[Dissertation] Victory in Red: An Analysis of the Red Commanders in the Southern Front in the Russian Civil War 1918-1919

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VICTORY IN RED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RED COMMANDERS ON THE

SOUTHERN FRONT OF THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 1918-19 19

Curtis S. King A DISSERTATION in History Presented to die Faculties o f die University o f Pennsylvania in Partial Fu lfillm en t o f die Requirements for the Degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy 1999

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Dedication To ray parents, George and Cecelia King, with love. Thanks for teaching me die importance o f education and learning.

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ABSTRACT VICTORY IN RED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RED COMMANDERS ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT OF THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 1918-1919 Curtis S. King Supervised by Dr. Alfred J. Rieber This diesis attempts to demonstrate that die Red military commanders in south Russia during die Civil W ar were competent and skillful operational leaders. As such, it attempts to correct die majority o f Russian Civil War literature, which portrays the Red commanders as hopelessly outclassed by their White counterparts. In short, the 'problem' (or question) is to determine the quality o f die Red commanders, and thus to assess their contribution to die ultimate Red victory. In order to examine this question, this diesis focuses on die orders and directives o f die Red Army relating to the forces fighting in south Russia in 1918 and 1919. Using this data, and a definition o f operational skill for commanders derived from Clausewitz and other sources, die results point to a surprisingly high level o f skill for die Red commanders in the south. The Red commandos proved to be a varied group of operational leaders, not unlike most groups o f military commanders found in war. In any case, these comm andos were certainly die equal—if not the better—o f their White opponents. These results, at a minimum, ask us to reconsider die popular notion that the Bolshevik victory was pie-determined by a Red superiority in strength and resources that overcame a weakness in m ilitary leadership— certainly die skill o f die Red military leaders made a major contribution to the Bolshevik's ultimate triumph.

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Table o f Contents Dedication

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Abstract

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Table o f Contents

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l is t o f Tables

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List o f Maps

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Chapter One: Introduction

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Chapter Two: Building an Army

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Chapter Three: Early Fighting in die South

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Chapter F our The Whites Attack

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Chapter Five: The August Counter Offensive

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Chapter Six: Orel and Voronezh: Victory in October

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Chapter Seven: Denouement and Conclusion

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Appendix: Biographies o f Key Red M ilitary Leaders

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Bibliography

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T.ist o f Tables

Table 1: Soviet Political and Military Organization in die Civil W ar

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Table 2: The Republic Rew oensoviet, Glavkom, and Military Staff

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Table 3: Overall Red Army Strengths

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Table 4: Southern Front Organization, October 1918

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Table 5: Southern Front Organization, April 1919

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Table 6: Southern Front Organization, July 1919

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Table 7: Southern Front Strengths as o f 15 July 1919

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Table 8: Southern Front Organization for die August 1919 Counter Offensive

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Table 9: Red Forces in South Russia for the October 1919 Counter Offensive

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T.tut o f Map«

M ap 1: General Map o f Terrain in South Russia

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M ap 2: Terrain in the Kuban

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Map 3: Taman Expedition

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M ap 4: Terrain in die Tsaritsyn Campaigns

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M ap 5: First White Assault on Tsaritsyn, July-September 1918

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Map 6: Second and Third White Assaults on Tsaritsyn, September 1918 to February 1919

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Map 7: Red Offensive Towards Rostov, Spring 1919

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Map 8: White Offensives as per the Moscow Directive

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Map 9: The Soviet August Counter Offensive, 1919

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Map 10: The Soviet Orel-Voronezh Offensive, October 1919

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Chapter One Introduction All Communists first and foremost, all sympathizers with diem, all honest workers and peasants, all Soviet officials, must display m ilitary efficiency and concentrate to the m axim um th eir work, their efforts and their concern directly on the tasks o f w ar, on die speedy repulse o f Denikin’s onslaught, curtailing and rearranging all their other activities in subordination to this task. V. L Lenin, July 19191 Lenin’s ringing call for an “all out effort” against the White Armies o f General Anton Denikin in the Russian Civil War is hardly a unique document. Throughout the war, the determined leader of die Bolsheviks frequently harangued his civilian and military subordinates with calls for vigorous efforts against the forces that threatened to topple the new Bolshevik regime. Perhaps, as historian Richard Pipes has suggested, Lenin’s role in die war was “largely confined to sending alarmist messages to frontline commanders and commissars.”2 Possibly, the Bolshevik leader’s instructions are a manifestation o f die Red leadership’s lack o f strategic and operational coherence. And yet Lenin’s appeal for the struggle against Denikin, like so many o f his other messages, is indicative of a salient, but largely overlooked, factor of the Civil War—the tremendous effort, and success, o f die Bolsheviks and their military commanders on the battlefield. Lenin’s own emphasis on the terms “m ilitary efficiency” and “tasks o f war” points to die importance o f conventional military operations in the Bolshevik victory. The Russian Civil War, like most historical events, defies easy analysis. There are numerous “schools” o f scholarship, which attempt to explain the causes, course, and results o f the war. One o f die most contentious questions, which these varied schools

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attempt to answer, is: Why did die Reds win? Despite die diversity o f answers, many o f which were inspired by Cold War polemics and personal political agendas, almost all scholars o f the war—Russian and Western, left and right—emphasize a combination of political, social, and economic reasons for die Bolshevik triumph. For Richard Pipes, generally conservative and particularly harsh on die Bolshevik leadership, the Red victory "was largely a foregone conclusion, given its immense superiority in manpower and war material and die advantages o f its geopolitical situation.”3 Pipes concedes that White strategic mistakes (no mention o f Red strategic skill) may have hastened their downfall, but "objective” elements doomed the Whites to defeat regardless o f military operations. William Henry Chamberlin, a Western liberal not altogether unsympathetic with the Bolshevik regime, argues that a "number o f factors, psychological, political, economic and geographical, must be taken into consideration” when discussing the Bolshevik success.4 In his The Russian Revolution. 1918-1921. which continues to be one of the most incisive portrayals o f the Civil War, Chamberlin briefly touches upon military considerations under his rubric o f "geographical” factors, but his focus is on the "psychological” issues that brought the bulk o f the Russian population over to the Bolshevik cause thanks to the appeal o f "the crude strength of a fresh young ruling class.”3 In addition to these Western scholars o f disparate political hues, we can add the views of a Marxist, and the father o f the Red Army himself, Leon Trotsky. In his introduction to How the Revolution Armed. Trotsky argues that the success o f the Red Army was built on a triad: a true concept (socialism), a stable regime (the Bolshevik party), and agitation (the winning o f die peasant to the Bolshevik cause).6 Among the

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numerous Marxist views o f the war, one might reasonably expect that Trotsky—the architect o f the Red victory, a firm believer in the efficacy o f using professionally trained officers, and avowed opponent o f ‘guerrilla-ism’—would be most inclined to give credit to the strategic and operational skills o f the Red commanders for die Bolshevik victory. Yet Trotsky, like Pipes and Chamberlin, saw the Red triumph largely in terms o f social, political, and economic factors. One o f die best syntheses o f the myriad o f influences on the Russian Civil War appeared in a seminal article by Leopold Haimson in Slavic Review. Haimson argues that the “vertiginous upturns and downturns in the fortunes o f the major political protagonists o f die civil war” stemmed from the fact that the war "encompassed, to a degree unprecedented since the Time o f Troubles, processes o f disintegration and reintegration o f die very fabric o f Russian society.”7 He goes on to assert that it was the Bolshevik skill in state building, “even more than fighting and terror,” that won die war for the Reds.8 Social reintegration, state building, Bolshevik party discipline, terror, propaganda, geography, White disunity—all o f these reasons must be taken into account in explaining the Bolshevik triumph, but in the final analysis wars are fought and won on the battlefield. The standard histories o f the Civil War have slighted or ignored actual military operations, and no scholarly evaluation has been made o f the Red commanders' contribution to the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War. This lack o f historical analysis complicates the problem o f evaluating the many interpretations o f the Red victory. Indeed, the Red commanders’ operational skill may rank high among these

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factors—few wars have ever been won by mediocre commanders. The purpose o f this work is to help fill die existing void.

L Scope.

An attempt to examine the skills o f Red commanders in every campaign o f the Civil War lies beyond the scope o f this dissertation. Thus, before delving further into the historiography o f the war, it is necessary to establish two critical dimensions o f this study. First is the geographic (and related temporal) limits o f the study. Second is what current military doctrine refers to as the "operational level o f war", on which this examination will focus. Both o f these dimensions deserve further explanation. The major campaigns o f die war can be identified by geographic region: the northwest, north, east, west, Ukraine, and south. O f these campaigns, the thrust in the east by the White Dictator and former tsarist Admiral, Alexander Kolchak, and the offensive in the south led by Denikin represented the greatest threats to die Bolshevik regime.9 Historians have often asked: which was the greater threat to the new Soviet state, Kolchak or Denikin? The Bolshevik leadership itself offered conflicting views on this subject Early in the war, the Red high command placed the priority o f effort on the struggle against Kolchak, and later, the focus was shifted to Denikin's forces. In fact, during most o f the summer o f 1919, die Soviet leadership was tom between placing its main effort in the east or south. Given the changing nature o f the participants’ perceptions, I am inclined to side with scholars who view Denikin's forces as the major

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military threat o f the war. The situation in the east may have posed die greatest relative danger to the Bolsheviks in 1918 when the fledgling Red Army was a scattering o f disorganized and untrained units. However, the 1919 campaign in south Russia, as noted by Chamberlin, demonstrated that the Red Army's improvement in organization had been matched by "a corresponding gain in organized strength on the side o f die Whites." Historian Evan Mawdsley agrees and asserts that during Denikin’s 1919 offensive “antiBolshevik potential reached its peak, and Soviet power was certainly gravely threatened.”10 Instead o f a series o f isolated clashes along a broken and extended front, the southern campaign presented a pattern o f set battles that revealed operational skills on both sides. An examination o f the fighting in south Russia in 1919 offers an outstanding opportunity to explore the abilities o f the Red commanders when their White opponents were at die height o f their military powers. In addition to focusing on one region o f the war, this paper will concentrate on one level of war—the operational level. Later in this chapter, I will discuss the operational level and operational art in some detail, but for now it will suffice to give a simple model that delineates the level o f commanders that this paper will examine. Modem United States Army doctrine divides warfare into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. As will be noted later, defining these levels involves a complex mixture o f subjects; however, one o f the most basic parameters—the size o f the units involved in the fighting—will serve to illustrate the focus of this paper. Normally, the strategic level o f war involves the highest level o f die armed forces. It discusses die entire military structure in multiple theaters and its integration with the political

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leadership. The operational level usually involves army groups, armies, and corps. The tactical level consists o f the employment o f the smallest level o f forces: divisions, brigades, and all units below brigade level By focusing on the operational level this paper will concentrate on the Red commanders at the Front (army group), army, corps, and strike group (also equivalent to a corps) level I have selected die operational level for three reasons. First, historians have already focused on the strategic level o f die Red command; many existing studies attribute the Bolshevik victory to the ability o f the Reds’ highest political leadership, especially the disciplined Com m unist Party, to coordinate all o f the resources o f the state towards a single objective. Second, although there is a lack o f works in English on both the tactical and operational aspects o f the Civil War, remaining at die operational level allows for consideration o f political economic, and social factors which had such a crucial impact on the war. A tactical focus has limited applications to individual batdes, while an operational analysis allows one to look at an entire campaign and the impact o f factors from both the tactical and strategic levels. Finally, I must admit a personal fascination with leadership at the operational level where commanders can exercise considerable initiative within the broad constraints o f strategic objectives.

II. Historiography: General

With the above parameters in mind, it is useful to return to the historiography o f the Russian Civil War and examine die approaches o f the major works in two categories:

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die more general historical writings and those with a specific military focus. Within both categories, there is a mixture o f Soviet and western accounts (to include Russian emigres) that—whatever die political orientation o f die author—usually reflect a negative view o f die Red military performance or ignore it altogether. First, we will examine die more general works on die Civil War. Any reader familiar with Soviet historical literature will not be surprised to find that the changing political leadership o f die Soviet Union heavily influenced their historiography o f the Civil War. The earliest scholarly efforts were relatively open to diverse opinions, though dominated by Marxist-Leninist interpretations. Stalin’s rise to power led to a precipitous drop in the quality of work on the Civil War to the point where authors could do little more than praise the efforts o f the Soviet dictator. With Khrushchev in power in the 1950s, much o f die writing on the Civil War reversed course and attacked Stalin and his "'cult o f personality.” Whatever the twists and turns o f the historiography in the Soviet Union, almost all of these works reflect, not surprisingly, an interpretation o f Marxism that stresses economic, social, and political factors in the Red victory. Trotsky's How the Revolution Armed was one o f the earliest Soviet works on the Civil War. These volumes are primarily a collection o f Trotsky’s documents from the war. Although many o f die documents are directed to military units, the vast majority o f die messages discuss political, organizational, supply, and morale issues. As noted earlier, Trotsky’s introduction lists political and social factors as die key elements o f the Red victory. Overall, Trotsky barely touched on operational issues.11

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Soon after die publication o f Trotsky's collection, a group o f Soviet editors wrote the first “'official history” o f the Civil War, G razhdanskava Voina 1918-1921. Completed in 1926, this three volume set is remarkably frank in its opinions and lacks die heavy political bias that characterized later works (although Trotsky’s role receives noticeably little mention). For a general history o f the Civil War, these volumes contain a considerable amount o f military detail, including several chapters devoted to operational topics. In any case, a traditional Marxist-Leninist view o f history dominates this account. For example, in the forward o f the second volume the author writes: “■Passing through the severe crucible o f the class war that was the Civil War, the vast majority o f the Red soldiers understood the full sweep o f the October Revolution and became international fighters.”12 While the editors give credit to the key Red military victories at Orel and Voronezh, they warn that “we should not however over estimate the importance o f this victory.”13 On one hand, this volume emphasizes the political wisdom and social cohesion o f the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the workers, while on the other hand, it stresses the political and social weaknesses o f the Whites, "due essentially to the very nature o f his [Denikin's] own governmental and military system." Occasionally, the official history refers to the performance o f Red commanders; for example, there is a critique o f Vasilii Shorin’s role in the August 1919 counter offensive.14 However, in this case as in others, the official history minimizes the commanders’ operational abilities and emphasizes the role o f “party organizations" and “political activity” in the campaigns.

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Even with its occasionally narrow M arxist focus, this early Soviet history remains a superb source o f information and generally reflects solid scholarship. The same cannot be said for works o f die Stalinist period. The m ajor publication o f this period was the 'new* official history o f die Civil War, published from 1938 to 1947 and edited in part by Maxim Gorky as well as Stalin's cronies Kliment Voroshilov and Viacheslav Molotov.15 As one might expect, this version of the official history credits Stalin for developing the winning strategy on most o f the major fronts o f the war while failing to mention Trotsky except as an enemy of the people. The distortions and misinformation in this work make it virtually worthless for serious scholars. After Stalin’s death, the Soviets did not publish any more 'official histories' o f the Civil War. Interest in the war seemed to wane, and Soviet accounts tended to focus on seizing power in October 1917 rather than on defending the revolution in 1918-1920.16 Since the opening of the former Soviet archives, Russian writers have not hesitated to attack old icons of the Soviet Union, but they rarely address the operational events o f die Civil War. For example, Dmitri VolkogonoVs solid trilogy o f biographies on Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin does not hesitate to take the Soviet leaders to task on many issues.17 However, he is mostly critical o f their political actions and rarely looks at the operational performance o f the Red commanders. A common theme in general Soviet and Russian literature on the Civil War is a tendency to minimize the role played by the Red commanders in the Bolshevik victory. Even the more balanced and accurate Soviet works that were not debilitated by Stalin's influence focus their explanation for the Red victory on class antagonisms and the

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superiority o f die Bolsheviks in recognizing the economic, social, and political conditions in Russia. Later post Soviet writers often attacked the Soviet political leaders and their Marxist philosophy. In almost all cases, the Red commanders are reduced to a secondary role and not worthy o f a detailed operational analysis. Turning to Western scholarship on Civil War, one notices similar tendencies. Fortunately, western writers have not labored under die type o f heavy handed control that Stalin wielded over many Soviet writers. And while individual scholars may have been biased by their political views, western works—taken as a whole—reflect a wide array o f political, social, and economic perspectives on the war. Nonetheless, almost all o f the western histories, like those o f die Soviets, ignore or minimize the role o f the Red commanders. Like the aforementioned Chamberlin, Paul M iliukov published one o f die earlier English language works to cover the Civil War, volume three o f his History o f Russia. Miliukov, a famous Russian historian, was a member o f the Provisional Government that ruled Russia before being ousted by the Bolsheviks in October 1917. After the Civil War, Miliukov remained active in emigre circles in France and returned to writing history. Despite his heavy involvement in the White movement, Miliukov wrote a relatively balanced account In his book, the author listed four reasons for the Red victory in the w ar.18 According to Miliukov, the most important factor was the social dimension—the ability o f the Bolsheviks to appeal to the masses, especially the peasants, through their land program. His other reasons included economic (the attraction o f the food regions in the South to Red soldiers attacking towards that direction), political (the

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disagreements among die White leaders and inability to secure die support o f die nationalities), and military factors. Under his limited discussion o f military elements, Miliukov gave some credit to the Red officers as well as noting the advantage o f holding a central position in die heart o f Russia Although Miliukov offered this modest praise for die Red Army leadership, he did not analyze the campaigns in any depth. Edward Hallett Carr’s seminal three volume set, The Bolshevik Revolution. 1917-1923. gives prominence to state building (including the nationalities question), economics, and international relations. The author credits the Red victory to the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state which were able to mobilize and control all o f die resources needed for a Red victory.19 Although Carr never describes the campaigns o f die war, his third volume touches on the building o f the Red Army.20 He mentions that die Bolsheviks were compelled to abandon their idealistic Marxist concept o f a m ilitia style armed force as Trotsky turned more and more to the ■‘bricks and foundation-stones” o f the old regime in constructing a professional Red Army. Aside from this short passage, Carr does not discuss military matters. Another general approach to the war is David Footman’s Civil War in Russia. Footman does not believe that a Red victory in the Civil War was inevitable. The author uses the Duke of Wellington’s famous words to describe the Civil War as “a damned near thing.”21 In his conclusion, Footman argues that the military skills on both sides were about equal, and unlike many other authors he does not believe that the Reds had a significant numbers advantage because they never really won over the loyalty of the peasantry—the main source o f soldiers for both sides. For die main part, Footman credits

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die ruthlessness and discipline of die Bolshevik party for die Red success.22 In his chapter on the southern campaigns, die author adds that the Whites were exhausted and their plans too ambitious for their fatally flawed political system. The final Red counter offensive took advantage o f this weakness and turned the tide in October 1919.23 W. Bruce Lincoln’s Red Victory asserts that die key to victory was die ability of the state and party to pull together all of the resources needed to win the struggle.24 hi fact, Lincoln's work is most concerned with the way in which die Civil War centralized power in the Communist party and created a society “permeated with illegality,” thus allowing die Reds to demand resources at will and with ruthless efficiency. When looking at the campaign in the south, Lincoln argues that the Reds offered a positive, unified program against the unclear, and sometimes disparate political goals o f the Whites.23 He also emphasizes die inability of the Whites to appease national groups (especially the Cossacks) and mismanagement in Denikin’s rear which often gave the appearance to the peasants that Denikin represented a return to the rule of the landlords of the old tsarist regime. Although Lincoln’s book considers factors that effect the operational level o f war (for example, the matching o f resources with goals), it contains relatively little detail on the operational maneuvers o f the armies. Historian Peter Kenez contends that the Civil War was not a military contest, but a political one in which each side tried to impose its will on a reluctant population.26 In Civil War in South Russia. Kenez’s central argument is that the Whites—almost exclusively military men—failed to build the political institutions that would have enabled

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them to sway that reluctant population. He rarefy mentions the actual battles on die southern front Finally among die general histories o f the War, Evan Mawdsley’s The Russian Civil War takes a notably different tack from all o f die books mentioned so far. Mawdsley writes that he makes “no apology” for discussing die armies and campaigns and that the Civil War was ultimately decided by force o f arms.27 Unlike die vast majority o f historians, Mawdsley argues that die Reds did not win for social and political reasons; they did not win over the mass of the peasantry (nor for that matter, the workers), did not create a “mass democracy,” and did not control die war effort with an all powerful political party.28 The crucial factor in die R ed's favor, according to die author, was control o f die Russian heartland, Savdepia, which not only gave the Bolsheviks control o f most o f die population, industry, finances, and communications network o f the former Imperial Empire but also permitted the Red Army to give up ground to the invading White armies without facing complete collapse. In fact, Mawdsley contends that this advantage o f central position was the chief ‘m ilitary' reason for die Red victory and that the Red strategies employed in the war were merely improvised reactions to die White advances. Although professing that military factors were crucial to the war, the author goes on to stress the well known White political and social weaknesses: poor civilian leadership, weak political appeal, the nationalities problem, and White misrule in their rear areas.29 As for die events in the southern campaign, Mawdsley writes that Denikin’s disorganized rear was “the real military Achilles heel” o f die White effort30 Again his use of die term ‘m ilitary’ is somewhat

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inappropriate; this becomes clear when the author agrees with Denikin’s own assessment that the failure on hie southern front was political and not strategic. In sum, Mawdsley covers hie cam paigns in more detail than most authors, but he is critical o f the Soviet military leadership and sees reasons other than hie Red commanders’ operational skill for the Bolshevik triumph. Although technically not considered 'general' histories, several biographical works on key figures o f the war offer excellent insights. It is interesting to note that there are no biographies o f Red Civil War commanders in English; Western biographers have focused exclusively on the famous Red political leaders or on hie White political and military leaders.31 Even so, it is worthwhile to examine two o f the more important biographies of Civil War. hi his classic biography of Trotsky, Isaac Deutscher praised hie Red War Commissar for his organizational skills and energy while taking a balanced view of Trotsky’s strategic skills. The author contends that the Reds had the advantage of central position, but that the Whites might still have won if they had coordinated their offensives.32 Thus, he implies that White disunity-political and military—was an important factor in the Red triumph. Deutscher recognized that hie constant shifting of Red reserves to different fronts inevitably caused friction over strategy, but he only examined these controversies as they impacted on Trotsky and did not look at the operational struggle. Dimitry Lehovich’s White Against Red is a biography o f General Denikin and naturally views hie war from the White perspective. Lehovich believes that Denikin was

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not at fault for the defeat because die Whites simply had too many disadvantages to overcome.33 Among those disadvantages were partisan uprisings in the White rear, separatist Cossack movements, looting and poor discipline among the troops, insufficient Allied aid, and the W hite's inability to address die land question. Lehovich defends Denikin's controversial “Moscow Directive,” the plan for the White offensive in the summer o f 1919, but he is somewhat critical of the White leaders’ use of cavalry. The author does not touch on the Red military leadership, preferring instead to grant an advantage to the Bolsheviks in their use of tenor and propaganda. To sum up the general Western scholarship, these authors, like their Soviet and Russian counterparts, focus almost unswervingly on the social, political, and economic reasons for the Red triumph, in those few cases where m ilitary skill is given some role, the Red commanders are usually portrayed as less than skillful, and rarely do any works on die Civil War go into operational depth. This view might best be expressed in one o f the more recent works on die Civil War, Behind the Front I.mes o f the Civil War, by Vladimir N. Brovkin. In this examination o f the political and social movements in the war, Brovkin writes, “the White armies overran territory but not the minds o f the citizens. They did not manage to unite the people. . . . Therein lay the cause of the Red tide, not in Budennyi’s [sic] cavalry attack in November 1919.34 Most authors seem inclined to agree with Brovkin.

