Dividing Africa with Policy: The Influence of the Union for the Mediterranean on the Unity and Security of Africa [1st ed.] 9783030413019, 9783030413026

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Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14

Lara Hierro

Dividing Africa with Policy

The Influence of the Union for the Mediterranean on the Unity and Security of Africa

Library of Public Policy and Public Administration Volume 14

Series Editors Michael Boylan, Department of Philosophy, Marymount University, Arlington, VA, USA Editorial Board Simona Giordano, Reader in Bioethics, School of Law, Manchester University, Manchester, UK David Koepsell, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Director of Research and Strategic Initiatives at Comisión Nacional de Bioética (CONBIOETICA),  Mexico Seumas Miller, Research Fellow, Charles Sturt University, Australia and Delft University, The Netherlands, Australia Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, Professor and Chair Philosophy, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH, USA Wanda Teays, Professor Philosophy, Mount St. Mary’s College, Los Angeles, CA, USA Jonathan Wolff, Professor of Political Philosophy, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, UK

Around the world there are challenges to the way we administer government. Some of these have to do with brute force that is backed by self-interest. However, there are those intrepid souls who think we are all better than this. This series of monographs and edited collections of original essays seeks to explore the very best way that governments can execute their sovereign duties within the sphere of ethically-based public policy that recognizes human rights and the autonomy of its citizens. Proposals to the series can include policy questions that are nationally or internationally situated. For example, regional migration from victims of war, terrorism, police integrity, political corruption, the intersection between politics and public health, hunger, clean water and sanitation, global warming, treatment of the “other” nationally and internationally, and issues of distributive justice and human rights. Proposals that discuss systemic changes in the structure of government solutions will also be considered. These include corruption and anti-corruption, bribery, nepotism, and effective systems design. Series benchmark: 110,000-150,000 words. Special books can be somewhat longer.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6234

Lara Hierro

Dividing Africa with Policy The Influence of the Union for the Mediterranean on the Unity and Security of Africa

Lara Hierro Department of Politics University of Johannesburg Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa

ISSN 1566-7669 Library of Public Policy and Public Administration ISBN 978-3-030-41301-9    ISBN 978-3-030-41302-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 2 Research Foundations������������������������������������������������������������������������������    7 3 Theoretical Framework��������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 4 EEC/EU Foreign Policy Towards the Mediterranean: Creating a Region������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   89 5 Declarations and Process: Keeping (Institutional) Memory Alive in the Mediterranean������������������������������������������������������  119 6 Three for the Price of One: Dividing a Continent��������������������������������  145 7 Resilience Assessment Part One ������������������������������������������������������������  201 8 Resilience Assessment Part Two ������������������������������������������������������������  255 9 Syntheses of Findings������������������������������������������������������������������������������  315 10 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  335 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  341

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About the Author

Lara Hierro  is a former postdoctoral research fellow at the NRF Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa. She holds a post-graduate diploma in international studies from Rhodes University, South Africa; an MA in international relations from the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa; and a DLitt et Phil in political studies from UJ. Her research areas include EU foreign policy towards Africa (particularly the Joint Africa-EU Strategy), and the Union for the Mediterranean, international relations and complexity studies.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1  Introduction There is a resurgence in anti-western sentiment and calls for decolonisation in parts of Africa 60 years after independence. These form the basis of the assertion of all and anything “African” as being better than “Western”. Universities across Africa are being asked to incorporate African authors into their courses. Where once there was a “Western” philosophy, philosophers are being asked to reconsider the African approaches to the same phenomena; teaching methods are being reworked to eliminate “western” methods of pedagogy and assessment. The decline in popularity of all things “Western” in Africa – and among its diaspora  – has much to do with the dissatisfaction associated with the perceived European failure to assist in the development of Africa and African countries. This has manifested as the negative perception of external values, and their imposition on African ones. While it may be easy to see this renewed rejection of everything Western as political knee-jerking, it is also just as easy to appreciate why these narratives in African-European history have become prominent at this time and are worth a deeper appraisal. The European Union (EU) as the representative of Europe often bears the brunt of these resentments, even as the EU attempts to strengthen ties with Africa and the individual countries it considers strategic. The cross-cutting structural relations that emerge from this external engagement add to the sense of overwhelming the African continent, and also the idea of “Africans” as a unifying concept. The multiplicity of overlapping EU foreign policy frameworks in Africa, the Middle-East and the Caribbean countries have created what appears to be a one-way agendum when compared to African struggles for unity and the development of its own continental institutions, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the African Union (AU) in 2002. In addition, these partnerships, agreements, and treaties have actually only added to perceptions of neo-colonialism, especially where the ideals of the partnerships – often to create peace, security, and p­ rosperity – © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_1

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have failed. Moreover, it is apparent that structural inequalities, the kind promoted by a neoliberal ideology and exported through EU foreign policy relations, reinforce the undoing of a more equitable distribution of resources and only serve to uphold the status quo. Peace, security and prosperity are perpetuated still, only for a minority, but now it has become apparent that these same inequalities are being replicated in African countries. The recent EU treatment of migrating waves of people from Africa and the Middle East has only contributed to the lessening of African opinion towards the European representative institution. The large number of policy frameworks, partnerships, and initiatives in EU foreign policy towards Africa, furthermore, have overlapped and simultaneously reinforced separation and individualisation between African regions, and are perceived to have contributed to the dilution of an African identity or (w)holistic voice. One such policy framework is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) established in 2007 by the then French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy. The UfM was the latest in a long line of policy frameworks towards the Mediterranean yet was presented as “fresh” and “improved” at the time. However, the political impetus behind this relaunching and in conjunction with others such as the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) initiated in 2005, the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership (2006/2007), and the EU-Sahel Strategy (2011), have formed a surrounding referential environment and context for African international relations to co-evolve and survive. The UfM has therefore in particular reinforced a Mediterranean identity distinct from an African one, constructing a de facto divide between North Africa and “the rest of Africa”. In forging such an enclave in the North of Africa and re-casting those states as “Mediterranean”, the EU’s UfM is one framework among many seen to be undermining the ideal of African unity, identity, and independence from the outside, an external interference in Africa’s internal political, economic, and ecological affairs. This work will look specifically at the EU’s UfM and how that framework has contributed towards the fragmentation of “Africa” as an idealised unified whole, and how it has contributed to calls for separation from the “West” in ideological terms, popularised as renewed calls for African nationalism, and “decolonisation”. Given the apparently increasing hostility towards Europe, research into the influences of EU policy, as embodied in the UfM, is timely. This may give a more objective appraisal of the underlying issues seen to be threatening unity and security in Africa. The complexity of these interactions as described above, are not localised in temporal or spatial scales, either horizontally or vertically organised; there are certain interdependent variables that have been cumulative across such scales. Within this interdependency there emerges nonlinear behaviour making the links between disintegrating African unity, insecurity, a “second wave” of decolonisation, African nationalism, isolation and rejection of all things “western” appear counterintuitive. It is because of these complexities that a complex systems theory has been adopted as the theoretical framework to explain the connections.

1.3  The Panarchy

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1.2  Aims and Objectives of the Book There are several objectives of this research that are integrated, mutually reinforcing, and are not limited to addressing the issues identified in the title. The title in many aspects is used as a figurative “springboard” for wider aims and objectives. It is the premise of this work to investigate the extent and influence of cross-scale multiple interactions characteristic of a hierarchically ordered set of nested complex adaptive systems (CAS), otherwise known as a panarchy, here specified to be the EU-Africa policy-complex comprising the EU, the UfM policy framework, and the countries that makes up the UfM together. The latter policy-complex would appear to be altering conceptions of African unity and inter-related issues of security, the basis of pan-African identity, strength, institutionalism, and independent policy-­ making capacity not only at the continental level in the AU, but also in African regional, national, and sub-national socio-ecological systems (SESs).

1.3  The Panarchy Panarchy, as the name suggests, is both all-encompassing (pan), and posits an “anarchic” view of systems (Holling et al. 2002: 74), properties that can be observed in the contemporary international or globalised system. These properties may further encompass qualities of interconnectedness and multiple feedbacks from many possible overlapping scales. Holling and Gunderson (2002) draw on the concept of the SES, which is the fusing of natural and human (economic, social, cultural, political, and technological) systems, to complement their “heuristic model of change” (2002: 25), making it applicable to long-term sustainable evolution. Taken as a whole, the SES is an integrated concept that engenders the possibility of balanced and equitable approaches to planetary sustainable development and evolution. The idea of nested sets of SESs, qualitatively complex and adaptive, as described by a panarchy, is not restricted in either time or space: different spatial scales develop at different rates (Holling and Gunderson 2002). Panarchies can therefore exist within panarchies. Due to their nested or inter-connected nature both complexity and adaptation impact across the entire panarchy, and at certain points have the ability to create qualitative change – to either degrade, destroy, innovate, or recreate for example. The transformation process is described by Holling and Gunderson through “adaptive cycles”, where the system evolves through four phases: those of exploitation (“r”), conservation (“K”), release (“Ω”), and reorganisation (“α”) (2002: 25), and then back to exploitation/ “r”. (This is discussed in detail in Sects. 3.5 and 3.6. of Chap. 3) Change and transformation within (and across) the systems are due to three identified properties that change in value over the lifetime of the adaptive cycle (Holling and Gunderson, 2002). These are resilience (the amount of disruption a system can

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take before it undergoes change); potential (human, social, or material capital); and connectedness (the tightness of the systems internal organisation that gives it the ability to resist or “modulate” external influences) (Gotts 2007; Holling and Gunderson 2002: 32–40). The properties and the interactions between and across the cycles can therefore explain seemingly paradoxical events, such as persistent structural inequalities in spite of contrived intervention (for example collective action or regional responses to collective problem solving). The complexity and range of factors encompassed in this research – geography, regions, institutions, and policies – can be examined within this framework. Together with panarchy as a suitable visual and structural concept, General Systems Theory (GST) as a theoretical background is ideally suited to understand the structures and processes of the contemporary world, which are essentially non-linear in their relations: modern day SESs and their evolution are now more than ever dependent on how the physical environment is approached and future resources are managed; they can no longer be approached from fixed ideas of structure or independent processes. Overall, this research approaches the understanding of complex phenomena informed by the paradigm of the “system”, that is to say how sub-parts work in relation to a larger “whole” to create emergent or further unique behaviour. The added value, however, concerns how the application of panarchy as a concept of a nested set of interrelated CASs can contribute to understanding and conceptualising said interactions, specifically as it relates to self-learning and evolution; why and how paradoxes exist and are maintained; how institutions1 transform the way they do; and why ineffective institutions persist in SESs. By applying such a systems paradigm to IR, the study will show how, where, and when, and indeed if any influence exists between traditional units of interests in International Relations – that is to say structural concepts such as the state, and non-­ state actors for example, international organisations, regional organisations, non-­ governmental organisations, and other (informal) transnational groups. It investigates the extent and influence of cross-scale multiple interactions characteristic of nested CASs, or a panarchy, as already defined as the EU-Africa policy-complex. Further objectives of this research are advocatory, drawing awareness to the interconnectivity of human and natural systems and the relevance of (w)holism to planetary sustainability rather than human centred approaches or those that focus on one or two systems (for example, socio-economic or political economy) at a time. In addition, through advocacy and awareness, the further aim is to generate transformation in how resources and their use are conceptualised. It is hoped that this research, through drawing attention to these relationships, that policy or issue formulation, attitudes, and the way in which policy is made, will be part of the decolonisation process, or at least transform in a way that is more participatory and reflective of those whom it affects directly. In this sense, the research aims to be both “pure” (theoretical) and “applied”.  Institutions will refer to both formal (associated with organisations and legal codes) and informal structure that guide human behavior, such as rules, norms, principles of relations, engagement, and procedures defining decision-making processes. Both will be approached from a system’s perspective, their organisation referring to the governing relations and their compositional arrangement. 1

References

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1.4  Structure of the Book An overview of the literature of complexity theory, in particular panarchy, in the field of international relations is presented in Chap. 2. It will also outline the methodology and methods of the research. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework used in this research, GST and the concept of panarchy; complex adaptive systems, and the adaptive cycle. Chapter 4 presents the historical creation and regionalisation of the Mediterranean that began with the transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and its enlargement. Traditionally the Mediterranean proper included the Sea-states such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, but was re-drawn in policy once these countries joined the EEC/European Communities (EC). EEC/EC foreign policy as a result transformed in relation to its internal and external restructuring, and continued to do so over time, first through the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), then the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and Barcelona Process. Chapter 5 will concentrate on the aftermath of the regionalisation process, detailing the Barcelona Process of 1995; its follow-up Work Programme of 2005 and conferences; and the launching of the UfM in 2008, which involved the condensing of the previous Process framework and a reformative institutional structure meant to redress imbalances and concerns of the member states. Chapter 5 also highlights the institutional design and normative quality, identified as neoliberal, of the established Barcelona acquis and subsequently the quality of selection pressures framed in the agreement. The JAES is discussed briefly, also, along with its relevance to the UfM. Chapters 7 and 8 introduce and apply the Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners 2.0 to the systems comprising North Africa and the Middle East, the Mediterranean as it stands in EU foreign policy conceptions in the UfM, and its physical, geographically inherited delineations as “states”. The analysis is done both from the EU perspective and as constructed by the Mediterranean member states. A Synthesis of Findings is presented in Chap. 9, with Conclusions presented in Chap. 10.

References Gotts, Nicholas M. 2007. Resilience, Panarchy, and world-systems analysis. Ecology and Society 12 (1). Holling, C.S., and L.H.  Gunderson. 2002. Resilience and Adaptive Cycles. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H.  Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Holling, C.S., L.H.  Gunderson, and G.D.  Peterson. 2002. Sustainability and Panarchies. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press.

Chapter 2

Research Foundations

2.1  Introduction As recently as the early 2000s, talking about the EU having a foreign policy per se, was considered misleading: the mere idea of the EU having a purposeful vision and coherent ideas about how to relate with other institutions, groups of states or states, was contentious, mainly due to the structural organisation of the EU at the time.1 This is in spite of Policy for Coherence and Development (PCD) having made its way into EU strategic planning as a bone fide concept and institutional aim in 1992, as well as the many (historical) attempts on the part of the EEC/EU’s to direct, control, and unify its objectives in its external relations. What occupied analysts and researchers of international relations rather was the institution itself, and the processes that took place within the EU in order to arrive at policies, their aims and objectives for the mutual interests of all member states. These processes were seen as problematic, and as such, an area of inquiry for those interested in Europe studies, and international organisations. It was a period in African IR and elsewhere, of an EU-centrism and obsession, driven to some extent by its institutional obliqueness at the time and the conundrum it presented to those who wished to unearth its procedural “secrets”. That the EU continues to present a mystery as to its workings for the vast European public, can still be claimed as recently as 2016 with the Brexit referendum: the general public in the UK has been held hostage to a broad ignorance of the EU of which it has been a member since 1982.2 1  See Smith, H. 2002. European Foreign Policy: What it is and what it Does. Pluto Press; Still, contemporarily, this is in dispute. See Szalai, P. 2019. There is no real ‘European foreign policy’, says former EU diplomat. EurActiv online 14 June. 2  It was widely reported the day after the referendum vote that the most searched for phrase (according to Google Trends) on the internet was “What is the EU.” While this has been contested as being directly correlated to ignorance, other surveys and opinion polls have since confirmed a strikingly poor understanding of the EU, its institutions, and what it meant to be a part of it (and subsequently

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_2

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What was almost always overlooked and discounted, however, were the summations of those decisions, the influence of those trade agreements, those singled-out issue-areas of focus and what effect they had on the EU’s external partners, i.e. the rest of the world, and how they perceived these policies together with their outcomes. This could be intuited to have been due to the restrictive nature of the theoretical frameworks popular at the time  – and still today  – that saw the world in zero-sum terms, easily identifiable actors, and the various structured (and quantifiable) terms of engagement thereafter. This external dimension, this emergent parallel-twin foreign policy, is rarely understood or considered independently of whatever kind of internal dynamics that happen within organisations like the EU, as its foreign policy. At this point in our history, a complexity approach in IR affords us the vision to see things from within and from without; between parts and its relation to the whole, and between the external environment as dynamic, interdependent processes. Whatever the kind of intention set by those giving direction or life to policy from (state or collective) interests, the emergent behaviour or sum of effects may very well be something entirely different, as experienced by those on the receiving end in the external environment, here designated external to the EU. This realisation may well be the result of increasing complexity in the international system, but also much to do with the global South’s increasing participation in, and connection to, global issues and politics; the necessity of taking their interests, foreign policy objectives, as well as their concerns vis a vie the results of the EU’s foreign policy they have experienced, into consideration. Drawing on this observation, the methodological approach herein takes as a starting point that knowledge is socially constructed and in many ways a “moving target”, being structurally referential and dynamic. From this viewpoint the CAS presents itself as the ideal conceptual basis for understanding international relations and its actors, with the SES as the natural alternative to regionalism, and state driven administration and governance. The conceptual framework that appears in this Chapter presents the key terms that are important to the overall study, delivering an alternative prism through which to view Africa-EU relations. This Chapter proceeds with a review of the theoretical literature concerning complexity approaches in IR, and sets out the methodology, methods, and conceptual framework (key terms) deemed important in the ensuing theoretical framework used in the analysis in the rest of the book.

what gains or disadvantages there were on leaving in the short and long term). Buchanan, T. 2019. Brexit behaviourally: lessons learned from the 2016 Referendum. Mind and Society 18:13–31; Carl N., 2019. Are Leave Voters less Knowledgeable about the EU than Remain Voters? In 2019. Brexit and Public Opinion. According to one journalist, asking the general (uniformed) public, to vote on whether or not Britain should leave the EU was like “asking a six-year old to perform delicate brain surgery with a crayon.” English, O. 2019. The British Public Still Don’t Know What they voted for, and it’s not elitist to admit it. The Independent [online] January 22. Gilbert, D., 2016. No, Britons Were Not Frantically Googling ‘What Is The EU?’ Hours After Brexit Vote. International Business Times [online], June 27.

2.2 The Devil in the Detail: Missing the Links in IR Theory

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2.2  The Devil in the Detail: Missing the Links in IR Theory While much research and theory have addressed and focused on the established main subject units of international relations such as states and non-state actors (NSAs), and processes such as decision making, policy-framing and making, not many have tried to incorporate all aspects within a general theoretical framework, or tried to reframe them within a larger philosophical (ontological and epistemological) understanding. This is perhaps not surprising. To do so would be to contest the accepted roles that states, institutions, and NSAs play, and accepted interpretations of relationships (multilateralism and bilateralism for example) that the field has come to rely on since its inception as a subject area of study in 1919 (Schmidt 2002). It is generally accepted that the global world structure has moved towards greater complexity (even as we appear to be seeing a contraction away from international regimes and multilateralism – this is in fact just a reordering) and new understandings, explanations of the particular and recurring events (patterns or “regimes”3) are required, along with alternative concepts and paradigms to assist. Explanations provided by traditional4 approaches in IR theory have not been able to adequately address the fast-moving, international context, with each apparently filling the gap where the other stops short. Further, it cannot be expected that analyses can more accurately depict the contemporary world, and provide further understanding, if basic concepts such as “the state”, or “international organisation” for example, remain unchallenged or untouched by alternative readings of the international system. Africa/EU/Africa relations will always be constrained by the same dynamics unless they are seen from an alternative perspective.5 The concept of the socio-ecological system (SES) is one such concept that is a natural alternative to the state. It refers to the combination of the social, cultural, political, economic, technological and ecological (ecosystem services) that make up 3  Regimes in the study of complex adaptive systems and their resilience are patterns of disturbance over time. These can take place either internally or externally to the focal system. Disturbance regimes are discussed in more detail in Chaps. 7 and 8. See Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners. 2010. Assessing Resilience in Socio-ecological Systems: Workbook for Practitioners. Version 2.0, p.15. 4  Traditional theories in IR here refer to those based on rationalist approaches to the study of international relations. These include a wide range of theories but in particular Realism, Rational Choice, Rational Choice Institutionalism, evolutionary game theory, microeconomic theory, liberalism, and what has been called the “neo-neo synthesis” – neorealism and neoliberalism. Waever, O., 1996 cited in Schmidt, B.C., 2002. On the History and Historiography of International Relations, in Carlsnaes, W. et al., (Eds) 2002. Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publications. 5  Bell describes the beginnings of IR theory as being “bound up with imperial projects” and goes on to point out that the field has remained chained and constrained by initial parameters of “autonomous states under conditions of ‘anarchy’”. Bell, D., 2013. Ideologies of Empire. In Freeden, M., et al. (Eds.) 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version] Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.537.

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a distinct unit tethered to and controlled primarily by its ecological components. It is not delimited by political, arbitrary boundaries, and the ensuing processes operate extra statum (outside of the State) and any (other) politically imposed regional structures. The SES construct runs counter to other concepts, such as regions and the study of formal integration (regionalism), as well as the popular understanding of resilience within these confines. The idea that there exist processes that operate outside of the state structure, together with the dismantling of formal regionalised boundaries implied above, are two of the most controversial worldview perspectives within the social sciences (Olsson et al. 2016), and in particular it is surmised here in international relations, as they challenge the relevance of the State in real-time. A generalised epistemological framework that is able to show understanding of the role that diverse actors may play across spatial and temporal scales, as well as explain both static and dynamic processes of the kind already described in the Introduction above, would transform the established understanding of knowledge, how knowledge is created, and subsequently our understanding of the international world “order” as it has stood. It is in some respects to be expected that complexity approaches that challenge the usefulness of these basic concepts in IR have largely, until recently, been marginalised. It is also to be expected that at times, in the attempt to incorporate complex arrangements and theories thereof into the mainstream IR theoretical cannon, some hybridity has occurred between complexity and rationalism, within which a large part of IR theories have their foundations. Much of what has ensued by way of analyses can be interpreted as in mitigation of dismantling the aforementioned traditional understandings outright, however. The hybrid application of complexity/ rationalism nonetheless, ends up confusing vocabulary, concepts, and analysis, as well as weakening the case for complexity sciences’ wider use in the subject area and matters of IR. While a rational perspective may be appropriate to simple or closed systems with controlled, controllable, or perfectly measurable components, natural or physical systems together with their resources on which growth and development (and on which ultimately institutional survival) are dependent, are not. As a result, much of the subsequent theorising is irrelevant to a contemporary world-system that is and has been recognised as one that is increasingly complex (Rosenau 2003: 3); one where the world system is acknowledged to be made up of and subject to non-linear processes and interactions across spatial and temporal scales. An issue that appears to have held the focus of a large part of theoretical thinking within IR is a fixation on individuation and specialisation  – an emphasis on the uniqueness of the relations between states and other international actors, and not on how to conceptualise, in theoretical terms, the connections between them. This is perhaps largely to do with the pervasiveness of liberal and neoliberal ideology and terminology (neoliberalisation) as it coincided with the emergence of IR as a discipline, and has been dispersed throughout multiple disciplines, something that Varoufakis has referred to as the “econobubble” in academia (discussed in more detail in Sect. 2.3.1), which elevates individualism, unique “talents”, and competition selecting “the best” entity, actor, or outcome to emerge.

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This loyalty to uniqueness has been carried over into Resilience Studies, an emerging area of focus in the study of CASs as they apply to political, economic, or social systems. Within this literature, resilience is treated in isolation as a system quality. The concept of resilience in GST and CASs however, is in relation to Gunderson and Holling’s adaptive cycle (2002). It is therefore relative to the qualities of potential and connectedness. The quality of specialisation/uniqueness is carried further: according to mainstream Resilience Studies, the definition of resilience changes according the discourse and practice. A number of definitions of resilience thereafter emerge.6 While each system is indeed unique and the observations of resilience in systems may differ in kind, allowing for the definitions of resilience to change as a result weakens the theoretical underpinning of resilience as an abstract concept. A definition of resilience, if it is to take on the significance as a theoretical tool, needs to be independent of the specifics of a system and be applicable across disciplines (and therefore systems). Gunderson and Holling (2002) in their core work on transformation and change in human and natural systems refer and apply only one, general definition of resilience, in this regard that applies to all CASs. The same propensity to find many competing singularities (or individualities) is not exclusive to the abstract realms of complexity theory’s application in IR specifically, but also found in the wider, more practical context of international data indices, which in the course of this particular book presented problems for tracking authentic change over time. (This is discussed in more detail in Chap. 9) Critical and key variables that were identified for the panarchy were not consistently defined by the international indices over the timeline of study. As a result it became difficult to track their values. In effect, each change in definition created an apparent new system and along with it a false sense of transformation and dynamism (false “economies” of renewal).

6  Three broad categories of resilience exist within this literature: a) where the system returns to its original state after some interaction; b) where the change after the interaction is “marginal”; and c) where the system adapts after the interaction and yet is able to retain its form an overall function (this latter type is sometimes referred to as “socio-ecological resilience”. See Bourbeau, P. (2013). Resiliencism: Premises and promises in securitization research. Resilience: International Policies, Practices, and Discourses, 1(1), 3–17; Chandler D., and Coaffee, J., (2016) Introduction. In Chandler, D., and Coaffee, J., (Eds.) (2016). The Routledge Handbook of International Resilience. [e-book epub version] London: Routledge. Retrieved from https://blackwells.co.uk/; Adger, W. N. (2000). Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Progress in Human Geography, 24(3), 347–364; Handmer, J.W. and Dovers, S.  R. (1996). A Typology of Resilience: Rethinking Institutions for Sustainable Development. Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 9(4), 482–511. However, all three are different aspects of the one overall property: that after some interaction, the system is still largely recognizable as itself. It is important to note that this particular observation is essentially independent of the details of the system, and is as a consequence of the CAS evolving through its adaptive cycle. Hence the system may emerge resilient after the collapse in any one of three categories mentioned.

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It would appear then that the preoccupation with finding unique qualities is endemic in global “think”, from methodology to methods, and has far reaching (and constraining) effects on global development and governance. The emphasis on specialisation and niche roles is problematic in a systems approach and thinking. If the study and observation of dynamic systems, like the complex adaptive system, shows anything, it is that the more specialised an actor (or species in the case of an ecosystem) in one function is, the more likely it is to become extinct. Likewise, if the CAS depends only on one actor to provide a unique “function”, there is a high probability that the CAS itself will degrade, and affect other CASs that are either nested or interconnected to it. The more flexible and adaptive, the more diverse the skills and able the actor/species is to perform multiple functions across scales (and this includes over time scales), the more likely it – and its panarchies – are to survive. Recent attempts at tackling “the complex” in international relations include inter-organisational approaches and international regime complexity or IRC. Inter-organisational approaches include those that draw on a variety of disciplines, including aspects of evolutionary studies, and look at more than one organisation to form “complexity”, yet still rely on rational choice to form the basis of understanding relationships between them. Inter-organisational approaches may look at the interactions between two or three organisations (Koops 2013: 72), and apply inter-disciplinary approaches and concepts from evolutionary studies (functional niches, for example) and resource dependency in order to draw attention to the particular kind of relationship that may exist between them (Brosig 2014). While the concentration on a few organisations and their particular dependency forms an interesting point of study, the limited focus does not illuminate the entire picture, nor does it situate it in the wider international system. Inter-organisational approaches such as these miss much of the complexity, based as they are on a linear logic and minimal sets of institutions and their traditionally viewed horizontal and vertical interactions (Koops 2013). Much of the latter has resulted in an instrumentalist, rational (institutionalist) reading due in no small part to borrowed vocabulary or hybridised conceptualised understandings in its application. The idea of “functional overlapping” within this school of thought for example, as it applies to multiple institutions, refers to their performing similar or the same function in a connected set of institutional arrangements or “niches” (Brosig 2014), is seen as an inefficiency. Within GST, the understanding of functional overlapping here is essential and necessary to the (resilience) survival of the overall system: the true relevance of the structural relationship both within and to other interconnected systems is missed. Other contributions to the field of international relations theory have focussed in particular on regime complexes (Alter and Meunier 2009) and international regime complexity (IRC). IRC in particular, acknowledges complex arrangements of a mixture of organised components (units – states, actors, regimes and so on) in international relations, but then positions both a fixed (and limited)  set of structural arrangements (overlapping, parallel, and nested arrangements), and hence limited

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interactions, and rational choice at the heart of these “complex” arrangements (forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and strategic (in)consistency) to manage and explain behaviour. The limitations outlined above do not allow for a fuller understanding of what constitutes a complex system as given in the literature. The result, in that case, is a mixture of social science and a superficial understanding of complexity science, which then cannot provide measureable outcomes, or form the basis for policy development. Any resulting analyses are at best anecdotal accounts of the interactions between preconceived systems in international relations. The Resilience Alliance’s Assessing Resilience in Socio-Ecological Systems: Workbook for Practitioners 2.0 (RAWP), however, provides such a scientific approach, with systematic steps to track change and transformation (and the processes of dynamic equilibrium) that is measurable, between identified complex adaptive systems, over temporal and spatial scales, and is presented in Chaps. 7 and 8. Details of the Assessment are to be found in those chapters. Rational choice and rationality within the realms of complexity, or any kind of theorising that seeks to deal with complexity, is a double-edged sword. Early theorists of GST have stringently avoided considering any contemplation of complex systems at least, as rational (Angyal 1941; Feibleman and Friend 1945). Bringing in this quality is to attribute conscious action and directed behaviour to “things” that cannot, and the ensuing analysis is often a repetition of what has gone before with “the old school” theories. While it is true that social systems and, to a certain degree, physical systems are thought of, conceptualised, and attempted to be managed or even controlled by humans, complex systems are not centrally controlled in any meaning of the phrase. This has presented social scientists with a problem, especially when confronting the SES, which is a mixture of both social and physical systems, a combination that most complexity and IRC proponents specifically avoid in their considerations. Critics of the SES and its incorporation into the study of international relations tend to focus on the difficulty of deriving any policy making or direction from it, citing a lack of practical means to derive observations, prediction and outcomes. To focus on the SES in such practical terms as being deficient is to miss its value as a paradigm in understanding complexity in international relations: as theorists and practitioners of IR, the introduction of the SES as a concept is primarily needed to shift our current thinking from one that focuses on social or physical systems in isolation or as separated entities when it comes to making policies. Its introduction into mainstream policy making and literature as a primary unit of analysis should be considered as the very first step to changing the way we think about (resource) governance and sustainability under conditions of complexity. In addition, theories that emphasise resource dependency only serve to strengthen the link between natural (renewable, and increasingly non-renewable) resources and material growth, much of which is further constrained by traditional measures of development and wealth, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is conceptually attached to it (Fioramonti 2013). GDP is now more than ever recognised as an inappropriate reflection of wealth, but yet one that has become entrenched and normalised in global development literature; it is still used widely and persistently

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(2013). Much of this association has come about from the influences of environmental studies, observations on climate change, and a still-prevalent Malthusian logic of scarcity (2013). The combination of resource dependency as a theoretical framework, together with “the politics of GDP” (2013), have contributed towards skewed perceptions of livelihood and well-being that equate materialism, quantity, and controllable outcomes with human development and sustainable well-being (2013). It is an imbalanced perspective non conducive to the realities of a complex and non-linear international system. As regards the literature on relations between the EU and the Mediterranean/ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) non-EU member states, this has focused on evaluating the Partnership’s performance in comparison to its original aims, which were (and still are) to establish peace (through trade), security (both soft and hard interpretations), and overall “structural stability” (Aliboni 2005) through democratic governance and the observance of human rights (Aliboni 2005; Cavatorta and Rivetti 2014: 620). Further studies have looked at how the EEC/EU relates externally in terms of bilateralism, multilateralism, or normative or materialistic projections of power, and  – as raised previously  – at the EEC/EU’s internal dynamics (individual states and interests versus the EU as a whole) (Cavatorta and Rivetti 2014). The methodological approach and choice of methods in this study, however, will be able to review both internal and external relations simultaneously.

2.3  Methodology: Knowledge and Strategies of Inquiry The methodological approach herein came from an original hypothesis that the EU’s UfM was undermining attempts at African institutional goals and security defined as generalised resilience of African SESs. Several hypotheses ensued, most notably that the EU’s integrationalism (see Sect. 2.4.7) – its own specific methodological approach to external relations – was being duplicated at different levels, with different groups of states. Proceeding from these hypotheses, it was necessary to firstly evaluate the presence of any influence on African institutions, specifically as regards Unity (its understanding in Pan-Africanism, African institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union), and security; both the quality of integrationalism and its degree of influence. Further, to find an explanation and – more importantly – an understanding, the process of both exploring and testing the hypotheses, led to a second dimension of explaining (how the influence is occurring), and consequentially understanding how the influence was enacted. The combined aspects of the research favoured the adoption of a methodological approach in-tune with an appropriate theoretical and conceptual framework, and a wide variety of methods unrestricted by either quantitative or qualitative prescriptions. The methodological approach is a pragmatic mixture of both positivism and social constructivism (sometimes referred to as interpretivism), that is to say a post-­ positivistic perspective. More than this, methodologically it is specifically the philo-

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sophical (ontological and epistemological) view that reality and the creation of knowledge are dynamic, structural (positional), and referential. The construction of reality and knowledge is as such a moving target, that is to say the search for truth and knowledge is dependent on a structural, referential logic that is unfixed and evolving; it is dependent on both the experienced (internal) and observed (external). From this perspective, the methodological approach adopted herein contains the foundational thinking of the GST framework, more specifically “systems science”, and in particular dynamical systems theory (von Bertalanffy 1972: 414). This foundation is used to understand and explain general International Relations concepts and constructs (or units of analysis such as states and international organisations, and a newer unit of analysis, the SES) under study here in this research, as well as their interactions. In this sense GST provides a philosophical perspective, including ontology, epistemology, values, and rhetoric (Cresswell 2003: 6). As a methodology, however, it is perhaps more appropriate to talk of systems thinking or a systems approach within which panarchy is an associated theoretical construct.

2.3.1  M  ethods: Data Type, Analysis Techniques, and Applied Concepts As indicated in the previous section, the methods undertaken herein are neither purely quantitative nor qualitative: quantitative data, after all, have to be interpreted and qualitative information must be structured in a transparent and verifiable manner, the latter aspects in keeping with a stricter scientific method. It is in this way that data or information have been approached, incorporating both an inductive (subjective) and deductive (quantitative) platform. It is this combination that also sets this approach apart from others, which attempt purely qualitative or purely quantitative (computational) analyses of international relations. Primary and secondary information have been gathered and reviewed. The primary sources of information used are policy documents as a reflection of institutional or collective interests, and non-attributable interviews. The interviews were deliberately kept unstructured and questions open ended to allow for a naturalistic flow of information and personal insights on the topic area. The interviewees who were chosen, were considered to be interested parties (or stakeholders) in the subject area, and who also held representative political positions. While the interviews have provided much insight, their overall import has functioned in a cumulative manner in conjunction with other information already outlined in this section, providing further layers of information. Secondary sources used are peer-reviewed articles, specialist literature on EEC/EU relations with North Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, and reports published by internationally recognised sources such as the United Nations (UN) and its institutions (FAO, AQUASTAT, UNESCO), other regional development bodies or issue-area advocacy groups (Action Aid, for example, or the United Kingdom’s Department for International

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Development (DFID); international specialised organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA); and international financial organisations (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB). The motivation for using the resilience assessment here is twofold: the first serves to evaluate the usefulness of such a systematised approach in International Relations, using formal constitutive documents (as in the case of the UfM), academic literature, and global reports published by recognised international or regional institutions. These include, for example, reports and studies published by the aforementioned range of established and canonised institutions, and non-attributable interviews to identify main or key issues of the overall system. In lieu of using groups of multi-level stakeholders as advocated in the practice of Adaptive Governance (AG) and the RAWP, for the primary panarchy under study here it has been considered more logistically appropriate to use the aforementioned cited sources. The assessment framework is ideally suited to smaller scale areas, such as localised communities and catchment areas, yet it can be applied regionally, and inter-regionally to formal and informal structures and processes (Berge and van Laerhoven 2011), as has been done here. The second reason for using the assessment (in conjunction with the RAWP) has been for the focus it has provided on applying theory in[to] practice, and its framework of analysis incorporating the concept of panarchy. Not withstanding its use of resource dependency (the limitations of which are dealt with further in Chap. 9) as part of the Assessment, as a framework, it may be an invaluable tool in gathering a deeper knowledge of the “Mediterranean” and the influence of its conceptual separation on the rest of Africa in terms of Unity and security, as well as more generally on the interrelated processes in other areas of the international system. Comparative literary analyses of the policy documents concerned (the JAES Summit and Declarations 2007–2017, Action Plans 2008–2010 and 2011–2013, the constitutive documents of the UfM including the Barcelona Declaration and the 2005 Work Programme) have been made in order to establish inconsistencies, changes in perspectives and policy towards Africa; as well as comparisons of issue areas between the Mediterranean and the “rest of Africa” – i.e. all African countries outside of this policy delineation and as members of the AU. This was done primarily to compare treatment between the two EU policy-conceptualised regions (the Mediterranean/UfM and Africa/JAES) with the ultimate goal of highlighting any competitive or divisive processes brought about by what has been identified as EU structural development ideology, and as such the influence on the institution and concept of African Unity. The influence of the processes of competition and division on African unity is addressed by conceptualising the regions and policies as CASs within a panarchy. While strictly speaking an emphasis is placed on analysing EU policy discourse and not its implementation in the traditional sense, the theoretical framework and the application of the RAWP deal with observed cross-scale interactions, change drivers, and other inter-institutional or inter-SES dynamics may be taken to be the influences or the results of implementation of said policy discourse; reviewed literature on European/UfM relations and interviews illustrate this.

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The influence of the UfM on security in Africa is however approached from a different perspective: that of overall system resilience. Resilience herein is defined as the measure of disturbance a system can take before transforming from one state into another system state that is qualitatively different (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Resilience therefore becomes central to interpreting the qualitative sustainability of the system(s), the panarchy, and the concept of security. What has been recognised during the undertaking of this research is that there are two panarchies that interact and overlap, but rather than reinforcing resilience as would be the case in imbricated redundancy, these panarchies consist of opposing sets of values. This, in the short and long term, may be detrimental to “African interests”. It has also become apparent that these panarchies may not be hierarchically ordered as the structural arrangement proposed by Gunderson and Holling, but more in tune with a shifting, fluid structure reminiscent of the multiple dynamic processes, whose directions are not confined to logical ordering, but based on changing dynamics and self-ordered goal directedness. However, it may be viewed hierarchically in terms of a system in a phase space, or as a static view of the system. The first and primary set of interrelated SESs (social, cultural, political, technological, and natural or physical systems), which are the focus of this research, are identified as the EU, the UfM as a concept of the Mediterranean both in policy and application, and the physical North African and Middle Eastern states. A second panarchy exists, parallel and in tandem to this conceptual/actualised structure, which is made up of African institutions and organisations. These are the AU, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the actual geographical and (inherited) conceptual delineations that make up African states currently.7 The two panarchies interact through international relations and policy frameworks such as the JAES and the UfM, forming an interdependent, and at times independent, fluid arrangement between states, non-state actors, policies and regions (both sub-­ regional and ‘international regional’) (Calleya 2005).8 The objective of using an applied framework has also been to test the viability of a structured and formalised approach in International Relations, and more specifically, larger geographical areas and conceptual arenas such as multiple policy 7  Africa and the AU are considered this way, as part of a whole panarchy, due to its standing in international relations and specifically in policy both internally and externally: The concept of “Africa” is relevant from this perspective, as it is has been pursued since the establishment of the OAU in 1963. 8  Stephan Calleya has defined very specific sub-regions and international regions in the EuroMediterranean area. The sub-regions in the Mediterranean are roughly the Middle East and North Africa (Mashreq and Maghreb); the “Middle East international region” includes both; the “Europe international region” is made up of EU states and Turkey. This book however, recognises the Middle East international region as being the Mediterranean region, based on EU foreign policy and its conceptualisation therein. Egypt, rather than being included in the Mashreq as per Calleya’s distinction, is considered to be part of North Africa, following an African geographical and institutional perspective. See Calleya, S.  C., 2005. Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 9–14.

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frameworks and multiple social systems (culture, economies, and political forms). From this perspective, assessing resilience has not only been for reasons of testing the overall elasticity or viability of the interrelated systems under study, but also for gaining understanding and further theoretical knowledge about whether such ­theories and concepts are feasible in the field, or when applied to real world dynamics and structures; it is used also to evaluate if GST/panarchies as a theory of integrated, structural, and positional relations can indeed explain perceived paradoxes or “distant proximities” (Rosenau 2003).

2.3.2  E  thical Implications of Applied Generalised Theory: Prediction Versus Systems Design or Systems Engineering A mention of resilience and system influence as a result of the theoretical application, would not be complete without acknowledging the capacity for resilience, resilience assessments, and the theoretical study of CASs to be applied in a manner unfavourable to the long-term sustainability and balanced/equitable distribution of resources (natural and human constructed), and growth. A tenet of systems theory is that it is almost impossible to predict with absolute certainty whether a system will transform or evolve in a particular fashion, with all its component parts and functions intact. This does not, however, stop interested parties from speculating and predicting futures based on what are often fanciful scenarios aimed at benefitting a politically interested minority. Recent years have seen the advent of studies dedicated to predicting and speculating on the futures or future trajectories of economic systems, financial markets, security, and transnational issues. More often than not it is dominant interest groups who have the financial capability and other resources to define a future or determine trends and pursue them in order to engineer desired outcomes. Like imposed or identified maladaptive schemata, the gap between people and the algorithms used by such futurists means that these mental models may not be conducive to any kind of adaptation or equitable, sustainable planetary evolution. In these futurist methodologies, computational or crude complexity is preferred. The dangers of modelling such futures becomes an issue of ethics and ethical behaviour, far removed from the communities involved who have no knowledge or direct input into the kind of future being defined or welcomed-in by a select-educated and moneyed few. The idealised projection of any CAS, such as the SES, is its adaptability and participative guidance. Who decides quality and values (equity and worth, for example) is a necessary component of any long-term system transformation. It is advocated that systems assessments and intervention or guidance, should be acknowledged as a participatory and iterative process, representative of a balance between majority’s interests and wishes that also takes into account minority needs

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and interests. This would perhaps necessitate decentralised management, yet with a shared (w)holistic vision of planetary well-being and direction, something that is missing from many nationalistic orientated ideologies. Much more than a balanced vision of the here and now, furthermore, a vision that extends beyond propinquity and arbitrary political boundaries into a future known in evolutionary literature and parlance as the “Long Now” (Brand 1999). This perhaps should be the starting point for any conceptualisation and study of a system or panarchy, and is the starting point from which the research herein is undertaken.

2.4  General Conceptual Framework 2.4.1  The (Classical Liberal and Neoliberal) State in Africa The State in Africa has a problematic history, both as an imported construct, and as proto-neoliberal harbinger of its values, concepts, and ultimately its divisive nature. Its presence as a construct in Africa has also been highlighted as a driver in the development of neoliberalism itself, as a response to the “first wave” of decolonisation (Slobodian 2018:147). The rise of classical liberalism as a body of socio-political thought coincided with direct or formal colonisation9 in the eighteenth century (Arneil 2012; Strakosch 2015; Williams 2018). The ideas (of labour, progress/civilisation/ democracy/backwardness), concepts (freedom/unfreedom, rationality/irrationality, democracy/authoritarianism) and language (rights) of later (modern) liberalism were used to justify and circumscribe the conditions of direct or structural colonisation, neo-colonialism, what Bell (2013) and Williams (2018) have referred to as a liberal imperialism to denote the continuity and far reaching effects, and Slobodian (2018) has called ordoglobalism10 (ordered or structured globalism), which for the purposes of this work is considered synonymous with neoliberalisation. While the basic structure and idea of the State has remained steeped in liberalism, the advent of the neoliberalism, at the beginning of the twentieth cen9  Strakosch refers to direct (presence of colonial actors) and indirect (by proxy or later, through various agreements or “treaty partners”) colonial rule, and structural colonisation to refer to the control over state institutions. Arneil refers to internal and external colonisation, the latter of “nonwestern peoples” who are or have been “subjected to the colonial power of a foreign power” and the internal to refer to the domestic colonisation of the poor or otherwise socially ostracised through Liberal socio-economic ideology. (Both the internal and the external kinds need to be analysed as part of one dialectical construct.) Strakosch, E., 2015. Neoliberal Colonialism. In, Strakosch, E. 2015. Neoliberal Indigenous Policy. London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 19; and Arneil. B., 2012. Liberal Colonialism, domestic Colonies and Citizenship. History of Political Thought. 33(3), p.493. 10  Taken from the German tradition of binding law and economics together, ordoliberalism. Slobodian 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 273.

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tury (Slobodian 2018), has made significant changes in the role of the State towards the people within its boundaries, and as it relates to other states in the international/ global sphere. The “roll-back” of the State’s role in redistribution of wealth and social justice, has been accompanied by a simultaneous enforcing of global structures, agreements, and codes (law) especially as it concerns international economics and finance, something found in abundance in the policy frameworks discussed in this work. Slobodian points to the progressive shoring up of the separation between “dominium” (property, ownership of “things”) and “imperium” (territorial states, rule of governments)11. The (neoliberal) State was – and has become – a structure of tight socio-ecological control, organising and dividing people within its “imaginary boundaries” between those that fall within liberal/neoliberal ideas of “capable”/ incapable (Arneil 2012), acceptable/unacceptable (Strakosch 2015). A superficial “nationalism” is maintained through the image of the “State” politically (dominium), yet undone through imperium/globally economically. These basic contradictions, however, are only the beginning of what can be traced to underlying liberal colonial ideas that routinely undermine social, economic, and political equality and cohesion within and between “states”, and regions in the world. These structural dynamics are entirely intentional and can be traced in the development of neoliberal thought (Slobodian 2018). The introduction of the colonial state in Africa brought with it the same kind of minimal structure of governance and liberal values that would be recognised as indicative of the likewise minimal neoliberal State much later (Bell 2013, 548–549). In addition, the colonial state and its mediators, in the form of colonial administrators and intermediaries (Ranger 1993), also brought with it “imagined” (Anderson 1983) identities, ethnicities, traditions (Ranger 1993; Bell 2013, 548), within state determined boundaries in an attempt to “divide and rule” (Ranger 1993; Bell 2013). The nature of liberal and neoliberal value systems has been documented to create the same kind of dynamics, exclusionary political and social policies (especially within states of previously externally colonised peoples) (Bell 2013; Strakosch 2015) and, as a result, fragmenting communities at different levels into “us” and “them” through these imagined different structural components12. While the State as a limited socio-ecological structure was indeed reaffirmed after independence in Africa, there were many attempts to run and organise them differently, based on various forms of African (national) socialism, Import Substitution Industrialisation and so on (see Chaps. 7 and 8). Yet, the external  Quite literally “a double government” provided by highly circumscribed roles of the State and global economy. The idea was to create a world constructed on “institutions of multi-tiered governance” protected from “democratic decision making.” Carl Schmitt, a former Nazi jurist and party member, is credited as giving neoliberals their vision of a global “non-state sphere” economy “permeating everything”, “over, under and beside the state-political borders.” See Slobodian, Q., 2018. pp. 260; 284. 12  Bell refers to “the modern social imaginary, in its imperial dimensions”, encoding “civilizational” or racial difference. Bell, D., 2012. Ideologies of Empire, In Freeden, M., et al. (Eds.) 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p.539. 11

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demands and surety of the global international system made it necessary to abandon these alternative models behind, however, as described in more detail in Chaps. 7 and 8. Decolonisation and national sovereignty, was at the time, seen as a threat to the neoliberal plan of global interdependence. The Swiss-based Mont Pelerin School13 (which included Freidrich Hayek, Ludwig on Misses, Wilhelm Ropke, and Micheal Heilperin and others that would go on to work in and with the WTO) (Slobodian 2018:204), dedicated to “ordering” the international world system, while recognising that structural colonisation (and in particular Apartheid in South Africa) had to end, were reticent to do so into the hands of governments of whom they were unsure would carry on the processes of neoliberal economic reform (Slobodian 2018). Old liberal colonial tropes and racial discrimination (arguments) were used to justify the resistance to decolonisation, with constitutional forms of democracy being the alternative to secure the freedom of capital, apropos the neoliberal prescript (Slobodian 2018). While the ideas of classical liberalism were used against colonisation (democracy, self-determination, and liberty) in the first wave of decolonisation in Africa (Strakosch 2015: 19; Bell 2013: 551), carrying the State as it was, forward, meant that the politics of division would still be inherent, as well as the mental models/ instruments of colonisation and eventual auto-arresting of the African SES. The pan-Africanist movement while a reaction to colonialism, cannot solely be seen to be based on a falsely premised understanding of unity, as has been proposed by some scholars who have drawn attention to the diversities of pre-colonial Africa and various imaginings and inventions for colonial ends (Ranger 1993). While the certainty of diverse political and social organisation in pre-colonial Africa is undeniable14 (Ehret 2002), the idea of Unity, as proposed herein is understood to have been a reaction to expelling colonisation and the perceived attempts at fragmenting African populations through displacements (the TAST, for example), and through the forms of “divide and rule” governance referred to above. While Unity in this context is still a valid call, it is comparable to having one arrow with which to use against a multiplicity of targets: Neoliberal imperialism/neoliberalisation can be seen as a diffuse set of multilevel assaults, and requires an understanding of how it is structured in order for it to be undone. Contemporary uses of the concept in Unity in African institutional documents show the permeation of neolilberal ideas and  It is worthwhile to note that at this time, a split occurred within the Mont Pelerin School during the first wave of (structural) decolonisation, in the period of the 1960s, between those who were opposed to apartheid rule in South Africa but still believed that the economic systems should be “insulated” from political “instability” (democracy), in favour of a “weighted” voting system (in particular William H. Hutt, the anti-apartheid “Libertarian”), and those that were outright opposed to a full “democracy” that would see the white minority lose political and economic control. The latter group led by Wilhelm Ropke, would be used by the Apartheid government to justify their continued dominance. Later proponents of “limited democracy” would be Milton Friedman, John Davenport, and Arthur Shenfield. See Slobodian, Q., 2018. p.2929–3006. 14  For a comprehensive account of pre-colonial civilisations in Africa, see Christopher Ehret’s seminal work. The Civilisations of Africa: A History to 1800. Charlottesville: Virgina University Press. 13

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concepts; Unity and integration have fused with the specific neoliberal understandings of integration, whose primary function is in pursuance of economic facilitation. At its basic form, the neoliberal state creates inclusionary/exclusionary dynamics between people, rewarding some and punishing others according to an allocation of “public goods” and “capacity assessments” (Strakosch 2015). This is not unrelated to the terms of the world system as described by dominium and imperium: the division is embedded, however, to the point that it is almost impossible to discern. It is these aspects that have enabled an internal colonisation within the liberal/neoliberal State, of those who find themselves on the outside of the classical liberal/ neoliberal delineations of “acceptability” (Strakosch 2015), and among the “idle poor” or the “irrational” (Arneil 2012), as well as the external, structured colonisation by colonial powers in the nineteenth century. What it means to decolonise is therefore not limited to specific geographical areas, but needs to take in larger groups of people deemed (by the liberal/neoliberal State) “incapable”, as well as flora and fauna, and even certain resources that may be either unrecognised or fail the capital/utility assessment defined by the market (Arneil 2012). Within these understandings, the prospects for thorough “decolonisation” are consequently limited by the neoliberal state as we know it (Strakosch 2015).

2.4.2  Neoliberalism and Neoliberalisation Neoliberalism is the doctrine of political economic beliefs that has come to dominate theories of human development and well-being on a global scale (Harvey 2005; Roberts and Peters 2008; Bourdieu 1998). It has become what Roberts and Peters (2008) have termed a “metanarrative” for almost all working conceptions of ‘social and institutional life’ (2008: 1). Mostly associated with the period of the late 1970s, specifically in the UK under Margaret Thatcher (Thatcherism), and in the USA under Ronald Reagan (Reaganomics) (Harvey 2005; Clarke 2005), some academics have broken down its developmental phases and historical beginnings from the introduction of neoclassical economics in Austria in the early twentieth Century; a “first globalisation” under the influence of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947; the period covering the Washington Consensus in the 1970s; Thatcherism and Reaganomics; the institutionalisation of neoliberalism through the global economic multilaterals (GEMs) (IMF, WB, WTO, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD) and structural adjustment programmes; and finally the development and the current unfolding of the “knowledge economy” and society (Roberts and Peters 2008: 9).15  Several theoretical (economic) sub-strands have been identified within the body of neoliberalism, including monetarism, human capital theory, rational choice theory, search theory, transaction cost analysis, new classical economics, new institutional economics, and law and economics Roberts, P., and Peters, M. A., 2008. Neoliberalism, Higher Education and Research. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. p.10; Harvey, D., 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 54.

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Neoliberalism’s roots, however, are generally considered to have been founded on the classical liberalism of John Locke and the classical political-economic philosophy of Adam Smith (Clarke 2005; Russell 1961: 21). The central organising principle of both may be identified as “freedom” or “liberty” and the range of social, economic, and political behaviour that this ideal should enable (Harvey 2005; Clarke 2005; MacIver and Page 1961: 55; Russell 1961; Polanyi 1957). For classical liberal/economics, this was presented through the concept of the “free” market and trade among “freely” enterprising individuals with minimal state intervention, save the institutional framework (coercive, if necessary) to ensure these freedoms, along with legally reinforced protection of property rights (Harvey 2005: 64; Clarke 2005). Neoclassical economics, and from where the two philosophies combined, brokered a shift in emphasis to micro or “small” economics (Varoufakis 1998: 38), and the motivations of individuals rather than contemplation of larger groups or wholes such as class or society (Varoufakis 1998: 36). Whereas under classical liberalism the factors of production (land, labour, and capital) were all taken into account in constructing the market price, under neoclassical economics, value or a product’s worth were transferred to its use in relation to the wider market in its contemplation of “utility maximisation” and “equi-margins” (Varoufakis 1998: 37). This has, among the other facets of classical liberalism, led to an economically driven perspective of human development and a commodification (and a dehumanisation) of human activity, motivated behaviour, and hence society (Harvey, 2005; Polanyi 1957: 75). The political and economic doctrines are, however, by no means consistent, as the former adheres to strong property rights enforced by the rule of law. This is, strictly speaking, a perversion of the idea of the free market and the understanding of the self-organising, flexible, structural relations implied by its ideology (Chang 2011: 10; Harvey 2005: 21). It also automatically predisposes an unequal system, where a position of privilege (private property and ownership) always maintains the upper hand: competition, contrary to its neoliberal explanation, is structurally limited. Neoliberalism has been legitimised through a combination of practice (coercion, incentives, conditionality in international development policy),16 and the authority

 There is a large body of literature that highlights the interdependent relation between authoritarianism and the adoption of neoliberal political and economic values and policy implementation. See Joffe, G., 1998. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects”. The Journal of North African Studies, 3(2):247–266; Joffe, G., 2009. “Investment in the Southern Mediterranean”. In Hedwig, G., (Ed.) 2009. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online] Available at: http://www.feps-europe. eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/feps_i.e_euromed.pdf; Bourdieu, P., 1998. “Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberalism”. Le Monde Diplomatic, Dec. [online] Available at: https://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu [accessed 25 Oct. 2015]; Behr, T., 2013. The European Union’s Mediterranean Policies After the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Amsterdam Law Forum, 4(2); Klein, N., 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. London: Penguin Books; and Harvey, D., 2005.op.cit. p.28; Polanyi, K., 1957. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. First edition. Boston: Beacon Press. p.250.

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of a “scientific” discourse (Roberts and Peters 2008: 9; Clarke 2005; Harvey 2005; Peters 1999; Bourdieu 1998: 2; Varoufakis 1998: 30–35). Manifest in global development policy most significantly through the 10 Point Plan or Washington Consensus, neoliberal economic orthodoxy was propagated in developing countries in exchange for loans, through the IFIs, the IMF and the WB via structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Chang 2011: 40; Phillips 2011: 433; Roberts and Peters 2008: 16; Harvey 2005: 13, 29: Bourdieu 1998).17 It has been noted, however, that the roll-out of neoliberal policy initiatives has been by no means an equal affair and, where monopoly interests collide with neoliberal orthodoxy, these tenets have been changed and adapted to suit (Chang 2007: 94,161; Harvey 2005: 19; 70–71; Roberts and Peters 2008; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005: 2). Neoliberalism and neoliberalisation (the process by which neoliberalism is socialised and accepted normatively, which includes the practical adoption of neoliberal economic policy at national, regional, and global scales), are, according to David Harvey (2005), the deliberate machinations to restore economic power to a previously disenfranchised elite under the Keynesianism fiscal policies or “embedded liberalism”18 that had dominated statecraft in the immediate post-war period, while creating the structural conditions for their renewal (Harvey 2005: 16–19; Clarke 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005). For neoliberal theorists, the free market is a specific structural organisation of component parts and dynamics, and is the central organising concept on which (neo)liberalism bases its theoretical and philosophical understanding of human activity and behaviour (Polanyi 1957: 68–69). In this sense, functionally, the ‘free’ market holds a unique value within the doctrine itself. The need to maintain this structure, its components, and its integrity of form and function, is paramount to neoliberalisation and the dominance of neoliberalism. The neoliberal capitalist model of society predisposes the SES to a particular structural path trajectory; it has structural implications on the African SES, and also on its reproduction in the theoretical context outlined in this book. The neoliberal values, specifically held to be creating a structural dissonance or counter-discourse to the successful pursuit of African unity, are considered to be the concepts of the free market economy; individual or personal freedom (defined in terms of free enterprise and private ownership) (Polanyi 1957: 256); the self-interested, “rational” actor; the organising

 Stabilisation (or removal of balance of payments, fiscal gaps, and inflation) followed by structural adjustment. For an expanded list of the WC detailed steps to “reform” see Taylor, L., (Ed.) 1993. The Rocky Road to Reform: Adjustment, Income Distribution, and Growth in the Developing World. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. p.41–42. 18  Identified with the political economist, John Gerard Ruggie, under embedded liberalism the state put in place regulations to direct its commitment firstly to its domestic audience and provide for full employment, followed by its international commitment in terms of an open market or “free economy”. See Ravenhill, J., 2011. The Study of Political Economy. In Ravenhill, J., (Ed.) 2011. Global Political Economy. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.15. See also Clarke, S., 2005. “The Neoliberal Theory of Society”. In Saad-Filho, A., and Johnston, D., (Eds.) 2005. Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader. London: Pluto Press; Harvey, D., 2005. op.cit. p.58. 17

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principle of competition; and the neoliberal ideological basis of utility maximisation. As these aspects form the basis of neoliberal political and economic thought, it is worthwhile to explore each individually in more detail here, as well as the possible implications for African19 societies. The expansion of markets such as technology and the knowledge economy,20 neoliberal understandings of “democratic governance”,21 and the appropriation of neoliberal circumscribed “rights” rhetoric (as regards the individual or human rights, dignity, or justice) applied universally (in particular in European/EU discourse), are considered to be tools of neoliberalisation, that is to say part of the integrated processes though which neoliberalism is reiterated and sustained (Harvey, 2005: 175–182).

 It is acknowledged that not all of Africa can be generalised in this way, but that some commonalities do exist, as in the continental-wide, institutional aim of finding unity and communitarianism among African states post-independence. This section will refer to the effects of neoliberalism on sub-Saharan African societies in particular. North African countries associated with Islamic culture are dealt with in more detail in Chaps. 7 and 8. 20  Like the expansion into financial services and speculation enabled by neoliberalism, the contemporary obsession with technological advancement and the knowledge economy/society by neoliberal proponents is potentially destabilising. Technology is predisposed to rapidly alter the market arena, bringing even the prospect of future developments and advances into the present; speculation is further deemed to create and build in an inordinate amount of social, cognitive instability and uncertainty, and together with property rights (intellectual, for example), has the ability to prejudice “natural” competition further, solidifying inequalities not only in the abstract market, but also in the more experiential, “real” world such as health, creating a separation between those who can afford access to medicines, and those who cannot. Excessive competition within the production realms of technology and the knowledge economy may also encourage fraud and misinformation in the race to produce “competitive” knowledge and results. See Harvey, D., 2005. op.cit. pp.33–36; 68–69; 159–162; Roberts, P., and Peters, M. A., 2008. op.cit. p.18–19. 21  Democratic governance often includes, as it has done in the JAES, the creation of a “good business climate” and the stipulated measures that allow for foreign direct investment, such as deregulation and elimination of tariffs, and non-tariff barriers to trade, together with the integration of other physical infrastructural support systems such as telecommunication networks, and transportation links. Further, democratic rule together with neoliberalism’s view on the limited state institutional framework, is one that often favours a close relationship between government and, as Margaret Thatcher called them, “the captains of industry”. Democracy therefore is often led and driven by un-elected and unaccountable international organisations, and those such as the GEMs, business or economic elites’ interest. Chang, H-J., 2007. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press, p.165–6; Harvey, D., 2005. op.cit.p.66. See Chossudovsky, M., 2003. The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order. Quebec: Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).p.305. 19

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2.4.3  The “Free” Market The free market is an abstract classical liberal concept of the plane where rational man was believed to interact with the assumed organisational principle of competition to solve the acknowledged problems of socio-economic inequality in a capitalist system through “trickle-down” disbursement (Chang 2011: 45; Harvey 2005: 64; Johnston 2005: 135; Clarke 2005). The free market within the neoliberal doctrine reinforces idealised self-centred or personal freedom, as it is the construct within which this kind of freedom negotiates its conditions: freedom of the market, according to neoliberal doctrine, guarantees personal and individual freedom (Roberts and Peters 2008). Individual freedom, further, is defined in terms of being able to act uninhibitedly in “enterprise and private ownership” (Polanyi 1957: 255–256), yet is broadened to take in a wider, more generalised, connotation: it is through this appeal that its underlying economic principles limit SESs, pass without redress or judgment (Harvey 2005: 179). The particular kind of “market society” (Polanyi 1957: 71) that ensues seeks “profit and human welfare” under these ideological constraints as the main means of human development (Polanyi 1957: 255), bypassing wider social justice and equality (Harvey 2005; Polanyi 1957). The free market, left uninhibited by the state as much as possible, is assumed to have an innate internal logic or organic spontaneity that self-regulates the transactions within it and between homo economicus, or the idealised self-interested, rational actor. The market is there to facilitate and encourage innovation and enterprise through competitive processes and interactions between individuals or traders. As an unintended consequence, distribution of resources is believed to trickle down and correct imbalances in society, thereby raising the standard of living for all who participate (Chang 2011: 45; Clarke 2005; Harvey 2005: 64; Johnston 2005: 135). The freely self-organised market furthermore, is deemed to out-perform its “rationally-­ bounded” (Simon 1990) state equivalent, its spontaneous and naturalistic distributive laws acquire not only a Darwinian prejudice, but a moral judgement as well on the relative success of those acting within it (Peters 1999; Clarke 2005: 50; 55; Polanyi 1957: 249–250). In the ensuing (free) market, the responsibility of being either poor or rich is transferred to the individual rather than the state or the community; well-being or welfare is left up to the innovative ability, and hence competitive capacity, of the individual his/herself (Clarke 2005). This ideology cum dogma assumes that innovative ability and the capacity to compete are axiomatic, rather than the result of interdependent cultural and social capital and thus also an historically dependent background (Bourdieu 1986): well-being, according to this rationale, is not acknowledged to be derived from, nor shared with, the wider social environment as perhaps

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would be the case in a traditional22 African setting23 (as contemporary critiques of strong-men in African politics, patrimonialism, clientelism, or crony capitalism testify). That is to say that neither was well-being acknowledged to be dependent on the embedded structural relations that deny wealth from some in order to privilege others, or what Harvey refers to as “accumulation by dispossession” (2005: 160ff).24 The naturalistic free market and its spontaneous distributary powers, within the (neo)liberal ideal, however, is contradictory to the idea of the individual as the sole originator of wealth, as is the free market and the basis of the free economy itself, which has over time been forcibly imposed, guided, and structured in this way (Polanyi 1957: 250–253; Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; Roberts and Peters 2008: 9). As it is understood under neoliberal treatment, the free market as a natural or “scientific” system, is treated separately (counter-intuitively) to other social, cultural, or ecological systems, and rather than socially constructed is presented as fixed and immutable, like the various ‘‘natural’’ (Darwinian selection) scientific or mathematical models from which it seeks to emulate and gain legitimacy.25 The free economy is, however, a construction that has gained traction, legitimacy, and reproducibility through a combination of practical organisation (state apparatuses, international organisations, non-governmental organisations)26 and discursive  It is acknowledged that the label “traditional” is considered troublesome in relation to African societies, as it has been compromised by the history of (British) colonisation in Africa. Within this book, “traditional” refers to a set of acknowledged customs claimed as African by African authors within Pan-Africanist writings. See Ranger, T. 1993. The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa. In: Ranger T., Vaughan O. (Eds) 1993. Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. St Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 23  Timothy Kandeke outlines “five fundamentals” of social development of any “peoples” that are identified by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda as traditionally African, and that Kandeke refers to as constituting African Communalism. According to Kaunda, these five fundamentals should be the basis of future African socio-economic organisation to preserve its African character and create the “ideal society”. These are “cooperative labour and mutual-aid living; common or communal ownership of property…individualism was discouraged; equal distribution and collective consumption of the products of mutual-aid and co-operative labour; absence of classification into ‘have’ and ‘havenots’. All members of society were materially equal; absence of ‘exploitation of Man by Man.’ Since there was no private ownership of the means of production no individual could exploit the labour of others for his own selfish interests.” Further, “Traditional community was a mutual aid society…organized to satisfy the basis of human needs of all its members…individualism was discouraged. Most resources were communally owned for the benefit of everyone…every activity was a matter of teamwork… the web of relationships…involved some degree of mutual responsibility”. Dr Kenneth Kaunda, cited in Kandeke, T. K., 1977. Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism. Kitwe: NECZAM.pp.41–43. 24  Accumulation by dispossession, according to David Harvey, includes four “features”: privatization and commodification; financialization; the management and manipulation of crises; and state re-distributions through privatization and austerity measures. See Harvey, D., 2005. op.cit. pp.160ff. 25  The concepts of the CAS and panarchy are under no such illusions; the socio-ecological system is the conceptual capturing of both natural and human (social) systems, and importantly the interactions between them. 26  Varoufakis et al. include academia as an important contributor to the perpetuation of the neoliberalism, and refers to the “econobubble” as a mixture of both “university life and the certainties of 22

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devices (such as policy frameworks, partnerships, declarations, persuasion, and co-­ optation) that constructs an unquestionable “common sense” (Harvey 2005: 40). In the African formal organisational context (such as the OAU/AU and policy documents post-independence), the neoliberal displacement of responsibility (sometimes referred to as “ownership” in both Post-Washington Consensus and EU policy discourse) (Lister 2002) is mirrored in African post-independence desires to uncouple from its colonial influences, and in this way shows the acceptance and assimilation of the (neoliberal) principle of self-reliance based on – albeit – the individual actor (here the struggling, embryonic unified Africa under the OAU/AU); the ability to create enterprise; and act as an “entrepreneur” in the international arena. It is precisely this about which Henri Maurier was writing in 1979 when he noted that Africa was “biting deeper and deeper into individualism” (1979: 12). It was, however, an anathema to Maurier, who saw it as an unnecessary regression for African states that need not be followed. The path trajectory of Western individualism and liberty being distinct to the African social setting, which Maurier acknowledged, was rather “characterised by solidarity, communitarianism, traditionalism, participation” (1979: 12). African political and economic processes are often still externally judged from a lack of, or distortions of, democracy and good governance (Collier 2009; Byiers and Bilal 2017). However, the persistent presence of these concepts in European policy frameworks is often informed by the neoliberal interest in enabling a free market economy (Harvey 2005), and it is perhaps for this reason that their African equivalents have been judged to be “poor copies”, finding dissonance in African settings that would otherwise consider their associated (neoliberal) values at odds with communalism and solidarity. Casting aside judgements of “failure” and the obvious comparisons with European state models and practices, African understandings and implementation of collective rule, for example, may inherently register the structural injustices of a pseudo unguided, faux-naturalistic neoliberal system, as opposed to one typically understood to have been overseen by stronger and tighter ties of kinship and filial associations (Mbiti 1969: 103ff).

2.4.4  The Individual as the Rational Actor: Homo Economicus As a basic understanding of human behaviour, the concept of the self-interested actor (homo economicus) (Clarke 2005; Varoufakis 1998; Roberts and Peters 2008: 13) has several implications, especially as it relates to understandings of African society, community, and the place of the individual in larger social groups. The idea of the self-interested actor in neoliberal ideology places an emphasis on the individual apart from society, implying that the actor is an isolated or individual unit, is self-reliant, and has complete autonomy. Through advocating the restriction

neoliberalism”. See Varoufakis, Y., Halevi, J., and Theocarakis, N., 2011. Modern Political Economics: Making Sense of the Post-2008 World. Oxford: Routledge. p.3–4.

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of the institutional framework of the state to allow for the freedom or liberty of the individual rational actor, neoliberalism furthermore de-emphasises the larger social grouping and its importance to overall development and well-being. For the African worldview this can easily be seen as an alien perspective: community and family in African cultures not only incorporate the present but also the past and future (Mbiti 1969: 106ff) through (dead) ancestors and “unborn members who are still in the loins of the living” (Mbiti 1969: 107). Such a perspective and understanding of family and community is one that grounds the individual, who cannot be made or attain “personhood” (Menkiti 1979) without the wider community and kinfolk (Mbiti 1969; Menkiti 1979). In traditional African society the necessary interdependency between the individual and society is an embedded socio-cultural truth, the over-­ writing of which by Western political economic doctrine would regress and have adverse effects on “African” social development. As John Mbiti (1969) states as an example of the importance of community in the development of African personhood, “I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti 1969: 108). This understanding cannot be overstated in comprehending the ideal of African unity in the context of its continental institutions, the OAU/AU, and how different it is to the neoliberal insistence on the rationally circumscribed, individual self-­interested actor. The following quotation from Ifeanyi Menkiti (1979) further describes the fundamental difference between the African view of man’s place in relation to his surroundings, and those found in the West; the basis for neoliberal values and its worship of the free individual: A crucial distinction thus exists between the African view of man and the view of man found in Western thought: in the African view it is the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will, or memory. (Menkiti 1979: 158).

Although it may indeed be true to say that in a traditional African setting the modern nation state has historically been one imposed, artificial, and questioned by pan-­ Africanist and anti-colonial literature, it has been sufficiently incorporated post-­ independence to create and maintain cross-currents of structural instability and institutional insecurity as regards an African identity based on said unity. The state’s role as provider and mediator of social justice, furthermore, bears some comparison with African patrimonial/matrilineal societies, where tight-knit clans and kinship provide social, cultural, and economic safety-nets (Mbiti 1969: 106). The skeletal state structure advocated by neoliberalism, therefore, together with the elevation of the individual, self-reliant actor, could have comparative fragmentary results in African states,27 irrespective of the original/artificially imposed nature of the African state.

 As regards the effect of a money economy on the African family and social structure is concerned, Julius Neyere is resolute: “It is for this reason that the impact of an individualistic money economy can be catastrophic as regards the African family social unity. The principles of the traditional African family all the time encourage men to think of themselves as members of a society”. See Nyerere, J., 1967. Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p.8. 27

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Neoliberalism and the processes of neoliberalisation, instigate what amounts to a cult of the individual as identity, consequently breaking up larger sets of social groups, and reducing interactions between individuals and families to the dynamics of competition (Peters 1999). Particular or traditional understandings of community and national unity tend to be dissolved, only to reform under competitive “gangs”, (extreme) religious groups, and select interest groups (Harvey 2005). The embedded “structural violence” to which Pierre Bourdieu (1998) refers is positively (increasingly) affected by this kind of atomisation, as individuals are pitted against individuals, and are unable to establish networks of trust and reciprocity (or social capital), cooperation, and hence solidarity (Harvey 2005: 41; Bourdieu 1998) within a (greater) localised geographically-based area. The possibilities of collective action for collective benefit (for example, social justice on a range of integrated issues), are thus vastly reduced and actively inhibited. Globally, the neoliberalisation process has re-oriented identity from collective institutions such as “the community” or the nation state, and redirected individual loyalty to the larger market and socio-political processes at the regional and global scales (Clarke 2005; Harvey 2005; Bourdieu 1998). The competitive basis for this interaction and reorientation still holds, and further creates fissiparous counter identities, structurally (internationally) organised, prone to “swarming” behaviour towards issue-based politics, and hence challenging towards any attempt at the counter-construction of a distinct African identity.

2.4.5  Competition Competition is the organising principle of relations within the neoliberal concept of the free market, and is considered to be the driver of innovation and further specialisation of the market; hence markets are believed and encouraged to continue expanding, and economic rents growing (Harvey 2005: 65; Clarke 2005). Imbalanced power relations, however, tend to increase or harden with the market’s structural basis bolstered by the protection of property rights by law, which predisposes the marketplace towards unequal information and resource access; while the establishment of conglomerates and monopolies of industry and finance restrict further entry into the marketplace of others (Harvey 2005: 68). Although competition itself is present in many relations and not exclusive to neoliberalism/neoliberalisation, it is its particular kind as described above with its accompanying conceptual framework, which creates a certain “embedded violence” that on a continental scale may prove to be dysfunctional, taking into consideration the prevalent African context, where community and kinship are archetypal values persistently invoked.

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2.4.6  U  tility Maximisation and the Equi-Margin Principle: Commodifying and Dehumanising Society The principles of utility maximisation28 and equi-marginal utility29 in use in neoclassical economics and hence neoliberal doctrine, have reduced the social condition to the relative sums of satisfaction versus dissatisfaction, reduced “rationale” to choice preferences under those terms and conditions, and commodified all aspects of human activity (Varoufakis 1998: 35). The maximisation of utility under neoliberal treatment, is predisposed to the individual’s pursuit of goods, rather than a regulated balance between equally distributing those goods. As discussed above, under the structural conditions of the neoliberal capitalist society, while freedom is actively enabled for some, it comes at the price of freedom for others (Harvey 2005; Polanyi 1957); freedom – and the maximisation of satisfaction – needs to be regulated in such a way as to ensure equal freedoms are enjoyed by all. Although preferences (and values) are wide and varied, they are grouped together and considered measurable under the “law of diminishing marginal utility” (Samuelson 1964: 427). The production of society, under these conditions, is reduced merely to the whims and vagaries of the market prices they may command in a particular market at a particular time. Intrinsic, culturally specific values (the assignment of moral judgement, ethical value, for example) are made indistinct from mass market or mass (grouped) values based on the generalisation of rational choices under the equi-margin principle. What makes products part of the human condition is removed (Varoufakis 1998: 37; 2015), and this is especially relevant to labour. The collective result is a dehumanisation of social activity, and socio-­ economic insecurity, as well as a dislocation from [African] modes of production, and their intrinsic traditional (and culturally specific) input-value.

 Utility maximisation is based on Jeremy Bentham’s “greatest-happiness-principle” believed to underlie human behaviour and choice; that is, people will choose to pursue pleasure and avoid pain (or displeasure), and will make choices based on maximising their pleasure or derived satisfaction, and minimising their pain or displeasure. (This doctrine became known as utilitarianism.) Bentham, nevertheless, recognised the propensity for the individual’s pursuit of pleasure or happiness needing to be regulated, and a balance between private and public interest established. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on non-regulation however, enables and compels a “free-for-all” society with little or no circumscription for (social) “justice”. Russell, B., 1961. History of Western Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin Unlimited. p.741. 29  The principle of marginal utility is based on the belief that the more a person consumes or derives satisfaction from a particular activity, their satisfaction will actually decrease in relation to the amount consumed/experienced. Equi-marginal utility is the point at which the “cost” or expenditure in pursuit of that pleasure/happiness/a particular good, is equal to the amount of maximum utility or satisfaction gained from it. Samuelson, P. A., 1964. Economics: An Introductory Analysis. Sixth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. p.427–430. 28

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Karl Polanyi, writing in the early twentieth Century, took note of the possible consequences of commodifying labour, which he rightly identifies as highly personal, and in this sense impossible to treat externally as the emerging neoclassical strains of economics were attempting to do. Polanyi was prophetic in his thoughts that this perspective and treatment of human activity would have on society: In disposing of a man’s labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. (Polanyi 1957: 73)

2.4.7  Integration The EU, as with other international and collective regional arrangements, has been seen to create regions, groups of states either based on geography, convergent interests, or sets of problematised issues, through a combination of foreign policy configurations, networks of partnership agreements, and policy frameworks. Integration, the streamlining or harmonisation of formal structures (institutions) and interactive processes (Lister 2001; Lister 2002: 7–8), has become synonymous with globalisation (Lister 2002: 7–8) and the spread of a “common neoliberal model” of capitalism (Lister 2001: 9; Wade 2011) through the GEMs in the 1980s, such as the IMF, the WB, and their subsequent hybrid socio-economic “development” packages, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Wade 2011: 373). Global integration and the neoliberal orthodoxy were presented at the time as unstoppable, and inclusion into its regime a necessary condition of the international order (Phillips 2011; Harvey 2005). Since then, various ideas of development, that is to say what it means to be developed (and underdeveloped), and policy prescriptions to rectify the well-documented imbalances,30 have themselves become merged or integrated in both perceptions of and responses to instability or insecurity31: human development and sustainable development are now the two dominant paradigms merged in global development projects framed under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty

 Failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes is well-documented; the neoliberal project resulted in worsening conditions for Latin America and even worse for African countries during the late 1980s. See Phillips, N., 2011. “Globalisation and Development”. In Ravenhill, J., 2011. op.cit. p.434. 31  Sometimes conceptualised in EU development frameworks as “nexuses”, for example the security/development nexus or the migration/development nexus correspond to the perceptions and solutions of integrated security concerns. See Carbone, M., (Ed.) 2009. “Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development”. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version] Oxford: Routledge. p.2. 30

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Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that replaced the SAPs (Phillips 2011: 441). While these global frameworks incorporated a holistic, or at least, wider concept of human development in conjunction with the physical environment, they are still underpinned by a strong, neoliberal account of how to develop that now not only requires the adoption of what are identified as neoliberal economic strategies (liberalisation of trade, free markets “free” from government interference, and the pursuit of privatisation, creation of a “good business” environment, for example), but also conformity and restructuring of internal institutions such as governance and government, specifically under the aegis of democracy and the rule of law (Carbone 2009; Richards et al. 2008: 228–232). Prospective partners in development projects or those seeking assistance were encouraged to implement their own development, and to “own” their projects (Phillips 2011: 441). Buy-in from all levels of society – including the newly conceptualised civil society – (Phillips 2011) was portrayed as paramount to the success – and failure if not achieved – of the projects (Lister 2002; Phillips 2011). The burden of global imbalances, unfair terms of trade, and the realities of a restructured division of labour (Mittelman 1996) (and any instability or resulting conflicts) resulting from globalised structural inequalities, was placed firmly on the shoulders of states’ responsibilities. The idea of post-post Colonialism (Lister 2002) has been used to describe both the transfer of blame and responsibility for structural inequalities from ex-colonial powers to African states themselves, the essence of which has been incorporated recently at the continental institutional level in the term “African solutions to African problems32”. The concept of partnership has replaced “association” in global development language (Lister 2002), and the EU, with many ex-colonial powers as members, incorporated this epithet in its external relations’ repertoire. The idea of a partnership, however, between ex-coloniser and colonised, has been deeply criticised as a false premise (Lister 2002), where the dynamic that exists between a donor/recipient can ever attain the equality assumed in a partnership. In recent EU policy frameworks, including those under study here, the partnerships have recast relations between the EU and Africa/Mediterranean in terms of shared and common values, historical, and geographical links. The past anti-colonial struggles are over-written, with the responsibility of development no longer a result of historically informed structural inequalities, but rather of African states. The EU’s conception of PCD established itself in parallel with globalisation in the 1980s (Wade 2011: 373), and is the attempt at aligning and integrating policy aims as well as outcomes (Carbone 2009: 4; Lister 2002; Grugel 2004; COM 2007/545).33 PCD was institutionalised in 1992 with the Treaty on European Union  Agenda 2063 points to this as “self-reliance” in Aspirations 2, articles 19 and 20. African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: the Africa we want. p.4. 33  There are in fact various perspectives of PCD, vertical (relations between EU member states), horizontal (problems raised by uncoordinated policy areas specifically as regards development policy and consistency between aid and non-aid policies in terms of their output); internal and multilateral coherence. See Carbone, M., 2009. op.cit. p.4 32

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(TEU) but made little headway until 2005 and the introduction of the European Consensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (Carbone 2009: 10). Eventually, development, security, and government reform were merged (Youngs 2009: 96; Lister 2002) and found (w) holistic form in what has been “identified specifically with the EU as ‘structural foreign policy”, which is designed to elicit or promote internal (structural) reform in the countries with whom the EU has external formalised relations or partnerships (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 25–27). Integration based on the EU’s archetype is often considered unique, having been the result of a wide range of historical and political interests and processes both within and external to Europe (Ludlow 2014), and also quite distinct from other forms of integration established in different parts of the world (Acharya 2013). In addition to external pressures of conformity and processes of globalisation, the European/EU integration model has been identified as resting on liberal democracy and the belief that economic integration is the key to establishing peace and structural stability (Asante 2014). While belief in democratic peace has an experiential basis in the history of Western Europe, the values with which it has become associated, such as neoliberalism, are not universal. EU multilateral decision-making has become the (structural) institutional and organisational aid to confronting the EU perceived causes of external structural instability, along with the belief in PCD, the idea of approaching integrated security issues through the integration of thinking, ideas, and values (or means); the effect of which is universal (on the whole system). The result of the fore mentioned structural processes is a “deep socialisation” (Aliboni 2009) of European/EU beliefs and values and its embedded reproduction through infrastructure explicit in physical (railways, SeaComs – underwater fibre optic communications and so on) and implicit in socially constructed CASs (policies, agreements). In order to simplify, condense, and separate the EU’s particular kind of integration from other forms of integration, the term integrationalism (Hierro 2018) denotes the combined aspects of physical (the joining of infrastructure – roads, railways, energy, telecommunications – to enable product dispersal and trade) and conceptual (philosophy and values) uniformity and harmonisation (“integration” rhetoric) based on neoliberal economic tenets for development and democratic peace evident in the EU’s external relations. Integrationalism is the combination of methodology and method used that influences unlimited cross-scale (both temporal and spatial) processes (such as competition or cooperation) that occur as a result. The foundation of integrationalism is complexity theory (discussed in Chap. 3 in more detail). Integrationalism combines processes of regionalism and regionalisation, leading to the construction of a particular socio-ecological unit. As such, integrationalism is acknowledged to be conceptually similar to the EU’s own PCD, which is the intentional homogenising of physical and social infrastructure leading to uniform success in policy output, coordinated with [identified] overall development policy objectives (Carbone 2009: 4). It is contended that integrationalism is responsible for fragmentation at the African social-institutional level, based as it is on self-help, competitive, individualistic values seen to be a part of neoliberalism,

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and the ensuing overlapping structural enforcement that it entails. It is also contended that recognition of this process has prompted the wholesale rejection of all things “European” in an attempt to isolate African states from further fragmentation, and dilution of what are considered African ways of life. The current calls for decolonisation are part of this attempt to delink (Amin 1990), preserve, and purge itself from anything associated with antecedent colonial powers now referred to as the West, something not dissimilar to takfirist and salafist movements in parts of North Africa and the Middle East. Processes of integration/globalisation/neoliberalisation, which aim to homogenise and generalise system components, identities, and markets for example (Mittelman 1996: 8), at higher or global scales have been shown to create what appears to be the opposite effect at lower scales (Rosenau 2003). Globalisation/ integration has shown a propensity to create structural inequalities and what is more, internalise them at lower scales (Lister 2002). Fragmegration (Rosenau 2003)34 or “inter-scalar contradictions” are apparent from the dynamics created by globalisation/integration, with regional organisations playing an intermediary or “buffer” role (Lister 2001: 8; Mittelman 1996: 8,11). Neoliberal economic restructuring actually allows inequalities by permitting competition and ignoring equitable redistribution (Mittelman 1996: 9; Peters 1999; Harvey 2005). It has been superficially observed that at the regional level, socio-political identities at least are oriented (and contrived) to national boundaries, and markets tend to re-orient themselves intra-regionally and externally to the State (Lister 2001: 8; Peters 1999). Integration at any level, it would seem, appears to promote opposite and fissiparous effects such as fragmegration (Rosenau 2003) or negative centricities such as xenophobia, or nationalistic movements as described by Scott Taylor (2014: 5) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). James Mittelman (1996) recalls that these same dynamics were identified behind the rise of economic depression, nationalism, and fascism that led to the Second World War (Mittelman 1996: 3) in Europe. Binary or “dyadic” (Bach 2014) relationships have been employed variously to describe these structural inequalities, such as global/local, integration/fragmentation, decentralising/centralising, or centripetal and centrifugal forces (Taylor 2014; Krugman 1998). While many approaches seek to find one aspect (either economic globalisation, new globalised divisions of labour and production, or “tensions between polarities”) (Rosenau 2003: 5) most miss a fundamental holistic (rather than global) view of interactions of both structure and process combined with an ability to “self-learn” (heuristics) beyond traditional concepts of spill-over or coincidental, un-purposeful transformation. A General Systems perspective, together with a theory of heuristic (self-learning or adaptive) change, will provide this.  Fragmegration is a description of the inter-scalar contradictions “causally linked to globalisation, centralising and integrating dynamics”. Rosenau does point out that not all contra-indications or opposite effects are negative: decentralisation may actually be relevant for opposition voices against authoritarian/centralising political structures. See Rosenau, J.N., 2003. Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalisation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.8.

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Ideal system integration may be described from a system’s perspective and the workings of a panarchy. Its structure is one of integrality (Feibleman and Friend 1945), or perfect synergism. Integration in this sense is naturally occurring, and not imposed from the outside by either physical or socially contrived structures. It is an optimal structuration that incorporates resilience, and the ability of the system to respond in an elastic manner to outside influences that enable the system keeping its form, function, and overall recognisable character (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 58). Integration in this sense is analogous to unification, whole and co-ordinated purpose of action; it is one more attuned to the ideals of African unity first expressed in the pan-Africanist movement and the so-called “radical unionists”, the Casablanca group. Understanding integration in this sense is separate from cognitions of current regional integration and regionalism, and theories thereof. EU integrationalism and integration in mainstream International Relations and Political Studies, tends to view integration from either a formalised intergovernmental structural arrangement between countries across geographical regions (regionalism) (Ravenhill 2014: 2), or as informal interactions as in the conception of “new regionalism” (among non-state or non-traditional actors), or given form/recognition based on cost/benefit collective action and convergent interests (for security, political solidarity or economic gains) (Ravenhill 2014: 3–4; Asante 2014; Fioramonti 2014: 9–10).

2.5  C  reating Regions: Regionalism, Regionalisation, and Panarchies Current work on region-building, and the process of creating or building regional cooperative frameworks, has distinguished between regionalism (state-led, or top-­ down formal structures of collective cooperation, ranging from thick to thin institutional design and purpose – political, economic or functional) (Ravenhill 2014:3–4; Fioramonti 2014: 9–10), and regionalisation, based on “increased integration within a geographically defined area” (Ravenhill 2014:2), which has become associated with new regionalism (Ravenhill 2014; Fioramonti 2014: 6). While Fioramonti refers to the ‘‘simplicity’’ of this description (2014: 6), such integration may encompass a broad range of actors and collaborative processes, which gives rise to its open-ended association with regionalisation (Bach 2014: 2–3). Regionalisation/new regionalism, nominally associated with geographical proximities (but, as indicated by Rosenau, not always) is often posed as the antithesis to regionalism, the former (regionalisation) by comparison flourishes – especially in Africa where borders are still porous  – above and beyond state-defined lines, and actually contributes to a “blurring”, as trans-national players (Bach 2014: 2) not only overflow into physical territory, but also state-purpose and activity, acting as a second or “shadow economy” (Bach 2014).35 The same kinds of contrapuntal processes are to be seen in the  The second or shadow economy is mostly identified with classified illegal activity – contraband smuggling, trafficking of SALW/people, and irregular (illegal) migration. It is assisted by ICT/

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on-going regionalisation of Africa, and neoliberalisation (as already described), both of which would appear to be under-mining the state’s traditional purview. Regionalisation, however, resists neoliberalisation and the strict, binary logic of capitalism36; it resists the will to be encompassed in the formal market economy, rather seen as the “shadow state” outside the reach of formalised “grand” business, which has monopolised legitimate discourse and position through neoliberalisation (Harvey 2005). Furthermore, and in accordance to this understanding, the processes of regionalisation therefore also run counter to the processes created by formalised structures instituted at the state-cooperative level, that is to say, regionalism (Bach 2014: 6–8; Taylor 2014). In some ways, regionalisation/new regionalism described in this way, has more in common with the idea of unity in general, and with African unity in particular, while at the same time being the antitheses of neoliberalisation. Both regionalism and regionalisation are often described in terms of binary opposition: push/pull; fragment/integrate or defragment; centripetal/centrifugal dynamics (Krugman 1998: 3;Taylor 2014; Bach 2014), which considering the contemporarily and generally accepted multi-level, complex, dynamic international arena, is somewhat reductionist and risks an over-simplification, or worse, a reliance on a diminutive focus of either structure or variables at only two or (rarely) three spatial scales (either informal or formal spaces). These are normally described as top/state, meso/middle or bottom/grassroots (Rosenau 2003). Although new regionalism/regionalisation have gone some way towards identifying alternative perspectives on region-building, a variation of panarchy found within political science developed by Paul Hartzog’s (Complexity + Networks + Technology) captures these dynamics and newer forms of organisations quite succinctly, yet without incorporating natural systems specifically as a necessary component. Governance and systems of government need to be reformed in line with the new understandings of the nature of systems and their interactions. Adaptive Governance (AG) (Folke et al. 2005) draws on the concept of the CAS in suggesting alternative forms of governance of Common Resource Pools (CPRs) or “the commons” (Ostrom 1990) as an alternative to centralised, top-down government and socio-­ ecological organisation. Its insight into the relevance of common purpose or the recognition of an holistic and generalised view of planetary evolution (Folke et al. networks of human and technological contacts that are only in some instances or catalysed by the need to circumscribe the established and strictly-structured state controlled confines or corrupt government officials. Bach, D., 2014. “Cross-border Interactions: From Regionalisation to Regional Integration”. Paper presented at the policy research seminar held by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) on Region-building and Regional Integration in Africa. Cape Town, South Africa, 28–30 April 2014. Manuscript in preparation for publication by the CCR. pp.5–6. 36  Yanis Varoufakis refers to the ‘binary dialectic’ of a capitalist system, where its structure is premised on inequality and the necessity to reproduce itself in order to keep producing, keep growing. Clarke likewise also notes that the costs (poverty) and benefits (wealth) within a capitalist system cannot be separated. See Varoufakis, Y., 2015. “How I became an Erratic Marxist”. The Guardian, [online] 18 February. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/18/yanis-varoufakis-how-i-became-an-erratic-marxist [accessed 25 Oct. 2015]; Clarke, S., 2005.op.cit. p.56–57.

