Divided Island: Faction and Unity on Saint Pierre [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674494169, 9780674494138

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Divided Island

Divided Island Faction and Unity on Saint Pierre

by William A. Christian, Jr.

Harvard University Press, iq6q

Cambridge, Massachusetts

© Copyright 1969 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 69-12720 Printed in the United States of America

TO ALBERT BRIAND

Preface

The small group of islands comprising Saint Pierre and Miquelon is France's last territorial possession in North America. The colony consists of three inhabited islands: Saint Pierre, He aux Marins, and Miquelon-Langlade. The bulk of the population lives in the town of Saint Pierre on the island of Saint Pierre, which has the archipelago's only real harbor. This book is concerned primarily with the town of Saint Pierre. Much of the present-day town bears witness to the events related in this book. On the south side of the harbor some grèves still remain— fields covered artificially with stone, where cod was once dried. The old warehouses along the waterfront shelter memories of huge fish transshipments and equally large stocks of alcohol for transshipment to the United States during prohibition. Near the airport lies the hull of a ship once used for smuggling to Canada. Trenches on the top of Calvary Hill with Crosses of Lorraine drawn on the concrete flanges mark the place where Free French volunteers held exercises and where Captain Louis Heron de Villefosse prepared for the possibility of a German attack on the island's flank. Here and there a dory or a fisherman's salt-house will bear a Cross of Lorraine; some are freshly painted, others old and weatherbeaten. On the hills above the town, white enamel statues of the Blessed Virgin and Christ symbolize the continuity of the islanders' devotions. Why and how does something "unreasonable" happen? When I look back I see that it was basically this question which provoked my study. I began to investigate Saint Pierre's history because I was surprised that the force of a political choice made twenty years before was still not spent. Some "Gaullists" were still not speaking to some "Pétainists," and vice versa. On such a pleasant island an enduring political schism vii

viti I Preface seemed unreasonable to me; I wanted to know how this could happen. I also felt challenged by the strategic problems facing an outsider trying to gather information on a subject that was still clearly touchy. But the explanation of the 1941-1945 conflict required a much deeper penetration into the island's social structure and history than I had anticipated, for the conflict had ancestors and progeny. The net outcome is a social history of Saint Pierre from 1900 to the present that concentrates on the 1941-1945 period as a critical moment in that history. The narrative and analysis follow the factions in the Saint Pierre society and the ideological counterpoint of "the community as a family" through the last sixty years, emphasizing the importance of the interplay between what the Saint Pierre society is, what the Saint Pierrais think Saint Pierre society is, and what Saint Pierre society becomes. The dismantling of a communal ideology was a particularly colorful process on Saint Pierre, but in its grand lines it has often occurred in many larger communities and societies. Students of France, especially, will find tìiat the story of Saint Pierre is in many ways the story of twentieth-century France in microcosm. It is presented here primarily for its intrinsic interest, but it provides a case study for social historians and sociologists in the ideological repercussions of social and economic change. On another level readers familiar with other isolated small towns will recognize Saint Pierre's quarrels and factions, and will have the advantage of seeing them in a historical perspective. Community studies often tell as much about the student as they do about the community. This is because a community is a finely balanced set of institutions and customs, of which a complete investigation is seldom possible. The student must select; and the elements which engage his attention greatly depend upon what he has known and seen before. What engaged my attention were the disputes that have racked the island since the beginning of the century, and particularly the Gaullist-Pétainist division. Another book could (and should) be written about how Saint Pierrais manage to get along with one another in spite of the things which divide them. I started with the (unformulated) viewpoint that people usually do get along together; someone

Preface | ix

else could equally well have started with the viewpoint that people do not get along together. I am sorely afraid that my friends on Saint Pierre will feel I have given an unbalanced view of their lives. And because of the very attitudes that I bring to the study, they will, from their point of view, be correct. I am less accustomed to strife than they are. I am sure that it seems much more abnormal to me than it does to them, or for that matter to most Frenchmen or most villagers. In fairness to the Saint Pierrais, then, the reader should be aware that the book gives a view of Saint Pierre life primarily through the particular optic of the problems of community strife and community cohesion. There is certainly much more to life on Saint Pierre than the tense silences of personal and corporate disputes. Only in feverish interludes do these disputes become the islanders' main preoccupation. For most of them, most of the time, life is not at all unhappy. The number of metropolitans who prolong their stay on the island and the number of tourists who return year after year testify to its attractiveness; it may even be that they testify also to the attractiveness of its disputes. The observer spends so much of his time seeing how things work that there is a tendency, once some sort of an answer is reached, to say that there is no other way that things could work. In this particular case there is the temptation, to which the Saint Pierrais themselves succumb from time to time, to say that Saint Pierre will always have its disputes; that they are an unavoidable by-product of the island social structure, which itself is determined by political and economic circumstance beyond island control; that they have been going on for so long that the islanders have become used to them, and use them to obtain certain goals and to satisfy certain needs. The quarrel potential is always there, and many of the accepted ways of behaving today help that potential to become active, but quarreling and conflict are not unavoidable on Saint Pierre, or anywhere else. An open-minded and analytic look at the potential for factionalism and quarrel is the first step toward avoiding them. I made this study convinced that a sympathetic presentation of the problems and ideals of Saint Pierre's various factions would open the way to a better understanding among them. Saint Pierre can learn from

* I Preface its past, and other communities have much to learn from Saint Pierre. Let my Saint Pierre readers see this book as a conscientious effort to see the past clearly for the benefit of the present and the future. I first went to Saint Pierre in the summer of 1962. By writing to the governor, who forwarded my letter to the Tourist Bureau, I had obtained a job working for the island airline, Air Saint Pierre, as radio operator, ticket salesman, and baggage clerk. Worn down by a trying first year in college, I needed the escape Saint Pierre afforded. I also needed to improve my spoken French. Saint Pierre was the perfect place, for the French spoken there is virtually indistinguishable from that spoken in Paris. It was only after living on Saint Pierre for a couple of months, when I began thinking of excuses for returning the next summer, that the idea of studying the island occurred to me. I was a student at Harvard College during the years that the research was going on, and concurrently with the Saint Pierre study I was deeply involved in field work and data analysis about a French village. The enforced reflection of the university year provided ample opportunity for the analysis of information collected on Saint Pierre in the summers, and the field work in France under Laurence Wylie broadened my perspective and provided a chance to use French sources about Saint Pierre. One of the three and a half summers of research on Saint Pierre was conducted under a National Science Foundation summer trainee grant, administered by the Harvard University Department of Anthropology. Data processing was subsidized by the Laboratory of Social Relations, and much of the data on the 1941-1945 period is contained in my undergraduate thesis under the Committee of History and Literature. Later research on Saint Pierre's history was carried out at Pembroke College, Cambridge, while I was on a Henry Fellowship (1965-1966). The study has benefited from the criticism of members of an informal seminar of graduate students in social anthropology. The manuscript was completed at the University of Michigan. I owe primary thanks to my many friends on Saint Pierre and lie aux Marins who endured too many questions with humor and patience. I hesitate to name anyone specifically—first because it is so difficult

Preface | xi to single anyone out and, second, because I do not wish to make islanders responsible for my interpretations of their history. Virtually every official and official organization on the island, including the Senator, the Deputy, the General Council, the Administration, the Municipality, the Chamber of Commerce, the Tourist Bureau, Air Saint Pierre, and the excellent Museum, lent their help sympathetically. I am bound by honor and affection to single out one person, however. I have dedicated this book to Albert Briand, my employer on the island while I worked for Air Saint Pierre, who died in May 1966. Mr. Briand was as much caught up in the old conflict as anyone on Saint Pierre, but he consistently encouraged me to appreciate each side of the conflict, and he was determined that my study should be as unprejudiced as possible. I feel less hesitancy in mentioning non-Saint-Pierrais I interviewed in France. I hereby thank Alain Savary, Edgar Aubert de la Riie, Ferdinand Legasse, and Gilbert de Bournat for their help. I also gratefully acknowledge the stimulation of the following persons at various stages of the production: on a preliminary social stratification, Harrison White; on the 1941-1945 period, Laurence Wylie, Lois Pattison, and Richard UHman; on information sets, James Faris and Leslie Howard; and on style, William Abrahams. William Gamson, Stanley Hoffmann, Everett C. Hughes, Eric Wolf, and Laurence Wylie read drafts of the completed manuscript. And last of all I thank my wife, Susan, with whom during a foggy summer on Ile aux Marins most of the manuscript was written. W.A.C. Ann Arbor, Michigan May 1968

Contents

Introduction

ι

ι. Saint Pierre in igoo

7

2. Challenges

22

3. Society as a Family

48

4. Saint Pierre Between the Wars

66

5. The Coming of the Free French

77

6. Reconciliation

101

7. Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction

128

8. Gaullists and Anti-Gaullists: The Organization of Choice

144

Appendix Methods Tables

173 279

Bibliography

187

Notes

193

Index

205

Tables and Illustrations

Text tables 1. 2. 3. 4.

Interfaction Marriages (Gaullist-Pétainist), 1936-1951 Native Saint Pierre Males: Profession and Politics, 1946 Levels of Education and Politics, 1946 Age Groups and Politics of Male Population, 1941

Appendix tables 1. Population, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 1847-1962 2. Exports, Imports, and Total Trade, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 1900-1942 3. Fishing Boats, 1900-1959 4. Volunteers from Saint Pierre 5. Saint Pierrais in the War 6. Politics of Families with In-laws on Saint Pierre, 1946 7. Prewar Occupational Mobility, 1936-1940 8. Saint Pierre Vocations: Fathers in 1916, Sons in 1946

17 17 18 18 18 18 18 18

Illustrations (following page 110) Map of the Saint Pierre Archipelago. facing page 1. The town of Saint Pierre. Photo author. 2. Mural by Gaston Roullet. Photo Andrieux. 3. Louis Legasse. La Dépêche Coloniale, October 31,1905. 4. Card used by Msgr. Legasse to solicit church funds. The Brothers of Christian Instruction and the Museum of Saint Pierre.

xvi I Illustrations 5. 6. 7. 8.

Vigie poster, c. 1904. Photo Andrieux from the original poster. Réveil poster, 1904. Photo Andrieux from the original poster. Demonstration, November 16,1908. Photo Briand. Liquor for the United States during Prohibition. Photo Andrieux. 9-10. Gaullist tracts, late 1941. Tracts Clandestins, I, 7 and 9. 11. Victory procession, 1945. Photo Briand. 12. Procession for the Fête des Marins, 1963. Photo Briand. 13. Demonstration, May 9,1964. Photo Briand. 14. Riot of May 19,1964. Photo Briand. 15. Reception for Albert Briand, 1964. Photo Briand.

Divided Island

Introduction

For, indeed, there was from the beginning a sort of concealed split or seam, as it might he in a piece of iron, marking the different popular and aristocratic tendencies; but the open rivalry and contention of these two opponents made the gash deep, and severed the city into the two parties of the people and the few. —Pericles, in Plutarch's Lives of the Noble Greeks

The town of Saint Pierre is squeezed in at the base of the steep hills that border most of the island's harbor. The climate is generally foggy, but on the days when the sun breaks through the green hillsides take on a radiant warmth. The casual visitor may be impressed with the quaintness and tranquillity of this odd colony. He might well send off a letter, as I did, quoting with approval and pleasure the cook at the hotel where he stays: "Saint Pierre est très calme, Monsieur, très calme." It will be only a matter of days before he finds out how untrue this statement is in most respects. Saint Pierre is a very lively place, but in a superficial and immediately obvious way Saint Pierre is calm. Direct contact with the mother country, apart from daily radio broadcasts and telegraph communications and, most recently, television, occurs with the monthly arrival of a freighter or an occasional visiting warship. Otherwise the island is linked to Canada by a small daily ferry to Newfoundland, fifteen miles to the northeast; a weekly packet boat to North Sydney, Nova Scotia, 180 miles to the southwest; and in the summer one daily airplane flight to the Sydney airport, weather permitting. 1

2 I Divided Island Saint Pierre's eccentric communications with the outside world provide a foretaste of the distinctiveness of island life. All of the travel services have their headquarters on Saint Pierre, and in their very irregularity and quasi-spontaneity it is easy to see that Saint Pierre's communications prematurely force the traveler to cope with Saint Pierre rather than drawing Saint Pierre into the busy, efficient schedules of the Eastern Canadian community. The traveler is soon aware that he is bound for a place quite different from Sydney, Charlottetown, or St. John's, Newfoundland. Although we are less concerned with the town of Saint Pierre as a physical place than with its population, Saint Pierre's site has placed limitations on its society and has shaped its people's expectations and achievements. First of all, Saint Pierre is a port. As such it shares the characteristics of all ports: it has merchants, sailors, stevedores, and the set of service trades necessary for ship repairs and the storage of cargo and ship's supplies. As in most port towns, there has been in the past an emphasis upon the accumulation of capital because of the substantial investment needed for each ship sent out (more than, for instance, would be needed to get a crop planted and harvested on a farm ). An incidental result has been, in most ports, the establishment of a highly literate and sophisticated merchant class; Saint Pierre's merchants are as cosmopolitan as those of Boston and Nantes. Saint Pierre is an island, and an island cut off from the rest of the world. Its insulation makes an outsider think that the islanders are liberated from time and worry; in reality they are just as subject to these pressures as are people elsewhere. The difference is that an isolated community can afford to have a set of concerns and a time of its own, adapted to its particular situation and needs. The times and needs of other societies impinge on Saint Pierre, but they are selected and bent to suit the island's needs and anxieties. Insulation invites a sense of privileged exemption from many of the demands of the world beyond the lighthouse. Saint Pierre is also a small town. Its resident population has never exceeded six thousand. In towns of such size, gossip and rumor are common. There is a strong sense of community that is less easily achieved in larger populations. The shorthand of social status, used

Introduction | 3 in larger cosmopolitan societies, is superfluous. Saint Pierrais evaluate each other by personal qualities. The fact that Saint Pierre is a port town, however, has mitigated one of the more oppressive aspects of gemeinschaft: the emphasis upon conformity and agreement. The Saint Pierrais are inured to people with strange ways and appreciate diversity. Saint Pierre is also a colony, and, as in most colonies, there is friction between the rulers and the ruled. Such friction exists despite the ethnic, racial, and cultural homogeneity of rulers and ruled. Saint Pierre provides an opportunity to view the problems of colonies uncomplicated by the problems of race, and in this sense Saint Pierre is more like colonial America or Australia than it is like colonial Africa. Indeed, readers familiar with American Colonial history will recognize some of the exasperations and complaints between twentieth-century Saint Pierre and France as similar to those between eighteenth-century America and Great Britain. It may be a recognition of this similarity that has prompted Saint Pierrais to display the American flag when disgruntled with French policies. Finally, Saint Pierre has a one-crop, one-season economy. Except in exceptional circumstances (rum-running during prohibition, harbor construction projects, and, recently, the operation of local trawlers in the winter), much of the population must live from November to April on the returns of the summer months. Like other such economies —the sugar plantation is another—there is a great need for sources of credit to cover the failures of unproductive seasons. On Saint Pierre, unless the government steps in to fill the gaps, dependent relations based on credit are set up between the merchants and the sailors and fishermen. In times of economic decline such relations can easily turn sour, leading to exploitation of the sailors and fishermen, bankruptcy of the merchants, or both. If the government does step in with either credit programs or unemployment payments for the off-season, then the government becomes a focus for grievances. When this happened on Saint Pierre, for example, merchant-fisherman relations improved but the ruler-ruled friction increased. The colonial administration became not only politically but also economically "responsible" for the island's misfortunes and bore the brunt of economic discontent. The

4 ] Divided Island factional history of Saint Pierre, as told here, is grounded on Saint Pierre's location and the social relations which that location has helped to shape. Although I do not deal directly with Miquelon-Langlade or Ile aux Marins, the other islands in the archipelago, they too demand some introduction. The five hundred villagers on Miquelon consist almost exclusively of dorymen and their families. Virtually all supplies for Miquelon come through Saint Pierre, five hours away by boat. All comments about Saint Pierre's insularity thus apply doubly to Miquelon. Until a modest airstrip was completed in 1964, the Miquelonnais were completely cut off from Saint Pierre for long periods of time. The island of Miquelon and its people offer quite a contrast to Saint Pierre. Whereas the Saint Pierre houses are in one dense cluster, the Miquelon houses are strung out in a line on both sides of the main street. The life is much simpler; Miquelon has yet to be hit by the revolution of rising expectations that whetted the Saint Pierrais' thirst for household conveniences in the 1930's. There has been virtually no immigration or intermarriage with neighboring Newfoundland communities. The population has remained the same size since 1816; younger sons ordinarily migrate to Saint Pierre. Like the Magdalen islands and many Newfoundland communities, Miquelon has usually been dominated by one company which acts as its broker to the outside world. Miquelon seems to be less factional, less pluralistic, than Saint Pierre. It is an endogamous, closed, corporate community.1 Although He aux Marins (originally Ile aux Chiens) is reputed to have its own "mentality," it is more like Saint Pierre than Miquelon. At the turn of the century the population was about eight hundred, but little by little the inhabitants moved over to Saint Pierre. They did not have far to go, for Saint Pierre is only fifteen minutes away by dory. Ile aux Marins lies like a bone in the mouth of Saint Pierre's harbor. This little island used to have approximately the same range of occupations as Saint Pierre, and when it was flourishing Ile aux Marins was a small self-contained society whose inhabitants had little occasion to go to Saint Pierre. Only for a brief time was it dominated by a single company, and its factions grappled over issues that were often strictly

Introduction | 5 local. Now Ile aux Marins is quiet. Only about thirty of its former inhabitants still live there during the dory-fishing season, and the island is uninhabited in the winter. Saint Pierre has always been the administrative and commercial hub of the small archipelago, but little is known and virtually nothing written of its social history prior to 1900. Until 1763 Saint Pierre contained no more than a handful of settlers who fished and sold goods to transient French fishing vessels. The island changed hands between the British and the French fairly regularly. After 1763, however, when France's possession of the islands was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, a governor, a garrison, and colonists were sent out from France. The French Revolution reached Saint Pierre only in muted form.2 In 1789 the populace, which had received news of the meeting of the Estates-General in France, formed a Colonial Assembly of twentyeight members (fourteen Saint Pierrais and fourteen ship captains) to discuss grievances against the French military vessels in the harbor. This assembly, in effect a group of elderly, conservative notables, was not opposed to the administration. A new threat to the old regime came in 1791 when a small group of people, motivated by a combination of personal grievances and imported revolutionary fervor, formed a club, Jacobin in outlook— "Friends of the Constitution." The leaders of the group were (as in 1941 ) lesser officials of the government. Their first action was a direct appeal to the National Assembly in Paris against what they termed a "despotic military government." To counteract the threat that the club posed to his administration, Governor Danseville began to call regular meetings of the Colonial Assembly. These meetings took place in the church, with the governor as chairman; "Citoyen Longueville," the curé of the island, was one of its members. It is cheerfully reported in the archives of the Fathers of the Holy Ghost in Paris that psalms were sung between the deliberations of Saint Pierre's "revolutionary" assembly. The showdown came when one of the insurgents accidently killed his sister at a club meeting. Danseville took the opportunity to hold all the club members responsible and demanded their banishment for subversion. The Colonial Assembly overwhelmingly approved.

6 I Divided Island As one observer put it, "The red, white, and blue flag had replaced the white flag; as for the rest, no difference at all." The situation was disturbed again in 1793 when naval officers from France, aroused by the Saint Pierrais who had been banished the year before, brought the Revolution to Saint Pierre. Again the populace united behind Danseville; the merchant captains, the representatives of French companies, and the local fishermen signed a petition confirming their confidence in him. The same resentment against the military which had been the basis for forming the Colonial Assembly prevented the Revolution from going any further. The naval officers did succeed in having a tree of liberty planted, and a Phrygian cap was paraded around the town and deposited in the church, but there was no change in the government. Paradoxically, it was in the first issues of the Gaullist newspaper of 1942, in the heat of the new revolution, that a serial history of the French Revolution on Saint Pierre was published. The two situations had exactly opposite results. As in 1941, the French Revolution had provided an excuse for people to satisfy their personal grievances under the pretext of ideology. But whereas in 1941 an alliance of a group of malcontents with the Free French Navy produced the overthrow of the government, described by one Pétainist as "the victory of the Jacobins," in 1793 it was definitely the Girondins who triumphed on Saint Pierre, and fairly conservative Girondins at that. When France declared war on England in 1793, Saint Pierre was taken over by the British, and not until 1816 was French power on the islands permanently re-established. From 1816 until 1891, the winter population grew steadily as Saint Pierre became increasingly popular as a base of operations for French fishing boats on the Grand Banks. The apogee of the island's prosperity lasted from 1895 until 1902, when the island population reached an all-time high of 6,500. Saint Pierre's early history provides a necessary context for the social history of the island in the twentieth century. From 1900 on, the internal situation on Saint Pierre becomes clearer. Old newspapers are available, and some of the elder citizens have sharp memories. Hence the turn of the century marks a convenient starting point for our narrative.

1 Saint Pierre in 1900

At the turn of the century, the major powers of government on Saint Pierre were in the hands of its governor, a Frenchman appointed by the French government for an average of two years.1 The governor was directly responsible to the French Ministry of Colonies, and he governed by local decree. The heads of major governmental agencies were also sent from France. They included the head of Customs, the Officer of Maritime Affairs, a judge, a public prosecutor, the police chief, the treasurer, and two or three doctors. Subordinate positions in the civil service were filled by Saint Perrais, who gained their places in open examinations. The chief organ for consultation between the administration and the population was the Administrative Council, which had as ex-officio members the mayors of Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and Ile aux Marins, and the president of the Chamber of Commerce. The administration of the colony was responsible for Saint Pierre's relations with the exterior, and the application of national laws from France. The town councils of Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and Ile aux Marins had jurisdiction over such internal matters as roads, water, and lighting. They were the only popularly elected bodies (renewed every two years, if not sooner by an act of dissolution by the governor), and hence the mayors were the chief spokesmen for island opinion and chronically at odds with the colonial administrators. The political position of the president of the Chamber of Commerce, elected by the Saint Pierrais holding licenses for business, was intermediate to that of the mayor and the governor. Elected by the more conservative elements of the population, he seemed to be able to come to terms with the governor more easily. The colony elected one member to the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies in Paris every two years.2 This election 7

8 I Divided Island and the elections for the Town Council of Saint Pierre provided the major occasions for the expression of townwide divisions. By 1900 no less than five religious orders had reached Saint Pierre from France, and they operated the colony's institutions and schools. Nuns of the order of Saint Joseph de Cluny had been there since 1826. They staffed the municipal primary schools for girls on all three islands, maintained an orphanage, and served as nurses in Saint Pierre's hospital. The main missionary order of the French colonies, the Fathers of the Holy Ghost, had been on the island intermittently since 1838. The evangelizing order of Eudist fathers, which gained popularity in Brittany and Normandy in the 1860's, sent their first mission to Saint Pierre in 1880. The Eudist school at Church Point, near Digby, Nova Scotia, provided secondary education for the sons of Saint Pierre merchants. Two fraternal orders were also present. The Brothers of Christian Instruction, an order based in Brittany, were in charge of the municipal schools for boys. Brothers of the Assumptionist order had maintained since 1897 a sailor's home on the islands under the aegis of the Société des Oeuvres de Mer, a French seamen's welfare association. Their work was dedicated to the moral and physical welfare of the sailors on the Grand Banks; they tried to combat the alleged evils of alcohol with a friendly atmosphere and free tobacco. The Apostolic Prefect from 1900 until 1916, titular head of the colony's churches, was Monsignor Christophe Legasse, brother of shipowner Louis Legasse. He was a member of the secular clergy and was assisted by three or four others sent from France. Together they handled the regular parish work of Saint Pierre, Ile aux Marins, and Miquelon. By long-standing arrangement, the secular clergy, the nuns of Saint Joseph de Cluny, and the Brothers of Christian Instruction were maintained by the administration of the colony. There were no "secular" schools. The economy of Saint Pierre before World War I, and especially before the depression of 1903, was quite different from what it is today. Before the war a flotilla of French fishing schooners anchored on the Grand Banks. Many were based on Saint Pierre, and nearly all went there for repairs and to deposit their first catch in midseason. Saint Pierre was thus the summer outpost for a great industry. Ten

Saint Pierre in 1900 | 9 thousand sailors and laborers called in at Saint Pierre during the April-October fishing period.3 Two types of Grand Banks boats came to Saint Pierre. The first was the schooner based in France and sent yearly across the Atlantic. The fleet of these boats was known as the metropolitan flotilla (la pêche métropolitaine). The second type was the schooner based, on Saint Pierre (la pêche coloniale). A few of the Saint Pierre boats had Saint Pierre sailors, but most of them, like the metropolitan boats, were crewed by sailors from France who came over for the season. At its height (1890-1902), the fleet which was based on Saint Pierre contained about two hundred schooners with crews totaling thirty-five hundred to four thousand men (about twenty per boat). Of these sailors, all but about six hundred came from France.4 They were transported every year from Saint Màio, many in a big steamer chartered for the occasion, the rest on French fishing boats which delivered them as passengers to Saint Pierre before going out on the Banks. The colonial flotilla had several advantages over its metropolitan counterpart. The local boats had an easier time obtaining bait at Saint Pierre, where it could be stocked by the shipowner's island manager; a schooner was less expensive to buy on Saint Pierre than in France, and cost less to fit out, because it did not have to make an ocean crossing; and, most important, the French government encouraged the Saint Pierre fleet by granting bonuses to companies which dried thenfish on Saint Pierre. The disadvantages were that only a fraction of the island boats could be crewed locally, so that the shipowner had to import the crew from France. The metropolitan boats had little tariff duties and less to pay in salaries. Furthermore, salt cost less when the fish were dried in France. Despite the advantages of the colonial flotilla, the ratio of French boats to Saint Pierre boats rose steadily from below parity in 1897 to equality in 1899 and to complete dominance during the war, when Saint Pierre's fleet virtually disappeared.5 In 1900 shipowning in the French fishing industry was almost completely a family enterprise. Because the fishing could be done in such small and inexpensive units, the industry was highly fragmented, with the vast majority of firms owning only one or two boats. Fifty-five different companies sent boats from Granville and Saint Màio in 1900,

ίο I Divided Island but only ten of these companies owned more than three boats. The largest company in Saint Màio owned only seven boats. There were only three or four companies with a higher number of boats in all of France.® It is often difficult to say whether shipowners made their headquarters in France or on Saint Pierre. Most of the owners had offices in both places, the subsidiary office run by a brother or a son. It was not unusual for major shipowners to commute back and forth, and even to take part in politics and hold office both in their French port and on Saint Pierre. Because much of the salted fish was sent to Guadeloupe and Martinique, French possessions in the Caribbean, a few merchants had moved up to Saint Pierre from these islands.7 At the turn of the century it was not impossible for an employee to become a shipowner, depending upon the luck of the first few boats, and several fortunes on present-day Saint Pierre began in this way. Louis Legasse, Saint Pierre's most prosperous shipowner in 1900, described the process in a pamphlet written to attract people to the colony: On Saint Pierre, the manager of a firm, the clerk in a business, who has a nest egg of 10-15,000 francs from several years' saving, can purchase a schooner with it. At a bank he will easily find the necessary credits for equipping the ship, the interest on which he will be able to pay off, under ordinary circumstances, by midAugust, thanks to the sales he will make during the fishing season. And if, for a few years, the fishing is good, he will find himself with two, three, four boats and an established situation. It is not the same with metropolitan shipowning, which suppresses the personal initiative of the small businessman [petit capitalist] and makes useless any intelligence or aptitudes that he might possess. In addition, the shipowner on Saint Pierre has a small shop which furnishes the goods and objects necessary for the crews of his boats. He can also sell to the stable population of the islands. Hence the operation of shipowning by the local owner has

Saint Pierre in 1900 | 11 a commercial side to it. By the sale of the thousand and one goods at his command, he can compensate for or at least reduce the importance of the losses undergone during bad fishing seasons.8 The shipowners recruited almost all their sailors in France.9 In the first days of December, the shipowner engaged his captain. The captain in turn hired one or two officers, an experienced salter, and seven or eight master dorymen; after that it was relatively easy to find the necessary dory hands, novices, and midshipmen. Every year, on the first Monday in December, a fair was held in a village called VieuxBourg, on the outskirts of Saint Màio. The numerous men seeking employment in the fishing trade met and signed up with the captains at this fair. Many of them came from the surrounding countryside: Chateauneuf, Plerguer, Saint-Pierre de Plesguen, Plesder, Saint-Domineuc. They were called terriens (landlubbers). Most of these farmer-sailors ended up on the Saint Pierre boats. The sailors were hired under three types of contract: cinquième, troisième, or fixed salary. Sailors hired under cinquième would receive an average of 200 francs as a share of the profits, in addition to advances and bonuses of 500-600 francs. Sailors on troisième had a higher share of the profits, but had to repay their advances from their share. The cinquième predominated on the boats based in France, and the troisième among the French crews of boats based on Saint Pierre. As the hiring was done in December, several months before the sailors began to work, the advances were necessary to get the sailors through the winter until the fishing season. Local Saint Pierre sailors were mostly paid a fixed salary. Although advances were also practiced, by an 1825 law a credit system existed which entitled a sailor engaged for the coming season to buy his goods in advance from his employer and not settle accounts until Saint Michael's Day, September 29. At times both sailors and shipowners protested against the livret system, named after the account booklet held by every Saint Pierre sailor and doryman and registered with the Office of Maritime Affairs. When abused ( and both sides admitted that it was abused) the livret system was similar to the "company store"

12 I Divided Island syndrome. It was all too easy to end a season of hard work owing more than one earned, and thus start the next season owing in advance whatever earnings there might be. The system of credit on Saint Pierre set up by repayable advances, and the livret was an important point of personal contact between the employer and the employed. It could be regarded as a system of either exploitation or benevolence. When cases of group conflict arose between sailors and merchants, each group would claim that the system hurt it the most. The tradition of credit and its use as an expression of political ideas and an ideal manifestation of social order have persisted today, when the livret itself is forgotten. The sailors who came from France on the chartered steamer were accompanied by seven hundred manual laborers from Brittany. Two hundred other workers came from the Basque ports, notably Bayonne. Six hundred laborers from nearby Newfoundland, female as well as male, were also employed during the summer months. Thus a total of fifteen hundred workers were employed handling fish. They were paid a low fixed salary—about 150 francs in the first decade of the century. They were generally boys aged fourteen to eighteen, employed to clean and dry the cod which the schooners brought in to Saint Pierre. These operations were performed on rocky beaches or on fields specially covered for the purpose with rocks called grèves—hence the name graviers for the workers.10 The boys were engaged by the shipowners and worked from April until October or November. It was the duty of the Office of Maritime Affairs on Saint Pierre to see that the graviers (presumably because of their youth) were employed solely for the purpose of handling fish. In fact, this rule was usually laxly enforced; as in Saint Pierre today, there was a certain amount of latitude in implementing regulations sent from France. The graviers were lodged in dormitories near the grèves, away from the rest of Saint Pierre. Part of the appeal of the job may have been the freedom of a long stay away from the farm in France. But their lot was far from enviable. One French commentator wrote: "These unfortunates are often maltreated and must undertake a labor of fifteen to sixteen hours a day, in a rigorous climate."11 Some Saint Pierrais today remember working as graviers in their youth

Saint Pierre in ìgoo | 13 —and remember it as the hardest work they ever did. Early in the century a Breton fisherman, Theodore Borei, composed this song about graviers going to work on Ile aux Marins (then Ile aux Chiens) in Saint Pierre's harbor. A quinze ans à peine, aux baies de Terre-Neuve Pauv' petits graviers, combien partiez-vous? Nous sommes pour le moins cinq à six centaines Qui partons là-bas mais n'en r'viennent pas tous. L a charge complète à la côte bretonne, Pauv' petits graviers, quand reviendrez-vous? Partis en hiver, on rentre en automne; Nous ne r'verrons plus les étés si doux. Sortis des bateaux le coeur tout malade Pauv' petits graviers, où débarquez-vous? Entre le Cap Rouge et l'Ile Langlade, C'est à l'Ile aux Chiens qu'est not' rendez-vous. 12 An almanac of 1893 gives a breakdown of the permanent population of Saint Pierre by place of birth. 13 ( The foreigners listed would in all probability be Newfoundlanders. Many fishermen and workers married Newfoundland girls who came to work as servants or graviers.) Place of origin France Saint Pierre and Miquelon

Males 1,024 1,938

Females 376 2,122

French colonies Foreigners

227

546

Total 1,400 4,050 14 773 6,247

From the composition of the population alone it is clear that Saint Pierre's contacts with France were extensive. More than a fifth of the islanders were born in France. The total population had been under three thousand until the 1860's, and the bulk of the increase must have come from the mother country. The excess of males from France reflects the tendency of French sailors to spend the winter on the island before going back out on the Banks, a temporary influx of labor due to an expanding economy. In 1900 there were three hundred of these

14 I Divided Island hivernants who found minor jobs in Saint Pierre as shop clerks, laborers, and so forth, to tide them over until the next spring.14 The long-term presence of administrators and hivernants, the intermittent presence of graviers and the numerous sailors, and the frequent visits by the shipowners themselves meant that the population of Saint Pierre was constantly shifting, constantly exchanging people with France, especially with the ports of Granville, Saint Màio, Saint Servain, Fecamp, and Bayonne. From April to November there was never any trouble obtaining passage between Saint Pierre and France. The fast packets which brought salt from Cadiz and delivered dried fish to Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Fécamp also carried merchandise and news back from France. The Saint Pierre journals of the day quote the newspapers of French fishing ports, discuss their local events, and carry the obituaries of people there who had relatives or acquaintances on Saint Pierre. Especially in terms of the reflections in Saint Pierre of major political currents in France, the colony was linked more closely to the mother country than it is now. A situation analogous to the infusion of metropolitan ideas which occurred on Saint Pierre in the crises of 1790 and 1940 was more or less constant from 1890 to 1915. Dory-fishing on Saint Pierre has remained unchanged since 1900, except for the introduction of the inboard motor in 1914. A description of fishing today can legitimately apply to dory-fishing sixty years ago.16 In 1900 there were 420 dories, providing employment for almost 900 fishermen—more Saint Pierrais than were employed on the schooners. The dorymen were probably equally divided among the three islands. Dory-fishing was virtually the only industry of Miquelon and Ile aux Marins, and this remains true today.16 On the fishing schooners, as in Kipling's Captains Courageous, the crew would be divided up into dory teams which would go out and set their lines each day, marking them with buoys. For those fishermen who operated in dories from Saint Pierre, Ile aux Marins, and Miquelon, the island to which they returned every night served as their schooner. The waters around Saint Pierre are rich with cod and mack-

Saint Pierre in igoo | i$ erel, and a persevering fisherman can still make a living in a good year by using the old methods: rising at one or two o'clock in the morning; procuring bait, preferably before sunrise; and fishing in selected areas until the fish stop biting, usually in the early afternoon. A doryman based on the islands usually had a higher income than a schooner doryman. In 1900 it was estimated that the owner of a dory earned about twice as much as his counterpart in la grande pêche.17 The Saint Pierre sailor on a schooner was probably a younger man who regarded the job as a way to earn enough money to buy his own dory. For the dory owner, in addition to the pleasure of returning to the hearth every day, there was the advantage of a greater degree of independence. He could pick his own hours for work, his own time to sell and his own dory mate. Further, he could call upon his family as an economic resource. The wife and the children of the doryman worked long hours unloading, cleaning, salting, washing, and drying the catch. Among local dorymen there was a premium on large families. Not all the dorymen were well off, however. Those who were less fortunate in their fishing were as much under the hand of the fishing companies as were the schooner sailors. For the doryman also had his livret, and the unfortunate doryman could be caught, just as easily as the schooner sailor, in a downward spiral of economic and political obligations to the company that sold him supplies, furnished him credit, and purchased his fish. The time is still remembered when a dory could be confiscated for nonpayment of debts, although the practice was never common. But those dorymen who were moderately successful, with no liens on their property, could afford to be more independent socially and politically. Candidates in the elections at the turn of the century did not fail to curry the dorymen's favor with references to their independence of spirit, and competition for their votes was heated. It was the more independent dorymen, especially of Ile aux Marins, who first reacted against the shipowners and whose alliance with the lower civil servants in 1920 led to the first defeat of the powerful Legasse faction.

i6 I Divided Island A precipitous decline in the fishing industry began in 1903. The number of schooners equipped for the Grand Banks from Saint Pierre fell from 207 in 1902 to 180 in 1903; to 151 in 1904; and to 101 in 1905. In 1907 the number of boats was only 71, little more than a third the number of five years before. The total number of sailors crewing the boats declined correspondingly from about 4,000 to 1,200. The number of graviers plus sailors sent from Saint Màio to join ship on Saint Pierre dropped from 3,500 to 1,300 in five years. The decline continued: in 1909 only 40 boats and 720 sailors were left; and after World War I only the odd boat, perhaps one or two a year, was based on Saint Pierre.18 At the time, the causes for the decline were disputed. At a session of the Congrès des Anciennes Colonies in Paris, 1909, Aristide Delmont, a West Indian who had been a lawyer and politician on Saint Pierre, blamed government actions for the decline of the fortunes of the colony. The application of the tariff laws of 1892 on goods coming into the colony from abroad was a burden which the colony, given its dependence upon Canadian foodstuffs, should have been spared. Two other actions which Delmont considered prejudicial were the increases in the navigation fees for boats coming in and out of Saint Pierre harbor, and the abandonment in 1904 of French rights on a certain stretch of the coast of Newfoundland, known as the French Shore, where some Saint Pierrais had set up lobster fisheries.19 Certainly the government might have revoked or softened these measures in the years of decline (the tariffs were finally reduced in 1911), but given the chronology of events they could hardly be the causes for the decline. Some of the reasons that Ferdinand Legasse, present head of the Morue Française, gives in his thesis of 1935 seem more plausible. After noting that French establishments on the French Shore were already in decline in 1904, he ascribes the depression to problems more directly involved with fishing. The fishing boats had very poor catches in 1903 and 1904, partly because of a scarcity of bait as well as fish, which had the effect of lowering the number of boats sent out the following season.20

Saint Pierre in lQoo | 17

Year 1901 1902 1903 1904

Number of boats 201 207 181 147

Average catch per boat (in quintals) 1815 1645 954 842

Legasse also mentions a high percentage of boats lost at sea, varying between 5 and 16 percent of the Saint Pierre fleet each year from 1902 to 1908.21 With an unsuccessful season the previous year, the shipowner would not be able to replace a lost boat for lack of capital. The drastic decline of the fishing fleet had numerous secondary repercussions. One was the failure of the smaller industries set up from 1896 to 1899 to supply the fishing fleet. These included a waxed clothing workshop, a biscuit factory, a paint manufacturer, and a dory manufacturer. The island's decline had a cumulative aspect. As some merchants liquidated their businesses, and as services for the fishing industry closed down, other shipowners specially fitted out their Saint Pierre boats for the Atlantic crossing and permanently based them in French ports; while the Saint Pierre fleet was drastically dropping off, the fleet based on French ports was actually increasing.22 Réveil, a newspaper opposed to the existing administration became the voice of doom in the colony, and on November 24, 1906, gloomily complained: What we don't understand is that there are people sheltered from depression who are egoistic enough to resent by a twisted logic our attempts to shed light on the public misfortune and find a solution to the cancerous evil devouring our island. Let those people who are well off remember the Saint Pierre that used to be, and they will see what we mean. [Réveil then lists twenty-six fishing companies that used to operate out of Saint Pierre.] What is left today to continue the great business of yesteryear? A few companies on a much smaller scale, such as Lebonne, Monier, Daygrand, Chuinard, Landry, Hubert, and La Morue Française, which seems, by its recent merger, to want to monopolize what remains of the cod industry.

i8 I Divided Island The Morue Française had emerged out of the welter of family companies in operation before 1905 to a position of predominance in the French fishing industry which it has maintained ever since. It was formed in 1905 by the merger of what were already probably the largest companies in the business: Saint-Martin Legasse & Cie, based on Bayonne and Saint Pierre with twenty-seven ships; Emile Houduce, a shipowner of Saint Màio with installations on Saint Pierre; and Secheries de Port de Bouc, a Marseilles company with twenty-five ships and a fish-drying plant on Saint Pierre. The result was a mammoth company of about fifty ships (in 1905 about thirty-five were based in Saint Pierre, and fifteen in France), with crews totaling over a thousand sailors. In their first year of operation they accounted for half of the fish exported from Saint Pierre, and this percentage rose when they merged in 1913 with yet another company, Sécheries de Fécamp. The dominant interest in the company from the outset was the Legasse family. The brothers Arnaud and Louis, both living on Saint Pierre, were founding members, along with their cousin, SaintMartin Legasse, who lived in Bayonne. A corporation with three million francs capital, the Morue Française was the first cod-fishing company with main headquarters in Paris. The importance of this company on Saint Pierre should not be underestimated. It was the largest single employer on the islands; its interests included the packet boat, fishing ships, the telephone company, buying and treating the fish from local dories, retail commerce, smithies, and bakeries. If one combines the employees and assets of the various members of the Legasse family, there results a preponderance of economic power that Saint Pierre had never known before and has never known since. The Morue Française was the predominant power on Saint Pierre until the First World War, and the ideals that it championed remained potent until the Second World War.23 Company consolidation, though, was not enough to spare the population from the economic disaster of the bad seasons, the loss of some ships, and the departure of others. The most noteworthy consequence was the emigration of Saint Pierrais and Miquelonnais. Merchants followed their ships to France; the poorer people went to Canada. Nearby Newfoundland, a more convenient destination for emigrants, was

Saint Pierre in 1900 | ig undergoing a similar depression and was hardly receptive. The total number of people who left the islands was put at 1,800 for the years 1904-1907.24 The census figures for 1902 and 1907 show a drop of 1,700, more than a quarter of the 1902 population. A good many more people probably left but returned, unable to adapt successfully to Canadian life. Canada, with vast tracts of undeveloped land, eagerly accepted them. While there was definitely a "push" effect—the prospect of long winters with no job—there was also a "pull." An emigration agent named Dr. Brisson was sent over by the Société Générale de la Colonisation de la Province de Québec. He was especially encouraged by the weekly Réveil, which lauded his efforts in articles and published his advertisements. Vigie, the Legasse newspaper, ungraciously intimated that Réveil was paid for its extensive coverage of Brisson's activities. A speech by Brisson was printed in the October 20, 1906, issue of Réveil: "Since misfortune has fallen on you and forces you to leave your country, why not come to Canada; there you will find, with hardly any transportation cost, other Frenchmen with origins like yours, who will receive you with all the more pleasure since they speak the same language and practice the same religion, a double cause for sympathy. In addition to these advantages, you will find a job and enough work to be well off and raise your families." The city of Québec also encouraged the migration of servant girls: "Servant girls of French origins with favorable references who wish to emigrate to Canada may go to the municipal employment bureau on their arrival in Québec, where they may easily find places in families recommended by the bureau, without having to pay a fee" ( Réveil, March 2 3> χ 9°7)· Agents from other provinces competed with Dr. Brisson for the islanders. Some agents went all the way to Miquelon, and many Miquelonnais did leave home. Some went to Dalhousie in Nova Scotia; others went as far as Winnipeg. The time of departure of the fall packet boats that carried the Saint Pierrais away from their homeland was undoubtedly a moment of drama in these years. On November 3, 1906, Réveil reported that 'last Sunday, the docks and quays of the customs house and all the vicinity were black with people—both spectators and entire families coming

20 I Divided Island to shake hands and embrace those who were leaving. It has been like this since the month of September and this exodus will continue for two or three more packet trips, and then start up again in March." On their arrival in Sydney, Nova Scotia, those who were brought across by Dr. Brisson were shepherded onto trains for Montreal. There was a good deal of publicity for their arrival in Montreal, and the French-Canadian press carried favorable stories. An article from the Montreal paper La Presse was quoted by Réveil (December 1, 1906): "In the last three months he [Dr. Brisson] has brought us more than five hundred healthy and absolutely desirable islanders . . . there were only three women and three children in this last contingent. The rest are men from 16 to 40 years old." That many of the men went alone is a clue to the emigration strategy. Wives were generally left at home, assured of bed and board with relatives, until the man could find a job and see whether he liked it. Some men went to work only for the winter, since there was little possibility for employment on Saint Pierre for sailors or laborers from November to April, and they returned to their families with money to work on Saint Pierre for the summer. The jobs the islanders were able to find were most often manual labor. Openings were especially to be found in logging and in saw mills. The talent that every Saint Pierrais possessed, since he had very likely built his own house and constructed his own dory, was carpentry; many of the emigrants who were successful took up this trade. It is probable that as the migration continued the establishment of relatives in Canada was a stronger attraction than any Brisson mentioned. When the emigration started again in March 1907, Réveil commented: "Of the thousands who have left, except for the Miquelonnais, who has returned? We are obviously not speaking about those who left only for the winter. A year ago we had predicted this emigration movement as likely to occur and become irresistible. Its principal incentive is that those who have already left and suitably set themselves up draw to them their relatives and their friends" (March 4, 1907). Just how much returning there was is disputed; five days later Vigie published an article remarking on the high rate of Saint Pierrais coming

Saint Pierre in igoo | 21 back because of homesickness and because of the inability of sailors to adapt as loggers. Economic decline and emigration marked Saint Pierre from 1903 until the First World War. The decline was accompanied by the amalgamation of the Morue Française, and an intense political rivalry set in between the corporation and a coalition of its smaller competitors.