DX Historiography: Military.

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There are few works on die Russian Civil War that have a military focus, especially at the operational leveL Soviet and Russian writers have produced die majority o f those exceptional volumes that look at operational campaigns o f the Civil War. Most Western scholars o f military affairs have focused on the larger issue o f the creation Red Army in which die campaigns o f the Civil War are just one part. In either case, military histories o f the Russian Civil W ar have remarkably little detail about the operational fighting and often revert back to explaining the Red victory in terms o f political and social factors. One o f those Soviet 'exceptions' to the lack o f operational detail is N. E. Kakurin’s KakSrazhalas ’Revolutsiva. hi the introduction, Kakurin sets his “modest task” as to examine die m ilitary events o f the war in relation to “contemporary economic and political conditions.”33 Thus, despite Kakurin's exemplary military detail, he subordinates strategy and operations to political and economic factors. He insists that the Red victory was due first to the worker-peasant link claiming that the Bolshevik peasant policy was the “basic material reason” for their triumph, and second to moral reasons such as revolutionary enthusiasm and a secure rear area.36 Even when discussing military reasons, especially in south Russia, Kakurin continues to focus on other factors such as the conflict between Denikin and the Cossacks which disrupted White attempts to build a unified strategy. The author hints that the Whites might have even been better military commanders than the Reds when he argues that the lack of mass support from the peasants doomed die Whites to only temporary success in the south despite the “individual talents o f its leaders.”37

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Soviet memoirs from the period prior to Stalin's assumption o f dictatorial powers reflect die same candor and openness o f die official history and Kakurin’s work. However, they often suffer from die habitual drawback o f memoir literature: they are biased in an attempt to justify and magnify die author’s role in the events in which he participated. For example, die commander o f the Southern Front during the crucial Red counterattack in October 1919, Alexander Egorov, published his account o f the fighting on die Southern Front, Razprom Denikina 1919. in 1931. It is free o f gratuitous praise for Stalin while still making die obligatory reference to Marxist history: “The will o f the proletariat towards victory will remain unchanged and in that will there will remain a glaring class antagonism between the working classes and the bourgeoisie.”3* He also analyzes operational matters such as criticizing Denikin for stretching his forces too far in the offensive towards Moscow. Egorov shows surprising frankness by admitting that “chance” played a role in bringing Budenny’s Cavalry Corps into the right position at Voronezh, but he is still apt to give him self too much credit for developing the overall plan for the counter offensive.39 During Stalin’s rule, Soviet writers were forced to attribute virtually all o f die Reds’ operational success to die Com m unist chief. Articles and books by Stalin's obsequious supporters, in particular old cronies like Voroshilov and Budenny, merely praised their leader's ability to anticipate all White maneuvers and to counter them with near perfect Marxist-Leninist plans. These works, like the general histories dominated by Stalin's influence, have little value for die reader in search o f unbiased views o f the Reds' operational plans and actions.40

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After Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s “secret speech,” Soviet writers began to publish monographs attacking Stalinist interpretations o f the Civil War. One o f die most effective of these is S. N. Shishkin’s “O planakh bor'by s armei DenikincT which was published in Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhum al in 1963. Shishkin, who was also one o f die editors o f the four volume set o f Front Directives, launches a spirited attack on die “strong influence o f Stalin’s cult o f personality.”41 The author’s sharpest barbs are reserved for Voroshilov’s piece entitled “Stalin I Krasnaya ArmiycT in which, notes Shishkin, the high command’s plan for a counter offensive on the Southern Front is simply labeled as “criminal” or ‘Trotskyite’ without any real analysis. While articles such as Shishkin’s are a much needed corrective to the Stalinist literature, this reaction still failed to produce a more comprehensive evaluation o f the Red commanders’ operational skills. Most current Russian scholarship on the Civil seems inspired by a desire to discredit die entire Communist system, and in most cases, Russian historians are eschewing the military aspects o f the war for more controversial political and social topics. A major exception is A. G. Kavtaradze’s Voennve Spetsialistv Na Sluzhbe Resoubliki Sovietov 1917-1920. which was published just prior to the collapse o f the Soviet Union. This book is an outstanding work devoted to the study o f the former tsarist officers who fought in the Civil War. Kavtaradze recognizes the key contribution made by the “military specialists” to the Bolshevik victory although he is inclined to give Lenin too much credit for seeing “the necessity o f utilizing the cultural heritage o f capitalism in the interests o f building socialism” when making use o f the former tsarist officers.42 The

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author undertakes a detailed analysis o f die Red officers as a social group—their backgrounds, education, military experience, and attitudes—but he does not examine their campaigns nor critique their operational competence. Turning to Western and emigre works with a military focus, most authors ignore die Red operational performance or, in passing, minimize die skills o f die Red commanders. Most often, the theme is that the White military commanders may have made mistakes but they fought heroically against overwhelming odds. The Red commanders are rarely given credit for a significant role in die Bolshevik victory. General Denikin’s own account o f the campaigns in the south, The White Armv. stresses the importance o f political over military factors despite the fact that he was a military man himself. Perhaps this is not surprising because by stressing the political difficulties of the Whites, Denikin can deflect the blame attached to his operational and strategic decisions. In any case, the White leader writes that in “civil war, more than in any other, the moral element is paramount.”43 Denikin believes that the Whites were unable to win this moral battle because die “solution o f the agrarian problem—the pivot of all others was hedged in with insurmountable obstacles.”44 Consequently, when the Whites made their major military move towards Moscow in 1919, die offensive depended on the question: “had the masses o f the people sufficiently outlived Bolshevism” and would they come over to the White camp? Denikin states that the answer was “in the negative.”43 I do not wish to imply that Denikin’s account is a social or political history: he does cover some of the campaign in detail But his military narrative is from the

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White perspective, and his conclusions clearly indicate that it was not Red military skill that won the war. Although there is not a monograph devoted exclusively to die Red Army's operations in the Civil War, there are numerous works on die Red Army that include die Civil W ar years as part o f their narratives. One o f die earliest o f these, and still an excellent book, is D. Fedotoff White’s The Growth o f the Red Armv. White argues that in order to win the war, die Reds had to overcome the inherent conflict between die party's ideology and the desire to create a conventional army that would need to draw on reluctant peasants and former tsarist officers in order to be successful He contends that it was Communists—in the form o f the commissars at the officer level and party cadres at the enlisted level—that enabled the Bolsheviks to resolve their dilemma.46 W hite’s argument implies that the former tsarist officers must have had some skill and he gives passing credit to two Red commanders, S. S. Kamenev and P. P. Lebedev. However, White’s book is more concerned with the origins and education of the Red officers rather than their effectiveness on the battlefield. Malcolm Mackintosh echoes many o f White’s views in his book, Juggernaut. Mackintosh also believes that Communist cadres were crucial to the Red victory, and he argues even more strenuously that the Reds needed the services o f the military specialists (die name given by the Bolsheviks to former tsarist officers fighting for the Reds).47 Unfortunately, Mackintosh does not devote enough effort to describing the campaigns that would justify his opinion o f die Red commanders’ contributions.

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A book that concentrates more on die White side o f die southern Russia campaign is George Brinkley’s The V olunteer Armv and Allied Intervention in South Russia. 19171921. Brinkley asserts that die battlefield was o f secondary importance to die political issues o f the war, and his thesis is that disunity, both among the Whites and with die A llies, doomed the White cause.48 He adds that the White policies were unfairly

characterized as tsarist and reactionary, and these characterizations, when used by the Reds as propaganda, hurt the White efforts. From die military perspective, Brinkley criticizes Denikin for an inability to coordinate his movements with Kolchak, but the author lacks a detailed assessment o f the Red commanders.49 Two works that examine the White movement and its campaigns on all o f the fronts are George Stewart’s The White Armies of Russia and Richard Luckett’s The White Generals. Stewart argues that the war was a struggle o f ‘"ideas, slogans, social theories and political shibboleths” as much as a fight between soldiers.30 In this struggle, Stewart claims that the Bolsheviks were effective at using propaganda to sway the populace—the key to their victory. As for the campaign on the southern front, Stewart lists many of the reasons for the White defeat mentioned by other authors: White disunity, Cossack separatism, reactionary White land policies, and the harsh foraging of the White troops. He contends that the White lines were stretched to the breaking point just prior to the Red offensive in October 1919, thus implying that White political mistakes made die Red military victory a simple task.51 Luckett contrasts the lack o f political and military unity o f the Whites with the “decisive factor” of a unified Bolshevik party.52 As far as military skill was concerned,

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the author argues that the Reds made more mistakes than the Whites. When writing on the southern theater, Luckctt blames Denikin for the corruption of his political and logistic administration. He also faults the Whites fen- their failure to make full use of die Cossacks thanks to die tsarist generals’ misguided political policy of Russian nationalism.23 Turning to die Red perspective, many historians recognize John Erickson’s The Soviet High Command as die standard work on die formation o f die Red Army’s highest leadership. Erickson focuses on the high commanders' relations with die Communist (Bolshevik) party and die Soviet state. Erickson recognizes that the Civil War was unique—a new style o f revolutionary war in which die political work in the rear was as critical as the fighting.34 Additionally, Erickson argues that the Bolshevik leadership felt that the political loyalty o f die army was an “absolute” requirement and that military efficiency could, at times, be sacrificed if necessary to retain that loyalty.33 The author does posit that some “not inconsiderable” talent emerged from among the Red commanders o f die Civil War, but Erickson does not describe any o f the campaigns in detail36 Erickson's analysis is outstanding at the military-political level, but his evaluation o f die Red commanders' operational skills is limited. Among Western historians who examine the Reds, Albert Seaton makes die most extensive use o f die published collection o f Glavkom and Front directives.37 Seaton does a creditable job o f explaining selected operations on die southern front, but he only examines the campaigns in which Stalin played a major role, principally die fight for Tsaritsyn, hi addition, Seaton is primarily focused on explaining Stalin’s role in these

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campaigns. The author's comments on the other Red leaders, especially the military commanders, is limited and expressed only in terms o f their connection with Stalin. Overall, die literature o f die Civil War—general and military, Soviet and Western, emigre and recent Russian—stresses non military factors in the Red victory over the Whites. M ost works see the Bolshevik triumph as an inevitable result o f political, social, and economic advantages in which Red commanders had little importance. Some scholars discuss military topics, but they often focus on White mistakes, die administrative steps taken to form the Red Army, or die effects o f the political controversies between Trotsky and Stalin. In short, most authors ignore the performance o f die Red commanders, denigrate their skills, or portray their efforts as a side story to the other major, non military, themes of the war. By examining the operational performance o f the Red commanders, we can discover whether their military skills were such a negligible factor as is portrayed in the vast majority o f works on the Russian Civil War. This is not meant to diminish the many and varied explanations for die Bolshevik victory that do not address operational, military issues. It is undeniable that the Reds had numerous advantages: particularly their geographic position, the political unity and focus o f die Bolshevik party, greater access to economic resources, and a larger manpower pool for their armed forces. Despite these advantages, the Reds had to create an army, and they needed commanders that could lead this army. How good were these commanders? Before turning to die answer o f this question, we need to address several other issues: the debate over military history, the use

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o f Russian (Soviet) sources, and parameters for measuring military skill at die operational leveL

IV. The "New" Military History and Sources.

One o f the reasons for the absence o f scholarly evaluations o f the Red Civil War commanders is that military history—especially operational and hattle' histories—seems to be out o f fashion in the historical community. An extensive examination o f the reasons for this phenomenon is beyond the scope o f this paper, but a brief look at the concept o f the "new" military history will help illustrate the struggle among military historians over the course and role o f their discipline. For many years, military history was simply the story o f battles—straight narratives, often over-dramatic and heroic—that have derisively been referred to as 'drum and trumpet' histories o f war. After World War Two, and more intensely in the 1960s, historians turned to a new form for the study o f war called simply, the 'new* military history. This form was a much needed addition to the old battle narratives, and it focused on the relationship between warfare, armies, politics, economics, and society. It looked largely in two directions: the effect o f society (including politics and economics) on the military, and the effect of wars on society. By the 1970s, military scholars were heavily focused on social issues and military institutions, and they rarely ventured into operational campaigns.

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Although die new military history provided an essential missing ingredient to die profession, its popularity may have detracted from die still essential need to include analyses o f battles, campaigns, and die performance o f military leaders. Several works have helped to correct this problem, two o f which stand out for their ability to integrate die new military history with a study o f battles and campaigns. First, John Keegan, in his brilliant introduction to The Face o f Batde. discusses die need to examine die actions of common soldiers on the battlefield in the overall context o f military history.38 His focus is tactical, and thus more concerned with the fighting soldiers than their commanders. However, Keegan presents a cogent argument for die need to include detailed examinations o f battles along with the socio-political views o f new military history. A second work that argues for the relevancy o f campaign analysis is Russell Weigley's Eisenhower*s Lieutenants59 Weigley has produced some o f the best works o f the new military history genre to include books on the institutional and organizational development "of American military thought." However in his preface to Eisenhower's Lieutenants. Weigley writes that: . . . it is to prepare for and to wage war that armies primarily exist, and for the military historian to fail to carry his studies from the political and social evolution o f peace to the test o f war is to leave his work grotesquely incomplete. A day's trial by battle often reveals more o f the essential nature o f the army than a generation o f peace.39 Clearly, Weigley believes that there is a significant utility to examining the performance o f an army in batde, and by implication, the performance o f its commanders. Perhaps, as one historian has suggested, there is a 'new new military history' which continues to analyze "armed forces in the context o f their matrices" while

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recognizing the legitimacy o f operational studies which are "no less intellectually legitimate than die analysis o f elections, bureaucracies, or gender consciousness."60 Like many historiographic debates, the arguments on all sides need not be mutually exclusive. The study o f battles and politics, campaigns and economics, commanders and society, are intertwined. Nonetheless, in the histories o f the Russian Civil War, operations and the role o f the Red commanders have taken a back seat to other aspects o f die war. This does not mean that addressing this vacancy in the literature should ignore or dimmish the importance o f other analyses. In short, there is a legitimate need for an examination o f Red Army operations and operational commanders in die Civil War, an examination that includes the context of political, economic, and social factors that also influenced the fighting. Another reason for die dominance o f non-military factors in the literature o f the war is die use and availability (or lack) o f source m aterial Historians have relied almost exclusively on the politically oriented documents of the Communist party, the socio­ economic material culled from statistical evidence, accounts from contemporary newspapers, and the post-war memoirs of the participants (mostly the Whites). As noted above, among Western historians, only Albert Seaton makes extensive use of the published collection o f Glavkom and Front directives. Yet, the directives, orders, teletype conversations, operational summaries, and intelligence reports o f the Red .Army’s units provide the key to understanding die competence o f the Red commanders. Scholars have had access to these collections since the 1960s, but historians seem reluctant to use these published sources. Perhaps Western historians mistrust documents published by the

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Soviets (although the Glavkom and Front directives contain accurate transcripts o f die original documents). On the other hand, Western scholars may have ju st found the sometimes bland operational directives o f Civil War commanders o f less interest than political documents, especially scholars writing at the height o f the Cold War. hi any case, the recent opening o f Russian Archives has now made available all o f the documents at die Glavkom, Front, and army leveL This new wealth o f material is fertile ground for the military historian.