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2005) provides resolution to Rosenau’s ideas of polar “tensions” (2003) and fragmegration. Without a common vision of human evolution, however, state-led construction of regions will continue to fragment and destabilise alternative visions of the present and future (development) through successions of contra-indicative policy, based on individualist and self-help ideologies, such as neoliberalism, and (EU) integrationalism. Contrary to the EU’s integrationalism and integration in general, a panarchy requires imbricated redundancy (or functional overlapping) and diversity as necessary conditions for system resilience: through the prism of panarchy, the CAS and GST, EU foreign policy can be seen to be weakening African institutional (aspect of both informal and formal) architecture, the African SES as it stands as a whole and in sub-regional configurations. This is achieved firstly from the harmonisation, streamlining, and uniformity (or PCD) contained as a policy condition; secondly, through the imposition of an alternative structural organisation that includes the symbolic plane of values not considered to be universal, but peculiar to Europe and the EU and Western developmental traditions; and thirdly the undermining of African unity from the fore-mentioned processes resulting in selection pressures as well as contrary (and externally contrived) regional demarcations alien to African organic regional configurations. From this perspective, both regionalism and regionalisation may play a part in an overall panarchy, the former having relevance to EU foreign policy – specifically foreign development policy – and its role in influencing African institution building, and processes as regards unity and security, the latter (regionalisation) providing a safety-net when regionalism destabilises (African) SESs. Regionalism, regionalisation, and region-building form separated aspects and perspectives of the wider concept of the system or the panarchy. Panarchy and GST are used in the place of all three categories of rationalising perceptions of geographical space, interactions, and actors, incorporating as it does processes (interactions), quality (dense/thick or thin institutionalism as it relates to system integrality), structural organisation, and the conceptualisation of actors from their position in relation to other actors within the system and, in relation to the system-whole, and the panarchy. Panarchy could also provide answers as to why specific institutions and policy frameworks fail, and produce the opposite effect of what is originally intended (Holling et al. 2002). In this particular case, it may be able to explain why the EU’s policy frameworks (the UfM and the JAES) appear to be working against each stipulated aim of bringing peace, stability, and prosperity to the region. As a description of paradoxes, it may also explain why states in the Sahel region, despite their internal chaos, remain intact beyond binary tension explanations, a subject (still) of curiosity and inquiry at the time of writing.

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2.5.1  The Mediterranean Conceptualising the Mediterranean region is not a simple task. This is in part due to the overlapping historical, cultural, and religious identities acknowledged to be within it and the more modern regional (and supranational) institutions that seek to give the area an imposed order or structure in world relations. It is perhaps Wiedenfeld and Janning (1993) who have described the Mediterranean best, as “a dense network of diversities and dividing lines between different political and socio-­ economic (sub) systems, cultures and regimes, as well as languages, forms of expression and religious denominations” (1993: 237). There has always been a tendency to group the Mediterranean countries (North African and Middle Eastern countries bordering the Sea) together, and to attempt to highlight their commonalities rather than to be fundamentally cognisant of the varied and important dissimilarities. For a time, this was attributed in part to a tradition of viewing the Mediterranean/Middle East through “Cold War lenses”, which focussed on the tensions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) in the region and little else (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 28–31). From the period of the late 1980s through to the immediate post-Cold War period and into the mid-1990s, Europe and the USA still addressed relations in the region in those terms, and policy enterprises until then reflected an instrumentalist, bargaining, and “interest-driven” nature (Bicchi 2007). It was the persistence of this perspective, according to Bicchi (2007) that led to the inability or reluctance to perceive signs of growing sub-regional conflicts, such as rising intolerance between Sunni and Shia Islamic groups, domestic social unrest, and resistance to continued Western influence in the region seen as neo-colonialism. When these issues were finally acknowledged, they quickly became conceptualised in terms of fear and hence security and, from a European perspective, were translated to fear of the spread of transnational crime, of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East, and the extension of terrorist acts perpetrated on European soil (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Bicchi 2007: 70–71, 131). Later foreign policy initiatives towards the Mediterranean have generally been placed first within a regional context of cooperation still supported by the existence of bilateral relationships, while EU multilateral agreements set out the general structures and conditions of the regional relationship. Examples of this structure would include the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Valencia Action Plan, 2002 (seen as “reinforcement” of the Barcelona Declaration) (Tanner 2005; Gillespie 2006), which show the transformation towards a more integrated policy initiative of the kind evident currently (COM 2008/319 Final). The EMP, or the Barcelona Process (1995) as it became more commonly known, however, became the first attempt at dealing with newly perceived threats in the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2007: 131). The processes leading up to it and the evolution of the subsequent Barcelona acquis, which incorporates the current UfM, reflects the continuing and mounting importance given to security, both in how it is defined

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and in how EEC/EU foreign policy has responded and addressed it over the following 13 years. The subsequent strengthening of bilateral ties and relations between the EU member states, the EU, and the Mediterranean partner states, has effectively created a dividing line socially, politically, and economically between the countries in Africa included in these policy frameworks, and those that are not, that is to say “the rest of Africa”. EEC/EU enlargement from the period of the late 1970s to date has continually redefined what constitutes Mediterranean and European, by virtue of being a member and likewise non-member of the EEC/EU. Currently the Mediterranean region has been further formalised through the UfM to include the non-riparian states of North Africa (Mauritania) and the Middle East (Jordan).37 Security therefore, has become associated with a specific set of issues linked to the decreasing geographical boundaries of the Mediterranean external to the EU-institution. The EEC/EU with a variety of policy frameworks has attempted to shape and re-shape what the Mediterranean region has been, and what it has become today through the process described in integrationalism. It has also had an impact on the identities of the countries captured within its confines and of those on the outside of its shifting demarcation. The overlapping of multiple policies that define regions made up of a number of diverse political, socio-economic sub-systems, cultures, and histories appears to be for no other apparent reason than ease of business for the EU and the expansion of integrationalism.

2.5.2  The ‘Rest of Africa’ in Perspective The grouping together of the Mediterranean states creates a counter region, which in contrast can be described as the rest of Africa. The tendency in policy documents so far has been to respond to the North African states as “Mediterranean”, separate or differentiated from sub-Saharan African countries. This is in direct contradiction to the efforts of the African Union (AU) (and that of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity – OAU) that seeks – among other objectives – unified, integrated, and hence institutional responses both within its continental boundaries and towards its external counterparts (African Union Constitutive Act 2000). In contrast to the highly institutionalised and developed response in terms of policy towards the Mediterranean, the JAES dates back to 2005; and although the relationship between Africa and Europe has been defined and framed in the founding policy document (the Lisbon declaration, 2002), as one based on a “shared history” alluding to past colonial ties, it does not directly acknowledge their characteristic dynamics. The states of the Sahel region (defined here as Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia), are in direct developmental con Under the Gadhafi regime, Libya refused to join the UfM, but as of 2013 is now currently an observer. See the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) website. [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/libya/eu_med_mideast/index_en.htm [accessed 24 Apr 2019].

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trast to their neighbours in North Africa and members of the UfM. The Sahel region is home to some of the poorest, drought-ridden, and recently turbulent countries in Africa. A quick glance at the most basic analyses as provided by the United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP HDI), for example, supports this: In 2017, the non-EU members of the UfM were ranked between Very High (Israel), High (Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan) and Medium (Palestine, Egypt, Morocco) ranking, with the exception of Mauritania, which was included in the “Low” development category. Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Chad, Niger, Ethiopia all occupy the “Low” human development category. Somalia is unlisted (UNDP HDR 2017).38 Economically and geographically challenged (in terms of terrain and impact of climate change), and politically unstable, these countries have become the frontier between developing European norms and institutional structure on African soil on the one hand, and lawlessness, poverty, and disorder on the other. The combined policy responses from the EU and the AU so far appear to have been inadequate to handle escalating problems of political instability, violence, and migration effects (displacement, social fragmentation) across the Sahel region, and consequent humanitarian fallout. The Sahelian countries of Mali, Somalia, and Niger, for example, have seen the rise of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb and terrorist activities, and Libya prior to its collapse, regularly made international news along with Egypt for its poor treatment of would-be migrants from African countries attempting to cross into Europe (Jawad 2010). The UfM could thus be seen to be compounding the array of issues linked to migration, such as trans-regional crime and terrorism through “thickening” their relations with the EU and EU member states bilaterally and in multilateral frameworks. In effect, the UfM and its member states transfer the conceptual boundaries of the policy framework (UfM) to the physical plane, creating a barrier or containment area between them and “the rest of Africa”. Furthermore, the geographical constraints of the Sahel region – arid and harsh conditions – assist this phenomenon, and the Sahel area has become a “border space” between widening degrees of development and insecurity between North Africa and the rest. The UfM, based on these conditions, is seen to be more potentially destabilising to the overall unity and specified39 resilience to the African panarchy, than the Sahel barrier-region.

38  See current “Human Development Index and its Components”. UNDP 2014. [online] Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components [accessed 16 Jan. 2015]. Prior to 2011, which saw Muammar Ghaddafi’s deposition and the collapse of the Libyan state, Libya ranked 53 on the HDR Index as opposed to 108 according to 2017 rankings. UNDP 2018 Statistical Updates. [online] Available at: http://hdr.undp. org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf [accessed 24 Apr. 2019] 39  As opposed to generalised resilience, specified resilience pertains to particular variables (key or controlling) that may have a threshold point leading to a change in system state or a regime shift. Both specified and general resilience are discussed in more detail in Chaps. 7 and 8.

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2.6  The EU-Africa Policy Complex The UfM, as an EU foreign policy initiative, can be considered part of a structure of CASs that forms the surrounding environment to Africa. Other interrelated CASs are the JAES, the EU-Sahel Strategy (2011), and the Joint EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, although these latter two partnerships are not considered central to this book. The presence of multiple policy frameworks, each with a narrowly (European) defined set of “main concerns” or politically defined issues with which to frame interaction between the EU and Africa, indicates primarily a divisive and fragmented perspective, and hence an externally projected compartmentalisation or regionalism of Africa, to Africa. This is in spite of the seemingly mutually beneficial aims of integration proposed by such policy frameworks that are purported to stimulate economic growth, and through prosperity provide stability and security; especially it would seem for Europe, a large part of which has been incorporated into the EU. Maladaptive systems such as imposed mental models and external schemata, through foreign policy partnerships, control and attempt to mould other systems in their image. Such external schemata maintain systems in particular states that otherwise would develop or evolve in conjunction with, and as a response to, its external environment. This is achieved without losing its internal integrity or changing its fundamental form or “work” function, that is to say its identity. Outside interference and the external environment, then, are deemed to be foreign policy agreements or partnerships that seek to organise and impose a particular order on their external environment, namely Africa, with its own specific institutionalised cultural references contained in integrationalism, which may be interpreted as counterproductive or counter-adaptive to African interests, internal schemata, or Africaness. In this particular case, neoliberal orthodoxy and ideals of “economically driven development” neatly parcelled into “integration”, are isolated as the kind of formulised schemata that provides selection pressures on African responses, in a bid to continue developing and evolving. That is not to say that one set of images, ideals, schemata or constructions of reality, identity, are universally “good”, or should even be considered more relevant compared to others. Neither is it ideal that in promoting Africaness, trends towards conservatism and social-ecological arresting should be further strengthened, as has been evident in some areas of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)/UfM area. The same policies, values, and processes that have been applied to the “Mediterranean” are being replicated in Africa as a whole, under the JAES, and the same emergent (negative) behaviours outlined (individualism, conservativism, isolationism/de-­linking, nationalism) need to be avoided as much as possible. In moving forward towards greater cooperation, whether it includes varying degrees of integration or not, it should be fair practice to mutually acknowledge the processes taking place; both parties need to take an active/pro-active joint role rather than pro-active/receptive role in creating a shared, fair vision of the future. More

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than this, however, is the mutual acceptance of cultural references, concepts, rules of behaviour and values, and social structures of organisation that lead to an egalitarian and sustainable socio-ecological (balanced) planet. While rhetorical provision has been made in some cases, for example in the JAES framework, African cultural references as far as they relate to styles of government and governance, economic paths of development, unity, and security are discarded in favour of those put forward by the EU and “shared” in the JAES. External influence in the form of dissonant external schemata, as provided by foreign policy frameworks with narrowly focused and determined conceptual paradigms, may create selection pressures unfavourable to perceived African resilience and hence security, as well as to unity as far as it relates to the holistic ideal of the African continent, formally institutionalised in the AU. While undermining an African identity, and through the imposition of one set of schemata onto another may appear to be the first issue of substance, and would certainly resonate with Realist zero-sum or even relative gains outcomes, perhaps the real issue relates to the juxtaposition of idealised or projected structures such as policy (human systems) and those that actually exist in real-time, which are subject to universal laws of physical nature. When schemata, images, or models of the outside world are created or invented, policies run the danger of inventing vastly dissimilar “imagined” or even maladaptive schemata, and hence SESs that restrict learning, adaptation and evolution to continual reproducibility (in evolutionary terms “fitness”) (Kauffman 1993: 37; Gell-Mann 1994: 248–249). Both informal and formal institutions including cultural frames of reference are considered as CASs with their own internal schemata. The UfM has been chosen as the focal or middle system in the panarchy, to evaluate its influence on the unity, and security of Africa as a continental whole. The UfM is defined as a policy framework, aimed at building an area of peace, prosperity, and security in a section of the world that incorporates parts of Africa and the Middle East. It is a conceptual or signified system that “sits above” the actual member states and so combines the policy with the EU perception of the UfM/MENA states. The infra or sub-system is considered to be the individual member states that make up the UfM in North Africa and the Middle East; the upper system is hence considered to be the EU.

2.7  Security The concept of security used in this study is one informed by systems philosophy and science. It is based on an understanding of structural relations and inter-dependency. System resilience as it relates to system security, further refers to a specified internal component of the system, (RAWP, 2.0: 34). As an internal component it is therefore a moving part relative to other system properties, values, and processes at different scales. As resilience levels change, consequently so do levels of security

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within the system’s adaptive cycle. Security (and insecurity) in this sense become natural processes of the system’s adaptive cycle. In the concept of panarchy, a balance between systems, and hence resilience or security, is to some extent maintained through its cross-scale interactions, its ability to “revolt” into the upper system/cycle, and for the larger slower system to contain the lower system’s omega (Ω) phase through “remembrance” and the “K” or Conservation phase (Gunderson and Holling 2002) (see Chap. 3). In current security studies parlance, both soft (non-military and non-state-­ centred) and hard (military and state centred) security issues are commonly associated with conflict, violence, and extended regional insecurity. In the context of this research, both social and physical systems being interrelated, abstract systems of signification (language), domination (politics, economics) and legitimation (law, norms) (Giddens 1987, in Westley et  al. 2002) play an important part in overall system resilience and hence security. In the absence of social “safety valves” such as equitable institutionalised structures of distribution (Holling et al. 2002), and the inability of the system to complete its adaptive cycle, the artificial extension or arresting of one phase, can lead to both specified and generalised resilience-loss, or more explicitly in the language of International Relations, social conflict, violence, inter-state and inter-regional conflict.

2.8  African Unity The concept of African unity is viewed as qualitatively distinct from European integration based on liberal democracy and neoliberal economic ideas of development (Ludlow 2014). African unity and Africa’s path to economic and political integration has a unique historical context based on shared African experiences of oppression under colonial rule, exploitation, and displacement (resulting from the Transatlantic Slave Trade, or TAST); struggles against colonial rule (liberation); the commitment to resisting further external interference and attempts to divide; and, resistance to bondage of any kind – economic and political, for example – by seeking “re-unification” (Audit of the African Union 2007; Nabudere 2001: 20–21). Furthermore, African unity is conceptually linked to pan-Africanism, and the solidifying of a holistic African consciousness that transcends regions, regionalism, and continental boundaries (Nabudere 2001: 19–20). The ideal of unification thus has a historically binding and emotional context, and is considered here an African value in its own right, that has been consistently kept alive and revisited over time in the pursuit of a collective African identity and external representation at the institutional and formal organisational levels; it has been successively addressed in the OAU, various policy agreements on security, economic development, and later in the AU. However, African unity and its pursuit became watered down, in the OAU, as an intergovernmental compromise between two identified groups, the so-called “gradualists”, or Monrovia group, and the more “radical” pan-Africanists or unionists, the Casablanca group (Nabudere 2001: 29–30; Ndi-Zambo 2001: 29), was reached.

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The establishment of the OAU took as its starting point the validation of the colonial territorial divisions (Ndi-Zambo 2001: 29; Nabudere 2001: 23), a decision that has been criticised and attributed the ensuing travails of the post-colonial/independent state, and subsequently the inability of Africa to (re)unite (Nabudere 2001: 18–19, 22–23). As such, African state formation was already established, resources already partitioned within territorial boundaries, value assigned and positioned in the international economic order as a result. Africa’s future institutional trajectory was as a result more than partially formed and determined. In this sense, perhaps, it may be contended that African identity has been not only physically constructed by external interests, but socially (institutionally) and ecologically as well. The establishment of the African nation state under colonial rule and its continued adoption post-independence, moreover, has (pre)established the basis for interest driven, “Realist” interpretations and understandings of African disunity, or the inability to act continentally, in spite of an African counter-discourse that has consistently pursued pan-Africanism and a (w)holistic identity based on unity. The EU foreign policy complex (and its integrationalism), of which the UfM and the JAES form a part, is posited to embody neoliberal economic values, and have contributed to and reinforced observed Realist behaviour between African states; in total, a counter-discourse that runs against the pursuit of African unity, and hence security in the sense already described above. The pursuit of African unification became both an inward-looking and outward-­ addressing process: The Monrovia Declaration (1979) and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) (1980) looked to strengthening internal ties, or “collective self-reliance and sustainable development” (Maloka 2004:8), and eventually “economic emancipation” from ex-colonial powers, external influence and an international economic world order perceived and acknowledged to be both unequal and ill-conducive to Africa’s participation on a fair-footing, and its future (Tesha 2004:8). Externally, this manifested itself in a concerted effort to change the international economic world order and its judged inequalities, with the New Economic International Order (or NEIO) (Tesha 2004:17). Economic independence and African self-reliance has expressed itself in policy agreements and African literary thinking as “delinking” (Amin 1990) and “autocentricity” (Mengisteab 1996); a conscious wish to separate African processes from those identified as external, colonial and n­ eo-­colonial ideas of economic paths to development and growth (Tesha 2004:8; 15–19; Adi and Sherwood 2003:vii). The African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER), the African Common Position on Africa’s External Debt, and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-­Economic Recovery and Transformation were explicit attempts to countermand and give voice to the recognition of European/external interference in African affairs. These counter-policies can be viewed as attempts to separate or “delink” itself from a system recognised to be unequal and detrimental to a distinct, independent, and regeneration of a “new” African identity.

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Institutionally, the subsequent step-by-step processes towards African unification by way of economic integration, and the appropriation of this term rather than the pursuit of unity, bear testament to the influence of Western organisational structure and symbolism carried over into African institutions and institution-making. The LPA and the Abuja Treaty to establish the African Economic Community (est. 1991) were attempts to create a formalised path towards African integration, and then unity. The AU, established in 2002, was seen as a response to the changing international circumstances and the forces of globalisation (Audit of the African Union 2007; Ndi-Zambo 2001: 31), and maintained the basis for a strategy of collaboration between African states. The ideal of unity has since provided a legitimate basis of intra-African relations and collegiate behaviour (Audit of the African Union 2007; Oxfam 2012: 2). Even if, as many have suggested, the political willingness to stay faithful to the long-term ideal has met with obstacles and challenges, the concept of African unity remains an idealised state successively valued in African consciousness, and one which is still held in the revived notion of an African Renaissance in the early twenty-first century (Nabudere 2001: 22–23; Filatova 2001: 65–66). The alternatives of competition, division, rivalry, and a yet another “scramble for Africa” are considered unthinkable for the future of the individual African states, and Africa as a continental, idealised whole (Audit of the African Union 2007: 14). In this at least, African unity remains a binding, if so-far elusive, institution. The historical precedent and long-standing institutional organisation presented by European/EU-Africa relations, together with the conceptualisation of the current mesh of EU policy complexes, predisposes Africa, and African institutionalism more susceptible to influences from Europe/EU, than vice versa. The ideal of African unity from this contextual basis runs counter to European or westernised ideals of integrationalism based on an entirely different historical context, notion of state, and of colonisers and colonised that now carries with it neoliberal economic and self-help/competitive ideologies prone to separation and individualism. Such antithetical positions cannot be married to Africa without undermining the fundamental ideological basis of African unity. Europeanised models of integration, which are already in play in Africa, are subsequently seen as potential threats to African institutions and a united (continental) identity.

2.9  Conclusion In describing the interactions between states and regions in international relations, the dynamics may evolve so rapidly that traditional descriptions may not be realistic. Rational approaches to international relations, including those that focus on institutions, can only provide a certain degree of explanation. The application of GST to the descriptions of such interactions is better suited and this chapter has described the rationale and methodologies of such an approach.

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It is generally difficult to account for emergence, transformation, and persistence of phenomena in social systems. The model of CASs in a panarchy helps to formulate and explain to a greater extent these properties than other theoretical frameworks. Regarding possible applicable methodological approaches, a fundamental understanding of the connectivities encountered daily, with interactions that may be either physical and/or social, at all spatial (local to world-wide) or temporal (immediate to far-reaching) scales, is required. This level of understanding is important as political dynamics and international relations are apparently contracting and moving towards isolationism. As a direct consequence, the propensity for the maladaptation of systems is also increasing. Under these circumstances, the concept of a SES, even if not dissected into individual systems and analyses, represents a paradigm shift in approaching sustainability of social and ecological systems. As such, the concept should be incorporated into mainstream political science and international relations. African value systems are fundamentally different to those being exported from the European Union. The EU foreign policy complex, consisting of the JAES, the UfM, the EU-SA Strategic Partnership, and the Cotonou Agreement/ACP countries, provides a referential environment for the developing African institutions. Recently, however, an African epic (see Chap. 6) has been emerging together with a rebirth of the idea of African identity. This is a counter-reaction to the suppression of African values from the top-down, which has happened in the MENA region through progressive successions of regionalism and EEC/EU policy framing. Integrationalism, the imposition of European neoliberal values via EU policy complexes has led to this counter-reaction. It has, to some extent, happened due to the disconnect between the top tiers of imposed, maladaptive schemata, which creates selection pressures on African lives through its institutions, and the infra-­system level of the MENA states. This transference has already been partially institutionalised through the JAES, and more recently with the African Agenda 2063 that sees Africa enshrining neoliberal ideological tenets and turning its gaze inward, demonstrating a propensity towards what Rosenau has called “fragmegration”.

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Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

3.1  Introduction General Systems Theory (GST) is a theoretical framework that is somewhat overlooked, especially in the recent applications of complexity in international relations theory. As applied, complexity theory (or as some would have it, theories) and the consideration of complex systems in international relations is considered “new”, or at least as having a rather shorter lineage and finer focus than its grounding in GST should give it. However, for reasons already touched on in Chap. 2 and as will be shown herein, complexity theory or the study of complex or dynamic systems, is considered to be part of the larger field of GST, and it is from here that this book’s methodology begins. The multi-faceted interpretations of security and the intersecting human and natural systems present in the focal system of study, GST, and the structural concept of panarchy, are deemed to be the best to describe the interactions that take place at the policy levels of the European Union (EU), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), between the countries of North Africa, and the “rest of Africa”. It is proposed that the international system of states, as it is so often referred to in International Relations literature, behaves as a nested set of complex adaptive systems (CASs), in this case considered as a panarchy, with the associated qualities and processes described hereafter. GST is complemented by a structured implementation found in the Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners 2.0 (RAWP) and the Resilience Assessment therein to understand the panarchy under consideration here, its component parts (such as states, regional and international organisations, foreign policy frameworks, international agreements), and the governing relations between them. The combination of theory and practical application is able to highlight the dynamics between system/policy/state and emergent issues from the theories and concepts that apply to and describe the panarchy. GST however, provides the theoretical underpinning and understanding of the interactions between human or socially constructed systems, and natural or physical systems. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_3

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The Resilience Assessment, as outlined in the RAWP 2.0, provides a practical tool for assessing overall resilience, sustainability, and as put forward here security, as well as indicate components that contribute or detract from specified resilience as regards the panarchy. The systems approach or methodology has already been outlined in Chap. 2. However, some confusion often arises from Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s GST, which is an umbrella term for a systems philosophy (including an epistemology, ontology and axiology), systems science, and systems technology (von Bertalanffy 1972). This theoretical framework relates to that which von Bertalanffy has termed systems science and refers to theories based on the paradigm “system” (and its associated qualities), acknowledged to be a generalised model (physical, abstract, and conceptual) and applicable across the disciplines of science and humanities. This chapter will give a brief overview of GST and its relevance to the research herein, before focussing on the concept of panarchy, the CAS, and its properties.

3.2  Why General Systems Theory? Due to advances in technology and a faster growing and connected world, current methodologies and traditional methods of observation are proving inadequate to provide results or answers (Page 2011; Laszlo 1973; Wilson 1973; Kramer and de Smit 1997: 1; Capra 1988). There is no parallel in history to the modern world and the phenomena of being “continually connected” (Hartzog 2005); information filters through at a much faster rate, influencing daily judgments and actions (Page 2011: 8). Converging information and the modern (at times overwhelming) complex world, presents a level of “unpredictability” or uncertainty that requires a novel way of making effective decisions (Page 2011: 8; Laszlo 1973). New approaches and understandings, therefore, are needed for iterative occurrences and situations, which resurface with pattern-like regularity despite careful planning and controlled management (Beer and Leonard 2011). GST and the study of systems are a way to manage the apparent overwhelming complexity of information that bombards modern life. As Emery states in his collection of essays on the topic, “systems thinking is demanded of us when we confront the “problems” or “messes” of people, including ourselves…” (Emery 1981: 12). Of most importance in this day and age of globalised international relations, systems thinking and theories allow us to go from the whole to the individual and back again, or from the “particular to the universal and back” (Emery 1981: 8). In this way system theories and methodology can help in the re-focussing of a unified and holistic vision of the future, and give us the perspective of an entirety, a whole humanity/planet, rather than solely of parts and its aggregates. Systems, and

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in particular panarchy, conceptualised as a nested set of CASs, can help visualise and organise the connections and interactions between the social, cultural, political, economic, technological, and ecological systems. These lead naturally to the concept of a socio-ecological system (SES), drawing attention away from an imbalanced focus on individual parts of a system, such as the economic system or people centred approaches to development, to an overall vision of what is conducive to a sustainably evolving planet. This is something that is becoming more relevant as the consequences of climate change become clearer. Over emphasising one part of evolutionary social development rarely takes into consideration the balance required to ensure the survival of the overall system(s). On the contrary, concentrating on only a few parts or sub-parts can lead to that which has been referred to by Holling and Gunderson (2002) as “pathology of resource management”. While apparently solving one problem, this managerial approach creates imbalances and deterioration in the resilience or elasticity of the overall systems. As a consequence its ability to recover and ultimately survive is jeopardised (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 61). In this sense, resilience is very much an aspect of security, security for the future and the survival of the system(s) connected to it. Current systems thinking and theories provide the kind of awareness and explanatory constructs of the interdependence that exists between human (constructed) systems and the physical environment, and also the required balance (or equilibria) between them. Systems theories are able to elucidate the workings between the Whole and its parts, and the relations or dynamics between them. Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s idea for a GST (von Bertalanffy 1950, 1972) was developed from the concept of “organismic” biology that examined the biological laws governing organisation at that (biological) level (von Bertalanffy 1972: 410). There have been a variety of ways of organising the various strands of systems theory and application. Having come from an assortment of disciplines (in the sciences and humanities), the converging and overlapping of concepts ultimately show that although originating from different backgrounds, the same concepts can be applied to a range of identified systems across disciplines. This is so, provided the original meaning ascribed to them are maintained and applied in the same way. As is so often the case, there has not been strict adherence to the original meanings and it is perhaps this that has most likely contributed towards GST and systems theories in general being dismissed from the pantheon of mainstream international relations theories as being “anecdotal”. Following von Bertalanffy, dynamical systems theory provides the basis for this research, and is also the point of departure from that which has been termed complexity theory, and the RAWP (which incorporates the Resilience Assessment). Dynamical systems or open systems are those which “exchange energy and matter with their available environment and display non-linear behaviour” (Huggett 2007; von Bertalanffy 1972).

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3.3  P  anarchy: A Theory Across Spaces, Times, and Disciplines It is from the expansive history of systems approaches drawing on traditions of empiricism and hermeneutics that Gunderson and Holling’s panarchy is based. The SES encompasses all aspects of human creativity or socially constructed systems such as social, cultural, economic, political, technological systems, and also natural/ ecological systems. Panarchy, the conceptualised model of interacting, multi-scale SESs, is used in conjunction with concepts and terms taken from GST. Under this conceptualisation, panarchy allows for an understanding of the international system that is based on the idea of an (pan)anarchic system: a bottom-up successively structured development of self-reinforcing scales and emergent structures and behaviour, “ordered” or possessing the “directed correlation” of a dynamic system (Sommerhoff 1969: 147,173). The overall functioning of the international system, viewed as a CAS, is uniquely correlated through relativistic relationships that are structurally integrated. The use of panarchy in the description of interacting systems leads to an understanding of mutually assured survival, based on just distribution and balance between SESs, geared toward a sustainable, egalitarian future which is in turn based on a vision of shared planetary identity. The idea of individualism and self-determination in all things, diversity and unity coexisting side by side, can be seen in panarchy, described by Delcourt and Delcourt (2004) as “an integrative paradigm” for theoretical modelling. Gunderson and Holling base their paradigm on the adaptive cycle observed in all ecological systems, therefore the living, dynamic, interacting complexes of organisms. What was once deemed the fashion of science to fragment, deconstruct and analyse into its most atomistic part, has now come full circle with panarchy. This approach seeks to integrate humanity once more with nature, and to view, at the same time, all systems  – technological, cultural, social, economic, natural or physical  – as inter-­ related and inextricably connected.1 However, in spite of panarchy’s integrated approach, it recognises the character of distinct systems and their equally distinct critical (or “key”) variables and dynamics co-existing and sharing the same space at different spatial and temporal scales, hence moving away from simplistic binary oppositions or “tensions”. The added complexity of recognising different spatial and temporal scales in the panarchy has come from (biological and ecological) dynamic systems theory (GST).

1  It is acknowledged that in a strict physical context, all “things” at all levels are not “connected”. Of the “four fundamental forces of nature” (gravitational; electromagnetic; “strong”; and “weak” forces), only two operate beyond the sub-atomic level. Of these two, only a charged system can experience the electromagnetic force, making complete interconnectivity impossible. See Ohanian and Markert 2007. Physics for Engineers and Scientists. Extended third edition. New  York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc. p.191.

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Gunderson and Holling’s panarchy needs to be distinguished from Paul Hartzog’s (2005) concept, however, as this emphasises the virtual world through information technology, and the advent of the internet and the World Wide Web. Although its application of the CAS and biological descriptive aspects of it are used – emergent properties and swarming, for example  – Hartzog’s concept misses the additional and vital component that is supplied by time and long-term evolution present in the bio-eco-system as a theoretical, conceptual, and physical backdrop. It is precisely this aspect of dynamism from biology – and therefore its background in GST  – in Gunderson and Holling’s version of panarchy that is most appropriate to describe the world-system: human and planetary life are CASs and made up of static and dynamic parts, and all socially constructed systems such as states, cities, villages, cultures, identities, and economies, can be seen to show the same propensities for complex interactions and evolution. As a dynamical systems construct, Gunderson and Holling’s panarchy also incorporates aspects of general evolutionary theory, systems design, and has the necessary theoretical and experiential tradition. It is this “image” of panarchy, the heterarchical, complex and adaptive image of the international world system that operates above, through and within, supplying a holistic image of an entire system that has the capability to lead human and social ecological humanity consciously, and collectively, into an equitable, balanced future.

3.4  Defining Systems: Getting Down to the Essentials As a starting point, a system may be considered a Whole, operating in “quasi independence” from its available environment (Feibleman and Friend 1945). A system, furthermore, may have an unspecified number of component parts and subparts, arranged in a particular order (for example, the human body “system”), which contribute to and define its functioning (Angyal 1941: 38; Sommerhoff 1969: 147). Most importantly, a system may not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts, but in conjunction with them to the overall, “super-ordinate whole” (Angyal 1941). There may be different kinds of discernible systems, varying from simple to complex, depending on the degree of connectivity of the parts and subparts in the overall system. A system is multi-dimensional, that is to say, it cannot be analysed in a linear, cause-effect fashion that is characteristic of a rational, A + B=C “thought recipe” (Angyal 1941)], for example. A system’s dynamics consist of nonlinear processes that need spatial and temporal scales to be taken into account as well as the positional value of constituent parts to the whole. According to Angyal (1941), rational thinking essentially tries to explain behaviour, whereas a system’s approach or way of thinking tries to understand behaviour (1941). Hence, it is the overall structural organisation of the constituent parts of the system that becomes of paramount importance (Angyal 1941; Feibleman and Friend 1945), especially when distinguishing one system from another.

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The idea of inter-related or “nested” CASs, as conceptualised in panarchy (Holling and Gunderson 2002), therefore, is uniquely apt to understand the dynamic relations and explain behaviour between human systems (states, regional and international organisations; policy initiatives, frameworks, organised relationships) and natural systems (ecosystem services and resource distribution), and to assess overall sustainable and equitably assured resilience; the security for the system(s) under review.

3.5  Discerning Types of Systems It is possible to identify and categorise systems by their organisational structure, and the degree of connectivity or interdependence that exists between their parts. These constitute varying degrees of simplicity or complexity (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 47). In categorising systems, Feibleman and Friend (1945) distinguish the kind of relations between parts within a system,2 the rules of organisation (that is the ordering or “construction principles”),3 and the kinds of system-organisations. Further, there are two kinds of system-organisation that are distinguished by their degree of “integrality” (1945: 47): agglutinative and participative, the latter being identified as the most common (1945). The Participative system-organisation has been further conceptually sub-divided into three more distinguishable variants: adjunctive, subjective, and “complemental” (Feibleman and Friend 1945). In the adjunctive kind, the sharing of parts within the system is not necessary; they are able to exist independently. This, following a strict definition, is not a system but what Angyal has termed an “aggregate”, a simple addition of parts to form a whole for a particular work or function (Angyal 1941: 39). In some respects, this is not unlike Hartzog’s “smart-mobs” or “swarming” observed in modern day collaborative action and facilitated by network communication. The Adjunctive “system” is therefore linear in its construct, and its parts can function independently and interchange without any transformation occurring in the overall appearance or operation of the system (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 49). In the Subjective organisation, sharing is necessary to one part, but not the other, hence there is a certain degree of interdependency; and in the third kind, the “complemental” organisation, all parts and subparts are shared and are completely interdependent for their survival and functioning as a system (Feibleman and Friend 2  For a comprehensive and detailed description of these kinds of relations, see Feibleman, J., and Friend, J.W., 1945. “The Structure and Function of Organisation”. In Emery, F.E., (Ed.) 1981. Systems Thinking. Volume One. Middelsex: Harmondsworth Publishing. pp. 41–68. 3  These can be the structure (the sharing of parts and subparts), and the organisation or arrangement of parts within a system, which is the “controlling” factor; in every system there is a controlling relation that is necessary, it must have a “middle” or centre part, and direct connection to all parts, subparts and the whole; all parts must be shared. Loc.cit.

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1945: 48–49). It is the last system-organisational type, the (Participative) “complemental” system, or as is now termed the “complex” system, that forms the conceptual basis and departure for discussion and analysis in this study. The various aspects of complex systems and in particular, CASs, are outlined below.

3.5.1  Pinning Down the Complex System A complex system is a system that exhibits nonlinear dynamics, containing sub-­ system structures that can function semi-independently, while exhibiting degrees of connectivity and dependency between all its parts, including its sub-parts, and their relation to the Whole. There are specific kinds of relations that are permitted between its parts and sub-parts (its internal structure), as well as its external, available (or operating) environment, which identify it as “complex”. Because of these conditions, a complex system further develops characteristics such as emergence and feedback effects (either positive/incremental or negative/diminishing). Hence “complex” refers not only to the number of components (or interacting agents) and sub-components that are interdependent, but also to the flexibility of the relations between them. Complex systems are able to reorganise themselves in relation to external influences from their available environment in such a way as to remain in the same functional, recognisable form and system state. The system is able to continue functioning without disturbing its overall form and function. The number of components/agents/parts of the system lends itself to complex arrangements (Waldrop 1992: 11), emergent properties, and structures: each component’s development or evolution is relative to its surrounding components or agents, and its external environment (sometimes referred to as a “fitness landscape”) (Kauffman 1993: 37) or other surrounding systems.

3.5.2  The Complex Adaptive System Complex adaptive systems are, as their name implies, both complex and adaptive. As such they are distinct from other kinds of systems (closed or non-adaptive systems, for example, such as a heating system in a house) in general. There are many different kinds of CASs, from biological forms such as humankind, and human internal sub-systems such as the immune system, to human or socially constructed forms such as the economy, political regimes, businesses, regional organisations and institutions, for example (Gell-Mann 1994: 19). In spite of their physical differences, however, CASs have common properties, traits, and governing relationships that distinguish them from other kinds of systems. CASs are dynamic, constantly changing and re-arranging their internal structures in relation to other CASs. The system maintains a stable or steady state by doing this, but is never at a static “equilibrium” state. There are many levels in a

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CAS as its structure reinforces its dynamism and ability to self-organise. Each successive higher level creates “building blocks” (Waldrop 1992) and hence emergent behaviours and structures for further levels, which are larger and higher (Waldrop 1992: 145; Gell-Mann 1994: 16). Furthermore, there is no “master neuron” (Waldrop 1992: 145) in a CAS that drives and guides its behaviour or evolution (Waldrop 1992: 145). Instead, the structure of the whole and its internal dynamics are uniquely correlated (through competition and cooperation) as to give it the appearance of being guided by an overall “intelligence” towards a near-perfect point of fitness, where the system and others related to it may reproduce (Gell-Mann 1994: 248–9; Kauffman 1993: 37). Self-­ organisation emerges from successive generations of increasing organisation and re-organisation of structure, and the ordering of inherited memory and learning gained from previous evolutionary cycles. Moreover, the CAS is designed from the bottom up, and subsequently also hierarchically ordered from the top down to optimal interdependent working synergy (Waldrop 1992: 244). It is more appropriate, rather, to name this bottom-up/top-down coordination and structural organisation a “heterarchy”, based on the number of dynamic processes taking place over both orders of time and scale (von Goldammer et al. 2003; Crumley 1995). The research herein has used Panarchy to denote a particular model of set dynamics that incorporates both sequential (hierarchical) and cross-scalar (heterarchical) interactions that can appear non-sequential. The surrounding environment of the CAS plays an integral and symbiotic part in the evolution of the system, and its ability to survive. It is through interaction with other CASs or the external environment at large that the CAS is able to evolve. It does so through creating an internal or “implicit model” (Waldrop 1992) of the external environment with which to project and predict possible effects and anticipate responses (Waldrop 1992: 146). The internal structure will “learn” to assign value to the most effect response to the external environment, and discard ones that have no or detrimental effect towards its overall survival. In this way the available environment feeds back into the CAS creating “selection pressures” (Gell-Mann 1994: 24) on the internal workings of the system; it also influences the “mental models” (or implicit models/schemata) of the CAS as the system adapts and changes its behaviour as it gains experience (Waldrop 1992: 179). In other words, the environment and surrounding CASs both shape and constrain the system: the CAS is only ever as adaptive or “fit” as its surrounding environment will enable it to be (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 61; Waldrop 1992). The implications for development and survival should be clear. Further, in the internationally globalised context, social systems may be more closely connected and influenced by others, and yet will be tethered to localised physical systems. In this modern context, the available environment of each CAS is of course wider than the confines of their physical bases. Adaptive systems learn and adapt, and through their adaptation are able to evolve towards greater or higher complexity, that is, the range of possible learned responses to their available environment in order to improve their relative “fitness” (Gell-­ Mann 1994; Waldrop 1992). Their complexity further enables or reinforces their

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adaptability and evolution (Kremyanskiy 1958; Feibleman and Friend 1945; Gell-­ Mann 1994: 19; Waldrop 1992: 145). Holling’s adaptive cycle is a conceptualisation of the change and transformation observed to take place in CASs, which draws on four system phases each representative of specific system processes: “Ω” (omega) Collapse or release; α (alpha) or Reorganisation; “r” (Exploitation); and “K” (Conservation). In the context of international relations, the similarities between the abstract notion and workings of the CAS, and the building blocks of international relations such as states, regional and international organisations, transnational advocacy groups, and non-governmental organisations, are evident, providing insight into their emergence, change, transformations, and disappearance.

3.6  The Adaptive Cycle Holling and Gunderson (2002) draw on observations of the processes of ecological systems to describe their understanding of the CAS and the adaptive cycle, shown in Fig. 3.1. According to Holling and Gunderson (2002) ecological systems have key characteristics in common with other CASs, such as a specific order and nature of transformation, spatial attributes, and multiple equilibria (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 26). For Holling and Gunderson, the adaptive cycle is used as a metaphor, one part of a “heuristic theory of change” to explain transformation and continuity in SESs, and the conceptual set of “nested” CASs called a panarchy, which completes it (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 74). The adaptive cycle is made up of four observable phases, each representative of varying levels of potential, connectedness, and resilience. The adaptive cycle, as described previously, moves through stages of exploitation (“r”), conservation (“K”), collapse (or realease – “Ω”) and re-­organisation (“α”).

Fig. 3.1  The adaptive cycle, showing the four phases

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3.6.1  The “r” Phase – Exploitation The “r” phase is characterised by the presence and prevalence of highly adaptable and competitive entities, such as newly founded businesses, or companies, that quickly move towards dominating their environment (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 43). They are companies that have evolved specifically as a result of past cycles and are particularly adept at dealing with the nature of such an unpredictable and fluid environment (Holling and Gunderson 2002). Holling and Gunderson (2002: 43) identify them as “risk takers, pioneers, opportunists”. Resilience is therefore high due to this overall characteristic of fluidity and the ability of the system to contract and expand at this point; correspondingly, Connectedness is still “loose” from the previous Alpha (“α”) phase. This in turn allows for competition to take place between the new arrivals and survivors from past cycles; the most aggressive and first to respond to the changing environment are the ones that succeed and dominate, eventually sequestering available resources to the exclusion of others (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 43). At this point, outside influences are still unpredictable, and entities – companies, new emerging species – are guided by their available environment, unable to control it. New “sub-species” often emerge in this phase from the competitive processes, as survival is more or less guaranteed in alliances or through domination. Eventually these new sub-species become better able to adapt to external variability. As this phase progresses towards the following “K” phase, the new dominant sub-species are able to control resources and space to such an extent that further newcomers are unable or limited in their ability to enter the arena to compete.

3.6.2  The “K” Phase – Conservation This phase, as the name indicates, further establishes structures of control, claiming or holding on to system resources that the dominant species or “winners” of the last phase have managed to accumulate. The majority of the available resources has been captured by the dominant few for their needs, and as a result the entry into the system of other would-be competitors, irrespective of their (perhaps) superior quality of product (Holling and Gunderson 2002), is restricted. Potential from system resources is reduced as it is “siphoned off” and exclusively allocated to the dominating entity, species, or company. As the conservation phase progresses, groups become tighter or more closely aligned, and contrary to what may be supposed under these conditions, the stability and resilience of the overall structure declines. Holling and Gunderson (2002) refer to institutions or firms stagnating, becoming too rigid in their bureaucracy, or “internally focused” at this point (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 44). As the system overall becomes more brittle, it becomes more susceptible to occasional shocks or disturbances from either within the panarchy between scales or from external sources. Potential is reduced as the phase enters the following the Ω phase.

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3.6.3  The “Ω” Phase – Collapse The Ω phase is prompted by a shock or disturbance, either from within or from outside the system or the panarchy. The Ω phase can often appear sudden and dramatic due to the slow build-up of positive feedback on slow-moving variables within the CAS, which gradually approach a threshold level and go unnoticed up until this point. The previous “K” phase also adds to the perception of “suddenness”, as its characteristic heightened connectedness only gives the appearance of stability, yet this (rigidity) also counter-intuitively increases the influence of the disturbance, subsequently triggering its actual collapse at that point. Once the variable’s threshold level is reached and tipped as described, the entire system collapses. This phase is also referred to as the “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, cited in Holling and Gunderson 2002: 45) phase, where the initial shock and break down of the system gives rise to new beginnings and opportunities.

3.6.4  The “α” Phase or Reorganisation The nature of the “α” phase in the cycle is an important one as it is key in the development of the life-cycle of the system. It is a dynamic phase, characterised by loose structure, loose enough for certain organisms, organisations, and entrepreneurs for example, to come to the fore that previously would not have been able to surface (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 41). It is a phase where anything is possible, uncertainty reigns, as conditions represent a “melting pot” of ideas, opportunities coalescing to form conditions for the following phases of the cycle. Potential is high, as is Resilience. It is precisely these pre-conditions that enable a “testing” of new combinations of groups, species and organisations, where the system becomes “elastic” and enables the emergence of new (derivative) species of organisations.

3.7  Qualities of Complex Adaptive Systems 3.7.1  Stability, Equilibrium, and Balance in Systems Equilibrium in common parlance is used interchangeably with balance and stability. In precise scientific language, however, and in relation to CASs, the term has a rather specific meaning, which in turn has a bearing on the kind of system interactions (and therefore system) present. Strictly speaking “equilibrium” should be reserved for inanimate or “static” systems that do not require any interchange of energy with its external environment to survive or maintain its function or structure (von Bertalanffy 1972). It is this definition that is most commonly used interchangeably with balance and stability:

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a­ pplying it incorrectly to modelling CASs in International Relations results in problematic analyses. All dynamic (and complex adaptive) systems strive towards equilibrium, but can never physically attain it until the point of death (biological organisms) or dissolution (businesses, companies). Once perfect equilibrium has been reached, the organisation/organism is effectively “static” or “dead” (as in a physical organism), as no further interchange between its environment, and hence growth, can take place (von Bertalanffy 1972; Waldrop 1992: 145; Miller and Page 2007: 83). In relation to the dynamics of a CAS, therefore, examples of which may be the international (world) system, a regional organisation, an international organisation or (nation) state, or combinations thereof, the concept of static equilibrium in this sense cannot be used. Instead a more appropriate description would utilise dynamic equilibrium, which is associated with open and complex systems.

3.7.2  The Steady or Stable State, Alternate States A steady state is synonymous with dynamic equilibrium. Each system occupies a state space, and includes a set of possible system states or a repertoire of states that it can be in. Systems, if one can attribute human preferences to them, will prefer to be in a stable or steady state, or one of dynamic equilibrium, where the system maintains a steady interchange with its available environment as to continue functioning (von Bertalanffy 1972: 85; Kauffman 1993: 176). Each system state has an ordered range of components or variables and a set of dynamics (interactions) and/ or values (qualities) that make it “stable”. Every so often, changes in variables may occur; crossing a threshold point will move the system from one system state to another, a process leading to alternate states of the system, which are repeatable in their general structure (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 36). For practical purposes, the Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners (RAWP) 2.0 advises reducing variables to 3–5 key variables, in order to minimise complexity (referred to as the “Rule of Hand”) (RAWP, 2.0: 25) but still be able to capture key processes and dynamics that will describe the system state (RAWP, 2.0: 25; Holling and Gunderson 2002: 71). Some system states are “super stable” and resistant to change or adaptation. By definition these are referred to as “maladaptive systems” or schemata, which hinder the ability of the system to change and evolve organically in relation to its landscape and survive intact (Gell-Mann 1994: 295–296). Maladaptive systems are also referred to as “traps”, as they maintain a restrictive array of processes to control the system state. These maladaptive systems can be held in place by a dominant individual, such as a dictator (Gell-Mann 1994: 297), or imposed traditions or regimes long past their relevance to evolutionary survival (1994). In these cases the system state requires constant intervention to maintain this imposed state. These kinds of system states are referred to as “meta-stable” due to their controlled or managed circumstances.

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3.7.3  I ncorporating Scale: Morphology, Lumping, and Imbricated Redundancy CASs and systems in general, operate at different orders of magnitude, that is at different scales, from the small to the large, over small to larger areas or regions and over short periods of time to years and millennia. The scale of observation – spatial or temporal – influences how the environment or a specific situation is perceived (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 63). Each scale is visualised as consisting of different processes and controlling variables that contribute to the organisation of its panarchy, or its connected system of adaptive cycles at higher/lower orders (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 76). Larger systems generally operate at a slower rate compared to smaller systems that are nested within them. The variables’ speeds of movement are relative to the scale at which they operate so that variables present in a small scale will complete the adaptive cycle processes over a shorter time period than larger, and slower, systems. As one example, species of animals, organisations, or other identified components of a CAS will exhibit properties and characteristics indicative of their scale – size and speed – of operation (Holling 1992). They will display form (size, shape, and other attributes), behaviour (decision making and selection) and function that enable them to use their available environment (both physical and constructed) that maximises their reproducibility (fitness) and survival (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 78–81; Gell-Mann 1994: 248–249). Morphology is the study of shapes and sizes in relation to the inhabited environment (von Bertalanffy 1972: 95; Kauffman 1993), the diversity of which is linked to system resilience through imbricated redundancy; and sustainability through structural composition of the panarchy (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 84). According to Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002), furthermore, the different scales will engender a discontinuous distribution of particular groups, similar in size, habit, or decision choices (2002: 86). The concepts of “lumping” or “clumping” refer to the distribution of groups as well as the resulting patterns created in the habitat or environment (2002). Resource patterns or aggregations (lumping), will also feed-back into decision making in environmental selection (2002: 86). All scales are important in a panarchy, as each level reinforces the viability and sustainability of the next successive scale or structural level through cross-scale interactions (integrated processes) that innovate, create, renew, and yet at the same time maintain the overall structural functioning of the panarchy (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 63). “Imbricated redundancy” refers to the overlapping of system functionality: at different scales of the panarchy. Institutions/species of animals will perform similar actions or functions to support and maintain the overall panarchy, especially in times of change or system disturbance (Holling et al. 2002: 408). Imbricated redundancy and the presence of diverse yet correlated agents / institutional function and behaviour add to the resilience of the overall system. The absence of this structural quality will contribute to its inability to adapt to previously

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tolerated system disturbances (Holling et al. 2002: 409). The idea of specialised or unique-styled businesses, companies or institutions filling a “niche” requirement in modelling international relations is actually an unviable construct within the theoretical framework of GST and the CAS, as it is primarily underwritten by the language – and logic – of “the market” within the rational tradition. This is one example where scientific (or ecological) concepts have been transposed and applied in another disciplinary context without their original meanings remaining intact. The resulting analysis misses the richness of a full application within GST, and the understanding it can provide of structural stability and resilience in international relations. The presence, for example, of multiple non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at different scales of engagement – community, national, regional – that overlap function yet respond differently, could add to the overall welfare and therefore resilience of social-ecological development.

3.7.4  Cross-Scale Interactions: Revolt and Remember Cross-scale interactions between CASs are between one scale and another, either higher or lower (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002). These interactions are necessary to the integration of the overall panarchy, where changing variables (moving at different speeds) at lower orders (scales) will have an effect at much larger and seemingly disconnected scales. International agreements, for example, will have far reaching effects and alter policies in a range of issue areas – economic, agricultural, or health– at the regional, local, and state levels in Africa. Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002) have further specified two particular kinds of cross-scale interactions that they consider to be of critical importance at times of change in the adaptive cycle: “Revolt” and “Remember” (2002: 75). “Revolt” refers to a disturbance from a smaller and lower sub-system cycle at the time of its collapse (Ω) phase, offering up a destabilising influence on the upper system cycle. Its effect is compounded if the scale above is passing through a K or conservation phase, when connectivity is particularly high and resilience is therefore low, causing over-rigidity in the system and hence a propensity to promote the onset of a collapse phase (2002: 75). “Remember” is a constraining process on the lower system cycles that contains (limits) the kind and degree of collapse and reorganisation the lower system is experiencing (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 76). Remembrance also acts as a resource (or reference) for potential regrowth, providing the lower system cycle with a “guiding” influence (2002: 76). The “Remember” influence is representative of past cycle adaptation and optimal structural system components (2002: 76). Revolt and Remember are key concepts in the processes of the adaptive cycle, as lower cycles “revolt” upward and “innovate” into higher cycles, while the higher cycles “stabilise” by providing “remembrance” to the lower cycles (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 76.)

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In human systems, however, at the level of hierarchies of signification, “reflexivity” is considered a unique quality that separates human systems from other CASs (Westley et al. 2002: 110). Reflexivity is the ability for the human psyche to remain intact at the level of the “whole” or of identity, while undergoing changes and re-­ organisation in memory, responses to external stimuli, and “reflex arcs” necessary for adaptation (Westley et al. 2002: 110).

3.7.5  Emergence Emergence is both a structural and behavioural phenomenon of CASs. It refers to the appearance of a form, quality, or behaviour due to collective action, at a particular temporal or spatial scale. Emergent properties (or behaviours) are those that come about only as a result of the collective action of a group of parts or sub-parts not distinguishable at the lower scale or in individual units. At different scales or levels of the system, the system will appear or behave in a manner distinct from the individual parts that go into its make-up. The EU identified as a CAS for example, and its foreign policy, could be described as emergent structures and behaviour from the collective efforts of sets of states or interests. Emergent behaviour and qualities in CASs are the result of many parts vying for survival and working together at the same time. Their dynamics are conducive to mutual survival as each adapts to the other in optimising their experience in that domain (Waldrop 1992: 259). The relationship between parts is not a straightforward competitive one. The components of the system “co-evolve”, and in doing so, the collectively formed qualities, behaviour, or policies “emerge” overall (Waldrop 1992: 288–9). Lumping (Sect. 3.7.3), or discontinuous distribution over temporal and spatial scales is, according to Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002), the result of slow and fast structuring variables and processes inherent in panarchies, and of the adaptive cycle phases (2002: 78). Hence lumping, can be seen as an emergent property of a panarchy and the configuration of nested sets of SESs (2002: 77). The study of “lumping” could help throw light on the emergence of particular social or political groups, such as ISIS.

3.7.6  Adaptation: Evolution, Learning, and Memory Learning, memory, adaptation, and evolution are essential to understanding the CAS. The CAS uses learned responses and memory to adapt and evolve through interactions with its external environment. The external environment, however, constrains the development and evolution of the CAS in a symbiotic relationship that elsewhere has been referred to as self-organisation and feedback. There are two ways a CAS can learn and evolve. One is through genetic inheritance or memory (Gell-Mann 1994: 19), and the other through gathered learning in

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the lifetime of the system (Gell-Mann 1994: 61). Through interaction with the environment, the CAS is able to draw an internal map/drawing or “model” along with the best possible responses to secure its survival in that environment among other “competitors”. The CAS is therefore only ever as “smart” as its relative environment can make it (Gell-Mann 1994: 17). The internal mapping or implicit expertise/models (Waldrop 1992), or schemata (Gell-Mann 1994: 17), underpin the formation and maintenance of a CAS, reorganising itself and selecting the most appropriate response from a range of others, assigning a higher value and discarding others, according to the stimuli from the external environment (Gell-Mann 1994: 24; Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 85). Those stimuli feed back to the internal schema to create selection pressures on the system, forcing it to choose a specific response from a range of others (Gell-­ Mann 1994: 24). The best possible response is then chosen and, if it proves worthwhile over time, it will be remembered and remain in the internal structure, having been assigned an appropriate value in relation to other responses (Gell-Mann 1994). In this way any foreign policy, for example, can be seen as providing selection pressures on other systems (groups of states), forcing them to adapt their internal structures and behaviours, as in the case of structural foreign policy (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008) such as that exhibited by the EU, or indeed here, as the foundation for EU integrationalism. The external environment (other surrounding systems), constrain the long-term development of the focal system (the meso-level of the panarchy), which is fundamentally and structurally dependent on the information, feedback, and selection pressures it receives from the external environment. In some cases, this restriction can lead to non-adaptation, non-learning, and extinction due to “too narrow a choice of criteria” for what is considered adaptive (Gell-Mann 1994: 297). What Gell-Mann (1994) has referred to as “maladaptive schemata” or mental models that fail, are therefore the ones that have no place or relation in the available environment as they are particularly inept at describing external events – and internalising them – and hence responding appropriately. These particular maladaptive schemata will not create a positive feedback and reinforce the appropriate selection, and hence adaptation and evolution (Gell-Mann 1994: 296–7). Human systems can be created maladaptive, as in the persistent preservation of a particular custom, cultural tradition, or market rule long past its applicability to current surrounding dynamics and structures (Gell-Mann 1994: 296), or from the choices of dominant or influential people in positions of power, who create rules and behaviour unable to adequately respond to a changing environment. The preference of heterosexuality as a “norm” has long been overwritten by the acknowledgment of alternative life-styles, sexual choices and orientations in different parts of the world, to various degrees. Uganda’s adopted stance on homosexuality is perhaps a recent example of the latter resistance (“Ugandan President Condemned…” 2014)4. More pertinent to this study, at a certain point in the development of the EU,  Interestingly, former President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have passed similar comments such as homosexuality as being “un-African”, and having been “imposed” on Africa, presumably by the West. See 2015. Homosexuality contrary to our values, 4

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for example, influential and dominant leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, and Jacques Delors were able to guide and impose their own elite and selective economically driven ideas of development on the agenda and working order of the then European Economic Community (EEC) / European Communities (EC) (Dinan 2004).5 Consequently realised much too late – and to the chagrin of leaders trying to pass through referenda at the national level – it was comprehended there appeared to be a “democratic deficit” and a large “gap” between what member states’ leaders had identified as of interest at the EU governance level, and what the individual populations actually voted for.6 Perhaps the most notable occasion of top-­ down imposition of such maladaptive schemata, is the EU’s “Constitutional Crisis” of 2000, and more recently in Britain with the now-infamous Brexit referendum vote in 2016. After what has been dubbed the Constitutional Crisis of 2000, the EU attempted to rectify and adapt itself structurally in a response to the apparent criticisms of its opaqueness, lack of democratic representation, and being out of touch with ordinary citizens and their interests. It is largely accepted, however, that business has continued “as usual” and little change was effected since then (Pech 2011). While it is still too soon to pass judgement on the outcome of the Brexit saga (ongoing at the time of writing), the tug-of-war in the negotiations of the terms of Britain leaving the EU has shown the disparity between those dealing at the higher levels of administrating government and the voting public in Britain. The years since the referendum vote have shown the lack of understanding, still, of the mechanics of the EU among its member states’ citizenry, in particular in the UK. It is important to note that although “maladaptive” can conjure up negative connotations, at their basic level they are simply systems or patterns of learned responses that do not adapt, and it is in this manner that they hinder the natural development of the overall system(s). In relation to foreign policy, these kinds of created or imposed schemata can evolve into being maladaptive, or at least be non-­representative of a majority’s reality. Within international relations theory, maladaptation shares some similarities to the idea of institutional “lock-in”, where once established, institutional rules and structures are difficult to dismantle or change, although this does not illustrate the extent or character of maladaptation, nor the implications for a CAS as described herein.

says Mugabe tells UN. News24. September 29; Sapa-AFP 2014. Mugabe slams “homosexual nonsense”. Mail and Guardian Online. April 19; Ismail, Sumayya, Sapa-AFP 2006. Mixed reaction to Zuma apology. Mail and Guardian Online. September 28. 5  Referring to the three Communities prior to the Merger Treaty of 1965(7): European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); and the European Economic Community (EEC). See Peterson and Shackleton 2012. The Institutions of the European Union. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.25. 6  For example the ratification process of the Maastricht or Treaty on the European Union, 1992. See Wood and Birol 2004. The Emerging European Union. Third edition. Pearson/Longman. p.71–72.

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3.7.7  Maladaptive Cycles, Systems, and Collapsing Panarchies As indicated above, maladaptive schemata can obstruct the flow and progression of the adaptive cycle, restricting its development and forward evolution. Increasing rigidity within the system can build up in the “K” phase and can intentionally be extended for longer periods of time by, for example, an authoritarian regime, or a particular socio-political or economic structure. The system then becomes arrested artificially and forcibly, with no adaptation actually taking place. As also pointed out, the rigidity of this arrangement will have the “seeds of its own destruction” (Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson 2002: 94, 98) built within it, as slight perturbations from within or from without can precipitate a collapse or “Ω” phase. This kind of CAS would exist with high connectedness, high potential and high resilience trapped in “K” phase (2002: 96). Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson refer to this as the “rigidity trap” (2002: 96). Causes for maladaptation in cycles may vary, however, as the concept of pathology of resource management would indicate: trying to manage production or a particular element that relies on a larger cross section of inputs and other influences, reduces the diversity of the overall system and panarchy (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 6). This in turns leads to an increase of uniformity and loss of resilience (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 60). Once resilience is reduced, so is existing and future potential and the ability to regenerate “novel” combinations and new(er) arrangements in order to progress to the following phases that in turn are important to the growth and succeeding development of the system (2002: 60–61;96). The subsequent system states become “degraded”, and can spread, influencing further degradation in states, even possibly beyond recovery (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 60; Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 96). These conditions create what Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002: 96) call a “poverty trap”, whereby the system becomes degraded and propagates the qualitative degradation through the panarchy, and its adaptive cyclical processes. Panarchies either subsist at the lowest level, or disintegrate entirely due to the inability to regenerate sufficient qualitative values of the adaptive cycle necessary for its constructive evolution (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002). Maladaptation, or the halting of the adaptive processes, therefore, can lead to maladaptive systems, and subsequently to eventual disturbances within a panarchy. Under certain circumstances, accumulated potential can exceed a threshold level within the adaptive cycle and cascade up creating a higher level of [the] panarchy (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 90). Under the normal progress of the adaptive cycle, as long as the systems remain connected, build-up of potential of any other kind of critical variable is able to dissipate between structures, reinforcing the self-maintenance of the panarchy. Although not highlighted by Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002), it must be assumed that if likewise a CAS becomes decoupled from its upper or lower levels, there is the possibility that the system at that scale will collapse due to it not being able to “overflow” or dissipate organically into those system cycles. At rare points over time, however, and across closely associated adaptive systems cycles, CASs cycles can become aligned sequentially: at that point, several

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systems can pass through the “K” phase – extreme connectedness, low resilience and therefore vulnerability – at the same time. The build-up of potential and novel recombination has a far greater impact than that of a (normal) transition phase (Ω to α), which would typically be contained by the larger higher level (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 90). At the same time it can occur that alternative kinds of potential at the lower levels will emerge that may not have previously been able to, due to the containment offered by the larger cycles, and reshape the ensuing social and/or ecological landscape (2002: 92). Smaller cycles move at a greater speed than larger cycles at a greater scale or order of magnitude, so the opportunity for this to happen is rare (2002). The kind of transformation described above is generally considered to be “constructive”, emanating from the “novel” recombination of the Ω/α phases of lower, smaller, and faster adaptive cycles (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 90). If creative influences such as potential tend to flow or “revolt” upwards, then accordingly destruction of the panarchy appears to begin from the top and “cascades” down (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002). Once a CAS has become maladaptive due to the elimination of either a critical and/or structural variable, or qualitatively speaking, in relation to different arrangements of potential, connectedness, or resilience, the system will – as indicated above – become more prone to random, large scale external events or disturbances (2002: 92). Such large scale events can destroy structuring variables of the panarchy across scales, leading to slow recovery afterwards (2002: 92). Examples exist of the resulting sporadic transformations in the history of ecosystems and human civilisations, where massive collapses were followed by long periods of stability and reconstructions, evolving to higher levels of structuration and complexity as panarchies rebuilt themselves (2002: 92).7 Social crises at many levels can also collude to precipitate an overall panarchy collapse (2002: 95). The ability of humans to create systems of signification and meaning, places them in the unique position of being able to pre-empt, enforce, or consciously deconstruct maladaptive schema or systems. As such, the ability to dissipate stresses and construct (institutional) outlets that serve to dissipate these system stresses, are possible. Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002) point out that modern democracies, provided they have literate and educated citizenry, can do this through periodic elections (2002). What they do not specifically account for, is the possibility of variations of “democracy”, as are found across the world, and an uneducated citizenry (2002: 95).

7  In ecological or biological examples, time scales for recovery are obviously much longer. Historical events indicate that biological diversity loss also eliminated species and their niches. Under these circumstances, different dominant species were able to establish themselves in the meantime and hence altered the ecological landscape. Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson point out that this is unlikely to happen in the evolution of human (social) systems. Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson, 2002. “Sustainability and Panarchies”. In Gunderson, L.H., and Holling, C.S., (Eds.) 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems. London: Island Press. p.92.

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3.7.8  Self-Organisation and Dissipation Self-organisation is a phenomenon observed in CASs, where components of the system may organise themselves spontaneously towards ever higher degrees of complexity, and in doing so increase their ability to adapt to their surrounding environment, and most importantly, to other agents or components in the system (Waldrop 1992: 145–6). While self-organisation is not an aspect that is considered specifically in this study, it is important to highlight how it relates to other concepts in the dynamics and structures of CAS systems. Spontaneity is key aspect of self-organisation, as it relates to the system’s ability to survive at an optimal level. Subsequent system arrangements are maximised by an “internal model” of the projected surrounding environment (Waldrop 1992: 146). In this sense, the internal model predicts the best path to be in, in order to maximise advantageous adaptation and evolution. This aspect has been identified by Christopher Langton and Stuart Kauffman as the “edge of chaos” (Kauffman 1993). In this regard, the “edge of chaos” is a transitional system state that can be equated with Holling and Gunderson’s “Ω” phase. It is a state between order and disorder, where the system is most “elastic” and flexible to allow for “diffuse” and “novel” (Holling and Gunderson 2002) arrangements to take place (Waldrop 1992: 146;303). The dynamic system itself does not have an explicit guiding principle that spurs it on to adapt and evolve, but what Sommerhoff (1969: 173) has referred to as “directive correlation” and set “controlling relations” (Feibleman and Friend 1945) within its organisational structure. Thereafter, it is through competitive and cooperative interactions with other agents or components from within or from outside the system that a “goal directedness” (Sommerhoff 1969) may be apparent (Waldrop 1992: 288). The system grows towards evolution and the best possible version of itself and in the process selects the most appropriate traits or qualities to continue to evolve and sustain itself (Waldrop 1992: 146). This is not to be confused with any conscious decision-making, however, or rational behaviour that would imply an innate consciousness in any sense. Selecting appropriate traits, qualities, or values therefore, is also part of the self-organising process and supports learning, adaptation, and evolution. Waldrop (1992) describes this as similar to the principle of increasing returns (Waldrop 1992: 35), where self-organisation is in fact, “self-reinforcing”: once a critical level of complexity and interactions have been reached, the system “spontaneously re-organises” itself to a higher level of complexity, “understanding” and adaptability (Waldrop 1992: 11). What is a necessary condition for self-organisation to manifest, is a critical level of density and diversity (Waldrop 1992: 11). It could be said that self-organisation emerges from this diversity and that the process further reinforces emergent structures and behaviours. Self-organisation is therefore reliant on structure. The building blocks of dynamic systems are arranged from simple to higher orders of complexity, producing emer-

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gent behaviour and structures that both reinforce the lower orders and provide the platform for further higher levels (Waldrop 1992: 244). All levels of system structure are integral to the Whole system.

3.7.9  Feedback Loops and Chains of Interaction Feedback loops are part of the self-organising and adaptive processes of the CAS.  Feedback loops refers to “chained” interactions between system variables, and between CASs and their surrounds that provide learning and hence the impetus for adaptation and evolution (Waldrop 1992: 180). Feedback can be “positive” or “negative”. A positive feedback is one that contributes to the overall workings or balance of the system, forcing it away from an equilibrium state; a negative feedback results in a stabilising effect (Miller and Page 2007: 75; Waldrop 1992: 36–7). The effects of positive feedback furthermore are difficult to surmise as small events can lead to greater returns (Miller and Page 2007: 75; Gleick 1998: 61; Waldrop 1992: 36). Feedback can have a different effect on different systems. In non-linear systems such as the CAS, it is quite possible for a positive feedback to continue to do so until it “dissipates” and attains a stable or dynamic equilibrium (Gleick 1998: 193–4;292).

3.7.10  Potential (Resources, Memory, Learning, Adapting) Potential forms one part of three key interrelated properties of the adaptive cycle, the other two being connectedness and resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 36). Throughout the adaptive cycle’s path, all three properties interact to produce the movement between phases of the cycle (Holling et al. 2002: 398). Potential is linked to the resources of the system and their organisation, and is “acquired” from their accumulation (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 38). As resources of the system are accumulated, potential increases, and as the system passes through a collapse (“Ω”) into reorganisation (α), the system’s resources are “dropped” (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 35). Potential remains low until the system passes from reorganisation (α) into exploitation (“r”), at which point the system’s resources can be “taken up” again by the requisite agents (2002). Between the reorganisation and exploitation phases, potential is likely to “leak” from the system, but never completely dissipates (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 38). If this were the case, the system would no longer have the ability to use the resources and regenerate itself or continue its adaptive cycle (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 38). At the same time, (lower) levels of connectedness allow for new entrants into the system to pick up whatever left over resources there are, and in

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conjunction with what potential there is, begin to reorganise: resources and potential begins to increase (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 38). In this sense, potential is also linked to the memory, and as such is path dependent (as the remaining potential gets carried forward into the following phase, exploitation). Potential therefore controls the possibilities of the system to develop and evolve its quality; its variable concentrations through the cycle creates the conditions for the future of the CAS (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 51). Potential is qualitatively different from system to system and is also dependent not only on the (other two) properties of Resilience and Connectedness, but also on the quality of the Agents or active components of the system and their ability to organise and regulate the system’s resources. The potential of a system is directly affected by this ability or lack thereof. Homer-Dixon’s concept of “ingenuity” (1995), and lack of it (as in the “ingenuity gap”), together with Bourdieu’s “cultural capital” (1986), share similarities with this understanding of the inter-dependency between having resources, and knowing how to regulate and organise them to develop and maintain potential. Understanding these dynamic relations helps to understand the depths of the influences that external selection pressures have on the internal ability of the CAS to evolve.

3.7.11  Connectedness (Internal Organisation) Connectedness refers to the optimal degree of internal structuration, which allows the system to adapt to external variability without jeopardising the overall integrity and functioning of the system (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 50). The number or density of relations will moreover determine the flexibility or elasticity (resulting in resilience) of the overall system allowing for feedback (communication between sub-systems and the external environment), self-regulation/organisation, and the establishment of a steady state or stability. In this sense, Holling et al. (2002: 399) propose that connectedness in general allows the system to “control its own destiny”. Connectedness as a system quality, has a direct relation to the capacity of the system to adapt and transform throughout the cycle’s phases, and acts in correlation to the other properties of the system such as potential and resilience. In the transition from “r” phase to “K” (conservation), connectedness is high, as is potential (although potential is already absorbed and contained through the high-levels of connectedness), and resilience is low. In the “Ω” phase of the adaptive cycle, connectedness is low, as is potential, and resilience is high (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 34). It is also at this stage in the cycle that the degree of connectedness allows for an “outward” looking ethos, where entrepreneurs and newcomers to the system may appear, adding further evolutionary possibilities (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 34; 38).

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3.7.12  Resilience Resilience is generally closely associated to understandings of stability and what it means for a system or an organisation to be stable. Holling and Gunderson highlight two interpretations essentially at odds with each other, one leading to a pathology of resource management (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 28), and the other more ideal interpretation, coming from an applied mathematical and resource/ecological background (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 28) or what Holling describes as an “inductive” theoretical background (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 29). The first and least amenable, termed an “engineering” view of resilience, is traced back to cultural contexts based on a rational approach, where Nature is perceived as manageable and controllable, with a fixed, determinable end “target”. In this sense, systems or organisations maintain a stable state in “static equilibrium”. Resilience is measured in terms of a system’s ability to resist disturbances, as well as the speed at which it returns to (static) equilibrium (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 27). This reading of resilience is inapplicable to natural systems, which are evolving, complex, and dynamic. Such a “snapshot” framework misses key components, dynamics or processes and restrict “knowledge”, of the overall system (Holling and Gunderson 2002). The second interpretation comes from what Holling and Gunderson (Holling and Gunderson 2002) deem as a “deductive” approach or one based on direct observation. This view of resilience is of one that is in orchestration with the system’s surroundings and circumstances. It is a view of the environment that is far from static equilibrium and based on the interconnectivity and multiplicity of processes that are on-going at any given time; one that involves multiple (dynamic) equilibria. The system is viewed as predominantly “unstable” and capable of “tipping” over into another re-arrangement or stability domain (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 27). Resilience is a necessary quality or variable of a dynamic system, which “expands and contracts” throughout the phases of the adaptive cycle. Resilience ideally should be high in periods of collapse (“Ω”) and reorganisation (“α”), allowing the system to re-organise itself in relation to the new arrangements of the succeeding phases. It is a quality that determines the ability of the system to remain faithful to its overall structure and hence character, without collapsing or deteriorating beyond a sustainable and reproducible state. Resilience in this sense is measured on the “magnitude of disturbance” an overall system can take, before it “flips” and re-organises its structure to encounter an alternative state (Holling and Gunderson 2002: 27). While some theoretical considerations of complex systems and complexity in the field of international relations tend to focus exclusively on one of these properties as key to understanding the CAS, this theoretical framework takes as a starting point that all properties (resilience, potential, and connectedness), function together and in relation to each other in a CAS to provide conditions for adaptation and survival.

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3.8  Components of a Complex Adaptive System 3.8.1  V  ariables, Critical or Key Variables, and Multiple Equilibria CASs change in value and quality over time due to the dynamic nature of its components (processes and variables). Variables of a CAS refers to components of a system that change in value or quality over a period of time. Depending on the scale, variables can be fast or slow moving, with fast moving variables normally associated with smaller scales. Slow moving variables may take a longer period of time to reach a threshold point (RAWP, 2.0: 27), creating the appearance of a sudden event or “Black Swan” (Taleb 2010), or of randomness when they do. Due to the integrated nature of systems, variables (and their thresholds or tipping points) can affect higher and lower scaled systems, causing cross-scale interactions or disturbances and precipitating a change from one system state to another (RAWP). Critical variables are those which are “critical” to the structure of the CAS (and therefore the panarchy), and are often (but not always) associated with slow-moving variables that “surprise” or shock the system when they cross a threshold point. Variables change over a historical timeline and the evolution of the system. However, critical structuring variables will remain present throughout, although over time their values may change in relation to other variables. Multiple variables and therefore multiple thresholds and tipping points exist, making it particularly difficult to identify which one or how many will influence the outcome (RAWP, 2.0: 28). The RAWP (2.0), however, proposes identifying the variables that may be of concern, and the drivers of change that influence said variables as seen over the course of a historical timeline (RAWP, 2.0: 28). Multiple equilibria present in a CAS or a panarchy, refer to the number of variables each striving for dynamic equilibria within a CAS. The overall effect is one of networked stability.

3.8.2  I ntra-system Dynamics and Interactions with the Environment The systems so described are, by definition, open systems and are in constant communication with their immediate (or available) environment making both a necessary part of each other’s existence. This constant inflow and outflow, or exchange of materials, is what keeps the system growing, evolving, and functioning. There are certain relational  interactions between the dynamic system and its environment, which further positions its capacity for either one of these advances (growth, evolution), and likewise may affect its environment.

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The interactions of the system/environment can be categorised to indicate the various responses and effects that they have on each other in their quest for continual survival. In every exchange of material/information, each changes or precipitates a response or reaction in the other. It can be difficult to judge where initial responses/overtures begin,8 whether from the environment or from the system itself, and this is an indication of how intrinsic each is to the other; there is virtually no separation in this regard, as the needs of each is equal to the other. In the case of social systems (formal or informal institutions, for example, such as “regimes” or organisations, states, and so on), it is easy to see from this perspective how the contemplation of complex systems that do not connect or communicate with each other is theoretically implausible. Each complex system(s) is an external environment for the other(s), and vice versa. Implications for the study and review of influence of the EU and Africa is not voided, however, as the sum of overall influence (or effect) is still relevant, and the analysis of which stimuli is more demanding or influential in requiring adjustments from (Africa) one system on the other, still holds. Establishing a balance is of paramount importance. If the inflow of material received from the system’s environment is too great, it may not be assimilated, or may in fact disturb the internal structure to such an extent that the system collapses due to the imbalance created. If the outflow of material from the system is too great, likewise the environment may not be able to adjust or recover for the system to continue to function. There are various levels and densities of interactions between the environment and the system that are geared to maintaining a steady state or dynamic equilibrium that come from within the system, as a response from the environment as a “separate system”, and also between them through their interactions. Depending on the kind of system and its requirements, the system will determine what it uses from its environment. This is called its available environment: a system will only use a particular part of its surrounding environment and what it needs to survive, thrive and evolve (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 51). At the time Feibleman and Friend were writing the world was indeed very different, and their take on dynamic systems was generalised within their global reality and the international system at the time. In the contemporary globalised world, however, political and economic systems have widened the ranges of “available environments” beyond close geographical locations – or surrounds at least – that would apply, although the principle still remains the same: certain systems will only be able to relate in an optimal way to certain parts of particular environments. The capacity of the system to interact with its environment is determined not only by its available environment, but also by its organisational principle. The degree of integrality or integration, whether it is participative (adjunctive, subjective, complemental) or agglutinative, will to some extent dictate its function and hence relation to its environment. Its integrality will also determine the amount and

8  Feibleman and Friend assert that initial “stimuli” come from the available environment. Feibleman and Friend 1945. op.cit. p.54

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range of inflows it will require from its environment. There is an optimal level of complexity or integrality that will enable a dynamic system to not only grow, but adapt and evolve to the best advantages of its environment. If the system organisation is too complex, too integral, and hence too rigid, any minimal disturbance from the outside environment may be too extreme to be handled by it and may result in collapse, as in the “K” phase. Conversely, an optimal operating system will have a looser, less integral organisation with sufficient flexibility to adapt and assimilate changes in its environment to not only grow, but learn or take the different stimuli from its environment and adapt to a better standard of exchange, hence evolving to a higher, more advantageous (or “fit”) operation. An example of this used by Feibleman and Friend (1945) is the human body coming into contact with a virus and developing antibodies to resist further infections from that same virus: the human body, in this case, would have adapted to an outside “disturbance” and made it part of its operating functions in order to survive. Interactions with the environment or other systems can be gauged both by stimuli from the environment, and the kinds of responses from the system/organisation. Feibleman and Friend (1945) conceptually categorise stimuli from the environment or other systems as being negligible, effective, or destructive. Effective stimuli are further minimal, optimal, or drastic. Feibleman and Friend additionally classify the organisation’s responses to the environment / other system as being strongly resistant (“tenacious”), flexible (“elastic”), or given to change along with its environment through the assimilation of parts (“self-determinative”) (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 58). The response from the environment to these actions/reactions of the organisation is either “conservative” or “extensive” (Feibleman and Friend 1945: 58–59). If the response from the environment is conservative, as the word connotes, the environment resists change; in the case of the latter extensive response, the environment makes large alternations to accommodate the system (1945: 58–59).

3.9  T  he Resilience Assessment: Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners, 2.0 The Resilience Assessment Workbook for Practitioners (RAWP) (2010) is a practical tool using GST, and dynamical systems theory in particular, together with the derived concepts of the CAS and panarchy, to provide deeper understanding of the SESs under review. Its aim is pre-dominantly to asses resilience of the overall nested set of systems as defined by analysts, “stakeholders”, or “practitioners”. From the structure of the Workbook, its application is most relevant to a particular geographical area with specific resource distribution parameters and governance structures. In this respect, the RAWP  – and in keeping with its theoretical underpinnings  – is focussed on ecosystem services and ecological “balancing” or co-ordination with human well-being. The analysis in this work has been limited somewhat by the

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amount of available and relevant information across the timeline of study. Moreover, the Assessment calls for a number of inputs from various levels of participants or “stakeholders”, which form part of the community embedded in the area, or at least interested and “invested” in its development. Logistically, as a solo project, it was not possible to sample or interview opinions at these scales. It was therefore deemed more conceivable to consult policy documents, wider literature, and non-­attributable interviews with select interested parties or experts in the designated SES. Moreover, at the time of this study, North Africa and some Middle Eastern UfM member-states were (and some still are) passing through periods of upheaval. It therefore proved difficult to interview as wide a sample as was originally envisaged. These limitations notwithstanding, the RAWP remains an important organising and structuring tool to conceptualising and understanding the SES incorporating GST, the CAS, and the panarchy under scrutiny here. Its additional value comes from the development and popularisation of a rich, inter-disciplinary systems language and hence academic resource. In this study, the meaning of resilience is taken to refer to how sustainable and secure the overall system is to outside interference or system disturbances without tipping the system into a degenerative or “trapped” system cycle defined by a select elite social stratum. Above all, the preservation of equitable system adaptation is considered to be the primary goal and attribute to be preserved in the African SES. Unity (rather than integration), as an African value-driven ideal, with historical and culturally embedded significance, is deemed related to security, as the apparent disintegration of this construct and the super-imposition of foreign or external values through integrationalism, could be seen to undermine current continental, and sustainable social-cohesiveness.

3.10  A  Word on Sustainability, Sustainable Development and Sustainable Futures It would be surprising in a work of this nature that interprets and applies resilience as an aspect of security, not to find a discussion of sustainability, as it relates to the evolution, development, and future of planetary well-being for now, and what Stuart Brandt has termed the “Long Now” (Brand 1999). The concept of sustainability on its own, is mostly commonly associated with linked to ideas of sustainable development as defined by the Commission on the Environment and Development, better known as the Brundtland Commission, and its report published in 1987 entitled “Our Common Future”. According to the Commission’s report, sustainable development is – …a development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs (UNGA A/42/427 1987).

Since then, this seminal definition has been criticised for being too broad a conceptualisation, leaving out the necessary details to circumscribe an egalitarian and

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inclusive future for all. While the concept of sustainable development is assumed to be bound to “inter and intra-generational equity” and quality of life or welfare (Gell-Mann 1994: 356; Brock et al. 2002: 270; Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 99), it has been considered insufficient to imply inclusive society either in the present or the future as it stands, in such general terms. (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 100; Jensen 2002: 241). Generalisations like these can and do lead to important issues and people being omitted in text, at the conceptual level and in practice. The theory and concepts outlined previously, should also serve as an indication that not all sustained systems are appropriate for the good of an all-encompassing equitable future. Established from observations of current political and economic situations worldwide, an egalitarian and inclusive society may not always be deemed a real prospect for the future. Gaps between levels of human well-being exist between regions and within states resulting from political and economic policies across the world that base their value system on differentiation, individualism, and a self-help philosophy that has destroyed a holistic vision (image) of a human/planetary community: “handbags and Porsches” tend to come before fellow human well-being. As noted above, stubborn maladaptive schemata and systems (such as these) can be imposed by charismatic leaders or dominant self-interested and self-serving politically (or economically) organised groups, which may in turn lead to net socio-­ ecological catastrophic effects, or more specifically, structures of control, torture, and repression. Properties of the adaptive cycle, (potential, connectivity, and resilience) are qualitatively indistinguishable, and do and can support indefensible and morally suspect CASs that serve no other purpose than suppression of the many for the benefit of a dominant and elite few. (The apartheid system in South Africa, for example, may be considered one of these very same enforced maladaptive schemata and systems.) Looking more deeply at the language and discourse of sustainability is important not only in understanding where the gaps or omissions lay, but also the balance of its ideological emphasis, which still heavily favours economic drivers such as production and growth to underwrite the future of planetary existence. This is off-set by prominent narratives of scarcity (carrying capacity, population versus available resources), disaster risk management and mitigation (resilience in terms of recovery or “bounce back” and even resistance) and technological adaptation to changing socio-ecological conditions (Carruthers 2005; Fioramonti 2013: 75; Gallopin 2002, 371). It is not enough, however, to change or adapt consumption patterns and markets; the socio-economic value systems that underpin these concepts need to be replaced. The idea of an economic system based on hierarchical values of production that promote extreme differences between peoples, and fragments humanity, could be construed as unsustainable in the long run for the learning, adaptation and evolution of an equitable and just future for all. Social fragmentation and maladaptation is associated with conditions of conflict in war-torn areas (Holling, Gunderson and Peterson 2002: 96), where family structures and communities are displaced, frac-

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tured, and social capital is at a minimum (2002: 96). In some socio-political regions, these conditions have been constructed as “legitimate” and “normal”9: the dissociation from wider members of [the human] the community limits the accumulation of social capital to maintain “higher structures of the panarchy”, and hence equitable and quality evolution (2002: 96). Such a system would need constant monitoring and energy spent on reinforcing the same values, structures of differentiation and hence fragmentation over, and over again. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the nature of the CAS and its adaptive cycle is to change or transform through diversity and periodic novel reinventions and arrangements of agents or components of the system. So far this discussion has only taken into consideration human systems. However, the co-evolution of human systems, and natural or physical systems must be seen as axiomatic. When the ecosystem is taken into consideration, that is, the basis for humanity to be on the planet and even contemplate these issues, the magnitude of catastrophe and threat to sustainable SESs created by human mismanagement becomes apparent: Destruction of the physical environment caused through conflict and prolonged war, or oppressive conditions,10 over-management of agro-industry (fish farms, intensive cattle and dairy farming), and economic policies that promote selfish, self-serving purposes and consumerism, are just a few scenarios that have, do, and can still play out. Perhaps the most dismaying to contemplate is that in some of these cases, the manipulation and construction of CASs and perpetration of maladaptive schemata is entirely conscious and widely accepted as “normal,” such as financial market speculation or “rating agencies” that opine on the viability of countries to repay

9  Similar conditions could be said to have been created under Thatcher’s Britain in the 1980s, at the height of neoliberal reform, where socio-economic policy emphasised the “nuclear” family (mother, father, child/children) over other family arrangements, and actively penalised them through public policy in favour of the “traditional” (nuclear), and “moral” family unit. Thatcher also famously declared that “there was no such thing as society, only individual men and women and there are families…People must look to themselves first”. The focus on the nuclear family as the basic social organisational unit was in line with neoliberal/Conservative ideology that on the surface sought a “freeing” up of state oversight and control over private life, yet at the same time provided incentives and legal restraints to engineer socio-economic choices at that level. Thomas, A.P., 1993. The Nuclear Family, Ideology and Aids in the Thatcher years. Feminist Legal Studies, 1(1): 23–44. Harvey (2005) also makes the case that the refocusing of policy on smaller, compact social units, essentially dissolved wider concepts of solidarity, such as community and state, and possible alternative interest groups. Harvey 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 10  Gell-Mann refers specifically to “influential leaders” such as statesmen or businesses, and Holling and Gunderson mention dictatorships as being able to arrest the development of adaptive cycles and evolution. Influential leadership, however, can be considered to be coercive / forcefully dominating or charismatic. The range would include “war-lords”, “strong-men”, or even shamans. “Resource wars” based on external demand for precious, sort-after resources for markets in welldeveloped parts of the world also provide restrictive parameters for environmental development, for example. Holling and Gunderson 2002. op.cit. p.31; Gell-Mann 1994. The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex. New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC. p. 297.

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debt, for example. “Predicting” and realising a future politically motivated and economically underwritten becomes not only feasible but uncontestable (Tichy 2011). Whether the future is sustainable for a modicum of equally shared well-being for all, has sometimes brought into question the carrying capacity of the planet in terms of available ecosystem services (resources) and growing populations. It has been noted that the majority of voices that highlight these concerns come from the developed West, that is to say countries that are considered well-developed. The discourse of population reduction and the contemplation of controlling population growth, however, have historically led to extreme abuses of human rights (Connolly 2008), and certainly seem to be rather aimed at “developing” states (Gell-Mann 1994). Restricting the development of higher levels of well-being and non-­renewable resource use in African countries for example has been contested, since it puts their needs beneath those who have already had the advantage and contributed to the majority of biosphere degeneration through aggressive industrialisation-led economic growth (Gell-Mann 1994: 351). Moreover it is irresponsible to cast aside “cleaner”, more efficient modes of energy production such as nuclear technology, on the basis that it could be harmful to future generations. Steward Brand (2009) puts is succinctly when he describes our responsibility to the future is to “let them decide”, based on the fact that there are numerous possibilities for developing fail-safes to prevent and limit such deterioration that may become available in the future (Brand 2009: 78–79). The benefits, as regards preserving the biosphere necessary to life being destroyed by coal-fire generated energy now, outweigh possible effects in the long-distant future as global warming, ice-cap melting, and rising sea-levels all testify. The carrying capacity of the planet could very well be down to distribution and ideological (economic) perspective rather than any real population bomb unable to be supported by the planetary resources already used up by the more “developed”. Rather than alluding to over-population outstripping resources, and “carrying capacity”, present views of resources and economic structures derived from these value systems should be re-thought. It is important to distinguish between ecosystem services necessary to life, and “resources” constructed by an economic system that values the acquisition of “Handbags and Porsches” identified as “wealth” over socio-ecological evolution and well-being. This kind of value system, which places constructed or imagined “wealth” as quality over community and human well-being (social or human “capital”), could be classed as unsustainable as regards the development of an equitable and certainly integrated human/planetary future existence.11 It is indeed telling that the discourses of sustainable futures are linked at all to “sustainable economic growth”, and the belief that this approach and view of humanity/ planetary well-being will be able to service the overall goal of sustainable development aimed at equitable future human/planetary existence. As Holling and Gunderson (2002) have shown with the recognition of the pathology of resource  It might well be feasible to explore scenarios of sustainable development where cultural or social “capital” or networks of norms of trust and reciprocity are highly valued rather than enforcing an artificial social barrier based on economic acquisition and consumerist values.

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management in ecosystems, Carpenter et al. (2002) have equally demonstrated why “economic optimisation” also fails when attempting to plan for sustainable yields (Carpenter et al. 2002: 186–7). Finally, for Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002), sustainability is the capacity of the system to “create, test, and maintain adaptive capability”; and “development” as the “process of creating, testing, and maintaining opportunity” (2002: 76). The concept of the panarchy, which is self-reinforcing  – or even self-sustaining  – for Holling, Gunderson, and Peterson, is “sustainability” in action: sustainability therefore, understood through the prism of the panarchy, is structural. Resilience, potential, and connectivity are self-reinforcing and at each level of the panarchy strengthen sustainability. The panarchy governs the relations and provides the constant workings, dynamics, and structure. It is therefore not only sustainability that is in question, but also the kind or quality of sustainable development and growth that must be examined. For a sustainable future for future generations, today’s economic systems, modes of production and values seen as maladaptive and untenable for equal distribution, must be consciously changed so as to integrate societies with their natural or physical environment. The relation between human and natural systems and what constitutes a “resource” must be carefully rethought and reconstructed in such a way as to ensure a viable co-evolutionary system trajectory. This would require a significant paradigm shift in our planetary consciousness, one that this work puts forwards as beginning with the concept of the SES replacing that of the State, and the propagation of the philosophical grounding found in GST and panarchy as a starting point.

3.11  Conclusion Panarchy, the concept of a nested structure of CASs, together with the adaptive cycle, can provide a convincing model of the transformation of the international system, captured in the idea of the SES, integrating human (socially constructed) and natural (or physical) systems. This is especially relevant in modern or contemporary day situations where problematic issues or policy decisions taken at one scale (either spatially/globally or over a timeline that includes the past) can have an impact or influence what happens politically or economically at localised scales in the present day. The idea of the panarchy is the idea of system integration, where all parts of the system are related through processes at different temporal and spatial scales that reinforce each other. Being able to visualise this structure is key to being able to at least have an idea of possible progressions and future path trajectories and system states. Integrated issues of concern created through emergent structures and process in the international system, require the same kind of integrated solutions, or at least the same kind of perspective that panarchy, and the wider conceptual framework of GST can provide. However, the SES must reinforce itself and cannot be of such a contrived manner so as to favour, manipulate or repress one aspect of the system over and above the other: equal relevance needs to be acknowledged in all parts of the SES concerned.

