part 3 is itself a linguistic utterance that remains somewhat broad and vague as long as it is not materialized by the reference in part 4 to concrete realities in the life of the believer such as good works, faith, sin and assurance of salvation. In this sense, part 3 is more of a theological summary of part 4. The idea of a ‘differentiated consensus’, which is not mentioned in the document, but which nevertheless determines the very structure of part 4, implies that the ‘remaining differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis’ (§40) are essentially part of the consensus. It is notable, however, that the differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teaching on justification are only made explicit in the JDDJ on the level of the ‘unfolding’ of the common understanding in part 4 and not on the level of the ‘basis’ or ‘summary’ in part 3.10 There is, in other words, no attempt in the JDDJ to articulate the Lutheran and Roman Catholic approaches to justification by means of two differing theological principles or structures of thought that would account for all other differences. Such an articulation of a difference between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran teachings on justification that brings all other differences concerning justification to a common denominator would have come close to the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ (Grunddifferenz) between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism.11 Especially because of the centrality of the doctrine of justification in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, a recapitulation of all the differences on justification under one heading would have come close to a summary of all the differences between both teachings. One might ask why the drafters of the document have not attempted to add such an articulation of a ‘fundamental difference’ in part 3.

10

Setting aside §18 on the doctrine of justification as criterion. Here, the differing views of Lutherans and Roman Catholics are also described in the form of a ‘differentiated consensus’. 11 Cf. Birmelé and Meyer (eds), Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz; H. Meyer, ‘Die Frage und neuere Erörterung einer katholisch/evangelischen “Grunddifferenz”’, in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie II: der katholisch-lutherische Dialog (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 2000), pp. 129–54; Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 247–74.

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On a preliminary analysis, the answer to this question seems obvious. The very idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ is problematic in this context for at least three reasons. First, ‘fundamental difference’ is an ambiguous notion in ecumenism. On the one hand, it can be used as a hermeneutical key that may be helpful in understanding the interconnectedness of the many doctrinal, spiritual and practical differences that exist between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism.12 A well-known example, which will be discussed extensively in the next chapter, is the way Otto Hermann Pesch characterizes the basic approach of the respective theological projects of Luther and Thomas Aquinas, namely as ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ theology.13 Although, strictly speaking, this distinction is limited to the analysis of the work of two particular theologians, it functions as a ‘fundamental difference’ in the hermeneutical sense of the word.14 Because of the authority both Luther and Aquinas enjoy within their respective traditions and because of the profound connection between their thinking and the spiritualities and ecclesial practices within these traditions, the characterizations ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ can be seen as interpretative concepts that illuminate a whole series of differences between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. It is in this hermeneutical (and heuristic) sense that advocates of the JDDJ, such as Harding Meyer and André Birmelé, understand the notion of fundamental difference and affirm its validity.15 They emphasize that every articulation of a fundamental difference remains a useful ‘conceptual construct’16 and that its purpose is merely descriptive. It is an aid in understanding the relationship between the churches and as such it is ‘ecumenically neutral’ and not an expression of a church-dividing divergence on the level of faith.17

12

Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (153). Cf. O. H. Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology: The Theological Confrontation Between Luther and Thomas Aquinas’, in Catholic scholars dialogue with Luther, ed. J. Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 61–81. Pesch developed this idea at the end of his dissertation: O. H. Pesch, Die Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas von Aquin. Versuch eines systematisch-theologischen Dialogs (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1967), pp. 935–48. 14 Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (139–40). 15 As I am about to point out, both Birmelé and Meyer highlight the fact that the ‘fundamental difference’ between Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching on justification goes further than the difference between (sapiential and existential) ‘forms of thought’. The difference is rather of a theological nature and has to do with the relationship between man and God. 16 ‘Die evangelisch/katholische Grunddifferenz – wie überhaupt die Idee einer konfessionellen Grunddifferenz – ist ein gedankliches Konstrukt. Sie ist die abstrahierendes Zusammenschau einer Mehrzahl von Einzeldifferenzen in Glaube, Lehre und Frömmigkeit’. Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (148). 17 Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 272. 13

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On the other hand, some authors use the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ in a way that is not at all ‘ecumenically neutral’. According to them, it would point to a radical difference that creates an unbridgeable gap between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic faith. The idea of a fundamental difference is brought into play in order to demonstrate that certain ecumenical agreements present a superficial and merely verbal consensus. These agreements would disregard or repress the deeper truth of a more critical discord that shapes the disturbing background of all alleged points of convergence. Leo Scheffczyk, for instance, criticizes a number of phrasings in §15 of the JDDJ, such as ‘Christ himself is our righteousness’ and ‘by grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work [we are accepted by God]’, because they can be affirmed by Lutherans and Roman Catholics, but only if both dialogue partners fill these ‘abstract formulae’ with a ‘different content’.18 This different content is related to a fundamental difference – considered as a divergence in the way God’s grace is conceived: ‘external’ versus ‘(also) internal’, or ‘relational’ versus ‘(also) ontological’.19 A second reason why the explicit articulation of one ‘fundamental difference’ in the JDDJ would have been problematic is that there are many ways in which this can be done. Birmelé points out that the fundamental difference has a ‘meta-dogmatic’ character. It lies beyond any particular area of Christian doctrine.20 At the same time, the fundamental difference manifests itself precisely in the concrete areas of theology and ecclesial life. Therefore, it can be said to possess a ‘circular’ structure. One can, for instance, start with the differences in the field of Christology and take this as a basis to elucidate differences in soteriology and ecclesiology. It is equally possible, however, to take another point on the ‘circle’ – for instance,

18

L. Scheffczyk, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung” und die Norm des Glaubens’, in Ökumene: der steile Weg der Wahrheit, ed. L. Scheffczyk (Siegburg: Verlag Franz Schmitt, 2004), pp. 261–82 (269). 19 ‘Dies führt zu der schon angedeuteten Feststellung, dass evangelische Glaubensdenken keine innere geschaffene Gnade kennt. Wenn deshalb die evangelische Theologie von der „Gnade” spricht, meint sie keine reale Entität, sondern den favor Dei und den von Christus geschenkten Heiligen Geist, der im Menschen den Glauben hervorruft und ihn in eine Beziehung zu Gott setzt. . . . Damit wird auch das Gottverhältnis der Gerechtfertigten rein relational verstanden, ohne in Erwägung zu ziehen, dass eine neue Relation eines entsprechenden Fundamentes bedarf, das nur in einer ontologischen Entität gelegen sein kann. Indem die katholische Theologie dieses Fundament in der habituellen Gnade findet, vermag sie auch in der Gottbeziehung etwas anderes zu erkennen als eine äußere Relation, nämlich eine innere Anteilnahme und Anteilgabe an der göttlichen Natur (vgl. 2 Petr 1,14)’. Ibid. (276–77). 20 Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 270; Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (149–50).

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soteriology – as the starting point. None of the alternatives offers the ultimate description of the fundamental difference. This circularity of explicating the fundamental difference in terms of the different themes of theology and doctrine is also present within the soteriological theme of justification. Each of the seven traditional areas of debate that are dealt with in part 4 of the JDDJ could be regarded as the central issue of justification in terms of which the other topics can be explained (even if the Law-Gospel distinction, the role of sin in the life of the believer and the relationship between faith and love would be the most obvious candidates). But it would also be possible to use categories that are not explicitly present in part 4 – such as the concepts ‘relational’ and ‘ontological’ mentioned earlier – to summarize the differences. The choice for any of these possibilities would, to a certain extent, be arbitrary and would have made the JDDJ more vulnerable to criticism. A third problem related to the idea of a fundamental difference is connected to this elusiveness of the difference. Since it is impossible to circumscribe it in terms of one particular theological idea, the fundamental difference has never been the official reason for church division. Churchdividing condemnations always had particular theological statements as their object.21 Therefore, an articulation of the difference between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism or of the difference embracing all other differences related to justification would have served neither of the two goals of the JDDJ: expressing a common understanding of justification and demonstrating the non-applicability of the historical condemnations in this matter (§5). In short, the absence in part 3 of the JDDJ of a summary of the seven differences described in part 4 seems perfectly reasonable. Any such summary would have been ecumenically ambiguous, arbitrary and would have appeared superfluous.22

21

‘Nicht die Grunddifferenz als solche ist darum Gegenstand des ökumenischen, die kirchentrennenden Unterschiede überwindenden Bemühens, sondern jene Einzeldissense, in denen die Grunddifferenz sich “materialisiert” und kirchentrennende Schärfe annimmt’. Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (152). 22 Meyer points out that the preparatory working group in the first phase of the official international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue refrained from articulating the ultimate root of all differences. Rather, they made a list of several issues that needed to be discussed. H. Meyer, ‘“Das Evangelium und die Kirche”: Vorgeschichte und erste Phase des internationalen Dialogs 1965–1971’, in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie II: der katholisch-lutherische Dialog (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 2000), pp. 17–41 (18).

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III. An Ambiguity However, things are more complicated than that. The entire project of the JDDJ is founded on the idea of a fundamental difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic ecclesial life and teaching. Birmelé himself discovers a fundamental difference in the JDDJ, not in a ready-made form, but by reading and summarizing first all Roman Catholic paragraphs of part 4 and then all Lutheran paragraphs.23 He acknowledges that the JDDJ fails to articulate this difference in a brief manner, but he is convinced that it is unmistakably present in the document and that, in the final analysis, it is situated in ‘the understanding of the human being before God’.24 The presence of the idea of a fundamental difference – albeit in a ‘hidden’ way – is crucial for the basic intention JDDJ. For the JDDJ only makes sense when the doctrine of justification offers a privileged access to the differences that separate Lutherans and Roman Catholics (and thus to what is commonly called the fundamental difference). In 1986, more than a decade before the signing of the JDDJ, Bernard Sesboüé interpreted the turn to the theme of justification in the American Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue and in the international Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue as an attempt to uncover the root difference underlying the crucial differences in ecclesiology.25 The possibility of expressing this fundamental difference in a summarizing way is crucial in order to transfer the insights gained in the dialogue on justification to other, mostly ecclesiological areas of dispute. This is precisely what Birmelé is doing. His interpretation of the difference between Roman Catholic and Lutheran teaching on justification in terms of ‘the relationship between the divine and the human’ allows him to relate the consensus in soteriology to the dialogues on ecclesiology.26 Put briefly: the difference between the Roman Catholic affirmative stance and the Lutheran critical reservation towards the idea of human cooperation in salvation is directly applicable to the question of ecclesial mediation in God’s salvific action.

23

Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 251–52. ‘La DCJ montre enfin la difficulté de nommer la différence fondamentale et de la résumer en une affirmation dogmatique. Au vu de notre manière de l’introduire, on pourrait affirmer qu’elle réside dans la compréhension de l’être humain devant Dieu et de la conception de la justification qui en découle’. Ibid., p. 253. 25 B. Sesboüé, ‘Analyse catholique’, in Consensus oecuménique et différence fondamentale, ed. Comité mixte catholique-protestant en France (Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1987), pp. 45–82 (46). 26 Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 257–60. 24

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In the light of this implicit but decisive role of the fundamental difference in the JDDJ, the absence of an explicit summary of that difference is more surprising than it seemed at first. My suggestion would be that this absence is connected not only to the three obvious reasons already discussed, but also to an ambiguity in the very idea of a fundamental difference as ecumenically oriented theologians such as Meyer and Birmelé interpret it. As stated earlier, Meyer and Birmelé had themselves detected a tension between the way critics of the existing ecumenical dialogues use the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ – namely as church-dividing difference – and their own ‘ecumenically neutral’ approach to it. There is also, however, a tension within their own interpretation. The fundamental difference as Meyer and Birmelé describe it is in an important respect analogous to the ‘fundamental consensus’ in part 3 of the JDDJ. That fundamental consensus is both a reference to the reality of the action of the Triune God and a concise verbalization of the consensus that is fully explained in part 4. The fundamental difference has strikingly similar characteristics. On the one hand it refers to the reality that is central to the Christian faith: the human being coram Deo. For that reason, Birmelé emphasizes that the fundamental difference between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism cannot be reduced to a different ‘packaging’ of the same ‘kernel’ of truth. It is more than just a matter of language. It involves a difference of fundamental theological choices and emphases regarding the God-man relationship.27 Similarly, Meyer writes that the fundamental difference does not merely concern differing ‘forms of thinking’ (Denkformen), ‘which fall under the category of “secular”, “creaturely” or “non-theological” factors’.28 Rather, the fundamental difference is about ‘the basic problem of theology in general: the relatedness of God and man and the determination of how this relationship

27

With reference to §40 of the JDDJ, Birmelé writes: ‘On pourrait être tenté d’affirmer que le même “noyau” est “habillé” différemment par les uns et par les autres. Dans cette optique, tout le contentieux historique se limiterait à une question d’ “emballages différents” mais finalement interchangeables d’un même objet. . . . Il serait cependant faux de vouloir réduire l’ensemble à une question de langage. La différence comprend des choix théologiques et des accentuations particulières différents’. Ibid., p. 250. 28 ‘Man [wird] bei [der Bestimmung der Grunddifferenz als einer Verschiedenheit der “Denkformen”] nicht stehenbleiben dürfen. Denn “Denkformen” fallen unter die Kategorie der “säkularen”, “schöpfungsmässigen” oder “nicht-theologischen Faktoren” . . ., die ohne Zweifel für das Verhältnis der Konfessionen zueinander eine wichtige Rolle spielen . . .; aber ein primär von hierher bestimmtes Verständnis der Grunddifferenz steht in Gefahr, den zutiefst theologischen Charakter der Grunddifferenz zu verkennen’. Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (149n83).

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“takes place” or takes shape’.29 At the same time, every articulation of this fundamental difference remains a ‘thought construction’ that attempts to bring all particular differences under one heading. It is always a specific linguistic expression that never fully succeeds in articulating the difference. It need not succeed in giving an ultimate account of the differences between Lutheran and Roman Catholic life and teaching. To the extent that it is merely a heuristic tool that helps the ecumenical theologian ordering the data about Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism, an articulation of the fundamental difference is helpful or unhelpful, rather than true or false. It does not exclude other useful articulations of the fundamental difference.30 This duality can also be expressed in the following way. The fundamental difference is not something that is invented by theology, but rather a reality that imposes itself on theological thinking. Birmelé and Meyer talk about the fundamental difference ‘influencing’ and ‘acting upon’ the individual domains of dogmatic theology.31 At the same time, the theological representation of this difference is a ‘recapitulation’ and ‘verbalization’ of the differences in these domains. As such this duality is not necessarily an ambiguity. Only on a closer examination of the parallel between the fundamental difference as Birmelé and Meyer see it and fundamental consensus as it is expressed in part 3 of the JDDJ, does the ambiguous character of the former come into view. From the foregoing considerations it would appear that the fundamental consensus and the fundamental difference are not simply verbal summaries of what unites and divides Roman Catholic and Lutheran systematic theology. Both are also and primarily related to the central reality of faith: God’s salvation of human beings. However, when Birmelé explicitly deals with the question of the relationship between a ‘fundamental consensus’ and a ‘fundamental difference’ he claims that there is a qualitative difference between both. The fundamental consensus concerns the common foundation of the Christian faith, whereas the fundamental difference is 29

‘Man wird darum die Frage nach einer evangelisch/katholischen Grunddifferenz letztlich . . . “meta-dogmatisch” ansetzen müssen, und zwar . . . im Grundproblem der Theologie überhaupt: dem Bezug zwischen Gott und Mensch und der Bestimmung wie dieses Verhältnis sich “vollzieht” oder gestaltet’. Ibid. (149–50). 30 See the contribution of Michael Root in the project on ‘fundamental difference’: Birmelé and Meyer (eds), Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz, p. 254. 31 Meyer writes: ‘[Die katholisch/protestantische “Grunddifferenz”] liegt jenseits der einzelnen dogmatischen Bereichen und loci, umgreift sie und wirkt auf sie ein’. Ibid., p. 232. Birmelé highlights both aspects in one phrase: ‘[La difference fondamentale] se situe au-delà des domaines dogmatiques particuliers tout en influant sur chacun de ces domaines et en les récapitulant’. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 270 (italics mine in both quotations).

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about the distinct interpretations of that same foundation.32 Furthermore, he writes that the fundamental difference ‘ought to be understood as an element that makes up a part – or at least is called to make up a part – of the fundamental consensus itself’.33 Some observations can be made about this claim. First of all, it is clear that different forms of language are being used here. The contention that the difference is part of the consensus is explicitly put in both informative and performative language. It is stated as a fact and as a desideratum.34 Moreover, if it is an informative statement, it remains ambiguous whether it is meant analytically or synthetically. For on the one hand the whole exposition is unmistakably presented as an analytic definition of the concept of ‘fundamental difference’, but on the other hand the insight that the fundamental difference does not question the existence of a shared foundation of faith seems to be the factual outcome of the ecumenical dialogue process.35 The danger of mixing up synthetic and analytic statements is that de facto observations are easily turned into de iure assertions. The conclusion that the ‘materialization’ of the fundamental difference in the distinct Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification turns out to be non-church-dividing is implicitly transformed, via the concept of a fundamental difference that is by definition only a ‘part’ of a fundamental consensus, into the claim that no other dissension can threaten the consensus on justification again. In other words, the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ is used as a crowbar that allows the consensus on justification to ‘break into’ other doctrinal realms such as that of ecclesiology. But whenever theologians would do the opposite and attempt to question the consensus on justification by pointing to a wide range of (mainly ecclesiological) differences that still exist between Lutherans and Roman Catholics and that can be summarized as one basic difference, the ‘ecumenical neutrality’ of the fundamental

32

‘La différence fondamentale ne porte pas pour autant sur les adiaphoras sans importance mais bien sur des interprétations distinctes du même fondement de la foi’. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 273. 33 ‘[L]a différence fondamentale peut et doit être comprise comme un élément qui fait partie – ou pour le moins qui est appelé à faire partie – du consensus fondamental lui-même’. Ibid., p. 272. 34 This ‘voluntaristic’ side of the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ is also expressed in the following phrase: ‘Toute différence séparatrice doit être transformée afin qu’elle perde son pouvoir séparateur et devienne une différence légitime’. Ibid., p. 274 (italics mine). 35 ‘[Dans la réflexion contemporaine] l’affirmation d’une différence fondamentale ne sert plus à justifier le maintien des identités confessionnelles traditionnelles. Il ne s’agit pas d’éliminer ces dernières mais celles-ci sont profondément transformées dans et par le mouvement œcuménique contemporain’ Ibid., p. 268.

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difference is invoked. Thus, the essential neutrality of the fundamental difference is used to neutralize certain consensus-threatening differences, which makes it anything but neutral. This leads to a second observation. Birmelé says that the fundamental consensus and the fundamental difference are qualitatively different. They are each situated on a different level, and this leads him to conclude that one cannot be said to be ‘deeper’ than the other.36 It is quite difficult to reconcile this statement with the rest of his description of the fundamental difference: that it is a part of the fundamental consensus and that it is situated on the level of interpretation, whereas the fundamental consensus is located on the level of faith. It is hard to maintain that there is no suggestion here that the fundamental consensus is more fundamental than the fundamental difference. It is difficult not to see a common ‘foundation of faith’ as something deeper than different ‘formulations of the same faith’ due to ‘distinct historical, cultural and philosophical backgrounds or particular theological orientations and accentuations’.37 So this is the ambiguity noticeable in the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ as Meyer and Birmelé use it. On the one hand, it seems to be an answer to both the questions – ‘How can we understand the web of interrelated differences between Roman Catholics and Lutherans?’ and ‘What is the deeper ground or cause of these differences?’ But on the other hand, the hermeneutical question seems to prevail, while the causal question is pushed into the background. This might have several justifiable grounds, such as the fact that questions of causality are both philosophically and ecumenically the more difficult ones. Moreover, the attempt to explain all differences between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism by one single cause automatically leads to an oversimplified rationalization of the complex web of problems.38 The disappearance of the causal question as such, however, brings about a shift in the way the fundamental difference can be called ‘hermeneutical’. An articulation of the fundamental difference is in the first place ‘hermeneutical’ because it offers a wide-ranging interpretation 36

‘La différence fondamentale et sa traduction quant aux différences particulières relèvent d’un autre niveau que le consensus fondamental. La distinction n’est donc pas “quantitative” dans le sens où l’une serait plus “profonde” que l’autre’. Ibid., p. 272. 37 ‘Le consensus fondamental veut mettre en évidence le fondement commun. Son contenu est le centre vivant, le fondement de la foi chrétienne. Dans l’expression “consensus fondamental”, le point de référence de “fondamental” est l’Évangile. La différence fondamentale a une autre finalité. Le référent de “fondamental” n’est pas la foi mais la différence. Il s’agit de qualifier la différence récapitulant des différences particulières et de comprendre comment des arrière-plans historiques, culturels philosophiques ou des orientations et accentuations théologiques particulières conduisent à des formulations différentes de la même foi’. Ibid. 38 Birmelé and Meyer (eds), Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz, p. 255 (Michael Root).

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of the differences between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. But Birmelé’s account illustrates that the fundamental difference, especially when joined with the idea of a fundamental consensus, may become ‘hermeneutical’ in a second sense, namely in the sense that all the differences are seen as merely differences in the interpretation of one and the same ground of faith.39 This shift is perfectly explicable in view of the ‘qualitative difference’ between the fundamental difference and the fundamental consensus. If all potential areas of difference between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism are held together by the reference to the same ground of faith (which is the object of the fundamental consensus) and if there is no possibility of discerning causal connections between the existing differences, but only ‘useful’ hermeneutical schemes to interpret them (the fundamental difference), then the particular differences themselves, be they doctrinal (e.g. justification) or existential (e.g. practices of devotion), can only be seen as ‘interpretations’ or ‘shapes’ of the same relationship of faith. Whether or not one agrees with this conclusion will determine the degree of appreciation one has for the JDDJ. For some it will be an example of begging the question, because all differences are from the outset considered as subordinate to an already existing consensus. For others this subordination is just another expression of the fundamental ecumenical conviction ‘that the division between Christian churches has not gone to the root’.40 It is not a surprise then that the main points of controversy between advocates and critics of the JDDJ can be explained in terms of this ambiguity in the concept of ‘fundamental difference’. The controversy is not merely a matter of ecumenical optimism versus ecumenical pessimism, as if one group of theologians would assess the convergences and differences between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism and judge the convergences to be more decisive, whereas the other group would arrive at the opposite conclusion. The issues underlying the attitudes of optimism and pessimism 39

It is remarkable that Michael Root emphasizes that a hermeneutical concept of fundamental difference does not imply a difference in hermeneutics. The denominational differences that the fundamental difference tries to summarize may be non-hermeneutical differences (e.g. differences in religious practices). At the same time, however, Root seems to dismiss any interpretation of the ‘fundamental difference’ as a difference that causes other differences. Although there might be good reasons for a rejection of an all too unifying causal concept of ‘fundamental difference’, it is my opinion that an overall disregard of the causal connections between the particular differences – and of a possible ‘hierarchy of differences’ – eventually leads to a reduction of all differences to hermeneutical differences. Cf. Ibid., p. 252.155. 40 W. Kasper, ‘Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft. Zum Stand des ökumenischen Gesprächs zwischen katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischer Kirche’, in Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz: Studie des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung. Ergebnisse und Dokumente, ed. A. Birmelé and H. Meyer (Frankfurt am Main/Paderborn: Lembeck/ Bonifatius, 1992), pp. 97–116 (97).

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are theological ones. They are related to the question as to where the differences between Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrine are situated and how doctrinal differences are related to the ecclesial unity being sought. We will now have to deal with these issues in greater detail.

IV. The First Issue: The Location of the Fundamental Difference The German Lutheran theologian Christoph Schwöbel, one of the most outspoken challengers of the JDDJ, summarizes the conclusion of the document as follows: In the light of the ‘consensus on basic truths’, ‘the remaining differences are ones that concern the verba, not the res’.41 Schwöbel interprets the words of §40 of the JDDJ about ‘remaining differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the understanding of justification’ in terms of the distinction between ‘words’ (verba) and the ‘thing/cause’ (res). This seems at odds not only with the text of the JDDJ, which does not confine the remaining differences to linguistic differences, but also with the contention of Meyer and Birmelé that the fundamental Lutheran Roman Catholic difference is not only about ‘indifferent’ matters, but also about the basic problem of theology: the situation of the human before God. Schwöbel’s interpretation is undoubtedly too crude to do justice to the text of the JDDJ and to the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ as Meyer and Birmelé understand it. At the same time, this apparent misunderstanding reveals the ambiguity of the idea of fundamental difference, which cannot be limited to the domain of language, but which does not fully stretch into the realm of the res either, since it can never be more than a difference in the interpretation of the same re -ality of faith. This raises the question what the consensus and the ‘remaining differences’ in the JDDJ are all about. Is there only a consensus on the ‘objective’ side of justification, namely in the reality of the saving action of God in Jesus Christ which is communicated to us through the Holy Spirit, whereas differences remain on the ‘subjective’ side, that is: in the way our being and action are caught up in this communication? And if there are 41

‘Der Anspruch [der Gemeinsamen Erklärung] ist also in der Formulierung “Konsens in Grundwahrheiten” . . . zusammengefasst, der als wichtiger Schritt auf das Ziel der sichtbaren Einheit hin interpretiert wird. Angesichts dieses Konsenses seien die verbleibenden Unterschiede solche, die die verba, nicht die res betreffen’. C. Schwöbel, ‘Konsens in Grundwahrheiten? Kritische Anfragen an die “Gemeinsame Erklärung”’, in Zur Zukunft der Ökumene. Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”, ed. B. J. Hilberath and W. Pannenberg (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1999), pp. 100–28 (105).

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basic differences on this ‘subjective’ level, do they concern the way Lutherans and Roman Catholics are actually involved in their relationship with the Triune God, or merely in the way they see themselves being involved in this relationship? Is there, in other words, a discrepancy in the way the act of faith occurs (the ontic level) or is it merely a matter of different theological interpretations of the same act (the epistemic level)? These questions are related to another, even more serious question: What does the ecumenical dialogue need to accomplish in order to overcome the church-dividing nature of differences? What has to happen to the fundamental difference and to its manifestations in the different areas of life and teaching? Both Meyer and Birmelé maintain that an agreement on previously church-dividing issues does not eliminate the fundamental difference.42 Rather, the fundamental difference as well as the particular differences relating to the issue under discussion appear in a new light. Therefore, the conclusion of a successful ecumenical dialogue is not the creation of a unified doctrine of, for instance, justification, but rather the recognition of a ‘legitimate diversity’ on the way to a ‘unity in reconciled diversity’.43 At the same time, both authors mention a ‘transformation’ or even a ‘conversion’ that needs to take place in order to overcome the church-dividing force of differences.44 So there is both permanence and transformation of the fundamental difference in the process of ecumenical rapprochement. This again raises the question of exactly what remains and what needs alteration. Is there something in the (ontic) relationship of 42

Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (153): ‘Es zeigt sich hier aber auch, wie in solchen Einzelfragen, in denen jene Grunddifferenz sich konkretisiert und kirchentrennende Schärfe angenommen hat, eine Verständigung erreicht werden kann. Die Grunddifferenz als solche ist damit nicht aufgehoben, aber sie erscheint jetzt – als solche betrachtet – in ihrem ökumenisch neutralen, nicht kirchentrennenden Charakter’. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 253: ‘La percée decisive de la DCJ vient du fait que la difference fondamentale ne s’oppose plus au consensus. Elle était séparatrice mais a perdu son caractère séparateur. Elle participe à présent au consensus fondamental et affirme que des choix théologiques différents peuvent rendre compte de la même réalité’. 43 For the concept of ‘unity in reconciled diversity’, see: H. Meyer, ‘“Einheit in versöhnter Verschiedenheit”: Hintergrund, Entstehung und Bedeutung des Gedankens’, in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie I (Franfurt am Main/Paderborn: Verlag Otto Lembeck/Bonifatius, 1998), pp. 101–19 44 Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 268: ‘[L]’affirmation d’une différence fondamentale ne sert plus à justifier le maintien des identités confessionnelles traditionnelles. Il ne s’agit pas d’éliminer ces derniers mais celles-ci sont profondément transformées dans et par le mouvement œcuménique contemporain, qui, en les ouvrant les unes aux autres, remet en cause leur identité figée et exclusive en provoquant leur transformation et leur conversion’. See also: Meyer, ‘“Einheit in versöhnter Verschiedenheit”’ (113) and H. Meyer, ‘“Anerkennung” - ein ökumenischer Schlüsselbegriff’, in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie I (Franfurt am Main/Paderborn: Verlag Otto Lembeck/Bonifatius, 1998), pp. 120–36 (135).

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Lutherans and Roman Catholics to God that needs change, as the idea of ‘conversion’ would suggest? Or are ecclesial divisions overcome by a transformation of the way we (epistemically) perceive ourselves and each other? Is the only necessary conversion one of the heart and the mind, as a result of which the untouched doctrinal differences now seem tolerable? These uncertainties are a direct consequence of the fact that the concept of fundamental difference remains unclear. Is there also a difference in the faith relationship itself, or is the difference merely hermeneutical, that is, in the way this relationship is interpreted? Obviously, notions such as objective/subjective and ontic/epistemic sometimes distort the question by capturing it in static binary oppositions.45 Nevertheless, the example of Schwöbel’s criticism of the JDDJ demonstrates that the lack of clarity about the locus (in terms of objective/subjective and ontic/epistemic) of the remaining difference and about the nature of the required transformation is a central issue in the whole justification debate.46 Schwöbel argues that the consensus established in the JDDJ is not compatible with the Reformation understanding of justification precisely because the assertion that justification is ‘objectively’ founded in the grace of God – which is indeed something that can be affirmed by both Lutherans and Roman Catholics – remains a deeply ambiguous statement as long as the way this grace manifests itself on a more ‘subjective’ level remains unspecified or undefined.47 At the same time, Schwöbel asserts that such doctrinal differences, which make a consensus on justification between Lutherans and Roman Catholics impossible, are still ‘merely’ situated on the level of theology and teaching, that is, of what I called earlier the ‘epistemic’ level. An overcoming of the church-dividing nature of these differences is possible and desirable, but only because both (irreconcilable) teachings refer to one and the same ‘ontic’ reality: the ‘ground and object of faith’.48 45

One is reminded of Karl Barth’s question that puts the ‘objective’, ‘subjective’, ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ aspects of the difference between Roman Catholics and Protestants in a dynamic relationship: is it possible that both see things differently (aliter) to such an extent that they see different things (alia)? Cited in: W. Beinert, ‘Konfessionelle Grunddifferenz. Ein Beitrag zur ökumenischen Epistemologie (II)’, Catholica 34 (1980), no. 1, pp. 36–61 (38). 46 Other examples could have been chosen, for instance, of Roman Catholic critics of the JDDJ. The only aim of this example is to show that the ambiguity of the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ is an important factor in the theological disputes on the JDDJ. 47 According to Schwöbel, ‘sola gratia’ articulates the Lutheran idea of justification adequately only if it is specified by means of expressions such as sola fide, solo verbo, simul iustus et peccator. Cf. Schwöbel, ‘Konsens in Grundwahrheiten?’ (105–06). 48 See his article: C. Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene: Über das Verhältnis von Kirchengemeinschaft und Gottesverständnis’, in Befreiende Wahrheit: Festschrift für Eilert Herms zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. W. Härle, M. Heesch, and R. Preul (Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 2000), pp. 449–66.

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In a sense, the implicit concept of ‘fundamental difference’ in Schwöbel bears important similarities to the way Meyer and Birmelé conceive it. In both cases the fundamental difference is both profoundly theological and non-church-dividing. The crucial difference is that Schwöbel explains the theological seriousness of the fundamental difference in terms of the strict inseparability of the objective and the subjective side of justification, thus making a doctrinal consensus on justification difficult to attain, by lack of an ‘objective’ common starting point. He considers the JDDJ definitely as a failed attempt to arrive at such a consensus. At the same time he strictly separates the epistemic level of doctrine and theology and the ontic level of faith and Revelation, thus making a doctrinal (epistemic) consensus unnecessary – and indeed undesirable – as a basis for church-unity (conceived as a joint relationship to the same ‘ontic’ ground of faith). This is also related to the way Schwöbel views the transformation of the fundamental difference that is needed in order to overcome church division. For Schwöbel, the content of the Lutheran doctrine of justification comes into play here. According to his interpretation, this doctrine implies a sharp distinction between the opus hominum and the opus Dei. Only the latter is the cause of our salvation and the basis of real unity among Christians. Therefore, the process of building a doctrinal consensus as a means of attaining unity between Lutherans and Roman Catholics is an all-too-human attempt to accomplish what God alone can accomplish. The only true consensus in Schwöbel’s view is not doctrinal, but ‘referential’: a joint reference to God as the ‘ground and object of faith’. An epistemic agreement on the level of doctrine about the objective or subjective aspects of justification would still be desirable, but it would not be the basis for church unity. It would rather be a strictly secondary result of the (ontic) divine action of creating the same faith in us. One could say that for Schwöbel the line between what is necessary (and sufficient) for ecclesial unity and what is not necessary for church unity coincides with the line between unity concerning the res, understood as the divine action as ground and object of faith, and unity concerning the verba, understood as the way the faith is reflected in the human actions of thinking and speaking. Birmelé and Meyer are implicitly or explicitly using the same two distinctions in their analysis of the fundamental difference and the fundamental consensus in ecumenism. The very nature of the ecumenical dialogue demands that one distinguish (a) between what is and what is not required for church unity and (b) between faith itself and the various ways

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it is expressed.49 Moreover, Meyer is aware of the fact that the latter distinction is a direct application of the Reformation doctrine of justification, which forbids man-made – for example, linguistic – restrictions that would limit and thus destroy the gratuity of the divine grace.50 Uniformity of linguistic expression, therefore, can never be a prerequisite for church unity. In their methodological reflections on the ongoing ecumenical dialogue, however, Meyer and Birmelé do not equate both distinctions as strictly as Schwöbel does. First, no matter how emphatically both authors insist that unity of the churches does not imply uniformity on the level of doctrine, they do not eliminate doctrinal consensus as a presupposition and foundation of church unity.51 Moreover, no matter how differentiated they consider this consensus to be, Meyer and Birmelé do not deny the fact that it always involves some ‘fundamental affirmation’ subscribed to by all dialogue partners. The differentiated consensus as they describe and defend it, involves by definition such an expression of agreement. In other words, the field of the verba is not completely excluded from what is required for ecclesial unity, as Schwöbel would have it. Secondly, and conversely, the relationship of Christians to the res does not have to be characterized by unity in every respect. As already stated, Meyer and Birmelé argue that the ‘fundamental difference’, which is a remaining and non-church-dividing difference, transcends the field of language and is situated in the God-man relationship. In other words, the relationship between the two distinctions – between res and verba and between the areas in which unity is required and those in which it is not required – is more blurred in Meyer and Birmelé than in 49

In a report of a consultation of the Strasbourg Ecumenical Institute on the idea of a ‘fundamental consensus’ (Puerto Rico, 1987), in which both Meyer and Birmelé participated, the former writes: ‘That one can and should distinguish between “thing” and “language” is no less than a fundamental conviction with which the ecumenical dialogues of our time stand or fall’. [‘Daß zwischen “Sache” und “Sprache” unterschieden werden kann und muß, ist nichts weniger als eine Grundüberzeugung, mit der die ökumenischen Dialogen unserer Zeit stehen oder fallen’.] H. Meyer, ‘“Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft”. Bericht und Reflexionen über eine Konsultation und ihr Thema’, in Grundkonsens - Grunddifferenz: Studie des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung. Ergebnisse und Dokumente, ed. A. Birmelé and H. Meyer (Frankfurt am Main/Paderborn: Lembeck/Bonifatius, 1992), pp. 11–55 (38). 50 Ibid. (39). 51 One of the assumptions of the consultation on fundamental consensus was ‘that although the consensus in doctrine is an important presupposition for church fellowship, it is not the only one, nor is it its only foundation’. [‘Es wird davon ausgegangen, daß der Konsens in der Lehre zwar eine wichtige, aber nicht die einzige Voraussetzung und der einige Grund für Kirchengemeinschaft ist’.] Hence, a doctrinal consensus is not excluded as presupposition and foundation of church unity as Schwöbel would have it. Ibid.

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Schwöbel. This is an important methodological problem in the discussions about the JDDJ. It is also a theological problem to the extent that the relationship between these two distinctions is rooted in the Reformation doctrine of justification, which draws a sharp line between what is necessary for salvation and what is not. We are not defending or criticizing either position here. We merely point out that the idea of a referential consensus has important consequences for how one assesses the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, which has been guided by a certain interpretation of the ‘fundamental difference’. This will become more clear in the discussion of the JDDJ.52

V. The Second Issue: Theological Concerns and Ecclesial Doctrines The ambiguity of the concept of ‘fundamental difference’ as Meyer and Birmelé describe it consists in the fact that the difference is not situated on the level of the adiaphora,53 or indifferent matters, nor on the level of the ground of faith, which is the ground of all Christian unity. This ambiguity is closely related to the method of differentiated consensus as it takes shape in part 4 of the JDDJ, for the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs express theological ideas that are not simply optional for the one expressing them. There are profound theological reasons why Lutherans and Roman Catholics believe they have to adhere to these ideas. At the same time, the overall adoption of each other’s ideas is not seen as a condition for ecclesial unity. It is only the recognition of the other’s position as a legitimate explication of the doctrine of justification that is constitutive of the differentiated consensus in the JDDJ. To put it succinctly: although one dialogue partner may feel obliged to hold unswervingly to a certain set of convictions, not because of some historical coincidence, but on theological grounds, the other partner is apparently not under the same obligation visà-vis those same convictions. The solution to this problem seems to lie in the concept of ‘concern’ (Ger.: Anliegen). Although this concept appears only once in the main text of the JDDJ (§36), the idea of Roman Catholics and Lutherans representing different theological concerns in their respective teachings on justification is also implied in the talk of different ‘emphases’ (§40). The idea of different

52 53

See infra Chapter 5 and the conclusion. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 273.

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concerns also played an important role in the American dialogue on justification and in the German dialogue on the condemnations of the Reformation era.54 In a sense, the idea that the fundamental difference between the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran doctrine of justification is a difference of ‘concerns’, transcends the dichotomy implied in the question whether it is situated on the level of language (verba) or on the level of the ‘ground and object of faith’ (res). A difference in ‘concern’ is a profoundly theological difference, since it is related to the way the respective doctrinal systems attempt to articulate what is absolutely essential in Christian faith. A ‘concern’ is intrinsically connected here with the ‘worry’ and the ‘fear’ that something crucial in our relationship to the res might be lost.55 At the same time, the concept of ‘concern’ allows for a relative plurality on two levels. First of all, there is a plurality of concerns regarding the doctrine of justification. Roughly speaking, Lutheran teaching is more concerned about safeguarding the absolute unconditionality and preeminence of God’s saving action in relation to human action. Roman Catholic soteriology is characterized by a stronger emphasis on the involvement of the whole human person in justification. This plurality (or, in this example, duality) of concerns is, of course, a relative plurality. The different concerns do not only remain linked to the same ‘ground and object of faith’. Overemphasizing one concern seem to lead automatically to a neglect of the other concern. Therefore, the idea of complementarity is often brought into play. Some sort of balance between the different concerns is needed in order to assure an adequate account of the Christian faith. Consequently, one of the crucial questions in the ecumenical dialogue is whether ‘the “concerns” and interpretative stresses which are of primary importance in the doctrine of the one partner [are] nevertheless so clearly maintained in the doctrine of the other that they can neither be overlooked 54

‘Justification by Faith (Common Statement)’, in Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII, ed. H. G. Anderson, J. A. Burgess, and T. A. Murphy (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 13–74; K. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg, LehrverurteilungenKirchentrennend? Bd 1: Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation und heute (Dialog der Kirchen, 4; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), p. 45. 55 The connection that is suggested here between ‘concern’ and ‘fear’ is certainly no peculiarity of the English language. Also in the German literature, the idea of a different ‘Anliegen’ in the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teaching on justification corresponds to the idea of different ‘Befürchtungen’. Cf. H. J. Urban, ‘Jenseits von Häresie und Schisma, oder: Differenziertes voneinander Lernen als Prinzip der Ökumene’, in Einheit, aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom differenzierten Konsens ed. H. Wagner (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), pp. 81–101 (89–90).

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nor misunderstood’.56 The difference between the doctrinal systems should only be a difference in emphasis within a common framework built by complementary concerns.57 A second, more radical form of plurality has to do with the diversity of ways in which one and the same concern can find expression. In both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraph on ‘the justified as sinner’ in the JDDJ (§§29-30) the same two contrary (though not contradictory) emphases are balanced: a stress on the enduring reality of sin in the life of the Christian and on the fact that sin has lost its power over the justified. The latter emphasis reflects a ‘concern’ for recognizing the efficacy of God’s saving work. This concern is expressed differently in the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs. §29 alludes to Luther’s distinction between peccatum regnans and peccatum regnatum: the sin of the justified ‘no longer is a sin that “rules” the Christian for it is itself “ruled” by Christ with whom the justified are bound in faith’. The Catholic paragraph refers to the Tridentine decree on original sin, in which it is stated that all that is truly and properly called ‘sin’ is removed from the human being in justification. Thus, Roman Catholics and Lutherans can acknowledge that they are both expressing the same concern in different ‘languages’. The possibility of different languages expressing one fundamental concern is crucial in the ecumenical dialogue process. The JDDJ and the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue on justification in general show that a crucial part of the whole process of rapprochement consists precisely in discerning concerns that are emphasized by one partner in the life and teaching of the other. At the same time, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that it would be far too simple to consider the distinction between language (verba – Sprache) and matter (res – Sache) as the key to the methodology of the JDDJ. The idea of different ‘concerns’ (Anliegen) plays a mediatory role between both. Here lies the only possible explanation of the puzzling fact that was mentioned at the beginning of this section, namely that in the differentiated consensus one dialogue partner experiences a theological 56

‘Wir haben zu fragen: Sind die “Anliegen” und Auslegungsschwerpunkte, die in der Lehre des Partners “vordringlich” sind, in der Lehre des anderen immerhin so deutlich gewahrt, dass man sie weder übersehen noch missverstehen kann?’ Lehmann and Pannenberg, Lehrverurteilungen-Kirchentrennend? Bd 1: Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation und heute, p. 46 [Eng. trans.: K. C. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg, The Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Divide? (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990), p. 40]. 57 For the concept of complementarity in this context, see: L. Ullrich, ‘Differenzierter Konsens und Komplementarität: Mögliche Wege zur Einheit in Verschiedenheit’, in Einheit, aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom differenzierten Konsens ed. H. Wagner (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), pp. 102–35.

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need of sticking to its traditional way of formulating the doctrine of justification, whereas the other partner is not under an obligation to adopt the same formulation. The theological need to remain faithful to one’s own tradition is related to the fundamental concerns that are embodied in this tradition, and which have to do with safeguarding the right relationship to the res of faith. The fact that the other dialogue partner is not obliged to embrace that same tradition is connected to the fact that the same concern can also be expressed in another way in the other tradition. This certainly sheds a light on the ambiguity that is detectable in the concept of fundamental difference as Meyer and Birmelé use it, namely its position in between the res and the verba. As a difference in concerns it is related to the res, but as a difference in expression of the same concerns, it is situated on the level of the verba. However, the reference to different concerns does not remove the unanswered questions regarding the status of the remaining fundamental difference and regarding its necessary transformation in the ecumenical dialogue process. Instead, it complicates these questions. This can be made clear in two points. (A) First, as stated earlier, the legitimate differences between the concerns behind the Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification can only be limited differences. The ecumenical dialogues show that it is crucial for church unity that the churches recognize their own concern in the teaching of the other. In an important respect, sameness – and not difference – of concerns is the main thing that is needed for ecclesial unity. Meyer’s account of the fundamental difference seems to approximate to the idea of ‘concerns’ in this respect. He speaks about it as a difference of ‘basic theological tendencies’ rather than of fixed positions.58 He further points out that these tendencies are never exclusively present in one tradition or the other. The fundamental difference is characterized rather by an ‘appropriate blurredness’ (sachgemäße Unschärfe), meaning that both tendencies are found in both teachings.59 Despite a certain ‘rhetoric of difference’ in the way Meyer describes the fundamental difference as non-church-dividing difference, this shows that some form of sameness – not to be confused with strict identity, let alone uniformity – remains the condition of all possible legitimate differences. On the level of concerns, the differentiated consensus remains a consensus in the way this word is commonly used: emphasizing similarity rather than dissimilarity. The more radical differences thus remain situated on the level of expression. 58 59

Meyer, ‘“Grunddifferenz”’ (150). Ibid. (151).

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This raises two questions. (i) Is there a possibility that one traditional expression of faith (verba) is a better expression of the relevant theological concerns regarding justification, or offers a better balance between these concerns than another expression? This question is generally not central in the ecumenical dialogue between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. The dialogue is rather aimed at showing that doctrinal expressions on both sides are equally legitimate. The dialogue partners therefore attempt to present their teaching in such a way that its plausibility as one possible genuine expression of Christian faith can be perceived by the other partner. Polemical formulations of doctrine stemming from times when the churches defined their own position over against the others are toned down for the sake of mutual comprehension. The claim that one of the two doctrinal expressions could be more adequate or plausible than the other, would not only miss the point of the dialogue, but would also endanger that dialogue by making it relapse into polemics. However, if the dialogue is not a matter of ‘political correctness’, halfway compromises and unity at the expense of truth, but precisely a ‘struggle for truth’60, then the question of the best possible expression of faith cannot be evaded. Generally, this question is raised explicitly outside the official ecumenical dialogue, by those theologians who take an apologetic rather than a dialogical stance vis-à-vis the other.61 By ‘apologetics’, I mean the defence of the truth of one’s own position and the attempt to convince others of this truth.62 As such, apologetics is not necessarily harmful to the ecumenical dialogue. The main issue in the debates on occasion of the JDDJ is the right relationship between dialogue and apologetics. Are Lutheran and Roman Catholic attempts to convince each other of the truth of their own teaching on justification akin to quarrels between theological ‘schools’ within an undivided Christianity (schools who are, in the final analysis, merely fellow seekers for the most adequate theological expression of something they already agree on)? Or are certain expressions of the 60

Meyer speaks about the ecumenical dialogues as ‘ein Ringen um die Wahrheit des Glaubens’. Meyer, ‘Die Prägung einer Formel’ (44). See, for instance, Christopher Malloy’s criticism of the idea of Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology as two complementary languages of faith: C. J. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration (American University Studies – Theology and Religion, 233; New York: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 340–50. 62 Paul J. Griffiths distinguishes between ‘negative apologetics’, which is basically the defence of a doctrine (or a doctrinal system) against criticism, and ‘positive apologetics’, which implies an argument for the superiority of this doctrine in comparison with the conviction of the other. See: P. J. Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic of Interreligious Dialogue (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1991), p. 14. The ‘apologetic stance’ I speak about entails positive apologetics. 61

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doctrines of justification so crucial for a right understanding of our salvation and a correct proclamation of the gospel, that the fact that the other does not subscribe to them is an impediment to unity?63 In the latter case, the dialogue would require more efficacious positive apologetics in order to arrive at its goal. (ii) A second question arises from the fact that doctrinal differences can only be legitimate against the background of some form of sameness. The main purpose of the Lutheran Roman Catholic dialogue on justification was to show that the dialogue partners share each other’s concerns. The question is then how to reconcile this with the contention of Meyer and Birmelé that the fundamental difference, which is a remaining difference, is not something merely ‘verbal’ and that it has to do with the relationship between the human and God. It is, in other words, an abiding difference in theological concerns. The answer given by Meyer and Birmelé and in the JDDJ is that this difference is a matter of emphasis and focus. But this in its turn raises the question of precisely what kind of sameness is needed and what kind of difference is tolerable on the level of theological concerns. At what point does the focus or emphasis on one particular concern or set of concerns cause the whole system to get out of balance, to the detriment of other crucial concerns? Again this brings to mind the question of where the line should be drawn between a situation of different theological ‘schools’ – possibly ruthlessly waging war against one another – professing one faith, and a situation where different ‘denominations’ are divided in their faith because the concerns of at least one dialogue partner are not ‘so clearly maintained in the doctrine of the other that they can neither be overlooked nor misunderstood’. (B) Both previous questions relate to the balance between unity and legitimate diversity on the levels of language and of ‘concerns’. These questions almost inevitably lead to the issue of doctrine as demarcation. Meyer refers to the difference between the Antiochene and Alexandrine Christological schools in the early church as an historical example of the fact that a unity in faith does not necessarily exclude differences on the level of conviction and teaching.64 It is worth reflecting a little further on this example. In the difference between the Antiochene and Alexandrine school there are definitely theological concerns involved, concerns about the full humanity and the full divinity of Christ. In addition, differences 63

This is the case, for instance, in the analysis of Malloy (Malloy, Engrafted into Christ). He points out that the assent to the reality of inhering righteousness as it is expressed in the Tridentine decree on justification is in no way optional. 64 Meyer, ‘“Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft”’ (38).

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existed in the exact wordings that theologians in the respective schools used to express their ideas. Looking in retrospect at these differences, in the light of the consequent developments in church history, it is indeed possible to say that many of them were legitimate. But from the same retrospective point of view it is equally noticeable that there was also a need to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate degrees of emphasis of certain concerns. It became necessary to formulate precisely when one concern had been emphasized to the extent that another crucial concern was no longer discernible. Certain well-intentioned Antiochene and Alexandrine Christologies that underemphasized decisive aspects of the reality of Christ, such as nestorianism and monophysitism, were dismissed as deviations from the true Christian faith by influential assemblies such as the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. The decisions of these councils were reflected in the way Christians professed their faith by means of creeds that are to this day part of the normative teaching of both Roman Catholics and Lutherans. The example of the different Christological schools in the early church shows that speaking in terms of ‘concerns’ and ‘different emphases’ is always a matter of degree. Most of the important theological concerns are present in most Christian teachings to a certain degree. Monophysites do not reject the humanity of Christ altogether. Deciding on the question whether monophysitism was acceptable as a genuine expression of Christian faith was a matter of establishing some kind of norm that determines the boundaries within which legitimate Christologies may lay their own emphases. In a similar fashion and more closely related to the doctrine of justification, Christopher Malloy raises the provocative question of whether there are no deep concerns shared by both Pelagians and Lutherans, such as the refusal of ‘the “easy grace, no Cross” Christianity of the contemporary West’. Still, it is clear that neither Roman Catholics nor Lutherans can accept Pelagian teaching, precisely because it gravely underemphasizes certain concerns.65 The drafting and the signing of the JDDJ have to do with the formal recognition that both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teachings on justification can be seen as different theologies expressing the same faith in a different way. Both doctrinal approaches fall within the limits of what is acceptable. In that sense there is a certain analogy between what the JDDJ is doing and what the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon have done in Christology. This comparison may seem misplaced in the light of the 65

Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 347–48.

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fundamentally different historical and ecclesial situation, and in view of the historical significance of the early councils. It seems particularly inappropriate because of the seemingly opposed purposes of the councils and the JDDJ. The former attempts to demarcate the field of orthodoxy by excluding certain views, whereas the latter tries to overcome demarcations previously constructed by highlighting the unity of faith among believers on both sides of the fence. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the JDDJ can only attain its goal by drawing new boundaries of acceptability. This is done modestly, but unambiguously in paragraphs 41 and 42. In §41, the Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification are said not to fall under the condemnations of the sixteenth century, but the scope of this statement is limited to both teachings as they are presented in the JDDJ.66 §42 affirms the abiding significance of the condemnations as ‘salutary warnings’. The JDDJ does not specify when a teaching is rightly condemned. It rather concentrates on the shape in which Roman Catholic and Lutheran doctrine are not condemnable. Moreover, the interpretation of condemnations as ‘warnings’ suggests a continuum ranging from sound doctrine to problematic doctrine, rather than an exact point beyond which an ‘anathema’ is pronounced. Yet, taken together, these paragraphs imply the possibility that there are forms of teaching on justification other than the ones put forward in the JDDJ, which need to be ‘warned against’ and corrected by the historical condemnations. This enduring possibility of condemnation, which remains largely implicit in the JDDJ, gives the whole document a considerable doctrinal weight. It is not the same weight as that of normative texts in both traditions that delimit precisely and explicitly what can and cannot be viewed as a genuine interpretation of Christian faith. But at least some positive conclusion is drawn in the JDDJ about the conditions under which the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teachings on justification are acceptable to one another. If these teachings are interpreted along the lines of the JDDJ, then the condemnations are not applicable. The ‘negative’ obverse of this conditional clause is that if Lutherans or Roman Catholics interpret their own teachings in a manner essentially different from that of the JDDJ, then there is no guarantee that the condemnations do not apply. And from this it follows 66

‘Thus the doctrinal condemnations of the 16th century, in so far as they relate to the doctrine of justification, appear in a new light: The teaching of the Lutheran churches presented in this Declaration does not fall under the condemnations from the Council of Trent. The condemnations in the Lutheran Confessions do not apply to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church presented in this Declaration’.

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that if Lutherans and Roman Catholics want to avoid the possibility of mutual condemnations, then they ought to interpret their own teachings according to the JDDJ. This implicit conditional imperative is probably the most important factor in the theological and methodological debates concerning the JDDJ. The official signing of the JDDJ by Lutheran and Roman Catholic representatives seems to have settled the issue of the validity of the interpretation represented in the document. But this act of recognition has done more than just that. It also seriously questions the validity of other possible Lutheran and Roman Catholic interpretations of the doctrine of justification. For such interpretations remain under the threat of the condemnations. Because of the overall conciliatory nature and purpose of the JDDJ, this aspect of doctrinal demarcation – weaker than strict definition, but stronger than the mere recognition of a plurality of concerns – is easily overlooked. It is only in the light of this doctrinal bearing of the JDDJ that one understands why theologians who think that relevant parts of the doctrine of justification have been neglected are forced to conclude that this document is striving for unity at the expense of truth. Aside from the hermeneutical question about the range of acceptable interpretations of the doctrine of justification, the related issue of the authority of the JDDJ has been in the centre of the debate. Two questions are especially relevant here. First, the precise extent to which the JDDJ is binding within the respective churches is a matter of dispute. Some critics have raised the question: What kind of doctrinal authority do the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity and the Lutheran World Federation, whose representatives have signed the JDDJ, have within Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism? How does this authority relate to the possibility of theological criticism of the document?67 This implies a second question. Both Lutherans and Roman Catholics have asked whether the JDDJ is to be used as a norm that limits the interpretation of authoritative 67

Christopher Malloy, for instance, argues that the signing of the JDDJ was only ‘informally’ authorized by pope John Paul II and by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Because the PCPCU itself is ‘not charged with doctrinal responsibility and authority’, the signing by its president, Cardinal Edward Cassidy, ‘command[s] no assent from the faithful’ (Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, p. 5). On the other hand, Peter Hünermann has included the ‘Official Common Statement’ and the ‘Annex’ as n° 5081 in the 2005 edition of Denzinger (H. Denzinger, P. Hünermann, and H. Hoping, Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 40 ed, 2005), pp. 1555–58). This decision seems to assume a considerable doctrinal significance of the signing of the JDDJ (even if the Denzinger-collection of authoritative text of the Roman Catholic Church is called since the 10th edition in 1908 a handbook not only of symbola and definitiones but also of declarationes).

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documents such as the texts of the Book of Concord and the decrees of the council of Trent.68 As was argued above, the JDDJ is not only ‘opening up’ the Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification, but also – implicitly – ‘closing off’ certain other paths of interpretation. Therefore it does present itself as a normative text that might be considered as a guideline for the interpretation of traditional doctrinal statements. Conversely, an understanding of the central doctrinal documents of both traditions that is at odds with the explication of justification in the JDDJ would again threaten the ‘consensus on basic truths concerning the doctrine of justification’ and the conclusion that the condemnations are not applicable any more to today’s partner.

VI. Summary The problem of a fundamental difference in the JDDJ reveals a nexus of problematic issues that stirred the theological debates before and after the signing of the document. The very notion of a ‘fundamental difference’ as it is used in ecumenical discourse turned out to be complex and even ambiguous. The reason is that it is used in the service of the idea of a ‘legitimate diversity’ of doctrines. The claim that there is such a legitimate diversity has to explain both why one dialogue partner is legitimately bound by a certain doctrinal expression and why the other partner remains legitimately unbound by it. Therefore, the idea of a fundamental difference that is not church-dividing is related both to the area of what is essential in the Christian faith (the res) and to what is indifferent or not strictly necessary for faith (the verba). The concept of ‘theological concern’ seemed to soften this tension implied in the notion of fundamental difference, but it was not able to dissolve it completely. For the very concept of doctrine as a demarcator that sets the limits of what can legitimately be taught within the church of Christ implies that theological concerns are themselves in need of a norm that discerns whether they are sufficiently expressed. If the implicit claim of the JDDJ that it embodies in one way or another such a norm is missed, then the vehement critical reactions against the document become utterly unintelligible. This chapter has introduced three themes that will continue to play a role in the course of this study. First, there is the question to what extent a change 68

B. Brenner, ‘Wie verbindlich ist die gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre? Ein Literaturbericht zu einigen Aspekten der kirchlichen Rezeption ökumenischer Dokumente’, Materialdienst des Konfessionskundlichen Instituts Bensheim 55 (2004), no. 1, pp. 11–16.

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in the position of ecumenical dialogue partners is a precondition for reaching an agreement. The concept of differentiated consensus may suggest that the churches involved in the dialogue simply juxtapose their respective doctrines and mutually declare each other’s position legitimate. It is possible, however, that a closer examination of the road towards the signing of the JDDJ reveals the dialogue as something much more dynamic than the notion of differentiated consensus would suggest. Second, the relationship between difference and consensus has to be further clarified. It is certainly important to realize that ‘consensus’ is not identical to ‘sameness’. However, our analyses of the concept of fundamental difference compelled us to recognize that consensus always involves some form of sameness. One of the crucial questions will be how this sameness has to be conceived and to what extent sameness of expression is needed. Third, the issues of doctrinal dynamics and of sameness lead to the idea of the limits of diversity and thus to the problem of doctrinal demarcation.

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Chapter 2

Reception of Theological Advances

I. Introduction In this chapter, the work of one Roman Catholic theologian, Otto Hermann Pesch, and that of one group of Lutheran theologians, the Finnish school of Luther research, will be discussed. Both can be seen as pioneers whose theological work paved the way for the consensus on justification that is expressed in the JDDJ. Within the larger framework of this research, the concentration on these two particular theologies implies a double narrowing of our focus. First, an ecumenical event is always an ecclesial event. It involves the churches as a whole. Concentrating on the role played by academic theologians in the ecumenical dialogue process means narrowing the focus to one specific group of Christians within the churches or to one specific ecclesial activity: reflecting on the Christian faith in an academic context. All academic theological work by Roman Catholic theologians, for instance, that has contributed to a more positive view of Luther within the Roman Catholic church, is to be seen as a part of a church-wide ecumenical aggiornamento in the twentieth century.1 Without even touching the difficult question of the causal connections between academic theology and the broader intellectual and spiritual climate within an ecclesial community, it can be maintained that it is only in their interaction with this broader context that theological efforts gain ecumenical relevance. Still, it will become clear that such efforts have significantly shaped the ecumenical dialogue process resulting in the JDDJ.

1

For an overview of Catholic Luther research in the twentieth century, see J. E. Vercruysse, ‘Katholische Lutherforschung im 20. Jahrhundert’, in Lutherforschung im 20. Jahrhundert: Rückblick, Bilanz, Ausblick ed. R. Vinke (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2004), pp. 191– 212. It is not insignificant in this context that Vercruysse observes ‘Deutlich hat das neue ökumenische Klima und die Wende nach dem Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil die Ausrichtung der neuen katholischen Lutherforschung wesentlich bestimmt’ (211).

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Second, the choice of Pesch and the Finnish Luther school is a further narrowing down of the focus, since their respective contributions to the ecumenical dialogue on justification are situated within broader movements in contemporary Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology.2 Therefore, the choice of other exemplary theologians could have been justifiable: Wolfhart Pannenberg on the Lutheran side and Hans Küng or Karl Rahner on the Roman Catholic side, to mention only some possibilities. The decision to opt for one theologian (or one more or less coherent group of theologians) was made for the sake of clarity and simplicity. A detailed analysis of the subtle differences between the various theological currents within one ecclesial community would have made things unnecessarily complicated. Pesch and the Finns were chosen because of their demonstrable connection not only with the dialogue process resulting in the JDDJ, but even with the very drafting of the document.3 At the same time, their work exemplifies the kind of dynamic that has been at work in the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic traditions and that has contributed to a considerable ecumenical rapprochement.

II. Otto Hermann Pesch and the Ambiguities of Difference a. Introduction Otto Hermann Pesch (1931, Cologne) is a retired professor of systematic and ecumenical theology, a former Dominican and the first Roman Catholic theologian in Western Germany to be part of a department of Protestant theology (University of Hamburg, 1975). He did extensive research on the theology of both Thomas Aquinas and Luther, the results of which include an impressive doctoral dissertation on the theology of justification in both theologians.4 He is one of the main figures of the

2

‘Contemporary theology’ here means theology having a direct impact on the ecumenical rapprochement between Lutherans and Roman Catholics of the last 50 years. So it roughly means twentieth-century theology. Good overviews of ‘contemporary’ Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies on justification can be found in the background papers by Robert W. Bertram and Avery Dulles published together with the statement of the American dialogue on justification: H. G. Anderson, J. A. Burgess and T. A. Murphy, Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 241–77. 3 This ground for choosing Pesch and the Finnish Mannermaa school still does not exclude Pannenberg from the possible candidates. For (disapproving) evaluations of Pannenberg’s view on justification, see Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 169–92 (Roman Catholic) and M. C. Mattes, The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 56–84 (Lutheran). 4 Pesch, Die Theologie der Rechtfertigung.