IV. Commanders and the Operational Art.

As stated above, this paper focuses on Red commanders in south Russia who fought at the operational level o f war. hi order to assess their performance properly, we must look closely at the practice o f the operational art and also present some parameters that enable us to evaluate their skills. The term operational level o f war and the corresponding practice of the 'operational art,' have been topics o f considerable discussion within the academic community o f military historians, as well as contemporary theorists and doctrine writers in most modem armies. The discussion is further complicated by a mix o f terms, concepts, and theories that are often loosely connected with the operational level: maneuver warfare (vice attrition—or positional—warfare), battle of annihilation, strategic envelopment, indirect approach, deep battle, and blitzkrieg.6I All o f these terms have some relationship to the operational level o f war, but in many cases, authors have used

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these words to promote a doctrinal agenda without actually examining all implications o f the operational level o f war. Earlier in this chapter, I defined the levels o f war in basic terms of unit size. In fact, the levels o f war involve many other factors, and die United States Army currently employs definitions that provide a good starting point for die discussion of the many facets o f die levels o f war.62 First, the Army defines the strategic level as where a "nation or group o f nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives." It is the ’highest’ level of war in terms o f die amount o f forces and resources involved, and it demands die closest cooperation o f the political and military leadership o f the state. At the other end of the spectrum is the tactical level o f war in which "battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives . . . . " Tactics are the 'lowest1level of war in that units are usually small scale (division or less), and these units employ their techniques in close combat. The operational level of war fits between strategy and tactics, but it is more than just a term describing intermediate sized units. It is: The level o f war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas o f operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying re­ sources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension o f time or space than do tactics: they ensure the logistic and administrative support o f tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.63 As this definition implies, the operational level o f war is not just a step between tactics and strategy—it is an entire aspect o f warfare in which the military leadership fulfills the strategic objectives and political goals o f the nation. The practice o f the operational art

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connects a series o f individual battles in a theater, and when done correctly, it links die battles with a purpose towards accomplishing the strategic goal. One o f the reasons for the debate among historians and modem military professionals over the concept o f operational warfare is the relative 'newness' o f the idea. While strategy and tactics have been a part of military history and theory since the origins of ancient warfare, the operational level is a relatively recent construct. Part o f the historical problem is determining if the operational art was a concept being practiced throughout the history o f warfare—but without die formalized theory and terminology of "operations'' as an enunciated precept—or if the entire concept of the operational art is a recent phenomenon, attributable to theorists in the years between the World Wars. This is a fascinating debate, but, in its full details, is beyond the limits o f this paper. Even so, it is worth a brief look at the evolution o f the operational art in order to give the reader a better understanding o f this level of war. Although great commanders such as Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great all seemed to have had an intuitive understanding of the connection between victory in individual battles and the larger political goals o f warfare, many historians credit Napoleon as the first true practitioner of the operational art of war. One historian has gone so far as to say that "the rise o f this new type o f operational campaign can be one aspect that marks the beginning of modem war."64 The key reason for this claim is the advent of the corps system. David Chandler, Napoleon's greatest scholar, explains how each self contained corps advanced on separate routes, but along a "single line of operations."63 Prior to the Napoleonic era, armies tended to be one large

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collection o f small level units (in Frederick's day, nearly 100 regiments) that marched on a single road and usually fought one-day battles at a relatively small location. As both Epstein and Chandler emphasize, the corps was not just a minor structural change; it enabled commanders to think in terms o f multiple advances, dispersion, and subsequent concentration on die battlefield. Even so, Napoleon, more a practitioner than a theorist, relied heavily on his instincts, and though he may have exploited some aspects o f what we call today the 'operational art,' he and his contemporaries never formed an operational theory nor did they use the term 'operations' in their military lexicon. hi addition to providing opportunities for Napoleon, die French Revolution and wars o f Empire produced two o f die most brilliant military theorists in Western history: Antoine Henri Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.66 These two great thinkers captured many o f the elements of modem warfare that were demonstrated in die Napoleonic era, and they have provided soldiers with concepts and insights that are relevant today. O f the two, Clausewitz was the more philosophical He borrowed from Kant and Hegel and he wrote in a dialectic style. This sometimes obscure writing style, coupled with the fact that he died before being fully able to edit his work, make his classic, On War, both a difficult and rewarding read. Jomini was more precise and somewhat formulaic. Jomini's work focused more at the operational level than Clausewitz's sweeping strategic views, hi fact, Jomini frequently addressed what he called "grand tactics" which to a degree reflects the modem concept of operations. However, scholars generally agree that neither Clausewitz nor Jomini fully grasped the concept o f operations.67 Both theorists saw the benefits o f dispersed maneuver inherent

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in die corps system, and they both—particularly Clausewitz—emphasized that battles had to be fought in furtherance o f the political purpose o f war. But both men also clung to a popular Napoleonic concept—die single, decisive batde. Given the communication and transportation technology o f their day and the glamorous allure o f Napoleon’s decisive battles, it is hard to fault Jomini and Clausewitz for their belief that war can (and should) be decided in a single batde. Nonetheless, it remained for future theorists to realize that most modem wars entail fighting a series of battles over time and in great depth within the theater. Both Nineteenth Century theorists failed to see that operational level commanders need to link multiple battles into a coherent campaign and not just fight one great Austerlitz. Many historians have argued that after Napoleon and the great Nineteenth Century military theorists, it was the Germans that fully fleshed out the concept of the operational level o f war.68 This claim rests on a perceived link between von Moltke the Elder's classic victories over the Austrians in 1866 and French in 1870 to the great blitzkrieg triumphs in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. For many historians, that link passes through von Schieffen’s dream o f a modem day Cannae, Hiddenburg and LudendorfFs great victory at Tannenburg, von Seeckfs efforts to maintain a viable German Army during the 1920s, and Guderian’s attempt to build a armored and mechanized force in die 1930s. These scholars interpret a German consistency and mastery at the operational level through almost 100 years o f both victory and defeat. The contention that die Germans were die first to exploit die operational level o f war has some valid points, but it is not a complete explanation. From 1866 to 1942, the

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German Army achieved considerable success at the tactical and—in part—operational leveL However, this success is more attributable to factors other than a discovery or mastery o f die operational art Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff and Hitler all believed that Germany’s survival (in a two front war) depended on a quick victory. The Germans based their plans on a strategic concept (commit the vast majority o f forces on one front) and tactical techniques (penetration and/or encirclement) that would ensure victory on the battlefield. Even die highly successful batdes o f 1939-1941 demonstrated that the German concept o f war (coined as blitzkrieg by Western correspondents) was an ad hoc mixture o f concepts at various levels o f war. Strategically, blitzkrieg offered Hitler a chance for quick victories that did not tax the German economy and popular support for the Nazis. Tactically, the concentrated use o f tanks and tactical airpower gave the German forces the opportunity for the treasured breakthrough that was so difficult to achieve in World War One. Operationally, the Germans sought to exploit their tactical success with a massive battle o f encirclement—a concept not far removed from Napoleon and von Moltke. It worked in Poland and France, and it failed in Russia. From 1866 to 1942, the Germans demonstrated unparalleled skill at the tactical level and glaring weaknesses in strategy. As for the operational art, the German performance was mixed at best with little theoretical link between battlefield and political goals—the essence of operations. The real pioneers o f the operational art were the Soviets. After Russia’s mixed fortunes in wars o f the Nineteenth Century, defeat in World War One, and the Red victory in the Civil War, Soviet military leaders—many o f whom were former tsarist

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officers—seemed to draw upon both their successes and failures, and thus grasp the full time and distance factors o f the operational level o f war. One o f the best Soviet operational theorists was Alexander A. Svechin. Ironically, Svechin held an organizational and administrative position in die Civil War, and he did not command soldiers at die operational level. None die less, his extensive writings are tremendously insightful: Combat actions are not self-contained, but rather the basic material from which an operation is assembled. Only in very rare instances can one count on achieving the ultimate aim o f military operations by means o f a single procedure. Normally, this path to an ultimate aim is broken up into a series o f operations; the latter are separated in time, more or less, by considerable pauses o f various sectors o f die territory in a theater o f war. . . . We call an operation that act o f war in the course o f which troop efforts are directed, without any interruption, to a specific region in a theater o f military operations to achieve a specific intermediate aim.69 Svechin added that both tactical and operational victories needed to be linked together to achieve the strategic aim o f the war. He pointed to the ultimate failure—despite victories in individual battles—o f Ludendorff in World War One as an example o f the inability to grasp the connection between operations and strategy. Svechin's writings are truly remarkable for the breadth o f their scope and clarity o f understanding. Despite his perceptive observations, Svechin is largely unknown among Western military historians. Part o f the reason for this is the greater fame attached to his 'rival' as a Soviet military theorist, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. The contrast between these two men was considerable. Svechin was a former tsarist colonel who had attended the prestigious General Staff Academy. Tukhachevsky had also served in the Imperial Army, and he even had a touch o f nobility in his family background. However, he had

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only reached die rank o f lieutenant in World War One, and he was an early convert to die Bolshevik cause and a famous combat commander. Even in appearance, the two officers offered a contrast: the older Svechin with a close-cropped mustache and balding head, and the young Tukhachevsky with a shock o f jet-black hair and clean-shaven face. Despite die differences, Svechin and Tukhachevsky had remarkably similar views on operations.70 Some historians have portrayed Svechin as die great proponent o f defensive war, while Tukhachevsky is often painted as the prophet o f unremitting revolutionary offensive. In fact, both o f these far-sighted Soviet theorists understood the diversity o f the operational art, in particular die use o f "successive operations" to achieve a strategic goaL The brilliant Tukhachevsky, while certainly more offensively oriented than Svechin, demonstrated a depth o f understanding in his operational writings that went far beyond blind advocacy o f an all out attack. In his classic work. New Problems in Warfare, the future Soviet Marshal provided a penetrating analysis of the growth o f the operational art from Napoleon through von Moltke to the setbacks o f the Schlieffen plan and the First World War.71 With characteristic insight, Tukhachevsky separated the idea of a single, decisive batde from the possibility o f a decisive campaign consisting o f multiple engagements: "Battles in depth become possible, creating conditions for a new phase o f the military art which ensures the possibility o f inflicting a decisive, irreparable defeat upon the enemy forces." He envisioned the need to "take into account the distribution o f enemy forces on broad fronts, both along die front proper, as well as between his main combat zone and the deep rear."71 Consequently, Tukhachevsky

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sought not only to achieve die initial penetration o f the enemy’s front, but also the "successive destruction o f enemy echelons in depth." He was a visionary who believed in attacking die entire depth o f die opponent’s position, using deep strike forces, maintaining momentum, marshalling logistic and administrative support for a frill exploitation, and utilizing reserves to turn fleeting tactical victories into meaningful operational and strategic triumphs. Other Soviet operational theorists echoed and expanded on the ideas of Svechin and Tukhachevsky during the inter-war years. Among the most notable o f these were G. S. Isserson and Vladimir K. Triandafillov. Isserson was probably the most historically oriented of the Soviet theorists—and the most serious about examining the role o f Marxist theory on warfare.73 He believed that the operational art was a relatively new phenomenon produced by a combination of socio-political conditions (the proletarian revolution) and new material-economic conditions (the mechanization of warfare). Isserson admitted that World War One was "rich" in tactics, but he claimed that commanders in that war lacked an understanding of the operational level He posited that the Russian Civil War 'with its crushing deep attacks up to the final enemy defeat, undoubtedly marked the beginning o f a new era in the history o f the military art." Triandafillov was more o f a military technician than Isserson. hi the introduction to his classic work, The Nature o f the Operations o f Modem Armies. Triandafillov strove to examine "the material base and . . . other conditions defining the nature of war” and "to demonstrate the difference between the present and the past, to show the direction in which military affairs are heading."74 He devotes much effort to describing the effect of

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technological change on operations, but in the aid, he echoes most o f die inter-war theorists' interests in sustaining successive operations in depth. This brief review o f die rise o f the operational art hopefully clarifies several issues. First, the full concept o f operations developed gradually over time and cannot be attributed to a single breakthrough event, technological invention, or theoretical concept Although the operational art is a relatively modem concept, it did not develop instantaneously and cannot be attributed to one person or country. Second, the definition o f the operational level o f war—while certainly related to intermediate sized units—is more complex than just attaching the label 'operations' to corps and army sized units. The operational level is a multi-faceted concept, and it involves the fighting forces' mission, which must provide a link between tactical batdes and the strategic goal. Finally, an understanding o f the operational level must include the concept o f linking multiple battles in depth and time. This does not mean that all campaigns must be long, bloody affairs—on the contrary, commanders would welcome a quick collapse of their opponent in the initial phase o f a war, but this rarely happens. Operational commanders must plan beyond the first clash of arms, particularly because modem nations and their armies have more extensive resources and thus can continue to fight after initial battlefield setbacks. With this concept o f operational warfare in mind, it is appropriate to return to the main focus o f this paper: die operational level performance o f the Red commanders in south Russia during the Civil War. These commanders did not 'invent* the operational art. In fact, most Red commanders in the Civil War used the generic term "operations"

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for any military plan or maneuver without referring to a specific operational level concept Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to apply modem concepts o f die operational art when examining die Red commanders because the method for evaluating military leaders varies at different levels. Iq short, die skills demanded o f a young platoon leader differ significantly from those of an army commander. Focusing at the operational level, we can now establish reasonable parameters forjudging die skills o f die Red commanders. The complexity o f the web o f factors influencing die success or failure o f combat leaders has perplexed military professionals and scholars alike. When is a commander intuitive or merely guessing, stubborn or determined, flexible or lucky? Clearly such evaluations, like the military leader's craft itself are not an exact science. None the less, one can start to answer these questions with a look at the prescient Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz devoted a chapter o f his classic work, On War, to a discussion o f military "genius.” In this chapter, he wrote that two qualities were indispensable to the skillful commander: "first an intellect th at even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings o f the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”75 The first o f these qualities, also called coup d 'o eil, is more than ju st an eye for terrain. It is the ability to recognize the reality o f a situation and make the correct decision. Although Clausewitz implies that this skill includes identifying an enemy's weakness and concentrating forces there, he does provide much more detail on how to divine a 'correcf decision vice a bad decision. The second quality, determination, is much more than stubbornness; it is the ability to overcome the inner

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doubts that will beset every commander—the inner doubts that naturally arise from a profession in which decisions m ust routinely be made with incomplete and conflicting information—the “fog o f war.” hi the century and a half since die publication o f Clausewitz’s works, numerous other authors have addressed m ilitary leadership and command skills. Most o f these writers have attempted to identify specific traits common to successful commanders. One o f the best works in this genre is W. J. Wood's Leaders and Battles.76 Although Wood tends to concentrate on tactical warfare, he identifies five traits that are equally applicable at the operational level: courage, will, intellect, presence, and energy. The author expands on all o f these characteristics, but o f particular interest is his three part structure o f intellect consisting o f imagination, flexibility, and judgment. Wood's framework for intellect is admirable, but still incomplete and imprecise. Assessing a commander's imagination (and innovation) is relatively straightforward, but the good commander must balance flexibility with will (or determination) and not just change his plan based on fleeting moments o f incomplete information. Finally, the difference between the good and bad judgm ent o f a commander is problematic; many authors have difficulty evaluating a commander’s judgment beyond the simplistic view that the winning commander must have had made the better decisions, a priori. John Keegan, in The Mask o f Command, describes a variation on the traits' theory o f leadership.77 Keegan presents four case studies o f command: Alexander the Great and heroic leadership, W ellington and die anti-hero, Grant and unheroic leadership, and Hitler as the false heroic. Although Keegan's analysis is insightful, perhaps even

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brilliant, his goal "is not to show that they [leaders] possessed unusual qualities, since that may be taken for granted, but to ask how the societies to which they belonged expected such qualities to be presented.” Keegan assumes that great leaders possess unique traits, but he is most interested in the way in which military leaders fit into their societies and armies. He believes that leadership, "even genius, [is] a matter is a matter of externals almost as much as intemalities.” The author's concept o f leadership is fascinating, but it falls short of describing the quality o f good judgment in a commander. Another classic work on the concept o f command is Martin van Creveld's Command in War. Van Creveld examines the evolution o f leadership systems, focusing on changes in technology and staff structures that have altered the methods of control for the military leaders.78 To a degree, the author recognizes consistent traits in successful commanders throughout history, but he concentrates on changes in the means by which the commander practices his trade, hi his case studies, Van Creveld occasionally offers critiques o f die military leaders’judgment, but he is much more concerned with the structure and methods o f command than with evaluating the commander.79 The problem with almost all o f these analyses is that they do not address the question "why" as it applies to intellect and judgment. Why was it a brilliant decision for Lee to split his forces (twice) at Chancellorsville? Why was Patton a genius for being able to divert his Army to save Bastogne? Why was Marlborough’s plan to break the center o f the French line at Blenheim considered a virtuoso performance of military command? Why, even in defeat, do we consider Napoleon's 1814 campaign a masterful demonstration o f the art o f war? These questions are difficult to answer. However, we

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must come to some understanding o f command skills if we are to properly evaluate the Red commanders o f the Russian Civil War. Looking at die traits o f successful commanders and the specific conditions o f the operational level o f war, there emerges a framework—valuable, but not dogmatic—that offers a worthwhile standard for evaluating die Red commanders. This standard includes die aforementioned traits of physical and moral courage, the ability to identify and take advantage o f die most current technical and social aspects o f warfare, and an ability to balance flexibility and determination—a judgment that knows when to change a plan and when to persevere and impose one's will. Perhaps most important of all, the skillful operational commander, using the most current available knowledge o f die enemy and his own forces, and taking into account the larger strategic goals of the campaign, maneuvers and fights his forces in order to achieve a decisive victory. In sum, before evaluating a commander's decision we must look at the information available to the commander, at the political and strategic demands placed on the commander, and at the position and conditions o f his forces. It is only after understanding the ’external conditions’ facing the operational commander that we can evaluate his decisions. A costly frontal assault may be justified by the need for a quick victory and an overwhelming preponderance of force. A skillful delaying action, though ultimately ending in defeat, may still have been the best option available to a heavily outnumbered operational commander. In addition, this study does not seek to find “genius” in the Red commanders, rather it looks to examine the Red military leaders and assess a basic level o f competence.

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Thus, I would supplement Clausewitz’s coup d ’oeil and determination with the ability to plan and execute operations with a consistent degree o f skill. This skill can be divined in the clarity and thoroughness o f the commander's orders, in the logic o f the overall plan, the ability to exploit advantages and minimize setbacks, and in the capacity to synchronize forces while moving swiftly to keep die enemy off balance. It also demands an ability to recognize the culminating point o f an attack and the use o f reserves to maintain die momentum o f an offensive or counter die moves o f the enemy. Using these criteria, this paper will examine die performance o f the Red commanders in south Russia in the Civil War. While pursuing this evaluation o f the Red commanders in south Russia, the following chapters will follow a broadly chronological sequence. The next chapter will examine the theory and creation of the Red Army. This will provide a context to better help the reader understand the origins o f the Red forces, and how this background shaped the development of the commanders and their soldiers. Then the third chapter will focus on the early campaigns o f the Southern Front in 1918 and set the stage for the crucial campaigns that followed in 1919. The next two chapters trace the ebb and flow in south Russia when simultaneous offensives—the White 'Moscow directive' and the Red August counter offensive—led to mixed success on both sides. The final section o f this paper examines the Red victories at Orel and Voronezh, certainly the most crucial battles on the Southern Front and perhaps die decisive moment o f the entire Civil War.

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la a modest attempt, this paper hopes to rescue the Red commanders of the Civil War from an undeserved obscurity. I hope to show that this diverse group of military leaders made a significant, and notjust incidental, contribution to die Red victory.

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Notes Chapter O ne

lVladimir L Lenin, “All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!" (letter o f the Central Committee of die Russian Communist Party to the Party Organizations, July 1919), from A D ocum entary Higtorv o f Communism volume 1, edited by Robert V. Daniels (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1984), pp. 116-117. 2Richard Pipes, Russia Under the R olahevik R egim e. (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf 1993X p. 57. Pipes views Lenin as a mere alarmist, incapable of any strategic judgment 3Ibid., p. 135. Pipes goes out o f bis way to prove that the Bolsheviks were both morally repugnant and incompetent He agrees with many of Mawdsleys critiques of the Reds (see note 27 below), but his attacks are much more harsh. See pp. 508-512 o f his conclusion for his vicious attack on Communism in general and die Bolsheviks in particular.

4William Henry Chamberlin, T he Russian Revolution 1918-1921. volume II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1935), p. 454. Chamberlin’s work has a balance and a ‘feel’ for die difficulties faced by die Bolsheviks that is altogether lacking in Pipes' effort Chamberlin is sympathetic to die Reds, but not blind to their mistakes. His work is exceptional—it was one o f die first efforts published after die events, but even over time, it remains one o f die best Western books on die Russian Civil War. 5Ibid., p. 460.

6Leon Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, volume E, translated by Brian Pearce (London, England: New Park Publications, Ltd., 1979), pp. 1-2. This five volume set is a collection of documents focused on building the Red Army, but they are mostly connected with die organizational (sometimes referred to as structural or institutional) aspects of die Army—not operational orders. Trotsky wrote fascinating introductions to each volume. 7Leopold Haimson, “The Problems of Social Identities in Early 20th Century Russia,” in Slavic Review. 1989, p. 1. 9Ibid., p. 20.