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The presence of multiple foreign policies towards Africa, notwithstanding their focus on “security” issues such as terrorism or immigration, or the foci of the UfM framework, such as regional integration, economic growth, democratic governance and acceptance of human rights, is the expression of an apparent external/foreign schema that “divides” or splits up the African continent into “policy” parts, and is divisive in the demands it makes on government structures. It seeks to divide through regionalism (for example, the “Mediterranean”). In addition, the kind of schemata transposed, based on a narrow and restrictive ideological range such as economic integration, is divisive and fragmentary. It is the kind of schema that while professing integration (now often mistakenly associated with unity), promotes individualism and self-help, or as has been termed here integrationalism, as exemplified by successive strategic partnerships. The UfM, as an EU foreign policy initiative with a strong and established institutional history (the subject of the next chapter), is interpreted for the purposes of this research as part of a panarchy, which forms the surrounding environment of Africa. As such, it thus also provides selection pressures on the African internal schemata, causing (through the process of adaptation), the (necessary) destabilisation, collapse (Ω), and reorganisation (α), followed by the other successive cycle phases and a return to a changed, alternate, but “stable state” recast in the EU’s policy image. The alternative is perhaps what is being experienced in some parts of Africa already; a collapse and degeneration of values and eco-system services, without substantial or qualitative alternative values and safety-nets to take over, which would contribute to African “fitness”, reproducibility, and evolution. The prospect remains that the “African system” could – due to the narrow gaze of self-interest policy framing and “problem solving” – degenerate into a less resilient state and eventually lose all resemblance to its original “Africaness”. (Other interrelated structures of complex adaptive systems would be the JAES, the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) – EU/Cotonou Agreement, and the Joint EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership). As outlined above, the quality and limits of evolution of the complex adaptive system, here as Africa, is only ever as “smart” or adaptive as the surrounding systems allow: they  – the UfM, the JAES  – have become (Africa’s) most prominent frame of reference for learning, adaptation, and evolution12. Adaptation, learning, and evolution, along a particular or imposed/manipulated path, may not always be to the long-term benefit of the system undergoing the change. This may be especially so in terms of what constitutes the external or surrounding environment in the form of foreign policy: in accordance with rationalism and rationalist schools of thought in the field of International Relations theory, foreign policy would be expected to be directed and framed in terms of self-interest. As pointed out previously, too fine a focus on one or two variables could lead to management pathology and decline in resilience of the overall system: the narrowness  The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have more recently presented an alternative counter-weight to the EU and its set of policies, but as a group has yet to gather institutional momentum (time) and layers (thickness) to provide an equal degree of influence as is described here by EU-Africa relations.

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of focus tends to miss critical components, processes, and therefore dynamics intrinsic to the system. Moreover, a systems approach, while not discounting this fundamental proposition, would observe that foreign policy as an expression of the external environment, carries with it the “other” system’s reality or schemata that may not be conducive to Africa’s long-term evolution. In this case, EU foreign policy will be shown to have provided a conservative response to African development, prompting tensions within the African setting identified as rising nationalistic or “continentalist” tendencies and rejection of all things western. The proposition is that foreign policy in the form of the UfM, has been providing maladaptive schemata for African internalisation, creating a crisis of consciousness, as well as institutional dissonance and instability. This goes to the heart of what has become apparent in systems research and in the premise of the adaptive cycle, which proposes that intervention can be made at two points in the cycle to influence the trajectory and/or following system state. This idea has been advanced in other system study areas by Social System Design (SSD), and the kind of Futures Methodologies and “Futurists” outlined in the Introduction to this book. The salient questions that arise from these approaches are: whose foreign policy/internal schemata are more relevant? Whose idea of maladaptive schema is correct, or indeed, who chooses whose future? In order to keep the topic of this research in line with a single panarchy and reduce the complexity to a manageable size, this work will focus on three nested CASs deemed to make up an overall interrelated system: the supra system has been identified as the EU, the focal system as the UfM policy, its concept and the EUs perspective of the member states, and the infra-system as the UfM/North Africa/ Middle Eastern member states.

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Carruthers, D. 2005. From Opposition to Orthodoxy: The Remaking of Sustainable Development. In Debating the Earth: The Environmental Politics Reader, ed. J.S. Dryzek and D. Schlosberg, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Connolly, M. 2008. Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population. London: Belknap Harvard. Crumley, C.L. 1995. Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies. Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association. 6: 1–5. Delcourt, P.A., and H.R.  Delcourt. 2004. Prehistoric native Americans and ecological change: Human ecosystems in eastern North America since the Pleistocene. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dinan, D. 2004. Europe Recast: A History of European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Emery, F.E., (ed.) 1981. Introduction to Volumes 1 and 2; Introduction to Volume 1, First Edition; Introduction to Volume 1, Revised edition. [Editorial] In Systems Thinking. vol. One. Middelsex: Harmondsworth Publishing. Feibleman, J., and J.W. Friend. 1945. The Structure and Function of Organisation. In 1981. Systems Thinking, ed. F.E. Emery, Vol. One. Middelsex: Harmondsworth Publishing. Fioramonti, L., ed. 2013. Regionalism in a Changing World: Comparative Perspectives in the New Global Order. Oxford: Routledge. Gallopin, G.C. 2002. Planning for Resilience: Scenarios, Surprises, and Branch Points. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Gell-Mann, M. 1994. The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex. New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC. Gleick, J. 1998. Chaos: The Amazing Science of the Unpredictable. London: Vintage Press. Gunderson, L.H., and C.S.  Holling, eds. 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems. London: Island Press. Gunderson, L.H., C.S.  Holling, and G.D.  Peterson. 2002. Surprises and Sustainability. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Hartzog, P.B. 2005. Panarchy: Governance in the Network Age. [online]. Available at: http://umich. academia.edu/PaulBHartzog/Papers/137686/Panarchy_Governance_in_the_Network_Age Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holling, C.S. 1992. Cross-Scale Morphology, Geometry, and Dynamics of Ecosystems. Ecological Monographs 62 (4): 447–502. Holling, C.S., and L.H.  Gunderson. 2002. Sustainability and Panarchies. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H.  Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Holling, C.S., S.R. Carpenter, W.A. Brock, and L.H. Gunderson. 2002. Discoveries for Sustainable Futures. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Holling, C.S., L.H. Gunderson, and D. Ludwig. 2002. In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Homer-Dixon, T. 1995. The Ingenuity Gap: Can Poor Countries Adapt to Resource Scarcity? Population and Development Review 21 (3): 587–612. Huggett, R. 2007. A History of the Systems Approach in Geomorphology. Géomorphologie: Relief, Processus, Environnement. [online]. http://geomorphologie.revues.org/1031 Ismail, Sumayya, and Sapa-AFP. 2006. Mixed Reaction to Zuma Apology. Mail and Guardian Online, September 28. Jensen, M.A. 2002. A Future of Surprises. In Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, ed. L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling. London: Island Press. Kauffman, S.A. 1993. The Origins of Order: Self Organisation and Selection in Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Chapter 4

EEC/EU Foreign Policy Towards the Mediterranean: Creating a Region

4.1  Introduction Chapter 3 established the theoretical framework and major concepts that will be employed in understanding the European Union (EU)/Africa Policy complex, defined as the EU/Africa panarchy. The idea that there is strength – and indeed, security – in numbers has a long lineage in European history. As far as the European integration project is concerned, the belief in integration began in the post-WWII period, and the incentive behind the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1952. The economic (and principle of democratic peace) basis of the ECSC gave way to the Treaties of Rome in 1957, creating the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Communities (Euratom). The idea of African unity, on the other hand, has a longer and more intense memory even though its institutionalisation in the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and then African Union (AU), has been relatively shorter. Furthermore, its institutionalisation has struggled against counter-fragmentary dynamics through external selection pressures, the likes of which have been assisted by EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, and more recently Africa in the Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership (JAES)/Cotonou Agreement conundrum.1

1  The Cotonou Agreement, which forms the legal basis for cooperation between the EU and the countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific, is due to be re-negotiated in 2020. There has been disagreement between whether the ACP/Cotonou framework is still viable for Africa, as the Agreement does not include North African states. Further, the AU is seeking to establish itself as the premier African institution through which negotiations are made on African affairs, continentto-continent, with the EU. See Carbone, M., 2018. Caught between the ACP and the AU: Africa’s relations with the European Union in a post-Cotonou Agreement context. South African Journal of International Affairs, 25(4): 481–496, and Bossuyt, J. and Medinilla, A. 2019. Africa-EU relations and post-Cotonou: African Collective Action or further Fragmentation of partnerships? Briefing Note No. 110. ECDPM.

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For the Middle East and North African (MENA) “region” as a whole, past attempts at Pan-Arabism have floundered under similar circumstances. The multitude of bilateral agreements (based on trade and commerce), together with the intensification of other kinds of cooperation (requiring political, cultural, social, and ecological consideration) has scuttled any serious overtures towards this end in the wider Arab world. The various iterations of policy towards the selective Mediterranean – such as the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – are possibly the most comprehensively institutionalised this group of countries has come to be in terms of temporal and multimodal governance structures. These are, however, externally constructed policies towards the Mediterranean, initiated from the EEC/EU. It was the late Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi who, before the Paris meeting in 2008 that launched the UfM, was perhaps the first to articulate the sentiment that European foreign policy and, specifically, the re-birthed Union for the Mediterranean at the time, was an attempt to “divide” Africa.2 Subsequently, this aspect has never been given much thought.3 Among European diplomatic representatives and in literature on the subject at least, this idea has been completely ignored. More recently, and perhaps due to the growing sentiment that interaction – and specifically interaction with Europe – has destroyed what it means to be “African”, this aspect has been given more credence: the second wave of decolonisation, the rejection of all colonial influence, after all, recognises that neo-colonialism is most perfectly transmitted through international relations, the international institutions, agreements and cooperative frameworks that help to regulate and organise them4: it is these policies networked between countries of Africa, regions, and the continent of Africa on the one hand, and European countries and the EU on the other, that change the nature of

2  “But Libya, which will boycott the meeting, has accused the EU of trying to divide Africa and the broader Arab world by drawing a Mediterranean Union map that echoes old colonialist designs for the region.” Ghaddafi was reportedly angry in the change of plans for the Union, initially an arrangement between the Southern EU-member states and the Mediterranean riparian states, excluding Israel. Waterfield, B. 2008. Ghaddafi attacks Sarkozy plan for Union for the Mediterranean. The Daily Telegraph Online. July 10. 3  Only recently has the divisive nature of the UfM – and other political cooperation frameworks like it, for example the JAES, or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – been referred to in academic literature, and here only in relation to the possible re-negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement that comes to an end in 2020. See de Groof, E. and Bossuyt, J. 2019. North Africa’s Double Pursuit – Part I: Mixed messages from Europe and Africa stand in the way of an intercontinental deal. Discussion Paper No. 239. ECDPM; Bossuyt, J. and Sherriff, A., 2010. What next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalizing an innovative framework. A scoping paper. Discussion Paper No. 94. ECDPM. p. 4. 4  Agenda 2063, Aspiration 7, 59 is instructive in this regard. Published in 2015, Aspiration 7, No. 59, states: “We affirm the importance of African unity and solidarity in the face of continued external interference including, attempts to divide the continent and undue pressures and sanctions on some countries.” African Union Commission, 2015. Agenda 2063.

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being “African”, imposing alternative views of economic, social, and ecological structures and processes. This chapter will focus on describing the various permutations of the EEC/EU’s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, illustrating the different emphases that accompanied the EEC/EU conservative institutional changes at the time, and culminating in the construction of the Mediterranean region in the EEC/EU policy repertoire and external conjuring. EEC/EU foreign policy is the institutional summation of a collective internal mapping (or set of schemata) made up of European values and normative perspectives externalised. Further, these values and norms are contingent with the neoliberal/neoconservative values systems and priorities already described in Chap. 2, structurally transferred through the concept and practical applications of integration in general, and regional integration in particular. This, as mentioned in Sect. 2.4.7 in Chap. 2, has been given the term (EU) integrationalism for practical reference, and indicates the merging of ideology, method, and cross-­ scale processes indicative of complex adaptive systems (CASs). Through the construction of the “Mediterranean” in foreign policy and subsequent Partnership agreements of the EEC/EU, choice demands were made on the socio-ecological systems of North Africa and the Middle Eastern states defined as such. A Mediterranean identity, which previously included Greece, Spain and Portugal, was set apart through a set of relationships based on EEC/EU integrationalism. The Mediterranean was defined by and through a particular set of values, based on what we now define as neoliberal value systems, and the EEC/EU integrationalism. The UfM forms one of many overlapping structures of such foreign policy measures towards Africa. In conjunction with other frameworks, like the JAES, the structures of EU foreign policy create a web of referential environments for African institutional evolution, in turn creating selection pressures on African institutions and policy-making, and propelling African institutions towards uniformity and conformity with European institutions, behaviour, norms, and values. At the localised level, the subversion of local values creates insecurity in the social (familial and community), economic, and, eco-system services. These form the socio-ecological system (SES) of North Africa, the UfM Middle Eastern member countries – and through overlapping geographical and institutional association – the “rest of Africa”. In much the same way that instability, underdevelopment, and poverty have arisen in the Mediterranean region (precisely where EU foreign policy has presumed to instil peace, prosperity and stability), the JAES could very well sow the same disruptive seeds in the “rest of Africa”. The following section will proceed with a description of the first recognised and institutionalised concept of the “Mediterranean” as a region, formulated with the GMP (1972), followed by the RMP (1989/1990), and finally the Barcelona Process (1995). In both early policy initiatives, the GMP and the RMP, the relationship between the EEC and the so-called Mediterranean group of states, was led primarily by

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objectives of commerce constructed through trade agreements based on exportable/ importable products, relative to EEC demands. With the advent of the Euro-­ Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Association Agreements and the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, this appeared to change and the ensuing Process was seen as an important and significant departure from previous approaches. A much wider gambit of formalised relations and policy areas came into existence that incorporated political, social, and economic synchronisation of structures between the two groups of states. Far from the uniform or multilateral approach that was implied and lauded at the time, however, relations continued to be carried out primarily at the bilateral level, prompting some scholars to label this manner of interacting internationally as “bi-multilateralism” (Minasi 1998, as cited in Xenakis and ­ Chryssochoou 2001).

4.2  Historical Background As the EU has evolved and expanded, so too have its interests and how it prioritises its foreign policies and objectives according to its transforming external environment. The UfM is an outcome of this evolving process, using a multi-layering of concepts, policies and organisational frameworks across time (history) and changing spatial boundaries (political delineations). Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the changing groups of states in Europe, as they moved from an older-type Mediterranean based on ancient trade routes, historical and cultural ties, to newer conceptualised regions, defined by their “external” or “extra-EEC” identity. At the same time, some of the previously associated Mediterranean states became part of the European Community. In Fig. 4.1, the countries of the EEC (in blue) are France, Italy, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg while the countries of the Mediterranean (in purple) are Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. The countries of the EEC/EC (in blue) in Fig. 4.2 are France, Italy, West Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium; United Kingdom and Ireland, Denmark (1973); Greece (1981); Spain, Portugal (1986) while the countries of the Southern Mediterranean (in purple) are Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. In Fig. 4.3, the countries of the EU (in blue) are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Finland and Sweden. The countries of the Southern Mediterranean in Fig.  4.3 (in purple) are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus. In Fig. 4.4 the countries of the EU (in blue) are France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, Finland, Austria,

4.2 Historical Background

Fig. 4.1  The Global Mediterranean Policy 1972

Fig. 4.2  The Renovated (or Renewed) Mediterranean Policy 1989/1990

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Fig. 4.3  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) 1995

Fig. 4.4  Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean 2008–2010

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Fig. 4.5  EEC/EC/EU expansion, institutional evolution and corresponding policies towards the Mediterranean

Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, while those of the Mediterranean (in purple) are Algeria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Monaco, Morocco, The Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Albania, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Montenegro, Syria, Turkey (Fig. 4.5).

4.3  E  EC/EU Foreign Policy Towards the Mediterranean: Pre-1972 EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean grew primarily from a mixture of perceived security concerns and continuing commercial needs (Bicchi 2007: 64; Marsh and Rees 2012: 147). As the EEC expanded and prepared itself for further readjustment to “new” neighbours on its borders, so too did its commercial and security concerns relative to them. The Cold War international dynamics also played out in the Mediterranean region, specifically the Middle East, which was deemed to be of strategic importance and interest by nature of its geographical proximity (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Bicchi 2007). Trade agreements and closer ties with the relatively new institution, were used as a “carrot” to entice countries of the Mediterranean at that time – Greece, Spain, and Turkey, for example – away from Soviet influence (Gomez 2003; Bicchi 2007). The period of the 1960s in Europe brought with it an increase in economic growth, particularly in France where close links to its former colonies in North Africa were used to fill the (cheaper) labour gap (Gomez 2003 Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001, Staab 2013; Pastore 2009). This prompted further interest and formalised cooperation more widely at the multilateral level through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Bicchi 2007). France became a key player in motivating a policy structure towards the Mediterranean countries external to the ECSC at the time, and agreed to

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the Treaties of Rome (1957) on condition of the inclusion of the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP as part of the new EEC (Parfitt 1997; Gomez 2003; Staab 2013). The Treaties of Rome establishing the new EEC allowed for limited negotiations in multilateral external negotiations. The tendency was to develop differential association agreements that were mainly geared towards economic considerations and maintaining the status quo between them (Joffe 1998; Larrabee et al. 1998). EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean thus began with a mixture of various kinds of association agreements,5 special preferential commercial arrangements for ex-colonial countries in North Africa (France), and commercial accords with non-EEC member states considered as part of the Mediterranean at the time (Gomez 2003: 26; Aghrout 2009: 30). The arrangements between the EEC/EU and the non-EEC member Mediterranean states essentially became a “patchwork” of agreements, or what has sometimes been referred to as a “pyramid” of preferential commercial accords between interested states, the Association Agreement gradually evolving to become the most popular form of agreement between the later EU and the Mediterranean region (Gomez 2003: 27; Bicchi 2007, 2009: 15; Aghrout 2009: 29).

4.4  The Global Mediterranean Policy (1972) The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was the first real attempt at constructing some uniformity in dealing with the (then) Mediterranean non-EEC member states, which, as shown in Fig. 4.1, included Greece, Portugal, Spain, Malta, and Cyprus, as well as those on the southern coastal region of the Sea in North Africa and the Middle East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Bicchi 2007). In fact, for Bicchi (2007), the Mediterranean region was “invented” in policy terms at this time, placing these countries on the “outside” of the growing self-styled European institution (Bicchi 2007: 63). The motivation for establishing the GMP was a mix of both externally perceived pressures and internal lobbying from EEC member states, interest groups, and the changing culture6 of the institution as new members joined (Gomez 2003: 32;

5  A range of different kinds of formatted Associations agreements allowed by various Articles of the EEC/Treaty of Rome, either for full accession, with or without a specific timeline; so-called “special” relationships (based on articles 182–7 of the Treaty of Rome) with ex-colonies in mind; and another based on Article 310 also for ex-colonies, but a much more “streamlined” version, minus provisions for financial aid, technical assistance or freedom of movement for labour. See Gomez, R., 2003. op.cit. pp. 27–28. 6  Denmark, UK and Ireland joined the EEC in 1973 and brought with them a particular bias that saw little relevance not only in prioritising relations with the Southern non-EEC member countries but also a classical liberal, and what became neo-liberal, view of economics and development. See Bicchi, F., 2007. op.cit. pp. 84–87.

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Bicchi 2007: 83).7 New dynamics in the international system such as the first wave of decolonisation and the emergence of the post-independent state anxious to prove itself as a viable model, the non-aligned movement  – specially within the Mediterranean area8 – and an apparent détente in the Cold War at the time, led to a renegotiation of roles, relations, and priorities for the EEC countries (Marsh and Rees 2012: 11). The lead-up to the creation of the GMP is informative as it shows both the shaping of its content and its developing geographical range. Internal, proximal external (regional), and international dynamics galvanised the movement towards creating what was originally conceived as a “global approach with a community orientation” (Bicchi 2007: 97). However, further external influences and interests later changed this outlook. It is noteworthy to mention that while the GMP was based on trade, aid, and the recognition of development responsibilities, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) developed simultaneously as a forum for political dialogue (Gomez 2003: 31). The two areas would eventually combine into the Barcelona Declaration and Process to create the most comprehensive approach to policy making at that time.

4.5  D  ynamics Leading the Establishment of the Global Mediterranean Policy Internally within the EEC/EC competing national foreign policies and accession in 1972 of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark contributed toward a re-thinking about the countries immediately bordering the EEC/EC at the time (Bicchi 2009: 15). The addition of Northern European countries to the EEC/EC shifted the internal balance of interests, dividing the EEC/EC implicitly between those who believed that the countries to the East of the Europe were more important to their institutional survival, and those who believed that countries to the South were more deserving of preferential attention due to past historical and colonial connections, and also their proximity. Moreover, Association Agreements for the new members came with internal (and external) adjustments, provoking responses from the then ‘Mediterranean’ non-EEC member states of unfair bias and the need for even further institutional adjustments and agreements to equalise the relationships (Aghrout 2009: 30). The need of a regularised and uniform policy framework became more significant. The differences between the cultures of the North and South within the EEC at the time went even deeper into divisions between philosophies of economic devel-

7  The UK had been trying to join since 1961 but had been continually “blocked” by France. See Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 83. 8  French and Yugoslav efforts to “demilitarise” the area were supported by Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, traditionally “non-aligned” states. See Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 67.

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opment and how foreign policy should be structured and applied, with the United Kingdom (UK), for example, favouring “a broad multilateralism” along classical liberal lines, and France preferring a regional approach (Bicchi 2007: 84). French attempts at further re-balancing the EEC by drawing interest towards the Southern Mediterranean shores were counter-balanced by Germany’s “Ostpolitik”, diverting attention towards the East (Wallace et al. 2010; Bicchi 2007: 85). In the proximate geographical landscape in North Africa and the Middle East, perceived security issues converged in policy terms (Joffe 1998), and were deemed commonly problematic for the EEC. Nationalistic movements in North Africa began with the newly independent Arab states taking control of their own markets and economies through successive nationalisations of foreign-held assets, in a variety of industry and land seizures, but most importantly in the oil sector (Bicchi 2007: 73–74). Egypt, led Arab Nationalism with the re-seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and Arab state after Arab state followed the trend with varying degrees of aggressiveness, with and without compensation to those whose (foreign country) assets they had re-claimed as their own.9 Successive Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meetings hiked the prices of oil consecutively, culminating with the first “oil shock” of 1972, which brought their largest consumers – the USA and the EEC – to the realisation that their economic interests were under threat. The dynamics between the Arab states and their European ex-colonisers were further complicated as the Arab states still required foreign capital and trade, creating a reluctant synergy between them (Bicchi 2007: 75). Securing continuous supplies of oil became a necessity (Gomez 2003: 31; Bicchi 2007: 102). It also became increasingly difficult for the EEC, however, to uphold what appeared to be a hypocritical stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict: at the political level condemning the occupation of the West Bank and yet continuing to conduct “business as usual” at the commercial level with Israel. At the same time at the international level, a divergence emerged between the foreign policies of the USA and Europe towards the Middle East and the Arab-­ Israeli conflict, with Europe taking a “pro-Arab” stance and the USA lending its support to Israel. From the EEC’s perspective, a new platform that could at least be seen to even out the contradictions and air the differences between the EEC’s stance and that of the USA’s became necessary (Bicchi 2007: 83; Gomez 2003). This necessity began to take on further urgency as the Arab-Israeli conflict brought its struggle to European shores alongside the oil shocks, culminating in 1972 with the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympic Games. The relative détente in the Cold War globally during 1970–1973 (Best et  al. 2008: 282–3; Bicchi 2007: 66–68) left room for the same possibility regionally: along with the turn to de-militarise relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the USA, the same was attempted in the Middle East and

9  Tunisia (1960–1971), Morocco (1971–1973), Algeria (1967–1969) followed by Libya. See Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 74–75.

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North Africa, even though the USSR retained its presence there. It was this perception of global, and regional détente in the MENA that enabled other identifiable issues to emerge and be framed in policy terms by the EEC (Bicchi 2007: 121;130). All of the aforementioned factors converged to bring together not only a geography as the “Mediterranean” in the minds of the EEC policy makers at the time, but also the consciousness to bring various issues of concern into one external policy framework as well, creating a combined and – what was originally foreseen as – a uniform regional Mediterranean policy framework, the GMP.

4.5.1  Structural Development The GMP was organised around Cooperation Agreements, which were vastly different to the previous economically and financially driven Association Agreements based on Articles 310 and 182–7, respectively. The Cooperation Agreements offered free-trade access on all industrial goods (excluding textiles), and limited access on agricultural goods (Bicchi 2009: 15; Aghrout 2009: 29). The GMP also had its own institutional structure in the form of (bilateral) Cooperation Councils, which coordinated the Agreements and monitored implementation (Gomez 2003: 32). The Cooperation Agreements also  included provisions for social matters, so-­ called “technical cooperation” as well as financial and economic matters, in areas such as the environment, industry, investment, and science (Gomez 2003; Aghrout 2009: 29). Migration and labour however, were dealt with in bilateral agreements, state to state. The GMP added provisions for non-discrimination and equal treatment of workers, as well as the facilitation of remittances to countries of origin and transferable pensions (Gomez 2003: 32). There was, however, no mistaking the tenor of the Cooperation Agreements that were geared toward all things economic with liberalisation of markets or free trade, or at least free access to Mediterranean markets, as a prominent theme at the time (Joffe 2009: 50). In spite of aiming for uniformity and a multilateral approach to its dealings with the non-EEC member/Mediterranean countries, EEC member states found it increasingly difficult to agree on whether to adopt broad spectrum trade liberalisation, or to take a protectionist stance and continue with preferential agreements on a case by case basis (Gomez 2003). Agricultural concessions were quibbled over and stymied by internal lobbying within the EEC to such a degree that negotiations were often stalled at various points. The most profitable products for the non-EEC member Mediterranean states – agricultural products and textiles – were effectively controlled by quantitative limitations and in some cases excluded from import altogether (Gomez 2003; Bicchi 2009: 15–16). Refined petroleum products from the oil producing states were restricted through import “ceilings” and duty levels, thereby restricting development in industrialisation and increasing the dependency of the non-EEC Mediterranean states on raw material export (Gomez 2003: 34).

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The outcome of this situation was a general agreement at the EEC level that there should be some degree of reciprocity between the two groups of states, but that bilateral and differential agreements between states were still permitted (Gomez 2003: 33). The relatively underdeveloped institutional form that was the EEC at the time (the institutions; decision making bodies; the limited and comparatively unsophisticated range of available formatted Agreements), all contributed to undermining the ideal of multilateralism at the collective level and uniformity in external relations with the non-EEC member Mediterranean states. Bilateral agreements and protectionist interests between countries overruled the supra-national-led initiative. Overall, the effect of this was to make trade and cooperation increasingly ­protectionist, with the relationship between the EEC and the GMP member states remaining one of dependency and underdevelopment (Joffe 2009: 57; Aghrout 2009: 33–35).

4.5.2  Changing Faces With the accessions of Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1986), further readjustments and complications rose from the impact that this expansion had on the new and re-defined Mediterranean groups, both external and internal to the EEC (Gomez 2003; Bicchi 2009: 16). The re-positioning of states from one constructed region to another institution, necessitated a shifting of relationships both in identity and conceptualising the Mediterranean as “partner”, and in commercial associations. The inclusion of Greece, Spain, and Portugal created significant changes in the relationship between the EEC and the non-EEC member/Mediterranean states as a result (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 186). Most significantly, overlap in Mediterranean agricultural products meant self-­ sufficiency of the EEC and a re-politicisation of commercial relations with its non-­ EEC member/Mediterranean states (Bicchi 2009: 16). The increased complexity in commercial and political interests that coincided with the increase of member states, recreated the same kind of disruption and inability to reach a common stance towards its external associates that had existed before. Surprisingly, Spain, supported by Italy, took a strong protectionist stance towards its previous colleagues in the GMP member group. The restrictions on terms of trade became severe, and in conjunction with other worldwide phenomena at the time, spelled disaster for the identified GMP group (Gomez 2003: 36). For the non-EEC member MENA states now classed as “Mediterranean”, the 1980s were a significant period of economic decline, caused partially by the effects of EEC expansion and integration, as well as international adjustments and events such as the global decrease in commodity prices, the oil prices shocks, and the world-wide recession at the time (Bicchi 2007: 118; Joffe 2009). The GMP/Cooperation Agreements did very little to ameliorate the detrimental effects of these transformations and, in fact, did much to under-develop those states

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further (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003; Bicchi 2009: 16). In contrast to the Agreements being made under the Yaoundé (1963) and Lomé Conventions (1975),10 the GMP furthermore was sorely lacking: the former agreements contained a separate institutional structure of a Council of Ministers, and a Consultative Assembly, greater and wider access to European markets and a development fund of 1 billion European Currency Units (ECUs), under the provisions of the Lomé Convention (Gomez 2003: 34). The dichotomous and competitive relationship set up by the two sets of external relations could not have been missed. As enlargement of the EEC became imminent, the GMP countries had consequently requested a re-negotiation of terms to offset the joining of the Spanish, Greek, and Portuguese production and markets (Larrabee et al. 1998). Trade deficits rose as did external debts, a result of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were an attempt at counteracting the consequences of structural adjustments conditional on attaining the loans to begin with (Joffe 2009: 50). As the economic situation in the near Mediterranean worsened, inter-related and cross-cutting social issues began to surface, previously suppressed to some extent by the focus on Cold War dynamics and competition between Soviet and USA/Western influence (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003). The GMP radically missed providing what the countries of the Mediterranean needed most. By focussing on economic restructuring and closely related concerns, the GMP failed to account or provide for interrelated aspects of the socio-ecological “Mediterranean” system, which gradually diverged developmentally creating a “lag” between themselves and those of the EEC member states (Gomez 2003: 44). The GMP represented the beginning of a controlled and coordinated external regime of interference not only in North Africa and the Middle East, but more widely in Africa too. The EEC/GMP effectively established ground rules for the continued annexation of North Africa from the “rest of Africa”. The early years of the EEC/EC’s development mirror that of a developing complex adaptive system (CAS). As discussed in Chap. 7, successive enlargements in the EEC can be viewed as the “press” disturbances of the system, as for the next two decades the EEC/EU continued to expand or “enlarge”, at the same time redefining itself and those on its periphery. Internally it could be said that the GMP and foreign policy towards the EECs external environment reached a stage in its development cycle that prompted a re-organisation phase. This took the shape of the RMP (1989), and would continue its reorganisation until the advent of the Barcelona Process, 1995.

 Trade and Aid agreements between the European Economic Community/European Union, and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries marked the most “significant” of its external relations. Elgstrom, O., and Pilegaard, J., 2009. “Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements”. In Carbone, M., (Ed.) 2009. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version] Oxford: Routledge. pp. 46; 56.

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4.6  The Renovated Mediterranean Policy (1989/1990) With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in Europe in 1989, it was in some respects to be expected that the EEC turned its attention away – provisionally – from the Mediterranean non-EEC member states, and focused rather on its eastern borders with a view to reorganising itself in relation to them, its continentally connected “new” neighbours. The EEC would now have to contend with the dynamics of freshly liberated countries, underlying conflicts, and inequalities on all sides of its institutional and geographical borders. However, the asymmetrical social, political, and economic conditions that had developed and now persisted between the GMP partner states and EEC member states, took on a new “security” dimension, and one that was to shape foreign policy decisions and relations between the two groups of countries for years to come. The years of 1989–1990 were of great upheaval, both within the EEC and at the international level (Gomez 2003: 44). The changing international system led to new interpretations, reappraisals of existing concepts and the emergence of new ones: the new security vocabulary, evolving at the time alongside the realisation of issue-­ interdependency and the integrated nature of human and natural systems, would change the EEC’s views of its external environment, how the EEC related to it, and especially that of how the EEC perceived the non-EEC member/Mediterranean countries. In 1989, Commissioner Abel Matutes presented a report on the Mediterranean to the EU Council outlining the interrelated issues of increased poverty, food shortages, deteriorating environment, low economic growth, and dense population as the new security issues that now epitomised North African and Middle Eastern countries (Gomez 2003: 49). The implications for Europe and the EEC were highlighted as increased immigration and fallout from the Arab/Israeli conflict (2003: 47). The European Parliament (EP) and the (European) Economic Social Committee (ESC) supported Abel Matutes’ conclusions, adding their support for “joint economic development, institutionalised economic integration, and more effective distribution of EEC financial resources” (2003: 49). The ESC was also highly critical of the protectionist stance EEC member states had taken towards their non-EC member/ Mediterranean counterparts, indicating that their protectionist leanings had indeed led to under-development (2003: 49). The Matutes’ report appeared to come at the right time as successive EU Council Presidencies were held by Southern Mediterranean states – Spain, France, and Italy – all of whom had vested interests by virtue of their geographical proximity to North Africa, and colonial pasts, and helped to refocus EEC attention on those countries (Gomez 2003: 49; Bicchi 2007). The successive Councils propelled multilateral consideration of policy revision towards the non-EEC member Mediterranean states (Gomez 2003; Bicchi 2007). Overall, the report also helped to re-focus (or at least re-balance) attention that had previously been held by the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) states and their decoupling from the now fading USSR (Gomez 2003: 49; Bicchi 2007: 155).

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By 1990, policy revision towards the non-EC member/Mediterranean states had resulted in the variously named Renewed/Redirected/Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP). The existing twelve bilateral agreements11 were tabled to be adjusted to include improved access to EEC markets in agriculture and textiles; areas that until this point were highly protected and restricted by EEC member states. Funds from the EEC budget and the European Investment Bank (EIB) were to be tripled, and an additional incentive of 2.3 billion ECUs allocated specifically for loans in regional projects (“decentralised, horizontal or regional cooperation”) (Bicchi 2007: 155); on inter-university programmes; assistance for small and medium enterprises; joint local authority ventures; environmental projects; demographic matters; investment creation, and the “cultural dimension of development” (Gomez 2003: 50). While the emphasis on regionalism promoted a wider gambit of issue-areas, no real structured collaboration or cooperation existed in the fields of security or politics to manage them at this point. Once again, essentially  the focus of the RMP remained financial, based on protocols that allocated funding for specified projects chosen by the EEC Commission and Councils (Bicchi 2007: 155–156). For the EEC, extending its integration agenda meant extending its cultural perspectives and values, and more specifically its economic ones. The combination of a consciously structured and overlapping approach meant the infusing of those values took place at every level, however, even in the choice of which projects to define within the RMP. Poor intra-regional trade in the Mediterranean had been identified as a hindrance to economic development and the overall liberalisation agenda (COM 2008/319: 3–4; Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 11–12; Gomez 2003: 50; Joffe 2009: 50). Intra-regional projects would therefore mean closer and more able ties between countries among the Mediterranean group, and easier penetration of outside market access and opportunities for the EEC (Gomez 2003: 50). Transnational oil and gas supply networks along with telecommunication networks linking the Maghreb (North Africa) and Southern European/EEC member states would facilitate lines of transport for goods and services the EEC wished to import (Gomez 2003: 50). In line with the new perspectives on the nature of integrated security issues, the promotion of economic ties of this ilk were believed to alleviate these issues (Gomez 2003: 50; Joffe 2009).

4.7  Exporting Integrationalism The European integration agenda was exported to the Mediterranean through incentivisation at a bilateral and differentiated level, and through association with the EEC as a prestigious institution. The Mediterranean countries were at the time

 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Malta, Syria, Malta, and Cyprus. Gomez, R., 2003. op.cit. p. 46.

11

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embedded in a cycle of under-development and increasing instability through internal (and subsequently external) structural inequalities, created in part by the trade-­ led Agreements and the beginnings of a “structured” policy framework towards the “Mediterranean” that reinforced free market ideology at intra-regional and national/ individual levels. Policy initiatives, however, fell victim to the self-help ideology that had been inherent in EEC external relations with North Africa and the Middle Eastern countries to date, and became institutionalised in the RMP (Bicchi 2007: 155–6). The result of this was disillusionment with the initial RMP and the perspective that it was “old wine in new bottles” (Gomez 2003: 43). The EEC’s own internal structural transformation was now moving towards integration with the CEEC states, having to revise its own structure to accommodate the changing international dynamics, leading to the Treaty on European Union (TEU). (The Copenhagen Criteria were introduced in 1993, with the EU Council even then making it clear that the institution would need to be capable of “absorbing” new members as well as pursing integration.) (Dinan 2004: 273–4) As the EEC was preparing to absorb the newly independent CEEC states, it needed to accommodate them with a re-designed internal structure in order to avoid a complete system-revision of itself. At the same time, the EEC evolved in the way it engaged with the “Mediterranean”. Financial assistance was difficult to obtain under the RMP, as it was allocated on a project-by-project basis and was subject to delays (Gomez 2003: 51). As a result, only a few projects within the range of specified areas were ever funded (2003: 51). Coordinating debt control for the Mediterranean group at an EEC level just did not happen: the EEC member states preferred to leave this up to the larger global financial institutions. Moreover, the (European) Council enforced conditions of structural adjustment on financial assistance, in line with IMF policy, making it a condition of receiving money from the EEC/EU (2003: 51). A concession was made, however, in that the EEC would grant extra financial aid for projects that would be affected by structural adjustments (2003: 51). At the global level, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) made concessions in textile tariffs (the Multi-Fibre Agreement) that meant any concessions made by the EEC to and for Mediterranean states in the same category irrelevant (Gomez 2003: 51). In general, the RMP turned out to be at least an opportunity to allocate more money to the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2007: 168; Gomez 2003: 52). It also introduced regionalism (Bicchi 2007: 156), prepared the way for subsequent integrationalism, and kept the Mediterranean non-member states “policy-relevant” at a time when the CEEC and the Northern EEC members were more inclined to look closer to within its own continental confines (Gomez 2003: 52). The lack of sophistication in the EEC’s institutional structure and policy repertoire at the time meant that even if the southern member states had wanted to, at the EEC level it was still unable to address the immediate and visible concerns of the non-EEC member Mediterranean states. This was apparent in the subsequent lack of trade and economic growth at the time. Although the RMP attempted to move into other develop-

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mental areas apart from financial aid, little influence was ultimately registered in these other areas. The relative newness of the EEC, its continual growth and expansion in the face of external pressures, meant that the EEC was in a continual loop of trust-building. The relations between EEC member states of 1989–1990 were not yet counter-­ balanced by a joint history consolidated by mutually constructed structural/institutional ties. With the RMP there was still a discrepancy between what the EEC stated was its policy towards the non-member Mediterranean states, and the actual concessions that the EEC member states and their embryonic mechanisms were willing and able to meter out (Gomez 2003: 50–52). The un-structured and comparatively disassociated group of Mediterranean non-­ EEC member states meant that any attempt at interaction at the regional level at the time would have been minimal. In comparison, the (relative) complexity of the EEC versus the non-institutionally related Mediterranean states would, in spite of an attempted multilateral or structured policy approach towards them, maintained fragmentation and isolation. Such contradictory performance has become only more institutionalised and indicative of EU foreign policy in the following years, no more so apparent than in the JAES and its engagement with Africa at the African Union (AU) level.

4.8  T  he Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)/ Euro-­Mediterranean Agreements The Gulf War crisis (1990–1991) slowed the relationship down further between the EEC and the Mediterranean states. The non-EEC Mediterranean states demanded more financial assistance from the EEC to offset the loss of trade during this warring time. The EEC, as a whole, was reluctant to give it and only agreed to partial aid to Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Gomez 2003). The Southern EEC member states of Spain, Italy and France, continued on their own to maintain relations and proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) (Marsh and Rees 2012: 147). The proposal proved unpopular in particular with the USA who, as increasingly recognised sponsors of the Israeli project, saw it as an attempt to usurp their position as peace-negotiator and go-between in the region (Bicchi 2007: 158; Gomez 2003: 53). The CSCM was eventually dropped (Gomez 2003: 53). France once again took the lead in relations with the non-EEC member/ Mediterranean states, and proposed a political dialogue between the five EEC Mediterranean member states and the five states of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), named the 5 + 5 process.12 This dialogue was to cover economic develop-

 Originally the 4  +  5, then the 5  +  5 (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Malta  +  Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco Tunisia, the group proved at the time to be too small – excluding Egypt, a

12

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ment, food self-sufficiency, and environmental management (Gomez 2003: 53; Bicchi 2007: 158). Tensions between states, however, led once more to the collapse of this effort, too. Against the backdrop of the Gulf Crisis, the dynamics of the end of the Cold War, the potential for enlargement (and absorbing the CEECs), and newly perceived security threats from North Africa and the Middle East, the EEC began to adjust and redefine itself in relation to its external environment once again. The signing of the TEU or the “Maastricht Treaty” in 1992 amended the institutional structure of the EEC, now re-named the EU. The TEU re-organised the EEC/ EC into three “pillars”, the first being on Economic Community, the second the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Wallace et al. 2010). It is the second pillar that had most bearing on EU foreign relations, however, in particular as regards the non-EU member Mediterranean states: the Commission was restructured internally, which resulted in its having a presence in both the EC and the CFSP pillars, and consequently found itself in a position to influence foreign policy in security matters (Gomez 2003: 54). It was however, this same internal structure that institutionalised and compounded conflicting interests between DGs representing EU member state Agricultural interests on the one hand, and the running of the EMP on the other (Gomez 2003: 57). Spain, once again led by Commissioner Abel Matutes and with the help of the (Felipe) Gonzalez government at the time, were charged with the task of reassessing the relationship between the EU and the countries of North Africa (Gomez 2003: 53; Bicchi 2007: 162). What appeared at the end of this venture was a document that was highly neo-­ liberal in tenor and content, calling for free trade, private investment, and macro-­ economic reforms. Association Agreements and EU financial aid were to be “used” in “support of these objectives” (Gomez 2003: 54; Joffe 1998: 248). It was also the first call for a “partnership”, albeit openly recognised as an unequal one, based as it was on conditionality. Cooperation was envisaged in a wide selection of policy concerns including co-management of natural resources, energy and food supplies

significant partner in any regional initiative – and too diverse: the conflict in Algeria and between Morocco and the Western Sahara disrupted the arrangement. The original Forum format in 1990 was geared towards discussing issues of natural resource management, economic links, financial assistance, immigration, and culture. It excluded discussions on military security. See Larrabee, F.S., 1998. “The Barcelona Process and Other Mediterranean Initiatives”. In Larrabee, F.S., et al., 1998. NATOs Mediterranean Initiatives: Policy Issues and Dilemmas. California: RAND. p. 34. Present-day the 5 + 5 incorporates 10 countries around the West Mediterranean sea (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta). This is a “regional initiative” that “aims to establish a propitious frame for dialogue and cooperation amongst member countries to tackle issues as security and stability, economical integration and regional migration”. European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) [online] Available at: http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/dialogue55-western-mediterranean/ [accessed 6 Jan. 2013].

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(Gomez 2003: 53). Institutional structures were proposed that had meetings taking place between the EU and the AMU at governmental and parliamentary levels. A later report on the CFSP framed two distinct geographical areas in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the North African states, each with slightly different priorities and therefore different foreign policy objectives. For the countries of North Africa, dialogue was envisaged on immigration, drug trafficking, Islamic fundamentalism, population growth, and terrorism. For the Middle East, the Israel-­ Palestine peace process was the focal point with the objective of changing Israel’s stance on the Palestinian territories (Gomez 2003: 54). By the end of 1992, Tunisia and Morocco had outlined agreements with the EU that included terms of trade, financial assistance to stimulate local and regional economic development, and what was referred to as “social cooperation”, which paved the way for discussions at ministerial level on migration, and living and working conditions for North African citizens in the EU (2003: 53). This agreement structure was eventually extended to the countries of the Middle East, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey (Gomez 2003: 55). In spite of the formatted structure, which included some fixed points of reference, however, contingencies were made for individual countries in terms of trade, thus tailoring once more the agreements to the individual needs of the non-EU/Mediterranean countries in relation to the EU member states (2003: 55). Once again, the approach was a multilateral idea or concept of approaching the external EU environment, with a network of differentiated sub-structures and preferences (agreements) that took priority, seeding competition and fragmentation. By 1994, confusingly, and somewhat contradictory in nature, these “Association” Agreements were collectively referred to as a singular character or policy framework: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships (EMP). At a later stage the EMP became synonymous with the Barcelona Process due to the overlapping and sequencing of agreements. There were, however, continuing difficulties in the development of the EMP and their negotiations. The EU at the time was again perhaps too institutionally incoherent to carry out such a multilateral mandate as described. Its internal structures – the Council, the Commission with its separated Directorates – undermined the ability to manoeuvre between strong internal/member states’ interests competing over the multilateral objectives of the institution. The divisions within the EU at the time have been identified by Gomez (2003) as between the Northern “liberalisers” such as the UK, Germany, and the Scandinavian states, and the Southern “protectionist” group consisting of Spain, Italy, and France. Agriculture and agricultural products featured as primary industry and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – strong areas for both the Southern EU member states and the non-EU member Mediterranean states. Friction between national level interest groups, therefore, and the multilateral policy aims of the EU made negotiations hard, sometimes leading to stalemates (Gomez 2003: 58–59). These internal dynamics and divisions ultimately led to their externalisation in dealing with the non-EU/Mediterranean states. In some cases, while the Commission negotiated the Agreements, individual EU member states found themselves offering

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side-payments (Gomez 2003: 59), increasing differentiation between non-EU/ Mediterranean states and effectively sidestepping and undermining the multilateral and policy coherence aims of the EU institution (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). In spite of this, the EU still remained a significant authoritative figure and desirable organisation with which to interact from the perspective of the non-EU member Mediterranean states, which at the same time were experiencing a period of slow economic growth and increasing instability (Best et al. 2004; Larrabee et al. 1998; Bicchi 2009: 18).13 In this sense, the EMP agreement s­ tructures were already furthering selection pressures on the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, and in this way constraining the possibility of alternative evolutionary paths of the same countries. The EU member states were able to use the leverage of the “EU institution” to create a particular dynamic – dependency – between them and the non-EU member Mediterranean states, effectively restricting the in-flow of external stimuli (or imports) so as not to threaten the internal integrity of the overall formal EU institution/system. The outcome of these interactions created a relationship between the EU and the non-EU member “Mediterranean” states that subsequently became one of conditionality and re-enforced dependency or tighter coupling. It could be said that the EU as an institution reached a particular level of structural flexibility that enabled internal adjustment (it was at this time that “opt-outs” had gained prominence, for example), and as such was able to evolve in relation to its external environment and maintain its overall Whole “personality” or institutional identity. The “partnerships” that had existed between the EU and non-EU Mediterranean states, could only be an unequal one and one in which, as Gomez (2003) points out, the non-EU member Mediterranean states were reduced to mere “bit players” (Gomez 2003: 59), or “hub-spoke dependency” relations (Joffe 1998: 250) with a propensity towards the creation of “leopard-spot economies” (Joffe 1998: 259).14 The EMP, on paper at least, moved away from the economically driven frameworks of the GMP and the RMP, to include a broader range of interaction and cooperation that reflected the new dynamics and concerns for the region, and relations between both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. In spite of this, the EMP – and by extension the EU – still failed to address these very same concerns that had been  The attractiveness of joining or being associated with EU is still relevant amongst North African states and is not only dependent on receiving development aid or preferential trade terms, but also on prestige or a least a non-material basis. A comment made during an interview for the purposes of this research alluded to the impression that North African states would much prefer to be part of the Union for the Mediterranean, and identified as “Mediterranean”, than [just] another African country. It is worthwhile to note, also, that African states receive more money or financial aid through the Cotonou Agreement than under aid provisions in Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. Non-attributable Interview, 2011. 14  Leopard spot economies refer to the specialisation of economies in the region, which responding to demand created by EU trade agreements, lead to a lessening of diversity. See Joffe, J., 1998. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects”. The Journal of North African Studies. p. 259. 13

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raised before and had led to the GMP and the RMP (Gomez 2003: 61). Internal dynamics and the institutionally immature structure at the time would appear to have prevented it from truly dealing with the Mediterranean non-EU members in a coherent or indeed a truly “multilateral” character. The relationship that was instigated was a complex one where the EU was seen to advocate a multilateral, uniform, and systematic approach to its external relations with the non-EU member Mediterranean states, yet continued to deal bilaterally with them on particular issues. This could only encourage fragmentation in external (and external) relations and also begin to institutionalise and normalise competitive behaviour in international and geographically regional relations. As Gomez (2003) notes, “The politicisation of trade diplomacy has been an enduring characteristic of the Union’s behaviour in the international system” (2003: 62). What was qualitatively and ­structurally begun at the “Mediterranean” regional level would become a trademark of EU foreign policy engagement towards the rest of Africa.

4.9  The Barcelona Process (1995) It is the Barcelona Process that is considered to be the predecessor to the current UfM, as the former – along with its Work Programmes and Agreements – became the structural basis for the subsequent Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean of 2008 (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 6/10). The Barcelona Process came at the beginning of a new era in the global order. The period of the 1990s and grand events at the global and key regional levels changed the make-up of international relations. Political dimensions both within the EU and the Mediterranean converged to bring about the Barcelona Process, as well as the various problems and hiccups that it encountered along the way. The Barcelona Process was on the one hand, as previous Mediterranean initiatives before it, the culmination of internal and external (global) re-structuring at the time: geography, politics, and socio-economic principles all contributed to the formation of this very specific and directed foreign policy framework towards the non­EU members, now properly identified as the Mediterranean, riparian countries of North Africa, and some of the Middle East. On the other hand, the Barcelona Process from 1995 onwards was seen as a departure from previous Mediterranean policy initiatives as it was deemed to incorporate a more holistic approach, recognising to some extent interrelated human and natural-resource systems, and the necessity to deal with inter-dependent and problematised concerns for the EU member states. The Barcelona Declaration acknowledged the strategic importance of its Mediterranean neighbours and of extending peace, stability and prosperity to that so-defined region. In subsequent documents, Euro-Mediterranean policy has been acknowledged as “proximity policy” (Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 7). Depending on the source, the reasoning behind the renewed interest in the region at the time are divided between those that believe the primary motivation was security concerns, and those who believe that economic interests drove the re-design of the

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Euro-Mediterranean initiative. These are, however, not mutually exclusive, especially in the lexicon of modern security studies where the latter achieves the former,15 dating back to the EU’s founding ethos based on the Kantian principle of “perpetual peace”, or what is now more commonly termed “liberal democracy” (Wallace et al. 2010; Joffe 1998: 248–9; Lister 2001: 8/15; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 106). The Barcelona Declaration/Process was an epitome of the neoliberal economic orthodoxy and the ideals of the Washington Consensus prevalent at the time (Lister 2001: 8; Joffe 1998, 2009: 50; Larrabee et al. 1998: 26).16 The Barcelona Declaration (and ensuing Process) are referred to as a “multilateral” frameworks, designed to reinforce cooperation and solidarity, and extend peace, stability, and prosperity to the defined Mediterranean region. As a multilateral framework, it took pains to point out however, that it did not replace the bilateral agreements already established between Member States and Partners, and more specifically other initiatives such as the Middle East Peace Process at the time. It outlined the prerequisites for peace, stability, and prosperity from a European perspective, identified in-text as democracy, respect for human rights, balanced economic and social development, the importance of alleviating poverty, and creating greater understanding between cultures (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 2/17). Initially the Barcelona Process included fifteen EU member states at the time, and twelve Mediterranean Partners: the Palestinian Authority, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Tunisia, Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Algeria.

4.10  Courting a New Relationship: The Initial Steps A variety of contributory factors led to the Conference in 1995, which produced the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent Process. The eminent enlargement of the EU with the inclusion of the CEECs led to southern Mediterranean member states such as France, Italy, Spain and Greece, to request a reciprocal EU-level gesture towards the Mediterranean non-members at the same time (Bicchi 2007; Gomez 2003: 71; Larrabee et al. 1998: 24; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 66). New perceptions of potential security threats from “structural risks” such as under-development, poor economic growth, migration, radical and Islamic fundamentalism, for example,  The idea that long-term stability is created through prosperity (i.e. economic development, based on classical liberal and neoliberal economic doctrine), and, more pointedly from the perspective of the Declaration, the creation of jobs, and the raising of standards of living will also diminish the attractiveness of extremist and “revolutionary” movements. See Larrabee, F.S., 1998. Ibid. p. 26. 16  Normally associated with the Washington Consensus, these include a minimalist state and the rise of the private sector in development, privatisation of state enterprises, de-regulation or liberalisation of markets and the distribution of benefits by the magical “trickle-down effect”. Joffe, G., 1998. op.cit. p. 248; Wade, H. R., 2011. “Globalization, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment, and Imperialism”. In Ravenhill, J., (Ed.) 2011. Global Political Economy. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 373; Taylor, L., (Ed.) 1993. The Rocky Road to Reform: Adjustment, Income Distribution, and Growth in the Developing World. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. p. 40–41. 15

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prompted the need for a “new” approach towards the Southern Mediterranean non­EU members (Gomez 2003: 69; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 105; Larrabee et al.1998: 24). Previous attempts at establishing a more formalised relationship with the Mediterranean non-members such as the CSCE, the Euro-Maghreb Partnership and the 5 + 5 meetings indicated a political willingness on both sides at least to collaborate and form closer ties. Moreover, the recent downgrading of tensions in the Middle East and the success of the Oslo Peace Process (1993–1994) served to inspire confidence towards such a relationship (Gomez 2003: 70; de Vasconcelos 2009: 60). The EU, apparently anxious to counterbalance the USA’s influence in the region and “prove” itself, had been effectively and successively blocked by Israel and the USA in involvement in other peace processes in the region (Bicchi 2007: 164). The new partnership was seen to be a perfect opportunity to stretch the EU’s range in this area and participate politically, raising its profile both internationally and regionally, becoming more than a just a “donor” and economic facilitator (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003: 70–71, 74; Bicchi 2007: 147, 164). All of these events and currents in international affairs created an opportune time for the construction of a new way of relating to the North African and Middle Eastern states under the guise of a (newer) Mediterranean policy framework. The Barcelona Declaration is considered a breakaway or “landmark” (Bicchi 2007: 174; Bicchi 2009) policy framework and innovative (Gomez 2003: 69; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 106; Bicchi 2007: 174). The Declaration took policy structures into a formalised policy framework, departing from the previous GMP and RMP arrangements that had been driven by economics: trade and financial support (Larrabee et al. 1998: 24). While some attempts at addressing social concerns were mooted at the agreement level, they were dealt with through financial assistant packages or aid. The Barcelona Process, however, was the first time that a clear multilateral approach would take a formalised presence in a Declaration and Work Programme (Gomez 2003: 69) and make the leap into a “truly” regional policy (Office for Official Publications, 2000: 8). The long-term outlook was institutionalised in follow-up programmes and structures and is also considered an innovation at this point in EU/Mediterranean policy-­ relations (Bicchi 2007: 169; Larrabee et  al. 1998: 26). The Declaration was remarkable in the multi-layered structural17 (thematic and topic areas) and institutional approach to external relations (Bicchi 2009: 17), bringing together the twenty-­ seven governments including Syria, Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to agree on a wide range of 17  Bicchi (2009) describes multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral “channels” of interaction, each dealt with through different combinations of internal institutional representation. See Bicchi, F., 2009. “Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Historical Perspective”. In Hedwig, G., (Ed.) 2009. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online] Available at: http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c83787c88fec55/feps_ie_euromed.pdf

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topics, some of which were extremely delicate, both diplomatically and politically (Gomez 2003: 69; Bicchi 2007, 2009; Office for Official Publications 2000: 8). These included areas of cooperation in terrorism, immigration, non-proliferation regimes and disarmament, democratic governance, rule of law, the “fundamental freedoms” and human rights (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 3–4/17; Bicchi 2007: 169). This was consistent with a significant shift in EU foreign policy thinking, which aimed at solidifying or creating coherence in its foreign policy output (Carbone 2009: 8). The approach aimed at a certain amount of uniformity in the structure of Association Agreements, their contents’ areas beginning to shape  a structural approach to foreign policy that would eventually define it (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 53; Lister 2001: 9). One characteristic of this contrived coherence, and consistent with global development ideology at the time (that is to say the Post Washington Consensus), was a transfer of onus and “ownership” onto partner states to implement their own development (Lister 2002: 9–10).18 The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements under the Process were to be updated once more, and would contain common elements based on the multilateral approach, and (formally) now individualistic adjustments based on the country concerned (Gomez 2003: 55; Bicchi 2007, 2009; Larrabee et al. 1998: 26). This kind of structured arrangement in foreign policy has led to the EU’s external engagement being termed by some observers as a “bi-multilateralism” (Minasi 1998 cited in Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 79); it was seen to lead to increased frustration and fragmentation between the Mediterranean partner states, as the potential of the collective bargaining power of the Mediterranean states and their capacity and will to act together was further constrained (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 80; Gomez 2003: 83). Bi-multilateralism as a structural set of dynamics was furthermore endorsed, as the prospect of bilateral agreements between member states and Mediterranean non-member states on a one-to-one basis were formally reinforced in the Declaration (Gomez 2003: 74). The Declaration clearly states this contradiction: …regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 2/14).

 Stratkosch has highlighted three progressions of the liberal state, from its transposed form and role in the processes of external colonialisation, through its social liberal to its current neoliberal form. At each point in the liberal/neoliberal State’s development, its role in relation to citizens has been reframed, as well as citizens’ to it. These have progressed from citizens’ having “morally authority” to the state itself taking over this image/role; and citizens’ portrayed rather as figures of “moral critique”, “risks” to the State through which “self-reliance” is a practice of mitigation; the citizen thus becomes a burden, and the state is “beleaguered”. While Stratkosch’s work relates to the internal workings of the state as it applies to inclusionary/exclusionary policy practices in Settler colonialism, its relevance is found here in the language and structural policy of the EEC/ EU’s UfM, and later as shown in the Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership in Chap. 6. See Stratkosch, E., 2015. Neoliberal Colonialism, In Stratkosch, E. 2015. Neoliberal Indigenous Policy.

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The content of the Declaration, in combination with the formalised long-term commitment was just as important, incorporating major adjustments to social, cultural, and economic systems supporting the hypothesis that EU foreign policy is designed to transform using structured ideational components as well, making the leap from foreign policy to “regime” (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 90; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 25–27). The Declaration presented at the Conference in November of 1995, had by no means been arrived at smoothly. Given the nature of the new multilateral approach and the range of different interests involved, there was bound to be some disagreement on the wording and issues covered. The absence of Libya at the Conference table was problematic and the issue divided the EU member states, for some of whom the presence of Libya meant good strategic sense at the time (Gomez 2003: 75; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 74–75). For others, however, Libya’s presence was considered to have been too confrontational in light of the then UN sanctions against it (for the Lockerbie/Pan Am and UTA/Paris bombings in 1988 and 1989 respectively). It would have been in the UK’s – and its ally, the USA’s – interests that Libya be marginalised for this reason. For the Mediterranean partners in North Africa and the Middle East, it was a matter of the region being represented minus a key partner, underscoring fragmentation from the start and at the same time drawing attention to external pressures and influences. Without Libya, the “region” would not be fully represented and any kind of collective or multilateral representation on behalf of the partner states, would be diluted (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 74). There appears to be a general consensus in subsequent literature that the Declaration, and the decision to create such an approach, was prompted, driven, and secured in its proposed institutional structure by the EU, and led by the Commission at that point. This aspect served to re-enforce its perception as Euro-centric and has subsequently lessened the legitimacy of the “Partnership” (Joffe 1998: 250). Only at later stages in its draft-form pre-Conference were the twelve partner states invited to comment (Gomez 2003: 72). Even then, much of what was contributed by the Mediterranean partner states by way of response and suggestion was “papered over” (Gomez 2003: 75). The Declaration that made it to the Conference had had little adjusted to it after the fact (Gomez 2003: 74). This goes somewhat towards explaining, therefore, the retrospectively perceived “failure” of this initial initiative and claims that it lacked “ownership” or “legitimacy” (Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005: 11). Perhaps a better explanation is the filtering through of the idea that “ownership” was a prerequisite for success. Since the period of the early 1960s, shifting the burden of policy programmes’ successful outcomes on to partner countries had become an entrenched and recurring theme in EU “development-speak” or structural foreign policy as already defined (Lister 2002: 9–10; Bergh 2012: 310).

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4.11  Conclusion This chapter has described the creation of the Mediterranean region in EEC/EC/EU foreign policy making, and its external consciousness. While the Mediterranean identity may have existed through historical and cultural ties before, it certainly did not exist in the ineffectual form that was subsequently created as a result of certain Mediterranean countries like Spain, Greece, and Portugal being incorporated into the EC and becoming “European”. Their separation from the “rest of the Mediterranean” meant they took on a stronger, differentiated identity, that of the EC/EU institution. This was shown in the competitive stance EC/EU member ­countries adopted towards those “left outside” in the renegotiation of terms of trade later on. The structurally imposed competition however, did not apparently affect the affinity that they – the EC/Mediterranean member states – still felt with the other “more southern” Mediterranean, non-EC members, as they consistently tried to re-­ negotiate ties and maintain links with them, most notably in the latter half of the 1990s. Yet this concern on their part cannot counteract either, the severity of the conditions that developed across North Africa and the Middle East as a result of being left out, and being the subsequent recipients of the remaining “Mediterranean” identity on the outside (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco). Furthermore, in spite of the fact that underdevelopment, poverty, external debt, economic crises, radical Islamic groups involved in terrorist activities were highlighted and recognised as risks to EC/EU security, these same issues cannot be dismissed as disassociated from the conditions structurally re-organised by enforced regional integration and conformity with externally imposed, EC/EU demands from policy frameworks and Association Agreements. From a systems perspective, the development of EC/EU foreign policy arose through a need to organise itself in relation to its external environment, and what aspects in the external environment it deemed was going to have a direct effect or “threat” to the EC. The first Agreements between the newly created “Mediterranean” were based mainly on material or consumable goods allocated for import/export (a relationship based on trade); but later Agreements changed to include socio-­ economic re-structuring. Finally, the Barcelona Declaration was a new model of EU foreign policy making, attempting – as in the new security language at the time – an “integrated” approach to redress perceived challenges or the major issues that ultimately converged in the Partnership. The Barcelona Declaration was nevertheless driven by, and underpinned by, the understanding and belief that economic “wealth” was akin to human well-being, and would create peace and stability. The pursuit of economic wealth and growth was strongly associated with neoliberal principles and a belief in integration overall. By the time of the Barcelona Process, EU foreign policy called for regional integration, and demanded changes in the national internal structures, restructuring all aspects of their socio-ecological systems, not only individually, but between them and as a whole, regionalised entity: the EC/EU regional integration agenda and

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compartmentalisation of the Mediterranean, changed how the physical environment was perceived in terms of economic-worth and exportable goods. As a direct result, it restructured the entire socio-ecological chain, from what was harvested and how, to production, exportation and distribution. EC/EU foreign policy and its regionalism of the Mediterranean therefore, not only defined what was produced in relation to others within the region, but en balance with other regions worldwide as well. This was apparent prior to and at the point of the integration of the CEECs into the EU, and the subsequent re-structuring of the Association Agreements; the Euro-­ Mediterranean Agreements with the Mediterranean countries, and the launch of the Barcelona Process. The change in policy making with the Barcelona Declaration was accompanied by a change in thought and perception of the principle challenges to be faced by the EU, from the Mediterranean region. These were, amongst others, socio-economic stability, and the related security concerns of immigration, and terrorism, inextricably coupled to radical Islamic groups. In as much as the Mediterranean was formed, its relationship with the EC/EU became defined by these issues and was embedded into what has become the Barcelona acquis.

References African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. ISBN: 978-92-95104-23-5. Aghrout, A. 2009. Euro-Mediterranean Trade Relations. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G. Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online]. http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/feps_ie_euromed. pdf. Aliboni, R., and Y. Qatarneh. 2005. The Future of the EMP in a Changing Context of Transatlantic and Regional Relation. EuroMeSCo Paper 46. [online]. http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/ media/euromesco_paper_46.pdf. Asser, M. 2011. The Muammar Ghaddafi Story. BBC News. [Online], October 21. Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27–28/11/1995. [online]. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2014. Bergh, S.I. 2012. Introduction: Researching the Effects of the Neoliberal Reforms on Local Governance in the Southern Mediterranean. Mediterranean Politics 17 (3): 303–321. Best, A., J.M.  Hanhimaki, J.A.  Maiolo, and K.E.  Schulze. 2004. International History of the Twentieth Century. London: Routledge. ———. 2008. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2nd ed. Oxford: Routledge. Bicchi, F. 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2009. Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Historical Perspective. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G.  Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online]. http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/ feps_ie_euromed.pdf. Bossuyt, J. and A. Sherriff. 2010. What Next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on Revitalizing an Innovative Framework, A Scoping Paper. Discussion Paper No. 94. Maastricht: ECDPM.

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Carbone, M., ed. 2009. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge. Carbone, M. 2018. Caught Between the ACP and the AU: Africa’s Relations with the European Union in a Post-Cotonou Agreement Context. South African Journal of International Affairs 25 (4): 481–496. de Groof, E. and J. Bossuyt. 2019. North Africa’s Double Pursuit – Part I: Mixed Messages from Europe and Africa Stand in the Way of an Intercontinental Deal, Discussion Paper No. 239. Maastricht: ECDPM. de Vasconcelos, A. 2009. Union for the Mediterranean: The Political and Security Agenda. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G. Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/ libros/Barcelona10_eng.pdf Dinan, D. 2004. Europe Recast: A History of European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Elgstrom, O., and J.  Pilegaard. 2009. Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements. In Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, ed. M.  Carbone. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge. European Commission Communication. 2008/319 Final/EU of 20 May 2008 on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. [online]. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319&from=EN. European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA). [online]. http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/dialogue-55-western-mediterranean/. Accessed 6 Jan 2013. Gomez, R. 2003. Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? Hampshire: Ashgate. Joffe, G. 1998. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects. The Journal of North African Studies 3 (2): 247–266. ———. 2009. Investment in the Southern Mediterranean. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G. Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online]. http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/feps_ie_euromed. pdf. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. [online]. http:// www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_ the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2014. Keukeleire, S., and J. MacNaughtan. 2008. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Larrabee, F.S. 1998. The Barcelona Process and Other Mediterranean Initiatives. In NATOs Mediterranean Initiatives: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, ed. F.S. Larrabee et al. Santa Monica: RAND. Larrabee, F.S., J.  Green, I.O.  Lesser, and M.  Zanini. 1998. NATOs Mediterranean Initiatives: Policy Issues and Dilemmas. Santa Monica: RAND. Lister, M. 2001. Reinvigorating Europe’s Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies. National Centre for Research on Europe. Paper 1/05. [online]. http://aei.pitt.edu/10950/1/ ncre0105_lister.pdf. ———. 2002. EU Development Policymaking: Globalization and the Post Lomé World. Development Studies Association (DSA) Annual Conference. University of Greenwich, UK, 9 November 2002. United Kingdom: Development Studies Association. [online]. http://www. devstud.org.uk/downloads/4bb997b3b0f23_Dp25.doc. Marsh, S., and H. Mackenstein 2005. The International Relations of the European Union [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge. Available at: Kalahari.com.

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Marsh, S., and W. Rees. 2012. The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War. Abingdon: Routledge. Medinilla, A., and J.  Bossuyt 2019. Africa-EU Relations and Post-Cotonou: African Collective Action or Further Fragmentation of Partnerships? Briefing Note No. 110. Maastricht: ECDPM. Office for Official Publications European Communities. 2000. The Barcelona Process Five Years On: 1995–2000. ISBN 92-894-0146-X. cat.no. NF-32-00-128-EN-C. Parfitt, T. 1997. Europe’s Mediterranean Designs: An Analysis of the EuroMed Relationship with Specific Reference to Egypt. Third World Quarterly 5: 865–881. Pastore, F. 2009. The Crumbling Bridge. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G. Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online]. http://www.feps-­ europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/feps_ie_euromed.pdf. Staab, A. 2013. The European Union Explained, 2nd and 3rd. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Wallace, H., M.A. Pollack, and A.R. Young. 2010. Policy-Making in the European Union. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waterfield, B. 2008. Ghadaffi Attacks Sarkozy Plan for Union for the Mediterranean. The Daily Telegraph [Online], July 10. Xenakis, D.K., and D.N.  Chryssochoou. 2001. The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Chapter 5

Declarations and Process: Keeping (Institutional) Memory Alive in the Mediterranean

5.1  Introduction Chapter 4 traced the beginnings of the creation of the “Mediterranean” in the European Economic Community? (EEC)/European Union (EU) policy repertoire as its external environment. Through successive initiatives beginning with the formally named Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), North African and Middle Eastern (MENA) states became redefined not only in isolation to, but in differentiation from other regions and policy consignments, and later in reference to other collectively-inspired groupings such as the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES). The EEC/EU’s own development, which included successive enlargements, assisted in this effort by splitting up what had once been part of a “liquid continent” (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 25); the “Mediterranean” prior to this had been more aligned through ties that held cultural and historical significance than any economically-incentivised regional grouping inspired by EEC/EU foreign policy initiatives at the time. The history of European/EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is a history of movement and re-organisation, both internally and externally. What eventually emerged over successive initiatives was a particular kind of foreign policy, infused with the popular neoliberal economic beliefs at the time that were reinforced after the “defeat” of Communism and the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The triumph of Capitalism over Communism was upheld as “proof” that neoliberalism worked, and it was this in combination with the promotion of closer integration that was exported in subsequent external relations (Best et al. 2008: 492). For the countries that made up the Mediterranean, EC/EU foreign policy, however, was a history of disappointment, repression, imposition, and arbitrary grouping. It was consistently felt by the countries of North Africa and the Middle East that their concerns were not being addressed, that Agreements and Partnerships were biased in favour of the EU’s own interests in spite of rhetoric that suggested a comprehensive and inclusive approach. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_5

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The relationship that then developed between the EEC/EU and the countries of the Mediterranean was one based on fracture and disillusionment, with the EEC/EU institutionalising multilateralism in a framework, together with bilateralism and individualism at the same time: competition and individualism were being fortified at the regional level of the “Mediterranean”, as well as an institutionalised relationship that was idealised as a region or Whole, and yet was also fragmented. In addition, the very nature of EU integrationalism meant that the value system transposed and imposed through agreements and partnerships further worked against internal (national) unity (or social cohesion) and also regional integration as proposed by the EEC/EU policies and frameworks. The EEC/EU’s approaches to integration were in reality neither qualitatively “integrated” nor coherent, and neither did they create integration or coherence. While EEC/EU policy rhetoric has reinforced integrationalism, it has also destroyed the legitimacy of the EU as a genuine partner, capable of deliverable and desirable results or outcomes. Within the EEC/EU, successive enlargements or assimilations of new states created more dissimilarity internally, but the desire to pursue a collective “personality” never faltered. What emerged was the “EU”, a regionally based institution with influential state leaders who, while driving internal “fissures” and dynamics, nevertheless maintained a definitive “EU” institutional profile on the world map and in international relations. With each successive enlargement, the EU was able to move forward by creating an internal institutional modularity (flexibility) that allowed member states to retain an amount of individualism and autonomy without giving up the EU identity or functional character. In other words, the EU exhibited reflexivity: its overall “personality” was retained while it underwent considerable change within. Prior to and throughout the development of EEC/EU foreign policy towards the “Mediterranean”, including the GMP, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), and the Barcelona Process, lines in Europe and the Mediterranean have been redrawn, as have institutional identities and associations. As the “Mediterranean” is, and has been defined and reinforced over successive EEC/EU enlargements and foreign policy frameworks, so too “Africa” has been diminished. By establishing and reinforcing the Mediterranean regional identity (through successive policy initiatives), African unity, identity, and underlying issues of “security” connected to these historical constructs, have been and are continually undermined. It is important to keep this point central, even as EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is discussed. North Africa is still Africa in the eyes of the African Union (AU), and forms part of the African socio-ecological system (SES), however apparently diverse politically and geographically. As observations of complex adaptive systems (CASs) have shown, strength and resilience are built from the bottom up and from within. Each level is subject to co-­ ordinated learning and emerging successive levels. The result is a complex system that is structurally integrated and sound, and behaves as a whole. EU integrationalism and foreign policy, therefore, works against generalised resilience, and as it is applied and interacts, specified resilience and hence “security” of the Mediterranean

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focal system and those connected to it either institutionally (formally or informally) or geographically. This chapter will focus on identifying selection pressures made through the Barcelona Declaration and its Process on the countries of the (then) Mediterranean leading up to the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008. This will include examination of the follow-up Conferences in Malta (1997), Palermo (1998), Stuttgart (1999), Lisbon (2000), the Five-Year Work Programme (2005), and the issues raised thereafter in response to and as a critique on the Process’ performance. The Barcelona Process is often referred to as the “Euro-­ Mediterranean Partnership” (EMP), after the title of the Agreements (Euro-­ Mediterranean Agreements); it is still relevant as it forms part of the Barcelona acquis (that includes the Declaration, Work Programmes, and other agreements made as part of the Process) referred to in today’s UfM founding documents. The (liberal democratic) idea that regional integration will accomplish peace, (structural) security and prosperity, and neoliberal economic approaches to growth and development (that development needs to be “owned” and applied by the partners), will be examined in the founding documents and the Barcelona acquis, focusing on language, topic area, and structural emphases.

5.2  Barcelona Declaration, Adopted at the Euro-­Mediterranean Conference 27–28 November, 1995 5.2.1  Structure and Content The Barcelona Declaration, which still exists today as the foundation of the current UfM, refers to three “pillars” of cooperation, drawing similarities between it and the structures of the previous Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM 1990) and Helsinki Final Act (Larrabee 1998: 58; Gomez 2003: 71; Bicchi 2007; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 75). The Partnerships, however (also referred to as “Chapters”), are Political and Security, Economic and Financial, together with a Partnership in Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs. The Political and Security Partnership and the Socio-cultural Partnership were obviously new additions and a departure from the previous GMP and RMP policy structures. They were intended to represent a fresh attempt at an “holistic” approach towards confronting EU interests in the Mediterranean (Larrabee 1998). A Work Programme outlining the measures to be undertaken was also adopted and Annexed to the Declaration that was designed to start “as soon as practical” (Barcelona Declaration, Annex: Work Programme 1995: 9/17). The introduction to the Declaration sets the tone of the overall Partnership and the principles of the relationship between the EC/EU and the Mediterranean countries. The new “Partnership” would be based on common history and values, on new

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and shared issues (specifically political, economic, and social), as well as the need to face common challenges with a “coordinated” (therefore a collective) response. The stipulation that the Partnership was not to replace any other initiative towards peace in the Middle East (it specifies support for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, or UNSCRs, on the Middle East and the Madrid Process) was to some extent evidence of the USA’s influence over the proceedings (Gomez 2003). There was, however, great disappointment amongst the partner states who were hoping precisely that the Arab-Israeli conflict, along with the Greece/Cyprus/Turkey and Western Sahara issues/conflicts  – all long-standing  – would finally be given political importance and dealt with by the premier European institution in the international arena, the EU (Gomez 2003: 76,80). With this inclusion, hopes for help in this regard were marginalised, as it meant an adherence to the status quo. This only served to reinforce the idea that the Partnership would not really seek to address the security concerns of the Mediterranean partners, but rather the strategic and political representations of the EU and European interests. The decision to include the Middle East as part of a Mediterranean region would always mean that its success was dependent on relations between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab world. The choice to extend the political and security dialogue to the Middle East was a convenient and arbitrary “lumping” together of the Mediterranean. In the present day, this has prompted parallel initiatives in the Western European-Mediterranean, and the subsequent de-coupling from the Middle East and its debilitating Arab/Israeli dynamics, in the re-emergence of the 5 + 5 Initiative. In some places the Barcelona Declaration appears to be contradictory, highlighting the struggle to incorporate the diversity of interests and yet the desire to subsume them under one framework. In the Declaration’s introduction, “dialogue, exchange and cooperation” are seen as the necessary precursors for peace, stability and prosperity (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 2/14). In turn, these are seen to be achieved through a “strengthening of democracy, human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development and an understanding of cultures” (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 2/14). There is likewise an ambiguity present in that the Partnership is required to pay attention to the “characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants” (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 2/14). The contradiction between wishing to draw similarities, based on European ideals, and highlight Partner states’ individualities, may add further credence to subsequent questions that this was indeed a “partnership” based on any degree of equity at all, or even a credible attempt on behalf of the EU to initiate one (Lister 2001: 5). The Mediterranean partners, moreover, saw these pre-requisites as an attempt to “Westernise” their cultures (Gomez 2003: 73).

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5.2.2  P  olitical and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability Of note in the Political and Security Partnership, is the prevalence of European and Western concepts and values in its make-up. Not only were the values and concepts of “fundamental freedoms” respect for human rights, rule of law, and democracy formally different to Islamic culture at the time (and still are to an extent) (Gomez 2003; Ramadan 2001: 49; Lewis 2003: 18–32), but the perceptions of security and what constituted security concerns were at odds with what constituted insecurity or security concerns for the majority of the Mediterranean Partner states (Bicchi 2007; Gomez 2003). The constructs, perceptions, and interests present in this Partnership were considered plainly to be European. Of importance to the Mediterranean Partners in the 1990s and at the time the Declaration was drawn up, however, were the Arab-Israeli conflict and the marginalisation of Libya, an important and charismatic part of North Africa and African identity in international relations and negotiations for the Barcelona Process (Bicchi 2007; Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). The acknowledgment of “universal” values such as human rights, non-­ discrimination, and the “fundamental freedoms” in the Agreements and the Declaration took for granted inter-regional cultural symmetry, and a top-down, centralised governmental approach that had the willingness and resources to guarantee it. This would eventually become a problem, sealing Mediterranean Partners’ fate towards conflicting values, cultural crises, resentment towards external “interference”, and social fragmentation (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003: 80; Schlumberger 2011). The inclusion in the Declaration that each Partner should provide their own political, socio-cultural, economic, and judicial systems was also at odds with the direction given by the Partnership that required economic restructuration – liberalisation – and the observance of democracy and rule of international law, equality, diversity, and tolerance (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 3/17). Incoherence in policy making in this aspect, in spite of the EU ideals of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), was effectively institutionalised. Integrationalism was pursued at all costs. As some critics of the Partnerships have since pointed out, the EU ignored compliance of the aforementioned “universal” values in lieu of superficial national stability held in place by increasing authoritarianism (Joffe 1998: 248–9; Ramadan 2012: 5, 56–62; Aliboni 2005: 52).1 Whether this can be considered a real criticism is obscured by traditional approaches to the evaluation of the Barcelona Process that focus on individual components of the policy input/output and not as an SES entirely, however: creating critical structural change in the economic (value) system would naturally change all other inter1  The EU Council of Ministers suppressed a Human Rights report on Syria, an EU pre-requisite to association, while a trade agreement was being signed. See Xenakis, D.K., and Chrysshochoou, D.N., 2001. The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p.87.

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connected systems, and collapse, reorganise, and transform the entire system. Economic restructuring, depending on the modularity at the regional level, would alter all related technological, political, and social systems connected to it. Irrespective of whether the EU “ignored” non-compliance, the propensity for a “crisis of identity” at the state and sub-state level was laid with the “new” structural approach to foreign policy making in the Barcelona Declaration. In a further departure from previous Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, the Barcelona Declaration required that the Partner states implement the structural reforms outlined in the Partnership themselves (Joffe 1998: 248). The Partners initially were reluctant to instigate these measures, which they believed  – quite rightly – would make them unpopular within their own countries (Lister 2001: 2/15; Joffe 1998; Larrabee 1998: 28; Bicchi 2007). The Political and Security Partnership is placed against and within the United Nations (UN) framework using the UN Charter, international law, and values, as the guidelines by which the Partnership is to proceed. The most salient of these is acknowledgment of, and respect for, the Universal Charter on Human Rights, and the values that are contained therein such as the “rule of law” and democracy, the “fundamental” freedoms  – association, expression, thought, conscience and religion  – both individually and as a group (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 3/17). Likewise, Partners are called upon to encourage and adhere to the principles of diversity and pluralism, and by extension tolerance of race, religion, sex, nationality, and language (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 3/17). Sovereignty, the right to self-determination, combating terrorism, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference/intervention in partners’ internal affairs, settlement of disputes by peaceful means reminiscent of the UN Charter, are outlined in the Declaration; it is yet another indication of the extension of these values in EU foreign policy documents and their wish to align and legitimise their values and interests through reference to globalised norms and “universalised” frames of reference. Pre-conference objections to the contents of the Political and Security Partnership, such as on issues of ethno-nationalistic “terrorism”, which the partner countries wished changed to “legitimate struggles”, were ignored, serving only to strengthen the Mediterranean partners’ concerns that the Partnership was not an objective understanding of both sides’ needs, or even perceptions of needs. Post-­ conference moreover, Mediterranean partner states reiterated their displeasure at these willfully one-sided interpretations of circumstances, as these aspects were  deemed to be at the heart of the Arab/Israeli conflict (Gomez 2003: 78; Larrabee 1998: 31). Issues of security in the Political and Security Partnership are generally framed in terms of “harder” security concepts, such as the scaling down of military capacity at least to a level commensurate with “reasonable defence”, disarmament, weapons-­ free zones – specifically raised in conjunction with the Middle East – ratification and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the negotiation process, however, these aspects proved to be too ambi-

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tious and consequentially a major stumbling block for cooperation; the content proving too contentious for the diverse and fractured region at the time.2 The idea of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and their culmination in a Euro-Mediterranean stability “pact” in particular caused dissonance. The Partner states were primarily sensitive to it firstly because it was reminiscent of the Bagdad Pact and the failures therein (Gomez 2003). As a result, the “Pact” at a later conference was subsequently changed to a “Charter” (Gomez 2003: 79; Tanner 2005: 73). Nevertheless, partners saw this as a step too far within the parameters of Partnership, especially in relation to the other chapters that were seen to be creating an overemphasis on EU security concerns and ignoring once again the needs of the Partner states (Lister 2001: 5/15; Gomez 2003; Larrabee 1998: 30; Joffe 1998: 248). The connection between the three pillars (or chapters) of the Partnership and the legitimate building of an area of participative, comprehensive and sustainable peace, stability, and prosperity, were thereby seen to be ignored by the EU; this was in spite of the espoused ideal of promoting an “holistic” approach (Gomez 2003: 79). CSBMs were, as a result, later softened to the seemingly less objectionable Partnership Building Measures (PBMs), as the former implied the harder aspects of security cooperation that had caused so much disagreement, the perception of double standards, and unequal (preferential) treatment between partners (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Larrabee 1998: 30–31). Championed by France and Malta, however, the Stability Charter also brought up divisions within the EU itself. Northern EU member states also proved more reticent to become involved in a “hard” arrangement such as was being proposed (Gomez 2003: 78; Larrabee 1998: 30). One of the reasons for this was because there was no independent institutional arrangement in the EU itself to handle security or defence, should the occasion arise (Gomez 2003: 79). Any progress of the Stability Charter, furthermore, and as time would tell, was held hostage to peaks and troughs of Arab-Israeli tensions. Without progress on one it was hardly likely that progress could be made on the other (Gomez 2003; Lister 2001: 4/15). The Stability Charter eventually succumbed to the same fate as the CSBMs and all that was left was cooperation in PBMs, which amounted to meetings, seminars, and conferences of experts in security issues (Aliboni n.d.; Gomez 2003: 79; Larrabee 1998: 83; de Vasconcelos 2002: 8; Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 8–9). Terrorism and international crime – drug trafficking and organised crime in general  – were also included as security issues to be jointly approached under the Partnership. The signing of any Agreement under the Partnership included commitment in these areas. Obviously of equal relevance to both the members of the EU and Mediterranean Partners, it could yet still be argued that these security issues were more attuned to a European context and perspective that had initiated the fram2  Arab countries were adamant that Israel should sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it resolutely refused to do so. Larrabee, F.S., 1998. “The Barcelona Process and Other Mediterranean Initiatives”. In Larrabee, F.S., et al., 1998. NATOs Mediterranean Initiatives: Policy Issues and Dilemmas. California: RAND. p.32; Gomez, R., 2003. Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? p.75.

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ing of the concerns to begin with. From the perspective of the Mediterranean Partner states, however, there were more pressing matters.

5.2.3  E  conomic and Financial Partnership: Creating an Area of Shared Prosperity The objective of this Partnership was to create an area of shared prosperity, most notably through “long term” approaches such as sustainable socio-economic development, improving living conditions and employment, and reducing the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean area. This translated into the restructuring of the economic environment through the establishment of a free trade area, the implementation of “appropriate” economic cooperation and “concerted action”, as well as an increase of EU financial assistance to its partners. As already indicated, this was to be accomplished through encouraging regional cooperation and integration between MENA member states of the Process as a first step. The Economic and Financial Partnership is divided into three distinct parts, which also outline the processes to accomplish this restructuring. This Partnership is highly detailed and specific, and not much doubt is left as to the way in which the economic restructuring should take place, further emphasising its prescriptive nature.

5.2.4  Free Trade Area The Free Trade Area (FTA) was considered the main “engine” (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001) behind the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent Process, fueling the creation of peace and prosperity through (regional) integration and increased socio-economic development (inter-regional and intra-regional trade). For the first time there was a set date for the establishment of the FTA, indicating the significance of European interest behind it, as well as the belief behind the ideal of economically driven “peace”. The Barcelona Declaration framework set out to cover most trade, but also acted in conjunction and in tandem with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and obligations. It stipulated that manufactured products would have all tariff barriers to trade progressively lifted according to bilaterally determined timetables and, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) policies aside, agricultural products would follow the same route although through a “reciprocal preferential access”; trade in services and “right of establishment” would also have to take the GATT agreements into account, while progressively liberalising. The Partnership Agreements as a result could not come close to providing much more than had already been catered for at the GATT level (Gomez 2003: 60–1). Further, reciprocity suggested equal starting points in market development, something that was clearly not the case.

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The FTA arrangements and the details of how it would be instigated were contained within the content of the new and improved Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements held between the EU, individual EU-member states, and the Mediterranean countries, respectively. However, while an FTA in industrial goods – an area where European businesses already had a good hold – were dealt with under the Association Agreements and to that extent at the generalised level (Gomez 2003: 55), agricultural goods, which represented the bulk of the Mediterranean partners’ exportable GDP, were dealt with on a one-by-one/bilateral basis. Control over those agricultural products that were duplicated by EU-member states was thereby retained (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003: 83, 91). As Ricardo Gomez describes: At the same time as trade and industry ministers were meeting around the Mediterranean to discuss cooperation on industrial and investment policies, so negotiators from both sides were arguing over import quotas for oranges, potato and rice. (Gomez 2003:83)

These structural circumstances, together with the Community Agricultural Policy (CAP), would always mean a restricted access to EU markets for the Mediterranean Partners. In order to compete with the EU and international markets, the Mediterranean Partner states, as a whole region, would have to deregulate, liberalise, and privatise as quickly as possible. The protectionist stance that the EU took as exemplified in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, would mean the Mediterranean “Partners” would have to do so without a considerable counterpart market (Gomez 2003; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). Furthermore, while the liberalisation of services (labour) was mentioned in the Declaration, its provision was not actually accounted for in the subsequent Annexed Work Programme (Gomez 2003). The asymmetries and barriers created by the Partnership both within and between overall trading “goods” were striking: goods and economic capital could move freely but not people.3 The FTA as a result did not turn out to be as “free” or as socio-economically enabling as the partner states would have liked, or indeed needed to accomplish, in order to achieve the stated Objectives of the EMP (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). That an FTA would not necessarily be the panacea for peace and stability was later acknowledged in a report presented at the Malta follow-up conference held in 1997, by the Euro-­ Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), a research institute set up to study political and social relations between Europe and the Mediterranean within the context of the Barcelona Process (Aliboni et al. 1997: 38). In spite of this, the FTA was pursued in subsequent policy. 3  The freedom in trade in services is still a sensitive issue within the EU. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 tried to review this provision first introduced in 1992 under the Single European Act (SEA). The Boltkestein directive, however, which would allow this, has still met with resistance with EU member states so far. Criticism of instigating this directive has pointed out the “race to the bottom”, that is a race for member states to de-regulate their labour markets as quickly as possible to gain a competitive advantage over other countries’ labour markets. Staab, A., 2013. The European Union Explained. Third edition. Indiana: Indiana University Press. p.99; Bongiovanni, F., 2012. The Decline and Fall of Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. p.192.

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Unfortunately, the Mediterranean partners had little bargaining power to counteract this apparent protectionism. Gone was the leverage of the oil market of years before that had been held together and wielded by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). What was being offered was financial and structural assistance from one of the leading – and proximal – regional organisations, with a potential market at the time of 800 million people (Gomez 2003). In spite of the fact that access to this market could possibly have promoted accelerated economic activity for the Mediterranean Partners, it was effectively cut off from them. In the age of globalisation and the uncertainty of volatile markets in an emerging international trade system, the EU must have seemed like the best option. The Mediterranean partners were (still) at this time mired in external debt (Gomez 2003: 44–45). The FTA would not come without further challenges, however. It was widely accepted that structural reform of the kind needed and requested by the Barcelona Declaration would create further internal structural problems and aggressive social consequences in the short-term (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Bicchi 2007: 171; Gomez 2003; Barcelona Declaration 1995).4 The Mesures d’Accompagnement financières et techniques a la reforme des structures économiques et social dans le cadre du partenariat euro-méditerranéen (MEDA) set up in 1996,5 was the financial instrument through which Mediterranean partner states were offered assistance in the transitional period to the fully-fledged FTA, scheduled to be up and running by 2010. What was new with this particular financial instrument, however, was not only the fact that this money was metered out specifically for regional and bilateral projects, but also that funding was to be directed towards the mitigation of the social and economic consequences. Such consequences therefore were accepted as a fait accompli and contingent to economic integration based on neoliberal economic “orthodoxy”, the likes of which had become embedded in the ethos of the EU’s “domestic” and foreign policy (Bicchi 2007: 173; Gomez 2003: 81). It is debatable whether neoliberal principles of economic development, however, have relevance to every SES, especially in established Islamic cultures like those in the Middle East and the North Africa (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Bicchi 2007; Joffe 1998; Ramadan 2001, 2012).6

4  “They [the Partners and EU Member States] will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations”. Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27-28/11/1995. p.4/14. 5  Set up “to implement the cooperation measures designed to help Mediterranean non-member countries reform their economic and social structures and mitigate the social and environmental consequences of economic development”. “Europa Summaries of EU Legislation”, Europa [online] Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_ third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r15006_en.htm [accessed 03 Nov. 2014]. 6  George Joffe (1998) questions the efficiency and wisdom of pursuing such a policy aligned with the Washington Consensus economic principles in the Mediterranean, where historical evidence only points to poor performance and results. See Joffe, G., 1998. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects”. The Journal of North African Studies. pp. 247– 266; and Bergh, S. I., 2012. “Introduction: Researching the effects of neoliberal reforms on local governance in the Southern Mediterranean”. Mediterranean Politics, 17(3).

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In order to facilitate the FTA, the following measures were to be implemented: rules of origin; certification; protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition were to be established; the development of a market economy; the integration of economies; the “modernisation of economic and social structures”; the promotion of the private sector; the upgrading of the productive sector; the establishment of necessary institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy, and the transfer of technology. In other words, a complete overhaul of the SES in the “Mediterranean” designated region was to be implemented.

