Diversity of Islamic Thought, Coming to Terms 9781729110362

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Diversity of Islamic Thought: Coming to Terms

PERVAIZ ASGHAR

Copyright © 2018 Pervaiz Asghar

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 9781729110362 ISBN-13: 9781729110362

CONTENTS Preface

i

1

Kharjis, Abadis, Mukhtarriya, Murjiyya, Mujabirah, Qadriyya, Sufi Silsilas

1

2

Hanafis, Malikis, Shafiis

5

3

Mutazillites, Hambalis, Maturidis, Asharis, People of the Sunnah and the Collective, Hadith Collection

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4

Reformist Movements of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn abd Al Wahhab

12

5

Movements of 19th Century Colonial India

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6

The Shia Factor

20

7

Various Shia Denominations

28

8

The Malaise Within

32

9

To the Quran Must We Turn

37

10

The Rocky Road to Salvation

42

PREFACE The one issue that intrigued me during my formative years was not so much the tendeney to inherit one's religions beliefs, which was but natural, but the vigour with which one tended to safeguard one's own turf, while belittling the similarly inherited beliefs of others. It cannot be doubted that the vast majority of individuals who inhabit our planet tend to stick to the religious beliefs of their parents. A relatively small number do switch faiths to be sure: some because they find the new message appealing, some because they sense greater opportunities, some because of troubled backgrounds and some because contrived circumstances force them to. Those who get disillusionedfor any reason or are too busy in their own occupations tend to join the ranks of the atheists or the agnostics. Adherents of each religion feel that they are exclusively on the light path and the more radical one is by temperament, the more easily he gets convinced of this assumption. Any thinking person is bound to ask himself why the religion or sect he is born into is the only one that is correct and why all others are wrong. If there is one established standardfor gauging the correctness of a set of beliefs, all thinking minds should have gravitated towards the same obvious conclusion. As things stand today, the most brilliant minds per capita can be said to belong to adherents of the Jewish faith, with Christians being a distant second. The entire Muslim world has just produced two Nobel pri%e winners in a scientific discipline, one of whom, Dr Abdits Salam, is largely shunned in his own county because of his religious persuasion, namely that he belongs to a sect that has been declared beyond the pale of Islam. On the face of it, it appears facetious to assume that we lesser minds have reached the comet religious conclusion, while a genius like Dr Abdus Salam could not. Why exactly do people believe that their religious belief is the only one that is correct? The answer is simple: the assumption of its correctness is drilled inside their heads eveiy waking moment, and the less inquisitive one is by nature, the more readily one takes it for granted. The other lesson that is constantly implanted in immature minds is that religion is a blind faith and that adherence to the specified rituals of one'sfaith will only grant one a place in paradise and shield onefrom thefires of hell. The idea offloating %ombie-like into heaven on the basis ofinherited rituals may seem attractive to most, though the thought is equally appalling to a small thinking minority. If religion is indeed a ‘blindfaith' and one is supposed to blindly pursue the beliefs of one's parents, be they Christian, Jew, Hindu, Sikh, Zoroastrian or any of their numerous denominations, then why this insistence on one's own belief being only right and all others being wrong? The founders' of all major religions understandably laid emphasis on morality as the core of their belief system, though this message got diluted

along the way for obvious reasons. The religion of Islam, which stands for 'submission to the will of God' and for 'peace' is unfortunately in the spotlight for quite some time for mostly the wrong reasons. The problem lies not with the noble religion of Islam but with inimicalforces that, for political reasons, have lavished tens of billions of dollars into foisting a most radical version of the faith on an unsuspecting public, targeting Muslims both within and outside Islamic countries. It is a good sign that moderate forces, which in the recent past had been ruthlessly silenced, are now making themselves heard. The other problem is that of oversimplification of complex issues. All intra Muslim killings for example are routinely passed off as Sunni-Shia traditional rivahy, which hardly accounts for the mass killings of Sunni Sufis-cum-Barelvis at the hands of their Sunni Deobandi-cnm-Wahhabi cousins through the extensive bombings of shrines across the length and breadth of Pakistan. One eternal truth is that religion and politics don’t mix, one being 'moralistic' in character, the other 'opportunistic'. This volatile combination has been the prime cause of Islam's affliction in the present era, though its origins can be traced to the earliest Islamic riding dynasties of the past. Islam in its present avatar, or even in its past shape, is by no means a monolithic faith, nor is it simplistically divided into Sunni and Shia beliefs, as commonly perceived. The big pins point in Islam is that nearly all its major sects and sub-sects believe in a common Book of Guidance, the Quran. Differences primarily stem from interpretation, which spill over from the Quranic domain into the vast field of Prophetic traditions. So if one wants to sincerely understand Islam, the place to start from is the Quran. Amongst other things, the Quran dwells at length about the Prophets ofyore, though it’s primay emphasis remains on the lessons derived therefrom. It lays stress on unity, on knowledge, on wisdom, on enjoining justice, on caring for the downtrodden, on non-aggression, on the reciprocation ofpeace overtures and above all, on the primaty of ethics in both public and private dealings. It not only holds the Prophet Mnhammad(saw) as a 'perfect exemplar' and as a 'mercy to all mankind', but also repeatedly exhorts the believers to 'obey Allah' and 'obey PIis Prophet' in the same breath. The centrality of Prophet Mubammad(saw) to the religion of Islam can thus not be ignored. The collection of traditions about the Prophet has however had a chequered histoy. It was actively discouraged dating the initial decades following the demise of the Prophet. Then, while some companions and their successors tried to pass on what they had heard to their disciples, other unscrupulous elements were churning out fake ones by the thousands to sipport their own ulterior agendas. The four Islamic scholars, who subsequently became theface of Sunni Islam, could not help but rely on Prophetic traditions to expound their point of view. At one end of the pectrum was Imam Abu PIanifa who applied a most stringent enterion to gauge their correctness, li

DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

while on the other end was Imam Ibn Hanbal, whose aversion to the analogical reasoning methodology as espoused by Imam A bn Hanifa, led him to put hisfaith in even those hadiths which were deemed to be flawed’. In between was Imam Malik who was convinced that the people of Medinah, his home city, best exemplified the true traditions of the Prophet and of course his part time student, Imam Shafi'i, who felt that the Book of Sunnah ruled over the Book of God, rather than the other way round. In response to criticism about the genuineness of Hadiths in mass circulation, Imam Shafii’s chosen methodology to gauge their correctness was essentially based on total reliance on an established chain of transmission. This criterion was subsequently applied by all later traditionalists, six of which were ultimately selected by the riding Abbasid Caliph to represent the Sunni perspective. The Sunni scholarly consensus on 'taqlid’ (adherence to one of the four prescribed Madhabs) puts a damper on the cross borrowing of ideas, thereby restricting the natural progression of the faith. The Shias on the other hand rely exclusively on the knowledge passed on progressively by the Prophet down the chain to the twelve divinely appointed Imams from his progeny. While laying down the principles gleaned from the Quran and the Prophet’s Sunnah, all the Shiite Imams stressed on recourse to reason for a true understanding of thefaith. Ironically, by virtue of his reliance on analogical reasoning, Imam Abu Hanifa’s viewpoint is, in this vital aspect, more closely aligned with one of his eminent teachers, Imam Jafar Sadiq, the sixth ordained Imam of the Shias, than with his other three Sunni connteiparts. Another little known fact is that a vast majority of the 'correct six’ set of Sunni traditions have originated from those who were only associated with the Prophet during the last 2 to 9 years of his life at Medinah, with the first 13 years of the Prophetic mission at Makkah, during which the main emphasis was on moral values and personal obligations, finding little direct mention. Since Sunnah occupies a preeminent place in Islamic theology, the question of why most of the Prophet's close companions chose not to make their presence felt by propagating the Prophet's sahih traditions is a particularly vexing one, which has not been adequately addressed by Sunni scholars. The use of reason through wisdom is a subject that resonates throughout the Quran. The Quran, in its own unique way, constantly exho its mankind to 'think’ and to 'understand’, and refers to those who are devoid of reason as the 'worst of beasts’ in His sight. If we thus wish to embark on a voyage to understand the Quran as well as the religion of Islam in all its glory, it can best be undertaken through the faculty of reason. The world of science is no admirer of oiganised religion and religion too is waiy of scientific pursuits, andyet the twain has to meet if the religion of Islam is to be truly appreciated. Islamic scholars would be well served should they choose to adopt scientific principles in pursuit of the truth that they aspirefor. The first seven chapters of the book deal with the rapid proliferation of Islamic iii

thought in rations directions, going way beyond what most people are attuned to hearing, namely Sunni-Shia rivalry set against a political minefield. It exploresfbriefly though) the origins and spread of ideologies like the Khwajis, the Abadis, the Kaysannia, the Murji'ah, the Mujabirah, the Qadariyyah, the Jabbariyab, the rations Sufi silsilas, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafiis, the Mnta^il/ites, the Hambalis, the Ahle Quran, the Matmidis, the A sharis, the twelver Shias, the Mukhtaniyya, the Alawis, the Zaydis, the Ismailis, the Mnstalians, the Ni^aris, the Tayyabis, the Hafirs, the Dawoodi Bohras, the reformist movements of 1bn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abd al Wahhab, and in our very own backyard, the Deobandis, the Tablighi Jamaat, the Ahle Hadith, the Barelvis and the Ahmadis, which started emerging soon after an uprising against colonial rule in 1857 was violently put down by the British. After the four disparate ‘madhabs’ had been clubbed together by a royal decree under the doctrine of ‘taqlid’ to form the nascent Sunni faith, the first major challenge that the doctrine faced came soon after the dismemberment of the Baghdad caliphate by ravaging Muslim hordes, in theform of Ibn Taymiyyah, whose radical views on the non-validity of taqlid and other issues put him at odds with all the four Sunni madhabs, not to mention the Shias, for whom he nursed a particularly deep hatred. In many ways, Imam Taymiyyah can be said to be the precursor of the vitriol-spewing Ibn Abd al-Wahhab of Central Arabia, whose doctrinal hand can be seen in most of the major acts of so-called Islamic terrorism. This philosophy (expounded by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab) has proved to be the most divisive and disruptive of all, as it provides a carte blanche sanction to the killing of all those who do not confirm to the puritanical, intolerant and narrow­ minded worldview that its founder endorses, and which resonates in the practises which al-Qaeda and ISIS have notoriously exhibited. The diversity of Islamic thought over the ages and the power of the present day social media has shown that it can be theoretically possible to move beyond our existing narrow orbit to appreciate, if not subscribe to, other interpretations and points of view that are found to possess greater appeal. The Quran encourages all believers to understand and follow the straight path that it sets down, while emphasising that unity should not be compromised at any cost. Aggressive behaviour is not permitted, with war being only indulged in as a weapon of last resort against an aggressor. The last few chapters of the book pertain to the author's observations and conclusions derived therefrom. Happy reading!