2 Challenges

From 1903 until 1920 the Legasse family and its company, the Morue Française, held unparalleled power on Saint Pierre. This power was challenged repeatedly. Even when issues did not involve the company directly, as in church-state problems, the disputes usually became a test of Legasse influence. The Mazier-Legasse disputes of 1903-1906 accompanied the consolidation of Morue Française power; from 1906 until the First World War the company held virtually undisputed sway over the colony; and the disputes of 1919-1920 marked the retirement of the company from the political arena. In 1903 the radical weekly, Réveil (Alarm), was founded, spearheading a challenge to the economic and political power of the Legasse family on Saint Pierre. The focus of the attack was upon Louis Legasse's seat in the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies. In response Louis Legasse published a similar, if slightly less violent newspaper, Vigie (Sentinel). A citizen of Saint Pierre, now well over seventy years old, recently recalled the 1903 election: "I was only a child, but I have not forgotten. Women walked arm in arm through the town calling out slogans and singing songs for their candidate; at the counting of the votes, the insults which people had written on their ballots were read aloud, and women were fighting in the doorway of the Town Hall. In those years the atmosphere was even more bitter than during the Free French occupation." What she remembers is confirmed by the bitterness of the newspapers of the day and by other Saint Pierrais who remember also. Ile aux Marins was particularly divided over the two candidates, and tumultuous election meetings were held in the schoolhouse. Legasse partisans burned the opposition candidate in effigy from a flagpole. 22

Challenges I 23 Legasse won, and two years later a new issue of Vigie ( March 12, 1905), revived in preparation for the municipal elections of 1905, carried the following front-page notice. It does not seem to have been an exaggeration: "Saint Pierre at this time is undergoing two crises: The economic crisis . . . The social crisis: discord and agitation. Division reigns everywhere: in the workshops, on the docks, in the streets, and even—should it be said?—even in your families." The agitation carried over to the election for the seat of the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies in 1906 and was, if anything, more violent. On the more elegant level of gentlemen candidates, duels were fought between every possible combination of opposing leaders. Men who refused to disclose the names of those for whom they had voted were fired from their jobs; their employers assumed they had voted for the opposition. In the first flush of the Legasse victory, the houses of opposition leaders were stoned. Demonstrators burned the Réveil editor in effigy, and the clergy and schoolchildren led parades through the streets in celebration. The challenge of 1903-1906 was a real one. It occurred at a time when the established order was having difficulty coping with depression and the poverty it produced. That the challengers, opposed by Legasse, the Church, and the government, were able to gain control of the Municipal Council in 1904-1905 testifies to the degree of dissatisfaction on the island, and explains the seriousness with which the opposition faction was taken. Although the political disputes from 1903 to 1906 were the most bitter, others occurred on Saint Pierre in less virulent form from 1900 to 1919; and they all had as their focus the power and prestige of Louis Legasse.1 His father was a captain and shipowner from Bayonne, in the French Basque country, who went down with a fishing schooner on the Grand Banks. Legasse had two uncles who were shipowners like his father, as well as brothers and cousins directly or indirectly involved in the fishing industry, whether in France or on Saint Pierre. It was his Basque origin that earned him the sobriquet "Louis Legascon," which he himself used at times. The sobriquet also referred to his disposition. When he entered Saint Pierre politics in

24 I Divided Island 1894 a t the age of twenty-four, he was brash as well as dynamic. By 1903 he had been arrested three times by the colonial administration for his bold opposition, and he proudly received punishments of fines or short prison terms. By all accounts he manifested exuberance in any kind of political or economic competition. His son, Ferdinand, who now controls the Morue Française, recalls that his father reveled in politics, that politics was a kind of sport for him. Over the course of the twelve years from 1893 until 1905, he fought no less than eight duels against political rivals. He and his followers won every political election that they contested from 1905 until 1920. Legasse was so bitterly attacked by the opposition newspapers (Réveil and Action Laïque) and so fiercely defended by his supporters in Vigie that it is impossible to obtain an unbiased judgment of him from the sources of the period. Hindsight has not served to make most Saint Pierrais any more objective in regard to either Legasse himself or his company. At the time, the opposition accused him of vulgarity, unethical personal insinuations about his opponents, and economic ruthlessness. Certainly moderation was not one of his characteristics in the heat of battle. From 1900 until 1920 Legasse was Saint Pierre's delegate to the rather unimportant Conseil Supérieur des Colonies in Paris. Before 1905 this responsibility alone took him to France often. After 1905 he was needed in Paris as the leading director of the Morue Française. Hence he could appear in Saint Pierre only rarely, and those rare times were usually around elections. After 1908, allegedly because of a susceptibility to seasickness, he never returned to Saint Pierre. The Morue Française and his relatives amply represented him. Legasse, on his infrequent trips to Saint Pierre, was so well dressed and so regal in manner that he was called the Emperor, the second of his nicknames. The image that he liked to project was that of an absentee uncle imbued with all the glamor of Paris, but "one of us" at heart, who comes back at election time to tell funny stories, distribute presents, and fight off any challenge to traditional Saint Pierre life. Yet beneath this masquerade was the hard fact of immense economic power. In this respect too his second nickname was justified. Legasse's position as a shipowner gave him his political base. He

Challenges | 25 was one of the few shipowners who were able to man their schooners with Saint Pierre fishermen; the others imported their sailors from France. Legasse was able to turn this point to political advantage on Saint Pierre. That most of his sailors voted for him or his party is undisputed. The opposition several times accused Legasse of trying to have elections early in April before the Saint Pierre fishing fleet left, and Legasse equally often accused the opposition of trying to obtain the postponement of the election until after the fleet left, thereby depriving the sailors of their vote. Both, by their accusations, assumed that the sailors voted for Legasse.2 In 1905 Legasse boasted that the Morue Française was making a special point of overhauling its ships and repairing its buildings during the winter months, when employment on Saint Pierre was at a low ebb. In an article for Vigie he said that the Morue Française was employing over a hundred men for these purposes. The total number of employees of the Legasse family or their subsidiaries, however, was much higher. In addition to the family interests on Saint Pierre, the Morue Française was the predominant power on Miquelon, where it employed over half the adult population and purchased all of the dorymen's catches. The population there voted for Legasse en bloc. Despite the fact that there was rarely a vote in opposition there were never any claims of fraud from the vigilant Réveil. On Ile aux Marins the company faced more competition, but a faction of the island staunchly supported the Morue Française, which owned a large store, a fish warehouse, and the island's only bakery. The nucleus of Legasse's political support came from his company personnel. At least half the members of the Legassist municipal council of 1905, for instance, were directly or indirectly employed by the Morue Française. In Legasse's case, the importance of his employees is heightened. Although the political boss, as it were, of the islands, he was usually absent, and his "boss" functions devolved upon company personnel. It usually fell to his employees, for instance, to write most of the articles in Vigie. The bond between employer and employee was (and still is) very strong on Saint Pierre. It was expected at the very least that an employee would vote for le Patron, especially with the philosophy ex-

26 [ Divided Island plicit in Legasse's campaign literature of Saint Pierre as an integrated organism of interdependent parts. In critical moments this unspoken rule becomes explicit. In the election of 1906 Jacques Legasse ( Louis' cousin), who was an election officiai, demanded to see people's ballots before they put them in the ballot box; when carpenter Francis Dolio refused to show his vote, he was fired from his job at the Morue Française. According to observations of employer-employee relations on presentday Saint Pierre, political allegiance normally occurs without any pressure. Hiring is usually done on the basis of kinship, which in itself ensures a high degree of political allegiance and helps to explain why such allegiance is often taken for granted. This often means kinship with the employer; it might also mean kinship with existing employees whose loyalty is proven. At the very least, hiring for permanent or semipermanent positions is done on the basis of membership in a political faction. It sometimes seems that working for an important man makes people who are already his supporters more fiercely loyal than they would otherwise have been. A phrase that an anticommercial politician used in describing this phenomenon is "spoiled employees." In the case of the Morue Française, the holding of a responsible position within the company almost necessarily meant taking a leading role in helping to organize the victories of Louis Legasse. In addition to company personnel, sailors, and a portion of the dorymen of Ile aux Marins and Miquelon, Louis Legasse had the support of the Church. From 1900 to 1916 Christophe Legasse, Louis' brother, was the Apostolic Prefect, head of the Saint Pierre diocese. He and the rest of the clergy regarded the opposition to Legasse as anticlerical. Réveil (January 5, 12, 1907) reports pro-Louis Legasse sermons and mentions the participation of the clergy in the victory celebrations of 1906. There has always been mutual understanding between the Church and the Morue Française on Saint Pierre. The company supported Christophe Legasse in his efforts to raise money for a new church after the old one burned down in 1902. In the church today one can see the names of the Legasse brothers as donors on six of the stained-glass windows. In 1926 when the order of nuns on Saint Pierre, the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny, were celebrating their centenary

Challenges | 27 on the islands, the Morue Française was favorably mentioned in the commemorative brochure: "The Morue Française has made a point at every opportunity of favoring the advancement in our colony of the works of education and benevolence."3 The opposition, of course, regarded quite cynically the relationship of the company to the Church, especially given the closer "brotherhood" involved. A tale related in Saint Pierre reflects this attitude: "After the big election when Louis Legasse has defeated the forces of evil a crowd gathers to cheer him in front of the Café du Midi. Louis, acclaimed by the multitude, naturally wishes to give them something in return. He goes to his brother across the street at the church and says, 'My brother, give them the blessing of Papa.' " Legasse also maintained a special relationship with the Basques on Saint Pierre. At the turn of the century when labor was scarce on Saint Pierre, Legasse and his relatives in Bayonne had recruited many Basques to emigrate to Saint Pierre as sailors, graviers, or laborers. Their favor was constantly cultivated by the Legasse family, who tried to look after them on Saint Pierre. The episode of Zazpiak-Bat, which became a political issue, is a case in point. The Zazpiak-Bat, a huge concrete backboard for playing pelote Basque or handball, is the rallying point for the Basques in Saint Pierre. It gives its name to the section of Saint Pierre around it and is still used today, though mostly by children practicing tennis. It was first constructed in May 1902 and financed by Legasse. In 1905, in the heat of the Municipal Council election, it was dynamited, presumably by Legasse's opposition. A collection was held immediately, and it is recorded in Vigie that the first donors were Louis Legasse himself and all the members of his newly elected Municipal Council. In 1907 there appeared in Vigie the names of the governing board of the Cercle du Zazpiak-Bat, or Basque Club. The honorary president was Louis Legasse; the secretary was his brother, Monsignor Legasse. Perhaps this helps explain why Louis Legasse was so proud of his nickname, Louis Legascon. From 1905 until 1920 the majority of the Saint Pierre population supported not only Louis Legasse but also his candidates for municipal office. The percentage gained by the opposition never reached more

28 I Divided Island than two fifths of the voters. Legasse's combination of Church support (on a devoutly religious island) and tremendous economic power, added to his personal dynamism, was very hard indeed to defeat. The Morue Française came to stand for the epitome of a way of life which was remembered and either cherished or resented long after it had any real relevance on the islands. Until 1920, the opposition to Legasse had as its leaders most of the other shipowners and commercial figures of the islands. The names of Gustave Daygrand, Emile Gloanec, and Leonce Dupont stand out in this respect. Each was, in his turn, president of the Chamber of Commerce. Despite hotly contested elections, the Chamber of Commerce always remained in the hands of Legasse's opposition. Gustave Daygrand was an important shipowner of Granville. On Saint Pierre he represented a Granville shipping firm and for the first years of the 1900's seemed to be the most substantial and most respectable of the opposition figures. He was the opposition mayor from 1904 to 1905. With the decline in the fishing industry, however, he moved to France and left the political arena to others. One of his successors was Emile Gloanec. He had come to Saint Pierre early in the century and worked for a fishing company on lie aux Marins. In 1906 he moved to Saint Pierre and set up a very modest drygoods store. An anecdote is told about him today: There was a question of setting up a bishopric for Saint Pierre; the leading notables met at the Hotel Lalanne to discuss the idea. Gloanec, mistrustful of Church power on Saint Pierre, was against it. "Why should we have a bishop for four thousand inhabitants?" Bill Miller, a pro-Legasse merchant, quickly replied, "Why shouldn't we have a bishop for four thousand inhabitants—we already have for president of the Chamber of Commerce someone who sells marbles." Leonce Dupont was the son of a prominent representative of French shipowners. The father had been active politically, a member of the General Council and Saint Pierre's delegate to the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies from 1893 to 1896. The son followed suit, eventually becoming the single most influential political figure on the island from 1920 until his death in 1946. Dupont succeeded Daygrand as the Saint

Challenges | 29 Pierre agent of the firm, L. Coste & Cie, which was so much identified with opposition to Legasse that Vigie, when listing the cod exports for the year, would put the name "Coste" in italics to emphasize their relatively small share of the Saint Pierre business. After World War I Dupont became the representative of a large French fishing company, Porée, and then of a fishing cartel that was competing with the Morue Française. When this second company failed, he took over its fishdrying plant and was one of the few fish buyers left in 1940. Always opposed to Legasse politically, he is said to have been a freethinker who paid only lip service to the Church and was suspicious of its intentions. Forthright, honest, and proud, Dupont was a man who commanded the respect of his bitterest rivals. Although the three men mentioned above were the real powers in the opposition camp, Paul Mazier made the most noise, attracted the most attention, and gave his name to the whole party, the members of which were called "Mazierites." The conflict at the beginning of the century is remembered now as "Mazier against Legasse." Mazier had been mayor of Saint Pierre from 1880 to 1897, and it was he who founded and edited Réveil. He was a smaller shipowner whose fortunes, like those of others, suffered drastically in the decline of 1904. He finally left the island in 1908, his business gone and his political prestige fallen to zero. He suffered the ultimate blow to his pride by selling his store unknowingly to Legasse through an intermediary. Legasse's commercial opposition can also be seen by comparing the two owners' associations which existed side by side from 1905 on. On the one hand there was the older Syndicat des Armateurs (Shipowners' Union) and on the other was Legasse's own association, the Syndicat des Armateurs de la Grande et de la Petite Pêche des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Union of Shipowners and Dorymen). The leaders of the latter association were all allies of Legasse; in 1905 its twenty officers included six employees of the Morue Française. Mazier himself was the head of the. older organization, which included virtually all the shipowners politically opposed to Legasse.4 The program these men advocated was in many ways similar to that of Legasse. Certainly the goals were identical: the removal of French governmental restrictions on island trade and the rebuilding of the

30 [ Divided Island colony's fallen fortunes by increased commercial activity. Both sides exploited resentment against the French administration, and both sides complained of the abuses of bureaucracy. From 1905 to 1915 Legasse's commercial opposition controlled, at best, one third of the Saint Pierre market. Legasse controlled the rest, and his share grew every year." Apart from the merchants, the spokesmen for the opposition included several lawyers who had come to Saint Pierre from France or from other colonies. Most notable were Aristide Delmont, a Negro who ran against Legasse in 1903 for Delegate, and Samuel Lagroseillière, Saint Pierre's most noted anticleric. These men and others like them brought to Saint Pierre the radical stance toward the Church that prevailed in France. Many of them were members of the proDreyfus Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, and the most extreme were dedicated anticlericals. There was no doubt in their minds that the Saint Pierre people were being exploited by the Legasse machine. The leaders of the opposition were supported by about two fifths of the population, gaining a majority only in the municipal election of 1904. It is to be expected, though it must remain unproven, that the bulk of their votes came from the commercial rivals of Legasse, their employees, and a small group of a hundred voters who styled themselves, in 1905, Le Cercle de l'Action Laïque. This organization of anticlericals included among its members some of the administrators from France. The administration's official support alternated between the local factions until 1907, depending mainly on the personal proclivities of particular governors. From 1907 until 1923, however, the administration was opposed to Legasse. In addition to the encouragement of some administrators, support for the opposition came from a faction of Ile aux Marins (Ile aux Chiens) headed by Jacques Revert, a doryman. Revert formed a dorymen's union in 1907 and gained about a hundred members on his island. The raison d'être of the group was its opposition to the use of new commercial methods of cod fishing, but most of its members were independent dorymen who had long opposed Legasse and his party. Revert's dorymen held few goals in common with the Chamber of Commerce aside from a desire to curb

Challenges | 31 the activities of the Morue Française. Although Revert's union soon died out, it was revived in 1919 and became the basis for a movement against all the merchants, including their erstwhile ally, Dupont. One of the more curious ways in which the opposition manifested itself was the organization of the Ligue Anti-Alcoolique. This supposedly prohibitionist society was in fact a center of agitation against Legasse and seemed to serve no other purpose. Campaigns for prohibition were prevalent in France and America at the time, and Saint Pierre would have made a fit subject for such a campaign. One captain reported that in 1895 there were thirty-six bars in Saint Pierre. Indeed, it came to the point where fishing captains would choose different ports, other things being equal, the better to preserve the health and sobriety of their crews. The Ligue, however, restricted itself to criticism of Legasse and the Church. The opposition to Legasse, then, was an ill-assorted combination of groups that were somehow beyond the reach of the Morue Française. They preferred to call themselves independents, using the word with implicit reference to the Legasse cartel. But their coalition carried no implication of agreement on positive policy. The incompatibility of some of their elements became clear in the disputes of 1919-1920. With the decline of the power of the Morue Française during World War I, the opposition coalition split. The more conservative elements, centered on the Chamber of Commerce, allied with the Morue Française in the face of an administration-sponsored coalition of dorymen and government employees. Legasse and his enemies skirmished on a wide variety of issues. Many of the disputes involved religion. On several occasions during the years between 1900 and 1910, the administration and the opposition to Legasse attempted to limit the clergy's influence on the islands. In almost all of these cases the Morue Française supported the Church and tried to impute anticlericalism to its opponents. These disputes must be seen in the French context. The French government at the turn of the century was concerned with the influence of the religious orders in all areas of community life and began to take measures to restrict their activities, closing institutions that

32 I Divided Island seemed unnecessary, secularizing the most necessary ones, and gradually eliminating the orders from public positions. The situation was more ambiguous in the colonies than at home, however. In the colonies priests and brothers performed functions of education and, indeed, Westernization which the Ministry of Colonies could not possibly otherwise afford. For this reason the laws concerning the secularization of education were not promulgated in most of the colonies. Nor was the decree separating church and state, passed in France in 1905, made applicable overseas. Saint Pierre was the most ambiguous colony of all. On the one hand it was technically a colony and as such was under colonial administration. On the other hand its citizens were just as devout and just as French as anybody in France, so that the presence of the orders in Saint Pierre could hardly be justified as a missionary endeavor. Saint Pierre has always been a colony that is not a colony. This observation, of course, did not escape the governors sent to Saint Pierre from France. The personal attitude of the governor toward the Church largely determined how he argued Saint Pierre's case with the Ministry of Colonies. Some administrators were either in basic sympathy with the Church or thought that for one reason or another it performed a useful role. Such a governor could then argue that Saint Pierre deserved special dispensation from government decrees, and the firmness of the French government determined his degree of success. Other administrators, however, were hostile to the Church on Saint Pierre. Especially in the years 1907 to 1923 administrators tended toward anticlericalism and felt it their duty, in the words of one Apostolic Prefect, "to de-idiotize" the population.6 These administrators usually sided with the dissident faction on the island, espousing its contention that the island was excessively dominated by the alliance between the Church and the Morue Française. The dissident faction tended to cultivate in administrative officials a simplified and exaggerated view of the Church's authority on the islands. A good example is to be found in a novel written in the 1920's about Saint Pierre as it was in 1915. The author was a colonial judge on the islands. He had one of his most reasonable characters, who probably represents Leonce Dupont, tell a new governor about the

Challenges [ 33 Apostolic Prefect: "The Apostolic Prefect is an all-powerful figure with whom every government has to reckon. If he said tomorrow to his flock to rim through your home and throw you into the harbor, without even telling them why, he would be blindly obeyed, immediately, to the accompaniment of sweetest hymns."7 At times, however, it seemed that conflict between the governor and the Apostolic Prefect was not necessarily a question of anticlericalism. I talked to one former governor who had obviously regarded the Monsignor as a threat to his personal authority on the islands. Both he and the Apostolic Prefect tended to treat the people as children, and the two seem to have vied for the "fathership" of the Saint Pierre family. The first in the series of secularizations, however, was ordered from Paris, apparently in spite of the recommendations of the governor, a Legasse ally. On July 17, 1903, the boys' primary schools on Saint Pierre and Ile aux Marins were secularized, and the Brothers of Christian Instruction left the islands. Their departure provoked a mass demonstration at which seventeen arrests were made. The opposition to Louis Legasse, preparing for an election campaign, led the demonstration against the closings. At the forefront were Daygrand and Delmont, the opposition leaders. Legasse probably wished to make the task easier for his ally, the governor, and he publicly announced that although he preferred the school of the Brothers of Christian Instruction, he would not hesitate to send his children to the state school in September. This was a position he could well afford to take: with his brother as Apostolic Prefect, no one could accuse him of being anticlerical. From 1903 on, at least one major government action per year against the Church aggravated local antagonisms. In 1904 the military hospital was staffed with civilian nurses; two nuns had to leave the islands. In January 1905 the Miquelon primary school for girls was secularized, and on the first of May an orphanage run by nuns on Saint Pierre was closed.8 The major demonstration came early in 1906. The municipal elections of April 1905 had been bitterly fought between Legassists and anti-Legassists, and the year ended in suspense over whether the Law of Separation of Church and State would be passed in France. On

34 I Divided Island January 13, 1906, the governor received a coded telegram ordering him to proceed with the secularization of the girls' primary schools on Saint Pierre and Ile aux Marins. The contents of the telegram, although in code, were soon common knowledge, and demonstrators massed in front of the governor's residence. The governor was Gabriel Angoulvant, a man firmly supported by Legasse and sympathetic to the Morue Française. One version has it that the governor himself placed responsibility for the Colonial Ministry's telegram upon Samuel Lagroseilliere, a mulatto lawyer from Martinique, who was supposed to have pressed the ministry to secularize the schools. In any case, it was hardly necessary for the governor to point him out: because Lagroseilliere was the outspoken editor of Action Laïque and head of Cercle Laïque, he was the most bitterly resented anticleric on the island. The crowd moved from the governor's residence to Lagroseilliere's house, where they broke into his store and ransacked it. Lagroseilliere succeeded in escaping up onto his roof by a trap door which his pursuers could not locate. They contented themselves with throwing snowballs at him until the suggestion was made that the house be burned down. A bonfire was prepared and was about to be lit when Mayor Pompeii arrived, forcibly prevented the fire, and sent for the police. Lagroseilliere had to be guarded day and night by his friends until he clandestinely embarked for Bermuda on an English boat. He never returned to Saint Pierre.® Two days after the demonstration, the governor decreed the secularization of the nun's schools, to take effect in September 1906. The nuns succeeded in reopening private schools in September, but without government support. Beginning in 1907 and continuing through 1923, by which time Legasse had retired from the Saint Pierre arena, the governors were uniformly at odds with the Morue Française and Legasse. Every time a governor thwarted what the people regarded as the legitimate and time-honored rights of the Church, Legasse's antiadministration stand was strengthened. In almost every election Legasse's supporters used smear tactics to identify the opposition as anticlerical by implication or by alliance.10 The political dividends of Louis Legasse's identifica-

Challenges | 35 tion with the Church began to decline only after his brother left Saint Pierre in 1916 to become Archbishop of Oran. On May 4, 1908, a petition with the signatures of almost seven hundred males was presented to the governor requesting permission to allow the Brothers of Christian Instruction to open a private primary school, as the nuns had done. This request was rejected by the governor on the ground that a state school was already in operation, but he did say he would look more favorably upon a private school with lay teachers. The arrival of two young schoolteachers from France in October brought the question to a head. They wished to establish a secondary school for boys under the aegis of the Church. The new governor, however, was allied to the party of opposition and distrusted anything that the Morue Française supported. He refused the authorization. On October 31 virtually the total adult male population, about twelve hundred men, signed a petition for the church secondary school.11 As the governor continued to frustrate their wishes, a meeting was called for November 16 in the Café du Midi, the Legasse headquarters facing the Church. There a committee was formed, and the meeting, attended by several hundred persons, was addressed by Vieillot, one of the two new schoolteachers. The committee included members of the Town Council, fishermen, and pilots. A delegation of three was sent to the governor, without any success. Thereupon a parade was held with most of the Legasse-party notables taking part, and demonstrations were held in front of the government building, where an American flag was raised; at the house of the American consul; at the public school, where M. Picaudel, the director, was insulted; and at the courthouse.12 This demonstration occasioned a certain amount of controversy in the French National Assembly, and Vigie carried its debates in full. Certain Radical members accused the clergy of starting a clerical insurrection and, because of the display of the American flag, insulting the French nation. Other deputies replied with the islanders' version that the display of the American flag was simply meant to demonstrate the colonists' approval of liberty and tolerance toward parochial

ß6 I Divided Island schools in the United States. Articles supporting the Saint Pierre request for private church schools appeared in several newspapers, most notably Figaro, which printed a favorable article by Albert de Mun, the rightist Catholic.13 An article against the demonstrators, which outlined the final demonstration in some detail and was obviously sponsored by factional islanders, was written by Paul Vibert and entitled, "The Clerical Domination on Saint Pierre and Miquelon." It included the charge that Legasse prepared a pro-United States coup d'etat. Although there were dissenters to Legasse politics on the islands, there were no counterdemonstrations on the various occasions of secularization. Island opinion was simply too overwhelming for any counterprotest to be safe. The best the few anticlericals could do was to send information to any one of several newspapers or journalists in France who were favorable to their cause. Friction between the populace and the administration continued. Didelot, the governor, did permit the establishment of a private secondary school in April 1909, but he limited the age of admissible students so that it could not compete with the state primary school.14 A particular grievance was that he did not allow the chief spokesman for the church schools, Vieillot, to teach on the island.15 The governor received criticism on both sides. On the one hand, Vigie accused him of bigotry; on the other hand, Vibert, in his polemic published in France, said that Didelot was "on his knees before the blackest Jesuitical agents from Rome, and the Canadian Church."18 Didelot seems to have been very much against the church schools and the Morue Française, but found it impossible to take the strong reprisals that Vibert and his friends would have liked. In April 1912 Monsignor Legasse appealed to the French Council of State on the constitutionality of Didelot's restricting the age for private school admission. In their decision the Council of State announced that, in regard to the limitation on the age of students, Didelot's decree had been "tainted with abuse of power."17 Henceforth, the church "secondary school" was in fact a primary school. Vigie (January 1, 1910) also complained of the suppression of government subsidies to the parish councils of Miquelon and Ile aux

Challenges | 37 Marins, and the transferal of responsibility for burials from the parish to the municipality. "This is the only colony in which this purely vexatious measure has been taken." Much of the opposition to the religious orders from 1900 to 1910 can be seen in the light of a crusading spirit concerned not only with the power of religion over the population, but also with the power of the Legasse family over religion. The reaction against the power of the Church on Saint Pierre was rarely for purely anticlerical reasons. The majority of the people supporting movements of opposition to the Morue Française were not at all anticlerical. It remained a maneuver of the Legasse party to taint opposition movements with anticlericalism but, for most of the Réveil faction, opposition to the Church, if present at all, was secondary to opposition to the Legasse family and the Morue Française. For this reason most of the issues, whether they involved the Church or not, revolved around the person of Louis Legasse as well as his brother, the Monsignor. The church-state issues were essentially conflicts between Saint Pierre and its government. They involved only incidental conflict within the population. During the same period, an entirely different set of issues provided scope for the local factions to express their conflicting interests. One of the issues centered on the building of a new church on Saint Pierre. On November 1, 1902, the wooden church burned to the ground. The questions of its rebuilding, size, material, the land involved, and the method used in collecting funds were political issues for the next five years. After the fire the Legasse brothers proposed the borrowing of 300,000 francs in France to rebuild the church, the presbytery, and the courthouse. This was under the assumption that the government would aid in the rebuilding. The question of the loan became the dominant political issue in 1903. The population suspected that the loan would cause an increase in taxes. This suspicion was encouraged by opposition leaders, who took the opportunity of making a stand against the Legasse interests. In October 1903 Mazier started his newspaper. In its first issue Réveil announced an open debate to be held on the question of the loan, in the Café Joinville. It was attended by seven hundred persons and addressed only by the anti-Legasse

38 I Divided Island faction, since the Legasse group had never agreed to come. The audience unanimously opposed the loan.18 The Administrative Council postponed any decision on the question. December 1903 saw the election of a delegate to the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies. Louis Legasse was up for re-election, and ever since October the opposition had been active with the question of the loan in an effort to rouse opinion against him. In what was probably the most bitterly contested election of the century on Saint Pierre, Legasse defeated his rival, Aristide Delmont, with 60 percent of the vote. In the week before the election, Legasse was challenged to four duels over electoral insults, and he fought three of them.19 In 1904 the Town Council election was contested solely on the question of the loan, and it was a great setback for Legasse when his council was put out of office and the opposition was elected, with Gustave Daygrand, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, as mayor. The question of the loan was definitively dropped, and the Town Council sharply engaged the Parish Council and Monsignor Legasse in a bid for control of the church rebuilding.20 The defeat of the loan was the first triumph by the opposition over Legasse, and they never forgot it. It misled them, however, into thinking that they could systematically oppose Legasse on other Church matters. It was finally agreed that the money needed for rebuilding the church would be raised in a charity drive in France. A plan was drawn up for a very large church of eminently fireproof concrete. The opposition at once ridiculed the idea in Réveil, calling the proposed building a monstrosity and reproducing stories from Norway to Chile about disasters in which reinforced concrete structures had collapsed, taking thousands of lives. The Town Council opposed both the size and the method of construction of the new church. They somberly predicted that it would always be empty, since so many people were leaving the islands.21 What they wanted was a "nice little church in wood." They accused the Monsignor of trying only to further his prestige on the island by erecting such an immense structure. The Monsignor and his Parish Council pushed ahead. In the winter months for each of the remaining years of his tenure, Christophe Legasse went questing for funds in France.

Challenges | 39 At a time when the Dreyfusards and the Radical government were threatening the whole fabric of traditional French Catholicism, the Monsignore appeal received widespread support. It was endorsed by Cardinal Richard of Paris and virtually all the provincial bishops. The Monsignor gave special attention to the Legasse stronghold in the Basque country. A master of public relations, he contrived to have himself favorably interviewed by journalists of every political plumage. Articles in favor of his cause appeared in Socialist newspapers as well as in the Catholic or Center newspapers like Figaro and Univers. He counted among his supporters in Figaro three members of the Académie Française, two of whom, Albert de Mun and Francois Coppée, were noted for their antirevisionist stance in the Dreyfus case.22 When the Monsignor brought his first collection back from France, the hostile Town Council demanded the right to supervise his accounts and asked for an accounting of his funds. Its claim was based on the fact that the council owned the land on which the church had been built. Legasse refused to acknowledge its authority, and the Town Council instituted joint proceedings against Monsignor Legasse and his Parish Council.23 By this time the governor, already well disposed to the Legasse family, decided that the Town Council which had been elected in 1904 no longer represented the wishes of the people. In March 1905 he dissolved the Town Council, and on the second of April a slate endorsed by the Legasse brothers was decisively elected under the slogan, "Saint Pierrais, do you want a church? Vote for the slate sponsored by Vigie." The highest vote getter on the Legasse slate was the manager of the Morue Française, Albert Letouzé, son-in-law of Louis Legasse. It was charged by the opposition that of the nineteen names that comprised the Legasse slate, seventeen were partners, employees, or furnishers of the Legasse family, the eighteenth was their lawyer, and the nineteenth was a relative.24 With the new Town Council there were no more obstacles to the building of the church, and work on the new structure was marred only by disputes between the workmen and the Parish Council. Réveil thoroughly savored the disputes and took the opportunity to accuse the Parish Council of trying to bankrupt the anticlerical contractor.25 The church was dedicated in 1906, although it was not completely

40 I Divided Island finished until several years later. The Monsignor, one suspects, very much enjoyed his barnstorming trips to France. He continued his campaign for funds for the rebuilding of the presbytery and was able to use his contacts in France to rouse support for church schools when that controversy reached a climax in 1909. Louis Legasse had profited immensely from the opposition's identification of him in a gigantic religious and commercial family monopoly. For when Legasse, who was not extremely clerical, was attacked by outsiders for being clerical, the devout population felt themselves attacked also, and consequently united behind him. Toward the end of the church-loan controversy there came a new opportunity for dispute, a proposal to establish a factory for whale-oil extraction on Miquelon. Since 1898 such factories had been set up at various points along the south shore of Newfoundland, and in 1904 and 1905 the industry was expanding. A German firm became interested in Miquelon as a site. A campaign was initiated for the whaling station by Auguste Salomon, an official of the Morue Française. Whether he was acting in his official capacity is not clear, but his proposal quickly found favor in Vigie (June 1905), which regularly published the articles he wrote in support of his cause. The sponsorship by Vigie is a sure sign that it had become a political issue. The pro-whalers were termed Baleinards and the anti-whalers, AntiBaleinards. Salomon, or "Gu-Gusse," as he was familiarly known by the opposition, became the object of a torrent of ridicule by Réveil, which even injected anti-German feeling into its campaign. Salomon made his first request in February 1904, when there was an anti-Legasse majority on the Administrative Council. It was rejected. He tried again in July 1905, but the united opposition of the Chamber of Commerce, the anti-Legasse Shipowners' Union, Réveil, and the faction on Ile aux Marins convinced the administration that it would be prudent to table the proposal indefinitely. The opposition had claimed that the whale oil would repel the cod. Since the factory was sponsored by the Morue Française, noted for looking after its own interests, this theory seems fairly unlikely. Opposition was based on pre-established political factions. The line-up had been the same as for the loan.

Challenges | 41 On the heels of the Baleinard dispute came one over the use of bait traps. The major problem of the schooners from 1902 was the lack of bait. The suggestion that traps might be used to obtain cod bait provided the occasion for another manifestation of the island division. The trap system had been used with success in Newfoundland. It was Dominique Borotra, the Miquelon representative of the Morue Française, who proposed that the traps be tried out, apparently at the Miquelonnais' suggestion. The Ile aux Marins faction that had been anti-whale immediately came out against the traps, saying that they feared there would be no bait left for the dorymen who arrived last at the few spots where traps were suitable. On December 8, 1906, Réveil published a letter from Jacques Revert on behalf of a group of Ile aux Marins dorymen protesting the use of traps, the machinations of shipowners, and the position of Dominique Borotra. The traps were an issue in the 1907 election of a delegate. Louis Legasse won with 634 votes, Jacques Revert had 1 1 5 votes, and Mazier, who announced his protest candidature at the last moment, had 90 votes. All of the votes on Miquelon went for Legasse. On March 30, 1907, Revert formed the first dorymen's union as a result of the trap question "in which the dorymen had been victimized."26 It was probably the He aux Marins fishermen who cut up the first $500 bait trap put into operation in May 1907, but no one could be sure and no retaliation took place. In mid-1907 Legasse obtained a subsidy from the government to build a refrigerated warehouse for fish and bait. This had been a project long debated on the island and opposed by the anti-Legasse faction. It was linked to the question of traps, since the traps would be necessary to stock the storehouse. Legasse set up a special company for the purpose, the Société des Frigorifiques, with his uncle, Jacques Legasse, as manager. However, the traps the company used for bait were cut, and thereafter whenever traps were used on the islands, they were cut. The loan, the schools, the whales, and the traps were the major issues on which the population divided. Minor pretexts for criticism were also found, especially when space had to be filled in the weekly newspapers. The conduct of duels was a common preoccupation. Once

42 I Divided Island in a while upon being assaulted as a preliminary to a duel, the victim would take his attacker into court instead of to the field of battle, provoking outcry from the opposite camp. On November 18, 1905, Vigie printed a list of all duels in the past twelve years in order to show that the other side had refused more duels than the Legasse side. Another minor issue, mentioned earlier, was the emigration of Saint Pierrais during the 1903-1906 depression. Réveil seems to have encouraged the emigration because it could be regarded as a demonstration of the economic decline for which the newspaper held Legasse responsible. Vigie (November 7, 1906), although grudgingly admitting the necessity for the departures, deplored them and accused Réveil of making politics out of misfortune. Several of the complaints in Réveil dealt with favoritism during the time when Legasse was aligned with the administration.27 Prosecution of Legasse for false declaration of cargo in 1901 was allegedly suppressed in the "Affaire Jules Jean Baptiste" (the name of the boat in question). The port was dredged, but the dredging was apparently abandoned after it had cleared the way to the docks of the Morue Française.28 Legasse held the contract for the postal packet and obtained a state subsidy in order to maintain it; Réveil gave publicity to delays and published any complaints made by passengers on Legasse ships. As soon as the administration had shifted to the other side (mid1906), very similar accusations are found in Vigie. When the postal contract passed to an English firm represented by Gloanec, Vigie (February 17, 1912) fulminated against foreign influence. Vigie (March 11, 1907) retrospectively accused Mazier of collaboration with the colonial administration during his tenure as mayor, and of having sold dry goods to the municipality at the time. After the church-school issue subsided around 1910, the opposition, encouraged by the administration, seemed to gather strength. Louis Legasse was seen no more on Saint Pierre, and his company based more and more of its boats on France. In a 1913 by-election, Leonce Dupont was elected to what had previously been an all-Legasse Town Council. For the first time the administrators enforced restrictions which prevented the Morue Française from using their graviers for

Challenges | 43 other work. Published sporadically to air company grievances, Vigie (November 9, 1912) accused the administration of trying to drive the Morue Française off the island and warned belligerently: "The Morue Française supports this country and its administration. It pays most of the customs duties, taxes, etc. without counting the salaries which it pays out in cash, refraining from forcing its employees to buy from it as others do without scruple, exploiting and ruining their workers . . . The Morue Française declares that you will never make it take seriously your speculations about it; that it will stay on Saint Pierre as long as it pleases; and that when it goes, you will find nothing anywhere to take the place of the benefits that you draw from it, which are indispensable to you." By the First World War, the claim that "the Morue Française supports this country and its administration" was no longer tenable. Although it remained the largest single company on the islands, its Saint Pierre branch was anything butflourishingduring the war years. Indeed, the war sealed the doom of Saint Pierre as a base for all deepsea fishing compaines. In 1914 there were twenty-four fishing schooners sent out from Saint Pierre. In 1915 there was only one. Sailors to man the Saint Pierre boats could not be sent out from France; in any case, most of them had been conscripted.29 During the war the only schooners fitted out from Saint Pierre were a couple of Morue Française boats that could be crewed locally; the other ships rotted in the harbor and by 1919 were unfit to be put back into service.30 During the war, the island economy was at low ebb. Exports of fish from schooners was barely a tenth of prewar figures. Imports exceeded exports for the first time since the early nineteenth century, and the budget had to be heavily subsidized from France. The decline in the economic power of the merchants led to a decline in their political attractiveness. The last years of the war witnessed a new challenge, qualitatively different from the earlier ones. The basis for the challenge was the only sector of the economy that continued with any sign of vigor—dory fishing. Although the number of dorys declined by more than a third when many dorymen were

44 I Divided Island conscripted, 250 boats were manned during the war years; and due to the great need for food in France and other colonies, fishermen obtained high prices for their catch. Evidence of the dorymen's new prosperity can be found in an address to the Legasse Shipowners' and Dorymen's Union delivered by Jacques Legasse in March 1917: Ί have seen you at work. Far from being discouraged, you have redoubled your efforts, and in the last two years they have been crowned with success. Dory-fishing, virtually the only resource left to the colony in these times of trial, has been fruitful; and thanks to the prices paid according to the law of February 25, 1911, you have not only been able to honor your debts, but in many cases you have helped out the families of those relatives and friends who have departed to do their duty."31 The very success that Jacques Legasse lauded in his speech brought about the demise of the kind of company union he was addressing. Dory fishing had previously been a minor factor in the Saint Pierre economy. With the onset of war it became the only vital part. This entailed a shift in the balance of power from the merchants to the dorymen. Prior to the war, the sailors on deep-sea boats, hired in France, had been beyond the reach of any organizing movement based on Saint Pierre; they had little interest or involvement in Saint Pierre affairs. Hence the merchants who succeeded in the deep-sea trade did so at the cost of little potential social conflict on the island. Saint Pierre dorymen who sold their fish to these same merchants could organize unions; but before the war the merchants, deriving more income from the deep-sea boats, held a bargaining advantage over the dorymen. With the elimination of the deep-sea boats from the scene, the dorymen held a predominate place in their merchants' transactions and thereby gained more leverage in bargaining. The dorymen, who were a minor element in the opposition to Legasse of earlier days, became a major element by the end of the war. But their opposition was not only to the Morue Française, but to virtually all the buyers of fish. As a result, the challenge in 191g was more coherent than that of the 1903-1906 epoch. Rather than an awkward coalition of disgruntled opponents of a monopolist corporation,

Challenges | 45 it was a challenge of producers against their intermediaries, only one of which was the Morue Française. The boost given to the dorymen by the wartime prices probably had something to do with their attempt to gain effective bargaining power and free themselves from the cycle of company-store credit. It is also possible that the prestige of returning veterans, bringing back new ideas of collective bargaining from France, had something to do with the fishermen's movement of 1919. Encouraged by Administrator Lachat, the dorymen activated the old dorymen's union that Revert had started in 1907.32 At the same time, they laid plans for a cooperative that would free them from debt to the commercial community by selling goods without profit and giving out short-term loans at low interest rates. Tied in with the fishermen's hopes was a huge fishstoring plant that the French government, faced with drastic wartime food shortages, decided to construct on Saint Pierre as an inexpensive means of supplying France with fish. In 1920 the building, which is in use on Saint Pierre today, was completed. Its potential value to the fishermen was high: frozen fish brought a better price than the dried fish they had been exporting. The dorymen refused to sell their fish in the fall of 1919 until they received higher prices from the five or six buyers on the island. Leonce Dupont, a buyer himself, as well as president of the Chamber of Commerce and member of the Administrative Council, was asked by Administrator Lachat to act as negotiator between the buyers and the fishermen; in the end the fishermen received their price. Faced with this joint movement of fishermen and administration, the two factions of businessmen—pro-Legasse and anti-Legasse—briskly resolved their differences and presented a joint slate for the Town Council elections of December 1919. Because Vigie was too much identified with the Legasse section of the new coalition it was abandoned, but a new campaign newspaper came off the Vigie presses, appropriately entitled L'Union des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon: Journal de Défense des Intérêts Colonials. The administration-favored ticket that opposed this slate was made up of civil servants and fishermen. It was called the "Liste Planté" after its head, François Planté, the director of the government press.

φ I Divided Island A main feature of the 1919 election campaign was a competition to raise money for the building of the war memorial. Planté, who was the leader of the Saint Pierre Band, held concerts, and the opposition sponsored a dramatic evening. Both sides were vying for patriotism at a time when patriotism was at a premium. The Planté list seems to have emphasized the "veteran" side of their ticket and to have implied that commerce was slightly unpatriotic. The election was a close one, but the majority of councillors elected were from the Planté list. The new Planté Town Council was supported by the dorymen's union. The independence of the union depended in turn upon the success of the cooperative store and the consequent freedom of the individual fisherman from obligations to island shopkeepers. The cooperative was explicitly limited to union members, retired sailors, or men on military pensions. Unfortunately for the whole movement, the dire predictions made by the shipowners in the Union were confirmed. Loans were made by the cooperative to sailors who did not repay them. The accounts were poorly kept. In the first years after the war, the colonial administration made short-term loans to the cooperative in order to keep it going and even took over its administration in 1924 because it was unable to gain payment from the cooperative. But by this time it had lost almost all its clients and only survived by selling off at a discount the goods purchased optimistically at its beginning. The cooperative was finally liquidated in 1927.33 Unhappily for the dorymen, thefish-storingplant was not a success either. The supply of fish was not regular enough to keep the factory in operation (a problem that plagues the plant today), and there were very few refrigerated ships to take the frozen fish to France. Only the building of the plant itself at a cost of seventeen million francs helped the Saint Pierre economy.34 The dorymen's union died out with the cooperative, and the Planté government with the union. At the next election the old commercial group was in again, led by Gloanec and Dupont. The experiment seemed to be over. Or was it? Something remained of this first challenge to the commercial group. Planté himself remained popular and was elected to subsequent town councils, along with one or two of his followers. There was a sense also, in some people, that something

Challenges | 47 had been said—that a page had been turned which made the old image of Saint Pierre more difficult to retrieve. Another result of the contest was the definitive retirement of the Legasse party. After the war, the Morue Française continued to be the most important economic power on the island, but the scale of its power was reduced, and it became more and more divorced from local politics. Although it no longer sent out ships from Saint Pierre, the Morue Française was still a major purchaser of dory fish for Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and Ile aux Marins. It operated a drying factory on each of the islands. An equally important activity was the transshipment of company fish from schooners and trawlers on the Grand Banks. In this its chief competitor was none other than Leonce Dupont, who represented a newly formed French fishery cartel. Although the "union" of 1919 was purely tactical, and Dupont and Legasse opposed each other immediately afterward in the election of a delegate to the Conseil Supérieur des Colonies, it did foreshadow an eventual entente in succeeding years of almost all the merchants— possibly because the recurrence of a movement from below was always a possibility. The entente, which was more or less under the leadership of Leonce Dupont, was made easier by Louis Legasse's absence. He had not returned to Saint Pierre since 1908, and his brother, the Monsignor, had left in 1916. In 1924 he was finally defeated by Dupont's candidate for delegate. Soon afterward his nephew, Jean Legasse, came to take over the Saint Pierre office of the company. A quiet, affable man, still on Saint Pierre in 1966, Jean Legasse wrote to his uncle recommending that the company cease its involvement in local politics. It was costing the company too much and gaining it too little.38

3 Society as a Family

Information about the period from 1900 to 1920 comes from two kinds of sources: material on the French fishing industry, which permits only glimpses at the people behind the companies; and the entertaining but tendentious newspapers of the time—the Legassist Vigie and the opposition Réveil, together with, for short stands, the anticlerical Action Laïque, the clerical Echo, and the merchant Union. Each of these papers represented a particular point of view and had a more or less explicit concept of what Saint Pierre was and should be. At the lowest level, every Saint Pierrais had a concept of what his society was like or should be like. It may have been latent or unconscious, but at times of great stress, as in 1903-1906, 1919-1920, and 1940-1945, it was brought into the open, and the newspapers served as vehicles for its expression. This study is concerned with the relationship of these ideal views of Saint Pierre to the social structure that they both mirror and shape. It seeks to assign the ideal views to sectors of Saint Pierre society. The divisions on the island were undoubtedly the result of conflicting interest groups as well as conflicting philosophies, but information for quantitatively studying the social composition of the various parties is lacking for the years 1900-1920. W e can, however, study the divisions as they represented conflicts of the ideal views of Saint Pierre. The ideological differences revealed in the disputes persisted in later years; and the newspaper electoral propaganda provides periodic indications of the diverging social philosophy that culminated in the Gaullist-antiGaullist crisis of 1941. A more precise correlation of these ideological positions with elements of the social structure will be undertaken for the 1941 dispute. What was the ideology of the two major groups as expressed in 48

Society as a Family | 49 Vigie and Réveil? In this early division there was very little difference of a purely political nature. There was virtually no dispute about the character of the French regime, in the sense that both sides were firmly republican. The real difference between the two factions lay not in their conception of what the French government should be, but in their conception of what Saint Pierre society should be. The Legasse party had what I shall call the organic ideal of Saint Pierre. The phrase, "Saint Pierre is a big family," expresses the ideal, but the key concept is that Saint Pierre is a harmonious working unit which settles things for itself, takes care of its weak and its sick, meets in church on Sunday, and is educated as a group. The word "family" is used because it is the best available analogy of social wholeness. The Saint Pierre family will incorporate Frenchmen and other outsiders if they conform to its standards; if they do not, they are rejected. It interprets political discord as the result of outside provocation, and ignores social discord until it too can be ascribed to agents provocateurs. This ideology is typical of societies in which the members of the population are intricately bound to one another by mutual obligations and yet differ greatly in wealth and power. It is one solution for coping with habitual face-to-face contact between the wealthy and the workers who provide their wealth. It was found in the manorial system of northwestern Europe during the feudal period and is characteristic of most company towns and plantation societies—small communities with well-defined boundaries. Usually the ideology is sponsored by the community's intermediary to the wider social system. He is usually the locus of power, and he has a stake in keeping the community and his predominance insulated from the world. The family ideology seems to serve this purpose. We are not surprised, then, that the family analogy is used on Saint Pierre to drum up a united community front for people on the outside. An incident that took place in 1905 will help to illustrate this point. When a Saint Pierrais schoolteacher allowed his antialcoholic principles to overcome his sense of community, he rashly wrote to a Paris paper denouncing the influence of drink on the islands. The islanders took this as treason and demanded that he be expelled from the island

5o I Divided Island and sent to France to teach. He was eventually transferred. Another Saint Pierrais attempted to repair the damaged image with the following letter to the Paris newspaper, also printed in Vigie. To Annales Politiques et Littéraires, June ι χ, 1905· To tell the truth, Saint Pierre is a nice little section of Brittany or Normandy, a small corner of France where, only two years ago, it was good to live, because everybody was friendly. W e lived in peace like a big family. Dirty politics have since arrived to bring trouble into that sweet peacefulness; but it will not last, thank God. Tranquillity will return soon, and with it we will see joy in the Saint Pierre homes . . . Moreover, poverty here, when it exists, is not at all comparable to the poverty of big cities; everybody being more or less related, we all help each other out; no one ever died of hunger or cold. The solidarity of the islanders in this context is explicit. At the moment, Saint Pierre is characterized as divided, but both past and future hold the family image in security; dirty politics ( la vilaine politique) refers of course to the Mazier group which, by opposing the general will, created division, the greatest ill a family can suffer. To say that the Saint Pierrais idealize the island as a close-knit family implies that for them the ideal family is close-knit. In written publicity and in public speeches to visiting dignitaries, the emphasis is upon le foyer (the home) as the sacred unit of the island. The warm kitchen where family and friends gather in the evening is the heart of Saint Pierre life. This is especially true in the long winter, when work and recreation are simultaneously reduced to a minimum. As in any family, when one member is in distress, the others come to his aid. In this respect the Saint Pierrais today are no different from their ancestors of 1900. Nearly everyone on Saint Pierre contributes to funds for victims of shipwrecks nearby, be they Saint Pierrais or foreigners. When there are fires, if the victim was not insured, an informal collection is taken. Vigie took explicit notice of one such occasion to restate the family creed. In early April, 1907, four men were lost in a dory on the way from Langlade back to Saint Pierre. Concluding its description of the aid to the men's families, Vigie (April 6,

Society as a Family | 51 1907) said: "As with all victims of the sea, the sympathy and compassion of everyone surrounded them. Even yesterday a group of men, among whom the Mayor of Saint Pierre himself made a point of being present, made a collection to relieve their distress a little. Solidarity and fraternal union are by no means mere words among us." This family image of Saint Pierre probably originated in the Church. The doctrine of the Catholic Church, of course, is saturated with references to the holy family and the family of man. God is the Father of all men. Priests are called Fathers, friars Brothers, and nuns Sisters. All men are brothers, members of the same family. The Catholic Church especially emphasizes Mary not only as the mother of the Church but, symbolically, as the mother and protectress of us all. Time and again we see the Church deliberately encouraging a feeling of social wholeness. The intense devotion of the people of Saint Pierre to their church stems first from the religious traditions of their pays of origin in France: Brittany, Normandy, and the Basque country. But it stems also from the uncertainty of the life of a fisherman, and the degree to which death is ever present. A major festival is the Fête des Marins, the blessing of the boats. The present president of the Sailors' Welfare Society called this "the festival of the family." It is the day on which the Monsignor blesses the fishermen's boats, safeguarding the lives of the fishermen and the unity of their families against the danger of the sea. This danger provides another clue to the deep sense of family community. The closeness of the community is security against the ocean. When the sea takes the life of a husband or father, the island takes up responsibility for the family. In a farming community, this mutual aid is far less often called upon for such critical purposes; hence the network of communication it develops is not so highly elaborated. On Saint Pierre the system of aid works by way of the Church, for it is in full accord with the Church's principles. In the first years of the twentieth century, for example, the only sailors' association was the Société de Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours—a kind of fishermen's life insurance association, directly under the aegis of the Church.1 Another important reason for the strength of the family image comes

52 I Divided Island from the nature of island society, where a high degree of intermarriage occurs and, compared with noninsular communities, a small number of marriages with the outside. To this extent, Saint Pierre not only thought of itself as a family—it was a family. In addition, a family image was deliberately encouraged by the shipowners, who cultivated a personal sense of obligation on the part of their sailors and employees. We see this especially in the Morue Française, known colloquially as Mama (Mémé). These seigneurs of Saint Pierre helped people out when they needed it but expected community loyalty in return, or competed for community loyalty. The harmony of the society, in this image, is manifest in the relation between employer and employed. In the Vigie of December 21, 1903, the following statement appeared: Legasse says, affirms, and proves, that the worker and the capitalist cannot mutually aid each other unless marching hand in hand and always in agreement. Without workers, capital remains inactive, and the man living off stocks should be suppressed, because everyone should do something on this earth. Messrs. Delmont, Mazier, and Clement have funds. What do they do with them? The first takes his money and scrams. The others, rather than employ young men from Saint Pierre in their service, go and recruit their crews—captains, sailors, etc. —in France. There are your good Saint Pierrais! And what does that great criminal Louis Legasse do? He, son of a sailor, always in contact with the sailor and the worker (not only during electoral periods like his adversaries who try, but in vain, to make them believe that political swans are geese), he, Louis Legasse, has several schooners at Saint Pierre, favors and encourages the Saint Pierre element with all his power, and exerts himself on their behalf. The kind of paternalism fostered by Louis Legasse as part of the true Saint Pierre way is another aspect of the family ideal. The employers, when they do what they should, act as fathers to their employees.