5.2.5  Economic Cooperation and Concerted Action This subsection within the Economic Partnership was the most detailed, outlining the important aspects of what the setting for a (free) market economy would entail, along with the areas considered important to cooperation. The Barcelona Declaration thus outlines those areas on which the Mediterranean Partners needed to focus, in order to contribute towards the Economic Partnership with the EU. Some of these areas have since become regularly acknowledged foreign policy areas and are included in EU policy frameworks with their [other] partners, including in the JAES. The areas of Economic Cooperation and Action were outlined as the environment, the promotion of women in economic and social life as well as employment, fisheries and fish resources, energy, water, agriculture (modernisation, restructuring, and integration of rural development, technical assistance and training, diversification, and the eradication of “illicit crops”), infrastructure (transport and communication, Information Technology), science and technology, and the coordination and collection of “proper and reliable” information, therefore the regulation and standardisation of statistics. In light of the Mediterranean Partner’s acknowledged external debt, this sub-­ section does not miss the opportunity to remind the Partners that internal savings are just as important as direct Foreign Investment (FDI) towards economic development. While mention is made of the debt, no measures were designed to assist the Partners in managing the debt or indeed, offering to expunge it completely in subsequent Work Programmes (Gomez 2003). As has been noted, it is highly unlikely that a credible partnership can be built where one partner is greatly indebted to the other (Gomez 2003: 83). However much trust there may be between the parties, the relationship will always be of debtor/creditor, and not of equal “partners” (Lister 2001: 6/15). The creation of a “business friendly” environment was also seen to be advantageous to encouraging inward foreign investors. Such an environment would include the “elimination of obstacles”,7 particularly as they apply or could apply to the 7  It is not clear what constitute “obstacles” in this context. It must therefore be assumed that it refers to anything that would hinder, discourage, or stop foreign business from re-entering and re-establishing themselves in North Africa and the Middle Eastern countries. Later on, in the JAES, this

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transfer of technology and increasing production and exports, the establishment of a regulatory framework, and the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. In the Barcelona Declaration and its Annexed Work Programme, the idea of creating a “business-friendly environment” required adjustments to regulations and standardisations in line with the EU’s. Assistance in the former would have to have come from European businesses (Gomez 2003). However, even in this development area, the total FDI for all partner countries at the time amounted to no more than 5% of the developing world (Gomez 2003). EU-Mediterranean Partner investment actually fell during the 1990s (Gomez 2003: 83; Lister 2001: 7/15), and the over-emphasis on the ability of FDI to support economic growth (and the incumbent structural adjustments necessary) was in part, flawed. With the exception of a few Mediterranean partners, most were unable to attract FDI into the volatile region due to the dynamics between Palestine and Israel ongoing at the time; other more favourable regions such as the “Far East” and “Latin” America were considered more appealing (Gomez 2003; Joffe 1998: 258, 2005: 39; Larrabee 1998: 29). Regional cooperation and intra-regional trade in the Barcelona Declaration was encouraged and furthermore seen as a fundamental precursor to the establishment of an FTA with the EU (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 5/17). The partners needed to regulate and standardise their own regional FTA to the standard by which the EU would eventually indulge in likewise free trade arrangements. Regional cooperation however, in the Barcelona Declaration was stipulated as “voluntary” (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 5/17), adding to the confusing and counterintuitive structural dynamics within the framework. In spite of the nature of cooperation (“voluntary”) set out in the Barcelona Declaration, the foundations for the transference of EU integrationalism were being laid with this Partnership, along with the implicit world-view of EU socio-­ecological values and structural priorities (social structures; modes of economic production, exchange values and therefore wealth and “worth”; political, technological; and re-­ visioning of cultural images of the natural environment). The promotion of women in economic sectors previously held by men, for example, would create a significant structural (social and cultural) dislocation. In spite of the obvious universally accepted relevance of improving women’s lives, the targeting of women for social development in more circumscribed settings such as traditional Islamic cultures, is widely recognised to be a method of social engineering leading to social, cultural, and political destabilisation (Roy 2007: 35). Emma Bonino (ex-vice President of the Senate of the Italian Republic) in her article on “Women in the Mediterranean: An

would be more explicitly defined as fraud, corruption, money-laundering and organised crime. Establishing a “business friendly” environment in the JAES, included establishing “protection” for investors (intellectual property rights, standards, promotion of investment codes), “credible laws” and guarantee systems to safe guard their capital. CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 10. Slobodian points to these kinds of stipulations as the fundamental basis of neo (ordo)liberalism, where capital is protected or “encased” to withstand political challenges. Slobodian, Q., 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Untapped Resource” (2005), writes of the “contradictions” (2005, 73) that are apparent within the predominantly Islamic cultures of the Mediterranean member states, both within and between the countries themselves. Electoral rights and ­political representation of women rest side by side with strict application “of the veil”, for example, or “modern legislation” with the observance of “fundamentalist traditions” (Bonino 2009: 72–73). What is most apparent, however, are the advances being made within the parameters of women’s existence in these countries, by using their positions of privilege to “break taboos” (Bonino 2009:73) in business and cultural areas. However, the progresses being made by women in the economic system, according to Bonino, makes it increasingly difficult to “question” their inequality and relative positions in other areas of society (Bonino 2009: 73). The belief that economic prosperity would lead to peace and “stability”, was of course the previsioned end result of the “required” economic and financial restructuring; the same kind of restructuring would eventually also find its place in the JAES. Such enforcement over the years would see the widening of differentiation between the countries both within the Partnership itself, and between the Mediterranean Partner states and the EU member states.

5.2.6  Financial Cooperation The creation of an FTA was to be further funded in order to counteract what are acknowledged as detrimental effects in the medium term to the local and existing socio-economic landscape. As already described, it was assessed that a large proportion of industry in situ would fail when faced with the competition from European markets, and funding was allocated specifically to “cushion” this effect (Bicchi 2007: 172; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001).8 However, when compared to the financial assistance being allocated to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in line for EU accession, the Mediterranean partners received a less than satisfactory deal, of which they were well aware (Lister 2001: 7). Coupled with this preferential bias, the relative success of the FTA area – as recognised in follow up ministerial conferences of the Process – would rely on the ups and downs of the relations between Israel and the Arab states, something that distinguished the situation between them, the Mediterranean Partner countries, and the countries of Eastern Europe.

8  The EU also made provision for ECU 4 685 million between 1995 and 1999 to be allocated to local businesses and industries during the transformation and adjustment period, to counteract the negative social consequences. In addition, further assistance was to be made available by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the form of increased loans and bilateral contributions from EU Member states. See Barcelona Declaration, 1995. op.cit. p.6/14.

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5.2.7  P  artnership in Social Cultural and Human Affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding Between Cultures and Exchanges Between Civil Societies The Partnership in Social and Cultural Human Affairs was considered new and “revolutionary” at the time: it was the first time that such an ambitious project had been launched, and the EU had actually little experience to date in this area (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). It marked an acknowledgment in policy making  to some degree that trade and economics could incorporate a “human side” (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001), and that material and social needs were mutually reinforcing and interconnected. It was indicative of a new approach emerging in Security Studies at the time that linked human development to (in)security (Hampson 2013: 279). The EU addressed that evolution through “development track diplomacy” (Lister 1999: 4/14; Lister 2001: 7/15), and, as in this Partnership, redirected development aid towards aspects that would enhance conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives (Lister 1999: 4/14; Lister 2001: 7/15; Aliboni 2005: 56; Tanner 2005: 76). The kind of topics and the structure of disbursement covered in the Partnership (reaching all levels of society and advocacy groups) have been cited as an attempt at so-called “regime-building” (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 82). While most definitions of “regimes” miss the quality of relations involved (the structural basis for interaction and the kind of content incorporated in “mutually” agreed rules), it was precisely this aspect that prompted Partner states to view this chapter as an attempt to “lump” the “Mediterranean region” together as an arbitrary construct for the convenience of western interests (Bicchi 2007): MENA states saw this Partnership as an attempt at imposing western cultural norms (or “cultural imperialism”) (Gomez 2003: 73) on their societies, under the guise of democratic  – and “universal”  – governance principles (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003; Aliboni et al. 1997: 36). The idea of “decentralised cooperation”, involving non-state actors such as civil society and private enterprises, is a recognised cornerstone of the neoliberal economic conviction in the retreat of the state from a public, regulatory and distributary role (Phillips 2011: 441). The promotion of civil society and non-state actors is presented throughout the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent Work Programmes. Most notably, the MEDA also had a specific “budget line” dedicated to projects on democracy, civil and socio-economic rights (the fundamental freedoms: expression, associations, and religion), protection of identified vulnerable groups such as women, children, refugees, and minorities. These served to reinforce the idea of “foreign” ideals being underwritten by the Process (Bicchi 2007: 174; Gomez 2003: 85). As regards the allocation of funding for these projects, however, foreign Non-­ Governmental Organisations (NGOs) rather than home grown civil society groups received the bulk of the financing (Gomez 2003; Aliboni 2005: 54). The Partner states had reason to be suspicious of engaging with the EU, but it appeared that there were few other options or at least geographically closer alternatives at the time.

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One of the aims of this Partnership was to bind the Mediterranean Partners further into a coherent European ideal of homogeneity through cultural and religious understanding, and spreading these values through “mass media” and “engaging the youth” (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 7–8/17). The youth under this Chapter are targeted for increased attention and hence greater social development, vocational training, and job creation to counter balance (the presumed negative impact of) population growth. The idea that creating a stable “home” environment in the Mediterranean Partner states was an acknowledged “strategy” to stem immigration, a concern linked to EU and European conceptions of security at that time (Marsh and Rees 2012: 10,149; Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 186–7; Lavenex and Kunz 2009: 115).9 In spite of the overall emphasis in the Barcelona Declaration to include women in its focus, and the importance given to gender equality as a principle of development, this aspect was still absent from the Chapter (Lister 2001: 3–4/15). The final points of the Partnership in Social Cultural Affairs are those related to security issues prompted by the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The removal of internal borders between EU member states introduced by the Schengen Agreement (1985) and later institutionally included in the 1992 Treaty of European Union/ Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) “Pillar”, heightened sensitivity towards the probability of inter-state crime: human and illicit drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism (Wallace et  al. 2010; Staab 2011; Marsh and Rees 2012: 18–19). Cooperation on these issues was subsumed under the JHA pillar, and is reflected in the Barcelona Declaration under this Chapter, even though  – strictly speaking  – Social Cultural and Human Affairs would appear to have little to do with inter-state crime and security issues at face value. In this manner, EU internal security concerns, normative (values) perspectives on security were exported in the Barcelona Declaration and levied on the Mediterranean Partner states. While the ideal of the multicultural framework in the Barcelona Declaration presented context and guidance, migration/illegal immigration was kept under the purview of bilateral agreements, or other formal arrangements, between the Mediterranean partners and EU member states. This included the readmission of “illegal” immigrants (Barcelona Declaration 1995: 8/17). Despite initial slow progress in this chapter, some later efforts were made towards its success (Gomez 2003: 85). By 2005, however, it was acknowledged that greater visibility was needed with the local Mediterranean populations (to be remedied by adding the prefix “EuroMed” before a project’s name).10

9  “The argument is that with trade growing, jobs will be created in Mediterranean countries and emigration will slow”. Xenakis, D.K. and Chryssochoou, D. N., 2001. op.cit. p.106. This idea was shared by Partner states: The Moroccan Ambassador to the UK is reported to have made the comment “If we want to keep people in our country, we have to find a way to give them jobs”. Cited in Gomez, R., 2003. op.cit. p. 47. See also Joffe, G., 1998. op.cit. p. 255. 10  Labelling projects became  a particular focus of the later Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, 2008. Office for Official Publications European Communities 2000/EU The Barcelona Process: Five Years On (1995–2000). [online] Available at: http://www.yatfund.org/ meetingpoints/pdf/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf p. 18–19.

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5.2.8  Structure The institutional structure of the Barcelona Process shows an extremely “loose”11 timetabling of meetings and organisational arrangements, especially when compared to later frameworks and structures such as the UfM and the JAES, which have biannual, annual, and three-yearly scheduled meetings. The political level of engagement in the Process was also criticised for being EU “heavy”, with the Troika/Commission departments guiding dialogue and interaction, in contrast to “representatives” from each partner state (such as Ministers of Foreign Affairs); the Commission performed the work of a Secretariat for the Process,12 and also sat on both Committees, thus doubling its role in the Partnership (Gomez 2003: 76). The flexibility of the structure has sometimes been interpreted as therefore “weak”, in that there was no reinforcement of the principles contained in the Agreements or Declaration, and neither was there the kind of high-level, regulated political guidance to follow-through. The comparatively irregular organisation was therefore criticised as undermining long-term “partnership” goals in favour of short-­ term interests and gains (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). The looseness of the Barcelona Process institutional organisation can also be viewed from an alternative, systems-organisational perspective, for which this kind of looseness denotes flexibility and allows greater exchange of ideas and interaction; especially where the wide range of areas could be seen to work against measurable outcomes. As Gomez (2003) notes, strategically speaking it makes more sense to keep objectives and subject areas of a policy initiative between diverse partners to a small manageable amount, rather than to have a sprawling framework where monitoring of compliance is administratively problematic (2003). It was therefore of no surprise that at the Malta Conference (1997), the modicum of success that appeared to have been made in the Economic Partnership was generally perceived to have happened “by accident”, rather than by any notable, concerted, conscious efforts by either side (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 86).

 Ministers for Foreign Affairs would meet periodically to agree on priority actions to achieve objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, activities to be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts, civil society. Euro-Mediterranean Committee consisting of the European Troika and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, to hold regular meetings and prepare the meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs (evaluate follow up to the Barcelona Declaration and its work programme). See Barcelona Declaration, 1995. Ibid.p.7/14. 12  Commission departments were allocated follow-up work of the EU-Mediterranean committee meetings. See Barcelona Declaration, 1995. Loc.cit. 11

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5.3  Barcelona Process: Annex Work Programme (1995) Table 5.1 is a representation of the three pillar structure of the Annexed Work Programme, 1995.

5.4  Post Conferences: The Barcelona Process Post-conference follow-up meetings such as those held in Malta (1997), Palermo (1998), Stuttgart (1999), and in Lisbon (2000), raised issues that could not ultimately be resolved and hindered progress to the extent that some academics speculated if there had ever been sufficient interest towards the Process at all (Lister 2001: 4/15).13 Once again the situation in the Middle East and the stalling of the Peace Process, affected the relationship between the Partners and progress in the overall Partnership (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003; Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 10,15; Aliboni et al. 1997). By 2001, only six Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements had been completed, and only four of those were in force (Gomez 2003: 60; Office for Official Table 5.1  Barcelona Process: Work Programme, 2005 Pillar I Political and security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability.

Conduct a political dialogue, senior officials to meet periodically, and examine the most appropriate means of implementing the principles adopted by the declaration and submit practical proposals.

Pillar II Economic and financial partnership: Building a zone of shared prosperity. The establishment of a Euro-Med FTA, focussing on the areas below to do so. Investment Industry Agriculture Transport (including maritime) Energy Telecommunication and IT Regional planning Tourism (new) Environment Science and technology Water Fisheries and resources

Pillar III Social, cultural and human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies Development of human resources Municipalities and regions Dialogue between cultures and civilisations Media (new) Youth Exchanges between civil societies Social development Health (new) Migration

 Marjorie Lister refers to the Barcelona Declaration/Process as the “fifth EU policy mode”, in reference to Theodore J. Lowi’s four general policy modes (1972). Lister calls this the “declaratory” or “hot air” mode. See Lister, M., 2001b. “Reinvigorating Europe’s Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies”. NCRE Online Paper No 01/05. [online] Available at: http:// aei.pitt.edu/10950/1/ncre0105_lister.pdf

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Publications EC 2000: 37; Joffe 2005: 37). Generally, the Partners were dissatisfied with the terms of their agreements – especially the economic aspects – that seemed to be less than that for which they had been hoping, especially with regards to the provisions and Objectives set out in the Declaration (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 187). The establishment of the FTA was criticised for not assisting in precisely the area (agriculture) where the Mediterranean Partners stood a chance of competing, and would have assisted in raising their overall exportable Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003: 61; Joffe 1998: 249,254).14 Free trade in services and the “rights of establishment” were never attained (Joffe 1998: 254), although later concessions for the treatment of migrant workers in the EU were conceded in exchange for the incorporation of other JHA issue areas into the Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs Chapter (Gomez 2003: 85). Other subsequent difficulties in processing the FTA’s implementation led the EU to push back its estimated establishment to 2015 (Gomez 2003: 60). The emphasis on the observance of human rights and democratic principles were, strictly speaking, the purview of the Peace and Security Partnership (Bicchi 2007: 172). All Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements under the Process, however, included these aspects as part of the Political Dialogue (Gomez 2003; Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 9), and compliance with human rights and democratic governance were incorporated into and made common to all Agreements (Bicchi 2007: 172).15 Compliance with human rights and democratic rule lagged behind in terms of progress with no apparent discernible way of monitoring them. This was despite the fact that compliance was stipulated by the European Parliament (EP) as a prerequisite to receiving economic assistance from the EU (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). No EU member state had until then pressed for compliance using the promise of signing Euro-Mediterranean Agreements as leverage against progress made in this area (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). At the Malta conference (1997), the Commission, in concord with a few EU member states, voiced their interest in setting up a Human Rights monitoring mechanism, but still no EU member state pressed for measurable compliance of these principles to become conditional on ratification of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 87). Moreover, in 1997, a human rights report on abuses in Syria was suppressed while at the same time Partnership negotiations were opened with that country (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). Where the opportunity existed for the EU to enforce its principles and universal values, thereby exerting what Aliboni (2005) refers to as “negative conditionality”, this was lost to what appeared be relative gains in trade and commercial  On where the “sensitivity” of this area is recognised, see Office for Official Publications European Communities 2000/EU op.cit. p.17. 15  Article 2: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: “respect of human rights and democratic principles as an ‘essential part of the agreement’”. See Bicchi, F., 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. London: Palgrave Macmillan.p.172. 14

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benefits (and later post-9/11, to interests in short-term security gains) (Tanner 2005; Aliboni 2005: 52). The EU and the Barcelona Process developed what has been referred to as indirect and direct policy approaches to advancing human rights and democratic practices (Aliboni 2005: 49). The indirect kind concerned a “deep socialisation” (Aliboni 2005: 55) and a softer, structural security approach from the EU perspective, included using financial assistance (or “incentives”) such as the democracy fund (the MEDA), and the third Chapter (Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs), which included promoting exchanges and freer (yet controlled) mobility; the Euro-Med Youth Programmes; Audio-visual Programme; and the Anna Lindh Euro-­ Mediterranean Foundation for Cultural Dialogue (Aliboni 2005: 50). The third Chapter has been credited with generally being “a success”, by virtue of the sheer volume of projects that were inspired by it and in the novelty of the collaboration. At the Malta conference in 1997, however, it was realised that the number of projects under this Partnership, too, had thrived to such an extent it was deemed too many on which to actually report (Gomez 2003: 85). However, most of the projects under the chapter were mistakenly considered “peripheral”, of no great “political” importance, such as the “collaboration on audio visual” projects and celebrations of heritage (Gomez 2003: 85). This attitude missed the significance of the “thickening institutionalisation”, or increase in transactional flows/overlapping reinforcement of values, or deep socialisation (Aliboni 2005: 55; Pace 2005: 65). The Anna Lindh foundation, while promoting tolerance and awareness of cultures, has been criticised for not promoting a future, shared culture (Aliboni 2005: 54) and playing into conservative “purist” tendencies to heighten separation (2005). The exchange and mobility programmes were criticised for being one-way, biased in favour of the Mediterranean countries learning about European cultures through exchange visits; the exchange was thus not reciprocated (Aliboni 2005: 50; Pace 2005: 64). The integration of civil society in mainstream governance, moreover, was considered extremely contentious for the Mediterranean Partners, as the leaders of most (Partner) states saw NGOs and civil society in general as “the opposition” and sought – in some cases – to actively exclude them.16 The MEDA, too, suffered from criticism, for being “too slow” and administratively too cumbersome to facilitate roll-out in a timely manner (Joffe 2005: 39; Joffe 1998: 248; Lister 2001: 2; Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 21). It was also reported that partner states were structurally unable to “absorb” the funds (Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 15). The Charter for Peace and Stability stalled in light of deteriorating relations between Israel and Palestine,17 but with other peace processes also disintegrating at  At the Helsinki Ministerial Conference, 1997, Arab governments insisted that NGOs from their countries be “officially” accredited before being allowed to participate in the conference. Gomez, R., 2003. Ibid. p.84. Also, Office for Official Publications 2000/EU. Ibid. p.14. 17  It was agreed at the Malta conference to call a halt to the Charter until such a time as conditions allowed. See Gomez, R., 2003. Ibid.p.78. See also Office for Official Publications European Communities 2000/EU. Ibid. p.10. 16

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the time, the EMP/Barcelona Process remained the only arena where at least the potential for dialogue still existed (Office for Official Publications EC 2000: 9. In all likeliness this was partly due to the co-existence and support of the other Partnerships. By 1999, however, the Charter was finally declared a failure (Tanner 2005: 74), with its EU interest-driven nature, content and objectives (being out of touch with the realities of the Middle East and the diversities of the entire region, for example), and lack of participatory decision making specifically in the Peace and Security Partnership as the underlying reasons behind its standstill (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 89).18 In 2000 it was decided to create the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean (CSM) with a view to “reboot” the Process and consolidate actions. This initiative, however, was firmly planted within the EU itself and was to be implemented by the European Council and the Council Presidencies, giving the Strategy a higher profile, at least internally (Gomez 2003). Unfortunately, it became a rehashing of the Declaration’s Objectives, which led to its significance overall being questioned (Gomez 2003). The most notable departure from the Declaration, nonetheless, was the direct connection it made between the Barcelona Process and  – finally  – its potential relevance to the Middle East Peace Process (Gomez 2003: 77).19

5.5  Five Year Work Programme: November, 2005 From the original three pillars or Partnerships of the Barcelona Declaration (1995), the Work Programme separated out issue areas or sections, and an additional Pillar, that of Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security. In all, the 2005 Work Programme covered a Political and Security Partnership, a section on Sustainable Socio-Economic Development and Reform (the largest and most detailed section by far in comparison to the others), Education and Socio-Cultural Exchanges, and the new thematic section already mentioned on Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security.

 Jorg Monar attributes the failure to organise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership / Barcelona Process in a legitimate manner to the EU’s own inherent structural make-up, the dual style of its Foreign Affairs system being based on “two different structures, with different legal bases, decision-making rules and procedures, a different institutional setup and perhaps most importantly, different rationales, that is, the supranational “Community” rationale on the one hand and the intergovernmental co-operation rationale on the other”. Monar J., 1998. “Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy”. Mediterranean Politics, 3(2), p.43. Certainly, the lead up to Barcelona Conference in 1995 would support this hypothesis as the processes between the Commission and the Council of Ministers when negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements prior to this showed. See Gomez, R., 2003. Ibid. p.56–57. 19  This connection was also prominent in the Commission’s Report. Office for Official Publications European Communities 2000/EU. Ibid. p.18. 18

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5.6  Political and Security Partnership Apart from the small introduction reiterating the promise of establishing a peaceful, stable, Euro-Mediterranean region, and the joint effort towards the creation of a “just, comprehensive and lasting” settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Political and Security Partnership focused on building (or restructuring) a society that appeared to be more in line with the European ideal: one based on democratic governance (free and competitive elections) including “basic” freedoms (expression and association), and the promotion of women in all areas of society  – political decision making, social, cultural, and economic. Decentralisation and participation of all levels of society such as non-state actors/civil society and citizens (specifically youth and women) were, according to the Work Programme, to be involved in the management of public affairs and delivery of public services. Finally, the UN and Regional Charters and Conventions on civil, political, social, and economic rights were to be implemented. Moreover, and of significance to their incorporation in state legal frameworks, financial assistance was to be provided for “willing” countries undergoing these reforms. Issues such as the promotion of human rights, however, were to be dealt with through the Association Agreements. While the setting and wording of this Partnership was written in the future tense (the EU will co-operate, the Euro Mediterranean partners will meet, will take measures, for example) much of the text omits firm outlines of action, commitment, deadlines, and oversight. Elsewhere in the Work Programme, the Euro-Mediterranean partners “will meet internationally agreed standards in the conduct of elections”. Contra-indicatively, however, “joint cooperation and exchange of experience in the field of elections” were “voluntary”. There was, essentially, no obligation or oversight to see that the Euro-Mediterranean partners would in fact implement these reforms, or indeed abide by them. Likewise, developing cooperation in conflict prevention, PBMs, crisis management activities, civil protection, and natural disaster prevention, were all “voluntary”. It can be surmised from this document that, as regards the status quo in situ of democratic governance, the inclusion of women, youth, and civil society in the democratic process, the rule of law, and equality were not to be firmly challenged at the multilateral level.

5.6.1  Sustainable Socio-economic Development and Reform The Chapter on Socio-Economic Development and Reform outlined its main objectives (to increase job opportunities for the growing population, reduce regional poverty, close the prosperity gap and raise GDP), and gave guidelines of how it aimed to achieve this by identifying further measures and efforts to contribute toward their achievement. Apart from the change in title, no longer a “partnership”, this Chapter resembles the Economic and Financial Cooperation Partnership of the original Declaration in that it too is highly detailed and leaves no room for alternative

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i­nterpretations of how socio-economies in partner states are to be developed and implemented. One of the tasks is again the establishment of an FTA, together with the liberalisation of trade in agriculture and services; acceleration of free trade agreements; cumulation of origin, standardisation, legislation and conformity, and increased investment flows. These measures are general actions, but do not specifically include the involvement of women in employment, something also defined as a measure to be taken in order to accomplish the overall objectives. Otherwise this subsection is more expansive than the other two, indicating the relative weight and importance of reform of the economic and financial sectors to promote economic growth in the Mediterranean region. Other topic areas covered are improving intra-regional transportation and energy (electricity and natural gas) connectivity, science and technology (specifically information and communication – the “Eureka Programme”) and the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (industrial emissions, municipal/urban waste). Interestingly, a project on the introduction of EU “regional policy methodology” was to be implemented or tested in the south, with a view to expanding and applying it elsewhere (Five Year Work Programme 2005: 4/7). Whereas the language is vague in some parts of the text and, in comparison to the Peace and Security Partnership where no deadlines are included, here the deadlines are. The FTA seems to have been brought forward again to be in place by 2010, the de-polluting of the Sea was to be accomplished by 2020, and the EU implementation of its regional policy methodology in two regions were to be completed by 2007. In addition, the Acceptance and Cooperation of Assessment Agreements on Industrial Products (ACAAs) and the eradication of technical obstacles to commerce were to be made by “at least” 2010 (Five Year Work Programme 2005: 3–4/17).

5.6.2  Education and Socio-cultural Exchanges This section also was newly separated under the Work Programme, and is framed in context to and with the introduction of the (now superseded) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As a globally-inspired set of poverty reducing objectives, this section appears to claim the wider and more legitimate conceptual framework. The rationale for this section is the acknowledgment that education is the foundation for political, social, and economic development and that access to education should be available to all (including women, girls, and students with special needs) (Five Year Work Programme 2005: 5/7). Likewise, in this section there are specific dates for accomplishing benchmarks towards the overall Work Programme Objectives. The majority of contributory actions are aimed at improving education and matching skills with viable job prospects (vocational and technical training), therefore locally relevant job skills. All levels of education from primary through to higher (university) and adult education were to be targeted for concerted action, as well as the “rationalisation of

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q­ ualifications” to assist employment/student transfer within the Euro-Mediterranean region. The socio-cultural dimension of this section was to be handled through the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures. Scholarships, mobility grants for higher education, and “dialogue” (for example the Euro-Med Youth Platform, to promote tolerance and respect for religion and cultures, awareness and therefore combat of discrimination, racism, xenophobia), virtual libraries and media (multilingual and multicultural channels and portals) were all considered to support the Objectives towards socio-cultural exchanges.

5.6.3  Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security The Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security section was an entirely new thematic and separated pillar introduced in the Work Programme of 2005 and shows the importance that the issues contained therein had achieved since the initiation of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. In effect this section is mainly dedicated to immigration-related issues. This section sought to enhance cooperation in promoting legal migration and issues associated with it, such as “fair treatment” and social integration, and facilitating the transfer of diaspora remittances back to countries of origin. The rationale for this was the involvement of expatriate communities in the development of their countries of origin (Lavenex and Kunz 2009). This Chapter was also, conversely, dedicated to reducing illegal immigration, which included cooperation in trying to deter and stop sea and land crossings. Interestingly, trafficking in human beings in the original Barcelona Declaration was considered an international crime and associated with illicit drug trafficking. This marks a notable shift in security perception and policy treatment with the Work Programme of 2005, where human trafficking and illegal immigration were now conflated. The aspect of Justice in this Chapter included cooperation towards modernising the administration of justice and increasing access to justice for Euro-Med citizens through the Euro-Med Justice Programme. Other than that, “Justice” denoted the related issues of migration and security, such as reinforced judicial cooperation as it related to cross border issues, and to problems arising from “mixed” marriages (CEU 15074/05 Presse 327: 11) and child custody cases in accordance with the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Security under this section – apart from “Migration” – covered cooperation on the promotion and implementation of UN conventions on combating organised crime, drugs, and improving cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Contributory measures included the rather loosely defined development of “mechanisms” for “practical cooperation”, and the holding of an “expert senior officials meeting” to prepare for a following “ministerial meeting” (Five Year Work Programme 2005: 7/7). Cooperation in the fight against illegal migration included establishing “different kinds of” re-admittance agreements between countries,

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c­ ombating human trafficking as well as “other forms of illegal migration” (Five Year Work Programme 2005: 7/7).

5.7  Conclusion The Barcelona Declaration and the ensuing Process that solidified EU-Mediterranean relations from 1972 up until that point and beyond until 2007, pointed towards a new and comprehensive regionalist approach by the EU, a departure in many ways from what had gone before. The Barcelona Process was the establishment of a formal memory between the EU and the countries selected by the EU to be “Mediterranean.” It also carried with it, however, a set of dynamics and roles that would be – at the policy level at least – unchanged by any such heralded departure or hailing of a new dawn in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Process would entrench neoliberal models of socio-economic structure and political organisation in those countries taking part in the Process and define those on its outside. As a result, the Barcelona Process met with disappointment as it failed to live up to expectations and only served to solidify the status quo. It was in the history of Euro-Mediterraean relations that at some point, another attempt at reinvigorating the “ties that bind” with the Southern Mediterranean states would emerge. This came in the vehicle of French politics and the presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. The French-Africa connection would only become apparent much later on in early 2018, however, with Sarkozy allegedly receiving funds from Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya for his presidential campaign, and with it – it may be presumed – for the re-launch of an exclusive Union between the riparian states of the Mediterranean Sea with the Southern European/EU member states: a Union of the Mediterranean. This was not to be. Chapter 6 outlines the UfM and describes its current structure, a vastly different make-up to what was intended in the build-up to French elections in 2007, and indeed what was meant to continue on from the Barcelona Declaration and Process. It will also give an overview of the available policy environment provided by the EU in context to pivotal actors and dynamics in play on the continent.

References Aliboni, R. 2005. EMP Approaches to Human Rights and Democracy. In The Euro-­Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, ed. H.A. Fernandez and R. Youngs, 2005. FRIDE. http:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/Barcelona10_eng.pdf. Aliboni, R., A.M.  Said Aly, and A. de Vasconcelos. 1997. Political and Security Cooperation, Confidence Building, Arms Control, and Conflict Prevention. EuroMeSCo Working Groups Report. [online]. http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/eur_jointreport97-98.pdf. Aliboni, R., [n.d.] Building Blocks for the Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Security. EuroMeSCo Paper 7. [online] Available at: http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_

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content&view=article&id=140:paper-7- building-blocks-for-the-euro-mediterranean-charter-­ on-­peace-andstability& catid=102:previous-papers&Itemid=102&lang=fr. Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27–28/11/1995. [online]. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2014. Barcelona Process Five Year Work Programme 2005 [online]. http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/ summit1105/five_years_en.pdf. Bergh, S.I. 2012. Introduction: Researching the Effects of Neoliberal Reforms on Local Governance in the Southern Mediterranean. Mediterranean Politics 17 (3): 303–321. Best, A., J.M.  Hanhimaki, J.A.  Maiolo, and K.E.  Schulze. 2008. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2nd ed. Oxford: Routledge. Bicchi, F. 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bongiovanni, F. 2012. The Decline and Fall of Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Bonino, E. 2009. Women in the Mediterranean: an Untapped Resource. In The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue: Prospects for an Area of Prosperity and Security, ed. G.  Hedwig. Rome: Solaris s.r.l. [online]. http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/b87820bf-4b3f-4fc4-a5c8-3787c88fec55/ feps_ie_euromed.pdf. De Vasconcelos, A. 2002. Europe’s Mediterranean Strategy: An Asymmetric Equation. Revised version 6/2002. [online]. http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/Vasconcelos.doc. Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, Europa [online]. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r15006_ en.htm. Accessed 3 Nov 2014. Gomez, R. 2003. Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? Hampshire: Ashgate. Hampson, F.O. 2013. Human Security. In Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. P.D. Williams, 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge. Joffe, G. 1998. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects. The Journal of North African Studies 3 (2): 247–266. Joffe, G., 2005. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Foreign Investment. In The EuroMediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, ed. H.A. Fernandez and R. Youngs, 2005. [pdf] FRIDE. Available at: http://fride.org/download/03_Libro_completo_ENG.pdf Larrabee, F.S. 1998. The Barcelona Process and Other Mediterranean Initiatives. In Larrabee, F.S., Green, J., Lesser, I.O., and Zanini, M. (Eds.) 1998. NATOs Mediterranean Initiatives: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, Santa Monica: RAND. Lavenex, S., and R. Kunz. 2009. The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations. In Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, ed. M. Carbone. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version] Oxford: Routledge. [online] Available at: Kalahari.com. Lewis, B. 2003. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] New York: Random House. Available at: Kalahari.com. Lister, M. 1999. Conflict, Development and the Lomé Convention. Development Studies Association (DSA) European Development Policy Study Group. Discussion Paper No.12, April 1999. [online]. http://www.business.mmu.ac.uk/edpsg/docs/Dp12.pdf. ———. 2001. Reinvigorating Europe’s Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies. National Centre for Research on Europe. Paper 1/05. [online]. http://aei.pitt.edu/10950/1/ ncre0105_lister.pdf. Marsh, S., and H. Mackenstein. 2005. The International Relations of the European Union [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge. Available at: Kalahari.com. Marsh, S., and W. Rees. 2012. The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War. Abingdon: Routledge. Monar, J. 1998. Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy. Mediterranean Politics 3 (2): 39–60. Office for Official Publications European Communities 2000/EU The Barcelona Process: Five Years On (1995–2000). [online] http://www.yatfund.org/meetingpoints/pdf/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf

144 5  Declarations and Process: Keeping (Institutional) Memory Alive in the Mediterranean Pace, M. 2005. EMP Cultural Initiatives: What Political Relevance? In The Euro-­Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, ed. H.A. Fernandez and R. Youngs, 2005. FRIDE. [online]. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/Barcelona10_eng.pdf Phillips, N. 2011. Globalisation and Development. In 2011. Global Political Economy, ed. J. Ravenhill, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramadan, T. 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity [e-book Adobe DRM epub version]. Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Available at: Kalahari.com. ———. 2012. The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Roy, O. 2007. The politics of Chaos in the Middle East. London: HURST Publishers Ltd. Schlumberger, O. 2011. The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations. Mediterranean Politics 16 (1): 135–153. Slobodian, Q. 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Staab, A. 2011. The European Union Explained. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ———. 2013. The European Union Explained. 3rd ed, 99. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tanner, F. 2005. Security Cooperation: A New Reform Orientation? In The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, ed. H.A. Fernandez and R. Youngs, 2005. FRIDE. [online]. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/Barcelona10_eng.pdf Wallace, H., M.A. Pollack, and A.R. Young. 2010. Policy-Making in the European Union. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Xenakis, D.K., and D.N.  Chryssochoou. 2001. The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Chapter 6

Three for the Price of One: Dividing a Continent

6.1  Introduction The late Col. Muammar Ghaddafi is now a distant memory, especially in light of what has followed his downfall: lingering unrest in North Africa, the Middle East and the phenomenon of ISIS. Even while Ghaddafi was still alive and in power in Libya, there had always been a tendency to underestimate him. He had long been one of the “movers and “shakers” of Africa and formed a vital part of African history between North Africa, Africa, the Middle East, and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). He was a long-time “thorn in the side” of both Europe and the USA’s access to oil and dominance in the region, often acting as a counterpoint to the niceties of their diplomacy and political overtures. It is often forgotten that Ghaddafi was prominent among his neighbouring states in North Africa, especially during the Oil Shock years in the period of the early 1970s that were instrumental in changing the European Economic Community (EEC) policy towards the Mediterranean in the first instance with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972, and with each successive policy thereafter, including eventually that of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). For many years Ghaddafi bankrolled the African Union (AU) when member states did not meet their institutional commitments. It has been alleged more recently that Ghaddafi had also contributed funds to Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign in 2007,1 and that this was eventually behind Sarkozy’s zealous role in the 2011 enforcement of UN Resolution 1973, as if to silence him before it could be known.2

1  Seale, A. 2019. Former French leader Nicolas Sarkozy haunted by Gaddafi’s spy. TRT World online 25 February. 2  Penney, J. 2018. Why did the US and its Allies Bomb Libya? Corruption case against Sarkozy sheds new light on ousting of Ghaddafi. The Intercept. 28 April. Seale, A. 2019. Former French leader Nicolas Sarkozy haunted by Gaddafi’s spy. TRT World online 25 February.

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Ghaddafi was a political chameleon in many respects, slipping from international pariah and “mad dog” to being welcomed back into the international community once the matter of the Lockerbie bombing in 1998 had been (politically) resolved. By 2004 he was being welcomed into the Barcelona Process. As a vocal proponent of a United States of Africa, however, he was highly critical of Sarkozy’s UfM at the time, speaking out against its divisive nature.3 Ghaddafi’s links and influence have even been extended to South Africa (SA), where former President Jacob Zuma has been alleged to have “hidden” monies for the erstwhile Libyan leader, and who certainly gave asylum to his banker, Bashir Saleh, who was shot in what appeared to be a robbery in Johannesburg, in February 2018.4 The connection is one that is more than a passing observation, as the overlapping of relationships, the ideal of African unity, and the passion behind rejecting western influence and “playing politics” extends both to the other actors identified by partnerships with the European Union (EU) on the African continent: it is as if the EU-SA Strategic Partnership (SP), and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) are frameworks that appear to be particularly useful in varying degrees of leverage and political point scoring when expedient to do so (Hierro 2017). International, regional (Africa-Europe), and sub-regional (EU-SA, Zimbabwe) dynamics have also had an influence on the relationship between the EU and the AU, and have contributed towards the changes that have come about in the shifting focus of the JAES over the years. The EU-SA SP, and the ACP/Cotonou Agreement have been identified as such regional and sub-regional structural components that have underwritten the overlapping and reinforcing of EU values in Africa, and at the same time have added to the tensions between the EU and the AU/African states. These in turn have assisted in the growth in anti-western sentiments on the one hand, and towards the promotion of a “tactical” African nationalism on the other. 2007 was a significant year for Africa-EU relations: the UfM was announced, along with the JAES, and the EU-SA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) was upgraded to the EU-SA SP. This chapter will review the Barcelona Process, Union for the Mediterranean, together with the JAES, beginning with the year 2007, and the regional dynamics filtered through the ACP/AU and the EU-SA SP. It will show how the various partnerships that criss-cross Africa are contributing to a fragmentation of African identity as pursued in the ideal of Unity and Pan-Africanism, through EU integrationalism. The UfM, its structure and content will be analysed. It will also briefly outline the main issue areas that have emerged between the EU and Africa through the JAES that have managed to apparently both galvanise the Pan-African agenda along the way, and at the same time reinforce neoliberal logics of self-help and independence as integral to the African epic. 3  Waterfield, B. 2008. Gaddafi attacks Sarkozy plan for Union of the Med. The Telegraph online. 10 July. 4  Stephan Hofstatter and Mzilikazi wa Afrika, 2013. Gaddafi billions found in SA. Times Live online 2 June; n.n. 2019. Gaddafi’s stolen loot may have been hidden in Nkandla – here’s what you need to know about the origins of the money. Business Insider online. 7 April; Dolley, K. 2018. Shot ex-Gaddafi banker not target of a hit – police. News24 online 14 May.

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6.2  Barcelona Process: The Union for the Mediterranean (2008) The idea for the UfM began with former French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential election campaign. The original conception proposed by Sarkozy was for an institution outside the EU’s domain, for Mediterranean riparian states only, and that would involve cooperation on the environment, migration, organised crime, terrorism and even a common judicial space (Schmid and Balfour 2008: 1/4). The title of this new initiative was originally the Union of the Mediterranean. Sarkozy’s announcement was met with varying degrees of scepticism and rejection, not least because the announcement was made without prior consultation to the proposed partners themselves (Bicchi 2011: 6). Post-election it became clear that Sarkozy would indeed need collaboration from his Southern Mediterranean EU member counterparts such as Spain and Italy, historically proponents of successive EEC/EU policies towards the Mediterranean. Spain, Italy, and France therefore began to help shape once again this “new” adventure in Mediterranean cooperation, renaming it along the way as the Union for the Mediterranean to avoid the obvious confusion between it, the EU, and the individual member states interests that sought a stake in it (Bicchi 2011: 6–8). Primarily, the project was not received well. Germany, in particular, took umbrage against what it perceived to be an attempt by France to extend its influence using old colonial connections, excluding non-“Mediterranean” states, yet using the EU to fund the endeavour (Schmid and Balfour 2008: 1/4). France was eventually persuaded to “Europeanise” the idea, bringing the EU members and the range of topics into the Community domain, and making it a “project of the twenty-seven member states” (Aliboni and Ammor 2009: 4). The UfM became the central policy instrument of EU-Mediterranean relations (Aliboni and Ammor 2009). The process of transforming Sarkozy’s ideas went through the Commission, outlined in the Commission report of May 2008 (COM 2008/319), and was followed by the Paris Declaration of July 2008, which produced the basis for the “revitalised” partnership. Finally, the Ministerial Meeting was held in November 2008, which added institutional fine tuning (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 16/20). The Commission reviewed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process and made preliminary suggestions as to the composition, basis, overall aims and objectives, funding and project orientation. The Commission report also acknowledged where the Partnership had made progress (human development, education and training, cultural understanding and the inclusion of civil society, and women; and to some extent the creation of a free trade area) and where there had been shortfalls, such as in the area of free trade in agriculture, services, human rights, “the freedoms”, and lack of domestic and foreign investment. The overall opinion, moreover, was that the “prosperity” gap between EU and Mediterranean partners had increased (COM 2008/319: 3).

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The shortcomings of the Barcelona Process were largely framed in political terms: the lack of the centrality of the Mediterranean, of co-ownership, the institutional balance between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners, of visibility, and the relevance of regional and sub-regional projects to the citizens of the region (COM 2008/319: 4). In July, 2008, the Paris Declaration brought forward the UfM as a “multilateral partnership” focussing on regional, sub-regional, and trans-national projects that had to follow specific requirements. The Ministerial Meeting held in November (Marseille, 2008), however, seemed to re-define the purposes of the UfM, which were objectified as raising Euro-Mediterranean relations through “co-ownership”, thereby creating a heightened visibility and producing much needed concrete results.

6.2.1  The Paris Declaration, July, 2008 The Paris Declaration opens by drawing on the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent acquis (all four “chapters” or pillars  – Peace and Security, Economic and Finance, Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs, together with the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism) for its founding principles, its concepts and methodology, reiterating the centrality of the “Mediterranean” and urging the need to raise its political profile for all partners, as well to address visibility and the legitimate co-ownership of the Partnership (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 4/10). The UfM, in its own words, became a “reinforced partnership” based on the long established history and acquis, an acknowledgment of the Mediterranean regime that had been developed over the years through successive policy initiatives to date. The Paris Declaration acknowledged common challenges faced by the UfM members as socio-economic development, the world food security crisis, degradation of the environment (climate change and desertification), energy, migration, terrorism and extremism, and the need to promote dialogue between cultures (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 18).5 With the acknowledgment of these challenges, global concepts and “universal concerns” entered the EMP/Barcelona/UfM policy structure more noticeably. Prior to this, the interconnected nature of external influences that affected the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region had been barely recognised. This is of course apart from the legal and normative frameworks of the UN, and international law as they pertained to security and human rights. The UfM member states consist of all EU members, the European Commission, and other “members” and “observers” of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League, 5  In the attached Annex to the Paris Declaration, these aspects as well as a few more are considered to be the “future of the Euro-Mediterranean region.” “Annex”. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, 13 July 2008. op.cit. p. 18/20.

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while “invited” to the meeting was later in the Final Statement of the Ministerial Meeting of November 2008 acknowledged as “participant” and as such invited to attend all levels of meetings. According to the Paris Declaration, peace, democracy, regional stability, and security were viewed as achievable through regional cooperation and integration. The Commission communication (COM 2008/319), as evaluative reports of the Process had acknowledged, reiterated that one of the tenets of developing integrationalism – regional intra-gration – had not been achieved, and that this was recognised as having been a severe setback to foreign investment and overall growth (Aliboni and Ammor 2009: 3). The Paris Declaration establishes regional integration as the “future of the Euro-Mediterranean region” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 9/10).

6.2.2  Security The harder security concerns of the original Barcelona Declaration have been retained, almost verbatim, in the Paris Declaration, along with the ideal of working towards a “Euro-Mediterranean pact” (it will be recalled that “pact” had been changed to “Charter” in the 2005 Work Programme to accommodate the sensitivities of Mediterranean Partner states who objected to it), and is reiterated in the Final Statement issued by the Ministerial Meeting, November 2008. Peace and regional security are in turn believed to bolster hard security measures such as compliance to international and regional non-proliferation regimes specifically the Non-­ Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and other arrangements such as weapons-free-zones, and disarmament conventions. In addition, parties are to consider “any confidence and security building measures”, which it will also be recalled were downgraded to the “softer” PMBs in response to Mediterranean partner concerns at the time. Moreover, the Euro-­ Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism was still included in the text in spite of this having been proved very unpopular (Bicchi 2007). In effect, the sensitivities and concerns expressed by the Mediterranean Partners states of the Process were expunged with the Paris Declaration and the EU’s original interests formed in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 were actually revived. In the Paris Declaration, the Heads of State and Government agreed to a “complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism”, an issue that should have been normalised in the Barcelona Declaration considering the balance of relations and the states concerned in the “Partnership”. The Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit (2008) further renounces “occupation” and “oppression” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 5/10).

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The hard security dimension, once acknowledged as a drawback and a prescription to failure of the previous Process, has been included again and is, perhaps, setting the current Process up for failure, or worse, indifference. As in the Barcelona Declaration, the Paris Declaration declares it will not replace other peace initiatives, relegating the UfM again to a framework that facilitates socio-economic cooperation based on EU integrationalism. Whereas this was a source of disappointment for the Partners before, who saw the EMP/Barcelona Process as a possible alternative forum for redress of the Palestinian/Israel conflict, this may have been the only way that such a framework encompassing the EU and the “Mediterranean” as a whole (as defined by the framework) could work. However, this still disregards the critical observation of the past Barcelona Process, and that the Paris Declaration has ignored, that the socio-economic aspect of the Partnership was also hindered by the ineffectiveness of the Peace and Security Partnership. Perhaps the reason for the inclusion of “hard” security aspects was a renewed hope in relations between Israel and the Arab states. Syria, Palestine, and Israel were seen to make progress in their relations at the time, which was mentioned in the Declaration of the Paris Summit (2008: 10/20). This may also account, however, for the revival of the 5 + 5 Dialogue which overlaps socio-economic development, together with peace and security objectives, but excludes the Middle Eastern Partner countries (Soler i Lecha and Garcia 2009: 2).

6.2.3  Development and the Millennium Development Goals As accepted by the signatories to the Paris Declaration, the MDGs are mentioned along with their aims: their “commitment” to “strengthen” democracy, political pluralism, and the “embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 5/10). This is further reiterated in accordance with international understandings based in international human rights law (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 10/20).

6.2.4  Scope and Objectives The main “scope and objectives” of the UfM are to enhance visibility, co-ownership and promote “concrete” projects.6 Previously in the Commission’s Report (COM 2008/319), these projects were highlighted as “relevant” projects to the citizens of  The European Commission Communication 2008/319 Final/EU of 20 May 2008 refers to “projects” of the UfM and “Initiatives”, which appear to be interchangeable; the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit (July 2008) refers to “Key initiatives”, and the Marseille Final Statement (November 2008) reverts to “projects” and “Fields of Cooperation”. See Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit

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the states involved. This marks a significant departure from the structure of the previous EMP/Barcelona Process based on Pillars of Cooperation or “Partnerships” organised through ephemeral “meetings”. Whereas “relevance” to citizens is mentioned in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit 2008, and the Final Statement of the Ministerial Conference, November 2008, the idea that the projects must be “concrete” is deemed of higher priority over relevance to citizens. Migration is also discussed in this section along with the (relatively new) idea of “fostering the links between migration and development” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 6/10). Once again, the UfM was considered additional to other arrangements such as bilateral relations, association agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans, the African Caribbean Pacific framework, and “complementary and coherent” with the JAES (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 13/20). It was also considered “independent” from the enlargement policy of the EU (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 13/20) and the associated Accession Agreements. The “upgrading” of relations between the EU and the countries of the non-EU UfM members, amounts to biennial summits of Heads of States and Government, producing two yearly work programmes prepared by annual meetings of ministers of Foreign Affairs. The UfM was envisaged to have a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures would continue to contribute towards the strengthening of cultural understanding (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 7/10). The UfM established co-presidencies (one from the EU side, and post-Lisbon Treaty this is an elected post for a period of 2 years; and one from the Mediterranean side chosen by consensus); a Secretariat; a Joint Permanent Committee; and Senior Officials Meetings. The entire Partnership is to be “driven” by “the principle of consensus” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 11/20). Projects are, according to the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit, viewed on a case by case basis and must contribute towards the Barcelona Declaration Objectives that are Peace, Security, and Stability. They must furthermore be of either a regional, sub-regional or transnational nature, conform to a particular size, and have relevance and interest for the “parties involved” (this is already a subtle yet significant departure from being of relevance to the citizens of the partner states, as stipulated by the Commission Communication). In addition, the project’s ability to promote sustainable development, “cohesion and inter-connections” will be taken into account along with the ability to attract private sector financing (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 16/20). Preliminary approval for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, Ibid. p. 8.ff.; and Council of the European Union Presse 2008 15187/08 (Presse 314)/EU of 9 November 2008 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Marseille, 3–4 November 2008. Final Declaration [online] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319&from= EN

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based on these criteria will be assessed by the Senior Officials (SOs), to be later approved overall by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Meetings (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 16/20). These criteria later changed substantially at the Marseille Ministerial meeting held in November of the same year. Under the Final Statement of that meeting, each project shall rather: Strive to contribute to stability and peace in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region; Not jeopardise the legitimate interest of any member of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean; Take account of the principle of variable geometry; Respect the decision of member countries involved in an on-going project when it is subject to further development. (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 7)

It would appear that the projects are to be driven by the state (and the private sector) rather than through consultation with or taking into account the “relevance” of the projects to local populations. All provisos are made with the state in mind, observing the interests of its members, and respecting member countries decisions on ongoing projects with little visible oversight to ensure that these will incorporate input from citizens’ needs at the local scale. The projects are primarily to be self-funded, by their ability to “attract” private sector funding (COM 2008/319: 8). This will have an impact on the kind of projects that are eventually put forward and chosen. Under these circumstances, the ideal of UfM project objectives, that they should be “relevant” to local citizens of the Partnership, could take second place to funding concerns and the interest of those willing to provide the financial support in select areas. The interests of the financiers cannot be ruled out in the selection of projects, as this is the first and fundamental pre-condition for the UfM/Secretariat’s consideration. Additional funding is to come from contributions from the EU budget, EU partners, other countries, international financial institutions and regional entities, together with the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Euro-Med envelope; the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI; or any other “instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiatives” (COM 2008/319: 8). In the Annex attached to the Joint Declaration of Paris (2008), however, it stipulates that the projects will not be funded at the expense of other “existing bilateral allocations under the ENP, the Pre-­ accession instrument, or the European Development fund” (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 9/10). This presumably is to counteract any kind of “double-dipping” for the projects, but also to maintain the primacy of the other more substantial (and important) arrangements, as well as the EU at the center of them. Key initiatives/Projects are outlined as the De-pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies: the Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research (the EuroMediterranean university), and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative (based on promoting small and medium enterprises) (2008: 9/10). Whereas the Barcelona Declaration, and the Five Year Work Programme of 2005 are constructed around “Partnerships”, the Joint Declaration of Paris (2008) and the

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Marseille Final Statement (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314) only refer to these compartmentalisations through the acquis, and focus rather on the three main Objectives: raising Euro-Mediterranean relations through co-ownership, creating visibility for the partnership as a whole and realising “concrete” results, and commitment to the key initiatives or projects outlined above. The Marseille Final Statement (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314) outlines the institutional structure to ensure “co-ownership” and continual work coverage in the annual programmes (drawn up by the Senior Officials), and the two-yearly work programmes (drawn up by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and approved at the biennial Summit meetings of Heads of States and Government). What is interesting in both general preambles and introductions to the Joint Declaration of Paris (2008) and the Final Statement (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314), is the reiteration and large amount of text relating to dynamics in the Middle East, latest peace processes, and specific mention of a “two-state solution” between Palestine and Israel, as if to establish these aspects as an agreed point of departure for the Partnership and further collaboration.7 In addition, combating terrorism, the commitment to disassociate terrorism to any particular civilisation or religion, the cooperation in protection against targets of terrorism, and cooperation in counter terrorism activities are also included. Previously these aspects have been encompassed within the Political and Security Partnership (for example, in the Barcelona Declaration 1995) and not necessarily in the preamble. The Marseille Final Statement (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314) also outlines “fields of cooperation” within the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the UfM, as a Work Programme for 2009, and considered a transition period to complete the Barcelona Process Work Programme of 2005, the areas and targets of which were well overdue. These Fields are similar in topic area and content to the previous “Partnerships”, with some new areas of collaboration.

6.2.5  I nstitutional Structure of the Union for the Mediterranean The hub of the institutional structure of the UfM, as shown in Fig.  6.1, is the Secretariat. This is where technical activity occurs (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 5). The Secretariat identifies, follows-up, promotes new projects, and searches for funding and potential partners. It works with all structures of the UfM, and where the projects are concerned it oversees their collation and that they comply with the criteria, as set (and adjusted) by the SOs. According to the CEU 15187/08 (Presse 314), the Secretariat is led by one Secretary General (chosen from candidates from the Euro-Mediterranean Partner countries) and five Deputy Secretary Generals

7  This of course excludes alternative representations, and places other political activism that still query the two-state solution, on the outside of the Partnership, and presumably the EU.

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Fig. 6.1  Institutional Structure of the UfM

(DSGs), approved by consensus, by the SOs. Proposals for the DSGs are made by the Partner countries and short-listed by the co-presidents and the EU Commission for a period of 3 years, with a further maximum extension of 3 years. Candidates for the Deputy Secretary General positions are proposed by all member states, and a short list prepared jointly by the Commission and the co-presidencies (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 6). If the co-ordination hub is the Secretariat, the SOs also hold a considerable amount of oversight and play a coordinating role. The Secretariat reports to the SOs who “inform” the Joint Permanent Committee (JPC) of any action or business needed. The SOs meet regularly and filter information for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (who meet annually). The SOs therefore prepare the meetings for the Ministers, including the projects yet to be endorsed; they can select, approve and dismiss the SGs and DSGs of the Secretariat. They approve the Secretariat budget; its organisational structure and staff; set and approve criteria for projects; their guidelines for processing and funding of the UfM; and even amend the Secretariat Statutes. The SOs also submit an Annual Work Programme for approval to the

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Ministers of Foreign Affairs and are responsible for any dispute settlement between members of the UfM and the Secretariat (Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean n.d.: 4). In cases where disputes cannot be resolved, they are referred to the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Statues of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean n.d.: 8). The JPC is an administrative support structure for the SOs, preparing their meetings and following up on work adopted. Based in Brussels, it can also act as a rapid-­ reaction consultation centre for all Euro-Mediterranean partners (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 8). The JPC is made up of representatives from all Member States, Mediterranean Partners and the Commission, on a permanent basis from the missions in Brussels (COM 2008/319: 6). The co-presidencies are drawn from both sides of the partnership, the EU co-­ president being chosen in accordance to the relevant Treaty in force,8 and the Mediterranean co-president being chosen by consensus for a non-renewable period of 2 years (COM 2008/319: 6). Both the mode of selection and the term of duties for the co-presidents are therefore unequal and have subsequently been criticised for this aspect (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009: 6). The co-presidencies call and chair the meetings of the UfM, and prepare and submit the agendas for approval to the SOs (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 4–5). The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) was created in 2004 and formed part of the set of institutions included in the Barcelona Process (1995). Its role has been described as giving “impetus” to the Partnership by adopting resolutions and recommendations. It has since been endorsed by the Commission Communication on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (COM 2008/319), and the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit (2008) as the “legitimate parliamentary representation” of the UfM (COM 2008/319: 5; Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 2008: 14/20). It consists of 130 EU members, 130 members of the ten founding Mediterranean partners; ten members from the parliaments of the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and ten members from the Mauritanian parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/content_ en.html). The Marseille Final Statement (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314) acknowledged further regional and local representation through the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly.9 8  One from the EU side compatible with external representation according to the Treaty in force. Under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, EU external representation is from the Presidency of the European Council and the President of the Commission (at the level of Heads of State and Government), and the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. European Commission Communication 2008/319 Final/EU of 20 May 2008 on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. [online] http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319&from=EN p. 6. 9  The Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM), consists of eighty members: forty members of the Mediterranean partners and forty members of the European Union (including thirty-two members of the Committee of Regions and eight members of European associations of local and regional authorities active in the Euro-Mediterranean. See “What is it?” EuroMediterranean Regional and Local Assembly [online] http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/ Documents/arlem-leaflet-en.pdf [accessed 04 Nov. 2014].

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Institutional partners of the Union are the European Investment Bank; the European Commission; and the Arab League; the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (EMWIS); UFM Cooperation in the Water Sector; Euro-­ Mediterranean University (EMUNI); the Association of Euro-Mediterranean Women in Business (AFAEMME); and the Anna Lindh Foundation.

6.2.6  Funding According to the Commission Communication of 2008/319, the EU countries “already provide significant funding in the Mediterranean region” (COM 2008/319: 8). The UfM was directed to devise alternative ways of funding itself and its projects. The funding of the UfM has been directed to come from all methods and levels of financing, from EU instruments such as the ENPI; FEMIP; the Community Budget10; bilateral contributions from EU member states; international financial institutions; regional banks/bodies; and the private sector.

6.2.7  Projects The Projects of the UfM must be recognised as of regional, sub-regional, and transnational relevance (COM 2008/319: 8). In 2008 these were the Key Initiatives mentioned in Sect. 6.2.4: De-Pollution of the Mediterranean; Maritime and Land Highways; Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan; Higher Education and Research; the Euro-Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative. Currently the UfM distinguishes between six “divisions” within the Secretariat that deal with eight on-going projects. The divisions correspond roughly to the initiative areas launched with the Joint Declaration of Paris (2008) under its Annex already mentioned above, and are given in Table 6.1. The Work Programme (Barcelona Process) of 2005, as well as its administrative structures, such as the Commission, is still functional in that role. The Commission, for example, still has input in the Barcelona Process and as such the UfM (Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit 2008: 8/20). The Euro-Mediterranean Committee (established in 1995), however, was disbanded and its mandate is now handled by the SOs and JPC (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314: 4–5). The original criteria for projects outlined in the Commission report have been substantially modified since then. As noted above, the Commission report indicated that in the interest of project visibility, co-ownership  – foci for the reinvigorated  When funding from the Community “normal procedures and selection rules apply”. If in the event projects fulfil the objectives of EU regional integration programmes, they may also be eligible for funding. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. Ibid. p. 17/20.

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Table 6.1  Union for the Mediterranean Projects 2008 Project name Euro-Mediterranean Development Centre for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Mediterranean Solar Plan Project Preparation Initiative Mediterranean Water Governance

Division Projects Funding Co-ordination and Business Development Energy

Promoters Milan Chamber of Commerce

Environment and Water

Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip Project

Environment and Water

The Euro-Mediterranean Sustainable Urban Strategy The Jordanian National Railway Project as part of a Regional Railway Network The “Completion of the Central Section of the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis” Young Women as Job Creators Skills for Success – Employability Skills for Women Creation of a Euro-­ Mediterranean University in Morocco

Transport and Urban Development Transport and Urban Development

OECD and Global Water Partnership- Mediterraneana Secretariat (Environment and Water) in conjunction with the Palestinian Water Authority All member states/Senior Officers Expert Group Jordanian Ministry of Transport

Higher Education on Food Security and Rural Development

Financed by European Investment Facility (EU)

Transport and Urban Development

CETMO, the Technical Secretariat of the Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (GTMO 5+5)

Social and Civil Affairs Social and Civil Affairs

Association of Mediterranean Businesswomen (AFAEMME)b AMIDEASTc

Higher Education and Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research Research and Staff Training of the Kingdom of Morocco under the auspices of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI Higher Education and The International Centre for Advanced Research Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CHIEAM)

One of thirteen Global Water Partnerships (GWPs). It is a regional non-profit organisation that brings together different organisation involved in water resource management. There are currently 2500 members of the network. The Global Water Partnership was founded in 1996 by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The GWP is funded by Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. See Global Water Partnership  – Mediterranean [online] http://www.gwp.org/en/GWP-Mediterranean/ [accessed 24 Jan. 2013]; and Global Water Partnership [online] http://www.gwp.org/en/About-GWP/ [accessed 24 Jan. 2013] b Founded in 2002, Barcelona, AFAEMME is an “Association of Organisations of Mediterranean Businesswomen” that number twenty-three Associations Members, including Spain, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, France, Italy, Croatia, Albania, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan. They are financed by International Institutions and others such as the European (continued) a

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Table 6.1 (continued) Commission. Their aims are to promote business enterprise and other economic objectives. See AFAEMME [online] http://www.afaemme.org/aboutus.php [accessed 24 Jan. 2013] c AMIDEAST is An American private, non-profit organisation established in 1951 and present in six countries in the North African and Middle Eastern region, but only five included – Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt – under this project through regional offices. AMIDEAST focusses on international education, training and development. See “Projects”, Union for the Mediterranean [online] http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/skills-for-success-employability-skillsfor-women/ [accessed 24 Jan. 2013]; and “About Us” AMIDEAST, [online] http://www.amideast. org/about/how-amideast-making-difference [accessed 24 Jan. 2013]

UfM – projects should be relevant to the citizens of the Euro-Mediterranean region. By the time of the Paris Declaration, these criteria had been replaced by the “relevance and interest to the parties involved”, and finally in the Project Guidelines where the citizens of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership do not feature at all: Project Guidelines, Union for the Mediterranean, April, 2011: (a) Uphold the principle of sustainable development; (b) Strive to contribute to stability and peace in the whole Euro-­Mediterranean region; (c) Not jeopardise the legitimate interest of any member of the UfM; (d) Respect the principles and rules of international law; (e) Take account of the principle of variable geometry; (f) Respect the decision of member countries involved in an on-going project when it is subject to further development. The process of collating potential projects, through to assessing, labelling, and evaluating is all done from the top-down, driven by the UfM bodies, business/project promoters and national governments. The criteria as set out above, reflects the state/government centricity of the projects in spite of the fact that “civil society” can submit proposals themselves. In addition, the principle of variable geometry11 hardly puts the UfM on an equal footing, institutionalising further differences between the states involved. The Secretariat accepts potential project proposals from all sources – ministerial meetings, national or regional authorities and institutions, private sector and civil society. The registration of the projects must further comply with three criteria, one of which is a “financial undertaking from the promoters to cover part of the initial development costs” (a preliminary feasibility study, for example) and contribute towards implementation costs (Project Guidelines, SUFM/2011). The Secretariat makes provision for instances where feasibility studies or market research cannot be carried out by the promoters, performing this on their behalf:

 Differentiated integration: the concept allows groups of lesser developed states to collaborate with each other. However, here it is a stipulation of the projects. See “Variable Geometry Europe”, Europa: Summaries of Legislation– Glossary. [online] http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ glossary/variable_geometry_europe_en.htm [accessed 23 Jan. 2013].

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…but without applying unduly strict or restrictive criteria, especially since the final responsibility for deciding on the certification of a proposal rests with the SOM. (Project Guidelines, Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2011: 2)

The projects under these provisions may be collated, prepared, assessed “favourably”, and submitted to the SOs. The Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) then approves and thereafter “labels” the project as a “UfM” project. Once labelled, the Secretariat takes over the further promotion and funding of the project in conjunction with the project promoters, sourcing funds from international banks, institutions, private or public. Project monitoring is done by the “implementing organisation”, submitting regular updates and reports on its progress. Again, if in the case they are unable to carry out proper monitoring, the Secretariat may take over this task (Project Guidelines SUfM/2011: 2), submitting the reports to the SOMs as necessary. Whereas the UfM has gained perhaps a higher profile and a formalised structure with the establishment of the Secretariat, physically present in Barcelona and somewhat separated from the EU, its structure still does not provide equal treatment between all members. The Secretariat is made up of equal representatives from both sides. However, as there are twenty-eight12 EU member states and only the twelve Mediterranean member states, decisions made by consensus could potentially bias the overall partnership towards a European cultural and normative perspective. The current UfM is far from the regional organisation with supranational powers as first envisioned by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. Although the UfM incorporates past partnerships that have gone before, including that of the Barcelona acquis, it has become less significant: its range of topic areas focus exclusively on regional, sub-­ regional, and transnational project areas, decided by top-down organisations and driven by funding criteria. The political and security relationship that was originally envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration and 2005 Work Programme has been diluted, with no ongoing projects dedicated to concerns of the Security Charter, or yet dealing multilaterally with the very real issues of immigration (re-admission, structured treatment of immigrants, and detention for example); trafficking of humans, illicit drugs; or Palestinian/Israeli relations. Oliver Schlumberger (2011) has acknowledged this as a “de-politicisation” of the issues most relevant to the Mediterranean Partner states, including that of the resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict and political transformation that could have been supported through negative conditionality and reinforcement of the EU’s normative agenda (human rights, democracy and the rule of law) (Schlumberger 2011). The UfM in its current format has been stripped down to five focal areas (de-­ Pollution of the Mediterranean; Maritime and Land Highways; Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan; Higher Education and Research; the Euro-Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative), which appear to have been given greater emphasis through the establishment of a central organising and monitoring organ in the Secretariat, peopled by top-heavy  EU

12

 At the time of writing, Britain is still negotiating its terms of leaving the EU.

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representation. However, other conduits of international relations, bilateral agreements with the EU, or the ENP, for example, appear to take on more weight and importance.

6.3  The Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership Chapter Five highlighted the neoliberal qualities and the structural approach evident in European Union (EU) foreign policy, specifically in the Barcelona Declaration (1995), the Five-Year Work Programme (2000). It also highlighted the various problems that the Partnership experienced. The description of the processes of the regionalisation of the Mediterranean, and the successive progression of partnerships, show the development of European Community (EC)/EU in relation to its surrounding environment. In an era of global integration, the EC/EU was able to not only affect those in the proximate vicinity, but also farther afield; this was also true of its response to perceived outside “threats”, interferences, or influences. This was the first step to describing the set of complex adaptive systems (CASs) that is the EU policy-complex, and moreover its specific character that surrounds Africa as its environment, providing overlap and contributing to persistence and resilience in EU ideological design and reform. Neoliberalism and the spread of the Ten Point Plan (Washington Consensus) was already underway by the time the Cold War officially ended. At that point, from the European perspective, both the North African and Middle Eastern states seemed to “erupt” with issues that were envisaged to have an impact on European stability. These “threats” were prioritised in foreign policy partnerships or cooperation arrangements. However, as Marjorie Lister has pointed out, as soon as the Barcelona Declaration (1995) was signed, the Mediterranean was “off the boil” (Lister 2001: 7/15). The EU’s eyes  – and those of the international community  – instead turned towards Africa and the new kinds of intra-state conflict that seemed to take centre stage for their violence, and persistence. Moreover, the effect of these intra-state wars was being felt in the surrounding states and regions. Weak governance, state failure, and the “shadow state” became watchwords of the new perspective on intra-­ state conflict and responses were considered in terms of the new international development paradigm that viewed “security” from an integrated perspective heavily influenced by the prevalent ideas of human development and well-being (Holland 2009; Phillips 2011: 435; Hampson 2013: 281). Securing the individual  – attending to their “basic needs”, and providing “freedoms”13  – was equated with securing the wider state and region. The  The “freedoms” as referenced for example, in the UN General Assembly A/RES/60/1 (143) definition of Human Security. See United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60 (2005) World Summit Outcome/adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1 (2005) [online] http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/I520EN.pdf

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international approach to what has become recognised as “human security”, became a set of integrated policy paths based on health, education, gender equality, and sustainable development. These became framed internationally as the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs (Phillips 2011: 441; Holland 2009: 22). Partnerships became the new nom de jour in foreign policy development-speak and, as shown in the follow up conferences of the Barcelona Declaration, “ownership” was presented as a necessary precondition to the success of the venture, the lack of which was a signal of failure. This rhetoric, together with an emphasis on institutional reform (re-structuring) on would-be “partner” states, found its orientation in Joseph Stiglitz’s Post Washington Consensus (PWC). A semi-neo-statist take on development, shortcomings in “internal” state structure were deemed to be reasons behind the failure of the neoliberal ethos that had prevailed and been fervently pursued at the global, regional level, and in the EU (Phillips 2011; Bergh 2012: 310–11). The JAES presents a similar outlook. Partnerships where “ownership” meant the Partners themselves took responsibility for restructuring their institutions and rolling-­out their own development strategies according to the prescribed tenets, brushed over any post-colonial interpretations of global structural inequalities (Lister 2002: 9–10). The subsequently named post post-Colonial relationship (Lister 2002: 10) has been institutionalised in this way between the EU and those member states with which they have had historical and colonial ties. The “new” relationships or “partnerships”, in this light are an attempt at de-emphasising the past, and hence the basis for African unity. In line with the dominant neoliberal agenda, the EU followed suit and took it one stage further with their Policy Coherence for Development or PCD (which included the “three Cs’ – Complementarity, Coordination and Coherence) (Carbone 2009: 8), an attempt at an equally integrated policy response at the inter-regional scale that merged security, development and eventually political restructuring or “government reform” (Carbone 2009). Immigration, normally an area for bilateral relations and  state control, was “revolutionised” and became an integrated aspect of the development/security model (Lavenex and Kunz 2009: 115). PCD and the integration agenda, however, create structural symmetry that can mean collapse for any CAS.  CASs thrive on diversity and seek complexity. The external environment (herein described as the EU-UfM-JAES) acts as a containment on the African institutional structure, both formally at the AU level and informally in the construction of African values such as Unity, found enshrined in the AU’s Constitutive Act and the founding principles of the Pan-African Movement. As EU ideals of PCD and regional integration take hold and are pursued more rigorously, the opposite effect may become apparent: fragmentation, disintegration, and the rise of negative centricities. The JAES is made up of eight “partnerships”, with distinct but overlapping areas was meant to contribute towards the accomplishment of the MDGs (now superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals). Integration and regional integration loom large in this political cooperation framework, along with neoliberal foundations for economically driven development.

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6.4  L  isbon Declaration – EU Africa Summit (Lisbon, 8–9 December, 2007) The Lisbon Declaration (CEU 16343/07 Presse 290) made at the Summit held on 8–9 December 2007, is the founding agreement and basis of the JAES Partnership. The Declaration presents an overview of the circumstances surrounding its formulation and the aims of the Joint Strategy. In addition the Declaration recognises that both the EU and Africa may, through the partnership under the Strategy, jointly accomplish action on “common contemporary challenges”, on an equal basis and as such moving away from a “traditional donor-recipient” relationship (CEU 16343/07 Presse 290: 1). Increasing integration and institutional sophistication in both the EU and Africa as a whole, is also highlighted as providing the impetus to “reach out” and deepen the strategic and political relationship between the two, and hence the current proposition of a Partnership (CEU 16343/07 Presse 290: 1). At a global level, and in acceptance of new levels of interdependence that are recognised as part of the globalisation of issues, the Declaration therefore recognises key political challenges identified as climate change, energy, migration, and gender issues (CEU 16343/07 Presse 290: 1). Both sides commit to pursue peace and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and development. The new partnership will “engage” both societies to achieve the “fundamental” commitments made in the Declaration, which are the reaching of the MDGs; the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture; increase investment, growth and prosperity through regional integration and closer economic ties; good governance; and human rights (CEU 16343/07 Presse 290: 1). The identification of politicised “challenges” in this Declaration, at the level of EU/Africa, establishes the sensitivity and implicit acknowledgment that these issues are of equal relevance. Most significantly, once again the attainment of investment, growth, and prosperity are accomplished through regional integration and “closer” economic ties, “good governance” and the acceptance of human rights. Human rights and the attainment of the MDGs, are considered to be relevant to socio-­ ecological maintenance and development in accordance with the global development agenda.

6.5  T  he Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy The new strategic partnership, according to the Joint Strategy, will create the necessary “instruments” and “mechanisms” required to support it and reach the goals set out in the First Action Plan (2008–2010) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291). The Action

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Plan is to be complemented with a “comprehensive and effective follow up mechanism” and the first period assessment or “results” scheduled to take place in 2010. The language in this part of the Joint Strategy is “mechanistic”, evocative of engineering and economics, a “means/ends” approach indicative of traditional Rationalistic terminology. This is at odds with the kind of broad-spectrum “human development” approach that is also found incorporated in this Declaration, and to be included in the ensuing Partnership. Figure 6.2 below illustrates the structure of the JAES as per The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291).

GLOBAL ISSUES

Climate Change; energy; migration gender issues;

EU

Common values & goals (peace & stability; democracy & rule of law, progress & development

Africa

Fundamental Commitments:

MDGs; Peace & Security Architecture; investment, growth & prosperity (Regional integration & trade); good governance & human rights; reshaping of global governance Fig. 6.2  Joint Africa-EU Strategy Graphic Depiction/Lisbon Declaration 2007

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6.6  Context, Shared Vision and Principles 6.6.1  Context According to the Context of the Partnership, Africa and Europe are “bound” together through culture, history, geography, a common future, and a community of values (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 1). These are outlined as human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, rule of law and democracy as defined in the AU and EU constitutions. In response to a quickly globalising world and increased interdependency, Africa and the EU are described as needing to move forwards towards a “new” kind of relationship that builds on their new “identities”, newly developed institutional structures that furthers their “integrated cooperation” in new and existing “areas and arenas” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 2–3). The Context (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 1) here appears to be at pains to establish “sameness”, where there may not be any. It is not made clear either at this point how “geography” binds Africa and Europe together, unless of course this refers relatively and in comparison to other continents. The emphasis on finding “sameness” is incongruent with Africa’s own perception of its history, and the establishment of its continental institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1963), and its successor the AU (2002). The OAU was established to enhance both unity among African nations and solidarity against further colonialism, and recognition of African shared anti-imperial struggles (Nabudere 2001; Audit of the African Union 2007). That the EU can claim “sameness” with these principles is to undermine recognition of African unity and solidarity, and the basis of a shared African identity.

6.6.2  Shared Vision The purpose of the Joint Strategy stated under this section, is to create a strategic, political partnership with enhanced cooperation at all levels. The Partnership, according to the Declaration, is to be based on “mutually agreed on and shared values, common interests and common strategic objectives”. The Partnership is also to assist a development agenda in Africa specifically through “economic cooperation” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 3). It will be operationalized through short-term Action Plans with the aim of measuring outcomes.

6.6.3  Principles Structurally, recognising African Unity within its historical context, and the interdependence between Africa and Europe are problematic. However, the fundamental principles of the Joint Strategy/Partnership are the “unity of Africa”, the

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interdependence between Africa and Europe, “ownership and joint responsibility”, respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, and the right to development. The Partnership is to be “co-owned”, and operate under co-responsibility and cooperation on global issues; “burden sharing”; and mutual accountability, solidarity, mutual confidence; equality and justice; common and human security; respect for international law and agreements; gender equality and non-discrimination; and a long term approach (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 2).

6.7  Objectives There are four Objectives overall that are overlapping and said to be mutually-­ reinforcing (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 4). These are, broadly speaking, “strengthening” the political partnership;  “jointly promoting multilateralism” through supporting global norms and institutions – and a address a mixture of areas such as health, illegal trade in SALWs, migration; development – with special reference to the MDGs; strengthening integration and incorporating non-state actors – defined as “private sector, economic and social partners including trade union organisations and civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 3) – into the Partnership with roles to play in development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes. As Checkland and Scholes (1999) have pointed out, objectives are largely acknowledged in management to be oriented to the short term, and so its inclusion in the overall framework is at odds with the fundamental nature of the JAES, which is to be a “long-term” partnership, and an holistic one. The Political partnership furthermore is structured around the organising and framing of “common concerns” and responses to “common challenges”. The first Objective, (i), outlines these as being peace and security, migration and development, and a “clean environment” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 3). Stronger institutional ties are seen to positively affect joint action on these issues, as well as upgrading the overall “political” partnership. Deepening integration at regional (EU-AU), continental (EU-Africa) and global levels, with special reference to institutional reform of the United Nations (UN) system, is identified in the Declaration as a “priority”. Further integration is seen in the context of “speeding up” the delivery on MDGs in all African countries by 2015, and of enhancing multilateral ties and “legitimate” institutions at all scales of governance. The promotion of “integration” (here specifically economic integration), and the belief that it will lead to development is significant here as it reflects the transference of the EU’s ideological beliefs (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 3). Both sides state their commitment to an “holistic approach” and to treat Africa “as one”, channelling the Partnership through the AU and EU respectively. Jointly perceived global challenges and “common concerns” are detailed as human rights; children’s rights; gender equality; fair trade; migration; HIV/AIDs, malaria, tuberculosis, and “other pandemics”; climate change; energy security and sustainability;

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terrorism; proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); trafficking of illicit Small and Light Weapons (SALWs); Information Communication Technology (ICT); and science, technology, and innovation (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 3). This is a mixture of politicised areas as established under the Partnership for Peace and Security, together with additional areas more widely perceived as “positive” such as ICT, science, technology, and innovation. Even at this level of international exchange, the EU is not “coherent”, confusing its relations, citing the main interaction of the JAES to take place between the EU and the AU, and “Africa”. Although not explicit, this of course refers to the relation of Morocco to the AU, which withdrew its membership in 1984. All of these aspects are shown in Fig. 6.3.

Fig. 6.3  Areas of interlocking/reinforcement

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6.8  New Approaches The section entitled “New Approaches” outlines and sets parameters for the “Partnership” to take place. Ten points outline the conditions within which the Objectives may be met, recognising the “political challenges” that are deemed “essential” to be confronted if the success of the Partnership is to be accomplished. Joint political commitment and responsibility is emphasised, especially as it applies to African leadership, mutual support and “buy-in” from all levels of society (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 4). Following the Post Washington Consensus (PWC) ideological format, these aspects are seen to enhance and support conditions for “sustainable social and economic development” and the partners’ development programmes. “Equality” and mutually defined “common” objectives are described as contributing factors towards a “real partnership” as opposed to “a traditional one”, from which to move away (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 4). It is stipulated that both sides need to redress existing negative “stereotypes” and reinforce positive images of each other. Cultural, social heritage and diversity are to be seen as “capital” to be better “used”, especially as they apply to discovering “economic wealth and opportunities” in both continents (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 7). In accordance with the now well-embedded immigration-development nexus (Sorensen et al. 2002) in EU policy, special mention is made of integrating migrants in their countries of residence, “facilitating links”, and using diaspora’s remittances as part of the on-going development process in countries of origin (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 5). Institutional infrastructure – policies, legal and financial frameworks and “new mechanisms”  – are to be developed and adapted towards the Objectives of the Partnership as well as that of a framework that “better addresses” both sides’ “concerns”. Dialogue, cooperation, bilateral and multilateral relations are to be directed towards the attainment of the overall Objectives, and the Partnership is to take into account its internationally embedded nature, and jointly address “global challenges” as included in the partnership’s agenda.14 Once more, softer aspects of social organisation are viewed in hard economic language, e.g. (“capital”) to be “used” for the furtherance of “economic wealth and opportunities”. Moreover there is the relatively “new” approach to abrogating responsibility for “development”, which is to make immigrants fund “development” in their countries of origin.15 Rather than being controlled by governments and states, however, the redistribution of wealth becomes mutually institutionalised as a  Literally “To integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges….” Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU of 9 December 2007 The Africa EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Lisbon. [online] http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf [accessed 29/10/2014] p. 6. 15  Actually initiated in a work by Sorensen et al., in 2002, bringing together a so-called “immigration-Development Nexus”, and viewing “migrants as a development resource”. Sorensen, N.N., van Hear, N., and Engberg-Pedersen, P., 2002. In van Hear, N., and Sorensen, N.N., 2003. The Migration Development-Nexus. Geneva: IOM [online]: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/ Migration_Dev_Nexus.pdf; Lavenex, S., and Kunz, R., 2009. “The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations”. In Carbone, M., (Ed.) 2009. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version] Oxford: Routledge. p. 116. 14

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developmental practice in the hands of the private sector. At the same time, this “strategy” is claimed by the Partnership with the possibility of the remittances being mainstreamed as financial contributions incurring “charges” or levied transactions.

6.9  Strategies 6.9.1  Strategic Framework The attainment of the four main Objectives have been re-organised to form “areas” where the progress towards them is defined as having major strategic benefit to the overall Objectives. These have been renamed “strategic priorities”, and are: Peace and Security, Governance and Human Rights, Regional Integration and Trade and Key Development Issues. A commitment to “policy coherence” (the integration of policies, policy themes, aims, and outcome) is desired as well as the endeavour not to “undermine results”.

6.9.2  Strategic Priorities The strategic priorities are further sub-divided into sections: (a) Peace and Security: Promoting a Safer World • Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa and Europe • Common and Global Peace and Security Challenges (b) Governance and Human Rights: Upholding our Values and Principles • Common and Global Governance and Human Rights Challenges • Cooperation between Africa and the EU on Democratic Governance (c) Trade and Regional Integration: Raising Potential and Using Opportunities • Private Sector Development • Trade and Integration (d) Key Development Issues: Accelerating Progress Towards the MDGs • • • • • • •

Development Cooperation Human and Social Development Gender equality Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change Migration and Development Agriculture and Food Security Infrastructure

6.9 Strategies

• • • • •

169

Water and Sanitation Energy Development of Knowledge based Societies Cultural Cooperation Communication

6.9.2.1  Peace and Security: Promoting a Safer World Peace and security are seen to be the end results of political, economic, and social development. An “holistic” approach to security is recommended, incorporating conflict prevention, long term peace building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, the latter being associated with issues of governance and sustainable development (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 5). At the forefront of this “holistic” approach is the desire to discover the “root causes” to conflict and instability (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 5). It is interesting to note the desire to unearth “root causes” of conflict and instability, as an holistic approach is not the natural heir to a one-dimensional perspective. Again, the language in the framework uses confusing terminology, and cannot help but obfuscate the unravelling of concepts and developmental ideology as a consequence. The holistic approach would imply a sense of complexity, yet within this lexicon there are no “root causes”, but a multitude of contributing factors: the sum of all parts may add up to an entirely different consequential outcome, as indicative of emergent behaviour and structures. The wish to uncover “root causes”, indicates a narrow approach in contradiction to the acknowledged integrated and inter-connected issues. This is further reinforced by the idea that regional integration (investment, economic growth) will provide the “answers”. The last paragraph refers to forging a greater strategic partnership to also face issues of “common concern” at the global level (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 5). It would appear from this entry in the framework that the Partnership also contains commitment to align itself with the EU in international decisions taken at that level. The overall theme of this section would appear to be “burden sharing” in the context not only of acknowledging “common” security concerns but also accepting financial responsibility for peacekeeping operations and their support. The two bulleted points under this section (Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa and Europe, and Common and Global Peace and Security Challenges) frame the kind of “closer” relationship that the EU and Africa, the continent, are to have.16 Both sides are to share information and “consult” each other on issues of “common concern”. The reference to “closer” relationships and cooperation also appears to be hinting at a coordination of responses and “joint” policy decision making, discussion, framing, and constructing.

 “Strengthened dialogue” and “institutional cooperation”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Press 291)/EU. op.cit. p. 5.

16

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This section acknowledges the AU and African efforts in guiding the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) at continental, regional, and national levels (CEU 16433/07 Presse 291: 6). However, the document also puts the EU forward as an integral part of “operationalizing” the APSA due to their “expertise, finance, human resources, and experience”. This involvement will take place not only through further endorsing of the Panel of the Wise, the Early Warning Systems, and the African Standby Force (ASF), but also in the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, the Declaration on the Border Program and other “relevant instruments on disarmament” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 6). With acknowledgment to African ownership of the project, other EU policy documents, frameworks and “lessons learned” are quoted as being relevant to the Partnership’s attention to the APSA.17 The EU’s learned experiences and interpretations of what constitutes security issues are therefore made the reference points for departure in responding to said “common security concerns”. There is a distinction made between what would appear to be “old” and “new” common security challenges, the latter defined as Climate change, environmental degradation, dumping of toxic waste, pandemics and water management issues. Furthermore, “major” contributing factors to state instability and the spread of conflicts are identified and acknowledged to be transnational organised crime, international terrorism, mercenary activities, human and drugs trafficking, and the illicit trade in natural resources (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 7). Major “common concerns” are detailed as the “illicit” spreading of SALWs, their ammunition, explosives and anti-personnel landmines, as well as traffic in WMDs. The Middle East, although not part of “Africa”, is singled out at the end of this section, as being the site of conflicts and crises that spill over into other areas and undermine their peace and security initiatives (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 7). Financial assistance for these projects are given a wider appeal to incorporate not just African, EU member states (on a bilateral basis) or EU crisis management instruments (for example Euro-RECAMP) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 9), but also importantly international participants or contributors such as the G8 (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 7). In addition, there is the proposal for the development of a funding mechanism under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, especially for AU-led peace keeping operations under “consent” from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In the context of “common concerns”, “security” is acknowledged as being a composite of interrelated concerns of the global community, which in turn is equally required to take responsibility for peace keeping operations and support. Civil society and non-state actors are mentioned as intrinsic to the holistic response to peace and security issues, with special emphasis to acknowledged vulnerable groups under UNSC Resolutions. These civil society groups include Women

 These are the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, the EU Joint Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform; the EU Concept on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; the African Peace Facility (APF). Council of the European Union 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 6.

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in Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) and Children in Armed Conflicts (UNSCR 1612). The Africa-EU/APSA partnership is contextualised within the wider capacity of the EU, and international environment with first the EU18 providing a socialising role through training (“expertise” and human resources), finance, and “experience”, and later the global/international (UNSC) structure playing a supporting or legitimising role in the overall framework. From the description of the APSA  at this point, its structural environment has already been moulded and it would appear that Africa/the AU is stepping into an already formulated or “pre-cut” policy – “suit” as far as security is concerned. The wider international context (referencing UNSC Resolutions for example) reinforces the web of norms and policy constraints under which Africa will now operate, and conform to in becoming a “partner”.19 6.9.2.2  G  overnance and Human Rights: Upholding Our Values and Principles: Common and Global Governance and Human Rights Challenges This section both names and labels clearly what constitutes “Democratic governance and human rights” and establishes the patterns of interaction (structured dialogue) and international hierarchical relevance, drawing on the UN framework as the overall context under the sub-section on Cooperation between Africa and the EU on Democratic Governance.20 Democratic governance and human rights are therefore defined as “central” to the Partnership and as such points to the importance of this section. The labelling of what constitutes “all aspects of governance”, is therefore not left to chance interpretation, but is detailed as including Human Rights, Children’s Rights, gender equality, democratic principles, rule of law, local governance, management of natural  All the EU “instruments” referred to as relevant. See Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 6. 19  The Africa – EU Partnership on Peace and Security will work on the establishment and adoption of multilateral, regional and national structures to “support” commitments made in this area, as well as and up to the global level with the United Nations Security Council and the construction of Resolutions. Cooperation will also take the form of information sharing, law enforcement, institutional capacity building, and judicial cooperation and will include “matters relating to counterterrorism”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 7. 20  Human rights actions and the reinforcement of human rights values are to be pursued not only at a continental level in the various institutions present (European Court of Human Rights of the council of Europe; the African court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African and European national Human Rights institutions), but also in conjunction with and reference to global institutions and frameworks such as international humanitarian law and the UN Human Rights Council. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is acknowledged as a primary mechanism for the upkeep and prosecution of “serious crimes to the international community as a whole” detailed as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 8. 18

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resources, transparent and accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, human security, security sector reform, the fight against corruption, corporate social responsibility and institution building, and development. Moreover, working through these aspects of governance is believed to help Africa and the EU come to recognise “common concerns”, establish “common positions” in order to jointly address them. With special reference to cases of weak institutions, conflict, crisis and “severe democratic deficit”, provision is made in this sub-section for the EU and Africa, on the foundation of international dialogue, to focus on reaching a “common understanding” on “situations of fragility”. This understanding is seen as the necessary prelude towards agreeing on “steps to be taken” in response (CEU 1634407 Presse 291: 8). Illicit trade in cultural goods – African21 cultural goods trafficked to Europe and their return to their countries of origin – is included as an item of interest and mentioned at the end of this sub-section, within the context of the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) conventions. This section establishes conformity or at least acceptance of values and normative constructs of human rights and democratic governance at national, regional (Africa, EU), and international levels, as well as legal constraints, commitments, and as such the acceptance of punitive measures in the mutually acknowledged validity of UNIDROIT and the ICC.22 The halting of illicit trade and “equitable” management of natural resources, together with special emphasis on financial oversight and control (“economic governance” and oversight for example, controlling measures over money-laundering, corruption, counterfeiting, bribery, and tax fraud) are to be addressed jointly and in the context of international agreements and initiatives such as the Kimberley Process, the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT), and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). Civil society, media, and democratic institutions are recognised as having “important roles” to assisting in this process (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 10). Significantly, and presumably as an indication of the importance this section is given, the EU commits support to the AU and Africa in its institutional development both financially and through “dialogue and incentives”, through the European Development Fund (EDF) and its respective Governance Initiative (CEU 1634407  The inclusion of cultural goods in the Partnership was a contentious point, with the EU not wanting it to be included at the time. Egypt in particular was driving concerns over the return of African cultural goods being held in museums and other cultural institutions. It subsequently led to the hold up of the other areas in the Partnership, with a final breakthrough being made only in 2014 at the Workshop of the Fight Against Illegal Trafficking of Cultural Goods, held in Casablanca. See DGEP 2014, p. 22. 22  The rule of law and democratic governance in line with regional and international standards (such as national Human Rights Commissions; national parliaments; independent electoral commissions; the UN-endorsed Declaration of Principles for International Election observation of 2005 and the Durban Declaration on the Principles Guiding Democratic Elections in Africa) will be supported by the EU and AU, together and with involvement from regional organisations and civil society. Loc. cit. 21

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Presse 291: 8). In addition, the EU commits itself to setting up an “instrument” to provide further financial assistance to specifically assist the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Pan African governance “architecture”. Specific support is envisaged for the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Pan African Parliament and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 8). No other participant or donor contributors are recognised in spite of international reference frameworks being mentioned elsewhere in this and other sections (as for example under the Peace and Security strategic area). Financial responsibility rests with the EU and Africa, and institutionally the AU. What must be inferred from this framework, is that Democratic Governance (all-aspects) and Human Rights are concerns of the EU primarily, who are willing to take financial responsibility for its evolution, while using the international context as a evaluative control. 6.9.2.3  T  rade and Regional Integration: Raising Potential and Using Opportunities Further integration of and focus on domestic markets, as well as regional integration are believed in this section to underpin Africa’s sustainable economic growth and its departure from continuous donor support (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 10). Both of these prerequisites are seen to lead to larger integrated markets (and regulatory convergence) that will in turn attract outside investors and increase “productive capacities” (CEU 163344/07 Presse 291: 10). Building productive capacity, according to this section, will entail moving African countries away from relying on primary resources for export and hence revenue, towards manufacturing and processed goods for export. This is seen as the way for African countries to become more involved in the global economy. Africa and the EU, together with other international partners within the context of “fair trade”, are to accomplish this through the reaching of “key goals”, which within the vocabulary of regional trade and integration, are seen as “necessary”: (i) Private sector development together with foreign investment; (ii) Development of physical infrastructure networks and related services needed for the easy movement of goods, people and information; (iii) Trade integration, essential to increase trade between the South-South, and North-South trade flows. (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 10) The above “recipe” for building productive capacity in Africa, could in fact be visualised and as “linear logic” in the following manner: domestic markets + regional integration = larger integrated market + regulatory convergence = better economic governance and investment climate and an increase in productive capacity = sustainable economic growth and development. Its formulaic nature is rather like a “one-size-fits-all” methodology of achieving productive expansion.