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DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

1. KHARJIS, ABADIS, MUKHTARRIYA, MURJIYYA, MUJABIRAH, QADRIYYA, SUFI SILSILAS Ever since our Holy Prophet(saw), whose gentle demeanour and compelling presence had kept his community united, left this world, the monolithic faith that he preached was destined never to be the same again. The political ascendancy of the Makkan aristocracy over the Ansars, the Ridda wars, the rapid expansion of the physical frontiers of the nascent faith, the empowerment of the Bani Umayyah and the two fitnas, leading ultimately to the tragedy of Karbala, were all events that brought the foundational principles of Islam into question and triggered a debate that shows no sign of abating. The foray of the Arabs into the vast territory controlled by the Byzantines and the Persians generated some expected though unfortunate side effects. It not only managed to gradually shift the centre of gravity of the Islamic world away from Makkah and Medina, but also succeeded in creating a class of nco-capitalists out of the simple and frugal followers of the early faith. As more and more inhabitants of the newly liberated areas flocked to the Islamic banner, it became increasingly difficult to discern whether the battles were being fought for the glory7 of the faith or for personal enrichment. The lure and lust for power increased exponentially with the ever rising stakes. Though a broad section of the community of Islam came to embrace the concept of a Caliph acting as God’s temporal deputy on earth, either through an engendered belief in this being the most correct course of action or through a simple acceptance of the fait accomplii, the question of whether the actions of an unjust ruler can supersede the laws of God and His Prophet continues to be a galling one. It's corollary7 is that acceptance of such a leader translates automatically7 into condoning the methods employed, namely the use of force, oppression and dirty7 dealing, to secure and perpetuate his rule. A similar basic issue which still bedevils a consensus is whether allegiance should be given willingly7 or whether it can 1

be extracted through force, something cthing which which defeats defeats its its very very purpose. purpose. Amidst all this turmoil in the hearts and minds of people appeared a group which appeared to be cocksure of the soundness of their beliefs, the precursor of all violent ‘Islamic’ fundamentalists, who earned the nomenclature Kharjis(the rejectionists) or ‘those who go out’. Though the Prophet had forewarned his followers about the appearance of just such a group, dubbing them the ‘dogs of hell’, the Kharjis considered themselves the purest of the pure, the only true interpreters of the word of God. ‘Judgement belongs to God alone’ was their rallying cry but each time they said that, they ended up projecting their own radical beliefs as the voice of God. It was however only when they began to terrorise the countryside around Nahrawan by setting up an inquisition to dispense the most brutal of punishments to those whose answers failed to meet their standards of rigidity, that Caliph AH bin Abu Talib(ra) felt compelled to act against them. The Kharijites were completely routed at the battle of Nahrawan, with the handful of survivors drifting off towards Oman and Yemen to bide their time. Abdullah Ibn Abad of the Banu Tamim broke off from the wider Khariji movement around two decades after their defeat at Nahrawan to found what is known as the Abadi school. Abadi theology, which became the basis of this sect and which distanced itself from the takfiri doctrine espoused by the Kharjis, was nurtured at Basra. Jabir Ibn Zayd of Nizwa, who took over the reins of the Abadi community’ from Ibn Abad, established a toehold in Oman, where his hadiths as well as the hadiths of the early Ibadi scholars, provided a solid foundation for their faith. They felt strong enough in due course to stage a revolt in Makkah and Yemen, but this was brutally put down by the Umayyad Caliph Marwan the Second. Abadis in Shibam(western Hadramaut), though surrounded, managed to extract a favourable peace deal from the Umayyads. It was in Shibam then that they continued to retain a modest presence for the next four centuries or so, while still paying taxes to the Abadi authorities in Oman. The Abadi imamate, established in the inner regions of Oman sometime during the 8th century, was not an inherited position, but one based on election. Once the coastal areas of Oman became rich and powerful through conquests in Eastern Africa, Sultan Taimur of the Al Busaidi dynasty’, taking advantage of the warring Abadi factions, united the Imamate with the Sultanate, and thus it has remained over the years in one form or another. The current Sultan of Oman, who seized power from his father in 1970, managed to extend his writ over all of Oman, thereby effectively unifying the posts of the Imam and the Sultan, and renaming die country’ from Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman. The Sultanate now happens to be the only Abadi-majorityr country in the world, with around 75% of the populace professing the faith. 2

DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

The horrific events surrounding Karbala created unease amongst a large segment of the inhabitants of Iraq in particular, and in the course of a few years gave rise to the phenomenon of Mukhtar Al-Saqafi. Mukhtar first sought the patronage of Imam Hussain’s sole surviving son, Imam Zainul Abidcen, in avenging the martyrs of Karbala, failing which he turned to Muhammad Ibn al Hanafiyyah, a step brother of Imam Hussain. After achieving his mission and then dying a martyr, his supporters, the Mukhtarriya, or the Kaysannia as they were more popularly called, attained the status of a cult, which considered Hazrat Ali(ra) and his three sons, AlHasan, Al-Hussain and Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyyah as successive divinely appointed imams and which also believed in the reappearance of the Mahdi, the occulting imam, for dispensing retribution and justice before the qiyamah (Day of judgement). As a counter reaction to the Kharji doctrine, and possibly in an endeavour to staunch the criticism levelled against the Umayyads because of their immoral and unjust ways, there emerged the Murji'ah, which shrank from judging human conduct, leaving this exclusively to God. This was again an extreme position, which left the field open to the rulers and their camp followers to indulge in unhindered exploitation and debauchery. The Umayyads understandably lent their weight to this philosophy. Doubts regarding the morality’ or otherwise of human actions and individual or collective culpability still persisted. The al-Jabariyah or Mujabirah were quick to jump on the bandwagon of Qadar, also mentioned in the Quran as the decree of Allah, to absolve man of all culpability over their actions since everything, in their opinion, was dictated by’ God. The Qadriyyah or Mufawadah belief however falls at the other end of the spectrum in that humans have complete control of their destiny7 to the extent that God does not even know what we will choose to do. Majority of Sunni scholars have over time gravitated to a middle position wherein humans have freedom of choice, though God has knowledge of everything that will transpire. When asked about the issue, Imam Jafar as-Sadiq, the 6th ordained Imam of the Shias, clarified that there is no compulsion from Allah’s side, nor is there absolute delegation of power (tafwid) from Allah to man, but the real position lies between the two extremes. He went on to elaborate that predetermination(qada) and divine decree(qadar) are amongst the secrets of Allah. Regarding the doctrine of bada(change of man’s intention to undertake a particular action), he explained that this concept cannot be extended to Allah, as some are prone to do, since no believer can conceive of bada happening to Allah regarding any matter, causing Him to regret. The worldliness of the Umayyad dynasty (661-749 CE) also resulted in the creation of a large body7 of people who revelled in the materialism of the era, while a smaller number of pious men were equally7 repulsed by7 such 3

profligacy. The latter group found a champion in the shape of a revered theologian named Hasan al-Basri(b.642 CE). Having spent time in the midst of companions like Hazrat Ali(ra) and Hazrat z\nas bin Malik(ra), he not only established a school of religious thought in Basra, but also burnished his credentials by speaking out against the unjust actions of the governors in Iraq. Sufi thought encompassing asceticism, Quranic meditation, piety, humanism and a predilection for Zikr and night prayers first appeared in small pious circles like that of Hasan Basri, followed some four centuries later by another renowned mystic Abd al-Qadir alJilani(l078-1166 CE) in Baghdad. Jilani(re), whose lineage could be traced to the 8th Shiite Imam Ali ar-Raza, preached to a small select circle of followers about the importance of humility, piety, moderation and philanthropy. His sons however formed a formal order which has since spread to nearly all corners of the world. Other tariqas or silsilas like Shadhilliyah, Chishtiya, Rifa’iyya, Suhrawardiyya and Naqshbandiyya soon followed. Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, who is known as a mujaddid(reviver) of the Chishtiya order, brought the silsila to India at the turn of the 11th century. His shrine in Ajmer continues to be thronged with pilgrims of all denominations. Most of these orders claim to have received their esoteric knowledge from Hazrat Ali(ra) but identify themselves as Sunni; Chishtiya and Naqshbandiyya arc Hanafi, Shadhiliyya is Maliki, while Qadriyyah is Hambali. They are however the polar opposite of other Sunni groupings in their beliefs and rituals. The landscape of present day Pakistan is dotted with shrines of Sufi saints, who still continue to exercise a larger than life influence on their devotees: Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi, Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai in Hyderabad, Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Shah Ruknuddin in Multan (which is also known as the city of saints), Baba Farid Ganjshakar in Pakpattan, Baba Bullch Shah in Kasur, Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, Bari Imam in Islamabad, Rahman Baba in Peshawar and many others. Though their annual ‘urs’ continue to attract millions of devotees, the impact of their humane teachings have witnessed a steady erosion since the 1980s by the influx into the county of a petrodollar fuelled intolerant version of Islam, which has even infected the local Sufi community in its own way.