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twentieth-century Roman Catholic Luther research, belonging to the ‘school’ of Heinrich Fries (often contrasted with the ‘Lortz-school’).5 His work in systematic theology has always been ecumenically oriented, as is evident in the recently published first volumes of his Katholische Dogmatik aus ökumenischer Erfahrung.6 He was also active in the German group that prepared the study on the sixteenth-century condemnations.7 There are at least three reasons why the work of Pesch can illustrate how tendencies within theology are ‘received’ by the ecumenical dialogue and eventually by the churches. First of all, Pesch has done original theological work on both the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran tradition which was comparative and ecumenically oriented. This work uncovered considerable common ground underneath seemingly conflicting theological positions. In his works on Luther and on Aquinas, he asked both the questions – how Aquinas would evaluate the approach of Luther and how the challenge of Lutheran theology ought to affect the Roman Catholic way of doing theology and being church. Second, Pesch has a specific thematic interest in soteriology in general and justification in particular. In his systematic studies on justification, he also ‘harvests’ the results of the work of other Roman Catholic theologians on justification (such as Küng and Rahner) and integrates them in his own synthesis.8 Third, and probably most importantly for the understanding of the JDDJ, Pesch offered a crucial contribution to ecumenical hermeneutics by his specific interpretation of the remaining differences between Luther and Aquinas, thus paving the way for what was later called the method of the ‘differentiated consensus’. Pesch’s systematic studies of the different aspects of justification in both traditions attempt to clear up misunderstandings and to reveal agreements, convergences and shared concerns that indicate a mutual openness. He is aware, however, of the fact that deep-seated differences remain regarding the way Lutherans and Roman Catholics conceive justification. He offers in his work an interpretation of these discrepancies, though not in an 5

Vercruysse, ‘Katholische Lutherforschung im 20. Jahrhundert’. O. H. Pesch, Katholische Dogmatik aus ökumenischer Erfahrung 1: Die Geschichte der Menschen mit Gott (2 vols; Ostfildern: Grünewald, 2008). 7 O. H. Pesch, ‘Kleiner “Werkstattbericht” über die Arbeit am Teildokument “Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders”’, in Lehrverurteilungen-Kirchentrennend, Bd 2: Materialien zu den Lehrverurteilungen und zur Theologie der Rechtfertigung, ed. K. Lehmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1989), pp. 326–62 8 See O. H. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln als Rechtfertigung und Heiligung des Menschen’, in Mysterium salutis, 4/2 (Einsiedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1973), pp. 831–920; O. H. Pesch and A. Peters, Einführung in die Lehre von der Gnade und Rechtfertigung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981); O. H. Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben: Luthers Frage an die Kirche (Fribourg: Herder, 1982). 6

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unequivocal way. One can distinguish in his writings at least three divergent ways of speaking about such doctrinal differences, even if these ways are deeply interconnected with one another. The next three sections will each analyse one concept of difference and point to the ambiguities and anomalies of this concept in Pesch. The fourth section will offer an interpretation of these ambiguities and briefly apply this to the JDDJ.

b. Mutual Challenges First, there is an interpretation of remaining differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic traditions as mutual challenges or mutual correctives. This interpretation emerges primarily where, directly or indirectly, ecclesial and ecclesiological implications of the doctrine of justification are concerned.9 Three examples are particularly relevant here: the interrelated Lutheran ideas of (1) the Christian as simul iustus et peccator, (2) the right distinction of law and gospel and (3) the view that justification is a criterion that judges all other doctrines and all ecclesial practices. (1) Often, Roman Catholic theologians are somewhat disturbed by the paradox or even the contradiction which seems to be implied in the expression simul iustus et peccator.10 Pesch attempts to allay the Roman Catholic fear by referring to the Lutheran ‘structure of thought’, in which sin and righteousness are not seen as ‘qualities’ of a substance, but rather as descriptions of the relationship between humankind and God. When used in this relational sense, there is no logical problem connected to the simultaneity of ‘sinner’ and ‘righteous’. In this life, the relationship between the believer and God is ever characterized by unfaithfulness, forgiveness and renewed commitment. Pesch does not pretend here to reduce the difference concerning the sinfulness of the justified to a misunderstanding or a terminological issue. The differences remain. Whether or not these differences are divisive depends on the question of ‘whether Catholic thinking can acknowledge the matter Luther is talking about: the permanently evil and as such active heart, which poisons even the best actions’.11 Or else: Is Roman Catholic theology able to highlight sufficiently the personal, 9

I distinguish between ecclesial implications of the doctrine of justification, which concern the life and teaching of the church as a whole, and ecclesiological implications, which are more narrowly conceived as pertaining to the way theology speaks about the church. 10 See Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (886–91) and Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology’ (69–74). 11 ‘Entscheidend ist, ob katholisches Denken die Sache anerkennen kann, von der Luther spricht: das bleibend böse und als solches aktive, auch das beste Tun vergiftende Herz’. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (889).

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relational and therefore total and non-accidental character of the sinfulness of the believer? The Tridentine decree on original sin refused to call the remaining concupiscence in the believer sin, limiting the term ‘sin’ to freely chosen actions. Apparently, this excludes the possibility of speaking about a sinfulness in the believer that contaminates even the good actions of the justified. In the Tridentine framework, such evil contamination would also have to be a free action in order to be called sin. Pesch seems to think, however, that there are tendencies in contemporary Roman Catholic theology towards a more personal and relational view about the sin of the justified. He refers, for instance, to Rahner’s reconsideration of the concept of concupiscence.12 Rahner indeed interprets concupiscence in a ‘personal’ way, in the sense that it is not merely an ‘accident’, but something that determines the human being as a whole. However, it is clear that Rahner adheres to the Tridentine idea of sin as a freely willed evil action. He is even further removed than Trent from an identification of concupiscence with sin, for he deals with concupiscence within a thomistic conceptual framework in which it refers first of all to a pre-ethical anthropological reality. It would probably have been more helpful if Pesch had gone deeper here into Rahner’s 1963 essay on simul iustus et peccator.13 The most relevant section of this article in this context is the one where Rahner deals with the classical distinction between venial and mortal sin. He does not abandon this distinction, but rather points to the danger of considering venial sins as completely harmless peccadilloes, isolated from that what sin really is: turning away from God. Rahner is convinced that our moral and religious attitude is characterized by an overall disposition oriented towards or away from God. Small acts of cold-heartedness vis-à-vis the neighbour may be signs or symptoms of a hidden hatred against God that governs the life of the human being. Rahner further calls upon the Tridentine rejection of the certainty of the believer about his or her salvation. Humans can never be theoretically certain about their ‘state of grace’. The occurrence of venial 12

Ibid. He is referring to Rahner’s seminal article: K. Rahner, ‘Zum theologischen Begriff der Konkupiszenz’, in Schriften zur Theologie I (Einsiedeln-Zürich-Köln Benzinger, 1954), pp. 377–414. For an in-depth review of Rahner’s position on concupiscence, see M. Ferrugia, ‘Karl Rahner on Concupiscence: Between Aquinas and Heidegger’, Gregorianum 86 (2005), no. 2, pp. 330–56 13 K. Rahner, ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’, in Schriften zur Theologie VI (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1965), pp. 262–76. Pesch mentions this article, but he categorizes it as an example of a Roman Catholic critique of simul iustus et peccator as a dogmatic statement (Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (886n197)). Pesch’s defective reference to Rahner’s discussion of simul iustus et peccator is also denounced in R. Kress, ‘Simul justus et peccator: Ecclesiological and Ecumenical Perspectives’, Horizons 11 (1984), no. 2, pp. 255–75 (261).

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sins is therefore a permanent open question about their most fundamental stance towards God.14 The crucial difference between these considerations and Rahner’s reflections on concupiscence lies in the involvement of human freedom. Both concupiscence and the ‘basic attitude’ towards God concern the human being as a whole. But whereas concupiscence precedes (and possibly resists) the free will of the human being, the turning to and away from God always involves a free act of the will, even if this choice is unconscious, concealed or unreflected upon.15 In this way, Rahner remains faithful to the Tridentine insistence on human freedom while fully taking into account the possibility which Pesch saw as a challenge to Roman Catholic theology: the evil contamination of the seemingly good acts of the Christian. Faced with the problem of evil in the life of the believer, Rahner does not give up the idea of sin as a free act. He rather points out the complexity of the working of human freedom both in terms of external versus interior activity and in terms of manifest versus hidden processes within the acting subject.16 (2) There is a close connection between simul iustus et peccator and the law-gospel distinction. It is because of the lifelong dialectic of the accusing law and the redeeming gospel that the believer can be called simultaneously accused and liberated, sinner and righteous.17 The distinction of law and gospel reveals the dynamics behind the seemingly static description of simul iustus et peccator, for it refers to the event of being put to death and being raised by God. Pesch sees the basic insight ‘that God raises up by annihilating’ and ‘vivifies by killing’ as the constant factor throughout the work of Luther.18 What is specific to the ‘Reformation Luther’ is the view that the law plays the role of killing the old man, whereas the gospel brings the new 14

Rahner, ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’ (273). Ibid. (272). 16 While Rahner’s thoughts on this subject bear some resemblance to insights from depth psychology, one could undoubtedly develop similar reflections starting from sociological, political and economical categories that would highlight the social and the structural aspects of sin. By merely participating in the life of the society, the Christian is involved in its evil. At the same time, this insight does not take away the responsibility of the believer. It rather shows the complexity of freedom and responsibility. 17 ‘Die Bewegung vom Gesetz zum Evangelium und das heißt: von der Sünde zum Heil, von der Anklage zum Freispruch ist lebenslang. Deshalb ist das Gesetz durch das Evangelium zugleich abgeschafft und aufgerichtet: abgeschafft als Heilsweg, aufgerichtet als der neu bestätigte Wille Gottes, der durch seine Anklage lebenslang das Evangelium erst wahrhaft Evangelium sein lässt. Die Formel “Gesetz und Evangelium” signalisiert daher den letzten Grund des “simul iutsus et peccator”’. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (893). Cf. also Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, p. 73. 18 ‘Was das Frühwerk mit der reformatorischen Theologie Luthers verbindet, ist der Grundgedanke vom Handeln Gottes im Gegensatz: Gott richtet auf, indem er vernichtet; Gott macht lebendig, indem er tötet’. Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, p. 65. 15

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man to life. What then are ‘law’ and ‘gospel’ for Luther? The distinction does not coincide with the division between the books of the Old and the New Testament. Both law and gospel are found in every part of Scripture.19 Law is the will of God communicated to humankind. Because the Christian cannot live up to its demands, the law leads to despair and becomes an object of hate. According to Pesch, the radicality of Luther’s concept of law consists in his view that it is God’s intention to confront the human being by means of the law with who he or she is. The uncompromising demands of the law reveal the failure of every human attempt to vindicate oneself in the face of God. The despair is not a goal in itself. It is inflicted upon the human being so that he or she may understand the value of the gospel.20 The gospel is the ‘other word’, which brings the message that Jesus Christ has fulfilled the law for us. This word communicates a promise instead of a demand.21 In order to see the rigidity of the distinction between law and gospel, it is helpful to refer to Pesch’s account of the genesis of this pair of concepts in Luther.22 The crucial step in this development was taken when promissio became the central notion in the articulation of the good news of God for the sinner. Whereas humilitas, the earlier central concept for Luther, could still annihilate itself by becoming a reason for boasting, God’s promise is free from any demand for moral or spiritual works, so that all boasting is excluded (Rom 3,27). Pesch is well aware of the rift between, on the one hand, Luther’s idea of an enduring dynamic of a law that leads us into despair about ourselves and a promise on which we can rely, and on the other hand the Tridentine insistence that the commandments precisely serve to guard and foster the gift of grace.23 He does not attempt to solve this divergence between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic tradition on this issue. One of the strategies Pesch uses to make the tension bearable is to transfer the problem of law and gospel from the life of the individual believer to the area of ecclesiology. The law-gospel distinction is related to a whole series of ecclesiological questions, such as the role of ministry, the instrumentality of the church, the function of ecclesial moral teaching and the tension between charismatic 19

Ibid., p. 72. ‘[Gott] will durch die buchstäblich gnadenlose Festschreibung seines Willens den Menschen in die Verzweiflung treiben, er will den Selbstbehauptungskrampf des Menschen am Gesetz scheitern lassen, selbst um den Preis, daß der Mensch noch tiefer in Auflehnung gegen Gott versinkt. Er will dies freilich nicht um der Sünde und Verzweiflung selbst willen – sondern damit der Mensch begreifen kann, was ihm im Evangelium geschenkt wird’. Ibid., p. 69. 21 Ibid., p. 70. 22 Ibid., pp. 62–65. 23 Ibid., p. 84. 20

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and institutional aspects of the church.24 Pesch does not concur with those who claim that the ecclesial and ecclesiological divergences between the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran traditions are in principle insurmountable so that any consensus on justification would necessarily be an other-worldly abstraction. Nor does he make the opposite, perilous assertion that the ecumenical problem of gospel and law could easily be solved on the ecclesiological level. Rather, he formulates a hypothetical ecclesiological consensus that could be summarized as follows. The ecclesiological differences that relate to the issue of law and gospel, and therefore the differences concerning that issue itself, would no longer be church dividing if the following two conditions are fulfilled. Primo, Lutherans recognize that the church cannot be built up merely by the law-gospel distinction. The latter is rather a corrective principle that presupposes the positive reality of the church. Lutherans acknowledge the divine (positively revelational) dimensions of ecclesial and ministerial structures. Secundo, Roman Catholics rediscover the counterpart of the law-gospel distinction in their own tradition. Pesch refers here to the section on ‘the law of the gospel’ (lex evangelii) in the Summa Theologiae (IaIIae q. 106), where Aquinas distinguishes between the new law as written in our hearts and the new law as a set of external ordinances.25 The former aspect has a clear priority over the latter. The new law only justifies as grace, not in the form of ‘dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing’.26 Therefore Roman Catholics perceive the enduring non-identity of external ecclesial structures and the gospel. (3) The foregoing hypothetical ecclesiological consensus is analogous to what Pesch writes about the possibility that Lutherans and Roman Catholics challenge each other with regard to the critical role they ascribe to the doctrine of justification. There is a sense in which Roman Catholics can adopt justification as criterion of all teachings and practices in the church. Ministry in the church means communicating the liberating gospel to human beings. This often involves a critical stance towards both the selfrighteous individual and the world. But this ministry is not necessarily critical towards itself. Some kind of prophetic ‘ministry’ that denounces ministerial tendencies towards legalism and self-satisfaction is not only 24

Ibid., pp. 78–94. ‘[D]icendum est quod principaliter nova lex est lex indita, secundario autem est lex scripta’ ST IaIIae q. 106 a. 1. See also Pesch’s reference to the crucial distinction in Aquinas between the veritas prima as formal object of faith and the enuntiabilia: Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (870). 26 ST IaIIae q. 106 a. 2. 25

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needed, therefore, but is even constitutive of the church.27 In a more general sense, Pesch seems to suggest that the doctrine of justification might exercise a critical role within the Roman Catholic church whenever a conflict arises between an honestly dissenting individual and the church authorities28 or whenever the new life of the Christian is supported by ecclesial ‘law-enforcement’ at the expense of Christian mercy.29 On the other hand, the Roman Catholic refusal to take the doctrine of justification as the sole judge and ruler over all aspects of ecclesial life is a challenge to Lutheran theology. It is significant that Pesch uses precisely the doctrine of justification against the tendency within Lutheranism to exaggerate the critical role of this doctrine. In most cases, Pesch says, the majority of Christians ‘live their faith in the liberating gospel in the form of an everyday, naïve and joyful participation (Mittun) in the church’.30 If the doctrine of justification were brought into play explicitly as critical judge in these instances, it would start functioning as a ‘law’, burdening and terrifying the consciences of the believers. The critical power of the doctrine of justification is always related to situations of calamity and oppression, which are truly worthy of criticism.31 It is not difficult to discern behind Pesch’s view on the criteriological function of the doctrine of justification, which hovers between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic position, a concern for the ‘freedom of the Christian’. There are two ways in which the interaction between the ecclesial community and the individual Christian can destroy this freedom. First, the pressure of the community’s moral and religious regulations can eclipse the liberating power of the gospel. Second, the critical potential of the message of justification can lure Christians into an attitude of compulsive criticism that is suspicious of every ‘joyful participation in the church’. Put into positive terms, Christian freedom can mean, depending on the circumstances, both prophetic criticism and unproblematic participation in the life of the church. 27

O. H. Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche: die kriteriologische Bedeutung der Rechtgertigungslehre fur die Ekklesiologie’, Ökumenische Rundschau 37 (1988), no. 1, pp. 22–46 (39–40). 28 Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, pp. 48–49. 29 Pesch mentions divorce and the conditions of admittance to the sacraments more than once as areas where the Roman Catholic church is prioritizing law at the cost of grace. Ibid., pp. 85–87; Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche ‘ (29–30, 32–33). 30 ‘Millionen von Christen, nicht nur in der römisch-katholischen, sondern auch in den evangelischen Kirchen, nicht nur theologisch ungebildete Christen, sondern auch sogenannte Intellektuelle und gar Theologen, leben ihren Glauben an das freimachende Evangelium in der Form eines alltäglichen, naiven und fröhlichen Mittuns in der Kirche’ Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche ‘ (40–41). 31 Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, p. 47; Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (902–03).

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It is significant that in the first of these three examples, the case of simul iustus et peccator, there is no mutual challenge. Only Roman Catholic theology is asked to reassess an idea which it usually rejects. If Pesch had followed Rahner on this issue, who holds on to the involvement of human freedom in both sin and justification, Lutherans would have been challenged as well to reconsider their usual denial of every human freedom coram Deo. But this is not what happens. This is all the more surprising, given the fact that an involvement of human freedom in the overall reality of salvation is probably implied in the challenges to Lutheran theology which Pesch does mention in the other two examples: the acceptance of divine dimensions of ecclesial and ministerial structures and the recognition of the theological significance of the believer’s ‘everyday, naïve and joyful participation in the church’. It seems as if Pesch thinks that the Lutheran position needs a ‘Roman Catholic corrective’ when ecclesiological questions are concerned. Yet he does not want to extend this ‘challenge’ to the underlying issue of human freedom coram Deo. Possibly, such a challenge would clash too directly with the Lutheran theological tradition. A possible interpretation of this anomaly will be offered in the concluding paragraphs of this section on Pesch.

c. Existential and Sapiential Theology Undoubtedly, Pesch’s distinction between sapiential and existential theology is his most original and best known account of the remaining differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teaching on justification. This distinction forms part of the conclusion of Pesch’s doctoral research on Luther and Aquinas.32 It is an attempt to understand the deepest level of difference between these two theologians and, more generally, between Roman Catholic and Lutheran theologies. Underneath the differing categories, concerns and forms of thought, Pesch discerns distinct Denkvollzugsformen (‘ways in which thinking is performed’). Put briefly, the distinction is the following.33 Aquinas attempts to understand the realities of God, man and the world from what one might call a bird’s eye view, or better still: from the perspective of God. The personal act of faith is presupposed in this approach, but at the same time a wisdom (sapientia) is sought that transcends this perspective of personal faith. Luther, on the

32

33

Pesch, Die Theologie der Rechtfertigung, pp. 935–48. This part of the dissertation was expanded and translated in English: Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology’. For an instructive overview of the meaning of ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ theology, see Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology’ (76).

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other hand, thinks strictly from within the act of faith in which the whole being (existentia) of the believer is involved, or else from within the personal relationship in which the believer stands confessing before God. According to Pesch, all crucial differences between Luther and Aquinas boil down to this different manner in which their theological speaking is ‘performed’. This can be illustrated with some examples. In an objective description of the structure of justification, it makes sense to take into account the interrelatedness of human and divine agency and speak in certain respects about human ‘cooperation’ in justification. By contrast, in the act of confession, which takes place in the context of an I-Thou (or a we-Thou) relationship, the grateful acknowledgement that one owes one’s salvation wholly to God leaves no room for the exclamation ‘O God I owe my salvation both to you and to myself’.34 The difference between the Roman Catholic affirmation of human cooperation in justification and the Lutheran rejection of it is therefore not an opposition between two contradictory assertions. Both statements belong to a different genre of theological speech, ‘explaining’ and ‘confessing’ respectively, and accordingly they have their own plausibility and legitimacy. Similarly, the phrase simul iustus et peccator is not to be understood as an objective and neutral description of a state of affairs (in which case it would be nonsensical indeed), but rather as a confession of the Christian in their direct encounter with God. In the context of a ‘sapiential’ theological project, however, the exclusive emphasis on the sinfulness of the Christian in se must appear as a gross exaggeration. A theology that attempts to explain the realities of faith in terms of ultimate causes and ends necessarily sees sin in its eventual powerlessness rather than in its remaining power over the believer.35 This distinction also explains the difference between the Lutheran sola fide and the Roman Catholic fides caritate formata. The former is again to be situated in the I-Thou relationship between the believer and God, which is aptly described as a faithful surrender to God, whereas the latter attempts to articulate the broader narrative of the believer’s return to God, which is appropriately described in terms of love.36 Enlightening as this distinction may be, the way Pesch defines the concepts of existential and sapiential theology is not unproblematic. Pesch writes that Luther’s existential theology ‘has as theme the act itself of faith as well as its theoretical implications’, whereas thomistic sapiential theology ‘has

34

Ibid. (67). Ibid. (73–74). 36 Ibid. (75). 35

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the act of faith (only) as the basis for its statements, without it becoming thematized’.37 This description of the difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies suggests that the main point of divergence is whether something (the act of faith) is made explicit or remains implicit. It is highly questionable, nonetheless, whether this is really the heart of the matter. First of all, if the difference really is about something being implicit or explicit, then making the act of faith explicit as the basis of sapiential theology would turn it instantaneously into existential theology, which is absurd. Second, it is clear that de facto the Roman Catholic sapiential tradition does make its existential background explicit. A brief reference to some relevant sources on merit makes this plain. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas writes the following answer to the question ‘can man in the state of grace merit eternal life condignly?’ Man’s meritorious work can be considered in two ways: first, so far as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, so far as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If the work is considered in its substance, and so far as it proceeds from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the greatest of inequality. But there is congruity, on account of a kind of proportionate equality: for it seems congruous that God should reward a man who works in the degree of his own power according to the excellence of his power. But if we consider the meritorious work so far as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then it is meritorious of eternal life condignly. For now the value of the merit is assessed by the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to eternal life, according to the text of John, It will become in him a spring of water welling up into eternal life. Also the value of the work is assessed by the dignity of grace, by which man, having become a sharer in the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, someone to whom the inheritance is due by the very right of adoption, according to the text of Romans: If sons, then also heirs.38 37 38

Ibid. (76). ‘Respondeo dicendum quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inaequalitatem. Sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam aequalitatem proportionis, videtur enim congruum ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suae virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam; secundum illud Ioan. IV, fiet in eo

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After having rejected the possibility that human persons can merit eternal life without grace (ST IaIIae q. 114 a. 2), Aquinas points out that meriting eternal life is possible in the state of grace, but, unsurprisingly, not without adding qualifications. He distinguishes between two perspectives on the good work: the work as proceeding from the free will and as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit. The kinds of meritum that are connected with these two perspectives are radically different. Luther and the Lutheran confessional writings generally reject both concepts of merit.39 The point here, however, is that these two perspectives are not unlike the distinction Pesch draws between existential and sapiential theology. When Aquinas speaks about the human person as a free being, he points out the maximal inequality (maxima inaequalitas) between God and humankind. What else is this but an articulation of the ‘existential’ situation of the human being who stands, in the act of faith, in his or her ‘creatureliness’ before God? The consequence of this inequality is not that whatever proceeds from the free-will in grace stands only under the accusation of the law. Rather, good works as free acts are appropriately and positively taken into account by God. Only when the good work is considered as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit – and the human person as being taken up in the divine life – can it be said to have an eternal dignity. This latter perspective could be called the ‘sapiential’ side of Aquinas’s idea of merit, in which the broader picture is articulated of everything good as coming from God (exitus) and returning to God (reditus). There is a lot in this explanation that is different from the Lutheran view on merit, but the difference is definitely not that the existential act of faith is not made explicit in Aquinas. The Tridentine account of merit shows a similar double perspective. On the one hand, Trent ‘sapientially’ affirms the fact that the good works of the justified can truly merit (promereri) eternal life.40 On the other hand, the rootedness of this theology in the ‘existential’ act of faith is made explicit in many ways. First, the decree on justification uses biblical metaphors to sketch out the living relationship with Christ as the ultimate reality that underlies any legitimate theology of merit: fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam. Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiae, per quam homo, consors factus divinae naturae, adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur hereditas ex ipso iure adoptionis, secundum illud Rom. VIII, si filii, et heredes’. ST IaIIae a. 114 q. 3. 39 For Luther, see T. Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der Theologie Martin Luthers (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1980), pp. 163–65. 40 All references to Trent in this paragraph are from Chapter 16 of the decree on justification (DS 1545–1549).

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For Jesus Christ himself continually imparts strength to those justified, as the head to the members and the vine to the branches, and this strength always precedes, accompanies and follows their good works, and without it they would be wholly unable to do anything meritorious and pleasing to God.41 Second, the council fathers were clearly aware of the dangers that are involved in the theological concept of merit. They admonish that even though Scriptures speaks highly of good works, ‘no Christian should ever either rely on or glory in himself and not in the Lord’.42 Third, and closely related to the previous point, the decree on justification reminds the reader of the fact that all Christians commit sins. Therefore, ‘each of us ought to keep before his eyes the severity and judgement as much as the mercy and goodness’,43 a sentence which may be considered as the Tridentine version of simul iustus et peccator. Finally, Trent points to the possible concealment of that sinfulness. It is only God, who sees through the darkness of the human heart, who can judge the human being.44 The two sides of the Tridentine teaching on merit, the formal affirmation of the meritorious character of the good works of the Christian and the qualification of merit as a function of God’s mercy on the powerless sinner, are not just juxtaposed in the decree. Rather, according to Trent, the necessity of the sapiential statement that good works performed in grace merit eternal life is ultimately based on the very nature of the Godhumankind relationship as it is ‘existentially’ experienced by the believer in faith. Christians should glory in the Lord, ‘whose goodness towards all is so great that he desires his own gifts to be their merits’.45 The fact that good works performed in grace are meritorious in God’s eyes is not the negation of the

41

‘Cum enim ille ipse Christus Iesus tamquam caput in membra et tamquam vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit, comitatur et subsequitur, et sine qua nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent’ (DS 1546). 42 ‘Neque vero illud omittendum est, quod, licet bonis operibus in sacris Litteris usque adeo tribuatur, ut etiam qui uni ex minimis suis potum aquae frigidae dederit, promittat Christus, eum non esse sua mercede cariturum, et Apostolus testetur, “id quod in praesenti est momentaneum et leve tribulationis nostrae, supra modum in sublimitate aeternum gloriae pondus operari in nobis”: absit tamen, ut christianus homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur et non in Domino’ (DS 1548). 43 ‘Et quia “in multis offendimus omnes”, unusquisque sicut misericordiam et bonitatem, ita severitatem et iudicium ante oculos habere debet’ (DS 1549). 44 DS 1549. 45 ‘[A]bsit . . . ut christianus homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur et non in Domino, cuius tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsiusdona’ (DS 1548, italics mine).

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gratuity of God’s grace, but its superlative. Undoubtedly, Pesch is right in criticizing and even ridiculing the hypothetical prayer of a Christian who prays ‘O God I owe my salvation both to you and to myself’.46 But Trent seems to move beyond this criticism when it allows Christians to pray something like ‘O God, I owe my salvation wholly to you, and I thank you for letting me play a humble role in this salvation with the freedom you have given me’. So Trent not only makes the existential act of faith explicit, but also the way its sapiential approach is rooted in this act of faith. A final example of how the Roman Catholic theological and doctrinal tradition makes its existential roots explicit in its concept of merit is a remark of Karl Rahner in the context of a review of Küng’s book on justification. First, Rahner writes: We hold with Trent that every ‘work’, since it means bringing forth fruit by the action of God, is in the same dimension as the coming blessed life of the same children of God. And hence we continue to think that there is no real difficulty in calling this work a beginning and a cause, and hence objectively, ‘from outside’ as it were, a meritorious thing with regard to the ‘reward in heaven’. This objective connexion results simply from the nature of things, which is that of sowing and harvest.47 It is hard to overlook the similarity between Pesch’s description of sapiential theology as thinking from a ‘God’s eye view’ and this account ‘from outside’ which interprets merit within the framework of God’s action which draws the human being near to himself so that he or she can already here and now participate in the blessed life. Rahner continues: A completely different question is whether this objective connexion of merit and reward may be made the first and last motive of the Christian life. As every Catholic schoolboy should know, this question is to be answered with an unambiguous No. Every Christian should know that no one can be saved unless he loves God first and last . . .. But when and in so far as one loves God, one cannot seek in such an act one’s merit and one’s reward. An act which would do so would not be an act of love. This line of reasoning is clearly what Pesch would call existential theology: a theology that argues from the inner logic of the act of faith. Again, this 46 47

Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology’ (67). K. Rahner, ‘Fragen der Kontroverstheologie über die Rechtfertigung’, in Schriften zur Theologie IV (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1960), pp. 237–71 (209).

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existential side does not remain implicit in Roman Catholic theology. It appears here in its paradoxical relationship to the sapiential perspective: the genuine love of God is objectively rewarded, but this love is only genuine when it does not seek any reward. Rahner explicitly resists the conclusion, however, that one should omit the sapiential language of an objective reward because it possibly leads to a pharisaic attitude of secretly doing everything for one’s own good. The paradox can remain. The perspective ‘from outside’ does not necessarily pervert the believer’s love of God. If this brief reference to Thomas, Trent and Rahner has shown that the question of whether or not the act of faith becomes thematic ‘from within’ is not what distinguishes existential from sapiential theology, and if sapiential theology is rather an attempt to combine or integrate perspectives ‘from within’ and ‘from outside’ the act of faith, then there remains the question as to what does constitute the difference between both. There is probably no other option than to formulate the following hypothesis: Sapiential theology assumes that the two aforementioned perspectives can legitimately be combined, even if the perspective ‘from outside’ is a possible threat to the authenticity of the act of faith itself, as Trent and Rahner acknowledge. This perspective ‘from outside’ the act of faith is even deemed necessary for the existential perspective, for knowledge about the active role of the human being in his or her return to God is, at least in certain contexts, a necessary appeal to human freedom, as is clear in the Tridentine decree on justification. Lutheran-existential theology, by contrast, is a form of thinking that refuses to integrate both perspectives and even eliminates the perspective ‘from outside’ because of its perverting potential. Thence comes the suspicion towards or outright rejection of ‘sapiential’ concepts such as cooperation, fides caritate formata, merit, inhering grace and satisfaction. If this is true, then the relationship between existential and sapiential theology is less symmetrical than Pesch presented it. If A is the internal perspective of the act of faith and B the perspective of God, Pesch suggested that existential theology spoke from perspective A and not from B, whereas sapiential theology spoke from perspective B and not from A. A closer analysis reveals that sapiential theology speaks from both perspectives. This is what Pesch himself calls the ‘transcendental’ character of God’s working in Roman Catholic theology, namely the idea that God’s all-encompassing activity does not exclude the activity of the human being within that horizon of grace.48 The statement that everything is pure grace is compatible with a crucial role of human agency in salvation. 48

Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (855).

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d. Comprehensive Models of Thought Pesch also speaks about the differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teachings on justification in terms of a ‘plurality of models of thought’. Each doctrine of justification is a coherent comprehensive outline (schlüssige Gesamtprägung) of the Christian message.49 This conviction has two sides. First, it involves the awareness of the historicity of all theological and doctrinal statements. The Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions on justification are contingent upon historically determined intellectual presuppositions. Second, Pesch emphasizes the transcendence of the word of God over all such historical circumstances. This means that God can address His message directly to people in different times and places, with very different frameworks of understanding.50 This, in turn, implies that no single set of intellectual presuppositions – for instance, those of scholastic theology – can claim to be the sole legitimate receptacle for the message of Christianity. However, these reflections on the historicity of all doctrines and on God’s transcendence are to a certain extent formal considerations that are applicable to any theological and doctrinal statement regardless of its concrete content. This is only one side of the issue. According to Pesch, two basic discoveries in the ecumenical dialogue have led to the idea of a legitimate plurality of forms of thought: (1) ‘the understanding of the relativity of all theological ways of speaking and thinking in comparison to the full content of what they have to express’ and (2) ‘the sharper inquiry into the precise significance of one’s own particular confessional-theological tradition, into concealed and forgotten truths on both sides and, therefore, into a mutual openness for each other which is greater than was hitherto believed’.51 The previous sections have shown that such a ‘sharper inquiry’ into the content of the differences on justification led to the discovery of different ways of speaking theologically (‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’) and of mutual challenges for both Lutherans and Roman Catholics.

49

Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche’ (23). Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (898). 51 ‘Zwei formale Grundbewegungen der ökumenischen Diskussion, die sich auch auf andere Streitfragen auswirkten, haben dieses Grundkonzept [die Idee einer legitimen Pluralität von Denkformen und Denkmodellen] möglich gemacht: die Einsicht in die Relativität aller theologischen Denk- und Redeweisen gegenüber dem Vollgehalt der Sache, die sie zur Sprache bringen sollen, und die schärfere Nachfrage nach dem genauen Sinn der jeweils eigenen konfessionell-theologischen Tradition, nach beiderseits verschütteten und vergessenen Wahrheiten und damit nach einer wechselseitigen Offenheit füreinander, die größer ist als bisher angenommen’ Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche’ (23). 50

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There is in Pesch a disparity between the two grounds of legitimate diversity, the formal one and the one related to content, and this is plain in his attempt to answer a question that is crucial for the ecumenical dialogue: What ought to happen to doctrinal differences in the ecumenical dialogue? Pesch’s answer to this question is complex. On the one hand, he dismisses all attempts to harmonize or integrate the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic views on justification. Such harmonization or integration would be impossible because of the radical plurality of thought forms. ‘One cannot be a Thomist and a Lutheran at the same time’, Pesch writes.52 It would be unnecessary, for, as was said above, Pesch considers both models of justification as coherent and comprehensive (schlüssige Gesamtprägungen).53 Finally, harmonization is undesirable, for it would feed the illusion of a kind of doctrinal and ecclesial absoluteness in which everything is adequately integrated and which transcends all historicity and relativity. It is precisely the doctrine of justification that decrees the recognition of the nonabsoluteness of ecclesial and doctrinal forms.54 The pluriformity of historical conditions and God’s sovereignty to act in radically different circumstances, the two insights that formed the basis of the idea of a ‘plurality of models of thought’, are also at the heart of Pesch’s resistance to integration as the ultimate goal of the ecumenical dialogue on justification. On the other hand, whenever Pesch goes deeper into the content of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic debate on justification (in the discussion about the criteriological function of the doctrine or in terms of sapiential and existential theologies), both doctrinal positions appear to be open to one another, to have common denominators, to be critically questioning and changing each other, and therefore to tend towards more integration. Pesch points out the necessity in ecumenism of ‘multi-dimensional thinking’.55 In the light of Pesch’s rejection of integration, this cannot mean that ecumenists should simultaneously hold all the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic convictions on justification. But the term does suggest something more than merely the acknowledgement that there is also truth ‘out there’. In the concrete practice of Pesch’s own theology, it means that at least some elements from outside his tradition are integrated into his own thinking. This tension between Pesch’s ‘prohibition’ of integration and his theological work which actually promotes integration is not necessarily a 52

Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, p. 44. Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche’ (23). Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, pp. 45–46. 55 Ibid., p. 43; Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (898). 53 54

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logical inconsistency. It is possible that Pesch believes that full integration as a final goal to be realized by ecumenical dialogue is unattainable, unnecessary and undesirable, while at the same time considering an evolution towards more unification as realistic and beneficial. Maybe he thinks that as long as the people of God is on pilgrimage here on earth, Christian communities with different intellectual backgrounds will need each other as critical and complementary ‘others’. However, two examples will demonstrate that it is at least a significant tension that draws near to an indecisiveness on the part of Pesch regarding a crucial theological issue. (1) In the chapter on justification of his recent ‘catholic-ecumenical dogmatics’, he repeatedly summarizes the Christian idea of justification as follows: ‘God carries through his will as Creator – as it were with calm equanimity and with means of inner power over the hardened hearts – with regard to his still beloved partner whom he does not abandon’.56 Pesch claims that this idea of the ‘gentle power of grace’ (die sanfte Macht der Gnade’) is a basic insight that underlies both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic theoretical models. The relationship between the concept of God’s ‘gentle power’ and the different doctrinal positions of Lutherans and Roman Catholics has a complexity that Pesch does not make explicit. On the one hand, one could say that the idea of a ‘gentle power’ holds together the insights that were torn apart in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic controversy: the real change that takes place in the life of the believer and the preservation of the freedom of that same Christian, who receives a new spirit of sonship rather than being forced into the process of transformation. In this interpretation, the power aspect is identified with the Roman Catholic emphasis on the effective side of justification, whereas the gentleness of this power corresponds to the Lutheran insistence that the righteousness of the Christian is not something that can be enforced by means of a law, but rather a result of the internal work of the Spirit, who renews the heart of the one whose relationship with God has been restored by faith. However, the two parts of the expression ‘gentle power’ can also be related in a different way to the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic doctrinal positions. The aspect of power can refer to the Lutheran assertion of God’s

56

‘Gott setzt gleichsam mit ruhiger Gelassenheit und mit Mitteln innerlicher Macht über die verhärteten Herzen seinen Schöpferwillen an seinem nach wie vor geliebten und nicht losgelassenen Partner durch’ Pesch, Katholische Dogmatik, pp. 1/2, 63 and 123.

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absolute sovereignty in the event of justification, whereas the gentleness reflects first of all the Roman Catholic concern that this sovereignty does not depersonalize the believer by reducing him or her to merely a passive ‘object’ of God’s justifying act. The strength of the idea of God’s ‘gentle power’ seems to lie in its complexity, which reveals both the multifaceted character of the reality of justification and the subtlety of the different doctrinal positions. There is an ambiguity, however. On one occasion in his dogmatics, Pesch portrays ‘die sanfte Macht der Gnade’ as a concept belonging to the Roman Catholic tradition. Later in the chapter, he describes it as an idea the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran traditions have in common.57 The point is that it is probably both. It is a thoroughly Roman Catholic sapiential account of justification and grace, which articulates the broader picture of the believer being ontologically transformed into a new creation, a process in which his or her faculties of knowledge and freedom are fully activated rather than eliminated. At the same time, this ‘sapiential’ concept attempts to integrate as much as possible the Lutheran ‘existential’ understanding of justification in terms of a relationship of the sinful creature with the sovereign God. Pesch tries to hold together the absolute priority of God’s work in justification and the reality of faith as a ‘paradoxical intertwining of God’s work and human activity’ (ein paradoxes Ineinander vol Gottes Werk und menschlicher Aktivität).58 On other occasions, however, Pesch speaks in a less integrative way about the sapiential and the existential approach to justification, or at least in a way that presents a less smooth kind of integration. This is the case, for instance, when Pesch expresses the conviction that certain terms in the Roman Catholic tradition that refer to the role of active human freedom (such as fides caritate formata59 and merit60) would better be avoided because they can lead to misunderstandings about justification. The critical distance between the traditional Roman Catholic sapiential language and the Lutheran existential approach is particularly manifest when Pesch writes about the concept of ‘cooperation’ (Mitwirkung). When Pesch sketches the differentiated consensus on justification that has been attained in the ecumenical dialogue, he mentions as one of the points of consensus:

57

Cf. Ibid., pp. 63 and 122–23. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (866). Ibid. (862). 60 Pesch, Katholische Dogmatik, pp. 1/2, 124. 58 59

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In the language of the tradition and of the council of Trent ‘cooperation’ is not ‘partner-like collaboration’ with God on one’s own justification, but literally only ‘assent’, and so response and not-blocking-the-way.61 In these passages, the idea of human cooperation in justification is limited to the somewhat passive ‘act’ of accepting justification or letting it happen. Elsewhere, Pesch seems to suggest the superfluity or even inappropriateness of the term ‘cooperation’: Justification takes place in the human being in such a way that his or her freedom complies with God’s liberating initiative, responds to it. This is not a ‘contribution’ because, in this matter, the human being as he or she is can do nothing of his or her own accord. And still the human response of ‘joining in’ belongs to the heart of the matter. Justification has not happened . . . as long as man has not given the response. Thomas called this event ‘assent/consent’ (and not ‘cooperation’) and this is also the word that Trent uses.62 The reference to Thomas and Trent is somewhat misleading. It might create the impression that Trent also uses ‘to assent’ or ‘to consent’ instead of ‘to cooperate’, whereas in reality it uses both verbs (assentire and cooperare) both in the doctrinal chapter and in the canon Pesch refers to.63 Moreover, it is doubtful whether Aquinas would see the terms assent and cooperation terms as mutually excluding alternatives.64 But whatever may be the historical validity of Pesch’s claim, he is trying to interpret ‘cooperation’ as passively 61

‘“Mitwirkung” ist in der Sprache der Tradition und des Trienter Konzils nicht “partnerschaftliches Zusammenwirken” mit Gott an der eigenen Rechtfertigung, sondern buchstablich nur “Zustimmung”, also Antwort und Sich-nicht-Sperren’. Ibid., p. 124. 62 ‘Die Rechtfertigung geschieht so im Menschen, dass seine Freiheit auf die befreiende Initiative Gottes eingeht, auf sie antwortet. Ein “Beitrag” ist das nicht, denn nichts kann der Mensch, so wie er ist, dabei aus sich selbst. Und doch gehört die Antwort als Mittun des Menschen zum Wesen der Sache: Rechtfertigung ist nicht geschehen . . . solange der Mensch die Antwort nicht gibt. “Zustimmung”, nicht etwa “Mitwirkung”, nannte Thomas dieses Geschehen, und dasselbe Wort gebraucht das Tridentinum’. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (858). 63 DS 1525.1554. 64 Pesch himself refers to an article of the Summa Theologica (Ia IIae q. 111 a. 2) which deals with the distinction between operating and cooperating grace. In this article, Aquinas does say that the movement of the human free will assents (consentire) to the divine justice. The question is what justifies Pesch’s emphatic addition ‘and not cooperation’ in the quotation above. For if this assent is a movement of the free-will, it can just as well be called an ‘operation’ and therefore a ‘cooperation’. Moreover, in ST q. 113 a. 9, the movement of the free will in justification is called ‘some sort of cooperation on the part of man’ (aliqua cooperatio ex parte hominis). Even if this is said in one of the objections (videtur quod non), it should be noted that the term is not refuted in the response at the end of the article.

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as possible. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, he is casting doubt on concepts such as cooperation, merit and fides caritate formata that were considered perfectly legitimate in the context of the distinction between existential and sapiential theologies (namely as sapiential concepts). Second, he arrives at conclusions that seem to contradict his idea of the ‘gentle power’ of grace. On a literal level, there is a tension between, on the one hand, Pesch’s ‘gentle power’ – a definition of justification in terms of the continuation of the divine-human partnership – and, on the other hand, the ‘no active cooperation’ – a definition that describes justification as an event in which God and human beings do not act as partners. This tension, which in itself is probably not irresolvable, may be a symptom of a more fundamental problem. In one approach, the absolute priority of God’s grace is entirely reconcilable with the idea that human and divine activity are inextricably intertwined (though ‘unmixed’) in the event of justification. In the other approach, this intertwining of the operations of God and humans appears to be considered a threat to the priority of God’s grace. In that case, the sovereignty of God can only be safeguarded doctrinally and theologically by pointing out the exclusiveness of the divine agency and, therefore, the passivity of the human person in justification. (2) The way Pesch describes the problem of good works is related to his treatment of the problem of freedom. The rejection by Luther of free human cooperation in justification was, according to Pesch, aimed against a self-asserting autonomy of the human being vis-à-vis God. Similarly, the problem with good works is the fact that works performed by believers, which are fruits of the Spirit, can ‘emancipate themselves’ from their source.65 The Reformation solution to this problem is to exclude any suggestion in teaching and practice that works are in some sense a condition for grace. Good works are not only excluded as pre-conditions (Vorbedingungen), but also as post-conditions (Nachbedingungen) for justification.66 The crucial difference therefore is between the following two views: on the one hand the view that a work is a fruit that is necessarily brought forth by the tree that has already been made good, and on the other hand the view that the tree has to show or prove by means of works that it has been made good. In the latter case, the order of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ (or ‘foundation’ and ‘consequence’) is reversed and the door is open for the kind of works righteousness that is rejected by Paul.

65 66

Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (838). Ibid. (838.49).

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Pesch does not go deeply into the Roman Catholic position on this issue. He hardly addresses the question about the meritorious character of good works. Pesch merely points out that Trent did not reverse the foundationconsequence relationship between faith and works.67 His chief aim is to demonstrate that the Lutheran rigidity in upholding the consequential nature of good works does not imply a low esteem for these works. Although sinners are justified by faith alone, faith is never alone (numquam sola), according to the Formula of Concord.68 The connection between faith and the works that follow it is not an external one. Works are called an incarnation of faith.69 Luther sometimes even ascribes a sacramental quality to them.70 However, Pesch does not only speak in defence of the Lutheran view on works, but also nudges the Lutheran position somewhat towards that of the Roman Catholic church. He interprets the numquam sola in a rather broad sense. Faith is never only the passive acceptance of something. It is always embedded in a complex whole of psychological and material acts of the believer.71 This means that a strict distinction between the act of faith in its purity and the multitude of surrounding human acts is impossible. Pesch concludes from this that the scheme of faith and works as foundation and consequence (Grund-Folge) is inadequate to describe the complex reality of faith. This reveals that there is some kind of paradox in the approach of Pesch. On the one hand, he states that Trent does not violate the Lutheran foundation-consequence scheme of faith and works. But on the other hand, he finds that this scheme is itself deficient. A generous interpretation of this apparent paradox could be that Pesch is merely examining whether both doctrinal positions can bear the test of being assessed by means each other’s fundamental principles. This would then involve the possibility of a differentiated judgement in which these principles are mutually questioning each other in certain respects. However, the fact that a Lutheran principle as fundamental as the strict priority of faith over works is simply called inadequate to describe the reality of faith leads one to suspect that something more is going on. 67

Ibid. (861). Ibid. (866). 69 Ibid. (860.81). Pesch refers to the distinction in Luther between absolute and incarnate faith, highlighted by Peter Manns, Pesch’s nemesis in the field of Roman Catholic Luther research. Cf. P. Manns, ‘Absolute and Incarnate Faith: Luther on Justification in the Galatians’ Commentary of 1531–1535’, in Catholic scholars dialogue with Luther, ed. J. Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 121–56 70 Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (877). 71 Ibid. (866). 68

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In summary, Pesch’s own account of justification and his treatment of the issue of good works undermine his claim that the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teachings are really comprehensive (schlüssig). For the Roman Catholic affirmations of the free cooperation of the human in justification and of meritorious works are both confirmed and subjected to a criticism that draws near to a rejection. There seems to be a tension between the view that both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic teaching on justification are based on equally valid and historically conditioned ‘thought forms’ and the integration that Pesch implicitly envisages. Moreover, the way Pesch constructs a more integrative view turns out to be deeply ambiguous with regard to the legitimacy of sapiential thinking. e. The Basis of the Paradoxes of Difference When one considers the three aspects of Pesch’s account of the doctrinal differences on justification, it is possible to discern a central problem that underlies all problematic aspects and ambiguities we have found in them. It is the tension between a ‘symmetrical’ and an ‘asymmetrical’ view on the differences. The idea of historical conditioned ‘thought forms’ that can be seen as equally appropriate contexts in which God reveals himself to man highlights mainly the negativity in the relationship between a teaching and the reality it represents. No single model or form of thought can claim to be the total embodiment of the word of God to the exclusion of all other models. Differences are legitimized on the basis of the ‘symmetrical’ distance between all models of thought and the word of God. It does not matter whether one explains this distance in a modern philosophical sense (all meaning is imposed by a subject on a fundamentally neutral reality) or in a theological sense (God reveals himself in a fundamentally neutral or godless reality). It also does not matter whether or not this symmetrical view is amplified in ecumenical discourse by a desire for ‘political correctness’ which does not tolerate in consensus texts an unfair division of support and criticism among the dialogue partners. The point here is only to show that this symmetrical view actually determines the way Pesch describes doctrinal differences. It distorts the issue of justification to the extent that it diverts the attention away from the concrete differences between the different teachings on justification, which are ‘asymmetrical’ both in their very structure and when it comes to particular sub-issues. This is most clear in Pesch’s account of Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies as existential and sapiential theologies.

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The interpretation of the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic approaches to justification in terms of existential and sapiential theologies eventually leads to a kind of deadlock in the approach of Pesch. He is well aware of the fact that the theology of Thomas Aquinas has to be both sapiential and existential in order to be authentic.72 Furthermore, we have shown that Pesch’s interpretation of the difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies in terms of the question whether the existential moment is explicit or implicit does not hold. The only possible way to make sense of the difference between Lutheran and thomistic theologies in Pesch was to understand it in terms of divergent judgement regarding the legitimacy of the sapiential perspective. At the same time, Pesch presents both theologies as equally legitimate options. This leads to an almost unsolvable puzzle. For in the final analysis Pesch defends the legitimacy of both the legitimacy and the illegitimacy of the sapiential perspective. As a consequence, concepts that are meaningful within a sapiential approach, such as free human cooperation in justification, merit and justifying faith as fides caritate formata, are both legitimized and criticized. The foregoing analyses have shown that these concepts are not just refined or ‘purified’ in Pesch’s interpretation, but that there is actually an ambiguity or indecisiveness regarding the question of their legitimacy. The significance of this observation is not just the fact that the complexity of Pesch’s notion of difference seems to render his interpretation of justification incoherent. There are ways to avoid or reduce this incoherence. The point is that the attempts to do so only lead to new problems. First, one could claim that both the legitimacy and the illegitimacy of the sapiential perspective contain no contradiction because different rules can be said to apply to different contexts. To use Pesch’s own example: in certain contexts of prayer and worship, it can be illegitimate to speak about human merit or human cooperation in justification. But these same concepts (merit and cooperation) can be seen as perfectly legitimate in other contexts, such as theoretical reflection on the presuppositions of our theological and religious language. The problem with this solution is that the simultaneous acceptance of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of sapiential theology on the basis of different contexts, which aims at upholding both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic positions, ultimately concurs with the Roman Catholic position. The reference to the position of Trent and Rahner on merit has

72

See also the interpretation in T. Lindfeld, Einheit in der Wahrheit: Konfessionelle Denkformen und die Suche nach ökumenischer Hermeneutik (ed. Johann-Adam-Möhler-Institut; Konfessionskundliche und kontroverstheologische Studien, 78; Paderborn: Bonifatius, 2008), pp. 146–49.

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shown that in the Roman Catholic tradition an affirmation of the sapiential concept of merit is perfectly reconcilable with the restriction that it should not be used in a way that would foster an attitude of complacency or would lead to an instrumentalization of the God-man relationship. It is therefore easier for Roman Catholics to accept that there is a sense (or a series of contexts) in which the use of sapiential concepts is illegitimate than it is for Lutherans to acknowledge even a limited legitimacy of these same concepts. If this is true, then the very structure of a legitimate diversity of Lutheran and Roman Catholic thinking in terms of existential and sapiential theologies would automatically be more favourable to the Roman Catholic position than to the Lutheran view. Second, the tension implied in Pesch’s imprecise answer to the question as to the legitimacy of sapiential theology can be reduced by accepting the sapiential concepts but at the same time minimizing their importance. This seems to be one of Pesch’s strategies when he is dealing with questions such as human cooperation in justification and human freedom coram Deo. In the case of cooperation, Pesch does not reject the concept itself, but he interprets it in such a restricted way that is almost completely stripped of its common meaning. With regard to human freedom, Pesch fails to appreciate Rahner’s Roman Catholic retrieval of simul iustus et peccator, thus refusing to present a human ‘fundamental option’ integral to salvation as a possible challenge for Lutheran theology and doctrine. This reluctance to posit unambiguously and straightforwardly the legitimacy of sapiential concepts is nevertheless a relatively superficial phenomenon in the work of Pesch. For realities such as freedom coram Deo and cooperation, whose significance is questioned or underplayed in one place, emerge somewhere else in Pesch’s work in all their glory, for instance, when he speaks positively about the ‘paradoxical intertwining of God’s work and human activity’ or the ‘everyday, naïve and joyful participation in the church’.

III. The Finnish School of Luther Interpretation and the Justification Debate This section examines the work of the Finnish school of Luther interpretation and assesses its significance for the ongoing dialogue between Lutherans and Roman Catholics about their faith in general and about justification in particular. No attempt will be made to analyse the subtle differences between the individual Finnish scholars. Nor will the adequacy of their Luther interpretation be the object of evaluation. The ecumenical

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significance of ‘the Finns’ lies in the fact that they discover in the works of Luther a richer and more complex vision of the Christian faith than in some other forms of contemporary Lutheran theology. In the first part, the general characteristics of the Finnish approach are described. The second part reflects on the relevance of their work for the theme of justification by faith. This theme is put in a wider theological perspective in the third part. Finally, some reflections are presented on the significance of the Finnish Luther interpretation for the ecumenical method of differentiated consensus. Unlike Otto Hermann Pesch, the Finns hardly deal explicitly with the issue of ecumenical hermeneutics and methodology. The ecumenical relevance of their work lies in the subtlety of the vision of justification which they lay bare in the work of Luther. Nevertheless in their theological elaboration of the theme of justification a certain ecumenical approach is implied.

a. The Finnish School of Luther Interpretation: General Characteristics ‘The Finnish school of Luther interpretation’ refers here to the work of Tuomo Mannermaa and his students during the last four decades.73 Their explorations into Luther had an ecumenical orientation from the outset. The background to their research is the dialogue between the Lutheran Church in Finland and the Russian Orthodox Church. Central to the Finnish reading is the concept of theosis. Mannermaa wants to show that this concept, which might sound somewhat ‘mystical’ and ‘physical’ to many a Lutheran theologian, is present in Luther’s own writings. Although the idea of divinization is not central in the theology of Luther,74 Mannermaa demonstrates that it can be used as a possible key to understanding Lutheran soteriological notions such as justification by faith, the relationship between law and grace and the Christian as simultaneously righteous and sinner.

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For an overview of the dissertations written by Mannermaa’s students, see T. Mannermaa, ‘Why is Luther so Fascinating : Modern Finnish Luther Research’, in Union with Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 1–20 (2–3). Helpful reflections on the work of the works of the Finnish school and its ecumenical relevance can also be found in V.-M. Kärkkäinen, ‘Salvation as Justification and Theosis: The Contribution of the New Finnish Luther Interpretation to Our Ecumenical Future’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 45 (2006), no. 1, pp. 74–82; V.-M. Kärkkäinen, One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2004); W. T. Cavanaugh, ‘A Joint Declaration? Justification as Theosis in Aquinas and Luther’, Heythrop Journal 41 (2000), no. 3, pp. 265–80. 74 See R. Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther: ein Beitrag zum ökumenischen Gespräch (Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, 78; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), p. 375.

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From an ecumenical point of view, one could immediately identify two ways in which the theological exchange between the churches can benefit from this approach. First, it provides the ecumenical dialogue between Lutheran and Orthodox churches with a theological point of contact. In some interpretations of the Lutheran doctrine of justification, personalistic, relational and ethical aspects of salvation are contrasted with physical and ontological soteriologies such as the Orthodox (‘Platonic’) idea of theosis and the Roman Catholic (‘Aristotelian’) concept of habitual grace. According to Mannermaa, this modern contrast between the ethical and the ontological is not present in patristic thinking on divinization, nor in Luther’s idea of justification.75 Rather, the Lutheran understanding of justification cannot be understood without reference to the ‘real-ontological’ presence of Christ in faith and the equally real union between the believer and Christ. Second, the Finnish interpretation claims to avoid some historical misinterpretations of the theology of Luther. Already at an early stage in the Lutheran tradition, the idea of justification was reduced to its forensic side, thus separating it from salvation as regeneration and vivification.76 In the Formula of Concord, for instance, justification is considered as the imputation of God’s righteousness, to be strictly distinguished from the ‘new obedience’ of the Christian. As Mannermaa’s student Simo Peura points out, the only effective change involved in this view of justification is the mere taking cognizance by the believer of God’s forgiveness.77 In other words, the event of justification takes place both outside the believer (in God’s declaration of the forgiveness of sins) and in the mental state of the believer (in the awareness of this divine grace), but not within the ontological reality of the life of the Christian. This imputative understanding of justification has strongly affected subsequent Lutheran soteriological thinking. The tendency to stress one-sidedly the forensic aspect of justification was further amplified by the influence of neo-Kantian philosophy. The work of Hermann Lotze has left its mark on twentieth-century Lutheran theology, as Risto Saarinen has shown in his study Gottes Wirken auf uns: Die transzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-Motiv in der Lutherforschung.78 In the work of 75

T. Mannermaa, Christ Present in Faith: Luther’s View of Justification (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), p. 2. S. Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift (donum): the challenge of Luther’s understanding of justification’, in Union with Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 42–69 (45–46). 77 Ibid. (47). 78 R. Saarinen, Gottes Wirken auf uns: Die tranzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 137; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1989). 76

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theologians like Albrecht Ritschl, Luther’s idea that Christ is present in faith is deprived of its metaphysical objectivity, in favour of a dynamic and relational interpretation. Against all metaphysics of substance, the presence of Christ is only considered from the perspective of God’s effects on the believer through the historical mediation of Jesus Christ. In accordance with the Kantian division between the noumenal and the phenomenal realm, the divine reality in itself (an sich) remains inaccessible behind God’s actions upon the believer. In a way that is analogous to the understanding of justification in the Formula of Concord, the metaphysical presence of God is replaced on the one hand by a divine existence ‘in itself’ which lies wholly outside our grasp and on the other hand a series of effects in the mind of the believer. The possibility of a real ontological presence of Christ in faith – and a real union of the believer and Christ – is thereby excluded. The study of Saarinen only ascertains that twentieth-century protestant theology is profoundly influenced by Lotze, but leaves open the question of whether the impact of neo-Kantianism leads to a distortion of Luther’s own theology.79 It is clear, however, that the overall conclusion of Finnish Luther scholarship does entail an answer to this question. The Finns indeed claim that Luther can be called a metaphysical realist and therefore antimetaphysical tendencies in the Lutheran theological tradition misrepresent the Reformer’s thinking.

b. The Finnish School and the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Debate on Justification In what way can the Finnish Luther research contribute to the LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue on justification? There are in my view at least two possible routes to showing the relevance of Mannermaa and his school for the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. First, on a systematic theological level, it can be made evident that the content of the Finnish-Lutheran concept of justification bears closer resemblance to the Roman Catholic approach to salvation than Lutheran soteriology shaped by the Formula of Concord and neo-Kantianism. Second, on a fundamental theological level, the Finnish interpretation can put a supposed ‘fundamental difference’ between Lutheran and Roman Catholic faith and theology into perspective. That is to say, the Finnish assertion that Luther had a metaphysically realistic concept of Christ’s presence in faith at least questions formulations of this Grunddifferenz in terms of dynamic thinking versus substance thinking. 79

Ibid., p. 231.

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1. Forensic and Effective Justification As regards the issue of forensic and effective justification, the work of the Finnish school seems most promising. Mannermaa’s work Christ Present in Faith accentuates the christocentric nature of Luther’s thought. In the union of the believer with Christ, sins are not only forgiven, but also destroyed. Christ is not only God’s goodwill (favor) towards the sinner, because of which sins are not reckoned, but also the gift (donum) to the believer, who now really participates in Christ’s divine nature.80 The unity of acquittal and renewal is founded in the person of Christ. Simo Peura points to the fact that both aspects, favour and gift, are necessary in order to deliver the human being from evil, for the misery of the sinner consists of both the wrath of God and the wickedness of man.81 Instead of defending an absolute priority of forensic justification over the transformation of the Christian, as is sometimes done in Lutheran theology and as is often assumed to be the only possible Lutheran position, Peura states that in Luther grace (favor) and gift (donum) depend upon one another. On the one hand, the perfect righteousness of Christ covers the sins of the sinner and only within this protecting shield is the inner renewal of the Christian (the gift) possible. On the other hand, the real regeneration of the believer is the condition for remaining within the protection of Christ.82 This remarkable description of the mutual dependence of acquittal and transformation can be seen as a compromise in what has been described as the heart of the controversy between Lutherans and Roman Catholics on justification – whether justification is to be understood analytically or synthetically.83 This would be an all too easy and insubstantial solution, however, were it not for its Christological foundation, for both grace and gift are themselves wholly dependent upon the indwelling of Christ in the believer. Two dangers are thereby avoided. First, the emphasis on the real presence of Christ prevents theology from thinking of God’s righteousness as a purely virtual reality for the believer. Justification does not only imply a mental awareness 80

Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 19. Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift’ (43) 82 Ibid. (56–58). For the reciprocity of favour and donum, see also S. Peura, ‘Baptism, Justification, and the Joint Declaration’, in The Gift of Grace: The Future of Lutheran Theology, ed. N. H. Gregersen et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), pp. 117–30 (121). 83 This is the question whether God’s acquittal of the believer is merely an acknowledgement of a righteousness that is already there due to the believer’s transformation (analytical) or rather a ‘performative’ declaration of a righteousness which is created by this ‘speech act’ (synthetical). For this question, see H. G. Pöhlmann, Rechtfertigung (Gutersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1971), pp. 352–61. 81

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of God’s saving grace on the side of the believer, but also the actual lifechanging union between the believer and Christ. Second, the presence of Christ prevents theology from thinking that one can detach the gift from the giver and have it at one’s disposal. The idea of the inhabitatio of Christ means that the gift and the Giver are identical and that the believer remains radically dependent upon God. The inaccuracy of any Luther interpretation that claims to find a purely forensic view of justification in the work of the Reformer did not remain unnoticed before the work of the Finnish school.84 Nor is the emphasis on the divine presence in faith as a way of reconciling the forensic and effective aspects of justification, a novelty introduced by the Finns.85 Still, for several reasons the Finnish interpretation of justification in terms of Christ’s presence in faith as favor and donum is anything but superfluous. First, repeating time and again that Luther’s convictions on justification are more subtle than is commonly assumed seems to be a permanent necessity. Misunderstandings and stereotypical misrepresentations of theological positions are persistent in theological discourse. The main reason for this is not difficult to guess: simplifications make both theological teaching and the definition of one’s own identity over against the opponent easier. Also for Pesch, to be done with the obvious and ‘irritating’ misunderstanding that the difference between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic views on justification can simply be identified with the opposition between forensic and effective justification was one of the first goals in his treatment of the theme of justification.86 Second, the Finnish interpretation offers an additional explanation of the obstinacy of the forensic Luther interpretation. The reference to the neo-Kantian intellectual climate does present a plausible account of the

84

See Ibid., pp. 313–28. Cf. also T. Beer, ‘Die Ausgangspositionen der lutheranischen und der katholischen Lehre von der Rechtfertigung’, Catholica 21 (1967), no. 1, pp. 65–84. Beer also refers to Luther’s distinction between favour and donum in order to demonstrate the proximity between the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran idea of justification. Unlike the Finns, however, Beer emphasizes the difference in the way Christ is present as favour and as gift (namely in a kind of ‘mechanical exchange’ and as a living, life-renewing presence, respectively). Beer, ‘Die Ausgangspositionen der lutheranischen und der katholischen Lehre von der Rechtfertigung’ (70–72). 85 John Henry Newman in his Lectures on Justification, to mention one example, attempted to find a middle path between extreme understandings of justification precisely by emphasizing the divine indwelling in the believer. Newman, however, did not avoid the typical error of ascribing a forensic view on justification to Luther. J. H. C. Newman, Lectures on Justification (London: J G & F Rivington, 1838). For a confrontation of Newman and Luther, see T. L. Sheridan, ‘Newman and Luther on Justification’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38 (2001), no. 2–3, pp. 217–45. 86 Cf. Pesch, Gerechtfertigt aus Glauben, p. 43; Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (847).