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Both Private Sector Development and Trade and Integration set out standardisation measures to ensure conformity, and hence compatibility, with the regional and international economy.23 Creating a “business friendly environment” is described through steps such as establishing fail-safes and “protection” for would-be investors (intellectual property rights and standards, promoting investment codes, establishing “credible” laws and guarantee systems). Likewise such an environment would exclude investment deterrents or “disincentives” identified here as fraud, corruption, money-laundering and organised crime (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 10). Hence both sides are to cooperate and exchange information and skills on technology development and infrastructure, to assist in the industrialisation process. Women, especially as regards their role in the informal sector and their diaspora contributions to remittances, are to be facilitated, incorporated, and invested into the formal financial cycle (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 11). Easier access to credit facilities and other business support services are to be made available, especially as they apply to incorporating “informal” economic networks. A joint body, the EU Africa Business Forum is to play a key role in facilitating the relationships, the business climate, and public and private investors from both continents. Trade and integration in Africa are recognised as being vital to “wider” integration and development menu.24 The Regional Economic Communities (RECs)25 are to play a fundamental role in this process. However, so too are the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)26 and their corresponding groupings or regions, along with “other” organisations (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 12). For this to take place, Africa (not the AU at this point) and the EU are charged to create integrated trade rules and regimes. Both sides agree to establish “mechanisms” and programmes to develop norms, standards, and quality control at both regional and Pan  The Africa-EU partnership aims to “harmonise” regulations and create “investment friendly legal frameworks” to facilitate foreign investment and promote “Corporate Social Responsibility”. Three key areas of improvement are stated as bringing conformity with international standards and facilitating Africa’s entry into international trade market. These are sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, pharmaceutical production and regulation, and promoting “environmental friendly technologies and products”. Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (SPSs), especially in the African agriculture and food processing industry, are deemed essential. It is understood that conformity to these standards will enable Africa to enter the international market, better trade with South-South regions and be able to export with fewer imposed trade tariffs. Both Africa and the EU will actively promote trade and market access for African good and services, but with particular emphasis in accessing the EU market. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU Ibid. pp. 10–11. 24  Trade and African integration into “rules-based world trading” as far as they are seen to support economic growth, are comprehended as means to eradicating poverty. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 11. 25  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), West African Economic Monetary Union/Union economique et monetaire ouest Africaine (or UEMOA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), CEMAC, COMESA, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU), East African States (EAS), East African Community (EAC) and the IOC. 26  West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa. 23

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African levels, and bring them into line with international standards (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 11). This specifically includes greater control over pharmaceuticals (production, control of counterfeit medicines and “other products”)27 and their distribution.28 The EPAs will be implemented at sub-regional level and will operate in conjunction with the overall AU-EU partnerships (this is in fact contrary to what is stipulated later under the section on Institutional Architecture and Actors). Both the EU and AU recognise the importance that the EPAs should play a supportive role in regional and continental integration on the basis of the Abuja Treaty (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 12). While the role of the EPAs are recognised by the EU and AU as “supportive” in this framework, it is a difficult to envisage how the EPAs will operate at a sub-regional level, and at the same time in conjunction with the RECs, whose groupings are not correlated (discussed in more detail in Sect. 6.11). The EDF, the [European] Community, EU member states in line with provisions made for by the European Union Aid for Trade Strategy and other developmental contributors, will support Trade and African “rules based world trading” with special regard to EPA implementation (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 12). The relationship between the EU and Africa is laid out as being required to be mutually supportive in international fora, and support global economic governance along with African integration into the international economy. Both the EU and Africa are to seek to complete the Doha Development Agenda as soon as possible29; to support the overall strategic area of the EU and Africa within the framework of the African Charter for Statistics; and are to cooperate on improving the gathering and accuracy of statistics to assist policy makers and other users of statistics. 6.9.2.4  K  ey Development Issues: Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals Meeting the MDGs and supporting African efforts, mid-way between 2000 and 2015 is seen as a major challenge for the EU and its external development provisions. Key to the attainment of the MDGs, is the ability in Africa to achieve both  Improving pharmaceutical production in line with international rules on good manufacturing practices, along with efficient regulatory procedures. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07(Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 11. 28  In conjunction, access to “affordable, essential generic medicines, vaccines and commodities for major prevailing diseases and epidemics” will be promoted. African countries are urged to make use of the “flexibilities” that Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreements allow in accordance to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa. Loc. cit. 29  The following areas are seen as possible areas of negotiation to bring the Agenda to conclusion: trade distorting subsidies, greater access to WTO member markets, reductions in tariff peaks, better anti-dumping rules, and reforms to guarantee supply. Furthermore, Africa and the EU will work together to build institutional and technical capacity on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Standards, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), quality and food safety, industrial goods and commodity issues. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07(Presse 291)/EU. Ibid.pnt.48. p. 12. 27

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sustainable economic development and equitable social development (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 13). It is recognised in this subsection of the Strategy that there is a need for both Africa and the EU to concentrate their efforts on better policies and delivery, as well as increasing their investments in those areas. Reference is made to the eight MDGs,30 and this Strategic area is focused on actions working towards their accession. Certain thematic concerns surface however, and run concurrently throughout the subsections. These are predictable aid flows (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 13), private sector involvement in funding development (for example in Health), reliable statistics,31 infrastructural integration as well as policy and financial integration (policy coherence and “financial harmonisation” or “complementarity”) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 13–14).32 International, regional, and national levels are implicated in the disbursement of these actions, and Africa, the AU, and the EU are seen as the major regional partners and drivers of these initiatives. The use of international guidelines, agreements or conventions are strategically used, otherwise regional frameworks are referenced as in the cases of health, science, and technology (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 15). In this case, only with regards to Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (specifically in relation to maternal and infant morbidity and mortality) are global and international guidelines evoked (the Conference on Population and Development, or ICPD and the Maputo Plan of Action). Other areas included in this strategic area not directly linked or associated to the MDGs are informative as they show the EU’s own development perspective, and also indicate the relative importance allocated to these areas. These include dedicated sub-­ sections on Energy, Migration and Development, Cultural Cooperation, and Communication. Development Cooperation The sub-section on Development Cooperation formalises the extent of Development interaction between the EU and Africa.33 Unlike the UfM, where the Framework  They are the following: End Poverty and Hunger; Universal Education; Gender equality; Child Health; Maternal Health; Combat HIV/AIDs; Environmental Sustainability; Global Partnership. United Nations Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 [online] www.un.org/milleniumgoals [accessed 7 Aug. 2012]. 31  Once again, the EU and Africa commit to enhancing their “cooperation” on statistics so that policies and decisions are made on “clear evidence”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.48. p. 12. 32  As well as other kinds of cooperation, non-aid policies are seen as key to contributing to the attainment of the MDGs. In this sense consistency amongst policies with development objectives and other initiatives are to be worked on by both sides. “Triangular” cooperation with third parties or other international actors and between African countries is to be encouraged as a way to ensure consistency or “policy coherence”, with the EU providing the financial or technical assistance as role required. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt. 50. p. 13. 33  The Monterrey Consensus reached in May 2005 is used as a reference and guideline, detailing Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) commitments to Africa. Provisions are made for specific percentage allocations of ODA/GNI of EU member states prior to the 2002 enlargement, those 30

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stipulates that participation will not affect or be affected by other aid/recipient agreements, the JAES/Strategic Area on Development Cooperation specifically states the integration of aid budgets.34 Human and Social Development Women, youth, and the incorporation of the informal economy into the mainstream economy are the focus and means to an end of Human and Social Development (Jobs/Employment, Education, Health). The economic concept of “micro-­ financing”, service and private sector development are to promote this incorporation. Together with these prescriptions, the ideal of the “decent work” Agenda apropos the International Labour Organisation (ILO)35 in this sub-section establishes what constitutes “a decent” job, or employment. As such, a specific stylised socio-economic structure is prescribed, as it does outlining a preferred method of funding, and what constitutes “work” and a “job”.36 Focus on women’s roles in the economy and better access to sexual and reproductive health and rights is acknowledged to drastically alter the economy and social structure (Roy 2007: 35). It is well-documented that the most reliable method of population regulation is to educate women to a level where they are able to obtain reasonable independence in the economy, and from their traditional roles as wives, mothers, and care-givers (Connolly 2008: 374–6).37 According to George Friedman who became members afterwards, and to achieving an overall target of an extra ODA of EUR20 billion by 2010, no less than 50% of which will “benefit the African continent”. Where debt levels become “unsustainable”, partners are to consider debt cancellation within the framework of “existing initiatives and fora”. Loc. cit. 34  Management of aid flows and the implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid Effectiveness are highlighted as well as the EU’s commitment to marry separate aid budgets and instruments to obtain maximum harmonisation and “complementarity”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 13. 35  The concept of “decent work”, as defined by the ILO (1999) as “opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity”. This concept has since then been mainstreamed in the international development literature, including the Millennium Development Goals and also seen here. In the World Development Report of 2013, decent work and “jobs” have been further explained to have effects that extend from the individual to the wider community providing social value, self-worth, and ultimately social cohesion. See World Bank. 2013. The World Development Report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank. [online] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/Resour ces/8258024-1320950747192/8260293-1322665883147/WDR_2013_Report.pdf.p.15; ILO Decent Work Agenda. [online] http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/ lang%2D%2Dde/index.htm 36  Additional focus is to be made on vocational and technical training (TVET), with the specific economic sectors in mind, and endeavouring to ensure that “there are jobs behind education”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 15. 37  This presupposes that the men in their society allow sexual equality and access to education or equality in all three (sexual and reproductive health, employment) areas. See Moghadam and Decker (2014) on the re-structuring role that education can play in social, cultural and religious, political, and economic platforms in Islamic societies, in particular in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Moghadam, V.M., and Decker, T., “Social Change in the Middle East”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. The Middle East. Thirteenth edition. California: SAGE Publications. p. 94.

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(2010), Chairman of Strategic Forecasting Inc. (STRAFOR), in many parts of the world, specifically Islamic countries that are opening up to “modernisation” (and therefore integrationalism), traditional cultures are rebelling in the form of reactionary terrorism, using an anti-imperialist rhetoric specifically directed at the “West”, and in particular the USA as a leader in contemporary international relations (Friedman 2010: 50–51, 60–61; Lewis 2003: 17, 63–64). In this Partnership, not only are all levels of education to be re-thought (basic through to high school),38 but also the way in which teaching and education is viewed through concerted “valorisation”.39 The value therefore of what it means to be educated or to have education, will be transformed in accordance with the Partnership, irrespective of existing modes of production, economic structures, traditional cultures, and social roles played by each member of society. Health, as fundamental and integral part of Human and Social Development, however, is regarded in a less restrictive manner, using “adequate” financing, human resources and commodities, as well as private sector and public-private sectors being “encouraged” to support (finance and develop) the health sector”.40 Gender Equality The role of women and Gender Equality is further reinforced in a subsection of the same name, which dedicates Africa and EU commitment to enhancing all aspects of women’s rights, and to mainstream gender equality in all policies, programmes, strategies, and actions, making the necessary adjustments in their institutional administrations to handle this.41 Women and their roles in society, as mentioned before, are at the heart of any culture and social structure, but most rigidly constrained in traditionally based cultures such as those informed by narrow interpretations of Islam (Ramadan 2001: 29).

 With reference to Education for All Fast Track Initiative, Plan of Action for the Second Decade of Education for Africa. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/ EU. Ibid. pnt.57. p. 14. 39  Both Africa and the EU commit to supporting recruitment, retention, training and the “valorisation” of the teaching profession. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.58. p. 14. 40  By 2010, both partners are to make “efforts” towards “scaling up” universal access to basic health services, HIV/AIDS, TB Malaria prevention, treatment, care and support; cooperation on other pandemics as well as issues relating to meningitis. With reference to the Africa Health Strategy, the EU Project on Human Resources for health, the Abuja commitment, the European Programme for Action to Tackle the Shortage of health Workers in Developing Countries “adequate financing” will constitute 15% for health. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.60. p. 15. 41  Other areas that will be addressed are eliminating illiteracy, fighting against the “feminisation of poverty”; promoting women in decision making positions and peace processes; combat violence and abuse, early forced marriages and the abandonment of female genital mutilation and cutting (FGMC), and other “harmful traditional practices” as outlined in the Beijing Platform for Action and the AU Solemn Declaration of Gender Equality. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.63. p. 15. 38

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Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change The language on Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change is still primarily driven by archaic development concepts such as “risk management” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 16) echoing “command and control” perspectives that are now associated with linear or one-dimensional approaches to interrelated eco-system services and their supervision, and outcomes that lead to a “pathology” of resource management (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 28). Climate Change and the mitigation of its effects, furthermore, are addressed through cooperation on economic growth, job creation, and “social stability” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 16). Africa and the EU on these issues are to work together at the global level and in international fora, in relation to and in compliance with the UN and other international agreements and frameworks. Both sides commit to establishing a post-2012 Climate framework as already agreed to, following the Bali Conference of December 2007 (CEU 16344/07 Press 291: 16). However, cooperation connected to the use of space technologies and space-based systems are envisaged to assist in counteracting illicit activity (logging and related trade) rather than on enhancing responses to land degradation, desertification and water distribution. Migration and Development Migration and mobility have been re-packaged as part of human development (specifically from a point of view that supports socio-economic development),42 and is to be considered as “largely positive” (CEU16344/07 Presse 291: 16), although the contrary are also recognised (and conflated) at the same time, such as illegal migration, human trafficking, and migrant return and readmission.43 The Partnership draws attention to the protection of the human rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Migration and mobility is to be addressed through regional and international agreements such as the OAU Convention on Refugees, the Tripoli EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Development (2006), and the Geneva Convention on Refugees, placing this issue firmly within the international n­ ormative setting (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 17). Structurally, the overlapping of the international and regional policies can be seen, as elsewhere, to reinforce one another at this point. Both Africa and the EU in this subsection agree to commit to making sure enough financing is available for the “effective” implementation of the Tripoli Declaration and all the actions outlined within it.

 This would include working on integrating migrants into communities in their countries of destination and making sure that their remittances are directed towards development. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.68. pp. 16–17. 43  “Brain drain” in the health and education sectors is also highlighted as a concern. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU Ibid. pnt.70. p. 17. 42

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Agriculture and Food Security The section dedicated to Agriculture and Food Security deals with agricultural and fisheries’ management, covering PCD,44 food security,45 safety,46 and quality. The main emphases are on development, research,47 and building institutional capacity and strength48 at regional and continental levels. The language of this section still focuses on “conservation” in conjunction with sustainability, but refers to “optimal” use of fisheries as a resource (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 18); both implicitly indicating a particular economic perspective of resource control49 that is counterproductive and isolated from its interconnected and interdependent variables, represented in the concept of the socio-ecological system.50 As indicated, this approach to resource “management” most often leads to what has already been referred to by Gunderson and Holling (2002) as “pathology of [resource] management” (2002: 28). The idea that in order to promote sustainability resources should be “conserved” is again widely accepted to be incoherent with the aim of sustainability (Collier 2010: 16). Infrastructure The subsection on Infrastructure addresses all aspects of physical integration as it relates to free movement and facilitation of goods, including transport itself (connectivity),51 water (hydraulic infrastructure, for example, to support national development and local livelihoods) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 18), and energy  Both the EU and Africa commit to enhancing PCD, as it relates to fisheries’ access arrangements, trade and control of illegal fishing, notably through the Fisheries Partnerships Agreements (FPAs). Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pp. 17–18. 45  Food security covers increasing domestic and foreign investment and rural diversification. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p 17. 46  Food safety incorporates disease surveillance in livestock, combating avian flu, risk management; and food quality comprises of complying with and regional and international trade and sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Loc. cit. 47  Research is to be aimed at development and using bio technology to its full advantage, in line with and guided by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA). Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.73. p.18. 48  Institutional strengthening includes supporting farmer organisations, inter-professional associations, and African public and private organisations in the agricultural sector. 49  This approach to resource control is recognised by Partha Dasgupta: [Natural assets] “…remain isolated from the main body of contemporary economic thinking…” (Dasgupta cited in Collier, 2010:9). Collier goes on – “Even when economists incorporate nature, they treat it as they do any other asset: natural capital is simply part of the capital stock to be exploited for the benefit of mankind”. Collier, P., 2010. The Plundered Planet. London: Penguin Group. p. 9. 50  With regards to African fisheries resources (inland and coastal), they are believed to be able to “contribute substantially” to economic growth and hence linked to the reduction of poverty. Fishery resources are therefore identified as means to an end. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p.18. 51  Trans African Road Transport corridors and accompanying regional road and rail networks, ports, air and maritime safety and security are to be enhanced by increased investments and an overall upgrading in infrastructure. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.75. p.18. 44

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delivery across state and regional boundaries.52 The upgrading of transport infrastructure is deemed a helpful precursor to the removal of “non-physical” barriers to the free movement of people, goods, and services across Africa. The subsection also mentions the regional protocols and agreements necessary to support collaboration in this area, including the already extant EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership and Trust Fund, and the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund. Follow-up sections on Water and Sanitation,53 and Energy,54 reinforce the formulaic approach to the integration of Infrastructure, along with the formal recognition of “water as a scarcity” in the Partnership (in relation to climate change), and as such its (possible) future “securitisation”. Water and Sanitation; Energy Additional partnerships such as the EU-Africa Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation and the inclusion of other international partners are to be drawn in to assist in the “dialogue” on sustainable water resources in Africa (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 19); both partners also agree to establish the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) to facilitate “affordable, clean, and efficient energy services”, and address “jointly” the “challenges of energy security and diversification of supply” (CEU 16344/07291: 19). The EU Energy Facility, other financial instruments and international donors will be encouraged to fund further investment into the development of the energy sector (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 19). Control and censure of nuclear energy is to be reinforced through the international body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 19). Development of Knowledge-Based Societies The Development of Knowledge-based Societies, it must be assumed, is a futuristic projection of the African/EU socio-economic path to development, as this section is at odds with the previous section on Education, which stresses the development of Technical, Vocational, and Educational Training (TVET) (vocational and technological training to specific local environments) to “ensure that there are jobs behind education” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 14–15). No indication is provided as to how the two are to be “integrated” in the overall division of labour in African society. Under this interpretation, Knowledge-based societies and economies (societies and  Partners agree that to improve energy infrastructure especially as it pertains to electricity, on joint standards and regulation procedures, and the removal of non-physical barriers for energy exchange/ delivery across national/regional borders. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.78. p 18. 53  Improving water management at local river basis and catchment, national and trans-boundary level. The section on Water and Sanitation also addresses hygiene education, “proper” sanitation, “water security” and climate change, and “sustainable access to safe affordable water supplies”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.79. p. 19. 54  Providing sustainable, affordable, clean and efficient energy and regional cooperation in this area concentrating on “energy security” stipulated as diversification of supply, new and renewable energy resources, climate change. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.82. p. 19. 52

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economies based on science, technology, and innovation systems, especially ICT) are seen as the way forward to integrating Africa into the international (or global) economy, and attaining the MDGs.55 Partners will use the outcomes of the World Summit on Information Society and pertinent AU/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programmes to guide the implementation of further investment in information communication and technology infrastructure, and access to “quality” education. Again, the specific prescript for attaining the eight MDCs, themselves a wide range of structurally qualitative ideals (Phillips 2011), are “economies” based on knowledge and ICT chains. “Bridging the digital divide” and creating an ‘inclusive Knowledge Economy” is a priority concern highlighted by the Partnership. The end result would appear to be increasing total cyber connectivity across Africa through promoting modern telephony and internet access, investing in broadband infrastructure and “non-­ commercial e-services” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 20). The harmonisation of policy and regulations as a consequence of these steps is also to be pursued (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 20). Not only is African interconnectivity or cyber-integration to be part of the overall Strategy, but also the way in which it will be disbursed; the structure is to be directed through building and enabling specialised networks (“networks of excellence”) at the regional and sub-regional level, both within Africa and with European partners (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 20). These networks will be tasked with focusing on specific priorities with the end aim of supporting African sustainable development. The pursuit of sustainable development, at this Partnership/Strategy level, is linked to establishing Knowledge-­ based societies and economies away from other (agricultural, manufacturing for example) kinds of economies. Cultural Cooperation; Communication The investment in cyber-connectivity, according to this sub-section, supports and reinforces the following areas on Cultural Cooperation and Communication. While these two separated sub-sections are comparatively small, they are important as they encapsulate the overall ideas and heightened sensitivities held by Africa and the EU, which it is assumed, have equal relevance in the overall Partnership. In text, Cultural Cooperation is considered as important to the political Partnership and every effort is to be made to promote, cooperate, and enhance this facet of the partnership. Both the “what” (all “expressions” of culture here defined as multilingualism, arts and sports; African World Heritage sites56) and the “how” (through twinning arrangements and cultural exchanges, capacity building and technical assistance) of Cultural Cooperation are defined and structured.

 Africa can become more “competitive” in the “global economy”. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.84. p. 19. 56  African Heritage sites, for example, are to be protected and preserved within the framework of the various UNESCO conventions. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt.89. p. 20. 55

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Communication under this subsection refers to better understanding between the EU and Africa, the elimination of stereotypes, xenophobia and the promoting of more accurate images of each other as a means to promoting each other’s cultures and values. It is believed that further exchanges and the participation of all levels of organised society (such as non-state actors, including Trade Unions, the media, private sector, professional associations, universities, research and cultural intuitions, sports clubs, and twinning arrangements), will accomplish this. The idea behind this kind of Communication, is outlined as the elimination of stereotypes, xenophobia, and the reinforcing of more “accurate images” of either African or the EU culture and values. It can also be construed to address the enforcement of separate, distinct identities (this sub-section allows for local cultural context), here “African” and “European”. While the transformation of stereotypes and “negative images” is appropriate and couched in terms of changing them for the better (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 20–21), there still exists the possibility that such contextualised reinforcement could aggravate conservative tendencies, rather than forging mutual acceptance.

6.10  Institutional Architecture and Implementation Figure 6.4 illustrates the institutional and operational structure of the JAES.

6.10.1  Institutional Architecture and Actors The partnership is to involve continental, regional, and national (localised) cooperation, using institutional and non-institutional actors.57 This multilevel approach is believed to be fundamental in creating “people to people contact”, or “co-­ownership” and as such the attainment of the Joint Partnership’s Objectives (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 23). Civil society organisations (CSOs) are to be “mapped”, as networks, and a web portal is to be established to facilitate contact with CSOs prior to key policy decisions being made (CSOs are invited to “express themselves” prior to Ministerial Troika meetings) (First Action Plan, 2008–2010 CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 29). The EU and AU member states, as well as sub-regional organisations and institutions will furthermore facilitate a “systematic dialogue” whereby information gathered from non-institutional actors/civil society will be circulated among them. It is unclear, however, that the “Stakeholders” referred to in-text as playing an increasing role in EU policy coherence and effectiveness (and the creation of  The Pan African Parliament, the European Parliament, the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); the EU Economic and Social Committees (EESC); Civil Society including research institutes, think tanks, and civil society organisations. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU Ibid. pnt.110. p. 35.

57

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Fig. 6.4  Institutional and operational structure of the JAES

mechanisms to this end), will actually help interface with African stakeholders, or will only be relevant to the EU’s participation (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 23). The proposed aim of institutional structure of the Partnership, therefore, is to achieve maximum dissemination of economic and cultural (social) values using all levels of African society to ensure its success (it is also envisaged that civil society will be “actively” involved in both “implementing and monitoring” the Joint Strategy and its Action Plans) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 23).58 It is made very clear, however, that the EU and the AU will be the central coordination points, and meetings at the “political level” will include those between Senior Officials (SOs), ministers and heads of state of government. The “schizophrenic” personality of the Partnership, referring to both “Africa” and the AU intermittently throughout the text of the framework, has been excused due to the exit of Morocco (in 1984) from the AU, and the desire to be inclusive and treat Africa “as one” (JAES First Action Plan 2008–2010: 30), which is in fact in counter to the AU’s own constituents. However, this sentiment overall is not supported by the sheer volume of EU foreign policy initiatives – the UfM notwithstanding – that appear to have created cross-cutting identity dynamics.

 As of 2014, and Civil Society involvement has been less than desired, with requests to be involved more directly, through access to decision making groups. See DGEP, 2014, p. 26, nn 123–125.

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The oversight and follow-up mechanisms are  top-down driven, and as shown above in the desired multilevel reach, is strategised, with Africa-EU Summits59 prepared at Ministerial level and taking place once every 3 years, alternately in Africa or EU member states. In between Summits, Presidents of the EU Council and of the AU, of the European and Pan African Parliament (PAP) and of the European and AU Commissions, will review progress made and also provide further political guidance (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 21). Biannual meetings of an EU-AU Troika60 will review and monitor the execution of the JAES and its Action Plans; the joint Colleges of Commissioners are to meet annually to support the Joint EU-AU Task Force, the latter in turn meeting once every 6  months. Both EU and AU presidents are to “increase” their contact, hold additional meetings between sectorial ministers, and create “mechanisms” to increase of enhance “dialogue” between the PAP, the European Parliament (EP), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), and local authorities. To this end it is recognised in this section that the EU would have to adapt its organisational structure in order to interact effectively with the AU. The EU states it aims to open a Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa to create a presence on the ground, and the AU will “strengthen” its representation in Brussels (First Action Plan, 2008–2010 CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 30). The EU furthermore put forward an offer of assistance to the AU to help strengthen its own institutions and it ability to interact with the EU (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 22). The existing RECs and Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs), together with the EPAs in Africa, are considered here an impediment to furthering regional integration, contrary to what is recognised in the Strategic area of Trade and Integration where the EPAs are to work in conjunction with the RECs/SROs. The RECs and the SROs are to be integrated into the current proposed architecture, taking care to minimise overlap and conflicting mandates (CEU 16344/07 Presse 219: 22). The aim is to simplify the African continental institutional architecture, that is, to deconstruct what has been organically constructed by original African interests. It is, however, the overlapping mandates that have possibly added to overall resilience of African socio-ecological systems (SESs) thus far and helped to maintain a continued drive towards an African cultural identity to date.

 The Summits are to take stock of progress made in implementation of the commitments, and give further political guidance through the approval of Action Plans. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. p. 21. 60  The Troika representatives will be empowered to speak for each Union. The African meetings will be represented by the current and outgoing presidencies of the AU and the Commission, and will also include the chef de file countries at the expert and senior official levels. The EU side will consist of the current and incoming EU presidency, the European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU.  Ibid. pnt.100. p. 22. 59

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6.10.2  Action Plans According to  the Joint Strategy, it is considered to be  an overarching, long-term policy framework. Its operations were to be implemented through successive Action Plans, which would cover approximately a 3 year period. The Action Plans outlined political priorities, programmes, actions and policy commitments to be taken over that period, and acted as benchmarks by which Heads of States and Government could assess progress made and suggest further guidance. Each year a progress report on the policies and actions in the Action Plans was to be submitted by the two Commissions and the EU Council Secretariat, at the Africa EU Ministerial Troika meetings. Every third year, these reports were to have been presented to the Heads of States and Government at the Summits, taking place alternatively in Africa or in the EU (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 25). At the same time, the European and Pan African Parliaments were “invited” to submit political reports on progress made. In addition, civil society organisations in the EU, Africa and “beyond” (referring to “think-tanks”, and expert groups) were expected to prepare “general and sector-specific” reports. These were to be submitted to the Commissions and the EU Council Secretariat for inclusion into their progress reports, and if appropriate, incorporated into the Joint Strategy (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 25). Financial support for the JAES was at the time to have come predominantly from the EU, using the full gambit of EU financial institutions to do so: the EDF, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the ENPI, and the Instrument for Stability, “Thematic Programmes”, and EU financial institutions including the European Investment Bank (EIB). Wherever possible, further contributions were  to  have been made from EU member states, AU member states, as well as African financial instruments such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 24). In keeping with the theme of policy integration, the financing of the JAES was to be integrated between Africa and the EU, and work towards forming a Pan African financial support programme, combining already existing cooperation agreements towards supporting the partnership.61 According to this sub-section, in order to effectively manage the financing of priorities, needs and Objectives, creating “complementarity” and “coherence” in policies, legal and financial frameworks, as well as appropriate “cooperation instruments and mechanisms is essential” (CEU 16344/07 Presse 291: 24–25). In other words, financial agreements were to have been streamlined or integrated. Figure 6.5 depicts a selection of recurring words and phrases within EU-Africa summit Declarations, from 2007 (which includes the Strategic Framework), 2010, 2014, and 2017. The words and phrases were then allocated thematic groups and  Lit. “Africa and the EU will work together to build synergies between existing cooperation agreements in support of the partnership….” Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU. Ibid. pnt. 114. pp. 24–25.

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Fig. 6.5  Groupings of key words in the EU-Africa summit Declarations

their numbers of occurrence were totaled in relation to the number of pages contained in the sample of documents used. Those are shown in Fig. 6.6 for a select set of words as listed. While the analysis is not meant to be exhaustive, it does give an indication of any major change(s) in attitudes reflected in the Declarations for the areas listed in Fig.  6.5 and for the years given. For the 2010 Summit, as a unique instance where the Declaration was only three pages long, the front matter to the second Action Plan (pages 1–8) were added to those of the Tripoli Declaration (2010). In the group allocated to Commerce/Technical language, “investment” stood out over the course of the Summits, declining between the years 2010–2014 but increasing in the Adijdan Summit Declaration. The same applied for the group of words allocated to Fortifying, and the use of “support”. The decline in mentions of investment, promote/promotion, partnership, cooperation, and support in the documents reviewed may indicate the relative decline during this period (2010–2014), of relations between the EU and the AU, as the following sections discuss further. It is also interesting to note that during this period, which saw a questioning of “rights” and rights language (see Sect. 6.11.6), its mentions rose in relation to its more Technical and Fortifying counterparts.

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Ratio

2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2007

2010

2014

2017

Year Partnership

Rights

Investment

Promote

Support

Cooperation

Fig. 6.6  Ratio of the number of occurrences of each word/phrase-compound listed to the number of pages in the EU-Africa summit Declarations for each year given

6.11  I ssue Areas That Have Contributed to Division Within Africa, African Positions on Partnerships 6.11.1  Financial Assistance The numerous financial instruments that have been involved in the disbursement of EU aid or development assistance have also contributed to partners protecting their established positions or agreements. At least since the Implementation Report of 2014, the need to streamline EU financial instruments has been called for. That there are so many financial “instruments” only adds to the confusion and incoherence as regards the JAES implementation (DGEP 2014). The advent of the Pan African Programme (PanAf), a financial instrument dedicated to the JAES (European Commission, Multiannual Indicative programme 2014–2017), proposed in 2007 but only recently inaugurated in 2014, “complements” other financial arrangements already in place. It thereby further contributes towards the dissection of competing claims and policy directions aligned to differing agreements. Both assessments issued by the EU Directorate-General of External Policies in 2014 and 2017 respectively, acknowledge that fact that the various funding mediums that also cut across various areas of development support, predisposes the JAES towards EU control, and undermines any semblance of an “equal” partnership (DGEP 2014: 3–32, 2017: 15).

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6.11.2  Peace and Security While the EU and the AU have had a few successes in terms of the Peace and Security Partnership, the relationship has also come up against a few challenges that has impacted relations within the JAES as explained in more detail in Sect. 6.11.4. This pertains more specifically to the conflicting positions on Libya, and the following enforcing of UNSCR 1973, led with particular zealousness by Sarkozy’s administration.

6.11.3  Trade and Regional Integration The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have been negotiated for many years with slow progress (DGEP 2014). The main issue for African states is that the EU has been dictating the terms of the agreements and their configuration (with some EPAs not conforming to the regional blocks extant in Africa), giving rise to the criticism that the EU/Europe was once again attempting to “carve up” Africa according to old colonial habits. The EPAs, where signed, counteract the ACP/Cotonou Agreement’s terms and conditions giving further credence to these beliefs. In addition, the EPAs negotiations with African countries take place outside of the JAES framework led by the Director General of Trade in the Commission. Further, the Partnership was chaired by the DEVCO of the EU (DGEP 2014). Prior to the 2014 EU-Africa summit, the differentiated treatment between EPA/Partnership was flagged by media as something that African leaders wanted resolved. However, discussion on the EPAs was tactically left off the Summit Agenda as an item but included in the ensuing 2014–2017 Roadmap adopted thereafter, but only in a reference to the establishment of a Free Trade Area, for which the EPAs form the basis (Manrique Gil 2014).

6.11.4  South Africa, the EU, and the AU The strategic partnership between the EU/South Africa, and the EU and wider Africa (now renamed the EU-AU partnership), is an important dynamic, though often underplayed. South Africa, due to its continental standing and moral capital derived from its past (Hierro 2017), was chosen by the EU strategically (COM(96)570 Final) for its role especially on the continent. This became more apparent under former president Jacob Zuma’s tenure, where South Africa’s political capital vis-a-vis its bilateral Strategic Partnership and its standing at the AU/continental level was played to full capacity. South Africa, under Jacob Zuma, appeared to be able to manipulate several scenarios involving other African states that led to the EU’s role on the continent being challenged both at the

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international level and within Africa (Libyan intervention, refusal to arrest President Omar al-Bashir/Sudan, Zimbabwean sanctions) (Hierro 2017). As a result, anti-­ west/EU sentiment rose sufficiently for an official AU/African reaction 2 years later, as well as at the South African, national level. It cannot be overlooked, however, that in 2012, former South African president Jacob Zuma’s “ex” wife, Nkososana Dlamini-Zuma became AU Chairperson.62 During her tenure, the Email from the Future (2014), was followed by the African Agenda 2063 launched in 2015. Both are heavy with a “continentalist” flavour, where the African epic (a nostalgic mix of narratives, combining pan-Africanism/ nationalism, an African Renaissance together with Africa rising63 – and its necessary corollary – the diminution of other actors64) is explicit,65 together with an isolationist tenor with Africa solving its own “problems”. In many respects, while championing an African cause, the African Agenda has absorbed much of the EU (neoliberal) rhetoric already, promoting “ownership” and finding “solutions to African problems” (in the Agenda 2063, this is referred to as “the principle of self-­ reliance”) on its own. One would be hard pressed not to counter-argue – as previous African arguments and knowledge of a globalised world-dynamics would point to – that much of Africa’s challenges are not entirely of its own doing, and neither can

 Dlamini-Zuma’s election to the AU Chair is not without its critics or suspicions. Landsberg and van Wyk refer to Dlamini-Zuma’s election to the AU chairperson as “cadre-deployment”. See van Wyk, J., 2012. In Landsberg, C. and van Wyk, J. (Eds.) 2012. South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume One. p. 283. See also Scholvin, S. Contestation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The foreign policies of Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, vis-a-vis South Africa. In Ebert, H. and Flemes, D. (Eds.) 2018. Regional Powers and Contested Leadership. Palgrave MacMillan. 63  The Africa rising narrative has been a potent, economically driven image within Africa, but has produced little on the ground results in terms of validating its claims. The same could be said of the idea of the African Renaissance, arguably driven by South African former president Thabo Mbeki, which appears (despite political air time at certain points), to be a future (still) yet to come. They are importantly both underpinned by economically driven development. The combined visions have become political rallying points, at times, and have acted as a call for diminutive versions of continentalism prone to isolationism. For discussions on either narratives, see Taylor, I. 2016. Dependency redux: why Africa is not rising, Review of African Political Economy, 43:147, 8–25; Adebajo, A., 2016. Mbeki’s dream of Africa’s renaissance belied South Africa’s schizophrenia, The Conversation [online], 24 April; Ajulu, R., 2007. Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance in a globalizing world economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent. Review of African Political Economy, 87: 27–42; Vale, P. and Maseko, S., 1998. South Africa and the African Renaissance, International Affairs, 74(2), 271–287. 64  This strand of dominance is found especially in the Black Consciousness student Movements within South Africa, and could be seen throughout the Fallist movements in general, as they spread across South Africa, and in the UK, to varying degrees and results. Of this new trend, “…the new student politics is asserting an exclusive and aggressive language of black domination.” Jansen, J., 2017. As by Fire: The End of the South African University. Cape Town: Tafelburg Publishers. p. 64. 65  Article 19 of the 2nd Aspiration of Agenda 2063 refers – “Since 1963, the quest for African Unity has been inspired by the spirit of Pan-Africanism, focusing on liberation, and political and economic independence. It is motivated by development based on self-reliance and self-determination of African people, with democratic and people-centred governance.” African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: the Africa we want. p. 4. 62

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many other acknowledged “global” issues (international crime, climate change, and conflicts) be adequately addressed by one “actor”. The AU mediation efforts in Libya, begun in April 2011 were led by Jacob Zuma of South Africa, Amadou Toumani Toure of Mali, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso. The team’s efforts reportedly had to be abandoned after the UN Security Council vote on resolution 1973 authorising a “no-fly zone”, as their safety could not be guaranteed. However, reports since then have thrown some of this account into dispute, rather citing Jacob Zuma’s hand in scuttling the peace process itself.66 The Libyan intervention by NATO, led by France (under Sarkozy’s leadership at the time) and the UK, was at first supported (in the sense that South Africa, along with Nigeria and Gabon had voted for UNSCR 1973) by South Africa and then quickly retracted, citing that South Africa did not support “regime change”, and national commentators suggesting that South Africa had been “duped” into siding with “hypocrisy” (“SA’s Libyan vote puzzle…” 2011). South Africa was at the time on its second round as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. South Africa was loudly lambasted both domestically and sub-regionally by Zimbabwe’s Mugabe who, while not being explicit in naming the countries concerned, nevertheless referred to the “betrayal” of Africa under these circumstances (“SA, Nigeria ‘betrayed Africa’ – Mugabe…” IOL, 14 June 2015). The dynamics between South Africa and Zimbabwe have been documented elsewhere, especially as they relate within and between the EU-SA Strategic Partnership (Hierro 2017). It does not appear to be coincidental that these dynamics have led to contentions in other JAES Partnerships, causing further divisions and pushback, specifically in areas of Democratic Governance and Human Rights, also initiated and through both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

6.11.5  Democratic Governance and Human Rights At the 2014 EU-Africa summit held in Brussels, Zimbabwe and South Africa appeared to be in alignment again, with former president Zuma joining Mugabe’s call for a ‘‘boycott” of the summit by other African leaders (“Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe Boycott EU summit over exclusion of wife Grace.”). Robert Mugabe assumed the Chair of SADC in the same year and it is arguable that this, together  Mahmoud Jabril, who was head of Libya’s National Transitional Council at the time, refused to counter a coalition government that included the late Muammar Ghaddafi. The suggestion, reportedly made by Jacob Zuma to Jabril, was an about-turn on previous meetings’ conversations between the two during the AU led peace negotiations in 2011. It has since been alleged that former South African (sitting) president Zuma “assisted” Ghaddafi in spiriting away “billions” of USD and gold bullion. Other reports contend that Jacob Zuma’s about-turn is due to apprehension that the same kind of deposition sweeping North Africa could set a standard for other African countries – specifically South Africa. See Fabricius, P. 2015. Four Years after the Libyan revolution, what happened between South Africa and Libya remains a mystery. ISS [online], May 25.

66

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with its turn as the AU Chair in 2015, contributed to the valour both South Africa and Zimbabwe displayed at this point. The EU had “denied” Grace Mugabe a visa to accompany former president Mugabe to Brussels. Seen as a rebuke, Jacob Zuma and Robert Mugabe took the occasion to also speak out about the indictment of then sitting president Omar al-Bashir by the ICC, who could not attend the summit for this reason. Jacob Zuma further remonstrated declaring “I think that time must pass wherein we are looked as subjects, we are told who must come, who must not come, we have not attempted to decide when we meet Europe; who must come and who must not come.”67 In 2015, the AU held its 25th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. A “surprise” visit by Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, still under an ICC arrest warrant, quickly brought about widespread controversy leading to some political commentators within South Africa to point to a “constitutional crisis” (Fabricius, and van Zilla, “Al-Bashir Saga: ANC government takes on SA Constitution  – again…”), South Africa being a signatory to the Rome Statute and founding partner of the ICC. Significantly, the ANC ruling party put forward a strong call for de-linking from the ICC and the wider west, refocusing its attention on the East (ANC General Council Discussion Documents 201568). In 2016, the issue within South Africa at least, had reached the executive level whereby Pretoria notified the UN Secretary General of its resolve to withdraw from the ICC.69 This issue escalated to the AU level in 2017 when as a body, the AU issued a symbolic “non-binding” resolution calling for a mass withdrawal from the ICC by African States (“African Union Backs Mass Withdrawal from ICC…” 2017).

6.11.6  Human Rights The ICC/Bashir controversy “split” human rights discourse (Hierro 2017) sufficiently for its questioning and heightened politicisation, and that of humanitarian intervention, and international law to be called into question Africa-wide. For a period in 2015 after this public debacle, academics and local [South] African media question human rights’ legitimacy as an “African” concept; the term “post-human rights era” became a new perspective through which to view the unfolding events. The al-Bashir arrest warrant and his ability to move freely through Africa, together with LGBTQ “rights”, which had long been a contentious issue between the EU and  Jacob Zuma went on to say “I thought the AU and EU are equal organisations representing two continents but there is not a single one of them who must decide for others…” Fabricius, P. 2014. Zuma will boycott EU Summit. IOL [online], March 21. 68  The ANC General Council Discussion Documents are presented prior to the party conference, held every 4 years. They are seen to provide an indication of the government/ruling party’s domestic and foreign policy leanings. 69  This was later withdrawn after a legal process within South Africa. 2017. South Africa Revokes its withdrawal from the ICC. ENCA [online], March 8. 67

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Africa, became sensitive prior to the Summit. Both issues, as comments on the concept of “rights” have been hijacked by the political wrangling between EU/ Europe/“the west” and Africa, where the Sudanese (and Kenyan) indictment is seen as external interference, and homosexuality is seen as “un-African” and “imposed” from outside (“Zimbabwe says No to homosexuality…”). Prior to the Summit, it was reported that African ambassadors “advised” their presidents not to attend the summit in protest against tensions surrounding these matters (“Europe-Africa relations: well-intentioned diplomatic disaster?..”). While homosexuality or “same-sex desire” (Msibi 2011) is not extraneous to Africa, its manipulation within rights discourse in Africa, and within the politics surrounding the JAES relationship, has been diverted in the cause of what has been referred to in this work as the second wave of decolonisation, the African epic, and the backlash against “the west”. The contestation of human rights values has had serious repercussions in Africa at the continental level with the EU, and can be seen to fuelling regressive, maladaptive cycles in a defence of “Africaness.” The contestation of Rights has, furthermore, opened an uncertainty gap between what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, rather than the questioning of its place within the parameters of restrictive neoliberal logics of control, as outlined in Chap Two.

6.12  T  hree for the Price of One: ACP/EU, UfM, and EU/ AU Relations The relations between the EU and Africa are overlapped with the ACP countries, the Cotonou Agreement that forms its legal basis, the JAES, and the UfM. The Cotonou Agreement is an Association Agreement that binds 79 countries that cross Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. The Association Agreement deals with preferential trade between these countries, with the exception of South Africa (which has a separate Trade and Development and Cooperation Agreement, or TDCA as part of its Strategic Partnership with the EU). Significantly, North African states are excluded (with the exception of Mauritania), being covered by the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements as referred to in Chap. Four of this book. The launching of the JAES in 2007 added to the criss-crossing and divisive policy intricacies, the potency of which is now finally coming into the “African” light, with the Cotonou Agreement coming to an end in 2020 (De Groof and Bossuyt 2019; Medinilla and Bossuyt 2019). The EU also relates through alternative regional and bilateral initiatives that range from trade (the EPAs), through to security (G5 Sahel countries), and “dialogues” on Migration (the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process, and the Valetta Summit70).  The Valetta Summit Declaration was issued in 2015 after the EU-Africa Summit in 2014 had resolved to address the migration crises in the Mediterranean. It brings together countries of the EU and Africa, under the JAES. See EU-Africa website 2015 Valetta Summit on Migration [online] https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/2015-valletta-summit-migration

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The ending of the Cotonou Agreement, together with changing global circumstances has prompted the EU to suggest changing the entire figuration of this web of complex policy cooperation frameworks (JOIN(2016) 52 Final). The plan to do so has come up against precisely the changing circumstances in Africa at least, that it (the EU) was trying to address, including the African epic narrative. As a consequence, the AU put forward a review process to take into consideration what a post-­ Cotonou world would like in relation to its role as African continental institution (Carbone 2018; De Groof and Bossuyt 2019) and its vision for a “united” Africa in Agenda 2063. The AU’s final Common Position on negotiating a post-Cotonou/EU relationship was adopted in 2018 (Carbone 2018). However, even the Common Position divided African countries, between pro-AU and pro-ACP views on the future significance of each group, specifically in relation to the EU (Carbone 2018: 488; De Groof and Bossuyt 2019). Significantly, while the EU included the possibility of North African states being included in the new ACP/EU arrangement, North African states have been reluctant to be drawn in, preferring to remain outside of this configuration and to retain its exclusive relationship built over the years through the Barcelona acquis, while also retain its relation to Africa  – albeit loosely  – through the AU and the JAES (De Groof and Bossuyt 2019). While the AU sent representation to the ACP Council of Ministers in Lomé, 2018, the AU was “denied the floor” in order to present its Position, and the Council went on to adopt a continuance of the ACP-EU agreement (Carbone 2018: 487) with no further regard given to the AU’s representation and position. Once again, the AU having established itself as the African institution for the continent, appeared to have its interests and vision subsumed under the ACP umbrella, with “other” groups of states not on the actual continent. The circumstances arsing from the re-negotiation of relations in a post-Cotonou scenario had brought up competitive and divisive dynamics even within the AU, and differing visions on which group has the greater potential to lead “Africa” in the negotiations.

6.13  Conclusion The UfM since its first instigation has undergone considerable changes. Gone is its lofty ideal of raising the political profile of the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean partner states. What is left is a shell of its former importance, reduced to “bit projects” in support of functional regional integration. As a study of the history of EEC/EU foreign policy towards the “Mediterranean” has shown, colonial relationships and a “shared history” have played their part in promoting the continuation of a “special” relationship between EU member states and those regionalised in the Mediterranean as relevant and indispensable. This has been shown in the willingness of North African and Middle Eastern states, the “Mediterranean”, to maintain relations (trade, aid, and cultural exchange) through

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policy initiatives and frameworks over the years in spite of the fact that these policies have only produced underdevelopment and extreme structural inequalities that cannot be separated from current instability being experienced there: the objectives of pursuing a “coherent”, harmonised approach to prosperity and hence peace and security have plainly failed in this regard. Through interpreting the network of institutions as a set of interrelated CASs, it becomes clear that the persistence of ineffective institutionalised relations such as policy frameworks and initiatives towards the Mediterranean are not a just a mixture of interests, bargains, and “preferential” relationships. As will be illustrated through dynamic systems theory in Chaps. Seven and Eight, the units of analysis or the individual relationships do not have relevance in isolation nor in bi-relational existence, but together as sub-systems and as they relate to a larger whole(s). The Barcelona acquis exhibited heavy emphasis on economic and financial pillars, which have consistently echoed neoliberal tenets of economic development, and the bias it incorporates on restructuring and pursuing economic growth. Other social and political areas were given a secondary role, unless it was in keeping with developing EU integrationalism and promotion of its integrated development approach. In accordance with globalised development norms (the acknowledgement of the “human side” of development, and the Post Washington Consensus emphasis on ownership, implementation, civil society involvement) the acquis transformed likewise, firstly in introducing the Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs chapter in the Barcelona Declaration as an indirect policy initiative, promoting integrated development strategies (deep socialisation) to reinforce values of human rights and democratic governance. It was followed by the chapter’s separation and specialisation in the Work Programme of 2005 into Migration, Social Integration, and Justice and Security; and Education and Socio-cultural Exchanges. The Barcelona acquis reflected global as well as EU internal dynamics and interests, which overlapped and reinforced both. The problem that becomes apparent is that the EU, with its myriad of policies, runs counter to indigenous institutions and/or cooperative organisations. For the EU, its policy complex relates to the external environment using its own normative values on how to “develop” and organise “human centred” development, not necessarily taking into the dynamics shared by interconnected physical/ecological supporting systems. Turning immigration into a “largely positive” phenomenon included capturing diaspora remittances in the formal economy for use in development projects in countries of origin, and the possibility of including charges and the overall amounts in the GDP of the receiving country. The amplification of said income could be further used to restructure aid (reduce) or foreign assistance levels to take this into consideration. At the same time, however, illegal immigration was further criminalised (demonised) and associated with the heinous crime of human trafficking, along with the human rights abuses incumbent with it. With these elements incorporated in the acquis the development/security/immigration cycle became complete. The EU’s externalised developmental perspectives happen to be of a particular kind, widely acknowledged to be based on liberal democracy and “structural stability”; driven by “neoliberal” economic bias, which encourage

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competition and individualism along with a self-help attitude, all of which work against any kind of unity, region – or indeed any kind of holistic vision of collaboration paid lip-service to in the policy frameworks reviewed here. The Mediterranean Partner states were aware of this, with the first Barcelona Conference and successive follow-up conferences and meetings; they raised specific issues regarding security and development as well as unbeneficial trade agreements that were against their interests. Human trafficking and illegal immigration were conflated in policy terms at the UfM level. These aspects were present in successive foreign policy initiatives, and through PCD and the pursuit of integrationalism, ignored by the EU.  The Paris Declaration establishing the UfM in 2008 reiterated whole parts of the original Barcelona Declaration text and reinstated PBMs and the Euro-Mediterranean pact, effectively erasing these concerns. Compounding the effectiveness of the values mentioned above is the structure of EU foreign policy, which formally reinforces these values through “bi-­ multilateralism”, as in the case of the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the UfM where the region is imposed through a (policy) framework, and differential bilateral Association Agreements divide it. The structure of the UfM is inter-governmentally led, while appearing more autonomous and formally structured than the early days of the Barcelona Process, the co-presidencies do little more than coordinate meetings; the locus of decision-making for the day-to-day projects and coordination still remain with the Senior Officials and  the Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meetings. With the Work Programme of 2005 and the Barcelona Declaration still current, the European Commission still plays a significant role; the entire Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean being an overlapping institutional representation of both. At both the structural scale and organisational relationship, and the meta-scale of signification, division and fragmentation are therefore self-reinforcing. This is why the frameworks, the initiatives, the fields of cooperation, and the partnerships apparently fail, and produce the counter effect of what is actually (rhetorically at least) desired. The EU’s policy complex relates to Africa through the JAES and the UfM along with others such as the EU-SA SP and the ACP group configuration. Africa on the other hand relates through the AU primarily with the EU. Africa does not relate – or even conceptualise the Mediterranean as a “region”  – through the UfM with the EU. There is no commonality in this sense and not one “panarchy” or combination of structured complex adaptive systems/policies, but many; the majority of which are external to Africa and do not provide reinforcement or validation of African values. On the contrary, the EU/UfM/North Africa and the EU/JAES/Africa panarchies reinforce European values and seek to replace African ones as relevant to Africa’s external governing relationship. There is sufficient evidence already to support the supposition that this is already taking place in continent visions of a “future self”. There is, in other words, sufficient overlap or imbricated redundancy to support resilience for EU institutions, but not in the same manner for African ones. The romantic idealised African chronicle of a resurgent past, referred to as the “African epic”, presents a real danger of further entrenching an isolationist Africa,

References

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one prone to conservatism and maladaptation, out of synchronicity with a fast(er) moving global context. The JAES and Africa’s relationship with the EEC/EU within the context of self-reinforcing value systems have created these contradictions deemed detrimental to the evolution of Africa and its institutions. In the Barcelona Process/Five-Year Work Programme 2005, for the first time instruction in EU integration “regional policy methodology” was presented. With the Projects under the current UfM, the EU continues the inculcation of these values by placing the funding and the ability to fund, through specific channels such as IFIs, regional banks and private sector investment above the relevancy of the projects to the citizenry of the Partnerships. The promotion of women in economic sectors previously held by men would bring dislocation in social and cultural systems. It is precisely these interferences that would appear to destabilise and reduce social capital (networks of trust and reciprocity) and counterproductively increase distrust of “foreign values” and Partnerships at the local scale. The promotion of women in societies where their roles are highly circumsribed has long been acknowledged to be a tool of social engineering and as contributing to social destabilisation (in American policy) (Roy 2007: 35). The attention in policy given to women’s roles (as wives, mothers, sisters and daughters) would, according to PCD, mean an integrated outcome, the quality of which (and what it would mean for women in their specific environments, see Sect. 5.2.5) can only be conjectured.

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Carbone, M., ed. 2009. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy. [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge. [online] Available at: Kalahari.com. Carbone, M. 2018. Caught Between the ACP and the AU: Africa’s Relations with the European Union in a Post-Cotonou Agreement Context. South African Journal of International Affairs 25 (4): 481–496. Checkland, P. and J. Scholes. 1999. Soft Systems Methodology in Action. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons Ltd. Connolly, M. 2008. Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population. London: Belknap Harvard. Council of the European Union Presse 2007 16344/07 (Presse 291)/EU of 9 December 2007 The Africa EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Lisbon. [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2014. ——— 2008 15187/08 (Presse 314)/EU of 4 November 2008 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Marseille, 3-4 November 2008. Final Declaration. [online] http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/081104-UfM-Marseille-Ministerial-conf-51108.pdf. Accessed 29 Oct 2014. Council of the European Union, 2016 JOIN/EU of 22 November 2016 A Renewed Partnership with the Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Strasbourg. De Groof, E., and J. Bossuyt. 2019. North Africa’s Double Pursuit – Part II Mixed Messages from Europe and Africa stand in the way of an intercontinental deal. ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 239. De Lange, D. 2011. SA’s Libyan vote puzzle. 2011. Mail and Guardian [online], March 22. Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B 2014. The Implementation of the Joint Africa Europe Strategy: Rebuilding Confidence and Commitments. EXPO/B/ AFET/2013/42 PE NNN.NNN. Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department 2017. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Dlamini-Zuma, N. 2014. Agenda 2063: An E-mail from the Future PRESENTATION by Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the AU Commission to the Retreat of Foreign Ministers Held at Bahir Dar, Ethiopia on 24-26 January 2014. [online] https://au.int/en/newsevents/29180/ agenda-2063-e-mail-future-presentation-dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-au. Dolley, K. 2018. Shot Ex-Gaddafi Banker not Target of a Hit – Police. News24 online 14 May. EU-Africa website 2015 Valetta Summit on Migration [online] https://www.africa-eu-partnership. org/en/stay-informed/news/2015-valletta-summit-migration. European Commission 1996 COM(96)570 Final/EU of 20 November 1986 Green Paper on Relations Between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership. European Union Presse 2008 15187/08 (Presse 314)/EU of 9 November 2008 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Marseille, 3–4 November 2008. Final Declaration [online] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008 DC0319&from=EN. Fabricius, P. 2014. Zuma will boycott EU summit. IOL [online], March 21. ———. 2015. SA, Nigeria ‘betrayed Africa – Mugabe. IOL, June 14. Fabricius, P., and L. van Zilla. 2015. Al Bashir Saga: ANC Government takes on SA Constitution – Again. Biznews.com [online], June 15. Friedman, G. 2010. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. New York: Anchor Books. General Secretariat of the Council Press Office EU-Africa Summit Brussels 2014 Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration 2–3 April 2014, Brussels. [online] https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ en/stay-informed/news/4th-africa-eu-summit. Gunderson, L.H., and C.S. Holling, eds. 2002. Panarchy: Understanding Transformation in Human and Natural Systems. London: Island Press. Hampson, F.O. 2013. Human Security. In Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. P.D. Williams, 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

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——— n.d. / Union for the Mediterranean, n.d. Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean. [online] http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/StatutesUfMS.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2015. Soler i Lecha, E., and I. Garcia. 2009. The Union for the Mediterranean: What has it Changed and What Can Be Changed in the Domain of Security? INEX Policy Brief, 4. [online] http://aei.pitt. edu/14990/1/INEXPolicyBrief_4__revised_esoler_.pdf. Accessed 18 May 2015. Sorensen, N.N., N. van Hear, and P. Engberg-Pedersen. 2002. The Migration Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. In The Migration-Development Nexus, eds. N. van Hear and N. N. Sorensen, 2003. Geneva: IOM. [online] http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/ Migration_Dev_Nexus.pdf. Taylor, I. 2016. Dependency Redux: Why Africa is not Rising. Review of African Political Economy 43 (147): 8–25. Thornycroft, P. 2014. Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe Boycott EU Summit over Exclusion of Wife Grace. The Telegraph [online], March 13. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60 (2005) World Summit Outcome / Adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1 (2005) [online] http://www.ifrc.org/docs/ idrl/I520EN.pdf. United Nations Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015 [online] www.un.org/milleniumgoals. Accessed 7 Aug 2012. Vale, P., and S. Maseko. 1998. South African and the African Renaissance. International Affairs 74 (2): 271–287. van Wyk, J., 2012. In South African Foreign Policy Review, ed. C. Landsberg, and J. van Wyk, vol 1. Waterfield, B. 2008. Gaddafi attacks Sarkozy plan for Union of the Med. The Telegraph online. 10 July.

Chapter 7

Resilience Assessment Part One

7.1  Introduction The earlier chapters considered a traditional approach in proposing a hypothesis of how European Union (EU) foreign policy affects African unity and security. It became apparent that there was a discrepancy between the policy issues raised, and the issues that were considered important to the governments and people of the Mediterranean. This chapter and Chap. 8 will focus on the resilience assessment using the Resilience Alliance’s Workbook for Practitioners (RAWP), version 2.0. The Resillience Assessment has been divided into two chapters for ease of reference. In its application herein, it is important to note some caveats. The RAWP 2.0 is primarily a step-by-step tool to apply dynamical systems theory incorporating panarchy to the everyday management of socio-ecological systems (SESs) and is used to assess the resilience of small or regional settings. The Assessment employs mixed methods: descriptions of the historical timeline of events and the identification and description of key variables of the systems in the panarchy, for instance. The overall SES at that scale is then reviewed and judged against its current sustainability. Natural resources, eco-system services, and their levels of “dependency” are considered in the assessment to be an integral part of the overall SES. The RAWP advocates involvement from multi-level stakeholders so that all interests are represented. In governance systems, this is rarely possible and what is traditionally practised is imposed change and structure from above. Part of the RAWP is advice of various evaluative tasks of assessing resilience or the viability of the overall panarchy. The Resilience Assessment in this study, however, has been used primarily as a tool to gather more information on the focal system in the panarchy under study, and to illustrate the influence of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as a policy framework as an external “disturbance” on the unity and security of African © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_7

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institutions, and hence Africa. While earlier chapters have shown the policies of the UfM and Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) act as constraints to establishing a genuine African identity and consequently paths to unity and security, here it is envisaged that the conceptualisation of the panarchy will assist in showing the patterns of cross-scale interactions between the North African SES and any further overflow into the Sahel region and consequently the rest of Africa. A particular feature of this approach relates to security issues. The RAWP 2.0 differentiates between “generalised” and “specified” resilience (RAWP 2.0: 34) and is applied to the interpretation of security for this analysis. The concept of generalised resilience, however, is given a slightly different emphasis herein to that found in the RAWP. Generalised system security refers to a system’s ability to retain its integrity and overall character; the ability to adapt in a manner conducive to retaining an optimal system state and, in the case of human systems, an equitable reproducibility of the Whole/CAS successively. It is in this sense that generalised resilience is used interchangeably with the overall security of the system. In order to keep “true” to the approach, it has been necessary to question at each step the main issues of concern, key components, valued attributes, and to whom these were relevant. As shown in previous chapters, the perception of main issues and key components of the system have varied between the partners. Wider literature and views from interviewees have also produced a mixture of different “main issues”. This chapter will firstly outline the system boundaries, spatially and temporally, and identify the central concerns and main issues together with what are considered to be the “valued attributes” of the system, and its “key components”. These are drawn from policy documents, general literature (peer reviewed journals, articles), specialised reports, and personal interviews. Resource, resource use, and “dependency” have been defined as they refer to the current state of the system. The chapter ends with a Summary of Remarks drawn from the information gathered on the system rather than a Conclusion, as the second half of the Assessment continues in Chap. 8. Information, charts, and tables that form part of the Assessment can be found in Hierro 2016.

7.2  Defining the Panarchies in Practice The Resilience Assessment requires at the fundamental level the panarchy constructed by the complex adaptive systems (CASs) of the EU, the policy/conceptual level of the UfM, and the actual states of North Africa and the Middle East, as described in detail in Chap. 3. A second panarchy not specifically under study here but which may need to be taken into consideration, is the African Union (AU), the African Regional Organisations or Economic Communities (RECs), and African states. Each CAS for the purpose of this study is here equated with a particular SES based on the regional arrangements and organisational perspective of the EU and AU.

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203

The panarchies are considered to be made up of both formal and informal institutions, at various stages in their own life-cycles en route to regime status. The EU and the AU are considered to be formal institutions, as they have established structures that manage and coordinate their relations. The UfM is considered to be both formal and informal: the UfM has a separate management structure (consisting of the Secretariat and co-presidencies – see Chap. 5), yet its implementation as a policy output is dynamic, fluid, and an expression of the institutional form. Apart from the Joint Africa EU Task Force and the Informal Joint Expert Group, the JAES works through the existing management structures of the EU and the AU. However, its Action Plans are counted here as the policy implementation and as such also the dynamic expression of interaction and processes. The SESs will therefore be approached from the EU/UfM policy perspective, as these are considered to be the operating and defining constraints. The EU will constitute the upper system, and North Africa and the Middle East will be considered as one unit in the context of the “Mediterranean” unless otherwise indicated. It is this middle or meso-level of the panarchy that will make up the “focal system” of the study; it includes the physical boundaries as conceptualised in the UfM framework. The AU, as the representation of African institutionalism, will be taken as a co-­ existing, overlapping operating SES. It is to be remembered that the various systems contain subsets of nested systems (as in the case of the EU/UfM /national level states, and sub-national or provincial levels, for example). Conceptually, the panarchy is often represented as a hierarchical structure. In some ways this is logical, as some tasks within a system need to follow a sequential order to make sense of the panarchy as a Whole. The over-riding perception of a panarchy, however, is one that gives the appearance of anarchy. The sets of relationships are non-static and do not follow an apparent logical order due cumulative change across the structure. In applying the panarchy-construction to these systems, it has been found that this stochastic dynamism holds true at least in policy output. From a more formal institutional perspective, however, international relationships are and have been guided by historical circumstances and other larger cycle (external) factors that influence governing relationships, for example, relative power or dependency. These structures, once fully institutionalised, could follow a more predictable path. An important consideration to maintain is the arbitrary division of land within Africa and its colonial history. This has had an effect not only on the shaping of socio-economic systems of each state, but also on its relative future interactions due to the likewise arbitrary portioning/sub-division of resources (non-renewable and renewable). With the awareness of human impact on the physical environment, and its ability for mutual sustainability of the interconnecting systems, eco-system services have become increasingly important in policy frameworks and in the treatment of “development”. The temporal boundary encompasses the years from 1972 (the Global Mediterranean Policy) to 2008 (UfM).

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7.3  Finding the Main Issues The main issues relevant to the focal system have been drawn from policy documents, wider literature and analysis of the Barcelona Process, and non-attributable interviews conducted with country representatives of North Africa based in South Africa. The key policy documents considered to form the basis of the Barcelona acquis are the Barcelona Process (1995), its Annexure the Work Programme of 2005, and the Marseille Final Statement on the UfM (2008). A summary of the main issues can be found in Hierro 2016. Irrespective of any perspective of the governing relationship (for example, recipient/donor) between the partners, it must be assumed that the policy documents in themselves are one, legitimate, rendition of the desires and interests of both sides of the UfM partnership.1 The general objective of the partnership between the EU and the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, according to the Barcelona Declaration (1995) and reiterated in the Marseille Final Statement (CEU 15187/8 Presse 314), is to establish an “area of peace, stability, security, and shared prosperity” (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314).2 It seems reasonable therefore to take the establishment of peace, security, and prosperity as of equal interest to both the governments and the people of the Mediterranean, as well as the EU institutionally. Having stated this, however, the interpretation and method of attaining these objectives may vary. Peace may not simply be the absence of conflict, likewise prosperity and security may mean different things to different people. Furthermore, the method of attaining prosperity – or what it means to be prosperous or wealthy – does not necessarily have to rely on the liberalisation of markets and closer regional economic integration, although this is the dominant ideology and method put forward in the Barcelona acquis. Although the main objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship have remained more or less constant, the areas of cooperation or of targeted action and concern have changed in emphasis over time. (Taking into consideration the upheavals in the region recently, the change in policy areas of action must be taken as an indication and reflection of changing perspectives from the regional level of the EU/ UfM and not necessarily from the populations involved.)

1  According to the diplomatic consultative process outlined in the Barcelona Declaration and thereafter, a wide selection of stakeholders, including civil society and grass roots organisations (GROs) have already been consulted to obtain the main issues of concern in the social ecological system under study. Barcelona Declaration Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27–28/11/95. [online] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf [accessed 29 Oct. 2014] p.  9/17; European Commission Communication 2008/319 Final/EU of 20 May 2008 on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. [online] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0319&from=EN. p. 2. 2  In the original Barcelona Declaration, its initial goals were to turn the Mediterranean into an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. Barcelona Declaration, 1995. op.cit. p. 1/17.

7.3 Finding the Main Issues

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7.3.1  T  he Main Issues as Defined by the Barcelona Acquis: Peace, Stability and Prosperity The main objectives of the partnership are given structure and process by the pillars or Partnerships, the Key Initiatives, and Fields of Cooperation. It is from these, rather than the Overall Objectives, that the “main issues” pertinent to the focal system have been derived. A summary of the Barcelona Declaration’s Work Programme (2005) and the Fields of Cooperation (2008) along with their sub-sections can be found in Table  7.1. Critical or key variables have been derived from the subject areas of these sub-sections. The amount of detail under each Partnership/Field of Cooperation can legitimately be taken as main issues of concern, as they have over the years been consistently targeted as action areas in the policy documents. There is no overall or clear continuity between Partnerships (Barcelona Declaration, 1995), Key Initiatives (Paris Declaration, 2008), and Fields of Cooperation (CEU 15187/08 Presse 314) in the subsequent policy documents, as their emphasis and structural organisation have changed over time. There are, furthermore, no apparent or direct links between the objectives of the Barcelona acquis (peace, stability, security, and shared prosperity) and the method or chosen policy areas through which to pursue them. The Paris Declaration of 2008, which formed the basis of the UfM, proposed Key Initiatives that bear no direct correlation to what has been outlined as the objectives of the current partnership: peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity (Paris Declaration, July 2008: 18/20).3 If the Partnership subject areas of the Barcelona Declaration Annex and those of the Marseille Final Statement on the UfM are compared, however, there are considerable thematic similarities (with additional areas of action). For the purposes of this study and its manageability, it seems reasonable to take their distillation into Political dialogue; Economics and Finance; and Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation (the Fields of Cooperation under the UfM) as the main issues of the policy documents. 7.3.1.1  Main Issues Derived from Specialised Literature and Analysis The main issues that are apparent in the specialised literature on the history of the development of international relations between the EU and North Africa and the Middle East, the countries of the UfM, are different to those which are expressed as

3  There is no indication of how the De-pollution of the Sea, the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the monitoring of maritime and land highways will directly effect the development of democracy, peace, or prosperity for example. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. [online] http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf [accessed 29 Dec. 2014] p. 19–20/20.

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Table 7.1  Comparison of 1995 Barcelona Declaration Annex and Fields of Cooperation, Marseille Final Statement, 2008

Political and Security Partnerships: establishing a common area of peace and stability.a

Barcelona Declaration Annex Work Programme Meeting arrangements.

Fields of Cooperation: Marseille Final Statement, Nov. 2008 Regular review of political situation in the Middle East.

Agree on means and methods implementing the Principles of the BD. Try to establish a network for more “intensive cooperation”.

Implementation of Code of Conduct on counter-terrorism.

∗NEW∗ Maritime Safety

Economic and Financial Partnership

Establishment of a Euro-­ Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Investment. Industry. Agriculture. Transport. Energy. Telecommunications and Information Technology. Regional Planning. Tourism. Environment. Science and Technology. Water.

Deepening of dialogue on ESPD and crisis management. Strengthen democracy, political pluralism, and participation; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Exchange of best practices on elections on a voluntary basis. Acknowledge long-term Euro-Med Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness, and Response to natural and man-made disasters (PPRD). Monitor and control traffic in maritime lanes. Proposals for Mediterranean Coast Guard Services Forum. Proposal for integrated Vessel Traffic Management systems to manage environmental risks and sea pollution. Towards the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Economic dialogue. Industrial cooperation. Agriculture. Transport. Energy. Information Society. Urban development. Tourism. Environment. Statistics cooperation. Water. (continued)

7.3 Finding the Main Issues

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Table 7.1 (continued)

Partnership in Social, Cultural, and Human Affairs.b

Barcelona Declaration Annex Work Programme Fisheries. Development of Human Resources. Municipalities and regions.

Fields of Cooperation: Marseille Final Statement, Nov. 2008

Dialogue between cultures and civilisations. Media.

Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Promoting dialogue between cultures, cultural diversity. Justice and Law. Euro-med youth.

Youth. Exchanges between civil societies. Social development. Health. Migration.

Developing a genuine social dimension. Human development.

Cooperation with civil society and local actors. Strengthening the role of women in society. Health. Migration.

Political and Security dialogue, Council of the European Union Presse 2008 15187/08 (Presse 314)/EU of 4 November 2008 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Marseille, 3–4 November 2008. Final Declaration. [online] http://www.euromedseminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/081104-UfM-Marseille-Ministerial-cond-51108.pdf [accessed 29 Oct. 2014] b Social, Human and Cultural Cooperation. Council of the European Union Presse 2008 15187/08 (Presse 314)/EU. Op.cit a

Objectives of the partnership outlined above. Those issues ostensibly include the need for resolutions to the Palestine/Israel conflict, the Western Sahara conflict, and the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003; Calleya 2013). Other main issues that have been highlighted from a review of the literature surrounding the Barcelona Process are “unfair” terms of trade and competition (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001; Gomez 2003), external influence (interference) and the corruption of local leaders and (internal) political processes (authoritarianism) (Cavatorta 2002, 2009; Cammett 2014; Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013; Ramadan 2012; Hinnebusch 2012; Schlumberger 2011), and hence social, political, and economic repression (Richards et al. 2008). 7.3.1.2  Interviews Interviews with the representatives of North African countries based in South Africa were sought for their opinion on the UfM and its impact on the unity and security of Africa. As the region was experiencing upheaval at the time, it was difficult to obtain interviews with most country representatives.

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However, four non-attributable interviews were obtained, which elicited wide and varied opinions on what the UfM meant to their countries, and whether they believed it had either a positive or negative effect on African unity or security. The interviews took place over a two year period between 2011 and 2012. The information gathered from the transcripts of interviews were compared thematically and topically. The interviews were as far as possible unstructured. Their purpose was to elicit as much information and also value judgements on the UfM/focal system from the perspective of key political positions. While on the surface the number of interviews would appear to limit their contribution to the research herein, they have had a cumulative effect, contributing to the other layers of information gathered from other sources. Economic factors or a consideration of what their country could offer in exchange with the EU, and the international trading system, were of primary value. Products were considered in terms of both renewable and non-renewable resources, which included agricultural goods, fisheries, oil and gas (hydrocarbons). Provisioning eco-­ system services were not mentioned as part of the production cycle, nor did they form part of the overall value for consideration. A clear perception of EU foreign policy and interests was evident. These were commonly identified among respondents as immigration, terrorism, and having a “stable backyard” free of drivers of instability. Factors contributing to instability were identified as structural inequalities (poverty), access to and distribution of renewable resources (water), religious fanaticism, lack of democracy and social justice, and irresolution of the Arab/Israeli and the Western Sahara conflicts (land). Islamic fundamentalism was generally referred to in a negative manner, with no middle ground for Islamic societies as such. Authoritarian governments, poor economic conditions, and lack of democracy were also considered the main drivers of recent uprisings in North Africa and the Middle Eastern UfM member states, as well as being behind the rise and popularisation of fundamentalist or radical Islamic activism. The Muslim Brotherhood was identified as one such Islamist group. Immigration was also acknowledged as an EU “pressure point” for leverage in EU/Mediterranean relations. It was noted that the UfM had been instigated and ratified by presidents who were no longer in power. Taking the pattern of renegotiation of agreements and the developments of partnerships of the historical timeline, it may be assumed that the UfM current country members consider it timely for a new or reinvigorated relationship, once the Arab Spring settled. Another common view was that the UfM, and the EU, as multilateral institutions and frameworks, was of lesser relevance than bilateral relations with EU member states, preferentially former colonising states. The views ranged from perceiving the UfM to be “French gesturing” to “insignificant”, and also openly acknowledged to be an arbitrary grouping. (In one case, a country representative believed that their country had only gone along with the UfM because they wanted to please their main partner in the EU.  Another said that they thought they would gain international

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legitimacy with regards to human rights and democratic values through association with an EU policy framework.) Asked whether they considered the UfM to have had any influence on their countries, the response was both in the negative and affirmative (one respondent had no doubt that socialisation of the main normative values most associated with EU policy frameworks  – human rights, democratic principles, rule of law  – had been accomplished, referring to them as “human values”). Whether or not the respondents were aware of transferral, or were unwilling to associate any influence having come from the EU, the fact that they were all able to value and recognise EU foreign interests is an indication of that influence; all interviewees were equally accepting of the (EU) concept of instability (and therefore stability), and which socio-­ economic aspects contributed towards either. While this unconscious acceptance does not necessarily point to EU influence specifically, in the context of EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean countries and the evolution of foreign policy areas described in previous chapters, this is a distinct possibility. All respondents seemed to believe that the EU itself had no influence on African countries in their internal or external affairs, although one respondent accepted that was the intended effect of the numerous agreements and frameworks that have been established. No respondent from the UfM/Mediterranean side knew of the Joint Africa EU Strategy, despite that all African countries, whether a member of the AU or not, are considered to be part of it. All respondents believed that the AU was institutionally “weak” and too divisive to interact in a meaningful way with the EU; no respondent believed therefore, that the AU had a foreign policy to speak of. The cases of Syria and Libya and the AU’s indecisiveness were quickly used as evidence of this. With the exception of one, all respondents had a deep sense of historical awareness, and spoke of their “ties” to former colonisers. All non-EU UfM interviewees believed their position on the Mediterranean Sea was of strategic relevance to Africa and EU relations; recognising North Africa to be the “gateway” of trade routes into Europe, as well as their roles as “police”-states of immigrants from sub-­ Saharan Africa.

7.4  Valued Attributes The valued attributes are drawn from a varied set of both human/social and natural resources. It is acknowledged that what is considered of value or valued as an attribute of the system(s) will change subject to interest group, perspective, and time. What is valued in a system or that to which “worth” is attributed, is also directed by dominant social, political, and economic structures, and the depth (therefore influence) of global integration. From the policy documents, wider literature and interviews held, the valued attributes of the system would appear to be bilateral relations with EU member states and the USA; regional and global integration and the ability to trade across regional/

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global boundaries; tourism; geostrategic positioning (as either a fearful/security perception, or “positive” proximity); non-renewable resources such as oil and petroleum products; and tradable/consumer goods relative to a wider international environment. In the interviews it became apparent that there was a conflict between the acknowledged necessity to form strong regional groupings, overridden by individualist or “realist” drives to compete inter-regionally or internationally with established markets or “influential” states, the latter qualified on the basis of prior relations (colonial links) or international relativistic power relations. This aspect clearly indicates the uncertainty of relations intra-regionally provided by wider and external pressures from other panarchic structures of organisation (inter-regional and global/international structures).

7.5  I dentifying the Key Components of the Socio-ecological System Key components of the system are defined as a mixture of physical and social properties of the system (RAWP, 2.0). Those components differ from the valued attributes in that they form critical parts of the SES based on historical and current information. The key components of the SES based on the main issues identified in Sect. 7.3, are taken to be the Mediterranean Sea; the Arab/Israeli conflict; Islam; water (scarcity, management, quality); tourism; and geostrategic position or proximity to Europe/the EU. The key components linked to the main issues are more social than bio-physical, although the latter is fundamentally important to the sustainability of the former. That these components are more socially constructed and organised is a further comment on the ability to project structures of signification and domination over physical constraints, giving them a “fictional” presentation beyond their actual boundaries.

7.5.1  Physical Key Components: Fuel, Water, and Land Physical key components to the focal SES have been identified as predominantly natural resources, specifically fuel (crude oil and petroleum products), as this appears to be the mainstay of most4 economies across the region; it is given value in 4  The two sub-regions are a mixture of oil and non-oil economies. Oil economies, however, give the region its position in the international economy and geostrategic relevance for the rest of the region. Oil economies: Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Egypt (mixed); Non-oil economies: Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Israel. See Cammett, M., 2014. The Political Economy of Development in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. The Middle East. California: SAGE. p. 174–5.

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relation to external demand, value and worth. From both geospatial maps of the region and policy documents of the Barcelona acquis, water is judged a key component for the current and future development of the SES. “Land” in as far as it occupies a “geostrategic position” and space in relation to the EU and Europe, is a fundamental part of the UfM SES; it plays a dual role having both value as a socio-­ political construct within the concept of the “state”, and a physical supporting, and provisioning role.

7.5.2  S  ocial Key Components: Palestine/Israel, Tourism, and Islam 7.5.2.1  Palestine/Israel As a socially constructed, and politically manipulated issue, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is a key component of the system as it has influenced dynamics in the Mediterranean region, and between the Mediterranean and the EU.  The conflict has proved to be prolonged and one with no end or resolution in sight. For these reasons it is considered both a key component and a press disturbance (see Sect. 7.7) in the SES. Tourism, as a related aspect of land, along with the Mediterranean Sea, are considered key to this SES as both play an integral part in the economy and identity of all the riparian states. 7.5.2.2  Islam Islam is also considered a key component. As part of the social/cultural/political fabric of North Africa and the Middle East, it is not at this point differentiated from radical or fundamentalist Islam, as they are considered an aspect derived from the whole. Islam culturally binds the countries of the UfM, and even with the exception of Israel as a Jewish State, it can be argued that Islamic society has played an important role in the development of the Palestine/Israeli conflict itself, and the governing relationships between states in the region as a shared identity over the years.

7.6  Resources, Resource Use, and Dependency How resources are viewed is informed by our geographical architecture and subsequently what is available for “use” to convert further into a hierarchy of activity and “worth”. Whether a livelihood can be eked out, and what kind of livelihood and familiar/social structure, is consequently organised and dependent on the perspective of “use” and mediated by dominant structures of value in place (Pollard et al. 2008; Holling 1992; Braudel 1966). Pollard et al. (2008) identify social, economic,

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political, and technical values that are “key” in influencing how natural resources are related to and used. Herein resources are defined as both a mixture of natural (renewable and non-­ renewable resources) and “human” or social resources. Natural resource dependency has been approached by reviewing direct and indirect uses of the key natural resources provided by the focal system, and possible stakeholders who rely on them. This has been done from the point of view of both the current system state, and by looking at these over the time-line of study to assist in further determining dependency patterns and continuity (RAWP, 2.0). Natural resources include eco-system goods and services (supporting, provisioning, regulating, and cultural) (Millennium Assessment 2003). Human or social resources have been defined as socially constructed “structures” of signification (language, symbols, and myths), legitimation (norms, rules, and routines) and domination (politics, governance structures or the “flow of power and control of resources”) (Giddens, 1987 cited in Westley et al. 2002: 107). They form part of a process of communication and interaction between people, and link the physical world and the “invented” or socially constructed one (Westley et al. 2002). In this sense human or social resources are unique. Their quality and how they relate to physical resources ultimately determine sustainability. As socially constructed, human resources have the ability to order and manipulate both time and location (Westley et al. 2002). As such, they can be considered processes as they undergo change over time. Westley et al. (2002) refer to the symbolic creation of the world as the “third” dimension (2002: 119). Hence human beings have a certain amount of control over their own ideational structures. As a result socially constructed reality may be subject to shorter cycle times and evolutional processes than those which regulate the physical world, which possess more “mechanical” or periodic processes (Westley et  al. 2002). Control over such narrative structures is not always conscious or contrived, but can be, especially when formalised through structural or institutional organisation (for example, through policy initiatives, partnerships, or agreements). Human or social resources in this way form complex adaptive systems of their own, incorporating said structures and processes of signification, domination, and legitimation at various levels of the overall social system (Westley et al. 2002). In addition it must be taken as axiomatic that eco-system services will provide combined functions in the SES, such as water or land, that provide provisioning, supporting, regulating, and cultural eco-system services. Due to the scale of this study it was not possible to research the implications and levels of dependency in these terms specifically.

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7.6.1  Human/Social “Resources” Human resources, as defined here, draws on the concepts of Assets, “Capital”, and Capabilities as defined in the Livelihoods framework (Chambers and Conway 1991; DFID 1999). A “livelihood” is defined as those socio-ecological components that enable a sustainable “means of living” (GLOPP 2008: 1). (The Livelihoods framework from this perspective represents a “resilience” approach to sustainable living.) The components of a sustainable living are further the existence of Capabilities (education, skill, health, psychological perspective or “orientation”), Assets (human, material, social, natural, and economic capital), and Activities (aspects of both Capabilities and Assets that form the main strategy for poverty alleviation (Pollard et al. 2008; Chambers and Conway 1991; DFID 1999). As an indicator of Assets, social capital (levels of trust and norms of reciprocity and their networks) (DFID 1999: 2.3.2) indicators have been taken from international indices such as the Human Development Social Integration table (“Trust in Government”), as well as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The World Happiness Ranking (2013) is a composite of indicators that also includes perceptions of corruption; healthy life expectancy; GDP per capita; freedom to make life choices; social support5; and generosity.6 In this way the Happiness Ranking is used to indicate a median of Assets, Capabilities (psychological attitude towards the surrounding social environment), and Activities. As a further measure of social integration, or of feeling a part of a national “community”, data from the 3rd Arab Youth Survey (Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011) on global citizenry, values, and influence have also been used for reference. Although the Arab Youth Survey is based on the Middle East, and makes a distinction between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and non-GCC states, it is considered a good indicator of where, at least, a proportion of the UfM states (in this case Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) stand in relation to traditional values, and on national or regional community versus a global one. This in turn indicates levels of unity and perceptions of belonging to a particular grouping, and at which scale. Human capital (skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health) (DFID 1999: 2.3.1) indicators, which are included in the concept of Assets, have been taken as education (levels and literacy) and life expectancy at birth; adult education levels over the age of 25; and employment to population ratio. The collection of information in the form of indicators, from the perspective of the Assessment, is not seen as an end in itself but rather as a means to describe and gain deeper knowledge of which aspects of the system are considered structurally 5  “Social support is the national average of the binary responses, either 0 or 1, to the question “if you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friend you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?” See Helliwell, J., et al., 2013. The World Happiness Report 2013. New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. p. 20. 6  “Generosity” is the “residual” of the regressing national average of response to the question “have you donated money to a charity in the past month?” on GDP per capita. Helliwell, J., et al., 2013. op.cit. p. 20.

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relevant. This section, together with the sections on main issues, valued attributes, and key components, contributes towards the building of an overall picture of the focal system, both internally and through its external relations.

7.6.2  Natural Resources: Renewable and Non-renewable Economic or labour activity by sector, and how much of the same kind of activity was either consumed internally, exported, or was for recreational (tourism or services) use, was deemed to reflect the level of “dependency” on particular resources linked to the activity. Land-use and labour activity by sector, along with water withdrawal by economic/labour sector was also researched to depict dependency on a particular economic activity: agricultural, services, or industry. These tables and figures can be found in the Appendix of Hierro 2016.

7.6.3  Dependency For the purposes of gauging levels of dependency, social capital will be measured as indicated above, using the Happiness Index and individual indicators from the Human Development Report (2013) on Social Integration (trust in government), and the CPI. In addition it is noted that Islamic culture provides a unique network of trust and reciprocity in “zaqat”. Zaqat offers a socio-cultural specific “safety-net” in Islamic-based societies. In place of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and sometimes side-by-side with them, Islamic community identity has filled a gap where the state has been unable or unwilling to step in due to commitments made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) either through country loans, or structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Dependency has been considered traditionally. Included, are the labour sector (employed), the breakdown by import and export figures of main commodity group, and percentage of GDP by sector of origin. All of these have been examined in each country, as well as in sub-groups of North Africa and the Middle Eastern members of the UfM.  In spite of the increasingly acknowledged inadequacy of GDP as a measure of well-being (Fioramonti 2013), it has been used here as a guide to economic dependency by sector. Land and water use includes cultivated land by progression (1973–2012), withdrawal by economic sector as a percentage of total water withdrawal (1998–2002); freshwater withdrawal as a percentage of total actual renewable water resources has been used to illustrate reliance on water. Natural resource depletion has been used as an overall indicator of the state of the socio-­ ecological focal system.

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7.7  Disturbances and Disruptions Disturbances, according to the RAWP 2.0, are “anything that causes a disruption to a system” (RAWP, 2.0: 15). They are distinguished between “press” (disturbances that create “cumulative pressure”) and “pulse” (once-occurring) disturbances (RAWP, 2.0: 15). A disturbance “regime” is a set or pattern of disturbances that occur over time and are not necessarily regular, but linked or associated (RAWP, 2.0: 15). The disturbances and/or disruptions to the focal system have been distilled into those that stand out across the UfM policy-region. These have been identified as the two phases of the Cold War; the end of the Cold War; the rise of modern terrorism; the economic depression of the 1980s (as a result of the shift in European focus to alternative energy sources  – the discovery of oil in the North Sea); Arab-Israeli conflicts (including the Palestinian conflict); Algerian election disruptions (1992); and the Western Saharan conflict. Continuous EU policy evolutions towards the Mediterranean (the Global Mediterranean Policy, Renovated Mediterranean Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the UfM) as instruments of integrationalism, are also considered a series of disturbances or a regime, as they have periodically shaped the conception of the Mediterranean, which issue areas of interest and consequence to frame the Mediterranean in policy, and also influenced internal socio-­ ecological landscape. In addition, four more disturbances have been included here, which although have emanated from beyond the panarchies described so far, they have had strong effects on the focal system of the UfM. These are the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003; the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; and the Iranian revolution of the same year.

7.7.1  The Cold War The Cold War is considered herein as an external “press” disturbance: It combined with local conditions already developed through previous interactions with extra-­ regional players and on-going conflicts. The localised socio-ecological fabric was the result of colonialism and its legacy, “modernisation”, subsequent calls for independence, the two World Wars, and nationalist movements. Much of what set the stage for the focal period between 1970(2) and 2008, took place beforehand. It is necessary to first explore, therefore, the major aspects that prepared the structural groundwork for the period under study here. The histories of colonial influence, and the conditions that ensued the post-War periods, varied between North Africa and the Middle Eastern sub-regions. The dynamics of the Cold War as a result played out differently in each. The (first) structural decolonisation process together with “Superpower” influence (the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – USSR), however, created divisions and tensions within both.

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The legacy of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa and the Middle East contributed to the dysfunction and difficulties of state formation in these two sub-regions: the change over from Ottoman rule, and by comparison, from large and relatively autonomous administration areas such as the “millet” system (an administrative unit based on religious identity) (“The Millet Religious Group”, 2014) to the westernised and “modern” nation state, meant that a “national identity” based within the new (and relatively restrictive) boundaries would be particularly difficult to build (Lust 2014: 109; Gasper 2014: 29–30).7 Iraq8 and Jordan, for example, were newly created states and their communities and collective identities were – as with much of colonial state formation across Africa – spread across the new boundaries. The rise of nationalism across North Africa and the Middle East, is said to have begun as a reaction to the “Turkification”9 of the Ottoman Empire, and overlapped with other historical movements at the same time that led to the singularity of a “nationalist” Arab identity that overwrote clan, tribal, and ethnic asymmetry, and – most importantly – the western modern state-territorial lines. The two sub-regions at the time under Ottoman rule, coalesced around a “wholesale” rejection of the proposed Turkish identity, and consequently connected beyond and across administrative boundaries to form part of a larger Arab identity or pan-Arab “nationalism” (Gasper 2014: 22). Kerr (1971) notes that the idea of Arab unity was, and has been, an “important psychological force” (Kerr 1971: 1), while at the same time (Kerr) points to the pull of modernising forces among generations of new elites educated abroad in colonial metropolises, and the prevalent form of the western nation state that was deemed to be both efficient and functional (Van Creveld 1999: 323; Davis 2014: 513; Moran 2001: 34). The combination of both later created dissonant, conflicting sentiments and trends towards governance styles and internal state-organisation, for while the advantages of the (colonial) state appeared to be acknowledged (a result of education and influence), rejection of the same was a binding force among the newly independent states. The new boundaries and subsequent international system operated against, and was contraindicated to, pan-Arab sentiment, however, and in consequence fuelled individualism and “bitter rivalry” (Kerr 1971: 1). The modernisation agenda and the combination of anti-imperialism/colonialism further created a passive/aggressive 7  In the post-World War I period, “Every political entity in the region was new. Almost without exception governmental and legal structures, institutions, and practices had to be created from scratch. These structures were planned and designed with the aim of moulding a modern national consciousness as well”. Gasper, M., The Making of the Modern East. 2014. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. op.cit. p. 39. 8  “Turkification” was the idea behind the Young Turks’ (1908) socio-political restructuring using the modern European state-model, and imposed the use of Turkish language and a centralised government that would “unite the empire’s many ethnic and confessional elements around a Turkish identity”. Davis, E., 2014. “Iraq”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 513. 9  The combination of an Arab Renaissance or Arab Nahda in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Islamic Modernist movement at the turn of the nineteenth beginning of the twentieth century, and enforced “Turkification” led to a nationalist backlash. See Gasper, M., 2014. Ibid. pp. 22 ff.