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2. HANAFIS, MALIKIS, SHAFIIS The religion of Islam, hatched and nurtured in the crucibles of Makkah and Medina, had, soon after the end of prophecy, expanded beyond belief from Afghanistan to the East, Central Asia to the North and Morocco to the West. Scholarly movements thus sprang up in each region to address the theocratic and legal questions being posed by agile and inquisitive minds. In the Kufa of 717 CE, a young Abu Hanifa had sought out a worthy­ master, Ibrahim Nakhai, who in turn could trace his scholarly heritage to a revered and knowledgeable companion, Abdullah bin Mas'ud(ra). Abu Hanifa, when he came into his own, looked at the Quran as his foremost point of reference, followed by only those hadiths whose authenticity he felt certain about. In order to address the finer points of law, Abu Hanifa developed a systematic form of analytical reasoning called Qiyas to extend the ruling of one situation to another as based on a shared legal cause(illa) derived from the teachings of Allah and his Prophet. Imam Abu Hanifa realised that Qiyas needed to be handled delicately by always keeping the context in mind. The application of Qiyas did lead at times to a result deemed to be unjust and harmful. In order to counter this, he came up with the concept of Istihsan (seeking the best), an alternate analytical manoeuvre that yielded a beneficial result. Abu Hanifa always kept his eye on what he believed to be the public good, in the pursuit of which he was aided by his own gende temperament as well as the cosmopolitan environment he grew up in. Although the methodology he employed became extremely^ influential in his own lifetime, he left it to his students to reduce it in writing. His leading students, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad bin Shaybani, did not however see eye to eye with each other nor with their illustrious master, and since they also got integrated with the Abbasid court at Baghdad, the original teachings of the great Imam understandably got diluted along the way. Imam Abu Hanifa’s younger colleague, Malik bin Anas, a lifelong resident of Medina, after studying under esteemed scholars like Nafi and Zehri, devised another approach to Islamic laws and beliefs. He based his teachings exclusively on the customs and practices endorsed byr the scholars living in what he considered the bastion of pure Islam, the Prophet’s city. In 5

his scholarly work, Muwatta, the earliest surviving work of hadiths and Islamic law. Imam Malik showcased his topic-wise compilation in the form of hadiths (527), rulings made by companions (613), rulings by successors (285) and his own opinions (375). It may be safe to conclude that since he obtained his hadiths from teachers who had directly interacted with some of the companions, this work is arguably more authoritative and authentic than most other similar collections. Imam Shaffi said so as much, although his student, Imam Hambal,wasn't impressed at all by the conclusions derived. Realising that he could not exclusively depend on the material that he collected for addressing all legal queries, Imam Malik simultaneously devised a technique of prohibiting things which appeared legal, simply because they tended to lead to a prohibited result. A Caliph of the newlyestablished Abbasid dynasty was so enamoured by Imam Malik’s scholarly credentials that he expressed his intention to make the Inam’s work the basis for an empire-wide code of Islamic law. Imam Malik, the scholar that he was, dissuaded him from doing so, for fear of disturbing the blossoming regional diversity, which he considered a blessing. Had the plan been implemented, the shape of Sunni Islam would be a lot different today. A group of thinkers called the Mutazilites (lit. to separate, as their professed founder Wasil b. Ata did, from the circle of Hasan Basri) emerged in the cosmopolitan city of Basra (in the early 8th century CE), prior making an appearance in the new Abbasid capital of Baghdad. In order to better respond to the queries raised by internal and external sceptics, they tried to base their understanding of Islam on things they could justify through logic. They took their cue in a way, without seemingly acknowledging it, from the principles of rational thinking espoused by Imam AIL They came out strongly in favour of free will, without which they felt a just God would never have promised retribution or reward. Into this cauldron of conflicting opinions descended an intrepid scholar by the name of Muhammad b. Idris Shafii. While agreeing in principle with the concept of holding the Prophet’s precedence sacred, he disagreed with the manner in which it was being achieved, as well as virtually everything else the regional scholars had to offer. He not only faulted both Malikis and Hanfis for their limited exposure to hadiths, but was extremely critical of the notion of analogical reasoning, the principle of Istihsan, local customs and claims of Ijma(consensus). He came to the conclusion that gaps in the understanding of Sunnah can only be bridged by strictly obeying the actual words of the Prophet as transmitted in hadiths. He accordingly tried to build the edifice of a common body of hadiths, accessed from all corners of the Islamic dominion, so as to be universally acceptable. To be sure, he was exceptionally cut out for the job: born in Gaza, he studied with Imam Malik in Medina for some time, served as the Abbasid Governor in Yemen, hobnobbed with the leading Hanafi scholar, Shaybani, 6

DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

and ended his days in Egypt. Imam Shafi'i not only professed that the Quran cannot be accessed without the Sunnah, but went a step further in declaring that die Sunnah rules over the Book of Allah rather than the other way round. He moreover did not hesitate to enter into debates with not only the students of Imam Malik and Imam r\bu Hani fa, but also with the Mu'tazilites. He countered the Mu'tazilite distrust of Hadiths owing to rampant forgery by asserting that the isnad, or chain of transmission, would serve as a guarantee as to its authenticity. An unbroken chain thus came to constitute a sound (sahih) Hadith, widely known hadith were referred to as ‘mashur’, hadith spread through multiple chains of transmission became known as ‘mutawattir’ while hadiths with some flaw in its chain were deemed weak (da’if). This still serves as the benchmark for ascertaining the authenticity level of Sunni hadiths and any scholar who tries to examine their contents through logic is subjected to derision. Faced with the task of adapting hadiths to the problems of his day, he favoured an innovative method known as Negatively Implied Meaning (Mafhum al-Mukhalafa) which meant that if the Quran or Hadiths made a positive statement about a thing, then the negative held true for all else. He made a limited concession to the use of reason by devising a form of analogy known as Manifest Analogy, Qiyas Jali, or by the stronger reasoning, which ensures a uniform ruling regardless of whether a particular factor is present in moderate or extreme form. Imam Shafli is also credited with introducing the novel concept of Darul Aman or Abode of Peace (for countries under the banner of Islam) and Darul Harb or Abode of War (for those beyond). Since he envisioned constant warfare between them, he propped up the idea of jihad as a constant duty enjoined on all believers. In support of this contention, he introduced the idea of abrogation, whereby he considered as many as 124 verses of the Quran dealing with pacific resolution of disputes and use of warfare as a defensive tactic only, as abrogated in favour of the few so-called ‘sword verses’. This would have been considered sacrilegious had the narrative been pushed by a lesser scholar. Two definitive camps emerged during Imam Shafii’s time: one, spearheaded by him, called the Able Hadith and the other incorporating voices of reason, inclusive of the Hanafis and the Mu'tazilites, known as the Ahl al Ra’y. Imam Shafli was the most authoritative voice of his time and many of the concepts that he introduced and the methods that he employed in matters of jurisprudence are still in widespread use today. Though Islam is believed to have been introduced in South India during the Prophet’s lifetime, the waves of Arab traders during Imam Shafii’s time and later, exported his ideas to the littorals of the Indian Ocean. The Mughals, it is believed, nudged the official shift to the Hanafl fiqh, as they felt it to be more conducive to their aspirations of ruling over a majority Hindu population than the Darul Harb concept. 7

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3. MUTAZILLITES, HAMBALIS, MATURIDIS, ASHARIS, PEOPLE OF THE SUNNAH AND THE COLLECTIVE, HADITH COLLECTION The new Abbasid capital of Baghdad afforded, during its heydays in the time of Caliph Harunur Rashid (786-809 CE), a level playing field to the Mu'tazilites, whose voices resounded in liberal circles. From the moment Mamunur Rashid assumed the mantle of the Caliph in 813 CE, their fortunes dramatically changed for the better. Not only did Mamun patronise the Mu'tazilites, he also organised interfaith debates in his court, which, apart from Muslim scholars of all denominations, also featured Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Buddhists and others, thereby adding to the intellectual nourishment of the Islamic world. Al-Mamun's greatest contribution by far lay in his setting up of of an academy called the House of Wisdom, more or less like his father did before him, where philosophical and scientific works of Ancient Greece, including all of Aristode’s work, were translated into Arabic. He was helped in this endeavour by the fact that since his father’s time, the primary ingredient required, paper, was cheaply and abundantly available. Apart from the inclusion of numerous Christians in its fold, he succeeded in recruiting famous scholars like al-Kindi, philosopher of the Arabs, and alKhwarizmi, from whose name die word ‘algorithm’ is derived. His biggest failing by far, which overshadowed all the good he had done, was that in the ninth year of his reign, his animosity against the traditionalists caused him to let loose a reign of terror against those opposed to the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the Quran being created, something that was close to the Caliph’s heart. The Mihna (inquisition) that he launched to forcibly quell the protests led to the arrest and flogging of prominent figures of the traditionalist camp, notably Imam Hanbal. The sixteen years that this tyrannical policy lasted (under Mamun and two of his successors) created havoc in the empire and when it was over, it resulted in far reaching ramifications. Al-Mutawakkil, who became the Caliph in 847 CE, not only reversed this policy but also went on to demonise the intellectuals of the House of 8

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Wisdom and ostracise the non-Muslims. The Mu’tazilites stood ousted, and the traditionalists, with the full blessings of the crown, went not only after all the Mu’tazilites, whom they had branded as heretics, but even after all those they deemed immoral. This became the source of the vigilantism, which has since become ingrained in Islamic thought. While on the subject of Mutazilites, it would be unfair not to mention the two influential schools of thought it inspired, albeit in different ways. Abu Mansoor al Maturidi (b. 853 CE) of Samarkand used similar arguments of Greek logical argument to discredit the traditional orthodoxy. His teachings on the moral aspect of human responsibility were to resonate many centuries later. The Barelvis of South Asia claim to be followers of the Maturidi school of thought as an addendum to the Hanafi Madhab. Baghdad of the 10th century saw the emergence of another group, the z\sharis, named after its founder Abul Hasan al Ashari (b. 867 CE), as a counterpoint to the Mutazilites. Abul Hasan was himself a diehard Mu’tazilitc till he turned his back on it at the age of 40, and hence, as opposed to the Hanbalis, employed similar techniques of rational arguments against his erstwhile associates. The Asharite theological school was to later draw into its fold such luminaries as al Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun. The Mu'tazilite voices were drowned and their their work cut out for them when Imam Hanbal’s provocative distinction between the traditionalists and those he dubbed as innovators caught the imagination of the common folk: “The sinners among the People of Tradition arc God’s friends. But the pious ones among the people of Innovation are God’s enemies”. Just as matters were settling down, one of MutawakkiFs descendents, Caliph al-Qadir, reignited the confrontation by calling on all innovators, especially the Mu’tazilites and the Hanafi scholars, to repent from their misguided ways on pain of chastisement. The ascendancy of the group which referred to itself as ‘The People of the Sunnah and the Collective’ (the followers of the true Sunnah and the United path of the companions) thus continued all the 12th century, a sort of victory of tradition over reason. Although many luminaries like Awzai of Beirut, Tabari of Baghdad and Thawri of Kufa had also attracted a considerable following, the Abbasid Caliph thought it fit to impose the four madhabs (Hanafis, Malikis, Shaft's and Hanbalis) under the umbrella of ‘Sunni’ Islam as a new reality, something that the Ulema of each school of thought could never have reached a consensus on, as each school believed that the unified law of God could only find a voice through their specific faith. This necessitated a novel approach to the unity and diversity of the Sharia, which was expressed rather eloquently by a Hanafi scholar of Central Asia, Abu Hafs Nasaft ‘Our school is correct with the possibility of 9