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fact that the theologians repeatedly reduce the reality of Christ’s presence in faith to an ‘awareness’, a ‘recognition’ or any other mental event.87 Third, the Finnish interpretation seems to do justice to the concerns underlying both Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrinal positions on justification. Both the ‘Lutheran’ insistence that justifying grace can never be abstracted from Christ as the source of all salvation and the ‘Roman Catholic’ emphasis on the actual reality of the righteousness bestowed upon the Christian – as opposed to righteousness as a purely virtual or hoped-for reality – are contained in the Finnish interpretation of Christ being present in faith.88 The approach of the Finnish school therefore bears a resemblance to the way the topic of justification has been dealt with in the ecumenical dialogues between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. In these dialogues, it has become customary to refer to the underlying concerns of doctrines, to the ‘spirit’ of conflicting dogmas rather than to their ‘letter’.89 Instead of directly comparing and harmonizing Lutheran and Roman Catholic dogmatic statements, the question is asked whether the doctrines of one dialogue partner also give expression to the concerns that lie behind the dogmas of the other partner. This approach is sometimes thought to be superficial or inattentive to the possibility that differences at the level of language may betray crucial doctrinal discrepancies.90 However, the Finnish Luther scholars show that it would be short-sighted to play theocentrism and salvific realism off against each other in the discussion on justification. 87

In that sense a parenthetical remark of Daphne Hampson is telling. While writing on the ontological interpretation of the Finnish Luther school and its concept of participation in God, she adds between brackets, ‘I am reminded of what my teacher Arthur MacGill was wont to say: that for Luther the circumference of my self-understanding is now nothing less than my sense of God’. This shows that Hampson somewhat misses the point of the Finns, spontaneously translating the explicitly ‘real-ontological’ language of Mannermaa and his students (‘participation’, ‘presence’) into purely mental terms (‘understanding’, ‘sense’). It is no surprise then that Hampson, looking at the Finns through neo-Kantian glasses, doubts whether their interpretation makes any difference in the discussion between Roman Catholics and Lutherans. D. Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought (New York Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 19–20. 88 ‘Lutheran’ and ‘Roman Catholic’ are within quotation marks here precisely because the Finns have shown that the concerns mentioned are not exclusively Lutheran or Roman Catholic. 89 Cf. Lehmann and Pannenberg, Lehrverurteilungen-Kirchentrennend? Bd 1: Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation und heute, pp. 22–23.46. The idea that both Lutheran and Roman Catholic theological ‘concerns’ are legitimate whereas the literal meaning of doctrinal expressions should be put into perspective is also implicit in the Joint Declaration’s claim that the condemnations of the Reformation era are no longer applicable to today’s dialogue partner while remaining valid as ‘salutary warnings’. ‘The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification between the Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church’, One in Christ 36 (2000), no. 1, pp. 56–74 (§§ 41–42). 90 Cf. L. Scheffczyk (ed), Die Heilsverwirklichung in der Gnade: Gnadenlehre (Katholische Dogmatik vol. 6, Aachen: MM Verlag, 1998), p. 480.

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Both concerns converge in the idea of Christ being present in faith. In that sense, the Finns offer a theological foundation for the ‘concern for concerns’ and the use of the ‘differentiated consensus’ in the LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue, at least in this particular issue. But, as was evident in the interpretation of favor and donum and as will become even clearer in the following argument, the recognition of converging concerns beneath verbal oppositions is only possible when the Lutheran theological tradition is interpreted in a certain manner. 2. Simul iustus et peccator Even if Lutherans and Roman Catholics can affirm together that the Christian undergoes a real transformation and that he or she really becomes righteous, the question remains as to what role sin still plays in his or her life. This is the problem of the right interpretation of the Lutheran simul iustus et peccator and the question of whether or not – and in which sense – Roman Catholic theology can agree with this formula.91 The discussion about the simultaneity of being sinful and being justified in the Christian is, of course, closely related to the issue of forensic and effective justification. A strictly forensic interpretation of the righteousness of the believer corresponds with a view of the Christian as someone who remains completely sinful in him or herself while being held wholly righteous by God for the sake of Christ. The fact that the Mannermaa school sees a reciprocal relationship between declarative and transformational aspects of justification already implies the exclusion of certain interpretations of simul iustus et peccator. This does not mean, however, that both topics simply boil down to the same thing. The Finnish argument is more sophisticated here than in the issue of forensic and effective justification, though equally dependent on Luther’s distinction between favor and donum. In order to see how Mannermaa is dealing with the expression ‘simul iustus et peccator’, it is instructive to first go somewhat further into the classical problem of the simul-expression, which contains at least two sub-issues. First, the question is, in which way the Christian can be described as iustus and peccator. Is he or she at the same time wholly sinner and wholly just (totustotus) or are both characterizations to be understood as partially descriptive of the Christian’s life (partim-partim)? Second, the question is how the 91

An exposition of the traditional discussions on simul iustus et peccator can be found in Pöhlmann, Rechtfertigung, pp. 361–78; M. Bogdahn, Die Rechtfertigungslehre Luthers im Urteil der neueren katholischen Theologie (Kirche und Konfession, 17; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), pp. 189–205.

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simultaneity of sin and righteousness is to be conceived. Are they to be seen as necessary elements in the invariable structure of Christian existence? Or is it rather that their relationship is a dynamic one? Often, a totus-totus interpretation goes hand in hand with a static-structural view on simul iustus et peccator. The underlying idea in that case is that it is only the sinner as sinner who is justified and therefore only the total sinner who is totally justified. This can be traced back to the Lutheran theology of the cross. Just as God’s definitive salvation for humanity is hidden in the revelation of radical human sinfulness at Golgotha, the liberation of the Christian remains hidden in his or her misery as a sinner and is only revealed in this paradoxical way.92 Moreover, the idea that we are only justified as sinners is aimed against the sin that radically perverts the relationship to God: religious self-glorification. In this earthly life, the Christian is not righteous as one who can boast of fulfilling the law nor as a master in spiritual growth, but only as a miserable sinner who stands empty-handed before God, in whom alone he or she has to trust.93 It is clear from this point of view that the present life of the Christian appears both wholly and necessarily as that of a sinner. At the same time, God does not ‘stop at half measures’ when justifying the sinner. He or she is, at least in some respect, wholly righteous. The simultaneity of complete righteousness and complete sinfulness builds the greatest paradox for the theologian, who is forced to ask in what way both characterizations apply to the Christian. Conversely, the partim-partim explanation of simul iustus et peccator is usually connected with an emphasis on the dynamic aspect of the simultaneity of sinfulness and righteousness. The Christian is caught up in a lifelong process of transformation in which his or her existence as iustus is constantly threatened by ever-emerging sinfulness. The fact that the Christian is peccator is here an undeniable empirical fact rather than a necessary constituent of the life of the baptized. In this interpretation, the believer is essentially righteous and only in a secondary sense a sinner.94 As a righteous person, the Christian is still partly attached to the vanishing ‘old man’. This prevents him or her from being fully iustus. In this way, the description of 92

This aspect of simul iustus et peccator is emphasized in Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, pp. 353–74. 93 Therefore, this interpretation of simul iustus et peccator presupposes a certain interpretation of the Pauline idea of the law and justification, one that assumes that Paul is engaged in a polemic against the law because ‘the law fosters an attitude of pride’. Cf. V. Koperski, What are they saying about Paul and the Law? (New York Mahwah, Nj: Paulist Press, 2001), pp. 7–18. 94 This is the view of Horst Georg Pöhlmann: ‘Der Gerechtfertigte ist bei Luther grundsätzlich und in erster Liniesündelos und erst erfahrungsgemäß und in zweiter Linie Sünder’. Pöhlmann, Rechtfertigung, p. 362.

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the believer as simul iustus et peccator is an expression of the renewal of the life of the Christian, rather than of a theological paradox. Mannermaa talks of two ‘points of view’ regarding the sinfulness of the Christian. If one looks at the believer in his or her struggle between the old and the new, then a dynamic partim-partim view is appropriate. He refers to Luther’s image of the leaven already present in the dough without yet permeating it, symbolizing Christ’s transforming presence in the believer.95 Just as the dough remains unleavened, the Christian is still partially a sinner. On the other hand in view of Christ’s real presence which is already bearing its first fruits in the life of the Christian, he or she can be called righteous. When the relationship of the Christian with God is taken into consideration, a totus-totus approach of simul iustus et peccator is justified, for in all his or her spiritual and ethical progress, the Christian remains wholly dependent upon God’s ‘favor’. Mannermaa’s description of the totus-totus interpretation is not unambiguous, for he seems to relate the permanent dependency of the Christian upon God both to the real imperfection of the believer’s faith and to his or her hypothetical misery if Christ should abandon him or her.96 Mannermaa does not clearly distinguish between these two aspects. The meaning of ‘peccator’ is therefore much clearer in the partim-partim interpretation of simul iustus et peccator. This simply means that the Christian remains characterized by a deep-seated tendency to be disobedient to God, an aversion towards the transforming presence of Christ. In the totus-totus interpretation, as Mannermaa describes it, the actual sinfulness of the believer and the permanent reliance on God’s grace – and therefore even the ‘infinite qualitative distance’ between the Creator and His creatures – seem to merge in the concept of peccator. Strangely enough, it looks as if Mannermaa is in accord with Reinhard Flogaus on this point, a critic of the Finnish school who defends a nearly exclusive totus-totus interpretation.97 Against the Finnish emphasis on theosis as the key to understanding Luther, Flogaus refers to Luther’s own conviction that ‘Christ has become man in order to lead us back to our true selfknowledge and to turn us from haughty gods back into true human beings, that means wretches and sinners’.98 By drawing an opposition between ‘sinner’ 95

Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 59. Ibid., pp. 60–61. 97 Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, p. 363. 98 Ibid., pp. 36–37: ‘[D]er altkirchliche Zusammenhang von Inkarnation und Vergöttlichung konnte von [Luther] durch die Feststellung ersetzt werden, Christus sei Mensch geworden, um uns zur rechten Selbsterkenntnis zurückzuführen und so aus hochmütigen Göttern wieder wahre Menschen, und das heißt, Elende und Sünder zu machen’. 96

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and ‘haughty god’, Flogaus (like Luther) uses the concept of ‘sinner’ in a paradoxical way. The peccator here is the one who does not commit the greatest sin: pride. It means the absolute neediness of the Christian in the face of the living God, so much so that all his or her good works shrink into nothingness and even appear as unworthy. Similar to Mannermaa’s description of the Christian as totus peccator, the elements of dependence, difference and moral unworthiness seem to flow together in the notion of ‘sinner’. Flogaus would assent to Mannermaa’s statement that ‘when believers are viewed from the perspective of their relationship with God, all are on the same footing’.99 All Christians are ‘poor sinners’ in need of God’s mercy. The levelling down of all human achievements by means of the umbrella term ‘peccator’ is not an aim in itself. Rather, both Flogaus and Mannermaa want to show that the full righteousness of the Christian remains dependent on God’s favour towards the human being. The difference is that for Flogaus this totus-totus perspective is the only way of looking at the righteousness of the Christian. The aspect of transformation and growth is not simply secondary to the believer’s justification as sinner. It can even be dangerous inasmuch as it can create the fatal illusion that we can ‘become like gods’. For Mannermaa, by contrast, the growth perspective, which is articulated in the partim-partim interpretation of simul iustus et peccator, is part and parcel of the righteousness of the believer. Both perspectives are not merely complementary viewpoints. Rather they describe one and the same thing: the presence of Christ who is both undeserved favour and regenerating gift. This does not mean that the tension between ‘grace’ and ‘works’ disappears in the Finnish approach. The tension becomes even stronger and more concrete. On the one hand, the justification of the sinner cannot be conceived apart from the real renewal of the life of the Christian. God’s favour always implies a real gift to the believer. But, on the other hand, this new life is only ever a dim light reflecting the infinite sun of God’s love. The gift always remains a favour. But the fact that the transformation of the Christian is in the final analysis the ontological presence of Christ in the believer prevents theologians from thinking of this dim light as something purely prospective or something merely existing in the mind of God. It is therefore unlikely that Mannermaa would agree with Flogaus when the latter states that ‘the re-ality of the new being of the human is and remains . . . hidden under the cross. Its eschatological reality is anticipated

99

Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 66

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only in the act of faith’.100 The Finnish partim-partim interpretation and its foundation in the real-ontological presence of Jesus Christ imply that the righteousness of the Christian is never completely hidden. Nor can it be something that will become real only at the end of time and which we can only ‘anticipate’. The Finns do not merely add their partim-partim interpretation as a supplement to a totus-totus approach à la Flogaus. Rather, the partim-partim reading limits the range of possible meanings of the totustotus reading. The totus-totus interpretation of simul iustus et peccator can be seen as a theological adaptation of the Augustinian ‘love of God carries even to the point of contempt for self’.101 It stresses the splendour of God’s grace even to the point of calling the believer a complete sinner. The fact that the Finns defend the equal importance of the partim-partim interpretation, however, means that theology should not end up in contempt for the Christian as historical being, denying him or her any progress in real righteousness in this earthly life. The growth perspective is not destroyed by an emphasis on God’s amazing grace. At the same time, all growth remains linked to the real presence of Jesus Christ. This means that genuine spiritual and moral development in the life of the Christian is not and should not be ‘love of self carried even to the point of contempt for God’.102

3. Confrontation with a Renewed Roman Catholic Approach to Justification The double viewpoint on simul iustus et peccator upheld by the Finnish school offers interesting prospects for ecumenical theology. This becomes evident when one confronts this interpretation with the way Hans Urs von Balthasar approaches the issue of simul iustus et peccator in his book on Karl Barth.103 Von Balthasar is an interesting dialogue partner here because he seems to read the protestant theological tradition benevolently while remaining faithful to the distinctive Roman Catholic approach to justification. According to von Balthasar, there are two ways in which the Lutheran 100

‘Die Re-alität des neuen Sein des Menschen ist und bleibt also eine unter dem Kreuz verborgene, deren eschatologische Wirklichkeit lediglich im Glaubensakt antizipiert wird’. Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, p. 363. The italicized ‘Re’ of ‘Re-alität’ refers to Luther’s statement that the Christian is a sinner in re and righteous in spe. See also G. Bausenhart, ‘Simul iustus et peccator: zum römischen Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zwischen der katholischen Kirche und dem Lutherischen Weltbund über die Rechtfertigungslehre”’, Catholica 53 (1999), no. 2, pp. 122–41 (127). 101 ‘Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestum vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui’. Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans (VII vols; London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. XIV, xxviii. 102 Ibid.

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formula can contradict the Roman Catholic standpoint, namely when it expresses an ‘exaggerated eschatologism’ or a ‘juristic nominalism’. In these cases, the reality of the believer’s love and righteousness is reduced either to something that is merely hoped for (in spe) or to a change in the mind of God, which can only be believed (in fide).104 As is apparent from the above description of the Mannermaa school, the Finnish approach excludes such interpretations due to their emphasis on the real presence of Christ in faith. Von Balthasar observes that Karl Barth equally avoids eschatologism and nominalism. In a kind of dynamic totustotus interpretation of simul iustus et peccator, Barth depicts the existence of the Christian as taking place at the turning point away from being wholly sinner towards being wholly righteous. The righteousness of the believer is therefore in no way virtual for Barth. The simultaneity of iustus and peccator does not mean an equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) between the two but precisely the removal of the equilibrium. The victory over sin has already become the determining reality for the Christian.105 In von Balthasar’s opinion, however, the Barthian recognition of the present reality of the Christian as iustus does not remove all possible Roman Catholic objections to his reading of simul iustus et peccator. Von Balthasar suggests that the concrete historical existence of the human being receives scant attention in Barth so that ‘in this theology of the happening and of history perhaps nothing happens after all, because everything already happened in eternity’.106 Among the symptoms of this suspected neglect of history, von Balthasar mentions the lack of ontic categories in Barth’s

103

H. U. v. Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie (Köln: Hegner, 1962), pp. 378–86. See also A. Dulles, ‘Justification in Contemporary Catholic Theology’, in Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII, ed. H. G. Anderson, J. A. Burgess, and T. A. Murphy (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 256–77 (269–70). 105 Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, p. 379. That this interpretation is influential in Lutheran thinking can be seen in the works of Eberhard Jüngel and Wilfried Härle, both of whom explicitly refute the idea of a ‘Gleichgewicht’ between sin and righteousness in the life of the believer. They instead speak of a ‘theological imbalance’ (theologisches Ungleichgewicht) resp. an ‘infinite overbalance’ (unendliches Übergewicht) of the love of God over any human infidelity. See E. Jüngel, ‘Amica exegesis einer römischen Note’, Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche Beiheft (1998), pp. 252–79 (261–64); E. Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des Christlichen Glaubens: eine theologische Studie in ökumenischer Absicht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), p. 187; W. Härle, Dogmatik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995), pp. 163–64. 106 ‘[D]as alles kann den Eindruck nur verstärken, daß in dieser Theologie des Geschehens und der Geschichte vielleicht doch nichts geschieht, weil alles in der Ewigkeit schon immer geschehen ist’. Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, p. 380. 104

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treatment of grace and justification and his rejection of all talk of growth and progress. Precisely on these points – ontic justification language and the idea of growth – the Finns seem to succeed better than Barth in allaying the fears of Roman Catholic theologians about ‘simul iustus et peccator’. Their double interpretation of the Lutheran motto allows for a positive appreciation of history. The fact that, in some respect, everything has already happened in Jesus Christ does not diminish the significance of what happens here and now in the life of the concrete historical Christian. The removal of the traditional Roman Catholic objections to simul iustus et peccator (nominalism, eschatologism, disregard for history) in the light of the Finnish proposal opens the way for a more substantial and more positive comparison of Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on sin and justification. Here, too, von Balthasar can be helpful. According to von Balthasar, there are two ways in which Roman Catholic theology can positively receive simul iustus et peccator and he claims that they are in line with Luther’s own intentions. First, the Christian lives in statu viatoris and has to turn away from sin daily. Second, the saying also expresses the fact that the righteousness of the Christian is and remains given by God and therefore cannot be considered as one’s own natural property. Comparing this with the Finnish interpretation of simul iustus et peccator, it becomes immediately evident that the partim-partim side as the Finns describe it resembles von Balthasar’s reference to the believer as homo viator, while the totus-totus reading corresponds to the Christian’s righteousness as coming ‘from outside’. This is, however, a superficial similarity that emerges when first putting the Mannermaa school and von Balthasar side by side. There is an ecumenically more important observation to make. Von Balthasar writes that simul iustus et peccator is in the end too short a phrase to communicate fully the ‘mystery’ that it intends to express. He therefore offers a Roman Catholic interpretation of the phrase by sketching a kind of dialectics of sin and righteousness in the life of the Christian. It can be called a ‘dialectics’ because the real sanctification of the Christian and his or her absolute dependence on the divine love are not considered merely as two theological ideas that balance each other, but rather as two mutually amplifying realities. In order to grasp this, it is important to see that von Balthasar is quite radical in his depiction of the believer as peccator. Far from trivializing the reality of sin in the life of the Christian by focusing exclusively on the external possibility of venial sins, von Balthasar talks of the inclination to sin as an ‘active potentiality’ which is rooted in our existence and which

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not only gives rise to actual sins, but also even ‘colours’ our good works.107 If God did not generously accept our good works, which are in this world always contaminated by an ‘air’ of sinfulness, the Christian would have only reason for despair. This idea is not only the hypothetical result of a speculation about what would happen if God should withdraw his favour from us, but also is rooted in a real experience of ‘Anfechtung’ where the Christian faces his or her ultimate failure in the light of the God’s judgement. One can notice that von Balthasar is not softening the paradox of the Lutheran simul totus iustus et totus peccator. He is speaking of a radical sinfulness that is interwoven with the historical existence of the Christian. His view on the believer as totus peccator bears similarities to that of Mannermaa and Flogaus in the sense that in his concept of ‘sinner’ the moral unworthiness and the broader idea of absolute dependence upon God are not always easy to distinguish. The acknowledgement of the mere fact that this sinfulness is part of the life of the believer and that it leads to utter despair when it is experienced seems to open the door for a Catholic recognition of a ‘forensic’ moment in the reality of justification. Some Roman Catholic theologians might be disturbed by this conclusion because it risks crossing the boundaries of what is doctrinally permissible in Roman Catholic theology. In the decree on justification of the council of Trent, for example, the person is anathematized who says that the righteous person sins in every good work and therefore deserves eternal punishment unless God does not reckon these works.108 In its decree on original sin, the same council also condemns the one who says that the inclination to sin (concupiscentia) remaining in the Christian after baptism can truly and properly be called ‘sin’.109 Moreover, some theologians would argue that 107

‘Nun ist zwar die Grenze zwischen aktueller Sünde und dieser aktiven Potenz eine wirkliche, aber ebenso wirklich sind auch die mannigfachen Zusammenhänge und Übergänge. Solange im Menschen die Wurzel nicht ausgerissen ist (und für die allergrößte Zahl wird sie erst mit dem Tod), bricht aus ihr nicht nur immer neue Sünde hervor, sondern es färbt sich auch das “Gute”, das der Mensch vollbringt, immer wieder von ihr her’. Ibid., p. 383. Also Karl Rahner is among the Catholic theologians who have tried to offer a Catholic interpretation of simul iustus et peccator by referring to the possibility of a deeper sinfulness at the root of venial sins. K. Rahner, ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’, in Schriften zur Theologie Bd 6: Neuere Schriften (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1965), pp. 262–76 (esp. 271–74). Undoubtedly, this tendency in twentieth-century Roman Catholic theology is related to the preference for a more personal and relational view on themes like revelation, grace and sin. 108 Can. 25: ‘Si quis in quolibet bono opere iustum saltem venialiter peccare dixerit, aut (quod intolerabilius est) mortaliter, atque ideo poenas aeternas mereri, tantumque ob id non damnari, quia Deus ea opera non imputet ad damnationem: anathema sit’ (DH 1575). 109 ‘Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus “peccatum” [cf. Rm 6, 12–15; 7,7 14–20] appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam numquam intellexisse, peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit: anathema sit’ (DH 1515).

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acknowledging a forensic aspect of justification would imply a theory of ‘double justification’, as if the Christian would need an extra ‘imputation’ of righteousness by God in addition to his or her becoming righteous through the grace of God.110 This theory was excluded by the council fathers in Trent.111 One could defend the orthodoxy of von Balthasar, however, by pointing out that he skilfully avoids violating the rules set by Trent. Von Balthasar does state that de facto and generally speaking the good works of the baptized are contaminated by the sinfulness of the world in which they are performed and by the Christian’s internal tendency to sin. He avoids, however, suggesting that this contamination is a necessary constituent of the Christian’s good works or that it leads to eternal damnation. By talking about an ‘active potentiality’ that is operative within the Christian as an instigator of sin, he equally avoids calling the remaining concupiscence in the believer ‘damnable sin’. Finally, von Balthasar’s recognition of a ‘forensic’ side of justification is minimized by the fact that he uses this term only between inverted commas in this passage, thus indicating that he does not understand it in the same way as did the Reformers.112 These references to the subtle ways in which von Balthasar remains within the constraints set by the Roman Catholic magisterium, relevant as they may be, seem to miss the point somehow. They run counter to what von Balthasar is actually doing in his Catholic retrieval of simul iustus et peccator. He is not making the phrase more Roman Catholic by playing down the depth of the sinfulness of the believer. What is decisively ‘catholic’ in von Balthasar’s interpretation is his insistence that this radical sinfulness and the ‘extrinsic’ nature of the believer’s righteousness is pre-eminently experienced by ‘saints’, that is: by believers who have already undergone a profound and real ‘intrinsic’ transformation. In other words, the reality behind the totus-totus interpretation of simul iustus et peccator manifests itself more overwhelmingly to the believer as he or she becomes more iustus and less peccator. More generally speaking, von Balthasar’s position implies that the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of justification do not constitute a zero-sum balance in 110

See for instance, the approach of C. J. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration (New York: Peter Lang, 2005). 111 The crucial passage is the one in Chapter 7 of the decree on justification in which it is stated that the only formal cause of justification is God’s righteousness by which He makes us righteous: ‘Demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos iustos facit’ (DH 1529). See also A. E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (2 vols; Cambridge: University Press, 1986), pp. 80–86. 112 Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, p. 381

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Roman Catholic theology as if an emphasis on one side would necessarily entail a reduction of the other. Rather, both aspects reinforce and illuminate each other. On the one hand, the paradox of the totus-totus interpretation is maintained; the justified are really righteous only insofar as none of their righteousness comes from themselves but only from outside. As noted above, von Balthasar does not postpone the reality of this righteousness in the life of the Christian to the future, as if the Christian were only peccator in re and only iustus in spe.113 Nor does he locate iustus and peccator in two separate ‘spheres of being’, as if the Christian were a sinner as historical being, but righteous according to God’s eternal ordinances. Both eschatologism and nominalism would dissolve the paradox, whereas von Balthasar actually sharpens it. According to him, it is precisely to the extent that righteousness becomes more intrinsic to the believer’s existence that the sense of its radical extrinsic nature grows. There is a certain formal analogy between the Finnish interpretation of simul iustus et peccator and the way von Balthasar understands it. The Finns recognize both the forensic and the effective sides of justification, as noted earlier. Moreover, they claim that the real presence of Jesus Christ in faith is the unique foundation of the justification event in its two dimensions. Their treatment of simul iustus et peccator shows that they affirm each of these two sides to their full extent, without one diminishing the importance of the other. The reason for this is precisely the fact that they are both rooted in the real-ontic presence of Christ. If this real presence – and therefore God’s forgiveness for the sake of Christ – were to be taken away from the believer, his or her existence would end up in complete misery (totus-totus). On the other hand, the same real presence necessitates that the Christian realize the gift of righteousness in his or her own existence (partim-partim). It is clear that the way von Balthasar elaborates the interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of justification differs in many respects from the Finnish interpretation. His approach as a Roman Catholic systematic theologian who meditates on the meaning of simul iustus et peccator does not correspond with the Finnish ambition of interpreting Luther. However, like von Balthasar, the Finns unravel the different threads in the expression simul iustus et peccator and thereby describe more fully the multifaceted 113

This is an interpretation of simul iustus et peccator that can be found in the works of Luther. Leo Scheffczyk seems to reduce Luther’s understanding of the righteousness of the Christian to this position. However, Guido Bausenhart points to the fact that it reflects only one of Luther’s elucidations of the believer as righteous and sinner. Scheffczyk, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung” und die Norm des Glaubens’ (277); G. Bausenhart, ‘Simul iustus et peccator’ (126–27).

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reality of the dialectics of sin and righteousness in the life of the Christian. One can perceive both in von Balthasar and in the Finnish school a certain ecumenically interesting ‘perspectivism’. Neither shrinks from statements that could be understood by fellow members of their respective churches as exaggerated or even dangerous. They seem to assume that these statements can be accepted when looked at from the right perspective. Von Balthasar, for instance, ultimately calls the crucified Christ the real simul iustus et peccator. 114 The idea of Christ as peccator derives directly from Luther,115 but does not fit comfortably into Roman Catholic dogmatics. Simo Peura from his part calls attention to Luther’s ideas of the Christian’s own righteousness (to be distinguished from self-justification) and of his or her cooperation, thus excluding certain Lutheran interpretations of the externality of grace and of the passivity of the believer in faith.116 The recognition of such ‘dangerous truths’ is required not only in view of the many-sided reality of Christian life, but also on a more fundamental level in view of scriptural Revelation. Scripture is full of statements that could be considered exaggerated or perilous from the perspective of certain forms of Lutheran or Roman Catholic ‘scholasticism’. To mention only one example: there is talk about ‘reward’ (Lk 6:35; Rev 22:11-12), but also about God’s sovereignty in granting it (Mt 20:1-16) and about the favour of God being beyond any thinking in terms of reward (Rom 4:1-5). The unravelling of simul iustus et peccator by both von Balthasar and the Finnish interpretation might prevent Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologians from subsuming this diversity of scriptural perspectives (and aspects of Christian existence) under some a priori theological categories. Positively stated, this means that the approach of von Balthasar and of the Mannermaa school to simul iustus et peccator can be seen as an invitation to Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologians to interpret their own doctrinal systems in such a way that they can accommodate this diversity of perspectives. The Finnish interpretation of simul iustus et peccator is an example of such a re-interpretation of a central theological idea in the Lutheran tradition. Far from forcing an ecumenical agenda upon Luther, the Finns discovered that his work bears testimony to a much wider theological scope than some of his followers would allow for. One can notice that the ‘perspectivism’ of von Balthasar and the Finnish Luther school shows an affinity with the above-mentioned method of ‘differentiated consensus’ used in Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues. In

114

Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, pp. 385–86. Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, pp. 13–16. 116 Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift’ (59.68). 115

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this method, a plurality of theological viewpoints and languages is accepted as legitimate against the background of a more fundamental common understanding. The analysis of von Balthasar and the Finnish school also has to do with a sensitivity to the many possibilities of language within religious and theological discourse. However, the multiplicity that is envisaged in their interpretation of simul iustus et peccator is not a diversity for diversity’s sake. Rather, it is rooted in the multiformity of the relationship between God and humankind. Therefore, investigations like those of the Finnish school can offer a deeper foundation for a differentiated consensus on justification and prevent it from becoming merely the facile recognition of sheer plurality. c. The Fundamental Theological Problem of Relation and Ontology Behind the Finnish interpretation of forensic and effective justification and of simul iustus et peccator stands a fundamental theological conviction, namely that in Luther’s soteriology the ontological and the relational aspects of salvation are not mutually exclusive. The alleged opposition between the relational and the ontological plays a decisive role in the debates on justification. Cardinal Leo Scheffczyk, for instance, criticizes Lutheran statements in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification such as: ‘[O]nly in union with Christ is one’s life renewed’ (§23). Scheffczyk claims that such assertions appear to have an ontological bearing while in reality they are understood ‘purely relationally’ by Lutheran theologians.117 However, when Scheffczyk explains the importance of an ontological interpretation of justification – in terms of ‘created grace’ – he also reaches for relational categories. He maintains that only when justification is something that takes place, at least partly, at the level of the created being, can this being be taken up into a real relationship with God.118 This does not mean here that the human being has to earn justification, but rather that justification as relation cannot be conceived as entailing complete annihilation or pure indifference on the side of the creature. Nor can the involvement of the human being in justification be considered as the mere ‘acceptance of acceptance’ considered as a purely mental event. Rather, in order to have a genuine relationship between God and humankind, the human side of the relationship has to exist as a real vis-à-vis and has to be determined in all its aspects (and not only on a mental level) by this relationship.119 117

Scheffczyk, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung” und die Norm des Glaubens’ (276). Ibid. (277). 119 Ibid. (273). 118

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As has become clear from the foregoing, the Mannermaa school interprets the justification event also in terms of both relation and ontology. These two aspects are considered to be mutually implicative in Luther’s thinking. The relationship between God and humankind in justification can only be described in ontologically realist terms such as real presence, participation and divinization. On the other hand, this implied ontology cannot be abstracted from the relationship it is describing. After all, what is at issue is Christ’s real presence and participation in the divine righteousness. However, the interplay between relational and ontological language constitutes a broader theological and ecumenical problem than just the topic of justification, understood as the question of the role of faith and works in human salvation. On a fundamental theological level, it has to do with the way Lutherans and Roman Catholics understand the nature of human existence, faith and revelation. A brief examination of this broader perspective will reveal additional ecumenical opportunities of the Finnish interpretation but also a remaining difficulty in their approach. In his article on Luther and metaphysics, the Finnish scholar Sammeli Juntunen criticizes the Luther interpretation of Gerhard Ebeling and Wilfried Joest, both of whom claim that in Luther’s theology all ‘metaphysics of substance’ has to make way for relational thinking.120 Juntunen does not deny the anti-metaphysical character of Luther’s theology. However, what underlies this tendency in Luther is not a rejection of the concept of being as such, but rather a suspicion that all metaphysical knowledge is corrupted by the amor hominis of the metaphysician. In the interpretation of Juntunen, the concept of being is not discredited completely by the human inclination to self-glorification. As a consequence, his assessment of the ‘new being’ of the Christian (esse gratiae) is different from that of Luther interpreters like Ebeling and Joest. The latter claim that faith is conceived by Luther as a purely extrinsic relationship.121 According to them, it can best be described in an ‘actualistic’ fashion, namely in terms of becoming (or being made) a believer at every given moment. The relation of faith lacks any stable ontological reality on the side of the human being. Juntunen does not altogether dismiss the approach of Ebeling and Joest. He acknowledges that there is a certain ‘actualism’ in Luther, especially in his idea of continuous creation which implies that all created being is at every moment dependent on its relation to the Creator. Nevertheless, Juntunen rejects the 120

S. Juntunen, ‘Luther and Metaphysics : What is the Structure of Being According to Luther?’ in Union with Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 129–60. 121 Ibid. (137).

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conclusion that this relation would exclude any intrinsic reality in the Christian. The creative activity of God always involves the establishing of a certain factum: a ‘thing’ (and not just an ‘act’) with a relatively stable existence.122 In discussions like these, one can easily find oneself running against the boundaries of language, especially when using twin concepts such as intrinsic and extrinsic, fact and act or being and becoming. When one speaks of the ‘intrinsic reality’ of faith, for instance, the obvious objection would be that the concept ‘intrinsic’ automatically excludes or critically undervalues extrinsic aspects of grace and faith. ‘Intrinsic’ here means something like ‘belonging to the thing in itself’,123 whereas the ‘extrinsic’ nature of faith refers precisely to the fact that there is, strictly speaking, no ‘thing in itself’. In faith, the Christian is not ‘strictly in him or herself’, but in relation to someone coming from the outside. It should be clear, therefore, that Juntunen’s insistence on the intrinsic side of faith is always conceived against the background of a larger ‘externality’. What Juntunen seems to be doing in his discussion with Joest and Ebeling is merely preventing the esse of the human being from being completely absorbed into this externality. This does not only converge with Scheffczyk’s concern for what one could call an ‘ontological relationality’, but it also reveals the limitations of the concepts ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ as characterizations of the Christian faith. Juntunen’s analysis shows that these notions can be useful in elucidating the reality of faith, but that their mutual relationship is too complex to simply play them off against each other. From this it follows that any description of the relationship between God and human beings that is expressed solely in terms of the opposition between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ runs the risk of being seriously misguided. In her book Christian Contradictions, for instance, Daphne Hampson defends the radical incompatibility of Lutheran and Roman Catholic faith on the grounds of an alleged ‘fundamental difference’ between two ways of thinking about the relationship between the self and God.124 In Lutheran theology, salvation would be thought of in terms of an absolute discontinuity with the previous existence. The new being of the Christian would imply living wholly ‘outside oneself’ in Christ. Roman Catholic theology, on the other hand, would be characterized by a view in which the self remains essentially the same in justification. The ground of 122

Ibid. (143). The definition is taken from The shorter Oxford dictionary on historical principles (2 vols; Oxford 1974). 124 Hampson, Christian Contradictions. 123

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the Christian’s salvation lies ultimately in his or her ‘intrinsic’ being which is transformed into a righteous life pleasing to God. Juntunen’s attempt to show that Luther does allow for an intrinsicontological side of the relationship between God and humankind would undoubtedly be considered by Hampson as a ‘Catholic’ endeavour to escape the radical nature of the Lutheran message. Michael Root poses this simple question to Hampson: ‘[I]f the old and the new selves are not fundamentally the same person, then in what sense is the gospel good news to sinners? It isn’t good news to tell the sinner that she or he will simply be replaced by an utterly discontinuous new self’.125 This suggests that there might be sound theological reasons for assuming some ‘intrinsic’ ontological permanence on the side of the believer in his or her relationship to God. Defending an intrinsic side to the Christian faith relationship is not necessarily an attempt by the human being anxiously to secure his or her own independence vis à vis God. It can also be a defence of the many-sided reality of this relationship against simplifying theological constructions. The fact that Juntunen finds this many-sidedness reflected in the work of Luther casts serious doubts on efforts like that of Hampson to indicate a clear-cut fundamental difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic faith. More sophisticated versions of a ‘fundamental difference’ between Lutherans and Roman Catholics may also be questioned by referring to the Finnish approach to Luther. The Lutheran theologian Eilert Herms, for instance, contends that there is a basic difference in the way revelation is understood in both denominations.126 He is more ecumenically optimistic than Hampson in the sense that he does not present Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism as two fundamentally different forms of Christian faith. He maintains that the object of faith is the same in both: the truth of the gospel, namely God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. What is different is the manner in which Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies conceive the way this truth becomes present and evident for the believer. According to Lutheran theology, the truth of the gospel becomes present in faith due to an ‘illumination’ (Erleuchtetwerden) of the believer by the Holy Spirit. Lutherans do not deny the historical and ecclesial context in which this happens. Visible aspects of the church (such as symbolic actions, preaching, 125

M. Root, ‘Christian contradictions: the structures of Lutheran and Catholic thought’, Christian Century 118 (2001), no. 25, pp. 44–46 (45). 126 E. Herms, ‘Ökumene in theologischen Grunddissens’, in Von der Glaubenseinheit zur Kirchengemeinschaft: Plädoyer für eine realistische Ökumene (Marburger Theologische Studien, 27; Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1989), pp. 188–215; E. Herms, Einheit der Christen in der Gemeinschaft der Kirchen: Der römischen Kirche im Lichte der reformatorischen Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984).

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doctrinal statements and ministries) are important and necessary witnesses to this revelation. The event itself of the truth of the gospel becoming an object of faith, however, remains invisible and beyond the reach of all intersubjective structures. Contrary to the Roman Catholic conviction, Lutheran theology denies that revelation itself can be transmitted or mediated by the church as community and its ministers. Only the Holy Spirit can reveal God to the human being and awaken faith (though not without the verbum externum of course). From the perspective of the Finnish Luther school, two questions can be raised about the proposal of Herms. First, one could wonder whether Herms is not offering too ‘actualistic’ an account of the faith relationship in Lutheranism. Does the permanent reliance on the inspiration and illumination of the Holy Spirit exclude the possibility, for example, of a mediation of the Christian faith through what the Spirit has already created in other Christians? Second, one might ask to what extent Herms’ interpretation is indirectly influenced by neo-Kantian philosophy. His strict distinction between the invisible revelatory action of the Holy Spirit and the subordinate visible ‘witnesses’ of this revelation seems to reflect a Kantian divide of spirit and nature.127 These questions also reveal a certain problem in the Finnish Luther interpretation. It is not clear in what way the ‘Finnish Luther’ can overcome the ‘actualism’ and ‘neo-Kantianism’ one suspects to be present in Herms. The concepts that are central in the Finnish interpretation – theosis, participatio and inhabitatio – are themselves not always easy to interpret.128 They have proven to be helpful in criticizing one-sided approaches to Luther, especially those denying the ontological aspects of faith. But when issues such as ecclesial mediation and the role of ministry are raised, these concepts appear to be too vague to contribute to the discussion. A further reflection on the ethical and ecclesiological consequences of a nonactualistic and non-neo-Kantian interpretation of Luther is therefore necessary. This is required not only with an eye to the ongoing LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue, but also in order to avoid a deadlock in the debate among Luther interpreters. As long as the precise significance of 127

Saarinen suggests that Herms is to be seen against the background of a long tradition of Luther interpretation that was shaped by neo-Kantian presuppositions: R. Saarinen, Gottes Wirken auf uns: Die tranzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-Motivs in der Lutherforschung (Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur europaische Geschichte Mainz, 137; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1989), pp. 1–4. 128 See, for instance, D. Bielfeldt, ‘Response to Sammeli Juntunen “Luther and metaphysics”’, in Union with Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 161–66.

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notions like inhabitatio and participation is not clarified, it will be easy for critics like Flogaus to interpret them again in terms of the standard ‘extrinsicist’ interpretation. The Finns may safely say then that ‘Christ is really present in faith’. Unless this presence is fleshed out ethically and ecclesiologically, the relationship between the words ‘really’ and ‘faith’ in this statement remains open to a variety of interpretations. In the next section, this point will be further elaborated.

d. Some Concluding Reflections The relatively positive attitude of the Finnish Luther school towards metaphysics, which was particularly clear in the article of Juntunen, but which is implied in the basic notion of Christ’s real-ontic presence as well, constitutes a point of contact with the questions that emerged from the work of Otto Hermann Pesch. Pesch cautions that his distinction between existential and sapiential theology should not be identified with the difference between ‘personalistic’ and ‘metaphysical’ theology.129 Still, the Finnish appreciation for ontological and metaphysical aspects in Luther’s work has the effect of making these Lutheran theologians receptive to ‘sapiential’ aspects of justification in Luther which would be excluded in more anti-metaphysical Lutheran theologies. It allows a more positive interpretation of the ideas of human cooperation and the constitutive role of human growth in justification. At the same time, however, the Finnish interpretation concurs with Luther’s rejection of ‘scholastic’ notions such as created or habitual grace and fides caritate formata.130 It is possible, however, that this rejection is partly based on a misunderstanding that can be cleared up on the very principles of the Finnish interpretation. Or, to put it less generously, there might be a tension between ontological and theological considerations in the Finnish retrieval of the theosis-motive in Luther. The Finnish rejection of created and habitual grace and of the interpretation of justifying faith as fides caritate formata is not surprising, not only in the light of Luther’s own convictions, but also given the specific Finnish emphasis on the Person of Christ who constitutes the unity of

129 130

Pesch, ‘Existential and Sapiential Theology’ (78–79). S. Juntunen, ‘Luther and Metaphysics: What Is the Structure of Being According to Luther?’ in Union with Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 129–60 (144.55); S. Peura, ‘Christ as Favor and Gift (donum): The Challenge of Luther’s Understanding of Justification’, in Union with Christ, ed. C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 42–69 (65); Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, pp. 24–25.

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effective and forensic aspects of justification. A description of justification in terms of an ‘accident of the soul’ or infused virtues could detract from the Person of Christ whose presence in faith means justification. In a commentary on Luther’s important Sermon on the Twofold Righteousness, Peura notes that ‘in the scheme of Luther [in comparison with the “scholastic doctrine of grace”] the habituality of grace is replaced by the idea of the real presence of Christ’.131 However, this description gives rise to a question. The Tridentine doctrine of justification shows that a theological position is possible which combines the idea of the real presence of Christ, which is evidently implied in the sacramental and ecclesiological approach of the decree on justification (‘engrafted into Christ’), with an interpretation of justification in terms of inhering righteousness and the infused virtues of faith, hope and love.132 The question can then be raised as to what the Finns see as the reason for the incompatibility of both ideas in Luther. Why has the idea of habitual grace to be replaced – rather than ‘framed’ or even ‘surpassed’ – by the idea of the real presence of Christ? Peura writes that in Luther’s theology divinization cannot exclusively denote the mere restoration of the primeval righteousness, the original impeccability and sinless state and the “becoming human of the human being” (Menschwerdung des Menschen), without properly participating in the divine nature.133 This means that a theological interpretation of justification in terms of inhering grace or infused virtues aims too low. What happens to the human being in justification is much more than a change at the level of his or her created being. In a similar fashion, Mannermaa explains Luther’s resistance against grace as ‘habit’ or ‘inhering quality’ by pointing out: In a human being, righteousness is “alien righteousness” – even though in faith this alien reality really determines the believer’s being, which it is 131

‘Die Habitualität der Gnade wird im Schema Luthers mit dem Gedanken von der realen Anwesenheit Christi ersetzt’ S. Peura, ‘Der Vergöttlichungsgedanke in Luthers Theologie 1518–1519’, in Thesaurus Lutheri: Auf der Suche nach neuen Paradigmen der Luther-Forschung, ed. T. Mannermaa, A. Ghiselli, and S. Peura (Helsinki: 1987), pp. 171–84. 132 There is discussion as to whether the Tridentine doctrine on justification implies the concept of habitual grace, but the distinction between habitual, created and inhering grace do not seem to be relevant here. Cf. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 84–95. 133 ‘In Luthers Theologie kann Vergöttlichung nicht ausschließlich die bloße Wiederherstellung der Urgerechtigkeit, ursprüngliche Tadellosigkeit und Sündlosigkeit und “die Menschwerdung des Menschen” bedeuten, wobei er nicht eigentlich der göttlichen Natur teilhaftig ist’ Peura, ‘Der Vergöttlichungsgedanke’ (175) (only italics in translation are mine).

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intimately connected with (formalis iustitia). What is “alien” here is not the elevated human love, but Christ himself and his real presence.134 What constitutes the righteousness of the believer in justification is not some pre-existing motion of the will that is ‘accidentally’ lifted up. Rather, the ‘substance’ of the believer is radically changed by the real presence of (or the participation in) Christ. However, these arguments are not conclusive. The fact that something higher happens does not exclude the occurrence of the lower. Theosis as Peura describes it does not logically exclude the possibility that it also involves a ‘becoming human of the human being’ and hence a change at the created level as integral to justification, even if this change is not necessarily the most important thing that can be said about justification. Hence the question remains as to why the ideas of created and habitual grace and of fides caritate formata have to be excluded. This question is all the more pressing as the Finns claim to overcome a purely imputative interpretation of justification. In the latter interpretation, believers are righteous in the eyes of God purely for the sake of Jesus Christ, which indeed excludes change in the created reality of the believer as a constitutive element in justification. When participation in Christ (or the real presence of Christ in faith) becomes the heart of justification, however, the situation is different. Participation and presence, even when they are themselves considered as the basis for imputation, always involve a real relationship between Christ and the believer. Thus, the person of the believer comes into focus and one cannot avoid asking in what way his or her internal and empirical reality is affected by this relationship. This question becomes more acute when one takes the Tridentine position into consideration here. As such there is no reason whatsoever for a Roman Catholic theologian to disagree with Mannermaa when he says that the doctrine of justification is all about an ‘alien righteousness’.135 The only really relevant question from the perspective of Roman Catholic doctrine is what exactly it means that this alien righteousness ‘really determines the believer’s being’. And when Mannermaa claims that the alien righteousness is ‘not the elevated human love’, the question remains as to what happens to the human will (and to love) in justification. Even if human love is not just ‘elevated’ in justification (with its dangerous connotation of a merely upward movement from the human being to God and even of self-elevation), the possibility that this love 134 135

Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 26. See the quotation above.

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is radically reoriented has to be taken into consideration in an approach that claims to enrich an imputative concept of justification with participation language. It is precisely this aspect of change at the level of the creature that is expressed in Trent in terms of gratia inhaerens and fides caritae formata. The question can then be rephrased: Why do the Finns, whose account of justification in terms of participation and presence implies some change in the creature, refuse these concepts? In order to have a better grasp of the exact nuance of the Finnish position on this issue, it is helpful to compare it with the view of George Hunsinger, who also attempts to clarify the ‘Reformation’ doctrine of justification in terms of participation.136 Hunsinger even contrasts the Roman Catholic and the Reformation teachings in terms of ‘formation’ versus ‘participation’. In the Roman Catholic tradition, the merits of Christ are only ‘the precondition, the cause and the source of justification’. The emphasis is not on the work of Christ, which is basically only the background of the present situation, in which the believer has to supplement the ‘insufficient’ justification obtained in baptism by his or her own works performed in freedom. Therefore, justification is above all ‘a process of spiritual formation’.137 Reformation theology, by contrast, sees the present situation of the believer as wholly absorbed in the work of Christ. This view can be made explicit in terms of participation, but it is immediately clear that it is a participation of a particular kind. Hunsinger not only claims that Christ ‘is not just the external cause of our righteousness and our life’, a phrase that could even be interpreted in a strictly Tridentine way, but he also says, ‘Nor is he the source of any righteousness or life that is not identical to himself’.138 It is crucial to see that the latter statement not only says that there is no righteousness apart from Christ, but also that in justification all righteousness is identical to Christ. The difference lies in the relational situation. When one merely says that there is no righteousness apart from Christ, then the believer permanently relies on Christ’s righteousness, even if his or her existence could possibly be described as numerically different from Christ’s. In that case, the believer can be said to enjoy a relative and constantly dependent freedom in the use of his or her human faculties. If all righteousness in justification is identical to Christ, however, it is difficult 136

G. Hunsinger, ‘Fides Christo formata: Luther, Barth, and the Joint Declaration’, in The Gospel of Justification in Christ, ed. W. C. Stumme (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), pp. 69– 84. Hunsinger points out the similarity of the positions of Luther and Barth on justification, both in contrast to the Roman Catholic teaching. 137 Ibid. (70–73). 138 Ibid. (74).

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to conceive the role and agency of the particular empirical believer. He or she seems to be viewed exclusively as ‘taken up’ into the person of Christ. Hunsinger admits that the Roman Catholic view on justification also implies a concept of participation, but largely in terms of ‘Christ in us’. The Reformation idea of participation, by contrast would be ‘our being in Christ’. The fact that Hunsinger sees this as an incompatible opposition between Roman Catholic and Reformation theologies logically implies that the Reformation position has to be specified as ‘our being in Christ without Christ being in us’.139 He outlines this view as follows: Our participation in Christ functions as the reality of our being made one with him, and so completely righteous by virtue of the great exchange. Through that exchange, Christ’s perfect righteousness is imputed to us even as our sin is imputed to him.140 It is noteworthy that Hunsinger, who previously stated that participation is the basis of justification as imputation, now explains participation wholly in terms of imputation. The idea that connects both concepts is that of Luther’s ‘wonderful exchange’: Christ taking our sins upon him while his righteousness becomes ours. The exchange is similar to the totus-totus interpretation of simul iustus et peccator. It is Christ’s perfect righteousness that becomes ours – through imputation. Hunsinger acknowledges that Reformation theology does not completely neglect the transformational aspect of justification. There is a consequential growth process in us, ‘by which we are brought increasingly into conformity with Christ’.141 Yet, Hunsinger does not connect this in any way with the idea of participation. Thus, Hunsinger proposes an interpretation of justification as participation that approximates to the radically extrinsic approach of Daphne Hampson, who described the fundamental difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic thinking as ‘dialectical’ versus ‘linear’.142 Also in Hunsinger, the participation of the believer in Christ is quasi-identical to being wholly outside oneself. All transformational and intrinsic aspects of justification are carefully excluded from the event itself. The question arises then in what 139

The article of Hunsinger is more ambiguous, since he says that in Roman Catholicism ‘participation is primarily a matter of Christ in us’, whereas in Reformation theology, ‘participation is primarily a matter of our being in Christ’ (italics mine). The question arises then to what extent Reformation theology also has a (‘secondary’) concept of participation in terms of ‘Christ in us’ and how exactly this should be conceived. Ibid. (80–81). 140 Ibid. (81). 141 Ibid. 142 Hampson, Christian Contradictions, passim.

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sense one can still speak of ‘participation’ as distinct from ‘imputation’. Justification seems to break up in two parts: from the side of Christ, it is a complete assimilation of the believer without remnant, and, from the side of the particular empirical believers ‘in themselves’, it is a constant lack of that perfect righteousness and thus a permanent confession of their own complete sinfulness. From the previous sections, it is clear that the Finnish interpretation differs from this approach in that it understands the sanctification of the believer also in terms of the real ontological presence of Christ and therefore as ontologically connected with justification. The growth perspective, expressed in the partim-partim interpretation of simul iustus et peccator (what Hunsinger would call the ‘formation’ aspect and Hampson the ‘linear’ view), is itself integral to the person’s salvation. It is more difficult therefore in this interpretation to drive the empirical and the ontological apart. It is true that both Juntunen and Peura give expression to the fact that for Luther the participation of the believer in God’s righteousness is not in a simple and straightforward way reflected in the empirical reality.143 Participation has to be seen in the light of Luther’s theology of the cross. Justification involves a crucifixion of the old man (redactio in nihilum). Moreover, the righteousness which the believer receives in justification is largely hidden in this world under the guise of its opposite (absconditas sub contrario). It is remarkable that these two ideas (annihilatio and absconditas), which are intimately interrelated in Luther, are the precisely basis of the critique of Flogaus against the Finnish interpretation. This suggests that the Finns interpret them in a significantly different way than Flogaus does. There seem to be at least two ways to describe this divergence. First, according to Flogaus, the redactio in nihilum has to be seen as a complete annihilation.144 Peura, by contrast, calls this expression a ‘synecdoche’ which does not literally denote an annihilation of the person, but only a destruction of the false love of the human being.145 This seems to leave more room for ‘intrinsic’ and ‘empirical’ aspects of the righteousness granted in 143

S. Peura, ‘Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther’, in Luther und Theosis: Vergöttlichung als Thema der abendländische Theologie, ed. S. Peura and A. Raunio (Helsinki: Luther-AgricolaGesellschaft, 1990), pp. 121–61 (157–58); S. Juntunen, ‘The Notion of “Gift” (donum) in Luther’s Theology’, in Luther Between Present and Past: Studies in Luther and Lutheranism, ed. U. Nissen et al. (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2004), pp. 53–69 (62). 144 ‘[F]ür [Luther] ist . . . die redactio in nihilium nicht nur eine “teilweise”, sondern eine völlige Vernichtung, die dem Menschen sein letztes substaculum nimmt und ihn dadurch in sein eigenes Nichts zurückführt’. Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, p. 379. 145 Peura, ‘Die Teilhabe an Christus bei Luther’ (159–60).

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justification. Still, one gets the impression that this apparent difference between Flogaus and Peura collapses again when the latter specifies this destruction of false love as follows: The disentanglement from the pernicious love, which forces the human being to cling to the gifts of God rather than to God, means that the human being is reduced to nothing. The person has “detached” him- or herself from oneself and from the creature and thus stands outside the creaturely realm. Because there is no third instance between the creature and God, one has to conclude from the foregoing that the human being comes to God and exists in God.146 Peura connects the ideas of theosis and redactio in nihilum by pointing out that the destruction of the old man equals his falling in the hands of God. The quotation makes clear, however, that this direct connection is only possible under the assumption that a detachment from perverted love is strictly equivalent to a detachment from all that is creaturely. False love is implicitly equated with creaturely love. If this assumption is true, then the question arises as to what extent the annihilation of the human being is still a synecdoche, for in that case the defeat of perverted love is only possible when the human being is detached from his or her humanity. One may conclude that with regard to this point, there is at least a tension between the Finnish attempt to give an ontological interpretation of the new being of the Christian that does not fully exclude intrinsic aspects of justification, and tendencies towards a more extrinsic interpretation of participation. A second way to clarify the difference between the Finns and extrinsic approaches to justification is to reflect further on the ontological consequences of the Finnish claim that the partim-partim interpretation of simul iustus et peccator can be interpreted in terms of the real-ontological presence of Christ. Flogaus is himself somewhat ambiguous when he criticizes the Finns on this issue. He writes: With regard to the divinization of the human being during this life, the “simul iustus et peccator” for Luther is not dissoluble in a “partim-partim”. 146

‘Die Loslösung von der verderblichen Liebe, unter deren Zwang der Mensch lieber an Gottes Gütern als an Gott festhält, bedeutet, dass der Mensch auf das Nichts reduziert wird. Er hat sich also hinsichtlich der verderbten Liebe von sich selbst und dem Geschöpf “losgelöst” und steht somit außerhalb des Geschöpflichen. Da es zwischen Geschöpf und Gott kein Drittes gibt, so folgt aus dem Gesagten, dass der Mensch zu Gott kommt und in Gott ist’ Ibid. (160).

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That the divinization of the believer, as S. Peura thinks, can be called “real-ontic” insofar as the justified in his communion with Christ is taken up in an increasing “sanative transformation” and there are only “remnants of sin” in him, does not correspond to Luther’s teaching on justification.147 This criticism misses the point insofar as the Finns never claim that the partim-partim aspect of simul iustus et peccator and the idea of transformation constitute an exhaustive interpretation of justification as real-ontic event. Rather, they say that the transformation of the sinner into a real righteous person is an integral aspect of Christ’s real presence in faith. The real opposition between the Finns and Flogaus emerges when the latter writes in the same paragraph that ‘for Luther the redactio in nihilum of man is not merely the preparation for grace . . ., but the very modus of its activity in this life’.148 The difference does not lie in the fact that the Finns absolutize the partim-partim interpretation, but rather that Flogaus absolutizes the totus-totus approach and therefore offers the most radical interpretations of terms like redactio in nihilum. Before his physical death, the Christian lives by grace only in the form of being constantly thrown back into his or her own nothingness. The question is then how to reconcile the ‘extrinsicist’ tendencies in Peura reported above with the Finnish departure from an extrisicist position à la Flogaus. The answer lies in Mannermaa’s claim that totus-totus and partim-partim are two perspectives on the event of justification. When Peura interprets theosis in terms of redactio in nihilum, he describes the situation of the human being who is not capable of genuine love, whose relationship to God is radically perverted by his tendency to love God’s gifts more than God, who therefore has no ‘point of departure’ in his humanity and whose only hope is to be taken wholly outside himself and to be entrusted to the hands of God. But there is another, equally legitimate perspective in Peura and the other Finns, namely that of the believer who is transformed more and more into the form of Christ.149 This perspective is not separated from 147

‘So ist gerade auch hinsichtlich der Vergöttlichung des Menschen whärend dieses Lebens das “simul iustus et peccator” für Luther nicht in ein “partim-partim” auflösbar. Dass die Vergöttlichung des Glaubenden, wie S. Peura meint, insofern “real-ontisch” genannt werden könne, als der Gerechtfertigte in seiner Gemeinschaft mit Christus in einer zunehmenden “sanativen Umwandlung” begriffen sei und es in ihm nur noch “Sündenreste” gebe, wird Luthers Rechtfertigungslehre nicht gerecht’, Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, p. 379. 148 ‘Doch ist die redactio in nihilum des Menschen für Luther auch nicht lediglich die Vorbereitung der Gnade, das dem opus proprium vorausgehende opus alienum, wie S. Peura angenommen hat, sondern sie ist während dieses Lebens der Modus von deren Wirksamkeit überhaupt’. 149 Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift’ (60–63).

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the idea of totus iustus, totus peccator for in both perspectives Christ’s presence in faith is the foundational reality. Nor does this transformational perspective imply a more glorious view of the justified sinner or a purely upward movement towards what is humanly considered as pure and perfect. The ideas of redactio in nihilum and absconditas sub contrario do play a role in this perspective, but not necessarily as negations of the role of the human being in justification, but rather as indications that this role involves a crosscentred discipleship and that christoformity always means being in the form of a slave.150 However, the partim-partim perspective does differ from the totus-totus perspective in the sense that it excludes the identification of false love and creaturely love that Peura used to connect theosis and redactio in nihilum. This is already true on a purely philosophical and conceptual level. It is difficult to make sense of the concept of transformation if there is not at least ‘something’ that is transformed. This ‘something’ cannot be Christ, for he is the terminus ad quem of the transformation. Even when the transformation is wholly conceived in Christological terms, namely as a growing conformitas Christi,151 the moulding of the believer according to the form of Christ at least presupposes a ‘matter’ which is moulded. Moreover, the language of a ‘growth’ or an ‘increase’ in righteousness as well as material metaphors such the leaven that gradually permeates the dough all suggest that the process does not have to start from nothing at any given moment. The fact that the transformation is permanently and wholly dependent on the real presence of Christ in faith does not mean that it cannot be viewed as a process advancing in different ‘stages’.152 The human person is not and cannot be annihilated as creature in this perspective. The created level does not have to be overcome or reduced to nothing, but gradually brought into conformity with Christ.

150

Mannermaa explicates this discipleship in terms of participation in the human nature of Christ who takes the burden and misery of humanity on himself. The believer loves his or her neighbour by carrying, in a similar fashion, his or her ‘burden, misery, sins, poverty and weaknesses’. T. Mannermaa, ‘Das Verhältnis von Glaube und Liebe in der Theologie Luthers’, in Luther in Finnland: Der Einfluß der Theologie Martin Luthers in Finnland und finnische Beiträge zur Lutherforschung, ed. M. Ruokanen (Helsinki: Luther-Agriclola Society, 1986), pp. 99–110 (106). The whole issue that is at stake here could be described in terms of the relationship between faith and love. Ecumenically speaking it would be interesting to confront the Finnish view on the real presence of Christ as the principle of the unity of faith and love with the view of Karl Rahner on love as truly self-giving. This would probably lead to the conclusion that the Lutheran fides Christo formata and the Roman Catholic fides caritate formata are close to each other as long as proper concept of love is used, a concept that does not necessarily exclude human love. See Rahner, ‘Fragen der Kontroverstheologie über die Rechtfertigung’. 151 Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift’ (60). 152 Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 66.