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tendency in inter-Arab relations, and may well explain current African trends in regional integration as well, which appear to oscillate between (localised) cooperation and self-interest. After the introduction of the United Nations (UN) mandate system and the division of lands between France and Britain, anti-colonialism further fuelled the ideal of a united Arab world or pan-Arabism (Kerr 1971: 1). While Egypt can be considered a “pivotal” and hence influential state (Landsberg 2004) in the two sub-regions, it is Syria that is generally credited with introducing the Arab socialist ideology for the Pan-Arab movement, with Abd al-Nasser “falling into” a socialist or “social revolutionary” paradigm gradually (Kerr 1971: 7). The nexus of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq formed the platform for Arab unity and the relations that existed between Arab states during the Cold War period; it was a movement that identified between “reactionaries” (Kerr 1971: 6) (those countries with ties to colonisers, such as France and Britain, or the USA) and “revolutionaries” (or those countries that were seen to rebel against old colonial masters and patronage) (Kerr 1971). It could be said that anti-colonialism as a concept tied the Arab states together, whether they were reactionaries or revolutionaries, and that this – and not ideological contradictions between the USA and the USSR – actually propelled dynamics between the Arab states during this time at least, until Nasser’s death in 1970. The Arab states’ interactions with the two superpowers were therefore driven rather by pragmatism, or at least “a mixture of ideological and practical considerations” (Kerr 1971: 16). Contrary to what the Eisenhower doctrine based its premises, communism itself was by then a “lost cause” (Primakov 2009: 75) in the sub-regions, being deemed “incompatible” with Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism (Kerr 1971: 7).10 The Cold War has at times been divided between periods of détentes or the relaxing of tensions between the main protagonists, and periods of heightened tensions. Moreover, the Cold War détentes in Europe for example, seemed to operate at slightly different speeds to that experienced between the direct relations of the USA and the USSR (Best et al. 2008: 272). While the external and international dynamics between the USSR and the USA made its way into the two sub-regions, the dynamics within and between the sub-­ regions themselves involved complex and complicated relations based on the search for an Arab unity in the philosophy of pan-Arabism, and a “revolutionary socialism” (Kerr 1971) that was considered distinct from Communism. While in some respects Communism was appealing as it provided a “social collectivism” (Moran 2001: 23),  Yevgeny Primakov admits that only Yemen came close to the form of scientific communism practised in the Soviet Union. Kerr (1971) proposes that Syria, out of fear of losing control to the Communist party, led the petition to join Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Primakov, Y., 2009. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present. New York: Basic Books. When Iraq fell to Abd al Qasim, [a] “…strange regime that drifted in a twilight zone between Communism and a shapeless anarchic radicalism resting on no visible organised support…” was inaugurated (Kerr 1971), and Nasser hence referred to Iraq as a “traitor to Arab nationalism and a stooge of international Communism”. Kerr, M. H., 1971. The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals. Third edition. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 17. 10

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it was more often seen as an externally (western) derived imposition, and as such became subject to suspicion of incompatibility with local nationalist agendas (Sorenson 2008: 21). The pursuit of a wider Arab “nation” and identity therefore rivalled the dynamics of Cold War allegiances, and had led to the identification of pragmatism as the guiding principle by which Arab states related to each other and the main protagonists in the Cold War, the USSR and the USA. 7.7.1.1  T  he International Dimension of the Cold War and Expanding Influence into Southern and Eastern Europe The North/South Korean war of 1950–1953 is generally credited for bringing the Cold War to the global level (Best et al. 2008: 265–7), with USA military expansion and a multiplex of agreements being made with foreign countries, one of which was the Baghdad Pact involving Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, and Iran.11 The spread of Cold War tensions, however, can be seen prior to this, gradually expanding and co-­ evolving with Communist influence and counter-Communist reactions in Europe. The USA was drawn into Europe, and consequently the proximate regions of North Africa and the Middle East, through the relationships it had established with the allies of World War (WW) II (Van Creveld 1999; Best et al. 2008: 224–8). Economic woes as a result of WWII and from administering its colonies had led European countries – and Britain especially – to defer to the USA and request economic assistance in the re-building of Europe, taking control where Britain could no longer.12 By 1946 after two confrontations with the USSR in Iran and Turkey, the USA established a naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Best et al. 2008: 225; 285). What had begun with the partitioning of Europe at the end of the Second World War became a partitioning at the global level, with the “Iron Curtain” symbolising the divide between two main competitors, the USA and the USSR, at least in Europe. The USA was seen to support the colonial powers and the USSR, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev (premier between 1953–1964), became the champion of the “wars of national liberation” (Best et al. 2008: 238; Lewis 2003: 57) lending military assistance and aid unconditionally to any perceived “left-leaning” governments or sympathisers.13

 While the Pact consisted of these countries, the USA played a financial and orchestrating role. See Best, A., et al., 2008. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Second edition. Oxford: Routledge. p. 231. 12  The Greek Civil war in 1944: Britain had been assisting the Royalists who had won the election, but was unable to continue due to its financial debt. At the same time Britain declared its withdrawal, the Greek Royalists requested help from the US, which duly supplied support. See Best, A., et al. 2008. op.cit. p. 226. 13  This was contrary to US doctrine, which attached conditions – either economic or ideological – to receiving its aid/assistance. In contrast to the USSR, the US had much more resources to extend, but it was this difference which more often than not, swayed the balance in the Soviet’s favour. Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 321. 11

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Between 1940 and 1960, a number of newly independent states had entered into the international system. With them came the further division between pro-Western/ pro-Soviet states. In the period of the 1950s, the USA had begun to increase aid to European states and the newly emerging non-communist governments rising from the first decolonisation process. The Kennedy era in the USA and America’s “Containment” policy expanded to the global level, with the intention of shoring up allegiance to the anti-­ communist cause. Military aid and economic assistance was used equally in an attempt to persuade newly emerging states to endorse the American way of life. The colonial legacy, the rise of Communism in the post-war period in Europe, the declining relationship between the Soviets and its previous allies Britain and the USA, and the ensuing division between East and Western Europe, all converged in the socio-ecological system that made up North Africa and the Middle East. 7.7.1.2  The Middle East The “Middle East”, having French and British mandates post-WWI together with the establishment of Israel in 1948, gave this sub-region a distinctly different and perhaps more volatile character: North Africa was predominantly under French rule (Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria), but with British (Egypt), Spanish (Western Sahara/Morocco), and Italian (Libya) colonial rule as well. The Mandate system of the League of Nations post-WWI meant that Britain oversaw Palestine, Iraq, and the Transjordan; and France oversaw Syria and Lebanon. The conditions that were established in the Middle East, therefore, and the development of Israel (from 1948), were profoundly different to that which existed in North Africa and maintained a certain amount of continuity – and in this sense, stability – under colonial rule up until the end of WWII (Cavatorta 2014: 399; Cammett 2014: 186). USA patronage of Israel in the region, however (President Harry S. Truman acknowledged the state of Israel 11 min after its declaration of independence in 1948) (Held and Cummings 2011: 363), perpetuated antagonism and conflict, just as the USSR conversely refused recognition and staunchly supported opposition to the Israeli state through supporting its Arab opponents (Held and Cummings 2011: 255; Lust 2014). The Arab/Israeli conflict to some extent, therefore, was exacerbated by the relationship between the USSR and the USA. 7.7.1.3  North Africa The Suez Crisis of 195614 consolidated USA interest and influence in the Middle East by 1958. The initial force – made up of British, French, and Israeli troops – in spite of “winning”, provided Nasser with the best possible publicity for his  The Suez Crisis was fuelled by the failure of the USA to support a World Bank loan for building the Aswan dam. When the USA failed to back this venture, Nasser seized control of the Suez Canal. See Brand, L. A., Jordan. 2014. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 581; Sorenson, D.S., 2008.

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nationalist cause, and Nasser was praised as a hero of anti-imperialism (Gasper 2014: 49; Sorenson 2008: 25). The USA, fearful that such an occupation would inspire Egypt to lean towards cooperating with the Soviets, managed to persuade the combined forces to withdraw. North African states were said to have vied for economic and military aid or support from either the USSR or the USA (Held and Cummings 2011: 255). Where one superpower failed to provide, the other stepped in (as in the case of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia), or was solicited (Best et  al. 2008: 414–5; Lewis 2003: 51). Moreover the USSR, post-Stalin, became less circumspect about to whom it gave aid, whereas the USA continued to attach conditions to its aid and assistance, such as respect for Human Rights and certain financial or developmental/economic reforms. At the same time Khrushchev, in the USSR, played upon the nationalist trends that were emerging from the ashes of colonialism (Best et  al. 2008: 385). Communism was mistrusted, however, among the more Islamic groups (Sorenson 2008: 21) for being atheistic (Gasper 2014: 63). It was here that the USA found a way to wield influence in the sub-regions, funding Islamist groups who appeared to be essentially “anti-communist” (Gasper 2014: 66; Best et al. 2008: 414).15 The Non-Aligned Movement began as a counter measure to the so-called “Third World”16 and was meant to be extended to those “following an independent policy keeping away from power politics” (Best et al. 2008: 318). However, even in this arena the Cold War dynamics between the USA and the USSR appeared to split the Movement between a “nationalist” or radical group (the so-called Casablanca Group, consisting of Ghana, Egypt, and Libya) and a pro-Western group (the Monrovia Group, consisting of Nigeria and Francophone Africa) (Best et  al. 2008: 322). It was not necessarily that the Cold War powers played out their conflicts using other states, which can be seen to have created a disturbance in the fabric of North Africa and the Middle East, but rather the values, norms of (mis)trust that were swept along with them. Communism reinforced the idea of “social collectivism”, but lacked the essential underpinnings that had formed the basis for its emergence in Europe. Together with the adherence to the western nation state and adopted ideals of “national identity” based on fixed geographical boundaries, communism counteracted localised traditional social and political structures and the calls for a wider pan-Arabism. Interaction with western European culture had begun a process of change that altered the socio-ecological systems of both sub-regions. Cold War An Introduction to the Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 26. 15  Funding Islamist groups became “institutionalised” during the Afghan war and the occupation by Soviet forces: the USA actively funded the mujahidin through local mosques. Law, R.D., 2009. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge: Policy Press. p. 296. 16  The Third World was originally meant to signify all those apart from the First World, the USA and its ideological allies, and the Second World (the USSR and communist states). See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 319.

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competition managed to undermine cohesion, spurred competition and division, yet also sowed and harvested the seeds of a particular kind of “unity” or social collectivism that had no legitimate basis in localised social conditions.

7.7.2  The End of the Cold War The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa and is considered a “pulse” disturbance for the purpose of this study. Left without the confines of bipolar dynamics, the emerging solo “superpower”, the USA, was able to export its socio-political ideals and the countries of the sub-regions began to fall into line. The socialist ideology as promoted by Communism was seen as imperfectly matched to the neoliberal internationalism espoused by western democracies as the latter had managed to out-sustain the former. The New World Order endorsed democracy and integrated liberal economics as the harbinger and “natural incubator” of peace and stability (Cavatorta 2014: 404). However, the promotion of democracy and an integrated world system prevailed over by universalistic principles of liberal democracy and human rights, came with contradictions: the USA and the EU, both principle promoters of these ideals, found it expedient in certain circumstances (and countries) to “turn a blind eye” when it believed that stability (and by default access to oil resources) was in jeopardy, allowing repression and authoritarianism to go un-remonstrated. Opposition parties were identified as “Islamist” groups, which incumbent heads of government painted as sources of internal instability and unamenable to western patronage and influence (Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005; Cavatorta 2009: 54). The USA, other western democratic states, and international organisations extending agreements and aid, quickly became “demonised” in the eyes of the populations of the Middle East and North Africa (Lewis 2003: 78), which were seen to be supporting authoritarian regimes against increasing local internal opposition, contrary to their strongly stated foreign policy of supporting and exporting political and economic liberalisation (Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005: 14; Schlumberger 2011).17 This blatant double standard further inflamed anti-western feelings and certainly added to distrust of outside influence and of internal rule.18 Local populations further translated this into a distrust of the neo-liberal principles of development.  The cases of Algeria (1990–2002), Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories are cases in point. Francesco Cavatorta (2009) is particularly instructive in the internal/external dynamics, which lead to first the promotion of the liberal democratic ideal in Algeria, and the circumstances that led to its unravelling. See Cavatorta, F., 2009. The International Dimension of the Failed Algerian Transition: Democracy Betrayed? Manchester: Manchester University Press. 18  Authoritarian governments were more inclined to favour a particular set of entrepreneurs in the reforms involved with liberalisation of the economy, for example. In turn, these favoured few reinforced the status quo in pursuit of their established interests. See Cammett, M., 2014. op.cit. p. 194; Cavatorta, F., 2014. “International Politics of the Middle East”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 413–414. 17

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Islamism, grounded in a larger majority and in a vision of wider social (community) welfare (Ramadan 2001), quickly became a trusted alternative.19 In response to the rise of Islamism and anti-western feelings, European and USA’s foreign policy adapted accordingly, securitising the rise of Islamism as a potential “threat” to stability in Europe (Bicchi 2007; Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005: 7–8).

7.7.3  The Rise of Modern and International Terrorism Although ethno-nationalist (Law 2009: 217),20 anarchist terrorism (Gelvin 2008), and tactical acts of terror can be traced back to ancient times, and was by no means an unknown occurrence prior to this period of study, it is generally agreed that anti-­ Israeli sentiment and Islamic activism as an ethno-nationalist response was galvanised by the 1967 Six Day War and Israel’s subsequent occupation of the Gaza Strip (previously under Egyptian control), Jerusalem, the West Bank (within Jordan), and the Golan Heights (previously within Syria) (Best et al. 2008: 434; Law 2009: 219; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 317).21 What began as refugee status post-1948 for Palestinians, became long term disappointment, disaffection, and political manipulation by the host-states of their cause (Law 2009: 226; Gasper 2014: 57). Between 1948 and 1967 various armed struggle groups had emerged in resistance. The Nasser-trained fedayeen within Egypt were among the first to lead “hit and run” attacks into Israel. In 1959, Yasser Arafat created the Fatah (Harakat al-Tahir al-Filastini), which carried out attacks against Israeli military targets and whose rationale was “waging war against Israel by any means possible”. In 1964 Arab states sponsored the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) (Law 2009: 218). From the outcome of the 1967 war, it was clear the extent of Arab states’ ability to fight for the Palestinian return to their homeland and achieve what Arab states’ rhetoric proclaimed, was vastly overrated. Palestinians realised that they would have to take up their own struggle and publicise their plight for national autonomy, from exile. Fatah emerged as the clear leader in the resistance and took up official residence in Jordan under the protection of King Hussein. This was in spite of there being a multitude of similar resistance groups that developed in the wake of the Six Day War.22 By 1969, Yasser Arafat had “commandeered” (Law 2009: 220) the  This is supported by views obtained in personal interviews with political representatives from North Africa, during the course of research for this book. 20  This, according to Law, is distinct from jihadism and considered a specific, religious-driven reactionism to modernisation and western influence. See Law, R. D., 2009. op.cit. Ch. 4. 21  According to the 1949 Armistice lines. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. A History of the Modern Middle East. Fifth edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 249. 22  The PLO (an umbrella organisation established in 1964 by Arab states that brought together different groups of anti-Israeli protest and united by the idea of armed struggle and retaliation) 19

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leadership of the PLO and had changed the governing charter to effectively reflect his supremacy. Through the new Charter, the fedayeen of the Fatah became the “core of the armed struggle”, and its aims were reaffirmed as the “destruction of Israel and the recreation of the Palestinian state” (Law 2009: 220). In 1968 and 1969, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) headed by George Habash, initiated a “new approach” in drawing attention to the resistance struggle by widening its target choices (of attacks).23 It was at this point the resistance became “international” (Law 2009: 221; Bicchi 2007: 69). 24 Habash’s method of choice was plane hijackings. Originally intended not to harm people in order to keep public sympathy, this soon spiralled out of control as various sub-­ groups of PFLP crossed that line. Continuous insurgency against Israel from within Jordan perpetrated by Fatah, sparked retaliation from Israel. Yasser Arafat and Fatah’s presence increasing began to impinge on Jordanian sovereignty, to the extent where the PLO operated as “state within a state”, (Law 2009: 222–3; Kerr 1971: 142; Primakov 2009: 229ff) culminating in 1970, when the PFLP hijacked four planes and diverted them to Dawson’s Airfield, Jordan. It took the so-called “Black September” of 1970, an attack initiated by the Jordanian army against the PLO refugee camps, to push the armed struggle to the next level and change the dimensions of the conflict in inter-Arab relations (Law 2009: 223; Bicchi 2007). The Black September Organisation, sponsored by Yasser Arafat, emerged from this event and the assassination of the Jordanian minister considered responsible for the Black September ejection of the PLO from Jordan followed. What ensued then was a series of escalating “tit-for-tat” retaliations between Black September and the Israeli Defence Force (Law 2009: 225) culminating in 1972, Munich, where Israeli Olympic participants were held hostage, ending with all hostages being killed along with five members of the Black September Organisation. (Three terrorists were arrested but subsequently released months later when another airliner was hijacked in return for their release.) In the late 1960s and early 1970s, (lesser) jihadism25 became popular in Egypt through the teachings of Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood (Lewis 2003). included Fatah (the largest group), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (the second largest group), and eventually the Black September Organisation. Law, R.D., 2009. Ibid. p. 220. 23  Apart from publicity for the Palestinian cause, terrorism was directed against Western European involvement in international politics. See Bicchi, F., 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 69. 24  Europe became “the most active terrorist environment in the world”, Pluchinsky, 1982 cited in Bicchi, F., 2007. op.cit. p. 69. 25  A “war” to create an Islamic area, so that all Muslims may live under Sharia. See Law, R. D., 2009. Ibid. p. 282. While jihad in modern popular journalism has become almost exclusively associated with armed political struggle, jihad in Islamic thought has two interpretations. “Lesser” jihad is associated with armed struggle, while “greater” jihad has a specific spiritual relevance to daily life. See Ramadan, T., 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. p. 65.

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The call for Islamic governance and a return to salafism26 (the lifestyle ways of “the predecessors”, embracing sharia) was presented as an alternative to what was portrayed as the failure of Arab states to deliver on their promises of unity and strength (pan-Arabism), economic growth and well-being for all (Arab socialism) (Ramadan 2001). The leaders of the post-independent Arab nations were seen to be corrupted through their contact with the West. Economic downturn, the withdrawal of the clerics from society, and the peace deal arrived at between Israel and Egypt added to the general perception that Arab states were being tainted through their contact with “the West” (Lewis 2003). The Tehran hostage crisis (November, 1979), the Iranian Revolution (February 1979), and the Invasion of Afghanistan (1979), saw ethno-nationalist terrorism, and the borrowed terms of jihadism merge together as a public narrative. The almost constant conflict between Israel and its neighbours created further impetus to bind the two aspects together as the fallout from conflict ravaged countries, abysmal conditions in refugee camps, and poor economic prospects turned more people towards Islamism and the comfort and relief to be found in the welfare-system (education, access to health services) provided by the Islamic groups that offered it. These were the circumstances behind the support found for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, its break-away branch Hamas in the West Bank, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Law 2009). It took the Afghanistan invasion by the USSR and the counter-involvement of the USA and its allies, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, to almost institutionalise jihadism through providing military support structures, weapons, finance, and fighters to combat the Soviet incursion. International networks of “holy warriors”, as the rebels in Afghanistan were called (or mujahidin), training camps, and financing were set up. By the time the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, an elite and highly militant group of fighters wholly dedicated to (lesser) jihad had been established; to driving out the “corrupting” force of Western non-Islamic influence, replacing it with a fully Islamic society (Law 2009: 298). After the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, some jihadist fighters returned to their countries of origin and agitated for a return to salafism, as was the case in Egypt and Algeria. Others tried to internationalise jihad in Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, and the Philippines (Law 2009; Lee and Ben Shitrit 2014: 243). Other jihadist fighters found their way to Sudan where they were welcomed by a new government, which was itself a product of upheaval, before regrouping in Afghanistan from 1996 onwards (Law 2009: 299; 304). September 11, 2001, is classified internationally as a turning point in global security. What had begun as a surge in terrorist activity in the latter half of the 1970s as a reaction to Israeli/Arab conflicts, and in response to USA influence and patronage elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East, grew into an international phenomenon. While perhaps strictly speaking, other contributing and external variables can

26

 Salafism Lit. the return to the Quran and hadith (or sayings) for sharia. Loc.cit.

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be seen as the basis for this action, the rise of modern terrorism and the specific meaning that jihad has taken as described above, is considered a disturbance as it has altered the socio-economic-political landscape of both sub-regions, creating a window to alternative governance structures and leadership, and disrupting current ones. As a disturbance that has waxed and waned between 1970 and 2005 within the sub-regions, modern terrorism and its association with violent jihadism is considered as a “press” disturbance, acting as an underlying current with the possibility of reaching a threshold and tipping point, but more likely to act in conjunction with other variables to destabilise more immediate and closely connected systems and panarchies. As Law (2009) has perceptively pointed out, it is of interest to note that the ideas of lesser jihad have maintained an audience, independently of the individual terrorist groups themselves that developed and propagated its specific meaning and connection to ethno-nationalism and anarchist causes originally.

7.7.4  The Economic Recession of the 1980s The economic recession of the 1980s is also considered a disturbance to the focal system as its consequences changed the socio-economic and political fabric of the Middle East and North Africa. While it is in some regards expedient to “lump” all countries within these sub-regions together, and under the influence of this disturbance, in fact the countries themselves varied widely in economic and political structure, and hence the resultant effect on each was similarly diverse (Cammett 2014: 161;195). Countries across the sub-regions took different economic growth and development paths post-independence, which in turn were dependent on the kind of social structures, and natural resources available to them (Cammett 2014: 161–2; 177–178).27 To a large extent the kind of economic path preferences had already been set by colonial legacies, as in the case of Egypt’s cotton industry, Morocco’s citrus and wine industry, and Algeria’s oil export (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 21; Cammett 2014: 186). Colonial metropolises set the stage for these countries future participation in the world economic system by institutionalising the demand for those resources, and creating the networks and institutions through which these resources could be bought and sold on the international market (Cammett 2014: 186; Yousef 2004: 94). In most cases across the sub-regions, the preference of resource-­economic linked activity followed into post-independence (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 25). However, while a certain amount of continuity was retained in the choice of resource use for economic growth, in an attempt to break away from colonial  The economies in the Middle East and North Africa can be divided between oil dependent and non-oil dependent economies, and further differentiated on their political structures: oil monarchies and non-oil monarchies, oil and non-oil single party republics, and democracies. See Cammett, M., 2014., Ibid. pp. 174–181.

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legacies, most countries in North Africa and the Middle East tried to establish their own methods and strategies of development that veered away from raw material export (or agro export-led Growth) (Richards et  al. 2008: 21), and promoted an inward looking, industrialised state-led growth and development path (Cammett 2014; Richards and Waterbury 1990: 25–26). This corresponded with nationalist and Arab socialist rhetoric at the time, which stressed a broader based development agenda, as in the case of Nasserite Egypt (Gasper 2014: 49; Cammett 2014: 190). Post-independence (from the period of the 1950s through to the early 1970s) is typically identified with Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI)28 and state-led (or an “interventionist-redistributive model”) (Yousef 2004: 92) development in non-oil producing and oil-producing states alike (Cammett 2014: 189; Richards and Waterbury 1990: 26).29 These early years, especially for those with oil wealth, meant a surge in growth, income, and foreign exchange (Yousef 2004: 96; Cammett 2014: 189). The increased confidence gained from a mixture of nationalistic fervour and economic viability, culminated in the 1973 oil embargo and the so-called oil “shocks” experienced by both the main consumers in the “West” (Europe, the USA, and Japan), and oil-poor Middle Eastern countries also dependent on those sources (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 28,63). As a direct result of this, the supply of oil became defined by western European countries and the USA in terms of “security” (Bicchi 2007: 73,109), and the search for alternative sources of oil/natural gas began in order to counteract dependency and “weakness” (Bicchi 2007; Richards and Waterbury 1990: 67). The sharp rise in oil prices led to “stagflation” (recession coupled with inflation) in the developed world (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 65); the consequential recession “weakened demand” for exports from the oil producing states in the Middle East and North Africa (Richards and Waterbury 1990:65). Alternative sources of oil were discovered in Alaska and the North Sea, and the price of oil fell, leading to lost  Import Substitution Industrialisation or ISI strategies were thought to assist in economic diversification, leading states previously subject to narrowly defined growth paths and volatile markets towards a more stable growth and predictable development pattern. The idea was to invest in local industrialisation to replace dependency on (expensive) imports, and at the same time produce for export. The faillings of ISI were considered to be over-subsidised industries and neglect of rural sectors; high production costs incapable of being competitive with international markets and therefore unable to earn foreign exchange; and over-valuation of currency rates. Balance of payments crises, public deficits and rising domestic inflation ensued. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 25 and 27. 29  Jordon was an exception to the ISI adoption rule. ISI was generally pursued by oil-poor countries although a mixture of the export led/ISI was most probable, as in the case of Egypt and Tunisia. Rich, oil producing monarchies such as pre-revolutionary Iran and Saudi Arabia, also fell into this category. Saudi Arabia’s circumstances were exceptional both in the amount of oil wealth it possessed and in the small population. It was therefore able to pursue both outward and inwardlooking development strategies, combining mineral export-led growth strategies with industrialisation. In the Saudi case, this led to protectionist measures against them by the USA and western Europe when their exports became too competitive. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1990. op.cit. p. 2; and Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 190–1. 28

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income and further debt for oil producing and non-oil producing North African and Middle Eastern states alike (Bicchi 2007: 117; Cammett 2014; Hamilton 2011: 17–18).30 This, together with the ISI model of development, which weakened capacity for buying foreign exchange, led to increased borrowing from international finance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) on terms of structural adjustment and the incumbent neoliberal economic “development” ideology that went with them (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 27, 50, 257–9; Yousef 2004: 98–9; Bicchi 2007: 118–9). While increasing debt contributed towards states in both sub-regions subscribing to SAPs during this era, it was, according to Cammett (2014), a mixture of the influence of liberal economic thought by key business concerns (who stood to benefit from structural adjustment) already ensconced in situ, and initiation of Cooperation Agreements with the European Community (EC) /EU that opened the road to liberalisation in the Middle East and North Africa (Cammett 2014: 194–5). With the bilateral agreements of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of 1972 (see Chap. 4) the stage had been set for the enculturation of the North African states and those singled out in the Middle East to constitute the “Mediterranean” into an group of countries on a similar (if not entirely uniform at this point) predetermined economic, political, and social restructuring trajectory.31 By the end of 1979, renewed Cold War tensions and a shifting focus towards the East (the invasion by Soviet forces into Afghanistan) and the Gulf States (Bicchi 2007: 116), diverted attention away from North Africa and other Arab states closer to the Mediterranean Sea. Worsening socio-economic conditions, the rise of Islamism exacerbated by the recession, and the implementation of austerity measures under IMF/SAPs were subsequently “ignored”, with no adjustment in policy – even through such Cooperation Agreements – to assist.32 Moreover, much attention within the EEC was being absorbed by its newer entrants into the EC (Greece,  Other “reasons” for the ensuing imbalance that contributed to the deepening of the economic crisis were “shrinking demand for migrant labour, reduced remittance flows and a more competitive international environment”. In addition, internal controls and restrictions hindered the development of investment and manufactured exports, which in turn created asymmetries with external would-be partners. See Yousef, M., 2004. Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since the 1950. Journal of Economic Perspectives, (18)3. p. 98. 31  Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Egypt all concluded Cooperation Agreements between 1962 and 1973. Pre-Global Mediterranean Policy, these agreements opened up European Economic Community (EEC) markets on a reciprocal basis (in theory), to varying levels of concessions and a range of issues forming a preferential “pyramid”, moving to most favoured at the apex, such as Greece, to least favoured, such as Turkey. While some Agreements contained space for providing financial aid and social provisions, all were centred on trade and creating conditions for the development of economies of scale to emerge. See Richards, A., and Waterbury, J., 1991. Ibid. p. 29–30; Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 57. 32  This came in 1989 with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, but in most cases this was too late for North African and Middle Eastern states, which had already entered into a cycle of increasing authoritarian control and suppressive regimes in order to counter act resistance to structural adjustment and accompanying austerity measures. See Cavatorta, F., 2014. op.cit. p. 413–414; Bicchi, F., 2007. Ibid. p. 119. 30

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Spain, and Portugal) whose produce were comparable to non-member states in North Africa and riparian Middle Eastern states (Bicchi 2007: 117–8; Gomez 2003: 44). By the period of the mid-1980s, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco had all signed agreements of conditional financial assistance with either the World Bank or the IMF (Yousef 2004; Cammett 2014; Bicchi 2007: 119). The countries of North Africa and the Middle East were, in fact, doubly bound to their paths of liberalisation. Borrowing against terms of structural adjustment, infused with the concomitant neoliberal values, instilled the preferences of an alternative western system, which upheld economic growth and income as the bastions of development.33 “Economic opening”, or trade liberalisation (or “intifah” as it is known locally in Arabic speaking countries) (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 238; Cammett 2014: 190) meant that markets were opened to Western consumer goods, and a new business/urban class was created far removed from the majority of rural, and by comparison, “uneducated classes” that formed the baseline and majority of human capital in the region (Richards and Waterbury 1990). Structural adjustment policies would also have a detrimental effect on the eco-­ systems of those countries undertaking them, shifting emphasis away from industrialisation back to agricultural/rural, land and water use (Richards et al. 2008: 220–1). Structural adjustment policies therefore meant an entire overhaul of the socio-­ ecological fabric of any country involved in them. Cleveland and Bunton’s (2013) account of the juxtaposition of developed versus developing lifestyles, and the contrast between one and the other, is no less relevant today and worth quoting at this point. The description shows the incongruity between the values presented by the “intrusion” or projection of one socio-­economic culture into the other: A sociologist’s portrait of an Egyptian peasant relaxing with his family after a gruelling day’s work in the fields shows the jarring intrusion of foreign values into the Middle East during the 70s: The peasant is watching Egyptian television on the set his son has purchased with money earned by working abroad. The program on the screen is Dallas. During commercial breaks he ‘is told in English that he should be drinking Schweppes or dubbed in Arabic that he should use deodorant, and that all his problems are caused by having too many children’ (Cleveland and Bunton 2013:365).

In Iran this kind of socio-economic restructuring led to the counteraction of mass mobilisation and the overthrowing of the establishment. Furthermore, the entanglement of the North African countries and those of the Middle East with external  Development and economic growth are traditionally measured by GDP, and per capita income (World Bank). These measures run counter to Islamic culture (of which finance and economic gain are “morally” referential), or at least the prevalent socio-economic structures in North African/ Middle Eastern states, most of which are traditionally clan/tribal, pastoral nomads or settled/sedentary agriculturalists. Ramadan, T., 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM version] Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Kalahari.com. p. 116; Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 165; Richards, A., et al., 2008. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Third edition. Updated 2013 edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 9–10. 33

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actors such as the EC,34 the IMF, and the WB meant a deepening of ties, connectivity (or integration) and hence dependency that would forever link their development trajectories and ideals with their external partners (Cammett 2014: 161). The change over from a state-led redistributive model of government to private sector driven/structural adjustment, created dissatisfaction and disappointment in local populations that still believed (from the colonial/WWII era) that the state was primarily responsible for providing growth and development (Cammett 2014: 172; 188; Yousef 2004: 99; Richards and Waterbury 1990; Yousef 2004: 99). Furthermore, the added emphasis on “economic growth” and debt repayment through increased business enterprises, touting for foreign investment, and private-­ led economic diversification, meant that the ecological aspects of sustainability and balanced management of resources were neglected. Emphasis on availability in “the here and now” were accentuated, to the detriment of long-term sustainability.35 The economic recession during the period of the 1980s interacted with pre-­ existing localised conditions already described, and although the range and degree of effect varied according to the particular extant politico-economic structure, all countries of North Africa and the Middle East here defined as the Mediterranean/ UfM members were affected sociologically, politically, economically, and as a result ecologically. By the end of the 1980s, most countries in both sub-regions were on the road to structural readjustment and involved with international financial institutions and/or the European Economic Community (EEC). The changes that needed to be made  – austerity measures, less provided by the state and more by private sectors – created further unemployment, social developmental negligence, and poverty, as small local businesses collapsed, food prices rose due to the withdrawal of subsidies, and as a result, animosity and distrust of the state grew. A particular form of political activism arose, Islamism, to fill in the gaps left by the state/ government withdrawal from its role as social adjudicator and administrator of “justice” in people’s lives. In turn, the states/governments tended to become authoritarian and distrustful of its populations increasing in number and poverty. The period of economic recession in the 1980s in this manner, disturbed and restructured the socio-ecological system of the Middle East and North Africa.

 Tunisia was the first country to begin to liberalise its economy in 1972, with others such as Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt with the assistance of the IMF in the mid-1980s and 1990s. Tunisia and Algeria had been assisted through Association Agreements with the EEC in 1963. Cammett, M., 2014. The Political Economy of Development in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 197. Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco’s relations with the EC started as far back as 1969 with commercial-based Cooperation Agreements. See country profiles of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) [online] http://www.medea.be/en/medea/message-from-the-president/ 35  So called “rentier” state and “Dutch Disease” in many cases was prevalent in oil producing states, but not exclusive to them. The major drawbacks for countries that succumbed to so-called Dutch disease was the over reliance on a particular sector for economic growth and therefore lack of diversification and stability. Other long-term effects of over-use and dependency are the depletion of eco-system services. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. op.cit. p. 13; Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 902, Note 10. 34

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7.7.5  Arab/Israeli Conflicts Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is geographically placed “properly” in the Middle East, because of numerous attempts at a collective regionalisation and integration of the Middle East encompassing North Africa (the current set of policy frameworks included), it has come to affect the relations there, most notably in the ability to make progress with the Barcelona Process. It is for this reason it is included here as a “press” disturbance. What began as a mixture of betrayal, international politics and allegiance bargaining between British, Arab, and the Zionist movements post-WWI at the beginning of the twentieth century (Best et al. 2008) quickly developed into what can be viewed as a struggle of emerging identities between pan-Arabism and individual nationalisms, Arab and Zionist nationalisms, and finally of Islam as an identity. These strands of conflict were contrived, exacerbated, and manipulated by the Cold War framework that erupted after WWII. The 1948 war in the Middle East established the state of Israel but conversely left Palestinians without one. The lack of institutional consolidation and representation, a firm sense of national identity, together with perhaps an ill-advised boycott of further discussions with the United Nations Commission on Palestine (UNCOP), meant that Palestinians were poorly placed to argue for any advantages for themselves. Palestinian society was at the time organised around family, clans, and tribes, and their formal political organisation was loose (Best et al. 2004). In addition, the Balfour Declaration, which recognised the place for a Jewish “national home” within Palestinian boundaries (Best et al. 2008: 112–113), had been included in the mandate of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Israelis or Zionist nationalists at the time, however, had a variety of institutions and organisations that organised their lives from socio-economic to religious and security details (Best et al. 2008). It took the 1967 Six Day War and the humiliating defeat of Arab forces for Palestinians to unite against a shared cause and gain an identity. The dream of pan-­ Arabism was fading fast and the need to coalesce around an alternative “Palestinian” identity or at least an identity of [the] “oppressed” established itself through necessity. Arab states had up until that point used the Palestinian issue to vie for attention and legitimacy between themselves, seeing it as a political rallying point for pan-­ Arabism, but only when (politically) expedient. In this sense the Palestinian/Israeli debate galvanised pan-Arabism, but later created more divisions when the idea of pan-Arabism failed against the backdrop of Cold war rivalries. At about the same time as the 1967 defeat, the rise of Islamism (political activism based on a shared Islamic identity) began. It was seen to emerge from the failure of the pan-Arabism movement (Law 2009: 282). The tenets of Islam and what became Islamism provided ground level assistance to local communities, but also condemned (atheist) communism and what it perceived as “corrupted” officials in government positions who were “un-Islamic”. Islamic groups began to emerge as a “the third” way alternative between corrupt government official and western influence, creating an identity built on socio-political and religious symmetry through

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Islam (Law 2009). The USA (eventually) provided support to both Israel and Islamic groups across the sub-regions as a counter-insurgency measure in states that were openly supported by the USSR.

7.7.6  The Iranian Revolution (1979) The 1979 Iranian Revolution that saw the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (Shah), changed the dynamics of the two sub-regions and inspired other Islamic movements around the world (Gasper 2014). It also galvanised the politicisation of Islam with the changes made in the new constitution introduced after the Revolution (Best et al. 2004; Held and Cummings 2011; Boroujerdi 2014: 478). In the words of Marc Lynch (2014: 388), the Revolution “dramatically unsettled the region”, and created division and insecurity amongst its leaders that would have further repercussions for unity and the pan-Arab agenda (Bicchi 2007). The Revolution is also recognised as a “seminal event” (Gasper 2014: 64) in the history of political Islam, garnering popularity for its cause and eventually spreading worldwide (Law 2009).36 For this reason, although outside of the UfM focal system both policy-wise and geographically, it is included here as a “pulse” disturbance. The new “theocratic republic”37 (Held and Cummings 2011: 574) was fiercely anti-Western and in particular, anti-USA, which it saw as the “puppet-master” (Lewis 2003: 60) of the previous leader, Mohammed Reza Shah (Held and Cummings 2011; Best et al. 2008: 288; Lewis 2003: 60–61). Iran, overnight became an adversary rather than an ally in the contested Cold War; oil-rich and as a geo-­ strategic area, it potentially threatened security and access to oil (Held and Cummings 2011; Boroujerdi 2014; Best et al. 2008: 288; 330).38 Iran furthermore, 36  Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the founder of Hezbollah in Lebanon called for the same kind of revolution to set up an Islamic state, and also inspired the take-over of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia in November of 1979. See Law, R. D., 2009. Ibid. pp. 288 and 289. 37  The “theocratic republic” was  – and is  – considered to be both Islamic and democratic. Governance, according to Shi’a Islam, the kind practised in Iran, is deemed to be divine; sovereignty “lies with God”. Democracy for the Iranians, was considered to be based on religion, equality, and justice. The ulema (trained interpreters of Holy-law) can only interpret god’s will, and according to this logic, are the rightful leaders of the political/legal/economic systems that is Islamic society. The kind of government structure in Iran that hence came about after the Revolution, was therefore a mixture of religious Islamic belief and “democratic traditions” inherited from Reza Pahlavi’s Iran, and created institutions which separated individual rights and electoral rights (the president, members of parliament, the Assembly of Experts, local city and village councils). Previous institutions were kept and new ones introduced that reinforced the new Iran. For example, the Revolutionary Guard was established in addition to the existing army. See Boroujerdi, M., 2014. Iran. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 484–5; Lewis, B., 2003. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] New  York: Random House. Kalahari.com. p. 21–22. 38  The USA became the “Great Satan”. See Held, C.C., and Cummings, J. T., 2011. Middle East Patterns: Places, People, and Politics. Fifth edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 597.

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proclaimed an outward looking foreign policy “exporting the revolution” beyond its borders (Boroujerdi 2014: 502). 39 The Revolution created fear of its spreading to other countries within the region (Lynch 2014). As a result, governments in the region became more oppressive, clamping down on political opposition (Lynch 2014; Gasper 2014: 64–65).40 Riding on the same wave of suspicion and insecurity caused by the Revolution, it was not surprising that with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 that most Arab states (with the exception of Syria) sided with Iraq, dividing the sub-­ regions further (Lynch 2014: 388; Boroujerdi 2014). 41 The Revolution pre-empted a change in USA foreign policy at the time and a “hardening” towards its adversary the USSR (Best et al. 2008: 288–9), and especially following the taking of USA diplomats as hostage in November of the same year by supporters of the self-proclaimed “Supreme Leader”, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.42 This coincided with a growing conservatism both within Iran (with the subsequent resignation of the more moderate Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister), and without in the neo-conservative rhetoric of Ronald Reagan’s new administration in the USA (1981), and the end of a détente period in the overall Cold War (Best et al. 2004: 281–2). The Revolution also produced effects in other parts of the so-called Third World, as the slackening of oil production pushed prices up and required those states to borrow heavily from international institutions such as the IMF and the WB, opening those countries to rounds of structural adjustments as conditions of the loans (Best et al. 2004: 282; 322). This in turn created a positive (increasing) feedback, perpetuating instability, discontent, and unpopularity with domestic constituents.

 Boroujerdi calls this “Islamic internationalism”. It was only much later that the realisation of its national priorities and the confines of the state within the international state system curbed its fervour for ideological export, and Iran became more “pragmatic” in its approach to international relations. See Boroujerdi, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 502. 40  In states where communism or left-leaning opposition were evident, governments saw mileage in supporting Islamist movements, which expressed distrust of the western-inspired atheistic communism. Eventually however, Islamist groups turned against their sponsors (as in the case of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the same year, the same governments were only too pleased to have an outlet to divert them to, organised by the USA-led counter insurgency against the Soviets. See Gasper, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 65; Moran, D., 2001. Wars of National Liberation. London: Cassell. p. 235. 41  The Gulf Cooperation Council was established to co-ordinate responses to the “new” Iran. See Lynch, M., 2013. Regional International Relations. In Lust, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 388; Held, C. C., and Cummings, J. T., 2011. op.cit. p. 225. 42  The Supreme Leader enforced the religiosity of the state. The Ayatollah is Head of State, Spiritual Guide of the Nation, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and “protector of the faith”. See Held, C. C. and Cummings, J. T., 2011. Ibid. p. 573–4; and Boroujerdi, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 484. 39

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7.7.7  The Invasion of Afghanistan (1979) The resultant turmoil and stress created by the overthrow of the Reza Pahlavi’s regime, and its replacement with a theocratic “democracy”, together with the support Islamist groups were garnering from anti-communist/Soviet governments via the USA, inspired Islamic movements elsewhere in the region and beyond (Best et al. 2004; Lynch 2014). The Revolution, together with the USA-led insurgency in Afghanistan and their eventual “victory”, spurred the further development of political Islam (it “energised Islamic militants”) (Gasper 2014: 66), and the institutionalisation of fund raising through formerly apolitical mosques, which would later form part of its infrastructure, supporting further “anti-imperialist” insurgencies (Gasper 2014: 66). The counter-insurgency in Afghanistan steered by the USA – even to the extent of producing a booklet urging Muslims across the world to support the “jihad” in Afghanistan (Gasper 2014: 64) – helped create transnational networks of Islamic fighters to do the same (Lynch 2014: 388; Law 2009: 296). This would later provide Al-Qaeda (translated as “the base”) the foundation from which to co-ordinate its efforts against the USA, prompting a second invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, this time led directly by the USA. Saudi Arabia had long been a pivotal country for the USA’s influence in the region against communist expansion during the Cold War (Menoret 2014: 760). The relationship with the USA had been a strategic one established during WWII (1943)43 and one which informed the “neo-triangular trade”.44 Committed to supporting the USA in the Cold War and countering communism, Saudi Arabia sent financial support and mobilised Islamic networks to do the same in Afghanistan. It was also seen as a way of exporting those (extremist) elements as far away as possible (Lynch 2014; Moran 2001: 235). It is for this reason that the invasion of Afghanistan is considered to be a “pulse-­ to-­press” disturbance in the focal system, as although begun as an external “pulse” event, it had turned into a press disturbance that had affected conditions in the countries of the UfM. The sub-cultures of lesser or – perhaps more succinctly – violent jihad now associated specifically with anarchist “terrorism” (Gelvin 2008) and al Qaeda, has spread into North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, and parts of sub-­ Saharan Africa as well.

 Saudi Arabia became part of the 1941 Lend-Lease programme. See Menoret, P., 2014. Saudi Arabia. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 759–760. 44  Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Western Europe formed the “triangle”, to provide cheap oil and air force bases to the west. See Menoret, P., 2014. op.cit. p. 760. 43

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7.7.8  I ntegrationalism: Issues Raised Through Successive Policy Initiatives/EU Towards the Mediterranean Integrationalism has been defined as the methodology and methods of expanding the EU’s foreign policy and interests. Issue areas that have developed over time in EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean have been identified as trade and economic concerns (through liberalisation of capital and integration), and changing perceptions of security and threats to EU space, relative to the Mediterranean region. Throughout the history of EEC/ EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean/MENA region, proximity to EU space has remained a pivotal and key component of design. Structural stability, political and social reform (democratic governance and observances of human rights) was formally introduced later in the Barcelona Declaration, along with intra-regional integration of the overall focal system (physical or infrastructural – roads, transport, energy, and telecommunication integration) and fully fledged integrationalism, which includes integration methodology or ideas and the beliefs of how integration should be accomplished. Security issues in EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean have widened from the perception of military to non-military threats since the end of the Cold War. Immigration has become the reference point for the linkages and evolution of subsequent security threat perceptions. In the Barcelona Process, soft (non-military) and hard (military/state directed threats) security issues were brokered but found no support or traction either in cooperation from the Mediterranean partners or from the EU through negative conditionality. Keeping people in their countries of origin was seen as the way to ensure they did not immigrate into Europe. This meant establishing a better environment at home through economic growth and opportunities for an expanding youthful population (something that still resonates in current EU foreign policy, and more recently addressed in the Joint Africa-EU Summits of 2014 and 201745). Social and political development still took a back seat to economic concerns in the approach to developing countries in the Mediterranean. Post-9/11 and, the perception of threats from the Mediterranean changed once again and “irregular” immigration became linked in policy to the spread of international crime, smuggling of illegal goods, people, and human trafficking, the spread of radicalised Islam, and its expression through terror tactics or terrorism. The European Security Strategy (2003) repositioned itself and turned the development/ security perception on its head, focusing rather on conflict prevention, where there could be no development without stability or security first. Structural stability (the

 General Secretariat of the Council Press Office EU-Africa Summit Brussels 2014 Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration 2–3 April 2014, Brussels. [online] https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/4th-africa-eu-summit; African Union – European Union Summit 2017 AU-EU/Decl.1(V) Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. Declaration 29–30 November, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/our-events/5th-au-eu-summit

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focus on political reform and the adoption of democratic government practices and observances of human rights) were found in more concentrated forms in the Work Programme of 2005. With the launch of the UfM, and the embracing of the Barcelona Declaration and acquis, environmental concerns, a result of acknowledge effects of climate change, have been added to the range of possible threats to stability and security in the Mediterranean, and by extension to EU territory.

7.7.9  The Gulf Wars: 1990 (Kuwait) and 2003 (Iraq) The Gulf War of 1990 and the Iraq invasion of 2003 changed the socio-political and economic landscape of North Africa and the Middle East and, once again, even as it originated outside of the strictly defined focal system, is here considered a “pulse” disturbance as its effects reverberated into UfM member states. The Gulf War of 1990 divided the Arab states between those who supported the USA and those who did not, and by default supported Iraq.46 This fragmentation and counter-attempts to create unity or collective action within the region, actually resulted in further distrust between Arab states (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 448).47 The economic effects of the Gulf War (1990) would affect surrounding countries economically directly and indirectly, as well as causing political instability. A combination of factors and circumstances contributed to the eventual invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. The USA’s previous backing of Iraq against Iran, and the seeming disinterest on the part of the USA in events unfolding between Israel and the Palestinians, led Saddam Hussein to believe that the USA would not retaliate for Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 448; Best et al. 2008: 489).48 Best et al. (2008) and the memoirs of Yevgeny Primakov (2009)49 are both highly instructive on the reasons for Hussein’s over-confidence in this regard: …Saddam Hussein interpreted a meeting he had with the American ambassador, April Glaspie, on 25th July 1990 as signalling that the United States would not intervene should Iraq invade Kuwait, as Washington did not wish to get involved in inter-Arab disputes. Taking into consideration prior invasions and occupations by other Middle Eastern Players and the lack of any Western or Arab reaction, Saddam calculated there would ultimately be acquiescence as long as the oil flow was not disrupted (Best et al. 2008: 491).

 Made up of the United States, Britain, France, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. See Al-Awadi, H., 2014. Kuwait. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 595. 47  For example, the Arab Fund ceased to function due to the split in allegiances, as well as the OPEC itself. Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 387 and 56. 48  In addition, the US had granted a substantial amount of “agricultural credits,” and to all accounts could have been said to be “courting” Iraq. Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 448. 49  Yevgeny Primakov, former head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Russia (1998–99). 46

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…Before launching his invasion, Saddam met the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, and asked her how the United States would respond to Iraq’s endeavour to settle a territorial dispute with Kuwait. Glaspie replied that this was ‘an internal matter for the Arabs’ (Primakov 2009: 316).

To add to this, past dealings with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had given Saddam Hussein confidence in the “dual containment” foreign policy towards the Middle East, where the balance between Iran was offset against Iraq (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 506–7).50 Saddam Hussein’s over-confidence ignored the importance of President George H. W. Bush’s ideal of the “New World Order”, however, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 448; 450; Wenger and Zimmermann 2003:232). While many would cite the issues of securing the flow of oil and creating a “balance” in the Middle East as reasons for so readily defending the sovereignty of Kuwait, the then uni-polar world fronted by the USA was equally just as anxious to show its conviction and the validity of collective security arrangements in the “New World Order” (Best et al. 2008: 494–5).51 Both prior conflicts in the region, the Iran-Iraq war (1982–1988) and the first Intifada (1987–2000) also contributed to the rationale behind Iraq’s motivation for the invasion of Kuwait. The colonial dispute over land divisions originally drawn by the British (intentionally made to leave restricted access in either Iraqi or Iranian hands of the Persian Gulf) (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 446; 190; Best et al. 2008: 489), had been continually contested by Iraq from its independence (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 446).52 Iraq, moreover, was heavily in debt to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who had helped fund the Iraq war effort. Both states refused to cancel the debt, totalling $80 billion (Richards et al. 2008: 306).53 In addition, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-set oil quotas were – according to Iraq and “other oil producing Arab states” (Cleveland and Bunton 2013)  – being ignored;54 the prices per barrel of oil were being lowered through “flooding” the market (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 447; Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 231;

 In Yevgeny Primakov’s memoirs, he recalls Saddam’s belief in his “lucky star”, the USA, and his part in its “foreign policy of containment”. Primakov asserts that even until the end, Hussein believed that there would be some final reprieve, stating that only Iraq, and he, could stand up to Iran. Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 315–319. 51  The Gulf Crisis was to be the “crucible of the New World Order”. Wenger, A., and Zimmerman. D., 2003. International Relations: From the Cold War to the Globalized World. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. p. 237. 52  Not the first time since its independence. The first occasion, it may be noted, took place after the coup d’état in 1958, which brought Abd al-Qasim to power. See Kerr, M.H., 1971. Ibid. p. 20. 53  The amount varies between $13-60-80 billion. In any event the amount was considerable enough to create pressure on Hussein’s regime. See also Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 446; Al-Awadi, H., 2014. op.cit. p. 595; Best, A., et al., Ibid. p. 489. 54  This had been a point of controversy for Saudi Arabia as the primary producer within OPEC, since the production quotas had been instigated in 1986. Interestingly, Iraq had been amongst those who openly abused the system. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 56. 50

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Davis 2014: 521).55 The resulting economic constraints prohibited Iraq from pursuing reconstruction and recovery in their post-war period with Iran, and led to internal unrest and a coup attempt in 1989.56 In addition to this, the Iraqi army, made up of the majority Shi’ite population,57 were proving hard to re-integrate back into the socio-economic landscape after the Iran-Iraq war (Richards et al. 2008: 306; Best et al. 2008: 489).58 The prospect of demobilisation versus leading “an Arab crusade” (Richards et al. 2008: 306) would have appeared to alleviate this problem (Richards et al. 2008: 306). Moreover, the added oil revenue from the captured Kuwaiti territory would have significantly increased Iraqi oil revenue and given it a major share of world oil, enabling it to gain control over price regulation (Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 231; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 447; Best et al. 2008: 490). All of these considerations made the decision to invade Kuwait necessary and possible without any serious backlash, or so Saddam Hussein believed at the time. The ineffectiveness of the PLO’s efforts to negotiate with Israel led them to align their cause with Saddam Hussein’s regime (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 445). Hussein in turn used the Arab/Israeli cause to further rally support around the invasion of Kuwait. As the war between coalition forces and Iraq began, Arab populations were confronted with the double standards of the New World Order, which reacted multilaterally and strongly to “free” Kuwait from occupation, but refused to find the same kind of collective action or will to pressurise Israel to withdraw from either Gaza or the West Bank (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 449). The connection between the two issues (the settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the occupation of Palestine) was skilfully crafted by Hussein, who once the war began, retaliated to coalition confrontation by firing SS-1 “Scud” missiles into Israel, associating the conflict to the Arab-Israeli cause even more in the minds of the Arab populations (Best et al. 2008: 491).59 Iraq, tactically thereafter, became the standard-bearer for the Palestinian cause (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 446; 451).

 Hussein’s regime also accused Kuwait of “slant-drilling”, and “stealing” $2.4  billion in oil. Kuwait later admitted abusing the quota system. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 446–7. See also Al-Awadi, H., Ibid. p. 595. 56  According to Eric Davis, the manipulation of oil prices through over-production (and against the OPEC quota) was deliberate on the part of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who were afraid of Iraqi military power and wished to counteract what they assumed would be an amassing of “might” against them. That the over-production of oil was deliberate was  a view apparently shared by Saddam Hussein at the time. See Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 316; and Davis, E., 2014. op.cit.. p. 521. 57  Estimates of the Iraqi population put the ruling Sunni population at roughly 20% occupying the central region, with Shi’a and Kurdish populations existing predominantly in the Southern regions and the North respectively, making up the remainder. Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 514. 58  As per the majority of the population, the Shi’a community made up the majority of the Iraqi army. Saddam Hussein was particularly sensitive to the possibility of being ousted by a Shi’a uprising. See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 489. 59  Saddam Hussein even went so far as to bargain withdrawal from Kuwait, with Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank. See Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 449. 55

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The after-effects of the war lasted at least until the following invasion of 2003.60 The UN’s cease-fire agreement (contained in UN Security Council Resolution 687) specified the conditions by which Saddam Hussein needed to abide. One condition was the handing over of all and any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons Iraq may have had. Hussein’s stubbornness61 in cooperating with the UN inspectors (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament  – UNSCOM) led to the existing import/export bans (including oil) and other economic sanctions – acknowledged as some of the “harshest set of sanctions ever imposed on a modern state” (Davis 2014: 521) – remaining in place (Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 234).62 It also led to further distrust and suspicion that Iraq was hiding more weapons (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 455). As a result of these sanctions, further debt incurred from the war effort was compounded. Immediately after the war, Iraq experienced major uprisings in the north and south63 of the country, from both returning “resentful” soldiers, and Kurdish insurgents fighting for autonomy from Iraq (Davis 2014: 521). 64 Both uprisings were eventually put down, with the latter rebellion instigating a flood of refugees to Iran, Turkey, and into the “inhospitable mountain” region in the North of Iraq, creating a humanitarian disaster during which  many people died (Davis 2014: 508; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 452; 453; Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 234). The infrastructure of the country, railways, hospitals, schools, water systems, and electrical distribution had been destroyed by the war (Richards et al. 2008: 104; Cleveland and Bunton 2013:456). Infant mortality rose sharply as a result of poor hygiene and malnutrition, becoming an internationally recognised humanitarian

 “…the Iraq war left Iraq with eleven years’ worth of economic sanctions”. Gasper, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 61; Wenger, A., and Zimmerman, D., 2003. op.cit. p. 233. 61  According to Yevgeny Primakov’s account of this saga, there was some evidence to support the fact that the UN commission was not “impartial”, and that during Richard Butler’s tenure as head of the commission, the CIA were actively looking for information that could lead to “toppling” the Iraqi leader. In addition, according to Tim Weiner, the UN Commission investigators let in after the Gulf War included amongst its ranks CIA officers. See Wiener, T., 2008. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. London: Penguin Books. p. 495; and Primakov, Y., 2009. Ibid. p. 318. 62  The only exceptions made were for medicine, food and “other items” deemed “humanitarian” items of assistance, although due to the “dual-use items” list, which included certain chemicals (such as sodium fluoride for example), and “spare parts for power, water and sanitation”, this actually excluded far more with increasingly adverse consequences for the re-building and reconstruction of vital infrastructure. In addition, Iraq was only allowed to sell restricted amounts of oil, its revenue controlled and regulated by a United Nations bank. Whatever was left after paying off its obligations under the cease-fire agreement, was siphoned off by Saddam Hussein’s elite clique. Both his sons became notorious for their ability to circumvent the sanctions, auctioning off oil and pocketing the proceeds. See Cleveland, W.  L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p.  455–6. See also Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 521, and Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 104. 63  In some texts referred to as the “intifada”. See Davis, E., 2014. Loc.cit. 64  According to some sources, these uprisings had been “courted” by the USA during the war, but immediately “dropped” once the cease-fire was in place, leaving both groups of insurgents to Hussein’s forces. See Wenger, A., and Zimmerman, D., 2003. Ibid. p. 234; and Wiener, T., 2008. op.cit. p. 395. 60

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issue (Richards et al. 2008: 104; 401; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 456). Economic and administrative control of the Iraqi state eventually became a patchy and irregular affair (Richards et al. 2008: 306). Subsequent pressures on Saddam Hussein’s regime from these uprisings led to a “re-tribalisation” and emphasis at the political level on ethnicity in an attempt to “divide and rule”, and make (political) control easier. It would later lead to further social (and political) fragmentation and violence, especially as the later invasion and occupation of Iraq by British and American coalition forces initially reinforced these structures (Davis 2014: 521;522). As a result of the split in allegiances between Arab states, some states were penalised for their pro-Iraqi stance, and others were rewarded for their support of the coalition by the international community.65 This reverberated within and between Arab states’ relations: those who supported the Gulf war coalition expelled immigrant workers of those countries who were  seen to be pro-Iraq (Jordan, Libya, Palestine, and Yemen).66 The returning workers to their countries of origin meant two things. First, there were no longer remittances being sent back as part income of those states (Cammett 2014: 198),67 and, secondly, the so-called “returnees” (Richards et  al. 2008: 401) created disruption in the local social, economic (and subsequently ecological), fabric (Richards et  al. 2008: 401). Some returning migrants had been away for so long they no longer had strong connections in their home countries and ended up in separate “makeshift camps” (Richards et al. 2008: 401). Those returning from Saudi Arabia for example, also tended to return “radicalised” and “out of synchronicity” with the local populations, creating more unrest and disruption amongst the local youth in situ (Richards et al. 2008: 401).68 Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia69 suffered economical, and in the case of Kuwait, environmental and infrastructural fallout from the war (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 458).70 The low oil prices and inability to create revenue led these states to run budget deficits and liquidate foreign investments (2013: 457–8). As a result both countries were unable to keep up their levels of social support in exchange for political 65  Egypt received debt relief to the value of $20 billion. Sudan however, lost its financial support from the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID), an instrument of the Arab Fund. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. pp. 250 and 387. 66  For Yemen, an “agro-poor” country reliant on diaspora remittances for its foreign exchange, the Gulf War had a devastating effect. Through diaspora remittances Jordan had become accustomed to receiving $1.3 billion per year. See Richards, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 68; Brand, L. A., 2014. Ibid. p. 567. 67  Jordan reportedly “lost” the equivalent of $1.3 billion per year due to expelled nationals working in other states. Brand, L. A., 2014. Loc.cit. 68  First time job entrants were left to compete with seasoned and skilled returning workers, which heightened tensions between those extant and those returning. Richards, A., et  al., 2008. Ibid. p. 401. 69  Jordan was penalised economically for not joining the coalition against Iraq, resulting in a 17% economic “shrinkage”. Cammett, M., 2014. Ibid. p. 163. 70  The retreating Iraqi forces set fire to oil fields and destroyed public properties. See Cleveland, W.L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 459; Wenger, A., and Zimmerman, D., 2003. Ibid. p. 235.

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acquiescence from their populations. The Kuwaiti people suffered in situ, while the royal family “sat out” the war in Saudi Arabia in apparent luxury and comfort. On their return the local population was resentful and restless and political adjustments had to be made (Richards et al. 2008: 315). In Saudi Arabia the USA’s armed forces appeared to outstay their welcome, leading to a resentment that spawned the rise of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad, Islamic activism, and the expulsion of USA forces from Saudi Arabia (Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 299; Gasper 2014: 61). The gap between the government and its popular masses, the “governance gap”, seemed ever wider with the states in question (pro-coalition) resorting to repressive tactics to retain the status quo. After the war, however, the USA was able to persuade Arab countries to stop supporting the PLO and discuss peace (Wenger and Zimmermann 2003: 299), leading to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 (Cavatorta 2014: 407). The disjuncture between the Arab states’ rulers and the attitudes of their populations became apparent, with the latter being majorly pro-Iraq, and the governments acting as hosts and helpers to the coalition forces (Cavatorta 2014: 410). 7.7.9.1  Gulf War/Invasion of Iraq (2003) The period between the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and what is commonly now referred to as the “invasion” of Iraq in 2003, was characterised by a continual testing of boundaries and strength between the USA, and the stubbornness of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. For a time, the UN was still used as an intermediary in the prelude to this second war, but its role was soon bypassed as USA interests out-­ weighed and out-grew the constrictions and usefulness of its dynamics. During this time, the USA’s international influence managed to maintain sufficient suspicions of Iraq’s capabilities of developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), its remaining weaponry from the Gulf War in 1990, and the possibility and willingness to hand over such weapons to al Qaeda (after the 9/11 attacks), to preserve stringent sanctions in place. Tensions between Iraq and UNSCOM reached an impasse, and in 1998 the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) carried out air strikes on Iraq intending to coerce Iraq into allowing the weapons inspectors to continue their mission. This backfired drastically with Iraq refusing to cooperate any further. Thereafter a continuous low-­ scale conflict or “war of attrition” was in effect up until the invasion of 2003 (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 506–7). There was, as a result, no longer any way of monitoring what was actually happening inside Iraq, which enabled further fuelling of suspicions and the eventual manipulation of “intelligence” by the USA “proving” that Iraq did indeed have WMDs (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 507). By the time of the invasion, continual bombing by the USA and its allies, together with sanctions, had begun to unravel the USA’s image in the minds of the Arab states and its populations, especially as the USA apparently continued to turn a blind eye to the continual transgressions of UNSCR 1397 and UNSCR 1402 on the Israel/Palestine ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Ramallah/Palestine at the time.

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After the events of 9/11, the USA increased its pressure on its allies and the UN, reporting a link (later to be without basis) between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Primakov 2009: 357–8). The UN finally granted resolution 1441 (2002), which framed an ultimatum to Iraq to surrender all of WMDs and to allow the UN inspectors to verify it (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 510). With the support of Britain, the USA issued its own ultimatum and then declared that Iraq was “in breach” of Resolution 1441; the USA proceeded with “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 510). The following occupation by the UK and the USA (recognised by the UN in 2003) could be deemed to have been an unmitigated disaster for the Iraqi people and for the USA as far as public or international relations was concerned, especially when no WMDs came to light. The USA and its allies, in both Arab and Iraqi public opinion, could not have been perceived in a poorer light, and a few months into the occupation the coalition forces were met with anger and resistance (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 511). After years of sanctions, Iraqi social, economic, and political structures had become over-extended, erratic, and moribund; families were displaced and a culture of “spying” and distrust had been sown under Saddam Hussein’s regime, then itself under the pressure of external constraints and sanctions (Davis 2014; Cleveland and Bunton 2013). The occupying forces of the USA and the UK thereafter were unable to maintain sufficient levels of safety and security, and so confined their administrative occupation to “safe-havens” while relegating those outside these spaces to criminality, violence, and general lawlessness (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 511). A further poor decision was made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of administering Iraq post-occupation, to dismiss the national army and police force therefore compounding the already unstable situation and releasing from duty, trained, and now highly resentful militia, into the growing number of unemployed Iraqis (Best et al. 2008: 528; Primakov 2009: 362; Davis 2014: 522). Their numbers were to further swell the ranks of insurgent groups that took advantage of the security vacuum, and contributed to the rise in sectarian violence that characterised the years between 2004 and 2007 (Davis 2014; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 512–3). Private security firms (such as the infamous “Blackwater”) (Avant 2008:426), and other heavy-handed tactics employed by USA’s military (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 513; Whitworth 2008: 114) undermined any kind of validity that “operation freedom” had rhetorically, at the start of the invasion. The ensuing state that was created under USA administrative guidance institutionalised a political culture of ethnic division and neoliberal economic principles, which further exacerbated the fragmented conditions, laying-off public sector jobs and eradicating established subsidies (Davis 2014: 523). American companies, furthermore, were given the task of rebuilding infrastructure without consultation with the local population as to their requirements, adding to dissatisfaction, concerns of relevance, and legitimacy (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 511; Davis 2014: 524).71

 This was later rectified through the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) using Iraqi input, but still, however, using “US technical expertise”. See Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 524.

71

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The war also created more refugees, fleeing into neighbouring states (estimates put the numbers at between 400,000 and 500,000 immigrants),72 which created further instability regionally.73 Post-economic recovery and security was biased, therefore, towards American companies and private military armies or companies (Davis 2014: 524; Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 511). With American attention focussed on the occupation in Iraq, Iran was now observed to have made strides in its nuclear capability, again raising suspicions that Iran was attempting to construct its own nuclear arsenal (Best et al. 2008: 530).74 With a Shi’a government now in power in Iraq, in spite of the ethno-confessional model installed by the CPA, Iran gained further leverage becoming “the region’s most powerful external actor in Iraq” (Davis 2014: 534). 75 Taking advantage of the animosity and “embarrassment” created by the catastrophe that became Iraq, Russia and China were also able to make significant headway in the Middle East region (Best et al. 2008; Cavatorta 2014: 424). Both the Gulf Wars and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 created rifts in the social, economic, and ecological landscape of the Middle East sub-region. With the disruption of political structures came the breakdown of any formal organisation of economy and structured distribution, leading Richards et  al. (2008) to admit that there were “no ready labels” to describe what the Iraqi economy and infrastructure had become (Richards et  al. 2008: 306). Formal economic breakdown led to the chaotic, random (or informal) kind, which tended to accompany violence, looting, the smuggling of ancient artefacts and of oil (Davis 2014: 522). Hussein’s regime had undermined social networks through his creation of the “spy state”, and his numerous changing of political paths (re-tribalisation post-1991, and even feigned religiosity at one point) (Davis 2014: 521) in turn created distrust between citizen and state and other locally based institutions, and between families and extended networks (Richards et  al. 2008: 405). Social breakdown now co-joined with the physical infrastructural breakdown that had been left by continual bombing and international sanctions. Waves of refugees made their way into neighbouring states straining their internal reserves and infrastructures. At the regional level and at the level of the Barcelona Process /Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), in spite of the fact that Iraq is not a member, Jordan and Syria had signed agreements and had active if not volatile relations with the EU, taking the brunt of the fallout in refugees and revenue loss (from the Gulf war). Both the

 Other estimates put Iraqi refugees at 100,000 per month. See Best, A., et al., 2008. Ibid. p. 529.  Unlike the previous influx of immigrants after the Gulf War of 1991, however, these refugees were poor and downtrodden from the years of sanctions. They added significantly to Jordanian social and economic woes, creating housing pressures and price increases. Brand, L.A., 2014. Ibid. p. 567–8. 74  By 2008 it was reported that Iran had over 3000 functional centrifuges in Natanz. See Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. Ibid. p. 516. 75  Post-2010 parliament elections, Iraqi candidates (“political actors”) went to Iran for guidance from Iranian leaders. They therefore became instrumental in the formation of the new Iraqi government. See Davis, E., 2014. Ibid. p. 534. 72 73

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Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq created divisions among the Arab states, from North Africa to the Middle East and Gulf. States that supported USA/British/external intervention were rewarded with aid and debt relief, and those who did not were excluded and penalised. Calls for Arab integration from the EU, in the form of the Barcelona Process /Euro-Mediterranean Agreements for example, were challenged by such disturbances as well as by the bi-multilateralism policy format. Moreover, the emphasis on oil as the primary resource of the region, led to the conceptual construction of oil as a “weapon”, and therefore as leverage in international relations between states. With the invasion of Iraq, the USA’s policy moved away from one where it contrived to “contain” relations through politicking and strategic balancing only, to direct control over what it perceived as material interests (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 506). In this change, the line was drawn under how important oil as a resource and “oil wealth” had become for the USA, as well as perceptions and projections of strength.

7.7.10  A  lgerian Elections 1990 and Civil War: The “Black Decade” The Algerian elections of 1990 and their annulment by the government that held power, the National Liberation Front (FLN), are considered a “pulse” disturbance here as they triggered the civil war that followed from 1992–2000, and also reinforced further distrust of “Western” influences and calls for economic and political liberalisation and democracy. Moreover, the suppression of Islamist activism in Algeria, actually spurred its cultivation elsewhere in the sub-region. The combination of isolationism and culture of repressive institutionalism internally, however, has since made Algeria “stable” among the array of crumbling regimes around it since 2010. Algeria’s post-independence political leadership gained its legitimacy from the armed struggle against France. Ahmed Ben Bella, a resistance leader and Algeria’s first president, was overthrown in 1965 by Houari Boumediene. Between the periods of office of the two leaders, Algeria effectively became a one-party state that espoused a left-leaning ideology, and also became increasingly authoritarian; Algeria’s government structure developed into a politico-military regime given to supressing any dissenting or opposing voices. Since then, Algeria has been run by a military regime with the appearance of a democratic state, but in reality the president and prime minister have been selected by the Army (Addi 2014: 435). The FLN managed to portray apparent political “openness” while political institutions were actually co-opted into maintaining the status quo. Under Boumediene’s rule, Algeria established institutions to specifically control the political economy, such as the National Assembly (only made up of FLN

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candidates) and the Council of the Revolution (Addi 2014: 431). This was done through handpicking members that were FLN friendly and marginalising the influence of opposition parties’ participation at the same time (Addi 2014: 433–6). Boumediene is largely credited with changing the socio-economic landscape in Algeria through adopting an ISI path of economic development, nationalising its oil resources and seizing foreign-held assets. Boumediene invested in health, education, and embarked on an ambitious land reform programme that saw formerly disenfranchised Algerian’s take control of French held properties, and yet also encouraged rural to urban migration (Addi 2014: 433). By the period of the 1980s, the economy had begun to fail due to falling oil prices (Cavatorta 2002).76 Yet even before the existence of formal loans with the IMF or other institutions, Algeria had changed its economic development ideology and had begun to adopt liberalisation measures with their help (Cavatorta 2002; Richards et al. 2008: 253–5). The effects of liberalisation and the shift in the structure of the economy – as elsewhere in the region – created a backlash amongst the population and saw the rise of Islamic parties willing to fill the welfare gap left by the government and its socio-economic reforms (Cavatorta 2014: 412; Cavatorta 2002: 11–12; Richards et al. 2008: 255). In 1988 there were public riots, which led to the regime attempting to open up the political sphere (allowing the legalisation of political parties and open public expression), in the hope that they would still be able to control the outcome (Addi 2014: 434). When the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party won in the municipal elections and appeared to look like it would win a majority in the National Assembly, the government instigated a military coup in retaliation, and a scourge of Islamic activism, arresting and imprisoning Islamic activists and their supporters (Lee and Ben Shitrit 2014: 236; Addi 2014: 434). The result was a further marginalisation of Islamist groups77 and the growth of violent resistance (Lee and Ben Shitrit 2014: 242). What followed thereafter were successive appointments of nominal presidents and prime ministers who were chosen for their allegiance to the regime and its wishes (Addi 2014: 435). Continuing suppression of Islamic groups within Algeria led to further violence and the eruption of a civil war that lasted 5 years (Law 2009). The civil war eventually lost momentum and relevance with the majority of Algerian people anxious for peace. Opposition violent activism lost its support base and popularity, and conversely, became “moderate” to fit in with the change in public sentiment (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013).

 For example, the price of oil had dropped from $13.5 billion in 1985 to $9.6 billion in 1986 and 1987. Cavatorta, F., 2002. The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria and the International Context: A Legacy of Stable Authoritarianism. The Journal of North African Studies. p. 11. 77  The Islamic Salvation Army or Front (AIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) See Law, R., 2009. Ibid. p. 313; Lee, R., and Ben Shitrit, L., 2014. Religion, Society, and Politics in the Middle East. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 242–243. 76

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7.7.11  The Western Saharan Conflict The Western Saharan conflict is perhaps one of the disturbances that has most potency in North Africa. As a long standing issue it is considered a “press” disturbance, and has the capacity to spread to its neighbours (Mauritania) and immediately beyond into the Sahel region.78 The on-going conflict and friction between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government/monarchy has eroded communities, solid socio-economic development, and contributed to social fragmentation along ethnic and elitist lines that override any kind of communal identity or cohesion (Boukhars 2012). At a regional level, the antagonism between Algeria, which hosts Sahrawi refugees and the Polisario Front, and the Moroccan state actively inhibits collaborative relations on what could affect security for the entire sub-area of North Africa (Spencer 2012; Arieff 2013). The issue of disputed territory has additionally affected the unity of African leaders, splitting them between those who support Morocco’s claim and those who side with Algeria (Calleya 2013: 71). Officially, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now AU) recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and Morocco withdrew its membership in 1984 (Spencer 2012: 6; Arieff 2013; Zoubir 1990: 227). It has thus institutionally fragmented Africa into the AU “and Morocco”.79 Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara are said to pre-date Spanish occupation (1884) and are legitimated by the Treaty of Fez (1912), and the Spanish-Moroccan Treaty (1861). While under Spanish occupation, the Polisario Front,80 a guerrilla resistance group, was formed (Sorenson 2008). In 1975 the International Court of Justice (ICJ), rejected the Moroccan claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but offered a compromise of dividing the territory between Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco (Sorenson 2008; Arieff 2013). However, in 1976 Morocco took matters into its own hands and organised a mass occupation of the (then) Spanish-held portion of the territory. At the same time, however, the Polisario Front made the same claim. Again the UN was drawn into the dispute and another agreement was drawn up to allow Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco to jointly administer the territory (Calleya 2013: 70). Spain and Mauritania eventually withdrew from claims to the Western Sahara, the latter forming a peace agreement with the Polisario Front in 1979 (Arieff 2013: 1).

 The spread of transnational and intra-regional crime: smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping and hostage taking, and infiltration of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). See Spencer, C., 2012. Strategic Posture Review: Algeria. World Politics Review [online] worldpoliticsreview. com; and Boukhars, A., 2012. Simmering Discontent in the Western Sahara. The Carnegie Papers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [online] www.carnegieEndowment.org/pubs 79  Morocco rejoined the AU in January of 2017. See 2017. Morocco rejoins African Union after more than 30 years. The Guardian [online] January 31. 80  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro. 78

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By 1979 the only claimants to the Western Sahara were the Polisario Front, now officially resident in exile81 in Tindouf (comprising of several camps within Algeria), and Morocco. In 1981, Morocco built large, heavily protected sand walls or “berms” that effectively commandeered most of the Western Sahara. According to Boukhars (2012), 85% of the land was partitioned off leaving a strip of land considered a “buffer” between Moroccan-controlled territory, and its neighbours: Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania (Sorenson 2008; Boukhars 2012; Arieff 2013). The separation that was created has become a de facto division between the relatively “stable” area controlled by Morocco, and that controlled by the Polisario Front, which appears to have developed into a “no-man’s land” of criminal activity and home to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) networks, threatening stability abroad in the fore-­ mentioned neighbouring countries (Boukhars 2012; Spencer 2012; Sorenson 2008; Arieff 2013; Calleya 2013). After years of skirmishes and fighting between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan forces, a cease-fire was recognised in 1991, and both sides agreed to a referendum to decide on either independence from, or full integration with, Morocco. The OAU and the UN committed to monitoring the voting procedure and also to establishing a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) (Sorenson 2008: 409; Arieff 2013: 1). Various attempts at brokering a viable roadmap to determine the future of the Western Sahara have been made, with little progress due to the intransigence of either side. The main contentions have coalesced around two political processes aimed at two separate audiences: the issue of “self-determination” and autonomy was aimed at unifying the Moroccan people and drawing attention away from domestic unrest; holding a referendum to determine independence for the Western Sahara was calculated to unify an otherwise disparate aggregation of rival ethnic communities that make up the Polisario Front (Arieff 2013; Boukhars 2012). While today it is generally accepted that socio-economic grievances are considered to be the primary driver of instability in the Western Sahara, the Polisario Front’s nationalist claims for independence still find resonance and support in refugee camps outside of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, and nationalist calls are still considered a point of rancour between both territorial contenders, Morocco, and the Polisario Front (Gillespie 2011: 181; Boukhars 2012: 15–16). While Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara is considered “stable” in comparison to the remainder of the Western Sahara, social and ethnic divisions have been contrived by both Morocco and the Polisario Front (Boukhars 2012).82 The subsequent division of ethnic (Sahrawis found in southern Morocco, northern Mauritania,  Government established in 1976 in Algeria. See Boukhars, A., 2012. op.cit. p. 3.  Over the years and in response to the calls for proposed referenda regarding independence, numbers of people from different ethnic Sahrawi groups outside the Western Sahara have been encouraged to take up residence there, and offered state housing, subsidies, tax exemptions, and other kinds of subsidised incentives. The deferential treatment has created resentment and open hostility between those already resident and incoming settlers. See Boukhars, A., 2012. Ibid. pp. 9–10.

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western Algeria, and indigenous Sahrawis who stayed behind in Western Sahara after the 1976 exodus) and national (Moroccan) identities has created resentment, distrust, and acrimony, as exemplified in the riots of Dakhla (2010) and Laayoune (1999, 2005, 2010, and 2011) (Boukhars 2012: 5). Several strands of disillusionment83 based on unequal treatment between ethnic groups of Sahrawis, has further fragmented the communities that reside in the Western Sahara. The Moroccan-­ controlled Western Sahara remains an aggregate of ethnic “units” with no overriding collective identity (Boukhars 2012), primarily due to the political manipulations of both Morocco and the Polisario Front, and the impasse that is the continuing battle for control of the territory. Later attempts at addressing the impasse have included the proposal by King Mohammed VI in 2007 for a “wider autonomy” (Sorenson 2008: 410) for the region, and then later in 2011 a more concrete proposal was made towards a constitutional monarchy (Boukhars 2012: 16; Arieff 2013: 4). This proposal included decentralised control, and the governance of the Western Sahara being placed in the hands of democratically elected regional councils (Gillespie 2011: 182). This latter proposal is seen to have been prompted by a decline in support from Morocco’s erstwhile allies, the EU, Spain, and other Arab states, a result of the badly handled protest in Laayoune by Moroccan forces in November 2010, public protests in Morocco in 2011, and the recent Arab Spring (Gillespie 2011: 182). The deadlock in the conflict has created a serious security vacuum exploited by radical groups such as AQIM and criminal syndicates.84 The poor relationship between Algeria, the host to the Polisario Front and a strong advocate of self-­ determination for SADR and the Western Sahara, and Morocco, has led to a lack of co-ordination in combating and controlling the in-roads made by AQIM, as well as criminal elements (Boukhars 2012; Gillespie 2011).

7.8  Summary Remarks A few summary remarks can be made at this juncture on the state of the system. This chapter has first of all focused on defining the boundaries of the focal system as the policy and countries of the UfM, North Africa and UfM members in the Middle East. The main issues based on policy evidence, therefore, were found to be – broadly speaking – the overall Objectives of the Barcelona acquis, peace, prosperity, and stability, but more particularly, political dialogue, economics and finance, and  Friction emerged between ex-Polisario members recently returned to the Western Sahara, Moroccans, Sahrawis from Tindouf (Algeria), and Northern Moroccan Sahrawis present in the Western Sahara. See Boukhars, A., 2012. Ibid. pp. 10–13. 84  Kidnapping, hostage trading, and smuggling fund AQIM. Tawil, C., 2010. The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from Within Jihadist Circles. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation. 83

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social, human, and cultural cooperation. From specialised analysis and literature on the history of EEC/EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean countries, the Western Sahara conflict, the Palestinian/Israeli issue, would appear to stand out as recognised flashpoints in EU-Mediterranean relations, precisely as they have not yet been adequately addressed in policy formats, forums, or other avenues of international relations available to interested parties. Furthermore, of the relations that have been institutionalised, unfair terms of trade, competitive and preferential behaviour on the part of the EEC/EU as a whole, and a general criticism of external or foreign influence, often re-registered as “interference” (Schlumberger 2011), have been contentiously aired. The latter has specifically been linked to the corruption of local leaders and internal political processes, leading to authoritarianism and repression (Schlumberger 2011; Cavatorta 2002, 2009). Valued attributes of the focal SES were drawn from interviews and specialised literature on EU/Mediterranean relations. Those attributes of the focal system were found to be the bilateral relations with the EU and the USA over and above inclinations towards regional relations. Resources and tradable consumer goods, and a profile or state-identity based on selective “goods” and tradable assets in relation to the external environment, were also seen as “valued” attributes. In this sense the “valued” attributes were found to be structural, their value derived and constructed from each country’s relative position to its neighbours, as well as its kind of produce or cultured resources also in relation to its neighbours, but also in relation to the EU and its competitive product/market. Overall, key components of the SES were found to be more social or socially constructed than physically relevant. This has perhaps more to do with the ability of social systems in general to create relevance and value over and above what is physically present, an on-going problem in the quest for sustainable practices. Land and hydrocarbons (oil, fuel) for example, as identified physical key components of the SES, are given primary relevance through politicisation, economic value chains, and wider external demand. Water as a basic necessity to human development and life, is less malleable in these terms, and in this sense is possibly the most important physical component to the focal system. Islamic culture, together with the socially constructed “uses” of land (the coastline of the Mediterranean, tourism, political and symbolic spaces such as “states”) and resources for “use” are considered key social components of the focal SES. In order to determine the state of the focal system, information on social and natural system variables were determined using internationally recognised indices such as the Human Development Report, the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organisation’s AQUASTAT, Transparency International, the Corruption Perception Index, and the Happiness Index. Resources were divided into human/social and natural resources, with human/social resources based on the DFID Livelihoods Framework made up of Assets, Capital, and Capabilities. Based on the information found and reviewed, a few observations can be made: there appears to be a correlation between dependency on agriculture and low levels of “Happiness”: the economies of North Africa and the Middle East that are significantly dependent on agriculture per percentage of GDP origin, compared to

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services, for example, appear to exhibit lower levels of Happiness, even though the Happiness Ranking includes overall GDP per capita normally associated with a certain degree of development and hence well-being. There also appears to be no correlation between levels of Happiness and Life Expectancy, indicating that the overall measure for Happiness (life expectancy; perceptions of corruption; GDP per capita; freedom to make life choices; social support; generosity) do not appear to have any influence on how long people live in North Africa or the Middle East. Neither is there consistent correlation between Trust in Government and Happiness: in spite of the Happiness measure including this indicator, taken in isolation and from another source, it would appear that people who trust their governments are not necessarily more “Happy” overall. Perceptions of Corruption are neither consistent with higher ranking on the Happiness Index. These observations may lead to either one of two conclusions, that the measure of Happiness is inadequate and does not correlate with other indices’ consistencies, or, that people in North Africa and the Middle East are not – contrary to popular analyses – too bothered about their government’s levels of corruption, or trust in national institutions. In some respects this latter proposition is supported by analyses of the Arab Spring, where social justice was deemed more important in whichever form it arrived, rather than the qualitative kind of government in place. It could also be a possibility, based on these observations, that in the context of the Islamic cultural setting, which encompasses North Africa and most of the Middle East, European/western-style government institutions and state structures in place and the tools or indices with which they are evaluated, are currently irrelevant as opposed to Islamic socio-political organisational structures and the cultural context through which they are evaluated. Overall, the majority of countries in the UfM on the Southern side of the Mediterranean, are moving towards economies based on industry and services, with only a few (Mauritania, Jordan and Morocco) reliant on agriculture (and hence water) for a considerable proportion of their GDP. Fuels and mining products are predominant exports of North Africa, with greater manufacturing in comparison to the Middle East. Natural resource depletion (energy, mineral, and forest depletion as a percentage of gross national income) for 2013 is greatest in Mauritania (also the country most dependent on agriculture), and least in Morocco. At the end of the Cold War, country after country in the Middle East and North Africa acknowledged the new liberal economic paradigm promoted by western countries and their institutions (Cavatorta 2014: 405–6). Islamism and Islamist groups however, had already gained fearful notoriety, and were identified as the new threat to regional and international stability. This was especially relevant at the end of the Cold War as the USA and its allies began to readjust their strategic positions internationally (Cavatorta 2014: 404) and see potential threats to the New World Order in Islamic activism. Concerns over maintaining stability overtook concerns of establishing democracy, and authoritarian governments in North Africa and the Middle East were tolerated and even assisted (Cavatorta 2014: 408–1; Schlumberger 2011).

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The disturbances or disruptions to the focal system are a combination of those that emanate from within the focal system, and those that emanate from outside but have strong effects on the focal system, parts of the focal system, or individual states. It is difficult to differentiate strictly between pulse and press disturbances, as some pulse after-effects create what can be characterised as a “tail” of slow, low grade press disturbances, as in the case of the Iraq/Gulf wars and the interim period of deterioration between them that left a trail of disturbances between states at the sub-national level and cross-state boundaries. Likewise the first invasion of Afghanistan (also considered initially as a “pulse” disturbance) triggered circumstances that converged with another recognised disturbance  – the rise of modern international terrorism – already developing in the focal system, further leading to globalised networked mercenary jihadism, which ultimately led to a second invasion in 2002. Certain “pulse” disturbances have profoundly altered the state of the overall system, which from the policy perspective, as an artificially imposed construct mitigates pertinent interactions that would have taken place organically. The Iranian Revolution altered the dynamics across the Middle East, pitting Iran against its more moderate neighbours, and the USA. The Western Sahara conflict and the Palestinian “issue” (as it is more commonly referred to today, having been continuously re-framed from Arab/Israeli to Palestinian/Israeli conflict) are both press disturbances that are being managed or supressed at the International and bilateral level (between the USA and Israel, for example, or lately between Egypt and Israel), without much hope for a long standing resolution that will address the underlying issues. Continual press disturbances from the EU in the form of structural foreign policy like the UfM, for example, will continue to create pressure internally and intra-­ regionally. It has already created competition between states, and a resource value-­ linked state identity or essentialism based on structural relations.

References 2017. Morocco Rejoins African Union After More Than 30 Years. The Guardian [online], January 31. Addi, L. 2014. Algeria. In The Middle East, ed. E. Lust, 13th ed. Los Angeles: SAGE. African Union – European Union Summit 2017 AU-EU/Decl.1(V) Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. Declaration 29–30 November, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/our-events/5th-au-eu-summit. Aliboni, R., and Y. Qatarneh. 2005. The Future of the EMP in a Changing Context of Transatlantic and Regional Relation. EuroMeSCo Paper 46. [online] http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/ media/euromesco_paper_46.pdf. Arieff, A. 2013. Western Sahara. Congressional Research Service, 7–5700. [online] http://assets. opencrs.com/rpts/RS20962_20110215.pdf. ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller. 2010–2011. Third Annual Arab Youth Survey. [online] http:// www.burson-marsteller.com/what-we-do/our-thinking/third-annual-asdaa-bursonmarsteller-arab-youth-survey/.

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Globalisation and Livelihood Options of People Living in Poverty (GLOPP). 2008. DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Approach and Its Framework. [online] http://www.glopp.ch/B7/en/ multimedia/B7_1_pdf2.pdf. Gomez, R. 2003. Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy? Hampshire: Ashgate. Hamilton, J.D. 2011. Historical Oil Shocks, Working Paper 16790. National Bureau for Economic Research. [online] http://www.nber.org/papers/w16790.pdf. Held, C.C., and J.T. Cummings. 2011. Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics. 5th ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Helliwell, J., R. Layard, and R. Sachs, eds. 2013. The World Happiness Report 2013. New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Hierro, L., 2016. Dividing Africa with Policy: The Influence of the Union for the Mediterranean on the Unity and Security of Africa. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Hinnebusch, R. 2012. Europe and the Middle East: From Imperialism to Liberal Peace? Review of European Studies 4 (3). Holling, C.S. 1992. Cross-Scale Morphology, Geometry, and Dynamics of Ecosystems. Ecological Monographs 62 (4). Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008. [online] http:// www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/ufm/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_ the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2014. Kerr, M.H. 1971. The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Landsberg, C. 2004. South Africa: A Pivotal State in Africa. Synopsis. Centre for Policy Studies Quarterly Review 7 (1): 1–18. Law, R.D. 2009. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge: Policy Press. Lee, R., and L. Ben Shitrit. 2014. Religion, Society, and Politics in the Middle East. In The Middle East, ed. E. Lust, 13th ed. Los Angeles: SAGE. Lewis, B.. 2003. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror [e-book Adobe DRM epub version]. New York: Random House. Kalahari.com. Lust, E. 2014. The Middle East. 13th ed. Los Angeles: SAGE. Lynch, M. 2014. Regional International Relations. In The Middle East, ed. E. Lust, 13th ed. Los Angeles: SAGE. Menoret, P. 2014. Saudi Arabia. In The Middle East, ed. E. Lust, 13th ed. Los Angeles: SAGE. Millennium Assessment. 2003. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A Framework for Assessment. Island Press. [online] http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/Framework.aspx. Moran, D. 2001. Wars of National Liberation. London: Cassell. Pollard S., H. Biggs, and D. Du Toit. 2008. Towards a Socio-Ecological Systems View of the Sand River Catchment, South Africa. Water Research Commission Project: K8/591. Primakov, Y. 2009. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present. New York: Basic Books. Ramadan, T. 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Kalahari.com. ———. 2012. The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Resilience Alliance. Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners. 2010. Assessing Resilience in Socioecological Systems: Workbook for Practitioners. Version 2.0. [online] Available at: http:// www.resalliance.org/workbook/. Richards, A., and J.  Waterbury. 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press. Richards, A., J. Waterbury, M. Cammett, and I. Diwan. 2008. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Third edition. Updated 2013 edition. Boulder: Westview Press.

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Chapter 8

Resilience Assessment Part Two

8.1  Introduction In Chap. 7 the focal system was defined as the policy level of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and its main issues as identified by policy documents, literature, and personal interviews. Key components of the system were also identified and established the idea of resources and resource dependency as a fundamental theoretical underpinning for the Assessment. Preliminary observations of information on the current state of the system have raised some counter-intuitive conclusions as to the nature of social capital and its relevance to overall well-being, itself an important aspect of being a productive member of a community. It is noteworthy that in the study of literature and analysis of the recent uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, perceptions of corruption of incumbent long-standing governments have been cited as instrumental in increasing the relevance of Islamism or social activism over and above that of the state apparatus, and also behind increasing dissatisfaction and insistence on social justice. The key components of the system have played a role in the interest levels of the European Union (EU) in the Mediterranean and its subsequent involvement through persistent policy evolutions. Proximity, oil, water (natural resources), the Mediterranean Sea (a cultural concept and a physical reality), and Islam (culture/ socio-political organisation) would appear to define the region and the EU’s response to it in external policy. The disturbances to the focal system, and ones that appear to feed back into the focal system after interacting with the upper level system (EU), would appear to be EU policy framing, and the two conflicts in the region that despite integration efforts from the EU, and belief in liberal or democratic peace, have not yet been resolved: the Western Sahara dispute and the Palestine/Israel conflict. This chapter proceeds with the Resilience Assessment, exploring in more detail the systems above and below the focal system, the key interactions and events that have contributed to driving the system through the adaptive cycle, and those used in © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_8

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evidence of transformation. Possible alternate states are also considered, to try to identify thresholds and transition points, taking into consideration the recognised key variables used to track change. Although this study does not intend to use the past to predict the future, this information will contribute to a deeper understanding of the current system state and possible future trajectories. Desirable/undesirable influences, and probable vulnerabilities as a result, are also considered. Using that information, and cross-referencing possible interactions between disturbances (as identified in the last chapter) and key variables of change, through assessing interactions between slow and fast-moving variables, their possible influence on both specified and generalised resilience are assessed. Finally, the make-up or quality of governance (current governance structures and values, social networks, international organisation and institutional inclusion, adaptive governance possibilities) will be used to create a “synthesis of findings.” In the case of the focal system, which still remains central, systems of domination have maintained artificial control and extended periods of Conservation. Resilience and potential of the system have been kept at low levels for artificially extended periods of time. It should not come as a surprise that any kind of collapse thereafter, should go beyond the normal recovery of the system state, or at least a desirable system state that would allow for subsequent cycles of the same quality.

8.2  Creating the Panarchy: Supra and Infra Systems The panarchy has been described in detail in Chap. 3 as a set of three nested complex adaptive systems or CASs. Each of these however, has the probability of itself having layers and subsets of CASs within them at smaller and faster moving cycles. Panarchy descriptions can therefore be limitless. The main panarchy, which forms the focus of this research, is considered to be the EU (supra-system), the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (the focal “conceptual” system or policy layer and the member states from the perspective of the EU), and the physical states that make up the North Africa and Middle East (MENA)-members of the UfM (the infra-system). The Sahel and “the rest of Africa,” will be referred to only as an illustration on the direction of interactions and their relevance to the overall hypothesis of how the influence occurs, and in which direction. It is shown in Fig. 8.1.