Society as a Family | 53 The assumption that workers should vote for their employers in elections is part of the same ideal relationship. By extension, a political leader is a father to his constituents. In the same issue of Vigie, there is a printed conversation between Louis Legasse and a blacksmith. Legasse addresses him with the "tu" form; the blacksmith replies to "Monsieur Louis" with the formal "vous" form, a common and convenient way of combining deference with familiarity. The conversation, which is a prelude to a loan, begins: "Well now, P'ti Ouis, how is it going?" "I'm in a mess, Monsieur Louis." "What's that? But you're still a blacksmith, I believe?" "Too true, Monsieur Louis. By doing smithwork one becomes a smithy. You can see on my forehead the lines deepened by the continual effort of lifting the hammer." "C'est vrai, tu es un brave." Out of this familiar relationship evolves the general concept of worker and capitalist walking hand in hand. The contradiction between father and brother—between Louis Legasse emphasizing his closeness to the sailors and workers, referring to "P'ti Ouis" as his friend and yet addressing him like a child or subordinate—seems to have escaped the people of the time. If familial social cooperation was an ideal for the Saint Pierre elite, it appealed also to some of the fishermen. At least so it would seem from Legasse's formation of the Syndicat des Armateurs à la Grande et la Petite Pêche—the Shipowners' and Dorymen's Union— which had over four hundred members, most of them small fishermen.2 Today it is hard to imagine a more naive coalition: the idea of buyers and sellers in the same union seems contradictory. But such a coalition was in the Catholic tradition of corporatism, and on Saint Pierre it did not seem anomalous. There was virtually no union tradition, the closest approach being the sailors' benevolent association mentioned earlier. In 1905 Legasse had recruited an editor for Vigie from France. Alphonse Poirier-Bottreau, an energetic, idealistic young man, suggested a sailors' union (Vigie, May 21, 1905). The response was favorable. The next week (May 28, 1905) he printed a letter from a sailor which,

54 I Divided Island he said, was but one of many: "As you say yourself, it is not the revolution of the wages against capital that we want, but rather solidarity, a kind of easy brotherhood with Messrs. the shipowners." By establishing his mixed union, Legasse was competing with the Réveil-dominated Syndicat des Armateurs, the shipowners' union. He could make it look as if the Réveil group was haughtily disassociating itself from the workers since there were no small fishermen in the group. It is significant that Legasse's union was carefully tied to the Churchsponsored sailors' benevolent association. On his governing board of twelve men elected at the opening meeting were the presidents of the benevolent associations of Saint Pierre, Ile aux Marins, and Miquelon.3 According to Vigie, the wealthy members of a family society must continue to work for the general welfare. Cooperation may be the defining characteristic of the community, but work supports it. "The duty of the rich is to work and do some good. That is what Carnegie does with his fortune and his advice. If there were on Saint Pierre a Carnegie or a Cecil Rhodes and fewer Maziers, our colony would be more prosperous" (Vigie, September 8, 1905). But the poor must work also. Vigie ( May 4, 1905 ) quoted Montesquieu to the effect that "A man is poor, not because he has nothing, but because he does not work." Work is an essential value in the family ideology, for if there is no ethic of work, there would be too many people abusing the charity that the family must also offer. Why was the Morue Française called "Mémé" instead of "Papa" in the local mythology? The answer, again, goes back to the Church. The main intermediary of grace for Roman Catholics has traditionally been Mary, not Christ. It is to Mary that Saint Pierrais turn in time of danger and need; she is the source of succor. The Morue Française liked to see its role on the islands in a similar way. In this sense we should really speak of the company's "maternalism" instead of its paternalism. Legasse was able to take over the island's mythology lock, stock, and barrel. He and his allies appeared to outsiders and to his enemies as the beneficiaries of an untoward monopoly over conscience and commerce, but they could appear to most of the islanders as benevolent family figures. The status of the Morue Française as a family figure was ensured

Society as a Family | 55 by its close association with the Church: the Apostolic Prefect was a Legasse; the company contributed heavily to the rebuilding of the local church; in its fishermen's union it made sure of the endorsement of the Church-sponsored benevolent associations (which, incidentally, were also dedicated to the Virgin Mary). By these links to the source of the family tradition and by its image of benevolent economic power, the Morue Française had an honored place in the mythic Saint Pierre household. It was the member of the family that took care of the rest. One is not entirely certain that this stance was a calculated one. I went to visit Louis Legasse's son, Ferdinand, now a director of the Morue Française in Paris, and he repeated the same idea. I asked him what had been the effect of the Gaullist arrival in 1941. He started out by saying, "Before 1941 Saint Pierre was a quiet, happy family." It is possible that Louis Legasse was as caught up in the image as his son seemed to be. In any case he knew the people believed in it and wanted to believe in it. At its worst, such an ideology of family unity can become a fairly rigid rejection of any nonconformity. Such was not the case on Saint Pierre, at least in regard to personal defects. Everyone's faults were known and usually characterized in the system of sobriquets, but the very naming of the faults implied a certain toleration and personalization; virtually everyone of note had a nickname, and being named was in effect a partial admission into the community. The process of rejection rarely occurred on Saint Pierre as the result of personal nonconformity. If the high degree of toleration for idiosyncracy on presentday Saint Pierre is any indication, in 1900 life was not forcibly uncomfortable for those who were different. A process of rejection did occur, however, when persons were stigmatized as outsiders hostile to the values of the organic society in any way, politically or socially. Then any personal faults or differences were seized upon and played to the hilt. For instance, Saint Pierrais had and retain a phobia about being viewed as non-French natives, especially since their administrators have usually come to them straight from Africa. This has made them sensitive to the color question. When Aristide Delmont, a Negro, ran for Legasse's office in 1903, Vigie

56 I Divided Island posters played on the Negro theme in showing the "cakewalk," and the Vigie election issue (December 21, 1903) ran a grotesque and slanderous song against Delmont which began, "un sale negro rempli de culot né entre deux cocos." Oldtimers can still sing this song today from memory. Vigie repeatedly pinned the blame for social discord on Mazier and on his company's disregard for the island's organic solidarity. In the issue for December 21, 1903, Vigie charged that Mazier was "a firebrand of discord, sowing division in the pays." It revived this charge on the eve of Mazier's departure in 1907 with a note entitled, "He who sows the wind reaps a storm," an adage that recurs throughout Saint Pierre history. "Everyone knows that demonstrations and violence of all kinds were unknown on Saint Pierre before the appearance of Réveil, and that it was precisely his friend Delmont and Lagroseilliere who brought them into this pays, hitherto so peaceful."4 On October 23, 1910, Vigie brought up the idea again: "If the pays is divided, if there exist two well-defined parties on Saint Pierre, our adversaries must consider themselves responsible. If they have a good memory they will be able to recall that Réveil existed before Vigie, that Delmont and Lagroseilliere were their friends, that the defunct Action Laïque left very unhappy memories in this land." Those who threatened the system were punished with social isolation and rejection. Réveil (March 2, 1907) charged that it was being boycotted and mentioned sermons encouraging this: "And Father Foetus [sobriquet], with the authorization of M. l'Abbé Legasse, who was present, did he not say from the pulpit that one should have no relation with such persons and by this attitude force them to leave the country? This is what the clergy has done to encourage boycotting." The process of rejection itself could take the form of a fairly organized campaign to make a certain person (for instance, Mazier from 1905 on ) feel uncomfortable. On one notorious occasion Louis Lefevre assaulted Mazier in his store because Mazier had written an article impugning the administration of Lefevre's deceased father. Mazier was undoubtedly correct when he concluded: "These attacks, from which M. Mazier will recover in spite of his poor health, follow others. His adversaries wish at any price to make him disappear, and all

Society as a Family | 57 methods are employed to that purpose" (Réveil, September 7, 1907). As for Lagroseilliere, he had no choice but to leave the island as soon as possible after the attack on his home, for he had violated the dearest institution of the islanders. Usually rejection was peaceful, the person was not injured, and the process succeeded. Mazier left the island, as did Lagroseilliere and most of the other bitter opponents of Catholicism. Merely to oppose Legasse politically, however, like Gloanec and Dupont, was not enough to warrant rejection, especially since such men were islanders who in other respects shared the assumptions of the family creed. The doctrine of the Catholic Church places great emphasis upon the maintenance of the integrity of the family unit. By sanctifying marriage, encouraging childbearing, and condemning infidelity, illegitimacy, and remarriage after divorce, the Church actively works to hold the family together and consecrate it as a religious as well as a social unit. Following the analogy through, we can see that the societal equivalent to illegitimacy or infidelity would be revolution or social change. We might expect from this analogy that those who use the image of the society as a family would be those most opposed to change in the social status quo. The process of rejection goes on today and will be discussed in later chapters, for it is something of a constant in Saint Pierre history. On the one hand, Saint Pierre's tolerance of personal nonconformity is fairly great, perhaps due to the wide exposure of Saint Pierrais to foreigners, who come as sailors or tourists. On the other hand, any overt attempt to challenge the dominant values on the island is likely to result in the challenger's expulsion. The rejection of extreme elements from 1900 to 1910 resulted in a certain homogeneity in the society; after 1910 and until 1919 political controversy was restricted to questions of power and economy that took for granted the underlying concept of organic social and religious harmony. Whereas the Legasse-Vigie ideology was fairly cohesive and easy to formulate, the opposition ideology of Réveil comprised a jumble of different influences and traditions that had little in common, apart from opposition to Legasse. First, a large percentage of the opposition,

ζ8 I Divided Island especially in 1903 before anticlericalism had become an important issue, probably shared the values of the Legasse camp except for a dissatisfaction with the island economy, which they thought might be improved by changing the political representatives. Some of these people became Legassist as anticlericalism developed; others left the island in the wave of emigration. A second group, centered in the Chamber of Commerce, was again largely paternalistic in oudook and would have agreed with most of the family creed; their only disagreement was over who should be the head of the family. This group continued through 1920 and took over when Legasse gave up the fight. Its prototype would be Leonce Dupont, who more or less served as the island "father" during the 1930s. A third shade of opposition was slightly more radical and slightly more anti-Church—volent in opposition to Legasse and his monopoly, but not sharply anticlerical. Among these were Mazier and other members of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme. Their ideology was pluralist, although still basically paternalistic: there should be several families, not one big family. The last group, on the extreme left, included the anticlericals—French civil servants and lawyers, and a few Saint Pierrais dedicated to opposing the power of a single church as well as that of a single company. Represented by the Cercle d'Action Laïque and the Ligue Anti-Alcoolique, their leaders were dispersed or silenced by 1908. Although there have since been anticlericals on Saint Pierre, even anticlerical politicians, no one has tried anticlericalism as a political issue. Of these four types of opposition, only the last two—the Mazier group and the Cercle d'Action Laïque— had an ideology significantly different from that of the Legasse party. But it was precisely the presence of the last two types that occasioned the sharpness of the political division from 1902 to 1907. The less anticlerical Mazier led the frontal assault on the Legasse monopoly in Réveil. He characterized the Legasse party in terms which revealed the outlook of his group: "plutocratie," "les privilégiés," "le grand maître du trust boycotteur," "honteuse exploitation." His language expressed and aroused feeling against everything aristocratic. He imputed to Legasse desire for personal gain and consequent distance from the people. By implication Réveil represented the op-

Society as a Family | 59 posite impulses—selflessness, fair and free trade, a certain Jacobinism. Indeed Vigie (May 4, 1905) referred to the Mazierites as Jacobins, a pejorative word for conservative Saint Pierre. In Réveil Mazier took account of the communal feeling on Saint Pierre and attempted to demonstrate that Legasse did not share it: "Usually when there have been misfortunes in the land, be they small or great, adversaries have joined forces in the effort to save as much as possible from the wreckage. M. Legasse is not, nor can he be, possessed of such unselfish sentiments; they are above his personal egotism. His dominant feeling would be, rather, to precipitate the catastrophe if, in the general ruin, he could continue to construct his fortune, while adding to the number of those unfortunates, his mercenaries" (July 6, 1907). Réveil put as much effort into tearing down Legasse's family role as Legasse spent in dismissing that of Réveil: "Look at those people who call themselves democrats and socialists in order to wring the necks of poor devils" (Réveil, April 13, 1907). But although Réveil frequently attempted to capitalize on the communal spirit, such a stance was doomed to failure. For the journal primarily stood for individualism and independence of mind. It represented a belief in the virtues of heterogeneity as opposed to Vigie's emphasis upon homogeneity. Overdramatizing the opposition's ideology, Vigie called them anarchists. This attribution, based on the ideal of an ordered and balanced paternal society, was not surprising. Réveil stood for individualism as against the corporatism of the Morue Française, and independence of mind as against an ideal of a society built on consensus. The Cercle d'Action Laïque, comprising as it did members of French anticlerical associations, had its true roots in France rather than on Saint Pierre. Calling themselves "Républicain à la Gambetta," and corresponding with socialist and radical newspapers in France, they were indeed much closer to "modern" French ideas than the Legasse group was. By 1904 it was clear in France that the Dreyfus case would be a triumph for those working against the Right. The Combes Ministry of 1906 was the most anticlerical government of the Third Republic. The Saint Pierre radicals felt that they had found on the island a perfect example of the kind of retrograde society that the forces for

6o I Divided Island modernism were trying to correct in France, and they felt the support of their French friends behind them. At one point, after suffering a crushing electoral defeat, the Saint Pierre anticlericals published a defiant statement in Réveil announcing that they were really in the majority, since most of the French people were also opposed to the religious orders: "We, the hundred-odd members of Action Laïque, so graciously referred to as fanatics by the sorry gentleman named Rocher [Abbé Rocher], we consider and are confident of demonstrating that we are the true majority, in perfect accord with the ideas of nine tenths of Frenchmen, who were able to rid themselves of these people whom you [Vigie] support" (Réveil, January 12, 1907). The newspapers Action Laïque and Réveil both used rhetoric similar to that of the abolitionists in the United States prior to the Civil War. On Saint Pierre they saw their mission as the freeing of a people oppressed by the bonds of religious and economic slavery. Another analogy is to the prohibitionists active at the very time in the United States. It is not coincidental that the same people were also members of the Ligue Anti-Alcoolique. The abolitionists, the prohibitionists, and the Saint Pierre radicals were all true believers. They were trying to change a society through values conceived outside of the society they were trying to change. The idea of Saint Pierre as a family followed from Saint Pierre's size, compactness, isolation; from its century of patron-client fisherman relations; from centuries of religious tradition on Saint Pierre and in France. This was an underlying assumption rather than a battle cry. It had support, and an advantage over the new ideas of the radicals, as long as the conditions that brought it into being did not change. The attempts of islanders and outsiders to bring new ideologies to Saint Pierre succeed only if conditions on the islands change in ways that make the islanders receptive. From 1903 to 1907 the island's decline did not necessarily make the Saint Pierrais more receptive to new ideas. Although the volume of fishing declined, the structures of merchant-fisherman relations remained; indeed, they were consolidated. Hence in 1903-1907, as in 1793, revolution made little headway on Saint Pierre. In 1919-1920 the family creed was directly challenged as never

Society as a Family | 61 before. Whereas the previous opposition was part of the struggle for leadership of the family, or for the existence of several companydominated families, the doryman-civil servant coalition of 1919 attacked the economic link that held the family together—the economic dependence of the fisherman on the merchant. The proponents of the family creed approached this new problem gingerly, for on the face of it the very fact of a class-based movement would seem to contradict their view of Saint Pierre. Although the campaign of the dorymen in 1919 was directed explicitly against the merchants and their political representatives, the attitude of the [/raon-supported candidates was somewhat more circumspect, apparently in the hope that the allegiance of the fishermen was only temporarily alienated from the ideal of the organic society. I said earlier that the usual reaction of the proponents of the organic society to those who questioned their basic tenets was stigmatization as an outsider and expulsion, as in the case of Lagroseilliere. But clearly it would be impossible to stigmatize and reject all of the fishermen, who provided the livelihood of the island. Hence the Union, at its most extreme, directed ridicule only at the leaders of the movement (referring to Georges Daguerre, a veteran who received the Communist l'Humanité from France, as "Camarade Daguerre," for instance). Its invective was reserved for Administrator Lachat and a liberal merchant, Leban. The Union candidates were careful to reiterate their friendship for the fishermen during the campaign, as did Dupont in an open letter to the administrator close to the election. He restated the old organic theme of the Morue Française and used the old Vigie tactic of ascribing trouble to outsiders (Administrator Lachat himself). "These fishermen, the very ones you are using to further your own purposes, are worthy fellows; from father to son they work at their trade in good relations with the shopkeepers, who are themselves for the most part sons of fishermen or workers. To put an end to this fine union, you had to come and sow disorder in the land." Dupont ended the letter in the same vein, seeking to draw his readers together in common resentment against an irresponsible meddler who did not understand the ways of Saint Pierre: "Whatever happens, all of us who

62 I Divided Island are Saint Pierrais by birth and by heart, fishermen, workers, or businessmen, will still be here on our barren isle when you are far away forgetting those whom you make a pretense of protecting in order to draw personal profit, and leaving behind you the unhappy memory of a man who betrayed everyone."5 After the Union candidates lost the Town Council election of 1919, clearly they could no longer avoid the conclusion that there was an internal as well as an external threat. Even if, as the-old line would have it, the election had been stirred up by the outsiders, a majority of the voters had supported the outsiders against the self-proclaimed heads of the family society. A long postmortem published in the Union (January 17, 1920) is therefore a rich source for understanding the public image the merchants wished to project and the fears aroused in them by the election results. In addition to more blame heaped on Lachat and Leban, the article contained a controlled threat addressed to the fishermen themselves, unsheathing the merchants' ultimate weapon—withdrawal of credit. Those who mobilized the fishermen for a battle against commerce have taken grave responsibilities. Up until now the elections on Saint Pierre, of which many were violent, nevertheless had only personalities in opposition. Legassists and Anti-Legassists, Baleinards and Anti-Baleinards, etc.; it is this time a question of a class struggle, and those who provoked it are all the more responsible in that they could foresee in advance the consequences. That is called Bolshevism, whether one admits it or not! The election of December was not made on the basis of names, it was made to the cries of "War against Commerce! War against Capital!" The whole theory of Bolshevism is resumed in these few words. The dorymen have forgotten the past; so be it. But are they sure of the future? Are they even sure of the present? Are there not many among them still in need of credit? Haven't we just seen an "independent" candidate declare that

Society as a Family | 63 he could not pay for the bread he ate on credit during the year? In autumn of 1919, when the wind of revolt was blowing among the fishermen, the storekeepers of the colony laid out about a million francs in a year's advances to these same fishermen. The weather is hard, the winter is severe, and work is hard to find. There are still many fishermen who can rest in peace by their hearth, well lodged, well fed, with even a few solid defense notes or stocks in the corner of their chest; but there remain enough of the others that have lived for several months from day to day deprived. They will have to hold out, moreover, until the return of spring; they will then have to equip themselves for fishing, on credit: salt, gasoline, and food. And whom will they be able to ask for this credit, if not that naive shopkeeper who has been charitable so many times. Cooperatives are fine, but you must pay cash there, and that's only good for the privileged ones who have it! In the old days, shopkeepers and fishermen had confidence in one another; the shopkeeper did all he could for his clientele, and his clientele were sometimes grateful. It was not always without trouble, but things always worked out. Today the situation has changed. Unfortunate words have been spoken by thefishermen;their demonstration has been public and nearly unanimous. The shopkeepers cannot have confidence, and it is to be feared that they will limit themselves strictly to their position, goods for cash, nothing more. That is the work of those who through personal ambition, greed, or desire for revenge have put thefishermenup to an indefensible struggle. They have taken grave responsibilities. In the Union article many of the unspoken premises that structured relations between merchant and fisherman emerged into the open. Implicit in the analysis of past relations ("in the old days") is the idea that because fishermen depend upon the merchants for credit, they

64 I Divided Island should leave political power on the islands in the merchants' hands ("be grateful")—that political subordination not only logically but morally follows from economic subordination. The implication throughout the article is that by their "indefensible struggle" the fishermen have violated an unspoken rule, and for this they must be prepared to suffer the condign consequences. The irony is that the journalist uses the word "charitable" to describe the shopkeepers. It is a measure of power of the old ideal of organic society that the article refused to place primary responsibility on the fisherman, but reserved it for Lachat and Leban. It is as if the writer refused to admit that Saint Pierre fishermen by themselves were capable of taking such action. By putting forward the Leban-Lachat conspiracy theory, the article attempted to interpret the movement in terms of the old-style paternalist relations, even though it explicitly stated that the election of 19x9 was a break with the past. The election was indeed a break with the past; the population was faced with a choice of two different levels of the occupational hierarchy, rather than with two competing groups on the same level. The great emphasis on credit in the Union article was not without reason, for credit was the binding force between shopkeeper and fisherman. The whole ideal of the organic society seemed to lose its appeal quite rapidly for the fishermen when they were presented with an appealing and seemingly economically feasible alternative—government-sponsored group solidarity. It is noteworthy that the Union article accused the opposition of Bolshevism, in contrast to Vigie, which called the Mazierites anarchists. Anarchism and Bolshevism are convenient terms for two different violations of the family creed. Anarchism in Vigie's world stood for the substitution of many patron-client families for the one big family run by the Morue Française. Bolshevism was Union's term for new group solidarity structured horizontally rather than vertically. The very coalition of the Legassists and the remaining "anarchists" against the "Bolshevists" showed that the cooperative movement represented a much more important breach of the family society than did the existence of a commercial and political competition. For while a commer-

Society as a Family | 65 cial competition cut down on the profits, the cooperative movement challenged both the structure and the philosophy of the whole enterprise. Even if, for reasons of ineptitude, the fishermen's movement came to a quick stop, an alternative to the old paradigm of the family society had been offered, and this breach widened into a chasm by 1941.

4 Saint Pierre Between the Wars

The internar years on Saint Pierre began with an intoxicating decade of rum-running prosperity and ended with a disastrous depression. The prosperity brought with it social harmony; the depression brought discord. Both administration and merchants were blamed for the decline, and local frustration found outlets in the antiadministration riot of 1933, in extensive union organizing, and finally in the Gaullist coup of 1941. The coming of prosperity probably help to block the fishermen's movement of 1919. During Prohibition in the United States, the merchants on Saint Pierre were demonstrably bringing prosperity to the island, instead of living off the dorymen. The leaders of the fishermen's movement remained conspicuous political figures, but the merchants, led by Leonce Dupont, were securely in control from 1924 until 1931. Smuggling from Saint Pierre had been going on since 1816, mainly to Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence basin, but it was not until the Volstead Act was signed in the United States in 1919 that Saint Pierre gained the possibility of an important rum-running business. Encouraged by low customs duties, American and Canadian dealers began to use Saint Pierre as a base for operations in 1922. Saint Pierre businessmen served as agents for cartels that sent millions of crates of alcohol to Saint Pierre for transhipment. Several warehouses were constructed, and the ill-fated freezing plant was converted for storing whiskey.1 From Saint Pierre boats took the liquor to Massachusetts Bay, "rum row" off Long Island Sound, and Chesapeake Bay.2 Although few of the boats or the crew members running rum to the United States were from Saint Pierre, Saint Pierrais were active in smuggling high-grade liquor to Canada at this time. The prospering liquor trade flourished until 1933, when the Volstead Act was repealed in the

66

Between the Wars | 67 United States. Thereafter it continued at a very diminished rate, concentrating on Holland gin. Saint Pierrais today look back on the era with nostalgia, for the whole economy prospered as never before. The rum-runner crews from the forty boats that were said to work out of Saint Pierre stayed in local hotels and spent their money freely. (It was about such a crew member and his love for a Saint Pierre girl that Damon Runyon wrote his story, "The Lily of Saint Pierre.") Truckers were busy, and stores and warehouses were full. Construction alone employed about one hundred and fifty men.3 Ship repairers and ships' chandlers flourished. The colony was no longer in a slump. Even the Church profited. American gangsters visiting in 1922 (one an Irishman, another a Jew) contributed $16,000 for the building of the present Catholic girls' school, the Ecole Sainte Croisine.4 The profits to the administration from the commerce were enormous. Total government receipts, mainly from customs, increased twelvefold from 1921 to 1930. In 1923, for thefirsttime since 1900, the administration was able to balance its budget without aid from France. Much of the surplus was spent on improving harbor facilities and roads, but according to two separate observers who visited the islands at the time, some islanders were convinced that the government was wasting island money for the benefit of French fishing interests. The temporary prosperity had several long-term consequences, not all of them positive. Perhaps the most important negative result was that a number of dorymen left their trade for stevedoring and carpentry, and a number of their sons never took up fishing as a trade. The number of active dories fell from 290 in 1920 to 163 in 1931. The depopulation of Ile aux Marins began at this time for the same reason —there were more jobs on Saint Pierre. Some Saint Pierre men became very wealthy, notably those primarily involved in the import-export business.5 The standard of living as a whole improved dramatically. People began to have many of the household comforts that still set them above the average household in France or above their Newfoundland neighbors. Saint Pierrais would no longer put up with some of the inconveniences that they had been subject to before. When the depression did come to Saint Pierre, their relative deprivation was

68 I Divided Island greater than it would have been had the period of intense prosperity not occurred.® The falling off of rum running in 1933 precipitated a political and social crisis on the islands. The Saint Pierrais were disgruntled with government expenditures for public works, fearful at the prospect of the end of prohibition, and unhappy over a proposed tax increase. Their frustration found its outlet in public demonstrations against administration officials who were known to be powerful and who were suspected of favoritism and financial irregularities. To compensate for the drastic decline in customs revenue, Administrator Georges Barrillot made cuts in government expenditures during the spring of 1933, and even decreased the salaries of all civil servants.7 In preparing the budget for the coming year, he found that a rise in taxes would be necessary. The Administrative Council, notably represented by Leonce Dupont, made it clear to him that it would be unwilling to approve new taxes. Four days after the presentation of the budget, on the evening of August 21, about two hundred demonstrators met at the Town Hall and went to demonstrate in front of the administration building, jeering civil servants who happened to live along the way. After demonstrating for about half an hour on the grounds of the administration building, they dispersed. Several, however, called out to Administrator Barrillot: "We will return, and if you don't make Vogt, Schmitz, and the ear-piercer (the veterinarian, LeBolloch) leave before Saturday, we will make them leave by force, and you along with them." The next morning Schmitz, who was the public prosecutor, imprisoned four men who had been out on parole and had played an active part in the demonstrations. The population again assembled to demonstrate these arrests, convinced that they were arbitrary and politically motivated. As Barrillot himself said in his subsequent report: "The truth is that on Saint Pierre, the slightest police action which elsewhere would pass unnoticed is likely to have unexpected or unlikely consequences, given the very special mentality of the majority of the population and the extreme sensitivity of the colonists." Late that evening a crowd of some two hundred and fifty persons made their way to the prison and, in spite of warnings from both

Between the Wars | 69 Barrillot and Prosecutor Schmitz, battered down the prison doors and freed the four prisoners. The administration did not have enough policemen to prevent them. After freeing the prisoners the crowd went to Schmitz's house, close on the heels of Schmitz himself, who wanted to get there before they did. In front of his house they sang the "Marseillaise" and the "Internationale" and then dispersed. The administrator called for reinforcements, and on August 24 a French warship, the Encastreaux, arrived. For fear of violence, the marines were not allowed off the ship. On August 26 the island packet brought a businessman back from Miquelon who was under arrest for smuggling. Again the population protested, massed in front of the prison, and were cleared away only after reinforcements were finally landed from the naval vessel. Trials were held on August 30 and 31 under guard of troops. The resentment of the population in the first demonstration was directed against several specific persons. M. Vogt, an engineer in charge of public works, was the most notable among them. He had been criticized for wasting public money derived from liquor revenues on poorly designed and badly executed projects. According to Barrillot's analysis, the riots were stirred by contractors unhappy with a new system of standardized fees for government projects that Vogt had instituted: "The contractors never forgave M. Vogt for thwarting their continued pillage of the colony's finances . . . Hatred mounted against the man responsible for their defeat. The brutal economic crisis of that year (1933), the total absence of public works for the next year, the necessity, which they foresaw, of renouncing the contractor's profession which had been so fruitful under such unusual circumstances, quite naturally led them to constitute an active core of agitators, covertly encouraged by big business (M. Dupont at the head). They had no trouble attracting a following from the mass of workers and individuals without precise profession: laborers, truckers, etc."8 Barrillot's analysis of the causes of the demonstrations is tainted by the assumption that the workers blindly followed their employers without having any grievances of their own. In this way he is a little like the Union writer who analyzed the 1919 election; both prefer a theory of conspiracy to the possibility that the mass of the population had a

γο I Divided Island real animosity. It is in the administrator's interest to show that he did not have the whole island against him, that it was agitators who were responsible. But it is more probable that the riots expressed a discontent more general than the grievances of a few disgruntled contractors. Some Saint Pierrais today well recall the demonstration; it was a high point in a long tradition of action against the administration. Their recollections support the basic facts of Barrillot's analysis: one of the three leaders they mention was indeed a carpenter who had five or six employees, and another was one of his employees, but they point out that the riots should be seen in the context of an oncoming depression that was expected to affect the whole economy, and also as part of a general tradition of antimetropolitanism. All this makes sense. After all, if Barrillot's facts about the building trades are correct, 140 artisans and workmen, as well as the ten contractors, were liable to lose their jobs. And it was not only the building trade that was in trouble in 1933. Everyone involved in the smuggling business knew that time was running out and that they, as well as their employers, would be hit by the new taxes. A case in point is the third leader of the demonstrations—a Saint Pierrais employed as a radio telegraphist on a smuggling boat. That the business community fomented the riots was less than likely; they were not the only ones who had cause for dissatisfaction. A genuine island consensus against the administration, as on the school question of 1909, seems to have been reached—this time the product of anxiety as well as frustration. An inspector from France arrived in 1934 to assess the situation of the islands. Two things were clear to Inspector Mérat: the island could not support all its citizens; and certain persons were stirring up the population. Part of his solution was selective emigration. Some Saint Pierrais prominent in antigovernment actions were induced to emigrate to France and were offered free passage. Many of the 150 Newfoundlanders who had come to the island to work at the height of the prohibition prosperity were sent back. All together, between one and two hundred people left the island in one way or another.9 But there was no mass emigration to help the island as it had in 1904. Canada and the United States had tightened immigration requirements, and France was too expensive to reach.

Between the Wars | γι The Barrillot demonstration came at a time not so much of economic crisis as of anticipated economic crisis; in this it was closely paralleled by the events of 1941. But as the economic crisis became not merely potential but real, the Saint Pierrais' sense of insecurity and dissatisfaction began to strain the already tenuous social harmony of the islands. As long as there was prosperity in all major sectors of the economy, Dupont was able to hold the parties together. His main tactic was to unite the islanders in resentment over government policies; it could suceed because their real grievances were slight. The repeal of the Volstead Act in 1933 by the United States Congress left the island even more out of kilter than it was in 1919. The Great Depression hit Saint Pierre with full force. Income from dory fishing was at an all-time low, and there were no jobs for the workers. For these reasons government unemployment projects, almost exclusively road building, began in 1933 on a large scale. In the first year of the projects 428 workers were employed on Saint Pierre alone, 50 on lie aux Marins, and 97 on Miquelon. Of these workers, 98 on Saint Pierre and all those from the other two islands were fishermen who needed support during the winter.10 The long-term sources of the Gaullist-anti-Gaullist dispute can be traced back through the antiadministration agitation, to the social movement of 1919, and finally to the denial of the organic society that Réveil stood for. The short-term cause was the depression that began in 1933. It was during the depression that union activity began again, partially stimulated by government intiatives. Through different means the gap between fishermen and merchants was again widened, and increased antagonism was also focused on the administration as its economic and social power on the island increased. The culmination of these two trends was the eventual overthrow of the Bournat administration in 1941. A consultative Fishermen's Committee had been set up in 1930 by Barrillot's predecessor, and although only about half of the dorymen bothered to vote in the elections, Barrillot had regularly consulted the elected president of the committee, Pierre Frioult. It was the idea of Barrillot's officer of maritime affairs to establish a chapter of Crédit Maritime on the islands, but in order to be eligible for membership

72 I Divided Island in Crédit Maritime, as the statutes stood in France, one had to be a member of a fishermen's union or cooperative. Hence the first step was the founding of a union, the Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs de Saint Pierre et de l'Ile aux Marins, whose head was (and remains) Pierre Frioult. The union was formed on December 10, 1932, with ninety-five fishermen, equally divided between the two communes.11 From the start, then, this union was a "government" union. It could not be said that its mild president was strongly against the fishing companies, but it seems that a number of fishermen joined the union for the possibility that it offered of more effective bargaining power. Many of the more militant fishermen of the old 1919 union joined Frioult's group. Leonce Dupont, faced with the new union, formed his own group of dorymen in 1933, the Syndicat des Pêcheurs des Trois Iles. In 1937, the only date for which exact information is available, there were forty-five members, but by 1942 it no longer existed. It was apparently a company union, and its president, Joseph Grignon, was the fireman at Dupont's drying house. Similarly, five days before Frioult formed his union on Saint Pierre, Pierre Andrieux, a major buyer of fish, had formed a company union on Miquelon, the Syndicat des Pêcheurs de Miquelon.12 In December 1932 Crédit Maritime was organized by the administration. Its goal was similar to that of the ill-fated cooperative of 1919: to free the fishermen from the burden of credit purchasing from merchants; or, to put it a way many Saint Pierrais would prefer, to free the merchants from the burden of heavy advances to fishermen. Established in France long before, Crédit Maritime lent money to its members on guarantees at 2 percent interest per annum, deposited funds for its members, paid and recovered money for them without charge, and invested the capital of the society.13 Administrator Barrillot, as he mentioned in reference to Inspector Mérat's report, was concerned with what he considered to be exploitation of fishermen by the intermediaries: "The study of Inspector Mérat emphasizes the profound depression on fishing on the islands, the extremely low prices, and the immoderate profits of the middlemen . . . I think the best way to obtain fairer prices is either to encourage

Between the Wars | 73 competition (foreign buyers) or to develop the fishermen's organizations (possibilities of direct sale by the fishermen and transport of their products through Crédit Maritime)."14 There is evidence that some dorymen shared Barrillot's mistrust of the fish merchants. Part of the resentment seems to have been an almost inevitable result of the economic system; a yearly conviction that they had been "taken" can be partly explained by a sense of powerlessness in the face of a world market over which they exercised no control. In addition to resentment against intermediaries, there was considerable resentment toward the Morue Française and other companies with trawler fleets based in France. These companies represented competition, not only for the cod market but also for the favor of the Colonial Ministry and the Saint Pierre administration.15 From 1930 on, Morue Française ships began coming less and less to the islands. The company still employed some 150 persons in peak moments of fish transshipment, but its place in the island economy became smaller and smaller at a time when the island desperately needed jobs. In an article summing up the history of relations between companies and fishermen, a union organizer in 1942 explained why he and many of the dorymen were convinced that the large companies like the Morue Française were hostile to dory fishing: "Our dory fishing is a thorn in their side because it is a seed out of which a competing industry could grow. Hence they are doing all they can to prevent this last source of economic revival from organizing efficiently."16 Although less antagonistic than the organizer quoted above, the Frioult union did bring a definite change in buyer-fishermen relations. From 1933 to 1937 it held negotiations to make sure that a fair price was obtained from local buyers. Barrillot's idea bore more fruit in 1937. The union then carried out washing and drying operations itself at a municipal drying house that the government helped to establish in the town of Saint Pierre. The fish was then marketed directly to Martinique and, as Barrillot had hoped, bypassed local middlemen. The fishermen, however, were by no means the lowest rung on the occupational ladder. The prohibition era left a new group of manual laborers, over three hundred on Saint Pierre alone, who at best could

74 I Divided Island find part-time jobs as dockers but who more often were to be found in the government work projects. Perhaps even more significant than the establishment of fishermen's organizations was the founding in 1935 of the stevedores' union by Leonce Claireaux and an influential lawyer and teacher, Georges Lefevre. 17 The fishermen may have been discontented, but they were unused to group action and difficult to assemble. Claireaux's union was formed of the most volatile element of the population, and was the most social-welfare-oriented and potentially antiadministration organization on Saint Pierre.18 The unrest manifest in the Barrillot incidents continued and began to have political repercussions. Hitherto the population had elected one or two of the old 1919 Planté list to the Town Council. For instance, in the Town Council elected in 1929 three members, François Planté and two carpenters, were of the anticommercial group. In the election of 1935, the last to be held before the dissolution of the commune, Planté was not elected, but two new members were: Georges Daguerre, a lighthouse keeper active in the 1919 movement, and Edouard Laborde, a commercial employee. In a yearly report on local political attitudes that he had to make to the Colonial Ministry, Barrillot singled out the anticommercial group as more extreme than the other members.19 The Administrative Council had remained solidly commercial and included three employees of the Morue Française, Leonce Dupont, and two representatives of the Northern Export liquor interests. But even this changed. In 1935 Laborde was elected, and in 1936 Leonce Claireaux, the founder and president of the stevedores' union, was also elected. In 1939 Dupont himself was defeated and a third member of the opposition slate joined the council. Barrillot was transferred in 1936, and Gilbert de Bournat had the misfortune to be administrator of Saint Pierre from 1936 to 1942. The son of a cavalry officer at Saumur, Bournat was upright and authoritarian in character. As administrator he utilized all the powers at his command and had the courage to brave public displeasure when necessary. Commenting recently on charges that he had been a dictator, Bournat said, "In a way it's true. During the war I could govern more or less as I saw fit; but in that sense every colonial governor is

Between the Wars | 75 a dictator."20 In this author's opinion, Bournat made the mistake of identifying himself too much with the commercial portion of the population, particularly with the knot of Morue Française merchants. He earned the enmity of Henri Claireaux, the brother of Leonce and a leader in the union movement, by sending him with ten other persons requested by France for conscription in 1939. Claireaux thinks it was because he was a syndicalist and low man on the Administrative Council and that, when he left, Dupont would then get his seat back. Bournat denies the allegation, but it is evident that even before the Armistice of 1940 he was suspected by the workers andfishermenof favoring the party of commerce. Moreover, Bournat continued his predecessor's unemployment program with an unpopular road-building project in the summer of 1938 on Langlade, the largest and least populated island of the archipelago. Bournat's road was intended to link the eastern farming settlement with the lighthouse complex at Pointe Plate on the west by traversing about eight miles of hill and swamp. From 1938 to 1941 workers had to be sent over from Saint Pierre and put in tents during the spring and summer. They complained of the unimportance of their task, low pay, poor food, inadequate shelter, and separation from their wives and children. Today it is said that the road to Pointe Plate was one of the major sources of the workers' disaffection with the old regime. Furthermore, since some of the food supplies sent over by the merchant Dominique Borotra were bad, the workers identified Bournat with Borotra and the whole clan of Morue Française commercial "exploiters." Before 1920 the credit offered by merchant to fishermen served as a guarantee against social conflict. The interwar period saw a transformation of the relationship of buyer tofishermen.The institution of Crédit Maritime and the energeticfishermen'sorganizations greatly reduced the necessity for store credit. Beginning in 1933 the government was replacing the storekeepers' "advances" by keeping men busy during the winter on public works projects. The result was a good deal more independence from the merchants. The government had wisely encouraged the unions and, to this extent, neutralized the possible

γ6 I Divided Island political repercussions of the fishermen's discontent. But it was no longer exclusively the fishermen who represented "the danger on the left," but also the relatively new group of dockers, laborers, and unemployed left over from the prohibition prosperity. The antagonism of the dorymen was directly largely against the intermediaries and the large companies rather than against the administration. The antagonism of the workers was against the government, their "employer." But the two antagonisms were to a certain extent shared, because about a third of the fishermen were workers in the winter, and most of the semipermanent workers were sons of fishermen. The administration was blamed for the colony's economic situation because it had spent the colony's surplus on harbor improvements which gave little dividend to the colony but more to the trawler companies, and because it had curtailed the smuggling trade over the previous years. Hostile workers and fishermen linked the Bournat government and the large fishing companies, especially the Morue Française, and assumed there was collusion between the two. The idea of a government-commercial clique was never far from the Saint Pierrais' minds, and easily fabricated tales of government-approved currency speculations and commercial profiteering on public works projects encouraged the growth of a conspiracy theory similar to that which Réveil propagated about Legasse and the colonial administration in the first years of the century.21

5 The Coming of the Free French

The "Drôle de Guerre" of 1939-1940 occurred on Saint Pierre as well as in France. A bizarre incident set the tone for the first strange year of the war. On September 6, 1939, the Astrid, a smuggling boat that belonged to Henri Morazé, was requisitioned and its crew of four mobilized.1 A tragedy occurred the next evening when both the Astrid and a French naval fisheries patrol boat, the Ville d'Ys, were searching the waters off Saint Pierre for a German submarine. The Ville dys opened fire on the Astrid by mistake, killing her Canadian mechanic.2 The island's responsibilities to the nation were far from clear, and the extent to which the nation would call upon the colony to fulfill them was similarly uncertain. According to a dispensation of 1816, the islanders were exempt from military service. However, a contrary precedent had been set by the conscription of Saint Pierrais in World War I. Even admitting the nation's right to call for the aid of the colonists in the war, the five hundred men Saint Pierre would be able to furnish might not be worth the effort and expense that mobilization and transportation would entail. Soon after the declaration of war, eleven Frenchmen on the island due for military service were dispatched to France. Four of them, including the schoolteacher, Henri Claireaux, were immediately returned home because of their Saint Pierre status. On October 18, 1939, all twenty-two- and twenty-threeyear-olds, a total of sixty-nine men, were called up and given military training of a most rudimentary sort on Saint Pierre. Weapons were not available. On the orders of the Ministry of Colonies, some of them were demobilized in December, and the rest in February 1940.3 Aside from censorship of mail, life on Saint Pierre went on as before. As the year progressed and France was rapidly overrun, the population of Saint Pierre naturally became disturbed. On June 13 Mon77