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One may perhaps conclude, then, that the rejection of the notion of created grace is only justifiable within the totus-totus perspective. Yet, when the ontological consequences of the legitimacy of the transformational perspective on justification are fully considered, then some form of change on the created level that is integral to justification is already presupposed, regardless of how one expresses this change theologically. At this point, it might be helpful to make a distinction. Until now, we have spoken in the same breath about the ‘intrinsic’ and the ‘empirical’ sides of justification, both of which are neglected in a merely extrinsic interpretation. The argument so far has only suggested that the Finnish claim of a strong bond in Luther between gratia and donum in the person of Jesus Christ logically implies a constitutive part of justification that is intrinsic to the creaturely realm (even if it is radically dependent on Christ). How does this intrinsic aspect manifest itself experientially and empirically? Juntunen seems to dismiss this question altogether when he interprets the donum again in a somewhat extrinsicist fashion: [T]he donum is real but not an empirical reality. It is something, which is present in faith in the “external word”, not in a person’s inner feelings.153 There are two elements in the Finnish interpretation of Luther that make it improbable that this is the final or complete answer of the Finnish school to this question. First, the Finns clearly state that there is a sense in which Christ’s righteousness becomes the personal righteousness of the Christian (eigene Gerechtigkeit) without necessarily implying self-justification (Selbstgerechtigkeit).154 The way God’s righteousness also becomes the righteousness of the believer is further specified in terms of active cooperation with the alien righteousness of God.155 Peura writes that the reasons why this idea of cooperation does not lead to ‘synergism’ are (a) the unity of the first (alien) and second (own) righteousness and (b) the foundation of the whole event of justification in the real presence of Christ.156 Nothing in these reasons suggests that this human cooperation has to lie outside the psychological or physical realm. The term cooperation rather implies that it cannot be conceived purely extrinsically. A second reason why a strict separation between the real righteousness of the Christian and an ‘empirical’ incarnation of this righteousness is difficult to 153

Juntunen, ‘The Notion of “Gift”’ (56). Peura, ‘Christ as favor and gift’ (59). 155 Peura, ‘Der Vergöttlichungsgedanke’ (177). 156 Ibid. (178). 154

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defend within the theological framework of the Finns is their critique of neo-Kantianism. If the donum is present in faith and not in the empirical realm or in ‘the person’s inner feelings’, as the above quotation of Juntunen suggests, and if this is the only way one describes the relationship between donum and empirical reality, then one runs the risk of relapsing into the neo-Kantian separation of Geist and Natur which the Finns attempted to overcome. One could ask whether the combination of extrinsic and (implicit) intrinsic aspects of justification in the Finnish interpretation is a tension peculiar to the complex reality of justification (and, possibly, to the work of Luther157) or whether it points, in the final analysis, to an inconsistency in the work of the Finns. As we have said, Mannermaa suggests that the extrinsic and the transformational approach to justification can be seen as two legitimate perspectives. But do not the ‘intrinsic’ implications of the transformational perspective, which we have tried to expose in this section, turn this duality of perspectives into an outright contradiction? A reference to the way the philosophical distinction between substance and accident is utilized in the whole debate will clarify this question and contribute to a possible answer. The Lutheran critique against the scholastic approach to justification concerned, among other things, the fact that it viewed both sin and justifying grace as ‘accidents’ of the human soul. The problem with such an interpretation is that it seems to minimize the radical nature of the change that is involved in justification as well as the role of Christ, who is the real agent of all our righteousness. The concept of sin and grace as accidents makes it look as if the human being loses one property (sin) and gains another property (grace) while remaining essentially the same. In reaction to this, Mannermaa says that grace should be viewed as belonging to the level of substance.158 This can mean two things, and both of them are present in Mannermaa’s argument. First, ‘substance’ can mean an entity that has its being in itself. In this sense, grace as God’s righteousness is more ‘substantial’ than the righteousness that humans receive in justification, for the latter is a dependent form of righteousness. So the 157

As was mentioned above, we are interested in the ecumenical relevance of the Finnish Luther interpretation, rather than in whether their reading of Luther is adequate. It is possible, however, that ultimately the tensions in the work of the Finns is based on what Theobald Beer has called the ‘fortunate inconsistencies’ in the work of Luther: the fact that Luther – for good reasons – has not consistently sustained the idea of the absconditas Dei sub contrario (the corner-stone of Luther’s thinking in Beer’s interpretation) throughout his whole work. Cf. Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit, pp. 481–90. 158 Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, p. 25.

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assertion that justifying grace is ‘substantial’ means that it should be seen as what is called – in the Roman Catholic tradition – ‘uncreated grace’. Second, a ‘substance’ is a bearer of characteristics. The assertion that the grace of justification is ‘substantial’ means that it is not something that merely changes the characteristics of the human being, but radically recreates him or her as a new ‘substance’. Only consequently do the characteristics change as well. It is clear that these two meanings of grace as substance lead directly to the idea of justification as theosis: the ‘substance’ of the believer is united with the one who alone is ‘substantially’ righteous. The point is that this also leads to a totus-totus view of the believer as righteous and sinner. How then does the partim-partim aspect, which the Finns try to rehabilitate, relate to the issue of grace as substance or accident? In line with the foregoing reflections, I would suggest that the interpretation of grace as substance cannot account for the reality of gradual transformation. It is precisely the variation of accidents of a substance which keeps at least its numerical identity that is, philosophically speaking, the only way to describe ongoing change. Therefore, one could argue that some form of the idea of grace as accident is implied in the Finnish claim that the transformational aspect is integral to justification. This seems to lead to the conclusion that their interpretation drives the Finnish scholars into contradiction, for the idea of grace as accident is both excluded and implied. The way out of this deadlock is the realization that the metaphysical notions of ‘substance’ and ‘accident’ possess certain flexibility here, a metaphorical quality which allows them to be both denied and predicated regarding the same subject (‘grace’). This flexibility is necessary in order to elucidate with the limited means of metaphysical language the different aspects of the event of justification: on the one hand the absolute and permanent ‘firstness’ of the divine righteousness and, on the other hand, the fact that (1) it is really the same human being who was a sinner and who is now righteous in Christ and (2) that becoming conformed to Christ involves a moulding of the humanity of the believer. One might suspect that the above interpretation presents a catholicized version of the work of the Finnish school. This may be partly true to the extent that the analysis takes place in the context of a discussion of the ecumenical encounter between Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies and that there is a focus on the openness of both traditions towards each other. Nevertheless, the interpretation is probably not far-fetched, for it merely spells out the consequences of the Finnish emphasis on the transformational aspect of justification and of their critique of a neo-Kantian exegesis of Luther’s work. This reveals not only a largely implicit proximity

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to certain Roman Catholic concepts, but also a structural analogy with the transcendental way of conceiving grace which Pesch deemed typical for Roman Catholic theology (in which the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of grace is seen as inclusive rather than exclusive). In the Finnish interpretation, the ‘existential’ totus-totus interpretation of simul iustus et peccator (the sinner having nothing to hold on to in the creaturely realm) does not supersede the more ‘sapiential’ partim-partim interpretation (the gradual transformation within the creaturely realm). Whether or not the ‘created’ aspects of this transformation are to be made explicit is, in the final analysis, a hamartiological question. The answer will depend on whether any language about the gift in terms of something that is not strictly identical to Christ would be an occasion for sinful humanity to love the gift more than the Giver.

IV. Summary In the conclusion of the previous chapters, three themes were mentioned that are related to the ecumenical problem of doctrinal difference: the dynamic nature of doctrinal positions, the inevitability of some form of sameness and the need for doctrinal demarcation. The investigation into the work of Pesch and of the Mannermaa school of Luther research has shed some light on these themes. What is most conspicuous in the way Pesch and the Finnish Luther school deal with the topic of justification by faith is their emphasis on certain aspects of this doctrine that are usually neglected and sometimes even denied in their respective traditions. Pesch attempts to positively receive Lutheran theologoumena such as simul iustus et peccator and sola fide. This converges with similar endeavours by other Roman Catholic theologians such as Rahner and von Balthasar. Pesch also draws ecclesiological consequences from these theological ideas, for instance, when he speaks about the need for a prophetic ministry in the church. The Finnish Luther scholars for their part highlight ontological aspects of Luther’s own theology and thus provide a basis for the recognition of the believer’s growth in righteousness and the idea of human cooperation. The ecumenical openness of the Finnish approach is bought at a price. Their interpretation of Luther turns out to be dismissive of more extrinsic descriptions of justification. The Finnish understanding thus represents one sector within the spectrum of Lutheran theologies of justification. One may suspect that ecumenical rapprochement entails on both sides the promotion of certain

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viewpoints within the respective traditions and the minimization or even the elimination of others. In other words, an ecumenical agreement probably presupposes a certain dynamics within the churches, a dynamics which is, of course, always open to intra-ecclesial debate. In the case of the justification, this dynamics brings about a particular congruence in the approach of Pesch and the Finns. The convergence takes place at two levels. Regarding the ‘objective’ side of justification, there is a shared emphasis on the absolute dependence of the believer’s righteousness on God’s action in Jesus Christ. Regardless of how one describes the way God’s righteousness is communicated to the sinner (using either ‘forensic’ or ‘effective’ metaphors), both sides agree that it is fully the work of God. On the ‘subjective’ level, there is a joint affirmation of the believer’s personal involvement in the gift of righteousness. This structural parallelism between the different accounts of justification is probably more fundamental than the sameness of language that emerges when Lutherans and Roman Catholics adopt and affirm each other’s key concepts (‘sola fide’, ‘cooperation’). At the same time, an ambiguity was noticeable in the work of Pesch and the Finnish Luther school. It was not clear to what extent some typically Roman Catholic doctrinal elements such as the emphasis on human freedom and on created grace are really considered legitimate expressions of faith. At times, these elements seem to be both affirmed/implied and rejected by Pesch and the Finns. The explanation we have suggested for this ambiguity is the asymmetry of what Pesch called existential and sapiential theology. Because the existential perspective is always presupposed in sapiential theology (and not vice versa), an outright affirmation of the legitimacy of the sapiential perspective tends to simply coincide with the traditional Roman Catholic teaching on justification. The simultaneous affirmation of the existential perspective is not really a corrective of sapiential theology nor a restoration of balance, but rather a making explicit of what is already implied in the sapiential description of justification. In other words, the double convergence, on the subjective and on the objective levels, between Pesch and the Finns draws near to what Pesch himself calls the ‘transcendental’ structure of the Roman Catholic theology of grace, in which God’s all-encompassing graceful agency does not exclude the active involvement of human beings. It is possible that both Pesch and the Finns attempt to avoid this conclusion by casting doubt on the legitimacy of some of the typical ‘sapiential’ concepts.

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Because this chapter has dealt with individual theologians rather than with decisions made by the churches, the issue of doctrinal demarcation was not very prominent here. Still, it is clear that the ambiguity concerning the legitimacy of sapiential theology may turn out to be more problematic once the discussion is brought to the level of official ecclesial teaching.

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Chapter 3

The Reception of Previous Dialogue Results

I. Introduction This chapter deals with the German and the American dialogue on justification. Both the content of and the method pursued in these dialogues are of direct importance for the understanding of the JDDJ. The seventh round of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue in the United States (1978–1983) resulted in the publication of the statement Justification by Faith (JBF).1 More than half of the text consists of a thorough description of the history of the question of justification before, during and after the sixteenth century, up until the more recent developments in Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology. The document further discusses six points on which Lutherans and Roman Catholics continue to hold diverging convictions, due to differing ‘concerns’ and ‘patterns of thought’. The issues are forensic and effective justification, the sinfulness of the justified, the sufficiency of faith, the meritorious nature of good works and the issue of satisfaction and justification as critical principle in the church. Some ‘perspectives for reconstruction’ are discussed, first by highlighting developments in scriptural exegesis and second by spelling out ‘convergences’ on the content of the doctrine of justification and on its role as criterion. After the visit of Pope John Paul II to Germany in 1980, which included a meeting with the representatives of the Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland – EKD), a Joint Ecumenical Commission

1

‘Justification by Faith (Common Statement)’. Background essays by the participants are included in the same volume. Commentaries and critical remarks on the US dialogue on justification are found in C. E. Braaten, Justification: The Article by Which the Church Stands or Falls (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990), pp. 118–23; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, pp. 240–73; P. O’Callaghan, Fides Christi: The Justification Debate (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997), pp. 128–30; Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 195–203; Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 23–32.

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of Protestants2 and Roman Catholics (Gemeinsame Ökumenische Kommission – GÖK) was established. This commission came to the conclusion that practical ecumenical questions, which seemed to be the most pressing ones, can only be addressed properly when some essential theological problems were tackled first. The commission decided to entrust to the existing Ecumenical Study Group of Protestant and Catholic Theologians (Ökumenische Arbeitskreis evangelischer und katholischer Theologen – ÖAK, also known as the ‘Jaeger-Stählin Group’) the task of undertaking a study of the doctrinal condemnations in the sixteenth-century authoritative documents of the respective churches. The group worked in three subgroups on the themes of justification, sacraments and ministry. In 1985, the ÖAK, as a result of their work, presented an extensive study to the GÖK. The GÖK in its turn issued a Final Report, which was sent together with the study to the German Episcopal Conference and the EKD. The study, the report and some additional background documents were published in 1986 under the title Lehrverurteilungen – kirchentrennend? (LK).3 2

In this part, we will refer to the Lutheran and Reformed participants in the German dialogue as ‘Protestants’ (adj.: ‘Protestant’). Just as in the English translation of the study document, we will not translate the German ‘evangelisch’ with ‘evangelical’ because this would be even more ambiguous than ‘Protestant’. Linguistic regulations such as these are delicate as they touch upon the issue of denominational identity. Often it is a matter of choosing the lesser evil. 3 Lehmann and Pannenberg, Lehrverurteilungen-Kirchentrennend? Bd 1: Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation und heute. [English translation: Lehmann and Pannenberg, The Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Divide?]. References to the document and to the annexed documentation will use the abbreviation LK followed by the page numbers of the German and the English text. Essays on the general approach of the project and on the issue of justification were published in K. Lehmann, Lehrverurteilungen-kirchentrennend? Bd 2: Materialien zu den Lehrverurteilungen und zur Theologie der Rechtfertigung (Dialog der Kirchen, 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989). Aside from direct reactions of the churches, which will be mentioned later, extensive discussions of the document and its reception can be found in W. Löser, ‘Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend? “Rechtfertigung, Sakramente und Amt im Zeitalter der Reformation und heute”’, Catholica 41 (1987), no. 3, pp. 177–96; J. Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung? Zur Prüfung des Rechtfertigungskapitels der Studie des ökumenischen Arbeitskreises evangelischer un katholischer Theologen: “Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?” (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1989) [And the response: U. Kühn and O. H. Pesch, Rechtfertigung im Disput: Eine freundliche Antwort an Jörg Baur auf seine Prüfung des Rechtfertigungskapitels der Studie des Ökumenischen Arbeitskreises evangelischer un katholischer Theologen: “Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?” (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1991)]; D. Lange, Überholte Verurteilungen? Die Gegensätze in der Lehre von Rechtfertigung, Abendmahl und Amt zwischen dem Konzil von Trient und der Reformation, damals und heute (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991) [a reaction of theologians from the faculty in Göttingen]; W. Pannenberg, ‘Müssen sich die Kirchen immer noch gegenseitig verurteilen?’ Kerygma und Dogma 38 (1992), pp. 311–30; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, pp. 273–321; J. Brosseder (ed), Von der Verwerfung zur Versöhnung: Zur aktuellen Diskussion um die Lehrverurteilungen des 16. Jahrhunderts (Neukirchen-Hamburg: Neukirchener Verlag-Katholische Akademie Hamburg, 1996); Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 32–63; L. Scheffczyk, Ökumene: der steile Weg der Wahrheit (Siegburg: Verlag Franz Schmitt, 2004), pp. 233–60.

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The official international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue that was initiated in 1965 and is now in its fifth phase will not be the object of this enquiry into the preparation of the JDDJ. None of the documents of the international dialogue prior to the JDDJ engages in a detailed discussion of justification by faith as is done in the national dialogues. Rather, some form of agreement or common understanding on justification is presupposed in these documents, especially in The Gospel and the Church (GC, 1972) and in Church and Justification (1993).4 Yet, some reference will be made to GC in as far as the theme of ‘unity in difference’ is already present in this document.

II. Diversity and Ecumenical Strategies GC states that the first round of the official international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue does not just ‘deal with the theological controversies of the 16th century’ (GC §6). Nor does it simply ‘repeat the traditional controversial theological positions’ (GC §15). Rather, the traditional issues are seen from new perspectives opened up by ‘modern biblical and historical research’. This corresponds with two of the four features which Harding Meyer sees as characteristic for the methodology of GC5: (1) the use of insights from historical-critical exegesis of Scripture, which reveals above all the diversity of Scripture as well as its openness to different further elucidations of the biblical message, and (2) a strong sense of the historical nature of theological thinking and ecclesial structures. A third feature is closely related to the first two: (3) an awareness of a difference between the traditional language in which both communities have expressed their doctrines and the reality these doctrines attempt to express. Lutherans and Roman Catholics cannot simply reaffirm their traditional formulations. Rather, both communities need to reflect on the language of their teachings as regards its relationship to its object. These three characteristics of the approach of GC all relate to the possible diversity of doctrinal statements as historical verbalizations of the same biblical faith. The fourth characteristic spells out a consequence of this diversity for the 4

‘Report of the Joint Lutheran-Roman Catholic Study Commission on “The Gospel and the Church” 1972 (“Malta Report”)’, in Growth in Agreement: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a World Level ed. H. Meyer and L. Vischer (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), pp. 168–89; ‘Church and Justification’, in Growth in Agreement II: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a World Level, 1982–1998 ed. J. Gros, H. Meyer, and W. G. Rusch (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2000), pp. 485–565. 5 Meyer, ‘Das Evangelium und die Kirche’ (21–25).

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form and goal of the ecumenical dialogue: (4) ‘convergence, rather than consensus’. Even though GC does speak about a ‘consensus’ (GC §8 and §26), this is not understood in the document as the establishment of a uniform doctrinal language, but rather as a ‘far-reaching agreement’ on the content of the gospel that does not exclude different wordings. Meyer raises the crucial question of whether this kind of agreement is sufficient for overcoming church division.6 To put it in the words of GC: ‘[W]e ask ourselves whether the differences that still remain differences must be viewed as hindrances to church fellowship’ (GC §8). In the document, this question is followed by a second one: ‘Are not the differences cutting across church lines, arising from diverse response to contemporary challenges at least as great as the traditional differences between the Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic church?’ Meyer interprets the latter – rhetorical – question as an indirect negative answer to the former. The internal diversity, or the lack of a uniform consensus within the dialoguing churches themselves, would facilitate the mutual recognition of Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrines as different, but legitimate teachings in the context of one fellowship of churches. The features mentioned in Meyer’s analysis of the earliest stage of the official Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue also characterize the American and the German dialogue on justification. In tackling the problem of doctrinal difference, these national dialogues have further contributed to the awareness that there can be non-church-dividing differences, that Scripture allows for a plurality of interpretations and doctrinal developments and that there is a flexibility in the relationship between language and reality. These insights are reflected in the methodologies of JBF and LK. In the following subsections, we will summarize and analyse some common traits of these methodologies.

a. Exegesis, History and the Challenge of Doctrinal Difference The American and the German dialogues on justification are faced with the challenge of doctrinal differences. Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, directors of the German study group on the condemnations, point out a ‘fundamental impasse’ (Grundaporie) which is connected to the task given to them: ‘the Confessions remain valid; yet at the same time they are no longer in all their parts applicable to the state of doctrine in the other

6

Ibid. (24).

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church today’.7 If the German study is to be successful, it has to demonstrate both that the churches who pronounced the condemnations were at least in some sense justified in doing so and that the declaration of the nonapplicability on the present dialogue partner is equally justifiable.8 Wholly in line with GC, the national Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues on justification make use of contemporary exegetical and church historical insights in their attempt to find a way out of this impasse. The Lutheran theologian André Birmelé observes that one of the major functions of the exegetical part of JBF is to establish the idea of a legitimate diversity of theologies, images and viewpoints that is centred around a common affirmation of faith.9 JBF states that the Bible in all its multiformity has a ‘Christological centre’ (§149). This exegetical insight prefigures the joint Christological affirmation in JBF from which the legitimacy of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings is derived. For Birmelé, this elucidation of a biblical unity-in-diversity and its transposition to the dogmatic level are among the key features of the document. The historical analyses in JBF seem to play a role similar to that of Scriptural exegesis. According to the American document, the starting point of the conflict as it arose in Western Christianity is the theology of Augustine. It was he who highlighted the absolute priority of divine grace, while at the same time initiating a tradition in which justification was viewed in terms of the transformation of the human being (§7). The subsequent history of the issue of justification, until the eve of the Reformation, is then described as a period in which there was ‘growing speculation about the human role in the process’ of justification (§8). The interesting thing is that in the accounts of the three areas in which this ‘growing speculation’ was manifest (the developments of the concepts of grace, merit and predestination), a similar structure is discernible. On the one hand, JBF mentions a theological tradition in which the productive Augustinian tension between theocentric and transformational aspects of justification is maintained. Thomas Aquinas is always among the examples of this ‘authentic’ tradition (§§10.11.15). On the other hand, there is a ‘distorted’ tradition in which the focus on the role of the human being destroys this 7

LK 179–180/170. This ‘impasse’ is also mentioned in the Preface. Here the terminology changes. The document speaks of ‘eine grundlegende Aporie’ (in the translation: ‘a fundamental contradiction’) LK 13/6–7. It is not clear whether this implies a shift in meaning. 8 That is why André Birmelé says that it could be misleading to speak of ‘lifting’ the condemnations as this may create the false impression either that those who pronounced the condemnations were erring or that what was once a heresy is now an acceptable teaching. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 35. 9 Ibid., p. 26.

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tension by undermining the gratuity and unconditionality of justification, thus ending up in some form of Pelagianism (§§10.12.17). The rise of the Reformation doctrine on justification is linked to the problems of, on the one hand, ‘rampant Pelagianism’ manifesting itself in the political and economical corruption of ecclesial life and, on the other hand, the ‘terrified consciences’ of those who honestly sought to earn their own salvation (§§21–24). This led Luther and others to the conclusion that the transformational model of justification was itself at the root of the problems of both the ecclesial community and the individual believer. The idea that human free action contributed in some way to justification was seen as underlying the perversion which treated grace as a tradable good and the timorous question of whether one has contributed enough. Therefore, the existing theology of justification needed to be replaced by the model of the believer as simul iustus et peccator, in which both the absolute inability of human beings to contribute to their salvation and the unconditionality of God’s forgiveness are maintained (§25). This brief outline of the way JBF sketches the history of the problem up to the sixteenth century already foreshadows the idea of a ‘legitimate diversity’ of perspectives on justification which the dialogue attempts to reveal. For the history demonstrates that both doctrinal traditions are rooted in an ‘authentic’ theological tradition: one in which speculation on the human role in salvation does not diminish the absolute priority of God’s justifying grace and one which needed to exclude such speculation in order to safeguard the liberating proclamation of the gospel. References to Scripture and to historical developments in theology and doctrine are also essential to the German project on the condemnations. The existing convergence on the authority of Scripture and its importance for the agreement on the condemnations is highlighted extensively in the Preface.10 The section on justification mentions a greater awareness in the churches of the difference between the biblical witness on justification and the later theological development of several doctrines of justification.11 Exegetical studies have revealed that in Paul, justification is an event that is received ‘solely through faith in Jesus Christ’ and in which the believers are ‘totally claimed by God’. The distinction between biblical message and doctrine thus serves to show both the legitimacy and the limits of later teachings. The main ‘concerns’ that determine in a special way the respective Protestant and Roman Catholic doctrines of justification are warranted by 10 11

LK 29–32/24–27. LK 44/37.

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the authoritative Scriptural witness. At the same time, LK hints at the fact that the Protestant and the Roman Catholic viewpoints each emphasize – and therefore potentially overemphasize – one of the two above-mentioned aspects of justification. LK speaks of the complementarity of Protestant and Roman Catholic teaching on justification.12 Neither of the two doctrines exhaustively conveys or reproduces the biblical message of justification. Because of its focus on the sixteenth-century condemnations, the German dialogue strongly relies on historical investigations into the precise circumstances in which the condemnations were pronounced. Like the American dialogue, LK attempts to point out the authentic kernel of both doctrinal traditions. It also shows how the churches at the time of the Reformation rightly reacted against certain extreme theological positions and that these reactions often led to new exaggerations. Regarding the issue of the ‘radical depravity of the unredeemed human being’, to mention only one example, LK shows that the mutual condemnations on this topic were largely explicable as rejections of radical theological positions which are not identical with the binding teaching of the other side. This non-identity is the reason why these condemnations can be suspended when it comes to the present-day dialogue partner. Still, the condemnations themselves are not wholly superfluous as they warn against possible misunderstandings or caricatures of the respective official positions, such as the idea that in Protestant teaching the person is not involved at all in justification or that Roman Catholics see human cooperation as a condition for baptismal grace.13

b. Fears, Concerns and Patterns of Thought The starting point that was outlined in the previous section – namely the diversity found in Scripture and history – shapes the way the doctrines of Lutherans and Roman Catholics are presented in JBF and LK. In the second chapter of JBF, the most important issues related to the theme of justification are dealt with. The first paragraph (§94) immediately introduces the key concepts that indicate how the document will proceed and arrive at its conclusion. It speaks about ‘contrasting concerns and patterns of thought’, about ‘fears’ and the possibility that the different patterns can be ‘complementary’ and ‘in unavoidable tension’. What is striking in the terminology is, to put it in mathematical terms, the occurrence of discrete and continuous concepts. On the level of ‘patterns of thought’, there is clearly a 12 13

LK 16/9 and LK 46/40. LK 49–50/43.

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discrete difference between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic approach to justification. There is no middle road between the transformational pattern and the pattern of simul iustus et peccator. The document acknowledges that both dialogue partners ‘have difficulty in finding a common language’ (§112) and that ‘some of the consequences of the different outlooks seem irreconcilable’ (§121). On the other hand, concepts like ‘fears’, ‘concerns’, ‘complementarity’ and ‘unavoidable tension’ evoke a continuum or a spectrum of theological positions. Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies would then represent different points on this continuum, each expressing a fear that the other side would drift too much to the other side. This interpretation is corroborated by the vast amount of other ‘continuous’ terminology in Chapter 2, which is employed to describe the differences between both teachings and their attitude towards each other. Each side ‘tends to’, ‘focuses on’, ‘is often inclined to emphasize that’, ‘presses for’ and ‘is concerned with’. The dialogue partners are not being ‘accused’ (§104), but rather their position is viewed as ‘making it difficult to express adequately that’, ‘diminishing the importance of’, ‘making insufficiently evident that’ or ‘being liable to distortions’. It is a matter of ‘less or more’ rather than ‘yes or no’. One could say that one of the basic modi operandi of the document is to call the church-dividing nature of the discrete differences into question by referring to convergences on the theological continuum. The notion of ‘concern’ plays a prominent role in the argument and it adequately illustrates how JBF goes about the problem of theological differences that are difficult to reconcile. The concerns that underlie the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran view are ‘different’ (§§104.112) and the divergences in theological language are a ‘reflection’ (§112) and a ‘symptom’ (§104) of these differences. This terminology suggests that the concerns are situated, so to speak, on a deeper level. It is precisely on this more fundamental level that the differences lose their edge, for ‘Lutherans and Roman Catholics can share in each other’s concerns’. This diminishes the problem on the level of theological language. Both dialogue partners ‘can to some degree acknowledge the legitimacy of the contrasting theological perspectives and structures of thought’. And even when there are seemingly irreconcilable differences, it is a matter of ‘tak[ing] seriously the concerns of the other and [of] striv[ing] to think jointly about the problems’ (§121). Moreover, if there is an imbalance in the ‘concerns’ of one dialogue partner, this one-sidedness or ‘weakness’ can be overcome, not by turning to the ‘pattern of thought’ of the other (in which the neglected concern is more adequately expressed), but ‘within its own framework’ (§100).

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What Lutheranism is anxious about, according to JBF, is that the Roman Catholic doctrine may lead to ‘legalism’ (§110) and ‘Pelagian distortions’ (§106). It may ‘throw believers back on their own resources’ (§100) and encourage human self-reliance and self-justification (§106) instead of reliance on God’s promise. This leads to human anxiety or complacency (§103). But what is equally clear in Chapter 2 is that these Lutheran fears are the negative and ‘subjective’ flip-side of the positive and more ‘objective’ concern to uphold the ‘unmerited character of God’s forgiving mercy’ (§101) or the ‘unconditional character of God’s justifying word’ (§110). In §101, in which the Lutheran fear about the Roman Catholic idea of infused grace is spelt out, the two sides are clearly distinguished: Lutherans can admit that this Catholic understanding of the infusion of grace does not necessarily imply that justification is dependent on sanctification in such a way as to undermine confidence in God and induce an anxiety-ridden reliance on the uncertain signs of grace in one’s own life. Yet they are likely to think that the traditional Catholic emphasis on the infusion of grace makes it difficult to express adequately the unmerited character of God’s forgiving mercy. The problem Lutherans bring up with regard to the Roman Catholic position on the nature of justifying grace is its failure to express fully the magnitude of God’s work for us rather than the fact that it would promote self-reliance. At the same time, JBF wants to demonstrate that, contrary to what Lutherans fear, the ‘sapiential’ elements of the Roman Catholic teaching on justification are embedded in an ‘existential’ context and serve precisely to allow and stimulate the believer to praise God for ‘the benefits actually imparted through God’s loving deed in Christ’ (§100) or ‘for his transformative indwelling’ (§101). What Roman Catholics fear is precisely that the elimination of doctrinal elements such as the constitutive role of good works ‘may not adequately motivate the believer to give praise and thanks to God for the healing and transforming effects of his redemptive action in us’ (§103). In the paragraphs on merit the Roman Catholic position is defended by means of the Augustinian idea that ‘in crowning our merits God crowns his own gifts’ (§111). Once more, a ‘sapiential’ idea is defended by the assertion that it is not only non-destructive of the ‘existential’ perspective, but also that it is itself ‘existential’ in the sense that it rightly honours God for his work for us. In the discussions of satisfaction (§§113– 116) and of the criteriological function of the doctrine of justification

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(§§117–120), something similar happens on the ecclesiological level. The penitential practices in the church and the ecclesial mediation of God’s grace in general are viewed with regard to their positive and constitutive contribution to God’s communication of salvation to us. Just as in JBF, LK sees the different ways in which Protestants and Roman Catholics have unfolded the message of justification as determined by different ‘forms of thought’ (Denkformen). This concept is related to several other features of the theology of doctrine that is implied in LK. First, it refers above all to the limitations of any doctrinal formulation. Doctrines are always embedded in a certain historical situation in which a specific philosophical and theological idiom is prevalent.14 By addressing the message of justification to contemporary people, the church at once limits its scope to the intellectual horizon of a particular time and place.15 Second, doctrines as ‘forms of thought’ are not only conditioned by historical circumstances, but also relative to the truth they attempt to convey. The distinction between ‘language’ and ‘that to which it testifies’ is crucial here.16 There is flexibility in the relationship between the two: different words belonging to different conceptual schemes can refer to the same reality. This insight is fundamental in LK. The document describes the central reality, to which all Christian doctrines refer, in a variety of ways: as ‘Christ and his gospel’ (quoting JBF),17 as the Biblical message of justification, and as the concrete life of the Christian believer which gives rise to different pastoral concerns. Third, the idea of doctrines as ‘forms of thought’ implies a holistic view of the teachings of Protestants and Roman Catholics. The forms of thought that underlie the teachings of the churches do not merely determine decisions in individual doctrinal questions, but also the structure of Roman Catholic and Protestant teaching and its internal logic. Instead of comparing isolated doctrinal elements with each other, ecumenical dialogue should consider the respective teachings in their entirety (as what Pesch had called ‘comprehensive outlines’ of the Christian message).18 The discussion in LK of the condemnations on concupiscence, for instance, does not use the term ‘forms of thought’, but implicitly it wholly relies on this idea.19 When viewed holistically, that is, within the context of the respective structures of Protestant and Roman Catholic teaching, the seemingly contradictory assertions that concupiscence is and is not sin are 14

LK 21/16. LK 23/18–19. 16 LK 22/17. 17 LK 43/36. 18 LK 45/39. 19 LK 50–53/44–46. 15

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part of two languages which refer to one and the same reality: the reality of the God-resisting tendencies within the believer which are the cause of the lifelong struggle of the Christian against sin, but which are only hypothetically (if God should withdraw his forgiving grace) condemnable.20 This hypothetical presence of damnable sin in the justified is expressed in the statement that ‘remaining concupiscence is not properly sin’ in Roman Catholic language, and in the idea of ‘ruled sin’ (peccatum regnatum) in the Lutheran thought structure. The idea that different legitimate theological ‘concerns’ underlie differing and even contradictory theological and doctrinal positions, which was crucial in the methodology of the American dialogue (JBF), is adopted in the German condemnations study as well. The corresponding preference for ‘continuous’ language over ‘discrete’ language that was observed in JBF is also detectable in LK. The Introduction states that theological ‘concerns’ are rarely an object of criticism. Rather they can lead to ‘one-sided’ interpretations.21 The shift of focus from doctrines to concerns leads to the image of a spectrum of legitimate theological positions, each highlighting to a greater or lesser extent crucial concerns. The condemnations can serve as ‘salutary warnings’ against one-sided forms of Christian teaching, even if they can be used in a one-sided way themselves, precisely by Christians who are zealous and anxious for the truth.22 The ‘discrete’ idea of doctrinal demarcation does not wholly disappear in the language of ‘concerns’, but it takes a somewhat vaguer and less tangible shape than the condemnations themselves. The decisive question is: ‘Are the “concerns” and interpretative stresses which are of primary importance in the doctrine of one dialogue partner nevertheless so clearly maintained in the doctrine of the other that they can neither be overlooked nor misunderstood?’.23 The ‘concerns’ are not presented in LK as abstract theological principles that need to be balanced out for the sake of systematic beauty. We can refer here again to the question on concupiscence and sin. The Protestant insistence that concupiscence is sin seeks to overcome the purely ethical and act-centred view of sin and to restore its original theological meaning as the ever present human ambition to be like God. The Roman Catholics, for their part, fear that calling concupiscence sin gravely undervalues the efficacy of baptism.24 Hence, both the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran concerns relate to the concrete life of the Christian and the way justification 20

LK 52/46. LK 23/18. 22 LK 23/18 and LK 32/27. 23 LK 46/40. 24 LK 51/44–45. 21

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is a reality for him or her. The focus on concerns, therefore, also implies a stronger attention given to the practical and pastoral orientation of the respective doctrines of justification, which facilitates the recognition of the authentic ‘kernel’ in the teaching of the other.25 c. Affirming the Consensus The notions of ‘thought patterns’, ‘fears’ and ‘concerns’ are related to the (discrete and continuous) differences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic views on justification. The fundamental agreement between these different ideas of justification can be summarized in the following way: Behind the different thought patterns, there are theological concerns that are sufficiently recognized and expressed by both dialogue partners. The question then needs to be asked how and to what extent both national dialogues arrive at this conclusion and thus affirm a consensus – or at least a sufficient convergence or agreement – between Lutherans and Roman Catholics on justification. In order to answer this question, it may be useful here to make a small excursion to the first phase of the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue and to the Leuenberg Agreement. GC suggests that there may be a convergence between the Lutheran idea of a ‘centre of the gospel’ and the Roman Catholic idea of a ‘hierarchy of truths’ (GC §§24–25). The dialogue commission saw these notions as expressions of the common view, held by both Lutherans and Roman Catholics, that their teachings and traditions are centred around a foundation, which is not a ‘theological formula’, but rather ‘the eschatological saving act of God in Jesus’ cross and resurrection’ (GC §24). In other words, one of the important aspects of coming to an agreement between Lutherans and Roman Catholics is the realization that all our doctrines are related to the same foundation of faith. There are, however, different ways in which a reference to a common foundation can lead to an agreement. A brief reflection on the concept of ‘centre of the gospel’ will show this. 25

See LK 45–46/40. Here, the impropriety of condemning another church for its defence of a fundamental concern that has its roots in faith is expressed as a matter of principle: ‘No one can condemn or accuse of departing from the Christian faith those who – experiencing the misery of their sins, their resistance against God, and their lack of love for God and their neighbour – in faith put their whole trust in the saving God, are sure of his mercy, and try in their lives to match up to this faith’. And ‘Nor, on the other hand, can anyone condemn and accuse of departing from the Christian faith those who, deeply penetrated by the limitless power of God, stress above all, in the event of justification also, God’s glory and the victory of his gracious acts on behalf of men and women, holding human failure and halfheartedness toward these gracious acts to be in the strict sense, of secondary importance’.

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The Finnish Lutheran theologian Minna Hietamäki interestingly relates the notion of ‘centre of the Gospel’, which is derived from the more traditional Lutheran idea of a ‘centre of Scripture’,26 with the Leuenberg agreement (LA, 1973).27 In this agreement or ‘concord’, Lutheran, Reformed and United churches in Europe arrived at a common understanding of the gospel ‘insofar as this is required for establishing church fellowship between them’ (LA §6).28 In line with the definition of the church in the article VII of the Confessio Augustana,29 Leuenberg substantiates this agreement in terms of, on the one hand, the central content of the gospel – understood as the message of justification – and, on the other hand, preaching, baptism and the Lord’s supper as the ways to communicate the gospel to men and women. It further spells out a common understanding of the Lord’s supper, Christology and predestination which suspends the mutual doctrinal condemnations of the Reformation era on these issues. The participating churches conclude that on the basis of this agreement, all barriers for table and pulpit fellowship are removed. The Leuenberg approach is not without ambiguities. Simo Peura points out a methodological ambivalence in Leuenberg.30 On the one hand, its methodology is based on the distinction between the foundation of faith and its expressions, or between fides iustificans and fides dogmatica.31 Nonchurch-dividing differences are situated on the level of expression (Ausdruck), while the foundation (Grund) of faith is at the same time the basis for unity. Peura calls this the ‘qualitative’ aspect of the Leuenberg approach. On the other hand, the churches involved in the Leuenberg Agreement had to formulate their consensus on the content of the gospel, on the way it is conveyed and on the issues that were previously occasions for doctrinal condemnations. This almost inevitably leads to another view on the agreement, namely in terms of a ‘quantitative’ distinction between centre and periphery. It is not only the reference to the same foundation, 26

Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 17. M. Hietamäki, Agreeable Agreement: An Examination of the Quest for Consensus in Ecumenical Dialogue (Ecclesiological Investigations, 8; London: T & T Clark, 2010), pp. 23–28. 28 Text cited from ‘The Leuenberg Agreement’, Lutheran World 20 (1973), pp. 347–53. 29 BSLK 61,1–4. 30 Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’. Peura’s analysis draws upon the work of Mannermaa: T. Mannermaa, Von Preußen nach Leuenberg. Hintergrund und Entwicklung der theologischen Methode in der Leuenberger Konkordie (Arbeiten zur Geschichte und Theologie des Luthertums. Neue Folge, 1; Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1981). 31 The latter notions are found in M. Lienhard, ‘The Leuenberg Agreement: Origins and Aims’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and Lutheran-Reformed Relationships : Evaluations by North American and European Theologians, ed. W. G. Rusch and D. F. Martensen (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), pp. 13–33 (20). 27

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but also a commonly formulated view on central matters that opens up the possibility of non-church-dividing differences in peripheral issues. It is clear that there is some tension between such common doctrinal ‘expressions’ and the contention that the traditional confessions are left wholly intact as a ‘hermeneutical key for the reading of Scripture and norm for preaching today’.32 The paradox is contained in the description Meyer gives of one of the key features of Leuenberg, namely that ‘church fellowship between confessionally different churches becomes possible by means of a binding doctrinal consensus with regard to what is fundamental or central to the understanding of the gospel and to its proclamation in word and sacrament’.33 The whole question is how the binding nature of the consensus, understood not only as a reference to a common foundation but also as a common doctrinal expression to which the churches assent, is related to the authority of the confessions. Does the quantitative consensus on the heart of the gospel itself become a hermeneutical key to understanding the confessions? This question leads us back to the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue on justification. To what extent is a consensus on the central issue of justification dependent on a commitment of both dialogue partners to certain common expressions of faith? We will now look at the way the two national dialogues on justification make their agreement explicit. Next we will relate this to the distinction between qualitative and quantitative views on consensus. JBF notices theological ‘convergences’ between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic views on justification. These are made explicit in the second part of Chapter 3 (§§150–160). A distinction is made here between, on the one hand, ‘an incomplete convergence’ (§152) on the doctrine of justification as criterion for ecclesial ‘practices, structures and theologies’ (§153) and, on the other hand, ‘prior and fuller material convergences on the doctrine itself’ (§155). The convergence concerning the criteriological function of the doctrine of justification is called ‘incomplete’ not because only Lutherans would view justification as a criterion, but rather because both dialogue partners give different answers to the question how the criterion of justification is to be applied, notably with regard to issues like papacy, purgatory and the veneration of saints (§153). 32

Ibid. (19). Lienhard points out that the Leuenberg agreement carefully avoids to identify the ‘assent’ to a doctrinal consensus with a joint confession of faith. 33 H. Meyer, ‘Critique of the Leuenberg Agreement as an Ecumenical Model’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and Lutheran-Reformed Relationships: Evaluations by North American and European Theologians, ed. W. G. Rusch and D. F. Martensen (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), pp. 53–66 (60).

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In the paragraphs about the ‘doctrine itself’ (§§155–160), there are two lines of argument. First, twelve points of convergence are mentioned (§156). They outline the convictions on the basis and the essence of justification that are held in common by Lutherans and Roman Catholics. Second, a ‘fundamental affirmation’ is pronounced, which was already formulated in the introduction of the JBF (§4): Our entire hope of justification and salvation rests on Christ Jesus and on the gospel whereby the good news of God’s merciful action in Christ is made known; we do not place our ultimate trust in anything other than God’s promise and saving work in Christ. (§157) It is probably no exaggeration to say that this affirmation forms the heart of the document. It is the basis for a mutual recognition of the position of the dialogue partner as legitimate. For ‘where the affirmation is accepted, Lutherans and Roman Catholics can recognize each other as sharing a commitment to the same gospel of redemptive love received in faith’ (§159). The differing ‘thought patterns’ play a role in this part on material convergence. In the twelve points of convergence they are implied insofar as the convergences mentioned there can be seen as basic beliefs that underlie both the transformational model and the simul iustus et peccator model for conceiving justification. What emerges in these twelve points is an account of justification that is thoroughly theocentric and christocentric, but which at the same time attempts to circumscribe the place of human freedom, good works and reward. Obviously, this approach of finding common convictions does not automatically imply a decision concerning the legitimacy of both ‘patterns of thought’. For it proves this legitimacy only when the remaining differences can be shown to be in some sense less fundamental than the common convictions. The reason why critics on both sides of the denominational fence attack the document is precisely their conviction that the differences are fundamental – that is: decisive for ecclesial unity – and that any formulation of the common denominators simply glosses over them.34 The establishing of a set of common convictions does not eliminate the church-dividing nature of the differences in 34

Concerning the issue of the sinfulness of the believer, for instance, JBF states that ‘sin no longer reigns in the justified, yet they remain subject to sinful inclinations and the assaults of sin so that, when left to their own powers they fall repeatedly’ (§156). Both the Roman Catholic Christopher Malloy and the Protestant Gottfried Martens reject, for very different reasons, the idea of concupiscence as ‘sinful inclination’. Cf. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, p. 203; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, p. 261.

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‘patterns of thought’ as long as these patterns remain the sole norm for assessing and interpreting these common convictions. The real resolution of the dividing character of the theological differences is attained therefore when the different patterns of thought are confronted with a ‘higher’ norm by which they are themselves assessed. This is what happens in the ‘fundamental affirmation’. The fundamental affirmation ‘serves as a criterion for judging all church practices, structures and traditions’ (§160). It, therefore, almost fills the role of the doctrine of justification itself in its criteriological function (cf. §152–153). The affirmation answers the question of where our ultimate hope and trust are to be placed, namely ‘in the God of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (§158). This is crucial because it has become clear that the more thorny issues of the doctrine of justification concern the question of how one ought to conceive of those realities that are considered by both dialogue partners as non-ultimate: good works, merit, human freedom and ecclesial structures and ministries. One could say that the conflicting ‘thought patterns’ differ precisely in their description of the relationship between what is ultimate and non-ultimate. But JBF claims that these differences are not destructive for church unity as long as the different theologies serve to ‘proclaim or evoke’ (§159) hope and trust in God. Both the transformational view and the forensic ‘imagery’ may stimulate this reliance, depending on ‘the needs of gospel proclamation in each age’ (§158). LK deals more explicitly with the issue of consensus and the role of common expressions of faith in a theological agreement on justification. Although the German dialogue was focused from the outset on the possibility of lifting the historical condemnations, the Joint Ecumenical Commission gave a second assignment to the study group, namely to reflect upon the question: ‘What declarations in the agreed statements that have been worked out by theologians can be received by the churches, and how can this reception find expression?’35 In the Preface of the published report, the study of the historical condemnations and the question of which existing convergence and consensus text can be received are called ‘two sides of the same coin’.36 It is clear that this leads to a tension in LK similar to the one Simo Peura had noticed in the Leuenberg Agreement. On the one hand, LK considers the Protestant and the Roman Catholic views on justification as determined by different (discrete) ‘forms of thought’, but on the other hand, the unity that is sought for seems to require expressions of faith that 35 36

LK 182/173. LK 11/3.

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are common to both dialogue partners. This tension is clearly articulated in the Introduction of LK: It is certainly true that conversation between the churches must never shun the labour of expressing in a common language what all affirm and to which all testify. Where a difference of language remains, we may suspect that there is still disunity in substance as well. And, above all, fellowship in the one church, whatever form this may take, requires a common language for a common creed [Bekenntnis]. At the same time, however, when we talk in different, indeed opposing, languages – as happens in our churches – we must remember that if we want to discover whether there is a real difference of doctrine, it is not sufficient merely to compare different words.37 The fact that in this quote from LK a link is established between finding a common language of faith and the goal of ecclesial unity also widens the gap between LK and Leuenberg. In an early letter to the chairs and the directors of the ÖAK written by Bishop Lohse and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in their capacity as chairs of the GÖK an analogy is drawn between the condemnations study and Leuenberg. It says, without further qualification or explanation: ‘The path entered upon in the Leuenberg Agreement between the Lutheran and Reformed churches ought to find a corresponding continuation between the Protestant Churches and the Roman Catholic Church’. There is evidence, however, that there was a growing awareness during the German dialogue of the differences between LK and LA. The final report speaks about important differences between both dialogues.38 The minutes of the second meeting of the GÖK report that no decision was taken about the terminology of ‘concord’ or ‘consensus’. It is interesting to see how both notions are being connected. On the one hand, the minutes state: ‘A concord might be too ambitious, but even a partial consensus would have to be judged as a positive result’. On the other hand, the members of the commission agreed ‘that the genre “concord” should not be aimed at; but that positive statements should even go beyond a concord, and should as a whole reap the harvest of the hitherto existing consensus texts’. If these statements imply a view on the relationship between the Protestant-Roman Catholic condemnations study and Leuenberg, then the message seems to be the following. The lifting of the condemnations that are studied in LK will not automatically lead to a 37 38

LK 22/17. Cf. LK 14/7–8; 27–28/23.

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declaration on altar and pulpit fellowship similar to the one that was established in Leuenberg. For the study involves only a partial consensus which does not cover all the areas in which there are church-dividing differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants. On the other hand, there should be a higher degree of agreement (‘consensus’ instead of ‘concord’) than in Leuenberg in those areas that are studied in LK. In other words, if ecclesial communion is to be achieved between the churches involved in the German dialogue, an agreement is required that is both broader and more elaborate than Leuenberg. It needs to be broader in the sense that it has to cover a wider range of topics than was dealt with in Leuenberg. LK itself mentions ecclesiology, ministry and doctrinal authority as still remaining divisive differences. In that sense, LK also points out its own incompleteness. Moreover, ecclesial unity between the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant churches participating in the dialogue also seems to presuppose a stronger elaboration of common expressions of faith than was done in LA. This latter conclusion, even though it is clearly attested in the way LK describes its own task, is not always endorsed in the secondary literature on the German condemnations project. Commentators have generally emphasized the fact that LK has to be seen against the backdrop of the crisis of consensus ecumenism.39 The main methodological achievement of the project would be its claim of overcoming church-dividing barriers without demanding doctrinal uniformity. André Birmelé suggests that the hesitant response of some Lutheran churches in (then Western-) Germany may be partly owing to the ‘imprudence’ of the Final Report when it states that ‘with regard to some condemnatory pronouncements a consensus can not yet be ascertained today’.40 He is convinced that in LK the elaboration of the condemnations and the quest for common formulations are largely unrelated to each other: The commission does not speak about the possibility of a formulation of the doctrine of justification that is common on every point. It even explicitly wishes that this question is not confused with the request to 39

Cf. for instance, P. Neuner, ‘Vor dem Ende der Konsensökumene? Zur Rezeption der Studie über die Lehrverwerfungen’, in Von der Verwerfung zur Versöhnung: Zur aktuellen Diskussion um die Lehrverurteilungen des 16. Jahrhunderts, ed. J. Brosseder (Neukirchen-Hamburg: Neukirchener Verlag-Katholische Akademie Hamburg, 1996), pp. 51–79; Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 32–63. 40 My translation of: ‘Bei einigen Verwerfungsaussagen allerdings läbt sich auch heute noch kein Konsens feststellen’. LK 189/180. See also : LK 32/27, where the document speaks about a ‘sufficient consensus’. Cf. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 57.

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make a pronouncement on the present-day pertinence of the historical condemnations. By judging that the different approaches could be compatible today, the commission deploys, without making it explicit, a certain notion of consensus.41 Birmelé seems to be guided by two convictions: (1) Common formulations hardly play any role in a decision on the contemporary applicability of the condemnations. The only commonality he sees as constitutive of the study of the condemnations and of the decision to declare the differences legitimate is the reference to a common ‘Christological centre’.42 (2) A binding decision of the churches on the condemnations is in itself sufficient to reconcile the churches with each other with regard to these particular doctrines. The lifting of the condemnations, apart from any common formulations, itself constitutes a sufficient consensus. In the light of the text of LK, these convictions are highly questionable. First, as we have shown, LK explicitly makes the connection between lifting the condemnations and formulating a consensus. It claims that such a consensus is a condition for church unity. Second, if one looks at the way the study group arrives at the conclusion that the sixteenth-century condemnations are not applicable any more to today’s dialogue partner, it is clear that a consensus is always implied in the argumentation. This is not all that surprising. The whole methodology of LK revolves around the affirmation of a central reality of faith which can be described in Christological, Scriptural or pastoral terms. Theological and doctrinal expressions are presented as secondary with respect to this centre. Nevertheless, whenever this centre is mentioned or described, a certain theological interpretation of it is always given. This is most obvious when there is reference to different complementary ‘concerns’ which are legitimately rooted in Scripture and which underlie different, and often contradictory theological and doctrinal positions. To use the example mentioned earlier: saying that both the enduring human ambition to be like God and the efficacy of baptism have to be taken into consideration when speaking about the sinfulness of the believer is already giving a rough outline of a theology of concupiscence with which all dialogue partners can agree. 41

‘La commission ne se prononce pas sur la possibilité d’une formulation en tous points commune de la doctrine de la justification et souhaite même explicitement que cette question ne soit pas confondue avec la demande de se prononcer sur la pertinence actuelle des condamnations de l’histoire. En jugeant que les différentes approches pourraient aujourd’hui être compatibles, elle met en œuvre, sans le dire, une certaine notion de consensus’. Ibid., pp. 43–44. 42 Ibid., p. 44.

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The same procedure is used elsewhere in LK. In the discussion of intrinsic (‘gratia inhaerens’) and extrinsic (‘extra nos in Christo’) interpretations of justification, the study-document points out that both ideas – Christ as our righteousness and God’s righteousness being ‘poured out’ in our souls – have biblical foundations.43 This eventually leads to the contention that the condemnations on this issue may be considered no longer applicable to the dialogue partner, because neither Roman Catholic nor Protestant teaching neglects either of these aspects, that is, because the Roman Catholic ideas of inhering righteousness or habitual grace do not imply that the believer relies on something in himself or herself, and the Protestant ‘externality’ of the righteousness by which the sinner is justified does not mean that the believer is not ‘touched’ and ‘claimed’ in the event of justification. The point to be noticed is that the assertion that the condemnations no longer apply to today’s partner is only warranted under the assumption that both Protestants and Roman Catholics accept the legitimacy of this interpretation of the ‘centre’ in terms of these particular ‘concerns’. One could say that there is a ‘concern-theology’ of justification operative in LK. It is a theological interpretation of the centre of our Christian faith as it is expressed in the biblical texts. As such, it is situated ‘in between’ this centre and the different existing theological and doctrinal explications of justification. It is less than a new, common doctrine of justification, because it does not spell out with precision the conditions under which one of the dialogue partners transgresses the boundaries of legitimate teaching. As we have seen earlier, LK merely states that all crucial concerns should be sufficiently recognizable in the Protestant and the Roman Catholic teachings. However, by saying this, the concern-theology is already seen as something more than just a theology on which Protestants and Roman Catholics happen to agree. They ought to agree on it. The identifiable presence of these specific concerns is a criterion which determines whether a teaching on justification is legitimate, no matter how vague and low-profile is the description of this criterion.44 43 44

LK 53–55/47–49. That the possibility of a radical doctrine of justification exists is obvious and is confirmed in LK at the end of the justification chapter: ‘The experiences of history, and especially the Reformation history, teach us that there really can be an interpretation of the justification of the sinner on which the unity of the church will founder, as it foundered once before’ (LK 75/68). In the document, this possibility is not explicitly connected with the question quoted above: ‘Are the “concerns” and interpretative stresses which are of primary importance in the doctrine of the one partner nevertheless so clearly maintained in the doctrine of the other that they can neither be overlooked nor be misunderstood?’ (LK 46/40). The answer in LK to this question is that ‘if they are, then a condemnation no longer has to be maintained today’. One may infer from this that the condemnations do apply if the ‘concerns’ that are

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With the aid of Peura’s distinction between qualitative and quantitative aspects of consensus, we can now summarize our findings regarding the way JBF and LK positively affirm an agreement on justification. It is clear that both national dialogues go beyond a merely qualitative approach (the foundation-expression scheme). Surely, the agreements in these documents have an important qualitative side. This is particularly clear in JBF with its more or less ‘pragmatic’ approach to doctrine, which assesses expressions of faith by asking the question whether they hinder or promote hope and trust in Christ as the foundation of our salvation. In a similar fashion, LK distinguishes between the message and the doctrines of justification and uses the complexity and multiformity of the foundational narrative to overcome the contradictions between later doctrinal expressions. Yet, it would be wrong to speak of JBF and LK as examples of what Christoph Schwöbel calls a ‘referential consensus’.45 What constitutes the agreement in both cases is not only a reference to a common ‘ground and object of faith’, but also an extensive elaboration of all the issues that pertain to the theme of justification and a common expression of the shared convictions about them. Our contention that there is a kind of ‘concern-theology’ of justification present in LK to which all dialogue partners assent is perfectly applicable to JBF as well. This means that the agreement on justification in LK and JBF also has an important quantitative aspect (the centre-periphery scheme). Yet, the relationship between the central issue of justification and more peripheral theological themes is complicated in both documents. JBF spoke about ‘incomplete convergence’ on the doctrine of justification as a criterion. There was no satisfactory accord about the way the ‘centre’ should determine the ‘periphery’. In LK, it was clear that the issues that were crucial for ecclesial unity were broader than the preaching of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments. Hence, both national dialogues, even though they see justification by faith as the heart of the Christian faith, are aware of the limitations of a dialogue on justification.

III. Existential and Sapiential Theology Revisited In the previous chapter, we have argued that there was some ambiguity in the works of Otto Hermann Pesch and of the Finnish Luther school with crucial for one dialogue partner are not clearly enough maintained in the doctrine of the other. This logically leads to the doctrinal question as to how an insufficient affirmation of a certain crucial concern is to be diagnosed. 45 See supra section 1.IV.

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regard to the question whether or not certain elements of the Roman Catholic language on justification (such as free human cooperation in justification and created grace) are really legitimate. We have suggested that this ambiguity is related to an asymmetry between what Pesch had called a ‘sapiential’ and an ‘existential’ way of doing theology. In this section, we will claim that similar ambiguities are present in the American and the German dialogues on justification. a. Freedom and Salvation (JBF) At first sight, Roman Catholics have reasons to complain about the fact that in JBF the theme of human freedom remains somewhat in the background. Three instances in the text might even create the impression that the issue was deliberately ignored. (1) As mentioned above, JBF describes the history of the thinking on justification prior to the Reformation as consisting of ‘authentic’ and ‘perverted’ theological traditions. In the paragraphs about the development of the idea of created grace, both traditions are contrasted as follows: For some theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas, God remained in total command as the initiator and perfecter of the movement (motus) from sinner to saint, and for all theologians God retained the initiative in that the habit of grace is freely “infused” (cf. Rom. 5:5). Yet for many the insistence on infused grace and on the presence of special assisting graces (gratiae gratis datae) of every step of the way was combined with a strong emphasis in the ability of free will to contribute to salvation, not simply on the basis of grace, but independently, ex suis naturalibus. (§10) This description is not false, but it is somewhat misleading in that it mentions the involvement of human freedom only when speaking of the ‘perverted’ tradition. It is beyond dispute, however, that Aquinas did also see human freedom as involved in justification, even if the person’s free will does not work independently but is moved by God’s grace.46 (2) In the section on recent developments in the Roman Catholic theology of justification, a whole paragraph is dedicated to the work of Karl Rahner (§79). Among his achievements are an insistence on the pre-eminence of uncreated grace, the fact that ‘[t]he free human response, for Rahner, does not diminish the primacy of grace, for the act whereby grace is accepted is itself a gift of grace’, and his adoption of the ‘Reformation principles of sola fide and sola gratia’. Again, this presentation of Rahner’s position is not altogether wrong, but it 46

S.Th. IaIIae q. 113 a. 3

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could have been more balanced. Rahner is not playing down the role of human freedom in justification in order to highlight the divine grace. Rather he is upholding both, so that the document could just as well have said: ‘the primacy of grace, for Rahner, does not diminish the freedom of the human response’. In his account of sola gratia, Rahner affirms that the human freedom which is involved in justification is a liberated freedom and that it is ‘returned to God’ in praise and thanks. Still, this freedom which comes from God and returns to God is not merely a freedom towards worldly things but a freedom towards salvation (Freiheit zum Heile).47 The fact that for Rahner a fundamental human ‘choice’ is part and parcel of Christian salvation is understated in this paragraph. (3) As was mentioned above, JBF claims that one of the main theological ‘fears’ of Roman Catholics fear is that the elimination of certain doctrinal elements such as the constitutive role of good works ‘may not adequately motivate the believer to give praise and thanks to God for the healing and transforming effects of his redemptive action in us’ (§103). One could say that, on the whole, the second part of JBF attempts to demonstrate that the Roman Catholic emphases on inherent righteousness, merit, good works, satisfaction and ecclesial mediation can be interpreted in doxological terms. These ‘sapiential’ ideas express the magnitude and praiseworthiness of God’s work. Yet, just as in the case of Rahner, it should be pointed out that doxology does not exclude responsibility. The importance Trent attaches to these ideas is only partly explicable as the giving of reasons for praise and gratitude. They are also appeals to the human liberum arbitrium, inciting the believer to persevere and to grow in righteousness on the basis of God’s grace.48 Again, this concern for freedom is not given prominence in the second chapter of JBF. It is only in §154 that the Roman Catholic insistence on ‘God’s respect for human freedom’ is more or less clearly affirmed. In this paragraph, the Lutheran ‘hermeneutical perspective’ is mentioned. Earlier in the document, this perspective was presented as one of the ecumenically promising developments in Lutheran theology (§§88–93). It draws on insights regarding performative language, that is, speech acts that effectuate the reality about which they speak. JBF claims that there is a convergence between this Lutheran perspective and certain strands within twentiethcentury Roman Catholic theology and doctrine, more precisely in the

47

K. Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums (Freiburg-BaselWien: Herder, 8 ed, 1997), pp. 348–49. 48 Cf. the chapters 11 through 13 of the decree on justification (DH 1535–1541).

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theology of Karl Rahner (§80) and in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council (§77), which reveal a high regard for the divine word. In §154, however, the hermeneutical perspective is said to increase ‘the tension with Catholic position. It does so by excluding from the gospel proclamation all reference to the freedom and goodness of fallen human beings on the ground that this would undermine the unconditionality of God’s promises in Christ’.49 This view is contrasted with the Roman Catholic emphasis on human freedom. As has been said, in other places in the document, the freedom towards salvation remains implicit or is stated only to be moderated. The point is, however, that the relative silence about human freedom towards salvation by implication means that it is not excluded either. In the final analysis, this constitutes a greater problem for the Lutheran critics of JBF than for Roman Catholics. The Lutheran theologian Carl E. Braaten points out that even a ‘hermeneutical understanding’ does not have to deny ‘the freedom and goodness of fallen human beings’ altogether (contra §154). He adds that JBF could have recognized this if it had made the proper Lutheran distinctions, namely between a human freedom coram Deo, which is to be denied, and a freedom ‘coram mundo, coram hominibus, and coram meipso’, which was acknowledged by Luther.50 The reason why this distinction, which strictly circumscribes the area in which human freedom is possible, hardly plays a role in JBF is directly related to the method of the document. JBF tries to preserve a doctrinal diversity which does not exclude the Roman Catholic position, which maintains a human freedom towards salvation (and so coram Deo) dependent upon God’s grace. In the fourth formula of §156, which expresses the material convergences between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic positions, one finds the following statement: We retain the human freedom to make choices among created goods, but we lack the capacity to turn to God without divine help. At first sight, this phrase seems to reiterate the Lutheran distinction Braaten is referring to. On closer inspection, however, it can be seen also to imply 49

The NCCB response affirms this ecumenical ambiguity of the hermeneutical perspective. On the one hand, it sees a parallel between the performative language and the Roman Catholic view on sacraments and the proclaimed word. But, on the other hand, the NCCB says that ‘Catholics have difficulties with explanations which would seem to exclude from the gospel proclamation all references to the freedom and goodness of fallen human beings and to the idea of a real change wrought by the Holy Spirit’. ‘Responses to the US LutheranRoman Catholic Statement on Justification’, One in Christ 29 (1993), pp. 333–53 (341). 50 Braaten, Justification, p. 122.

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the exact opposite. For the freedom coram Deo is qualified rather than denied. The second part of the sentence can mean: ‘and we also have the freedom to turn to God, though not without divine help’. Affirmation by implication seems to be the general approach in JBF to the idea of human freedom towards salvation. For Roman Catholics, this approach may be a reminder of neglected aspects of their own tradition. History has shown that the gift of human freedom can strive to emancipate itself from its Giver. In view of this possibility and of all the consequent tendencies in theology and spirituality (Pelagianism, anxious consciences), it is not a surprise that Roman Catholic theologians such as Rahner have attempted to reconnect and subordinate created grace – the basis of all free human cooperation with grace – to uncreated grace. Especially in dialogue with Lutheran churches, Roman Catholics tend to emphasize their efforts to retrieve this ‘forgotten’ aspect. The only thing Roman Catholic theologians may be worried about when they read consensus documents such as JBF is that former mistakes are ‘overcorrected’ and that the ‘sapiential’ elements of Catholic theology remain invisible or implicit. The possible dismay of Lutherans with regard to this approach is potentially more serious. At least some Lutheran theologians would see this as a form of doctrinal capitulation. Crucial Lutheran distinctions such as that between freedom coram Deo and freedom coram hominibus or between gospel and law are blurred by the mere fact that they are seen as only one way of looking at things.

b. An ‘Existential’ Common Ground and ‘Sapiential’ Differences (LK) The distinction between freedom coram Deo and worldly freedom is also present in a somewhat ambiguous way in the German dialogue. In the discussion of the condemnations concerning the ‘radical depravity of the unredeemed human being’, LK states: When Catholic doctrine recognizes human liberty [Freiheit], it is either a liberty, not over against God and toward God, but with regard to the things of this world (which the Lutheran Confession did not deny either; cf. CA 18.1: . . .); or it is already a liberty issuing from the call and power of grace. And it is to this liberty, evoked by God and made efficacious for the very first time, that the Council of Trent ascribes the works (including the works of repentance) which are done on the basis of justification.51 51

LK 49/42–43.