error, and another school is in error with the possibility of being correct’. The followers of the Hanafi madhab were normally referred to as Able Sunnah, while the other three madhabs were known as Able Hadith. There is no denying the fact that the original positions of each madhab kept evolving as new hadiths came to light. Hadiths thus constituted the bedrock of the nascent Sunni faith. They became so central to the faith that Imam Ibn Hanbal openly acknowledged his preference for even a flawed Hadith over a scholar’s opinion or Qiyas. The only problem was diat there were a lot of them in circulation. Imam Ibn Hanbal for instance sifted through as many as 750,000 transmissions that he came across during his travel but settled on only 27,700 of them (roughly a quarter of them repeat ones) for his Musnad. Rationalists and reformists throughout history have pointed to a number of major fault lines in our understanding and use of hadiths. Firstly, Hadith collection has had a chequered history: the first of the four righteous Caliphs Abu Bakr(ra) not only discouraged its spread on the ground that it would spell discord but also destroyed the 200 odd hadiths that he had in his personal collection, while the second caliph severely castigated and even punished eminent companions like Abu Hureyra, Ali b. Kab, Abdullah bin Mas'ud and Abu Darda(ra) for being careless in this regard. Abu Hureyra(ra) went on cement his standing as the most prolific of narrators by far, though he had known the Prophet for barely 3 years. Secondly, hadiths had for a very long time followed an oral tradition and there were bound to be errors in transmission, especially since in many cases up to 9 transmitters are involved. Thirdly, the Caliph who had reportedly ordered the initiation of the process of recording hadiths under the supervision of the state was none other than Jafar al-Mansur (753-775 CE), who gained notoriety as the chief tormentor of both Imam Abu Hanifa (who was incarcerated and then poisoned) and Imam Malik (who was whipped). Fourthly, complete reliance is placed on isnad (chain of transmission) and none on whether the Hadith meets the criterion of reason. Scholars who tried to segregate them on this basis failed in their endeavour as what one scholar considered devoid of sense, the others didn't; no common ground exists to this day. Fifthly, the reliability of a transmitter is mainly determined by the compiler himself, with the result that many transmitters whom Imam Bukhari for instance considered reliable, Imam Muslim didn't. So although the six accepted traditionalists were sifting through hadiths in a broadly similar timeframe, their works hardly include any which arc common in more dian two compilations. Sixthly, there are many instances of contradictor}- entries. Seventhly, Ulema haven't been able to forge a consensus on the level of authenticity to allot to each Hadith. Eighthly, traditions contained in the correct six books included barely 1% on average of the hadiths sifted through by each individual collector; so with this high a 10

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rejection rate, one can imagine the number of forgeries in circulation. Ninthly, since hadiths were compiled by humans, the rationalists reasoned, flaws could not be ruled out completely. And lastly, since only a handful of originators had been associated with the Prophet(saw) during his first 53 years at Makkah, a useful source of knowledge is missing. There were so many counterfeit hadiths floating around even in Caliph Umar bin Abdul Aziz’s time that the man sometimes referred to as the fifth righteous caliph decided to determine the genuine ones on his own. He also solicited the support of Imam Abu Shihab Zuhri (d. 744 CE) for separately undertaking the work. No trace of these collections exist. Imam Hamam Ibn Munabbih (d. 750 CE) attempted to do the same but could only attest to barely 138 traditions. The primacy of hadiths extolled by luminaries like Imam Shafii and Imam Hambal, gave rise nevertheless to a highly significant school of thought called the Ahl al Sunnah Waljamaat, as mentioned earlier. On the face of it, this was at odds with the analogical reasoning espoused by the Hanafis and the emphasis on Mcdinite practices by the Malikis. Though a community consensus as implied by the United path of the companions was not in sight, the compromise imposed by the caliph was to allow everyone the flexibility to follow one creed (Taqlid), while respecting all others. Although differences remained, some mellowing of views were visible, as the Hanafis and the Malikis took notice of the new hadiths becoming known, while the Shafii’s and the Hanbalis tried analogical reasoning, though only as a last resort, when suitable hadiths were not handy. Hadiths had however proliferated so much during this time, that in a search for common ground, six books of hadiths, which became known as the Sihah Sittah or the Correct Six were promulgated, as Brig. Nazir Ahmed so eloquently put it, ‘on the point of the Abbasid sword’. It seems perplexing that Imam Malik’s Muwatta, the oldest surviving and still highly regarded book of hadiths, which Caliph Harunur Rashid once wanted to proclaim as the law of the land, stood ignored. The Hadiths chosen by great traditionalists like Imam Shafii and Imam Hanbal, on the basis of which they honed their specific creeds, also didn't figure in the list. Mentors of Imam Bukhari, like Abu Zarah Razi, Abu Hatam Razi and Yahya Zullii, all widely respected tradition memorisers in their own right, were presumably not included because of their opposition to Imam Bukhari's methodology. The fact remains that during Imam Bukhari’s lifetime and much beyond, his hadiths were subjected to harsh criticism by equally notable scholars, Imam Muslim being amongst them. It was only when radical reformists like Ibn Taymiyyah joined the ranks of the disenchanted that traditionalists hunkered down and banned all such criticism of the Correct Six, Sahih Bukhari in particular, whose work they publicised as being next to the Holy Quran in importance. II

4. REFORMIST MOVEMENTS OF IBN TAYMIYYAH AND IBN ABD AL WAHHAB The Mongol invasion of 1258 CE, which put an end to what remained of the Abbasid dynasty, caused havoc in the Muslim world in more ways than one. Apart from the widespread destruction of lives, property and books that ensued, the Mongols became a fixture of Islamic politics by embracing Islam. Amidst such a desolate landscape arose a figure, going by the name of Ibn Taymiyyah, whose impeccable scholarly credentials were diluted by views so controversial that he ran afoul of both the state as well as prominent Sunni scholars of all the four madhabs. Hanafi and Shafi'i scholars accused him of being misguided and consequently misleading others. Ibn Taymiyyah spoke contemptuously of the legitimacy of dogmatic theology, which had become the bedrock of the Sunni faith. While rejecting the need for a caliphate, he demanded that religious law be applied stringently in all Muslim principalities, and that a Muslim ruler should only be obeyed as long as it did not entail disobedience to Allah. He likened Allah to a corporeal entity, taking his attributes in a literal manner, and was consequently accused of anthropomorphism by ignoring the Quranic injunction ‘There is nothing whatsoever like unto him’ (42:11). Ibn Taymiyyah was scathingly critical of what he felt were innovations (bid'ah), Sufi practices in particular, since he considered worship to be a limited field of activity, entailing only those rituals where some textual evidence is available, all others being forbidden. Ibn Taymiyyah’s philosophy was primarily guided by the visceral hatred he harboured for the Mongols whose invasion of Baghdad had devastated what remained of the Caliphate. Since the Mongols had later embraced Islam, he considered them as apostates worthy of being killed. Ibn Taymiyyah exerted influence over various reform movements, notably that of Abdullah Ibn Abd al Wahhab(l702-1792 CE). What Ibn Wahhab lacked in terms of scholarly credentials in comparison to Ibn Taymiyyah, he made up for it in zeal. Having been banished from his hometown Najd in Central Arabia in the mid-18th century owing to his

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extremist leanings, he gained the patronage of an eminent tribal chieftain, Ibn Saud, who viewed the alliance as a pathway towards attaining regional ascendancy. The movement that Ibn Wahhab kicked off in the town of Diriyah near the site of present day Riyadh, called for the restoration of Tawhid and elimination of all practises that he considered sinful. Anything that he labelled as an innovation like decorating mosques, visiting shrines, weeping over the dead, venerating saints, celebrating the Prophet’s birthday and even worshipping of Allah beyond the mandatory7, he ostracised on pain of death. As per the takfiri doctrine that he espoused, all those he deemed apostates, like Shias, Sunni Sufis and all other Muslims indulging in rituals he deemed innovative, merited death. His definition of Bid'ah was so broad-based that apart from his ardent followers, any Muslim could be declared an apostate. Though disdainful of the practice of Taqlid of the four established madhabs, he ironically encouraged his own Taqlid by insisting that his was the only true path. Ibn Wahhab’s alliance of convenience with a powerful local chieftain of the Al Saud family proved to be a combustible bifurcation of religious and political authority, which was to serve the mutual interests of both the clans in the decades to come. All Muslims in regions under their control were supposed to pledge allegiance to one temporal and one religious authority, representing the two sides of the alliance. The most extreme part of his doctrine was that anyone who resorted to what Ibn Wahhab considered as an innovation or turned his back on the authority vested in the ruler or the recognised religious establishment would forfeit his life, with his family and possessions taken over as spoils of war. After gaining and consolidating control over most of Central Arabia, the heirs of ibn Al Wahhab and ibn Saud cemented their politico-religious alliance by attacking the city of Karbala in 1801, pillaging it and massacring thousands of its inhabitants, including women and children, under, as an official British historian of the time put it. ‘circumstances of particular cruelty’. They pushed into the holy cities of Makkah and Medina too around two years later, which after the routine slaughter, they commenced administering with their hallmark harshness, the idea being to cow down the people to their will. The people’s tribulations didn't last too long, as the Wahhabi Ikhwan forces were crushed by the autonomous Ottoman satrap in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, who then went on to destroy the Wahhabi headquarters of Diriyah. It was in the years preceding, during and following World War 1 that the fortunes of Abd al-Aziz bin Saud and the Wahhabi Ikhwan displayed a resurgence, due in large part to British-sponsored agents like John Shakespeare, Lawrence of Arabia and John Philby, who promised (and delivered) glory in the form of a family kingdom incorporating the sacred land of the Hejaz, in return for subservience to British and later American