γ8 I Divided Island signor Poisson visited Bournat and reproached him for not doing anything to maintain island morale. Four days later Bournat issued a proclamation urging Saint Pierre to keep "an unshakable faith in the victory of the Allies." The Armistice was proclaimed in France on June 23, 1940. Shortly before that, on June 18, 1940, General de Gaulle made his famous radio appeal and launched the movement that was to bring him to power four years later. By the day of the Armistice, all on Saint Pierre knew that they were faced with a choice of allegiance. On the day the Armistice was declared, Administrator Bournat went to Monsignor Poisson and suggested sending a telegram to President Lebrun asking that the war be continued. Poisson agreed, and Bournat successively contacted Emile Gloanec, former mayor and senior member of the Administrative Council; Leonce Dupont, head of the Chamber of Commerce; and François le Buf, head of the War Veterans. A meeting was held in the evening to draft the telegram. The first hint that Saint Pierrais were interested in de Gaulle was that some of them wanted to mention his name in the telegram. Bournat put that suggestion aside, and the telegram was sent at 11:00 P.M.3 The recognition of the Vichy government of France by the United States and Canada influenced both Admiral Robert in the Caribbean and Gilbert de Bournat on Saint Pierre to continue to follow orders from France after the Armistice. However, Bournat did toy with alternatives, including the notion of joint French-United States sovereignty over Saint Pierre, and he seems to have waited before fully committing himself to Vichy. In the four months that followed the Armistice he made two trips to Washington to arrange for the provisioning of the islands, now cut off from the direct aid of the home government. The Americans were sympathetic to his plight and allowed him to utilize Vichy funds blocked in the United States. In return for Bournat's assurances of neutrality, the United States undertook to safeguard the islands against any attack. The Newfoundland government and some elements in the Canadian government were anxious about the presence of the Vichy colony on Saint Pierre, fearful of what might happen should the Germans be able to make use of Saint Pierre's resources and radio equipment.4

The Coming of the Free French | 79 Indeed, Newfoundland officials seized upon the alternative of a Free French administration of the islands almost immediately after the Armistice, and suggested the possibility to Bournat.5 In order to understand Bournat's initial rejection of this proposal, one must remember that in 1940 the Free French were not recognized by any nation as the legitimate government or government-in-exile of France. In 1940 it was still by no means clear that the government of Pétain was unpatriotic or morally bankrupt. By the time the French government's policy of collaboration with the Germans had been formulated in the spring of 1941, Bournat had Washington's assurance of support, and he saw little advantage to be gained for the islands by turning in another direction. If Bournat seemed to hesitate in the first few months, his hand was partially forced by the arrival of France's fishing fleets from the Grand Banks. Between June 29 and July 16 thirteen trawlers made their way to the safety of Saint Pierre. Between August 4 and September 3 an additional fifteen sailing schooners of the old style, the last of France's schooner fleet, came into the harbor. The sailors from these boats (but in general not their officers) were strong partisans of de Gaulle, and it was with them that Bournat had his first trouble. Their presence on Saint Pierre during the summer of 1941 was an important cause of unrest. The sailors' first Gaullist demonstration took place on September 8. Police Adjutant Raymond found that the Café Français was serving rum to the sailors from the fishing boats, contrary to a local ordinance. There were about sixty sailors in the cafe, and a brawl ensued, rife with cries of "Vive de Gaulle!" Order was restored by a patrol from the Ville dYs, but the arrest of some of the sailors for what could easily be taken to be political reasons provoked a demonstration of four hundred to five hundred persons in front of the gendarmerie, again with cries of "Vive de Gaulle!"® In the same week the first of a series of Gaullist tracts came out, and on September 14 the War Veterans held a meeting and voted that a resolution be sent to the General himself: "The War Veterans of Saint Pierre, confident in the eventual victory of General de Gaulle and of his army, fighting alongside the British Army for the liberty

8o I Divided Island of France and of the world, sends them the expression of their profound admiration and gratitude, and the hope that by their fighting they will soon liberate French soil. Vive la France! Vive l'Empire Britannique! Vive de Gaulle!" The head of the War Veterans asked Bournat for permission to post this telegram on the town notice board. Bournat refused, objecting especially to one word (presumably "liberate"). As a result, the veterans' distrust of Bournat deepened. On the next day, when the Ville Í T Y S uncovered its guns in response to a low overflight by Canadian reconnaissance planes, about four or five hundred persons, mostly sailors from the French fishing vessels, demonstrated on the quay against the presence of the Ville d'Ys and for the Free French. A major factor in public enthusiasm was a personal message from General de Gaulle brought by a Newfoundland government delegation to the War Veterans.7 Agitation continued. Bournat left on September 28 for his second trip to Washington to negotiate with the American government, and in his absence the police had another nocturnal encounter with the Gaullist sailors. This time (October 5 ) they were trying to break in the doors of the home of a tavernkeeper. The police arrived and broke up the attempt, but not without having to listen to exuberant cries of "Vive de Gaulle!" After his return from Washington, Bournat's differences with the War Veterans came to a head. Hearing of a meeting called for October 24 in which the veterans planned to vote on a motion that a plebiscite be taken on joining the Free French, Bournat asked permission, as a fellow veteran, to attend the meeting and to address it. The head of the association replied that the War Veterans would be honored by his presence. In a long two-hour speech, Bournat gave his reasons for not supporting de Gaulle, emphasizing his accord with the American government. By demanding beforehand the names of the authors of a Gaullist tract, however, he had alienated much of his audience. The veterans met again two days later without the governor present and voted in favor of a plebiscite, ninety-four in favor, five blank, five opposed.8 At the previous meeting of the War Veterans, Bournat had heard charges that there were people in Saint Pierre who were openly in

The Coming of the Free French | 81 favor of the victory of Germany. The next day he sent a note to Adjutant Raymond: "If there are any persons living on Saint Pierre who openly wish to see a Nazi victory, I want them to be unmasked." Raymond tried to find out whom the War Veterans had been talking about and came up with a butcher who had said that he "didn't give a hoot what flag flew over Saint Pierre, even a swastika, as long as business was good." Raymond suggested in his report that the man probably did not realize the gravity of his words. The possibility that any Saint Pierrais actually favored a Nazi victory is very much discounted in Saint Pierre today. By the time Bournat came back from his second visit to Washington, perhaps under the influence of Henry-Haye, Vichy ambassador to the United States, he seems to have opted for full allegiance to Vichy. In the month of November he began issuing the various ordinances of the Vichy regime, such as those against secret associations and the edict against the Jews (there were none on Saint Pierre), which he must have held back while he was making up his mind. On November 1 1 , the anniversary of the armistice of World War I, another antiadministration demonstration was held. Boumat prepared a long poster extolling the Pétain regime and explaining the colony's position in regard to Canada and the United States.® In a telegram to his government he reported on the day's events: "The atmosphere is oppressive/few are those who still dare support me openly/however on one hand I have the support of several including Chef de Cabinet/ on the other hand my personal prestige remains intact since although people are shouting Vive de Gaulle everywhere they respect me when I go by . . . November 1 1 no official ceremony is expected as it took place on November 2 nonetheless several hundred persons gathered on the main square but enthusiasm is lacking, many are distrustful and want to wait to see what will be on my poster/the most violent ones feeling themselves a little abandoned become discouraged and so the day passes." Bournat's poster seems to have reassured much of the population, and on December 3 1 he wired his government optimistically: "I am happy and proud to be able to assure to you today the perfect loyalty of the immense majority of the population." Bournat seems to have

82 I Divided Island been purposely concealing from his government the extent of the Gaullist movement on the islands, and he avoided mention of the many Gaullist activities. In effect, by December 1940 there was an efficient underground movement on the islands in favor of General de Gaulle. At its head was a circle of administrators, teachers, and lesser businessmen. In the late summer of 1940 this group had met informally on Langlade. The main members were Henry Humbert, an insurance agent; Judge Guillot; Paret, the head of the Treasury; Marcel and Henriette Bonin, teachers at the state school; Archibald Bartlett, British vice consul and head of the local Western Union office; Francis Paturel, a Saint Pierre businessman living in Canada; and Louis Plantagenest, the clerk of the court. Guillot, Paret, and Bonin were from France; the rest were Saint Pierrais.10 The Gaullist movement had the nearly unanimous support of the War Veterans, of which Humbert was the secretary. François le Buf, head of Saint Pierre's slip, was president and spokesman, and he tacitly supported the underground. Humbert organized the publication of the broadsheet L'Eclaireur (The Spotlight), of which one hundred issues had come out by the time the Free French forces arrived.11 The tracts mainly consisted of political cartoons, antiadministration and anti-Pétainist doggerel, and political manifestos, remarkably similar in tone and content to the political newspapers of the pre-World War I era. They were mimeographed by a pair of young Gaullists in the Treasury building with the tacit approval of Treasurer Paret. Another young group of Gaullists, referred to as the Action Group, distributed Crosses of Lorraine, posted Gaullist flags in various places, and generally harassed Raymond and his gendarmes.12 External publicity operated mainly through a Saint Pierrais working in Montreal. His father, a government archivist, sent him information which he then distributed to sympathetic newspapers. The principal newspaper ally of the underground in Canada was the Montreal newspaper Le Jour, which published violent articles against the Bournat regime with Saint Pierre information. The editor of Le Jour, Emile Hamel, was a spokesman for the minority of liberal anticlerical French Canadians in Quebec. His newspapers attacked the conserva-

The Coming of the Free French | 83 tive traditions of the French Canadian Church and community in Canada, as symbolized by the pro-Vichy daily Le Devoir. Le Jour supported de Gaulle at the earliest opportunity and became the focus for the Free French organization in Canada. In his own columns Hamel told of meetings with prominent Saint Pierre Gaullists ( Humbert, Lebolloch, a disgruntled veterinarian, and others who visited Le Jour in the years 1940 and 1941 ) who described the "terrible poverty" of the islands and, one suspects, somewhat overemphasized the authoritarian nature of Bournat's government.13 Both before and after the landing of the Free French, Le Jour was responsible for marshaling public opinion in Canada against Bournat (whom they called "Le Fuhrer de Saint Pierre") and in favor of the Free French takeover. A Belgian journalist from Le Jour, Jean le Bret, accompanied the Free French forces and became Saint Pierre's Director of Information and the man perhaps most resented by Saint Pierre's Pétainists.14 Le Jour's articles were copied by the New York Post, which played a key role in gathering liberal American support after the Gaullist takeover.15 Other newspapers that were supplied with information from Saint Pierre were Le Presse of Montreal and Quebec's Le Petit Journal and Photo-Journal, and Observers Weekly of Newfoundland. The Gaullists on Saint Pierre were also aided by an active and sympathetic Free French movement in Newfoundland with the covert support of the Newfoundland government (Newfoundland was then a British colony). Only six days after the Armistice, the Newfoundland government had sent an official to Saint Pierre who urged Bournat to rally to the Free French. On November 11, 1940, de Gaulle had telegraphed the War Veterans of Saint Pierre through the governor of Newfoundland, who had forwarded it to Bournat who himself took it to Le Buf.16 The Dominion government also communicated the reports of its representatives concerning Saint Pierre to the Free French in London. Archibald Bartlett, the British vice consul and head of the telegraph office, was in a key position to communicate with Newfoundland. He was especially active, along with Humbert and Plantagenest, in the recruitment of volunteers for the movement. In December 1940

84 I Divided Island the first ten boys left Saint Pierre clandestinely for Newfoundland, and from there were taken to Great Britain. By December 1941 thirtysix Saint Pierrais had left the island by this route to enlist in the Free French forces. The Newfoundlanders living on the coast near Saint Pierre were as much in favor of continuing the war as their government was, and this sentiment was shared by their relatives on Saint Pierre, who were almost exclusively in favor of the Free French. Bartlett resigned as British vice consul in February 1941 after Bournat raised objections about his dual position on the island. Bournat did not really begin active measures of his own to try to counteract the Gaullist influence until the beginning of 1941. In reply to the Canadian newspapers and Gaullist handouts, he issued two series of propaganda. One consisted of three hagiographie brochures about Pétain and his government, entitled "The New Regime in France." The second was a monthly newsletter, "Documentary Information Bulletins," which he edited from newspaper articles in the pro-Vichy papers of Quebec, including Le Devoir, Le Nationaliste, and L'Oeil. He posted this material in the windows of the stores of Francis Leroux and the bookshop of Leon Briand, where portraits of Pétain were also sold. In addition he sent them to the heads of all government departments and to the schools.17 Much of the battle between Gaullists and anti-Gaullists was fought between Saint Pierre's two school systems—the state schools and the church schools. The Bonins claimed the unanimous support of the teachers in the state schools for de Gaulle, and refused to use Bournat's propaganda when he sent it. In the church schools the teachers seemed to follow the lead of the clergy, for aside from Monsignor Poisson, whose stand until the arrival of the Free French seems to have been purposely ambiguous, the other priests on Saint Pierre firmly supported Bournat.18 Hence the church schools used Bournat's brochures in their classes. Some Gaullist parents transferred their children from church to state schools for this reason. Although Bournat had not named the persons involved in the Gaullist cause, Vichy suspected that some of the Gaullist leaders were government employees; it is possible that the government was in-

The Coming of the Free French | 85 formed by one of the captains of the trawler fleet. In March 1941 Vichy sent Bournat a telegram listing several persons and asking him what he was going to do about them. Bournat replied: "All persons named in your telegram are indeed considered passive or active partisans of the Gaullist movement, just as, moreover, the great part of the local population, including nearly all the War Veterans and the great part of the crews of metropolitan fishing boats that stayed on Saint Pierre during the second semester."19 Perhaps under the prodding of Vichy's telegram, Bournat finally took token action against Gaullists in the administration. His previous actions had been to request the transfer of Judge Guillot, after Guillot had displayed the Cross of Lorraine from his window on the main square. The judge left Saint Pierre in December 1940. Bournat had also dismissed the veterinarian Lebolloch, although in Lebolloch's case it is not at all clear that political considerations were the major reason. From April through July the governor held sporadic meetings of a commission of inquiry. In all, eight persons appeared before it, including Humbert, Plantagenest, and Madame Bonin. Madame Bonin was placed on sick leave; Humbert was dismissed from his post as interpreter; and another teacher was reprimanded.20 Bournat also tried to form the pro-government patriotic organizations of the Vichy regime, but his efforts fell flat under the derisive attacks of the Gaullist broadsides. On June 8,1941, he founded a chapter of the Pétainist boy scouts, Compagnons de France. This was countered with a tract which began, "Do not sell your son to Hitler." Only fifteen boys joined and the attempt was abandoned. On June 23, he published the decree founding the Union Français de Combattants (later the Legion), the Pétainist veterans' organization, and on July 4 he founded an auxiliary institution, Friends of the Legion. The organization meeting of the Legion was held on August 26 with the presence of fourteen people; of these, nine were administration employees, two were employees of the Morue Française, with one worker, one sailor, and one priest. Forty-two out of the 160 War Veterans joined the Legion, and 116 Saint Pierrais joined the auxiliary. The organizations rarely met, however, and had no real popular

86 I Divided Island support.21 In accordance with French government decrees, Bournat dissolved the old War Veterans Association and confiscated its treasury.22 On October 17 the trawler fleet began to leave for France, but the Gaullist opposition on the island was too strong and too well organized to abate, although it did not feel strong enough to attempt a local putsch.28 The Gaullists realized from Bournat's stubbornness that they would have to call in outside aid if they wanted the colony to declare for the Free French. Indeed, several false starts before the actual liberation and occupation by the Free French raised the tension on the islands even higher. Humbert, Francis Paturel, and Le Jour advanced several suggestions for Free French takeovers based in Canada. The Free French in London vetoed these plans, but made a false start of their own. The official expedition by Vice Admiral Emile Muselier was supposed to originate in Newfoundland in early December, but was postponed due to the uncertainty of Allied approval of the mission. Gaullist literature on the island intensified at each false start.24 Broadsides proclaimed the existence of a secret blacklist and described penalties for specific Vichy supporters when the Free French arrived. On Armistice Day, November 11, 1941, there were two processions to the war memorial, a practice that has since been consecrated by various divisions in Saint Pierre's population. At 9:00 A.M. the govvernment procession was held, including the officers of the Legion and a few civil servants, the rare Pétainists willing to brave Gaullist observers. At 11:00 A.M. the mass of the population held their procession, an overwhelming demonstration for adhesion to the Free French.25 The landing of the Free French took place on December 24, 1941. Without the approval of the American or Canadian government, Muselier finally sailed from Halifax with four vessels (three corvettes and a submarine). Accompanying him were Francis Paturel; Ira Wolfert, an American newspaperman; and Jean le Bret from Le Jour. The ships were signaled that the coast was clear by a secret radio set up in the small fishing hamlet of Ravenel, and they arrived early on Christmas morning in Saint Pierre harbor. They were welcomed on the docks by throngs of Saint Pierrais, some of whom knew of their

The Coming of the Free French | 87 coming in advance. Armed with a previously prepared list, Muselier proceeded to put prominent Vichyard businessmen under detention "for collaboration with the enemy," and placed Governor Bournat and his wife under guard. On the next day the long-awaited plebiscite took place. The wording of the question exaggerated the Gaullist majority, for the choice was not between de Gaulle and Pétain, but between "Ralliement à la France libre" and "Collaboration avec les puissances de l'Axe." Most of the Vichyards, who did not believe Pétain was collaborating with Germany, abstained, and the vote was proclaimed throughout North America the next day as 98 percent for de Gaulle. In an article published on the second anniversary of the event, Henriette Bonin described the emotions she felt at the landing: December 24 1941 . . . Saint Pierre awakes beneath a lovely winter sky: . . . with my elbow on my pillow I watch the harbor, still dark and empty as usual, the Newfoundland coast thinly powdered with snow, a white streak in the distance. A delicate foliage of frost gleams on the windowpanes, it can't be too cold; when the sun comes up it will be nice outside, in the freshness of this beautiful morning. It is very early, too early to get up yet, and I begin to slip back into sleep when someone comes in hurriedly and shouts something of which I catch only the words: boats . . . Free French . . . With one bound I am at the window: two dark shapes cut through the still water, a third soon appears around the Cap à l'Aigle, then a fourth, very long, so very long and low against the water. They seem to come out of the night, from the unknown mystery that surrounds us. Quick, the binoculars: It is, it really is the Free French! . . . Can the most exorbitant of dreams become true? And, suddenly, I slip from the level of a day-to-day living, to the level of the extraordinary, of the marvelous. This is not just any winter morning, it is a morning above all others, everything takes on a new look.28 For most of the Saint Pierrais, the arrival was a thing of beauty, of glory, of inspiration. The first meeting which Muselier held in the

88 I Divided Island Salle des Fêtes, calling for volunteers, had all the emotion and fervor of a religious revival.27 The newspaperman with Muselier was caught up in the same feeling: "There was nothing to censor because nothing was ugly, everything was roses and victory. It was just a marvelous thing, and you could see right away the whole meaning of the war unfold."28 It took only a few days for the Free French to realize that many things were ugly, that 30 percent of the population were against them, and that everything was not roses and victory. What started as a movement of national liberation developed for many into bitter personal hatred which had little real relation to political beliefs. One of the first Free French volunteers said recently, "When I joined I didn't know that there was any question of personal animosity —like Paturel's grudge against Bournat. The incidents that followed, the arrests and the mobilization, were terrible for the islands. But I didn't know they would happen." There was a naivete about the retaliations the Gaullists began to make against those who had supported Bournat—they did not seem to realize the implications of their acts for the future of the island. The same idea implied in the volunteer's statement is found with less charity in an anti-Gaullist diary: "Besides, the Gaullists are in the majority. These people would sign the death warrant for a large part of the population to keep in good terms [with the Free French]. They are perhaps not entirely aware of the consequences of their attitude. The emphasis on patriotism soothes their consciences." Five days after the Free French forces landed on Saint Pierre, Monsignor Poisson, the Apostolic Prefect, posted the following notice on the door of the church: Monday December 29, 1941 My Brothers, You have the right to know what your Apostolic Prefect, the guardian of your souls, did yesterday. Enlightened by three days of observation, reflection, and meditation, I went to see the Admiral, who had two officers with him, to tell him:

The Coming of the Free French | 89 "I cannot in conscience recognize you as the true government of Saint Pierre. Neither your military possession of the colony, nor the plebiscite, false in method as well as in principle, gives you the right. You are occupiers, you are not the legitimate government by right or by fact." The Admiral asked me to put this declaration in writing. I wrote: "I affirm that I do not recognize you as the government of France." Ten times perhaps, the Admiral wished to force me to say that I would remain neutral. My conscience could not allow this. I replied, "You will judge me by my acts." Before God, cherished Saint Pierrais, I owe you this declaration. Your Apostolic Prefect who blesses you, who prays God for you and who offers himself to Him for the peace of your little land. Msgr. A. Poisson The attitude of the Church on Saint Pierre had much in common with that of the Church in Quebec, which actively supported the Vichy regime from its inception. But the opposition on Saint Pierre had been strengthened by the anticlericalism of some of the early partisans of Gaullism on the islands. The special importance of the Monsignori denunciation was that it was the first sign of dissidence on the islands to reach the foreign press. Furthermore, his objection to the plebiscite had a reasonable basis: the result as proclaimed gave no indication of the substantial minority opposed to the Free French government. There is some disagreement about the effect of the Monsignore declaration upon the Pétainists of Saint Pierre. Most Gaullists, in retrospect, ascribe virtually all of the intransigence of the Pétainist group to the declaration.29 A Saint Pierrais writing in La Liberté of November 7,1943, spoke of the clergy: "In December 1941, the islands were liberated. It is at this crossroads in the history of the colony that the nefarious action of those responsible for the direction of consciences had the

go I Divided Island clearest effect. From childhood the Saint Pierrais and the Miquelonnais were accustomed to listen to them and to respect them. The unequivocal position which they took two or three days after the liberation led the minority who were resisting to gather round them, and all together they succeeded in drawing away a small part of the population which was still hesitating." The Monsignor's stand occasioned an inevitable reaction from Free French partisans. Inscriptions like "Death to the Crows" and "The Priests Are Pederasts" were written on the walls of the presbytery. The clergy were treated like the nonjuring clergy of the French Revolution, and, indeed, the comparison might be extended to the attitudes of the two groups involved. One priest wrote in a memorandum: "The members of the movement' started a campaign of slander against the clergy. Sometimes the faithful spent the night in the presbytery to protect Monsignor. The names of the bishop and the priests became for them [the Free French] the synonym of pigs." Those responsible for the extreme bitterness toward the official clergy seem to have been a small minority of anticlericals among the soldiers and sailors who came with Muselier, or people from the small nonpracticing minority of the population. Most of the population that supported the Free French, however, were not any less devout than before. For Saint Pierre recruits and their families, the Free French installed a military chaplain who held an open-air Mass on the dock, about four hundred yards from the established church. In my opinion, the principal effect of the Church's position was to confirm the opinions and harden the resistance of those Pétainists who had already made up their minds. The Church held an honored and revered place in Saint Pierre society. There were clearly some people whose Pétainist position could be ascribed to their religious devotion, but for the most part political and religious opinions formed a whole, a way of life, that lingered on from the era of the Morue Française. The alliance of the political and religious attitudes was merely made more explicit by Poissons stand. The Pétainists in Saint Pierre were as recriminatory toward the Free French regime as the Gaullists had been toward Bournat's. Aside from imprisonments and an oppressive atmosphere, they complained

The Coming of the Free French | 91 most about the cutting off of their communications with the exterior. The purpose of this isolation seems to have been to prevent the outside world, and the United States in particular, from knowing about a strong minority opposition on Saint Pierre, with the possible result of unfavorable propaganda for the Free French. In the first place, any of their mail containing political information was censored; second, Pétainists were hampered by the difficulty of leaving the islands. Some Pétainists charged that, if after multiple attempts an exit permit was secured from the government, their way would be blocked by the Canadian or British vice consuls on the island. The Free French took a certain amount of action against followers of Bournat based upon tendentious evidence supplied before their arrival on the islands. In this category would fall the first arrest of Henri Morazé and the imprisonment of Raoul de la Villefromoy and Georges Landry on trumped-up charges of trading with the enemy (with Bournat's permission they had disposed of some Italian salt on the island in 1941).30 But the Free French quickly realized that most of the charges against local officials were baseless. Nonetheless they did have to put Free French men in the most responsible places of the administration, and a number of officials loyal to Vichy were sent to forced residence on Ile aux Marins. In general the removal or downgrading of Saint Pierrais civil servants under the Free French was almost as rare as it had been under Bournat. A number of arrests of Vichyards did take place, however, as part of the Free French attempt to stop pro-Vichy agitation, and it must be said that in this respect they were more severe than Bournat had been. Two extreme cases may be cited: Daniel Gauvain, the lawyer who had produced Saint Pierre's almanac in 1916 and attacked the administration in 1909 over the school question, was at this time in retirement on Miquelon. There he typed out a ludicrous newsletter in favor of Pétain which even the Free French did not take seriously, until they found he had been smuggling copies to Le Devoir in Montreal. The harmless old man was then arrested and put in prison for three months.31 He unrepentantly continued when he was let out. In another case, a sixteen-year-old youth, Jacques Legasse, was imprisoned for a month for composing an anti-Gaullist song.32

92 I Divided Island There were two main periods in which the Free French administration deemed a show of strength necessary: the first two or three months of their rule, when the Pétainists were strong in the expectation of United States sanctions against the Free French; and again in late 1943 and early 1944, when the spirit of the population began to wear a little thin, and there was vocal opposition to conscription. In order to intimidate the Pétainists there were two armored cars circulating around the town at all times, and it was illegal to be out on the streets after dark. A number of trials were held of Pétainists who had insulted members of the movement in one way or another, some of them justified, others ridiculous ( as in the case of the trial of Henri Morazé for not respecting a Free French officer).33 Perhaps more serious in their effect than any judicial action were the Saint Pierre radio broadcasts and the Free French newspaper. La Liberté. While their main effect was doubtless to keep the majority in a patriotic humor and to cow the Pétainists, they had the unfortunate side effect of stirring up anti-Pétainist antagonism. The normal pattern of the hortatory speeches and articles was to begin with an appeal to patriotism and end up with bitter references to the Pétainist minority, who were assumed to be past conversion. The following is an excerpt from a radio speech of February 14, 1942, by Captain Heron de Villefosse, military commander of the islands after the departure of Muselier: "Liberty means the right that citizens have to choose those who will conduct the destiny of the nation, and to impose the wish of the national conscience, upon a disloyal and overprivileged minority . . . Let the men of Vichy sorrow, let them mutter or sulk, the time of their reign of these islands has passed; their struggle would be that of clay against steel . . . Saint Pierre and Miquelon will be administered with a new spirit, in the interest of the workers and of the majority."34 The Free French administrators wanted to make Saint Pierre a showcase of how much better life could be under the Free French. Young and idealistic, they tended to take the side of the worker and the fisherman against the merchant. Even before they arrived they seem to have believed that the gros on the Vichy side were exploiting

The Coming of the Free French | 93 the mass of the population. Muselier mentions in his book the "shameful exploitation of fishermen," and Savary considered that the island was still run by the Morue Française.35 The group of civil servants and merchants who supported Bournat was substantially the same as the group against which antagonism had coalesced in the late 1930's. The fact that these people turned in favor of Vichy gave a focus and a point to the old antagonism. In their first year the Free French were able to capitalize on the antiadministration feeling which existed on most levels of Saint Pierre society before the war, and they emphasized it further. Apart from militarizing the island, the Free French administration could hardly change Saint Pierre's basic economic situation. They wisely abandoned the road-building scheme, tainted with Bournat's unpopularity, but instituted the substantially similar project of building an airfield.38 The workers on the airfield, like the workers on the roads, eventually opposed the administration. The rest of the unemployed had been absorbed by the wholesale enlistment of Saint Pierrais either for active service or for a rather factious "sedentary" service. One of Muselier's first actions was to place the Morue Française under investigation.37 Deeply suspicious of the Vichyard fish merchants, the new administration supported the fishermen's organizations and in the first months especially favored a comparatively recent formation, the Corporation des Pêcheurs. The Corporation des Pêcheurs had been formed in April 1941 "in order to avoid the abusive exploitation of fishermen by the intermediaries who purchased the fish."38 Some of its members were dissidents from Frioult's union; many left Frioult because of the low price obtained for the fish in 1941 and because Frioult himself was not a partisan of de Gaulle. The founders were Henri Dagort, a lawyer, and Francis Olano, a small businessman. Vichyards on the island termed Olano a communist, but the word was much too strong: they used it to describe anyone interested in cooperative movements. It can be said, however, that the tone of corporation newletters in La Liberté implied that it would be much firmer with the merchants than Frioult's union was.

94 I Divided Island It is estimated that about thirty of Frioult's members left in 1941 to join the corporation, which itself had a total of perhaps sixty members on Saint Pierre and forty more on Miquelon. On the front page of the first issue of La Liberté (January 31, 1942), the Free French newspaper published a month after the arrival of the forces, is an article by Olano entitled "For an Economic Renaissance of the Islands." In it he accused the Bournat administration of opposing systematically any suggestion of economic revival which came from the people ( la masse ). For Olano, at least, the Bournat administration represented the same alliance of administration and Morue Française that the fisherman had always distrusted. Like Frioult's Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs, the corporation gathered information of current cod prices so that it would have some idea of whether or not to accept offers of the major buyers on the island—Dupont, Morue Française, or Andrieux. The Corporation des Pêcheurs obtained its information from the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and the Services de Pêches of the Canadian government.39 In the first year it sold its fish to an intermediary. In 1942 the corporation itself, like Frioult, worked the fish, paying out nearly a million francs in costs. It also set up a refinery for cod-liver oil. Like Frioult, the corporation sometimes sold its fish directly to the French West Indies, the chief destination of Saint-Pierre dried cod. The main stumbling block for the corporation was, naturally, the Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs. In January 1943 the corporation was still calling for recalcitrants to join, irrespective of political affiliation, but they found even some of the Gaullists hesitant: "The corporation finds it regrettable that certain fishermen, who are nonetheless warm partisans of the Fighting French, do not understand the efforts of the corporation for the future of the colony, and they go off imprudently to people who have nothing but their own interests in mind, thereby prejudicing that which is just, good, and loyal."40 During the war Frioult's union was divided between Gaullists and anti-Gaullists, while the corporation was with only one or two exceptions Gaullist. Much corporation literature was also directed toward Miquelon, where many fishermen sided with Pierre Andrieux or the Morue Française. The fishermen for or against the Free French could

The Coming of the Free French | 95 be easily distinguished by the presence or absence of a Cross of Lorraine on their dories. Olano claimed administration favor for his corporation and of corporation support of administration policies.41 But in fact the administration offered the same benefits to the Frioult union as it did to the corporation. When the Free French had arrived in 1941, the Administrative Council and the Chamber of Commerce (with the exception of Leonce Dupont in both cases ) had resigned. This initial rejection of the Free French regime by Saint Pierre's notables was followed by a gradual softening of attitude when it became clear that the regime would stay in power and that it was making an attempt to be impartial. The main liaison man for the anti-Gaullists and the administration was Leonce Dupont, who was a moderate Gaullist trusted by both sides.42 Again, as in 1919, he conserved a position at the critical crossroads of the island divisions, and he would argue anti-Gaullist as well as Gaullist cases with the administration. The Administrative Council took up its functions again, and a somewhat uneasy modus vivendi was reached between the pro-Vichy merchants and the administration.43 But such was not the case between most of the Pétainists and the Saint Pierre Gaullists. Three months after the Free French arrival, the new administrator, Alain Savary, gave a long speech to some of the people of Saint Pierre who had gathered to see a patriotic film about the resistance in France. The speech, reprinted in La Liberté (March 24, 1942), gives some idea of the depth of difference between the two groups of Saint Pierrais. I ask of you a sacrifice, one which is difficult because it is a permanent one. You must renounce these habits of quarrels and rivalry, this atmosphere full of false rumors which begets tension and loss of time, since we owe every moment to France. How many hours spent criticizing the neighbor could have been spent for the common good: the French nation arrived at unity by suffering, struggle, and hope. We will attain this unity, and this unity will be the great miracle of our devotion to our country. While every day Frenchmen are dying of hunger, or falling from

g6 J Divided Island German bullets, we on Saint Pierre cannot continue these family quarrels. We owe it to those who have died, to those who are fighting: they deserve our union and our labor. It would be a betrayal of their sacrifice to refuse . . . I put forth recently the unfortunate effects of certain habits here, and I asked those around me to act and speak to combat them. They replied to me that these were habits which were too ingrained, that one could not overcome them, that every call to unity was unanswered, and that another would be in vain. I do not believe it! If all those calls have already been made, they have never been made in circumstances so tragic. France has never been so bowed down, so close to the abyss, ready to disappear among the subject nations. Never before did the Saint Pierrais have an obligation so attractive and so compelling, that of directing all its energies, all its activities towards only one goal: the delivery of our country. By 1942 Saint Pierre was torn apart. As Savary implies, national questions were no longer of major importance. The dispute had been driven down to the level of family quarrels and personal enmities. The 70 percent who were Gaullists and the 30 percent who were antiGaullists frequented different shops and avoided contact as much as was possible in the everyday activity of the town. Before the war, those who later became Pétainists had already shown a mild tendency to marry one another, but during the war almost all intermarriage between the two groups was broken off. ( See Table 1. ) Accident was taken for insult, and insult was taken for injury. Monsignor Poissons forthrightness soon after the landing encouraged the anti-Gaullists to make their position as outspoken as that of the Gaullists under Bournat. They too, in a very minor way, had their "underground." It seems to have been the women especially who fought the bitterest of the verbal duels. Several of the suits for slander and prosecutions for treasonous utterances arose out of women's sallies into opposition stores. It was not uncommon for the anti-Gaullists to impugn, sometimes quite gratuitously, the motives of the

The Coming of the Free French | 97 Table 1. Interfaction Marriages, Gaullist-Pétainist, 1936-1951 Male

Female

1936-1941

1942-1944

1945-1951

Gaullist Gaullist Pétainist Pétainist

Gaullist Pétainist Gaullist Pétainist

60% 4 22 15

75% — 6 19

63% 13 16 8

101% (n = 65)

100% (n = 54)

100% (n = 119)

Note. For the 1936-1944 groups the faction affiliation is that of the male during the war and that of the girl's parents during the war. For the 1945-1951 group the faction is that of the couple's parents during the war. Marriages with non-Saint Pierrais are not included.

Gaullists who had gone off to fight, as well as those who had stayed behind. One of the favorite subjects for anti-Gaullist commentary was the composition of the sedentary force that remained on the island. The criticism of the Pétainists were points of pride and excitement to the Gaullists. The visitor can still see concrete bunkers on a hill outside the town where the home troops trained and the names of the volunteers marked proudly in the cement with the Cross of Lorraine. The dorymen carried Cross of Lorraine flags or inscriptions; some Gaullists placed wooden Crosses of Lorraine on their houses, over the door. For many followers it was indeed a time of honor and in many ways the millennium. In June 1942, when a Free French corvette, the Mimosa, sank with twelve Saint Pierrais aboard, some Pétainist women made unpatriotic statements: "If the ships hadn't come to Saint Pierre all of those young men wouldn't have died"; "It's a good thing; they didn't have to leave"; "They were well paid for leaving." 44 Gaullist indignation reached a peak, and that evening mobs did 80,000 francs worth of damage to Pétainist stores and houses. Although a detailed hearing was held to discover the identity of the culprits, no action was taken. It was the first time since 1906 that a mass demonstration on the island was directed against fellow islanders, not the administration. The four years of continuous division had indeed left their mark on

q8 I Divided Island the islanders. Saint Pierre was cordoned off from the relatively "sane" atmosphere of Canada and Newfoundland. The island became a closed system with little means of gaining a perspective, and the pressure on the population rose to a point where tension turned the Saint Pierrais upon themselves, made social differences explicit, and made the islanders destroy each other's property. For most of the Pétainists and many of the Gaullists, peaceful Saint Pierre became as tense and bitter as occupied Paris, three thousand miles away. The temperature of the islands seemed unbearably high, while the climate all around was relatively mild. By April 1943, little more than a year and a half after the arrival of the Free French troops, the Gaullists' euphoria had begun to wear off. Articles in La Liberté by Saint Pierrais took on a somewhat shriller and more argumentative note. Although local antagonism did not abate in the slightest, both sides were now growing tired of the Free French government, which was slipping into the habits of colonial administrations of old. At this time the Free French administrator wrote a report to headquarters in which he recommended mobilization as the way to solve the island's morale problem. "At the beginning," he said, "the owning class was two thirds against us. Now it is totally hostile toward us. We have lost the support of the others since they realize that we are governing honestly and do not cater to their personal interests." He went on to list the causes of the decline in public support. The first of these, division between islanders and temporary personnel from France, is a commonplace for all Saint Pierre administrators: "The occupation: the territory was occupied by the Free French forces, the word [occupation] has had success, has been consecrated in official texts, and has been justified by events. There has not been, with few exceptions, interpénétration between the inhabitants and the occupying forces and the gap between the two is not being filled." The second cause he mentioned was the failure of a commando force which the Free French tried to recruit on Saint Pierre. This, he said, strengthened the hand of the opposition. The final cause was the ambiguous turn that politics had taken in North Africa, with de Gaulle making joint appearances with Giraud. This factor, he said,

The Coming of the Free French | 99 was somewhat allayed by the excellent interpretations made of the situation on Saint Pierre radio. In September 1943 the government posted notices reading, "Army recruitment: Medical examination, ages 20 to 37." The Saint Pierrais, except for a small minority, went to the examination, although the Miquelonnais would have none of it. Georges Lefevre, the teacher at the church school, tried to organize resistance, but to no avail. The actual conscription did not occur, however, until January 4, 1944. One week before the departure date, draft notices were sent to each of the Saint Pierrais and Miquelonnais who had been approved in the medical examinations. This time an opposition did form on Saint Pierre. Governor Garrouste wired Algiers: O f the 125 men we tried to mobilize, about 50 have refused. They include 17 workers on the airfield, 4 teachers in the church schools, and the rest, merchants. The 50 objectors represent a minority of businessmen and unemployed living directly or indirectly off our subsidies; the French government should not have to give in to them. The boil must be lanced that has poisoned the life of Saint Pierre for two years." On the fifth of January a delegation protested to the governor, and on the sixth a crowd of between two hundred and five hundred people waited silently in front of the government buildings while a delegation of five asked that the conscription be postponed until the committee in Algiers was informed of the island's special situation. Garrouste promised a reply for the next afternoon, but the next morning he ordered the arrest of nine opposition leaders, including Georges Lefevre, Henri Claireaux, and Leonce Claireaux. Seven were found and arrested, although Albert Briand and one other escaped. With Saint Pierre's opposition activists out of the picture, a delegation of Saint Pierre women sought out Gaston Lavoisier, otherwise known as Gaston Dilfoy, the head of the airport works project, and he became the effective leader of the opposition to the mobilization.46 On the eighth of January another demonstration was held, this time mainly women marching in columns of three, a total of five to six hundred persons. Again they sent in a delegation to the governor. In the meantime the administrator used every means he could to persuade Lavoisier, and by the evening he had a statement from

loo I Divided Island Lavoisier saying that it was the duty of the Saint Pierrais to let themselves be conscripted. Effective opposition ceased. On February 4, the one hundred and fifty conscripts left Saint Pierre in an atmosphere that was more troubled than ever. The mobilization was salt in the wounds of the Pétainists, for they had to leave, while many of the "sedentary" Gaullists remained behind.

6 Reconciliation

The reconciliation of the two groups is not complete today. Twentyfive years after the landing of the Free French, the wound in Saint Pierre society has not yet mended. But in a slow, complex process, much of the old bitterness and animosity has disappeared. The governor and the Apostolic Prefect were replaced in 1947; the new men were dedicated to social peace. New jobs and welfare benefits have prevented inequalities of wealth and job insecurity from increasing; and coalitions of Gaullist with anti-Gaullist politicians on the islands have confused political allegiances, as did de Gaulle himself by becoming the leader of the party of order instead of the party of revolution. On the other hand, some of these same factors helped to perpetuate the trouble. Although shifting coalitions scrambled parties, the very frequency of postwar elections gave little time for new alignments to form permanently, and the major voting blocs long maintained clearly identifiable bases in the old division. Similarly, rival veterans' organizations, corresponding to the wartime factions, kept the old division alive by holding separate ceremonies on the many military festival days. Finally, enough inequality of opportunity and income still exists on the island to perpetuate social discontent. In fact, though, the continuance of economic discontent has been just as critical a factor in furthering reconciliation as its reduction might have been. The postwar years have seen a greater and greater concentration of economic power in the hands of the colonial administration. The focus of discontent for the younger workers is now the administration, not the merchants. The axis of island division, pro- and antiadministration, now cuts across the old parties and the old quarrel. Many Saint Pierrais felt that the wartime division had fed upon economic insecurity and that it would dwindle if the insecurity could 101

102 I Divided Island be eliminated by the establishment of new jobs. Unfortunately, not enough well-paying jobs have been provided to test this theory. Saint Pierre in the early 1960's still lacked a rational primary occupation to support the people. Its postwar situation was aggravated by inflation in France, which meant that Saint Pierre had to pay more francs for Canadian foodstuffs. The story of administrations and political assemblies in the postwar decades reveals a succession of attempts on the part of both to discover solutions to a problem that was, for that period, insoluble. From 1945 until 1952 Saint Pierre had but three products. Two were very minor: the farming of silver foxes, employing up to fifteen men; and the canning of herring for French consumption, which lasted until 1949, employing about fifteen workers in season. The third product, of course, was dried fish from the dorymen. In the years immediately before the war there had been about 195 fishing dories. Their number stayed the same after the war, until it began to decline in the mid-1950's.1 A fish-drying factory operated on Saint Pierre, employing about forty persons, until it discontinued operations when the freezing plant was opened in 1952. Jobs were few, and the population increased rapidly. Like the United States, Saint Pierre experienced a postwar baby boom. Inflation pushed prices up in spite of complicated government measures to compensate by subsidizing food purchases from Canada. The dory industry did not expand, and total revenues to dorymen were lower in 1956 than they had been in 1946.2 The administration had little choice but to take up the slack in the economy, increasing the subsidy provided by France to very high percentages. The practice adopted during the depression of using the unemployed on public works projects was continued, facilitated by a French government program for capital development in the colonies—the Fund for Economic and Social Development (FIDES). By i960 the administration provided two fifths of the permanent jobs (not counting the unemployment projects) and one half of the total income of the islanders.3 The founding of the SPEC (Société de Pêches et Congelation des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon) in 1951 was a milestone in the islands' development. It is termed in French corporate law a société mixte,

Reconciliation | 103 a combination of private and government financing and administration. Its governing board includes five members of the Saint Pierre General Council; three private investors, one of whom must be a fisherman; and one representative of the employee (in other words, five administrators and five Saint Pierrais). For the first time successfully utilizing thefish-freezingplant built in 1917, the SPEC processed the catch of the dorymen from Saint Pierre and Ile aux Marins, as well as the catch of an improvised trawler, the Beam. In the next years the SPEC increased its operations by the addition of new trawlers, some of which were appropriately named after the hamlets where dorymen had lived earlier in the century.4 On each trawler there were about sixteen sailors who gained a share of the catch. The captains were mostly Saint Pierrais who had advanced training in France. The advent of the SPEC temporarily reversed the decrease in dories, because the dorymen could dispose of their fish more profitably. But as more trawlers went into operation, many dorymen or their sons joined the crews of the trawlers, which totaled sixty sailors when the fleet had its four boats.6 The SPEC had its greatest impact on processing. The dorymen had previously cleaned and salted their own fish, which were then dried at a drying house. The freezing plant, however, had to deal with more fish and operated all year round, filleting, packaging, and freezing the packages. In 1952 the plant employed seventy-five persons, a total of 28,000 man-hours. By i960 it was employing about two hundred persons for a total of 72,000 man-hours. Of these employees, sixty-two were women, needed for the highly skilled filleting operations. Many girls go to work at the SPEC as soon as they get out of school at fourteen or fifteen and stay on until they have children. A large proportion of the men employed as manual laborers are as young.6 There was a sharp drop in dories for the years 1950 and 1951, offset in 1952 by the coming of the freezing plant. But by 1955 the decline set in again, and in i960 the number of dorymen was lower than ever. This in turn meant that the number of men employed in i960 in fishing, whether in trawlers or in dories, was still lower than it had been before the advent of the SPEC. Thus while it must be said that the advent of the SPEC was a desperately needed improvement in the

104 I Divided Island island economy, it by no means provided a final solution to finding productive jobs for the islanders. The mass of the unemployed remained, and more were joining the ranks every year from the sons of fishermen and the sons of those already unemployed.7 The SPEC suffered many growing pains, still in evidence in 1966. It was difficult to keep it well supplied with fish. In order to provide an outlet for the remaining dorymen, the trawlers had to stop operations during the summer months. The workers in the factory demanded their vacation in August, the best month of the dory-fishing season. Sailors for the trawlers were hard to find, even though the pay was better than it was on dories; the work during the winter months was punishing, and the sailors had to be away from their families for weeks at a time. A certain number of Newfoundlanders had to be employed at first in order to have a full complement of crew. The factory also had to accustom itself to a high rate of turnover in personnel, and had trouble recruiting and keeping the female labor. After the advent of the SPEC, the government turned its attention to the conversion of the archaic methods of the dorymen, who were now artificially maintained by fringe subsidies which amounted to 50 percent of their total revenue from fishing. Fish traps, gill nets, and larger boats were all tried, with no appreciable success. There was better luck with fish loops—a small sonar device for locating fish— but on the whole dory fishing today is a dying industry.8 The servicing of foreign fishing boats has always been one possibility for improving the economic base of the islands. Before World War II there was a certain amount of work on Italian and Spanish boats, and until 1950 the Morue Française transshipped some fish on Saint Pierre. The years from 1956 to 1958 saw the coming of the Spanish fleet to Saint Pierre in greater numbers, and there was so much work that the crews of the fishing boats were permitted to do some of the unloading. In i960 a French economic expert, A. Tymen, warned against counting on port activities as a primary industry. Major difficulties were the cost of fuel and basic foodstuffs, obtainable at equal or better prices in Sydney, Halifax, or Saint John's.9 Nevertheless, a project of a scope virtually unrivaled in Saint Pierre's history was set in motion in 1962 when it was decided that Saint Pierre

Reconciliation | 105 would become the fishing port for the Common Market. The result was a tremendous amount of money for expanding port facilities. The dock area of the port itself was tripled. The company awarded the contract was the Société des Batignolles in France. They employed one hundred to one hundred fifty Saint Pierrais on the port project from September 1963 onward and completed it in 1966. The new activity of the port could benefit the whole island, and with the installation of a second fish-freezing plant and a fish transshipment storehouse, Saint Pierre may have a brighter economic future. From 1955 on, Saint Pierre also witnessed the birth of a new industry, the tourist trade, largely due to the initiative of Albert Briand, a businessman who chartered planes to establish the local airline, Air Saint Pierre. All of the island commerce has benefited from the five thousand tourists who now come to Saint Pierre in the summer. Saint Pierre's balance of payments with the United States and Canada has improved markedly. The tourist trade accounts for the two types of commerce which have expanded most rapidly in recent years: hotels and taxis. In addition to the tourists, Saint Pierre has seen the establishment in 1962 of a summer school by the University of Toronto for the French language, and many Saint Pierre families received appreciable remuneration for boarding summer-school students. In 1966 two other summer French programs were started. Although the advent of the SPEC, the tourist trade, and the harbor project reduced unemployment, population increases have canceled out much of the improvement. Although the standard of living in the late 1960's is somewhat higher than it was in 1946, insecurity and inequality still characterize the economy. Economic improvements, although they may have kept the social division from further increasing, have not proven to be major factors in reconciliation. This brief summary of economic developments provides a useful background for a chronicle of political events in the postwar years. Political activity on the islands contributed to a superficial reconciliation in that it scrambled some of the parties. But as late as 1958 voters still voted in wartime blocs, and the many elections probably served more to revive the Gaullist-anti-Gaullist dispute than to assuage it.