9The campaigns in die east and die south dwarfed all other White efforts in almost all measurable categories: number of troops, armaments, supplies, amount of territory, population, and finance. In addition, Allied intervention and aid heavily favored Denikin 43

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and Kolchak. The Allied intervention in die north was largely defensive in nature (motivated by a desire to protect Allied supplies) and only posed a limited threat to the Soviet regime. Yudenich’s attack towards Petrograd was a legitimate concern, but its resources were limited and the threat too short-lived. The fighting in Ukraine was a morass of con flictin g faction s that included Whites, Reds, Greens (peasants and anarchistsX Ukranian nationalists aid political movements o f all shades. The complex struggle influenced the fighting on flic Southern Front, but in itself did not threaten the survival o f the Soviets in central Russia. Finally, the Polish campaign in the west was a major threat to the Soviet state, but it was not an internal Russian movement—the Poles fought a more or less traditional war of nation-states for control o f border regions. The Russo-PoHsh war was not fully a part of the Civil War because, unlike Donkin's and Kolchak's movements, the Poles never intended to destroy die entire Soviet political system. I0Chamberiin, p. 267; George A. Brinkley, T he V olunteer Armv and Allied Intervention in South Rnssia- 1917-1921 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p to ; and F.van M aw dalgy The Rimaian f!iv il W ar fRngton M am • Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1987), pp. 194-195. “ Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, volume Q, pp. 1-2. 12A. S. Bubnov e t a l (eds.) G razhdanskava Voina. 1918-1921 . volume n (Moscow: G osudarstvennoe IzdateV stvo O tdeV Voermoi L iteratury, 1930), pp. 70-72. 13Bubnov, volume m , pp. 279-283. l4Ibid., pp. 254-256.

liMaxim Gorky e t al, History of the Civil War in Russia (London, England: 1937). 16P. N. Sobolev (editor in chief) with Y. G. Gimpleson and G. A. Trukan, The Great O ctoher Socialist Revolution. English translation (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 461-480. This is one of the typical Soviet works written within a strict Marxist interpretation of events (although without the Stalinist bias) and translated for Western consumption at the height o f the Cold War. It only tangentially touches on the Civil War and contains no operational detail. 17Dnritri Volkogonov, I^nm . A New Biography (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 198-243; Stalm Triumph and Tragedy (Rocklin, California: Prima Publishing, 1988), pp. 39-49; and Trotsky. The Eternal Revolutionary (New York N.Y.: The Free Press, 1996), pp. 192-194. VolkogonVs works are a fresh, and often critical, approach to key Soviet political leaders, but they do not offer an operational look at the military campaigns. His biography of Stalin only touches on fee role o f the Communist 44

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dictator in the 1918 battle at Tsaritsyn. The biographies o f Lenin and Trotsky focus on state bonding and die creation of the Red Army. Neither work discusses the role o f die Red commanders in any depth. 18Paul Miliukov, with Charles Scignobos and L. Eisenmann, translated fay Charles Lam Markmaim, History o f Russia, volume three, Reforms. Reaction. Revolutions (18551932) (New York, N.Y.: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969, French copyright, 1932), pp. 377-378. Although Miliukov's account focuses on the political and social side of the White movement, he does give passing credit to die Reds for using talented officers (an indirect reference to the use of the military specialists—the ex-tsarist officers). He also credits Soviet partisans for distracting the Whites, however this reflects his extensive personal experience with the irregular fighting in Ukraine. Red partisans were not as effective on the Southern Front, and Green partisans such as Makhno were politically unpredictable, and thus just as much concern to the Reds as the Whites. I9Edward HaQett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. 1917-1923. volume I (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 1953), pp. 193-194. Carr concentrates heavily on the centralization of die Bolshevik (Communist) party during the war. According to the author, the ability to turn the revolutionary party into a powerful, centralized organ was crucial to the Red victory 20Carr, volume ID, pp. 65-67. 21David Footman, Civil War in Russia (London, England: Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 15. Footman states that the vast majority of the Russian people simply wanted to stay out of the war and that both sides had to force the reluctant peasants to join their armies. Thus he claims that the number of soldiers on both sides were relatively equal. He credits the Red "ruthlessness” for victory in the Civil War. IBs chapters are topical, but none of them are devoted to the cam paign in south Russia. 72Ibid., pp. 303-304. 23Ibid., pp. 26-27.

MW. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory (new York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 12-13. Lincoln is primarily concerned with the effect of the Civil War on the Soviet state, and less interested in the reasons for the Red victory. He focuses on the shaping of the party, the state, and the nation. 25Ibid., pp. 225-226.

26Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. xi-xiv. Kenez ultimately claims that die Civil War was not a military contest, but a political one in which each side attempted to impose its will on a 45

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reluctant population. He states that the Whites failed to m aintain the institutions in their rear areas that would have enabled them to impose their will on the peasantry. ^Evan Mawdsley, The Rmmian C ivil W ar (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, inc., 1987), p. xL ^Ibid., pp. 273-278. ^Ibid., pp. 278-279.

30Ibid’, pp. 205-213. Mawdsley depreciates die Red strategy in die October 1919 counter offensive, a view that I will address in detail later in this work. 3Donald W. Clark, Lenin. The M an Behind die Mask (London, England: Faber and Faber, 1988), pp. 417-418; and Robert C. Tucker, Stalin an Revolutionary 1879-1929 (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, inc., 1973X pp. 206-209. As one would expect, biographies of key figures in die war often stress individual leadership as a crucial aspect of the war. For example, in his biography of Lenin, Ronald Clark argues dial die “ruthlessness and military intuition” of Lenin and Trotsky helped “to decide die outcome of die civil war.” Robert Tucker also sees Lenin and Trotsky as die leading figures of die war, but he posits that Stalin ’s crude forcefulness and capacity for work were traits that die Reds needed in die desperate times of die Civil War. Both of these books focus on die Reds' highest political and strategic decisions and do not cover any of the operational campaigns. ^Issac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed. Trotsky 1879-1921 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 432-433. Deutscher points out that the most significant Red advantage in die war, interior lines, was also the greatest cause of friction within die Soviet leadership. The Reds were able to shift forces from front to front to meet changing threats, but the High Command and political leaders often fought over die determination of the most threatened front 33Dimitry V . Lehovich, W hite A painst Red (New York, N.Y.: W . W . Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 351-352 and pp. 399-405. Lehovich lists a large number of political and social issues as die main causes of the White defeat—in particular crediting Lenin's use of propaganda and Red political savvy over Denikin's political clumsiness (in fact, Lehovich's critique of Denikin's political sk ill is actually meant as praise for Denikin's honor and moral directness). Lehovich devotes considerable effort to one operational aspect of die war, the "Moscow directive” (pp. 403-405). This order will be covered in detail later in this paper. 34Vladimir N. Brovkin, Rehind die Front Lines of the Civil War. Political Parties and Social Movements in R ussia 1918-1922 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994X pp. 234-235. 46

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35N. E. Kaknrin, KakSrazhalnx' Rtgonhitdua. second volume (Moscow; Gosudartsvermoe Izdatel’stvo, 1926), p. 10. Kaknrin emphasizes that die military events of die war most be linked to die contemporary economic and political conditions. ^Ibid., pp. 350-351. Not surprisingly, Kaknrin leans heavily on a Marxist interpretation o f the conflict He stresses die worker-peasant link, and specifically the Bolshevik peasant policy, which was die "powerful lever” that brought the vacillating peasant masses over to the Red side. According to Kakurin it was this support that enabled die Reds to formulate their military strategies without worrying about problems in their rear areas

31Ibid., pp. 353-354. Even when listing military reasons for the Red triumph, Kakurin says that die victory was dependant on "internal politics” and die maintenance of order in die Red rear. 38Alexander L Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919 (Moscow: Gosudartsvermoe Voeimoe Izdatel’stvo , 1931), pp. 218-219. Egorov pays die usual credit to Marxist theory by stressing die class antagonism o f die workers and die bourgeoisie. 39Ibid., pp. 180-181.

^Semon M. Budenny, Proidermii put (Moscow, 1958); and Kliment E. Voroshilov, Stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Partizdat, 1937). As noted in John Erickson, Soviet High Command (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1962), p. 815. See note 41 below for a critique o f another of Voroshilov's articles. 41S. N. Shishkin, uO planakh bar ’bi s armei DeruldncT in Voenno-Istoricheski ZhurnaL 1963, number 2, p. 21. Shishkin attacks Stalin's influence on the Civil War literature and singles out Voroshilov's fawning article, “Stalin I Krasnaya ArmiycT for severe attacks. However, Shishkin's work is dim inished by the constant degradation of Trotsky that fails to recognize any of die War Commissar's contributions to die Red effort 42A. G. Kavtaradze, Voermve Spetsialistv Na Sluzhbe Respublifd Sovietov 191 71920 (Moscow: Nauka, Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Istorii SSSR , 1988), pp. 3-5 and p. 16. Kavtaradze states that die Reds had "no illusions" as to die drawbacks o f the specialists—a generally unsympathetic attitude to die Bolsheviks and their occasional desertions. Kavtaradze endorsed die use o f threats to keep the specialists loyal to die regime. Even with die need to watch die political loyalty o f die specialists, the ex-tsarist officers made a major contribution to die Red victory. 43Anton Denikin, The White Annv (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1930), p. 238. Denikin's emphasis on die ’moral' element of the war goes so far to say 47

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that "All that had been won during many months by moral impetus and the force of arms, was lost in a moment of depression." Clearly, Denikin is anxious to explain the White defeat as a moral collapse, perhaps to justify his own military decisions. Many case, Denikin consistently presents the White commanders as superior to their Red opponents. “ ibid., pp. 209-231.

43I b id p 280. 46D . Fedotoff White, The Growth o f the R ed Army (Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1944X pp. 122-126. According to White, the Communist party members at all levels were the key factor in die Red victory.

47Malcom M ackintosh, Jnp p e m an t The R ussian Forces 1918-1966 (New York, N.Y.: The MacMillan Company, 1967), pp. 22-23. 48George A. Brinkley, T he Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia. 1917-1921 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. xixiii and pp. 281-283. *9Ibid., pp. 190-191.

50George Stewart, The White Army (New York, N.Y.: The MacMillan Company, 1933), p. vin and P. 414. 51Ibid., pp. 183-184.

52Richard Luckett, The White Generals (New York, N.Y.: Routledge & Keegan Paul, Inc., 1971X p. xvi and p. 387. In strictly military matters, Luckett asserts that die Reds made more military mistakes than die Whites. S3Ibid., pp. 328-332.

MJohn Erickson, The Soviet H igh Com m and (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1962X pp. 50-51. Erickson devotes part o f his effort to die discussion of die 'new* military doctrine of Marxism. Trotsky's political opposition used this theory to oppose die conventional military concepts of die specialists, and thus indirectly attack Trotsky. However, because Erickson is more concerned with the High Command's internecine struggles, he does not evaluate die merits o f die Marxist view of war or die conventional techniques employed by die specialists. 55Ibid, p. 22. 56Ibid„ pp. 79-80.

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57AIbert Seaton, Stalin as. M ilitary Commander (New Yoric, N.Y.: P ra te r Publishers, 1975), pp. 16-39. Although Seaton makes use of the Glavkom and Front directives, his book only discusses die events of the war in which Stalin was directly involved. He does not focus on die operational level of war nor does he evaluate die Red military leadership. 58John Keegan, The Face of Batde. A Study of Aowicourt. Waterloo & the Somme (New York, N.Y.: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1976), pp. 1578. Keegan's section on die usefulness o f military history is on pp. 22-27, die deficiencies of military history are on pp. 27-36, ami his discussion of die "history of military history" is on pp. 54-62. S9Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants The Campaigns of France and Germany. 1944-1945. volume one (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. xiii. “ Dermis E. Showalter, a book review o f Warfare in the Western World, two volumes, by Robert Doughty e t cd (Lexington, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), in The Journal of M iHtarv H istory volume 62, Number 2, April 1998, pp. 388-390. slThe concept of maneuver warfare is a particularly popular doctrine espoused by some (self-appointed) iconoclasts in die American military community. Perhaps this comment is a bit harsh, but die fact remains that some of the most strident supporters of maneuver warfare claim to have virtually discovered die operational art and die key to quick and easy victories (as opposed to the long and bloody struggles of attritional warfare). Two of die strongest proponents of this theory are William S. Lind, M aneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985); and Robert Leonhard, The Art of M aneuver. Manenver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1991). Both o f these authors present arguments for die use of maneuver to achieve operational victories without unnecessary casualties. However, they tend to subsume all aspects of operational warfare to the single theory of maneuver. A more balanced—and historically oriented—compilation of essays on maneuver warfare is contained in Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (editorX M aneuver Warfare. An Anthnlopv (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993). In addition to contributions from Lind and Leonhard, Hooka's book includes strong articles from Bruce L Gudmundsson on die German experience and Robert A. Doughty on die French use of methodical batde. See also Earl F. Ziemke's "Military Effectiveness in die Second World War,” in M ilitary Effectiveness. volume HI, edited tty Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, published by die Mershon Center Series on Defense and Foreign Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 299-307. Ziemke describes operations almost completely in terms of maneuver. His chapter makes some solid observations, but he does not mention any of die theoretical concepts of die operational art

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Aside from the common misuse o f maneuver warfare as synonym for the operational level o f war, several other works have mistakenly equated other terms and concepts with operations. E xam ples include Jefmria U W allach, T he D ogm a o f die Battle n f Annihilation The Theories of Clanscwitz and Schlieflfcn and Their Impact on the German O ndnrt nf Two World Wars (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986); Colonel T. N. Dupuy (U.S.A , R et), A Genius For War. The German Armv and General Staff 1807-1945 (London, England: MacDonald and Jane's, 1977); Matthew Cooper, The German Armv 1933-1945. Its Political and Military Failure (New York, N.Y.: Stein and Day, 1978); and Richard Simpkin, Red Armour. An Explanation n f the Soviet Mobile Force Concept (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984). Wallach's book is an excellent examination Clausewitz's belief in the battle of annihilation and how this idea influenced die German Army. It ties the concept of blitzkrieg to earlier German battles and theory, and sees a thread in the German inability to articulate war aims at the strategic IeveL Dupuy, in a more flattering view of die Goman Army, also finds a consistent thread in Goman concepts o f warfare from Mohke the Elder’s battles in 1870 to German success in die early battles of World War Two. His analysis also hints that the Gomans had a mastery of the operational level of war, but lacks a full explanation of die concept Coopo, while attacking the political and strategic failures of die German Army, discusses the German concept of Kesselschlachten, the desire to achieve a decisive victory (literally a 'cauldron' battle that destroys the enemy in a single encirclement). He also suggests that the Germans were masters of operational warfare—whatevo their failures at die strategic level However, Dupuy's analysis has more of a tactical focus, and fails to provide a significant view of the operational IeveL On a different note, Simpkin believes that die Soviets were the first to truly understand operational warfare. Other authors have made strong cases that die Soviets pioneered the concept o f operational warfare (discussed below), but Simpkin— like historians of the German perspective—sometimes makes the mistake of equating the use of tanks and maneuver with die discovery of the operational level o f war. In order to view die extensive literature on operations, the reader may want to consult an excellent bibliographical reference on the operational art, The Operational Level of War. CSI Historical Bibliography No. 3. compiled by Elizabeth R. Snoke (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995). Snoke's bibliographic compilation includes sections cm French, German, and Russian language works, as well as the expected English tides. Finally, current United States Army doctrine places a heavy emphasis on the operational art Clayton R. Newell provides a straightforward and effective analyses of modem operations in his article “What Is the Operational Art?” in Military Review. volume 70, number 9, September 1990, pp. 3-16. Newell, with die help of Michael D. Krause (general editorsX later edited a book, On Operational Art (Washington, D.C.: Center o f Military History, United States Army, 1994), an expansion on his earlier article. Newell’s article succinctly expresses the principles of the operational level of war. Ms book provides a more generalized view of operations with a focus on the United States Army's Field Manual on operations, FM 100-5, in pp. 3-16. Two other sections of the book are related to this paper: Major General William A Stofifs chapter on 50

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leadership (pp. 189-196) and Colonel Richard M. Swain's chapter on the historiography of operations (pp. 197-210). ^History of the Military Art (HB02, 2nd Semester, 1993-1994X Course Notebook, Instructors Copy (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1993X pp- 6-8. These definitions of the level of war are used in the instruction o f West Point cadets and are derived from current doctrine in the United States Army. 63Ibid., pp. 7-8.

64Robert M. Epstein. Napoleon's Last V ictory and the Em ergence nf Modem War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 4-5. Epstein argues that Napoleon's 1809 campaign marked die beginning of the operational art and hence the true emergence o f modem warfare. Epstein's argument, though flawed in some areas (for example, a tendency to believe that the French exclusively created the concept of conscription), presents a strong case that the Napoleonic era saw the first extensive attempt to link a series o f battles into a single unified campaign in support o f political goals—a significant aspect o f the'operational art “ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns nf Napoleon (New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 154-155. Chandler's superb analysis o f Napoleonic warfare draws the crucial connection between modem methods o f war and the corps system. However, he avoids crediting Napoleon with 'inventing' die operational level of warfare. Chandler is willing to praise Napoleon as a great practitioner of war, but he rightfully cautions against giving Napoleon too much credit as a theorist “ Two of the best English translations of Jomini's and Clausewitz's works are Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, translated by Captain G.H. Mendell and Lieutenant W.P. Craighill (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1862); and Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976). 67Several outstanding analyses of Jomini and Clausewitz demonstrate that the two theorists had only a partial grasp o f the operational level of war. Michael Howard, in one of his superb essays, "Jomini and the Classical Tradition in M ilitary Thought," in Studies m War and P ( N e w York, N.Y.: The Viking Press, 1959), pp. 21-36, discusses the classic debate between proponents o f warfare as a precise science (attributed to Jomini) and warfare as an instinctual art (Clausewitz). Howard demonstrates the simplicity of these views: Jomini and Clausewitz, as well as the less known British theorist Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd, recognized elements of science and art in all of warfare. Howard shows that Jomini and Clausewitz addressed this debate only in terms of tactics and strategy, not at the operational level In another essay by Howard, "The Forgotten Dimension o f Strategy," in Operational T-evel of War—Its A rt edited by Colonel Ralph L. 51

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Allen (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 1985% pp. 328 to 3-38, the British historian uses die term 'operational' to refer to Clausewitz’s ideas on strategy. However, Howard means generic sense of maneuvering combat units in contrast with the logistical, social, and technological elements o f war. He concludes that die great Prussian theorist was focused on the strategic level o f war, and perhaps too enamored with the dream of die great battle o f annihilation. Two other outstanding essays are worth consulting. Both can be found in Makers o f Modem Strategy from MachiavelB to the Nndear Age, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986). The first is an essay on Jom ini by American historian John Shy (pp. 143-185% and die other is Parefs own piece on Clausewitz (pp. 186-213). Like Howard, these authors focus on the debate between Jomini's alleged formalism and Clausewitz's broader, but sometimes contradictory, philosophical approach. Both essays refer to the concept of "principles o f war" and discuss die viability, if any, o f attempting to form universal precepts for an endeavor as unpredictable as war. Once again, like Howard, Shy and Paret state that the two Nineteenth Century military theorists saw their concepts only in terms o f strategy and tactics with a particular focus on die decisive battle (or as sometimes postulated by Jomini, a decisive victory through maneuver without the need for any battle). Note that the earlier version n f M A em o f Modem Strategy. M ilitary Thnnpht ftnm Machiavelli to Hitler edited by Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971) contained solid essays on Jomini (by Crane Brinton, Gorden A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, pp. 77-92) and Clausewitz (by H. Rothfels, pp. 93-113). These chapters focus extensively on the emerging social and economic dimensions of modem war in Jomini's and Clausewitz's ideas. There is no mention of die operational level o f war. One often overlooked military writer of die Nineteenth Century (more an historian than a theorist) was Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, a British officer and biographer o f Stonewall Jackson. Henderson touched on some operational concepts in an 1894 lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, "Lessons from the Past for the Present," in Henderson's The Science of War (London, England: Longmans, Green, and company, 1905), published as a United States Army War College pamphlet, Old Look—New Subject: The Operational lev el o f War. April 1987, pp. 1-8. Henderson struggled to come to grips with the operational level using terms such as minor tactics, grand tactics, and strategy to try to carve out a third level of war. He argued that the 'great captains1 endeavored "to comprehend the whole art of war (p. 4%” and he believed that this provided some link between strategy and tactics. The British author was also less inclined to seek the trig battle,' as a solution to all campaigns—he believed that a campaign might involve several engagements in a theater. Even so, Henderson falls short o f seeing the full implications of the operational art His focus is cm the study of military history; he wants officers to receive instruction at higher levels than tactics, but he does not argue for a separate operational level of war. Finally, die reader may want to consult David M. Glantz's introduction to Evolution of Soviet Operational Art. The Docum entary Basis, volume L 1927-1964, translated and edited by Harold S. Orenstein (London, England: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1995% pp. 1-2. Glantz gives a succinct summary of Nineteenth Century 52

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thought on the operational level o f war, concluding that both theorists (Jomini and Clausewitz) and generals (Schlieffen) may have tangentially brushed against some operational level concepts, but they remained fixed on a belief in the single battle of aw nthtlation