8.3  Social and Ecological Dimensions of the Panarchy The EU interacts with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East through a range of policy mechanisms: the policy framework of the UfM, Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements, and through separate bilateral agreements. Cultural, political, economic, technological transfer and assistance, are controlled largely through these policy frameworks that institutionally also allow for the engagement

8.3  Social and Ecological Dimensions of the Panarchy

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Fig. 8.1  The Panarchy

of a larger variety of non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international financial institutions (IFIs), “think-tanks” and expert groups. In this sense, the changing topic areas, evolving agreements and frameworks applicable to the Mediterranean states of MENA over the years, have interacted with the focal system from the top-down. From the perspective of the policy documents, the Fields of Cooperation from the Marseille Final Statement (2008) can be taken as the guidelines to framing key socio-ecological interaction between the nation states of the UfM and the countries of the EU. The social dimensions of interaction (or rather interactions structured through the UfM) are: immigration, terrorism (the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, for example), justice and law, health, human development, women and youth development, the “environment” (climate change mitigation), disaster risk management, and higher education. The ecological dimensions, also structured through the UfM framework, are not exclusively ecological as they provide interrelated social functions and can also be framed, politicised, and “securitised” (all social processes), especially in a policy framework setting. Ecological dimensions of the UfM include water scarcity and management, the Mediterranean Sea (pollution management), agriculture, tourism, “energy” (projects of infrastructural integration across state boundaries and the Sea, transport of electricity and gas), and transport. It is through these (politicised and securitised) issues underwritten by ecological dimensions that the EU engages with the MENA UfM member countries. Interactions from the lower cycle or the UfM nation states are constrained by the upper policy level structure of the UfM to some extent. The Mediterranean Sea is

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the link that connects the countries of MENA UfM members to Europe, as it is the physical, ecological, and conceptual connection between the two sides of the shores. Ecological processes such as the pollution of the Sea, precipitation and climate regulation, bind the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean politically and economically together in the Union’s framework. Illegal immigration, and more recently, uncontrolled (irregular and human trafficking) immigration, have progressively been linked to security threats and the spread of terrorism to Europe and indeed remain so (Colombo 2018; Bicchi 2007). The more formal interactions through EU policy that transmit norms of development such as intra-regional integration and integration for prosperity in general, socio-economic, and political reform, have become the main social dimensions between the UfM states and the EU. Technological transfer such as Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT), and social networking play a supporting but nevertheless important infrastructural/connecting role at all three levels of the panarchy. Changing security perceptions of the UfM as a “region” have altered policy areas and their emphasis. The developing structural constraints at the sub-national level, across all states – partially due to the overlapping of EU foreign policy implementation – has created resentment towards Europe and what the populations of the UfM states consider the “West”. In this sense, resentment and rejection of “western values” has become another social dimension of cross-scale interaction between the sub-state level, the state level, and the EU. The Barcelona acquis focus on economic growth and restructuring, urbanisation (with the incumbent strain on infrastructure – water, electricity) and “sprawl” (informal settlements and accompanying sanitary and environmental risk) (CEU 2008, 15187/08 Presse 314: 15), has, as a result, increased air pollution, soil degradation, and deforestation from unregulated economic growth and pressures to increase income from outside the formalised economy. Creeping desertification and water scarcity linked to global warming (and climate change) also affect the degree of perceived insecurity by the EU, and hence has also been represented in the UfM framework.

8.4  Driving Forces/Change Drivers and Patterns The driving factors that have led to change within the MENA (lower) infra-system itself are changing economic development perspectives (from import substitution industrialisation or ISI, and state-led growth to private sector-led growth and economic liberalisation), rising social dissatisfaction, and social activism identified in the last chapter as Islamism, and its further derivatives (radical or fundamentalist sub-cultures). The driving forces of change across the time line appear to be the result of interactions with its superior system (the EU and the European member states) and these interactions can be classed as “critical”. The patterns of upheaval and change in the MENA infra-system have either come directly or as a result of interaction with the external environment through colonialism, post-colonial influence and political machinations, “coercion” through cycles of debt/repayment and conditional reforms to western current ideological beliefs on economics (economic liberalism, the free

8.4  Driving Forces/Change Drivers and Patterns

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market economy) or values (Human rights, democracy, gender equality). These in turn have inspired sub-cultures of jihadism and anti-imperialism (specifically towards the West); terrorism (both ethno-nationalist and jihadist informed expressions); inter-communal conflict; immigration away from conflict; cycles of underdevelopment; and social immobility. Economic interdependence and past colonial economic structural paths have made the countries of MENA vulnerable to the shocks – both peaks and troughs – of the international trade and monetary systems. Development projects funded by precarious (and narrow) exports dependent on international markets, once depleted, caused social unrest and the opportunities for radical opposition such as Islamist activism and jihadist tendencies to take root. Economic structural reforms such as ISI, state-led growth followed by economic liberalisation, have led to further transformation between rural and urban populations distributions, labour and class structures (Mittelman 1996; Richards et al. 2008: 415–6; 425–7). In times of economic depression, social unrest and dissatisfaction as a result of austerity measures have led to repressive states and violent coercion as a reactionary trend.

8.4.1  Social and Ecological Cross-Scale Interactions At this point, interaction from the Sahel into North Africa itself appears to be small: violent overspill and possible system disruptions have traditionally been considered as “revolting” up into the system immediately above the Sahel, and those in the Middle East and into the Gulf Peninsula. Islamic jihadist movements are currently finding space, according to the majority of literature, in the vastly uninhabited and harsh areas of the Sahel region (Tawil 2010; Wehrey and Boukhars 2013). While the MENA should provide some stability (through Remembrance), this has not happened due to its relative geographic and structural dislocation, a possible result of its externalised structure in the UfM, and temporal overlay of influences from 1972 and the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) onwards, due to the kind of enculturation that the North African states have received from such policy interaction as the evolving Barcelona Process/UfM and other bilateral agreements with the EU1. Migration agreements and the emphasis on creating border controls to restrict outflow into the European states, while not remotely successful, could deter immigrants from the Sahel countries choosing that route into Europe, as they perceive it as more difficult. There is strong evidence to support the belief that rather than

1  This is supported by interviews undertaken for the purpose of this study and the valued attributes that were drawn from them. Bilateral relations on immigration and repatriation are shared by Spain/Algeria/Libya/Morocco/Mauritania; France/Algeria/Morocco, Mauritania/Tunisia, Egypt, Libya; Portugal/Morocco; Germany/Algeria/Morocco/Syria; Italy/Egypt/Lebanon/Syria/Turkey; Malta/Algeria/Libya/Tunisia/Egypt; United Kingdom: Algeria/Libya/Morocco/Tunisia/Egypt/ Jordan/Lebanon. Information obtained from Return Migration and Development Platform (RMDP) [online] http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/analyses/ra/

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seeking entry into Europe through North Africa, most Sub-Saharan and Sahel migrants are making their way through to sub-Saharan countries, and that North African migrants are more likely to seek residence in Europe and/or with countries with whom they have colonial ties2.

8.4.2  I dentifiable Eras, Critical Interactions Between Scales, and Trigger Events Leading to Change from One Era to Another In the focal system the period of the 1970s may be identified as an era of Confidence (Consolidation), followed by the 1980s–1990s to present day, as moving through eras of Depression and uncertainty (Collapse and Reorganisation), to Repression (Consolidation) respectively. Cross-scale interactions between the  MENA CAS and the EU are more formalised than interactions between the Sahel and North Africa, due to the “thicker” institutionalisation between them both bilaterally and multilaterally. The EU appears to interact/communicate or “talk” more with the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the main issues (peace/conflict; prosperity/economic and financial integration; stability or security/terrorism, immigration). These have been reinforced by the structural network of regional and continental institutions: the UfM and bilateral agreements between the EU and European member states have enforced economic and financial cultures between them in the pursuit of their integrationalist belief system. The relative “newness” and less structured AU (by comparison) and other regional organisations in the Middle East and North Africa, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (1989), for example, have not proved to provide adequate incentive, sufficient commonality, or identity, to counteract the pull of an externally generated labelling that the “Mediterranean” in EU policy-making has become, along with its incumbent socio-ecological regime. However, the Sahel countries have been encouraged to participate in regional organisations and others (such as the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, for example) that in policy terms for now, have further split the Sahel from Northern Africa. There is at this point nothing to suppose that the kind of fractionalisation that is occurring between North Africa and “the rest of Africa” will not occur between the Sahel, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the whole of Africa becoming compartmentalised according to externally predetermined socio-­ ecological regimes.

2  In 2000, African migrants totalled 23 million, half of which moved to or stayed in Sub-Saharan countries. Excluding North Africa, intra-regional migration is the most common kind of migration. International Organisation for Migration 2010. World Migration Report. The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. [online] http:// publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR_2010_ENGLISH.pdf

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The biophysical interactions correspond to the regional dynamics, and includes shared climate and dependency on local climate conditions (drought, flooding, sand storms, and cyclones). The region of the Sahel is quite distinct from that of the North African states, which while sharing a connection through land, the variability of climate processes makes for wide ranges of diversity in ecosystem services due to elevation and coastal exposure. The critical interactions between upper and lower systems that contribute to change in the (physical) infra-system (MENA), appear to be degrees of integration and inclusion into the wider international environment through large institutions and their defining ethos, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the EU. In the past, closer association with these institutions have created a cycle of debt (Langan 2015); and the ensuing counter-measures of economic and financial readjustment, undercurrents of immigration, reactionary terrorism, and conflict have been framed and defined in turn at the policy level (the UfM). By agreeing to these partnerships, MENA countries are agreeing to accept the (externalised) interpretation that these main issues and their management (through integrationalism) are of mutual concern and benefit. Industrialisation and emphasis on economic growth and natural resources has skewed the perception of North African states and those in the Middle East to likewise view and value their physical environment for “use” and exploitation, in support of export and expanding wealth in the international system. This is reinforced through partnerships such as the UfM, and has been further compounded through a cumulative and structural “partnership-effect” (the EU-policy complex). EU enlargement/integration has also had an effect on the focal system: sporadic but ordered absorption of other states into the EU has led to a redefining of both the focal system and the nature of the EU as it expands and takes on the larger form. Adjusting to the incorporation of countries at an economic level had required further integration of markets and subsequent re-balancing of income generating products. This in turn has meant a re-balancing, or re-ordering for those on the “outside”, or in Partnerships with the EU wishing to trade with them or their members individually. EU enlargement has occurred at a slower rate and often after observed events or disturbances. In addition, and as a consequence, policy towards what has been defined by the EU as the “Mediterranean”, has cycled through various permutations in response to internal adjustments and the perceived challenges that the EU faced from the two “merged” sub-regions: the (GMP 1972), the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP 1989, adopted in 1990), the Barcelona Process (1995), and the UfM (2008) as detailed in Chap. 4. There exists at the conceptual level and in policy, a firm division between North Africa and the Sahel, and “sub-Saharan” Africa. At the geographical scale, in spite of the concept of “continent” and “nation state” sub-divisions, biophysical regions cross and intersect these socio-political divides, just as social systems do and broader identities used to. What has resulted is a network or mosaic of patchwork socio-economic, political, and ecological systems unrelated to its physical boundaries and limits.

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In summary, driving forces of change appear to have counter-intuitively originated from the upper EU system. This is perhaps due to the relative advanced institutional development and historical (colonial) role Europe and European countries have played in Africa. Positive feedback has played a part due to the connectivity and the tightening between the EEC/EU and North Africa, as progressive policy arrangements have evolved, and the persistent push for integration both as enlargement from within the EEC/EU, and as an external policy in the integrationalist agenda. Economic crises have intensified perceptions of security emanating from the UfM/MENA member states, and likewise economic crises in the countries of the UfM have fuelled structural rigidities and resentment as a counter-dimension to a point where it has almost founded a sub-culture of resistance. Physical constraints (harsh climate and terrain) have acted to prevent significant lower (Sahel) to upper (North Africa) scale or critical interactions.

8.5  The Focal System as an Adaptive Cycle From the study of the disturbances and the depiction of the historical timeline, the period of the 1970s seems to have been one of great flux and upheaval, passion, and innovative responses to the socio-economic trends that were appearing. The rise of nationalism, of Pan-Arab ideals, the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian nexus and conflicts, the spread of the “new” terrorism, the rise of Islamism and Jihadism, created the equivalent of a socio-economic vortex. This episode in the history of the focal system was replete with bravado, confidence, and pragmatism. The dynamics of the Cold War and post-independence enabled many of the states in North Africa and the Middle East to skillfully negotiate their way in the new “bi-polar” world. This is evidenced by the ability to have coordinated the oil embargo and managed – to a degree – the “oil weapon”. The ideal of unity was engaged through a shared history of colonialism and reactionary anti-imperialism. This period could be characterised as the “conservation”/“K” phase, or the “Age of Confidence”. The following period, which roughly coincides with the 1980s, however, resulted in the (relative) decline of the MENA UfM-member system. A drop in oil prices led to development projects across the sub-regions falter and stall. Bailouts and conditional loans from large IFIs witnessed the co-opting of North African and Middle East states into a neoliberal economic orthodoxy. In reaction to the reforms, countries experienced large scale social and political unrest, exemplified in the rise of Islamism as a viable opposition to what local populations perceived as the corruption of the western-co-opted governments in power. This period of upheaval could be construed as the collapse or “Ω” phase. Governments in turn became repressive to maintain control. International relations and agreements increased in number and changed perspective (for example, the RMP). North African and Middle Eastern governments furthered projects of integration with external powers (the USA, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, Britain, and China), regional organisations, and those at the higher and

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global level (the UN, the WTO). This period of excessive control, greater co-­ ordination and integration or confluence, could be characterised as the Reorganisation or “α” phase of the adaptive cycle. By the end of the period of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War precipitated a collapse at the global and international regional or EU level, and re-entry into a phase of re-organisation, with the USA emerging as the dominant power in the international system. The Gulf War of 1991 was – as has already been noted  – a demonstration of the “New World Order”. The states of North Africa and the Middle East scrambled to readjust and align with the new configuration of world relations and dynamics. Most governments maintained their hold over their countries’ internal workings with little disruption, increasing repression in the pursuit of stability. Policies and external interests at that point assisted in “papering over” the socio-economic and political “cracks” in North Africa and the Middle East. This would indicate that the ties established through policy initiatives, their ideas and concepts, especially as they pertained to economic reforms (and structural  – read social and ecological – realignment) were sufficient to create and maintain the focal system cycle at that time in the Exploitation/Consolidation phase. This supports the proposition that towards the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, North Africa and Middle East were at a “brittle” stage, ready for a cascade of change to take place. However, most governments remained in power, solidifying their control through coercion and external assistance. Security as an issue of interest for Europe was sometimes exploited by North African/Middle Eastern states’ autocratic rulers, as in the case of the Human Rights Commission’s report being suppressed prior to Syria signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 1995, in spite of human rights observances being a condition of the agreement (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001: 87). North African states and Middle Eastern countries, which were part of the Barcelona Process, were therefore able to retain the power of reconstructing socio-­ economic-­political systems, and to maintain them apart from the changes incurred in supporting ecological systems, their over-use and “expenditure” of natural, non-­ renewable, and renewable resources.

8.5.1  K  ey Factors Observed to Be Driving Change in the Focal System (Using the Timeline) Over the timeline of study, the key factors that have transformed the character of the focal system have been changes in economic development perspectives; levels of formalised integration both regionally and internationally; and dynamics between Islamist or social activism and formal political institutions. The key variable and its chosen indicator have been identified as the numbers of overlapping regional and international organisations of which the Mediterranean states of the focal system are members. These are enumerated in Table 8.1.

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Table 8.1 Membership in sub-regional, regional/international and global-international organisations State Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Palestine Syria Tunisia

Sub-regional associate 9 7 0 5 5 10 7 + 1 Candidature 7 1 4 7

regional/International 51 52 44 47 41 42 43 45 2 36 49

Observer Pending International 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 1

Associate

1

1

1

1 2

1

1

Changes in economically biased development perspectives, from ISI/state-led growth, to private sector, export led growth, have already been outlined in earlier chapters. A full list of countries and the sub-regional, international/regional/global organisations can be found in Hierro 2016. The organisations have been grouped into sub-regional (League of Arab States, or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – IGAD, for example) and regional/international, such as the AU, or Organisation of American States (OAS), International Development Bank, and Global such as the UN, or the WTO. “Global” and “International” correspond to membership base, including Observers or Associates. Libya stands out having the largest number of regional and sub-regional memberships, showing an indication of its ties and identification with it nearest neighbours. Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia rank highest in membership at the international/ global level, with Syria judged the least related or connected to international norms and practices based on this overview.

8.5.2  The Current System State and Cycle Phase The current overall state of the system appears to be passing through a reorganisation phase. Beginning with Tunisia in 2010 (although some studies have related the beginnings of the Arab Spring movement to the so-called Green Revolution in Iran 2009 as well), countries in North Africa and the Middle East underwent various protests, grouped together and referred to as either the Arab Spring or Arab Awakening (or Uprisings) respectively. This “Spring” has come to represent a new birth or renaissance (Gasper 2014) not unlike that of the 1950s and the revolutions

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that took place bringing to power Nasserites in Egypt, and Ba’athists in Iraq and in Syria (Anderson 2011: 1/6; Kerr 1971). The protests or uprisings have taken place to varying degrees (Lust and Wichmann 2012), and have resulted in the same variety and degrees of political and social change. Both the uprisings and their effects are believed to be dependent on the kind of political structures already in place, the economic profile (oil-producing/dependent, whether they are non-oil producing or diversified economies), and the presence/absence of resistance (community) groups or actors (Cammett 2014: 161; Richards et al. 2008: 428). No two Uprisings have been the same (Anderson 2011; Arab Youth Survey 2011: 7). According to Masoud (2014), the protests that began in Tunisia were echoed in Egypt, which as an established “role model” was instrumental in “diffusing” further popular protests across the two sub-regions (2014: 449–1). Gasper (2014: 68) also asserts that internal, regional, and international dynamics – as larger and slower adaptive cycles would behave – have constrained the relative changes/transformations that took place. Transformations have ranged from outright regime change in some countries like Tunisia and Libya, to Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, and Jordan, which managed to maintain their regimes while making either structural (Saudi Arabia3) or “cosmetic” political concessions (Morocco4). However, what appears to have stood out in the consciousness across North Africa and the Middle East, is the perception of unequal access to opportunities for socio-economic advancement (Cammett 2014: 169; Richards et al. 2008) encapsulated in the phrase “bread and dignity” (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 246, 277; Anderson 2011: 1/6). While the particular circumstances in each country that experienced unrest or protest action vary widely (Anderson 2011: 1/6), the rigidity of the overall social-economic systems in each, and the seeming inability to traverse the divide from poor to affluent (Cammett 2014: 170), appears to have united people across regimes in frustration, and against those who apparently held most of the resources. Rampant “cronyism” and connections were seen to trump qualifications in a small public sector arena shrunk by structural reforms and a retreating state.5 As the World Development Report (2013) states: 3  Saudi Arabia – and Gulf States in general – is said to have handed out “fistfuls of funds” and social welfare reforms in order to counteract any would-be protestors or discussion. See Menoret 2014. “Saudi Arabia”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. The Middle East. Thirteenth edition. California: SAGE. p. 745; Cleveland, W. L., and Bunton, M., 2013. A History of the Modern Middle East. Third edition. Boulder: Westview Press. p. 533; Lust, E., 2014. “Institutions in Governance”. In Lust, E., 2014. op.cit. p. 153. 4  Emanuela Dalmasso and Francesco Cavatorta (2013) outline the “cosmetic” political changes that were affected by the Moroccan monarchy, manipulating the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) into power. See Dalmasso, E., and Cavatorta, F., 2013. “Democracy, Civil Liberties and the Role of Religion after the Arab Awakening: Constitutional Reforms in Tunisia and Morocco”. Mediterranean Politics. 18(2). pp. 225–241. 5  See also Lust, E., and Wichmann, J., 2012. “Three Myths About the Arab Uprisings”. Yale Global Online, [online] http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/three-myths-about-arab-uprisings [accessed 16 Nov. 2014] Cammett, M., 2014. “The Political Economy of Development in the Middle East”. In

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“The Arab Spring was not merely about employment. But disappointment, especially among youth about the lack of job opportunities and frustration with the allocation of jobs based on connections rather than merit…” (World Development Report 2013: 13).

The ability to seek rectification and justice therefore, through reliable and trustworthy avenues (institutions, government and/or dissipative structures) was not apparent to the local populations (World Development Report 2013). Looking at the current focal system and the generalised acknowledgment that the sub-regions have to varying degrees only (not uniformly) transformed, or are undergoing transformation (Egypt, Syria), would indicate that the focal system is passing through a period of Reorganisation.

8.5.3  Key Variables Used to Track Change Based on the historical overviews provided in the last chapter, the timeline, and observing interactions between the levels of the conceptualised panarchy, the key variables indicated in the following tables are deemed to contribute to transformation of the system. These have been identified as Gender (in)equality; perceptions of corruption (and the absorption of democratic values); social justice and expectations (perceptions of inequality, and social integration/cohesion); EU integrationalism (defined here as levels of social and physical infrastructural integration, which include the values of Policy Development for Coherence); radical Islam and sub-­ cultures of terrorism (represented as levels of fear and insecurity in relation to immigration). 8.5.3.1  Gender Roles and Women The changing role of women in North Africa and the Middle East has had profound effects on the family structure and therefore the overall socio-ecological system (SES) structure of the focal system. Traditional patriarchal familial structures in the two sub-regions have been radically changed by the modernisation of the economy and inclusion into the international economic environment over the years, as well as various development initiatives aimed at improving women’s health (including sexual and reproductive health), family planning and enhancing their position in society. The traditional patriarchal extended family typical to the SES and entrenched in Islamic law (Ramadan 2001), is being replaced by the ideal of the nuclear family and taking effect especially in urban areas; this change makes the divide between rural and urban development more pronounced. Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 169; Richards et al. 2008 cite “personal connections”, or “wasta” as being seen to be more important than diplomas in obtaining a “good job”. See Richards et al. 2008. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Third edition. Updated 2013 edition. Boulder: Westview Press. Ibid.p. 428; and Cammett, M., 2014. op.cit. p. 175.

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Fig. 8.2  Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2013 (UNDP HDR 2013) Table 8.2  Gender empowerment measure (UNDP HDR 1995, 2000, 2005) Ranking gender empowerment measure (GEM) 5-year progression 1995 2000 Algeria 87 Algeria 23 ↑ Algeria Egypt 96 Egypt 68 ↑ Egypt Israel – Israel 23 ↑ Israel Jordan 99 Jordan 69 ↑ Jordan Lebanon 103 Lebanon – – Lebanon Libya – Libya – – Libya Mauritania 111 Mauritania – – Mauritania Morocco 85 Morocco – – Morocco Palestine – Palestine – – Palestine Syria 81 Syria 65 ↑ Syria Tunisia 91 Tunisia 60 ↑ Tunisia

2005 – 77 24 – – – – – – – –

↓ ↓ – – – – – – – –

Figure 8.2 shows the Gender Inequality Index (GII) ranking out of 186 countries, where 0 is equal and 100 highly unequal. The GII combines aspects of both the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), as shown in Table 8.2 and Fig. 8.3, and the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) (excluding income disparity), including indicators of “reproductive health, empowerment, and labour market participation in relation to men” (UNDP HDR 2013). The GEM includes indicators of parliamentary representation, labour sectors (administration and managers, professional and technical), and income share (UNDP HDR 1995, 2000, 2005). It is a composite variable made up of political and economic representation. At the level of the UfM, focusing on improving the role of

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Fig. 8.3  Gender Empowerment Measures (GEM) scores 5 Year progression (UNDP HDR 1995, 2000, 2005) Table 8.3  Gender development ranking 5 year progression (UNDP HDR 2010) Ranking gender development index 5-year progression 1995 2000 Tunisia 59 Israel 22 Lebanon 65 Libya 65 Syria 72 Lebanon 74 Libya 75 Tunisia 86 Algeria 84 Algeria 91 Egypt 92 Syria 95 Morocco 93 Egypt 99 Mauritania 116 Morocco 103 Israel 0 Mauritania 122 Jordan 0 Jordan – Palestine 0 Palestine –

↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ – –

Israel Lebanon Tunisia Jordan Algeria Syria Morocco Mauritania Libya Egypt Palestine

2005 23 68 69 73 82 84 97 118 – – –

↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ – – –

women in the UfM non-EU member countries will affect change in the range of roles that women perform as mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives. This is reflected in the Gender Development Ranking shown in Table 8.3. Obtaining measurable and comparable variables has been difficult, as gender inequality or the gender gap as a concept entered UN Indices in 1995 as the GEM and the GDI. Both were discarded in favour of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) introduced only in 2010, and made up of aspects of the GDI and the GEM, without using income (UNDP HDR 2010). The variable deemed most appropriate to track over the longest period of time, therefore, has been the percentage of women in parliament from 2001 to date, as these were the data consistently available. This is

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Fig. 8.4  Seats in parliament % of total/5 year progression 1995–2013

shown in Fig. 8.4. The GEM and GDI/HDI measures have been included to attempt to “map” the same kind of data or behavioural trend as regards to women’s roles in both sub-regions. Most countries under study have experienced an upward trend in the percentage of women in parliament over the period between 1995 and 2013, with the exception of Egypt and Lebanon, experiencing a slight downturn and reduction in numbers. Algeria and Tunisia, however, have experienced a notable sharp increase post-“Spring”. The 1995 data, in Fig. 8.4, are taken from figures appropriate to 1994; 2005 figures are as of March 1, 2005, and where there are lower and upper houses, data refer to weighted average of women’s share of seats in both houses (UNDP HDR 1995, 2005). 8.5.3.2  Perception of Corruption and Democratic Values Assimilation Identification of “democracy” with the “West” (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013) and mistrust of western styles of influence, have led the people of North Africa and the Middle East to disregard democracy as a viable avenue for changing their circumstances (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 273). What is apparent is the desire for social justice that was and is still strongly associated with Islamic parties (that distribute zaqat or social tax) (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 263)6 (Richards et al. 2008: 407–9;

6  Zaqat is considered to be “charity for the poor”, or “social tax”, where a percentage of earnings are donated. According to the Quran, this is rated at 2.5%. It is an important aspect of social justice

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Burson-Marsteller 2012: 14). Corrupt regimes across the Middle East and North Africa are seen as having been kept in place by western governments (Ramadan 2012: 9–10; 2001: 109–10; Cavatorta 2010: 189), and their insistence on “democracy” (a kind of democracy that allows for the manipulation of parties, votes – as in the case of Algeria, for example – to suppress an opposition seen as “radical” and supportive of “jihadism” and terror) has resulted in a strong association between corruption and democracy in general. (The Corruption Perception Index, or CPI 2012 for these countries is shown in Fig.  8.5. The CPI Score 2012 is given in Table  8.4.) The progression of the CPI over 2001 to 2012 is shown in Fig.  8.6. Recently, however, Islamic parties have become more moderate in response to local demand for combined democratic-style governance with Islamic approaches to social welfare (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013). The Rank is the country’s relative score in relation to others. The 2013 CPI listed 176 countries in total. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, shown in Figs. 8.7 and 8.8, is a composite of 60 indicators grouped into 5 sub-groups that form the overall Index number: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation, and political culture. Each sub-grouping is rated 0–10 and the overall rating is the averaging of the total.

Fig. 8.5  Corruption perception index 2012 (TI CPI 2012)

and compassion. See Ramadan, T., 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity. [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Kalahari.com. pp. 53–54 and 124; Faruqi, Y., 2007. Islamic View of Nature and Values: “Could these be the Answers between modern science and Islamic Science?” International Educational Journal, 8(2). p. 262.

8.5  The Focal System as an Adaptive Cycle Table 8.4 Corruption perception index score 2012 (TI CPI 2012)

271 2012 CPI ranking Israel Jordan Tunisia Morocco Algeria Syria Egypt Mauritania Lebanon Libya Palestine

39 58 75 88 105 114 118 123 128 160 0

8.5.3.3  Social Justice and Expectations Quality of life, subjective well-being, social cohesion7 or integration, have all featured in the literature dedicated to human development since 20108 and have become more prevalent since the Arab Spring, with lack of social cohesion (or integration)

7  The concept of social cohesion can be traced back to the work of Ibn Khaldun, an historian of the fifteenth century with his idea of “asabiyah”. This is generally considered to correlate with modern interpretations of social cohesion, although according to Weiss (1995), it was also used to refer to “group feeling” and solidarity, which “emerges spontaneously among relatives and tribes” rather than any association with “capital” or natural resources. Furthermore, asabiyah is qualitatively associated with the condition of the social system state. This means that according to Ibn Khaldun, the quality of asabiyah or social cohesion will determine the resilience or ability of the social system to maintain itself. For Weiss in particular, this means that social cohesion is imperative to economic sustainability, as described by orthodox neoliberal economic thought and the use of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Social cohesion or “group solidarity” is unlikely, however, in the face of the specific economic prescriptions that form the basis of the SAPs, which enforce structural differentiation, division of labour (specialisation), and have been shown to result in wide and rigid “prosperity” gaps. See Weiss, D., 1995. “Ibn Khaldun on Economic Transformation”. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27(1).p. 30. Social cohesion here, however, is defined as an aspect of social capital, as per the DFID Livelihoods Framework, and following the work of Pierre Bourdieu. It is therefore not only the ability to participate in civic activities (community organisations, non-violent protest action, unions, and political parties) but also to have in place networks of trust and reciprocity (Bourdieu, 1986), including that which extend beyond the family. That is to say that social cohesion involves the acknowledgment (at the individual level) of trust in civic or government institutions and their ability to solve or mediate social grievances, conflict, or dissatisfaction. It is moreover, extended networks of trust in organisations or government institutions’ abilities to meter out social justice. Department for International Development (DFID) 1999. Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets. [online] http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0901/section2.pdf 8  First introduced in the Human Development Index in 2010. United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report (UNDP HDR) 2010 The Real Wealth of Nations. [online] http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf

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Fig. 8.6  Corruption perception index /5  year progression (including most equal) 2001–2012. 0 = perceived as highly corrupt, 100 as “very clean” (TI CPI 2001, 2005, 2010, 2012)

as it relates to jobs9 being one aspect more commonly cited as a major factor contributing to uprisings. Social justice is identified as a key variable, as its lack relates and is connected to the inequality of opportunities and social mobility. Rigidity of social structures across North Africa and the Middle East, and the inability to traverse the divide between poor and wealthy, have been among the numerous reasons cited as contributing to the Arab Uprisings of 2010 and beyond (Richards et al. 2008: 413).10 The consolidation of resources among a select few and the restriction of avenues of advancement through what has been described as “crony” (Richards et al. 2008) or “cosy” capitalism (Cammett 2014: 175), has led to frustration, disillusionment, and the devaluation of what had been the normal avenues of advancement particularly for the middle classes: education.11 Faith and trust in government institutions as 9  As it relates to job employment contributing to social cohesion. See World Bank 2013. The World Development Report 2013: Jobs. World Bank 2013. The World Development Report 2013: Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank. [online] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/Reso urces/8258024-1320950747192/8260293-1322665883147/WDR_2013_Report.pdf pp. 3 and 14. According to the Arab Youth Survey, “the region’s youth” are shown to want a greater say “in their own destinies”. See ASDA’ A Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011. Third Annual Arab Youth Survey. p.  15. [online] http://www.burson-marsteller.com/what-we-do/our-thinking/third-annual-asdaaburson-marsteller-arab-youth-survey/ p. 7. 10  The growing income inequality gap between rich and poor, is noted among respondents of the Third Arab Youth Survey as being a “major problem”, and has increased since the last Survey in 2009. According to the Survey 2010–2011, “a perception that the gap is growing, even amid economic recovery will serve as potent fuel for resentment”. See the ASDA’ A Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011. Third Annual Arab Youth Survey. op.cit. p. 15. 11  Richards et al. 2008 believe it was the “middle classes” across the sub-regions, which had previously formed part of the “authoritarian coalition” that finally tipped the balance, turning rather to

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Fig. 8.7  Democracy index 2011: economist intelligence unit. % of people who answered “yes” to the Gallup World Poll question “In this country, do you have confidence in this national government?” (UNDP HDR 2013: 174)

Fig. 8.8  Economist intelligence unit/democracy index 2011: scores (EIU 2011: 29)

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vehicles through which to pursue and redress social justice moreover, eroded (WDR 2013). It was this lack of social mobility that led to a “perceived increase in inequality” (Richards et al. 2008: 427), and has contributed to a degraded notion of overall life satisfaction and expectation (Richards et  al. 2008; Lust and Wichmann 2012). Compounding this was the existence of those within the population who could still remember the relatively affluent past, when the state took care of its people through subsidised markets. According to Richards et al. (2008), this in turn bred a culture of entitlement and reliance on the state to provide (Richards et  al. 2008; Cammett 2014: 172) that contrasted sharply with the structural reforms following in the 1980s and 1990s, and the financial crisis of 2008 (the Bread riots of 2009)12, exacerbating dissatisfaction amongst the populations of North Africa and the Middle East (Cammett 2014: 169). Social justice, expectations, and life satisfaction at the community level are therefore seen to be key variables in the focal system in defining its current state. Here key indicators used are Overall Life Satisfaction and Satisfaction with Freedom of Choice (as it is seen to relate to perceptions of social mobility and ability to orchestrate change). Both indicators have been taken from the Table on Social Integration, appearing for the first time in the Human Development Report 2013. As seen in Fig. 8.9, apart from Israel and Jordan (that rank 0 and 0 respectively in the HDI 2013), all other countries in the region rate overall Life Satisfaction at an average level (5%), with Egypt and Syria – both countries with continuing upheaval – the least “satisfied”. The percentage satisfaction with Freedom of Choice is shown in Fig. 8.10. 8.5.3.4  I ntegration and Integrationalism: Levels of Integration and Connectedness Integration is considered a key variable as it relates to levels of political and economic integration, both at an intra-state or regional and inter-state (international) level, as well as levels of interpersonal connectedness measured by internet penetration, Facebook and Twitter accounts (and usage where applicable), and numbers of mobile telephones. Economic and political integration are measured by the numbers of regional and international organisations countries are part of, as well as international agreements and conventions that countries have signed and ratified.

identify with the marginalised poor regions and against their erstwhile partners. See Richards et al. 2008. Ibid. pp. 409 and 428. The Third Arab Youth Survey (2010–2011) notes the education gap between Gulf States and Non-Gulf states as being extremely wide among the youth. See ASDA’ A Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011. Third Arab Youth Survey. Ibid. p. 10. 12  The 3rd Arab Youth Survey deems “fall-out” from the 2008 global economic crisis as having “tipped” the region over into unrest. See ASDA’ A Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011. Third Annual Arab Youth Survey. Ibid. p. 16.

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8

Israel

7

Jordan Lebanon

6

Algeria

5

Morocco

4

Mauritania

3

Libya Palestine

2

Tunisia

1

Egypt

0

Syria 2013

Fig. 8.9  Overall life satisfaction 2013. 0 = least satisfied, 10 = most satisfied (UNDP HDR 2013: 117) (Average response to Gallup World Poll question: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? Table 9, “Social Integration”, United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report (UNDP HDR) 2013. Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. New  York: United Nations Programme. [online] http://hdr.undp.org/en/ [accessed 27 Nov. 2013] p. 117.)

Fig. 8.10  % satisfaction with freedom of choice 2007–2011 (UNDP HDR 2013: 117) (% of people answering “yes” to the Gallup World Poll Question, “In this country are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” Information and data taken from the Table 9, “Social Integration”, UNDP HDR 2013. op.cit. p. 117.)

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Table 8.5  International and regional treaties held by the MENA members of the Union for the Mediterranean States (North Africa and Middle East) (http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/, 2013) Country Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Palestine Mauritania Morocco Syria Tunisia

Bilateral/regional 4 (EU) 7 18 7 2 None 2 4 10 2 5

Multilateral international 52 50 41 37 37 33 None 32 55 43 52

Total number 56 57 59 44 39 33 2 36 65 45 57

The number and kind of regional and international organisations and international agreements (bilateral and multilateral) and conventions to which a country is a signatory13 will give an idea of the kind of norms the countries wish to identify themselves with, both domestically and internationally (and also give an idea how far the penetration of norms are); find of use to in seeking legitimacy both domestically and internationally; and also give an idea of their countries’ identities in relation to the international community. For the MENA countries, the numbers of treaties held are shown in Table 8.5. The majority of regional/international agreements and frameworks fall into three categories with overlapping issue areas (for example, fish stock management is considered an Environmental concern as well as having effects on Trade; the control of Nuclear waste overlaps with both Security and the Environmental concerns). The regional and international agreements include amendments. The three main categories identified are the Environment, Trade, and Security. Due to considerable overlapping concerns noted above, it was deemed expedient to include an extra category that has already established itself, that of Environmental Security, defined as aspects of the environment that will impact human security and physical well-being, and, Trade and the Environment. A full list of the regional and international agreements that the countries of North Africa and the Middle East are party to can be found in Hierro, 2016, followed by the categorised list by topic areas in A.10.1., 10.2., 10.3. and 10.4. From the number of Agreements/Protocols/Conventions that are in use, it can be seen that Environmental Security and Trade appear to make up the majority, pointing to the priority that the Countries of the Mediterranean apportion to this area.

 Some countries are signatories but have not ratified particular agreements or conventions. This goes some way towards identifying states/countries’ willingness to commit, or perceived the utility of signing in terms of gaining either legitimacy or other more measurable benefits.

13

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Hard (Non-proliferation) and soft (trafficking, illicit drugs) security concerns are generally covered by UN Conventions at the global/international level. 8.5.3.5  S  ocial Media and Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) The role of social media (Facebook, Twitter, and Blogging) and access to the Internet, as well as “smart” phone technology and satellite television, has often been given a high profile in the Arab Uprisings and social unrest in the Middle East and North Africa and accredited with a major aspect of mobilisation, “swarming” and “smart-mobs”.14 While the role of social media and ICTs has indeed played a part in a new era of collective action and organisation, it cannot be given too much credit for a variety of reasons, the least of which is to overlook the myriad of social, political, and economic diversity that exists in the two sub-regions, the diversity of formal and informal, spontaneous networks that took part. To assume that the Uprisings in the years of 2010–2011 were the result solely of cyber-activism and organisation is to ignore the role of persistent mobilisation and grass roots activism outside of the cyber-realm for the past decade (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 278). These include activism against corruption and fraud (the Katifa movement, Egypt, 2004); for a change in attitudes towards women’s role in Arab society (the “April 6 Movement”); and the role of “conventional” technology and media such as pan Arab satellite television (Al Jazeera) (Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011: 22). In addition, it must be taken into account that prior to the unrest, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt had the lowest rates of internet penetration (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 281; Lust and Wichmann 2012: 1; Lust 2014: 151). This said, the role of ICTs and social media certainly created an alternative sphere for political and social contestation outside traditional state-controlled political arenas (Masoud 2014: 459) during and post “Spring”15, leading civic participation (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 283). This has been corroborated by the Arab Social Media Report of 2012, published by the Dubai School of Government, (ASMR 2012: 2), which found that social media had a significant effect on national, regional, and global identity, something that may have an impact on formal inter-­regional and international integration in the future.  In network theory and the panarchy of political science, swarming and smart mobs are interestdriven ad hoc groups that self-organise and dissipate, made possible through the internet or “smart” technology. See Hartzog, P. B., 2004. “21st Century Governance as a Complex Adaptive System”. Proceedings at Pista. [online] https://www.academia.edu/210380/21st_Century _Governance_as_a_Complex_Adaptive_System 15  Internet use has increased post Arab Spring compared to previous levels. See Mourtada, R., Salem, F., and Alshaer, S., 2012. “Social Media in the Arab World: Influencing Societal and Cultural Change?” Arab Social Media Report. Dubai: Governance and Innovation Program, MBRSG.  Dubai. [online] http://www.mediame.com/en/tags/arab_social_media_report/arab_ social_media_report_social_media_arab_world_influencing_societal_and_cultural_change p.  6; Lust, E., 2014. “Actors, Public Opinion, and Participation”. In Lust, E., (Ed.) 2014. Ibid. p. 151. 14

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Social media and internet communication has also had the advantage of reaching a wider range of different networks, both informal or “loose” networks and formal networks linked to established causes (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 279), and to some extent has changed the nature and dynamics of political and social organisation: people were – and still are – able to coalesce or self-organise around specific and common interests rather than relative gains/collective action in formalised (stylised) democratic forms of organisation. Jamal and Khatib (2014) have proposed that political action with the support of cyber activism became “bottom-up” rather than “top-down”, but really the relationship between issues, common interests and collective action was chaotic and random. Traditional media (such as newspapers), satellite television, and online social media (blogs, Facebook, and MySpace), helped popularise and organise physical grassroots protests (Iran, 2009; Tunisia, 2008, and the Arab Spring) (Jamal and Khatib 2014: 276). This is in spite of the obvious monopoly that states have over the internet and connections to the outside world, as evidenced in Hosni Mubarak’s ability to shut down mobile networks and internet access during Egypt’s uprisings (Ramadan 2012; Jamal and Khatib 2014: 282; Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011: 21). It would be remiss, however, to believe that greater connectivity in ICTs would lead to greater social cohesion or community sensibility. Dominating economic integration is neo-liberal thought strongly associated with individualistic values such as competitivism, a poor interpretation of Charles Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”, and the smaller nuclear family social unit underpins these values. Fragmegrative (Rosenau 2003) properties of the integrationalist value system already identified in Chaps. 2 and 5, are therefore juxtaposed to the cyber-connection that technology has provided. While the role of ICTs and social media may not be as central as mainstream analysis of events has proposed, therefore, it has certainly been organisationally and transformatively supportive; this aspect cannot be overlooked and for this reason is considered a key variable. 8.5.3.6  Radical Islam, Terror, and Immigration Radical Islam and fear of radical Islam have played an advanced role in policy making and the frameworks in the evolving Euro-Mediterranean discourse, as well as in shaping attitudes towards immigration and increasing immigration controls into the EU (Marsh and Rees 2012: 23,145). While terrorism on European soil is not a new phenomenon, its centralisation in EU policy is, and found its way into EU policy proper post-9/112001 (Marsh and Rees 2012: 29; Calleya 2013: 72). The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the relationship between the coalition forces and local populations produced a backlash of resistance, and marginalised Islamic communities across Europe became radicalised. Fear of the radicalisation of Islamic communities or “home-grown” terror, entrenched the idea of “fortress Europe” and measures to increase the security of Europe’s borders: with the absorption of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) states  between the

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years of 2003–2005, this left North Africa and the Middle East, therefore the “Mediterranean”, as the new frontier in the EU’s “backyard” (Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005: 15).

8.6  Alternate States The key variables identified in the last section have been chosen as the most appropriate given the character, major events, and upper scale interactions that have taken place over the timeline. As the key variables are dependent on each other, they have held different relative values over the historical development of the panarchy. In addition, as these variables have been observed over time, their perception in development literature and make-up of measurable indices has also altered. The relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean states can be seen to have helped shape and re-shape these variables, as well as the perception of the historical episodes with which they have become associated. What has become apparent and in hindsight after the “collapse” of North Africa and Syria, is that while the main concerns prevalent in literature and EU policy have remained constant since 1995 (immigration, security, the perception of North Africa and the Middle East as a “threat” along with an emphasis on integrationalism/economic growth as a solution), none of these have actually been viewed in relation to the turmoil that ensued. The following section therefore will identify the various (past) epochs that stand out, and key variables that were apparent at the time, also incorporating an awareness of the various policy frameworks in effect.

8.6.1  Alternate state 1: “Age of Confidence” The first Alternate State may be identified as a Conservation phase. The most prominent variables present in the focal system at the time were revolutionary governments, state-led growth following a loosely associated socialist ideology, and ISI models of state development. From the European perspective, it was at this same time that the GMP was born, and so too the politicised conception of the Mediterranean as a homogenous “whole” incorporating North Africa and the Middle East.

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8.6.2  Alternate State 2: “The Era of Depression” The second Alternate State may coincide with the collapse phase of the adaptive cycle. The fall in oil prices in the period of the late 1970s–1980s, led to chronic debt. Subsequent loans from international financial institutions that came with conditional restructuring of the economy, and as an eventual by-product, political repression and social-structure “lock-in” (Cavatorta 2002, 2009; Richards et  al. 2008; Bergh 2012; Schlumberger 2011). As structural adjustment policies took effect, large sections of society previously cushioned by state subsidies were left redundant and newly poor: public sector jobs were curtailed, small businesses closed in the face of large-scale competition particularly from the EU/European businesses under the terms of the RMP and (much later) the EMP/Barcelona Process. With the “roll-back” of the state, Islamic networks filled the welfare gap, providing relief and a social safety-net (Larrabee et al. 1998: 8). Populations’ allegiance shifted from the incumbent government to those who could provide social safety and personal security, as well as a sense of identity, dignity, and commune in the face of foreign influence and what amounted to national bribery in the eyes of the population at large. As described in detail in Chap. 7, this perception was further galvanised by the ongoing Arab/Israeli issue, the USA backing of Israel and complicity by certain states in North African and the Middle East. Corruption in government at this point, from the view of the population, was the co-optation of their leaders by external (and in the case of the EU/European, old colonial powers) influences whose interests were at odds with the majority’s wishes. Local populations often did not support their governments’ decision to make peace with Israel or tolerate external interference. As a result, ethno-terrorism and Jihadism found fertile ground and recruits, making this a key variable at the time. In summation, in this state/phase, key variables were social activism and the rise of Islamism as a counterpart to formal (westernised) government or state structures; increased economic integration with IFIs; increased association between corruption (and hence breakdown in trust in government) and westernised styles of governance such as liberal-styled democracy; and increased association with ethno-terrorism as a symbolic counter-reaction.

8.6.3  Alternate State 3: “Disillusion” The re-organisation phase of the adaptive cycle gives rise to the third Alternate State, which coincides with the latter half/end of the 1980s period through to 2005. The following variables strengthened in this period: integration through trade and economic neoliberal ideology prevailed, governments began to favour or “buy off” the business/private sector with tenders, and public sector jobs were given to groups of people most likely to support the incumbent governments’ policies; jobs and

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opportunities were no longer given on the basis of merit, or hard work, but on political or familial connections (Richards et al. 2008: 413). Social mobility stalled and resources were guarded by the few; generalised resilience decreased. Governments became more repressive and intolerant of Islamic opposition parties, who became the representatives of the grassroots populace (as in the case of Algeria, which descended into civil war). In order to gain further legitimacy and convergence with external partners, standing governments had established fear of political Islam and positioned it in opposition; its relation to terrorism and immigration had already been identified as a threat to stability in the Barcelona Conference and formalised in the Declaration and following Process. Repression of opposition parties often came with claims that the parties in question were complicit and supportive of terrorist activities in order to discredit them, in the eyes of the general population, and more importantly, in the international arena. As this phase of the cycle progressed, the perception of corruption in government developed to include the aforementioned cronyism. The rise of radical Islam adjoined with issues of immigration and terrorism, passed into the European consciousness and can be seen in their adjusting of policy towards the Mediterranean (therefore North Africa and the Middle East) later in the 2005 Work Programme. The rise of neoliberal economic thought in the West prompted changes in the relationship between the Mediterranean and its foreign partners, particularly with international financial institutions (IFIs). As the Mediterranean regions became more dependent on outside assistance and conforming to external economic mores, the perception of government from the grassroots levels became tainted: governments responded to foreign concerns over radical Islam, and became increasingly more authoritarian and repressive in order to maintain control. The change from ISI/inward-looking development to neo-liberal/outward-­ looking (export-led) growth created discontent from a previously advantaged and cared-for stratum of society, at this point the agriculturalists and small business merchants (Richards et al. 2008; Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). Social mobility became increasingly restricted over the following decades both from the austerity measures and receding welfare “safety-nets” imposed from outside conditional loan-packages and overall integrationalism.

8.6.4  Extended Exploitation External influences have promoted increased connectivity or integration with world trade and financial markets, and propelled the Mediterranean towards greater dependency and also volatility. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 changed the relationship between the Mediterranean and the EU once again. As covered in Chaps. 4 and 5, the RMP (1989/1990) and the Barcelona Process (1995) were policy responses to the absorption of the newly free CEECs and the changing dynamics within the supra-system of the EU. By the time of the Barcelona Process, gender perceptions and the acknowledgment of gender inequalities became

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the focal point of the first Human Development Report in the same year, and the GEM and the GDI were introduced. In this phase, in addition to the development of radical Islam as an issue of concern in EU policy making (the Barcelona Process), and as such a key variable, radical Islam also embedded itself into the domestic political scenario in the countries of the UfM. Perceptions of governance (trust), economic integration (the terms of which continued to be re-constructed from an EU/Mediterranean perspective in the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements), gender relations (issues of equality), and democratic governance (perception of corruption) became prevalent as key variables. Post-2005, increasing uniformity in policies and regional economic integration grew with more countries joining collective and collaborative organisations. Greater integration, however, has not always accompanied greater unity of purpose or solidarity of arms as shown during the Cold War period amongst the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Integration at the policy and institutional/organisational level (what had recently been incorporated into EU vocabulary as Policy Coherence for Development or PCD) has also crept into policy documents and EU external relations. In terms of key variables, what has been identified in this research as Integrationalism – introduced in Chap. 2 and discussed in relation to the Assessment in Chap. 7 – has increased steadily since the end of the Cold War and is shown in the number of international organisations and conventions to which the states of the Barcelona Process /UfM have joined. The world economic recession has further impacted the middle classes, previously advantaged and now feeling disenfranchised and insecure as increasing state (public) services are cut-back in order to keep economies viable (Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011: 16). According to the 3rd Arab Youth Survey (2010–2011), rising food prices and increasing unemployment has contributed to a trend among the youth requesting better representation (2010–2011: 16). Graduates from universities are now less likely to find employment, and none are eager to enter the Public Sector or government jobs in Egypt, for example, as the latter is generally perceived to be corrupted by cronyism and nepotism (i.e. closed networks) (Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011: 20). Pressure from outside partners such as the EU, the USA, or other institutions/ organisations with which the countries of the Mediterranean have had ties, have opened up the economic sphere in some countries, and in some cases (excluding Algeria) countries have moved towards a wider political milieu at least in appearance or name. The rise of political Islam in the countries of the UfM and the backlash from local populations against home-grown terrorist activities or violent Jihadism, has “normalised” as austerity affected the middle classes (Richards et al. 2008: 428). Likewise local socio-political arenas have managed to mold Islamic parties in the Mediterranean, making them less radical and more generally appealing, especially to the middle classes and those previously favoured and complicit with the governing elite (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013; Cavatorta and Rivetti 2014: 620; Richards et al. 2008: 425–6; Bergh 2012: 309). Radical Islamism as a political construct has lost its “radical” classification and has become favoured over

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authoritarian, repressive governance, and the kind of narrow cronyism that is seen to restrict social mobility and therefore increase frustration in social justice, life expectations, and perceptions of inequality (Lust and Wichmann 2012: 2; Richards et al. 2008: 428).16 Islam, its sub-cultural permutations of political extremism, radicalism/jihadist strains, and integration have remained constant if not fluctuating key variables throughout the timeline of the focal system.

8.6.5  Future Possible Alternate States The key components of the system have remained constant, although the variables derived from them and identified above have exhibited change over time. Political Islam, as already indicated, has become more moderate and gained much support as a viable opposition to the perceived corruption of current governments. Generally, “democratic governance” has advanced, as well as – provisionally – perceptions of gender and women’s roles in Islamic society. Terrorism, on home ground at least, has become less tolerated and violent jihadist groups are more isolated from mainstream society. Inequality between social strata and social mobility are still variables of concerns and will continue to be so as long as integrationalism (as discussed in Chap. 2) is pursued with international partners. Integrationalism and integrationist development agendas or paths, especially from outside influences such as policy frameworks or international agreements, will continue to intensify unless checked by strong internal system (MENA) counter-­ resistance and a definitive sense of socio-economic and political identity. This has only happened in the historical timeline during the 1970s, when the (MENA) infra-­ system was united through a shared sense of communal identity, self-possession, basic trust levels, and had the economic independence to do so. Increased socio-­ economic integration over the timeline has rendered socio-economic and political systems at the lower system level of states fragmented, and communally disconnected at the sub-regional level. This has been accomplished through differential policy interaction with the EEC/EU Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, and hence dependent on external dynamics. The framing of immigration, for example, as a mutual concern from both the EU and from the Mediterranean countries will continue to be (re)constructed as has been shown it its changing role and emphasis in policy content from its introduction in 1995 with the Barcelona Declaration, its Annexed Work Programme; and the 2005 Five Year Work programme. This includes the identification of migration with  According to Lust and Wichmann, when people were surveyed by the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute and the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (DEDI-ACPSS) regarding presidential candidates, no-one had an idea as to their stand on their economic positions, but could identify what the candidates’ stands were on Islam and the state. Lust, E., and Wichmann, J., 2012. op.cit. p. 2.

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terrorism and transnational crime; formalising/mainstreaming the treatment of foreign immigrants; their return to their countries of origin; and the channeling, monitoring, and coordination of remittances from diaspora communities as part of the development paradigm. If the level of integrationalism increases, it may reach either a saturation point, at which point the overall system may remain the same (become inert) or exhibit the same patterns described in the adaptive cycles over the timeline; or a bifurcation of the two systems may occur. This would amount to a re-emergence of a split in the focal system, and either a separation between the Mediterranean states and/or between relations of the Mediterranean states and Europe, or a split between the Mediterranean and “the rest of Africa”. In other words, increased political/regional integration along with economic integration will homogenise the Mediterranean, creating a further dissociation from “the rest of Africa”, continuing to undermine an African identity as part of its primary and current organisational association with the AU. Mediterranean dependency on the EU will increase, along with EU-style regional integrationalism. Contentious or problematic variables will be those already present in the social and political systems, but here intuited to be at higher levels of the infra-system, which will struggle to hold on to and emphasise either national identity (boundaries) or an Islamic/cultural identity (while religious identity ranks lowest compared to regional and global citizenry in non-Gulf Cooperation Council states of the Middle East, traditional values and familial influence rank highest) (ASMR 2012: 6) in order to assert separation from external (western) influence. Regimes at the national level may once again seek and find legitimacy in the eyes of their populations, in rejection of closer ties with external partners that can be shown to muddy cultural purity (as in the Islamic modernist movement of the mid­to late nineteenth century) (Gasper 2014: 22–24), or dilute existing national allegiance or cohesion. Changing attitudes towards national identity in favour of an amorphous (less centralised) or global one, united by universalised values, will take longer in richer countries of the Middle East (Gulf oil producing states, for example, as social contracts in these countries are attached to high rents from oil) compared to those of the poorer states (non-oil producing/non-GCC) in the Mediterranean, such as Lebanon for example, whose youth already see themselves as part of a “global citizenry” (Burson-Marsteller 2010–2011: 11,27; ASMR 2012: 4).17 Relatively poorer countries in the MENA region will be more likely to reach outward and claim universal values and solidarity than richer ones more able to sustain their internal regimes through artificial means.

 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey (2010–2011) states that global citizenry is more important than regional, ethnic or national identity as opposed to those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain. See ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2010–2011. Third Annual Arab Youth Survey. Ibid. p. 27. The Arab Social Media Report published in 2012 however, states that social media has “re-enforced” their sense of national identity. Mourtada, R., Salem, F., and Alshaer, S., 2012. “Social Media in the Arab World: Influencing Societal and Cultural Change?” Arab Social Media Report. op.cit. pp. 5–6.

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Integrationalism, as shown by some states such as Syria (and Iran) to a degree, is reversible: ties and agreements can be disassociated from or ignored over a shorter period of time. This is at the risk, however, of being labelled “rogue” or out-cast through ostracism and punishment (marginalisation and sanctions, for example) at the mainstream international level. With the advent of newly emerging states such as China, India, and Brazil, and groups of states such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) however, their different kind of approach to collective action and cooperation may dilute the impact of ostracism and punishment by mainstream international groups.

8.6.6  Thresholds and Transitions While it is not easy to identify specific key variables that have driven the focal system through the adaptive cycle’s phases, gradually increasing integrationalism has certainly compounded other variables such as perceptions of gender, the moderation of political Islam, perceptions of governance (corrupt practices), social justice and expectations of social contract that exists between the state and its people. While the “drive” to integrate for economic gains and to participate in relations with the EU has been paramount from the beginning, and as shown in the bare structural make­up of the first policy frameworks, the Barcelona Process of 1995 was the turning point that saw additional normative values of tolerance, democratic governance, gender equality, and cultural exchange being included, as well as (EU) politicised interests such as security arrangements (Confidence Building Measures – CBMs), collaboration on anti-terrorism and immigration matters. It would, perhaps, be an oversimplification to propose that increasing integrationalism/integration has driven the focal system towards change, as this would be to deny the importance of other variables that have developed, waxed and waned, over the timeline. These variables have been highlighted here and have played a contributory role in the overall development of the focal system. It must also be reiterated that human systems are particularly fluid, amorphous and decentralised at the best of times. While physical systems are less so, human systems give them their value and “use” (or purpose) in economic systems, often stretching their availability beyond real amounts. This is something already entrenched in trade and financial markets where speculation drives demand. The ability of systems to self-­ organise, moreover, often mitigates pinpointing one exact variable to apportion causality, or at least, direction or “drive”, as the association of variables intersect to assume this role. Integrationalism in this context can be seen as a constructed “basin of attraction”, where the system-state is “pulled” towards one desired end result. Gender roles, social justice and expectations, perceptions of governance (corruption, trust building) and Islam are less reversible as are interrelated variables such as education or health, for example, and are subject to progressive accumulation, development, and therefore longer and slower processes. Knowledge, for example, holds memory in social systems, as in traditional (religious) or customary

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knowledge that has been shown to pass down and through generations. As variables in the focal system, changing levels of health and education are nevertheless of importance and contribute towards overall threshold-tipping points in the system cycle independently of the state of the system. Looking at the system over the time line, information on gender equality using the GII, and the GEM where possible, has fluctuated, with women’s empowerment actually declining in most cases. Gender Empowerment has been identified overall as a slow-moving variable. Education (measured as adult literacy), life expectancy, and overall human development have gradually increased. These have been identified as fast changing, along with gender inequality, measured as GII.  Exports in crude oil over the timeline, as would be expected, were also erratic, while cultivated land use has also exhibited variation between countries. Cultivated land use over the timeline however, has been identified as a slow-moving variable, but fresh water withdrawal a fast-changing one. Thresholds reached in social immobility are difficult to measure quantitatively, but social justice and expectation, and perceptions of social inequality, have played a role in recent events as seen by the collapse of focal system in 2010. These variables need to be considered “composite” or emergent properties of the system-­ scales at which they appear. The economic system is directly connected to the ecological system through dependency on oil/petroleum/agricultural (provisioning ecosystem services) products and private sector-led economic development (Moghadam and Decker 2014: 76). Dependency on particular products or provisions is directly supported by their degree of integration in the international trade and economy and the value given, placed and ranked in order of its relevance (and tradable value) in the international trade system (Ravenhill 2011). Despite being signatories to international agreements on Human Rights (UN), for example, violently coercive political structures in the MENA UfM members have managed to be maintained: most regimes over the timeline remained authoritarian/repressive with little attention paid to pluralistic political processes or the increasing dissatisfaction among the population with the status quo. This was, as has been shown, in the interests of economic ties with outside partners who mistrusted political Islam with whom radicalism was associated. Key components of the focal system have remained constant, with the exception of qualitative interpretations of proximity and geostrategic position: proximity to Europe has been progressively recast in fearful terms; security framing at the policy levels is increasingly linked to radical Islam and prospects of terrorism. Once the economic system had begun to unravel, the social system followed suit at a slightly slower pace, yet was kept in check by political structural/system constraints (coercion, and repression) until such a point that the self-immolation of Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, and frustrated expectations of social justice could “tip”. Changes to the economic structure of the focal system had begun in the 1980s, and the structures of political dominance in place continued the requisitioning of available resources. Perceptions of governance (degrading trust and perceptions of corruption), changing gender roles and relations, weakened local social networks of

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trust; frustration at social immobility compounded circumstances leading to an overspill or “revolt” into the (upper) political system, as indicated already in its Exploitation/brittle phase and “tipped” by way of the symbolic act of self-­immolation already mentioned above. In summation, the main factors driving change and containing potential thresholds of concern are integrationalism, specifically changing economic paths of development and its part in transforming gender roles or equality associated with empowerment (political, workforce representation, and income share). The latter, gender empowerment, is a slow-moving variable (distinct from gender inequality), along with cultivated land use. While not formally measurable in any quantitative way, social rigidity and therefore social immobility and repressive control, has played a significant, if artificial structuring role. The interactions between gender, economic paths of development, social, cultural, and political systems are evident as are the links between land use for agricultural development and economic growth, social and cultural roles, and the possible political implications that land can play symbolically, and as a “tool” to counteract poverty.

8.6.7  External Factors Because of the extended interaction between the states of the UfM and the EU, it is at times difficult to distinguish between externally imposed issue framing and those pertinent or home-grown to the countries defined by the Mediterranean themselves. The Arab/Israeli conflict for example, and its fair resolution is – and has been – of great importance to the countries of the Mediterranean, and although acknowledged in policy frameworks such as the Barcelona Process and the UfM documents as important, has made little progress toward resolution. Economic and financial restructuring, however, has been at the forefront of the GMP, the RMP, and the Barcelona Process. The policies of the EU towards the Mediterranean have been mainly interest and internally driven, yet to some extent also “sensitive” to changing variables in the focal system such as the radicalisation of Islam, gender roles, democratic governance, inequality and the effects of integrationalism; these are aspects of, and form part of the body, of “main concerns” of the Barcelona Process and the UfM. However, these policy frameworks have failed to keep a necessary pace with the changing face of political Islam and its rising popularity; democracy has become associated with corrupt practices and social injustices, a result of the selective repression of democratic processes when opposition (Islamist) parties were portrayed as unfriendly or “anti-imperialist”. The call for greater social equality and better wealth distribution, as indicated by information on social justice and expectation, may require a greater state role, trust in government to do so, and also reversing the values inherent in integrationalism (neoliberal ideology of the free market economy and government non-interference).

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It has been in the context of policies and external values that key or critical variables of the system state have been identified, such as immigration/terrorism /radical Islam, for example, or even the “problem” of a youthful and fast growing population (Sorenson 2008: 78; Roudi 2011; COM 1994/427 Final; Calleya 2005: 137). In addition, suppression of the system’s natural evolution through coercive measures across much of the region, would have masked the performance and “real” or organic trajectory of the system. Taking into consideration the more traditional markers of human development and their indices over the years (life expectancy, education levels, gross national income for example), it would appear that although a poverty gap has existed in the past between the MENA members of the UfM and Europe, the poverty gap that exists between the countries of the Sahel and the MENA members of the UfM, is qualitatively wider by comparison (UNDP HDR 2010, 2013). Moreover, the most repressive or “unfree” state at the time this research was begun (Libya, scoring a possible 7.0 out of 7, i.e. highly “unfree”, according to Freedom House 2009–2010), was also paradoxically the one with the highest level of “development” in North Africa and among the Middle Eastern UfM member states (excluding Israel) (HDI 2010). It was also the only state of the region not to belong to the Barcelona Process /UfM at the time.

8.7  Cross-Scale Interactions The larger or supra system of the panarchy has been identified as the EEC/EU. The EEC/EU, over the timeline, has passed through cycles of growth (enlargement) and institutional change that have had a direct effect on its relations with the countries of the UfM members of MENA. This section illustrates the cross-scale interactions between the supra (EU) and infra (MENA) systems of the panarchy. Major influences (factors) in the transformation of the EU have been European intra-nation state dynamics, and the pull towards a “pooling of sovereignty” (Best 2005: 8). This is sometimes viewed from the perspective of changing regional integrationist programmes on a continuum, ranging from inter-governmentalism (state controlled/directed collaboration) to supra-nationalism (collective-led) and the establishment of a constitution (Reh 2009). At the beginning of the timeline in the period of the 1970s, it is fair to say that the EEC project was under economic pressure due to the oil embargo, subsequent “oil shocks”, and the resulting global monetary crisis (the delinking of the US dollar to the gold standard and the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system) (Wood and Birol 2004: 51; Staab 2011: 14). Although the period of 1970s-1980 at least has been described as an era of “sclerosis”, (Staab 2011: 15), a time when the EEC was “dominated by member state politics and a policy making system paralysed by its own complexity” (Staab 2011: 15), other historians have pointed to the initiatives made during the latter half of the 1970s that established a path towards its later successful development: these initiatives included advances in political integration with the launch of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and organising a

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European security community (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Helsinki Accords), which bridged the divide between West and East (Wood and Birol 2004: 42). Institutional developments moreover, were far from stagnant: the instigation of summitry in the wake of the “Empty Chair Crisis” with the Hague summit (1969), led the way to the establishment of more frequent communication and hence greater contact with the European Council regularly meeting three times a year (Wood and Birol 2004), and the establishment of an “extra-ordinary agenda” allowing for additional thematic and institutional expansion (Wood and Birol 2004). In 1975 the Treaty of Rome was amended to create the Court of Auditors, which extended the powers of the European Parliament (Wood and Birol 2004: 42–43).18 Moreover, between 1960 and during the course of the 1970s, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was able to incrementally establish a “body of constitutional law” by establishing precedents, case by case (Wood and Birol 2004: 43). At each point of these incremental advances, the EEC’s perception of its surrounding environment and the challenges it faced, changed. The advent of the EPC and the CSCE coincided with the establishment of the GMP and the EAD, and although the GMP was commercially driven, the creation of the other bodies indicated an expanding awareness of the need to formulate a closer coordination in political/security matters with its surrounding neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East. With the entry of the UK into the EEC, along with Denmark and Ireland in 1973, the EEC became “top” heavy with northern European states, and in the case of Britain, brought with it a particular reticence towards closer political integration. The prominence of the European Council, together with the strong presence and direction of France’s Charles de Gaulle within the EEC, meant that the predominant character of the EEC at this time was decidedly inter-governmentalist or state-driven. From the latter half of the 1970s up to the mid-1980s, an apparent optimism developed within the EEC, and with it a further move towards political and economic integration with the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS) between 1978 and 1979. This period also saw the beginning of “Europe a la carte” (Staab 2011: 23), referring to the possibility of negotiated “opt-outs”, or the assertion of individualism within the confines of the institution (Wood and Birol 2004). By the middle period of the 1980s, relative stability had been established in the economies of the EEC, due much to the Single European Act (SEA) and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (Wood and Birol 2004: 59). By the end of 1989, however, further enlargement and integration was previsioned with the end of the Soviet Union and re-integration of East Germany, along with the possibility of absorbing more states from central and eastern Europe. The RMP emerged at the same time, and kept the non-EEC Mediterranean states relevant when they could have become lost in the international developments at the  The European Parliament was given the power to reject budgetary provisions; appoint members of the European Court of Justice. Wood, D. M., and Birol, A. Y., 2004. The Emerging European Union. Third edition. Pearson/Longman. pp. 42–43.

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time. While still commercially focussed, the RMP introduced a budget line for regional projects dedicated towards “horizontal or vertical” integration, which included provisions for environmental and cultural projects (Gomez 2003: 50). With the RMP, the EEC began to expand its range of interest and areas of engagement with its external “Mediterranean” partners. The Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 was an attempt to tighten relationships between the existing member states prior to further enlargement, and incorporated a degree of social alignment between member states with the introduction of the Social Charter (previously mooted), as well as a defence agreement. The Social Charter was eventually separated from the main treaty (Wood and Birol 2004: 71), establishing a precedent for “opt-outs” from member states on issues where they wished to remain in control. Member states in this case therefore retained control over social aspects pertaining to employment (conditions of employment, equal rights). The TEU also incorporated amendments to the Rome Treaty, and the SEA, institutionalising the terms by which new member states needed to adhere (Wood and Birol 2004: 73). The TEU effectively established and institutionalised split-governance, between states (the European Council and the Council of Ministers) on the one hand, and collective-bodies such as Parliament and the Commission on the other hand, through the “three pillar” structure (EC, Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP, and Justice and Home Affairs or JHA) and the separation of policy areas. The relations between member states wishing for greater integration and those opposed, created a division or bifurcation within the EU, and paved the way for the proposition of “two-speed” Europe (or the extension of “opt-outs”) creating the ability for different groups within the overall structure of the EU to collaborate on joint projects, or opt for closer integration on specific issues or sets of issues (Wood and Birol 2004: 80); this has become known as “variable geometry”. At the same time, however, the establishment of the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy signalled a collective wish to move towards a more consolidated position in these areas (Wood and Birol 2004: 82). A result of these internal reconfigurations, the Barcelona Process /EMP had been introduced in 1995. The Association Agreements had taken on a wider range of cooperation in the structural format indicative of EU foreign policy as described in in detail in Chap. 3. The Amsterdam Treaty saw the transfer of certain policy areas to the EC pillar, thus relocating decision-making on these topics to the collective arena (Wood and Birol 2004: 82). The Treaty of Nice (2005) further adjusted institutional arrangements to make way for additional (new) members to the EU; to make the voting procedures and subsequent relations between member states more equal (Wood and Birol 2004: 84–85). The events of 9/112001 prompted a revision of how the EU viewed and executed its foreign engagement. The European Security Strategy (ESS 2003) prompted a re-visioning of how it was to tackle the newly perceived global challenges the wake of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror. Multilateralism was acknowledged as the way forward (ESS 2003; COM 2003/526 Final). The Barcelona Process /Work Programme 2005, with the additional pillar areas of Migration,

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Social Integration, Justice and Security (all focussed on aspects related to immigration), and Education and Socio-cultural Exchanges followed as a result. The Constitution for Europe project, which eventually became the Lisbon Treaty (2009), showed the impact of national politics on the EU integration agenda, and brought to light the disjunct between the interest of European countries’ leaders and their voting publics. With the economic crisis, which began in 2008 and whose after-effects still continue, the EU has stalled in an “inter-governmental stage”, stopping short of handing over further concessions on state identity-linked interest areas to a supra-national collective or European one (Reh 2009). The UfM was supposed to reinvigorate (once again) the Mediterranean region, which, since the period of the early 1990s, had been an important area of engagement for the EU. While the UfM includes the Barcelona acquis, it is primarily a projects based endeavour, focussing on infrastructural and environmental areas rather than hard  security or political objectives (Bicchi 2009: 19; Schlumberger 2011). The projects are open to a wide range of potential financiers and a mixture of interested partners, incorporating IFIs, EU funding instruments, as well as private sector funding. It has, as Federica Bicchi (2009) has noted, inaugurated an era of “minilateralism” (2009: 19), a half-way point between multilateralism and bilateral arrangements between the EU, its member states, and the MENA UfM members (2009: 18–19). Within the context of EU/MENA relations, this newer, more flexible institutional arrangement may avoid the dependency on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict and the political tensions that it generated from time to time, and to which the Barcelona Process had been held hostage. However, the added emphasis on visibility and “project badging”, may also see a reinforcing of divisions between countries who will collaborate with Israel, and those who will refuse for political mileage (Tovias 2009: 28). If these dynamics take place within the UfM, such dynamics (divisions) may become institutionalised. The EU has moved from economic integration, to moderate political (including attempts at security cooperation) and social integration, with a loosely organised set of policy areas that allows member states to pick and choose their collaborations. This has created a particular kind of internal modular structure, while maintaining an overall external form of relations that has acquired some uniformity and progressive direction; the EU’s external relations have taken on a formally recognised “character”. The EU, as the supra-system, would appear to be in the end phase of reorganisation and entering a phase of exploitation, in other words a period of vulnerability as transformation or the cross-over points between cycle phases generally indicate. However, the two strands of governance within the EU are not hierarchical, and its institutional path has converged to allow for a more resilient system capable of adaptation: the EU is at a mid-way point between straight-forward “collaborative” action and strict or tight institutionalism with binding and uniform agreements on all areas: economic, political, and social integration policy. EU influence, and perceptions based on geographic significance (both positional as well as ecological resources) have created a vast difference between the focal system and the Sahel, making the states along the Mediterranean coastline almost

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impervious to an upward “revolt” or exchange of de-stabilising influences from the Sahelian countries. In this sense, the EU policy-complex has contained the range of possible system trajectories and states that may occur at the focal system, through its continued patronage, integrationalism, and international relations.

8.7.1  Desirable/Undesirable Influences from Larger-Scale Systems Taking into consideration the information gathered so far, undesirable influences from the larger-scale CAS would be continued ties of “closer” relations (integration) and so-called “coherent” strategies of development that create symmetry. The “distant proximity” (Rosenau 2003) of the relationship between the EEC/EU member states and the UfM MENA members is not so much physical but conceptual, and the tension that exists between the two is that of wanting to maintain control yet keep at bay, a duality that exists in other relationships between the EU and externally identified partners. The prolonged effect of such an approach on the focal system would be untenable and at the least maintain the existing (undesirable) system state, replete with inequalities and conflict. Integrationalist ideology, along the specific lines that the EU exports, has been shown to be incompatible with a holistic approach towards a balanced socio-­ ecological development path.

8.7.2  Vulnerabilities and Influences As similar speeds of integration  – especially with a re-launch of PCD (ideas of closer ties and external policy conformity) in the Post-2015 EU development agenda (European Report on Development 2013) – converge, the cycles of the EU as the supra-system, the focal system, and the lower system will become more aligned, and increasingly subject to abrupt changes or disturbances  – whether economic, political, or social upheaval – between each other. As human systems in “control” of ecosystems, or at least their perception at a mass and global level, real-time eco-­ system-­change across the panarchy as a result will perpetuate a regime of disturbances: human systems will be continuously surprised by sudden breaks, “black swans” (Taleb 2010), or apparent discontinuities with past system states moulding disparate, new arrangements. The Sahel region (differentiated by its climactic conditions) has in the last few years experienced an upsurge of terrorist activity and insecurity and, until now, these aspects have only managed to make in-roads into the states physically connected beneath it that also share similar ecosystem services across state boundaries: Nigeria, and Kenya. In the same way that Braudel (1966) noted of the Mediterranean

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terrain and lifestyles in the sixteenth century, the ecological conditions – dry, arid landscape with limited water  – along with socio-economic conditions (modes of economic activity and social and cultural structures such as pastoral nomadic or dimorphic lifestyles) in the Sahel have to some extent mitigated the spread of further negative (and “positive”) influences. However, given the constraining geographical features of the focal system, and the similar ecological parameters across the Sahel that overlap into Nigeria and Kenya (irrespective of political state boundaries), the dynamics apparent in Nigeria and Kenya may present possible positive feedback into some areas of the Sahel, creating a wider and similar area of non-­ conformity. If this should happen, the focal system and the central African region could experience further cross-scale interactions or “revolt”. It would be fair to say, based on these observations that the Sahel is in the process of re-organisation, having passed through a collapse just after the apparent and relative political collapse/reorganisation of North Africa/Middle East.

8.7.3  Balance: Flexibility or Efficiency? The focal system, as it is made up of both a conceptual level of the policy and the geophysical states in the region, needs to maintain a flexibility over and above any efficiency or goal-oriented path to peace, prosperity, and stability. Balance (or flexibility) is interpreted here to be the difference between diversity (which encourages balance) and uniformity (which in policy and certainly PCD is associated rather with efficiency). To date, natural resource dependency across the focal system has varied in relation to the economic gains relative to international market share. It would be fair to say that within these confines, individual states are dependent on a certain set of conditions to maintain the same levels of relevance. The conditions that have existed across the focal system and infra-system, due to the variety among the socio-political and economic settings already mentioned, have so far worked together to produce the that system-state. Few would disagree, however, that this is an undesirable one. It would be a mistake to actively pursue further uniformity and market integration in this case. As the historical timeline shows, consecutive policy towards the Mediterranean states has not created or pushed the region towards the ends of peace, prosperity, and stability. Instead, they have contributed to dissonance, and rigid structures that are alien to localised cultures. This aspect is both robust and uniform. A brief review of the focal system would indicate that a lessening of ties or cultural influence, to allow the social or human systems embedded in the focal system to adapt over a longer time span, is required; that is to say less cultural exchanges and less investment from foreign firms, equating to less liberalisation. Tighter coupling to the EU and its influences will increase blanket resistance to change at the current stage. While less liberalism and cultural exchanges might seem contraindicative to finding tolerance and peaceful coexistence, the cultural linkages between them are not mutually exclusive: tolerance and peaceful coexistence are not only constituted

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through liberal economic underpinnings or cultural exchange. In some cases, like the one presented here, when one is dominant and presented as better or more relevant than the other in international relations and policy exchanges, they can actively promote rejection, intolerance, and conflict. From the beginnings of the Arab Spring, the UfM in the opinion of most interviewees, has been “dormant” or even “dead in the water” (personal interview, 2012). Hence at the conceptual level of the UfM policy framework and the relationships structured therein, the Barcelona acquis is perceived to have had no direct functional relevance to what is happening “on the ground” in the MENA UfM member countries. However, it is clear that the UfM, and continual policy engagement between the EEC/EU and the “Mediterranean” has had an effect, as the upheavals (protests against authoritarian rule, corruption, and clientelism) and transformations in the region have shown.

8.8  Interacting Thresholds and Cascading Change Transforming women’s roles and hence gender roles in the societies of North Africa and the Middle East have met with varied degrees of rigidity. Education, sexual and reproductive health, and economic enhancement have played a role in changing perspectives of gender roles, and as identified fast moving variables have the ability to interact with and destabilise others. Increasing modernisation and technology (ICT for example) apropos integration(alism) has compounded issues of social justice, gender roles, and life satisfaction. Mitigating thresholds of variables is to some extent possible by social manipulation and coercion, as seen over the history of the timeline: maladaptive systems can and have been maintained, albeit with the help and assistance of integrationalism and EEC/EU policy initiatives.

8.9  General and Specified Resilience General resilience, according to the RAWP 2.0. refers to system-wide resilience and is “measured” by observed qualities of diversity, openness, closeness of feedbacks, system reserves, and modularity (RAWP, 2.0: 35). Specified resilience refers to individual components of the system that have the ability to disturb overall or general resilience (RAWP 2.0: 34). The relation between variables or system components and their resilience levels can be interrelated, and managing for one variable may necessitate managing or balancing management for the others as a result (RAWP 2.0: 34). Concentrating on specified resilience therefore can lead to a style of socio-ecological management that reduces general system resilience, and also to possibly irreversible system states (RAWP 2.0: 34). The UfM and the EU has long identified increased integrationalism as the way through which to pursue social economic viability, seen as the panacea to instability

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and unrest. Integration of markets, of infrastructure, and of social values, such as the position and role of women in society, as well as related (universally) or system-­ wide values of wealth and consumerism, aim at symmetrising the focal SES. The creation of integrated and simplified regional trading blocs and coherent policies, for example, all lead to uniformity as opposed to diversity, a critical attribute associated with general resilience and the ability to reproduce itself. However, structural inequalities (dissimilarities and modularity) within the countries of the UfM MENA member states mean that not all levels are included in the socio-economic fabric proposed and controlled from the top-down. Frustration at system resources almost exclusively being held by an elite, with no recourse to gain access by what is nominally accepted as fair means, has provoked unrest in the focal system (Cavatorta and Rivetti 2014: 620). Authoritarian rulers have long instigated, with the help of external actors and dynamics (Hinnebusch 2012; Cavatorta 2009, 2010: 181–3; Schlumberger 2011), forceful maintenance of what has been identified earlier as an extended phase of Conservation. The pursuit of economic growth and the incumbent urbanisation has in some cases meant a disconnect between traditional and familial links, and together with population dynamics (youthful and fast-growing population), has meant the weakening of social and capital reserves. Also, any change in economic structure and modes of production will have to create new learning, often neglecting important attitudes towards the environment and natural resources. The structure of the overall focal-SES, has been artificially constrained into uniformity, yet it also resulted in the construction of distinct subsystems. The combination is counter-indicative to “peaceful” existence and social stability as it is commonly understood. Intra-regional integration has not materialised. It is due to this degree of modularity that the North African states and those within the Middle East have managed to maintain some distance and respond in time (the example of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2011, bringing a halt to protests in their countries and promising change are cases in point, and in some respects Morocco as well, which instigated “cosmetic” political changes as an outcome) (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013: 231; “Timeline: anti-government protests in Bahrain…” 2011; “Arab uprising: Country by country Bahrain and Saudi…” 2013).

8.10  Critical Attributes and Feedbacks The focal system would appear to have been experiencing a period of reorganisation through the Arab Spring of 2010 and thereafter. Certain entrepreneurial groups at the infra-system level have taken the lead in reaction to, and rejection of, what has gone on before, and past perceived inequalities and injustices. It is unlikely that the countries nominally part of the UfM that are undergoing these changes, will ever

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resemble their past states: current trends of extreme “openness” and diversity have broken with past system paths. It is likely that Syria’s past of connecting with radical Islamic groups has created an alternative state or “regionness” (or regionalisation processes), whose identity is based on shared injustices and rejection of wider integration, reinterpreted from an Islamic perspective as modernisation (as distinct to a more fundamental version of Islam). Modularity of the focal system needs to be maintained. Influences of the EU and its policies need to be less complex and invasive, so change is not seen to come from the top down, but rather as a result of the general consensus of the people. The countries of North Africa and the Middle East need to develop diversity of alternative structures and processes that allow for a balanced approach to socio-ecological growth and sustainable development.

8.11  Governance Systems Governance systems at the level of the nation state infra-system have notoriously been elitist and non-inclusive, holding on to the majority of resources in access to education, health, and jobs. Key decisions have been made at the highest political level with little input from the wider and larger, less educated, “less-skilled” population. A decreasing elite in control of the majority of available resource-flows enabled by austerity measures, led to the further alienation of the lower middle classes. At the level of the UfM, the project basis for the Union has in structure at least, enabled a broader spectrum of participation yet, as already pointed out in Chap. 5, the project conditions are sufficiently circumspect to engender a limited range of projects and kinds of participation.

8.11.1  Adaptive Governance and Institutions Because of the history of authoritarian rule in the focal system post-independence, and the current unrest, there would appear to be no historical precedent for either adaptive governance or functional, trustworthy, national level institutions. As the analyses herein has shown, trust in government prior to the Arab Spring was low, but increased substantially after the first initial wave of collapse. It will be interesting to see if this trend continues in the “tail wind” of the reorganisation phase, which is considered to be ongoing. As the focal system remains in the reorganisation phase, it is difficult to predict what kind of decision making structures will emerge. The past was constrained by centralised control, not through democratic processes, but from corrupt practices and the expropriation of resources, both natural and physical, by the few. Future Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and privatisation/ownership by foreign companies

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will dictate the locus of decision making regarding resource use and control. This is in addition to direction given by foreign policy, and specifically EU integrationalism. If duplication of current neoliberal state-models are adopted to their full extent in the focal system, the concept of adaptive governance proposed by Elinor Ostrom (1999) will not have a place: control and management over natural resources (those on which the state is dependent) will continue to be private-sector led with little or no acknowledged role to be played by local communities, their knowledge, or indeed their interests. This analysis relates to formal structures, however, and not to the de facto power or non-state actors that in effect are shaping “shadow states” (Bach 2014) or a “new regionalism” (Fioramonti 2014: 12–13).

8.11.2  Social Networks It has not been possible to map social networks in the manner prescribed by the RAWP due the large scale of the focal system19. However, the list of sub-regional, regional international, and global organisation membership prior to the Arab Spring, may serve as an indication of the meta-formal networks (a full list can be found in Hierro 2016). NGOs listed in the MENA may be used as an indicator of meso-level networks, as well as social network penetration (Facebook), which may include both. Levels of social network penetration has been taken from above the age of thirteen. The maps displayed in Figs. 8.11, 8.12, 8.13 and 8.14 have been generated from interactive data obtained from the Arab Youth Survey (AYS), reproduced with kind permission by Fadi Salem, Director of Governance and Innovation Programme, Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government (formerly Dubai School of Government) (http://www.mbrsg.ae). The majority of MENA UfM member states appear to be more associated with global organisations or bodies, rather than either regional or sub-regional. Israel and Palestine predictably remain less associated with sub-regional organisations (in the case of Israel there is no association). As shown in Table 8.6, the majority of registered NGOs are found in Egypt, with the least in Libya. Facebook penetration in the MENA UfM member states would appear to have steadily grown in coverage, with the exception of Libya in 2011, which showed a contraction, followed by a substantial recovery in 2012. Saudi Arabia showed a slight decrease in Facebook use in 2013.

 The Resilience Assessment prescribes a certain amount of detail (such as an analysis of the subgroups within all networks available in the focal system, key actors’ relationships, and an analysis of activities between them) that was not possible due to access restrictions at the time of this study. See Resilience Alliance 2010. Assessing Resilience in Socio-Ecological Systems: Workbook for Practitioners, Revised Version 2.0. p. 42.

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Fig. 8.11  Facebook penetration 13 years and over: North Africa May 2010

Fig. 8.12  Facebook penetration 13 years and over: North Africa May 2011

Regarding the main stakeholders identified in Hierro, 2016 (the EU, USA, China), it has been noted that the Mediterranean has become “less European” (Bonino 2009: 72), with involvement of new actors in the region such as India and China. As a result, the EU and the USA will increasingly have to interact with these actors. If this is the case, the Mediterranean region, and the UfM countries, may be tempted to recreate the dynamics that were present during the Cold War, but now in a multipolar, more complex setting. The countries of the UfM, unless offered some further, such as substantial incentive for preferring closer integration with European/

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Fig. 8.13  Facebook penetration 13 years and over: North Africa May 2012

Fig. 8.14  Facebook penetration 13 years and over: North Africa April 2013

colonial ties, may use to their advantage the presence of other interested actors in Europe’s “backyard” area to gain leverage, if they should choose. The choice of whether to engage with the MENA will no longer rest with the EU, but with the countries in their Mediterranean surrounds. (This dynamic, it should be noted, began to emerge between Africa/AU, South Africa, and the EU, as explained in Chap. 5)

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Table 8.6  Number of registered NGOs in North Africa (www.wango. org/ 2014)

Egypt 100 Algeria 14 Morocco 29 Tunisia 29 Libya 7

8.12  Conceptual Model: Part A. Synthesising Findings The conceptual model of the CAS for the Focal system is shown in Fig. 8.15.

8.13  P  art B. Synthesising Findings – Thresholds and Interactions Between Disturbances and Slow-Moving Variables 8.13.1  T  he Palestine/Israeli Conflict; Gender (in)Equality and Land Cultivation Use While gender (in)equality would not appear to have a direct relation to the possibility of resurgent Palestinian/Israeli animosity or conflict, land cultivation goes to the heart of the issue. As a result, an increase in land cultivation or appropriation by Israel would likely trigger the disturbance. An intervening variable is the prevailing structure of dominance, in this case the overwhelming Israeli military and its support by the USA and its allies in the MENA region. The key variable of modern terrorism (and insurgency) is informed by positive feedback from this disturbance. At the UfM focal system level, and as seen over the timeline of study, ethno-­ terrorist insurgencies against Israel tend to freeze the functionality of the UfM as a framework. At the upper scale of the EU, terrorist activity or insurgency from Palestinian resistance groups would likely trigger further controls on immigration and greater collaboration on (EU) internal security.

8.13.2  W  estern Sahara Conflict; Gender (In)Equality; Land Cultivation Use As a disturbance that arises from within the lower system cycle, the Western Sahara conflict would have a direct positive feedback on gender roles and inequality only in conjunction with integrationalism. Changing women’s ability to own land, and to use land without restriction, would create a positive feedback into the disturbance itself. Land and its use, as both a symbolic and physical reality, is at the heart of the

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Fig. 8.15  Conceptual model of the Focal system /complex adaptive system (diagram adapted from RAWP 2.0: 43)

disturbance, being as it is a highly politicised assertion over ownership and identity with the land itself. As a result, any change in land cultivation use will also have a positive feedback into the disturbance. A resurgence of the Western Sahara conflict would likely halt any advancement or working relations at the level of the UfM. Like the Palestine/Israel disturbance, the Western Sahara conflict is orchestrated by structures of dominance, in this case notably by Morocco. Counter insurgency lies with an exiled group, the Polisario Front, resisting the domination. However, in this case, Algeria, a strong and open supporter of the Polisario front, acts as a counter-­weight to Morocco within the lower system cycle. This makes land (cultivation) use much more susceptible to threshold triggers in combination with the Western Sahara disturbance regime. With recent concessions made by Morocco, however, these could act as a safety valve for any tensions that may arise.

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8.13.3  I ntegrationalism; Gender (In)Equality; Land cultivation use As a disturbance that originates from the larger scale system-cycle (EU), Integrationalism has been identified as the most destabilising because of its reach (historical precedence and geographical proximity). Formalised in social and physical infrastructure at the focal system level of the UfM, its effects are nevertheless felt in the lower infra-system at the sub-national scale. Integrationalism has been identified as both an external disturbance and a key variable that has manifested itself within the focal system cycle. As a structural and composite formed variable, it likewise affects and influences a wide range of interconnected subsystems. Paths of economic development and financial restructuring, alter how and which resources are used at the lower MENA system, and how they are distributed at the upper scale. This includes related eco-system services. 8.13.3.1  Integrationalism and Gender (In)Equality As already described earlier, integrationalism is an external, formal disturbance regime that alters the SESs it is associated with, namely the member states of the UfM. Through the UfM framework, integrationalism is designed to feedback into all scales and inter-connected systems, symbolically and physically. The promotion of gender empowerment as a composite variable would also have an integrated effect on the SESs. The UfM targets “strengthening the role of women in society” which includes social, political, and economic development (CEU 2008, 15187/08 Presse 314: 23). Changing women’s roles in this manner in a society where their traditional roles are restricted and closely associated with a larger Islamic culture and identity, is likely to create a backlash or counter-reaction. Takfirism and salafism are recognised movements that aim to promote Islamic fundamentalism; takfirists more specifically dedicated to “purifying” Islam against what has been acknowledged by “external” corrupting influences (Law 2009: 282–6), including that which affects traditional gender roles in Islamic societies. 8.13.3.2  Integrationalism and Land Cultivation Use Agriculture in Africa, North Africa, and the UfM members of the Middle East still forms a significant part of labour sectors, even if no substantial income or GDP is derived from it. Israel is a case in point, where only 2% of employment is linked to the agricultural sector (CIA World Factbook 2013), and at the time of writing 2.4% of GDP is obtained from agricultural produce (in comparison to 66% from services and 31.2% from industry) (CIA World Factbook 2013).

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Through integrationalism, value is placed on particular attributes of the system such as natural resources (petroleum, minerals), and specific products. Integrationalism at the UfM level and through the Association Agreements (establishing import/export quotas for example) will influence what kind of trade takes place. By restricting access to EU market(s), the EU is dictating which products are produced, and therefore which kind of economy and dependency exists on resources in the lower cycle. These in turn will obviously influence how land is used and in what proportion; how or if people are employed (in agriculture for example); and how many are employed in that sector. As financial integration and inter-dependency related to specific resources continues, the more susceptible the lower-system-cycles will be to economic crises when they occur at any other levels of the panarchy.

8.13.4  R  ise of Modern and International Terrorism; Gender (In)Equality; Land Cultivation Use As a disturbance to the panarchy, the rise of modern and international terrorism was acknowledged at the EU level, and also at the (lower) UfM policy discourse/focal level. Transforming gender roles, and more specifically transforming women’s roles through investing in their education, health, family planning, and economic situation, is widely acknowledged to be a key driver of social change. Identified as a composite variable, transforming the roles and position of women in society transforms the entire SES. The rise of Islamic extremism is cited as due to a rejection of “modernity” and the “debauchery of the West” (associated with America in particular) (Lewis 2003: 64–65,111) that includes the perception of western gender roles. In particular, transforming women’s roles in Islamic society – seen by fundamentalist groups as a result of western influence – is recognised as playing a key role in deconstructing Islamic culture overall, which acknowledges women as central to the family, and hence socio-cultural structure (Ramadan 2001: 49–50). Land and (cultivation) its chosen use in Islamic/MENA country economies, as already stated, plays a symbolic, politicised, as well as practical role, as shown in the Palestine/Israel and Western Sahara conflicts. As a continual or press disturbance, the rise of international terrorism shows no sign of abatement, in fact it appears to be increasing in qualitative violence; the latest extremism as exemplified in the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and/or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its violent tactics is the most recent evolution of this disturbance region-wide, along with its ability to recruit members from Northern Europe.