io6 I Divided Island In 1945 and 1946 Saint Pierre was awarded a deputy in the National Assembly, a senator in the Senate, a new General Council in place of the older, smaller Administrative Council, and a new Town Council, for the municipality of Saint Pierre was re-established. In addition there were three French constitutional plebiscites. Hence these two years were passed in a dizzying series of elections and candidates. The election for the first postwar Town Council was held on December 2, 1945, and a hard-core Gaullist slate was elected. Among its thirteen members were the sister of Le Buf, the veterans' leader, two of the more radical prewar councillors, Laborde and Daguerre (who was made mayor), and Francis LeRolland, the president of the Corporation des Pêcheurs. The councillors included six fishermen, which meant the largest proportion of fishermen since the Planté list of 192ο.10 The new town councillors were among the most uncompromising Gaullists on the island. The last election for Administrative Council was held two weeks later and again an all-Gaullist list was elected, this time comprised uniquely of merchants and artisans, again the most prominent of Gaullists, but in general with more prestige than those on the Town Council. In 1946, however, the political statutes of the colony were changed so that a new representative assembly, a General Council of thirteen members, had to be elected. It was at this time that Henri Claireaux, who was to dominate Saint Pierre politics until 1962, formed his first coalition. Henri Claireaux's uncle had been a minor shipowner before 1914. His two brothers, Leonce and Elie, were the organizers of the dockers' union and the civil servants' union before the war. Claireaux had been schooled in France, but came back to Saint Pierre as a teacher in the church school. He entered politics in 1938, when he was elected to the Administrative Council. At the outbreak of war he was sent to France, but returned almost immediately. From 1941 to 1942 he studied political science at Laval University. After the first few months of Gaullist government he returned to Saint Pierre and to the church school. He was one of the administration's most active opponents in regard to the conscription of 1943-1944. During the last week of the

Reconciliation | 107 conscription he and his brother Leonce, among others, were detained because of their bitter opposition. Another of the detainees was Claireaux's most influential ally, lawyer Georges Lefevre, the secretary of the dockers' union. In 1946 Claireaux took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction of the population and organized a coalition for the election in 1946 of the General Council. They succeeded in gaining the participation of some mild Gaullists, notably Henri Dagort, the chargé d'affaires of the Corporation des Pêcheurs, whom they put up as their chief. In addition to three moderate Gaullists were five wartime Pétainists, including two businessmen, Henri Morazé and Marcel Girardin. The result of the election was a bare majority for the Claireautist ticket. Their opponents had been a straight, staunch Gaullist ticket made up of the newly elected members of the Administrative Council and the Town Council. Only on the Gaullist stronghold of Ile aux Marins was the Claireaux list checked. In 1964 Louis Jacquinot, Minister of Overseas Territories, visited Saint Pierre to encourage the re-establishment of order after the workers had been rioting. On this occasion, Henri Claireaux gave an insight into his view of the 1941 dispute and, by implication, the way in which it had influenced his policies after the war: "Time has erased much discord and much animosity, and for many years now, Gaullists and non-Gaullists have worked together for the well-being of the territory. But we cannot forget that Christmas 1941 brought us many improvements in the social sphere . . . For many, Gaullism and social welfare were intimately linked. So today, the trouble comes again from social problems."11 For Claireaux, then, the troubles of the war on Saint Pierre stemmed from a discontented society. With his General Council after the war he made a determined effort to close the gap between the two unequal sectors of the population: the administrators and businessmen, on the one hand, and the fishermen and workers on the other. From 1946 until 1964 he succeeded in having virtually every welfare law that was passed in France applied to Saint Pierre. Claireaux and the leaders who supported him, like Georges Lefevre, head of the Welfare Bureau, and Jean Ozon, whose father had been

io8 I Divided Island head of the Fabrique under Monsignor Legasse, represented a group of intellectuals who recognized the failure of the old order to support the population and who defected from it. They were men whose families were anti-Gaullist, whose roots were in the family tradition, and whose opposition to the old order came from exposure to new ideas, especially in France. In this respect they were unlike most of their followers, whose opposition was based upon the personal experience of economic hardship. Claireaux was able to recruit a very devoted following. Even his opponents would admit that he was honest, intelligent, and courageous. If a doryman was disabled and needed a car, Claireaux would find a used one for him in France at a low price and have it shipped to Saint Pierre. He had devoted followers ( Militants) in many sections of Saint Pierre. When a follower would hear of someone who was disaffected, he would write to Claireaux, and the next time Claireaux was in Saint Pierre they would go and visit the family together to find out what was the matter. The General Council was responsible for the election of a senator. Gilbert de Bournat and Claireaux were candidates and, after lastminute lobbying, Claireaux was elected. He was still Saint Pierre's senator in 1966. The deputy for Saint Pierre and Miquelon to the Consultative Assembly, which prepared a new constitution, was Henri Debidour, who had been a doctor with the Free French forces on Saint Pierre at the end of the war. Debidour received the straight Gaullist vote, which at this time was almost exactly one half of the voting population. Until 1946, the Pétainist vote was split three ways. In the first election of August 1945 about half had gone for Henri Claireaux and half for Gilbert de Bournat, who returned to an island where he retained loyal support from the Pétainists. The administration, however, would not allow Bournat to land on the island, so he waged his campaign from the town of Grand Bank, Newfoundland. A run-off election was held, because no one had a complete majority, and Bournat stepped down, leaving the hard-core Pétainist votes to the third Pétainist candidate, lawyer Dominique Laureili. Debidour won the run-off. By June 1946 Claireaux had his sights set on the senator-

Reconciliation | 109 ship, and supported Laureili as deputy. In June 1946 Laureili was narrowly beaten by Debidour in the election for the Assembly. Laureili was finally elected in November 1946, by a margin of forty votes.12 Dominique Laureili had been the head of customs on Saint Pierre before the war, but in 1936 he had been indicted for allegedly receiving bribes from various Saint Pierre firms in return for expeditious customs clearance in off-hours. He was cleared upon appeal in France, but in the interim he had studied law and passed the bar examinations, becoming a lawyer in France. On Saint Pierre, however, he had married into a Saint Pierre family that was mostly Pétainist during the war. His Saint Pierre relatives suggested that he run for the newly created deputy's seat in 1945. In 1946 he gained the support of Claireaux, and his original supporters, who were strong Pétainists, were joined by Claireaux's mixture of Pétainists and workers. The alliance of Laureili and Claireaux was consecrated by the presence of Laurelli's brother-in-law on the Claireaux General Council. Laureili remained allied with Claireaux until 1951. From the various election results of 1945 and 1946 one arrives at the following line-up of political tendencies on the island: out of 2,100 active voters, 1,000 were for the Gaullist candidate, 650 for the Pétainist candidate, and 450 for the Claireautist candidate. From 1946 until 1951 the Claireautists and the Pétainists formed a coalition which elected Laureili as deputy, and the Claireaux list for the General Council. In 1947, Monsignor Poisson resigned. He had felt bound to ride out the storm during the war, but he was under intense pressure from local Gaullists and was doubtful of the fruitfulness of his remaining on Saint Pierre. His resignation was accepted by the Fathers of the Holy Ghost in Paris. They themselves had been divided during the war and were not a little embarrassed by the forthright stand that Poisson had taken on Saint Pierre. Poissons successor was Monsignor Martin, who remained on Saint Pierre until 1966. In his opening address, Monsignor Martin set the tone of reconciliation. The phrase that stayed with his listeners was: "In essential things, Unity; in relative things, Liberty; in all things, Charity."13

no

I Divided Island

At about the same time that Poisson resigned, a moderate governor, Moisset, came to Saint Pierre with reconciliation as his official policy. Under Moisset, the two or three Pétainists who had been excluded from the civil service were reintegrated. Other steps had already been taken. Most of the discriminatory judgments made during the war against Pétainists were reversed or annulled. Import and export licenses began to be issued again with a measure of impartiality. With the reintegration of the Pétainists into the civil service, few tangible results of the war were left. One was that Saint Pierre Gaullists with war experience found it easier to reach higher positions in certain branches of the civil services, notably customs, the post office, and the harbor administration. Another was that fifty-five Saint Pierre girls (virtually all in the Gaullist camp) were wives of soldiers and sailors among the Free French. Some of the husbands stayed on the island. In 1962 there were still several Frenchmen on Saint Pierre who had come with the Free French. At the presentation of the Legion of Honor to Claireaux's president of the General Council, Henri Dagort, each speaker took the opportunity to mention reconciliation, especially because Dagort, a Gaullist, had been president of the predominantly Pétainist General Council. The following is an excerpt from the speech of Henri Morazé, the General Council's vice president: Speaking in the name of the General Council, I wish to insist upon the courage [of Henri Dagort] in presenting himself as a candidate in spite of the bitter criticisms of many of his friends, on a list which included men who had not always shared his political opinions and who above all wished to put an end to the deleterious quarrels which had lasted too long . . . That is why, M. Dagort, all those who repudiate hatred and vengeance—and there are many on Saint Pierre and Miquelon—rejoice with us in the high distinction that has been accorded to you.14 But reconciliation could not become more of a political and social reality until elections ceased to be fought on the old issues, and Gaullist stopped confronting Pétainist on the electoral list. Although on public occasions Saint Pierre's leaders proclaimed the necessity for

2. Mural by Gaston Roullet, painter for the Ministry of the Marine, for display at the Colonial Exposition of Bordeaux in 1895. Graviers are in the foreground.

3· Louis Legasse, c. 1905.

4· Card used by Msgr. Christophe Legasse to solicit funds in Paris for a new church.

Louis

5. Vigie poster, c. 1904. Réveil published a false dispatch about Louis Legasse's sickness and death. Here Vigie lampoons the Réveil reaction. The small fat man is Leoni Coste, rival merchant. Beside him is Gustave Daygrand, followed by Aristide Delmont. Mazier is the one-man band and proudly displays the cross of the Legion of Honor awarded during his mayoralty. The candle is an allusion to an old charge that Mazier took advantage of his term as mayor to sell a large stock of candles to the municipality. Saint Pierrais have been unable to identify the waiter and the crocodile man on the shelf.

6. Réveil poster, 1904. The Morue Française is seen as an octopus with tentacles reaching to the governor (upper left), the customs (upper right), the dredging operation (lower right), and the postal contract (lower left).

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i l . Victory procession, 1945. The Saint Pierre militia is followed by Free French troops and the war veterans of 1914.

12. The old Saint Pierre: procession for the Fête des Marins, Spring 1963.

13- Batìgnolles workers demonstrating for a pay raise, May 9, 1964, in front of the administration building.

14- Riot of May 19, 1964. Saint Pierrais seek Grad at the police station early in the day. Many more came to find him there later.

15. At the reception for Albert Briand, August 1964, Hôtel Ile de France.

Reconciliation | 111 peace and concord, when it came to legislative elections the old division came up again and again, and the candidates tended to represent one side or the other. This in turn is a measure of how deep the feeling ran among the voters. Laureili was the standard-bearer of the Pétainists. His chief opponent after Debidour was Alain Savary, who had retained an enthusiastic Gaullist following on the island ever since his euphoric reception as the first Free French governor. Savary first ran for deputy in 1947, on the solicitation of Saint Pierre's Gaullists. In that year he was defeated by Laureili (who had Claireaux's support) by twenty-two votes. The next election took place in 1951. Claireaux had fallen out with Laureili and was looking for another candidate to support. Father Gervain, a Saint Pierre priest living in Paris, suggested a rapprochement between Claireaux and Savary, as a means of gaining Gaullist support for Claireaux's General Council, and as a way to help conciliate the old quarrel on Saint Pierre. Although Claireaux belonged to the Catholic Mouvement Républicain Populaire which favored government aid to parochial schools, and Savary belonged to the anticlerical socialist party, they found that their ideas for Saint Pierre did not radically differ, and Claireaux agreed to support Savary in the June 1951 election for deputy. It was more or less assumed that Claireaux would take effective control of legislative representation of Saint Pierre and Savary would be free to operate on the national level. ( He became Secretary of State for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs under Mendès-France. ) At the small price of putting doctrinal differences aside, the two politicians assured each other's election and were free to pursue their own preferred courses.16 Claireaux estimates that of his core of 450 supporters, 100 Pétainists were lost in the switch; but it gained him the Gaullist votes on the island. The votes which he brought to Savary were enough for Savary to defeat Laureili by a wide margin in the election. Some of Claireaux's supporters who had been Pétainists stayed with him in the switch. They may have been influenced by the fact that the alliance was mediated through a priest who gave it his wholehearted support.

112

J Divided Island

Although paradoxical, in a sense it was inevitable that the Gaullists on Saint Pierre should find their leaders in the old Pétainist families. There was a vacuum in the leadership of the local Gaullists, a vacuum that Claireaux found difficult to fill when he was looking for a suitable Gaullist to be deputy in 1958, 1962, and 1964. The only experienced political leaders who had gone Gaullist in 1941-1942 were Emile Gloanec and Leonce Dupont, and both of them died in 1946. The alliance did help to scramble the legislative elections so that they were not simply Gaullist against Pétainist, and although subsequent elections did revive the old issue, it was no longer in simple black and white terms. It was thus a second step in the reconciliation of the two parties—the removal of the quarrel from the political, after the administrative arena. In 1951, however, it still remained with deep force on the personal level. Both for Gaullists and anti-Gaullists the fire of the wartime experience welded the most committed together, confirming old connections, setting up new ones, and creating a wider political brotherhood on each side. Among the most active partisans of both sides a tutoyer was set up, born of comradeship in the little battle that Saint Pierrais lived out among themselves. An anti-Gaullist Saint Pierrais, writing in 1958, remarked on the durability of the old division, which still underlay the political coalitions of the moment: The Gallo-Communist Free French movement in Saint Pierre really became a mystique. It was as if the people had been inoculated with some serum. One Frenchman writing near the end of the war described "miracles of Gaullism" that he witnessed in other places. This applies also to Saint Pierre. To take one example: there was one man who could not walk any more, he just moved slowly about with two canes. When they arrived he just dropped his canes and walked about like anyone else. As a matter of fact, he would run. He died only a couple of months ago. This stubbornly lasting serum still had its effect to some extent in 1951. And in passing I think it is remarkable that in spite of what Henri [Claireaux] did for the people of Saint Pierre: increases in salary, baby bonus, holidays, etc., etc., still the beneficiaries of those

Reconciliation | 113 would have voted for Savary against Henri, had they been opposed.16 Indeed, the old question was far from settled. Most of the Pétainists bitterly resented Claireaux for what they considered his desertion of the cause, and some of them became his fiercest opponents. The alliance of 1951 was the union of the left-wing Claireautists with the Gaullists, who filled the lower occupations on the island. That left the naked conflict between commerce and the workers, which had been at the root of much of the 1941 hostility. Claireaux's support had emerged from social discontent, and his political statements seem to have fostered the continuance of the discontent. W e can detect the anticommercial bias of an intellectual. His speeches constantly refer to fishermen, workers, and the poorer wage earners, but rarely did he encourage the commercial sector of the economy or understand its benefits to the population as a whole. In the end, he tended to remind the islanders of the differences in class and wealth that existed among them. Hence, although Claireaux had been an anti-Gaullist, and had been a teacher in the church school, it could hardly be said that he encouraged the myth of the family on Saint Pierre. Not that there was much myth left to encourage by 1946. Because of the alliance of social-minded Pétainists like Claireaux with the workers and the fishermen, there was already a partial mix-up of the old political factions. After Savary's victory of 1951, in which he received virtually all of the Gaullist vote, his opponent, Laureili, slowly began to gather new strength. Laurelli's strength came from another reversal. The more moderate Gaullists grew apprehensive of Claireaux's shrill opposition to everything governmental and everything commercial, and moved toward Laureili as the candidate of stability. By the election of 1956 the sides had nearly evened up, and Savary defeated Laureili by only nine votes out of 2,300. The solidity of the Pétainist bloc broke in 1951 as a result of a political maneuver. That of the Gaullist bloc eroded as the Gaullism of 1941 gradually lost its political relevance. Whereas in 1951 that

114

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Island

section of the Pétainists who were inclined toward the left had gone to Savary, in 1956 and 1959 that section of the Gaullists who were inclined toward the right had gone to Laureili. Laureili encouraged this tendency by joining the Gaullist party, the Union Nationale pour la Cinquième République, in 1958. The return to power of de Gaulle in 1958 further confused the matter, for Gaullism was suddenly the doctrine of order, with none of the appeal that it had for the down-and-out in 1941. It soon became clear that the Gaullist of 1941 was very different from the Gaullist of 1958. Many of the more flexible Pétainists, like Francis Leroux, supported de Gaulle, while most of the workers, opposed to the administration of the islands, were naturally opposed to the government it represented. The parties were thus reversed from their 1941 positions; many people made a complete about-face on the national level while remaining opposed on the local level. Francis Leroux's campaign hand-out in 1964 included the following statement: "If you send me to sit in the Palais Bourbon [Chamber of Deputies], I am assured membership into the UNR, the party of the governmental majority; and in order to make my position clear I should say that since 1958 I have been a member of the National Association for the Support of the Actions of General de Gaulle, head of state. For many of you, my obedience may seem strange, but you may be assured that it is motivated by sincere and profound sentiments: the spirit of order, the sense of dignity, and the respect and prestige of France in the world."17 Leroux's reasons could stand for those of a substantial number of former anti-Gaullists. A member of the General Council of 1965 described the change. "The opposition (in 1942) tended to be the conservatives, the gros. They were the kind of people who turn with the wind, who are now Gaullists. As for me, I was a Gaullist, and I am not any more." Savary had been a minister under Mendès-France and could not accept the seemingly rightist de Gaulle of 1958. Whereas Laureili, the candidate for Saint Pierre's Pétainists, had become a Gaullist, Savary, the epitome of wartime Gaullism, became an anti-Gaullist. He could not run again from Saint Pierre. For the 1959 legislative election Claireaux had to find another wartime Gaullist in order to maintain

Réconciliation | ιι$ his alliance. Unfortunately two turned up at once, one of whom apparently had the sole purpose of telling the Saint Pierrais that the other was a fake. Their election speeches on the radio dealt with whether or not they had actually been bona-fide Gaullists during the war. The result was that the Gaullist vote was split between the two, and the eternal Laureili was finally re-elected. By 1962 the Saint Pierre population was tired of its General Council. It had been re-elected in 1959 only because it had resigned over the issue of conscription, and the island felt bound to support it as a question of local pride and defense of local prerogatives. In 1962 Claireaux failed to regain the deputyship for his candidate. The election of 1962 marked the political emergence of Albert Briand. Briand ran against a Claireautist candidate and Deputy Laureili, and won the election. Already the owner of a major department store, Briand had set up Air Saint Pierre in 1959 and opened a large hotel to handle the tourists. He also purchased a boat and took over ferry service with nearby Newfoundland. No one man was more responsible for Saint Pierre's burgeoning tourist trade, the only area of island affairs which could be said to have prospered from 1959 until 1962. As a prominent Saint Pierrais said after the election, "they voted for a man whom they knew well in action." In 1964, in conjunction with the wage demonstrations of construction workers, Albert Briand resigned his position in protest against the General Council, and then ran again explicitly to show that the population did not support the council. He was victorious, and soon afterward, Henri Claireaux, after heading the General Council for eighteen years, dictated a letter of resignation to his councillors. The years 1962-1965 were mainly a struggle between Briand and Claireaux. The two brothers-in-law represented the two streams of Saint Pierre history that went back to the beginning of the century. The flamboyant Briand in many ways was a political reincarnation of Louis Legasse. He had appeal both for the commercial class and for the workers. His father had been on Legasse's Town Council. More significantly, Briand deeply believed in the unity of Saint Pierre. He was perhaps one of the few men who continued to have faith in the concept of Saint Pierre as a family. His elections were nearly

ιι6

I Divided Island

always a call to unity. He had the support of certain elements of the clergy and the Legasse traditionalists on the island, as well as that of a surprising number of workers. In his political style, too, Albert Briand was a leader in the old tradition. As in the old-time elections of Legasse, he found people coming to him at his store saying, "We have twelve votes, will you give us credit?" It was the expected way for him to act. In the election of 1964 he found out that Claireaux had helped an old man who had some lettuce to sell by putting an announcement on the radio to advertise the lettuce. Briand was more direct—he bought the lettuce. In a way this symbolized the difference in method between the two traditions. Claireaux gave help through the intelligent use of public systems. Briand used his economic power. The turnover in the General Council was partly caused by a new generation's coming of age, an event that found its parallel in France. The Claireaux General Council virtually had not changed since 1946 and drew its appeal from the same figures—the same unions that had elected it in 1946. But the new generation of workers had its own leaders, and the younger men, who had not directly experienced the paternal hand of Henri Claireaux (although their fathers probably had) grew restive under the control of their elders. The election of Albert Briand, irrespective of its implications for the future, marked a final period in the political repercussions of the old division. Many people, Gaullist and Pétainist alike, said that Briand would not have stood a chance had he rim for office ten years before. As one of the more extreme anti-Gaullists, he would not have been able to win. But in the ig6o's there were simply not enough people left for whom the old division meant enough to defeat a former opponent. In August 1964 Briand was elected partly because of the support of former Pétainists (one of whom said to me after the election, "We finally got them!"), but also with the support of many Gaullists. From what material I could gather about Briand's supporters, over two thirds of those who had been active in the events of 1941-1944 had been Gaullists. Some of the men, at the traditional victory reception after the election, pointedly wore the Cross of Lorraine in their lapels. It is not that these men were rejecting their past, for their pride

Reconciliation | 117 in the Free French movement lives on; it is just that enough of the bitterness has worn off to permit them to support a capable man, even though he was opposed to their movement. The erosion of time, and the rise of a new generation whose resentment is directed against the administration instead of the wealthy, have done more to calm the old hatreds than have the official declarations and remonstrances of the Church and the various governors after 1945. Yet none of these developments has changed the bitterness of those people whose stand for Vichy or the Free French was most marked. The establishment of rival veterans' organizations after the war was a powerful source of friction. Those Pétainists who had been conscripted in 1944 formed L'Association de L'Armée du Rhin et Danube, while the Gaullists formed three separate groups: one for the select few who volunteered before the coming of Muselier, Les Evadés de Guerre; one for those who had volunteered after Muselier's arrival, L'Association des Engages Volontaires; and one for those who had been conscripted, Les Anciens de la Deuxième Division Blindée. Because it was formed first, the Pétainist organization received by chance the authorization from France to be the official veterans organization for World War II, and the former head of the group, Eugene Cormier, is the official government veterans' secretary. This is naturally a subject for Gaullist resentment. Until recently the old war wounds were reopened every time there was a memorial celebration, for there would always be two parades and two separate banquets—one for the Ancien Combattants of World War I and all of the Gaullist groups, the other for the Pétainist group. It is only in the late 1950s that the to veterans' groups began to march together, and the Pétainists began to attend the regular Saturday night dances, sponsored by the Gaullist veterans, in the Salle des Fêtes. Perhaps the most intransigent Gaullists today are the old members of the World War I veterans' organization who helped to organize the Free French movement from the start and who, unlike those who fought, remained on the island through the heat of the conflict. Similarly, those Pétainists who, like one family, had their windows broken and were stoned by children in the streets, will never really forget.

ιι8

I Divided Island

On each side there may be twenty-five families for whom the old rancor is still a daily factor in their lives, who will not talk or associate with most members of the opposite party.18 Only for these few people is the old division significant in terms of friendship. The discrimination is not passed on to children, and for those durs who remain it will probably die only as they die. One of the most potent sources for reconciliation had itself once been a source of collective antagonism. The old resentment against the civil servants from France, so powerful a factor before the war, had been somewhat overshadowed during the time of the Free French by the local political division. After the war it gradually returned, and Saint Pierrais regrouped, both in their opposition to particular administrative policies and in their distrust of colonial bureaucracy. In December 1957 the workers on government unemployment projects wanted a raise in the minimum hourly wage. They also objected to a stipulation that any worker who had a job would have to be unemployed three days before he would be accepted on government projects. They held a demonstration in front of Governor Pierre Sicaud's official residence. "We went to tell the Governor to pack his bags," bragged one worker. The policemen did not come because there were only about thirteen of them, and they had been told that if they came they would be thrown into the water. When Sicaud came out to talk with them, he was insulted and hit with snowballs. But he promised to meet them at his office at nine o'clock that evening, and at the meeting he granted all of their demands. There was no more violence. "Fortunately," wrote an observer of the incident to a Saint Pierrais friend in Canada, "because, you know, in these crowds when something happens you don't know where it will go." In May 1964 a more serious demonstration occurred, which perhaps had greater repercussions than the one in 1957. Some time in the spring of 1964 Henri Claireaux had wired to union leaders on Saint Pierre that the Common Market had voted money to be used in raising the pay of the workers on the new port project. By this time the Société des Batignolles had been on Saint Pierre for a year and a half and was paying the manual workers on the project a salary only slightly more

Reconciliation | îig than the minimum wage. The government on Saint Pierre proved to be a stumbling block to increasing the wage, because it feared that a general increase in salaries would result. Finally, early in May, the workers held a demonstration in front of the government building with signs reading "Poverty Wage" and "Sixty cents, c'est un insulte." The workers waited for government action. There was none. Another strike was held on the nineteenth of May. At this point Governor Herry promised to convene the labor-management-administration bargaining committee for ten o'clock on the morning of May 20. It is reported that on May 19 there was a sign on one motorcycle saying, "Grad, pack your bags!" Charles Grad was the governor's Director of Public Works. Already on the night of May 19 there was talk of making Grad leave Saint Pierre. On that night the union gave the order to strike the next day. The pot was boiling over. On May 20 union leaders and a number of workers met at the office of Henri Leroux for the promised negotiations. They were told that the negotiations would be postponed until the afternoon. That morning groups of workers were at the governor's residence, the administration building, the main square, and the police station. Governor Herry seemed to be waiting for the arrival of the French warship, the Jeanne d'Arc, due for an official visit, to settle things down. The governor himself was found in his car by the rioters, and they rocked it back and forth before letting it go. When the captain of the Jeanne d'Arc arrived at the administration building, the workers refused to let him through. One striker said, "Let him through, he doesn't have anything to do with it." But another ended the idea with "No, he's a mailloux [a Frenchman]." At two o'clock workers came to Henri Morazé, who was at an emergency meeting of the General Council, and asked that the departure of the packet boat, the Miquelon, for Canada, be postponed. Morazé, as head of the Administrative Fleet, was in charge of the boat. The strikers then sounded the fire siren on the public school, immediately drawing out the bulk of the population. The workers started for the main square, then went looking for Charles Grad—first to the government building, then to the police station, then to the church, then to Grad's house, and finally back to the police station, where they found him. Some say he had spent the night there. By this

120 I Divided Island time everyone knew they were going to make Grad leave. A large crowd gathered in front of the police station, singing the French Mardi Gras song, "You are going, and you leave us, it's the day of Mardi Gras." At first the police had wanted to take him to the boat in the police truck, but the rioters would not agree; he must walk. They did not allow him to get his bags or even to say goodbye to his family. On the walk from the police station to the dock everyone whistled and shouted at him, and all the old quarrels against him were brought up. A great many people were there who were his friends, drawn by curiosity to see what was happening. When Grad got to the boat, he came out on deck as if to address the crowd, but one worker threw a board at him and he went back in. That was the last of him on Saint Pierre. (Like Bournat in 1942, he received a promotion on arrival in France. ) The bargaining committee had finally got underway at 5:15, while the demonstration was still going on, and was over by 6:00. But Grad had already left. The demands of the workers were met. Why did the rioters pick Grad to send away? As one official put it, "He drew fire from every side." As head of the public works he had been the boss for the unemployed on public projects. As president of the SPEC he had the enmity of certain SPEC workers; and it had been implied that the delay of Common Market funds for the Batignolles workers was his doing. Grad's close association with the Church did not stop the rioters. He had never refused when the Church requested a few workmen for repairs. It was perhaps this special relationship which prompted Monsignor Martin to condemn the riots the following Sunday. Grad had been on Saint Pierre for a number of years and, like many civil servants, had good friends among the merchants. It was inevitable that he had also made enemies, for he was loyal to his friends. He was a personality upon whom the rioters' frustration and dissatisfaction could focus. It was partly an irrational decision born of built-up resentment against the boss, against metropolitans, and against authority in general. One favorite phrase that Saint Pierrais use in explanation is, "He as too well known on Saint Pierre; he was here too long." In a photograph made of the striking workers during the first demonstration, all of them are Batignolles employees. In the photo-

Reconciliation | 121 graphs taken of the subsequent riots, and according to other reports, the rioters were not only Batignolles workers but also dockers, SPEC workers, the unemployed, and the regular collection of ne'er-do-wells who join most communal affairs. Of the striking workers and rioters identifiable on the photographs, 85 percent were from families of the Gaullist side during the war, and 15 percent were from families on the Pétainist side. As a measure of the extent to which this new division cut across old lines, it should be said that most of the striking workers voted for Albert Briand, whom they would have bitterly opposed twenty years before. The riots of May 1964 provoked an official visit in July by Louis Jacquinot, Minister of Overseas Territories, who came and decorated some of the more orderly members of the population. The riots also provided a good sounding board for Albert Briand's re-election in August. On the evening of Albert Briand's election another incident, perhaps slight in itself, was indicative of the continuing rancor against French civil servants. A celebration party ended with a violent set-to by three or four workers, with antimetropolitan overtones. A foreman from France who had lived for a long time on Saint Pierre shoved a Saint Pierrais who had pushed his way into the bar. The worker asked defensively why he had been picked on. The foreman said, "You drank too much, like the others." It was this reference to the group—comme les autres—which started the fight. Instantly came the reply from another worker, "We're not mailloux, mister," and there was a full-scale brawl. When a dockers' strike occurred in May 1965, the Briand General Council resigned. The governor, who had long feared a recurrence of the riots of 1964, called in troops from France "to maintain order." The troops landed at night at the fish plant, but were surprised to find the town peaceful and sleeping. The Saint Pierrais felt insulted by the arrival of the troops. A general strike was called, which lasted for three days, under the aegis of the Committee for the Defense of the Interests of the Islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon. Led by the mayor and the members of the General Council, the population peacefully demonstrated against the troops.19 But the demonstration was not unanimous. Senator Claireaux and his unions did not take an active

122 I Divided Island part, nor did most of the Gaullist war veterans. Most of the workers did, however, and the demonstrations had a heavily antiadministration, antimetropolitan tone. In theory the French administration, like the Church, could be regarded as a unifying influence, cutting across group divisions. In this respect, the availability of civil service jobs to qualified personnel, despite their social or factional origins, might be cited, as well as the social benefits provided by the French government, which tended to even out gaps in the population. Unfortunately, in other respects the effects of the French administration have been negative. In practice many governors have given in to the temptation of supporting one or another faction of the population. On a less deliberate level, individual civil servants quite inevitably have their friends and their enemies. Furthermore metropolitans themselves constitute a social grouping that associates differentially with the Saint Pierre groups. An analysis of the social problems created by the presence of the metropolitans on Saint Pierre helps to elucidate the sources of conflict in 1941, as well as of more recent island unrest. Mistrust between Saint Pierrais and metropolitans has existed throughout the century. It is understandable, even if it sometimes takes irrational forms. Its sources are to be found in the social isolation of the metropolitans, a colonial mentality on the part of a few of them, real differences in standard of living and in education, and a certain inferiority complex on the part of the islanders. The metropolitans surpass the Saint Pierrais in education, salary, and family payments. It is only necessary here to show just how much resentment exists on Saint Pierre. The differences in child-support payments are mentioned the most frequently in demonstrating the unfairness of the administration. It crops up often in private conversations about metropolitans, and the subject has been raised several times in Claireaux's General Council.20 Differences in salary and a paid vacation in France—with transportation and often with a Saint Pierre maid in tow—arouse much resentment in those Saint Pierrais who have to live on the minimum wage paid to them in the winter by these very administrators. By themselves these differences would

Reconciliation | 123 be something to complain about, but nothing serious; they become more important when added to other factors. Saint Pierrais think there are too many functionaries from France and that the money going to pay supernumeraries comes out of their own pockets. A Gaullist (of 1941) fisherman complained, O n e of the first things that de Gaulle was going to do in 1958 was to get rid of a lot of functionaries, and now there are more than ever." Apart from the differences that the metropolitans bring to Saint Pierre, they are socially isolated once they arrive. A Saint Pierrais described this isolation as follows: "When certain civil servants from France come to Saint Pierre, they are the nicest people you would ever want to know. They are friendly with everybody. They would soon become close friends with everyone, but after fifteen days or a month, we don't see them any more. They are drawn away by those that were already here." The civil servants live fairly close together in government buildings. They may say that their isolation is due to mistrust in the population. The population attributes it to disdain by the "metros." "They act like they are superior," said one Saint Pierre civil servant. "They have a colonial mentality." Another local civil servant put it similarly: "They come from other colonies, where there were Negroes, and they take on superior airs. When they are by themselves together they tear us apart." Throughout the century Saint Pierrais have repeated the charge that "they are treating us as if we were Negroes."21 A great deal of harm is done by the few metropolitans who do put on airs. There is most recently the case of a judge who was wont to declare that Saint Pierrais were good for nothing, that they didn't want to work and didn't know how. He finally became an embarrassment to the administration and went back to France. This social isolation causes a good deal of resentment. Perhaps an even greater cause is the fact that the outsiders are not totally isolated, but associate with selected segments of the population. Indeed, the government on Saint Pierre has not ceased to exercise power by allying itself with one or another political faction on the island. There are several cases throughout the century of elections on the island where one side was put up by the administration (the Planté list). In 1965

124 I Divided Island the governor attempted to raise an opposition list to the Briand General Council. Usually, however, the administration is more subtle and favors a candidate already established. Prior to 1910 the administration seemed to alternate its support between the Morue Française and the more radical faction. The governor in 1920 went so far as to set up his own popular faction, which succeeding governors until 1942 spent much of their effort trying to stamp out. It is not, however, the political policies of the administration which are really important here, but the social associations of the administrators. Throughout the century there have been close ties with some of the rich merchants, often those who had the most to gain through such relationships. There has even been a certain amount of intermarriage. These associations are in a sense determined by the similar level of education and culture of the two groups. Many of the more well-off merchants travel regularly to France and place importance on being up-to-date and sophisticated. They come closer than any other group to speaking the same language as the metros. In 1965 there was even a club where the two groups mixed—the Club des Iles. It should be noted that the merchants and civil servants do most of their socializing in their homes. One governor attributed this to class instinct. He reported that when metropolitans invite Saint Pierrais to their houses, and then suggest they go to have a drink at a bar after dinner, the Saint Pierrais refuse. The governor was probably incorrect here: this is not a class instinct; rather the Saint Pierrais do not want to be seen with metropolitans more than they have to. The Saint Pierrais outside of this charmed social circle draw their own conclusions. They assume that there is collusion between the merchants and the civil servants, to their own loss. Réveil made charges of the intimacy between certain administrators and the Morue Française, and Vigie replied in kind. There were echoes of this in 1942 when Le Rolland, of the Corporation des Pêcheurs, referred to the "grande pêche industry, all-powerful in the ministeries and the colonial administrations."22 This picture was shared by the Free French on their arrival. After the war it was no longer the Morue Française, but most of the other large merchants, that people assumed to be in collusion with the administration. Today on Saint Pierre it is commonly sup-

Reconciliation | 125 posed that many administrators do favors in return for presents; the strawberry-patch episode below is an excellent case in point. To be identified by the population with the metropolitans is the kiss of death for an aspiring politician on Saint Pierre. Consequently, although Saint Pierrais in elected positions must have a considerable professional contact with the administrators, they avoid extensive social contact. The election of 1964 provided an opportunity to see this factor in action. One candidate was a founder of the Club des Iles and quite friendly with many administrators. In one of the campaign broadcasts Albert Briand put it quite bluntly: "I permit myself to say that you have been encouraged to set up your candidacy by several metropolitan civil servants, no doubt charmed by your qualities as man of the world." Briand then played on his own brouilles (quarrels) with the metropolitans, knowing that this would appeal to the population and contrast with his opponent's friendships: "You will no doubt have the votes of several of those metropolitan civil servants on Saint Pierre that I must have indisposed toward me by certain of my interventions."23 Both Briand and Claireaux avoided social contacts with metropolitans. Behind the Saint Pierrais' accusations of a colonial mentality is a deep, almost ingrained sense that Saint Pierre is unappreciated in France, that its inhabitants are mistreated and not given what they deserve. For Saint Pierre is the only colony populated by Frenchmen from France. The Saint Pierrais would most like to be treated as real Frenchmen, not as Frenchmen by adoption. They emphasize at every opportunity that they are white. When Mayor Leheunen greeted Louis Jacquinot, Minister of Overseas Territories in 1964, he was careful to say: "Permit me, M. le Ministre, to introduce you to all those who live in this small land—all of white race, direct descendants of those Bretons, Normands, and Basques, who at the price of extraordinary effort have been able to keep for France this corner of land in North America. We thus consider ourselves to be the legitimate children of France."24 The same inferiority complex appeared during the General Strike of 1965, in response to the sending of the Gardes Mobiles from France. The sending of these soldiers was an affront to patriotism, and an

126 I Divided Island affront to the islanders' Frenchness. It is in this spirit that, when they feel that the mother country is mistreating them, they make gestures toward the outside—the United States or Canada—as a child might punish his mother. That, I think, is how the display of the American flag in 1908 and in 1965 should be interpreted. All the same, Saint Pierre draws much benefit from remaining a colony. It had the choice of independence in 1959, and turned it down because of the substantial subsidies it now receives. The people who are in the most daily contact with the metropolitans are their subordinates, the civil servants who are recruited on Saint Pierre. In no case is there a Saint Pierre civil servant higher in rank than a metropolitan one, because if that were the case the metropolitan would not have to come to Saint Pierre. With two different pay scales, there is naturally resentment. And as the people who are most ordered about, the Saint Pierre civil servants also feel most acutely the socalled colonial mentality of their superiors. That such an attitude existed before World War II is undeniable; but many of the administrators now come directly from France, and the old prestige of the Ministry of Overseas Territories at the Rue Oudinot is now irrevocably lost. What Saint Pierrais consider a colonial mentality now may well be the same bureaucratization that is common in France, but not normal on a small island where affairs are conducted on a more personal level. The diffuse hostility of the Saint Pierre workers to Charles Grad well represents their attitude to the administration as a whole. Ever since 1935 the administration has taken up the slack in the Saint Pierre economy, and the continued decline of people employed in primary occupations has provided more and more slack for the government to take up. The three largest sources of employment in the 1960's were the SPEC, which the government mostly funded; the harbor construction project, for which the government decided the wages; and the public works projects, entirely run by the government. As public works director, Grad was involved in all of these affairs. Today the administration is the boss of Saint Pierre, the source of most of the Saint Pierrais' income. As such, it is the obvious scapegoat when the economy is in decline,

Reconciliation | 227 and the latent resentment of metropolitans comes out at every economic crisis. Functionally, the government fills the same role that the Morue Française did at the beginning of the century. As in 1936-1940 it dominates the economic future of the majority of its citizens. In 1941 the transition from merchant power to administration power was only partially completed. The onus of economic responsibility rested jointly on the government and the merchants; hostility to the two merged; and the Gaullist-anti-Gaullist division was a manifestation of frustration with the joint loci of power. Today the power is almost completely in the hands of the administration, and economic frustrations provide the opportunity for the expression of long-standing prejudices against French administrators.

7 Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction

This analysis of Saint Pierre society from 1900 to 1965 has concentrated on the explanation of particular factional arrangements, their composition, and their decomposition. It is possible to abstract a rough pattern of social estrangement on Saint Pierre from the occasions and factors involved in any particular case. This chapter establishes a similarity in pattern between personal and group quarrels, and relates the two by means of the concept of information sets, a building block for the rise of factions. Saint Pierrais are extremely friendly toward tourists. The island visitor who has made the effort to go into homes has found a welcome there that most tourists never find anywhere. The contrast between his gracious welcome and what he hears about disputes on Saint Pierre may confuse him. Actually his welcome and the disputes are related. For in outsiders the islanders find a welcome relief from the complicated business of living with their neighbors. There is one grandmother, who lived through and remembers most events mentioned in this book, who says: "I am not the kind of person who likes to go and gossip. I do not mind stopping in to see someone after teatime for fifteen or twenty minutes, but no longer. I say hello and nod to everyone, but no more than that. One comes to learn that people are not trustworthy. I had two cousins, living on either side of my house, and we were close with them, but with nobody else. I learned to entrust my secrets to no one else." The woman emphasizes privacy and confidence. This emphasis runs through almost all of Saint Pierre life. There is a great preoccupation with the exchange of information and the preservation of information that is private. Aubert de la Rüe recalls that gossip and secrecy worked so hard on one man s mind in the 1930's that he finally became partially deranged. 128

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 12g At exactly 5:30 every afternoon he would lean from his window and repeat all the gossip he had heard during the day. He was known as Radio Saint Pierre.1 On Saint Pierre "secrets" might be as simple as a person's daily activities, political opinions, income, or profits. But to let someone in on these things is to let them have something on you; they may not use it now, but they might well have occasion to use it in twenty years—the likelihood being that in twenty years you will both still be living on Saint Pierre. The cultivation of the secret is matched by the avidity with which it is sought out. In conversations and in books about Saint Pierre life, the word cancan, meaning malicious gossip, comes up time and again. Naturally, when one repeats a piece of gossip, one has to protect one's source, so that gossip on Saint Pierre usually begins "On dit . . ." On the one hand, most people find it useful and entertaining to be part of an informal network that transmits gossip; but on the other hand, each person has to prevent his own private information from entering the network. A major source of rumor is the closed circuit of communication between the French government and the administration. Major decisions on policy, such as increases in the minimum wage and subsidies, are made in France. The Saint Pierrais know how much of their destiny is in the hands of the administration. Given this situation, advance information about administration policy can prove most useful. And in many cases it is more useful when fewer persons know about it. The administration is thus confronted with constant overt and covert attemps on the part of particular persons or groups to penetrate its communication system. In this sense "scuttlebutt" is endemic on Saint Pierre, as it is in an army platoon or on a ship. It is in the interest of the superordinates not to reveal all their information to subordinates for the efficient management of the community; and it is in the interest of the subordinates to find out things that other subordinates do not find out. But unlike scuttlebutt on a boat, much rumor on Saint Pierre does not reach all of the population, but remains boxed in groups of people who find it to their advantage not to spread it any farther. Indeed, a kind of social unit can be defined by means of "boxed" rumors. I shall call this an "information set"—the group of persons

130 I Divided Island among whom private information can be exchanged and discussed. The set is mostly composed of relatives (often including in-laws), but not exclusively. Each large business, because of the intensity of competition on the island, must itself be an information set; most company employees at a high level—clerks, accountants—are selected above all with a view to their discretion and, if possible, from within the owner's family. Units of government employees also tend to form information sets. Apart from such professional sets, the others work on an informal social level. Membership in the set can perhaps be measured by the freedom with which the members visit each other's kitchens. The set might never meet all together, except perhaps around the sickbed of one of its members. Everyone on Saint Pierre knows that such sets exist, and some people have developed something of a complex about them. It is a kind of fear of what someone is saying behind one's back. A Gaullist referred defensively to a gossip circle (boîte de cancans) where some of the Pétainists met in 1941, and "where everything was repeated." A Pétainist diary mentions the Gaullist meetings on Langlade as if they were trials, calling them the "Diet of Langlade." In the early part of the century certain information sets were formalized and called cercles. The Almanac of 1916 lists two cercles and their members. One was clearly made up of Legassists and the other of anti-Legassists.2 Political subjects were supposed to be taboo in these particular cercles, though, and they functioned somewhat like fraternal organizations in America. In Ceux de l'Epave, a novel valuable for its glimpses of social life, a Saint Pierrais describes the life to the wife of a new administrator: "You form a large family, and quickly an intimacy develops."3 This "large family" is what I am calling the information set. The membership of persons in more than one information set is the means by which rumors gain wider and wider audiences. This joint membership in effect sets up chains of sets which cover virtually all of the people on the island. Saint Pierre's sets and chains, defined as they are by their function in the preservation of nonpublic information, vary in configuration according to the different types of information. Certain private personal information may never pass beyond the immediate set. Certain

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 131 political information may string up several sets that share the same attitudes. Whereas the set itself is a relatively permanent unit, the arrangement of sets, I think, varies a great deal, following economic, political, and social-emotional coalitions of the moment. These sets exist throughout the world wherever people live together, but in some places they are more bounded than in others. The range of informal social units in a society could theoretically vary from a uniform network, in which every person has the same number and strength of links with a given number of persons, who are in turn linked to others with the same degree of intensity; to a society made up of unconnected social clusters. Social units may be more or less bounded. A priori it would seem that, as with most social phenomena, we should expect that a map of social linkages would reveal clusters rather than a network, if only by the very asymmetry of kinship itself —some people have living parents and others do not. What little "hard" data I present in Chapter Eight on the informal social units of Saint Pierre suggest that the units on Saint Pierre are quite definitely bounded. My own experience there supports this: of the people I knew well, it was usually clear whether they were in a set whose existence I was aware of. Saint Pierre's sets and chains are made stronger, with more secure boundaries, because of the relative permanence of the population. Contributing factors are the concentration of the population in a small area, its isolation, and the need for social entertainment over the long dreary winters. Also, many of the sets on Saint Pierre have been welded by the fire of its corporate divisions. For most Saint Pierrais the information set is the most important social unit beyond the nuclear family. "Saint Pierre has the foolish way of life that one leads in every little town. The people are gossipy, and in truth one cannot blame them. Shut up on an island where living is necessarily cramped, they are all over each other, as if on board a ship. Lacking more important ideas, personalities, misfortunes, and disputes are common subjects of conversation, and, when rumor concerns everything, the relations between people suffer, and there are quarrels in which the ridiculousness of the causes does not rule out animosity."4 Saint Pierre has always had more than its share of personal quarrels.