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The problem with this statement is that, while attempting to do justice to both doctrinal positions, it runs the risk of doing justice to neither. At first glance, traditional Roman Catholics are more likely to be bothered by this text than traditional Protestants. From a Tridentine point of view, the difficulty is that it looks as if the last sentence implies that the only freedomin-grace is the freedom to do works ‘on the basis of justification’, which corresponds to the situation of the believer after baptism. This provokes the question of how the free agency of the adult in the preparation for baptism and in justification itself is to be conceived.52 If the first part of the quotation, which uses the Lutheran distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ freedom, is the answer to this question, then the whole text gets a markedly Lutheran ring. The fallen human being has no freedom whatsoever in relationship to his or her salvation, but only in relationship to the world and to other creatures. When the ‘call and power of grace’ has aroused faith in him or her, that is, when he or she is justified, a freedom is created which is strictly speaking a fruit of justification (though this freedom itself does not cooperate in justification). This is at least how one could read the text. However, another reading is possible, for the idea that this liberty comes from the ‘call and power of grace’ evokes precisely the terminology (vocatio, gratia excitans atque adiuvans) that Trent uses to describe the grace that helps the sinner ‘to turn [convertere] towards their own justification by giving free assent to and cooperating with this same grace’.53 The freedom-in-grace of the second part of the quote can quite correctly be read as dealing with the preparation for justification. If this is true, then the last sentence is somewhat deceptive, suggesting that the text speaks about a freedom that is a mere effect of justification. In reality, the involvement of human freedom in the preparation for justification and in justification itself can also be seen as silently implied rather than excluded, so that the last sentence could just as well have been: ‘And it is this liberty through which the human being willingly accepts “the grace and gifts whereby someone from being unjust becomes just” [DH 1528]’. This would undoubtedly be more difficult to accept for some Protestant theologians. The point is that Trent itself is marked by the double perspective of this quotation (and the double interpretation to which it gives rise). Because of 52 53

Cf. the Chapters 5–7 of the Tridentine decree on justification (DH1525–1531). ‘[I]psius iustificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum Iesum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab eius vocatione, qua nullis eorum exsistentibus meritis vocantur, ut qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per eius excitantem atque adiuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum iustificationem, eidem gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando’ DH 1525.

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the absolute dependence of the human being on the grace of God, he or she has no freedom towards God comparable to the freedom exercised in relationship to worldly creatures. At the same time, the radical dependency on God’s grace in no way implies that there is a moment in the existence of the human being in which this freedom is completely annulled. By virtue of what Pesch called the idea of the ‘transcendental’ nature of God’s working, Roman Catholic theology and doctrine conceives both aspects as compatible.54 This is an instance of our previous conclusion that in the Roman Catholic approach the ‘existential’ confession that one is radically dependent on God’s grace does not exclude, but rather includes the ‘sapiential’ affirmation that human beings remain to a certain extent free; not free to secure their own salvation, but nonetheless free in relationship to salvation. This does not mean that these two aspects, divine grace and human freedom, are of the same importance. Also from the Tridentine point of view, it is clear that human freedom is in itself incapable of doing anything for salvation and is only brought to its fulfilment in justification, which is ‘efficiently’ caused by God alone.55 The possibility of this Roman Catholic reading of the text does not imply that LK contains no potential problems from a traditional Roman Catholic point of view. Similarly to what we have observed in the work of Pesch, in the writings of the Finnish Luther school and in JBF, something more ambiguous is happening than the cautious and often implicit affirmation of the aspect of human freedom in justification. Whereas with the aid of some hermeneutical skills this implicit affirmation can be uncovered in parts of LK, other statements in the same document seem to contradict this conclusion. In the part on ‘the passivity of the human being toward God’s justifying act’, LK says that ‘[t]here can be “cooperation” only in the sense that in faith the heart is involved [dab das Herz beim Glauben dabei ist], when the Word touches it and creates faith’.56 The original German ‘dabei sein’, in combination with the grammatical structure of the restrictive conditional clause, seems to exclude any activity on the part of the human being. On the other hand, however, faith is described in the same paragraph as ‘the human being’s response to the word of promise’, as distinct from a human ‘work’. Both Protestants and Roman Catholics are said not to deny ‘that human beings are in a very real sense involved [ein wahrhaftes Beteiligtsein]’.57 ‘Beteiligtsein’ is not without ambiguity here, since it means both receiving 54

Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (855). DH 1529. 56 LK 53/47. 57 LK 53/46. 55

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and participating. The question of free human agency remains unresolved in this paragraph. The same is true in the discussion on the concept of faith in Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. LK contends that the ideas of ‘faith alone’ and ‘faith hope and love’ as constituents of our justification do not have to exclude one another, for the Protestant concept of faith comprises what Roman Catholics call faith hope and love.58 On the one hand, the Roman Catholic intellectual concept of faith is too narrow to describe the reality through which the sinner is justified. On the other hand, the Protestant idea of faith should not be separated from the renewal of the human being. LK points out that only in later developments in sixteenth-century Protestantism, the concept of ‘justification’ was clearly distinguished from ‘sanctification’, ‘regeneration’ and ‘renewal’.59 In the light of these reflections, it is remarkable that in the same part LK declares that Protestants and Roman Catholics agree that ‘the renewal of the human being does not “contribute” to justification’. The (legitimate) difference would be that Protestants emphasize the sufficiency of faith, whereas Roman Catholics stress the subsequent renewal in order to rightly honour God’s creative power. In the ‘Protestant’ reading of the text, this difference can be perfectly understood (though only in terms of the ‘later’ strict conceptual distinction between justification and sanctification). From the point of view of Trent, on the other hand, which holds that without hope and love, faith cannot unite the human being with Christ;60 it is more puzzling to say that renewal, which includes love, does not contribute to justification. It is not enough to answer that for Protestants faith always and necessarily brings about renewal and that thus justification and sanctification are inextricably connected. For in Trent the gift of faith and the gift of love are precisely not inextricably connected. Rather, love has a specific role in justification which is not reducible to an effect of faith. There is therefore a problem with the alleged mutual translatability of ‘justification by faith, hope and love’ and ‘justification by faith alone’, even if the latter is a powerful faith which changes the human being into a lover of God and the neighbour. In order to understand better these tensions in the account of freedom, passivity and the sufficiency of faith, it is helpful to consider two major ‘concerns’ – to use LK’s own idiom – of Trent and to ask the question whether these concerns are ‘so clearly maintained in the doctrine of the other that they can neither be overlooked nor misunderstood’. 58

LK 59/52. LK 56/50. 60 DH 1531. 59

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(1) First, there is the aspect of moral and religious incitement, which reverberates in nearly every particular facet of the Tridentine teaching of justification. Without the idea of an appeal to human responsibility, it is virtually impossible to fully grasp why Trent states that the person ‘does not do absolutely nothing’ when receiving grace ‘for he can also reject it’,61 that ‘the reborn are immediately ordered to preserve the justice freely granted to them through Jesus Christ in a pure and spotless state’,62 that ‘no one should yield to complacency in faith alone’,63 that ‘labours, watchings, almsdeeds, prayers and offerings, . . . fastings and chasity’ are ways for the reborn to ‘work out their own salvation in fear and trembling [Phil 2:12]’,64 or that ‘the grace of justification once received is lost not only by apostasy . . ., but also by any other mortal sin, though faith is not lost’.65 There seem to be some indications in LK that this perspective is not wholly absent in the Protestant doctrine of justification. The document says: According to Protestant doctrine [the passivity of the human being toward God’s justifying act] means that human beings can do no more than simply allow God’s grace to be bestowed on them, fully and entirely. It does not mean that in this bestowal, the man or woman does not respond to God, person to person.66 The idea of human responsibility is implied in the covenantal description of the relationship from person to person and even in the minimizing statement that the human at least has to allow (‘sich schenken lassen’) the gift to be given. In the same context, LK points out that Luther exhorted the people to faith, which also entails at least some reaction on the part of the human being, even if the document is quick to add that this response is not a ‘work’. (2) A second major Tridentine concern that is partly recognized in LK, but about which one could ask whether all the consequences of such a recognition are taken into consideration, is the idea that justification means that God’s righteousness ‘inheres’ in the baptized person. Broadly put, this signifies that justification as being righteous in the eyes of God is only possible when the very existence of the human being as a creature is to a 61

DH 1525. DH 1531. 63 DH 1537. 64 DH 1541. 65 DH 1544. 66 LK 53/46. 62

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certain extent shaped by the gift of God’s righteousness. Without this idea of ‘created grace’, one cannot grasp the conviction that one can grow in justification.67 Nor is it possible, in that case, to become aware of the vulnerability of this righteousness through which one is justified, which underlies the rejection of a certitude regarding salvation.68 The possibilities of increase and loss of this righteousness also show the intimate connection between inhering grace and the issue of human responsibility in justification. In the part of LK that deals with the question of the ‘essence’ of justification, this aspect is positively approached by Protestant theology.69 The idea of inhering grace is said to have biblical foundations. The distinction between gratia creata and gratia increata is more or less identified with the distinction between effective and forensic justification. Finally, the findings of historical research ‘no longer permit Protestant theology of the reproach that the notion of grace as habitus – an enduring disposition of human existence which inclines it to new activity – is the equivalent of trust in one’s own strength, and is hence the equivalent also of loving God by means of one’s own natural powers’.70 Hence, LK gives the impression that these two concerns are not rejected by the Protestant dialogue partner. At the same time, however, these concerns cast serious doubt on the adequacy of certain convictions that are presented as ‘common opinions’ of Protestants and Roman Catholics. We mention four such ‘joint statements’. (a) As has already been indicated above, both Protestants and Roman Catholics are said to believe that the renewal of the believer is not a contribution to their justification. In a Tridentine frame of thinking this can be understood, with the hermeneutical benevolence that is always necessary in ecumenism, as a reference to the priority of grace and to the fact that God remains in all eternity the only efficient cause of our justification. It cannot be interpreted, not even with the greatest benevolence, in the sense that justification itself (being considered righteous before God) is possible with no counterpart whatsoever on the level of the creature and without a necessary choice, decision, freedom, wilful acceptance – or whatever one may wish to call it – of the person involved. The emphasis on this choice and on created grace is not based on the fact that the human being wants to play a part in justification and thus take over a part of the job 67

DH 1535. DH 1534. 69 LK 53-55/47-49. 70 LK 55/48-49. 68

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from God (which would contradict the concept of God as efficient cause of justification), but that God in the actual bringing about of justification wants to act in this covenantal fashion.71 In the light of this observation, it is clear that the comparison and even equation of the concepts uncreatedcreated grace and forensic-effective justification in LK is not necessarily incorrect, but that it may obscure the question of responsibility. For it can be interpreted in such a way that effective justification is a quasi-automatic effect of forensic justification, so that all activity on the part of the human being is only seen as an emanation of divine agency. Again it must be emphasized that Trent does not reject the ‘existential’ perspective which humbly acknowledges that righteous human action can only be the fruit on a tree which God has already made good. The Christians are described in the decree on justification as branches on the vine which is Christ and through whom all the strength is given to perform good works.72 However, in the Tridentine perspective, such metaphors are always complemented by reminders of human choices in preparing for, accepting and fostering the created gift of righteousness.73 (b) When dealing with the question of the assurance of salvation, LK suggests that Protestants and Roman Catholics can agree with Luther’s statement that ‘faith is the assurance of salvation’ if it means: ‘[A] person can certainly lose or renounce faith, and self-commitment to God and his word of promise. But if he believes in this sense, he cannot at the same time believe that God is unreliable in his word of promise’.74 Moreover, in view of human weakness, all dialogue partners caution against a vain certitude about one’s own salvation. In other words, the common ground on this issue is that in faith God is considered reliable and man is known to be weak. According to LK, the crucial difference between Protestants and Roman Catholics is that ‘Luther and his followers’ 71

This can be related to the ‘formal cause’ of justification in the Tridentine decree on justification, namely God’s righteousness by which we are made just (DH 1529). This implies a change on the created level and, if this created level as human reality is taken seriously, an active involvement of the human being in justification. According to Leo Scheffczyk, the fact that this active, though ‘non-causal’ involvement is also asserted in Trent when it speaks about the preparation for justification, concerns ‘the preservation of the personal nature of the event between God and human beings, which is not to be obliterated by the sole activity [Alleinwirksamkeit] of God’. Scheffczyk, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung” und die Norm des Glaubens’ (273). 72 DH 1546. 73 This double perspective is illustrated in Chapter 5 (DH 1525) which refers to two scriptural texts: ‘[W]hen scripture says, Return to me and I will return to you [Zech 1,3], we are being reminded of our freedom; when we answer, Restore us to yourself, O Lord, that we may be restored [Lam 5,21], we are admitting that we are preceded by the grace of God’. 74 LK 62/56.

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. . . urge that the uncertainty should not merely be endured. We should avert our eyes from it and take seriously, practically and personally the objective efficacy of the absolution pronounced in the sacrament of penance, which comes “from outside”.75 Further on, ‘the true meaning of the Protestant doctrine of the assurance of salvation’ is formulated as follows: [B]ecause we can of ourselves never “subjectively” meet the claims of the divine law, which demands our works, faith should rely on “the most objective thing” there is for the church: the word of God – and this irrespective of the “condition” of the person who relies on it. In brief, the Protestant teaching of justification aims at turning the eyes of the believer away from his or her weak and deceptive self towards God’s promise, which is fully reliable. There is hardly a clue in LK about the reason why Roman Catholics did not pursue this line of thought and even rejected ‘the vain confidence of the heretics’ who merely trust that their sins are forgiven.76 The document does refer to the Roman Catholic fear that the Protestant doctrine is, in the final analysis, a quest for subjective certitude and comfort. The groundlessness of this superficial Roman Catholic objection is easily demonstrated in the document. However, it can be argued that the two Tridentine concerns that were mentioned above lurk underneath this effortlessly dismissed Roman Catholic suspicion. If one seriously considers Trent’s emphasis on the responsibility of the human being throughout God’s dealing with him or her, then it is more difficult to say that in justification the eyes of the believer are only on God’s work in Jesus Christ. The focus is also on the ‘condition’ of the concrete person of the believer. More specifically, the weakness of the human being is not seen by Trent as something one should look away from. Christians ‘ought to tremble about the struggle with the flesh, with the world, with the devil’, not only in contrast to the trustworthiness of God embraced in faith, but also as a fruitful incitement to live according to the Spirit.77 The uncertainty is not something one either endures or looks away from, but it may itself have a fruitful role to play in salvation.78 The idea of created grace equally 75

LK 60/53–54. DH 1533–1534.1562.1564. 77 DH 1541. 78 Both the constructive role of the uncertainty about one’s salvation (and so the fear for the possibility of God’s rejection in his Judgement) and the double role of this uncertainty, 76

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prevents Roman Catholic doctrine from thinking of justification solely in terms of fixing one’s eyes on God’s promise. This is partly for the same reasons as those that were connected to the issue of responsibility: when justification takes place in the created reality of believers, they have also to behold the concrete ‘conditions’ of their life, for it is precisely here that God acts and that they have to respond. Moreover, there is also a thread connecting the concept of created grace with the idea that justification can increase. If the righteousness of the believer is always also created righteousness, then looking at himself or herself is for the believer not necessarily either deceptive self-assurance or truthful despair, but possibly also grateful recognition of growth in righteousness. To be sure, Roman Catholic theologians will find no fault in the thought that faith involves fixing the eyes above all on God’s steadfast love. But not all the crucial Tridentine ‘concerns’ about justification, and about the issue of assurance of salvation in particular, are expressed when one speaks exclusively in this manner. (c) In the section on concupiscence that we have already discussed, the Roman Catholic assertion that concupiscence is not properly sin and the Protestant (Lutheran) view on sin in the justified as peccatum regnatum are said to be equivalent.79 Both would express the conviction that the concupiscence in the justified human being does not separate the believer from God any more. This is definitely a true statement about the common ground of both doctrines. Again, however, something is lost in translation, namely the issues of human responsibility and created grace. In the Roman Catholic act-centred concept of sin, it is plain that free will plays a crucial role in preserving the righteousness that is granted by God. The christocentric notion of ‘dominated sin’, by contrast, may or may not include an appeal to human responsibility to ‘stay in Christ’.80 The same is true for created grace: the distinction between sin and concupiscence facilitates the idea that being grafted into Christ corresponds namely putting one’s trust in God and incitement, is illustrated in canon 8 of Trent’s decree on justification: ‘If anyone says that the fear of hell, because of which we seek refuge in God’s mercy by expressing sorrow for our sins, or refrain from commiting sin, is itself sin or makes sinners worse: let him be anathema’ (DH 1558). 79 LK 52/46. 80 In the interpretation of Mannermaa, for instance, the concept of peccatum regnatum seems to leave room for an appeal to the believer’s responsibility. Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, pp. 69–70. It would be equally possible, however, to interpret it along the lines of a radically extrinsic approach to faith in which any reference to human responsibility in relation to justification would automatically be a manifestation of human haughtiness, so that the ‘rule’ over sin is only looked upon from the perspective of God’s putting the sinner to death and raising him or her. For such interpretations cf. Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther, pp. 285–380; Hampson, Christian Contradictions.

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with an overall movement of the human being away from sin, even if the attraction of and tendency towards sin are still there. The notion of concupiscence which is sin, but whose sinfulness is ‘reigned over’ in the believer corresponds to the Lutheran simul iustus et peccator. The relationship between sinfulness and righteousness in the latter phrase can be conceived in different ways as was pointed out in the discussion of the Finnish Luther school. Not all interpretations allow for a view on justification in terms of a gift of righteousness and a destruction of sin on the created level as a constitutive part of justification. The assertion in LK that peccatum regnatum ‘is only damnable hypothetically, as it were – that is, only if God were not to forgive’ only complicates this issue.81 For surely it is true that Roman Catholicism also has a concept of the sinner who without God is wholly unable to overcome his or her own sinfulness, and thus is damnable. In this sense, the justified is ‘hypothetically damnable’. However, the mere duality of ‘the sinner damnable in him- or herself’ versus ‘the sinner justified for the sake of Christ’ is not able, in the Roman Catholic perspective, to express fully what justification is. For the pure grace of justification is also a change ‘in him- or herself’ and an engagement of the free will ‘in him- or herself’. (d) In the conclusion of the chapter on justification in LK, the specific function of the doctrine of justification in the life of the church is described as follows: That function is continually to remind Christians that we sinners live solely from the forgiving love of God, which we merely allow to be bestowed on us, but which we in no way – in however modified form – “earn” or are able to tie down to any preconditions or postconditions.82 It is important to see that what is called ‘unconditional’ here is not justification, but the ‘forgiving love of God’.83 Pesch, whose terminology of preconditions (Vorbedingungen) and ‘postconditions’ (Nachbedingungen) is adopted in this text, is somewhat ambiguous on this point. He speaks about the unconditionality of both grace and justification.84 The first claim is in line with Trent’s decree on justification: ‘nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, would merit the grace of justification’.85 This does 81

LK 52/46. LK 75/69. 83 Cf. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, p. 319. Martens complains that the documents speak here only about the unconditionality of the grace which lies at the basis of the new life. 84 Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (838. 49). 85 DH 1532. 82

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not settle the question, however, whether the sinner can be justified without any activity of the liberum arbitrium. As we have argued, Trent affirms the necessity of human responsibility in accepting and fostering the gift of righteousness. The text of LK just quoted even affirms this cautiously when it says that we (‘merely’) allow the love of God to be bestowed on us. Moreover, the Tridentine insistence that through mortal sin the righteousness of the justified is destroyed exposes the impossibility, from a Roman Catholic point of view, of a complete dismissal of any concept of conditionality for justification.86 It is in any case unclear which concept of ‘unconditionality’ is being used when one claims that according to Trent the avoiding of mortal sin (and the free choices this involves) is in no respect a condition for being righteous in the eyes of God. The four instances above show that the concepts that are used in LK to express the common understanding of Roman Catholics and Protestants and those by means of which the plausibility of the Protestant position is explained to Roman Catholics have something in common. The dependence of justification on God’s ‘objective’ agency, the turning of the believer’s eyes to God’s absolute reliability, the fact that the believer is ‘hypothetically’ (i.e. without God’s grace) damnable and the unconditionality of God’s love, all belong to the sphere of what Pesch had called ‘existential theology’: the reflection on faith which thinks strictly from within the act of faith, where the believer confesses his or her faith before God. All these concepts may or may not leave room for ‘sapiential’ affirmations of freedom, responsibility and created grace as integral aspects of justification.

c. Different Implications of Recognizing the Consensus The ‘differentiated consensus’ as it is expressed in LK thus seems to imply a common affirmation of the ‘existential’ perspective while allowing for a different stance towards ‘sapiential’ theology. Similarly, JBF permitted both a Lutheran exclusion of human freedom coram Deo and a Roman Catholic affirmation of freedom-in-grace in relation to salvation. This implies that there is a different form of recognition involved when Roman Catholics and Protestants affirm the doctrinal differences as a legitimate diversity. For the 86

One is reminded of the critique of Carl J. Peter of the language of unconditionality in JBF as sole interpretative concept for the reality of justification. Peter’s article reveals that the insights that are offered here also have important ecclesiological consequences. C. J. Peter, ‘Justification by Faith and the Need of Another Critical Principle’, in Justification by Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII, ed. H. G. Anderson, J. A. Burgess, and T. A. Murphy (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 304–15.

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former, it is a recognition of the legitimacy of a teaching in which the sapiential aspects are seriously minimized, even if the Protestant perspective in LK does not always wholly exclude these aspects. For the Protestant dialogue partner, the structure of the consensus implies that the affirmation of LK and JBF entails the recognition of the legitimacy of a teaching in which these sapiential elements are more strongly emphasized (and, therefore, that these elements are no reason to declare a teaching illegitimate). Once again, we suspect that the affirmation of this legitimate diversity is less demanding for Roman Catholics because it is perfectly conceivable from a Tridentine perspective to deny human freedom coram Deo – provided that this denial is limited to certain pastoral or theological contexts. That the affirmation of the legitimate diversity expressed in LK and JBF is indeed difficult to accept for certain Lutherans is shown by a debate between the Lutheran theologian Jorg Baur on the one hand and Otto Hermann Pesch and Ulrich Kühn on the other hand. Baur published a polemical reaction against the section on justification in LK.87 Part of his criticism of LK is a discussion of the ‘christological ground’ of the German (and the American) dialogue, expressed in the statement: ‘Christians have no other basis for eternal life and hope of final salvation than God’s free gift in Jesus Christ, extended to them in the Holy Spirit’.88 Baur says that this statement: . . . leaves open in an untenable way whether this ‘basis’ refers to the very life of the justified or only to its presuppositions. Furthermore, the phrase ‘extended to them in the Holy Spirit’ is defenceless against the interpretation that it concerns a conveyance of a supernatural endowment to the Christian subject.89 This quotation shows two things. First, Baur does not really take into consideration the Roman Catholic ‘transcendental’ approach to the relation between divine and human agency. ‘God’s gift in Jesus Christ’ is either identical to the life of the justified or it disappears into the background as a mere presupposition of the person’s self-contained activity. A view on justification in which Christ is the very reality which constitutes the life of the justified, while not excluding the free agency of that same Christian in 87

Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung? JBF §156; LK 43/36. 89 ‘[Die] abständige Redeweise von der einzigen “Grundlage des ewigen Lebens”, die “als Gottes freies Geschenk in Jesus Christus” bestimmt wird, läbt es in unvertretbarer Weise offen, ob diese “Grundlage” das Leben des Gerechtfertigten selbst oder nur dessen Voraussetzung meint. Zudem ist die Wendung “ihnen mitgeteilt im Heiligen Geist” wehrlos gegen die Deutung, es handle sich um die Vermittlung einer übernatürlichen Ausstattung an das christlichen Subjekt’ Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung?, p. 15. 88

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the event of justification is simply unintelligible within Baur’s frame of reference.90 Secondly, precisely because of his way of thinking, Baur believes that a teaching on justification should contain sufficient defence against the threat of ‘sapiential’ elements such as the idea of created grace. Any suggestion that justification means that the external righteousness of Christ becomes ours in a causal way – and not only through proclamation of the gospel – in the end throws the Christian back on himself or herself, thus leading to a conscience in despair and to haughty autonomous human action.91 In other words, the problem with LK is that even in all its ‘existential’ orientation, it does not resolutely reject the ‘sapiential’ perspective. In their ‘friendly answer’ to Baur’s criticism Pesch and Kühn reproduce the ambiguity that was present in the dialogues. On the one hand they admit that Baur is right in stressing the ‘strict and unalterable foundationconsequence relation between declaring righteous and sanctification, between faith and love, and between grace and work’.92 On the other hand, they interpret this foundation-consequence relation in such a way that it can accommodate the Roman Catholic transcendental view on grace and works. In response to Baur’s rejection of the Roman Catholic idea of justifying faith as fides caritate formata, Pesch and Kühn point out, first, the meaning of the medieval concept of ‘love’; namely self-surrender and a looking away from oneself. Hence, caritas implies precisely the opposite of the autonomy and self-importance which Baur fears.93 The person’s ‘own’ subjectivity is, one could say, disowned in the free act of love. The fact remains, however, that the human being is still seen as a free agent even in this interpretation of love. Secondly, therefore, Kühn and Pesch make a distinction between the theological and the psychological level. The crucial statement in their defence of the Tridentine teaching against the assaults of Baur is: ‘What appears psychologically as a “free” act of the human being is theologically completely an act of God’.94 So the fear of Baur that in the Tridentine scheme the priority of grace becomes in fact merely a 90

Cf. Baur describes the position of Trent as: ‘Die Gerechtigkeit Gottes ist die unsrige, denn sie haftet uns an’. This reasoning demonstrates that he does not consider the possibility that the believer is made righteous by God’s justice which fundamentally remains God’s justice. Ibid., p. 103. 91 Ibid., pp. 64–65. 92 Kühn and Pesch, Rechtfertigung im Disput, p. 29. 93 Ibid., p. 24. This ‘ecstatic’ concept of love is also emphasized by Rahner in his commentary on Küng’s book on Barth and justification: Rahner, ‘Fragen der Kontroverstheologie über die Rechtfertigung’ (248–56). 94 ‘Was psychologisch als “freier” Akt des Menschen erscheint, ist theologisch ganz und gar Tat Gottes’. Kühn and Pesch, Rechtfertigung im Disput, p. 56 [this appears in a part of the book that is written only by Pesch].

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presupposition of autonomous human action is countered by the assurance that the subjectivity of the human being is merely ‘“the place” where God’s justifying action asserts itself’.95 One could ask the question whether Baur would be convinced by these arguments. It is quite probable that he would not. First, the reference to the ecstatic concept of love does not meet the requirements of Baur’s theology of justification because, unlike faith as he understands it, love is always also the lover actively surrendering. It thus belongs to the realm of law and brings about the dangers of law when it is seen as a way to salvation: selfsatisfaction and the debilitating and tormenting question whether one has loved enough. Secondly the distinction between theology and psychology, which bans human freedom to the domain of psychology, is deeply problematic from Baur’s point of view. It is clear that the distinction coincides with what Pesch had called ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ theology, the former speaking from within the act of faith and acknowledging above all the great things God has accomplished and the latter reflecting further on the consequences and presuppositions of these acts. The objection of Baur to the psychological interpretation of freedom is foreseeable; it allows all the vices that are excluded on the theological level to re-enter through the backdoor of the psychological level. As was mentioned in the chapter on Pesch, the psychological reality of faith was for Pesch a reason to conclude that the foundation-consequence scheme of faith and works is simply inadequate to describe the complex reality of faith.96 One easily gets the impression that this foundation-consequence scheme is affirmed here to arouse the benevolence of Lutheran theologians who hold an extrinsic view on justification. What remains somewhat concealed is the fact that the affirmation of the ‘psychological’ freedom of the human being in justification actually blurs this scheme. The above reflection on the answer of Pesch and Kühn is not meant as a critique of the theological or ecumenical position they represent. It only seeks to demonstrate that the resistance of a theologian like Baur against the project of LK is not necessarily caused by stubbornness or nonconformism, but is the consequence of the inner logic of what is clearly a coherent theological position. This logic clashes with the structure of the dialogue itself and its somewhat ambiguous attitude towards sapiential theology (namely both upholding and minimizing it). Pesch and Kühn are definitely right in stating that Baur represents only one strand within 95 96

Ibid., p. 57. Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (866).

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Lutheran theology. But the fact that Baur’s approach is hardly reconcilable with the ecumenical strategy which Pesch and Kühn keep defend shows that this ecumenical project at least contradicts this particular strand of Lutheran theology.

IV. The Problem of Doctrine a. Doctrine and the Reality of Faith Baur’s fierce criticism of the German (and the American) dialogue on justification may cause astonishment among ecumenically minded theologians. It would be tempting to dismiss such attacks as examples of a narrow-minded confessional chauvinism. This counter criticism would be somewhat unfair, however, because it ascribes to Baur an exaggerated and, in the final analysis, non-theological attachment to certain theological ideas. It is more reasonable to assume that he has first of all theological reasons to formulate his criticism. Baur attempts to draw a clear line of demarcation between true and false teaching. The only true teaching on the righteousness of the Christian is the one which excludes all ‘sapiential’ elements. LK has drawn another line, which was less sharp, but which nonetheless distinguishes true from false teaching. A true doctrine of justification acknowledges all crucial ‘concerns’ expressed in the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic traditions and has Christ the sole Redeemer as its ultimate point of reference. Therefore, the debate is a doctrinal one. The critical question is: Which criterion is there to separate truth from falsity when it comes to justification? A closer analysis of some reactions to the American dialogue on justification will demonstrate that demarcation is indeed the key issue in the whole discussion about the legitimate difference proposed in the ecumenical dialogues. This analysis will also show that doctrinal demarcation is not simply a matter of safeguarding confessional identities. What is at stake, rather, is the reality of faith. The official response of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)97 to JBF distinguishes between theology and doctrine. The response 97

Cf. ‘Responses to the US Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement on Justification’ (342–49). The ELCA came into being in 1988 when three American Lutheran churches were united. Previously, two of these churches, the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in America, had already produced responses to JBF, which were more critical than the later ELCA text. Cf. W. G. Rusch, ‘The History and Methodology of the Joint Declaration on Justification: A Case Study in Ecumenical Reception’, in Agapè: Études en l’honneur de Mgr. Pierre Duprey, ed. J.-M. Tillard (Geneva: Centre Orthodoxe du Patriarcat Oecuménique, 2000), pp. 169–84 (173).

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speaks about two proposals that are made in JBF: (1) a convergence of the theological models that are used by Lutherans and Roman Catholics to explicate the reality of justification and (2) a consensus at the level of doctrine, ‘about what must be said and what cannot be said about justification and salvation for the Church to remain faithful to the gospel of Jesus Christ’.98 The ELCA response itself is almost unreservedly positive in its assessment of both proposals. The distinction between theology and doctrine is not inadequate, but it is probably more precise to follow Gottfried Martens on this point and to distinguish between three levels in JBF: not only the teachings of the churches and the theological concerns, but also the common experience of faith shared by Lutherans and Roman Catholics. He rightly considers this third level as the joint focus that unites the different concerns.99 It is the fundamental Christological affirmation which serves to aim all doctrines (and practices) of the church towards the promotion of this faith experience of ultimate hope and trust in God. Of course, the response of the ELCA does not ignore this third level. Rather, it merges the levels of doctrine and faith experience. For the fundamental affirmation is seen as the expression of ‘a basic doctrinal consensus’. It ‘imposes limits to diversity’ in the field of theology by excluding ‘beliefs, practices and theologies inconsistent with seeing Christ as our entire and ultimate hope of salvation’.100 This reveals the unmistakable doctrinal quality of the ‘fundamental affirmation’ in JBF. It determines ‘what must be said and what cannot be said’ and all other doctrines are subordinate to this norm. It is precisely the elevation of the joint Christological affirmation to a kind of ultimate criterion which troubled Roman Catholic and Lutheran critics of the document. One could say that both want to safeguard the proper normative quality of the doctrines peculiar to each tradition over against attempts in JBF to reduce them to concerns or to subsume them under a higher criterion. A closer look at two instances of such criticism will reveal the underlying ‘concern’ of these critics. The Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod (LCMS), a more conservative American Lutheran denomination, acknowledges in its response to JBF that one could talk about a theological convergence between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. However, the response firmly denies that there is a doctrinal consensus on justification, a consensus which it deems necessary

98

‘Responses to the US Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement on Justification’ (344). Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, p. 252. 100 ‘Responses to the US Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement on Justification’ (347). 99

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for ecclesial unity.101 One of the main grounds for this denial is the conviction that JBF insufficiently presents justification as articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae. Justification is described in JBF too much as one of the biblical metaphors for salvation, rather than as ‘the wholeness of the gospel itself’ which creates the church and all other teachings.102 In one and the same breath, the LCMS response claims that no concessions can be made with regard to the content of the doctrine and that all transformational elements should be excluded. The connection between these two elements, justification as articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae and a radically nontransformational interpretation of its content, remains somewhat implicit here. In Gottfried Martens’ criticism of JBF the relationship between both is clearer. He says that the method followed by JBF leads to the concept of justification as an image rather than an event.103 What disappears is justification as the act of God in which He pronounces sinners righteous. Instead, the doctrine of justification becomes the business of theologians and churchmen, who have to develop man-made words and concepts that promote hope and trust in God. What also disappears, according to Martens, is justification as liturgical event of word and sacrament in which Christ is the sole agent. Abstracted from the reality of this context, the idea of justification as a proclamation of righteousness is misinterpreted as a ‘legal fiction’ which has to be supplemented by a more ‘realistic’ and ‘effective’ interpretation.104 What underlies the criticism of Martens is, in the final analysis, his emphasis on doctrina as a sacramental event.105 The doctrine of justification is not a knowledge about the salvation of the sinner, but rather the very occurrence of this salvation. Therefore, it cannot be seen as a historically conditioned translation of a broader phenomenon (‘salvation’) for which other translations (such as transformational ones) are also possible. Any addition of another perspective than sinners being proclaimed righteous would destroy the reality of the event itself.106 The response of the USA National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) is slightly more cautious than the reaction of ELCA, but far more positive than the LCMS response. The main hesitation concerns the paragraphs on justification as a criterion. The response states that the differences regarding 101

Ibid. (352). Ibid. (351). 103 ‘Die Rechtfertigung ist im Rahmen ihrer Methode prinzipiell nur noch ein Bild, das auf etwas verweist, und kein Geschehen’. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, p. 252. 104 Ibid., p. 261. 105 Ibid., pp. 23–24. 106 In order to be ‘watertight’, this description would need further specification in terms of sola fide and the right distinction between law and gospel. Both are presupposed here. 102

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this point ‘may well point to a profound ecclesiological difference between Catholics and Lutherans. It could be that our different concepts of Church are not reconcilable by the mutual recognition of each other’s religious concerns and thought-patterns’.107 This concern returns when the NCCB speaks about the ‘fundamental affirmation’ in JBF. The response does not question the value of the affirmation as a decisive criterion, but highlights the fact that it is only about the ultimate trust of Christians. This does not exclude ‘a penultimate trust in the Church’.108 Similar and more developed reflections are elaborated by the Roman Catholic theologian Carl J. Peter in Justification by Faith and the Need of Another Critical Principle, an essay that was published in the same volume as JBF.109 Peter draws an analogy between the criteriological role of justification in JBF and what Paul Tillich had called the ‘protestant principle’, a principle which criticizes every created reality – particularly every ecclesial reality – that sets itself up as a condition for God’s grace. Peter sees a similarity here with the language of unconditionality which is used in contemporary Lutheran theology and in JBF to make explicit how the article of justification is ‘judge and ruler’ over all church life and teaching. Peter does not object to the protestant principle, but, still using Tillichian terminology, he wonders what is to happen to the ‘catholic substance’ – that is: the whole body of ecclesial traditions, institutions and practices – in the light of justification as criterion. He suggests that this ‘substance’ can easily be damaged by the protestant principle, which is critical rather than constructive. As such, this concern does not go beyond JBF, which states that Catholics ‘are on guard against criticism that might erode the catholic heritage’ (§120) and that Lutherans are equally convinced ‘that the principle of justification by faith alone must not be employed to erode the fullness of the apostolic heritage and of the means whereby this heritage is to be mediated in any given time and place’ (§117). Peter’s proposal is, however, to supplement the protestant principle with another principle that needs to protect the catholic substance against ‘erosion’. He suggests that one might call it the ‘Principle of Respect for the Divine in its Concrete Realizations’ and he formulates it as follows: ‘Be not so prone to expect sin and abuse that you fail to recognize God’s grace where it is at work’.110 There is a parallel here with the insistence of Otto Hermann Pesch that justification as church-critical instance (as ‘protestant 107

‘Responses to the US Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement on Justification’ (338). Ibid. (340). Peter, ‘Justification by Faith and the Need of another Critical Principle’. 110 Ibid. (309–10). 108 109

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principle’) can only be used in contexts that are worthy of criticism and that it should not destroy ‘the naïve and joyful participation in the church’ that mostly characterizes the faith of Christian believers.111 But, although Pesch did not provide a strong theological foundation of this ‘participation in the church’, Peter interprets it in terms of God’s presence in the church. It is because God promised to be active in the life of the community of believers that there is holiness in the church, a holiness that should not be denied for fear of idolatry. This stronger ecclesiological – and, one could say, ‘sacramental’ – approach prevents Peter from wholeheartedly accepting the language of unconditionality. He wonders whether (even in the Lutheran churches) ecclesial elements such as the preached word and the sacraments are not seen as ‘subsequent conditions’ (something Pesch had explicitly rejected112). What is important in this proposal is that it is not only a concern which is expressed, but also the need for a principle. This has serious consequences for the assessment of JBF, for it implies that the criterion of ultimate hope and trust in God, expressed in the fundamental affirmation, is insufficient as sole normative instance that decides about ‘what must be said and what cannot be said’. Surely, what Peter calls the ‘penultimate trust’ in the church is distinguishable from the believer’s ultimate trust in God alone. But this does not mean that the penultimate has no normative value whatsoever. The ‘other principle’ needs to safeguard this penultimate trust against blasphemy. It is a doctrinal element that protects the realism of faith: the real presence of the ultimate in the penultimate. It is striking that both Martens and Peter, each from a different perspective, question the agreement reached in JBF – or at least consider it in need of modification – because it is an unsatisfactory expression of justification as doctrine. The reason for the deficiency is in both cases given as the fact that the description of the doctrine of justification in JBF fails to bring out the efficacy of the divine action. The doctrinal elements which Peter and Martens see neglected in JBF are theological expressions of the reality of the believer’s encounter with God. It is no coincidence that, in making their points clear, both theologians refer to the reality of preaching in the concrete life of the believer. For Martens the preaching which properly distinguishes law and gospel and which proclaims the total sinner totally righteous is, as we have seen, a sacramental event in which justification becomes reality. Any other kind of preaching does not console the conscience of the believer. 111 112

See supra section 2.II.b. Cf. Pesch’s dismissal of any ‘Nachbedingungen’. Supra section 2.II.d.

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Peter, by contrast, claims that an appeal to the freedom of the believer in preaching does not necessarily lead to anxiety or self-complacency. He thinks that, on the contrary, the absence of any moral and spiritual growth combined with the repeated hearing of the promise of forgiveness will eventually lead to despair.113 It should be clear that the respective doctrinal elements which Peter and Martens consider crucial (as well as their respective pastoral consequences) are diametrically opposed to each other. What both want to preserve, however, is the specific way both traditions conceive of the active presence of God to the believer. Apparently, both view doctrine as having the function of protecting and invoking justification as reality.

b. Primary and Secondary Criteria The problem of doctrine as demarcation emerged already in the first phase of the official international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. One section in GC attempts to identify the ‘criteria for the church’s proclamation’. It offers a pneumatological account of the question of criteria: ‘The primary criterion is the Holy Spirit making the Christ event into a saving action’ (GC §18). This is in line with the emphasis in GC on the gospel as the communication of an event, namely of God’s saving action in Christ, rather than a set of propositions (GC §16 and §24). Doctrinal authority in the church is, therefore, in every respect bound to the reality of faith, this means, in the first place, to the event of God’s saving action, but also to Scripture as a normative witness to this event and to the working of God’s Spirit who makes the good news present to us. This common affirmation of the essential dependence of the teaching authority of the churches is not simply one point of consensus among others, but rather an essential ecumenical principle which enables churches to view their doctrinal differences in the much broader perspective of God’s salvific agency. Subordinating church authority to a higher authority opens up the 113

Peter, ‘Justification by Faith and the Need of another Critical Principle’ (312–13). Peter’s reflections on preaching are not unlike the pastoral concerns behind Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s critique of ‘cheap grace’. In Bonhoeffer’s view, the one-sided emphasis on faith as presupposition of obedience eventually leads to a deadlock. For the one who is refusing simple obedience to the call of Christ, God’s proclamation of forgiveness will eventually lose all its meaning. He or she wonders why this proclamation has no effect in his or her life and this leads to despair. This situation can only be overcome by the call for simple obedience. The insight that ‘only the believer obeys’ has to be supplemented by the view that ‘only the obedient believes’. Cf. D. Bonhoeffer, Discipleship (ed. M. Kuske and I. Tödt; Works, 4; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), pp. 67–69. It would be interesting to study how Bonhoeffer makes this claim while remaining within a Lutheran theological ‘pattern of thought’.

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possibility of a legitimate diversity of authoritative teachings in the churches. However, already in GC it is clear that things are more complex than that. One of the main problems is that it is easier to acknowledge the ‘higher authority’ of ‘God’s saving action’ and of ‘the word’ and ‘the gospel’ than to explain precisely how they function as criteria.114 Therefore, GC refers to ‘secondary criteria’ that elucidate ‘how the power of the Holy Spirit can be concretely identified as criterion’ (GC §18). GC goes on to mention such secondary criteria, namely ‘the living word of preaching’, the Confessions and the situation of a status confessionis for Lutherans (GC §19) and ‘the reciprocal interaction of official and unofficial charisma’ on the Roman Catholic side (GC §20). But this description of the relationship between the primary and the secondary criteria has a complexity that cannot wholly be captured in a distinction between a norma normans and normae normatae. For apparently the secondary criteria are needed in order for the primary criterion to be recognized as a criterion, so that one is almost compelled to believe that the primary criterion is in some sense (epistemically, rather than ontologically) bound to the secondary criteria (which would immediately explain why the latter are called ‘criteria’ in the first place). The objections to JBF brought up by Gottfried Martens and Carl J. Peter demonstrate that for some theologians the relationship between primary and secondary criteria is not clarified in an adequate way in the ecumenical dialogue. Martens clearly sees the sacramental event of the proclamation of the gospel as the primary criterion, sharply distinguished and even separated from all other criteria, which can only function as ‘law’. Peter’s request for ‘another principle’, by contrast, draws attention to the necessity of certain secondary criteria, for without them the absolute rule of the primary criterion simply leads to blasphemy. These considerations are a serious challenge for the theological convergence and the doctrinal consensus proposed in JBF. Already in the historical part of JBF, the difference between the Lutheran and the Roman

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With regard to the beloved Lutheran concepts ‘word’, ‘kerygma’ and ‘gospel’, Krister Stendahl, who was a member of the dialogue commission, somewhat mockingly said in a paper: ‘I am very suspicious of the hypostasis “the word”, the fourth member of the Lutheran trinity, our worthy competitor with the Mary of the Roman Catholics. I am highly suspicious of the hypostasis “kerygma” which speaks and acts. . . . Since I am highly suspicious of such language habits, I am also critical about our use of the word Gospel’. K. Stendahl, ‘The Question Concerning the Gospel as Center and the Gospel as Totality of the New Testament Witness’, in Evangelium-Welt-Kirche: Schlußbericht und Referate der römisch-katholisch/ evangelisch-lutherischen Studienkommission ‘Das Evangelium und die Kirche’, 1967–1971, ed. H. Meyer (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 1975), pp. 97–109.

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Catholic position was described as a different attitude towards the growing theological speculation on the human role in salvation. Both doctrinal traditions are said to be rooted in an ‘authentic’ theological tradition: one in which such speculation does not diminish the absolute priority of God’s justifying grace and one which needed to exclude this speculation in order to safeguard the liberating proclamation of the gospel. The description of the developments in pre-Reformation theology of justification in terms of this ‘growing speculation’ may suggest that these developments were an accident of history or the result of the theoretical fancy of theologians. This may be true to a certain extent. The decisive question is, however, to what extent this ‘speculation’ is considered as an inalienable part of the doctrine of justification, as something what ‘must be said’. The Tridentine decree on justification seems to answer this question in the affirmative. Reformation theology, for its part, is presented in JBF as a necessary reaction against grave distortions in ecclesial life and teaching. It came to the conclusion that the exclusion of the speculation in question is necessary for the right proclamation of the gospel. The next question is then why two ‘authentic’ traditions can hold diametrically opposite views concerning this ‘speculation about the human role’, asserting respectively its necessity and its necessary exclusion? Obviously this problem is closely related to the issue of existential and sapiential theology. Roman Catholic theology seems to insist that a certain perspective – the sapiential ‘speculation’ about the human person’s return to God and his or her active involvement in this event – should be included in the teaching on justification, whereas Lutheran theology precisely wants to exclude this perspective and to limit the doctrine of justification to the ‘existential’ situation of sinners to whom the faith-provoking proclamation is addressed that God has done everything in Christ that is necessary for their salvation. It is clear then that the need for doctrinal demarcation makes the ambiguity about the legitimacy of ‘sapiential’ elements in Christian doctrine a far more pressing issue. c. Ecclesiological Ramifications The NCCB response to JBF suggested that ‘a profound ecclesiological difference’ may underlie the discussions about justification as (primary) criterion. This ecclesiological side of the debate about the right criteria can be further explained by referring to a reaction by the German Jesuit Werner Löser to the German study on the condemnations. Löser argues that in the Tridentine decree on justification the ecclesiological and

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sacramental background of justification remains implicit and conceptually underdeveloped.115 The sapiential terminology of grace ‘abiding’ (inhaerens) in the believer (can. 11) suggests an approach to justification that is focused on the individual believer. Löser demonstrates, however, that in the light of the Chapters 3–7 of the decree and of the developments in Roman Catholic teaching up to the Second Vatican Council, gratia inhaerens may be interpreted in terms of ‘church membership through baptism’. The council fathers did already have this ecclesiological meaning of justification in mind, but it remained hidden for a lack of appropriate terminology. The council does relate justification to baptism and penance, but it does not highlight the ecclesial character of these sacraments. In the subsequent history of Roman Catholic theology and doctrine, this was made more explicit, for instance, by means of the idea of the sacramentality of the church. There are other elements in the decree on justification which support the analysis of Löser, such as the assertion, that ‘faith unless hope is added to it and charity too, neither unites him perfectly with Christ nor makes him a living member of his body’.116 The ‘engrafting’ of the believer into Christ, which is the basis for other specific ‘sapiential’ emphases in the decree (free cooperation, active love, merit), seems to be connected here to participation in the life of the church as the body of Christ, even if this connection is not further elaborated. While Löser finds a clue to this implicit ecclesial view on justification in the sacramentology of the decree, it would be equally possible to broaden this interpretation with the aid of more ‘moral’ concepts such as love and mortal sin. In Chapter 15, the decree states ‘that the grace of justification once received is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin, though faith is not lost’.117 This means that being and remaining ‘in Christ’ is not only a matter of faith, for one can believe and at the same time have lost one’s righteousness before God because of grave sin. This further implies two things. First, it is not possible to spell out the Roman Catholic view on justification by means of a ‘pure’ distinction of law and gospel. For in the Tridentine interpretation being engrafted into Christ – or being children and heirs of God – is not only a matter of faithfully receiving the promise (‘gospel’), but also of abiding by a set of fundamental 115

Löser, ‘Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?’. DH 1531 (italics is mine). 117 ‘[N]on modo infedelitate, per quam et ipsa fides amittitur, sed etiam quocumque alio mortali peccato, quamvis non amittatur fides, acceptam iustificationis gratiam amitti’ (DH 1544). 116

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commandments in the field of faith and morals (‘law’). Secondly, this ‘law’ which is a condition for preserving the believer’s being in Christ is always ecclesially mediated and specified. For even if the ‘mortality’ of fornication is a message, one can directly find in Scripture (1 Cor 6, 9–10) the question of what counts as fornication is one that is answered within the ecclesial community.118 To put it more generally, just as the seemingly ontological language of gratia inhaerens might have involved, the implicit idea of belonging to the church through baptism, the presence of love in the heart of the believer (and its loss by mortal sin) was probably in Trent a matter of moral and spiritual growth (or corruption) within the regulating context of a community of faith, rather than a matter of an individual soul possessing (or losing) a certain ‘quality’. The sacramental and the ‘moral’ ways of describing the ecclesial nature of the Tridentine teaching on justification are mutually implicative. The moral community is the sacramental community and vice versa.119 What is clear from this sacramental-moral background of the Tridentine decree on justification is that, in an indirect way, ecclesial belonging is seen as integral to the believer’s being ‘in Christ’ and so to his or her righteousness before God. This belonging cannot be considered as something that is situated on one side of the gospel-law distinction. It always involves a demand which is addressed to the believer and which has to be met in order for him or her to remain engrafted into Christ. Hence, the ‘fear and trembling’ and the constant appeal in Trent to the believer’s free arbitrium. This implies that, in the Tridentine view, justification cannot be the sole criterion for the life and teaching of the church, at least when this unique position of the article of justification would involve a denial of the constitutive salvific role of the just demands of the law and of the free human response to them. Trent does not attempt to preserve purity in the teaching on justification that excludes from the article of justification everything that is a demand to be fulfilled by the liberated human being. The council does seems to use the criterion that grace always precedes temporally and structurally any involvement of human agency in justification. This is clear when the decree on justification speaks about conversion, the causes of 118

See the letter Sub catholicae professione (1254) of pope Innocent IV in which he answers the question whether fornication between two unbound persons (male and female) is a mortal sin (DH 835). A similar question can be asked, of course, with regard to murder. That murder is a ‘mortal sin’ is clear in the Roman Catholic tradition, but whether killing in a war, the execution of a death penalty, abortion or euthanasia are cases of murder is to be determined in an ecclesial context in contingent historical situations. 119 The ecclesial determination of what is mortal sin and what is venial sin adjudicates, for instance, how believers in certain situation should participate in the sacraments.

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justification and the meritorious nature of the good works of the believer. But the fact that this priority of grace does not exclude a constitutive role for the human answer in justification automatically means that the Tridentine doctrine of justification connects itself to the ‘other criteria’ that articulate and specify what it means for a human being to be made a child of God. All this shows that the question about the legitimacy of sapiential theology, that is the doctrinal question whether it is something which ‘must be said’ or something which ‘cannot be said’ about justification, touches upon a broader set of questions, including questions about the role of the church in justification.

V. The German Dialogue and the Problem of Reception In order to set the stage for an analysis of the JDDJ (and of its reception), it is necessary to deal with one last topic that is related to the national dialogues on justification, namely the way the German study on the condemnations was received by the churches. Official ecclesial reception was an integral part of the goal of the whole enterprise of LK. Without some authoritative act of approval, the non-applicability of the historical condemnations to the presentday dialogue partner can be argued for theologically, but not ‘declared’ by the churches for whom they are binding. The Final Report, which was sent by the chairs of the GÖK to the German Episcopal Conference and to the Council of the EKD, asked ‘the leading bodies of the churches involved to express in binding form that the sixteenth-century condemnations no longer apply to today’s partner, inasmuch as its doctrine is not determined by the error which the condemnation wished to avert’.120 In their letter to the study commission (ÖAK), the same chairmen of GÖK had announced that they would ask the churches ‘to give the document [LK] the greatest possible degree of church recognition’.121 Even if the second phrase sounds somewhat more self-confident (and less self-evident), the problem is in both cases the same. On its own, the German Episcopal Conference is not entitled to give the ‘binding’ affirmation, let alone the ‘greatest possible degree of church recognition’, that is asked for. In relation to the Lutheran church, which is particularly relevant here in view of the JDDJ, this creates an asymmetry. For the United Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Germany (Vereinigte evangelisch-lutherische Kirche Deutschlands – VELKD) did arrive at a

120 121

LK 195/186. LK 187/177.

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decision with regard to LK which can be considered as ‘the greatest possible degree of recognition’, in the sense that this recognition does not depend on another ecclesial body outside of its own members. The reception, especially on the Protestant side, was a long and complex process which will not be described in detail here.122 The complexity of the Protestant reception is mainly related to the plurality of the denominations involved (Lutheran, Reformed, United), the complicated situation of prereunification Germany, and the way the different local and supra-local levels interacted in the ecclesial consultation. For the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, the joint standpoint of the VELKD and the German National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation (DNK-LWB) is the most significant document, in which the theological arguments of LK are discussed extensively.123 After a consultation of the member churches about the results of this study, the VELKD and other German Protestant churches, which had followed similar procedures, drew up and approved a joint statement, which was handed by the end of 1994 by the EKD to the German Bishops Conference and to Pope John Paul II. On the Roman Catholic side, the reception process was less complex and less transparent. It took place on two levels: national and supra-national. In 1986, the German Bishops Conference established a study group which was to scrutinize the arguments of LK in preparation for an official statement, which was issued in 1994.124 The statement of the German Bishops states that it takes into account the ‘evaluation’ (Gutachten) which had been produced between 1990 and 1992 by order of the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity (PCPCU).125 The latter 122

Helpful descriptions of and commentaries on the reception process, both in the Roman Catholic Church and in the Protestant churches, are available: H. Goertz, Dialog und Rezeption: die Rezeption evangelisch-lutherisch/römisch-katholischer Dialogdokumente in der VELKD und die römisch-katholische Kirche (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 2002), pp. 164–90; W. Pannenberg and T. Schneider, Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend? Bd 4: Antworten auf kirchliche Stellungnahmen (Dialog der Kirchen, 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994); Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, pp. 55–63. 123 ‘Stellungnahme des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschland und des Deutschen Nationalkomitees des Lutherischen Weltbundes zum Dokument Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?’ in Lehrverurteilungen im Gespräch: Die ersten offiziellen Stellungnahmen aus den evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 57–160. 124 Stellungnahme der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz zur Studie “Lehrverurteilungen kirchentrennend?” (Die deutschen Bischöfe, 52; Bonn: 1994). 125 Gutachten für den Päpstlichen Rates zur Förderung der Einheit der Christen zur Studie “Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?” (1992). We do not know whether there are different versions of this document. We will refer to the page numbers of the copy we received from the library of the Centro pro unione in Rome which mentions the year 1992 and contains 115 pages.

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initiative is justified in the Gutachten itself by referring to the ‘universal ecclesial relevance’ of the themes discussed in LK. Undoubtedly, the request to the churches to give LK ‘the greatest possible degree of church recognition’ was also a reason for involving the Vatican in the discussion.126 In the light of this request, it is problematic, however, that the Gutachten itself was never published (and was even explicitly put under an embargo), so that it cannot be viewed as part of an official response from Rome. Nor was it sent to official representatives of the Protestant churches involved. It was only conveyed to the study group that composed LK (ÖAK) with the request for an assessment and a further discussion on the ‘open questions’. This procedure has been the object of some irritation on the Protestant side.127 It may indeed give the impression of a refusal to give a fully authoritative official response, or even of ‘secret diplomacy’. A more generous interpretation is possible, however. The fact that the document was sent to the ÖAK can be seen as an unprecedented invitation to dialogue on the part of the Vatican.128 Instead of immediately bringing an authoritative response into public view, the PCPCU apparently judged that first an additional exchange of ideas was needed. The fact that an official reaction from Rome was not forthcoming is both problematic and understandable in the light of the aim of LK: to investigate whether the condemnations are applicable to the contemporary dialogue partner. As was argued above, this aim made a discussion of the positive content of the respective teachings on justification unavoidable. However, an exposition of the content of Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrine is not the only element necessary in order to attain the goal of withdrawing the condemnations. An official endorsement of this content as it is presented 126

The requests of the chairmen of the GÖK to ‘make binding statements’ and to give ‘the greatest possible degree of church recognition’ are repeated in the introduction to the statement by the German Bishops. It remains unclear, however, whether the statement views itself as the response that is asked for. The statement does not comment on the GÖK requests but only refers immediately in the next paragraph to the Gutachten. This at least creates the impression that the fact that LK is also discussed on the level of the PCPCU serves as an assurance that the Roman Catholic Church is at least ‘working on it’ at the highest possible level. 127 Birmelé makes the mildly ironical comment: ‘Comme d’habitude l’insistance sur le caractère confidentiel et la non-publication de ce document auront contribué au fait qu’il fut rapidement largement connu et amplement commenté’. Birmelé, La communion ecclésiale, p. 60. Harald Goertz, by virtue of his strictly juridical concept of reception, decides not to take into account the Gutachten in his study of the reception of LK. Goertz, Dialog und Rezeption, p. 180. 128 Cf. D. Sattler, ‘Zum Gutachten des Einheitsrates: Analyse - Anfragen - Konsequenzen’, in Lehrverurteilungen-kirchentrennend? Bd 4: Antworten auf kirchliche Stellungnahmen, ed. W. Pannenberg and T. Schneider (Dialog der Kirchen 8, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), pp. 101–20 (101).

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in LK is also indispensable. In their letter to the churches, the chairmen of GÖK therefore give the directive: ‘The churches, their teachers of theology, and their clergy should interpret the Protestant Confessions and the statements of the magisterium of the Roman Catholic church in the light of the recognitions [Erkenntnisse] formulated here’.129 Even though one could take this as a simple request to look at the teaching of the dialogue partner in the way it is interpreted in LK, it is clear that the whole project and the reliability of its conclusions are also called into question when the churches read their own teachings in a way that differs substantially from LK. For in that case there is again uncertainty about the teachings that are potentially the object of condemnation. The response of VELKD/DNK-LWB is ambiguous in this respect. On the one hand, it says that it can only give a conditional approval to the results of LK, particularly when it concerns condemnations which may have been applicable in the past, but which no longer apply to today’s partner due to a development in its teaching.130 In that case, the Lutheran churches can only agree to a withdrawal of a certain condemnation when they have a ‘magisterial’ guarantee that today’s Roman Catholic teaching has really changed on this issue. In that sense, the lack of an official Roman Catholic response to LK is problematic. On the other hand, however, the VELKD/DNK-LWB text says that, for their part, they cannot meet the demand of the GÖK to explain the Protestant confessional writings in the light of LK ‘if this means that the document would constitute an interpretative instance vis-à-vis the confessional writings’.131 This would contradict the way these authoritative writings are understood in the Lutheran tradition. The statement only promises to ‘bring up’ LK whenever the confessional writings are interpreted. In the Gutachten for the PCPCU, this problem emerges with regard to the canons 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Tridentine decree on justification.132 The Gutachten positively assesses the attempt in LK to demonstrate that these condemnations do not apply to today’s dialogue partner.133 Yet the eventual conclusion about the canons is also conditional. The document refers to the negative response – or rather: assault – of the theological faculty of Göttingen to LK.134 The Gutachten states that if the Lutheran interpretation of justification emphasizes the sole activity of God to such an extent ‘that 129

LK 195/186. ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (69). 131 Ibid. (158). 132 Gutachten, pp. 23–25. 133 It should be noted that the Gutachten focuses on the Lutheran dialogue partner. 134 Lange, Überholte Verurteilungen?. 130

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the free acceptance of God’s grace, which is itself a gift from God, plays no essential role in justification’, as is the case in the interpretation of the Göttingen faculty, then the canons still indicate ‘a noteworthy doctrinal difference’ [ein beachtlicher Lehrunterschied].135 It is not implausible to see this as one of the reasons why the Roman Catholic Church could not publish an official, supra-national response to LK. It basically acted in response to the same problem the VELKD/DNK-LWD was confronted with, namely the uncertainty about the positive content of the contemporary teaching of the dialogue partner. It just reacted to it in a different, though equally ‘conditional’ way. Hence, the reception of LK is in a deadlock, which is not even noticeable when the fundamental role of positive doctrinal formulations in the study of condemnations is disregarded, or when the methodology of the dialogue is described one-sidedly in terms of a mutual recognition of different positions, as if a certain degree of modification and more precise definition of the traditional doctrines were not constitutive of the whole project. Only if one does notice that something happens to the teachings through their mutual interaction and that this ‘happening’ is a necessary element in the dialogue and reception process, can one understand the problematic nature of the situation in and around 1994. For both the German Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic Church put forward conditions on which they are prepared to acknowledge the non-applicability of the condemnations. Within the dynamics of the ecumenical dialogue, communicating such conditions amounts to asking the dialogue partner for more precision than before about the positive content of its teaching (for instance, by excluding certain possible interpretations of previous formulations). This precision is precisely what the dialogue partners do not offer each other at this stage. The deadlock is not merely a matter of procedure. The contents of the conditions that are expressed in the Gutachten and in the VELKD/DNKLWB text are potentially conflicting. As already mentioned, the Gutachten says that the Tridentine canons 4, 5, 6 and 9 still point to a fundamental doctrinal difference when Lutherans defend a strict divine monergism in which there is no role in justification for the free human act of accepting God’s gift of righteousness.136 The VELKD/DNK-LWB response states on the issue of passivity and cooperation: 135 136

Gutachten, p. 25. Strictly speaking, this is the only instance in the section on justification where the Gutachten refers to the possibility that a certain interpretation of the Lutheran teaching on justification can cause serious ecumenical problems. Referring to an earlier discussion about canons

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Trent distinguishes between a “predisposing grace” (gratia praeveniens), through which the human being is called to faith by God, and the “grace of justification” (gratia justificans), which is conveyed in baptism and for which the human being – “roused” by the predisposing grace – has to prepare him- or herself. If this distinction serves to enable human beings to cooperate towards justification, then we have to contradict this. If, however, grace from the outset refers to the whole of God’s benefaction [Zuwendung] to the human, and so to the grace of justification, and if Christian existence is understood as the way coming from justification towards justification, then the traditionally existing disagreement becomes superfluous.137 The ‘concern’ behind the statement in the Gutachten does seem to be related to the free acceptance without which no justification takes place. This concern is in line with what the Tridentine Fathers decided about the preparation for justification, and also with their statements about perseverance and fostering the gift of righteousness. The confrontation of this perspective with the text of VELKD/DNK-LWB once again shows the asymmetry of the positions. For within the theocentric and anti-Pelagian framework of Trent, it is obvious that the distinctions in the concept of grace are rooted in the one grace, which can indeed be called God’s love and benevolence towards human beings. This love that was manifested in Jesus Christ is in no way conditional upon human efforts. So far, the Roman Catholic Church meets the conditions put forward by VELKD/DNK-LWB. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that for Trent (1) the ‘objective’ side of justification does not wholly usurp the ‘subjective’ event of this concrete sinner becoming righteous in the eyes of God (hence, the statement that the only ‘formal cause’ of justification is the grace which makes the sinner righteous) and (2) the involvement of human freedom is at no point wholly excluded in this ‘subjective’ justification. Therefore, the distinction between predisposing and justifying grace does serve to safeguard the involvement of human freedom in justification, which is rejected by VELKD/DNK-LWB. As Pesch and the dialogues have emphasized exhaustively, safeguarding this freedom theologically is not considered in Trent as a self-assertion of the 9–12, the Gutachten states that these canons do not contradict Lutheran teaching ‘[i]f the Tridentine and the Lutheran doctrine are understood in the way that was mentioned above’ Ibid., p. 26. The document is not unambiguous on this point, for in the conclusion of the section on justification, it expresses its agreement with LK ‘that the canons 1–32 of the decree on justification do not strike the Lutheran teaching as it is established in the confessional writings’ Gutachten, p. 34. 137 ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (80).