“ Numerous works explore aspects of German military theory and prowess from the mid Nineteenth Century through World War Two. These works often touch, in varying degrees, on die operational level of war. One approach is by Larry H. Addington. The Blitzkrieg Fra and the German General Staff 1865-1941 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 3-12. Addington believes Mottke took advantage of modem technology (and the organizational skills of the General Staff) to achieve considerable victories in 1866 (against Austria) and 1870 (against France). The author believes that the Germans saw die key strategic and tactical transformations engendered by the new social and technological conditions in modem warfare. The culmination o f this concept was the kesselschlacten, the great battle of annihilation—a concept that die Germans embraced in the Schlieffen plan, and in their blitzkrieg doctrine o f World War Two. Although Addington makes some valuable observations, he writes only in terms of strategy and tactics. The author makes a solid case for continuity between Moltke's vision o f kesselschlacten and the continued desire for short and decisive battles, there is no evidence for a German belief in a new level of war linking strategy and tactics—the operational art Gunther E. Rothenbcrg reflects many of Addington's arguments, in his essay "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine o f Strategic Envelopment," in M akers o f Modem Strategy from Machiavelli tn the Nuclear Ace, edited by Peter Paret, pp. 296-325. Rothenberg, using the term 'strategic envelopment,' believes that blitzkrieg was a continuation o f Moltke and Schlieffen's desire for swift and decisive victory—not a new theory based on technological changes. The author gives credit to Moltke and die development of a professional General Staff system, for German success on die batdefield. But Rothenberg is almost completely focused on the strategic and tactical levels. His examination looks in particular detail at the Schlieffen plan, but only in its strategic implications for the allocation of resources between the eastern and western fronts. The author, at best, hints at a German concept of operational war, but he avoids making a specific case for German skills at an operational IeveL Jehuda L. Wallach's The D ogm a of die Battle of A nnihilation, as noted above, presents a powerful case for a German belief in the single, decisive, and allencompassing batde for victory. The author presents a negative view of die concept of the battle of annihilation, arguing that the Germans incorrectly interpreted Clausewitz's complex views as a single minded belief in decisive batde that corrupted the German strategic performance in the both world wars. While Wallach's views are persuasive, the author only addresses operations fiom a tangential perspective (see pp. 11, 72,165, 172, 187 and 194). He does not make a case for die German 'discovery* of a new level of war. Bruce L Gudmundsson's essay, "Maneuver Warfare: The German Tradition," in Richard D . Hooker, Jr. (Ed.X M anenver Warfare. A n A nthology (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 273-293 is another strong argument for continuity in the 53

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German doctrine o f decisive battle (or die battle o f annihilation and 'maneuver warfare*), which taps into the concept o f the operational a rt The author presents a case for the "tactical and operational virtuosity o f [those] counterparts who served in the armies o f die Kaiser, die Weimar republic, and die Third Reich" (p. 273). He believes that the Prussians (and Germans) had an 'operational tradition’ (pp. 274-281X but a close examination o f Gudmundsson's use of this term shows that he uses 'operational' as a synonym for 'maneuver’. In other words, he is not arguing that the Germans had discovered a new level of warfare. He basic concept is that die Germans (dating back to Frederick the Great) had a better concept o f how to maneuver their forces—but mostly at the tactical IeveL Dupuy*s A Genius for War, as the title suggests, is a fawning portrayal of German military skills. The author claims that his research in statistical analysis demonstrates that the Germans consistently won victories (or at least staved off defeat) against vastly superior odds. D upu/s work claims, rather more as an assumption than with proof that the Germans were "much better at soldiering" than their opponents, and he is "particularly impressed by the resilience, imagination, and initiative,demonstrated by German soldiers a t all levels" (my emphasis, see pp. 1-5). In fact, Dupuy presents some strong arguments for German tactical skills, but he fails to address their major strategic failures, and he virtually ignores the operational IeveL He is most concerned with disproving the two 'myths' o f German militarism and rigid discipline (pp. 7-16). While the author is right to dispel the misbegotten thought o f Germans as mindless automatons, he does not establish a case for German 'genius' at the operational or strategic level of war. 69A A. Svechin, "Strategy and Operational Art," in Evolution of Soviet The D ocum entary Basis, volume I, 1927-1964, translated and edited by Harold S. Orenstein (London, England: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1995), pp. 5-15. Operational Art,

’“Glantz, "Introduction" to Evolution o f Soviet Operational A rt The D ocum entary Basis, volume I, 1927-1964, translated and edited by Harold S. Orenstein, pp. 2 -4 . Glantz's introduction contrasts the relatively moderate differences between Svechin and Tukhachevsky, but it also draws parallels between their concepts of operational warfare. Glantz's own book, S oviet M ilitary Operational A rt Ih Pursuit of Deep Battle (London, England: Frank Cass and Company. Ltd., 1991), provides an excellent overview of the Soviet development of the operational art, although the majority of the book is devoted to World War Two and the following years. See pp. 1638 for an excellent overview o f the operational art from antiquity (of particular interest is Glantz's summation o f historical variations on the terms for strategy and tactics, p. 17). On pp. 50-76, Glantz focuses on the Soviet operational theories from 1917 to 1934. These pages have solid summaries of Svechin, Tukhachevsky, and TriandafiUov. 71Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, New Problems in W arfare (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, November 1983), pp. 2-5. This is a text used at the Army's War College. It contains English translations of excerpts from the 54

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first three chapters o f Tukhachevsky's work. The reader may also want to consult Richard Simpkin, in association with John Erickson, Deep Battle. The Brainchild o f Marshal Tnlrhachevskii (London, England: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987). On pp. 135-158, Simpkin also provides a translation of parts of New Problems in Warfare, but Simpkin does not include the historical review. The remainder o f Simplon's book contains excerpts from several of Tukhachevsky’s other works. tukhachevsky, pp. 16-20. ^G.S. Isserson, "The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art," in Evolution of Soviet Operational Art. The Documentary Basis, volume I, 1927-1964, translated and edited by Harold S. Orenstein, pp. 48-77. Also in this book is Issersoris "Operational Prospects for die Future," pp. 78-90. Isserson viewed the First World War as conflict with considerable tactical innovation but no operational perspective. He was particularly critical of the German reliance on tactical breakthroughs with no concept of how to exploit these victories for a strategic victory (p. 49). He was not much more sympathetic to the Allies who relied on political and economic advantages to achieve their victory (p. 48). Isserson placed a heavy emphasis on the connection between the proletarian revolution and die emergence of modem warfare. He believed that the release of the new energy of the workers, coupled with their skill in new industrial technology, provided military commanders with the opportunity to exploit the operational a rt Two chapters in Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to die Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, address the influence of Marx and Engels on the development o f revolutionary theory and Soviet military doctrine—a connection to Isserson's belief in ties between Marxist theory and operational a rt See Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen in "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Anny in Society" (pp. 262-280) and Condoleeza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy" (pp. 648-676). 74Vladimir K. Triandafillov, The Nature of die Operations of Modem Armies. translated by William A. Burhans and edited by Jacob W. Kipp (London, England: Frank Cass and Company. Ltd., 1994). See pp. 7-8 for Triandafillov's introduction, which places a heavy emphasis on his belief in the uniqueness of operational warfare. Also, the author (in pp. 9 -2 4 ) emphasizes new weaponry and technical advances that will restore mobility and depth to the battlefield. Although Triandafillov is much less apt to look to historical precedents for operational warfare than Svechin, Tukhachevsky, and Isserson, he comes to die same belief in multiple (or 'successive') battles that must be exploited to fulfil a successful operation. Readers may also want to consult Selected R eadings in M ilitary History: S oviet M ilitary History. Volume I, The Red Army, 1918-1945 (Fort Leavenwoth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College [Combat Studies Institute], January 1984). This volume is an eclectic collection of both Soviet and Western articles on Red Army theory and practice. Many o f the articles contain a tactical focus, but they present a beneficial English language source of Soviet military theory in the inter-war years. 55

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75Carl von Clausewitz. On War, edited and translated bv Michael Howard and Peter Paret, pp. 100-104. 76W. J. Wood (L t CoL, RetX T and Ratting The Art o f M ilitary Leadership (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1984). Wood explores numerous command traits, many o f which relatively accepted (such as physical and moral courage), even if rarely understood. For the purposes of this paper, Wood's examination of intellect holds die most promise (pp. 149-235). O fparticular interest is die author's use of Custer at Little Big Horn as a case study for "judgment” Wood is courageous to pick a disastrous defeat for his example of a commander's judgment, but he still falls short of telling the reader why Custer's decisions were incorrect at the time. This is not all Wood’s fault. The author does not have extensive primary sources that could help explain the choices made by Custer at the time of die batde. However, Wood's choice of narrative style tends to add to die difficulty in separating the "good" from the "bad" decisions made by Custer. ^John Keegan, The M ask of Command (New York, N.Y.: Elisabeth Sifton Bodes, Viking Penguin, Inc., 1987), pp. 1-11. Keegan does an excellent job of demonstrating that die 'mask* of command has evolved over time: Alexander's heroic style of personal leadership at the front of his soldiers on the battlefield was effective in ancient batties, but Grant's management style was more appropriate for an era of larger forces, telegraph and railroads. Despite his insights, Keegan does not come to grips with the concept ofjudgment For example, other commanders of die American Civil War functioned in similar fashion to Grant—in particular, J. E. Johnston, William Rosecrans, and Joseph Hooker seemed to adopt well to the same "mask" of command as Grant (all were popular, all understood their soldiers, and all took advantage of staff and new technology to control large dispersed forces). Yet, these other three generals lost Keegan does not tell us why Grant had the better judgment—why he made die better operational decisions. 78Martin L. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univarsity Press, 1985), pp. 1-16. The author places a heavy emphasis on technology (and to a lesser degree on social and political factors) in shaping the art of command- For example, die role of communications—die advent of telegraph and radio—are seen as key factors in the evolution of die mode of command. 19Ibid., p. 135. Chi this page is one example o f die strengths and weaknesses of

van Creveld's approach to the individual decision maker. The author addresses an incident in die batde of Koniggratz between Prussia and Austria in 1866. Van Creveld states that die Prussian commander, Frederick Charles made "a somewhat misguided” decision on die night of 1-2 July when he ordered a "frontal assault against formidable positions that was likely to result at best, in an Austrian withdrawal." Van Creveld deserves praise for giving a solid reason behind his critique (too many military historians 56

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simply censure commanders without explaining why). Even so, the author leaves several questions unanswered. Did Charles have an overwhelming numbers advantage, which would justify his desire to crush the enemy in the quickest possible method (frontal assault)? Did Charles believe that he was actually conducting a flank assault (based on his latest intelligence of the enemy position)? Was Charles under political pressure to win a quick victory to keep other German states out o f die war? Was die terrain so constrictive that Charles had little choice but to launch a frontal assault? In any case, Charles may have made a bad decision, but we must look at all o f the alternatives and conditions under which that decision was made before we pass judgment

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Chapter Two Budding an Army . . . every great revolution, and a socialist revolution in particular, even if there w oe no external war, is inconceivable without internal war, Le., civil war, which is even more devastating than external war, and involves thousands and m illions of cases of wavering and desertion from one side to another, implies a state of extreme indefiniteness, lack of equilibrium and chaos. V. L Lenin, April 19181 As Lenin’s words imply, a civil war is a chaotic affair with particular problems for leaders trying to build a viable army. The leaders o f die new Soviet state pieced together their army in 1918 when, as historian John Erickson has argued, die crucible of combat shaped the Red Army as much as the ideological precepts o f Marxism.2 While in theoretical terms, a socialist army was supposed to be a militia force, free from the overbearing interference of a central state, and consisting o f elected officers answerable to soldiers' committees, the new Red Army emerged from 1918 as something quite different This force, which in 1919 on die Southern Front turned the tide of victory, was a conscript army, relatively well disciplined, under the firm control of the Soviet government, and led by skilled, professional commanders, many of whom were former tsarist officers. One need only compare the establishment of the Red Army and its relatively swift victory with the struggles of revolutionaries in other conflicts to gauge the extent of this accomplishment For example, the American colonists had a well established militia that, if not always sturdy in combat, at least provided a relatively well trained, established force at the disposal of die Continental Congress. The French revolutionaries of 1789 were able to use enough of die Royal Army of the ancien regime in combination with the new

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revolutionary recruits to provide France with an experienced military force. The Union forces in the American Civil War expanded on a small regular, pre-war army; but the North could also call on the full force of an established economy and political bureaucracy to build an expanded force. In a more modem example, Mao was able to cultivate a guerrilla army over a long period of time and then slowly convert it into a regular force—a luxury that the Bolsheviks did not enjoy in 1919, Mien they faced a life or death struggle almost immediately after seizing power. Every revolution, every civil war, is unique, and perhaps the singular aspect of die Russian Civil War is that die Bolsheviks were able to create a successful, and for the most part conventional, army in such a short time and with so little of the resources of the old army which it replaced. Understanding die early efforts at forming this new type of army is important to understanding the type of force that the Bolsheviks were able to field against Denikin in south Russia. Several writers have covered important aspects of the creation of the Red Army. John L. H. Keep discusses the transition from a workers’ militia to a more conventional Red Army.3 Keep focuses on die workers' loss of military power and the decline of die role of die Red Guards. Keep makes a major contribution to understanding the gradual Bolshevik rejection of Marxist based militia forces and the centralization of military control, but he does not address conscription, die need for officer expertise, and the growth of die high command. The author's main contention is that the workers who initially provided the Bolsheviks with their political ’muscle’ lost their influence as a military force with die growth of die Red Army in 1918.

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John Erickson also makes considerable contributions to an understanding of die formation o f the Red Army.4 In his T he Soviet Hiph Command, the author concentrates on the struggle between the military high command and die leaders of the Bolshevik government He discusses some o f the steps taken by die Soviets in raising their army and structuring its administration and emphasizes the need for die Bolsheviks to ensure the political reliabilily of the militaiy specialists. Because of die focus of die topic and long time period covered by his book, Erickson does not give an exhaustive treatment of all of the steps in creating die Red Army. In another work, Erickson writes an essay with extensive detail on the origins of the Red Army; however, his analysis stops shortly after the introduction of conscription (June 1918) and does not cover the formation of die Reds' strategic and operational leadership. The most comprehensive account of the Red Army's origins is Mark von Hagen's Soldiers in die Proleti*rian nictatm-ghtp5 The author does a superb job o f tracing the disintegration of the Imperial Army, the Red need for conscription, and the political tension of producing a mass army in support of the proletariat in a nation consisting largely of peasants. Von Hagen provides insightful analysis of the numerous Soviet decrees and structures that led to the eventual adoption of a conscript regular army force. Although the author provides one of the best accounts of the Red Army’s evolution, von Hagen focuses on the enlisted and noncommissioned ranks, and does not discuss the growth of the Red military leadership. Even so, his work is an essential contribution to our knowledge of the key events in the creation o f the Red Army.

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Keep, Erickson, and von Hagen have all done superb work, but none of these authors have drawn together all o f the aspects o f the creation o f the Red Army and linked them to the Army’s operational performance. The following chapter builds on these authors' extensive work and endeavors to trace die creation of die Red Army—specifically its leadership—in a detailed chronological fashion. The goal is to provide die reader with background on the type of soldiers, military structures, and operational commanders that fought on the Southern Front

L Between Theory and Practice.

Initially in keeping with Marxist theory, the Bolsheviks were only too happy to see the destruction of the old tsarist army—a necessary pre-condition for the successful taking of power in October 1917. Recent scholarship has discredited die argument that the collapse of the Imperial Army was solely the result o f Bolshevik agitation; genuine war weariness and a desire to return home for land were a far more powerful force than the words of revolutionary propagandists.6 Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks welcomed the disintegration of the Tsar’s army and felt little desire to use its edifice as a superstructure for the future socialist army. Yet the leaders of the new socialist state soon found that even if they had no motivation to preserve the units and high command of the old army, it was beneficial to borrow the doctrinal concepts and recruit at least part of the former leadership of the Imperial forces. Whatever their ideological misgivings, the Bolshevik leaders inexorably

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gravitated towards a regular anny—conscript, centralized, and led by professionals—a concept that had been anathema to the Bolsheviks prior to seizing power in 1917. Before die October Revolution, the Bolsheviks believed firmly in the destruction of the old regime's military forces which upheld the capitalist states, but they had few concrete ideas as to what sort o f military force would replace the old armies that they intended to destroy. This murky view o f die role and composition of armed forces followed from die somewhat cloudy pronouncements on military topics from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This is not to say that Marx and Engels ignored military affairs. In fact, though Marx gravitated towards a largely economic detenninist view of history, Engels became the military expert of communist theory, and Bernard Semmel’s characterization of Engels as “the General” of Marxist theory is certainly accurate.7 Nevertheless, Engels’ views remained heavily focused on seizing power and unclear on building a new army that could retain that power. Engels devoted a large measure of his lifetime to the study of war, and in particular, he searched for ways for the proletariat to defeat the organized armed forces of the capitalist state. Engels’ theories evolved over time, and his publication o f the “AntiDuhring” in 1878 marked a departure from his earlier, pragmatic work to a more dogmatic 4

view focused on economic determinism. Before the “Anti-Duhring”, Engels was conventional in his military thought; he believed that some of the technical aspects of the military profession did not depend purely on economics and that there was room for the “genius” of the individual in military affairs. Later, he would retreat from these views: “It

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is not the ‘free creations o f the mind’ of generals of genius which have revolutionized [sic] war, but the inventions o f better weapons and changes in human material, the Soldiers... Engels’ later views o f the role of the military in the coming workers’ revolution led to some unusual conclusions. He saw the benefit of loose tactical formations, but he did not see this resulting from terrain, technology nor military innovation. Instead, he attributed these formations to social conditions such as those that shaped the Colonial forces in the American Revolution and the untrained masses o f fire French revolutionary armies. In addition, Engels concluded that conscription was an inhibition against die arming of the “whole people” because of the numerous exemptions and privileges accorded to the upper classes of European society. He surmised that expanding European militarism would eventually lead to the need for ‘true’ universal conscription that would sow the seeds of capitalism’s own destruction; the capitalists, in their own endeavors for more massive armed forces, would unwittingly arm the proletariat and thus undermine the reliability of the state army. Engels also concluded that the leaders of the armies had clung to over-disciplined, rigid formations in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 while “the soldier had been shrewder than the officer” in adopting to the demands of modem warfare by using skirmisher formations that reduced die impact of improved firearms technology. For the Marxist movement, Engels left a legacy of distrust for the European Nineteenth Century military system. He disliked compulsory military service because it contained too many exemptions, and he offered a somewhat utopian alternative concept of universal conscription in which the proletariat willingly participated in order to undermine

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the old forces of the ancien regime. Smolariy, Engels despised the doctrinal (tactical) precepts of the old order, and he concluded that the amateur proletarian soldier was better able to ascertain the objective conditions of modem warfare than the privileged officer of die capitalist state. Engels’ views on the military are particularly illuminating in regards to the Russian CivH War for two reasons. First, Engels’ writings on military affairs—no mater how extensive—lack substantial guidance on the shape o f the socialist armed forces that would replace die counter-revolutionary armies of the old regime. At times, in die very last writings of his career, Engels even went so far as to argue that the large conscription armies of the capitalist states, in conjunction with expanded voting privileges and increased workers' rights, might lead to a peaceful victory of the proletariat thus obviating the need for a violent revolution and socialist army. Second, Engels indicated that even should armed struggle be necessary for the triumph of the revolution, the militarily unschooled proletariat was intuitively better prepared than the professional officers because leaders of the old regime were tied to antiquated concepts of the warfare that failed to recognize the new objective realities. Lenin adopted Engel’s military perspective with modifications for the particular conditions in Russia. Lenin’s writings on the Russian Revolution of 1905 illustrate that the Bolshevik leader believed more firmly in violent revolution than Engels, but Lenin still focused much of his writing on the destruction of the armies of the old regime and little on the form of the new army that would defend a successful revolution. In fact, he wrote of three lessons learned from the 1905 struggle in Moscow: the absolute necessity for

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“desperate, bloody war” in the armed uprising against the state, the need for offensive, violent action to sway ova: die troops o f die old order, and “new barricade tactics. . . the tactics of guerrilla warfare.”9 Lenin’s views diverged from Engels’ over die scale and intensity of the armed struggle that would be needed for the proletariat to seize power, but both men stQI viewed the fight purely in terms o f taking power and undermining the state’s armed forces. In addition, they both distrusted the structure o f conventional armies. Neither man considered die possibility that revolutionary forces might initially overthrow an established army with ease only to have to face new counter-revolutionary armies, possibly aided by capitalist countries, in conventional warfare. The Bolshevik leader continued to distrust conventional armies through the first weeks after seizing power in 1917—although the severe fighting of the Civil War and his own pragmatic nature led him to change his ideas on warfare prior to the decisive struggles of 1919. With the complete collapse of the Kerensky government and its army in October 1917 (November, new style), Lenin quickly saw the need to build an effective fighting force. His new, socialist army was to be a militia force with a new style of discipline that respected the soldiers’ rights. He clearly meant to continue the use of elected officers and soldiers’ committees while hoping that propaganda and the allure of fighting for the world’s first socialist state might restore some of the fighting spirit of the soldiers.10 Thus, from a purely theoretical point of view, Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks faced the task of creating an army in 1918 within the construct that traditional, professional armies were unfit for a socialist state. They clung to the belief that recruitment must be

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voluntary (at least until such time as the elimination of all class enemies made a ‘true’ universal conscription possible). They mistrusted old class enemies—especially officers; and they resisted any attempts to centralize die control of the military, which could provide a tool for the aspirations of a potential Bonapartist counter-revolution.11 In addition to Marxist theory, die Bolsheviks could turn to several practical examples of revolutionary regimes that attempted to build armies from both new forces and the remnants o f old military structures. In particular, the American and French Revolutions offered examples of newly established governments attempting to construct armies with only partial support from existing structures to having to defend their regimes from counter-revolution and outside intervention. At first glance, the American Revolution appears to exemplify the triumph of a militia force—culled from the mass of common citizens—over the highly trained professionals of a regular army. Certainly, the American militia made a significant contribution to the victory over Britain, but there are several circumstances that mitigated the applicability of the American example to the builders of the Red Army. First, die American militia performance was, at best, a mixed bag. The local citizen soldiers provided significant support to regular Continental soldiers at Bunker HID and Cowpens, but militia could also disintegrate at the mere approach of British regulars as at Camden. Generally, the militia performed best when teamed with the well-drilled 'professionals' of the Continental Army. A second factor that made the American example less appealing to the Red leaders was that the American militia was an established force accepted under British rule. The British government encouraged, and—to a degree—trained and supplied

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the American militia prior to the Revolution in order to have local forces ready to oppose the French. On the other hand, fee tsarist regime did not establish or recognize a militia along the lines o f die American model, in part to avoid die potential of such a force supporting an opposition regime. In short, die Americans had an established militia before the revolution began, whereas the Bolsheviks could turn to few, if any, nmt» as ready-made forces to support their cause. As for die red guards, this clandestine, untrained, and idsupplied force was forbidden under the Tsar and barely tolerated by die Provisional government, and it was a far cry from the extensive American militia.*2 Similarly, die Americans had a ready-made pool of officers, many trained through die militia system, who could command both their die Continental and m ilitia forces. O f course, George Washington is the classic example of skilled military leader who gained experience as a militia leader with die British before becoming a revolutionary commander. However, the American example of a revolutionary officer corps had lim ited applicability to die Red situation. The difference is subtle but important The American officers, mostly members of colonies separating from their mother country, were willing to take up die American cause and did not have to give up positions in die regular British Army. In fact, many of these officers became significant leaders of die Revolution. The Bolsheviks, attempting a complete dissolution of the former government, had paltry few party members with military experience. The Reds had to turn to members of die former regime for military expertise, but die Imperial officers would have to be treated as political outsiders, not integral supporters o f the revolution.