132 I Divided Island The newspapers of the Legasse era, accounts of visitors to the islands, the novel of Saint Pierre life (Ceux de l'Epave), letters and diaries of the Free French era, all testify that the brouilles one witnesses on Saint Pierre today are not new to the islands. A government official, talking about the rejection of Grad, said: "He was here ten years. Let's say that every year he made two or three enemies: it's inevitable. In ten years that makes twenty or thirty enemies. And then when you count the wives and the children, that makes a hundred enemies." What is interesting is the assumption behind his words that life on Saint Pierre necessarily involves making enemies. The pages of the old newspapers resound with bellicose phrases about seemingly trivial disputes. And one finds repeated the same assumption voiced by the official above, that such disputes are inevitable: "Certainly we have our divisions, our dissensions, personal questions that one could regard as almost inevitable in any small town; we must accept it if we are pushed, or at least tolerate it. It is so much a part of human nature."5 In 1942 when Alain Savary came to Saint Pierre as the first Free French governor, he found the same plethora of personal quarrels that enmeshed every aspect of his work on the islands. Since the war, Saint Pierrais have been treated to major quarrels between leading merchants and between the heads of virtually all corporate and political bodies. The number of disputes and estrangements that major public figures seem to have is perhaps slightly higher, and certainly the quarrels are more visible than those for the average citizen. But every observer who has spent time on Saint Pierre and written at length about it has remarked upon the frequency and duration of personal quarrels. They differ only in whether they report the quarrels as harmful or entertaining. These virulent personal disputes have an intimate connection, both in cause and in effect, with the island's political and social divisions. An examination of several brouilles on Saint Pierre will be instructive in terms of the more serious disputes of the larger social groups with which I have been concerned so far. Perhaps five hundred persons vacation in small houses each summer, on sites well away from the center of town. Comparison with other island communities in the Atlantic and the Pacific suggests that the

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 133 existence of summer houses may fill the need for escape from smalltown hostilities; and, indeed, a disproportionate number of the summer houses are used by extreme partisans. But the summer colonies do not always provide a vacation from friction. On one site that houses perhaps thirty persons, most of the houses are strung along a road. Nearby, a merchant owns an old farm that has extensive acreage, and he vacations there. In the summer of 1962 a dispute developed over a right of way across his farm. The other vacationers had traditionally used his old road to go and gather wild strawberries on dimes that were common land. The merchant allegedly decided that it was a nuisance having people across his land, and he asked a metropolitan friend, an official, to check for any old maps that might not show the road. Such a map would enable him to say legally that there was no right of way across his land. Eventually a map was produced (some say fabricated), and a judge (also metropolitan) decided the case in favor of the merchant. Some people charged that the judge was one of the merchant's friends and not above doing him a service. The road was closed with a fence, and a notice of the judgment was printed in the Journal Officiel. With the legality of the matter so suspect, the vacationers felt justified in opposing the merchant. Neither side talked to the other. The merchant took shelter behind the law; the others plotted. Soon after the court decision, I arrived by chance in the midst of a summer war council and was told the whole story. At the end one of the women turned to me and said, "You can write that we want all those metropolitans to get the hell out of Saint Pierre." All sorts of ways to harass the merchant were considered, not the least of which was to picnic loudly on an (undisputed) road that ran in front of the farm. They did drag down the fence several times. At the time of this writing, two years after the dispute, it is still unsettled, and the judgment is on appeal in France. The two metropolitans, unpopular for these and other reasons, have long since left the islands. The Saint Pierre parties in all likelihood will remain estranged in the foreseeable future. Another brouille, apparently of commercial origin, will serve as a second example. A storekeeper became brouillé with his sister when she and two of his nephews set up another smaller store. The sister and

134 I Divided Island the nephews were not opposed to him in principle, but they expected him to be jealous of their venture. He was not opposed to them at the start, and he even helped them to furnish the business. But soon friction developed. The sister thought he wasn't being friendly and attributed this to his fear of competition. He felt nervous about their feeling nervous about him. Direct communication was broken off in a mood of uneasiness. The second business became favored by the governor, who was then at odds with the owner of the first, and consequently not on speaking terms with him. Official and semiofficial business that had previously gone to the larger store now went to the smaller. Visiting government functionaries were recommended to the smaller store. While the protagonists approached the situation gingerly, their close associates fed the fire enthusiastically, reporting with prejudice the doings and intentions of the other camp. When tourists who had previously traded at one store failed to return there, it was assumed until disproven that the other store had "stolen" them, although there were many neutral stores to which the tourists could have gone. At the very beginning, probably for economic reasons, each side was suspicious that the other was against it, although I am convinced of the good faith of both parties. Then, the slightest indication of aggression was thought to reveal an underlying ill-will, and was repaid in kind. Essential to the process was the cutoff of communication between the principals. Much of the information passed by intermediaries was biased. After about two months the hostility of each camp ceased to be a hypothesis that had to be proven and became a fact that had to be lived with, one of the "givens" of life on Saint Pierre for the people involved. It manifested itself in alignment in opposing political camps and commercial competition in other spheres. The author of Ceux de l'Epave provides a third example of a brouille: The old head of the administrative bureau had a tenacious grudge against the doctor. Hence he had a great joy in causing him troubles and making him enemies. He never missed the opportunity to draw up the doctor's monthly pay check personally, with errors

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 135 in order to delay the payment. Nor did he fail to reject every request for supplementary credits, even the most justified ones, for the need of the hospital service. This animosity was born of two pretended vexations on the part of the doctor. The first was the refusal of a vacation in France for convalescence for the son-in-law of M. Dutronel, after he had served only six months in the public school. M. Dutronel, who had recently married off his daughter, had thought it only natural that she take her wedding trip abroad at the expense of the public funds, the fairy godmother of all administrators. Dr. Dutrou-Fourmi, in spite of his great good will and his grand ideas of communism without any goods or future heritage to divide, had considered that M. Dutronel exaggerated. "If your son-in-law already had two years of service, it would be all right, but six months, no. The abuse would be too obvious." And he refused the vacation of convalescence asked for. The second vexation was the attribution, allegedly given him by the doctor (although the doctor always denied it) of the nickname O l d Man Whiskey." M. Dutronel, in spite of his fiery rages and his threats of duel on Green Island, had never been able to get rid of it.® Using the three quarrels related above as examples, the main steps in becoming opposed to someone on Saint Pierre can be outlined. In some way or another a source of potential hostility probably exists between any two persons on the islands, but between some persons the potential is certainly greater than between others. For simplicity of exposition, sources of potential hostility can be said to be of two sorts: ideological difference and ambiguity of obligation. Often both exist together. The road dispute is a good example of the way in which a basic difference can aggravate a touchy situation. The merchant-farmer was set apart from his opponents in many ways, and these differences were sources of friction even before the whole dispute started. He had a farm set apart; they had summer houses clumped together. He was a wealthy merchant; they were perhaps in less prestigious positions,

136 I Divided Island and certainly in less remunerative ones. He had social contacts with metropolitan administrators and regular access to their information; they did not. The other vacationers were probably better educated than he. Their political opinions were at variance with his. Two persons are more likely to disagree if they were brought up with different ideas about what is good in life or if they have different methods of attaining it. This is an obvious point. Basic differences in ideology can mean that individuals speak a different language. An eventual breakoff of communication is made simpler because there never was any substantial communication. Two of my examples illustrate the ambiguity of obligations. The businessman with the store was faced with two sets of conflicting rules. One set contained the rules for competition in business. The other comprised the obligations of aid due to kin. Once his sister decided to start a store, they were both faced with a dilemma. Both were nervous about it. His reaction was to remain distant; hers was one of premature apprehension. It seems to be unusually common on Saint Pierre, and perhaps in France also, to finesse the ambiguity of such situations completely by avoiding contact. Similar ambiguity of obligations occur frequently in administrative areas where the men with true responsibility are mainly those from France. On the one hand there are fixed rules for almost everything. On the other, Saint Pierre is a place notorious for doing things in a personal way, and many administrators make up their own rules or try to slip gracefully into the well-oiled ways of their predecessors. First, there is an initial ambiguity between the legal set of rules and the customary Saint Pierre interpretation of these rules. Second, since Saint Pierre customs are unwritten, there is dispute about just what they are and what can be expected from the administrator. This is the position in which "Doctor DoutrouFourmi" finds himself in the excerpt quoted above. Dutronel contends that six months is long enough to merit a "convalescence leave," and the doctor holds out for two years. The "law" by which they are making their decisions is unwritten. Early in the century Saint Pierre gentlemen settled their differences on the dueling field. Today Saint Pierrais duel with silence, which in some ways is less harmful than guns but can be equally serious and

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 137 last much longer. In the case of the storekeepers who were brother and sister, the cutoff of contact probably helped to avert direct hostility. In the case of the strawberry feud, the cutoff of communication came after open conflict in court and probably served to avoid further faceto-face conflicts. At whatever point it happens, a cutoff of communications is a typical feature of quarrels on Saint Pierre. It is even known to happen with two people living in the same house, and it can last over a period of years. But while severing of contact is the most likely mechanism for avoiding anguish in a small community, it often serves to render less possible the chances for reconciliation. The people involved tend to seek solace by justifying their point of view to their information sets. Having no communication tends to make both parties expect the worst of the opposition. It also permits biased reporting of the other's objectives by a third party. In the no-man's land of noncommunication, ridiculous accusations cannot be answered. Unwarranted fear of being attacked leads to unwarranted aggression. An analogy is provided by the malicious game which was reputedly played on cabin boys in navy ships: they would be blindfolded with one hand tied to the mast so that there was a circle of boys tied around the mast. Then a bat was placed in the outside hand, and they were told that if they were hit they should hit the boy in front of them harder. When communications are cut off on Saint Pierre the protagonists become blindfolded, and sometimes find their best defense in aggression. Sometimes hostility is directed not toward the opposition's position, but toward the opposition personally. The basic differences, which were latent, become explicit. The vacationers no longer see the situation as a man committing a wrong act, but as a metropolitan-allied merchant committing a hostile act. The ascription of hostility is all the easier because there is no direct contact to qualify the notion. It is made all the more likely because the opposition is going through the same process. The businessman moved from a position of nervous avoidance to one in which he was convinced of the ill will of his sister. Once it is decided that the other man is acting out of hostility, basic orneriness, or some motive that can be ascribed to a basic difference,

138 I Divided Island the prime objective changes from blocking the particular action he is engaged in to depriving him of power and thwarting further actions. A final stage of estrangement comes when participants in quarrels, when they can afford to, square off against their opponents on all new issues that arise, even though the new issues are completely unrelated to the initial question that divided them, and even if the new issues are relatively trivial. The storekeepers' opposition spread to the political sphere, and the two joined opposite sides in townwide disputes. M. Dutronel, having decided that the doctor refused his son-in-law permission out of animosity, retaliated by issuing the doctor paychecks with deliberate mistakes. In a memorandum to a new governor written in 1923, a priest on Saint Pierre referred to past disputes on the islands: "As attenuating circumstances it should be mentioned that these prohibitions and rules ( against church schools ) were taken at a time of political and religious quarreling which, on Saint Pierre, means above all personal quarreling."7 The relationship between quarrels and factions is two-way. On the one hand, the division of the town into factions over a major issue provides an excellent opportunity to express the hostility of a quarrel by lining up against the enemy on the townwide issue. On the other hand, the latent distrust of corporate opposition can intensify a quarrel with an individual member of that opposition far beyond its usual bitterness. In the most extreme types of faction—such as the Gaullist and Pétainist faction—membership on one side can cause a quarrel with an old friend or a relative on the other. In other words, quarrels help to determine the composition of factions, and factions intensify or even precipitate quarrels. In the case of the storekeepers, the quarrel led the sister to join the political faction opposed to her brother's. It is not at all unusual for this to happen on Saint Pierre. Since the turn of the century, personal grievances have been mixed up in townwide divisions. It was especially true in 1941, when a number of persons joined the Gaullist side to exact vengeance on Pétain's administrators or on those who were Pétainists. Alain Savary himself became aware of this as he spent more time on the islands, and he made reference to it in his speech.

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction j 1 3 9 It was also true of the demonstrations against Vogt and Grad, those two remarkably similar incidents thirty years apart. A number of people reportedly joined in the demonstrations against the two men for personal reasons. The obverse is also true. Membership in factions has caused the most bitter of quarrels. We saw in 1941 and 1942 how friends or relatives who had previously been close broke off all contact because they had chosen differently in regard to the Free French. The same has been known to happen, except on a smaller scale, in political divisions after the war: between Claireautists and old-style Pétainists, for example. As we have seen, the information set of friends and family is a particularly close unit on Saint Pierre. To have such circles broken and the whole rhythm of social life disturbed for political reasons is considered especially tragic on the islands. Yet it happens. That is an extreme, however. What happens more often is that the ignition of townwide controversies and the creation of townwide divisions intensifies an existing brouille with an individual member of that opposition far beyond its normal bitterness. The vacationers on Langlade already had gripes against the French civil servants. But when the closing of the road made the merchant's alliance with the administrators so explicit, all of their previous animosity against the metropolitans was added to that generated by the merchant. The existence of a number of long-standing personal quarrels helps to determine sides in townwide controversies. But they are not at all sufficient to account for the way the majority of people choose. If the social and political disputes chronicled in this book are examples, it will be seen that townwide factions go through the same stages as those of personal brouilles. If we consider corporate groups as individuals, the resemblance to personal quarrels becomes clearer. Two sets of opposition are more or less constant: the group of Church-oriented Saint Pierrais who believe in the family principle versus those who have become alienated from the old order; and most of the Saint Pierre people versus the civil servants from France and those merchants who associate with them. Both divisions have been present in potential form in Saint Pierre since the beginning of the century. They have flared up from time to time,

ιψ> I Divided Island and they are always possible. There is thus a constant latent hostility stemming from basic differences. There has also been ambiguity of obligation, to spark incidents and ignite the divisions. In the first quarter of the century, and to a lesser extent since, no one really knew how much credit the merchants "owed" the fishermen and workers in the workless winters. This ambiguity later passed over to the government when it was unclear whether the government work project served as unemployment compensation or not and, if it was, what kind of work could be required for such compensation. In general, the moments when group conflicts have flared up have been times of economic instability, either during economic declines or when economic declines were anticipated. The anticipated decline brings the ambiguity of obligation to a head, for when the reserves of the economic system are most needed they are least available. In both sets of opposition there are strikingly different points of view in the groups involved, born out of differences in education and experience. In both sets of division there is an initial lack of communication, and the few channels of communication still left are cut out in times of corporate dispute. One whole sector of the population, in effect, becomes brouillé with the other, and communication is cut off with the identifiable members of the other group for the mere reason that they are members of that group. The ill will is ascribed to the corporate opposition. The hostility is transferred to new issues, the most elaborate example of which was the string of trivial questions that inflamed the two groups forming around the Legasse clan. When the town divides into two or more factions, each faction in itself, if the situation is sufficiently intense, becomes a large information set. It may happen in this kind of situation that a Saint Pierrais might find himself with deeper, more varied, and richer friendships than was the case before the polarization of factions occurred. A kind of fraternity develops which lasts long afterward—even after the community, depolarized, has returned to a network of many sets. Inasmuch as the two factions become two large information sets, two faction-wide systems of news are established. In the case of factions before and during the war, it was of the utmost importance whether a faction was receiving news from Vichy France, Administra-

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction ¡ 141 tor Bournat, and Pétainist Quebec, or from Newfoundland and the Gaullists in Montreal. Thus, both personal and group quarrels on Saint Pierre pass through several stages. First there is usually a source of potential hostility—a basic difference in ideology or interest, or an ambiguity in relationship. Second, an event occurs that sparks the potential hostility and the protagonists pass into a noncommunicating relationship. The third stage is the personalization of the quarrel—the ascription of hostility. And finally there is the alignment in opposition on new issues. The similarity in estrangement between persons and groups is not coincidental. The pattern contains an internal dynamic such that, once the dispute is sparked, each stage will trigger off the next. In much the same way, subjects in the "prisoner's dilemma" experiment, when given a description of their opponent as "wily" or "clever" and cut off from communication with him, will become stuck in a dead end of mutually detrimental moves. A key condition in both the "prisoner's dilemma" and the Saint Pierre case is that the subjects must not communicate. In terms of personal quarrels, as we have seen, communication is usually limited to begin with, and is quickly cut off at the first sign of trouble. The means by which communication is cut off in group quarrels is more complicated. A likely hypothesis is that townwide factions cannot emerge in the first place in situations where there is extensive communication between the groups. Other things being equal, it should not be surprising that established systems of social relations hang together. If we admit the probability that the ongoing informal social relations on Saint Pierre primarily take place in the context of an uneven distribution of linked information sets, it follows from the very nature of the information set that there will be relatively few links between sets whose interests basically differ. Sets that are tightly linked together will tend to agree on important issues; sets that are not linked, or relatively loosely linked, will be less likely to agree. Because of the interlocking nature of information sets, some sets must be broken up when Saint Pierre divides, as it did in 1941. But divisions are likely to strike the network of sets precisely at those points or seams where

142 I Divided Island there is the least interlocking. Division will seek out the "sort of concealed split or seam, as it might be in a piece of iron" that Plutarch mentions in reference to Athens; for it is in the interest of the people involved that the fewest number of sets be broken up. In other words, whereas the basis of a factional dispute is most likely to involve a basic difference in interest, as in the cases I have reported, the distribution of links between information sets most likely already reflects that difference in interest, and indeed provides the basis for the lack of communication necessary for our estrangement pattern to work. One recurring theme in the history of Saint Pierrais against Saint Pierrais is the frequency with which women are protagonists. In terms of factional antagonisms, women have been no less passionately involved than men. Political activity on Saint Pierre, it will readily be agreed, is impossible to separate from social conflict, and women did not wait until they were granted the suffrage in 1945 to become involved in the conflicts. Part of the explanation for the feminine aspect of Saint Pierre's conflicts might lie in the devotion to the family and its particular values and factional traditions—a devotion less alloyed by other considerations in women than in men. Identification with the family or the information set may be such that, if one member becomes committed or takes a firm stance, the mother becomes the outspoken spokeswoman for his position. Far fewer women are employed than men. Part of the salience of female action might be due to the comparative freedom from the social control that is entailed by involvement in the occupational structure of the island. Some support for this idea can be found in the 1942-1945 period, when several women singled out as conspicuously hostile by the Free French government were wives of civil servants who, because of their position, maintained a prudent political silence. This interpretation of the role of women in community quarrels contains an implicit assumption—the more links, and the stronger the links between people, the less likely is conflict to break out. But this assumption is only the first step. In a tight multilink network, once conflict does break out, it quickly spreads as the protagonists call in their closely linked allies.

Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction | 143 In large or loosely organized societies, where most persons have little in common in terms of friendship, kinship, or other links, conflict between individuals may quite soon follow from differences of interest. But such conflict will have little means of spreading. In small or compact communities, relatively isolated, of which islands and company towns are examples, much informal social control is provided by the multiplicity of links between any two persons. In this situation, however, if conflict, in spite of the links, does occur, it widens like a crack opening in the ice. Its ramification depends on another characteristic I have mentioned—that the links between individuals are not distributed evenly in intensity and number, but rather that they cluster unevenly, providing more or less resistance to the widening crack.

8 Gaullists and Anti-Gaullists : The Organization of Choice

The end of deep-sea fishing, Prohibition, and the Great Depression changed the profile of Saint Pierre society. By 1940 the island was quite different from the Saint Pierre of 1900, and a rapid sketch of the changes that had taken place in the occupational groups will anchor the subsequent analysis of the social composition of the Gaullist and anti-Gaullist factions. In 1940 about fifteen administrators still came directly from France —the heads of administrative services, doctors, engineers, technicians, and the judge. Then, as now, the nature of the French colonial administration was such that there were many government officials whose functions were exercised so rarely that they were mostly dead weight. A full-time weather station was maintained, as well as a telegraph office and a printing office—all for four thousand people. Most of the priests and nuns also came from France. In 1940 four priests and fifteen nuns worked on the islands. The leaders of Saint Pierre society under what one might call the ancien régime were the large merchants. These were the persons who were elected to the Administrative Council and who had most contacts with the outside world. These merchants (referred to as gros commerçants) were the heirs of the firms that had financed the fishing sloops on the Grand Banks, plus some whose commerce gained strength through the importation of supplies to the islands and the later whiskey trade. The most important man on the islands was Leonce Dupont but, as we have seen, his influence was waning. Another financial power was Pierre Andrieux, a buyer of Saint Pierre fish whose domain included the Miquelon fish-drying factory and 144

The Organization of Choice | 145 an insurance agency. A third figure was Henri Morazé, smuggler and businessman, who claims to have handled three fourths of the island's retail business. Jean Legasse, a nephew of Louis Legasse, was a director and Saint Pierre head of the Morue Française. In 1940 this company still controlled the telephone exchange and several retail stores and bakeries on the islands, in addition to its fishing interests. Other important shipbrokers and wholesale importers were Dominique Borotra, Paul Colombani, the Folquet brothers, Georges Landry, Gaston Marsoliau, Auguste Maufroy, Eugene Norgeot, and Raoul de la Villefromoy. These tweleve merchants probably handled well over 50 percent of the island's commerce. As is true today, it was the gros commerçants who had extensive connections in France proper, who were well educated, and who associated most easily with the administrators from France. It was most particularly the alliance of certain merchants with the resented "metros" that brought the suspicion and distrust of the rest of the population upon them. The next most influential group indigenous to the islands were the higher echelons of civil servants, including technicians and teachers. Most of these men had fairly advanced educations because they had usually spent time studying in France. In 1940 most of them shared the general outlook of Saint Pierre's commercial families. These men would normally be second in command in their departments to administrators from France. These first two groups of islanders together comprised only about one tenth of the male population. The lower civil servants, comprising another tenth, were totally different. This group included customs officers, postal employees, printers, lighthouse keepers, doormen, chauffeurs, and messengers. The jobs were less competitive and more open to distribution by patronage. After both world wars they were filled with veterans. The prestige of their positions was approximately on the same level as the small neighborhood shopkeepers and the clerks in the larger businesses. It was the rest of the population—the craftsmen, fishermen, and manual laborers—who suffered most from the sadly depressed economy of the islands. The number of dories had steadily decreased

146 I Divided Island after 1907, and by 1940 only a quarter of the adult male population was engaged in the island's sole primary industry. This decrease was mainly attributable to a decline in the availability of the cod itself and to the extremely variable prices. Most of those who abandoned fishing were forced by necessity to work as laborers on government projects. By 1940 a quarter of the population worked as unskilled laborers, mostly in government employ. The percentage varied inversely with that of fishermen, since four fifths of the fishermen had to seek public help during the winter months when they could not fish. The government had to improvise make-work programs, which were of inadequate scope and compensation. The fishermen and manual laborers together formed a full fifty percent of the population. Some idea of how closed the occupations were can be gained by comparing the occupations of Saint Pierrais in the 1940 period with that of their fathers. The comparison was made in two ways, both of which showed the same result: it was very unusual for the son of a fisherman, a laborer, or an artisan to become a high civil servant or a shopkeeper. ( See Appendix Tables 7 and 8. ) The commercial sector of the population was the most closed. Every business on the island was a family business: there were no corporations in which one could be promoted to a directing position solely on merit. Shops and agencies were handed from father to son or, lacking a son, to a son-in-law or nephew. In the larger companies, more distant kin would have to be used in positions of responsibility. The largest company of all, the Morue Française, used second cousins. It seems surprising at first that in the higher-paid civil service positions there was also a high measure of father-son succession. The sons of the better-paid civil servants were usually quite well educated; many studied in France. For a well-educated person who is not in a commercial family the only logical position, if he wishes to remain on Saint Pierre, is to enter the civil service, for only there will he be paid according to the level of his education. Virtually all of the fishermen in 1940 were sons of fishermen themselves, for dory fishing is a craft demanding as much special knowledge and skill as any skilled art or trade. Those fishermen's sons who

The Organization of Choice | 147 abandoned their fathers' profession generally became laborers. The change occurred during the smuggling boom of the 1920's and 1930's. Virtually the only hope of improvement for the son of afishermanor laborer was in the skilled trades, such as mechanics or carpentry, or in the competitive examinations for the civil service. The lower ranks of the civil service included manyfishermen'sand workers' sons who had "made good"; such men were the natural leaders of the lower occupational groups on Saint Pierre. It remains true on Saint Pierre today that there is a great deal of circulation among the lower occupations on the island—fishing, stevedoring, public works, and minor civil service jobs. But the barrier between these and the more remunerative positions—commercial and government jobs demanding education—was even more difficult to cross in 1940 than it is today. The barrier is found also in marriage patterns. In the marriages between 1936 and 1940 a "totem pole" pattern emerges when the occupation of the girl's father is compared to that of the boy's father. The sons of merchants and civil servants married the girls of their own strata, plus a few lower-strata girls. The sons offishermen,craftsmen, and workers never married merchant daughters, but always either lower-strata girls or Newfoundland girls who came to work as domestic servants in Saint Pierre. The Newfoundland girls remained almost exclusively in the lower levels of the population. All in all, there seems to have been less mobility in comparison to postwar Saint Pierre. It is conceivable that this "hardening of the social arteries" was a temporary phenomenon—the result of the depression, in which the gap between the haves and the have-nots was suddenly increased—but in any case, it played a significant part in hindering effective communication between the two groups and helped to prepare the way for the split to come. In 1942 the plebiscite, the declaration of Monsignor Poisson, and the divisive policies of the Free French administrators ensured the completion of the split that had developed during the preceding two years. Each man was virtually compelled to decide whether or not he was for the Free French. After the first prise de position in early

i/ß I Divided Island 1942, there was very little change. As one observer put it, "It had become a matter of pride, and to change camps would be to betray one's friends." Positions became so clear that twenty years later I was told by some people the exact position of 90 percent of the adult inhabitants during the war. From talking to the leaders, it seemed to me that each faction had its share of idealists when the initial, irreversible positions were taken between 1940 and 1942. What probably happened was that a few key people on both sides took, or were forced to take, strong stands, and a number of other people, linked to them directly or indirectly in one way or another, followed after them. It is possible to give some idea of the links that held the people on each side together, and which were probably, therefore, instrumental in the orginal separation. In the nature of these links lies the crux of the organization of choice. The problem faced by Saint Pierrais lay not in an abstract choice between distant political parties, but in the very concrete, dramatically real decision of choosing one's friends and one's enemies, of choosing between husband and father—and this in a small island community where one was forced to see and be seen by one's friends and enemies every day. It seems only natural that a political choice, especially such a crucial political choice, should be subject to extrapolitical influences and should be based partly on prior social relations among the Saint Pierrais. Earlier I discussed the existence of a social unit I called an "information set" because it is defined by the fact that among themselves its members can speak freely; members pass around the most private information about one another. It is these units that provide the hidden lines of communication on the islands. And it is the links among members of these sets that are most crucial in political choice. The composition of such sets, however, is always in flux, and to pinpoint the composition of information sets in 1940 would be an impossible task. I approach it here obliquely, using kinship and occupational connections, but I have analyzed these connections mainly with the assumption that they are the bases for the formation of the information sets. With the aid of Saint Pierrais and the records of the Town Hall, it is possible to reconstruct the kinship relations of the people on Saint

The Organization of Choice | 149 Pierre in 1946. Then, by learning the political choice of each person, we can see the degree to which families were united or divided. It was assumed that family relations had played some role in the organization of choice. The degree of family unanimity provides an idea of the importance of family cohesion in the forming of the GaullistPétainist division. (What constituted membership in a family was determined by whether the members were linked by living relatives. For example, cousins could be counted as being in the same family if a common grandparent was living. In practice the family rarely went beyond two degrees and three generations.) Generally speaking, families stuck together. If just the elementary family of fathers and sons is taken, 95 percent of the families were undivided. When uncles were included, then about 80 percent remained undivided, and for the 396 full families (as defined above) 64 percent were undivided. Family

allegiance

United Gaullist United Pétainist Divided One quarter or more of family unclassified

Full

families

5o%

14 27 9

100% Thus, excluding in-laws, two thirds of the families on Saint Pierre maintained consensus on politics during the war. Of course the existence of 27 percent of the families (105 families) who were divided politically was high enough for observers to mention these family schisms as the most tragic manifestation of the Free French-Pétainist split on the islands. But from the figures above, it seems that kinship provided the main bonds for holding persons to one side or another. Not surprisingly, the further away from the elementary family that one looks, the more division one sees. When it comes to in-laws, not considered above, one notices wholesale division. Three quarters of the full families on Saint Pierre had in-laws on both sides of the fence. Hence it is between in-laws that the great division occurred on Saint Pierre. All but six of the Pétainist families had some Gaullist in-laws, and most Gaullist families had some Pétainist in-laws. All of the

ΐζο

I Divided

Island

divided families had in-laws on both sides. This was to be expected, as we know that those who later became Gaullists and Pétainists had intermarried before the war. It is also related to the pattern of the sons taking wives from less prestigious occupations. (See Appendix Table 6.) It is interesting to see the influence of Newfoundland, Miquelon, and Ile aux Marins. Those Saint Pierrais who had in-laws in these places tended to agree with them. Those with in-laws in Newfoundland or Ile aux Marins were overwhelmingly for the Gaullists. Seventyfive percent of the men from Newfoundland, or those married to women from Newfoundland, were Gaullist. The other figures show that the families of these men were Gaullist as well. It should be noted in this respect that the Newfoundlanders, mostly recent immigrants, were almost exclusively at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Not a great number of Saint Pierre families had Miquelon inlaws but, of the eleven that did, six were Pétainists and one was divided. A revealing fact is that all of the thirty-seven families where over a quarter of the members were classified by the rater as politically questionable or neutral had in-laws on both the Gaullist and the antiGaullist sides. It seems that these Saint Pierrais succeeded in leaving their position ambiguous in order to remain on good terms with their relatives. For this reason there was a tendency for Gaullist raters to classify these people as Gaullist, and Pétainist raters to classify them as Pétainist. The presence of this small group helps to account for the variation in percentages of the population estimated by different Saint Pierrais, and why they estimated higher percentages for their own particular group. Those families without in-laws were less divided than those with them, for they did not have the problem of in-laws pulling in different directions. Families with in-laws

Total number Gaullist Pétainist Divided

211 55% 12% 33%

Without in-laws on Saint Pierre

52 6o% 30% io%

The Organization of Choice | 151 The Pétainists did not represent a compact kinship network set apart from the rest of the population. This would hardly have been likely for such a small group in such a small community. On the other hand, there were enough Gaullists, and they were so concentrated in the ranks of fishermen and manual laborers, that there were many Gaullists who had only distant relations, if any at all, who were Pétainists. A large number of Gaullists had only Gaullist kin. Although generally speaking a boy kept the politics of his family, a special situation occurred when a boy whose family went Gaullist was married to a girl whose family went Pétainist. Usually this was a case of a jump in prestige, since the Pétainists were generally in the more honored echelons of commerce and administration. If the boy was upwardly mobile, then he probably adopted the ideology of the social group he married into. It is necessary to imagine what happened at the moment of division. The predominant pattern had been that the men in the higher-prestige occupations married downward. There was thus a set of linkages between the upper-prestige occupations and the lower ones. The fact that these linkages existed probably tempered the corporate hostility. The links were the women: the old widows at the heads of families and the girls who had married upward themselves. It is on the women that the most strain falls when a community starts to divide. For the widow it is the strain of having some of her children go one way and some another; for the upwardly mobile wife it is the strain of having her husband go one way and her parents another. At the time of division on Saint Pierre the links between the two groups either snapped, in which case they snapped in favor of the Pétainists, or they held, in which case whole clusters of people who might have just as well gone to one side followed their kin to the other side. Few were those agile or unobtrusive enough to leave their position ambiguous. Then the two parties drew apart, leaving between them the debris of torn families and friendships and the open conflict of differing occupational groups, hitherto tempered by ties of kinship. It is harder to pinpoint those links in information sets connected to commercial or professional loyalty. That would involve finding out

ι$2 I Divided Island who worked for whom in 1941, information impossible to obtain. Some informed guesses will have to suffice in this respect. In 1941 far fewer Saint Pierrais were employed privately than in 1900. In the thirties, the public sector of the economy had necessarily expanded to take up the slack left by the depression. For those employees left in positions of even moderate responsibility, the same kind of loyalty which had held in 1900 surely held in 1941 (especially considering that company loyalty still counted in political choice in 1966). Those remaining employees of the Morue Française are most often cited in this respect. For some Saint Pierrais, commercial loyalty is so strong that it is handed down from father to son in a kind of commercial kinship. The first way that jobs count in forming links, then, is in loyalty toward the employer. This can be said to count with all the employers on the island with the exception of the administration, because of its very impersonality. Links are also set up within work groups. The best evidence for this is the near unanimity with which different branches of the administration opted for one side or the other. The printers, for instance, were nearly all for Bournat and Pétain; the customs house, with the exception of its metropolitan chief, was for de Gaulle. The Western Union telegraphers, with the exception of Bartlett, their head, were for Pétain. All of the teachers in the public school were for the Free French, while all of the teachers in the church school were for Pétain. This type of work group solidarity seemed only to apply, however, in those few groups of men and women who were in close daily contact—in short, who formed teams. Such teams created links between members and, indeed, constituted information sets on their own. In this sense the leading merchants, who gathered for a drink at the American House in the late afternoon, also constituted a work group and perhaps the most important of the occupational information sets. It is highly likely that the chain effect of information sets determined the choice of many people on both sides who could just as well have gone the other way. Especially after the landing of the Free French, there was a bandwagon tendency, and the large majority of Gaullists probably did not faithfully represent those who had a

The Organization of Choice | 153 strong idealistic purpose. However, by the time most of the active population were drawn into the struggle, no matter at what point or how reluctantly, they became intensely involved. The crux of the matter is that in 1941 political and social divisions were to a great extent congruent and, far from contradicting each other, they were complementary and served to intensify the bitterness of the split. Why did 30 percent of Saint Pierre's population support Pétain? After 1941 it was no longer a question of supporting Boumat, for Bournat had been sent away. Yet they persisted in their allegiance to the Pétain government, even through the early months of 1944. A certain amount of hero worship was involved. One or two priests were especially vocal in their admiration of Pétain. Some people bought photographs of the Maréchal and displayed them in their houses. A retired lawyer in Miquelon issued a series of inspirational newssheets from his typewriter. Entitled Le Billet de Saint Michel, they portrayed Pétain as "Le Soldat de Dieu" and de Gaulle as an antichrist. But on the whole Gaullist and Pétainist alike paid little attention to this sort of nonsense. The most succinct explanation for the Pétainists' persistence was offered by a former smuggler. Poking his cigar in my face, he barked, "I was following the government. If you take a wife one evening, you don't go and get a different one the next day." Two Saint Pierre civil servants put it this way: "We simply considered that Marshal Pétain's government was the legal government of France." Behind this adherence to the legality of the Pétain regime lay a belief, in some cases, in order as a necessary and positive value in itself. The extralegality of the Free French government was a challenge to the whole fabric of law, order, and justice upon which the old regime in Saint Pierre was based, and which even an expression of democratic opinion, such as a plebiscite, could not change. The Monsignor expressed this clearly when he called the plebiscite "as false in principle as in method." Conversations with Saint Pierre's ex-Pétainists and a reading of their diaries impressed me with their emphasis upon order—family,

ζ54 I Divided Island peace, tranquillity, the good life. They are relaxed men, the philosophers of the island, the "wise men," the elders of the community. Life in Saint Pierre before the Gaullists, for these men, was "the good old days." Jean Laroche wrote in his diary: "The population was nothing less than a large family, passing the long winter evenings with friends at home, at cards, dances, skating, and various festivities. The civil servants, fishermen, and merchants arriving from the mother country brought back to it the mood and spirit prevalent in France." This attitude prevailed among the merchants, the clergy, and among the higher civil servants like the man (in 1941 a local administrator), who told me: "I am for order. Disorder doesn't get you anywhere: you can create nothing out of disorder." The same reason that made him favor the stable Pétainist government of Saint Pierre in 1941 makes him favor de Gaulle now—"He has re-established order and stabilized the economy." For Jean Laroche, merchant and devout churchgoer, there was a possibility that "an accord between France and Germany seemed to assure peace in order and labor." Pétain's slogan, Travail, Famille, Patrie (Labor, Family, Fatherland), had a definite meaning for these men. Part of it may be due to the fact that most of them were devout Catholics. But all of them have a real ethic about work. "To work," goes an old saying common on Saint Pierre, "is to pray." Laroche's estimation of the human condition is, "suffering, stubborn labor, courageous resignation." Patrie, for these men, meant the land, the soil, home. Those who desert the home are not patriots. "True patriotism is formed with devotion, attachment, abnegation, and all the sentiments which tie man to the earth which saw his birth." Inasmuch as this was true on the national level, their sympathies were with the Frenchmen who remained in France under the Germans, and for them the Free French movement smacked of facileness and desertion. Other "Pétainists" have disclaimed the use of the name altogether and base their stand entirely on local issues, the patrie in this case being Saint Pierre. Such people, who would prefer to call themselves anti-Gaullists, formulated their stand not so much against de Gaulle or for Pétain as against those Free French "outsiders" who came to Saint Pierre ("international adventurers, opportunists, the rejects of two continents"). I think Mon-

The Organization of Choice | 155 signor Poisson's stand could be seen in this light. He did not even question de Gaulle's movement in his proclamation, but merely its right to be on Saint Pierre as a government. For the bulk of Saint Pierre's Pétainists (using the word loosely), political attitudes were holdovers from the era of the Morue Française before World War I. As we have seen, the stubborn belief in Saint Pierre as a family was still very much alive in 1941. After all, a number of the same people were alive, and the position of the Church in this respect remained the same. A certain evolution of the old Morue Française ideology had necessarily taken place. Because of the agitation of the twenties and thirties, it was the belief in order which was most emphasized by the time of the choice between Bournat and the Free French. Some of the Pétainists found in the policies of the Marshal a return to the older ways. Probably the greater number made their decision on local terms, on the basis of an inherited ideology, clinging to an ideal of social harmony which was no longer possible. A descendant of one of the Legassist mayors before World War I said, "The Legasse group was still together in 1940 because we continue, we follow the same line from father to son. Not like the others who will take every side-road they come across." Louis Legasse's ideology had lasted long after his political power (Louis Legasse himself, after many years of senility, died in 1938). For these men, the Gaullists represented disorder, and the Gaullist takeover disrupted all they had known and loved on Saint Pierre. Jean Laroche wrote in his dairy: "Never in Saint Pierre, where the sweetness of its family life was perhaps its only charm, was there such an explosion of hatred, of antagonism, of lowness." In notes he took for his brother, a priest in Canada, Albert Briand wrote in a similar vein: "We were relatively calm here on Saint Pierre. And suddenly, brutally, they call on us to participate in an operation which our consciences reprove. At the bottom, to my mind, the question is no longer the one that they are presenting, Pétainist or Gaullist. There is order and there is disorder; that is more or less what it is. I came across one of the old prophecies of Uncle Eugene: 'Two parties will form in France, the party of order and the party of disorder; one will be more numerous than the other, but the party of order will triumph.' "

ι$6 I Divided Island Among the Gaullists and the anti-Gaullists, Georges Benoit was considered to be the most forceful writer for the Gaullist cause. An official in the public school, he had sided with de Gaulle from the very beginning. In the summer of 1964 I went to visit him at a summer retreat, one of the places where the Gaullists had convened in the summer of 1940. He is in his sixties now, and retired. He tries to avoid talking about his past: "Now one takes care not to speak about it any more. It is possible I was too extreme in La Liberté. We speak about everything else, but we stop there." Yet it was clear that it was a relief to him to talk about it to an outsider. As he rocked back and forth in his chair, he told of his background; as a staunch republican, he had admired Jules Ferry. "It was an antichurch education. Anatole France was the great writer for us." For him, de Gaulle represented a real break with the immediate past, a voice speaking for the true France. Pétain, on the other hand, "for me, he was a fascist. Even before the eighteenth of June I was wondering aloud at the café whether someone would stand up and say that Pétain was wrong." Many of the boys he had known as students enlisted with the Free French. "For the boys who enlisted it was in a spirit of youthfulness. General de Gaulle was not young, but he seemed only twenty years old. The true youth enlisted, those uncorrupted by the older generation. It doesn't do to be 'realistic' when one is twenty years old. The realists' [raisonneurs] were Vichyists." Georges Benoit is intelligent. And he has noticed something important in the difference between the two groups. Objectively, the most reasonable thing to do was not to volunteer. Saint Pierre could have fared very well in its neutrality. But for much of the youth, there was great importance, indeed great beauty, in the original idealism and vigor of the Gaullist cause. The Gaullist movement on Saint Pierre was not, however, a break with history. It had behind it as much historical inspiration as the Pétainists had, but, as might be expected, it chose a different past to emphasize. The heritage of the Free French on Saint Pierre was the revolutionary past of France, the moments when it broke away from tradition. From La Liberté (May 18, 1944): "The French bourgeoisie which has already exploited to its benefit the Revolutions of 1789 and

The Organization of Choice | 157 1848 thinks it can again become the mistress and make a profit on that of 1943-44. It clinging dangerously to an outdated social structure shaken by the tempest. Let it not be too obstinate, or by its means the whole structure will collapse." As in the French revolution, though, the true Jacobinism of the movement was limited to the intellectuals from France and Saint Pierre, who gave literary expression to the movement. What had formed, it seems, was an alliance between the mass of fishermen and workers, moved largely by patriotic or economic reasons, and a few French radical intellectuals whose patriotism in this case was sharpened by a distrust of Church and rightist authority. Yet the animus aroused by the violence of the intellectuals' attacks carried over to all, and the mere presence of dissenters was a challenge to even the most disinterested patriots. The Gaullists emphasized the simplicity of the choice to fight. For them, it was not a question of being "reasonable," but of right and wrong. The adjectives that recur in Gaullist literature are "simple," "pure," "true," "straight." When I was visiting Alain Savary in Paris, Savary broke into a complicated exposition of Saint Pierre history to say: "The question was simple. There were those who wanted to fight. And there were those who did not wish to fight." Dorothy Thompson, in a speech at the presentation in the United States of the propaganda film, Little Isles of Freedom (for which she prepared the script), shows the same kind of thinking: "From a dramatic point of view, the history of Saint Pierre is, in microcosm, the history of all the oppressed people of the world. You can see who is brave, and who is cowardly, as in all societies" (La Liberté, January 28, 1943). What one finds, in short, is an ideology of absolutes: right versus wrong, good versus bad, virtue versus sin, black versus white. The Pétainists, making their decision on perhaps more local terms, seemed to see the choice as that between two grays; the best one could do was to choose the lighter. In the orientation of the Gaullists toward national, as opposed to local, questions, and in their use of moral absolutes, there is a similarity to the opposition to Legasse in the early 1900's—the party of reform, as it were. The island's Pétainists who were still oriented

158 I Divided Island toward the old Morue Française philosophy clearly identified the Gaullists with the old opposition. The Saint Pierrais whose ancestor had been Legasse's mayor put it this way: "Of course they're the same. The opposition is always the opposition." In effect there is a line that runs back from the Gaullist leaders of Saint Pierre during the war to the union movements and the Planté cooperative to the anti-Legasse minority before World War I. From the beginning, the ideology and outlook of the Gaullists on Saint Pierre were so different from those of the governor, the Apostolic Prefect, and the "respectable" people that any sort of dialogue was virtually impossible. The Pétainist conception of order as the fundamental principle of society was diametrically opposed to that of most of the Gaullists. The Gaullists had not benefited from the old regime's stability, and so it was easier for them to reject the whole system. For the Pétainists, order was more than valuable; it was sacred, taught and nurtured by the Church and by generations of Saint Pierrais who had gone before. For the Gaullists, order was long since dead; community was an outworn idea that paled before economic insecurity. And, for many, the Church itself fell with the concept of order, at least that portion of the Church on Saint Pierre which supported the old order. For many of the Saint Pierre Free French, as evidenced in the pre"liberation" pamphlets, Gaullism represented a social, political, and economic millennium. Prosperity and equality were expected to appear simultaneously with the Free French liberation. Doubtless the leftwing orientation of the Free French propaganda issued in London during the first years of the war contributed to this idea. With their eyes on the promise of their goals, the Gaullists paid little attention to the methods they used or the casualties involved in attaining them. For the Pétainists, method was everything; the disruption of the social order and the flagrant violation of politico-legal order were great enough evils in themselves to warrant complete dismissal of the Free French objectives. How did the social structure in 1940 divide in terms of Gaullists and Pétainists? From Table 2 it is clear that the more secure a per-

The Organization of Choice Table 2.

| 159

Native Saint Pierre Males: Profession and Politics, 1946

Truckers; Low civil High servants; fishermen; Big civil Skilled manual small Voting males merchants servantsa merchants trades laborers Total Total number Gaullist Pétainist Unknown affiliation

47 38% 5i%

30 50% 47%

161 60% 39%

139 67% 25%

45* 77% 18%

829" 69% 26%

11%

3%

2%

8%

5%

5%

a The civil servants from France are not included in the table. Out of some fifteen men, all but four or five were Pétainists, supported the governor, and were suspended when the Free French arrived. b The grand total represents all those males for whom a profession was given on the 1946 voting list.

son's position was, the more likely he would remain Pétainist. Conversely, those with the fewest attachments to their positions, with the least wealth, and the least stake in the old economy, were overwhelmingly Gaullist. Within categories in Table 2 further divisions re-emphasize the point. Except for one or two, all of the very largest merchants were Pétainist. Most of these men were imprisoned at one time or another for their attitude. One of Muselier's first acts was to call thirty of them to his office and threaten them collectively with a "concentration camp" if they did not improve their attitude. 1 It is not surprising that those merchants who were most associated with the "metros" from France were most likely to be Pétainist. Among the high civil servants, who were evenly divided, those from commercial backgrounds tended to be Pétainist, and those whose fathers were fishermen and workers were more likely to be Gaullist. Men who were lower down in the civil service, who resented the civil servants from France, seemed more prone to Gaullism. Those who had advanced training—the radio operators, technicians, and printers —were more likely to be Pétainist, while those relatively unskilled— customs, post office, lighthouse keepers—tended to be Gaullist.

i6o I Divided

Island

Table 3.