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interests. As the Kingdom blossomed under the three pillars of Ibn Abd al Wahhab’s doctrine (One Ruler, One Authority, One Mosque) and as its coffers started overflowing with oil revenues from the mid-1970s onwards, it's thoughts turned towards the export of this ideology. The monarchy was however itself shaken in 1979, when some 500 armed ultra-conservatives seized the Grand Mosque at Makkah. Their leader, Juhayman, was the grandson of one of the leaders of the original Ikhwan from the influential Otaybi tribe of the Najd, and his Ikhwan leanings found favour even in the heart of the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia. Where Sheikh Bin Baz, arguably the most influential of Saudi muftis in recent times, faulted him was not in his religious views, but in his criticism of the ostentatious and westernising ways of the monarchy. This seizure of Masjid al-Haram in Makkah by an armed group harbouring a similar belief system so unnerved the Saudi ruling elite that they decided to appease its religious establishment by ceding ever greater control over the educational and legal domains and generously funding them to export their doctrine to all corners of the world. Apart from keeping their religious elements sated and at bay, this served the dual purpose of directing their venom at a potential politicalcum-religious adversary7 in the shape of the newlv-established Islamic Republic of Iran. But since their strategy of targeting Iran revolved around its Shiite character, this anger extended to all the Shias everywhere, with all the top Saudi clerics labelling them as infidels and apostates. If Al-Qaeda, which professed a similar religious ideology wasn't bad enough, the rise of ISIS, accompanied by their unprecedented atrocities in Syria and Iraq, generated international revulsion. Saudi clerics in general, while agreeing that both they and ISIS shared commonalities in Islamic values and law, disagreed only to the extent of methods employed. A number of factors, not the least of which was the international backlash since 9/11 against violent Islamic ideologies, forced the Kingdom to finally loosen some of the stifling prevalent restrictions on women and to generate avenues of enjoyment for the new generation of Saudis. This wasn't an easy decision to be sure, as matters of faith and culture had become so intertwined that it was considered well-nigh impossible to untangle them. To elaborate the issue further, the ease with which the soul of Wahhabism was injected into die body fabric of Sunni Islam, in which petrodollars and US backing played no small part, belies the fact that it wasn't always so. The teachings of hardline scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and much later Abdullah Ibn Abd al-Wahhab of Diriyah in present day Saudi Arabia had after all shaken the foundations of Sunni Islam through their rejection of the concept of Taqlid, which was considered central to the Sunni faith. Though reviled in their own times as being too radical, their 14

DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS teachings found a niche in the nascent Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where they could not only thrive but even be exported abroad. The trend towards the Kingdom’s modernisation, spurred by its mounting wealth, was impeded by the anti-innovation Wahhabi philosophy. Faced with pressure from the monarchy, whose largesse they were dependent on, the clergy’s toleration criteria kept evolving. The Kingdom has been the top importer of western arms for the past many decades: this is looked upon favourably on grounds of meeting the State’s religious obligation of keeping ready the ‘steeds of war’. Public broadcast systems as well as telephones, once considered an abomination , have since become indispensable. TV, once strongly opposed, is tolerated on the basis that it can be used to transmit religious activities. The one tiling consistently opposed is any change in the status of women in a patriarchal society, in which she is not permitted to do anything without the permission of a male guardian. In the post-9/11 period, when Saudi Arabia came somewhat under the scanner, the Kingdom tried to boost its Sunni credentials (as opposed to its Wahhabi-Salafi orientation) by passing itself off as an adherent of the Hambali madhab. Truth be told, the clergy had deliberately ignored King Abdullah’s request to bring the Kingdoms’ laws in accordance with the aforesaid Madhab. More recently, a stream of reforms, hitherto unthinkable, has been set in motion, while at the same time all voices of dissent are being silenced. A process of de-radicalisation has also commenced in tandem, with US scholars directly overseeing the replacement of radical literature with a more acceptable version, as gleaned from the testimony given by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson before a congressional committee. The toxic mix of faith and politics that the founding fathers of the Kingdom had espoused has come full circle.

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5. MOVEMENTS OF 19™ CENTURY COLONIAL INDIA Though the Ikhwan of Ibn abd al-Wahhab had met an ignominious end at die hands of the Egyptian army in 1815, the teachings of its founder managed to resonate beyond the Arabian Peninsula to far-off India. Just before the War of Independence of 1857, Maulana Shah Ismail Dehlvi, a descendant of Shah Waliullah, wrote Taqviat ul Islam, a treatise in favour of the Wahhabi belief system over the prevalent Hanafi school of thought. Needless to say, this received a sharp though scholarly rebuke from another prominent religious scholar of Delhi, Allama Fazle Haq Khairabadi; thus were the seeds of Deobandism and Barelvism sown! It was around the same time that the Aide Hadi th emerged as a religious movement in Northern India. Its views were similar to Wahhabism/Salafism in the sense that it opposes all 'innovations’ introduced in Islam after the earliest times and reject the traditional Sunni philosophy of taqlid(following legal precedent). It is gaining traction in Pakistan these days at the expense of the Deobandis, while maintaining a low national profile. A group of Indian scholars, notably Rashid Ahmed Gangohi and Qasim Nanotvi, inspired by Shah Waliullah and his grandson, formalised the Deobandi movement by founding an Islamic seminar}7 known as Darul Uloom Deoband in 1867. Though its desired objective was to counter what they felt were divisive machinations by the British colonialists, it's real agenda was to seek reforms in the prevalent Sufi practices and rituals that had become an intrinsic part of the Indian Muslim ethos.The traditional Islamic value system of the time (Hanafi madhab, Maturidi school of Islamic theology and the Sufi tariqas), feeling increasingly threatened by the Deoband reformist agenda, established Islamic schools of its own in 1904. The founder of this movement, Ahmed Raza Khan (1856-1921), from whose hometown of Bareilly the movement derived its name, went so far as to declare all Deobandis infidels and apostates. At first sight, it is difficult to understand the high level of animosity between the two sub-sects, especially when the Deobandis also currendy claim, on paper at least, to be strong

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proponents of the doctrine of Taqlid and followers of the Hanafi madhab. In practice, though, the two sects are as dissimilar as chalk and cheese. The Barelvis believe in honouring the Sufi saints who had contributed so much in bringing disparate communities together and whose shrines dot the landscape of present day Pakistan and even Northern India. Barclvi practises like visiting shrines and graves to pray for their dear ones are however considered anathema by their Dcobandi peers. The two movements, however, became politicised in due course, with the latter forming the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind in 1919 and the former the Jamiat Ulema-c-Pakistan much later in 1948. As Indian independence neared, the JUH came out against the Pakistan movement, opting instead to join the majority Hindus in a joint nationalist front, while a small faction, which came out in support of the All India Muslim League, splintered in 1945 to form the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam. The JUP, which served as a political vehicle for the Barelvi strain of Sunni Islam, has since given rise to various parties and ‘tchriks’ (movements). So has the JUI for that matter, with its various factions earn ing the name of leaders who engineered the breakaway. Their historical animosities only resurfaced in the Pakistani context when the various Deobandi groups became militarily more powerful, financially more sound and ideologically more rigid, courtesy of the backing they received during the Afghan Jihad and even after. All these factors combined made these militants first turn their guns against the Shias, and later from 2006 onwards, the Barelvis found themselves too on the receiving end of an equally vicious campaign, the principal targets, apart from their leadership, being their mass gatherings at Sufi shrines and at Eide-Milad-Un-Nabi celebrations. What is most striking is that both Deobandis and Barelvis, as mentioned earlier, not only claim to be Sunni, but also to subscribe to the relatively liberal Hanafi stream of thought. From the Danil Uloom Deoband crucible had also emerged the Tablighi Jamaat, a movement whose monumental growth over the years exceeded all expectations. This Jamaat had been formally launched in 1927 by Ilyas Kandhalvi, an alumni of the same institution, who after a teaching stint at their adjoining madrassa, relocated to Nizamuddin in Old Delhi for the purpose of ‘tabligh’ (spreading the message). The TJ originally focussed on six core principles- absolute faith in Allah, devotion to daily prayers, meditation, selfless sendee to the cause and dawah (invitation to the righteous path) - which it considered central to its missionary work. The Jamaat lays particular stress on undertaking regular Tablighi missions in small groups to all corners of the country and even beyond, targeting those Muslims they feel either possess insufficient knowledge of the faith or are otherwise less inclined towards its rituals. Elevating the moral standards of the community they visit is far from their agenda. Things went smoothly till the time of the third Amir, who had 17

constituted a ten-man shura to undertake the rapidly mounting management responsibilities. By the time his son, Maulana Zubairul Hasan, who was acting as de facto leader, passed away in March 2014, the move of one of the surviving members of the original shura, Maulana Saad, based at Nizamuddin, to be designated Ameer, generated resentment within its ranks. Most of its followers, particularly those outside Nizamuddin, were in favour of continuing with the consultative mode of governance. The autocratic approach of Maulana Saad, moreover, forced the dissatisfied members to move to Bhopal, leading thereby to a division along ethnic lines. The only other surviving member of the Shura, Maulana Abdul Wahhab at Raiwind, Pakistan, became a magnet for the proponents of the shura system. Activists residing in Europe in general and London in particular, where the TJ enjoys a formidable presence, also stood divided along these lines. The two major annual Tablighi congregations used to be at Raiwind and at Dhaka, Bangladesh, though now' with the latter siding with the Nizamuddin group, a drop in attendance at both venues is visible. Maulana Saad’s efforts at introducing reforms in a stagnant body has not been well received either by his detractors. His parent body, Darul Uloom Dcoband, issued a fatwa in December 2016, accusing the Maulana of deviation, disrespecting the scholars and earlier Prophets, and introducing new unacceptable interpretations. Many of TJs ardent supporters arc apparendy watching the unfolding train of events with understandable dismay. In Pakistan particularly, TJ operates like an old boy network, with its more influential members facilitating those in need, w'hile enjoying unofficial patronage at the same time. Though TJ claims to be apolitical, it has been accused at times of succumbing to its latent sectarian tendencies by harbouring known sectarian killers in its midst. The fourth major movement of the 19th century with its roots in colonial India is referred to as the Ahmadiyya. Its origin can be traced to the pledge of allegiance Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian obtained from forty' of his supporters at Ludhiana in 1889 under what he claimed was divine instruction. His claim to receive divine inspiration was met with derision and hostility from the broader Islamic community’, which ultimately led to his followers being branded as non-Muslims by' Pakistan’s parliament in 1974, and ten years later to their being forbidden by' law' to pose or identify' themselves as Muslims in any' manner and through any means. This had been sparked by public anger stemming from what they' believed was the Ahmadi faith’s denial of the Prophet Muhammad being the ‘seal of the Prophets’. Though reviled at home, the Ahmadi diaspora in the West have knit themselves into a robust community' abroad. The official Ahmadi version is that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is considered to be the Messiah prophesied by’ Prophet Muhammad and as foretold in the Holy' 18

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Quran. They claim to adhere to the Islamic declaration of faith and observe the same five pillars of Islam as Sunni Muslims. As to not believing in Prophet Muhammad as the last of the Prophets, they quote their founder as saying, ‘The Prophet is Muhammad, the chosen one, who is higher and more exalted than all Prophets and is the most perfect of Messengers and is the Khatamul Ambiya and the best of men’. To further buttress their claims, they invite attention to their founder’s extensive writings extolling the greatness and perfection of Prophet Muhammad. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad derived his original support from the Punjabi middle class, who were impressed by his scholarly credentials (lie went on to write nearly 90 books on Islamic teachings) as well as his exceptional oratorical and debating skills. Imam Abu Hanifa, to whose fiqh a vast majority of the Muslims of South Asia claim to subscribe to, once defined a Muslim as one ‘who sincerely believes himself to be a Muslim’. Our hearts have however hardened so much that we find it difficult to accept the verdict of the Imam of our fiqh when it runs contrary- to our own inflamed perceptions.