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Even more than the American Revolution, the French Revolution provided the Reds with examples, though still limited, o f constructing a new revolutionary army. The French upheaval, more than the American, went through stages that mirrored the Russian Revolutions of 1917. Specifically, die initial period o f die French Revolution (1789-1792), Hke the period of die Provisional Government in Russia (February to October 1917), allowed for the continued existence of the old regime's Army while new forces were raised. Another similarity is that die French initiated die concept of a "nation in arms,” which reflected some aspects of the Marxist concept o f a popularly supported citizens' army. However, the French example for a revolutionary army was still only partially applicable to the Reds' situation. First and foremost, the forces of the French ancien regime, though decimated and disillusioned, provided significant strength to the French Army, even after the radicals seized power in 1792.13 The key indication of the French reliance on established military structures was the amalgame order that meshed the incoming forces from the levee en masse with the remaining and more well-trained Royal Army units. The Bolsheviks did not have this choice. They relied heavily on undermining the morale and discipline of virtually the entire Imperial Army in order to seize power. The French revolutionaries were able to win the support of significant parts of the old Royalist Army to their cause while the Bolsheviks—using peace, bread, and land as their rallying cry—intentionally subverted the military effectiveness of the vast majority of the Tsarist forces to ease the Red takeover in October. Even so, the Bolsheviks needed technical military expertise and leadership for their new armed forces, and like the French revolutionary government, they hoped to tap into an

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existing, experienced officer corps to provide that help. In tins regard—the use o f officers from the old regime—the Bolsheviks found two close parallels with die French example. First, most o f the higher ranking Royalist officers left France early in the Revolution, and this exodns gave the opportunity for lower ranking officers to achieve high positions in the amalgamated French Army.14 Similarly, the mass of die highest ranking tsarist generals refused to serve the new Bolshevik regime, but a large number of talented, lower ranking, and younger officers were willing to support die Reds. The second aspect o f the French use of officers that had a strong connection to the Russian situation was die role of deputies on mission (or as die Russians termed, political commissars) in overseeing die political loyalty of the officers from die old regime.15 The French revolutionaries, particularly under Jacobin rule, dispatched civilian deputies to their armies who had substantial power to approve orders and could even bring about die execution o f ineffective officers. The Bolsheviks believed that commissars, modeled on the French example, would ensure die loyalty of die former tsarist officers. Later in the French Revolution, after die Jacobins had lost power, Napoleon removed the need for this political oversight. The Bolsheviks, never completely trusting the former Imperial officers during the Civil War, kept die system of political commissars throughout that War and into die Second World War. hi sum, die Bolsheviks combined their theoretical concepts of Marxism with some examples of actual revolutionary armies in search of concepts for building their own army. Initially, they resisted using units and officers from die tsarist regime, and hoped for a militia force of loyal Bolsheviks.

Later, the Reds had to modify their concepts and tap into

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some of die old regime's professionally trained officers; although they never w oe able to use a significant number of complete units from die tsarist Army. Given Marxist theory and the differences between Russian conditions and the eariier French and American situations, it is not surprising that few units from die old army made it into the new Bolshevik force. John Erickson writes that immediately after ousting Kerensky, Lenin could only call on four units for die defense of the capital: die Latvian Brigade, the 436th Novolodozhskii Regiment, die 479th Khadnikovskii Regiment, and an unnamed reserve regiment. D. Fedotoff White adds that die 4th Cavalry Division (ready no more than a regiment in strength) and a few armored car detachments could also be counted into the Bolshevik side.16 Obviously, these pitifully small forces would not even be sufficient for a small corps, much less the future 5 million man forces that Bolsheviks eventually utilized to defeat their White opponents. On a limited scale, the Latvian troops made significant contributions to sustaining the new regime in the early months of power, and they were used as shock troops at key moments, especially on the Southern Front in 1919.17 One reason that die Latvians were able support the Soviet government was that they believed in the Bolshevik promises of self-determination for the ethnic groups of the former Tsarist empire. Even so, the Latvians were only a small force o f elite troops, not the foundation o f a mass army. During the struggle for power in 1917, die Bolsheviks searched among other sources for armed soldiers that party leaders optimistically hoped could be used as a base for their new army. One of these sources was the “red guards.” These troops were armed detachments of factory workers, and while they were well suited for the machinations of

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Petrograd politics, they were too disorganized, too ill armed, and too few in number to defoid Lenin’s government Similarly, die Baltic sailors had been a valuable source of muscle for die Bolsheviks on die streets o f die capital, but as die Kronsdadt rebellion was to prove, die sailors were too anarchistic to be a reliable force.18 Although the Bolsheviks could not find sufficient, reliable military forces from the old army or their own red guards, they were able to avail themselves of die large administrative machinery that supported the old War Ministry. Soviet historian N. E. Kakurin points out that die new Soviet government inherited both the central and local bureaucracies from die old army, and that these administrative organs remained relatively unimpaired despite die numerous permutations o f die military’s High command structure in 1918.19 According to another Soviet source, die Bolsheviks used 10,339 civil servants in the military bureaucracy during the Civil War.20 The role of this administrative machinery in the construction o f the Red Army must have been considerable, and it warrants much research in its own right Suffice it to say that for our purposes die continuily of die bureaucracy at least gave the Bolsheviks some stability in their military system, but die cutting edge of die armed forces—die fighting soldiers, officers, and structure of die high command—had to come from outside of the old regime. Thus, with a relatively stable bureaucracy, but too few units and ill suited theoretical concepts, the Bolsheviks set about building an army and its high command. This construction took place in fits and starts during 1918 when the Bolshevik regime faced a growing, but disorganized, opponent For die historian, tracing the military events of this year and die creation of die Red Army is a different task.21 The chief problem is that die

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Soviet government created an overlapping and conflicting aggregate of bureaus, agencies and militaiy staffs each claiming to have more authority than they really had. Despite this difficulty, a careful study of die evolution of die Red Amoy in 1918 reveals a trend towards a more centralized force, manned by conscripts, led by professionals, and committed to fighting a more conventional style of warfare.

n. Demobilization.

Upon seizing power in October 1917 (November, new style), the Bolsheviks immediately set about dismantling the old army. Lenin’s new government, known as the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), included a MiKtary-Naval Committee concerned with disbanding and “democratizing” the oki army.22 This committee consisted of Nikolai V. Krylenko, Pavel E. Dybenko, and Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko. These committee members were all dedicated revolutionaries with little military experience. Krylenko had been an ensign in die Imperial Navy and now found himself the Army's new commander in chief. Antonov-Ovseenko had studied some military theory, and he later was a moderately effective military leader in the Ukraine. Two other Bolsheviks later joined the committee: Efraim Skfianskii and Nikolai T. PodvoiskiL The work of the committee focused on demobilizing the old army, but it also touched upon the issue of forming a new army. This new, revolutionary, army was to be a volunteer force with elected officers, no ranks, and no military awards. In addition, the soldiers’ committees,

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which had done so much to destroy die operational effectiveness of die Imperial Army, were intended to play a major role in the new army. The Military-Naval Committee took several steps to bring the command structure o f die old army under its control while simultaneously demobilizing the soldiers.23 On 23 November 1917, Krylenko relieved the Commander in Chief General N. N. Dukhonin, by phone. Two weeks later, Krylenko arrived at the high command headquarters in Mogilev to formally relieve Dukhonin, but in an ugly incident, the soldiers and sailors accompanying the former ensign killed the unfortunate Dukhonin despite Krylenko’s protests. In general, the Bolsheviks sought to m inim ize the violence in their takeover of the army. Nonetheless, the Dukhonin incident accelerated the process by which many high ranking tsarist officers fled to form an anti-Bolshevik movement in the Don and Kuban regions. The Committee issued its official decree of demobilization on 23 November 1917. The decree sought to retain some parts of the old army to “screen” the German Army at the front, but in general die order fulfilled Lenin’s promise to get the soldiers home as soon as possible. Four days after the demobilization order, the Committee issued another decree that put the old military schools under Bolshevik control—a clear attempt to remove the threat of counter-revolution from the young officer cadet corps. Two more decrees on 29 December confirmed the principle of elective command and enumerated the soldiers’ rights under the new regime.24 At die end of December, the Bolsheviks held an All-Army Conference on Demobilization. The conference not only took up die issue of demobilization; it was also committed to giving a recommendation to the Military-Naval Committee for the creation of

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and revolutionary backgrounds. Three plans for the new army were discussed.23 First, the few former tsarist officers now in die Red service (known as military specialists to die Bolsheviks) recommended that parts o f the old army could still be the base for a new force. Second, die Petrograd Red Guard Staff (a group of Bolshevik Party members led by Podvoiskii), not surprising^, believed that the red guard detachments could expend to become die center of a large workers’ army. Still another group favored forming a “socialist guard” of volunteers in die rear while die remaining units o f die old army maintained die screen of forces watching die Germans at dm front While die delegates debated, events at die front began to force the Bolsheviks to take concrete actions. On 4 January 1918, die Romanian Front collapsed under mild pressure from die advancing German forces (a Front is roughly equivalent to an army group). The Petrograd Staff sent red guard units to shore up die wobbly front line troops, but it became painfully obvious that the red guards did not exist in near enough numbers to resist the Germans. At die same time, Podvoiskii became die biggest spokesman for a new “socialist” army of volunteers built upon “mutual comradely respect”26 The Bolsheviks were beginning to recognize the need to expand die army, but they remained reluctant to abandon such cherished Marxist concepts as vohmteerism. Within these guidelines, Podvoiskii canvassed the Petrograd workers for more recruits. Based on their work at die Demobilization Conference, Podvoiskii and Krylenko presented a plan for the formation of die new army to die Third Congress of Soviets on 25 and 26 January 1918.27 The concept was familiar—to form a “socialist” army in die rear

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while screening the Germans at Ac front with the remnants of old forces. The plan also included draft instructions for the creation of an All-Russian Collegiate that would be die organizational, but not operational, head of the new “Red Army." The original draft did not survive Lenin’s pen intact The Bolshevik leader, while agreeing that initial recruitment needed to be voluntary, removed the strong all-volunteer clause from the proposal, thus leaving open die possibility o f conscription in the future.

DDL Creation o f die Army.

After the deliberations of die Congress, die Scnmarkom issued a decree on 28 January 1918 creating The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. Still rooted firmly in Marxist theory, die decree called for die army to draw upon “die most conscious and organized elements of the working people” as its source of soldiers.28 In fact, prospective recruits had to obtain statements from two sources (such as trade unions or soldiers’ committees) that attested to die political reliability of die new soldier. Finally, die decree authorized die formation of the All-Russian Collegiate to head the administration of the army, but it did not contain specifics on the CoQegiate’s composition nor its powers. Three days later, the Sovnarkom partially rectified this oversight by appointing five members to die Collegiate, including Krylenko and Podvoiskii, and appropriating 20 million rubles for die Collegiate’s budget29 Legislating the bare bones administration of a new army was one thing, transforming this paper army into an effective fighting force was quite another. No one

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realized the desperate situation o f Bolshevik power and the utter inadequacy o f its armed farces better than Lenin. This realization was die strength behind hi« argum ents fo r the “breathing space” that the Brest-Litovsk provided for the budding of the Red Army. The debates over Brest-Litovsk were particularly bitter, but the wisdom of Lenin’s view was confirmed when die negotiations were temporarily broken off in mid February, and die German army advanced with relative im punity towards Petrograd and deep into die Ukraine. This renewed threat helped Lenin win over a majority of die party to his views, and die Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed on 3 March 1919. The uneasy peace gave the Bolsheviks about two months of relative calm to begin building die new Red Army. Ironically, it was not the Germans who ended the breathing space, but instead a conflict between the Bolsheviks and die Czechoslovak Legion. While Lenin sought to buy time on die political front for the survival of the fledgling Soviet state, the German advance into the Ukraine in February spurred die creation of several central military organizations including die Supreme Military Soviet This body began as the Extraordinary Petrograd Military Staff in February in order to mobilize workers from the capital for the Soviet defense in the Ukraine. Under the leadership of the former tsarist General ML D. Bonch-Bruevich, die Staff changed its name in March to the Supreme Military Soviet, and almost by default, it took over die strategic and operational direction of die screens that faced the Germans on die western border of Russia. In addition, die Supreme Military Soviet, influenced as it was by several former Imperial officers, sought to create die Red Army in die image of a more conventional military force that even included reconstructing the militaty district system of the old army.

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Even as the Military Soviet set about its work, Sovnarkom established another commission that was to draw up plans for the establishment o f a “socialist militia.* In addition, the Operations section o f die Moscow district staff attempted to gain control of the units fighting the “internal” war behind the screens. Given die confusion of social, economic, and military conditions in Russia after die Bolshevik takeover, this plethora o f organizations with overlapping responsibilities and often conflicting goals should not be surprising. Soviet historians, and western scholar John Erickson, have dubbed die time from March to May 1918 as the period of parallelism.30 The Military Soviet, which contained a large number of military specialists, saw the Germans as die mam enemy, and they tried to build a conventional army upon the screens in order to combat this threat The Collegiate, along with other ad hoc organizations that tended to be manned by Bolshevik Party members, worried about internal enemies—a counter-revolutionary threat from within Russia—and they sought to build a politically reliable socialist army that could defeat this foe. The first step towards rationalizing this confused approach occurred on 13 March 1918 with the appointment of Leon Trotsky as the People’s Commissar for war. So much has been written about Trotsky and his role in the Revolution and Civil War that it is tempting to dismiss most accounts as politicized hyperbole. Yet Trotsky remains a fascinating figure—the creator of the Red Army and second only to Lenin as the key leader on the Bolshevik side o f the war. Though far from perfect, Trotsky was a crucial player in building the Red Army, and he was intelligent enough to provide strategic guidance to the Red commanders while allowing his military leaders considerable

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operational freedom. However, before delving into strategic and operational questions, Trotsky had to free die mote basic issue of constructing an army virtually from scratch. In a speech delivered in Moscow on 19 March 1918, die new War Commissar outlined some o f his views on die need for an effective army.31 He began with die stirring cry, “Comrades! Our Soviet Socialist Republic needs a wed-organized army.” Referring to die traditional Marxist approach to military affairs, Trotsky admitted that the “party deliberately set out to break up the old tsarist Army” and that the first few socialist units “which had been put together in haste” were inadequate for the task. He then elaborated on two proposals that would soon embroil him in controversy with other party members: universal compulsory military training and expanded use of the former tsarist officers (military specialists). In proposing universal military training, Trotsky stopped short of actual conscription; but this training proposal was clearly pointing the Soviet regime towards mandatory military service. As for the officers, Trotsky saw the logic of employing military professionals much as the Bolsheviks also needed trained doctors and engineers in civil society. However, this logic was not very convincing to the party loyalists who, with some justification, questioned the political reliability of the military specialists. With less reasoning, many Bolsheviks opposed the use of the specialists on an emotional reaction to all officers who represented a despised class o f oppressors. A week later, Trotsky made another speech that re-emphasized the need to draw upon skilled military personnel of the old regime: Here I come to a ticklish matter which is at die present time, to some extent, a sore point in our Party life. This is one o f the questions con­ cerning the organization of the Army, namely, the question of drawing

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military specialists, that is, to speak plainly, former officers and generals, into the work o f creating and administering die Army. in the sphere o f command, of operations, o f military actions, we place full responsibility upon the military specialists and, consequently, give diem die necessary powers.32 Trotsky rejected the concept of elected officers, and he warned his audience that the new Bolshevik regime was going to have to rely on skilled military professionals in order to survive. Finally, the new War Commissar argued that die Soviets must rely on a “regular Army” and relegate guerrilla forces to a supporting role. The need to employ the former tsarist officers was a constant refrain of Trotsky throughout die Civil War. In a lecture given in Moscow in April 1918, Trotsky pleaded, “you see, we need instructors who know about military matters.” He then elaborated, “The art of war, that’s a complex subject, involving intricate work,. . . in order to learn, we must have specialists.”33 Although he was one of the strongest supporters of the specialists, Trotsky still feared their political loyalty. Borrowing from the French revolutionary example, Trotsky implemented a system of military-political commissars (later shortened to military commissars) to watch over the military specialists. An order in early April defined the role of the military commissars in the army. They were responsible for political education and morale. They were not to interfere in operational matters, but all orders from the commander needed die commissar’s countersignature in order to be valid. Naturally, this counter-signature authority gave some commissars an excuse to interfere in operational decisions, but all in all, the system worked relatively well.

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W ide Trotsky sought to draw mote forma: tsarist officers into the army, the Bolshevik leaders continued to search for ways to mobilize more soldiers for die ranks. Despite their best efforts, the Bolsheviks probably had no more than 153,000 soldiers in die Red Army by 1 April 1918.34 On 8 April, Sovnarkom issued a decree setting up several local Military Commissariats corresponding to military districts. At first, the Sovnarkom formed these commissariats in only die key regions in European Russia in an attempt to mobilize soldiers from the most reliable areas o f Bolshevik support Later in April, Sovnarkom expanded the commissariats to almost all o f the regions under Bolshevik control33 The quality o f these commissariats varied greatly from district to district, but recruitment began to improve in most regions. On 22 April, Trotsky delivered another speech in Moscow that reiterated several of his favorite themes while also raising some new concepts that pushed the Red Army closer to becoming a regular force.36 Among the old proposals, Trotsky again defended the use o f the military specialists, and he gave a detailed explanation o f the role o f the commissars under the dual command structure. After this explanation, in what had to be dismaying to some o f the old party stalwarts, Trotsky focused on the issue o f conscription. The War Commissar stated that die voluntary principle was “a temporary compromise.” Although he couched conscription in Marxist terms, speaking o f avoiding coercion and waiting until material conditions were right, Trotsky’s message was unmistakable—the new Soviet state was prepared to use conscription, if necessary, in defense o f socialism. The day after Trotsky’s speech, Sovnarkom issued a decree that established the rules and apparatus for universal military training (a necessary precursor to conscription).37

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The decree began by describing socialist Russia as a state surrounded by capitalist enemies. AH workers and peasants who did not employ labor were subject to the training and divided into various age groups. The training was to consist o f no less than 12 hours a week, and the War Commissariat was tasked to find qualified instructors. The decree created the Universal Military Training Administration (the Russian acronym was Vsevobuch) to oversee this training. In early May, Trotsky took a major step towards ending parallelism and rationalizing the Red Army administration.38 First, die War Commissar dissolved die old All-Russian Collegiate and created the All-Russian Supreme Staff. This new organization assumed responsibility for the mobilization o f die Red Army on all fronts thus reducing the multiplicity o f organizations each trying to raise its own type o f army. As part o f this reorganization, the Supreme staff assumed control o f the Moscow operations section. Several days later, the Supreme Staff also took over the direction o f the Supreme Military Soviet, the military specialist dominated Petrograd headquarters. Thus, in addition to rationalizing the administrative and mobilization functions o f the Red Army, Trotsky was creating a unified operational and strategic leadership.