Voting males and females Total number Gaullists Pétainists

Levels of Education and Politics, 1946

Higher diplomas 81 4% 11%

Primary education certificate

No certificate

25 7 17% 28%

Unknown

570 49% 37%

354 30% 24%

Total 1264 100% 100%

Note. The sample is composed of all males and females on the 1946 voting list who were alive in 1962. O n the lower levels, two main characteristics apply to the small percentage of craftsmen or workers w h o were Pétainist: either they were employees of the Pétainist merchants—like Jean Lecourtois and Joseph Belliard at the Morue Française, or Jean Jolivet, w h o clerked for Albert Briand—or they were very devout, influenced b y the stand of the clergy. In terms of education, a similarly clear-cut division occurred. Here, as might be expected from Table 2, the Pétainists were significantly better educated than the Gaullists. ( See Table 3. ) If only those men w h o volunteered to join the Free French forces are considered, it is seen that they represented larger proportions of the lower occupational categories. This must be ascribed not only to the poverty, but also to the insecurity of the lower jobs. T h e men with the most secure jobs were those least willing to volunteer. High Saint Pierre commerce; Low civil Free French high civil servants; servants low commerce Volunteers Number volunteering 27 Percent volunteering 1% 17%

Crafts

Manual laborers; fishermen

25 20%

129

Total 182

30%

T h e statistics are misleading in one w a y : the workers and truckers are overwhelmingly the younger members of the population, while the commerçants,

especially the gros commerçants,

are mostly over

fifty years old and thus unfit for volunteering even if they wanted to

The Organization of Choice | 161 Table 4. Males

Total number Gaullists Pétainists

Age Groups and Politics of Male Population, 1941 Age 61-70

202 53% 47%

Age 21-60

676 71% 29%

Age 15-20

36 82% 18%

All ages total

914 73% 27%

do it. It may in fact be the conservatism of age, added to a stable occupational situation, that helped to influence the choice of parties. ( See Table 4. ) In summary, the Pétainists were what could be termed the respectable people. They were the people most highly regarded, the most highly educated, the most secure, the wealthiest, and evidently the most devout. The Gaullists were the mass of the people, including almost all of the poor and especially those with the least secure occupations. The younger man in their teens were especially likely to be Gaullist. None of these generalizations, however, is absolute. Indeed, the exceptions prove interesting. The merchants and civil servants like Henri Humbert, Francis Paturel, Madame Bonin, and François Le Buf were the most extreme of the Gaullists. In the same way the Pétainists, like Albert Briand, who were younger, were the most adamant of their party. From all this evidence it seems clear that the political division ran along lines that existed before the war. In other words, before the war the people who later became Pétainists already existed as a group mildly set off from the rest of the population. As one perceptive fisherman stated in 1963, "There were divisions which existed, but under cover. It is likely they are now—they are present, but in latent form." Before World War I Legasse's political machine depended upon a company and family paternalism. It found its natural opponents in radical, French-centered intellectuals and competing merchants. Many of the most extreme of the radicals were purged from the island in one way or another, leaving a certain homogeneity and solidarity in the pre-World War I society. The political system, however, depended upon a viable economy in order to function. The economic failure of fishing on the islands and the withdrawal of the French fishing fleet

i62 I Divided Island resulted in a social and political reaction against merchants and shipping companies, beginning with the cooperative of 1920, slowed down by the whiskey prosperity, but exacerbated by the renewal of the depression in the late 1930's. In other words, the paternal economic system run by the Morue Française and other merchants had acted as a cement between the major occupational groups. When it gave out, the radical forces were ready and waiting and gained over the mass of the economically dislocated. During the years 1900-1910 political divisions consisted primarily of two rival commercial factions. Independent companies and small shipowners were allied against the Morue Française. What was left of the Legasse commercial faction stayed together in 1940 and was joined by a portion of the older opposition from the higher occupations who shared the same ideology. But some of the merchants still held out against the old commercial set and favored the Gaullists. It is no coincidence that the major Free French businessmen like Gloanec, Dupont, Paturel, and Le Buf had been strongly opposed to Legasse thirty years before. The long antagonism between the two sides requires an explanation, and the greatest preoccupation of Saint Pierre people today as they review the war years is the motivations of the people involved. The standard pattern is to ascribe motives of class interest to the opposing party while describing one's own side as motivated by ideology or idealism. The Saint Pierrais' preoccupation with this issue provides a key to understanding the wartime bitterness. The Gaullists, in L'Eclaireur, called the Pétainists raisonneurs, bourgeois who hoarded their money, men without principles, or "men for whom money is God."2 In a 1943 article in La Liberté entitled "The Marshal of the Capitulation," they repeat the same kind of accusation: "The desire for gain, the absolute disdain of spiritual values, fierce ambition, the race after money and medals, where has he seen all this, Pétain, if not in himself and around himself." Pétainists have charged in return that the Gaullists were the poor who were looking for a way to get on top, people without roots, jobs, or security, people who didn't know what ideals were. Pétainists refer especially

The Organization of Choice | 163 to those Free French volunteers who remained on the island with the exalted title of Sedentary Marine Volunteers (Fusiliers Marins Voluntaires Sédentaires) as "sand fleas" (poux d'herbe) and "stomach Gaullists" ( gaullistes de ventre ). Exceptions are made in both camps for those who could demonstrate their principles by their actions—those Gaullists, for instance, who left the island to fight in Europe are respected by the Pétainists, and those Pétainists whose stand was clearly influenced by the Church are excused by the Gaullists. Such people are referred to as "pure" and are generally used as explicit exceptions to show how self-interested all the others on their side were. When describing the motives of their own parties, however, both sides explicitly deny self-interest. An article in L'Eclaireur of October 1941 and two excerpts from La Liberté are typical of the Gaullist defensiveness in this respect: The Gaullists stick to their convictions above all. They are not Gaullist by self-interest. It is because they have an unshakeable faith in the greatness of their country, because they prefer death to slavery, because they wish to avenge the heroes that the tyrants have killed, because they are motivated by the purest sentiments of liberty, equality, and fraternity.3 . . . warm applause greeted the mention of the names of the commanders Birot, Blaison, and de Villefosse, as well as the name of Admiral Muselier, the men responsible for the liberation of the islands, and the passage dealing with the intangibility of the principles that we are defending.4 To certain Saint Pierrais Vichyistes: Some of you do not fear to affirm that our young volunteers joined up for reasons of selfinterest, because by the very words that I have heard from the lips of one of your women, "They have been well-paid." That is an abominable He. Our boys joined up because of patriotism with a hope of helping to free their homeland. They left without ulterior interests, and they have died for their country.5

164 I Divided Island In a similar fashion, the Pétainist interpretation of their own motives puts emphasis upon the ideal. Here is an excerpt from a 1962 interview with a Pétainist fisherman: "Those who were for Vichy—there were a few in all the groups (clans)—you have some who were businessmen, you have some who were civil servants, and you had fishermen and workers. It is rather an ideal in itself, and which does not correspond to economic life, you know, not at all, not at all." There are two models of social action involved here. The first model is the one each party ascribes to the other: socio-economic position

> actions

The second model shows the way each Saint Pierrais understands himself and his party: beliefs and ideals

> actions

At this point it is necessary to say that both ways of explaining behavior are, in a sense, valid. My social analysis has demonstrated that it was the rich, the prestigious, the men of status who were Pétainists, and the poor and insecure who were Gaullists. In other words, there was a direct correlation between wealth and prestige and political choice. But a correlation is not the same thing as a causal relation. My ideological analysis has shown that the two groups differed in very basic ways in regard to the values they held and the goals they were seeking. In other words, there was also a direct correlation between basic outlook and political position. Each observer could thus choose whichever correlation he saw fit to explain motivation, depending upon which party he was discussing. The coincidence of opinion and economic situation served as the means by which Saint Pierrais who had known each other all their lives could become bitterly opposed. Principled action (being "pure") is so important in the minds of Saint Pierrais that disrespect and hatred are able to exist only by attributing lack of principle. Furthermore, by imputing selfish motives to their opposition, it was not necessary to defend their own principles. The Gaullists never bothered to face the charge that theirs was not a legal government, and the

The Organization of Choice | 165 Pétainists could avoid facing the wider questions of Gaullist patriotism and antifascism. As a result, arguments on Saint Pierre passed from the level of national policy to a local level of class and personality, and the personal and class hatred that resulted ensured the permanence of the division. In order to emphasize motives of self-interest on the part of a whole group of people, it was necessary to use class terms and refer to collective differences. The bitterness of the dispute made prewar social differences explicit largely because the prewar social differences provided the best ad hominem arguments possible. All of the haggling and defensiveness about motivation was made possible by the congruity of the ideological and socio-economic division. It is artificial to separate, as the Saint Pierrais themselves do, social and economic factors from ideological factors. The differences between the two groups that were outlined in the section on social origins fit clearly into the ideological dispute. The model of social action it seems best to use is a combination of the two extremes the Saint Pierrais used, in which socio-economic position is perhaps at the root of the way people think, but in which it is their beliefs and ideals, their religion in the widest sense, that actually move them. Social background and outlook on life are thus bound together into a pattern or syndrome which is fundamentally different for the Pétainists and for the Gaullists. We know how one's position in society can affect one's attitude toward it. When a man is unhappy or depressed, he finds it easy to convince himself that the whole world is out of sorts—nothing is linked together, he is living in a world of isolated people and isolated things, there are no causes and no effects. In other words, his inner chaos seeks out the chaos in the world around. Conversely, the closest a man comes to a holistic viewpoint is the moment when he is happy and has few problems. It is then that the order and meaning in the world are easily perceived. Chaos seems susceptible to defeat. Inner order makes the finding of an outside order much less of a problem. The world we see is very much a creation we assemble ourselves— the stimuli come to our senses and we fit them together and find them

i66 I Divided Island related or unrelated, meaningfully or unmeaningfully. An analogy between man's view of nature and his view of society may prove useful here. Both nature and society are concepts perceived by men according to their state. In the "pathetic fallacy" common to Western literary tradition, the poet's despair is echoed by nonhuman animate and inanimate objects: trees bend, stones moan, and the wind sighs. The pastoral elegies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries presented an artificially constructed world of nature that shares the poet's mourning. In the nineteenth century, nature provided the romantics with an alternative to the less pleasant social landscape. And in T. S. Eliot's poetry of disillusionment, nature is used to exemplify the fatigue of an old world gone inchoate. Nature is thus an essentially neutral construct, perceived by man to be organized in a way that is consistent with his condition. In his concept of nature, the poet presents an ever-changing myth that is limited by his own everchanging vision. Perhaps such a process occurs on Saint Pierre when Saint Pierrais formulate their ideas about their society. When a man loses his place in the order, the order is no longer easy to perceive. When a man is firmly entrenched in order and in a social order, he tends to see order in the society below him where order might no longer exist. Nothing could be more natural than to find the Pétainist value of order for its own sake in men whose lives had been lives of order, whose actions were guided by and predicated upon order—the men of well-established commercial organizations, the men of administration who advanced through seniority, and men of a well-established and unchallenged Church. The old image of Saint Pierre as a big family is found among men for whom the family is of tremendous importance. Saint Pierre is a big family for the Apostolic Prefect, for whom the Saint Pierrais are "brothers" and "children." The emphasis upon tradition and legal precedent found among the Pétainists are found among those people whose lives are most explicitly built upon tradition and precedent. It was a shock to these people to find that there were other islanders who did not understand their way, and it is this element of disbelief in the possibility of such a fratricidal tend-

The Organization of Choice | 167 ency that at first made them place all the blame on Free French outsiders. As for the Gaullists, who were accustomed to lives of uncertainty, to a dory of fish in a few hours and an empty dory for a week, whose winter job depended upon the whim of the administration, and whose future was full of every kind of insecurity, does it not follow that they would be susceptible to an appeal to idealism, a call to a higher duty, especially when they had little duty on the islands? It was at the climax of a depression, with winter coming on and with intense pressures of propaganda, that they realized they had little to lose and much to gain by a change in the old way. These were men of action, of daily physical labor, who led active lives and who thought in active terms. The Pétainists were rooted to Saint Pierre and locked in its traditions. They let developments come to them and dealt with them methodically. The fishermen, craftsmen, and workers who volunteered left the island and fought for an ideal which in their minds transcended the island in importance. When the Free French took over the islands, there was a pathetic moment when the Saint Pierre Gaullists wondered why the others were not joining them. They really did not know what was happening to their community, and like the Pétainists they too did not suspect the two different worlds that had been developing on their island. Under the old regime of prewar Saint Pierre, the two worlds were usually integrated, united against the outside ( as in the episode with Administrator Barrillot). A certain amount of paternalism and a large amount of religion held the two close together in a fairly solid community. When things went badly for the poorer people, they did not blame the merchants, but rather the French administration. In 1938 Monsignor Poisson could write in all sincerity, "This population includes fishermen, workers, businessmen, and civil servants, but one can say that the different classes of the society interpenetrated more than elsewhere." β It was after the break became apparent, and after enough pride was aroused to make it irreparable, that the two groups squared off, looked each other over, and began a private war, which for some has lasted

i68 I Divided Island into the present. During this war all the class differences they could find were made explicit, and almost no attention was paid to the idea that the other group might believe in what they were doing. Most intermediaries, like the Church and the administration, were gone, and most discussion between the two groups, aside from denunciatory polemics, ceased. For four years Saint Pierre lived with a caste system and a bitterness far surpassing anything the islanders had ever experienced. During the last two centuries different questions have divided the Saint Pierre people into different groups, according to their beliefs, but no question divided them so precisely along latent social and economic lines as did the choice put to them in 1940-1941. The nature of the Free French-Vichy confrontation touched Saint Pierre society at its most vulnerable link, and the choice put to the islanders was one that split them as never before. One is still faced with the question: why are personal and group conflicts particularly endemic to Saint Pierre, as opposed to other small towns or other islands? From the start of the century, within a small community of five thousand citizens, all living together in a town of a few acres crowded at the base of rocky hills, there has been quite an elaborate spectrum of occupations and professions. Saint Pierre is anomalous in that it is a small community with the social apparatus of a city and the governmental apparatus of a nation. This situation cannot be ignored when we search for the sources of its social troubles. In terms of potential for conflict, Saint Pierre's occupational divisions and its alien administration more than make up for its ethnic and religious homogeneity. Its elaborate, if not overelaborate, social structure has been dictated mainly by the political fluke of its being the colony of a distant nation. Only in such circumstances would its top-heavy colonial administration be possible; only in such circumstances would there have formed, by 1900, a group of merchants made possible not by an exchange of goods with the islanders, but by the strategic location of the islands near the Grand Banks and the distance of that fishing ground from France. Saint Pierre is subject to social divisions of exceptional intensity precisely because of its combination of small size and the face-to-face

The Organization of Choice | 169 inter-class encounters that this size entails. The relations between personal hostility and collective hostility, described above, are very close. Owing to the town's small size, disputes among the various interest groups are inevitably personalized, and thereby prolonged. The compression of an elaborate social structure into a small space is compounded by the fact that Saint Pierre is an island and, more significant perhaps, an island ethnically and politically distinct from its nearest neighbors. The possibility of migration, for one thing, is very much reduced, especially after Canada tightened its immigration laws. In a French market town, the unskilled unemployed may go elsewhere. In 1903 discontented Saint Pierrais could move off to Canada, which helped the island reach a more stable political, as well as economic, equilibrium. Now they must stay on the island. In a French market town, men who have made it disagreeable for themselves politically may go elsewhere; a study of a French village found that, following the German occupation, there was a certain amount of circulation of persons who had made themselves too "hot" to stay in the same place.7 But only for the well-off has this been a possibility on Saint Pierre. The most outspoken commercial factionaries on both sides, for instance, are now living in France or Canada, where breathing is easier. But the factional leaders from lower occupations have remained on Saint Pierre. Escape is not as feasible as it might be in a town of its size in France or elsewhere. Saint Pierrais have had to live with their past, and with their past enemies. Other effects of its insularity heighten the small-town aspects of Saint Pierre. Like most small towns there is gossip, only more so. I would guess that its information sets are more important social units and more permanent than in less isolated towns of similar size. It is inbred, only more so. It is intensely preoccupied with itself, only more so. Indeed, Saint Pierre's preoccupation with itself has provided the means of grasping the social divisions discussed in this study; all through the century Saint Pierrais have been examining themselves, writing about their community, and measuring what it is against what they think it should be. Its group hostilities have been exacerbated by the disintegration of its economy after 1902.8 Even the era of Prohibition had the long-term

ιγο ¡ Divided Island effect of raising the economic aspirations of the population, while hastening the abandonment of its sole source of primary income. The economic decline exaggerated differences in the social structure because it affected the bottom much more than the top. The decline hastened the separation of the community into groups which held different values, goals, and different ways of achieving those goals. As long as faction is a constant in Saint Pierre life, it is not surprising to find a strong value placed on principles that counterbalance factionalism and quarrels and emphasize unity and solidarity. In Neil Smelser's terms, in order to keep factionalism from getting out of control there must be a belief capable of mobilizing the whole community. A value placed on unity, then, is a constant which one would expect to the very degree that factionalism itself is a constant. In the early part of the century, the belief in society as a family fulfilled this function on Saint Pierre. There is every evidence that at the time the belief was common among the Saint Pierrais; they themselves affirmed that it was, and they acted accordingly. The family creed was a community resource which, no matter how susceptible to manipulation, always reaffirmed the basic unity of Saint Pierre and prevented the shedding of blood. Although the Legasse faction in particular thrived on this belief, the belief also served as an effective political and social control against the excesses of factional politics, and it probably even had some restraining influence upon the Legasse faction. The belief seems to have been well suited for the type of faction then prevalent on the island and, indeed, was precisely linked to that particular type of faction. For vertical, patron-client factions are themselves a kind of image of the family, and the family analogy in turn is especially useful in justifying and humanizing the structurally similar economic relationship. Since each faction was vertically arranged, each had an interest in the maintenance of the family belief. Each claimed the image for its own and tried to show how the other was not living up to the common island ideal. Legasse accused Mazier repeatedly of unfamilial agitation; Mazier accused Legasse of equally unfamilial self-interest. In addition, each accused the other of selling out to the outsiders—the French administration—for a personal profit at the expense of the general interest.

The Organization of Choice | 171 The reality of faction and the ideal of unity remained with Saint Pierre throughout the century, but their natures changed radically. Economic disintegration led to a new type of faction on the island and rendered the ideal of the family society economically and politically obsolete. The new groupings were a direct result of economic decline, rising aspirations, and the substitution of French public welfare measures for Saint Pierre aid and credit. Factions developed more and more identification with broad occupational groupings. Diagrammatically the factions shifted from vertical to horizontal. In this respect, the Pétainist-Gaullist division was a culminating step in a trend that had been going on since the founding of Jacques Revert's Dorymen s Union in 1907. The economic and social movements of 1920-1940 had prepared the town for the shift, with union movements and the increasing percentage of unemployed on government relief; but the cognitive change from an idea of the community as family to the concept of the community as clashing occupational interests lagged somewhat behind. The final irrevocable separation occurred only under the intense pressure of the imperative Gaullist-Pétainist choice of 1941-1942. For this reason the explanation that one Free French Saint Pierrais gave, to Douglas Anglin in 1961, as to why a coup had not been attempted against Bournat becomes dramatically significant: "A coup d'état [in 1941] might have been possible on Saint Pierre, as most men owned several hunting guns. But, prior to the Armistice, Saint Pierre was one large family where everyone knew everyone else and lived in peace. We did not wish to risk shedding French blood, which perhaps might have been necessary."9 Although, from the Free French point of view, there were many other reasons to attempt the coup, the belief in Saint Pierre as a family held them back. But it should be noted that the Gaullist spoke of the family in the past tense. For the workers and many fishermen, the bridges were burned with the arrival of the Free French. That is why, in fact, the Gaullist-Pétainist division had such an inordinate impact on Saint Pierre. It drew together the main trends of the century, and made explicit for most Saint Pierrais a whole new side of their society. In economic and political terms, Saint Pierrais perceived the existence

1J2 I Divided Island of clashing occupational groups on their island. Several have said in interviews that classes existed in latent form before the war, but that class consciousness only came with the war. The image of the family as an economic and political ideal, symbolized by Pétainism, survived primarily in the upper sector of the population, in the isolated pockets where there was a deep loyalty to the past or where the family ideal still had relevance to a particular occupation or company. The switch to horizontal factions based on occupational interests (always with the proviso of complications from quarrels) was completed by the polarization of Claireautists and anti-Claireautists, and by the elimination of those elements of the Gaullist-Pétainist division that were irrelevant to the new horizontal factions. The switch from vertical to horizontal factions led to a particular adaptation of the family ideal—its divorce from matters of politics and economics and its retreat to the few areas where community action is still deemed necessary or rewarding: union in time of disaster. Almost any Saint Pierrais today will present the stranger with a statement of the family ideal, but it will be something far more restricted than it was sixty years ago, unless the stranger has happened on one of the pockets of old sentiment. Even there he will encounter a yearning, perhaps, but very few illusions.

Appendix

METHODS 1962. My first summer on the islands was spent working for Albert Briand's airline, living at the Hôtel Ile de France, and serving as gobetween for tourists and Saint Pierrais. My friends were usually friends of M. Briand or of his employees, but also included customs officials, weather men, and others whom I normally met in the course of my job. It was only toward the end of the summer that the idea of seriously studying Saint Pierre occurred to me. 1963. I visited Saint Pierre for the month of June before joining the Chanzeaux study project in France. During this month I held taperecorded interviews with some of the major figures on both sides of the dispute. Perhaps because I was already to some extent an accepted member of the community, these interviews were quite frank. They provided an intelligent basis for hypotheses about the social origins of the political division. In France I interviewed other Saint Pierrais on vacation, and I obtained census data in Paris. During the fall of 1963 I catalogued the group categories used spontaneously by the Saint Pierrais on the tape in order to construct a model of the social structure as seen by the Saint Pierrais themselves. I then attempted to use these categories to compare Saint Pierrais on the basis of the various census data available in the Rencensement de la Population du Territoire de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, 1962 (Paris: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). In 1962 the occupations of the 1,607 Saint Pierre males could be broken down as follows: m

174 I Appendix 1. Metropolitan administrative personnel 2. Local administrative personnel 3· Commerce and trades 4· Fishermen 5· Manual workers, skilled 6. Manual workers, unskilled 7· Other and inactive (mostly students and retired)

5% 11 10 16 "•5 31 17-5

In our survey of occupations we were interested in "breaks," major differences that might provide clues for the analysis of factional differences. In terms of income, a major line can be drawn between administrative personnel, commerce, and tradesmen; and the fishermen and manual workers. The second "break" people referred to was that between the metropolitans and their commercial camp followers, and the rest of the population. The French administrative personnel generally fill the top governmental positions. They are paid more than the local officials, even when the positions are comparable, partly because they profit from higher fringe benefits. Education produces another source of information for intra-island distinctions. As a whole the Saint Pierre population is less well educated than a town of equivalent population in France, although in Saint Pierre the situation has greatly improved since the war. Of the 1962 population virtually all have attended primary school, approximately half in church schools, the other half in state schools. Two thirds, however, have not finished primary school, and hence have not received their primary education certificate. Only 8 percent received schooling beyond primary school, and only 2 percent were educated beyond the level of high school. The reasons are clear. An advanced education, whether in France or Canada, is expensive, and the job opportunities for exceptionally educated persons on Saint Pierre are few; many of those who did receive higher education did not return. In comparison to the city of Lyons, France (chosen only because information on it was handy and comparable), Saint Pierre's level of education is similar for the administrators (who came from France anyway and who could thus be presumed to have a similar amount of education to metropolitan Frenchmen of equivalent occupations) but

Methods | 175 much lower for the local population, especially for the unskilled manual laborers. For instance, in Lyons 51 percent of the workers had obtained their primary education certificate (CEP), against 17 percent in Saint Pierre. Eighty percent of white-collar employees had obtained their CEP in Lyons, while in Saint Pierre only 59 percent of commercial employees and 65 percent of the o iE ce workers had obtained it. The difference in education between blue-collar workers and whitecollar workers is far greater in Saint Pierre ( 17 percent versus 63 percent) than in Lyons (51 percent versus 80 percent). The other main difference between the two towns is the education gap between the administrators and the rest of the population, again much greater in Saint Pierre than in Lyons. Information about education on Saint Pierre supports the two major divisions most frequently mentioned in the interviews. (For Lyons, see Emile Pin, Les Classes Sociales et la Pratique Religieuse [Paris, 1955], pp. 214-215.) There are major differences in dwelling patterns also. In Saint Pierre, no matter what the occupation, rarely do three generations occupy the same household. Only when the grandfather dies will the grandmother who has no more unmarried children move in with her daughter and son-in-law. Widowed men often remarry. But aside from the presence of the two-generational family, there are striking differences. Merchants and tradesmen usually live in apartments above their stores or workshops, and most of them are concentrated in a relatively small radius around the main square. Their sons, if they follow in the business, may take over the family store, while the old father might move to France. If the son wishes to set up on his own, he will have to purchase or rent another store in the business district. Rarely will he build his own house on the outskirts of town. Adjacent to the business district, which centers on the waterfront, is the administrative district. Here many of the government officials from France Uve near the cluster of government offices. Since the colonial officials are usually rotated from colony to colony, they regard no colony as their home, but France. If the son of a government official should marry a Saint Pierre girl, he would take her to France with him. Saint Pierre is laid out contrary to the American urban pattern. On Saint Pierre the wealthy dwell close to the waterfront, and the poorer

ij6

J Appendix

families live farthest away from the waterfront. The situation resembles that of colonial New Haven, and is still true of many South American cities. The key factor is that only in few cases have Saint Pierre's merchants divorced their businesses from their homes. For the noncommercial families, the son will often construct his own home on the outskirts of town. At present the town is slowly moving up the mountain slope and out toward Savoyard. This pattern of building a new house before marriage is similar to that offishermenin the Newfoundland outports (James C. Faris, Cat Harbour [St. John's, Newfoundland, 1966], pp. 63-69). 1964. In the summer of 1964 I did the core of the research. In order to check out the hierarchy of groups abstracted from the unstructured interviews of the previous summer, I had raters of both factions sort out on the basis of consideration (approximately equal to "prestige") twenty "Gaullists" and twenty "anti-Gaullists" stratified for occupational groups. The rankings were in over-all agreement, and they established the order in which the occupational groups were presented in Appendix Table 6. In informal interviews I sought out how professions (as listed in voting lists and the like) corresponded to the socio-economic categories culled from the informal interviews. For example, I wanted to know whether an accountant was considered a businessman or a commercial employee, and whether a trucker was seen as a laborer or an artisan. For this my informants were primarily friends I had made during my first summer, as a part of my job. At the same time, I had to know precisely who was in which camp, an obvious preliminary to explaining why people chose one camp rather than the other. This was the information I approached most gingerly, because I knew that it was generally regarded as island business and not to be discussed with outsiders. I obtained it by going down a 1946 voters' list with a friend (who had been a Pétainist). This is a weakness in my data; I had only one rater classify the entire population for a political affiliation of twenty years before. But I trusted his memory and checked on his ratings as best I could. Whenever he seemed to hesitate I classed the person as a "don't

Methods ] 177 know," even if my rater eventually came up with an answer. Aside from wives, whom we did not consider because of their general agreement with husbands, he failed to classify only 5.5 percent of the population. I made two safety checks on his ratings. I took a carbon copy of the voting list to a Gaullist and had him classify a random sample of the population, and compared the ratings with those of the Pétainist. I also compared the ratings with a card file of 83 Pétainists and 194 Gaullists I had myself compiled from references to Saint Pierrais in diaries, newspapers, or other documents. Virtually every mention concerning any individual on Saint Pierre left no doubt as to what side he or she was on. Prime sources were La Liberté, court records, and enlistment records. The composite ratings from the Pétainist rater, the Gaullist rater, and my own card files are in three categories: Pétainist (or anti-Gaullist), Gaullist, and a residual category. In this third category were placed all of the don't knows, "neutrals," and any persons for whom there was any disagreement on any of the three lists. Less than 7 percent of the persons on the 1946 voting list were in this category, for there is still very general knowledge throughout Saint Pierre of peoples' position during the war. The knowledge is there because the positions are still there, and they still count. The composite classification was used in all analyses comparing Gaullists with Pétainists in this book. Table 2 in the text was constructed from the 1946 voting list, corrected as much as possible for persons left off the list. Occupations listed together in this table are those ranked as approximately equal in interviews. The sample rated is of males with occupations. Virtually all males on the voting list are given an occupation, except for the very old and the very disabled. 1965. In 1965 in consultation with Saint Pierrais in France, I built up a book of kinship diagrams of persons living in 1946. When the diagrams were completed, I referred back to the composite political ratings to see how the families had divided, and the extent to which Gaullists and Pétainists were related. A second approach to the same information, concentrating on marriages, was the analysis of marriage

178 I Appendix registers at the Town Hall of Saint Pierre. The results are presented in Chapter Eight. Historical information for the 1900-1935 period is based almost entirely on sources listed in the bibliography. Many of them, like the newspapers Vigie and Réveil, are obtainable only on Saint Pierre. The best collection of materials that I know of has been gathered by Edmond Fontaine, curator of the Saint Pierre Museum, where the old Saint Pierre comes back to life. Historical information from 1935 to the present is based on a combination of documents, diaries, and interviews. Especially for the 1940-1945 period I had to persevere to obtain a balanced picture of the affair, for my first contacts on the island were with those who had been anti-Gaullist, and it was all too easy to obtain only one side of the story. I believe that Douglas Anglin, who spent some time on Saint Pierre in 1961, ran into a similar problem. From island accounts he was introduced to the Gaullist side and had trouble making fruitful contact with the Pétainists. My contacts with the Gaullists came first with those who had allied with Albert Briand in the 1960s, and later with others. The most congenial interviews with them took place outside Saint Pierre, for some of them continued to view me with suspicion because I worked for Mr. Briand at the airline. It was on Langlade, Ile aux Marins, in France, and in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that I heard the other side of the story, which can be read in Douglas Anglin's book, The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941, especially in the chapters entitled "Resistance" and "Liberation."

TABLES Table ι . Year

Population, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 1847-1962

Population

Year

1,665 2,916 4.750 6,352 6,482

1847 i860 1870 1897 1902

1907 1911 1921 1926 1931

Year

Population 4,768 4.209 3,9i8 4.030

Population

1936 1945 1951 1957 1962

4,321

4,175 4,354 4,606 4,822 5.025

Table 2.

Exports, Imports, and Total Trade, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 1900-1942 (annual value expressed in millions of contemporary Canadian dollars)

Year

Imports

Exports

Total

Year

1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921

1-7 1.8 ΐ·7 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.0 •9 1.0 1.0 •9 1.0 1.0 .8 .8 •5 •7 .8 1.0 4·ο 3·ΐ 1.8

2-5 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.4 ΐ·3 ΐ·5 ΐ·3 1.2 1.6 ΐ·7 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.2 ΐ·7 •5 •5 1.2 2·9 2.2 1.6

4.2 4.0 4.0 3·4 2.6 2-3 2-5 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.1 1-9 2.0 2.2 1.2 1·3 2.2 6.9 5-3 3-4

1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942

Imports 4.1 9-8 8.0 6.1 4-7 6.6 6.7 8.9 13-3 9·ΐ 8.6 6.1 1.4 1.8 .8 .8 .8 .8 •7 .6 •7

Exports

Total

3-6 8-7 7-7 8-3 3-7 5·ΐ 5-8 8.1 14.0 90 8.3 7-3 4.0 3-6 •7 .6 •5 •5 •4 .1 .1

7-7 18.5 15-7 14.4 8.4 11.7 12.5 17.0 27· 3 18.1 16.9 13-4 5-4 5-4 1-5 1.4 1-3 1-3 1.1 •7 .8

Source. Manuscript statistics; Saint Pierre administration archives. m

Table 3. Year

Dories (SP, IM, MIQ)

Fishing Boats, 1900-1959

Schooners (SP)

Year

Dories (SP, IM, MIQ)

Trawlers (SP)

2 188 1900 1938 193 465 1 201 1901 418 179 1939 1 7 6 0 1940 206 1902 413 0 424 180 175 1941 1903 142 1 424 1942 1904 147 1 107 163 421 1943 1905 ? 1906 105 370 135 1944 1907 360 163 1945 71 1946 1908 422 54 191 414 202 42 1947 1909 1948 209 1910 51 354 1911 50 198 378 1949 170 1912 40 1950 382 309 1951 29 175 1913 1914 24 180 1 1952 379 1 178 1 1915 1953 237 2 180 1 1916 253 1954 1 160 238 2 1955 1917 1 1918 1956 156 251 4 2 1957 159 1919 347 3 1920 0 310 1958 156 4 1921 290 0 141 1959 4 0 1922 i960 256 1 248 1923 0 1924 232 0 266 1925 0 269 1926 0 1927 249 0 1928 224 0 242 1929 0 1930 215 0 163 1931 169 1 1932 1 179 1933 198 1934 4 2 213 1935 2 1936 195 0 1937 215 Note. The decline in dories in recent years has occurred above all on Saint Pierre and Ile aux Marins; those of Miquelon have remained at the same level ( about 60). The figures in this table are for boats registered and fishing. Especially among the dories there is a certain percentage of boats manned by injured, semiretired, or otherwise employed dorymen who are not fishing actively (an estimated 15% ). Sources. 1900-1943, manuscript statistics, Saint Pierre administration archives; 1943-1946, La Documentation Française, Notes no. 1308 (Paris, 1950); 19471959, A. Tymen, Etude Economique (Paris, i960), pp. 72-74.

Tables \ 181

Table 4.

Before December 24, 1941 December 2 4 - 3 1 , 1 9 4 1 January 1942 February March April May-December January-December 1943 Total

Table 5.

Volunteers Conscripted 1944 1945 Total

Sedentary service

Active service

Date

Category

Volunteers from Saint Pierre

36 44 38 20 14 5 16 6

47 79 15 21 11 21 2

179

196

Total 36 91 117 35 35 16 37 8 375

Saint Pierrais in the War

Active service

Sedentary service on Saint Pierre

Women's corps

Youth brigade

179

196

50

30

150 12 617

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

Note. 18 sedentary left with conscription, 1944; 36 sedentary demobilized for fishing; 2 sedentary special assignments; 32 sedentary demobilized for other reasons; 36 active duty sailors demobilized; 7 sailors demilitarized to serve in merchant marine; 24 died for France.

I82

I

Appendix

Table 6.

Politics of Families with In-laws on Saint Pierre, 1946

Family categories With Gaullist in-laws only With Pétainist in-laws only With Gaullist and Pétainist in-laws With at least 2 5 % in-laws unclassified

Percent united GauUist families

Percent united Pétainist families

Percent divided

Percent with 2 5 % unclassified

47%

2%

2%

9%

0

13

4

0

50

76

92

62

3 100% (n - 164)

9 100% (n = 46)

2 100% (n = 93)

29 100% (n -- 2 1 )

Note. Both for this table and the tabulation on p. 149, spouses were assumed to have the factional position of the husband. They were not counted when calculating the family makeup unless they themselves were blood members of the family, in which case they were assumed to be talcing their husband's position. Only Saint Pierrais who were twenty-one by 1946 were considered.

Table 7. Prewar Occupational Mobility, 1936-1940 (occupations taken at marriage of son) Occupation of father Occupation of son Merchants, high civil servants Lower occupations

Merchants, high civil servants 11 4

Lower

occupations 4 50

Note. Table 7 and Table 8 attempt to measure the rigidity of Saint Pierre's occupational structure. Table 7 is based on a complete population unit—all Saint Pierre men who married from 1936 to 1940. The marriage records included the occupation of both the groom and his father. These five years are important to know about, since they immediately preceded the factional division in the population. On the other hand, the population is a small one, totaling 69, and there were therefore not enough cases to gain a very detailed picture of occupational mobility.

Tables \ 183

Table 8.

Saint Pierre Vocations: Fathers in 1916, Son's in 1946 Occupation of son

Occupation of father

Commerce Technicians, high civil servants L o w civil servants Artisans Seamen, fishermen Workers Total

Technicians, high civil servants

Low civil servants

Artisans

Seamen, fishermen

Workers

Total

19

4

2

6

3

4

38

2

10

—

7

1

1

21

1

-

Commerce

1 2 2 -

26

36

1

3 3

6 48

35 1

22 6

76 8

41

39

197

4

1 2

2 1

8

7

-

-

-

21

13

57

Note. Table 8, compiled from entirely different sources—a population list in a 1916 almanac, the voters list of 1946, and my own genealogical tables—lacks the advantage of completeness and includes the effects of the division it should help to explain. In essence it is all father-son pairs living on Saint Pierre in 1946 for whom the father was given an occupation on the 1916 list and the son was given an occupation on the 1946 list. As such it is a very rough measure indeed. But it does contain enough cases for a more detailed occupational breakdown than Table 7. It probably oversamples those occupations which improve the chances of longevity, but there is no α priori reason why it should be biased in terms of mobility information. A better table could be compiled if access were permitted to the birth registers in the Saint Pierre Town Hall.

Bibliography, Notes, Index

Bibliography

Acloque, Alphonse. Nos Pêcheurs de Haute Mer. Tours: Alfred Mame etfils[ca. 1900]. L'Action Laïque: Organe de Défense Républicaine des Iles SaintPierre et Miquelon. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1893,1899. L'Affaire de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. London: Centre de réception des émissions radio-electriques d'information, 1942. Mimeographed. Ancellin, J. "La Pêche aux Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," Revue des Travaux de ÎInstitut Pêches Maritimes, 19 (March 1955), 9-50. Anglin, Douglas G. The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941: A Study in Diplomacy in the North Atlantic Quadrangle. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966. Annuaire des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1893,1899. Arnold, Frederick K. "Islands Adrift: St. Pierre et Miquelon," National Geographic Magazine, 90 (December 1941), 743-768. Aubert de la Riie, Edgar. Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Montreal: Editions de L'Arbre, 1944. Saint-Pierre et Miquelon: Un coin de France au seuil de ΓAmérique. Paris: Collection Horizons de France, 1962. Bellet, Adolphe. Les Français à Terre-Neuve. Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1901. Besson, Maurice, et al. "Les Colonies Françaises d'Amérique," in Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime. Paris, 1936. Canadian Broadcasting Company. "Close Up," December 17, 1961. Caperon, Maurice. Pêches et Chasses. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1889. Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Collection Les Territoires Françaises. Paris, 1900. 187

i88 I Bibliography Un Drôle d'Histoire. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1901. Coleman, James. Community Conflict. Glencoe: Free Press, 1957. Corbin, Pierre. Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Series Notre Domaine Coloniale. Paris, 1924. Curton, Emile de. Les Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Alger: Offices Français d'Edition, 1944. Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. Daily Mail, St. John's, Newfoundland, 1942. Dansette, Adrien. Histoire Réligieuse de la France Contemporaine sous la Troisième République. Paris: Flammarion, 1931. Darboux, Gaston, et al. L'Industrie des Pêches aux Colonies. Vol. VI of Exposition Coloniale de Marseilles, 1906. Marseilles: Barlatier, 1906. David, R. P. Albert. Les Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, 1826-1926: Un Centenaire d'Apostolat. Mamers: Editions Gabriel Enault, 1928. De Gaulle, Charles. War Memoirs. Vol. I: The Call to Honour, 19401942. London: Collins, 1955. Delmont, Alcide; Daygrand, Gustave; Cligny, A. "La Ruine des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon: Les Réformes Nécessaires," Congrès des Anciennes Colonies, October 11-16, 1909. Coulommiers: Imprimerie Dessaint, 1909. Duncan, Otis Dudley and Artis, Jay. "Some Problems in Stratification Research," Rural Sociology, 16 (March 1951), 17-29. Stratification in a Rural Pennsylvania Community, Penn State College Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin, 461 (1951), 22-27. Dutourd, Jean. The Best Butter. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. L'Echo de Saint Pierre: Dieu, Famille, Patrie. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie de Vigie, 1905. Enim, Pierre (pseud.). Ceux de VEpave: roman de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Paris: Editions Figieures, 1928. Reprinted Paris, Colmar: Alsatia, 1966. Faris, James C. Cat Harbour: A Newfoundland Fishing Settlement. Newfoundland Social and Economic Studies, No. 3. St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1966. Fay, Charles Ryle. Life and Labour in Newfoundland. Cambridge, England: Heffers, 1956.

Bibliography | 189 Fosberg, Francis Raymond. Man's Place in the Island Ecosystem; A Symposium. Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1963. Le Foyer Paroissial, Saint Pierre, 1924-1957. France Libre. Report of Operations from December 1941 to June 1942 on Saint Pierre and Miquelon. London, 1942. Gachés, R. "Aperçus sur Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," Revue Maritime, 150 (December 1958), 1565-1580. Gamson, William. "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," American Sociological Review, 31 (February 1966), 71-81. Gauvain, Daniel. Un Almanach du Centenaire. Paris: Renaudie, 1916. "Le Billet de Saint-Michel." Manuscript. 1942-1944. Girault, Arthur. The Colonial Tariff Policy of France. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916. Guindon, Hubert. "St. Pierre: A Case Study of a Physically-Isolated Urban Community." Manuscript. March 5, 1964. Guyho, Louis. Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Paris: Horizons de la France, 1932· Hughes, Charles, et al. People of Cove and Woodlot. New York: Basic Books, 1959. Les Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Paris: Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, 1938. "Les Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon," La Dépêché Coloniale, October 21,1905. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, Paris. Recensement de la Population de Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Paris, *957> 1962. Le Jour, Montreal, 1942. Journal Officiel des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement. Lacroix, Louis. Les Derniers Voiliers Morutiers Terreneuvas, Islandais, Groenlandais. Rouen: J. Peyronnet et Cie, 1949. LaFontaine, Georges. Le Coopèratisme et l'Organisation Economique de la Gaspésie. Montréal: Editions Bernard Valiquette [1944]. Landry, Georges. "Importance des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon pour les Pêcheries Europeenes," La Pêche Maritime, 995 (1961), 7. Lavoisier, Gaston. Travail d'Après Guerre. Montreal: Editions Fides, 1945· Lecanuet, R. P. L'Eglise de France sous la Troisième République. Paris: Alean, 1930.

lQO I

Bibliography

Legasse, Ferdinand-Louis. L'Evolution Economique des Iles SaintPierre et Miquelon. Thesis. Paris: Sirey, 1935. Legasse, Louis. Notice sur la Situation et ΐAvenir Economique des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Paris, 1900. La Liberté de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon: Hebdomadaire Indépendant. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1942-1945. McNabal, Iain S. "St. Pierre, Site of Ambitious Plans," Canadian Fisherman, May 19,1963. Mackay, Robert Alexander, ed. Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, Strategic Studies. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946. Martin du Gard, Maurice. La Carte Impériale: Histoire de la France cCOutre-Mer, 1940-1945. Paris: André Bonne, 1949. Martineau, Alfred. "Esquisse d'une Histoire de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," Revue d'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, 6 ( 1928), 677-700. Muselier, Emile. De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme. Paris: Editions du Chêne, 1946. Percier, R. "La Pêche à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," La Pêche Maritime 982 (1958), 13-18. Pin, Emile. Les Classes Sociales et la Pratique Religieuse. Paris: Spes, 1955·

Rannie, William. Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, 2nd ed. Beamsville: Ontario: Rannie Publications, 1966. Redfield, Robert. The Little Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, i960. Le Réveil Saint-Pierrais: Journal Républicain. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Réveil, 1903-1907. Ribault, Jean-Yves. Histoire des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon des Origines à 1814. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1962. Ristelheuber, René. "Le Coup de Main de la France Libre sur SaintPierre et Miquelon," Ecrits de Paris, 1 1 7 (July-August 1954), 64-70. Roberts, Stephan H. The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963. Robert-Muller, Charles. Pêches et Pêcheurs de la Bretagne Atlantique. Paris: Armand Colin, 1944. Rossel, Fred. "Un Mois à Saint Pierre de Terre-Neuve," May 1898. Cut from an unidentified journal, Museum of St. Pierre. Ruellon, Leon. "Evolution Démographique de la Territoire." Manuscript. 1957.

Bibliography | 191 Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Paris: Agence de la France D'Outre Mer. 1950. Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Booklet prepared for the Exposition Coloniale Internationale. Paris, 1931. "Saint Pierre et Miquelon," La Documentation Française, Notes no. 1308 (April6,1950). Paris. Saint Pierre et Miquelon. Service de Coordination de l'Enseignement dans la France d'Outre Mer. Paris, 1946. Sasco, Emile. Ephémerides des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1931. Smelser, Neil. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Stewart, Walter. "Trouble in Paradise," Star Weekly (Toronto), June 5,1965· Thompson, David. Two Frenchmen: Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle. London: Cresset Press, 1951. Tracts Clandestins qui circulaient à St.-Pierre et Miquelon, avant l'occupation des îles par les forces navales françaises libres du general de Gaulle, le jour dé Noël, 1941. Brochure nos. 1 and 2. Ottawa: Service de l'Information France Libre, 1942. Tricoche, Georges Nestler. Terre-Neuve et Alentours. Paris: P. Roger, 1929· Thouin, César. Une Colonie qui veut Rester Français: Saint-Pierre et Miquelon et les Projets de Rattachement à Terre-Neuve. Pamphlet. Paris: Editions l'Association des Armateurs et Patrons de Pêches, 1918. Tuai, Isaac. L'Engagement des Marins pour la Grande Pêche. Thesis. Paris, 1907. Tymen, A. Situation Actuelle et Possibilités de Développement de VEconomie deslíes Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (Janvier 1961). Paris: Société D'Etudes Pour le Développement Economique et Social, 1961. L'Union des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon; Journal de la Défense des Intérêts Coloniaux. Saint Pierre: 1919-1920. Vibert, Paul Théodore. La Concurrence Etrangère; la Philosophie de la Colonisation; les Questions Brûlantes Exemples d'Hier et dAujourd'hui. Paris: Ed. Cornély, 1906. "La Domination Cléricale à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," in Questions Américaines. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1909.

1Q2 I

Bibliography

La Vigie; Journal de Démocratie Sociale des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Saint Pierre: Imprimerie de Vigie, December 21, 1903, March 1905 sporadically to 1921. Villefosse, Louis de. Souvenirs d'un Marin de la France Libre. Paris: Les Editeurs Français Réunis, 1951. The author spent a total of nine months on Saint Pierre, 1962-1966, and much of his information has been based on tape-recorded interviews, questionnaires, private diaries, documents, and photographs gathered on the island. In addition he interviewed Saint Pierrais living in the United States and in France.

Notes

Introduction 1. For an excellent study of a similar Newfoundland community, the reader is referred to James Fans, Cat Harbour: A Newfoundland Fishing Settlement (St. John's, 1966). 2. For the French Revolution on Saint Pierre, see Jean—Yves Ribault, Histoire des lies Saint-Pierre et Miquelon des Origines à 1814 (Saint Pierre, 1962); and a series of articles by Emile Sasco published in La Liberté: Hebdomadaire Independent (Saint Pierre, 1942-1944).