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6. THE SHIA FACTOR But amidst all this discourse about theology, where and how exactly do the Shias fit in? Some scholars like Ibn Hazm trace their origins to the period after the Prophet’s succession, some like Ibn al-Nadim to the two fitnas of Al-Jamal and Al-Siffin and some to the tragedy of Karbala. The myth that the Shias were originated by Abdullah Ibn Saba, a Jew supposed to have converted to Islam during the reign of the third righteous caliph, gained immense traction during the charged atmosphere between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the newly-installed Islamic Republic of Iran. The last myth can be set aside on the grounds that all that is known of the shadowy and illusive figure of Abdullah Ibn Saba can be traced to the writings of one Sayf Ibn Umar al-Tamimi, who has himself been derided by such notable scholars like Imam Nisai, Imam Abu Daud and al-Suyuti as being unreliable and untrustworthy. It defies reason that someone about whom so litde is definitively known could have exercised such power over so many while remaining in the shadows. /Vccording to Ayatollah Kashif al-Ghita, ‘Imam Ali (as) had said, “Allah has favoured the word Shia by using it in the Holy Quran (And verily Ibrahim was amongst the Shia of Noah). And you arc amongst the Shia of Muhammad (saw). This name is neither restricted to a particular group nor is it a newly adopted religion”.’ lust as the Sunnis believe in the five fundamentals of Islam, Shias place their trust in five Usool-e-Deen or roots of religion (Oneness of God, Justice of Allah, Prophethood, Imamat and Resurrection), followed by ten branches (furu-e-deen), which include Prayers, Fasting, Hajj, Khums(alms equivalent to 20% of savings) and jihad. In essence, the one major point of departure appears to be the Shiite belief in a divine Imamate as opposed to the Sunni reliance on a temporal caliphate. According to Al-Baqir, the 5th ordained Imam of the Shias, the choice of an Imam was decided when God granted Prophet Ibrahim(pbuh) this favour and conferred the Imamate on him and upon those of his progeny who did not go astray(Al-Quran 2:124). Insofar as the role of an Imam is concerned, the first Shiite Imam, Ali bin Abi Talib(as) had dwelt upon it in one of his sermons: ‘Certainly, there is no obligation on the Imam except 20

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what has been devolved on him from Allah, namely to convey warnings, to render good advice, to revive the Sunnah, to apply penalties on those liable to them and to issue shares to the deserving. So hasten towards knowledge before its vegetation dries up and before you turn yourselves away from seeking knowledge from those who have it.’ Imam Husain(as), while responding to messages from the people of Kufa, had further expounded on it: ‘The statement of most of you is that “there is no Imam over us; come, God may unite us in guidance and truth through you.” for, by my Life, what is the Imam except one who acts according to the Book, one who upholds justice, one who professes the truth, and one who dedicates himself to (the essence of) God. Peace be with you.’ In response to questions subsequently raised about the nature of an Imam, Al-Baqir clarified that Imams are the chosen ones (35:32) referred to as ‘those who submitted’ in the Quran as well as in the earlier scriptures and that Allah has made the Imams an ‘umma wasat’, so that they might be God’s witnesses to His creatures. Al-Baqir also dwelt at length on the concept of knowledge (ilm) possessed by the Prophet and his divinely guided progeny (3:5), their infallibility (Ism) (33:33), the notion of Shafaa or intercession (7:17), about Nass or divine and explicit appointment, about the hereditary nature of the Imamate (33:6), about the Imams outstripping others in performing good deeds (35:32), about them being the light which guides men along the path of righteousness (28:28). Allah has also made obedience and love of the Imam incumbent upon the believers (42:22). The centrality of the Ahle Bayt or People of the House of the Prophet, for whom Allah wishes a perfect purification by removing all impurities (33:33), is well entrenched in Shia as well as Sunni Sufi-cum-Barelvi beliefs, with their love being enjoined on all believers (42:22). As to who all constitutes the Ahle Bayt, the various ‘traditions of the cloak/mantle’ on the authority of Ummul Momineen Ayesha(ra) from Sahih Bukhari, and from others on the authority of Ummul Momineen Umm Salama and Saffiya(ra), as well as the Prophet’s beloved daughter Fatima(as) arc instructive in this regard: the five personalities only include the Prophet himself, his daughter Fatima, Ali (his cousin, son-in-law and ward) and the Prophet’s two grandsons, Hasan and Husain. A number of other reports exist in the Sunni Hadith tradition to the effect that for months after this Ayat of Purification was revealed, the Prophet, while proceeding for his prayers, used to place both his hands on the door of Ali and Fatima’s house and recite this verse aloud. More widely reported(Imam Muslim, Tirmidhi, Ahmad bin Hambal, Nisai, Hakim, Bayhaqi) is the Hadith from Amr Ibn Saad bin abi Waqas that when the verse of Mubahila (3:60) was revealed, the Prophet called Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husain(as) and said ‘O Allah, these are my Ahle Bayt’. Another mutawatir Hadith reports the Prophet as saying: ‘Behold! My Ahle Bayt are like the Ark of Noah(as). Whoever 21

embarked in it was saved and whoever turned away from it was doomed’. Amongst other things, the Prophet has referred to Ab(as) as the ‘mawla’ of all the believers after him, his daughter Fatima(as) as the leader of all the women of Paradise and his grandsons, Hasan and Hussain(as) as the leaders ot all the youth of paradise. In die eyes of his followers, Ali(as) emerges as the obvious and only choice to don the mantle of the first Imam. Shias believe that Allah instructed His Prophet to designate Ali as die first Imam and quote a number of hadiths to that effect, which although being also included in the works of notable Sunni traditionalists and historians, are seen in a different light by each group. It has been reported that when die Quranic verse 26:214 (And admonish thy nearest kinsman) was revealed, the Prophet gathered together all his family members to proclaim Ab , then barely twelve years of age, to be ‘his brother, his executor and his successor’ and to advise those present to ‘listen to him and obey him’. Again, in the context of choosing Ab (as), under divine inspiration, to convey Surah alBaraat to the people of Makkah during Hajj, the Prophet (saw) is reported to have said:”Ab is from me and I am from Ali, and nobody can discharge my duty* except me and Ab.” This can be found in the works of Imam Tirmizi, Nasa'i, Ibn Maja, Ibn Kathir and Sayuti et al. The ebspute between various scholars however bes in the realm of context as web as interpretation. They further believe that in the short timespan between the Quranic revelation 5:70 (about proclaiming the revealed message, without which the mission would not be considered fulfilled) and revelation 5:4 (announcing the completion of the rebgion of Islam), the Prophet had debvered an historic message on 18 Zilhaj 10 AH to the departing hajis at a place called Ghadecr Khum: “Whoever takes me as mawla, Ab is his. May Allah lend support to whoever bids him loyalty, fight whoever takes him as enemy, dishonour whoever fails him and turn the truth with him in whichever direction he turns.” The famous historian Abu Jafar Tabari has quoted the entire sermon in his book Kitab U1 Wilayah, its opening words being: “The Angel Gabriel has conveyed Allah’s command to me that I stop at this place and inform the people that Ab bin Abi Tabb is my brother, my successor, my caliph (vice regent) after me. O’ men! Allah has made Ali your Wali(guardian) and Imam (guide). Obedience to him is obbgatory on each one of you; his command is supreme; his utterance is truth; curse be upon him who opposes him; Allah’s mercy be on him who befriends him.” In this sermon, the Prophet had reportedly referred over 27 times to Ab as Wab, Mawla and Imam, but used the epithet Khabfa for him only 3 times, leading one to deduce that his emphasis was more on spiritual rather than temporal leadership. 22