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8.14  Conclusion Assessing resilience means mapping the chosen panarchy, the key components, and the interactions between the various levels that determine its reproducibility or conversely, threaten this ability. Through isolating a focal or middle level system, and understanding the system at the intermediate level in relation to upper and lower systems, it is possible to recognise influences from one scale/system to another, within the context of a panarchy. The panarchy becomes the larger whole to which the all three CASs relate. While it is almost impossible to pinpoint resilience in a panarchy, it is possible using the Assessment to locate resilience in the internal dynamics (between key variables and components) and organisational structure, how its external relations or interactions with its environment are structured, and the quality and ordering of system responses to stimuli from feedback. Both specified and generalised resilience are also dependent on relative levels of potential (energy or resources) that change over time. In this way there is also a temporal aspect to both kinds of resilience, and equally system vulnerability. The CAS is considered most vulnerable at times of transition from one cycle phase to another (or one system-state to another). Generalised resilience of the panarchy, therefore, further depends on the non-linear interactions and processes between multiple – but key – components that structure the system/panarchy at any one time or phase. These can be either combinations of social or physical components. The focal system’s resilience rests partly on its internal structure and its ability to respond to disruptions from the lower levels of the panarchy, as well as working and adapting with the restrictions of the larger, slower, upper system, here the EEC/ EU. The dynamics between CASs in the panarchy, also have an effect on the dynamics within the focal system. As an integrated structure, the key variables of the focal SES concerned are affected by both upper and lower system cycles, with the focal system (as both a policy-conceptualisation and the level of government/heads of states involved) acting as a “filter” in-between. The UfM as the focal system, filters and reorganises perceptions of the lower system: immigration, social activism or Islamism, population demographics have been re-interpreted in fearful terms and fed back (positively) into the upper system. The timeline has shown the influences and interactions of successive policy EEC/EU making towards the “Mediterranean”, and the comparative work done in previous chapters on the frameworks show the changing emphases in EEC/EU policy-making as this feedback has taken place. Social media and ICT, social justice and expectations, gender roles and women’s roles, radical Islam, immigration and terror, are interrelated and feedback into one another at all three scales. The dominant or initiator role is played by the upper and focal systems, with reaction emanating from the lower system at the sub-state scales themselves. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the power of ICT and social media, especially as it relates to the Uprisings from 2010 onwards and its ability to spread and organise social activism. Yet just as easily, as in some cases has

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happened, ICT and social media can be “shut down” and their access monitored and controlled by governments. EU Integrationalism and its policy towards the Mediterranean have driven much of the change in cycle phases. Apart from at the beginning of the timeline of study, where the Age of Confidence brought about the initiation of the “oil weapon” and “shocks”, interaction since then has initiated from the upper system. This is contrary to the understanding of panarchy where change or disruptive influences tend to come from below at smaller, faster scale cycles. This dynamic is not excluded from happening in the future, especially as the continuing current re-organisation phase of the lower system is still ongoing, and by adaptive cycle standards is particularly vulnerable to further influences. The relative sophistication and institution of the EU together with successive (formalised) policy from 1972 have reinforced these dynamics through the emergence of a “Mediterranean” (policy) regime. Connectivity or a level of integration between the systems within the panarchy, is necessary for its overall resilience and is a naturally occurring aspect of the systems’ organisation and growth. Like potential and resilience, it too changes qualitatively depending on the system-state or phase of adaptive cycle. Connectivity, for the resilience of the system, cannot therefore be fixed or static. Integration and integrationalism, however, is and has been a fixed policy perspective and ideology since the beginning of the timeline, with only a few adjustments made to strengthen its underlying, neoliberal political economic doctrine. Further still, integrationalism is constructed externally and managed from a perspective of specialisation/individualisation rather than diversity. Integration and EU integrationalism work against resilience of any kind of adaptive system because of its externally driven, structurally “fixed” format; its rigidity comes not only from its ordered preferences and structured values enforced by formal organisation, but its influence from a resourceful and dominant institutional identity.

8.14.1  Interacting Parts and Flashpoints for Instability The key components have remained the same in the focal system, and relate to each other through political (dominant) and cultural (symbolic) systems. The Palestine/Israel conflict, land, water, are highly politicised throughout the timeline, with no signs of change in the future. The Mediterranean Sea and geostrategic proximity has over the timeline always been valued as both an ecological constant and a politicised component, but which nevertheless has the capability to change in relation to the other more fluid (or less stable) components (such as the Palestine/Israeli conflict for example) that are subject to social construction. The Mediterranean Sea can either be a “bridge” between Africa and Europe, or a “buffer” and protective area that require constant policing against illegal immigrants, prospective terrorism from anti-western groups, and illegal criminal activities. What makes this focal system/CAS and panarchy unique, however, is the presence of a disturbance-to-key-component, artificially “manufactured” as a key

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component through coercive means: this is the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The adaptive cycle of the focal system and that of the lower system, therefore, has been artificially and externally controlled through human (social, political, economic) systems rather than any fundamental ecological consideration. Any change in this manufactured key component will likely change the entire nature of the panarchy. The relationship between the key components of the focal system, as they are a mixture of social and ecological, does render the overall panarchy slightly more flexible, and in this sense hopeful: the Palestinian/Israel conflict, for example, could be seen to make the governing organisation of the components complemental or dependent on maintaining the geostrategic interpretation of the “Mediterranean” in international politics. If the interpretation of the “Mediterranean” were to change in this regard, it could have a positive (incremental) effect on related variables and other components considered key at this point. Likewise the conflict’s effect on land and the perception of land in the focal system gains much of its importance from the manufactured or social nature of the issue. Islam has also been recognised as having a dual structural and dynamic role in the focal system, and in the panarchy as a result. It has been considered as both a key component and a slow moving variable. Islam is to all intents and purposes intrinsic to the focal system and the lower system. Over the timeline as a variable, Islam has exhibited change, yet as a key component remained a stable part. Transformation or attempted transformation of Islam from external pressure such as integrationalism, has prompted a deterioration of its original form, leading to splintering and the evolution of further differentiated forms that include Islamism (political activism) and its eventual moderation or reform; radical or fundamentalist Islam and (lesser) jihadism, salafism, and takfirism as “forms” of Islam. Terrorism as a tactical response has become historicised and associated primarily with Islamic fundamentalism over the timeline. It has developed further into a sub-­ culture of violence that has little to do with mainstream Islam, Islamism, or ethno-­ nationalism. Land cultivation use has been considered as a slow moving variable, which has responded to changes in economic development paths handed down by external demand. Linked to agriculture, in most MENA UfM member states, land cultivation use has slowed down over the timeline. This corresponds to information reviewed on agriculture as a percentage of labour sectors, and GDP earnings compared to services and industry. As a key variable and component of the focal system, Islam is necessary for both specified and generalised resilience, and it responds to its representation in both upper and lower CASs, as well as concentrations of other variables present at those scales. Integrationalism has been identified as both a key variable of the focal system, relative to the levels of connectedness within the focal system, and an externally imposed disturbance, a result of EU foreign policy decisions and structural preferences. Authoritarian regimes and their repressive tactics in the focal system have been in response to the pressures of integrationalism and its implicit values (organisation) and structure. It has had a direct influence on both specified and generalised resilience, and therefore the overall resilience of the system and panarchy. As it operates as both a key variable and external disturbance, Integrationalism, is

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self-­reinforcing through its presence as an external “force” and an internal variable at multiple scales, both in its ideological and policy setting, and as an expression in its execution in domestic-level structuration. Interaction between integrationalism and Islam will engender instability or mal-­ evolution, as in the case of destructive and maladaptive permutations of Islamic fundamentalism. Few would disagree that deterioration and rigid interpretations of Islam are beneficial to the continual evolution of the lower and focal system, or indeed Islam as an inclusive communitarian culture. Radical/fundamentalist jihadism and takfirism, and their split from mainstream Islam and political activism, is the expression of failing specified resilience in response to the disturbing “force” of integrationalism. The focal and lower systems have managed to maintain a certain amount of modularity, that is to say a degree of internal asymmetry, independence, and flexibility. This has been evidenced so far by the isolation and “manageability” of the Arab Spring: if the focal and lower systems had been more tightly coupled (more integrated), the Arab Spring would have waved smoothly through each country with no hindrance. This may not always remain the case if further symmetry, harmonisation, and “coherence” are enforced. The balances of disturbances are external, however, with only the Western Sahara conflict, the Palestine/Israel conflict, and the rise of modern terrorism emanating from within the focal system. The Palestine/Israel conflict has resurfaced sufficient times over the period of the timeline to be classed as a disturbance regime. The EU on the other hand, as the upper system cycle, is institutionally resilient due to its internal flexibility or modularity, and has the resources to project its influence and integrationalism through foreign policy. It has evolved over time changing only slightly in how it organises or structures its formal relations relative to its external environment; this includes the focal system and Africa. Integrationalism as an external output of the EU is a non-linear expression of its internal preferences, able to influence structural values at the same time. Resources or potential of the lower system of the panarchy, are being interpreted through the dictates of external demand and integrationalism, as well as controlled connectivity. The lower system of MENA/UfM member states and domestic level appears to be passing through a reorganisation phase of its adaptive cycle. The focal system has been partially affected by the collapse and reorganisation process of the lower system cycle, although the state structures or political boundaries have remained so far the same. (This is despite the recent attempts by ISIL/ISIS to form an alternative separate state that transcends current state boundaries.) Revolt or possible destabilising interactions from the focal system into the upper system are unlikely to occur. This is due to the internal modular structure of the EU that makes it resilient and able to withstand external disturbances. Further, diversity of internal institutions and the in-built redundancies of roles within the institutional organisational structure increases the EU’s resilience. It is also possible, however, that an intervening scale /CAS may exist (and not considered herein) between the focal and upper system, preventing direct influence.

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8.14.2  Transformation and Intervention Intervening in the focal system to correct or assist in its transformation would be extremely difficult, as the upper CAS (the EU/EU policy discourse) studied acts as containment on the lower CASs of the panarchy. As a resilient CAS itself, the EU policy discourse enmeshed with the other CASs to reinforce itself, it “commands” stability from above. Intervening in the focal system to influence its trajectory to a limited array of paths should also be considered reprehensible. Investing or building capital in order to effect transformation, as proposed by the RAWP, is considered to be problematic in this particular focal system. The term “capital” pre-empts a particular outlook, and does not give an idea of the quality of “capital”. Human capital, defined as skills, knowledge, and the ability to labour (DFID 1999), should be used in  localised specific contexts, as opposed to one informed by a “blanket” neoliberal economic perspective employed only in relation to its accumulation in monetary or “objectified” (Bourdieu 1986) terms. Using “blanket” neoliberal economic perspectives on materialism, “capital” accumulation, and economic conversions of social interaction as a generic point of investment to do so, should be understood as irrelevant and ineffective in any qualitative positive sense for the communities that inhabit the geographical space in the “Mediterranean”. The neoclassical economic tenets on which neoliberalism rests on are the antithesis of localised Islamic socio-ecological systems, where property is strictly socially and culturally defined, interest charges (ideally) cannot be levied, and monetary wealth is shared periodically among the community (zaqat). In the Islamic context, economic or material capital would be hard to invest in, without the existence of the “western” context being first assumed; it would then have to supplant what is organically socially and culturally there initially. To invest in “capital” and transform the lower system cycle into a more desirable (perceivably less conflicted) state, therefore, would be to invest in Islam: contextualise “capital” in Islamic socio-ecological structure and dynamics, and restore specified – and generalised – resilience to the lower-system cycle. Transformation of this type would necessitate a re-balancing and visioning of the focal and upper systems; their values, structure, and dynamics. However, driving forces of change, apart from the initial “oil shocks” at the beginning of the timeline, have since that time come from the upper system cycles. Due to the established structure of the panarchy and these dynamics, it is therefore unlikely that transformation of the kind described above will take place, and that the current structure and dynamics of the (constructed) panarchy will therefore be preserved.

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8.14.3  I nteracting Thresholds, Disturbances and Slow-Moving Variables: To Have or Not to Have Resilience The key components of the focal system and lower system have remained the same and can therefore be considered “stable”. The key variables, however, have been fluid over the timeline. This has in some cases been the result of changing perspectives and indices with which to “measure” or judge their variability and import. Perceptions of corruption, social justice and expectation, and social integration are relatively newly “discovered” or acknowledged aspects and terms in development language and evaluative analysis. Changing perceptions of variables or notable phenomena may hinder the kind of accurate predictions that most analyses demand. However, the Resilience Assessment is meant to be an iterative process whereby, once the system-picture has been drawn, it is necessary to review and revisit main issues, variables, interactions, and key components to see if they have changed at all and in which way. In this particular case, drawing definitive conclusions of whether the focal system possesses resilience, is too strong an ambition; it also presupposes that the current system trajectory, bearing in mind its relation in and to the overall panarchy, is a desirable one. It is perhaps better to firstly review the entire panarchy as has been described, and attempt to address the overall structure for its ability to reproduce itself in a sustainable manner, and secondly review if indeed this particular combination is desirable for all “stakeholders”. For as long as the focal system and upper system’s dynamics are initiated from the top-down, this panarchy will be artificially “stable”, but not resilient in the idealised sense as described, and certainly not sustainable unless there is sufficient long-term commitment and dedication to consistently reinforce the current structure and routine (or policy regimes) interactions. This will require sustained energy, resources and persistent creation of the main issues. In other-words a maladaptive schema of the Mediterranean-MENA member states. In this case the particular combinations of roles, quality of parts, and dynamics have worked to maintain the panarchy and the system-trajectories of each CAS at each scale. However, the contradictions inherent between in-situ, localised SESs and external demands or influences have the potential to create further or extended periods of reorganisation and what would therefore appear as instability. Land use, Islamic culture, and gender empowerment are slow-moving variables, but will be “prompted” by gender inequality, social inequality and perceptions of corruption as the fast moving variable counterparts within the panarchy. Availability of fresh water (fresh water withdrawal), conflict, economic crises and policy responses are likewise, in comparison to the aforementioned, possible threshold triggers in relation to land, Islamic culture, and gender empowerment. It is hard to imagine, given the structure and dynamics of the panarchy over the timeline and historical evidence provided, that the lower CAS has been included rather than led, and at times coerced by their governments and external foreign policy demands. Specified resilience aspects have on the one hand deteriorated,

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while overall resilience and sustainability of the panarchy has been maintained by force; it has not been maintained by agreement or participative action.

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Chapter 9

Syntheses of Findings

9.1  Introduction This work has described how European Union (EU) foreign policy towards the Mediterranean has promoted division and divisive dynamics between the region designated Mediterranean, and the “rest of Africa”. It has done so through successive frameworks culminating in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and through integrationalism, the EU’s combination of emphasis on structural simplification at the ideological and physical scales. This includes the ideological reduction to neoliberal essences, the addressing of “integrated” issue-areas, as well as an integrated policy response; physical infrastructure streamlining and connectivity (such as roads, railways, ICT, energy transferral or grid connections); and also the cumulative processes across temporal and spatial scales with the conscious intention of transforming a whole system, as shown in policy decisions. In this manner, EU foreign policy has actively contributed to countermanding the stated African aims of Unity. Further, in the process of undermining and re-writing unity, EU foreign policy as described in integrationalism has interfered with the resilience of the African socio-ecological system (SES). As security has been defined in terms of specified and generalised resilience, a measure of a system’s ability to withstand a disturbance and retain its reproducible state, African security has been shown to be profoundly affected by the relationship that has been maintained between the EU and Africa. The divisive dynamics have affected African institutions and policy-making in a manner that can be construed as detrimental to its balanced development and evolution in a reproducible and sustainable manner. The structurally manifested conditions behind the failure of the UfM to create an area of peace, prosperity, and stability are likely to be replicated in African and EU/Africa as relations mature. Contemporary events in the UfM countries cannot be isolated from the policy’s overall failure, as well as the direction of the EU’s integrationalism, the repercussions of which may still yet be felt further in central and southern parts of Africa. As © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_9

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the UfM has established itself with a unique policy-identity and interpretation of North Africa and the Middle East as “Mediterranean”, it has divided Africa. The Sahel states, among some of the poorest and insurgent-ridden in Africa, have become the buffer-zone between North Africa and the “rest of Africa”. Already struggling under climate change, geographical conditions, and underdevelopment, the Sahel contrasts sharply with the member states of the UfM (North Africa) and those “below” in central and southern Africa that appear at least to show comparatively higher levels of human development and are not subject (so far) to the spread of fundamental Islamic cultural-related movements. Allocation of resources in the form of institutional structures, both formal organisations dedicated to, and informal institutions in support of, an EU-selected “Mediterranean”, make this region more potentially divisive to Africa and African institutionalism, and also more resistant to external influences from the Sahel. As global relations become more tightly integrated, or in the EU sense, more streamlined, harmonised, coordinated, and simplified, the spread of destabilising influences will increase in speed of dissemination, making the overall Africa system vulnerable to both internal and external disturbances. The possibility exists that the failure of the UfM to “secure” the Mediterranean in EU terms will be echoed in other parts of Africa and where the EU employs integrationalism as its relational medium. This work has looked in detail at the evolution of European Economic Community (EEC) / European Union (EU) foreign policy towards its external environment, from the creation of the Mediterranean in 1972 with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), through to its current form in the UfM. It has also looked in detail at the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) established in 2005 and compared its evolution, which along with its specifically integrationalist character, has evolved in policy as the new “paradigm” of integrated policy responses for development output or Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and is explicit throughout its Action Plans of 2008–2010 and 2011–2013. The analysis of the policies towards the Mediterranean used the theoretical framework of General Systems Theory (GST), more specifically dynamical systems theory, the complex adaptive system (CAS), and the structural concept of panarchy, which have been used to assist in addressing the research hypotheses. Unity has been identified as an African concept distinct to the European concept of integration, and therefore integrationalism as its structural methodology. Examining the effect of the UfM on the unity and security of Africa has also been approached through a “Resilience Assessment”, using the corresponding Workbook for Practitioners 2.0 in applying it to the EU policy-complex. The idea was to gauge the resilience of the identified overall panarchy (herein described as the inter-­ connected socio-ecological systems of the EU, the conceptual and policy framework of the UfM, the MENA members of the UfM), and to evaluate areas of potential concern that could lead to an alternative less desirable state, vis-a-vis current visions for Africa, including those that correspond to either “security” or its “unity”.

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Dividing Africa with policy was hypothesised to have occurred in a number of cumulative and self-reinforcing ways. The manner in which the UfM influenced the unity and security of Africa was principally imagined as taking place on a number of levels and through different processes that had evolved over time. It was primarily conjectured as due to the heavy or “thick” institutional relationship and hence a “deep socialisation” existing between the countries of the UfM and the EU. The heightened engagement between the EU/UfM countries was hypothesised, furthermore, to divorce North Africa from “the rest of Africa”, causing “dis-unity” at the institutional and symbolic levels. Other EU foreign policy frameworks and partnerships, such as the JAES, were conjectured to reinforce these divisions and contradictions through providing alternative regional and referential perspectives, forming an EU policy-complex, or web of policies that made up the available environment for African institutions and policy-making. The second manner in which the UfM was seen to influence unity and security was through the kind of foreign policy (values grounded in neoliberal values and methods of economic development, as well as liberal “democratic peace”) employed in combination with its embedded structural conveyance in regional integration and integrated policy (PCD), which set the parameters for the fore-mentioned processes to take place. It is through these described structures and processes that the EU policy-complex has reinforced European values, replacing African values and organic institutional structures with those ill-matched for authentic African development and evolution with the kind of strong cultural identity and frame of reference required for further equitable, and sustainable reproduction.

9.2  Findings and Review What has become apparent in studying the focal system, the UfM, is the distinction created between physical and human or social systems, and yet the underlying interdependency between them. At a very basic level, the physical environment should guide and inform social, cultural, and economic activities to enable sustainable living. With globalisation (and its implicit neoliberal value-structure) however, the distance between the physical environment and perceptions of what is possible within it, has divorced itself from physical reality to such an extent that dominant social systems have been able to reinvent the physical parameters of existence, leading to resilient maladaptive systems. What globalisation and more specifically EU integrationalism has done is taken a specific socio-economic perception of the physical environment and applied it across the world (or to different defined regions) in a systemised manner, irrespective of the socio-ecological systems (SESs) already in place. The subsequent pressures created by imposed values/structures act as disruptions/disturbances on those SESs.

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The EEC/EU has been able to do this specifically towards Africa, through overlapping policies and the establishment of regimes to form the surrounding, referential environment for African countries, and the African Union (AU) through the JAES and other external frameworks. The interactions between the EU and the UfM have been described using the concept of panarchy, taking the EU as the upper system, the UfM (as policy) as the focal system, and the lower system level of the domestic and sub-national level of the member states. The upper system has provided the contextual arrangement for African countries and the AU, based on a specific European “memory” of the Mediterranean and what it means to be “ex-Europa”. Through this structural relationship, and its own internal one previously identified as sufficiently modular, the EEC/EU institutionally has remained “resilient” and able to extend its influence through integrationalism. The upper two system levels of the panarchy have been found to be more closely inter-connected than that of the lower system level (sub-national). Dynamics have originated from the upper system in policy terms, been filtered and re-configured at the focal system level, with little input from the lower system at the sub-national level. This has shown the contrived form of policy-making at the moment. The panarchy is dependent on an intricate arrangement of overlapping roles, components and dynamics (which include disturbances) that have managed to create a resilient panarchy of sorts. However, the panarchy is considered to be consistently and artificially maintained by the upper two system levels, and not realistically informed by either the ecological basis that makes up the lower system level, or even a realistic representation of social organisation at that scale. Resources and potential of the lower system are dictated to by the upper two system levels, and the demands made and informed by a European colonial memory (established economic “historical” dependency and relationships), and currently, the ideology behind EU integrationalism. Through the review of the literature on EEC/EU relations with the Mediterranean and eventual UfM member states, it was possible to likewise see a difference between what was perceived and evaluated of the focal system level (the GMP / Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) / Barcelona Process and the UfM), and what the member states (the lower system level) have considered was the value of the frameworks, their involvement, and the effect of the policy frameworks concerned were. While governments of the MENA UfM member states still went ahead with economic and financial reforms required of them, and when the time came, engaged in cooperation in areas of justice and social affairs, and aspects of soft (and hard) security, there was still a level of dissatisfaction with the performance of the framework in relation to the expectations of what the frameworks, from their perspective, were meant to fulfil. The ensuing corruption and authoritarianism in turn presented the opportunity to frame political Islamism into “threats” against the west, and “stability” in EEC/EU policy language. The Barcelona acquis, the UfM, and its arrangements of Association Agreements still meant emphasis was placed on bilateral, rather than multilateral relationships; this confounded the overall rhetoric espoused of uniformity, or horizontal and vertical “policy coherence”.

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9.2.1  Constructing Regions The Barcelona Declaration forged a Mediterranean identity distinct from those traditionally considered to be Mediterranean, and created further division between what had historically been a Mediterranean identity that included Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and Malta. While not acknowledged, the EEC in effect created two “Mediterraneans”: those within the EEC and those not, setting up a structural (conceptual and eventually actual) divide between the two, which had previously formed an intuitive Whole. While much literature has been dedicated to the vast dissimilarities that exist between the countries of the Mediterranean, many aspects have bound the region together over centuries, most of all through being defined by the Sea and the countries’ placing around it. Once Greece, Spain, and Portugal had been incorporated into the EEC, what constituted the Mediterranean became fixed in EEC relational terms, with ensuing adjustments and redefining occurring through the enlargement processes of the EEC/EU. The Mediterranean as a region in policy for the EEC, finally found external form in the GMP, and was succeeded in various evolutions by the RMP, the Euro-­ Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)/Barcelona Process, and finally the UfM. The first incarnations of policy frameworks were driven by trade relations and economic concerns, with no formal institutional structures to amend, modify, or re-­ direct them. The newly-inaugurated EEC / ex-Mediterranean members, subsequently enforced strict trade quotas and custom duties in order to restrict imports from North African states and those in the Middle East, previously considered to be their “Mediterranean” compatriots. This showed the first division caused through institutional interference. An interdependent relationship developed between the Mediterranean and the EEC, recognised through the changing theoretical perspectives at the time, moving from an emphasis on realism and “hard” military security perceptions, to “soft”, developmental and integrated approaches to “human security”. Rising immigration, poverty, and ethno-national terrorism came to define the Mediterranean, the EU in relation to it, and in EU policy in terms of fear and “security”. What affected the EEC/EU consequently affected the Mediterranean, and vice-versa. The first Gulf War and the support that Iraq had among other Arab nations, together with political propaganda gained from their additional politicisation of the Arab/Israel issue, prompted further policy adjustment from the EU. After September 11, 2001, “conflict prevention” turned previous orders of visualising development and stability upside-down: the European Security Strategy viewed security as rather a precursor to development and stability. Security for the EU finally settled into a format of integrated ideas or nexi of security causes/ responses, with immigration as its pivotal focus. Development in the environment close to the EU/Europe (job creation, “decent work”, changing the economic landscape to fit with external demands, and political and socio-cultural “reform”) was

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seen as part of this integrated response, removing one of the primary motivations for migration. It was at this point that the Barcelona Process emerged and, along with the introduction of the concept of PCD, integrationalism proper became the form and conduit of interaction between the EU and the Mediterranean members taking part in the Process. The structure and the values present in integrationalism together with the longitudinal relationship established, assisted in the transference of European ideals of liberalism in political and economic thought, and the building of an effective regime over time. Mediterranean EU member states tried to regain ground with their old Mediterranean compatriots. Successive EU Council presidencies held by southern EU member states and circumstances converged over the timeline reviewed and conspired to keep the “Mediterranean” as it was, on the EU agenda. However, the agreements in place continued to reinforce the neoliberal paradigm through integrationalism and progressive engagement. The Mesures d’Accompagnement financières et techniques a la reforme des structures économiques et social dans le cadre du partenariat euro-méditerranéen or MEDA, the financial body of the EMP, was set up to assist in the initial adjustment phase, and later also created conditional attachment to the specific areas (regional integration projects) and values of EU integrationalism. By forming the MEDA, both sides consciously accepted the expected consequences of integrationalism, and still both sides pursued structural adjustment, policy engagement, and committed to the continued socialisation processes. Just as the Barcelona acquis and the advent of the UfM created a division between Mediterraneans, the UfM has further established a dividing line between North African states and “the rest of Africa”. With the addition of the JAES, which at least in policy rhetoric attempts to “treat Africa as one” (including Morocco, which at the time was not a part of the AU), there are contradictions: the acknowledgement of the Barcelona acquis recognises a formalised historical process and precedent set of relations with the Mediterranean (in whichever form it was at the time), contradicting the “treatment of Africa as one”. This still remains current in discourse and literature at the level of the JAES, and the ACP group. The Barcelona acquis and the UfM established structures and forms of production relative to the EEC/EU, effectively recreating at an exclusive level, relationships that echo colonial conditions and the development of “leopard spot economies”: countries of North Africa have become defined by their produce, and the development of physical infrastructure (and intra-regional relations) has been driven by delivering products and goods to the major centres or ports for trade and redistribution across the global economy. Resource dependency in this context is purely material and in function of economic exchange. Under these conditions and in pursuit of development, major institutions such as the EU, have created further conditions – or at least parameters of cooperation and partnerships – whereby social (political, cultural, and technological) ecological systems are coordinated, standardised, and “discoursed” out of fear and the recognition of “threats” to European “regional” security.

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9.2.2  Deconstructing Africa The UfM, as constructed by the EU, is one of many policy frameworks in place in Africa. While the JAES Partnership is considered to be the main partnership framework between the AU, African countries, and the EU, many other “strategic partnerships” and cooperation frameworks co-exist dividing the African continent where and when it should be most cohesive and united. On a practical level, and in regards to the stated aims of either PCD (interpreted as part of EU integrationalism), or indeed the stated objectives of the Partnerships, both have clearly failed. North African states and those in the Middle East, which have made up the EU’s “Mediterranean”, still do not coordinate their actions in relation to each other; do not function as a “regional” unit in any collective action or manner that is recognised on a continual basis, and certainly trade more with the EU than they do with each other. Moreover, since the Arab Spring, North African states and the Middle East have experienced upheaval, uncertainty, and in some cases, paralysis. Indeed, EU foreign policy does not actually allow them to form a “regional” identity apropos EU stated integrationalist/PCD aims, nor to find peace, prosperity, and stability: bi-multilateralism does not “breed” regionalism, but rather competition and competitive action. The EU, furthermore, has repositioned itself to become the co-ordinator or the main actor in the set of relationships that make up the “Mediterranean” of the UfM. Through the combination of PCD/Integrationalism on the one hand, and bilateral and differential relations on the other, EU foreign policy creates confusion by an unrealistic, shifting set of relationships that make the interpretation of its actions and policy difficult. It has become harder, in fact, to subsequently evaluate what were the “true” initial objectives of the policies in the first place. It has been proposed herein, however, that this disruption of values was accomplished by creating selection pressures on the internal mapping of African worldviews, through overlapping and reinforcing demands, and creating a reference of adjustment through conditional and historical relationships built on “partnerships”, agreements, and declarations. In the pursuit of an authentic internal “map” of the external environment, Africa and African institutions are misled; their ability to learn and adapt in an authentic, sustainable manner that reinforces and reproduces an African identity is compromised under these circumstances. This is not to negate change or transformation, but the quality of adaptation that is conducive to evolution of the system, and its ability to maintain is identity, form, and function. With the structural pressures created by the EU policy-complex, not only are values being transformed, but also levels of connectivity and complexity: the internal workings of Africa and African institutions, through harmonisation, are being simplified to accommodate an alternative and externally-pressured environment. Simplification in this constructed manner goes against a basic principle of dynamic system development that systems grow and evolve towards complexity. In this manner the EU is restricting the evolution and growth of African institutions. It remains to determine if pursuing a

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“pan-African” identity is worthwhile, given that these inter-fluencies and the propensity for fragmegration and negative centricities are more dangerous, as fundamentalist movements it the Middle East have shown.

9.2.3  E  xtent and Influence of Cross-Scale Multiple Interactions The CASs of the panarchy have been identified as regional and institutional (the EC/ EU), sub-regional and institutional (GMP, RMP, Barcelona Process and UfM), and national. All three CASs exist subjectively from the perspective of the EU, and structurally accepted from the perspective of partner states in the Mediterranean. The lowest scale of the domestic/national level is recognised as having a strong physical presence attached to them, based on inherited and colonially established boundaries with fixed resource bases. The frameworks, policies, and agreements between the EU and the “Mediterranean” countries of the UfM, create the cross-­ scale interactions at the symbolic-institutional and physical level within established state boundaries. The main interactions are considered to take place between the EU member states and the Mediterranean partner states. The EU’s issues of security, highlighted in the frameworks as main concerns (immigration, terrorist threats, and energy), are still maintained in the Association Agreements it shares with partner states. The EU’s security issues have been projected and externalised in their policy as Objectives and main concerns, the idea of “structural stability” distilled into  the policy areas of immigration and terrorism, for example (part of the main issues identified in the UfM / Barcelona Declaration). It was these interests that effectively kept authoritarian leaders in power: in this aspect, the EU has affected the unity and security of the Mediterranean, and weakened the generalised resilience of the focal system at the state level, through pursuing its own interests and allowing the Exploitation phase of the adaptive cycle to be artificially maintained by localised processes of domination and falsely premised (external) legitimation. The specific integrationalist character of the UfM as a framework has created disturbances at the lower level of the panarchy, the level of the Mediterranean UfM member states, as well as between them, as described in the previous section. The combination of the UfM and the JAES, form part of an EU foreign policy-­ complex at both the focal and upper system and compounds the overall influence and pressure of interactions at the meso (focal) and upper scales. Historical and evolving perceptions of foreign policy have formally maintained and adjusted conceptions of the Mediterranean, and incumbent issues or (policy) “areas of concern” that have arisen over the years. The structural “readjustments” of the regional space existing between EEC/EU members and non-members over the timeline has, therefore, re-created (and influenced) the concept of the Mediterranean.

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If it is accepted, however (and all literary and academic analysis points to this), that in terms of policy outcome compared with policy objectives, the UfM has effectively “failed”, it may also be entertained that the focus of the policy framework itself is misplaced, and that the influence of the UfM on the lower system level has not been able to penetrate that far. However, the panarchy has been approached both from the EU perspective and in relation to the complexities of its own structures, as well as from the perspective of the Mediterranean UfM member states. It is entirely reasonable that critical variables relating to the effect of its policies exist and process at different, and as yet unstudied, scales and systems. The possibility still exists that on-going processes at various levels have still to develop or dissipate. Although it can be claimed that the Barcelona acquis, the UfM, and interest in the Mediterranean has exhibited resilience, the lower system of the panarchy at the state level has crumbled. In terms of the fundamental assumptions of the panarchy, this is structurally unheard of: revolt or destabilising influences normally emanate from the smaller, faster moving CAS cycles, and not (as the supposition here is) from the larger, slower ones. As explained in the theoretical framework, only under exceptional circumstances can this happen, one of which being the temporal aligning of system phases at multiple scales. Yet this also would require a sufficiently externally generated large disturbance, or a tipping point being reached in an important and structural variable that, again, is present (necessarily) at more than one scale. (This scenario is also not inevitable, as successive structural alignments as promoted by EU integrationalism may create these circumstances in other panarchies.) The question then remains as to what the original purpose of the frameworks, policies, agreements, and partnerships were: to create peace, prosperity, and stability, or integrationalism? Clearly the former set of integrated aims and objectives have not been able to exist as an outcome of the latter methodology. The alternative perspective, that of a dislocation that exists between the EU/UfM and the domestic level/lower CAS, is also possible: that there still exists sufficient modularity (or independence) between the sub-regional groups and at the physical level of the states themselves, to have resisted the wave of change and transformation that appeared as the Uprisings/Arab Spring. (This perspective is supported by the observed perceptual distance between super-imposed policy and the actual reality of the SES already mentioned.) This disconnect could be the domestic level/ lower CASs saving: there must still exist sufficient diversity (non-conformity) and generalised resilience in place at lower and smaller system scales and cycles, in spite of integrationalist aims and efforts to the contrary at this stage. This is not to say that these efforts will not be met with “success” in the future. Pocket-sized backlashes from the processes in “border-spaces” in the form of radical Islamic sub-movements, and nationalism elsewhere in Africa already show the presence and acknowledgment of external inter-fluence (interference and influence) and socio-ecological restriction  (“brittleness”) in a very real manner. Until this point, the strength and resilience of the UfM focal CAS and the upper (EU) CAS, has managed to constrain the cycles’ phases.

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The various permutations of Islam (moderate to radical) are currently present and addressed at national and regional scales through targeted and integrated policy initiatives or physical confrontations. The original panarchy under study has helped to identify the larger, more diffuse system of an Islamic frame of reference that shares some operational dynamics with the concept of regionalisation. Through the study of cross-scale interactions and their extent, it would also appear that the panarchy may not be ordered in any regular or logical manner: the hierarchical structure of a panarchy was originaly envisaged as having a logical progression in orders of magnitude, each SES self-contained at one scale. It has become apparent that the lower sub-national system is more directly connected to a much larger supra-­system, by-passing the structural containment of the upper two panarchy’s CASs, and that this may be identified as an Islamic frame of reference. This translates as an identity that exists through processes identified in regionalisation and presupposed herein as a response to integrationalism. This would account for the individualised, fluid, and various (and fundamentalist) derivations of Islam that have evolved outside and in spite of these structures, and also its ability to spread unhindered as an organising identity.

9.2.4  H  ow the Policy Frameworks Influence Unity, Strength, and Institutionalism The JAES and much of EU foreign policy towards North Africa have established themselves on the basis of shared history, geography, and values. If Africa’s colonial past is to be recognised, it cannot be done solely on the half-truths of a history that erases the shared consciousness derived from the collective experiences of African peoples, and its response in the ideal of pan-African Unity. Such a reading is inauthentic to the African cultural memory and identity, and is one that has been superimposed, artificially and externally created for the purposes of policy or diplomacy rhetoric. In this manner and from a systems perspective at the institutional level and in relation to the EU, African memory (an essential part of being able to construct and interpret its available environment for survival and future evolution) is undermined. An authentic interpretation of an external environment, it will be recalled, is imperative in order for the CAS to be able to select the relevant responses that will enable it to survive intact. The EU, it can be seen, is both hindering African institutions from creating a reliable picture of its external environment, and also restricting its ability to interpret it, by firstly its structured approach to foreign policy in a complex-form as described, and secondly reinforced by the quality of values that it seeks to establish as “shared”. The JAES and the Barcelona acquis / UfM create and reinforce the EU’s interests and values through overlapping at successive scales. They have become the available environment for Africa and African institutions through technical training and

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highly-density networked structures of partnerships. It is the combination of structure that adds to the reinforcement of the values and the values themselves here identified as contingent with neoliberal economic and integrationist ideology. Without the structure, however, the values would be left unguided. The structure of EU foreign policy reinforces the values through their arrangement and ordering (emphasis on regional integration and economic harmonisation seen in the particularly “thick” institutionalism of the partnership of Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure for example), and creates the pressure to conform through its overlapping frameworks and bilateral relations. The EU policy-complex as described is therefore imbricated and highly “resilient” as a system, far more so than (relatively) newer African institutions that are being influenced in this manner.

9.2.5  How Policy Frameworks Influence African Security The structural aims and end results of integrationalism are, among others, to create symmetry. Yet a major tenet of systems theory is that symmetry leads to a weakening of the system counteracting imbricated redundancy and reducing resilience of both specified and generalised kinds. Selection pressures created by the EU policy complex have resulted in changes in regional identities from an African perspective, re-organised through the over-riding of Africa’s own regional organisations for the European Partnerships Agreements or EPAs. Furthermore, EU foreign policy, in creating larger areas of symmetry, has already facilitated the effects of disturbances, which although have not been seen to have had a successful execution as compared to its objectives, has created substantial influences in the form of resurgent nationalisms and vehement rejection of all things considered “western”. That the external disturbances have not always been of such calibre to collapse systems involved in the panarchy, is due to the larger and slower CAS of the Islamic identity, which is applicable globally and as yet not subject to the direct and concentrated effects of integrationalism. As far as EU policy versus Islamic culture is concerned, and the geographic area that it covers in the MENA through the UfM, Islamic culture can be considered a much larger, slower cycle, which will transform at a slower rate than the EU institution or its policy cycles. The different strands of Islamic political activism, and fundamental or radical Islam offer different interpretations of Islam’s response to outside interference. While there is a continuous re-aligning and re-designing of interests instigated by a force of external interference, the AU, already acknowledged to be less institutionally strong, or united enough to deal with the EU on an equal footing, may never be able to influence the dynamics of interaction between Africa and the EU. This is not to say that the EU is alone in contributing to the dissection of Africa and potentially reconfiguring its interests. There are of course many others as processes of globalisation attest to. As long as nation states exist, so will their interests and international relations will mediate how these interests are expressed and re-­ designed in the process. The situation therefore remains one of contradiction,

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institutionalised in the existence of the AU, standing as it does for a “united” Africa, while at the same time the presence of smaller configurations and agreements create dissonant and conflicting alliances. There is on the one hand a call to integration and multilateral action, and on the other, bilateral arrangements that consistently reinforce fragmentation. The study of the panarchy in question has highlighted the organisation of relations from one particular set of circumstances and dynamics. However, it has illuminated the possibility of alternative arrangements, such as the grander, larger Islamic scale of reference. A pan-African identity could exist as the same kind of frame of reference, if it were to properly unite outside of the nationalist or even continental borders and “act as one”. If Africa could identify itself as one extending to its diasporic communities, it would certainly be a larger CAS/cycle than that of the EU institutional identity and reach, and could dictate the dynamics of interaction. Attempts at this supra-identity, using the AU as the vehicle to do so have already been registered, specifically in the Agenda 2063, the African renaissance, and with the second wave of decolonisation. While it may appear to be a simplification to compare identities between those essentially religio-political, such as Islam, and pan-Africanism (a response to the repression and exploitation of colonisers), it is worthwhile to remember the words of the Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia:“The art of colonisation, if it is to succeed, means a coloniser sees to it that the victim is not only colonised politically, but also economically and culturally” (Kaunda, in de Gaay Fortman 1969:9), something that could be said both Islamic and African peoples have undergone. It serves well also to remember that both fundamentalist versions of Islam and pan-Africanism appear to be against western styles of “interference” in their SESs.

9.3  Theoretical Implications The GST and the concept of the panarchy have been able to provide a “cleaner” and more focussed appraisal of the dynamics and components of the relations between the EEC/EU and the countries defined by it as the “Mediterranean”. Its fluid, methodological basis has also provided a more nuanced reading relevant to current modern international and global dynamics. In spite of the fact that the UfM itself is perceived as not having had any effect on the security of the Mediterranean, which includes a part of Africa, through the conceptualisation of the panarchy and GST it has, on the contrary, shown that it has created changes and transformations through its integrationalist agenda, weakening SESs and structures, and changing them to accommodate the neoliberal economic structures being demanded of the “Mediterranean” region created. As part of Africa, that which has affected North Africa will influence and have an effect on the rest of Africa. The panarchy as a conceptual model and an alternative emphasis on structural relations has been able to show the locus of the exchanges or interactions between

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the CASs. It has been able to separate the real from the perceived. In other words the theoretical and conceptual framework, and its formalised practical application through the Resilience Assessment and the RAWP, have been able to provide a deeper and more focussed understanding of the pertinent variables and system components, contemplate the nature of the system, the dynamics of exchange, and possible future scenarios (or system states) based on the current state. With the panarchy, it has been possible to show the various scales at which the interactions take place, more so than traditional approaches that implement policy from fixed points, such as regional, sub-regional, national or sub-national level. Traditional analyses moreover tend to evaluate policy by comparing its aims and objectives with its results or output, as has been done in the case of the Barcelona Process, and is currently built into the structure of the JAES Partnership frameworks. Integrationalism has described the combined aspects of EU foreign policy as resting on two aspects: values and structure; specifically integration and a neoliberal economic development ethos. Neither has produced the desired results as exemplified in the objectives and aims of each policy so far. Maladaptive systems/schemata in the form of dictators and authoritarian leaders, their coercive and repressive practices, have contributed to this outcome and have been a product of them, through the combination of a distortion of policies and external dynamics. It would be hard to say if the specific combination of integration along neoliberal lines, as the EU had intended, would in fact produce peace, prosperity, and stability. Integrationalism, however, has produced a mixture of resistance and individualism, isolating large pockets of people in its processes. It has created, furthermore, the political conditions for the marginalisation of local “traditional” populations. These pockets of people have reacted through affirming their own cultural/social identities and value systems more strongly, not only due to the patchiness of the integrationalist application in the panarchy/UfM, but also because of its values, which are individualist, competitive, and violent in nature; qualities that have historically found expression in exclusionary nationalistic movements such as Fascism and Nazism in the early twentieth century. The theoretical perspective that underpins the CAS and its dynamics has been able to show that the strength of ideas, and values, are dependent on the internal structure of the system. The internal workings of the CAS are fluid over time, and also dependent on the relative values and qualities of the other existing components and variables. From this, it may be expected that values and ideals of how a system “should” behave, can never be taken for granted: they have to be continually reaffirmed throughout the processes and timeline of the CAS to retain their original quality (if still pertinent to survival in its available environment). In today’s globalised world, however, the propensity is that the distant becomes the proximal, and the available environment is no longer so circumscribed as it once may have been. The purpose of PCD and integrationalism is to instate and reinforce values through structure (harmonisation and symmetry of political and economic systems, social systems “automatically” transforming as a result). Human rights, democracy, rule of law, the “freedoms”, are, from the perspective of a CAS, reversible and are not all equal in quality, subject as they are to continual transformations or degradations

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over the course of the adaptive cycle (time), as well as in relation to other system components (spatial organisation in relation to the whole). The nature of systems and CASs in particular, is that they are both “receivers and transmitters”: the CASs, at all identified scales of the panarchy under study, will transform the value of democracy, for example, to suit its own internal (cultural) frame of reference in order to ensure its own survival: it will naturally try to resist external disturbances that will transform its own character, function, and identity, that is to say what makes it that identifiable system. While it is true to say that human rights, democracy, rule of law, the freedoms, tolerance, may be portrayed as universal and desirable to human existence, neoliberal economic orthodoxy with its individualistic and self-help, competitive emphasis is not, and neither is it conducive to the nature of the SES. The concept of the SES is of a balanced, organic structure designed to ensure sustainability and reproducibility as a “whole”. Both Classical Liberalism and Neoliberal economic thought exclude demonstrably sustainable values and most certainly do not incorporate a planetary existence that includes all inhabitants of the earth in an equitable socio-political-economic manner. This aspect goes to the heart of future planetary survival. The challenge comes when the system is (unnaturally) constrained to move along a path which may destroy its identity. As systems are inherently non-rational, it is arguable that the AU as an institution, or African governments/countries on their own, will be able to independently make decisions, however, given the embedded nature of EU integrationalism in foreign policy and the pressures created through its policy-complex or panarchy. The rise of anti-western sentiment in Africa and Pan-­ Africanism go hand-in-hand, and are in some respects the response to this embeddedness on a fundamental level. Its further politicisation by leaders within Africa is a symptom. In addition, linear appraisals of international relations and inter-organisational approaches, have been unable to account for reversible dynamics, present in the CAS. Order from chaos is not a natural progression of closed systems, which is the realist/rationalist mind-set of these theoretical approaches. The CAS and GST have been able to show through the adaptive cycle and the incorporation of temporal scales/movement that systems can deteriorate; change for the better, however, is not axiomatic. Regionalisation, as defined in Chap. 1, refers to the border spaces being the concentration of new arrangements of socio-economic interactions. It may also be the site of the most purposeful interactions between people nominally under different political jurisdictions or states. It may no longer be possible or sustainable to think or organise our socio-political organisations along traditional boundaries such as states, or even “regions”. The RAWP as a functional tool incorporates both concepts. The study of cross-scale interactions has highlighted the concept of the SES as a new paradigm for policy contemplation, which while ignoring traditional boundaries takes them into consideration as part of policy instruction or guidance. In the future it may be advisable to re-map areas into naturally occurring SESs, without the traditional boundaries (state or region), especially as resources become more securitised and more emphasis is placed on them, their worth, and their use

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converted into monetary terms. The concept of the SES has the capability therefore to transcend political machinations as a first step towards sharing resources in an equitable manner and viewing them in a sustainable – or at least in the manner of a long “now”. While traditional policy evaluations are still pertinent, a description of the wider, and specific influences on the systems identified, and how they influence and interact with each other, has been illuminated by the perspective of a GST, dynamic systems study, and the concept of panarchy. The study of the panarchy in question has highlighted the organisation of relations from one particular set of circumstances and dynamics. However, it has illuminated the possibility of alternative arrangements  and cross-scale interactions, such as the grander, larger Islamic scale of reference. The use of the SES has shown how important the integrated concept is to sustainable values and practices, and the influences the physical or natural system can have on shaping human systems and vice-versa. It is no longer going to be possible to exclude this perspective when approaching studies of international relations; it will be imperative to do so if we want to transcend closed-system thought processes associated with rationalism and rationalist approaches. GST, the conceptual framework that includes the concepts of panarchy and the SES, may prove to be the best theoretically integrated and empirical approach to studying modern-day international relations and its dynamics. As regards the use of international indices for longitudinal studies of the kind needed in the evaluation of resilience, which require longer time scales than are usually performed, these are considered highly problematic. The definitions of variables over time are not consistent, and as such when they are used in the social sciences for study over longer periods of time, do not add to knowledge of the system as a “whole system”. This is part of a larger problem not only related to the issue of changing the definitions of variables, but also to the recognition of larger temporal scales when studying international relations and indeed, other fields within the social science. There is a propensity to have short-term, more populist, memories; to see any crisis or sudden change as a discontinuity with the past. The understanding of the global system, history, and of policy making, however, is more involved than that. While dynamism and change are acknowledged as positive qualities of social systems implying progress, they are not often embraced methodologically as has been done here with the CAS, over larger temporal scales and as such as part of a continuous path of evolution. Rationalist approaches to studying contemporary international relations accepts its complexity and globalised nature, yet focusses on only a limited amount of phenomena, structure, responses, and over a short time span: nominally “complex” perhaps, but linear logic in application. Transformation and progress are superficially incorporated into the changing definitions of the phenomena observed, giving the appearance of acceptable dynamism and evolution. New systems are constructed each time, with new data sets being presented, as happened in the resilience study undertaken and for which allowances had to be made (see Sect. 9.5). This is, part of a tradition of isolating phenomena or components of a system in order to analyse

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them, even as they relate to each other. The analysis that ensures is rather of an “aggregate” than an actual CASs and/or panarchy. The panarchy is able to assist in seeing the system over a much longer time scale than is perhaps convenient in a contemporary world of short soundbites, sloganeering, and populist politics culture. This is indeed a unique observation facilitated by panarchy, and should be used to bring the study of international relations back from the conservationist brink that it teeters on, each time it considers a “new” event or departure from what has gone on before. Adjusting to this perspective, however, may be difficult, and it is expected that GST, and the study of CASs as a panarchy will remain largely the purview of GST practitioners.

9.4  Policy Implications GST and the study of CASs has shown the possibility of selection pressures being provided by the overlapping and self-reinforcing frameworks, carrying specific value systems of developmental growth, identified with the current and dominant ideology of the times. The Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) specified a refocussing on the internal restructuring of the countries willing to participate in partnerships, based on historical ties; states were required to implement their own developmental trajectory. The basis for partnerships between Africa/EU/Mediterranean have been framed in terms of “shared history”, which, while true as regards some aspects, does not reinforce a relationship of equals, as the shared history in question has an experiential basis in inequality, dominance, and exploitation. In emphasising the past relationship in the new one, the EU at the symbolic and institutional level has undermined the existence of the current reawakening African identity, and its institutions. If African institutions are to survive, the idea of unity and what security means must come from within its own cultural and historical frame of reference, which includes its colonial repression. Elsewhere, and across cultures that have seen similar fragmenting or cultural denigration, scholars like Tariq Ramadan (2001) have called for a re-visioning or revival of self-confidence, a re-valuing of identity: it is perhaps under these circumstances that the same should apply to Africa at this point in its international history, while incorporating its diverse cultures. An important caveat, however, is that while this is undoubtedly the ideal for a “confident” and valued self-identity and sustainable system, it cannot give in to the kind of conservatism the likes of which Ramadan rightly rails against within modern Islamic culture. Care has to be taken that the same kind of marginalisation, and reactionary conservationism does not take place in the “rest of Africa”, thereby auto-arresting its own adaptation. Furthermore, the conditions that exist under the UfM partnership for the MENA states, could create the same dynamics under the JAES Partnership in the “rest of

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Africa”. The question remains if the same exact conditions of transformation, instability, and conflict will arise in the same way as a result of the same methodology of regional integration, and “partnership”, in the rest of Africa. While African cultures may respond differently, the structural dynamics of integrationalism have remained the same. The propensity for the same kind of reaction therefore, is high, if an unconscious acceptance of Partnerships, Agreements, and other kinds of formalised relations, are pursued. The concern of changing definitions of variables over time is a cross-cutting issue that has implications for theoretical understandings of CAS and the international system, for policy and influencing change in SESs. Influencing systems, making informed policy choices, and planning become less reliable if they depend on new sets of system components and variables each time. The current focus on migration flows at the EU-AU summitry is such an example, where for political purposes, migration and “the youth” have been re-launched as “new” phenomena separated from previous (and continuous) flow in the longer-term past. Both of these “phenomena” were also presented as “extraordinary” in the period of the 1970s in Europe. It has become clear that the EU’s own historical journey, evolution and struggle to find an identity cannot be separated from the projection of its foreign policy, which at times has reflected this. The EEC/EU’s continual search for security and “survival” has relied on expansion or enlargement, and later the exportation of its value systems to its immediate neighbours. As the EU has enlarged, so too has the proximity of new “strangers”. The specificity of European integration does not travel well, as has been shown in the continual attempts to form a homogenous region in the Mediterranean. The “Mediterranean” region has three different identities, that in EU foreign policy; the real geographical “region” that is still as diverse in culture and historical experience as it ever was; and as part of Africa, institutionally and geographically in the AU. The Euro-Mediterranean “partnerships” creates selection pressures on sets of countries, here grouped together as either the Mediterranean, or African, that require changes in all aspects of the socio-ecological system, their structural arrangements, and their dynamic processes. The promotion of integration and policy coherence in the frameworks and ultimately in their execution, does not, as is the “party-line”, promote “harmony” and “coherent results”, but weakens the overall resilience of the SES. The act of externally changing resource uses and therefore economic, social, cultural, and technological ones, will create dissonance or disturbances that could reverberate to other inter-connected systems. It has become clear that current modes of policy, most specifically that which has been identified as integrationalism, cannot produce an equitable, or fair, peaceful and sustainable existence. As integrationalism includes both content and form (values and structure), both will need to be addressed and reformed in a manner that promotes equitable distributive practices that exclude accumulation of “capital” for individuals, but rather alternative values of worth, wealth, and well-being for the community or Whole. It is therefore recommended that the neoliberal emphasis on economic development, integration and growth be replaced with an inclusive community emphasis, made possible through localised and micro-organisational “stewardship”, as

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proposed by the Resilience Alliance. The concept of the SES will need to become an integral part of policy planning, as well as looking towards smaller, participative (rather than representative) administrative structures. Further, it should be proposed incorporating localised knowledge, or at least a contextualised livelihoods frameworks that de-emphasises competition and individualism, and re-emphasises mutualism; cultural and social “capital” within a localised ecological context.

9.5  Limitations of the Study A main concern encountered over the course of this research, as indicated earlier, has been the lack of consistent data, changing perspectives or complex indicators. It was difficult to track change due to the changing vocabulary, measures, and perspectives that were used over the timeline to measure, judge, or name indicators. The measuring of gender inequality is a case in point. Originally introduced in 1995 in the Gender-related Empowerment Measure, and the Gender Development Index, aspects of both were later combined to form the Gender Inequality Index in 2010. With each reinvention of the variable’s definition, a new system is effectively “born”. It has become customary to reinvent concepts and phenomena creating in turn what has been referred to in this work as false “economies of knowledge”. Each system, however, should be governed by transformations from its initial conditions. The changes in the variables from the initial conditions of the systems are determined by the interactions internally and between the CASs within the panarchy, and dictate the evolution of each system. The ability to describe such a situation is dependent on the consistency of the definition of the variables. The changes are reflected in the values of the variables over time, as found from data. Should variables’ definitions be allowed to change, as happened over the timeline of study, it is possible that other regimes may have been missed, as well as (other) important variables that may operate at different scales and take longer to evolve. The RAWP has, as its fundamental assumptions, relied on concepts of capital and dependency, which biases the Assessment results in those terms; it was not designed a priori of “resources”. This tends to bias the assessment towards economic interpretations of the environment. Future research should try to redefine life-components, steering away from “economic” or instrumentalist language, or related concepts. The perspectives of “use” or dependency, are seen to instil fear of loss and a hyper-securitised policy environment, both of which are considered ill-­ suited to equitable distributive practices. The acknowledgment of this short-coming is important in order to change its emphasis, but here language is just as important to the overall understanding of the issues at hand, as it pertains to a resilience assessment: what kind of resilience, therefore, are we looking for? Within this book and its Assessment, in order for the African SES to maintain resilience levels, and that requirement throughout its adaptive cycle in commensurate response to other qualities of potential and

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connectedness, the reliance on “capital” language and an “econo-ecological dependency” lexicon, need to be dismantled. The building of, or investing in “capital” as a concept, is problematic in the resilience assessment. Viewing resources in terms of capital or dependency relies on economic and materialistic interpretations of the world, and reinforces paradigms that are deterministically destructive. The idea of “capital” thereby reduces human qualitative interaction to mechanistic quantitative sums and values. Having stated this, in light of “the testing” aspect of this research, the terminology and biases were used knowingly in order to unravell these inherent difficulties. Under these acknowledged limitations, it would therefore be difficult to invest in any natural capital in this way, without reinforcing its conversion into monetary units for exchange in a market for trading (as has happened with international carbon trading, for example). In order to change this perspective  to begin with, investment in natural capital would require investment in social capital of the type that would reinforce the connection between social organisations and a kind of viable “economic” activity that would lead to  a mutualistic and communalistic, qualitative existence. A reappraisal of the RAWP may be necessary, as far as these issues are concerned.

References Kaunda, Kenneth D. 1969. Humanism in Zambia. In After Mulungushi: The Economics of Zambian Humanism, ed. B. de Gaay Fortman, 9. Kenya: East African Publishing House. Ramadan, T. 2001. Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity [e-book Adobe DRM epub version] Translated from Arabic by Said Amghar. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. Available at: Kalahari.com.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

10.1  Introduction Recent calls for decolonisation almost 60  years after the physical withdrawal of colonial powers from Africa has confounded many, but these renewed calls may not be so far off the mark in helping to uncover larger issues that have been misdirected through lack of “landing space” in contemporary international relations’ discourse. General systems theory, in particular dynamic systems and the modelling of complex adaptive systems, have been able to offer this “space” and reveal the deeper inter-dependencies between the past, present, and future, that is to say the transformation of values and structures over temporal and spatial scales. Little has changed in terms of addressing inequalities and the perception that African values and contributions to international society are (still) not being taken into consideration. EU foreign policy in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and other cross-cutting policy frameworks such as the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) and the South Africa EU Strategic Partnership contribute to the understanding that as African ideals of Unity are pursued, outside influences are pulling in the opposite direction, causing divisions among African states and making unity and security at the continental level, difficult to maintain. Frustration is further compounded as the aims and objectives of these partnerships, prosperity, stability, and peace, have not been met. What, then, is the point of this continued envelopment in the “western” international system of government? The calls for a second decolonisation and what the African experience knows, is a confusion between the historical institutionalised (both informally and formally) memory in the ideal of African Unity and pan-Africanism, and its focus on eliminating colonialism(s) as a blanket response/experience. However, the understanding of this contemporary anti-colonialisms/colonialism revolt is not, as it has been represented, in a binary form. It is rather the result of structural processes that have trained societies into believing (and responding) in smaller and finer groups that reflect negative, disassociation from possible wider solidarities and commonalities. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. Hierro, Dividing Africa with Policy, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41302-6_10

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The response to perceived social injustices at national level and  magnified in international terms is further non-binary, but one that is better understood in terms of a heterarchical bombardment on the SES, or as has been modelled here in this work, as a panarchical one. As EU values of integration, associated with neoliberalisation, have dug deeper into its African institutional equivalent in the AU, and with other strategic partners on (and outside of) the continent, it has affected the idea of African Unity as part of the pan-Africanist narrative. The gap between integration and unity has slowly closed to the point where, at the AU level, there appears to be a confusion over the distinction between the them and their substance: the idea of Africa taking ownership” of its future, and being “self-reliant”, while maintaining paternalistic “ties that bind”, a shared history with the West (or the EU), in whichever form, as well as implementing “integration”, will always create contradictory messages about what it means to be “united”. These contradictions will be maintained for as long as the State, with its recognised liberal-imperial ancestry exists in Africa. The Monrovia group of African states in the early 1960s did the best they could at the time. The attachment to the (liberal) colonial state, however, would only entrench specific path trajectories for African SESs based on this original structure. Chapters Four and Five presented a detailed discussion on the evolution of EEC/EU foreign policy towards its external environment, from the creation of the Mediterranean in 1972 with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), through to its current form in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The dynamics that ensued from the developing intergrationalist methodology that was to become the EU’s main vehicle of expression in external affairs, gave rise to competition, rivalry, and conflict between them. The more austerity measures put in place as part of neoliberal structural adjustment policies, programmes of trade liberalisation and overlapped in Association Agreements between the EEC/EU and the Mediterranean states, the more it was necessary for leaders of those states to use coercion and clientelism to stay in their positions: The contradictions between establishing stability, framed in terms of quelling the rise of anti-west activism, political Islam and terrorism, and authoritarian governments – openly anti-democratic – eventually became apparent. EEC/EU norms of human rights, democracy, rule of law, were exposed as substantively empty terms when Mediterranean states openly disregarded these at the national level with no apparent repercussions. In the meantime, the SESs of these states were changing, forcibly, by and from EU integrationalism. It would only be a matter of time before the strain of maintaining the external disturbance would be untenable. Chapter Six looked at the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) established in 2005 and linked its evolution with other foreign policy initiatives emerging at the time. It also highlighted its specifically integrationalist character, as it has evolved in policy as the new “paradigm” of integrated policy responses for development output or Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and explicit throughout its Action Plans of 2008–2010 and 2011–2013. It also provided the wider context of the EU in relation to its strategic partnership and other frameworks such as the Cotonou Agreement now coming to a close. It is only at this point, with the prospect of a post-Cotonou

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world that the EU foreign policy’s divisive nature towards Africa is being exposed as Mediterranean states show reluctance to give up their identity and preferential status established over the years in the UfM, and some African countries wish to continue as part of the Cotonou group rather than forge ahead with a solo African/ AU identity. The EU’s strategic interests elsewhere, as in the EU-SA Strategic Partnership have added to the cross-currents within the continent as some actors have taken advantage of rising conservatism within the notable resurgent pan-­ African movement. While Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 provided the groundwork in analysing EU-Africa relations, through the UfM as an example of the kinds of dynamics created, Chaps. 7 and 8 have provided the essential “scientific” backbone to the central hypothesis. Dividing Africa with policy was hypothesised to have occurred in a number of cumulative and self-reinforcing ways. The UfM’s influence on the unity and security of Africa was principally imagined as taking place on a number of levels and through different processes that had evolved over time. It was primarily conjectured as due to the heavy or “thick” institutional relationship and hence a “deep socialisation” existing between the countries of the UfM and the EU. The heightened engagement between the EU/UfM countries was hypothesised, furthermore, to divorce North Africa from “the rest of Africa”, causing “dis-unity” at the institutional and symbolic levels. Other EU foreign policy frameworks and partnerships, such as the JAES, were conjectured to reinforce these divisions and contradictions through providing alternative regional and referential perspectives, forming an EU policy-complex, or web of policies that made up the available environment for African institutions and policy-making. The second manner in which the UfM was seen to influence unity and security was through the kind of foreign policy (values grounded in neoliberal values and methods of economic development, as well as liberal “democratic peace”) employed in combination with its embedded structural conveyance in regional integration and integrated policy (PCD), which set the parameters for the fore-mentioned processes to take place. The analysis of the policies towards the Mediterranean used the theoretical framework of GST, more specifically dynamical systems theory, the CAS, and the structural concept of panarchy, which were used to assist in addressing the research hypotheses. The second approach to examining the effect of the UfM on the unity and security of Africa has also been appraised through a “Resilience Assessment”, using the corresponding Workbook as a practice-guide in applying it to the EU policy-complex. The idea was to gauge the resilience of the identified overall panarchy (herein described as the inter-connected socio-ecological systems of the EU, the conceptual and policy framework of the UfM, the MENA members of the UfM), and to evaluate areas of potential concern that could lead to an alternative less desirable state, vis-a-vis current visions for Africa, including those that correspond to either “security” or its “unity”. The practicalities of the Assessment provided a unique tool for re-imagining the connections and interactions between the EU, the policy conception of the UfM, and the North African and Middle Eastern countries considered as the lower level CAS in the panarchy. As a practical process, it was

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able to go beyond the purely anecdotal and provide empirical examples of the processes involved over the timeline of study, including identifying disturbance regimes, key components and variables likely to remain important in the future. It is through these described structures and processes that the EU policy-complex has reinforced European values, replacing African values and organic institutional structures with those ill-matched for authentic African development and evolution with the kind of strong cultural identity and frame of reference required for further equitable, and sustainable reproduction.

10.2  The Future Ain’t What It Used to Be (Perhaps) EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean has been found to divide Africa through structural reinforcement of its own SES referential environment, founded on an fundamentalist interpretation of “capitalist” neoliberalism, where resources and their use determine a state’s relative position in the international system, and importantly its position in relation to the EU. Furthermore, the EU in its relations with the defined Mediterranean, has influenced the kind of resources, the economies and hence degrees of dependency of each MENA UfM member state. The EU has proved to be a resilient institution in the face of its less institutionalised or cohesive surrounding environment. This has been achieved through integrationalism, which although on the surface would appear to be coherent with the concept of the SES, structurally it is not: integrationalism itself does not allow for overlap or diversity, two fundamental structural arrangements that can guarantee sustainability and system resilience or security. While EU rhetoric proposes unity of purpose, aims, and objectives in its policies and external relations, it consistently diverges from this through integrationalism to promote differential arrangements between states in regions and between regions. The result is competition rather than cooperation. At the heart of this approach is the fictitious reliance on the State in Africa as a source of administrative control and distribution of resources. The State in this form has always been a foil for neoliberalisation. As long as the State is given legitimacy and maintained not only by African states, but by the demands placed on its form from outside, from international organisations and the international world as it stands, African values as outlined in this work will struggle to find oxygen. This includes the central ideal of African Unity that could have possibly counteracted the State’s role in divisionary dynamics on the continent. This is not, as it would seem, to negate larger areas of administrative coordination that may still be referred to as a “state”, entirely at this late stage. Realistically, the processes of globalisation will not dissipate easily, as the transnational issues that are now part of our global reality (climate change, terrorism, and pollution, for example) will require continued and mutually assertive collaboration and some universally acknowledged “valued attributes” of the planetary system. The SES, not only as a paradigm in IR, but as a formally recognised structure of governance may be such an alternative in our global system, not instead of, but together with the state

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side by side. State power, control, and its role as mediator of social justice has for a long while been a living myth, painstakingly recreated through rule of law and rights to property, while in reality the state’s formal and informal institutions have been emptied of humanity. The kinds of values and production modes that have been identified with neoliberalism and that have been shown to cause the kinds of fragmentation and fragmegration explained in this book, will need to be re-organised, and alternative preferences reassigned greater value. Here, African values may indeed have a highly valuable role to play in bringing communitarianism, caring, and an acknowledgment that “I am, because we are” back into the global consciousness and with it the understanding that the past, present, and future can exist in one moment in time: John Mibiti’s observation of man’s connection to all three has become more prescient with the realities of an increasingly complex, interdependent world. Paradoxically, the values that neoliberalism and the EU’s integrationalism have been found to be undermining may be the world’s saving grace. The continued pursuit for decolonisation and pan-Africanism may have to be abandoned, as these only confirm old dynamics that have rested, and festered there (on the liberal-colonial State). They have in a sense become maladaptive in that both will only reinforce the external values that have been the focus of resentment and anger in the first place. Trying to recreate the present based in an image of an unjust past, in relation to a state-centric, nineteenth century reality, may have outgrown its usefulness as regards contemporary global dynamics. That is not to say that the “African epic” is no longer relevant, but that it needs to steer away from one that is economically defined, isolationist and prone to reactionary conservationism and a “purist” bent. Assumed shared values have been shown to be at odds with those countries and “regions” where they have been applied through “partnerships”, strategic or otherwise, and they have contributed to a weakening of specified resilience and system-­ state, pre-empting collapse and reorganisations of that CAS. It is presumptuous to assume shared values across such a wide and varied area, and, as the dynamics within a CAS show, such values have to be continually reappraised, and re-­evaluated in relation to all other variables, components, and qualities of the system. If the values are found to be restrictive or maladaptive, it may be time for conscious and guided transformation; with the most immediately effected by such policy being included in the decision making processes. The distinction between “good” values and “bad” values, may be defined as the difference between universal values, and values that disproportionately only take care of a select few. The “good” values, need to be continuously strived for over each adaptive cycle in relation to others prominent or emerging at any point that may interfere; it is this aspect that EU foreign policy needs to take into account, rather than “assuming” values from the out-start: such a policy perspective will always lead to disappointment for both sides of any partnership. There is much to be said for finding relevance or an equivalent of such values within African understandings of unity and security, their institutionalisation, and their subsequent reproduction in policy making that need not be defined through or by contact in policy with the EU. While uniqueness can still be celebrated, a united

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vision of human and planetary existence, and development can still be entertained without deteriorating into realist or zero-sum interpretations of co-existence implicit in neoliberal thought and exercise. This is not to say that the EU, as a representation of its member states well-being and interests should be ignored over and above that of the EU as an external actor in international relations: the fears and security issues of the “EU”, should be considered of equal relevance as it represents the sum of its constituent parts. For as long as the Mediterranean is treated with fear and a “management” style relationship constituted by the EU’s institutional memory in the manner described in this book, its relevance and true socio-ecological character and that of “Africa”, will be dictated and controlled externally.

Index

A Abuja Treaty, 46, 175 Adijdan Summit Declaration, 187 Afghanistan, 215, 224, 227, 232, 233, 250 Africa African Agenda 2063, 47, 190 African-Caribbean Pacific Agreement (ACP), 47, 84, 89, 101, 146, 189, 193, 194, 196 African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, 173 African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, 173 African Development Bank (ADB), 186 African Epic, 47, 146, 190, 193, 194, 196, 339 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 173 African Regional Organisations, 202 African Standby Force (ASF), 170 African Union (AU), 1, 3, 14, 16, 17, 28, 29, 33, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 89, 90, 105, 120, 145, 146, 161, 164, 165, 170, 172, 174–176, 178, 182–187, 189–192, 194, 196, 202, 203, 209, 245, 260, 284, 299, 318, 320, 321, 325, 326, 328, 331, 336, 337 African Union Constitutive Act, 40 AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council, 173, 183 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 182 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 1, 14, 17, 28, 29, 40, 44, 89, 164, 179, 245, 246

pan-Africanism, 14, 44, 45, 146, 326, 328, 335, 339 African National Congress (ANC), 192 Agreement association, 92, 96, 97, 99, 106–108, 112, 114, 115, 127, 135, 136, 139, 151, 193, 196, 229, 263, 282, 283, 290, 303, 318, 322, 336 cooperation, 99, 100, 146, 186, 193, 227, 229, 256 Cotonou (see Cotonou Agreement) Euro-Mediterranean (see Europe) Agriculture, 66, 96, 99, 100, 103, 106, 107, 127, 129, 136, 140, 147, 168, 174, 180, 182, 206, 208, 214, 228, 235, 239, 248, 249, 257, 281, 286, 287, 302, 303, 306 al-Bashir, Omar, 190, 192 Algeria, 110 civil war, 243, 244, 281 Al Jazeera, 277 al-Nasser, Abd, 217 Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 245–247 Arab/Israeli conflict, 98, 102, 122–124, 159, 210, 215, 219, 230, 231, 287 Arab League, 148, 156 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 105, 107, 260 Arab Spring, 23, 208, 247, 249, 264, 266, 271, 277, 278, 294, 296, 297, 307, 321, 323 Arab Youth Survey (AYS), 213, 265, 272, 274, 282, 284, 297 Arafat, Yasser, 222, 223

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341

342 Authoritarianism, 19, 23, 123, 207, 221, 244, 248, 318 Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini, 231, 232 Aziz, Mohammed Ould Abdel, 191 B Balfour Declaration, 230 Bali Conference, 179 Barcelona acquis, 5, 39, 115, 121, 159, 194, 195, 204–209, 211, 247, 258, 291, 294, 318, 320, 323, 324 conference, 138, 196, 281 declaration, 16, 39, 92, 97, 109–112, 114, 115, 121–134, 138, 141, 142, 148–153, 159–161, 195, 196, 204–207, 234, 235, 283, 319, 322 process, 5, 39, 91, 94, 101, 106, 107, 109–111, 114, 115, 120, 121, 123, 125, 127, 134–138, 142, 146–160, 193, 196, 197, 204, 207, 230, 234, 242, 243, 259, 261, 263, 280–282, 285, 287, 288, 290, 291, 318–320, 322, 327 Bazargan, M., 232 Bella, A.B., 243 Bilateralism, 9, 14, 120 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 124, 149 Black September Black September Organisation, 223 Boumedienne, H., 243 Brazil, 84, 285 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), 84, 285 Brexit, 7, 8, 69 Britain, 8, 69, 81, 159, 217–219, 235, 241, 262, 289 Bush, G.H.W., 236 C Capitalism, 23, 25, 27, 32, 37, 119, 272 Casablanca group, 36, 44, 220 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 236, 238, 302 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 124, 149 Children in Armed Conflicts, 171 China, 84, 242, 262, 285, 298 Civil society organisation (CSO), 183, 186

Index Climate change, 14, 41, 55, 148, 162, 165, 168, 170, 179, 181, 191, 235, 257, 258, 316, 338 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 241, 242 Cold War, 39, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 106, 133, 160, 215, 217–219, 221, 222, 227, 230–234, 236, 249, 262, 263, 281, 282, 298 Colonialism post-, 258 post-post-, 33 Communism, 119, 217, 219–221, 230, 232, 233 Complexity theory, 5, 11, 34, 53, 55 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 124, 149 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 289 Confidence and Security Building Measures, 149 Connectedness, 4, 11, 61–63, 70, 71, 73–75, 274, 306, 333 Constructivism social, 14, 305 Convention Lomé, 101 Yaoundé, 101 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 213, 214, 248, 270, 272 Cotonou Agreement, 47, 84, 89, 90, 108, 189, 193, 194, 336 Cross-scale interactions, see Interactions Cycle adaptive, 3, 5, 11, 44, 56, 61–63, 65–67, 70, 71, 73–75, 80, 81, 83, 85, 255, 262, 263, 265, 280, 284, 285, 305–307, 322, 328, 332, 339 complex adaptive, 5, 256 phase alpha (α), reorganisation, 61–63 K, conservation, 61, 62 omega (Ω), collapse, 61, 63 r, exploitation, 61, 62 Cyprus, 92, 96, 103, 107, 110, 122, 157, 207, 319 D Decolonisation, 1, 2, 4, 19, 21, 22, 35, 90, 97, 193, 219, 326, 335, 339 Democracy democracy Index, 273

Index Democratic Republic of the Congo, 191 Denmark, 92, 95–97, 157, 289 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 186 Disturbance press, 101, 211, 215, 225, 230, 233, 245, 250, 303 pulse, 221, 231, 235, 243, 250 regime, 9, 215, 292, 301, 302, 306 Dlamini-Zuma, N., 190 Dynamics nonlinear, 59 E Early Warning Systems, 170 Economy classical, 22, 23, 31, 308 econobubble, 10, 27 free market, 24, 28, 129, 259, 287 neoclassical, 22, 23, 31, 32, 308 Egypt, 17, 41, 92, 95, 96, 98, 103, 105, 110, 114, 157, 172, 177, 210, 213, 217, 219–229, 232, 239, 250, 259, 264–266, 269, 274, 277, 278, 282 Eisenhower doctrine, 217 Equilibrium, 13, 59, 63, 64, 73, 75, 77 Europe Economic Social Committee (ESC), 102 EU Africa Business Forum, 174 EU Aid for Trade Strategy, 175 EU Directorate General of External Policies, 188 EU Foreign Policy, 1, 2, 5, 17, 38, 40, 42, 45, 47, 84, 85, 89–115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 160, 184, 194, 196, 201, 208, 209, 234, 248, 258, 290, 306, 315–317, 321, 324, 325, 327, 331, 335–339 Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), 97, 289 Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, 105–109, 115, 121, 136, 138, 193, 243 Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements, 256 Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), 151, 155 Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships (EMP), 5, 23, 39, 92, 94, 105–109, 121, 125, 127, 128, 138, 147, 148, 150, 151, 158, 215, 242, 280, 290, 319, 320 European Atomic Energy Communities, 69, 89

343 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 69, 89, 95 European Community (EC), 5, 69, 92, 133, 136, 137, 160, 175, 227 European Council, 102, 104, 138, 155, 289, 290 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 289 European Economic Community (EEC), 5, 69, 89, 101, 119, 145, 227, 229, 316 European Investment Bank (EIB), 103, 131, 156, 186 European Neighbourhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI), 152, 156, 186 European Parliament (EP), 102, 136, 183, 185, 289 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 288, 289 European Security Strategy, 234, 290, 319 European Union (EU), 1, 23, 53, 89, 119, 146, 201, 255, 315, 335 EU-Sahel Strategy, 2, 42 EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership, 2, 42, 84 Treaty of Rome, 96, 289 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 33–34, 104, 106, 290 Europe entry, 169, 260, 289 F Fatah, 222, 223 Feedback loops, 73 Food security, 148, 168, 180 Fragmegration, 35, 38, 47, 322, 339 France, 92, 95–98, 102, 105, 107, 110, 125, 147, 157, 191, 217, 219, 235, 243, 259, 262, 289 Free market, 23, 24, 26–28, 30, 33, 104, 129, 259, 287 Fuel, 126, 193, 210, 216, 219, 240, 248, 249, 262, 272 Functional niche, 12 Fundamentalism, 107, 110, 208, 302, 306, 307 G de Gaulle, C., 289 Gender equality, 133, 161, 165, 168, 171, 176, 178, 285, 286 Gender Development Index, 268, 332 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), 267, 268, 282, 286

344 Gender (cont.) Gender Inequality Index (GII), 267, 268, 286, 332 inequality, 267, 268, 282, 286, 287, 309, 332 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 104, 126 Germany, 92, 98, 107, 147, 157, 259, 289 Ghaddafi, M., 41, 90, 142, 145, 146, 191 Ghana, 220 Glaspie, A., 235, 236 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 278 Governance adaptive governance (AG), 16, 37, 256, 296, 297 Greece, 5, 91, 92, 95, 96, 100, 110, 114, 122, 227, 319 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 13, 107, 127, 136, 139, 195, 213, 214, 228, 249, 302, 306 Gulf Wars, 105, 215, 235–243, 250, 263, 319 H Habash, G., 223 Hamas, 224 Helsinki Accords, 289 Hezbollah, 224, 231 Homo economicus, 26, 28–30 Human Development Report, 214, 248, 271, 274, 275 Human Development Social Integration, 213 Human rights Universal Charter on Human Rights, 124 Hussein, S., 222, 235–242 I Imbricated redundancy, 17, 38, 65, 66, 196, 325 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), 20, 226, 227, 244, 258, 264, 281 India, 84, 285, 298 Individualism, 10, 27, 28, 42, 46, 56, 80, 84, 120, 196, 216, 289, 327, 332 Information Communication Technology (ICT), 36, 166, 182, 258, 294, 304, 315 Integrated regime complexity (IRC), 12, 13 Integration integrationalism, 36, 38, 149, 274, 283, 285 Interactions cross-scale, 44, 65, 66, 76, 202, 258–260, 288–292, 322–324, 328

Index remember, 66 revolt, 44, 66, 259 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 245 International Criminal Court (ICC), 171, 172, 192 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 172 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 177 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 16, 22, 24, 32, 101, 104, 214, 227, 229, 232, 261, 271 International Relations (IR), 2, 4, 5, 7–13, 15, 17, 36, 44, 46, 53–55, 61, 64, 66, 69, 75, 84, 90, 109, 120, 123, 160, 178, 203, 205, 232, 236, 241, 243, 248, 262, 292, 294, 325, 328–330, 335, 338, 340 Inter-organisational approaches, 12, 328 Iran Green Revolution, 264 Iranian Revolution, 215, 224, 231–232, 250 theocratic republic, 231 Iran-Iraq war, 232, 236, 237 Iraq, 216, 217, 219, 235–243, 250, 265, 303, 319 Ireland, 92, 96, 97, 289 Islam Islamism, 230, 306 radical Islam, 278 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 224, 244, 257 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 67, 145, 303, 307 Israel, 41, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 105, 107, 110, 111, 122, 125, 130, 131, 137, 150, 153, 207, 211, 219, 222–224, 227, 230, 231, 235, 237, 240, 250, 255, 274, 280, 288, 291, 297, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306, 319 J Jabril, M., 191 Jihadism, 222–225, 250, 259, 262, 270, 280, 282, 306, 307 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), 2, 5, 16, 17, 25, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 84, 89–91, 105, 119, 129, 131, 134, 146, 151, 161–163, 165, 166, 177, 183–186, 188, 191, 193, 196, 202, 203, 316–318, 320–322, 324, 327, 330, 335–337 Joint Declaration of Paris, 152, 156

Index Jordan, 40, 41, 95, 96, 103, 110, 157, 210, 213, 216, 219, 222, 223, 228, 229, 239, 242, 249, 265, 274 K Khaldun, I. asabiyah, 271 Khartoum Process, 193 Korean war, 218 Krushchev, N., 218 Kuwait, 235–240 L Land, 23, 141, 152, 156, 159, 179, 203, 205, 208, 210–212, 214, 228, 236, 244, 246, 248, 261, 286, 287, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306, 309 League of Nations, 219 Lebanon, 41, 92, 95, 96, 103, 110, 111, 157, 210, 213, 219, 224, 227, 231, 259, 284 Liberal liberalism classical, 19, 21–23, 26, 96, 98, 328 Lisbon Treaty, 155, 291 Locke, J., 23 Long Now, 19, 79 M Maastricht Treaty, see Treaty on European Union Maghreb, 17, 41, 103, 105, 245–247, 260 Maladaptation maladaptive schema, 71, 85, 309 system, 42, 64, 70, 294, 317 Mali, 40, 191, 246 Malta Malta conference, 134, 136, 137 Marseille Final Statement, 150, 153, 155, 204–207, 257 Matutes, A., 102, 106 Mauritania, 40, 41, 95, 105, 106, 191, 210, 219, 245, 246, 249, 259 Mediterranean Common Strategy for the Mediterranean, 138 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 23, 39, 92, 94, 105–109, 121, 125, 127, 138, 147, 148, 150, 151, 158, 215, 242

345 Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), 5, 90, 93, 96–101, 119, 145, 215, 227, 316, 336 MEDA, 128, 132, 137, 320 Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), 5, 90, 102–103, 120, 215, 227, 261, 318 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) fields of cooperation, 153, 196, 205, 257 key initiatives, 205 partnerships, 2, 84, 196 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 42, 43, 47, 90, 99, 100, 119, 126, 132, 148, 234, 256–262, 276, 283, 284, 286, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 297, 300, 302, 303, 306, 307, 309, 316, 325, 330, 337 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 32, 140, 150, 161, 162, 165, 168, 175–183 Monrovia group, 44, 220, 336 Morocco, 41, 92, 95, 96, 98, 103, 105, 107, 110, 114, 157, 158, 166, 184, 210, 219, 225, 227–229, 245, 246, 249, 259, 265, 301, 320 Mubarak, H., 278 Mugabe, G., 192 Mugabe, R., 68, 191 Multilateral global economic (GEM), 22 multilateralism, 9, 14, 98, 100, 120, 291 Muslim Brotherhood, 208, 223, 224 N Nationalism Fascism, 35, 327 Nazism, 327 National Liberation Front (FLN), 243, 244 Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), 152 Neoliberal neoliberalisation, 10, 19, 21–25, 30 neoliberalism, 9, 22–25, 30 Nguesso, D.S., 191 Nigeria, 190, 191, 220, 292, 293 Nonlinear dynamics (see dynamics) nonlinearity, 2, 57, 304 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 124, 125, 149, 181 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 106, 125, 191

Index

346 O Organisation internal, 4, 74 international, 4, 7, 9, 15, 25, 27, 53, 58, 61, 64, 221, 256, 263, 274, 282, 338 non-governmental, 4, 27, 61, 111, 132, 214 regional, 4, 35, 59, 64, 128, 159, 172, 183, 185, 202, 260, 262, 297 self-, 60, 67, 72 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 22 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 98, 128, 235, 236 Ottoman Empire, 216 Overall life satisfaction, 274, 275 P Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, 231, 233 Pakistan, 218, 224 Palestine Palestinian Authority, 92, 95, 105, 110, 111, 122, 210 Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), 222, 223, 240 Panarchy, 3, 11, 53, 89, 196, 201, 256, 316, 337 Panel of the Wise, 170 Paris Declaration, 147–150, 158, 177, 196, 205 Pathology of resource management, 55, 70, 75, 82, 179 Philippines, 224 Policy for Coherence and Development (PCD), 7, 33, 34, 38, 123, 161, 180, 196, 197, 282, 292, 293, 316, 317, 320, 321, 327, 336, 337 Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, 170 Polisario Front, 245–247, 301 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 223 Portugal, 5, 91, 92, 96, 100, 105, 114, 228, 259, 319 Positivism, 14 Potential, 4, 11, 25, 41, 46, 61–63, 66, 70, 71, 73–75, 80, 83, 106, 110, 112, 128, 138, 153, 158, 159, 168, 173–175, 194, 222, 231, 249, 256, 287, 291, 304, 305, 307, 309, 316, 318, 325, 332, 337 Primakov, Y., 217, 223, 235–238, 241

Q Qutb, S., 223 R Rabat Process, 193 Rationalism, 10, 84, 329 Reagan, R. Reaganomics, 22 Realism realist, 43, 45, 46, 210, 318, 340 Regional Economic Communities (RECs), 17, 174, 175, 185, 202 Regionalism regionalisation, 5, 34, 36–38, 160, 230, 296, 324, 328 Resilience generalised, 14, 41, 44, 120, 202, 256, 281, 304, 306, 315, 322, 323 Resilience Alliance Workbook for Practitioners (RAWP), 5, 9, 13, 16, 43, 53–55, 64, 76, 78, 79, 201, 202, 210, 212, 215, 294, 297, 301, 308, 327, 328, 332, 333 specified, 41, 54, 120, 202, 294, 307, 309, 339 Russia, 84, 217, 242, 285 S Sahel EU-Sahel Strategy (see Europe entry) Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 245, 247 Salafism, 224, 302, 306 Sarkozy, N., 2, 90, 142, 145–147, 159, 189, 191 Satisfaction with Freedom of Choice, 274, 275 Saudi Arabia, 177, 224, 226, 231, 233, 235, 236, 239, 265, 284, 295, 297 Scale spatial, 2, 3, 13, 37, 67, 83, 315, 335 temporal, 10, 56, 57, 328, 329 Schema\schemata external, 42, 43 internal, 42, 43, 68, 84, 85 maladaptive (see Maladaptive schema) Security, 1, 14, 53, 89, 120, 148, 201, 202, 258, 315, 335 Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights, 176 Shah, see Pahlavi Six Day War, 222, 230 Smith, A., 23

Index Social media facebook, 274, 277, 278, 297–299 twitter, 274, 277 South Africa, 21, 37, 68, 80, 84, 146, 189–193, 204, 207, 285, 299, 335 Soviet Union, see USSR State colonial, 20, 216, 336 liberal, 112 neoliberal, 19–22, 112, 297 ordoglobalism, 19 system (see System, state) Sudan, 40, 190, 192, 224, 239 Suez Crisis, 219 Sustainability, 4, 13, 17, 18, 47, 54, 65, 71, 79, 80, 83, 165, 168, 176, 179, 180, 201, 203, 210, 212, 229, 271, 310, 328, 338 Symmetry, 123, 161, 230, 292, 307, 325, 327 Syria, 92, 95, 96, 103, 110, 111, 123, 136, 150, 157, 209, 210, 217, 219, 222, 232, 242, 259, 263, 264, 266, 274, 279, 285, 296 System complex adaptive systems (CAS), 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 53, 59–61, 63–71, 76–78, 84, 91, 101, 120, 160, 202, 212, 277, 301, 316, 335 complex systems theory, 2 connectedness, 74, 306 dynamical, 15, 55, 57, 78, 201, 316, 337 ecosystem, 9, 12, 58, 71, 78, 81, 82, 179, 228, 229, 261, 286, 292 focal, 9, 53, 68, 85, 121, 201, 203–205, 208, 212, 214, 215, 225, 231, 233–235, 248, 250, 255–257, 260–263, 266, 274, 279, 283–287, 291–293, 295–297, 300–302, 304–309, 317, 318, 322 general systems theory, 4, 35, 53–55, 294, 316, 335 natural, 4, 11, 37, 53, 58, 71, 83, 102, 248, 329 physical, 10, 13, 17, 44, 53, 60, 81, 83, 285 science, 15, 54, 176 socio-ecological system (SES), 3, 8, 9, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 38, 47, 55, 56, 79, 83, 91, 114, 120, 123, 129, 162, 180, 201–203, 210–212, 214, 219, 220, 229, 248, 266, 295, 297, 303, 304, 308, 316, 317, 323, 324, 328, 329, 331, 332, 336–338

347 state bi-multilateralism, 92, 112, 196, 243, 321 maladaptive cycles, 70–71, 193 maladaptive systems, 42, 64, 70, 294, 317, 327 NSAs (non-state actors), 4, 9, 17, 132, 139, 165, 170, 183, 257, 297 technology, 54 T Takfirism, 302, 306, 307 Terrorism, 41, 84, 107, 112, 115, 124, 125, 133, 147–149, 153, 166, 170, 178, 208, 215, 220, 222–225, 233, 234, 250, 257–262, 266, 278, 281, 283, 286, 288, 300, 303, 305–307, 319, 322, 336, 338 Thatcher, M. Thatcherism, 22 Thresholds, 41, 63, 64, 70, 76, 225, 256, 285–287, 294, 300–303, 309 Toure, A.T., 191 Transatlantic Slave Trade (TAST), 21, 44 Treaty of Fez, 245 Treaty of Nice, 290 Treaty of Rome, see Europe Truman, H.S., 219 Tunisia, 41, 92, 96–98, 103, 105, 107, 110, 114, 158, 210, 219, 226–229, 259, 264, 265, 269, 278 Turkey, 17, 41, 92, 95, 96, 103, 107, 110, 122, 157, 207, 218, 227, 238, 259 U Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), see Mediterranean Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 39, 98, 102, 119, 133, 215, 217–220, 224, 231, 232, 262 United Kingdom (UK), 7, 15, 22, 69, 92, 97, 98, 107, 133, 157, 190, 191, 240, 241, 259, 289 United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (UNDP HDI), 41 United Nations Commission on Palestine (UNCOP), 230 United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 15, 172, 182

Index

348 United Nations (UN) (cont.) United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), 246 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), 122, 171, 191, 240 United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM), 238, 240 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 230 United States of Africa, 146 United States of America (USA), 22, 39, 98, 101, 105, 111, 209, 215, 217–221, 224, 226, 231–233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 241, 243, 248, 249, 262, 282, 300 Unity, 1–3, 16, 21, 25, 29, 36–38, 40, 41, 43–46, 56, 79, 84, 89, 90, 120, 146, 161, 164, 190, 196, 201, 202, 208, 216, 217, 221, 224, 231, 235, 245, 262, 282, 315–317, 324, 330, 335–339 V Valencia Action Plan, 39 Valetta Summit, 193 Variable geometry, 152, 158, 290 Variables critical, 76 definitions, 332 fast, 67, 76, 256, 309 key, 11, 64, 76, 201, 205, 256, 266, 274, 279, 280, 282, 283, 285, 304, 309 slow, 76, 286, 300–303, 306, 309

W Washington Consensus Post Washington Consensus (PWC), 28, 112, 161, 167, 195, 330 Water, 129, 156, 157, 169, 170, 179–181, 208, 210–212, 214, 228, 238, 248, 249, 255, 257, 286, 293, 294, 305, 309 Weapons Small and Light Weapons (SALWs), 166, 170 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 166, 170, 240, 241 Western Sahara conflicts, 207, 208, 248, 250, 300, 303, 307 Wholism, 4 Women in Peace and Security, 170–171 Work Programme Five Year, 121, 138, 140, 142, 152, 160, 197, 283 World Bank (WB), 16, 22, 24, 32, 157, 177, 219, 227–229, 232, 248, 261 World Happiness Ranking, 213 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 16, 21, 22, 126, 175, 263, 264 World War I, 216 World War II, 218 Y Yemen, 217, 224, 239 Yugoslavia, 133 Z Zaqat, 214, 269, 308 Zimbabwe, 68, 146, 191, 193 Zuma, J., 68, 146, 189, 191, 192