1. Saint Pierre in 1900 1. Until 1887 the island was governed by a military commandant, as were all of France's colonies. When France's empire passed over to the Ministry of Colonies, however, a governor was placed in charge of Saint Pierre. During two intervals, from 1906 to 1923 and from 1933 to 1946, the island head was titled "administrator," a lower rank than "governor." In both cases this was a measure of economy occasioned by a severe decline in Saint Pierre's fortunes. The reversion to the use of "governor" and the appointment of a higher level official to fill the position were apparently rewards for Saint Pierre's involvement in the First and Second World Wars. Saint Pierrais regarded being governed by mere administrators as evidence of the Colonial Ministry's discrimination against the colony. 2. The Conseil Supérieur des Colonies was founded as an advisory body in 1883. Although it rarely met after 1886 it did provide the only elected representative of the colonies to the central government, and for this reason it was characteristic of most colonies that they paid a good deal of attention to the election of the delegate in the first years of the century. 3. Louis Legasse, Notice sur la Situation et l'Avenir Economique des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Paris, 1900), p. 9; Louis Lacroix, Les Derniers Voiliers Morutiers Terreneuvas, Islandais, Groenlandais (Rouen, 1949), p. 24; pamphlet issued by the Société des Oeuvres de Mer, Paris, February,

m

194 I Notes to Pages Q-ιγ 1933; Gaston Darboux et al., L'Industrie des Pêches aux Colonies, vol. VI of Exposition Coloniale de Marseilles, 1906 (Marseilles, 1906), p. 437. 4. Isaac Tuai, L'Engagement des Marins pour h Grande Pêche (Paris, 1907), PP· 8, 57. 5. Legasse, Notice, pp. 10, 50; Adolphe Bellet, Les Français à TerreNeuve (Paris, 1901), p. 226; Darboux, Pêches aux Colonies, pp. 485-487; Lacroix, Derniers Voiliers, p. 26. 6. Lacroix, Derniers Voiliers, pp. 95-96; Bellet, Les Français à TerreNeuve, p. 236. 7. Maurice Caperon, Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Paris, 1900), p. 13. 8. Ibid., p. ix. 9. Information on the hiring and paying of the sailors can be found in Tuai, L'Engagement des Marins, pp. 28-29, 56-57; Legasse, Notice, p. 50; Darboux, Pêches aux Colonies, p. 457. 10. For the graviers, see Legasse, Notice, pp. 22, 50; Tuai, L'Engagement des Marins, p. 48; Pierre Enim (pseud.), Ceux de l'Epave: Roman de Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Paris, 1928), pp. 33-34. 1 1 . Tuai, L'Engagement des Marins, p. 48. 12. Lacroix, Derniers Voiliers, pp. 138-139. 13. Annuaire des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Saint Pierre, 1893). 14. Caperon, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, p. 25. 15. J. Ancellin, "La Pêche aux Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon," Revue des Travaux de l'Institut des Pêches Maritimes, 19 (March 1955), 9-50. 16. See Legasse, Notice, p. 8; manuscript statistics, Administration, Saint Pierre; Daniel Gauvain, Un Àlmanach du Centenaire (Paris, 1916), p. 260; Annuaire, 1893. 17. Caperon, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, pp. 7, 10; Legasse, Notice, p. 1 1 ; Annuaire, 1893. 18. Ferdinand-Louis Legasse, L'Evolution Economique des Iles SaintPierre et Miquelon (Paris, 1935), pp. 102-103; manuscript statistics, Administration, Saint Pierre. 19. See Stephan H. Roberts, A History of French Colonial Policy, 18701925 (Hamden, Conn., 1963), p. 50; Arthur Girault, The Colonial Tariff Policy of France (Oxford, 1916), pp. 185-186; Alcide Delmont, Gustave Daygrand, and A. Cligny, "La Ruine des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon; Les Réformes Necessaires," Congrès des Anciennes Colonies, October 1 1 - 1 6 , 1909 (Coulommiers, 1909). 20. See Girault, Tariff Policy, p. 146; Legasse, Evolution Economique; La Vigie: Journal de Démocratie Sociale des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, autumn issues, 1912; Darboux, Pêches aux Colonies, pp. 502-503. 21. Darboux, Pêches aux Colonies, pp. 435-436; Le Réveil Saint-Pierrais: Journal Républicain, October 13, 1906. All of the losses may not have been

Notes to Pages 17-29 | 195 accidental. It is affirmed by oldtimers on the island that it was the policy of the largest companies to scuttle some of their boats for the insurance in the years of poor fishing after 1902. Such an operation would be accomplished, for security's sake, while the sailors were out in their dories and only the captain, the salter, and the cabin boy were aboard. Uncharitable insinuations are found in Réveil, July 20, 1907, which mentioned boats that sank "from a leak" when the sea was perfectly calm, with all hands saved. If this practice was at all common, the loss of some boats was as much an effect as a cause of the decline. 22. Legasse, Notice, p. 18; Vigie, 1905-1907 and March 21, 1908; Lacroix, Derniers Voiliers, p. 24; Legasse, Evolution Economique, pp. 102103. The decline in schooners on Saint Pierre was not caused by competition from steam vessels. Although the first steam fishing vessel made its appearance in Saint Pierre in 1900, using the then new trawling method, it and its kind had litde efEect until the period between the wars (see Darboux, Pêches aux Colonies, p. 427). In 1938, although steam trawlers were predominant, there were still twenty-four schooners on the Grand Banks from Saint Màio. In 1940 there were fifteen left. The total demise of the fishing sloop with its primitive system of hand-lines came only with World War II—see Charles Robert-Muller, Pêches et Pêcheurs de la Bretagne Atlantique (Paris, 1944). 23. Governor Jullien, note to Minister of Colonies, 1901, requesting Legion of Honor for Louis Legasse; Paul Theodore Vibert, La Concurrence Etrangère (Paris, 1906), p. 31; Paul Theodore Vibert, Questions Américaines (Paris, 1909). 24. Delmont, Daygrand, and Cligny, "La Ruine." 2. Challenges 1. Information on Legasse was received through personal communication with Jean Legasse and Ferdinand Legasse. Some information is contained in a request by Governor Jullien to the Ministry of Colonies soliciting the Legion of Honor for Louis Legasse in 1901; it was refused. Legasse did not receive it until 1923. Also see the French National Archives, Section Ministère des Territoires d'Outre-Mer, Saint Pierre File 41. In this chapter, other information on the Legasse family and their interests, unless otherwise documented, comes from Vigie and Réveil, 1903-1912. 2. See also Vibert, Concurrence, p. 35. 3. R. P. Albert David, Les lies Saint Pierre et Miquelon, 1826-1926: Un Centenaire d'Apostolat (Mamers, 1928), p. 15. 4. Réveil, July 6, 1907; Gauvain, Almanach, p. 266.

ig6 I Notes to Pages 29-42 5. I have counted someone as a Legasse ally who was a close relative, an officer of the Legasse union, or a member of any Legasse municipal ticket. The opposition shipowners were found among the officers of the Chamber of Commerce, the candidates opposing the Legasse municipal councils, and the members of the rival shipowners' union. 6. Archives, Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, Paris, File 96. 7. Enim, Ceux de l'Epave, p. 70. 8. Most dates are from Emile Sasco, Ephémerides des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Saint Pierre, 1 9 3 1 ) . 9. Enim, Ceux de l'Epave, pp. 70-72; Réveil, December 29, 1906. 10. See, for example, Vigie, October 23, 1910. 1 1 . Ibid., May 1908, October 3, 1908, and October 3 1 , 1908. 12. Ibid., November 2 1 , 1908; Vibert, Questions Américaines, pp. 55-62. 13. The following were reprinted in Vigie: Journal de Genève, November 20, 1908; Nouvelliste de Bordeaux, November 23, 1908; Figaro, December 2, 1908. 14. Archives, Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, Paris, File 96. 15. Vigie, January 1, 1910. 16. Vibert, Questions Américaines, p. 62. Vibert also accused Christophe Legasse of being influenced by the very conservative French Canadian clergy, as the Free French later accused Monsignor Poisson. 17. Archives, Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, Paris, File 93. 18. Réveil, October 14, October 2 1 , 1903. 19. Only one duel out of the fourteen which actually took place from 1900 to 1907 (there were at least twenty-two challenges) resulted in anyone being hurt; and that was the only duel in which swords were used. In the rest the duelists used pistols, and whether they were fired into the air or whether rubber bullets were used, as in Europe, the results were always solemnly reported: "Four bullets exchanged without result. The seconds intervened and agreed that honor had been satisfied." The place of the duels is not usually mentioned. Sometimes they took place at Ravanel, a fishing hamlet on Saint Pierre island, and sometimes they took place on Green Island, a deserted rock between Saint Pierre and Newfoundland. 20. Vibert, Concurrence, pp. 34-35. 21. Revéil, November 10, 1906. 22. See Vigie, 1905-1907; and Figaro, July 19, 1907. 23. Vibert, Concurrence, p. 34. 24. Ibid., p. 35. 25. Ibtd., p. 36; Réveil, March 2, April 13, 1907. 26. Réveil, March 30, April 20, 1907. 27. Réveil Illustré, 1904; Réveil, April 6, May 1 1 , 1907. 28. Vibert, Concurrence, pp. 32-33.

Notes to Pages 42-56 | 197 29. Bellet, Les Français à Terre-Neuve, p. 29; Lacroix, Derniers Voiliers, p. 26. 30. Gauvain, Almanach, pp. 255-256, 260-261. 3 1 César Thouin, Une Colonie qui veut Rester Français: Saint Pierre et Miquelon et les Projets de Rattachement à Terre-Neuve (Paris, 1918), p. 19. 32. L'Union des lies Saint-Pierre et Miquelon: Journal de la Défense des Intérêts Coloniaux, December 1919; "Liste des divers Sociétés, Associations, et Syndicats de Travailleurs et Marins ayant existé et existant actuellement à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon" (Saint Pierre, 1942), p. 5. 33. '"Liste des divers Sociétés," p. 1. Paternalistic companies have an advantage over cooperatives that often outweighs the cooperative's monetary advantage; the companies build up a backlog of mutual obligations on a person-to-person basis that is more important than a financial contract (see Faris, Cat Harbour, pp. 147-161). It may be that this first cooperative on Saint Pierre tried to build up a similar personalized service, but did not have the financial resources to do enough fishermen enough favors for the fishermen to feel obligations in return. Cooperative movements attempted to improve the lot of fishermen all along the North Atlantic coast of North America during the twenties and thirties, but the companies usually staved off the movement, either by underselling, or promoting its own identification with the community, and opposing the community to the outside (where the central office of the cooperative usually was). See Georges Lafontaine, Le Coopèratisme et l'Organisation Economique de la Gaspéste (Montreal 1944)· 34. Iain McNabal, "St. Pierre, Site of Ambitious Plans," Canadian Fisherman (May 19, 1963); Edgar Aubert de la Riie, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (Montreal, 1944), p. 124; Pierre Corbin, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (Paris, 1924). 35. Jean Legasse, personal communication. 3. Society as a Family 1. Statuts de la Société de Secours aux Marins sous le titre de NotreDame de Bon-Secours (Saint Pierre, 1946). 2. Vigie, August 29, 1905. 3. Ibid., August 29, 1905. 4. Ibid., October 19, 1907. "Qui sème le vent recolte la tempête" is a phrase used also by Vigie (January 1, 1910) to describe Didelot's intransigence on the school question. It was also Senator Claireaux's alleged response to Governor Herry's request for aid in the 1964 riots, according to a campaign broadcast (August 27, 1964) by Francis Leroux.

iq8 I Notes to Pages 56-67 5. Leonce Dupont, "Open Letter to Administrator Lachat, December 16, 1919," printed in L'Union, December 1919. 4. Saint Pierre between the Wars 1. Corbin, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, p. 269; Aubert de la Riie, SaintPierre et Miquelon, p. 216. 2. The liquor arrived in Saint Pierre from Scotland, France, Holland, and Canada in very large shipments. From Saint Pierre it was sent out on smaller boats that carried it to any one of a number of places on the eastern coast of the United States. The smaller boats could actually land their cargoes if they had adequate shore liaison. The larger boats anchored in groups (for safety) outside the territorial limit (which was at first three miles, and later twelve miles) where launches came out to pick up cargo. The shipment might be reserved for one consignatory or sold at a fixed rate to any comer. In the first years there were many entrepreneurs like Bill McCoy, who brought "the real McCoy" to America from the Bahamas and Saint Pierre, but gradually big syndicates took over the business. The rum runners ran two very grave dangers. The first was interception, confiscation, and condemnation of their boat by the U.S. Coast Guard, which they could suffer if they strayed inside the prescribed limit. The second, almost as likely, was piracy. Many cargoes from Saint Pierre were hijacked, and many crew members killed. Doublecrossing on the part of the American buyers was not unusual, and rumrunners had to beware of counterfeit money. The boats beyond the territorial limit were beyond the law, and the amount of money they amassed on board, as well as their unsold cargo, was an invitation to crime. The pay was high for officers and sailors on board these ships, but they were mostly crewed by Americans and Canadians. Saint Pierrais were more involved in the petit fraude to Canada. See Alistair Moray, Diary of a Rum-Runner (London, 1929); Willoughby, Rum War at Sea (Washington, 1964); Robert Corse, Rum Row (New York, 1959); and Legasse, Evolution Economique. 3. Report of Administrator Barrillot to the Ministry of Colonies (19c, typewritten), Saint Pierre, February 7, 1934, p. 24. 4. Archives, Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, Paris, File 96A. 5. Those Saint Pierrais who profited directly from the grande fraude rum running were few. A merchant involved in the business gave the following estimates for the percentage of grand fraud business done on Saint Pierre: 60 percent went to a Canadian syndicate whose name on Saint Pierre was Northern Export. Though Northern Export's head on Saint Pierre was

Notes to Pages 67-76 | 199 a Canadian named Roseborne, two or three Saint Pierre men made their fortunes by being involved in one way or another. For the year 1933 alone, the Saint Pierre office of Northern Export reported a business of over three million Canadian dollars. About 20 percent went to Louis Ozon, 15 percent to Louis Hardy, 10 percent to Georges Landry, and 5 percent to the Morue Française. 6. Hubert Guindon, "St. Pierre: A Case Study of a Physically-Isolated Urban Community" (typewritten, 1964), pp. 5 ff. 7. The account of the demonstration that follows has been taken from the Barrillot Report, pp. 3-29. 8. See Barrillot Report, pp. 22-25. 9. Barrillot Report, p. 29; Appendix to Barrillot Report, "Etat des personnes ayant quitté la Colonie depuis les événements sur l'intervention de l'Administration"; Aubert de le Riie, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, p. 199. 10. Manuscript notes of November 5, 1943 listing public works projects and unemployed, 1933-1943, administration archives, Saint Pierre. 11. "Liste des divers Sociétés," p. 5; Barrillot Report, p. 8; Statuts: Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs de Saint Pierre et d'Ile aux Marins (Saint Pierre, n.d. ). 12. Both unions appear in the "Liste des divers Sociétés," pp. 4-5. 13. Ibid., pp. 2-3; Statuts de la Caisse de Crédit Maritime des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Saint Pierre, n.d. [1933]). 14. La Liberté: Hebdomadaire Indépendent, April 14, 1942. 15. Aubert de la Riie, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, p. 254; Ferdinand Legasse, personal communication; La Liberté, July 28, 1942. 16. La Liberté, April 14, 1942;. also February 7, 1942. 17. Henri Claireaux, personal communication. 18. Out of this union came the core of supporters who elected Saint Pierre's postwar General Council. Its members shared the spirit of the Barrillot demonstrations of 1933. Indeed one Saint Pierrais recently retrospectively assessing the Barrillot demonstrators termed them "Claireautists avant Claireaux." 19. "Composition des Assemblées Locales," reports of Administrator Barrillot to the Ministry of Colonies, Third Bureau, dated July 7, 1932; December 13, 1934; October 9, 1935; August 21, 1936 (administration archives, Saint Pierre). 20. Gilbert de Bournat, personal communication. 21. Emile Muselier, De Gaulle Contre le Gaullisme\ (Paris, 1946), p. 250; L'Eclaireur, October, 1941 in Tracts Clandestins qui circulaient à St.-Pierre et Miquelon, avant Voccupation des îles par les forces navales françaises libres du General de Gaulle, le jour de Noël, 1941 (Ottawa, 1942), no. 2, p. 7.

200 I Notes to Pages 77-86

5. The Coming of the Free French 1. In the same month the packet boat Beam, which ensured the liaison between the islands, was also requisitioned. The two boats were finally returned to civilian hands in August 1940. 2. The source for much of the information in this chapter concerning the period 1939-1944 is an official report giving a detailed account of Saint Pierre during the war. Because this report remains confidential today I am not at liberty to be more specific about it. 3. Charges were later made that Bournat changed the substance of the telegram and delayed its dispatch, but they have no real basis. 4. For the diplomatic entanglements and repercussions of the Saint Pierre affair, see Douglas G. Anglin, The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941 (Toronto, 1966). Anglin's suggestion that Bournat actually favored and aided the Nazi cause is not, in my opinion, substantiated either in his book or elsewhere. Anti-Gaullists on Saint Pierre feel that Anglin has presented only one side of the internal events on Saint Pierre. 5. Anglin, Affaire, p. 41. 6. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 7. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 8. Ibid., pp. 22-28. 9. The full contents of the poster can be found in ibid., pp. 163-166. 10. Private journals, sources confidential. 11. Some are reprinted in Tracts Clandestins. 12. Anglin, Affaire, pp. 36-37. 13. Le Jour, January 20, 1942. 14. Muselier, De Gaulle Contre le Gaullisme, p. 285. 15. New York Post, December 26, 1941—January 10, 1942. 16. Anglin, Affaire, p. 27. 17. L'Eclaireur, December 1, 1941, in Tracts Clandestins, no. 2, p. 17. 18. Bournat remains convinced that Poisson, who had regularly opposed him on many issues before the war, was in favor of de Gaulle until the arrival of the Free French. A report on Saint Pierre received by Free French in London and dated April 1941 states that "except for Monsignor Poisson, war veteran, but timid, the clergy are in favor of Pétain" (Bournat, personal communication). 19. La Liberté, April 14, 1942. 20. A year later Vichy ordered the suspension of three more government employees who had appeared before the commission, but by that time Saint Pierre was under the Free French. 21. Tracts Clandestins, no. 1, pp. 9, 10, 29.

Notes to Pages 86-102

| 201

22. Anglin, Affaire, p. 29. 23. Ibid., p. 26, note, p. 49. 24. For example, Tracts Clandestins, no. 1, p. 9. 25. L'Eclaireur, November 13 and November 22, 1941, in ibid., no. 2, pp. 1 3 - 1 5 . 26. La Liberté, December 23, 1942. 27. Louis de Villefosse, Souvenirs dun Marin de la France Libre (Paris, 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 165. 28. Ira Wolfert on "Close Up," Canadian Broadcasting Company, December 1 7 , 1 9 6 1 . 29. Villefosse, Souvenirs, pp. 164, 188. 30. Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 284; New York Times, December 25, 1941. 3 1 . Villefosse, Souvenirs, pp. 189-190; Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 292; Saint Pierre, Palais de Justice, Records, March 9, 1942. 32. Saint Pierre, Palais de Justice, Records, February 4, 1942. 33. Saint Pierre, Palais de Justice, Records. The trial was on April 3, 1944; the incident took place on August 13, 1943. 34. "Allocation Prononcée à la Radio de Saint-Pierre le 14 Février 1942 par le Capitaine de Vaisseau Héron de Villefosse" (Saint Pierre, n.d.), pp. 7, 9· 35. Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 278; conversation with Savary, September 23, 1965. 36. Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 281. 37. Ibid., p. 288. 38. La Liberté, January 1 4 , 1 9 4 3 . 39. Ibid., May 19, 1942. 40. Ibid., January 14, 1943. 41. Ibid. 42. Private diaries. For the ambiguity in Dupont's position, see L'Eclaireur, October 23, 1941, in Tracts Clandestins, no. 2, p. 9. 43. Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p. 297. 44. Saint Pierre, Palais de Justice, Records, July 1 , 1941. 45. Saint Pierre, Palais de Justice, Records, May 1, 1944; letter from Lavoisier to Garrouste, January 8, 1944. 6. Reconciliation 1. A. Tymen, Situation ActueUe et Possibilités de Développement l'Economie des Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquélon (Paris, 1961), pp. 12, 71. 2. Ibid., pp. 79-80, 157-160.

de

202 I Notes to Pages 102-130 3. Ibid., pp. 145, 147, 155-156; Journal Officiel, December 14, 1963. 4. Tymen, Situation, pp. 42, 69-81, 92, 104. 5. Ibid., p. 72. 6. Ibid., pp. 36-37, 97. 7. Ibid., pp. 37-43. 7*> 150. 8. Ibid., p. 70. 9. Ibid., pp. 105-108, 186. 10. Election results are reported in the Journal Officiel. 11. Henri Claireux, speech at the Salle des Fêtes, June 19, 1964, broadcast by Radio Saint Pierre. 12. Elections of August 22, 1945, November 4, 1945, June 2, 1946, November 10, 1946 in Journal Officiel; Gilbert de Bournat, "Electrices et Electeurs de Saint Pierre, de Miquelon et de l'Ile aux Marins," typewritten (Grand Bank, May 20, 1946). 13. Quoted in a speech by Henri Morazé, Journal Officiel, March 15, 1949, ΡΡ· 25-30. 14. Ibid. 15. Conversations with Savary and Claireaux, September 1965. 16. Private communication. 17. Francis Leroux, "Profession de Foi," August 1964. 18. When I asked six Gaullists and six Pétainists to rate forty other people (half Gaullist and half Pétainist from all occupational groups) in terms of friendship—whether they would invite them to their houses, talk to them in the street, etc.—for only two elderly Pétainists did the old division make any difference. 19. For the 1965 demonstrations, see Walter Stewart, "Trouble in Paradise," Star Weekly (Toronto), June 5, 1965. 20. For instance, see Journal Officiel, May 30, i960, and December 15, 1962. 21. For instance, Vigie, January 1, 1910; Georges Nestler Tricoche, Terre-Neuve et Alentours (Paris, 1929), p. 286. 22. La Liberté, July 28, 1942. 23. Political broadcast by Albert Briand, August 25, 1964. 24. Joseph Leheunen, speech at the Salle des Fêtes, June 19, 1964, broadcast by Radio Saint Pierre. 7. Rumor, Quarrel, and Faction 1. Personal communication, Edgar Aubert de la Riie. 2. Gauvain, Almanack, pp. 264-265; Enim, Ceux de l'Epave, pp. 29, 115; Vigie, August 24, 1907.

Notes to Pages 130-172 | 203 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Enim, Ceux de l'Epave, p. 29. Caperon, Saint Pierre et Miquélon, p. 21. Vigie, May 16, 1908. Enim, Ceux de l'Epave, pp. 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 . Archives, Maison Mère des Pères de Saint Esprit, Paris, File 96.

8. Gaullists and Anti-Gaullists: The Organization of Choice 1. Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, pp. 291-292. 2. See Tracts Clandestins. 3. L'Eclaireur, October 23, 1941, in Tracts Clandestins, no. 2, p. 9. 4. From an article describing the celebration of the first anniversary of the arrival of the Free French, in La Liberté, December 1, 1942. 5. La Liberté, June 1, 1944. 6. Les Iles Saint-Pierre et Miquélon (Paris, 1938), p. 110. 7. Laurence Wylie, ed., Chameaux: A Village in Anjou (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 180-183, and unpublished data from the study, Harvard University. 8. Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1963); Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, 1959); and William Gamson, "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," American Sociological Review, 31 (February 1966), 7 1 - 8 1 , have been helpful in formulating the conclusion. 9. Anglin, Affaire, p. 26, footnote.

Index

Action Laïque: opposition newspaper, 24, 34, 48, 56, 60; Le Cercle de Γ, 30, 34. 58, 59, 60 Address, forms of, 53, 55, 112 Administration: in 1900, 144; in 1940, 144; helped cooperative, 46; antiadministration feeling, 93, 101; and Morue Française, 94, 124; cross-cutting divisions, 122. See also Antimetropolitanism; Civil servants; Metropolitans; Social structure Administrative Council ( replaced by General Council in 1946): composition, 7; and loan, 38; and whale-oil factory, 40; and administration, 45, 68, 95; elections, 1935-1945, 74, 106, 107; Claireaux and, 75. See also Dupont Air Saint Pierre, 105, 173 Alcohol, 30, 31, 49. See also Ligue Anti-Alcoolique Anarchism, 64 Anciens Combattants of World War I. See War veterans Les Anciens de la Deuxième Division Blindée, 117 Anglin, Douglas G. ( The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941), 171, 178, 200 Angoulvant, Gabriel, 34 Anticlericalism, 30, 34, 36-37; and Legasse, 58-59; and Gaullism, 89-90 Antimetropolitanism, 68, 70; and Free French, 98; 118-122; social isolation of, 124-127, 133; merchants and metropolitans, 133, 139 Apostolic Prefect, 8, 26, 32, 33, 55; relation to Gaullists and anti-GauÜists, 88, 101, 158 Armistice, 78; Armistice Day, 81, 86

L' Association de L'Armée du Rhin et Danube, 117 L' Association des Engagés Volontaires, 117 Assumptionist Brothers, 8 Astrid, 77 Bartlett, Archibald, British vice-consul and Gaullist leader, 82, 83; resignation of, 84; and Western Union, 152 Barrillot, Administrator Georges, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74 Basques: workers, 12; and Legasse, 23, 27, 39; country, 51; racial pride of, 125 Bayonne, France: Basque port, 12, 14; Saint-Martin Legasse and Cie, 18; and Louis Legasse, 23, 27 Beam, 103, 200 Benoit, Georges, 156 Le Billet de Saint Michel, 153 Birot, Commander, 163 Blaison, Commander, 163 Bolshevism, 62, 64 Bonin, Mme. Henriette, 82, 85, 161; describes landing of Free French, 87 Bonin, Marcel, 82 Bordeaux, France, 14 Borei, Theodore, 13 Borotra, Dominique, 41, 75, 145 Boumet, Gilbert de, 74, 78, 96, 108, 141, 200; and antiadministration feeling, 93, 94 Briand, Albert, 99, 105, 173; political leader, 116, 121, 125, 178; loyalty to order, 155; anti-Gaullist, 160, 161 Briand, Leon, 84 Brittany, 8; homeland of St. Pierrais, 12, 50, 51, 125

205

2o6 I Index Brothers of Christian Instruction, 8, 33, 35 Brouilles. See Quarrels Bureaucratization, 126 Café Français, 79 Café Joinville, 37 Café du Midi, 27, 35 Canada: communications, with Saint Pierre, 1; Church, 36, 83, 89; education in, 8, 174; emigration to, 18-21, 70, 169; Gaullists, 81-83, 86, 141; Pétainists, 141; smuggling to, 198. See also Nova Scotia; Quebec Carpentry, 67 Ceux de l'Epave, 130,132, 134 Chamber of Commerce: and Administrative Council, 7; presidents of, 28, 38; conservative, 31; opposition to whale-oil factory, 40; opposition to anticlericalism, 58; opposition to Legasse, 196; and Gaullism, 78, 95 Chanzeaux, France, 173 Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 2 Church: and administration, 32; Canadian, 36, 83, 89; and Grad, 120; and Morue Française, 26-27, 3 1 , 55; opposition to, 32, 37; and Prohibition, 67; and Saint Pierre as family, 51, 57, 154-155; schools, 32-37, 138, 152. See also Apostolic Prefect; Clergy Church Point, Nova Scotia, 8 Civil servants: in 1900, 7; in 1940, 144152; salary cut, 1933, 68; Gaullist, 82; downgraded for political reasons, 84-85, 91, 110; and Bournat, 86,153154; union, 106. See also Administration; Metropolitans; Social structure Claireaux, Elie, 106, 107 Claireaux, Senator Henri, 77, 99, 116, 121; forms coalition, 106-109; and Savary, 111, 112; and Common Market, 118; avoids metropolitans, 125; 1964 riots, 197. See also General Council Claireaux, Leonce, 74, 99, 106-107 Clergy: in 1900, 8; and Legasse, 2627; and Bournat, 84, 154; and Free French, 90. See also Apostolic Prefect; Church

Club des Iles, 124,125 Collaboration with enemy, 87 Colombani, Paul, 145 Colonial mentality, 122-126 Combes Ministry of 1906, 59 Commerce. See Merchants; Social structure Committee for the Defense of the Interests of the Islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 121 Common Market, 105, 118, 120 Communications with France by sea, 1, 14 Compagnons de France (Pétainist Boy Scouts), 85 Company employees, 25, 26, 130, 146; loyalty to company, 152 Company store. See Credit Company unions: 29, 44-45, 5 2 - 5 3 , 72 Conscription: 77; mobilization recommended, 98; opposition to draft, 99, 106-107 Conseil Supérieur des Colonies: 7; Legasse and, 22, 23, 24; Dupont and, 28; re-election of Legasse, 38; election of 1919, 47; founded 1883, 193 Conspiracy theory: 61; of Leban-Lachat, 64; and demonstrations, 69; of government commercial clique, 76 Consultative Assembly, 108 Cooperatives: 45-46; cooperative movement, 63-65; Crédit Maritime, 72; and paternalistic companies, 197 Coppée François, 39 Cormier, Eugene, 117 Corporation des Pêcheurs, 93-95, 106, 107, 124 L. Coste and Cie, 29 Craftsmen, 145 Credit: 3, 10-12; and dorymen, 15, 4445; merchants withdrawal of, 62-64; "owed" by merchants, 140 Crédit Maritime, 71-73, 75 Cross of Lorraine, 95, 97 Customs, 7, 109, 110; employee support for de Gaulle, 152, 159 Dagort, Henri, 93, 107, 110 Daguerre, Georges, 61, 74, 106 Dalhousie, Nova Scotia, 19 Danseville, Governor, 5

Index | 207 Daygrand, Gustave, 28, 33, 38 affair, 68-69; company union, 72; Debidour, Henri, 108, 111 Administrative Council, 74; and Free De Gaulle, General Charles: radio apFrench, 95; death, 112; factional hispeal from, 78; war veterans' support tory, 162 of, 79; personal message from, 80; Gaullist leaders, 82; and Frioult, 93; Echo, 48 reconciliation of anti- and pro-Gaull- L'Eclaireur, 82, 162, 163 ists, xoi; Gaullists and Free French Economic and Social Development, 134-155; Gaullists and Pétainists, Fund for (FIDES), 102 Education, 160, 174-175. See also 153, 156 Schools Delmont, Aristide: opposition leader, Ά 3°> 33; defeated by Legasse, 38; England, Saint Pierre a possession of, 6 denounced by Vigie, 52, 55, 56 Demonstrations: 1903, 1906 elections, Eudist Fathers, 8 Evadés de Guerre, 117 23, 56; 1903-1909 over secularizations, 3 3 Family: kin as employees, 26, 146; 36 close-knit, 50; Saint Pierre as, 26, 1933 Barrillot, 68-71; 33, 48-65; intellectual anti-Gaullist 1941 Gaullists, 79-81, 86; families, 108; myth of, 113; church 1942 anti-Pétainists, 97; and, 139, 155, 166; as ideal of unity, 1943 against conscription, 99; 170-172; female role in, 142; and 1957 Sicaud, 118; politics, 148-151, 183 1964 Batignolles, 118-121; Fathers of the Holy Ghost, 5, 8, 109 1965 Gardes Mobiles, 121-122 Fécamp, France, 14 Depression: of 1903, 8, 16-17, 21 > a n d emigration, 42; of 1933, 68. See also Fêtes des Marins, 51 Figaro, 36, 39 Economy; Public-works projects Fishermen. See Dorymen; Sailors Le Devoir, 83, 84, 91 Fishermen's Committee, 71 Dockers, 74, 106, 107, 121 Dorymen: in 1900, 14-15; in 1940, Fishing: importance of, 5, 8, 9; during World War I, 43; markets, 10; bait, 145-147; during Prohibition, 67; 9; bait traps, 41; fish traps and gill during World War I, 44-45, 61; lie nets, 104; fish loops, 104; salt, 9, 14; aux Marins faction, 30, 41; and storing plant, 45, 46; freezing plant, SPEC, 102-104; unions, 29-30, 4566, 103, 105; herring canning, 102; 46, 53-54, 72-73, 93-95, 124; ™ion transshipment, 73, 104; metropolitan of dockers and of civil servant, 106flotilla, 10, 76; trawlers, 103-104, 107; political factions and union, 171. 195; boats, 1900-1959, 180. See also See also Cooperatives; Credit; Social Dorymen structure, inter-group relations; Syndicat des Pêcheurs ( dorymen's Folquet brothers, 145 Fontaine, Edmond, 178 union) France, Anatole, 156 Dorymen's union. See Syndicat des France: colonial history, 6; as fishPêcheurs ing base, 9-11, 18, 42, 44, 168; emiDreyfus, 39, 59 gration to, 13, 70, 169; relations to Dueling, 41-42,136, 196 Saint Pierre, 13-14, 125-126; ideoDupont, Leonce: opposition leader, 28— logical influences, 14, 31-32, 51, 5829; commercial position, 28, 47, 72, 60; politics, 35; intellectuals, 49-50, 94; attitude to Church, 32; Legasse 53, 58-60; inflation, 102; Saint ally, 45, 47; mediates strike, 45; Pierre education compared with, 174; Town Council, 46; island father, 58, research in, 178; liquor source, 198. 95, 144; ideology, 61; and Barrillot

2oS I Index See also Antimetropolitanism; Metropolitans Free French: in 1940, 79; impressions of Morue Française and administrators, 124; divisive policies of, 147; as "outsiders," 154; as revolutionaries, 156; deterred by image of family unity, 171; and Msgr. Poisson, 196. See also Caullists French Revolutions, 5 , 1 5 6 - 1 5 7 French Shore, Newfoundland, 16 French West Indies, 94 "Friends of the Constitution," 5 Frioult, Pierre, 71, 72, 93-94 Frioult's union. See Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs Gardes Mobiles, 121, 125 Garrouste, Governor, 99 Gaulle, Charles de. See De Gaulle Gaullists: sources of disputes with antiGaullists, 71, 161, 162; in 19391941, 78, 82; leaders, 82; tracts and newspapers, 82-83; Newfoundland support, 83-84; during war, 97-98; in postwar politics, 106-117; in veterans' organization, 117, 118; families, 148-151; in working groups, 151; ideology, 156-158; occupations, 158-160; education, 160; ages, 160161; motivation, 162-168; alienation, 165; idealism, 167. See also Free French Gauvain, Daniel, 91 General Council: and SPEC, 103; in i945> 106-108; resignation of 1959, 114; of 1962, 116; emergency of 1964, 119; resignation of 1965, 121; opposition of governor to Briand council, 124 General Strike, 121, 125 Gervain, Father, 1 1 1 Girardin, Marcel, 107 Gloanec, Emile: president of Chamber of Commerce, 28; represents English firm, 42; led commercial group, 46; opposes Legasse, 57; Gaullist, 78,

112, 162

Grad, Charles: director of public works, 119; hostility toward, 126, 139 Grand Banks: and sailors' welfare, 8;

boats of, 9; decline in fishing, 16; and Legasse, 23; transshipment on, 47; Gaullist supporters from, 79; and commercial leaders, 144, 168 Granville, France, 9, 28 Graviers, 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 6 , 27 Grignon, Joseph, 72 Guadeloupe, 10 Guillot, Judge, 82, 85 Herring, canning of, 102. See also Fishing Herry, Governor Jacques, 119, 197 Hôtel Ile de France, 173 Humbert, Henri: Gaullist leader, 82, 83, 85; proposes Free French takeover, 86; extreme position, 161 Ideology, 48-49, 162-168; receptivity to new, 60; of rejection, 55, 57, 61 Ile aux Chiens. See He aux Marins Ile aux Marins: description of, 4; town council, 7; parish and, 8; graviers song, 13; dorymen and, 14, 15; politics of, 22, 25, 26, 30; secularization of schools, 33, 34; secularization of burial grounds, 37; opposition to whaling station, 40; opposition to bait traps and drying factory, 41, 47; and Legasse union, 54; Gaullists and, 91, 107, 150, 178; and SPEC, 103 Information set, 128-131, 137, 140-

143, 148, 151

Jacobins, 5, 6 Jacquinot, Louis, 107, 121, 125 Jeanne d'Arc, 119 Jews, 81 Le Jour, 82, 83, 86 Journal Officiel, 133 Jullien, Governor, 195 Kinship. See Family Laborde, Edouard, 74, 106 Lâchât, Administrator, 45, 61 Lagroseillière, Samuel, 30, 34, 56, 57, 61 Landry, Georges, 91, 145 Langlade, 4, 75. 130, 139 Laroche, Jean, 154, 155 Laureili, Dominique, 108, 111, 113

Index | 20g Laval University, 106 Lavoisier, Gaston, 99, 100 Leban, M., merchant, 61 Le Bret, Jean, 83, 86 Lebrun, President, 78 Le Buf, François: head of war veterans, 78; supports de Gaulle, 82, 83, 106; opposed to Legasse, 161,162 Lefevre, Georges, 74, 99, 107 Lefevre, Louis, 56 Legasse, Arnard, 18 Legasse, Monsignor Christophe: brother of Louis, 8; and Morue Française, 26-27; leaves Saint Pierre, 35; and building of church, 38; and boycotting, 56; conservatism and, 196 Legasse, Ferdinand, 16, 24, 55,195 Legasse, Jacques, 44, 91 Legasse, Jean, 47,145,195 Legasse, Louis: pamphlet, 10; founder of Morue Française, 18; background, 23-24; politics, 24-27, 161; and secularization, 33; 1903 election, 38; stays in France, 42, 47; ideology, 170; sources, 195 Legion (Union Français de Combattants), 85, 86 Leheunen, Mayor Joseph, 125 Le Rolland, Francis, 106,124 Leroux, Francis, 84 Leroux, Henri, 119 La Liberté: Gaullist newspaper, 6, 92; liberation and clergy, 89; opposes exploitation of fishermen, 93; for economic progress, 94; Savary's speech in, 95; becomes more argumentative, 98; and Benoit, 156; as source material, 177 Ligue Anti-Alcoolique, 31, 58,60 Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, 30, 58 Little Isles of Freedom, 157 Livret, 11,12,15, 45. See also Credit Lyons, France, 174,175 Maritime Affairs, Office of, 7,11,12, 71 Marriages, 52, 97,124,147 Marseilles, France, 14, 18 Marsolieu, Gaston, 145 Martin, Monsignor, Raymond, 109,120 Martinique, 10, 73 Maufroy, Auguste, 145

Mazier, Paul: editor of Le Réveil, 29, 37; attacked by Vigie, 42, 50, 52, 54, 56; leaves island, 57; and Legasse, 58, 170 McCoy, Bill ("the real McCoy"), 198 Mendès-France, Pierre, 111 Mérat, Inspector, 70, 72 Merchants: in 1900, 9-10; and depression of 1906, 17; and Legasse, 29, 44» 52~53; union opposition, 29, 40, 54, 195; in 1940. 144-145; hereditary, 146; ideology, 154; factions, 162; residences, 175. See also Credit; Social structure, intergroup relations Metropolitans: in 1900, 7; anticléricale, 58; superior socioeconomic status, 122; political activities, 123; social relations, 123-126; in 1940, 144. See also Administration; Antimetropolitanism; Social structure, intergroup relations Mimosa, 97 Minister of Overseas Territories, 107, 121, 125. See also Ministry of Colonies Ministry of Colonies, 32, 73, 77, 193. See also Minister of Overseas Territories Miquelon: overview, 4; town council, 7; clergy, 8; dorymen, 14, 72, 94; emigration from, 18-20; commercial dependency on Saint Pierre, 25-26, 47, 72, 144; school secularized, 33; parish subsidy suppressed, 36; support for Legasse, 41; sailors' benevolent association, 54; depression, 71; Gauvain, 91, 153; resist conscription, 99; in-laws on Saint Pierre, 150 Moisset, Governor, 110 Montesquieu, 54 Montreal, 20, 82,141 Moraze, Henri: smuggler and business man, 77, 107, 110, 119, 145; arrest of, 91 92 Morue Française: founding, 18; power, 25, 47, 145; and Church, 26-27, 31, 55; symbol, 28; company union, 29, 44-45, 53; and Angoulvant, 34; and Didelot, 36; and disputes, 39-43; employees in politics, 39-40, 74, 152, 160, 162; family role, 52-54; ideol-

210

I

Index

ogy, 61; resented, 73, 75-76, 94; and Bournat, 76; and Legion, 85; and administration, 94, 124; in 1940, 145; and Pétainists, 155. See also Legasse Mouvement Républicain Populaire, 1 1 1 Mun, Albert de, 36, 39 Muselier, Vice-Admirai Emile: led Free French expedition, 86, 90, 163; departure of, 92; and Morue Française, 93; and merchants, 159 Museum of Saint Pierre, 178 Mutual aid, 44, 50, 51 National Assembly, 106 Le Nationaliste, 84 Newfoundland: communications with Saint Pierre, 1; outports, 4, 176; workers from, 1 2 - 1 3 , 70, 104; depression, 18; traps, 41; smuggling to, 66; and Free French, 83, 86, 141; Fisheries Board, 94; Bournat campaign, 108; intermarriage, 147, 150 New York Post, 83 Nicknames, 24, 40. See also Address, forms of Norgeot, Eugene, 145 Normandy, 50-51, 125 North Africa, 98 Northern Export, 74, 199 Nova Scotia, 1, 19, 20 Observer's Weekly, 83 L'Oeil, 84 Olano, Francis, 93, 94 Ozon, Jean, 107 Paret, head of Treasury, 82 Patriotism, 46, 125, 154, 165 Paturel, Francis, 82, 86, 161 Pétain, Marshal: in 1940 and 1941, attitude toward, 79, 81; Gauvain's letter in support of, 91; support of and opposition to, 153-154, 156, 162; clergy support of, 200 Pétainists: Poisson's declaration, 8890; under Free French, 90-93; during war, 96-98; in postwar politics, 106-117; in veterans' organizations, 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 ; in families, 1 4 8 - 1 5 1 ; in work groups, 1 5 1 ; ideology, 152-155,

157-158; occupations, 158-160; education, 160; ages, 160-161; motivation, 162-168; sources, 161-162, 166-167 Le Petit Journal, 83 Photo-Journal, 83 Plantagenest, Louis, 82, 83, 85 Planté, Francois: 45, 74; Planté list, 45, 46, 106, 123 Plebiscite to join Free French, 80, 87, 89, 147, 153 Pointe Plate, Langlade, 75 Poirier-Bottreau, Alphonse, 53 Poisson, Monsignor: urges support of war, 78; opposes Free French on island, 88, 147, 155, 200; resignation, 109; and conservatism, 196 Population, 13, 19, 102,179 Porée, French fishing company, 29 Post office and Gaullists, 110, 159 Le Presse (of Montreal), 83 Printers, 152, 159; printing office, 144 "Prisoner's dilemma," 141 Pro-Germans, 81 Prohibition: and Ligue Anti-Alcoolique, 60; effect on economy, 66, 169-170; rum running, 68, 198; immigration from Newfoundland, 70; liquor sources, 198 Public-works projects: demonstrations against, 69; road building, 75, 93; airport, 99; projects continued, 102, 126; demands for more wages on, 118, 1 1 9 , 1 2 0 Quarrels, 95-96, 125, 1 3 1 - 1 4 1 Québec, 19, 8 2 , 1 4 1 Racial sensitivity, 55, 123, 125 Radio Saint Pierre, 92, 99 Ravanel, Saint Pierre, 196 Raymond, Police Adjutant, 79, 81, 82 Religious orders, 8 Residence patterns, 123, 132, 133, 175 Réveil: opposition newspaper, 17, 29; encourages emigration, 19-20; opposes Legasse, 22-26, 37, 42, 54, 56-58; accuses parish council, 39; opposes whaling factory, 40; ideology of, 49, 57; source of Gaullist and

Index anti-Gaullist dispute, 71; charges collusion between administrators and Morue Française, 124; sources, 178 Revert, Jacques, 30, 41, 45, 1 7 1 Robert, Admiral, 78 Riie, Aubert de la, 128 "Rum row," 66 Rum running, 66, 198; sources of rum for, 198 Rumor, 128-130 Runyon, Damon ("The Lily of Saint Pierre"), 67 Sailors: French, 9, 1 1 - 1 2 , 15, 44; voted for Legasse, 25; Basques, 27; and SPEC, 103-104. See also Dorymen ; Social structure; Société de Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours (welfare association) St. John's, Newfoundland, 2 Saint Màio, France, 9, 10, 1 1 , 14, 18 Saint Servain, France, 14 Salle des Fêtes, 88, 1 1 7 Salomon, Auguste, 40 Savary, Alain: Free French governor, 93, 95-96, m , 132; calls for unity, 95-96; defeated for deputy (1947), 1 1 1 ; elected deputy ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 ; conversation with, 157 Schmitz, Prosecutor, 69 Schools: municipal primary, 8; church schools, 32-37, 40; funds for Ecole Sainte Croisine, 67; Gaullist teachers, 82, 84, 152, 156; summer school, 105; prohibitions against church schools, 138. See also Education Sedentary Marine Volunteers, 97, 100, 163 Senate, 106 Shipowners. See Merchants Shipowners' Union. See Syndicat des Armateurs Shopping and politics, 96 Sicaud, Governor Pierre, 1 1 8 Silver-fox farming, 102 Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny, 8, 26 Smuggling. See Prohibition Social Mobility, 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 , 1 8 3 , 1 8 4 Social structure: in 1900, 7 - 1 5 ; in 1940, 144-147; and location, 2, 168;

I

211

and ideology, 48; and politics, 159; research methods, 173 Social structure, intergroup relations: dorymen and civil servants, 61; dorymen and merchants, 15, 44-47, 61-63, 72; dorymen and sailors, 103; dorymen and stevedores, 67; dorymen and workers, 76, 107, 147; employers and employees, 25-26, 130, 146, 152; merchants and civil servants, 76, 120, 124; merchants and metropolitans, 107, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 , 145; merchants and sailors, 1 0 - 1 1 ; merchants, sailors, and dorymen, 3; merchants and workers, 1 1 3 ; merchants, workers, and dorymen, 140; metropolitans and local civil servants, 126 See also Antimetropolitanism; Credit; Marriages Société des Batignolles, 105, 1 1 8 - 1 2 1 Société des Frigorifiques, 41 Société Générale de la Colonisation de la Province de Québec, 19 Société de Notre Dame de Bon Secours 51 Société des Oeuvres de Mer, 8, 193 Société de Pêche et Congelation des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (SPEC), 102, 104, 120, 121, 126 Songs, political, 22, 56, 91, 120 Spanish fleet, 104 SPEC. See Société de Pêche et Congelation Stevedores' union. See Dockers Sydney, Nova Scotia, 1, 2, 20 Syndicat des Armateurs (Shipowners' Union), 29, 40, 54, 195 Syndicat des Armateurs de la Grande et de la Petite Pêche des Iles Saint Pierre et Miquelon (Union of Shipowners and Dorymen), 29, 44-45, 53 Syndicat des Pêcheurs (dorymen's union founded by Revert), 30, 45-46, 72, 171 Syndicat des Pêcheurs de Miquelon, 72

212 I Index Syndicat des Pêcheurs des Trois Iles, 72 Syndicat des Petits Pêcheurs de Saint Pierre et de l'Ile aux Marins (Frioult's union), 72-73, 93-94 Tariffs, 16, 29 Thompson, Dorothy, 157 Toronto, University of, summer school, 105 Tourism, 57, 105, 128, 134 Town Council, 8, 23, 27, 35; of 1904, 38, 39; of 1913, 42; of 1919, 45, 46, 62; of 1929, 74; of 1935. 74; of 1946, 106, 107 Tracts: Gaullist, 79, 80, 82, 158-162, 163; Pétainist, 84 Trade, 43, 181; markets, 14; tariffs, 16, 29; balance of payments, 105. See also Economy Tutoyer. See Address, forms of Tyman, Α., 104 Unemployed, 104, 121. See also Depression; Public-works projects L'Union des lies Saint Pierre et Miquelon; Journal de Défense des Intérêts Colonials, 45, 46, 48, 62-64 Unions. See under Corporations; Syndicats United States: and church-school issue, 36; tightens immigration, 70; influence of her recognition of Vichy government, 78-61, 92; sees propaganda film, 157 Univers, 39 Vacation homes, 132 Vibert, Paul, 36 Vichy: importance of recognition by

Canada and United States, 78, 81; demands loyalty, 84-86; Free French treatment of Vichy supporters, 86, 91-93; and information sets, 140, 141 Vigie: Legasse newspaper, 19, 22-25, 27, 36, 39; supports whaling station, 40; attacks foreign influence, 42, 61; supports Morue Française, 43; source of information, 48-49, 178; and family image, 51-53; attacks Delmont and Mazier, 56, 57 Ville cTï's, 77, 79, 80 Villefosse, Captain Heron de, 92, 163 Villefromoy, Raoul de la, 91, 145 Virgin Mary, 51, 54 Vogt, M., public-works engineer, 69, 139

Volstead Act, 66, 71 War veterans: support de Gaulle, 78, 79-80, 82; de Gaulle sends telegram to, 83; Vichy accuses, 85; association dissolved, 86; and memorial celebrations, 117 Welfare Bureau, 107 Western Union, 82, 152 Whale-oil factory, 40 Winnipeg, Canada, 19 Wolfert, Ira, 86 Workers: Basques, 27; unemployed, 71; SPEC, 103; postwar, 101, 118-121; in 1940, 145-147. See also Graviers; Public-works projects; Social structure World War 1,16,22, 31, 7 7 , 1 9 3 World War II volunteers, 182,193 Zazpiak-Bat, 27