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Shia theologians, taking a cue from the teachings of the divinelyappointed Imams, take pains to emphasize that the Book of Allah too contains several references to Ali(as). He has been called the Guardia n(Wali) of the Believers after Allah and His Messenger (5:55), the Witness (Shahid) from the Holy Prophet(saw) who verified him (11:17) and the Guide (Hadi) of the community (13:7) after the Prophet. He is one of the Able Bayt whom Allah has purified from all impurity and sins (33:33) and the near kin (Qurba) of the Prophet whose love is obligatory for Muslims (42:23). He is part of the Holy Progeny of Abraham from whom Allah appoints the imams (2:124) and upon whom He has bestowed His guidance, wisdom and Kingdom (4:54). Imam Shafii had expressed marvel at the man (Ali) about whose lofty status there was no dearth of testimony, despite the fact that his enemies were loath to say anything in his favour because of hatred and his friends due to fear. Since the time of Ameer Muawiya, the long-serving Governor of Syria and later the 5th Caliph, a vilification campaign was launched against Ali and his family from the pulpits of state-controlled Mosques. Those companions who protested were rebuked, while those who agitated against it were brutally tortured. On appointing Sa’d bin Abi Waqas (ra) as a Governor, the Caliph questioned him as to what prevented him from abusing Abu Turab (father of dust, a nickname given to Ali by the Prophet because of the long duration he spent in prostration to Allah and his denunciation of worldly pleasures). Sa’d(ra) had outlined three unique distinctions, namely All’s comparison with Aaron to the Prophet’s Moses(as); the Prophet’s announcement at Khaibar about ‘giving the standard tomorrow to a man who loves Allah and His Prophet and whom Allah and His Prophet also love and who would bring glory to us’; and the Prophet’s calling of Ali ,Fatima, Hasan and Hussain when the verse of Mubahila was revealed and saying ‘ O’ Allah! These are my Ahle Bayt’ (Sahih Muslim). Other similar narrations has the Caliph severely castigating the Governor for not doing so (heaping abuse). Ummul Momineen Umm Salama(ra) was so incensed at tins practice that she is reported to have complained to Abdullah al Jadali(ra) who came to see her, as to “how come Allah’s Messenger is being cursed among you?” When Jadali mumbled something about seeking refuge from Allah, Umm Salama went on to add that she had heard the Allah’s Messenger say that “whoever curses Ali, has cursed me” (Musnad Ahmad bin Hambal). The intensity and viciousness of the campaign was such that the true legacy of Ali is still being reclaimed. And indeed, when news of the martyrdom of Caliph Ali in the Mosque of Kufa (in a state of prostration during prayers), made its way to Damascus, people in the streets found it hard to digest that he used to pray also. Much later, during the time of the

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Abbasids, Imam Shafii was also amongst those accused of being soft on the followers of Ali(as). When called by the Caliph to explain his position, the Imam is reported to have said in the open court:’Ali will judge mankind and allot them heaven and hell. He was the leader of men and jinns, a true testator of the Holy Prophet. If the followers of Ali arc ‘rafidhes’ (a derogatory* term used for the Shias, meaning rejectionists), verily I am one of that sect. Ali at the time of breaking of idols in the Kaaba put his feet on the shoulder where Allah had put his hand on the night of Mairaj and verily Ali was that man into wdiose eyes was shone the light of Allah’. While visiting Damascus around 290 AH, Imam Nisa’i was so incensed on hearing such imprecations being routinely hurled against someone of whom he ‘knew nothing but good’, that he decided to compile his ‘IChasa’is Ali’ devoted to the virtues of Ali. Ali’s nobility of character w’as so renowned that even his critics were at times forced to concede to his excellence. Admired for his piety, his humility and sense of justice, he was as ferocious on the battlefield as he w-as docile outside it. He was the standard bearer in all the ghazvas the Prophet participated in, and distinguished himself in each one of them. During one such Ghazva, the Battle of the Ditch (Khandaq), the Prophet, after permitting Ah to ride out to respond to the single combat challenge thrown by a formidable pagan warrior, couldn't help saying that ‘total faith’ (Qul Eman) is going up against ‘total evil’(Qul Kufr). It w-as also during this battle that Ah, when about to deliver the coup de grace, had stepped back. When quizzed later, he responded that his opponent, Abd Wudd, had spit on him, and had he struck him then, it would have seemed that he was venting his personal fury, instead of fighting for the glory of Allah as he always did. Such nobility amidst the heat of battle, the Shias feel, is a rarity befitting an Imam. The written advice that Ameer ul Momineen Ali(as) gave to the Governor-designate of Egypt, Malik Ash tar, about how a public figure should conduct himself and the letter he is believed to have written to his eldest son (in the form of a will, when he felt his end was near), which is replete with spiritual, moral and practical advice on all aspects of life, are classics in themselves. As far as supplications go, Dua Kumayl, named after the companion to whom the Imam had bequeathed it to, remains unmatched in quality and tenor. Knowledge was another notable thing that the Imams of the Holy progeny excelled in. ‘If I am the city of knowledge’, the Prophet is reported to have said, ‘Ali is its gate’ (al-Tirmidhi). Ali (as) is arguably the only ruler in history who repeatedly beseechcd his congregation to profit from his knowledge. ‘Ask ye of me,’ he used to say, ‘before you lose me. By Allah, if you ask me about anything that could happen up to the Day of Judgement, I wall tell you about it. Ask me, for, by Allah, you will not be able to ask me

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DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

a question about anything without my informing you. Ask me about the Book of Allah, for by Allah, there is no verse about which I do not know whether it was sent down at night or during the day, or whether it was revealed on a plain or in a mountain’. Ali (as) in turn has referred to all the Ahlc Bayt as treasure troves of knowledge. When quizzed about the source of the vast knowledge that he possessed, the first Shiite Imam was always quick to point out that it was handed over to him by the Holy Prophet, from whom he was inseparable since his(Ali’s) birth, like a bird feeds its young, morsel by morsel. Each Imam in turn passed it on to his divinely appointed successor, and when the 12th Imam will reappear towards the ‘end of days’ to ‘fill the earth with equity and with justice, just as it has been tilled with tyranny ano oppression’, he will inter alia be armed with r\l Jafr, a book containing the collective wisdom of all the Prophets. The sixth ordained Imam, Jafar Sadiq, had relatively greater freedom of action (owing to the prevalent political turmoil) as well as longevity, which is why Shias are said to follow the Jaffaria fiqh (jurisprudence). The subjects that he taught to thousands of students in lus madrasah at the Prophet’s mosque in Medinah ranged from law and theology’ to mathematics and science. One of his most famous students was Jabir Ibn Hayyan (Geber), the father of chemistry, who frequently made references to the ‘truthful one’. Another was the Sunni Imam, Abu Hanifa, who used to say that if it weren't for the two years he spent with Imam Jafar Sadiq, his life would have been wasted. Imam Malik, being based at Medinah, referred to the Imam as ‘the most knowledgeable man he had ever met’. So there’s more commonality at the scholarly level between the Shia and Sunni streams of thought than commonly admitted. To prove the point, most of the traditions quoted above are from Sunni sources. The true glory of Allah and the excellences of the Household of the Prophet are however more extensively and more vividly brought to life through narrations from Shia sources. What is most associated with the Shiite faith is its unfailing remembrance of the Martyrdom of Husayn Ibn Ali(as), the beloved grandson of the Holy Prophct(saw) and the third Shiite Imam, in the desolate sands of Karbala. What is unique about this tragedy is that the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, the oppressor and the oppressed, couldn't have been starker. When Yazid bin Muawiya took over the reins of the caliphate on the demise of his father, his first order of business was to either have the hand or the head of Imam Hussain, as he had surmised that without the allegiance of the latter, a lack of legitimacy would continue to stalk him. The Imam’s position was simple, that ‘someone like me can never swear allegiance to someone like him’, but beyond that, he was open to all other possibilities, including that of leaving the Caliph’s dominion. When the Imam left Medinah for Makkah, and 25

1

some months later, left Makkah for Iraq, he constantly reminded the people through his sermons that his only mission was to seek the reformation of his grandfather’s community, to enable them to distinguish between good and evil. When the Imam’s caravan finally encamped at the desolate landscape of Karbala, the first ‘lashkar’ of the Caliph’s army that arrived shortly afterwards, asked him to move his encampment away from the Furat tributary, which he acceded to in order to prevent the premature outbreak of hostilities. As if the odds of 300 to 1 weren't good enough, the Umayyad army made it further uneven by keeping the besieged group deprived of food and water for three days. Details of how the battle as well as its aftermath unfolded are too gruesome to narrate. Suffice it to say that no two groups professing to adhere to the same Islamic beliefs could be so far apart in terms of practical observance of the basic tenets of the faith. The pathos that the tragedy of Karbala continues to evoke to this day was best summed up by the famed historian Edward Gibbon: ‘In a distant age and climate, the tragedy of Karbala will awaken the sympathy of the coldest reader’. The persecution unleashed against the Slaia of Ali (as they were referred to) by both the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, who looked upon them as an existential threat at multiple levels, grossly restricted the natural flow of the Shia narrative. The sermons, letters and maxims of the first Shiite Imam, from which his followers draw their primary’ inspiration, could only be collected around the turn of the tenth century’ (by an eminent scholar Al Sharif al Radi) at a time when the Abbasid Caliphs had been reduced to mere figureheads by the Buyid dynasty. Another noteworthy' work, As Sahifa Al Kamilah Al Sajjadiyya, whose origin can be traced back to the fourth Shia Imam (Imam Sajjad, also known as Zainul Abideen, Beauty of the Worshipers), also surfaced much later. This consists of a set of 54 supplications(to God), which though intended for various occasions and needs, share the common thread of reflecting the magnificence and glory7 of Almighty Allah at every7 turn, through the manner in which Fie is addressed. Al Sahifat Al Ridha (The Pages of Al Ridha) is another valuable collection, constituting 240 Hadiths attributed to the 8th Shiite Imam, which deals with all important spiritual, doctrinal and moral issues. The four major Shia Hadith books (Ku tub al Arba) are Al Kafi (The Sufficient) by Muhammad bin Yaqub Kalyani (15,176 traditions), Man La Yahduruhu Al Faqih (I am my7 own Jurist) by7 Shaikh Suduq bin Ali (9044 narrations), Tahdhib Al Ahkam (The Refinement of Laws) by7 Shaikh Abu Jafar Tusi (13,590 traditions) and Al Istibsar (Foresight) by7 the same author with 5511 narrations. The Shiite take on the authenticity of traditions is also a bit different from the traditional Sunni view. The words of any7 Shiite Imam are considered directly7 traceable to the Holy Prophet through an ‘infallible’ 26

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DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

chain of transmission as explained by the sixth Imam. Beyond that, distortions arc possible, to guard against which Imam Jafar Sadiq had decreed that any narration not found to be in conformity with the Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet should be vehemently rejected.