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human being who desires to be autonomous vis-à-vis God. Rather, in the Roman Catholic self-understanding, it is an attempt to give an adequate account of how God operates when He justifies the sinner. The response of VELKD/DNK-LWB does not overlook this ‘subjective’ side of justification It does not speak about freedom, but, using the words of LK, about the ‘full personal involvement [Beteiligtsein]’ of the human being in justification. We have noted that the notion of Beteiligtsein is somewhat ambiguous in view of the question of freedom. It is no wonder then that it has been the object of criticism of both Roman Catholics, who wonder about the compatibility of a ‘full personal involvement’ and the Lutheran mere passive, and Lutherans, who fear that active human freedom in justification is not sufficiently excluded by this expression.138 Another instance of such ambiguous language with regard to grace and freedom is the statement in LK that in Roman Catholic doctrine grace is salvation.139 This may seem a fulfilment of the condition in the VELKD/DNK-LWB text that predisposing and justifying grace should be identified with each other. Yet, at the same time it is difficult to see ‘grace is salvation’ as an exhaustive summary of the Tridentine teaching.140 It is clear that such ambiguous phrases make the dialogue partners suspect the presence of a doctrinal development, yet without clearly stating whether this is in fact the case. This ambiguous situation remains even after Roman Catholics and Lutherans have expressed their ‘conditions’ on occasion of LK. With regard to this issue of free cooperation in justification, the really problematic point is that it is difficult to imagine how both dialogue partners can simultaneously meet each other’s conditions. This shows that both dialogue partners do not only say ‘Only if the other interprets justification in the way it is expressed in LK, do the mutual condemnations not apply’, but also ‘Only if the other interprets LK in such and such a way, do the condemnations not apply’.141 138

Lutheran: Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung?, p. 56; Scheffczyk, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung” und die Norm des Glaubens’ (272). 139 LK 48/42. 140 Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders, p. 307. 141 This happens sometimes in subtle ways. The response of VELKD and DNK-LWB ‘unsuspectingly’ interprets the joint statement that concupiscence is ‘in contradiction to God’ (Gottwidrigkeit) (LK 52/45) as a Roman Catholic concession that concupiscence is sin. Thus it completely misses the point of the different concepts of sin in Lutheran and Roman Catholic theologies. For, in Roman Catholic theology and teaching, sin always involves a personal element (freedom), so that there can be inclinations on a sub-personal level that are ‘gottwidrig’ because they ‘put pressure’ on the believer to move away from God, but which are not sin properly. By interpreting the consensus-concept of Gottwidrigkeit in a strictly Lutheran sense and attributing this interpretation to the Roman Catholic dialogue partner, the authors of the response are making the acceptance of LK more dependent on a certain interpretation of the text. ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (82).

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This deadlock on the level of content is related to a deficiency in LK which both the Gutachten and the response of VELKD/DNK-LWB have noticed. LK barely mentions the problem of the correct distinction between gospel and law, even if it is clear that this idea constitutes the basis of the Reformation teaching of justification.142 The ‘obvious’ reason why LK did not deal with this question extensively is that there are no explicit condemnations relating to this distinction.143 However, the issue of free human action in relation to justification, which turned out to be in need of further clarification, can hardly be addressed if the question about the significance of the divine demand (law) remains unresolved. If the problem of the law as theological instance remains hidden, the consensus is too easily construed according to the distinction Kühn and Pesch had described; theologically Lutherans and Roman Catholics agree that it is God alone who justifies the sinner, whereas on the psychological (or philosophical) level they disagree about the way in which faith calls on human freedom.

VI. Summary In this chapter, we have examined the strategies used in JBF and LK to deal with the problem of doctrinal diversity. Both dialogues rely on results of historical and exegetical research which show both the diversity within authentic Christian traditions and the possibility of theological and ecclesial distortions and exaggerations. The two documents under investigation state that, although the different theological ‘thought forms’ that emerged in history cannot simply be unified, the dialogue partners can come to recognize and share each other’s most fundamental concerns. The movement from ‘discrete’ to ‘continuous’ language and the subordination of all doctrinal statements to the centre of the Christian faith can be seen as two basic strategies of the two national dialogues on justification. This approach in JBF and LK implies a certain dynamic in the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic doctrines of justification. As long as the language of different ‘thought forms’ is prevalent, one could see the teachings of both dialogue partners as more or less static conceptual edifices whose difference is simply declared legitimate in the dialogue. However, the idea of theological ‘concerns’ reveals that legitimate diversity presupposes a certain degree of translatability of the different languages of faith. It is

142 143

Gutachten, p. 28.34; ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (77). Pannenberg and Schneider, Lehrverurteilungen-kirchentrennend? Bd 4, p. 45.

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precisely the dynamic process of translating the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic idiom into the ‘third language’ of theological concerns that enables a mutual recognition of the authenticity of the different doctrines. This dynamic immediately shows that the agreement on justification expressed in JBF and LK involves joint statements of faith. It is not merely a consensus by virtue of a common relation of both ‘languages of faith’ to a common ‘object’. Even though an awareness of diversity is important in the whole dialogue process, unity is also sought and found at the level of expression. Our analysis of the issues of freedom, responsibility and created grace in JBF and LK has revealed some ambiguity on the question whether or not ‘sapiential theology’ is considered in the two national dialogues as a legitimate perspective. The investigation has shown that the potential problems for Roman Catholics are considerable. It is not clear whether the Tridentine concerns which we have identified are actually acknowledged. Yet, the legitimate diversity that is claimed in the document allows Roman Catholics to see the minimization of the sapiential perspective as only one side of the whole story, a side they can accept as long as the role of freedom, responsibility and created righteousness in justification is not completely denied. For Lutherans, the situation is potentially more problematic. We have argued that at least a certain interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine of justification can rightly consider itself incompatible with the theology of justification that is implied in JBF and LK. By analysing some critical responses to the American dialogue on justification, we have discovered that criticisms of the ecumenical dialogues are not necessarily the result of an irrational adherence to a particular language or a lack of openness. Rather, the goal of such critiques is often the preservation of the reality of faith. Both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic critics call for a clearer demarcation of true and false teachings as a defence of God’s self-communication to human beings. This implies two things for the appreciation of JBF and LK. First, there seems to be a limit to what one can achieve with a turn to ‘continuous language’. There will always be a moment when ‘discrete language’ needs to be spoken and a distinction has to be made between true and false teachings. Second, the dialogues themselves are already involved in this process of discernment. The ultimate criterion of hope and trust in God (JBF) and the enduring validity of the historical condemnations as ‘salutary warnings’ (LK) reveal the doctrinal ambition that is implied in both documents. A ‘criterion’ and a ‘warning’ which exclude the possibility of a negative judgement are simply powerless or void of any real content. The national dialogues on justification make

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claims – sometimes implicitly – concerning what has to be said and what cannot be said about the righteousness of the believer. Even though the American document makes a distinction between an ‘incomplete convergence’ on the doctrine of justification as criterion and ‘fuller material convergences on the doctrine itself’, the boundaries of a true teaching on justification that are hinted at in JBF and LK are connected to the criteriological function of the article of justification. To put it in the terminology of Otto Hermann Pesch and Carl J. Peter, the more one emphasizes the importance of ‘sapiential theology’ and its focus on justification as a process within the created reality, the more one will need ‘another critical principle’ in order to acknowledge the reality of created grace and protect it against the ‘protestant principle’. Similarly, the analysis of Werner Löser has shown that the issue of created grace has important ecclesiological implication. The fact that the legitimacy of sapiential theology remains to a certain extent ambiguous in the document thus implies an ambiguity on the criteriological role of the article of justification and on its application in ecclesiological matters. It is therefore possible that, in the final analysis, the ‘incompleteness’ of the convergence on justification as criterion is rooted in an incomplete consensus on the doctrine itself. In a final section of this chapter, we discussed some of the official responses to LK. It became clear that the reception process of the German condemnations study had led to a kind of impasse because both the German Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic Church gave a conditional answer to the question whether the condemnations are still applicable today. The dialogue partners asked each other for more clarification about the questions: (1) Is the description of the respective doctrinal positions in LK adequate? (2) How are some ambiguous statements in LK interpreted by the other? Thus, the reactions to the German condemnations study seem to reveal the need for a further step in the ecumenical dialogue.

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Chapter 4

The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification: Analysis

This concluding chapter deals with the JDDJ itself. It will contribute to an answer to two main questions: (1) What is the achievement of the JDDJ as an official reception of previous dialogues and theological endeavours? (2) How can one explain the massive negative reactions by certain groups of Christians against this document, especially in Germany? The official reception of a dialogue text has at least two aspects. It is a process in and between the churches. At the same time, it is related to a certain theological content. Obviously, both aspects, process and content, are not separable. Yet, they can and will be distinguished. In line with the previous chapters, the emphasis will be on the content of the doctrine of justification. This is not merely a methodological choice. The right interpretation of the doctrine of justification is really the issue that is at stake in the debates, and not merely a defence of confessional identities or the self-assertion of academic theologians. Focusing on the content is a way of taking the critics of the JDDJ seriously and of benefiting from their work. First, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the process that has led to the signing of the JDDJ. Second, some of the methodological choices that were made in the reception process will be made explicit. The differences between this and the German condemnations study will be pointed out because they are crucial to understanding the criticism of German Lutherans levelled against the JDDJ. Third, the largest part of this chapter will consist of a detailed analysis of part 4 of the JDDJ. The main findings of this analysis will be discussed in the general conclusion.

I. A Brief History of the JDDJ The initiative to draw up a joint declaration on justification did not come out of the blue. The possibility and necessity of such a step became clear

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through various impulses. The two national dialogues on justification that were discussed in the previous chapter had substantiated the intuition of Malta that ‘a far-reaching consensus is developing in the interpretation of justification’.1 As was argued before, the internal dynamic of the ecumenical rapprochement concerning the doctrine of justification, especially in Germany, had led to questions about the official status of the teachings presented in the dialogue and of the mutual assessment of these teachings. Thus the issue of reception became more pressing. Furthermore, the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, especially in its second round, was characterized by a growing awareness of the need for official steps by the churches that would confirm and disseminate the insights gained in the dialogues. Several of the dialogue documents express this need for reception.2 In 1988, the sponsors of the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity (PCPCU) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), decided to intensify their mutual contacts and to engage in a common reflection on strategies for a better reception of the existing dialogue results.3 A working paper, Strategies for Reception (1991), was drafted by a special working group, in which a formal process of reception of dialogue documents was proposed, which would be initiated after the completion of the third phase of the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue.4 Both the form and the content of the proposed process of reception are relevant here. With regard to form, Strategies for Reception observes that the documents that will be the object of official reception employ a notion of consensus that is not the same as uniformity and that allows for non-dividing differences.5 Concerning the content of this process of reception, the paper refers to the documents The Eucharist (1978), Ministry in the Church (1981), the document on ecclesiology of the third round, which was in progress (and which was going to result in

1

GC §26. Cf. the documents The Eucharist (1978), Ways to Community (1980), The Ministry in the Church (1981) and Facing Unity (1984). 3 J. A. Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation on Justification: A Chronology of the Holy See’s Contributions, 1961–1999, to a New Relationship between Lutherans and Roman Catholics and to Steps Leading to the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification’ (Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009), pp. 114–15. In his book, Radano, who worked for the PCPCU between 1984 and 2008, convincingly demonstrates that Rome was always strongly committed in its dialogue with Lutherans and in working towards official recognition of that dialogue. 4 ‘Strategies for Reception: Perspectives on the Reception of Documents Emerging from the Lutheran-Catholic International Dialogue’, The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity - Information Service 80 (1992), pp. 42–45. 5 Ibid. (45). 2

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Church and Justification, 19936), and, finally, to a ‘platform paper’ on justification that had been drafted during that third dialogue round in order to facilitate the conversations on the church in relation to justification. The latter document was drafted in Versailles in 1988 (therefore, sometimes referred to as the ‘Versailles document’) and can be considered as a direct predecessor of the JDDJ.7 The four texts mentioned in Strategies for Reception were considered ‘a conceptual whole’.8 Hence, at this stage the official reception of the dialogues concerning justification was seen by the PCPCULWF working group as fundamentally connected with the reception of dialogues on church, sacraments and ministry. In the course of the next few years, however, the preparation for the official reception of the dialogue results took a somewhat different direction. During the reception process of LK, the LWF was not only involved through the German National Committee, but also on supra-national level. It soon expressed the desire to ‘integrate’ the German document in the international dialogue.9 In 1990 an English translation of LK was published in order to facilitate a possible extension of the reception process regarding the condemnations study to other member churches of LWF.10 The ELCA discussed in 1992 and 1993 the possibility of affirming officially – and possibly even unilaterally – the results of the German dialogue. Because of the relatively positive evaluations of JBF, by the ELCA and by the United States Catholic Bishops Conference, the proposal was focused on the issue of justification.11 The idea was supported in 1993 at a meeting of the ELCA Bishops Conference by two invited speakers: bishop Pierre Duprey (PCPCU) and Harding Meyer (Strasbourg Institute for Ecumenical Research).12 Two things that were emphasized by both speakers are especially relevant in the process towards the JDDJ. First, while not being unsympathetic towards the idea of a unilateral American Lutheran approval of the results of LK, both 6

‘Church and Justification’. O. H. Pesch, ‘Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”: Entstehung - Inhalt - Konsequenzen’, in Zitterpartie “Rechtfertigungslehre”, ed. A. P. Kustermann and A. Esche (Stuttgart-Hohenheim: Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 4–38. The text of this platform paper is published in: P. Holc, Un ampio consenso sulla dottrina della giustificazione: studio sul dialogo teologico cattolico-luterano (Tesi Gregoriana - Serie Teologia 53 Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1999), pp. 377–89. 8 ‘Strategies for Reception’ (44). 9 Goertz, Dialog und Rezeption, p. 169. 10 E. L. Brand, ‘Der Prozess im LWB hinsichtlich der Gemeinsamen Lutherisch/RömischKatholischen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Zu einer Gemeinschaft zusammenwachsen: Dokumentation zur Tagung des Rates des Lutherischen Weltbundes, 24. September - 1. Oktober 1996, Genf, Schweiz (LWB-Dokumentation 40, Geneva: LWF, 1996), pp. 55–60 (56) 11 Ibid. (57); Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, p. 132. 12 Rusch, ‘The History and Methodology of the Joint Declaration on Justification: A Case Study in Ecumenical Reception’ (176). 7

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Duprey and Meyer stressed the importance of the reciprocity of the reception process that was needed.13 Second, both seemed to agree that the act of reception should not be strictly limited to the question about the applicability of the condemnations, but should also concern the question to what extent a common expression of the doctrine of justification is possible. The American plans for an act of reception with regard to the dialogues on justification were soon taken to the international level, for in the same year (1993), the LWF and the PCPCU decided to initiate a process that was planned to lead to a declaration about the condemnations on justification in 1997 (at the 450th anniversary of the Tridentine decree on justification and the 50th anniversary of the LWF).14 Both parties were well aware of the discrepancies between the ways each body usually responded to ecumenical dialogue results by virtue of their different ecclesiologies. The joint initiative was especially a challenge to the LWF, which had already disseminated dialogue texts among its member churches before, but for which the instigation and organization of a world-wide reception process and the ‘discerning of the common mind’ were novel ways of operating.15 There are altogether four text versions of the JDDJ, three of which were sent out for study and approval.16 The first version was produced by a small working group appointed in 1993 by the PCPCU and the LWF. This first draft was reworked in 1994 on the basis of comments by the sponsoring bodies and by various experts. The new text (the ‘Geneva-version’) was sent in early 1995 to the member churches of the LWF and to the PCPCU with a request for responses and for improvement suggestions. In June 1996, an extended working group drafted a new version (‘Würzburg I’) on the basis of these responses. The Roman Catholic remarks and proposals had arisen in a joint working group of the PCPCU and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and through the consultation of bishops’ conferences 13

The content of both speeches is summarized in Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, pp. 133–35. 14 Ibid., pp. 136–37. 15 ‘Strategies for Reception’ (43). The minutes of the meeting of the Council of the LWF in June 1993 in which the decision is mentioned to initiate a process towards a mutual ‘lifting’ of the condemnations on justification states, ‘dass es neuer Modelle für den angemessenen Umgang mit Lehrfragen auf der Ebene der lutherischen Gemeinschaft und der Koordinierung mit den autonomen Mitgliedskirchen der Gemeinschaft, die vor ähnlichen Entscheidungen stehen, bedarf’. F. Hauschildt, U. Hahn, and A. Siemens (eds), Die Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre: Dokumentation des Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsprozesses (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), p. 24. [This volume, which contains the most important official documents in the genesis and reception of the JDDJ, will be abbreviated: GER-DER] 16 GER-DER, 31–49.244–255.273–283. A synopsis of the three released versions is found in Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’ (168–98).

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in countries with a large Lutheran presence. On the Lutheran side, 36 of 122 member churches – representing almost 64% of the individual members – had responded to the document that was sent to them. The answers, ranging from unconditional affirmation to outright rejection, were gathered and summarized by the Strasbourg Institute for Ecumenical Research.17 After Würzburg I, the need for a new modification of the text became clear. A working group, which was roughly the same as the previous one, drafted ‘Würzburg II’ in February 1997, taking into account proposals for revision coming from the German National Committee of the LWF and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The LWF and PCPCU decided in February 1997 that this would be the final text, which was going to be offered to the churches for official reception. The official reactions both of the Lutheran churches and of the Roman Catholic Church followed about 16 months later, in June 1998. Both procedures were, of course, very dissimilar. The LWF sent the text of the final version to its member churches and to the national committees. The churches were asked to answer the question whether they could agree with the statements in §40 and §41.18 Hence, there were in fact two questions propounded to the Lutheran churches: (1) whether the JDDJ indeed shows ‘that a consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification exists between Lutherans and Catholics’ and (2) whether ‘the condemnations in the Lutheran Confessions do not apply to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church presented in this Declaration’. The Strasbourg Institute for Ecumenical Research, which analysed the answers in June 1998, points out in its analysis that the formulation of a consensus was unavoidable for two reasons.19 First, the non-applicability of historical condemnations on justification becomes clear in the JDDJ, not through a study of individual condemnations, but only in the light of a fundamental common understanding of justification. Second, the answer to the question whether condemnations apply to the doctrine of the dialogue partner as it is presented in the JDDJ is pointless as long as that partner does not affirm that the document has properly presented its teaching.20 17

GER-DER 209–239. Cf. the letter sent by Ishmael Noko, general Secretary of the LWF, to the member churches. GER-DER, 286–288. 19 GER-DER, 748–749. 20 It is significant that the penultimate versions of the text still declared that the condemnations of A do not apply to the present-day teaching of B. Because one of the difficult problems in the whole debate is to find out exactly how contemporary Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching should be described, it was reasonable that there was a shift in the redaction process of the declaration towards the non-applicability of the condemnations of A to the teaching of B as presented in the JDDJ. 18

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The answers sent back by the member churches of the LWF were generally positive. By 3 June 1998, the Strasbourg Institute had received and analysed responses of 76 member churches representing 85% of all Lutherans whose churches are affiliated to the LWF.21 More than 90% of the churches that responded answered ‘yes’, some with and others without qualifications. The remainder of the responses was either negative or unclear. The Institute said that an affirmation by the Council of the LWF of the conclusion of the JDDJ would be in line with the world-wide ‘consensus’ that had become manifest. The figures mentioned by the Institute create the impression of a great unanimity among Lutherans. This may be true statistically and even on a world-wide level. It was definitely not true within all member churches and least of all among German Lutherans.22 One may speculate about the grounds for the polemical nature of the German debates. Undoubtedly non-theological factors played a role, such as the fear of losing one’s Lutheran identity in an increasingly secularized and pluralistic WesternEuropean society, or the tension between the role university professors and church leaders play in the church, especially in relation to teaching authority.23 It is equally clear that the negative reactions in Germany were also expressions of fundamental concerns with regard to both the nature of the reception process initiated by the LWF and the PCPCU and the theological content of the document. Both concerns can to a certain extent be understood in the light of the way the common understanding on justification had emerged in the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, as will become evident in the next sections. Following a recommendation (Beschlussempfehlung) of the VELKD Bishops Conference, which was adopted by the General Synod of the VELKD and by the DNK-LWB24, many regional churches in Germany had given a more or less affirmative answer to the questions propounded by the LWF. But there was a feeling that the bishops had ‘rammed the Declaration through’, as Robert Jenson puts it, despite the fierce criticism of many academic 21

Later that month, that number grew up to 95%. GER-DER, 746. For a critique of the ‘statistical’ method of the Strasbourg Institute, see: J. Wallmann, ‘Das Konsensprinzip darf nicht durch das Mehrheitsprinzip ersetzt werden: Zum Umgang des Lutherischen Weltbundes mit Voten zur Gemeinsamen Erklärung’, epd-Dokumentation (1998), no. 37/98, pp. 42–43. 22 For a detailed account of the debates in the German Lutheran churches, written by a critic of the JDDJ, see: J. Wallmann, ‘Der Streit um die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (Beiheft 10) 95 (1998), pp. 207–51. 23 These ‘non-theological’ factors are mentioned, together with theological issues, in: T. Dieter, ‘Zum Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung”: Hermeneutik - Konsequenzen - Kritik der Kritik’, in Zitterpartie “Rechtfertigungslehre”, ed. A. P. Kustermann and A. Esche (StuttgartHohenheim: Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 63–76. 24 GER-DER, 431.466.491.

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theologians, whose voices grew even louder as a result.25 In the light of this friction, it is quite understandable that the official Vatican response caused such disappointed and, at times, furious or cynical reactions among Lutherans.26 The response, released 25 June 1998, nine days after the LWF had officially affirmed the central statements of the JDDJ,27 agrees that one could speak of ‘a consensus on basic truths on the doctrine of justification’. At the same time, however, it remarks ‘that we cannot yet speak of a consensus such as would eliminate every difference between Catholics and Lutherans in the understanding of justification’. As such, this observation corresponds with the aim of the JDDJ: to formulate a sufficient consensus that does not eliminate all differences. However, some statements in the part of the Vatican response entitled ‘Clarifications’ seem to cast doubt on the claim of the JDDJ that these differences are no longer church-dividing. Many Roman Catholic theologians and church officials, including the then prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger, insisted that the Vatican document did officially receive the JDDJ and that the ‘Clarifications’ do not question this outcome.28 Yet, even if it could be said that both the LWF and the Vatican had endorsed the central conclusions of the JDDJ, it was not at all clear at that moment whether this endorsement would lead to an official signing of the JDDJ.29 As PCPCU staff member John Radano said, a ‘new critical stage’ had begun after the publication of the official responses.30 One of the elements that played a crucial role in the continuation of the reception process was the work of a small, informal working group consisting of four members: Cardinal Ratzinger, Lutheran bishop Johannes Hanselmann and professors Heinz Schütte and Joachim Track.31 They drafted a text that was adopted by the LWF and the PCPCU and that 25

R. W. Jenson, ‘On the Vatican’s “Official Response” to the Joint Declaration on Justification’, Pro Ecclesia 7 (1998), no. 4, pp. 401–04 (402). 26 German reactions to the official Vatican response are collected in several issues of epdDokumentation (27a/98, 32/98 and 37/98). The English text of the response as well as American theological reflections are found in: C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson, ‘Symposium on the Vatican’s Official Response to the Joint Declaration on Justification’, Pro Ecclesia 7 (1998), no. 4, pp. 398–470. 27 GER-DER, 806–808 (LWF) and 809–813 (Vatican). 28 Ratzinger wrote a letter which was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (14 Juli 1998). GER-DER, 840–841. 29 Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, p. 155. 30 Ibid., p. 153. 31 Cf. H. Schütte, ‘Vom Streit zur Versöhnung: Der schwierige Weg der Gemeinsamen Rechtfertigungserklärung’, in Rechtfertigung gemeinsam bekennen - Erneuter Ruf zur evangelischen Katholizität. Achtzig Jahre Hochkirchliche Vereinigung, 1918–1998, ed. T. Hauf and U. Kisker (Eine Heilige Kirche. Neue Folge 5, Bochum: Hochkirchliche Vereinigung, 1999), pp. 157–84.

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developed into the Official Common Statement and the Annex.32 In the latter document, several issues that had emerged in the qualified positive responses of the Lutheran churches, in the various theological debates and in the Official Vatican response were briefly addressed and given some further clarification. Because this text was not approved by the member churches of the LWF, it was important, especially from the Lutheran perspective, to remain as close as possible to the text of the JDDJ, to Scripture and to the authoritative documents of the respective churches (i.e. Trent and the confessional writings). It was the Official Common Statement, in which the statements of §40 and §41 of the JDDJ are affirmed and which refers to the Annex, that was signed in Augsburg by representatives of the Lutheran World Federation and of the Roman Catholic Church on 31 October 1999.33

II. Characteristics of the JDDJ as an Official Reception of Previous Dialogues Before entering into a study of the theological content of the JDDJ, it is helpful to highlight, on the basis of the above brief history of the final text of the JDDJ, five characteristics of the reception process that was initiated by the LWF and the PCPCU. They are also crucial for the understanding of the fierce debates on the JDDJ. This is especially relevant in relation to the reactions in the German Lutheran churches, for each characteristic indicates a difference between the German condemnations study and the international process towards an official reception of a joint declaration on justification. Even though the German dialogue and the process of its reception played a decisive role in the decision to make such a declaration, the international reception process followed a certain logic that was different from that of LK, so that many Germans were wondering how to relate the reception of the two documents to one another.34

32

GER-DER, 919–923. An analysis of this document and its genesis is available: A. Rytkönen and R. Saarinen, ‘Der Lutherische Weltbund und die Rechtfertigungsdebatte 1998–1999: Die Entstehung der “Gemeinsamen Offiziellen Feststellung” und des “Annex”’, Kerygma und Dogma 53 (2007), no. 4, pp. 298–330. 33 An extensive description of the signing of the JDDJ and the celebrations accompanying it can be found in Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, pp. 167–87. 34 Cf. D. Wendebourg, ‘Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’, in Zitterpartie “Rechtfertigungslehre”, ed. A. P. Kustermann and A. Esche (Stuttgart-Hohenheim: Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 50–62; Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’.

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1. The official approval of the results of the ecumenical dialogue by means of a joint declaration on justification was planned as a world-wide process. This implies that some initiatives had to be taken on the supranational level to initiate, coordinate and officially conclude the process. As mentioned earlier, there is a tension between this international character of the JDDJ and the structure of authority in the Lutheran churches, in which doctrinal decisions are taken on regional levels. With regard to LK, for instance, the (conditionally) positive response of the VELKD constitutes for the German Lutheran churches the ‘greatest possible degree of church recognition’. In the light of the sufficiency of the VELKD/DNK-LWB text as the official response of the German Lutheran churches, the question arises as to what the meaning could be of a process on a ‘higher’, that is, supra-national level. 2. In contrast with the ‘unilateral’ response of VELKD (and DNK-LWB), the plan for a joint declaration on justification clearly aimed at a joint act of reception by the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran churches. On this point, there is no tension between the German Lutheran response and the international process of reception. On the contrary, the VELKD/ DNK-LWB text had to speak conditionally about the non-applicability of the condemnations because the authors were not sure whether the Roman Catholic Church subscribed to the way LK presented the teachings on justification, sacraments and ministry. A joint act of approving the same text would avoid a situation where one partner had to wait for the reaction of the other to overcome the conditionality of a statement on the condemnations. At the same time, however, it was noted that there was a tension between at least one condition put forward in the VELKD/DNK-LWB text and one expressed in the Gutachten.35 The uncertainty apparently did not only concern the question of whether or not the dialogue partner endorsed the text of LK, but also how the other interpreted LK. A joint act of reception would therefore imply joint clarifications on issues that were still awaiting further elucidation because they were perhaps expressed ambiguously in LK. In the light of this need for further clarification, it is not surprising that the JDDJ, even though it is not the result of a new dialogue round, had in some formulations to go ‘beyond the preceding dialogues’.36 This again made the reception of 35

It concerns the issue of free (responding) cooperation of the believer in justification. Cf. ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (80); Gutachten, p. 25. 36 These are words of Jared Wicks, who was a member of the working group that drafted Würzburg I and II, quoted in Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, p. 138. Event though Wicks only speaks here about the ‘inner dynamic’ of the drafting process which lead to new formulations, I would argue that it was also the logic of the whole Lutheran-Roman

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the JDDJ in Germany more difficult, since the Lutheran churches were asked to evaluate a text (JDDJ) that was on certain points different from the one (LK) they had already (conditionally) received.37 3. The reception process culminating in the signing of the JDDJ in 1999 was a bilateral Lutheran-Roman Catholic (or rather: LWF-Roman Catholic) affair. In the German condemnations study, on the other hand, Reformed and United Protestants were also involved. The fact that the Lutheran churches in Germany were engaged in two processes of reception, the one with and the other without the other Protestants (including other Lutherans), was not only ‘psychologically’ problematic, because of the loyalty of the Lutherans towards Reformed and the United churches. The Leuenberg agreement demonstrates that this loyalty has a theological significance. The participation in the Leuenberg agreement bears witness to a common view on what ecclesial communion between churches involves. LK shows an awareness of this when it distinguishes between its own methodology and that of Leuenberg, arguing that the Protestant churches involved in Leuenberg belong to a same ‘ecclesial type’, whereas LK has to take into account the ‘different structure’ of the Roman Catholic Church.38 It is clear that the German Lutherans have read the JDDJ with the question in the back of their minds as to whether or not this document and the process of its reception betray the understanding of the gospel that is the basis of Leuenberg and the ecclesial self-understanding that is implied in that agreement. 4. As mentioned above, the PCPCU-LWF paper Strategies for Reception envisaged an official reception of a series of texts on justification, church, ministry and sacraments that formed a ‘conceptual whole’. One can speculate about the reasons why the theme of justification was eventually more or less detached from this conceptual whole, becoming the focus of a separate process of formal reception.39 The main reason is undoubtedly the advanced stage of the dialogue on justification, seen from an international perspective. With the Versailles document, a succinct outline of the ‘far-reaching consensus’ on justification, which was discussed in previous dialogues on the national and the international level, already lay on the table. Moreover, the Gutachten commissioned by the PCPCU on the German condemnations study had offered a Catholic dialogue on justification which necessitated a more thorough reflection at this stage on issues that were not wholly resolved in a satisfactory way. 37 Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’ (146–47.63–66). 38 LK 14/7. 39 Cf. Radano, Lutheran & Catholic Reconciliation, pp. 124–30.

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particularly positive evaluation of the section in LK on justification. It stated ‘that the canons 1-32 of the [Tridentine] decree on justification do not strike the Lutheran teaching as it is established in the confessional writings’.40 The conclusions of the Gutachten with regard to sacraments and ministry did not contain such unconditionally positive statements.41 The separate treatment of the issue of justification poses specific theological problems. The detachment from the issue of sacraments threatens to break up the unity between the proclamation of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments, which is decisive for the Lutheran view on ecclesial unity (CA VII). Furthermore, the disconnection of justification and ecclesiology in the new reception process ran the risk of isolating the doctrine of justification and neglecting its creative and critical role in relation to the church; a crucial theme that the third round of the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue precisely wanted to bring to the fore. 5. The two invited speakers at the ELCA meeting in 1993, Meyer and Duprey, had insisted that an act of official approval of the dialogue results regarding justification would have to involve a reflection on the possibility of a common Lutheran-Roman Catholic expression of the teaching on justification. In all the text versions, the structure of the JDDJ embodies this concern for common expression. Both in the part on the ‘common understanding of justification’ (part 3) and in the treatment of the separate issues (part 4), there is always a verbal expression of what Lutherans and Roman Catholics hold in common before the legitimate differences are mentioned. Even though the previous chapter has argued that it is difficult to separate the issue of the applicability of the condemnations in LK from the joint statements the document contains, some German Lutherans saw the emphasis in the JDDJ on consensus as a precondition for lifting the condemnations, as an idea that was alien to the condemnations project.42 The original recommendation of the DNK-LWB about the JDDJ advised the churches to affirm that the condemnations in the Lutheran confessional writings do not apply to the Roman Catholic teaching as it is presented in the JDDJ. The text suggests that this ‘lifting’ of the 40

Gutachten, p. 34. It was argued in the last chapter that even the evaluation of the part in LK on justification was not entirely unconditional. The final conclusion of the PCPCU-evaluation explicitly mentions the conditional nature of the some of its conclusions (Ibid., pp. 102–03). This clearly relates to the section on justification as well (Gutachten, p. 25). 42 Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’ (150–51). 41

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condemnations could be affirmed on the basis of ‘the consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification’ which the JDDJ had demonstrated.43 In a consultation of Lutheran academic theologians and church leaders in Leipzig, a proposal was put forward to detach the question about the condemnations from the one about the alleged ‘consensus’ in the JDDJ.44 The VELKD, and in its wake the DNK-LWB, did not take up this proposal. This is seen by Johannes Wallmann as a decisive moment in the German-Lutheran reception process. He claims that many of the problems about the JDDJ in Germany could have been avoided if the churches had adopted the Leipzig proposal.45 The authors of the Strasbourg analysis of the Lutheran responses argue, on the other hand, that the acceptance of this Leipzig proposal would have led to an impossible situation. The reason is that the distinct Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions as they are presented in the JDDJ cannot be disconnected from the common statements in the document. Hence, if Lutheran churches do not officially affirm the consensus statements of the JDDJ, an official Roman Catholic declaration that the Tridentine condemnations are not applicable to the Lutheran teaching as it is expressed in the JDDJ is a non-event.46 In other words, a Lutheran refusal to affirm the consensus in the JDDJ would take the reception process back to the situation after the official reception of LK by the VELKD/DNK-LWB, which gave a conditional ‘yes’ to the question of whether the condemnations could be declared non-applicable to today’s dialogue partner, while dismissing the request to understand the Lutheran confessional writings in the light of LK.47 The need to affirm the consensus of the JDDJ is therefore closely related to point (2) mentioned above: the necessity of a jointly organized act of reception. One could push this point a bit further and argue that the unilateral reception of LK by VELKD/DNK-LWB also presupposed a notion of consensus which was the basis of the decision to declare the condemnations (both Lutheran and Roman Catholic) as non-applicable. The only difference with the JDDJ is that the terms were set unilaterally rather than bilaterally; for the condition on which the VELKD/DNK-LWB was prepared to see the condemnations as not pertinent was not only the Roman Catholic approval of the text of LK, but at times also a certain 43

GER-DER 289–290. Wallmann, ‘Der Streit um die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’ (218–22). 45 Ibid. (233). 46 GER-DER, 778–780. 47 ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (158). 44

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reading of this text. This is not necessarily a critique of the approach of VELKD/DNK-LWB towards LK (or of the refusal of the German critics to move beyond this approach in the case of the JDDJ). It merely indicates that the gulf between advocates and critics of the reception process of the JDDJ as it was organized by the German churches possibly entails a deep-seated difference with regard to the question of what ecclesial ‘unity in diversity’ means and, above all, which procedures and what kind of commonalities it takes to arrive at ecclesial ‘recognition’.48

III. The Content of the JDDJ This section offers a close reading of the text of part 4 of the JDDJ. The editorial changes the text has undergone throughout the three versions that were disseminated will be taken into account. They reveal something about what is at stake for both dialogue partners. Even though the JDDJ is not the fruit of a new dialogue round, the act of making a document that will be officially signed by representatives of both communities forces the participants in the dialogue to make some crucial choices, for instance, about what should be emphasized or what can be omitted. Since the historical question is not a goal in itself in this research, not all textual changes will be mentioned, but only those that shed a light on the question of how the Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrines of justification are presented in the document and which differences remain. The Annex will also be taken into account since it is mentioned in the Official Common Statement and thus also part of the official reception of the JDDJ. Finally, the analysis will also refer to the reactions to the different versions both by official ecclesial bodies and by theologians.

a. Sin and Human Powerlessness In JD1, the title of the first subsection of part 4 (4.1) merely spoke of ‘human powerlessness’.49 The German National Committee of the LWF (DNK-LWB) pointed out in its response that for Lutherans sin and 48

For the chances and problems of the concept of recognition in ecumenism, see: Meyer, ‘“Anerkennung”’. 49 In this account of the theological content of the JDDJ, the different publicly available versions of the document (Geneva, Würzburg I and II) will be referred to as ‘JD1’, ‘JD2’ and ‘JD3’, the last one thus indicating the final text. ‘JDDJ’, which is used elsewhere to indicate this last version, will refer here to the entire process or to elements that occur in all three versions.

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powerlessness are not identical. Sin is not only an inability to be righteous in the eyes of God, but also an active opposition to God.50 Consequently, the title in the corresponding subsections in JD2 and JD3 was changed and mentions both sin and powerlessness. The commentary of the Strasbourg Ecumenical Institute indicates that the original title expresses more adequately what this subsection is all about: ‘whether sinners could turn to God or attain salvation by their own powers’.51 Yet the reference to sin is significant. In a consultation by the DNK-LWB about JD2, the proposal was made to insert a new subsection on the understanding of sin, preceding the one on human powerlessness. This would clarify the distinct Lutheran and Roman Catholic concepts of sin that underlie the issues dealt with in 4.1 and 4.4 (on the sinfulness of the justified).52 This proposal, which was not implemented in JD3, is in fact a return to the earlier Versailles-document, in which the theme that is dealt with in 4.1 is discussed in no less than three sections: ‘justification “of the sinner”’, ‘human powerlessness’ and ‘justification “by grace alone”’.53 The idea of sin as active resistance against God is crucial to getting a clear view on what is probably the most thorny issue in this subsection: the Roman Catholic notion of human cooperation in justification. The idea of ‘powerlessness’ leaves this issue undecided, for in itself ‘powerlessness’ is open to the interpretation that it is overcome when God ‘empowers’ the human being to achieve the righteousness commanded by the law. In contrast, an emphasis on the human being as sinner – as a creature who incessantly worships other gods and aspires to become like God54 – is more likely connected to an emphasis on God’s sole activity in justification and the ‘passivity’ or ‘receptivity’ of the human (and, thus, the exclusion of 50

GER-DER, 193–194. The reactions to JD1 of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland and of the National Alliance of Lutheran Churches in France also highlight sin as active opposition against God, even though their proposals for change only relate to the Lutheran paragraph in this subsection. Cf. GER-DER, 99.224. 51 Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, p. 35. 52 GER-DER, 264–265. 53 Gemeinsame römisch-katholische/evangelisch-lutherische Kommission, ‘Feststellung des weitreichenden Konsenses in der Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Un ampio consenso sulla dottrina della giustificazione: studio sul dialogo teologico cattolico-luterano, ed. P. Holc (Tesi Gregoriana Serie Teologia 53 Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1999), pp. 377–89 (379–81). 54 The proposed Lutheran paragraph on sin in the DNK-LWB reaction to JD2 says: ‘Diesen Charakter der Sünde als verkehrter Beziehung zu Gott heben die Lutheraner mit Nachdruck hervor. Sünde ist ihrem Wesen nach Verstoß gegen das Erste Gebot: Der Sünder macht anderes zu seinen Göttern, auf die er sich verlässt, ja, er will selbst sein wie Gott und widersetzt sich so seinem Schöpfer und Erlöser. Dieses Bestreben verdirbt nicht nur seine Taten, sondern er bestimmt seine Person und prägt somit seine innersten Neigungen, Ängste und Begierden und lässt sie dadurch gottwidrig, das heißt Sünde sein’. GER-DER, 264–265.

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human cooperation). It is clear that in the Tridentine view, there is a direct connection between the idea that human freedom is wounded rather than destroyed by sin (Chapter 1) and the emphasis on the role of the free will in the preparation for justification and on the free acceptance of God’s gift of righteousness (Chapters 5–7).55 Even though the term ‘empowerment’ would be an erroneous translation of the Tridentine idea of ‘freedom in grace’, it is equally clear that Trent does not interpret justification in every respect as a creation ex nihilo. This means that the question which the commentary of the Strasbourg Institute saw as central in this subsection – whether sinners can turn to God by their own powers – is an adequate question to explain the commonality between Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching. Both would give a negative answer to this question. However, the question that seems to distinguish both positions is as follows: are human faculties allowed to play any role in the preparation for justification and in the acceptance of it? Even though the JDDJ does not express the differences in these precise terms, the different answer given to this question is part and parcel of the legitimate diversity that is claimed by the document. In order to see what this diversity entails, it is helpful to focus briefly on four emendations that were made (or refused) during the drafting process. The first two seem to move the original text in a direction that corresponds to the Roman Catholic proposals for text revision, while the last two seem to reflect Lutheran concerns. (1) The DNK-LWB response to JD1 says that there remains a difficulty with regard to the Roman Catholic concept of ‘cooperation’. The Roman Catholic Church is asked to articulate more precisely the meaning of the concepts of ‘freedom’ (which does not occur in JD1 4.1) and ‘cooperation’. The DNK-LWB refers to the statement of VELKD/DNK-LWB on LK.56 In the relevant section of this statement, the Lutherans had insisted on the identity of gratia praeveniens and gratia justificans. It said: ‘If this distinction serves to enable human beings to cooperate towards justification, then we have to contradict this’.57 At the same time, however, Rome requests a modification of the statement in JD1: When Catholics say that persons by consenting to God’s justifying action “cooperate”, they do not mean an action arising from innate human abilities. Rather, they see such personal consent as itself an effect of justifying grace, 55

Cf. DH 1521.1525.1526.1528. GER-DER, 194. 57 ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (80–81). 56

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changing the last line into: ‘as itself an effect of grace’ [italics mine].58 This proposal was adopted in JD2 and JD3. Since the Roman desiderata, unlike many Lutheran reactions, are not accompanied by clarifications, it is difficult to say with absolute certainty why this suggestion was made. It is probable, however, that Rome wanted to avoid the possible conclusion that the personal consent of the human being is only the effect of justification which has already ‘taken place’ without any involvement of human freedom. If this is the case, then the distinction between ‘justifying grace’ and ‘grace’ (as a wider category which also includes ‘predisposing grace’) is used in the way the VELKD/DNK-LWB statement rejected: to mark out the space of gracewrought human freedom in the whole process of justification and to highlight the fact that without this free consent, grace is not justifying the sinner. (2) In JD1, the common Luther-Roman Catholic paragraph on human powerlessness (§18) declares: Catholics and Lutherans confess together that all persons depend completely on the saving grace of God for their salvation. They stand under God’s judgment and are by themselves incapable of meriting their justification before God or even of turning to God to seek deliverance. In a first outline in preparation of a statement by the DNK-LWB on JD1, a small working group of German Lutheran theologians proposed, among many other things, to change the second sentence to: ‘They [all persons] are sinners rebelling against their creator and they stand with all their thoughts and actions under God’s judgement . . .’.59 The goal of this proposal is clear: to highlight the all-encompassing and actively opposing nature of the sinfulness of the human being. The Roman reaction to JD1, on the other hand, asks that the part that speaks about the human standing under God’s judgement be deleted.60 Eventually, both JD2 and JD3 start the sentence with: ‘As sinners they stand under God’s judgment . . .’ [italics mine]. This is not quite a compromise formula. It seems to take into account the Lutheran proposal by calling the human being ‘a sinner’, but it does not take up the crucial idea of sin as an active opposition to God. It even threatens to radically contradict the Lutheran emphasis on the sinfulness of ‘all thoughts and actions’, because it can easily be read as: insofar as the human being is considered as a sinner (in a personalistic-holistic sense), he or she is seen as 58

GER-DER, 270. ‘Er [der Mensch] ist gegen seinen Schöpfer rebellierender Sünder und steht mit all seinen Gedanken und Taten unter dem Gericht Gottes’. GER-DER, 109. 60 GER-DER, 241. 59

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standing under God’s judgement, but insofar as the human faculty of freedom can be viewed as ‘only wounded’ and not destroyed, this faculty, revived by grace, may be thought of as cooperating in the preparation for and acceptance of justification. (3) In the common paragraph on powerlessness and sin in JD2, the following phrase is inserted after the first sentence: The freedom they [all persons] possess in relation to persons and the things of this world is no freedom in relation to salvation. This is evidently an attempt to meet the German Lutheran demand to be more specific about the concept of freedom. It utilizes the Lutheran distinction between freedom coram Deo and coram mundo, reiterating similar statements in JBF and LK.61 In the previous chapter, it was argued that the American and German dialogue on justification never used this distinction in such a way that it wholly excluded any role for human freedom in salvation. This is true here as well. There was clearly some uneasiness on the part of Roman Catholic dialogue partner about the addition in JD2, for in the proposals sent by the PCPCU to the members of the drafting committee there is a suggestion that the sentence be changed as follows: The freedom they possess in relation to persons and the things of this world is not a possibility to create their salvation by their own powers.62 The proposal was not taken up in the last version. Still, the sentence in JD2 (which remained unchanged in JD3) can perfectly well be interpreted along the lines of the proposed emendation, that is: in a way that does not exclude any free human agency in relation to salvation. It can be taken to mean: the freedom we receive by grace in relation to salvation is of a different nature from the freedom we have towards things in the world.63 61

‘We retain the human freedom to make choices among created goods, but we lack the capacity to turn to God without divine help’. JBF, §156. ‘When Catholic doctrine recognizes human liberty [Freiheit], it is either a liberty, not over against God and toward God, but with regard to the things of this world . . .; or it is already a liberty issuing from the call and power of grace’. LK 49/42–43. 62 ‘Die Freiheit, die er gegenüber den Dingen und Menschen der Welt besitzt, ist keine Möglichkeit, sich mit eigener Kraft das Heil zu schaffen’. GER-DER, 270. 63 The official Vatican response to the final version of the JDDJ insists that this sentence ‘must . . . be related to the impossibility for man to reach justification by his own efforts’. The meaning of the phrase is thus restricted to the Tridentine, anti-Pelagian assertion the human being cannot attain justification without grace. The possible wider meaning that any human action towards salvation is excluded is ruled out.

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(4) Something similar can be said of the cautious Roman Catholic proposal to make a change in the Lutheran paragraph. JD1 stated that the Lutheran emphasis on human ‘passivity’ in justification (in the final version interpreted in terms of receptivity) does not mean that Lutherans ‘deny that believers are fully involved personally in their faith’. The official Roman response to JD2 wonders whether it would not be possible to speak of a free personal involvement. This suggestion did not lead to a change in the final text. It is clear, however, that this suggestion was not strictly necessary in order to safeguard the Roman Catholic concern for human freedom. ‘Full personal involvement’ can easily be interpreted as free involvement. Moreover, it was pointed out in the previous chapter that the German word used here for ‘involvement’ (Beteiligtsein) has active and participatory connotations. The official Vatican response to JD3 interprets the ‘full personal involvement’ in an active sense, in any case, for the response wonders about the compatibility of this expression and the Lutheran ‘mere passive’ and asks for more clarification on this issue. Two things can be concluded from these observations on the history of the text. First, it is clear that in this subsection the issues of freedom and cooperation were the crucial problems for both dialogue partners. Most proposals for textual emendations were requests for clarifications on these issues. Second, though it seems that both partners met success and failure in their attempts to implement their proposals in the text, there is at least one feature of the whole process which is wholly in line with the Roman Catholic concern: an interpretation of justification in which human freedom plays some constitutive role is nowhere univocally excluded. In the light of this conclusion, it is not a surprise that not all Lutheran churches endorsed the differentiated consensus expressed in JD1. The Kinki EvangelicalLutheran Church of Japan, for instance, was of the opinion after JD1 that ‘the traditional Roman-Catholic view of man’s ability to cooperate in justification and sanctification is retained without major adjustments’.64 Nor is it surprising, in the light of the further development of the text, that this same Japanese church also rejected JD3, one of the reasons being the continuing presence of the Roman Catholic doctrine of predisposing grace which allows for human cooperation.65 Conversely, the official response of the Roman Catholic Church to the final version of the JDDJ insisted even

64 65

GER-DER, 223. GER-DER, 405–406.

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more on the notion of cooperation. It expressed the desire to expose more fully the meaning of this concept: [T]he Catholic Church notes with satisfaction that No. 21, in conformity with Can. 4 of the Decree on Justification” of the Council of Trent (DS 1554) states that man can refuse grace; but it must also be affirmed that, with this freedom to refuse, there is also a new capacity to adhere to the divine will, a capacity rightly called cooperatio. b. Justification as Forgiveness of Sins and Making Righteous 1. The Theme in Relation to Human Cooperation The main line of argument in all versions of 4.2 is that Lutherans and Roman Catholics agree that forgiveness of sins and renewal of the believer cannot be separated from each other. Both are acts of God. It is necessary to state this consensus in order to clear up the following crude misunderstandings: that Lutherans would only emphasize forensic justification without taking into account the real change in the believer, or that Roman Catholicism would hold a purely moralistic view on justification. The question then is what the legitimate differences between the two teachings entail. On a superficial reading one might think that it is a matter of emphasizing one of the two aspects of God’s action towards the human being. Partly this is true, though the more fundamental issue is the way forgiveness and renewal relate to each other. This relationship has got everything to do with the issue of cooperation, which was also prominent in the previous subsection. It is remarkable that in JD1, the distinct Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs contain exactly the same statement: both dialogue partners state that God’s gracious action remains free from human conditions This sentence reflects above all a Lutheran concern. It is something which Lutherans ‘insist’ on and which Roman Catholics ‘do not deny’. The Roman Catholic list of suggestions in preparation of JD2 contained a proposal to formulate the sentence in the Roman Catholic paragraph as follows: that God’s gracious action in justification remains independent of human cooperation,

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and to change ‘conditions’ into ‘cooperation’ in the Lutheran paragraph as well.66 The proposal was implemented in JD2 and JD3 and probably expresses better what the remaining differences are all about. Most likely as a consequence of this change, the Lutheran paragraph underwent a further modification in JD2: that justification remains free from human cooperation. There had been no specific proposal from the Lutheran churches in reaction to JD1 to talk about ‘justification’ here instead of ‘God’s gracious action’. It is clear however, that the change from ‘conditions’ to ‘cooperation’ made the change to ‘justification’ a plausible option for the commission, an amendment which takes into account the concerns expressed by some Lutheran churches with regard to the concept of cooperation in the previous subsection. Because of these changes, the sentence that was originally identical in both paragraphs came to bear divergent meanings. The Lutheran version is an unambiguous exclusion of cooperation in justification. The Roman Catholic sentence, by contrast, leaves the possibility of human cooperation in justification open and even supports it. First, the assertion that God’s gracious action remains ‘independent of’ – instead of ‘free from’ – cooperation implies that such cooperation is not at all excluded. Second, in the Roman Catholic version, it is only God’s gracious action which is said to be independent of cooperation, not justification itself. The official Vatican response to JD3 leaves no room for ambiguity on this issue, stating that the sentence in the Roman Catholic paragraph ‘must be understood in the sense that the gifts of God’s grace do not depend on the works of man, but not in the sense that justification can take place without human cooperation’. It can be argued that the Roman Catholic proposals to make further modifications to the Roman Catholic paragraph in the final version (JD3, §24) are attempts to highlight this aspect of free human cooperation in justification even more strongly.67 The first thing that strikes one is that Rome proposes to modify once more the sentence that was already discussed: that God’s gift of grace in justification remains independent of human cooperation.

66 67

GER-DER, 241. GER-DER, 270–271.

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The proposed change, which was included in JD3, avoids a certain ambiguity in the previous formulation. Stating ‘that God’s gracious action in justification remains independent of human cooperation’ may imply, at least in a Tridentine framework, a form of synergism in which there are two parts in justification, one ‘action’ accomplished by God and another one, human cooperation, which falls outside God’s gracious agency.68 The new wording indicates more clearly that, in the Roman Catholic view, the relationship between God’s gracious action and human cooperation can be looked at in two ways. This gracious action can be described in terms of God as the sovereign Giver of grace, whose freedom is independent of any human operation. This is what is expressed in the new sentence. On the other hand, the new wording allows that more can be said about God’s gracious action in justification in relation to human cooperation than only its independence, for instance, that his gracious action also works in the human being and makes free human cooperation possible.69 A second element of the Roman Catholic proposal for a last change in that same paragraph is the reference to Chapter 7 of the Tridentine decree on justification. The proposed insertion mentions the Roman Catholic emphasis on ‘the renewal of the inward being by a willing acceptance of grace’.70 The JD3 renders this as ‘the renewal of the interior person through the reception of grace imparted as a gift to the believer’. What is left out in this partial adoption of Trent is the willing acceptance of grace as an aspect of justification. The final result of the subtle recasting of the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs in this subsection is, therefore, a juxtaposition of two positions with regard to the issue of free cooperation in justification. The Lutheran paragraph explicitly rejects it, whereas the Roman Catholic paragraph largely implies it, even though it takes careful analysis of the text to unearth this implication. The ‘legitimate diversity’ contains more tension here than in the first subsection of part 4, in which free cooperation was never explicitly rejected. The juxtaposition of seemingly conflicting views on cooperation can help to understand the ‘legitimate diversity’ with regard 68

As stated above, the Roman Catholic list of desired changes does not contain any explanatory remarks. I am not suggesting that the ambiguity that is described here was the reason why a new formulation was recommended, even though such a suggestion would not be implausible. I am only contending that this new formulation de facto avoids this ambiguity. 69 For a commentary on this passage, see: Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 267–73. Malloy is too fixated, however, on the question of whether or not the idea of created grace is present – verbally if possible – in the text to see how the Roman Catholic paragraph in this subsection carefully moves within the Tridentine framework. 70 GER-DER, 270. It is a direct quotation from Trent (DH 1528).

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to the proper theme of 4.2, the relationship between forgiveness and making righteous. As noted earlier, it is possible to interpret the difference between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs in a superficial way. The way JD3 describes the different Lutheran and Roman Catholic emphases may give rise to such a simplistic interpretation. They respectively insist: that the sinner is granted righteousness before God in Christ through the declaration of forgiveness and that only in union with Christ is one’s life renewed [Lutheran]; that God’s forgiving grace always brings with it a gift of new life, which in the Holy Spirit becomes effective in active love [Roman Catholic]. On the basis of these assertions, one might be led to think that both dialogue partners agree that there is a kind of ‘causal’ connection between forgiveness and renewal and that Lutherans emphasize the cause and Roman Catholics the effect. If this is true, then the question of whether renewal is also part of justification would be merely linguistic; one of determining whether the definition of justification entails only the cause or also its constantly recurring effect. However, this is not the case. It is true that there are commonalities between the distinctive approaches, as the common paragraph had already pointed out. In both cases, there is an intrinsic relationship between forgiveness and renewal. Moreover, the real change in the believer is described by both dialogue partners in relational terms (‘declaration’, ‘union with Christ’, ‘gift’, ‘in the Holy Spirit’). However, the assumed legitimate difference has to do with the way the relational nature of this renewal is conceived. One of the main contentions of the Lutheran paragraph, that justification ‘is not dependent on the life-renewing effects of grace in human beings’, makes most sense when it is understood against the background of the statement in JBF (repeated in the Versailles document) that ‘Lutherans . . . fear that the Catholic emphasis on non-forensic aspects could tend to throw believers back on their own resources’.71 In other words, the strictly one-way consequential relationship between forgiveness and renewal and justification’s independence from the latter are at least to some extent related to the Lutheran rejection of the idea of human cooperation in attaining righteousness before God, an idea that only increases human 71

JBF, §100; Gemeinsame römisch-katholische/evangelisch-lutherische Kommission, ‘Feststellung’ (381–82).

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self-complacency and the misery of the terrified conscience. If one considers the Roman Catholic paragraph, especially in view of its last emendation (from JD2 to JD3), one notices that the traditional inclusion of renewal in justification is described in a way that precisely allows for human cooperation in justification. JD1 and JD2 have the phrase that Roman Catholics insist: that the forgiving grace of God is not without the gift of active love in the Holy Spirit. After a suggestion in the official Roman Catholic response this was changed in JD3 into: that God’s forgiving grace always brings with it a gift of new life, which in the Holy Spirit becomes effective in active love.72 The intention of the proposal is clear. The original text suggests that the active love of the believer follows more or less ‘automatically’ whenever God forgives the sinner. The final version still affirms that there is always an inner renewal immediately related to the forgiveness of sins (‘a gift of new life’). But the consequence of active love does not follow at once. This evokes the Tridentine notions of faith remaining ‘dead’ or justification being lost through sin, two ideas which in the decree on justification are unmistakably an appeal to human responsibility.73 In the final text of JDDJ §24, this becoming effective of the new life is also worked by grace (the Holy Spirit), but its differentiation from the gift of a new life, which always accompanies forgiveness of sins, opens up the space for a ‘moral’ element: the need for human cooperation in justification. To summarize, the treatment in the JDDJ of the issue of forgiveness and renewal remains somewhat superficial when the themes of human freedom and cooperation (and the corresponding theme of the total nature of sin) are left out of consideration. These themes are the ‘subtext’ in this subsection. Due to the fact that, implicitly at least, differing views on freedom and cooperation are just put side by side in these paragraphs, the underlying issue of the precise definition of the relationship between justification and renewal remains largely invisible.

72 73

GER-DER, 270–271. Cf. DH 1531.1544.

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2. A Lutheran Tension There is an interesting tension in the Lutheran paragraph and in the Lutheran contribution to the common paragraph in this subsection. It reflects a difference within the spectrum of possible Lutheran theologies of justification, which more or less coincides with the discrepancy between the Finnish-Lutheran and the German-Lutheran interventions in the textual history of the JDDJ.74 In reaction to JD1, both the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland (ELCF) and the DNK-LWB plead for a stronger Christological – and, in the case of the Finns, also Trinitarian – articulation of the relationship between declaring and making righteous.75 Their respective proposals to change the text, however, reveal a divergent approach. Largely in line with the Mannermaa-school of Luther research, the Finnish Lutherans propose to emphasize the union with Christ in faith as the basis of both the forgiveness of sins and the renewal of the believer.76 In the response of the DNK-LWB, on the other hand, the central notions are declaration (Zuspruch) and trust (Vertrauen). The theological working group that produced a proposal, which was sent to the member churches in preparation of the DNK-LWB statement, rewrote large parts of this subsection in terms of ‘declaration’ and ‘trust’.77 Even the Roman Catholic paragraph was rephrased in this manner. It includes the passage: [The Roman-Catholic church] teaches that the believers through Christ’s righteousness are truly righteous before God. And she considers the effects of grace in active love not as a co-cause [Mitursache] of justification, which is received in the trust [Vertrauen] in God’s forgiving declaration [Zuspruch] in Jesus Christ. Eventually, the statement of DNK-LWB adopted for the most part the proposals of the working group regarding the common and the Lutheran paragraph. Concerning the Roman Catholic paragraph, DNK-LWB does not make concrete proposals for change. It only wonders how Roman Catholic teaching will integrate the insights from LK which were positive received in the VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK (and referred to by the DNK-LWB working group as well), namely (a) the ‘personal character of grace, and its link with the Word’ and (b) that grace does not become ‘an 74

Therefore, these different theological approaches to justification will be called in this section, somewhat simplistically, the ‘German’ and the ‘Finnish’ interpretation. 75 GER-DER, 96–97.100.194. 76 GER-DER, 97.100. 77 GER-DER, 110.

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objective “possession” (even if a conferred possession) on the part of the human being’.78 Moreover, the DNK-LWB reaction to JD1 also refers to the VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK where it wonders about the compatibility of the interpretation of justification in terms of Zuspruch with canon 10 of the Tridentine decree on justification (which rejects the view that the justification of the human being can be described solely in terms of Christ’s own righteousness). The Finnish and the German remarks influenced JD2 in a different way. The Finnish proposal had a visible impact on the rewriting of the common paragraph (JD2, §22), which describes the unity of forgiveness and making righteous in terms of faith as participation in Christ and as union with Christ.79 The interpretation proposed by the Germans affected more clearly the Lutheran paragraph (JD2, §23), which states that ‘the righteousness is declared [zugesprochen] to the sinner in Christ’. In the phrase from the final version of the Lutheran paragraph quoted earlier (JD3, §23: ‘that the sinner is granted righteousness before God in Christ through the declaration of forgiveness and that only in union with Christ is one’s life renewed’), both Finnish and German motifs are put side by side. There were, therefore, reasons for both Finns and Germans to believe that their own theological concerns had not been sufficiently taken into account.80 It can be argued, however, that the final text of this paragraph is, on the whole, closer to the Finnish interpretation than to the German view. First, Simo Peura’s reflections on the method of the JDDJ show that the Finnish influence on the subsection on forgiveness and making righteous is part of a larger shift in the outline of the text (especially in the drafting of JD2) towards a more substantial formulation of the common beliefs of Lutherans and Roman Catholics.81 This joint view on the centre of justification teaching involves a

78

LK 55/49; ‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (85–86); GER-DER, 110.195. ‘Wenn der Mensch an Christus im Glauben teilhat, rechnet ihm Gott seine Sünde nicht an und wirkt in ihm tätige Liebe durch den Heiligen Geist. Beide Aspekten des Gnadenhandelns Gottes . . . gehören in der Weise zusammen, dass der Mensch im Glauben mit Christus vereinigt wird, der in seiner Person unsere Gerechtigkeit ist’ [italics mine]. 80 The German Lutheran Dorothea Wendebourg, who was a member of the drafting committee(s) for the Würzburg texts (JD2 and JD3), sees the Zuspruch-character of justification receding in the final version. Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”’ (164–65). Johani Forsberg, by contrast, thinks that the scholarship of the Finnish Luther-school could have been taken into account more and that the final text of the JDDJ gives a one-sided forensic interpretation of the Lutheran position. J. Forsberg, ‘Der finnische Beitrag zum Dokument Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Caritas Dei: Beiträge zum Verständnis Luthers und der gegenwärtigen Ökumene (FS Tuomo Mannermaa) (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), pp. 152–69 (166–67). 81 Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’ (184–91) 79

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stronger emphasis not only on the Trinitarian and Christological foundations of justification, but also on the union with Christ in baptism which brings about a real renewal. None of the notions that are central in the German approach – especially ‘declaration’ and ‘trust’ – plays a prominent role in this emerging common articulation of the doctrine of justification. Second, in the Lutheran paragraph the conception of justification as Zuspruch is present. Nonetheless, the notion of trust (Vertrauen), which is equally significant in the view that was put forward by DNK-LWB, is wholly absent in this subsection. One could explain this by referring to the next subsection (4.3), which deals with the way justification is described on the level of the believer and in which the notion of ‘trust’ does play an important role. Still its absence in subsection 4.2 is problematic from a ‘German’ point of view. The proposals of DNK-LWB and of its preparatory working group express the view that it is precisely the Spirit-wrought trust aroused by the declaration of the forgiveness of sins which forms the heart of the new life of the believer.82 Thus, it is the link between declaring and making righteous, a link that is missing here. It is probable that ‘Finnish’ and ‘German’ approaches to justification would have different emphases when explaining the statement in the Lutheran paragraph that justification ‘is not dependent on the life-renewing effects of grace in human beings’. In the German view, the new life of the Christian is a life emanating from a confidence effected by God’s Zuspruch of righteousness. Any attempt to think of the righteousness of the believer as dependent upon actual renewal would be destructive of that trust. The Finnish interpretation would not emphasize so greatly the idea that justification through trust is itself the heart of the renewal of the believer. Rather, the emphasis would be on Christ as the heart of both declared and effective righteousness (and, therefore, of both faith and love). Making justification dependent on renewal would above all obscure the fact that both are dependent upon Christ. This would obviously also imply a lack of faith as trust. But the Christological interpretation of both declaring and making righteous as participation in and union with Christ opens up a wider range of descriptions of renewal than simply one in terms of ‘a life in trust’. The Finnish reaction to JD1 explicitly refers to sacramental and 82

The DNK-LWB working Group proposed to reformulate the Lutheran paragraph thus: ‘Wenn die evangelisch-lutherischen Kirchen die Rechtfertigung als Gottes vergebendes Liebeshandeln verstehen, so verneinen sie damit nicht die lebenserneuerende Kraft der Gnade. Sie wollen vielmehr festhalten, dass das Leben der Christen gerade so erneuert wird, dass es ein Leben ganz in geistgewirkten Vertrauen auf Christi zugesprochene Gerechtigkeit ist’. GER-DER, 110.