IV. Initial Fighting and Conscription.

Although positive, albeit tentative, steps were being taken to build the Red Army through decrees and bureaucratic reorganizations, the real force behind die creation of fighting forces was combat at the fronts. On the southern front, the embryonic White

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Volunteer movement and the Don Cossacks under their Ataman (or leader), Petr N. Krasnov, were proving that die rabble o f undisciplined soldiers that made up the Red forces at tins juncture were no match for determined and skilled military professionals The turmoil in the Kuban region demanded an expansion o f the Red Army to bolster the sagging Red fortunes in die south. These struggles had a sense o f urgency that had been lacking from die various deliberations concerning die Red Army during the first two months after Brest-Litovsk. Perhaps even more critical was the Soviet response to die threat of die Czech Legion on die Eastern F ront39 During the fighting with Germany, and especially AustriaHungary, die Russians had capitalized on die Czech desire for an independent nation and recruited Czech prisoners to form a corps (sometimes called a legion) to fight against the Central powers. After Brest-Litovsk, die Allies sought to bring these troops to France to fight on die Western F ront The Soviet and the Czech leaders reached an uneasy agreement by which die Legion would join die French by moving to ports in die north and east o f Russia for embarkation on Allied ships. For various reasons, including Trotsky’s own intransigence, the planned, peaceful exodus o f die Czechs fell apart On 14 May, first shots were fired at CheHabinsk as Czech and Soviet forces fought over die right o f the Legion to retain their weapons. Less than two weeks later, die Bolshevik regime and die Czech Legion were in open conflict, in part sparked by Trotsky’s 31 advised order to disarm the Czech forces. Unlike previous opponents to die Red regime, die Czechs were both well-trained and relatively numerous. In feet these early struggles on die Eastern Front even convinced the fervent revolutionary,

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Podvoiskii, that die Red Array needed to torn to conscription in order to build an effective fighting force. The Red Army suffered several embarrassing defeats at the hands o f the Czechs, and these futures galvanized the Bolsheviks into action. One o f the first steps was taken by the Party Central Executive Committee on 18 May 1918.40 Based on the April law creating the local military commissariats, the Central Committee formalized the establishment o f Military Councils at the province, uyezd, and volost levels. These organizations contained one military specialist and two political commissars, and they were entrusted with die responsibility o f recruiting soldiers in die rear areas and, if necessary, converting into an operational headquarters when confronted with active enemy forces. Later in the war, a three man command structure became the standard headquarters organization fo r all Red army units at army level and above—a commander, his chief o f staff; and the military commissar. On 29 May 1918, the Soviets finally turned to conscription to fill the ranks o f their undermanned army.41 A decree from the Central Committee called for conscription among the workers and peasants, while the bourgeoisie and other formeriy privileged classes were to serve the Soviet war effort in the various non-combatant capacities. The Bolsheviks were still hesitant to call for conscription in all regions o f Russia. Therefore, they began with a partial measure that included only the Moscow, Petrograd, Don and Kuban districts. These areas either contained large numbers o f pro-Bolshevik workers or were particularly threatened by the nascent White forces. On 12 June, the Bolsheviks felt confident enough to extend the conscription law to all districts under their control.

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Not long after die Central Committee issued its initial decree, Trotsky reinforced die idea o f conscription. On 7 June, he reiterated that die used o f volunteers was only a temporary measure.42 Soon after, in a report to the Sovnarkom, Trotsky stated that the initial conscription and compulsory military training were working wdL43 In fact, Trotsky was pretty close to the mark. According to both Soviet and western sources, die initial conscription in Moscow—admittedly, a pro-Bolshevik stronghold—yielded 12,000 new soldiers without excessive evasion or protest44 The success o f die initial call for soldiers from the workers o f Moscow led to an additional plea to Moscow’s proletariat on 17 June.45 The mobilization o f soldiers on an ad hoc basis by district had been a moderate success, and enough to convince Trotsky that the new Soviet state could implement universal conscription. On 26 June, he presented a plan to die Sovnarkom that would establish systematic, centralized conscription in all areas under Bolshevik rule.46 The Soviet leaders, ever reluctant to approve a plan that seemed to contradict Marxist doctrine, did not give the plan their immediate approval. While they debated, the need for more troops forced another impromptu call for the workers o f Petrograd to supply additional soldiers to die ranks o f die Red Army. At die 5th All-Russian Congress on 10 July 1918, die Soviets finally adopted universal military conscription. Trotsky was clearly die moving force behind this action. He made an impassioned speech to the Congress that once again emphasized the temporary nature o f voluntary enlistment: This was a principle that we fought for and promoted. It was

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a necessary compromise measure for a particular moment, because there was no other solution available. But if you take all o f our statements o f principle since fee October Revolution, all our programmatic speeches, you will then be able to establish that we considered the voluntary principle precisely as a temporary measure, a palliative, as a measure which was contrary in principle to die task o f budding a real workers’ and peasants’ army.47 Certainly, Trotsky distorted the extent to which die voluntary principle was a temporary measure and contrary to traditional socialist views o f die military. Nonetheless, he correctly emphasized the extent to which conscription filled the ranks o f die Soviets’ enemies, and the members o f die Congress could not ignore the serious situation that the Czechs and White Volunteer Army had forced upon the Bolshevik regime. The 5th All-Russian Congress adopted the proposal for compulsory military service.48 The decree stressed the serious danger facing die Bolshevik nation: “The Russian Soviet Republic is like a fortress which is besieged on every side by imperialist forces.” All citizens between 18 and 40 years old were eligible for service. The decree instructed the district commissariats to carry out the recruiting. The Congress also reaffirmed the need to use the military specialists in order “to create a centralized, welltrained and well-disciplined army.” Additional measures called for schools to train more military leaders (preferably from among the ranks o f loyal workers and party members), reaffirm ed die use o f military commissars to oversee the work o f die military specialists,

and trumpeted the need for “iron revolutionary discipline” in the ranks o f the Red Army. This iron discipline was certainly a far cry from the ‘comradely respect’ o f die early Bolshevik proclamations.

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V. Officers and Centralization.

The passing o f die conscription resolution effectively aided debate over methods for recruiting Red Army soldiers, but die dispute over die use o f former tsarist officers reached a high point in July and in fact never completely subsided during the course o f die Civil War. The crisis was sparked by political events early in die month when die Left Socialist Revolutionary Party (Left SRs), which had been allied with the Bolsheviks in a quasi-coalition government, rebelled against die Bolsheviks, assassinated die German ambassador, Mirbach, and wounded Lenin in an attempted assassination. Naturally, these incidents contributed to die already growing feelings o f isolation among the Bolsheviks and sparked the rise o f Red terror and concomitant White terror—one o f the grimmest aspects o f die Civil War. Soon after die Left SR revolt, Mikhail A. Muraviev, the Soviet commander on the Volga front and a former tsarist officer, changed sides, and with several Red units, he joined the White and Czech forces. Operationally, Muraviev’s defection presented difficulties to die Red forces on die Volga, but perhaps more importantly his actions placed die entire concept o f using the military specialists into doubt In addition to questions about the use o f specialists, die Muraviev incident produced two other effects.49 First, Trotsky may have lost some power to die military opposition that resented his reliance on the specialists expertise. Second, die Bolsheviks increased die centralized control of die Army, which included an end to any pretenses o f elected officers, soldiers' committees, and local autonomy.

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Predictably, Trotsky spoke fo r die need to continue die use and recruitment o f form a' tsarist officers. On 18 July, die W ar Commissar attacked those Communist commanders who refused to take orders from the military specialists.30 He accused these communists o f being “insolent” and stressed the need for military discipline and proper subordination in the chain o f command. Trotsky was not immune to die Bolshevik resentment felt towards those officers who pretended to support die regime and then betrayed the Reds’ in a speech in late July. He warned that Red terror would be used against traitors and that the heretofore neutral former Imperial officers could not just stand on the sidelines in the current struggle trying to keep “out o f politics.”51 Yet even while admonishing those who were disloyal and wavering in the ranks o f the mQitaiy specialists, Trotsky cautioned that the Bolshevik regime must not engage in blanket terrorism against the officers—the Soviets needed the skills o f the specialists for survival in the military struggle. At the same time that he was defending die former tsarist officers, Trotsky also turned to a previously under-utilized source o f military expertise—the former noncommissioned officers (NCOs) o f die Imperial Anny. In a speech in early August, the War Commissar called on the patriotism o f the former NCOs and promised them advancement in the ranks o f die Red Army.32 The response to this plea was moderately successful Some of the former NCOs filled the ranks o f the officer corps o f the Red Army, the most famous being the First Cavalry Army commander, Semen Budenny; but for die most part, the former NCOs remained as noncommissioned officers—performing functions as vital as those o f the commissioned officers. In particular, the NCOs taught

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basic military skills such as marksmanship to the raw Red conscripts, instilled discipline in the lower ranks, and provided some badly needed tactical expertise at the small unit leveL Events on the Eastern Front continued to force die Soviets to move towards a more conventional army in August o f 1918. The fighting began to focus on die city o f Kazan, famous for its role in die expansion o f die Russian empire under Ivan die Terrible. White and Czech forces took Kazan on 6 August 1918, precipitating a powerful reaction by the Soviets. Trotsky arrived with the authority to shoot leaders o f the deserting Red units, an authority that he did not hesitate to use. Also arriving on the scene were reinforcements for the shock troops o f die Soviet regime, die Latvian brigade under Ioakim Io. Vatsetis. Later to be appointed Red commander in chief Vatsetis found h im self fighting Czechs and White Russian forces on the Volga river in August 1918. Eventually, the Reds were to triumph in September, but in the meantime, die Latvian commander sent a scathing report to Moscow condemning “the complete incapacity o f the worker’s detachments” in the struggle for Kazan.33 Vatsetis pleaded for the creation o f more regular army units like his Latvians. Perhaps this plea was little more than self-promotion. None the less, Vatsetis' condemnation o f irregular volunteer forces was not lost on the Soviet leadership who, after die recapture o f Kazan, were more determined than ever to raise a disciplined, conventional force. A further step towards die centralization o f die Soviet war effort occurred on 19 August when die War Commissariat was renamed die People’s Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Beyond die simple change o f tides, the Commissariat focused its structure into sections for recruiting, administration, training, arms and die reserves.43

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The next step in die consolidation o f power into a central military authority was perhaps the most important On 6 September 1918, the Soviets promulgated a law establishing die Revolutionary Military Council o f die Republic (known by its Russian acronym, Rew oensoviet).55 The decree, once again, described the Soviet Republic as an “armed camp” and spoke o f the need for unified military direction. It dissolved die Supreme Military Soviet and placed die All-Russian Supreme Staff under die control o f die Rewoensoviet. In addition, the resolution created the post o f commander in chief and appointed Vatsetis to die position. The initial structure o f die Rew oensoviet included several subordinate structures.56 O f course, die key member was Trotsky as die People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. The decree allowed for other People’s Commissars to serve on the Rewoensoviet, but it did not specify who nor how many. The high command (in Russian, Glavkom) of die Republic’s armed forces also formed a key element o f the Rewoensoviet. Also included were die Political Administration (die PUR, which controlled die military commissarsX the Military Revolutionary Tribunal, die Supreme Military Inspectorate, and die Central Supply Administration. The initial members o f die Rew oensoviet were Trotsky, Vatsetis, Peter A. Kobozev, Konstantin A. Mekhonoshin, F. F. Raskol’nikov, L N. Smirnov, and Karl Kh. Damshevskh. Between September 1918 and January 1919, die Rewoensoviet underwent several personnel changes. Raskol’nikov left die body, but several new members were added: Antonov-Ovseenko and Vladimir I. Nevskii (who both only served until May 1919), A. P. Rozengol’ts, Semen L Aralov, Podvoiskii (die former supporter o f a socialist 89

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militia, now firmly convinced o f die efficacy o f a regular army), Konstantin K. Yurenev, VasfltM. Al’tfater, Efiaim M. Sktianskii, and a young Georgian with a scarred face and determined manner, Josef V. Stalin. As with many o f die measures enacted by die Soviets in die first year o f their existence, the Bolshevik leaders found that there was a large chasm between written law and concrete action. On 30 October 1918, only two months after the initial creation o f die Rewoensoviet, die Central Committee o f die Party felt it necessary to reassert the authority o f tins body declaring it “the country’s supreme organ o f military authority.”37 The Central Committee also reaffirmed the preeminent role o f Trotsky as die head o f the Rew oensoviet and Vatsetis as commander in chief. Finally, die Committee’s resolution gave die commander in chief independent powers “in all questions o f a strategic-operative character,” although it still required die counter-signature o f another member o f the Rewoensoviet to make an operational order valid.

VL Evolution o f High Command.

One o f die key subordinate elements o f die Rewoensoviet, die Glavkom, evolved over time from September 1918 to January 1919. Glavkom was not a single, clearly defined organization; it was the high command o f die Red Army as embodied in the commander in chief and the supporting staffs that assisted die commander.38 Eventually, Glavkom gained die power to issue operational orders in its own name and it had "full independence on all questions o f a strategic-operational character"—although the

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cntwmandfy m r.h ief (nr later in thft w ar htg rhitfFnFsta ff) grill w eeded th e cnim tw -aignalnre

of a political member o f the Rew oensoviet to make die order valid. Another concession given to Glavkom was the authority to appoint military commandos at die Front level and below. To carry out his functions, the commander in chief was given several personal aides and two key staffs: the All-Russian Supreme Staff and the Field Staff. The All-Russian Supreme Staffj which had earlier subsumed the functions o f the All-Russian Collegiate and the Supreme Military Soviet, performed most o f the administrative functions o f the Red Army. These functions were divided into four categories: universal military training, organization, mobilization and staff training.59 Initially under the direction o f Bonch-Bruevich, the All-Russian Supreme Staff came under the capable direction o f Alexander A. Svechin in August o f 1918. Svechin was a superb administrator who later became a leading military theorist for the Red Army in the 1920s. Under his leadership, the Supreme Staff performed essential administrative functions, including the key mission o f mobilizing soldiers under die recent conscription laws. Although entrusted with a wide variety o f tasks, the Supreme Staff rarely intervened in operational matters. For strategic-operational decisions, the Glavkom relied upon the Field Staff. Created on 6 September 1918 along with the Rew oensoviet, the Field Staff inchided sections (or departments) for operations, intelligence, and communications, as well as various inspectorates for the technical services (such as artillery and engineers), and a commandant’s chancellery for the staff’s own internal functions. The Rew oensoviet conducted a minor reorganization o f the Field Staff on 8 November 1918 by giving more

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clear definition s to the responsibilities o f die various departments and adding an aviation section as well as a radio-telegraph inspectorate.*50 The initial members o f die Field Staff w o e Nikolai L Rattel’ (military specialist), and V. G. Sharmanov and K.F. Fominov (military commissars). By 1 November, according to historian John Erickson, the core o f the Field Staff was the “bureau o f three,” Trotsky, Vatsetis, and the military commissar, Semen L Aralov.61 While the bureau of three may have dominated operational affairs early in the war, the Field Staff came to its full fruition as an operational staff for Glavkom in mid 1919 when Boris M. Shaposhnikov and Pavel P. Lebedev became members o f the Field Staff. Shaposhnikov, who later gained fame as a competent, stabilizing influence on the Red Army in the inter-war years, was a thoroughly professional member o f the operations section o f the Field staff. Though the contributions o f younger officers such as Shaposhnikov were significant, much of the credit for the Field Staff’s solid performance in the Civil War can be attributed to the quiet, self-effacing Lebedev. Lebedev’s five years as chief o f staff were outstanding; he was instrumental in matining a high level o f professionalism in die orders and plans o f the Red Army. Throughout the long ordeal o f the Civil War, Lebedev’s figure could be seen constantly at work in die offices o f die Field Staff. With thick dark hair, bushy eyebrows and a broad mustache, the Chief o f Staff was a bit o f an alter ego to the more flamboyant commander in chief Kamenev. But Lebedev was no shadowy background figure; he was affable, clear thinking, and thorough.

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As the Rew oensoviet and die Field Staff groped for die reigns o f operational control, the Central Committee o f the Party created yet another organization, the Soviet o f Workers and Peasants Defense, on 30 November 1918 that occasionally intervened in die operational affairs o f the Red Army.42 Also known as the Defense Council, this body was primarily concerned with coordinating all o f the Sovnarkom Commissariats into the war effort, especially supply and labor. The Council included Lenin and Trotsky, as well as Stalin, Nevskii, Nikolai P. Briukhanov and Leonid B. Krasin. The Council normally concerned itself with issues o f mobilizing the nation's resources (Krasin headed the Extraordinary Commission for Red Array Supply), but die Rew oensoviet was ostensibly subordinated to the Defense Council and occasionally received operational guidance from the Council At this point, it is useful to describe the structure o f the highest Red military organizations that were to carry die Soviet state through the batdes o f 1919 (see tables 1 and 2). Unlike the clean lines o f command that we often find in today’s nrilitaiy organizations, the Red command structure was confused with overlapping bodies and authority, but it managed to function despite the confusion and duplication o f effort At the highest level o f political control (the level that Clausewitz would have considered most crucial), the Red Army received input from both Party and State organs. The Politburo, the Central Committee o f the Bolshevik (later, the Communist) Party, and on rarer occasions party Congresses all provided guidance. Similariy, the Sovnarkom, representing the state organizations (the Soviets) also gave instructions and orders to the Red Army.

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The State Defense Council attempted to coordinate die activities o f die various People’s Commissariats in die Sovnarkom for a

war effort

AH o f this input went to the Rew oensoviet which included Glavkom, die Red Army high command. The Rew oensoviet and Glavkom absorbed die political (and occasionally operational) directions from above and attempted to turn this guidance into definitive orders for die Red Army. Glavkom relied upon the Supreme Staff to formulate regulations and directives for die administration, organization and training o f the Red Army, and it called upon the Field Staff to provide the operational direction o f the Red Army, and it called upon the Field Staff to provide the operational direction o f the Red Army’s military units. While the Red Army’s high command began to settle into a stable organization, the lower levels o f command also took on a fixed structure. Again, it was the fighting on die eastern front that shaped die Red structure. During the struggle on the Volga and at Kazan, die Red command formed Fronts (Army Groups). These Fronts and their subordinate armies partially adopted the R ew oensoviet structure with a commander, chief o f staff, and political commissar. Eventually, the Rew oensoviet o f the Republic was mirrored by R ew oensoviet at the Front and army level throughout the Red Army command. In all cases, the Front or army commander needed the counter-signature o f his military commissar to make an order valid. In addition, the Rewoensoviet issued instructions that standardized (at least in theory) the structure of infantry divisions in the Red Army based on the model o f units on the Eastern F ront63

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ft took time for die Soviet command structure to settle into a routine, and it took gratified officers to provide com petent commanders for d ie m ilitary leadership To this

end, Trotsky continued his prolonged battle to gather in more military specialists from the former Imperial Army. Still stung fay the disloyalty o f some officers at Kazan, Trotsky issued an order in September 1918 that threatened to arrest die families o f officers who deserted to the Whites.64 The harsh tone o f this order only masked die desperate need of die Reds to obtain more officers. On 3 October, the All-Russian Supreme Staff, under Svechin’s direction, issued a set o f rules and regulations governing die recruitment and use o f mffitary specialists.63 The urgent situation was reflected in this document that spoke of die need for large numbers o f officers in die “shortest possible time.” The Supreme Staff particularly emphasized die need to acquire more officers in the technical specialties such as artillery and military engineers. Ten days later, Trotsky reinforced die efforts o f the Supreme Staff with a directive to die local Rewoensoviets to accept even larger numbers o f military specialists “o f whom there is a great need.”66

VIL Overcoming die Opposition.