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7. VARIOUS SHIA DENOMINATIONS By far die largest Shia denomination at present is known as the Isna Asheri or the twelvers, because of their belief in the twelve ordained imams from the bloodline of the Holy Prophet (saw), the last of whom they believe to be in a state of occultation till the appointed hour. This number (12), the Shias insist, had been proclaimed by the Prophet himself, with even their names being traced to his time, as well as to the time of the imams who followed: diere is no dearth of reports on this aspect in Shia traditions. In Sahih Bukhari also can be found a Hadith in which the Prophet(saw) is reported to have mentioned that the number of Caliphs diat will rule the Ummah after him will be 12, like the number of leaders of Bani Israel. In Sahih Muslim, the Prophet is reported to have said diat this religion will remain standing until 12 Caliph, all of them from Quraysh, rule over them. The only difference is that whereas Shias consider the Caliphs (lit. Successors) to be the divinely appointed imams from the Prophet’s progeny (only one of whom was also a caliph from the Sunni perspective), the Sunnis look at it as an earthly arrangement. The Prophet was also heard more than once to exclaim ‘O my brethren!’ His companions said to him, ‘O Messenger of God, are we not thy brethren?’ and he answered: ‘Ye are my companions. But my brethren are amongst those who have not yet come’ - in other versions ‘who will come in the last days’. The way he spoke, adds Martin Lings, suggested he was referring to persons of great spiritual eminence. While Hadith from Sunni sources quote the Prophet as saying that the promised Messiah (Al Mahdi) will ‘be from my stock’, i.e. one of my descendants, Shia Hadith books are full of details about the birth, disappearance, occultation and reappearance of die ‘Mahdi’, enjoining all believers to follow him once he makes his presence known. The first split in die Shiite Imamate occurred when the followers of Mukhtar al Saqafi shifted their allegiance from Imam Ali bin Hussain to Muhammad Ibn Hanafiya, the half-brother of Imam Hussain, on not gaining the support of the former for the movement that they had launched to avenge the martyrs of Karbala; and thus came into being the Kaysannia, which has been discussed earlier. The second divide also came about for a similar reason, when many of the Shias of the time gravitated towards Zayd 28

DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS

Ibn Ali instead of his brother al-Baqir, the 5th ordained Imam of the Isna Asheris, because of their expectation that an Imam should be willing to demand his rights, and in turn theirs, through force if necessary. According to Zaydi sources, one of the descendants of Imam Zayd migrated to Yemen around 893 CE and established an Imamate there by 901 CE. I lis lofty standing amongst the tribes, owing to his growing reputation for righteousness and his ability to foster peace by toning down internal rivalries, made him an acceptable candidate for this position. The Zaydi Imamate has, since its foundation, been an instrument of reconciliation between warring tribal factions, which explains to some extent why they have been historically successful in repelling invaders like the southern tribes, the Ottomans and more recendy, the Egyptians. This is not to say that their Imamate has not been without its fair share of battles for dominance between various claimants to the title. In the Zaydi scheme of things, Imams can and have been of two types: the first, called Sabiq (predecessor) to wage wars, levy taxes, defend the community by the sword and thereby earn the right to hold Friday prayers; the second, called Muhtasib (accountable) can only administer religious law, while being restrained from holding Friday prayers. Contrary to perception generated by the ongoing war in Yemen between the Zaydi Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition about the Zaydis being a co-religionist Iranian proxy, the truth is that the Zaydis arc closer to the Sunnis, rather than the twelver Shias, in their belief system, in that they follow the four Sunni schools of law and observe Friday prayers side by side with Sunni worshippers. The major point of divergence is their reverence for Imam Zayd and their consequent belief that the Imamate should be exclusively reserved for his descendants. The next shift, perhaps more cataclysmic, occurred when another group of Shias tilted towards Ismail bin Jafar as the appointed spiritual successor to Imam Jafar Sadiq in lieu of his other son, Musa Kazim, and this is where the IsmaiLis derive their name from. After the death of Imam Muhammad bin Ismail Ibn Jafar, however, the Ismaili imams went into concealment, surfacing only when Imam Abdullah al-Mahdi managed to successfully establish an Ismaili Shia political state, centred around present-day Egypt, in 910 CE. The Fatimid caliphate, which flourished up to the 12th century till it was snuffed out by the forces of Sultan Salahuddin Ayyubi, catapulted Ismailism into the most dominant of the Shia branches at that point ot time. Three further splits occurred during the Fatimid dynastic rule. The first occurred when the exuberant supporters of Caliph al-Hakim bin Amr Allah, who ascended the throne in 986 CE aged 11, came to accept him as the Mahdi, and refused thereby to acknowledge his successor. The nascent faith went on to develop unique doctrines of its own, which often clashes with both Ismaili and general Islamic beliefs. The Druzcs, as they are called. 29

believe in Daurs (cyclical nature of revelation), which began with Adam and ended with al-Hakim. The Druzes further believe that the divine legislative doctrines that define the permitted and the forbidden came to an end with Muhammad bin Ismail. The community is at present centred in Lebanon. The second Ismaili split occurred when Nizar and al-Musta’li, the sons of al-Mustansir Billah, fought for political and spiritual ascendency upon his death in 1094 CE. Though Nizar was defeated, his son managed to escape to Alamut, where the local Ismaili community accepted his claim, and became what is known as Nizaris, as opposed to the mainstream Mustalians. The tliird split divided the Ismailis into Tayyabi and Hafizi, with the former insisting that the son of al-Amin bi-Ahkamil Lah, being the 21st Imam, has gone into occultation, and the latter choosing to stick to the ruling Fatimid Caliph as die Imam. The Tayyabis further believe that a Dai al-Mutiaq had been appointed by die occulting Imam to guide the community, and this line which began in 1132 CE, is still continuing, its main sect being known as the Dawoodi Bohras. After the Fatimid caliphate was demolished by Sultan Salahuddin Ayyubi in 1169 CE, the mainstream Ismaili imams (Hafizi and Mustalians) again went into concealment, emerging only in die early 20th century-, when Sir Sultan M Shah Aga Khan the tliird was recognised as die 48th Imam. The tide ‘Aga Khan’ incidentally was conferred on Hasan Ali Shah, the 46th Imam, in 1818 by the Qajar of Persia, Shah Fateh Ali Shah. The current Imam, die 49th, Shah Karim Aga Khan the fourth, has been widely recognised for his services to humanity. The role of the current imam is to provide spiritual guidance and religious interpretation, and ensure the security and quality’ of life for the Ismaili Shia communities. Another branch of the Shias, which can currendy be found in Syria and Turkey, are alternately referred to as Alawis, or Nusairis. As per Allawi sources, a small Islamic regiment that came to support(nasr) Abu Ubaidah(ra) in his attempt to capture Northern Syria, did, on completion of their mission, setde down in Mount al-Hilu, which came to be known as the Nusairi mountains. Those amongst the Alawis who chose to setde down in Turkey came in due course to refer to themselves as Ale vis and began to use Turkish tides for die imams. The Alawis fervendy believe in the special position occupied by Ali(as) in religion, as an assa (base or foundation) in whom divinity is manifested in accordance with die Quranic verse 36:12 (Verily We shall give life to the dead, and We record that which tiiey send before, and that which they leave behind, and of all things We have taken account in a visible Imam). Sheikh Ali Ibrahim Al-AIawi claims the existence of no less than 300 words or phrases in the Holy Quran that refer to Imam Ali, which include ‘a witness from himself (11:17) and ‘the great news’ (78:2).

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DIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: COMING TO TERMS The Alawis arc akin to mainstream Shia Islam in that they believe in all the twelve ordained Imams and also that perfection in religion has been attained through the delegation of the Imamate to Ali(as) and his descendents after him. They are however in disagreement on the scale of perfection of these sacred personalities, and because of the extremist ideas and practices the Alawis have adopted, they are sometimes referred to as the ‘Ghulat’. The Alawites believe that every imam has a ‘door’, who performs the same role as the Imam in religious guidance and in the dissemination of concealed knowledge, except that they don’t possess the divine quality of the Imam. After the occultation of the twelfth Imam, they came to follow Muhammad bin Nusair as the ‘door’ to the 11 th Imam and many others after him, the most famous amongst them being Sayyid Abdullah alJunbalani, who established the famous Alawi Junbalani order, and Sayyid Hussain al-Khusaibi, who wrote the famous al-Hidaya al-Kubra (The Great Guidance). The Alawi community has however kept fragmenting as each faction began following its own ‘door’ or Sayyid. Although traditionally referred to as Nussairis, after the ‘door’ of Imam Hasan al-Askari, as mentioned earlier, it was the French mandate in Syria following the First World War, which not only popularised the term Alawis, as per their own preference too, but also helped bring them into power in Damascus from their remote mountainous hideouts.

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8. THE MALAISE WITHIN It seems to be no accident that in the present day world, the blessed religion of Islam, despite being guided by Allah’s eternal revelations and having been nurtured by a Prophet specifically chosen to convey the divine message, appears deeply fragmented, not only on religious lines, but more dangerously, on political ones. Politics, or more accurately the lust for power, has always cast lengthening shadows on the natural evolution of any divine religion. Islam couldn't prevent Muslim armies from clashing with each other in the batdes of Jamal and Siffin, barely 30 years before the esteemed Prophet had taken his last breath, despite clear strictures to the contrary. Religion couldn't prevent triple caliphates from existing at the same time (centred around Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba), despite the Quranic plea for unity; religion couldn't prevent Muslim rulers fighting Muslim rulers, brothers fighting brothers for glory in die vast Indian sub­ continent; religion couldn't prevent the Arabs from siding with the British and the French against the only surviving Muslim caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. In even more recent times, though religion may have encouraged the break-up of India in 1947, it couldn't prevent the break-up of Pakistan barely 24 years later. Religion may be an opiate for die masses, but it has been ruthlessly abused by rulers to stamp dieir own personal authority over the empire. Lust for power has always trumped faith. Amidst all this push for glory, the clergy has been a willing abettor. As Thomas Jefferson put it: “In every country and in every age, the priest has been hostile to liberty; he is always in allegiance to the despot, abetting liis abuses in return for protection of liis own”. Despite what All bin Abi Talib (ra) had said about religion being learned, and not inherited, the fact is diat most of us stick to the belief system we were born with. The more rigid one is by temperament, the more vehemently he clings to his inherited set of beliefs. Most religious scholars too, regrettably, don't substantially deviate from their inborn beliefs even as they move towards the progressive attainment of knowledge. Such scholars tend to look at knowledge merely as an instrument of consolidating one’s existing beliefs and refuting diose held by others, rather than as a path towards soul-searching and spiritual enhancement. 32

DIVERSITY OE ISl AMIC II l( H J( il IT: ( ()MIN< i I ( ) 1I I'M', >1 lip It stands to reason that a genuine change in ihc forniiH faith of Islam can only come about if people at all lrv»'T. d' 7' "P G ' capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. 'This is ccriainly po* •Jr/1' the current digital age, as a multitude of religious oils opinions