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ecclesiological ways of accounting for the connection between declaring and making righteous.83 It was argued in the chapter on the Mannermaaschool that this more ontological – and less ‘neo-Kantian’ – way of conceiving of justification allows for a more positive Lutheran stance towards the idea of human cooperation. It is probably not far-fetched to suggest that such a Lutheran theology of justification is more likely to be ‘open to’ a Roman Catholic theology which upholds its view on human cooperation, and perhaps for this reason it is more strongly accentuated in this part of the document.

c. Faith and Grace 1. Trust, Hope and Love The subsection that became 4.3 in the final text was originally placed after the subsection that is now 4.4 (on the sinfulness of the believer). The DNKLWB response proposed to reverse this order in view of ‘rigour as regards content’.84 It is indeed logical to speak first about what justification is and only later about the situation of the justified. Moreover, the new structure displays more clearly the proximity of the themes of the second and the third subsections. There are actually a lot of overlapping issues in 4.2 and 4.3. The commentary of the Strasbourg Ecumenical Institute argues that these two subsections relate to justification ‘in terms of God’s action’ and ‘in terms of the justified person’, respectively.85 Though this is undoubtedly a correct analysis, it reveals at the same time that the separate treatment of these issues in two subsections is not unproblematic. Traditionally, the whole issue is precisely the relationship between justification as act of God and as reality for the believer. This problem already emerged in 4.2, where the notion of ‘trust’ was completely neglected, though it was for the ‘German’ interpretation a crucial idea for understanding the unity of forgiveness of sins and renewal of the believer as acts of God. In 4.3, the interpretation of justification by faith in terms of trust is more prominent. Yet, this prominence leaves many questions unanswered, in its relation to both Roman Catholic teaching and the Finnish-Lutheran approach. In the common paragraph, an attempt is made to explain how both Lutherans and Roman Catholics can say that the sinner is justified ‘by faith’. Several Roman Catholic proposals for textual emendations have turned the 83

GER-DER, 97–98. GER-DER, 195. 85 Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, p. 36. 84

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JD2 and JD3 versions of the paragraph into complex texts.86 A first proposal that was implemented in the text was to insert a reference to baptism right after the statement on justification ‘by faith’. This was not only a Roman Catholic concern. As mentioned above, the Finnish scholar Simo Peura claims that the consensus in the JDDJ is strengthened by the stronger emphasis on baptism in later versions. This development is in line with his own conviction that Lutheran theology should endorse a stronger ‘sacramental realism’ than it usually does.87 This, in its turn, harmonizes with the endeavour in Finnish Luther scholarship to bring to the fore the ‘real ontic’ nature of the Lutheran idea of union with Christ in faith. A second change proposed in the Roman Catholic list of desiderata concerns the sentence in JD1 which says: This justifying faith includes – as trust in God’s gracious promise – love for God and hope in him. The Roman Catholic proposal was to modify this to: Justifying faith includes, with trust in God’s gracious promise, love for God and hope in him. Eventually it became: [Human beings] place their trust in God’s gracious promise by justifying faith, which includes hope in God and love for him. This compromise still allows for the interpretation that was compulsory in the first version: that it is faith as trust from which hope and love proceed. But it equally permits the emphasis the Roman Catholic proposal wanted to put forward: that justifying faith entails trust, but also love and hope.88 86

The ‘Roman list’ about this paragraph is found in GER-DER, 242. Peura, ‘Baptism, Justification, and the Joint Declaration’ (129). 88 Two further observation on this phrase: (1) It is remarkable that the commentary of the Strasbourg Institute explains this sentence as follows: ‘This [justifying] faith is more precisely understood as “trust in God’s gracious promise” which declares to the person God’s saving action. As trust, this faith includes hope and love toward God’. Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, p. 37. The commentators are simply describing what was there in JD1 without taking into account the modifications of the text. (2) The consultation of the DNK-LWB on JD2 stated that speaking about ‘justifying faith’ may give rise to the misunderstanding that it is faith itself that justifies, whereas in Lutheran theology faith is the way the sinner ‘grasps’ (or is grasped by) the justifying Word. GER-DER, 266. This comment shows that the way the notion of faith is used in this phrase (which was repeated in JD3) is close to the traditional Roman Catholic view on faith, hope and love as ‘infused virtues’. 87

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The Roman Catholic ‘list’ in preparation of the drafting of JD3 contained a further suggestion. After the sentence about justifying faith as including love and hope, JD1 and JD2 stated: This faith is active in love and cannot remain without works. The Roman Catholic proposal suggests: This faith is active in love and cannot and should not remain without works. The formulation in JD3 is: Such a faith is active in love and thus the Christian cannot and should not remain without works. Once again, the final wording tries to take into account the different concerns: the Roman Catholic stress on the aspect of incitement (‘should not’) and the Lutheran contention that justifying faith should not be made dependent on such incitement. The final sentence of the common paragraph seems to add force to this Lutheran concern by saying: But whatever in the justified precedes or follows the free gift of faith is neither the basis of justification nor merits it. This statement appears to go beyond the Tridentine decree on justification, where it is only stated that ‘nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, would merit the grace of justification’.89 The Roman Catholic list of possible amendments contained a proposal to delete the words ‘or follows’, a suggestion which was not implemented.90 Yet, in view of the 89 90

DH 1532. GER-DER, 242. There is, however, one curiosity in the development of the German versions of the JDDJ which has no parallel in the English versions. JD1 speaks about ‘alles, was im Menschen dem freien Geschenk des Glaubens vorausgeht oder nachfolgt’ [Eng.: whatever in the justified precedes or follows the free gift of faith]. In JD2 and JD3, the English version remains the same, while the German undergoes a subtle change: ‘alles, was im Menschen dem freien Geschenk des Glaubens vorausgeht und nachfolgt’ [‘oder’ changes into ‘und’]. It is not clear whether this has any theological significance. If it does, the meaning would be that the (only) things that did not merit or establish justification before faith do not merit or establish it after faith has been given. This could be interpreted – after some more ‘hermeneutical acrobatics’ – as a way to account for the ‘growth in justification’ in the new life of the Christian of which Trent speaks.

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preceding sentences, it is clear that the seemingly un-Tridentine sentence can itself be interpreted in many different ways, dependent on what is meant by the ‘basis’ of justification, how one defines the concept of ‘faith’ here (in its relation to hope and love) and in what way justification is linked in this statement to baptism. 2. Justification as Communion In the original draft, the remainder of this subsection contained no less than 5 paragraphs. The last three of them once again addressed the problem of ‘forensic’ and ‘effective’ justification. In JD2, the structure was simplified by creating one Lutheran and one Roman Catholic paragraph in which much of the material of JD1 §§28-32 was integrated. This led to complex paragraphs in which diverse theological ideas pass in review and which leave significant questions unanswered. What does constitute a unity in these paragraphs, however, is the notion of communion with Christ, which was already present in both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraph in JD1, but which became more prominent in JD2, where it knits together more closely the descriptions of both positions. Thus, the following parallelism becomes visible: In faith [sinners] place their trust wholly in their Creator and Redeemer and thus live in communion with him. [Lutheran paragraph] In justification the righteous receive from Christ faith, hope, and love and are thereby taken into communion with him. [Roman Catholic paragraph] One could wonder why the common paragraph of 4.3 (§25) does not reflect the commonality that is so obvious in the separate paragraphs, namely that both Lutherans and Roman Catholics can articulate justification in terms of communion with Christ or with God. This would have been consistent with the overall orientation of the document since JD2. The Trinitarian articulation of the reality of justification, which was in JD2 incorporated in the central §15, had already described justification in terms of ‘participation’ (‘share’, ‘teilhaftig werden’) in the righteousness of Christ. Even more significantly, the part on the biblical message of justification, which was revised drastically in JD2, explicitly defines justification in terms of union with Christ (§11). The latter emendation was suggested by the ELCF. In the Finnish proposal for change, the relevant sentence was: ‘God justifies us by giving us the Holy Spirit (Rom 8:9-11). He makes us righteous in baptism by

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the power of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:11), which means that we grow together with Christ and with his death and resurrection (Rom 6:3-11; Col 2:11-15)’.91 Thus the idea of communion with Christ is connected with baptism, which played only a secondary role in the corresponding paragraph in JD1.92 This converged with the Roman Catholic proposal with regard to this paragraph, which equally suggested a stronger emphasis on baptism.93 The latter intervention in the drafting process added an ecclesiological connotation to this interpretation of justification as communion through baptism. The final text in JD3 says that justification ‘occurs in the reception of the Holy Spirit in baptism as incorporation into the one body (Rom 8:1f, 9f; I Cor 12:12f)’.94 These changes in part 1 of the document may shed a light on the ‘common affirmation’ of justification as communion with Christ in 4.3, which is at least implied in the parallelism between the separate Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs (§§26-27). This affirmation possibly has a counterpart in the common paragraph (§25) where it says that the gift of salvation is granted ‘by the action of the Holy Spirit in baptism’ (possibly understood as ‘incorporation into the one body’). However, the baptismal – and ecclesial – interpretation of justification as communion, plausible as it may be in the light of the whole document, is not really helpful for the understanding of the separate Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs in this subsection. Baptism is mentioned only in the Roman Catholic paragraph and seems to play no role whatsoever in the Lutheran part. The paragraphs describing the different points of view rather seem to be marked by a peculiar tension which is, at least at first sight, only indirectly related to baptism and church.

91

‘Gott rechtfertigt uns, indem er uns den Heiligen Geist gibt (Röm 8,9–11). Er macht uns in der Taufe durch die Kracht des Heiligen Geistes gerecht (1 Kor 6,11), was bedeutet, dass wir mit Christus sowie mit seinem Tod und seiner Auferstehung zusammenwachsen (Röm 6,3–11; Kol 2,11–15)’. GER-DER, 94. 92 JD1 §10 states that the justified are given the Spirit through baptism, thus suggesting that baptism plays no significant role in justification. In JD2, the Finnish proposal is only partly adopted, because the ideas of union with Christ and of baptism seem to be somewhat disconnected. Both ideas are mentioned in two consequent sentences. The description of the union with Christ in terms of death and resurrection and the corresponding reference to Rom 6, however, makes the connection with baptism obvious. 93 GER-DER, 240. 94 Italics mine. This is a direct translation of the German text, which significantly diverges from the English version in this paragraph. In the German text there is a change between JD2 and JD3 from justification through baptism ‘and incorporation into the one body’ to justification through baptism ‘as incorporation into the one body’. The final English text maintains the ‘and’ of JD2. The German JD3 thus expresses a more ecclesiological interpretation of justification itself, which is closer to the intent of the Roman Catholic proposal.

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The Lutheran paragraph first states that ‘God justifies sinners in faith alone (sola fide)’. This faith is explained in terms of trust in God, effected by God’s creative word. This new creation ‘leads to a life in hope and love’. Thus, trust as the ‘missing link’ between justification and renewal, fruitlessly advocated in the German Lutheran response to the previous subsection, seems to be affirmed here without ambiguity. However, at the end of the paragraph the train of thought takes a slightly different turn. The distinction (which is ‘not a separation’) between justification and renewal is said to be necessary to ‘[indicate] the basis . . . from which the renewal of life proceeds’.95 At this point, the reader is still inclined to think that it is the faith as trust provoked by God’s word which constitutes this basis. The Lutheran paragraph proceeds, however, by saying that the renewal of life . . . comes forth from the love of God imparted to the person in justification. Justification and renewal are joined in Christ, who is present in faith. A version of the second sentence in this quote, which clearly expresses a ‘Finnish’ concern,96 was already present in JD2. The first sentence was added only in the final version, apparently without any antecedent request by one of the churches. The idea of justification involving God’s love being ‘imparted’ to the human being is a very different description of the basis for renewal than ‘trust’, though not necessarily incompatible with it. It is definitely consistent with the idea of Christ’s presence in faith as the basis for both the declaration of righteousness and the renewal of the believer. In the light of this unio cum Christo idea, the foregoing account of justification in terms of trust alone might have been understood as too exclusively ‘forensic’, with renewal as the mere consequence of a communion with Christ which is already fully established. The sentence which was added is therefore, most likely, a ‘Finnish’ interpolation. Mannermaa highlights the fact that Luther’s concept of Christ’s presence refers to a real presence in faith and love.97 He dismisses purely ‘relational’ interpretations of this presence. As was argued in the chapter on the Finnish school, it is not always clear what exactly the ‘real-ontic’ presence or indwelling of Christ in the believer entails in the Finnish interpretation. If it is more than a ‘purely relational’ view on justification, it probably involves ontological, sacramental 95

This interpretation draws on the German version which is, once more, slightly different from the English edition. 96 It was inserted in accordance with a remark in the Finnish response. GER-DER, 99. 97 Mannermaa, ‘Das Verhältnis von Glaube und Liebe’.

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and ecclesial aspects. As long as this is not clarified, however, the relationship in this paragraph between, on the one hand, the word- and trust-centred concept of justification and, on the other hand, the description in terms of Christ’s presence and of ‘imparted love’ remains somewhat unclear. The Roman Catholic paragraph in JD1 contained the traditional concepts of sanctifying and created grace. This grace was said to be constantly dependent on ‘uncreated grace’ (God) and never to become a ‘possession’ of the human being. In JD2 these traditional notions are left out.98 Instead, a more relational idiom is used. The grace that justifies ‘makes us children of God’ and is described in terms of a ‘new personal relation to God’. In addition, two elements which were virtually absent in JD1 come to the fore in the opening sentences: The Catholic understanding also sees faith as fundamental in justification. For without faith, no justification can take place. Persons are justified through baptism as hearers of the word and believers in it. First, justification happens ‘through baptism’. As was indicated in Chapter 4, Werner Löser argues that the Tridentine idea of gratia inhaerens, which is closely related to ‘created grace’, had an implicit sacramental and ecclesial meaning for the council fathers.99 It could be translated in terms of ‘church membership through baptism’. In the light of this analysis, it is no surprise that the disappearance of the concepts of sanctifying and created grace in JD2 is balanced by the emergence of a reference to baptism. Second, faith, which was mentioned in the corresponding Roman Catholic paragraphs of JD1 only as a part of the triad faith, hope and love, is given in JD2 a more prominent role in justification. It is connected, furthermore, to the proclamation of the gospel (‘hearers of the word’). The DNK-LWB consultation on JD2 expressed an uneasiness about the last sentence in the 98

The statement of the DNK-LWB about JD1 said that the concept of ‘created grace’ was problematic from a Reformation point of view. It deemed the removal of this concept justifiable in view of its origin in ‘scholastic theology’. Presumably, the authors of the statement believed that ‘created grace’ belonged to the historical context in which the classical Roman Catholic teaching on justification was formulated, rather than to its substance. GER-DER, 196. There is a tension between this request and what LK says about grace as habitus (which is closely related to ‘created grace’): ‘[R]ecognitions drawn from the history of theology no longer permit Protestant theology the reproach that the notion of grace as a habitus – an enduring disposition of human existence which inclines it to new activity – is the equivalent of trust in one’s own strength, and is hence the equivalent of loving God by means of one’s own natural powers’. LK 55/48–49. In other words, one could also argue against the response of DNK-LWB that, in the light of the previous dialogues, it was equally unnecessary to delete the concept of created grace. 99 Löser, ‘Lehrverurteilungen - kirchentrennend?’.

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quotation above because it seems to suggest that hearing the word and faith are merely preconditions for justification, which actually takes place in baptism.100 Despite this comment, the sentence was not changed in JD3. These two points reveal an unresolved tension in the Roman Catholic paragraph similar to the one in the Lutheran paragraph. In both cases, a relational and word-oriented articulation of justification is combined with elements that suggest a more ontological, sacramental and ecclesial interpretation of the righteousness of the believer. It seems as if both paragraphs bring in concepts that are traditionally associated with the other dialogue partner, such as justification involving ‘imparted love’ (Lutheran) and the person being justified as ‘hearer and believer of the word’ (Roman Catholic). The fact that those elements do not always fit in smoothly in the overall approach of the paragraph may be seen either as the result of a careless amalgamation of irreconcilable elements or as the consequence of a discovery during the dialogue process of aspects of one’s own teaching which are difficult to integrate with the customary way of presenting this teaching. But however one assesses this tension, it corroborates the thesis of Simo Peura that JD2 moved beyond the somewhat stereotypical presentation of the doctrinal positions in JD1.101

3. Faith Alone – or Trust Alone? One final criticism of the approach in this subsection needs to be mentioned, because it has led to a further clarification of the consensus in the Annex. There was dissatisfaction among Lutherans that the central reality of justification sola fide was only made explicit in the Lutheran paragraph and not in the common paragraph, thus reducing a central and crucial expression of Christian proclamation to one particular option among others.102 This was one of the main points of a petition in January 1998 in which about 150 German speaking Lutheran lecturers and professors advised the Lutheran churches to reject the JDDJ.103 In the Annex, the

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GER-DER, 266. Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’ (185–86). 102 Wendebourg, ‘Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’ (59–60); R. Brandt, ‘Gemeinsame Erklärung - kritische Fragen: Die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre” und die Fragen zu ihrer Rezeption in den deutschen lutherischen Kirchen’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 95 (1998), pp. 63–102 (73–76); See also the answer of Eberhard Jüngel to Pannenbergs defense of the JDDJ: E. Jüngel, ‘Martin Luthers entscheidende Exklusivpartikel’, epd-Dokumentation (1998), no. 7/98, p. 54. 103 GER-DER, 493–497. 101

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relationship between justification, grace and faith was resumed in point 2C. There, Lutherans and Roman Catholics affirm together: Justification takes place “by grace alone” (JD 15 and 16), by faith alone, the person is justified “apart from works” (Rom 3:28, cf. JD 25) This clarification did contribute to a change in the assessment of some initial critics of the JDDJ.104 Yet, the Annex and the Official Common Statement also gave rise to more Lutheran criticism.105 Some Lutheran theologians observed that the Annex uses Lutheran concepts such as sola fide, but that it interprets them in a strictly Tridentine way.106 In his response to this petition, VELKD leading bishop Horst Hirschler expressed his dissatisfaction with this new criticism. He thought it focused only on what was possibly problematic in the Annex and did not take into account the genre and the intention of the text.107 It is true that the critics of the Annex (and of the whole reception process of the JDDJ) use what one could call a ‘direct comparative method’ in their assessment of the ecumenical documents. One’s own authoritative writings are used as the ultimate criterion and the quality of the consensus text is measured on the basis of its proximity to this criterion. The official Vatican response to JD3 was also viewed by some as using this inappropriate method.108 When one considers the content of the Annex and the text of its critics from a theological point of view however, it is then difficult to avoid the following conclusion: There is at least a form of Lutheran theology which does not find its most central claim, on which the whole truth of the Christian message hinges, reflected in the Annex. In their reaction to the Annex, Jorg Baur and Notger Slenczka formulate such a central claim:

104

E. Jüngel, ‘Ein wichtiger Schritt: Durch einen “Anhang” haben Katholiken und Lutheraner ihre umstrittene “Gemeinsame Erklärung” verbessert’, epd-Dokumentation (1999), no. 24/99, pp. 60–60a; I. U. Dalferth, ‘Einheit in Verschiedenheit: Ein neues ökumenisches Dokument zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, epd-Dokumentation (1999), no. 26/99, pp. 11–13. 105 There was, for instance, a second petition that was signed by even more Lutheran lecturers and professors than the first one. GER-DER, 944–949. 106 Cf. W. Härle, ‘Lutherische Formeln - tridentinisch interpretiert’, epd-Dokumentation (1999), no. 43/99, pp. 13–17. 107 GER-DER, 957–959. 108 Robert Jenson laconically remarks: ‘The single most startling feature of the Vatican statement is that it is a perfect mirror image of the Protestant-professors one, both in its matter and in its theological incompetence’, continuing that ‘they do not grasp what the function of such a document might be, and therefore do not know how to read it’. Jenson, ‘On the Vatican’s “Official Response”’ (402).

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[That] the assurance of human beings before God and their freedom hangs on the fact that every concern of human beings about their existence before God is taken out of their hands, because their salvation is founded in Christ and in no way – not even by means of a gracious renewal – in human beings.109 One could say that Baur and Slenczka describe the powerlessness of the human being in relation to salvation not simply as the ‘problem’, but rather as the ‘solution’. Justification by God’s grace is not what overcomes the situation in which human beings are unable to be righteous through their deeds. It rather means that the last possibility is taken away from them to contribute anything to that righteousness.110 Therefore justification ‘by grace’ is understood properly only when it is accompanied by the sola fide interpreted as sola fiducia. The proclamation that Christ has fulfilled the law for us destroys all our claims to power over our ultimate destiny and arouses trust in God as the only author of our salvation. What is described here briefly is, of course, a crucial trait of all Lutheran theology. But, as the tension in the Lutheran paragraph in this subsection demonstrates, there are probably different ways in which this element of fiducia can determine the overall Lutheran concept of justification. It is plausible to say that the more the fiducial concept of faith is stated as the sole central truth of justification from which all other aspects emanate, the more one is inclined to reject any ‘transcendental’ view on grace, which emphasizes the non-exclusivity of grace and human action. Or, to state what is clearly apparent: if the highest manifestation of God’s grace can only be well understood in terms of the destruction of human effort, then a defence of a transcendental view is likely to appear as a grace-resisting self-assertion 109

They talk about Luther’s view ‘nach der die Gewißheit des Menschen vor Gott und seine Freiheit daran hängt, daß dem Menschen jede Sorge um sein Bestehen vor Gott aus der Hand genommen wird, weil sein Heil in Christus und in keiner Weise – auch nicht auf dem Wege einer gnadenhaften Erneuerung – im Menschen begründet ist’. J. Baur and N. Slenczka, ‘Lutherische Rechtfertigungslehre ohne das “Simul iustus et peccator”?’ epdDokumentation (1999), no. 43/99, pp. 3–4. 110 This point is made by Baur in his criticism of LK. He says that the impossibility of cooperation in justification is an insufficient description of what the Reformation was all about. Rather, the heart of Reformation theology is: ‘Daß Gottes rechtfertigendes Wort schöpferischer Ruf ist, der uns aus dem “Nichts” unserer Verlorenheit hervorruft, daß also die völlige Gnadenhaftigkeit unserer Rechtfertigung nicht etwa nur der einzig mögliche Ausweg angesichts der Sünde ist, sondern vielmehr die Weise, in der Gott, der schöpferische Erlöser, mit seinem Geschöpf umgeht, das sich immer nur rufen und beschenken lassen kann und deshalb sein Heil nicht nur nicht, weil er Sünder ist, mitwirkend erwerben kann, sondern auf keinen Fall selber – auch nicht partiell – gewinnen darf und soll’. Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung?, p. 6.

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of the human being. It is precisely such a transcendental view on grace that is defended in the chapter of the Annex, which also contains the commonly asserted sola fide.111 For that reason, Wilfried Härle doubts whether the sola fide in the Annex has resolved the question about the constitutive role of human effort in salvation and about the enduring applicability of canon 9 of the Tridentine decree on justification, which defends the necessity of cooperation and willing preparation for justification.112 He also wonders about the validity of canon 12 of the same decree, which precisely rejects faith as sola fiducia.113 Perhaps a misunderstanding has arisen after LK. The section on ‘faith’ in the German study states: ‘The decisive point about the Protestant understanding of faith – unconditional trust in the merciful God, here and in the final judgement – is no longer a problem for contemporary Catholic theology’.114 The text suggests that a fundamental shift has occurred in the Roman Catholic assessment of Protestant view on faith. It is unclear, however, what this shift involves. The Tridentine canon 12 only rejected a view on faith as nothing else (nihil aliud) but trust and thus, indirectly, acknowledged a fiducial aspect of faith. The suggestion of a shift in the Roman Catholic position may have led people to believe that the Roman Catholic Church now recognizes the legitimacy of a purely fiducial concept of faith. Neither LK115, nor the JDDJ justifies such an interpretation. Sola fiducia is not acknowledged in the Roman Catholic paragraph of this subsection, nor in the common paragraph and the Annex – and, arguably, not even in the Lutheran paragraph. If one considers sola fiducia as the interpretation by which the article of justification stands or falls, then rejecting the paragraphs

111

‘The working of God’s grace does not exclude human action: God effects everything, the willing and the achievement, therefore we are called to strive (cf. Phil 2:12 ff)’. Annex, 2C. 112 Härle, ‘Lutherische Formeln - tridentinisch interpretiert’ (15–16). The Tridentine canon declares: ‘Si quis dixerit, sola fide impium iustificari, ita ut intelligat, nihil aliud requiri, quo ad iustificationis gratiam consequendam cooperetur, et nulla ex parte necesse esse, eum suae voluntatis motu praeparari atque disponi: anathema sit’ (DH 1559). 113 ‘Si quis dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordiae peccata remittentis propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse, qua iustificamur: anathema sit’. (DH 1562). 114 LK 57/51. 115 The references in LK to the Second Vatican Council (Dei Verbum 5 and Dignitatis Humanae 10) only allow the interpretation that the Roman Catholic Church has arrived at a higher appreciation for faith as trust. They, however, do not come anywhere near the idea of sola fiducia.

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of this subsection is a perfectly logical reaction and not necessarily a result of not comprehending the ecumenical method of the JDDJ.

d. The Sinfulness of the Justified 1. Sinfulness, Renewal and Baptism Subsection 4.4 is probably one of the most discussed parts of the JDDJ. It was subject to far-reaching editorial changes throughout drafting process, even though it is not always clear by whom certain modifications were suggested. Theologically, the connection with the previous paragraphs has to be borne in mind. The interpretation of the relationship between justification and renewal determines the way one sees the reality of sin in the life of the believer (and vice versa). The relationship with the previous paragraphs is probably ill-formulated if one states it in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’ justification. Rather, the same problem that was dealt with in previous subsections – how the sinner is righteous in the eyes of God – is now repeated from another perspective, namely that of the life of the baptized. For the writing of the common paragraph, the drafting committee drew extensively on the results of previous dialogues. The key concepts of the paragraph – power of sin, remaining opposition to God (Gottwidrigkeit), enduring dependence on God’s forgiving grace, lifelong struggle against sin and daily prayer for forgiveness – are all found in the corresponding sections of the German or the American dialogue documents.116 In the final version (JD3), the paragraph receives a new emphasis due to the insertion of two statements, one at the beginning and one at the end of the paragraph. Instead of immediately speaking of the constant reliance on God’s grace, the paragraph now starts by saying: We confess together that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies, and truly renews the person.117 This statement is consistent with the general tendency in the drafting process towards a stronger emphasis on baptism. The goal of this insertion is not merely making the connection with the previous paragraphs on

116

LK 50–53/44–46; JBF §§102–104. Many of these ideas were also expressed in Pesch, ‘Gottes Gnadenhandeln’ (886–91). 117 In JD2, an earlier version of this sentence formed a short separate paragraph inserted after the Roman Catholic paragraph. The DNK-LWB consultation on JD2 proposed to integrate it in the common paragraph. Ger-DER, 267.

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renewal in the sense that now the limits of this renewal are going to be demonstrated.118 It rather suggests that everything that is going to be said about the sinfulness of the believer has to be seen from the perspective of the efficacious pneumatological-sacramental union with Christ. The sacramental aspect is also hinted at by a second insertion in the JD3-version of the common paragraph. The concluding sentence is now: The justified . . . are ever again called to conversion and penance, and are ever again granted forgiveness. As will be indicated, the ideas of conversion and penance are given a sacramental interpretation in the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs, namely in terms of a daily return to baptism (§29) and the sacrament of reconciliation’ (§30). Both insertions thus build a kind of inclusio that places the statements about the sinfulness of the believer and the permanent need for forgiveness in the perspective of God’s actual giving of this forgiveness and of its sacramental mediation.

2. Tendencies in the Separate Paragraphs The separate Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs in this subsection were in JD1 relatively short. The Lutheran paragraph explained the idea of simul iustus et peccator by saying that believers are iusti in their faith, which relates them to Christ, and peccatores in view of themselves. It emphasized that the power of sin does not ‘reign’ over the believer any more, thus adopting Luther’s concept of peccatum regnatum.119 The Roman Catholic paragraph in JD1 equally revolves around a traditional concept: concupiscentia, which refers to desires ‘in contradiction to God’ (gottwidrig) that give rise to ‘a lifelong struggle’ for the believer. Because concupiscence does not separate the believer from God, it is not properly called sin. In JD2, two main changes take place. First, the central concepts of both paragraphs – and more precisely their ecumenically problematic aspects – are elaborated somewhat more. The Lutheran characterization of the 118

The conjunction ‘but’ in the next sentence (‘But the justified must all through life constantly look to God’s unconditional justifying grace’) seems to suggest such an interpretation. However, the commentary of the Strasbourg Institute sees this ‘but’ as misleading. Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, p. 39 The ‘but’ indeed creates the impression of a strong tension or even opposition between the idea of constant reliance on grace and the idea of real renewal. Such opposition is alien to both Lutheran and Roman Catholic thinking. 119 Cf. also LK 52/46; JBF §102.

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believer as peccator is accounted for in terms of the inability to obey the divine command to love God wholeheartedly (Deut 6:5). The Roman Catholic conviction that concupiscence is not sin is explained by pointing out point out the Roman Catholic concept of sin (which always involves a freely willed decision) and the idea that the selfish desires of the Christian do not deserve eternal punishment. In other words, what happens is that the traditional beliefs are not merely presented in their distinctiveness, as was the case in JD1. A stronger attempt is made to formulate them in a way that makes them plausible to the dialogue partner. Second, a parallelism is created by literally adopting in the Lutheran paragraph of JD2 the statement that the believer ‘is not separated from God’, which was previously only in the Roman Catholic paragraph. In JD3, the parallelism between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraph is strengthened and made even more obvious. The significantly expanded paragraphs each contain in their second half no less than three of what are almost verbal parallels: (1) the Christian is no longer separated from God, (2) what remains in the Christian that is in opposition to God does not deserve eternal punishment and (3) sins are forgiven in the daily return to baptism (Lutheran) and in the Sacrament of Penance (Roman Catholic, in the case of mortal sins). The developments in 4.3 and 4.4 of the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs are comparable in terms of both form and content. On the level of form, there is in this subsection a growing rapprochement in the language that is used to express the distinct doctrinal positions. The parallelisms that were mentioned above mostly emerged because concepts that were first used only by one dialogue partner were adopted in the paragraph of the other.120 In 4.3, something similar had occurred when Lutherans spoke of justification as involving God’s love being ‘imparted’ and when Roman Catholics articulated justification in terms of ‘hearing the word’ and replaced the ontological language of ‘created grace’ by a more relational 120

One can debate about the question which dialogue partner has taken over the most from the other. In this subsection, the ideas that the Christian is ‘not separated from God’ and that the remaining opposition to God ‘does not deserve eternal punishment’ first appeared in the Roman Catholic paragraph and were later adopted in the Lutheran text. One could argue, however, (1) that from the beginning the Roman Catholic dialogue partner had admitted the word Gottwidrigkeit in its paragraph, thus already approaching the Lutheran idiom, and (2) that the description of the sacrament of penance is particularly word-centred (‘for they must receive pardon and peace in the Sacrament of Reconciliation through the word of forgiveness imparted to them in virtue of God’s reconciling work in Christ’). A closer look on the last example also reveals the limits of adopting each other’s terminology. For the list of Roman Catholic desiderata in preparation of JD3 said in its original printed version that the word of forgiveness is ‘declared’ (zugesprochen). This word was crossed out, however and replaced by ‘imparted’ (gewährt). GER-DER, 271.

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terminology. On the level of content, the growing parallelism and common language in 4.3 and 4.4 centres around the idea of communion of the believer with God, in the latter case expressed negatively as ‘non-separation’. In both subsections, the sacrament of baptism seems to play a distinctive role in making explicit what this communion means.

3. A Structural Change in the Lutheran Paragraph In the light of these general tendencies in the drafting process of these paragraphs, the drastic and theologically far-reaching changes the Lutheran paragraph has undergone may be better understood. In order to perceive what happened and to see the connection with similar developments in previous subsections, it is necessary here to offer a more detailed analysis of the concept of peccatum regnatum in the Lutheran paragraph. In the first version, the idea is formulated simply as: The enslaving power of sin is broken. It no longer rules the justified, for it is itself “ruled” by Christ. The wording is too brief here to offer a decisive answer to the question of exactly how ‘sin is ruled by Christ’. It probably had to be understood in the light of the earlier description of Christians as iusti, namely in terms of faith, which ‘truly binds the believer with Christ and makes them “justified” before God’. As the analysis of the previous paragraph has shown, however, there is no precision in the Lutheran paragraphs of JD1 about the nature of this ‘being bound with Christ in faith’. JD2 sheds some more light on this issue. The sentences on peccatum regnatum are formulated thus: Nevertheless, the enslaving power of sin is broken: despite sin, the believers are no longer separated from God because they are forgiven. And sin does no longer rule them, for it is ruled by Christ, with whom the justified are bound in faith. By pulling the two sentences apart (in terms of content) and by adding the elements of ‘forgiveness’ and being bound with Christ, the main idea is now: because we are forgiven, we live in relation to Christ and because of this relation, sin no longer rules us. This may express the Finnish emphasis on the real presence of Christ as the reality behind both forgiveness and renewal. Nevertheless, the relational terminology does not exclude an interpretation in terms of ‘trust alone’ either.

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The official German reactions to both JD1 and JD2 insisted on an interpretation of the righteousness of the believers in terms of Christ’s righteousness being ‘declared’ (zugesprochen) to them.121 This suggestion was eventually adopted in the Lutheran paragraph of JD3. However, this paragraph differs considerably from the previous versions. The first part explains the Lutheran simul iustus et peccator. It now speaks about believers as totally righteous and totally sinners. The aspect of total righteousness is interpreted in terms of forgiveness through Word and Sacrament and of Christ’s justice which is zugesprochen by God and appropriated in faith.122 The Christian as ‘total sinner’ is explained by referring not only to the commandment to love God, but also to ‘the law’ in general, so that the connection between simul iustus et peccator and the gospel-law distinction becomes visible. Moreover, the believers are called sinners in view of their continual trust in false gods. This part of the paragraph seems to correspond to many concerns that were expressed by German Lutheran churches throughout the drafting process. What one could call the second part of the paragraph starts with the sentences on peccatum regnatum quoted above (with some modifications, such as the absence of the element of forgiveness, which had been moved to the first part of the paragraph). As a conclusion to this idea of sin being ruled by Christ, the paragraph states: In this life, then, Christians can in part lead a just life. This is a highly significant modification of the German Lutheran proposals in reaction to JD1 and JD2, which stated that believers remain peccatores because: [Christians], as long as they dwell on earth, can lead only partly a life in righteousness.123 Although the phrase in JD3 seems to be a logical consequence of the German proposal, it conveys something different. The German proposal said: despite all righteousness in the life of Christians, the law constantly reveals the deficiency of this righteousness and thus places them as sinners before God. This is related to an interpretation of justification in terms of 121

GER-DER, 225–226.266–267. Once again there is a curious difference between the German and the English version. While the German text seems to be more in line with the German-Lutheran proposals for change by speaking about ‘zusprechen’, the English text says that God ‘grants the righteousness of Christ’. Theologically this is a highly significant disparity. 123 GER-DER, 226.266. 122

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trust, for in view of the half-heartedness of every righteousness in the life of Christians, salvation can only be communicated to the believer by arousing trust in God’s forgiveness. The phrase in JD3 brings a somewhat different message: despite all imperfection of the righteousness of Christians, their being ‘bound with Christ’ allows them to lead lives that are actually righteous. Thus, the whole structure of the paragraph evokes the distinction between a totus-totus and a partim-partim interpretation of simul iustus et peccator.124 This does not mean that both perspectives are disconnected in this paragraph.125 It does mean that the partim-partim interpretation, and therefore the question how righteousness becomes an incarnated reality in the life of the believers, appears as a perspective on justification in its own right, still deeply connected with the forgiveness of sins, but not wholly reducible to it. It is on a par with the description of justification involving ‘imparted love’ in §26, which seemed to emphasize that the union with Christ is the basis of both faith and love. This emphasis has important consequences for the interpretation of the concept of peccatum regnatum. An approach which almost exclusively ‘deduces’ the renewal of the Christian from the Zuspruch of forgiveness and its reception in faith as fiducia is likely to understand peccatum regnatum solely as ‘imputation’ (Christ as fulfiller of the law standing protectively in between the believers, who remain damnable as ever in view of the law, and the wrath of God they deserve). Such an interpretation will be reluctant to articulate this concept in terms of the changes it implies on the level of the created existence of the believer, partly because this would run the risk of encouraging a false trust of Christians in their own abilities to lead a life of righteousness. The stronger emphasis on a partim-partim interpretation in JD3 allows for a view on peccatum regnatum which does take more fully into account aspects of growth and even human cooperation. This was the case in the work of Mannermaa, who relates peccatum regnatum to the struggle – and thus the activity – of believers and their obligation, with the help of the Spirit, not to give in to the desires of the flesh.126 Similarly, the reactions of the Finnish Lutheran church to JD3 emphasize that the crucial distinction between feeling temptation and yielding to it is also part of the Lutheran tradition.127 In this way, the concept of peccatum regnatum as it is used in JD3 implies an even greater proximity to 124

Cf. supra section 2.III.b.2. This interpretation is also proposed in Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’ (189–91). 125 This is clear, for instance, by the insertion in the sentences on peccatum regnatum of the clarification that the power of sin is broken ‘on the basis of the merit of Christ’. 126 Mannermaa, Christ present in faith, pp. 69–70. 127 GER-DER, 359.381.

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the Roman Catholic concept of concupiscence than is made explicit in the document. 4. The Vatican Response The official Vatican response to the final version of the JDDJ considered the subsection on ‘the justified as sinner’ the most problematic part of the document. The main issue was the unclear relationship between the Lutheran affirmation of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator and the reality of inner renewal.128 It even states that the totus-totus interpretation which is offered in the first half of §29 is ‘not acceptable’ for Roman Catholics and that ‘it is difficult to see’ how the Tridentine condemnations are not applicable here. The Annex offers a further elaboration of this problem. It explains how the sinfulness of the Christian can and cannot be interpreted (2A). On the basis of this explanation, it says that Lutherans and Roman Catholics ‘together understand the Christian as simul iustus et peccator’. The Annex also offers further reflections on the different concepts of sin and concupiscence in Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism (2B). There are different ways these further elucidations in the Annex can be assessed. A negative evaluation is given in the above-mentioned criticisms of the Annex by the German Lutheran professors, who claim that the document seems to contain Roman Catholic affirmations of the Lutheran concepts sola fide and simul iustus et peccator, while interpreting them in a Tridentine way.129 Their appraisal is not wholly unwarranted. The affirmation of simul iustus et peccator in the Annex speaks about the sinfulness of the Christian mainly in terms of ‘sins’ and ‘mistakes’. The deed-oriented language of the ‘sins’ of the Christian definitely implies a more Tridentine approach, even if ‘unwitting sins’ and ‘secret faults’ are also mentioned. Moreover, the power of sin is described as a ‘persisting danger’ and a ‘tendency to oppose God’ rather than an actual reality. Thus, the Annex seems to endorse the Roman Catholic idiom in which the desires ‘coming from sin’ are not really sinful in themselves, but only pressing ‘towards sin’. Yet, this may be a one-sided reading of the Annex. There are two interrelated elements in the document which favour a different interpretation. First, the Roman Catholic affirmation of simul iustus et peccator does not only depend 128

Interestingly, the Vatican critique of this concept perfectly mirrors the response of the Kinki Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Japan to JD1 ‘We miss in Joint Declaration; however, a discussion of how the effective aspect of justification is related to the doctrine of “simul iustus et peccator”’. GER-DER, 226. 129 Individual assessments are found in epd-Dokumentation 43/99. The petition is published in GER-DER 944–949.

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on the fact that Christians commit sins, but it is also connected to liturgy and to the prayer ‘God be merciful to me, a sinner’ (Lk 18:13). This reference to liturgy and prayer enables Roman Catholics to appreciate a personal and holistic approach to the sinfulness of the Christian. In prayer and liturgy, the believers address God as persons and as such they confess their sinfulness. This was the point made by Pesch when he described Lutheran theology as ‘existential’ theology. It is possible that the Annex allows Roman Catholics to reflect further upon the existential meaning of simul iustus et peccator, even in its totus-totus interpretation, and its relation to their own tradition.130 This resonates with a second point in the Annex, namely the affirmation of the ‘personal character’ of sin. The Roman Catholic paragraph of subsection 4.4 had pointed out that in Roman Catholic teaching ‘sins always involve a personal element’, meaning here: a human decision. However, in the Annex, the personal nature of sin mainly refers to the fact that it always concerns the whole human being. It thus expresses a mainly Lutheran concern. It is possible that the affirmation of this ambiguous notion of ‘personal’ sin indicates a shift in the Roman Catholic understanding of sin towards a greater sensitivity to the ambiguity of sin itself. On the one hand, it involves the freedom of the human being, but, on the other hand, it has a depth and a complexity that cannot be articulated solely in terms of an individual giving in to a desire that is in itself neutral. The expression ‘selfish desires’ in the Annex seems to point to such a complexity. Joachim Track, one of the drafters of the Annex, formulated the following question with regard to the presentation of the Roman Catholic position in the JDDJ: [One has to ask the question] whether there can be a ‘desire’ at all without a personal element. Is this not a sheer theoretical construction? Is not the desire of the drives, insofar as it is my desire, a personal desire and therefore always a desire that has to do with the relationship of human beings to God?131 130

A reference to liturgy was also important in Küng’s attempt to articulate a Roman Catholic interpretation of simul iustus et peccator. He referred to the priest in the Roman Catholic Mass who, though being in a state of grace, prays for forgiveness in the strongest possible terms. H. Küng, Rechtfertigung: Die Lehre Karl Barths und eine katholische Besinnung (Horizonte, 2; Einsiedeln: Johannes, 4th ed, 1957), pp. 232–33. 131 ‘Erstens kann man und muß man schlicht fragen, ob es eine “Begierde” ohne ein personales Element überhaupt geben kann. Ist dies nicht bloß eine theoretische Konstruktion? Ist nicht das Begehren der Triebe, insofern es mein Begehren ist, ein personales Begehren und damit immer schon ein Begehren, das mit des Menschen Gottesverhältnis zu tun hat’. J. Track, ‘Grundsatzüberlegungen zum weiteren Vorgehen in der Frage der Gemeinsamen Erklärung’, epd-Dokumentation (1999), no. 24/99, pp. 1–48 (36).

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In addition, Track refers to another member of the drafting group, Cardinal Ratzinger, who spoke about sin manifesting itself even in ‘the highest moral decisions of human beings’. It is plausible that the Annex does not merely interpret Lutheran terms in a Tridentine way. Rather, it moves beyond the hamartiology of Trent.132 To summarize, both the progression in the textual history of the Lutheran paragraph and the development of the Annex demonstrate the dynamic nature of the process leading towards the signing of the JDDJ. The Lutheran and the Roman Catholic positions are not merely juxtaposed. Rather, they have influenced each other in the way they were formulated. The emergence of the partim-partim interpretation of simul iutsus et peccator in the Lutheran paragraph and of a commonly articulated broader view on the personal nature of sin in the Annex allowed for a stronger mutual appreciation for the respective doctrinal positions of both dialogue partners. Not only this, but the Finnish-Lutheran affirmation of the distinction between experiencing temptation and giving in to it and the Roman Catholic reflection on the hamartiological implications of the liturgical tradition may also be seen as forms of ‘re-receiving’ forgotten or underplayed elements within both traditions.

e. Law and Gospel The Lutheran interpretation of the law-gospel distinction was itself not directly the object of Tridentine condemnations (even though canons 19–21 of the justification decree do relate to the role of law and commandments for Christians).133 Even if this may account for its absence in the German condemnations study, the issue was too central to the Lutheran understanding of justification to be left out in the JDDJ.134 The request for clarification on this issue in the statement of VELKD/DNK-LWB on LK was quoted in the ‘sources’ of the JDDJ. The German Lutheran churches had stated: If Canon 20 stresses that a person is bound to keep the commandments of God, this canon does not strike at us; if however Canon 20 affirms that

132

Obviously, the idea of sin contaminating even the best human actions immediately implies a higher appreciation of imputative aspects of justification and fiducial aspects of faith. 133 Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, pp. 41–42. 134 The fact that the DNK-LWB working group in its proposal in preparation of a statement on JD1 has rewritten literally every word in the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraph in this subsection already shows the importance Lutherans attach to this issue. GER-DER, 112.

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faith has salvific power only on condition of keeping the commandments this applies to us.135 This statement is somewhat puzzling in view of what the Tridentine canon 20 actually says: If anyone says that a justified person, of whatever degree of perfection, is not bound to keep the commandments of God and of the church but only to believe, as if the gospel were simply a bare and unqualified promise of eternal life without the condition of observing the commandments: let him be anathema.136 It is clear that according to this canon and according to the Tridentine decree on justification as a whole, the free human response to God’s acts, including the response to the commandments, cannot be excluded from what constitutes the righteousness of the Christian. The very fact that grave sin can destroy that righteousness, leaving the believer with a dead faith which does not justify, implies that in some sense the keeping of the commandments are conditions for salvation (DH 1544). This does not mean, however, that faith – understood as fiducia – is denied in Trent or that it is derived from keeping the commandments. Trent does affirm in canon 12 the role of fiducia in justification, just as it affirms in canon 20 the character of gospel as promise. However, these are only indirect affirmations, implied in the assertions that justifying faith and the gospel are more than trust and promise. Trent does not fully explain how they are also trust and promise.137 Therefore, from a Tridentine point of view, the remark on canon 20 in the VELKD/DNK-LWB statement could be assessed as follows. If the Lutherans express their fear that the Tridentine insistence on the keeping of the commandments leads to a neglect of faith as trust (and the gospel as promise or creative word), then that is a perfectly legitimate concern in the light of the factual marginality of trust and promise in Trent. If, however, the Lutheran defence of the independence of the ‘salvific power’ of faith implies that the human being is saved by fiducia alone, canon 20 indeed

135

‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (89). ‘Si quis hominem iustificatum et quantumlibet perfectum dixerit non teneri ad observantiam mandatorum dei et ecclesiae sed tantum ad credendum quasi vero evangelium sit nuda et absoluta promissio vitae aeternae sine conditione observationis mandatorum: anathema sit’. DH 1570. 137 It should be noted that a significant reference to both ‘trust’ (confidentia) and ‘promise’ is also present in Chapter 16 of the decree (DH 1545). 136

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applies to them. This is the theological problem which stands in the background of subsection 4.5.138 The JD1-version of this subsection was not structured according to the pattern of the differentiated consensus, but consisted of three common paragraphs. The main contention was that, on the one hand, ‘Christ has fulfilled and overcome the law and its works as a way to salvation’ and, on the other hand, God’s commandments remain valid for Christians. Because the justified remain sinful, they are under the accusation of the law and ‘turn in faith in the gospel to the merciful grace of God’. At this stage of the drafting process, the document leaves many questions unanswered. The German Lutheran reaction (DNK-LWB) rightly remarked that it was clear from these paragraphs that the previous dialogues had hardly tackled the issue.139 The German Lutherans asked for a clearer articulation of the ‘pedagogical’ role of the law, namely of revealing the sinfulness of the human being. Referring to the VELKD/DNK-LWB statement on LK, they also insisted that the Roman Catholic dialogue partner should make more clear statements about the Lutheran view on law and gospel. That the Roman Catholic side was not thinking along those lines is shown by the Roman Catholic list of reactions to JD1. It included the proposal to specify that Christ has fulfilled and overcome the law of the Old Testament, thus testifying to an insufficient understanding of the all-encompassing significance of the law-gospel distinction in Lutheranism.140 The comments of the DNK-LWB on JD1 were taken into account in the newly created Roman Catholic paragraph of JD2 (reproduced in JD3) and in the Lutheran paragraph of JD3. Yet, it is debatable whether the concerns of the German Lutherans have actually been met by those changes. The Roman Catholic paragraph says: When Catholics emphasize that the righteous are bound to observe God’s commandments, they do not thereby deny that through Jesus Christ God has mercifully promised to his children the grace of eternal life.

138

The evaluation of LK for the PCPCU also points out the necessity of a deeper study of the theme of gospel and law in relation to the canons 19–21 of the Tridentine decree on justification. 139 GER-DER, 197. 140 GER-DER, 242. If this proposal had been implemented in the text, it would only have made the idea of Christ as the one fulfilling and overcoming the law as a way to salvation irrelevant for the question which is at stake: the role of law – as expression of God’s will – for the Christian.

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This only recalls what was already stated in the common paragraph, namely that neither Roman Catholics nor Lutherans are ‘antinomians’, while adding that Roman Catholics also see eternal life as a promise. It is a stronger affirmation of a somewhat underemphasized aspect of the Tridentine teaching, but it does not say anything about the question how observing the commandments and trusting in the promise relate to each other and to eternal life.141 The Lutheran paragraph in JD3 does correspond to the German Lutheran request to be more clear about the role of the law for the human being. It says that, in ‘its theological use, the law is demand and accusation’ and that ‘Christians also, in that they are sinners, stand under this accusation which uncovers their sin’. Still, unlike the previous subsection on the sinfulness of the believer, the Lutheran paragraph here does not relate the sinfulness of the believer revealed by the law to the issue of renewal. It only states that the revelation of this sinfulness makes the believers ‘in faith in the gospel, . . . turn unreservedly to the mercy of God in Christ, which alone justifies them’. The emphasis is on faith as trust in God, for the law precisely reveals to the believers how little there is in themselves that is trustworthy. Yet the paragraph does not touch upon the question of how this fiducia is related to justification (for it is ‘God’s mercy in Christ’, not ‘faith’ which is said to justify) and renewal.142 Is the description of the theological use of the law as ‘demand’ and as ‘accusation’ a tautology? Or is there also a constructive role for the law as demand in the partly just life of the believer? The common paragraph gives rise to the same questions. It says that ‘Christ has by his teaching and example expressed God’s will which is a standard for the conduct of the justified also’. The corresponding sentence in JD1 spoke about Christ as expression of ‘God’s demanding will’ which the believer should obey. At the request of the DNK-LWB response this was changed into Christ as ‘standard’.143 This change does not do away with the question

141

The footnote in this paragraph, which refers to Chapter 16 of the Tridentine decree on justification, supports the claim that Roman Catholics do see eternal life as God’s promise. In one and the same breath, however, the decree on justification affirms that eternal life is also ‘a reward to be faithfully bestowed, on the promise of God himself, for their good works and merits’. 142 That there is an important connection is indicated in the ‘sources’ at the end of the JDDJ in relation to this subsection: ‘The last paragraph is related factually to 4.3, but emphasizes the ‘convicting function’ of the law which is important to Lutheran thinking’. The reference to the subsection on faith and grace implies that the importance of the renewal of the believer in Lutheran teaching is presupposed here. The sin-revealing function of the law is stated in a somewhat low-profile fashion as an important emphasis rather than a central aspect of the Lutheran doctrine of justification. 143 GER-DER, 197.

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in what sense Christ’s example is also a demand for Christians and whether this standard as demand only reveals the failure of the believers in order that they trust more fully in God or whether it has got another role as well in the righteousness of the Christian. In brief, this subsection was a necessary element from the point of view of the goal of establishing a consensus on the doctrine of justification and because its absence was experienced as a lacuna in previous dialogues. Its treatment in the JDDJ, however, leaves too many crucial questions unanswered, especially the one about the function of demand within the event of justification. The fact that the issue of human cooperation remains largely implicit in other parts of the document is certainly connected to its rather superficial treatment in this subsection.

f. Faith as Assurance of Salvation A large part of the material in this subsection is derived from the treatment on the topic in LK.144 The ‘fears’ sixteenth-century Lutherans and Roman Catholics had about each other’s positions are described in the German document as follows. Roman Catholics thought that the Lutheran view on faith as assurance of salvation was an expression of a kind of subjectivism, in which the individual wanted to be sure about his or her own salvation. Lutherans for their part, were convinced that the Roman Catholic Church deliberately kept the faithful in uncertainty about their salvation. However, LK argues, both positions are closer to each other than was assumed in the classical debates, so that the mutual fears turn out to be groundless if both positions are explained properly. Both Lutherans and Roman Catholics at least share the convictions (1) that one can wholly rely on what God has done in Jesus Christ and (2) that every ‘subjectivistic’ certitude is excluded in the light of the weakness and unreliability of human beings. These convictions are reflected in subsection 4.6 of the JDDJ, both in the common paragraph (§34) and in the separate paragraphs (§§35-36). What then, are the ‘legitimate differences’ on the issue of assurance of salvation? This becomes clear when one compares the common paragraph and the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs. There are two crucial differences. (a) The common paragraph speaks about the assurance of God’s grace, whereas the Lutheran paragraph claims that ‘[i]n trust in God’s promise [believers] are assured of their salvation’. The importance of this 144

LK 59–63/53–56. Cf. also the summary in the Versailles document (Gemeinsame römischkatholische/evangelisch-lutherische Kommission, ‘Feststellung’ (385).

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difference between assurance of grace and assurance of salvation is testified to by a development in the Roman Catholic paragraph. In JD1 and JD2, the paragraph declares that there is a sense in which Roman Catholics can say that ‘faith is assurance of salvation’, namely to the extent that faith means trust in God and that such trust is incompatible with doubt about God’s promise. This statement seems to meet the conditions stipulated in the VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK, which stated that canon 13 of the Tridentine decree on justification is non-applicable to Lutherans only if Roman Catholics agree with a ‘biblically renewed concept of faith’ and with the statement that faith is assurance of salvation.145 The DNK-LWB reaction to JD1 again refers to this passage in the VELKD/DNK-LWB response, presumably because it desires an even clearer declaration that this biblical concept of faith as trust is really endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church.146 However, at the request of the Roman Catholic dialogue partner, the phrase ‘faith is assurance of salvation’ was deleted from the paragraph in JD3 and replaced by: ‘the believer may . . . be certain that God intends his salvation’.147 Assurance of salvation is thus replaced by assurance of grace (understood as God’s salvific will), which implies that the concept of faith as trust is indeed sanctioned, but not necessarily the idea that the righteousness of the Christian can be described in terms of this faith alone. (b) In the Lutheran paragraph a certain conclusion is drawn from the reliability of God and the weakness of human beings, namely that ‘in the midst of temptation, believers should not look to themselves but look solely to Christ and trust only him’. This corresponds to the example mentioned in LK about the sacrament of penance. Cardinal Cajetan said in 1518 that, viewed from the side of the sacrament itself, Christians can and should be absolutely sure of the forgiveness granted in the sacrament. From the perspective of the recipient, however, one is never sure about the way the forgiveness is received. LK draws a parallel between Cajetan’s statements and the Lutheran teaching. The only difference would be that in the Roman Catholic view ‘[t]he Christian should endure this uncertainty with patience’, whereas Luther and his followers go a step farther. They urge that the uncertainty should not merely be endured. We should avert our eyes from it and take seriously, practically, and personally the objective efficacy of the

145

‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (92); LK 62/56. GER-DER 198. 147 GER-DER 271. 146

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absolution pronounced in the sacrament of penance, which comes “from outside”.148 The expression that Luther goes a step ‘farther’ is somewhat misleading here, because in some respect Lutheran theology takes a step in the opposite direction. This has to do with the question of what role uncertainty should play in the life of the Christian. It is quite a different thing to say that it should be endured (Cajetan) from saying that the believer should turn their attention away from it (Luther). What LK does not see – and it remains largely invisible in the JDDJ as well – is the constructive function of this uncertainty and the way it relates to human cooperation in Trent. It is probably true that the Tridentine decree on justification rejected the ‘vain confidence of the heretics’ because the council fathers thought this assurance of salvation involved a theoretical certitude on the part of the individual human being, about a matter – salvation – on which only God had sufficient knowledge. This Roman Catholic suspicion indeed reflects an inadequate understanding of the Lutheran position, in which this assurance is the personal-relational reality of being assured by God’s word, rather than the purely theoretical-individual knowledge about one’s own final salvation. In this sense, the ecumenical dialogue rightly suggests that the different Lutheran and Roman Catholic concepts of faith have complicated the issue of assurance of salvation. However, the uncertainty about one’s own salvation in Trent is not only related to our lack of knowledge as human beings,149 but also with the fact that we do not know whether we will persevere.150 Therefore, our lack of certitude it is also related to the responsibility of human beings to preserve the righteousness granted to them. It is difficult from a Tridentine point of view to say that believers should only look away from their own weakness. In this perspective, a certain anxiety about one’s own salvation is not only an adequate mirror of reality, but also a potentially fruitful reminder of one’s responsibility. This makes the new emphasis that was added to the Roman Catholic paragraph in JD3 explicable: No one may doubt God’s mercy and Christ’s merit. Every person, however, may be concerned about his salvation when he looks upon his own weaknesses and shortcomings. 148

LK 60/53–54. Cf. especially DH 1534 and 1540 (the latter dealing with human ignorance about divine predestination). 150 DH 1541. 149

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The things about which there should be no doubt – God’s mercy and Christ’s merit – more or less correspond to what Trent had named the ‘efficient’ and the ‘meritorious’ cause of justification.151 This is what one could call the ‘objective’ side of the justification event in the Tridentine view. It is not a surprise that paragraph 36 articulates the Roman Catholic understanding of faith as ‘trust’ and as ‘looking away from one’s own experience’ precisely in relation to ‘the objective reality of Christ’s promise’.152 However, the fact that in the end faith is not defined in the Roman Catholic paragraph as assurance of salvation correlates to the fact that in Trent justification is not only described in terms of ‘the objective reality of Christ’s promise’. There is also a ‘formal’ cause of justification, namely the righteousness of God by which he makes us righteous. This means that the righteousness of the Christians is not only an event outside them which has taken place for all time, but also a historical reality in which they are involved as free human agents here and now. It is precisely because of the vicissitudes of human history, which are included in the Tridentine definition of justification, that uncertainty should not simply be looked away from in view of the righteousness of the Christian. The description of the Roman Catholic position about ‘assurance of salvation’ and faith as ‘looking away from oneself’ is structurally analogous to the Roman Catholic attitudes towards sola fide and simul iustus et peccator in previous subsections and in the Annex. On the one hand, there is a recognition of faith as trust and of the ambiguity of all human agency (and perhaps a stronger recognition of these realities than is customary in Roman Catholic thinking). At the same time, the limits of these concepts are indicated. In this paragraph, this leads to the decision not to define faith as assurance of salvation. This logic behind the removal of ‘faith is assurance of salvation’ in the Roman Catholic paragraph is somewhat overlooked in the commentary of the Strasbourg Ecumenical Institute. The commentary interprets the last sentence in the paragraph (that ‘the believer may . . . be certain that God intends his salvation’) emphatically in terms of God’s communication to the individual that his or her sins are forgiven, rather than in the sense of God’s universal salvific will.153 Even though this emphasis is not unwarranted, it is also true that the paragraph speaks about the assurance of God’s intention and not about the individuals actually being sure about their salvation in trusting that their sins are forgiven, precisely

151

DH 1529. This formulation was criticized by the DNK-LWB consultation on JD2. GER-DER 267–268. 153 Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, pp. 43–44. 152

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because the history of the individual is part of his or her righteousness or unrighteousness in the eyes of God. If one considers the fears of Roman Catholics and Lutherans mentioned in LK with regard to this issue – Lutheran subjectivism and Roman Catholic ecclesial ‘control’ over the consciences of the faithful – then one perceives that the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue has made progress in the sense that it gives reasons to both dialogue partners to overcome the suspicion that there are ‘malicious intentions’ behind the teaching of the other. At the same time, the JDDJ shows that underneath such fears there remain differing views on the reality of salvation, reminiscent of Pesch’s distinction between ‘existential’ and ‘sapiential’ theology. Lutheran theology thinks strictly from within the ‘existential’ relationship of the sinners whose unreserved trust in God is aroused by God’s word and who do not even ‘cast a sideway glance at their own endeavours’.154 In the Peschian scheme, Roman Catholic theology is said to consider justification from the perspective of ‘the whole’, taking also into consideration how the prayerful relationship with God is reflected in the historical reality in which the believer’s return to God is embodied. If this is an adequate description of Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology, then one has to conclude, in the light of this paragraph, that those two ‘perspectives’ are actually more than just perspectives on the same reality. As the difference between ‘assurance of grace’ and ‘assurance of salvation’ shows, these two ways of thinking imply different views of what salvation entails. In the Lutheran approach as it is presented in this paragraph, salvation is only described in terms of God drawing the attention of believers away from themselves to Christ. If this conviction is indeed reflected in the paragraph, thinking ‘existentially’ is not just an option for Lutherans, but a necessity of faith which does not allow for another view. Likewise, the ‘sapiential’ element in Roman Catholic theology is not just an approach favoured by some theorists who like to speculate about anthropological and metaphysical presuppositions of faith, but is an inner necessity of the Roman Catholic view on salvation, which always draws the attention also to the historical reality of the believer’s existence as the stage on which salvation takes place. There are hardly any elements in this subsection which suggest an alternative to this ‘fundamental difference’. g. Faith and Good Works The most important biblical reference in the justification debate is undoubtedly Paul’s assertion that ‘a man is justified by faith apart from works of law’ (Rom 3:28). Christians who are not acquainted with the details 154

The phrase is taken from LK 53/46, and is quoted in the sources of JDDJ 4.1.