By the beginning o f 1919, die Soviets had structures in place to meet the three key needs o f die Army: a command and staff officers, and soldiers. The new conscription laws brought the manpower o f die Red Army up to 800,000 soldiers by December 1918 (see table 3). Also fay this time, the Reds had recruited over 22,000 officers and 128,000 NCOs. These numbers would rise even further by April 1919. Raw numbers do not

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always tell a complete story, and any numbers referring to troop strengths—for both Reds and Whites—are always questionable, particularly when desertion plagues the Bolsheviks so severely that they had to offer frequent amnesties in order to entice soldiers back into the ranks. None the less, considering the difficulties o f building a state and an army from scratch in die midst o f revolution and civil war, the Soviets were achieving a remarkable success. This success was not, to borrow a mathematics term, a straight line path. The vacillations o f the fighting front, as well as die constant tension between military necessity, theory, and politics, all continued to make the Soviet progress towards a regular army a fitful struggle. Even after the legislative rationalization o f the Red Army’s command and recruitment structure in late 1918, Trotsky still faced serious challenges to his authority as the War Commissar, and by extension to his concepts o f conscription, die use o f ex-Tsarist officers, and a centralized operational direction for the Red Army. One o f these challenges came in January 1919 when Red Army units near Perm on die eastern front suffered an embarrassing defeat Several Red units fled, and the leadership o f die Republic Rewoensoviet as well as the former tsarist officers in command o f Red armies was admittedly weak Although die Perm debacle proved to be only a temporary setback, at die time, the poor performance o f the embryonic Red Army units and leadership did not bode well for continued Bolshevik support o f a regular army. The defeat at Perm prompted Lenin to send a special commission to investigate the events. This commission was headed by Stalin and Feliks E. Dzerzhinsky, die head o f die Soviet internal security police (die notorious CHEKA). Despite the popular depictions o f

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Stalin and Dzerzhinsky as sinister and rabid opponents to Trotsky, the harsh condemnations contained in their “Perm report” probably resulted more from theoretical opposition to Trotsky’s concepts than from personal anim osities. Certainly there was no love lost between Trotsky and Stalin, especially considering that Trotsky had demanded Stalin’s recall from the southern front in October o f 1918. However, Stalin also had a justified complaint against the former tsarist officers who sometimes used their technical expertise to belittle the party members at the fron t As for Dzerzhinsky, die CHEKA leader was not a blood thirsty Stalin cruny. hi fact he was die most idealistic o f revolutionaries— cold and possessed o f a maniacal devotion to the cause—certainly not motivated by personal political gain. Whatever their motivations, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky produced a report that, to borrow the words o f historian John Erickson, “breathes militant detestation o f the Republic Rewoensoviet.”67 The report attacked the operational direction o f the Rew oensoviet “whose so-called instructions and orders disorganized the control o f the front and the armies.” The report used evidence from Sergei S. Kamenev, the Eastern Front commander, to detail the confusion sown by the Rewoensoviet. A directive was received saying that 2 [sic] Army. . . was to be ready for another assignment to another front, without saying where this was likely to be. In these circumstances 2 Army could not be committed in case it might be impossible to extricate i t . . . . Then suddenly Shorin, the Commander o f 2 Army, was called to Surpukhov, thus paralyzing 2 Army (things being what they were), and a further five days were lo st68

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The report went cm to condemn die army-level leadership, especially in the Third Army, and thus by implication attacking the performance o f the military specialists and their commissars. Despite die intensity o f the Penn report’s accusations, Lenin did not remove his War Commissar nor did he seriously undercut Trotsky’s authority (although he certainty did not hesitate to pass on personal admonitions). Perhaps Lenin realistically assessed the difficulty o f trying to build die Red Army in die midst o f chaos, and he may have been influenced by die fact that Trotsky had only had about 3 months to piece together the Rew oensoviet, hardly enough time to form a smoothly functioning headquarters. In any case, the Perm report gave ammunition to Trotsky’s enemies for future use without actually threatening the War Commissar’s position for the time being. An even more serious threat to Trotsky and his concepts occurred in March 1919 at die V m Party Congress in Moscow. The Congress had several key issues on its agenda, and certainty one o f die most important was die ‘‘military question.” Prior to the Congress, a “military opposition” had already coalesced against Trotsky and his ideas for a regular army. The military opposition did not have a dominant leader, but their spokesman at die Congress was Vladimir M. Smirnov. Renewed conflict on the Eastern front forced Trotsky to leave Moscow prior to die Congress. In his absence, Trotsky’s trusted subordinate, Grigorii Ya. Sokol’nikov, defended die War Commissar’s position.69 The debate over die military question was spirited, and die final voting was, by Bolshevik standards, relatively close. The discussion o f military issues became so extensive that die plenary session o f die Congress formed a special military section to argue die

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issues and make a recommendation to the Congress.™ Although a technical argument over die supervision o f Red Army party members provided die opposition with a cover, die real issue was die use o f die military specialists. On 21 March, die military section o f die Congress, chaired fay E. Yaroslavskii, a member o f the opposition, voted 37 to 20 to cut die powers o f the military specialists and extend those o f the party workers. Also, the old Marxist aversion to military discipline, ranks and awards crept into the opposition’s motions. This vote was a clear condemnation o f Trotsky’s Rew oensoviet with its ideas of centralized leadership and die need for ex-tsarist officers. Later that evening, Lenin moved to block the sweeping motions o f die military opposition, while still allowing diem to voice their views. The Congress, as a whole, heard the arguments from both sides on die military question. Aralov presented a particularly revealing piece o f evidence when he revealed that former Imperial officers already made up 60% o f the Red Army officer corps (a number that even surprised Lenin). Among those who supported Trotsky was Stalin. Whatever his personal feelings towards Trotsky and the military specialists, Stalin more than likely realized that die Red Army needed conscription and centralized leadership to function. The Congress rejected the military section’s “anti-Trotsky” dieses by a vote o f 174 to 93. None die less, Lenin formed a special committee that included some members o f the opposition to draw up the Congress’ resolution on die military question with specific guidance to include some o f die opposition’s views. The result was a resolution o f die Congress that basically upheld Trotsky’s concepts, but included provisions that occasionally chided die work o f die Rewoensoviet.71

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The first section, called the “general premises,” contained 19 points and was a distillation o f Trotsky’s concepts on a regular army. The first four points were a convoluted argument that attempted to reconcile Marxist concepts o f militia and voluntarism with the necessities o f conscription. Whatever the justifications, the conclusion was unmistakable: die Red Army was to complete the “transition from the voluntary to the compulsory principle.” Sections V through XIH summarized the concepts for implementing the compulsory training and recruitment These passages concluded with: The class militia army [a cover term for conscription] toward which we are proceeding does not signify, as is clear from the preceding discussion, an improvised, slapdash, poorly trained army with fortuitous selection of weapons and half-prepared command personnel . A militia army must be an army trained, armed, and organized according to the last word in military science.72 The next four points dealt with command personnel and the military commissars. These passages called for creating command schools to educate new officers from the working classes while reaffirming die use o f ex-tsarist officers: “die ranks o f die present Red Army contain a great many commanding officers from the old army who are carrying out their responsible work with great benefit for the cause.” Other sections emphasized the need for discipline and the subordination o f militaiy units to die central authority o f the Soviet state. The general premises were followed by a section called “practical measures.” This section was clearly die work o f the opposition. It stressed the need to recruit more party members into die military command structure and to watch over the militaiy specialists with “unwavering centralized party-political supervision.” The practical measures also sought to re-establish some o f the power o f the local party organizations on administrative

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matters, political education and recruitment. Perhaps die most clear condemnation o f Trotsky’s work were die final five points that instructed die party Central Committee “to regulate the work o f the republic’s Revolutionary Military Council \R ew oensoviei\” with more frequent meetings o f commissars and a greater reliance on local party organs. The implication was that the R ew oensoviet was a loose cannon needing firmer party control. At the eastern front, Trotsky soon received the results o f the Congress. Stalin, who had supported Trotsky’s position at the Congress (cynics might argue that he simply followed Lenin’s lead, but there is no evidence to doubt Stalin’s sincerity), sent Trotsky a message informing the War Commissar that the Congress had adopted his dieses. According to Trotsky’s biographer, Lssac Deutscher, soon after Stalin’s message, Gtegorii E. Zinoviev, one o f the highest members o f the party who supported the military opposition, sent Trotsky a “warning” which included the original resolutions drawn up by die opposition.73 The “practical measures” o f the Congress’ resolution and Zinoviev’s “warning” notwithstanding, Trotsky emerged from the attack on his authority with his essential powers intact and his views o f a regular army confirmed. The key element was the support o f Lenin. The Bolshevik leader was not an absolute dictator, but the respect for him within the party was immense, and his determined arguments often carried the day in party debates. Lenin used his power to support Trotsky. He seemed to recognize that his flamboyant and energetic War Commissar, whatever his failings, was the glue that held the Red Army together. In any case, Trotsky and the Red Army leadership survived its most serious challenge and continued to build a regular army.

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The V m Party Congress was the final, official Bolshevik pronouncement on the “militaiy question” in the Civil War. As April 1919 approached and the campaign in the south heated up, the time for theoretical debate was ending and the time for fighting was budding towards its peak intensity. In the 18 months since die Bolsheviks had seized power, the Red Army had come a long way. Though no commander ever feels that he has enough soldiers, conscription gave the Red commanders a solid supply o f troops that, while not overwhelming, were enough to achieve victory. The ex-tsarist officers, sometimes unreliable and always mistrusted, along with former NCOs and some surprisingly skillful military leaders from the Bolshevik ranks, provided the Red Army with professional competence. Finally, despite opposition from within die party, the Rewoensoviet and Glavkom gave the Red Army a centralized structure and relatively effective system of operational control. The Red Army o f 1919 was significantly different from the army of Marxist theory, but it was relatively well prepared to take on the most serious threat that faced the Bolshevik regimen—the military professionals o f Denikin’s White forces. We can now turn to the fighting itself on the Southern Front From the start o f the conflict in 1918 to the summer o f 1919, this fighting was occasionally desperate, but often sporadic as both Reds and Whites gathered their forces for the final showdown that took place from July to December 1919. Perhaps through the smoke and sound o f batde we can gain a feel for the commanders, planning in their dank command posts, driving home attacks and rallying retreating soldiers in the dust and heat o f the front, fighting for this new creation called a socialist state.

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Notes Chapter Two 1Vladimir L Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks o f die Soviet Government” (April, 1918), in Darnel's, A Documentary History o f Communism. p. 97. zJohn Erickson, “The Origins o f die Red Army,” in Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium, ed. by Richard Pipes (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 286*325. The thrust o f Erickson's article is that die Red Anny was bom in the fighting on die Eastern Front On pp. 324-325, he makes a specific reference to utopian Bolshevik ideas on die military that were discarded as a result of die Eastern Front 3John L. H. Keep, The Russian Revntnfion. A Study in Mass Mnhflizatinn (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 1976), pp. 276-287. 4Erickson, The Soviet High C ommand, pp. 3- 22, pp. 25-52 and pp. 53-83. These are die first three chapters o f Erickson's book. The first chapter discusses die Marxist origins o f Bolshevik attitudes to militaiy issues and touches on some (but not all) o f die events o f demobilization. The second chapter is the section most specifically devoted to die creation o f organs that supported die structure o f a new, but regular, army. The third chapter is specifically focused on die Red Army leadership, but not on their operational performance. In this third chapter, Erickson concentrates on the struggle between die Bolshevik leaders' political attitudes towards professional militaiy leaders and die need to use die technical skills o f those leaders. Also see Erickson's "Origins o f the Red Army" (pp. 286-325). As mentioned above and in die text, Erickson focuses on die initial period o f die creation o f die Red Army and the effects o f fighting on die Eastern Front in shaping that force. In this essay, Erickson provides considerable detail on measures relating to conscription and die centralization o f die Army's administrative control, but he does not address the role o f operational command in these new structures. 5Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in die Proletarian Dictatorship. The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State. 1917-1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990X pp. 13-66. Von Hagen's work is certainty the most detailed account of the origins o f the Red Army. His first chapter uses extensive primary sources to cover the steps taken to create a more conventional force within a political leadership that inherently mistrusted professional armies. Although von Hagen's work is outstanding, he does not address die concept o f operational command. The author discusses some aspects o f die military specialists, but mostly in relation to the tension that their employment caused within the Bolshevik traditionalist revolutionaries. He is more focussed on die evolution o f the Army at the soldiers' level, and thus he is not concerned with explaining the growth o f a command structure and its effect on operational decisions.

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6Allen K. WSdman, The F.nd n f the Rnaaiati Imperial Army volume (me, (Princeton, J.J.: University o f Princeton Press, 1987). Wikhnan argues that die soldiers’ war weariness was not a result o f Bolshevik agitation per se (see pp. xiv-xv and 402-405). Wildman’s main chapter on the role o f die Bolsheviks (pp. 36-72) goes to great lengths to show that the soldiers' actions were often conscious and spontaneous. 7Bemard Semmel, M anrim and die Science o f War (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 6 and pp. 8-9. “Friedrich Engels, “The Force Theory,” in Anti-During: Herr Duhrm g’a Revolution in Science, in Semmel, pp. 50-54. ’Vladimir Lenin, “The Lessons o f die Moscow Uprising o f 1905,” in Selected Works, in Semmel, pp. 208-212. “ White, pp. 27-30. “ White, p. 43; and Erickson, Soviet High Command, p. 138. White describes the natural opposition o f die Bolsheviks to a regular army and to die old officer corps in general He writes that die "molding o f die Red Army developed against a background o f acute antagonism." White adds that the "very nam e 'officer' was considered so odious to die masses fay die Soviet government in 1918 that the commanding personnel o f the Red Army was given other appellations." According to Erickson, even Trotsky—a supporter o f the use o f militaiy specialists—continued to fear "Bonapartist designs" even after the victory in die Civil War. uDon Higgenbothem, The War o f American Independence. M ilitary attitudes. Policies and Practice. 1763-1789 (Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press, 1971, 1983 reprint), pp. 7-13; and Robert Middlekaufj The Glorious Cause. The American Revolution. 1763-1789 (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 496-510. Higgenbothem writes relatively favorably o f the American m ilitia performance, especially as an irregular force. Even so, he admits that die militia was usually weak in stand-up battles, and thus die Americans needed their more well-trained C ontinentals to confront die main British forces. Middlekauf believes that die militia performed an essential service by reflecting the political aspirations o f die revolution, but he also admits that their military effectiveness was varied and unpredictable. Both authors recognize die militia as an essential aspect o f die American victory, but its success is predicated on die existence o f a regular force that can steady the militia soldiers when facing die professional British (and Hessian) troops. For a view o f die red guards, the Bolshevik's initial equivalent o f a militia force, see Rex Wade, Red Guards and Workers' Militias m die Rumrian Revolution (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976). Wade focuses on die early period o f the

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Bolshevik revolution, and his work is centered on the red guards' function as the violent force behind die Red takeover in Petrograd in October 1917. KBs woik clearly shows die tension between die necessity for a conventional Red Army and die guards' resistance to the discipline and centralization in such a force. uGunther E. Rothenberg, The Art o f Warfare m die Age o f Napoleon (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 95-125; and Chandler, The Campaigns o f Napoleon, p. 54 and p. 142. Both Rothenberg and Chandler emphasize the need to group together die remaining, well-trained, elements o f die Royal Army with the new revolutionary soldiers. At first, the revolutionaries hoped to use volunteer forces (the National Guard started in this way), but the levee en m asse brought conscripts into the army. In either case, the amalgame grouped new recruits with a base o f experienced soldiers. The Reds could not find enough Tsarist units willing to support the Bolshevik cause that might be die basis for an integration o f their own forces. Finally, the reader may want to consult Richard Cobb, The People's Armies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987), which gives a detailed case study o f the French Revolutionary Armies during the height o f Jacobin power. 14Rothenberg, p. 98. The author describes the loss o f Royalist officers and its effects on the French Army. Also see David G. Chandler (ed.), Napoleon's Marshals (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987). Chandler’s compilation shows that the French Marshalate relied heavily on the lower ranks o f soldiers for its source o f new officers. Here is a brief list o f some o f these officers and their backgrounds: Augereau—soldier and 'adventurer' in various armed forces. Bemadotte—Noncommissioned officer (NCO) in Grenadier regiment. Berthier—Lieutenant colonel with experience in multiple Royal regiments. Davout—lieutenant in Royal Cavalry regiment Grouchy—Sous-lieutenant in artillery, captain in cavalry. Keflerman—Lieutenant colonel in Hussars. Lefebre—NCO. Massena—NCO in Italian regiment that served in the French Army. Murat—Started as enlisted soldier, promoted to NCO, then a lieutenant in various Royal units. Ney-NCO. Oudinot—First an enlisted soldier, then an NCO. Serurier—Lieutenant colonel in various Royal units. Clearly, this list indicates a large number o f enlisted and NCO soldiers that became major French commanders after the Revolution. The Bolsheviks seemed to rely less on former enlisted soldiers and more on mid level officers from the former Imperialist Army. Even so, the success o f Budenny (NCO) and Tuckhachevsky (lieutenant) have remarkable parallels to the French example.

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^Rothenberg, pp. 111-113: and Frickann T he Soviet Hiph Command, pp. 40-41 (and footnote 57 on p. 678). Rothenberg evaluates die performance o f die French deputies and concludes that while they may have lacked operational skiDs they often provided a morale boost to die French conscripts. Erickson points out that the Reds consciously imitated die French example. In fact, the French only used deputies (commissars) for a limited time—during the most radical period o f die revolution—and Napoleon never felt die need to have representatives ensuring die political loyalty o f his officers. The Soviets kept their commissars throughout the war and even into part o f World War Two. “ White, pp. 27-28 and Erickson, Soviet Hiph Command. p. 19. 17Erickson, “Origins o f die Red Army,” p. 303. 18Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970). This work discuss die role o f Baltic sailors and their political volatility, which indicates a their unsuitability as a major building block for die larger Red Army. Also note that it covers the struggle in 1921 and is thus not directly related to the sailors earlier impact on die construction o f die Red Army. 19Kakurin, p. 135. 20N. Efimov, “K om andniiSostavK rasnoiA rm ii” in Bubnov, volume 2, p. 95. uErickson, “Origins o f die Red Army.” On pp. 287-289, Erickson discusses die difficulties o f pinpointing a chronology, die confusion o f die multiple militaiy and civilian organizations, and die need to understand the “periphery” o f the struggle as well as events in die capital Also, Erickson emphasises that die Bolsheviks found it easy to incapacitate an army, but agony to create one (p. 292). 21Ibid., pp. 292-294. Also see von Hagen, pp. 17-18. ^Erickson, Soviet Hiph Command. pp. 14-16. “ Both decrees are dated 29 December 1917, from Dekretv Sovetskoi vlasti (Soviet Government Decrees), Moscow, 1957, volume I pp. 242-245. As quoted in Erickson, Soviet High rra rrm a n d . p. 16. 2SErickson, “Origins o f the Red Army,” pp. 292-296. See also, von Hagen, pp. 1820. Von Hagen relies extensively on E. N. Gorodetskii's account o f die Demobilization Conference, which contains considerable detail Overall von Hagen's account is outstanding, but he does over emphasize the Bolshevik's initial hope o f using Imperial

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Army units. In fact, during this conference, only the former tsarist officers favored die use o f old Army units; die Bolsheviks sought soldiers that were more politically reliable. “ Erickson, “Origins o f the Red Army, pp. 297-299. 27Ibid., pp. 300-301. “ "Formation o f die Red Army,” Sovnarkom Decree Signed by Lenin (28 January 1918), in The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State. 1917-1921. D ocum ents, edited by Martin McCauley (London, England: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1975), pp. 140-141. See also von Hagen, pp. 21-22. “ Erickson, “Origins o f the Red Army,” pp. 300-301. Also in Erickson, Soviet Hiph Command- p. 19. “ Erickson, “Origins o f the Red Army,” pp. 307-310. 31Trotsky, “We Need an Army,” Speech at die Session o f Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies, 19 March 1918 (from Pravda, 21 March 1918), in How die Revolution Armed, volume I, pp. 19-27. T ro tsk y , “Work, Discipline, Order,” Report to the Moscow City Revolution o f Conference o f die Russian Communist Party, 28 March 1918, in How the Revolution Armed, volume I, pp. 44-47. T ro tsk y , “The Internal and External Tasks of die Soviet Power,” Lecture Given in Moscow, 21 April 1918, in How the Revolution Armed volume I, pp. 74-75. 34Erickson, “Origins o f die Red Army,” p. 309. “ Erickson, Soviet Hiph C om m and p. 30.

“ Trotsky, “The Red Army,” Speech at the Session o f die All-Russian Central Executive Committee, 22 April 1918, in How die Revolution Armed volume I, pp. 127134. 37”Decree on Compulsory Military Training,” adopted at die Session o f the AllRussia Central Executive Committee o f die Soviets’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, 22 April 1918, in How die Revolution Arm ed volume I, pp. 157-159. See also von Hagen, pp.28-29 for an account o f the dual command concept and the creation o f the Universal Military Training Administration. “ Erickson, “Origins o f the Red Army,” pp. 310-311.

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29I b id pp. 313*319 and von Hagen pp. 31-32.