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of the classical debates on justification between Lutherans and Roman Catholics may at least know that the right relationship between ‘faith’ and ‘works’ is at stake. On the basis of the ecumenical dialogues on justification, one might point out the importance of distinguishing between works done prior to justification and works as fruits of justification.155 The former include the ‘works of law’ Paul speaks about and which are only ‘negatively’ related to the justification of the sinner, namely as steps on a path that is excluded as a way to salvation.156 The ‘good works of the justified’ which are dealt with in subsection 4.7 of the JDDJ have a more positive connection with justification, namely as its ‘fruits’. At the same time, the common paragraph of this subsection claims that these works are for believers also ‘an obligation they must fulfil’. The history of the text shows that this double perspective on the good works of the believer as fruits of justification and as obligation is a problem both dialogue partners are concerned about. The corresponding paragraph in JD1 said that believers ought to (‘soll’) work and live in the grace received and ought to bear fruit. The DNK-LWB proposed to leave out the ‘ought’ and to simply say that believers live and work in grace and bear fruit.157 The reason for this proposal was that it should be clear that the good works of the Christian are dependent on faith (and not on the law).158 JD2 dropped the ‘ought’ of JD1, but spoke of works as ‘obligation’ instead. The DNK-LWB consultation unsuccessfully proposed to change this and to describe the good works as a ‘task’ (‘Aufgabe’) for the believer.159 Even if this may seem a mere dispute over words, it shows that the superficial treatment in 4.5 of the law-gospel distinction and of the role of the law in the life of the believer has left important questions unresolved. It may be a symptom of the more fundamental problem, highlighted in previous sections, of sola fiducia and the Tridentine emphasis on justification as a reality that unfolds in the historical existence of the believer. Before further exploring this problem, we will first point out the convergences that are noticeable in the different versions of this JDDJ subsection and in the Annex.

155

Cf. F. A. Sullivan, ‘Faith and Works in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification’, Ecumenical Trends 29 (2000), no. 8, pp. 1–5. 156 Obviously, in the Tridentine approach the works prior to justification also include the human acts in preparation for justification. Whether they could be called ‘works of the law’ is a different debate which is not immediately relevant here. 157 GER-DER 198. The proposal was formulated by the DNK-LWB working Group (GER-DER 113). 158 In contrast, the Roman Catholic proposal with regard to this paragraph expressed an even stronger emphasis on the aspect of obligation. It suggested saying that good works ‘ought to follow justification’, rather than just ‘follow justification’ GER-DER 243. 159 GER-DER 268.

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Like the developments in some of the previous subsections, the textual history of 4.7 is characterized by a growing similarity between the Lutheran and Roman Catholic paragraphs. At least three elements demonstrate that neither dialogue partner is merely articulating their teaching on good works in a customary way. Rather they are seeking rapprochement on the level of both content and form. (1) JD1 already mentions in both the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran paragraph the ideas of ‘growth in’ and ‘preservation of’ grace. Some Lutheran churches wondered whether these ideas were really compatible with the Lutheran view on justification.160 Yet they were repeated in the subsequent versions of this subsection. The Annex (2D) attempts to convince the sceptics by providing evidence from the Lutheran confessional writings that at least the idea of preservation of grace is part of the Lutheran tradition. (2) JD1 creates the impression that the main difference is that Roman Catholics think that through good works ‘communion with Christ is deepened’, whereas for Lutherans such ‘deepening’ is impossible. The Lutheran paragraph states that ‘righteousness as acceptance by God and sharing in the righteousness of Christ is always complete’. In JD2 and JD3, however, this phrase is followed by the sentence: ‘At the same time, they state that there can be growth in its effects in Christian living’. As such, this does not necessarily change the Lutheran-Roman Catholic difference that was noticeable in JD1, but it adds a new emphasis. The insertion is analogous to the stronger accent on the partim-partim perspective on simul iustus et peccator in the subsection on the sinfulness of the believer. The completeness of the participation in Christ’s righteousness clearly corresponds to the totus-totus interpretation of the believer as iustus. As in 4.4, this is now complemented by the way righteousness determines the life of the Christian. Still, the way the paragraph describes the relationship between the complete righteousness of Christ and its ‘effects’ leaves some space for interpretation. Once again, the comments of the German and Finnish Lutherans on JD1 illustrate the different ways the insertion in JD2 can be understood. The German proposals want to distinguish clearly between the righteousness of the believer as participation in Christ’s righteousness and any idea of ‘growth’ in righteousness. The latter cannot be conceived of as growth in the believer’s acceptance by God.161 The text of JD2 and JD3 seems to follow this line of argument, for it adopts the proposal by the DNK-LWB, which

160

The Association of Lutheran Churches in France and The Lutheran Church in the Philippines expressed their concern about these notions. GER-DER 231. 161 GER-DER 113.198.

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does not speak about a growth in righteousness, but about a growth in its effects in Christian living.162 The Finnish reaction to JD1 equally highlights the distinction between the complete righteousness of Christ and the growth in the believer’s life, but the stress is not on the categorical difference between the two, but on the fact that the latter is only ever a partial realization of righteousness. The wordings are telling here. The Finnish response distinguishes between, on the one hand, ‘righteousness as acceptance by God and sharing in the righteousness of Christ’ and, on the other hand, ‘righteousness as realizing itself in the life of the believer’.163 The main concern of the Finnish response is not to exclude the growth of the believer from the theological definition of righteousness, but rather to highlight the qualitative difference between complete and incomplete righteousness. It goes without saying that this emphasis is theologically rooted in the idea that the real-ontic presence of Christ to the believer is the foundation of both (complete) forgiveness and (incomplete) renewal. Perhaps the ‘German’ and ‘Finnish’ approaches should not necessarily be seen as oppositions, but the interventions of the German-Lutheran and Finnish-Lutheran churches in the debates at least place different emphases which gain a special significance in the context of the dialogue with Roman Catholics. (3) With regard to the relationship between good works and eternal life, JD1 made it seem as if ‘merit’ is the central Roman Catholic concept, whereas Lutherans use the biblical language of ‘reward’. In JD2 and JD3, the picture is more nuanced. First, the new formulation in the Lutheran paragraph seems to place the emphasis more on the affirmation of the concept of ‘reward’ than on the rejection of ‘merit’. Secondly, and more importantly, the Roman Catholic paragraph now interprets the concept of merit in terms of reward. Moreover, reward is described as a promised reality.164 The Roman Catholic thus takes into account the judgement of the VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK, which claimed that canon 32 of the 162

The DNK-LWB working group formulated it even more clearly in its rewriting of the Roman Catholic paragraph: ‘Wenn die römisch-katholische Kirche feststellt, die guten Werke des Christen trügen zum Wachstum seiner Gerechtigkeit bei, dann meint sie nicht die Gerechtigkeit vor Gott und die in Christus gegebene Gemeinschaft mit ihm, die als geschenkte immer vollkommen ist, sondern das Leben in dieser Gerechtigkeit, das durch stetige Übung in guten Taten und im Kampf gegen die Sünde gestärkt und gebessert wird’. GER-DER 113. 163 ‘Gerechtigkeit is als Annahme durch Gott und als Teilhabe an der Gerechtigkeit Christi immer vollkommen, als sich im Leben des Glaubenden verwirklichende Gerechtigkeit aber immer nur partiell’. GER-DER 99. 164 ‘When Catholics affirm the “meritorious” character of good works, they wish to say that, according to the biblical witness, a reward in heaven is promised to these works’.

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Tridentine decree on justification, which deals with the issue of merit, is not applicable to Lutherans only if ‘merit’ is understood ‘from the perspective of the biblical idea of reward and its eschatological horizon’.165 In other words, there seems to be a strong convergence, facilitated by joint reference to the biblical concept of reward. It is tempting to conclude that the idea of merit, which is called ‘a misleading word’ in LK,166 would better be avoided by both dialogue partners.167 Both Lutherans and Roman Catholics seem to agree that the biblical idea of reward implies a certain ‘paradox’, namely as ‘undeserved reward’.168 Even if Trent states that believers can truly merit (promereri) eternal life, it declares in one and the same breath that without Christ ‘they would be wholly unable to do anything meritorious and pleasing to God’.169 The danger of the idea of merit is that it takes one of the elements out of the paradox, namely the real connection between good works and salvation, and affirms it separately. It thus runs the risk of obscuring the other element: that this connection is wholly the work of God. This would make the Tridentine approach ambiguous, for to the extent that promereri suggests that in some respect God really owes us eternal life, the concept inevitably erodes the gratuitous and undeserved nature of salvation. Still, the drafters of the JDDJ deemed it necessary to say that ‘Catholics affirm the “meritorious” character of good works’. The Vatican response equally insists on the classical Tridentine teaching on merit: The Catholic Church maintains, moreover, that the good works of the justified are always the fruit of grace. But at the same time, and without in any way diminishing the totally divine initiative, they are also the fruit of man, justified and interiorly transformed. We can therefore say that eternal life is, at one and the same time, grace and the reward given by God for good works and merits. The question is whether these affirmations are simply a sign of some sort of Roman Catholic traditionalism, a stubborn refusal to get rid of a pastorally useless and theologically dangerous concept. It is significant that the Vatican 165

‘Stellungnahme VELKD & DNK-LWB’ (94). LK 74/67. This is suggested in the Versailles-document: Gemeinsame römisch-katholische/evangelischlutherische Kommission, ‘Feststellung’ (386). 168 The DNK-LWB consultation on JD2 suggested not to place ‘reward’ between inverted commas, but rather to say that Lutherans understand reward ‘in paradoxer Weise als unverdienter Lohn’. GER-DER 268. 169 DH 1546. 166 167

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response is not blind to the possible criticism that ‘merit’ is a dangerous idea, but that it dismisses this criticism and claims that good works as works of the human being in no way diminish ‘the totally divine initiative’. It says further, that it is necessary to affirm good works as works of believers (as human beings), taking into account their interior transformation. This brings to mind the traditional Roman Catholic idea of inhering or created grace. Taken at face value, this idea might suggest the image of an enigmatic substance that is infused in human beings when they are baptized and which mysteriously elevates their otherwise vain works to the dignity of meritorious acts. Undoubtedly, such a view of the believer’s ‘interior transformation’ is likely to lead to misunderstandings about the relationship between human and divine agency in justification. It is also possible, however, to interpret the ‘interior transformation’ in less individualistic terms and to speak more generally, as we have done in previous chapters, about the righteousness of Christ ‘taking shape’ in the historical existence of the believer. This is connected to what was said about the previous subsection of the JDDJ, namely that the Roman Catholic view on assurance of salvation implies a concept of justification which includes the historical realization of Christ’s righteousness in the life of the Christian as a part of the definition of justification. In the light of a concept of justification that includes ‘historical transformation’, the idea that the good works of the believer are meritorious gains a more precise meaning. The meritorious nature of good works does not imply that these works create an obligation on the side of God to recompense them. Rather, they can be seen as an embodiment of the righteousness of faith in which the eschatological fulfilment of God’s promise is, in an imperfect way, already present. This precisely is in line with how Karl Rahner explained the Tridentine idea of merit, namely as the idea that the good works of the believer are ‘in the same dimension as the coming blessed life of the same children of God’.170 A similar idea is expressed in the discussion of works and reward in the Annex (2E), where it states: ‘We face a judgement in which God’s gracious sentence will approve anything in our life and action that corresponds to his will’. Neither Rahner’s interpretation, nor the sentence in the Annex contains the slightest hint of God ‘owing’ something to the doer of good works. Rather, they speak about the eschatological significance of our works here and now. If this idea is viewed in connection with the responsibility of human beings for their own 170

Rahner, ‘Fragen der Kontroverstheologie über die Rechtfertigung’ (260). Cf. supra section 2.II.c.

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actions, which is affirmed by both Lutherans and Roman Catholics, then the concept of merit, pastorally inappropriate as it may be, at least becomes more intelligible. It expresses the conviction that concrete choices of the believer on this side of the eschaton can be themselves eschatological realities. This aspect of the discussion on merit is sometimes overlooked in ecumenical discussions. In a statement by the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod (LCMS), which criticizes the achievements of the JDDJ, the following assertion is found: The Roman Catholic Church teaches that something more than trust in Christ is necessary for us to be saved. It teaches that we are able to merit, through our works, eternal life for ourselves and others. We believe this teaching obscures the work of Jesus Christ and clouds the central message of the Bible.171 In response to this criticism, Francis A. Sullivan convincingly argues that the manner in which the LCMS statement describes the Roman Catholic teaching on merit is a caricature of Trent.172 However, Sullivan does not respond to the issue raised in the first sentence; whether something more than trust is needed for salvation. Yet, this question is crucial in the light of the historical view on justification that underlies the continued Roman Catholic affirmation of the classical teaching on merit in the JDDJ. If the concrete historical existence of Christians in which they are involved as free agents has an eschatological significance, or even is itself an eschatological reality, then what constitutes the righteousness of the Christian is more difficult to describe in terms of sola fiducia. It would be possible, of course, to characterize this concrete existence as a ‘life of trust’, but this would not exclude human cooperation and would go beyond the idea that one should only look away from oneself in order to see salvation.

171

The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, ‘Toward True Reconciliation: A Comment on Lutheran-Roman Catholic Relations’, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 9 December 1999. The text is also available online (http://www.lutheransonline.com/lo/163/FSLO-1115247163– 918163.pdf, 26 February 2010). 172 Sullivan, ‘Faith and Works’ (3–5). In the light of what has been said above, one could add to Sullivan’s reflections a reference to the ‘Supporting Documentation’ for the LCMS statement (also published online: http://www.lutheransonline.com/lo/238/FSLO1115247247–568238.pdf, 26 February 2010). The LCMS interprets inhering grace precisely in the way that we deemed reductive: ‘According to Rome, grace is a spiritual power infused into man that makes it possible for him to do the good works that then merit forgiveness and eternal life’.

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In the context of these reflections on the theological background to the Roman Catholic preservation of the concept of merit, the importance of the specific emphasis of the Finnish Luther interpretation and of the Finnish interventions in the drafting process becomes clear. The Finns insist on the real-ontological presence of Christ as the basis of both forgiveness and renewal and stress the partial righteousness of the believer. In so doing, they show considerable affinity with the historical-eschatological view on justification. This is in stark contrast with a teaching on the righteousness of Christians that almost exclusively emphasizes that whatever ‘effect’ Christ’s righteousness has in the concrete life of the believers, they have to be called time and again out of the death of their complete sinfulness by the Zuspruch of the gospel.

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Conclusion

I. The JDDJ and the Fundamental Difference In Chapter 1, the idea of a ‘fundamental difference’ and its interpretation by André Birmelé and Harding Meyer were discussed. Birmelé claimed that one can perceive a ‘fundamental difference’ in the JDDJ if one reads the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs separately. The close reading of the different versions of the JDDJ in this chapter confirmed Birmelé’s thesis, even though our analysis would add some nuances to it. Both Birmelé and Meyer argue that the fundamental difference in the JDDJ is not merely a matter of language. It also concerns basic theological options regarding the way the relationship between God and human beings is conceived. To a certain extent this is true. Certainly when one examines the Roman Catholic paragraphs, one suspects that a fundamental theological conviction underlies the continued affirmation of human cooperation in justification, the refusal to define faith as assurance of salvation and the preservation of the idea of merit. This underlying conviction was made explicit in our analysis as a concept of justification that includes the historical existence of the believer. We will call this from now on the ‘semi-historical’ definition of justification.1 The Lutheran paragraphs in the different subsections of part 4 of the JDDJ are more complex in this respect, for reasons which will be discussed later. However, they are also related to underlying principles or beliefs that give them a certain consistency. It would be possible to investigate further the underlying convictions in the paragraphs of both dialogue partners, thus constructing the ‘fundamental difference’ of the JDDJ. This is what the previous analysis of the JDDJ has 1

As will be clear from the analysis of part 4 of the JDDJ, this expression is a translation of the Tridentine statement that the only formal cause of justification is the righteousness of God by which he makes us righteous (DH 1529). Justification means that the believer is righteous in his or her historical existence as it is ‘engrafted into Christ’. The ‘semi’ in the expression should not be understood as ‘half’. It means that the perspective on the historical existence of the individual Christian is only a limited perspective, even though it is a necessary one. The ‘formal cause’ of justification does not express everything that can and should be said about justification.

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done, to the extent that it has examined the interconnection between the different subsections. Before we attempt to make the ‘fundamental difference’ of the JDDJ more explicit, it is important to note first that this is a somewhat ambiguous undertaking. It is necessary in view of a certain weakness of the JDDJ, but at the same time, it would be imposing something alien upon the document, thus perhaps endangering its most important achievement. The weakness is that it is not always made clear in the JDDJ why a certain concept is upheld by one of the dialogue partners and rejected by the other. Sometimes both positions are juxtaposed, so that the difference seems to be a matter of language or even particular preference, while in reality it may pertain to a larger issue. There is, for instance, an ambiguity in the JDDJ similar to the one that was noted in the work of Pesch with regard to what he called ‘sapiential’ concepts such as cooperation and merit. Pesch’s distinction between the Denkvollzugsformen of Luther and Aquinas implied the legitimacy of both approaches and, therefore, of these thomistic-sapiential concepts. At the same time, there was an opposing tendency in Pesch either to question the legitimacy of these concepts or to critically minimize their importance. An analogous ambiguity is discernible in the Roman Catholic paragraphs of the JDDJ with regard to the ideas of free human cooperation in justification and the meritorious nature of the good works of the Christian. These ideas are affirmed in the Roman Catholic paragraphs, but they can easily be read as relics of a past one might just as well forget. Yet, even if there are probably good reasons to avoid notions such as cooperation and merit in certain contexts, the discussions of both previous dialogues and of the JDDJ have demonstrated that they reveal something about the most fundamental theological convictions underlying the Roman Catholic position. A more thorough elaboration of the ‘fundamental difference’ could unearth the deeper roots of these concepts.2 At the same time, it is hardly surprising that no fundamental difference is made explicit in the JDDJ. This is related to what Meyer had called the ‘appropriate blurredness’ (sachgemäße Unschärfe) of the fundamental difference. Any clear-cut formulation of such a difference would run the risk of overlooking the complexity of the doctrinal dividing lines between the churches. What is seen as the distinguishing mark of one dialogue partner is often also present in some form in the life and teaching of the other. The study of the textual history of the JDDJ has shown that it has moved from a 2

Such consideration could have contributed, for instance, to a more fundamental reflection on the relationship between the issues of renewal and cooperation in 4.2.

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classical and even stereotypical presentation of both doctrinal positions to an approach that shows the ‘blurredness’ of the border lines. Specific traditional ways of explaining teaching on justification were elucidated in terms that were acceptable for the dialogue partner (merit and reward) or were even left out altogether (created grace). Ways of speaking that can be seen as typical for one of the dialogue partners were adopted in the paragraph of the other (imparted love), sometimes causing an unresolved tension within such a paragraph. Moreover, in the later versions of the JDDJ, there was a much stronger articulation of the common ground of the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification, namely in terms of Christology and Trinity, baptism and the idea of justification as communion with Christ. An unambiguous affirmation of a fundamental difference between both teachings on justification could mean a relapse into stereotypical thinking. More importantly, it would jeopardize the very project of the differentiated consensus, which is never merely a juxtaposition of differing doctrines, but always a demonstration how the concerns of one doctrine are also present in the other. Hence, making the fundamental difference implied in the JDDJ explicit is necessary in order to gain a deeper understanding of some aspects of justification that were discussed in a somewhat shallow manner in the document. At the same time, this attempt should take into account the ‘appropriate blurredness’ of this fundamental difference. This blurredness means, for instance, that it would be simplistic to think that the LutheranRoman Catholic difference coincides with the distinction between what we have called the semi-historical definition of justification and a view that highlights exclusively the role of fiducia in justification. This distinction is important in the JDDJ and in the whole justification debate, but the above analysis has shown that it is a tension that is present within both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs. In several subsections, especially in 4.3, 4.4 and 4.7, there was an affinity of the Lutheran paragraph with the semi-historical definition of justification. This was particularly true in the partim-partim perspective on the Christian as simul iutsus et peccator. Conversely, in the Roman Catholic paragraphs and in the Annex, there was an emerging Roman Catholic understanding of the Christian as total sinner and, correspondingly, a stronger emphasis on proclamation, promise and trust. Perhaps the fundamental difference can indeed be explained by means of this tension between a semi-historical and a trust-centred interpretation, but then only as a difference in emphasis. This would correspond to the way the JDDJ itself describes the remaining differences, namely as ‘differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the understanding of justification’.

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II. Doctrinal Demarcation What does this conclusion about the content of the JDDJ mean for the official reception of this document? Before addressing this question, it is helpful to recall that one of the crucial issues that emerged from the discussion of the notion of fundamental difference in Chapter 1 was that of doctrinal demarcation. The JDDJ claims (a) that its description of both teachings is adequate and (b) that the positions as they are described are not condemned by the dialogue partner, or to put it positively: that they sufficiently express all relevant theological concerns. This implies that the whole project of the JDDJ obliges the churches to engage in a double process of discernment. First, they have to discern whether they can endorse the presentations of their own teaching in the JDDJ, including all changes, omissions, translations and different emphases that come to light when one compares these paragraphs with traditional expressions of Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrine. In other words, they have to answer the question as to whether the ‘blurredness’ of the dividing lines as it is presented in the JDDJ is really ‘appropriate’. Second, they have to assess the presentation of the doctrine of the dialogue partner expressed in the separate and the common paragraphs. This implies that both Lutherans and Roman Catholics are required, in the process towards the official reception of the JDDJ, to reflect upon the question of true and false teaching. Even if this whole reception process aims at overcoming certain condemnations that were the consequences of previous doctrinal demarcations, new ways of distinguishing true from false teaching are always implied in such a process. When Lutherans accept the JDDJ, they say that Roman Catholics can speak about merit, if they understand it in connection with the biblical concept of reward. When Roman Catholics affirm the JDDJ they agree that Lutherans (and Roman Catholics) can speak about the Christian as simul iustus et peccator, if it is understood in the way that this it is explained in the JDDJ and the Annex. The history of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue from The Gospel and the Church (GC) up to the JDDJ shows that there were two parallel processes going on. On the one hand, there was an important discovery that doctrinal uniformity is not a requirement for ecclesial unity. On the other hand, through the call for official reception of the dialogue results, the necessity for discernment emerged, and thus of distinguishing true from false teaching and of indicating the limits of diversity. From the beginning, there was a kind of ‘rhetoric of difference’ at work in the way the method of the ecumenical dialogue was described by its advocates. This rhetoric

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highlighted somewhat one-sidedly the aspect of legitimate difference. This was obvious in Harding Meyer’s characterization of the method of GC. The main ambiguity in the concept of fundamental difference was also related to this. It was presented by Meyer and Birmelé as a purely descriptive category, but at the same time it was defined is such a way that the possibility of a church-dividing fundamental difference was excluded. A rhetoric of difference is probably also present in some of the attempts to defend the JDDJ against its critics. Both the official Vatican response and the reactions of the German professors were often dismissed as criticisms which had not really understood the ecumenical method of differentiated consensus.3 In the light of the dialectic between openness to difference and limitation of difference that is typical for any ecumenical reception process, it is necessary to give a differentiated assessment of this defence of the JDDJ. The defenders of the JDDJ are certainly right if they mean that Lutherans and Roman Catholics should not merely compare ecumenical documents with their own traditional formulations of dogma, as if only a verbal match between both would justify approval. From that point of view, the Vatican response probably rejected the expression simul iustus et peccator too rashly, without even attempting to understand the idea of the Christian as total sinner. Yet, there are no reasons whatsoever to exclude a priori the possibility that one of the two dialogue partners thinks the consensus as differentiated consensus is unacceptable in the light of its traditional beliefs. On the contrary, this possibility of rejection is part and parcel of ecumenical reception. One could even say that the Roman Catholic dialogue partner would never have arrived at an affirmation of the Christian as wholly peccator in the Annex, if there had not first been a careful comparison with its own doctrinal tradition. The danger of the ‘rhetoric of difference’ is that in the end it imperils the very project of the JDDJ. In his argument about the lack of understanding by the critics of the JDDJ for the differentiated consensus, Theodor Dieter points out:

3

We have already referred to Robert Jenson’s critique of the Vatican response (Jenson, ‘On the Vatican’s “Official Response”’). A similar criticism is also expressed in Dieter, ‘Zum Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung”’ (73), and in the response of the Lutheran bishop Hirschler to the first petition of German professors against the JDDJ (GER-DER 500). Eberhard Jüngel, on the other hand, strongly denies that the German critics of the JDDJ have misunderstood the concept of consensus that is implied in the JDDJ. E. Jüngel, ‘Amica exegesis einer römischen Note’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche Beiheft (1998), pp. 252–79 (257n15).

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The whole structure of the “Joint Declaration” [shows] that it is a case of a differentiated consensus, in which one teaching is presented from the perspective of the communalities with the teaching of the other church. Each side would present its teaching in a different manner when this is done separately.4 It is difficult to see how this statement is compatible with the fact that the Strasbourg Ecumenical Institute, of which Dieter is a member, argued that a formulation and an official approval of a consensus in the JDDJ was unavoidable because otherwise the dialogue partners could not make a pronouncement on the applicability of the condemnations. If it is true, as Dieter suggests, that the Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings are presented in a significantly different way outside the context of the dialogue, then the conclusion that the condemnations are no longer applicable to the dialogue partner on the basis of the JDDJ becomes almost meaningless. This has to be seen against the background of the question about the relationship between the JDDJ and the authoritative Roman Catholic and Lutheran formulations of doctrine. The VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK had refused to declare that Lutherans will explain their teaching from now on along the lines of LK. There was apparently a fear that an ecumenical dialogue text would become a binding criterion (Auslegungsinstanz) that would decide on the correct interpretation of the Lutheran confessional writings. The same fear was expressed with regard to the JDDJ.5 This is a complicated discussion that involves questions about ecclesial authority, doctrinal development and the role of doctrine in the life of the churches. Yet, even if one is convinced that the JDDJ is certainly not a criterion that stipulates how to read Trent and the Lutheran confessional writing, one should not overlook the fact that the document is at least a translation and an application of the teaching on justification contained in these authoritative writings, namely both in the formulation of the paragraphs of part 4 and in the judgement about the applicability of the condemnations. It is difficult to deny that, by virtue of its official signing, the JDDJ makes a 4

‘Darüber hinaus zeigt die ganze Struktur der “Gemeinsamen Erklärung”, daß es sich in ihr um einen differenzierten Konsens handelt, in dem die eigene Lehre unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Gemeinsamkeit mit der Lehre der andern Kirche dargestellt wird. Jede Seite ‘Dieter, ‘Zum Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung”’ (73). In the same paragraph, Dieter also draws a comparison with Leuenberg. One wonders whether the attempt to make the differentiated consensus of the JDDJ acceptable to other German Lutherans by highlighting its similarities to Leuenberg does not overlook the crucial differences between Leuenberg and the form of consensus that developed within the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. 5 This issue is discussed in Brenner, ‘Wie verbindlich ist die gemeinsame Erklärung’.

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certain claim on future interpretations of the authoritative writings of the churches, even if it is hard to explain this in strictly juridical terms.

III. The Assessment Given the inevitability of some form of doctrinal discernment, the question arises as to how the dialogue partners will assess the remaining LutheranRoman Catholic differences in the JDDJ, that is, both the portrayal of the two doctrines and the question of whether they are acceptable in the light of the condemnations. It was argued that the ‘fundamental difference’ as it appears in part 4 of the JDDJ can be described as a different emphasis within a tension that was discernible in the expositions of both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic doctrines of justification, a tension between a semi-historical and a trust-centred concept of justification. Our main thesis, which has been foreshadowed in previous chapters, is that this tension is more likely to be ‘receivable’ from a Roman Catholic point of view than from a Lutheran perspective. This has to do with the asymmetry that was noticeable in Pesch’s idea of existential and sapiential theology, even if it will be necessary to revise this idea once more. It had already become clear that a characterization of Roman Catholic thinking as ‘sapiential’ and Lutheran thinking as ‘existential’ was too simple. The Roman Catholic position turned out to contain ‘existential’ as well as ‘sapiential’ aspects. The clarification in the Vatican response on the issue exemplifies this when it affirms the Tridentine teaching that good works are also the ‘fruit of man’ without ‘diminishing the totally divine initiative’. The existential or ‘confessional’ side of theology and doctrine is expressed here by the recognition of the totally divine initiative, which excludes all boasting and calls for trust in God. At the same time, the created constitution (we have said: the history) of human beings is also part of the whole picture of their righteousness before God, to the extent that this righteousness is not untouched by the vicissitudes of the creature in history. The existential side of Roman Catholic teaching was emphasized more strongly in the JDDJ and the Annex, for instance, through the recognition of a fuller personal view on the Christian as peccator. The existential-sapiential (or fiducial-historical, or relational-ontological) structure of Roman Catholic teaching made us suspect that there was an asymmetry in the difference between the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic doctrines of justification. Both would share the ‘existential’ concern, whereas the ‘sapiential’ aspect, which Roman Catholicism wants to include

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in the theology of justification, is ruled out in the exclusively existential approach of Luther as Pesch described it. However, the study of the work of the Finnish Luther school and of the Finnish influence in the text of the JDDJ seems to demonstrate that the Lutheran view on justification does not necessarily exclude Pesch’s sapiential perspective. The interpretation of both forgiveness of sins and the renewal of the believer in terms of union with Christ was connected with a perspective on the believer’s partial righteousness, not as an emanation of fiducial faith, but rather as a manifestation of Christ’s presence in the believer. What is crucial in this approach is that the Finnish scholars emphasized that this presence should not be interpreted in a ‘neo-Kantian’ manner, but rather in an ontological way. As the analysis of the Finnish Luther interpretation in Chapter 2 has shown, this enabled the Finnish scholars to speak about Christ’s righteousness becoming our own righteousness in a more intrinsic and empirical (we would say: historical) way than some extrinsic interpretations of justification would allow. Roman Catholic Assessment – What does this mean for the Roman Catholic assessment of the JDDJ? The stronger existential (or relational, or fiducial) emphasis in the Roman Catholic paragraphs and in the Annex, as compared with both the earlier versions and traditional dogmatic formulations, is not a revocation of the basic structure of the Tridentine teaching. It does mean, however, that certain statements of Trent appear in a new light. An acceptance of the Roman Catholic paragraphs and of the Annex implies that the Tridentine insistence that the justified are ‘truly just’ (i.e. as creatures) has to be balanced more emphatically with an awareness of a depth-dimension of sin, which shows itself even in ‘the highest moral decisions of human beings’ (Ratzinger) and which reveals the believer’s reliance on God alone. In this sense, an official reception of the JDDJ is at the same time a reception of the work of theologians like Rahner and von Balthasar who attempted to deepen the Roman Catholic understanding of sin in their interpretation of simul iustus et peccator.6 With regard to the Lutheran paragraphs, it is safe to say that the Lutheran openness to the semi-historical view on justification certainly facilitated the Roman Catholic signing of the document and was probably even a conditio sine qua non. It is difficult to imagine, in view of the Roman Catholic concerns that emerged throughout the dialogue and the drafting process, that the Vatican would have signed a document which considered an exclusive sola 6

In previous chapters, we refered to Balthasar, Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, pp. 378–86, and Rahner, ‘Gerecht und Sünder zugleich’.

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fiducia approach to justification a legitimate ‘unfolding’ of a common understanding of the gospel. This may seem a disenchanting conclusion to some Lutherans: Rome is imposing conditions upon the dialogue partner. There is, however, no way to evade this conclusion, unless one considers ecumenism as a purely spiritual affair in which all Christians are gathered around Christ and in which no concrete commitments may be demanded from one another (a view that is itself derived from a certain understanding of the relation between gospel and law/obligation and thus from a particular interpretation of justification by faith). It should be borne in mind that also the VELKD/DNK-LWB response to LK also spelt out conditions for the non-applicability of the condemnations.7 A counterargument against the thesis that, from a Roman Catholic doctrinal point of view, the JDDJ is fairly easy to accept, may be the fact that some Roman Catholic theologians, such as the German Cardinal Leo Scheffczyk and the American Christopher J. Malloy, also strongly criticized the document.8 This criticism argues precisely that the JDDJ is incompatible with the teaching of Trent. Apart from the fact that, in comparison with the massive scale of Lutheran reactions, the scale of this critique was somewhat marginal, its content is also rather problematic. It is clear that for both authors the only desirable outcome of the ecumenical dialogue would be that Lutherans accept the teaching of Trent in its entirety and abjure their own heresy. In this sense their approach is clearly apologetic. Of course, ecumenical dialogue always involves some form of apologetics to the extent 7

The obvious counter-argument would be that that the VELKD-DNK-LWB response mainly focuses on the Roman Catholic condemnations, explaining under what conditions they are applicable to Lutheran teaching. So it seems that the response is not imposing conditions on Roman Catholics but rather discussing the conditions Roman Catholics want to impose. If one takes into account the fact, however, that the Tridentine condemnations in the decree on justification are merely the negative side of the positive teaching of the decree, it is more difficult to maintain that saying how these condemnations should be understood in order not to be applicable is itself not expressing a ‘condition’ for church unity. This problem is related to the notorious footnote 3 in the JDDJ, which indicates that not all Lutheran churches accept those writings that contain doctrinal condemnations on justification as a normative basis for their teaching. This points to an asymmetry between the dialogue partners in terms of condemnations. The Roman Catholic church seems to be the more ‘condemning’ partner. Especially among the German Lutheran churches, there was a wish to express this asymmetry more clearly (GER-DER 260). Cf. Wendebourg, ‘Einspruch gegen die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’ (53–55). The question is, however, whether too strong an emphasis on this asymmetry does not overlook the fact any normative expression of the Lutheran view on justification does imply a distinction between true and false teaching, regardless of the presence of historical condemnations. This insight reduces the absolutes of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic asymmetry in terms of condemnations, unless of course the Lutheran convictions about true and false teaching are considered something particular with which one should not bother others. 8 See Malloy, Engrafted into Christ; Scheffczyk, Ökumene: der steile Weg der Wahrheit.

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that a church presents its own teaching in a way that is as plausible as possible for the dialogue partner and indicates problematic aspects in the teaching of the other. The problem is, however, that there is not the slightest hint in the approach of Scheffczyk and Malloy that the Roman Catholic church could learn something in the dialogue. This seems to be at odds with the apparent dynamic nature of the dialogue itself, in which the participants are challenged to find new formulations for their traditional beliefs and to reconsider aspects that may have been underemphasized in classical expressions of doctrine. Still, there is no logical contradiction in the position of both theologians, because if one is convinced that Trent offers an unsurpassable expression of teaching on justification, it is better for a Roman Catholic not to be too ‘dynamic’, but rather to encourage others to move towards the truth. The problem is, however, that in their attempt to show that there really is an unbridgeable gap between Lutherans and Roman Catholics, Scheffczyk and Malloy have to offer a one-sided view of Trent. This is most obvious in Malloy. His whole argument is built on the fact that Trent did not adopt a theory of ‘double justice’, which would have said that the formal cause of justification is both the righteousness by which the believer is made righteous and God’s own righteousness.9 Rather, Trent spoke of the former as the only (unica) formal cause of justification. Historically and doctrinally true as this may be, Malloy’s classical ontological interpretation of this formal cause as infused righteousness or quality of the soul tends to reduce the whole issue to the question: Are Christians really (i.e. ontologically) righteous or are they in some sense still damnable in the eyes of God? The basic mistake of Lutheran teaching would be that it holds that believers, because of their enduring sinfulness which makes them still damnable, are in need of the imputation or reckoning of Christ’s righteousness. The question is, however, whether Malloy’s alternative – created righteousness or the need for imputed righteousness – does not lead to a distorted picture of what Trent says. The Tridentine decree on justification does reject the view that the righteousness of the Christian is merely imputed righteousness.10 However, it is difficult to maintain that in the perspective of Trent there is no sense in which that righteousness also remains ‘outside’ the believer. Trent could say that created righteousness is the sole formal cause of justification only because it had already stated that the efficient cause is the God of mercy, and that the meritorious cause is Christ. If these 9 10

Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 59–122. DH 1560.

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latter ‘causes’ have any enduring relevance for believers apart from communicating the knowledge that their ontological righteousness is really backed up by God, that is, if created righteousness only exists and only will exist because of the continuing relationship with God (as is expressed in the image of the believer being ‘engrafted into Christ’), then there is no reason to reject the idea of imputed righteousness altogether. This idea indicates precisely the lasting reliance of the believer on God, which is also highlighted by the above-mentioned positive Roman Catholic interpretations of simul iutsus et peccator. Perhaps Roman Catholic teaching, due to its existential-sapiential structure, implies a more paradoxical view of sin than is admitted by Malloy, who describes the reality of sin in the life of the believer almost exclusively by means of the concepts of venial and mortal sins.11 He does not come anywhere near the positive reception by von Balthasar of the Lutheran idea of Anfechtung,12 which could give more concrete meaning to the role of fiducia in Trent. Malloy’s interpretation of Trent seems to exclude from the outset the kind of learning process that is typical for (ecumenical) dialogue. It can be argued that Trent is fundamentally open to the dynamic that led to the presentation of the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification in the JDDJ and that it even calls for such a development. Lutheran Assessment – One might expect that the judgement of the JDDJ by Lutheran churches would be quite similar to the Roman Catholic evaluation. The observation that the Lutheran paragraphs were characterized by the same theological tension that also marked the Roman Catholic position described by the JDDJ would make a similar assessment by both dialogue partners predictable. In other words, the study of the Finnish Luther interpretation and of its influence in the JDDJ seems to have questioned the asymmetry of both positions in terms of existential and sapiential theology. It looks as if a more symmetrical picture has re-emerged. However, this is not entirely the case. The reason is quite straightforward: a great deal of the Lutheran and other Protestant authors whom we have encountered along the way (Gottfried Martens, Jörg Baur, Daphne Hampson, Georg Hunsinger, Reinhard Flogaus) offer a radically extrinsic – and, therefore, radically trust-centred – interpretation, which basically says that the whole event of justification of sinners consists in their being saved from the messy business of their concrete historical existence, rather than in that same existence. It can be called a ‘messy business’ because the combination of its 11 12

See, for instance, Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 289–93. Cf. supra section 2.III.b.3.

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aspects of growth, obligation, freedom and self-reflection creates a fundamental uncertainty about what takes place on the historical scene: the most supreme virtue can conceal the greatest God-despising pride. Only in a God-given self-forgetfulness in which human beings look away from themselves to Christ, they are saved. Any inclusion of the historical perspective in the view on justification, for instance, by emphasizing the partial righteousness of the believer, in the final analysis comes from and leads to the self-observation in which the vetus homo is entrapped.13 It is clear that from such a point of view both the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran paragraphs in the JDDJ fall short in describing the heart of the Christian message. The former cautiously preserved the vision of Trent, while the latter did not unambiguously affirm an exclusive sola fiducia interpretation of justification (which was precisely the reason for their acceptability from a Roman Catholic perspective). The existence of this radical extrinsic interpretation seems to imply that the compatibility of a trust-centred and a semi-historical view on justification is attested more clearly in the Tridentine doctrine than in the Lutheran tradition. The hermeneutical endeavour that was necessary in order to unearth the ‘sapiential’ element in the Finnish interpretation confirms this suspicion. Yet whether or not this sapiential or historical perspective is a possible or even a necessary aspect of the Lutheran tradition cannot be decided here. It is the object of a discussion that takes place within and among the Lutheran churches. What is relevant here is that there is such an unfinished discussion. The main problem is, therefore, that the signing of the JDDJ threatens precisely to close this discussion and, thus, to limit the diversity within Lutheranism. This means that the discussion about the content of the JDDJ automatically leads back to questions about authority in the churches and about the procedure that was followed in the reception process of the JDDJ. The fact that the dialogue process inevitably pushed the formulations of both dialogue partners in a certain theological direction is directly related to the Lutheran anxieties and criticisms concerning the relation between the JDDJ and the confessional writings and the role of the LWF. The very structure of authority in the Lutheran churches makes it more difficult to argue, as we did in the case of the Roman Catholic evaluation of the JDDJ, that the Lutheran confessional writings are fundamentally open to the theological (‘Finnish’) developments that led towards the final text of the JDDJ. The question is: ‘Who is to discern this 13

A good and comprehensible account of this view is also found in O. Bayer, Aus Glauben leben: Über Rechtfertigung und Heiligung (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1984).

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openness?’ and, more fundamentally, ‘To what extent is something like ‘binding doctrinal development’ conceivable in a Lutheran perspective’.14 This authority problem and the issue of doctrinal development would have been avoided if the consensus in the JDDJ had been limited to what Christoph Schwöbel has called a ‘referential consensus’.15 If the presentation of Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrine in the JDDJ had been merely fructum and signum of a deeper common understanding and a common relation to the same ‘ground and object of faith’, the whole issue of making authoritative statements about the teachings as they are presented in the document would be less central. This would have drawn the JDDJ nearer to the approach of the Leuenberg agreement to the extent that it is determined by a foundation-expression (Grund-Ausdruck) scheme. The analysis of the document in the light of the preceding dialogues has shown, however, that this scheme cannot be an exhaustive description of the consensus expressed in the JDDJ. Obviously, the consensus of the JDDJ is in an important respect referential, in the sense that it testifies to a ‘concord’ and a shared relationship of Christians to the Triune God. Yet it is more than that, for the condemnations are lifted on the basis of common and separate expressions of faith that have to be officially approved by the churches. The growing presence of common formulations of doctrine throughout the history of the document further increases the significance of the level of expression. As was indicated in Chapter 4, it was precisely the dependence of the lifting of the condemnations on the formulation of a consensus that was problematic in the eyes of some Lutherans. In the light of our examination of the content of the JDDJ, it seems that the reluctance to base ecclesial unity to some degree on doctrinal unity and the use instead of a strict foundation-expression scheme are themselves rooted in a certain view of justification, namely an interpretation that denies a constitutive role in salvation to the concrete historical existence of believers (and so also to human expressions of doctrine) and that sees trust in God alone as the sole (‘referential’) principle of unity among Christians. Conversely, the prominence in the JDDJ of a semi-historical view on justification corresponds to a methodology in which expressions of doctrine, which are always historical, play a significant role in the quest for ecclesial unity. The form and the content of the JDDJ – and the criticisms of form and of content – turn out to be closely related. 14

This question was raised by Ulrich Kühn. Cited in Brenner, ‘Wie verbindlich ist die gemeinsame Erklärung’ (15). 15 See supra section 1.IV. Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’.

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IV. Justification as Criterion and the Church The foregoing reflections on the content of the JDDJ and on ecclesial authority are related to one final disputed issue: the role of the doctrine of justification as the criterion for Christian life and teaching. §18 of the JDDJ deals with this issue. JD2 spoke of justification as criterion (without definite or indefinite article) ‘which constantly serves to orient all the teaching and practice of our churches to Christ’. The final version of the text calls it ‘an indispensable criterion which constantly. . .’ and added: When Lutherans emphasize the unique significance of this criterion, they do not deny the interrelation and significance of all truths of faith. When Catholics see themselves as bound by several criteria, they do not deny the special function of the message of justification. The insertion of the indefinite article and the fact that Roman Catholics are said to have ‘several criteria’ has been the object of strong Lutheran criticism.16 This problem is related to the detachment of the theme of justification from the original plan of the PCPCU and the LWF to officially receive a whole series of dialogue documents, including texts on ecclesiology, the Eucharist and ministry.17 These themes are mentioned only at the end of the JDDJ. In §43, they are described as areas in which the consensus on justification can and must have an influence: Our consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification must come to influence the life and teachings of our churches. Here it must prove itself. In this respect, there are still questions of varying importance which need further clarification. These include, among other topics, the relationship between the Word of God and church doctrine, as well as ecclesiology, ecclesial authority, church unity, ministry, the sacraments, and the relation between justification and social ethics. We are convinced that the consensus we have reached offers a solid basis for this clarification.

16

See, for instance, the polemical texts: I. U. Dalferth, ‘Kairos der ökumene? Die Gemeinsame Erklärung führt zu neuem Nachdenken über reformatorische Theologie’, epd-Dokumentation (1997), no. 46/97, pp. 52–58; E. Jüngel, ‘Um Gottes willen - Klarheit! Kritische Bemerkungen zur Verharmlosung der kriteriologischen Funktion des Rechtfertigungsartikels - aus Anlass einer ökumenischen “Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’, epd-Dokumentation (1997), no. 46/97, pp. 59–65; D. Wendebourg, ‘Kampf ums Kriterium - Wie die Rechtfertigungserklärung zustande kam’, epd-Dokumentation (1998), no. 3/98, pp. 45–49. 17 This plan was explained in the document ‘Strategies for Reception’. See supra section 4.I.

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Lutherans wondered, however, as to how a consensus on the doctrine of justification could have been reached if ecclesiological consequences do not immediately follow. Some claimed that a genuine Roman Catholic endorsement of justification as criterion would inevitably lead to joint celebration of the Eucharist, the recognition of Lutheran ministries and of the Lutheran churches as churches. The fact that these consequences were not forthcoming, was seen as a proof that being ‘bound by several criteria’ means not being bound by the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae at all.18 The freedom of the Christian vis-à-vis conditions for salvation that is established by the message of justification, seems to be undone again by those other criteria. The insertion of footnote 8 in JD2 (footnote 9 in JD3) was seen as a confirmation of the suspicion that the consensus on justification would remain without consequences for the Roman Catholic dialogue partner. It stated: The word “church” is used in this Declaration to reflect the self-understandings of the participating churches, without intending to resolve all the ecclesiological issues related to this term. An indication of what could be meant by the ‘several criteria’ Roman Catholics are bound by is found in the Roman Catholic proposals for textual changes in preparation of JD3. It suggests adopting the statement: Following the biblical witness, Catholics view the doctrine of justification within the context of the whole structure [Gesamtverbund] of the fundamental salvific truths and of the mediation of salvation.19 There was no mention of ‘several criteria’ here, so presumably this formulation originated from within the drafting committee.20 The Roman Catholic proposal, which was reiterated in different words in the official

18

This was expressed in the first petition of German professors against the JDDJ: ‘Votum der Hochschullehrer zur “Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’, epd-Dokumentation (1998), no. 7/98, pp. 1–4. See also Jüngel, ‘Um Gottes willen - Klarheit!’ (64). 19 ‘Katholiken sehen die Rechtfertigungslehre im Anschluss an das biblische Zeugnis in einem Gesamtverbund der fundamentalen Heilswahrheiten und der Vermittlung des Heils’. GERDER 270. 20 Cf. Wendebourg, ‘Kampf ums Kriterium’ (48–49). Wendebourg argues that the absence of the statement about ‘several criteria’ in the Roman Catholic proposals does not diminish the significance of its presence in the final text.

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Vatican response to the JDDJ,21 makes clear that the ‘several criteria’ include ecclesiological criteria. This corroborates the Lutheran fear that for Roman Catholics the article of justification cannot rule over all the teachings and practices in the church. Rather, the article itself seems to be limited or even ruled by what it is supposed to rule. Some theologians pointed out, in defence of the JDDJ, that the talk of ‘several criteria’ in §18 does not invalidate the fact that Lutherans and Roman Catholics affirm together in JD3 that the doctrine of justification is an indispensable criterion.22 In response, Eberhard Jüngel wondered as to whether then the other criteria are dispensable criteria and he somewhat mockingly rejected this dubious implication of the Roman Catholic position.23 However, the first phase of the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue (GC) has shown that, when it comes to the issue of church authority, both dialogue partners can speak about primary and secondary criteria.24 Moreover, the Vatican proposal for textual change in §18 quoted above contained a reference to Church and Justification §2, in which Lutherans and Roman Catholics say together: Everything that is believed and taught about the nature of the church, the means of salvation and the church’s ministry must be founded in the salvation-event itself and must be marked by justification-faith as the way in which the salvation-event is received and appropriated. Correspondingly, everything that is believed and taught about the nature and effect of justification must be understood in the overall context of statements about the church, the means of salvation and the church’s ministry. This statement, which is also found in the Versailles document, suggests a more dynamic relationship between the teaching on justification and the church than does the idea of the article of justification as ‘ruler over all teachings and practices in the church’. It is clear that Lutherans, even those who strongly reject the idea of ‘several criteria’, recognize ‘the whole structure [Gesamtverbund] of the fundamental salvific truths and of the 21

‘Whereas for Lutherans this doctrine has taken on an altogether particular significance, for the Catholic Church the message of justification, according to Scripture and already from the time of the fathers, has to be organically integrated into the fundamental criterion of the regula fidei, that is, the confession of the one God in three persons, christologically centred and rooted in the living church and its sacramental life’. 22 W. Kasper, ‘In allem Christus bekennen: Einig in der Rechtfertigungslehre als Mitte und Kriterium des christlichen Glaubens?’ epd-Dokumentation (1997), no. 46/97, pp. 49–51; Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasbourg), Commentary, pp. 31–33. 23 Jüngel, ‘Um Gottes willen - Klarheit!’ (61–62). 24 See supra section 3.IV.b.

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mediation of salvation’ that was mentioned in the Vatican proposal about §18.25 The crucial question is: Why do some Lutherans think that saying that this structure involves other criteria is a threat to the criteriological function of the article of justification? The only answer to this question lies in the content of the doctrine of justification itself. The Lutheran theologian David S. Yeago points out that the reactions against §18 have to be seen against the background of a certain interpretation of the idea of ‘criterion’ in Lutheranism.26 He refers, for instance, to Gerhard Ebeling, who claims that Protestantism is marked by a specific view of reality: ‘a relational ontology at the heart of which is the individual conscience coram Deo’.27 This becomes a systematic principle that determines what is truly Christian (Protestant). It excludes all the consequences of a ‘Roman Catholic’ substance ontology, for instance, the idea ‘that eschatological holiness can have any visible and abiding presence in the world of space and time’.28 Yeago thinks that the JDDJ works with another concept of justification as ‘criterion’. It is a more ‘pragmatic’ criterion, which says that all teaching and practice in the church should serve the gospel and promote trust in God. It is clear that the latter definition of the criterion of justification is much more open to the possibility of other, secondary criteria. They are not excluded, but they have to be assessed by the primary criterion as to whether they hinder or promote the gospel. Two remarks can be made from the perspective of our research. First, Yeago’s reflections show that in §18 the JDDJ again tends to decide on an issue that is probably an ongoing debate among Lutherans. This raises once more the problems about doctrinal decision and development mentioned in the previous section. Secondly, the distinction between the two concepts of ‘criterion’ is closely related to the tension that was noticeable in both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic paragraphs of part 4 of the JDDJ, namely between a trust-centred and a ‘semi-historical’ view on justification. It is clear that only an exclusive sola fiducia interpretation would see other criteria as an intrusion in the coram-relationship, because these criteria make us rely on something or someone other than God. From the moment a semi-historical perspective on justification emerges, it becomes more plausible that certain secondary criteria can be at the service of faith. If the 25

Wendebourg, ‘Kampf ums Kriterium’ (48). D. S. Yeago, ‘Lutheran-Roman Catholic Consensus on Justification: The Theological Achievement of the Joint Declaration’, Pro Ecclesia 7 (1998), no. 4, pp. 449–70. 27 Ibid. (462). Ebeling played an important role in the first petition of German professors against the JDDJ. Cf. Wallmann, ‘Der Streit um die “Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre”’ (228–29). 28 Yeago, ‘Lutheran-Roman Catholic Consensus on Justification’ (462). 26

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concrete historical existence of the human being is the locus of salvation, then such criteria even seem unavoidable. This insight can lead to a final reflection on how the JDDJ may inform Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues on the church. Documents resulting from some of the recent ecclesiological dialogues explicitly refer to the JDDJ. On a national level, there was the German document Communio sanctorum (CS – 2000) and the American document The Church as Koinonia of Salvation (CKS – 2004).29 The fourth phase of the international LutheranRoman Catholic dialogue led to the publication of The Apostolicity of the Church (AC – 2006).30 It would require a long and careful study of these documents to discover how the differentiated consensus on justification affected these dialogues on the church. It is only possible here to make a few general remarks. One way of describing the relationship between a consensus on justification and the Lutheran-Roman Catholic ecclesiological dialogues would be as follows: since Lutherans and Roman Catholics have reached an agreement on the heart of the Christian faith, they can more easily settle less essential issues. One could argue that through the JDDJ a consensus on ‘our final goal’ was reached, whereas the remaining ecclesiological issues concern the ‘means’ towards that goal. This is a legitimate and important perspective on the relationship between justification and church in ecumenism. This line of argument is used, for instance, in AC §§288-293, where it states that the consensus in the JDDJ on the ‘apostolic gospel’ facilitates the recognition of Lutheran and Roman Catholic ministries as a service to that gospel. Yet this ‘centre-periphery’ approach, useful as it may be, does not solve all the problems. The discussion of the concept of ‘hierarchy of truths’ has shown that in the Roman Catholic view, ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, ‘goal’ and ‘means’, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ criteria are useful categories in ecumenism, but not necessarily concepts that distinguish church-dividing from non-church-dividing issues. The secondary criteria are still criteria.31

29

Communio Sanctorum: die Kirche als Gemeinschaft der Heiligen. Bilaterale Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Kirchenleitung der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands (Frankfurt am Main/Paderborn: Verlag Otto Lembeck/ Bonifatus-Verlag, 2000); R. Lee and J. Gros, The Church as Koinonia of Salvation: Its Structures and Ministries (Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue, 10; Washington: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2005). 30 The Apostolicity of the Church: Study Document of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission on Unity (Minneapolis: Lutheran University Press, 2006). 31 Arguably, this is again related to the Roman Catholic ‘semi-historical’ doctrine of justification.

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We would suggest, therefore, a more direct connection between the content of the consensus on justification in the JDDJ, and ecclesiology (complementary to the centre-periphery approach), even if this will lead to new problems rather than to solutions. The category of ‘history’, which we used to explain both the Roman Catholic position and the Finnish Lutheran influence in the JDDJ, may be helpful here. If the growth in righteousness in the concrete historical existence of the believer is a legitimate and even necessary perspective on justification, then the role of the church as a historical community in salvation also comes into view. This perspective is clearly present in the two national dialogues (CS and CKS). Their central concepts for describing the church (communio and its Greek equivalent koinonia) have both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions. The two documents speak about the church in relation to salvation and in terms of its ‘structures and ministries’. Thus they touch upon one of the most fundamental issues in the ecumenical dialogues on the church as communion: to what extent structures are necessary for the communio/koinonia of Christians.32 Because structures and ministries are always historical and human realities, the issue is directly analogous to the central question in the debates on justification: the role of the human being in salvation. This analogy allows us to formulate two challenges for ecclesiology that arise from our investigation of the dialogues on justification. Further study of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic documents on the church may reveal whether these challenges have been sufficiently taken into account in the ecclesiological dialogues. (1) Through the official approval of the JDDJ and the Annex, Roman Catholics have endorsed an understanding of the Christian as peccator that went beyond traditional doctrinal formulations. Sin was recognized as a more encompassing reality for the believer than was the case in the classical act-centred approach. If this were applied to the church as historical institution, it could enable Roman Catholics to see more clearly how the holiness of the church in its historical realization is always to some extent a paradoxical reality. It is no surprise that theologians like Rahner and von Balthasar, who positively received the Lutheran simul iustus et peccator, also looked for ways to talk more adequately about the sinfulness of the church, without denying its real ‘historical’ holiness.33 This view is, to a certain 32

S. Wood, ‘Ecclesial Koinonia in Ecumenical Dialogues’, One in Christ 30 (1994), pp. 124–45 (143). 33 H. U. v. Balthasar, ‘Casta Meretrix’, in Sponsa Verbi: Skizzen zur Theologie II (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1961), pp. 203–305; K. Rahner, ‘Kirche der Sünder’, in Schriften zur Theologie VI (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1965), pp. 301–20; K. Rahner, ‘Sündige Kirche nach den Dekreten des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils’, in Schriften zur Theologie VI (Einsiedeln: Benzinger, 1965), pp. 321–47.

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extent, also expressed in CaJ (§§148-165), even though the presentation of the Roman Catholic position emphasizes the sinfulness of the members of the church more strongly than structural aspects of sin in the church. In CS §88 the sinfulness of the church is only a Lutheran affirmation. The question for Roman Catholics is in what way they are prepared to speak about the sinfulness of the church and what this means for teaching and practice. Is it possible, for instance, that in a certain historical situation ‘secondary criteria’ are themselves affected by human sinfulness to the extent that they fundamentally contradict the primary criterion of God’s unconditional love? Or to use the concepts of Carl J. Peter and the NCCB: are there historical circumstances in which the penultimate trust of Christians in the church has to be questioned from the perspective of their ultimate trust in God?34 What is the role of what Pesch called a ‘prophetic ministry’ in the church?35 (2) The ecclesiological challenge for Lutherans that arises from the JDDJ is probably greater. The Lutheran teaching presented in the document is not an exclusive sola fiducia interpretation of justification which rules out all ‘historical’ criteria. Rather, the doctrine of justification as ‘pragmatic’ criterion assesses all historical manifestations of the church and judges as to whether they promote or obstruct trust in God. One may then ask the question: to what extent does penultimate trust in the church as historical reality – and so also as institution – support trust in God? As such there is nothing in the idea of justification as a pragmatic criterion which a priori disallows trust in ecclesial structures and institutions. The issue is more complex, however, if one takes into account the nature of trust itself. Permanently assessing whether someone is trustworthy is in the end a symptom of a lack of trust. This is precisely what the pragmatic criterion seems to do. It checks at all times whether the church does its job properly as mediator of God’s grace. This is why Carl J. Peter pointed out the need for ‘another critical principle’ which would prevent the reality of the church from being eroded by the incessant criticism of the ‘protestant principle’. Similarly, Pesch claimed that the article of justification as criterion runs the danger of encouraging a compulsive critique against the church, which is destructive of the way Christians mostly live out their faith: as a ‘naïve and joyful participation in the church’.36

34

See supra section 3.IV.a. See supra section 2.II.b. 36 See supra section 2.II.b. 35

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This problem is related to the way the Roman Catholic idea of the church as a sacrament is presented in the ecumenical dialogues. In CS §87, for instance, this idea is almost exclusively explained in terms of the church as ‘sign’ and ‘instrument’ (cf. LG §1). Moreover, the church’s dependence on God and the difference between Christ and the church are strongly emphasized. All of this is true, of course, but as long as a broader view on the church as sacrament is not mentioned, the issue of penultimate trust in the church does not come into sight. The assertion that the church is ‘sign and instrument’ of unity with God and among people can again lead to an exclusively evaluative attitude towards the church (‘Is it really fulfilling its role as sign and instrument?’). In CaJ §§120-124, the interpretation of the church as sacrament in terms of ‘sign and instrument’ is complemented by a reference to the affirmation in LG §8, of the close relationship between the divine and the human element in the church. A consequence of this broader ‘incarnational’ view of the church as sacrament may imply that trust in God is always mediated by trust in human elements, even if it does not necessarily mean the exclusion of any critique of that human element as a historical reality. The historical aspect of salvation and the role of baptism in justification, which were crucial elements in the differentiated consensus of the JDDJ, point towards this question about trust in historical institutions. This issue can easily remain hidden under the common Lutheran-Roman Catholic affirmation that the church has a mediating role in salvation. It seems to be decisive, however, in any discussion about apostolic succession and about the question as to what structures are needed for the unity that is aspired to in ecumenical dialogue. Lutherans may be troubled by this question and wonder whether this is not taking the outcome of the dialogue on justification too far. In view of Roman Catholic soteriology and ecclesiology, it is above all a realistic question. Troubling though it may be, for Roman Catholics no less than for Lutherans, it is a question that both parties will have to address if the quest for unity is to make any further significant progress.

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Index Aquinas, Thomas 10, 36–7, 42, 44–7, 50, 55, 59, 103, 120, 220 von Balthasar, Hans U. 71–8, 95, 226, 229, 237 Barth, Karl 71–8 Baur, Jorg 134–7, 191–2, 229 Birmelé, André 8, 10–11, 13–15, 17–20, 22–4, 27, 29 ,103 116–17, 219, 223 Dieter, Theodor 223–4 Duprey, Pierre 159–60, 167 Ebeling, Gerhard

Löser, Werner 144–5, 156, 189 Lotze, Hermann 62–2 Luther, Martin 10, 35, 37–8, 44–5, 47, 56–7, 61, 63–5, 79, 81–4, 88–90, 92, 95, 104, 127, 129–30, 207–8, 220, 226 Malloy, Christopher J. 30, 227–9 Mannermaa, Tuomo 61–4, 67, 69–70, 72–4, 77, 84–5, 90, 93, 95, 111, 180, 183, 188, 199 Meyer, Harding 10, 14–15, 17, 19–20, 22–4, 27, 29, 101–2, 112, 159–60, 167, 219–20, 223

79–80, 235

Flogaus, Reinhard 69–71, 74, 83, 88–90, 131, 229 Fries, Heinrich 37 Hampson, Daphne 80–1, 87–8, 229 Hanselmann, Johannes 163 Härle, Wilfried 193 Herms, Eilert 81–2 Hietamäki, Minna 111 Hunsinger, George 86–8, 229 Jenson, Robert 162 Joest, Wilfried 79–80 John Paul II 99, 148 Jüngel, Eberhard 234 Juntunen, Sammeli 79–83, 88, 92

Pannenberg, Wolfhart 36, 102 Pesch, Otto Herman 2, 3, 10, 35–61, 65, 83, 95–6, 108, 119–20, 125, 132–7, 140–1, 152, 154, 156, 201, 210, 220, 225–6, 238 Peter, Carl J. 140–3, 156, 238 Rahner, Karl 36–7, 39–40, 44, 49–50, 59–60, 95, 120–3, 215, 226, 237 Ratzinger, Joseph 115, 163, 202, 226 Root, Michael 81 Scheffczyk, Leo 11, 78, 80, 227–8 Schütte, Heinz 163 Schwöbel, Christoph 19, 21–4, 119, 231 Slenczka, Notger 191–2 Track, Joachim

Kühn, Ulrich

163, 201–2

134–7, 154 Wallmann, Johannes

Lehmann, Karl 102 Lohse, Eduard 115

9780567236654.indb 251

Yeago, David S.

168

235

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